[Senate Hearing 112-80, Part 2]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-80, Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1253
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 2
SEAPOWER
----------
MAY 18, 25, AND JULY 13, 2011
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 112-80 Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1253
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 2
SEAPOWER
__________
MAY 18, 25, AND JULY 13, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
_____
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
68-085 PDF WASHINGTON : 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Seapower
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Marine Corps Acquisition Programs
may 18, 2011
Page
Stackley, Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition; Accompanied by Lt. Gen. George J.
Flynn, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and
Integration/Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command; and VADM John T. Blake, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources....... 5
Navy Shipbuilding Programs
may 25, 2011
Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition......................... 45
McCoy, VADM Kevin M., USN, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command.. 57
Galinis, Captain William J., USN, Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Gulf Coast..................................................... 59
The Required Force Level of Strategic Airlift Aircraft Mandated by
Title 10, United States Code, and the Administration's Request to
Eliminate that Requirement
july 13, 2011
Fox, Hon. Christine H., Director, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 96
McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command........................................................ 98
Johns, Gen. Raymond E., Jr., USAF, Commander, Air Mobility
Command........................................................ 102
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed, Hagan,
Blumenthal, Wicker, and Ayotte.
Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; and Thomas K. McConnell,
professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: David M. Morriss, minority
staff director.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and Brian
F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to
Senator Webb; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Laurie
Rubiner, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Lenwood Landrum,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator
Wicker; and Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN
Senator Reed. The subcommittee will come to order. Let me
begin by once again thanking Senator Wicker for his great
cooperation. I look forward to working with Senator Wicker for
another year. We had, I think, a very productive and successful
session last year.
I want to welcome Senator Ayotte from New Hampshire, who
brings great insights and skill. Thank you very much, Kelly.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. We, I think, had a very successful fiscal
year 2011, despite all the challenges, in terms of coming up
with the necessary resources for the Marine Corps and for the
Navy. I again am confident, working together, we can provide
the resources necessary for the mission of the Marine Corps and
the Navy in very difficult times and, I emphasize, on a
bipartisan basis.
This afternoon we're convening to hear the testimony
concerning the Marine Corps acquisition programs. I want to
welcome Secretary Sean Stackley, Vice Admiral John Blake, and
Lieutenant General George Flynn back to the subcommittee.
Welcome, gentlemen. We are grateful for all your service to the
Nation and to the Navy. We certainly want to have you convey
our best to the Navy and the Marine Corps, the men and women
who do the real work and do it so well.
The Marine Corps has continued supporting the national
interests around the world, including significant participation
in Afghanistan. I want to express the committee's, indeed the
Nation's, thanks for these outstanding efforts of the Marine
Corps and others who are involved there.
Since last year, the Marine Corps completed a force
structure review which recommended several actions. Among these
was the following, and I'm paraphrasing: retain the capacity
and capabilities to conduct amphibious operations with the
assault echelons of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades,
reinforced by one or more additional Marine Expeditionary
Brigades aggregated from flying-in forces and equipment
forward-positioned in maritime prepositioned ships.
I commend the Marine Corps for completing this review and
reaching this conclusion. The uncertainties we face in the
world make it even more imperative than before that we develop
a vision of the world as we would hope to shape events in it.
Also since last year, we have seen the Marine Corps
recommend cancellation of what was one of their premier
modernization programs, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
(EFV). Since the mid-1980s the Marine Corps had focused on
several programs that would enable what was then known as a
ship-to-objective maneuver. These included the V-22, the
Landing Craft-Air Cushion (LCAC) and the EFV.
We called this hearing to better understand the rationale
behind making this change and to understand the path forward
for maintaining that capability to conduct amphibious
operations. However, this hearing is not solely about that
issue. We need to understand what progress the Marine Corps is
making in resetting the force and in modernizing other portions
of its equipment inventory. We also need to understand how Navy
investment is enabling the Marine Corps to exercise the
capabilities that are inherent to the Marine Corps.
I believe that the world we face will continue to be one of
uncertainty and unrest. Therefore, I continue to believe that
great emphasis should be placed on lighter, more lethal forces
and on the mobility of forces. But we must not let the
outstanding performance of our Marine Corps distract attention
from some of the real fiscal challenges that the Marine Corps
faces. In 2002, Senator Kennedy, then the Seapower Subcommittee
chairman, noted that the Navy needed to work diligently to
address some of these very important problems, including
improving fire support capability, including organic Marine
Corps fire support and Navy shore fire support, enhancing our
tactical mobility for Marine Corps forces, and augmenting our
mine countermeasures capability both for sea and land combat.
In each of these areas, we have made some progress, but
progress has been slow. The Navy cancelled the DDG-1000
program, capping it at three ships. These ships would have
provided a volume of fires to support marines until the time
when they are able to establish organic fire support ashore.
We have been able to enhance tactical mobility in some
respects, but now we see the end of the EFV with uncertainty
about the system or systems that will replace that capability.
We have seen the Navy begin to shift the mine countermeasures
mission to the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and their mission
packages. These ships should be much more deployable, but
progress on completing the mine countermeasures systems that
would be deployed from their mission modules has been subject
to a number of setbacks.
There are other examples, but in the interest of time I
will just stop there. I hope we can explore these and other
issues with the witnesses today.
Before we begin with our opening statements by the panel, I
would now like to recognize Senator Wicker for his comments.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing, and thanks to our panelists. We certainly
appreciate their service and don't want to pass up on an
opportunity to say that publicly.
The focus of today's hearing is Marine Corps procurement
and the President's fiscal year 2012 budget request and Navy
support to Marine Corps operations. In particular, we hope to
focus on Secretary Gates' decision, announced in January, to
end the Marine Corps EFV program after nearly 15 years in
development and more than $3 billion in sunk costs.
This decision has raised concerns among many supporters of
the Marine Corps, and I count myself as one of those, because
the ability to conduct an amphibious assault against a defended
shoreline is the core competency that distinguishes our Marine
Corps from other ground combat forces. It is a capability that
has been honed to perfection over years of investment and
development of doctrine, training, and specialized equipment,
that has proven invaluable in countless missions.
Amphibious operations made possible by the legacy vehicles
that have come before the EFV have been as large as the Inchon
landing during the Korean War in 1950 and the feinted landings
in Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Such
operations have also been as small as the withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Somalia in the mid-1990s and the ongoing
contingency operations currently underway off North Africa. The
ability to perform such complex operations is a force
multiplier for the United States that must be taken into
consideration by any adversary we might face.
Secretary Gates' decision to end the EFV program as part of
the budget cuts sought in the fiscal year 2012 defense budget
is supported by the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps. They believe it will cost too much to
continue EFV development, to purchase vehicles, and to operate
them over the long term. However, the Department of the Navy's
cost projections for the EFV are being evaluated in comparison
to the portion of the budget historically available to the
Marine Corps to purchase and operate its ground combat
vehicles.
Mr. Chairman, I question whether or not historical cost
proportion should be the primary factor in determining the
systems required for the Marine Corps to meet its mission
requirements. As all of us recognize, the cost of even the most
basic utility vehicle, the general purpose Humvee, drastically
increased as requirements-driven modifications were
implemented.
As such, I hope the witnesses will explain carefully the
methodologies that were used to evaluate our current
requirements for an amphibious vehicle and how that analysis
led to their decision to abandon the EFV and start over with
lesser requirements. I would specifically appreciate our
witnesses addressing some specific questions regarding the
proposed termination of EFV.
First, how are essential criteria like speed and the
distance the vehicle will travel to the beach consistent with
the Marine Corps' and the Navy's concept for ship-to-objective
maneuver?
Second, if we lower the requirements how do we ensure that
a vehicle other than the EFV is going to be any less expensive
to buy or operate, or that an alternative vehicle fundamentally
changes the budget crunch the Marine Corps faces in updating
its total inventory of ground combat vehicles?
Third, how do we ensure that the new vehicle can be
delivered to the Marine Corps in a timely manner if we start
over again, given that we've been working on a replacement for
the current Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) since the mid-
1990s?
The Navy-Marine Corps planning concept which underlays the
requirement for the EFV has been that Navy ships should be over
the horizon at 25 miles from shore when launching marines. The
new concept of the amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) now being
discussed to replace the EFV may be launched as close as 10
miles from shore. I'd like to hear from our witnesses about our
current naval capabilities to protect marines and sailors from
threats such as anti-ship cruise missile systems, anti-ship
ballistic missile systems, sea mines, and hostile aircraft.
Given the Marine Corps' requirement for naval surface fire
support that was intended to be met by the DDG-1000 Zumwalt
destroyers, now capped at only three ships, as the chairman
stated, I would like our witnesses to discuss whether only
three DDG-1000 ships can meet the Marine Corps naval surface
fire support requirement, or what will be done to upgrade the
fire support capability of our other surface ships.
Gentlemen, there are a lot of issues for us to discuss and
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. I wonder, Senator Ayotte, if you would have a
comment?
Senator Ayotte. I don't. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Secretary Stackley, your testimony has been made part of
the record, so feel free to summarize and abridge freely.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY LT.
GEN. GEORGE J. FLYNN, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT
DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION/COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND; AND VADM JOHN T. BLAKE, USN, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND
RESOURCES
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker,
Senator Ayotte, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today to address Marine Corps programs. I'll be testifying
alongside Lieutenant General Flynn and Vice Admiral Blake, and
if it's acceptable I will keep my opening remarks brief and
submit a formal statement for the record.
Your Navy and Marine Corps serves as America's
expeditionary force in readiness, a balanced air-ground-naval
force, forward deployed and forward engaged. The deployment of
Kearsarge Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG), which returned home
to Norfolk 2 days ago, offers a great example of utility,
flexibility, and responsiveness provided by a forward-deployed
Marine Corps air-ground task force. The three ships of the
Kearsarge ARG, the Kearsarge, Ponce, and Carter Hall, got
underway in August of last year with 2,200 marines of the 26th
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked. The group deployed 1
month ahead of schedule in response to a disaster relief call
for flood-stricken victims in Pakistan. Upon completing its
relief mission in January, elements of the 26th MEU,
disembarked to conduct the fight in Afghanistan alongside
20,000 other marines in Helmand Province.
The balance of the MEU remained embarked on the Kearsarge
group to conduct theater security cooperation engagements in
Jordan, Kenya, Djibouti, and other countries in Sixth Fleet's
area of operations. As the world's attention was drawn to
events in northern Africa, the Kearsarge group was among the
first to respond, conducting air operations in support of
Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector. Then, when
relieved by the Bataan ARG, which likewise got underway early
in response to the crisis, Kearsarge returned home this week.
In all, in the course of their 8\1/2\ month deployment, the
group and MEU conducted 1,500 air sorties, 150 well deck
evolutions, covering 3 continents, and 8,000 miles of ocean.
All the while, marines of the 31st and 15th MEUs embarked on
Boxer and Essex amphib groups were doing likewise in operations
stretching from Japan, the rim of the Pacific, Latin America,
and Africa.
The success of these operations, built upon the spirit of
innovation and flexibility, has been the bedrock of the Marine
Corps in the post-Cold War era. To retain this amphibious
capability, our ship-to-shore tactical mobility is a key
priority as the Marine Corps shapes its future force. The
transition from operations at sea to operations ashore
necessitates a mix of lift and combat vehicles, and to this
end, as you described, the Marine Corps initiated the
development of a ground and combat tactical vehicle strategy in
2008 with the goals of fielding vehicles with the correct
balance of performance, protection, payload, mobility,
transportability, and fuel efficiency.
The challenge we've encountered, which will be an enduring
and pervasive challenge, is that the lessons learned from
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) bring increased performance requirements to our vehicle
programs, requirements that translate to increased procurement
and operating and support costs, threatening to make new
vehicles exponentially more expensive than the systems they're
replacing.
So with the focus on balancing mission needs, force
structure constraints, and affordability, a four-phase review
has been conducted, as you described, where the early phases
have identified impacts associated with the increased
requirements and later phases are intended to address impacts
to the amphibious force, as well as vehicle requirements going
forward.
An important outcome of this is as the Marine Corps has
looked at their total vehicle inventory they made a decision
that the 42,000 vehicles they currently operate will be reduced
by a total of 10,000 in the course of executing the results of
this review.
In conjunction with the formulation of this strategy and
the conduct of the Marine Corps force structure review, two
clear and important determinations were made. First, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps have reaffirmed the necessity of
the Nation to possess the full range of amphib operations,
including forcible entry, which will require a self-deploying
amphibious vehicle, able to project ready-to-fight marines from
sea to land in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments.
This capability is a key to building power ashore and
overcoming access challenges posed by either lack of improved
infrastructure or the threat of an adversary. The EFV has been
the program of record to provide this capability. However, over
time as the EFV unit cost and operating and support costs grew,
as production costs entered the budget alongside increasing
costs for other vehicle programs, driven largely by increased
vehicle complexity and survivability requirements, and as
affordability assessments have become tempered by more
realistic projections of post-OIF, OEF budgets, it was also
determined that the program of record, EFV, was not affordable
based on either procurement or operating and support cost
estimates.
Cost projections for the EFV procurement alone would
consume the projected budget for all Marine Corps vehicles,
while placing great pressure on the balance of Marine Corps
procurement for the balance of this decade, including critical
upgrades to C4I systems, radar systems, and logistics systems,
all of which are necessary to replace obsolete systems of the
expeditionary force, all of which offer improved capability
while reducing operating and support costs for the future
force.
Accordingly, we have concluded we must revise our approach
for developing and future ACVs, with increased emphasis on
affordability to ensure we're able to field this capability in
the numbers that would be required for amphibious operations.
To this end, we've commenced the front end effort leading to an
analysis of alternatives (AoA) and technical demonstration of a
new ACV, with the intent of mitigating cost, risk, and schedule
associated with the new vehicle through an integrated portfolio
approach: leveraging investments made in the EFV; engaging with
industry to foster a competition for ideas and innovation;
weighing the vehicle performance requirements across the larger
portfolio of capabilities required to ensure successful
operations, including amphibious ship operations; and building
upon the long history and force structure inherent to the
legacy AAV.
We need to open the trade space for vehicle performance
requirements and include cost as a requirement to drive
affordability trades. Ultimately, we need to procure at a rate
that brings healthy competition and efficient production.
Integrating the three separate programs that are in our
program today, the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC), the service
life extension program (SLEP) and upgrades for a portion of the
existing AAVs, and a new ACV would create greater opportunity
to field this critical capability within the challenging
resource constraints that we're facing.
We recognize the significance of this course change
relative to the EFV program and, further, we recognize that the
challenges to our ground and combat tactical vehicle programs
in total cannot be solved through this single program change,
but will require similar focus across the vehicle portfolio.
We're committed to conducting this work with full transparency
with Congress.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today and we look forward to answering your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stackley, General
Flynn, and Admiral Blake follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Sean J. Stackley, Lt. Gen. George J.
Flynn, USMC, and VADM John Terence Blake, USN
introduction
Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of this
subcommittee, we are honored to appear here today. We want to thank you
for your continued support to our sailors, marines, and their families,
and we appreciate the opportunity to address our ground investment
strategy.
As America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness our ground program
investments support our ability to engage forward to build partners,
assure allies and protect our interests; build access to a global
economic system, deter aggression, and respond to crises; assist others
when disasters strike; provide the only sustainable means to overcome
access challenges; and, when required, defeat threats to our interests
ashore. Key is the ability to deploy and employ from the sea in austere
environments at a time and place of our choosing--a significant
asymmetric, strategic, and operational advantage that has been used 137
times since 1990.
Our ground investments allow us to develop and sustain a ready,
middleweight force that is easily deployable, energy efficient, and
highly expeditionary. Complementary to our ground investment, we
require parallel investments in amphibious ships, amphibious combat
vehicles, connectors such as the landing craft air cushion and landing
craft utility, naval surface fire support assets, mine counter
measures, radars, command and control, vertical lift, and fixed-wing,
short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft and many other programs
critical to maintaining tactical and operational readiness. These
investments are designed to provide a full range of complementary
capabilities for our Nation's Expeditionary Force in Readiness.
the operating environment
The adversaries we face and will likely continue to face are
diverse and not easy to characterize into a monolithic threat. They
learn and adapt quickly to counter our actions and target our
vulnerabilities simultaneously across multiple domains. Surprise is a
reality that cannot be eliminated; it must be mitigated by properly
organizing, training, equipping, and employing our forces.
Access must be created and maintained during all phases of conflict
against a wide range of adversaries. Today, we face a number of
challenges to access that must be overcome. The American Association
for the Advancement of Science concluded in 1995 that within 30 years
``75 percent of humanity . . . will reside in coastal areas'' (defined
as 150 km inland). This prediction appears to be coming to fruition, as
densely populated urban centers become increasingly common in the
littorals--precisely where access is required.
Environmental challenges caused by major disasters not only inflict
intense human suffering and loss of life, the resultant damage to
roads, buildings, fresh water resources, communications systems, and
electrical power distribution impede first responder actions and can
quickly overwhelm local governments. Therefore, the execution of
disaster relief operations and restoration of basic governmental
services present a high degree of danger and uncertainty.
The military challenges we face span the full spectrum from
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) through high-tech weaponry, to
include precision munitions that target our vulnerabilities both on
land and at sea.
Additionally, growing sensitivities to U.S. and coalition presence
on, near, or in the air over sovereign boundaries present increasing
political challenges.
In combination, these changes in the operating environment are
having a profound impact of the complexity of combat and tactical
vehicle designs.
The Nation needs an expeditionary force-in-readiness that can
overcome impediments to access and immediately respond to a crisis
anywhere in the world across the range of military operations.
posturing for the future
While supporting operations in Afghanistan remains the Commandant's
top priority, the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan directs the Marine
Expeditionary Force commanders to continue to develop and maintain
amphibious capabilities. In 2010, the Navy-Marine Corps team returned
to conducting large-scale Marine Expeditionary Brigade/Expeditionary
Strike Group exercises in order to hone these critical amphibious
skills. On the west coast, I Marine Expeditionary Force and
Expeditionary Strike Group-3 commenced its annual Marine Expeditionary
Brigade-level amphibious exercises Dawn Blitz and Pacific Horizon. On
the east coast, II Marine Expeditionary Force and Expeditionary Strike
Group-2 conducted the first in a series of Marine Expeditionary
Brigade-level exercises known as Bold Alligator. While these exercises
are critical to enhancing our proficiency in large-scale amphibious
operations, they also serve as a valuable platform from which new
concepts can be tested that lead to the development of updated joint
operating doctrine.
These exercises and our force development experiments inform future
amphibious capability requirements in mobility, command and control,
intelligence, fires, sea-based logistics, organization, doctrine,
training, and education. The landing force of the future requires
surface and vertical assault systems with the speed, range, precision
location and navigational capabilities, protection, and firepower to
launch from over-the-horizon positions, maneuver through tactical
points of entry, and achieve the objective regardless of whether it is
on the low- or high end of the spectrum of conflict. The technologies
required to enhance these capabilities are under development, and the
combat systems implementing these technologies are the highest priority
in the Marine Corps.
Both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy have
reaffirmed the necessity of the Marine Corps' amphibious assault
mission. Accordingly, we must develop an affordable and capable
amphibious combat vehicle to project Marines from sea to land in
permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. This remains the
Corps' top priority. We ask for your continued support to reach this
goal.
In order to adapt to the future operating environment and address
access challenges, the Navy and Marine Corps are pursuing a number of
other programs that leverage operational lessons learned and adopt
acquisition best practices.
ground and combat tactical vehicles
Over the next two decades the Marine Corps will replace or upgrade
a large portion of the ground combat and tactical vehicle inventory.
Unit costs for new vehicles have risen substantially, on the order of
300 to almost 500 percent, over their predecessors. The Marine Corps is
facing increasing fiscal pressure across all investment categories.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance capabilities, requirements and costs have increased
significantly. Some programs that were initiated in response to urgent
universal needs statements and joint urgent operational needs and
initially funded with overseas contingency operations funds are being
integrated into standard force structure and will therefore need to be
funded in the base budget.
The Marine Corps initiated its Ground and Combat Tactical Vehicle
Strategy (GCTVS) in 2008 to provide a basis for planning, programming,
and budgeting for balanced maneuver and mobility capabilities to our
force. This effort is evolutionary in approach, and it includes combat
vehicles such as the M1A1 Main Battle Tank, Amphibious Assault, and
Light Armored Vehicles, as well as tactical vehicles such as the Medium
Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
Vehicle, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), and Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The strategic goals of the GCTVS are to
field vehicles with the correct balance of performance, protection,
payload, mobility, transportability, and fuel efficiency. This balance
will enable rapid concentration and dispersion of Marine Air-Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) combat power, support strategic deployment concepts,
and meet and sustain worldwide Marine Corps commitments.
Our end-state is to develop a more relevant and affordable
portfolio of combat and tactical vehicles. Through procurement,
recapitalization, and service-life extension, we will provide the
capacity for Marine forces to conduct irregular warfare and sustained
operations ashore, and, when necessary, conduct Marine Expeditionary
Force-sized forcible entry operations from the sea. The enduring
challenge to the strategy is that the cost to procure and sustain new
vehicles is exponentially more expensive than their predecessors.
GCTVS is evolving in four phases. Phase I supported the 2010
Program Objective Memorandum, and identified the boundaries of our
strategic lift capacity and assessed the negative impact that increased
armor protection is having on our ability to remain a sea-based
expeditionary force. During Phase II, which supported planning for the
fiscal year 2012 Program Objective Memorandum, we assessed the capacity
needed to meet operational requirements. As a result of this analysis,
we will be able to reduce our overall inventory by about 10,000
vehicles across all vehicle types, resulting in savings in both
procurement and long-term operations and maintenance costs.
We will continue to refine our vehicle inventory requirements as we
move into Phase III as part of our reconstitution strategy to inform
POM-13 planning, update our tables of equipment to reflect our reduced
inventory, and plan to have the reductions fully implemented by the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013. We will also continue to move into
the engineering manufacturing and development phase of the JLTV program
and examine the feasibility of a HMMWV recapitalization program to
address critical performance and protection requirements in our light
tactical vehicle fleet.
Subsequent to the decision to cancel the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle (EFV) program, we broadened the strategy objectives to include
a comprehensive cost-informed, systems engineering review of amphibious
combat vehicle operational requirements. This ongoing review will
analyze costs and requirements of water and land mobility, lethality
and force protection in order to develop trade-space to drive down
procurement and sustainment costs for future amphibious combat
vehicles.
Phase IV of the strategy will inform POM-16, providing the fully
cost-informed plan to modernize our vehicle fleet to support the Marine
Corps' objective force which was developed during the Force Structure
Review Group.
amphibious combat vehicles
The high production and operating costs of the EFV were the
principal factors leading to the recommendation to cancel the program.
Based on Marine Corps cost projections, the EFV would have consumed 44-
57 percent of the Marine Corps' projected procurement account during
the years 2018-2025; consumed 90-100 percent of funding for all ground
vehicles during the years 2018-2025: and consumed 91 percent of the
Marine Corps' vehicle-related operations and maintenance account when
fully fielded.
Following several years of theater operations, we are facing
competing demands across all elements to reset war-weary equipment and
to modernize capabilities. Funding identified for EFV will be used to
address overall modernization and to pursue an integrated vehicle
program crafted from inception to provide affordable capabilities and
where possible leveraging the investment made in the EFV. We intend to
balance capability with cost while mitigating the risks associated with
a new vehicle program through the use of an integrated acquisition
portfolio approach. This approach will initially examine three
integrated efforts: a service life extension program and upgrades for a
portion of the existing Amphibious Assault Vehicles upgrade, the
development of a new Amphibious Combat Vehicle, and the procurement of
Marine Personnel Carriers. Utilizing best practices in systems
engineering, cost estimating, and government/industry teaming during
concept refinement and technology development, we intend to develop
operationally relevant and technically achievable requirements that are
affordable.
Our fiscal year 2012 budget request was based on early cost
estimates for the initial development of these three vehicle programs.
We have since refined our program management approach and our cost
estimates, necessitating a shift in some budget categories while
maintaining a zero-sum profile. This year we will begin an analysis of
alternatives (AoA) of amphibious combat vehicles that will evaluate
cost versus capability of several different vehicle configurations.
This AoA will also consider the input we have received from industry in
response to requests for information that we released earlier this
year. We will also conduct a series of wargames in collaboration with
the Navy to evaluate the operational impacts of closing the ship-to-
shore distance from 25 nautical miles (nm) to 12 nm while also reducing
the water speed of the vehicle.
In the wake of the cancellation of the EFV, we intend to pursue an
aggressive and responsible acquisition timeline for new and upgraded
amphibious vehicles. To meet these challenges, we will utilize a
disciplined systems engineering process and sound cost analysis. Where
possible, we will streamline acquisition activities to ensure
capabilities and requirements are met. We look forward to working with
this committee to help meet these objectives.
other programs supporting ground vehicles
To complement our future ground and amphibious vehicles, the Marine
Corps is investing in other key support areas. For example, the Corps
is leading the way to build a next generation medium-range radar called
the Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar. This system will replace five
radars, and will be significantly more advanced in its capabilities. It
will improve threat detection and be more deployable, able to be set up
in a fraction of the time compared with current systems. In addition,
we are investing in the Common Aviation Command and Control System, an
ACAT I program which will help better network our communications,
radars, intelligence, and ultimately our forces. To better protect the
Marine on patrol, the Corps is also planning to replace its electronic
jamming equipment to counter IED threats with the next-generation, open
architecture JCREW 3.3 system.
conclusion
In order to contribute to the stability of the global system and
thrive in the 21st century, amphibious forces must: engage forward to
forge partnerships, prevent crises, promote diplomatic access, reassure
allies and friends of our commitment, build partner capacity, and
facilitate the security and stability of our allies; respond rapidly
and effectively to protect national interests, contain disruptions to
global stability, overcome access challenges by operating from the sea
base, reinforce U.S. credibility, solidify relationships with
international partners and forge new ones; and project power in order
to assure access allowing us to prevail when conflict arises by rapidly
transitioning from the open hand of engagement to the closed fist of
power projection that can impose our Nation's will and defeat our
adversaries.
The sea is a vast maneuver space--one that can be used to our
advantage provided we maintain the capability and capacity to conduct
amphibious operations. Equally integral to overcoming access challenges
from the sea is our ability to conduct a wide range of missions ashore
against various threats. The mix of ground assets we are developing
will provide the best flexibility for the Nation's Expeditionary Force
in Readiness.
In this age of uncertainty, the demand for adaptable forces--
capable of immediately responding to crises--is certain. It is true
that all things are not equally important or affordable, and thus as
the Nation resources its future national security, it will be forced to
make tough choices between capabilities, capacities, and levels of
readiness in and among the Services. Although it is impossible to know
where the next flare-up will be, it is clear that well trained and
equipped amphibious forces will be ready to respond and protect
interests or prevent undesired effects. With the continued support of
Congress and the American people, we will ensure amphibious forces are
well prepared to secure our national interests in an uncertain future.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and we look forward to
answering further questions.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I presume
that General Flynn and Admiral Blake have no statements.
We've included and provided everybody with two charts, and
we've shared them with the panel. One is the basic procurement
course for Marine Corps combat ground vehicles, including the
EFV for illustration purposes, and that is the operation and
maintenance (O&M) costs.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Reed. But the point really is, as we've talked
about before, in a very few years we're looking at a huge bow
wave, even if you factor out the EFV and assume you're getting
a cheaper replacement, probably it's not that much cheaper. It
might be more efficient, more effective.
As General Flynn and I discussed, this is not unique to the
Marine Corps. The Navy has a similar challenge when it comes to
trying to build ballistic missiles, ballistic submarines,
attack submarines, carriers, et cetera.
It really has to focus our attention as to how are you
going to deal with this issue. Even assuming the EFV is
cancelled or a replacement comes on line, the cost of these
other vehicles that are essential are also increasing. So,
Secretary Stackley, please comment, and I'd like General Flynn
to comment and Admiral Blake also from his perspective.
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me start with the specific
question on the vehicles and then there's a broader issue there
that wraps around all of this. As I mentioned in my opening
remarks, the decision to cancel the EFV to go to another ACV
with a greater focus on affordability is not going to fix this
problem. It's not going to fix the vehicle problem. It's one
step of what needs to be a number of steps in each of the
program areas to create a more affordable vehicle portfolio.
As I described, General Flynn led an effort looking at
vehicle inventories. That's another important piece here, which
is reducing the total inventory of vehicles required, and I'll
let him go into that in more detail.
But we have a significant looming challenge. When we look
at our budget projections and we look at our recapitalization
of many systems that we procured back in the 1980s and 1990s at
higher rates of procurement, we can't look at the numbers and
arrive at a one-for-one replacement knowing that the systems
that we're fielding going forward are far more capable, far
more complex, and therefore far more expensive.
So we are across the board looking at making tough
decisions in terms of our investments; what are the priorities
in terms of fielding new capabilities? Depending on what the
capability is, we look at do we extend the service life of the
legacy capability? Is that sufficient to meet the requirements?
Do we buy new? When do we have to make that decision? We go
system by system into the specific list of requirements and
challenge the requirements, cut back where it's the right risk
decision, where the risk is, can you afford the thing, and you
put a risk even procuring the thing versus getting some measure
of increased capability.
So there's no single silver bullet. There is no sacred cow.
We know that there is no more money and we have to live within
the resource constraints we have and make the right capability
decisions. Hopefully, we have them correctly lined up against
our overarching requirements. Then we have to deliver in
accordance with what we estimate to be the right price for
those things.
Senator Reed. You mentioned that part of this complete
analysis is looking at legacy systems and effectively extending
their lives. Does that go to EFV too, in terms of a possible
solution?
Mr. Stackley. That is not counted out. We're at the front
end, as I described, of the analysis. We have over 1,000 AAVs.
Part of the technology demonstration that we would like to get
into is, using some of those AAVs as a hull form, let's talk
about bringing off-the-shelf systems to that hull form and see
what performance level we can get the existing AAV up to; and
separately look at technology demonstration of an alternative
hull form where we could potentially port those same systems
over now to a separately developed hull form, and what does
that point towards in terms of cost versus capability. In any
AoA there's likely to be an alternative that says extend the
existing vehicle, and we don't have cause to discount that on
the AAV.
Senator Reed. General Flynn, please.
General Flynn. Mr. Chairman, it's always good to see one of
your slides used at a hearing. This is the slide that keeps me
up at night and this is the problem that keeps me up at night.
This includes our vehicle challenges, and if you notice the
mountains in the sand chart are all in the out years. So this
problem is coming and we're not ignoring it.
Aircraft have gotten more expensive and ships have gotten
more expensive. But on the ground side, because of our need for
protection, whether it be in vehicles or individual protection,
because of the battlefield that we're operating in right now,
there's been an exponential increase in costs.
About 5 years ago, it cost us about $1,500 to outfit an
individual marine. Today that's $7,500. The Humvee when we
bought it in the mid-1990s, about $50,000. When I look at
replacements for a light vehicle, what I get across my desk is
in the range of $300,000. So, there's an increased cost there.
The other part is I know we can't buy our way out of here.
Over the past couple years the budget projections were more
optimistic than we're seeing today. So we have to do more than
just settle for the fact that it's more expensive. When we did
the force structure review, we tried to design a force as part
of Secretary Gates' and Secretary Mabus' guidance, was to tell
us what the 21st expeditionary force in readiness was. That
wasn't just about manpower. It was also how we are going to
equip it.
Because you can't buy your way out of this, what should be
the table of equipment for that force? The table of equipment
for that force should be a crisis response TE, which would be
lighter than what you see that force looking like in
Afghanistan right now; and that you need to have the capability
to heavy it up when you need it to be.
Very similar to what the Third Battalion, 8th Marines, did
when they came off the 26th MEU. They deployed with a crisis
response TE, but on their way to combat in Afghanistan they
heavied up with mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles
and MRAP all terrain vehicles (MATV).
So we're going to look at ways to reduce our vehicle
inventory, by going out light for the normal crisis response
missions, and having the ability, either through prepositioning
on the land or by operational use of the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF), to be able to heavy it up from
using those assets as well. That's why it was critical that we
operationalize the MPF to be able to do at-sea transfer of
vehicles and selective offload.
The other thing is, as Mr. Stackley mentioned, we took a
hard look at our vehicle inventory and we said, ``Okay, to
reduce costs we're going to reduce the vehicle inventory by
about 10,000 vehicles.'' That's a significant savings in
replacement costs and in operating costs, and that's going to
happen over time.
We also have to fix the requirements-acquisition
relationship. In other words, early on we have to be able to do
those cost-capability tradeoffs early in our process. That's
what we're going to do as we look for a solution to the EFV and
our approach to the ACV.
We'll also take a hard look at our table of equipment. The
other thing we'll look at, sir, is we are exploring everywhere
that we can for new ideas. You mentioned about the
recapitalization of legacy equipment. We're looking at that for
the Humvee. Is there a way we could do something, by either
capsule technology that we talked about last year or structural
blast challenge, also known as chimney, has a way of mitigating
costs. So we're pursuing technology, we're pursuing new ideas,
and we're pursuing new concepts, all as a way to try to drive
this down and to take some of the peaks off those hills.
But when you look at this chart, the only thing on there is
vehicles. Vehicles exceed our total procurement dollars. I know
we're using historical norm, but that was 30 years of
procurement history, when at the beginning of those 30 years we
had over $4 billion in procurement for the ground side and some
parts in the middle we had less than $1 billion a year.
What I tell my people is, ``Okay, what makes us think that
history is going to change?'' Like I say to them, sometimes you
can have anything you want; you just can't have everything.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral, in the next round I'll ask if you have any
comments. But let me recognize Senator Wicker for his
questions.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
General Flynn, let me ask you first about the 10 miles
versus 25 miles that I mentioned in my opening statement. Has
the requirement changed? Do you stand behind the requirement to
conduct amphibious operations against a defended shoreline? Is
the amphibious assault mission still relevant for the future,
and what about the point I made about 10 miles versus 25?
General Flynn. Senator, in context of that, it's not just
about the amphibious assault. It's about amphibious operations
across the range of military operations. When we did the
recertification of the program in 2007, the launch distance
that was used for the EFV was launched anywhere between 10 and
20 miles, and that was for the amphibious assault.
When we released the request for information (RFI) for the
replacement for the EFV, what we had in the RFI was a launch
distance of 12 to 18 miles. That 12-mile mark is not a static
position. That is normally where the ships would come in for
the high-speed launch. We think it's going to be dependent on a
number of factors: our tactics, techniques, and procedures of
using the sea as maneuver space.
If you're going to have to do a large amphibious assault, a
two-brigade operation, there is no doubt that we'll have a
significant amount of time to be able to do shaping operations,
because it'll take us about 60 days to assemble the shipping to
be able to do that. So there is going to be significant shaping
operations that have to take place to knock down the threat as
well.
Since we had the original requirement for the EFV, as
Admiral Blake briefed last week, there have been significant
improvements in the Navy's ability to deal with the threat. For
the crisis that we're likely to respond to today, we're going
to have to mitigate those risks, because you could have a high-
end threat there, but it may not be the same volume that you
would expect against a near-peer competitor. We're going to
have to continue to go where they don't think we're going to
go, to use improved tactics, techniques, and procedures, and
also to rely on the new defensive systems or integrated
defensive systems that the Navy's bringing to the fight.
Senator Wicker. Thank you for your answer. If I could break
that down, would you explain in a little more layman's terms
what happened between 2007 and 2011, or I guess 2010, and what
the difference is? It seems to me that 10 to 20 miles is not
that different from 12 to 18 miles. So what happened? What is
the reason for the change between the recertification in Nunn-
McCurdy, which favored continuing the EFV, and today?
General Flynn. One of the key drivers of the EFV was the
ability to come up on plane, sir, and be able to go above 17
knots. It was to be able to do that high-speed launch. The EFV
on the water in a planing configuration could do in excess of
25 knots. That capability's pretty expensive and that was one
of the key drivers, to be able to hydraulically configure the
vehicle, to be able to develop the engine thrust to be able to
do it. That part of the capability was a key expensive piece of
that.
What we're saying in the future is to make the vehicle
affordable we have to look at all the mission sets that the
vehicle's going to have to perform, and then we're going to
have to try to make those tradeoffs. Part of that tradeoff is
do we need that level of speed? If we don't need that level of
speed to be able to do the operation, can you reconfigure the
program to be more affordable?
The threat launch in the Nunn-McCurdy certification was 10
to 20 miles launch. It's the speed to be able to do that, but
it's also the ability of the task force to be able to protect
the ship when it comes in to do the launch. Now, they wouldn't
stay there in a static position, but we're also launching
aircraft, we're also launching other types of connectors at the
same time.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We're going to
have a second round?
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. I think I'll defer to others and then come
back.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Thank you for all of your great work and the extraordinary
dedication of the men and women who work with you and under
you.
As I've listened to some of the discussion today and read
the testimony and other material to prepare, from a very
simplistic standpoint some of the variants here, maybe the
major variants, are weight, protective value, and cost. I know
that the MRAP vehicles were once regarded as extraordinarily
heavy vehicles and perhaps disregarded in their importance
because of it.
I wonder if you could comment on whether vehicles with that
kind of bulk, for protective value and other reasons, have
become the new normal, whether there is almost inevitably an
increase in weight, bulk, and whether that variant is
inevitably tied to cost, or whether technology may enable us to
reduce both?
General Flynn. Sir, one of the key things on weight is
weight is a factor in being able to mitigate under-belly blast.
But in the end, explosives tend to always win. You can always
pack more explosives to do that. So the combination of the
technology that you saw in the MRAP vehicle was not only
weight. It also had a new hull shaping form, the single-V hull;
your standoff distance from the blast. All contribute to your
ability to mitigate blast and protect the servicemen and women
inside the vehicles.
What we've learned over time is, though, with weight comes
a tremendous lack of mobility and transportability. We had to
field an MATV in Afghanistan because the MRAP vehicles couldn't
go everywhere because of the road structure and the ability to
get around where you needed to go.
We also found in some areas of the country that our light
armored vehicles worked very well, because they could go
anywhere, and you can't put improvised explosive devices (IED)
everywhere. So there's a degree of protection that comes with
mobility.
What we've realized is, if we continue on this trend as an
expeditionary force we may not be able to load ships any more
with that much weight. So that's why we're looking for
technology, and we've learned more in I think the last 5 to 10
years about blast than we've learned over maybe 2 or 3 decades.
That's why in the future the single-V hull may not be the
solution. A double-V may be the solution, and in some cases a
rigid flat hull could actually be the solution.
That's why we're continuing to pursue alternative
technologies to see if we can find that sweet spot, if you
will, between transportability, mobility, and protection.
But you're right; on the basis of where we are now, sir,
the more weight you have, the more expensive it is, but the
lesser mobility and transportability you have on the
battlefield.
Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied, General, that the
Nation is investing in the technology in sufficient amount and
timeliness to do whatever it can to improve the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle and all the other vehicles under development
to take advantage not only of what we've learned in the last 5
years, which has been impressive, but also what we need to
learn going forward about the threats that may be in our future
that haven't been in our past?
General Flynn. Sir, everything I see, down working on the
requirements aspect for the Marine Corps, is we don't discount
any idea. We've gotten help from Mr. Stackley and we've gotten
help from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. We go
out to this one company that was working on structural blast
channel, technology which is known as chimney. That could have
applications to a lot of different things. The double-V hull.
All of that has a tendency to take weight off the vehicle.
We've also seen some advances in material science as well.
But we haven't found the silver bullet, so we're still
looking. We're still discovering. But when we find something,
sir, we see if it's going to work and we try to take advantage.
I think we're at the stage of maybe seeing some successes in
the not too distant future, but I don't see anything tomorrow.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, General.
Mr. Stackley. Weight is just one part of the solution, and
really on our learning curve what we're focusing on is a total
system design that provides the best solution. So there is a
shaping of the hull. The element of weight itself provides a
benefit. There's the degree of armor protection. But then, as
General Flynn described, things like the double-V and the
structural blast channel, there's an element of stiffness
associated with the vehicle that's starting to emerge as this
is an important characteristic that we need to consider in the
design of the vehicles.
Ultimately, what you're trying to do is protect the marines
or soldiers inside the vehicle. So now you're starting to deal
with designs of floors, designs of seats, and you're starting
to get down to a certain level of detail. I believe we still
have a significant amount of learning to do as we put together
optimal system designs. When you start to talk now about an
AAV, weight's a huge penalty.
When we're looking at speed and range, when weight starts
arriving as a requirement for protection, now you're really
trading off total system performance. So we need to look at the
entire design, where the ultimate goal is protecting the marine
inside the vehicle and not go first to weight. There are a lot
of ways to add stiffness without adding weight. There are armor
solutions that are lighter in weight. In fact, we have some
armor solutions that float. Those are more costly, so there's a
cost element that we wrestle with.
This front-end design work that we're doing for the ACV,
we're trying to bring all of that innovation to the table and
look at a total system approach to that protection thing, which
does drive costs and does trade off in performance in other
areas of the vehicle.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Blake. Sir, if I could just add to that, when we
look at the issue from the Navy perspective, you have ships
with expected service lives anywhere from 25 to 40 years, and
so when we build a ship and we're going to build it for a
period of 25 to 40 years, what I have to do is I have to sit
down with General Flynn and we have to look at it and say, all
right, we have to have give and take here, because the
displacement of that vehicle is what it is and weight is a
critical factor.
So when we have to sit down and look at it, if a vehicle
increases in weight then we have to figure out where our
tradeoffs are, because we still have to get that composite
force of marines ashore and get them ashore safely.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral Blake.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
all of our witnesses for what they do for our country.
I wanted to follow up, Secretary Stackley, on a question
about the EFV program termination. As part of it, we know that
we invested approximately $3 billion. Then part of it is this
$185 million that we have to pay to terminate the program. I
wanted to understand that piece of it and understand it from
the perspective of going forward what is it that we need to do
to inform our acquisition process?
Was it something in our terms that we need to be conscious
of in terms of how we're contracting for these types of
vehicle, obviously acquisition overall, where we can put
ourselves in a better position to deal with the cost issue, but
also to have more favorable terms for our country, so that
we're not put in a position where we actually have to pay money
to terminate a program.
So if you can help me with that, I'd really appreciate it.
Mr. Stackley. I want to help you 100 percent here. My view
is termination costs should be approximately zero.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Mr. Stackley. Particularly in this program, with, I'll call
it, knowledge upfront. There are termination costs associated
with a major program if you slam the door shut. You have a
large workforce and the company has responsibilities to that
workforce in terms of everything from relocation, they might
owe them severance, or they might have 2 months pay they have
to pay out. So there are definite costs associated with
termination if it's not managed.
What we've attempted to do here is to manage the
termination. So we've done a couple of things. We've taken a
look at the workforce. We've taken a look at things like
tooling and material. Those have to be disposed of at the end
of the contract. So we've put a plan together on what do we
want to do with these things, and we work our way out of the
EFV by getting value out of the dollars that are otherwise
considered to be termination dollars.
So the workforce, for example; I've given a Warren Act
notice. General Dynamics would have to provide 2 months notice
to folks that they're going to be laid off. There's a bill, and
if they're not being gainfully employed then we get nothing for
that cost. So we took a look at the workforce. We took a look
at where we are in the EFV program, and we want to harvest as
much of the learning and technology that we invested in that
program as possible to help us to transition to the ACV.
So we put together a plan that matches the rolloff of staff
at General Dynamics with harvesting of technologies from the
EFV, which includes everything from subsystems on the EFV that
might apply to the ACV, to taking the vehicles that are in
piece parts and finishing their testing, so we actually get the
test results that will inform the ACV.
So you could call it a termination cost, but we're calling
it a smart termination as we exit the program, so that we get
the maximum value out of the program as we exit, and we don't
incur unnecessary costs associated with terminating.
I don't know if that answers your question or not.
Senator Ayotte. It does. I think what we're all trying to
figure out is how we can avoid this. What are the lessons
learned from this experience, because we're not picking on the
Marine Corps in all of this because we've seen this in other
weapons systems across the Services. Whether it's putting more
of the burden on the contractor in terms of if they don't
produce the product that we want that they bear more of the
risk, just in terms of, obviously we've been talking about the
acquisition process, but what are some of the lessons learned
overall so that we can make sure that we avoid these situations
again?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, ma'am. First, there are different types
of termination. I'll just be frank. In the case of the decision
to terminate the EFV program, as discussed, in 2007 we had the
Nunn-McCurdy. At that point in time we decided we're going to
continue with the program. We restructured it, and since 2007
General Dynamics has been performing in accordance with the
plan.
So this isn't in 2010 their performance has led us to
terminating the program. This is DOD looking at the future
costs of the program and saying, we can't get there from here.
So there's not fault on the contractor here. What he's been
doing is he's staffed up to ramp into production, so he does
have tooling. He has infrastructure. He has people on the
program.
If you try to close the program immediately, there's a lot
of work in process. He has subcontractors throughout the
country who are going to be invoicing for the work that they're
doing, all allowable costs on the contract that would have to
be paid. So that's just a practical matter of we are
terminating, we're limiting our exposure in that termination,
but we do have liabilities for this work that was started
before the decision to terminate.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that. I guess at the end of
the day really where I'd like to be is, how do we avoid this
from happening again? I know we've been talking about it, but
when we look at the fiscal state of our country and the need
that our Armed Forces have; I think this is just one example
across. We've seen this on multiple areas at DOD.
Mr. Stackley. Depending on the contract type, we have
clauses and terms and conditions that protect the government's
liability. Typically, for example, for our cost-plus contract,
which development contracts are, the clause would describe that
there's a limitation of funds. So the government's liability is
limited to the amount of funds that are put onto a contract.
That causes the contractor to have to measure, gauge, and
ensure that he doesn't go spending money beyond the limitations
that are imposed in that case.
On a fixed-price contract, he owes us the deliverable. We
owe him the amount of money we signed up to; he owes us the
deliverable. Typically, on a fixed-price contract we're fully
obligated at the front end. If we terminate while all that work
is in place, then we're stuck with a legal review in terms of
what his actual costs are versus what he's billed and the
differences inside the termination.
But we do not encumber Congress, for example. We don't
encumber future Congresses on things like termination or
cancellation without notifying you and telling you what the
amount of that liability is in advance.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate your answer, Mr. Secretary.
My time is up, but I still don't have a clear picture on
when you have a situation like this you have to take the
lessons learned. We need to take the lessons learned from this,
all of us, and I think we need to do it across the Services. So
I don't have a clear picture in my own mind how we avoid this
again.
General Flynn. Ma'am, I think one of the key lessons
learned is we have to do the cost tradeoffs early on in the
requirements process, not in the acquisition process. So as
we're looking for the capability, those cost tradeoffs have to
be done in requirements development early, so that you're not
in acquisition, so that you know what technology you're asking
for and you're not overreaching, and that you understand the
costs.
That's what's going to be different about how we're
approaching the ACV, is that we've set up the method and the
methodology right now to inform the requirements process, with
cost as an independent variable.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Flynn, Secretary Stackley, and Admiral Blake, thank
you for your work and being here today.
I wanted to talk about the amphibious ship requirement. I
know that the Marine Corps' stated amphibious ship requirement
remains 38, and the Nation currently has an amphibious fleet of
less than 30, despite an agreement within the Navy to maintain
a minimum of 33.
Amphibious ships should not be decommissioned earlier than
their expected service life spans, obviously, without
replacements. I'm concerned that the Marine Corps will not have
sufficient amphibious capabilities to fully support the
combatant commanders' requirements within an acceptable level
of risk.
I'm also concerned that the Marine Corps will not have
sufficient amphibious capabilities to meet its demands for
operational deployments. Maintaining a sufficient amphibious
capability I believe is critical in order to project power, to
evacuate essential and non-essential U.S. personnel stationed
overseas, and engage in crisis response and humanitarian relief
operations.
General Flynn, can you share your thoughts regarding the
impact of not having the minimum amphibious ship requirement
and how does it affect the Marine Corps' ability to respond to
crises, such as what we've seen recently in Libya and in Japan?
General Flynn. Ma'am, we've agreed within the Navy on the
38-ship requirement, and that is both for what we would need to
be able to do amphibious assault operations at the high end,
but it's also that inventory of ships that is needed to do what
we're actually doing today. So it's not based on desires or
needs. It's actually what's being employed today.
With a 33-ship inventory, you could meet both your day-to-
day needs and your larger requirements. When you get below
that, obviously you take on additional risk in terms of
availability, especially as you heard from the operations that
are going on now, when you're surging.
So where are you going to pay the bills? You're going to
pay a bill in maintenance. Ships need to have time to be
maintained, and if they don't have the time to be maintained we
could have a challenge in getting them to their 40-year service
life. The other place you pay the bill is in training; training
of the ship and the crews together. So there is the ability to
happen there. What we're going to see for the first time in
recent memory when the 11th MEU deploys this summer is all
ships will be together when they deploy. That's the additional
risk that you take.
So 38 was the requirement, 33 was an acceptable level of
risk, and the further you get away from that the more risk you
assume in being able to meet your day-to-day requirements, and
where you pay the bill is in maintenance and in training.
Senator Hagan. Where are we right now?
General Flynn. I think we're at 30 right now in the
inventory, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. I'm concerned about the number. In last
year's National Defense Authorization Act, Senator Webb and I
included report language mandating a report on the
expeditionary amphibious warfare ship force structure. The
report directs the Secretary of Defense to complete an
operational capabilities-based assessment that reviews and
reconciles the amphibious requirements, the ship retirement
schedules, as you mentioned, and the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Can you give me, Secretary Stackley, the status of that report?
Mr. Stackley. Ma'am, I'm going to have to take that one for
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Expeditionary Amphibious Warfare Ship Force Structure Report to
Congress was provided to the congressional defense committees on June
3, 2011 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Senator Hagan. Okay.
Mr. Stackley. Let me assure you, though, I'll take it for
the record and we'll pull this thing forward and make sure it
gets back to you in a timely manner.
Senator Hagan. Any comments on why we have fewer than the
minimum required, and why the Navy has continued to
decommission vessels from the amphibious fleet despite the
shortage?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, ma'am. A couple pieces there. One, we're
balancing across the ship portfolio in total. The commonly
referred to number is a 313-ship Navy, which dates back about 5
years when that total force structure requirement was
established. At that time, we were at about 280 ships. Today
we're at 287 ships. So in total we're far below what we've
established as a requirement class by class.
Inside of the amphibs themselves, we have two specific
amphibious shipbuilding programs ongoing, and we've had
challenges in terms of schedule on those programs. So part of
the shortfall is associated with delays in delivering
amphibious ships.
Senator Hagan. The schedule problems being what?
Mr. Stackley. Ship delivery schedules. Frankly, there have
been some performance issues at the shipyards that have driven
delays on the LPD and LHA class ships. It's also been a long-
term impact associated with Hurricane Katrina. All of our
amphibious ships today are built at Ingalls and Avondale on the
Gulf Coast. There's been a long-term impact associated with
Hurricane Katrina on everything from schedules to productivity,
and we're still working our way back from those impacts.
The third element is the new construction side. Then there
is the decommissioning side. We spend a lot of time reviewing
decom schedules, and each decision in terms of decom is, I
would say, made on its own merits or otherwise in terms of how
many deployments does that ship have left in it, does it
require another service life upgrade to get another deployment,
so what's the balance of investment required to keep the amphib
on line versus what's the useful service we would get out of
it.
I can only assure you that there's a lot of tough
discussion and debate with each of those, because we're below
the 33 number, and we're not going to be able to quickly get
back to 33 just through new construction. So we have to look at
the existing amphib ships in the fleet, and do what we can to
make sure that we get the service life that's required out of
them.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Admiral Blake. Senator, one of the issues that we have
taken up is because of the fact that we recognize that there
are delays in the delivery of, say, the big-deck amphibs. We
have already looked at and are putting in place funding so that
we can extend ships that are currently on service and not
decommission them, delay their decommissionings, if you will.
But that comes at a cost and that's what we work. We
recognize that we need to meet the commitment to put the number
of amphibs out there in order to meet the requirement. We also
recognize that, because of the level of operational tempo that
we've had over the past several years, that we have now made a
concerted effort to make sure that not only do we have to look
at extended service lives, we have to get the ships to their
expected service lives.
One of the best programs I can give you is the LSD-41s with
their mid-life program. We've actually put a tailored package
together in order to ensure that we get those ships to the end
of their service lives. We've actually tailored it for each of
those ships to get them out there, so that they can meet the
end of their service.
In addition, we're also looking at ships as they're coming
up at the end of their service and seeing if we can work it
that we can get additional life out of them. But again, that
comes at a cost and we have to do the tradeoffs.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Let me ask about the Humvees. The use of the Humvees is
limited in theater due to the survivability and the crew
protection concerns. Obviously, with the mine blast and the
IEDs, the Humvees have been exposed to these underbody attacks,
which really concerns me greatly. The current Humvee underbody
protection levels are inadequate in meeting the current and
emerging threats that our troops are seeing.
I'm very supportive of anything that we can do that can
increase the survivability, the mobility, and the operational
utility of our Humvees. In last year's authorization bill, I
inserted language requesting the Army and the Marine Corps to
report their Humvee acquisition and recapitalization plan. In
the Marine Corps the report mentions that an armored capsule
system was evaluated as a possible survivability upgrade for
the Humvee, and the report goes on to say that, despite doing
well in blast testing, challenges were discovered integrating
it onto the current Humvee chassis, including the automotive
and performance issues.
General Flynn, can you describe some of the challenges in
integrating the capsule onto the Humvees?
General Flynn. Yes, Senator. We're trying to look at a
cost-effective way of making our light tactical vehicle fleet
last longer and be able to perform in the current threat
environment. We looked at the capsule. The idea was to build a
survivable capsule that could fit on an existing frame, using
the existing drive train and power plant. What we found is when
we married the two up we did significant frame damage when we
took it out and tested it out in the field.
It did well in blast testing. So now we have to look at
what would be the cost of redoing the frame and would we have
to redesign a frame?
A similar effort is what we're looking at in structural
blast channel, the chimney, that is again taking a look at an
existing frame, an existing power plant and a power train, and
seeing if we could recapitalize that way. Where we're at in
that, it is doing well in its blast testing. Recently we took
it out to the Nevada Automotive Test Center and we're seeing
how its frame has done. In some cases we've seen some frame
damage.
Now, we have to analyze and say, okay, what's causing the
frame to be damaged? Is it weight? Is it how we're marrying it
up? Is it how the frame was manufactured? Was it manufactured
to the right tolerances? So we're all in the information-
gathering, information analysis part. But we definitely are
trying to pursue some way of recapitalizing the light vehicle
fleet at an affordable cost and getting us an acceptable level
of protection.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
I think one of the obvious impressions in the questioning
of everyone is that these are a series of very critical
decisions that are interrelated in so many different ways; the
Navy shipbuilding program in terms of accommodating whatever
you decide to build as an ACV, et cetera.
There's another aspect of this. The Nunn-McCurdy breach, at
that point there was the decision to reduce the total number of
EFVs and to complement them with the MPC, and you face a
milestone B decision next year, basically. That raises the
issue again of what is the relationship between the new ACV and
the MPC? Is that part of the analysis?
Then there is a whole set of issues. One, if you can reduce
the speed and increase the armor of the ACV, does that mean it
can act in some respects as a replacement for in certain cases
the MPC, that you can reduce the total there?
I know General Flynn has been extraordinarily, I think,
thoughtful about systems engineering and making decisions
early. But there's a whole set of decisions that go not just to
the replacement EFV, but to the MPC, LCACs, and a host of other
things.
General Flynn?
General Flynn. Sir, when we cancelled the EFV the best
option at the time that we had was to simultaneously pursue
potentially three alternatives or three programs together. One
was the new ACV, one was the MPC, and one was service life
extension to the AAV.
I don't have the final answer for you as to say in the
future are we going to be pursuing all three, two, or one.
We're working through the data right now. We're working through
the AoA to do that. The MPC was added to the mix as a way of
trying to get cost back then under control for the EFV. It was
a less expensive vehicle, and we were trying to meet the cost
requirements back then by doing a mixed fleet.
That's back on the table now and we have to do that
quickly, because I know in the current program there is a
milestone B decision, I think in fiscal year 2014. So we need
to get to those answers quickly, and that's one of the reasons
why as we pursue our way forward on this we need to be able to
do an AoA faster than we have traditionally or historically
done. In the past it's taken 18 months to do an AoA. We need to
do that in about 9 months. At the same time, we need to be able
to be pursuing some type of technology demonstrator so we can
determine what the real requirement is going to be, because
right now I wouldn't commit to all three and say we're
definitely going to do all three. I don't think that would be
wise at this time because I don't have the data to back up a
decision like that, sir.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, you have $12 million in the
budget for the AoA. Is that enough, given the complexity of
evaluating several moving parts?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. The budget that you're looking at
today was best estimates put together in a pretty constrained
period of time, and I can guarantee you we have adjustments
coming. An AoA by itself doesn't require a whole lot of money.
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. Stackley. So I don't think the AoA is going to be the
issue. It's going to be some of the other costs. We have a lot
of talent from the EFV program that we don't want to lose. So
what we have to do is get productive work for them consistent
with the time line that General Flynn described for technology
demonstrator. I think that's really where we want to be
investing dollars, is on identifying those mature technologies
that would apply to a future amphibious vehicle.
The 9-month timeline for an AoA is more aggressive than
most, but we're not starting standing still. We're not starting
with a clean sheet of paper, and the last thing we want to do
is disband the corporate knowledge that we have and have to
bring brand new folks in and climb the learning curve for the
AoA. So we want to leverage the hot operation that we have from
the EFV as we transition.
Then the question on the MPC and its role. We're bringing
all three of these--the AAV SLEP, the MPC, and the ACV--
together, same room, same group of people managing the
capability, recognizing that we have one pot of money that's
going to have to manage both the development and ultimately
procurement of the vehicles and the necessary upgrades.
So do we have an MPC plus ACV fleet? We're going to look
real hard at whether or not that makes sense.
Senator Reed. Another aspect here is LCAC is something
you're looking at with a new ship-to-shore connector program.
Is that group going to be in the room, too? That begs the
question, too, and then obviously the Navy in terms of the
amphib fleet, the basic delivery vessels, they'll be in the
room, too? Are we looking outside the proverbial box at all
these interrelated issues to make a comprehensive presentation?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me describe a couple things
there. The LCAC SLEP is wrapping up now and we're going out
very shortly here with a request for proposal for the ship-to-
shore connector. Its set of requirements are set and the things
that the ship-to-shore connector would be carrying are well
set. So we don't see the ship-to-shore connector's performance
requirements changing as a result of the discussion with
regards to the amphibious vehicle. But it might impact the
quantity that we end up procuring.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Just one other question, then I'll recognize the ranking
member. As General Flynn said, we'd like to think that all of
these decisions are driven by threats and doctrine, but we know
there's a budget lurking around every corner that has to be
met, too. But part of your conclusion is going to be based on
can the Navy neutralize the opposition on the shore,
successfully get the marines either 25 nautical miles or 10
nautical miles from the launch point in a changing environment,
air threats, cyber threats, et cetera.
So just if you could comment briefly on that, Admiral
Blake. Then specifically, both you and Secretary Stackley about
the mine countermeasure module, because some areas which we
would anticipate a potential use of amphibious forces the most
significant threat would be mines. So Admiral Blake, then
Secretary Stackley, and then I'll recognize Senator Wicker.
Admiral Blake. Sir, I think what you're referring to in
general terms is anti-access. I think the Navy has put in place
a number of programs. I'll only hit a couple of the highlights.
We won't go delving down into every detail. But I think we've
put together a family of systems. We've bundled them together
and we've said this is how we think we can engage, if you will,
in the anti-access environment.
One of the premier ones would be Naval Integrated Fires
Counter-Air. That program is, as I said, a family of systems.
It comes in two varieties, if you will, from the air and from
the sea. There are key components within that, everything from
the E-2D, the aircraft, to the SM-6 missile. Then you're going
down, of course, to the Aegis ships, Aegis cruisers and
destroyers. I think that's how you sort of look at it, and we
are evolving that.
The second one I would mention is the Surface Electronic
Warfare Improvement Program. We recognize that we have to make
advances there because of the proliferation of systems, and
that is one of the areas where we will have three levels, and
each one builds on the other so that we put it as the potential
adversary evolves so do we evolve.
You mentioned mine warfare briefly. We recognize that the
LCS module for the mine warfare is a key component and we have
to get it out there. We have to get it out there because we
have to get the man or the woman out of the minefield. Right
now the way we deal with it is the individual has to go into
the minefield in order to clear it. We've recognized that.
One of the key components of that program for the LCS is
that we get that individual out of the minefield. If we don't,
then we are going to have to look at the current capability we
have, which is in programs like the Avenger class, which keeps
a man in the minefield. Then we recognize we'll have to extend
that program. We do not want to do that. We want to get the LCS
modules out there.
Indications are now that we are going to get that module
out there on time. So we believe we have a way ahead and that
we will address the issue, as you put it.
Senator Reed. Just for the record, Secretary Stackley, on
time?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me add on to what Admiral Blake
said. The mine countermeasures (MCM) mission package actually
gets delivered in phases. So we have a four-phased approach.
It's incremental capability, and so the first increment initial
operational capability (IOC) is in 2013. The key pieces we have
there, we have the remote mine-hunting system (RMS), which has
gone through Nunn-McCurdy and has been rebaselined,
restructured to improve its reliability, but all the other
performance parameters have been met for the RMS.
The other elements are: a sensor system, where we have a
sensor system today that's operated off of an aircraft, that
provides orders of magnitude greater capability than what the
current MCM fleet provides. What we're working on is we fall
short of the key performance parameters (KPP) by about 5
percent. So we have a system that's order of magnitude more
capable, doesn't meet the full KPP. So we're looking at, okay,
let's test it with what we have, let's field it with what we
have, and let's figure out is it worth the added investment to
get the other 5 percent.
So the first increment, right now we're still holding to a
2013 date. Then the subsequent increments provide added
capability. As I described, the first increment will provide a
capability equivalent to your MCM fleet. The added capability,
what it will do is increase your sweep rates. so basically you
can cover a greater area over less amount of time, and also
allow us to retire the MH-53, the airborne mine countermeasure
program that we have today.
So many piece parts that have to be integrated together.
One of the things that we've done there is we've taken the
piece parts and put them all inside of one program executive
officer for a LCS. So we're bringing the mission packages, the
ship, the test and evaluation team, and the in-service team all
together in one organization, and we have to ensure it's
robustly funded.
The history of these systems is when these ships were
struggling the funding was cut on the mission package side. Now
we have the ships up in production, we have this lag that we
have to overcome on the development side, and we're focused on
that because it is a priority.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, the decision to cancel
the EFV, how close of a call was that?
Mr. Stackley. Sir, to be honest, I wasn't part of that
decision.
Senator Wicker. Okay, that's a fair answer.
If we had proceeded on with the EFV, when would the first
vehicles have been available for our troops?
Mr. Stackley. In 2016. We had about another year, this year
plus a year in terms of development, and then we go through the
operational testing, to lead to IOC. The full operational
capability would be about a decade later.
Senator Wicker. So what is the answer?
Mr. Stackley. It would have been 2016 for the IOC.
Senator Wicker. Available for the troops.
General Flynn. Sir, to make that clear, in 2016 we would
have had one set for a battalion, but it would have taken us to
2026 to buy the whole 570-some odd vehicles.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Best guess, if we instead moved to
the ACV concept, when will they be available for the troops?
Mr. Stackley. Let me describe that. I talked about the
three different capabilities that we're looking at between the
MPC, the AAV SLEP, and the ACV.
Senator Wicker. Right.
Mr. Stackley. We're looking at tradeoffs between those
three capabilities. So for example, what we'd like to do is
move forward on a technology demonstrator for the ACV, about a
2-year effort, to take a vehicle and demonstrate its
capability, and see if we can go from there into the completion
of development, where you'd have that same IOC that was 2016
for an EFV, could be in the 2017, 2018 timeframe.
So you're really in the same ballpark in terms of time that
we had with the EFV program, and what we would do is as we look
at this, do we want to go forward with the MPC as a stand-alone
program, that would slide left or slide right depending on what
we decided on the ACV.
Senator Wicker. The prime contractor of the EFV very
vigorously disagrees with the decision of DOD, and they have an
estimate saying let's finish what we've started with 200. They
estimate that doing so would cost $4.6 billion, and that would
be less than the combined cost of termination and replacement,
which all told would be $6.1 billion. What do you say to that?
General Flynn. Sir, first of all, 200 vehicles doesn't meet
the requirement. Two hundred vehicles does not give us the
capability to do a two-brigade operation. It falls short in the
number of vehicles.
The other part is the O&M cost of those vehicles. It's not
just the procurement cost of the vehicles; it's also the O&M
cost of the individual vehicles, which was another reason why
the decision was made to cancel the program.
Then we'd also have the challenge of having to have a mixed
vehicle fleet with different capabilities. So 200 vehicles does
not meet the requirement and it gives us a mixed vehicle fleet.
Senator Wicker. You might have that under this three-
pronged approach.
General Flynn. No, sir. The three-pronged approach, the AAV
SLEP would have been designed to give us the time. Even if we
were fielding the EFV, we would have had to have invested in
extending the life of the AAV because of the time limit that it
would take us to go from IOC in 2016 to full operational
capability in 2026. So we would have to do an AAV SLEP along
the way to bridge the gap.
Senator Wicker. So there's not much difference, in your
judgment, in the cost of the AAV SLEP based on the termination
of the EFV? You would have had to do that in either scenario.
General Flynn. We would have had to have done some type of
SLEP in survivability, mobility, and communications to get the
vehicle mix, because we would have only been purchasing 50
vehicles a year.
Senator Wicker. Gentlemen, I'm learning a lot today, and I
guess that's the point of these hearings. It occurs to me that
we really don't know how much we're going to save because of
this decision to cancel the EFV because we don't know what
we're going to replace it with.
I think, General, your testimony is that of the three-
pronged approach to where we go from here, we're not sure which
ones we're going to do; is that correct?
General Flynn. That would be correct, sir. I'm not ready to
tell you what the specific vehicle mix would be until I got a
better idea of the cost-capability trades that we could get and
the capabilities of each of those individual programs.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Secretary, what's your most informed
estimate for this subcommittee of how much we're saving because
of the cancellation of the EFV program?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. We're going to do these all in
constant year dollars. Today the estimate for the EFV at 573--
not 200, at 573--is north of $17 million. It's approaching $18
million per vehicle. Now, we're going to put requirements on
the table and do some trades to get to a more affordable
vehicle. You're not going to get the same capability at any
significant cost reduction. So we have to trade off capability.
Senator Wicker. Yes, we're going to get a slower vehicle
and a less capable vehicle for sure.
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. What we're going to do is, as
General Flynn described, get requirements and acquisition in
the room at the same time, open up, unlock the requirements,
and price out a more affordable vehicle, where you take those
KPPs on things like speed, range, level of protection, and
number of marines that you're carrying, and instead of saying
it will be the following, we create a range. So there's a range
of speed, for example, that we're going to put on the table and
that will influence everything from the size of the engine to
endurance and things of that nature.
So in doing that, we've gone one time through in terms of
just a rough idea to figure out no-less-than values, what would
it cost. While we are talking about an $8 to $10 million
vehicle, the first cut going around is more like a $10 to $12
million vehicle. So there's that. Today if you asked me a best-
informed estimate, I would tell you that we're going to be
going from an $18 million vehicle to a $2 million vehicle based
on what we know today, but we're very, very early in the
process with the focus on figuring out, okay, how do we get
that cost down further.
But we're going to trade off capability to do that. We're
going to trade off speed, and we're looking at things like a
mix of ACV vessels, for example, where they don't all have to
have the same level of capability when it comes to things like
command and control, communications package, or maybe even
lethality when you get to the gun system that's embarked on
board.
General Flynn. Senator, one area where we've learned a lot
is in the area of protection. So there is an opportunity right
now to take advantage of everything we've learned on protection
in the next hull design, because if we have three big areas
that we're looking at right now as to how to make this
affordable in terms of capability, obviously it's performance
over the whole mission set, not just the ship-to-shore transit,
which is water speed, but also the performance on land and the
protection that's needed.
By some of the other discussions we've had today, hull
design could change significantly in this, and that's why it's
important that we pursue a technology demonstrator to see if
that protection's going to be different, because that's one
thing that's changed a lot over the last 10 years, is our
approach to protection and the different technologies available
to do it.
The third factor that we have to look at is habitability,
which also affects how the marines do in the back of the
vehicle. That's one of the reasons as the program cancellation
is proceeding one of the key things we're going to do with the
technology demonstrators or the system demonstrator vehicles
this summer is we're going to do some habitability
experimentation to see how the marines embarked on the vehicles
do in different lengths of time in the back of the vehicle. Air
quality, air temperature, all of that affects your ability to
fight when you get out of the vehicle.
So we're going to take a look at that, and that's going to
inform some of these tradeoffs that we're going to have to
make, so that we can get from an $18 million vehicle somewhere
down to a $10 to $12 million vehicle.
The other point about the 200 vehicles, sir, is the cost
would have grown from $18 million to well over $20 million a
vehicle. That was one of the other reasons why we didn't think
that was affordable.
Senator Wicker. You heard Secretary Stackley's answer to my
question about whether this was a close call. He said he was
not really involved at that level. How close of a call was it
in your estimation?
General Flynn. Sir, I don't know how close of a call it
was, but I would tell you it was difficult. All these decisions
are difficult. It was a difficult decision because we realized
how much we had invested in the program. But there was also a
realism that, could this be affordable. The graphs that we have
here, we were facing a pretty stark budget reality. So the
reality was when you look at where we were on budget, whether
we could afford the capability, and what had changed over time
in terms of threat, and in terms of the Navy's ability to do
it.
Although it was a difficult decision, I believe it was the
right decision to do it, sir.
Senator Wicker. If it turns out it was a $15 million
vehicle instead of $12 million vehicle, it becomes a dicier
choice, doesn't it? That's not outside the realm of
possibility.
Mr. Stackley. It's not outside the realm of possibility,
but I don't see us heading on that course. Affordability is
going to be a heavy factor in determining the design of the
ACV. So if we find ourselves ending up in the $15 million per
vehicle range, we're going back into the requirements to figure
out how do we get that cost back down so we can get the
quantity that's needed to perform the mission.
But today we don't have information that is looking at a
$15 million a copy vehicle.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been most
informative and it does occur to me that we're well served by
these gentlemen in front of us.
Mr. Stackley. Can I take one more piece on? This discussion
today, this is beyond just a hearing and beyond just a
briefing. What we're serious about is doing this work as
transparently as possible. We set up a war room just for having
discussion across the table, sometimes government to
government, and potentially down the road with industry. But
this story is going to continue to unfold with time and we
intend to make ourselves available as your questions continue.
I know it's been a hard spot in the past and we want to get to
a better place in that regard.
Senator Reed. Let me associate myself with the thoughtful
comment of my colleague that this was a very productive
hearing, as a result of your questions particularly.
I want to thank you, gentlemen, not only for your
testimony, but for your service. Also, there may be other
colleagues that have written questions which will be submitted,
and I would ask everyone to get those questions in, let's say
before next Wednesday for your prompt response. I know you're
taking one for the record for Senator Hagan already.
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
service and for your testimony.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
naval surface fire support requirements
1. Senator Reed. Vice Admiral Blake and General Flynn, in my
opening statement I mentioned the long-term efforts to address some
very important problems, including the need to improve fire support
capability, both organic Marine Corps fire support and Navy shore fire
support. I also referred to the mixed results we have achieved to date
addressing that problem. Please describe what your efforts have
achieved to date in improving fire support capability for sustaining
Marine Corps forces in a conflict.
Admiral Blake. In 2005, the ``Joint Fires in Support of
Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals'' Initial Capabilities
Document (ICD) documented four gaps in our fires capabilities:
(1) The ability to transmit/receive targeting information from
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) sources to Command
and Control systems assets;
(2) The ability to engage moving targets in adverse weather;
(3) The ability to engage known targets when friendly forces are
in close contact or when collateral damage is a concern; and
(4) The ability to provide volume fires to suppress targets.
For Gap (1), the Navy-Marine Corps team focused on three areas:
Unmanned Air Systems (UAS), Target Processing Systems, and Counter-fire
Radar. Unmanned air systems provide expanding warfighting options and
are frequently employed in conjunction with ground spotters to improve
targeting. For target processing systems, the Naval Fire Control System
(NFCS) automates shipboard naval fires planning and coordination for
DDG-81 and following hulls (currently fielded). The Supporting Arms
Coordination Center-Automated (SACC-A), integrates the capability to
plan and coordinate supporting arms fires on LHA/LHDs (currently
fielded). The Distributed Common Ground Station-Navy (DCGS-N) will
employ common geopositioning services capable of deriving aim points
for precision coordinate seeking weapons (Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) planned for 2011). POM 12 investments to address Gap
(1) include: Intelligence Carry-on Program (ICOP) and Multi-Function
Radar (MFR). ICOP will provide critical ISR capabilities to unit level
platforms and forces ashore (IOC planned for 2015). MFR will provide a
sea-based counter-fire capability to the DDG-1000 (IOC planned for
2016).
Gaps (2) and (3) are addressed by a number of systems including
tactical aircraft (TACAIR) delivering weaponry specific to the threat.
Over the last 20 years, Navy-Marine Corps aviation has significantly
increased its target prosecution capability through use of improved
aircraft-to-weapon connectivity that enables in-flight target updates
to data link equipped weapons. Today a single aircraft can attack
multiple targets. Additionally, there are a number of currently, or
soon to be, fielded weapons that are critical to ``mitigating'' these
gaps including:
- Tactical Tomahawk (currently fielded)
- Low Collateral Damage Bomb (currently fielded)
- Joint Stand Off Weapon (currently fielded)
- Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (IOC planned for 2011).
- Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (IOC planned for 2011)
- Harvest Hawk Airborne Weapon Mission Kit (currently fielded)
POM 12 investments to address Gaps (2 & 3) include: The Joint Air-
to-Ground Missile (JAGM) and Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) Increment II.
Both improve our ability to deliver precision fires and address moving
targets in adverse weather (IOC planned for 2016).
To address Gap (4), the ability to mass aircraft, missiles, and
NSFS can under most scenarios provide volume fires when needed. There
are over one hundred 5'' guns in the CG/DDG fleet today, all with a
13nm range and most of which have a fire control system that has much
improved accuracy over previous systems. Additionally, the TACAIR leg
of our ``Fires Triad'' (TACAIR, sea-based fires, ground-based fires)
provides a significant improvement in the volume of fires as compared
to past generations of aircraft and munitions. POM 12 investments to
address Gap (4) include: DDG-1000's Advanced Gun System (AGS) with its
Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), and Electro-Magnetic Rail
Gun (EMRG). LRLAP will have the capability to deliver precision and
volume fires (IOC planned for 2016). In future years, EMRG may offer a
system that could launch projectiles at ranges over 100nm. The Office
of Naval Research's EMRG Innovative Naval Prototype (INP) effort is
underway and the system could IOC in the 2025 timeframe.
General Flynn. The character of future operations in the littorals
has been proffered in several key Marine Corps and Naval documents, to
include Operational Maneuver From The Sea and Ship-to-Objective
Maneuver (STOM). These future visions call for an increased capability
with regard to fire support, especially during the critical transition
of combat power ashore. We have made great strides in improving the
aviation and ground-based fires but much work still is needed with
naval surface fires. The STOM concept of operations identifies the need
for fires throughout the littoral battlespace in order to support both
the vertical and surface assault elements of the amphibious force.
Effective fire support is provided by a combination of tactical
aviation, naval surface fires, and ground-based indirect fires. This
triad will ensure that the supported commander has fires available when
and where he needs them. The complementary nature of the triad is
essential.
DoN/USMC Aviation are investing in two weapon systems for air-to-
ground employment that will help mitigate fire support gaps.
1. The JAGM will be the replacement air-to-ground missile for
current Hellfire, TOW, and Maverick missile systems. It has a tri-mode
seeker (millimeter wave (MMW), Semi-active Laser (SAL), and Imaging
Infrared (IIR)) and is an all-weather, forward-firing, low collateral
damage weapon for both moving and stationary targets. IOC for use on
AH-1Z aircraft is 2016.
2. The SDB II is the second iteration (first for USMC/DoN) of the
miniature munition weapon system family. It uses a tri-mode seeker
(mmW, SAL, IIR) and will provide the F-35B increased standoff against
defended targets. It is a 250 lb. weapon, that will give the JSF the
advantage of increased kills per sortie compared to current families of
500, 1000, and 2000 lb weapons. It has day and night capability against
fixed and moving targets in all weather conditions. IOC for use on F-
35B is 2018.
The Marine Corps has made considerable investments in fire support
programs over the last two decades resulting in significant
improvements in organic, ground-based fires support. The principal
programs are:
1. High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System
2. M777A2 Light Weight 155mm Howitzer
3. Expeditionary Fire Support System includes weapon system and
development of Precision Extended Range Munitions
4. Improved 81mm and 60mm mortars
5. Family of Artillery Munitions (Dual-Purpose Improved
Conventional Munition replacement and munitions modernization)
6. Rocket Assisted Projectile replacement
7. Infrared 155mm Illumination
8. BiSpectral Smoke
9. Non-incendiary smoke
10. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
2. Senator Reed. Vice Admiral Blake and Lieutenant General Flynn,
what plans are represented in the budget and the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) to address this problem?
Admiral Blake. In 2005, the ``Joint Fires in Support of
Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals'' ICD documented four gaps in
our fires capabilities:
(1) The ability to transmit/receive targeting information from ISR
sources to Command and Control systems assets;
(2) The ability to engage moving targets in adverse weather;
(3) The ability to engage known targets when friendly forces are
in close contact or when collateral damage is a concern; and
(4) The ability to provide volume fires to suppress targets.
For Gap (1), the Navy-Marine Corps team focused on three areas:
Unmanned Air Systems (UAS), Target Processing Systems, and Counter-fire
Radar. Unmanned air systems provide expanding warfighting options and
are frequently employed in conjunction with ground spotters to improve
targeting. For target processing systems, the NFCS automates shipboard
naval fires planning and coordination for DDG 81 and following hulls
(currently fielded). The SACC-A, integrates the capability to plan and
coordinate supporting arms fires on LHA/LHDs (currently fielded). The
DCGS-N will employ common geopositioning services capable of deriving
aim points for precision coordinate seeking weapons (Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) planned for 2011). POM 12 investments to
address Gap (1) include: ICOP and MFR. ICOP will provide critical ISR
capabilities to unit level platforms and forces ashore (IOC planned for
2015). MFR will provide a sea-based counter-fire capability to the DDG-
1000 (IOC planned for 2016).
Gaps (2) and (3) are addressed by a number of systems including
TACAIR delivering weaponry specific to the threat. Over the last 20
years, Navy-Marine Corps aviation has significantly increased its
target prosecution capability through investment in precision munitions
with advanced guidance capabilities and data linked weapons, both of
which contribute to the ability of TACAIR assets to prosecute targets
in challenging weather conditions and in close proximity to friendly
forces. Additionally, there are a number of currently, or soon to be,
fielded weapons that are critical to ``mitigating'' these gaps
including:
- Low Collateral Damage Bomb (currently fielded)
- Joint Stand Off Weapon (currently fielded)
- Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (IOC planned for 2011).
- Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (IOC Planned for late
fiscal year 2011
- Harvest Hawk Airborne Weapons Mission Kit (Initial kits fielded)
POM 12 investments to address Gaps (2 & 3) include: The JAGM and
SDB Increment II. Both improve our ability to deliver precision fires
and address moving targets in adverse weather (IOC planned for 2016).
To address Gap (4), the ability to mass aircraft, missiles, and
NSFS can under most scenarios provide volume fires when needed. There
are over 100 5,, guns in the CG/DDG fleet today, all with a 13nm range
and most of which have a fire control system that has much improved
accuracy over previous systems. Additionally, the TACAIR leg of our
``Fires Triad'' (TACAIR, sea-based fires, ground-based fires) provides
a significant improvement in the volume of fires as compared to past
generations of aircraft and munitions. POM 12 investments to address
Gap (4) include: DDG-1000's AGS with its LRLAP, and EMRG. LRLAP will
have the capability to deliver precision and volume fires (IOC planned
for 2016). In future years, EMRG may offer a system that could launch
projectiles at ranges over 100nm. The Office of Naval Research's EMRG
INP effort is underway and the system could IOC in the 2025 timeframe.
General Flynn. The Marine Corps does not plan or budget for NSFS
capabilities. The DDG-1000 is the Navy's only funded Program of Record
for NSFS.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
expeditionary fighting vehicle
3. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle (EFV) program went through a Nunn-McCurdy breach and
recertification in 2007 during which the Department of Defense (DOD)
certified to Congress that requirements for an amphibious assault
capability were still operationally necessary and that the most cost-
effective means to achieve that capability was the EFV. Not much has
changed in terms of the need for the Marine Corps to have the
capability to carry out an amphibious assault. If anything, the area
denial capabilities of our adversaries that would oppose Navy-Marine
Corps amphibious operations have increased. What leads DOD and the Navy
to believe that lesser requirements for a vehicle like the EFV are
adequate to accomplish the amphibious assault mission?
Secretary Stackley. Based on the assessment conducted in support of
Nunn-McCurdy certification requirements, the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff validated that ``The Amphibious Joint Forcible Entry
Operations capabilities defined by the EFV Capabilities Production
Document remain essential to national security.'' The most essential of
those capabilities were:
the ability to self-deploy from over-the-horizon, thus
reducing the reliance on surface connectors whose limit of
advance was the beach or a port;
the ability to carry a reinforced squad of marines in
a single lift to facilitate the rapid buildup and projection of
combat power;
the inherent protection against most likely threats
encountered during the early phases of projection ashore
(ballistic threats from enemy combatant direct-fire weapons).
While the tactical advantages of at-sea speed capability provided
by the EFV are not dismissed, the principal driving factor leading to
the EFV's water speed requirement was the assumption that Marines would
not be combat ready after spending more than a hour in the vehicle at
sea--a legacy of the current amphibious assault vehicle (AAV). Testing
conducted during the EFV's development indicated that improvements in
habitability (air conditioning and improved vehicle exhaust) may
permitted Marines to ride in the vehicle longer without suffering ill
effects associated with the legacy AAV. Confirmation testing is
currently planned to occur in the Aug/Sept timeframe. At-sea speed
requirements were a significant system complexity and cost driver. With
information gained from EFV testing, we are reevaluating at-sea speed
requirement.
Our requirement remains to be able to deploy from amphibious
shipping from over-the-visual-horizon but at ranges less than 25 nm.
The Navy has supported campaign analysis and a war game, examining
scenarios requiring power projection from the sea using the EFV as well
as the legacy AAV and our current and projected suite of air assault
connectors. The analysis used official threat assessments and modeled
battlespace preparation in order to define threats to landings. The
analysis assessed concurrent and separate landings from 25 nm with one
force using EFV and another force using AAVs delivered by Landing Craft
Air Cushion (LCAC). The analysis did not specifically compare EFV and
AAV, in that the forces landed were in different locations and facing
different opposition. While both missions were accomplished, suggesting
that the EFV may not be required, higher risk was incurred using the
LCAC/AAV as a result of a slower build-up of combat power ashore.
Using fielded and planned capabilities to conduct pre-assault
battlespace preparation, the Navy assessed that U.S. weapons and
sensors will allow amphibious ships to operate at 12 nm from the coast
with acceptable risk against any residual threats. In March 2010, the
Office of Program Appraisal ``Assuring Operational Access'' Wargame
conducted three separate and distinct excursions using the then Program
of Record (EFV), the current capability set (AAV) and alternative
capabilities (Marine Expeditionary Maneuver Vehicle (MEMV) (notional),
and Ultra Heavy-lift Amphibious Connector (UHAC) (experimental)). The
results indicated that each option with its CONOPs has slightly
different risks, but similar successful outcomes.
As part of our ongoing systems engineering analysis and in the
analysis of alternatives to be conducted in support of the EFV's
replacement, we intend to evaluate the costs and operational
effectiveness of high vs. lower water speeds as well as distance
requirements.
4. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, do the Navy and the Marine
Corps stand behind the requirement to conduct amphibious operations
against a defended shoreline, or can requirements and costs be reduced
to support landings in only uncontested areas? In other words, is the
amphibious assault mission still relevant for the future?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, the amphibious assault mission is relevant
now and in the future, as it has been throughout recorded history.
An amphibious assault, as defined by the Department of Defense,
``involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile
shore.'' As that definition implies, an amphibious assault is not
necessarily against a defended shoreline. In fact, Marine Corps
maneuver warfare doctrine specifically espouses avoiding fixed defenses
if at all possible. This doctrine reflects both common sense and
operational experience. In 1943 General A.A. Vandegrift, who was
awarded the Medal of Honor for his command of the 1st Marine Division
at Guadalcanal, summarized his experience in the Solomon Islands
campaign. ``A comparison of the several landings'' he said, ``leads to
the inescapable conclusion that landings should not be attempted in the
face of organized resistance if, by any combination of march or
maneuver, it is possible to land unopposed within striking distance of
the objective.'' That is exactly what the Marine Corps is advocating in
the ship-to-objective maneuver concept.
What General Vandegrift clearly understood was that in war the
enemy gets a vote. While it is always preferable to avoid a contested
landing, that option is not always available. Thus, when conducting
amphibious operations in a hostile or uncertain environment, the Navy-
Marine Corps team must do so from a ready-to-fight posture.
We are in an era of great uncertainty. The Secretary of Defense
himself has acknowledged that the United States has been ineffective at
predicting the next conflict. In order to protect U.S. citizens and
interests overseas when crises erupt, we must maintain our capability
to project power--and that includes projecting power in the face of
armed opposition. Amphibious power is the only sustainable means of
doing so.
5. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, fundamentally, what has
changed since the Nunn-McCurdy certification in 2007 that favored
continuing the EFV as the most cost-effective way to meet the
amphibious assault requirement?
Secretary Stackley. The requirement has not changed. As stated by
the Secretary of Defense, we are firm in the requirement for a Marine
Corps amphibious combat vehicle (ACV). It is the key to allowing ship-
to-shore operations in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments;
assuring access where infrastructure is destroyed or nonexistent; and
creating joint access in defended areas.
What has changed, however, is that since 2007 unit costs for all
other vehicles have risen substantially, on the order of 300 to almost
500 percent, over their predecessors. The enhanced threat environment
in Iraq and Afghanistan has pushed increased counter improvised
explosive device and location requirements onto all future combat and
tactical vehicles. At the same time, C4/ISR capabilities, requirements
and costs have increased significantly. These fiscal pressures combined
with fiscal pressure across all other investment categories have forced
the Marine Corps to develop a top-to-bottom approach that affected the
EFV program.
6. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, when the Marine Corps
provided information to Congress in January supporting the decision to
end the EFV program, the case for termination was made by citing the
affordability of the EFV, not whether the EFV would be reliable and
capable of meeting mission requirements. The Marine Corps said that
continuing with the EFV would: consume about half the Marine Corps
total procurement budget for 2018-2025; consume all of the budget that
was projected to be available for procurement of ground combat vehicles
over that period; and consume about 90 percent of the operation and
maintenance (O&M) budget for Marine Corps ground vehicles when the EFV
was fully fielded. These cost projections were made against historical
cost averages. The affordability concerns raised by the Marine Corps
are significant, but should we allow comparisons to historical costs
drive an assessment of what is required to do the mission?
Secretary Stackley. The Marine Corps provides the Nation with a
comprehensive capability that is neither defined by nor limited by a
single vehicle platform. In order to maintain that capability and to
improve it to meet future challenges and threats, we must consider
affordability. In the case of EFV as with all of our other programs,
the Marine Corps did not measure costs of future systems strictly
against those of legacy systems.
Over the next two decades the Marine Corps will replace or upgrade
a large portion of the ground combat and tactical vehicle inventory.
The Corps assessed the affordability of EFV along with other key
elements of its ground combat and tactical vehicles against several
affordability metrics, one of which was based on historical vehicle
investments projected into the future. EFV was unaffordable by every
metric but it is just as important to note that even without EFV, the
potential required investment in vehicle modernization and sustainment
is also unaffordable when measured against the same metrics which means
that our fiscal trade-space within the vehicle portfolio is very
limited, even for a capability as important as that provided by an ACV.
7. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, since almost all new
procurement programs are more technically sophisticated than the
equipment they replace, is the historical cost of legacy programs
relevant to the requirements needed to execute the mission today?
Secretary Stackley. The Marine Corps assessed the affordability of
EFV along with other key elements of its ground combat and tactical
vehicles against several affordability metrics, one of which was based
on historical vehicle investments projected into the future. EFV was
unaffordable by every metric, but it is just as important to note that
even without EFV the potential required investment in vehicle
modernization and sustainment is also unaffordable when measured
against the same metrics. This effectively means that our fiscal trade-
space within the vehicle portfolio is very limited, even for a
capability as important as that provided by an ACV.
Over the next two decades the Marine Corps will replace or upgrade
a large portion of the ground combat and tactical vehicle inventory.
Unit costs for new vehicles have risen substantially, on the order of
300 to almost 500 percent, over their predecessors. At the same time
the Marine Corps is facing increasing fiscal pressure across all
investment categories.
Previously we have stated that procurement and sustainment of 573
EFVs would have:
consumed on average 49 percent of the Marine Corps
total procurement account during the years 2018-2525 (Based on
historical average procurement);
consumed more than 100 percent of what is projected to
be available for all procurement of ground vehicles during the
years 2018-25;
consumed more than 90 percent of the Marine Corps'
vehicle-related operations and maintenance account when fully
fielded.
Our supporting analysis was based on the fact that in recent
history the Marine Corps has committed about a third of its baseline
ground procurement budget to ground vehicle programs. Examining the
Marine Corps budget historically from fiscal year 1982-2015, and
projecting forward based on historical averages, we project a total
future vehicle procurement budget of $5.9 billion ($TY) during the
fiscal year 2018-2025 timeframe, which is a third of the total ground
procurement budget projection of $17.7 billion (TY$). The programmed
vehicle procurement cost for EFV during the same timeframe was $8.6
billion PMC, which equates to 49 percent of the projected total
procurement budget and 146 percent of our projected vehicle procurement
budget.
Our supporting analysis also projected available ground equipment
O&M funding against the O&M requirements for ground vehicles. Since
Marine Corps O&M funding is a large account, this analysis focused only
on baseline O&M dollars that supported:
organizational, intermediate, and depot level
maintenance;
acquisition and program support costs to include life-
cycle management and logistics and technical support;
sustainment programs associated with current equipment
sets, such as funding for secondary repairables and corrosion
prevention.
To determine O&M costs and affordability for the EFV, the annual
O&M would be about 6 percent of the average unit cost of the vehicle,
based on the program manager's estimate (analogous to other vehicles).
By fiscal year 2027, when the EFV was to be fully fielded, we projected
that the annual O&M cost for the EFV program would be about $750
million, or about 97 percent of the USMC O&M budget allocated to
vehicles. While this projection is very coarse, based on historical
vehicle O&M costs, and the Department would aggressively attack these
costs had we pursued procurement of the EFV; without question, the
complexity of this vehicle would have significantly impacted all other
Marine Corps O&M accounts.
8. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, what sort of methodology or
analysis of the operational requirements went into making the decision
to end the EFV other than concern about its cost?
Secretary Stackley. The Marine Corps assessed multiple options to
reduce EFV program costs balanced against operational (capability,
readiness, strategic depth and training) risk including:
(a) Reduced procurement. We looked at various reductions ranging
from 37-48 percent of the Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) of 573
vehicles. Each AAO reduction assessed increased our operational risk.
Each reduction option decreased or removed EFV from the operating
forces, the Reserve component, the training support establishment,
prepositioned equipment, and the Depot Maintenance allowance.
(b) Capability Modifications. 16 modifications were identified and
considered; however, only 2 carried acceptable operational risk.
(c) Compressed procurement cycle. This would have required an
additional $1.4 billion within the FYDP.
(d) Sustainment of current AAV in current configuration.
concept of ship-to-shore maneuver
9. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral Blake, the concept of ship-to-shore
maneuver supporting the EFV considered anti-ship threats from land-
based mobile cruise missiles, air-to-surface weapons, and mines
sufficiently serious that amphibious assaults were planned to be
launched from over-the-horizon to minimize the chances of loss or
damage to Navy ships. In the years since the EFV program was started in
1996, anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities have been added as a
potential threat to large Navy ships, including the large-deck
amphibious ships, and the sophistication of the other threats has
increased. What has changed about the Navy-Marine Corps concept of
ship-to-shore maneuver that makes the Navy more willing to bring
marines closer to shore to launch the assault phase?
Admiral Blake. In the 20 years since the EFV Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analysis, the threat in the littorals has indeed evolved
in new and challenging ways. These changes are characterized by the
proliferation of anti-ship cruise missiles, guided rockets, artillery,
mortar and missiles, advanced diesel submarines and mines. The threat
has also changed with the emergence and evolution of coordinated small
boat tactics and ``anti-access'' doctrine.
The Navy's area and self defense capabilities have also evolved to
pace this threat. Key to countering the threat is improved ISR
capabilities, and the ability to share a common operational picture.
The proliferation of Aegis combatants, the evolution of AN/SPY-1 radars
and the ongoing fielding of the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
in those combatants represents a significant enhancement in both area
and self defense capabilities. Additionally, the Naval Integrated Fire
Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) Project Office was established to ensure
that the Navy and Joint component programs of record (Aegis
modernization, CEC, Standard Missile-6, and E-2D) are aligned from a
systems engineering, integration, and test perspective. NIFC-CA expands
on the CEC sensor netting capability to provide Engage on Remote Over-
The-Horizon air defense capability to engage threats at the maximum
kinematic range of the missile. For a significant amphibious operation
involving a high threat environment, there will also be significant
shaping operations that occur to reduce risks associated with the
threat prior to commencing amphibious operations.
Amphibious ships have also improved and will continue to improve
self defense systems. Lower radar cross section (RCS), and the Rolling
Airframe Missile improve survivability. New gun systems including the
Mk 38 MOD 2 25mm gun, the Close In Weapons System) Block 1B with anti-
surface capability has been mounted on LHD and LSD Class ships, and the
LPD-17 employs the highly capable and extremely lethal Mk 46 30mm gun.
Enhanced naval capabilities are also being fielded to address the
submarine threat. An improved Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) combat
system suite as well as advanced versions of existing torpedoes greatly
enhance our capability to detect, track, and engage submarines
operating in the littorals.
The mine threat remains a challenge, but systems such as Littoral
Combat Ship with Mine Countermeasures Mission Module are being
developed to help counter this threat from deep water through the surf
zone.
A viable standoff range will provide sufficient reaction time to
counter the expected threat with a reasonable amount of risk.
Acceptable operational risk is determined by considering the mission,
the nature of the threats that can potentially oppose that mission, and
the capabilities of friendly forces to counter those threats. The final
decision to conduct amphibious operations is based on mission
requirements and risk, regardless of standoff range.
10. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral Blake, if a 25 knot water speed is
no longer required to launch from about 25 miles from the shore, what
range of speed and distance from shore are being considered for the
EFV's replacement?
Admiral Blake. Projected speed of the EFV replacement, the ACV, is
currently 8-10 knots. The speed of the amphibious vehicle, the distance
traveled, along with temperature, sea-state, and cabin atmosphere have
a direct impact on a marine's combat effectiveness once ashore. Past
studies have indicated that an individual combat effectiveness
diminishes after an hour of transit of time. In order to ensure optimal
combat effectiveness, stay-time for the marine within the vehicle is
targeted at one hour or less. Launch distance therefore is a function
of the speed of the vehicle and the other factors listed above.
The Marine Corps continues to evaluate these requirements, and will
do Human Affects Testing (HAT) to determine transit time versus combat
effectiveness, a key factor in the determination of speed and distance
to shore.
The Navy is working to support the Marine Corps in the development
of the requirements for the ACV and its associated doctrine. Further
detail with regard to ACV requirements would be more appropriately
addressed by the Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration &
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
11. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral Blake, what drives the speed and
distance requirement in terms of how long marines can stay in an
amphibious vehicle and be effective when they reach shore?
Admiral Blake. The intent of the requirement is to deliver combat
ready marines ashore regardless of the distance traveled. The speed of
the amphibious vehicle and the distance it travels will yield a direct
relationship to the amount of time that a marine spends inside the
vehicle. In addition to the time spent in the vehicle, there are
several other factors known to affect human performance, including:
temperature, sea-state, and cabin atmosphere. The Marine Corps will be
conducting testing to further refine our understanding of human
physiology as it relates to sustained travel aboard amphibious
vehicles.
The Navy is working to support the Marine Corps in the development
of the requirements for the ACV and its associated doctrine. Further
detail with regard to ACV requirements would be more appropriately
addressed by the Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration
and Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
12. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral Blake, can this be improved?
Admiral Blake. The Marine Corps will be conducting studies in
August 2011 to determine the relationship between time spent in the
amphibious vehicle and combat effectiveness and identify potential
improvements.
The Navy is working to support the Marine Corps in the development
of the requirements for the ACV and its associated doctrine. Further
detail with regard to ACV requirements would be more appropriately
addressed by the Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration
and Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
marine corps response to the expeditionary fighting vehicle termination
13. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, the Marine Corps
proposes responding to the EFV termination through a three-phased
acquisition policy. It will upgrade a portion of the legacy AAV
inventory through a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) that will
extend their life and add capability. It will accelerate the Marine
Personnel Carrier (MPC) program designed to complement the EFV, AAV, or
the replacement for the EFV known as ACV. The MPC would not be designed
to swim ashore, but would be a fighting vehicle on land. Design
requirements are being developed. It will also develop the new ACV
building on the lessons learned from the EFV. The wind up of the EFV is
focused on harvesting relevant technology from the EFV program to
transfer to the new ACV. How many of the legacy AAVs now in service
will undergo a SLEP?
General Flynn. We estimate that approximately 400 of our legacy AAV
will be required to undergo SLEP in order to the required operational
availability of vehicles as a bridge until we field the ACV.
14. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, what capabilities
will be added to the AAV?
General Flynn. The initial priority is to make survivability and
force protection improvements while restoring land and water
performance lost through previous survivability improvements. This will
likely require modifications and improvements to power-train and
suspension components to mitigate the effects of weight growth and
component obsolescence.
15. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, how old are the AAVs
and how much additional life will the SLEP provide?
General Flynn. Today's AAV are built upon the LVT-7 family of
vehicles which began fielding in 1971. Over the past 40 years these
systems have been service life extended, product improved, rebuilt to
standard, upgraded and continuously maintained at all echelons.
Depending on the extent of the SLEP, it may be possible to extend the
serice life by up to 20 years. Our current plan is limited to those
survivability-related upgrades to improve the capability until we can
field the ACV.
16. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, how much funding does
the Marine Corps estimate will be required, or how much is available,
for a SLEP?
General Flynn. The funding available in PB-12 is sufficient to
begin work on AAV SLEP. The detailed cost estimates necessary to
determine total program costs will be developed as part of acquisition
strategy. We estimate that we will need to SLEP approximately 400 of
our legacy AAVs to address force protection, survivability, durability
and obsolescence modifications and improvements.
17. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, given budget
constraints, how confident is the Marine Corps that improvement of the
amphibious assault capability may not be limited to a SLEP of the AAV?
General Flynn. Development and procurement of the ACV will remain a
high investment priority; however, we are assessing AAV affordability
options and risks. In the absence of a modern replacement for the AAV,
the limitations and risks associated with relying solely on the legacy
system will be assessed and mitigated where possible.
18. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, in terms of the MPC,
how expensive is this vehicle estimated to be in comparison to the EFV
or its proposed replacement the ACV?
General Flynn. In order to better distribute combat power for
sustained operations ashore, two MPCs are required to lift the same
reinforced rifle squad that is concentrated in a single EFV or single
ACV. Based on responses we have received from industry, the cost to
lift a reinforced rifle squad in comparison to EFV was approximately
half. Given current ACV cost targets, the comparative costs to lift a
reinforced rifle squad are estimated to be approximately two thirds
that of the ACV's targeted cost.
19. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, how much money will
actually be saved by cancelation of the EFV if the Marine Corps must
extend the life of the AAVs, and design and build two new vehicles, the
ACV and the MPC?
General Flynn. The plan to procure MPC and to upgrade AAVs is
independent of the decision to cancel EFV as the AAV upgrade was a
necessary activity to bridge to EFV and MPC was a complementary
capability to EFV to address overall tactical lift capacity. Both
initiatives pre-dated the cancellation of the EFV program. The
principal cost avoidance will be attained by developing an ACV that
costs less to procure than the EFV would have. We have set a cost
target of approximately $12 million for the ACV.
20. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, what is the timeline
for designing and building the MPC?
General Flynn. We are working to fully develop an integrated
acquisition plan in support of ACV, MPC, and AAV SLEP. Early returns in
this process point to a required initial operational capability of
2018.
21. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, won't an improved AAV
that will be in service for a long time together with the new ACV leave
the Marine Corps with two different sets of amphibious vehicles and the
associated higher costs of a mixed inventory?
General Flynn. Improvements to the AAV are intended to enable the
Marine Corps to sustain its amphibious capability until the ACV is
fielded. As with other equipment replacement programs, the transition
period between the initial fielding of a new capability and attainment
of full operational capability will result in a mixed fleet of
vehicles. During this transition period, the AAV inventory will be
disposed as the ACV inventory increases.
22. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, how will the MPC get
ashore if it doesn't swim as the EFV and APC would?
General Flynn. Introduction of the MPC into theater is planned as
part of a Maritime Prepositioning Force deployment. MPC is a
reinforcing capability relative to the self-deploying ACV. MPC will
transit to the beach or port via connectors such as the LCAC,
conventional landing craft, the Improved Navy Lighterage System or via
pier-side offload. The ACV will be optimized to support ship-to-
objective water and land mobility as the main effort of an amphibious
assault, while the MPC is optimized to provide a combat vehicle capable
of protected land mobility in support of sustained operations ashore.
23. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, does this mean that
the Marine Corps will be operating two different combat vehicles during
the land phase of the amphibious assault, the ACV, and the MPC?
General Flynn. The Marine Corps operates multiple combat and
tactical vehicles including AAVs, Light Armored Reconnaissance
Vehicles, and tanks as well several tactical vehicles. The role of
providing tactical mobility in armored personnel carriers would have
been fulfilled by a combination of the EFV and the MPC. The ACV will
fulfill the role intended for the EFV and it will be complemented by
the MPC to achieve the required mobility capacity.
24. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Flynn, won't protection from
improvised explosive devices and other threats necessarily be different
in the two vehicles?
General Flynn. Yes. Each system will need to be designed to counter
and mitigate the effects of the IED threat. The ACV design will be
driven, in part, by its strenuous amphibious requirements which will
likely mean a different survivability and force protection approach
than for the MPC which will be designed for superior land mobility.
However, common materials and approaches will be evaluated in order to
reduce life cycle costs. ACV protection methodologies, performance and
payload protection trade-space assessments and capability level
estimates will be a critical part of early technology demonstration and
development efforts just they were for the MPC.
[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:27 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed, Blumenthal,
Wicker, and Ayotte.
Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Christopher J. Paul,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Brian F.
Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to
Senator Webb; Jeremy Bratt, assistant to Senator Blumenthal;
Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Joseph Lai,
assistant to Senator Wicker; and Brad Bowman, assistant to
Senator Ayotte.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN
Senator Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. I want to
welcome our witnesses to the hearing this afternoon. We're
honored to have: Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition; Vice Admiral
Kevin M. McCoy, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA);
and Captain William J. Galinis, Supervisor of Shipbuilding
(SUPSHIP) for the Gulf Coast. Thank you, gentlemen. We're
grateful for your service to the Nation and certainly grateful
for the service of your fellow naval personnel and marines who
do so much to assure our safety and our freedom. Thank you.
The Navy continues to be faced with a number of critical
issues as it tries to balance its modernization needs and
procurement needs against the costs of current operations. The
shipbuilding budget remains at a level where it will be
difficult at best to field the Navy we want, and indeed even
the Navy that we need.
With that in mind, we need to ensure that we are getting
good value for every shipbuilding dollar that we spend. We were
very pleased to see the Department's decision to continue
budgeting for two Virginia-class submarines per year. We
believe that what the Navy and the contractor team have been
achieving in driving down costs and reducing construction
should be a model for other Navy programs.
We support the Navy's efforts to drive costs out of the
Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program.
SSBNs will remain a vital leg of the nuclear triad for the
foreseeable future. Achieving cost reduction goals in these two
programs will yield significant stability to our Navy's
submarine industrial base and provide the Navy with a modern,
capable submarine fleet for many years to come. As we have been
told on numerous occasions, stability is a very important
factor in achieving quality and affordability.
We now have the prospect of achieving some stability in the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Since last year, after
conducting a winner-take-all competition, the Navy decided that
by awarding 10 ships to each shipbuilder the Navy could save
$2.9 billion, or $1 billion more than the program of record,
and could purchase an additional LCS vessel during the same
period of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), 20 ships
rather than 19.
We understand that each builder has been making much better
progress on the second ship in terms of cost, quality, and
schedule. Stability in the program should permit the
contractors to make further improvements.
On a somewhat less happy note, there have been lingering
problems in some shipbuilding programs. The highest profile
among these has been the LPD-17 program. We have had a host of
problems on these ships, not the least of which has been cost
growth, schedule delays, and construction problems,
particularly on the earlier ships in the program.
The Navy took delivery of the first and second ships while
they were still in an incomplete form and has subsequently
identified numerous construction problems on the first two
ships. We also know that the Navy has had problems with the
later ships in the class as well. There have been welding
problems, pipe hanger installation problems, lube oil
contamination problems, and others.
Now, the goal here is not to single out a particular
shipyard. In fact, you can look at every naval program over the
last several decades and find significant problems. When I was
first elected in 1991, the Seawolf was suffering from cost
overruns, from quality control, et cetera. So our purpose is
not singling out shipyards. It's really to find out
systemically what we have to do to ensure that all the
shipbuilding programs of the Navy are operating on budget, on
time, and with high quality. That's the challenge we all face.
If we understand these systemic issues, we can help the Navy
deal with them, and that is our intention.
Secretary Stackley, we talked last week about the bow wave
in procurement costs and bow wave of operating and support
(O&S) costs facing Navy and Marine Corps ground systems. I
suspect that we could have a similar discussion today about
Navy ships. Later in this decade we will need to ramp up
surface ship construction to meet missile defense and fleet air
defense requirements, and we'll have to begin construction of
an Ohio-class replacement submarine. The 30-year shipbuilding
plan lays out all of these programs along with the resources
necessary to execute the plan.
However, in our country's current fiscal environment it is
very unlikely that we will have as much money to spend on the
30-year shipbuilding plan as that plan assumes. Fundamentally
that is why this hearing is so important.
We need to focus on harvesting the savings from quality
improvements and efficiency improvements in the shipyards
across the entire shipbuilding program without exceptions. We
need to do this not only because of the direct savings, but
also because we need to demonstrate to the taxpayer that we are
using defense dollars wisely.
There are significant challenges and we fear they have the
potential to add a great deal of instability to the Navy
shipbuilding budget even in the near term. If the Navy is not
able to control its acquisition program and drive our cost
growth down while still getting quality ships, the Navy will
not be able to afford the 313-ship fleet the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) says he needs to meet the requirements
identified by the Quadrennial Defense Review.
We look forward to hearing your testimony this afternoon on
these and other issues facing the Navy.
With that, I will recognize my colleague Senator Wicker,
then Senator Ayotte if she has any comments.
Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
holding this very important hearing today.
I'd like to thank our witnesses for their attendance today
as well as their selfless service to our Nation, and also thank
all the attendees in the hearing room today for their interest.
I'm sure I speak for all subcommittee members when I say
that our thoughts and prayers are with all our deployed sailors
at sea and ashore, including those expeditionary sailors from
Mississippi, our Seabees, explosive ordnance disposal teams,
and riverine and maritime security forces, particularly those
who are currently engaged in combat. Their hard work and
dedication reflect the very finest traditions of the Navy, and
of course their sacrifices are matched only by those of their
families, who have supported these men and women in the service
of their country.
There are many issues for us to discuss today. I know our
esteemed witnesses as well as the tens of thousands of
dedicated naval shipyard workers throughout our country share a
joint commitment to providing our sailors and marines with the
finest ships in the world on time and on budget. I look forward
to the testimony of our witnesses in this regard.
The Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan sets a course to build
from the current battle force inventory of only 286 ships to a
goal of a minimum of 313. Over the next decade, the Navy will
begin to ramp up its production of destroyers, amphibious
landing and support ships, submarines, LCSs, oil tankers, and
Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV).
I'm concerned about the amount of funding needed for ship
construction going forward. The Ohio-class replacement SSBNs
run about $6 to $7 billion each and the Virginia-class
submarines cost about $2 billion each. With more than half of
the construction and development cost dollars being needed to
build extraordinarily expensive nuclear submarines, I am
concerned that our commitment to submarines may be crowding out
funding needed to build large surface ships and to modernize
the fleet. I hope the witnesses can tell us what they are doing
to reduce the cost of building these submarines and give us
their views on the impact of submarine construction costs on
surface shipbuilding, including amphibious ships, and how it
may impact the shipbuilding industrial base.
In addition, there are concerns that continued design
problems and the Navy's recent decision to continue a dual sole
source LCS strategy may increase cost risks in these and other
complex acquisitions. From the first ship in its class, the
LPD-17 San Antonio-class amphibious ship program has displayed
chronic problems in terms of safety, engineering, design, and
oversight. These problems have been so significant that they
give rise to broader concerns about a widespread readiness
problem afflicting our surface fleet.
I'm pleased with the leadership of the Atlantic Fleet
Commander, Admiral Harvey, in starting to turn these problems
around. But I'm troubled by how we got to this point. As to the
LPD-17 class of ships, for example, how, with five already
delivered and four under construction, have we been left with
an entire class of ships that, according to the Pentagon's
chief independent weapons tester, is ``not effective, suitable,
and not survivable in combat.''
With Northrop Grumman's sale of its shipyards, I'd like to
know what the Navy's plans are for the construction of the last
LPD-17 ship.
In addition to these points, I would also like the Gulf
Coast SUPSHIP and the NAVSEA Commander to address the apparent
downward trend in funding for maintenance, with the negative
impact falling more heavily on surface combatants than on
carriers and submarines.
Now let me say a quick word about the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) program, which has a couple of important test
events coming up this year that relate to the shipbuilding
portfolio, in particular shipboard testing on a carrier and on
the L-class ship for the Navy's F-35C and the Marine Corps' F-
35B respectively.
Given the well-deserved focus on the JSF program recently,
I'd like to know from our witnesses what challenges do they see
in having each of those F-35 variants effectively integrated to
the ships from which they are supposed to operate.
The Navy faces many difficult challenges. That said, the
performance of our sailors and marines has never been more
gratifying to watch. They make us proud every day.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on these and
other tough but important issues which go squarely to how we
arm and equip those men and women who serve their Nation so
selflessly at home and abroad.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Ayotte, do you have any comments?
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just again
welcome the witnesses and thank you for your service. I do want
to give a special welcome to Vice Admiral McCoy, who is a
former Commander of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and we're
very honored to have him since I'm very proud of our shipyard.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator.
Secretary Stackley.
STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker,
Senator Ayotte, thank you for the opportunity for Vice Admiral
McCoy, Captain Galinis, and myself to appear before you today
to address Navy shipbuilding. Thank you, of course, for your
steadfast support to our sailors and marines as you provide and
maintain our Navy.
With your permission, I propose to keep my opening remarks
brief and to submit a formal more detailed statement for the
record.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Stackley. Today's Navy is a battle force of 286 ships,
as many as half of which are under way on any given day,
providing presence and maintaining readiness to respond to
crisis or conflict wherever our Nation's interests are
challenged. Our Navy's ability to reliably meet the demands
that come with global presence and readiness rely upon certain
enduring qualities: the size of the force, measured in numbers
of ships; the capabilities designed and built into these ships,
the skills and productivity of our government and industry
workforce responsible for building and maintaining these ships;
and the skill, dedication, and resourcefulness of our sailors
and marines who put to sea in them.
The CNO and the Commandant have defined the 313-ship Navy
as the force necessary to meet our naval requirements. In fact,
the CNO has emphasized that 313 ships is the floor. So to this
end, the 2012 budget request includes funding for 10 ships and
over the 5-year FYDP includes 55 ships, an increase of 5 ships
over the plan of a year ago.
This increase reflects a priority placed on shipbuilding
and reflects efforts to improve affordability within our
shipbuilding program, efforts which must prove effective if we
are to succeed in recapitalizing ship classes which were
constructed during the buildup of the 600-ship Navy.
Our budget request includes continued funding for CVN-78,
advanced procurement for CVN-79, and funding for the refueling
overhaul of CVN-72, all necessary to sustain an 11-carrier
force over the next 3 decades.
We continue Virginia-class construction at two boats per
year, a build rate essential to recapitalizing our submarine
force, essential to affordability, and essential to ramping up
our industrial base as we approach construction of our next
fleet SSBN.
We sustain DDG-51 production, adding capability and
capacity to our sea-based missile defense, and to our plan of a
year ago we have added a second destroyer in 2014 which, with
the planned proposal for a multi-year procurement in 2013, will
leverage the stability of this mature program, improve build
rates for our two combatant shipbuilders, and improve
affordability.
Our Aegis modernization efforts are equally critical,
serving to increase the number of missile defense platforms
from 21 today to 41 by the end of the FYDP, while also
improving their material condition to meet readiness demands in
the second half of their service lives.
We increase LCS construction to four ships per year.
Efforts to stabilize design, improve production planning,
invest in shipbuilder improvements, build at efficient rates,
and leverage long-term vendor agreements, all within the
framework of competitive fixed price contracts, have markedly
improved affordability for this 55-ship program.
We increase our amphibious lift capacity and capability
with procurement of the 11th LPD-17 class ship and our
extending the service of the USS Peleliu to maintain 9
operationally available big decks while awaiting delivery of
the lead ship of the America-class, LHA-6.
We're also increasing our logistics lift capability with
procurement of the third Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) and a
JHSV. Actions by Congress and the Navy to accelerate the MLP
program significantly improve affordability while also
addressing a critical work load valley confronting that
shipbuilder.
In the second half of this decade, we will need to proceed
with recapitalization of three major ship programs. We're
accelerating introduction of our next fleet oiler, T-AOX,
beginning in 2014. T-AOX will bring modern commercial design to
our refueling at sea capabilities while also providing critical
stability to an important sector of our industrial base.
We plan to commence replacement of the LSD-41 class
amphibious ships in 2017 following definition of lift
requirements for this new ship class. Most significantly, we
will procure the lead ship of the Ohio-class replacement in
2019. It is vital that we sustain development activities for
this submarine with sufficient lead times to ensure our ability
to produce this highly complex, uniquely capable ship on
schedule. But it's equally vital that we address cost risk on
this program or we place other ship programs at risk. So we've
carefully defined capabilities necessary to ensure the ship's
ability to meet its requirements while embarking on a focused
design for affordability effort to capitalize on lessons
learned in the Virginia program at a much earlier stage in the
Ohio replacement program.
In the most pragmatic terms, in balancing requirements,
risk, and realistic budgets, affordability does control our
numbers. So to this end we're focused on bringing stability to
the shipbuilding program, finding the affordable 80 percent
solution, strengthening our acquisition workforce, imposing
cost discipline as we define our requirements, clamping down on
contract design changes, placing greater emphasis on O&S costs
in our designs, and placing greater emphasis on competition and
fixed price contracts.
Modernizing today's force and recapitalizing the fleet
affordably cannot be accomplished without strong performance by
industry. So we are working with industry to benchmark
performance, to identify where improvements are necessary, to
provide proper incentives for capital investments where
warranted, and to reward sustained strong performance.
As well, we're working with industry to improve quality in
construction and reliability and readiness in service. LPD-17
reliability, Aegis wholeness, completion levels of new
construction carriers, and isolated quality issues on even our
most reliable construction program, the submarine, have caused
us to methodically and aggressively attack root causes in
design, construction standards, workforce training and
qualifications, oversight and compliance, ship's force manning
and training, documentation, software maintenance, and
logistics support.
Much progress has been made in these areas. Quality of
delivered ships continues to improve. Readiness measures are
improving. Underlying issues that have affected readiness are
being identified. But much work remains. We need to sustain
these efforts to improve quality and readiness while also
ensuring the higher standard becomes the standard practice.
In sum, the Navy is committed to building the fleet
required to support the National Defense Strategy, to which the
2012 budget request addresses near-term capability needs, while
also laying the foundation for long-term requirements.
Ultimately, we recognize that as we balance requirements,
affordability, and industrial base considerations, it is vital
that we, Navy and industry, improve affordability within our
programs in order to build the Navy needed by the future force.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today and we look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stackley, Admiral
McCoy, and Captain Galinis follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Sean J. Stackley, VADM Kevin M. McCoy,
USN, and CAPT William J. Galinis, USN
Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to address Navy shipbuilding. The Department is committed to the effort
to build an affordable fleet which supports the National Defense
Strategy, the Maritime Strategy, and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). The Department's fiscal year 2012 budget will provide
platforms that are capable, agile, and able to respond to the dynamic
nature of current and future threats. The fiscal year 2012 shipbuilding
budget funds 10 ships, including 2 Virginia-class attack submarines, 1
Navy Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), 1 LPD-17-class amphibious
transport dock, 1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), 1 DDG-51-class
destroyer, and 4 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). In addition, the Navy
will procure an oceanographic ship and the Army has funded one JHSV
which the Navy will procure. Our budget also funds advance procurement
for CVN 79, the second increment of full funding for LHA-7, and advance
procurement for the two fiscal year 2013 DDG-51s and Virginia-class
submarines.
The Navy continues to ensure our shipbuilding plan is affordable,
stable, and increases capacity and capability as needed to meet the
most likely evolving threats. In 2010, six ships were placed in
commission; two Virginia-class submarines, three Arleigh Burke
destroyers, and one LCS. In addition, two T-AKEs were delivered.
Today, our sailors and marines are conducting combat operations in
Afghanistan. In addition, our aircraft carriers are providing about 30
percent of combat air support for troops on the ground in Afghanistan,
with more sorties being provided by AV-8B Harriers flying from
amphibious assault ships. While the drawdown in Iraq continues, we
still have more than 24,000 sailors and 22,000 marines ashore or afloat
in the Central Command Area of Responsibility.
Because our national interests extend beyond Iraq and Afghanistan,
so do our sailors and marines. More than 40 percent of our ships are
underway daily, globally present and persistently engaged. Recently,
U.S. naval forces supported efforts in Japan. Last year, U.S. naval
forces provided deterrence against North Korea, conducted counter-
piracy operations in the Indian Ocean with a coalition of several
nations, trained local forces in maritime security as part of our
Global Maritime Partnership initiatives in Africa and the Pacific,
responded with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the
earthquake in Haiti and flood in Pakistan, and conducted the world's
largest maritime exercise, our biannual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)
multi-national training exercise. RIMPAC brought together 14 nations
and more than 20,000 military personnel, including 25 of our Navy ships
and submarines, a Coast Guard cutter, and elements of the III Marine
Expeditionary Force. Through RIMPAC and follow-on exercises, our
forward-deployed forces, in partnerships with naval forces from the
Republic of Korea, demonstrated a strong, credible deterrent against
continued North Korean aggression. Off the coast of Africa, as part of
an international coalition of more than 20 other nations, U.S. naval
forces continue to provide deterrence and maritime security in the form
of counter-piracy. Specifically, our Navy-Marine Corps team
successfully intervened and freed the crew of the German merchant
vessel M/V Magellan Star after pirates captured the vessel in the Gulf
of Aden last September and during that same deployment rescued 62
Somali and Ethiopian persons. We are also continuing to partner with
U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement teams in the Caribbean to conduct
counter-narcotics and anti-trafficking operations and deny traffickers
use of the sea for profit and exploitation.
Our USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), and U.S.
marines assigned to the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), deployed
early to reinforce the Peleliu ARG/15th MEU in providing humanitarian
assistance to Pakistan after a flood placed almost one-fifth of the
Nation underwater, devastating the population and the land. Our
disaster relief effort also continued in Haiti with 15 ships including
the USNS Comfort (T-AH-20), USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), USS Nassau (LHA-
4) ARG with the 24th MEU, USS Bataan (LHD-5) ARG with the 22d MEU, and
the maritime prepositioning ship USNS 1st Lt Jack Lummus (T-AK-3011),
as part of Operation Unified Response. In Central and South America,
the medical staff and Seabees embarked aboard the multi-purpose
amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7), working with partner
nations, provided medical, dental, veterinary, and engineering
assistance to Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Nicaragua, Panama, and Suriname during Continuing Promise 2010. During
the deployment, Continuing Promise 10 personnel provided medical,
dental, and optometry services to more than 161,000 patients. Operation
Pacific Partnership, led by the Commander, Destroyer Squadron 21 aboard
the USNS Mercy, provided treatment to 109,754 patients. In addition,
they completed 22 engineering projects and treated more than 2,800
veterinary patients in Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Palau, Timor-
Leste, and Papua New Guinea.
Our sailors and marines remain on point throughout the world,
projecting U.S. influence, responding to contingencies, and building
international relationships that will keep the maritime commons safe
and secure. This is critical to the free flow of commerce, a foundation
of our economic prosperity.
Our ballistic missile submarines are providing nuclear deterrence
year-round, while our Aegis cruisers and destroyers are providing
conventional deterrence in the form of ballistic missile defense (BMD)
of our allies and partners in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the
Western Pacific. Our Carrier Strike Groups and ARGs continue to prevent
conflict and deter aggression in the Western Pacific, Arabian Gulf and
Indian Ocean, while their forward deployments afford the United States
the ability to influence events abroad and the opportunity to rapidly
respond to crisis.
Global demand for naval forces remains high and continues to rise
because of the ability of our maritime forces to overcome diplomatic,
geographic, and military impediments to access while bringing the
persistence, flexibility and agility to conduct operations at sea. Our
fiscal year 2012 budget submission properly balances our naval forces
to support this demand and includes five more ships than our fiscal
year 2011 plan, which were achieved through competitive contracting,
reduced overhead and increased efficiencies. We continue to pursue
steps to buy smarter, streamline our organizations and operations,
realign manpower, and pursue energy efficiencies.
The Department has conducted a Force Structure Analysis based upon
the minimum 313 ship force needed for our Navy-Marine Corps team. The
plan is designed to provide the global reach; strategic deterrence;
persistent presence; and strategic, operational and tactical effects
expected of naval forces within reasonable levels of funding. The plan
balances the combatant commanders' demand for naval forces with
expected future resources, and takes into account the importance of
maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding design and industrial
base and using realistic cost estimates.
The global proliferation of land-attack ballistic missiles and the
anticipated proliferation of anti-ship ballistic missiles, and the
challenges associated with gaining and sustaining access for shore-
based BMD systems worldwide suggest the demand for BMD-capable surface
combatants will continue to increase beyond 2024 even with the
introduction of Aegis Ashore.
Over the next decade (fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2021), the
Department of the Navy begins to ramp up production of ships necessary
to support strategic deterrence, persistent presence, maritime
security, irregular warfare, intra-theater sealift, humanitarian
assistance, disaster relief, and partnership building missions; namely
the LCS, JHSV and Fleet Oiler Replacement programs. At the same time,
the Department continues production of large surface combatants and
attack submarines, as well as amphibious landing and support ships.
Yearly new construction shipbuilding spending during this period is
projected to average $15 billion (fiscal year 2011$). Beyond fiscal
year 2021, Navy investments at a sustainable average of $15.7 billion
(fiscal year 2011$) a year in new ship construction, which is roughly
the 30-year average. The overall size of the battle force begins a
steady climb, reaching 324 ships by fiscal year 2021.
In the second decade (fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2031), the
recapitalization plan for the current Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine
(SSBN) inventory is realigned. Current plans call for 12 new Ohio-class
replacement submarines (SSBN(X)) with life-of-the-ship nuclear reactor
cores to replace the existing 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. Advance Procurement
funds for detail design for the first SSBN(X) begin in fiscal year 2015
with funds following in fiscal year 2017 to support procurement of long
lead time material for the lead ship of the class scheduled to begin
construction in fiscal year 2019 ensuring that 12 operational ballistic
missile submarines will be available to perform the vital strategic
deterrent mission. Since SSBNs have not been procured since the early
1990s, shipbuilding expenditures have not included funds for this class
of ships in over 20 years. To support the recapitalization of the
seaborne leg of the Nation's strategic deterrent, yearly shipbuilding
expenditures during the second decade are projected to average about
$17.5 billion (fiscal year 2011$) per year, or about $2 billion more
than the steady-state 30-year average. Even at this elevated funding
level the total number of ships built per year will inevitably fall
because of the percentage of the shipbuilding account which must be
allocated for the procurement of the SSBN(X). Recognizing these
impacts, we have already embarked on a program of aggressively
challenging capability improvements and design and construction
practices to identify means to deliver this important capability at
least cost, including leveraging technology and lessons learned from
the highly successful Virginia SSN shipbuilding program.
In the last decade (fiscal year 2032 to fiscal year 2041), average
new construction shipbuilding expenditures are projected to fall back
to a more sustainable level of about $14.5 billion (fiscal year 2011$)
per year. Moreover, after the production run of Ohio replacement SSBNs
comes to an end in fiscal year 2034, the average number of ships built
per year begins to rebound.
aircraft carriers
Our aircraft carriers are best known for their unmistakable forward
presence, ability to deter potential adversaries and assure our allies,
and capacity to project power at sea and ashore; however, they are
equally capable of providing our other core capabilities of sea
control, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster
response. Our carriers provide our Nation the ability to rapidly and
decisively respond globally to crises with a small footprint that does
not impose unnecessary political or logistic burdens upon our allies or
potential partners.
cvn-78
The Gerald R. Ford is the lead ship of our first new class of
aircraft carrier in nearly 40 years. Gerald R. Ford-class carriers will
be the premier forward deployed asset for crisis response and early
decisive striking power in a major combat operation. They incorporate
the latest technology, including an innovative new flight deck designed
to provide greater operational flexibility, reduced manning
requirements, and the ability to operate all current and future naval
aircraft. Among the new technologies being integrated is the
Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) which will support
Ford's increased sortie generation rates. EMALS is moving from a
promising technology to a proven operational capability, which will
deliver the warfighting enhancement needed in the future. Recently, the
program successfully demonstrated a controlled launch sequence with the
full-scale EMALS production representative unit and a successful
aircraft launch demonstration. While land-based testing is ongoing and
identifying engineering issues that will allow us to retire risk prior
to ship operations, EMALS' production schedule supports the planned
delivery of CVN-78 in September 2015.
the submarine fleet
Our attack and guided missile submarines have a unique capability
for stealth and persistent operation in an access-denied environment
and to act as a force multiplier by providing high-quality
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as
indication and warning of potential hostile action. In addition, attack
submarines are effective in anti-surface ship warfare and anti-
submarine warfare in almost every environment, thus eliminating any
safe-haven that an adversary might pursue with access-denial systems.
As such, they represent a significant conventional deterrent. While our
attack submarine fleet provides considerable strike capacity already,
our guided missile submarines provide significantly more strike
capacity and a more robust capability to covertly deploy Special
Operations Force personnel. Today, the Navy requires 48 attack
submarines and 4 guided missile submarines (SSGN) to sustain our
capabilities in these areas. The Navy is studying alternatives to
sustain the capability that our SSGNs bring to the battle force when
these ships begin to retire in 2026.
virginia-class ssn
The Virginia-class submarine is a multi-mission submarine that
dominates in the littorals and open oceans. Now in its 14th year of
construction, the Virginia program is demonstrating that this critical
undersea capability can be delivered affordably and on time. The Navy
is mitigating the impending attack submarine force structure gap in the
2020s through three parallel efforts: reducing the construction span of
Virginia-class submarines, extending the service lives of selected
attack submarines, and extending the length of selected attack
submarine deployments.
ballistic missile submarines
Our ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable leg of the
Nation's strategic arsenal and provide the Nation's only day-to-day
assured nuclear response capability. They provide survivable nuclear
strike capabilities to assure allies, deter potential adversaries, and,
if needed, respond in kind. The number of these submarines was
delineated by the Nuclear Posture Review 2001 which established the
requirement of a force comprised of 12 operational SSBNs (with 2
additional in overhaul at any time). Because the Ohio SSBNs will begin
retiring in fiscal year 2027, their recapitalization must start in
fiscal year 2019 to ensure operational submarines will be available to
replace these vital assets as they leave operational service. In
addition, because of a life-of-ship reactor plant, the replacement SSBN
program inventory will be 12 ships to support the seaborne leg of the
nuclear triad. To maintain an at-sea presence for the long term, the
United States must continue development of the follow-on to the Ohio-
class submarine. Throughout the past year, and throughout the program,
all aspects of the Ohio replacement program continue to be thoroughly
reviewed and aggressively challenged to drive down engineering and
construction costs.
submarine modernization
As threats evolve, it is vital to continue to modernize existing
submarines with updated capabilities. The submarine modernization
program includes advances in weapons, integrated combat control
systems, sensors, open architecture, and necessary hull, mechanical and
electrical upgrades. These upgrades are necessary to retain credible
capabilities for the future conflicts and current peacetime ISR and
Indication and Warning missions and to continue them on the path of
reaching their full service life. Maintaining the stability of the
modernization program is critical to our future Navy capability and
capacity.
surface combatants
As in the past, cruisers and destroyers will continue to deploy
with strike groups to fulfill their traditional roles. Many will be
required to assume additional roles within the complex BMD arena. Ships
that provide BMD will sometimes be stationed in remote locations, away
from strike groups, in a role as theater BMD assets. The changes
necessary to meet demands for forward presence, strike group
operations, and BMD place additional pressure on the existing inventory
of surface combatants. The current baseline for number of ships in the
surface combatant inventory is 88. While future force structure
analyses may require the Navy to procure a greater number of these
ships, we will also have to consider redistributing assets currently
being employed for missions of lesser priority for these new missions
as a result of the 2010 QDR and the President's commitment to
supporting the missile defense of our European allies.
ddg-51
To address the rapid proliferation of ballistic and anti-ship
missiles along with deep-water submarine threats, we have restarted
production of the Arleigh Burke-class DDG-51 Flight IIA series. The
Flight IIA ships will incorporate Integrated Air and Missile Defense
(IAMD), providing much-needed BMD capacity to the Fleet. These ships
will also be the first flight of Aegis ships to be built with the Open
Architecture Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 12 Aegis Combat System.
ACB 12 will allow these surface combatants to be updated and maintained
with commercial off-the-shelf technology, yielding reduced Total
Ownership Cost and enhancing the ability to adapt to future military
threats. The approach for the Flight IIA restart leverages the cost-
savings of existing production lines; reduces the potential for cost
overruns and delays through the incremental approach of developing new
technologies; and strengthens and stabilizes the industrial base to
more efficiently and cost effectively produce ships to meet our
national needs. This budget request procures one ship in 2012.
We intend to deliver highly capable, multi-mission ships tailored
for IAMD by advancing the DDG-51 design into the next future destroyer,
DDG Flight III. This approach will develop and install the Air and
Missile Defense Radar on a DDG-51 hull with the necessary hull, power,
cooling, and combat systems upgrades. Additionally, in support of the
Navy's energy goals, a hybrid electric drive system is in development
for the DDG-51-class and land-based testing of this system is expected
this summer. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for a total
of eight DDG-51 ships, including funding for an additional DDG-51
Flight IIA ship in fiscal year 2014 and the first Flight III ship in
fiscal year 2016. The Navy intends to pursue multiyear authority in
fiscal year 2013 for fiscal year 2013-2017 procurements. The MYP would
generate significant cost savings, and provide a long-term commitment
to the shipbuilding industrial base that stabilizes shipyard employment
levels.
lcs
The Navy remains committed to procuring 55 LCS. These ships expand
the battle space by complementing our inherent blue water capability
and filling warfighting gaps in the littorals and strategic choke
points around the world. LCS design characteristics (speed, agility,
shallow draft, payload capacity, reconfigurable mission spaces, air/
water craft capabilities) combined with its core Command, Control,
Communications, Computers and Intelligence, sensors, and weapons
systems, make it an ideal platform for engaging in Irregular Warfare
and Maritime Security Operations.
LCS capabilities address specific and validated capability gaps in
Surface Warfare, Mine Countermeasures, and Anti-Submarine Warfare. The
concept of operations and design specifications for LCS were developed
to meet these gaps with focused mission packages that deploy manned and
unmanned vehicles to execute a variety of missions. In 2010, the Navy
deployed USS Freedom (LCS-1) with Surface Warfare (SUW) mission package
capabilities (MH-60S helicopter, two 30mm guns, two 11m Rigid Hull
Inflatable Boats, Maritime Security Module, a Surface Warfare DET and
an Aviation Detachment in support of counter-illicit trafficking
operations). By 2018, 11 Mine Countermeasures (MCM) mission packages
will be delivered, supporting the decommissioning plan for the USS
Avenger (MCM-1)-class ships. The core capability of the Anti-Submarine
Warfare mission package will be provided by a Variable Depth Sonar
(VDS) and Navy will begin at-sea testing in 2012 with a VDS Advanced
Design Model (ADM).
Affordability remains the key factor in acquiring the needed future
capacity of this highly flexible and capable ship. To stay on path to
deliver this ship in the quantities needed, the Navy announced this
past December that we awarded 2 competitive contracts for 10 ships of
each version of the LCS under a dual award strategy. Each ship brings
unique strengths and capabilities to the mission and each has been
designed in accordance with overarching objectives for reducing total
ownership cost. Our 2012 budget funds 4 ships in fiscal year 2012, with
a buy of 19 across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). We request
your continued support as we take the measures necessary to deliver
this much needed capability at the capacity we need to meet future
demands.
ddg-1000
The DDG-1000 Zumwalt guided missile destroyer will be an optimally
crewed, multi-mission surface combatant designed to provide long-range,
precision naval surface fire support to marines conducting littoral
maneuver and subsequent operations ashore. The DDG-1000 features two
155mm Advanced Gun Systems capable of engaging targets with the Long-
Range Land Attack Projectile at a range of over 63 nautical miles. In
addition to providing offensive, distributed and precision fires in
support of marines, it will provide valuable lessons in advanced
technology such as signature reduction, active and passive self-defense
systems, and enhanced survivability features. The first DDG-1000 is
approximately 50 percent complete and is scheduled to deliver in fiscal
year 2014 with initial operating capability planned in 2016.
modernization
To counter emerging threats, we continue to make significant
investments in cruiser and destroyer modernization to sustain our
combat effectiveness and to achieve the 35 year service life of our
earlier Aegis fleet. Our destroyer and cruiser modernization program
includes Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) upgrades, as well as
advances in warfighting capability and open architecture to reduce
total ownership costs and expand mission capability for current and
future combat capabilities.
USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53) are the
first two DDGs to undergo the HM&E phase of this comprehensive
modernization. Due to the scope of the design changes, we extended
these availabilities by 2 months to allow for adequate execution and
system testing. The lessons learned from these first two modernization
efforts will be included in subsequent upgrades. The second phase of
the modernization will be conducted 2 years after the initial yard
period and provide DDGs with an improved processing capability in their
SPY-1D radars and an open architecture combat computing environment
that will also be adapted to DDG-113 and following ships. Focusing on
Flight I and II DDG-51 ships (hulls 51-78), the modernization process
will also include the addition of BMD capability, installation of the
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), an upgraded SQQ-89A (V)15 anti-
submarine warfare system, integration of the SM-6 missile, and improved
air dominance with processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire
Control-Counter Air capability. In fiscal year 2012, USS John Paul
Jones (DDG-53) will be the first destroyer to be modernized with ACB
12.
Through December 2010, Navy has completed the modernization of two
additional cruisers, USS Mobile Bay (CG-53) and USS Philippine Sea (CG-
58). Combat System upgrades to USS Antietam (CG-54) and USS San Jacinto
(CG-56) are in progress. Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E)
upgrades to USS Hue City (CG- 66) are also in progress. The key aspects
of the CG modernization program include an upgrade to the Aegis weapons
system to include an open architecture computing environment,
installation of the AN/SPQ-9B radar, addition of the ESSM, an upgrade
to Close In Weapon System Block 1B, an upgraded SQQ-89A (V)15 anti-
submarine warfare system, and improved air dominance with processing
upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air capability. Nine
Baseline 4 cruisers will receive the BMD upgrade beginning in fiscal
year 2014.
Our budget for fiscal year 2012 requests funding for the
modernization of four cruisers (three Combat Systems and one HM&E) and
three destroyers (one Combat System and two HM&E).
amphibious ships
Amphibious ships are multi-capable, agile, and responsive to the
dynamic nature of the security era. In an era of declining access and
strategic uncertainty, the geographic combatant commanders' have an
increased demand for forward-postured amphibious forces capable of
conducting security cooperation, regional deterrence, and crisis
response. For example, their cumulative fiscal year 2010 request for
amphibious forces equates to 3.4 ARGs/MEUs plus 4 smaller, task-
organized amphibious formations like Global Fleet Stations. These
demand signals reflect the operational flexibility and value of
amphibious forces for missions across the range of military operations.
This value is well-illustrated by the 2010 deployment of the Peleliu
ARG/15th MEU, which concurrently conducted humanitarian assistance and
disaster response operations in Pakistan, strike operations in
Afghanistan, and the recovery of the M/V Magellan Star from pirates in
the Gulf of Aden. During the same deployment, they also conducted a
wide variety of cooperative activities with forces from Australia,
Indonesia, the Maldives, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Turkey,
and Pakistan, in addition to supporting to the U.S. Secret Service
during the Presidential visit to India. As articulated by the Secretary
of the Navy, the Navy's amphibious ships are the fleet's most
``flexible'' asset.
There are two main drivers of the amphibious ship requirement:
maintaining the persistent forward presence, the largest driver, which
enables both engagement and crisis response, and the episodic
aggregation of sufficient numbers to deliver the assault echelons of up
to two Marine expeditionary brigades for major operations and
campaigns.
The Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps
have determined that the force structure requirement is 38 amphibious
ships. Understanding this requirement, and in light of the fiscal
constraints, the Department of the Navy will accept risk by sustaining
a minimum of 33 total amphibious ships in the active fleet. The
Department has 30 amphibious ships in the inventory now and will reach
33 ships by fiscal year 2017. Once 33 is attained the Department will
retain 33 amphibious ships through the maintenance of current assets
and the planned procurement of amphibious vessels.
lsd/lsd(x)
A fully funded LSD mid-life program, to include repairs, will
ensure these ships meet their expected service life. Material readiness
in regards to LSD's readiness for tasking will be enhanced by a fully
funded program. LSD(X) will replace 12 of the aging LSD-41/49 Whidbey
Island/Harpers Ferry-class vessels and will perform an array of
amphibious missions. Eleven LSD(X) platforms will provide one third of
the total amphibious lift necessary to meet USMC mission requirements.
LSD(X) Initial Capabilities Document is currently under review, the
Analysis of Alternatives will be conducted in fiscal year 2012 with a
planned fiscal year 2017 lead ship procurement. Affordability remains
the key factor in acquiring the needed future capacity and operational
capabilities of this highly flexible multifaceted ship.
lpd-17
The San Antonio-class LPD (LPD-17) has a 40-year expected service
life and serves as the replacement for four classes of older ships: the
LKA, LST, LSD-36, and the LPD-4. Lessons learned from the effort to
resolve material reliability concerns identified in the early ships of
the class are being applied to ships currently under construction.
Quality continues to improve with each ship delivered as the Navy
continues to work closely with the shipbuilder to address cost,
schedule, and performance issues. Five ships have been delivered, and
four more ships are under construction. The construction contract for
the 10th ship was recently awarded and the 11th and final LPD is
planned for procurement in fiscal year 2012.
Ships of the class have deployed seven times including two ships
that are currently on deployment. USS San Antonio (LPD-17) has deployed
once (2008), USS New Orleans (LPD-18) has completed two successful
overseas deployments (2009 and 2010). USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19) has also
completed two successful overseas deployments. Today, LPD-19 is again
deployed overseas; and USS Green Bay (LPD-20) is in the middle of her
first overseas deployment. LPD-18 and USS New York (LPD-21) are fully
operational, conducting local operations in their homeport areas. LPD-
17 is completing her major post-deployment repair availability prior to
next sea trials.
In February of this year, LPD-21 successfully passed an inspection
by the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) to support the
Final Contract Trials. The President of INSURV remarked that LPD-21 was
the best LPD-17-class ship they had seen and that lessons learned from
the first ships of the class were clearly being implemented.
The Navy and Industry have made significant progress in correcting
early class design and construction issues on the LPD-17-class. Early
ships of the LPD-17-class were delivered to the Navy with pipe welding
quality, engine alignment problems, inadequate lube oil cleanliness and
bearing wear which led to unplanned engine repairs and overhauls. These
material issues, combined with an optimized sized crew and a reliance
on computer-based vice classroom training, led to decreased reliability
and operational availability of the class.
The above issues, as well as inadequate initial reliability of the
ships computer network and some of the engine and ship control systems
led the Navy and DOD independent operational testing organizations to
rate the ships as not operationally suitable during the initial
operational testing conducted in 2007-2008. Follow-on Test and
Evaluation, which commenced in July 2010 and runs through fiscal year
2012, is being conducted by the Navy's Commander, Operational Test &
Evaluation Force and the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation
Activity to confirm adequate corrective actions have been taken.
Over the last couple of years, the shipbuilder (Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding, now Huntington Ingalls Industries, (HII)) has implemented
several initiatives to address the quality issues associated with ship
construction and delivery.
The shipbuilder significantly revised their welding, quality and
production processes to improve quality and ensure consistency across
all of their shipbuilding facilities. Their workforce was retrained and
recertified to the updated process. The Navy and HII have improved the
oil flushing procedures to get all the contaminants out of the ship's
lube oil system and improvements to the lube oil filters and strainers
have been developed to better remove any contaminants that might be
introduced through normal operation of the engines. These more
stringent flushing procedures are being used on all ships in the class
and the improved filters and strainers are planned for installation on
all ships in the class. Additionally, the shipyard has taken several
steps to ensure pipe sections are maintained in a clean condition from
fabrication in the pipe shop to installation on the ship including a
new cleaning process in the pipe shop and improved pipe capping
procedures to prevent contaminants from entering the pipe during
shipping and installation onboard the ship. The Navy has also
significantly improved its lube oil sampling and analysis process. This
process has been incorporated into the ship construction process. The
shipbuilder is responsible for the overall quality of the ship. To
manage quality, the shipbuilder utilizes a Quality Management System
comprising of Quality Control (ensuring the correct product
requirements, manufacturing processes, et cetera) and Quality Assurance
(focused on end product quality and conformance).
The Ship Wide Area Network (SWAN) design, which was based upon
1990's Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) technology, experienced
multiple failures resulting in failover monitoring, maintainability,
and supportability issues. The ATM-based SWAN is being replaced by
current Gigabit Ethernet technology hardware and software. Today, this
``Gig-E'' SWAN is installed on LPD-17, -18, and -21 with no reported
failures to date. LPD-19 and -20 will receive this upgrade in fiscal
year 2012; and the baseline for LPD-22 and follow ships has been
updated to include the Gig-E SWAN. Initial system reliability issues
with the engine controls, ship controls, and interior communications
systems have been addressed through major software upgrades to each
system, as well as the replacement of critical obsolete parts with more
rugged, current technology hardware.
Government oversight by the Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Gulf
Coast (SSGC) has been revamped with an increase in overall SSGC manning
by 21 percent from 2005 through the end of 2010, including an intensive
focus on critical waterfront Quality Assurance (QA) billets. All
Government QA weld inspectors were required to undergo retraining and
recertification in critical process areas, and QA oversight was
increased across all phases of production. Within the last 18 months,
the QA organization has been restructured to include more surveillance
of in process work and compliance with formal ship construction
procedures. A revamped training program has been implemented, providing
an ``apprentice to subject matter expert'' career roadmap for QA
specialists. SSGC has implemented a process of ``critical process pulse
audits'' to ensure HII maintains production quality across the critical
shipbuilding areas of structure, pipe, electrical, and coatings. Navy
critical process metrics have been aligned with the shipbuilder to
better assess performance trends leading to earlier identification of
issues when they arise.
In addition, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) sent
teams of QA experts to assess SSGC ability to provide QA oversight and
HII's production quality in spring 2009, July 2010, and January 2011.
The NAVSEA audits confirmed initial improvement by both SSGC and HII.
The focus going forward, and a key element of the critical process
pulse audits, is ensuring sustainment of that performance.
The Navy is also strengthening the LPD-17-class crew training by
establishing more traditional shore-based schoolhouses for critical
systems that will result in a blended philosophy of classroom, on-ship,
and computer-based training rather than solely relying on the
previously emphasized computer-based shipboard training.
The Ship Manning Document was recently approved, increasing the
LPD-17-class crew size to 381 from the original ``optimized'' manning
level of 360.
The LPD-17-Class System Sustainability Strike Team, made up of
personnel from the Fleet, the Navy regional maintenance centers, the
shipbuilder, the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, the class planning yard,
and the Navy Warfare Centers was established in fiscal year 2009. The
Strike Team has focused resources on developing and prioritizing
correction plans addressing system design, production/quality,
operations and maintenance issues identified in recent test/evaluation
reports, as well as those discovered during normal shipboard
operations. Lessons learned from this effort are being incorporated in
the ship construction process.
Quality and reliability problems seen on the early ships of the
class are being systematically addressed by the shipbuilder and the
Navy. Additionally, the Fleet has recognized the need for additional
manning for each ship and training for the crews, which is being
implemented. The above-listed corrections and improvements are already
being realized in the later ships of the class, as evidenced by LPD-
21's recent success during Final Contract Trials. The Navy recently
discovered quality problems with repairs on various ships during Fleet
maintenance availabilities. We are addressing these issues by providing
additional government oversight to ensure strict compliance with all
required maintenance and repair specifications and holding the
contractor accountable to provide quality.
lhd/lha/lha replacement (lha(r))
The LHA(R) will provide flexible, multi-mission amphibious
capabilities that span the range of military operations from forcible
entry to humanitarian and disaster relief. LHA(R) will replace our
Tarawa-class ships that reach the end of their already extended service
life between 2011 and 2015 for the remaining ship of the class. The
America (LHA-6) is now more than 30 percent complete and is scheduled
for delivery in fiscal year 2014. The decommissioning of USS Peleliu
(LHA-5) has been tied to the delivery of the America in order mitigate
any possible gaps in future deployment cycles. In support of the Navy's
commitment to advancing our energy security, the hybrid propulsion
drive in use on USS Makin Island (LHD-8) is being installed on LHA-6.
Beginning with LHA-8, the Navy will reintegrate the well deck onto the
large deck amphibious assault ships. Our budget for fiscal year 2012
requests funding for research and development to support reintegration
of the well deck into the design of the large deck amphibious ship and
the construction of LHA-8 in fiscal year 2016. Funding has been added
to install a critical self defense capability for LHD-2-6 during the
fiscal year 2016 Mid-Life Upgrade program. The Capstone Ships Self
Defense System is essential to ensure ships survivability in any
environment.
maritime prepositioning force
The MPF(F) concept envisioned a forward-deployed squadron of ships
to enable rapid closure to areas of interest, at-sea assembly, and
tactical employment of forces to areas of interest in the event of
crisis. Although useful across the range of military operations, this
squadron was primarily designed for use in major combat operations. Due
to refocusing of priorities and cost, this program has been deferred
until the 2025 timeframe. The Secretary of the Navy stated that he was
especially interested in enhancements that would give the legacy MPS
squadrons additional capabilities and illuminate capabilities that
would guide the development of MPF(F). Ships previously discussed in
the context of the MPF(F) have been moved to the Command and Support
section for battle force accounting. As noted in PB11, the Department
has determined the large-deck aviation ships previously designated for
the MPF(F) would better serve the Navy and Marine Corps in the
amphibious ship inventory--hence the LHA(R)-class ships described
previously.
In support of this enhanced Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons
(MPSRON) concept of employment, three T-AKE auxiliary dry cargo ships
were added to the program to provide persistent logistic support to
Marine Corps units afloat and ashore. Further, the Navy recognizes the
need to provide for at-sea transfer of personnel and equipment from a
cargo ship and to provide an interface with Landing Craft Air-Cushioned
(LCAC) vessels, both key capabilities the MPF(F) program was to
provide. To fulfill this capability, the Navy will procure three MLPs.
The third MLP is included in the PB12 budget. Operationally, the three
current MPSRONs will add an MLP, a T-AKE, and a Large Medium-Speed
Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) cargo ship. Future MPF capabilities will
increase capacity attributed to new ship designs along with seabasing
enabling capabilities such as at-sea arrival and assembly, employment,
persistent sustainment and reconstitution.
joint high speed vessel
The JHSV provides high-speed support vessels for the combatant
commanders who clearly communicated to the Navy their desire for the
unique capability to move assets throughout marginally developed
theaters of operation while requiring a less well developed port
facility. In addition, the JHSV's relatively shallow draft permits
operation in a greater number of port facilities around the globe. The
combination of these attributes permits rapid transport of medium size
payloads over intra-theater distances to austere ports, and load/
offload without reliance on a well developed, heavy port
infrastructure. A Memorandum of Agreement with the Army transferring
programmatic oversight and mission responsibility for the entire JHSV
program, including operations and maintenance, to the Navy was signed
by the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy on May 2,
2011. All delivered JHSVs will be operated by the Navy's Military
Sealift Command and manned by civilian or contract mariners. The budget
request for fiscal year 2012 includes funding for construction of the
one Navy JHSV. Army has funded its final JHSV in fiscal year 2012. Army
funded JHSVs will be considered part of the Navy's ship inventory.
fleet oiler replacement (t-ao(x))
The Navy plans to procure the lead ship for the replacement T-AO
fleet oiler in fiscal year 2014 with follow-on production at one ship
every year until 2032. Ultimately, this will likely result in a
complete recapitalization of the existing T-AO and T-AOE-classes and
will include a total of 19 ships procured. Legacy fleet oilers will
begin retiring in fiscal year 2017. The new oilers will have a double-
hull design to ensure compliance with the environmental protection
requirement for this type of ship. The T-AOX AoA will also consider the
business case of recapitalization of the four T-AOE fast combat support
ships that begin retiring in fiscal year 2032.
shipbuilding industrial base
Beyond balancing requirements and resources, the fiscal year 2012
President's budget submission for shipbuilding also weighs the
shipbuilding industrial base, achieving a balanced and executable
shipbuilding program which provides additional capability while
striving for efficiency. Our goal is to build from the current (fiscal
year 2011) battle force inventory of 286 ships to a battle force
inventory goal of a minimum of 313 ships. This budget submission
includes increases in large surface combatant capability and capacity
and both new construction and modernization to support the President's
directive to meet the growing ballistic missile threat to the United
States and its allies. It also continues the Navy's long-term plan for
small surface combatants by awarding competitive contracts for 10 ships
of each version of the LCS.
We will continue to closely monitor our shipbuilding industrial
base and especially the planned closure of Avondale shipyard by 2013.
Northrop Grumman completed the divestiture of its shipbuilding segment
by distributing shares in Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc. to its
shareholders on March 31, 2011. After months of discussions and
evaluation, the Navy did not object to NGC's spin-off of its
shipbuilding business. The Navy's position on the spin-off was based on
its conduct of due diligence with respect to proprietary forward-
looking projections, including key financial assumptions.
Robust competitive opportunities do exist across our industrial
base as evidenced by shipbuilding contract awards for MLP, LCS, and
JHSV. A stable shipbuilding industrial base, underpinned by level
loading and predictable ship procurement, is critical to meet the
Navy's requirements for an affordable and capable future force.
acquisition workforce
The Department has embarked on a deliberate plan to increase the
size of the Department of Navy's (DoN) acquisition workforce (AWF) over
the FYDP. The Navy's position is to continue its current plan as stated
in the DON AWF Strategic Plan, to rebuild the (DON) civilian AWF. In
fiscal year 2010, the DON AWF grew by approximately 3,000 people (DAWDF
- 499, In-sourcing - 759). The remainder of the growth was in the
Warfare Centers (NWCF organizations).
We started last year and aggressively increased our AWF based upon
bottom-up requirements from our program executive officers (PEOs),
Systems Commands, and Warfare Centers. In fiscal year 2010, we have
added approximately 1000 acquisition personnel (122 DAWDF, 325 In-
sourcing, and 600 other growth) to support shipbuilding programs at
NAVSEA. Approximately 70 percent of these new acquisition positions
were added to our warfare centers across the country. These warfare
centers provide critical engineering, integration support, testing, and
contracting oversight to all of our sea, air, land, space acquisition
programs. These personnel are critical since they represent a part of
the pipeline of future Program Managers and Senior Systems Engineers.
We have also taken advantage of the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Development Fund (DAWDF), initiated by Congress, and added nearly 400
acquisition interns this past year. We are on target to bring aboard an
additional 500 this year and next. About 30 percent of our DAWDF AWF
hires are now in shipbuilding organizations. We have also improved our
education and training programs in two critical areas of need:
shipbuilding program management and contracting.
We have used DAWDF funds to pilot a shipbuilding program manager's
course that was successful enough that we are moving it permanently to
our Defense Acquisition University program. Other training initiatives
include the integration of a ``Navy Day'' into the current PMT-401
course that introduces all Program Managers to DoN's S&E infrastructure
(Warfare Centers/Labs/FFRDCs/UARCs) and the development of an
Acquisition War Room focused on shipbuilding programs and acquisition
lessons learned. In addition, because of the difficulty in hiring
experienced contracting officers, we have implemented an intense
accelerated contracting training program at NAVSEA to increase the
number of qualified contracting officers as well as increase retention
rates among this important group. It will take several years to rebuild
and rebalance the DON's AWF, but these measures and continuing them
with this budget is an important step.
The Navy continues to emphasize the significant value added by
having a professional cadre of onsite Supervisor of Shipbuilding
(SUPSHIP) personnel colocated with our Nation's shipbuilding industrial
base in an oversight role. Over the last year, the number of onboard
SUPSHIP staff reached 1,100. This marks a continued growth trend of
SUPSHIP staffing from approximately 900 onboard in fiscal year 2007 and
marks another successful year of achieving hiring targets, as SUPSHIPs
have done every year from fiscal year 2007-fiscal year 2011. Leadership
will work to continue to align resource needs and staffing
requirements.
summary
The Navy's shipbuilding submission for fiscal year 2012 President's
budget and fiscal year 2012-2016 FYDP supports the requirements
addressed in the National Defense Strategy, the Maritime Strategy, and
the 2010 QDR. The plan sustains an 11 CVN force from 2015 through 2045;
sustains Virginia-class build rates at two submarines per year through
the FYDP; increases Air and Missile Defense capability with increased
DDG-51 construction and Aegis modernization; increases amphibious lift
capability with the 11th LPD-17; sustains intra-theater lift capability
with JHSV procurement; leverages strong competition in the LCS program
to buy additional ships; accelerates procurement of fleet oilers; and
continues Ohio-class replacement design and development by funding
Research and Development efforts within the FYDP as well as Advance
Procurement funds for detail design in fiscal year 2015. In the near
years, this plan relies heavily on your support for our fiscal year
2012 budget.
Through the long range plan for naval vessels, the Navy instills
affordability, stability, and capacity into the shipbuilding plan and
advances capabilities to meet the most likely evolving threats. The
plan continues DDG-51 construction to leverage a stable design and
mature infrastructure to achieve affordable capabilities. DDG-1000
technologies will provide long-range, precision naval surface fire
support to marines conducting littoral maneuver and subsequent
operations ashore. LCS will address specific and validated capability
gaps in Mine Countermeasures, Surface Warfare, and Anti-Submarine
Warfare, and our selection of both LCS designs leverages the unique
capability delivered by each platform while providing stability to the
shipbuilding infrastructure. Restructuring of our Maritime
Prepositioning Force to augment our current MPS squadron with a T-AKE,
MLP, and an existing LMSR will enhance the existing capabilities of the
MPSs. The Navy has also increased the emphasis for meeting and
extending service lives of in-service ships. We are sustaining the CG/
DDG Modernization while also providing critical mid-life overhauls of
LSDs. We have deferred command ship replacement and intend to sustain
the current command ships until 2039.
The Department of the Navy has addressed realism in our
shipbuilding plan by incorporating realistic budget projections. The
Department has addressed the industrial base in leveraging stable
designs to minimize disruption experience with first of class
constructions and provides stable production rates within the
constraints of requirements and budget. Finally, the Department of the
Navy's plan supports the Secretary of Defense's guidance to
significantly reduce excess overhead costs and apply the savings to
warfighting capability and capacity.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. I presume
that Admiral McCoy and Captain Galinis do not have statements;
or do you, sir?
STATEMENT OF VADM KEVIN M. McCOY, USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL SEA
SYSTEMS COMMAND
Admiral McCoy. I have a short statement, sir.
Senator Reed. Excellent. Please go ahead.
Admiral McCoy. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
distinguished subcommittee members, thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify on shipbuilding initiatives and the
material readiness of our Navy. As the Commander of NAVSEA, I
have been actively engaged with senior Navy leadership, the
shipbuilders, and the NAVSEA organization to improve the
quality of ships delivered to the fleet and ensure that our
ships retain their warfighting effectiveness and achieve their
full service lives.
Let me speak up front to the LPD-17 class program. Similar
to previous shipbuilding programs, the LPD-17 class continues
to improve and mature as lessons learned on early ships are
rolled into follow ships and each successive hull completes the
building process. NAVSEA and SUPSHIP Gulf Coast are working
closely with the shipbuilder to incorporate lessons learned
from the lead ship into follow ships.
Relative to this class, NAVSEA's focus has been in three
areas: One, addressing the shortcomings of government oversight
at the SUPSHIP. SUPSHIP Gulf Coast has hired over 284 new
employees in the past 6 years, resulting in a 21 percent
increase in manning, including having a second Navy captain
assigned as the deputy supervisor for operations.
SUPSHIP has already conducted quality audits and made
improvements in the shipbuilding process, including better
foreign material exclusion from piping and increased quality
assurance compliance inspections, with particular focus on
working with the shipbuilder to assess and improve the
compliance with critical ship construction processes. These
efforts are independently validated by my staff on a regular
basis, including an annual comprehensive quality assurance
audit conducted by outside experts focusing on both the SUPSHIP
and the shipbuilder.
Two, ensuring shipbuilder compliance in all areas of
construction and having the metrics and situational awareness
of deckplate performance to catch trends early as possible in
the shipbuilding process.
Three, implementing strike team modifications to make the
ships more reliable in service. We have created a cross-
functional strike team that includes engineers and fleet
representatives to address issues associated with this new
class of ship. Significant focus areas include: redesigning the
filtering elements of the diesel engine and steering systems;
improving the reliability of electrical generation and
distribution systems; and updating the software in the
engineering and ship control systems.
The LPD-17 class brings tremendous warfighting capability
to the Navy and the Marine Corps and it's imperative that we
continue to ensure that our warships are available for tasking
now and in the future. Moving forward, we are committed to
leveraging lessons learned during the fleet introduction of
LPD-17 class into our initiatives to improve overall service
readiness.
I will add that last week we had all five delivered LPD-17
class ships underway, two on deployment, two on local
operations, and one is just back from successful sea trials.
I think we're over the big hurdles on that class, sir. In
fact, San Antonio, which has been off line for about 18 months
during a major rebuild from some earlier construction issues,
is back at sea, having been at sea over a week on sea trials,
and so far doing well.
With respect to surface force readiness in general and the
findings and recommendations of the fleet review panel in 2010,
at NAVSEA we fully embrace our responsibility to: one, define
with rigor the processes and methods of ensuring our ships meet
their full service lives; and two, ensure that maintenance and
modernization are executed in a formal, deliberate, and
efficient manner to ensure the operational readiness,
reliability, safety, and effectiveness of our ships.
We're working hard to address these issues in order to keep
America's Navy number one in the world.
I'd be happy to take any of your questions, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral, for that
excellent testimony.
Captain Galinis, do you have a statement?
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM J. GALINIS, USN, SUPERVISOR OF
SHIPBUILDING, GULF COAST
Captain Galinis. Sir, I do have a short statement.
Senator Reed. We'd like to hear that. Thank you.
Captain Galinis. Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, Senator
Ayotte, thank you very much for this opportunity to testify on
Navy shipbuilding and the quality issues affecting some of our
ship construction programs. I have been the SUPSHIP Gulf Coast
since September 2009 and before that served as the LPD-17 class
program manager.
As the SUPSHIP, I serve as the Navy's on-site or waterfront
representative responsible for the day-to-day administration of
Navy shipbuilding contracts with private shipyards under my
area of responsibility. At SUPSHIP Gulf Coast my team currently
oversees ship construction work across the Gulf Coast from
Alabama to Louisiana and as far north as Wisconsin. The
shipyards we oversee are currently constructing the DDG-51
class, LHA-6, and LPD-17 class ships at the Ingalls Yards in
Mississippi and Louisiana, the LCS class Freedom variant LCSs
in Marinette Marine, WI, oceanographic and special purpose
ships at VT Halter Marine in Mississippi, and several smaller
yards, including foreign military sales work at many of the
yards in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
As the Navy's waterfront representative for these
contracts, I am responsible for overseeing shipbuilder quality
compliance and ensuring that the ships delivered for Navy
service meet all of our requirements. My team works on a daily
basis with the shipyards to ensure that contractors satisfy
their contractual obligations. It's no secret that we have
struggled with quality of some recently delivered ships from
Gulf Coast shipyards. We, my organization and the shipbuilders
that we work with, have done a lot of work in this area over
the last 2 years implementing many improvements to improve
quality.
In some cases, this is simply getting back to the basics,
namely reinstituting a culture of quality and a culture of
compliance with well-engineered written processes and
procedures, monitoring deckplate execution, and then measuring
our performance against these requirements. Both the supervisor
and the shipbuilders are heavily focused on process compliance
and are continually assessing our performance in this area.
We are not done yet. Namely, we are executing quality work,
but the near-term additional oversight measures are causing
cost increases. We need to continue to improve our first-time
quality and reduce rework. My team and the shipbuilders
building these ships are committed to improving overall ship
construction quality, building these ships as affordably and on
schedule and delivering ships that are safe and reliable. I
believe that our sailors and marines deserve nothing less, and
I look forward to discussing these efforts with you.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, thank you for the very insightful testimony. Let
me begin with Secretary Stackley. Both Senator Wicker and I
have commented on the LPD-17 and both Admiral McCoy and Captain
Galinis also. Just a preliminary question. We took delivery of
these ships and found there were significant shortcomings, at
least the initial ships. Were we obligated to take delivery? As
someone who did not have the benefit of an Annapolis education,
Mr. Secretary, I assumed that we'd only take delivery if
everything was okay.
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. In the case of LPD-17 we were not
compelled to take delivery. The ship delivered in the summer of
2005. She did receive an acceptance trial. There was a unique
circumstance with regards to funding and completion of the
ship. A decision was made that work would be deferred, to be
completed in post-delivery, that deferred work would be
documented by the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) and
they would actually come back and do a final acceptance trial
after that post-delivery period.
Literally days after that event, Hurricane Katrina hit the
Gulf Coast and all good intentions were abandoned. The ship
basically stayed at the shipyard for the amount of time
necessary to get it ready to get under way and all the deferred
work moved with it to its home port in Norfolk, where it was
contracted out under a competitive bid process.
So there was a confluence of events there. The Navy was not
required to take delivery by any means. It was a conscious
decision, but the planning went awry when Katrina basically
overturned events.
Senator Reed. But when you took delivery, was it
contemplated that the Navy would pay the additional costs for
the rework, or is that somehow still the responsibility of the
yard?
Mr. Stackley. The reality is that the first four ships were
awarded back in about the 1996 timeframe under a single cost-
plus contract. Within the terms of a cost-plus contract, the
government is responsible for paying the cost of the work and
then industry basically puts at risk fee. But if there are
allowable and allocable costs incurred on the contract, then
the government is responsible for paying those. That does
include rework so long as there isn't any fraud or mischarging
or things of that nature.
Senator Reed. Just to be clear in my mind, because of the
nature of that cost-plus contract taking delivery of the ship
did not shift costs to the government or the contractor?
Mr. Stackley. Not at all, no, sir.
Senator Reed. My presumption is that we're not contracting
like that in the future.
Mr. Stackley. In fact, the fifth ship of the class was also
cost-plus, and what we did several years ago was convert that
to a fixed price to basically stop the bleeding. In general, we
have contracted lead ships of a class inside of a cost-plus
contract because of all the parallel development that takes
place with the lead ship, and then we look to move to a fixed
price environment as quickly as possible after that.
In this case, a single contract awarded the first four as
cost-plus.
Senator Reed. I think what Admiral McCoy indicated was that
the recent ships that have delivered have much fewer problems.
Your sense is that the trend line is now in the right
direction, that they're leaving the yard basically ready for
sea trial?
Mr. Stackley. Absolutely. I'll let the two gentlemen on
either side of me add to that, but there are several aspects of
that. First, the program is just far more mature now. So the
design deficiencies have been corrected, the build plans
associated with the shipbuilder and how he builds the ship have
matured. The vendor base has matured.
Equally important is the government's oversight has
matured. Admiral McCoy mentioned the strengthening of the
SUPSHIP. A complete audit and review of processes and
procedures is in place to ensure compliance.
The challenge that we have is going after the first-time
quality, as opposed to the inspected-in quality. So we're
working side by side with the shipbuilder, because it's
impacting them as well inside of this. They're in a fixed price
environment now, so they're paying for their cost of rework.
We're both working to get it right the first time, so that
we're not incurring costs late in a ship's build cycle
correcting deficiencies.
Senator Reed. Admiral McCoy?
Admiral McCoy. Mr. Chairman, let me add. Fundamental
completion and fundamental quality improved on 21, for example,
the last one that we took delivery of. We did have, I would
say, two lingering problems that were late in discovery for the
class, that did affect the 21, and that is grit in the lube oil
system, so we had some rebearing and flushing to do to the
engines; and insufficient socket weld length of material, and
so we had a significant number of welds to go back and redo.
But all the other stuff greatly improved from the first. In
fact, we had a highly successful final contract trial just
earlier this spring on New York and received lots of praise
from INSURV during that trial.
Senator Reed. Admiral, you've made the very explicit point
that you've beefed up dramatically your supervisory staff. I
think that quite clearly implies that one of the defects was a
lack of Navy supervision. I think that's the case, correct?
Admiral McCoy. Yes, sir. First let me just say, though, the
fundamental responsibility for constructing the ship right lies
with the contractor. However, as a backstop we have a SUPSHIP
in place that we expect to monitor the contractor's quality
performance and be able to pull the penalty flag out of the
back pocket when necessary. That did not effectively happen
here.
I'll let Captain Galinis talk about some of the things that
he's done to get us much more in a compliance mode and looking
at the same metrics the shipbuilder is looking at to backstop
the shipbuilder effectively. But I would say yes, that is a
fundamental responsibility of the government and that did not
happen here, sir.
Senator Reed. One follow-on question before I recognize
Captain Galinis. You have learned a great deal. We've all
learned a great deal. I presume that you're operationalizing
these lessons, not just along the Gulf Coast, but in every
aspect of shipbuilding.
Admiral McCoy. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Also, you're taking this and you're trying
with Secretary Stackley to plug it into the design phase and
the build phase of future vessels, so that we don't have to
relearn this lesson every time we have a new class of ship. Can
you just comment briefly on that?
Admiral McCoy. Yes. Let me just address the first part
first. As part of what we learned coming out of the Gulf Coast
issues, we instituted across the four SUPSHIPs what we call
back to basics. It's heavily focused on compliance, as well as
contract oversight and training.
We have increased the staffing across all four SUPSHIPs by
over 200 just in terms of gross numbers. We were at about 900
across the force SUPSHIPs. We're now at about 1,100. So we
recognized that across the board, particularly with this ramp-
up of shipbuilding--two LCS classes, JHSV, two Virginias--that
we weren't postured the way we needed to be and we needed to
get back down to the fundamentals; and that we also had in many
cases a green workforce that needed significantly more
training.
So we went off on that direction across the board, across
the corporation. I can let Captain Galinis talk about some of
the things that he's done.
Senator Reed. Before he does that, just a final point about
how you, Mr. Secretary, have taken these lessons learned and
put them into the development of new ships or new classes of
ships?
Mr. Stackley. I would say if you look at the LPD-17 class
of ships, fundamentally it's a great class of ship. The Marine
Corps loves it. The Navy operators love it. The Achilles heel
has been some of these nagging reliability issues, like the
grit in the lube oil, which has been kind of a mission kill
from a propulsion standpoint. But yes, we have been looking at
those issues across the board and looking at our other classes
and saying, okay, where could we have the same problem?
For example, welding. We have beefed up welding oversight
and compliance at every one of our four SUPSHIPs because we
know that is one of those critical processes that if it gets
away from you it's very difficult to recover from. Critical
coatings is another one, in terms of paint and things like
that. So we're looking at that across the board, Senator.
Senator Reed. Let me do this. Because my colleagues have
been very indulgent and I've taken a lot of time and I want to
recognize Senator Wicker. I'm going to come back with the
second round and ask you sort of the same question, which is
how are you working to take these lessons, incorporate them,
not just in shipbuilding supervision but in design, in
decisions about what ship classes you can build on the force.
So you can think about that.
But one reason I requested that Captain Galinis be here is
that Admiral McCoy is a great commander and he probably reaches
out every day, in fact several times a day, to you, Captain,
and says, what's going on on that waterfront, what are we
doing, et cetera? I wanted to be able to get the benefit of the
kind of advice that Admiral McCoy, because of his leadership
skills, gets. So can you give us, as Admiral McCoy suggested,
some sort of feel of what you think the problems are and how
we've addressed them and where we have to do more?
Captain Galinis. Yes, sir. Fundamentally what I've seen
since I've been down there, the basic root cause of this really
comes down to process compliance. We look at it at four
functional areas in shipbuilding: piping systems, electrical,
coatings, and structure. Across those four major processes that
it takes to build a ship, fundamentally the work items and the
processes are sound. What we found--and this is on both the
Navy side and the shipbuilder--we have gotten away from or
deviated from following those written processes.
Collectively there has been a renewed focus to look at the
work processes that are in place, and ensure that we're
following those, and then measure our compliance to those
processes.
What did we do at SUPSHIP Gulf Coast specifically for our
workforce? In addition to the increased hiring that we've been
able to do over the last several years, training has been a big
factor in our quality organization. Essentially, we've
restructured our quality organization and we've provided a
career path now where a person can enter the quality workforce
at an entry level and work his way all the way to essentially a
subject matter expert as a quality assurance specialist.
That was not there before. That training comprises two
aspects of it. There's formal training, classroom, schoolhouse
type training, as well as experience that needs to be
documented and logged. For example, a nondestructive tester who
would inspect welds, he goes through a formal training course
and then he's required to incur so much time on the job
performance, that essentially gets documented and he works
under the supervision of a more qualified welder.
The second thing that we've done working with the shipyard
is we have aligned our inspection attributes and the things
that we look at, so that we know when we get reports from the
shipbuilder that we understand what they're looking at and they
understand what we're looking at, so our metrics, if you will,
are somewhat aligned. That was a tremendous process. It sounds
fairly basic, but it was something that over time we had gotten
away from.
Once we aligned those metrics, what we started doing is
what we call critical process pulse audits. Across those four
areas that I mentioned--electrical, piping, structure, and
coatings--we've been doing this every other month now, a joint
inspection using the common attributes that we've developed.
That has allowed us to realize and understand where our risk
areas are, where the crafts are deviating from the processes
that are in place.
We've been doing this for probably about 14 or 16 months,
since the early part of 2010. We have a pretty good track
record now that we can go back and we can see where our risk
areas are. So where in the past we didn't know what we didn't
know, now we know where our risk areas are.
Then the results of those processes are fed directly back
to the operations, the craft leadership, and I meet on a
monthly basis with the craft directors and we literally go
through these metrics. Then from that they either adjust the
shipyard training for the craftsmen or we adjust training for
the quality inspectors if we need to do that. In some cases
maybe we do make changes to the processes.
So that in a nutshell is kind of the process that we've
been through over the last almost 20 months or so.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Let me just observe that the chairman, with
neither an Annapolis education or a fine Reserve Officers'
Training Corps education, seems to have been able to drill down
on some very good points here.
Let me see if I can summarize in layman's terms. Things are
better now with the LPD-17 because the program has matured, and
that stands to reason. Admiral McCoy says that actually things
are going pretty well there now and the people love it. Yet, as
late as the winter 2010, we did have this independent weapons
tester saying that the ship is not effective, suitable, and is
not survivable in combat.
Admiral McCoy, do you take issue with that? Was it correct
at the time it was made and in a short time that's been
rectified, or what can you tell the committee?
Admiral McCoy. Senator, I think if you look at the issues
that they identify, I don't take issue with the issues. We were
having mobility issues, no doubt about that. We were in the
middle of grit and lube oil on just about all our ships that we
were dealing with, so that was a mobility issue.
Senator Wicker. When was the grit solved?
Admiral McCoy. I'd say right now with San Antonio going to
sea and doing well I think we can say the grit is behind us
now.
Senator Wicker. Just behind us?
Admiral McCoy. Yes, sir. We've had to flush, we've had to
change system design, and we've had to prove with a significant
number of hours on the engines that these ships are reliable. I
hate to knock on wood, but I'll knock on wood here and say,
with two deployed and last week three others out at sea doing
well, and I think a good understanding of the issues both at
the shipbuilder and how we get the grit out, flush, service,
and some of the system design changes, that I think that one's
behind us.
There were also issues with the Ship-Wide Area Network
(SWAN). On the earlier ship, you had the less reliable,
outdated, obsolete, almost the ATM version, and we're now
putting the Gig E version. Two of the ships have it and we have
a program to put that on the others.
We had issues with interior communications that we've been
dealing with. So we have been systematically going through some
of these issues and I think we're in a much better place. We
have answered this question before and I'm happy to give an
update to the committee, sir. We'll take that one for the
record in terms of the status of each one of those items.
[The information referred to follows:]
The LPD-17 Class of ships has met or exceeded all Key Performance
Parameter objectives outlined in the LPD-17 Class Operational
Requirements Document with the exception of one information exchange
requirement that still needs to be validated.
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) found the LPD-17
Class ``not operationally effective, suitable, or survivable in a
hostile environment'' during testing in 2007-2009; and its report
identified 68 deficiencies grouped under 3 major issues--reliability,
self defense, and recoverability. The Navy has completed its review of
operational test reports by DOT&E, developed corrective active action
plans, and has substantially resolved or is in process of resolving the
deficiencies cited.
The LPD-17 Class operational evaluation was conducted with a legacy
asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) version of the Ship Wide Area Network
(SWAN) and an early version of the Engineering Control System (ECS).
The first two ships of the class have received the upgraded GIG-E SWAN;
and no issues have been cited since installation. Upgrades to LPDs-19
and -20 are scheduled for completion by the end of 2012. All remaining
LPD-17 Class ships in construction will include the GIG-E SWAN upgrade.
New ECS software to improve performance and provide additional built-in
test/monitoring capabilities has been installed on all LPD-17 Class
ships.
Main engine reliability issues have been observed on four of the
first five LPD-17 Class ships. The root cause of those issues can be
traced back to lube oil cleanliness. Poor initial system cleanliness
led to steering reliability issues. A major redesign of the lube oil
filtration system was completed in early 2010. Damaged bearings and
lube oil piping segments have been replaced on all affected ships. New
filters and/or modified strainers have been or will be installed on all
delivered ships. New flushing procedures have been developed and
implemented; LPD-22 and follow ships will all be delivered with the new
designs and components.
Interior/Exterior Communications (IVCS) components demonstrated
unreliability and could not support high volume traffic capability
beyond existing amphibious ships; and the Uninterruptible Power Supply
(UPS) batteries failed prematurely resulting in total power loss for
some components. The IVCS software has been upgraded; and new
batteries, along with revised preventive maintenance procedures, have
been installed on all LPD-17 Class ships. Additionally, a new UPS
monitoring system is being implemented across the class.
Recoverability refers to the ability of a ship and its crew to
prevent loss and restore mission essential functions given a casualty
from accidents or threat weapon effects. Systems that directly impact
recoverability include UPS, SWAN, ECS, damage control equipment,
shipboard damage control features and crew training. Ship system issues
and associated resolutions have been identified in the preceding
paragraphs. Additional isolation valves in the chill water system are
planned for installation on all LPD-17 Class ships; and fire detection
system software deficiencies have been identified and corrected across
the class to improve the ship's recoverability.
Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation, which commenced in July
2010, is being conducted by the Navy's Commander Operational Test and
Evaluation Force and the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation
Activity under DOT&E oversight to confirm these corrective actions
resolve the problems noted by DOT&E. The evaluation is scheduled to run
through the end of fiscal year 2012.
The first three ships of the class have successfully completed
their maiden deployments, meeting not only their anticipated
operational requirements but also responding to emergent missions
requests. Today, USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19) and USS Green Bay (LPD-20) are
deployed overseas; and the other three commissioned ships in the class
are conducting local operations.
A classified brief providing the status of DOT&E deficiencies and
associated corrective actions was presented to the Senate Armed
Services Committee professional staff on August 6, 2010; and the Navy
can present an updated classified level brief with additional
clarification and detail of each deficiency, if desired.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Do you think the independent tester
went a little overboard late last year in stating, as I have
quoted, not effective, not survivable in combat? Went a little
too far in your judgment?
Admiral McCoy. I certainly don't want to second guess the
inspector. I will tell you that in my mind I had serious issues
a year ago on reliability of the propulsion plant because we
were still coming through it, and I think we're through that.
So I don't want to take issue with the tester, sir.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Secretary Stackley, are you trying to
jump in?
Mr. Stackley. I was going to add to that. We did a thorough
review of the findings from the test and evaluation (T&E)
community coming out of operational T&E and three basic
categories emerged. One was a reliability issue associated with
the propulsion plant, which Admiral McCoy has highlighted and
the efforts that have gone into identifying things from the low
boil system to engine alignment. Those issues technically
understood; fixes are either in place or being completed
throughout the class.
The second category was reliability associated with, the
Admiral mentioned, the SWAN and the obsolete technology. That
technology is being refreshed. This touches everything from the
propulsion system to interior communications to motor-operated
valves.
Senator Wicker. Was that a design defect or a manufacturing
failure?
Mr. Stackley. Actually, at the time that was state-of-the-
art. This mid-90s technology was state-of-the-art for basically
passing signals from one end of the ship to the other. You get
to a decade later and it's obsolete technology. It has been far
surpassed by this gigabit ethernet approach which we're
incorporating throughout the class.
The third category is the combat systems. On LPD-17, the
combat systems--I will call them Navy standard systems are the
same systems that you'll find on other Navy ships. There are
some deficiencies associated with those systems against certain
threats that are known throughout the Navy, that are being
addressed Navy-wide in terms of upgrades to those systems, and
when we have the Navy-wide solution that will be back-fit on
the LPD-17 class.
So the findings we found to be generally accurate and the
final determination, that's the Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation's call.
Senator Wicker. Let me try to boil this down with regard to
the LPD-17. We had gotten away from a culture of quality, and I
take it from the testimony that the shipyard itself had gotten
away from the culture of quality.
Number two, the Navy didn't follow the process closely
enough. Number three, part of that was not enough Navy
personnel were assigned to this task to make sure we stayed
with this culture of quality.
Then number four, getting down to specifics, there were
written instructions as far as the process that simply were not
followed.
Captain Galinis, I'll let you take the first stab at this.
Have I summarized at least four important parts there
correctly? If not, what did I miss? I think the chairman is
asking the exact right question. This program has matured and
it's going to be fine and folks like it now, but it sure has
been a mess.
Are we learning lessons, not just for this system, but for
the next system, so that it can be avoided again?
Captain Galinis. Yes, sir. First of all, I believe you did
characterize the points correctly there. Again, the written
processes that we have I think are good processes. As I said,
what we have in place now, I believe, the inspections that we
have, working with the shipyard, give us the ability to measure
compliance with those processes. I believe that probably in the
past we were not as effective in that area collectively, both
the Navy and the shipbuilder, as we should have been or
certainly could have been. I think that's what led to some of
the issues that we're seeing.
The pipe weld issue that Admiral McCoy referred to. The mil
standard that's in place to measure weld quality has about 18
different attributes, and I'll say over time our inspectors
both on the Navy and the shipbuilder side maybe were only
looking at 6 of those, as an example. We were not catching all
of the particular attributes that would lead to a quality weld.
That's just one example that over time we've atrophied how
we look at particular issues. I think through the training
processes now that we've put in place both on the Navy side and
the shipbuilder side, one of the things that Admiral McCoy
referred to, his teams that have come down, since I have been
down there, in almost 20 months we've had eight different
quality or technical authority type-based assessments done
between the shipbuilder and the SUPSHIP, as well as a number of
other informal audits.
So one of the things that came out of that early on was the
training of the craftsmen on the deckplate, not knowing exactly
what process they should be using. In the Ingalls yard that we
work with, they have three different contracts in place at the
same time. So there are different requirements across those
different contracts. For the craftsman on the deckplate, to do
the job correctly he had to understand what the requirements
were for the ship that he was working on and the processes he
should follow.
A lot of times that information wasn't being flowed down to
the craftsman. I'll tell you that's one thing that the shipyard
has corrected, and within the last year they have a very robust
training program in place now, not just for new hires, but also
for people in the workforce to go back and refresh those
skills.
Just 2 months ago I had the opportunity to go through that
school myself and we walked through what they're doing for the
welders, how they're training the electricians and the
pipefitters. There is a very good effort in that place, and I
think that gets us to that process compliance piece that we're
striving for.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. I'll stick around for
a second round, but I know Senator Ayotte has been very
patient, so I'll let her take a turn.
Senator Reed. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much,
Senator Wicker.
Secretary Stackley, I wanted to ask you about the issue of
modernization of our shipyards. In your written testimony you
cite the impending attack submarine force structure gap that
you anticipate coming in the 2020s. You've also stated that you
plan to address this impending attack submarine force structure
gap by reducing the construction span of the Virginia-class
submarines and extending the service life of selected attack
submarines and extending the length of selected attack
submarine deployments.
The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is a very important public
shipyard in our country. There is a gap in the modernization of
our shipyards in terms of the backlog there. I'm sure that the
other shipyards have backlogs as well, but the backlog at
Portsmouth is approximately $500 million in modernization.
What steps do we plan to take to address that, given if
we're going to focus on extending the life and the maintenance?
A shipyard like Portsmouth is very critical in having the
ability and modernization to be able to do that in the most
efficient and appropriate manner to meet your goals.
Secretary Stackley, what steps do you think we should be
taking to prepare for an increased workload, as I would see it
actually, in what we do at the shipyard?
Then also, Admiral McCoy, if you could comment, based on
your previous experience as the commander at the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard, how you think the Navy's plan to address the
attack submarine forces structure gap will impact Portsmouth,
and also what steps we can be taking now and what steps you
anticipate taking to address this backlog so that we can be
prepared to meet what your proposal is.
Mr. Stackley. Yes, ma'am. Let me start by describing first
the mitigation efforts that you highlighted from our written
statement. Those are mitigation only. They don't close the gap.
If you look at the force structure tables, in fact our
submarine force structure drops down to a low of about 39
submarines in about 20 years.
That's of deep concern to us. When we look at what that
potentially means with regards to operational cycle and
turnaround times, turnaround ratios, it means that we have to
stay right on top of the maintenance plan for the Virginia-
class. Historically, submarine and carrier maintenance has been
funded to about 100 percent. It's at the top of the priority
list when it comes to our Operation and Maintenance account and
so we ensure that we do fully fund the maintenance that's
planned.
You're getting at the flip side, which is, how about the
infrastructure that's going to be responsible for executing the
maintenance? We have a couple of benchmarks that we look at.
The investment in terms of infrastructure for our depots, we're
required and we do meet the requirement to ensure that at least
6 percent of our maintenance budget would be going through
those depots, into the infrastructure. We carefully ensure that
we meet that benchmark.
The backlog is the delta between that benchmark and then
the long potential list of things that we'd like to do to
upgrade or modernize our facilities. That comes back to the
rest of the budget process. After we hit our benchmarks in
terms of ensuring that we've fully funded the maintenance and
the modernization and that we've met the benchmarks for taking
care of the infrastructure, this remaining list of work has to
compete inside of the budget process based on priority.
We're looking across the board in terms of our depot
investments and the projects that either are a higher priority
or return the greatest bang for the buck. Looking at the future
requirements for those depots is how it plays out. Each of the
depots are looking at that type of a backlog and it simply
comes down to the budget that's available, prioritizing the
requirements inside of the budget, and ensuring that we meet
the maintenance demands for the force today and for the
foreseeable future.
Senator Ayotte. Just as a brief follow-up, you said you are
deeply concerned about the 39-submarine structure, and then
also the purpose of the modernization would be to make sure
that we can most efficiently use our shipyards. In terms of
your deep concern about that, please tell me a little bit more.
Mr. Stackley. It's both maintenance and modernization. One
of the other things that we've done with Virginia, the latter
half of the LA class, Seawolf, and for the replacement, is gone
towards the ARC-E concept, which is basically modernizing as
you go. In other words, rather than bring submarines in to deep
modernization periods to upgrade their capability to pace the
threat, we've gone towards a more open systems approach, so
that the impact associated with modernization periods is less
dramatic.
But the other aspect of it then is just class maintenance
plan, doing the periodic maintenance and the condition-based
maintenance on a regular cycle. That's the two parts. It's
ensuring the maintenance is funded, which it has been and
foreseeably will continue to be; and the other is to ensure
that the infrastructure is there to conduct the maintenance.
I haven't reviewed the backlog list at Portsmouth. I
suspect that Admiral McCoy has. But I'm not aware of an issue
at Portsmouth regarding the backlog of upgrading that facility
that directly places at risk our ability to maintain the
submarine force that will be relying on Portsmouth as a depot.
Senator Ayotte. Admiral, I know you're quite familiar with
the shipyard. I wanted to get your thoughts on this.
Admiral McCoy. If you did know, I'm one of the fiercest
defenders of the four naval shipyards within DOD, because they
are so critical to sailing in the Navy. As a matter of fact, I
tell people every single man-day at least for the next 5 years
has already been accounted for in the four naval shipyards with
known work. It's that critical to the fleet.
I watch and evaluate the military construction (MILCON) and
the sustainment and restoration money that goes into the four
naval shipyards. I am satisfied, and we argue vehemently inside
the Navy rack and stack process, that the critical maintenance,
piers and drydocks, the things we need to do to execute our
mission every single day, is in fact done, and the critical
replacements that we need to do.
After that, as Secretary Stackley said, it becomes where in
the budget in terms of this thing or that thing. Maintenance,
MILCON, modernization, equipment buys, hiring people,
apprentice training, and things like that where in the priority
is the best expenditure of our dollars at any given time. But
we are very conscious to make sure that our four naval
shipyards get the critical maintenance that they need and
MILCON that they need to execute their mission.
Now, I'd like to address the attack submarine backlog.
That's an issue that all of us are working on within the Navy.
There are things that we can do that I will just point out that
the folks up in Portsmouth are intimately involved with. We
have the SUBMET folks, about 250 people up there at the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, colocated along with the shipyard,
and in fact we're looking at ways to collapse the maintenance
cycle down. Can we do less maintenance with good engineering,
the track record, and the trending that we've been doing over
the years?
For example, a year ago we signed out a change to the
second half of the 688 class life where, instead of doing 4-
year on-center selected restricted availabilities, we're now
doing 6-year on centers. That one change just between 2010 and
2016 gave us 12 submarine years back.
I think there's a tremendous opportunity for the submarine
repair industrial base that Porstsmouth is deep in the middle
of to look at how on the repair side we can reduce the amount
of maintenance required to give more operational time to the
fleet.
We're looking at right now how do we get engineered
overhauls from about 20 months down to 18 months? That gives us
2 more months of submarine time. There's a huge role for our
public shipyards in helping that submarine gap out there in the
future, as the Secretary said.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much for your answers. I
appreciate it.
My time is up.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator.
Let me go back to the question that both Senator Wicker and
I alluded to, Mr. Secretary.
That is, we've learned a lot through not just the LPD-17
program, but so many programs that you've all spoken about. How
are we capturing these lessons, not just in terms of oversight
of the shipyards, but in the design and the contractual
arrangements that we are going to see in the future to ensure
the ships come in on time, on budget, and at high quality?
Just as a footnote, I think one of the lessons we have
learned is you have to have the Navy personnel on the shipyard.
My sense was in the 90s that presence was a billpayer for a lot
of things we did. With the tough budget ahead of us, we can't
do the same thing again or we'll squander these lessons.
With that as a prelude, Mr. Secretary, your comments
please. Admiral McCoy, if you have comments I'd appreciate it;
and Captain Galinis also.
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me start at the very front end
of the process, which is requirements. If you get the
requirements wrong, you can't fix them downstream. What we've
spent a lot of time and effort on more recently is requirements
definition, looking at risk, how much development is being
required to meet the capabilities that are being lined up with
the requirements, and what's it going to cost.
I can tell you that with the LPD-17 program cost realism
was approximately nonexistent at the front end. LCS had a
similar problem getting out of the starting blocks. If you
don't understand the cost and if in defining the requirements
you bring a lot of risk associated with developing new
capabilities, then downstream when you're trying to actually
execute what was planned on the front end you're going to run
into cost problems. You're going to run into schedule problems
when you have concurrent development, design, and construction
going on.
So we've been focusing on the front end, bringing cost
realism, looking for that 80 percent solution to achieve the
requirements, reduce the risk, and reduce the cost as we get
into the design and construction phase. The Ohio replacement
program is a good example. We spent a year unlocking those
requirements and looking at trades inside of capabilities to
figure out how we get the cost of this large program down so
that later in 5 to 10 years report that we are not breaking
other shipbuilding programs to meet that national strategic
requirement.
There's the requirements piece and there's the cost realism
piece. To go with that is design for affordability. It's really
bringing lessons learned from other shipbuilding programs into
the front end. We're in a much better position to do that today
with the design tools that we have. We're away from vellums,
we're away from paper. We're going into standard computer-aided
design tools that allow us to design a ship many times before
we build it.
We can catch and capture design deficiencies and
interferences. We can bring standard practices. We can have
more people reviewing the design, and then look at
producibility in that process. So it's get the requirements
right, it's leveraging some of the lessons learned in the
design tools that we have.
The other key piece is to get the design done before you
build so you're not carrying concurrency into the construction
cycle. One example is something like a product ion readiness
review; before you go cutting steel on this new ship program,
you certify that the design is done, it's mature, so that we're
not incurring concurrency in the construction process.
Those are probably the three key things on the front end.
Then a lot of the discussion today has been about compliance
and oversight. I can tell you that the focus on that today is
where it needs to be, from the top, the Secretary, CNO, on
down, to ensure that we're investing in terms of putting the
right people, right skills, and right location to perform that
oversight function, and also reviewing, as we talked about all
the procedures and processes so that we don't have disparity,
relying on judgment at the deckplate level, but in fact we have
certified processes and procedures in place driving that
compliance.
Then it's ensuring that you have a contract vehicle that
enforces what you've tried to set up through the requirements,
design, and specs and standards piece. I can tell you we need
to continue to work on that. There's a lot of experience that's
required to write a good contract, and we've lost a lot. Not
only are SUPSHIPs attriting, but also at our headquarters.
Those folks who are extremely experienced, that have the 30
years school of hard knocks on what the right terms and
conditions are and how to structure a good contract, they're
small in number. We're going towards things like peer review
process, where we bring in the larger acquisition workforce to
review contracts to try to harden up everything from terms and
conditions, incentives, and contract type.
You see a lot of this coming through in the discussion with
Dr. Carter and the better buying power initiatives. That is
largely about how we buy what we buy, to write a good strong
contract to enforce the intention that was on the front end.
So there are a lot of parallel efforts. They need to be
sustained. There is a lot of training of the workforce that
goes with that. I think we're seeing early returns. We're
seeing early good trends. But it really is a long-haul effort,
and as we get into the challenges ahead with regard to the
budget and new ship programs, we really have to carry this
discipline further forward to ensure that we don't have
breakage at a period when the budget is potentially coming down
and major programs are trying to rise.
Senator Reed. Admiral McCoy or Captain Galinis, any
comment?
Admiral McCoy. I agree with everything that the Secretary
said relative to getting the requirements right and flowing
that into the design. I would say probably 90 percent of my
problems over the last almost 3 years now with the LPD-17 class
have not been design or requirements. They have really been
fundamental compliance with known requirements that were not
built into the ship, either welding or foreign material
exclusion from critical fluid systems, that kind of thing.
What we've been trying to do is across the four SUPSHIPs
hire up to adequate staff, proper staff, get the training, and
then focus really on a compliance mentality and oversight with
the shipbuilder.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Captain Galinis, any comments?
Captain Galinis. Sir, I would take it to a little bit more
of a tactical level. What we're doing day-to-day on LPD-22,
which is our next LPD to deliver and is going to deliver this
year, the program office and the program executive officer
several years back stood up the strike team. This is an
organization with input from the fleet, from the builders, and
from the program side, to kind of capture lessons learned
across the class.
They have developed a pretty good database of issues.
They've solved a great deal of those. What we have done is
we've leveraged off of that database and put together what I'll
call focus groups to go and look at high-risk areas for this
class, many of the things that Admiral McCoy and Secretary
Stackley talked about: main propulsion; electrical; the mission
systems area, which is your hydraulic ramps; the stern gates;
some of the big heavy equipment on board the ship; ventilation
systems; and coating systems. Those are the high-risk areas
that we've had problems on the ship.
We've put together focus teams that include resident
experts from the warfare centers, from the fleet, from the
program office, and the SUPSHIP's office, to work with the
shipbuilder to ensure that we have those captured. Where we can
get design changes in, we're doing that. Where some of the
other fixes are really just performing the work correctly the
first time, we're ensuring that. So there's a laser focus on
those issues for LPD-22 as we go forward.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
I have some questions that I'll submit in writing, and
we'll recognize Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. I want to thank the panel for being willing
to go in depth with us on this issue.
Let me ask about the cost of the 2011 30-year shipbuilding
plan. The Navy says it's going to cost $16 billion per year.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) says it will cost $19
billion per year. What can we make of that?
Mr. Stackley. We tend to take the 30-year plan and break it
down into three windows: first 10, second 10, and third 10,
recognizing that in the first 10 years of the 30-year plan we
have a lot of fidelity, better accuracy, and better
understanding of the ships in the plan, what the requirements
are, and what their costs are.
So we believe we have fairly high fidelity in our cost
estimates for the first 10 years of the plan, and that's $14 to
$15 billion per year, maybe just a tad north of that.
The second 10 years, you start to lose some of that
fidelity, and that's a critical 10-year window because that's
also where you're into heavy construction of the Ohio
replacement program and other new ship programs are starting to
emerge.
Senator Wicker. Let me interject. Does CBO approach it with
three windows of 10 years each also? If so, are they closer in
the first 10 years?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. I was going to wrap around to that.
I will cut to the punch line in terms of the difference between
CBO and the Navy. Dr. Labs and I have had this conversation on
a number of occasions. We have a difference in terms of how we
escalate and then de-escalate the price of ships in the out
years. It's a difference between the way the Navy cost
estimators account for inflation versus the way CBO accounts
for inflation. That difference makes up the majority of the
difference between CBO's estimates and the Navy's estimates.
What happens between that 10-, 20-, and 30-year window is
the further out you go obviously the greater the impact the
inflation will have, and that's where it tends to exacerbate
the difference between the Navy and CBO.
Going back to the 10-, 20-, 30-year look, in the first 10
years I think we're fairly close in our estimates. We start to
diverge in that second window, which is a combination of that
escalation difference and also some assumptions regarding
largely the Ohio replacement program. Then when you get out to
the third window, the last 10 years of the 30-year plan, we're
fairly far apart, again driven by difference in escalations,
but now you're also starting to get into programs that don't
exist and what assumptions are you going to make, for example,
regarding a DDG-X out 30 years from now.
That's why I break it down to those three windows. We're
very much focused on the first 10-year window. We're very
concerned about the second because that Ohio replacement
program is so dominating. The third window we look at for long-
range planning and consideration, but we don't do a whole lot
in the near term to try to affect that last decade of the 30-
year plan.
Senator Wicker. That makes sense. Let me ask in conclusion
about the industrial base. We want our shipyards to do right
and to get this right, but also we want to keep them viable.
There are concerns that the relatively low orders for new ships
in the 2011 plan may jeopardize the administration's plans to
support the shipbuilding industrial base over the intermediate
to long term.
Tell us what you can to reassure us in that regard, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. We talked about adding five ships
to the FYDP. If you look at the ships we've added, there was a
very heavy focus on, one, it's a valid requirement, but two,
the industrial base. So we've added a 2014 destroyer, for
example. We have two surface combatant builders. We have a
sawtooth profile, which is marginal to support two surface
combatant builders. What we would really like to do is get that
build rate up to a more stable flow of work that helps our
affordability, helps their viability, and meets the force
structure requirement.
Senator Wicker. We'd like to help you on that.
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir.
So there's the surface combatant piece. We've added a
destroyer in the FYDP. I believe we have further to go and we
need to continue to work on that.
We also added the T-AOXs and we pulled the MLP to the left.
Today we have two auxiliary builders and we need to pull that
work into the FYDP to keep the auxiliary sector of our
shipbuilding industrial base viable, recognizing that by itself
is not going to be able to support two auxiliary shipbuilders
or we are at risk of losing both.
That was critical to the sector, but if the shipyards were
side by side with me they would describe that as not sufficient
to support both of the auxiliary builders today.
The other aspects of our shipbuilding plan, submarines are
going to two per year. In fact, in some years in the out years
when Ohio starts up we're at three. I think that sector is very
healthy compared to the past 10 to 15 years. For carriers, we
are very stable between new construction and refueling and
complex overhauls, so that sector is healthy. Then the last
piece is amphibs and between our big deck build plan and the
LPD-17 winding down, we have in fact pulled the LSD-X, which
was originally going to be out in the 2020s, in to the 2017
timeframe and are going to be kicking off that analysis of
alternatives, again with concerns for the industrial base.
So we keep a close eye on the industrial base when we build
the shipbuilding plan. We are in a $15, $16 billion rate over
that 30-year window. Some people would argue that we're going
to be challenged to meet that budget plan. But in the near term
we're doing everything we can to address the rise in the budget
and the types of ships that we build with an eye on the
industrial base.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, this is going to do it for me today. I really
appreciate this panel working with us to help us increase our
understanding of these very large, expensive, and complex
issues.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator. I want to join you in
thanking the panel for very insightful and very, very helpful,
constructive testimony this afternoon. We look forward to
working with you, because this is a long-term ongoing, mutually
involved exercise. So thank you very much.
Admiral, thank you for your service. Mr. Secretary and
Captain, thank you, because you brought a real from-the-
dockside view of the process and we appreciate it very, very
much.
With that, there will be some written questions provided to
you within the week and we hope you respond as quickly as
possible; and we'll now adjourn the hearing. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
littoral combat ships
1. Senator Sessions. Secretary Stackley, a May 12, 2011,
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) report
stated that the Navy lacks an Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) authority
for executing the two block-buy contracts for the LCS class ships.
According to CRS, the provision that granted the Navy authority did not
include wording explicitly permitting the Navy to use EOQ purchasing in
procuring the 20 LCSs covered under the two 10-ship LCS block-buy
contracts. The CRS report states that EOQ purchasing would shift the
procurement of certain LCS seaframe components from later years of the
two block-buy contracts to earlier years, funding these EOQ purchases
would increase LCS seaframe procurement funding requirements in the
earlier years of the two block-buy contracts, and reduce (by an even
larger amount) LCS seaframe procurement funding requirements in the
later years of the two LCS block-buy contracts. Does the Navy support
authorizing language that would provide EOQ authority?
Secretary Stackley. The Navy plans to use EOQ authority for the LCS
program and would support additional statutory language authorizing EOQ
for the program. However, the Navy believes that Congress has already
authorized the Navy to make EOQ purchases under the two Block Buy
contracts that were awarded on December 29, 2010. This statutory
authority is granted by section 121 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111-84 (section
121); as amended by Section 150 of the Continuing Appropriations and
Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, Pub. L. 111-322 (section
150).
Subsequently, the Navy sought authorization from Congress to award
10-ship construction contracts to both LCS shipbuilders, thereby
enabling the Navy to construct a total of 20 LCS vessels (acquiring 10
each of both designs) for less than it had budgeted to acquire only 15
ships of one design under its original acquisition strategy.
In response, Congress enacted section 150 providing that `` . . .
the Secretary of the Navy may award a contract or contracts for up to
20 LCSs.'' Section 150 does not repeal or amend other portions of the
prior authorization in section 121, including authorization to acquire
``material and equipment in economic order quantities when cost savings
are achievable.'' This position is supported by the fact that Congress
subsequently included $190,351,000 of EOQ funding for the LCS Program
in the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2011, Pub. L. 112-10.
2. Senator Sessions. Secretary Stackley, do you agree or disagree
with CRS's characterization of how EOQ authority would affect the cost
of future LCS ships? Please explain your position.
Secretary Stackley. The Navy plans to use EOQ authority for the LCS
program, and would support additional statutory language authorizing
EOQ for the Program. However, the Navy believes that Congress has
already authorized the Navy to make EOQ purchases under the two Block
Buy contracts that were awarded on December 29, 2010. This statutory
authority is granted by section 121 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010,
Pub. L. 111-84 (section 121); as amended by section 150 of the
Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act,
2011, Pub. L. 111-322 (section 150).
Subsequently, the Navy sought authorization from Congress to award
10-ship construction contracts to both LCS shipbuilders, thereby
enabling the Navy to construct a total of 20 LCS vessels (acquiring 10
each of both designs) for less than it had budgeted to acquire only 15
ships of one design under its original acquisition strategy.
Congress responded by enacting section 150, providing that `` . . .
the Secretary of the Navy may award a contract or contracts for up to
20 LCSs.'' Section 150 does not repeal or amend other portions of the
prior authorization in section 121, including authorization to acquire
``material and equipment in economic order quantities when cost savings
are achievable.'' This position is supported by the fact that Congress
subsequently included $190,351,000 of EOQ funding for the LCS Program
in the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2011, Pub. L. 112-10.
With respect to how EOQ authority would affect the cost of future
LCS or Navy ships in general, the Navy agrees with the CRS
characterization. EOQ purchasing shifts procurements from later years
to earlier years, increasing earlier year funding requirements but
reducing by a larger amount funding requirements in later years as
industry is able to negotiate with suppliers lower prices for items
purchased in greater quantities. The Navy had projected more
significant EOQ savings based on a combination of Government Furnished
Equipment and ship component purchases prior to House Appropriations
Committee rescission of those funds.
repair facilities
3. Senator Sessions. Secretary Stackley, as we discuss the Navy's
shipbuilding plans and fleet size, I want to recognize the important
role that high-quality ship repair activities play in all of this. For
decades, open competition has provided the Navy with a reliable and
capable private sector workforce made of both large and small
businesses. In non-nuclear ship repair this open competition was
encouraged by the Competiveness Demonstration (Comp Demo) program that
began in 1988. However, at the end of last Congress this successful
program was unfortunately repealed. Since that time, more than 30
government vessels have been set-aside, thereby eliminating numerous
shipyards from competing to work on them. I know the negative impact
this has on shipyards in Alabama and their skilled workers. In your
opinion, should the Comp Demo program be reinstated for non-nuclear
ship repair?
Secretary Stackley. The purpose of the Comp Demo Program was to
evaluate the ability of small businesses to compete without the use of
general small business set-asides. The DOD Office of Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, specified in their memo of June 16, 2010
that set-asides could only be implemented if small business received
less than 40 percent of the awarded dollars for industries covered
under the Comp Demo Program. In fiscal year 2010, for the industry code
that governs non-nuclear ship construction and repair, according to the
Federal Procurement Data System, small businesses received over 55
percent of the Navy's awards thus exceeding the minimum required by
DOD.
The DON Office of Small Business Programs is presently conducting
an analysis covering the past 5 years to fully evaluate and understand
the participation small business has had in this and other areas
formerly covered by the Comp Demo Program to fully assess the impact of
the repeal. Upon completion of this review DON will evaluate an
appropriate action.
In the meantime, prior to approving any acquisition strategy the
DON will continue to perform comprehensive market research analysis to
determine the availability and capability of small business, the depth
of potential competition, the present health of the industry and the
appropriateness of applying set-asides in accordance with the Federal
Acquisition Regulations.
4. Senator Sessions. Secretary Stackley, if it is not done soon,
then what impact do you think this decrease in competition will have in
the ship repair area?
Secretary Stackley. The purpose of the Comp Demo Program was to
evaluate the ability of small businesses to compete without the use of
general small business set-asides. Elimination of the Comp Demo program
may impact the level of competition for all Navy and Military Sealift
Command (MSC) operated vessels, although competition would exist under
small business set-asides.
For non-nuclear repair of U.S. Navy ships, the repeal of the Comp
Demo program may require that future Multi-Ship/Multi-Option (MSMO)
contracts be set aside as appropriate per Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR). For non-nuclear ship repair of MSC-operated vessels,
while it is reasonable to expect that the majority of MSC non-nuclear
ship repair contracts on the east coast will be set-aside, recent
industry consolidation of some small business yards on the west coast
makes the impact there less certain. The extent of set-asides will
depend on the capabilities and availabilities of small business
qualified yards which will be determined on an individual procurement
basis.
In the meantime, prior to approving any acquisition strategy the
DON will continue to perform comprehensive market research analysis to
determine the availability and capability of small business, the depth
of potential competition, the present health of the industry and the
appropriateness of applying set-asides in accordance with the FAR.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
industrial base
5. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, the Navy's current 30-Year
Shipbuilding Plan (2011 Plan) indicates that we will be building ships
at minimum sustaining rates. Many observe that this could pose
challenges to fulfilling the amphibious force requirement and possibly
give rise to a sea-lift capability gap and aviation-lift gap in 2015.
Let's set aside the operational implications of those issues for a
moment. Many worry that the relatively low orders for new ships
proposed in the 2011 Plan may jeopardize the administration's plans to
support the shipbuilding industrial base over the intermediate- to
long-term. The reductions in vendors to provide equipment for the
shipbuilding industry may also make it difficult to realize desired
efficiencies. Is the number of ships currently planned for enough to
keep the Navy's six major shipyards in business?
Secretary Stackley. The 30-year plan aligns with decisions made by
the Secretary of Defense in fiscal year 2012 President's budget as well
as priorities and guidance from the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). The shipbuilding program invests where necessary to ensure the
Navy's battle force remains equal to the challenges of today as well as
those it may face in the future. The program represents a balance
between the expected demands upon the battle force for presence,
partnership building, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,
deterrence and warfighting as well as expected future resources.
As discussed in the fiscal year 2011 Shipbuilding Report to
Congress, the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine
Corps have agreed that 38 amphibious ships are necessary to ensure full
lift capability for a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault.
Further they have determined that this force can be sourced in the
Assault Echelon (AE) with 33 ships, with acceptable risk. In keeping
with this agreement, the Navy is reviewing options to increase the AE
to reflect a minimum of 33 amphibious ships in the AE, evenly balanced
at 11 aviation-capable ships, 11 LPD-17-class ships, and 11 LSD-41-
class ships. The 33 ship force accepts risk in the arrival of combat
support and combat service support elements of the MEB but has been
judged to be adequate in meeting the needs of all parties within the
limits of today's fiscal realities. The fiscal year 2012 President's
budget achieves the minimum of 33 AE ships beginning in fiscal year
2017.
The Navy recognizes that level loading of ship procurement to help
sustain minimum employment levels and skill retention promotes a
healthy U.S. shipbuilding industrial base and this was considered in
the development of our shipbuilding plan.
6. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, what is your sense about the
shipbuilding industry's support for the proposed plan?
Secretary Stackley. The Navy is the primary customer for all of the
first tier shipyards. Additionally, fleet maintenance and modernization
workload provides further workload stabilization. The Navy recognizes
that level loading of ship procurement to help sustain minimum
employment levels and skill retention promotes a healthy U.S.
shipbuilding industrial base. The Navy has made a series of key
shipbuilding investment decisions, each of which have contributed to
meeting the Department's requirements while also serving to strengthen
the industrial base. These adjustments to the shipbuilding plan have
been well supported by the shipbuilding industry, including:
accelerating increased Virginia-class submarine
construction to two boats per year, commencing in fiscal year
2011;
realigning DDG-1000 construction to a single shipyard
(BIW) while restarting DDG-51 construction;
accelerating Mobile Landing Platform construction to
three ships over 3 years;
accelerating start of the future fleet oiler, T-AO(X),
construction from fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2014;
accelerating construction of the LSD(X) to fiscal year
2017;
increasing construction of DDG-51 destroyers with the
addition of a second DDG in fiscal year 2014; and
dual award of LCS contracts in fiscal year 2010.
Further, the Navy is supporting the industrial base by leveraging
stable designs to minimize disruption experienced with first-of-class
constructions and providing stable production rates within the
constraints of requirements and budget.
7. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, in your view, can industry
withstand the minimum sustaining rate at which the Navy is building
(and intends to continue building) many of its ships?
Secretary Stackley. The Navy recognizes that building the required
force structure will largely depend on controlling shipbuilding costs
(including combat systems) within an affordable range. We are committed
to maintaining stability in requirements, funding and profiles in an
effort to control costs. This will require the combined efforts of the
Navy, the shipbuilding industry and combat systems industry. Working in
conjunction with Congress, the Navy will procure and sustain force
structure necessary to deliver the naval capabilities needed to support
national interests.
The Navy has and continues initiatives to support the shipbuilding
industrial base including:
1. In Title II of Public Law 109-234, section 2203, Congress
directed that at least $140 million be made available for
infrastructure improvements at Gulf Coast shipyards that have existing
Navy shipbuilding contracts and that were damaged by Hurricane Katrina
in calendar year 2005. In 2010, the Department awarded an additional
$39.5 million in infrastructure improvement projects to Gulf Coast
shipyards that support the Navy shipbuilding industrial base. These
projects focus on expediting recovery of shipbuilding capability,
increasing efficiency, and preventing further hurricane damage to Gulf
Coast shipyards.
2. The Department of the Navy's new ship construction procurement
and funding plans for fiscal year 2012 and the Future Years Defense
Program as reflected in the President's budget 2012 submission,
reflects the Navy's commitment to support and add stability to the
industrial base by taking into account industrial base implications, as
acquisition strategies and contracting strategies are developed.
Specifically the Navy has:
a. Accelerated production of the double-hulled fleet oiler T-
AO(X) from 2017 to 2014 in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission. This
allows the Navy to acquire this important capability 3 years earlier
while bringing greater stability and promoting competition in the
shipbuilding industry.
b. Accelerated the procurement schedule for Mobile Landing
Platform (MLP) to one ship per year in fiscal years 2011-2013 from
procurement in fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 2013, and fiscal year
2015.
c. Executed an acquisition strategy for the LCS where Lockheed
Martin and Austal USA were each awarded a fixed-price incentive
contract for the design and construction of a 10-ship block buy from
fiscal year 2010-2015. This LCS strategy supports the industrial base
for shipbuilding by keeping workers employed at two shipyards along
with workers at their various subcontractors and vendors.
d. Developed a plan which most affordably meets the
requirements for Navy surface combatants, commences the transition to
improved missile defense capability in new construction, and provides
significant stability for the industrial base. The plan allocates
construction responsibilities for DDGs-1000-1002 and DDGs-113-115
(fiscal year 2010-2011 ships) between Bath Iron Works (BIW) and Ingalls
HII. The workload agreement should ensure workload stability at both
yards, efficiently restart DDG-51 construction, facilitate performance
improvement opportunities at both shipyards, and maintain two sources
of supply for future Navy surface combatant shipbuilding programs. To
further stabilize the combatant industrial base, the Navy added a
second DDG-51 Flight IIA in fiscal year 2014 and plans to request MYP
authorization in fiscal years 2013-2017.
e. Increased procurement of Virginia-class attack submarines to
two per year starting in fiscal year 2011. The Navy plans to continue
procurement of the Virginia-class attack submarines at two ships per
year when possible.
3. Of the Big Six shipyards, only General Dynamics NASSCO has
recently competed in the commercial shipbuilding industry. However,
NASSCO currently has only U.S. Navy shipbuilding and repair contract
work at the shipyard. In 2010, the Navy signed an Shipbuilding
Capabilities Preservation Act (SCPA) agreement with NASSCO and the
company is pursuing commercial contracts. The Navy is also prepared to
provide an agreement, in accordance with the SCPA, that would assist in
making HII more competitive for commercial shipbuilding work. The
purpose/benefits of an SCPA is to facilitate a shipbuilder's entry into
private sector work and reduce that shipbuilder's reliance on the
Department of Defense industrial base.
The ships brought into service during the 1980s, some procured at a
yearly rate of four to five ships of a single class, are projected to
retire during the next 15-20 years. With the need for multi-mission
platforms vice single mission platforms, and recognizing the
significantly increased capabilities of current new construction ships,
the navy cannot recapitalize legacy ships at the same rate at which
they were originally procured and maintain an affordable balanced
procurement plan. The Navy is working to stabilize the shipbuilding
plan but industry must move to right size and strive for efficiencies
to enable an affordable shipbuilding plan.
8. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, in both the current budget
request and in terms of a more general policy, what, if anything, is
the Navy doing, or will it do, to support the shipbuilding industrial
base? Are there any plans, for example, such as helping to convert
existing shipyards into ship-repair yards?
Secretary Stackley. The Department of Defense and Navy face the
challenge of ensuring that the defense industrial base can meet the
current and future requirements for systems and support while
maintaining cost effectiveness, competition, and the necessary skills
and technology base. To help meet this challenge, the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) has
engaged an outside entity to develop and provide a publicly available,
comprehensive, and independent assessment of the Navy shipbuilding
industrial base.
The Navy seeks an industrial base analysis that focuses on the
essential capabilities and capacities needed to support Navy ship
construction. The objective of the study is to identify the industrial
base challenges facing the Navy and the strategies for mitigating the
effects of those challenges, across a variety of issue areas such as
cost, schedule, technical, infrastructure, and workforce capability.
This may include recommendations to change/improve policies, standards,
contract elements, performance benchmarks, government and industry
practices, and oversight that define the effective delivery of quality
products, platforms, and systems (including combat systems).
Recent examples of what the Navy has done to support the industrial
base include:
1. In Title II of Public Law 109-234, section 2203, Congress
directed that at least $140 million be made available for
infrastructure improvements at Gulf Coast shipyards that have existing
Navy shipbuilding contracts and that were damaged by Hurricane Katrina
in calendar year 2005. In 2010, the Department awarded an additional
$39.5 million in infrastructure improvement projects to Gulf Coast
shipyards that support the Navy shipbuilding industrial base. These
projects focus on expediting recovery of shipbuilding capability,
increasing efficiency, and preventing further hurricane damage to Gulf
Coast shipyards.
2. A recent adjustment in the shipbuilding industrial base is the
Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) decision to spin-off/sell its
shipbuilding sector. Navy evaluated this complex corporate transaction
and negotiated with NGC to ensure that the reorganized entity,
Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), would remain a financially viable
company capable of performing current and future Navy shipbuilding
programs. This reorganization is now complete, after Navy completed its
evaluation and announced its position supporting this reorganization
and finding HII to be a responsible contractor. The Navy is also
prepared to provide an agreement, in accordance with the Shipbuilding
Capabilities Preservation Act (SCPA), that would assist in making HII
more competitive for commercial shipbuilding work. The purpose/benefits
of an SCPA is to facilitate a shipbuilder's entry into private sector
work and reduce that shipbuilder's reliance on the DOD industrial base.
U.S. commercial shipbuilding accounts for approximately 1 percent of
world commercial shipbuilding output; 80 percent of this comes from the
mid-tier sector.
3. The Department of the Navy's new ship construction procurement
and funding plans for fiscal year 2012 and the Future Years Defense
Program as reflected in the PB2012 submission reflects the Navy's
commitment to support and add stability to the industrial base by
taking into account industrial base implications as acqusition
strategies and contracting strategies are developed. Specifically the
Navy has:
a. Accelerated production of the double-hulled fleet oiler T-
AO(X) from 2017 to 2014 in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission. This
allows the Navy to acquire this important capability 3 years earlier
while bringing greater stability and promoting competition in the
shipbuilding industry.
b. Accelerated the procurement schedule for MLP to one ship per
year in fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 2012, and fiscal year 2013 from
procurement in fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 2013, and fiscal year
2015.
c. Executed an acquisition strategy for the LCS where Lockheed
Martin and Austal USA were each awarded a fixed-price incentive
contract for the design and construction of a 10-ship block buy from
fiscal year 2010 through 2015. This LCS strategy supports the
industrial base for shipbuilding by keeping workers employed at two
shipyards along with workers at their various subcontractors and
vendors.
d. Developed a plan which most affordably meets the requirements
for Navy surface combatants, commences the transition to improved
missile defense capability in new construction, and provides
significant stability for the industrial base. The plan allocates
construction responsibilities for DDG-1000-1002 and DDG-113-115 (fiscal
year 2010-2011 ships) between BIW and Ingalls HII. The workload
agreement should ensure workload stability at both yards, efficiently
restart DDG-51 construction, facilitate performance improvement
opportunities at both shipyards, and maintain two sources of supply for
future Navy surface combatant shipbuilding programs. To further
stabilize the combatant industrial base, the Navy added a second DDG-51
Flight IIA in fiscal year 2014 and plans to request MYP authorization
in fiscal year 2013-2017.
e. Increased procurement of Virginia-class attack submarines to
two per year starting in fiscal year 2011. The Navy plans to continue
procurement of the Virginia-class attack submarines at two ships per
year when possible.
4. Of the Big Six shipyards, only General Dynamics NASSCO has
recently competed in the commercial shipbuilding industry. However,
NASSCO currently has only U.S. Navy shipbuilding and repair contract
work at the shipyard. In 2010, the Navy signed an SCPA agreement with
NASSCO and the company is pursuing commercial contracts.
5. Government shipbuilding contracts are routinely structured with
incentive fees on fixed price type contracts. Incentives are tools or
mechanisms through which the government encourages specific behavior or
performance. The Navy has implemented a number of different
shipbuilding facilities investment incentives. By setting aside ship
construction funds to be allocated based on business case
justification, these special incentives allow shipbuilders the
potential to earn additional fees toward capital and process
improvements when proven to be mutually beneficial to both contract
parties.
6. Both the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR Subpart 32.5) and
specific Navy regulations address how progress payments are to be
distributed for shipbuilding contracts. In general, contractors are
paid upon demonstration of physical completion and costs incurred,
while the Navy retains some remainder of funding (i.e., retentions) to
ensure completion of contract deliverables and expectations. However,
in certain circumstances, the Navy has authorized the early release of
contract retentions. Contract retentions are meant as monetary leverage
over the shipbuilder to obtain a fully compliant ship delivery, but for
purposes of providing cash flow to support shipyard investment, early
release of contract retentions can be a timely, real stimulus from a
corporate perspective. Several shipbuilders have benefited from
investments supported in part or wholly through the early release of
contract retentions. This approach was used through the DDG-51 Program
at General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works. Two projects that have utilized
this mechanism are the Land Level Transfer Facility and the Ultra Hall
Facilities.
There are no plans to help convert existing shipyards to repair
yards as they have the capability to perform repair work. There is
currently excess capacity in the private ship repair industry. Navy
must also balance public/private capacity for ship repair. Additional
private capacity would put undue pressure on that public/private
balance.
9. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, what level of cost risk is
created by increasing reliance on sole-source contracts?
Secretary Stackley. Where possible, the Navy is moving away from
sole source contracting. But where that is unavoidable, the Navy
strives to create a strong negotiation posture using in-depth cost
analysis of actual costs, component breakouts, and incentives to focus
industry on reducing costs.
A sole source contract in itself does not automatically result in
an elevated cost risk. The degree of contract cost risk is a function
of Government and industry joint understanding of the contract
requirements and an understanding of the business and technical factors
that drive cost behavior. In September 2010, the Navy implemented an
internal management tool coined should-cost management. The goal for
this initiative is to ensure that program managers articulate only
those contract requirements necessary to deliver warfighting
capability; understand the factors that influence cost behavior; and
drive productivity improvements into their programs during contract
negotiations through effective contract type, terms, and conditions,
and throughout program execution. This policy applies to all contract
types.
Ultimately, one of the Navy's biggest negotiation leverages is
competition. I have challenged the acquisition community to seek every
opportunity to compete at all levels of a program.
10. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, are there any unrealized
opportunities to increase cost controls?
Secretary Stackley. The Department recognizes that building the
required force structure will largely depend on controlling
shipbuilding costs (including combat systems). The Navy is addressing
this in three ways.
First, the Navy continues to look for further affordability and
efficiency opportunities as we go forward with the shipbuilding plan,
such as revising the acquisition strategy for the LCS program to
maximize the advantage of the competitive pricing we received and
enable us to gain an additional ship or seeking to employ multi-year
contracts for Virginia-class submarines and future DDG-51 destroyers.
Second, the Navy is continuing to emphasize the use of fixed price
contracts as a cost control mechanism, when technical risk is low and
when a ship's design is mature. The contract for T-AKEs-12-14 was
recently converted to Firm Fixed Price.
Third, the Navy is placing increased emphasis on affordable
requirements and stable designs. Prior to Milestone A approval for the
Ohio Replacement submarine, the Department evaluated numerous
capability trades to reduce costs. As a result, the Navy made trades in
the number of ballistic missile tubes, the diameter of those tubes, the
number of torpedoes to be carried, acoustic sensors, and other
defensive features throughout the design. These trades made the
submarine more affordable while maintaining the necessary level of
capability. Additionally, the Navy worked with General Dynamics NASSCO
to develop a more affordable design of the Mobile Landing Platform
(MLP). The alternative solution resulted in approximately $2 billion of
cost avoidance. The MLP will improve throughput capabilities for the
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPSRON) though float-on/float-off
(FLO-FLO) technology from a large reconfigurable mission deck.
11. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, I understand that an
outside study on the health of the Navy's shipbuilding industrial base
that was done for you is complete. Please share its preliminary
findings and recommendations.
Secretary Stackley. In April 2010, the Navy initiated a
Shipbuilding Industrial Base Study to review capabilities/capacities of
the shipyards including design and production, the health of the vendor
base, and trends in rates and overhead, productivity, and investment
strategies. The information exchange between industry and government
has been extensive and informative. The study is due to complete
shortly and is currently being staffed for review by senior leadership.
Findings/recommendations of this study will be made available upon
completion of the Navy review.
amphibious ship gap
12. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, it has been suggested that
we are decommissioning amphibious ships too early in their lives and at
a rate that cannot be sustained by new construction ships without
dipping below a level that would negatively impact our amphibious
capability requirements. However, ships such as the Austin-class
amphibious transport docks (LPDs) began reaching the end of their
designed service lives more than 20 years ago. A Service Life Extension
Program (SLEP), which would have modernized the ships for another 10 to
15 years of service, was not authorized by Congress when requested in
1987. As a result, these ships which many consider ill-equipped to
defend themselves against modern threats have remained in service far
longer than intended. Of the recently decommissioned amphibious ships,
how many--if any--were decommissioned earlier than their planned end of
service life?
Secretary Stackley. Since 2005, there have been four LHA-1-class
Amphibious Assault Ships that have been decommissioned earlier than
their expected service life (ESL). The ESL is the number of years a
naval ship is expected to be in service. It is used as a planning
estimate to facilitate the development of ship recapitalization plans.
However, the LHA-1-class ships were built to a design service life
(DSL) objective of 20 years, which they exceeded. The LHA-1-class did
receive mid-life modernization availabilities that enabled them to
exceed their DSL but were not part of a SLEP.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Age at Decom.
Ship ESL (years) DSL (years) (years)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ex-Tarawa (LHA-1)............................................ 35 20 32.8
Ex-Saipan (LHA-2)............................................ 35 20 29.5
Ex-Belleau Wood (LHA-3)...................................... 35 20 27.1
Ex-Nassau (LHA-4)............................................ 35 20 31.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, how many of those ships had
their service lives extended beyond what was intended when they were
built?
Secretary Stackley. Since 2005, there have been eight Amphibious
Warfare ships that have been decommissioned whose services lives
extended beyond their ESL. The ESL is the number of years a naval ship
is expected to be in service. It is used as a planning estimate to
facilitate the development of ship recapitalization plans.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Age at Decom.
Ship ESL (years) (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ex-Austin (LPD-4)..................... 35 41.6
Ex-Ogden (LPD-5)...................... 35 41.7
Ex-Duluth (LPD-6)..................... 35 39.8
Ex-Dubuque (LPD-8).................... 35 43.8
Ex-Juneau (LPD-10).................... 35 39.3
Ex-Shreveport (LPD-12)................ 35 36.8
Ex-Nashville (LPD-13)................. 35 39.6
Ex-Trenton (LPD-14)................... 35 35.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The LHA-1-class ships were built to a design service life (DSL)
objective of 20 years. The four LHA-1-class ships that have been
decommissioned since 2005 exceeded their DSL.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Age at Decom.
Ship DSL (years) (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ex-Tarawa (LHA-1)..................... 20 32.8
Ex-Saipan (LHA-2)..................... 20 29.5
Ex-Belleau Wood (LHA-3)............... 20 27.1
Ex-Nassau (LHA-4)..................... 20 31.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, were those service life
extensions through planned SLEPs or through an ad-hoc process?
Secretary Stackley. Since 2005, there have been eight LPD-4-class
Amphibious Transport ships that have been decommissioned whose services
lives extended beyond their ESL, and four LHA-1-class Amphibious
Assault ships that have been decommissioned whose service lives
extended beyond their Designed Service Life (DSL).
SLEPs can be accomplished on a Navy vessel that is approaching its
ESL. None of the service lives of the aforementioned ships were
extended through planned SLEPs.
The LHA-1-class ships did receive mid-life modernization
availabilities that enabled them to exceed their DSL. Five of the LPD-
4-class ships had an Extended Sustainability (ES) availability that
enabled them to exceed their ESL. (Note: LPDs-7, -8, -9, -13, and -15
received an ES availability.)
15. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, of our currently serving
amphibious ships, how many are already beyond their planned service
lives?
Secretary Stackley. There are four existing ships from the LPD-4
Austin-class, specifically USS Dubuque (LPD-8), USS Cleveland (LPD-7),
USS Ponce (LPD-15) and the USS Denver (LPD-9) that have exceeded their
35 year ESL. Dubuque and Cleveland both are 44 years old and will
decommission in fiscal year 2011. Ponce will be 41 years old at her
planned decommissioning in fiscal year 2012. Denver will be 45 years
old at her planned decommissioning in fiscal year 2013.
16. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, if the San Antonio-class of
ships had remained on schedule for delivery would we be experiencing
this amphibious ship gap that raises so many concerns today?
Secretary Stackley. If the San Antonio-class of ships had remained
on schedule for delivery, it is less likely that we would be
experiencing this amphibious ship gap. Specifically, it is less likely
that the number of active, in-commission LPDs would dip below the
requirement of eleven. This is because the lead-time required for
adjusting the decommission dates of the legacy Austin-class LPDs is
longer than the advanced warning associated with delivery delays of the
San Antonio-class LPDs.
littoral combat ships
17. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, if last year's authority to
implement the dual sole-source award strategy for the LCS program were
amended to give the Navy the explicit authority to use EOQ purchases as
part of the block-buy contracts that it awarded to the two LCS
builders, would the Navy use this additional EOQ authority, and if so,
how much might it reduce the cost of the 20 LCSs to be procured under
these two contracts?
Secretary Stackley. The Navy plans to use EOQ authority for the LCS
program, and would support additional statutory language authorizing
EOQ for the Program. However, the Navy believes that Congress has
already authorized the Navy to make EOQ purchases under the two Block
Buy contracts that were awarded on December 29, 2010. This statutory
authority is granted by section 121 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010,
Pub. L. 111-84 (section 121); as amended by section 150 of the
Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act,
2011, Pub. L. 111-322 (section 150).
Subsequently, the Navy sought authorization from Congress to award
10-ship construction contracts to both LCS shipbuilders, thereby
enabling the Navy to construct a total of 20 LCS vessels (acquiring 10
each of both designs) for less than it had budgeted to acquire only 15
ships of one design under its original acquisition strategy.
In response, Congress enacted section 150 providing that `` . . .
the Secretary of the Navy may award a contract or contracts for up to
20 LCSs.'' Section 150 does not repeal or amend portions of the prior
authorization in section 121, including authorization to acquire
``material and equipment in economic order quantities when cost savings
are achievable.'' This position is supported by the fact that Congress
subsequently included $190,351,000 of EOQ funding for the LCS Program
in the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2011, Pub. L. 112-10.
The Navy had projected more significant EOQ savings of up to 10
percent based on a combination of government-furnished equipment and
ship component purchases prior to the House Appropriations Committee
rescission of those funds.
18. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, the Navy has announced some
changes or potential changes to the composition of LCS mission modules.
Regarding the surface warfare module, it is not clear from press
reports whether the Navy plans to replace the canceled non-line-of-
sight (NLOS) missile with the Griffin missile. Is the Griffin missile
the Navy's replacement for the NLOS, or not?
Secretary Stackley. In April 2010, the Army cancelled the Non-Line-
of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) program. The Navy had planned to use
NLOS-LS in the LCS Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package to counter the
small boat threat. The Army planned production quantities accounted for
nearly 90 percent of the total NLOS production, and the Army program's
cancellation resulted in a significant and unacceptable increase to the
projected unit cost for the Navy.
The Navy reviewed over 50 missile systems and gun improvements for
their ability to meet the LCS SUW requirements in a cost effective
manner. The review led to a strategy to address all layers of LCS SUW
defense including potential gun ammunition improvements and a phased
plan to deploy an anti-small boat missile capability on LCS.
The Griffin Missile, already in production by Raytheon Missile
Systems, is planned for integration into the LCS Surface-to-Surface
Missile Module to provide an initial SUW missile capability. The long-
term solution, one that will provide increased range and autonomous
engagement capability to increase battlespace and engage multiple
targets simultaneously, will be determined through competition to
identify the most cost-effective option.
The initial capability is planned to be in operation on LCS by
2015, matching the previously planned introduction of NLOS capability.
The long-term missile solution is planned to be in operation in 2017.
19. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, the Navy has also announced
a possible change to the mine warfare (MCM) module. When will the Navy
announce whether this change will be implemented?
Secretary Stackley. The Navy is continuing to investigate
modifications of the Airborne Mine Neutralization System and the Joint
Assault Breaching System programs to replace surface/near-surface mine
neutralization capability due to the loss of the Rapid Airborne Mine
Clearance System. The Navy will evaluate the outcome of these ongoing
assessments upon completion, planned for fiscal year 2012.
20. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, the Navy has announced a
change to the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) module. How will this change
affect the cost of the ASW module?
Secretary Stackley. The announced change to the ASW mission module
will result in a decrease of the cost of this module, when compared to
the cost of the previous configuration.
The findings of a periodic warfighting assessment led the Navy to
change the ASW Mission Package approach to better address operational
requirements. The resulting Increment 2 ASW Mission Module is
inherently less complex and is technically more mature, resulting in a
less expensive ASW Mission Module.
21. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, concerns have been
expressed in some quarters about the combat survivability of the LCS.
Please give your perspective on the combat survivability of this ship.
Secretary Stackley. The LCS Ships meet the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council-approved survivability requirements and the designs
incorporate OPNAVINST 9070.1 Level 1 Survivability standards as well as
tailored survivability enhancements (``Level 1+''). LCS survivability
depends on a combination of ship design, ship quantity, and the Concept
of Operations (CONOPS) which says LCS will:
Operate as part of a networked battle force
Independent operations only in low-to medium-
threat scenarios
Part of a networked battle force ops in high
threat environments
Create Battle Space/Avoid being hit
Reliance on networked battle force for threat
attrition
Reliance on overboard systems
Fight and survive if hit
Ship design: Accept ship mission kill; keep
ship afloat and protect crew after hit
Battle force design: Maintain battle force
fight--through capability, through LCS numbers, and
mission flexibility
Withdraw/reposition if hit
Campaign Measure Of Effectiveness (MOE)
LCS is designed to maintain essential mobility after a hit allowing
the ship to exit the battle area under its own power. The LCS
survivability features enable the ship to perform required missions in
the littorals with an emphasis on crew survival.
22. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, the first LCS has
experienced hull cracking. Please discuss the Navy's actions to address
this problem, and whether it has any implications for follow-on ships
in the program.
Secretary Stackley. In order to validate the service life of the
LCS-1-class design the industry team was required to conduct a Spectral
Fatigue Analysis (SFA) in accordance with the Naval Vessel Rules (NVR).
This analysis was conducted against the LCS operating profiles, to
include stressing sea environments, and resulted in the identification
of several high-stress areas in the design. These analysis findings
were used to develop a full ship instrumentation plan and a detailed
post delivery test and trials event schedule to include analysis
verification and hull performance monitoring.
NAVSEA, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), and Industry have
conducted a detailed analysis and review of the workmanship and design
to determine the root cause of the hull and superstructure cracks in
USS Freedom. Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) indicated that a
contributing factor for the single hull crack was likely a weld defect.
Another contributing factor is undersized backing chocks, which expose
that area to higher-than-expected stresses. These chocks will be
replaced during a Post Shakedown Availability (PSA) this summer.
To address these issues in follow-on ships, Navy and Industry
identified and implemented design changes in LCS-3 to ease
accessibility and production of the spray rail (location of the hull
crack of USS Freedom). LCS-5 and follow ships incorporate additional
design changes throughout the spray rail. To confirm that there are not
widespread weld spray rail quality issues, additional NDT is planned at
PSA for LCS-1. Navy is also conducting an ongoing assessment to review
the consistency of design and construction documentation for follow-on
ship construction.
With regard to the superstructure cracks, the investigation found
11 of the 16 cracks coincide with high stress areas discovered in
subsequent detailed structural modeling and analysis. Six of the 16
cracks were attributed to some form of workmanship issue. All 16 cracks
have been repaired.
Based on additional analysis, the LCS-3 design was modified to
lower the stresses in the superstructure via the installation of
gussets and increased material thickness. Design modifications from
LCS-3 will be incorporated into LCS-1 and no further design related
superstructure cracking risk is expected for the LCS-1 design.
joint strike fighter
23. Senator Wicker. Secretary Stackley, the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) program has several important test events coming up this
year that relate to the shipbuilding portfolio--in particular,
shipboard testing on a carrier and an L-class ship for the Navy's F-35C
and the Marine Corps' F-35B, respectively. At this point, what
challenges do you see to the effective integration of each of those F-
35 variants to the ships from which they are supposed to operate?
Please speak to, for example, thermal footprint from the main engine
exhaust, shipboard noise levels, and information technology-related
challenges to integration.
Secretary Stackley.
JSF Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) Variant (F-35B)
Integration Aboard L-Class Ships (LHA and LHD):
Eight modifications required to support F-35B
integration on LHA/LHD-class ships that are incorporated into a
package of ship change documents known as ``cornerstone''
alterations. These modifications provide necessary electrical
servicing upgrades, expanded weapons handling and storage,
provisioning for the JSF Autonomic Logistics Information System
(ALIS), construction of secure access facilities, mission
rehearsal training, and relocation of the flight deck tramline
for safety concerns.
The thermal stresses imparted to the deck steel by the
F-35B have been characterized by sub-scale modeling and a
representative deck coupon tested at Lockheed's hover pit in
January 2010. Initial results show that the ship's structure
will handle the thermal footprint for a single landing, but
further evaluation is required to determine if operationally
representative scenarios may prompt future ship alterations. F-
35B Developmental Testing (DT) on board USS Wasp (LHD-1) will
include measurements for thermal footprint, pressure,
deflection, and strains caused by F-35B operations in the
shipboard environment. Shipboard DT is planned to occur in fall
2011.
The ``cornerstone'' ship alterations have commenced on
USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and USS Wasp (LHD-1). Follow-on
design changes to install External Environment (EE)
modifications will occur once informed by shipboard DT. These
modifications will be installed on USS Wasp prior to the
Operational Test (OT) period currently scheduled for the
summer/fall of 2013. Subsequent ship alterations for the LHD-1-
class will occur at a rate of one hull per year starting in
fiscal year 2015.
JSF Carrier Variant (F-35C) Integration Aboard CVNs:
Eight modifications required for F-35C (JSF Carrier
variant) integration on CVNs are actively being developed to
maturity or being installed. These modifications provide for
necessary electrical servicing upgrades, expanded weapons
handling, construction of secure access facilities, mission
rehearsal training, ALIS, Joint Precision Approach and Landing
System, thermal effect mitigation, Lithium Ion battery storage
and noise abatement.
F-35C thermal impacts on CVNs are currently being
studied by modeling exhaust impacts on Jet Blast Deflector
(JBD) and Flight Deck systems. Land-based testing of the F-35C
exhaust plume on a JBD started June 29, 2011. It is necessary
to validate the modeling analysis and determine the scope of
JBD and shipboard modifications.
Required CVN modifications will continue to be
incorporated into CVN 68 (Nimitz)-class aircraft carriers
during planned maintenance availabilities in advance of F-35C
arrival. Required modifications that are not part of the CVN-78
(Ford)-class design will be incorporated into the ship prior to
F-35C deployment.
Common CVN/L-Class Air Ship Integration Topics
Noise:
The F-35 program has taken a proactive approach to address noise
concerns on-board Naval Ships. Protecting the hearing of maintainers
and ship board personnel has been a program focus and new Hearing
Protection Devices (HPD) were developed to support personnel working in
close proximity to F-35 and other jets at high power engine settings
during launch/recovery operations. The HPD devices will allow service
personnel to work more effectively and longer at tasks in extreme noise
environments before reaching their total daily exposure (TDE) limit to
high noise.
Many F-35A noise characterization tests have been completed. Tests
have shown F-35A is in the same noise class as other Department of
Defense aircraft (e.g. F-22 and F/A-18E/F aircraft). F-35B Ground Test
Plans are in development, with data collection planned for the third/
fourth quarter of calendar year 2011 timeframe. The objectives of these
tests are to capture near-field personnel noise environments with a
focus on capturing noise exposure data during Short Take-Off (STO) and
Vertical Landings (VL). The data from these tests will be used to
support noise assessments for flight deck personnel and further assist
aircraft integration aboard L-class Ships. Ground Test Plans for the F-
35C have been developed and testing commenced in conjunction with JBD
testing on June 29, 2011. Like F-35B, the data to be captured from this
testing will be used to support maintainer noise exposure assessments,
personal hearing protection requirements, and flight deck CONOPS.
The Department of the Navy has also established hazardous noise
exposure mitigation working groups that bring together scientists,
engineers, and medical professionals to work toward further protecting
our sailors and marines from the risks to prolonged exposure to noise
from all sources (above deck, below deck, and ashore). These groups
will collaborate on common issues affecting noise sources and exposure
management and will work with the Department's System Safety Advisory
Board for integration of recommendations into the Department's long-
term noise risk mitigation plans.
Information Technology:
Issues associated with shipboard special access program space
accreditation have been resolved. Interoperability with legacy Naval
Aviation Enterprise information systems remains in-work. Towards
resolving this topic, we have identified all affected systems via a
joint risk review; identified data exchange requirements with DoN
legacy systems; and agreed on a plan to build the necessary interfaces
between the F-35 ALIS system and legacy aviation maintenance systems.
quality control problems
24. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral McCoy, from the first ship in its
class, the LPD-17 San Antonio-class amphibious ship program has
displayed chronic problems in terms of safety, engineering, design, and
oversight. These problems have been so significant that they give rise
to broader concerns about a widespread readiness problem afflicting our
surface fleet. As to the LPD-17-class of ships, we have been left with
an entire class of ships that, according to the Pentagon's chief
independent weapons tester, is ``not effective, suitable and not
survivable in combat''. With Northrop Grumman's sale of its shipyards,
what are the Navy's plans for the construction of the last LPD-17 ship?
Admiral McCoy. A new LPD-17-class build plan, which rolls in
lessons learned from the initial ships of the class and focuses on
increased pre-outfitting, increased first-time quality, and higher
completion levels at launch, has been developed and incorporated on the
ships currently in construction. The design is mature; and the program
requirements and schedule are stabilizing as production trends continue
to show improvement. The last LPD-17-class ship (LPD-27) is planned to
be awarded to Huntington Ingalls Industries.
25. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral McCoy and Captain Galinis, please
address the apparent downward trend in funding for maintenance, with
the negative impact falling more heavily on surface combatants than on
carriers and submarines.
Admiral McCoy and Captain Galinis. Even though the percentage of
the Ship Maintenance requirement funded has fallen, the baseline
maintenance budget request has actually increased from $4.3 billion in
fiscal year 2010 to $4.9 billion in fiscal year 2012. This increase is
a reflection of the Navy's commitment to funding the surface ship
maintenance requirement. Additionally, investments being made in the
Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program and enhanced
assessments of our surface ships provides us with more insight on how
to best manage risk and ensures that deferred work will be properly
documented and tracked for completion in future availabilities. Navy
remains committed to sustaining the force structure required to
implement the Maritime Strategy.
The Navy's total budget submission reflects the best balance of
risk and available resources across the Navy portfolio.
ship repair issues
26. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral McCoy, earlier this month, the
Navy terminated a large ship-maintenance contract with Earl Industries,
citing problems it found with Earl's earlier work and its lack of
proper documentation related to repair work. The Navy also reported to
us recently that its investigation into engine repairs on the
amphibious warship USS San Antonio and other ships similarly found that
key maintenance reports were missing and several other important
anomalies with documentation. However, 3 weeks before it terminated a
$75 million, 5-year maintenance contract with Earl Industries, the Navy
defended the company's work in a letter to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) in a bid protest. What is going on here?
Admiral McCoy. The termination of Earl Industries, LLC's (Earl's)
MSMO contract for the repair of LPD-17-class ships was based on serious
documentation and recordkeeping problems, and other quality-assurance
issues, discovered during Earl's ongoing Continuous Maintenance
Availability (CMAV) on USS San Antonio (LPD-17). These problems
generated significant concerns about the company's ability to perform
successfully on LPD-17-class ships under the 5-year MSMO contract.
There is no inconsistency between the Navy's defense of the bid
protest and its decision to terminate the maintenance contract with
Earl Industries. In its submission to GAO on April 18, 2011, concerning
the January 2011 award to Earl, the Navy emphasized that the
deficiencies in Earl's documentation on the CMAV contract were unknown
to the Navy at the time of the MSMO award, and, therefore, not relevant
to the protest. In that filing, the Navy noted that its investigation
of Earl's documentation under the CMAV contract was ongoing. The
escalation in performance problems during the course of the CMAV
contract, however--including, but not limited to, issues related to
documentation--raised concerns about the efficacy of Earl's quality-
assurance program in connection with LPD-17-class repair work. The Navy
terminated the MSMO contract on May 6, 2011, based upon the gradual
accumulation of information, subsequent to the award of that contract,
regarding Earl's difficulties under the CMAV contract.
27. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral McCoy, what should this
subcommittee make of these developments?
Admiral McCoy. The termination of Earl Industries, LLC's (Earl's)
MSMO contract for the repair of LPD-17-class ships was based on serious
documentation and recordkeeping problems, and other quality-assurance
issues, discovered during Earl's ongoing CMAV on USS San Antonio (LPD-
17). These problems generated significant concerns about the company's
ability to perform successfully on LPD-17-class ships under the 5-year
MSMO contract.
There is no inconsistency between the Navy's defense of the bid
protest and its decision to terminate the maintenance contract with
Earl Industries. In its submission to GAO on April 18, 2011, concerning
the January 2011 award to Earl, the Navy emphasized that the
deficiencies in Earl's documentation on the CMAV contract were unknown
to the Navy at the time of the MSMO award, and, therefore, not relevant
to the protest. In that filing, the Navy noted that its investigation
of Earl's documentation under the CMAV contract was ongoing. The
escalation in performance problems during the course of the CMAV
contract, however--including, but not limited to, issues related to
documentation--raised concerns about the efficacy of Earl's quality-
assurance program in connection with LPD-17-class repair work. The Navy
terminated the MSMO contract on May 6, 2011, based upon the gradual
accumulation of information, subsequent to the award of that contract,
regarding Earl's difficulties under the CMAV contract.
28. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral McCoy, like the Earl Industries
fiasco, similar problems are affecting other shipyards and ship repair
facilities outside the Gulf Coast. For example, Navy frigates, such as
the USS Elrod, USS Klakring, USS Taylor, and USS Nicholas have had
shipyard maintenance periods extended because of work that was not done
correctly the first time and poor Navy oversight. The repair problems
don't just end with surface ships; submarines USS Helena, USS Virginia,
and USS San Juan have extended their shipyard periods because of a lack
of materials and a lack of shipyard resources, all which impact ship
and submarine sailing and deployment schedules. Is there a systemic
problem here that needs more direct attention by Navy leadership or
congressional action?
Admiral McCoy. The Navy's assessment is that there is not a
systemic problem with how ship maintenance is done. Likewise, while
there have been some issues with recent ship maintenance efforts, the
Navy does not see a common root cause that spans the different
availabilities. The Navy has rigorous processes for its ships to meet
their expected service lives and methods to verify that the necessary
maintenance and modernization are executed in a formal, deliberate and
efficient manner. The Navy assesses the efficacy of the ship repair
yards, works with them to correct identified problems, and changes
contractors when needed, thereby providing the necessary oversight to
ensure the operational readiness, reliability, safety, and
effectiveness of the Navy's ships and submarines.
Several issues can impact the duration of ship availabilities.
Availabilities may be extended or delayed as emergent repair work on
other ships arises and is given priority. New work identified during an
availability may also lead to the availability's extension.
Furthermore, availabilities may be adjusted to support revised Fleet
operational priorities. Adjustments to availabilities are appropriately
managed by the Fleet Maintenance Officers and the Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA).
Regarding the allocation of shipyard resources, NAVSEA is involved
in the management of all ship and submarine availabilities in execution
at public and private shipyards and those at the regional maintenance
centers. Availability workload is reviewed monthly by NAVSEA and
quarterly with the Fleet customers. The Naval Shipyards' current fiscal
year capacity is set to the execution guidance workload. These
Shipyards, along with the two private-sector nuclear repair yards, use
the One Shipyard concept to focus on cost, schedule and quality through
standardizing processes, sharing resources among public shipyards and
within Regional Maintenance Centers, and partnering with private
shipyards to meet their resource requirements. Workload/workforce
forecasting for Naval Shipyards is accomplished monthly to allow for
the hire of specific skills based on the forecast and attrition
history. For surface ship repairs executed by private contractors, the
workload/workforce forecasting is determined during contract
negotiations and monitored by the Navy's Supervisory Authority during
execution of the contract.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
maritime prepositioning force
29. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stackley, you state that the three
current Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons will add a Mobile
Landing Platform (MLP), an Auxiliary Cargo (K) and Ammunition (E) Ship
(T-AKE), and Large Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) cargo ship. I
also note that the Navy has added three Auxiliary Cargo (K) and
Ammunition (E) Ships to the fiscal year program. I interpret these Navy
decisions as a reaffirmation and a validation of the importance of the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). Based on the importance of the
MPF, I was surprised to learn that the Navy plans to place 6 ships of
the 3-squadron, 16-ship total MPF for the Marine Corps into reduced
operating status beginning in fiscal year 2013. General Panter of the
U.S. Marine Corps has stated in testimony that this decision needs
additional analysis. When I asked General Panter last week about this
decision, he said that placing portions of Squadron 1 in the
Mediterranean on a reduced-operating-status would ``translate to
potentially a slower response time in support of the combatant commands
(COCOM).''
During our Readiness and Management Subcommittee hearing last week,
I understood Admiral Burke to essentially say that the decision to
place Squadron 1 in the Mediterranean on reduced operating status was a
calculated risk in order to save money. Does it make sense to you to
reduce the readiness of our MPS in the Mediterranean in light of the
turmoil in that region?
Secretary Stackley. Yes. The MPSRONs were acquired primarily to
support major combat operations. The timing required to support those
major operations has changed since the squadrons were formed 25 years
ago, permitting the Mediterranean squadron to be placed in Reduced
Operating Status (ROS) 5-day status with acceptable risk. Response time
includes 5 days to activate in addition to the transit time from the
U.S. East Coast (USEC). For example, USEC to Mediterranean and the west
coast of Africa is typically 7 to 12 transit days. It should be noted
that none of the ships have been used to support current operations to
date.
30. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stackley, if the MPS is important
enough for your office to invest additional and finite acquisition
funds, why isn't it important enough to maintain them at full operating
status?
Secretary Stackley. We have many strategic sealift capabilities
maintained in reduced operating status ( 60 ships). Their capacity is
required to meet wartime requirements, but wartime requirements do not
mandate retention in full operating status. This is the same case for
the Mediterranean MPS squadron.
advanced gun system
31. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stackley and Vice Admiral McCoy,
given the investment in DDG-1000, the Advanced Gun System (AGS), and
the Long-Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), would it increase
efficiency and lower costs by leveraging this technology for the DDG-51
Flight III?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral McCoy. Where practicable, Navy will
seek to leverage existing technologies for DDG-51 Flight III. However,
DDG-51 Flight III's primary mission will be Integrated Air and Missile
Defense rather than DDG-1000's emphasis on Naval Surface Fire Support
(NSFS). Therefore, DDG-51 Flight III's Naval Gun Fire Support
requirements align most closely with current DDG-51 requirements that
are filled by the 5'' gun system.
32. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stackley and Vice Admiral McCoy, if a
modified AGS was deemed compatible with the planned DDG-51 Flight III
general arrangement, would it be technically and programmatically
feasible to make the necessary modifications and be production ready
for the first planned DDG-51 Flight III?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral McCoy. DDG-51 Flight III's primary
mission will be Integrated Air and Missile Defense rather than DDG-
1000's emphasis on NSFS. While technically feasible to modify DDG-51
Flight III to support AGS, such installations in DDG-51 Flight III
ships would result in cost and schedule impacts that may not be
acceptable. Furthermore, DDG-51 Flight III's Naval Gun Fire Support
requirements align most closely with current DDG-51 requirements that
are filled by the 5,, gun system.
33. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stackley and Vice Admiral McCoy, in
your opinion, would the capabilities of the AGS and the LRLAP developed
for DDG-1000 complement current weapons such as the Tomahawk Land
Attack Missile? Please explain why or why not.
Secretary Stackley and Admiral McCoy. The LRLAP fired from the DDG-
1000 AGS is a natural complement to tactical aircraft-delivered
precision munitions as well as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile.
Together, these weapons provide combatant commanders with persistent,
all-weather strike capability including precision and volume fires in
support of forces ashore.
[Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE REQUIRED FORCE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT MANDATED BY
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUEST TO
ELIMINATE THAT REQUIREMENT
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed, Wicker, and
Ayotte.
Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk; and Jennifer L. Stoker,
security clerk.
Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Christopher J. Paul,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Brian F. Sebold and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator
Wicker; and Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN
Senator Reed. The subcommittee will come to order.
I want to extend a welcome to our witnesses and thank each
of you for appearing before the Seapower Subcommittee today.
The subcommittee will hear from the Honorable Christine
Fox, Director of the Office of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE); General Duncan McNabb, Commander of the U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM); and General Raymond Johns,
Commander of the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC). We
welcome you all and thank you for your service.
I would note that this hearing is principally the result of
the excellent work that Senator Ayotte has done, together with
her staff, to call to the attention of the subcommittee the
issue of the inventory of strategic lift, which is a vital
topic to this subcommittee. Her work has caused us to, I think,
take a very close look at what you are proposing, what the
administration is proposing, and be prepared, we hope,
appropriately for the authorization bill when it comes to the
floor.
But I would be remiss if I did not very strongly, and with
great appreciation express my thanks to Senator Ayotte and her
staff for her excellent work.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Today, we would like to hear about the Department of
Defense's (DOD) request to eliminate the provisions of section
8062 of title 10, U.S.C., which require that DOD maintain at
least 316 strategic airlift aircraft in the inventory.
For these purposes, the term ``strategic airlift aircraft''
is defined essentially as C-5s and C-17s. Congress established
that requirement based on previous assessments of strategic
airlift requirements for supporting wartime operations.
It is appropriate that we consider this change very
carefully. We need to be sure to get this decision right since
we could be incurring large expenses if we get the decision
wrong in either direction, either maintaining too many aircraft
or too few, given the potential contingencies going forward.
If we keep more aircraft than we really need, we have to
pay operating and support costs. If, on the other hand, we
retire more aircraft than is prudent, we may face the need to
reactivate retired aircraft--and that is always an iffy
proposition, both in terms of cost and in terms of the
availability and the condition of these aircraft--or, more
likely, consider buying new strategic airlift aircraft.
I suspect that either one of these options would be very
expensive to the point that it would quickly wipe out any
planned near-term savings in operating and support costs
achieved by retiring too many aircraft. So getting the number
right is absolutely important.
I think also it is important--and again, I hope the value
of this hearing is so that we understand the logic, the
analyses, and that we also are able to feel comfortable about
whatever proposal is adopted.
We are in a situation of retiring aircraft not because the
C-5A aircraft are worn out--I think there is a lot of
serviceable life left in these aircraft--but Congress bought
essentially 43 more C-17 aircraft than the Air Force said it
needed a few years ago. Had we stopped production at 180 C-17
aircraft, we would not be in the position of retiring any C-5A
aircraft currently slated for retirement under the Air Force's
plans.
Unlike other parts of our aircraft forces, the C-5A
aircraft we retired have not expended all of their useful
service lives. The reason that it is suggested to retire these
aircraft would be to save operating and support costs, not
because they are worn out. Frankly, there are some classes of
aircraft in our inventory that are closer to the wear-out
situation than the C-5A.
So I suspect that many other aspects of the Air Force would
love the luxury of being able to retire aircraft that still
have useful life. In fact, General Johns, I think in a previous
position, you identified potential fighter Air Force structure
shortfall of some 800 aircraft in the next decade because they
were wearing out, not because we just didn't need them.
So over the years since the late 1970s, assessments of our
wartime requirements have fluctuated, generally increasing,
except in the past few years. To my knowledge, previous
analyses have never explicitly addressed requirements for a
strategic airlift to support peacetime operations.
Last year, despite operating fewer aircraft than the
current requirement for 316 aircraft, we were told that
strategic airlift forces were flying harder than ever before.
To that specific point, because of a lack of availability of
strategic airlift aircraft to support peacetime operations,
TRANSCOM had to hire former Soviet strategic airlift aircraft
to carry mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles to the
theater to support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
So it raises a host of questions about the Civil Reserve
Air Fleet, leasing other nationality aircraft, how many
C-17s, how many C-5s? I must say I have looked at the
testimony, and I will just initially say how thoughtful I
believe you have considered this issue. So thank you for that
thoughtfulness.
I look forward to the testimony, and I also look forward to
a good round of questioning because, like any serious issue,
you have raised many questions with your thoughtful analyses.
We would like to answer them today.
With that, let me recognize Senator Wicker. I would
certainly like to recognize Senator Ayotte, if she would have
comments.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this important hearing today.
I want to thank our witnesses for their attendance and for
their valuable service to our Nation.
I will be relatively brief, and I appreciate the chair and
his willingness to allow Senator Ayotte also to make an opening
statement.
The National Military Strategy (NMS) has continued to
evolve since 2005, when DOD conducted its last study to
determine the right mix of aircraft, ships, personnel, and
facilities to move cargo and passengers for military
operations. Although the ability to prosecute two nearly
simultaneous conventional campaigns remains a cornerstone of
U.S. defense policy, the current strategy places increased
emphasis on irregular warfare, stabilization operations, and
support to Homeland defense.
Furthermore, defense planning recognizes the reality of
long-term U.S. involvement in globally dispersed operations,
which may include commitments to major campaigns.
In order to provide an updated comprehensive assessment of
DOD's mobility system, TRANSCOM last year completed the
Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS-16). In
its fifth comprehensive mobility study--it is the fifth
comprehensive mobility study conducted by DOD and the second
mobility study conducted since September 11.
The objectives of MCRS-16 were to determine the mobility
capabilities and requirements needed to deploy, employ,
sustain, and redeploy joint military forces in support of NMS
in the 2016 timeframe. Also, to determine capability gaps and
overlaps associated with the programmed mobility force
structure and to provide insights and recommendations to
support the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
MCRS-16 assessed the military's strategic airlift, large
cargo aircraft; intra-theater airlift, small cargo aircraft;
sealift; aerial refueling; ashore and afloat prepositioning;
surface transportation; and infrastructure. This was done by
assessing whether the military has the right type of equipment
against a set of operational metrics to determine whether
available forces met warfighter objectives within desired
timelines.
MCRS-16 found DOD's planned mobility capabilities are
sufficient to support the most demanding projected
requirements. Some specific findings are, number one, large
cargo aircraft airlift capacity exceeds the peak demand in all
the scenarios considered, which covered a broad spectrum of
military operations. Based on the study's findings, the
military needs only 264 to 300 large cargo aircraft.
Number two, lack of foreign infrastructure or access to
foreign infrastructure to support major force deployments
remains the fundamental constraint when attempting to reduce
deployment timeliness in support of U.S. objectives.
Number three, sealift is the primary means for delivering
large ground forces.
Number four, DOD relies on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF), with commercial air carriers as the primary means of
delivering passengers. Projected passenger airlift capacity
greatly exceeds the requirement in all scenarios considered.
Number five, intra-theater airlift using the Air Force's
programmed amount of C-130s exceeds the peak demand, covering a
broad spectrum of military operations. Those are the findings.
In his prepared testimony for this subcommittee, one of our
witnesses today, General McNabb, says, ``With the MCRS-16
complete, we now have the analytical justification to recommend
repeal of the 316 strategic airlift floor.''
I agree. Eliminating the 316 large cargo aircraft floor
restriction would allow the Air Force to retire an additional
15 C-5As and provide substantial savings by freeing up billions
in taxpayers' dollars over the next few years. Given the
current climate of fiscal austerity, which requires that we
look to all corners of the defense enterprise to determine how
DOD can conduct itself more efficiently, this is a move in the
right direction.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our
distinguished witnesses. I can only say one other thing. I have
heard a wild rumor that General McNabb may be in the process of
retiring in October.
Surely this couldn't possibly be true. But if it is, we
will miss his services, and he is doubly due the praise and the
admiration of this committee and this Congress.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much
appreciate your holding this hearing.
I also want to thank Ranking Member Wicker for holding this
hearing today.
During the markup process for the National Defense
Authorization Act, I brought forward an amendment that would
have changed the strategic airlift requirement, allowing DOD to
reduce that number from 316 to 299.
I did that because, in looking at this issue, it came to my
attention that DOD and the Air Force had done very careful
analyses when the proposal was submitted through the
President's budget to the Armed Services Committees for
consideration. That is why I was going to bring forward that in
the markup.
I very much appreciate the chairman and ranking member
having this hearing. When this issue was brought up in the
markup, they realized how important it was and decided to have
this hearing today. I am very appreciative of their work on
this issue.
I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here, for
your thoughtful analyses. Because what has been done by the Air
Force on this issue, there was an extensive study done in 2010
to identify the peak of demand for airlift capacity, which has
already been referenced, and that that airlift capacity would
be 32.7 million tons per day. We would be able to meet that
capacity with reducing to 299 strategic airlift aircraft.
Why is that important? It is very important, as the
chairman and the ranking member have already mentioned, because
all of us want to ensure that our military can meet our
strategic airlift requirements. I know the witnesses share that
concern, and that is why you undertook such careful analyses in
coming to this conclusion.
But we also want to make sure that, in these difficult
fiscal times for our country, and for DOD, that we aren't
spending money that we don't need to maintain aircraft that we
no longer have a capacity or need for. If we were to change the
strategic airlift requirements in a way that I hope will happen
as we go forward from this hearing, we could--in retiring the
unneeded C-5A models, save up to $1.2 billion in taxpayers'
dollars across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) over the
next 4 years.
Those, of course, are resources that could be better used,
either to upgrade our C-17s for other uses within the military,
given the difficult choices that we are going to have to be
making going forward. We, as you all know and appreciate, with
$14 trillion in debt and with Admiral Mullen, I think,
rightfully identifying the national debt as the greatest threat
to our national security, all of us, when we find that we have
too much of something that we need, it is very important for us
to act on, in my view, your recommendations. That is what
prompted me to raise this issue in the committee.
I am looking forward to hearing each of the witnesses'
testimony today. Just to follow up on something that the
chairman said, one of the reasons that we had too many C-17s is
because Members of Congress, rather than what you asked us to
produce, actually, through the earmark process, had more of
those aircraft produced than the Air Force had requested.
So we, in part, in Congress have created this situation.
So, I am hopeful that we will heed your careful analyses and
advice going forward so that we can right-size and still meet
our strategic airlift requirements.
So thank you very much.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
All of your testimony has been submitted and will be made
part of the record. You may be free to summarize your
testimony.
We will begin, I believe, with Director Fox and then
General Johns or General McNabb, whoever wants to go next.
Director Fox, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE H. FOX, DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT
AND PROGRAM EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Fox. Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you to discuss DOD requirements for strategic
airlift.
The Office of CAPE has extensively studied strategic
airlift requirements through a series of studies, beginning in
the early 1990s.
Last year, we completed the MCRS, which assessed peacetime
and wartime demands on our airlift system. We conducted this
study in conjunction with TRANSCOM. It serves as the analytic
underpinning of the Air Force's current fleet management plan
and supports retirement of 32 C-5 aircraft.
Here, I will briefly summarize the results of that study.
As you said, sir, we have submitted a more detailed written
statement.
The study assessed steady-state and surge requirements for
airlift, sealift, and prepositioned assets for various
scenarios, providing DOD with a comprehensive understanding of
our mobility system in time of peace and time of war.
An understanding of the steady-state demand is important
because it quantifies the level of effort needed to support
daily operations without mobilization. It also sets the
conditions for the location of forces and mobility assets at
the commencement of the surge events.
For our analysis of steady-state demand, we evaluated both
historical support to global logistics and, through modeling,
the deployment, employment, redeployment, and sustainment of
forces supporting globally dispersed operations. Historical
data included missions flown in support of combatant
commanders, such as cargo and passenger missions, exercise
missions, and special assignment airlift missions conducted
over the past 7 years.
The special assignment airlift missions include movement of
nuclear means and related material, presidential support,
special operations support, and other time-sensitive, high-
priority missions.
For our analysis of the surge requirements, we developed
three different cases to evaluate peak airlift demands. Each
case included Homeland defense and major campaigns.
The results of our study showed that it is the surge events
that drive the size of the strategic airlift fleet. These
events are periods of finite, but extremely high levels of
demand for strategic airlift. In comparison, steady-state
demands represent prolonged requirements, but with
significantly lower peaks. While these requirements contribute
to the surge demand, they do not drive the size of the airlift
fleet.
So based on the study findings, DOD needs a military
airlift fleet capacity between 29.1 and 32.7 million ton-miles
per day (MTM/D), which can be met with 264 to 300 aircraft.
These results support the Air Force desire to retire 32 C-5
aircraft. It is our assessment that the retirement of these
aircraft will not increase operational risk.
Without this change, DOD would be required to maintain a
strategic airlift fleet in excess of what is required, costing
DOD billions of dollars over the life of the aircraft.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Fox follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Christine H. Fox
Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the Department of Defense requirements for strategic airlift.
The Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation has
extensively studied strategic airlift requirements through a series of
studies beginning in the early 1990s. Last year we completed the
Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study (MCRS), which assessed
peacetime and wartime demands on our airlift system. We conducted this
study in conjunction with U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). It
serves as the analytic underpinning of the U.S. Air Force's current
fleet management plan and supports retirement of 32 C-5 aircraft. Here
I will briefly summarize the results of that study.
The MCRS was an 18-month, department-level assessment of a broad
spectrum of mobility capabilities, which included strategic airlift,
intra-theater airlift, sealift, aerial refueling, ashore and afloat
prepositioning, surface transportation, and infrastructure. As with
past mobility studies, MCRS assessed the mix of military (organic) and
commercial lift capabilities needed to support the National Defense
Strategy. The analysis was based on illustrative conventional and
irregular military operations conducted over a notional 7-year
timeframe.
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between the
resources the department uses for planned wartime capability and those
it uses in steady-state operations. When operating at full wartime
capability (surge demand), the department mobilizes Guard and Reserve
Forces and employs them along with active forces at wartime utilization
rates. Additionally, the President has the authority to activate the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) which can contribute as many as 900
aircraft. When not operating at full wartime capability (i.e., steady-
state sustainment), Guard and Reserve Forces are not mobilized, and
CRAF is not activated. This is why the department sometimes relies on
commercial/foreign source airlift like the Russian-built IL-76 and AN-
124 to support current operations. Accommodating a short-term surge
with use of commercial assets is more cost-effective than maintaining
additional force structure that is not required full time.
MCRS assessed steady-state requirements by evaluating historical
support to global logistics and by modeling the deployment, employment,
redeployment, and sustainment of forces supporting globally dispersed
operations. Steady-state analysis is important for two primary reasons.
First, it quantifies the level of effort needed from the mobility
system to support daily operations without mobilization. Second, it
sets the initial conditions for the location of forces that need to be
relocated by the mobility system to support the commencement of surge
events.
TRANSCOM analysts examined 7 years of mission data from the Global
Decision Support System database to identify historical support
requirements for global logistics. Global logistic missions include
routine channel missions, exercise missions, and Special Assignment
Airlift Missions (SAAMs) that fly daily support for Combatant Commands
(COCOMs). Channel missions consist of cargo and passenger missions--
organic and commercial--flown in support of COCOMs. The study assumed
that exercises other than Joint Chiefs of Staff/COCOM exercises would
be canceled or curtailed when U.S. forces were engaged in one warfight
and that all exercises would be cancelled when engaged in two
overlapping warfights. SAAMs include movement of nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapons-related material, presidential logistics support,
special operations support, and other time-sensitive, high priority
airlift requirements. The study assumed some SAAM requirements would
continue even during overlapping campaigns.
As part of the steady-state assessment, the study analyzed two
different Department-approved strategic environments consisting of
representative vignettes arranged over a 7 year timeline. The ``Global
Insurgency'' strategic environment included 64 distinct operations and
reflected an increased level of effort for irregular warfare
representing an expansion and intensification of global operations. The
strategic environment developed during the most recent Quadrennial
Defense Review included 69 vignettes which had a similar irregular
warfare emphasis.
For our analysis of surge requirements, we developed three
different cases to evaluate peak airlift demands. Each case included
Homeland defense and major campaigns. The cases involved demanding
operational assumptions. The model used in the analysis accounts for
the fact that many aircraft are not loaded to their maximum weight
capacity due to load size, scheduling constraints, and route structure.
The MCRS cases were defined as follows:
Case 1 evaluated two overlapping large-scale land campaigns
occurring in different theaters of operation, concurrent with three
nearly-simultaneous homeland defense consequence management events,
plus support to ongoing steady-state operations, to include Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF). This case required a military strategic airlift
fleet with a capacity of 32.7 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D), which
can be met with a fleet of 300 aircraft (222 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms, and 26 C-
5As).
Case 2 evaluated a large scale air/naval campaign immediately
followed by a major campaign in a different theater of operation, plus
one large-scale homeland defense consequence management event, plus
support to ongoing steady-state operations, to include OEF. This case
required a military strategic airlift fleet with a capacity of 30.7
MTM/D, which can be met with a fleet of 277 aircraft (222 C-17s, 52 C-
5Ms, and 3 C-5As).
Case 3 evaluated U.S. forces surging to conduct a large-scale land
campaign against the backdrop of an ongoing long-term irregular warfare
campaign of a size and scale similar to the 2007 Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) surge force. Case 3 also included three near-simultaneous
homeland defense consequence management events, plus support to ongoing
steady-state operations, to include OEF. This case required a military
strategic airlift fleet with a capacity of 29.1 MTM/D, which can be met
with a fleet of 264 aircraft (222 C-17s, 42 C-5Ms, 0 C-5As).
The results of our study showed that it is the surge events that
drive the size of the strategic airlift fleet. These events are periods
of finite, but extremely high levels of demand for strategic airlift.
In comparison, steady-state demands represent prolonged requirements,
but with significantly lower peaks. While these requirements contribute
to the surge demand, they do not drive the size of the organic airlift
fleet. Based on the MCRS findings, the department needs a military
fleet capacity between 29.1 and 32.7 MTM/D which can be met with 264 to
300 aircraft.
These results support the Air Force desire to retire 32 C-5A
aircraft. It is our assessment that the retirement of these aircraft
will not increase operational risk. Without this change, the department
would be required to maintain a strategic airlift fleet in excess of
what is required, costing the department billions of dollars over the
life of the aircraft.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you, and I
look forward to your questions.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Director Fox. Once again, thank
you for your very thoughtful written testimony.
Since I don't know date of ranks--okay, General Johns.
General McNabb, you are recognized because General Johns does
know date of ranks. [Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General McNabb. Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker, and
distinguished members of this subcommittee, I would like to
express my gratitude to this committee for your support to
TRANSCOM and to the men and women who strive every day to
protect our Nation and its freedom.
It is my distinct honor to be with you today, representing
the more than 145,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, coast
guardsmen, and civilians that are TRANSCOM. Daily, our total
force team provides the warfighters the force and sustainment
they need to win.
I am also privileged today to be joined by two of my good
friends and colleagues, General Ray Johns and Ms. Christine
Fox. Great to be up here with you all.
Rapid global mobility is among our Nation's greatest
asymmetric advantages. And the ability to mobilize forces and
materials within hours, rather than days or weeks, depends on
the right-sized fleet of versatile, ready, and effective air
mobility forces.
I fully support the administration's proposal to repeal the
statutory requirement for the Air Force to maintain a strategic
cargo fleet of 316 aircraft. The congressionally-directed floor
of 316 strategic airlifters was established before the MCRS-16
determined the strategic airlift requirement to be 32.7 MTM per
day. Our analysis confirms this capacity can be met with
approximately 300 strategic airlift aircraft.
Additionally, a strategic airlift aircraft reduction allows
the Air Force to retire an additional 15 C-5As and, as the
Senator mentioned, with a substantial saving of over $1.2
billion in taxpayers' dollars across the FYDP and, most
importantly, focus our critical infrastructure, aerial port,
and aircrew personnel and resources on a right-sized fleet.
The current program fleet of 222 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms, and 27 C-
5As satisfies this requirement and is far more modern and
capable than any strategic airlift fleet in our history. To
underscore this point, our strategic airlift fleet of
approximately 350 aircraft in 1999 provided about 26 MTM per
day capacity. Yet today, a fleet of only 300 aircraft will
provide over 32 MTM per day.
This also allows us to meet our peacetime requirements.
Indeed, in 2010, while supporting both the troop withdrawal
from Iraq and the surge into Afghanistan, our busiest day in
AMC was on March 23, when we performed 16.6 MTM per day of
lift. For comparison, prior to September 11, the busiest day in
2001 for AMC was 5.5 MTM per day.
When these numbers are compared with our projected
capacity, the Air Force program fleet can meet all readiness
and peacetime requirements, as well as be surged to meet
wartime needs.
In addition to a more modern and capable fleet, we also
continuously improve the efficiency of air mobility operations.
For example, with the use of multimodal operations, we move
large volumes of cargo by sea to locations in close proximity
to the area of operations, then by truck from the seaports to
the nearby airfields, and finally by air to its destination.
This concept has been used with great success throughout
2010 and 2011 as we moved almost 7,000 mine-resistant attack
platforms and M-ATVs to Afghanistan. Utilizing the combination
of air, land, and sea modes of transportation, we increased
velocity, employed aircraft more efficiently, and ultimately
reduced transportation costs by almost $400 million in 2010
alone.
Multipurpose aircraft will also improve the efficiency and
capacity of our airlift fleet. The KC-46 fleet, the new
tanker--and thank you for your support of that--will be sized
based on war plan tanker requirements. In those plans, when not
at aerial refueling peak demand periods, the KC-46 can
supplement the heavy airlift fleet by conducting a variety of
airlift and air medical evacuation missions.
Not only will it dramatically change our air refueling
concept of operations, but it will also allow us to make the
whole air mobility system that much more efficient.
Our commercial partners also provide superb modernized and
cost-effective airlift support in peace and in war. Their
ability to move bulk cargo and passengers around the world
complements our organic capabilities. I depend on them in
wartime.
The CRAF program's ability to augment our organic airlift
fleet helps to reduce the operational burden on our military
assets and allows us to deal with short-term surges without
having to mobilize total force assets. Based on all these
factors, I reiterate my full support to repeal the 316
statutory floor.
At TRANSCOM, we view our success through the eyes of the
warfighter. We know that combatant commanders around the world
absolutely depend on us to deliver the forces and their
sustainment day in and day out.
We are committed to deliver to the warfighter, while also
being responsible stewards of the taxpayers' trust and dollars.
The men and women of TRANSCOM, our components, and industry
partners are proud to provide world-class support to those who
put themselves on the line every day. We want them to
absolutely know that we will always, always deliver.
Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker, and all members of this
subcommittee, thank you for your continued superb support of
TRANSCOM and of all of our men and women in uniform.
Thank you for including my written statement for the
record, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General McNabb follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF
Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of this
subcommittee, I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation to
this committee for your support to the U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM) and to the men and women who strive every day to protect our
Nation and its interests.
Rapid global mobility is among our Nation's greatest asymmetric
advantages, and the ability to mobilize forces and materiel within
hours, rather than days or weeks, depends on the right-sized fleet of
versatile, ready and effective air mobility forces.
This year, the administration proposed a repeal of the statutory
requirement for the Air Force to maintain a strategic cargo fleet of
316 aircraft. I fully agree with the administration's proposal. The
congressionally-directed 316 strategic airlift requirement was
established before the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study
2016 determined the strategic airlift requirement to be 32.7 million
ton-miles per day (MTM/D), based on the most challenging wartime
airlift scenario. Our analysis confirms 32.7 MTM/D capacity exceeds the
peacetime requirement and can be met with approximately 300 strategic
airlift aircraft.
With the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016
complete, we now have the analytical justification to recommend repeal
of the 316 strategic airlift floor. As I and others have previously
stated or testified, it was necessary to wait for the results of the
study before making any recommendation to change the size of the
strategic airlift fleet. I do so confidently today. The strategic
airlift aircraft reduction will allow the Air Force to retire an
additional 15 C-5As and provides a substantial savings by freeing up
over $1.2 billion in taxpayer dollars across the FYDP.
The current programmed fleet of 222 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms and 27 C-5As is
far more modern and capable than any strategic airlift fleet in our
history. To underscore this point, our strategic airlift fleet of
approximately 350 aircraft in 1999 provided about 26 MTM/D capacity,
yet, today, a fleet of only 300 aircraft provides 32.7 MTM/D. The
dramatic improvement in strategic airlift capability provided by C-17s
and modernized C-5s has enabled a reduced fleet size to meet our
warfighter requirements.
C-17s will continue to meet TRANSCOM's future requirements through
currently funded purchases, upgrade programs and fleet rotation. New C-
17s arrive with improvements that increase the reliability of the
weapon system. Older aircraft enter into the Global Reach Improvement
Program to increase their sustainability and reliability. Furthermore,
aircraft located in corrosive and training environments are monitored
and analyzed for stress and rotated to maintain structural integrity of
the fleet.
The C-5 is critical to our oversized and outsized air cargo
capability. C-5 fleet management has two main focus areas: C-5
reliability and C-5A retirements. The Reliability Enhancement and Re-
Engining Program (RERP) is on track to increase the mission capable
rate (MCR) of the C-5 fleet by at least 25 percent over the current C-
5A and at least 15 percent over the current C-5B . . . increasing the
utilization rate for these aircraft and allowing us to operate into
more austere locations. All C-5 B and C models and one C-5A model
aircraft will undergo RERP resulting in a total of 52 C-5Ms in the
inventory. Additionally, the new maintenance processes changed our
focus from ``fly to fail'' on major components to preventative
replacement. This has reduced the number of C-5s stranded off-station
awaiting parts and will result in a 7-percent increase in MCR. Finally,
C-5A retirements will improve aircraft availability by removing
maintenance intensive jets from the fleet and will allow us to focus
our critical maintenance, aerial port, and aircrew personnel and
resources on a right-sized fleet.
In addition to a more modern and capable fleet, we also
continuously improve the efficiency of air mobility operations. This
efficiency allows a smaller strategic airlift fleet to handle wartime
and peacetime mobility requirements. For example, with the use of
multi-modal operations, we move large volumes of cargo by sea to
locations in closer proximity to the area of operations, then by truck
from the seaports to the nearby airfields and finally by air to its
destination. This concept has been used with great success throughout
2010 and 2011 as we moved almost 7,000 MRAP and MRAP all-terrain
vehicles to Afghanistan. Utilizing the combination of air, land and sea
modes of transportation, we increased velocity, employed aircraft more
efficiently and ultimately reduced costs by almost $400 million in
2010.
Multi-purpose aircraft will also improve the efficiency and
capacity of our airlift fleet. The KC-46 fleet, for example, will be
sized based on war plan tanker requirements. In those plans, as the
need for aerial refueling diminishes, the KC-46 can supplement the
heavy airlift fleet by conducting a variety of airlift and aeromedical
evacuation missions. Not only will it dramatically change our air
refueling concept of operations, it will also allow us to make the
whole air mobility system much more efficient.
Our commercial partners provide superb, cost-effective airlift
support in peace and in war. Their ability to move bulk cargo around
the world complements our organic capabilities. The Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) program's ability to augment our organic airlift fleet
helps to reduce the operational burden on those assets. Because of the
importance of the CRAF, we continue to seek out incentives, especially
those that provide additional peacetime business opportunities, to
strengthen participation in the program with modernized aircraft by our
commercial airline partners.
At TRANSCOM, we view our success through the eyes of the
warfighter. We know the combatant commanders around the world
absolutely depend on us to deliver the forces and their sustainment day
in and day out. We are committed to deliver what the warfighter needs,
where they need it, when they need it . . . while also being
responsible stewards of the taxpayers' trust and dollars. The men and
women of TRANSCOM, our components and industry partners are proud to
provide world-class support to those who put themselves on the line
every day, and ensure we always, always deliver.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
General Johns?
STATEMENT OF GEN. RAYMOND E. JOHNS, JR., USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
MOBILITY COMMAND
General Johns. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the
135,000 active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve
airmen of AMC, we thank you for the opportunity to speak with
you about our strategic airlift fleet.
AMC airmen are employed every day around the world,
providing global mobility for the Nation. We answer the call of
others so that they may prevail. We thank you for your
steadfast support for our efforts over the past many years.
As a force provider, AMC is charged with maintaining our
strategic airlift fleet and ensuring it has the capability and
capacity required by TRANSCOM and the geographic combatant
commanders. The strategic airlift fleet is a national asset,
allowing America to deliver hope, to fuel the fight, and to
save lives anywhere in the world within hours of getting the
call.
We are also keenly aware of the fiscal challenges our
Nation is facing and take very seriously our role in fulfilling
our requirement not only today, but as we look out into the
future. It is incumbent on us to maintain effectiveness across
the spectrum of operations in the most efficient manner
possible.
We are devoted to managing the strategic airlift fleet
responsibly. As part of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010, several restrictions were placed on the
Air Force regarding strategic airlift, including a floor of 316
aircraft and several reporting requirements prior to any C-5
retirements.
The Secretary of the Air Force met the C-5A retirement
restrictions earlier this year, and we greatly appreciate the
committee allowing us to begin retiring our oldest and least
capable C-5s. We are still constrained by the 316 floor and
currently are only able to retire one C-5A for every C-17
delivered.
AMC fully supports the President's request to repeal the
316 strategic airlift floor and allow the Air Force to manage
its fleet. MCRS-16, the most recent study completed on the
strategic airlift requirement, was wholly informed by the
National Security Strategy and the NMS. The foundation of MCRS-
16 analyses is directly tied to the QDR, and its conclusions
reflect our Nation's strategic priorities.
Based on MCRS-16 requirements of 32.7 MTM per day, we
believe the program fleet size of 301 C-5s, C-5Ms, and C-17s is
sufficient. By allowing the Air Force to retire the additional
C-5As as requested, $1.2 billion, ma'am, as you stated, of
unprogrammed cost will be avoided across the FYDP.
Again, we thank you for the opportunity to come before you.
Today is an important issue, and we sincerely thank you for
your strong continued support. I look forward to your
questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Johns follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Raymond E. Johns, Jr., USAF
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of the nearly 135,000 active duty, Air National
Guard, and Air Force Reserve airmen that provide rapid Global Reach for
the Nation as part of the Mobility Air Forces, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. Our strategic airlift
capability is a national treasure which allows us to deliver hope, fuel
the fight and save lives anywhere in the world within a matter of hours
as evidenced by our continuing efforts in Afghanistan and our response
to both the devastation in Haiti in 2010 and Japan earlier this year.
The Mobility Air Forces are proud stewards of this capability. We
constantly strive to ensure we have the right mix of aircraft and
personnel to always be effective while at the same time remain fiscally
responsible to the American taxpayer. This is the responsibility that
brings us before you today.
supporting forces
As the air component of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), we
are charged with providing the required airlift to support geographic
combatant commands (COCOM) around the globe. We do not determine the
requirement, but we develop the most effective and efficient airlift
fleet possible to support the National Security Strategy, National
Military Strategy, and COCOM plans. To that end, we completely support
the President's authorization request that would: (1) strike subsection
(g) of section 8062 of title 10, U.S.C.; and (2) change the
certification requirement in section 137 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84), eliminating
the 316 strategic airlift aircraft restriction.
historical perspective
The strategic airlift fleet we manage today traces its roots to the
Mobility Requirements Study (MRS-05) completed in January 2001, prior
to the attacks of September 11. That study addressed the best mix of
strategic airlift required to deploy forces from a posture of global
engagement. MRS-05 determined 54.5 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D),
provided by a combination of organic strategic airlift and Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) airlift met requirements with acceptable risk.
The organic strategic airlift accounted for 34.0 MTM/D of the 54.5 MTM/
D total requirement and could be met with a range of fleet sizes,
dependent on the mix of strategic aircraft. Based on the operations
tempo around the world post September 11, the Mobility Capability Study
delivered in December 2005 confirmed the findings of MRS-05 for
acceptable levels of risk. Both studies were led by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff.
The most recent study, the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements
Study 2016 (MCRS-16), was completed in February 2010 by OSD and
TRANSCOM. This study investigated scenarios that generated an organic
strategic airlift requirement of between 29.1 and 32.7 MTM/D. The
higher number (32.7 MTM/D) is the benchmark that the Air Force and AMC
currently uses to right size the strategic airlift fleet. Between the
initial MRS-05 study and the most recent MCRS-16 study, the number of
strategic airlifters required has remained relatively steady over the
last decade (between 292 and 304 depending on fleet mix).
Notwithstanding the COCOM requirements, the strategic airlift fleet
we maintain today is not the one envisioned just a decade ago. When the
final C-17 is delivered to the Air Force, we will have over 40 more in
the inventory than anticipated during MRS-05. As the force provider,
the exact fleet mix is less critical than the ability to provide the
required MTM/D.
managing the fleet
We greatly appreciate the committee allowing the retirement of C-
5As in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 language. Every new C-17 delivered now allows
retirement of a C-5A resulting in considerable savings. As more capable
aircraft like the C-17 and C-5M enter the inventory, the 32.7 MTM/D
requirement can be maintained with fewer aircraft. However, the 316
strategic airlift floor requires us to keep unneeded, less capable C-
5As in the inventory. Each of these unneeded aircraft comes with a cost
to maintain in flyable status, a cost not programmed in the Air Force
budget. Over the Future Years Defense Program, the unprogrammed cost to
the Air Force to maintain these aircraft could be as much as $1.23
billion. For this considerable investment, the Nation will maintain 1.5
MTM/D of excess capacity; approximately 5 percent above the requirement
of 32.7 MTM/D.
conclusion
Our ability to manage the strategic airlift fleet over the coming
years will enable us to be more fiscally responsible to the Nation. The
fiscal year 2012 President's budget includes a strategic airlift fleet
of 301. This reflects the highest MCRS-16 requirement of 32.7 MTM/D
which can be met with the programmed fleet of 222 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms and
27 C-5As, or 301 total strategic airlifters. With over a decade of
study by multiple organizations, we firmly believe the programmed fleet
of 301 aircraft meets our current national strategic objectives. We
humbly ask the committee and Congress to support the President's vision
by repealing the 316 strategic airlift floor and enabling us to manage
the fleet to ensure we continue to meet COCOM requirements. We thank
you for the subcommittee's continued support of America's Air Force and
particularly to its airmen and their contributions to Global Mobility.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General Johns.
We will do an 8-minute first round, and I think this is a
topic that is of significant technical complexity and also
interest that we will do a second round. We might have other
members join us, too.
But let me just preface my remarks by saying--and this
might be more folklore than fact--but I think one of the
reasons there was a floor placed with respect to strategic lift
is that there are strong intramural and extramural pressures
sometimes to avoid buying airlift and buying other platforms. I
hope that is not the case going forward.
Because, frankly, I think, as you have demonstrated and
continue to demonstrate every day, strategic and tactical
airlift is central to everything we do, everywhere we do it,
and it deserves premier attention, not secondary attention. So
that is just a preface to my questions.
First, in terms of the analysis, there are several terms
that are running around. Director Fox, you talk in two
categories, steady state and surge. Other people talk about
peacetime and wartime.
Do you equate steady state as equals peacetime and surge
equals wartime? Just for clarification.
Ms. Fox. Yes, sir. Essentially, that is correct. In the
wartime, it includes Homeland defense operations concurrent
with the warfight. Perhaps that is part of the confusion. But,
yes, what you said is correct.
Senator Reed. The surge is not only Homeland security. It
is also a major campaign, which would be a conventional fight,
unlike the irregular warfare we are seeing now?
Ms. Fox. Absolutely, sir. The most stringent cases, two
overlapping, large land warfare campaigns, plus three
simultaneously Homeland defense----
Senator Reed. That leads to a 32.7 million tons per day
figure to meet that?
Ms. Fox. Yes, sir. The max.
Senator Reed. The max, and that is what you feel you can
obtain, even with these reductions down to 301 aircraft,
basically?
Ms. Fox. Yes, sir. A point of clarification, if I could?
Senator Reed. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Fox. The maximum needed is not that. It is 20 MTM/D.
But when you look at how you schedule, how you load, the size,
so it is really quite conservative. The model tries to go
through that so we don't get caught short in our inability to
provide it.
Senator Reed. Just in terms of modeling, so the range of
error--can you quantify that in terms of--were you told to get
this within a 2 percent error, or was that not a modeling
factor?
Ms. Fox. Sir, the model--I ought to be able to answer your
question, but I will have to get back to you. We were not told
to get to something. What we have tried to do is model it as
accurately as we can.
Of course, you are right. There are errors in any model. I
should know that, but I am afraid I don't.
[The information referred to follows:]
The difference between the 20 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D)
that I mentioned in my comment and the 32.7 MTM/D is the difference
between the cargo-miles actually moved (20 MTM/D) in the simulation and
the capacity of the fleet (32.7 MTM/D) required to achieve that level
of activity. When loading aircraft we often run out of space before
reaching weight limits resulting in a difference between the capacity
of an aircraft and the capability realized. It is also true that due to
the location of the airfields, not every aircraft flies the maximum
hours/day authorized. The actual hours flown is dependent on weather
and the departure and arrival locations. Thus the actual miles flown in
a given scenario is always less than the theoretical miles possible.
Our models take these factors and many others into consideration to
ensure the most realistic simulation possible. In addition we update
the model algorithms based on the latest information from current
operations. For these reasons and because the model is based on time-
distance-payload computations which are very accurate, we are quite
confident that the results reflect what we would actually achieve given
the scenarios assessed. The results of the Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study 2016 which range from 29.1 MTM/D-32.7 MTM/D reflect
different strategic assumptions and are not reflections or statements
of model error.
Senator Reed. No, that is quite all right.
The other issue, just a clarification, of steady state.
Steady state is essentially what we are in right now.
We have a major operation in Afghanistan. You are doing
major operations out of Iraq, particularly airlifting equipment
out of Iraq. You have ongoing support requirements globally. So
this is steady state?
Ms. Fox. That is correct. Steady state is intense.
Senator Reed. Okay. General McNabb, let me--and General
Johns or Director Fox, if you feel that you want to comment,
please. One of the realities that is facing us right now is in
this steady-state process, we are relying upon one of our
allies, Pakistan, for terrestrial transit, their roads, et
cetera. But given the political dynamics there, I will just ask
the question.
The loss of Pakistan as a land transit point would not in
any way affect your plans to retire the C-5As you currently
have on duty or in any way change your request to--at least in
the short run--to go down to as low as 301 aircraft?
General McNabb. No, sir, it wouldn't at all. We were really
constrained going into Afghanistan by the throughput of the
airfields in Afghanistan. It is not a matter of number of
airplanes that we have. It is how many you can get in through
and have and flow through there.
So one thing that we have done is by using those multimodal
operations, where we bring stuff by surface as far forward as
possible and then maximizing C-17s going back and forth, or C-
5s, that has really allowed us to optimize those slot times
that we have in Afghanistan. So, we will continue to work very
hard at that.
But, no, this would in no way restrict----
Senator Reed. Right. But the commander on the--one of the
reasons you have been able to do this successfully is most of
what you are moving is into the ports in Pakistan and then up
through Pakistan. If that option is gone and you have to
deliver by air, now you either shift to K2, I guess, in
Uzbekistan or you just have to be much more efficient in those
airfields.
General McNabb. Sir, two things that we are doing there.
One, we opened up the operations in the north. We call it the
northern distribution network. So we are bringing a lot of the
resupply up through the north.
In fact, to the tune of about 35 percent comes from the
north, about 30 percent comes through the Pakistan ground, and
about 35 percent by air. Everything that is high value,
everything that is lethal, everything that is special, we bring
in by air now.
What we would have to do is absorb that and bring more of
that stuff either through the north, or we would have to bring
in by air. Air is our ultimate ace-in-the-hole. Ideally, we
will have other ways of getting that in, and right now, we have
worked very hard to make sure we have good options.
Senator Reed. Right. Let me ask another question. I will
direct it to you, Director Fox, but it might be General Johns's
area.
So who gets the savings if we go ahead and retire these
aircraft?
Ms. Fox. That would probably be a point of issue between
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Air Force.
But I am sure the Air Force thinks the Air Force gets the
savings. We have to see how all of the budgets and the
requirements come out this year. He won't like my answer.
Senator Reed. Okay, General Johns? I think your answer is
fine.
General Johns. What we have done by assuming the savings
and the retirements, as we submitted our fiscal request through
OSD, was to actually use those resources to support other air
forces in the effort. So they have already been spread, and
then we will have that discussion with----
Senator Reed. So put it another way, you have already spent
the savings, conceptually, on Air Force programs?
General Johns. Yes, sir. I wouldn't say we spent the
savings. We basically--yes, sir, the simple term is, we said if
we don't have to preserve these aircraft, we would use them
against other obligations.
Senator Reed. Okay. I think--and again, probably best to
follow up with a question to give us an idea of how you are
distributing the savings, and we will follow up with a
question.
General Johns. Yes, sir. It wasn't like there was the
savings there. It was more as we built the POM, we reduced the
requirement. So it was used across the Air Force.
Senator Reed. So you lowered the amount of request going
forward?
General Johns. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. But we will, I think, follow up with a
question, try to get an idea of what you are doing with those.
General Johns. Yes, sir. But again, it was pretty much
spread across. So it is hard to track and say, ``This dollar
went here, and this dollar went there.''
Senator Reed. Okay. Thank you.
Let me ask another--General McNabb or General Johns, et
cetera, particularly in your testimony, General McNabb, you
said the C-17s will continue to meet TRANSCOM future
requirements through currently funded purchases, upgrade
programs, and fleet rotation.
All of you in this study assumed no additional acquisition
of C-17 aircraft. Is that correct?
General McNabb. Sir, that is true.
Senator Reed. That is true.
General McNabb. Just make sure that we upgrade--continue to
upgrade the older models so that we have a common model of C-
17s across the board with common capabilities.
Senator Reed. Now just another question, and I will--as I
said, we will have a second round. So let me at this point
recognize Senator Wicker, and then I will see you again.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. I have been absent from the room, and I
haven't heard all of the questions. If it is all right, I think
I will let Senator Ayotte go before me, if that is all right,
Mr. Chairman?
Senator Reed. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much, Senator Wicker.
I just want to make sure that we are clear on the results
of the 2010 study. As I understand it, according to Director
Fox's written testimony--and I would like to make sure that we
have the concurrence of the two generals that are here--that if
we have reduced the airlift capacity to 32.7 million tons per
day, as the conclusion was of the study, that would still allow
us the capacity, based on the results of the study, to do two
overlapping large-scale land campaigns occurring in different
theaters, three nearly simultaneous Homeland defense
consequence management events, and ongoing, as we have right
now, steady-state operations, including Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.
General McNabb and General Johns, do you concur with that
analysis in terms of what capacity we would be left with if we
reduce the number to, say, a 301 or in that range, whatever
your recommendation would be?
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am. We can do that. Basically, that
32.7 was that two major land campaigns, separate theaters, just
as you mentioned, and our ability to still handle the steady-
state requirement.
Now, if you talk about an Afghanistan and Iraq along with
that, then now you are starting to go a little bit beyond what
they were talking about. We are talking in the neighborhood--we
actually did a scenario where we did a steady state that was
very similar to Afghanistan, along with one land campaign, and
that was one of the other scenarios that we ran to make sure
that we could do a much larger steady state, like we have
today, along with another scenario.
So based on how you just said that, if you, depending on
how you would define Iraq and Afghanistan, what level we are at
when you brought that up, that is the one where I would go it
would depend how large we are still in Iraq and Afghanistan and
then to be able to go do two theater wars.
Senator Ayotte. General, I just wanted to follow up. The
situation right now, for example, let us assume we stay where
we are, current operation in Afghanistan, which would be peak
right now, given the number of troops we have there with the
surge before any of them are withdrawn, and we also were to be
in a situation where we decided to leave additional troops,
because the Iraqis have asked us to, in Iraq because we have
obviously seen some flare-ups there because of the influence of
others that want to undermine our success.
If we change the capacity, would we be able to handle that
type of situation? Because I think that is, obviously, a very
real scenario we could face in the coming year.
General McNabb. Yes. I think what we would do is we would
be taking a very hard look at--because a lot of it is the
number of forces you have engaged there. So it wouldn't be--
lift probably wouldn't be the thing that you would start
looking it. It would be all the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets, all the other assets that you would have
to bring all that to bear.
Senator Ayotte. Right.
General McNabb. So lift, I would say that from the
standpoint we will move what needs to be moved where it needs
to be moved. It is just that overall capacity, if you mirror
that with two very large land campaigns along with that, I
would say we would have to prioritize within that.
Senator Ayotte. Okay.
General McNabb. That is beyond, I think, what the MCRS
looked at. I don't know, Ms. Fox, how you see that. I saw that
as the one option that we looked at for the scenario in Africa.
Go ahead.
Ms. Fox. So the least stressful case that we looked at was
an Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Iraq-like sustained campaign,
plus a major ground war, land war campaign concurrently. So,
yes, I agree with General McNabb.
But the most stressing case was two large land campaigns,
separate theaters. The steady state was more--was not the OIF
peak, but it was consistent with OEF at a lower level, the
Afghanistan.
Senator Ayotte. Really, the point would be that this is a
very conservative estimate. If we are in a position where we
are engaged in two major, large-scale land campaigns and
obviously a situation like we are sustaining right now in OEF
in Afghanistan, that is a very significant engagement level for
our country. I am not saying that we shouldn't be prepared to
be there. I think our readiness should always be well beyond
where we are.
But as I understand your analyses, it is very conservative
in terms of what you have provided for testimony if we were to
reduce our capacity to 301. Is that right?
Ms. Fox. If I could add, don't forget three additional
concurrent Homeland events at the same time. So, yes, I would
say it is very conservative.
Senator Ayotte. So anyone that would be concerned about our
readiness posture should be satisfied if we were to reduce the
fleet to 301?
General Johns. Yes, ma'am. Again, from Air Mobility and the
Air Force perspective, we want to deliver on the requirements
that come from TRANSCOM through the analyses of CAPE. So, we
will look at that to ensure across the spectrum to do the two
MCOs, as you talk about.
But as we look at Iraq and Afghanistan today, they are at a
surge period, per se, and probably a little bit above what we
consider steady state.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. Thank you.
General McNabb. Senator, could I mention one other thing,
is the other part to that is when we think about doing two
major theater land campaigns, you really are going to mobilize
the complete force, mobilize all our total force, and activate
our CRAF. So this is you are bringing everything to the game.
As I mentioned last year, during the very peak of the
surge, our highest requirement was in the 16 MTM, about half of
what we would surge to. But it gives you an idea of what all we
would then bring to bear, and that is how--every once in a
while that gets lost in it, is that you are taking everything
and everything we have in reserve all goes.
Senator Ayotte. So, General, just to use your example, you
said March 23 was the peak, and that is only half, in terms of
Afghanistan and the surge, of what you have been doing. So that
was really only half the capacity of what we would still have
as a capacity if we reduce to 301?
General McNabb. That is right. Now we did not fully
mobilize, but we did mobilize, do a partial mobilization of C-
17 and C-5 crews to be able to handle that increase.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. General Johns?
General Johns. Yes, ma'am. Yes, Senator.
We called March 2011 ``March Madness'' as we looked at it
from the mobility force. We had Japan going on. We had the
support of Libya. We had a presidential banner mission. We had
Afghanistan and Iraq working.
In my history, that was the busiest period. So, again,
March Madness of a different silk.
In looking at that, around the 23rd of March to about the
29th is where we had our heaviest commitment of our gray tails,
of our mobility fleet. It was 127 C-17s, 33 C-5s, and 208
tankers across the globe. So I have never seen such a heavy
demand, but still that is less than half of what we could
deliver.
Senator Ayotte. Great. I really appreciate your putting it
in that perspective. When you think about that much activity,
and that is only half of the capacity that we would still be
leaving here if we reduce the fleet to 301 or near that level.
I also wanted to follow up, some who have been critical in
the past of reducing the strategic Air Force airlift capacity
to the requirements that you are recommending have cited the
fact that we lease commercial aircraft as an argument against
reducing or eliminating the aircraft floor. Yet I am also told
by the Air Force that we sometimes lease aircraft for two
reasons.
First, in order to meet short-term surges in airlift
demand, and second, sometimes it is more cost effective to
lease commercial assets for a brief period rather than
purchasing and having to continually maintain an asset.
General McNabb, can you address this issue to those that
might raise this issue in terms of concerns about leasing and
our capacity?
General McNabb. Certainly, Senator.
I basically run an enterprise, and I have three parts to
that enterprise. I have the active duty fleet. I have the Guard
and Reserve total force augmentation of that as well. So I have
the total force to augment that, and third, I have our
commercial partners.
All three of them are integral parts, and my job is to
match the capability against the requirement. What goes into
that is, is it a military-type mission like air drop or going
into some high-threat fields where I have to use a military
airplane? Second, it goes into cost. How much will it cost me
if I end up taking MRAPs or M-ATVs?
In fact, in general, if I can use our commercial partners,
if I can use them, it is normally cheaper than if I use
military airplanes. That does the two things you mentioned. It
preserves their longevity. It preserves those airframes for
when I need them later. Saves you in the long term.
But more importantly, if I have an immediate requirement,
then I have that extra capacity to go. We are always mixing and
matching. As General Johns mentioned, March Madness, we were
pivoting the enterprise to take care of Iraq and Afghanistan,
pivoting it to Libya, pivoting it to Japan, pivoting it to
South America for the movement of the President. All of those
things are going, and our ability is to swing that very
rapidly.
A lot of questions came up, and Mr. Chairman, you brought
up the AN-124s. The 124s actually are a subcontractor to one of
our CRAF members, in this case Atlas Air. They actually could
move MRAPs cheaper on that than we could on any other airplane,
cheaper than C-17s, cheaper than C-5s. It also then freed up C-
17s to be able to go do the additional air drop that we do in
theater.
Those are the kinds of things that I will be looking at.
Again, if I am helping our commercial partners, our CRAF, they
obligate their fleet to us in wartime for peacetime business.
So when I give them business, it is good for everybody. It is
good for them to operate in our system. It brings jobs, and it
is also cheaper for the taxpayers to do it that way.
Again, it preserves my military capability for where I need
it, and it normally has to do with threat and then also
availability. If I were running short of airplanes, then, in
fact, I would say, ``well, okay, I am out of C-17s. I am going
to have to use one of these others.''
I haven't had to do that in the last couple of years. It
has been because of cost where I have used them.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General.
My time is expired. Appreciate it. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Senator Wicker, please?
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
This has been a very informative hearing. Let me just see
if I can nail a few things down.
General McNabb, would a programmed fleet of 301 strategic
airlifters provide enough capacity to meet wartime and
peacetime requirements?
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. General Johns, do you agree?
General Johns. Yes, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Gentlemen, would there be any increased
risk at all in getting your jobs done by moving to this reduced
number?
General McNabb. Senator, it would not. In fact, from my
standpoint, those facilities, those air crews, the maintainers,
the aerial porters, making sure that I have them targeted on
our best assets is smart business and actually helps me because
I better manage a right-sized fleet.
Senator Wicker. The risk would be reduced, in your view?
General McNabb. Sir, I hate to have folks working on stuff
that I don't need. Manpower is absolutely critical.
Again, as I think about this, running it like a business,
those facilities and the people are the most critical factor in
all of this. The $1.2 billion is a savings, but it is really
taking full advantage of our great people.
Senator Wicker. General Johns, do you concur?
General Johns. Senator, I do concur. I think the excess
above 301 is over capacity. I may not use the term ``risk.'' I
may say it is extra workload on our airmen to keep that
capability when we don't need to utilize it.
Senator Wicker. So it is more than getting rid of a luxury.
It is actually getting rid of something that stands in the way
of doing our best job?
General Johns. Yes, Senator.
Senator Wicker. General Johns, why does the number change?
During previous testimony, we have been told 316 was the right
number. Why does that change?
General Johns. Sir, I think when we were here last time--or
before me. In fact, when General McNabb was the AMC commander,
we didn't have the results of MCRS-16. So, that number really
was not definitized until we saw the results of MCRS-16. Once
we had that, we now had the analyses to articulate a position
based on facts.
Senator Wicker. General McNabb, how long have you seen this
coming? I have been meeting with you for a long time.
General McNabb. For the 300?
Senator Wicker. Yes.
General McNabb. The fact that about 300 was what we were
going to need, and as we went above that----
Senator Wicker. Indeed. Moving from the larger number to
the 300, how long have you really honestly seen this coming?
General McNabb. I think ever since MCRS-16 was complete.
Because what changed really was we, from MCRS----
Senator Wicker. That was when?
General McNabb. I am sorry? Oh, 2010. It was 2010.
Senator Wicker. So that was just last year, okay.
General McNabb. So, but where we, at MCRS-05, we had a
range, 292 to 383. The administration came in, and we said that
we needed 292 fully modernized aircraft. That is C-17 and C-5M.
What changed was the Nunn-McCurdy breach on the C-5
Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program. Basically, we
looked at that, and DOD got together and said, ``Okay, what is
the best way to address this?''
When we did this, they said, ``well, if we don't
do all of the C-5s because of cost, if it is not cost
effective to do all of them, let us use--the JROC came up with
a requirement, 33.9, and said here is how much we want to take
all the alternatives and then cost the different ways of
getting at that.'' That is where the 316 came from.
But we always acknowledged that MCRS-16 was going to relook
at all of the things that you mentioned, like steady-state
requirements, how would we do intra-theater, all the things
that you mentioned earlier in your opening statement, sir. We
did that.
We always knew that once we had the results of MCRS-16, we
would come back and take a look at that and see is 316 the
right number, or would it be less? It ended up being less, 301.
Senator Wicker. We are looking at very serious budget
constraints. General McNabb, based on your illustrious career
and your vast experience, is this more or less an isolated
savings, or do you think if we dig deeply we can find this Air
Force-wide?
Would you--and I ask that question in the context of the
desire of many people in the public arena saying that there is
a real savings that can be made in the defense budget.
General McNabb. Yes, sir. I think that is what Secretary
Gates, now Secretary Panetta, are really after on efficiencies.
``Go take a look at every part of what you do.''
We happen to have the opportunity to look at this as an
enterprise because it is all parts. It also includes our
ability to use land and air, use commercial versus military,
all of those things. Go back and say ``every nickel we can
save, we need to save,'' and look at every part that you do.
I think that that is what--Ms. Fox can actually talk to
this for the whole DOD. But from my standpoint, that is what I
was tasked to do by the Secretary. I think all the COCOMs and
the Services were asked to do the same thing. Go take a look at
every part of your operation and say ``are there places where
we can save money prudently, smartly?'' Still get the
capability that we need but make sure that we are not wasting
any money.
Given the demands, as you mentioned and the chairman
mentioned, there are a lot of things out there that are really
wearing out that you need to spend dollars on. We want to make
sure we are putting the dollars against the right thing.
We have had great support because of what we have done the
last 10 years in the mobility world. Congress has been
tremendously supportive, as has the administration. We have
been able to do lessons learned. We have been able to try to
figure out how to use C-17s and C-5s in commercial and
different ways.
What that has done is allowed us to look into some of these
things and come up with alternative ways of using airplanes,
different concept of operations that would allow us to maybe
say, hey, we can actually do this better, save some money, and
actually reduce risk.
This is one of those departments where I think when the 316
number came, we always said we will use MCRS-16 to make sure
that we refine that number, take full advantage of the C-17,
the full 222--at that time 223 C-17s being in the inventory.
Let us see how that plays out. Let us see how the C-5M does.
Let us make sure that we model that.
Let us see how this whole thing comes together with how we
do the lessons learned from doing 10 years of surge, and let us
put that together. That is the results that you have.
I am very comfortable with the results. TRANSCOM and CAPE
co-led that and did that together, and I am very comfortable
with the results on that. I think that it captured Services,
COCOMs, all the agencies, and made sure that we had all the
parts to the puzzle and everybody had a voice. I think, in
general, I have not had a lot of pushback on the MCRS results
within DOD at all, at least from my standpoint.
So we are basically saying we have done that. Now we come
back and tell you here is what the answer that we get, this is
what the analysis shows, and I am very comfortable with saying
that you can come down to the 300 strategic airlifters.
Senator Wicker. Finally, who can tell me what will become
of the 32 C-5A aircraft?
General Johns. Sir, the C-5As will go down to AMARC and put
into our storage there.
Senator Wicker. Is that the most efficient thing we can do
with them?
General Johns. Senator, as opposed to selling them or doing
something else, sir, I think that preserves us the capability
of putting them into storage there down at Arizona.
Senator Wicker. All right.
General Johns. Then potentially using some of those to
sustain the other aircraft down the road. We will have to look
at the discussion about do you take some of the parts from
those to sustain the fleet to reduce operating costs in the
future? So there is the tradeoff there we look.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thanks, Senator Wicker.
Let me initiate a second round. I have a few questions.
One, just for the record to clarify Senator Wicker's
question, Director Fox, this is the opinion not just of the
Department of the Air Force and TRANSCOM. This is DOD, the
Secretary, presumably as General McNabb said, all the CINCs,
commanders, have been able to weigh in. So, this is the
conclusion of DOD, all the way up to the Secretary, about the
right number?
Ms. Fox. That is correct, sir. This has been vetted by
everyone in DOD, and it does have the support of the Secretary.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
General McNabb, particularly in a surge, you have to call
on the civilian fleet. What number of millions of tons per day
or miles per tons per day would they have to contribute in a
surge?
Because, i.e., that 32.7 million of tons per day is just
what your organic aircraft are delivering. There is another
number, and that number is what? Do you know?
General McNabb. Yes, sir. I will get that for the record
for you, but it is about 20 MTM per day.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) reported a
peak demand for 149 wide-bodied cargo aircraft and 157 wide-bodied
passenger aircraft. MCRS-16 used these commercial aircraft in the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to deliver approximately 43 percent of the
cargo (bulk, containerized, and palletized cargo) and approximately 93
percent of our passengers/troops. The 149 wide-bodied cargo aircraft in
CRAF can generate about 25.4 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) in
addition to the 32.7 MTM/D provided by military organic lift to move
oversize and outsize cargo.
Senator Reed. Right.
General McNabb. We plan on doing 37 percent of our cargo
movement done by our CRAF in those two theaters that we were
talking about. So 37 percent. So over a third will be done on
the commercial, and 93 percent of our passengers.
So when you say how have you sized your fleet, the gray
tails--the C-17s, C-5s--are tailored toward rolling vehicles
and military-type cargo because that is what they are optimized
for. Where all your bulk cargo, your pallets and all that,
would be carried on commercial.
The one thing that makes it a little different that you
have to throw in there is that sometimes the commercial can't
go all the way forward because of the threat and then we have
to transload. We have that built in there. But that is also
where the one tanker, if it is not being used for tanking,
would make a very big difference because it has the defensive
systems to be able to do that.
Senator Reed. You obviously have less control over the
composition in terms of airframes of the civilian fleet. Are
there any concerns you have about commercial companies buying
different aircraft that might support passengers, but not any
kind of bulk or pallets or, i.e., has that been factored in?
General McNabb. Yes, sir. We work very closely with the
commercial industry, and we have a mix of passenger and cargo.
We make sure that we meet both of those.
Just for clarification, you brought up the AN-124s, we
don't plan on using any of that during those surges. This will
be totally our U.S. commercial fleet, and they do a great job.
The good part there is that they already are incentivized to
modernize. They are already incentivized to take care of all
the other things to get better, more efficient, fuel efficient,
all of those things, because they can't survive in the
commercial market if they don't do those things already.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you another question, which is
this--I think it is looking at the worst possible case, but
that, in some cases, is what we get paid for. What about
attrition of aircraft, either through normal wear and tear or
through combat action? Has that been built into the model?
General McNabb. Yes, sir. What I would say is that for the
big airplanes, we have lost one C-17 and one C-5 in the last 8
to 10 years.
I would say that one of the things that General Johns--and
I will ask General Johns to jump in here. Because primarily the
Air Force, then--one of the reasons they talk about 301--and I
think it comes up was at 299 or 301--a lot of that is to make
sure that he has the right-sized backup aircraft inventory
(BAI), and he has that factored in.
But again, for the large airplanes, because we don't lose
very many, it is not the same as what we do in fighters and
others, where that you are going to lose some airplanes.
So, I would say we do it a little differently. I think we
capture it. The BAI helps us do that. By the time that we
really have to get at, usually we are into another platform,
and we can adjust at that time.
Senator Reed. Let me just--a follow-up question before I
recognize General Johns. Is that the point you raise about--
right now, in the steady-state environment, the ability, the
willingness of commercial entities to fly is a lot more--is a
lot, I guess, better than the situation where they are afraid
or the insurance companies are afraid they might get shot at.
General McNabb. Right.
Senator Reed. So, have you effectively factored in a
situation, and particularly in the surge, where, for many
reasons, just the insurance companies simply saying, ``you
ain't flying,'' that you would not be able to meet your----
General McNabb. Yes, sir. A couple things that you do
there. One, we work with the Federal Aviation Administration to
guarantee insurability, wartime insurance. So we already do
that. So, whenever you have operations into Afghanistan or
Iraq, that is one of the things that I will sign off and say,
we recommend that we allow that.
But to your point, we also are not going to put any of our
airplanes into harm's way unless they have the defensive
systems and the training and all the things that go with that.
So what we will do then is we will transload. We will take it
as far forward as possible, and then we will transload.
That is where these multi-modal ops, sometimes it is
surface-to-air, sometimes it is commercial air-to-military air.
We do that in Manas now. All of our passengers going into
Afghanistan will go in on a C-17 and C-130. But we take them
commercially to Manas and then transload them onto an airplane
where they have the defensive systems. They have night-vision
goggles. They have the tactics, techniques, and procedures to
get our folks in and out in the safest possible way.
Senator Reed. General Johns, your comments on that? I have
a few other questions for you.
General Johns. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
With the large aircraft, because we haven't experienced the
losses, we don't build in attrition reserve, as we do with the
tactical aircraft. So our model basically is how many aircraft
do you need to accomplish your mission? Then we have a backup
inventory to allow us to have enough aircraft available and
still have aircraft in the depot.
So we have the two modeled. We don't add the third element,
which is attrition reserve. It hasn't been warranted, and that
would cause us to have more capacity than we need.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you a follow-up again on Senator
Wicker's very good question about what happens with the C-5As.
Have you done--and this is, again, the worst-case, and again,
we have to ask these questions--an analysis of how much it
would cost you to take a C-5A out of the desert and put it back
in the air, if all this very thoughtful analysis proves to be
wrong? Because that happens sometimes.
Is that part of the--would all the savings evaporate in two
or three retrofits and recommitments?
General Johns. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take the
specific numbers for the record, if I may?
Senator Reed. Absolutely, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The cost to return a C-5A to flying status after it has been
inducted into the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group would
depend on the type of storage the aircraft is placed into and the
length of time it has been in storage. Type 1000 storage, which is the
most costly, would maintain the retired aircraft in anticipation of
future requirements and ensure parts were maintained in a serviceable
manner. Type 1000 storage would generate a reoccurring cost of
approximately $50,000 every 4 years per aircraft with an actual
regeneration cost, the cost to return an aircraft to the fleet,
estimated at $300,000. Based on the length of time the aircraft are in
storage, there could be additional costs such as implementing time
compliant technical orders for safety and periodic depot maintenance.
Should all of these additional actions be required we estimate the cost
would be $35 million per aircraft.
General Johns. But we look at putting them in storage and
keeping at different levels of readiness and then having to
take them out and make sure they are current for the wartime
employment or the safety employment. So let me take the
specific numbers.
But it is still very low in comparison to keeping that many
aircraft, and the likelihood of needing them also is
considered.
Senator Reed. One other follow-up, and that is part of the
savings going forward that you are projecting are a function of
Congress changing the law. Just as bookkeeping or policy-wise,
how often do you do that, Director Fox, in terms of the defense
budget? Like, these guys will get it. We have a lot of
confidence in them.
Ms. Fox. Sir, I would like to tell you that we only do that
when we have the best analyses available to support the
decision.
Senator Reed. That is a very good answer, but just it
raises some policy issues with us.
Ms. Fox. Yes, sir, I understand.
Senator Reed. But I just wanted to flag it.
Ms. Fox. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. I don't think it is a major issue at the
moment.
Ms. Fox. It is a very fair question, sir.
Senator Reed. My time expired. I just must say I think this
has been a very useful hearing. I am going to recognize Senator
Wicker for any questions, and Senator Ayotte?
Senator Wicker. I will pass, and I understand that Senate
Ayotte has some.
Senator Reed. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have one brief follow-up. Director Fox, is it fair to say
that Congress has added, by earmarks, C-17s over and above what
DOD has requested, particularly in 2007 and 2008?
Ms. Fox. Yes, Senator, it is.
Senator Ayotte. Is that one of the reasons why, in part, we
find ourselves here and examining this important issue of what
is the right size that we have?
Ms. Fox. I do believe that the number of C-17s that we are
ending up with, above what we had planned, is a factor. As we
look at what we would do to get to the number that the study
says we need, it obviously points you in a particular place.
So, yes.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. Obviously, I hope going forward
that we rely on your recommendations, as opposed to--it is one
of the reasons that when I ran this past fall, I decided to
swear off earmarks. So, I appreciate what can be the unintended
consequences of some of our perhaps well-intentioned actions on
behalf of our constituents.
So, thank you all.
Senator Reed. Senator Wicker has a second round.
Senator Wicker. Let me just follow up on that. If there
were earmarks that increased the number of these aircraft, they
were based on the Air Force's studied opinion at the time, that
those were appropriate numbers. Is that not correct?
Because we have testimony that the requirement changed last
year after MCRS-16.
Ms. Fox. Sir, let me get back to you with the record of
exactly what we asked for. But it is my understanding the total
number of aircraft that you need, yes, sir, that has changed.
It has come down.
[The information referred to follows:]
Over the last decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
consistently maintained that an organic strategic airlift fleet of
about 300 aircraft is required to support the strategy with acceptable
risk. Changes to the strategic environment, as well as adjustments in
the fleet mix, which include changes to the number of modernized C-5s,
have contributed to variations in the total number of aircraft
required. Prior to September 11, the Mobility Requirements Study
concluded that DOD needed between 252 to 302 aircraft depending on the
strategic assumptions and the mix of C-17s, C-5s, and modernized C-5s.
In 2005, the Mobility Capability Study concluded that a fleet of 292
aircraft, comprised of 180 C-17s and 112 fully modernized C-5s, would
meet DOD's requirements. In 2008, when DOD reduced the C-5 Reliability
Enhancement and Re-engining Program from 112 to 52 aircraft, the
required number of aircraft increased slightly. During this timeframe,
DOD briefed Congress that a new mobility study was underway to update
earlier findings based on lessons learned from ongoing operations and
the evolving strategic environment. Subsequently Mobility Capabilities
Requirements Study assessed 3 different strategic cases and determined
that the airlift capacity needed to support the strategy ranged from
29.1 to 32.7 million ton-miles per day which can be met with a fleet of
264-300 aircraft.
Senator Wicker. It just changed last year?
Ms. Fox. It is a small change, frankly, but it is a change.
You are right. It went up, actually, a little bit from what we
had thought before. But Congress wanted it to be 316 for a
safety margin, as General McNabb has explained, until we
finished the MCRS study.
The mix within that total number is, I think, perhaps the
question with regard to C-17s, and Congress has given us more
C-17s than we have requested in the past. But I don't have with
me the exact numbers we requested and what we received. But
that is the history.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Senator Reed. My only comment is, and I think it is trying
to encapsulate what Senator Ayotte said, had we not added
additional C-17s, either at the request of the Air Force or the
request of Congress, then we would not be able to retire these
C-5As. So any way you look at it, the debate today about
retiring C-5As is a function, at least in some respect, of the
additional C-17s.
Now one of the issues, and I think this goes to one of the
points that Senator Ayotte made and one that I suggest, is that
your analysis assumes that we will not add any additional C-
17s, that the Air Force is not going to come up and recommend
that we build more C-17s because, unfortunately, this study has
reduced the number of aircraft and we need more aircraft. Is
that fair to say, General Johns?
General Johns. Mr. Chairman, the Air Force is very content
with the 222 C-17s. It will not be asking for additional ones.
Senator Reed. The swing, if you will, if--again, I think
this analysis is very thoughtful. But if there are conditions,
unpredictable at the moment, the swing comes out of civilian
fleet. It comes out of, as you have suggested, you will have at
least the capacity of reactivating C-5As which have not flown
their full life of service. Those options, I presume, would be
advanced to us prior to any other options?
Ms. Fox. Yes, sir, absolutely. We have done a lot of cost
analyses of those various options. So, again, my testimony
today is about the total number.
Senator Reed. Right.
Ms. Fox. Then the mix within is something that you also
look at for cost.
Senator Reed. General Johns?
General Johns. Mr. Chairman, as we talked about how do you
take them out of the depot if they are there? What you have to
do is you have to unwrap them, and you may have to put them
through a depot itself. You may have to do some modernization.
But what you are hugely saving is the annual flying hour
program of not having to fly them. So, we have to look at then
do we put them all in that type of storage, or do we allow some
to be used to part out and support the other aircraft?
Senator Reed. Sure.
General Johns. So there is a mix there between the type of
storage we use. That is the biggest difference.
Senator Reed. If there are no additional questions, again,
I think, as we reflect upon these issues, we might have written
questions, which we will submit to you. I think there has been
some indications that you would like to provide some written
information.
We would accept that, and we would like to let us give
ourselves a week, until next Wednesday, for written questions
submitted to the panel. We would ask you to respond as quickly
as you could to any written request made by the committee.
Again, I have to thank Senator Ayotte because she has
raised this issue, and she has done it with great insight into
an important program. I think this hearing has been very useful
to me, and I thank her for urging us to do it.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the chairman and the
ranking member, Senator Wicker, again because I raised the
issue, but this has provided much more helpful information to
be able to bring this to the floor of what the right number is
and also really support for such an important issue.
So I think this hearing was very helpful. I want to thank
both of you for accommodating my having it. Rather than having
that vote in committee, I think this is really a better place
to be in terms of how much information we have.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
If there are no further questions, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
aircraft service lives
1. Senator Reed. General Johns, what is the average number of
flight hours on the C-5A aircraft that you intend to retire?
General Johns. The 22 C-5As projected for retirements have an
average of 21,237 flight hours
2. Senator Reed. General Johns, how does this average compare to
what we believe is the total service life of the C-5A aircraft?
General Johns. The expected service life of the C-5A is 47,270
flight hours. At the current flying hour rate, the fleet is not
projected to reach or exceed the total service life before 2040.
3. Senator Reed. General Johns, how about comparable numbers for
the C-5B fleet?
General Johns. The C-5B fleet has an average of 19,157 flight hours
per aircraft with a service life expectancy of 52,500 hours.
4. Senator Reed. General Johns, what is the average number of hours
of service life expended by the C-17 fleet?
General Johns. Average actual airframe hours for the entire C-17
fleet are 9,650.
5. Senator Reed. General Johns, how does this average compare to
the total expected service life of the C-17 aircraft?
General Johns. Designed service life of the C-17 is 30,000 hours
before we examine any service life extensions.
6. Senator Reed. General Johns, if we keep burning hours on the C-
17 at the current rate, when would we need to begin a C-17 replacement
program?
General Johns. The C-17 fleet averages more than the planned 1,000
actual flight hours per year, but the life-limiting effects ``felt'' by
the fleet are within limits. The C-17 fleet will meet its service life
of 30 years, and based on historic usage severity, should be available
much longer. Targeted fleet service life extension programs (SLEP) can
be utilized to refresh aging aircraft drivers (wing upper cover,
landing gear) as appropriate to enable continued safe/reliable/economic
C-17 operations.
Supporting Information:
The C-17 was delivered with an engineered service life of 30,000
actual flight hours (AFH), programmed to fly 1,000 AFH per year for 30
years. Recent history shows higher usage.
The true measure of an airframe's ``remaining life'' is total
Equivalent Flight Hours (EFH), based on aircraft usage severity; in
effect, what the aircraft ``feels'' it is flying. Usage severity is
specific to each tail number by mission (e.g., low-level airdrop is
more ``severe'' than high-altitude, straight/level).
While the entire aircraft accumulates AFH at the same rate,
individual ``regions'' of an aircraft accumulate EFH at different
rates, depending on each region's loading environment. For all but one
aircraft region, the average accumulated annual EFH is under the
designed 1,000 EFH annual standard. Wing Upper Cover (Control Point W2)
is the exception; and it is only the exception at Altus Air Force Base
(AFB), due to the harsh training environment which, in effect, ``ages''
the upper cover faster.
HQ Air Mobility Command (AMC) and the C-17 SPO coordinate to
monitor these operational effects at Altus, and rotate aircraft on a
schedule through Altus. The System Program Manager and Boeing confirmed
that W2 EFH accumulation slows down and starts to recover after
aircraft leave Altus, as AFH begins to outpace EFH again.
As C-17 aircraft sections approach life limits, SLEP can be
utilized to refresh these sections in order to breathe new life into
the fleet. For instance, a W2 SLEP, when applicable, could be applied
to essentially reduce the aircraft ``age'' by reducing the leading
aircraft service life driver. Currently, the only proposed C-17 SLEP
relates to landing gear, which has a life limit of 19,000 landings
(although it was tested to 4 lifetimes); the fleet's high time aircraft
currently has over 17,000 landings ( 3 years of service life left at
current rate); SLEP will provide a solution for these ``high landings''
fleet drivers, enabling continued aircraft availability. The proposed
SLEP will analyze landing gear available life, determine components
requiring modification to attain 38,000 landings, and implement
required modifications or impose life limits on components.
aircraft availability
7. Senator Reed. General Johns, normal Air Force planning for force
structure includes additional aircraft for attrition reserve, so-called
back-up inventory aircraft that protect against aircraft being
unavailable during periods of depot maintenance, et cetera, and
aircraft for training purposes. To what extent have your assessment of
the adequacy of a force of 301 aircraft taken these factors into
account?
General Johns. AMC plans for Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI) to
account for aircraft that are in depot for maintenance, modifications,
etc. Formal training requirements for mobility aircraft are also taken
into account when considering the proper fleet size. The assessment
that 301 inter-theater airlift aircraft will meet MCRS-16 peak demand
takes both BAI and formal training aircraft into account. Unlike
tactical aircraft fleets, AMC does not program for attrition reserve
aircraft because the historic and forecasted loss rates for mobility
aircraft does not justify the additional investment.
8. Senator Reed. General Johns, is there any attrition reserve in
the 301 number, or back-up aircraft inventory, or provisions for
training aircraft? If not, what would you propose to do if we should
lose another C-17 or C-5 aircraft in a major mishap?
General Johns. AMC plans for BAI to account for aircraft that are
in depot for maintenance, modifications, et cetera. Formal training
requirements are for mobility aircraft are also taken into account when
considering the proper fleet size. The assessment that 301 inter-
theater airlift aircraft will meet MCRS-16 peak demand takes both BAI
and formal training aircraft into account. Unlike tactical aircraft
fleets, AMC does not program for attrition reserve aircraft because the
historic and forecasted loss rates for mobility aircraft does not
justify the additional investment. Any loss in the C-17 or C-5 fleets
would be filled by BAI aircraft.
9. Senator Reed. General Johns, C-5B aircraft will be unavailable
for nearly a year in the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining
Program (RERP) modification, which continues through 2015. In fiscal
year 2013 and fiscal year 2014, you will have 11 C-5B aircraft offline
undergoing the modification. If Congress removes the 316 floor, the Air
Force plans to complete the action of getting down to 301 aircraft by
2014. What assumptions have you made about the availability of C-5B
aircraft that are undergoing the extensive RERP modification, where
these aircraft will be unavailable for almost a year at a time?
General Johns. AMC has taken into account depot possession of C-5Bs
as they continue through the RERP modification. If a fully-mobilized
scenario requiring all inter-theater aircraft were to arise in the
near-term, steps would be taken to defer aircraft inputs into depot
and/or accelerate aircraft through depot lines. The increased depot
load for the C-5 RERP modification will not adversely impact current
day-to-day operations.
10. Senator Reed. General Johns wouldn`t the Air Force plans for
retirement actually allow capabilities for million ton-miles per day
(MTM/D) to fall below the revised requirement for several years in the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)?
General Johns. AMC's plan for 301 inter-theater airlift aircraft
steadily improves our MTM/D capability between fiscal year 2012 and
fiscal year 2015. As we begin fiscal year 2012, our current inventory
of 212 delivered C-17s and 104 C-5s (5 C-5Ms, 45 C-5Bs, 2 C-5Cs, and 52
C-5As) provides approximately 31.0 MTM/D. Continued delivery of C-17s
to a total of 222 and the progress of the C-5 RERP modification for 52
aircraft will steadily improve MTM/D capability to 32.1 by end of
fiscal year 2012 and above 32.7 by end of fiscal year 2015. This steady
improvement in capability is balanced with realistic unit conversion
schedules from the C-5A to the C-17 and avoids expenditures on
modifications and depot maintenance on retiring aircraft.
implementation of reductions
11. Senator Reed. General Johns, have you decided which C-5A
aircraft you want to retire, and which units will be losing aircraft
without replacement by C-17s if you have to maintain 316 aircraft?
General Johns. The main driver in selecting specific C-5A aircraft
for retirement is the programmed depot maintenance (PDM) schedule. We
typically choose aircraft coming due a PDM, and we are formulating that
list. The remaining aircraft will be redistributed across the remaining
C-5A units after the remaining ARC unit for conversion to the C-17 is
selected through the Air Force's strategic basing process. All existing
inter-theater units will be covered with aircraft.
12. Senator Reed. General Johns, which aircraft and which units
would be affected if we either eliminate the floor or lower the floor
to 301 aircraft?
General Johns. The fiscal year 2012 request reduces the C-5A fleet
to 27 as the overall inter-theater fleet is reduced to 301 (222 C-17s,
52 C-5Ms, and 27 C-5As). A remaining ARC C-5A to C-17 unit conversion
will be announced as we complete the Air Force's strategic basing
process. No units will go uncovered as we reduce the inter-theater
fleet to 301 aircraft.
13. Senator Reed. General Johns, if we eliminate the 316 floor,
would the Air Force retire more than the number it takes to get to a
total of 301?
General Johns. Based on the most stressful MCRS-16 requirement of
32.7 MTM/D, our fiscal year 2012 request is to retire C-5As to achieve
an inter-theater fleet of 301 aircraft (222 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms, and 27 C-
5As). We will maintain the strategic fleet of 301 aircraft until such
time that a new requirement is established and/or a follow-on study is
accomplished that points to a reduced inter-theater airlift requirement
in the future.
14. Senator Reed. General Johns, what would be the effect of
immediately implementing these reductions, rather than spacing them out
over the FYDP?
General Johns. Attempting to immediately implement all proposed C-
5A reductions in 1 year would initially exceed the Aerospace
Maintenance and Regeneration Group ability to accept the aircraft and
would exceed the converting unit's ability to initially train
operations and maintenance personnel in the C-17. The proposed C-5A
retirement schedule attempts to balance fiscal savings with achievable
aircraft acceptance and unit conversion schedules.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
heavy-lifting capability
15. Senator Wicker. General McNabb, how does U.S. Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM) engage the private sector to support the lift
mission from big and heavy equipment like a mine-resistant ambush
protected (MRAP) vehicle to other essentials that are large and bulky?
General McNabb. TRANSCOM starts with the lift requirement as
identified by the Geographic Combatant Commander. We examine
restrictions such as size, weight and delivery timeline. For heavy
equipment such as MRAPs, joint priorities, delivery timelines, and cost
effectiveness are all factors in vessel and mode selection. Rapid
delivery often requires military organic solutions, deliveries over
time may allow engagement of commercial partners, and more cost
effective multi-modal solutions. To ensure the best value and meet
mission parameters, TRANSCOM acquisitions uses departmental contracting
guidelines to engage commercial industry.
16. Senator Wicker. General McNabb, how important is cargo
preference to sustaining an adequate sealift capability?
General McNabb. Maintaining U.S.-Flag sealift readiness is a top
priority for TRANSCOM. Sealift is the primary means for delivering
combat forces and sustainment during major and contingency operations.
TRANSCOM's partnership with U.S. commercial sealift industry is a vital
component in meeting the Nation's strategic sealift requirements. To
date, over 90 percent of all cargo to Afghanistan and Iraq has been
moved by sea in U.S.-Flag vessels.
Under cargo preference laws, the Department of Defense (DOD) gains
critical access to U.S.-Flag commercial sealift and transportation
networks in exchange for our U.S.-Flag maritime industry to have first
opportunity to move U.S. Government cargo. This allows the continued
viability of the U.S.-Flag fleet and the pool of citizen mariners who
man them. U.S. commercial sealift industry depends on preference cargo.
Any reductions in available U.S.-Flag sealift will have to be offset in
other ways to maintain DOD sealift readiness.
17. Senator Wicker. General McNabb, the Defense Advanced Research
Products Agency hopes that its Pelican program will provide heavy-
lifting capability from lighter-than-air vehicles for the U.S.
military. What role do you see for such aircraft in the future?
General McNabb. Initial research observations lead me to believe
that airships could provide a balance of cargo throughput at lower
operating cost and fuel savings. Such operations can potentially blend
efficiency and cargo velocity independent of infrastructure. Beyond
creating alternative approaches to operations, it also has the
potential to improve the effectiveness of the existing transportation
system.
We are presently developing understanding of competing technical
viewpoints through our participation in multiple Cooperative Research
and Development Agreements with industry to analyze different aspects
of this technology. To date, our analyses have reinforced the
importance of flexible cargo delivery options.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
air force air fleet
18. Senator McCaskill. Director Fox, with the high costs of keeping
the C-5As ($30,167/hour for the C-5A vs. $13,767/hour for the C-17),
how much of an impact would retiring C-5As have on the operation and
maintenance budget?
Director Fox. DOD currently has more airlift than it needs, and
thus there would be no reason to replace C-5As with C-17s. Furthermore,
the 2009 congressionally mandated fleet mix study conducted by the
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) concluded that it is not cost
effective to replace C-5As with C-17s. Their analyses accounted for the
full life-cycle costs, and the operational readiness and cargo capacity
of both aircraft. That said, retiring C-5As would save DOD
approximately $9 million per aircraft per year in annual flying hour
cost.
19. Senator McCaskill. Director Fox, if the full fleet of C-5As
were retired and the Air Force wished to maintain the same total lift
capability as it has now, how many additional C-17s would be required
taking into account operational readiness and cargo capacity of both
aircraft?
Director Fox. DOD currently has more airlift than it needs, and
thus there is no reason to replace the 32 aircraft the Air Force
currently plans to retire. Retiring 32 of the 59 C-5As leaves DOD with
enough airlift capacity to meet the peak demand of the most stressing
set of scenarios examined in the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements
Study (MCRS-16). That said, when considering operational readiness and
cargo capacity, it would take 22 C-17s to replace the
remaining 27 C-5As.
20. Senator McCaskill. Director Fox, what would it cost to secure
this capability taking into account the lower cost per flight hour
rates for the C-17, reduced maintenance costs for the C-17, and reduced
manpower costs for the C-17?
Director Fox. Taking into account operational readiness and cargo
capacity, it takes 22 C-17s to replace the capability of 27 C-5As at an
upfront cost of about $6 billion in procurement. This could save
approximately $160 million per year in operations. It is worth noting
that the 2009 congressionally mandated fleet mix study conducted by the
IDA concluded that it is not cost effective to replace C-5As with C-
17s. They based their conclusion on analyses of full life-cycle costs,
and they accounted for the operational readiness and cargo capacity of
both aircraft. Their conclusion was that if DOD needs the capacity, it
is more cost effective to maintain some C-5As versus buying additional
C-17s.
21. Senator McCaskill. Director Fox, can you retire all C-5As and
still meet your war-time mobility requirements?
Director Fox. Retiring all the C-5As would result in a fleet
capacity capable of meeting the demands of two of the three strategic
cases assessed in the MCRS. The demands of the most stressing and least
likely strategic case involving two large overlapping land campaigns
would not be met at 100 percent and the associated risk would have to
be assessed.
22. Senator McCaskill. Director Fox, would the purchase of C-17 to
replace the C-5As reduce the requirement to recapitalize the C-130
fleet?
Director Fox. No. While C-17s can support many intra-theater
missions, the C-130Js are far more efficient in that role.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
civil reserve air fleet
23. Senator Chambliss. Director Fox, in your statement you comment:
``When not operating at full war-time capability, Guard and Reserve
Forces are not mobilized, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft
are not activated. This is why DOD sometimes relies on commercial/
foreign source airlift like the Russian-built IL-76 and AN-124 to
support current operations. Accommodating a short-term surge with use
of commercial assets is more cost-effective than maintaining additional
force structure that is not required full time.'' If that is true,
could a limited activation of the CRAF accomplish the same objective?
Director Fox. Generally speaking a limited activation of CRAF would
not be able to accomplish the same objective. The IL-76 and AN-124 are
typically used to move large cargo, like MRAP vehicles. This type of
cargo is ill-suited for most CRAF aircraft, which are normally used to
move personnel and bulk cargo. It's important to keep in mind that DOD
accesses the Russian-built aircraft by providing peacetime cargo
business to DOD's CRAF partners. They in turn determine how best to
support the requirement. In the past, the AN-124s were provided via a
subcontract to one of our CRAF members.
24. Senator Chambliss. General McNabb and General Johns, section
137 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
requires the Air Force, before retiring any C-5 aircraft from the
active inventory, to provide a report to Congress several items
including ``an assessment of the costs, benefits, and implications of
transferring C-5 aircraft to U.S. flag carriers operating in the CRAF
program or to coalition partners in lieu of the retirement of such
aircraft.'' Please explain what, if any, actions the Air Force has
taken regarding this assessment.
General McNabb. TRANSCOM does not oppose the transfer of C-5A
aircraft to CRAF program carriers or to our coalition partners. Based
on current policy however, the C-5A is catalogued on the U.S. Munitions
List as a ``category C'' aircraft. That policy requires the removal or
destruction of certain components before transferring ownership. In
this case the list of components includes the wing spars, fuselage, and
tail assembly making the aircraft inoperable. If the policy were
altered to allow the transfer, commercial carriers would then have to
determine if refurbishment required to meet Federal Aviation
Administration standards were fiscally viable for operations.
The transfer of the C-5A to coalition partners would not fall under
the same policy. As with the acquisition of C-17s and other military
aircraft, it would be possible for our coalition partners to acquire
and operate the C-5A.
General Johns. The Air Force delivered the requested report,
``Report on Retirements of C-5A Aircraft'' to the four congressional
defense committees in October, 2010. That report concluded that the
benefits of transferring C-5A aircraft to CRAF are limited, primarily
because a transfer of these aircraft to the commercial fleet would
create an increase in capacity that isn't required, i.e. the excess
capacity would merely be traded from one fleet to another. There is
also a high cost to transfer the aircraft to commercial carriers due to
required demilitarization.
russian and ukrainian aircraft
25. Senator Chambliss. Director Fox, it has been estimated that
between 2005 and 2009, DOD spent $1.7 billion contracting airlift from
the Russians and Ukrainians. Are Russian and Ukrainian aircraft
available world-wide or just in limited locations?
Director Fox. DOD provides peacetime cargo business to our CRAF
members as an incentive for their voluntary participation in the CRAF
program. They in turn leverage the capability of foreign carriers (i.e.
Russian and Ukrainian aircraft) to move our peacetime cargo at less
cost to the taxpayer than using our organic fleet. Additionally, this
helps preserve our fleet for its wartime mission. Finally, DOD only
uses these foreign aircraft where they are accepted, and we do not rely
on their capability to meet our wartime surge demand.
26. Senator Chambliss. Director Fox, General McNabb, and General
Johns, how does the United States account for the fact that, based on
the specific requirement the Russians and Ukrainians are asked to
support, they might decline to do so, similar to how some countries
where we have troops or assets stationed have denied over-flight rights
or denied our request to use those troops or assets for certain
purposes?
Director Fox. DOD leverages the capability of Russian and Ukrainian
aircraft because it is often less expensive than using our organic
fleet and it helps preserve our fleet so that we can meet wartime
demands when called upon to do so. We do not rely on the capability of
the Russian and Ukrainian aircraft to meet our wartime surge demand.
General McNabb. Russia continues to be a strong partner in support
of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), including the recent approval of
Polar Overflight. Our transit agreement with the Russians has been
instrumental moving passengers into Afghanistan. Approximately 60
percent of troops deploying and redeploying in support of OEF transit
over Russia's airspace. Over 1,300 flights have transited Russia
ferrying 211,000 soldiers. In the unlikely event Russia or Ukraine
change their stance, TRANSCOM would seek to maximize routing through
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan. The flexibility of the Northern Air
Lines of Communication provides TRANSCOM with several options.
The Northern Distribution Network provides strategic surface
flexibility, metering cargo between the Pakistan ground routes and
European/Russian/Caucasus routes. Loss of Russian access would have a
large impact on this northern route system, with 79 percent of northern
cargo passing through Russia in July 2011. Additionally, losing Russian
access would essentially cut off supply lines from ports in Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia. The load would be carried by ground lines in
Pakistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and
Kyrgyzstan, but with slightly less volume due to host nation
infrastructure limitations. We could also increase the amount we bring
in by air, especially through multimodal operations.
General Johns. We are fully capable of meeting our national
objectives without relying on Russian and Ukrainian assets air mobility
assets to meet our national objectives. Studies like the MCRS-16 define
requirements we will meet with U.S. military organic lift (like C5s, C-
17s, and C-130s) combined with partnerships from carriers in the CRAF.
A prerequisite of membership in the CRAF is being a U.S. flagged
carrier; no foreign flagged carriers are CRAF partners. Beyond our
combatant commander requirements and where contractual law permits, DOD
can and does contract for commercial business with foreign flagged
carriers. In some cases, such an arrangement results in lower costs to
the taxpayer. In other cases, we use foreign contracts to access
locations where a U.S.-Flag presence may be politically unwise or
diplomatically difficult. U.S. troops or assets stationed in harm's way
can always depend on support from U.S-Flag carriers whether they be
military or commercial when needed.
mobility capabilities and requirements study
27. Senator Chambliss. Director Fox, General McNabb, and General
Johns, in 2008, the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) conducted a
Strategic Airlift Review and concluded that the then current program of
record was the most cost-effective and there was no need for additional
C-17s. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) also established
a requirement for 33.95 million ton-miles (MTM) organic capability and
stated that any reduction in strategic airlift capability would
increase risk to unacceptable levels and jeopardize DOD's ability to
adequately support the combatant commands (COCOM).
In 2008, OSD also certified the need for 316 strategic airlifters.
In 2009, a congressionally directed airlift review conducted by the
Institute for Defense Analyses concluded that the current program of
record (316 aircraft) met all requirements and that retiring C-5As to
buy/operate additional C-17s was not cost effective. Air Force
leadership also testified to Congress that 316 strategic airlift
aircraft was ``the sweet spot.''
In 2009, the MCRS established a new 32.7 MTM worst case requirement
which was lower than previous studies in recent years. The Air Force's
desire to retire 30+ C-5As which could drive the strategic airlift
fleet below 300 aircraft is based on this most recent study.
Over the last 3 to 4 years, DOD and the Air Force have changed
their positions several times on what the strategic airlift requirement
is. How do you compare the results of these studies and which study is
most correct?
Director Fox. Over the last decade, DOD has consistently maintained
that an organic strategic airlift fleet of about 300 aircraft is
required to support the strategy with acceptable risk. The small
changes in the numbers of aircraft (i.e., 292 vs. 316 vs. 301), and the
required fleet capacity, expressed in MTM/D (i.e., 33.95 vs. 32.7 MTM/
D) result from changes in the National Military Strategy (NMS), changes
in force structure, and changes in the capabilities of the airlift
fleet. The most recent mobility study, MCRS-16 assessed three different
strategic cases and determined that the airlift capacity needed to
support the strategy ranged from 29.1 to 32.7 MTM/D. This can be met
with a fleet of 264 to 300 aircraft. One of the reasons we no longer
view 316 aircraft as ``the sweet spot'' is because that number was
based on a greater proportion of the fleet consisting of C-5As. Because
the C-17 is more capable than the C-5A and because Congress added 43 C-
17s over DOD's program, DOD doesn't need to retain as many C-5As to
meet its fleet capacity requirements.
General McNabb. The Mobility Capability Study (MCS) of 2005
determined that the 2005 programmed force mix of 180 C-17s and 112 C-5s
(all intended to be reliability enhanced and reengined; RERP-ed) was
sufficient to meet organic strategic airlift requirements. The MCS did
not establish a specific MTM/D requirement. Subsequent to MCS, as a
result of the Nunn-McCurdy breach in the C-5 RERP, the Air Force
limited the C-5 RERP program to 52 C-5Bs and continued with plans to
acquire 205 C-17s to meet requirements. As part of the Nunn-McCurdy
process, the JROC validated an organic strategic airlift requirement of
33.95 MTM/D. The JROC validated this requirement based on the fleet mix
used in MCS and pending the results of the MCRS-16. DOD subsequently
determined that 316 tails (111 C-5s and 205 C-17s) best met the interim
requirement of 33.95 MTM/D of organic capacity.
The MCRS-16, released in 2010, determined a specific organic
airlift requirement of 32.7 MTM/D based on updated scenarios approved
by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF). MCRS-16 examined
various C-17/C-5 force mixes able to meet the new 32.7 MTM/D
requirement, and determined that a mix totaling about 300 tails
fulfills the requirement. Although the MCS fleet mix in the 2005 study
was sufficient to meet organic strategic lift requirements, MCRS-16
provided a much more specific and reliable airlift requirement, based
on high-fidelity, DEPSECDEF-approved scenarios. Bottom line: I don't
see anything on the horizon that will substantially alter MCRS-16
results.
General Johns. Your recount of history is accurate and we know that
the current demand signal for 32.7 MTM/D of strategic organic airlift
capacity from MCRS-16 can be met with approximately 300 aircraft. Our
program of record for 222 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms, and 27 C-5As assures we can
address the most demanding validated needs of the Nation with this
force structure. All previous DOD-level studies you reference were
``correct''; the MCRS-16 is the most ``current'' and serves as the
foundation for a requirements demand signal extending to fiscal year
2016. History has shown a need to update such studies every quadrennial
review cycle and we respond to those validated and reviewed changes
each time we submit a new Program Objective Memorandum.
28. Senator Chambliss. Director Fox, General McNabb, and General
Johns, how do we know that you have it right this time and that we are
not incurring unacceptable or unnecessary risks?
Director Fox. Over the last decade, DOD has consistently maintained
that an organic strategic airlift fleet of about 300 aircraft is
required to support the strategy with acceptable risk. The minor
variations in the numbers of aircraft (i.e., 292 vs. 316 vs. 301), and
the required fleet capacity, expressed in MTM/D (i.e., 33.95 vs. 32.7
MTM/D) result from changes in the NMS, changes in force structure, and
changes in the capabilities of the airlift fleet. The most recent
mobility study, MCRS-16, assessed three possible strategic cases and
determined that the airlift capacity needed to support the strategy
ranged from 29.1 to 32.7 MTM/D. This can be met with a fleet of 264 to
300 aircraft. The high end number of 300 aircraft is very conservative
as it represents the fleet required to support two overlapping major
campaigns concurrent with three nearly simultaneous Homeland defense
consequence management events, plus support to ongoing steady-state
operations, to include OEF.
General McNabb. The MCRS-16 is the most comprehensive study done to
date. TRANSCOM and OSD led the effort and the study enjoyed the
contributions of all the Services, COCOMs, and the Joint Staff. MCRS-16
addressed three demanding cases to integrate overlapping campaign-level
warfights with concurrent protection of the Homeland, support to small
scale security postures around the globe, and maintain a preparedness
to respond to critical alert requirements. The completeness of the
study and the collaboration among all key participants gives us great
confidence that we are not incurring unacceptable or unnecessary risks.
General Johns. The MCRS-16 is the most current assessment of the
need for mobility assets based on 2 years of studying three demanding
cases involving the integration of scenarios to simultaneously protect
the Homeland, posture our Nation to respond to events around the globe,
and be prepared to address significant overlapping combatant campaigns
in response to threats to our national interests. These DOD validated
scenario sets are continuously being reviewed and updated to assure we
can respond to world events and address conflicts with acceptable
levels of risk. Each year we submit our programming actions based upon
the most current family of scenario sets and demands approved by DOD.
29. Senator Chambliss. Director Fox, did the MCRS-16 account for
the possibility of future losses--combat or otherwise--in the strategic
airlift fleet? If not, why not?
Director Fox. Unlike combat aircraft and bombers, DOD does not
program an attrition reserve for mobility aircraft. DOD does program
(and the MCRS accounted for) BAI at approximately 10 percent of the
fleet size.
30. Senator Chambliss. Director Fox, did the MCRS account for
already planned heavy depot modifications and upgrades to both C-17s
and C-5s that will continue through 2016, and how these modifications
and upgrades will affect the aircraft's availability? If not, why not?
Director Fox. The study accounted for depot rates consistent with
all programmed modifications.
31. Senator Chambliss. Director Fox, did the MCRS analysis include
or exclude training assets?
Director Fox. MCRS included training assets. During the steady
state portion of the analysis, the demand included full training
operations consistent with the training demands witnessed over the past
7 years. When operating under surge conditions, as would be the case if
engaged in two overlapping warfights, DOD plans to curtail routine
training while sustaining the primary training pipeline. The fleet
capacity of 32.7 MTM/D required to meet peak demands of overlapping
warfights includes a 50 percent reduction in training aircraft for the
45-day surge period.
air force c-5ms
32. Senator Chambliss. General McNabb and General Johns, as I
understand, the Air Force currently has five C-5Ms in operational
service. Please provide a summary of how well the C-5Ms are performing
operationally.
General McNabb and General Johns. The C-5M has demonstrated its
superior capability as early as Operational Test and Evaluation where a
small fleet of aircraft were employed to provide direct delivery of
heavy outsized cargo to U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) front door.
The C-5M was able to overfly the en route gas stops where any other AMC
airlifter would have to land for fuel. These 23 hour roundtrip missions
delivered approximately 120,000 pounds of cargo on each mission from
Dover AFB, DE, to Turkey and Iraq, dramatically increasing mission
velocity and reliability. Approximately 36 missions were completed by 3
aircraft and 6 crews in only 35 days.
In February, Dover AFB, DE, brought together an all-star team of 8
aircrews and 28 maintainers, composed of Active and Reserve airmen, and
deployed 2 C-5Ms and 2 C-5Bs in support of an intermodal movement of 2
Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) of the 101st Airborne Division. In only
31 days, Team Dover successfully delivered 172 helicopters plus
personnel and support equipment totaling over 6 million pounds. The C-
5M outpaced the C-5B by consuming approximately 20 percent less fuel,
moving 59 percent of the cargo, and increased mission effectiveness and
velocity by overflying intermediate gas stops required by the C-5B
(while carrying heavier cargo loads in and out of the theater). The C-
5M maintained a phenomenal 87 percent logistics departure reliability
rate.
In June, a C-5M from Dover AFB was tasked to complete the first
direct, non-stop mission from Dover AFB, DE, to Bagram, Afghanistan.
This was the first flight of its kind which involved flying over Canada
towards the Arctic Circle, then down through Russia and into
Afghanistan. This history-making flight was made possible by the
improved reliability and capability of the C-5M. The flight took over
15 hours to complete. The success of this mission laid the ground-work
for future polar over-flight operations from the United States directly
delivering high priority outsized cargo into the area of responsibility
(AOR).
33. Senator Chambliss. General McNabb and General Johns, is the Air
Force satisfied with the C-5M?
General McNabb and General Johns. Yes, the C-5M's performance is
exceeding our expectations. Five C-5Ms have been delivered to the Air
Force; however, over the past 18 months we have had three or less C-5Ms
which are available to fly missions in support of our customers. The
other C-5Ms have been receiving modifications such as large aircraft
infrared countermeasures (LAIRCM), programmed depot maintenance, or
have been supporting follow-on reliability enhancement reengining
program (RERP) development testing. With a possessed fleet size of
three or less, a peacetime Mission Capable Rate does not provide a
meaningful measure of the current and future performance of the C-5M.
To date we assess the performance of the C-5M as exceeding our
expectations. The propulsion system which is over 70 percent of the
modification is proving very reliable and provides the C-5M much higher
climb, payload, range, and exceptional noise abatement performance over
the legacy C-5. Consequently, a C-5M uses less mobility assets and 10
to 20 percent less fuel to accomplish the same mission than a legacy C-
5. On several occasions, we have tasked C-5Ms to perform their wartime
representative surges and their wartime mission capable rate has
exceeded 75 percent with maintenance departure reliability rates
exceeding 85 percent. The C-5M is lauded by both aircrew and
maintainers as being an outstanding platform. Aircrews praise the
climb, payload, range, diagnostics system, and upgraded flight station
equipment and displays. Maintainers now deal less with the legacy
issues that were upgraded by the RERP conversion and maintainability
has become much more user friendly thanks to improvements in
diagnostics system and maintenance manuals. The C-5M maintenance repair
time and mission essential equipment fix rates are much better than the
standards established by the C-5 RERP Capabilities Requirement
Document.
34. Senator Chambliss. General McNabb and General Johns, one of
those C-5Ms was previously a C-5A. How is that aircraft performing
relative the other C-5Ms?
General McNabb and General Johns. There is minimal difference
between A and B model C-5s. The C-5Ms are still a relatively small
fleet and we do not have enough data to determine how the ``A-model''
conversion is performing relative to the other C-5Ms.
c-5 reliability enhancement and re-engining program
35. Senator Chambliss. General McNabb and General Johns, as
reported in the 2008 C-5 Capabilities Production Document signed by
then Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Moseley, the Air Force
conducted a cost/benefit analyses of the C-5 RERP effort and concluded
that modernizing 52 C-5s to the C-5 RERP configuration results in an
$8.9 billion reduction in total ownership costs after paying for all
development and production through 2040. This suggests that the current
52 aircraft C-5 RERP not only pays for itself, but generates sufficient
net savings that would also pay to RERP the entire C-5A fleet if the
Air Force chose to modernize them as well. Is this your understanding
as well and are these estimates still accurate?
General McNabb and General Johns. The reduced total ownership cost
(RTOC) estimate will be at least $8.9 billion (BY00). However, the RTOC
for the RERP modification of 52 C-5s will not be realized until after
2025 which is late to funding modification of C-5As, i.e., fiscal years
2014 to 2019. The estimated cost to RERP 27 C-5As is in excess of $3
billion. The Air Force does not need to RERP additional C-5As to meet
known strategic airlift requirements. Currently the Air Force plans to
use savings from RERP to pay for future budget reductions.
36. Senator Chambliss. General McNabb and General Johns, the MCRS
assumes full Guard/Reserve mobilization to meet national requirements.
Once that happens, all assets are brought to bear to meet strategic
airlift requirements. However, in peacetime that is not the situation.
I have heard that AMC has challenges day-to-day meeting peacetime
requirements. Please comment on what effect your desire to retire up to
32 C-5s will have on your ability to perform your peacetime mission?
General McNabb. Bottom Line--there is sufficient capacity for
peacetime operations. While supporting both the troop withdrawal from
Iraq and the surge in Afghanistan, the busiest day for TRANSCOM's
component, AMC, was 16.6 MTM/D. So far in 2011, it has been 15.9 MTM/D,
highlighted by our ability to support operations in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and Libya, while responding to the disasters in Japan, where we were
able to deliver over 3,600 tons of supplies and evacuate over 7,500
dependents. I am confident we have enough organic surge capacity and
commercial partner augmentation to satisfy the anticipated workload
based upon our recent years' experience.
General Johns. The Air Force's need to retire 32 C-5s, excess to
the maximum demand of 32.7 MTM/D, will not result in an adverse impact
to our day-to-day peacetime operation. Today, in the midst of the lower
access to C-5 aircraft because of the avionic modernization program
(AMP) and RERP modification lines, we have still been able to balance
our C-17 and C-5 fleets to meet current airlift requirements. Our
challenge has been to keep the C-5s moving in the system. The
reliability rates we've been experiencing have reduced our capacity to
move as much airlift as we might like with the C-5. With the 52 C-5M
tails presently programmed, we forecast an increase to C-5 airlift
capacity. This increase comes from an increased aircraft reliability or
mission capable rate of 54 percent with our legacy fleet to 75 percent
for our RERP'd fleet and increased C-5M range and tonnage capability
over the C-5A/B.
an-124 augmentation
37. Senator Chambliss. General McNabb and General Johns, will we
see TRANSCOM continuing or increasing reliance on foreign AN-124
augmentation to get their job done?
General McNabb. We will continue to take advantage of AN-124
aircraft's ability to carry outsize cargo when they are the lowest cost
option, thus allowing us to fly our C-5 and C-17 fleets at lower
utilization (UTE) rates and preserve their service life. AN-124
augmentation will not be at the expense of CRAF carriers and the AN-124
capability will be arranged as a subcontract through CRAF carriers.
General Johns. The ability to meet the requirements of U.S.
combatant commanders around the globe does not rely upon the use of
foreign flagged aircraft like the AN-124. Studies like the MCRS-16 come
with solutions that rely wholly on U.S. flagged capabilities. We will
continue to augment our organic capability and our partnerships with
U.S. flagged carriers in the CRAF with foreign flagged carriers to
reduce operational/personnel tempo on our troops, to save wear-and-tear
on our military assets, to reduce costs to American taxpayers, and to
facilitate diplomatic access to destinations that may be restricted or
denied to U.S. carriers. We do not rely on foreign augmentation, but we
do seek to build partnerships and trust throughout the international
community where foreign contractual relationships make sense to save
time, save money, and/or free our people and assets for other
activities.
[Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
