[Senate Hearing 112-80, Part 1] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] S. Hrg. 112-80, Pt. 1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM ======================================================================= HEARINGS before the COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON S. 1253 TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES __________ PART 1 MILITARY POSTURE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA THE F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM __________ FEBRUARY 17; MARCH 1, 8, 17, 29, 31; APRIL 5, 7, 12; MAY 19, 2011 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ ? U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 68-084 WASHINGTON : 2012 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com. COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director (ii) C O N T E N T S ---------- CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES Military Posture february 17, 2011 Page Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by Robert F. Hale, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller........ 15 Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 25 U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Command march 1, 2011 Olson, ADM Eric T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command........................................................ 175 Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command..... 182 Department of the Navy march 8, 2011 Mabus, Hon. Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy............... 261 Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations............... 275 Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps........ 294 Department of the Air Force march 17, 2011 Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the Air Force.............. 433 Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force.. 456 U.S. European Command and U.S. Strategic Command march 29, 2011 Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command/ Supreme Allied Commander, Europe............................... 543 Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.. 587 Department of the Army march 31, 2011 McHugh, Hon. John M., Secretary of the Army...................... 669 Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army....... 701 U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command april 5, 2011 Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command 757 Fraser, Gen. Douglas M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.. 765 U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Africa Command april 7, 2011 McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command........................................................ 842 Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.......... 852 U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea april 12, 2011 Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command..... 926 Sharp, GEN Walter L., USA, Commander, United Nations Command/ Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea...................... 940 The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program may 19, 2011 Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics......................... 999 Fox, Hon. Christine H., Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 1009 Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 1012 Van Buren, David M., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Air Force for Acquisition...................................... 1017 Venlet, VADM David J., USN, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program........................................... 1053 Burbage, Charles T. ``Tom'', Executive Vice President and General Manager, F-35 Program Integration, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company........................................................ 1054 Sullivan, Michael J., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office................... 1057 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM ---------- THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2011 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC. MILITARY POSTURE The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Chambliss, Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Collins, and Graham. Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel. Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Christine G. Lang, Brian F. Sebold, Bradley S. Watson, and Breon N. Wells. Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; and Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee welcomes this morning Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen for our hearing on the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2012 budget request, the associated Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), and the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces. We also recognize Secretary Hale and welcome him here this morning as well. We are thankful to all of you and your families for your dedicated service to this Nation and to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at home and in harm's way around the globe, and to their families. Your personal commitment to the welfare of our troops and their families shines through all that you do. The American people are grateful for that and we are grateful and eager to help wherever we can. DOD, like all Federal agencies, is currently operating under a continuing resolution (CR) that expires on March 4, 2011. If the current CR is extended for the whole year, then DOD's base funding of $526 billion for fiscal year 2011 would be $23 billion below the original fiscal year 2011 request of $549 billion. Secretary Gates will describe to us this morning this situation as a crisis on his doorstep. I hope that we will soon, as a committee, be in a position to enact a full year appropriation at an appropriate level and that the full Senate will adopt such an appropriation. At a time when we face a budget deficit in excess of $1 trillion and many in Congress are convinced that we need steep spending cuts to put our fiscal house in order, no part of the Government, including DOD, can be exempt from close examination. The Secretary of Defense has subjected DOD's budget to close examination. He has insisted on efficiencies, streamlining, cuts, and cancellations that we are told add up to $178 billion over the course of the next 5 years. The fiscal year 2012 base budget request of $553 billion is $4 billion higher than last year's request but is a reduction in inflation-adjusted terms. We will be closely scrutinizing the Secretary's efficiencies initiative and will be looking for additional efficiencies as we move through the legislative process. The total defense budget, which includes base funding for DOD and additional funding for overseas contingency operations (OCO)--that total defense budget declines from $708 billion in fiscal year 2011 to $671 billion in fiscal year 2012. That decline is due largely from our continued withdrawal from Iraq which results in the budget for the OCOs falling from $159 billion in 2011 to $118 billion in fiscal year 2012. Even as the defense budget request reflects difficult choices, it rightly requests increased funding for military personnel and health care, including funding sufficient to continue initiatives supporting wounded and sick servicemembers, continued research into traumatic brain injury (TBI), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and psychological health, and fully funds a variety of family support programs. Notably, the budget request would reduce Active Duty Army and Navy end strength by 7,400 soldiers and 3,000 sailors, respectively. The Army has announced its plan to reduce its so- called temporary end strength by 22,000 soldiers over the next 3 years, followed by an additional reduction of 27,000 soldiers between 2015 and 2017. As the Services resize their forces according to anticipated demand, we must ensure that any reductions avoid unnecessary increased risk or stress on our servicemembers. The budget request also prioritizes funding for ongoing major operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Senators Reed, Tester, and I heard during our visit to Afghanistan and Iraq last month, both of these conflicts are entering critical transition periods. In Iraq, our forces are implementing the decision by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki, as set forth in the 2008 security agreement, to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. As we draw down, our goal is to leave behind an Iraq that is stable. Because Iraq will continue to need support in meeting its security needs, the budget request includes significant funds for starting up the Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad to make our security assistance available to Iraq. The transition from a DOD lead to a State Department lead for numerous bilateral activities in Iraq can only be successful if the Department of State (DOS) and our other civilian agencies receive the resources that they need to take on these missions. In Afghanistan, July 2011 will mark the date set by President Obama a little over a year ago for the Government of Afghanistan to take more and more responsibility for Afghan security and governance and by July 2011 for the beginning of reductions in U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The President's decision to set the July 2011 date has increased the urgency, as General Caldwell put it, of the efforts of Afghan leaders to prepare for this transition. General David Petraeus told us that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Afghan officials are preparing to provide President Karzai by the end of the month with a recommendation on which provinces and districts should be transferred to an Afghan security lead in the coming months. During our visit to Afghanistan, we saw significant signs of progress over the last 6 months, although great challenges remain. The Afghan army and police have surged by an additional 70,000 over the last year and are on track to meet the current target of 305,000 Afghan security forces by October of this year. President Obama's budget request for fiscal year 2012 includes substantial resources to continue supporting those Afghan forces which will bring closer the day when Afghan troops will bear the major responsibility for their nation's security, which in my judgment is and always has been key to success in Afghanistan. On February 15, 2011, in an op-ed that appeared in the Chicago Tribune, General Caldwell said that while the international community has expended tremendous blood and treasure for this just cause, the remarkable story of the surge of Afghans, of a people committing themselves to the defense of their country, is a reason to hope for a successful long-term outcome. In an e-mail message to me, General Caldwell, who is in charge of training of Afghan forces, followed up that op-ed by saying: ``It has become truly the untold story of the last 15 months. In that time, Afghan men and women have swelled the ranks of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) to levels more than double the U.S. and NATO surge.'' He continued, ``While the enormous increase in quantity is significant to the security of Afghanistan, our focus on the improvement of quality is even more important.'' The op-ed and the e-mail message to me from General Caldwell will be made part of the record. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Levin. The administration is also considering a proposal to grow the Afghan army by 35,000 men and the Afghan police by a similar number, which would bring total Afghan security force levels of 378,000 by the end of 2012. These additional forces would add important enablers, logistics, engineering, and intelligence and others, that would reinforce and sustain the transition of responsibility for Afghanistan's security to the Afghan security forces. I support this proposed increase. I know from our conversations that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen support it as well. I have urged President Obama, as recently as last Friday, to approve that request. In the field, Afghan security forces are partnered with coalition forces and deployed in the key regions of Helmand and Kandahar in equal or greater numbers than coalition forces. U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces are taking the momentum from the insurgency, particularly in former Taliban strongholds in the south. The Afghan army is increasingly in the lead in planning and executing operations. That is what the Taliban fear the most: Afghan security forces, as opposed to foreign forces, out in front providing security for the Afghan people. As support for the Afghan army and police grows, lower-level insurgent fighters are slowly beginning to reintegrate into Afghan society. Improving Afghan governance remains a major challenge to success. The government in Kabul is largely absent from Afghans' daily lives and corruption and mismanagement remain major obstacles. We must ensure that our forces are prepared to address other threats in other places besides Iraq and Afghan. We obviously must remain attentive to those threats around that region and throughout the world. I outline those threats in some detail in the balance of my opening statement, but I will put that in the record rather than reading it at this time. [The prepared statement of Chairman Levin follows:] Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin This morning, the committee welcomes Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, for our hearing on the Department of Defenses' fiscal year 2012 budget request, the associated future years defense program, and the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces. We are thankful to you and your families for your dedicated service to the Nation and to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at home and in harm's way around the globe and to their families. Your personal commitment to the welfare of our troops and their families shines through all that you do. The American people are grateful for that and we are grateful and eager to help wherever we can. The Department of Defense, as are all Federal agencies, is currently operating under a continuing resolution (CR) that expires on March 4, 2011. If the current CR is extended for the whole year, then the Departments base funding of $526 billion for fiscal year 2011 would be $23 billion below the original fiscal year 2011 request of $549 billion. Secretary Gates will describe to us this morning this as a crisis on his doorstep. I hope that we will soon be in a position to enact a full year appropriation at an appropriate level. At a time when we face a budget deficit in excess of a trillion dollars and many in Congress are convinced that we need steep spending cuts to put our fiscal house in order, no part of the government, including the Department of Defense, can be exempt from close examination. The Secretary has subjected the Departments budget to close examination and insisted on efficiencies, streamlining, cuts and cancellations that, we are told, add up to $178 billion over the course of the next 5 years. The fiscal year 2012 base budget request of $553 billion is $4 billion higher than last years request but is a reduction in inflation-adjusted terms. We will be closely scrutinizing the Secretary's efficiencies initiative and will be looking for additional efficiencies as we move through the legislative process. The total defense budget, which includes base funding for the Department of Defense and additional funding for Overseas Contingency Operations, declines from $708 billion in fiscal year 2011 to $671 billion in fiscal year 2012. That decline is due largely from our continued withdrawal from Iraq which results in the budget for Overseas Contingency Operations falling from $159 billion in fiscal year 2011 to $118 billion in fiscal year 2012. Even as the Defense budget request reflects difficult choices, it rightly requests increased funding for military personnel and health care, including funding sufficient to continue initiatives supporting wounded and sick service members, continue research into traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, and psychological health, and fully fund a variety of family support programs. Notably, the budget request would reduce active duty Army and Navy end strengths by 7,400 soldiers and 3,000 sailors, respectively. The Army has announced its plan to reduce its so-called temporary end strength by 22,000 soldiers over the next three years, followed by an additional reduction of 27,000 soldiers between 2015 and 2017. As the Services for re-size their forces according to anticipated demand, we must ensure that any reductions avoid unnecessary increased risk or stress on our servicemembers. The budget request also prioritizes funding for ongoing major operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Senators Reed, Tester, and I heard during our visit to Afghanistan and Iraq last month, both of these conflicts are entering critical transition periods. In Iraq, our forces are implementing the decision by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki, as set forth in the 2008 Security Agreement, to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. As we drawdown, our goal is to leave behind an Iraq that is stable. Because Iraq will continue to need support in meeting its security needs, the budget request includes significant funds for starting up the Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad to make our security assistance available to Iraq. The transition from a DOD lead to a State Department lead for numerous bilateral activities in Iraq can only be successful if the Department of State and our other civilian agencies receive the resources they need to take on these missions. In Afghanistan, July 2011 will mark the date set by President Obama a little over a year ago for the Government of Afghanistan to take more and more responsibility for Afghanistans security and governance and for the beginning of reductions in U.S forces in Afghanistan. The Presidents decision to set the July 2011 date has added urgency, as General Caldwell put it, to the efforts of Afghan leaders to prepare for this transition. General David Petreaus told us that th North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Afghan officials are preparing to provide President Karzai by the end of the month a recommendation on which provinces and districts should be transferred to an Afghan security lead in the coming months. During our visit to Afghanistan last month, we saw significant signs of progress over the last several months, though great challenges remain. The Afghan Army and police have surged by an additional 70,000 over the last year, and are on track to meet the current target of 305,000 Afghan security forces by October of this year. The Presidents budget request for fiscal year 2012 includes substantial resources to continue supporting these forces, which will bring closer the day when Afghan troops will bear the major responsibility for their nations security, which is key to success in Afghanistan. On February 15, 2011, in an op-ed that appeared in the Chicago Tribune, General Caldwell said, While the international community has expended tremendous blood and treasure for this just cause, the remarkable story of the surge of Afghans, of a people committing themselves to defense their country, is a reason to hope for a successful long-term outcome. In an email message to me he followed up by saying, It truly has become the Untold Story of the last 15 months. In that time, Afghan men and women have swelled the ranks of the Afghan National Security Force to levels more than double the U.S. and NATO surge. He continued, While the enormous increase in quantity is significant to the security of Afghanistan, our focus on the improvement of quality is even more important. Without objection, the op-ed and General Caldwell's email message to me shall be made a part of the record. The administration is also considering a proposal to grow the Afghan Army by 35,000 and the Afghan police by a similar number, which would bring total Afghan security force levels to 378,000 by the end of 2012. These additional forces will add important enablers logistics, engineering and intelligence and others that will reinforce and sustain the transition of responsibility for Afghanistans security to the Afghan security forces. I support this proposed increase, and I know from our conversations that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen support it as well. I have urged President Obama as recently as last Friday to approve this request. In the field, Afghan security forces are partnered with coalition forces and deployed in the key regions of Helmand and Kandahar in equal or greater numbers than coalition forces. U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces are taking the momentum from the insurgency, particularly in former Taliban strongholds in the south. The Afghan Army is increasingly in the lead in planning and executing operations. Thats what the Taliban fear most: Afghan security forces, as opposed to foreign forces, out in front providing security to the Afghan people. As support for the Afghan Army and police grows, lower-level insurgent fighters are slowly beginning to reintegrate into Afghan society. Improving Afghan governance remains a major challenge to success. The Government in Kabul is largely absent from Afghans daily lives and corruption and mismanagement remain major obstacles. We must ensure our forces are prepared to address other threats in other places besides Iraq and Afghanistan. We must remain attentive to the threats burgeoning from al Qaeda and its affiliates in places like Somalia, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and West Africa. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has narrowly failed to strike the U.S. Homeland on two occasions these narrow misses, which were planned and executed by AQAP operatives in Yemen, have inspired them to develop new and creative ways to attack the United States and our interests. It is critical that we continue to work with our partners in the region to increase the pressure on AQAP and its associated forces. As protests in the Middle East continue to unfold, it is also critical that we urge our partners to as President Obama said earlier this week get out ahead of change. If countries like Yemen fail to do this, transitions could create a less favorable outcome for their people, for the region, and for the United States. Earlier this week, the President spoke of the hunger for freedoms among the peoples of the Middle East. The committee looks forward to hearing from Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen on: the current situation in Egypt and the broader Middle East; our communications with Egyptian military leadership and their confidence in their commitment to truly democratic elections; and the future of U.S.-Egyptian military relations. The Egyptian people have been denied their democratic rights for too long and over the few plus weeks the Egyptian people demanded those fundamental rights. It is critical that the United States supports transition to democratic governance in the Middle East and the world. Across the Gulf of Aden, in Somalia and the Horn of Africa more broadly commerce continues to be impacted by threat of increasingly aggressive pirates, as well as certain elements of al Shabab that have expanded their violent attacks to include regional targets, most recently in July 2010 in Uganda. Iran clearly provides a challenge for the United States and the international community. While continuing to profess that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes, all of Irans actions indicate otherwise. Iran continues to violate the directives of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and refuses to enter into meaningful negotiations with the P-5 plus 1 group of nations. The sanctions that have been imposed by the United States and most of the international community under the U.N. sanctions resolutions, as well as domestic laws, have had an effect. In recent days, domestically, Iran has demonstrated yet again its total disregard for the fundamental rights of its people when it once more violently oppressed the political opposition to its tyrannical rule. The Iranian people are demanding that their voices be heard, we should stand with them. I also wanted to highlight Admiral Mullens Guidance for 2011, which states that DOD would continue to plan for a broad range of military options should the President decide to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear arms. While not the preferred option, it is important that Iran understands that military actions remain on the table. The Asia-Pacific region also requires increasing attention from the administration, Congress, and the U.S. military. Among the challenges we face are the unprovoked aggression from North Korea, questions raised by the continuing growth and modernization of Chinas military capabilities, and the destabilizing influences of violent extremism in South and Southeast Asia. As we confront these challenges, we must work closely with partners and allies, and make smart decisions about the U.S. military's posture, presence, and capabilities throughout the region. In the area of missile defense, the budget request is $10.7 billion, an increase of $450 million from last years request, including funds for the Missile Defense Agency and the missile defense programs of the Army. There are likely to be two major focal points for missile defense this year: implementing the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe, and taking the steps necessary to make sure the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system is on a path to being effective, reliable, and sustainable. On implementation of the European PAA, the key objective this year is to deploy Phase 1, which includes deployment of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ship to the Mediterranean, and a forward-based radar in southeastern NATO Europe. These deployments will provide near-term protection against existing and future Iranian missile threats to NATO. Numerous capabilities for future phases of the European PAA are under development, particularly the enhanced Aegis missile defense elements for deployment on land and at sea. It is particularly noteworthy that last November at the Lisbon Summit, the NATO alliance agreed unanimously to adopt missile defense of its territory and population as a core mission, and NATO fully supports the European PAA as the U.S. contribution to NATOs missile defense mission. One of NATOs key objectives in this decision is to seek cooperation with Russia on missile defense, through the NATO-Russia Council. As President Obama described in his December 18 letter to the Senate on missile defense, such cooperation will not in any way limit United States or NATO's missile defense capabilities. I hope our witnesses today will describe the types of cooperation they believe would be both useful and possible. As for the GMD system, I would note that the last two flight tests have failed to result in intercepts, and we want to make sure that the Department is taking the necessary steps to understand and fix the problem, and to ensure that the system will work effectively and reliably. It remains essential to test our missile defense programs in a realistic manner, and to demonstrate that those systems work properly before we deploy them. Turning to the readiness of our Armed Forces, the fiscal year 2012 budget request provides adequate levels of funding and an overall increase from fiscal year 2011 levels, including support for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the war funding request to reset and reconstitute equipment has decreased from $21.4 billion in fiscal year 2011 to $11.9 billion in fiscal year 2012. We must recognize that long term reset requirements must be supported with sustained funding for several years after forces have withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan. As operational tempo increases in Afghanistan, it is imperative that the vital readiness accounts are protected and fully funded. Lastly, I applaud the Department for recognizing the need to maintain robust funding for science and technology programs that will provide the underpinning for the technological superiority of our future military capabilities. These efforts, along with supporting a capable acquisition workforce and maintaining a vibrant national defense industrial base, will be crucial for the successful and timely development and fielding of the next generation of cost-effective and reliable weapons systems. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, we look forward to your testimony. Now I will turn to Senator McCain for any opening remarks he may have. Chairman Levin. I will turn now to Senator McCain. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in welcoming Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen and Secretary Hale to discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year 2012 and its impact on the FYDP for DOD. Secretary Gates, you were asked to return to public service at a time when this country was embroiled in the turmoil of an unpopular war and another deteriorating war, and Pentagon critics were abounding. Your historic tenure has been marked by a surge to victory in Iraq, a new strategy to defeat our enemies in Afghanistan, and DOD's lead on humanitarian responses around the world. Your service will also be noted for the substantial reforms for the defense acquisition process and your decisive actions to stop wasting taxpayers' funds on unneeded and outdated systems. On behalf of my fellow citizens, I want to thank you for your outstanding service. I view you as one of the greatest public servants that I have ever had the opportunity of serving with. Today we are faced again with a demand for change. We are facing a harsh reality that runaway Federal spending has put this country on an unsustainable path. I agree with Admiral Mullen who observes in his written statement ``our debt is our greatest national security threat.'' The competing demands for our resources and the imperative we face to reduce our debt requires Congress to provide more leadership than it has shown in the past to restore fiscal responsibility. I believe we took a step in the right direction in last year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) by stripping the earmarks from the bill. Since then, both House and Senate have imposed moratoriums on earmarks for 2011 and 2012. I commend my colleagues in advance for restraining themselves from using earmarks, and I know it is tough for some. Mr. Secretary, I hope you will reinforce the President's commitment made during the State of the Union Address and recommend a veto of any 2012 defense bill that contains earmarks. I am concerned about the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). I know that you are. We have had many briefings, many discussions, but it has been a source of great frustration to you, to me, and to members of this committee, but most of all, it has been an incredible waste of the taxpayers' dollars. It hurts the credibility of our acquisition process and our defense industry. It reinforces the view of some of us that the military industrial congressional complex that President Eisenhower warned us about is alive and well. I hope that you can make your position absolutely clear to the Senate today to prevent further wasteful action by Congress that will deny DOD the resources it really needs but, at the same time, give us the kind of assurance that the F-35 can be put on the right track. I believe that as we move to try to reduce the deficit and the debt, almost everything is going to be on the table. Overall the base budget request of $553 billion is $13 billion less than the amount projected last year. I commend your efforts to get out ahead of the cuts by finding ways to improve the efficiency of DOD. Your decisions to reduce the number of senior military and civilian officials, freeze civilian pay, and halt with some exceptions the process of expanding the civilian workforce are sound decisions. I worry that we might, however, do some things that might cause us to see what we saw in the 1970s and the 1980s. Reducing flying hours, deferring aircraft maintenance, and postponing needed facility repairs are not true savings, and I fear the possibility of a return to what we once knew as a hollow Army. I have long said DOD does not deserve a special pass from spending the American taxpayers' dollars efficiently. But I have also said that the savings we identify must be reinvested in critical defense priorities. One example of this reinvestment is the increased efforts to combat the trafficking of drugs and illicit materials through Mexico. This has become an issue of national security. I look forward to working with you and our allies in Mexico to combat this scourge. Yesterday you stated, regarding the U.S. presence in Iraq ``there is certainly on our part an interest in having an additional presence, and the truth of the matter is the Iraqis are going to have some problems that they are going to have to deal with if we are not there in some numbers.'' I agree. We are now scheduled to be completely out by the end of this year. I think it is time we engage in active discussions with the Iraqis as to their future needs as well as any threats there might be to our national security if there is a complete withdrawal by the end of this year. In addition to Iraq, we will still have 98,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan. I expect our troops will remain there until they are no longer needed. A couple of weekends ago, I was at Munich and our allies came up to me and said, you say you are beginning to withdraw in the middle of 2011. Why should we not go to our constituents and say we are beginning to withdraw? I think one of the worst announcements ever made, as far as the conflict in Afghanistan, was the statement that we would be beginning withdrawal in 2011. I am glad to see that 2014 is now the operative year, but it still is very unsettling to our allies and encouraging to our enemies. Success of our mission in Afghanistan must be assured to honor the sacrifices of our brave men and women, as well as coalition partners who have fought, died, and been injured there. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, Secretary Hale, we face many challenges in the year ahead which will require your continued skill and tenacity. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. We have a quorum here and in a moment I will ask approval of a number of nominations and the committee budget. Before I do that, though, I just want to say, Mr. Secretary, I join and concur with Senator McCain and his comments about you and your tenure here as Secretary of Defense. It has been an extraordinary number of years. You have brought great capability, objectivity, and thoughtfulness to the job and great strength, independence, and courage, and I very much commend you for it. I look forward to many more times when you will be before this committee, and I am sure that you do too. I do not want this to sound kind of like it is anywhere near the end of your tenure here. [Laughter.] I discussed the matter of the committee budget with Senator McCain, and I now would ask the committee to consider and approve a Senate resolution authorizing funding for our committee from March 1 of this year through February 28, 2013. The funding resolution is consistent with the joint majority leader and Republican leader's February 3 agreement on committee funding and with the funding guidance provided to us by the Senate Rules Committee on February 7. This matter is time-sensitive. All committees have been asked to report their budgets to the Senate by no later than today. So I would now entertain a motion to favorably report this resolution. Senator McCain. So moved. Chairman Levin. Second? Senator Lieberman. Second. Chairman Levin. All those in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.] Opposed, nay. [No response.] The ayes have it. Now, we have some discussion that lies ahead of us on our committee rules. I would ask everybody to read those rules during the next week, and we will take up the matter of our rules on Monday or Tuesday after we return from the recess. We also have in front of us 670 pending military nominations. All of these nominations have been before the committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to favorably report those nominations? Senator McCain. So moved. Chairman Levin. Is there a second? Senator Lieberman. Second. Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.] Chairman Levin. Opposed, nay. [No response.] Chairman Levin. The motion carries. Thank you all. [The list of nominations considered and approved by the committee follows:] Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on February 17, 2011. 1. LTG Eric E. Fiel, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command (Reference No. 138). 2. Col. Howard D. Stendahl, USAF to be brigadier general (Reference No. 139). 3. LTG Dennis L. Via, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, US Army Materiel Command (Reference No. 141). 4. LTG Mark P. Hertling, USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army (Reference No. 142). 5. MG Susan S. Lawrence, USA to be lieutenant general and Chief Information Officer/G-6, Office of the Secretary of the Army (Reference No. 143). 6. MG John M. Bednarek, USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, First US Army (Reference No. 144). 7. MG Francis J. Wiercinski, USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, US Army Pacific (Reference No. 145). 8. BG Renaldo Rivera, ARNG to be major general (Reference No. 147). 9. BG William M. Buckler, Jr., USAR to be major general (Reference No. 148). 10. BG Mark J. MacCarley, USAR to be major general (Reference No. 149). 11. In the Army Reserve, there are eight appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Marc T. Arellano) (Reference No. 150). 12. In the Army Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Gregrey C. Bacon) (Reference No. 151). 13. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of commander and below (list begins with John G. Brown) (Reference No. 153). 14. Col. Arlen R. Royalty, USAR to be brigadier general (Reference No. 167). 15. In the Marine Corps, there are 11 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Juan G. Ayala) (Reference No. 168). 16. In the Air Force Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Erwin Rader Bender, Jr.) (Reference No. 171). 17. In the Air Force, there are six appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with David M. Crawford) (Reference No. 172). 18. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 175 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Richard T. Aldridge) (Reference No. 173). 19. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Sebastian A. Edwards) (Reference No. 174). 20. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Gregory R. Ebner) (Reference No. 175). 21. In the Army Reserve there are 10 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Curtis O. Bohlman, Jr.) (Reference No. 176). 22. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Timothy E. Lemaster) (Reference No. 178). 23. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Dax Hammers) (Reference No. 180). 24. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Richard Martinez) (Reference No. 181). 25. In the Marine Corps, there are four appointments to the grade of major (list begins with William Frazier, Jr.) (Reference No. 182). 26. In the Marine Corps, there are four appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Douglas R. Cunningham) (Reference No. 183). 27. In the Marine Corps, there are four appointments to the grade of major (list begins with James E. Hardy, Jr.) (Reference No. 184). 28. In the Marine Corps, there are five appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Conrad G. Alston) (Reference No. 185). 29. In the Marine Corps, there are five appointments to the grade of major (list begins with David M. Adams) (Reference No. 186). 30. In the Marine Corps, there are six appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Stefan R. Browning) (Reference No. 187). 31. In the Marine Corps, there are seven appointment to the grade of major (list begins with Joel T. Carpenter) (Reference No. 188). 32. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Roger N. Rudd) (Reference No. 189). 33. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Lowell W. Schweickart, Jr.) (Reference No. 190). 34. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Katrina Gaskill) (Reference No. 191). 35. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Sean J. Collins) (Reference No. 193). 36. In the Marine Corps, there are three appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with William H. Barlow) (Reference No. 195). 37. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of major (James H. Glass) (Reference No. 197). 38. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Richelle L. Kay) (Reference No. 198). 39. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Chris W. Czaplak) (Reference No. 201). 40. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Scott D. Scherer) (Reference No. 202). 41. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of commander and below (list begins with Carlos E. Moreyra) (Reference No. 203). 42. In the Navy, there are 30 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with David Q. Baughier) (Reference No. 204). 43. In the Marine Corps, there are three appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Timothy M. Callahan) (Reference No. 206). 44. MG Ellen M. Pawlikowski, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Space Command (Reference No. 210). 45. MG Michael J. Basla, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command (Reference No. 211). 46. MG Rhett A. Hernandez, USA, to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Cyberspace Command (Reference No. 212). 47. Col. Johnny M. Sellers, ARNG, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 214). 48. Col. Janson D. Boyles, ARNG, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 215). 49. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Stephen L. Buse) (Reference No. 216). 50. In the Air Force Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Thomas J. Collins) (Reference No. 217). 51. In the Air Force Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Phillip M. Armstrong) (Reference No. 218). 52. In the Air Force Reserve, there are five appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Lloyd H. Anseth) (Reference No. 219). 53. In the Air Force Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Kathleen M. Flarity) (Reference No. 220). 54. In the Air Force, there are seven appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Melina T. Doan) (Reference No. 221). 55. In the Air Force, there are 12 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Villa L. Guillory) (Reference No. 223). 56. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Alfred P. Bowles II) (Reference No. 224). 57. In the Air Force, there are 49 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Brian F. Agee) (Reference No. 225). 58. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 100 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Earl R. Alameida, Jr.) (Reference No. 226). 59. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Edward J. Benz III) (Reference No. 227). 60. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Charles E. Lynde) (Reference No. 228). 61. In the Army, there are four appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Ozren T. Buntak) (Reference No. 229). 62. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Marcia A. Brimm) (Reference No. 230). 63. In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Dustin C. Frazier) (Reference No. 231). 64. In the Army Reserve, there are eight appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Robert L. Bierenga) (Reference No. 232). 65. In the Army Reserve, there are 12 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Don A. Campbell) (Reference No. 233). 66. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Ernest L. Ackiss III) (Reference No. 234). 67. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are 74 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Philip Q. Applegate) (Reference No. 235). 68. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Jeffrey K. Hayhurst) (Reference No. 238). 69. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Steven D. Elias) (Reference No. 239). 70. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of commander and below (list begins with Amy R. Gavril) (Reference No. 241). 71. In the Air Force Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Steven L. Argiriou) (Reference No. 242). 72. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Richard C. Ales) (Reference No. 243). 73. MG Vincent K. Brooks, USA, to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, U.S. Army Central Command/Third U.S. Army (Reference No. 248). Total: 670. Chairman Levin. We will now call on you, Mr. Secretary. STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT F. HALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER Secretary Gates. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year 2012. But first I want to thank the members of this committee for your outstanding support of DOD, but especially your support of the men and women in uniform serving in a time of war. I know you will join me in doing everything to ensure they have all they need to accomplish their mission and come home safely. The budget request for DOD being presented today includes a base budget request of $553 billion and an OCO request of $117.8 billion. These budget decisions took place in the context of a nearly 2-year effort by DOD to reduce overhead, cull troubled and excess programs, and rein in personnel and contractor costs, all for the purpose of preserving the global reach and fighting strength of America's military at a time of fiscal stress for our country. In all, these budget requests, if enacted by Congress, will continue our efforts to reform the way DOD does business, funds modernization programs needed to prepare for future conflicts, reaffirms and strengthens our Nation's commitment to care for the All-Volunteer Force, and ensure that our troops and commanders on the front lines have the resources and support they need to accomplish their mission. My submitted statement includes more details of this request. Now I want to take this opportunity to address several issues that I know have been a subject of debate and concern since I announced the outlines of our budget proposal last month: first, the serious damage our military will suffer by operating under a CR or receiving a significant funding cut during fiscal year 2011; second, the projected slowing and eventual flattening of the growth of the defense budget over the next 5 years; third, the plan for future reductions in the size of the ground forces; and fourth, the proposed reforms and savings to the TRICARE program for working age retirees. I also would express the hope that the Senate will continue to reject the unnecessary extra engine for the F-35 as it did the last time the Senate spoke to this issue in 2009. I want to start by making it clear that DOD will face a crisis if we end up with a year-long CR or a significant funding cut for fiscal year 2011. The President's defense budget request for 2011 was $549 billion. A full-year CR would fund DOD at about $526 billion. That is a cut of $23 billion. The damage done across the force from such reductions would be further magnified as they would come halfway through the fiscal year. Let me be clear, operating under a year-long CR or significantly reduced funding, with the severe shortfalls that entails, would damage procurement and research programs causing delays, rising costs, no new program starts, and serious disruptions in the production of some of our most high-demand assets, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Cuts in maintenance could force parts of our aircraft fleet to be grounded and delay needed facilities improvements. Cuts in operations would mean fewer flying hours, fewer steaming days, and cutbacks in training for home station forces, all of which directly impact readiness. Similarly, some of the appropriations proposals under debate in Congress contemplate reductions of up to $15 billion from the President's original fiscal year 2011 request. I recognize that given the current fiscal and political environment, it is unlikely that DOD will receive the full fiscal year 2011 amount. Based on a number of factors, including policy changes that led to lower personnel costs and reduced activity forced by the CR, I believe DOD can get by with a lower number. However, it is my judgment that DOD needs an appropriation of at least $540 billion for fiscal year 2011 for the U.S. military to properly carry out its mission, maintain readiness, and prepare for the future, which brings me to the proposed $78 billion reduction in the defense budget top line over the next 5 years. To begin with, this so-called cut is to the rate of predicted growth. The size of the base defense budget is still projected to increase in real inflation-adjusted dollars before eventually flattening out over this time period. More significantly, as a result of the efficiencies and reforms undertaken over the past year, we have protected programs that support servicemembers, readiness, and modernization. These efforts have made it possible for DOD to absorb lower projected growth in the defense budget without sacrificing real military capabilities. In fact, the savings identified by the Services have allowed our military to add some $70 billion beyond the program of record toward priority needs and new capabilities. Of the $78 billion in proposed reductions to the 5-year defense plan, about $68 billion comes from a combination of shedding excess overhead, improved business practices, reducing personnel costs, and from changes to economic assumptions. Only $10 billion of that 5-year total is directly related to military combat capability. $4 billion comes from restructuring the JSF program, a step driven by the program's development and testing schedule that would have taken place irrespective of the budget top line. The rest, about $6 billion, results from the proposed decrease in end strength of the Army and Marine Corps starting in 2015, a decision I will address now. Just over 4 years ago, one of my first acts as Defense Secretary was to increase the permanent end strength of our ground forces, the Army by 65,000 to a total of 547,000 and the Marine Corps by 27,000 to 202,000. At the time the increase was needed to relieve the severe stress on the force from the Iraq war as the surge was getting underway. To support the later plus-up of troops in Afghanistan, I subsequently authorized a further temporary increase in the Army of 22,000, an increase always planned to end in 2013. The objective was to reduce stress on the force, limit and eventually end the practice of stop-loss and to increase troops' home station dwell time. As we end the U.S. troop presence in Iraq this year, according to our agreement with the Iraqi Government, the overall deployment demands on our force are decreasing significantly. Just 3 years ago, we had some 190,000 troops combined in Iraq and Afghanistan. By the end of this calendar year, we expect there to be less than 100,000 troops deployed in both of the major post-September 11 combat theaters, virtually all of those forces in Afghanistan. This is why we believe that beginning in fiscal year 2015, the United States can, with minimal risk, begin reducing Army Active Duty end strength by 27,000 and the Marine Corps by somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000. These projections assume that the number of troops in Afghanistan will be significantly reduced by the end of 2014 in accordance with both the President's and NATO's strategy. If our assumptions prove incorrect, there is plenty of time to adjust the size and schedule of this change. It is important to remember that even after the planned reductions, the Active Army end strength would continue to be larger by nearly 40,000 soldiers than it was when I became Secretary of Defense 4 years ago. I should also note that these reductions are supported by both the Army and Marine Corps leadership. Finally, sharply rising health care costs are consuming an even-larger share of DOD's budget, growing from $19 billion in 2001 to $52.5 billion in this request. Among other reforms, this fiscal year 2012 budget includes modest increases to TRICARE enrollment fees, later indexed to Medicare premium increases for working age retirees, most of whom are employed while receiving full pensions. All six members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have strongly endorsed these and other cost- saving TRICARE reforms in a letter to Congress. I understand that any kind of change to these benefits prompts vigorous political opposition, but let us be clear. The current TRICARE arrangement, one in which fees have not increased for 15 years, is simply unsustainable, and if allowed to continue, DOD risks the fate of other corporate and government bureaucracies that were ultimately crippled by personnel costs, in particular, their retiree benefit packages. All told, the cumulative effect of DOD's savings and reforms, combined with a host of new investments, will make it possible to protect the U.S. military's combat power despite the declining rate of growth and eventual flattening of the defense budget over the next 5 years. As a result of the savings identified and reinvested by the Services, our military will be able to meet unforeseen expenses, refurbish war-worn equipment, buy new ships and fighters, begin development of a new long-range bomber, boost our cyber warfare capability, strengthen missile defense, and buy more of the most advanced UAVs. But I should note this will only be possible if the efficiencies, reforms, and savings are followed through to completion. In closing, I want to address the calls from some quarters for deeper cuts in defense spending to address this country's fiscal challenges. I would remind them that over the last two defense budgets submitted by President Obama, we have curtailed or canceled troubled or excess programs that would have cost more than $300 billion if seen through to completion. Additionally, total defense spending, including war costs, will decline further as the U.S. military withdraws from Iraq. We still live in a very dangerous and often unstable world. Our military must remain strong enough and agile enough to face a diverse range of threats from non-state actors attempting to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated missiles to the more traditional threats of other states building up their conventional forces and developing new capabilities that target our traditional strengths. We shrink from our global security responsibilities at our peril. Retrenchment brought about by short-sighted cuts could well lead to costlier and more tragic consequences later, indeed, as they always have in the past. Surely we should learn from our national experience since World War I that drastic reductions in the size and strength of the U.S. military make armed conflict all the more likely with an unacceptably high cost in American blood and treasure. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working through this next phase of the President's defense reform effort with you and your colleagues in the weeks and months ahead to do what is right for our Armed Forces and what is right for our country. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:] Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year 2012. I first want to thank the members of this committee for your support of the men and women in uniform who have answered the call in a time of war. I know you will join me in doing everything to ensure they have all they need to accomplish their mission and come home safely. The budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD) being presented today includes a base budget request of $553 billion and an Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request for $117.8 billion. These budget decisions took place in the context of a nearly 2-year effort by DOD to reduce overhead, cull troubled and excess programs, and rein in personnel and contractor costs--all for the purpose of preserving the fighting strength of America's military at a time of fiscal stress for our country. The goal was not only to generate savings that could be applied to new capabilities and programs, but for our defense institutions to become more agile and effective organizations as a result. In all, these budget requests, if enacted by Congress, will:Continue our efforts to reform the way the department does business; Fund modernization programs needed to prepare for future conflicts; Reaffirm and strengthen the Nation's commitment to care for the All-Volunteer Force; and Ensure that our troops and commanders on the front lines have the resources and support they need to accomplish their mission. Before I further summarize the elements of the President's budget request, I want to address three issues that I know have been a subject of debate and concern since I announced the outlines of our budget proposal on January 6: First, the serious damage caused to our military by operating under a continuing resolution or receiving a significant funding cut during fiscal year 2011; Second, the projected slowing and eventual flattening of growth of the defense budget over the next 5 years; and Third, the planned future reductions in the size of the ground forces. I want to make clear that we face a crisis on our doorstep if DOD ends up with a year-long continuing resolution or a significant funding cut for fiscal year 2011. The President's defense budget request for fiscal year 2011 was $549 billion. A full-year continuing resolution would fund the department at about $526 billion. That's a cut of $23 billion. Similarly, some of the appropriations proposals under debate in Congress contemplate reductions of $15 billion and more from what the President requested for defense in fiscal year 2011. The damage done across the force from such reductions would be magnified as they would come halfway through the fiscal year. Let me be clear, operating under a year-long continuing resolution or substantially reduced funding--with the severe shortfalls that entails--would damage procurement and research programs causing delays, rising costs, no new program starts and serious disruptions in the production of some our most high demand assets, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The reductions would likely fall most heavily on our operations and maintenance accounts. Cuts in maintenance could force parts of our aircraft fleet to be grounded and delay needed facilities improvements. Cuts in operations would mean fewer flying hours, fewer steaming days, and cutbacks in training for home-stationed forces--all of which directly impacts readiness. That is how you hollow out a military--when your best people, your veterans of multiple combat deployments, become frustrated and demoralized and, as a result, begin leaving military service. Consider also that throughout this past decade of conflict, the Service Chiefs and Members of Congress have repeatedly voiced concerns about the lack of training opportunities for conventional high-end combat resulting from the operational demands of Iraq and Afghanistan. We are just now beginning to get the kind of dwell-time for our home stationed forces to allow that kind of training. If forced to operate under a continuing resolution or reduced funding, some of that full- spectrum training will not happen in fiscal year 2011. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that given the current fiscal and political environment, it is unlikely that DOD will receive the full amount originally requested for fiscal year 2011. Based on a number of factors--including policy changes that led to lower personnel costs and reduced activity forced by the continuing resolution--I believe the department can get by with a lower number. However, it is my judgment that DOD needs an appropriation of at least $540 billion for fiscal year 2011 for the U.S. military to properly carry out its mission, maintain readiness, and prepare for the future. Which brings me to the second issue--the proposed $78 billion reduction in the defense budget topline over the next 5 years. To begin with, this so-called ``cut'' is to the rate of predicted growth. The size of the base defense budget is still projected to increase in real, inflation-adjusted dollars, before eventually flattening out over this time period. More significantly, as a result of the efficiencies and reforms undertaken over the past year, we have protected programs that support military people, readiness, and modernization. These efforts have made it possible for DOD to absorb lower projected growth in the defense budget without, as Chairman McKeon warned last month, ``leav[ing] our military less capable and less able to fight.'' In fact, the savings identified by the Services have allowed our military to add some $70 billion towards priority needs and new capabilities. Of the $78 billion in proposed reductions to the 5-year defense budget plan, about $68 billion comes from a combination of shedding excess overhead, improving business practices, reducing personnel costs, and from changes to economic assumptions. Only $10 billion of that 5-year total is related directly to military combat capability. $4 billion comes from restructuring the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, a step driven by the program's development and testing schedule that would have taken place irrespective of the budget top- line. The rest, about $6 billion, results from the proposed decrease in end strength of the Army and Marine Corps starting in fiscal year 2015, a decision that I will address now. Just over four years ago, one of my first acts as Defense Secretary was to increase the permanent end strength of our ground forces--the Army by 65,000 to a total of 547,000 and the Marine Corps by 27,000 to 202,000. At the time, the increase was needed to relieve the severe stress on the force from the Iraq war as the surge was getting underway. To support the later plus up of troops in Afghanistan, I subsequently authorized a temporary further increase in the Army of some 22,000. The objective was to reduce stress on the force, limit and eventually end the practice of stop-loss, and to increase troops' home station dwell time. As we end the U.S. troop presence in Iraq this year, according to the agreement with the Iraqi Government, the overall deployment demands on our force are decreasing significantly. Just 3 years ago, we had some 190,000 troops combined in Iraq and Afghanistan. By the end of this calendar year we expect less than 100,000 troops to be deployed in both of the major post-September 11 combat theaters, virtually all of those forces being in Afghanistan. That is why we believe that, beginning in fiscal year 2015, the United States can, with minimal risk, begin reducing Army active duty end strength by 27,000 and the Marine Corps by somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000. These projections assume that the number of troops in Afghanistan would be significantly reduced by the end of 2014, in accordance with the President's strategy. If our assumptions prove incorrect, there's plenty of time to adjust the size and schedule of this change. It is important to remember that even after the planned reductions, the active Army end strength would continue to be larger, by nearly 40,000 soldiers, than it was when I became defense secretary four years ago. I should also note that these reductions are supported by both the Army and Marine Corps leadership. I would note that prior to these budget decisions, the last Marine Commandant stated that he believed the Marine Corps was larger than it should be for the long term. The current Commandant, General Amos, has just completed a comprehensive force structure review for the post- Afghanistan security environment that is consistent with the out-year reductions projected in the President's budget plan. REFORM--EFFICIENCIES These budget decisions took place in the context of a nearly 2 year effort by DOD to reform the way the Pentagon does business--to change how and what we buy, to replace a culture of endless money with one of savings and restraint. To not only make every defense dollar count, but also become a more agile and effective organization in the process. Last spring, we launched a comprehensive effort to reduce DOD's overhead expenditures. The goal was--and is--to sustain the U.S. military's size and strength over the long-term by reinvesting those efficiency savings in force structure and other key combat capabilities. This process culminated in my announcement last month that summarized the impact of these reforms on the fiscal year 2012 budget. The Military Services conducted a thorough scrub of their bureaucratic structures, business practices, modernization programs, civilian and military personnel levels, and associated overhead costs. They identified potential savings that totaled approximately $100 billion over 5 years. More than $70 billion is being reinvested in high priority needs and capabilities, while about $28 billion is going to higher than expected operating costs--``must pay'' bills that would otherwise be paid from investment accounts. We then looked at reducing costs and deriving savings across the department as a whole--with special attention to the substantial headquarters and support bureaucracies outside the four Military Services--savings that added up to $78 billion over 5 years. As I mentioned earlier, $10 billion of that total came from restructuring the JSF program and reducing Army and Marine Corps end strength starting in fiscal year 2015. The rest of the DOD-wide savings came primarily from shedding excess overhead, improving business practices, and reducing personnel costs. Key examples include: $13 billion from holding the civilian workforce at fiscal year 2010 levels for 3 years, with limited exceptions such as growth in the acquisition workforce; $12 billion through the government-wide freeze on civilian salaries; $8 billion by reforming military health programs to maintain high quality care while slowing cost growth; $11 billion from resetting missions, priorities, functions for the defense agencies and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. $6 billion by reducing staff augmentation and service support contracts by 10 percent annually for 3 years; $2.3 billion by disestablishing Joint Forces Command and the Business Transformation Agency; $1 billion by eliminating unnecessary studies and internal reports; $4 billion in changed economic assumptions, such as a lower than expected inflation rate; $100 million by reducing more than 100 flag officer and about 200 civilian senior executive positions; and $11 billion in a variety of smaller initiatives across the department. To better track how and where taxpayer dollars are spent, the department is also reforming its financial management systems and practices--with the goal of having auditable financial statements by the congressionally mandated date of 2017. We are pursuing a streamlined approach that focuses first on the information we most use to manage the department. FISCAL YEAR 2012 BASE BUDGET REQUEST The President's request for the base defense budget is for $553 billion, which represents a 3.6 percent real increase over continuing resolution levels--and about 1.5 percent real growth over the omnibus defense bill marked up by Congress last year. The four major components are: $207.1 billion for operations, maintenance, logistics and training; $142.8 billion for military pay and benefits; $188.3 billion for modernization; and $14.8 billion for military construction and family housing. MODERNIZATION In all, the fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $188.3 billion for modernization in the form of Procurement, Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation. Key modernization initiatives include: $4.8 billion to enhance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and buy more high demand assets, including the MC-12 surveillance aircraft, Predator, Reaper and Global Hawk UAVs--with the aim of achieving 65 Predator-class Combat Air Patrols by the end of fiscal year 2013; More than $10 billion to modernize our heavily used rotary wing fleet; $3.9 billion to upgrade the Army's combat vehicles and communications systems; $4.8 billion to buy new equipment for the Reserves; $14.9 billion to buy new fighters and ground attack aircraft; $24.6 billion to support a realistic, executable shipbuilding and investment portfolio that buys 11 ships in fiscal year 2012 and modernizes existing fleet assets; $10.5 billion to advance the modernization portion of the administration's approach to ballistic missile defense (BMD)--including $8.4 billion for the Missile Defense Agency; and $2.3 billion to improve the military's cyber capabilities. Questions have been raised about whether we are too focused on current conflicts and are devoting too few resources to future possible high-end conflicts. This budget should put those questions to rest. The fiscal year 2012 base request provides for significant investments at the high end of the conflict spectrum, including: $1 billion ($4.5 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)) for a tactical air modernization program that would ensure that the F-22 will continue to be the world's preeminent air-to-air fighter. This effort will leverage radar and electronic protection technologies from the JSF program; $204 million ($1.6 billion over the FYDP) to modernize the radars of F-15s to keep this key fighter viable well into the future; $30 million ($491 million over the FYDP) for a follow- on to the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, that would provide greater range, lethality and protection against electronic jamming; $200 million ($800 million over the FYDP) to invest in technologies to disrupt an opponent's ability to attack our surface ships; $1.1 billion ($2.2 billion over the FYDP) to buy more EA-18 Growlers than originally planned, plus $1.6 billion over the FYDP to develop a new jamming system, expanding our electronic warfare capabilities; $2.1 billion ($14 billion over the FYDP) to fund Aegis-equipped ships to further defend the fleet from aircraft and missile attack and provide theater-wide tactical BMD; and To improve anti-submarine capabilities, $2.4 billion for P-8 Poseidon aircraft ($19.6 billion over the FYDP) and $4.8 billion for procurement of Virginia-class attack submarines ($27.6 billion over the FYDP). The fiscal year 2012 budget also supports a long-range strike family of systems, which must be a high priority for future defense investment given the anti-access challenges our military faces. A key component of this joint portfolio will be a new long-range, nuclear- capable, penetrating Air Force bomber, designed and developed using proven technologies and with an option for remote piloting. It is important that we begin this project now to ensure that a new bomber can be ready before the current aging fleet goes out of service. The budget request includes $10.6 billion to maintain U.S. supremacy in space, in keeping with the recently released National Security Space Strategy. This new strategy will help bring order to the congested space domain, strengthen international partnerships, increase resiliency so our troops can fight in a degraded space environment, and improve our acquisition processes and reform export controls to energize the space industrial base. As the Military Services were digging deep for excess overhead, they were also taking a hard look at their modernization portfolio for weapons that were having major development problems, unsustainable cost growth, or had grown less relevant to real world needs. The JSF program received special scrutiny given its substantial cost and its central place in ensuring that we have a large inventory of the most advanced fifth generation stealth fighters to sustain U.S. air superiority well into the future. The fiscal year 2012 budget reflects the proposed restructuring of the F-35 JSF program to stabilize its schedule and cost. The department has adjusted F-35 procurement quantities based on new data on costs, on likely orders from our foreign nation partners, and on realigned development and test schedules. The proposed restructuring adds over $4 billion for additional testing through 2016. It holds F-35 procurement in fiscal year 2012 at 32 aircraft and reduces buys by 124 aircraft compared with last year's plans. Even after these changes, procurement ramps up sharply to 108 aircraft by fiscal year 2016. This is the fastest that future procurement can prudently be increased. The F-35 restructuring places the Marine's short takeoff and vertical landing variant on the equivalent of a two year probation. If we cannot fix this variant during this timeframe and get it back on track in terms of performance, cost and schedule, then I believe it should be canceled. To compensate for any delays in F-35 deliveries, we propose buying 41 more F/A-18s between fiscal year 2012 to 2014. I also want to reiterate the President's and my firm opposition to buying an extra engine for the F-35--a position echoed by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps leadership. We consider it an unnecessary and extravagant expense, particularly during this period of fiscal contraction. The Congress has not spoken with one voice on this matter and DOD has been operating this fiscal year under ambiguous guidance at best. Given the situation, I decided to continue to fund the JSF extra engine effort during this interim period to give Congress the opportunity to resolve this matter as part of its ongoing debate on the budget. However, this also means that the American taxpayers are spending $28 million a month for an excess and unjustified program that is slated for termination. The President, the military services and I continue to oppose this extra engine and, when the current CR expires, I will look at all available legal options to close down this program. It would be a waste of nearly $3 billion in a time of economic distress and the money is needed for higher priority defense efforts. This budget proposes cancelling the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) and reallocating funds to existing Marine ground combat requirements, a decision based on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Ultimately, the Navy and Marine Corps leadership based their recommendations on two main principles: affordability and balance. The EFV, a program originally conceived in the 1980s, has already consumed more than $3 billion to develop and will cost another $12 billion to build. The EFV as designed would have cost many times more than the system it would replace, with much higher maintenance and service costs. If continued over the next two decades, the EFV program would consume fully half of all Marine Corps procurement dollars while swallowing virtually the Corps' entire ground vehicle budget-- procurement, operations, and maintenance--with all the risk to readiness that entails. To be sure, the EFV would, if pursued to completion without regard to time or cost, be an enormously capable vehicle. But as with several other high end programs completed or cancelled in recent years--the F- 22, the Army Future Combat Systems, or the Navy's DDG-1000 destroyer-- the mounting cost of acquiring this specialized capability must be judged against other priorities and needs. Let there be no doubt--we are committed to sustaining the Marine Corps amphibious mission. This fiscal year 2012 request proposes that the $2.8 billion previously budgeted to the EFV for the next 5 years instead be reinvested towards an integrated new vehicle program for the Marine Corps, including: New armor, weaponry and engines, plus a life-extension program for the existing amphibious assault vehicles: The development of a new, more affordable, sustainable and survivable amphibious vehicle; Accelerated procurement of new personnel carriers; and Enhancement of existing Marine vehicles such as the Abrams tank and Light Armored Vehicle. Throughout this process, we will harness the lessons learned--in terms of engineering, design, and testing--from the development of the EFV. PERSONNEL The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $142.8 billion for military pay and benefits and continues our strong support for troops and their families. This includes funding for wounded, ill and injured care, enhancing the military health care system and supporting military families under stress. Examples in this request include: $2.3 billion to provide care for our Wounded Warriors and their families; and $8.3 billion for supporting families, including child care and school programs; and While the department continues to insist on and pay for the highest quality health care, we are also mindful of sharply rising health costs--which have risen over the last decade from $19 billion in 2001 to $52.5 billion in this budget request. The department has taken a comprehensive look at all facets of the military health care model-- emphasizing the need to balance the number one priority of continuing to provide the highest care and service, while ensuring fiscally responsible management. One area we have identified are benefits provided to working-age retirees under the TRICARE program. Many of these beneficiaries are employed full time while receiving full pensions, often forgoing their employer's health plan to remain with TRICARE. This should come as no surprise, given that the current TRICARE enrollment fee was set in 1995 at $460 a year for the basic family plan and has not been raised since. By comparison, the fees for a comparable health insurance program for Federal workers total roughly $5,000 per year. Accordingly, we propose a modest increase to TRICARE Prime enrollment fees for working age retirees: $2.50 per month for individuals and $5.00 per month for families in fiscal year 2012, and then indexed to Medicare premium increases in future years. We are proposing other health care initiatives such as efficiencies in pharmacy co-pays designed to provide incentives to make greater use of generic prescriptions and those ordered by mail. We also seek to phase out, over several years, special subsidies offered to a small group of hospitals that treat military families and retirees. Additionally, we are proposing providing TRICARE-for-Life to all Medicare-eligible retirees aged 65 and over, including future enrollees in the Uniformed Services Family Health Plan. It is important to note that none of these changes would affect health care benefits for active-duty personnel. SECURITY ASSISTANCE REFORM The fiscal year 2012 request includes funding and authorization for a key step forward in a critical policy area: helping other countries to protect and defend themselves. The Pentagon and the State Department have agreed to a 3-year pilot pooled fund--called the Global Security Contingency Fund--that will be used to build partner capacity, prevent conflicts, and prepare for emerging threats. The proposed fund would incentivize interagency collaboration through a new business model. It would provide a more agile and cost effective way to reduce the risk of future conflicts by allowing our government to respond to unforeseen needs and take advantage of emerging opportunities to help partners secure their own territories and regions. The request is modest, an initial $50 million State Department appropriation, along with a request for authority to transfer an additional $450 million into the fund from either department if needed. DOD intends to make significant contributions from its own resources into this pooled fund. We will be requesting in parallel an authorization for this initiative in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS Finally, this budget request includes $117.8 billion in fiscal year 2012 to support OCOs, primarily in Afghanistan, and to wind down our operations in Iraq--this is a significant reduction from the $159 billion request for OCO in fiscal year 2011. The request, which fully funds our wartime requirements, includes: $86.4 billion for wartime operations and related costs; $425 million for the Commander's Emergency Response Fund; $475 million for the Afghan Infrastructure Fund; $2.6 billion to support counter-IED efforts; $3.2 billion for mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles, including the MRAP All Terrain Vehicles developed for Afghanistan; and $11.9 billion to replace and restore worn, damaged, or destroyed equipment. $12.8 billion for training and equipping of the Afghan security forces. CONCLUSION All told, the cumulative effect of the department's savings and reforms, combined with a host of new investments, will make it possible to protect the U.S. military's global reach and fighting strength despite the declining rate of growth, and eventual flattening, of the defense budget over the next 5 years. As a result of the savings identified by the Services and reinvested, our military will be able to meet unforeseen expenses, refurbish war worn equipment, buy new ships and fighters, begin development of a new long-range bomber, boost our cyber-warfare capability, missile defense, and buy more of the most advanced UAVs. But, I should note, this will only be possible if the efficiencies reforms and savings are followed through to completion. Before closing, I want to address the calls from some quarters for deeper cuts in defense spending to address this country's fiscal challenges. I would remind them that over the last two defense budgets submitted by President Obama, we have reformed and rebalanced the department's spending habits and priorities, curtailing or canceling troubled or excess programs that would have cost more than $300 billion if seen through to completion. Additionally, total defense spending-- including war costs--will decline further as the U.S. military withdraws from Iraq. We still live in a very dangerous and often unstable world. Our military must remain strong and agile enough to face a diverse range of threats--from non-state actors attempting to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated missiles, to the more traditional threats of other states both building up their conventional forces and developing new capabilities that target our traditional strengths. We shrink from our global security responsibilities at our peril. Retrenchment brought about by short-sighted cuts could well lead to costlier and more tragic consequences later--indeed as they always have in the past. Surely we should learn from our national experience, since World War I, that drastic reductions in the size and strength of the U.S. military make armed conflict all the more likely--with an unacceptably high cost in American blood and treasure. Today, I ask your support for a leaner, more efficient Pentagon and continued sustainable, robust investments in our troops and future capabilities. Our troops have done more than their part, now it is time for us in Washington to do ours. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working through this next phase of the President's defense reform effort with you in the weeks and months ahead--to do what's right for our Armed Forces and what's right for our country. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Admiral Mullen. STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Admiral Mullen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of this committee, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss the President's fiscal year 2012 defense budget. Before I do, however, let me just echo Secretary Gates' comments about the very real dangers inherent in failing to pass this year's budget. The fiscal year 2011 CR, if carried forward, would not only reduce our account by $23 billion, it would deprive us of the flexibility we need to support our troops and their families. The Services have already taken disruptive and, in some cases, irreversible steps to live within the confines of the current CR. Steps that ultimately make us less effective at what we are supposed to do for the Nation. The Navy did not procure Government-furnished equipment for another Arleigh Burke class destroyer. The Army and the Marine Corps have curtailed or altogether frozen civilian hiring. All the Services are now prevented from issuing contracts for new major military construction projects. Some programs may take years to recover if the CR is extended through the end of September. So I urge you to pass the fiscal year 2011 defense bill immediately. Even at a reduced top line, it will provide us the tools we need to accomplish the bulk of the missions we have been assigned. Accomplishing those missions into the future demands as well support for the President's fiscal year 2012 proposal. As the Secretary has laid out, this budget, combined with the efficiency effort he led, provides for the wellbeing of our troops and families, fully funds current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and helps balance global risk through streamlined organization, smarter acquisition, and prudent modernization. The Army, for instance, will cancel procurement of a surface-to-air missile and the non-line-of-sight launch system, but it will continue production of the joint light tactical vehicle and spearhead the development of a whole new family of armored vehicles. The Navy will give up its second fleet headquarters, reduce its manpower ashore, and increase its use of multiyear procurement for ships and aircraft, allowing it to continue development of the next generation of ballistic missile submarine, purchase 40 new F/A-18s, and 4 littoral combat ships and another LPD-17. The Marines will cancel the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and like the Army, reduce their end strength starting in 2015. But they will reinvest these savings to sustain and modernize the amphibious assault vehicle and the light armored vehicle, even as they advance a new concept of operations and restore much of their naval expeditionary skills. The Air Force will be able to continue development of the next tanker, a new bomber, and modernize its aging fleet of F-15 fighters, all the while finding savings of more than $33 billion through reorganization, consolidation, and reduced facilities requirements. None of this balancing will come on the backs of our deployed troops. We are asking for more than $84 billion for readiness and training, nearly $5 billion for increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and more than $10 billion to recapitalize our rotary aircraft fleet. These funds plus those we are requesting to help build partner capacity in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen all speak to the emphasis we are placing on giving our troops and their partners in the field everything they need to do the difficult jobs we have asked of them. We must also give them and their families everything they need to cope with the stress and the strain of 10 years at war. That is why I am so pleased with the funds devoted in this proposal, almost three-quarters as much as the $200 billion budgeted for operations and maintenance (O&M), to personnel housing and health care issues. The chiefs and I penned a rare 24-star letter to Congress this week expressing our unqualified support for the military health care program changes included in this budget. We sought equity across all health care programs with beneficiaries and health care delivery providers having the same benefits and equivalent payment systems regardless of where they live or work. That, in turn, led us to propose increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for working age retirees. These increases are modest and manageable and leave fees well below the inflation- adjusted, out-of-pocket costs set in 1995 when the current fees were established. We sincerely hope you will see fit to pass these increases. Please know that we will continue to invest wisely in critical care areas to include research, diagnosis and treatment of mental health issues and TBI, enhanced access to health services, and new battlefield technologies. We understand that changes to health care benefits cause concern among the people we serve and the communities from which we receive care, but we also understand and hold sacred our obligation to care completely for those who have born the brunt of these wars, as well as those for whom the war never ends. I am convinced that we have not begun to understand the toll in dollars and in dreams that war extracts from our people. As the grandsons and granddaughters of World War II vets still struggle to comprehend the full scope of the horror those men yet conceal, so too will our grandchildren have to come to grips with the wounds unseen and the grief unspoken unless, of course, we get it right. I believe the investments we are making in wounded care and family readiness will pay off in that regard, but it will take time and patience and money, three things we seem so rarely to possess in this town. That brings me back to this particular budget request. With limited resources and two wars in progress, we should be prudent in defining our priorities in controlling costs and in slaking our thirst for more and better systems. We should also be clear about what the joint force can and cannot do, just as we should be clear about what we expect from our interagency and international partners. Our global commitments have not shrunk. If anything, they continue to grow, and the world is a lot less predictable now than we could have ever imagined. You need look no further than Tahrir Square to see the truth in that. Foolhardy would it be for us to make hasty judgments about the benefits, tangible and intangible, that are to be derived from forging strong military relationships overseas such as the one we enjoy with Egypt. Changes to those relationships in either aid or assistance ought to be considered only with an abundance of caution and a thorough appreciation for the long view, rather than the flush of public passion and the urgency to save a buck. The $1.3 billion we provide the Egyptian military each year has helped them become the capable professional force they are and, in that regard, has been of incalculable value. Of equal or greater value is increased appropriations for DOS and our request in this budget for the Global Security Contingency Fund, a 3-year pooled fund between DOD and DOS, that will be used to build partner capacity, prevent conflicts, and prepare for emerging threats. The request is modest, an initial $50 million appropriation, along with a request for authority to reprogram an additional $450 million if needed. But what it will buy us is an agile and cost effective way to better respond to unforeseen needs and take advantage of emerging opportunities for partners to secure their own territories and regions. We must get more efficient, yes, but we must also get more pragmatic about the world we live in. We can no longer afford bloated programs or unnecessary organizations without sacrificing fighting power, and we can no longer afford to put off investments in future capabilities or relationships that preserve that power across a spectrum of conflict. I have long said we must not be exempt in DOD from belt-tightening, but in truth, there is little discretionary about the security we provide our fellow citizens. Cuts can reasonably only go so far without hollowing the force. In my view then, this proposed budget builds on the balance we started to achieve last year and represents the best of both fiscal responsibility and sound national security. I would be remiss, indeed, if I did not close by lauding the incredible effort of our troops overseas and their families as they finish one war in Iraq and begin to turn corners in Afghanistan. I know you share my pride in them and their families and your support has been superb. I know you will keep them foremost in mind as you consider the elements of this proposal. I thank you for your continued longstanding support of our men and women in uniform and their families, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:] Prepared Statement by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the committee, it is my privilege to report on the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces. We remain a military at war. Yet, in the face of daunting challenges, our Armed Forces have successfully carried out their far- ranging missions over the past year. They have disrupted al Qaeda, improved security in Afghanistan, continued on a path to soon end the war in Iraq, promoted stability in the Pacific Rim, and provided humanitarian assistance when disasters struck. However, the cumulative stress of 9 years of war is growing and substantial. We will need your sustained support, even in the midst of fiscal difficulties, to reset the Joint Force needed to protect the American people. Our country is fortunate to be served by the best Armed Forces I have seen in over 42 years of wearing the uniform. Despite continuous deployments and combat operations, our men and women in uniform and their families have been resilient beyond all expectations. They are patriots who care deeply for this country and serve under very trying conditions. They are the most combat experienced and capable force we have ever had, and they continue to learn and adapt in ways that are truly remarkable. I am continuously humbled as I visit them around the country and the world. Time and again, these men and women and their families have proven that our All-Volunteer Force is the Nation's greatest strategic asset. This Force cannot thrive without the support of the American people. Everything we are and everything we do comes from them. I am grateful for Congress' and the American people's constant reminders that the service, heroism, and sacrifices of our servicemembers and their families are valued. However, I am concerned that because our military hails from a shrinking percentage of the population, some day the American people may no longer know us. We cannot allow this to happen. We will endeavor to stay connected and to maintain a strong and open relationship. As we look to our military's posture and budget, we recognize that our country is still reeling from a grave and global economic downturn and is maintaining nearly historic fiscal deficits and national debt. Indeed, I believe that our debt is the greatest threat to our national security. If we as a country do not address our fiscal imbalances in the near-term, our national power will erode, and the costs to our ability to maintain and sustain influence could be great. To do its part, the Department of Defense (DOD) must and will become more efficient and disciplined, while improving our effectiveness. We must carefully and deliberately balance the imperatives of a constrained budget environment with the requirements we place on our military in sustaining and enhancing our security. Going forward our fundamental resourcing problem will be identifying where we can reduce spending while minimizing the additional risk we will have to take on. For too much of the past decade we have not been forced to be disciplined with our choices. This must change, and it already has. We have identified a number of efficiencies in our budget and have reduced spending, while also retaining the combat readiness, force structure, essential modernization, and personnel programs we need. We are proud of what we have done so far, identifying $100 billion in efficiency savings over the next 5 years. But we need to do more. Under the Secretary's leadership, DOD has conducted two comprehensive reviews of our requirements. First, the Quadrennial Defense Review surveyed the strategic environment, identified the strategy for the Joint Force, and determined what we need to execute that strategy. Second, we reviewed our spending to ensure we can achieve the maximum security benefit for every defense dollar. We must be careful to not cut defense beyond prudent levels, below which U.S. Armed Forces would be unable to execute our defense strategy at acceptable risk. Given the challenges and complexity of the security environment and the breadth of our national security interest, the defense strategy is necessarily global, wide-ranging, and highly responsive. This is why it is expensive. At about 4.5 percent of GDP, the return on U.S. defense spending has been immense and historic: preventing world war between great powers, securing the global commons and the free flow of international trade and natural resources, combating terrorism across the globe, and protecting the American people and our allies. However, our operations have come with stresses and strains as well as costs to our readiness. For this reason, if we are to continue to execute the missions set out by our strategy, we must recognize that returning from war and resetting the force is costly and will require several years of continued investment. Congressional support is required for our forces, their families, their equipment and training, and our military infrastructure to ensure the success of our ongoing efforts and for us to be ready to respond to new and emerging security challenges. The President's National Security Strategy, the recently released National Military Strategy, and the President's Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan describe our military approaches and ongoing operations in great detail. This posture statement will focus on the strategic priorities for the military and the Congressional support we need. My priorities remain defending our vital interests in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia, improving the Health-of-the-Force, and balancing global strategic risk. DEFENDING OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA Over the past year, our Armed Forces have continued to shoulder a heavy burden, particularly in the Middle East and South Central Asia. The balance of this burden and our wartime focus has shifted, however, from Iraq to Afghanistan. This was made possible by drawing down military forces in Iraq and transitioning security responsibilities to the Iraqis. Meanwhile, we committed additional forces and resources to Afghanistan and Pakistan. We have made steady, albeit uneven, progress toward disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda in the region, while remaining ready to address other challenges around the world. As a result of our operations with our Coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani partners, and extensive cooperation with other partners, al Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan is weaker and under greater pressure than at any other time since being forced out of Afghanistan in late 2001. They have suffered the losses of numerous senior leaders and face significant challenges to coordinating operations, maintaining safe havens, and acquiring funding. Despite this operational progress, al Qaeda retains the intent and capability to attack the United States and other Western countries. The movement's leaders continue to operate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, planning operations and guiding the efforts of al Qaeda networks operating out of the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, and even Europe. We, in turn, remain committed to our deepening and broadening partnerships in the region and to our goal of ultimately defeating al Qaeda and creating the conditions to prevent their return to Afghanistan and Pakistan. We continue to implement our national strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan with great urgency. This past November, we completed the deployment of the 30,000 additional U.S. forces, and we are beginning to see signs of improvements on the ground. These forces have allowed us to go on the offensive with our Afghan partners, force the Taliban out of safe havens in its heartland of Kandahar and Helmand, protect the Afghan population, and reduce civilian casualties. Our counterinsurgency operations, conducted in close partnership with Afghan forces, have reduced the Taliban's influence, reversed the insurgency's momentum in key areas of the country, and forced many Taliban leaders to flee across the border. Our forces will consolidate recent gains in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces and further expand security in other critical parts of the country. This success against the Taliban and other insurgent groups is essential to prevent the return of al Qaeda, gain time to build the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and force insurgents to reconcile with the Afghan Government on acceptable terms. We expect the violence coming in 2011 to be greater than last year. The fighting will be tough and often costly, but it is necessary to sustain and even increase the pressure we have been placing on the insurgent groups. We cannot allow the Taliban to reorganize and reconstitute as they did in 2004 and 2005, regain their oppressive influence over the Afghan people, and once again provide safe haven to al Qaeda. For the success of our military operations to be enduring, it is critical that the ANSF be able to provide security for the Afghan people. Our greatest success story this past year has been the growth and development of the ANSF. With the help of additional NATO trainers, the ANSF added 49,000 soldiers and 21,000 policemen to their ranks--an astonishing growth of 36 percent. The ANSF also continue to improve on the battlefield and increasingly contribute to the war effort. They are fighting beside us and have grown in their ability to plan and conduct complex operations. In fact, their expanding capabilities and presence have already allowed ISAF forces to ``thin out'' in some parts of central Helmand and Kabul Province. We are on track to begin the transition of security responsibilities and drawdown of our forces in July 2011. In the coming year, while continuing to grow the ANSF in size, we will place greater emphasis on improving its quality, professionalism, and self-sufficiency, to ensure that they remain on track to assume the overall lead for security in 2014. To this end, the Afghan Security Forces Fund remains critical to the building of the ANSF's capabilities and to the ANSF's eventual assumption of security responsibilities. Despite our successes, numerous other challenges remain. Achieving sustainable security requires developing Afghan governing capacity, cultivating the conditions needed for conflict resolution, neutralizing insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan, and countering corruption. Absent these conditions, we will not succeed. Despite a dramatic increase in our civilian presence in Afghanistan this past year, improvements in subnational governance and reconstruction have not kept pace with progress in improving security. This has impeded our ability to ``hold,'' ``build,'' and ``transfer.'' For this reason, the Commander's Emergency Response Program remains the most responsive means for addressing a local community's needs and is often the only tool our commanders have to address pressing requirements in areas where security is challenged. Along with development projects, we believe that new transparency and anti-corruption efforts may counter the deleterious effects of Afghanistan's criminal patronage networks, mitigate the distortive effects of international aid and development programs, and ultimately improve the confidence the Afghan people have in their government and their governing officials. To complement this ``bottom-up'' development, we will support the Afghan Government's reconciliation and reintegration efforts in order to achieve the political solution that is an imperative to sustainable peace. Successful military and security gains cannot be sustained unless we meet this challenge. Though our operational efforts are focused on Afghanistan, our diplomatic efforts have increasingly focused on Pakistan, a country critical to our strategy in the region. We must overcome years of mistrust and continue to lay the foundation for a true partnership with Pakistan. We made progress this past year by holding a third, productive round of Strategic Dialogues in October and by improving high- and mid-level coordination on security operations in the vicinity of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Equally important, we responded to last summer's devastating floods with timely aid and humanitarian relief. Our assistance eased some of the burden of the Pakistani military and demonstrated our enduring commitment to the Pakistani people. A key component of our partnership is to help enable the Pakistani Military's counterterror and counterinsurgency operations. The series of offensive operations undertaken by the Pakistani Military in the tribal areas expanded dramatically in 2009. Since then, the Pakistanis have fought bravely and sacrificed much--losing thousands of soldiers in the process. We have faithfully supported them in a variety of ways, primarily in the development of the counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistan's security forces. This development and the military's operations have kept pressure on al Qaeda's senior leadership and the militant groups threatening Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, insurgent groups such as the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network operate unhindered from sanctuaries in Pakistan, posing a significant threat to NATO and Afghan forces. The aftermath of devastating flooding continues to place a high demand on the military. Our efforts to enable the Pakistani Military depend on several critical programs, such as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund and the Multi-Year Security Assistance Commitment announced by Secretary Clinton last fall. It is also important that through exchange programs, such as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, we establish relationships with the generation of Pakistani officers with whom we had cut ties. In addition, because we so heavily depend on Pakistan as a supply route supporting our efforts in Afghanistan, Coalition Support Funds remain critical to reimbursing the Pakistanis for their assistance. In terms of our broader engagement with Pakistan and the region, reducing some of the long-standing enmity and mistrust between India and Pakistan would greatly contribute to our efforts. As neighbors, it is in both India and Pakistan's interests to reduce the tension between them and strengthen their political, security, and economic ties. While we acknowledge the sovereign right of India and Pakistan to pursue their own foreign policies, we must demonstrate our desire for continued and long-term partnership with each, and offer our help to improve confidence and understanding between them in a manner that builds long-term stability across the wider region of South Asia. Another increasingly important aspect of our engagement in South Central Asia is the development of the Northern Distribution Network. This line of communication has proven critical to maintaining flexibility in our logistical support to our efforts in Afghanistan. We will continue to work with our partners to ensure access and sustain the viability of redundant supply routes for our forces. We have ended our combat mission in Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and started a new chapter in our partnership, Operation New Dawn. We successfully transferred lead for security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces (ISF) on August 31, 2010. Iraq's military and political leaders are responding vigorously and professionally to the residual, but still lethal, threat from al Qaeda. As a result, and despite a drawn-out government formation process, the security situation there continues to improve, and the Iraqi people are increasingly able to focus on jobs and development. Beyond this security transition, the State Department has taken the lead for U.S. efforts in Iraq, and our diplomats and other civilians are increasingly the face of our partnership with the Iraqi people and their government. Sustained funding for our civilian efforts, commensurate with the State Department's growing responsibilities--particularly our development assistance and police training programs--is needed to ensure we are able to successfully turn our military accomplishments into political ones. However, the end of the war in Iraq will not mean the end of our commitment to the Iraqi people or to our strategic partnership. We must focus on the future to help Iraq defend itself against external threats and consolidate a successful, inclusive democracy in the heart of the Middle East. As we continue to draw down forces through December 31, 2011, in accordance with the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement, we will transition to a more typical military-to-military relationship. We will shift the focus of our assistance from Iraq's internal domestic security to its external national defense, keeping in consideration the interests and sensitivities of all Iraqis as well as Iraq's neighbors. While ISFs have made great improvements, they will require external assistance for years to come. The cornerstone of our future security partnership with the Iraqis will be a robust Office of Security Cooperation as part of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. Key to our assistance and not squandering our hard won gains will be continued support to the ISF fund through fiscal year 2011, equipment transfer provisions, IMET and other traditional security assistance programs, as well as section 1234 authority to transfer equipment from DOD stocks. Despite the energy we commit to defeating al Qaeda and to stabilizing the situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, we remain vigilant against other security challenges and sources of aggression and proliferation throughout this critical region. The Iranian regime continues to be the region's greatest state-level threat to stability. Despite growing isolation from the international community and a fourth round of increasingly costly U.N. sanctions, the regime has neither ceased providing arms and other support to Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups nor accepted a verifiable end to its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Many of the potential flashpoints in the Levant and the Gulf region bear Iran's signature, commanding the region's and the world's attention. That said, strong social, economic, and political tensions pull on the region and its people--as evidenced by the turmoil we have recently witnessed in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere. Volatility in regional affairs can often follow volatility in domestic affairs. However, strong military-to- military relationships can help reduce and mitigate the risks of instability. We will continue to help counter terrorist threats, deter Iranian aggression, and protect our partners from coercive influence. To do this we will continue to build the capabilities of our partners. More important, we will nurture the development of a regional security architecture based on multi-lateral partnerships that address a wide range of security issues including counter-proliferation, maritime security, counter-terrorism, air and missile defense, and emergency response. As with our other partnerships across the globe, our security assistance programs form the keystone of our relationships. In particular, our section 1206 and 1208 programs provide a unique and necessary flexibility and responsiveness to combatant commander requirements that we cannot currently get with our Foreign Military Funding (FMF) programs. IMPROVING THE HEALTH-OF-THE-FORCE The back end of war--the continued care of our veterans and their families and the resetting of our force--cannot be an afterthought, and getting it right will be expensive. Moreover, because of the duration of these conflicts, we have begun to reset our units even in the midst of conflict. The stress of nine years of constant warfare has come at a great cost to the Force and its ability to continue to conduct operations and respond to other emergent crises. We must care for our people and their families and reset and reconstitute our weapon systems to restore our readiness, capabilities, and wartime effectiveness. This will require a sustained commitment of at least 3 to 5 years, and could continue well beyond the end of our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Care for our People Our foremost focus is on our service men and women, their families, and their supporting communities--the bedrock of our Armed Forces. They each play unique and growing roles in our national security fabric, but they have been under great, often unrecognized, stress for the past 9 years. Hundreds of thousands of our servicemembers have deployed to fight overseas. Some have served multiple grueling tours, a great number have suffered significant injuries, and thousands have sacrificed their lives. Even those serving stateside enjoy only short respites between deployments. We have asked a great deal from our people, and we must invest in them and their families--through appropriate pay, health care, family care, education, and employment opportunities--as they are the single greatest guarantee of a strong military. And they become our best recruiters. The many accomplishments of our All-Volunteer Force over the past 9 years of continuous combat operations have been unprecedented. That we remain competitive in attracting the country's best talent during this period is simply extraordinary. All of our Services in the active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard components continue to have exceptional recruiting and retention rates. Ninety-six percent of our accessions have earned at least a high school diploma, which helps explain why this is one of the finest forces we have ever fielded. Competitive compensation and selective bonuses are critical to our ability to recruit and retain talent, as are other ``people programs,'' such as the new GI Bill, improvements in housing, access to quality schooling for military children, mental health counseling, adequate child care, and attractive family support centers. All of these programs make the harsh burdens of military life easier to bear. I ask for Congress' continued support for them in order to sustain the Force while our overseas operations continue. I also urge Congress to continue funding the programs that will create a continuum of health care for our veterans and their families that seamlessly spans active duty and veteran status. With a focus on our enduring commitment, we must continue to improve our active and veteran care services, with special emphasis on Wounded Warrior Support. We will expand our public and private partnerships and tap into the ``sea of goodwill'' towards our veterans found in our Nation's communities and civic organizations. That will be important, but it is not sufficient. Long term fiscal support for the Department of Veterans Affairs will serve the growing number of veterans requiring care. One issue that demands acute national attention is the challenge of Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is the signature weapon of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and is directly responsible for many of these injuries. Many of our heroes suffer from severe TBI and have had their lives dramatically changed in ways we do not yet fully understand, and over 150,000 others have been exposed to events that may have caused moderate TBI. As such, we need to aggressively identify the victims of TBI, both within the serving force and among our veterans, and the treatment and rehabilitation they need and deserve. The effects of these efforts will pay dividends for some time, because we can expect to face IEDs in future conflicts as well. In addition, suicides and the many other stresses and social health costs that lag behind war--divorce, domestic violence, post-traumatic stress, depression, and even homelessness--are becoming alarmingly evident. Suicide rates remain unacceptably high, although programs such as the Department's Suicide Prevention Task Force and our improved leadership efforts have helped to lower the rates this past year in three of our four Services. Leaders must remain focused on this issue, as we work to improve our systematic understanding of the problem's scope, warning signs, and at-risk populations. As a society we must work to end the stigma that prevents our servicemembers, veterans, and families from seeking early help. By more effectively leveraging public-private partnerships, we can pursue solutions and treatment for all of these health issues afflicting the Force with great urgency and compassion and honor the sacred trust our Nation has with all of our combat veterans. Reset and Reconstitute The grueling pace of deployments has not allowed for the training needed to keep our forces ready along the entire spectrum of military operations and, as a result, our readiness in some mission areas has atrophied over the past decade. There are some modest reasons for hope, though. The Army now has fewer soldiers deployed than it has had at any time since the invasion of Iraq. In addition, this past year we completed the increases in the Army and Marine Corps end strengths authorized in 2007. As a result, we are beginning to see some stabilizing deployment rates and modestly improving dwell times. We appreciate the Congressional support to our wartime manning needs that has enabled this. However, our overseas contingency operations do continue to demand significant numbers of ground and special operations forces and low-density, high-demand specialties. For our Army combat units, we do not expect to begin to reach our interim goal of 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratios until 2012. After reset and reconstitution activities and as demand decreases, we expect to begin off-ramping some of our recent force level increases. However, my concerns about the health of our force go beyond our people and training--we must also restore the readiness of our combat systems and capabilities, which have similarly been under extraordinary stress. In the back end of previous conflicts, we were able to contract our equipment inventory by shedding our oldest capital assets, thereby reducing the average age of our systems. We cannot do this today, because the high pace and duration of combat operations have consumed the equipment of all our Services much faster than our peacetime programs can recapitalize them. We must actually recapitalize our systems to restore our readiness and avoid becoming a hollow force. All of this will force us to be more efficient and disciplined in our choices. We must focus resources where they matter most, and we will reset and reconstitute by prioritizing people, readiness, capabilities, and essential modernization to maintain a technological edge. In the short- term, we will continue previous efforts to reconstitute and expand our rotary wing and tilt-rotor capacity in our Combat Aviation units and to convert one heavy Brigade Combat Team to a Stryker Brigade. However, over a period of years, we will modernize our battle fleet of ground combat vehicles, including replacing the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. We require enhancements to our manned and unmanned Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, a new bomber program, extending the service life of a portion of our F-16 fleet, and continuing improvements in our missile defense and electronic warfare systems. We hope to modernize and extend the service life of our F/A-18 fleet and invest in additional P-8A aircraft and tankers. Lastly, we ask for full resourcing of the Air and Missile Defense Radar, the Next-Generation Jammer, and communications and integrated fire control systems designed for operating in contested environments. These investments are, without question, costly, but they are critically demanded by our current and likely future challenges. Your support is particularly important this year as we adjust to the impact of recent Continuing Resolutions on program starts and growth rates and to the $17.9 billion difference between the amount authorized by the resolutions and our fiscal year 2011 budget request--$23 billion if this becomes a year-long resolution. Just as important as the reconstitution of these combat systems are the acquisition processes and production capacities underlying them. Our procurement systems remain complex and in need of streamlining to help us acquire needed capabilities faster and more affordably. Last year we committed to adding 20,000 experts to our acquisition corps by 2015. In doing so, we seek to improve stability in our programs, conduct more comprehensive design reviews, improve cost estimates, utilize more mature technology, and increase competition in order to make the entire process more responsive. In addition, as I stated last year, I am concerned about the capabilities of our defense industrial base, particularly in ship building and space. Our ability to produce and support advanced technology systems for future weapon systems may be degraded by decreasing modernization budgets as well as mergers and acquisitions. Left unchecked, this trend will impact our future warfighting readiness. Although we are properly focusing on near-term reset requirements, DOD, our industry leaders, and Congress need to begin considering how to equip and sustain the military we require after our contemporary wars come to an end. BALANCING GLOBAL STRATEGIC RISK Balancing global risk requires maintaining a ready and forward presence with available forces that, overall, can meet the full scope of our security commitments. To meet these requirements, we must reset, sustain, and properly posture a force that includes both our Active Force and our National Guard and Reserve components. But we must also make prudent investments and continuously evolve the force so as a whole it can meet the challenges of an increasingly complex global security environment. For many decades, our overmatch in our general purpose forces has underwritten our National security and our prosperity, as well as that of our many allies and partners. This credible strength has deterred aggression and reduced the likelihood of interstate conflict like those of the 19th and early 20th centuries. With these capabilities, we have stood side by side with our allies in the face of belligerent aggression, helped secure access and responsible use of increasingly contested domains, and provided timely humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters across the globe. However, our recent experience reminds us that we must continue to adapt some of our systems and tactics to counter anti-access and area-denial strategies, which may involve both the most advanced and simplest technologies. This year I will publish my ``Joint Force 2030,'' which will lay out the operating concepts and capabilities of our future force. But we already know some of the contours of what that force will need to do. We know that, in addition to the current array of aggressive states and transnational terrorists we face, we must adjust to a changing global environment impacted by the rise of China and other emerging powers as well as the growing worldwide use and capabilities of cyber space. Such a world requires an agile, adaptive, and expeditionary force. It must ensure access, protect freedom of maneuver, and project power globally. It should retain decisive overmatch with air, land, sea, and special operations forces and be able to operate in degraded space and cyber environments. As such, transitioning to this future force will likely involve a greater emphasis on ISR, command and control, long range strike, area denial, undersea warfare, missile defense, and cyber capabilities. This transition will also involve further developing flexible leaders, operators, and technicians who are highly proficient and able to fully integrate our efforts with our partners from other agencies and other countries. Beyond maintaining our regular and irregular warfare capabilities, we will also continue to rely on secure and stable nuclear deterrence. It is also important that we maintain the safety and surety of our nuclear forces, even as we seek to reduce them in accordance with the Nuclear Posture Review and implement the recently ratified New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. We need to modernize our nuclear force and its supporting infrastructure to ensure that a smaller force is nonetheless safe, secure, and effective. Lastly, our missile defense systems should support the stability of our deterrence architectures. And while we work to reduce, safeguard, and provide confidence in our nuclear force and those of treaty signatories, we acknowledge that the proliferation of nuclear technology and other weapons of mass destruction by state and non-state actors remains one of the most significant and urgent worldwide threats. Effectively countering proliferation requires strong international partnerships, new surveillance technologies, and layered defenses. These are supported by ongoing expansion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, establishment of a standing joint headquarters for weapons of mass destruction elimination, and investments in nuclear forensics technology and programs. These relatively small programs can have a disproportionately large positive impact on our security. Balancing global strategic risk also requires improving our capabilities in cyberspace. Today we face a range of threats to our computer systems from other states, mercenaries, and even civilian hackers, and their ability to wreak havoc cannot be understated. Lower grade cyber threats conducted by organized criminals and talented individuals do not necessarily put the Nation at serious risk. But the effects of a well-coordinated, state-sponsored cyber attack against our financial, transportation, communications, and energy systems would be catastrophic. We have made headway by standing up U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and by developing constructs for cyberspace operations, but more work is needed. Critical to CYBERCOM's future success will be our ability to recruit, train, and most importantly, retain the right people. We must devote the same time and attention to cultivating this nation's cadre of future cyber warriors as we do to our combat specialists. We must also empower CYBERCOM and the combatant commands by working with the Executive Office of the President and other agencies to develop appropriate cyber authorities and by refining our cyber doctrine, tactics, and procedures. Lastly, we need to actively foster public discussion about international observance of cyber space norms. Balancing global strategic risk requires strong military-to- military engagement programs. These collaborative efforts engender mutual responsibility and include ongoing combined operations, multi- lateral training exercises, individual exchanges, and security assistance. They help demonstrate the United States' responsible military leadership in critical regions, reassure our allies, and strengthen the international norms that serve the interests of all nations. They also foster connections with other governments that reinforce our diplomatic channels and have proven critical during times of crisis. We currently benefit from numerous strong and well appreciated military partnerships. For example, at the November NATO Summit in Lisbon, we and our allies recommitted to our alliance, ongoing operations, and a new Strategic Concept for the next decade. NATO is also poised to release its Alliance Maritime Strategy. In Asia, though still underpinned by U.S. bilateral alliances, the region's security architecture is becoming a more complex mixture of multi-level multilateralism and expanded bilateral security ties among states. As the region's military capability and capacity increases, we seek new ways to catalyze greater regional security cooperation. Unfortunately, the global economic downturn is placing pressure on the resources of partner nations' security forces. We foresee no decrease in the commitment of our partners to us or to any of our mutual security efforts, but we must face the reality of less spending by our partners on our combined security and stability efforts. Any measures we take to strengthen our partnerships, such as the administration's Export Control Reform effort, can only improve our collective security. We should not engage only with like-minded allies. Military-to- military engagement, in coordination with other diplomatic efforts, can help foster cooperation in areas of mutual interest between nations with varying levels of amity. We have seen the fruits of our engagement programs in strengthening cooperation in the Middle East, countering piracy in the Red Sea and the Straits of Malacca, and countering proliferation across the globe. We will seek out military-to-military relations even where they have not existed before because sound relations can prevent miscommunication and miscalculation that could lead to crisis or conflict. In particular, increased engagement with China could increase understanding and cooperation on a multitude of issues, including encouraging North Korea to refrain from further provocation and ensuring access to and equitable use of the global commons. A significant component of our engagement program is the security sector assistance we provide to build the capabilities of our partner nations' security forces. These cost-effective programs properly place security responsibilities in the hands of other sovereign governments and reduce the tactical strain on our own forces by helping to prevent conflicts and instability. In many places, across the range of U.S. interests, investments in capacity building result in strong foundations for the future. These investments are often small but, if persistent, can yield a high return. I urge your continued support for Theater Security Cooperation programs, Global Train and Equip initiatives (under 1206 authorities), funding for special operations to combat terrorism (under 1208 authorities), as well as the many security assistance programs managed by the Department of State (DOS), including FMF and IMET programs. However, just as these programs require full funding, they also need wholesale reform. Our security assistance structures are designed for another era--our authorities are inflexible, and our processes are too cumbersome to effectively address today's security challenges in a timely manner. I urge your assistance in modifying the laws and regulations surrounding security cooperation and assistance to create a better coordinated, pooled-resource approach that make resources more fungible across departments and programs and better integrates our defense, diplomacy, development, and intelligence efforts. We should not allow bureaucratic resistance to trump operational effectiveness when security sector assistance is essential to our national strategy of helping others secure and defend themselves. On this last point of interagency cooperation, I want to reiterate our commitment to comprehensive approaches to our security challenges that employ all elements of national, and international, power in coordination. Our future security concerns require a whole-of- government effort, not just a military one, and we serve best when we serve hand-in-hand with all of our partners and support, rather than lead, foreign policy. As such, we will work closely with DOS and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to support their implementation of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, particularly in the areas of conflict prevention and response. To this end, I reiterate my unequivocal support to Secretary Clinton and her efforts to fully resource DOS's and USAID's activities and an expansion of its diplomacy and development capabilities, particularly in Iraq to support the transition from a military to a civilian-led mission. In addition, I support interagency cooperation programs and work to expand the number of exchanges between DOD and other executive agencies. CONCLUSION In the upcoming year, our Armed Forces will build on the past year's achievements and continue to provide the common defense our Constitution directs with distinct honor and effectiveness. We will advance our ongoing efforts and maintain the credibility of our forces while learning, adapting, and preparing for new security challenges. We know that the military's role in national security will remain substantial, and the demands on our service men and women will be high. However, we also know that we can never let our actions move us away from the American people, and that the quality of our work and our personal conduct will say far more about who we are and what we stand for than anything else we do. In all of our efforts, we will maintain a strength of character and professionalism, at the individual and institutional levels, that is beyond reproach and continues to be a source of pride for our Nation. As we move forward, I remain thankful to Congress for doing its part this year to better guarantee our Nations' security. You have reminded us of your important role as a steward of our Armed Forces and of our mutual respect for our Nation's security, values, and servicemembers by approving the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and repealing the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. I am encouraged that the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell will enhance the connection between the military and the American public, particularly in our relationships with some of America's premier universities. We look forward to working with you as we implement these initiatives and as you consider other pending security agreements, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Ratification of these two agreements would greatly benefit our national security. Again, on behalf of all our men and women under arms, I thank this committee, and the entire Congress, for your unwavering support for our troops in the field and their families at home during this time of war and for our efforts to maintain a strong, agile, well-trained, and well-equipped military that can prevail in our current conflicts and remain poised to deter or respond to new challenges. Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral Mullen, for your eloquent statement and for your great service. Secretary Hale, do you have anything to add before we begin? Mr. Hale. No, thank you. Chairman Levin. We will have a 7-minute first round. Mr. Secretary, you indicated that we are on track to end the presence of our combat troops in Iraq by the end of this year as decided upon by President Bush. Do you continue to support that decision? Secretary Gates. Yes, I do. Chairman Levin. Are you planning to begin reductions of our troops in Afghanistan by July of this year as ordered by President Obama with the pace to be determined by conditions on the ground? Do you support that decision? Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. Chairman Levin. Can you tell us why? Secretary Gates. Frankly, this was the most difficult part of the Afghan strategy, going forward, for me to support. I steadfastly, as some on this committee will remember-- steadfastly--opposed any deadlines in Iraq and so came to this with a certain skepticism. But I also realized that there is a difference between Iraq and Afghanistan in this respect. The truth of the matter is the Iraqis want us out of the country as quickly as possible. On the other hand, the Afghans, at least a certain number of them, would like us to stay forever. They live in a very dangerous neighborhood and having U.S. forces there to support them and help them often in the place of their own troops is something that they would like to see. So it seemed to me that we needed to do something that would grab the attention of the Afghan leadership and bring a sense of urgency to them of the need for them to step up to the plate to take ownership of the war and to recruit their own young men to fight. I think that the comments that you quoted earlier from General Caldwell has illustrated that over the last year or so the Afghans have, in fact, done this to a considerable degree, particularly in terms of their own troops. I must say I was very pleased to have--and I recognize the risk of the message we were also sending to our adversaries, to the Taliban. However, it seemed to me that if the Taliban was messaging to all of their people that we were all leaving, that our troops were all leaving in July, that they would be in for a very big surprise come August, September, and October when we are still hunting them down in very large numbers. So on balance--and I will say it was a close call for me, but I came to believe that it was the right thing to do. I must say I very much support and applaud NATO's decision to accept the idea of a full turnover of security responsibilities to the Afghans by 2014 because I think that bookends the July 11th statement and lets everybody know that we are not leaving precipitously. We are going to do this based on conditions on the ground, and we will continue to carry the fight to the Taliban. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Admiral Mullen, do you want to add anything to that? Do you agree basically with what the Secretary said, or do you have a different view? Admiral Mullen. No, no. I agree with that. I would say again a very tough part of the whole decision process. Certainly not the signal that we are not staying is one that is of great concern in that part of the region for a long time, and at the same time sending the message that we, in fact, are going to get to a point where we turn this over to them I think was very important. I have seen the effects of that in their leadership in the military and the police. It has given them a sense of urgency that they did not have before the decision was made. I also think, with respect to the Taliban specifically, with where we are right now, they have a lot more things to worry about in terms of just how well they are doing because they are not doing very well, and they know we are going to be there beyond July. They had a really bad year. That does not mean this year will not be tough. It will. It will be very difficult on both sides. But we have made a lot of progress because we have committed the resources to get this right. Chairman Levin. Relative to the size of the Afghan security forces, there is a proposal currently under consideration within the administration to increase the size of the ANSF by around 70,000 personnel. That would raise the target end strength for the security personnel of the Afghans to about 378,000. Now, those forces, as I indicated, would include some key enablers, including intelligence and logistics. As I also indicated, I spoke to the President now twice on this subject and very strongly support the increase that is being considered for the reasons which you have just talked about and which I talked about in my opening statement in terms of the importance of the Afghan security forces taking responsibility for security. They are very much supported by the Afghan people and they are targeting an enemy that is detested by the Afghan people, to wit, the Taliban. Our partnering with the security forces has really improved many more partnerships between our forces. The training is intense and very successful. The operations are joint. We witnessed that when we were down in Kandahar. So my question to both of you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, is do you support the proposal to increase the size of the ANSFs as is being considered? Secretary Gates. First of all, I would say that we have all recognized from the beginning that being able to turn security over to Afghan forces to deal with a degraded Taliban was our ticket out of Afghanistan and to accomplish our goal of making sure we are not attacked out of there again. I think the issue is under discussion within the administration. We do have a request from the commander. The issue is under discussion in no small part because of the question of sustainability. How big an army can we afford? Let us not kid ourselves. Nobody else is contributing to this in any significant way. We have in our OCO budget for fiscal year 2012 $12.8 billion to pay for the ANSFs. So the question is how long can we afford to do that, and you cannot do that indefinitely. So then can you look at an increased number of Afghan forces in the same terms as you look at our surge as something that is temporary until this problem gets solved, and then those numbers begin to go back down again. So this is one of the big issues that we are discussing and I expect a decision in the fairly near future. But this is really the core issue that I think is under discussion. Chairman Levin. Admiral Mullen, do you support that? Admiral Mullen. I think, Mr. Chairman, you know that the recommendation was teed up from somewhere between 352,000 to 378,000. That is the range. I certainly share the concern the Secretary has spoken of in terms of the sustainability of this. You also characterized in your opening statement a specific recommendation from me. We are still very much in discussion inside the administration on where this comes out. As the Secretary said, I think in the near future we will have that. There are a lot of issues at play here. None of us disagree with your assertion or your statement about the importance of this part of the mission, training them and turning it over to them. It has gone incredibly well over the course of the last year. So how fast we can move, how much more there should be is still very much in discussion and the comprehensiveness of the issues that are associated with this are being reviewed as we speak, and I think it will be resolved here in the near future. Chairman Levin. The bottom part of that range you mentioned would represent an increase from the current goal. Is that correct? Admiral Mullen. Right. We are at 305,000 at the end of this year, and 352,000 would be a range from 352,000 to 378,000. Chairman Levin. So even if the approval were at the bottom of the range, that would represent about a 45,000 increase. Is that correct? Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. Chairman Levin. So we save a lot of money having their forces there trained and equipped rather than our forces in terms of relative costs. I think you both would agree to that. Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. Secretary Gates. Absolutely. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator McCain. Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Gates, did you recommend to the President the date of July 2011 as a date to begin withdrawal? Secretary Gates. No, sir, I did not. Senator McCain. Did you, Admiral Mullen? Admiral Mullen. No, sir, I did not. Senator McCain. On the issue of our continued presence in Iraq, obviously the casualties have been reduced dramatically, but I think it is also obvious that the Iraqi military does not have a lot of the technological capability that they need to combat this kind of insurgency that is still out there. But also, if they want to have an air force, it seems to me they need that kind of technical assistance, a number of other areas of modernization of their forces. It is necessary. We are not talking about continued combat operations on the part of the United States, but they do need the kind of technical assistance that they will need to maintain their security. Do you agree with that? Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. Senator McCain. So is there any discussion that you know of going on with the Iraqi Government concerning the future role of the United States in Iraq besides the fact that we are now scheduled to leave by the end of the year? Secretary Gates. There have been a number of informal conversations with the Iraqis about this. Our concern, as I indicated yesterday, is principally in three areas: intelligence fusion, logistics and maintenance, and in air cover in providing the ability to protect their own air space. Right now, under current circumstances, as of the 1st of January, we will have 157 DOD military and civilians, along with several hundred contractors, basically processing foreign military sales, and that would be it. As I have indicated, I think this government is very open to a continuing presence that would be larger where we could help the Iraqis for a period of time. I am not actually concerned about the stability of the country, but I am concerned about their ability to address these three issues in particular. But the fact is we have a signed agreement that President Bush signed with the Iraqi Government, and the initiative for this needs to come from the Iraqis. My hope is that once they sort out who their new defense minister is going to be, which has been a problem in putting together their government, that then we will be able to move forward with this dialogue with the Iraqis. I think it is little bit, frankly, in Iraq like the strategic agreement itself in the sense that our presence is not popular in Iraq. So the politicians, I think, the leaders understand the need for this kind of help, but no one wants to be the first one out there supporting it, very much like the security agreement itself. So we will continue that dialogue, but at the end of the day, the initiative has to come from the Iraqis. They have to ask for it. Senator McCain. I take it you were pleased with the House's decision yesterday on the--what did you call it--the additional engine? Secretary Gates. The extra engine. Senator McCain. Extra. Excuse me. Yes, extra engine. I take it you would support efforts over here to do the same. Secretary Gates. Absolutely. Senator McCain. I share your optimism about our success in Afghanistan, which has confounded many of the critics. I also share your view that there is a long way to go. But do you share that same optimism about Pakistan? There have been some very serious disruptions, obviously, with this American citizen who is now being held in prison, the whole role of private contractors, the continued allegations of relationships between Interservices Intelligence (ISI) and the Taliban. I am deeply concerned about the situation in Pakistan, which obviously is vital to the sustained and long-term success in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates. Let me just say a word or two and then turn to the chairman because he has spent a lot more time in Pakistan in the last few years than I have. I worry a lot about Pakistan. It has huge economic problems. Those problems were significantly aggravated by the terrible flooding last year. They have a serious internal terrorism threat that is seeking to destabilize Pakistan itself. I worry that some of those terrorists might try and provoke a conflict between Pakistan and India. So I think that there is a lot to be concerned about with Pakistan. Senator McCain. There are still sanctuaries in Pakistan. Secretary Gates. That said, there are still the sanctuaries. But I will say the Pakistanis have 140,000 troops on that border. These things improve step by step, but not as quickly as we would like, but we get to a better place over time. If you had asked me 2 years ago if the Pakistanis would withdraw six divisions from the Indian border and put them in the west, I would have said, impossible. If you would have asked me if we would begin coordinating operations on both sides of the border with Afghan and ISAF forces on the one side and the Pakistanis on the other, I would have said, that is very unlikely. They are chipping away at some of these sanctuaries. It is very important what they have done in south Waziristan and SWAT, but it is a mixed picture, and it is something we just need to keep working at. The chairman has worked at it about as hard as anybody. Admiral Mullen. On the military side, Senator McCain, I am more optimistic than I have been. I mean, the Secretary talked about the cross-border coordination, the work that we have done with them. But on the political side, the economic side, at least from my perspective, it looks worse than it has in a long time. So I share your concern. The vector is going in the wrong direction overall for the country. We are very unpopular there. You have seen that. It gets highlighted in each crisis. We provided extraordinary support for the floods last year--we, the military. Then that registers in a popular way shortly. You have an incident like the one we are going through right now, and our popularity is back down in very small numbers. So I do think we have to stay at it. It is where lots of terrorist organizations head, not just al Qaeda. They are more combined in their efforts than they have ever been. So I do think we have to continue to work at it, but I am concerned as I have ever been. Senator McCain. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, just briefly. Anything more on the Wikileaks investigation? Secretary Gates. Sir, after our last hearing, I went back and I had been told that I had to keep my hands off of it because of the criminal investigation. But I have been able to narrow an area that I have asked the Secretary of the Army to investigate in terms of procedures and the command climate and so on that has nothing to do with the accused individual, but to see what lapses there were where somebody perhaps should be held accountable. Senator McCain. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain. Senator Lieberman. Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, Secretary and Chairman, for your service, for your leadership, for your testimony today. I believe that the President's budget for DOD is a budget that recognizes the times of economic stress we are going through particularly with regard to our national deficits and debt but also meets our defense needs. I appreciate, Mr. Secretary, your advocacy of the budget but also your warning that we have to be very careful about cutting too deeply into our defense budget. I have noticed some change of terminology around here which concerns me, which traditionally, as we have discussed the various components of the Federal budget, when we get to discretionary spending, we distinguish between defense and non- defense spending. The defense spending had a more protected status, if you will, and I think it was for a good reason, which I believe I know you and all of us on the committee believe, which is that we have no greater responsibility in our national government than to protect our security. It is the underpinning of our freedom and our prosperity. So we have to be very cautious about cutting below a level that we can continue to fulfill that--well, it is really a constitutional responsibility to provide for the common defense. I have noticed now the difference between defense and non- defense discretionary spending in terminology seems to be fading, and I think we do that at our peril. So it does not mean, obviously, that what everybody at the Pentagon wants we are going to say yes to or that we can tolerate wasteful spending. I know the two of you have been very aggressive about that in the programs you have set forward. But I hope as we go forward in these very difficult economic times with a lot of stress politically on everybody here, that we keep that primary responsibility we have for the national security in mind. Frankly, without going any further on it, I think for those of us who are committed to doing everything we can to continue to give you the resources and the men and women in uniform to protect our security, it compels us to look much more directly and act more boldly on the most expanding part of our national deficit and debt, which is the entitlement programs that are non-defense. So with that invocation, I just want to pick up on what Senator McCain said earlier about the input we got at the Munich security conference this year. It was quite significant to me on Afghanistan. The first was I thought there was a real change in opinion from our European colleagues, that we really are making progress in Afghanistan, and they feel good about it. Normally we have been concerned that they would leave the fight before we did. They turned the tables on us this time, and they said we are committed now through NATO to the 2014 exit date from Afghanistan. We are worried that you in America are going to begin to leave earlier, and they still have in mind, notwithstanding all the transition to 2014, this July 2011 date. So I would ask you if you would care to respond to that, and of course, part of that is just to urge that whatever we do in July 2011, be mindful of the effect it will have not only on the Afghans and the region but on our European allies. Secretary Gates. I would just make two comments. First, I had a NATO defense ministers meeting last December and it was really quite extraordinary because I do not think I have ever seen so many ministers so optimistic about how things were going in Afghanistan. I did not encounter a single one who was pessimistic or who felt that the effort was for naught and that we were not headed in the right direction. So there was a level not just of sort of grudging support but a general feeling of cautious optimism that we finally had all the parts right in this thing, the civilian strategy, the military strategy, had the resources there. When I took this job there were 12,000-13,000 Europeans or other partners in Afghanistan. There are now 50,000. They have really stepped up to the plate. Now, we are carrying the bulk of the burden, but they are doing a lot as well. By the same token, one of my missions in next month's defense ministers meeting is to ensure that in fact whatever we do in July does not start a rush for the exits on the part of our allies, and I would say particularly those who have the largest contingents there. There are a lot of countries that are making a real contribution, but they have fairly limited numbers of people there. I think that our principal allies and those who are the principal contributors are probably okay, but I need to be able to reassure them that this is going to be conditions-based and that it will be gradual. The other point I will make to them is it should not be mathematical. If we take out 1 percent or 2 percent of our troops, or whatever the number is, that does not mean everybody gets 2 percent because in some of them 2 percent--when you have only 10 guys there, you have a problem. So I think that we need to ensure that their forces are taken out on a conditions-based arrangement as well. I think this is the challenge for General Petraeus. The way I think he is thinking about it is that when we turn over security responsibility, sort of three things will happen to the foreign troops that are there. A few will stay to continue to provide a strategic overwatch and safety net, if you will. Some will be reinvested in the neighboring district where the security is not as good yet, and then some portion would be allowed to come home. So I think that that is the approach that he is taking, and frankly I have not seen from the defense ministers, at least, signs of nervousness or a feeling that they would be compelled to make significant withdrawals themselves before the timing that they have already announced. Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that reassurance. What you found at the defense ministers meeting is exactly what we found in terms of the cautious optimism at the Munich conference. I appreciate it. I think you are right on target in your focus for the next meeting coming up because it sounded to me as if they need that reassurance. I will just tell you that one of the people high up in one of our major NATO allies' foreign ministry said that they were worried that if we withdrew a small proportion of our troops in July, that there would be a tendency of their political community to take it in absolute mathematical numbers. So for us it is only 1 percent, but let us say it is 1,000. They are worried that at home their parliament is going to say, well, how about taking out 1,000 of our troops as a result. Secretary Gates. The interesting thing about particularly the Europeans who are in Afghanistan--most of them are in coalition governments and most of their publics are opposed to their participation. Senator Lieberman. Right. Secretary Gates. I think it needs to be said these governments have shown some real political courage in being willing to commit to the alliance and to Afghanistan the forces that they have in the absence of political support at home. Senator Lieberman. I could not agree with you more. Final word. My time is up. But the other thing that I found very heartening is that our NATO allies, particularly following the meetings you have referred to, have stepped back and understand not just that we are doing better in Afghanistan, but this is the first time NATO has gone to war. A failure in this first time at war, interestingly outside of the geographic area of NATO, would have terrible consequences for NATO's credibility, and NATO's credibility at this uncertain, dangerous time in the world is critically important to the stability and security of a lot of other places far from the United States, Europe, and Afghanistan. So I think we are at a point where the alliance is really moving together in a very positive way. I thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. Senator Inhofe. Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was glad to hear that statement, Secretary Gates, what you said about the 17,000 to 50,000. Somehow I had missed that. But I am glad to know that more are coming to the table. Senator Hagan and I spent New Year's Eve with the troops in Afghanistan and had a chance to spend a little time to get out to the training area. When we talk about what is going to happen in reduction and so forth, a lot of that is going to be dependent on the success and the training of the Afghan National Army and how they are coming. I was very pleased. Senator Hagan and I were both surprised at the Kabul military training center, the segregation of infantry and artillery and how they are doing that on two sides of the mountain. We are used to seeing how we do it in this country. I was most impressed with their training. To accommodate some of these potential discussions on withdrawal, I would just like to know your opinion as to how we are coming with that training. Is it ahead of where you thought it would be, or are you as impressed as we were when we went over and witnessed it? Secretary Gates. I think we both should address that briefly. But I would say that what General Caldwell has done in the last year or so I would characterize as nearly a miracle. It is not just the numbers. A year ago 35 percent of the recruits or the new soldiers, Afghan soldiers, qualified on marksmanship. It is now in the 90s. They have a literacy program going for officers, for noncomissioned officers (NCO), and even for some junior enlisted that is going to make a huge long-term difference in Afghanistan. So I think that the quality of what they have been doing and the speed with which they have been doing it and the ability to accommodate the significant increase in the numbers being trained and getting quality training has just been really quite extraordinary and I think has played a big part in the progress that we have had over the last year. Admiral Mullen. I would say very briefly, sir, I think the number I saw the other day was 24,000 trainees in training right now. That number was minimal a year to 2 years ago, I mean, literally in the hundreds because all you did was you recruit and place a soldier or a policeman in the field. What also gets lost here is that there has been an extraordinary jump on the police side as well behind the military, as it was in Iraq. So we are making a lot of progress there. I would just commend General Caldwell and all his people because they put in the structure. You have seen for yourself the kind of training. It has really been an exceptional effort over a very short period of time. Senator Inhofe. Yes. We even had an opportunity to talk to some of the ones who are being trained to be trainers. They are excited. They are looking at careers. I was very shocked and very pleased. As you know from previous meetings, I always bring up the 1206, 1207, 1208, Commander's Emergency Response Program and Combatant Command Initiatives Fund. These are programs that I have been very enthusiastic about and I think have been very successful. I was pleased that the 1206 funding was increased in this budget request from $350 million to $500 million. The thing that I am confused about, because I am not sure what it means, is this pooled funding. When I first read about this, I thought is this returning back to what we were trying to get away from, in other words, having more of the concentrated commanders in the field, having greater authority, and this type of thing. How does the pooled funding work? Would either one of you like to share that with me? Admiral Mullen. This is actually a $50 million appropriation, should it be approved, initially DOS money, with an opportunity to reprogram upwards of $450 million between us. So there is no specificity that says how much DOS would reprogram at this point or how much DOD would. What is really critical here--and this goes back to your support of 1206, 1207, and 1208--is it gives us the flexibility and the ability to meet an emergent sort of this year maybe even this month need which, heretofore, we just have not been able to do. We see it year after year in country after country. So it actually is very consistent with what has happened in 1206, 1207, and 1208 in terms of the strategic thrust, although some of the mechanisms will be a little different. Senator Inhofe. That is good. I am glad to hear that because I did not want to dilute that program that I think has been very, very successful. Recently we have heard more and more about China and Russia and how much further advanced they are on the fifth generation of fighters, the T-50, J-20, or whatever that is over there. The decision that we had made to move backwards a little bit or move the 124 F-35s out of this 5-year period or delay them--was that decision made before we realized that they were perhaps a little further along in developing fifth generation fighters in other countries that might be sold eventually to people who could be our enemies? Secretary Gates. I think that, first of all, the way I have characterized it, Senator, is that when I was in China, President Hu rolled out the red carpet and the People's Liberation Army rolled out the J-20. They may have flight-tested it a half a year, a year or so before our intelligence estimated they would, but the truth is it will be quite a while before they have any numbers. The latest estimates on the Chinese side would be that by 2020 they might have 50 deployed and by 2025 maybe a couple hundred. We will have 325 F-35s by the end of 2016, even under the revised program, which with the F-22s gives us over 500 fifth generation aircraft. We will have 850 F-35s by 2020 or fifth generation aircraft by 2020 and about 1,500 by 2025. So there is still a huge disparity in terms of these aircraft. Frankly--and I do not want to get into it too much in an open hearing--this is their first low-observable aircraft. Given the challenges that we have had--and we have been at this now better than 20 years, frankly, I think they have a long road in front of them before this becomes a serious operational aircraft in any numbers. Senator Inhofe. I am glad to hear that. My time is expired but I want to ask a question for the record, and it might be more appropriate to respond to it for the record. You commented about your visit to the Far East, and at that time you were saying North Korea will have developed an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile within 5 years. We hear about our intelligence estimate talking about Iran's capabilities in 2015. I would like to have an update on those estimates for the record, if you would do that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The information referred to follows:] The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is coordinating with Senator Inhofe's staff to provide the Senate with a briefing on the latest DIA and National Air and Space Intelligence Center threat assessments. Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, if I could. Back to just a specific on the F-35, the Secretary's decision to move those aircraft to the right--those are short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft. I actually think---- Senator Inhofe. Those are the Marine version? Admiral Mullen. Yes. That actually puts us in a better position to deliver the Navy and the Air Force version sooner because those two versions are actually doing pretty well in testing and development. So I thought it was a wise decision and to give the Marine Corps, give us--give the Navy an opportunity to work on this airplane for the next 2 years. It was at the front of the queue and actually it was holding up the development of the other two airplanes. Secretary Gates. I would just say that the first Air Force variant of the F-35 will go to Eglin in May and others will flow through September to begin training, and the Navy variant will be at Eglin in fiscal year 2012. Senator Inhofe. That is very helpful. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country. Secretary Gates, for the past several years, the need for a new U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) headquarters has been under consideration. It has been apparent and identified as a requirement. So I have been extremely pleased with the progress made toward addressing this vital need. The existing facility's shortcomings and problems have put STRATCOM's mission and its personnel at some risk. STRATCOM's existing headquarters was built in 1957 and it has weathered 5 decades with little renovation. So for any combatant command, of course, these problems would be challenging if they continue to have electrical service and cooling water and other problems, but for STRATCOM, these facility maintenance matters are just untenable and they stand in the way of some of the most important national security missions. General Chilton, the retiring commander of STRATCOM, said it best, that the STRATCOM headquarters is the nuclear command and control mode for the United States and that we must make the appropriate investments. So I am very pleased that this budget represents that and wonder if you might have any comments on it and, as well, Admiral Mullen. Secretary Gates. I just have one comment and that is Admiral Mullen and I were there a couple of weeks ago for the change of command at STRATCOM, and the building looks a lot like it did when I walked in as a 2nd lieutenant in 1967. Senator Nelson. The electrical systems are probably the same as well. But thank you very, very much. In addition to the concerns that have been raised about continuing our relationships in the Middle East right now, the fiscal year 2012 budget presumes that the military, in terms of Iraq, will depart on December's plan. We have had a lot of discussions here about whether or not it is important to do that or appropriate to do that and what kind of assistance and advice will we continue to provide the Iraqis. But as we are looking at our budget and trying to find ways to economize in DOD, is there a plan to have the Iraqis pick up more of the costs of any retention that we might have of our personnel there to provide the advice and the training that will be required? Secretary Gates. Not at this point, Senator. To tell you the truth, we have not really done much in the way of the budget looking beyond the 31st of December because we are assuming that we will come to December 31 and that will be it. So we would have to revisit that issue. I think we would have to take a look at whether the Iraqis could do that. They are running about--even with the price of oil where it is, they are devoting about 14 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) to security, and they are running, I think, a $15 billion or thereabouts--$10 billion to $15 billion deficit this year. We should be so lucky. But we really have not gone down that road yet. Senator Nelson. But if we are in a position to where we are requested and we make the decision to continue some relationship there, would it be possible to look at that from the standpoint of the budget? It is not that I want to drive their budget into the ditch any more than I want ours to continue to be there. We have to find a way to balance it for them and for ourselves as well. Secretary Gates. I understand, and we will certainly take that into account. Senator Nelson. I appreciate that. In terms of ISR assets, DOD has put forth spending about $4.8 billion on procuring another 110 airframes for the budget. Can you speak about what the infrastructure and personnel will cost? Maybe this is for Admiral Mullen. The personnel costs and the infrastructure costs for adding these additional ISR assets. Admiral Mullen. I would have to get back to you with a detailed response. Senator Nelson. Sure. [The information referred to follows:] Increasing our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in support of combat operations continues to be one of our highest priorities. The fiscal year 2012 budget continues development, integration, and expansion of ISR enhancements to unmanned platforms to deliver critical command/control, persistent ISR, and firepower to U.S. and coalition forces. These systems cover the full spectrum of capabilities from high-altitude, long-endurance capabilities to hand- launched, tactical systems. The fiscal year 2012 budget requests $4.8 billion to invest in the following ISR capabilities: Procure additional Global Hawks (RQ-4) Three aircraft/$1.7 billion Maximum Reaper (MQ-9) production 48 aircraft/$1.4 billion Maximum Gray Eagle (MQ-1) production 36 aircraft/$1.0 billion Accelerate unmanned maritime unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (MQ-8 Fire Scout) 12 aircraft/$0.3 billion Other UAVs: Shadow, Raven, Small Tactical Unmanned Air System $0.3 billion Procure/sustain MC-12 12 aircraft/$0.3 billion Each of these investments apply to current programs of record and are either in-line with current acquisition strategies or an acceleration of existing plans. Each system fits into a planned architecture to meet commitments to our warfighters and the Services have incorporated the necessary infrastructure and personnel costs to support their integration into operations. Based on contracting and production schedules, the fiscal year 2012 investments listed above will deliver and field approximately 1 to 2 years after receipt of funding. The personnel and infrastructure costs will be incurred over several fiscal years as soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are trained and assigned to maintain and operate these systems. To match the growth in capacity, balanced investments in operations and support (O&S) include: An increase in RQ-4 Global Hawk personnel and O&S funds by 21 percent in fiscal year 2014 from the fiscal year 2012 level. An increase in MQ-9 Reaper personnel and O&S funds by 55 percent in fiscal year 2014 from the fiscal year 2012 level. An increase in MQ-8 Fire Scout O&S funds by 101 percent in fiscal year 2014 from the fiscal year 2012 level. These funds include contractors operating in conjunction with on-board military personnel. An increase in ``Other'' UAV personnel and O&S funds by 15 percent in fiscal year 2014 from the fiscal year 2012 level. The MQ-1C Gray Eagle is integrated into the Army Force Generation Equipping Strategy. Overall, the Military Construction costs to field the entire complement of systems (not only the fiscal year 2012 systems) totals $522 million. Admiral Mullen. Certainly the infrastructure and personnel costs are incorporated into the budget and that is how the services actually bring it forward. It has become more and more significant. But I would also say, Senator Nelson, it has just become such a critical part not of just what we are doing now but what we are going to do in the future. We oftentimes think about the future sort of out there by itself, what is going to happen in 5 or 10 years. One of the things that has happened in these wars is there are a lot of capabilities that we have developed, rapidly field that will be every bit as relevant in a few years as they are right now. ISR probably leads the pack with respect to that. Senator Nelson. In that regard, we are living the future right now as we see it develop around us, and I hope that as we do that, we will continue to find a way to do it, obviously, as efficiently and as cost effectively as possible but not be short on personnel simply because we may end up with fewer pilots, but the piloting is obviously done a different way. So I hope that you will consider that. Also, Secretary Gates, in growing the forces and the capacity of the ANSFs, we have talked about the numbers increasing and you mentioned sustainability of the numbers and the range from the lower and we are adding 40,000 and looking at a higher range of 378,000. Can we establish what we think would be a sustainable number as we look forward? Because, obviously, that is a pretty sizable percent of the population. Now, it is good to have people working. There is no question about it--fully employed. But do we have some idea of what the Afghans can support and sustain into their future? Secretary Gates? Secretary Gates. The sustainability issue, at least for the next number of years, is more what the United States can sustain because the Afghans' ability to sustain a military force would be a fraction of the size of what they already have, much less what they may increase to, which is why I think of the size of their force more in terms of a surge like ours so that once we have defeated the Taliban or degraded them to a point that a smaller Afghan force can keep control where it is almost like the Afghan local police or smaller numbers of the Army can manage to keep the Taliban or others inside the country down to the point where they are not a threat to the stability of the government or to the people of Afghanistan. They cannot afford a force the size that they already have. So I think the only way we can think of it or the way we ought to think of it is something that we would be willing to support for a few years. Senator Nelson. In the short term? Secretary Gates. Yes, for a few years. But then it seems to me, particularly if there is a political solution to this war, as we all believe there needs to be ultimately, that they could get by with a significantly smaller force. We probably would have to help them even then, but it would be a dramatically smaller bill than it is now. If it is a smaller bill, we may be able to get other countries to help us as well. Senator Nelson. Hopefully, the NATO support would extend to providing help for the sustainability into the future because until we secure the country, a political solution is going to be very difficult. Secretary Gates. Just as an example, I mean, the Japanese basically pay the salaries for the Afghan national police. That is their contribution. They do not have troops there, but that is not a small thing that they are doing. Senator Nelson. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Senator Ayotte? Senator Ayotte. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I want to thank you for being here today and commend both of you for your long and distinguished service to our country. Before I ask any questions, I just want to say that I believe our Government's most important responsibility is to protect the American people. This is a deeply held personal belief for me. I am from a military family. My husband is in the Guard and is a veteran of the Iraq war. So I applaud your efforts to ensure that our brave men and women in uniform have everything that they need to fight and win our wars. Supporting our men and women in uniform is certainly a solemn and sacred responsibility that we have. As we draw down in Iraq and our country confronts a fiscal crisis, I think it would be a mistake to drastically cut the size of our military or our readiness. That said, you appreciate--and I know based on Admiral Mullen's comments--that we face a fiscal crisis in this country and that we face great challenges in balancing the need to protect our country and to make sure that we serve and provide for our troops with the need to cut back in all areas. I want to commend Secretary Gates for proactively going forward to look for efficiencies and billions of dollars in savings. As a new member of this committee, I want you to know that I look forward to working with DOD to bring reforms forward and efficiencies to fruition and also to look for additional cost savings. I have a question based on having the appearance of Secretary Vickers the other day for his nomination, and that is that he testified that 25 percent of the detainees that are being released from Guantanamo are going back into theater and engaging in hostilities again. I wanted to ask Secretary Gates whether that is an accurate figure and how that is informing our release decisions from Guantanamo. Secretary Gates. That is about the right figure based on the latest information that I have. I would say that we have been very selective in terms of returning people. One of the things we have discovered over time is that we are not particularly good at predicting which returnee will be a recidivist. Some of those that we have considered the most dangerous and who have been released or who we considered dangerous and potentially going back into the fight have not, and some that we evaluated as not being much of a danger or much of a risk we have discovered in the fight. Then I would say that the NDAA of Fiscal Year 2011 imposes some additional restrictions on who we can release, and Congress put me in the uncomfortable position of having to certify people who get returned, that they are no longer a danger. So I will tell you that that raises the bar very high as far as I am concerned. Senator Ayotte. One of the concerns that I think this raises as well is if we are able to capture a high-value target in an area where we may not currently be engaged in a direct conflict, where are we going to put these individuals if the President still goes forward to attempt to close Guantanamo? Secretary Gates. I think the honest answer to that question is we do not know if we capture them outside of the areas where we are at war and are not covered by the existing war authorizations. One possibility is for such a person to be put in the custody of their home government. Another possibility is that we bring them to the United States. After all, we have brought a variety of terrorists to the United States and put them on trial in Article III courts here over the years, but it will be a challenge. Senator Ayotte. Would that cause you to make a different recommendation to the President on closing Guantanamo given the challenges that it presents? Secretary Gates. I think we are in the position, frankly, that the prospects for closing Guantanamo, as best I can tell, are very, very low given very broad opposition to doing that here in Congress. Senator Ayotte. But we also are not using it to add additional detainees there that might be appropriate for holding at Guantanamo either, are we? Secretary Gates. Not at this point. Senator Ayotte. I wanted to ask you about the reset equipment for combat within the budget. I am concerned about the lower funding levels proposed in fiscal year 2012 to reset equipment for combat units returning from deployments. I wanted to get your thoughts on that part of the budget. On September 11, 2010, the New Hampshire National Guard deployed the largest number of guardsmen and women since World War II for our State, and these troops will be returning in the second half of this year. I know that reset is more than just buying equipment. It includes manning time and time to train. So restoring readiness levels takes time. But I also know that the National Guard units have historically been at the end of the food chain in getting new equipment and resources for training. This can impact their readiness for Federal missions but also can impact their responsiveness to State emergencies. So with this in mind, how confident are you in that the amounts included in the fiscal year 2012 budget for the services for reset will allow all units in the Active and Reserve components to be able to address the critical readiness needs that we have going forward? Secretary Gates. One of the things that has happened over the past 4 years that I am very proud of is that when I assumed this position, the historic equipment on hand percentage across the board for the National Guard was about 70 percent, and when I took this job, it was at about 40 percent. It is now on a national basis at about 77 percent. What has changed now compared with the past, just to your point about the food chain, is the Guard now is getting the same kind of equipment that the Active Force has. So they are getting much higher quality equipment. At the same time, they are getting more equipment. How fast we can do this for units that are coming back from conflict is going to be a challenge because it is a lot of money. One of the concerns that I have about the CR is that there is some reset money in there, and it is going to be very difficult for us to execute. One of the things that we will have to do, if we get a year-long CR, we will have to get pretty close to shut down the recapitalization of the humvees at Red River and Letterkenny depots. So all of these things are tied together, but it is going to be a challenge. Until a year or 2 ago, we would have testified to you that we will need reset money for at least a couple of years after the conflict ends, and we think that is probably now a longer period of time, longer than 2 years. The problem is that when the conflicts end, that reset money for the most part has come out of these OCO budgets, and finding the dollars for a significant reset after the end of the conflict, if we are not getting any OCO funding, I think will be a big challenge for us. Senator Ayotte. I know that my time is up. I thank you very much, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. I appreciate it. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. Senator Akaka. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Aloha, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen and Secretary Hale. I want to thank you all for your leadership and service. Secretary Gates, if this is your final budget testimony before this committee, I would like to say that I appreciate the excellent job that you have done leading our military. I want to also thank the brave men and women of our armed forces and their families for their service. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I applaud the steps taken to care for our servicemembers' mental well-being. I believe that taking care of those defending our Nation is a responsibility and not a choice. I also believe that the healing process should also account for families as well. I am interested in hearing your thoughts on the progress DOD is making in helping families as a whole as they work through the challenges of PTSD, TBI, and other stress-inducing situations for families. Admiral Mullen. Thanks, Senator Akaka. I know that you have focused on these issues, and all of us greatly appreciate that. I think we are in a much better position than we were a few years ago, but we also have a much better understanding of the size of the problem. I will speak specifically to families first. While early on there was a great deal of focus on spouses, in terms of the stress that they have undergone, what I have seen certainly over the course of the last couple years is an increasing awareness and understanding of the need to address the whole family, including the kids, as they have been stressed. I mean, if you are in a high-end, high-rotation unit and you were 10 years old when these wars started, and you had mostly your dad, but mom and dad, on their fourth or fifth deployment, you just went off to college and you basically almost have not seen your dad. There are issues associated with that that I think we are going to have to deal with in the long run. A 15-year-old in one of these military families--their whole life has been at war. That is something a lot of us have never been through. So there has been an extraordinary amount of effort placed in terms of prioritizing inside each of the Services to get at the major issues. It is not just the stress and the mental stress. We are short health care providers, although we are up dramatically from where we were in 2001. We were in the 1,000 range in 2001. We are over 7,000 now. We have TRICARE health providers that are almost 50,000, but we are still short. The country is short, and we have to figure out a better way to break through, to join with the VA, another committee I know that is near and dear to your heart as chairman, and work together with the VA and, quite frankly, with communities throughout the country to get at this. The last thing I would say is the initiative that the First Lady has undertaken and announced with the President about a month ago, an extraordinarily important issue focused on military families across a number of issues to include this--it is wellness. It is education. It is employment. It is child care--signed up by all the Secretaries from every department, 16 of them, is a huge step forward in terms of giving this visibility in a way that we just have not had before. So I am more optimistic than I have been, but we have some substantial steps that need to be taken. Secretary Gates. I would like to just mention two things, Senator. One is one of the significant changes, I think, we have made in the last 3 years or so--we have moved virtually-- we used to pay for--most of these family programs associated with those who are deployed and the challenges that they have been facing have been in the supplementals and in the OCO funding. We have over the last 3 years moved virtually all of that money into the base budget so that long after the war funding ends, we will be able to sustain these family-oriented programs. This year, I think we have $8.3 billion in the budget for these programs, and that is about a $200 million increase over fiscal year 2011. Senator Akaka. I know your concern goes back also to the TRICARE program probably needing more resources than they have had before. Secretary Gates, I believe that an electronic medical record system would be very beneficial to current and former military families and members, as well as the health care providers. Mr. Secretary, can you provide an update on where DOD is on electronic health records? Secretary Gates. We will get you an answer for the record that has the details. Military Health System (MHS) medical facilities use the Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA), the Department of Defense's (DOD) current electronic health record (EHR) capability, as part of a family of systems. AHLTA generates, maintains, stores and provides secure online access to comprehensive outpatient records. The current DOD EHR family of systems forms one of the largest ambulatory EHRs in the world, with documentation of an average of 145,000 clinical encounters each day. The MHS is currently executing a plan to improve system speed, operational availability and the user interface to enhance provider satisfaction until interagency EHR (iEHR) capabilities are delivered. Executing this plan allows MHS to meet providers' near term needs, while better preparing our applications and supporting infrastructure for the EHR Way Ahead. The DOD EHR Way Ahead Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is ongoing. Because DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) are engaged in concurrent EHR modernization efforts, significant opportunities for collaboration exist. To achieve common objectives, a DOD-VA EHR Senior Coordinating Group has been established. The group, which consists of representatives from DOD, VA, and the White House, is charged with reaching agreement on a proposed approach to a DOD-VA iEHR. The Senior Coordinating Group established six teams to reach agreements on proposed courses of action. The six teams are the Enterprise Architecture, Data Interoperability, Business Process, Systems Capabilities Presentation Layer, and Mission Requirements and Performance Outcomes Teams. The agreements reached by the group will form the basis for a proposed DOD-VA iEHR approach. On February 12, 2011, a high-level common data and architecture approach was presented to and subsequently endorsed by the Deputy Secretaries of DOD and VA and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Regardless of the alternative selected as a result of the DOD AoA, the agreements made by the Departments will apply to the iEHR. Additional meetings between Secretary Shinseki and I will occur to further define high level plans for the iEHR. Secretary Gates. I will tell you we have made a lot of progress, but it is not fast enough as far as Secretary Shinseki and I are concerned. He and I met, just the two of us, about 2 weeks ago to try and accelerate this effort. So he and I will meet again with our staffs in the middle of March to assess where we are and what needs to be done to move this forward and get it done. Then we will have a follow-up meeting at the end of April. I have found, unfortunately, with these huge bureaucracies, whether it is Veterans Affairs or DOD, that things like this that are big projects do not move very fast if they do not get high-level attention. So Secretary Shinseki and I are both committed to making as-fast-as-possible progress on this. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka. Senator Collins. Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, I very much appreciate the fact that you opened your testimony with highlighting the damaging effects of a year-long CR on DOD. I am very concerned about these impacts. Senator Bill Nelson and I recently wrote to our leaders suggesting that we should be working on the defense appropriations bill right now. I made a similar suggestion to our leaders last fall, advice that unfortunately they did not take. But I will say to my colleagues that it is inconceivable to me that we have spent the past 10 days debating the Federal Aviation Administration reauthorization, not to say that that is not important, but it pales in comparison to the urgency of acting on the defense appropriations bill. So I hope our Senate leaders heard you loud and clear today and that we will return next week and make that our first order of business. Certainly the impact that you have outlined is a disaster, and there is just no need for us to be debating a bill that is not urgent when we should be doing a high priority bill and certainly the passage of the defense appropriations bill is the highest priority. So thank you for your testimony on that. Admiral Mullen, in your testimony you stated that one of the greatest success stories this year has been the growth and development of the ANSFs. You went on to say that that has gone incredibly well. I understand that that is going well generally, and I also understand how imperative it is that we build up those forces so that we can eventually leave Afghanistan. But I want you to know that I am concerned that the focus on so rapidly increasing the number of Afghan security forces is shortchanging the vetting of those recruits. Recently six U.S. military personnel, including Private 1st Class Buddy McClain of Maine, were killed by an Afghan border police officer. The press have reported that in the past 13 months, Afghan personnel have attacked our military personnel or our coalition partners six times. What are we doing to better vet those Afghan recruits to ensure that tragic incidents and attacks like this do not occur? Admiral Mullen. Certainly it is, Senator Collins, each one of them, a tragedy. To go to the overall structure, when I go back 12 months or 15 months with General Caldwell and what we had then versus what we have now, we have moved incredibly quickly. But we have also focused on the quality of the move, and by that I mean the quality of the instructors, the quality of the infrastructure, a substantial training program that was virtually nonexistent there before. The Secretary talked earlier about the improvement in literacy. We are now focused very much on the need to both train in specific skill sets, and all of this while we are obviously fighting a war, moving pretty quickly, moving very quickly to ensure, as best we can, that nothing like that in the security forces, the military or the police, occurs. I would assure you there is a tremendous amount of focus on this with respect to the leadership. That said, tragically these things do occur on occasion. They did in Iraq. They do in Afghanistan. While we will do everything we can to eliminate them, I would not sit here and tell you that we will be 100 percent successful with respect to that. Every one of these is investigated thoroughly. Every one of them. In fact, the one to which you refer--I went through this with General Caldwell specifically. What happened? What do we know about this guy? What was the background? There was not a lot there with respect to his background that would have led him to specifically take that action to kill our six troops. So we take that. We investigate it. We certainly integrate that back into what we are doing, but it is a big challenge. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, I applaud you for holding accountable both military and civilian personnel who have failed to perform adequately. On Tuesday, Senator Lieberman and I met with one of the victims of the Fort Hood massacre, Sergeant Alonzo Lunsford. He was accompanied by friends and family members, as well as other family members who had lost loved ones in this attack. The very first question that they asked Senator Lieberman and me and the one that I pose to you today is when will the supervisors that filed such misleading officer evaluation reports regarding Major Hassan be held accountable. These evaluation reports ignored his increasingly erratic behavior, his poor performance as a physician. We know from our investigation that one of his commanding officers told the people at Fort Hood you are getting our worst, and yet when you read the officer performance evaluations, they are glowing by and large. So this attack occurred 15 months ago, and what the victims and their family members are asking us is when will these individuals be held accountable. Secretary Gates. At my request, the Secretary of the Army has undertaken an investigation to address this specifically, and the latest information that I have is that he is nearing decisions on this. So I do not have a precise timeline, but I think in the very near future he will be reaching his conclusions and taking whatever actions he deems appropriate. Senator Collins. Thank you. My time has expired. I am going to submit some questions for the record. Admiral Mullen, I do want to mention to you that I am very concerned about the increase in suicides among the National Guard. I recently had the honor to welcome back a company of Maine National Guard men and women who have spent a year in Afghanistan. It seems to me we are doing a better job in helping the Active-Duty Force which has those resources more readily available, but I am really concerned about whether we are providing that same kind of support to the Guard and Reserve. Admiral Mullen. I said this many times. We would be nowhere close to where we are in these wars without the extraordinary performance of the Guard and Reserve, and they deserve every bit the attention that everybody else has gotten. Certainly on the suicide issue, it is a huge concern to all of us. The Services are working it and, in particular, the surge in that over the last year on the Guard side. So there is a great deal of effort to try to, first of all, understand it and then address it, as we have in the Services as well. Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins. I think Senator Collins speaks for all of us on that issue of suicide. Thank you. Senator Reed. Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by associating myself with the remarks of Chairman Levin and Senator McCain and others about your extraordinary service, Mr. Secretary, to the Nation throughout your tenure in difficult times and making difficult judgments. Thank you for what you have done and we continue to wish you well as you continue to serve. Admiral Mullen, I know in October you will finish your tour, and I will add that commendation to you for your extraordinary service of 43 years in uniform in the U.S. Navy and to all your colleagues at DOD. Let me emphasize what you all have emphasized. It is absolutely critical to fund the defense budget going forward not in an ad hoc, every 60 days basis, but over a long period of time to provide certainty for programs, certainty for strategy. But there is another aspect of our national strategy that is increasingly important and that is the role the DOS will play in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mr. Secretary, I would assume that you would stress with the same urgency the need to fund those types of DOS programs in Iraq and Afghanistan because otherwise what you have accomplished and, more specifically, what young men and women in our military forces have accomplished could be severely jeopardized and our national security severely threatened if we do not follow through. A concern that many of us have is that you are able to summon an almost reflexive response by the American people when you talk about helping men and women in uniform. That same response is not elicited when people start criticizing foreign aid which this could be labeled. I just think it would be helpful if you would comment on this issue of the need also to support that effort. Secretary Gates. First of all, I would say that for the entire time I have been in this job, I have been an advocate for more money for the DOS. Actually this dates back to my days in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when we had case officers collecting information that any good political officer in the Foreign Service could get, but there were not enough. So it has been a concern of mine all along. I would say that right now it is a critically urgent concern because if DOS does not get the money that they have requested for the transition in Iraq, we are really going to be in the soup. We have spent probably close to $800 billion or $900 billion, perhaps more importantly, more than 4,000 lives, and here we are at the end game and it reminds me of the final scene in ``Charlie Wilson's War.'' We have spent billions to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan, and we could not get a million dollars to build schools in Afghanistan in 1989 and 1990. The same thing is going to happen in Iraq. If we cannot have a transition to DOS and the police training function, if they do not have a presence in various places throughout Iraq, much of the investment that we have made in trying to get the Iraqis to the place they are is at risk in my view. The chairman mentioned the need for DOS funding in his opening statement. But you would find, I think, extraordinary support across the entire DOD for their budget, but more importantly our real worry that all that we have gained is potentially at risk if we do not have the kind of DOS presence and DOS activities in Iraq. Here is the other piece of the problem and it goes to the CR. DOS cannot spend the money to get ready right now. This is getting toward the end of February. There are facilities to be built. There are people to be hired, and they cannot do any of that. So we are going to run out of time in terms of being able to get this accomplished. So I hope that the passion in this reflects just how strongly we feel about this. This is really, really important. Admiral Mullen. Senator Reed, just quickly, you talk about Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a global issue. This is not a lot of money invested in places around the world that prevent conflicts. The military does this. We have to do it with our partners in DOS, otherwise we are going back for a lot more investment and a lot more casualties. Senator Reed. Mr. Hale, please. Mr. Hale. Let me just offer a brief additional point. For the first time, in fiscal year 2012, State will request a budget under the OCO fund. It will be very important for Congress to enact that and isolate the money that is associated with these operations, so I hope that's favorably received. Senator Reed. That's an excellent point, Mr. Secretary. Just, with Afghanistan, too, you mention ``Charlie Wilson's War.'' We learned a very expensive lesson about not spending the million dollars in September 11, 2001, attacks. Frankly, particularly with Afghanistan, where at a point we might have to relearn that lesson, because the threats that are being organized against the United States and our allies are still emanating from border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, unless I'm mistaken. Is that a fair judgment, Mr. Secretary? Secretary Gates. Absolutely. The chairman refers to it as the epicenter of world terrorism. While al Qaeda has metastasized and has branches in Yemen and North Africa and elsewhere, the reality is, that border area with Afghanistan and Pakistan is still the heart of the problem. Senator Reed. Let me make one follow up point about Afghanistan, because as the chairman mentioned, we were there recently. We are building an increasingly credible force there, but it's a force that the government of Afghanistan cannot afford indefinitely. It's much cheaper than our troops. But this is not just a 2- to 3-year commitment. This has to be a multi-year commitment to support their forces in the field. Not singly the United States, but the international community. We have to start now and build that in. Is, I think, is that another point you would agree with? Secretary Gates. I made the point earlier. I mean, I think that the international community and Afghanistan cannot afford a force of 375,000 Afghan National Security Fund (ANSF) indefinitely. We have to think of this, I think, more as a surge for the Afghans. With a political settlement and with the degrading of the Taliban, perhaps the size of the ANSF can come down to a point where it's more affordable for us and for everybody else. But we have, just as an example, I mean, our fiscal year 2012 budget has in the OCO $12.8 billion to support the ANSF for 1 fiscal year. We can't sustain that for many years. So, a lot depends on being successful by 2014 in getting the transition to the Afghans. Even if we have to support it for a little after that, if we have most of our troops out of there, it's still going to be a lot less money for the American taxpayers. Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed. When you go to your NATO meeting, I hope that you would also see what support we might be able to get for the continuing cost of an Afghan army from some of our NATO allies. In that regard it would be helpful as well. Senator Graham. Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Any chance you'll reconsider leaving, Secretary Gates? Secretary Gates. No, sir. Senator Graham. I didn't think so. I just can't thank you enough for what you've done for the country. Admiral Mullen. I just want to say something about the administration here. I know we have our differences. But when it comes to Iraq and Afghanistan, I think the policies you've created, the policies the President has supported, have been very sound. We're about to reap the benefits of operations that have been tough, difficult, sometimes mismanaged, but that's the nature of war. We're very close in Iraq. So, I just want to build on what Senator Reed said. I'm going to be the ranking member of the Foreign Operations Accounts on Appropriations. I'd like for you to put in writing to me and Senator Leahy what you said about this account. Let's give a real world example. What did it mean in terms of the Egyptian crisis to have a good dialogue with the Egyptian military, Admiral Mullen? Admiral Mullen. It was huge. It was the benefits of 30 years of investment of the interaction that we've had with thousands of them in our schools, the values that have rubbed off over time with them, the ability to sustain those contacts, and then see them act in such a responsible way. Senator Graham. I think that's a real world example of where 30 years of investment really paid off. This account has been reduced to $45 billion in the House. I do share my House colleagues' desire to reduce spending, and no account is above scrutiny. But the $5 billion that is flowing to Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan on the civilian side of the OCO account, what, are you telling us that, basically, that should be seen sort of as emergency spending and not counted against our baseline? Admiral Mullen. I think, I mean, certainly some of it is tied to the military. But I think the Kerry-Lugar-Berman piece, that's a 5-year program at a billion and a half a year. That isn't military, and that's what we were taking about earlier. Sustaining that is going to be critical, not just now, but in the long term. Senator Graham. I guess the point I'm making, we're surging on the civilian side as we draw down our troops. The civilian- military partnership is essential to holding and building. Admiral Mullen. Right. Senator Graham. There are funds going to Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan on the civilian side that I think will be just as important as any brigade, and I would like to treat those funds as a national security asset. I will do everything I can on the Republican side in the Senate to make sure that we protect those funds that you can't hold and build without. Admiral Mullen. Sure. Senator Graham. Now, here's what a waste the American people--we're talking about fiscal austerity at home. What is the percentage of GDP spending on defense when you count all appropriations? Secretary Gates. Well, two facts. First, the base budget alone---- Senator Graham. Right. Secretary Gates.--is 3.7 percent of GDP. If you take all the war funding for fiscal year 2011, plus the base budget, it's about 4.9 percent of GDP. Senator Graham. Historically---- Secretary Gates. But there's another fact that's worth noting---- Senator Graham. Okay. Secretary Gates.--and that is that as a percentage of Federal outlays---- Senator Graham. Right. Secretary Gates.--with the exception of the late 1990s and early 2000s, at 18.9 percent it is the lowest level of Federal percentage of outlays since before World War II. Senator Graham. Okay. Now, we need to understand that as a Congress here, the Secretary of Defense has just told us, and, since World War II terms, we're on the very low end, at a time when I think the threats to our Nation are growing exponentially. Now, as we pull down in Iraq, it is your belief, if the Iraqi Government would ask for American troops to be left behind to perform the three functions you suggested, it would be in our national security interest to say yes? Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I believe that. Senator Graham. Now, there's a fourth component--security for those who are going to be in the lead. DOS, the Department of Justice, Agriculture Department, the police trainers. My concern is, if we don't have a sufficient military footprint, then DOS literally has to build its own security apparatus, which will be in excess of $5 billion. Do you think, all things being equal, it would be better for the U.S. military to be able to continue to provide security? Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, I do. I'm, partly because we would also have the helicopters and things like that. The private security contractors that State's going to have to hire to perform that role will not have some of the, quote, unquote, enablers that we have. Senator Graham. Well, see, this is the dilemma. We need to know this soon. Because DOS needs to build capacity. Do they buy helicopters? Do they buy 54 MRAMs? Is it wise to hire a private contractor army to replace the American military if the Iraqis will allow the American military to perform that function. So, the sooner we know the answer to that question, the more likely we are to be successful. Because I have grave concerns about building a DOS army. So, that's must my 2 cents worth. Detainees. Admiral Mullen, our special operators are all over the world as I speak, is that correct? Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. Senator Graham. The threat from terrorism is just not confined to Iraq and Afghanistan. Admiral Mullen. It is not. Senator Graham. What would we do as a nation if we were able to capture a high level al Qaeda operative in any country outside of Iraq or Afghanistan, let's say, Somalia, Yemen, as examples. What would we do with that detainee? Admiral Mullen. We don't have an answer to that question. Senator Graham. See, now, this is a big deal to me. We're in a war, and capturing people is part of a intelligence gathering. It's an essential component of this war. Do you agree with that, Admiral Mullen? Admiral Mullen. Right. Senator Graham. It is better to capture someone than it is to kill them in a lot of cases, is that correct? Admiral Mullen. It is. Senator Graham. It's hard to capture someone if you don't have a jail to put them. All those on the other side who want to stop renditions, we need to come up with an American jail, because we're in, the only alternative is to kill them or go to renditions. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that sometimes this year Republicans and Democrats can have a breakthrough on this issue to help our men and women fighting this war, because it is a very spot to put the special, a tough spot to put the special operators in. Our CIA doesn't interrogate terror suspects any longer. These are things we need to talk about and get an answer to. Afghanistan. Not only is it miraculous what General Caldwell has done. It's stunning to me that we're in 2009 and 10, and 30 percent of the NCO corps in Afghanistan could read. When he took over, he tested the Afghanistan army for literacy, and on paper, every NCO should read at the 3rd grade level. When they tested the NCO corps, 70 percent could not read at the 3rd grade level, and he is going about fixing that. So, you're dead right. But, we need to know, after 8 years of involvement, 90 percent of the Afghan army could not shoot to NATO standards 18 months ago. So, after all these years we're just finally getting it right. In many ways, we've been in Afghanistan with the right formulation for about 18 months. Is that a fair statement? Admiral Mullen. That's a fair statement, and it's a very difficult discussion to have because it was 10 years ago when this started. Senator Graham. I just want the American people to know that we've made mistakes, but we're finally getting it right. One last thought. When 2014 comes, I am very optimistic that there will be a better Afghan police and army than we have today, that we can transition. But I've been discussing among my colleagues and others about what an enduring relationship with Afghanistan would look like. It is my belief, Mr. Chairman, that a political economic and military alliance with the Afghan people, at their request, would be incredibly beneficial to our long-term national security interest and could be a game-changer in the region. To both of you, what do you believe the effect of an enduring military relationship would be on the future security of Afghanistan and the region as a whole if the Afghans requested of us to have joint airbases past 2015? Would that be something you think it would be wise for us to talk about and consider? Secretary Gates. Absolutely, Senator. I think that, to go to, Admiral Mullen's comments about Pakistan a little while ago, there is a big question in the whole region whether we will stick around. It's in Afghanistan, it's in Pakistan, it's all over the area. A security agreement with Afghanistan that provided for a continuing relationship and some kind of joint facilities and so on for training, for counterterrorism and so on beyond 2014, I think would be very much in our interest. I think that it would serve as a barrier to Iranian influence coming from the West. I think it would serve as a barrier to a reconstitution of the Taliban and others coming from the border areas in Pakistan. So, I think it would be a stabilizing, have a stabilizing effect, not just in Afghanistan, but in the region. Senator Graham. Would you also agree that it would give an edge to the Afghan security forces in perpetuity over the Taliban, and you might, with that kind of a relationship, get by with a somewhat smaller army? Secretary Gates. Absolutely. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham. Senator Hagan is next. We have a vote now on the Senate's schedule for 12:10. We're going to try to work around that vote and to work through that vote. I'm going to turn the gavel over now to Senator Udall, because I have to leave for a few minutes as well. But, we're going to try to keep going right through that vote the best we can. Senator Hagan. Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will actually cut my own questions short, because I have to preside over the capsule that's on the Senate floor at noon. But, I do want to say to all three of the individuals here, thank you so much for your service and your testimony, and the excellent work that you do for our country. I did want to agree with Senator Reed and Senator Graham on the concern, and Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, your concern about the funding for DOS and the foreign aid. I think that is critically important. As you both said, it certainly was evident as to what has taken place just recently in Egypt. I did want to talk a little bit about the health of the Special Operations Forces (SOF). Admiral Mullen, in your prepared remarks you acknowledged the continued stress on the force from 9 years of constant conflict. Last week Admiral Olson, Commander of the U.S. Special Operation Command (SOCOM), told an industry group that difficult and repeated deployments of Special Operations personnel are causing some fraying around the edges of the force. Admiral Olson also made the point that demand for SOF will continue to outstrip supply for the foreseeable future. Given the demand for these SOFs, not only in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), but also in other parts of the world, for partnership and capacity-building activities, how does DOD intend to address the readiness issues identified by Admiral Olson? Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates? Admiral Mullen. I think, actually, the force has expanded, I think, from, when these wars started, around 30,000 to on a way to upwards of 56,000. I think there are insatiable appetites and requirements for Special Forces. The vast majority of them are in CENTCOM. That said, they actually are in many, many countries around the world, and they're making investments for the future so that we don't have to go to war in other parts of the world. I think his statement about fraying around the edges is right. They've been on, had a significant number of deployments. I think in Iraq, actually, in Iraq and Afghanistan they'll typically be the last forces out. So, the pressure is going to continue there. We've worked very, very hard both increasing size to increased dwell time. But as we do that, quite frankly, Petraeus asked for more, because they have such an impact. So, we're on a very, we're on a knife edge there with respect to this. They're extraordinary in their performance and their execution. I consider the Care Coalition, which is the group that takes care of wounded families, families of the fallen, to be the Gold Standard in our military with respect to how we approach that. That said, they're pushed very, very hard. From a readiness standpoint, as they come back and dwell time will increase, I think we'll be fine in terms of giving them the time, and then to be able to disperse them to other parts of the world, which we have not been able to do in the kinds of numbers and requests, because they've been so tied to CENTCOM. So, I think we will be able to meet that. But it's going to be awhile until we get on the down side of both these conflicts. Secretary Gates. I would just add that with the increase in SOCOM and their higher level of activity, another one of the things that we've tried to do is move a lot of the SOCOM money, a lot of the Special Forces money, into the base budget, so that once these wars end we are able to sustain the larger Special Forces that we have, and properly equip them. Senator Hagan. Thank you. The international security environment, particularly in cyberspace, continues to evolve. Cyber threats to our electrical grid, telecommunications, military networks, critical infrastructure, and the financial system pose serious concerns to our national security. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is DOD's strategy to recruit, train, and retain cyber specialists, and what is the way forward to centralize the military cyberspace operations and U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), and to synchronize the defense networks? Secretary Gates. I think we've made a lot of progress in this area. The creation of CYBERCOM was in important step. I directed the Service Secretaries about a year ago to consider training in the, in cyber, to be their, one of their highest priorities and to ensure that all the spaces that we have in our schools for teaching cyber skills be filled at a priority level. I think they've made a lot of headway. We have a lot of money in this area. This budget for fiscal year 2012 has a half a billion dollars for cyber research at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). So, and I think we're in pretty good shape in terms of protecting the dot-mil world. This last summer, Secretary Napolitano and I signed a memorandum of understanding that give, that begins to move us in a direction where we can begin to do better at protecting dot-gov and dot-com. The reality is, there was a big debate, and it went on in the Bush administration, and it continued in this administration, of people who did not, for, did not want to make use of the National Security Agency (NSA) in domestic cyber protection because of civil liberties and privacy concerns. What Secretary Napolitano and I did was arrive at an agreement where Department of Homeland Security senior officials are now integrated into NSA senior leadership. They have their own General Counsel, their own firewalls, their own protections, so that they can exploit and task NSA to begin to get coverage in the dot-gov and dot-com worlds. This is really important. I think it's a start. But we still have a long way to go. Senator Hagan. Thank you. Admiral Mullen, anything to add to that? Admiral Mullen. No. Ditto. I mean, it's a huge concern. Senator Hagan. Yes. Admiral Mullen. A growing threat. A lot has been done. Schools are filled. But we have a long way to go. Senator Hagan. I think it's good that the schools are filled, it's positive. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Udall [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Hagan. Senator Chambliss is next. Senator Chambliss. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I don't know what all this conversation is about, about saying great things about you because you're leaving. We're planning on you being, both being around here for awhile longer to help us make some very critical decisions. Whether it's voluntary in your case, Secretary Gates, or your time is up, whatever, Admiral Mullen, to both of you, you provided a very valuable service to our country over this last short term. I'm not even counting the years and years and years that both of you have given. So, thank you very much for that service. Whether we've agreed or disagreed, you've always responded to me in a very professional way. I'm very appreciative of that relationship. I want to echo what Senator Graham said about this detention and interrogation issue. I mean, guys, we have a real problem there that needs to be addressed in the short term. I'm sure you've probably seen what, the way in which Director Panetta responded yesterday to a question I asked him about if we did capture bin Laden or Zawahiri. That just highlights the fact that we don't have a plan, and we really do have to figure out something here. We thought Baghram might be the answer. But it looks like it's obviously not long-term. So, we look forward to working with you on that. I continue to have, Secretary Gates, a TACAIR issue that just really bothers me with respect to where we are now. The further we get into the F-35, the more I'm concerned about this. In May 2009, just to go back a little bit, General Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, testified that the military requirement for the F-22 was 240, or 60 more than DOD was willing to purchase. That summer there was a concerted effort made to strip funding for seven additional F-22s out of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010. Ultimately, obviously, and you've taken a lot of credit for the fact in your budget that the F-22 has been terminated and there's a huge savings out there. First, there was an argument that the F-35 would be more affordable than the F-22. Secretary Gates, on July 16, 2009, in a speech in Chicago you personally stated that the F-35 would be less than half the total cost of the F-22. Since that time, the F-35 experienced a Nunn-McCurdy breach due to cost increases, and DOD has recently restructured the program again, delaying deliveries and again driving up the cost. Last month your own Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office established that the unit cost of a JSF average over variance has doubled since the program began to approximately $116 million per copy in fiscal year 2010 dollars. Things may even get worse. Of note, the price per copy for the last F-22s purchased was $130 million. Second, regarding the threats the United States may face in the future and our ability to maintain air supremacy, you downplayed the threat and stated again on July 16, Mr. Secretary, of 2009 in that Chicago speech that, and I quote, ``China is projected to have no 5th generation aircraft by 2020.'' Well, I heard what you said earlier in response to Senator Inhofe, but the fact is that last month China flew their first 5th generation fighter, the J-20, which your own intelligence experts predict will reach Initial Operating Capability (IOC) with 20 aircraft, a 20-aircraft squadron well before 2020. Also, over a year ago Russia flew their 5th generation fighter, the PAC FA, which, again, your own intelligence experts predict will have an IOC date well before 2020. Third, Mr. Secretary, a year ago in this very room, when DOD was in the process of notifying Congress of an F-35 Nunn- McCurdy breach, you had just fired the F-35 program manager, and I asked you if you were going to revisit the issue of additional F-22 production. You responded, and I quote, ``No, sir, because the IOCs, based on information that I was given in preparation for this hearing, the IOCs for the Services, for the arrival of the training squadron at Eglin all remain pretty much on track.'' Even though we do have a plane you say that's on schedule going to Eglin in May, and additional planes going in September, those are all test airplanes. A few months after you made that statement, the IOC date for the Air Force version slipped from 2013 to 2016, the IOC date for the Navy version slipped from 2014 to 2016, and the Marine Corps version has gone from a projected IOC date of 2012, or next year, to being on a 1-year probation and not even having an IOC date. In light of all these developments, I hope you can understand why I am extremely concerned as we go into this budget about where we're headed, gentlemen. In light of General Schwartz's stated military requirement I need to ask you one more time, Mr. Secretary, is DOD considering the purchase of any additional F-22s? Secretary Gates. No, sir. We are not. Senator Chambliss. DOD is spending billions of dollars to buy hundreds more 4th generation fighters, F-18s. DOD has linked at least some of these additional F-18 purchases directly to delays in the F-35 program. I can understand that. Can you explain why it makes sense to invest billions of taxpayer dollars in buying 4th generation F-18s, which are basically useless whenever there's contested airspace, rather than buying additional F-22s, which can fly anywhere, anytime, in any airspace? Secretary Gates. Sir, first of all, let me say about the F- 35 that the new program manager, Admiral David Venlet, probably the best acquisition person we have in uniform, has completed a comprehensive tactical baseline review. I think we have, now, it, he took several months to do this. I think we have greater understanding and granularity in terms of progress on the F-35. The reality is, both the Navy and Air Force variants have made substantial progress over the last year. The Air Force version flew twice as many flight tests as had been originally planned. It is training aircraft that are going to Eglin, and both for the Air Force and the Navy. We are investing money in upgrades to the F-22. There's, there are hundreds of millions of dollars in the fiscal year 2012 budget to upgrade the F-22. Some of the lessons learned from the F-35 and the F-22 are being put into upgrades for our existing 4th generation aircraft that our people believe with those upgrades can take on the adversary's best aircraft. I finally would say that this is China's and Russia's first low observable aircraft. We've been at this 20 years. I think that they are likely to run into a number of the same challenges we did early in our stealth programs. I think that our tactical air situation will be in good shape. In addition, the Air Force has realized that they can upgrade some of their 400 F-16s to give them additional capability and sustainment, as well as the early block F-16s, and they're upgrading the most recent blocks of F-16s. So, I think that combining all these different programs that we have in modernizing TACAIR, plus getting on with the F-35, now under new management and new leadership, I think that we're in reasonably good shape. I would finally say, the last procurement that is, has been negotiated with Lockheed Martin, the Low-Rate Initial Production 4, actually has resulted in a fairly substantial decrease in the price of the F-35 for that particular buy, and we hope that we can continue that trend. Senator Chambliss. There's no question but that you're increasing the risk, Mr. Secretary, and I hope that we don't get down the road and realize that was too far a reach for us from a risk standpoint. I have a question that I'd like to ask Admiral Mullen for the record, and it's on a little bit different tack. Admiral Mullen, we're struggling with this issue of the deficit as well as debt reduction long-term. I have quoted you several times, as have a number of us, in saying that the number one national security interest of the United States is the long-term debt that we face. Would you mind just sending us a written statement amplifying on that record? Because your opinion, I can tell you, resonates around the world with respect to that issue. I'm thankful that you stood forward and you made that comment. I'd just like you to amplify it for the record. Admiral Mullen. I've tried to stay out of trouble in doing that. But it really in its simplest form focuses on what I believe would be a shrinking national security budget. We are now involved in, as we should be, looking at ways to save money and do it more efficiently and effectively. But at some point in time, the size of our budget could have a dramatic effect on the size of our force structure. That's the danger that's there, given the national security requirements, which seem to be growing, not reducing, not getting smaller. [The information referred to follows:] The ties between the strength of our economy and our Nation's security are inseparable and incontrovertible. We need a vibrant, growing economy to exert influence internationally and to provide for our military and other defense capabilities. In turn, we need the security provided by our national defenses to underwrite our economic endeavors and our livelihoods. But today we find both our economy and our security threatened by our burgeoning national debt. The U.S. national debt is projected to quickly reach levels with few precedents for a nation not fully mobilized for war. Continued future budgetary pressures could make it extremely difficult for us to maintain the size and readiness of our military forces and to promote the technological innovation (in all areas not just defense) needed to preserve an advantage over our competitors. This could threaten our ability to maintain a credible deterrent against potential adversaries and to respond to security contingencies--large or small. In many ways, these budgetary pressures are a present reality, and we in the military have already started tightening our belts and working to become a more fiscally responsible Pentagon. How we should deal with the looming threat of our national debt is a historically necessary conversation. It will involve tough decisions with significant trade-offs, opportunity costs, and strategic risks. What we do, or don't do, will shape our Nation for decades to come. Senator Chambliss. Thank you. Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Chambliss, and thank you, Senator Chambliss, for your work with Senator Warner on this very important challenge related to our annual deficits and our long-term debt. I know there are many senators who are eager to work with you in this important mission. Thank you. Senator Blumenthal, you're recognized. Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join the chairman, ranking member, and others on the committee in thanking you for your extraordinary service, Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates. In particular, for your continued commitment to the JSF and the single-engine, and the submarine building program, which I know was reiterated as recently as yesterday in remarks in Florida. So, I assume that will continue. I want to express my thanks. In particular, I'd like to focus on one area of your prepared testimony, Admiral Mullen, relating to the injuries of many of these young men and women returning from these conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, TBIs that are new in their magnitude and number, and ask you perhaps to describe more specifically what is being done in terms of the treatment, both in-service and veterans. Also, what can be done to enlist the growing number of private efforts, for example, the Woodruff Foundation, which you may be familiar with, that could provide resources. Admiral Mullen. One of the areas we've struggled in throughout these wars is the stigma issue, will I raise my hand and ask for help. On my most recent trip into Afghanistan, which was December, I was with the Command Sergeant Major there for the 101st, and he relayed to me an extraordinary statistic, which essentially had those that were in concussive events, essentially they were returning to duty at about 98 percent. We have put in place procedures, if you are in a concussive event, within 50 meters, et cetera, you get pulled out of the fight. One of the reasons that the return to duty rate is so high is because we're treating them well literally in the battlefield, as fast as possible. If they're asked, they're willing, because they're not going to get sent home, they're willing to raise their hand and say, I need some help. Now, we have a long way to go on stigma, in post-traumatic stress, et cetera, in families with the same challenges. But we actually have made some progress there. We have, at the same time, I have been struck, in the TBI, the difficult ones are the mild ones. The most serious are ones that become very obvious. But it is the mild ones oftentimes that your, you don't see your symptoms for months, or you don't admit you have them. It is those who obviously are in the military, those who transfer then, who transfer out of the military back to communities throughout the country. I've also been struck, I'm going to use a comparison, when you look at Walter Reed or Balboa, or the Intrepid Center for the amputees, and where we are, we're, I would argue, leading the world with respect to that. That's just not the case in TBI because there's a lot of newness to this that surprised me. We know a lot about the brain, but we don't know a lot about how these injuries affect the brain. So, we've tried to reach out, not just, not to reach and understand it just inside the military, but reach experts throughout the country who are contributing in ways--there's a Brain Center at UCLA, for instance, which has contributed significantly--and to get the best minds that we can across, throughout the country to help us work our way through this. But, I'm struck that we're in the nascent stages of this even at, even in this year, in so many ways. Senator Blumenthal. Is there a specific command or a structure within either the Pentagon or dealing through the VA that is coordinating this effort? Admiral Mullen. There is, there's not a single point of contact. There's, obviously, a significant effort inside the Pentagon. We have taken steps to try to work with the VA, and then also understand the capabilities that are out in the country as we've engaged for those who've transferred back home. But there's an awful lot we still have to do to make those connections so we're all working it together, which is going, which I think would be the most effective. We're just not there yet. Senator Blumenthal. To take a related subject, I'm sure you are familiar with reports about the danger of a combination of different pharmaceutic drugs---- Admiral Mullen. Yes. Senator Blumenthal.--in treatment of post-traumatic stress and similar kinds of phenomenon. I wonder if you or Secretary Gates could describe efforts being made to address those dangers. Admiral Mullen. Sometimes we're slow to need because we've gone through a time where we have, in too many cases, over- medicated, too many prescriptions. Not just in the battlefield or back here when they get back, but also in the VA. What, in particular, the Army has done recently is put in place a much more aggressive multifaceted treatment regime which expands beyond drugs to yoga, to acupuncture, to other forms which have proven positive to support those who've been through the kind of combat that they've been through. So, I'm actually encouraged by that significant effort put forward now to try to back off of that over-medication. That's not in, that's going to take us awhile. But, certainly it's a concern we all have. Secretary Gates. I'd say there are two additional problems here that we have to deal with. One is servicemembers stockpiling prescriptions. The second is, the frequency with which servicemembers will go outside the military healthcare system and get prescriptions. We don't have any visibility into that in terms of just how much medication they're taking, or how those drugs all interact with one another. So, these are all areas that we're aware of and trying to work on. But we still have a ways to go. Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator Shaheen. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here. I want to add my concern to those that have been expressed already about the JSF and what is happening with that program. I appreciated your comments about the efforts to get the program back on track, and I certainly hope that that is correct and the program will go forward and it will be effective with those efforts to readjust it. I also want to commend DOD on your decision to cancel the planned purchase and production of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program. I'm new here, so I'm still getting the acronyms down. But, I think it's important, as DOD found, that we can't afford to purchase MEADS and make the critical investments that we need to make in the Patriot over the next two decades. So, I certainly hope Congress will support your decision and press for the continued Patriot modernization. Admiral Mullen, during the House hearing yesterday you touched on something that you just referenced a little bit just now in your exchange with Senator Blumenthal, and that is about research into what we need to know about brain injuries. You talked about the importance of consistent and sustained support for research and development in our military budgets. Can you talk about whether you feel like the budget that's been submitted adequately addresses that to prepare us for the future? What have been the most cost-effective efforts that the military's used to leverage research and development (R&D) in the budget? Admiral Mullen. I'll be very specific to focus on Secretary Gates because, and he spoke earlier, his frustration that if you're a leader of one of these bureaucracies, there are things that, if you really want to get it done you're going to have to focus on it personally. This is another area, probably 2 years ago, 3 years ago, that he made a priority to ensure that we actually were growing in science and technology (S&T) and R&D. What's happened over the course of the last 2 decades is many of the programs we've talked about--I'll use JSF--has R&D money, but what it's really become program money, and it's not true R&D. So, I think for, particularly as budgets tighten and we look to capabilities in the future, we can't buy it all, we can't protect against everything. But having a robust S&T base, 6.1 through 6.5 and 6.6, is really important in terms of being ready for things in the future. So, even in these times where there's an extraordinary amount of pressure on the budget, and I think that will increase, I think we have to continue to get that right. You talk about most effective. I think the investment--and this is not an uncontroversial, sometimes an uncontroversial investment--but I've watched DARPA over the many years work, and they really reach at some of the, to get at some of the most difficult problems. I think we need to be mindful of sustaining that investment as well, for example. One other comment is, the S&T or the R&D investment in the medical field to get at brain research, and that, as I understand this budget, that actually is in pretty good shape as well. Secretary Gates. I would just amplify that by saying that in this budget there is $1.1 billion for and TBI and PTSD research. Senator Shaheen. Thank you. In New Hampshire we have a very significant defense industry that has been doing a lot of cutting edge research, and I know that DARPA's role has been very important in promoting that research. The National Guard and Reserves, as you all have said, has played a huge role in allowing us to be effective in Iraq and Afghanistan. In New Hampshire, as Senator Ayotte pointed out, we've seen the largest deployment of our Guard since World War II. I appreciated everyone's expressed commitment, again, to the health and well-being of all the servicemen and women and their families. One of the things that we have done--and Admiral Mullen, again, I think you've been briefed personally on the Full Cycle Deployment program that we have in New Hampshire, that is a model to help families both as they're preparing for deployment and when they return, as well as the member who's being deployed. This program has been supported by congressionally- directed spending--earmarks--which are not likely to continue. So, are there, are you looking at models like this as you think about developing ways to be most effective in supporting Guard and Reserves who are deploying? Are there ways in which, as the congressionally-directed spending ends, that we can continue to support these kinds of programs that have been so effective? Admiral Mullen. Senator, when you speak to this, and as you have spoken to the, and the way you've spoken to it, I'm immediately reminded of the need to be, build resilience in our people and families, literally from the first day they come into the Guard, Reserve, or on active duty in all Services. We've come to understand that. We've actually made some significant progress there, but we still have a long way to go. We've built more of it in our members than we have in our families, and we need to build it in the families as well. I would need to get back to you with a more specific answer on, because I want to know more about the, where your program, where the New Hampshire program is. Because what we do try to do is canvas the field and look at the best programs that are out there, and then inspire others to grab those. So, in particular, I'd be happy to do that and get back to you. As I speak, I really don't know where there resourcing side of it is with respect to that kind of, with respect to the program in New Hampshire. Senator Shaheen. I withdrawal very much appreciate your getting back to me. Thank you. My time has expired. [The information referred to follows:] The New Hampshire Deployment Cycle Support Program (NH DCSP) has generated promising results by establishing a support system that starts as soon as deployments are identified and directly engaging the individual servicemember and his or her family in their community. The prevention-based approach allows for assessing risks and resiliencies, early action to mitigate those risks, and ongoing support throughout the deployment cycle. Compared to non-participating New Hampshire Army National Guard members, those accessing DCSP have shown to have been more favorably impacted across a number of areas: suicides, resiliency, mental health, family fitness, readiness to deploy, retention, unemployment, and homelessness. Among the prominent outcomes are: Of 30 at risk of suicide (28 servicemembers and 2 spouses), all are using NH DCSP in active prevention with a licensed clinician and support team Of 77 servicemembers deemed ``at risk'' of not deploying due to mental health issues, DCSP intervention enabled more than half of those (43) to deploy Over a 2-year period, the percentage of DCSP SMs choosing to remain in service was four times higher Being a publicly- and privately-funded service delivery system that includes utilization of social service capacities in all 234 New Hampshire communities presents a useful model which warrants emulation. As fiscal limitations become more pronounced, the Department of Defense will have to weigh support of NH DCSP against other competing priorities. Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator McCaskill is recognized. Senator McCaskill. Thank you, as always, for being here. I want to say, Secretary Gates, that I know the President has an awful lot of hard decisions to make this year. I think one of the hardest decisions he has is how he's going to replace you. Let me start with a topic that is very difficult, I think, for you all to get your arms around, and that is the incredibly serious allegations that have been made about sexual assault within the military. I'm not assuming that the allegations that are contained in a lawsuit that was recently filed are true. But if we take them as factual, then we have a real serious problem, that a woman in our military was raped by more than one member of the military, and the video shared around the unit of this rape that had occurred. A woman raped and who goes to the chaplain, and the chaplain tells her that she needed to go to church more, if she would attend church more. The rape kits are only kept for a year. I can't think of a police department in the country that would only hold onto a rape kit for a year. I just think that we have to look at this problem in a systemic way in terms of, do these women have a safe place they can go? Are we gathering the evidence quickly? Or, do we have experts available in terms of prosecuting these cases? But if someone rapes a woman and the evidence is there, and that person doesn't end up in prison, then we have failed. I know that you all feel probably as strongly about this as I do. But I'd like you to address this and tell me what, who I should deal with within the military structure to follow up and make sure that we make some obviously very important changes that are needed. Secretary Gates. Senator, it is a problem. It's a serious problem. I have zero tolerance for any kind of sexual assault, as do the leaders of all of the Services. I've worked with Admiral Mullen and the Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries to ensure that we're doing all we can to respond to sexual assaults. I've engaged, had a number of meetings myself with the senior leadership of DOD. I've focused on four areas--reducing the stigma associated with reporting, ensuring sufficient commander training, ensuring investigator training and resourcing, and ensuring trial counsel training and resourcing. We've made some progress. We've hired dozens more investigators, field instructors, and prosecutors, and lab examiners. We've spent almost $2 million over the past 2 years training our prosecutors better. Generally, the defendants go to somebody who's specialized in this kind of allegation or crime, and our prosecutors tend to be generalists, and so we don't do very well in the court, and so we've spent this money to try and make our prosecutors effective. More victims are stepping forward. We have had improvement, or, an increase in the number of court-martials. We've gone from about 30 percent of alleged violators being court- martialed to about 52 percent now. So, at least it's headed in the right direction. We've expanded the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator and Victim Advocate Program ten-fold, from about 300 to 3,000. We now have an advocate at every base and installation around the world, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. I heard some suggestions and comments yesterday in the House hearing that I take very seriously and would like to pursue. One of them is ensuring the confidentiality of the relationship between the victim advocate and a victim, ensuring, or, providing a military lawyer for victims. Commanders have the authority to move somebody out of a unit. I'm worried by the press accounts that that hasn't happened, and so they're considering over on the House side legislation that would create this as a right for somebody who's been a victim so they can get out of a unit where the person who attacked them is in the same unit, and so on. So, I think there are some ideas that I heard in that hearing yesterday that I think are definitely worth pursuing. So, we do take it seriously. I've taken this seriously, frankly, because sexual assault is a problem on university campuses. Senator McCaskill. Right. Secretary Gates. Texas A&M, just like every big public university in America has a problem with this. One of the suggestions that I've made to our folks working on this is to get in touch with some of the universities that have the best prevention programs in the country, to see if we can learn something from these universities. So, I think we have a broad program to try and tackle this. But there is no question that there's more to do. I just invite Admiral Mullen to comment. Admiral Mullen. I testified over here in 2004. I was a vice chief of the Navy on this subject. There was a lot of work that needed to be done. It was very obvious in all the Services. I testified with my three Vice Service Chiefs. So, I agree with what the Secretary said in terms of our having made progress. It's not enough. It's completely intolerable. It has to be answered, I think, on the sort of the skill side, as well as the leadership side. I still hear too many anecdotal stories where it's ongoing, including in theater. With my wife, we visit VA hospitals, and females talk about trying, having come in the military, previously sexually assaulted before they came in, coming into the military, looking for a safe haven, and finding out that it isn't. It's almost, it's an intensity that certainly is not expected. This is, Senator, a vastly under-reported offense. So, we can see the statistics we have, but it's the ones that we don't have that we have to get after as well. Senator McCaskill. I guarantee that---- Admiral Mullen. While we've made a lot of progress, there's a lot left to do. Senator McCaskill. I guarantee that it's more under- reported in the military than it is even on a university campus or in the civilian population at large. I would just make one suggestion. Having spent many, many, many, many hours and days in courtrooms prosecuting sexual assault cases as a young prosecutor, I relied heavily on people who had specialized in prosecuting those crimes for my training. I relied heavily on the victim advocacy network that we had on, in terms of rape victims. In the civilian sector in any major city you're going to have a large group of people with great expertise. I know they would volunteer their time to help train and mentor people that you need to have this expertise, whether it's people at the emergency rooms that are gathering rape kits, having a victim advocate with the victim at the hospital when the rape kit, or the medical facility, where the rape kit is gathered, whether it's victim advocacy. I think you could find, and I've mentioned to General Quantock at Fort Leonard Wood that I would be happy to assist him getting in touch with this expertise that exists out there. I think that these people that do this, they aren't rape prosecutors and sexual assault prosecutors because they're making big money. They're very much true believers and want to help in this regard. The same thing is true of the victim advocacy organizations. I think this is one where you might be able to get a lot of free training and get you guys up to the point where the civilian population has gotten over the last 20 or 30 years. Thank you for your interest in this. I'll continue to follow up. I just want to let you know, two questions that I want to do for the record. One, obviously, is continuing, the problem we're having auditing the Pentagon. I cannot see how we can continue to give you what you ask for if we can't see the measurable progress in terms of auditing the Pentagon. I will have a series of questions about the financial management system that's in place. The last thing is pointing out for the record and questions for you for the record, that I know the GDP of Afghanistan is not large enough to pay for the military we're building. I think it's time that we be very, very honest with the American people that we're building the Afghan military for the nation. It costs what, $12 billion a year? Their GDP isn't even that high. So, once we're gone, I think we're going to be on the hook to help pay for this military for a long time--cheaper than our folks being there. But I think we need to begin to talk about the responsibility for paying for this military down the line. Because clearly Afghanistan can't afford the army we're building. Thank you. Secretary Gates. Senator, the contact person that you asked for is Dr. Clifford Stanley, who is the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness. Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much, Secretary Gates. Thank you all for being here. Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. Before Senator McCaskill leaves, I think we would both agree, Mr. Secretary, that you could take one of those difficult decisions off the President's desk if you would reenlist for a year or 2 more. But we'll leave that decision to you, as it properly should be. But I, too, want to thank both of you and Secretary Hale for your leadership, and for the courageous decisions that you continue to make, and for telling the Senate of the United States the truth as you see it. I did want to follow up on what Senator McCaskill also just mentioned about the GDP in Afghanistan. I think you both know that the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 required the President, through the offices of the Pentagon and DOS, to provide an economic strategy for Afghanistan. Could you speak to where we are with that process, and how important you think such a strategy would be to the overall success? Then, specifically, we have the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, and what further role would you see for that particular task force? Secretary Gates. I'll take the second part of your question first. This task force is one of those things that creates incredible antibodies in the bureaucracy, because it doesn't fit anyplace, and, both in DOD and in DOS. I think it's an honest answer to say that without in effect the protection of the Secretary of Defense, this operation would not, could not be sustained. My belief is that Paul Brinkley and his team have made a huge contribution, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. It was Paul that took the team to Afghanistan, of private sector geoscientists and others, and were able to do the estimates of the extraordinary mineral wealth that exists in Afghanistan, if only there were the security to exploit it. So, I think they've made a real contribution, and I hope they will continue to do that. But, I think it's fair to say that they face a lot of bureaucratic resistance in doing that. We talked earlier about the cost of the Afghan security forces. That's why I believe--and we've talked about it before in this hearing--that we essentially need to look at the size of their force as a surge as well, and that once they have a political settlement inside Afghanistan, and the Taliban is degraded in terms of their capabilities, the need for the Afghans to have a smaller military than they have now. Because we can't sustain $12.8 billion a year for very long. The economic strategy for Afghanistan is, and the task force, really go hand-in-hand. I think there's a significant effort at the Embassy in terms of trying to entice private sector individuals, as well as foreign investors, to invest in Afghanistan. But I have to admit that where the economic strategy for the country stands, I'm just not certain. I'll have to get back to you. [The information referred to follows:] An economic strategy is an essential component of the overall success of the Afghan civil-military campaign plan, by focusing efforts and resources in ways that maximize the effects of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan, while helping the Afghans become more self-sufficient. Such a strategy will build on the good work that the Director of the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, Paul Brinkley, and his team have already started in key sectors and provide overall direction for developing Afghanistan's capacity for self-sustainment. The Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development have participated in discussions, led by the National Security Staff, on the process by which the economic strategy report will be produced. The Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development will play a central role in the drafting process, and they will require support from Congress in carrying out the important roles they will have in implementing the strategy. The Department of Defense will also participate in the drafting of the report, as directed by the Executive Office of the President, and will pay particular attention to elements of economic strategy that support the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, promote economic stabilization, and enhance the establishment of sustainable institutions. We plan to complete this report, as required, in early July 2011. Senator Udall. Admiral Mullen, do you have any comments to add? Admiral Mullen. I would add only that, again, what Paul Brinkley and his team have done has truly been extraordinary in both countries, and under incredibly difficult circumstances in the countries. Although the circumstances back here may have been more difficult. So, how to sustain that is actually an open question. I think we do need to do that. Senator Udall. Yes. Admiral Mullen. That becomes the heart of, I think, sort of, the longer-term investment there, not just nationally, but internationally. Senator Udall. Yes. I, too, would like to add my compliments to Mr. Brinkley. I've heard many stories about how effective he is, how dedicated he is. So, I hope he understands that many of us here on the Hill, Mr. Secretary, know what accomplishments he's had. Secretary Gates. Well, and to Admiral Mullen's point about the conditions in which they have worked, several members of Brinkley's team, including Brinkley, have been wounded in attacks. So, they've been really out there on the front lines trying to work these problems. Senator Udall. Could I move to a question about the popular uprisings in the Middle East that we're seeing in Algeria, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere? The people are coming out on the streets for a variety of reasons. How do you analyze those countries' leaders' ability to command their security services? Secretary Gates. Well, I think it varies from country to country. We talked at the beginning of the hearing about the discipline and the professionalism of the Egyptian military, and the restraint that they exercised under some fairly difficult circumstances. In Tunisia, the military also stood aside and, basically, did not defend Ben Ali. So, I think in each of these countries, though, the circumstances are going to be different. But the one thing that these armies seem to have in common--certainly in Egypt and in Tunisia--is a sense that they are a national institution, and even though somebody may have been in power for a long time, they see themselves as having a special relationship with their people. I know in my conversations with Minister Tantawi, we talked often about the relationship that the Egyptian army had with the Egyptian people, and that it would protect it's people because they were the people. He delivered, I think, in an exemplary fashion. Just to defend our intelligence folks a little bit, I think that they'd done a pretty good job of describing the rising temperature in a number of these countries, and the economic and social pressures that were building in a number of these countries, particularly related to the youth bulge, the 15- to 29-year-olds who have educations and can't get a job. The petty corruption and nepotism makes life difficult for ordinary people. Clearly, Ben Ali was quite surprised by what happened in Tunisia. He didn't expect to, in 2 weeks to be pushed out of power. I think that President Mubarak was in the same situation. I think that the United States, there's been a lot of to- ing and fro-ing about how we've handled this. But the truth is, I think the United States has pretty consistently, primarily privately but also publicly, encouraged these regimes for years to undertake political and economic reform because these pressures were building. Now they need to move on with it, and there is an urgency to this. Events move very quickly. We were talking at one point, if Mubarak had given his first speech when he declined to run for office again in September, when he changed the government, when he promised constitutional reform--if he had given that speech 3 weeks before, he'd probably still be the president of Egypt. So, being able to latch onto the speed with which these events are moving, and have people who have seen, relatively, perceive a static situation in their countries, to appreciate that it's not static, that these pressures are building and they do need to get out in front of it, is, I think, what we've been trying to do. Senator Udall. Yes. Our advice and encouragement may hold more weight in this region and other regions of the world, as those leaders and those countries look at the example of Egypt and Tunisia, perhaps others. I have to wonder, Admiral Mullen, Secretary Gates, Secretary Hale, what the British intelligence services were generating in 1776. I think there are these tipping points that you talk about that can't be predicted. Thank you again for your service. Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Udall. I just have one additional point and then we'll close it, because I know that you folks are running late on your schedule. That has to do with the size of the Afghanistan army. I want to give you some statistics about comparing the Iraq army and the Afghanistan army. I know the situations are different. But I still want to give you these statistics. Iraq has fewer people than Afghanistan. The Afghan population is about 30 million; Iraq about 27 million. But in Iraq you have 665,000 Iraqi security forces. In Afghanistan you have a goal, 378,000 would be the new target if it was accepted. So, it would still be about half the size of the Iraqi security force, with more people to secure. So, I would, first of all, I think, probably based on that, but some other things, not agree that the increase, the proposal for the increase would be more than they would need, even if over time there would be a lesser need for security. Hopefully there will be a lesser need and, obviously, if there is you could reduce it. But I wouldn't necessarily plan on there being a need for less than 378,000. Second, when you describe a surge force, in your mind, Mr. Secretary, I would hope that the surge force that you believe it should be looked at, as, would be a, that the surge force would be the 378, and not the current level. So that it would be the additional 70 that would be viewed as the surge, and not the current level, which I believe you spoke at, as a surge force. Secretary Gates. I would tell you, Mr. Chairman, the budget that we have submitted would accommodate the additional growth. Chairman Levin. All right. That's reassuring. Finally, I totally agree, both the need for an objective, an honest view about the cost. I think that is essential. That's what you pointed to, and rightly so. But I would just reiterate my hope that when you meet with your colleagues at a NATO ministerial that you really would drive home the fact that there's going to be an ongoing need, whether it's at 305,000 or whether or not it's at 378,000, that there really needs to be a sharing of that burden among our NATO allies. We cannot carry the 12 billion alone, I agree with you. But just they way they have not, it's been kind of spotty, frankly, in terms of NATO support, on the trainer side, not nearly still what we had hoped for. But, you're properly giving good grades to those who have come through. A lot of our NATO allies really have. Some of them have taken greater losses proportionally than we have, and we should recognize that. But, I really would hope that you would reinforce that they are going to need a significant military and a security force, that that is the ticket to success, as well as to an exit. Or, at least, a significantly reduced number of foreign troops which, in turn, is part of success. That they should come through financially with some ongoing expected support for the Afghanistan security forces. That would be my summary. Admiral Mullen? Admiral Mullen. Sir, just one quick comment. I've been working NATO pretty hard since 2004. I've never seen them more together than they have become over the last couple of years in this mission. Your comment earlier about, out of area--or, maybe it was Senator Lieberman. But I really do think success here bodes well for the future of NATO, and not succeeding does the opposite. Then, second, we've talked a lot about NATO here. Well, there are 49 countries total that are providing forces right now. So, there are an awful lot of non-NATO contributing countries who've made a difference as well, and are very focused on sustaining that for a period of time. Some of them very small numbers. I understand that. But, they've really made a difference, and we appreciate their contributions as well. Chairman Levin. Yes. I think, I made the mistake of saying NATO when I should have said NATO and other coalition forces. You're absolutely right. A number of those non-NATO countries have made contributions also way out of proportion to their population, way out of proportion to their financial ability. I think we should recognize that, and their losses sometimes have been out of proportion as well. We do appreciate that. We want to thank all of you for coming. Again, we're grateful for your service. We hope to see a lot more of you than you expect, Secretary Gates. Admiral Mullen, we always love to have you here, and know that you want have too many more visits. But again, we hope, know that all of them will be as helpful as this one was this morning. Secretary Hale, thank you. We'll stand adjourned. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin HEALTH AND STATUS OF OUR DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 1. Senator Levin. Admiral Mullen, in your posture statement, you expressed concern over the capabilities of our Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and the ability to produce and support advanced technology systems for future weapon systems. What is the Department of Defense (DOD) doing to mitigate these concerns? Admiral Mullen. In order for the defense industry to remain a source of strategic advantage well into the future, DOD and our Nation require a consistent, realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping the structure and capabilities of the DIB. For example, the fiscal year 2012 budget request contains resources for two providers of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a result enabled by establishing a competitive environment in which two competitors have offered affordable alternatives. Additionally, the Navy continues to pursue the work share agreement on the Virginia class submarine program. Looking ahead, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) to undertake a sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier assessment of the DIB that will include space and shipbuilding. This effort will be accomplished in full partnership with the Military Services. The results of this analysis will allow us to improve our acquisition strategies and influence DOD's program and budget review, beginning with the fiscal year 2013 cycle. Once completed, DOD will continue to map and assess the industrial base on an ongoing basis. Additionally, as the DIB evolves through mergers and acquisitions, DOD participates in reviews conducted by antitrust agencies and in reviews conducted by the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to mitigate consolidation and ownership concerns. The affects of the continuing resolution on program execution and the resultant impacts on defense sector production lines remain a concern. What these industrial bases need more than anything else is a plan and investment strategy with a certainty and predictability that has here to fore been very elusive. DOD is committed to being more forward leaning in its ongoing assessments of the industrial base--refocusing our efforts on our future needs, working much more closely with the Services to foster an integrated approach to the overall industrial base, and placing transparency and dialogue with industry at the forefront of our agenda. ACQUISITION WORKFORCE 2. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, while much of the attention in the personnel sector has been rightfully focused on deployed warfighters and their families, the success of our military largely depends upon the effectiveness and reliability of high-technology weapon systems that give the U.S. military its premier technological advantage. Fundamental to developing and fielding these weapons systems is a community of highly trained science and technology (S&T) and acquisition personnel in DOD. What will you do to ensure that DOD can continue to attract and retain a highly skilled S&T and acquisition workforce--especially in today's competitive environment where at the national level there is a limited pool of skilled scientists and engineers facing competition from industry, academia, and other Federal agencies? Secretary Gates. DOD continues its initiative to grow the acquisition workforce through fiscal year 2015. Significant emphasis and progress has been made hiring and supporting the growth of the technical workforce, but there is much more work to do in this area. For example, the Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation Scholarship-for-Service program supported 900 students with majors in DOD relevant science and engineering disciplines. Three hundred of these students transitioned into the DOD workforce. Another 230 are expected to transition into the workforce in 2011. AFGHAN TALIBAN 3. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, in a recent interview, General Petraeus discussed growing friction between local Taliban fighters living in Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban leadership, who are phoning in orders that the local insurgents should continue to fight against Afghan and coalition forces through the winter, while the Afghan leadership remains in the safety of sanctuaries in Quetta and elsewhere in Pakistan. He said we are seeing a degree of discord among Afghan Taliban leaders and among the lower-level fighters that we've not seen in the past. Do you agree with General Petraeus' assessment that there is friction and discord between local Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and the Taliban leadership in Quetta, Pakistan, as that leadership phones in orders for the lower-level fighters to keep up the fight through the winter? Secretary Gates. I agree there is tension between Taliban leaders in Pakistan and the fighters and commanders who remain in Afghanistan. I do not believe current frustration levels are sufficient to degrade insurgent capacity or create exploitable fissures. For example, increased violence levels this winter indicate that this tension did not undermine the insurgents' desire or ability to conduct attacks. 4. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, is this level of friction something that we've not seen in the past? Secretary Gates. Every winter since 2002, DOD observed tension between Taliban leaders in Pakistan and the fighters and commanders who remain in Afghanistan. This also occurred during the 1980s mujahedeen resistance against the Soviets. The tone of reporting this winter indicates a heightened level of frustration; however, the multi-faceted nature of this issue makes it difficult to make a qualitative comparison to previous years. 5. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, are we seeing this friction contributing to a slow increase in the number of lower-level insurgents seeking to reintegrate into Afghan society? Secretary Gates. I do not see evidence that tension with Quetta- based leaders is eroding local insurgents' motivation to fight or increasing lower-level insurgents' willingness to reintegrate. Most insurgents are locals fighting for local issues and not necessarily in support of Taliban senior leadership; therefore, they are likely to sustain their efforts regardless of any frustration with Quetta-based leaders. Emergence of a reintegration program that addresses local concerns, provides protection for fighters and their families, and delivers on promises will make reintegration a more viable option. GLOBAL SECURITY CONTINGENCY FUND 6. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, in Admiral Mullen's opening statement he made reference to a proposal for a pooled Department of State (DOS)-DOD security sector assistance initiative, called the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF). At the hearing, he indicated this initiative would include $50 million from DOS and an authority for DOD to transfer up to $450 million into this initiative. Are you confident that DOS is committed to making this initiative work jointly beyond the tenures of both of you and Secretary Clinton? Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Yes. Although I cannot speak for our counterparts at DOS or future leadership of either department, DOD and DOS are working collaboratively on the development of the GSCF. This pilot program is designed to demonstrate the ability of both Departments to respond to emerging requirements rapidly (within the budget cycle) and in a collaborative manner. The benefit of this limited pilot is that it allows future senior leaders to evaluate the GSCF's effectiveness and determine if it should be extended beyond its initial 3-year term. 7. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, do either of you have concerns that the joint arrangement will prove too unwieldy? Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. No. I am aware of this concern and would work to address it with the processes and procedures we establish. We are applying lessons learned from Section 1206 and other programs in developing the notional processes and procedures. At this point, we plan to have the GSCF be administered by a small combined DOS-DOD fund staff that will provide joint program formulation, decisionmaking, and implementation. That staff would bring in relevant staff augmentation depending on the expertise needed to meet each requirement. Throughout the pilot, I expect the GSCF to undergo continual process improvements as it matures. 8. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, do either of you have any concern that this type of initiative is too much of a militarization of foreign policy? Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Not at all. The GSCF is designed to enable DOD and DOS to respond to a variety of emerging global challenges in a collaborative manner. Program formulation for military and other security forces would be joint, while programs for justice sector, rule of law, and stabilization assistance would be formulated by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. This ensures that the appropriate Departments retain primary responsibility for missions within their respective core competencies, while benefiting from the cooperation the GSCF structure fosters. This is a force-multiplying authority that maintains DOS primacy in non-military missions. 9. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, does the proposal envision that funds transferred into GSCF would be subject to the standard reprogramming processes? Secretary Gates. Not at all. The GSCF is designed to enable DOS and DOD to respond to a variety of emerging global challenges in a collaborative manner. Program formulation for military and other security forces would be joint, while programs for justice sector, rule of law, and stabilization assistance would be formulated by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. This ensures that the appropriate Departments retain primary responsibility for missions within their respective core competencies, while benefiting from the cooperation the GSCF structure fosters. This is a force-multiplying authority that maintains DOS primacy in non-military missions. Admiral Mullen. The reprogramming of funds into the GSCF would be conducted in accordance with the legislative proposal that states that this authority to transfer is in addition to any other transfer authority available to DOS and DOD. Jointly, the Secretaries of State and Defense would provide a quarterly report to the specified congressional committees on obligations of funds or transfers into the Fund made during the preceding quarter, to include the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA 10. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, you each lead a bilateral channel of discussion with your respective Russian counterparts in which you are exploring the possibilities for cooperation on missile defense. These discussions are consistent with similar North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts. Please describe why you believe missile defense cooperation with Russia is in our interest and what kinds of cooperation you believe are both desirable and possible. Secretary Gates. The United States seeks to responsibly sustain a stable relationship with the Russian Federation as the pace of military-technical innovation increases and the global security environment evolves. DOD also hopes to enlist Russia's help in addressing emerging security challenges from regional actors seeking illicit capabilities. DOD has made clear that the system it intends to pursue with Russia will not be a ``dual-key'' system, and it will not in any way limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities. The U.S. concept for missile defense cooperation stems from the conviction that NATO must be responsible for defense of NATO territory and that Russia should be responsible for defense of Russian territory. The United States and Russia would operate their missile defense systems independently, but cooperatively, including sharing sensor data that may improve the ability of both systems to defeat missile attacks. I believe that Russian radars could provide data that would improve the capabilities of U.S. and NATO missile defense systems, and that U.S. sensors could improve the capability of Russia's missile defense systems. Further analysis would help to understand how U.S. and Russian interceptor systems could be mutually supportive in defending our respective territories. It is important to note that this process will take time, but I believe that meaningful cooperation is possible--cooperation that can strengthen the security of the United States and our NATO Allies as well as Russia. Admiral Mullen. The Military Cooperation Working Group is the military-to-military line of communication between me and the Russian Chief of Defense. The Missile Defense Sub-Group is the military-to- military forum that enables bilateral discussion of missile defense cooperation activities, such as joint exercises. These discussions correspond to the ones we conduct at the policy and strategic levels, as well as in multinational NATO-Russia forums. Although attention is presently focused on the European region, Russia and the United States share concerns about global ballistic missile threats, such as those in Northeast Asia. Our bilateral engagement on missile defense issues is intended to shape awareness of these threats and develop cooperative long-term responses to them. We have a clear directive to reset our bilateral relationship with Russia. While missile defense cooperation between Russia and NATO continues to develop, there will remain a clear need for the United States and Russia to maintain bilateral dialog on critical issues and concerns unique to our two countries. AFGHANISTAN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS 11. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, according to published reports, the tempo of counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan by U.S. and Afghan Special Operations Forces (SOF) has increased dramatically in the last 6 months and demonstrated significant results. Lieutenant General Rodriguez stated recently that the Afghan people are playing an increasingly important role in the success of these operations by ``helping to provide significantly more tips because they see Afghan Security Forces out among them more than they ever had because of the increase in the number [of Afghan Forces].'' Reportedly, 85 percent of counterterrorism operations take place without a shot being fired. Do you agree with Lieutenant General Rodriguez that the increased presence of Afghan Security Forces has resulted in better intelligence because the population is more likely to come forward with information? Secretary Gates. Counterterrorism network targeting operations increased in the past 6 months, complementing the additional U.S. and partner nation forces deployed to Afghanistan during this period. Almost all of these operations are conducted jointly with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). I agree with Lieutenant General Rodriguez that partnered operations with the ANSF in all counterinsurgency activities result in increased reporting by the local population and better intelligence. 12. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, what has been the impact of this intelligence on the success of counterterrorism operations? Secretary Gates. The increased trust and confidence the Afghan people have in the ANSFs, especially in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan Special Forces, has had a significant positive impact on the success of counterterrorism (CT) network targeting operations. Afghan civilians feel safer and are more likely to provide information about insurgent activities when they witness a competent and impartial ANSF playing a prominent role in protecting the population and degrading the insurgency. This cooperation enables a higher degree of success in CT operations, greater precision during the execution of these operations, and an increased likelihood of receiving information that can be used to plan future operations. 13. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, are news reports accurate that 85 percent of SOF's counterterrorism operations are conducted successfully without a shot being fired? Secretary Gates. Yes. During the period from February 1, 2010 to January 31, 2011, 85 percent of counterterrorism network targeting operations were conducted without shots being fired. The quality of intelligence that shapes these operations, the careful and deliberate planning that precedes each operation, and the unmatched skill of our operators with their Afghan partners allows us to successfully capture many terrorists without the use of force. CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN IRAQ 14. Senator Levin. Admiral Mullen, in your personal and professional military view, and from a purely military perspective, if the Government of Iraq requested the continued presence of U.S. military forces, including combat forces, would you recommend the approval of such a request? Admiral Mullen. I cannot answer that question without knowing exactly what type of presence or mission the Iraqis would like us to do. Then, I would have to consider variables like risk to our troops, our enduring national interests, our long-term strategic partnership with Iraq, our worldwide military commitments, and Iraq's ability to do that mission on their own before making a recommendation to the President. In the meantime, we remain focused on executing a responsible drawdown of our military forces according to our security agreement with the Government of Iraq. VIOLENCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 15. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, during my trip to Iraq in January, I met with leaders of Iraq's Christian religious minorities who expressed their desire to preserve the Christian communities within Iraq and the need for greater security so Christians can stay in their communities without fearing for their lives. What is your assessment of the Iraqi Government's efforts to ensure the safety of its many religious minorities? Secretary Gates. The Iraqi Government took positive steps to protect religious minorities more effectively, particularly since the October 31, 2010 bombing of Our Lady of Salvation Church in Baghdad. The Iraqi Government increased security at virtually all churches and police patrols in minority-dominated areas. The Iraqi police force arrested 12 individuals suspected of carrying out the attack on Our Lady of Salvation Church, including an al Qaeda operative. The Iraqi security forces (ISF) have endeavored to fortify minority religious sites and increase check points in minority neighborhoods. This must be done with the concurrence of minority populations because some of these communities believe increased security may serve to identify their facilities as targets. U.S. Forces-Iraq continues to advise, train, assist, and equip the ISF to enable them to conduct more effective security operations against violent extremist organizations seeking to attack minority religious communities. Al Qaeda in Iraq remains the most enduring threat to Christians and other minorities because it characterizes churches as legitimate targets of jihadist efforts to rid the region of western influence, ideology, and theology. 16. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, in your view, what more should they be doing to improve that protection? Secretary Gates. In the process of establishing a professional, reliable security service, the Iraqi Government should also improve Iraqi rule-of-law institutions, and particularly ensure that the property rights of Christians and other minorities are protected by these institutions. The Iraqi Government must also continue to modernize and professionalize the ISF to ensure that they protect all Iraqis impartially. Examples include recruiting and training more minority police, and reliably implementing the process of restoring property rights to Christians, as well as other minorities, whose lands were illegally confiscated when they fled their traditional homelands due to sectarian and other anti-minority violence. Since many minorities choose resettlement within Iraq, other impediments to protection and reintegration include lack of adequate educational and economic opportunities in areas to which minorities are moving and congregating (such as the Ninewa Plain). These are longer-term challenges that supplement, rather than replace, improved police interaction with minorities and the equitable administration of justice. 17. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, are the Iraqis recruiting and training any police units that are comprised exclusively of religious minorities and, if so, are they deployed exclusively to the areas where their respective communities reside? Secretary Gates. Iraqis are recruiting and training police cadets from the minority communities, which improves police visibility within those communities and builds trust between police and minority Iraqis. However, as with most national police forces, Iraq does not create police units segregated by religious affiliation, which could imply uneven standards, complicate overall force integration, and limit the ability to deploy such units or individuals to where they may be needed to address security concerns elsewhere in Iraq. Matching ISF individuals or units to minority-dominated areas is further complicated by the fact that minority demographics are in flux and groups within, for example, the Christian community, are subdivided among numerous denominations (Assyrian, Armenian Orthodox, Chaldean, Jacobite, Arab, and so forth) which do not necessarily share objectives. SPACE SYSTEMS FUNDING 18. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, the Air Force has proposed to incrementally fund the acquisition of two large and critical satellite programs, using multi-year, fixed-prices contracting authority that will require advanced appropriations. In your view, why is this authority needed for these two satellite programs? Secretary Gates. DOD requires authority to use advance appropriations to fully fund the block buy of Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites 5 and 6 during fiscal year 2012. After careful review, DOD determined multiyear procurement authorization is not required for this acquisition. For AEHF 5 and 6, the Air Force is procuring two satellites, in a block buy, in a single year. The Air Force worked closely with the DOD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office and, based on CAPE independent estimates, expects to realize unit cost savings from the bulk buy of piece parts, electronic components, and sub assemblies, as well as from a more efficient assembly and test process. In order to achieve savings, DOD needs to order these satellites in blocks of two. However, fully funding both satellites in a single year is not practically achievable in today's budget environment. Therefore, I propose a modified approach whereby DOD fully funds the satellite block buy over a fixed number of years using advance appropriations. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka REPEAL OF ``DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL'' 19. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, on December 22, 2010, the President signed legislation that will lead to the eventual repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''. The Services were directed to provide a plan by February 4, 2011, indicating how they will prepare their respective Services for the implementation of the repeal. In your opinion, what are the biggest challenges the Services face as they prepare for this change? Secretary Gates. The biggest challenge will be training those members who are not co-located with their units or who serve intermittently. This is why DOD is moving forward in an extremely deliberate and purposeful manner to develop and deploy our training and education. 20. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, how are these challenges being addressed, and what is the current timeline for certification as you see it? Secretary Gates. There is no set date for certification. I am working closely with the Services to develop multiple ways to train the Force. Among various approaches, DOD identified that the most preferred approach is with leadership driven face-to-face training. When that is not feasible, computer-based training will also be available. I continue to work purposefully and responsibly toward certification. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS 21. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, on November 5, 2010, the Under Secretary for Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Mr. Clifford Stanley, sent a Memorandum For Record (MFR) titled, ``Updated Plan for the Removal of Social Security Numbers (SSN) from DOD Identification (ID) Cards.'' The MFR states that SSNs may not be removed as previously indicated in 2009 based on concerns raised by DOD stakeholders. What is DOD's position on the removal of SSNs from ID cards issued to retired personnel, dependents, and those currently serving? Secretary Gates. DOD recognizes the ongoing risks and dangers associated with identity theft and the need to protect Personally Identifiable Information, such as the SSN. In 2007, DOD implemented a three-phase plan to remove SSNs from DOD ID Cards. In a November 5, 2010 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, DOD updated its implementation plan. This was due to concern over interruptions to benefits provided to servicemembers, retirees and their families, and it was due to adverse impacts to DOD contingency operations. This updated implementation plan is, as follows: Phase One--The act of removing the printed dependent SSNs from all Dependent ID Cards continues, as initiated in 2008 under the original plan. This phase will be completed by the end of 2012. The standard Dependent ID card life cycle requires replacement every 4 years. Phase Two--The act of removing the SSN from all ID cards and replacing it with a DOD ID Number will be implemented in June 2011. Phase Three--The act of removing all SSNs from barcodes on the ID cards remains on schedule, with implementation expected in 2012. 22. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, what are the leading alternative identifiers which are being considered to replace SSNs? Secretary Gates. The SSN will be replaced on DOD ID cards by the DOD ID Number. The DOD ID number is a unique, 10-digit identifier created upon initial enrollment of the individual into the Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System database. The DOD ID Number is permanently fixed--it will not change over time or be contingent on one's role (e.g. dependent, civilian). All individuals eligible to receive DOD benefits--such as commissary, exchange, Morale, Welfare and Recreation or TRICARE purchased care--will also receive a DOD Benefits Number. The DOD Benefits number is an 11-digit number. The first nine digits are common to the sponsor. The last two digits indicate the card holder's relationship to the sponsor. The DOD Benefits Number has been agreed to by the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) as an acceptable substitute for the SSN for management of benefits with no interruption of services. Similar to the DOD ID number, the DOD Benefits Number will not change over time. LITERACY EDUCATION 23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, with a 14 percent literacy rate among new Afghan recruits, every Afghan soldier and police recruit now undertakes mandatory literacy education. By October 2011, 128,000 Afghan soldiers are projected to be literate to at least the first- grade level, further enabling security forces to become self- sustaining. What are the overall goals of this program and how is it progressing against the baseline plan? Secretary Gates. In parallel with DOD's instruction programs for ANSF recruits is a drive to educate the ``legacy illiterate'' (i.e., those serving in the ANA who have not had the benefit of literacy training). The goal of the literacy program is to bring all ANSF personnel up to a basic level of literacy (third grade-level). The program employs 1,800 teachers and provides new recruits with 64 hours of basic literacy training and an additional 248 hours after they complete basic training. As of February 2011, approximately 66,600 ANSF personnel have received literacy training; approximately 34,950 ANSF personnel have completed first grade-level literacy training, which is on track toward achieving the goal of 100,000 personnel completing first grade-level literacy training by October 2011; and approximately 10,187 ANSF personnel have completed third grade-level literacy training, with the goal of having 14,028 personnel complete third grade-level training by October 2011. Literacy remains a major challenge to the development of the ANSF, as about 86 percent of new recruits entering the force are totally illiterate. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) instituted a mandatory literacy program in April 2010, and continues to work with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to increase the literacy of the force. 24. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, please describe the importance of this program to the future ability of the Afghan Government to succeed. Secretary Gates. Literacy education is a key component in the development of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Basic literacy skills allow Afghan military and police personnel to perform their duties, including reading maps, writing reports, and calling for military support in the field. Illiteracy can cost lives in combat and renders the police ineffective in providing basic public security functions. Literacy training is also a major incentive for enlistment and retention and increases the comparative advantage that the ANSF has over the Taliban in terms of drawing new personnel. Literacy also contributes to the overall ability of the Afghan government to succeed by strengthening the professionalism of the ANSF and instituting longer-term capacity for self-sustainment. ARMY TROOP REDUCTION 25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, in January, you announced that in fiscal year 2015, the Army would decrease its permanently authorized end strength by 27,000 soldiers. In addition, the Army will also shed 22,000 positions by fiscal year 2013, reducing the temporary surge numbers. This total reduction of 49,000 is very significant. How will this reduction affect the ability of the force to meet future demands? Secretary Gates. Two factors will determine how the end-strength reduction will impact on the Army's ability to meet future demands: the future demand level and the Army's end-strength reduction implementation plan. With regard to the demand level, I cannot predict with certainty when and where contingencies may occur that will require Army forces. I do believe that Army forces will continue to be required for a variety of missions, but that near-term demands will not reach the high level of commitment seen in recent years. As long as this assumption is valid, the Army will be able to implement the planned end-strength reductions while meeting demands and improving readiness and strategic depth. The Army is continuing to ensure accomplishment of its assigned missions, improve operational readiness to meet future demands and care for the well-being of its soldiers and their families. 26. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, will this result in a potential realignment of combat forces to better support such demands? Secretary Gates. The Army is developing options to implement directed manpower reductions, while satisfying near-term demands and increasing readiness for unforeseen contingencies. The Army will plan and implement its end-strength reduction and any associated structure adjustments in a deliberate fashion with the intent of achieving a balanced and capable force. The Army is continuing to ensure accomplishment of its assigned missions, improve operational readiness to meet future demands and care for the well-being of its soldiers and their families. 27. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, how will it affect our reliance on Guard and Reserve Forces? Secretary Gates. The Army depends on access to its Reserve component to accomplish its assigned missions. The planned Army Active component end-strength reductions will have modest impacts on Army Reserve component forces needed to support current and anticipated operational demand. The Army is developing options to implement the reductions, while satisfying near-term demands and increasing its readiness for unforeseen contingencies. The Army is continuing to ensure accomplishment of its assigned missions, improve operational readiness to meet future demands and care for the well-being of its soldiers and their families. READINESS IN THE PACIFIC REGION 28. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the sinking of the Cheonan, and China's growing military capability continue to remind us of the importance of our military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Given the many demands on the defense budget and the recently announced reductions, how does the fiscal year 2012 budget impact our military readiness in the Pacific region? Secretary Gates. America's forward presence in the region played a key role in ensuring decades of stability in Asia. The United States continues to be globally postured in order to secure the homeland and its citizens from direct attack and to advance American interests around the world. While there are many demands on U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific, the fiscal year 2012 defense budget ensures that DOD remains prepared to meet the challenges and fulfill security commitments in the region. The fiscal year 2012 budget makes a number of investments that enhance the ability of U.S. forces to project power into the Asia- Pacific region and elsewhere. Chief among these are the commencement of a new long-range bomber program and increased procurement of conventional cruise missiles across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). At the same time, DOD has worked, and will continue to work, with U.S. allies and partners to maintain peace and ensure stability throughout Asia. With the fiscal year 2012 budget, DOD intends to enhance its forward military presence in the Pacific, invest in base resiliency to protect critical infrastructure, and develop new concepts of operation for how the United States will project power when challenged with emerging capabilities in the future. DOD will continue working with Japan to implement the bilateral Realignment Roadmap agreement and relocate 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam in order to offer strategic flexibility, enhance contingency response capabilities, and improve peacetime engagement. DOD requested $181 million in the fiscal year 2012 budget to support military construction to meet the requirements for the Marine Corps relocation to Guam. DOD will enhance the readiness of our forces in Korea with Tour Normalization. This initiative will further the long-term commitment to provide greater stability for forward stationed servicemembers and their families. For fiscal year 2012, the Army allocated $106 million for Tour Normalization, while the other services have not identified their allocation amount. DOD will also continue transitioning wartime operational control to South Korea by December 2015. Finally, DOD also intends to exercise regularly with our allies and partners. Examples of these exercises include the annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian and Foal Eagle/Key Resolve exercises in the Republic of Korea, the Keen Edge/Keen Sword and Annualex exercises in Japan, Talisman Sabre with Australia, and the U.S.-Thailand-hosted Cobra Gold which attracts partners from across the region. The United States continues to be engaged throughout the region. The earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis response efforts in Japan are the latest examples, once again demonstrating the value of being able to work in close partnership in times of critical need. FUTURE ISSUES FOR SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE 29. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, you mentioned that this would most likely be your last defense budget hearing before this committee. If you were to compile a list of items that ``keep you up at night'', what would this list look like? In other words, from your perspective as our 22nd Secretary of Defense, what should your successor be told to watch out for? Secretary Gates. As I previously testified to the House Armed Services Committee, thinking about the future, two issues that worry me are the defense budget and jurisdictional lines in Congress. First, I see a growing disconnect between the missions given to the military and the discussion of the defense budget. It is true that, as the biggest part of the discretionary Federal budget, DOD cannot presume to exempt itself from the scrutiny and pressure faced by the rest of our government. It is imperative to eliminate wasteful, excessive, and unneeded spending. Nevertheless, drastic and ill-conceived cuts to the overall defense budget would be operationally catastrophic, and would have little impact on the Nation's $1.6 trillion deficit. DOD needs a budget baseline with a steady, sustainable, and predictable rate of growth that avoids extreme peaks and valleys in defense spending that can be enormously harmful to readiness, planning, and financial management. Only then can DOD have the right balance between winning the wars of today and being prepared for likely future threats. We shrink from our global security responsibilities at our peril, as retrenchment brought about by short-sighted cuts could well lead to costlier and more tragic consequences later--indeed as they always have in the past. The best way to support our military personnel is to ensure that they have the tools and training they need to prevail against present and future adversaries. Second, I worry that the increasing integration of national security policy and execution in the executive branch are not paralleled by the legislative branch of the government. Jurisdictional lines in Congress prevent congressional leadership from seeing the overall national security picture that the executive branch sees, and these lines risk splintering coherent whole-of-government efforts into multiple lines of authority and disparate agency budget accounts. It is my hope that efforts to achieve needed integration in Congress can reinforce our resolve on critical national security policies. Third, I am concerned that DOS and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) do not have the resources necessary to contribute to a more integrated, coherent, and successful civil- military strategy. Ensuring support for whole-of-government efforts, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, is critical to creating and maintaining secure environments in key regions of the world. LANGUAGE SKILLS AND CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING 30. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, I have long-supported efforts to improve the language skills and cultural understanding of our military and Federal workforce. The United States must have the language skills and cultural understanding to successfully engage in this world. Please discuss how DOD's fiscal year 2012 budget ensures that our military and civilian workers have the language skills necessary to meet its mission. Secretary Gates. Baseline funding of $792 million is projected in fiscal year 2012 to support language and culture instruction to achieve higher proficiencies. Programs include the following: increasing pre-accession training, education and immersion opportunities at the Service Academies and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC); continuing the ROTC Skill Proficiency Bonus; providing pre-deployment training for general purpose forces; continuing Language Training Detachments to provide and sustain commanders' needs for language; regional and cultural training for the general purpose forces; continuing support to the Afghanistan/ Pakistan Hands program; and enhancing English language training for partner nation personnel. DOD is moving ahead to develop strategic direction, to create effective policies and to refine processes for generating language, regional and cultural capabilities. ADDICTION ISSUES 31. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, the Army Inspector General (IG) report released in January indicates that between 25 and 35 percent of patients assigned to special wounded-care companies or battalions are addicted to or dependent on drugs, particularly prescription narcotic pain relievers. What steps are being taken to address the issue of potential overmedication or addiction within Wounded Transition Units (WTU)? Admiral Mullen. After receiving multiple briefings from scientists and line leaders with a growing concern about drugs, I have come to the conclusion that reducing the use of illicit drugs, unprescribed pharmaceuticals, and excess alcohol requires an integrated approach. Drug abuse is a systems problem that requires a coordinated medical and line leadership approach. The Army Surgeon General LTG Eric B. Schoomaker established an aggressive program to minimize dependence on narcotics to treat pain through implementation of the recommendations of the Pain Management Task Force. The Task Force membership included a variety of medical specialties and disciplines from the Army, as well as representatives from the Navy, Air Force, TMA, and Veterans Health Administration (VHA). Between October 2009 and January 2010 this task force conducted 28 site visits at Army, Navy, and Air Force Medical Centers, Hospitals and Health Clinics, as well as VHA and civilian hospitals. During site visits, leadership and staff were asked to assess pain management capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and best practices at their respective facilities. The task force developed 109 recommendations that lead to a comprehensive pain management strategy that utilizes state-of-the-art/ science modalities and technologies, and provides optimal quality of life for soldiers with acute and chronic pain. Medical providers are now informed and encouraged to utilize alternative means of pain management wherever possible. Such techniques include development and integration into clinical practice of a common Pain Assessment Tool, establishing acute pain medicine services across the continuum of care, implementing a drug abuse assessment strategy in the primary care setting, providing appropriate pain management and clinical pharmacy oversight in Warrior Transition Units (WTU), incorporation of pain related questions into the WTU Satisfaction Survey, and establishing a tiered pain management approach leveraging techniques such as osteopathic manipulation, acupuncture, and yoga. U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) has established a number of policies that also address this issue, including: 1. OTSG/MEDCOM Policy 09-022, WTU High Risk Medication Review and Sole Provider Program. This has proven to be a highly successful medication reconciliation policy that has reduced adverse events in warriors. Providers perform medication reconciliation with each Warrior within 24 hours of assignment. Clinical pharmacists monitor and support safe and effective medication treatment and review medication profiles weekly. Case managers periodically perform clinical risk assessment and when assigned. Warriors identified as high risk are closely monitored, dispensed smaller quantities of medications, and are assigned to one provider and pharmacy. 2. OTSG/MEDCOM Policy 09-064, Use of Opioid Medications in Pain Management. This policy educates providers regarding the proper selection of patients and appropriate treatment with opioid analgesics. Primary Care Managers (PCM) will assess patients face-to-face before initiating opioid therapy for risk factors and meet with patients every 60-90 days to monitor clinical response and potential adverse effects. 3. MEDCOM published OPORD 10-76, Comprehensive Pain Management Campaign Plan (CPMCP) in September 2010, a phased operationalization of Pain Task Force recommendations including: a. 4.4.1. Establish Regional Medical Commands (RMC) Integrative Pain Management Centers and expansion/standardization of non-medication pain management modalities. b. 4.2.1. Incorporate integrative and alternative therapeutic modalities into a patient centered plan of care. Standards are being developed in order to expand/establish standards for alternative medicine programs (acupuncture, bio-feedback, yoga, osteopathic manipulation, and mind-body techniques). Additionally, Dr. Stanley and I have had several discussions regarding this issue. One outcome of these discussions was a Memorandum on ``A Systems Approach to Drug Demand Reduction in the Force.'' In this memorandum I made several recommendations that I believe will further reduce drug demand. These recommendations included: Subsume all DOD drug testing efforts under Readiness and fully fund the program Fund the expansion of drug testing to include the most commonly abused prescription drugs Complete the Prescription Drug Verification Portal to allow testing labs to instantly verify narcotics prescriptions in the TRICARE database As recommended, the Drug Demand Reduction Office is now under the Deputy Under Secretary for Readiness and has been fully funded, including funding to complete the Prescription Drug Verification Portal. As of March 2011 the portal was undergoing connectivity testing and was scheduled to begin beta testing before the end of the month. Additionally, a testing method for benzodiazepines is under development and expected to be implemented during the second quarter of 2012. It is important, however, to keep in mind that addiction is not the same as being prescribed narcotics or controlled substances even over a long period of time. Addiction refers to behaviors as a result of using or seeking drugs (narcotics) including active behaviors to obtain, abuse, and persist in a pattern of abuse in spite of adverse consequences. Tolerance and withdrawal may result after 6-8 weeks of daily use or years of intermittent use, however this does not equate to addiction. Consensus among addiction physicians shows development of narcotic dependence when treating pain in the absence of other risk factors is rare. Risk factors for addition include: 1. Personal history of addiction to opioids or other mood-altering substances (i.e. alcohol) 2. Family history of substance use disorders 3. History of poor medication compliance or abuse 4. Co-morbid psychopathology (depression, anxiety, etc) which may motivate a patient to self-medicate psychological pain. Returning to the importance of line leadership involvement, I am also moving forward with a doctrinal change called ``Total Force Fitness'' which calls upon line leaders to take a proactive role in setting the conditions for healthy lifestyles in the force. While the few specific examples I provided represent true progress, much more is being done. Task forces continue to study the many related issues and researchers continue to explore alternate pain management techniques. There will, of course, always be room for improvement, but we have made significant strides. 32. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, what is your overall assessment of the effectiveness of these WTUs? Admiral Mullen. The WTUs have been effective in helping ensure that our most seriously wounded soldiers are receiving the care they require and deserve. To some extent, however, WTUs have become victims of their own success. While intended to focus on our most seriously injured, the WTUs have become the default unit for our less injured soldiers also. The Warrior Care and Transition Program (WCTP), overseen by the Army's Warrior Transition Command, a Major Subordinate Command of the MEDCOM, currently provides care, support, and advocacy for some 17,000 soldiers and veterans. This represents a dramatic increase in scope and impact compared to what preceded the establishment of the WCTP. WTU plays a central role in the management of the care provided to wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. Although a remarkable amount has been accomplished, the WCTP continues to mature and improve through a coordinated medical and line leadership effort. Through a vigorous program of organizational inspections and assistance visits, the Army's Warrior Transition Command continues to identify areas of the program that can be improved, as well as best practices that can be implemented across all WTUs. Additionally, through the Department of the Army's Inspector General Program, Army leadership recently identified 56 recommendations for improving the WCTP. The Army, under the leadership of BG Darryl Williams, Commander of Warrior Transition Command, is currently in the process of implementing these recommendations as part of a program of continuous refinement and improvement. Additionally, the Army's Warrior Transition Command continues to respond to the requirements and recommendations of the ongoing DOD Inspector General's review of WTUs. Also, I am aware that the Congressionally mandated Recovering Warrior Task Force recently received an entire day of testimony from Brigadier General Williams and the staff of the Warrior Transition Command on the various aspects of WTUs and the WCTP and is now conducting site visits at WTU locations. I look forward to the findings and recommendations of the Task Force and I am confident Army leadership will continue its commitment both to transparency and responsiveness to the findings and recommendations of the Recovering Warrior Task Force. I commend Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey for his leadership in ensuring that the care of wounded, ill, and injured soldiers continues to improve and flourish. As Secretary of Defense Gates and I have repeatedly stated, after the war itself, we have no greater responsibility than to care for those who have been wounded, become ill, or been injured in service to their country. PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS OF TROOPS 33. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, upon completing deployments and prior to returning to the civilian world, Guard and Reserve members are required to undergo a demobilization process to evaluate each member's overall health and wellbeing. Oftentimes, mental health issues do not surface immediately, but rather after the soldier returns to civilian life. What changes do you plan to make in how these men and women are evaluated upon return from deployment to better account for their psychological wellbeing? Admiral Mullen. It is DOD policy that all returning servicemembers will receive a Post-Deployment Health Assessment within 30 days of their return from deployment with the participation of health care providers. In addition, they should receive a Post-Deployment Health Reassessment 3 to 6 months following their return. Both of these assessments have significant portions focusing on the evaluation of psychological well-being, and both of these assessments are required for returning Reserve component members. In addition, DOD is implementing mental health assessments, described below, which will be required for Guard and Reserve members. The purpose of the mental health assessment is to identify mental health conditions including posttraumatic stress disorder, suicidal tendencies, and other behavioral health conditions that require referral for additional care and treatment. On July 19, 2010, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) issued a policy memorandum to the military departments to implement the mandatory mental health assessments following deployment. The Services have requested that the DOD Reserve Health Readiness Program (RHRP) support their Reserve and Guard Components by conducting the mental health assessments according to the HA policy guidance. RHRP has modified its contract to address the requirement telephonically. RHRP providers will use the DOD mental health assessment training program and become certified to conduct mental health assessments for the Reserve components as specified in the ASD(HA) guidance. The Air Force Reserve component expects to be in full compliance with the policy no later than April 2011. The other Service components are currently working with the RHRP to implement the mandatory mental health assessments in their Reserve components as quickly as possible. NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE SUICIDE PREVENTION 34. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, DOD appears to be doing a better job preventing suicides within our Active-Duty Forces than in the past. At the same time, the suicide rates for National Guard and Reserve units have increased. Please discuss actions that are being considered or implemented to help our Guard and Reserve members in this area. Admiral Mullen. The resilience and suicide prevention programs that the Services have implemented are also being tailored to fit the unique needs of the National Guard and Reserve members and their families. The National Guard in each State has programs that are unique to the state, which incorporate such approaches as peer support, call centers, or embedded mental health providers. For Reserve members and their families who have entered the deployment cycle, the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program provides information and referrals that support their health and well-being. DOD also has other tools, such as the online Real Warrior Campaign, Service-produced video messaging, Military Pathways self-assessment tools and the National Resource Directory that can enable remote access to support. This is particularly useful to Reserve component members and their families since they are dispersed throughout communities nationwide and not centrally located at an installation. The following are some examples of ongoing National Guard and Reserve efforts being made to help members in this area: The Air National Guard Psychological Health Program has embedded Wing Directors of Psychological Health (WDPHs) to provide consultation, information, referral, and case management for Airmen and their families. WDPHs work with State Directors of Psychological Health, Joint Family Support Assistance Program and Military and Family Life Consultants, serving as consultants to medical personnel conducting pre- and post-deployment assessments of airmen and provide further screening, referral and case management as appropriate. The Army National Guard (ARNG) has distributed the Resilience and Risk Reduction Campaign Plan, and the ARNG ``Leader's Guide to Soldier Resilience'' to State leaders to promote the mental, physical, and spiritual health of soldiers and families. These guides complement peer-to-peer support programs, aimed at building a support network for soldiers in between traditional drill periods. The Navy Reserve sponsors a Psychological Health Outreach Program where counselors provide education, referrals, and resources to Navy and Marine Corps reservists and their families, to include those who may be considered suicide risks. This proactive outreach to every corner of the country occurs during the deployment cycle and continues throughout the reintegration period in a variety of venues. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN 35. Senator Udall. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 requires the President to provide an economic strategy for Afghanistan, one that supports the counterinsurgency campaign and helps create sustainable Afghan institutions--but also one that will help the Afghan Government eventually be able to pay for its own security. When can we expect to see this strategy, and how important do you believe an economic strategy is to the success of the overall campaign? Secretary Gates. An economic strategy will contribute to the overall success of the civil-military campaign plan by helping USAID focus its efforts and resources in ways that maximize the effects of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan. We have participated in discussions, led by the National Security Staff, on the process by which the report will be produced. DOS and USAID are part of this process. DOD will participate in drafting of the report, as directed by the Executive Office of the President, and will pay particular attention to elements of economic strategy that support the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, promote economic stabilization, and enhance the establishment of sustainable institutions. DOD will work, as directed, to help complete this report as expeditiously as possible, noting the complexity and difficulty of the task. Admiral Mullen. An economic strategy is a key element of our whole- of-government approach to the campaign in Afghanistan in the short and medium term. Economic development addresses the drivers of instability in key population areas by providing equitable access to basic services. A economic strategy is also important to the longer-term sustainability of the Afghan state by enhancing the government revenue base and building a robust private sector that underpins job creation, economic growth and long-term fiscal sustainability. In a coordinated interagency effort, DOS, USAID, and DOD are working to develop a U.S. strategy to strengthen Afghanistan's economy. Other departments and agencies across the U.S. Government, such as the Department of Treasury, will also be able to provide useful input to the strategy. 36. Senator Udall. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what are likely to be the basic tenets of that economic strategy--the minimum objectives it should meet in order to complement and support the overall campaign? Secretary Gates. DOD plays a supporting role to DOS and USAID in terms of an economic strategy for Afghanistan. I believe that it is important, at a minimum, for the economic strategy to address the need to expand employment opportunities for Afghanistan's bourgeoning population of young people and increase government revenue, giving hope that Afghanistan will in the future be able to provide for its own security with minimum outside assistance. To reach fiscal sustainability and increase economic growth, Afghanistan must establish a transparent and accountable regulatory regime for managing public resources, including those generated by its natural resource base. The economic strategy should also account for agricultural growth, which contributes to food security. Finally, an economic strategy should make the maximum use of the resources that build towards an economic structure which benefits the majority of Afghans and does not facilitate the empowerment of a few elites. Admiral Mullen. While we would defer to DOS and USAID, who have the real expertise on this area, from DOD view it is important that at a minimum the economic strategy address the need to provide jobs for Afghanistan's bourgeoning population of young people. Additionally, this strategy should chart a way forward that gives hope that Afghanistan will in the future be able to provide for its own security with minimum outside assistance to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a safe haven for extremist to attack the United States. The strategy should make maximum use of the resources influx we now have to build towards an economic structure that benefits the majority of Afghans and does not facilitate the empowerment of exploitive elite. An economic strategy will be an important element of developing Afghanistan's long term fiscal sustainability. It will emphasize the need to move from donor dependency to export-led growth. 37. Senator Udall. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, from a DOD perspective, what should be the further trajectory of engagement and commitment by the USAID and other elements of the U.S. Government that provide civilian assistance? Secretary Gates. The U.S. strategy should take into account both near-term activities that help stabilize cleared areas, as well as longer-term considerations that are more typical of traditional development programs. To that end, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan recently revised the joint civil-military campaign plan, which spells out the integrated civilian and military efforts required for our strategy in Afghanistan to succeed. DOS and USAID contributed additional personnel through the civilian surge, allowing civilians to partner and share expertise with U.S. military units at every level of the chain of command, from the national level down to the district level. I strongly support USAID's continued assistance to the Afghan Government to build effective governance structures and effectively deliver services to the Afghan people. Given the importance of agriculture to the Afghan economy, USAID agricultural experts along with U.S. Department of Agriculture experts have an important role in advising Afghans on ways to increase the productivity and income of Afghan farmers, and in helping to build the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock. Admiral Mullen. USAID and its civilian partners play a critical role in Afghanistan, and need more resources to continue to perform the challenging task of rebuilding Afghanistan. In areas that are more stable, USAID has demonstrated its value by providing longer-term economic development projects. We see significant need to preserve and expand the programs and activities currently undertaken by USAID to support the stabilization effort, build capacity of the government and civil society, encourage economic growth, and further the social development of Afghanistan. As we continue our efforts to develop Afghanistan's economy, we will consider how best to ensure the unique capabilities that USAID provides are sustained. As we begin to thin out our military presence in areas that we transition to ANSFs, we will rely on our civilian partners to take a lead role in engaging with Afghan counterparts. The sustainment of civilian assistance in Afghanistan will be critical to our strategic partnership with the Afghans, and as Secretary Gates recently observed: ``Economic development is a lot cheaper than sending soldiers''. Note: General Petraeus's testimony on March 15, 2011: ``I am concerned that levels of funding for our DOS and USAID partners will not sufficiently enable them to build on the hard-fought security achievements of our men and women in uniform. Inadequate resourcing of our civilian partners could, in fact, jeopardize accomplishment of the overall mission. I offer that assessment, noting that we have just completed a joint civil-military campaign plan between U.S. Forces Afghanistan and the U.S. Embassy which emphasizes the critical integration of civilian and military efforts in an endeavor such as that in Afghanistan.'' TASK FORCE FOR BUSINESS AND STABILITY OPERATIONS 38. Senator Udall. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what further role in Afghanistan do you envisage for the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO)? Secretary Gates. TFBSO is an invaluable element of the United States' comprehensive civil-military effort in Afghanistan. TFBSO's mission--generating economic growth in conflict areas, specifically in Afghanistan, including through the mobilization of private investment-- is one that no other part of the U.S. Government is currently able to perform. I understand the view of some that DOD is not the appropriate fit for such a mission, but it is important to note that this work is not currently being carried out by any other U.S. department or agency. Moreover, senior Afghan officials requested that TFBSO continue its activities in Afghanistan, and senior U.S. military and civilian leaders in Afghanistan expressed strong support for TFBSO's activities. While DOD works to provide options to Congress for the continuation of TFBSO's mission, I request your support in continuing the TFBSO program so that it may continue performing its vital role. Admiral Mullen. The TFBSO has fulfilled an important role in Afghanistan. There is a large institutional gap in U.S. capability regarding economic development operations in conflict zones. TFBSO has demonstrated value to DOD field commanders and U.S. Ambassadors--both in Iraq and Afghanistan--as filling a vital need for initiating longer- term economic development projects while the countries are, or were, in ongoing operations. Specifically, it helps fill the gap between initial stabilization and longer-term economic development. We see significant need to preserve the programs and activities currently undertaken by the TFBSO to support economic stabilization operations in Afghanistan. As we continue our efforts to develop Afghanistan's economy, we will consider how best to ensure the unique capabilities the TFBSO provides are sustained. 39. Senator Udall. Secretary Gates, please share your views on the requirement in the NDAA to provide a plan for transferring TFBSO's activities to USAID, whether you would support such a transfer in fiscal year 2012, and whether you have any concerns regarding the potential transfer of the TFBSO's activities to USAID. Secretary Gates. The TFBSO proved to be an invaluable element of the United States' comprehensive civil-military effort in Afghanistan. TFBSO's mission--generating economic growth in conflict areas, specifically in Afghanistan, including through the mobilization of private investment--is one that no other part of the U.S. Government is currently able to perform. I understand the view of some that DOD is not the appropriate fit for such a mission, but it is important to note that this work is not currently being carried out by any other U.S. department or agency. Moreover, senior Afghan officials requested that TFBSO continue its activities in Afghanistan, and senior U.S. military and civilian leaders in Afghanistan expressed strong support for TFBSO's activities. While DOD works to provide options to Congress for the continuation of TFBSO's mission, I request your support in continuing the TFBSO program so that it may continue performing its vital role. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin MEDICATION MANAGEMENT 40. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gates, last week the New York Times reported on servicemembers that come home from battle caught in a web of misuse and overuse of prescription drugs--in fact, a young man from my home State was featured as an example of how the misuse of medications can lead to disaster. We send our men and women to war on multiple deployments and give them medications to keep them awake, to help them sleep, and to help ease the physical and psychological pain of being in a stressful environment. As a result, many are coming home broken, not healed. We are finding out that the stories behind many suicides and unexpected deaths are often complicated by dangerous cocktails of drugs. It's been nearly 2 years since the Pentagon was directed in Section 715 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 to study how medications are being used, and misused, to treat the physical and mental wounds of our warfighters, and how to decrease the risks to our troops. The study is now overdue by almost a year. This problem is costing lives and money. When can we expect to receive this critical study on the management of medications for physically and psychologically wounded members of the Armed Forces? Secretary Gates. I appreciate the sensitivity of this issue and your concern for a solid prevention strategy. As was indicated in the interim report, DOD pinpointed certain effective methodologies that identify dangerous combinations of medications. The scope of this study is complex and multi-layered, however. It includes both inpatient and outpatient care at military treatment facilities, service specific WTUs, community-based WTUs, and private sector care. Additionally, this protocol must be approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that oversees the contractor with whom the Department is engaged in for the study. Likewise, DOD needs approval by the IRBs of the six multi-Service sites where the contractor would conduct focus groups and a review of medication practices. The overall IRB process may take up to a year. At this time, DOD obtained all of the necessary IRB approvals. The site visits are scheduled to take place no later than March 31, 2011. These site visits are instrumental in formulating a gap analysis between current and best practices and in developing policies and procedures that will carry out the intent of the legislation. DOD anticipates completion of the final report by November 2011. Thank you for your continued patience as we develop a comprehensive report that is thoroughly responsive to the legislative requirements. 41. Senator Manchin. Admiral Mullen, please provide more information about the growing problem of over-medicating and self- medicating soldiers and what resources in the fiscal year 2012 budget are being directed toward this problem. Admiral Mullen. Increased medication use is a societal problem and DOD medicine mirrors civilian practice. This problem has been of increasing concern to Dr. Stanley and me. Our ongoing discussions lead me to believe that drug abuse represents both a symptom and a problem that fuels the worsening of other conditions. Senior military leaders have been aware of the acute need to gain better controls on the inappropriate use of drugs. However, until recently, we have been unaware of the hurdles faced by their subordinate commanders and by the DOD drug testing community. We realize that drug demand reduction operates within a larger system of readiness and is therefore of great importance to the Chiefs. Despite growing concerns among commanders that drug use is a problem within the ranks, the DOD drug testing programs have remained at budget flat line for the past several years and are facing an estimated $11 million shortfall. While the abuse of prescription drugs has grown substantially since the beginning of the wars, we have only been capable of testing a fraction of these compounds. Until recently, the main DOD drug testing program was positioned under the TMA while its budget was under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy (DASD Counternarcotics and Global Threats) within the Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account. This created a dual loyalty conflict. Compared to the 1980s, when highly effective drug testing in the DOD was first launched, there has been a substantial reduction in commanders' willingness to take urinalysis positive individuals to adjudication. This was certainly a concern heard by VCSA Chiarelli during his visits to installations for a suicide prevention task force review. Commanders indicated the competing demands of filling ranks for deployment and removing drug-using troops made random urinalysis untenable for many. Furthermore, the adjudication process is often long and is perceived to distract leaders from deployment-specific tasks. Rising rates of legal narcotics prescriptions without a seamless capability to quickly verify the prescription means that these actually cloak the real extent of the problem. To help alleviate these problems, I recommended that Dr. Stanley take the following actions: Subsume the DOD drug testing efforts directly under Readiness and fully fund the program to the required levels. Complete the Prescription Drug Verification Portal (the portal that would allow drug testing labs to instantly verify narcotics prescriptions in the TRICARE database). Make drug prosecution statistics part of regular unit readiness reporting. Designate several independent drug testing teams (similar to the approach used by the UK MOD) as mobile units that can independently obtain specimens at random. This encourages commanders to remain compliant and introduces a new variable that is likely to improve deterrence. Fund the expansion of drug testing to include the most common prescription drugs of abuse (particularly benzodiazepines e.g. Valium, this is estimated by the Drug Demand Reduction Program Office to be a $20 million shortfall). Preface these changes with an announcement to the force encouraging drug counseling and treatment 90 days prior to any launch of a new testing regimen. The objective of the program should be to drive inappropriate drug use to their lowest possible levels. Regularly exchange information between the DOD Drug Demand Reduction Program and the ongoing suicide prevention programs and the DOD Joint Pain Task Force. As previously stated, several of these recommendations have already been implemented and others are in progress. In addition to the initiatives above, the Army's new policies and procedures for identifying and mitigating polypharmacy have reduced the risk of over-medication and self-medication. These include: OTSG/MEDCOM Policy 10-076, Guide for Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Risk via the Prevention and Management of Polypharmacy Involving Psychotropic Medications and Central Nervous System Depressants: Implementation of this policy has resulted in improved communication by involving the patient in the treatment plan. The provider will review medications at each encounter and refer to a clinical pharmacist for a comprehensive medication review when the patient is on four or more medications with at least one a psychotropic or Central Nervous System depressant. Revision of MEDCOM Regulation 40-51, Medical Review Officers and Review of Positive Urinalysis Drug Testing Results: This revision will limit the authorized use of controlled substances and clarify the timeframe for determining legitimate use of controlled substances. Note: As of the date and time of submission. This response does not address specific resources included in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. A revised response will be provided once granularity on this subject is obtained. EFFICIENCY INITIATIVES 42. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gates, I want to applaud your efforts to, as you've said, ``reform the way the Pentagon does business--to not only make every defense dollar count, but also to become a more . . . effective organization.'' The American taxpayers want us to start making the hard choices--to root out every inefficiency, cut every bit of waste, and most importantly, change the culture of endless money. I am still concerned that we do not have the full audit of DOD. What are the obstacles preventing this commonsense practice from occurring, and what can we do to make it happen sooner? Secretary Gates. DOD's massive size and complexity make it extremely difficult to achieve full auditability. In addition, DOD financial processes were established and ingrained in systems long ago. These processes and systems were designed for budgetary accounting--not proprietary or commercial accounting called for in the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act. To meet the commercial accounting standards called for in the CFO Act, there is a substantial amount of work to be done, including efforts to address the most difficult challenges: DOD systems are not integrated--breaking the audit trail Systems do not collect data at the transaction level Many diverse functional organizations must work together in end-to-end processes Earlier focus was on information of limited value to management and was not supported throughout DOD Meeting these challenges and improving DOD's business processes receive more attention than ever before. DOD is addressing them by changing the way it does business. To realize success, DOD is using a streamlined approach that focuses on improving and auditing the information we most use to manage. Improving the budgetary and mission critical asset information used to manage the DOD will allow commanders and other leaders to better meet mission needs with available resources. I believe this alignment of operational and financial objectives is the most effective incentive to improve financial management. DOD also established long- and short-term goals, set up a governance process, and provided funding to the Military Services to make process and system improvements. These system improvements, primarily made by deploying Enterprise Resource Planning Systems (ERPS), have broad operational improvement goals which include improving business processes in a way to support audited financial statements. DOD also implemented other effective measures such as including audit related actions and objectives in Senior Executive performance plans. Preparing DOD for financial statement audits is a monumental task, but with leadership focus, accountability, and our streamlined approach, I believe it can succeed. With this streamlined approach I believe that DOD can achieve its goal of meeting this objective by 2017. CHINA 43. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gates, during the next 5 to 10 years, how do you see the defense budget changing as a result of China's predicted rise as a worldwide provider of strategic minerals, consumer goods, and weapons? Secretary Gates. The rise of China as a regional political, economic, and military power with global ambitions is one of the defining elements of the international strategic and security environment. The primary focus of China's military modernization appears to remain on preparing for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. However, China's military is also exploring missions beyond Taiwan. DOD is watching carefully, for example, China's development and acquisition of weapon systems and capabilities that would classify as intended for anti-access and area denial missions. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review examined operating in an anti-access/area denial environment and recommended that the United States pursue effective, affordable, and sustainable U.S. defense posture based on a broad portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. The President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2012 includes $113 billion for DOD to procure the capabilities needed to protect the United States and its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Included in this amount are funds to invest in new programs, as well as modernization efforts for existing equipment. Two specific items of note are investments in a new bomber for the Air Force and five additional ships for the Navy. These investments will enable the United States to sustain our forward presence in the Western Pacific and to operate in contested areas in the future. 44. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gates, what does DOD now spend on goods from China? Secretary Gates. In fiscal year 2010, the DOD purchased a total of $123,560 in unspecified miscellaneous commercial, industrial, and professional goods and services directly from Chinese industry. DOD expects to issue its annual report to Congress on purchases from foreign entities shortly, presenting in greater detail DOD purchase of goods and services from all foreign countries, including China. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand AFGHANISTAN 45. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, in December 2010 President Obama, while discussing the results of his Afghanistan-Pakistan review policy, said ``the United States is on track to achieve its goals in the war against terrorism against al Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.'' The review also stated ``as a result of our integrated efforts in 2010, we are setting the conditions . . . to begin a responsible, conditions-based U.S. troop reduction in July 2011.'' Now that we are about 135 days away from that July 2011 objective, how many troops do you think conditions on the ground will allow us to bring home this year? Secretary Gates. General Petraeus will provide options and make a recommendation for the drawdown of U.S. surge forces in the coming months. This timing will allow him to take into account important on- the-ground considerations, including progress in provinces and districts that are being transitioned to Afghan-security lead. This analytical process will allow the time needed to provide the President the best information to inform his ultimate decision on this matter. Until that time, it is too early to say how many U.S. forces will redeploy. 46. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, you have budgeted in fiscal year 2012 for 98,000 troops in Afghanistan--the same force level you have today. I understand that you wish to leave yourself wiggle room in case conditions on the ground do not permit a timely withdrawal, but the American people want to see execution of the promise to begin withdrawal this summer. At some point we need to reduce our troop presence and turn security over to the Afghan security forces. Why could you not have assumed a lower number of troops in building your fiscal year 2012 budget? Secretary Gates. There is every indication that conditions will permit the United States to begin withdrawing forces in July 2011. General Petraeus will provide options and make a recommendation for the commencement of the drawdown of U.S. surge forces. General Petraeus may also recommend, as the transition process continues and the responsibility for security in selected regions is transitioned to Afghan security forces, that some U.S. forces be reinvested in other areas. DOD's budget request is driven by numerous factors, including assumptions that may need to be reassessed as conditions evolve in a dynamic environment. General Petraeus and I continue to assess the conditions on the ground so that we may provide options and a recommendation to the President, but I believe that it is premature to attempt to forecast a budget based on lower U.S. force levels at this point in time. 47. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, as I assess the situation, it seems that 135 days out you are still not confident about conditions on the ground. When will you be confident? Secretary Gates. I am confident that we are making steady progress on the ground. I recently returned from my 13th trip to Afghanistan as Secretary of Defense and the progress made by our forces exceeds my expectations. The President and I trust the judgment of General Petraeus, who will provide us options and make a recommendation in the coming months for the commencement of the drawdown of U.S. surge forces in July 2011. 48. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, if your assumptions are ultimately too high, where will the extra funding go? Secretary Gates. I will consult with Congress to determine the best course of action. 49. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, are you planning a similar model in Afghanistan that we executed in Iraq--changing composition of the forces deployed in Afghanistan, over time, to an ``advise and assist mission'' in support of Afghan forces? Secretary Gates. The short answer is yes. As the United States moves toward transferring lead responsibility for security to the Afghan security forces in 2014, I expect to continue to conduct training, advising, and assisting activities and joint counterterrorism operations, at the request of the Government of Afghanistan, to help secure U.S. and Afghan mutual national interests. This is particularly helpful in ensuring that Afghanistan is never again a safe haven from which terrorists attack the United States. An enduring strategic partnership with Afghanistan is important to demonstrate to the Afghans and others in the region that the United States is committed to this goal. 50. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, how much of that progress do you expect to accomplish in fiscal year 2012? Secretary Gates. The situation in Afghanistan is very fluid. Progress is significant but still fragile and reversible. Based upon the progress in recent months, however, I am increasingly confident that alongside our Afghan and international partners, and with Congressional support, the United States will continue to solidify security gains and transition lead responsibility for security for additional geographic areas to Afghan security forces throughout fiscal year 2012. Concurrently, Afghan security forces will continue to develop their fighting and support capabilities. I believe that our strategic partnership with the Government of Afghanistan, including our willingness to train, advise, assist, and equip the ANSF, and to carry out joint counterterrorism operations through 2014 and beyond, will change the strategic calculus of the Taliban and other actors. Combined with our relentless pursuit of mid-level Taliban commanders, the increasing competency and professionalism of ANSF will encourage greater numbers of fighters to reconcile with the Government of Afghanistan and reintegrate into Afghan society. 51. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, in the recently published National Military Strategy (NMS) you stated ``we must continue to support and facilitate whole-of-nation approaches . . . military power complements economic development, governance, and the rule of law.'' Yet you just said that improvements in Afghanistan's governance and reconstruction have not kept pace with improving security. Given the Karzai Government's extensive corruption, including the looming collapse of the Kabul Bank that pays Afghan military salaries, how do you hope to sustain the erosion of al Qaeda and the Taliban's support among the Afghan people no matter what successes our troops obtain? Admiral Mullen. We will sustain the erosion of al Qaeda and the Taliban's support among the people by capitalizing on our successes and momentum gained through the winter 2010 campaign. The new Civilian- Military Campaign Plan is closely aligned with the Government of Afghanistan's National Development Strategy and the Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) transition plan. Our objectives are oriented towards the goals of the Lisbon Conference and transitioning the lead for security to Afghan security forces by the end of 2014. There is a greater emphasis on interagency coordination and support to our civilian partners on provincial and district governance, trade, transportation, infrastructure; counter-narcotics programs; customs and border-capacity development and sustainable private-sector development. There will be an emphasis on civilian and diplomatic efforts throughout transition but we now have the right inputs to make the strategy successful. 52. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, when I traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan a few months ago I heard repeatedly from our commanders on the ground that our mission in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to Pakistan's harboring of al Qaeda, Taliban, and aligned organizations. U.S.-Pakistani relations have chafed greatly over the past year. How are we going to execute a redeployment strategy in Afghanistan if Pakistan does not go after the insurgency within its borders? Admiral Mullen. Our commanders on the ground accurately characterize the inextricable linkage of security and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Peace in the region, and our mission success, depend on securing populations and denying safe havens for terrorist groups on both sides of the border. Given the difficult terrain and sophisticated threats in the border area, observers not in contact with the Pakistan military may conclude that they are not pursuing insurgents on their side of the border. The situation on the ground in Pakistan is complex. The Pakistan military has made unprecedented progress over the past 2 years in clear and hold operations against militants in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In the course of those operations, they have lost roughly 3,000 dead and 8,000 wounded among security forces fighting militants, with thousands of civilian casualties as well. While it is true that the Pakistan military has not gone after Afghanistan-focused insurgents to the same degree it has taken on those groups targeting their own government this is a function both of Pakistan's perceptions about the specific threats and the capabilities of the Pakistan military, which are already stretched by the need to continue holding areas previously cleared. Although our bilateral relations with Pakistan have had difficult moments in the past year, there have also been noteworthy positive developments such as cooperation between our forces in flood relief operations and the development of more formal, robust defense planning ties and security assistance. We have also greatly improved operational cooperation between our forces in the border regions, reducing safe havens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. DOD continues to plan force level reductions in Afghanistan based on the increasing capabilities of ANSFs and conditions on the ground. As our cooperation and coordination with Pakistan in the border area grows and develops, the greater the conditions will be to secure the population. TERRORISM 53. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, in the NMS it states ``the intersection between states, state sponsored, and non-state adversaries is most dangerous in the area of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and nuclear terrorism.'' And then it goes on to say ``the prospect of multiple nuclear armed regimes in the Middle East with nascent security and command and control mechanisms amplifies the threat of conflict, and significantly increases the probability of miscalculation or the loss of control of a nuclear weapon to non-state actors.'' How confident are you that al Qaeda or associated insurgent groups could not acquire or steal a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials from Pakistan, that they could in turn use in a nuclear September 11 scenario? Admiral Mullen. The prospect of unsecure nuclear weapons or materials, and their acquisition and use by al Qaeda or an affiliate, is a serious threat that DOD addresses in the NMS as well as in our operational planning efforts. This scenario presents a formidable challenge for developing prevention and response strategies; however, as preventing nuclear-armed terrorism is a top presidential priority, we have a number of initiatives in place to broadly address this threat. With regard to Pakistan specifically, as the Secretary has said before, we are confident in the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. 54. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, how are the growing U.S.- Pakistan tensions impacting our ability to protect against that scenario? Admiral Mullen. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has endured periods of tension as well as periods of cooperative growth in recent years. While street protests and negative media coverage frequently complicate our work in Pakistan, they do not prevent the cooperative efforts that we and our Pakistan military counterparts see as critical to mutual security. Compared to 10 years ago, when bilateral relations were nearly frozen due to sanctions we have far more robust mechanisms for cooperation and dialogue today. The bilateral relationship reflects a slow, difficult process of deepening trust and cooperation. Full transparency may require years to develop. Progress depends on our ability to identify and build upon areas of mutual concern and mutual interest; those areas become a platform for effectively preventing worst case scenarios from materializing in Pakistan. 55. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, I am very concerned about the growing risk of Yemen's collapse, given the recent protests, the historical conflicts within and across Yemen's boundaries, and the country's dire poverty. A year ago, a bomb attempt conceived in Yemen threatened our Homeland. Last year I asked Secretary Gates why we ought to focus so many resources on Afghanistan when we face a similar threat of an unstable state with Al Qaeda or related elements in Yemen. We seem to be addressing Yemen with a target counter-terrorism mission, rather than a larger counterinsurgency footprint as in Afghanistan. Please explain the strategic difference. Which do you think is more effective? Admiral Mullen. The largest difference between our strategies in these two countries lies in the scope and scale of our efforts. Unique threat contexts in each of these countries have shaped our responses. We invaded Afghanistan to fight the Islamist Taliban militia and its terrorist affiliate, al Qaeda, who held control of most of the country. Our efforts in Yemen, on the other hand, are limited to the cooperative counter-terrorism assistance we can provide that respects Yemen's sovereignty. While the scale and scope of the threat is larger in Afghanistan, our significant military presence allows us to conduct full-scale military operations. We do not have that liberty in Yemen, because we cannot operate within the country without Yemeni permission. Instead, the U.S. military seeks to build Yemeni counter-terrorism capacity. We have a viable threat in Yemen, and the growing instability there may allow for greater terrorist activity, but our ability to combat AQAP is confined to our cooperative arrangements with the Yemenis. Both our counter-insurgency and counter-terror strategies can be effective depending on how and where they are applied. In each of these countries, we are working within our resource and legal constraints to develop comprehensive approaches to ending terrorism. Counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan are engaging with communities to target enemy insurgents while improving security. In Yemen, we are training counter-terrorism forces while pursuing a range of development initiatives to reduce the systemic causes of terrorist recruitment. CYBERSPACE 56. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, the NMS states, ``the United States faces persistent, widespread, and growing threats from state and non-state actors in space and cyberspace. Should a large- scale cyber intrusion or debilitating cyber attack occur, we must provide a broad range of options to ensure our access and use of the cyberspace domain and hold malicious actors accountable. We must seek executive and congressional action to provide new authorities to enable effective action in cyberspace''. What are the specific authorities you need to support cyberspace operations? Admiral Mullen. Foremost, we need to clearly specify the military's functions and authorities with respect to both offensive and defensive activities in cyberspace, both to protect DOD networks and in support of broader national security interests. In the past, network protection was reactive, limited to implementing ``fixes'' to network vulnerabilities that had already been exploited by threat actors. Such a posture is insufficient and cannot be characterized as a effective ``defense'' in a domain where offensive action has clear advantage. In cyberspace, static defenses are quickly subverted, overwhelmed, and defeated. DOD is developing a dynamic, agile, active, and informed defensive capability. I am confident that this approach will result in more secure, hardened, and resilient DOD networks. Extending similar capability to the Nation's critical infrastructure and government functions, as called for in the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, will require an integrated whole-of-government approach. 57. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, in the strategy you state that the United States faces growing threats from state and non-state actors in cyberspace. Are you saying that you are seeing evidence of terrorist groups gaining the capability of launching a cyber attack or simply using the Internet for recruitment, motivation, or fundraising? Admiral Mullen. Yes. Al Qaeda and associated Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) aggressively use the Internet to disseminate their ideology and propaganda; to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize new members; to coordinate operations; and, to generate and distribute funds. A VEO's ability to exploit the Internet complicates our military's efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, while posing challenges to our domestic law enforcement and Homeland Security initiatives. Additionally, I am concerned that these VEOs may eventually acquire and use sophisticated cyber tools developed by nation-states, criminal organizations, or disaffected cyber specialists whom they may recruit. If this occurs, the U.S. Government will not have the luxury of time and distance to separate ourselves from the adversary. 58. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, the fiscal year 2012 budget requests have $2.3 billion for cyber security. Can you explain the components of that number and how it compares to the last 3 years? Admiral Mullen. The fiscal year 2012 budget request for cyber security of $2.32 billion is made up of core information assurance (IA) activities [$2.00 billion], the cyber security/DIB initiative [$0.20 billion], and Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) headquarters operations [$0.12 billion] programs. The core IA program includes the following program elements: Public Key Infrastructure, Key Management Initiative, and Information System Security Program. DOD must protect and defend information, information-based processes, and information systems on the Global Information Grid at all security levels to meet its strategic goals. The Department is also working to identify and mature the capabilities required to support cyber operations and the stand-up of CYBERCOM. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request for cyber security continues to address computer network defense; cyber identity and access management; engineering and deployment controls; cryptographic key production and management; cross domain capabilities; workforce development; and operational resiliency. The fiscal year 2012 request also initiates the design and construction of a Joint Operations Center for CYBERCOM; adds resources to monitor and secure classified networks and information; increases manpower to assess cyber threats and develop countermeasures; sustains cyber schoolhouses; and supports evolution of DIB cyber security activities. The enacted fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 budgets for cyber security were for $2.32 billion and $2.35 billion, respectively. The fiscal year 2011 budget request was for $2.50 billion. Cost reductions in fiscal year 2012 are due to operational changes to include the removal of initial/one-time facility and equipment costs for establishing CYBERCOM at Fort Meade in fiscal year 2011, and cyber security funding transfers into DISA's Working Capital Fund. HOMELAND DEFENSE SECURITY PREPAREDNESS 59. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, the NMS states that ``we will continue to dedicate, fund, and train a portion of the National Guard for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. Working with Canada and Mexico, we will remain prepared to deter and defeat direct threats to our North American homeland.'' What is your assessment of the terrorist infiltration threat along our northern border and what specific steps are you taking to counter it? Secretary Gates. This question is best answered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for preventing terrorist attacks within the United States (6 U.S.C. Sec. &A(b)(1)(A)); preventing the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terrorism into the United States (6 U.S.C. Sec. 202(1)); and securing the borders, territorial waters, ports, terminals, waterways, and air, land, and sea transportation systems of the United States (6 U.S.C. Sec. 202(2)). ______ Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ 60. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, U.S. troops are currently deployed with ISFs and Kurdish peshmerga fighters along the disputed internal boundaries between Arab and Kurdish communities. These ``Combined Security Mechanisms'' are easing tensions between Arabs and Kurds, while contributing to the integration of peshmerga units into the ISFs. How risky and potentially dangerous is it for these peacekeeping mechanisms to go away at the end of this year, as they must under the current security agreement? Secretary Gates. The U.S. Government continues to implement the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement fully, including completing the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. As part of the drawdown, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) is taking steps to mitigate the potential for conflict by building confidence at the local, provincial, and national levels between security forces and political leaders. USF-I is also working closely with DOS to transition the U.S. military's role as a mediator and honest broker in northern Iraq to the post-2011 civilian- led mission. The Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) consists of a series of trilateral (U.S. military, ISF, and Kurdish Security Forces (KSF)) coordination centers and checkpoints to facilitate confidence-building and coordination at the local and national levels in areas of northern Iraq with Disputed Internal Boundaries. At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki's 2009 designation of some KSF units as ``Regional Guard Brigades'' allowed USF-I to advise, train, and assist these forces so that they are able to integrate into the ISF. USF-I developed drawdown plans for ending U.S. participation in the CSMs by engaging with Iraqi and Kurdish military leaders to transition this trilateral mechanism to a bilateral forum. ISF and KSF modernization efforts also increased stability, improved communication, and built confidence among leaders in DIBs areas. These efforts will mitigate the impact of U.S. forces' drawdown from the CSMs. DOS plans to establish temporary Embassy Branch Offices in the DIBs to address local and provincial ethno-sectarian tensions. Even so, DOS's ability to successfully lead the mediator and honest broker missions in northern Iraq depends on full funding of its fiscal year 2012 budget request. Without full funding, the achievement of the U.S. goal to facilitate peaceful, political processes for resolving outstanding issues in northern Iraq is at risk. Admiral Mullen. Unresolved Arab-Kurd issues, including the resolution of Article 140, agreement on a hydrocarbon law, revenue sharing, and the status of Kirkuk, remain a primary concern. Tensions are elevated within disputed areas and will remain so until these issues are resolved. Dialogue among Arab and Kurdish leaders with international mediation has been helpful but it is highly unlikely issues will be resolved before U.S. military forces leave Iraq at the end of the year. In the short term, the Combined Security Mechanism is an effective stop gap until these broader issues are resolved and provides a confidence building measure between the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government. In coordination with the State Department, we have developed plans to mitigate the risk of U.S. forces leaving the disputed areas at the end of the year by significantly increasing our diplomatic presence in the north. We believe this increased diplomatic presence, if fully funded, will help address Arab-Kurd tensions. The risk of violent confrontation will increase without an adequately resourced replacement for the current U.S. military presence. 61. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, please explain what comparable civilian arrangement will take over the peacekeeping role now played by U.S. troops operating along the Arab- Kurd fault lines in Iraq. Secretary Gates. DOS's plan for its 2012 civilian-led mission prioritizes engagement in northern Iraqi areas with Disputed Internal Boundaries by providing for the establishment of Embassy Branch Offices (EBOs) in Ninewa and Kirkuk Provinces. The EBOs will be staffed by diplomats, development specialists, and representatives from other U.S. agencies, such as the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, and Treasury, in order to bring a whole-of-government approach to conflict prevention and peace building in northern Iraq. The location of the EBOs along the Arab-Kurd ethnic fault line reflects the concern that Arab-Kurd tensions remain a leading source of instability in Iraq. DOS's ability to play a mediating and honest broker role in northern Iraq depends on full funding of its fiscal year 2012 budget request. Admiral Mullen. As part of the U.S. military drawdown in Iraq, we have planned for and are actively transitioning enduring programs to the State Department and the Government of Iraq. This includes the U.S. role in the trilateral security relationship we share with the ISF and the Peshmerga along Arab-Kurd fault lines. While different from the military's current role, the State Department will utilize the diplomatic tools inherent to its capabilities in mitigating tensions between Arabs and Kurds. I am concerned the State Department will assume increased risk in this very important role if their funding is further decreased. IRANIAN INTENT 62. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would you agree that the highest priority of the Iranian government during this year is to prevent any changes to the security agreement with Iraq so as to ensure that no U.S. troops will remain in Iraq by January 1, 2012? Secretary Gates. Iran would almost certainly oppose a continued U.S. troop presence after 2011. I remain troubled by Iran's continued support to, and training of, militant groups that target both Iraqi and U.S. personnel. The United States encourages Iran to maintain constructive and peaceful relations with its neighbor Iraq, with which it shares a long history of cultural, religious, and economic ties. Iran can be a better neighbor by respecting Iraqi sovereignty, and by ending its support to those who support terrorism in Iraq. NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MODERNIZATION 63. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in their proposal to fund the remainder of fiscal year 2011, House appropriators cut $300 million from the President's request for nuclear weapons modernization. Do you agree that it is critical that Congress fund the $624 million increase in fiscal year 2011 and that a long-term commitment to the funding proposal set forth in connection to the New START treaty, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is of the upmost importance to national security and the viability of our nuclear deterrent? Secretary Gates. Yes, it is critical that Congress fund the entire $624 million fiscal year 2011 increase for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and sustain the long-term funding requirements as laid out in the 1251 Report to Congress, which serves as a roadmap to implementing the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and New START treaty. The treaty is buttressed by credible modernization plans and long-term funding for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and the infrastructure that supports it. This administration proposes significant investments over the next decade to rebuild and sustain America's aging nuclear infrastructure--especially the national labs, and the science, technology, and engineering base. This funding not only begins with a commitment to the long overdue modernization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure, it continues ongoing activities and starts the studies necessary to sustain and life-extend the nuclear deterrent so it remains in a safe, secure, and effective status. In addition, the funding augments NNSA activities required to sustain the personnel with key critical skills to continue to sustain our nuclear arsenal. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 64. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, while the fiscal year 2012 budget includes a $200 million increase over the President's fiscal year 2011 level, overall FYDP funding is cut by $2.6 billion. Given the President's commitment to missile defense as reaffirmed during our debate on the New START treaty just a few months ago, how does DOD justify significant out-year decreases for missile defense? Secretary Gates. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget for 2011 through 2015 is based on the missile defense priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The MDA budget strategy in fiscal year 2012 identified efficiencies and balanced personnel, budgetary and management resources within and across its components. In instituting efficiency initiatives, the MDA will make greater use of competition across its acquisition programs and realize savings through a refined approach to contracting for services. EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION FOR SPACE EFFICIENCY INITIATIVE 65. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, while I appreciate the stated goals of the Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency initiative for procuring satellite systems, I remained concerned with the overall track record of cost overruns and schedule delays for space systems. Does DOD intend to follow the requirements set forth by this committee on multiyear procurements, to include: A certification that the use of such a contract will result in substantial savings; That the minimum need for the property to be purchased is expected to remain substantially unchanged during the contemplated contract period; That the head of the agency will request funding for the contract at the level required to avoid contract cancellation; That there is a stable design for the property to be acquired and that the technical risks associated with such property are not excessive; and That the estimates of both the cost of the contract and that anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a multiyear contract are realistic. Secretary Gates. The DOD discussed the multiyear procurement provisions at length with the White House and congressional staffs. As a result of these discussions, DOD determined that multiyear procurement authorization is not required for this space system. Therefore, the model DOD is implementing is not multiyear procurement. The Air Force is procuring two satellites in a block in a single year. However, full funding for both satellites in a single year is just not practically achievable in today's budget environment. I share your concern with the past performance of space programs. I am bringing the block buy approach forward to address specific root causes of some of those difficulties. The stability that comes with buying in quantity, even in quantities of two, will help the prime contractors, subcontractors, and parts and supplies vendors. These satellites have thousands of often sophisticated components, tens of thousands of complex integrated circuits, and many dozens of unique designs only found in U.S. factories. The people who design and manufacture these parts and subparts are highly talented but small in number, and DOD wants to keep them working for its needs. Further, the government will realize lower unit costs by buying in quantity and by minimizing production line stops and restarts. 66. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in pursing this contracting strategy, what sort of accountability does DOD intend to place on the prime contractor of these satellite systems? Secretary Gates. The best approach for accountability under the acquisition strategy for the AEHF communications satellites is the fixed-price, incentive fee contract. Government liability is constrained if the contractor experiences problems directly related to contractor responsibilities within the scope of the contract. Contract penalties for unmet milestones or premature failure in on-orbit performance will also apply. Along with these provisions, DOD plans to bring improved industrial base stability that should help avoid some of the conditions that contributed to past cost overruns. In addition, designating block buys as subprograms will provide congressional insight into actual space vehicle block costs. The resulting visibility ensures Air Force and DOD accountability for the costs and funding requirements to which they committed at the block Milestone Decision. 67. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you share my concern about using these sorts of contracts for these sorts of programs? Secretary Gates. While I share your general concern regarding accountability and space acquisition management in particular, I think there is merit to the block buy approach for AEHF. The AEHF satellite program, the first program with which DOD seeks to implement this approach, is now a well-defined acquisition program with plenty of execution data around which to design a stable production program. The operational requirements are well validated; all derived system-level specifications are clear; and the experienced government/contractor team is in place. Additionally, one satellite has launched, one is in storage awaiting launch, and two more are in various stages of production. I anticipate the block buy of satellites 5 and 6 to be a smooth continuation of the production line. To support these contracting efforts, DOD is implementing ``should cost'' analyses to gain a much more detailed and thorough understanding of the cost structure for AEHF and other space programs. I believe maturity and stability lend well to a fixed-price contracting strategy. 68. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how do you intend to ensure that these types of contracts are used appropriately and judiciously for these programs? Secretary Gates. DOD put a great deal of thought into this overall approach to include the contracting strategy, focusing on mature programs that have reached the production phases of their life cycles. Because development is complete, I do not expect unplanned design or manufacturing changes. However, an important element of this approach is sound obsolescence management. The contractor team will have an on- going effort to identify components set to be discontinued or superseded. As they identify these parts, their engineers can make smart adaptations to the assembly or test before the update affects the production flow. On our end, DOD is ensuring the performance requirements levied upon these systems do not change, which is critical over the duration of the block build. In summary, these conditions go hand-in-hand with a fixed-price contracting approach. NUCLEAR TRIAD MODERNIZATION 69. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when released last year, the NPR set forth a broad vision that must not be viewed outside of the realm of affordability. The cost alone for modernizing both the nuclear weapons complex and the triad are substantial, and as we move to reduce the size of our nuclear stockpile, this modernization effort becomes all the more important. Factoring in the cost of missile defense and prompt global strike--both essential and critical, but also costly, programs--the overall budget outlook seems to suggest steady increases for the foreseeable future. The same defense budget which you recently stated will experience at most long-term growth of 1 percent a year after inflation. What is the near-term and long-term affordability of implementing the NPR? Secretary Gates. The 2010 NPR concluded that a Triad of strategic forces best maintains strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or geopolitical surprise. The 10-year estimate for sustaining the nuclear deterrent (approximately $214 billion) was identified in the fiscal year 2012 Annual Update to the report pursuant to section 1251 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010. These costs are larger than the planned overall growth of 1 percent per year after inflation. This results from the need to begin the activities necessary to replace or sustain all three legs of our nuclear Triad over the next 2 to 3 decades. This cost projection is considered essential to maintaining our nuclear deterrent and is in accordance with the NPR. DOD will continue to assess the force size required for an effective deterrent. While we work to maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, a wide range of efficiency measures also are being explored, including a research and development program, which was noted in the NPR. This program was initiated to focus on commonality between the military departments' requirements and joint, scalable flight-test demonstrations. DOD is committed to sustaining and modernizing the Triad in an efficient and cost-effective manner while maintaining strategic stability and deterrent capability. 70. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2012 budget provides funding for a next generation long-range bomber and the next generation ballistic missile submarine; however, little has been said about the next generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which is needed by 2030. When does DOD intend to provide details on the funding requirements and timeline for the development, production, and deployment of a new ICBM? Secretary Gates. The administration plans to sustain the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030, as required by section 139 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. Sustainment programs include ICBM Fuze Refurbishment for the Mk12A and Mk21 reentry vehicles, Joint Fuze Development on the Mk21 and Mk12A replacement, the ICBM Cryptography Upgrade II for nuclear surety, the Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle program, the Propulsion System Rocket Engine Refurbishment Life Extension Program, the Environmental Control System Replacement Program, the ICBM Security Modernization Program, and the Minuteman Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network Program Upgrade. Other sustainment programs may be necessary, and weapon system requirements are being reviewed to ensure the viability of the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030. The preparatory analysis for a follow-on ICBM capability fielded in the 2030 timeframe began in 2011. The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) will assess potential materiel solutions including sustaining the current Minuteman III ICBM weapon system and supporting infrastructure. During the GBSD AoA review, concepts will be evaluated for effectiveness, cost, schedule, concepts of operations, and overall risk in meeting operational requirements. DOD will recommend a specific way-ahead to the budget for an ICBM follow-on in fiscal year 2014. 71. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what about a replacement nuclear capable air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)? Secretary Gates. The ALCM will be maintained in the inventory until the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) missile capability is fielded. The ALCM will undergo multiple service life-extension programs to ensure the viability of the propulsion systems, guidance and flight control systems, and warhead arming components. DOD intends to field an advanced penetrating LRSO missile to replace the ALCM, and the Air Force has programmed $0.9 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) over the next 5 years for the development of the LRSO. 72. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when should budgets begin to reflect the steady increases suggested in the NPR? Secretary Gates. In fiscal year 2012, DOD will begin to see more substantial progress with NPR-driven modernization recommendations. These include: (1) Investments in research, development, and test and evaluation of Conventional Prompt Global Strike capabilities; (2) Construction of the Navy's West Coast Explosive Handling Wharf to ensure safe missile and warhead off/on loading operations and maintenance for Pacific SSBN operations; and (3) The Air Force initiation, as directed, of a program for a new long-range, nuclear-capable penetrating bomber. The President's fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budgets include funding of NPR initiatives. The February 2011 update to the report submitted pursuant to section 1251 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 provides a summary of spending for delivery systems and weapon- related activities of the NNSA, which total approximately $214 billion from fiscal year 2012-fiscal year 2021. 73. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what are the implications for the strategic deterrent if we don't modernize the triad or find we cannot afford to? Secretary Gates. The United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist. The NPR calls for making investments in nuclear delivery systems to ensure that existing capabilities are adequately sustained with essential upgrades and modifications. Such investments, and the NPR's strategy for continued delivery system capability, represent a credible modernization plan necessary to sustain and support our Nation's deterrent. 2005 BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE 74. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, as you may know, DOD is required by law to complete base realignment and closure (BRAC) resulting from the 2005 BRAC round by September 15, 2011. Is DOD on track to meet this deadline? If not, why not? Secretary Gates. While the Department faces scheduling challenges in a few cases, it is working diligently to ensure we satisfy our BRAC legal obligations. 75. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in meeting the deadline, will you have construction completed on all facilities and infrastructure directly and indirectly required to support the BRAC moves? Secretary Gates. There are a limited number of direct and indirect infrastructure projects on which some elements of construction will continue after September 15. The Department is working diligently to ensure it satisfies the BRAC legal obligations, even if some construction continues past the deadline. 76. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what are the costs incurred by DOD to complete all 2005 BRAC actions and any unobligated balances you may have? Secretary Gates. The overall cost to implement BRAC 2005 is $35.1 billion. I do not anticipate that the Department will have any significant unobligated balances at the end of the BRAC 2005 implementation period. 77. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in your opinion, should DOD conduct another round of BRAC to reduce excess infrastructure? If so, when should DOD conduct the next round? Secretary Gates. DOD is not currently seeking authority to undertake another round of closures and realignments under the Defense BRAC Act of 1990, as amended. The Department is currently focused on completing implementation of the 2005 BRAC round. STATUS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE 78. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, at the NATO Munich Security Conference that I attended last month, it was clear that the intent for European members of the alliance is to address fiscal constraints by slashing their defense budgets, ending drafts, sharing resources, and increasing their reliance on American military capabilities. How are you addressing concerns the changes could burden the United States by reducing the number of European troops available for NATO missions and other military efforts around the world? Secretary Gates. Over the past 10 years, most European Allies increased their deployable and sustainable forces and capabilities, in spite of steady declines in defense spending. They accomplished this by reducing the size of forces designed primarily for territorial defense, and by investing in more capable expeditionary forces. But there are obviously limits to how long those Allies can rely on reinvesting the savings from force structure reductions to sustain this type of transformation. I am now generally urging senior European Ally officials to avoid reducing force structure as they consider decisions about how to allocate scarce defense resources, and instead to seek efficiencies through multinational cooperation and sharing resources. Most European Allies have told me that they are not planning to make defense cuts that will affect current operational commitments. Of course, the realities of the fiscal crisis in Europe and the required reductions in defense spending are such that preserving force structure and sustaining the current high operating tempo will probably result in less investment in future capabilities. As a result, I intend to ask my Defense counterparts to commit to increasing defense investment once their military operating tempo decreases after the successful transition of security responsibility to the Afghan Government. I do not believe that Europe has descended into an irreversible fiscal crisis. At their next meeting in March, NATO Defense Ministers will be asked to agree to Political Guidance for Allied defense planners. This planning guidance looks forward 10 years. I intend to push hard for no decrease in NATO's level of ambition, continued increases in the deployability and sustainability of NATO forces, and a long-term recommitment to the benchmarks of 2 percent GDP devoted to defense spending and 20 percent of defense expenditures allocated to investment in future capabilities. 79. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how is the dynamic nature of fiscal decisions by members of the alliance affecting U.S. military planning? Secretary Gates. DOD must consider the availability and capability of NATO forces in its planning process. DOD always seeks to mitigate the risks of assumptions in its contingency plans (including assumptions about partner participation) by developing multiple options for plan execution. DOD is also engaged in regular bilateral dialogue with our Allies (particularly with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia), and in multilateral discussions to clarify planning assumptions. The NATO Alliance has a particularly well-developed defense planning process to assist Allies in identifying NATO needs. This process is focused not only on ensuring that Allied military forces prevail in current operations, but also on ensuring that NATO can implement the November 2010 Strategic Concept, including the ability to address 21st century security challenges. This planning process and these multilateral discussions inform our national decisions on defense planning and resourcing. 80. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, will the reduction of forces and resources available from other alliance members force the United States to have to make adjustments in order to meet treaty obligations? Secretary Gates. The reduction of forces and resources available from other Alliance members will not force the United States to make adjustments in order to meet its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. In keeping with Article 3 of the Treaty, DOD will continue to work with America's Allies through the NATO Defense Planning Process to determine the correct mix of forces and capabilities needed to maintain and develop our individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, and to maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. In addition to treaty obligations, Allied partners agreed in the NATO Strategic Concept and other strategic-level guidance that NATO must also have the capability to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations. In the current and projected security environment, meeting NATO's level of ambition for crisis response operations and security cooperation with partners is likely to require a much greater share of Allies' national defense resources than honoring treaty obligations. 81. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the current plan for U.S. Army force structure in Europe since 2004 has been to drawn down from four to two Brigades Combat Teams (BCT) by 2014 and to close military bases at Bamberg and Schweinfurt. This would reduce the Army force posture in Europe by 8,000 troops, leaving approximately 36,000 Army forces available in theater for missions and training. You are in the process of evaluating a request by the Commander of European Command (EUCOM) to leave the four BCTs in place. In light of the actions of other European nations to reduce their military resources and forces, why would it be in the best interest of the United States to reverse our planned reductions, reverse base closures, and to maintain additional forces in Europe? Secretary Gates. As part of a broader review of global defense posture, the United States is reexamining our capabilities and force structure in Europe ensuring that our country is well positioned to support Allies and partners in a 21st century security environment. NATO's new Strategic Concept reaffirmed NATO's core commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as its commitment to crisis management and cooperative security. Allies must be prepared to meet a broad range of 21st century challenges through work in new areas, such as missile defense and cyber security, and through modernizing traditional capabilities. The United States is committed to a defense posture in Europe that meets its enduring commitment to NATO's Article 5, ensures a credible deterrent against all forms of aggression, and maintains a robust capacity to build Allied and partner capacity for coalition operations. The President is making his decision about U.S. Army force structure in Europe based on that information. 82. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what does EUCOM gain by having 44,000 Army personnel in Europe vice 36,000 troops assigned and available for theater security cooperation efforts, particularly given the realization that the Commanders of Africa Command (AFRICOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), or Central Command (CENTCOM) have very little or no forces assigned to their commands? Secretary Gates. U.S. Army force posture in Europe not only enables theater security cooperation, but it also assures our allies; it is the cornerstone of NATO; and it supports global requirements, including those for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the past 10 years, EUCOM-assigned Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) in particular have rotated consistently into the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Forward- based forces provide significant flexibility in force management, and often are more efficient than U.S.-based forces, as demonstrated most recently by the rapid manner in which EUCOM-assigned forces were allocated to AFRICOM for Operation Odyssey Dawn. Moreover, CENTCOM routinely receives forces assigned outside its area of operations, including from EUCOM. 83. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would this decision actually validate the intent of the NATO alliance members to increase reliance on the U.S. forces and capabilities for their regional security requirements? Secretary Gates. Almost all of the forces and capabilities available to NATO, other than the headquarters that are part of the NATO command structure, are provided by member nations and funded through their national defense budgets. The principal external influences on national defense budget decisions are the NATO defense planning process and bilateral consultations. The NATO defense planning process allocates force planning targets to nations based on the principles of burden sharing and reasonable challenge. When a nation fails to achieve its force planning targets due to insufficient defense spending, those targets are not reallocated to another nation unless other Allies determine that the original allocation posed an unreasonable challenge (the challenge is considered reasonable as long as it does not require the Nation to spend more than 2 percent of its GDP on defense). Although nations may use many excuses for not allocating sufficient resources to meet NATO objectives, it is unlikely that U.S. decisions to support our security commitments will prompt other Allies not to support their commitments. In fact, the opposite is normally true. In the multilateral reviews of each member's defense plans that occur at NATO, peer pressure makes it more difficult for nations to reduce their commitment to NATO further, and the most intense pressure comes from those nations that are setting an example by meeting their commitments. The fact that no Allies have pressed to reduce the NATO level of ambition upon which defense requirements are based, nor the goal of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, indicates that they want that peer pressure to continue. Although I am never happy when European Allies decide to reduce defense spending, I firmly believe that without the example set by U.S. leadership within the Alliance, European Allies' defense spending would be even lower. COMPETITION AND LIFECYCLE COSTS 84. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, both the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 and DOD's efficiency initiatives espouse guiding principles of increasing competition to lower lifecycle costs. While these are commendable goals given the current budget crisis, I am concerned with the pace and extent of implementation, particularly given recent DOD data that of $366 billion in total DOD contract obligations in fiscal year 2010, $188 billion was identified as not competed or receiving only one bid. Please provide examples from each of the military departments where competition has been used to lower lifecycle costs. Secretary Gates. Life-cycle cost can be defined as the total cost to the government of a program over its full life, including costs for research and development; testing; production; facilities; operations; maintenance; personnel; environmental compliance; energy; and disposal. Competition can be used to reduce costs in each of the individual stages but is most effective in reducing procurement/acquisition and sustainment costs. The following are some examples of competition reducing cost in these areas: In the Army, within the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) portfolio, the Multifunctional Distribution Information System-Low Volume Terminal (MIDS-LVT) radio program is an example of how competition has resulted in procurement cost savings. During the production phase of the MIDS-LVT program, competition has resulted in approximately 60 percent cost savings. The initial production cost of the radio was $435,000 per unit and, through ongoing competition between the two approved vendor production sources, the cost per unit has steadily decreased to $181,000 per unit. With over 2,600 MIDS- LVT units purchased to date, the program has achieved hundreds of millions of dollars in procurement savings through the successful MIDS-LVT competitive acquisition strategy. For the Air Force, the MQ-1 Predator Organizational- level maintenance contract is a good example of how competition produced acquisition cost savings. The initial contract, issued in March 2005, was a sole source award to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. This decision not to compete the Organization-level maintenance contract was primarily driven by the lack of published technical orders. When those technical orders became available, the contract was recompeted 1 year ahead of schedule and awarded to Battle Space Flight Services. This competition resulted in a savings of $102 million. Because of increased and accelerated wartime demand, the Air Force is anticipating additional savings over the life of the contract. The ability to compete between the OEM and the current supplier in the future will continue to enable cost savings. For the Navy, the most visible example is the LCS Program. After receiving proposals from Lockheed Martin and Austal USA in early 2010 that were deemed unaffordable, the Navy changed its acquisition strategy to an all-or-nothing competitive contract award and encouraged the companies to establish leaner teaming arrangements. After proposals were submitted, the Navy realized they could achieve competitive prices, and the requirement was re-solicited for a 10-ship contract award to each company. In December 2010, Lockheed Martin and Austal USA were each awarded fixed-price incentive contracts for the design and construction of 10 ships from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2015. The benefits of competition; serial production; employment of mature technologies; design stability; fixed-price contracting; commonality; and economies of scale contributed to reduced life cycle costs and a highly affordable ship construction program. The approach, self-financed within the program budget by re- investing a portion of the greater than $2 billion in total savings through the FYDP, enabled the addition of a year of ship procurements. The approach also enables the DoN to efficiently produce the ships at an increased rate to meet operational requirements sooner. 85. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, have you found areas where DOD can leverage commercial investment in technology, manufacturing, and service capability to decrease expenses for lifecycle support requirements? Secretary Gates. DOD is leveraging commercial technology, manufacturing, and service capabilities in many ways to reduce weapons system life cycle costs. Since 1998, the USD(AT&L) Commercial Technologies for Maintenance Activities (CTMA) program has been steadily improving maintenance efficiency and effectiveness by integrating proven commercial maintenance technologies into DOD maintenance activities. The Military Departments are undertaking a variety of initiatives leveraging commercial investments through the CTMA program. For example: The Department of Air Force implemented a commercially developed capability, which replaced legacy pin-to-pin continuity procedures with the Enhanced Wiring Integrity System (EWIS). The EWIS gives maintainers the ability to check the integrity of entire wire bundles within seconds and not only detects a fault, but also isolates the fault to within inches of its origin to assist the maintainer in rapidly repairing the wire. The EWIS is widespread across the Air Force, and it is transitioning to the U.S. Navy and Army aviation, as well as to the Marine Corps land systems. The Department of Navy utilized commercial technology employed by airports to detect trace amounts of explosives on passengers and luggage to detect contaminate in lubricants and hydraulic fluids used across the DOD. The resultant capability is being employed on Military Sealift Command vessels where this hand-held tool can assess contamination, viscosity, and other critical fluid parameters in under a minute per test. This capability is in transition to the Army, Navy, and Air Force for diesel oils used in ground vehicles and support equipment. The Department of Army is leading the transition of a commercial technology developed for the automotive maintenance industry and widely used for commercial airline maintenance. This capability, the Automated Process and Inspection Guide (AP&IG), provides accurate point of maintenance technical data and collects standard inspection and maintenance data. AP&IG has: reduced inspection times by 40 percent; reduced repair turn times; and improved overall maintenance quality. Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is a strategy that has been successful in leveraging company investment in technology and services throughout commercial industry. This support strategy has transferred to many applications across the DOD for Weapon System Sustainment. PBL incentivizes the provider to deliver a guaranteed outcome at a fixed price. What have traditionally been revenue centers in transactional relationships between government and industry become cost centers under PBL. PBL strategies can improve both product reliability and processes to drive down costs. Industry makes up front investments to lower costs by improving the product and streamlining sustainment processes. PBL strategies support the warfighter through increased availability, reduced logistics footprint, and lower life cycle costs. 86. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how specifically is DOD better incentivizing and empowering program managers to bring competition into otherwise previously sole-sourced lifecycle programs, whether termed as maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO); or contractor logistics support (CLS); or PBL? Secretary Gates. The USD(AT&L) November 3, 2010 memo to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies directed immediate action to increase competition. The acquisition community is addressing this in the development of Weapon System Acquisition Strategies. Specifically, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Defense Agency Directors were directed to implement the following: Present a competitive acquisition strategy at each program milestone: Provide a one-page competitive strategy for each Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program at each milestone as part of the overall acquisition strategy. Report to USD(AT&L) in fiscal year 2011 on how their military department or agency intends to reduce single-bid competitions--negotiations when only one offer is received. At a minimum, the report will address market research, restricted specifications, and adequate time for proposal preparation. Achieve a 2 percent reduction in single-bid competitive contracts in fiscal year 2011, with continuing reductions thereafter. Remove obstacles to competition: ensure contracting officers conduct negotiations with all single-bid offerors, unless this requirement is specifically waived by the Head of Contracting Activity or Military Department Secretary. The basis of these negotiations will be cost or price analysis, as the case may be, using either certified or non-certified cost or pricing data, as appropriate. Have their component or agency competition advocate develop a plan to improve both the overall rate of competition and the rate of effective competition. These plans establish an improvement rate of at least 2 percent per year for overall competition and an improvement rate of at least 10 percent per year for effective competition. Require open systems architectures and set rules for acquisition of technical data rights: Program managers are to conduct a business case analysis in concert with the engineering tradeoff analysis presented at Milestone B. The business case analysis outlines the open systems architecture approach, combined with technical data rights the Government pursues in order to ensure a lifetime consideration of competition in the acquisition of weapon systems. The results of this analysis will be reported in the Acquisition Strategy Report and in the competition strategy. Increase the dynamic small business role in the defense marketplace competition: All competitive and non- competitive procurement actions will seek to increase small business participation through weighting factors in past performance and fee construct. These actions apply to all contracts, including MRO, CLS, and PBL contracts. The result will be program executive officers and program managers developing a competitive strategy early in acquisition that spans the program's life and improves the ability to compete MRO, CLS, and PBL contracts in sustainment. For example, the Navy undertook a specific initiative to engage each program executive officer, program manager, and Product Support Manager (PSM) to emphasize real competition at every stage of acquisition and sustainment. The Navy directed the program executive officers/ program managers/PSMs to establish a competitive environment throughout the life cycle of their programs, and to enable better competitive opportunities in the sustainment phase. Additionally, program executive officers and program managers are reviewing their existing portfolios in pursuit of increased competitive opportunities, including consideration of breakout opportunities, and expanding open architecture solutions and small business opportunities that fosters additional competition. The Army is emphasizing the conduct of logistics analyses early to baseline costs and develop technical data requirements that facilitate competition in sustainment contracts. The Air Force is also taking proactive steps to ensure program managers and PSMs correctly identify and pursue data rights in their contract negotiations to facilitate competition in sustainment. The outcome will be required warfighting capability at a reduced cost to the Government. 87. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the committee spearheaded legislation which became Section 805 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 regarding Lifecycle Management and Product Support, calling for PSMs to maximize competition and make the best possible use of available DOD and industry resources at the system, subsystem, and component levels. Section 805 was implemented through Under Secretary Carter's Directive- Type Memorandum on October 6, 2010. Since then, how has competition at subsystem and component levels been pursued to reduce lifecycle costs? Secretary Gates. Since the issuance of the DTM, the military departments continue to implement section 805 and have made significant progress identifying PSMs for ACAT I and II programs and issuing the guidance. One of the PSM's major duties is to promote opportunities to maximize competition while meeting the objective of best-value, long- term outcomes for the warfighter. To this end, the Defense Acquisition University developed and fielded DOD Life Cycle Management and PSM Rapid Deployment training with strong attendance across the DOD and the industry acquisition community, which specifically addresses increased competition. Additionally, the military departments are undertaking a variety of initiatives to increase competition. For example: The Navy engaged each Program Executive Office (PEO) and program manager to establish a solid foundation for a competitive environment throughout the life cycle. Therefore, the PEOs and program managers are reviewing existing portfolios in pursuit of increased competition opportunities, including consideration of breakout opportunities at the subsystem and component levels to reduce lifecycle costs. The Air Force published regulations and guidebooks that detail the importance of competition. The Air Force is specifically focusing on sole-source contracts for software maintenance, as well as engine repairs and parts, to increase competition. The Army plans to review and refine internal practices and processes over the course of the next year that empower the PSM to promote competitive opportunities. COST-SHARING FOR MILITARY HEALTHCARE 88. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, regarding the administration's healthcare reform proposals, I received a letter signed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) endorsing the administration's reform proposal and request that this letter be included in the record. I know that we will hear from many other interested stakeholders, and we must consider those views as well. Do you agree that we must always remain committed to ensuring that the quality of healthcare for our military servicemembers, their families, and veterans is never compromised, even in tough economic times? [GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Secretary Gates. Yes. The performance and the quality of care delivered by the Military Health System (MHS) in austere, combat environments continue to exceed anything ever witnessed and recorded in battlefield medicine. For example, increased survival rates from wounds and decreased loss of personnel from disease and non-battle injuries are two areas where our medical system established itself as world- class. Here at home, our MHS is also among the best in terms of quality and outcome throughout the Nation. I stand proudly and strongly by DOD's commitment to military healthcare quality and excellence and will never compromise or waver from this standard. This proven commitment to high performance is separate and distinct from any potential minor changes in TRICARE enrollment fees or copayments. Our MHS rests on a core principle of trust with the people DOD serves, and that trust must never be broken. 89. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain how the health reform proposals that you have put forth fulfill this obligation, and most especially for our wounded warriors? Secretary Gates. The overall health budget for fiscal year 2012 represents an increase in the fiscal year 2011 request, as DOD continues to invest in initiatives that strengthen the military healthcare system for today and into the future. DOD continues increasing financial investment in medical research and development for its wounded warriors, particularly in the areas of traumatic brain injury, psychological health, extremity injuries, amputee care, and regenerative medicine. Additionally, DOD is modifying significantly the Disability Evaluation System to oversee the disability evaluation process in a manner that best meets the needs of each servicemember. These health reform proposals are intended to secure the long-term financial security of the MHS. By introducing this set of reform proposals now--reforms that establish internal efficiencies, reforms that standardize reimbursement policies to civilian network providers and reforms to beneficiary out-of-pocket costs--DOD continues providing a comprehensive health benefit for DOD beneficiaries. 90. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what medical index rate would DOD plan to use for TRICARE fees and why? Secretary Gates. A final decision on the exact medical index has not been made. DOD is in ongoing discussions with various stakeholders on what might serve as the most appropriate index. The aim is to select an index that is transparent, based on actual market costs, relevant to the retired population and demographics at issue, clear and understandable, and one that reflects foreseeable growth in health care costs. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 91. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in regard to unauthorized disclosures of classified information, do you believe that changes to DOD policy (particularly policies governing access to classified systems) would be sufficient to prevent another Wikileaks event? If not, what other changes would you recommend? Secretary Gates. I share your concern regarding the unauthorized disclosure of classified information and DOD is reviewing policies to mitigate the risk of future disclosures. As DOD continues efforts to improve its policies and information sharing capabilities, it will strive to implement the mechanisms necessary to protect intelligence information without reverting back to pre-September 11 stovepipes. One of the major contributing factors in the WikiLeaks incident was the large amount of data that was accessible with little or no access controls. Broad access to information can be combined with access controls to mitigate this vulnerability, without overly restricting users from obtaining the information they need. One example of an access control mechanism that DOD has begun is to issue a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based identity credential on a hardened smart card. This is very similar to the Common Access Card (CAC) used on the unclassified network. DOD will complete issuing 500,000 cards to SIPRNet users, along with card readers and software, by the end of 2012. This will provide very strong identification of the person accessing the network and requesting data. It will both deter bad behavior and require absolute identification of who is accessing data and managing that access. In conjunction with this effort, all DOD organizations will configure SIPRNet-based systems to use the PKI credentials to strongly authenticate end-users who are accessing information in the system. This provides the link between end users and the specific data they can access--not just network access. DOD's goal is that by 2013, following completion of credential issuance, all SIPRNet users will log into their local computers with their SIPRNet PKI/smart card credential. 92. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you plan to conduct or oversee a damage assessment on the Wikileaks disclosures? Secretary Gates. DOD conducted an assessment of the disclosed DOD information to determine what actions must be taken to mitigate the disclosures' effect on U.S. forces, the coalition, and host nation partners. At my direction, the Intelligence Review Task Force (IRTF), established under the purview of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), reviewed every line of the disclosed information and worked with our foreign partners and the combatant commands (COCOM) to warn of potential danger and mitigate the degree of risk or threat resulting from the compromise. The IRTF did not conduct a full damage assessment due to the interagency nature of the disclosed material and of the risk incurred. The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has the mandate to conduct damage assessments in these circumstances and is in the process of doing so. 93. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what changes need to be made in the way that DOD conducts background investigations for security clearances? Secretary Gates. DOD investigative service provider is the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) which conducts 95 percent of all background investigations for security clearances across the Federal Government, including the majority of DOD investigations. The background investigations are conducted utilizing requirements set forth in the 1997 Federal Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information, which are promulgated at the national level. The Federal Investigative Standards are currently being rewritten by a working group composed of representatives from the Intelligence Community, DOD, and other executive branch departments and agencies. The new Federal Investigative Standards will apply 21st century technology using an enterprise-wide approach. These technologies will enable more cost-effective and timely case management and information sharing. 94. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you see the need for increased counterintelligence scrutiny or investigations of cleared DOD personnel? Secretary Gates. DOD investigative service provider is the OPM that conducts 95 percent of all background investigations for security clearances across the Federal Government, including the majority of DOD investigations. The background investigations are conducted utilizing requirements set forth in the 1997 Federal Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information, which are promulgated at the national level. Since DOD investigations are conducted in accordance with the Federal investigative standards, we do not believe additional investigations are warranted beyond what is required by existing policies. When the current personnel security investigation develops indicators requiring security, law enforcement, or counterintelligence follow-up actions, the information is referred to the appropriate organization. DOD policies and legal guidelines concerning law enforcement, security, and counterintelligence investigations identify what circumstances require investigations. DOD policy directs that when counterintelligence, security, or other types of investigations are completed on, or derogatory information is received regarding personnel with a security clearance, the information must be provided to the individual's Commander/ Director. Finally, DOD is a champion of the Joint Reform Effort, and key members of DOD are participating in the development of new national-level personnel security procedures, which will integrate counterintelligence and security equities into procedures regarding the development of derogatory or suspicious information. 95. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, do believe that the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) is as vulnerable to a Wikileaks-type scenario as the SIPRNET has proven to be? Admiral Mullen. Yes, if the threat results from an individual in a position of trust who opts to violate applicable U.S. military regulations, DOD policy, and Federal law. JWICS does have slightly greater security controls than SIPRNET, but there remains a possibility that its contents could also be exploited for unauthorized and illicit purposes. 96. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if you decide to more tightly restrict access to classified data on DOD computer systems, how will you make sure that the right people are still getting the information they need? Secretary Gates. DOD is working to improve intelligence information sharing, while ensuring the appropriate protections and safeguards are in place. A more resilient information sharing environment can be achieved through both technological solutions and comprehensive policies. Immediately following the first release of documents by WikiLeaks, I commissioned two internal DOD studies. The first study, led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, directed a review of DOD information security policy. The second study, led by the Joint Staff, focused on procedures for handling classified information in forward deployed areas. The information security policies that were in place at the time of the WikiLeaks disclosures were determined to be adequate. However, adherence to and implementation of those policies were found to need improvement. Since then, DOD combined five separate policies into a single updated version of DOD's Information Security Program policy, and the Defense Security Service is developing web-enabled information security training that will become part of the mandatory information assurance training conducted annually across DOD. Results of the Joint Staff study showed that forward deployed units maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage media, and also revealed a limited capability to detect and monitor anomalous behavior on classified computer networks. EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVES RELATED TO INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS 97. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in an August 9, 2010 speech, you announced an immediate 10 percent reduction in funding for intelligence advisory and assistance contracts. What effect has this reduction in intelligence contractors had on the defense intelligence enterprise? Secretary Gates. Last August, DOD considered an immediate reduction in funding for intelligence advisory and assistance contracts, but have since conducted a DOD-wide review of our reliance on contractors. As the result of this review, funding used to acquire service support contracts was reduced 10 percent per year over the next 3 years from their reported fiscal year 2010 level. Based on the DOD components' allocation of the efficiency achieved by this action, the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) was assessed a portion of this reduction. Contractor funding reductions in the MIP were absorbed by realizing process efficiencies and moving away from higher-priced contractor services. The MIP significantly reduced its reliance on contractor support. Compared to fiscal year 2010 actuals, MIP contractor reliance declined approximately 19 percent. 98. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in a subsequent January 6, 2011, statement, you mentioned a review of DOD intelligence organizations conducted in conjunction with the Office of the DNI. Please provide details on the results of that review for the record. Secretary Gates. The review of intelligence organizations was an integrated effort between DOD and DNI. The analysis team consisted of DOD and DNI members and this partnership was critical for success. The group reviewed baseline resources across the Intelligence Community, identifying areas of major investment and significant recent growth and focusing on analytic organizations. The decisions made as a result of the review are the following: 1. Resize the Geographic COCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) for Phase 0/1 operations only. 2. Establish a rotational model for DIA support to the COCOMs. 3. Disestablish the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) and the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). 4. Consolidate selected DOD Counterterrorism (CT) functions under the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT). 5. Consolidate selected DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) elements under a new Joint Intelligence Task Force for CTF (JITF-CTF). 6. Track emerging intelligence organizations and develop plans to harvest them as they redeploy from theater. 99. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you agree with the review's overall assessment that many new defense intelligence organizations, created after September 11, have grown too large and have largely duplicated work done elsewhere? Secretary Gates. The number of defense intelligence organizations has increased since 2001. In the defense arena, large and well-staffed intelligence structures now exist in the military departments, in the defense agencies, in the COCOMs, and in the theaters. The Intelligence Review Study Group (IRSG) identified areas of major investment and focused on the analytic organizations within the IC. Although the IRSG findings identified areas where efficiencies can be gained by consolidating select functions, such as counterterrorism and CTF, DOD continues to look for areas to increase efficiency and eliminate redundancy. Several efforts are underway to identify Defense Intelligence efficiencies and evaluate the impact on intelligence support to combat operations, if efforts are reduced or eliminated. Ongoing efficiency efforts within DOD include a working group that is tracking and reviewing intelligence organizations formed to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to identify which of these would be retained as combat operations draw to a close. 100. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you have approved recommendations to roll up various defense intelligence organizations that focus on counter-terrorism and terrorism finance into two separate task forces housed at the DIA. Could these organizations simply be done away with? Secretary Gates. No, because they provide different specialized intelligence that is critical to the current fight in Afghanistan and U.S. forces deployed in every theater. My efficiency recommendation regarding JITF-CT at DIA focused on consolidating analytic functions in one organization to use our resources more effectively against adversaries that continue to reinvent themselves and reemerge as threats to U.S. forces around the world, as recently seen with the attacks on the airmen in Germany. Over the past 9 years, JITF-CT provided exceptional support to operational forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The leadership, tradecraft, and efficiencies gained by consolidating smaller analytic elements with JITF-CT will enhance overall Defense Intelligence capabilities as well as DOD contributions to the national counter-terrorism mission. Although the Treasury Department has the lead for the overall U.S. Government CTF effort, our efficiency studies identified a requirement for a focal point within DOD to coordinate and lead the disparate CTF efforts that were already in place. Intelligence support to CTF remains a core analytic function. Because illicit finance does not exist as an end in and of itself, the focused work of DIA analysts in Washington and in Afghanistan will continue to assist commanders in the field in understanding how adversaries sustain their efforts and help identify vulnerabilities. By consolidating the CTF mission within DIA, DOD is improving the efficiency and efficacy of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. DIA will streamline the CTF mission by consolidating and realigning DOD components into a single organization to support both the warfighter and the policymaker more effectively. 101. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what organizations within the defense intelligence enterprise would you recommend significantly reducing or abolishing and what would be the savings to the taxpayer of these cuts? Secretary Gates. As part of the Reform Agenda, DOD formed an ISRG to conduct an extensive examination of the DOD and IC apparatus. The ISRG identified the DIOCC and JFCC-ISR as redundant organizations that can be eliminated in fiscal year 2012. The ISRG also recommended that the AFRICOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM's JIOCs be ``right-sized,'' commensurate with their current responsibilities for Phase 0/1 operations. These efficiency initiatives will save DOD approximately $32 million in fiscal year 2012. I continue to look for areas of redundancy within Defense Intelligence. A working group is reviewing existing organizations providing intelligence support to counterterrorism and CTF with the goal of consolidating those functions under the DIA. I am also reviewing intelligence and intelligence-like organizations that have formed to support combat operations to identify which of these organizations should be retained as combat operations draw down. None of these efforts have identified any savings, but savings are possible as additional efficiencies are identified. 102. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, could further reductions be made without harming intelligence support to warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan? Secretary Gates. I continue to look for areas in Defense Intelligence where we can increase efficiency and eliminate redundancy. Several efforts are underway to identify Defense Intelligence efficiencies and evaluate the impact on intelligence support to combat operations, if efforts are reduced or eliminated. Ongoing efficiency efforts within DOD include a working group that is tracking and reviewing intelligence and intelligence-like organizations formed to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in order to identify which of these organizations should be retained as combat operations draw to a close. I am also reviewing existing organizations providing intelligence support to counterterrorism and CTF, with the goal of consolidating those functions under the DIA. All Defense Intelligence efficiency efforts will ensure that intelligence support to forces conducting combat operations will continue as long as that support is required. FORT HOOD INVESTIGATION 103. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee recently issued a report on Fort Hood claiming that ``DOD and FBI collectively had sufficient information necessary to have detected Hasan's radicalization . . . [but failed] to act on it.'' Do you agree with that conclusion? Secretary Gates. No. DOD was not notified or otherwise made aware of Major Hasan's contact with extremists until after the incident. In terms of Major Hasan's professional behavior, the Army is conducting an accountability review which will appropriately address what supervisors knew about his job performance and whether they acted according to Army policies and procedures. That report is being reviewed by the Secretary of the Army and should be released in the near future. 104. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you believe that the defense intelligence enterprise has devoted sufficient resources to understanding and countering the threat from homegrown violent Islamic extremists like Hasan? Secretary Gates. Yes. DOD devotes significant resources to understanding and countering violent extremism among its military personnel. DOD continues to examine how to address the threat originating from disaffected individuals within the U.S. Armed Forces who may commit violent acts, and best apply the resources available. Specifically, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise details personnel to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) to broaden the understanding of the overall threat within the United States to our military forces. DOD also completed a full assessment of newly identified JTTF requirements based on the Fort Hood incident, and is in the process of resourcing those needs. 105. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you believe that defense intelligence organizations are adequately represented on the FBI's JTTF? If not, do you plan to increase that participation? Secretary Gates. Today, yes. In the aftermath of the shootings at Fort Hood, I determined that DOD's commitment to the JTTFs and guidance for sharing force protection information were inadequate. I directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to lead oversight of DOD's contributions to JTTFs by providing policy guidance, and by developing DOD-wide goals and objectives for DOD's JTTF participation. This has led to an increase in the Department's contributions to JTTFs through the DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism. This enhancement in analytical capabilities and information sharing plays a critical role in better understanding the terrorist threat to the United States. 106. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what other steps do you plan to take to ensure that radicals like Hasan are detected before another tragedy like Fort Hood occurs? Secretary Gates. On August 18, 2010, I approved Department-wide guidance to familiarize leaders with behaviors that may indicate radicalization or precipitate violence. I also reinforced to commanders that they are expected to exercise sound judgment and consider the full range of disciplinary actions when addressing personnel whose behavior adversely affects good order, discipline, or unit safety. Current DOD policy prohibits behavior that creates a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of military personnel. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is revising DOD Instruction 1325.06, Handling Dissident and Protest Activities among members of the Armed Forces, to ensure it effectively prohibits behavior that materially interferes with the accomplishment of the military mission or is incompatible with military service. This policy authorizes commanders to employ a range of administrative and disciplinary actions to stop behavior that is incompatible with military service, regardless of the underlying cause. DOD made several important steps to improve information sharing and its ability to ``connect the dots.'' DOD has drafted a new, consolidated information sharing agreement with the FBI. This new agreement creates a mechanism for DOD to provide force protection threat information requirements to the FBI, ensures threat information is reported to senior defense leadership, and reaffirms the already excellent working relationships between DOD Provost Marshals and local FBI JTTFs and Field Offices to ensure that threat information gets to the defense installation that is threatened. Additionally, DOD and the FBI established a formal notification process whereby information on all counterterrorism investigations with a DOD nexus is forwarded appropriately. DOD also utilizes FBI's eGuardian suspicious activity reporting system. This secure, unclassified capability enables information sharing across DOD, as well as with Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement partners. This system provides information to the FBI's JTTFs. In the future, DOD will establish the Law Enforcement Defense Data Exchange (D-DEx) in order to allow our Military Criminal Investigative Organizations to post, query, retrieve, and share criminal investigation and other law enforcement data in one database. Another important step is to supplement military personnel health screenings to include ``violence risk assessments'' before deployment and three times after deployment. These ``violence risk assessments'' are conducted person-to-person by a medical provider trained and certified to conduct in-depth evaluations. Finally, I have directed the Military Services and Investigative Agencies to collaborate with Defense intelligence organizations, facilitating access to investigative information on DOD- related counterterrorism cases. To most effectively pool DOD's resources against this threat, the government must overcome information sharing and cultural challenges between investigative and intelligence analysis organizations. The combination of enhanced information sharing and analytic presence in JTTFs plays a critical role in understanding the ``homegrown'' threat to DOD. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG ACTIVITIES 107. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the budget submission calls for an increased emphasis on DOD support to Mexico in its counterdrug activities--a decision I support fully. What's your assessment of the Mexican Government's current capability to confront the drug cartels and associated illicit organizations? Secretary Gates. In recent years, Mexico significantly increased its willingness to confront transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and strengthened capabilities to do so through law enforcement, judicialand military support, and by other means. Mexico also launched initiatives to promote legitimate economic opportunity that help diminish illegal activity. The U.S. Government provides significant support to Mexico through training, equipment, information exchange, and related cooperation, but Mexican authorities' own efforts have achieved most of these improvements. In confronting TCOs, the Mexican people suffer grievously from escalating violence, and I support Mexico's steadfast resolve to further strengthen the rule of law. Although Mexico's capability to disrupt TCOs is increasing, TCOs adapt quickly by escalating violence, dispersing geographically, and diversifying their criminal activities. As a result, Mexican authorities activated the Mexican Armed Forces to help disrupt TCOs, and buy time for the civilian agencies to build capacity. Mexico is building rule of law capacity through police vetting and training, as well as anti-money laundering, judicial, penal, statutory, anti- corruption and related reforms. Mexico efforts have produced notable successes, including the arrest or killing of several TCO leaders as well as key members from all seven of Mexico's major drug organizations, while at the same time disrupting the TCOs' business environment. Unfortunately, this led to increased violence, as the criminals fight for territory. As the illegal drug business is disrupted, TCOs are also diversifying into other criminal activities and dispersing geographically, including into Central America. Despite the Mexican authorities' efforts, the country remains the primary transit route into the United States for illegal drugs of foreign origin, as well as a major supplier of heroin, methamphetamines, and marijuana. Mexico is also the primary destination for weapons and bulk cash smuggled illegally out of the United States. Mexico's sustained interdiction efforts made great progress in reducing cocaine movement directly into Mexico from South America to low levels. Most cocaine now reaches Central America by air or sea, then transits Mexico primarily hidden in private vehicles into the United States over land. Admiral Mullen. Mexico has identified TCOs as the principal security challenge we face in the Western Hemisphere. The United States and Mexico understand this is both a shared challenge and responsibility between our nations. In recognition of this need, Mexico has made great strides in its understanding of TCOs and its capability to counter them. However, much work remains as Mexico is yet able to overcome the TCOs' grip on Mexico's citizenry, public security and economy. In collaboration with Mexico, we continue to work toward improved information sharing which has enabled the Mexico effort. This has manifested itself through the Mexican apprehension of key several TCO senior leaders. Mexican armed forces are making strides with their public security forces to assume the lead role. These short-term gains have not come without a cost; drug-related murders have grown to an annual rate of 15,233--a 61 percent increase from 2009 due largely to TCO-on-TCO violence. As Mexico's armed and public security forces follow and exploit these successes we could very well see violence levels continue to increase as TCOs are forced to operate at greater risk in an environment increasingly inhospitable to organized crime. As Mexico consolidates its successes in establishing the rule of law, we must continue to support them as they deal with the TCOs' culture of impunity--namely violent intimidation and corruption. In our daily interactions, we continually stress the importance that Mexico forces integrity must be above reproach. It is these forces that represent the government's legitimacy and garner the trust of the citizens. Mexico has made progress in its capability to confront TCOs but will require expansion and deepening of their capabilities and institutions as it is anticipated violent intimidation and coercion will worsen. 108. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what priorities have you identified for DOD to pursue regarding support to Mexico? Secretary Gates. U.S.-Mexico relations deepened significantly in recent years, including with respect to security cooperation on matters of mutual concern such as countering TCOs. DOD provides support for cooperation under the State Department-led Merida Initiative (MI) carrying out programs requested by Mexican authorities. DOD executes $415.5 million in MI Foreign Military Financing (FMF) appropriated in fiscal years 2008-2009, including provision of helicopters, maritime surveillance aircraft, handheld drug and explosives ion scanners, and other equipment. The DOD counternarcotics (CN) program also compliments MI with training, equipment, and information sharing in support of Mexican military and law enforcement forces. The DOD CN program also provides logistical, analytic, radar, communications and other support to U.S. law enforcement agencies' activities. In recent years, DOD's CN support to Mexico has concentrated on helping Mexican forces improve tactical and operational proficiency, as well as their air mobility, maritime law enforcement, communications, and reconnaissance capacities. DOD training and information exchanges emphasize interagency-coordinated operations, and safeguarding human rights. The DOD CN program allocated $51 million in fiscal year 2011 to support Mexico (up from about $3 million per year before 2009), and is working to reinforce this effort. DOD also works with other U.S. agencies and foreign partners to integrate cooperation throughout the Americas, recognizing that TCOs present challenges to all countries in the region. Admiral Mullen. DOD conducts programs as agreed upon by both United States' and Mexico's Governments as found in the ``Beyond Merida'' construct. Principally we seek to support Mexico's efforts to directly confront TCOs and disrupt TCOs' capability to conduct organized criminal activities, thereby helping Mexico to strengthen the capabilities necessary to exploit TCO weaknesses while working to help reduce Mexico's security forces susceptibility to TCO intimidation and corruption. To expand Mexico's capabilities, DOD will focus on accelerating Merida Initiative equipment in coordination with DOS as we move beyond equipping to truly partnering with our Mexican counterparts to develop a clear strategy of military support to law enforcement activities. In addition to provision of equipment, DOD will focus on providing Mexico with more information sharing thereby helping them develop the analytical capacity to exploit TCO network vulnerabilities. We recognize that our bilateral efforts with Mexico must be part of a wider collaboration with law enforcement agencies as well as diplomatic efforts. Beyond these immediate priorities we are simultaneously supporting the sustainment of our coordinated efforts and building partner capacity in all pertinent areas. Our military-to-military efforts must maintain a coherent doctrine, conduct coordinated operations with an interoperable force, and ensure both adequate and appropriate training for the forces committed to the defense of Mexican national sovereignty. Personnel and leader development programs are essential to ensuring that Mexican initiatives are carefully managed and maintained. This type of attention is necessary if we are to capitalize on earlier gains in galvanizing public security institutions' credibility and longevity in what must be a long-term effort to partner with Mexico to defeat transnational organized crime. 109. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, drug cartels operating from Central and South America have shown an increasing ability to adapt and continue their operations. For example, the Ecuadorians and most recently the Colombians have apprehended fully submersible ``narco-subs.'' Colonel Manuel Hurtado, chief of staff of Colombia's Pacific Command, told the Associated Press that he estimated the captured narco-sub could hold 8 tons of drugs and has the capacity to sail totally underwater and travel to the coast of Mexico without surfacing. What trends are you seeing in the region and what priorities have you identified for DOD to pursue with regards to its counterdrug activities and assistance? Secretary Gates. Ecuadoran and Colombian authorities seized submersible vessels under construction in Pacific coast jungle areas in July 2010 and February 2011, respectively. These authorities cooperated fully with U.S. counterparts in studying the vessels, which appear intended for fully-submerged operations. TCOs continue to rely principally on ``go-fast'' boats to smuggle most cocaine from South to North America. Over the last 10 years, however, drug traffickers experimented with self-propelled semi- submersible (SPSS) vessels, also known as low-profile vessels. SPSS vessels achieve considerable stealth by moving very low in the water, but cannot actually submerge entirely. The recent emergence of the self-propelled fully submersible (SPFS) drug-smuggling threat appears to represent a significant evolutionary step. DOD and other U.S. Government agencies are refining ways to detect, monitor, and interdict SPFS and SPSS craft more effectively. United States authorities are also working with Colombian authorities and those of other countries to locate the sites where the vessels are built, loaded, and launched, as well as to identify the logistical, financial, and associated networks that support them. Likewise, security cooperation programs with South and Central American countries, as well as with Mexico, are critical in strengthening those countries' surveillance and interdiction capabilities and their capacity to cooperate with U.S. counterparts and with one another. Admiral Mullen. Ecuadoran and Colombian authorities seized narco- subs in Pacific coast jungle areas in July 2010 and February 2011, respectively. Ecuadoran and Colombian authorities have cooperated fully with U.S. counterparts in studying the narco-subs, which appear to have been intended for limited fully-submerged operations. Drug Trafficking Organizations continue to rely principally on ``go-fast'' boats to carry over half of all U.S.-bound cocaine. However, the recent emergence of the Self-Propelled Fully Submersible (SPFS) drug-smuggling vessels represents a significant evolutionary step and demonstrates the trafficking organizations' adaptability, resources, and persistence. As the lead agency of the Federal Government for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the Unites States, DOD continues to refine its technology, tactics, techniques and procedures to adapt to the law enforcement threat narco- subs pose to the United States. Additionally, U.S. authorities are working with Colombian authorities and those of other partner nations to locate where the narco-subs are built, loaded and launched, domains which are much more conducive to intercept. We also partner with like- minded countries to identify the logistical, financial and associated networks which support such illicit activities. Likewise, U.S. security cooperation programs with South and Central American countries, as well as with Mexico, are critical in strengthening those countries' surveillance and interdiction capabilities, including their capacity to cooperate with U.S. counterparts and with each other in the Central American region. COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING 110. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, I am concerned about what I see as a movement by DOD away from competition. The most egregious recent example is the Navy's decision to award contracts to both bidders in the LCS program--a decision I still believe was ill-advised. But, there are numerous others--outside the context major systems. In fact, the Congressional Quarterly recently reported that ``according to newly available DOD data . . . more than half the Pentagon's total budget obligations for contracting last year were spent without effective competition or with no competition at all.'' Are you aware of this report? Secretary Gates. DOD actually employed a very effective competitive procurement strategy in the case of the LCS. The effects of head-to- head competition resulted in competitive pricing from both offerors that had not occurred with any previous strategy. This strategy promotes competition for DOD by establishing multiple options for conducting future competitions. While I have not read the specific ``Congressional Quarterly'' report, Dr. Ashton Carter, the USD(AT&L), is aware of the issue and made promoting real competition a major component of his Better Buying Power Initiative. As part of this effort, guidance was issued on November 24, 2010 on ``Improving Competition in Defense Procurements.'' 111. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how concerned are you about this development and how do you intend to address it? Secretary Gates. I am concerned about this development and have undertaken a major reform agenda in DOD to improve business processes and change the way it acquires goods and services to generate greater efficiencies and savings. Aspects of this initiative are being implemented in the USD(AT&L)'s September 14, 2010 memorandum for ``Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending.'' The goal of this initiative is to achieve more efficient, effective, and affordable ways of conducting DOD business. Promoting real competition is a focus area within the initiative that requires the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to develop plans to improve overall and effective competition by: reducing the number of single-bid contracts; negotiating better prices on single-bid contracts and task and delivery orders; and reducing the dollar value of sole-source contracts and task and delivery orders. On November 24, 2010 the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy issued guidance on improving competition in Defense procurement. [GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 112. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, since this data was taken from DOD sources and should have been available to your staff, why wouldn't increasing completion be the cornerstone of any efficiency initiative announced by DOD to date? Secretary Gates. Competition is the cornerstone of the acquisition process and its benefits are well understood. Competition was re- emphasized when the USD(AT&L) issued his June 2010 memorandum, ``Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending'' to underscore the importance of competition. In July 2010, the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy established Subcommittee 13 under the Panel on Contracting Integrity to address opportunities for more effective competition. In September 2010, the USD(AT&L) followed his June memorandum with the ``Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending'' to promote real competition, which was followed by his November 2010 Implementation Directive that requires Military Departments and Defense Agencies to improve the overall rate of competition by 2 percent and the rate of effective competition by 10 percent. Further direction was provided by the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy's November 2010 memorandum ``Improving Competition in Defense Procurements,'' which instructs contracting officers to resolicit any solicitation that was open for less than 30 days, and if only one offer is received in the resolicitation, the contracting officer must conduct negotiations to achieve the best value for the DOD. 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Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, soon after you announced that you wanted to restructure the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program again, Pentagon officials reportedly said that the program could be delayed by 1 to 3 more years and cost another $5 billion. Is that true? Secretary Gates. Yes. Following the breach of the Nunn-McCurdy critical thresholds, rescission of the original October 26, 2001 Milestone B decision, and program recertification in June 2010, DOD set out to reestablish a firm foundation for the JSF program. The new F-35 PEO conducted an extensive bottom-up Technical Baseline Review (TBR) involving more than 120 tactical aircraft experts from both the military Services and DOD to evaluate every aspect of the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of the program. The TBR identified the need for an additional $4.6 billion in resources and schedule duration for execution of the SDD phase. In addition to the TBR, the PEO will perform a schedule risk assessment this summer, will conduct an integrated baseline review, and will prepare the integrated master schedule for the program this fall. 114. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what are the new estimates on how much the program and each plane will cost? Secretary Gates. DOD is currently finalizing its estimates on how much the program and each aircraft will cost. These estimates are being prepared in support of the planned Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) Milestone B recertification review scheduled for May 2011. The cost figures resulting from this review will be reflected in an update to the Selected Acquisition Report which will be provided to Congress this summer, subsequent to the DAB review. 115. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, will there be another Nunn- McCurdy breach on the program this year? Secretary Gates. No, there will not be another Nunn-McCurdy breach this year. Although DOD added another $4.6 billion to the development program, and the short-term aircraft price will increase resulting from the reduction of 124 aircraft within the FYDP, I remain committed to procuring 2,443 aircraft in total. I believe that the changes to the development program, together with DOD's long-term commitment to procurement quantities, provide a reasonable baseline and strong foundation for program execution going forward. These changes will not result in a Nunn-McCurdy breach. 116. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, under your restructure proposal, what is the current estimate for the additional time required to complete developing the aircraft? Secretary Gates. The development phase of the SDD phase ends with the completion of development testing, now estimated to be completed in fiscal year 2016. This estimate was based on the independent Technical Baseline Review involving 120 tactical aircraft experts from the Military Services and DOD over a period of months. 117. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you suspended the Marine Corps version of the JSF, the F-35B, putting the program in a 2-year probationary period--necessary to get the program back on track. At the time you stated if cost, development, and schedule overruns could not be rectified in that 2-year timeframe, you would cancel the program. However, the PEO of the JSF program, Vice Admiral Venlet, reportedly said, ``There is no black and white checklist to weigh the program's performance against.'' Admiral Venlet reportedly said the future of the Marine Corps version of the JSF will not be judged against a checklist of hard milestones, but rather by a loose-knit series of requirements--ranging from the aircraft's weight, propulsion ratios, its ability to operate in a maritime environment, etc. Do you agree with Admiral Venlet's assertion? If so, please explain, exactly what does probation mean for the Marine Corps version of the aircraft? Secretary Gates. ``Probation'' is not a suspension; ``probation'' is linked to both production and development. First, DOD reduced the production of the F-35B Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant to three aircraft in fiscal year 2011, six aircraft in fiscal year 2012, and six aircraft in fiscal year 2013. These aircraft numbers are the minimum numbers required to sustain the F-35B production and engineering workforce, as well as to sustain the supplier base of STOVL-unique parts. The F-35A Conventional Take Off and Landing and F- 35C Carrier Variant (CV) aircraft are not dependent on the F-35B development and flight test to complete their development. Cost, schedule, and development progress must balance against warfighter utility. The Commandant of the Marine Corps reviews the F- 35B STOVL progress monthly and separately from the monthly Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) reviews of the F-35 program as a whole. These reviews assess metrics ranging from affordability, weight growth, key STOVL performance requirements, technical performance measures, flight test status, and risk burn-down plans. These metrics provide a holistic view of the F-35B progress. None of them provide ``black and white'' decision criteria. These metrics, taken as a whole, will inform the Commandant of the Marine Corps and DOD on the continued F-35B progress at the end of the ``probation'' period. 118. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is success and what is failure that warrants termination? Secretary Gates. Termination is not a ``black and white'' decision. It must be viewed from a holistic viewpoint by assessing cost, schedule, warfighter utility in performance being delivered, and risk. The goal of any acquisition program is an affordable system that provides the desired warfighter utility. Warfighter utility is a combination of capability delivered in a desirable timeframe. It is DOD's job to accomplish this at a reasonable level of risk. The Technical Baseline Review conducted by the new F-35 PEO establishes a more realistic expectation for the F-35 development program. The program is continuing its restructure activities for the SDD phase, production activities, and operations and support. The program will be assessed monthly by the service acquisition executives, the warfighters, and DOD leadership to determine that the balance of cost, schedule, and performance goals do not exceed acceptable risk levels. 119. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, it appears the program office has not taken any additional steps to refine the criteria on those key goals, or established any further metrics on what needs to be done to remedy the F-35B's serious issues to save it from cancellation, if that is the right thing to do. As those steps are being taken, it seems to me that there should be transparent, clear, and measurable milestones against which performance can be measured against plan. Is that your vision for determining whether the Marine Corps version of the aircraft passes probation? Secretary Gates. DOD is providing individual attention to the F-35B STOVL variant specific issues to ensure cost and schedule milestones are achieved in delivering required warfighter capabilities. Specifically, Navy and the Air Force established a battle rhythm of monthly Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) reviews with the F-35 PEO to assess the overall F-35 program, with additional emphasis on F-35B STOVL variant. These monthly SAE reviews examine the F-35 airframe and propulsion SDD, production, and sustainment programs with particular emphasis on cost/affordability, risk, and schedule. In addition, the Commandant of the Marine Corps established a monthly F-35 review focused solely on the STOVL variant. This review is also led by the Navy SAE. The topics and metrics that are assessed include, but are not limited to, the following: Cost/Affordability/Earned Value Management (EVM): A review of Acquisition Procurement Unit Cost, Program Acquisition Unit Cost, Operations and Support costs, and EVM cost/schedule indices. Risk: Monthly assessment of `Program Risk' with explanations about each risk item, their interactions, and risk burn-down plans. Assessments include a review of the assumptions and environment used to determine the risk evaluations. F-35B weight/weight growth: weight assessments track each pound added to the airframe with an understanding of the underlying reasons for the growth. If there are trades that need to be made to mitigate weight growth, DoN senior leadership/warfighters are to be consulted. Key Performance Parameters (KPPs): review of F-35B KPPs with a tracking/trending methodology and monthly discussions of considerations for a Concept of Operations that might help facilitate achievement of F-35 KPPs and program goals. Airframe Technical Performance Measurements: Assessments of reliability, maintainability, combat radius, and gross weight (with metrics that indicate the desired value(s), the current status, margin, and trends). F-35B Flight Test: review of F-35B flight test data, to include planned/scheduled test points to be flown versus achieved test points flown; scheduled test flights flown versus actual test flights flown (delineated by STOVL variant); and Clean-Wing Flight Envelope coverage (to assess the progress on the envelope cleared for flight as a result of Developmental Test and alignment with software delivery). As these monthly reviews mature, the Navy will refine key F-35B metrics to ensure this essential capability is delivered to the Marine Corps warfighters and to enable the Department to make a decision on the F-35B STOVL variant probation status. SHIPBUILDING 120. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, another area of the Navy's budget that I am very concerned about is the amount of funding needed for ship construction going forward. With about half of the construction and development dollars being needed to build extraordinarily expensive nuclear submarines (for example, right now, Ohio class replacement nuclear ballistic submarines are estimated to cost at least $7 billion), I am concerned that our commitment to building new submarines may be crowding out funding needed to modernize the surface fleet. Do you share that concern? If so, how do you intend to address it? Secretary Gates. DOD recognizes that building the required force structure will largely depend on controlling shipbuilding costs (including combat systems) within an affordable range. I continue to look for further affordability and efficiency opportunities as DOD goes forward with the shipbuilding plan, such as revising the acquisition strategy for the LCS to maximize the advantage of the competitive pricing received and gain a ship within the FYDP. Additionally, prior to Milestone A approval for the Ohio replacement submarine, DOD evaluated numerous capability trades to reduce costs. As a result, the Navy made trades in the number of ballistic missile tubes, the diameter of those tubes, the number of torpedoes to be carried, acoustic sensors, and other defensive features throughout the design. These trades made the submarine more affordable, while maintaining the necessary level of capability, resulting in a reduction of the projected cost to a target cost of $4.9 billion (fiscal year 2010 dollars) for the follow on hulls 2-12. These initiatives support DOD's ability to provide the capability and flexibility for meeting the myriad of missions that the Navy is called upon to execute throughout the world every day. Admiral Mullen. We developed the shipbuilding plan and this budget based on averages of about $15.9 billion per year for the early years of the plan, and then about $2 billion more on average for the years in the plan when the Ohio replacement submarine is being constructed. This will support a force structure of about 313 battle force ships, enabling the Navy to meet its global commitments and to support contingency operations. We will continue to look for efficiency opportunities as we go forward with the shipbuilding plan. This will involve decisions such as we have already made by truncating the DDG- 1000 program to three ships and restarting the DDG 51 production line, taking advantage of the aggressive pricing we received on LCS to gain a ship within the FYDP, and pursuing a lower cost alternative for the Mobile Landing Platform. Prior to Milestone A approval for the Ohio replacement submarine, numerous capability trades were evaluated to reduce costs. As a result, the Navy made trades in the number of ballistic missile tubes, the diameter of those tubes, the number of torpedoes to be carried, acoustic sensors, and other defensive features throughout the design. These trades made the submarine more affordable while maintaining the necessary level of capability, resulting in a reduction of the projected cost from $7 billion to about $5 billion per boat. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND THE NEED FOR AUDITS 121. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain to me how you can demand fiscal savings and efficiencies across every sector of operations in DOD without the ability to track expenditures in financial statements that can be audited? Secretary Gates. DOD records and reports expenditures associated with budgeted amounts. While not sufficient to meet audit standards, this longstanding approach proved to be an effective means of responsibly managing public funds entrusted to DOD. There are thousands of well-trained financial management professionals in DOD dedicated to and motivated by their role in providing the resources to warfighters necessary to meet the national security mission of the country. These financial managers know DOD missions cannot be executed without timely and sufficient resources so are able to track expenditures and report to managers with an accurate status. Because of this capability, I feel DOD can demand and track savings from specific operations. This does not mean that DOD does not take the financial statement audit requirement seriously. Financial statement audits are also a key indicator to the public that we have reliable financial management information. While it is not the intent of financial statement audits they are a signal to the public that DOD manages funds legally, effectively, and efficiently. I am dedicated to having fully auditable financial statements by 2017, the deadline established by Congress. 122. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, why is this not your highest and most critical efficiency initiative? Secretary Gates. The highest priority for DOD's business enterprise is to meet the needs of the warfighters executing the national security mission. Due to potential budgetary constraints, I directed DOD to eliminate or reduce overhead tasks and transfer the related resources to meet urgent warfigher needs. In other words, transfer resources from tail to tooth. This initiative to improve financial management is part of that effort. Improved financial management information will help DOD better identify overhead costs and ensure reductions are realized. 123. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how can DOD ensure that taxpayer dollars are not being wasted, stolen, or otherwise abused without an audit? Secretary Gates. I believe that even though DOD cannot currently meet commercial audit standards, the public can have confidence that it is spending dollars responsibly. That is a primary task of DOD's financial management workforce, and DOD has an extensive training program to ensure financial managers know the proper rules and processes. In addition, there are thousands of auditors reviewing programs and payments. These audits find far fewer improper payments and appropriation law violations in DOD than in other Federal agencies, after adjusting for the size of the budgets. This is true even though most other Federal agencies have auditable financial statements. As mentioned in an earlier question, this does not mean DOD is not fully committed to achieving full financial statement auditability. This demonstrated progress will further reinforce confidence in the positive financial outcomes we already achieve. 124. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how will you ensure that the savings you have proposed will be achieved? Secretary Gates. DOD effectively manages operations by tracking obligations and expenditures against budgeted amounts. The primary control the Department uses to implement savings efforts is to include them in the President's budget request. The efficiencies that DOD defined in response to my initiative have been included in the President's 2012 budget request. DOD has several management controls, including regular reviews of obligation rates and detailed program budget reviews, to ensure it is executing according to the budget. Through these means DOD will ensure that proposed overhead reductions are realized. 125. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, over the last few years, Congress has pushed DOD to reform its financial management practices, most recently the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, requiring DOD to achieve a full, unqualified audit by 2017. The law also requires you to submit to Congress semiannual reports that lay out milestones describing progress over time. Are you on track to comply with this statutory requirement? Secretary Gates. As you recognize, preparing DOD for financial statement audits is a monumental task, but with leadership focus, accountability, and a streamlined approach, I believe it will succeed. To realize success, DOD is using a streamlined approach that focuses on improving and auditing the information most used to manage. DOD established long- and short-term goals, set up a governance process, and provided funding to the Military Services to make process and system improvements. These system improvements, primarily deploying ERPS, have broad operational improvement goals which include improving business processes in a way to support audited financial statements. I am dedicated to having fully auditable financial statements by 2017, the deadline established by Congress. The goal is in our Strategic Management Plan and is one of eight high priority items DOD committed to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to achieve. While it is still early to definitively predict success, I believe DOD is on track to comply and look forward to reporting progress in the semi-annual reports. 126. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, given the push for savings, can you achieve the audit earlier than 2017? If so, what additional resources would you need? Secretary Gates. Achieving auditable financial statements is a massive undertaking requiring changes to the capabilities of our people, processes and systems. Like any major change management effort changes take time and a great deal of resources. The extreme size of DOD complicates change further and requires more time and resources. DOD is already investing significant amounts in improving its financial management systems by implementing and integrating ERPS as well as investing over $200 million a year in improving people and processes. I feel that the resources allocated are appropriate and the significant dependency on systems modernization makes achieving the audit earlier than 2017 impractical. C-17 GLOBEMASTER 127. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, under the continuing resolution enacted late last year, has DOD been funding the continued production of C-17 cargo-lift aircraft? Secretary Gates. No, DOD did not fund the continued production of new C-17 aircraft beyond the 10 aircraft appropriated in fiscal year 2010 by Congress. However, in accordance with Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) guidelines, DOD funded a total of $12.7895 million in fiscal year 2011 CRA to support transition to sustainment in preparation for shutdown activities. 128. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what are DOD's plans for this program in the future under the various appropriations scenarios for fiscal year 2011? Secretary Gates. DOD determined that the C-17 aircraft already procured are more than sufficient to satisfy airlift requirements. As I have previously testified, I do not support the addition of more C-17s. 129. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is your position on the inclusion of any funding for continued production of C-17s in the 2012 defense bill? Secretary Gates. Since 2001, DOD conducted four major mobility studies, all of which support the conclusion that the C-17 and C-5 airlift fleet capacity is more than sufficient to meet current and foreseeable demands. 1. Mobility Requirements Study-05 (MRS-05) (completed in 2001) 2. Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) (completed in 2005) 3. Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) study conducted in 2009 as required by Section 1046 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) 4. Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS-16) (completed in 2010) The most recent study, the MCRS-16, identified the requirement for organic airlift as 32.7 million ton miles per day (MTM/D). This level of airlift capacity meets the most demanding scenario consistent with the Defense Strategy. The current programmed strategic airlift fleet of 223 C-17s, and 111 C-5s, provides a capacity of 35.9 million ton-miles per day. The difference (35.9 MTM/D vs. 32.7 MTM/D) is the equivalent of 25 C-17s or 30 C-5As. The MCRS-16 and the aforementioned studies clearly show that the Department has more strategic airlift fleet capacity than needed. Therefore, I believe that it is not in the national interest to include any funds for continued production of C- 17s in the 2012 defense bill. President Obama's comments on releasing his administration's fiscal year 2011 budget request included the following statement: ``We save money by eliminating unnecessary defense programs that do nothing to keep us safe. One example is the $2.5 billion that we're spending to build C-17 transport aircraft. Four years ago, DOD decided to cease production because it had acquired the number requested--180. Yet every year since, Congress had provided unrequested money for more C-17s that the Pentagon doesn't want or need. It's waste, pure and simple.'' In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, I echoed the President, saying that I would not support the addition of more C- 17s. My position today remains unchanged. SAVINGS-AND-EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVES 130. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, given how inherently unreliable and defective DOD's financial management processes are, I have serious questions about the projected savings of many of the efficiencies initiatives. While I certainly commend your attempt to find $78 billion in cuts over the next 5 years, I have to question how likely is it that DOD will actually realize the savings it says it will get. What is your assessment of how much of the $78 billion in cuts will result in deferment of bills that must eventually be paid, in contrast to actual savings from an elimination or a reduction in requirements? Secretary Gates. The $78 billion reduction to DOD's projected budget over the next 5 years is achievable and will be closely monitored and assessed by DOD to ensure savings are fully realized. The efficiency initiatives include actions to reduce overall requirements commensurate with the lower rate of growth after the $78 billion cut. I remain strongly committed to meeting these goals and finding new ways to improve how DOD conducts business thereby better using the country's scarce resources. 131. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, which of the elements of savings and efficiencies that you have identified carry the most risk of not being realized? Please explain your answer. Secretary Gates. Experience tells me that some of these initiatives may not proceed entirely according to plan. DOD has no choice but to strictly monitor and enforce these efficiencies and make adjustments as needed with the understanding that it cannot afford to return to past behavior. At this point, there are no elements that I believe are especially risky. 132. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain what cost- based analytical processes and methodologies (such as performance- based, mission-based, staffing-profile-based government, military, contractor, etc.) are the efficiencies proposals based on? Secretary Gates. The majority of these proposals were function or mission-based. The intent was to focus scarce resources on functions/ missions associated with the provision of military capability. DOD took an ``unsparing'' look at reducing functions (and costs) associated with overhead and administrative positions. Even the reductions in contract costs were motivated and enforced with this principle in mind. 133. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, I understand that the COCOMs and the IC were asked to submit zero-based assessments with accompanying recommendations for gaining 10 percent efficiencies. Exactly how did OSD review assessments or analyses of those submissions? Secretary Gates. The entire fourth Estate (OSD, the Defense Agencies, Field Activities, and COCOMs), including the IC, conducted a zero-based review to identify opportunities to perform more efficiently, eliminate unnecessary functions, and reduce costs. My Efficiencies Task Force reviewed each of the zero-based submissions with a two-fold purpose: Develop a baseline of each organization's missions, priorities, and resource allocation Using this baseline, rebalance resources within and across components so that they align better with the most critical challenges and priorities within DOD. These submissions included a detailed profile of each organization's missions, functions, and resources. The rebalancing process involved the critical review, analytical assessment and evaluation of: (1) baseline data, (2) mission and manpower priorities, and (3) recommendations for organizational restructuring and reallocation of resources. This process was conducted by members of the Efficiencies Task Force, subject matter experts and analysts from responding organizations, and was reviewed by program, comptroller, and manpower experts. 134. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, was a broader portfolio review or trade-off analysis performed to understand and balance cost- savings with mission performance? If so, please explain. Secretary Gates. Yes, this year's program and budget review process focused on preserving critical capabilities by making very targeted resource allocation decisions. During this cycle, DOD used a series of front end assessments to address a variety of portfolio-type reviews such as airborne ISR, long-range strike, global posture and tactical aviation to better understand the range of options in each area. These analyses guided investment decisions, while the efficiencies initiatives focused on trading administrative and overhead expenses for operational capability--this was a prudent trade. 135. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, additionally, how were the COCOMs' and the IC's overall annual budget evaluated and compared to their unique ongoing mission requirements--to devise an accurate estimate of actual expected savings versus annual budget? Secretary Gates. Each of these organizations submitted its own detailed accounting of personnel and missions in priority order. These submissions explicitly considered the organizations' unique and ongoing mission requirements. Additionally, every organization also submitted its own ideas for how it could operate more effectively and efficiently. In some cases it nominated new and better ways of performing critical functions. In other cases, it nominated functions that were of minimal value for either elimination or downgrading. Such missions were typically either redundant or overhead functions. COCOMs estimated savings in coordination with OSD budgeting, programming, and manpower experts. The IC followed a similar process and considered input from both a supply perspective (analysts from intelligence organizations) and a demand perspective (combatant commanders). MANAGING FORCE REDUCTIONS 136. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, reductions in end strength for all the Active-Duty Forces, not just the Army and Marine Corps, appear inevitable due to the declining budgets and the rising cost of personnel. Next month, the Army will begin a year-long plan to cut 7,000 soldiers, and from 2013 through 2014, an additional 14,000. And that's just the beginning. Cuts of 27,000 in the Army and 15,000 in the Marine Corps have been forecast to commence in 2015. During the force drawdown in the 1990s, the availability of force- shaping authorities, such as early retirement authority and financial incentives for those voluntarily retiring or resigning, were essential tools in equitably achieving force reduction goals. In the current economy, with retention at very high levels, it appears that such incentives will be necessary. Do you plan to submit legislative proposals that will facilitate the kinds of force cuts that are being planned for? Secretary Gates. Yes. DOD is carefully examining the authorities required to achieve the legislated end strength, while maintaining transparency with regard to future requirements. My goal is to submit legislative authorities that allow targeted reductions and maximum flexibility. Leadership is the key to ensuring each individual understands the needs of DOD so they can make informed choices. This will be no easy task. But I assure you, DOD will continue to recognize the contributions of the men and women who served throughout numerous conflicts, while ensuring that the military departments and the COCOMs meet their missions in an ever-changing global environment. 137. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, other than force cuts, and putting aside the Defense Health Program momentarily, do you see any feasible way to control the costs of personnel as a share of the DOD budget? Secretary Gates. Yes. In order to control total personnel costs across DOD, improvements to the Total Force management of our Active/ Reserve military, government civilians and contracts for services must be considered. This is critical to control personnel costs as a share of the budget. To this end, DOD is changing how it strategically views the Total Force--both as it executes the mission and plans across the FYDP. DOD is scrutinizing the meaning of the ``demand'' for manpower, rigorously determining which should be funded and how (e.g., Active/ Reserve military, civilians, or contracts). Total Force Management requires a holistic analysis and prioritization of work, and the identification and investment in the most effective and efficient component of the workforce to best accomplish a specific task. I believe that our military should not be considered a ``free'' source of labor by organizations within DOD, while the military services alone ``finance'' their recruitment, training and development. The true cost of military, government civilians and/or contractors depends greatly on individual facts and circumstances. DOD must do more to objectively analyze not only the demands for manpower but, where appropriate, the best ``Total Force solution.'' The separate decisions that affect each component of the Total Force must be better synchronized to achieve the desired outcomes and to balance operational, fiscal and acquisition risks. The solution must not only include the development and promulgation of policies, but also ensure that DOD provides managers with the tools, resources, training and information necessary to achieve the desired outcomes. Finally, current business processes must be better synchronized to achieve a more appropriate balance in the workforce, aligning inherently governmental activities to military and civilian workforces, and commercial activities to the most cost effective service provider--be that military, civilian, or contracted support. NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU 138. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, under your leadership, significant changes have been made in the way the National Guard and all the Reserve components contribute to the decisionmaking process. Designating the Guard Bureau as a joint activity and elevating the rank of the Chief of the Guard Bureau to a four-star general are just two examples of the recognition that the Army National Guard and Air National Guard are vital parts of the Army and the Air Force. Despite this, we continue to see proposals that the Chief of the Guard Bureau be made one of the JCS. What are your views about the proposal to make the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) a member of the Joint Chiefs? Admiral Mullen. Over the last 10 years, the National Guard has provided crucial elements to our Joint Force and their execution of Army and Air Force missions has been stellar. They are appropriately represented on the JCS by the respective Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, so I and the other JCS members unanimously do not support the CNGB being made a member of the JCS. Since the CNGB was elevated to the four-star rank in 2009, we have included him in our meetings and he has contributed valuable perspectives regarding the National Guard, particularly its critical, non-federalized homeland defense mission and forces. This is congruent with the 2008 NDAA promulgating the CNGB fulfilling a statutory role and responsibilities as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense through me on these unique matters. 139. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, do you think such a change would be harmful? Why or why not? Admiral Mullen. Adding the CNGB as a member of the JCS would be redundant and harmful. Like the other Service Chiefs (the JCS members), the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff organize, train, and equip their Total Force, including their respective National Guard, to present an integrated Joint Force to the combatant commanders. They maintain the independent departmental authorities and budget with which to do so. Adding CNGB to the JCS would disrupt those lines of authority and introduce representation inconsistencies. Since the CNGB's responsibilities are administrative in nature, making him a member would also create the harmful impression that the National Guard is a separate Military Service. EARMARKS 140. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, with the recent pledge for both chambers to enforce a moratorium on earmarks over the next 2 years, there is a renewed concern that Members of Congress with special interests will go underground to pressure program managers within DOD in phonecalls and meetings to steer funds toward their pet projects. What processes do you have in place to protect DOD program managers from this kind of pressure? Secretary Gates. Program managers and contracting officials' compliance with the United States Code, the Federal Acquisition Regulations, and the President's March 2009 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Government Contracting all serve to safeguard the acquisition process from underground earmarks and congressional pressure--through requiring competition and transparency. Compliance with the many requirements in the acquisition process protects program managers from being forced to award contracts noncompetitively or under the table. Furthermore, the Department demands ethical behavior from its program managers and would expect the same of those it deals with in the legislative branch. 141. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what can be done to ensure taxpayer funds provided to DOD go to the most critical priorities and are not used to satisfy a specific Member interest? Secretary Gates. Several actions would provide DOD flexibility to ensure that its appropriations go to the military's most critical needs or can be realigned to fund unforeseen emergent requirements. Eliminate section 8006 in Appropriations bills. That section is aimed at ensuring that DOD executes the exact funding for specific programs, projects, and activities--as listed in the tables in the Explanatory Statement (or Committee Print or Conference Report) accompanying a bill. Eliminate bill language or General Provisions that specify funding for specific programs, projects, or activities. Approve the transfer authority requested in each President's budget to give DOD enough flexibility to reprogram funds to its most critical needs. Omit legislative direction that restricts DOD reprogramming, such as prohibiting the reprogramming of funds added by Congress. Reform the process by which congressional oversight committees review reprogrammings to facilitate timely approval--such as initiating a time limit for review. Increase the amount of funds that can be reprogrammed below threshold within an appropriations. 142. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, is there an opportunity to make public the specific requests by Members of Congress made to representatives of DOD on issues related to contracts, acquisitions, and fiscal obligations? Secretary Gates. I believe that would be a counter-productive effort and detracts from executing the mission. For the majority of earmarks, DOD does not place each earmark on a funding document by itself. Most earmarks are incorporated into the funding document for activities related to it. DOD funding is executed at the field activity level, and requiring these activities to collect information related to earmarks would impose a wasteful burden and detract them from focusing on efficient management of funds. 143. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in recent years, there has been a proliferation of funding grants and other large amounts appropriated to DOD for vague requirements (to preclude being called an earmark) like $300 million for medical transportation infrastructure in the National Capitol Region, $50 million for private museum construction, $250 million for repairs to local community schools, and $500 million for civilian infrastructure projects on Guam. None of these amounts are included in DOD budget requests, nor are they considered firm DOD requirements. All of them are added as a result of decreases to other DOD accounts. So, it would seem logical that in these times of fiscal austerity where DOD is making hard decisions about savings and efficiencies, there would be strong opposition to congressional efforts to fund them from DOD accounts. But there isn't. What is DOD's position on the use of DOD funds for non-DOD requirements which are not included in a budget request? Secretary Gates. DOD's position is that the President's Budget requests what is required to meet our mission requirements each year. Upon enactment of an Appropriations Act the Department executes the enacted programs, complying with reprogramming and transfer authorities. Background In DOD appropriations bills, Section 8006 and general provisions specifying funding for specific items do not give DOD the flexibility to decide whether congressional adds are the best use of appropriated funds. Congressional adds can only be reduced if they are for Federally Funded Research Development Centers, economic assumptions, or excess cash balances of the Defense Working Capital Funds, by their proportionate share. All other reductions in the DOD appropriations bill result in the President's budget baseline taking those reductions, thus diverting funding from mission requirements. 144. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if you are presented a request for a formal position on a particular spending item of this nature, can I expect a firm and unequivocal position from you stating why you either oppose or support the spending? Secretary Gates. Yes, DOD leaders and I are always prepared to state opposition to unrequested changes to the President's budget because these changes divert funding from DOD's most pressing requirements, as detailed in the budget. Beyond this straightforward opposition to changes to the President's budget, however, comments on specific congressional adds, or any other legislative positions, are the purview of the White House and OMB, and DOD follows their lead, and does not provide a position on its own. OKINAWA AND GUAM 145. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the road to a reduced U.S. presence on the Island of Okinawa has been paved with quite a few speed bumps. Not only do we have an irate contingent on Okinawa that has already ushered out one prime minister, but the folks on Guam aren't exactly excited about the current plan either. I notice that you have scaled back the request for funds by almost $300 million for Guam construction for fiscal year 2012 from what you had planned last year. This is in addition to the $320 million we have deferred in fiscal year 2011 for a host of reasons. You mentioned that you expect to see a decision in the spring of 2011 on the final location for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) on Okinawa. Will this decision be considered the tangible progress required by the formal agreement between our Government and the Government of Japan? If not, when do you expect Japan to demonstrate tangible progress towards completion of the FRF? Secretary Gates. I see tangible progress on the FRF, not as a single specific event, but rather as a series of steps taken roughly in parallel between Japan and the United States, as spelled out in our bilateral understandings on realignment. As Japan makes progress on the FRF, the United States will take associated steps to move forward on Guam. There are a number of different indicators of this progress, starting with the decision on the runway configuration that is expected at the upcoming two-plus-two meeting with Japan, the issuance of the landfill permit, the construction of the sea wall, and progress on the landfill itself. An essential point of our realignment understanding with Japan is that preparations for facilities on Guam need to begin well in advance of the actual construction of the replacement facility at Camp Schwab. It is necessary to ensure that when the U.S. is satisfied with the progress Japan has made on the FRF, suitable facilities will be available on Guam allowing the phased relocation of Marines from Okinawa, such that any relocation can be sequenced to maintain unit cohesion and operational readiness. 146. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in your view, should the movement of marines to Guam take place without the demonstration of tangible progress regarding Futenma? Secretary Gates. The realignment of marines to Guam is dependent on tangible progress towards completion of the FRF at Camp Schwab. An essential point of our realignment understanding with Japan is that preparations for facilities on Guam need to begin well in advance of the actual construction of the replacement facility at Camp Schwab. It is necessary to ensure that when the United States is satisfied with the progress Japan has made on the FRF, suitable facilities will be available on Guam allowing the phased relocation of marines from Okinawa, such that any relocation can be sequenced to maintain unit cohesion and operational readiness. 147. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the Navy's Record of Decision related to the environmental impact on Guam released last fall conveniently punted on two major issues--potential damage to coral reefs in the Apra Harbor and the impact to cultural resources from the acquisition of private land for Marine Corps training ranges. Both issues, as well as the adequacy of Guam's civilian infrastructure, are of significant concern to Guam residents and should be of equal concern to DOD. Shouldn't we resolve these issues completely before we continue to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in the construction of a new Marine Corps base on the island? Secretary Gates. These three issues--the impact to coral reefs associated with dredging for a proposed nuclear powered aircraft carrier transient wharf, the management of cultural resources through a Programmatic Agreement, and the adequacy of Guam's civilian infrastructure--are of significant concern not only to the Guam community but also to DOD. DOD is actively working to address all of these issues, but complete resolution will be an ongoing effort throughout the buildup process and is not required prior to beginning military construction. The Navy recently completed additional surveys of the marine biology in the alternative sites proposed for the proposed wharf for a transient nuclear aircraft carrier. It is anticipated the results of these surveys will be outlined in a report due in November 2011, allowing for a full assessment of impacts for coral reef resources. As to the management of cultural resources, DOD and relevant Federal and local regulatory authorities reached agreement on a Programmatic Agreement under the National Historic Preservation Act. This Programmatic Agreement guides how DOD handles impacts to historic properties as the build-up effort moves forward. DOD is requesting $11 million in PB-12 to fund the development of a repository used to meet DOD's commitments for preserving artifacts unearthed during military construction. Addressing Guam's infrastructure capacity is a priority, as it directly affects the construction program and DOD is taking steps to address this issue. With the application of Japanese-provided financing, Guam's wastewater and power systems will be improved to support the relocating marines, the influx of off-island workers needed for the ramp-up of military construction, and Guam's long-term population growth. DOD contributed $50 million to the Port of Guam and $116 million in Defense Access Road funding ($49 million appropriated in fiscal year 2010 and $67 million authorized for appropriation in fiscal year 2011), both of which contribute to improving infrastructure off-base to address construction capacity requirements. In the longer term, an interagency effort, led by the Economic Adjustment Committee, will continue working with Guam to assess off-base needs and identify potential Federal funding solutions. 148. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is DOD's plan to rectify these issues with Guam? Secretary Gates. As for the potential impacts to coral, the Navy recently completed additional marine biology surveys regarding the alternative sites for a transient nuclear aircraft carrier proposed wharf. It is anticipated that the results of these surveys will be outlined in a report due in November 2011, allowing for a full assessment of impacts to coral reef resources. Following significant public comments, discussions with Guam's leaders, and 3 years of consultations with the Guam State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO), I understand and appreciate the concerns regarding cultural resources, and in particular, the potential impact to Pagat village and cave from the preferred alternative site for a live fire training range complex discussed in the Final Environmental Impact Statement. On March 14, 2011 DOD, Guam SHPO, and Advisory Council on Historic Preservation successfully reached agreement on the Programmatic Agreement that will guide how DOD deals with impacts to historic properties as the build-up effort moves forward. As part of the Programmatic Agreement, DOD committed that access to Pagat village and cave will remain unfettered and that these sites would not be within the footprint of the live fire training range complex, should the Navy select the Route 15 site in a forthcoming Record of Decision for training on Guam. DOD is requesting $11 million in PB-12 to fund the development of a repository used to meet the Department's commitments for preserving artifacts unearthed during military construction. As the military build-up continues, DOD will remain engaged with these stakeholders to avoid, protect, and mitigate impacts to cultural resources. Improvements to Guam's infrastructure are necessary to support the relocating Marines, off-island workers needed to ramp up the construction program, and Guam's long-term civilian population growth. Japan-provided financing will be applied to make improvements to off- base power and wastewater systems, and to the Navy's water system on- base. In its fiscal year 2011 budget, Japan requested $415 million of its required $740 million contribution in utilities financing. The projects funded by the fiscal year 2011 financing include upgrades to the Northern District and Hagatna wastewater treatment plants, and water production, treatment and transmission on-base. In the meantime, efforts to address improvements to Guam's roadways and port are underway. Through the Defense Access Road program, DOD will fund improvements to Guam's public roadways ($49 million appropriated in fiscal year 2010 and $67 million authorized for appropriation in fiscal year 2011). DOD also contributed $50 million to the Port of Guam, which, when coupled with $54 million in financing from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, will improve the port's capacity to support the needs of the buildup. DOD continues to work with other Federal agencies through the Economic Adjustment Committee to identify and assess Guam's needs and look for Federal funding solutions to address the island's infrastructure issues. 149. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, we have been asking DOD for a master plan of the details of construction projects and total costs for 3 years, to no avail. Can we get that masterplan, a revised timeline, and a total estimate cost to complete the move of 7,000 marines and their families to Guam? Secretary Gates. I understand Congress's concerns regarding the total cost of the Guam realignment and DOD is committed to providing an accurate picture of current costs. DOD is currently working to develop an updated estimate, and this estimate will be provided to committee staff prior to mark-up. KOREA 150. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, on September 23, 2010, you directed U.S. Forces Korea and the Services to proceed with full tour normalization for Korea, as affordable, but not according to any specific timeline. You stated that ``full tour normalization in Korea will further our long-term commitment to support our forward stationed troops and their family members.'' Do you have an estimate of the total costs required to implement this decision? If so, please provide it. Secretary Gates. I understand the importance of tour normalization from an operational and quality of life perspective and DOD is working to better understand the costs of tour normalization. As the costs come into better focus, DOD will determine the timing for moving forward. 151. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, is DOD on track to provide a plan by March 31, 2011, detailing schedules and costs? Secretary Gates. Yes. 152. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, on November 23, 2010, an unprovoked and premeditated artillery barrage by North Korea on a South Korean island killed two South Korean marines, wounded at least 19 other people, and set buildings and forests ablaze, the first time in years that North Korea has trained the firepower of its 1.1 million- strong military on South Korea's civilian population. This attack, coupled with a new revelation about the North Korean nuclear program, prompted one media outlet to call Korea ``a massive strategic challenge in one of the most dangerous corners of the world.'' Given the increase in uncertainty surrounding the security environment on the peninsula, are you still committed to stationing U.S. military family members in Korea? Secretary Gates. DOD is committed to stationing U.S. military family members in Korea under the Tour Normalization Initiative. DOD intends to proceed as affordable, but not according to any specific timeline. Tour Normalization in Korea will further DOD's long-term commitment to provide greater stability for forward stationed servicemembers and their families. U.S. Forces Korea, in coordination with U.S. Pacific Command, the military departments, CAPE, and other relevant OSD organizations, are working to provide a feasible, affordable and secure plan to continue toward full Tour Normalization. 153. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would families have the option of not being stationed in Korea? If so, would they incur any personal expense? Secretary Gates. If Korea Tour Normalization is fully implemented, the assignment tour length for a majority of the locations will be 36- months accompanied and 24-months unaccompanied. Military families will still have the option of not accompanying their sponsor to Korea. In this case, the family can remain where they currently reside, or move to a place they designate in the United States at government expense. If the family does not reside in government housing and is entitled to housing allowance, their housing allowance will be as authorized for the locality where they have chosen to reside. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU 154. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what are your thoughts on providing to General McKinley, CNGB, a three-star position to serve as his deputy? Secretary Gates. This matter will be under review until the fall 2011. Admiral Mullen. I fully support re-establishing the Vice CNGB at the rank of lieutenant general. Doing so would enable the CNGB to better administer his diverse duties and expansive portfolio that includes the unique non-federalized homeland defense equities of the National Guard. This action would be more purposeful to the National Guard than making CNGB a member of the JCS. CYBERSECURITY CAPABILITIES 155. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates, you have proposed $2.3 billion to support improved cybersecurity capabilities within DOD and greater joint planning efforts between the military and DHS. Are we dangerously vulnerable to cyber intrusions and cyber attacks as a result of our dependence on critical infrastructure? Secretary Gates. The United States is vulnerable to cyber intrusions and potential cyber attacks on its critical infrastructure. The capabilities of state and non-state actors to exploit, disrupt, or even destroy our critical information systems are increasing. Almost every aspect of civilian life depends on access to the Internet and other data-transmission networks. With our reliance on cyberspace comes vulnerability. Because so many of our civilian and military functions depend on computer networks, any large-scale interference with our networks represents a potentially significant threat to national security. DOD has invested heavily in information technology--$38.4 billion requested for fiscal year 2012--because information technology is a force multiplier for military, intelligence, and business operations. DOD has more than 15,000 networks and seven million computing devices, across hundreds of installations in dozens of countries around the globe. Our networks are attacked thousands of times each day, and scanned for vulnerabilities millions of times each day. We know that more than one hundred foreign intelligence agencies are attempting to get into DOD's networks. The departments and agencies of the public sector, as well as the private sector, rely upon cyberspace to accomplish their missions successfully. Because of the cross-cutting nature of the cyber threat, U.S. Government departments and agencies must work together to protect U.S. networks and systems. Our cybersecurity initiatives and investments will enable DOD to protect its networks more effectively and to support DHS and other agencies in achieving their cybersecurity missions. (As a point of clarification, when we consider the full range of DOD's cybersecurity investments, including CYBERCOM, the Defense Cyber Crime Center, and the $2.3 billion requested for information assurance, our comprehensive request for fiscal year 2012 is $3.2 billion.) Cybersecurity is a top-tier national security issue for the United States. We have made progress in strengthening our cybersecurity, but more must be done. DOD looks forward to working with DHS and other interagency partners, and with Congress, to improve the protection of U.S. networks and systems. 156. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates, if the United States is hit by a catastrophic cyber attack--as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Panetta described as the next Pearl Harbor--are we prepared to respond? Secretary Gates. DOD is prepared to protect defense critical infrastructure/key resources from a catastrophic cyber attack and to respond should such an attack occur. As described in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, DOD is taking several steps to strengthen capabilities in cyberspace, including: (1) developing a more comprehensive approach to DOD operations in cyberspace; (2) developing greater cyber expertise and awareness; (3) centralizing command of DOD cyber operations; and (4) enhancing partnerships with other agencies and governments. Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection), DOD is working with its private sector partners in the DIB to facilitate vulnerability assessments and to encourage risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the effects of attacks. DOD is also working closely with its Federal partners to assist in ensuring the protection of critical infrastructure and the preparedness of the national cyberspace response system to deal effectively with cyber attacks. DHS developed a National Cyber Incident Response Plan, in which DOD is a key partner, to help ensure resiliency in the face of changing threats and associated technologies. In general, DOD defers to the DHS to evaluate the current preparedness of the national cyberspace response system. 157. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates, from your perspective, do we have the necessary resources to prevent such an attack and who would be in charge of such a response? Secretary Gates. The United States possesses capabilities to help prevent a major cyber attack, but they must be enhanced significantly to cope with a rapidly advancing threat from both state and non-state actors. DOD continues to work with DHS and others in the U.S. Government to leverage existing authorities and develop new interagency processes and capabilities to prevent a cyber attack. DOD is also working with DHS and other agencies to identify additional authorities that may be needed to defend the Nation against cybersecurity threats most effectively. In the event of an attack, the President has emergency authorities to direct a unified, national response. Outside of emergency Presidential authorities, DHS is responsible for coordinating the national effort to improve the cybersecurity of U.S. critical infrastructure. DOD is responsible for the security of its networks, is assigned additional responsibilities for all national security systems, and is the Federal agency responsible for coordinating with the DIB to identify and defend against cybersecurity threats. If directed by the President, DOD can use its capabilities to support DHS and to protect U.S. Government systems, as well as the private sector systems on which the U.S. Government relies. IRANIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY 158. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates, today Iran is producing higher enriched uranium and is moving closer to possessing the weapons-grade uranium needed for a nuclear weapon. What is your assessment of Iran's nuclear intentions? Secretary Gates. The Iranian nuclear program and Iran's intentions remain issues of paramount interest and concern, and we continue to watch them very closely. At this time, DOD believes that Iran is not nuclear weapons capable. DOD also assesses that Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to being able to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. As new information becomes available, and as the Iranian nuclear program evolves, we will reevaluate and reassess Iran's ultimate intentions and potential capabilities. 159. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates, do you agree that a nuclear- armed Iran poses an unacceptable risk to the United States? Secretary Gates. A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. I remain committed to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. A nuclear-armed Iran would be highly destabilizing to the Middle East, and could have significant implications for U.S. interests. However, no one can say with certainty how the situation might unfold. A nuclear- armed Iran could provide other States in the Middle East with the impetus to pursue nuclear programs. Iran also could become more emboldened in its actions throughout the region, most notably by expanding its support for proxies. A nuclear-armed Iran could also cause strategic instability that could eventually lead to a regional conflict. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman ALTERNATE ENGINE 160. Senator Portman. Secretary Gates, with the recent vote against funding the JSF second engine, the House moved a step closer to awarding one company a sole source contract for $100 billion lasting 30 years. This seems remarkably shortsighted and this fight for a competitive process is not over. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has stated that: ``DOD experience with other aircraft engine programs, including the F-16 fighter in the 1980s, has shown competitive pressures can generate financial benefits of up to 20 percent during the life cycle of an engine program and/or improved quality and other benefits.'' In other words, by funding the JSF competitive engine, we have the chance to save about $20 billion over time. I am concerned that the short-term financial benefits of terminating the alternative engine will be dwarfed by the long-term costs of a sole-source contract for an engine that is 50 percent over budget. I believe the F-35 will replace five aircraft currently in the Navy and Air Force fighter fleet (F-16, F/A-18, AV-8, A-10, and F-117). It is my understanding that by 2030, the F-35 will make up about 90 percent of the U.S. tactical fighter force. Would you please comment on whether or not there is historical precedent for being so dependent on one aircraft? Secretary Gates. Being a tri-service program with eight international partners, the scope of the JSF program is without precedent. While the scope and number of tactical aircraft the JSF program represents is large, having a single type model series aircraft to fulfill a mission requirement is not without precedent. For example, the Air Force will gradually replace the legacy fleet of F-16s and A-10s as it transitions to a predominantly 5th Generation fleet. In the 2030 timeframe, the Air Force will still operate a significant number of legacy tactical assets. Assuming the Air Force maintains its current fighter force levels, only 58 percent of the Air Force tactical fighter force will be F-35As in 2030; combined with the F-22 fleet, 63 percent of the Air Force fighter inventory will be 5th Generation platforms. The Air Force continues to assess its fighter force structure and will evaluate alternatives to replace additional legacy platforms as they reach the end of their service lives. The Navy's mission of airborne command and control is fulfilled solely by E-2D/E-2C while search and rescue, anti-submarine, and anti- surface warfare are fulfilled by MH-60 variants. The Navy's tactical aviation projected aircraft inventory in 2030 will be comprised of six Type Model Series (TMS) aircraft: F/A-18E/F, F-35C, F-35B, EA-18G, the next generation air dominance aircraft, and the replacement for the EA- 18G. Of these aircraft, F-35s are expected to comprise roughly 65 percent of the Navy tactical aircraft inventory. 161. Senator Portman. Secretary Gates, given our future dependence on the F-35, does the failure to have a back-up engine present a risk to our forces? Secretary Gates. I believe that the interests of the taxpayer, the military, our partner nations, and the resource integrity of the overall F-35 program are best served by not pursuing a second engine. The benefits which might accrue with a second engine are offset by additional cost. Additionally, logistics complexity will divert precious modernization funds from more pressing developmental priorities. The F135 engine program completed over 12,000 hours of engine ground testing, more than 4,300 hours of engine specific flight testing, and over 850 hours of aircraft flight tests on three variants. As in any development program, there were technical challenges and those that have arisen are understood and modifications are in progress. Throughout SDD, the engine continues to be monitored and any necessary modifications to ensure safety, reliability, and specification deficiencies will be made. Dedicated F135 flight testing will demonstrate performance throughout the flight envelope. Continued funding for the F136 engine carries cost penalties to both the F135 and F136 engines in the form of significant upfront investment cost, reduced production line learning curves, and less efficient economic order quantities. DOD concluded that maintaining a single engine supplier provides the best balance of cost and risk. I believe the financial risks associated with a single source engine supplier are manageable, and are less than the investment required to fund a competitive alternate engine. 162. Senator Portman. Secretary Gates, in your testimony you state that in regard to funding the second engine, ``the Department has been operating this fiscal year under ambiguous guidance at best.'' And that given the situation you ``decided to continue to fund the JSF extra engine effort during this interim period to give Congress the opportunity to resolve this matter as part of its ongoing debate on the budget.'' But isn't it the case that OMB concluded that the F-35 alternate engine funding must be funded in fiscal year 2011 even under the temporary continuing resolution? Secretary Gates. On December 21, 2010, OMB Director Lew did inform Senator Brown of Ohio that the then in-effect CR ``would continue fiscal year 2010 funding, terms, and conditions for the entire Federal Government.'' Subsequent CRs also continued extending the funding, terms, and conditions of the 2010 appropriations. However, consistent with standing OMB guidance on the point, Director Lew also indicated that DOD was expected to not impinge on congressional full-year funding prerogatives for fiscal year 2011. Because funding need not be made available in the course of any single period covered by a continuing resolution if sufficient opportunity to fully execute would be available upon the enactment of an appropriation act at the end of a CR period, the protection of the Congress's fiscal prerogatives does not require funding in any single CR. 163. Senator Portman. Secretary Gates, do you believe that you have a choice as to whether or not to fund the alternate engine under a continuing resolution? Secretary Gates. During the period of the existing CR, I believe that DOD has the discretion to issue a stop work order on the alternate engine program, and given the circumstances the department may determine that it should issue a stop work order. A stop work order is temporary in nature and may not exceed 90 days unless extended by agreement between the government and the contractor. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins U.S. FAMILY HEALTH PLAN RESTRICTIONS 164. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, the President's budget request precludes enrollment in the U.S. Family Health Plan (USFHP) for beneficiaries who reach 65 years of age. According to the transcript I saw and the budget briefing, it is my understanding that DOD is committed to working with the impacted hospitals on this issue to ensure that the quality of care is not impacted. I also understand that no current enrollee in this plan would be affected in terms of their quality of care or health care costs. Are these accurate characterizations of DOD's position? Secretary Gates. Yes. Current enrollees are not affected by this change. The Department continues working with the six health plans to ensure that quality of care is not affected for current or future enrollees. Upon reaching age 65, USFHP enrollees may opt to enroll in Medicare Part B and receive the TRICARE for Life (TFL) benefit as a supplement to their Medicare coverage. The proposal does not result in a beneficiary's loss of provider access, as long as the USFHP providers continue to accept Medicare patients. This proposal provides equitable treatment for all Medicare-eligible retirees by offering a nationwide uniform plan. Most retirees do not live in one of the USFHP service areas, and their only option for health care is Medicare and TFL (requiring payment of their Medicare Part B premium). They and all others enrolled in USFHP will be taken care of. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE 165. Senator Collins. Admiral Mullen, separate from the concerns about the continuing resolution in the short-term, I noticed in your written testimony that you raised concerns about maintaining the capability of the shipbuilding industrial base in the long-term. Clearly, stability in requirements, procurement plans, and buying ships at cost-efficient rates go a long way to achieving the necessary force structure and save money. I am also encouraged that a second DDG-51 ship was included in the fiscal year 2014 budget as I had recommended to sustain a DDG-51 procurement rate of at least two ships per year, which should be closer to three ships per year. DDG-1000's construction is also proceeding very well at Bath Iron Works, and I look forward to Admiral Roughead's visit on the 23rd of February to see first-hand the ship's and yard's progress. Please elaborate on the specific concerns you have for the shipbuilding industrial base. Admiral Mullen. As I stated last year, I am concerned about the capabilities of our DIB, particularly in shipbuilding and space. Our ability to produce and support advanced technology systems for future weapon systems may be degraded by decreasing modernization budgets as well as mergers and acquisitions. Left unchecked, this trend will impact our future warfighting readiness. To ensure that DOD can continue to rely on a dynamic defense market to meet shifting requirements, robust competition is vital for producing high quality, affordable, and innovative products. My other concern regarding the shipbuilding industrial base has to do with ship design and production. Six major U.S. shipyards build nearly all of the Navy's warships, and while they consistently build extremely capable ships, their production rate pales in comparison with production rates of leading international shipyards. This places U.S. shipyards at somewhat of a disadvantage because serial design and stable production are critical factors to the incorporation of leading shipyard technologies and decreased cost for DOD. The Virginia class submarine and the T-AKE auxiliary program show the benefit these factors can have on shipbuilding cost. Both programs enjoyed significant cost reductions and improved production schedules as a result of serial production and a stable design. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn INSTABILITY IN MEXICO 166. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, last month, General Michael Hayden, a former CIA Director, described the crisis next door in Mexico as one of six national security challenges that would ``keep him awake at night'' if he were still in government. At this time, the U.S. Government does not seem to have a coherent, meaningful strategy in place to help the Mexican Government regain control over its country and defeat the drug cartels. What do you see as the risks to our own national security if the Mexican drug cartels are not defeated? Secretary Gates. In 2008, the U.S. Government began coordinating assistance to Mexico under the Merida Initiative with the goal of supporting Mexico's efforts to build capacity to combat TCOs, strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights, reduce violence, and stem the flow of drugs north and arms and illicit money south. We recognize that, moving forward, U.S. efforts should: (1) reinforce progress made in disrupting cartels; (2) begin institutionalizing Mexican capacity to act on public safety and security issues; (3) help Mexico meet the challenges of securing its borders while facilitating trade and travel; and (4) promote respect for human rights, the rule of law, and a culture of lawfulness. Although none of these are easy, we know we are making slow but steady progress. I admire President Calderon's government for the brave stand taken against TCOs that seek to operate with impunity inside Mexico. Although Mexico increased efforts to counter the TCOs, TCOs responded with increased violence as they fight for turf and attempt to intimidate law enforcement officers and the Mexican public. Although I am concerned about the escalating violence in Mexico, I am confident that Mexico's democracy is strong and that the government maintains control over its territory. As DHS Secretary Napolitano noted recently, we do not have evidence that TCO violence is spilling across the border into the United States. Still, these dangerous organizations have linkages to illicit groups operating inside the United States, including drug traffickers and gangs that pose health, law enforcement, economic, and security challenges to cities and towns throughout our Nation. Although Mexico called upon its armed forces to support Mexican law enforcement efforts to combat TCOs, it continues to see the problem as a law enforcement issue, as do I. DOD, along with interagency partners, is working closely with Mexican counterparts to support its efforts to dismantle TCOs, and DOD will continue to provide assistance as requested by Mexico. 167. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, the Mexican government reports that over 34,600 people have been killed in drug-related violence in Mexico since December 2006, including 15,000 deaths in 2010 alone--representing a 60 percent increase over 2009. What common threads do you see between the cartel-driven unrest in Mexico and the insurgency-driven violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, which our troops have been battling for most of the past decade? Secretary Gates. The challenges facing Mexico are quite different from those confronting Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, the TCOs operating in Mexico are not attempting to overthrow the Mexican Government, but instead are fighting for turf and to create a space in which to carry out their illicit activities. As such, Mexico is dealing with a law enforcement challenge; DOD is providing support to Mexico as well as U.S. law enforcement entities in their unprecedented efforts to confront this challenge, but is not directly engaged in the fight. 168. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, in your opinion, how can the U.S. Government, and in particular DOD, better support our Mexican partners? Secretary Gates. Under President Calderon's leadership, Mexico is bravely confronting the grave security threats posed by TCOs operating within Mexican territory. At Mexico's request, through the Merida Initiative and complementary programs, the U.S. Government, including DOD, is providing support to Mexico to face these challenges. Under Merida and other cooperative programs, DOD provides training, information sharing, and operational support to Mexican military and other security forces, as well as to U.S. law enforcement agencies' activities with regard to Mexico. DOD is working with Mexican partners to find areas in which to increase cooperation. In recent years, DOD concentrated on assisting Mexican forces to improve tactical and operational proficiency, as well as air mobility, maritime law enforcement, communications, and reconnaissance capacities. DOD provided non-intrusive inspection equipment for mobile checkpoints and eight Bell 412 transport helicopters for the Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional. Also, DOD is working to deliver three UH-60M Blackhawks and four Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA 235) maritime surveillance aircraft. DOD support focused on helping Mexican security forces learn to mount intelligence-driven and interagency-coordinated operations, as well as on safeguarding human rights in the context of military operations in support to law enforcement. Moving forward, I believe the Department can best support our Mexican partners by preparing to respond quickly to requests for continued assistance from Mexico. Domestically, the United States must also commit to confronting issues on our side of the border that contribute to the challenges facing Mexico--namely the illicit trafficking of arms from the United States into Mexico and our country's demand for illegal drugs. The United States and Mexico have a shared responsibility in the fight against TCOs, and our success will depend on our continued partnership. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY 169. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Mullen, in your written testimony, you asked for Congress's help in modifying the laws and regulations surrounding security cooperation to create an approach that better integrates our defense, diplomacy, development, and intelligence efforts. In terms of geographic organization, DOS has six regional bureaus and DOD has six different regional COCOMs, which are not demarcated along the same lines on the map. At the same time, the IC defines world regions utilizing a third set of lines on the map. In your opinion, does this lack of common demarcation of the world's regions by these Federal agencies hamper effective interagency cooperation and coordination on national security? Admiral Mullen. It is true that there is not a common demarcation of the world's regions among Federal agencies. Many of these differences are the result of historic ties and relationships, and the unique focus of each agency. While these differences may create some challenges, they do not hamper effective interagency cooperation and coordination on national security. In some cases, the different regional demarcations are beneficial to interagency cooperation and coordination. Whenever lines of demarcation are created or utilized on a map, issues may be created or exist that affect both regions, but are missed due to their cross-boundary nature. By utilizing differing lines of demarcation between the agencies, the impact of these seams within an organization is minimized by working with other agencies to formulate a cohesive foreign policy. Additionally, I have a statutory responsibility under Title 10 U.S.C. 161 to review the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which includes the COCOM areas of responsibility, not less than every 2 years, and recommend any changes to the President through the Secretary of Defense. This is a thorough review that includes inputs from Office of Secretary of Defense, combatant commanders, and the Services. The draft UCP is then reviewed by the interagency via the National Security Staff prior to receiving Presidential approval. In this process, I have not received any indication that I should recommend a change to the President to more closely align our regional designations with that of other Federal agencies or that such a realignment would overcome any existing shortfalls in interagency coordination. INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN 170. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, India has committed some $1.3 billion and 3,500 Indian personnel to relief and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to date, in recognition of the fact that stability in Afghanistan is crucial to its own security. As noted in Admiral Mullen's testimony, the enduring success of our military operations in Afghanistan is dependent on the ANSF being able to provide security to the Afghan people. However, reports indicate that NATO still faces a shortage of 740 trainers needed by this summer in order for the ANSF to be ready to take the lead by 2014. Given the clear and immediate demand for more trainers and training options in Afghanistan, as well as India's willingness to provide substantial support to stability and security efforts in the region, should we encourage India to expand its role and help train the Afghan security forces? Secretary Gates. The United States and India have shared interests in a stable and prosperous South Asia region and in preventing Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. In the past, India provided scholarships for ANSFs personnel to study in India, and is currently exploring options to train Afghan women police in India. I welcome these efforts, and encourage India to consider further assistance in Afghanistan through priority infrastructure projects, additional training and education assistance, and technical assistance to the agriculture sector. I also encourage India to continue to engage the Afghan government to identify further areas of cooperation. During President Obama's visit to India in November 2010, he and Prime Minister Singh committed to intensify consultation, cooperation, and coordination to promote a stable, prosperous, and independent Afghanistan. They agreed to collaboratively assist the people of Afghanistan by identifying opportunities to leverage our relative strengths, experience, and resources, including joint projects on agriculture and women's economic development. Eighty-five percent of Afghans derive their income from agriculture, and Afghan women continue to lack economic, social, and political opportunities. The shortfall of 740 trainers currently identified by the NATO NTM- A for filling the NATO's Combined Joint Statement of Requirements includes a number of specific capabilities that only certain allies and partners possess. DOD is currently working to match these specific capacities with the NTM-A requirements. Admiral Mullen. India already plays a role in training the ANSF. They have provided training in India to over 400 ANA personnel, are currently training 90, and have offered training for another 192 this year. Expansion of further training efforts must be closely coordinated with NTM-A and Afghanistan to ensure it meets the needs of the ANSF. Regional political military considerations should be carefully weighed when considering any expansion of an increased role for the Indian military in the development of the ANSF, especially the introduction of Indian Trainers to Afghanistan. F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER 171. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2012 DOD budget request includes a major restructuring of the F-35 program that cuts 124 aircraft from the FYDP, postponing production of these aircraft until after 2016. I am concerned with the resulting impact to unit cost to the remaining aircraft in the FYDP, and I believe this poses the most immediate problem to our Services and our international partners. What actions will you take to ensure that the restructuring of this critical fifth-generation fighter program does not itself lead to a substantial spike in unit cost? Secretary Gates. In the short-term, I acknowledge there will be an increase in unit costs as a result of the reduction of 124 aircraft within the FYDP. DOD is currently assessing the magnitude of this increase in support of the DAB review scheduled for May 2011, and will report these figures as part of an update to the Selected Acquisition Report this summer following completion of the DAB review. Despite the reduction of aircraft within the FYDP, DOD remains committed to procuring 2,443 aircraft in total, and this commitment will serve to lessen the short-term spikes in unit procurement costs. The reduction of aircraft procurement within the FYDP is prudent given the extension of the development program, and the need to properly manage the risks of concurrent development and procurement. 172. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, were our international partners consulted on the announcement surrounding the restructuring of the F-35 program? If so, what has been the reaction of our allied partners, and do you believe this decision will impact when or how many F-35 aircraft our international partners will ultimately buy? Secretary Gates. The international partners in the JSF F-35 Program are integral to our collective effort and were consulted prior to the announcement regarding the restructuring of the program. The partners' reaction to the announcement was positive. They appreciated the fact senior leadership in DOD took the time to contact them ahead of the formal announcement. There is no indication at this time that the decision to restructure the JSF F-35 Program will affect the number of aircraft the partners will ultimately buy or when the buys will occur. B-1 FLEET 173. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, how are your fiscal year 2012 proposed budget cuts to the B-1 bomber fleet consistent with your message about the need to sustain the current military force structure during a time of war? Secretary Gates. The B-1 fleet faces potential grounding due to diminishing manufacturing sources and other sustainability issues. Taking a minimal reduction in fleet size garners savings to increase B- 1 fleet viability through modernization efforts. The Air Force conducted a review of current bomber force structure, existing capabilities, and future power projection requirements in determining the risk associated with a B-1 fleet reduction. The results of this review, combined with high-fidelity modeling and simulation analysis conducted by Air Force Studies and Analysis, indicate a reduction of six B-1 aircraft leaves a more capable fleet that meets the requirements in currently approved OSD analytic agenda scenarios. A modest B-1 reduction, while modernizing the remaining fleet, is a wise reinvestment strategy providing a capabilities-based bridge to the future long range strike platform. 174. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, how much of the savings obtained from this cut will be reinvested in sustaining and improving the current B-1 fleet, to include enhancements such as a new radar system? Secretary Gates. The retirement of six B-1s provides a total savings of $61.9 million in fiscal year 2012 and $357.3 million over the FYDP in procurement and sustainment funding. Of these savings, the Air Force is reinvesting $32.9 million in fiscal year 2012 and $125.4 million over the FYDP, into critical B-1 sustainment and modernization programs to ensure the health of the remaining fleet. These programs include procurement and installation of Vertical Situation Display Upgrade and Central Integrated Test System sustainment efforts, Fully Integrated Data Link capability upgrade and procurement of critical initial spares for these modifications. The ongoing Radar Maintainability and Improvement Program will replace two unsupportable Line Replaceable Units within the current radar system. The Air Force is assessing the remaining components of the B-1 radar with consideration to both supportability and performance. DOD applied the remainder of the savings from the B-1 reduction to other Air Force and DOD priorities to include continuing to strengthen the nuclear enterprise and investing in Building Partnerships capacity. 175. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, the B-1 bomber has repeatedly been cited by senior U.S. military commanders as the premier bomber in Afghanistan. General David Petraeus has emphasized that, ``The B-1 is a great platform in at least two respects. First, it carries a heck of a lot of bombs, substantial ordnance. Second, it has very good intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. And it can loiter for a good time, when it's not being used to drop bombs . . . '' How will the proposed cuts to the B-1 fleet impact B-1 operations in Afghanistan in the years to come? Secretary Gates. There will be no negative impact to operations in the Afghanistan theater. The fiscal year 2012 budget request reduces the B-1B force structure by six primary aircraft authorizations leaving 60 B-1Bs in the Air Force inventory. This provides additional funds to improve the existing B-1B fleet, including the central integrated test system, fully integrated data link, and vertical situation display unit. These initiatives will help bridge the gap until the next generation strike aircraft is operational. However, investing in a new penetrating bomber is critical to maintaining our long-range strike capability in the face of increasing risk associated with anti-access and area-denied environments. 176. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, why was the B-52 fleet, which currently numbers 76 aircraft and does not provide nearly the utility of the B-1 in current operations in Afghanistan, not similarly reduced? Secretary Gates. The answer is two-fold. First, the dual missions of conventional and nuclear capabilities of the B-52 provide the flexibility to meet COCOM requirements that the conventional-only B-1 does not provide. Second, the B-52 fleet maintains better maintenance statistics and requires fewer operational upgrades than the B-1; therefore, the Air Force was able to provide those upgrades without sacrificing force structure to pay for sustainment and upgrades. LONG-RANGE STRIKE 177. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2012 DOD budget request includes $197 million in Air Force RDT&E funding to begin development of a new long-range bomber (Long-Range Strike) that we are told would be penetrating, carry precision-guided conventional weapons, and be nuclear-capable. Yet last month, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley told reporters that while the new bomber would be able to carry nuclear weapons, it would not be immediately certified for nuclear missions.Why will the new bomber not be certified at the outset to carry nuclear weapons? Secretary Gates. The new bomber will be nuclear capable. The Air Force will design and build the system to balance capability priorities with the need to responsibly and affordably mature a new system. Detailed timelines for certification will be developed as the program matures. 178. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, what plans, if any, are being made to enable the B-2 to be certified to deliver a nuclear ALCM? Secretary Gates. The Air Force is planning to integrate the LRSO weapon, which will replace the current nuclear ALCM, on the B-2. GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM 179. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, there are now 30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) deployed in Alaska and California to defend against Iran and North Korea, but the administration has purchased only 52 GBI missiles. Following the last two Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system flight test failures, the MDA is down to only 20 GBI missiles, which is not enough to continue development and improvement of the GMD system, to conduct annual reliability flight testing, and to maintain spare missiles for emergency deployment. Yet the fiscal year 2012 budget includes a reduction of $186 million to the GMD system from fiscal year 2011 levels, while the proposed 5-year funding for GMD is $1 billion less than that proposed in the fiscal year 2011 budget request. Given the administration's commitment to continue development and improving this important capability, how are these reductions justified when additional testing and GBI missiles are needed? Secretary Gates. The change from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2012 in the President's 2012 budget of $185 million reflects efficiencies introduced by the Department and the MDA. One of the focus areas of the efficiencies is cost savings through contract competition in the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense program. Another key efficiency was the consolidation of test events to achieve stated test objectives with fewer events. These efficiencies execute the same program scope with fewer program dollars, while continuing to meet the strategic goals and timelines laid out in the BMDR to ensure the United States has a reliable and proven system for homeland defense. IRAQI AIR FORCE 180. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, in your testimony, you cited the Iraqi Air Force's ability to protect its own air space as one of three primary areas of U.S. concern with Iraqi military capabilities as DOD prepares to withdraw the last U.S. troops at the end of 2011. What steps have you taken to enable the Iraqi Air Force to take over this key mission, including training and equipping efforts? Secretary Gates. The Iraqi Air Force is on track to achieve minimal essential capabilities by the end of 2011 in all mission categories except airspace control; intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance; and fixed-wing airlift. With continued support from U.S. advisors and adequate resourcing from Iraq, improvements in accessions, airlift, flying and technical training, air staff effectiveness, combat support, and command and control should demonstrably contribute to internal security while setting the stage for contributing to external defense as well. Iraq funded several Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases that provide both fixed and rotary wing pilot and ground crew training, including training to prepare pilots for a fourth generation fighter aircraft. Additionally, Iraq funded FMS cases that are currently providing aircraft as well as air surveillance radars. 181. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, the Iraqi Government had clearly been preparing to purchase 18 American-made F-16s until this week, when they announced they would postpone their planned purchase in order to shift funding to other non-military priorities. What steps are you taking to complete this critical F-16 purchase to help bring the Iraqi Air Force's air defense capability to proficiency? Secretary Gates. GoI requested the purchase of 18 F-16s. However, due to a number of competing priorities that must fit into a limited Iraqi budget, the Iraqis were not able appropriate funds for an F-16 procurement program in the 2011 budget that was recently approved by the Council of Representatives. Funds initially earmarked in the 2011 budget request to buy F-16s were shifted to provide critical human services in the final Council of Representatives approved budget. The most recent F-16 Letter of Offer and Acceptance tailored to meet Iraqi funding constraints expired on January 31. USF-I leadership continues to engage in discussions with Iraqi leadership on the details of a possible F-16 sale. This continues to remain a top U.S. Government and Iraq priority. NATIONAL DEBT 182. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Mullen, in your written testimony, you state: ``I believe that our debt is the greatest threat to our national security.'' Reckless fiscal policy is not the typical focus of our military's threat analyses but, frankly, I could not agree more with your assessment. Last Congress, I introduced a bill called the Foreign- Held Debt Transparency and Threat Assessment Act, which would have required regular assessments from the GAO on the national security risks of the ballooning national debt. In addition to the sheer size of our national debt (now more than $14 trillion), I am also deeply concerned about our clear dependence on foreign governments such as China to fund our deficit spending, so my bill would also require the President to report quarterly to Congress on the national security risks posed specifically by foreign holdings. Do you agree that having this type of analysis is critical to both our fiscal and national security policies? Admiral Mullen. The ties between the strength of our economy and our Nation's security are inseparable and incontrovertible. We need a vibrant, growing economy to exert influence internationally and to provide for our military and other defense capabilities. In turn, we need the security provided by our national defenses to underwrite our economic endeavors and our livelihoods. But today we find both our economy and our security threatened by our burgeoning national debt. In my position, my concerns about our debt stem from its long-term effects on our Nation's fiscal standing and the difficult trade-offs associated with restoring our fiscal health, rather than the holders of our debt. As such, I have taken no position on the nature of the holders of this debt. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter MISSILE DEFENSE BUDGET 183. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, on February 16, 2011, you testified before the House Armed Service Committee: ``I do know that the overall budget for missile defense is going from $10.2 billion to $10.7 billion, so we're putting another $500 million into it. And there is money for more--more Aegis ships, more of the transportable radars like we have in Egypt--like we have in Israel and Japan right now, and--and then there are also continuing investments in the Ground Based Interceptor system.'' Of the $500 million increase for missile defense, only $219 million is going to the MDA, whose budget increases from $8.4 billion in fiscal year 2011 to $8.6 billion for fiscal year 2012. Despite the $200 million increase for MDA, 5-year funding for MDA declines by $2.6 billion between fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2015, as compared to last year's budget request. Funding for the GMD in fiscal year 2012 is reduced by about $185 million, as compared to fiscal year 2011. Funding for the GMD program over fiscal years 2012 to 2015 is reduced by approximately $590 million, as compared to last year's budget request. Why does the MDA budget decline by $2.6 billion between fiscal years 2011 and 2015? Secretary Gates. The MDA budget for 2011 through 2015 is based on the missile defense priorities set forth in the BMDR. The MDA budget strategy in fiscal year 2012 identified efficiencies and balanced personnel, budgetary and management resources within and across its components. In instituting efficiency initiatives MDA will make greater use of competition across its acquisition programs and will realize savings through a refined approach to service contracting. 184. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, why does the GMD budget decline by $185 million in fiscal year 2012 and by $2.6 billion between fiscal years 2011 and 2015? Secretary Gates. The change from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2012 in the PB12 budget of $185 million is reflective of efficiencies introduced by the Department and MDA. One of the efficiencies focus areas is cost savings through contract competition in the GMD program. Another key efficiency was the consolidation of test events, achieving stated test objectives with fewer events. These efficiencies execute the same program scope with fewer program dollars, while continuing to meet the strategic goals and timelines laid out in the BMDR to ensure the United States has a reliable and proven system for homeland defense. The $2.6 billion change between fiscal years 2011 and 2015 reflects the change in funding for MDA as a whole, not GMD specifically. The MDA budget for 2011 through 2015 is based on the missile defense priorities set forth in the BMDR. The MDA budget strategy in fiscal year 2012 identified efficiencies and balanced personnel, budgetary and management resources within and across its components. In instituting efficiency initiatives MDA will make greater use of competition across its acquisition programs and will realize savings through a refined approach to service contracting. MEADS AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM 185. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, I applaud you for your decision not to proceed to procurement of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) air and missile defense system. As noted in the DOD memo, the program is substantially over budget and behind schedule; and it would take an extra $974 million to $1.16 billion just to complete the design and development. But I understand that the decision is to still proceed to spend approximately $804 million to implement a proof-of-concept effort. I am concerned that this would mean spending hundreds of millions of limited dollars on a system that we will not procure. What is the basis for continued funding on a program that DOD will ultimately not procure? Secretary Gates. Although the DOD has decided not to procure MEADS, the Department determined the technology being developed in the program will be useful for other DOD programs. The DOD explored viable potential courses of action, including: (1) Terminating the program immediately, if the DOD could obtain the required consent of the other Participants in the MEADS program under the legally binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) among the Federal Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Italy, and the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America on behalf of DOD concerning Cooperation on a Project for Design and Development (D&D) of a MEADS (D&D MOU); (2) Working with the other D&D MOU Participants to continue MEADS development within the agreed funding limits set forth in the D&D MOU; or (3) Working with the other MEADS D&D MOU Participants to complete the planned D&D phase by amending the D&D MOU to add the additional funding and time required to develop and test the system fully for production and fielding. The DOD decided that the best option available under the MOU is to continue to participate in the D&D phase within the funding limits set forth in the D&D MOU. This decision ensures the DOD: will fulfill its obligations under the D&D MOU; will avoid a situation where the DOD may be viewed as reneging on its international obligations; will avoid requiring the DOD to pay termination costs we expect would be comparable to the cost of completing the ``proof of concept'' effort under the D&D MOU; and, will facilitate the maturation of key technologies useful to the DOD in other programs. 186. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, I applaud you for your decision not to proceed to procurement of the MEADS missile defense system. As noted in the DOD memo, the program is substantially over budget and behind schedule. It would take an additional $974 million just to complete the design and development of the program. It does not make sense to continue to waste $800 million on a system we are not going to procure. Will DOD go back to the drawing board and try to find a way to ring out some additional savings out of this $800 million for MEADS? Secretary Gates. The DOD will continue to explore opportunities to minimize cost. The Department explored viable potential courses of action, including: (1) Terminating the program immediately, if the DOD could obtain the required consent of the other MEADS partners under the MOU among the Federal Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Italy, and the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America on behalf of DOD concerning Cooperation on a D&D Project of a MEADS (D&D MOU); (2) Working with the other D&D MOU Participants to continue development of MEADS within the agreed funding limits set forth in the D&D MOU; or (3) Working with the other MEADS D&D MOU Participants to complete the planned D&D phase by amending the D&D MOU to add the additional funding and time required to develop and test the system fully for production and fielding. The DOD decided to continue to participate in the D&D phase within the funding limits set forth in the D&D MOU. This decision ensures the DOD: will fulfill its obligations under the D&D MO; will avoid a situation where the DOD may be viewed as reneging on its international obligations; will avoid requiring the DOD to pay termination costs we expect would be comparable to the cost of completing the ``proof of concept'' effort under the D&D MOU; and, importantly, will facilitate the maturation of key technologies useful to the DOD in other programs. 187. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, DOD's memo indicates that it will be necessary to allocate funds for Patriot upgrades. At a minimum, will DOD work to reallocate funds for design and development for upgrades to the Patriot system? Secretary Gates. Yes. The Army is working to determine specific actions to mitigate the loss of MEADS. The Army will then reallocate funds originally programmed for MEADS beginning in fiscal year 2014 to improving the Patriot system. 188. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, in the memo accompanying your recent decision not to proceed to procurement of MEADS, you specifically highlighted the Army's inability to afford to procure MEADS and make required Patriot upgrades as rationale for the decision. In light of your decision, can you provide your assurance that DOD will accelerate Patriot modernization efforts? Secretary Gates. Yes. The Army is working to determine specific actions to mitigate the loss of MEADS. The Army will then reallocate funds originally programmed for MEADS beginning in fiscal year 2014 to efforts accelerating improvements to the Patriot system. CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE 189. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, you recently stated, ``U.S. senior military leaders monitored very closely all provisions related to conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) throughout the recent START treaty negotiation process''. Do you believe there is a current clear commitment to deployment that allows for adequate U.S. missile defenses? Admiral Mullen. Yes. The START treaty allows for deployment and further development of conventional strike weapons, which are designed to hit targets any place in the world in 60 minutes or less. Any warhead--nuclear, high explosive, or high speed kinetic--on an ICBM or submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) would be counted under the New START treaty central limits. However, deployment of CPGS does not impede our ability to provide for adequate U.S. missile defenses. 190. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, additionally, condition 6 of the New START Resolution of Ratification called on the President to clarify its planning and intent in developing future conventionally- armed, strategic-range weapons systems (aka, CPGS). The February 2, 2011, report on CPGS, pursuant to Condition 6, lists three efforts under development (hypersonic technology vehicle (HTV), advanced hypersonic weapon (AHW), and conventional strike missile CSM)), at a cost of some $2 billion between now and 2016 for research and development. Is it still the policy of the administration, as per the 2010 NPR, to develop and field CPGS capabilities? If so, is it the intent of the administration to make a deployment decision anytime soon? Admiral Mullen. Our plan is to continue to strengthen our conventional capabilities as we reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks. We are continuing to plan for and develop contributions by non-nuclear systems to U.S. regional deterrence while preserving reassurance goals by avoiding limitations on missile defenses and maintaining options for using heavy bombers or long-range missile systems in conventional roles. The success of a CPGS fielded capability will be dependent on progress made through the continued RDT&E of critical technologies, formal establishment of follow-on Service acquisition programs, and a concurrent effort to improve the Nation's ISR capabilities. 191. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, the February 2 report states that ``conventionally armed SLBM and conventionally armed ICBM concepts with traditional ballistic trajectories are not currently being pursued,'' and that ``DOD at present has no plans to develop and field these systems.'' Given that these are the most mature technologies, why isn't the administration pursuing conventionally armed SLBMs and ICBMs as a near-term CPGS option? Admiral Mullen. While CPGS capabilities are currently limited, the current RDT&E approach is consistent with the department's vision of developing enhanced conventional technologies and capabilities that will minimize political and operational risks associated with fielding and employment in the future. The HTV -2 and AHW technology experiments along with the CSM demonstration are expected to provide more flexible operational characteristics that will not count (New START treaty) against a smaller triad of strategic nuclear capabilities. It will also be important to discriminate these capabilities from current ICBM or SLBM employment. [Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the committee adjourned.] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM ---------- TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 2011 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC. U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Nelson, Webb, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, Portman, Ayotte, and Cornyn. Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Jason W. Maroney, Counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member. Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I. Lloyd, and Brian F. Sebold. Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett and Casey Howard, assistants to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Gordon Gray, assistant to Senator Portman; Adam Hechavarria, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; and Dave Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from Admiral Eric Olson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and General James Mattis, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Today's hearing continues the committee's review of the missions and operational requirements of our combatant commanders in light of the priorities set out in the President's fiscal year 2012 budget request. Nowhere will the President's budget priorities have a greater impact than with the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). The men and women of CENTCOM and SOCOM have been engaged in major military operations for nearly a decade. Yet, in Afghanistan and Iraq, our troops' morale is high. They are dedicated to their mission and serving with courage and distinction. We have asked so much of them. They have done everything we have asked and more. That includes not just the servicemembers themselves, but the families who have served our Nation at home while their loved ones serve overseas. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, on behalf of this committee, please pass along our gratitude to the troops serving under your commands. Admiral Olson, it is my understanding that you plan to retire this year after an exceptional career in which, among other things, you became the first Navy SEAL to attain the rank of four-star admiral, and you have led SOCOM with great distinction. Thank you for your outstanding service and that of your family. The Department of Defense (DOD), as are all Federal agencies, is currently operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR) that expires in a few days. Last week, Secretary Gates described this as a crisis on his doorstep. I hope that we will soon be in a position to enact a full- year appropriation at an appropriate level. I hope, General Mattis and Admiral Olson, that you will help the committee better understand the impact of proceeding by CR on the forces operating under your command. In Iraq, CENTCOM is continuing to oversee the drawdown of U.S. forces, as agreed upon by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki in the 2008 security agreement, which requires all U.S. forces to be withdrawn from Iraq by December 31st of this year. Because of the ongoing reduction of our general- purpose forces in Iraq, the importance of the role performed by our Special Operations Forces (SOF) as a force multiplier, continuing to build the capacity of Iraqi counterterrorism forces and enabling their operations against al Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorist groups, is even more important. As we reduce our presence, we must make sure that our special operators receive adequate support, including intelligence, medical evacuation, and quick-reaction forces. The transition in Iraq also means that the State Department will take over the lead for numerous activities in Iraq previously implemented by DOD, including training the Iraqi police. We would be interested in hearing from our witnesses this morning your views on the importance of providing adequate resources to the State Department and other civilian agencies to the success of that transition. In Afghanistan, it is essential that President Obama holds to his decision to set July 2011 as the date for the beginning of reductions in U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates told this committee a few weeks ago that he supported the decision to set the July 2011 date because it was necessary to ``grab the attention of the Afghan leadership and bring a sense of urgency to them of the need for them to step up to the plate to take ownership of the war and to recruit their own young men to fight.'' Admiral Mullen said at the same hearing that the July 2011 date ``has given the Afghans a sense of urgency that they didn't have before the decision was made.'' The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have added 70,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) over the last year and will meet the current target of 305,000 ANSF by October of this year. A large, capable, effective Afghan security presence is what the Taliban fears the most because it would demonstrate that--contrary to the Taliban's propaganda, the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda is a war the Afghan people believe in and it is being fought by an Afghan security force that they believe in, rather than a war waged by foreign occupiers, as Taliban propaganda would have it. The administration is now considering a request to grow the ANA and ANP by between 45,000 and 70,000 people, which would bring the total ANSF levels to a range of 352,000 to 378,000 by the end of 2012. I have twice recently urged President Obama to approve this request for additional Afghan troops. It is a key to the success of our mission and to faster reductions of U.S. troops. It is also far less costly in terms of U.S. casualties and taxpayer dollars than keeping large numbers of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. I hope our witnesses this morning will tell us whether they support the request to build the ANSF by up to an additional 70,000 personnel. The presence of safe havens for terrorists across the Afghanistan border in Pakistan continues to pose a security threat to Afghanistan and to the region. While U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation has improved in some respects, the Pakistani army has not yet gone after the sanctuaries for the Haqqani network in North Waziristan or the Afghan Taliban in and around Quetta, Pakistan. Over the past month, the status quo in the CENTCOM AOR has changed dramatically, and this change appears to be ongoing. The protests in Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Iran, Yemen, and other countries are examples of what President Obama has correctly called a ``hunger for freedom.'' Many in the Middle East have been denied their democratic and human rights for too long, and the past month is a clear demonstration of the people there demanding those rights. The United States needs to make constantly clear it supports those seeking to exercise their fundamental rights in the Middle East and around the world. The committee looks forward to hearing from General Mattis on his assessment and views on these protest movements, how our security, how our counterterrorism operations, and how our strategic goals are impacted by the events in the Middle East, and how, if at all, the nature of our military-to-military relationships might change in the region as a result of these events. In the waters off the coast of Somalia, the flow of international commerce continues to be impacted by the threat of increasingly aggressive pirates. Just last week, four Americans were murdered at the hands of more than a dozen pirates bent on extracting ransoms in exchange for their lives. The committee looks forward to hearing from our witnesses about their assessment of this threat and about ongoing U.S. anti- piracy operations. Iran provides the greatest challenge to the United States and the international community. While continuing to profess that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes, its actions indicate otherwise. The sanctions that have been imposed by the United States and most of the international community under the United Nations (U.N.) sanctions resolutions as well as domestic laws seem to be having some effect, but they need to be maintained and ratcheted up. Admiral Mullen's guidance for 2011, which states that DOD would ``continue to plan for a broad range of military options should the President decide to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear arms,'' needs to be reiterated. While not the preferred option, it is important that Iran understand that military actions remain on the table. I am concerned about the fraying of our SOF, as you have put it, Admiral Olson. While our SOF have seen rapid growth over the past decade, the demand for such forces and their unique skills will continue to outpace supply for the foreseeable future. This committee stands prepared to support SOCOM's efforts to provide the best-trained and best-equipped special operators to our combatant commands, and we look forward to hearing from you on this matter. Thank you again, both of you, for your testimony today. Let me now turn this over to Senator McCain. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our witnesses for joining us this morning. Admiral Olson, thank you for your many years of courageous and outstanding service to the United States Navy and to the Nation. General Mattis, as always, we look forward to your straight talk and candid views on the issues that are so important to us. This hearing couldn't come at a more important time. Senator Lieberman and I have spent the past several days visiting some key countries within the CENTCOM AOR, including Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, as well as some equally critical countries that influence events within the AOR, such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Israel. In addition, we are all, obviously, focused on the tectonic changes that are shaking countries and governments in Yemen, Bahrain, Iran, and, of course, Libya. That is to say nothing of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which remain the focus of our military and diplomatic efforts. Not since the fall of the Soviet Union have we seen a wave of change destabilize more critical countries all at once than we are now witnessing. Indeed, the old bargains that have defined regional order in the Middle East for the past several decades are now collapsing in front of us. This is, of course, deeply unsettling, but it is also an unprecedented opportunity to support the people of the Middle East in shaping a new regional order that is all at once reflective of their aspirations, conducive to our interests, and consistent with our values. The people of the Middle East are playing the leading role in this historic endeavor, but America's Armed Forces are playing an indispensable role, strengthening and defending our friends while deterring and defeating our enemies. 2011 will be a consequential year for CENTCOM and SOCOM. Among the vital strategic issues that were in play this year, we face the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) transition of responsibility for security in Afghanistan to local and national Afghan forces amid strained and even deteriorating U.S.-Pakistani relations. We face hard choices about the future of U.S. defense assistance to Lebanon after Hezbollah's use of coercion to become the dominant actor in the government. We face the Iranian regime's desires to develop a nuclear weapons capability and to exploit the current regional instability to expand its hegemonic ambitions. We face the destabilization of critical counterterrorism partners like Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Bahrain, where the headquarters of U.S. Fifth Fleet is now caught up in the broader debate over the people of Bahrain's political future. Of course, we face the prospect of a complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the year, despite increasing evidence and recent testimony by the Secretary of Defense suggesting that such a plan is not consistent with Iraq's continuing security needs or our enduring interests at this time. Amid these and other challenges, this year will also require increased vigilance on the part of our SOCOM, for the changes sweeping across North Africa, the Middle East, and South and Central Asia may open up new ungoverned spaces that could be exploited by our enemies. While our special operators continue to perform with remarkable resilience and success, the effects of nearly 10 years of sustained operations and repeated deployments appear to be straining this elite force. Admiral Olson, as the chairman has said, we are concerned by your recent comment that our SOF are showing signs of ``fraying around the edges.'' It is important that you lay out today what steps are being taken or need to be taken to mitigate this strain. We are also interested in SOCOM's progress in meeting growth targets mandated by the Quadrennial Defense Review, as well as any associated issues, such as training or facility constraints that you are facing. We continue to see al Qaeda and affiliated movements attempting to expand their reach through the Maghreb, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, and beyond. We are all eager for the assessments of both our distinguished witnesses about the capabilities of these groups to threaten America's friends, allies, interests, and Homeland. What is critical to note is that the historic changes now reshaping the broader Middle East are a direct repudiation of al Qaeda and its terrorist allies. The people of this dynamic and crucial region are rising up to change the character of their governments, but the revolutions they are making are largely defined not by violence, but by peaceful protests. They are inspired not by intolerant and extremist ideologies, but rather by demands for greater freedom, democracy, opportunity, and justice. More than any weapon of war with which this committee must concern itself, it is these principles and the changes they are inspiring that will ultimately defeat our terrorist enemies. If only for that reason alone, these universal values and those now struggling for them deserve our full support. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our distinguished witnesses for joining us this morning. General Mattis, Admiral Olson, thank you for your many decades of faithful service to our Nation, and on behalf of our entire committee, please convey to the brave men and women you lead how grateful we are for their sacrifice, and that of their families. This posture hearing could not come at a more important time. I have spent the past several days visiting some key countries within the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, including Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt--as well as some equally critical countries that influence events within the AOR, such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Israel. In addition, we are all obviously focused on the tectonic changes that are shaking countries and governments in Yemen, Bahrain, Iran, and of course Libya. That is to say nothing of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which remain the focus of our military and diplomatic efforts. Not since the fall of the Soviet Union have we seen a wave of change destabilize more critical countries all at once than what we are now witnessing. Indeed, the old bargains that have defined regional order in the Middle East for the past several decades are now collapsing in front of us. This is of course deeply unsettling, but it is also an unprecedented opportunity to support the peoples of the Middle East in shaping a new regional order that is, all at once, reflective of their aspirations, conducive to our interests, and consistent with our values. The people of the Middle East are playing the leading role in this historic endeavor, but America's Armed Forces are playing an indispensable role--strengthening and defending our friends, while deterring and defeating our enemies. 2011 will be a consequential year for CENTCOM and Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Among the vital strategic issues that are in play this year, we face the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's transition of responsibility for security in Afghanistan to local and national Afghan forces, amid strained and even deteriorating U.S.-Pakistani relations. We face hard choices about the future of U.S. defense assistance to Lebanon after Hezbollah's use of coercion to become the dominant actor in the government. We face the Iranian regime's desire to develop a nuclear weapons capability and to exploit the current regional instability to expand its hegemonic ambitions. We face the destabilization of critical counterterrorism partners like Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Bahrain, where the headquarters of U.S. Fifth Fleet is now caught up in the broader debate over the people of Bahrain's political future. Of course, we face the prospect of a complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the year, despite increasing evidence and recent testimony by the Secretary of Defense suggesting that such a plan is not consistent with Iraq's continuing security needs or our enduring interests at this time. Amid these and other challenges, this year will also require increased vigilance on the part of our special operations command--for the changes sweeping across North Africa, the Middle East, and South and Central Asia may open up new ungoverned spaces that could be exploited by our enemies. While our special operators continue to perform with remarkable resilience and success, the effects of nearly 10 years of sustained operations and repeated deployments appear to be straining this elite force. Admiral Olson, I am concerned by your recent comment that our Special Operations Forces are showing signs of ``fraying around the edges.'' It is important that you lay out today what steps are being taken to mitigate this strain. We are also interested in SOCOM's progress in meeting growth targets mandated by the Quadrennial Defense Review, as well as any associated issues such as training or facility constraints that you are facing. We continue to see al Qaeda and affiliated movements attempting to expand their reach through the Maghreb, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, and beyond. We are all eager for the assessments of both our distinguished witnesses about the capabilities of these groups to threaten America's friends, allies, interests, and Homeland. What is critical to note, however, is that the historic changes now reshaping the broader Middle East are a direct repudiation of al Qaeda and its terrorist allies. The people of this dynamic and crucial region are rising up to change the character of their governments, but the revolutions they are making are largely defined not by violence, but by peaceful protests. They are inspired not by intolerant and extremist ideologies, but rather by demands for greater freedom, democracy, opportunity, and justice. More than any weapon of war with which this committee must concern itself, it is these principles, and the changes they are inspiring, that will ultimately defeat our terrorist enemies, and if only for that reason alone, these universal values and those now struggling for them deserve our full support. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, let us start with you. STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND Admiral Olson. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and other distinguished members of the committee. I do thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to present the current posture of SOCOM. We, at SOCOM, recognize that we were created by Congress and that our ability to meet our Nation's high expectations is due, in large part, to this committee's continued strong support. I am especially pleased to share this hearing with my friend and teammate, General Jim Mattis. General Mattis' headquarters and mine are coincidentally located on the same base in Tampa, and we and our staffs work together quite closely. With your permission, I will submit my written posture statement for the record and open with some brief remarks. Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record in full. Admiral Olson. The lingering threat of violence in Iraq, the fragility of the progress in Afghanistan, the complexity of our relations with Pakistan, the decentralization of al Qaeda's network, the revolutionary activity across the Maghreb and into the Middle East, the various destabilizing elements in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, the increased intertwining of violent extremism and criminality, and the persistence of piracy are all among the many daily reminders that we live in a world that poses many security challenges and some opportunities. The SOF are universally recognized as key to our Nation's ability to address all of these and others. As the Commander of SOCOM, I am responsible and accountable for the readiness of all Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps SOF. With a dedicated budget and through my component commanders, I select, organize, train, equip, and deploy these forces to serve all of the Geographic Combatant Commanders. Though with 85 percent of our deployed forces currently in the CENTCOM area of operations, my colleague to my left is, by far, the largest customer of our product. We include many forces of legend: Green Berets, SEALs, Rangers, Air Force Air Commandos, Army Night Stalker Aviators, Combat Controllers, Pararescue Jumpers, Combatant-craft Crewmen--today's version of Marine Raiders--and others. The active duty practitioners of Civil Affairs operations and Military Information Support Operations are also in our ranks. These are special operations careerists. But they are backed by a magnificent assortment of administrative, intelligence, communications, engineering, logistics, and other specialists who serve in special operations units on a less permanent basis. At our various headquarters, we also include over 300 representatives from at least 15 other agencies within and beyond DOD, providing a senior-level counsel and staff-level expertise that significantly broadens and deepens us. I am convinced that the forces we provide to the Geographic Combatant Commanders are the most culturally attuned partners, most lethal hunter/killers, and most responsive, agile, innovative, and efficiently effective advisers, trainers, problemsolvers, and warriors that any nation has to offer. In fact, we have become the model for many others. Our value comes from both our high level of skills and our nontraditional methods of applying them, which is to say that our principal asset is the quality of our people. Whether they are conducting a precision raid, organizing a village police force, arranging for a new school or clinic, or partnering with counterpart forces, they do so in a manner that has impressive effects. In Afghanistan and Iraq especially, it is undeniable that they have had impact far above their relatively small numbers. They are in dozens of other countries every day, contributing to regional stability by training and advising counterpart forces. This balance of direct and indirect operations must be carefully managed. But because SOF live in both of these worlds, we become the force of first choice for many missions. As Admiral Mullen said a couple of weeks ago, SOF are typically first in and last out. I am very proud of these forces, as we all should be. But I also acknowledge there are challenges. Key among them is how to meet the increasing global requirement for their capabilities. We can't grow them more than a very few percent per year, but the demand is outpacing the supply. Since September 11, our manpower has roughly doubled, our budget has roughly tripled, and our overseas deployments have quadrupled. I have said that this great force is beginning to fray around the edges. The fabric is strong. The weave is tight. It is not unraveling, but it is showing signs of wear. Partial solutions include finding a process that will habitually assign units from the Services to train and deploy with SOF, ensuring that our needs for local training ranges are fully met, providing buildings and facilities at the standard that our force needs and deserves, investing more broadly in the types of enabling capabilities that will relieve SOF from sending our own people to perform functions that could be performed by others, and expanding the Services' inventory of specific assets that are so essential to today's complex and irregular warfare. We must ensure that our force has the specialized equipment and advanced training that they need to survive and succeed in the complex, ambiguous, and often violent environments in which we ask them to serve. Underlying all of it is the need to look after our people and their families. We must rehabilitate and return to duty those of our wounded who can, care for those of our wounded who can't, along with their families and caregivers, and provide enduring support to the families of those who have died in action. I ask for your action to approve a defense budget for fiscal year 2011 and for your support for the fiscal year 2012 budget proposal. I also ask that you fully fund the special operations budget, particularly as conventional forces begin to draw down from major operations, because our forces will most likely be reallocated at the same levels to areas with pent-up demand for our unique capabilities. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. You have reason to take great pride in what the men and women of SOF are accomplishing around the world, today and every day. I remain humbled by my opportunity to command this formidable force and to provide it to answer our Nation's most daunting security needs. As I appear before you in this capacity for the fourth and very likely the last time, I thank you for affording me the profound honor of serving my country in this way. I stand ready for your questions. [The prepared statement of Admiral Olson follows:] Prepared Statement by ADM Eric T. Olson, USN Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to provide an update on the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) give us much cause for great pride and it is my deep privilege to represent them to you, and especially to do so for the fourth time as their commander. My intent today is to describe the current status, activities and requirements of SOF. I'll begin by briefly describing SOCOM and its assigned SOF. As many of you know, SOCOM is a creation of Congress, legislated into being in 1986. A relatively small number of Army, Navy, and Air Forces units designated as SOF were assigned to SOCOM, with Marine Corps forces joining the Command just over 5 years ago. Before the establishment of SOCOM, the Nation's SOF had generally not been treated as a top priority. They now thrive under the focused attention of a single headquarters and a dedicated budget. In the 24 years since SOCOM was established, SOF have repeatedly proven their value, often under extraordinarily demanding conditions. In many ways, SOCOM is a microcosm of the Department of Defense (DOD), with ground, air and maritime components, a global presence, and authorities and responsibilities that mirror the Military Departments, Military Services, and Defense Agencies. We take pride in the diversity of our people and our mission. One of our headquarter's functions is to synchronize DOD planning against terrorists and their networks globally. This is complex work that connects us across DOD and into other U.S. Government departments and other nations' military forces. The effects of this are manifested in a series of planning documents that guide specific actions by the Services and combatant commands. Primarily, SOCOM organizes, trains and equips SOF and provides those forces to the Geographic Combatant Commanders under whose operational control they serve. The Command also develops special operations strategy, doctrine and procedures for SOF employment and develops and procures specialized equipment for the force. Our key subordinate commands are U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, and Joint Special Operations Command. Within these commands are the legendary Special Forces or Green Berets, SEALs, Air Commandos, Rangers, Night Stalker helicopter crews, and the modern version of yesterday's Marine Raiders. Our force also includes the active duty practitioners of Civil Affairs Operations and Military Information Support Operations, and all of the instructors, logisticians, administrators, analysts, planners, communicators, doctrine writers, and other specialists who are key to our ability to meet our Nation's needs. Most are active duty military, but we depend heavily on our Guard and Reserve units and the government civilians and contractors who perform duties that don't require a uniformed servicemember. We now total close to 60,000 people, about a third of whom are career members of SOF, meaning those who have been selected, trained, and qualified to earn the Military Occupational Specialty or skill code identifier of a SOF operator. The activities of the force are as varied as its character. From high-risk, high-intensity counterterrorist raids; to meticulous intelligence analysis; to providing first response during a natural disaster; to launching from submerged submarines; to training and accompanying foreign counterparts; to working with local leaders to determine what will bring value to their village; to providing supporting precision fires to fighting troops from orbiting aircraft-- SOF personnel are in vital roles, in key places, performing essential tasks. Our presence is generally small and agile, inherently joint and persistent. Our formations normally include an array of attached capabilities that are necessary to optimize the force--including female Cultural Support Teams, Tactical Air Controllers, Military Working Dogs, interpreters, maintenance and repair personnel, Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians and others. SOF rarely dominate an area with their mass, so they must work with indigenous forces and the local civilian population to accomplish their missions. This is often complicated, demanding and high-risk. Each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders who will appear before you is well served by the SOF that are deployed to his region, although the balance is heavily weighted towards U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). In fact, about 85 percent of deployed SOF are directly engaged in Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. I will defer to the regional commanders to highlight the contributions of SOF in their theaters. I will just say here that, although the precision counterterrorism missions certainly receive the most attention, SOF are conducting a wide range of activities in dozens of countries around the world on any given day--at the request of the host government, with the approval of the U.S. Ambassador and under the operational control of the U.S. Geographic Combatant Commander. To support these forces and activities, SOCOM invested in many specialized programs and equipment. As the commander responsible for the preparation and readiness of SOF, I focus on developing and sustaining operational skills and capabilities, training and maintaining the quality of the force, caring for its families, and ensuring that our people have the right equipment in sufficient quantity. I also carefully monitor global military and political trends in my role as the senior advisor on the employment of SOF. Among SOCOM's most important functions is the management of Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11). MFP-11 is provided to the Commander of SOCOM to address requirements that are ``SOF-peculiar'' in nature, and it is the essential fuel that enables SOF to meet the Nation's needs. It provides for the conduct of advanced and unique training, the timely and flexible fielding of equipment, and the capability to rapidly and effectively project our force. In fiscal year 2012, the request for MFP-11 funds totals $10.5 billion in baseline and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. This is an increase of 7 percent over the fiscal year 2011 request, and every dollar is necessary to meet the ever-increasing demands placed on our SOF. At the forefront of budget discussions is the acknowledgment that many of the current expenditures funded by OCO are, in fact, part of SOCOM's baseline requirement in the ``new normal.'' This was highlighted by the Department last year when a commitment was made to eventually move funding required to execute OCOs into the baseline as part of the Secretary of Defense's initiative to ``rebalance'' the force. However, SOCOM will continue to rely on OCO funding over the next few years as the phased transfer to the base budget occurs. For example, in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission 34 percent of the total MFP-11 request is OCO funding. For some higher intensity SOF elements, the OCO percentage is greater than 75 percent. SOCOM will carefully prioritize and manage the OCO to base transition. Overall, we are in a fiscally satisfactory condition, but the force requires continued support. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2012, if approved, is an essential step towards meeting the growing demand on our force by providing SOCOM the resources required to sustain critical programs and initiatives. Now, I would like to highlight some of these key efforts. PROGRAMS SOCOM continues to expand and recapitalize its rotary and fixed- wing aviation fleets. This year we began modification of the last of the originally planned 61 MH-47G helicopters, while starting procurement of 8 additional MH-47Gs. We are also fielding the first of 72 planned MH-60M helicopters as part of our recapitalization of MH-60 K/L platforms. The tilt-rotor CV-22, having demonstrated its capabilities on multiple deployments, must remain on plan to ensure enhanced future mobility capabilities for SOF. SOCOM's MC-130Ws, rapidly modified with a Precision Strike Package utilizing SOF's Joint Acquisition Task Force (JATF), are providing armed overwatch and mobility to deployed SOF as an interim augmentation to our Vietnam-era AC-130 gunship fleet. We are on a path to ultimately recapitalize the gunships with AC-130J models. The MC-130J program is on track to replace our aging MC-130Es and MC-130Ps. Our Non-Standard Aviation Program is delivering a variety of smaller aircraft to provide intra- theater airlift capacity and we continue to grow our aviation foreign training capability in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders' engagement plans. SOCOM is also modernizing its maritime mobility systems. We will award competitive prototype contracts later this year for Combatant Craft-Medium as replacements for the Naval Special Warfare Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat. We have realigned resources from the Advanced SEAL Delivery System and the Joint Multi-Mission Submersible to fund the development of a family of Dry Submersibles as part of our undersea mobility strategy. These will be launched from surface ships or Dry Deck Shelter-equipped submarines. As part of this modernization program, we will explore expansive and flexible approaches that are supportive of the Secretary of Defense's intent to streamline acquisition processes and accelerate delivery times. SOF continue to rely on a wide range of ground mobility vehicles, often leveraging Service and Department investments. Modified to meet the wide variety of SOF mission sets and provide enhanced crew protection, vehicles such as the MRAP have been essential to SOF teams operating in dispersed and rugged terrain throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). These vehicles, as well as our other ground mobility systems, will remain relevant well into the future as we synchronize our long-term sustainment strategy with the Services. We continue to invest in airborne manned and unmanned Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) programs, relying heavily on the Services to expand capabilities and capacity that benefit DOD across the board. SOCOM is moving toward a relatively small number of manned and unmanned ISR systems; essential processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities; and supporting communications architectures. One of the most noteworthy improvements within special operations over the last few years has been the growth of advanced communications and networking capabilities through our expeditionary SOF Information Enterprise (SIE). As our portion of the Department's Global Information Grid, the SIE provides network independence while maintaining connectivity into the global interface, and links SOF across the globe into a common network. This connectivity shortens the decision cycle for SOF operators worldwide and allows more rapid information sharing. The research and rapid development of these types of technologies is an inherent strength of special operations. SOCOM, inherently joint in all it does, is in a unique position to leverage and apply Service and Department Science and Technology (S&T) efforts to rapidly field new technologies on the battlefield. SOCOM's ``Rapid Exploitation of Innovative Technologies for SOF'' program, enables innovative new capabilities to be developed and inserted quickly into the battlefield-advanced ''talk and jam'' capabilities for SOF vehicles; mobile repair and maintenance ``shops in a box''; to solar panel energy technology that supports SOF in remote locations. SOCOM also seeks to expand its biomedical research and development activities. To date, SOCOM has pushed ``state-of-the-art'' combat medicine with modest resources through the Tactical Combat Casualty Care program. However, we also have great need to explore innovative methods of treating our wounded members so that they may be reintegrated and returned to duty as rapidly as possible. As a force that operates from the tropics to the Arctic regions, from under water to high elevations, and from peaceful areas to violent combat zones, SOF serve as an ideal ``control group'' for Service R&D investments that can result in significant benefits across DOD. SOCOM's development of the JATF concept enabled accelerated acquisition and fielding of urgent SOF capabilities. First demonstrated on the MC-130W Dragon Spear program, SOCOM expanded use of the JATF concept to address many emerging requirements of SOF warfighters. Innovative approaches such as the JATF, coupled with a professionally trained and certified SOF acquisition corps that stays in close and frequent contact with the operators, continue to ensure that SOCOM remains as a vanguard of rapid acquisition within DOD. SOCOM's acquisition planning, collaboration, and continuing dialogue with the Services continues to improve as we become more efficiently effective while rapidly moving capabilities to the warfighter. SOCOM, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics initiated a series of Acquisition Summits with the Military Department Acquisition Executives to minimize programmatic disconnects and to better align requirements, co-sponsorship opportunities, funding efficiencies, and contracting actions among MFP-11 programs and Service-related/dependent programs. These periodic meetings offer a level of transparency among all our accounts that enables us to seek common solutions for Service-wide requirements and to better invest in SOF-peculiar modifications or special capabilities. This forum identified several opportunities, which if supported by Congress, would enable more efficient execution of SOF unique acquisitions. SOCOM is making a significant investment in Military Construction (MILCON) to address shortfalls resulting from fielding new capabilities, a growing force structure and aging infrastructure that was inherited without a future recapitalization budget. To address the shortfall, the Command's 2012 budget submission is based on a MILCON roadmap that identifies over 300 prioritized requirements valued at more than $5 billion between 2012 and 2025. Specifically, our fiscal year 2012 submission includes 33 of these projects, valued at $631 million across 8 States and representing 9 percent of the Command's projected base budget request--a near record level. This investment demonstrates a commitment to addressing our critical infrastructure needs. To continue this effort, the Command's new Strategic Planning and Programming Guidance raised the MILCON funding minimum from 4 to 6 percent to support this priority in future budgets. A congressional action that enhanced the effectiveness of our force is our Section 1208 authority. This authority to reallocate limited MFP-11 funds remains a key tool used by widely dispersed SOF to leverage indigenous forces in support of counterterrorism operations. SOCOM is appreciative of the increase to $45 million provided by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, as it provides us the ability to support ongoing operations with a measure of flexibility should a contingency arise. Continuation of Section 1208 authority provides enhanced effectiveness to our force both strategically and tactically. INITIATIVES Our primary challenge is the need to carefully manage the growth of SOF, even in these periods of high demand, in order to ensure the continued quality the Nation expects. I have stated in my last three posture hearings that SOF's organic manpower growth should be in the range of 3-5 percent per year. That is the pace we have sustained to great effect over the past several years and our fiscal year 2012 budget submission continues this pace. But 3-5 percent growth within SOCOM will not answer the increasing demand for our force unless it is matched by the Military Services' commitment to attach supporting and enabling forces at a commensurate rate. SOF units must include a limited amount of these enabling forces to ensure rapid response to emerging requirements, but we were designed and intended to rely on the Services to meet most of our combat support and combat service support requirements. In order to establish a predictable demand signal for these Service-provided capabilities, SOCOM is proposing changes to the way we build, train, deploy, and sustain a fully enabled force. To better build the SOF team, we are developing a force generation system that engages the existing Service systems. In 2011, SOCOM will strive to create a SOF Force Generation system that will be synchronized with the Services, matching their capabilities with our Special Operations core units in time to provide fully optimized force packages to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. For elements organic to SOF, such as our Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations, we will expand their capacities to meet the increasing demand for their capabilities. Another challenge we face is how to effectively prepare and train the force to achieve enhanced interoperability with the General Purpose Forces (GPF). Currently in the CENTCOM AOR, SOF is executing the counterterrorist strike mission and the Village Stability Operations mission; two of the primary lines of operation underpinning the Afghanistan strategy. SOF's key role in both is creating opportunities for enhanced interoperability with the GPF such as the deployment of the 1ST Battalion, 16TH Infantry, now assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan; a sea change in SOF-GPF relations. Currently, we are developing initiatives that will increase inter-operational effectiveness prior to the deployment phase of the operation. In 2011, we will continue to review and coordinate changes to Service personnel policies to further incentivize language pay for key languages such as Pashto, Dari, and Arabic. We will work to develop courses of action that allow SOF reliable and predictable access to Service resources such as training ranges for our ground and aviation elements. The shortage of readily available, local ranges currently hampers SOF's ability to meet deployment training timelines and causes our operators to ``travel to train,'' further increasing their already excessive time away from home. Understanding the operational context of the environments in which we operate is a hallmark of SOF. Developing this knowledge and experience within our force, and understanding the value of ``micro- regional'' expertise allows SOF to conduct its activities with more predictable outcomes. While immersion opportunities enhance our regional sophistication, our training can never develop the level of nuanced understanding possessed by indigenous populations. To gain this high level of cultural knowledge, SOCOM will continue to strongly support DOD's Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest and the Army's Intermediate and Advanced Language Programs to recruit and access the requisite expertise provided by native speakers. Additionally, our attached female Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) allow us to reach key elements of the population in some environments which was not previously possible. This concept of attaching females to SOF units is effective and long overdue; we are urging the Services to recognize the capabilities of CSTs as essential military skills. Finally, our efforts to become more innovative include studying the best practices of other organizations. For example, we are inspired by the ability of the World War II's Office of Strategic Services to rapidly recruit specialized talent, develop and acquire new technologies and conduct effective global operations within the period of its relatively brief existence. To further our engagement with our international allies and partners, and within the U.S. interagency community, SOCOM will continue to expand the Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) and Special Operations Support Team programs. Both of these outreach efforts provide SOF experts to support and enhance their host organizations while serving as SOF liaisons. Our priority is to assign SOLO officers wherever a foreign partner has, or is planning to establish, a SOCOM-like headquarters. Joint operations and special operations are two growing trends in many of our partner nation military forces. One manifestation is the recent establishment of the NATO SOF Headquarters. In accordance with the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of Defense designated SOCOM as the lead component for this Headquarters--a role we will embrace and expand in an effort to advise and assist an interoperable network of global SOF. Importantly, we remain committed to caring for our servicemembers and their families. I am concerned about the effects of 9 years of focus on combat operations on the well-being of our extended special operations community. To support the wounded and injured and their caregivers, the Command remains committed to our Special Operations Care Coalition and the Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning Program. Both programs are focused on long term care, rehabilitation and reintegration of our warriors. In an additional effort to be predictive and preventive, I established a ``Pressure on the Force'' Task Force to survey and analyze the effects of repetitive combat deployments over nearly a decade. Necessarily relying on soft data, collective experiences and commanders' instincts, it will try to determine what initiatives might help ease the strain and contribute to long-term retention and force stability. I expect to receive the recommendations from this team within 90 days. In conclusion, I will reinforce what I believe are the top challenges to the Command. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently stated, `` . . . the first forces in are typically Special Forces. The last ones out are going to be Special Forces.'' As we expect to remain the force of first choice for many military operations, SOCOM must: 1. Carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing demand for SOF. 2. Improve and expand our tactical and operational level skills, equipment and systems. 3. Preserve our proposed budget levels and authorities. 4. Find better structures and processes to obtain Service-provided capabilities. 5. Continue to improve our acquisition speed and agility. 6. Better understand the people and conditions in the places we go, whether to assist or fight. 7. As our most solemn duty, look after the health and well-being of this magnificent force from whom we ask so much. Today's SOF are the most capable, best prepared SOF in history. Their ingenuity, perseverance, spirit and skill continue to inspire and amaze. In significant ways, they have emerged from the shadows to make visible and dramatic impacts of great magnitude. It is my honor to have served within SOF for the last 37 years and to represent this extraordinary force today before this committee. As always, our success is only possible because of your continued support and advocacy. Your approval of the President's budget request will help ensure our continued ability to address some of our Nation's most daunting security challenges. Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral. We, again, are grateful to you, the men and women you command, for all that you and they do. We have that pride, which you made reference to at the end of your statement, in them and in you. General Mattis. STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND General Mattis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the posture and priorities of CENTCOM, testifying alongside a friend and shipmate of many years, Admiral Eric Olson, Commander of SOCOM. I have submitted a written statement and request it be accepted into the record. Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record. General Mattis. Thank you for supporting our troops and their families who carry the brunt of the physical and the emotional burden in this 10th year of war. Our forces today are among the most dedicated and skilled professionals I have served alongside in my 39 years in uniform, and they constitute a national treasure. I also recognize the commitment and sacrifices of our international partners, who operate with us from the waters off Somalia to the mountains of Afghanistan, where the largest warfighting coalition in recent history is engaged with troops from 49 nations united in the fight against our common enemy. The strategic landscape of the broader Middle East has been altered by recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere. We see pressure on government institutions from the aspirations of people seeking improved economic and social conditions. Young people born in the information age are exchanging ideas in real time. While the long-term impact of this unrest is unknown, it presents as many opportunities as it does challenges. The changes that we are seeing will manifest differently in each country. People are seeking their rights and, for the most part, doing so peacefully and bravely. It is too early to say how it will all turn out. It is important that we work today with the people and the governments throughout the region. We don't want to see this change slide into a new form of authoritarianism. So while there is both opportunity and danger, it requires unrelenting engagement by our Nation. The central challenge for us, I believe, is how to make common cause with our friends throughout the region. There is one clear lesson we can draw from the dramatic changes underway. Now, more than ever, we must remain relentlessly engaged with our military partners in this region. While we know each country is different, we remain committed to strengthening our military bonds and advancing our mutual interests in peace and opportunity for all. Notably in Egypt, we have clearly seen the benefit of mature military-to-military relationships. The Egyptian armed forces continue to demonstrate exceptional discipline and restraint under trying circumstances. As Admiral Mullen recently noted, our assistance has helped the Egyptian military become the professional force that it is today, just as our military has learned a great deal from our Egyptian counterparts, who have contributed a stabilizing influence in this time of transition. Of course, we cannot achieve our broader objectives in the region through military means alone. Our efforts require coordination and a spirit of collaboration between highly integrated civilian military teams. Our civilian colleagues need your full support, even in this difficult fiscal environment, to undertake their essential role in today's complex environment. Robust resourcing for the State Department's mission is one of the best investments for reducing the need for military forces to be employed. Together, our military leaders and our diplomats not only represent a symbol of America's enduring commitment to the region, but they also build trust through partnerships that have an important stabilizing effect when trouble looms. CENTCOM's main effort is in Afghanistan, where, along with our Afghan and coalition partners, we are making undeniable progress, though some of our gains at this time remain fragile and yet reversible. Al Qaeda in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is under the most pressure they have experienced since 2001. Over the past year, our enemies have lost leaders, battle space, maneuver room, and the initiative. The enemy's strategy has been undercut by the clear commitment of the international community and the Afghan Government to begin this summer a process of fully transiting responsibility to Afghan lead by 2014. I support the ongoing analysis for further growth for the ANSF, the greatest success of our last year their quantifiable and qualifiable growth in capability. The range of growth being considered is from 45,000 to 70,000. With the improving quality in combat performance by the ANSF, we are seeing the enemy's worst nightmare coming of age. The transition process will start with a limited conditions-based withdrawal this year. Our overall campaign is on track in Afghanistan. Our successes, as General Petraeus has stated, entailed hard fighting and tough losses. I am sure that there will be tough fighting ahead as the enemy tries to regain the initiative. Finally, we must also redouble our efforts to address challenges in the areas of governance and development in Afghanistan. Turning now to Pakistan, we are strengthening and deepening our security partnership with Islamabad, even as we work to overcome years of mistrust and misunderstanding on both sides. The Pakistanis have shifted a quarter of their army, 140,000 troops, to their western border, and we are now conducting hammer and anvil operations in close coordination with them on opposite sides of the border. Pakistan's military has conducted significant counterinsurgency operations in the past decade and especially the past 2 years, and they have suffered 2,757 troops killed and 8,549 wounded while also responding to urgent humanitarian needs following devastating floods in 2010. In Iraq, we are helping a new, more stable country emerge in a turbulent region. Our commitment there is transitioning from a military to a civilian-led effort. I will note that the transition underway in Iraq has been enabled in large part thanks to the vital commitment and support of Congress for our troops on the ground, and I want to personally offer my thanks to you. As we transition to civilian lead in Iraq, it is essential that the State Department be sufficiently resourced to solidify relationships between the United States and Iraq for the future. At CENTCOM, we need congressional authorities that enable us to continue advising, training, and equipping our Iraqi partners through the new Office of Security Cooperation- Iraq. Looking ahead, we will redeploy our military forces from Iraq this year, unless asked to stay by the Iraqi Government and the U.S. Government concurs. I anticipate al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-sponsored proxies will attempt to attack us and detract from this milestone by executing sensational attacks in the coming months. Next, Iran. The greatest threat to long-term regional security is a defiant Iran in its current state. We are countering the malign activities of the regime while bolstering relationships with our partners. Iran continues to rebuff international efforts for engagement. It continues to coerce its own population and pursue activities disruptive to regional peace and stability, including supplying arms to militant proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan and supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon. But for the vibrant people of Iran, the regime is no giant. The regime's actions have thrown the economy into disarray, destroyed rapport with the bulk of the world, and spread hate and discontent across the region, steadily eroding any international support the regime could once muster. Despite the shrinking nature of the regime, I have no reason for optimism about Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, its growing ballistic missile arsenal, and present destabilizing course. Across the region, we are disrupting al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. We are actively focused on the threat of extremism in Yemen, especially al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the group that has twice attempted to attack our Homeland in recent years. With our international partners, our SOF are putting our most violent enemies and related networks under increasingly intense pressure. At the same time, the populist-inspired changes that are taking place across the region undercut the message of al Qaeda and other extremist groups, highlighting the bankrupt philosophies of terrorists who use violence and contribute nothing but mayhem to the innocent. As Senator McCain just noted, the populist-inspired changes are a direct repudiation of the violent extremists because these young folks today have achieved more change in 10 weeks than 10 years of al Qaeda's murderous campaign. That is a snapshot of our major ongoing operations. We are focused on a number of other important mission areas to include countering piracy. There can be no more stark reminder about the need for more proactive diplomatic, legal, and military efforts against pirates than the brutal murder of four Americans by pirates last week. This is a defining moment for the people of the region and, by extension, a critical moment for CENTCOM to remain engaged with our partners and to clear away obstacles to peace and prosperity. On that note, while Israel and the Palestinian territories are not in my assigned theater, lack of progress toward a comprehensive Middle East peace affects U.S. and CENTCOM security interests in the region. I believe the only reliable path to lasting peace in this region is a viable two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. This issue is one of many that is exploited by our adversaries in the region, and it is used as a recruiting tool for extremist groups. The lack of progress also creates friction with regional partners and creates political challenges for advancing our interests by marginalizing moderate voices in the region. By contrast, substantive progress on the peace process would improve CENTCOM's opportunity to work with our regional partners and to support multilateral security efforts. We recognize you face tough decisions in this constrained fiscal environment. In all of our activities at CENTCOM, we honor the obligation to be the best stewards possible of our Nation's monetary resources. CENTCOM has established stringent control mechanisms to execute our fiscal authorities and to apply increasingly effective oversight of all programs. Finally, Mr. Chairman, Senators, we must never forget the families of those who gave their last full measure in defense of liberty. Thank you once again for your support of our men and women serving in the CENTCOM AOR, and I am prepared to answer questions. [The prepared statement of General Mattis follows:] Prepared Statement by Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC INTRODUCTION A Command at War U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) oversees operations alongside our allies, partners, and friends in a critically important region of the world. CENTCOM is engaged throughout the greater Middle East and South Central Asia across the full spectrum of warfare, standing against violent aggression and the tyranny of militant extremists, while contributing to the broader conditions for peace, stability, and prosperity. Recognizing our Troops, Civilians, and Partners Our troops and their families carry the brunt of physical and emotional burdens in this 10th year of war. Today, over 200,000 American troops and tens of thousands of civilians are deployed to the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). These men and women--all volunteers, no less--defend our freedoms with great courage in the face of a murderous enemy on harsh terrain. Our troops stand together with tens of thousands of our international partners, conducting coalition operations from the waters off Somalia to the mountains of Afghanistan, where the largest warfighting coalition in recent history is engaged. Operating in a Dynamic Region The CENTCOM AOR is more dynamic than I have seen it since first serving there in 1979. Across our theater, we are required to maintain a degree of military flexibility such as we have seldom seen before. At the same time, given the financial realities in Washington, we require ourselves to exercise the utmost degree of stewardship over every penny we spend. To operate in this context successfully, we seek to build strong military-to-military relationships with our partners, recognizing that CENTCOM's actions represent a tangible signal of America's continued, long-term commitment to the security and prosperity of this area. Throughout the region, we see institutions of government responding to the aspirations of youthful populations. As the people in the region have made their voices heard, regional militaries have so far demonstrated their professionalism, exercising a capability that did not arise by accident or overnight. The strong security relationship between the United States and our partners is decades in the making and has helped them become the professional forces they are today--and in the process made our forces better as well. While we seek to understand the unique circumstances that our partners confront, CENTCOM remains committed to supporting the efforts of our military counterparts and to strengthening the security partnerships that have proven critical during this period of political unrest. We do this first by listening, learning, and understanding, and continue by engaging with our partners based on mutual respect and shared interests. Our Mission Overall, amidst these conditions, we remain committed to carry out our mission: With our national and international partners, CENTCOM promotes security cooperation among nations; responds to crises; deters or defeats state and non-state aggression; supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity. Snapshot of Operations Our main effort is Afghanistan--and progress there is indisputable, even if some of our success is fragile and reversible. We and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and coalition partners are conducting a comprehensive yet focused counterinsurgency campaign to ensure Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for transnational extremists. Our forces are part of a 49-nation international coalition, led by the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and united behind President Karzai's goal of transitioning the lead of security tasks from the international community to Afghan security forces by the end of 2014. In full partnership with the Afghan Government, we are inflicting unprecedented damage on al Qaeda (AQ) and associated extremist groups--a reality recently affirmed by President Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review. Moreover, we confound our enemies by demonstrating our unambiguous commitment to our long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, we continue supporting Pakistan's military efforts against extremists operating from and threatening that country and Afghanistan, while contributing to the broader U.S. goal of growing our strategic partnership with Islamabad. The recent U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue and a number of development assistance programs sponsored by the Department of State are good examples of how the United States is attempting to build trust with the Pakistani people and government. In Iraq, following 7 years of hard fought gains, we are drawing down our troops as we transition full security responsibilities to our Iraqi partners. The enemy in Iraq is capable of dramatic attacks but has proven unable to muster a significant threat to the Iraqi Government. In coordination with the U.S. Department of State, CENTCOM is standing up the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq to conduct sustained security assistance and cooperation activities with the Government of Iraq. We are planning an organization manned and positioned to support the long-term U.S. objectives in Iraq as determined by the Iraqi and American Governments, in order to best advance our civilian-led relationship for the future. In the broader CENTCOM region, our forces are conducting a theater- wide campaign alongside our partners in pursuit of AQ and its extremist allies. Meanwhile, we remain continuously poised and postured to respond to crises and to conduct contingency operations, while continuing to forge partnerships in the region and increase the security capacity of our partners. We continue to rely on our capable and flexible amphibious forces. For example, over a 36 hour period last September, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit delivered aid to the flood-ravaged people of Pakistan, provided close air support from the skies over Afghanistan, and rescued pirated crews in the Gulf of Aden. Three months later, two-thirds of our Marines Expeditionary Unit deployed to Afghanistan on 3 day's notice. OVERVIEW OF THE CENTCOM AOR Nature of the AOR The CENTCOM AOR is comprised of 20 countries spanning over 4 million square miles in 3 diverse subregions from Egypt and the Levant, to the Arabian Peninsula (including the Gulf nations), and Central and South Asia. These regions are home to a half-billion people practicing all of the world's major religions and speaking more than 18 major languages. Several countries with economic challenges have burgeoning populations--184 million people in Pakistan, 80 million in Egypt, and 77 million in Iran. In 12 of the 20 countries in the region, 30 or more percent of the population is between the ages of 15 and 24 (at 39 percent, Yemen ranks at the top in this category). In most of those countries, another 30 percent of the overall population is under 15. This youth bulge represents tomorrow's future leadership and the region's greatest challenge in terms of education, employment and expectations. The CENTCOM AOR is a region of rich history, distinct culture, and great potential, encompassing the proud traditions of a wide variety of ethnic groups, including: Arab, Azeri, Baluch, Gilaki, Hazara, Kurd, Lur, Mazandarani, Qashqai, Pashtun, Persian, Talysh, Turkmen, and Uzbek, among others. The AOR contains more than half of the world's proven oil reserves and nearly half of its natural gas. As a result, the region contains some of the world's busiest trading routes linking Europe, Africa, and East Asia to the Gulf. This trade is essential to continued global economic prosperity and growth. The region's trading routes contain three of the world's major maritime choke points, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Bab al Mandeb Strait joining the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. But while the region contains abundant energy resources, supplies of water and the availability of arable land are limited and increasingly scarce. External Influences on the CENTCOM AOR The region retains its historical tradition as a social, economic, and cultural crossroads, attracting nations and non-state actors seeking to advance their interests and influence regional events. Among a host of external influences on the CENTCOM AOR, the most significant include: Middle East Peace: Lack of progress in achieving comprehensive Middle East peace affects U.S. and CENTCOM security interests in the region. It is one of many issues that is exploited by our adversaries in the region and is used as a recruiting tool for extremist groups. The lack of progress also creates friction with regional partners and creates political challenges for advancing our interests by marginalizing moderate voices in the region. As Secretary Gates noted in July 2010, ``the lack of progress in the peace process has provided political ammunition to our adversaries in the Middle East and in the region, and . . . progress in this arena will enable us not only to perhaps get others to support the peace process, but also support us in our efforts to try and impose effective sanctions against Iran.'' In December 2010, Secretary Clinton observed ``the conflict between Israel and Palestine and between Israel and its Arab neighbors is a source of tension and an obstacle to prosperity and opportunity for all of the people in the region.'' By contrast, substantive progress on Middle East peace would improve CENTCOM's opportunities to work with our regional partners and support multilateral security efforts. Speaking about the need for Middle East peace at the Manama Dialogue in December 2010, King Abdullah of Jordan observed ``Our region will not enjoy security and stability unless we solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and Arabs and Israelis find peace. The stakes are high. As a solution continues to elude us, faith in negotiations, as the only path to peace and justice, is eroding. If hope is killed, radical forces will prevail. The region will sink into more vicious warfare and instability . . . threatening security far beyond the borders of the Middle East.'' Bordering Powers. China, Russia, Turkey, and India-- each of which lie outside but border the CENTCOM region-- represent four great gravitational forces influencing various countries in the AOR. China pursues its many energy-related interests throughout the region, extending influence from its traditional partnership with Pakistan, to a $3.5 billion investment in Afghanistan's Aynak Copper Mine, to building pipelines for oil and gas from Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan. Chinese activities in the region may begin to compete with the regional interests of Russia, which maintains a network of security, economic, and social ties with Central Asian nations and beyond. India's influence impacts the strategic calculations of Pakistan and, to some extent, virtually every other country in the CENTCOM AOR. Turkey increasingly asserts its interests in the region in keeping with its emergence as a considerable force within the international community. All four of these nations have unique relations with Iran, affecting the international approach to the Iranian situation. We remain attentive to these dynamics as we seek to ensure that we work effectively across U.S. Government and combatant command seams to improve our unity of effort. Somalia. State failure in Somalia has enabled extremist and criminal elements to proliferate and spread northward into the Horn of Africa and Yemen and other areas of the CENTCOM AOR. At the same time, widespread poverty in Somalia creates incentives for young men to pursue the lucrative enterprise of piracy. Additionally, lack of governance permits extremists to freely migrate to Yemen, providing opportunities to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In the past year, the Somalia-based terrorist group al- Shabaab successfully maintained control of most of southern Somalia and radicalized factions of this group have sought alignment with AQ in the Arabian Peninsula and in Pakistan. U.S. Interests in the Region Given the centrality and volatility of the CENTCOM AOR, the United States and nations around the world retain significant interests in the region. Among others, significant U.S. interests in the region include: Security of U.S. citizens and the U.S. Homeland Regional stability Promotion of effective and legitimate governance, human rights, the rule of law, and sustained economic growth and opportunity, and Free flow of commerce and trade within the region, through strategic maritime chokepoints, and via land-based trade routes to international markets Threats to U.S. Interests in the Region Violence, instability, and underdevelopment represent the primary threats to U.S. interests in the region. Some areas face uneven or even dismal economic development, often coupled with endemic corruption. Social and economic friction have led to or exacerbated a number of deep-rooted and longstanding disputes over territory, resources, and power, many of which remain unresolved due to a lack of adequate security arrangements on the local or national level. Some areas will face increasing competition for food, water, mineral deposits, oil, and other natural resources. The region is also defined by tensions and sectarian rivalries between many ethnic, tribal, and religious groups. Such conditions create the potential for broader violence, particularly in the absence of effective governance and indigenous security forces, ultimately giving rise to violent extremist organizations that have attacked us and our friends. We have seen the dangers present within a security vacuum, where institutions fail to facilitate mediation, partnership-building, and open dialogue between feuding groups, or to put down violent extremists. Connecting Our Strategic Challenges The challenges of the CENTCOM AOR are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing--and thus cannot be treated separately. We have seen a symbiosis, for example, between extremist groups and other factions that, in aggregate, tend to strengthen each other and which, if left unchecked, tend to threaten wider areas of territory and the stability of civilian governments. Areas in the CENTCOM region, especially those with a rapidly expanding population of youth, are left vulnerable to (and often become the victim of) a worsening spiral of conditions, whereby young people forego meager, but legitimate opportunities for employment and turn, instead, to a range of criminal activities, including piracy, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and narcotics--fueling violent extremist organizations bent on destroying the lives of innocent people. State and non-state actors operating with malign intent can readily exploit such conditions, with the most dangerous scenarios involving a mix of insufficient governance, weapons proliferation--especially Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)--the influence of hostile states, and the free flow of extremist elements across national borders as well as free range in cyberspace. In some cases, disenchantment with globalization's efforts coupled with a desire to belong to a movement with a clarion call of purpose can provide the excitement for young men (and increasingly women) to take on a violent role in an extremist organization. PRINCIPAL TASKS In light of these many challenges, we continuously assess our strategic and operational approaches in order to achieve our desired national interests of security, stability, and prosperity in the CENTCOM AOR. CENTCOM is focused on the following tasks: Supporting the Mission in Afghanistan Partnering with Pakistan Countering the Destabilizing Activities of Iran Enabling Transition in Iraq Strengthening Partnerships in Central Asia Building Partner Capacity and Pursuing Cooperative Activities Disrupting Violent Extremist Organizations Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Countering Piracy Supporting the Mission in Afghanistan Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, connected by a porous border region historically providing free movement and safe haven to groups traversing the Durand Line. The senior leadership of AQ and associated extremists groups--groups that are intent on carrying out attacks on innocent civilians worldwide--plan, prepare, and direct operations from this region, making it of critical interest to the security of the United States and our allies. Currently AQ in the border region is under the most intense pressure they have experienced since 2001. A Clear Objective and a Sound Strategy With our NATO and coalition partners, we are working to achieve our core goal of preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a sanctuary for al Qaeda and associated transnational extremist groups. President Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review affirmed the core elements of our strategy in Afghanistan, the first imperative of which is to improve the overall security environment and to reduce violence levels in Afghanistan. After regaining the initiative from the enemy, our forces act as a bulwark behind which the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the roots of Afghan governance can grow. Aiming Toward a Common Strategic Vision Our military objectives and strategy in Afghanistan support the developing strategic vision between the political leadership of the United States and Afghanistan, as reflected in Vice President Biden's comments alongside President Karzai in January: ``It is not our intention to govern or to nation-build. As President Karzai often points out, this is the responsibility of the Afghan people, and they are fully capable of it. We stand ready to help you in that effort. We will continue to stand ready to help you in that effort after 2014.'' Success in Afghanistan is an Afghan security force able to protect the people with a government that meets the needs of the people and prevents safe haven for international terrorists. The Campaign Plan We have increased efforts in virtually every facet of the comprehensive yet focused civil-military campaign in Afghanistan. As one part of that effort, we have executed an unprecedented pace of counterterrorist operations to capture or kill insurgents using enhanced intelligence largely enabled by conventional ground forces. Our efforts range from major combat operations (in Helmand and elsewhere, for example), special mission unit operations allowing no safe haven to the enemy, and concurrent bottom-up and top-down initiatives (exemplified by expanding Village Stability Operations). The breadth of our current operations squelches the enemy's ability to recuperate and threaten the Afghan people. Our forces have partnered with the Afghan security forces to increase their capabilities; to expand border security; to conduct robust detainee operations and rule of law activities; to address and counter corruption by working with the Afghan Government to target criminal patronage networks; and to interdict the flow of illegal weapons and narcotics to deny criminals and insurgent groups a critical source of their operational revenue. We are capitalizing on our expanded security footprint in the winter months to retain the initiative, suffocate the enemy, and increase momentum into the start of the traditional fighting season. Ultimately, we are working to create an Afghanistan that is hostile to our enemies and denies them the support of the population, making it untenable for insurgents to return from their winter safe havens. This is the essence of counterinsurgency operations. While we will face tough fighting this spring, the enemy's situation continues to worsen day-by-day. The Right Inputs The overall international effort in Afghanistan has transformed from an economy of force mission 3 years ago to a focused and reinforced civil-military counterinsurgency campaign, largely assuming its full strength in September 2010. U.S., coalition, and partner nations have worked hard to apply the right mix of organizations, approach, and resources in Afghanistan. Last year at this time, we had less than 270,000 American, coalition and Afghan forces on the ground in Afghanistan. This year, we have more than 370,000 total security forces (American, coalition and Afghan) in the fight, and 109,000 Afghan security forces are projected to be added by this time next year. Beyond the additional organizations put in place on the ground in Afghanistan, the Pentagon's Joint Staff Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell and CENTCOM's Afghanistan Pakistan Center of Excellence are better organizing our resources at home and providing mission-critical reach-back support to deployed forces. The CENTCOM Center of Excellence will provide the cadre of regional experts for the long haul as we transfer to Afghan lead in 2014 and commit to a long- term partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Enemy Violence and Coalition Progress Despite the enemy's efforts to disrupt progress in Afghanistan, we have achieved the major military objectives we set out to accomplish in 2010 and made considerable progress with respect to governance and development. As Secretary Gates noted after his December 2010 trip to Afghanistan: ``The bottom line is that in the last 12 months, we have come a long way. Frankly, progress--even in the last few months--has exceeded my expectations.'' We recognize, however, that progress and violence coexist in this type of war. Our enemies continue to conduct attacks heavily focused on non-combatants and to intimidate the population and maintain relevancy, albeit decreasing, in newly-cleared areas. Enemy-initiated violence is increasingly localized. From November 2010 until 31 January 2011, 57 percent of the violence in Afghanistan has been concentrated in 12 of 401 districts. Notably, the key districts of Maiwand in Kandahar Province and Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province--which are critical to our efforts to link the Helmand and Kandahar security bubbles--are no longer among the top-12 most violent districts. The elevated levels of violence is less a reflection of increased insurgent capability and more the result of increased Afghan and ISAF operations in areas previously considered insurgent strongholds. The enemy is not adapting well to this development. While we make progress, our enemies continue to make grievous mistakes, to include: purposefully killing innocent Afghans; leaders fleeing into Pakistan and leaving subordinates to fight; and killing nearly 5,000 Afghans in the first 10 months of 2010 (more than three quarters of all civilian casualties in that period). We highlight the ruthless actions of the enemy, and in recent months Afghan leaders and human rights groups have stepped forward to condemn insurgent-initiated violence. Road to Transition in 2014 We and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other Coalition and ANSF partners are improving security for the Afghan population, increasing the size and quality of the ANSF, and supporting efforts to improve governance and development throughout Afghanistan. At last November's NATO Summit in Lisbon, we undercut a key pillar of the Taliban's strategy by affirming the long-term resolve of the United States and international community to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan. We are united in support of President Karzai's goal of Afghan forces assuming security responsibilities from the international community by the end of 2014. In partnership with the Afghan Government, we are working toward President Obama's goal of beginning a drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan beginning in July of this year at a pace determined by conditions on the ground. The process for identifying, assessing, and transitioning areas of Afghanistan is based on recommendations from the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal (Transition) Board (JANIB) to the Government of Afghanistan. ISAF is working closely with JANIB as we begin the process of transition and methodically move forward in our campaign. ANSF Support Most importantly in the security arena, our investment in the ANSF is working and the growth of the force is on track. The remarkable quantity growth of ANSF (rising by an unprecedented 70,000 personnel while facing a determined enemy) is now being matched by quality improvements in the force. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan is supporting the efforts of the Afghan Government to build leaders at all levels, to increase literacy, and to improve capability and training capacity. Combined, these programs increase the quality of the force, ultimately helping to reduce attrition, enhance recruitment, and contribute to sustainability. Meanwhile, we are helping the ANSF to overcome remaining challenges in the recruitment of medical staff and other enablers, as well as increasing the participation of females and recruiting more southern Pashtuns. In league with Admiral Stavridis (Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe), we are trying to reduce our shortage of trainers. ANSF in the Lead The ANSF is increasingly in the lead of operations in many areas of Afghanistan. In southern Afghanistan, the ANSF took the lead in mid- 2010 for an operation in Malajat, Kandahar City--with support from ISAF for additional combat power, close air support and other enablers-- resulting in the capture or killing of several dozen insurgents and the establishment of a new model for Afghan-led operations. The ANSF also provided well over half of the combat power for the latter phases of Operation Hamkari, clearing the insurgency's most vital safe havens in southern Afghanistan. In northern Afghanistan, Afghan National Army and Police conducted joint operations throughout December 2010 with ISAF forces in northern Balkh Province, and Afghan National Police have demonstrated considerable capacity by capturing insurgents and discovering caches of weapons in U.S.-Afghan partnered operations in Kunduz Province. Additionally, ANSF now leads security efforts in 14 of 15 of Kabul's districts, and have executed coordinated security plans for several events, including the June Consultative Peace Jirga, the July Kabul conference, August Independence Day events and the January seating of the Parliament all without incident, at odds with the insurgents' claims that it would seek to disrupt them. Local Security Initiatives Beyond national level security efforts, the Afghan Government has steadily expanded the local security initiatives designed to squeeze extremist elements from their traditional safe havens and cut off their lines of communication. Clearing operations in key terrain districts have shifted operational-level momentum and altered village-level calculus in remote areas. Local elders in dozens of villages throughout Afghanistan have conducted jirgas to assume increased responsibility for their own security, and U.S. and coalition forces have supported the Ministry of Interior's efforts to fortify Afghan villages. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) program represents one of the most promising endeavors to wrest local areas from insurgent influence. The ALP and other Village Stability Operation initiatives work from the bottom-up and the top-down, connecting the support of local communities with the capacity of the central government and coalition partnerships. The Taliban has revealed their concerns that the ALP represents a direct threat to their existence and operational ability. Today, there are a total of 63 ALP sites--24 of which the Ministry of Interior has site validated--and approximately 4,000 ALP are now assigned. These local efforts buttress security in areas with limited ANSF presence, complementing the progress made elsewhere (and in ALP locations) by conventional ISAF and ANSF. Given the initial success of the ALP program, the Ministry of Interior wants to increase the program beyond the current projected number of 10,000 with our reinforced special operations forces providing oversight and mentoring. Popular Support Since 2003, AQ and the Taliban have tried with some success to expand their strength and influence in much of the country. In 2010, coalition and Afghan forces applied additional resources in all aspects of the campaign to change the security landscape in much of the country. As security improves in key areas and we are better able to protect the people, Afghanistan's population has increasingly supported efforts to bring development and basic services to their areas. In recent months, in particular, Afghan security forces have assumed more of the load in the fight, village elders have encouraged young men to join the Afghan police, and insurgents in several areas have begun to put down their weapons and integrate into society. Reintegration efforts are bearing fruit due to the concerted effort of the Afghan Government both at the local and national level and the support of coalition forces (aided, of course, by the momentum in our campaign). In terms of reconciliation, the process is led by Afghans, with ISAF partnering with ANSF to set security conditions and dash the enemy's hopes of victory. These are progressive steps toward building irreversible momentum in our overall campaign. Rule of Law Progress Unlike our enemies, we continue to support the legitimate efforts of the Afghan Government to improve the Rule of Law for Afghanistan's more than 29 million inhabitants. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan's Joint Task Force/Combined Interagency Task Force 435 and our Afghan partners have achieved considerable progress in the last year: transferring detainees to the state-of-the-art detention facility in Parwan; implementing transparent and robust internment processes; strengthening judicial guarantees for detainees; and expanding robust reintegration programs that include literacy and vocational training. Moreover, we have established robust efforts to combat corruption at all levels, even as we implement best practices to reduce the challenge of corruption in contracting and in every aspect of our campaign. Infrastructure Initiatives We are also pursuing infrastructure initiatives--for example, building roads, rail, and installing electrical grids and transmission lines--to capitalize on Afghanistan's potential as a Central Asian economic hub. A regional transport network facilitates the creation of private sector jobs and provides additional incentives for reconcilable elements of the insurgency to abandon the fight. Ultimately, such economic development reduces the need for U.S. forces and underpins long-term transition activities and is fundamental to a sound counterinsurgency campaign. Congressional Support Congressional leadership continues to play a critical role in enabling our efforts in Afghanistan, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), the authorization of an infrastructure program, and the Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP). Above all, we rely on the ASFF to enable the eventual full transition of security tasks to a robust, trained ANSF capable of preventing the resurgence of insurgent safe havens in Afghanistan. In terms of the CERP, our Commanders on the ground continually comment that the CERP funds are invaluable in carrying out operations toward our strategic objectives in Afghanistan, undercutting the enemy's information operations and legitimacy. In 2010, CERP funded more than 8,300 projects, including, for example, transportation initiatives to improve freedom of movement throughout Afghanistan; agriculture production across Afghanistan involving the repair and improvement of irrigation canals and wells and providing farmers with higher-quality seeds and fertilizers; education projects such as the services of more than 200 local Afghan education outreach coordinators; and water and sanitation projects to install three high-production groundwater wells that will increase the accessibility of potable water to over 850,000 Afghans in Kandahar City. Apart from CERP, the new Afghanistan infrastructure program enables us to work together with the U.S. State Department to undertake high-priority infrastructure projects to address critical needs for Afghan security, governance, and development. The Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund will be the vehicle for the Defense Department's contribution to this integrated program. To enable our reintegration efforts, we continue to execute the ARP using funds in support for the Government of Afghanistan's Peace and Reintegration Program. Challenges Ahead Much work remains to achieve our goals in Afghanistan. We face a resilient and determined enemy. The United States and the international community are positioned to favorably influence reform and synchronize Rule of Law development to counter corruption within the Afghan Government. Despite considerable progress in many areas in 2010, we recognize that there will be hard work ahead as we continue to fight along with our Afghan partners. But, by progressively and steadily executing our sound and validated strategy, I believe we can set the conditions to succeed in Afghanistan. Partnering with Pakistan Strategic Partnership We recognize, of course, that any solution in Afghanistan must address the regional context. CENTCOM supports President Obama's goal of strengthening the U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership through nascent yet improving military-to-military cooperation with Pakistan. As Secretary Clinton and other leadership has noted, we must concentrate on the efforts Pakistan is taking. They have made very significant moves for going after the terrorist within their own country. Over the past year, CENTCOM has strengthened and deepened our security cooperation with Pakistan by supporting our counterparts through CENTCOM's Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan (ODRP). ODRP is focused on assisting Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts and this past year, led the U.S. interagency effort to provide disaster relief and Humanitarian Assistance to areas affected by the flooding. Additionally, in support of our long-term partnership with Pakistan, the CENTCOM Center of Excellence continues to deploy subject matter experts and provide unique reach-back support to ODRP and Special Operations Command-Pakistan (Forward) in order to deepen analysis and to provide greater interagency fidelity on critical issues. Threats in Pakistan The potential for instability in Pakistan and the free movement of extremists in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region continue to pose a serious threat to regional and global security. Pakistan's tribal areas remain the principal sanctuary for al Qaeda and a safe haven for other extremist groups, enabling them to threaten the population and coalition forces in Afghanistan, the people and government in Pakistan, and U.S. and Western interests globally. The Afghanistan-Pakistan region also faces significant humanitarian concerns, including refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from decades of conflict. Additionally, roughly three million Afghan refugees still live in Pakistan, having been displaced by the Russian invasion into Afghanistan 30 years ago. U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Last summer's historic flooding in Pakistan was devastating-- effectively equivalent in scope to flooding the entire East Coast of the United States. The United States responded to the floods by providing historic levels of Humanitarian Assistance. In all, U.S. rotary and fixed wing aircraft transported more than 40,000 displaced persons and delivered more than 26 million pounds of aid supplies to the people of Pakistan. U.S. helicopters flew more than 5,000 flight hours during the relief operation. The U.S. Government provided Zodiac boat kits to the Pakistan Military for use in rescue operations, and provided eight 50 meter bridges to replace bridges swept away by the floods. U.S. Support to Pakistan Military On the security front, continued U.S. assistance is critical to enabling Pakistan to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations. Our forces carry out important partnership and engagement activities in support of the Pakistan military's improving counterinsurgency capabilities. As one important example, ODRP supports Pakistan's Frontier Scouts by providing training support and enabling further counterinsurgency operations. U.S. personnel also assist in the procurement of materials and equipment needed to build infrastructure in support of education, power, and food. Pakistan Operations and Sacrifice Pakistan's military has made impressive strides in combating militants in the FATA, while dealing with the effects of large-scale flooding that devastated much of the country. Over the last year, the enemy has lost battlespace to the Pakistan military's sustained efforts to move against the enemy strongholds. Pakistan's military has suffered more than 2,500 casualties (enduring more than 500 personnel killed in action and more than 2,000 wounded in action) since the start of offensive operations against extremist elements in the Khyber Pashtunkhwa and the FATA. Since June 2009, the Pakistan Military has been involved in nearly continuous operations against militants in the Khyber Pashtunkhwa and the FATA. In total, the Pakistan Military has deployed upwards of 140,000 troops along Pakistan's western border with Afghanistan, a significant portion of which were drawn from Pakistan's border with India. Regional Context Our efforts to support Pakistan fit well within the broader regional context. We recognize that Pakistan's longstanding tensions with India are an important part of Pakistan's strategic decisionmaking calculus and military force posture. However, the presence of extremist sanctuaries in Pakistan significantly impacts our progress in Afghanistan, and with the Pakistan military's help we are taking important steps to improve cross-border operations. To address existing challenges along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, coordination between ISAF, Afghan security forces, and the Pakistan Military continues to improve, especially in the area of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). In Regional Command East, we are planning coordinated operations with the Pakistan Military. The Pakistan Military recently began clearing insurgent safe havens in Mohmand Agency across the border from Kunar Province--where insurgents have initiated a number of attacks to undermine recent security gains in Afghanistan. While Pakistan's operations are acting as the ``hammer'' on their side of the border, combined Afghan and ISAF forces are poised to defeat displaced insurgents, acting as the ``anvil.'' Afghan Border Police and other combined security forces are manning outposts along the border and armed drones and close combat aviation are monitoring previously-identified mountain passes that insurgents will likely use as they seek sanctuary in Afghanistan. Congressional Support Multi-year security assistance is critical to our efforts in Pakistan. We appreciate continued congressional support for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, which serves as a key enabler of the Pakistan's military operations against extremists. The fund also provides for a range of partnership activities with potentially transformational long-term effects on our relationship with Pakistan if they can be sustained. Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Iran's Destabilizing Activities In view of Iran's destabilizing behavior and its persistent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, the Iranian regime's current stance represents the greatest long-term threat to the region. Iran continues to rebuff efforts for engagement, further alienating and isolating itself from much of the rest of the region and from much of the international community. The actions of Iran's leadership squander the potential of its own educated populace and sacrifice the free exchange of ideas for the short-sighted interest of preserving an increasingly harsh and oppressive regime. Recently, Tehran equated the Egyptian protests to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, making a fanciful and wholly false connection. The Iranian regime relies on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to extend influence and create instability across the region through persuasion, coercion, aggression, and targeted messaging. In fact, Iran continues to fund, arm, train, and equip a network of agents, surrogates, and proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, Afghanistan and elsewhere across the region. In the pivotal region of the Levant, Iran seeks to expand its influence, in part by enabling Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas in order to weaken legitimate governance, limit economic development, and undermine security partnerships. Additionally, Iran delivers weapons and provides military training to surrogates in an effort to target Israel (a nation Iran's leadership have vowed to destroy) and undercut the Middle East Peace Process. Of urgent concern, the IRGC-QF continues to equip militants in Iraq and Afghanistan that attack U.S. and coalition forces and undermine stability and governance in each of these countries. The recent January 2011 large caliber Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortar (IRAM) attack against U.S. forces in Iraq demonstrated Iran's malicious intent, and ability to escalate violence when they desire. Iran's Pursuit of Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Weapons In spite of a fourth round of United Nations sponsored sanctions, Iran appears determined to mature its nuclear weapons program--an ambition that could lead to the proliferation of illicit nuclear materials and spark a nuclear arms race in the region. Admiral Mullen reinforced this point in December 2010, observing: ``I see Iran continuing on this path to develop nuclear weapons, and I believe that developing and achieving that goal would be very destabilizing to the region.'' Iran also continues to expand and improve its arsenal of over 2,200 ballistic missiles and long-range rockets, and of approximately 225 fixed and mobile launchers, making it the largest ballistic missile and long-range rocket force in the Middle East. Iran can use these ballistic missiles and rockets, combined with increasing naval capabilities, to threaten global commerce. Countering Destabilizing Iranian Activities and Keeping Peace with our Partners Firmly nested within the broader approach of the U. S. Government toward Iran, CENTCOM is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing and coercive activities by building confidence with our partners in the region. As one example, we are working together with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners and other nations to advance Integrated Air and Missile Defense. We also conduct activities to reassure our friends in the region that we are with them, preclude conflict, and deter Iran's destabilizing activities, while at the same time standing ready to conduct contingency operations. Enabling Transition in Iraq Looking Ahead in Iraq The year ahead in Iraq presents a significant opportunity for the United States to solidify our long-term support to this keystone of regional stability. Our continued investment in Iraq is critical at this juncture, especially given the significant commitment we have made in lives and treasure. Now is not the time to be penny wise and pound foolish with respect to our mission in Iraq. Nested firmly inside the State Department's vision for an enduring U.S.-Iraq strategic partnership, CENTCOM is setting conditions to build on the shared sacrifices between our countries. The Situation in Iraq Iraq faces lingering ethnic and sectarian mistrust, tensions between political parties, and strained governmental capacity to provide basic services. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) remains committed to undermining the Iraqi Government and is capable of carrying out orchestrated, high profile attacks. Likewise, Iranian-inspired and equipped proxies continue to be a threat to Iraqi security and governance. While the security situation in Iraq is vastly improved since the peak of sectarian violence there in mid-2007 (violence is currently at all-time lowest levels since 2003), Iraq continues to face significant political, economic, and security challenges. Over the coming year, several factors will determine Iraq's strategic direction, including the continuing development of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the effectiveness of the nascent governing coalition, and the degree to which the country is influenced by Iran and threatened by AQI and Shi'a militia elements. U.S. Forces-Iraq From now until the end of this year, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) is continuing to partner with ISF during this historic period of transition. USF-I is undertaking a range of activities, foremost among these strengthening the ISF, transitioning security-related activities to Iraq and the U.S. interagency, and contributing to border management and ministerial development. Establishing the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq Through USF-I and in partnership with the Embassy country team, we are planning the initial stand-up of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) in June of this year and expect it to be fully operational by this October. OSC-I is the cornerstone of our long-term mission to build partner capacity with the ISF. Additionally, the OSC-I will ensure the continuation of the military-to-military relationships that advise, train, and assist Iraqi Security Forces. Iraq's Regional Integration: Iraq is now at a crossroads, poised to emerge as a positive force for the region after posing security challenges for its neighbors in past decades. Baghdad's selection as the location to host the Arab League Summit is a significant testament to Iraq's re-emergence in the region. Iraq also accepted Egypt's invitation to participate as an observer in CENTCOM's largest exercise, Bright Star. Jordan has also exerted considerable positive influence in Iraq, training over 1,500 Iraqi Army officers, a number of Iraqi Air Force pilots, and posting a Jordanian defense attache in Baghdad, in addition to hosting a program to provide extensive training to Iraqi police. Additionally, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have aided the economic reintegration of Iraq into commercial activity and regularly scheduled transportation networks. Finally, the United Arab Emirates have trained Iraqi police officers in a joint program with Japan and Germany. Iraq's constructive integration into the region will also help blunt destabilizing Iranian influence. If left vulnerable to Tehran's meddling, Iraq's sovereign future would be imperiled. At the same time that Iran reconstructs shrines, provides electrical power, and constructs schools and clinics in Iraq, Iran also undermines Iraqi political processes, facilitates violence against innocent Iraqi civilians, and provides lethal support to extremist groups targeting U.S. forces. For the United States and the international community, a sovereign Iraq under a stable and inclusive government is fundamental to regional stability. Congressional Support The support of Congress is critical to facilitating an effective transition in Iraq and in setting the conditions for an enduring U.S.- Iraq partnership. We seek congressional support in obtaining the appropriate authorities in fiscal year 2011 to begin immediate facility and site work for the OSC-I to reach full operating capability by October 2011. This is an area of critical need as we work to meet our aggressive timelines. The Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) critically enables Iraq to set a foundation for its internal and external defense capabilities and provides Iraqi Minister of Interior police forces the training and equipment necessary to maintain internal security without assistance from the Ministry of Defense. Additionally, the ISFF enables Iraqi Army counterinsurgency capabilities and enhances cooperation between the government of Iraq and Kurdish police forces to ensure the consistency of police training and equipment standards throughout Iraq. Strengthening Central Asian Partnerships In Central Asia, CENTCOM is committed to strengthening relationships based on those shared interests and goals that we have in common with the Central Asian States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While our nations seek to improve broader economic conditions, CENTCOM is working with our partners to address the migration of extremists in certain areas of Central Asia and to counter the trade of illicit narcotics and human trafficking. Often these activities are interrelated. Northern Distribution Network: Over the past 2 years, the development of a robust transportation network has been the most expansive area of cooperation with our Central Asian partners. Our collective agreements with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan together constitute a logistical system termed the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) used to supply coalition operations in Afghanistan and taking pressure off the Pakistan lines of supply. This diverse network supports the transit of about half of all sustainment cargo to Afghanistan using a variety of sea, air, and land routes. The remaining supplies are flown directly into Afghanistan, trans-shipped from sealift to airlift, or arrive via surface routes through Pakistan. Ultimately, the development and expansion of the NDN and its associated infrastructure will facilitate long-term economic growth in the region, representing a new opportunity for export of Central and South Asia raw materials and exchange of goods in the international marketplace. Enhancing the Northern Distribution Network Future NDN efforts are centered on partnering with certain countries to permit two-way flow of all types of wheeled vehicles and associated repair parts, and to increase shipment of cargo already permitted on the NDN (such as building materials). In terms of airlift, Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan is a key Central Asian location that supports aerial refueling and passenger transit missions. Building Partner Capacity and Pursuing Cooperative Activities Cooperation Based on Shared Interests The investment we make in our military-to-military engagement to build the capabilities of our partner nation security forces is a critical component of the whole-of-government efforts in the region. These cost-effective efforts properly place security responsibilities in the hands of other sovereign governments and help to prevent conflicts and instability. With a long-term perspective, CENTCOM carries out partnership activities designed to build strong security capacity and relationships with our friends in the region. Training CENTCOM's training and exchanges with our partners are critical to our regional cooperation. CENTCOM has spearheaded the establishment of several Training Centers of Excellence hosted in partner nations, providing world-class mission-specific training for our allies and partners. Existing Centers of Excellence include an Air Warfare Center and an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center in the United Arab Emirates (UAE); the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center in Jordan; a NATO Partnership for Peace Combat Engineering and INTERPOL Counter Narcotics Center hosted in Kazakhstan; and an extensive array of associations with the other countries' Professional Military Education programs. Developing Centers include a U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) Maritime Center hosted in Bahrain; a new Explosives Ordinance Disposal school with future Center of Excellence in Saudi Arabia; a proposed Near East South Asia (NESA) branch Center of Excellence in Bahrain; and the Gulf Region Communications, Computer, Command, and Control (C4) Center of Excellence hosted by the Bahraini Minister of Communications. Exchanges CENTCOM manages and conducts focused engagement programs with specific partner nations located throughout the AOR in support of the CENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation Plan. The objective is to understand our friend's views and to strengthen relationships and regional organizations to defeat violent extremist networks or situations that threaten the security interests of the region and the United States. This includes capacity building. Additionally, CENTCOM Headquarters in Tampa, FL is host to over 193 coalition partners from 58 allied nations who make significant contributions to our efforts, and receive invaluable experience interacting with both U.S. forces and our allies. Equipping We also provide equipment and security assistance to our regional partners. These activities are among the most important practical steps we can take to demonstrate CENTCOM's enduring commitment to our partners--and to enable interoperable forces in the fight. I ask for continued congressional support of these efforts, including Global Train and Equip, as well as the many security assistance programs managed by the Department of State, including Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and International Military Education and Training Program. As Admiral Mullen noted in his testimony, our security assistance authorities are inflexible, and process are too cumbersome to effectively address today's security challenges in a timely manner. We encourage ongoing efforts to streamline the Foreign Military Financing process in order to cement training and sustainment relations with our critical partners. Accomplishing our mission at CENTCOM requires that we demonstrate our responsiveness to the requests of our partners when we alone should not carry the increasing costs of defending the international order. Exercises The final pillar of CENTCOM's partnership activities is our military exercise program. Exercises bolster interoperability between our forces and those of our partners. Each year, our component commands conducts more than 50 exercises with our partner nations in the region, including 5 overseen by CENTCOM component commands. The Long-Term Value of our Exercise Program The Combatant Commanders Exercise and Engagement program provides critical support to CENTCOM joint training support, exercise and engagement requirements in support of national-level strategic priorities, readiness, and building partnerships within the AOR. Since the beginning of our operations in Afghanistan in 2001, CENTCOM has seen reductions in our exercise program due to ongoing combat operations within the AOR. As combat operations are completed or reduced, restoring sufficient funding levels is critical to support engagement activities with our partners. Without restored funding levels, CENTCOM could lose the advantages gained from a robust exercise engagement program, affecting future access and presence within the AOR and our Theater Security Cooperation Plan. In the interim, we will work imaginatively to make the best use of our exercise budget. Disrupting Violent Extremist Organizations across the Region Terrorists in False Religious Garb The CENTCOM AOR is home to numerous Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) comprising a network that, in its own right, represents a considerable threat to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. and Western interests, and our allies in the region. The most significant of these is AQ. AQ seeks to impose its morally bankrupt ideology worldwide, and has regional affiliates across the Arabian Peninsula, in Iraq, the Maghreb, and in Somalia (al-Shabaab), with associates including Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Afghanistan Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). The growing cross-organizational cooperation between VEOs replicates mafia syndicates. The organizational success of VEOs is frequently abetted by operating with near impunity in cyberspace. Attacking VEOs Along with our interagency and regional partners, CENTCOM continues to develop and implement theater-wide responses in the cyber and physical domains to disrupt and degrade militant networks. Over the past year, interagency efforts have resulted in designating al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and TTP as foreign terrorist organizations, obtaining a number of Treasury designations, Justice Department arrest warrants, Interpol notices, and placing over 100 individuals and entities on the U.S. Department of Commerce Denial List. Thanks to Congressional funding, the Defense Department Rewards Program has been used by commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal year 2010 to capture more than 700 high-value individuals, insurgents and terrorists. Preventing Security Vacuums In the long-term, CENTCOM is working as a part of an integrated civil-military effort to prevent security vacuums that foment extremism and provide sanctuary to VEOs. In Yemen, we have forged a tight bond between CENTCOM and our Embassy team in Sana'a to address the heightened threat of AQAP through long-term counterterrorism capacity-building. AQAP cemented its role as a viable and enduring threat to the U.S. Homeland by following-up the failed attempt to bomb Northwest Airlines flight 253 on 25 December 2009 with the ``printer cartridge'' parcel bomb plot in late October 2010. Radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi publicly spearheads AQAP's campaign against the West, most notably by creating Inspire magazine in an effort to encourage Western-based Muslims and enable ``lone wolf'' style attacks. In Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has had to navigate a challenging environment in which it does not yet have the monopoly of violence in much of the country. Our assistance has had substantive impact on the ground to include helping the LAF deploy four brigades to the south since 2006 in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701--taking up space where Hezbollah had been. Additionally we have increased the capacity of the LAF Special Operations Forces that won a hard fought battle in 2007 against the al Qaeda affiliated Fatah al-Islam movement in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in Northern Lebanon. The LAF sustained almost 200 killed and 2,000 wounded in this operation. We value our close relationship with the LAF officer corps based on mutual respect and confidence. We continue to monitor the government formation process in Lebanon and will need to examine the final composition, policies, and behaviors of the next government before making any decisions regarding our relationship, including security assistance, while recognizing that continued engagement with the LAF is an important step in securing its status as an apolitical, non-sectarian, and professional organization. In Syria, the regime's continuing support for terrorist organizations prevents CENTCOM from developing a military-to-military relationship and limits the scope of U.S. engagement. Consequently, we view the recent return of a U.S. Ambassador to Damascus as a vital piece of our regional security architecture. We stand ready to support Ambassador Ford's diplomatic efforts to produce a more constructive relationship with Syria however we can, and we urge the Senate to confirm his nomination so that he may continue his important work beyond 2011. Across the region, Theater Security Cooperation activities work against the ability of Iran and extremist elements to destabilize the region. Absent these programs, there is an increasing potential for security vacuums to arise and open the door to greater influence from Iran or violent actors. Our cooperative efforts with regional partners are essential to the long-term effort to address these threats. Countering the Enemy's Use of the Information Environment Our enemies are using every available lever of the information environment to promulgate and reinforce their ideology--and, in league with our interagency partners, CENTCOM is committed to countering the efforts of our adversaries. Our enemies operate within cyberspace (and its associated relevant physical infrastructure) to plan, coordinate, recruit, train, equip, execute and garner support for operations against the United States, its allies, and interests. The recruitment of Umar Farouk Abdullmutallab, the unsuccessful Christmas Day Bomber, demonstrates our adversaries' ability to reach across borders, promote their narrative, and defy traditional military constructs to achieve their objectives. Clearly, in the information age, our military must adapt to this new domain of warfare. We ask for the support of Congress to fund our programs that attempt to counter the enemy in the information domain, just as we need funding to disrupt violent extremists in the physical domain. CENTCOM Activities in the Information Environment Consistent with the guidance provided by Secretary Gates last December, we conduct Operation Earnest Voice (OEV), which synchronizes and oversees all of our Information Operations activities. OEV seeks to disrupt recruitment and training of suicide bombers; deny safe havens for our adversaries; and counter extremist ideology and propaganda. Full funding of OEV supports all activities associated with degrading the enemy narrative, including web engagement and web-based product distribution capabilities. The effective engagement of our enemies in cyberspace requires the ability for us to conduct a full-spectrum of traditional military activities against them in that domain, including all aspects of Information Operations and Strategic Communication. We coordinate with the Joint Staff, the Interagency, the Intelligence Community, and our coalition partners to examine the adversary's use of cyberspace and identify techniques, tactics and procedures we can use to counter the adversary in the cyber domain. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Risk of Weapons of Mass Destruction At CENTCOM, we recognize the serious risk and potentially devastating ramifications of a terrorist group, violent extremist organization, or state actor acquiring, proliferating, or using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The nexus between extremist groups, malign state actors, and WMD remains a critical concern throughout the AOR and presents a clear danger to our partners, allies, and the U.S. Homeland. CENTCOM remains vigilant in executing the nonproliferation, counter proliferation, and foreign consequence management pillars of America's National Strategy for Combating WMD. Countering Proliferation and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Countering the proliferation of WMD-related material is a fundamental aspect of CENTCOM's overall efforts to combat WMD. In concert with our regional partners, CENTCOM is involved with the interagency effort to curtail the ability of adversaries to finance the acquisition of WMD-related items and to deny malign actors the ability to transport suspect dual-use materials across national borders. To this end, CENTCOM plays a key role in containing Iran's evident drive for nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty by actively enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolutions that sanction the Iranian regime. CENTCOM also supports the interdiction and counter proliferation framework under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). CENTCOM's mainstay program for Combating WMD engagement is the Cooperative Defense Program (CDP). The CDP provides a series of bilateral and multilateral engagement activities to improve U.S. and partner nation interoperability while strengthening partner nations' combating WMD capabilities. Countering Piracy The Real and Growing Threat of Piracy Somali-based pirates continue to prey upon international shipping in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and on the high seas well into the Indian Ocean. Pirates are using previously captured vessels as mother ships to conduct successful attacks as far as 1,400 nautical miles from the Somali coast. The number of successful pirate attacks has risen from 42 in 2008, to 51 in 2009, to 68 in 2010. Pirates now hold nearly 700 hostages for ransom. Multi-million dollar per ship ransoms ensure piracy remains lucrative for pirates and others involved in this criminal enterprise. A Model for International Cooperation CENTCOM works with international partners to help patrol the region and to work with interagency partners to gain the prosecution of captured pirates (though we currently lack an international legal framework to detain and prosecute pirates). Piracy is a threat to all, and has promoted international military cooperation that serves as a model for cooperation in other areas. We acknowledge, however, that military action is only one part of the solution, but an essential element nonetheless. NAVCENT coordinates the efforts of over 25 contributing nations to combat piracy at sea and coordinates with European Union (EU) Task Force Atalanta and NATO Standing Naval Maritime Group in Operation Ocean Shield. Pakistan is currently in command of Combined Task Force 151, the international coalition to combat piracy. NAVCENT also hosts a monthly Shared Awareness and De- confliction (SHADE) conference in Bahrain to foster multi-national cooperation and to encourage maritime industry to adopt best practices to defend vessels against piracy. In addition to Coalition, NATO, and EU representation, the conferences also include civilian maritime organizations, and delegates from China, Russia, Japan, and India. STRATEGIC APPROACH Many of our challenges are interconnected and require comprehensive long-term solutions, prompting us to adopt an overall approach that is cooperative, integrated, and enduring. As we undertake a diverse range of operations and activities, three principles guide our efforts: Adopting Cooperative Approaches by Partnering Based on Shared Interests First, we must adopt cooperative approaches to solving shared challenges. America's strength and security depends on our ability to help our friends in the region defend themselves, underscoring the importance of CENTCOM's initiatives to build partner capacity and pursue bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Starting from our shared interests, we must capitalize on the comparative advantages of all participating nations--for instance, by taking advantage of unique geography or specialized capability. Ideally, such efforts would combine the political, economic, and security spheres of those who choose to participate, strengthening the whole to be greater than the sum of the parts. Our efforts to develop effective solutions for Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Gulf Region represent a significant example of the kind of cooperative efforts that are necessary to deter and defeat our common threats. As mentioned above, the international coalition to counter piracy in the Somali Basin is a model for multilateral cooperation in the region that not only addresses piracy but also offers opportunities for engagement in other areas. Our ability to cooperate with our partners depends to a great extent on trust. As a consequence of the confidential diplomatic and military reporting made public by Wikileaks, we must patiently strengthen trust with our partners over time. We are up front with our partners about this episode--which has informed our enemies about supportive leaders as well as our tactics, techniques, and procedures. We remain committed, as ever, to forthright communication in pursuit of our shared objectives. We are reinforcing our efforts to ensure the security of our communications and focusing on enhancing mutually reinforcing objectives with allies and partners. Integrating Our Efforts by Implementing Civil-Military Solutions Second, the wars we are fighting today require intensively integrated, comprehensive approaches from the highest to the lowest levels, embracing diplomatic, information, military and economics in an interwoven effort that builds synergy. Promoting security and stability in the CENTCOM AOR cannot be achieved through military means alone. We must therefore look beyond just the traditional application of military power and integrate all elements of national power to address our many challenges. CENTCOM's experience has shown that military might alone is not sufficient to deal with the challenges we confront along with our partners. Diplomacy and Development are just as vital as Defense in securing our national interests. CENTCOM support efforts to address the underlying conditions of instability that fuel current conflicts. Successful application of these instruments of national power, in turn, depends on our ability to achieve harmony within our civil-military relationships. As such, it is a security concern for us when diplomatic posts go unfilled in the region. The overlapping forces at work in the CENTCOM AOR--those originating from within and outside the region--require exceptional cross-combatant command cooperation and coordination. We have achieved progress across AOR geographic seams, exemplified by cooperation with PACOM on matters dealing with China and India and cooperation with European Command on Russia, Turkey, and the Middle East Peace Process. CENTCOM, and PACOM regularly synchronize efforts to combat mutual challenges such as piracy, proliferation of WMD, and support to countering VEOs. Additionally, we continue to work closely with U.S. Africa Command to address the state-failure in Somalia, as well as share critical assets to meet time-critical force requirements. Together we have established a counter-piracy Joint Operating Area in the Somali Basin. We team with U.S. Cyber Command to support global relationships in cyberspace and U.S. Northern Command to protect U.S. borders and domestic security. In all, the cross-combatant command effort is going very well. Supporting Enduring Solutions by Demonstrating Long-term Commitment Finally, our approach to the region must be enduring. Following through with our long-term commitments in the AOR improves the depth, breadth and quality of our relationships in the region and increases the likelihood of cooperation at the outset. In this region of the world, we are judged by our actions, not words. Individual instances of demonstrated trustworthiness on our part resonate throughout the region for decades. Enduring solutions to the problems that we face also depend on stability, steady economic growth and development in governance. To that end, CENTCOM supports our partners' long-term efforts to grow economically and to develop effective and legitimate institutions of government. RESOURCING THE FIGHT Beyond the critical funding authorities highlighted above, accomplishing our mission requires that we fully and efficiently resource the following critical enablers. We appreciate Congressional support to provide our warfighters on the battlefront with the tools they need to accomplish their challenging missions. As we adapt to a thinking adversary, we recognize the need to accelerate our acquisition processes to enable us to out-maneuver our enemies. We also recognize the obligation to be good stewards of our nation's monetary resources. CENTCOM has established stringent control mechanisms to execute our fiscal authorities and to apply the most effective oversight possible of all of our programs. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance An Indispensable Tool There is a considerable and justifiable appetite for ISR capabilities in the CENTCOM AOR. In Afghanistan, persistent ISR capabilities represent one of the most important and effective force multipliers and contribute directly to protecting our troops from the threat of improvised explosive devices through ISR. In cooperation with the ISR Task Force, we have augmented ISAF forces with a greatly increased capability to counter the Taliban and understand the environment in which we operate. Additionally, as we drawdown our forces from Iraq, we are adjusting the apportionment of ISR in a measured way to ensure that we retain adequate capability to support our force in Iraq while we provide the necessary resources to Afghanistan and elsewhere. We continue to refine our ability to fully integrate U.S. and coalition ISR to deny transnational extremist organizations safe haven, training bases, or staging areas to conduct attacks. Enhancing ISR Capabilities We greatly appreciate the support of Congress and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology in meeting the ongoing demand for more rapidly delivered ISR collection, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities. Interrelated with our ISR needs, we recognize a need to further enhance integration and synergy between aviation and ground elements that is critical to Combat Air Support and counterinsurgency doctrine. We support a limited objective experiment to refine the requirement for a manned, armed ISR asset attuned to the unique challenges of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Continued investments in ISR technology, infrastructure, architecture, tools, and personnel (particularly trained ISR managers) help us to build on the significant gains we have achieved in the CENTCOM AOR--and enable us to use the arsenal of ISR capabilities currently in the field. Critical Intelligence Capabilities Human intelligence and counterintelligence are just as important as technical solutions to remotely gather intelligence, especially in the conduct of operations in wars among the people. Such intelligence activities are inherently government functions that require a long lead time to develop. CENTCOM is posturing for sustained application of our human intelligence capabilities to afford us insights into adversary plans and intentions. CENTCOM is posturing for sustained application of our human intelligence capabilities to afford us insights into adversary plans and intentions. We are also reshaping our counterintelligence forces to face threats from hostile foreign intelligence services and VEOs that employ sophisticated cyber techniques and trusted insiders to penetrate our networks and compromise our operations. Improving Force Protection and Countering Improvised Explosive Devices The Enemy's Weapon of Choice Now and for the foreseeable future, the enemy is using Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) to kill and maim our troops. These devices remain the greatest risk facing U.S. and coalition forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a threat to U.S. interests and regional stability throughout the CENTCOM AOR. In Afghanistan, IED attacks account for more than 60 percent of the U.S. and coalition force casualties, though IED casualties have steadily decreased over the past 6 months. The flow of lethal aid, migration of IED technology and materials, and development of new tactics techniques and procedures represents a global threat. Homemade explosives, which now account for an estimated 85 percent of all IEDs, coupled with the proliferation of commercially available IED materials and commercial grade explosives make them relatively cheap and easy to build and employ. Ongoing Interagency C-IED Efforts CENTCOM counters the threat of IEDs by working together with all Services and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The Services continue to equip U.S. and coalition forces with the latest technology to mitigate and defeat IEDs. Thanks to Congress and the Department of Defense, CENTCOM and our national and international partners have delivered and fielded an unprecedented number of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected family of vehicles throughout Afghanistan. These vehicles have proven critical to safeguarding the tactical mobility of our warriors in harm's way. CENTCOM, in conjunction with the C-IED Senior Integration Group, and JIEDDO have recently fielded a variety of C-IED enablers that have proven to save lives on the battlefield. As a result, we are finding and clearing more IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan-- at a rate above 60 percent for the last 12 months and 70 percent over the last quarter of 2010. These improvements are due in part to more tips from the population, better tactics, and additional enablers, including the effective use of additional ISR provided by the Services to counter this threat. Attacking the Network We are going after the entire IED network and insurgent supply lines. Many of our recent successes have come in the use of persistent systems emplaced throughout significant threat areas to help develop insights into the local area. We are concurrently protecting the force using trained dogs, mine rollers, jammers, and handheld devices; the Marines in southern Afghanistan now employ nearly one dog per squad, and soon we will have more than 200 working dogs in Afghanistan. Along with the Services, JIEDDO, and academia we will continue to do everything in our power to ensure our servicemembers and coalition partners have the best technology and training available to defeat the IED threat. Supporting Additional C-IED Efforts We continue to call on the defense industry to provide innovative solutions to counter the threat of IEDs. Critical airlift and airdrop sorties dramatically reduce the number of servicemembers exposed to the IED threat. In fact, the number of pounds of supplies airdropped in Afghanistan has doubled every year since 2005, with an astonishing recovery rate of better than 98 percent. Not all critical movements can be completed by air however. We ask that Congress continue to fund those organizations that provide research and development for the evolution of new and existing counter-IED systems and technologies, especially in areas of predetonation, IED stand-off detection, and non- lethal weapons to deny the enemy the ability to deliver or emplace IEDs. We also ask that Congress provide the flexibility to rapidly and proactively counter new, emerging, and future threats that are either present on the battle field or potential threats that represent vulnerability and would be difficult to counter. Unity of Command and Control of C5 Networks Coalition, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C5) networks that meet the challenging demands of our troops in theater are essential to CENTCOM. Currently, the command and control of networks available to our deployed forces is divided among Services, agencies, and combatant commands, resulting in degraded and delayed actions that have allowed our adversaries to exploit this fundamental cyber shortfall for too long. One bright network spot, however, is the Afghan Mission Network, which enables U.S. and coalition forces and civilians to remain connected and synchronized on the battlefield and linked to supporting assets throughout the world. We seek congressional support to enable effective integration and extension of networks to wherever we fight, from maritime environments to the aerial layer and over rugged mountainous terrain. CONCLUSION In closing, we greatly appreciate the support of Congress on behalf of America's military personnel serving in the CENTCOM region. The stalwart Americans in today's force have been fighting two wars for nearly 10 years in the CENTCOM AOR. With remarkable spirit, they look beyond the ambiguity and longevity of today's complex, demanding operations and answer their country's call. Their courage, character and commitment in the face of repeated deployments are inspiring. As their commander, I am proud to serve alongside them. Thank you very much for your unflagging support of our troops in harm's way and their families here at home. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Mattis. We will try a 7-minute first round for questions. General, you made reference to Pakistan and noted that they, indeed, have gone after some terrorist groups, and they have suffered losses in that process. What you did not make reference to, though, is what troubles us a great deal. What troubles you, I am sure, too, and our leadership, is the failure of the Pakistanis to go after terrorist groups in North Waziristan and in Quetta, and those are the groups that cross the border and attack our force, coalition forces, and the Afghan people. Why is it, in your judgment, that Pakistan is not going after those terrorist groups, including the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and the Quetta Shura? General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, there have been disconnects where we have not always seen eye-to-eye with Pakistan. Part of the reason these groups exist is, together with Pakistan, we helped create some of them. Any attempt to look at Pakistan's security interests must include their difficult relationship with India. Over the years, I believe that Pakistan got into a position where the very groups that, in some cases, we helped to give birth to, became part of the landscape, the Kalashnikov culture, for example. In many cases, they have moved against these areas, and not all of it has been cost-free. As I noted, they have lost thousands of troops, killed and wounded. Especially telling is the number of junior officers they have lost, indicating an aggressive effort against these areas. I think, too, it is the most difficult terrain I have ever operated in, in my 39 years in uniform. The Pakistan military's movement against these folks is continuing. We are now into our 24th month of unrelenting campaign against them. Chairman Levin. But the Pakistanis have not gone after the two groups that are giving us the most trouble in Afghanistan. Have you pressed on the Pakistan military the importance of going after those groups? General Mattis. Yes, sir, I have. Chairman Levin. There has been a request, as you have indicated, to increase the size of the ANSF. You made a reference to the request that is under consideration to be an increase between 45,000 to 70,000 above the goal set for October of this year, which will be met. That target of 305,000 is already met or will be met easily by October. Now when you made reference, when you say you support further growth of ANSF, did I understand you then to support the growth beyond the October 2011 target of 305,000 and somewhere between 45,000 and 70,000 personnel is the target that you support? General Mattis. Yes, sir, I do. I think, though, we have to look at whether or not we can sustain it. I believe that President Karzai last week came out of his National Security Council and said that he now supports it, and that recommendation, of course, will have to be considered by the NATO Council. Chairman Levin. Right. Now I made reference repeatedly to the importance of the July 2011 date for the beginning of reductions of American forces in Afghanistan. We heard, as I indicated in my opening remarks, from Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen a week or 2 ago that they support the reduction beginning in July 2011 of U.S. forces with the pace to be determined by conditions on the ground. General Mattis, do you support the decision to set the July 2011 date as the beginning point of reductions in U.S. forces in Afghanistan? General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, I do support it. I would like to say that I support it because it undercuts the enemy's narrative. When they say we are there to occupy Afghanistan, this helps to deny the enemy that moral victory. I think, too, that because it is a conditions-based drawdown that begins this year, I am comfortable with it from a military point of view. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Admiral Olson, do you support that date as the beginning of U.S. reductions? Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, I do. As a beginning to thin out the force in order to accomplish a full transition eventually. Chairman Levin. Admiral, what has been the effect of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) effort that the special ops folks are so deeply involved in, in the villages of Afghanistan where you, working with the Afghans' military and police, are working at the local village level to create these local police units? Can you tell us about these programs? How successful are they? What is the partnership arrangement with the Afghans in the operations between our special operations people and the ALP? Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, that is a matter, of course, under General Mattis's operational control, but I was just able to visit a couple of these ALP sites last week, and my sense is that this is having real value at a micro regional level. This is an Afghan Government program that is administered within the Ministry of the Interior. It is at the local level under the district governors, and it is local leaders who recruit and select those who will be members of the ALP forces. The role of SOF in this is to move to these remote regions in small numbers, establish the personal relationships that are so important to gain credibility as an advising force, and then provide some training and mentorship to these ALP as they gain the ability to defend their villages. In my opinion, this has had quite a powerful effect locally. These are not roaming armies by any means. These are certainly locals who have organized themselves under local leadership to protect their own neighborhoods. Chairman Levin. The partnering issue? Admiral Olson. Sir, the partnering is in that there is a small team of U.S. forces in a village that is then the naturally partnered force with the ALP in that village. They stay for months at a time there, and so this becomes a very strong partnership. But again, it is an Afghan Government- administered program with the U.S. forces strongly supporting it. Chairman Levin. Are Afghans with us in any operation that we are involved in? Admiral Olson. Sir, in all of the operations that are conducted in Afghanistan, there are Afghans involved. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much. Senator McCain. Senator McCain. Well, thank you Mr. Chairman. As a follow-up to the chairman's question, does it concern you, General Mattis, that the defense ministers of various allies who have troops and commitments in Afghanistan have said to me that, ``Well, if you are going to begin to withdraw, we will begin to withdraw as well.'' Is that of concern to you? General Mattis. It would be, sir. It is why we have to engage with them. Senator McCain. So we expect them to stay, while we withdraw? General Mattis. I think what we want them to do is, as we look at the transition process, Senator McCain, we make certain in their area that we follow the transition guidelines, and in some cases, that may mean withdrawal. In some, it may mean that they reinvest the people that they have achieved some success with into another area. Maybe that they go into training, that sort of thing. But there is no misunderstanding that the Americans are carrying the bulk of this fight, over 100,000 troops, and I think that our commitment is pretty straightforward, both fiscally and troop wise. Senator McCain. I know Libya is not within your AOR, but would you venture an opinion as to the difficulty of establishing a no-fly zone? General Mattis. My military opinion is, sir, it would be challenging. You would have to remove the air defense capability in order to establish the no-fly zone. So no illusions here. It would be a military operation. It wouldn't simply be telling people not to fly airplanes. Senator McCain. Declaration of a no-fly zone to the enemy would have a significant deterring effect on their desire to fly. I think we know that to be the case. General Mattis. Yes, sir. Senator McCain. Obviously, the events in Bahrain are of great concern to you and all of us. How much Iranian involvement have you seen in these? I fully understand this is a popular uprising, but isn't it into some respects a proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran? General Mattis. I think the current Tehran regime is incapable of trying to let other nations just take care of their own issues. They have to meddle and create mischief. The Bahrain situation I think is a legitimate popular effort. But I am under no illusions that the Iranians would not try to take advantage of this issue or any other, whether it be in Lebanon or anywhere else in the region. Senator McCain. The loss of the Fifth Fleet headquarters would be a significant setback? General Mattis. It would be. But right now, sir, from even the opposition, our sailors who live out in town, driving to and from work, have encountered zero anti-Americanism. I was just there about a week ago, and there is no hostility directed towards Americans right now--obviously not from the government with whom we have been very good friends for 40, 50, 60 years, but not from the opposition either. It has been heartening, actually. The DOD school has been open every day. We are on about the 12th day with no violence. So it is not right now something that concerns me. Senator McCain. Given the long-term needs of Iraq, how are the deficiencies of the Iraqi Security Forces--such as maintenance, readiness, intelligence fusion, and particularly the building of an air force--going to be addressed absent U.S. troops? General Mattis. You hit the three points that we are concerned with. Under logistics, it is maintenance as well, how they keep their gear going. The intelligence fusion and the air sovereignty are critical. I think right now there are going to be loose ends unless the Iraqis ask us to stay and work on these issues. Those loose ends would be difficult for them to overcome on their own, sir. Senator McCain. Hezbollah is now the dominant actor in the government of Lebanon. Do you think the United States should continue providing military assistance to the Lebanese air forces, armed forces, or is it something we should wait and see? What is your view of that situation? General Mattis. Well, we saw Hezbollah use threats of violence to undercut the government. We are all very much aware of that. The new government is still in formation, and we will have to take a very close look at how it is organized and how it is formed to deal with Lebanon's future. I think that an inclusive government is the only option that works with the various confessional groups that try to share power there. But I believe right now, if we look at the example of Egypt, and we look at what happened where we were able to maintain, under some criticism that Congress came under for giving us the amount of money that we gave to the Egyptian military, but we were able to maintain a relationship there that paid off, I think, when it came time to see them either ethically use their position to help the people of the country or what we see in Libya. So as we look at Lebanon, where they have never lost track of any of the equipment that we have given to them yet--the equipment given to the Lebanese armed forces, I think we should look at the quality of the government as it is put together, recognize that the military can actually be a bulwark against malign influence, and act in our best interest once we have made that analysis. Senator McCain. Have you seen the news reports that a number of people were arrested in Iraq as a result of demonstrations? General Mattis. I have. Yes, sir. The ones on, I think, the 26th? Yes, sir. Senator McCain. So it is of concern that they would be arresting demonstrators in a country we expect them to allow demonstrations? General Mattis. Sir, the demonstrations were not as large as we expected, but they were spread all over the country. The demonstrations, by and large, were peaceful. The Iraqi Security Forces were out, and al Qaeda did not take advantage. I don't think they could take advantage of this opportunity to kill more innocent people. In the midst of that, there were some people who did things like stone troops. There were about as many people injured on the Iraqi Security Force side, around 50, as there were injured total and killed, unfortunately, on the demonstrators' side. Those appear to be contained in each case where government buildings were stormed. Prime Minister Maliki has said that he will investigate each death, each injury, and make certain they know what happened in each case. So I think right now what we saw was, by and large, a very restrained use of force by the Iraqi Security Forces in regards to the demonstrators. There was no opening fire on them. It was a much more restrained effort. I don't know what all the investigations are going to show yet, Senator, but I would like to get back to you once I see what we can find through our intel sources. [The information referred to follows:] In coordination with U.S. Forces Iraq, we have determined the protests drew approximately 27,000 Iraqi citizens to 43 demonstrations across the country. Protestors directed many of their grievances at provincial governments. The largest demonstrations were in the cities of Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, and Fallujah. Individual demonstrations ranged from a few hundred up to 8,000 protestors. While the protests were largely peaceful, 14 of 43 turned violent, usually after the demonstrators attempted to enter or damage government buildings. Current reporting has determined that 119 Iraqis and 4 journalists were detained across Iraq on the day of 25 February. At this time, I do not know the specifics of each arrest. In several cases, security forces responded to violent demonstrators with small arms fire. Prime Minister Maliki has initiated investigations to determine what happened in these instances. In total, 11 Iraqi citizens were killed; 72 citizens were injured, and 45 members of the Iraqi Security Forces were wounded. Senator McCain. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain. Senator Lieberman. Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both of you. General Mattis, thanks for your service. Admiral Olson, also let me join those who are thanking you for your extraordinary career of service to our country and the time particularly in which you have been the leader of SOCOM, and through you really to thank everyone who serves under you in that command. This is a remarkable group of Americans who I have had the privilege to meet as I have traveled around, particularly to battle zones. Honestly, every day they are performing critical and dangerous missions with a remarkable degree of skill, bravery, and I would say patriotism, and also, of course, effect. A lot of that has grown and developed under your watch. I can't thank you enough for that, and thank all of them. Let me just give you an opportunity to develop a little more your metaphor that the fabric is strong, but around the edges there may be a little fraying of the SOF. What are the specific shortfalls that you would like to see us address to make sure that the whole fabric is as strong as you and we want it to be? Admiral Olson. Thank you, sir. I got an email not too long ago from an operational commander forward who said, ``Sir, the good news is that the demand for SOF is higher than ever. The bad news is the demand is higher than ever.'' As 100,000 U.S. troops came out of Iraq, only fewer than 1,000 were from SOF. At the same time, we saw a requirement to move more than 1,500 into Afghanistan. This is the force that, as you said, has earned its way to real importance in terms of executing strategies in those conflicts. It is at the point where for some elements of our force, time at home with their families has become the abnormal condition. They have to adjust to being home rather than adjust to being away. It is those elements of the force that I am seeking to provide some relief for in terms of 1,000 programs. There is no magic answer to this. It is gaining a greater understanding of what the real issues are. It is shaving where we can the number of days that they are away from home for training when they are not forward deployed. It is putting more predictability into their lives. It is relieving every special operations member of any job that can be performed by anybody else. I do believe that the Services--Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps--could invest in capabilities that would provide more habitual, more timely support to SOF. We are in those discussions with each of the Services. I do believe that the quality of the training, the equipment, and the facilities that we provide them is certainly a factor in ensuring that this force, in which we have invested so heavily for 10 years, will still be with us 10 years hence. Senator Lieberman. Well, I appreciate that answer, and I am sure the members of the committee look forward to working with you and your staff to see if we can help you with some of those. General Mattis, as Senator McCain said, we had the opportunity to travel through some of the Arab world last week where these remarkable changes are occurring. My own feeling is that while you are right, there is both opportunity and challenge, that the opportunity here is greater. It is really remarkable to see these peaceful revolutions occur, which have to make both the leaders of al Qaeda up in the mountains feel that history may be passing them by, but also represent a real direct threat to Iran, which I think you correctly and characteristically bluntly identify as our greatest long-term threat in the region. I want to just come back to Libya briefly because I was interested that in some of our visits with young people and others in Tunisia, Egypt, where these revolutions have succeeded, they are watching how the world responds to Gaddafi's brutality to his own people. Because they are taking it as a sign of if Gaddafi can survive, they worry that other leaders in the Arab world will similarly try to repress revolutions. I know the administration is considering a range of options now with regard to Gaddafi. I know Senator McCain asked you about the no-fly zone. Have you, in your CENTCOM role, been asked to prepare for any activities relating to Libya, including, for instance, the provision of humanitarian assistance, medical supplies, food, to people in the liberated areas of Libya? General Mattis. Senator, as you understand, this comes under Africa Command's (AFRICOM) AOR. Senator Lieberman. Yes, sir. General Mattis. I have dispatched ships under the order of the Secretary of Defense that could provide options to the President. Yes, sir. Senator Lieberman. That is reassuring to hear. I know it is the AFRICOM. But obviously, you have a lot of assets in the region, and I am encouraged to hear that they are moving to be available. Going back to Iran, for some period of time, there was a certain uncertainty, if I can put it that way, about the extent to which the Iranians were assisting the terrorists and extremists in Afghanistan against us. It was clear that they were assisting the Shia extremists in Iraq and, unfortunately, have a lot of American blood on their hands as a result. Could you tell us a little more now about the state of our conclusions about what the Iranians are doing to help the Taliban or other anti-government, anti-American forces in Afghanistan? General Mattis. I can give you an incomplete answer, Senator. They have given low levels of ammunition, money, that sort of support, improvised explosive device components, to our enemies in Afghanistan. At one point, the Taliban and Iran were very much at odds with each other, to include the Taliban killing a number of Iranian diplomats there in northern Afghanistan. But the reason I say I am giving you an incomplete answer is we are keeping a very sharp eye on some recent information we have to see if they are, in fact, elevating their support, which would be very, very unwise for them to do. Senator Lieberman. Thank you, sir. My time is up. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. Senator Inhofe. Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, we would all echo the remarks about your service, Admiral Olson. You certainly will be missed. When we are talking about the withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan, occasionally the President talks about conditions on the ground. I am not sure just what is going to happen, what these timetables are. But I would say this. I have had the opportunity, going all the way back to the fall of 2003 when it happened to be the Oklahoma 45th over in Afghanistan helping the ANA to train themselves, and they were doing really a great job. But each year when, we go back and see it, we see this improvement in training. I think this really has to be recognized. I don't see Senator Hagan here now, but she and I were there spending New Year's Eve in Afghanistan and had a chance to go down to the Kabul military training center. It is almost like looking at a training center here in the United States. I am talking about the separation between artillery and infantry, how they are doing it. We had individual interviews, with interpreters, where just at random we would select people, and we saw the enthusiasm they have for their quality of training. So I see really great improvements in the quality of training over there, and that was my personal observation. General Mattis, are you as excited about that as I am? General Mattis. Sir, the success of this last year, especially as we see the Afghan forces coming of age, very much is depending upon the training, the superb training, and it is going exactly as you say. We now have metrics in place where we measure them. Then we are seeing the improved capability in the field. It has to be the enemy's worst nightmare. Senator Inhofe. Yes, I would say that is true. When we talk to these individuals, they want this to be a career. When I saw the position that the Egyptian military is going to be in during this new transition or whatever we are going into right now, I was somewhat pleased with it. One reason is that I have been a staunch supporter up here, probably the most staunch supporter, of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and what it has meant. With Egypt, it even goes further because we are talking about 3 decades now that they have done this. My feeling was that one of the great benefits of the IMET program is that it develops a relationship between the military of other countries. I have seen this throughout Africa and elsewhere, which is why we have been wanting to expand it. So I felt pretty good about that. I noticed that in 2010, our Egypt IMET program was at about $2 million and dropped down to about $1.5 million in 2011. I am trying to get the figure now as to what is requested for 2012. I would like just to get you on the record on your feelings about the IMET program and how much that has benefited us, particularly with the situation right now as it is in Egypt. General Mattis. Senator, I think the IMET program is a strategic asset to us, where we bring those officers to our country. They go through training and education here. We then go on joint exchanges with them back in their country, exercises and all, and we see it pay off there. But there is a longer-term payoff, and that payoff is when I walk into a room as a brigadier general back in 2001, and the first discussion I have with a half dozen officers is them telling me the best year of their life was in Maxwell Air Force Base or in Fort Leavenworth--and we immediately start from a position of common understanding. I think this is a strategic asset to us that we should certainly maintain full support for. Senator Inhofe. All right. I appreciate that. Do you echo those sentiments, Admiral Olson? Admiral Olson. Absolutely, sir. You can sign me up as a member of the IMET fan club. I was in a position long ago, a part of the implementation team of IMET in Tunisia, and that country was particularly well served by IMET. Senator Inhofe. Yes. We were just a couple of days ago with Prime Minister Netanyahu. He was referring to the earthquake that is taking place right now. When Senator Lieberman was talking about the commands, it occurred to me that when we were in Stuttgart, we were with European Command, AFRICOM, and CENTCOM. You have three commands, really, right now that are dealing with this problem. Are you guys all talking to each other? Do you feel there is no problem in that you are dealing with an earthquake that has taken place in three commands? General Mattis. Sir, we have a very close working relationship, and there is strong collaboration between us. Senator Inhofe. Yes. Admiral Olson, we also had the opportunity of spending some time in Djibouti, and Admiral Losey, I guess it was, spent quite a bit of time with us. I was certainly impressed with what they are doing there. When I look at your statement, it says, ``We now total close to 60,000, about a third of whom are career members of SOF, meaning that they have been selected, trained, and qualified to earn the military occupational specialty or skill code identifier of the SOF.'' Now that would be a third of the 60,000. Tell me a little bit about the other two-thirds that are not included in this category. Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. They are the full range of enabling, technical, supportive capabilities--engineers, logisticians, administrators, intelligence analysts, maintenance crews, and the like--that make the rest of it all possible. We are a broadly capable force. We do have our own airplanes, our own helicopters, our own boats, our own mini submarines. So, this requires a supporting crew that has to be quite expert as well. Senator Inhofe. Well, we are concerned about your resources, that you have them, because we know what your mission is and what you have been able to do. Is everything going all right in terms of retention and recruiting? Admiral Olson. Sir, the recruiting is good. The recruiting has been pretty consistent over the last decade, even consistent across the 9/11 attacks. Retention has been pretty good. It has been above the service averages in almost every category. Senator Inhofe. Which is very good, too. Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. Senator Inhofe. Yes. Admiral Olson. We are beginning to see at the mid-grade level, sort of the 8 to 10 years of service point, a slight leveling off of the retention. Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you. My time has expired. But if you, maybe for the record, could elaborate a little bit on your numbers that you have right now as you look into the future and how this--whether the 60,000 is going to be--increasing it, if that is going to be adequate, for the record. Admiral Olson. Sir, for the record, in my opinion, it is adequate. I believe that the key to special operations capability beyond our current numbers is mostly in terms of supporting special operations from the much broader range of capabilities within the department, with habitually assigned units that are timely in their response, that understand what special operations is and how to support special operations requirements. I am calling this the ``special operations force generation concept'' and working with each of the services on how they can contribute to that and how we can contribute to their force generation cycles, as that is appropriate. The specific answer to your numbers question is that--and I am on record before this committee now in 3 previous years as saying we should not, we ought not grow more than 3 to 5 percent per year in our manpower because of the quality that we need to maintain as we do that. We are projected to do that for the next 3 or 4 years. Senator Inhofe. That is good. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Nelson. Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Also let me add my appreciation, Admiral Olson, for your service and best wishes for your future. IMET is a very important part of what I would hope to be our outreach to the world in a way that makes good sense. I have had military officials from Egypt in my office before who have been here getting the IMET training, and I have been impressed with their appreciation and their understanding of what kind of military--or what the military should do in connection with government. My question would be do you think that the difference between the way the military has behaved in Libya and the way military behaved in Egypt is, at least in part, due to their IMET training? General Mattis? General Mattis. I think there is no doubt it has contributed, sir. Each nation has its own history, its own culture. But I think the ethical performance by the Egyptian military was impacted by their time spent in our schools over these last decades. Senator Nelson. The same would be true in the case of Tunisia as well? General Mattis. Yes, sir. Senator Nelson. Do we have any plans to try to expand the program? I know resources are tight right now. But one of the best ways of avoiding future expenditures is to have ethical military operatives in other countries. Are there any plans that you are aware of to expand this to perhaps some other countries where there is an interest? General Mattis. I am not aware of plans to expand it. Of course, the Secretary of Defense can open the door to different countries at different times, give them more school seats, that sort of thing. I think it would be a resourcing issue. You would have to have more instructors, more classrooms, this sort of thing. I think it is worth looking at, but I am not aware of any plans right now to do so, Senator. Senator Nelson. Well, we will try to take this up with the Secretary. I appreciate, though, your response. General Mattis, I have been a strong proponent of benchmarks with metric measurements for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I had support for those in Iraq as well, and I am interested in your evaluation of the benchmarks. The last report was in November 2010, and it is my understanding the next report will be provided in April of this year. So perhaps I am a little ahead of the report progress. I would like to know whether or not the report in November stated that the assessment of governance in focus districts showed that 38 percent of the population lived in the areas rated as having emerging or full-authority Afghan governance. It reflects no change through March 2010. I wonder are we trending up, or are we flat-lined, or are we trending down at this point? I am talking about both Pakistan and Afghanistan. There may be a difference in each of the countries. General Mattis. Oh, there is significant difference, sir. Let me address Afghanistan, where General Petraeus and Ambassador Eikenberry lead our effort in supporting the Afghan governance. I will tell you that this is receiving a lot of attention. We are making progress. I believe it is lagging behind the security effort. I think that is somewhat understandable. You don't get governance in until you get enough security that people can, without concern, carry out the governmental functions. At the same time, we are dealing with a country that probably took several hundred billion dollars' worth of damage during decades of war, according to the International Monetary Fund. When you translate that into the human damage and the damage to the people, the education system, this sort of thing, it is a long, hard slog to create the kind of governmental organizations and the right people who can then create the kind of progress that will reflect in those metrics, sir. The Pakistan military is where I have most of my connections. But from what I read, I have concerns about Pakistan's governance and their ability to meet the needs of their people. I believe right now that President Karzai may actually be in a better position on this than the political leadership in Pakistan. Senator Nelson. Both Afghanistan and we depend on the Pakistani military and the Pakistani Government to be able to take care of those largely isolated areas--I guess Swat and the particular areas there--where there are safe havens for al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other hostile operatives. That makes it much more difficult for us to be able to contain and degrade and defeat that enemy. Is that fair? General Mattis. It is very fair, sir. Again, it is the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), which constitutionally is under a different sort of governance even within Pakistan. Further, I think the impact of the floods this year--we served alongside the Pakistan military that performed very well providing relief and life-saving efforts. But those floods, which were enormous in their impact--the worst in a hundred years--I don't know that once the Pakistan military had done what they could do in terms of saving the people from those floods, that there was a sufficiently robust governmental response then to help those people put their lives back together. Senator Nelson. So the attitude towards the government may not be as strong as it could be if the government had a strong follow-up response? General Mattis. I believe you are right. I don't have the data. I haven't looked at it specifically. But I believe you are correct, Senator. Senator Nelson. Okay. My final question, General, is that as we trend out of Iraq and we come upon December 31, there is some concern that maybe the Iraqi Government will ask us to remain. I don't have any indication of that, but just a general concern that perhaps their security is not sufficient for them to be able to self-govern. If that is the case--and I asked this of Secretary Gates recently. If that is the case and we are in a position where we might make the decision to stay, I would hope that we would do so, recognizing that from that point forward, that we would expect the Iraqi Government to pick up a bigger share of the cost that we would incur. It is my understanding they are dealing with a deficit there, just as we are here. But it only adds to our deficit. If I have to choose between mine and theirs, you know what I am going to choose. If that happens, I would hope that we would be thinking about how we can make certain that the Iraqi Government picks up a bigger share of any costs that we would incur going forward. That is less a question more than a wish. In that regard, I hope that you will keep that in mind because, obviously, it will come indirectly under your jurisdiction. Have you had any thoughts about that? Should we be asked to stay? General Mattis. I haven't looked specifically at your point. However, there is clearly an increasing sense of responsibility by the Iraqi Government toward resourcing their own security forces. I think that would be a natural part of the negotiations between the two governments if we were asked to stay. Senator Nelson. Yes, I would hope that we would make that a part of the negotiations because that is what we would have to do. We can't just assess it. We would have to have a common agreement. General Mattis. I have it, sir. Thank you. Senator Nelson. Well, thank you, General Mattis, and thank you for your service and all the men and women under your command. We appreciate their continued sacrifice and service, and their families as well. Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Senator Ayotte. Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman. I also want to commend Admiral Olson and General Mattis for your distinguished service to our country. Please express our gratitude to all the troops that serve underneath you for all that they are doing to protect our country. In recent hearings, Secretary Gates as well as Secretary Vickers have testified that approximately one out of four detainees who have been released from Guantanamo have gotten back into the fight. Admiral Olson or General Mattis, could you tell us a little more about what are the details regarding some of these detainees who are joining the fight? Have there been examples where some of these detainees have actually injured or killed American troops that have been returned back into the fight? General Mattis. Senator, the best data we have would show approximately 25 percent have either returned, and we can confirm it, or we strongly suspect they have returned. Twenty-five percent is a concern to all of us involved in this war because it reinforces the enemy. It gives people some degree of credibility because they have been in our hands. They have gotten out. So, yes, ma'am, it is a big concern. Senator Ayotte. Have there been examples where some of these detainees who have returned to the fight have actually injured our soldiers or killed our soldiers? General Mattis. I don't have a specific example of that. However, for example, we know one of them is the number two person in AQAP. Clearly, he is engaged in trying to do so. If he hasn't, it is just because he hasn't been successful yet, but his intent is exactly what you are suggesting. Senator Ayotte. He is obviously directing members of al Qaeda to kill American troops. That is a deep concern, given that we released him from our detention facility. I am deeply concerned about our policy toward detainees and release back into theater, and I think that the least we can do for our troops is to hold those who are dangerous and not allow them to get back into theater to harm our troops. It is certainly something that I look forward to continuing to work with others in the Senate to make sure that we have a sensible detention policy that doesn't allow these terrorists to get back into theater. General Mattis, I know that we have emphasized that, of course, Libya is not directly in your responsibility. However, you mentioned that recently you have dispatched ships to provide options and assets in the region itself. Last week, there were many nations who were sending military aircraft and ships to Libya in order to evacuate their own citizens that were in Libya. As I understand it, we sent and chartered a civilian ferry to try to take the civilians that were in Libya, U.S. citizens, to get them out of Libya. Yet that ferry actually couldn't depart port for 2 days due to high winds and waves. Are you aware whether certain nations, including Germany and Great Britian, actually sent military assets to be able to get its citizens out of Libya? General Mattis. Senator, I am not aware of the specifics here. As you will understand, I have been a little busy in my own theater. But I think what you are saying is about right, but I can't confirm it. Senator Ayotte. Do you know if we had wanted to, whether we could have sent military assets to be able to get our civilians out of Libya, as other countries did? General Mattis. Ma'am, again, I don't keep the Mediterranean picture. I am not current on it. So I don't know what ships or aircraft were available at what time and where they were and what airfields were open. I really can't give you a good answer on that. Senator Ayotte. Okay. But you are now, of course, sending some of our CENTCOM assets over to assist in that area, as you testified earlier? General Mattis. Yes, ma'am. We have. Those were to give whether it be humanitarian or whatever options the President may want. Those assets have been sent through the Suez Canal. Senator Ayotte. Had you been asked to do that last week, is that something you would have been able to do earlier last week, as opposed to where we are now? General Mattis. Yes. Well, ma'am, the way it comes to me is not as a request, frankly. I get orders. But, yes, ma'am, we can do it on order. Obviously, I have my own requirements in the theater. It is always a balancing act that the Secretary has to go through between different combatant commanders. Senator Ayotte. General, you would have certainly had the capability of doing it last week, as opposed to where we are right now? General Mattis. Yes, ma'am. Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much. I appreciate both of you testifying before the committee today. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, thank you so much for your distinguished service to our country. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. Senator Webb. Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, Admiral, greetings. I am hoping that you can help provide us a little bit of focus in terms of how we are going to approach similar situations in the future. Not long after September 11, a coalition of Afghan forces, assisted by a handful of special operators, Forward Air Controllers, kicked out the Taliban in a matter of a few weeks. We were the enablers, for lack of a better term, not the instruments or the creators, of societal change in that evolution. We took a different approach in Iraq. We are taking a different approach today in Afghanistan. We have undertaken a duty, I understand, what I would call the concept of negligence in the law. Once you undertake a duty, if you don't see it all the way through, you are guilty of negligence. At the same time, we need to really start looking at the future in terms of how we are going to use our military. Secretary Gates made a speech at West Point recently, indicating that, in his view, this troop-heavy concept read pretty much nation building is not a model that should be applied in the future with respect to issues of international terrorism. At the same time, General Casey, over the past day or 2, mentioned that he wouldn't be surprised to see 100,000 Army soldiers deployed in these types of operations 10 years from now. I would like to hear your thoughts on where should we be moving here in terms of the use of our ground troops in issues of combating international terrorism? General? General Mattis. Senator, I think, as we look toward the future, I have been a horrible prophet. I have never fought anywhere I expected to in all my years. I believe that we have to take each situation on its own, and we have to define the problem to a Jesuit's level of acceptability. It has to be defined to a point that the solution is very clear in terms of what is the strategy we must adopt. The strategy, of course, is what are the ends, and what are the means to get there? The one caution I would give, having studied this problem, is that we cannot marry one preclusive view of war and preclude other types and say we just won't do that because the very nature of war is the enemy will gravitate toward our perceived weakness. We are going to have to have a force that has a built-in shock absorber, basically can go anywhere and do anything, at the same time have a moderating impact on our own strategy, so we don't try to go anywhere and do everything. It has to be a vital national interest, and we have to make sure we have a force that is a general-purpose force that does not allow the enemy to think that we are leaving some form of warfare uncovered and then works against us in that direction. Senator Webb. I wouldn't disagree with you on that at all. At the same time, I can recall having written a piece the day after September 11, discussing how to deal with international terrorism, and two of the concepts in that--you build your strategy off of operational concepts and the enemy that you are facing. Two of the clear concepts in that was, number one, you have to maintain your maneuverability, and, number two, when you are fighting a mobile enemy, you are at risk whenever you occupy territory and then have to defend the territory that you are occupying. I think that those are the decision points moving toward the future. Admiral, do you have any thoughts on that? Admiral Olson. Sir, I think when the enemy is a ponderous, state-sponsored, uniformed, organized fighting force, it may require a similar force to defeat it. But I think that is less likely in the future. I agree with Secretary Gates on that. We are much more likely to see the less regular kinds of warfare--the cyber warfare, the terrorist warfare, the non- state sponsored warfare--to which the best solution is often enabling another country's forces to deal with it in that region and being, as you said, the supporting force, not the supported force in that fight. Senator Webb. Again, clearly, in terms of international terrorism, the whole operational concept is to not align themselves with a state. By the way, I would not in any way disagree with what General Mattis just said about keeping all your options on the table. But it just seems to me with the variety of threats that face us right now, the type of response that we have made over the past 8 or 9 years is not a workable model. It concerns me a good bit. General, I want to ask you a question about Pakistan. I have raised a number of questions over the past 2 years about the transparency of our funding in terms of assistance to Pakistan. Are you comfortable with the transparency of the money that is going into Pakistan, and that you know where it is going? General Mattis. I am, Senator; they don't do it by computer. So it is all written out by hand, and we track it right down to the end user. I have some of the most aggressive colonels and majors you can imagine in Islamabad working under my vice admiral there who track this, and we routinely reject requests from them for reimbursement. I know it is not where they just walk in with a bill and we pay it. Sometimes the ones we want more evidence of outweigh the numbers that we just accept and say, ``Yes, we know you did these things. So we are going to pay you.'' For example, fuel for our forces and that sort of thing that comes in. So, yes, I think we do have a very good feel for whether or not we are reimbursing real costs vice any fraudulent costs. Senator Webb. We have seen news reports that Pakistan has doubled its nuclear arsenal in recent years, as we have been providing assistance in other areas. Do you have any worries that our assistance to Pakistan has allowed them to fund programs such as their nuclear program? General Mattis. I am confident there is no direct funding going to their nuclear program because of my confidence in tracking the costs we are reimbursing them for now. Obviously, they have their own funding, and whether or not they would spend some of that elsewhere, if we weren't reimbursing---- Senator Webb. Right. I understand that direct money would not be going over there. The concern that I have is that if we are funding programs that they otherwise would be funding and they are able to take that money in order to increase their nuclear arsenal, it is not a healthy situation for the region and for us, in my view. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. Senator Wicker. Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. General Mattis, let me follow up on a line of questioning Senator McCain began. I was not in the room at the time, but I understand that he got a brief answer to this so-called day of rage in Iraq. Let me see if I could explore this a little further. In particular, I would point out a Washington Post Foreign Service story that appeared on Saturday, February 26, in which it is reported that Iraqi Security Forces detained hundreds of people, including prominent journalists, artists, and intellectuals, in demonstrations that brought thousands of Iraqis to the streets and ended with soldiers shooting into crowds. It goes on to say that this involved more than a dozen demonstrations across the country that killed at least 29 people, as crowds stormed provincial buildings, forced local officials to resign, freed prisoners, and otherwise demanded more from a government they only recently had a chance to elect. Is this, in your judgment, General, an isolated incident? Or is it an example of the contagion that is sweeping the entire region? What does it say about the popular support of a government which recently was subject to election? I understand the complications after the elections of the government being formed in a very fragile manner without a clear consensus. How accurate is this depiction? How worried should we be that this country, where we have invested so much of our blood and treasure, might be just as unstable as some other regimes? General Mattis. Senator, I can't comment directly on the accuracy of the story because the word that I have is there were dozens of demonstrations. But I take that as a positive sign. Those did not happen 15 years ago under Saddam. It is a nascent democracy. It is the one that has been through a very violent era. A critical part of our training of the Iraqi Security Forces has been the ethical use of force. They are also still operating against a very capable terrorist enemy. For example, the minister of defense of al Qaeda in Iraq was killed on that day--I believe it was on that day--by Iraqi Security Forces. It was a very good event for us. Senator Wicker. Was he part of the protests? General Mattis. He was not. But my point is that the enemy operates in this country, even as the people are trying to exercise their freedom to protest. I believe, from what I am told, that the number of Iraqi Security Forces injured and the number of demonstrators injured and killed is about the same. The reason I bring that up is that that is oftentimes an indicator of whether or not a military just opened fire on a crowd. You open fire on a crowd with an automatic weapon, and the casualties are going to be significantly higher than the ones reported either by the government or by the newspaper article. Frankly, I wasn't ready for your question. I need to go back and check and see if I missed something in our assessment of what happened that day. I need to get back to you, Senator, because the numbers you are citing are higher than what I was told. Senator Wicker. I see. General Mattis. In most cases, it was when a government building was attacked, and most of the injured soldiers were in place, were injured by rock throwing. So that is the kind of the framework I am looking at it through. Senator Wicker. So I can expect you to supplement your answer on the record, and I appreciate that. [The information referred to follows:] In coordination with U.S. Forces Iraq, we have determined the protests drew approximately 27,000 Iraqi citizens to 43 demonstrations across the country. Protestors directed many of their grievances at provincial governments. The largest demonstrations were in the cities of Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, and Fallujah. Individual demonstrations ranged from a few hundred up to 8,000 protestors. While the protests were largely peaceful, 14 of 43 turned violent, usually after the demonstrators attempted to enter or damage government buildings. Current reporting has determined that 119 Iraqis and 4 journalists were detained across Iraq on the day of 25 February. At this time, I do not know the specifics of each arrest. In several cases, security forces responded to violent demonstrators with small arms fire. Prime Minister Maliki has initiated investigations to determine what happened in these instances. In total, 11 Iraqi citizens were killed; 72 citizens were injured, and 45 members of the Iraqi Security Forces were wounded. Senator Wicker. As to the larger question, though, sir, of whether we need to be concerned about this government falling, much as governments in the region have toppled and are toppling one by one, what is your informed judgment as to the larger question? General Mattis. Well, the election was very close. It took months--I think 8, 9 months--to actually get a government formed. In close elections in a parliamentary system, that is understandable. I think it is still a work in progress. The performance of the Iraqi Security Forces during that long period, when there was just basically a caretaker government at work, gives me some degree of confidence that the security forces can protect this nascent democracy as it grows its roots. But one or two elections doesn't make a democracy, as we all know, and there is a lot of work that still has to be done. Right now, I do not think that it is in danger of falling. Senator Wicker. To what extent are the supporters of Mr. Allawi supportive of the government as it finally emerged? General Mattis. I think that is still a work in progress as well, as we see where Mr. Allawi falls out in the organization of the government. I spoke with him about 2 months ago in Baghdad, and he was still relatively positive at that time that he was going to have a meaningful role. That would bring the people you are referring to onboard with him. Since then, it has been difficult to see progress, but I think it is always slower than we want to see. I think there is still progress along those lines, but I don't know where it is going to fall out right now. I think it is still too early to say. Senator Wicker. Finally, to what extent do we need to be concerned about Iran attempting to influence the foreign policy of Iraq? General Mattis. I have no doubt that Iran will attempt to influence the foreign policy and domestic policy of Iraq. Senator Wicker. Is this a serious problem or simply one of the many concerns that we have? General Mattis. I think Iran is going to be left behind by this contagion, as you described it, sweeping across the region, as they find that people are not interested in exchanging one authoritarian for one like in Tehran. So I think they have as much to worry about from this contagion. Actually, I think, in many cases, the Iraqi people are quite capable of making up their own mind without Iranian help, and that will continue to manifest. I am not naive about Iran's intent here. Senator Wicker. I hope you are correct. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Hagan. Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly want to thank Admiral Olson and General Mattis for your excellent service to our country. Thank you so much. The Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was established in 2005 and is headquartered at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. Some have suggested that MARSOC personnel should be special operations for life, rather than rotating through the command on a rotational basis as they are currently doing. They argue that this would help SOCOM create and retain personnel within the special cultural and language skills that are critical for success in irregular warfare and the foreign internal defense missions. Admiral Olson, what is your assessment of the progress made in standing up and growing MARSOC, and how are they unique within the SOF? Could you also give me your thoughts on whether the Marine operators should be special operations just for life, just as in the Army? Admiral Olson. Thank you, ma'am. First, I would say we can be very, very proud of the way that MARSOC has been established. It did just celebrate its fifth birthday last month, and they have made tremendous progress. They have been deployed at the battalion level now for over a year with tremendous effects in western Afghanistan and earning an awful lot of respect from the forces with which they serve. It has been a very close partnership between SOCOM and the U.S. Marine Corps in building the MARSOC to the extent that it has so far. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has recently approved a military occupation specialty for those who have been through selection and advanced training to be members of the MARSOC, which will help us track and retain selected members of that community. I do believe that SOF for life is a concept that ought to be limited, that there is great value to circulation, that it is good for SOCOM to circulate people through its community back out into the big services and to bring people from the big services into our community so that we are not guilty of spinning a cocoon too tightly around ourselves in the special operations community. I am quite comfortable with the way it is going now. Even those who are in for sort of one tour in the MARSOC, that is now at least a 4-year tour and in some cases 5 years, which goes beyond some of the other services in many cases. Senator Hagan. Thank you. On February 17, Secretary Gates indicated during his testimony before this committee that it is unsustainable for the United States to fund a sizable ANSF indefinitely. He suggested that perhaps the United States could temporarily fund the ANSF as a sort of surge in security assistance and then reduce that as conditions in Afghanistan improve and as the ANSF becomes more capable. General Mattis, can you elaborate on what Secretary Gates discussed on February 17? General Mattis. I can, Senator. If you look at what has happened with the Taliban, beaten down badly in 2001, was able to regain its balance and come back strongly, and then over this last year or 2, we have reversed their successes. So we have surged our own military. NATO has surged. The troop-contributing nations have--about 100,000 United States, about 50,000 non-U.S. coalition. We have about double that on the part of the Afghans. What you are seeing is we are going into a critical time, and we are going to have to fight it out. As the enemy loses-- and they will lose--we will succeed. Then there is going to come a point where you don't need as many international troops and eventually, perhaps, not as many Afghan troops and police because the enemy has been taken down. So the idea that Secretary Gates explained about a surge right now shows the normal ebb and flow that could result as a result of this kind of war, as the enemy's fortunes start going backwards. Senator Hagan. You said that you thought the ANSF could also, at some point, reduce its numbers? General Mattis. Well, I believe that at some point after the country gets more mature, it has more opportunity for young people. So there is not the breeding ground there for young guys to go join the extremists. Then the demand, the requirement for the size of those forces could well drop off. Senator Hagan. Thank you. Admiral Mullen has indicated that the longstanding U.S. military-to-military relationship has contributed to the professionalism of the Egyptian military. Experts have indicated that it is important to sustain Egypt's annual military aid because regardless of how events unfold in Egypt, the military will likely preserve its unique position within the governing system. They have also argued that freezing military aid to Egypt undermines the leverage that our Government has to promote an effective transition and to persuade the Egyptian armed forces to abide by the peace treaty with Israel. General Mattis, what is your position on the future of the U.S.-Egyptian military-to-military relationship? How might restructuring the foreign military financing allocation to Egypt impact our strategic objectives in the country, as well as the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty? General Mattis. Senator, I believe that we should remain relentlessly engaged with the region. This is not the time to pull back. I am on the phone, for example, with General Anan, the chief of defense of the Egyptian military, on a routine basis. I have seen him in Egypt. There is a degree of professional respect there that allows us to have very candid discussions. He has been very proud of the fact that they are a caretaker military government. They are going to move quickly toward elections. I don't think you can disconnect that from the experiences of his officers, who have spent years in our country going through schools. I think that right now the military-to-military relationship and the ethical performance of the Egyptian military are very tightly tied together. This has to do with regional peace. This has to do with Middle East peace, as you know so well from decades of peace between Egypt and Israel. I endorse what we are doing right now, and I think we should continue. Senator Hagan. As far as the treaties, do you feel confident that they will abide by these treaties? General Mattis. Yes, ma'am, I do. It is in Egypt's best interest as well. But I am hesitant to get into the political arena and start forecasting things. Without a doubt, our military-to-military relationship, I think, is helpful in terms of being a stabilizing force and, I might add, with a force that used its authority in an ethical manner when a crisis came. Senator Hagan. They did. Thank you. My time has expired. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan. Senator Blumenthal. Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join in thanking both of you, Admiral Olson and General Mattis, for your service and the service of the courageous and dedicated men and women under your command. I want to ask a couple of questions about those men and women who are serving and sacrificing so courageously. Admiral Olson, last year, I believe you testified that the SOCOM's Care Coalition was supporting 2,800 wounded SOF officers through a clearinghouse that works to increase the likelihood of their returning to service or having lives afterward. I think that clearinghouse exemplifies one of the SOF truths, which is that humans are more valuable than hardware, an emphasis that I certainly appreciate. I wonder if you could share with the committee an update on what SOCOM is doing to manage the kind of care, medical care, counseling, and other kinds of care that are necessary for these wounded warriors? Admiral Olson. Thank you, Senator. I thank you for highlighting the Care Coalition. It was actually mentioned by Admiral Mullen as the gold standard for DOD, and we are quite proud of it. Part of the true value of the Care Coalition is that the population with which it works is small enough that the relationships are personal. So that when somebody calls the Care Coalition for some help, a wounded or a family member, they are known to the Care Coalition. It is difficult to scale this up too much, but so far, it is within a manageable level that has been quite effective. What they do is serve as advocates for the wounded and their families. They connect those who have need with those who are willing to provide for needs. So your term ``brokering'' and ``broker house'' is an accurate one. In addition to that, we are investing more heavily than in the past in rehabilitation facilities, in physical therapy experts, and technicians at the unit level so that those who need that frequent assistance have access to it on a daily basis. That has been hugely effective in accelerating the ability of our people to return to duty. It is reality that the instinct of virtually all of our wounded is to ask ``How soon can I get back to my unit?'' So, providing them accelerated opportunity to do that has become very important. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Mullen testified not long ago before this committee about the difficulty of identifying some of the wounds, particularly when they involve traumatic brain injury or post traumatic stress. Can you give the committee your assessment of how adequate, how effective the means are to diagnose and identify those kinds of problems? Admiral Olson. Senator, frankly, I think we are very inadequate. I think the data does not collect in a meaningful way the information that we need to not only be responsive but, perhaps more importantly, to be proactive and preventive in dealing with those who have suffered psychological trauma as well as physical trauma. I have established what I call the ``pressure on the force task force.'' This is a tiger team that is going from unit to unit now. I will get a report back from them in about 90 days. What I have asked them to do is ignore the data and do sensing, rely on leaders, intuition, on the experience of teammates, and spend real time with the families, to include the children, to gain an understanding of what really is happening in the force. I don't want to get out ahead of that because I don't want to taint the responses to the surveys. But I do look forward very much to receiving the recommendations from that team. Senator Blumenthal. Your testimony speaks very powerfully to the potential of new developments actually on the battlefield as well as afterward in medical advances, potential research and development, and technology and so forth. Can you elaborate on that and also give us your assessment on whether the resources in the 2012 budget are adequate for that purpose? Admiral Olson. Sir, I would ask that the 2012 budget be supported. I don't have a strong sense of the adequacy precisely, but I believe that there is enough request in the budget to give us room to move with respect to that. In terms of medical advances, I do believe that biomedical research is a very important undertaking for the military, that we have experiences that are unlike civilian medicine and that any investment in military biomedical research is a good investment. Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. General Mattis, in light of what we are seeing in the world today, the recent transit through the Suez Canal of Iranian naval vessels, the ongoing attacks by Somali pirates, and other developments that affect our lines of communication and transport at sea, I wonder if you could share your views on the adequacy of the Navy's funding request with respect to submarine operations and undersea warfare for this fiscal year and the next. General Mattis. Senator, I have not looked at the Navy's request because, as a combatant commander, I only look at whether or not they are filling my requests with those ships they have today. I am somewhat in the current fight. I will tell you that I get what I need when I ask for it. But clearly--CENTCOM's future will be an increasingly naval future. It will not be one in which we have significant numbers of ground troops on the ground in various locations. So, how do we maintain a Navy that has the reach and can sustain our influence, reassure our friends, and temper any mischief by our enemies, make certain that they realize there is a cost? I think that is critical in the CENTCOM future. Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. My time has expired, but I just want to thank both of you. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator Manchin. Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of you. I just returned from Afghanistan and Pakistan. I can't tell you how impressed I was at the quality of people that we have--our men and women, all of you who are leading them, and the job they are doing. With that being said, I am going to ask some questions. We will try to keep the answers as brief as possible to try to get through these. First of all, I will ask both of you, are we fighting a war on terror, or are we nation building? I will start, Admiral, with you. Admiral Olson. My responsibility is in both arenas. We present the SOF in two flavors. One is simply the strike flavor, the man hunting, the hunting aspect of counterterrorism. But at the same time, we are out in the villages and remote areas, working with locals to develop their own resources and look after their own neighborhoods. Senator Manchin. General? General Mattis. Sir, we are fighting a war that is unlike conventional war. It requires both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. Part of that would be seen as nation building, but you have seen it in action over there. Whatever it is called, it checkmates the enemy's designs. Senator Manchin. The other thing I would ask is the size. Can you all identify the size of our enemy and how much our enemy is being funded by--their cost of their operation against us? General Mattis. Identify the size of the enemy? Senator Manchin. Is there 10,000 of them versus 100,000 of us? Are they getting $100 million, and we are spending $100 billion? General Mattis. I will have to take the question for the record, sir. There is a syndicate of organizations. Al Qaeda has been--pretty much been pushed down, beaten down. They are in a kind of hang-on up in the FATA right now. Haqqani network is still robust, kind of their special forces. They are linked to the Taliban in Afghanistan, who are also linked to the Taliban in Pakistan. It is a syndicate. It comes together. It goes apart. It fights each other. It fights us. It is hard to get an exact count. It will take me a little time, but I will get you our best estimate on each of those groups in that syndicate. [The information referred to follows:] [Deleted.] General Mattis. As far as the cost, I think it is very difficult to evaluate the cost. But clearly, I think we have to look in the future to how do we become cost imposing, use cost- imposing strategies on an enemy, rather than being in the position that you just described. [The information referred to follows:] In coordination with the AF/PAK Center of Excellence at U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center Special Operations Command estimates that the Taliban and insurgent forces inside of Afghanistan is between 22,000 to 32,000 fighters. Senator Manchin. Let me just say, if I can, the best I could decipher from what we were getting information is I think it is fair to say that we have about 10 to 1 of the troops superior. We have about 10 troops for their 1 identified. We spend about $10 for their $1. It looks like money is not going to win this war. Is that a fair statement, Admiral? Admiral Olson. Sir, I would have to take, for the record, your numbers to confirm or deny that. I do believe that the presence in a variety of capacities and the whole of nation approach to Afghanistan is very important. I do believe that it is less expensive to fund an insurgency than a counterinsurgency, certainly. Senator Manchin. If I may ask this question, and this will be to you, Admiral. I was so impressed with special ops. We were privileged to go through a briefing and watch how they operate. With that being said, do you believe that you all are able to identify the Haqqanis and Quetta Shura tribes, if you will, and their location within Pakistan and your inability to go get them or them to assist you in getting them? Is there any break in that whatsoever? Admiral Olson. Sir, I would say that Pakistan is a sovereign nation and will, as sovereign nations do, act in its own best interests first. It does not see itself as threatened by those groups, as our forces feel they are threatened by those groups. We are willing to assist Pakistan at the rate that they are willing to accept our assistance, sir. Senator Manchin. So, basically, we have an ally who truly is not acting as an ally. This is just from an outsider's opinion and looking at the operation of our people being at risk, knowing where the enemy is, and we can't do anything about it. Admiral Olson. Sir, I would say that in many ways Pakistan is behaving as a great ally and taking much risk upon themselves. But there is perhaps more that can be done. I think that the senior-level dialogues that are taking place are very productive in this regard. Senator Manchin. To both of you, do you know if the literacy rate in Afghanistan has improved at all over 10 years? General Mattis. Yes, it has. I would have to get you the numbers, sir. It is also one of the primary recruiting tools for the Afghan army. But today, we have significantly higher education. I will get you the numbers that can verify this. Senator Manchin. The numbers that I received show that literacy in Afghanistan is still only 28 percent. General Mattis. Sir, well, considering that during the Taliban's control, they didn't build a single school and they have been trying to blow up the ones we are building, it has been difficult. But we are making progress, sir. I will get you the numbers. [The information referred to follows:] Afghan literacy rates have indeed improved and are currently trending upward under International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)- led development efforts. In 2008, the Department of State estimated the adult (over 15 years old) Afghan literacy rate at 43 percent for males and at 12 percent for females. In September 2009, an ISAF assessment estimated the adult Afghan literacy rate had climbed to 50 percent (+7 percent) for males and 14 percent (+2 percent) for females. Based on the October 2010 Congressional Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, most literate Afghans are concentrated in the cities. In rural areas, 90 percent of women and more than 60 percent of men remain illiterate. Under the Taliban regime girls were not allowed to go to school and fewer than 900,000 boys were enrolled. During the same period, university enrollment was only 7,881 students. In stark contrast, nearly 7,000,000 students are now enrolled in primary and secondary education facilities (with 37 percent of them being female) and university enrollment has grown to 62,000. Senator Manchin. I would ask both of you this question, too. Do you believe that al Qaeda still poses a threat to the United States of America? If that is still correct, since they are not a presence in Afghanistan, with all of our resources and so much of our money has been dedicated to that arena, where are they now, and what are we doing to be able--are we capable of taking the fight to them, wherever it may be? Admiral Olson. Sir, I think al Qaeda is struggling. I think that its leadership is less experienced. I think its ranks are more fractured than any time in the last decade, and they certainly have distributed. There is AQAP, al Qaeda in the Maghreb, al Qaeda in Iraq, and other al Qaeda associated groups in the region. So there is a requirement to continue taking the fight to where they are, sir. Senator Manchin. General? General Mattis. They are a threat. They are under terrible pressure right now. They have gone to ground in the epicenter of this effort, which is up in the FATA, but they have also distributed down into AQAP. They have been hit hard in Iraq, but they are still a threat to the Iraqi Government. We see links going down into Somalia with al-Shabaab. Senator Manchin. With the tremendous budget concerns we have within our own nation, if changes are made or adjustments are made to the operation as we know it in Afghanistan today, do you think it will affect the outcome at all, if we reduce the funding? General Mattis. Absolutely, it will, sir. It must. I mean, right now, we have, just in the last year and a half, gotten the resources, personnel, training, Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, that sort of thing correct. We are right now approaching the time when we are going to see the results of all that. We are already seeing the results, but they are going to be very telling shortly. Senator Manchin. Admiral? Admiral Olson. Sir, Afghanistan SOF are operating at the edge of their people and at the edge of their budget. Any reduction in either would be detrimental to the effect, sir. Senator Manchin. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator Udall. Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your patience and, of course, for your service. I would like to pursue further discussion about the sanctuaries in Pakistan with this lead-in. General Mattis, I was in Malajat last October. I know you spoke to, in your testimony, what had happened there and the positive developments. Fort Carson troops were there from my home State of Colorado. So it was particularly special to be there, and it was very impressive. My fear is that it is only a matter of time before insurgents reappear. Their refuge in that part of Pakistan is only about 4 hours from Kandahar. It is just my sense is as long as the enemy has sanctuaries, we are fighting with an arm tied behind our back. General, you have spoken to why Pakistan isn't doing more to eliminate the sanctuaries. If they can't or won't address them, do you believe that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan forces working together can make enough progress on the security front to overcome the challenges presented by the sanctuaries? Admiral Olson, I would welcome your thoughts as well after the General has spoken to this. General Mattis. Sir, the area the troops from your State were operating in is, obviously, close to the border area. It is subject to being impacted by the enemy coming out of safe havens. It is not that the Pakistanis have done nothing here. They have lost thousands of troops. They have had almost 30,000 of their civilians murdered by these enemies, and they are probably in a position of saying, ``I don't want to create more enemies right now than I already have.'' They are engaged in years of the longest campaign and the most costly campaign that they have faced. I think that, while it is not perfect, we have to remind ourselves that the only thing more difficult than fighting with allies is fighting without allies. Thank God, we have the 49 nations alongside us, fighting in Afghanistan right now. With Pakistan, I think we have to look at both what they are doing and continue to try and close the gap in our understanding with what they are not doing. We are very candid in our discussions with the Pakistani leadership about this, and we will continue to work it. However, in the area that you are referring to, that kind of open ground coming from Kandahar over towards the border, General Petraeus, thanks to the increase that the President authorized, now has a surveillance brigade from the Army that is watching over that area. In other words, it is not just a thoroughfare. The enemy is going to have a very difficult time come spring when they try to reintroduce their troops back into the areas of Helmand and Kandahar, where they have lost the initiative. We are aware of the situation. We are adapting to it, and the Pakistanis are doing a lot. There is more they could do, but there is more we could be doing as well. This is the normal give-and-take of war, sir. Senator Udall. Admiral Olson? Admiral Olson. Sir, we wish they would do more. Perhaps they could do more. But I don't pretend to understand the internal dynamics within Pakistan, certainly the strategic implications of their decision-making process, to be too critical of them. Senator Udall. Yes, they do have their hands full. I do know there is a school of thought that counterinsurgencies have never been successfully completed if the insurgents have sanctuaries, and we need to continue to worry that concept. If I might, General, Admiral, I would like to talk about some of the analysis that right now we are in a strategic stalemate in Afghanistan. That is a better situation, some would argue, than we had a year or 2 or 3 ago. By that, I mean neither side can achieve its aims through the use of arms alone. A follow-on thought is that we will have difficulty preserving our gains just because we are visitors, if you will, to the area, without entering into some sort of negotiations. I know there are still disagreements among many in Afghanistan, both in the Afghan community and in ISAF, what those negotiations look like, how quickly they should happen, and what they might accomplish. My opinion is--and I have heard this from the military leadership in our country and the civilian leadership--that the way home is through a political process and political solution, ultimately. How do we incentivize the process further and make reconciliation and reintegration move more quickly? General Mattis. Senator, I do not think we are in a strategic stalemate right now. If I was before you a year ago, I probably would have accepted that. I think that the enemy is now in a worsening situation. What we are doing is our strategy is that we have a military component. You have seen that. Everyone knows what that is--reinforced, well-trained troops, better strategy. I can go on. Then you have a civilian component. Those two are married together into a combined civilian-military effort. Additionally, there is a diplomatic effort to end the war. Taliban are going to have to say we will abide by the constitution, break with al Qaeda and stop using violence. They are welcome back in. The reconciliation process has to be a process that is owned by the Afghans because they are the ones who have to reconcile. We can support it. We should support it. The international community is supporting it. Reintegration is the bottom up, reconciliation being the top down. Reintegration is where we are getting young fellows to come over to our side, and there is a process to bring them onboard. So you are seeing right now a strategy of how do you incentivize it? First point, make certain the enemy doesn't think they are going to win. That is what we have had to reverse in the last year. Then the diplomats have more of a chance to get these other efforts--reconciliation, reintegration--going. I hope that answers your question. Senator Udall. Admiral Olson, do you have any additional thoughts? Admiral Olson. Sir, I certainly agree with what General Mattis said. I would say that I do think we are on a path to being able to negotiate from a position of strength. I do believe that negotiation can accelerate the termination of a conflict, but you have to be able to do it from a position of strength. Senator Udall. Speaking of negotiations, General, India and Pakistan are reportedly negotiating again over such tough topics as Kashmir and economic integration. I assume you and Admiral Willard share perspectives and are working together. Would you comment on the opportunity there? My opinion, if India and Pakistan could reach the point at which they had a little warmer relationship, it would help our efforts in Afghanistan. General Mattis. I completely concur with you. Admiral Willard and I are in routine contact with one another, as we make certain that seam between the two combatant commands does not become a gap in our efforts to work together. At the same time, this India-Pakistan reconciliation has to be something that they take responsibility for. So we are more in a mode of making certain that what we are doing militarily is never seen as contrary to that trend. Senator Udall. My time has expired. Two brief comments. I met with some returning civilian and military leaders from Afghanistan. Interesting ideas taking shape, which is that the Afghan civilian sector ought to surge into the Afghan rural communities. That is not a new idea to you, but I wanted to continue to acknowledge. I know the chairman has really pushed on that front as well. Then, second, listening to you, I was reminded of President Lincoln's great comment that it always seemed like in war the best generals were working for the newspapers. Listening to you two today, I think the best generals and admirals are working for the American people. So, thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Udall. I just have a couple questions for a second round, and then we are going to adjourn over to the Capitol Visitor Center, room 217, for a closed session. There has been a request by at least one Senator for that. We should start there, hopefully, 5 minutes to 12:00, if no one else has any additional questions here. I just have two questions. One, General, is the question of whether or not you expect that President Karzai will be announcing later this month the first phase of provinces and districts for transition to Afghan security responsibility based on the joint recommendations of ISAF and Afghan officials. That is what Defense Minister Wardak told me was likely to happen, when he met with me in my office. Is that your understanding? General Mattis. It is, Mr. Chairman. I believe it will be on March 21. Chairman Levin. All right. The other question relates to the camp in Iraq, Camp Ashraf, where there are Iranian dissidents who are being continually harassed in various forms by agents of Iran and also by some of Maliki's people as well. Now, one of the issues there are the loudspeakers, apparently large numbers of loudspeakers, which blare propaganda into that area. I am wondering whether you have taken this issue up, General, with Prime Minister Maliki and whether we are pressing this issue because that kind of psychological abuse is unacceptable. Have you raised this with Prime Minister Maliki? General Mattis. I will raise it with him, sir. Chairman Levin. Has it been raised before, do you know? General Mattis. I don't know. Chairman Levin. Okay. Will you make sure that it is raised? General Mattis. I will. Chairman Levin. Any other questions? If not, we are going to adjourn right away to that classified session. We thank both of you again for your service. We will see you over at the Capitol Visitor Center. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS/AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE 1. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, General Petraeus and others have emphasized the importance of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs to the strategy in Afghanistan. Under the ALP, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are working with local villagers to empower communities to create their own protection force answerable to the local elders and under the oversight of the Ministry of Interior. General Petraeus has discussed the possibility of dramatically increasing the size of both programs to more effectively undercut Taliban influence in rural areas while also better connecting these areas to the central government. What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan populations and what has been the response from the Taliban? Admiral Olson. VSO and the associated ALP program have offered the Afghan Government its first steps toward legitimacy in key rural areas. By contributing to local governance, VSO provides the mechanism by which the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is able to address security, economic, judicial and developmental grievances. This has improved popular confidence in the Afghan Government and the various Afghan Security Forces. It has significantly impacted Taliban safehavens, freedom of movement, recruiting and operational effectiveness in the micro-regions where it has been implemented. As a result, the Taliban are increasing their efforts to intimidate communities and individuals participating in the VSO and ALP programs. General Mattis. [Deleted.] 2. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, do you believe the availability of U.S. Special Operations teams is a limiting factor in expanding these programs to a point where they can have a strategic impact in Afghanistan? Admiral Olson. The SOF teams have a strategic impact even in small numbers, but the demand is outpacing the supply. General Mattis. No. While the VSO/ALP mission initially required SOF's unique capabilities, the program is now mature enough for conventional forces to conduct with SOF oversight. AFGHANISTAN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS 3. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, according to published reports, the tempo of counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan by U.S. and Afghan SOF has increased dramatically in the last 6 months and demonstrated significant results. Lieutenant General Rodriguez stated recently that the Afghan people are playing an increasingly important role in the success of these operations by ``helping to provide significantly more tips because they see Afghan Security Forces out among them more than they ever had because of the increase in the number [of Afghan Forces].'' Reportedly, 85 percent of counterterrorism operations take place without a shot being fired. Do you agree with Lieutenant General Rodriguez that the increased presence of Afghan Security Forces has resulted in better intelligence because the population is more likely to come forward with information? Admiral Olson. Yes. This is one of the reasons that SOF operations are partner led and U.S./Coalition missions are no longer unilateral. General Mattis. Yes. Locally provided intelligence has increased based on the growth of both Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and International Security Assistance Forces. A more secure environment has reduced the threat of retribution and allowed for the establishment of numerous community-based self-defense programs, multiple ``tip lines'' to harvest indigenous information, and 74 new local police sites that collectively provide actionable intelligence. 4. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, what has been the impact of this intelligence on the success of counterterrorism operations? Admiral Olson. Further deployment of ANSF has led to better intelligence collection. Not only is the local population more likely to report information to the ANSF, the pairing of ANSF and coalition partners can greatly assist in guiding collection focus and methods. Specifically, the partnership of Afghan National Army (ANA) Special Forces with U.S. Special Forces teams has greatly increased the Operational Detachment Alpha's ability to understand the human terrain and socio-cultural dynamics at the village and district level. Similarly, Afghan National Civil Order Police has seen success in manning checkpoints throughout southern Afghanistan. Their lasting presence along major roadways helps the Conventional Forces to better understand local populations and have demonstrated an ability to support counter IED initiatives in southern Afghanistan. General Mattis. These operations have facilitated Coalition and Government of Afghanistan efforts to secure the Afghan populace. The enhanced security environment has paid great dividends and fostered popular support and trust in the ANSF, leading to more intelligence tips from the people. 5. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, are news reports accurate that 85 percent of SOF counterterrorism operations are conducted successfully without a shot being fired? Admiral Olson. Our data for 2010 indicates that, of about 2,000 counterterrorism operations, 86 percent did not include gunfire. General Mattis. [Deleted.] AIRLIFT SUPPORT FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 6. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, one of the most frequent concerns related to deployed SOF is the lack of rotary wing airlift to support their missions, especially in Afghanistan. The two primary concerns are that U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) uses its organic rotary wing airlift almost exclusively to support kill/capture counterterrorism missions and that airlift support from the General Purpose Forces is rarely available. This leaves special operations personnel performing counterinsurgency missions with very little direct support. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) mandates some action on this issue by increasing SOCOM's organic capabilities and by dedicating a limited number of Navy helicopters to support of SOF. Do you believe the actions directed by the QDR will address SOCOM's airlift needs? Admiral Olson. The actions directed by the QDR adequately addressed SOCOM's longer term organic helicopter needs. Surge operations still require allocation of General Purpose Force helicopters to support SOF operations. Further, foreign training requirements may place an additional demand on SOF rotary wing capabilities. 7. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, do you believe additional capabilities should be grown within SOCOM or provided by the General Purpose Forces? Admiral Olson. SOCOM's programs of record, and those we have planned across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), combined with General Purpose Forces provided by the Service Departments, are adequate to fulfill the current and anticipated airlift support requirements. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES 8. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, some observers contend that the National intelligence agencies focus their assistance to the Department of Defense (DOD) in Afghanistan on special operators engaged in direct action operations against the Taliban. As a consequence, it is alleged, General Purpose Forces and SOF engaged in indirect activities, including VSOs and population security, receive less intelligence support. Do you believe SOF performing primarily indirect missions in Afghanistan receive adequate intelligence support? Admiral Olson. Yes, intelligence support is generally adequate and responsive. General Mattis. Yes. All general purpose and SOF are provided the intelligence support required to accomplish their assigned missions. 9. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, how is SOCOM working to build its organic intelligence gathering and exploitation capabilities? Admiral Olson. SOCOM is focused on developing an organic airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability with a corresponding Processing, Exploitation & Dissemination (PED) capacity. The SOCOM J2 (Intelligence) and J6 (Communications) have teamed to design and build a robust Special Operations Information Enterprise (SIE) that will facilitate the movement, sharing, and coordination of information across theaters of operations, from tactical users to strategic decisionmakers. The intent is to fully integrate with the Service developed Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) family of networks, which will enable the rapid sharing of critical information in a joint-combined operating environment. SOCOM leads DOD in the employment of Identity Intelligence tools, tactics, techniques and procedures. Partnering with the Biometric Identity Management Agency and the ISR Task Force, we received $79.9 million the past 2 years and developed a $26 million (FYDP) training program at Fort Bragg, NC, resulting in the fielding of 1,426 biometric systems that led to 2,686 tiered Watchlisted and IED associated persons of interest. Our Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) program leverages biometrics, forensics and document/media exploitation as mission enablers to defeat terrorists and their networks. SOCOM is also a leader in tagging, tracking, and locating technology, as well as in providing SOF with a world-class reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition capability that includes still/video, sensor trigger and unattended ground sensors/unattended maritime sensors (UGS/UMS). SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 10. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, some have argued that you, as the Commander of SOCOM, should have greater influence on personnel management issues which are generally within the purview of the Services, but which directly impact the assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of SOF. Do you believe you are adequately empowered to influence the personnel management decisions of the Services as they apply to SOF? Admiral Olson. Until recently, no. However, DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of DOD and its major components, approved by the Secretary of Defense on 21 December 2010, requires the Services to ``coordinate'' personnel policies with SOCOM, and this has the potential to improve SOCOM's influence in this regard. UNDERSEA MOBILITY STRATEGY 11. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, last July, SOCOM cancelled the Joint Multi-Mission Submersible program and announced a new Undersea Mobility acquisition strategy focused on the development and fielding of a family of wet and dry combat submersibles to meet the requirements of SOF. These actions follow the extremely costly development and fielding of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System, which was ultimately rendered inoperable by a November 2008 battery fire. Please describe the decisionmaking process that led to the change in acquisition strategy. Admiral Olson. In the programming and budgeting process for fiscal year 2012, the Department conducted a detailed review of the JMMS program. Based on the review, it was determined that the planned program to develop and field a fleet of JMMS was unaffordable due to current and expected future competing priorities for SOCOM resources. In addition, during the JMMS material solutions analysis, another feasible alternative had been identified to develop and field a fleet of smaller, less-capable dry combat submersibles that could operate from Dry Deck Shelter equipped submarines and surface ships. Simultaneously, SOCOM has been looking at alternate commercial submersible concepts and experimenting with a commercial-off-the-shelf submersible that showed promising results at reduced cost. Accordingly, SOCOM revised its undersea mobility acquisition strategy to use the funds originally programmed for JMMS to develop a fleet of affordable Dry Combat Submersibles (based on commercial technologies and practices) and the necessary Dry Deck Shelter and submarine modifications to support them. This enables SOCOM to field a larger number of undersea vehicles sooner than the original JMMS approach. 12. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, how would you characterize the technological, cost, and schedule risks associated with development of a new family of dry combat submersibles? Admiral Olson. Technical risk is medium to simultaneously meet the ``iron triangle'' of payload, speed, and range requirements due to current battery technology. Commercial off-the-shelf and Government off-the-shelf silver-zinc battery technologies are rated at Technology Readiness Levels 7-9, so they should be reliable. However, they have not demonstrated the power required for our ideal submersible in a realistic environment. Our Dry Combat Submersible program is focused on identifying what is affordable and achievable within current budgets and technologies. Cost and schedule risk are both assessed as medium level risk based primarily upon the risk associated with safety certification. SOCOM is using commercial design standards and processes (e.g. American Bureau of Shipping) wherever possible to help reduce these risks through a more determinant certification process. SOCOM is also working closely with the U.S. Navy to properly scope any certifications they require for operations associated with nuclear submarine. 13. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, how does SOCOM intend to avoid the costly development and reliability issues that plagued the development and operation of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System? Admiral Olson. SOCOM intends to leverage commercial submersible design, fabrication, and safety certification methodology to provide timely, reliable, and cost-effective capabilities. Design studies are also planned to cultivate the submersible industrial base. SOCOM intends to use American Bureau of Shipping classed competitive prototypes to affirm speed, range, and payload thresholds prior to ordering the Dry Combat Submersible-Light lead ship. Additional economies will accrue from using proven sonar systems and communication systems from our wet SEAL Delivery Vehicles. 14. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, what is the appropriate role for the Naval Sea Systems Command in the development and acquisition of SOCOM's undersea mobility platforms? Admiral Olson. SOCOM will use the engineering expertise of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), its shipyards, and laboratories to support the Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) programs, especially in the areas of engineering and safety certification. We are working with NAVSEA to identify experts and define roles such as the subsea engineering found at Naval Surface Warfare Centers. NAVSEA will perform system safety certification of all submersibles that will operate from submarines. SOCOM will perform system safety certification of any DCS submersibles (including prototypes) that will not operate from submarines. SOCOM is also using the expertise of commercial engineering and safety certification agencies such as American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) to provide independent review and classification services for DCS programs. ABS has certified 47 submersibles that operate for extended periods every day, carrying civilian and non-DOD government personnel for research, tourism, and the oil industry. MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS 15. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, DOD recently announced that it was discontinuing use of the term ``psychological operations'' in favor of the term ``Military Information Support Operations.'' Why do you believe such a change was necessary? Admiral Olson. The U.S. Armed Forces have long recognized the vital importance of conveying truthful information to influence foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. Military information activities in both wartime and peacetime have been described as ``psychological warfare'', ``psychological operations'' and PSYOP. In recent years, the term ``psychological operations'' became anachronistic and misunderstood. Although PSYOP activities relied on truthful information credibly conveyed, to some people PSYOP connoted propaganda, brainwashing, manipulation and deceit. In some cases, the negative connotations of the term discouraged commanders and our civilian interagency partners from making use of military PSYOP capabilities to advance national objectives. To overcome the stigma of the name and allow DOD to better utilize these military information capabilities in an interagency environment, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, and I recommended to the Secretary of Defense that we replace the term ``psychological operations'' or PSYOP with Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to more accurately convey the nature of the activities. The Secretary directed DOD to implement the change this fiscal year. 16. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, what operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe such a change will have? Admiral Olson. The change will have no operational or doctrinal impacts. It is only an administrative terminology change. The definition and all policy, legal, organization, and doctrinal guidance previously applied to PSYOP remain in effect for MISO. SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS 17. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, in recent years, SOF have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to SOCOM's Title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities SOF are carrying out around the world. What changes, if any, would you recommend to SOCOM's Title 10 missions? Admiral Olson. Over the past year, SOCOM has reviewed the set of special operations activities listed in Title 10 through the Strategic Capabilities Guidance process. We have identified a set of operations and activities that better reflect how SOF supports national strategies, global campaign plans, and theater plans. We have also come to realize that operations-counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and others-often blend in today's complex environment. It is now much more difficult to neatly categorize a specific operation as one type versus another. Therefore, we see the need to differentiate between operations and activities. To provide clarity in how SOF executes its missions, we have developed a framework for SOF Core Operations and Activities. Core Operations are the operational contexts within which SOF operate, often in concert with conventional forces and interagency partners. Core Activities, however, are unique capabilities that SOF apply in different combinations tailored for an operational context. A core special operation activity is a stand-alone, operationally significant, military capability that SOF can apply independently or in combination as part of a global, Geographic Combatant Command, or joint force commander's campaign or operation. I will be reviewing the revised list of operations and activities over the next few months with SOF senior leaders. The revised list, which could possibly become the basis for a Title 10 legislative proposal, includes the following: Core Operations: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterinsurgency Counterterrorism Foreign Internal Defense Stability Operations Support to Major Combat Operations and Campaigns Unconventional Warfare Core Activities: Advise and Assist Civil Affairs Operations Hostage Rescue and Recovery Intelligence Preparation of the Environment Interdiction and Offensive Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Military Information Support Operations Operational Preparation of the Environment Reconnaissance and Surveillance SOF Combat Support and Combat Service Support Strikes and Raids Support to Insurgency COUNTERING RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 18. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, in 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second-in-command, declared that ``We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the battlefield of the media.'' The new National Military Strategy lists ``countering violent extremism'' as the first National Military Objective and stresses the importance of long-term ``whole of nation'' approaches to countering extremism beyond short-term activities of killing and capturing extremists. However, earlier this year, a non-partisan study highlighted the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment violence (e.g. Islamism or Salafist-Jihadism). What is SOCOM's role in supporting efforts by the geographic combatant commands to counter the spread of violent extremist ideology and the radicalization of vulnerable populations? Admiral Olson. SOF, specifically MISO support the geographic combatant commands in countering VEO ideologies and radicalization of vulnerable populations through several means. SOCOM Military Information Support units have been deployed in direct support of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan (OEF), Iraq (New Dawn), and the Philippines (OEF-Philippines) from the onset of those operations, often in collaboration with coalition forces and other U.S. Government Agencies. Outside the areas of conflict, SOCOM deploys Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) to countries supporting military objectives to erode support for extremist ideologies and deter tacit and active support for VEOs. Deployed at the request of both the GCC and the respective U.S. Ambassador, MISTs provide the GCCs with a direct engagement tool to improve partner nation capabilities to combat VEOs and resist the spread of their associated ideologies. SOCOM also resources and manages two effective trans-regional military information support programs: the Trans-Regional Web Initiative (TRWI), and the Regional Magazine Initiative (RMI). Both programs provide the GCCs a capability to conduct influence operations to directly address VEO ideology, facilitation, and radicalization without putting boots on the ground. In addition to forces provided and programs executed, SOCOM also supports the GCCs by providing direct planning support. 19. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, to what degree does SOCOM draw upon research conducted by DOD's Minerva and Human Social Cultural Behavioral Modeling programs? Admiral Olson. Minerva Research Initiative (MRI) MRI is a DOD-sponsored, university based social science program initiated by the SECDEF in 2008. The program's goal is to improve DOD's basic understanding of the social, cultural, behavioral, and political forces that shape regions of the world of strategic importance to the US. SOCOM has been an integral part of two of the five projects: (1) `Finding Allies for the War of Words: Mapping the Diffusion and Influence of Counter-Radical Muslim Discourse' and (2) `Terrorism, Governance, and Development' SOCOM has fostered multiple relationships between DOD project managers; academics; and SOCOM planners, analysts, and interagency personnel. Human Social Culture Behavior (HSCB) Modeling Program In 2008, OSD established the HCSB modeling program. The mission of the 6-year program is to research, develop, and transition technologies, tools, and systems to help planners, intelligence analysts, operations analysts, and others represent, understand, and forecast sociocultural behavior at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. SOCOM representatives have been in close collaboration with HCSB project managers to garner better insights regarding objectives, identify those projects that are of importance to SOCOM, and engage with appropriate academics to ensure they understand our interests. SOCOM received funding to write a program called ANTHRO ANALYST (AA) FOR J2 SOCPAS. AA is an advanced application allowing a user to quickly input elevation, population density, and intelligence information to generate and predict human terrain as well as habitable areas. SOCOM attends the Air Force Office of Scientific Research annual program reviews and provides updates to appropriate offices and directorates within the command. SOCOM continues to leverage the projects' findings and to incorporate appropriate information into efforts across the command. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill CAMP ASHRAF 20. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, in recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on U.S. policy in Iraq, as well as during this hearing before the committee, the plight of residents of Camp Ashraf in Iraq was discussed. In addition, prominent former government officials have recently raised concerns about the welfare of the residents at Ashraf, including former Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, General Peter Pace (Ret.), and former Attorney General Michael Mukasey. The approximately 4,000 Iranian dissidents and their advocates continue to allege abuses and harassment by members of the Iraqi security services. The harassment includes tactics such as continuous exposure to loudspeakers, as Chairman Levin remarked, and up to and including serious physical harm against camp residents. To what extent do U.S. military forces have contact with the residents of Camp Ashraf? General Mattis. U.S. military forces had limited contact regarding Camp Ashraf since Government of Iraq has taken over responsibility. In the wake of the incident on 8 April that led to a number of deaths and injuries, we have requested access to Camp Ashraf but so far have been refused by the Iraqi Government. We have been told the Iraqi Government is undertaking an investigation on events there, and the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad and General Austin are making clear U.S. policy and the way forward with the Iraqi Government 21. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, has any U.S. military equipment provided to the Iraqi military or security forces been used to harass or endanger the residents of Camp Ashraf? General Mattis. It is possible that any given Iraqi unit which operated in the vicinity of Camp Ashraf may have had some U.S.-provided equipment in its inventory, particularly vehicles. Since 2003, the United States has provided millions of dollars worth of defense equipment to the Government of Iraq which is widely distributed across the Iraqi Security Forces. Overhead photographs taken during the 8 April 2011 events at Camp Ashraf appear to include images of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) among the vehicles employed by Iraqi forces. The HMMWV, which has been supplied in large numbers to the Government of Iraq, is a characteristic U.S. military vehicle. It is possible that some at Camp Ashraf on 8 April are among the many which have been delivered to Iraq by the United States over the course of the past 8 years. 22. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, what is your opinion of the Government of Iraq's willingness and ability to protect the residents of Camp Ashraf? General Mattis. The events of 8 April that led to a number of deaths and injuries are of serious concern. In the wake of that incident, we have requested access to Camp Ashraf but so far have been refused by the Iraqi Government. Most important is the assurance that residents will NOT be forcibly transferred to a country where there are grounds for believing the residents would be persecuted, tortured, or unfairly put on trial based on their political or religious beliefs. The Government of Iraq (GoI) has also publicly committed to undertake an investigation as to what exactly happened on April 8 that led to a number of deaths and injuries. We continue to urge restraint and nonviolence as means to facilitate an appropriate solution to the situation. I respectfully defer to the Department of State (DOS) for any details concerning specific issues. 23. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, what is your assessment of Prime Minister al-Maliki's long-term plans for Camp Ashraf? General Mattis. The Government of Iraq's stated policy is that the People's Mujahideen Organization of Iran must leave Iraq by the end of 2011 with the cooperation of the United Nations and international organizations. DOS is working to find a negotiated settlement to the situation. I respectfully defer to DOS for any details concerning specific issues. AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES 24. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, during his testimony on DOD's 2012 budget request, Secretary Gates stated that he was still uncertain how the United States was going to continue to train and fund the ANSF once U.S. forces have withdrawn or been reduced. I believe that investing in ANSF is extremely important to long-term stability in Afghanistan. However, I also have concerns that the U.S. Government may not have adequately come to grips with just how expensive it will be to sustain ANSF over the long term ($12.8 billon is requested for next year). The total gross domestic product (GDP) of Afghanistan is about $29.8 billion a year, so it is unrealistic to expect the Afghans to pay for full ANSF costs anytime soon. What long-term branch plans are being developed to sustain the training and funding of the ANSF beyond 2014? General Mattis. The international community has acknowledged that while the transition of lead security responsibility will be completed by December 2014, financial support of the ANSF and other parts of the Afghan economy will be necessary past 2014. Senior Civilian Representative Sedwell, as recently as February, commented that the ANSF will need some level of funding through 2025. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), in collaboration with other U.S. Government agencies, is developing economic initiatives to enable more coordinated and effective international community assistance. This effort will help transition Afghanistan from an aid based economy to more of a self- sufficient, trade based economy putting the Government of Afghanistan on a path to meeting the expenditures of a robust ANSF. 25. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, what checks and balances do you have in place to ensure that U.S. weapons and equipment provided to the ANSF are accounted for and do not end up in the hands of the Taliban or other terrorist groups? General Mattis. In March 2009, the Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan established a functional organization within its command to register and monitor the transfer of equipment to Afghanistan. This organization carries out the requirements of Section 1225 of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires the Secretary of Defense to certify that a program of registration and monitoring is in place in Afghanistan. 26. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, given the repeated and frequent requests by the United States on the NATO members for increasing troop and equipment contributions for ANSF trainers, what do you think is an equitable and reasonable cost-sharing for ANSF training in terms of manpower and funding? General Mattis. The North Atlantic Council has agreed to expand the NATO ANA Trust Fund to include funding for sustainment costs. Timely provision of these funds will represent a welcome, tangible demonstration of fiscal cost sharing. We continue to make a concerted effort to increase NATO and other international partner fiscal contributions. Our coalition partners have made good faith efforts to fill manning requirements for ANSF trainers within their capabilities and national interests. We will continue to work with our coalition partners, NATO and others, to meet the needs of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). IMPACTS OF MIDDLE EAST TURMOIL 27. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, the political upheaval in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and elsewhere in CENTCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) is of great concern. Given the rapidity of the change and the subsequent fragility of the geo-political status quo, there seem to be numerous potential impacts on CENTCOM operations. What, if any, impact do you assess the turmoil in the Middle East could have on the function of Northern Distribution Network and on the logistical tail needed to support coalition operations in the region, especially related to fuel and the cost to transport it? General Mattis. The current situation in the Middle East is expected to have minimal impact on fuels operations supported through the Northern Distribution Network since these fuel sources, both crude and refined products, originate from Southeastern Europe, Caucasus Region, Central Asian States, and Russia. 28. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, what is your opinion of the effects of the turmoil on some of the more autocratic Central Asian leaders, including and especially Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan? Do you anticipate any impact on our air or rail transit agreements as they stand? General Mattis. I view the influence of the changes in the Middle East on Central Asian leaders as minimal in the short term due to the deep entrenchment of leaders among the social, political and economic elite, the existence of little political opposition, and the lack of a coordinated social network capability to organize and implement a challenge. I consider Uzbekistan to be at low risk for instability leading to a change in government. I do not anticipate any impacts to our air or rail agreements as they stand. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich RELIANCE ON FOREIGN FUEL SOURCES 29. Senator Begich. General Mattis, as you noted in your testimony, countries in your AOR contain more than half of the world's proven oil reserves and nearly half of its natural gas. As a result, this area also has some of the world's busiest trade routes. It's also one of the world's most volatile regions. I am extremely concerned with the national security implications of relying on foreign sources for fossil fuels when we have significant reserves in the United States, specifically in the State of Alaska. I know DOD buys most of its fuel from local refineries in proximity to Iraq and Afghanistan for the vast majority of our requirements in the area. In which countries are those refineries located? General Mattis. Our contracted suppliers that move fuel through the various ground lines of communication report that fuel is sourced from refineries in Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Iraq, and various European countries. 30. Senator Begich. General Mattis, what would be the impact to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan if those refineries no longer could meet our needs? General Mattis. To mitigate supply chain disruptions, CENTCOM has developed redundant and complementary fuel supply capability to satisfy fuel demand in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Should supply be reduced because of the loss of a refinery or refineries, our supply chain managers have the ability to shift fuel orders to alternate sources. CENTCOM has established minimum storage requirements at current operating and intermediate storage locations to enable us to continue operations until alternate means of supply can be implemented. Additionally, CENTCOM can implement fuel conservation measures, relocate aircraft, and reduce certain operations in order to mitigate the effect of reduced fuel availability. 31. Senator Begich. General Mattis, what would the impact be of a Suez Canal or other trade route disruption on operations in CENTCOM's AOR? General Mattis. The Suez Canal is an important trade route and any interruption to current commercial transit through the Suez could have an impact on global resupply, as transit times without the use of the Suez Canal would increase by approximately 10 days. However, temporary closure of the Suez and ensuing disruption to the transit lanes would have little to no impact on operations in the CENTCOM AOR. Adequate stores of fuel are on hand that would provide a buffer until alternate supply routes are established. 32. Senator Begich. General Mattis, what role do these energy resources play in regional and internal instability in your area of operations? General Mattis. Energy resource problems are prominent in our region, particularly in States where meeting growing domestic demand for electricity has become more challenging. For some governments, the energy resource supply and demand imbalance, and subsequent populace discontent, come as States continue converting traditional crude oil- based energy industries to those based on more efficient natural gas. In other countries, inadequate energy resources and infrastructure could have a more lasting destabilizing impact. Competition over shared hydrocarbon resources also has the potential to undermine regional stability, as challenges to poorly defined territorial borders where shared energy resources exist can quickly turn historic accommodation to more volatile, intrusive demands over ownership. 33. Senator Begich. General Mattis, in your opinion, does U.S. consumption of oil and natural gas from these countries perpetuate instability? General Mattis. No. In my opinion, just the opposite is true. U.S. consumption boosts economic stability in these countries, as this is a fundamental exercise of international commerce providing economic benefit to a lengthy supply and consumer chain. 34. Senator Begich. General Mattis, in your opinion, how do recent protests, uprisings, and calls for reform in many of the countries in your AOR potentially impact availability of energy resources to the United States? General Mattis. The wave of unrest is currently confined to nations that are relatively small oil and gas producers. If the wave migrates to larger energy producing regions, energy resource availability could be more significantly impacted. 35. Senator Begich. General Mattis, how would potential disruptions impact operations in CENTCOM? General Mattis. CENTCOM is well postured to endure an array of possible disruptions that may occur. We have ample storage at current operating and intermediate storage locations, fuel conservation measures, plus the redundant and complimentary fuel supply chain capabilities that have been developed. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS 36. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, in response to the major uprising against the Qadhafi regime, how would you rate the risk that a post-Qaddafi Libya turns chaotic and provides a safe haven for al Qaeda and associated groups to exploit? Admiral Olson. SOCOM respectfully defers this question to AFRICOM as Libya is under their area of concern. General Mattis. [Deleted.] IRAN 37. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, I am concerned, as I know you are, with Iran's continuing deployment of hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that can reach our forces and our allies throughout the region. Do you believe you have sufficient ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability to defend against this threat now and in the future? General Mattis. [Deleted.] 38. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, I am concerned with Iran's mix of conventional and asymmetric warfare capabilities and the threat they pose to U.S. interests in the Gulf. If Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, which as you know would drastically affect the flow of petroleum to the world economy, do you have everything you need to deter and defeat this threat? General Mattis. [Deleted.] 39. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, do we have sufficient support from allies to achieve our goals? General Mattis. Yes. Our regional partners, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council nations, increasingly recognize the threat posed by Iran. We have a shared interest with these partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities, and we have seen an increased level of cooperation in that regard. At the same time, we recognize the territorial integrity of our partners, continue to act in concert with them, and relentlessly engage to support mutually reinforcing objectives. 40. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, two Iranian Navy ships were permitted by Egypt to sail through the Suez Canal this month. The Iranians have said they are traveling to Syria for a training mission. While other military ships have travelled through the Canal, since 1979 no Iranian military ship has done so. What do you think is the reason for Iran's activity? General Mattis. Iran increasingly asserts its military capability across the region in order to expand its influence and to assume the role of regional hegemon. Iran's regular navy deployed the two ships through the Canal and to the Mediterranean Sea and Syria as part of their semi-annual cadet training cruise. These cadet cruises have a two-fold mission of training the next generation of naval officers and showing the Iranian flag. The cruises included foreign port visits, which support Iran's strategic effort to portray itself as a regional military power. 41. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, what actions are we taking, if any, in response to Iran's activity? General Mattis. With respect to Iranian naval vessels transiting the Suez Canal, we have not responded with any operational actions, though CENTCOM continues to closely monitor such activity. CENTCOM maritime operations are clearly observable by Iranian vessels, sending a clear message of U.S. presence and readiness, but also a sign of commitment to our partners. PIRACY 42. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, last week, as you know, Somali pirates killed four Americans on a yacht they had captured. Admiral Mullen said in discussing the incident that more than 30 warships are involved in the anti-piracy drive underscoring the ``significance of the challenge [of piracy] and also the priority in terms of focus.'' Despite this presence, Somali pirates continue to hijack vessels, and last year they seized 53 ships and took 1,181 hostages. Admiral Mullen further stated that hunting down the sea bandits in such vast waters was like searching for a ``needle in a haystack.'' How are you adapting your tactics to deal with what is now a more lethal threat to U.S. citizens? Admiral Olson. I defer to General Mattis on questions concerning how forces under his operational control are employed. SOCOM is responsible for equipping SOF and providing the Geographic Combatant Commands with fully trained SOF. For counter piracy activities, SOF elements are trained to respond to hostage scenarios in a maritime environment in a manner that best protects U.S interests and the lives of U.S. citizens. SOF is generally not brought in unless there exists a lethal threat to U.S. citizens. I believe our current tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs, are sound and we have made no recent significant changes. However, SOCOM will continue to assess the threat and modify our TTP's appropriately. General Mattis. We continue to adapt our tactics, as do the pirates. The scope and scale of the piracy enterprise has expanded considerably in recent years, and represents a challenge to both commercial and military elements of the international maritime community. Working with our Coalition, European, and NATO partners we have established three Naval Task Forces in the region that have placed up to 30 military vessels at any given time in key locations to deter attempted pirate attacks. Our CENTCOM Maritime Component Commander also hosts a bi-monthly Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) conference in Bahrain to ensure multi-national deconfliction of activity and cooperation among all counter piracy activities in the region. In addition to Coalition, NATO, and European representation, the conferences also include civilian international maritime organizations and delegates from non-affiliated countries such as China, Russia, Japan, and India. In addition to these international military efforts, we continue to coordinate closely with the maritime industry on communicating to merchant vessels the importance of adhering to the International Maritime Organization's Best Management Practices. Statistics indicate that the employment of these practices, to include well-trained embarked security teams, is a significant deterrent against pirates. 43. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, considering that this is essentially an international criminal issue, do you have the authority to respond? Admiral Olson. SOCOM respectfully defers this question to CENTCOM and the other combatant commanders as they are responsible for military operations within their area of control. General Mattis. Yes, we have several counter-piracy authorities. Legally speaking, the use of military assets to conduct counter-piracy operations is permitted under both domestic and international law. U.S. counter-piracy operations in the CENTCOM AOR are conducted pursuant to the Counter-Piracy Execute Order and in accordance with the Law of the Sea and U.N. Security Council Resolutions pertaining to suppressing piracy in the Horn of Africa Region. Suppressing piracy has been a traditional maritime military activity dating back hundreds of years. Counter-piracy operations are conducted to preserve freedom of navigation on the high seas, ensure the free flow of commerce, and protect the sea lines of communication. Criminal prosecution, albeit an effective tool to keep captured pirates from returning to their activities and deterring other would-be pirates, is a means to accomplish the military mission of preserving freedom of navigation. 44. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, the root cause of piracy is often a failed state. What do you need from diplomatic and developmental resources to address piracy? Admiral Olson. SOCOM respectfully defers this question to AFRICOM as they are working with Department of State on how to deal with the root causes of piracy emanating from Somalia. General Mattis. While we can inhibit piracy on the sea with military action, ultimately the solution to the problem of piracy lies ashore, with stable governments that can control their sovereign territory. I fully support ample funding for diplomatic and developmental resources as part of an integrated civilian-military effort to maintain international support and unity of effort in combating issues of mutual concern such as piracy. 45. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, what steps should the private sector take to protect itself from piracy? Admiral Olson. I expect they will follow all Legal options available. SOCOM is not in a position to speak about what the private sector should or should not do in order to protect itself from piracy. General Mattis. The most effective deterrent against pirates is to adhere to the International Maritime Organization's Best Management Practices. These practices include the use of professional, well- trained embarked security teams, adherence to established security routes through the region, notification of sailing intentions to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), employing speed and evasive maneuvering when approached, and construction of onboard fortified citadels. 46. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, are you concerned that companies may take overly aggressive measures in response to piracy? Admiral Olson. SOCOM is not in a position to comment on what measures the private sector may take or how those measures could impact Combatant Command Counter-Piracy efforts. General Mattis. No. CENTCOM continues to advocate the importance of adhering to the International Maritime Organization's Best Management Practices. Statistics indicate that employing these practices, to include well-trained embarked security teams, provides a deterrent against piracy. The next iteration of Best Management Practices will recommend the practice of embarking armed security teams in order to prevent ship crew members from performing this function. TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION 47. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, I am concerned with reports that Iran is acting as an intermediary with North Korea to supply Syria with various forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technology. In April 2010, the Obama administration called in Syria's ambassador to ask about reports that Syria had transferred Scud and Fateh 110 missiles to Hezbollah. With the longer-range Scuds and more accurate Fatah 110s, how do you see this affecting the strategic balance in the region? Admiral Olson. [Deleted]. General Mattis. I do not believe Hezballah's acquisition of SCUDs and Fateh 110s will significantly alter the regional balance of power. These new weapons enable Hezbollah to strike deeper into Israeli territory and enhance the group's power projection, but Israel already defends against comparable missile threats from Syria by maintaining a high defensive posture and employing modern air defense and offensive systems. 48. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, this year's National Military Strategy (NMS) states: ``the intersection between states, state-sponsored, and non-state adversaries is most dangerous in the area of WMD proliferation and nuclear terrorism. And then it goes on to say the prospect of multiple nuclear armed regimes in the Middle East with nascent security and command and control mechanisms amplifies the threat of conflict, and significantly increases the probability of miscalculation or the loss of control of a nuclear weapon to non-state actors.'' How confident are you that al Qaeda or associated insurgent groups could not acquire or steal a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials from Pakistan that they could then in turn use in a nuclear September 11 scenario? Admiral Olson. [Deleted.] General Mattis. The nexus of Violent Extremist Organizations and WMD proliferation is among my most pressing concerns. CENTCOM, along with our interagency partners, conducts a range of activities to combat WMD proliferation. With respect to Pakistan, I know Islamabad regards its nuclear program as the country's most important strategic asset and continues to place highest priority on nuclear security. Its nuclear security program is well established and we remain confident in Pakistan's ability to safeguard its nuclear weapons and stockpile. 49. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, how are the growing U.S.-Pakistan tensions impacting our ability to protect against that scenario? Admiral Olson. [Deleted.] General Mattis. At this time, I do not believe the present tensions between the United States and Pakistan will significantly impact the security of Pakistan's nuclear program. However, continuing tensions between the United States and Pakistan could undermine the effectiveness of long-term U.S. support to the Pakistan Army, which could in turn indirectly impact Pakistan's nuclear program security. But at this point such connectivity is spectulative and not based on concrete facts. AFGHANISTAN 50. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, when I traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan a few months ago I heard repeatedly from our commanders on the ground that our mission in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to Pakistan's harboring of al Qaeda, Taliban, and aligned organizations. U.S.-Pakistan relations have chafed greatly over the past year, particularly recently, and while Pakistani military has indeed suffered casualties in their fight against insurgency groups, our assessment remains that insurgents enjoy a relative safe haven in Pakistan. How are we going to execute a redeployment strategy in Afghanistan if Pakistan does not go after the insurgency within its borders? Admiral Olson. I defer this question to the combatant commander since he has operational responsibility for that area. General Mattis. Insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan somewhat limit our ability to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan. Despite this considerable challenge, we continue to make significant progress in our campaign. It is important to note that Pakistan has taken a number of difficult steps and has suffered over 30,000 casualties in the fight against insurgents in their Northwest. Our intent is to simultaneously degrade the enemy's capacity while we enhance the capacity of our Afghan and Pakistani partners to a point that they can pursue this effort without direct U.S. intervention. Such efforts are adversely affected by Pakistani requests that we reduce our footprint. Despite the challenges we currently face in Pakistan, we are committed to our long-term strategic relationship with them. We will continue to transfer the lead for security and governance to our partners in accordance with ISAF objectives, the Afghan-led transition process, and U.S. national strategy regarding both Afghanistan and Pakistan. LEBANON 51. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, you state that you value the relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and that you would like to see how the government develops before making a decision regarding continuing U.S. aid to the LAF, despite Hezbollah's role in the new government. What factors will you look for with respect to the new government in Lebanon and the LAF in order to shape your strategic outlook with respect to Lebanon or the LAF, and particularly the advisability of continued aid or military-to-military transactions? General Mattis. [Deleted.] CENTRAL ASIA 52. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, Kyrgyzstan has been a major refueling station for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. The Northern Distribution Network with the other central Asian republics has provided us with important logistical support. How solid are the military relationships in Central Asia for the United States? Admiral Olson. All of our SOF military relationships with the Central Asian countries fall under the purview of CENTCOM. SOF elements under U.S. Special Operations Command-Central Command have established good tactical level military relationships with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan through Counter-Narcotics Training (CNT) programs. General Mattis. Our military to military relationships in Central Asia are generally good and improving, despite being comparatively new. I have been encouraged by the support of our Central Asian partners. We have made strides in further developing the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) over the last year in particular. Of course, our Central Asian partners offer support in accordance with domestic concerns. We have seen Russia accommodate our NDN efforts, which has helped to allay a significant concern among our partners. Central Asian states are at times reluctant to provide public or direct support of our efforts because of their Soviet-era Afghanistan experiences as well as concerns about provoking violent extremist organizations. Continued support for our military-to-military programs, IMET, and exercises is critical to continuing to improve these relationships. We are committed to conducting all military-to-military activities in concert with broader DOS strategy and policy within the Central Asian region. 53. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, does Russia remain neutral with respect to these relationships or does it attempt to disrupt them? Admiral Olson. [Deleted.] General Mattis. Russia's influence is a significant factor in the strategic calculus of Central Asian states, but has so far not significantly disrupted U.S. policies in the region. Russia supports efforts in Afghanistan, most notably by enabling recent enhancements to the NDN. Russia is concerned about the growth of violent extremism as well as the flow of narcotics and other illicit cargo through Central Asia into Russia. At the same time, Russia is sensitive to the potential expansion of U.S. influence and the prospects of permanent U.S. bases in the region, and engages in information operations to counter and contain U.S. influence. As Central Asia's most influential trading partner, Russia has substantial influence over most of the Central Asian nations. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain COOPERATIVE SECURITY LOCATIONS IN IRAQ 54. Senator McCain. General Mattis, I have a question about the establishment of cooperative security locations in CENTCOM as a vital tool for your theater security plans. Assuming the current plan for U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraq by December 2011 is carried out, we should still want to maintain a positive collaborative relationship with the Government of Iraq in a very strategic location of the region for our national interests. Is there value to you and the United States to establish forward operating sites and cooperative security locations in Iraq for future operations? General Mattis. While there is potential value to establishing security assistance sites and cooperative security locations in the CENTCOM region, the establishment must be balanced against many factors, to include host nation support, operational need, and possible future U.S. funding to develop and sustain these locations. 55. Senator McCain. General Mattis, would the establishment of these locations have an impact on your withdrawal plans? General Mattis. The establishment of cooperative security locations would not be consistent with the current U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement or current U.S. policy for departure of U.S. forces. 56. Senator McCain. General Mattis, what impediments, if any, preclude you from establishing the agreements necessary to establish these locations? General Mattis. The establishment of cooperative security locations is not consistent with the current U.S.-Iraq security agreement, which calls for the full withdrawal of U.S. forces by end 2011, and is consistent with current U.S. policy. It is also worth noting that the current U.S.-Iraq security agreement, which has authorized the U.S. military presence in Iraq from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2011, stipulates that ``Iraqi land, sea, and air shall not be used as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries.'' THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION 57. Senator McCain. General Mattis, on the issues of theater security cooperation plans, I am aware that you have very few forces assigned to you during peacetime. Any exercises or collaborative training you plan to accomplish with other nations in your region must be supported by rotational U.S. forces sourced from the Services. Realizing that it has been some time since you were able to devote any significant resources to theater security cooperation in a peaceful region, are you comfortable with the arrangement to rely on rotational forces for the overwhelming majority of your security cooperation requirements? If, not, what changes would you propose? General Mattis. Yes. I am satisfied we are meeting our theater security cooperation objectives through a robust program of exercises, events, and activities across our AOR. The engagements include individual training utilizing subject matter experts, fielding equipment through Foreign Military Sales and direct commercial sales, increasing interoperability via mil-to-mil engagements, and executing bi-lateral and multi-lateral training exercises to develop partner capability and capacity. One area that does present a problem is the need for sufficient and sustained Foreign Military Financing and a more responsive Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system that delivers urgent operational capabilities to meet our partner requirements. Too often, we are not able to meet their requirements in a timely manner due to an overly complicated foreign military sales system. I strongly support the recent initiatives of the Secretary of Defense directed Security Cooperation Reform Task Force and believe it is a definitive step in the right direction. AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 58. Senator McCain. General Mattis, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction recently published a report questioning the U.S. plan to invest $11.7 billion to construct facilities for over 300,000 ANSF. Are you aware of that report? General Mattis. Yes. I am aware of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Audit released on January 26, 2011. 59. Senator McCain. General Mattis, what are you doing to address the concerns raised in the report? General Mattis. We are working with the Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to incorporate the majority of the report's recommendations to extend our planning horizon and develop long-range operations and maintenance plans. CSTC-A is currently updating their guidance documents to incorporate the planning principles referenced in the report which should improve the identification of future projects and better document their priorities. 60. Senator McCain. General Mattis, can you provide a long-range construction plan to meet the facility requirements for Afghan forces with the funds that Congress has provided? General Mattis. Afghan National Security Force generation drives the timeline for the construction planning and execution. Fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 are significant program years for construction, with $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2011 and $2.4 billion in fiscal year 2012 from the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). This ASFF funded infrastructure must support the diverse requirements of over 305,000 ANA and Afghan National Police personnel at locations throughout Afghanistan. BAHRAIN NAVAL BASES 61. Senator McCain. General Mattis, given the uncertainty in the region, including Bahrain, as well as the crisis we are facing here at home with deep deficits, in your opinion, should taxpayer funds exceeding $370 million continue to be expended this fiscal year on the complete revitalization of our navy base at Manama, Bahrain, and our base at Isa, or would a pause be prudent to allow for further assessment of our requirements in the region? General Mattis. The CENTCOM AOR presents limited opportunity for U.S. basing options. Bahrain remains one of our staunchest allies and provides us an optimum location. Current and future contingency operations in the region dictate the need to spend military construction (MILCON) funds now to address shortfalls. The current MILCON augments ship berthing space due to severe degradation of pier facilities, and provides critical ammunition storage for current and future operations. The MILCON program also includes quality of life improvements to alleviate overcrowding and provide acceptable living standards. Continued execution of MILCON funds in Bahrain is an essential CENTCOM mission support requirement and integral to CENTCOM Global Defense Posture initiatives. Reduced expenditure of MILCON funds in Bahrain will significantly impact operations now and in the future. 62. Senator McCain. General Mattis, from an operational perspective, do you currently have an alternative port to Manama for support of 5th fleet? If not, do you believe it would be wise to use MILCON funds to develop one? General Mattis. No. The U.S. relationship with Bahrain remains strong and we do not currently see the need for an alternative port to Manama, Bahrain. In the event the situation dramatically changes with respect to either the bilateral relationship or U.S. policy, we will present options to DOD and Congress. SOCOM MAJOR WEAPONS PROGRAMS 63. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, SOCOM has historically relied on the modification of service common equipment with SOF-peculiar technology as the basis of its equipping strategy--a strategy that has proven enormously successful in a number of areas. However, over the last several years, the command has undertaken efforts internally to develop major weapons programs, some at significant cost, such as the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), the Joint Multi-Mission Submersible (JMMS), and the Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR). While the specific issues and outcomes associated with the development of these three particular programs differ, they have brought attention to the ability of SOCOM to develop and ultimately field major weapon systems, particularly in an increasingly resource constrained environment. Do you believe SOCOM is properly structured to successfully undertake the development and fielding of major weapons systems? Admiral Olson. The structure of the Special Operations Research, Development and Acquisition Center (SORDAC) is not staffed or intended to be staffed, to support Major Defense Acquisition Programs. For programs such as the ASDS or JMMS, SORDAC enters into agreements with Service component acquisition offices to support our efforts. Traditionally SOCOM relies on the Services to develop major programs (e.g. ASDS) so that SORDAC can focus organic capabilities on the integration of new technologies, modifying service platforms, and developing new capabilities that the Services are not well positioned to do. SORDAC has had success in using the Joint Acquisition Task Force model to rapidly field new capability by integrating teams from the various service offices to meet urgent needs. 64. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what lessons has SOCOM learned, not just from the aforementioned programs, but as a whole, in its efforts to develop and field systems to satisfy its requirements? Admiral Olson. SOCOM has developed its acquisition approach around the following four key principles which have enabled the successful acquisition of SOF unique equipment: deliver capability to the user expeditiously, exploit proven techniques and methods, keep warfighters involved throughout the process, and take and manage risks. SOCOM has shown that a dedicated corps of SOF acquirers is essential to rapidly, agilely, and successfully field SOF unique capability. SOCOM has been working closely with the Services to improve the synergy of Service and SOCOM acquisition activities through biannual acquisition summits co- chaired by the OUSD/AT&L and the SOCOM Commander. 65. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, to what degree is SOCOM looking to leverage commercially available and proven technology in the development of solutions to satisfy SOF-peculiar requirements? Admiral Olson. The SORDAC, the SOCOM acquisition arm, balances the need for advanced technology with rapid fielding of needed capability. In an effort to provide Special Operations deployed forces with required assets, SORDAC Program Executive Offices (PEOs), constantly evaluate existing technology, service available, and off the shelf solutions (commercial off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf). There are a number of venues that provide direct insight into technology currently available or technology that will be available in the near term. The Technology and Industry Liaison Office (TILO) serves as the interface to industry, providing a venue for open dialogue and market research in support of the command. SOCOM utilizes the TILO as a conduit for industry to present products and services to the command for evaluation. Additionally, SORDAC's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, constantly evaluates technology with a near term potential to mature into fielded capability. SORDAC S&T initiated the Rapid Exploitation of Innovative Technology for SOF (REITS) program in 2010 to expedite technology which had the potential to rapidly transition to the field. Examples of current technology being evaluated in a Special Operations environment through the REITS program are; vehicle shock mitigation systems and mobile solar power generating systems. SORDAC S&T also sponsors an open experimentation venue which provides an opportunity for industry to demonstrate emerging technologies and capabilities which could support SOF. Experimentation creates synergy among industry partners and connects SOF operators to developers during concept assessments. The PEOs continually evaluate existing standalone equipment and package them to provide an enhanced capability to meet a new capability gap. For example, the Austere Location Force Protection Commodity Procurement Project packages off-the-shelf equipment to provide an integrated force protection system to support remotely deployed SOF Teams. Off-the-shelf equipment is a critical aspect of SORDAC's strategy to balance capability that will save lives today with the need to provide a technological leap that will provide SOF Operators with a significant tactical advantage in the field tomorrow. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS SHORTFALLS 66. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, does SOCOM have any shortfalls in the availability of training resources, particularly ranges and facilities that are affecting the ability of your forces to prepare and train for specific deployments and missions? If so, please describe in detail these shortfalls and the effect they have on the ability of your forces to adequately train for specific deployments and missions. Admiral Olson. Many SOF units are unable to conduct all of their training requirements at or within close proximity of their home stations. Some training requirements, including long-range, full- mission profile validation exercises for example, require SOF to train at other installations. It is difficult to conduct training missions that accurately replicate operations routinely conducted by the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces in Afghanistan, and previously Iraq. These long-range live-fire exercises generally include mounted and dismounted ground elements supported by helicopters and tactical aircraft. Additionally, SOF units may conduct training with SOF-unique weapons systems that require larger Surface Danger Zones than weapons systems employed by conventional forces. Ever increasing competition with conventional ground and aviation units for limited training range resources is adversely impacting SOF access to Service-owned ranges. For example, there are a very limited number of ground tactical ranges on U.S. Navy installations for Navy SOF to train. The majority of ground tactical ranges within the Department of the Navy are located on U.S. Marine Corps installations. This has challenged Navy and Marine Corps leadership to balance the training requirements of Navy SOF with those of Marine Corps units vying for use of the same ranges and training areas. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) training continues to be hampered by the lack of adequate restricted airspace for SOF to execute fully integrated training events in which the full range of ``shoot, move, and communicate'' skills are rehearsed with UAS ISR support. Federal Aviation Administration Certificates of Waiver and Authorization allow limited access to the National Airspace System; however, the restrictions placed on UAS flights in these areas do not allow for adequate training for SOF. 67. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what is planned to address these shortfalls? Admiral Olson. SOF is working closely with the Services to develop courses of action that allow SOF reliable and predictable access to resources such as training ranges for ground and aviation elements. SOCOM is currently conducting a range study to examine the specific problems SOF is encountering with respect to ranges and training areas. The analysis will include SOF range access shortfalls, range saturation levels at home station, as well as adequacy of master range plans and existing agreements with the Services. Additionally, the study will determine if SOCOM components currently have adequate access to simulators and range simulation devices that could mitigate their requirements for range access. Findings and recommendations from this study will be staffed and presented to the SOCOM Commander. SOCOM is addressing range and training area issues with each Service during scheduled warfighter talks. SOCOM is also hosting periodic range conferences and working groups with representatives from our components as well as the Services. The intent of these conferences is to exchange ideas, information, and seek solutions to any range issues identified. The Navy has established a range working group with Marine Corps, Naval Special Warfare Command, and SOCOM participation to coordinate resolution of a request from Navy SOF for increased access to ranges and training areas on the west coast. U.S. Army SOCOM is working with the Army to determine the feasibility of establishing SOF training centers at select ranges on Army installations. The Army G3/5/7 is analyzing and modeling Army SOF requirements (specifically, long-range mobility full mission profile validation exercises) to determine supportability on identified Army installations. SOCOM and its components are working in numerous areas to bolster and support mission training requirements. These include: investment of MPF-11 dollars to fund SOF-peculiar modifications of existing ranges and facilities; expanded use of nontraditional training areas such as contracted facilities; and development of plans for SOF-managed training areas. 68. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what can Congress do to help you address and improve the specific training requirements for SOF? Admiral Olson. DOD faces an increasing challenge from the cumulative effect of continuing urbanization and the increasing application of environmental requirements to military readiness activities--sometimes through novel or overly broad interpretation of law. Congress will have to balance the two public goods--military readiness and environmental protection. Some issues may require congressional action, while others can be relieved by changes within the regulatory agencies. Under Title 10, U.S.C., ownership of real property--to include ranges--is a responsibility of the Services. The Commander, SOCOM cannot own real property. SOF units are tenants on installations and do not own the ranges on which they operate and train. It is therefore critical that Congress adequately fund SOCOM to continue using home station, as well as other Service installation ranges and training support. Having sufficient resources also allows SOCOM to fund range enhancements and improvements, where appropriate, to meet SOF-unique training requirements. SOF access to Service ranges can be adversely impacted by challenges associated with land withdrawal agreements, National Environmental Policy Act actions, aviation airspace issues, and civilian encroachment on Federal lands. As Service initiatives addressing these challenges move forward, congressional advocacy, as appropriate, may be warranted. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Scott Brown IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS 69. Senator Brown. General Mattis, today Iran is producing higher enriched uranium and is moving closer to possessing the weapons-grade uranium needed for a nuclear weapon. Neither economic sanctions nor diplomacy have worked to diminish Iran's goal to enrich uranium. The President has stated that he intends to ``use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.'' What is your assessment of Iran's role in the CENTCOM AOR? General Mattis. Iran's persistent destabilizing behavior runs counter to the United States, and more importantly, regional country interests. Likewise, Iran uses its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp- Qods Force to expand soft power influence across the region and beyond via religious, cultural and humanitarian outreach, while at the same time executing destabilizing activities. Iran's nuclear program is a serious, destabilizing factor in the region and is widely believed to be part of the regime's broader effort to expand its influence. 70. Senator Brown. General Mattis, what would it mean for the neighbors of Iran and the entire Middle East if Iran were to secure a nuclear weapon? General Mattis. A nuclear armed Iran would dramatically shift the balance of power between Iran and key regional nations. This shift and perceived failure of the international community in allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons, would likely spark a regional arms race as Iran's neighbors would be apt to redress the balance. In the short term, the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon will place tremendous pressure on other countries to follow suit. The effects of these developments would rapidly extend beyond our region. A nuclear- armed Iran would most likely be more assertive and more aggressive with regional states, leading to less stability in an already unstable region. Possession of a nuclear weapon would likely embolden Iran to engage in ``saber rattling'' to intimidate or coerce its neighbors and enhance or increase Iran's perceived status as a leader in the Gulf region. Iran might not provide nuclear technology or weapons to its surrogates, due to concerns over control, accountability, and international repercussions. However, those surrogates, with a nuclear- armed sponsor, may be emboldened to act more aggressively, though not necessarily under Iran's control or on Iran's behalf. 71. Senator Brown. General Mattis, do you agree that a nuclear- armed Iran poses an unacceptable risk to the United States? General Mattis. Yes. Iran remains the most significant threat to regional stability. Although the United Nations Security Council has spoken out against Iranian actions through additional sanctions, the regime continues its destabilizing activities globally. A nuclear armed Iran would significantly impede our global priorities of preventing WMD proliferation, retaining strategic access and ensuring the security and free flow of global commerce, especially energy resources. This would create a significantly more complex problem for our national security team and for the U.S. economy. Also, we could see other countries in the region finding it necessary to develop nuclear weapons or significantly increase conventional weapons to deter a nuclear armed Iran. We should endeavor with our international partners to take strong measures to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. TRANSITION IN IRAQ 72. Senator Brown. General Mattis, do we have a contingency plan in place if Iraq security forces are not making progress by the end of this year? General Mattis. We are currently on track to remove U.S. security forces from Iraq by 1 January 2012 and will be ready to support U.S. Government led efforts through the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq. If the Government of Iraq requests U.S. forces remain to assist Iraqi Security Forces after December 31, 2011, and the U.S. Government agrees to such a request, the U.S. military has the capability to assist. 73. Senator Brown. General Mattis, during the transition in Iraq how do we prevent a mass exodus of institutional knowledge from occurring as a result of DOS taking over too abruptly? General Mattis. The same military personnel with institutional knowledge assigned to the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq are currently working closely with our partners in DOS to support a smooth transition. We share a common objective for continuity and stability during the transition in Iraq. Preparations have been underway for some time and began with a comprehensive assessment of what was necessary to ensure a successful transition. A plan was developed and went into execution in the summer of 2010, including the identification of a multitude of tasks that will transition from U.S. Forces-Iraq to the U.S. Embassy-Iraq, CENTCOM, and the Government of Iraq, or be discontinued altogether. 74. Senator Brown. General Mattis, what is the psychological dimension of the transition in Iraq? General Mattis. The psychological impact of the transition in Iraq varies. The American public may view the transition as positive. For the majority of the Iraqi people, the transition will be a positive experience that marks the re-emergence of Iraq in a regional and international context. Iraqi nationalism and the emergence of a representative government are all positive trends towards a new and prosperous future for Iraq. The future security and prosperity of Iraq now rests with its citizens. At the same time, some citizens in Iraq may view the transition with angst and uncertainty as the U.S. transitions from a Defense Department led effort. 75. Senator Brown. General Mattis, will our Iraqi military partners have the confidence and incentives necessary to keep security tight after we are gone? General Mattis. Current assessments project some gaps in the Government of Iraq security capabilities will continue to exist. The Iraq Security Forces Fund combined with Foreign Military Sales cases directly address required equipment and training to deal with capability requirements. With these efforts, some shortfalls such as an air sovereignty capability requiring much longer timelines to put in place will continue to exist. Our primary strategic objective remains assisting the Government of Iraq in building and forging a professional, self-reliant, and effective security force capable of maintaining internal security and deterring external threats. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins U.S. FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN 76. Senator Brown. General Mattis, I understand the number of ANSF has increased dramatically in the past year. Pending the funding level provided for 2011, we have committed about $20 billion towards training and equipping the ANSF in 2010 and 2011. We provided roughly the same amount in the preceding 7 years. It is unclear to me that Afghanistan has the budget to sustain these forces once we drawdown in Afghanistan in 2014 or sometime between now and then. Unlike Iraq, which has significant oil revenue, Afghanistan's total GDP is about $30 billion.\1\ Are we establishing a long-term U.S. financial commitment with the Afghan Security Forces Fund, or is there a transition plan that ensures Afghanistan sustains their security forces once we have trained and equipped them? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ CIA World Fact Book. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- General Mattis. The international community has acknowledged that while the transition of lead security responsibility will be completed by December 2014, financial support of the ANSF and other parts of the Afghan economy will be necessary past 2014. CENTCOM, in collaboration with other U.S. Government agencies, is developing economic initiatives to enable more coordinated and effective international community assistance. This will move Afghanistan from an aid based economy to a more self-sufficient trade based economy that will put Government of Afghanistan revenues on a path to eventually meet the expenditures of a robust ANSF which is capable of both meeting Afghanistan's security requirements and achieving U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan. SAFE HAVENS IN PAKISTAN 77. Senator Brown. General Mattis, last week, Admiral Mullen stated in his written testimony before this committee that one of the necessary conditions to succeed in achieving sustainable security in Afghanistan and Pakistan requires neutralizing insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan.\2\ On the next page he testified that ``Insurgent groups such as the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network operate unhindered from sanctuaries in Pakistan.'' \3\ Putting these two comments together, it leaves me with the impression we are not on a path to success unless these safe havens in Pakistan are addressed. How confident are you that coalition or Pakistani forces will neutralize these sanctuaries-- including those sanctuaries utilized by the Haqqani and Quetta Shura groups--in the next 12 months? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Mullen Testimony, SASC Hearing, February 23, 2010: Page 6 ``Achieving sustainable security requires developing Afghan governing capacity, cultivating the conditions needed for conflict resolution, neutralizing insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan, and countering corruption. Absent these conditions, we will not succeed.'' \3\ Mullen Testimony, SASC Hearing, February 23, 2010: Page 7. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- General Mattis. I don't believe Pakistan will reverse its current policy within the next 12 months and eliminate sanctuaries enjoyed by the Quetta Shura Taliban and Haqqani Network. However, satisfactory end-states are attainable in Afghanistan even if the sanctuaries persist. Combined counterinsurgency operations beginning in late 2009 succeeded in ejecting the Taliban from key districts in southern Afghanistan despite Taliban sanctuary across the Pakistani border. Continued security gains and Afghanistan Government progress in security, governance, and development over the next several years have the potential to neutralize the Taliban as a strategic threat, even if sanctuaries in Pakistan allow insurgents to maintain influence in outlying areas and sustain a certain level of violence throughout Afghanistan. IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 78. Senator Brown. General Mattis, last month, the quarterly report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency reiterated concern about undisclosed nuclear-related activities that Iran has undertaken since 2004 related to the development of a nuclear payload for a ballistic missile. Will you update the committee on the latest estimates for when Iran could develop a nuclear weapon and when it could launch an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile? General Mattis. The Iranian regime continues to flout U.N. Security Council resolutions on its nuclear and missile programs. Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so. Iran would likely choose missile delivery as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon. It continues to expand the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, many of which are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload. PIRACY ATTACKS 79. Senator Brown. General Mattis, I am alarmed at the sharp rise in piracy attacks on the high seas in the last 4 years. According to the International Maritime Bureau, the number of pirate attacks against ships has risen every year for the last 4 years, and ships reported 445 attacks in 2010, up 10 percent from 2009. The number of crew members taken hostage has increased from 188 in 2006, to nearly 1,200 crew members in 2010. The recent killing of four Americans traveling on a sailing yacht demonstrates that the pirates threaten the safety of our citizens in international waters. In addition, the freedom to safely travel on the open ocean enables trade, which is the lifeblood for many American jobs. I certainly can appreciate that anti-piracy missions require significant resources and present many legal issues because most of these instances occur in international waters, but what needs to be done to reverse the increasing trend in piracy attacks? General Mattis. While we can inhibit piracy on the sea with military action, ultimately the problem of piracy must be solved on shore, primarily in Somalia with a stable government which can enforce the rule of law over its sovereign territory. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 80. Senator Brown. General Mattis, many of us are concerned about the number of missiles and ships required to deploy an adequate BMD for our Nation and for our allies. The challenge is that in addition to protecting the U.S. Homeland, we need to protect our forward based troops and our allies. As a result, there are likely going to be a demand for BMD assets in European Command, Pacific Command, and CENTCOM--which is your AOR. Has CENTCOM established present and future requirements for both missiles and launchers regarding BMD in your AOR? General Mattis. Yes. We have identified BMD requirements for the CENTCOM AOR and they are based on our assessment of potential threats, present and future. 81. Senator Brown. General Mattis, do you expect that the CENTCOM requirements for these assets will be fully satisfied now and in the future? General Mattis. No, I do not. There simply are not enough assets to deal with the global threat. As our adversaries improve their capability both in quality and quantity, the threat becomes ever more challenging and we must continuously re-examine the gap. Hence, we advocate for more interceptors now and additional systems as they become available. However, we are taking other steps to deal with the growing threat. We have engaged our partners and encouraged them to invest in their own BMD. Our adversaries will likely continue to outpace us in terms of sheer numbers of ballistic missiles compared to our interceptor inventory. However, we don't need to match them one for one. We believe we can establish a credible deterrent by establishing an integrated, interoperable, collective defense with our regional partners. Therefore, in order to adequately defend against the missile threat in our region, we must maximize production capacity, to not only close our own capability gaps, but also to enable rapid delivery of these critical systems to our partners once they commit to procuring them. SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 82. Senator Brown. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, the information and oversight the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has provided over the last several years has been invaluable to my colleagues and I to evaluate the U.S. mission in Iraq. The most recent SIGIR quarterly report suggests SIGIR has experienced some challenge in obtaining detailed information from DOD in the course of fulfilling its congressionally mandated requirements.\4\ Will you each commit to be forthcoming in providing information to SIGIR for adequate reporting of the transition during this year? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ SIGIR Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to Congress. Pages 5 and 16. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Admiral Olson. Yes. General Mattis. Yes. CENTCOM has always, and will continue to fully support SIGIR to the very best of our ability by providing the detailed information they require to execute their oversight functions. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn ROLE OF U.S. GROUND FORCES IN FUTURE CONFLICTS 83. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, on February 25, 2011, Secretary Gates made the following comment regarding the force structure that will be needed in the years ahead: ``The Army also must confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements--whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere . . . But in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the President to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should `have his head examined'.'' This past week, we had the 20th anniversary of coalition forces driving Saddam Hussein's Army out of Kuwait. Clearly, land forces played a huge role in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Remarkably, 150,000 coalition ground troops and 1,500 tanks were able to push the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait in just 100 hours. Is that type of military operation truly a thing of the past? General Mattis. I agree with the Secretary that the most plausible scenarios for military intervention involve naval and air engagements. These forces are particularly well suited to conducting short-notice, reactive and expeditionary actions to counter threats to our national interests. However, there remain plausible scenarios today where a U.S. ally or interests are so threatened by a force that only a joint force including robust, integrated land forces would be able to defend our partners and U.S. interests, as we saw in Operation Desert Storm. I expect this reality will continue to be a dominant feature of my Command's AOR and for that reason we must always be able to rely on our Army's core land force capabilities. 84. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, if such a scenario arose again in the near future, would it be possible to drive the enemy out through primarily naval and air engagements? General Mattis. A combination of air, land, and sea engagements is critical in influencing enemy courses of action and their will as an opposing force. An example illuminating the limitation of an air power only campaign includes the NATO air campaigns over Bosnia in 1995. Successful engagements are derived by concurrent balance of forces that offer the greatest strategic flexibility while building on momentum to create opportunities for rapid achievement of objectives. 85. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, would it have been possible to conduct the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom--in which we invaded Afghanistan, inflicted severe damage on the Taliban and al Qaeda, and held key ground in Afghanistan--using primarily naval and air forces? General Mattis. No. During the early phases of combat operation in Afghanistan in October 2001, naval and air forces were largely focused on disrupting the Taliban and al Qaeda and preventing their use of terrorism training camps. However, CENTCOM assessed that the indigenous ground forces could not prevail without U.S. and allied assistance on the ground. U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ 86. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, several startling recent events in Iraq call into question the Iraqi Security Forces' ability to maintain peace, including violent protests and the bombing of the Baiji Oil Refinery--the largest in Iraq. During your testimony, you alluded to the possibility that terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda are behind this recent unrest. How concerned are you that al Qaeda or its affiliates will return to Iraq and take root again following the departure of U.S. forces? General Mattis. The Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) network continues to suffer setbacks. AQI efforts to reinvigorate a Sunni support base will likely fall short of achieving its objective. The majority of Sunnis in Iraq strongly oppose the al Qaeda network for the harsh tactics the group imposes. The transition to Iraqi-led counterterrorism operations has already taken place and the Iraqi Security Forces have demonstrated the ability to aggressively and accurately pursue AQI entities. Iraq will undoubtedly face challenges long after the departure of U.S. forces; however, the Government of Iraq and its security forces are demonstrating the ability to prevent AQI from advancing. 87. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, several military and civilian leaders have expressed serious concern about the Iraqi Air Force's ability to protect its own air space once U.S. forces redeploy home. The Iraqis had aggressively pushed to purchase 18 American-made F-16s, but they announced postponement of the planned purchase in order to shift that funding to domestic priorities. In light of this unfortunate delay, what steps have you taken to enable Iraq to adequately defend its airspace following the U.S. withdrawal? General Mattis. While current intelligence assessments describe the threat to Iraqi air sovereignty as minimal, shared contingency planning addresses any potential threats and provides a framework for mitigation procedures. Iraq has taken the initial steps towards self-reliance in air defense with the objective of acquiring two long-range radar systems that will provide them a capable early warning system. This is the first piece in the development of a sustainable air sovereignty posture, of which the F-16 case was to be the next essential step. These radar systems, one to be provided through Iraqi Security Forces Funding and the other through an FMS case, will provide a foundational capability in air defense. We are working with them to have the radar capability installed and operational by the end of 2011. CENTCOM also intends to conduct military-to-military bilateral contingency planning with GoI. The GoI will still need to acquire a capable air defense weapon system in the future, whether it is the F-16 or another platform. While the GoI will investigate all options, including a like- capability from other countries, CENTCOM will continue to encourage a U.S. manufactured solution as we believe this will provide the best sustainable capability for Iraqi air defense. PIRACY 88. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis and Admiral Olson, Somali pirates are a lingering threat off the Horn of Africa and now even in the Indian Ocean. The February 22 murder of four Americans on a private, hijacked vessel near Oman served as a wake-up call. This year alone, Somali pirates have mounted over 50 attacks, hijacked several ships, and have taken over 200 crewmembers hostage. It appears that piracy is increasing in numbers, reach, and determination, despite the growing number of U.S. and international assets committed to protecting the maritime commons. In your mind, what is the most effective strategy to guard against piracy and secure the use of maritime routes off the east coast of Africa and throughout the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean? Admiral Olson. SOCOM provides specially trained and equipped forces to support the counter-piracy strategies of the geographic combatant commanders. General Mattis. While we can inhibit piracy on the sea with military action, ultimately the problem of piracy must be solved on shore, primarily in Somalia with a stable government that can enforce the rule of law over its sovereign territory. SOCOM FUNDING 89. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Olson, in January, Secretary Gates announced several ``efficiency'' cuts, including $2.3 billion from the SOCOM budget. At the same time, our Nation asks more than ever of our SOF. Recently, you stated ``We are doing more with more, but the more we're doing it with doesn't match the more we've been asked to do . . . we are beginning to show fraying around the edges.'' You have also stated that deployment frequency for SOF is exceedingly high, while SOCOM lacks the resources to meet the current demand. Will losing this $2.3 billion detrimentally impact SOCOM operations? If so, why? Admiral Olson. Senator Cornyn, thank you for affording me the opportunity to answer this extremely important question. Secretary Gates has directed cost consideration in all we do, and a ``culture of savings'' to ensure that we optimize the resources entrusted to us. His direction for improving DOD business operations last summer was clear; identify our savings and efficiencies initiatives over the next 5 years under the notion that those savings would be reinvested. The Department's stated goal was to significantly reduce excess overhead costs and apply savings to force structure and modernization--not a reduction of the DOD topline through efficiency cuts. CDR SOCOM's efforts in resourcing tactical units, divesting of obsolete and redundant capabilities, and leveraging Service common capabilities are consistent with the Secretary of Defense efficiency focus. Realigning the $2.3 billion across the FYDP did not have a negative impact on SOCOM. In fact, it allowed us to address growing capability gaps and improve battlefield performance by invigorating our acquisition agenda. SOCOM was able to realign funding towards Undersea Mobility and AC-130J Gunship recapitalization. Additionally, we were able to realign funding to improve SOF operational readiness and improve our human capital strategy. Key efforts such as Foreign Language Proficiency Pay, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command sustainment, flying hours funding, and Warrior Rehabilitation were enhanced. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY 90. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, in recent years, our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are increasingly operating in areas outside their traditional competencies. We have seen examples of combat commanders standing up agricultural unions, dealing with veterinary issues, water issues, health issues, human services issues, and conducting elections in their areas of operations. While most of these tasks have been executed successfully, due in part to the sheer tenacity and determination of our military, many have been completed without the support and expertise of the relevant U.S. Government agencies. Could you comment on what legislative modifications you think are necessary in order to improve interagency security cooperation? General Mattis. Transitioning our military forces out of Iraq and Afghanistan will become more difficult if we cannot maintain assistance in the economic and governance areas on the civilian side. Robust resourcing for the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other agency and department missions are some of the best investments for reducing the need for military forces to be employed. 91. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, do you see the need for a more comprehensive review or possible reorganization of some government agencies to better support our expeditionary military? General Mattis. Improved interagency coordination begins with an adequate level of resources available to our civilian interagency associates and partners. It is vitally important to support and fully fund the requests made by these departments and agencies in the 2011 and 2012 budget requests that address and build the capabilities and capacity required for the future success of the National Security Strategy. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review offers important contributions to both improving efficiencies and allowing us all to better understand how our partners operate. 92. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, under current DOD organization, Iraq and Afghanistan fall within CENTCOM's AOR. However, within the DOS organizational structure, they fall under two separate regional bureaus. Similarly, Pakistan and India fall under the same DOS regional bureau, but under two different DOD unified combatant commands. These problems are not limited to the DOD and DOS maps. It would seem that this misalignment of geographic regions between Federal agencies would cause inherent challenges in the area of interagency coordination. In your opinion, does this lack of common demarcation of the world's regions hamper effective interagency cooperation and coordination on national security? General Mattis. No. Differences in the Areas of Responsibility geographic demarcations do not restrict accomplishment of assigned missions among COCOMs and civilian leaders across the Federal Government, to include diplomatic coordination, interagency cooperation, advancing U.S. interests, and protecting U.S. national security. IRANIAN INTERFERENCE IN IRAQ 93. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, you noted in your testimony that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) is equipping militants in Iraq and Afghanistan who have attacked U.S. and coalition forces, undermining stability and governance in both nations. Through these actions, Iran has essentially been waging a proxy war against U.S. troops. Your testimony also highlights a recent January 2011 large-caliber improvised rocket-assisted mortar attack against U.S. forces in Iraq that, in your words, ``demonstrated Iran's malicious intent and ability to escalate violence when they desire.'' What concerns do you have regarding the potential for the Iranian regime to obtain a greater, destabilizing influence in Iraq following the planned withdrawal of U.S. troops in December 2011? General Mattis. IRGC-QF will likely continue to support Shia militant groups in Iraq after U.S. forces withdraw, just as IRGC-QF continued to support Lebanese Hizballah after the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in 2000. IRGC-QF will likely attempt to replicate the Hizballah model in Iraq via Shia militia groups such as Kata'ib Hizballah, Asaib Ahl al-Haqq and Muqtada al Sadr's Promise Day Brigade. Their intent is to have a loyal proxy with legitimate seats in the Iraqi Government and a capable, responsive militia. These militia groups, backed by IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hizballah, could collectively destabilize the security gains made in Iraq should Iran and these militias believe increased violence would benefit their interests and increase their influence. 94. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, in your view, what is the best strategy, short of contingency operations, that the United States can employ to deter Iran's destabilizing activities in the region? General Mattis. I believe the most effective strategy is one that mobilizes the international community to implement sufficient diplomatic and economic pressure to further isolate Iran forcing the regime to change its destabilizing behavior. In the meantime, CENTCOM will continue to work through institutions, alliances, and coalitions to dissuade Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. To this end, we will continue to pursue security cooperation with our allies and regional partners while helping to strengthen their defensive capabilities. We will also continue to support interagency efforts that blend economic, diplomatic, informational, and military tools to deter Iran. B-1 BOMBERS 95. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, the B-1 bomber has been operating over Afghanistan in support of our troops on the ground and has proven itself a critical component of our long-range strike operations overseas. Senior U.S. military leaders have consistently acknowledged that the B-1 fleet is doing an outstanding job. In a recent confirmation hearing, General David Petraeus stated that the B-1 is a ``great platform'' and a ``very capable bomber.'' In your view, what role has the B-1 fleet played within CENTCOM's AOR, and what unique capabilities has it brought to the table, as compared to other platforms? General Mattis. The B-1 is a very capable combat aircraft that combines precision targeting and guided munitions. The B-1 can deliver up to 48,000 pounds of munitions and can loiter for 7 hours before needing aerial refueling. During the first 6 months of OEF, the B-1 dropped 38 percent of all weapons delivered while flying only 5 percent of the overall sorties. In addition, the bomber dropped twice as many precision munitions as the coalition partners combined. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the aircraft flew less than 1 percent of the combat missions while delivering approximately 43 percent of the precision munitions. [Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the committee adjourned.] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM ---------- TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 2011 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:48 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, Webb, McCaskill, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, Brown, Ayotte, and Collins. Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel. Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; and Michael J. Sistak, research assistant. Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells. Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Patrick Hayes and Joanne McLaughlin, assistants to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; and Taylor Andreae, assistant to Senator Graham. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. I want to welcome Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Amos to the committee this morning to testify on the plans and programs of the Department of the Navy in our review of the fiscal year 2012 annual budget and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request of the administration. We are pleased to welcome General Amos to his first posture hearing as Commandant and to welcome Admiral Roughead for what will probably be his last posture hearing before the committee as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). We are grateful to each of you for your great service to our Nation and for the valorous and truly professional service of the men and women under your command, and we're grateful to their families for the vital role families play in the success of careers and missions of our Armed Forces. As we discuss the budget issues here at home, our eyes are principally focused on places far from here. Nearly 20,000 marines are partnered with an equal number of Afghan security forces (ASF) in Helmand Province, in the effort to bring security and stability to the people of southern Afghanistan. The marines have seen some tough fighting in clearing those areas of Taliban. They have also performed brilliantly in working with ASFs and local Afghan leaders to keep these communities free of insurgent control and to help the Afghan people build a better future. These efforts are showing progress, with villages secured in the central Helmand River Valley, market bazaars are reopening, and children are returning to school. The marines are also helping to establish community watch groups throughout Helmand Province, which are enabling local villagers to provide for their own security and to prevent a return of the Taliban. When we met for the Navy posture hearing last year, the Marine Corps was completing its drawdown of forces in Iraq and was in the midst of its redeployment to Afghanistan. The Navy has also been contributing directly to the war effort in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) as well and has 14,000 Active and Reserve sailors on the ground and another 10,000 at sea in CENTCOM, including ongoing individual augmentee support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. New challenges have emerged in recent days. Two ships with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) of over 1,000 marines aboard are in the Mediterranean. Missile-launching ships are available should the President choose to use them to strike Libyan targets, including military aircraft, air defenses, airstrips, command centers, and bases. Before exercising any use of force option, the President is appropriately seeking support from the international community, in particular the support of other countries in the Arab and Muslim worlds and in the region. It has been reported that some Arab states are apparently considering coordinating with the African Union in support of imposing a no-fly zone over Libya. Also, France and the United Kingdom are drafting a resolution for possible use at the United Nations (U.N.). Meanwhile, discussions are ongoing at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in advance of a defense ministerial meeting on March 10 and 11. Under the War Powers Act, the administration would need to consult with Congress before exercising a military option involving the use of force and to notify Congress promptly if a decision were made to use force. The use and possible use of our forces overseas makes it even more important that our budget provides for their success and their wellbeing. Our witnesses this morning are faced with a number of critical issues that confront the Department of the Navy and the budget, such as balancing modernization needs against the costs of supporting ongoing operations. We also know that you are facing serious complications due to the fact that the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have a full year budget for the current fiscal year. Many of the ongoing challenges facing the Department of the Navy (DON) center on acquisition programs. For instance, we have had great concerns about cost problems in the shipbuilding arena, including the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Since last year, we approved a revised acquisition strategy for LCS that will result in $2.9 billion in savings compared to the previous shipbuilding plan and has also contributed, at least in part, to the fact the Navy is buying additional ships in this budget and has added purchases of additional 41 F-18 aircraft to help address a potential shortfall in tactical aviation. We will be monitoring closely to ensure that the DON actually achieves these savings and gets costs under control in other acquisition programs. The Navy has made modest progress in achieving the goal of a 313-ship fleet by increasing the size of the Navy fleet, and that has increased from a low of 274 ships in March 2007 to a planned level of 288 during fiscal year 2012. We need to see more success stories, such as the savings from the LCS program or the savings from more efficient production of the Virginia-class submarine or the savings from the F-18 multi-year program if the Navy is going to make continued progress in building the size of the fleet. The future strength of the Navy depends on holding firm on these cost reduction efforts and expanding them across the whole acquisition portfolio. The Marine Corps has announced their intention to cancel the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program. DON acknowledges the importance of the Marine Corps' amphibious assault mission and of the continuing relevance of that mission and capability to the Nation's defense. This mission in turn depends on an ability to move ashore from 20 to 30 miles out to sea with armored vehicles. That has been the purpose of the EFV program. So we need to hear this morning on the status of the alternatives to the EFV to achieve that mission. The Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 has dictated that DOD make significant changes in its regulations and procedures governing the acquisition system. While I'm certain that this legislation will help correct past problems, I also know that we will succeed only through concerted efforts within the executive branch to implement that legislation and improve past behavior within DOD. We look forward to hearing this morning how the Navy is proceeding to implement the provisions of that act. Another concern surrounds future ship and aircraft force levels. As I have previously mentioned, the Navy budget would buy an additional 41 F-18 aircraft, but the budget would buy fewer Marine Corps and Navy versions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Additionally, the Navy is planning to conduct a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) on some 150 F-18 aircraft already in our inventory. We need to understand the net effect of all these changes and how that alters the prospect of having empty carrier air wings later in this decade. Readiness continues to be a major concern for our committee. Without a final fiscal year 2011 appropriations act to match this committee's 2011 authorization of additional resources for readiness, the Navy readiness posture is in great jeopardy. Specifically, the funding needed in this fiscal year, in addition to the original budget request, is roughly $60 million for aircraft depot maintenance and $34 million for ship depot maintenance. During last year's budget review cycle, this committee authorized those additional resources to meet the CNO's identified unfunded priorities for fixing shortfalls in the Navy aircraft and ship depot maintenance accounts in the fiscal year 2011 budget. While the Senate Appropriations Committee matched that additional funding, there has been no final appropriations act. Delaying the final appropriations act for fiscal year 2011 has already had a negative effect on readiness. The Navy has cancelled five ship availabilities. Further delay on appropriations will result in additional cancellations. The fiscal year 2012 budget continues an inadequate request for ship and aircraft depot maintenance, as I mentioned. For these two areas, the Navy budget request is short some $367 million, which would only exacerbate an already stressed state of naval readiness. Turning to operational energy issues, I want to commend Secretary Mabus for his foresight and aggressive goals and his successful testing of alternative fuels from renewable sources. The sooner we can free ourselves from the shackles of fossil fuels, the better off our Armed Forces will be along with the Nation. I understand that last year one Marine company deployed to Afghanistan with renewable power systems to recharge batteries and laptops and energy-efficient lighting for tents, among other items. Since then, fuel use has decreased 90 percent and two patrol bases now operate entirely upon that renewable energy. I congratulate you, Secretary Mabus and the Marines, for that initiative. I also want to commend Secretary Mabus on his recent announcement that DOD will take new steps to enhance cooperation on clean energy and energy security by furthering last year's Memorandum of Understanding between DOD and the Department of Energy. Last year's committee report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 contained language expressing this committee's concerns with the planned relocation of 8,000 marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam. We recommended a reduction of $320 million from the request for construction of aircraft parking, site preparation, and utilities on Guam, since we concluded that these funds were budgeted ahead of need. The committee also recommended that authorization for the construction of future projects be deferred until we were provided with essential and relevant information. To date, the committee has not received that information on any of these six items that we requested. This year's budget request contains $181 million in similar projects. DOD has not yet shown that tangible progress has been made to implement a final decision on the replacement facility that meets the operational requirements for the marines on Okinawa, and we should not proceed with such an important, costly endeavor until we have complete, detailed information and realistic plans. To do otherwise would risk billions in taxpayers' dollars and could potentially put our strategic posture in a crucial region in jeopardy. So we look forward to hearing testimony this morning from our witnesses on these and other issues that are facing the Navy, and again we strongly commend you on your great service to the Nation and on the initiatives that you have taken. Senator McCain. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for being here today and I thank them for their service to the country. They join us in interesting times. There are a lot of issues that are now before us and the President and the Joint Chiefs and also our military leadership have to handle various situations that are unfolding in the world, some of it on a day-to-day basis. So, I'm very interested in hearing General Amos' and Admiral Roughead's assessments of some of these situations. I remain concerned--by the way, in case--I know that our witnesses didn't miss it, but the Chinese announced a 12 percent or 12.5 percent increase in their defense budget. We all know that that is not a true reflection of their defense spending, and a lot of their recent behavior in my view has emphasized the need for a naval presence in that part of the world, a very significant one, which may in future years turn our attention again to our overall maritime strategy. The JSF is an issue that we have been over and over and over again both in hearings and with the witnesses. General Amos, I would really appreciate it if you would keep us informed almost on a monthly basis. Secretary Gates has said, as we all know, that the Marine Corps version of the F-35 is on ``probation.'' This has really been a--I hate to keep throwing around the word ``disgraceful,'' but the cost overruns and delays have been unfortunately characteristic of a lot of our acquisition problems and challenges over the past several years. I know, General Amos, that you will keep us informed. But we don't want to be surprised about anything that happens with the F-35. In these tough fiscal times, we do have an obligation to our citizens to make sure that--we always have that responsibility, but now in these tough times, that responsibility has even been increased. General Amos, I appreciate your decision concerning the EFV. I know it was a tough one for you and I'll be very interested in hearing your views on what we will do instead of the EFV in the future, particularly in light of my opening comments. Our whole shipbuilding costs are really something which is disturbing us. Secretary Mabus, how you're going to fit the submarines as well as our other shipbuilding requirements all into a very tight budget, I would be very interested in hearing how you're going to approach that. Finally, on the LCS, I would just quote not my own views, but from Norman Polmar. Over the years we learn to respect the views of certain individuals who are experts and I would quote from an article that Norman Polmar wrote called ``A Crisis in Leadership'' in January. He basically said: ``And more recently, the Navy has again changed course on the LCS program. The program began a decade ago when the Navy awarded contracts to two industry teams to develop and build competitive LCS designs `at the speed of light.' As successive CNO and surface warfare flag officers attested, each team was to build up to two ships.'' At the last hearing I went through the numbers of the ships that were begun and cancelled, at huge costs. ``After competitive evaluation, the Navy would select one design to fulfill the requirement for a total LCS force of about 55 ships.'' I go on to quote Norman Polmar: ``Into 2010, the Navy continued to praise this approach to the LCS program, even though both designs have been late and far above planned costs. The design selection also was delayed with the penultimate declaration by the Navy's leadership being that the winning design would be chosen in November 2010. ``Then, without warning, in November the Navy announced a `split decision.' The leadership now wants to buy 10 additional ships from each builder. The claim is made that the existing competition had driven down costs for both designs. ``That is a questionable claim in view of the more than doubling of the costs of prototypes of both designs, major problems in development and producing their mission modules, and increased costs of supporting a large number of both LCS configurations in the fleet. The two LCS designs have different sensors, computers, software, tactical displays, propulsion systems, et cetera. Those will cause increased maintenance and support costs, increased personnel training costs, and restrict flexibility in personnel assignment, an important factor in view of the small LCS crew size. The different combat systems of the two LCS designs will create problems related to operating the mission modules. Developing a new common combat system for both designs could cost up to $1.8 billion, according to the Congressional Research Service. Adapting one of the combat systems to the other design would cost just under $1 billion.'' That's Norman Polmar's view, and we'll see, Mr. Secretary. We'll find out. I'll be here for a few more years, and we'll see whether your decision was correct, or whether Norman Polmar and I were correct, when you made a snap decision in November that we had to approve two different shipyards to do the job that for years you told Congress and the American people that you were going to select one. This kind of thing erodes, enormously erodes, the credibility of the Navy's plans and programs, at least for this member. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and I thank them for their service to their country. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, let me call on you first. Secretary Mabus. STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Mr. Mabus. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee: I have the honor of appearing here today representing the sailors, marines, civilians, and their families that make up our Department of the Navy. Today the Navy and Marine Corps are conducting missions across a full range of military operations. They remain the most formidable expeditionary fighting force the world has ever known and, thanks to your support, they will continue to meet the multitude of missions entrusted to them by our Nation. As the chairman pointed out in his opening statement, today we face an immediate crisis, the absence of a defense appropriations bill and the increasingly serious problems of operating under a continuing resolution (CR). The pressure of the CR has already significantly impacted procurement and reduced the resources available to maintain readiness. If the CR continues for the entire year, we will be forced to reduce aircraft flight hours and ship steaming days, cancel up to 29 of 85 surface ship availabilities, defer maintenance on as many as 70 aircraft and 290 engines, and defer up to 140 maintenance and construction projects across the country. In addition, lack of legislative action will prevent the construction of two Arleigh Burke destroyers, one Virginia- class submarine, and one mobile landing platform, prevent procurement of two nuclear reactor cores, and delay increased funding for the Ohio-class replacement, reduce Marine Corps procurement by a third after the Marine Corps rebalances its manpower accounts, create a $4.6 billion shortfall in operations and maintenance accounts, and create a nearly $600 million shortfall in combined Navy and Marine Corps manpower accounts. These measures not only place additional stress on the force and on our families; they will weaken the industrial base and affect over 10,000 private sector jobs. The disruption to our fleet and shore maintenance and modernization schedules may take years to recover from and will come at a much greater cost. We strongly request congressional action to address the implications of the CR. This is particularly important when considering that submission of the fiscal year 2012 budget was based on the fiscal year 2011 request. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request for the Navy of $161 billion, an increase of only one-half of 1 percent from fiscal year 2011, includes funds this year for 10 ships and 223 aircraft. It maintains our commitment to take care of our people, build a strong research and development and industrial base, and to grow the fleet. The $15 billion request for OCO, which represents a drop of $3.5 billion from fiscal year 2011, includes funds to sustain operations, manpower, infrastructure, as well as procure equipment to support operations in Afghanistan. During the budget development, we were keenly aware of the fiscal position of the country and the necessity to be responsible stewards of taxpayers' dollars. The resulting request is a strategy-driven document, informed by fiscal realities. I think it balances competing requirements and does what is best for the country, the Navy and Marine Corps, and our sailors and marines. We began this budget cycle by examining every aspect of what we do and how we do it. Consequently, $42 billion in the Navy efficiencies were identified over the 5 years. As a result of these efficiencies, we have been able to add one Aegis destroyer, three T-AOX fleet oilers, and one T-AGOS ocean surveillance ship to our shipbuilding plan. With our dual-block LCS strategy, this increases the total number of ships in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) from 50 to 56, including one Joint High-Speed Vessel to be built for the Army. The savings allow us to buy additional F/A-18s, extend the service life of up to 150 aircraft as a hedge against delays in the deployment of the F-35B, and allow us to continue investing in unmanned systems, which are becoming increasingly important on the battlefield. The upcoming year will see the deployment of Fire Scout to Afghanistan and continuing testing of the UCAS-D, the forerunner of an integrated carrier-based system. In 2010, one of the most important efforts was the decision endorsed by Congress to pursue the new LCS through a dual-block buy procurement strategy. At an average cost of less than $440 million per ship and with the cost reductions we have seen on LCS-3 and -4, the new strategy will save taxpayers $2.9 billion. This plan is one that's good for the Navy, good for taxpayers, good for the country, and demonstrates what can be accomplished when sound acquisition principles are followed and enforced. We heard the message from Congress very clearly. We need more ships, but they have to be affordable. The LCS strategy supports the industrial base by keeping workers employed at two shipyards and is indicative of DOD's push to ensure acquisition excellence. The fixed-price contracts used for LCS, I hope, will be a model. They are the result of effective competition, give the government full ownership of the technical data package used in construction, and afford greater congressional oversight. With the new strategy, we get more ships, more quickly, and more affordably. As was pointed out, significant additional savings were also achieved through termination of the EFV. It's important to emphasize that this decision in no way changes our Nation's commitment to amphibious warfare. We have to maintain an amphibious assault capability that will put marines ashore ready for the fight. But the EFV is simply not the vehicle to do this. Conceived in the 1980s, the EFV is a two-decade-old solution to a tactical problem that has since fundamentally changed. Its cost per unit would have consumed half the Marine Corps' total procurement from fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2025 and 90 percent of its vehicle-related operation and maintenance account. In aviation programs, we, as you, are closely monitoring the JSF, particularly the Marine Corps variant, the F-35B. After a 2-year period of focused scrutiny, we'll be able to make an informed recommendation about resolving the technical and cost issues. Ashore, we continue to confront rising health care costs caused by an increasing number of beneficiaries, expanded benefits, and increased utilization. To deal with these trends, we have to implement systematic efficiencies and specific initiatives to improve quality of care and customer satisfaction, but at the same time more responsibly manage costs. We concur with the recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense to ensure fiscal solvency and benefit equity for our retirees. Finally, we are continuing efforts to invest in and develop alternative energy. The latest headlines from around the world reinforce the basic point: Energy is first and foremost an issue of national security. We cannot allow volatile regions of the world to control the price and affect the supply of the fuel we use. Last year, the Navy and Marine Corps took huge steps forward, including, again as was pointed out earlier, flying an F-18 Hornet on biofuel, conducting a large expansion of solar power, and beginning expeditionary energy initiatives in Afghanistan. The Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, was the outfit that you talked about, Mr. Chairman, and in the middle of some of the heaviest fighting in Helmand Province they have demonstrated not only the ability to reduce their use of fossil fuels, but also to make them better fighters. One foot patrol saves 700 pounds of batteries that they don't have to lug through the battlefield, simply by using some of these renewable energy devices. What we're doing there is already saving lives. We will continue these investments this year and will continue to move toward our goal of at least 50 percent alternative energy use by 2020. In closing, I want to thank you again for your support. Thank you for always looking out for our sailors, our marines, their families, and for your support of efforts to make the Navy and the Marine Corps better, stronger, and better able to defend our great Nation. It's a solemn privilege to lead the naval services during an era of protracted war and of national challenge. I have been profoundly moved by the sacrifice and devotion that I have witnessed daily in the sailors and marines who defend us. The Navy and Marine Corps are and will remain ready to do any mission America gives them. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Mabus follows:] Prepared Statement by Hon. Raymond E. Mabus, Jr. Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain, I have the honor of appearing here today on behalf of the nearly 900,000 sailors, marines, and civilians that make up the Department of the Navy. I have appeared before this committee on a number of occasions, and I am happy to be here again, along with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to report on the readiness, posture, progress, and budgetary requests of the Department. We consider ourselves privileged to lead the dedicated men and women of the Department who are selflessly serving the United States all around the world. Today, your Navy and Marine Corps are conducting missions across the full range of military operations. They are engaged in combat in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, deterrence and ballistic missile defense (BMD) in the Pacific, Arabian Gulf, and the Mediterranean, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations across the globe. Our unmatched global reach, endurance, and presence continue to allow the Navy and Marine Corps--in partnership with our sister Services--to secure and advance America's interests wherever challenges or crises have arisen, as well as operate forward to prevent crises from occurring. We remain the most formidable expeditionary fighting force the world has ever known, and with your continued support, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to meet the multiplicity of threats that endanger international peace and security. But today we are very concerned about the absence of a Defense Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 2011 and the negative effects of operating under a continuing resolution for the remainder of the year. We are equally concerned about passage of a bill that reduces the topline from the level requested in the fiscal year 2011 President's budget. Either course of action significantly impacts the resources available to grow the fleet and jeopardizes recent efforts to restore and maintain readiness levels commensurate with the standards expected of the Navy and Marine Corps. Without legislative action, limiting fiscal year 2011 procurement accounts to fiscal year 2010 levels will: Prevent start of construction of one Virginia-class submarine to be built in Groton and Newport News which will break the existing multi-year contract. Prevent start of construction of one Mobile Landing Platform to be built in San Diego. Prevent start of construction of one or possibly both programmed Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to be built in Bath and Pascagoula due to DDG-1000/DDG-51 swap language that prevents award of either ship unless both are authorized and appropriated. Preclude fourth and final increment of full funding for construction of CVN-78 (USS Gerald R. Ford) and advance procurement for CVN-79. Prevent procurement of two nuclear reactor cores for refueling of one aircraft carrier and one ballistic missile submarine, as well as delay increased funding for research and development of the Ohio-class replacement and replacement of two Moored Training Ships that provide half of the force's nuclear training capability. Prevent completion of one Arleigh Burke-class modernization. Reduce Marine Corps procurement by $563 million. This would add to equipment shortfalls generated by 9 years of conflict and prevent equipment replacement or purchase of four H-1 helicopters, numerous LAVs, MTVRs, LVSRs; tech upgrades to counter IED jammers; communication and intelligence equipment; tactical fuel systems to power our vehicles and generators; engineering equipment to move ammo, gear and supplies; air conditioners and heaters to take care of marines and sensitive gear; and EOD improvements to protect them. Reductions to expected procurement levels will create additional stress on the force, as units in service pick up additional commitments to cover the seams created by fewer available platforms. Likewise, fixing fiscal year 2011 operations to fiscal year 2010 levels has created a $4.6 billion shortfall in Navy and Marine Corps operations, maintenance, and training accounts. Faced with this prospect, the Department began efforts in January to mitigate the impacts of operating under the continuing resolution, which over the course of the fiscal year will cause us to: Reduce aircraft flight hours and ship steaming days, including a reduction of four non-deployed air wings' flight hours to minimal flight-safety levels. Cancel up to 29 of 85 surface ship availabilities. Defer maintenance on 70 aircraft and 290 aircraft engines, bringing the combined backlog of aviation maintenance close to 1-year redlines. Defer 41 facilities maintenance projects and 89 new construction projects in Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and Guam. These cuts equal an approximate 50 percent reduction and will eliminate, among many projects, dry dock certifications, bachelor quarters maintenance projects, repairs to explosive handling wharves at Bangor and Kings Bay that support ballistic missile operations, and modernization projects to support introduction of new training aircraft. The combined effects of the continuing resolution will directly impact the strength of the industrial base and over 10,000 private sector jobs at shipyards, factories, and Navy and Marine Corps facilities across the country. The degradation or loss of perishable skill-sets within our workforce, including many nuclear workers, and the disruption to both our fleet and shore maintenance and modernization schedules will take 3 years to recover based on rotational schedules alone--and only at significantly greater cost than requested in the fiscal year 2011 President's Budget. Finally, there is almost a $600 million shortfall in Navy and Marine Corps manpower accounts. As a result of this shortfall, the Services must raid other accounts in order to meet payroll for the duration of the year. We are currently living within funding constraints by limiting or conducting short-notice permanent change of station moves; however, this tactic places significant hardship on our military families and is not sustainable over the entire fiscal year. We strongly request congressional action to address the implications of the Continuing Resolution on our forces and our people by taking action to enact the fiscal year 2011 President's Budget. DEPARTMENTAL PRIORITIES As I testified last year, there are four imperatives I believe the Department of the Navy must address to maintain preeminence as a fighting force and successfully meet the challenges of the future. They are: (1) Taking care of our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families (2) Treating energy as a strategic national security issue (3) Creating acquisition excellence (4) Continuing development and deployment of unmanned systems These priorities underpin every action of the Department, from supporting current operations to developing the current year's budget request, finding efficiencies within the Department, and preparing our Navy and Marine Corps for the future. Fundamentally, it comes down to a question of resources, of ensuring that our people have what they need to do their jobs, ensuring the Nation that the Navy and Marine Corps uses our fiscal and energy resources wisely, and ensuring that seapower, as a resource, remains readily available to meet the Nation's policy requirements and the orders of the Commander in Chief. SEAPOWER: A CRITICAL STRATEGIC ENABLER It is clear that we live in a time of sweeping change and an era of strategic realignment. The President has stated that we ``must pursue a strategy of national renewal and global leadership--a strategy that rebuilds the foundation of American strength and influence.'' Seapower has always been a part of that foundation and will continue to be an indispensible asset to American leadership and economic strength in the global community of nations. American seapower, as it has done for generations, continues to guarantee freedom of navigation and international maritime trade, underpinning global economic stability and facilitating continued global economic growth. No other component of American military power is as flexible or adaptable as seapower. I see one of my primary responsibilities as Secretary to be ensuring continuation of this responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability through the policies we adopt and in the ships, aircraft, and weapons systems that we build. Maritime nations have many inherent strategic advantages. Naval forces operating in the open ocean provide an effective conventional deterrent to those who threaten regional stability or promote extremism. Strong expeditionary forces can swiftly respond to crises and make potential adversaries pause before committing hostile actions. But should deterrence fail, our combat ready naval forces must be prepared to conduct sustained combat operations. The Navy and Marine Corps are America's ``Away Team.'' They exist primarily to protect our Nation far from home and respond quickly to crises wherever and whenever they occur. Exploiting their inherent mobility and maneuverability at sea, naval forces gather information, perform surveillance of seaborne and airborne threats, defend regional partners, deter prospective adversaries, interdict weapons of mass destruction, disrupt terrorist networks, conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and support the work of American diplomacy. This variety of capabilities is a primary feature of seapower, and it provides the President and our Nation with unmatched flexibility to deter conflict and, if necessary, project power from the sea to defend U.S. national security interests. The ability to accomplish these tasks without placing a large presence ashore and absent concerns of sovereignty is absolutely critical in our world of increasingly sophisticated threats and growing geopolitical complexity. It is for these reasons, and in order to improve global force projection capabilities that the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are working on an Air Sea Battle concept to improve joint capabilities and cooperation in addressing anti-access/area-denial challenges. Unique in history, the blanket of maritime security and stability provided by American maritime power is the first to be used for the good of the whole world. But in order to ensure continued American leadership in issues of maritime policy and security, we strongly recommend accession of the United States to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, an action that has been similarly and repeatedly recommended by multiple Secretaries of the Navy and Chiefs of Naval Operation. Accession by the United States would enhance stability of the navigational rights inherent to the Convention and would strengthen our bargaining position in international discussions of Arctic Policy and access to resources and sea lines of communication. CURRENT OPERATIONS Over the past year, our forces have successfully navigated the world's growing complexity and have consistently demonstrated the utility, effectiveness, and flexibility of seapower and maritime forces. Following completion of the Marines Corps' mission in Iraq, the primary operational focus of the Department has been supporting the war effort in Afghanistan. Over 30,000 marines and sailors are committed to the fight there, working all across the country, with the largest concentration operating as Regional Command-Southwest along the Helmand River Valley. In my visits to the marines on the ground throughout the year, I had the opportunity to look firsthand at the progress made by our increased presence in Helmand. In December, I visited three Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) with increasing levels of stability in three separate districts of Helmand: Sangin, Marjah, and Nawa--or as the marines put it, I went to look at where the fight is, where the fight was, and where there is no fight. In Nawa, I saw a strong partnership between the local government, Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Army, and our Marines--who have built the capacity of their partners so that they may shortly assume responsibility for their own security. The district is very safe, and because of the success of the counter-insurgency effort, Nawa is growing in both political strength and economic activity. In Marjah, after successful operations to clear it last spring, the markets are open, schools are being built, and a local government is working to build capacity. In my visit just 3 months ago, I personally walked the streets of Marjah to witness the progress, something that even in the summer of 2010 would have been unthinkable. Then, just stepping outside the gates of our FOB would have generated a pitched battle. Now, it brought out street vendors and men on motorbikes. I also went to Sangin District near the Kajaki Dam in Northern Helmand, which has been a Taliban stronghold for years and for the past few months has been the main effort of the fight in Helmand. Our marines in Sangin have been conducting intensive combat and security missions in support of the counterinsurgency strategy, and concurrently--even in the midst of the fight, have been testing new solar energy equipment to expand their operational reach. Together with their partners from the Afghan National Security Forces, they have taken the fight to the Taliban and are facilitating the Afghan Government's reestablishment of local control. Elsewhere across Central Command, the Navy has over 14,000 sailors on the ground supporting joint and coalition efforts and another 10,000 sailors at sea supporting combat operations, including from our carriers operating in the Indian Ocean, where we are launching approximately 30 percent of the strike or close air support missions that watch over our marines and soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan. In addition to combat operations, the Navy and Marine Corps remain globally engaged in a host of other security and stability operations. On any given day, more than 72,000 sailors and marines are deployed and almost half of our 286 ships are underway, ready to respond where needed. It was the Navy and Marine Corps that were the first on scene after both the devastating earthquake in Haiti and the summer's catastrophic floods in Pakistan. Within hours of the January 12th earthquake, both Navy and Marine Corps assets were en route to Haiti. A total of over 10,000 sailors and marines and 23 ships, including the carrier USS Carl Vinson, the Bataan and Nassau Amphibious Ready Groups, and the hospital ship USNS Comfort ultimately participated in Operation Unified Response. Halfway around the world, after Pakistan was struck by devastating August floods that impacted nearly a fifth of its population, helicopters from the USS Peleliu and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit supported the Government of Pakistan through delivery of 2,000 tons of relief supplies and by contributing to the rescue of over 10,000 people. Later, the ships of the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group deployed early to provide a continuous U.S. humanitarian presence. In response to the administration's strategic direction, the Navy is scaling up our BMD force and their deployments to enhance our deterrent posture, especially in the defense of Europe. Our multi- mission, BMD-capable, Aegis cruisers and destroyers now routinely deploy to the Mediterranean and the Arabian Gulf, as well as the Western Pacific to extend our deterrent umbrella for our allies. I had the opportunity a few months ago to visit the destroyer USS Ramage after she completed her first BMD deployment, and I can assure you that the sailors on these ships are some of the most professional and dedicated men and women in the country, and they are incredibly excited about their work. We appreciate Congress' continued support of the destroyer and cruiser modernization programs that are bringing additional BMD capability to the fleet. Our growing BMD capability is complemented by our traditional sea- based, strategic nuclear deterrent centered upon our globally deployed and proficient ballistic missile submarine force. In the Western Pacific, as an integral part of U.S. diplomatic actions, several times last year the USS George Washington sortied to the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan in response to territorial disputes with North Korea and open North Korean provocation. In late November, after the North Korean artillery attacks on Yeonpyeong Island west of Inchon, the George Washington strike group conducted a training exercise with the South Korean Navy in order to demonstrate the continuing value and strength of our alliance. We are also working to build regional capacity and resolve security issues of common international concern. In support of our Maritime Strategy, both the Navy and Marine Corps routinely engage with nations all around the world to build capacity and forge stronger maritime partnerships. In the ``Rim of the Pacific'' or RIMPAC exercise, 32 ships, 5 submarines, and more than 170 aircraft from 14 nations participated in the world's largest multinational maritime exercise encompassing every aspect of traditional naval warfare. Global Partnership Stations in Africa, South America, and the Pacific are training hundreds of sailors, marines, and coastguardsmen from dozens of nations and are bringing advanced medical and civil engineering assistance to those in need. The Africa Partnership Station alone has trained with 32 African and European partners since 2007. Between them, Pacific Partnership 2010--conducted by the USNS Mercy-- and Continuing Promise 2010--conducted by the USS Iwo Jima--treated over 100,000 patients and conducted over 20 civil engineering projects. In the Caribbean and South America, we continue to work with the Coast Guard-led Joint Interagency Task Force-South to synchronize forces from 13 nations and interdict the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States. In 2010 naval forces contributed to the seizure of over 133.2 tons of cocaine, 3.2 tons of marijuana, 92 boats and aircraft, and $2.7 billion in drug revenue. In the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean, the Navy remains committed to counter-piracy efforts with approximately 16 partner nations. Combined Task Force 151, in cooperation with forces from the EU, NATO, and other nations deploying individual units or task groups, is operating off of Yemen and in the Somali Basin to protect the safe passage of maritime commerce. Where our forces are located, pirate activity has fallen, but the areas involved are huge, and as Secretary of State Clinton said in April 2009, the solution to Somalia piracy lies largely with Somalia, through building its capacity to police itself and offering young pirates viable alternatives to that way of life. We are treating the symptoms of piracy, rather than its fundamental cause: Somalia's failure as a state. Despite the international community's commitment, piracy has both continued to increase and move further offshore, a measure of pirate resiliency and the strong economic incentives that underpin it. Nine of 10 pirates captured are ultimately freed as there is often insufficient evidence or political will to prosecute them, or to incarcerate them after conviction. We strongly endorse additional international efforts to address these concerns. FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET SUBMISSION Over the past year, I have visited with thousands of sailors and marines stationed with our forward operating forces at sea and our combat forces in Afghanistan. I can report, based on both the direct observations I mentioned and from personal inputs from Joint and Combined commanders, that the quality of our sailors and marines is superb and we are continuing to protect America's interests abroad. But while we are prevailing today, we must also build the foundation for the Navy and Marine Corps of tomorrow. During the development of the President's fiscal year 2012 budget submission our Navy and Marine Corps leadership team made numerous difficult tradeoffs to preserve current readiness while better posturing the Navy and Marine Corps for the challenges of the future. I believe that the result provides a balanced approach that will enable the Services we lead to successfully perform our assigned missions, even while setting a course for future success. It is important, however, to reiterate that the fiscal year 2012 budget was developed based upon ultimate passage of the President's fiscal year 2011 budget. If the continuing resolution now in place remains the de facto budget for the year, or if a Defense Appropriations Bill is passed that reduces the amounts requested in the fiscal year 2011 President's budget, the proposed fiscal year 2012 budget will not be sufficient to recover from delays, cancellations, and mitigations we have been forced to put in place this year. Over the past year, we have examined every aspect of what we do and how we do it in order to eliminate waste and move every resource possible toward operations and successfully executing our missions now, and in the future. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, in June 2010, the Services were formally asked to continue this process through an efficiencies review, which we developed through three complementary approaches; buying smarter, streamlining our organization and operations, and being more efficient in the way we use, produce, and acquire energy. This effort has had a substantial impact on our overall budget, allowing us to invest more in our core warfighting missions and enhance our acquisition plans. Savings were also derived from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-mandated, Defense- wide efficiencies. Since the review began, the Department of the Navy has identified approximately $35 billion in self-generated efficiencies over the next 5 years. When DOD-wide efficiencies are factored in we will achieve $42 billion in savings. These savings will facilitate adding one guided- missile Aegis destroyer, three T-AO(X) fleet oilers, and one T-AGOS ocean surveillance ship to our shipbuilding plan, which with our dual- block LCS strategy will increase the total number of ships in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) from 50 to 56, including one joint high speed vehicle to be built for the Army, an average of more than 11 ships per year. We were also able to accelerate a Mobile Landing Platform from fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2012 and increase R&D funding to support the accelerated procurement of the T-AO(X), and the development of the next amphibious dock-landing ship (LSD(X)). The savings allowed additional investments in the Next Generation Jammer to provide greater protection for tactical aircraft, electronic warfare systems, ballistic missile sets, and the new air and missile defense radar that will equip our DDG-51 Flight III destroyers. The savings allowed increased funding for a new generation of sea-borne unmanned strike and surveillance aircraft; and gave us the ability to buy additional F/A-18s and extend the service life of 150 aircraft as a hedge against more delays in the deployment of the F-35B, the Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. We addressed Marine Corps needs by increasing equipment funding for units in dwell and for repair and refurbishment of Marine equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on heavy usage rates, we requested $2.5 billion for Marine reset in the fiscal year 2012 OCO request, and estimate a $5 billion reset liability upon termination of the conflict in Afghanistan. We also added funding for fire and maneuver platforms, command and control capabilities, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. We found the $35 billion through a close and systematic review of our programs and by cutting excess capacity in our support establishment. Over the FYDP, with congressional support we will reduce Navy manpower ashore and reassign over 6,000 personnel to operational missions at sea; use multi-year procurement and production efficiencies to save more than $1.1 billion on the purchase of new airborne surveillance, jamming, and fighter aircraft; and disestablish both Second Fleet and excess staffs for submarine, patrol aircraft, and destroyer squadrons plus one carrier strike group staff. Programmatically, one of the most important efficiency efforts was the decision endorsed by Congress to pursue the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) through a dual-block buy procurement strategy. Over the past years the message from Congress has been clear, we must build more battle force ships as affordably as we can, consistent with the statutory requirements laid out in the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. We heard that message clearly, and are grateful to the administration for its support and to the many Members of Congress who worked with the Navy to make the LCS program an example of what can be done right when strict acquisition standards are laid out and enforced. With an average cost of $440 million per ship, and with the cost reductions we have seen demonstrated on LCS-3 and -4, the Navy will save taxpayers approximately $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016. More importantly, the fact that prices were so dramatically reduced from the initial bids in 2009 will allow us to save an additional $1 billion--for a total of $2.9 billion--through the dual award of a 10-ship contract to each bidder. This plan is truly one that is good for the Navy, good for taxpayers, and good for the country. At the recommendation of both the Commandant and myself, significant additional savings were also achieved by the Department of Defense through termination of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program. The nation absolutely must retain and rebuild an amphibious assault capability that will get marines from ship to shore in a protected amphibious tracked vehicle ready for the fight. This is a core capability the Marine Corps must have. But the EFV is not the vehicle to do this. Conceived in the 1980s, the EFV was the previous generation's solution to a tactical problem that has since fundamentally changed. Just as importantly, the EFV's cost per unit would have eaten up over half of the Corps' total procurement account and 90 percent of the Corps' vehicle-related operation and maintenance account; the requirements levied on the vehicle outstripped what could affordably be achieved. We are committed to developing and fielding an effective, survivable and affordable amphibious capability that will meet the Corps' amphibious requirements. This will be done through upgrading existing vehicles, through service-life extensions, and by working with OSD and industry to go as fast as possible in the acquisition and contracting process to develop a successor program to the EFV, one that will meet today's requirements for this critical Marine Corps capability. We are also closely overseeing the Joint Strike Fighter program. In particular, we are providing additional focused attention on the Marine Corps variant, the F-35B, which the Secretary of Defense has placed on a 2-year probation. During this time, solutions to the unique F-35B technical issues will be engineered and assessed while production will be held to a minimum sustaining production rate of six aircraft per year in fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013. This low-production rate is required to ensure continuity in the engineering workforce involved in the design and assembly of the F-35B at the prime contractor and key vendors without a loss in learning and to sustain the supplier base of F-35B unique parts. After this 2-year period of focused F-35B scrutiny, an informed decision will be made about how to proceed with development and production of this variant, to include the potential for program cancellation. I want to point out that it is only the F-35B (STOVL) variant that is on probation. The F-35C variant, which will be flown off of our aircraft carriers, is doing satisfactorily and will be procured by both the Navy and the Marine Corps. The President's budget request of $161 billion will maintain our commitment to take care of our people, build a strong R&D and industrial base, and grow a fleet capable of sustaining our preeminence as the world's most formidable expeditionary force. The fiscal year 2012 request of $15 billion for contingency operations includes incremental costs to sustain operations, manpower, equipment and infrastructure repair as well as equipment replacement to support our operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request includes funds for 10 Navy battleforce ships, including: two Virginia-class submarines, one Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, one Mobile Landing Platform ship, one Joint High Speed Vessel, one Amphibious Transport Dock Ship, and four Littoral Combat Ships. In aviation, we have requested 223 aircraft in the fiscal year 2012 baseline budget, including: 13 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for both the Navy and Marine Corps, 24 MH-60R and 11 P-8As to replace the aging current ASW and maritime patrol squadrons, 18 MH-60S for logistics support, one KC-130J, 25 H-1 variant helicopters, 30 MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, 28 F/A-18E/F fighter/attack planes, 12 EA-18G to continue replacing the veteran EA-6B, five E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes, 36 Joint Primary Aircraft Trainers for our student aviators, and 20 Unmanned Aircraft. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request also contains funding for the Navy Unmanned Combat Aerial System demonstration and continues development of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) unmanned system. The individual efficiency initiatives the Department has put in place will continue to further streamline our organizations and operations, will reshape and reduce both capacity and personnel associated with the Department's ``tail,'' and will contribute to the dramatic transformation already underway in how the Department does its business. More importantly, they will sharpen the operating ``tooth,'' free up critical resources for maintaining and accelerating our shipbuilding and aviation acquisition plan, maximize fleet capabilities, and help preserve a strong industrial base. TAKING CARE OF SAILORS, MARINES, CIVILIANS, AND THEIR FAMILIES The Navy and Marine Corps have continued to recruit and retain the high quality men and women we brought into the Services in the past years, and 2010 was no exception. Both the Navy and Marine Corps met or exceeded their mission quotas and quality standards. We recognize that quality of life programs are important for morale and the military mission. We recruit sailors and marines, but we retain families. We continue to provide a wide array of readiness programs, including deployment support services, morale and welfare services, and child and teen programs. These award winning career management, training, and life-work balance programs are nationally recognized for their excellence not only by respected national human resource organizations, but even more by the marines and sailors that benefit directly from them. Medical care for our Wounded Warriors, already outstanding, continued to get better throughout the year. Since Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom began, over 12,000 marines and sailors have been wounded in action. Their service and sacrifice mandates that we provide quality care for those who have given so much for our country. Our medical community continues to meet this challenge and make advances in dealing with the signature wounds of the current wars: traumatic brain injuries, mental health issues, amputation, and disfiguring injuries, and Navy Medicine continues to reach out to its colleagues in both civilian and Veterans Affairs hospitals to improve our understanding and improve overall care for our people. But care for our Wounded Warriors does not end in the hospital. We have undertaken a commitment to bring our Veterans back into the workforce of the Department of the Navy through several Wounded Warrior outreach programs and hiring conferences. We are not there yet, but we are moving towards the goal of being able to say to every Wounded Warrior--if you want a job, we have one for you. As a representative example, in the past year alone, the Naval Sea Systems Command hired 200 Wounded Warriors. In 2011 we will continue to make employment opportunities for Wounded Warriors a priority for the Department. It is important to note that rising health care costs within the Military Health System continue to present a fiscal challenge for the Department. Like the Secretary of Defense, both I and Departmental leadership are particularly concerned that the rate at which health care costs are increasing and the relative proportion of the Department's resources devoted to health care cannot be sustained; the Military Health System is not immune to the pressure of inflation and market forces evident in the civilian health care sector. The military faces a growing number of eligible beneficiaries, expanded benefits, and increased utilization throughout the military health care system. As a Department, we must be resolute in our commitment to implement systemic efficiencies and specific initiatives which will improve quality of care and customer satisfaction but will at the same time more responsibly manage cost. We have made progress, but there is more to do. We concur with the recommendations made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; we must create incentives such as the Home Delivery Pharmacy Program and implement modest fee increases, where appropriate, to both ensure the fiscal position of the system and ensure equity in benefits for our retirees. Taking care of sailors and marines also means aggressively addressing the issues of sexual assault prevention and response. Last year, you supported the establishment of a new Office of Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPRO) reporting directly to me to focus attention on the issue, develop effective training, and coordinate prevention and response programs across the Navy and Marine Corps. However, it is clear through sexual assault surveys that this crime remains a significant problem in the Services, and within some populations we have seen a negative trend of an increased number of assaults. But I can assure you that we are not accepting this trend, and we will not rest while any cases of this awful crime continue to occur. In 2010, the Department moved forward on expanding the opportunities for women in the Navy. We established a comprehensive plan to integrate women into the submarine force, beginning with our ballistic missile and guided missile Ohio-class submarines. This summer, the first 21 women officers were selected for nuclear training--and they have begun their approximately 15-month training pipeline. The first of these officers will get to their boats beginning in November 2011. We are preparing to move forward with successfully implementing Congressional guidance with respect to repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' in 2011. Overall, the fiscal year 2012 budget reflects a carefully crafted request for the fiscal support and resources necessary to sustain the force in light of the ongoing demands on our people and their families. Thank you for your continuing support. ENERGY SECURITY AND LEADERSHIP Energy consumption in the Navy and Marine Corps has become a strategic vulnerability, an operational Achilles' heel, and a readiness challenge. This has made our energy usage a national security issue of rising importance. As a Department, we rely too much on fossil fuels, making our forces susceptible to fluctuations in both price and supply. Dramatic shifts in cost and availability can be caused by a host of manmade or natural events in volatile areas of the world. Those potential shocks could have, in turn, strategic, operational, and tactical effects upon our forces. A survey of headlines around the world today demonstrates exactly the point we are trying to make-- energy is first and foremost an issue of national security. Without sustainable and reliable sources of energy and increased efficiency in our platforms, we may find ourselves paying an exorbitant price for operating our fleet, training our aviation and ground forces, and running our installations that support them. The ability to train and prepare forces for deployment could be curtailed. Worse still, our naval forces may find that future adversaries target our operational dependence on petroleum, as we see in attacks on fuel convoys in Afghanistan today. Our dependence on a fragile fuel distribution network increases our footprint, drains resources from the tip of the spear to supporting logistics lines, and ties up combat forces for security. Thus, energy diversity and efficiency are essential to maintain our warfighting capabilities and enhance our combat effectiveness. This is a topic I have spoken on a great deal, in front of this committee last year, around the world in speeches to industry and military audiences, and in conversations with international leaders. Through these events and discussions, it has become clear that energy security is not just an American issue--it is an issue that affects both our allies and potential adversaries alike. History has taught us that competition for resources has been one of the fundamental causes of conflict for centuries, and today, competition for energy still provides one of the most inflammatory sources of potential conflict. Energy, or more specifically denial of energy, could affect many of our NATO partners in Europe and indeed the strength of the alliance itself. Many of our partners are dependent upon external sources for their energy, so for them--denial of energy is a weapon, one just as real as the threat of tanks or airplanes. For all these reasons, and in order to improve our long-term strategic position and enhance the future operational effectiveness of our forces, I have charged the Navy and Marine Corps with accelerating the exploration and exploitation of new ways to procure, produce, and use energy. This effort began in October 2009, when I issued my five energy goals for the Department, the most important of which commits the Navy and Marine Corps to generate at least 50 percent of all the energy we use from alternative sources no later than 2020. Alternative sources include all renewable forms of energy such as solar, wind, geothermal, and ocean energy, as well as biofuels and nuclear energy. We are on track to meet all our goals, and throughout 2010, we demonstrated progress through many energy programs, partnerships, and initiatives. Throughout the year, we successfully conducted both ground and airborne tests of an F/A-18 Hornet and MH-60 Seahawk helicopter, and ran a Riverine Command Boat (experimental) on renewable biofuel blends made from either camelina or algae. Recently, we also completed testing of a marine gas turbine engine that will enable us to certify our frigates, destroyers and cruisers for biofuel operations. In each case, there was no impact on performance and no degradation to engine reliability. Together, these tests represent critical milestones for the Department's goal of demonstrating the Great Green Fleet in 2012 and its planned deployment in 2016. In late 2010, the Navy conducted concurrent but unrelated tests of a more efficient F/A-18 engine in order to generate an increase in the aircraft's range. Afloat, as I discussed last year, the USS Makin Island is using a hybrid-electric drive to dramatically lower its fuel usage at slow speeds, which we estimate will generate life-cycle savings of up to $250 million at today's fuel prices. Over the next few years, we will continue to move forward with installation of a similar system on new construction DDGs and look at the feasibility of retrofitting the fleet with these systems in the course of routine shipyard availabilities. The Marine Corps is also aggressively exploring energy efficiency solutions in its operating forces in theater and in the supporting establishment. The Marines realize that energy as a resource influences a Commander's operational freedom of maneuver, and its conservation and wise use can save lives on the battlefield. Reduced logistics support and fewer convoys for expeditionary forces would free up resources and limit the exposure of marines to ambush and IEDs. Energy efficiency equals better combat effectiveness. At home, the Marine Corps demonstrated their traditional spirit of innovation by scouring the commercial world for rugged solutions, building two Experimental Forward Operating Bases (ExFOB) at Quantico and Twentynine Palms. New alternative energy technologies tested at the ExFOB deployed this fall with the Third Battalion, Fifth Marines (3/5), posted to Sangin District in the north of Helmand Province. Immediately upon arrival, they began evaluating expeditionary solar power generators at their FOBs and combat outposts to supplement or replace fossil fuels. They have done this even while engaged in near constant combat against a determined enemy in one of the most hotly contested districts of the war. When I visited Sangin, I heard first-hand from a Marine First Lieutenant about what worked, what did not, and how his marines in India Company of 3/5 were using the equipment. Two patrol bases are operating entirely on renewable energy, and another with a 90 percent reduction. One of the team-portable systems, called GREENS (Ground Renewable Expeditionary Energy Network System), is being used to provide power for the Operations Center, small radios, and small electronic equipment. Across the battalion's operating area, manportable SPACES (Solar Portable Alternative Communications Energy System) are being used by individual squads to recharge their radios and other combat electronics. This capability made it possible for a foot patrol to operate for 3 weeks without battery resupply, reducing their burden by 700 pounds and saving more than $40,000. By deploying these renewable solar energy technologies the marines in Sangin have been able to expand their operational reach, eliminate or minimize their need for fossil fuels in their generators, and dramatically reduce the need for often dangerous logistic support. At Camp Leatherneck, the marines have likewise begun a small bio- fuel pilot project for Helmand Province, purchasing locally produced cotton oil from an Afghan facility to mix with their own fuel. At Leatherneck, a standard generator is producing power from a 20-80 mix of cotton oil to fuel, yielding a 20 percent reduction in demand for fuel, while simultaneously demonstrating to Afghan farmers that there are alternatives to opium, and demonstrating to Afghan leaders that they can power their own economy from within Afghanistan. I am monitoring its progress closely. As the ExFOB gets all this feedback from returning marines, our expeditionary energy systems and programs will continue to improve and we will move even further down the road of energy efficient, combat effective forces. In addition to these tactical and platform applications, we have implemented a number of energy projects at our facilities ashore. We are actively exploring for new geothermal resources to augment our existing 270 MW geothermal power plant at China Lake. Last year we established the Nation's first grid-connected wave buoy at MCB Kaneohe Bay, HI. Last December the marines completed a 1.5 MW solar installation situated atop six acres of a landfill. The installation was unique because the equipment foundations were designed not to perforate the membrane covering the garbage below. Our budget request asks for continued support of these and similar projects in order to enhance our efficiency and maximize our move to greater independence and more resilient infrastructure. Finally, throughout the year we developed partnerships with a number of Federal agencies, states, academic institutions, and industry partners including the Departments of Energy and Agriculture, NASA, and the Small Business Administration. It is precisely because of the spirit of innovation that these partnerships embody that our Nation remains a world leader in its unrivaled capacity to stimulate and exploit cutting-edge ideas and new technologies. The U.S. Navy has always been a technological leader and has excelled at embracing change, particularly in propulsion systems and energy sources. We moved from wind to coal in the 19th century, from coal to oil early in the 20th century, and added nuclear power 60 years ago. In every transition there were opponents to change, but in every case these changes increased our combat effectiveness by an order of magnitude. I have tasked the Navy and the Marine Corps to once again pioneer technological change through alternative energy sources. I am pleased with the progress to date, and expect it to sharply enhance the long- term strategic agility of our operating forces, as well as better posture the Department for an age of fiscal austerity and potential energy volatility. I want to stress, however, that every action and program we undertake is focused on generating improved warfighting capability and strategic flexibility, it is not just change for change's sake. CREATING ACQUISITION EXCELLENCE Our future combat readiness is dependent upon the design, development and acquisition of weapons, platforms, and information technology. The current ships and aircraft of the Navy and Marine Corps provide decisive advantages over today's threats. But that edge must be constantly sharpened and modernized against constantly evolving technologies. We must continue to invest in intelligence, precision missiles and munitions, networked command systems, stealth technology, unmanned vehicles and ground fighting systems. To retain our advantage across multiple warfighting areas, we rely heavily upon both our dedicated personnel and the expertise resident in America's private sector. Throughout my tenure, I have taken the opportunity to visit shipyards, aircraft plants, vehicle factories, maintenance facilities, and warfare centers for detailed briefings and a firsthand look at the people responsible for designing and building our fleet and equipping our sailors and marines with vital weapon systems and technologies necessary to do their jobs. One cannot fail to recognize the creativity, dedication, and skills of our Nation's workforce. Yet, with government spending increasingly constrained, affordability, cost containment and total ownership costs are more important than ever. Because acquisition costs are rising faster than our top-line and because replacement systems can be more expensive than the platforms or weapon systems being replaced, we are putting tomorrow's force at risk. Both on our own and as a result of Secretary Gates' guidance, the Department has devoted considerable effort to finding efficiencies, reducing support costs, and scrubbing our acquisition process to mitigate this impact. In accordance with the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act passed by Congress in 2009, we have made the requirements and acquisition processes more rigorous in order to better manage the resources entrusted to us by the American taxpayer, and we are working with OSD to develop a streamlined process for acquiring information technology in a more responsive manner to better equip the warfighter with emerging technologies and ward off the cyber threat. This requires constant examination of every single one of our policies, practices, priorities, and organizations, with a clear focus on controlling cost. Our acquisition community has been extensively engaged with industry and the Services to streamline processes, and they are ruthlessly evaluating both requirements and the supporting analyses in order to get more value out of the overall acquisition system. The Navy and Marine Corps will continue initiatives already in place to improve processes and to instill discipline in procurement. In 2010, we strengthened our cost estimating group and met statutory requirements to obtain independent cost estimates, and we have incorporated Defense-wide best practices in the formulation of all our major programs. We have made our cost estimates more realistic and are using these improved cost and schedule plans to make necessary capability tradeoffs and difficult investment decisions at the front end of the requirements process rather than during design or construction. A professional acquisition workforce is a key element in our overall acquisition excellence initiative and a driver in our strategy to preserve our fighting edge at an affordable cost. Accordingly, and with your strong support, we are rebuilding the acquisition workforce within government to fulfill Federal oversight of the acquisition process and ensure that accountability to taxpayers is the foremost concern of our employees. In the last year, the Department has added nearly 1,300 acquisition professionals towards the goal of increasing the community by 5,090 over the FYDP. Our acquisition strategies have been shaped to expand the use of fixed-price contracts, leverage competition, and tighten up on the use of incentive and award fees to ensure quality systems are consistently delivered on budget and on schedule. The new acquisition plan for the LCS epitomizes this strategy, and is indicative of the type of fixed- price contracts that will be the model for the future. The LCS block- buy contracts are the result of effective competition and give the government full ownership of the technical data package used in construction. This will ensure our ability to pursue competitive strategies for LCS Seaframe requirements in fiscal year 2016 and beyond and affords greater congressional oversight of the program. With the new LCS strategy, we get more ships, at a faster rate, and at less cost. The LCS dual-block procurement strategy also contributes to meeting another acquisition goal of both this Committee and the Navy through its strong support of the industrial shipbuilding base. Modernizing today's force and recapitalizing the fleet affordably cannot be accomplished without a healthy industrial base and strong performance by our industry partners. We have worked hard to procure our ships, aircraft, and weapon systems at a rate intended to bring stability to the industrial base and enable efficient production. The Navy's shipbuilding and aviation plans were developed with particular regard to maintaining the unique characteristics and strength of the industrial base and our efforts have promoted increased competition, greater innovation, and better capacity within the base. Over the FYDP, we will continue to build upon our progress to date and we will work with our shipyards, aircraft manufacturers, weapon systems providers and systems integrators to build the best possible fleet for the future. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS The complex nature of today's security environment, as well as current and future anti-access/area-denial threats faced by the United States, require that the Navy and Marine Corps continue to advance in unmanned systems and exploit the contributions they make to warfighting capability. Unmanned systems are unobtrusive, versatile, persistent, and they reduce the exposure of our sailors and marines to unnecessary threats or dangerous environments. They can perform a vast array of tasks such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, hydrographic monitoring, mine detection, targeting, and precision strike. Navy and Marine Corps unmanned systems have already made key contributions to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, unmanned aircraft systems have flown thousands of flight hours, enhancing the effectiveness of our combat operations and undoubtedly saving lives. Unmanned ground vehicles employed by the Marine Corps have conducted thousands of missions detecting and/or neutralizing improvised explosive devices. Off the Horn of Africa, unmanned systems contribute to surveillance and tracking of suspected or confirmed pirate vessels. The range of tasks that these capabilities may fulfill will grow substantially over time. I am determined to ensure that your Navy and Marine Corps are at the cutting edge of this military capability. Our vision for the future will exploit unmanned systems in every domain of our operating environment (sea, air, and land) while maintaining an affordable price. The Department's Unmanned Systems will move from adjunct capabilities supporting manned systems and platforms to providing autonomous, networked, and interoperable independent capabilities--much as naval aviation matured from an adjunct to the Battle Fleet to a combat capability in its own right in the first half of the 20th century. We will field unmanned systems in the near term to: Provide sensing, influence and effects where manned systems are limited by range, endurance or risk. Shift from relying primarily on manned platforms to accomplish missions to combinations of manned platforms, robots, augmented human performance, and remotely operated and unmanned systems that make operational sense. Increase the combat effectiveness of sailors and marines, their platforms and combat organizations to better operate against multiple types of threats. In implementing this vision, we will embrace Unmanned Systems as critical tools in our warfighting quiver of capabilities. We will integrate them into everything we do across the full range of military operations to enhance our combat effectiveness and efficiency. We will invest in the infrastructure to ensure we have the capabilities and capacity to properly task, collect, process, exploit and disseminate the information so the intelligence data gets to the decision makers and warfighters. The initiatives and investments contained in the fiscal year 2012 budget request will continue moving us along this desired track. I look forward to reporting our progress toward this vision throughout the year. CONCLUSION Today I have laid out our strategic posture as well as the goals and priorities that guide the Department's investment portfolio and future direction. These goals and programs will significantly influence our future capabilities and ensure we remain ready to deter regional conflict or respond rapidly and decisively to emerging crises. Our specific requests are reflected in the President's fiscal year 2012 budget submission. In order to retain a ready and agile force capable of conducting the full range of military operations, we must carefully weigh risks and apply our available resources efficiently and carefully. This year's request reflects our strategy-driven priorities and the disciplined trade-offs that you and the American taxpayer expect of us. The Department's efficiency efforts have been beneficial in terms of enhancing our ability to invest in the future even while preserving and extending our force structure. This is not a one-time event, as we will continuously work to increase efficiencies in every project, program, and operation, afloat and ashore. The budget request ensures that we will retain the world's most powerful and agile expeditionary force. The CNO, Commandant, and myself are committed to that aim and to being effective stewards of the Nation's resources. As Secretary, I have seen firsthand the selfless courage of our young marines and sailors in Helmand; the dedication of our medical community caring for our wounded; the professionalism of our surface, submarine and aviation sailors; and the incredible technical skills of the maintenance crews that sustain them. I have also borne witness to the sacrifices of our personnel in hospitals in theater and at the National Naval Medical Center. A single visit to Bethesda will make you marvel at the resilience of the human spirit and the unflagging patriotism of our American service men and women. Your Navy and Marine Corps are performing at a high operational tempo, at unparalleled levels of skill and dedication, and with remarkable results afloat, at depth, aloft, in cyberspace, and ashore. Thanks to your support, this level of performance has been sustained with the modern platforms, weapons systems, and training necessary to underwrite our readiness. Your continued support recognizes and sustains the sacrifice of our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families. The support of this committee for our key programs and our people has been instrumental to operational success of the Navy and Marine Corps and maintenance of the world's most flexible instrument of national policy--a modernized and ready naval expeditionary force. It is a solemn privilege to lead the Naval Services during an era of protracted war and national challenge. I have been honored by the trust the President and Congress have placed in me, and even more honored by the sacrifice and sterling devotion I have witnessed by those sailors and marine who go forward into harm's way to defend us. Preserving our values and our way of life is ultimately dependent upon our being prepared to use decisive force against those who threaten them. The Navy and Marines have been ready to do so for 235 years, and will continue to be ready. You can count on it. Thank you again for your support. Godspeed. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Admiral Roughead. STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS Admiral Roughead. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee: It's my honor to appear before you in my 4th year as the CNO, representing more than 600,000 sailors, Navy civilians, and families who operate and live globally. I appreciate your continued support for them as they continue to carry out our maritime strategy. Our Navy continues to meet operational commitments and respond to crises as they emerge. We're engaged in Afghanistan and in Iraq, with, as you mentioned, 14,000 sailors on the ground in those countries and with 2 aircraft carriers now in the CENTCOM area of operations, 14,000 at sea. From the carrier, we provide about 30 percent of the fixed wing air sorties that fly in support of our troops in Afghanistan. Our presence in the Middle East also gives us the flexibility to respond to the sweeping changes that we see taking place there. But our interests extend beyond that, and so do our operations. Today we have about 65,000 sailors and about 40 percent of our force deployed. They're globally present and they're persistently engaged. They provide deterrence in northeast Asia and presence in the western Pacific. They conduct counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and they're building maritime partnerships in Africa, South American, and the Pacific. The demand continues to grow for the offshore option our Navy and our Marine Corps team provides the Nation. We assume the lead for the first phase of the Phased Adaptive Approach for ballistic missile defense in Europe and we're working with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) on providing that same capability ashore. We created the new Information Dominance Directorate on my staff, which has enabled us to make better decisions and investments in countering anti-access and area denial strategies. We recently established the Tenth Fleet, our cyber fleet, which has demonstrated its expertise by conducting joint and naval operations in the cyber network cryptology and space arenas. To deliver the above, we've been pushing the fleet hard. We have 288 ships today. That's the smallest that we have been since 1916, when our interests and our responsibilities were nowhere near what they are today. That's why 313 ships remains the floor of our future force and why sustaining fleet capacity is essential to reaching that floor. Since I've become CNO, I've focused on ensuring the Navy is ready, that our quality of work and quality of life are fulfilling to the men and women of our Navy, and that we place underperforming programs back on track. We've introduced stability, affordability, and capacity into our shipbuilding and aviation plans, and with the assistance of Congress, we have advanced capabilities to meet the most likely evolving threats. We've secured a fixed-price dual award for 20 LCSs. We've addressed the strike fighter capacity with a multi-year F-18 procurement, and pending resolution of the CR, we will build two Virginia-class submarines per year, another DDG-51, start the Mobile Landing Platform, construct and refuel our aircraft carriers as planned, and continue the design of our replacement strategic deterrent submarine. I'm pleased with our accomplishments and I thank Congress for their continued support of our acquisition strategy. Our fiscal year 2012 budget request is a balanced approach to increasing fleet capacity, maintaining warfighting readiness, and developing and enhancing our Navy total force. This budget goes beyond ships and aircraft. It enhances electronic warfare, information dominance, integrated air and missile defense, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities for evolving challenges. It continues to develop a family of unmanned systems that will work in concert with our manned systems to secure access and establish maritime superiority when and where we choose. It continues our effort over the last 2 years to reduce total ownership costs and leverages the opportunity presented by the Secretary of Defense's efficiencies to reduce excess overhead, improve readiness, and reinvest in warfighting capability and capacity that improves the long-term sustainability of our force. Importantly, it supports the Secretary of Defense's health care initiatives included in the President's budget, which continue our efforts in health care to improve internal efficiency, incentivize behavior, ensure all our beneficiaries are treated equitably, and enhance our ability to deliver high- quality health care for years to come. You can be exceptionally proud of our sailors and Navy civilians, who they are and what they do. Today's sailors are the best with whom I have ever served. I ask you for your strong support of our fiscal year 2012 budget request. I thank you for all you do to support the men and women of the U.S. Navy, our enduring global force for good. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead follows:] Prepared Statement by ADM Gary Roughead, USN Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, it is my honor and pleasure to appear before you, in my 4th year as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), representing the more than 600,000 sailors and civilians of the U.S. Navy. As we have done for more than 235 years, our Navy is forward-deployed around the world protecting our national security and prosperity. Today, our dedicated Navy men and women are operating globally at sea, on land, in the air, and in space and cyberspace. I appreciate your continued support for them and their families. As the demand for our Navy continues to grow, our Maritime Strategy, which I issued more than 3 years ago with the Commandants of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, continues to guide our Navy's operations and investments. Its core tenets are enduring and our Navy is executing daily the six core capabilities it articulates for our sea Services: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. With your support, since becoming CNO, our Navy has placed underperforming programs back on track; we have introduced stability, affordability, and capacity into our shipbuilding and aviation plans; and we have advanced capabilities to meet the most likely evolving threats. We improved the performance of several programs, most notably the Littoral Combat Ship. After cancelling the LCS ships we had planned for 2007 because of unacceptable costs, last year we were able to secure a price for 20 ships through a dual award strategy that will add new and needed capabilities to our Fleet, bring important stability to the industrial base, and get us closer to the minimum of 313 ships our Navy needs. I thank Congress for their support of this strategy. We delivered five new ships in 2010, including one Virginia-class submarine, two Arleigh Burke destroyers, and two T-AKE logistics ships. We commenced testing and low-rate initial production of the P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft and continued testing and low- rate initial production of the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye. Through multi- year procurement contracts for F/A-18E/F and EA-18G, and Virginia-class submarines, and planned multi-year procurements for the MH-60R/S and E- 2D, we are introducing affordability in our aviation and shipbuilding plans and realizing significant savings. For example, on the Virginia- class Multi-Year Procurement alone, the savings has been $3.2 billion. We are advancing capability to meet emerging threats, particularly in Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and information dominance. In BMD, we assumed lead for the first phase of the President's Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for BMD of Europe and we are working with the Missile Defense Agency on providing Aegis Ashore capability to support the second phase of the PAA. Our newly-established Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. 10th Fleet demonstrated its expertise conducting joint and naval exercises and operations in the cyber, network, cryptology, signals intelligence, information warfare, electronic warfare, and space arenas. We also achieved the early operational deployment of the MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle, the first successful flight of our Navy Unmanned Combat Air System demonstrator, and a memorandum of agreement with the Air Force to pursue increased commonality between the Global Hawk and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance programs. Our Navy continues to meet planned operational commitments and respond to crises as they emerge globally. We remain engaged in operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Our Navy has more than 14,000 Active and Reserve sailors on the ground and another 10,000 at sea in Central Command, including ongoing Individual Augmentee support to both operations. Our aircraft carriers provide about 30 percent of the close air support for troops on the ground in Afghanistan and our Navy and Marine Corps pilots fly an even greater percentage of electronic attack missions there. Because our national interests extend beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, so do the operations of our Navy. More than 40 percent of our Navy is underway daily; globally present and persistently engaged. Last year, our Navy provided deterrence against North Korea; conducted counter- piracy operations in the Indian Ocean with a coalition of several nations; trained local forces in maritime security as part of our Global Maritime Partnership initiatives in Africa and the Pacific; responded with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the earthquake in Haiti and the flood in Pakistan; and conducted the world's largest maritime exercise, which brought together 14 nations and more than 20,000 military personnel, to improve coordination and trust in multi-national operations in the Pacific. Navy sealift continues to deliver the lion's share of heavy war and humanitarian equipment in the Central Command and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, while Navy logisticians operate the seaport and airport facilities that ensure this vital materiel arrives on time. Our sailors remain forward throughout the world, projecting U.S. influence, responding to contingencies, and building international relationships that enable the safe, secure, and free flow of commerce that underpins our economic prosperity. Our Navy's global presence guarantees our access and freedom of action on and under the sea. We are developing with the Air Force and Marine Corps the Air Sea Battle concept that will identify the doctrine, organization, training, procedures, and equipment needed for our Navy to counter growing military threats to our freedom of action. This joint effort will inform the conceptual, institutional, and material actions needed to employ integrated forces that support U.S. operations to project power and influence, protect allies and partners, and secure our national objectives in peace and war. I remain committed to supporting our Active and Reserve sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. Our Navy continues to be recognized as a highly-ranked place to work as a result of its workforce planning, life-work integration, diversity, and training opportunities. We met or exceeded overall officer and enlisted active recruiting goals last year and we are accessing a force of extreme high quality. We continue to move forward on assigning women into our submarine force, with the first women submariners on track to report aboard SSBNs and SSGNs by the end of this year. We remain committed to performance as a criterion for promotion in our Navy, and have successfully transitioned the majority of our civilian personnel out of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). Our remaining NSPS employees are scheduled to convert by the end of this year. I appreciate the support of Congress for our Fleet and the dedicated sailors, Navy civilians, and their families that serve our Nation every day. My priorities for the Navy remain unchanged: to build tomorrow's Navy, to remain ready to fight today, and to develop and support our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. We continue to advance our Navy in each of these areas thanks to your support. Our Navy remains the most capable maritime force in the world; however, we are stretching our force to meet combatant commander demands. Since 2000, our Navy's ship-underway days have increased by approximately 15 percent, yet we have about 10 percent fewer ships in our Fleet. Greater demand for our forces has led to longer deployments and shorter dwell, or turnaround times, which increase stress on our sailors and drive up maintenance requirements for our ships and aircraft. We are implementing force management measures in the near term to stretch the capacity of our 286-ship force to meet increasing global requirements while providing the necessary maintenance our Fleet needs to reach its expected service life. Our Navy is different from other Services in that we reset our force ``in stride''; that is, we rely upon regular maintenance of our ships and aircraft, and training and certification of our crews between deployments, to sustain our force. I thank Congress for their support of our fiscal year 2011 Operation and Maintenance (O&M) request, which would enable our Navy's continuous reset and translate into decades of service for each ship and aircraft, a significant return on investment. Regrettably, the continuing resolution (CR) for fiscal year 2011 prevents us from applying the increased fiscal year 2011 O&M funding to improve our readiness, and it negatively impacts our ability to procure our future Navy and support our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. It has forced us to take mitigation measures that include: reducing operations, limiting numerous contracts for base operating support, slowing civilian hiring, reducing Permanent Change of Station notifications for our sailors from about 6 months lead time to less than 2 months, not initiating the Small Business Innovative Research program, and delaying procurement contracts for new capabilities and existing production lines. Starting this month, we will cancel or scale back ship maintenance availabilities in Norfolk, Mayport, and San Diego, and cancel more than a dozen Military Construction (MILCON) projects in several States. If the CR lasts all year, we will have no choice but to make permanent these mitigations and others, significantly reducing our operations, maintenance, and training. We will be forced to further reduce facilities sustainment, cancel training events and additional surface ship availabilities, and defer maintenance on our aircraft, which would result in almost a 1-year backlog in aviation maintenance. The impact of these actions will jeopardize the efforts we made in recent years to restore Fleet readiness. Without relief, we will procure only one Virginia-class submarine and break the multiyear contract. Agreements made with our surface combatant builders, as a result of the DDG-1000/DDG-51 swap, precludes us from awarding any DDG-51s in fiscal year 2011 unless both ships are appropriated. In addition, without relief, we will delay the new start Mobile Landing Platform; we will constrain aircraft carrier construction and refueling, negatively impacting operational availability, increasing costs, and delaying CVN-79 delivery by up to 1 year; and we will limit aviation and weapons procurement to fiscal year 2010 quantities, impacting E-2D and Standard Missile production. A full-year CR will also defer essential research and development in unmanned aerial systems and significantly delay the design of our replacement strategic deterrent submarine and the recapitalization of our nuclear operator training infrastructure. It will eliminate our ability to source out-of-cycle overseas contingency operations demands for increased Fleet presence and activated Navy Reserve sailors. Operating under a continuing resolution for a full year at the fiscal year 2010 level would have negative effects on our Fleet, on the ship and aviation industrial base, and on the many workers who support naval facilities. Your support in addressing this critical current and long term readiness issue is appreciated greatly. Our fiscal year 2012 budget submission achieves the optimal balance among my priorities, but it is based on our funding request for fiscal year 2011. If the CR lasts all year, we will need to revisit our fiscal year 2012 request to properly balance our Navy for today and in the future. Our fiscal year 2012 budget request continues to rely on a combination of base budget and overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding, but it reduces the extent to which we rely on OCO funding for enduring missions. Our fiscal year 2012 request continues the effort we started 2 years ago to reduce the cost to own and operate our Fleet. We leveraged the opportunity presented by the Secretary of Defense to significantly reduce excess overhead costs, and apply the savings to warfighting capability and capacity, by executing a deliberate, thoughtful, and integrated approach to finding efficiencies that improve the long-term sustainability of our force. We are taking steps to buy smarter, streamline our organizations and operations, realign manpower, and pursue energy efficiencies. Through these efforts, and with your support, we will improve readiness and warfighting capabilities and optimize organizations and operations, including increasing the number of ships and aircraft in our procurement plans and enhancing or accelerating anti-access capabilities, unmanned systems, and energy initiatives. Our fiscal year 2012 budget request supports our Maritime Strategy and continues to support our forces, take care of our people, rebalance our force to meet current and future challenges, and reform how and what we buy. Highlights follow. BUILD TOMORROW'S NAVY Since the release of our Maritime Strategy, I have stated our Navy requires a minimum of 313 ships to meet operational requirements globally. This minimum remains valid; however, we continue to examine this requirement to address increased operational demands and expanding requirements for BMD, intra-theater lift, and forces capable of confronting irregular challenges. Our fiscal year 2012 submission funds 10 ships, including 2 Virginia-class fast attack submarines, 1 Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), 1 LPD-17, 1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), 1 DDG-51, and 4 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), which reflects our new LCS procurement plan under the dual award strategy. Our submission also supports the acquisition of an oceanographic ship. I thank Congress for their support of our LCS acquisition strategy and for our shipbuilding program. With your support over the last 3 years, we have been able to improve the balance among capability, capacity, affordability, and executabilty in our shipbuilding plan. As I reported last year, I remain concerned about the capacity of our Fleet in the future. Starting in the 2020s, many of our existing cruisers, destroyers, and submarines will reach the end of their service lives. During this period, it will be particularly critical to procure sufficient new ships to offset these decommissionings to avoid a rapid decline in force structure. In the same timeframe, we will begin to procure the replacement for our Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine, the most survivable leg of our Nation's nuclear deterrent triad. While we have reduced the cost of that submarine substantially, our total shipbuilding budget will be pressurized in that decade as we seek to recapitalize our surface and submarine forces while sustaining warfighting readiness and supporting our people. I am confident our near-term force structure plans provide the capability and capacity we need to meet demands today, but in this decade we must address how to best resource the shipbuilding programs required in the 2020s. Our fiscal year 2012 program funds 203 manned aircraft. We have increased our procurement of P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft to provide needed anti-submarine warfare capacity to our Fleet and facilitate a successful transition from our legacy P-3 Orion aircraft. Our fiscal year 2012 submission also procures 28 F/A-18 E/F aircraft, extending the F/A-18 procurement through fiscal year 2014 and purchasing 41 more aircraft than requested in last year's budget submission. I remain committed to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and was pleased to see the first flight of the F-35C last year. The timely delivery of the F-35C remains critical to our future carrier airwing strike fighter capacity; however, we are procuring additional F/A-18 Super Hornets to address the decrease in strike fighter capacity we have identified. I thank Congress for their continued support of the F-35 program and our overall strike fighter fleet. Our Navy is also looking beyond our ships and aircraft and investing in information capabilities that span space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. We moved boldly last year with the establishment of U.S. 10th Fleet and the Deputy CNO for Information Dominance. That restructuring has enabled us to focus on enhancing our electronic warfare, information dominance, integrated air and missile defense, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. I request Congress' support for these programs as they position our Navy to successfully conduct operations in an evolving anti-access environment today and in the future. A viable, highly technical, and specialized industrial base is essential to sustaining the capability and capacity of our future Navy. Our shipbuilding and aviation industrial base is a strategic national asset and a significant contributor to our Nation's economic prosperity, employing more than 97,000 uniquely-skilled Americans while indirectly supporting thousands more through second- and third-tier suppliers. The highly specialized skills in our shipbuilding base take years to develop; and, if lost, cannot be easily or quickly reconstituted. A viable shipbuilding industrial base, underpinned by predictable, level-loaded ship procurement, is essential to meet our Nation's naval requirements. I remain committed to delivering a balanced and capable Fleet that will meet our national security requirements. I seek your support for the following initiatives and programs: AVIATION PROGRAMS Aircraft Carrier Force Structure Our nuclear-powered aircraft carrier fleet is capable of flexibly employing capabilities that span from power projection and deterrence to humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Our 11-carrier force structure is based on worldwide presence and surge requirements, while also taking into account training and maintenance requirements. Our Navy has put in place measures to minimize the impact of the 10-carrier period between the inactivation of USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and commissioning of USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78). After the delivery of CVN-78, we will maintain an 11-carrier force by continuing the refueling program for Nimitz-class ships and delivering our Ford-class carriers at 5-year intervals starting in 2020. CVN-78, which is approximately 20 percent complete, is the lead ship of our first new class of aircraft carriers in nearly 40 years. These new carriers incorporate an innovative flight deck design that provides greater operational flexibility, a nuclear propulsion plant that generates more than 50 percent greater energy while decreasing maintenance requirements, and a combination of measures that reduce manning by more than 1,200 sailors. Among the new technologies being integrated in these ships are the Dual-Band Radar, the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), and the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), which will enable the carrier to increase its sortie generation rate by 25 percent and lower total ownership costs. AAG is currently undergoing commissioning testing at our land-based testing facility and, in December, EMALS successfully launched an F/A-18 aircraft. Both systems are on schedule to support delivery of CVN-78 in September 2015. Strike Fighter Capacity I remain committed to the F-35 JSF program. The timely delivery of the F-35C carrier variant is critical to our future carrier airwing strike fighter capability and capacity. As a result of delays in the F- 35 program, we are closely managing our strike fighter inventory to address the decrease in strike fighter capacity that is projected to peak in 2018 as our F/A-18A-D aircraft reach the end of their service life. Our actions include managing the service life of our A-D aircraft, extending the service life of our A-D aircraft, buying new F/ A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft, and maintaining wholeness in the F-35C program. With these measures, we can manage our current strike fighter inventory to meet TACAIR requirements. F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter The F-35 program gives us the advanced sensor, precision strike, firepower, and stealth capabilities our Fleet needs. I continue to base our Initial Operating Capability (IOC) timeline for the F-35C on the level of capability delivered at the completion of Initial Operational Test and Evaluation of the F-35C equipped with Block 3 software. We are reviewing the results of the in-depth Technical Baseline Review and restructuring of the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase to determine our IOC. While the overall system demonstration and development schedule has slipped, we have not reduced the total number of airplanes we plan to buy. Our fiscal year 2012 request procures seven F-35C aircraft. We are monitoring the program closely and managing our existing strike fighter capacity to meet power projection demands until the F-35C is delivered. Procurement of an alternate engine for the F-35 increases our risk in this program. The Navy does not have a requirement for an alternate engine; indeed, we would only take one model to sea. Its additional costs threaten our ability to fund currently planned aircraft procurement quantities, which would exacerbate our anticipated decrease in strike fighter capacity throughout the remainder of this decade. F/A-18A-D Hornet and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Our F/A-18A-D Hornet aircraft were originally designed for a service life of 6,000 flight hours. Through a life assessment program and High Flight Hour (HFH) inspections, which have been in place for 3 years, we have been able to extend the service life of our legacy F/A- 18A-D aircraft to 8,600 flight hours. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding to pursue a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for 150 F/A-18A-D aircraft, commencing in fiscal year 2012 at a rate of about 40 per year, that would further extend the service life of these aircraft to 10,000 flight hours. We are also conducting a life assessment program for our Super Hornet aircraft to extend their original 6,000-hour service life design to 9,000 hours. The F/A-18A-D HFH and SLEP are necessary measures to address our strike fighter inventory while preserving our investment in F-35C. To further reduce risk, we are accelerating the transition of 10 legacy F/A-18C squadrons to F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets, and our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding to procure more F/A-18E/F Super Hornets than we requested last year. I thank Congress for their support of the F/A-18 program as we introduce F-35C into our Fleet. EA-18G Growler The Navy has been a leader in Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) for more than half a century and AEA is in high demand. AEA provides one of the most flexible offensive capabilities available to the joint warfighter and is becoming increasingly important as technology capable of manipulating the electromagnetic spectrum matures. We are leveraging the mature and proven F/A-18E/F Super Hornet airframe to recapitalize our AEA capability with the EA-18G Growler. Although the EA-18G currently utilizes the same ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System as the EA- 6B, we are developing a new system, the Next Generation Jammer, as a replacement for the aging ALQ-99. The Next Generation Jammer will incorporate a Modular Open System Architecture and improved reliability and maintainability to provide a robust, flexible jamming capability that can evolve to address emerging threats. The EA-18G is in full rate production and we have accepted delivery of 43 aircraft. We have transitioned three EA-6B Prowler squadrons to EA-18G Growlers and two more squadrons are currently in transition. Our first EA-18G squadron deployed in November to Iraq. Our program of record will buy 114 total EA-18G aircraft, recapitalizing 10 carrier-based EA-6B squadrons and 4 expeditionary squadrons, all to be stationed at NAS Whidbey Island. The program continues to deliver on schedule and our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for 12 EA-18Gs. P-3C Orion and P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft Our P-3C Orion aircraft remain in high demand today across a range of missions including Anti-Submarine Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare, and time-critical Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Our Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) force is a direct enabler for troops on the ground in Central Command while also ensuring access and battlespace awareness at sea. Because we are operating our P-3Cs at a high rate, about 100 P-3 aircraft have been grounded since February 2005 for fatigue life and we anticipate continued groundings through the remainder of the P-3 program. Through significant Congressional support for P-3C wing repairs and sustainment, as of February, we have a current inventory of 84 mission aircraft; a 58 percent increase since last year. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests about $100 million to continue our P-3C sustainment program. Continued investment in this program and in the modernization of our P-3s is critical to ensure we retain sufficient capacity to conduct maritime battlespace awareness and support to land forces in Central Command, while successfully transitioning to the P-8A. The P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft is ideally suited for regional and littoral operations, and is our pre-eminent airborne capability against submarine threats. Procurement of P-8A will deliver needed capacity for these missions. The P-8A is scheduled to reach initial operating capability and will begin replacing our aging P-3 Fleet in 2013. The current delivery schedule enables transition of two squadrons per year. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for 11 P-8A aircraft. I request Congress' support for the P-8A program schedule and for our P-3 sustainment and modernization program, the combination of which is essential to our transition to the next generation of MPA capability while avoiding future gaps in our MPA force. E-2D Advanced Hawkeye The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft, will replace the E-2C and represents a two-generation leap in airborne radar surveillance capability. The E-2D will improve nearly every facet of tactical air operations and add overland and littoral surveillance to support theater Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) against air threats in high clutter, complex electro-magnetic and jamming environments. The airborne radar on the E-2D, with its improved surveillance capability, is a key pillar of the Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC- CA) concept. Four test aircraft have been delivered to the Navy and we will commence operational test and evaluation in late 2011. The first Fleet squadron transition is planned for 2013, with an IOC scheduled for late 2014. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests six E-2D aircraft. We plan to procure 75 aircraft, with the final aircraft procurement in 2019 and Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2022. MH-60R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter The MH-60R and MH-60S are in full rate production. The MH-60R multi-mission helicopter replaces the surface combatant-based SH-60B and carrier-based SH-60F with a newly manufactured airframe and enhanced mission systems. With these systems, the MH-60R provides focused surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare capabilities for our strike groups and individual ships. The MH-60S supports surface warfare, combat logistics, vertical replenishment, search and rescue, air ambulance, airborne mine counter-measures, and naval special warfare mission areas. We have delivered 85 MH-60R and 187 MH-60S to our Fleet and our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for 24 MH- 60R and 18 MH-60S helicopters. SURFACE SHIP PROGRAMS Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) LCS is a fast, agile, networked surface combatant optimized to support naval and joint force operations in the littorals with capability to support open-ocean operations. It will operate with focused-mission packages to counter mine, small boat, and submarine threats in the littorals. The modular design and open architecture of the seaframe and mission modules provide the inherent flexibility to add or adapt capabilities as new technologies mature or to counter threats that emerge beyond the Mine Countermeasures, Surface Warfare, and Anti-Submarine missions currently planned for LCS. These ships will employ a combination of manned helicopters and unmanned aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles. USS Freedom (LCS-1) completed her first operational deployment to the Southern and Pacific Commands in April 2010, 2 years early. While deployed, USS Freedom successfully conducted counter-drug missions and validated its open ocean capability, allowing us to learn valuable lessons from these real-world operations. USS Independence (LCS-2) was commissioned in January 2010 and is currently in Norfolk undergoing post-delivery tests and trials. We are seeing demonstrated performance and stability in the construction of LCS-3 and LCS-4 that captures lessons learned from the first ships. PCU Fort Worth (LCS-3) was launched and christened in December and is completing final construction. PCU Coronado (LCS-4) is almost 50 percent complete and is scheduled to be launched and christened later this year. Both LCS-3 and LCS-4 are experiencing minimal change and are scheduled to be delivered to the Navy in 2012 on cost and on schedule. I thank Congress for approving the Navy's dual award strategy in December 2010. This strategy enables the Navy to save over $2 billion in acquisition costs and acquire these ships well below the congressionally-mandated $480 million cost cap set in 2009. It allows our Navy to acquire an additional Littoral Combat ship, increasing needed capacity in our Fleet. I am impressed and satisfied with the capabilities of both LCS designs and remain committed to procuring 55 of these ships. Consistent with the dual award strategy, our fiscal year 2012 budget requests four LCS seaframes at a total cost of $1.8 billion. The budget also requests two mission packages in fiscal year 2012. These packages provide the vital center for LCS's combat capability and we have aligned LCS mission module procurement with that of our LCS seaframes. I request your continued support as we continue to acquire the future capacity and capability the Fleet requires. Ballistic Missile Defense The Navy's mature and proven maritime BMD capability will play a primary role in the first phase of our Nation's Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for the missile defense of our NATO Allies in Europe. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding to increase our current BMD ship capacity from 21 ships (5 cruisers and 16 destroyers) to 41 BMD capable ships by 2016. This planned capacity expansion will eventually include all of the Navy's Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and nine Ticonderoga-class cruisers. Until we grow our BMD ship capacity, our existing BMD ships may experience longer deployment lengths and less time between deployments as we stretch our existing capacity to meet growing demands. As part of the PAA, we are working with the Missile Defense Agency to adapt Navy's proven and flexible Aegis BMD capability for use in an ashore configuration by repackaging components of the afloat Aegis Weapons System into modular containers for deployment to pre-prepared forward sites. The Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex is currently under development, with fabrication to begin in Kauai, HI, in 2013. This complex is a key enabler of the Aegis Ashore capability, which will be tested prior to shore placement overseas in 2015. This phased approach provides needed technology and capacity to pace the threat; it serves as a conventional counter to trends in global ballistic missile technology; and it allows for technological maturation through 2020. DDG-51 Flight IIA and Flight III To keep pace with the evolving air and missile defense threats, we restarted the DDG-51 Flight IIA production line in the fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 budgets with advanced procurement buys for DDG- 113, -114, and -115. The restarted DDG-51 Flight IIA destroyers provide Navy with a proven multi-mission combatant that fills critical warfighting needs across the spectrum, and is the first warship built from the keel up to conduct maritime BMD. They will be the first Aegis ships to be built with the Open Architecture Advanced Capability Build (ACB)-12 Aegis Combat System. ACB-12 will allow these surface combatants to be updated and maintained with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology, yielding reduced Total Ownership Cost and enhancing the ability to adapt to future military threats. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for the construction of DDG-116 as part of our plan to build seven more of the Flight IIA class over the FYDP (an increase of one DDG-51 over last year's budget). We also request just over $75 million to support research and development for ACB-12, which will support the integration of this critical system on DDG-113 and our development of Aegis Ashore. The follow-on to DDG-51 Flight IIA is the DDG-51 Flight III, which will commence with the construction of DDG-123. Flight III ships will be tailored for Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) and include the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), upgraded command and control software and hardware, and enhanced electrical power and cooling. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for a total of eight DDG-51 Class ships, including funding for the first Flight III ship in fiscal year 2016. Modernization To counter emerging threats, we continue to make significant investments in cruiser and destroyer modernization to sustain our combat effectiveness and to achieve the 35 year service life of our Aegis fleet. Our destroyer and cruiser modernization program includes Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) upgrades, as well as advances in warfighting capability and open architecture to reduce total ownership costs and expand mission capability for current and future combat capabilities. In addition to HM&E upgrades, key aspects of our destroyer and cruiser modernization programs include the installation or upgrade of the Aegis weapons system to include an open architecture computing environment, addition of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), an upgraded SQQ-89A(V)15 anti-submarine warfare system, and improved air dominance with processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air capability. Our destroyers also receive integration of the SM-6 missile, while our cruisers receive installation of the AN/SPQ-9B radar and an upgrade to Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) Block 1B. Maintaining the stability of the cruiser and destroyer modernization program is critical to our ability to provide relevant capability and capacity in our future Fleet. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for the modernization of four cruisers (three Combat Systems and one HM&E) and three destroyers (one Combat System and two HM&E). DDG-1000 The DDG-1000 Zumwalt guided missile destroyer will be an optimally crewed, multi-mission surface combatant optimized for long-range precision land attack. In addition to providing offensive, distributed and precision fires in support of forces ashore, these ships will serve as test-beds for advanced technology, such as integrated power systems, a sophisticated X-Band radar, and advanced survivability features, which can inform future ship designs. Following a Nunn-McCurdy breach due to the reduction in procurement to three ships, we restructured the DDG-1000 program to remove the highest risk technology, the Volume Search Radar, from integration into the platform. DDG-1000 is more than 37 percent complete and is scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 2014 with an initial operating capability in fiscal year 2016. Joint High Speed Vessel The JHSV will deliver a new level of organic logistic and maneuver flexibility for combatant commanders. JHSV is a high speed, shallow draft ship. Its unique design allows the ship to transport medium payloads of cargo and/or personnel to austere ports without reliance on port infrastructure. JHSV-1 and -2 are currently under construction by Austal USA in Mobile, AL and are scheduled to be delivered in fiscal year 2012 and 2013. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for the construction of the third JHSV. We are currently developing a Memorandum of Agreement with the Army that would transfer programmatic oversight and responsibility for the entire JHSV program, including operations and maintenance, to the Navy. Upon the signing of the agreement, all JHSVs when delivered would be operated by the Navy's Military Sealift Command and manned by civilian or contract mariners. SUBMARINE PROGRAMS Virginia-class SSN The Virginia-class submarine is a multi-mission submarine designed to dominate the undersea domain in the littorals, access denied environments, and the open ocean. Now in its 14th year of construction, the Virginia program is demonstrating its continued ability to deliver this critical undersea asset affordably and on time. The Navy continues to realize a return on investment in the Virginia cost reduction program and construction process improvements through enhanced shipbuilder performance on each successive ship. A majority of the submarines contracted via multiyear procurement have delivered under budget and ahead of schedule, and their performance continues to exceed expectations with every ship delivered. I am pleased with the accomplishments of the combined Navy-Industry team and anticipate additional improvements as we ramp up production to two submarines per year, as requested in our fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budget submissions. SSBN and Ohio Replacement The Navy remains committed to recapitalizing the Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent, the most survivable leg of our nuclear triad. With a fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), we have been able to meet the strategic needs of the Nation since 1980. This class will begin retirement after more than 40 years of service in 2027. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed that our Nation will continue to rely on a reliable and survivable sea-based strategic deterrent for the foreseeable future. To ensure the Navy is able to meet the Nation's demand in this critical capability, our fiscal year 2012 budget requests research and development funds for the design of the Ohio-class replacement, enabling construction of the class beginning in 2019. The Ohio replacement will possess the endurance and stealth required for continuous, survivable strategic deterrence for decades to come. Appropriate R&D investment is essential to design a reliable and survivable submarine capable of deterring all potential adversaries. Over the past year, the Ohio replacement program has been thoroughly reviewed and all aspects of the program were aggressively challenged to drive down engineering and construction costs. Our fiscal year 2012 request represents best balance of needed warfighting capabilities with cost. The Ohio replacement program will leverage the many successes of the Virginia SSN program to achieve acquisition and total ownership cost goals. These efficiencies and a record of acquisition excellence are critical to minimize risk to our total force structure while recapitalizing sea-based strategic deterrence between fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2033. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS LPD-17 Class Amphibious Warfare Ship The San Antonio-class LPD (LPD-17) amphibious warfare ships provide the Navy and Marine Corps the ability to embark, transport, control, insert, sustain, and extract combat marines and sailors on missions that range from forcible entry to forward deployed crisis response. These ships have a 40-year expected service life and will replace four classes of older ships: the LKA, LST, LSD-36, and the LPD-4. Of the 11 ships in our program of record, 5 ships have been delivered, 3 have completed their initial deployments, and 4 are under construction. We continue to resolve material reliability concerns with the class and apply the lessons learned during initial operation of the early ships to those under construction. Quality continues to improve with each ship delivered as we work closely with the shipbuilder to address cost, schedule, and performance issues. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding to procure the final ship in the program. LHA Replacement (LHA(R)) LHA(R) is the replacement for our aging Tarawa-class ships, which will reach the end of their extended service life between 2011-2015. LHA(R) will provide flexible, multi-mission amphibious capabilities by leveraging the LHD-8 design. The America (LHA-6) is now more than 30 percent complete and on schedule for delivery in fiscal year 2014. Beginning with LHA-8, the Navy will reintegrate the well deck into the large deck amphibious assault ships. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for research and development to support reintegration of the well deck into the design of the large deck amphibious ship and the construction of LHA-8 in fiscal year 2016. Mobile Landing Platform Based on commercial technology, the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) will enable the transfer of equipment, personnel, and sustainment at- sea, and delivery ashore in support of a wide range of contingency operations. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for one MLP and we intend to procure a total of three MLPs. We expect the first ship to deliver in fiscal year 2013 and project initial operating capability and incorporation into the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) for 2015. In the Maritime Preposition Force, each of our existing Maritime Preposition Squadrons will be augmented by one MLP, one T-AKE combat logistics ship, and a Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off cargo ship. The three T-AKE are all under contract with projected delivery dates beginning this year and going through fiscal year 2013. INFORMATION DOMINANCE PROGRAMS Unmanned Systems Our Navy is developing a ``family'' of unmanned systems over, on, and under the sea to provide unique capability, in concert with our manned platforms, to rapidly secure access and establish maritime superiority at the time and place of our choosing. We are developing information architecture that will allow us to rapidly assimilate data into information for our commanders, enabling shorter decision cycles that will give us an advantage in joint and maritime operations. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Our unmanned aircraft family of systems includes the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS, which will enhance our situational awareness and shorten the sensor-to-shooter kill chain by providing persistent, multiple-sensor capabilities to Fleet and Joint Commanders. Through our recent memorandum of agreement with the Air Force, we are pursuing greater commonality and interoperability between BAMS and the Air Force's Global Hawk UAV. Our Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle (VTUAV) is on its second deployment aboard the USS Halyburton (FFG-40) and will deploy in an expeditionary role to support combat operations in Afghanistan later this year. Our fiscal year 2012 budget includes about $12 million in research and development funding to facilitate development of a weapons-capable VTUAV ready for deployment in late fiscal year 2012. Our fiscal year 2012 request also includes funding to develop a medium range maritime-based UAS and a Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial System that will support a variety of ships, Naval Special Warfare and Navy Expeditionary Combat Command units, and Marine Corps elements. The Navy Unmanned Combat Aircraft System Demonstration (NUCAS-D) will prove carrier suitability of an autonomous, unmanned, low- observable, carrier-based aircraft. This effort includes maturing technologies for aircraft carrier catapult launches and arrested landings, as well as integration into carrier-controlled airspace. Initial flight tests to demonstrate carrier suitability are scheduled to start next year and autonomous aerial refueling demonstrations are planned for 2014. We will leverage the lessons learned from operating the demonstrator in developing a low-observable unmanned carrier- launched airborne surveillance and strike system (UCLASS). The UCLASS program will shorten the timeline to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess time sensitive targets. UCLASS will integrate with the carrier air wings and increase the flexibility, versatility, and capability of the carrier force. We are currently developing the UCLASS acquisition strategy with OSD. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) provide an innovative technological solution to augment manned platforms. Our Navy has logged more than 85,000 hours of UUV operations to improve battlespace awareness. Our small-body Littoral Battlespace Sensing (LBS) oceanographic autonomous undersea gliders have demonstrated the ability to conduct 6-month long autonomous operations and will achieve Initial Operating Capability this year. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests about $13million for research, development, and procurement of the LBS glider. We are also developing Large Diameter UUVs (LDUUV) with the capability to autonomously deploy and manage a variety of sensors and payloads. The development of these highly capable vehicles will require investment in commercially and militarily beneficial alternative energy technologies, including refinement of fuel cell technology and cutting edge battery technologies. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests about $47 million to develop an LDUUV, and I remain committed to conduct fully independent UUV missions with durations of 2 months by 2017. This capability will allow full scale employment and deployment of LDUUV squadrons in the 2020s. Mobile User Objective System Our Maritime Strategy demands a flexible, interoperable, and secure global communications capability that can support the command and control requirements of highly mobile and distributed U.S. and coalition forces. Satellite communications give deployed forces a decisive military advantage and often offer the only communication means to support ongoing operations. Rapidly expanding joint demand for more access at ever-higher data rates requires moving beyond our current legacy Ultra High Frequency (UHF) satellite capabilities. The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) will help satisfy those demands when initial operational capability is reached in fiscal year 2012. The first satellite in our planned constellation of five is scheduled for on-orbit capability in May 2012. Our fiscal year 2012 budget submission continues our investment in MUOS to replace the aging UHF Follow-On (UFO) constellation. I request your continued support of MUOS and the critical narrowband communication capability it will provide to the joint warfighter. Next Generation Enterprise Network The Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) is a Department of the Navy enterprise network that will provide secure, net-centric data and services to Navy and Marine Corps personnel after the current Navy- Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) network stands down. In July, Navy awarded Hewlett Packard Enterprise Services with the NMCI continuity of services contract to transition the Navy out of NMCI and into NGEN. NGEN will sustain the services currently provided by NMCI, while increasing government command and control of our network and enabling secure, reliable, and adaptable global information exchange. The initial NGEN contracts are expected to be awarded in the first quarter of fiscal year 2012. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests an additional $22 million to support government command and control of our networks and improve our network situational awareness and defense. Remain Ready to Fight Today Our Navy continues to experience a high tempo of global operations which I expect to continue even as combat forces draw down in Afghanistan. Global trends in economics, demographics, resources, and climate change portend an increased demand for maritime power and influence. America's prosperity depends upon the seas: 90 percent of world trade moves on the world's oceans and underwater telecommunications cables facilitate about $3.2 trillion of commerce each year. As new trade patterns emerge, such as those that will result from the expansion of the Panama Canal and the opening of the Arctic, and as disruption and disorder persist in our security environment, maritime activity will evolve and expand. Seapower allows our Nation to maintain U.S. presence and influence globally and, when necessary, project power without a costly, sizeable, or permanent footprint ashore. We will continue to maintain a forward-deployed presence around the world to prevent conflict, increase interoperability with our allies, enhance the maritime security and capacity of our traditional and emerging partners, confront irregular challenges, and respond to crises. High operational demand for our force over the last decade has led to longer deployments, lower dwell time, and reduced maintenance time for our surface ships. If these trends continue, our force will be less ready and less available than it is today because of increased stress on our sailors and a reduction in our Fleet capacity as ships fail to reach their expected service lives. We have initiatives currently underway to address these trends. We are moving approximately 1,900 sailors from shore billets onto our ships to meet operational demands while maintaining acceptable Fleet readiness levels and sailor dwell time. To enhance the material readiness of our Fleet, we are improving our ability to plan and execute maintenance by increasing manning at our Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs), and by institutionalizing our engineered approach to surface ship maintenance, converting the successes of our Surface Ship Lifecycle Maintenance initiative I began 2 years ago into the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program Activity. I remain focused on ensuring our Navy has a force that is maintained and trained to provide the capability and forward presence required in the two areas of interest identified in our Maritime Strategy, the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf, while preserving our ability to immediately swing from those regions and our Fleet concentration areas in the United States to respond to contingencies globally. Our fiscal year 2012 base budget and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding requests balance the need to meet increasing operational requirements, sustain our sailors' proficiency, and conduct the maintenance required to ensure our ships and aircraft reach their full service lives. It does not address the potential impacts of a full-year continuing resolution on our ongoing operations and maintenance afloat and ashore. Highlights follow of initiatives that ensure our Navy remains ready to fight today. Depot Level Maintenance Our ships and aircraft are valuable capital assets that operate in unforgiving environments. Keeping these assets in acceptable operating condition is vital to their ability to accomplish assigned missions and reach their expected service lives. Timely depot level maintenance, based on an engineered assessment of expected material durability and scoped by actual physical condition, will preserve our existing force structure. Continued investment in depot level maintenance is essential in achieving and sustaining the force structure required to implement our Maritime Strategy. Our combined fiscal year 2012 base budget and OCO funding requests fulfill 94 percent of the projected ship depot maintenance requirements necessary to sustain our Navy's global presence and 95 percent of our aviation depot maintenance requirements, servicing 742 airframes and 2,577 engines. The actual extent of our depot maintenance requirements will be determined by the final funding levels for fiscal year 2011. I request that you fully support our baseline and contingency funding requests for operations and maintenance to ensure the effectiveness of our force, safety of our sailors, and longevity of our ships and aircraft. Shore Readiness Our shore infrastructure enables our operational and combat readiness, and is essential to the quality of life and quality of work for our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. High operational demands, rising manpower costs, and an aging fleet of ships and aircraft cause us to take deliberate risk in shore readiness, specifically in sustaining our shore infrastructure. We have focused our facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization funds on improving our housing for unaccompanied sailors and investing in energy efficient building modifications. To source these enhancements, we have temporarily cancelled our demolition program and reduced our facilities sustainment posture to 80 percent of the modeled requirement. We have targeted our shore readiness investments in areas that have the greatest impact on achieving our strategic and operational objectives. These areas include support to our warfighting missions and capabilities, nuclear weapons security, quality of life for our sailors and their families, and energy enhancements. We remain on track in our Homeport Ashore initiative to provide sufficient accommodations to our junior single sailors by 2016, and we continue our support for family services. We plan to complete an expansion of 7,000 child care spaces in fiscal year 2011, allowing us to meet OSD's mandate of providing child care for 80 percent of the potential need in fiscal year 2012. Training Readiness Our Navy is leveraging modeling and simulation (M&S) extensively across the Fleet training continuum to reduce at-sea training requirements and associated operating costs and energy use. These virtual environments stress critical command and control warfare skills and fine tune basic warfighting competencies without going to sea. They provide synthetic events that are scalable and repeatable, including the ability to train multiple strike groups simultaneously. Synthetic training provides a complex, multi-faceted threat environment that cannot be efficiently recreated at sea on a routine basis. Ship command and control simulations, in conjunction with the Fleet Synthetic Training (FST) program, support unit level and integrated pre- deployment training and certification, including Joint Task Force Exercises, Ballistic Missile Defense Exercises, and LCS qualification and certification training. In fiscal year 2012, our Navy's use of simulators will reduce steaming days by 603 days for a savings of $30 million, and flying hours by 5,400 hours, for a savings of $35 million. The Fleet has placed FST as a top training priority with the objective to increase simulator use and synthetic training to reduce Fleet operating costs. Although we are maximizing our use of synthetic training, it cannot completely replace our need to conduct live training. Simulators cannot replicate the physical environment, risks, stress, or experiences that live training provides. Naval units must be able to practice and hone their skills in the air and at sea. Having the right facilities and the ability to practice skill sets in a live operating environment are necessary for the proficiency and safety of our sailors and for the warfighting effectiveness of our Fleet. The proliferation of advanced, stealthy submarines continues to challenge our Navy's ability to guarantee the access and sustainment of joint forces. Robust anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training with active sonar systems is vital for our Navy to effectively address this threat. The Navy remains a world leader in marine mammal research and we will continue our investment in this research in fiscal year 2012 and beyond. Through such efforts, and in full consultation and cooperation with other Federal agencies, we have developed effective measures that protect marine mammals and the ocean environment from adverse impacts of mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar while not precluding critical Navy training. We continue to work closely with our interagency partners to further refine our protective measures as scientific knowledge evolves. It is vitally important that any such measures ensure the continued flexibility necessary to respond to future national security requirements. In January, we announced our plan to initially focus JSF homebasing on the west coast in accordance with 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review direction and the JSF Transition Plan. We also announced that we are suspending work on the Outlying Landing Field (OLF) draft environmental impact statement (EIS) planned for the East Coast until at least 2014. At that time, we will re-evaluate the requirement for an OLF based on our east coast JSF basing and training requirements. We continue to experience capacity shortfalls at our current East Coast field carrier landing practice sites that present challenges to meeting our current training requirements under both routine and surge conditions for existing Navy aircraft. We will continue to ensure we meet all our training requirements by implementing the measures necessary to use all available facilities. Energy and Climate Change The Secretary of the Navy and I are committed to advancing our energy security. I consider energy an operational imperative and I established the Navy's Task Force Energy more than 2 years ago to improve combat capability, assure mobility, and green our footprint. We will achieve these goals through energy efficiency improvements, consumption reduction initiatives, and the aggressive adoption of alternative energy and fuels. Reducing our reliance on fossil fuels will improve our combat capability by increasing time on station, reducing time spent alongside replenishment ships, and producing more effective and powerful future weapons. Our tactical energy efforts fall into two categories: technical and behavioral changes that use energy more efficiently, and testing/ certification of alternative fuels. We are making good progress on our efficiency initiatives. The USS Makin Island (LHD-8) uses hybrid propulsion and we are installing the same system on LHA-6 and LHA-7. We are developing a hybrid electric drive system for the DDG-51 class and I anticipate a land-based test as early as this summer. We continue to introduce advanced hull and propeller coatings and solid state lighting in our ships, and we are developing the Smart Voyage Planning Decision Aid to achieve more efficient ship routing. We are also implementing policies that encourage sailors to reduce their personal energy usage. These incremental initiatives add up to significant efficiency improvements. Our alternative energy programs are progressing. We are aggressively certifying elements of our operational force for biofuel use. To date we have operated the ``Green Hornet'' F/A-18 and MH-60S on camelina-based JP-5 fuel and the RCB-X riverine craft on algal-based F- 76 fuel. Operational testing of energy efficiency upgrades to the Allison 501k engine completed last month and is a key milestone toward certification of our Navy combatants with marine gas turbine engines. We have reduced our energy use ashore by more than 14 percent since 2003, as a result of our energy efficiency efforts, including energy efficiency building upgrades, energy management systems, procurement of alternative fuel vehicles, and achievement of sustainable building standards for all new construction and major renovation projects. Our continued investments in advanced metering and energy audits will help identify further opportunities for efficiency gains and alternative energy use. Our approach remains focused on integrating the right technology at the right time in the right place while transforming Navy culture and behavior for long term sustainability. Since establishing Task Force Climate Change in 2009, our Navy has taken several actions to better understand and address the potential impacts of climate change on our Navy. We have increased our operational engagement in the Arctic, participating this past summer in Operation Nanook/Natsiq with Canada. We are re-assessing regional security cooperation, through our African, Southern, and Pacific Partnership station missions to include consideration of climate change adaptation, especially with respect to improving water security. We are also participating with the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration and other Federal agencies to survey in the Arctic and improve our environmental observation and prediction capability worldwide. Scientific observations indicate that current changes to the climate are occurring on a decadal scale, giving our Navy enough time to conduct the studies and assessments necessary to inform future investment decisions. Second East Coast Carrier-Capable Homeport The Navy continues to focus on achieving the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review direction to upgrade the carrier port of Mayport. Much like the dispersal of west coast aircraft carriers between California and Washington, a second homeport on the east coast to maintain aircraft carriers is prudent in the event of a natural or man-made disaster in Hampton Roads. The dredging project funded in fiscal year 2010 is underway and will ensure unimpeded access to Mayport. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for the Massey Avenue corridor improvement projects. We plan to request funding for the Wharf F recapitalization in fiscal year 2013, and the remaining projects within the FYDP, to establish Naval Station Mayport as a nuclear carrier- capable homeport by 2019. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea The Navy has consistently supported a comprehensive and stable legal regime for the exercise of navigational rights and other traditional uses of the oceans. The Law of the Sea Convention provides such a regime with robust global mobility rules. I believe it essential that the United States become a full Party to the treaty. The Convention promotes our strategic goal of free access to and public order on the oceans under the rule of law. It also has strategic effects for global maritime partnerships and American maritime leadership and influence. Creating partnerships that are in the strategic interests of our Nation must be based on relationships of mutual respect, understanding, and trust. For the 160 nations who are parties to the Law of the Sea Convention, a basis for trust and mutual understanding is codified in that document. The treaty provides a solid foundation for the United States to assert its sovereign rights to the natural resources of the sea floor out to 200 nautical miles and on the extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, which in the Arctic Ocean is likely to extend at least 600 nautical miles north of Alaska. As a non-Party to the treaty, the United States undermines its ability to influence the future direction of the law of the sea. As the only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council outside the Convention, and one of the few nations still remaining outside one of the most widely subscribed international agreements, our non-Party status hinders our ability to lead in this important area and could, over time, reduce the United States' influence in shaping global maritime law and policy. The Law of the Sea Convention provides the norms our sailors need to do their jobs around the world every day. It is in the best interest of our Nation and our Navy to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention. We must demonstrate leadership and provide to the men and women who serve in our Navy the most solid legal footing possible to carry out the missions that our Nation requires of them. DEVELOP AND SUPPORT OUR SAILORS, NAVY CIVILIANS, AND THEIR FAMILIES Our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families are the backbone of our Maritime Strategy. They make us who we are. Their skill, innovation, and dedication turn our ships, aircraft, weapons and systems into global capabilities that prevent conflict, build partnerships, and, when necessary, project combat power to prevail in war. Our investment in our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families ensures our Navy's continued maritime dominance today and in the future. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests authorization and funding for 325,700 Active and 66,200 Reserve end strength. This request includes the migration of more than 1,800 military billets from shore and staff activities into the Fleet to man new ships and squadrons, restore optimal manning cuts, add needed information technology and nuclear operators to our force, and restore billets for fiscal year 2013 to extend USS Peleliu in commission. This migration will enhance our forces afloat; however, the transition will present challenges to our ability to maintain sea-shore flow for some of our enlisted sailors and sustain manning levels across the force. We are aware of these challenges and believe the transition is manageable. Our fiscal year 2012 end strength request also begins to move end strength previously supported by OCO funding, namely our Navy Individual Augmentees (IAs), into our baseline program. We will execute a phased draw down of our OCO end strength as we project a gradual reduction of IA demands in Iraq and Afghanistan. Should IA demand remain at current levels, or increase over time, we will be challenged to meet manning requirements for our Fleet. Our Navy continues to size, shape, and stabilize our force through a series of performance-based measures designed to retain the skills, pay grades, and experience mix necessary to meet current and future requirements. Our fiscal year 2012 end strength reflects efficiencies in our manpower account that reduce excess overhead by disestablishing several staffs, but not their associated ships and aircraft, for submarine, patrol aircraft, and destroyer squadrons, as well as one Carrier Strike Group staff. We are disestablishing the headquarters of Second Fleet and transferring responsibility for its mission to U.S. Fleet Forces Command. These efficiencies streamline our organizations and allow us to reinvest the savings into warfighting capability and capacity. I would like to touch briefly on the issue of changes to the health care benefit. Navy Medicine has been a leader in implementing pilot testing for the Department in a new concept called the Patient-Centered Medical Home. Beneficiaries have welcomed Navy Medicine's Medical Home Port initiative and it shows in their satisfaction scores. I am convinced that our beneficiaries will readily accept very modest changes to copayments as long as we continue to invest in these transformational approaches to delivering high quality health care. The proposals in the President's budget are consistent with our efforts over the last several years: a focus on internal efficiency, incentivizing the health behaviors we want, and ensuring all of our beneficiaries are treated equitably. I request you support these timely and appropriate efforts. The tone of our force continues to be positive. In 2010, we conducted the Navy Total Force Survey, which was the first of its kind to assess the work-related attitudes and experiences of Active and Reserve sailors and Navy civilians. The survey reported that Navy personnel are, overall, satisfied with the quality of their leadership, benefits, compensation, and opportunities within the Navy for personal growth and development. The survey results reaffirmed what more than 20 national awards have recognized: that our Navy is a ``Top 50'' organization and an employer of choice among today's workforce. Our fiscal year 2012 budget request represents a balanced approach to supporting our sailors and their families, sustaining the high tempo of current operations, and preserving Fleet and family readiness. Highlights follow of our efforts to develop and support our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. Recruiting and Retention Our Navy has enjoyed strong recruiting success over the past 3 years, and we expect this trend to continue through fiscal year 2011. Fiscal year 2010 marked the third consecutive year Navy met or exceeded its overall enlisted recruiting goals in both the Active and Reserve components and we continue to exceed Department of Defense quality standards in all recruit categories. We accessed the highest quality enlisted force in history last year, with more than 97 percent having traditional high school diplomas. Active officer recruiting for fiscal year 2010 also exceeded our overall goals. Reserve officer recruiting exceeded our fiscal year 2009 levels, but achieved only 95 percent of our fiscal year 2010 goal. Reserve medical officer recruiting continues to be our greatest challenge as the requirement for medical officers has increased by more than 100 percent since fiscal year 2008. We continue to explore new avenues for recruiting, including expanding our social media engagement to maintain a dialogue with potential applicants and influencers nationwide. Navy will remain competitive in the employment market through the disciplined use of monetary and non-monetary incentives. Using a targeted approach, we will continue our recruiting and retention initiatives to attract and retain our best sailors, especially those within high-demand, critical skill areas that remain insulated from economic conditions. We are taking advantage of current high retention rates and success in accessions by reevaluating all special and incentive pays and bonuses and reducing them where possible. Judicious use of special and incentive pays remains essential to recruiting and retaining skilled professionals in the current economic environment, and will increase in importance as the economic recovery continues. Our goal remains to maintain a balanced force, in which seniority, experience, and skills are matched to requirements. To ensure we stay within our congressionally-authorized end strength, we are executing force stabilization measures that include Perform-to-Serve (PTS) for enlisted sailors and a series of Selective Early Retirement (SER) boards for Unrestricted Line (URL) captains and commanders. PTS considers the manning levels in each enlisted rating and reviews the record of sailors eligible for reenlistment to determine if the sailor should remain in the rating, convert to an undermanned specialty, transition to the Reserves, or separate from the Navy. The SER boards will address the excess inventory of Active component captain (O6) and commander (O5) URL officers in our Navy to ensure sufficient senior officers are available at the right time in their careers to serve in critical fleet billets. We project approximately 100 URL captains and 100 URL commanders will be selected for early retirement through this process. With these performance-based measures, we expect to meet our fiscal year 2011 authorized Active end strength of 328,700 and Reserve end strength of 65,500 by the end of the fiscal year. We will be challenged to meet our Active and Reserve end strength targets in fiscal year 2012 using existing force shaping measures. As a result of continued high retention and low attrition across the force, we are facing increasing pressure to use involuntary force shaping measures to remain within our authorized end strength. Diversity Demographic projections estimate that today's minorities will make up more than one third of our Nation's workforce by 2020; by 2050, that projection increases to about half of our workforce. Our ability to access and retain the talents of every component group in our society is critical to our mission success. Recruiting and retaining a diverse workforce, reflective of the Nation's demographics at all levels of the chain of command, remains a strategic imperative and a focus area for leaders throughout our Navy. To foster a Navy Total Force composition that reflects America's diversity, we are focusing our efforts on outreach, mentoring, leadership accountability, training, and communication. Our diversity outreach efforts have contributed to our 2014 U.S. Naval Academy and Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps classes being the most diverse student bodies in our history. We have increased diverse accessions through targeted recruiting in diverse markets, developing relationships with key influencers in the top diverse metropolitan markets, and aligning Navy assets and organizations to maximize our connection with educators, business leaders and government officials to increase our influencer base. We continue to expand our relationships with key influencers and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics-based affinity groups to inform our Nation's youth about the unique opportunities available in our Navy. We are also building and sustaining a continuum of mentorship opportunities that includes the chain of command, individual communities, social networking, peer-to-peer relationships, and affinity groups. We will continue to ensure that all sailors are provided with opportunities to develop personally and professionally. Women on Submarines After notifying Congress last year of our intent to assign women to submarines, the Secretary of the Navy and I have authorized female officers to serve aboard Ohio-class SSBN and SSGN submarines. This will enable our submarine force to leverage the tremendous talent and potential of the women serving in our Navy. The first 18 female submarine officers commenced the standard 15-month nuclear and submarine training pipeline in 2010, and will begin arriving at their submarines at the end of this year. These officers will be assigned to two ballistic missile (SSBN) and two guided missile (SSGN) submarines which have the space to accommodate female officers without structural modification. The plan also integrates female supply corps officers onto SSBNs and SSGNs at the department head level. In December, the Secretary of Defense notified Congress of Navy's intent to expend funds to commence design and study efforts regarding reconfiguration of existing submarines to accommodate female crew members, as well as to design the Ohio replacement SSBN with the flexibility to accommodate female crew members. Don't Ask, Don't Tell I am pleased Congress voted to repeal section 654 of title 10, U.S.C., commonly referred to as the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' (DADT) statute. Legislative repeal affords us the time and structured process needed to effectively implement this significant change within our Armed Forces. As I testified in December, we will be able to implement a repeal of DADT in our Navy. I assess the risk to readiness, effectiveness, and cohesion of the Navy to be low. Our implementation process will be thorough, but timely. We are preparing the necessary policies and regulations to implement this change in law and training sailors and leaders at all levels to ensure they understand what repeal means to them, their families, and the Navy. Before repeal can occur, the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs must certify that the change can be made in a manner consistent with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces. I will provide Navy's input to the certification process and I remain personally engaged in this process. Sailor and Family Continuum of Care We remain committed to providing our sailors and their families a comprehensive continuum of care that addresses all aspects of medical, physical, psychological, and family readiness. Our fiscal year 2012 budget request expands this network of services and caregivers to ensure that all sailors and their families receive the highest quality healthcare available. Navy Safe Harbor is at the forefront in Navy's non-medical care for all seriously wounded, ill, and injured sailors, coastguardsmen, and their families. We have expanded our network of Recovery Care Coordinators and non-medical Care Managers to 12 locations across the country. Safe Harbor continues to provide exceptional, individually tailored assistance to a growing enrolled population of more than 600 individuals. Over 116,000 sailors and their spouses have participated in Operational Stress Control (OSC) training, which actively promotes the psychological health of sailors and their families by encouraging them to seek help for stress reactions early, before they become problems. The Warrior Transition Program (WTP) and Returning Warrior Workshops (RWW) are essential to post-deployment reintegration efforts. The WTP offers an opportunity for IA sailors redeploying from a combat zone to decompress, turn in their gear, and receive tools that will help them ease their transition back to their home and families. The RWW is designed to address personal stress that may be generated by deployment activities and it supports and facilitates the reintegration of the deployed sailor with his/her spouse and family. The RWW also provides a safe, relaxed atmosphere in which to identify and address potential issues that may arise during post-deployment reintegration. Stress on the Force While the overall tone of our force remains positive, current trends suggest that high operational tempo, increasing mission demands, lean manning, force shaping, and economic conditions are placing increased stress on our Navy personnel. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests increased funding to improve our program manager-level support of our suicide prevention and stress control programs. Suicide dramatically affects individuals, commands and families. Over the last year, we expanded our approach to preventing suicides from historic suicide surveillance and annual awareness training to include more comprehensive resilience building and tailored suicide prevention training, peer intervention, research and analysis. We saw a reduction in our number of suicides from 46 in calendar year 2009 to 38 in calendar year 2010. Our calendar year suicide rate also decreased from 13.3 per 100,000 sailors in 2009 to 10.9 per 100,000 sailors in 2010. Our 2010 suicide rate is below the national rate of 19.0 per 100,000 individuals for the same age and gender demographic; however, any loss of life as a result of suicide is unacceptable. Suicide prevention is an ``all hands, all the time'' effort involving our sailors, families, peers, and leaders. We continue to work towards a greater understanding of the issues surrounding suicide to ensure that our policies, training, interventions, and communications are meeting intended objectives. We are integrating our suicide prevention efforts into the broader array of programs we offer to improve the resilience of our force. These programs, aimed at reducing individual stress, address issues, such as substance abuse prevention, financial management, positive family relationships, physical readiness, and family support. We continue our efforts to eliminate sexual assault by fostering a culture of prevention, victim response and offender accountability. Sexual assault is incompatible with our Navy core values, high standards of professionalism, and personal discipline. We have organized our efforts in this critical area under the Navy Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program. The SAPR program and the Naval Safety Center and Alcohol and Drug Prevention Program are currently developing an integrated approach to sexual assault prevention that includes clear leadership communication, bystander intervention training for sailors to help them recognize and interrupt risky situations, and training for military investigators and lawyers on issues specific to sexual assault investigation and prosecution. Learning and Development Education and training are strategic investments that give us an asymmetric advantage over adversaries. To develop the highly-skilled, combat-ready force necessary to meet the demands of the Maritime Strategy and the Joint Force, we have 15 learning centers around the country providing top-notch training to our sailors, Navy civilians and members of the other Services. In fiscal year 2010, we completed learning and development roadmaps for all enlisted ratings, providing sailors with detailed information about the required training, education, qualifications and assignments they need to succeed in their career fields. We continue to leverage a blended training approach, integrating experienced instructors, advanced technology, and state-of- the-art delivery systems with modularized content in order to provide the right training at the right time in a sailor's career. We are balancing existing education and training requirements with growth in important mission areas such as cyber defense, missile defense, and anti-submarine warfare. Cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise remain essential to successfully accomplishing the Navy's global mission, and our budget request supports our Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) program as well as the Afghanistan- Pakistan Hands Program sponsored by the Joint Staff. Last year the LREC program provided language and cultural training to more than 120,000 sailors en route to overseas assignments. We recognize the importance of providing our people meaningful and relevant education, particularly Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), which develops leaders who are strategically-minded, capable of critical thinking, and adept in naval and joint warfare. Our resident courses at Naval War College, non-resident courses at Naval Postgraduate School and in the Fleet Seminar program, and distance offerings provide ample opportunity for achievement of this vital education. CONCLUSION You can be exceptionally proud of our sailors. They are our Nation's preeminent force at sea, on land, and in air, space, and cyberspace. While the future is not without challenges, I am optimistic about our future and the global opportunities our Navy provides our Nation. Our fiscal year 2012 budget request represents a balanced approach to increasing Fleet capacity, maintaining our warfighting readiness, and developing and enhancing our Navy Total Force. I ask for your strong support of our fiscal year 2012 budget request and my identified priorities. Thank you for your unwavering commitment to our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, and for all you do to make our U.S. Navy an effective and enduring global force for good. Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral, and again, thank you for your extraordinary service over the decades. General Amos. STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS General Amos. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the committee: It is indeed my honor to appear before you today for the very first time as the Commandant of the Marine Corps to articulate the posture of your Corps. Today the Corps serves as America's expeditionary force in readiness, a balanced air, ground, logistics team of 202,000 Active, 39,000 Reserve, and 35,000 civilian marines. Our ability to serve as our Nation's principal crisis response force is due in large part to this committee's and Congress' continued strong support. Thank you for that. Today, there are over 32,000 marines forward-deployed around the world. As we sit here, it's half past 7 in the evening in Afghanistan. The rainy season has hit. The evenings remain cold and damp in this nation, where 20,000 of our young men and women are engaged in full-spectrum combat and counterinsurgency operations. I'm encouraged by the significant progress they have made in the Helmand Province and you have my assurance that this effort remains my top priority. Sergeant Major Kent and I spent Christmas with our marines and sailors in Afghanistan and I am happy to report that their morale is high and their belief in their mission is strong. Partnered with the U.S. Navy, we are forward deployed and forward engaged. This past year alone, our afloat forces conducted humanitarian assistance operations in Pakistan, Haiti, and the Philippines. They recaptured the pirated ship Magellan Star, rescuing its crew from Somali pirates, and partnered with allied forces in engagement missions in the Pacific Rim, Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Right now over 400 marines from the First Battalion, Second Marine Regiment, who deployed last week from Camp Lejeune, NC, within 20 hours of notification, are embarked aboard two amphibious vessels with a full complement of fixed and rotary wing assets. These marines are poised in the Mediterranean, prepared to do our Nation's bidding. Our role as America's crisis response force necessitates that we maintain a high state of readiness. You're either ready to respond to today's crisis with today's force today or you risk being late and thus irrelevant. I am keenly aware of the fiscal realities confronting our Nation. During these times of constrained resources, the Marine Corps remains committed to being the best stewards of scarce public funds. We maintain a longstanding tradition with Congress as DOD's penny-pinchers. Our institutionalized culture of frugality positions us as the best value for the defense dollar. For approximately 8.5 percent of the annual defense budget, the Marine Corps provides the Nation 31 percent of its ground operating forces, 12 percent of its fixed wing tactical aircraft, and 19 percent of its attack helicopters. This year's budget submission was framed by my four service-level priorities. We will: number one, continue to provide the best trained and equipped marines in Afghanistan; number two, rebalance our core and posture it for the future; number three, better educate and train our marines to succeed in increasingly complex environments; and lastly, number four, we will keep faith with our marines, our sailors, and our families. While these priorities will guide our long-term plan for the Marine Corps, there are pressing issues facing our Corps today that concern me, issues for which I ask Congress' continued assistance in solving. Our equipment abroad and at home stations has been heavily taxed in the nearly 10 years of constant combat operations. The price tag for reset is $10.6 billion, of which $3.1 billion has been requested in fiscal year 2011 and $2.5 billion is being sought in fiscal year 2012. The remaining $5 billion will be needed upon the completion of our mission in Afghanistan. The F-35B Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) JSF is vital to our ability to conduct expeditionary operations. Continued funding and support from Congress for this program is of utmost importance. During the next 2 years of F-35B scrutiny, I will be personally involved with the program and closely supervising it. Both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy have reaffirmed the necessity of the Marine Corps' amphibious assault mission. We must develop an affordable and capable amphibious combat vehicle to project marines from sea to land in permissive, uncertain, and in hostile environments. I ask for your continued support to reach this goal. To ensure the Marine Corps remains a relevant force with a capacity and capability to respond to the demands of future security environments, we recently conducted a detailed internally-driven force structure review. The results of this effort provide America a strategically mobile, middleweight force, optimized for forward presence, and rapid crisis response. As we look to the future, the Marine Corps is committed to finding ways to be more energy efficient. Since 2009, we have aggressively pursued energy-efficient capabilities that will make marine units more energy self-sufficient, increase our combat effectiveness, and protect the lives of our young men and women. Two weeks ago, I signed our new bases to battlefield energy planning guidance, with such goals, metrics, and a plan for implementation. Finally, I would like to comment on the impact of the current CR as it has impacted our operations and our programs. As of today, $567 million in military construction (MILCON) contracts have not been awarded. $2.4 billion of MILCON is at risk for the remainder of this year. These projects impact the lives of marines, the local economies of the communities around our bases and stations, and are projected to generate over 63,000 jobs from the Carolinas to Hawaii. If the CR extends through the entire fiscal year, 13 bachelor enlisted quarters (BEQ) totaling 5,000 affected spaces will not be built, thus stymieing our BEQ modernization efforts. These 13 BEQs will allow 8 infantry battalions to move out of 50-year-old Cold War barracks. Finally, the CR could prove catastrophic to our procurement accounts, resulting in the loss of almost one-third of our procurement budget capabilities. Lastly, you have my promise that in these challenging times ahead, the Marine Corps will only ask for what it needs, not what it might want. We will make the hard decisions before coming to Congress and we will redouble our efforts toward our traditional culture of frugality. As has been the case for over 235 years, your Marine Corps stands ready to respond whenever the Nation calls, wherever the President may direct. Once again, I thank each of you for your continued support. I'm prepared to answer your questions. [The prepared statement of General Amos follows:] Prepared Statement by Gen. James F. Amos, USMC AMERICA'S EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN READINESS The Marine Corps is America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness--a balanced air-ground-logistics team. We are forward-deployed and forward-engaged: shaping, training, deterring, and responding to all manner of crises and contingencies. We create options and decision space for our Nation's leaders. Alert and ready, we respond to today's crisis, with today's force . . . TODAY. Responsive and scalable, we team with other Services, allies and interagency partners. We enable and participate in joint and combined operations of any magnitude. A middleweight force, we are light enough to get there quickly, but heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival, and capable of operating independent of local infrastructure. We operate throughout the spectrum of threats--irregular, hybrid, conventional--or the shady areas where they overlap. Marines are ready to respond whenever the Nation calls . . . wherever the President may direct. --General James F. Amos America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness Today, your U.S. Marine Corps is foremost America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness. Established originally by an act of the Second Continental Congress on November 10, 1775, your Marine Corps has evolved over 235 years into a balanced air-ground-logistics team that is forward deployed and forward engaged: shaping, training, deterring, and responding to all manner of crises and contingencies. Through the ongoing support of Congress and the American people, your Marine Corps is a cohesive force of 202,100 Active Duty marines; 39,600 Selected Reserve marines; and 35,000 civilian marines. At any given time, approximately 30,000 marines are forward deployed in operations supporting our Nation's defense.\1\ This year, as our Nation recognizes a decade since the tragic events of September 11, your Marine Corps has been conducting Overseas Contingency Operations for an equal amount of time. From Task Force 58 with 4,400 marines launching from 6 amphibious ships to secure critical lodgments in Afghanistan in late 2001 to our counterinsurgency efforts in the Al Anbar province of Iraq and to our current operations in the Helmand River Valley of Afghanistan, your marines have been forward deployed in the Service of our Nation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ As of December 2010, there were approximately 20,700 marines in Afghanistan including marines serving in external billets (e.g. transition teams and joint/interagency support, et cetera); 6,200 at sea on Marine Expeditionary Units; and 1,600 marines engaged in various other missions, operations and exercises. The 30,000 statistic excludes over 18,000 marines assigned to garrison locations outside the continental United States such as in Europe, the Pacific, et cetera. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yet, during this time the Marine Corps has not been confined solely to major combat operations and campaigns. From our rapid response aiding fellow Americans and enabling joint and interagency relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina's floods, to our noncombatant evacuation operation of 14,000 American citizens from Lebanon in 2006, to our numerous and ongoing security cooperation missions with nations of Africa, Eastern Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Latin America, the U.S. Marine Corps continues to demonstrate the agility and flexibility expected of America's principal crisis response force. Over the course of the past year alone, your brave men and women who wear the Marine uniform and who bring a diversity of talent in service to our Nation, have simultaneously: Waged an aggressive full-spectrum counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan while concurrently increasing combat power nearly two-fold (i.e. from 10,600 to 19,400) in accordance with the President's December 2009 Afghanistan- Pakistan strategy; Successfully completed our mission in Iraq, bringing stability to Al Anbar province. This achievement was not without sacrifice and suffering in that 1,022 \2\ marines gave their lives and 8,626 marines were wounded in action; --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ 1022 deaths = 851 killed in action (hostile) and 171 deceased (non-hostile). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Partnered with allied forces in engagement missions throughout every Geographic Combatant Commander's Area of Responsibility; Conducted foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions in Pakistan, Haiti, and the Philippines; Participated in maritime security operations to ensure freedom of navigation along vital sea lines of communication, to include the recapture of the vessel Magellan Star and rescue of its crew from Somali pirates; and Rapidly reinforced U.S. Embassies in Port au Prince, Haiti; Conakry, Guinea; Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; and most recently Cairo, Egypt to assist and protect diplomatic personnel amidst crises in these foreign capitals. Their actions align with the functions of our Corps as seen in the new Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, and are a critical link to the continued prosperity and security of our Nation and the survival of our friends, allies, and partners. The performance of your marines on the global stage adds to our storied legacy of sacrifice and success--under even the most adverse conditions--inspiring a sense of pride and confidence in the American public that their marines are able to respond quickly, ensuring the Nation's interests will be protected. Future Security Environment Public law, defense policy, our doctrine and operating concepts, and the future security environment shape how we organize, train, and equip our forces. As we look ahead, we see a world of increasing instability, failed or failing states, and conflict characterized by: Poverty, unemployment, urbanization, overpopulation, and extremism; Competition for scarce natural resources; and Rapid proliferation of new technologies to include capabilities to disrupt cyber networks, advanced precision weaponry, and weapons of mass destruction. These troubling socio-economic and geopolitical trends converge in the littorals--regions along the world's coastline where the sea joins with the land. The majority of the world's population lives near the sea. The trend towards accelerated birth rates in the developing world, coupled with ongoing migration from rural to urban landscapes, results in hyper-populated coastal regions, burdened by the cumulative stressors of criminality, extremism, and violence. Littoral cities increasingly may assume what some have called feral qualities, raising the potential for conflict, providing a measure of sanctuary for our adversaries, and posing challenges to governmental sovereignty and regional security. It is in this complex environment that your U.S. Marine Corps will operate. We stand optimally postured to conduct a range of operations for Joint Force commanders, bridging the gap between operations at sea and on land. Nonetheless, we are committed to the prevention of conflict as we are to responding to it. Indeed, 21st century security challenges require expansion of global engagement--facilitated through persistent forward naval presence--to promote collective approaches to addressing common security concerns. Accordingly, forward deployed Marine forces will increasingly conduct theater security cooperation activities and will build partnership capacity through security force assistance missions with our allies and partners around the globe. The goal of our engagement initiatives is to minimize conditions for conflict and enable host nation forces to effectively address instability as it occurs. Role of the Marine Corps The United States is a maritime nation with global responsibilities. With a naval tradition as the foundation of our existence, we remain firmly partnered with the U.S. Navy. Forward deployed, we retain the ability to come from the sea rapidly to conduct missions across the range of military operations. Our persistent forward presence and multi-mission capability present an unparalleled ability to rapidly project U.S. power across the global commons--land, sea, air, space, and cyber. Amphibious forces with robust and organic logistical sustainment provide a maritime Super Power significant advantages, including the ability to overcome the tyranny of distance and to project power where there is no basing or infrastructure--a strong deterrent capability for our Nation. To Marines, `expeditionary' is a state of mind that drives the way we organize our forces, train, develop and procure equipment. By definition, our role as America's crisis response force necessitates a high state of unit readiness and an ability to sustain ourselves logistically. We must be ready to deploy today and begin operating upon arrival, even in the most austere environments. The U.S. Marine Corps affords the following three strategic advantages for our Nation: A versatile ``middleweight'' capability to respond across the range of military operations. We fill the gap in our Nation's defense as an agile force capable of operating at the high and low ends of the threat spectrum or the indistinct areas in between. An inherent speed and agility that buys time for national leaders. Our flexibility and rapid response capability present unique opportunities to develop strategic options, shape the environment, and set conditions to deploy the full capabilities of the Joint Force and other elements of national power. An enabling and partnering capability in joint and combined operations. Our unique forward posture aboard amphibious ships, manned by well-trained, uniformed sailors, positions us to be the `first to fight.' USMC Priorities My four service level priorities informed this year's budget submission. These priorities were influenced by and derived from a number of factors to include our understanding of the 21st century battlefield based on lessons learned over nearly a decade at war, our examination of the future security environment, our doctrine and operating concepts, and our current and future budgetary and programmatic requirements. These priorities are aligned with the principal recommendations of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, meeting its end state of ensuring that the Marine Corps is able to ``prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.'' My priorities also support America's four enduring strategic interests as identified in the 2010 National Security Strategy.\3\ To that end, we will: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ (1) Security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; (2) A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; (3) respect for universal values at home and around the world; and (4) an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. 2010 National Security Strategy Pg, 7. Continue to provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan; Rebalance our Corps, posture it for the future, and aggressively experiment with and implement new capabilities and organizations; Better educate and train our marines to succeed in distributed operations and increasingly complex environments; and Keep faith with our marines, our sailors, and our families. The above priorities guide my long-term plan for the Marine Corps; however, there are pressing issues facing our Corps today that give cause for concern. Equipment: Our equipment abroad and at home station has been ``heavily taxed'' in the nearly 10 years of constant combat operations. We require funding to reset equipment being utilized overseas and to reconstitute home-station equipment and modernize for the future. This is critical to maintaining readiness throughout the Corps. The Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing F-35B Joint Strike Fighter: The F-35B is vital to our ability to conduct combined arms operations in expeditionary environments. Continued funding and support from Congress for this program is of utmost importance. Amphibious Combat Vehicle: We will begin the development of an affordable and capable amphibious combat vehicle to replace the recently-cancelled Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program. The capability inherent in a ship-to- shore connector is critical to our expeditionary nature, as affirmed by the Secretary of Defense. End Strength: The drawdown of our Active component from 202,100 to 186,800 must be conditions-based, and only after completion of our mission in Afghanistan. We must keep faith with our Marine Corps family by allowing appropriate time and support for those departing the force and to ensure the resiliency of our units still engaged in war. Family Readiness Programs: Like our equipment, marines and their families have been ``heavily taxed'' since September 11. We will continue to fund family readiness and family support programs that are vital to the health and welfare of our entire Marine Corps family. Amphibious Ships: The Navy and Marine Corps have determined a minimum force of 33 ships represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship amphibious force requirement for the Assault Echelon. Marines are best postured to engage and respond to the Nation's security interests from amphibious ships. The Marine Corps needs the continued support of Congress in confronting these critical issues and the many others discussed below. My promise to Congress is that we will do our part by continuing to be good stewards of our taxpayers' dollars. Fiscal Year 2012 Budgetary Submission The Marine Corps maintains a longstanding tradition in DOD as being ``Penny Pinchers.'' A prime example of our many noteworthy cost-saving measures is our practice of units deploying to Afghanistan utilizing equipment sets maintained and repaired in country--a measure saving significant funds annually on costs associated with the cycle of deployment and redeployment. Our institutionalized culture of frugality, streamlined business practices, lean structure, and multi- mission capability, position us as the ``best value'' for the defense dollar. This fiscal year we are seeking over $40 billion \4\ to fund ongoing operations, provide quality resources for our marines, sailors, and their families, conduct reset of equipment stressed from nearly 10 years at war, and prepare our forces for future missions. For approximately 8.5 percent \5\ of the annual Defense budget, the Marine Corps provides the Nation approximately 31 percent of its ground operating forces (Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support), 12 percent of its fixed wing tactical aircraft, and 19 percent of its attack helicopters. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ This sum includes both ``Blue in Support of Green'' funding, Overseas Contingency Operation funding, and other Navy funding for USMC needs (e.g. chaplains, medical personnel, amphibious ships, et cetera.) \5\ Based on provisions of the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts for Fiscal Year 2010. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During these times of constrained resources, the Marine Corps remains committed to streamlining operations, identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings to conserve scarce public funds. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense in June 2010, the Services conducted an efficiencies review and our fiscal year 2012 budget is the result of a thorough study of all of our business activities. Already one of the most economical of the Military Services, we achieved our DOD efficiency goal. We captured overhead efficiency savings by focusing on three main efforts: Buying smarter through acquiring platforms more intelligently Streamlining our operations Being more efficient in the way we use, produce, and acquire energy This effort has had a marked impact on our overall budget, allowing us to invest more in our core warfighting missions and enhancing our acquisition plans. The efficiency initiative drove adjustments to our programs and ensured restoration of funding in areas where needed most. Additionally, we used funds realized from efficiencies to support programs originally not funded. We reinvested savings into critical warfighting programs to enhance readiness. We anticipate unit equipment readiness to increase by fiscal year 2014 through the purchase of additional equipment beginning in fiscal year 2012. This readiness increase will allow the Marine Corps to equip, train, and prepare units earlier in the pre-deployment cycle. Other expansions that we were able to address include enhancing funding for facilities with direct operational impact, energy and water investments at bases and installations, command and control and logistics programs, and equipment modernization. In addition to our frugality and aggressive pursuit of finding efficiencies to enhance our warfighting capacity inherent in our budget request, your Marine Corps remains the first and only military Service whose financial statements have been deemed audit ready. We are continually striving to be good stewards of the public trust and know the ongoing financial audit will serve to both strengthen our financial management practices and give us actionable business intelligence to support our decisionmaking process in supporting our operational forces at home, abroad, and in harm's way. PRIORITY #1: CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE BEST TRAINED AND EQUIPPED UNITS TO AFGHANISTAN Operation Enduring Freedom We have made great progress in Afghanistan; this effort remains our number one priority until we attain our national objectives. At present over 20,000 marines are deployed in Afghanistan. This mission ultimately involves almost 60,000 marines, or just under one-third of our Active-Duty Force, factoring in deployment, redeployment, training cycles and other direct support. We will continue providing forces in Afghanistan capable of full-spectrum combat and counterinsurgency operations, while balancing our capabilities to perform what the Nation will likely ask of us in the future. We will ensure that marines, sailors, and the units in which they serve, receive the best possible training and equipment to succeed in the many types of missions we are conducting in this complex, dynamic environment. Our successes within Helmand Province are paving the way for economic development and governance. Marine commanders on the ground and Afghan officials indicate that freedom of movement for the local populace has improved. Bazaars and markets are flourishing; critical infrastructure projects are underway. Today, 10 of 13 districts in Helmand Province are under the control of the Afghan central government. Daily, 135,000 children attend school, which is more than a 60 percent increase from 2008 levels. Formerly dangerous places like Marjah, Now Zad, and Garmsir, untrafficable due to improvised explosive devices just 1 year ago, now have significant activity occurring in commercial centers. Yet, other challenges remain as we now seek to capitalize on our 2010 successes. We are currently expanding battle- space northward into other hostile locations such as the district of Sangin, where our forces are going ``head-to-head'' with Taliban resistance. As America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness, we are ready to execute any mission assigned in support of crisis and contingency response. In addition to our Afghanistan commitment, we continue to source forward-based and deployed forces to meet Geographic Combatant Commander requirements. In light of our operational demands, and through the support of Congress in authorizing our end strength of 202,100 Active-Duty Forces, our combat units are beginning to realize an approximate 1:2 dwell time.\6\ Other units vary at more favorable dwell-time levels depending on their mission. We anticipate the 1:2 dwell ratio for combat units to remain relatively stable provided current deployed force levels are not increased; however, increased operational demands in Afghanistan or elsewhere may result in dwell times inconsistent with fostering a resilient Total Force. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Infantry battalions will continue to remain just below 1:2 dwell time due to relief in place/transfer of authority requirements. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some marines in select military occupational specialties continue to fall into what is known as a high-demand, low-density status. This is a key indicator that the combat demand for Marines with these skills does not match, or exceeds, the current manpower requirement and/or inventory. In addition, there are currently 14 of 211 occupational specialties where the on-hand number of marines is less than 90 percent of what is required.\7\ Our recently completed force structure review addressed all these concerns. We are working actively to recruit, promote, and retain the right number of Marines in the right occupational specialties thus promoting resiliency of our Total Force. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Our most stressed occupational specialties based on percentage of marines beyond a 1:2 dwell are: (1) Geographic Intelligence Specialist, (2) Imaging Analyst/Specialists, (3) Signals Collection Operator/Analyst, (4) Unmanned Aerial Systems Operator/Mechanic, and (5) European, Middle East, and Asia-Pacific Cryptologic Linguists. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Training for Full Spectrum Counterinsurgency Operations Our comprehensive training program conducted at our premiere desert training base in Twentynine Palms, CA, has been credited by leaders throughout the Corps with providing a dynamic environment that replicates the many tasks, challenges, and requirements required of units in a counterinsurgency setting. Our newly-instituted Infantry Immersion Trainers are realistic, reconfigurable, and provide comprehensive training environments that develop small unit tactics and individual skills for deploying infantry squads. The Infantry Immersion Trainer supports essential training such as control of supporting arms, language, improvised explosive device recognition and defeat measures, human terrain understanding and close quarters battle. Introducing battlefield effects simulators, culturally appropriate role players, and interactive avatars at the Infantry Immersive Trainers teaches marines to make legally, morally, ethically, and tactically sound decisions under situations of great stress. It also contributes to reducing the effects of combat stress. I view this training program to be of vital importance to our Operating Forces. Equipping for the Afghan Effort Marine units are operating in Afghanistan with high rates of ground equipment readiness. Through the generosity of Congress, we have received funds for the rapid fielding of urgent need items in support of our Afghanistan effort. The Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicle program continues to meet urgent requirements while we actively pursue vehicle upgrades to outpace emerging threats, enhance mobility, and improve vehicle performance. We can accomplish this goal through engineering changes and capability insertions in current production, planned orders, and fielded vehicles. We have a requirement for 3,362 vehicles in the family of MRAP vehicles, including 1,454 MRAP All- Terrain Vehicles. To date, we have fielded 1,214 MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles to our units in Afghanistan and have met the theater requirement. To date, we have fielded 34 Assault Breacher Vehicles, 5 of which are in Afghanistan, to enhance the mobility of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). We plan to field a total of 52 Assault Breacher Vehicles. Production of the remaining 18 vehicles remains on schedule and is fully funded with final delivery scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 2012. In our continuing efforts to find improvised explosive devices by all possible means, we are tripling our successful Improvised Explosive Device Dog Detection program and are also undertaking a research and development effort to train dogs with improved detection capabilities with fielding expected this fall. This year, we will have fielded 647 specially trained Labrador retrievers who work off-leash, supporting our infantry units in ground combat operations. We also have fielded a wide array of intelligence collection sensors and analytic and processing systems to include the Multimedia Archival Analysis System, the Ground Based Observational Surveillance System, the Tactical Remote Sensor System, the Communication Emitter Sensing and Attacking System, and improvements to the Tactical Exploitation Group, to name a few. Lastly, in December 2010, we deployed a reinforced company of 17 M1A1 Main Battle Tanks to join our efforts in Regional Command SouthWest to provide increased force protection and firepower. Today, these tanks are fully integrated with our forces operating in our most highly-contested regions, and are rapidly proving their utility in this environment by enabling our marines to increase operational tempo. They also demonstrate the commitment of Coalition Forces to the security of Southern Afghanistan. PRIORITY #2: REBALANCE THE CORPS, POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE, AND AGGRESSIVELY EXPERIMENT WITH AND IMPLEMENT NEW CAPABILITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS Posture for the Future and Force Structure Review The Marine Corps has deployed MAGTFs in support of irregular warfare missions such as our counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in Pakistan, Haiti, and the Philippines, and engagement missions such as our theater security cooperation exercises in support of every Geographic Combatant Commander. Despite these and many other operational successes over the past decade, new challenges await us requiring the same spirit of innovation and institutional flexibility that have been the bedrock of our Corps for 235 years. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review highlights an expanding need over the next two decades for military forces skilled at countering irregular threats,\8\ and the 2010 National Security Strategy signals a need for increased engagement activities. Both of these thrusts necessitate marines who are not only fighters, but also trainers, mentors, and advisors. The 2011 National Military Strategy advances the idea that ``strengthening international and regional security requires that our forces be globally available, yet regionally focused.'' \9\ Likewise, Geographic Combatant Commanders have continued to register their growing need for forward-postured amphibious forces capable of conducting security cooperation, regional deterrence, and crisis response.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ ``The wars we are fighting today and assessments of the future security environment together demand that the United States retain and enhance a whole-of-government capability to succeed in large-scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations in environments ranging from densely populated urban areas and mega- cities, to remote mountains, deserts, jungles, and littoral regions.'' 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Pg. 20. \9\ 2011 National Military Strategy of the United States, pg. 10. \10\ In the past 20 years, U.S. amphibious forces have responded to crises and contingencies 114 times--a response rate double that during the Cold War. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This past fall, we conducted a detailed force structure review to develop the optimum mix of capabilities for our role as America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness in the post-Afghanistan security environment. The force structure review addressed 21st century challenges confronting our Nation and its Marine Corps, aiming to build on our historic role as the Nation's crisis response force. The review sought to provide the ``best value'' in terms of capability, cost, and readiness relative to the operational requirements of our forward- engaged Geographic Combatant Commanders. The results of that effort provide for a strategically mobile, ``middleweight'' force optimized for forward-presence and rapid crisis response. We will be light enough to leverage the flexibility and capacity of amphibious ships, yet heavy enough to accomplish the mission when we get there. Sea-based forces, in particular, will be invaluable for discreet engagement activities, rapid crisis response, and sustainable power projection. Our review also aimed for a force structure that provides capability and capacity across the range of military operations, while simultaneously providing for resiliency in our Total Force. With likely reductions in forward basing and strategic transportation, the importance of regionally-focused headquarters and forces, both forward- postured and immediately deployable with a minimum of strategic lift, is paramount. We have thus built a Joint Task Force-capable headquarters at several Geographic Combatant Command locations. As we aim to implement signature outcomes of the force structure review, marines on a day-to-day basis will be forward-deployed and engaged, working closely with our joint and allied partners. When crises or contingencies arise, these same marines will respond--locally, regionally, or globally if necessary--to accomplish whatever mission the Nation asks of us. To best meet Geographic Combatant Commander needs and ensure optimal configuration as America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness, we require Congressional support to reset our equipment, develop new organizational structures, and begin implementing initiatives from our force structure review. These measures ultimately will improve our ability to function within the Joint Force, execute distributed operations, command and control in complex environments, and conduct persistent engagement missions. As we are entrusted with the resources and funding to posture ourselves for the future, we will continue to conduct responsible examination required of a disciplined force to ensure that we implement every refinement--from the smallest to the most sweeping--in a manner that provides the Nation with a lean force, capable of rapidly projecting the Nation's power and strategic influence. EQUIPPING Reset of the Total Force. Resetting the Marine Corps for the future after nearly a decade at war is my number one equipping priority. This past year, we completed our mission in Iraq, effecting the retrograde of more than 25,000 marines,\11\ 382,000 items of equipment, 10,800 short tons of aviation support equipment, and nearly 11,000 containers from Al Anbar province via Jordan and Kuwait to the U.S. and elsewhere. This drawdown of equipment over the course of 1 year was a significant logistical and operational achievement. We also accomplished the rapid shift of critical equipment from Iraq to Afghanistan in support of the deployment of the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This shift of materiel within a theater of operation became one of the largest redeployments in U.S. history, both in terms of equipment moved and distances involved. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ At present, approximately 100 marines remain in Iraq serving in individual augment, transition team and other miscellaneous billets. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Marine Corps is currently sourcing highly-trained and ready forces to meet global combatant commander requirements. Approximately 98 percent of deployed units report the highest levels of readiness for their assigned mission. However, high deployed-unit readiness has come at the expense of home-station, nondeployed units, which have sourced organic equipment and personnel to meet the needs of our deployed forces. Approximately 68 percent of nondeployed units report degraded levels of readiness. The largest contributing factor is equipment; approximately 37 percent of nondeployed forces report degraded levels of equipment supply. This lack of equipment impacts the ability of nondeployed forces to respond rapidly to other potential contingencies and represents lost core training opportunities early in the deployment cycle in preparation for Overseas Contingency Operations. The equipment redeployed from Iraq to Afghanistan in support of the 2009 surge included most of our deployed medium tactical fleet, the majority of our fleet of MRAP vehicles, light armored reconnaissance vehicles, other hard-to-move equipment, and theater-specific items. While shifting this equipment directly to Afghanistan enabled the Marine Corps to meet critical operational timelines, it resulted in the deferment of previously-planned post-Operation Iraqi Freedom reset actions. These same assets comprise a significant portion of the Marine Corps' total reset liability and depot maintenance costs. Thus, a consequence of delaying reset actions on this equipment is the acceptance of considerable risk in the long-term readiness and future availability of our ground equipment. In addition, increased usage rates of our ground equipment and harsh operating environments over these many years at war have resulted in our ground equipment far exceeding planned peacetime usage rates by a factor of six. It is vital that we reset our equipment from nearly 10 years at war to maintain the necessary levels of readiness to posture ourselves for the future. We estimate the cost of reset for the Marine Corps to be $10.6 billion. $3.1 billion has been requested in fiscal year 2011 to reduce this liability, leaving a $7.5 billion deficit. $5 billion of the $7.5 billion reset liability will be incurred upon termination of the conflict in Afghanistan. (Note: $2.5 billion has been requested for reset in fiscal year 2012. These estimates assume no reset generation beyond fiscal year 2012 and thus do not include any reset requirements for fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014.) This funding will support the depot-level maintenance of our Operation Enduring Freedom equipment, procurement of combat vehicles and major weapons systems, engineering equipment, ammunition expenditures, and combat losses. The reset estimate is based on current circumstances and will change as operational requirements are re- evaluated. Moreover, as long as the war continues, our costs for reset will grow accordingly. Reconstitution of Equipment Our experiences in combat operations over the past decade have shown us that our legacy 20th century tables of equipment are inadequate with regard to the demands of the modern battlefield. As we move towards finalizing our force structure review by conducting a thorough Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities assessment, we will finalize determination on the costs associated with modernization of equipment sets necessary to support our future operations. However, at this time, our initial estimate of reconstituting our tables of equipment is $5 billion, which is an amount entirely separate from our reset costs. We have begun to address our reconstitution shortfall by requesting $253 million in fiscal year 2012 for equipment procurement. As our force structure review is implemented, we will continue with deliberate assessments of the modernization requirements for equipment that optimizes our post-Afghanistan posture while simultaneously reinforcing our frugal and responsible roots. Our Service Reconstitution Equipment Strategy will guide the identification of emerging requirements for refining the capabilities of our status as a middleweight force, our support to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, our service level prioritization, and resource allocation. Marine Aviation We are transitioning our entire inventory of fixed and rotary wing aircraft to support our future force and require ongoing support from Congress for this comprehensive aviation modernization effort. The continued development and fielding of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B Joint Strike Fighter remains the centerpiece of this effort. The capability inherent in a STOVL jet facilitates our maneuver warfare doctrine and fills our need for close air support in the many austere conditions and locations where we will likely operate in the future. Around the world, there are 10 times as many 3,000-foot runways capable of handling a STOVL jet as there are 8,000-foot runways required of conventional fighter aircraft. Additionally, we maintain the organic ability to build an expeditionary 3,000-foot runway in a matter of days in support of aviation operations. The capabilities of the STOVL F-35B enable the Marine Corps to replace three legacy aircraft types--F/A-18, EA-6B, and AV-8B--which once fielded will save DOD approximately $1 billion per year in operations and maintenance costs. The F-35B program has made significant progress to date including 22 successful vertical landings so far this year which is more than double that achieved all last year. I am confident that we will field this aircraft in accordance with responsible timelines. This matter has my unwavering attention, and I am personally overseeing this program. With a fully-fielded fleet of F-35Bs, the Nation will maintain 22 capital ships--11 carrier and 11 amphibious assault--with fifth generation strike assets aboard--a significant deterrent and response capability for our Nation. Our legacy aircraft supporting operational missions are consuming service life at a rate up to three times faster than scheduled. Averaged across our complete fleet, we are consuming aircraft service life at a rate 1.85 times faster than planned. This reality results in compressed timelines between re-work events and in earlier retirement of aircraft than originally programmed. The majority of our legacy platforms are nearing the end of their service lives, and most production lines are closed. New aircraft with low average ages and robust service life projections are the future of our aviation force and its support of Marine Corps and joint operations. As we transition to these new capabilities, we are mindful of the need to ensure a fully-integrated and networked force to provide Marine aviation to the MAGTF and the Joint Force. We are exploring the viability of transformational platforms such as the Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System. The Cargo UAS will facilitate the delivery of logistics to remote locations when weather or threat systems preclude manned aviation sorties or overland resupply convoys. Our new aircraft will provide increased range, speed, standoff, time on station, lift capability, and will be critical to tomorrow's MAGTF. By 2020, we will transition more than 50 percent of our aviation squadrons to new aircraft and complete fielding of the tilt-rotor MV-22 Osprey assault support aircraft and the upgraded UH-1Y Huey utility helicopter. We will field new close air support platforms such as the AH-1Z attack helicopter and the STOVL F-35B. We also will have new platforms for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and an entirely new family of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Lastly, we will introduce greater lifting power to the MAGTF with a new model of the heavy-lift CH-53 cargo helicopter. Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy The priority for our Ground Combat Element is our ship-to-shore tactical mobility. The seamless transition of our Operating Forces from the sea to conduct sustained operations ashore, in particular to support three balanced Marine Expeditionary Brigades (i.e. two sea- based Joint Forcible Entry Marine Expeditionary Brigades reinforced by a third Maritime Prepositioning Force-based Marine Expeditionary Brigade) as well as for conducting irregular warfare missions, necessitates an appropriate mix of ground combat vehicles. We are focusing our efforts on developing and fielding a family of vehicles with a balance of performance, protection, payload, transportability, fuel efficiency, and affordability that supports the rapid concentration and dispersion of combat power, supports strategic deployment concepts and meets our worldwide operational commitments. Our Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy is currently in its third phase of development. Its overall goal is to field a ground combat vehicle portfolio structured to support the ground combat element. Vehicles in this portfolio include the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the Marine Personnel Carrier, and a new amphibious combat vehicle. In the complex future security environment, the execution of amphibious operations requires the use of the sea as maneuver space. An amphibious combat vehicle is essential to our ability to conduct surface littoral maneuver and seamlessly project ready-to-fight Marine units from sea to land in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. As the Secretary of Defense affirmed earlier this year, the cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is by no means a rejection of the Marine Corps amphibious assault mission. The standing, validated requirement for, and development of, an amphibious combat vehicle will ensure we continue to develop the right platform--at the right price--to support rapid ship-to-shore movement. To that end, we are now pursuing an integrated new vehicle program with three components, crafted from inception for affordability and leveraging the investment made in the EFV. We intend to mitigate risks associated with a new vehicle program and to maximize value by use of an integrated acquisition portfolio approach. This approach will have three synchronized efforts: Acceleration of the procurement of Marine Personnel Carriers Investment in a service life extension program and upgrades for a portion of the existing amphibious assault vehicles Development of a new amphibious combat vehicle We intend to manage these complementary capabilities, requirements and acquisitions from a portfolio perspective. NAVY SUPPORT The Navy Marine Corps Team. As part of the Joint Force, the Marine Corps and the Navy partner to leverage the significant advantages provided by amphibious forces--a point reinforced by joint doctrine.\12\ The Navy and Marine Corps team will be postured and engaged forward to be most operationally relevant to the needs of our Nation. Together, we provide the capability for massing potent forces close to a foreign shore while maintain a diplomatically sensitive profile. When needed, we are able to project this power ashore across the range of military operations at a time of our Nation's choosing, collectively demonstrating the essence of naval deterrence. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ ``Timely response to crisis situations is critical to U.S. deterrent and warfighting capabilities. The timeliness of U.S. response is a function of U.S. forward deployed forces and prepositioned forces with adequate organic movement capability . . . .'' Joint Publication 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, 7 May 2007, pg I-8. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Amphibious Shipping The Marine Corps' requirement to deploy globally, rapidly respond regionally, and train locally necessitates a combination of tactical airlift, high-speed vessels, amphibious ships, maritime preposition shipping, organic tactical aviation, and strategic airlift. The inherent flexibility and utility of amphibious ships is not widely understood, as evidenced by the frequent--and erroneous--assumption that ``forcible entry capabilities'' alone define the requirement for amphibious ships. The same capabilities that allow an amphibious task force to deliver and support a landing force on a hostile shore enables it to support forward engagement and crisis response. In fact the most frequent employment of amphibious forces is for steady state engagement and crisis response. The Geographic Combatant Commanders have increased demand for forward-postured amphibious forces capable of conducting security cooperation, regional deterrence, and crisis response reflecting the operational value of amphibious forces for missions across the range of military operations.\13\ In an era of declining access and strategic uncertainty, I anticipate that this upward demand trend will continue. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ Since September 11, U.S. amphibious forces have responded to crises and contingencies at least 50 times, a response rate more than double that of the Cold War. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Our principal contribution to U.S. Global Defense Posture is our ``rotationally responsive'' forces aboard amphibious ships. These forces combine the advantages of an immediate, yet temporary, presence, graduated visibility, and tailored, scalable force packages structured around the MAGTF. Rotational Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units forward deployed in three Geographic Combatant Command areas of responsibility, not only provide the capability for crisis response, but also present a means for day-to-day engagement with partner nations. Rotational forces also offer additional flexibility for decisionmakers in the event that forces are required to rapidly re-deploy across divergent regions and conflicts. In January 2009, the Navy and Marine Corps agreed that the force structure requirement to support a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade lift is 38 total amphibious assault ships. In light of the fiscal constraints, the Department of the Navy agreed to sustain a minimum of 33 total amphibious ships in the assault echelon. This number gives a capability needed for steady state operations and represents the minimum number of ships needed to provide the Nation with a sea based power projection capability for full spectrum amphibious operations-- including the amphibious assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. The Marine Corps is committed to the spiral development of the America Class LHA (R), which is 27 percent complete. We expect the Navy to take delivery of LHA-6 in fiscal year 2014 with availability to deploy beginning in fiscal year 2017. In terms of LHA-7, we anticipate the contract award in late fiscal year 2011 with fabrication commencing the following year. These two ships are maximized for aviation, and I believe it is essential that a well-deck be reintroduced in LHA-8 as currently planned. The ongoing procurement and commissioning of the final two of our planned 11 San Antonio-class LPD-17 ``Common Hull Forms'' is critical to providing the lift capacities and operational capabilities to support the full range of military operations up to and including forcible entry. Maritime Prepositioning Assets The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) program exists to enable the rapid deployment and engagement of a Marine Air Ground Task Force anywhere in the world in support of our National Military Strategy. The current MPF, which has been employed 55 times since 1985, is composed of a fleet of 16 ships divided into 3 Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons located in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia), and Pacific Ocean (Guam and Saipan). With the restructure of the Maritime Prepositioning Force-Future, the Marine Corps and Navy have focused on an interim solution to enhance current MPF with three new ships to enable future sea-basing concepts. The addition of three Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP) and three T-AKE auxiliary dry cargo ships to the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons, coupled with existing Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-On, Roll-Off (LMSR) cargo ships, will enable the MPS squadrons to conduct at-sea, sea-state three, selective offload of vehicles, personnel, and equipment without complete reliance on fixed ports ashore. The introduction of MLPs, T- AKEs, and LMSRs provide the Navy and Marine Corps team a substantial step in enhancing our current sea-basing capabilities. The Department of the Navy is currently funding the full MPF program of 16 ships through fiscal year 2012; however, the DoN POM-13 places one Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (6 ships) in a Reduced Operational Status beginning in fiscal year 2013. We will continue to optimize the MPF program to remain responsive and relevant to Geographic Combatant Commander requirements. Naval Surface Fire Support The Marine Corps has an enduring requirement for fire support from naval vessels in the range of 41-63 nautical miles to support amphibious operations in the littorals. These fires are needed by tactical commanders to maneuver towards battlefield objectives once ashore, contributing to joint doctrine for assured access. They serve as a component of the balanced and complementary joint triad of fires. Yet, unlike tactical aviation and ground fire systems, naval surface fires are unique and vital for their volume, lethality, accuracy, and all-weather capability. Planned reductions in the procurement of certain naval ships along with cancellation of specific weapons programs over the past few years have led to a deficiency in systems available for naval surface fires. Completed in 2009, the Joint Expeditionary Fires Analysis of Alternatives identified the optimum U.S. Navy programs to support Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements. This study established the baseline capabilities of the current naval surface fire support program of record (13nm projectile of the 5-inch gun and the Advance Gun System of the DDG-1000) to be insufficient in mitigating fire support gaps. The study determined that extended range 5-inch munitions would serve as a complementary alternative to the three DDG- 1000s. Dramatic improvements in 5-inch projectiles can extend the naval surface fire support maximum range, across the 106 guns in the surface fleet, from 13 to 52 nautical miles with precision, high angle attack for use in operations in urban terrain, and potential effectiveness against moving targets. We also support ongoing research and development of transformational technologies like the electromagnetic rail gun with its potential to revolutionize the reach, coverage, and responsiveness of ship-based naval gunfire to ranges in excess of 200 nautical miles. Assured Access We remain vigilant of burgeoning anti-access/area denial threats proliferating around the globe, particularly in the Pacific Rim. The family of guided rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles and subsurface systems like mines and quiet submarines, pose a challenge to the power projection capability of seaborne expeditionary forces and threatens DOD's ability to prevent and deter conflicts and prepare for a wide range of contingencies. Marine Air Ground Task Forces ashore and aboard amphibious shipping will support operations to ensure the freedom of action of U.S. and Allied forces by establishing expeditionary bases and airfields or defending advance bases. Marine Short Take-off and Vertical Landing aviation assets will be of particular value in overcoming adversary anti-access and area denial capabilities since they can operate from short or degraded airfields, can be rapidly dispersed, and can utilize both large carriers and amphibious ships for attack, maintenance, force protection, and dispersal purposes. The Joint Force Commander can leverage these unique capabilities to ensure the sea control necessary for the conduct of subsequent joint operations, whether they be power projection, forcible entry, or freedom of navigation. In this regard, we are partnered with the joint community to develop an overarching concept to attain operational access. This year, we will employ our wargaming capability in Expeditionary Warrior 2011 to examine operations designed to overcome anti-access challenges. We are partners with the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force in the development of the Air-Sea Battle Concept aimed at integrating capabilities to defeat these advanced weapon systems in maritime areas of strategic interest. We also continue to participate in the U.S. Army's Joint Forcible Entry Warfighting Experiment, examining capabilities to conduct airborne and amphibious forcible entry operations. PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATONAL INITIATIVES People. Today's Marine Corps represents less than 1/10 of 1 percent of the U.S. population, and the individual Marine remains our most valuable asset. Our 202,100 Active Duty and 39,600 Selected Reserve end strength allow us to meet current operational commitments while promoting resiliency throughout our Total Force. In fiscal year 2010 Marine Corps Recruiting Command accessed 1,703 officers (100.18 percent of the 1,700 officer goal). Our fiscal year 2011 accession mission is 1,650 active duty officer accessions with the same goal projected in fiscal year 2012. In terms of enlisted accessions, we are exceeding our internal quality standards of 95 percent enlisted recruits entering the Marine Corps possessing a high school diploma and 63 percent qualifying in the DOD I-IIIA mental group categories (DOD quality standards are 90 percent and 60 percent respectively). We will achieve our mission of 31,500 enlisted Active component non-prior service recruits in fiscal year 2011. Enlistment Bonuses remain vital to meeting the continuing requirement for high demand skills. We are continuing to experience unprecedented retention in both first-term and career marines. We will continue to shape our Total Force to provide the ideal grade and military occupational specialty mix needed for sustainment. Our force structure review developed ways to increase unit readiness within our operating forces to ensure 99 percent manning of enlisted billets and 95 percent manning of officer billets. At the close of the Future Years Defense Program, we will work with the Secretary of Defense on a responsible drawdown of our end strength that is aligned with the future mission demands of a post-Operation Enduring Freedom security environment. I am determined to ``keep faith'' with our marines and their families by designing and executing a responsible drawdown from our current 202,100 end strength such that we avoid reduction-in-force actions and early retirement boards. The Marine Corps is committed to making concerted efforts to attract, mentor, and retain the most talented men and women who bring a diversity of background, culture and skill in service to our Nation. Our diversity effort is structured with the understanding that the objective of diversity is not merely to achieve representational parity, but to raise total capability through leveraging the strengths and talents of each and every marine. The success of our pioneering Female Engagement Team program in Afghanistan, which is an offshoot of a similar effort we employed in Iraq, is one way that the Marine Corps utilizes diversity within our ranks for operational benefit. We are currently developing a comprehensive, Service-wide strategy on diversity, an effort facilitated through our standing Diversity Review Board and a Diversity Executive Steering Committee chartered to establish the foundations for diversity success in the Total Force. The Marine Corps has established minority officer recruiting and mentoring as the highest priority in our recruiting efforts. Along with the other Services, we have provided timely input to the congressionally- sanctioned Military Leadership Diversity Commission and look forward to release of the Commission's final report scheduled for March 2011. Marine Air Ground Task Force Enhancements To further posture ourselves for the future, we are evaluating the internal workings of our MAGTFs to account for the distributed operations, decentralized command and control, dispersed forces and diffuse threats inherent on the modern battlefield. We are implementing a diverse suite of command and control systems within all elements of the MAGTF. We continue to work to build the capacity of new organizations like the Marine Corps Information Operations Center to achieve non-lethal effects in today's irregular and complex environments. We are ensuring the rapid analysis, fusion, and dissemination of intelligence down to the tactical level by continuing implementation of the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise. We also aim to reorganize our intelligence collection and exploitation capabilities, increasing the ratio of resources to users. We will also capitalize on the capabilities of unmanned aircraft systems via an increase in capacity. We are developing regionally-focused Marine Expeditionary Brigade command elements that are joint task force capable, with habitually aligned subordinate elements, to improve Geographic Combatant Commander effectiveness and speed of response. We have recently stood up one such element in Bahrain in support of U.S. Central Command. To better standardize operations and training for units and staff in our ground combat element, we established the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group, which reached full operational capability in May 2010. Among other measures, this organization's mission is to support the refinement of our doctrine, including how our infantry companies will fight in the future. Building on the successes of the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group for the ground combat element, we are also developing and establishing a Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group capability for the Logistics Combat Element along with reorganizing Marine Logistics Groups to establish standing Combat Logistics Battalions habitually aligned to specific Marine Expeditionary Units and infantry regiments. Over the past decade, we have become more reliant on equipment sets resulting from the emergence of new threats, perhaps most notably the improvised explosive device. This trend has resulted in the acquisition of some resources that are incompatible with the ethos of an agile, expeditionary force. To that end, we have begun an effort known as ``Lightening the MAGTF,'' a measure aimed at reducing the size, weight, and energy expenditure of our forces from the individual rifleman to wholesale components of the MAGTF. Sustained combat operations and worldwide theater security cooperation and training commitments over the last decade point towards an essential requirement for the Marine Corps Reserve to continue focusing at the operational, rather than strategic level of warfare. Since September 11, our Marine Corps Reserve has engaged continuously in combat operations as well as in regional security cooperation and crisis prevention activities in support of the Geographical Combatant Commanders. This operational tempo has built a momentum among our warfighters and a depth of experience throughout the ranks that is unprecedented in generations of Marine Corps reservists. In fact, today's Marine Corps Reserve is more highly trained, capable, and battle-tested than at any time since the Korean War. The transition in utilization of the Marine Corps Reserve from a strategic to operational Reserve, as affirmed by our force structure review, expands our ability to perform as America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness. Sharing the culture of deployment and expeditionary mindset that has dominated Marine Corps culture, ethos and thinking since our beginning more than 2 centuries ago, the Marine Corps Reserve is optimally organized, equipped, and trained to perform as an Operational Reserve. Institutions for Irregular Warfare Irregular operations (e.g. Counterinsurgency, Stability Operations, Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare and Counterterrorism) often occur in response to crisis and are executed in austere conditions--situations often entailing employment of marines. Our experiences countering irregular threats in ``Small Wars'' is a result of responding to complex crises involving a mix of security, economic, political, and social issues--usually under austere physical conditions. Our approach to irregular warfare is based on the understanding that people, ideas and organizations--not platforms and advanced technology--are the keys to success in operating in complex and irregular warfare environments. Naval forces conducting theater security operations and security force assistance to build partnership capacity also provide the Nation the potential for immediate crisis response capability and options for escalation or de-escalation. Building on our lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are developing options to re-organize, consolidate, and strengthen our institutions that emphasize our irregular warfare and multi-mission capability such as the Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning, the Security Cooperation Training and Education Center, and the Center for Irregular Warfare. The objective is to gain unity of effort, increase effectiveness and efficiency, and reduce redundant capacity. We established the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) within the past 5 years to train, equip, and deploy Marines for Security Force Assistance missions in support of Geographic Combatant Commander theater security cooperation plans. The MCTAG provides conventional training and advisor support to Host Nation Security Forces. This organization also offers planning assistance to Marine regional component commands in developing and executing partner nation training programs. The MCTAG is scheduled to reach full operating capability in September 2011 and to date has directly trained more than 180 marines and sailors and assisted in the training of more than 600 marines and sailors, who themselves have conducted in excess of 150 deployments to more than 50 countries worldwide. The MCTAG has also developed programs of instruction to train joint service advisors/ trainers deploying on theater security cooperation missions as well as programs of instruction to train light infantry battalions from the Republic of Georgia in executing combat operations in Afghanistan. Because the Marine Corps functions in an integrated fashion throughout all traditional domains--land, sea, air, and space--it is a logical step forward for us to be optimally organized, trained and equipped to operate synergistically on the modern battlefield, which now includes the cyber domain. As U.S. Cyber Command matures and sponsors initiatives to increase cyber operational capacity, we are taking deliberate steps to build additional Marine Corps cyber capability and capacity to meet joint and service-level demands. We see the continued development of organic cyber capabilities, capacities, and awareness as a critical element to retain speed, precision, and lethality across the entire spectrum of operations. We are working to incorporate scenarios into our exercises to increase opportunities for marines to leverage cyber capabilities while also training marines to operate where cyber-enabled warfighting capability may be degraded and/or contested. Additionally, we are integrating tailored cyber education into our officer and enlisted professional education programs. We are continuing to examine our options for recruiting, training and retaining our cyber workforce. This is especially challenging given the highly specialized skill sets and the competition for such in both the Federal and Private sectors. Formed in 2006, Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is currently conducting an internal reorganization into three mirrored battalions. Upon completion of this reorganization in fiscal year 2014, MARSOC will have one regiment consisting of 3 battalions, 12 companies, and 48 Marine Special Operations Teams. Since December 2009, MARSOC has maintained an enduring battalion-level Special Operations Task Force headquarters and 2 companies in Afghanistan along with persistent Marine Special Operations Team engagements in other high priority regions. Since its inception, the Marine Corps has resourced MARSOC with significant investments in military construction for training facilities, barracks and headquarters. In the near term, MARSOC will have 2,678 personnel. Our force structure review recently evaluated ways to increase the number of combat support and combat service support marines (e.g. logisticians, intelligence personnel, et cetera) enabling MARSOC's operations. I intend to add 1,001 marines to MARSOC, which will increase its capacity by 44 percent. These marines, who are above and beyond the planned fiscal year 2014 personnel increase, will better enable it for effective special operations. The Marine Corps serves as the DOD Non-Lethal Weapons Executive Agent responsible for developing program recommendations and stimulating non-lethal weapons requirements. Non-lethal effects are part of the DOD portfolio of capabilities that enhance the Joint Force Commander's ability to act in a timely manner to detect, deter, prevent, defeat, or, if necessary, mitigate the effects of an attack. Non-lethal capabilities provide the Joint Force the ability to selectively target hostile threats, covered or concealed by civilian assets, while avoiding collateral damage. Geographic Combatant Commands are registering increased demand for non-lethal weapons options to include items such as arresting nets, dazzler lasers, acoustic hailing devices, electric stun guns, blunt impact munitions, and non-lethal warning munitions. The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program continues to support joint and combined non-lethal weapons research, development, training and exercises in support of all Geographic Combatant Commands. Expeditionary Energy The Marine Corps is leading the development of expeditionary energy solutions for DOD and the Department of the Navy--reducing energy demand in our platforms and systems, increasing the use of renewable energy, and instilling an ethos of energy and water efficiency in every marine. Our priority is force protection--saving lives by reducing the number of marines at risk on the road hauling fuel and water. We also aim to help marines travel lighter and move faster through the reduction in size and amount of equipment and the dependence on bulk supplies. In February 2011, we issued a ``Bases to Battlefield'' Expeditionary Energy Strategy Implementation Planning Guidance, which sets goals, performance metrics, and a plan for implementation by 2025. This strategy supports congressional and Department of the Navy goals to increase energy security through the use of alternative fuels and energy efficiency. Since 2009 we have aggressively pursued renewable energy and energy efficient capabilities that will make Marine units more energy self-sufficient, and ultimately increase our combat effectiveness. Within a year, we stood up an Experimental Forward Operating Base, sourced commercial and government technologies, trained an infantry company with renewable energy technology, and deployed them to Afghanistan in the winter of 2010 where they operated two patrol bases entirely on renewable energy. As a result, our forces required less fuel and batteries, reducing risk to marines and saving money. This year, the Experimental Forward Operating Base will focus on the requirements of a major battlefield energy user--the Command Operations Center and the Command Element--and will evaluate a second round of energy technologies to support expeditionary operations. In fiscal year 2012 we are devoting more resources--in current programs and new areas--to build a foundation to achieve our goals for increased energy efficiency and renewable energy by 2025. As a starting point, we anticipate savings of petroleum over the Future Years Defense Program in our Overseas Contingency Operations of 100,000 to 150,000 barrels. For example this year, we are procuring mobile electric power sources to achieve 17 percent fuel efficiency using U.S. Army-funded development and Marine Corps-funded procurement monies. We are also fielding Enhanced Efficiency Environmental Control Units to achieve 15- 30 percent power efficiency improvements. Installation Energy We are also devoting more resources to our Energy Investment Program than ever before. These funds will be used to implement the results of recent and ongoing energy audits at our installations; install more efficient systems and reduce overall energy consumption. Additionally, new facilities will continue to incorporate the latest energy sustainability and efficiency features. This effort aboard our installations complements our Corps-wide initiative to develop an energy ethos and culture of conservation. TRAINING Training MAGTFs. We are utilizing our Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan as a roadmap to strengthen and maintain our core competencies and to ensure we remain America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness well into the future. This effort also will also help synchronize our Service level security cooperation activities in support of national strategy and guide the type of training and exercises we must conduct, in particular at the Marine Expeditionary Brigade level. Our amphibious core competency figures prominently in our Service Campaign Plan, and as a result we have undertaken an array of exercise planning in this critical skill area. We will soon be conducting a MAGTF large scale exercise that will refine our capability to conduct amphibious power projection and sustained operations ashore in a joint and interagency environment. In late-2010 we conducted Exercise Bold Alligator 2011, the first large-scale amphibious training exercise with the Navy on the east coast in almost 10 years. This synthetic training event practiced planning for forcible entry operations against conventional and asymmetric threats and a large scale non-combatant evacuation operation. We will take lessons learned from this exercise and build upon them for the next iteration of this important exercise with the U.S. Navy scheduled in the coming year. We are reviewing the core functions of our organizations and, where appropriate, adding irregular warfare capabilities to reflect the full spectrum of possible employment options as a core task set for the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. We view integration with other government agencies and coordination with nongovernment organizations as essential to our success in irregular warfare and have significantly increased interagency participation in numerous exercises and training venues such as Expeditionary Warrior-09/10, Emerald Express, Joint Urban Warrior-09, and Joint Irregular Warrior-10. We aim to capitalize on our current theater security cooperation and partnership capacity building activities with our allies and partners in all operational environments providing our national leaders with strategic options to shape outcomes, prevent and deter conflicts, strengthen ``at risk'' states, and deny enemy safe-havens. PRIORITY #3: BETTER EDUCATE AND TRAIN OUR MARINES TO SUCCEED IN DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS AND INCREASINGLY COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS Professional Military Education and Small Unit Leader Development We are planning more investments in the education of our noncommissioned officers and junior officers, as they have assumed vastly greater responsibilities in both combat and garrison. This focus on education will better train them for decisionmaking during distributed operations against more diffused threats over broader areas of the battlefield. The primary initiative to address this priority is to increase markedly their opportunities to attend resident professional military education. We are currently evaluating ways to increase throughput at resident professional military education courses with options for both constrained and unconstrained manpower and resource increases. We are evaluating traditional paradigms relative to course lengths and instructional methodology, with the specific objectives of tripling throughput at the Expeditionary Warfare School (career level) and doubling resident Command and Staff College (intermediate level) throughput. These key leaders also impact unit cohesion and our overall effectiveness in combat. Introducing these leaders into a unit at the right time and stabilizing them in a life cycle continuum of a unit positively impacts a unit's effective training, performance and resiliency during pre-deployment training and post combat. These leaders are in the best position to influence our cultural ethos with its emphasis on intangible qualities such as esprit de corps, integrity, and ``service to country during time of war.'' We are currently reviewing manpower policies and models and will ensure these key leaders are present and able to lead a cohesive unit throughout its life-cycle continuum, including rigorous predeployment training and post-deployment actions. This effort will ready our units for any fight, whether irregular or combat. We also intend to infuse Values Based Training, rooted in our core values of Honor, Courage and Commitment, at all levels of professional development to foster resilience and to enable effective operations, especially in complex irregular environments. Our overall goal is to institutionalize efforts to develop more mature, educated, and capable non-commissioned officers and maneuver unit squad leaders. As these concepts mature, there will be costs in terms of military instruction and facilities for which we will require congressional support. Regionalization and Specialization The increased call for engagement, as seen in our force structure review and in strategic guidance, requires marines with improved cultural and language skills and formal education. To develop better specialization for anticipated future missions and operating environments, we will expand our Foreign Area Officer and Regional Affairs Officer programs, as well as opportunities to send more officers through graduate level training, fellowships and research opportunities--ideas supported by findings and recommendations of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel Report.\14\ This effort will extend to our ``Whole of Government'' approach toward irregular warfare as we seek greater exchanges and fellowships with the elements of the Interagency. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, pg 54; 2010 QDR Independent Panel Report, pgs 75-77. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Marine Corps University We are continuing to implement recommendations of our 2006 Officer Professional Military Education Study (the Wilhelm Report) and are making significant strides in terms of resources and facilities enhancing the campus of the Marine Corps University (MCU). We have programmed approximately $125 million in Military Construction between fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2012 for new academic facilities for the Marine Corps War College, Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Warfighting. In addition, we will expand the Staff Noncommissioned Officer Academy at the main campus in Quantico. These funds represent only a down payment on a larger commitment to double the size of the University campus and to upgrade our enlisted academies worldwide. Completion of the MCU master plan will require the demolition and relocation of tenant units aboard the campus. Detailed documentation of costs associated is ongoing; however, we estimate over $400 million is needed to complete the master plan. Our ultimate goal is to develop the MCU into a premier institution with world-class faculty, facilities, students, and curricula; we will require the assistance of Congress in this goal. priority #4: keep faith with our marines, our sailors and our families Keeping Faith We expect and demand extraordinary loyalty from our marines--a loyalty to Country, family, and Corps. Our Nation has been at war for a decade, placing unprecedented burdens on marines, sailors, families, wounded warriors, and the families of the fallen. They have all made tremendous sacrifices in the face of danger. We owe them all a reciprocal level of loyalty. Our approach to caring for their needs is based on the same unwavering faithfulness they have demonstrated to the Marine Corps. We will ensure their needs are met during times of deployment and in garrison by providing the services, facilities, and programs to develop the strength and skills to thrive on the challenges of operational tempo. When needed, we will restore them to health. We will also transition them back to civilian life, and in the cases of our fallen marines, we will support and protect their surviving spouses and dependents. We will do this by focusing on several areas this fiscal year. Combat Stress, Resiliency, Medical, and Mental Health Care We continue to advocate for the highest quality medical care and facilities for our servicemembers, retirees, and their families. To ensure the Department can continue to provide the finest health care benefits in the country to our beneficiaries, we fully support the medical efficiencies and adjustments in TRICARE included in the President's budget proposal. The evolving security environment requires a physically and mentally resilient marine able to endure extended exposure to ambiguous, stressful, and ever-changing situations. Young leaders find themselves on the vanguard of a protracted war, adapting to a variety of situations and scenarios. To improve their resilience, we are working aggressively and creatively to build a training continuum that better prepares them for the inevitable stress of combat operations and to equip them with the necessary skills required to cope with the challenges of life as a marine. Instruction founded and focused on our core values helps provide some of this resilience, especially in irregular warfare and complex environments. A program combining the ``best practices'' of mental, emotional and physical fitness will best instill in our marines the resiliency needed to endure the stressors of combat and enhance their ability to perform effectively across the range of military operations. We are developing a comprehensive program to improve the resiliency of our marines both in garrison and in combat. We are partnered with the Navy to address the Nation-wide dearth of qualified mental health care providers, which challenges our ability to provide care at some of our bases and stations and, in some cases, to our reservists in remote locations. During calendar year 2010, we saw a nearly 30 percent decrease in the number of suicides within our Total Force.\15\ We are too early in our suicide studies to identify what specific initiative(s) have resulted in this dramatic turnaround. However, we have implemented a number of measures on multiple fronts. Some of these include the following: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ Calendar year 2010 suicides = 37 whereas calendar year 2009 suicides = 52. Evocative Peer-led Training Program: ``Never Leave a Marine Behind'' suicide prevention program for noncommissioned officers and junior marines. We are expanding this training to include staff noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers this year. DSTRESS Line Pilot Program with TRICARE West: ``By Marines--For Marines'' call center designed to assist with problems at an early stage. The call center is staffed by veteran marines, providing anonymous service to all current marines, veteran marines, their families, and loved ones. Combat and Operational Stress Control and Operational Stress Control and Readiness Teams: Utilizing unique training programs across the Total Force and ensuring the presence of mental health professionals in front-line units as a primary prevention tool to help Marines identify and mitigate stress. Marine Resilience Study to Assess Risk and Resilience: We are participating in a longitudinal research study that will examine risk across three domains: biological, psychological and social. The outcome of this study will inform our future work in the area of building and maintain resiliency across the Corps. We will continue advocating to the medical community for better diagnostic and increased treatment options for marines with severe injuries including post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injury. In collaboration with the other Services, we developed a set of events- based parameters, mandating that our leaders search out marines who have experienced a concussive event. This measure no longer relies on identification of impacted servicemembers solely on their willingness to seek help on their own initiative. These protocols are in place now in Afghanistan, and we are already seeing a culture change in the attitude of marines about being treated early for a traumatic brain injury. We have established an in-theater Restoration Center that brings comprehensive concussion diagnosis and management as close to the front lines as possible to ensure that appropriate care is available as quickly as possible. We are currently developing policy and applications to track traumatic brain injury from ``point of injury'' to ``return to full duty'' separately but in parallel with medical documentation. These measures will empower commanders with the information they need to monitor the health of a marine who has suffered a concussive event and intervene appropriately for the duration of a marine's career and long after the initial injury.'' Transition Assistance We believe transition assistance should be a process not an event. We have established a goal to make the Marine Corps Transition Assistance Management Program more value added for our departing marines. From 2009 to 2010, we conducted functionality assessments of the Transition Assistance Management Program and the Lifelong Learning Program and noted many deficiencies. In response, we established two Transition Assistance Operational Planning Teams in 2010 to assess existing programs. We have developed an ``end-to-end'' process improvement plan that will begin at the point of initial accession into the Marine Corps and continue through post separation. We are initiating actions and integrating existing capabilities that will most directly improve the quality of support provided to marines within 6 months prior to separation and those who have been separated at least 6 months. Marines have expressed a desire for assistance navigating Department of Veterans Affairs benefit processes such as in cases of enrollment for and access to education benefits. We will modify existing websites to improve access and enhance opportunity for separating marines to speak directly to Marine Corps support personnel who are trained to remove administrative benefit processing barriers. We will improve networking opportunities to help marines find meaningful employment and are adapting our current job fairs to support increased networking opportunities that will allow them to meet mentors and employers. Marines have asked for an opportunity to connect with employers and learn how to translate their intangible and tangible attributes. Our transition workshops will be overhauled to address these needs. Marines are also seeking help to simplify enrollment processes for the Post-9/ 11 Montgomery GI bill and to gain access to academic institutions that will provide the quality and level of business education and skills private industry demands. We have initiated a Leader-Scholar Program, which includes academic institutions who value marines' service commitment and pledge special enrollment consideration. While the support varies from school to school, we now have 75 participating institutions with the goal of an additional 25 by the end of this year. As we gain momentum, we will continue to change the transition assistance program from its current event focus to that of a process that reintegrates marines into the civilian sector with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to leverage and communicate their Marine Corps time and experience. Family Readiness Programs We increased baseline funding for family support programs beginning in fiscal year 2010 to ensure appropriate wartime footing. Programs benefitting from this measure include the Unit, Personal and Family Readiness Program; Marine Corps Family Team Building Program; Exceptional Family Member Program; School Liaison Program; and other miscellaneous Marine Corps Community Services Programs supporting remote and isolated commands, deployed marines, and independent duty marines and families. We are currently conducting a complete review to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of these programs. Our goal is to determine where expansion may be needed to further assist our families and where programs can be streamlined to reduce redundancy. Wounded Warrior Care Marines continue to suffer numerous wounds, trauma, and injuries during operations in combat and during training missions. Many of these brave heroes with significant injuries are convalescing at military treatment facilities here in the National Capital Region and across our Nation at other major military treatment facilities. Our Wounded Warrior Regiment provides non-medical care management services to wounded, ill, and injured marines and their families. The Wounded Warrior Regiment continues to improve existing programs and add new support mechanisms. We have increased support to wounded, injured, and ill Reserve marines through additional Recovery Care Coordinators, enhanced family support at military treatment facilities, and one-on- one orientation sessions. We also provide Integrated Disability Evaluation System Support through Regional Limited Duty Coordinators and Wounded Warrior Attorneys. We have also initiated a mandatory Warrior Athlete Reconditioning Program. Outreach is an important aspect of the Regiment's nonmedical care delivery and management. The Sergeant Merlin German Wounded Warrior Call Center extends support to marines and families through advocacy, resource identification and referral, information distribution, and care coordination, 24 hours a day, 7 days per week. The comprehensive care coordination provided by the Wounded Warrior Regiment throughout the phases of recovery has been highly successful. The results of internal assessments have substantiated that creation of the Wounded Warrior Regiment has had a positive impact on the support offered wounded, injured, and ill marines and families. The Marine Corps will continue to honor the commitment to our Wounded Warriors and to help them return to full duty or successfully reintegrate into their communities. Behavioral Health Integration Behavioral health needs since September 11 have become increasingly complex with individuals often requiring assistance in a number of areas at one time. Marines with more than two deployments have been identified as a higher risk population. According to the Joint Mental Health Assessment Team, psychological health problems remain steady at 11 percent of marines for the first and second deployments, but increase to 22 percent for those who have deployed three or more times. Sixty-five percent of marines are under 25 years old. Associated with this young force are high-risk factors that include communication and coping skills, isolation, combat-related wounds and substance abuse. Drawdown of end strength following Operation Enduring Freedom and return to garrison life will likely result in additional behavioral healthcare requirements as marines redeploy and adjust to the garrison environment. We continue to move forward with our integration of prevention and intervention programs initiated in 2009. We have established a Behavioral Health Branch at our headquarters for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Headquarters Marine Corps Health Services also has created and filled a new billet for a Director of Psychological Health. Military Construction The Marine Corps maintains its commitment to facilities and infrastructure supporting both operations and quality of life. Our military construction and family programs are important to success in achieving and sustaining our force structure and maintaining readiness. For many years, we funded only our most critical facility needs. As a result, our installations were challenged to properly house and operate the additional forces required to meet our planned end strength increase. Between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2010, we received $6.9 billion in new construction and design. With this funding, we are providing new quality of life facilities, improved operational and training facilities, and more modern utility infrastructure systems. Our fiscal year 2012 military construction budget request is $1.4 billion. With these requested funds, we will provide bachelor enlisted quarters, aviation support facilities, and improvements to quality of life, utilities and infrastructure, and professional military education facilities. Additional family housing efforts in fiscal year 2012 include improvements to existing housing units and funding for the operations, maintenance, and leasing of 1,100 units worldwide and oversight of 22,000 privatized units. CONCLUSION The U.S. Marine Corps remains the Nation's crisis response force- of-choice. Our continued success in Afghanistan and throughout the globe is made possible by the loyal sacrifice of our incredible men and women in uniform, civilian marines, and our Marine Corps family. The personnel, equipment, and training that have given us success over the nearly past 10 years at war has come through the ongoing support of Congress and the American people. I promise that your Marine Corps understands the value of each dollar provided and will continue to provide maximum return for every dollar spent. In the coming year, we will begin a deliberate transformation into a force optimized for the likely threats of the next 2 decades. We understand and appreciate the contribution that each marine has made for this great Nation, and we recognize the heavy burden it has placed on their loved ones. We remain ``Always Faithful'' to our Marine Corps family, to Congress, to our chain of command, and to the American people. Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Amos. Let's start with a 7-minute first round. General, over the weekend there was reported, and it's been reaffirmed here today, that 400 marines from Camp Lejeune have arrived in Greece. Have they now joined the 1,300 marines of the 26th MEU on those two amphibious ships? I know they went to Greece, but are they on board those two ships now? General Amos. Yes, sir, they're on board and the ships are at sea. Chairman Levin. Thank you. The newspapers reported yesterday--and this goes to both you, Admiral Roughead and General Amos--that some of the capabilities of the two amphibious assault ships as follows: Harrier jump jets that can engage in air-to-ground and air-to- air combat, as well as maintain surveillance on ground positions. They have attack helicopters on board; transport aircraft, including cargo helicopters and the V-22 Osprey, so you have a capability there for long-range transport; as well as landing craft capable of reaching the Libyan coast. Are there any other capabilities, major capabilities, that I've left out, and is what I have just described accurate? Admiral Roughead, why don't we start with you. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, those are accurate capabilities, and I would say that in addition to that on board the large amphibious ships there is a medical team with operating room capabilities. So there's significant capacity there, and also they're quite well loaded with humanitarian assistance items as well. Chairman Levin. Thank you. General? General Amos. Chairman, that's an accurate portrayal of the physical equipment and those capabilities therein. That force is capable of performing a variety of missions. They're trained. They can do everything from a raid to an amphibious assault, to a noncombatant evacuation, forcible entry, trap mission, those kinds of things. So there's a lot of capability that resides in those two vessels. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Admiral, is it also correct that, in addition to those two ships, we have in the Mediterranean ships that are currently available that have missile-launching capability against land targets? Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, that's correct. Chairman Levin. General, let me switch to Afghanistan. Can you give us your assessment of what's called the Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure, which is a separate program I understand from the Afghan local police program? Can you tell us about that program, the Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure? Is that a name which resonates at all with you? General Amos. Sir, it does not. I'm going to have to take that for the record and get back to you, Mr. Chairman. [The information referred to follows:] [Deleted.] Chairman Levin. It didn't resonate with me either, and we read about it and I was curious about it. But if you could get us that for the record that would be helpful. Secretary Mabus, can you tell us where we are in the process of moving marines from Okinawa to Guam, and how we are going to complete the program given the strong opposition to it in Okinawa? Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. To echo what the Secretary of Defense said earlier, we are waiting for substantive movement on the Futenma replacement facility by the Japanese before taking any major substantive steps of our own. But in the interim we have signed the record of decision on the environmental impact statement. We held a lot of hearings. We had a lot of interaction with the people of Guam. My under secretary has been to Guam numerous times to meet with the Government of Guam and with the people of Guam, and he has identified four overarching goals for Guam. First, is a one Guam and one U.S. Government response to Guam. Second, is that whatever resources are put there should be renewable type energy projects, or a green Guam. Third, is that we will be sensitive to cultural matters, such as Pagat Cave and Pagat Village, the Guam cultural items that have been identified as crucial. Fourth, is that at the end of the day that there will be a net negative footprint, so that we will use less land for military purposes than we are using today. But again, before we take substantive moves to implement the road map that was agreed to several years ago we are awaiting Japanese Government moves on the Futenma replacement facility. The last thing I will say is that the Japanese Government has deposited the amounts of money that it had committed to into our Treasury up until this point. Chairman Levin. Now, the Japanese Government moves that you refer to include a signature on a document, is that correct? Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir, and also something substantive in terms of beginning the construction of a replacement facility for our Futenma Air Base. Chairman Levin. That is what the opposition in Okinawa strongly opposes, is that signature on that document, as I understand. Mr. Mabus. I understand there's opposition to that in Okinawa. I also understand there's opposition to Futenma in Okinawa. Chairman Levin. Right, both. The opposition is so strong--I think it was unanimous in the Okinawa legislative body. The prospects it seems to me are not great that this is going to happen this fiscal year. Can you comment on the likelihood that we're going to get the Japanese sign-off on both the replacement facility and on the signature for that document? Mr. Mabus. I will simply quote what Secretary Gates said in previous hearings, which he said that he was hopeful that progress would be made soon, and I believe by ``soon'' he meant in this fiscal year. Chairman Levin. Hopeful, but not necessarily optimistic; is that fair? Mr. Mabus. I believe his word was ``hopeful.'' I don't want to put words in his mouth. But he expressed that he was--I can't think of a different word than ``hopeful''--to go forward. Chairman Levin. All right. Are you personally optimistic it's going to happen this year? Mr. Mabus. I believe that the Japanese Government understands what our position is and that, absent movement, that we cannot go forward. So they understand the urgency. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Senator McCain. Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Amos, have you had a chance to look at the air capabilities that the Libyans have now as far as fixed wing and helicopters? General Amos. Senator, yes, sir. I've looked at what they have. Senator McCain. What has been your assessment? General Amos. I think it's modest. I think their greatest threat is their helicopter-type forces. That's just my assessment standing from afar. Senator McCain. Their air defenses? General Amos. They have air defenses, sir. I'm unfamiliar with the depth of those air defenses, but they have some. Senator McCain. But my information--I wonder if you have the same thing--they are Soviet-style, somewhat older versions of surface-to-air missile capability. General Amos. Yes, sir, I believe that's correct. Senator McCain. Isn't it true that the air assets are concentrated in about four air bases right around Tripoli? General Amos. I believe that's correct, Senator. Senator McCain. So the air assets, both fixed wing and helicopter, are going out of a relatively small area around Tripoli, operating out of those areas; is that true? General Amos. Yes, sir, predominantly. I believe that's correct. Senator McCain. Do you have any assessment of the numbers of aircraft that they have, both fixed wing and helicopter? General Amos. Senator, I just know the general capabilities. I've not spent time looking at the precise numbers. Senator McCain. Has it been your experience in combat that if the enemy controls the air above, particularly in terrain like Libya, it gives them an enormous advantage? General Amos. Sir, I think there are several things that will give the enemy an enormous advantage. One is the ground movement of forces, vehicles, military on the ground. I think it's a very complex environment, where the Gaddafi forces are predominantly located. So I think it's more than just aviation. I think it's very complex. Senator McCain. But you have very little doubt that control of the air above, particularly in an untrained enemy, gives you an enormous advantage in any conflict? True? General Amos. Sir, I would say it would give you an advantage. I'm not sure about his air force. Senator McCain. Have you heard that Gaddafi is still flying in mercenaries in to Tripoli from other countries? General Amos. No, sir, I have not heard that. Senator McCain. Did you hear that he has two Airbuses that are shuttling back and forth? General Amos. No, sir, I have not heard that. Senator McCain. You have been getting regular briefings? General Amos. We do, sir. Senator McCain. The ships that are offshore, the Harriers, they also have surveillance pod capability? General Amos. They do, sir. The Harriers are carrying an ISR pod. Senator McCain. Do they have jamming capability? General Amos. Yes, sir, they do. Senator McCain. So we could jam Gaddafi's communications, including television? General Amos. Sir, excuse me. I misunderstood you. I thought you said camera capability. You're talking jamming capability? Senator McCain. Yes. General Amos. They do not. Senator McCain. What assets would have those, the jamming capability? Airborne Warning and Control System? General Amos. Sir, it would be that, and I'd have to refer to the CNO, but it would probably be aircraft, EA-6Bs off the carrier. Senator McCain. Admiral? Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, the jamming that would be required, whether for communications or for their air defense system, I believe you would require EA-6Bs or the Growlers that we're now introducing to the fleet. Senator McCain. How far away are those? Admiral Roughead. The aircraft carrier USS Enterprise is the closest capability. The USS Enterprise is currently in the Red Sea. Senator McCain. Are there plans to move it? Admiral Roughead. At the present time, plans are for her to remain in the CENTCOM area of operations, sir. Senator McCain. Not move into the Mediterranean? Admiral Roughead. There has been no order issued to do that, no, sir. Senator McCain. General Amos, in the withdrawal from Iraq is it your personal opinion that Iraq will be able to take over logistics, intelligence, and air sovereignty missions that the United States has been carrying out? General Amos. Senator, I've always believed that--I can't speak to the degree of where they are today because the marines are out of there and we're focused primarily in Afghanistan and other parts of the world. But we were certainly on a glide slope to make that happen. Senator McCain. Admiral? Admiral Roughead. I believe we are on that path, yes, sir. Senator McCain. So you're not concerned about a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq as far as logistics, intelligence, and training of an air force, or a navy? None of that is of concern? Admiral Roughead. As of my most recent visit there, Senator, where I focused primarily on the navy, I see very good progress. In addition to that, because that navy will operate offshore, our Fifth Fleet that operates in the Arabian Gulf, and I believe it will be a very supportive relationship, addressing the needs of Iraq from the naval perspective. Senator McCain. So they need no other assistance? Admiral Roughead. I believe that assistance will continue through the way that we interact with all navies in the region with our Fifth Fleet headquarters and the ships that deploy there, the exercise programs that we have. That will continue on with the Iraqi navy, and not have to have people ashore. Senator McCain. General Amos, have you been requested to identify any drawdown from Afghanistan, to begin the middle of July of this year? General Amos. Senator, no, we have not been asked to identify any forces. Senator McCain. So we really have no plans yet that you have been made aware of of the beginning of our drawdown in Afghanistan? General Amos. Senator, all I'm aware of is that there will be a drawdown. The President has announced it, beginning in July of some forces. The Secretary of Defense spoke about that yesterday in Afghanistan. I can't tell you whether it'll be marine forces. I would have to defer to General Mattis and General Petraeus. Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain. Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the three of you for your service and for your testimony today. Before I get to my questions, I just want to begin by thanking the three of you for the leadership role that you're playing in the implementation of the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell. Admiral Roughead and General Amos, I recently watched the opening portions of training videos that you have filmed for sailors and marines, and I just want to express my gratitude for the leadership that you display there. As you indicate in those videos, this is all about values, values that are deep and inherent in your Services, values of leadership, discipline, professionalism, and respect. I think-- and I really thank you, based on looking at these videos, for leading your Services, as the two of you have throughout your career, by example. I appreciate that very much. I want to get to a couple of questions about Libya. I just want to pick up from something Senator McCain asked and the inference from it, which is, no one's saying that a no-fly zone is uncomplicated, but the fact is that we have some experience doing this and, though people have said Libya is a large country, it is of course a large country, but the activity here is mostly along a strip of land along the coast. So if there's a decision to do this--and I appreciate what Secretary Gates said in his testimony, though it's the part that's less quoted, which was that, if asked to implement, hopefully with our allies and others, a no-fly zone, we're perfectly capable of doing it. But the point I want to make from what Senator McCain asked is that the air defense systems of the Libyans are modest and air capabilities are modest, and the activity, though the country is large, is happening mostly along the strip along the north of the country, along the coast. The question I wanted to ask is this. The chairman and Senator McCain have asked about our resources in the region. We're all following this very closely. I was interested that our Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, said--has been quoted as saying that ``The United States has been conducting round-the- clock air and ground surveillance in Libya.'' I wanted to ask you, Admiral, and you, General, whether you have any knowledge about that, and toward what end are we conducting that surveillance? Admiral? Admiral Roughead. Senator, the ability to monitor the level of activity, the disposition of the forces, is something that is within our capabilities to do and we have been following the fighting that's been taking place through a variety of means that we have. So we have some insight into what's going on there. Senator Lieberman. General, do you have anything to add to that? General Amos. Sir, I don't. I know that, just as we do in many other places around the world where there's hostile action taking place, we pay very close attention through a variety of means and capabilities. Senator Lieberman. Right. General Amos. Some national and some organic. Senator Lieberman. Admiral, based on what we know or what you know, do you think this is now settling into a kind of stalemate situation? I know it's always hard to predict--where we may end up but, unless something surprising happens, we may end up with a long-term civil war type conflict in Libya. Admiral Roughead. Having spent some time in the Middle East, to include actually living in Libya, I am always hesitant to predict what the future may be there. I think it's still a very uncertain period that bears watching. Then as some of the thoughts are discussed and debated, I believe, at least from a military perspective, that looking at what some of those details may be ahead of time is very important, issues such as a no-fly zone, restrictions on use of force, and what basing and access that might be required. I think all of those need to be sorted through. Senator Lieberman. Understood. I understand that, and it's, I believe, been publicly acknowledged, that the State Department at least has opened up channels of communications with the Temporary National Council or provisional anti-Gaddafi Government, which is headquartered in Benghazi. As far as you know, is there any military-to- military contact going on through DOD with the military leadership of the anti-Gaddafi forces? Admiral Roughead. I'm not aware of any, sir. Senator Lieberman. General, do you know? General Amos. No. Senator Lieberman. Good enough. Let me go to something--Secretary Mabus, I noted in the statement you made in your prepared testimony that the F-35C variant of the JSF will be procured for both the Navy and the Marine Corps. I think it's been the general understanding that the Marine Corps would want to see produced and would procure a pure F-35B STOVL fleet variant of the F-35, and that in fact is the plan that's reflected in the current FYDP. Did I read this correctly in your prepared statement, and could you speak therefore to the future mix, if that is the correct interpretation, of the F-35B and the F-35C in the Marine Corps inventory? Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. It has always been true that the F-35B was solely a Marine aircraft. Senator Lieberman. Right. Mr. Mabus. But it's also been true that the C version, the carrier version, the naval version, was going to have marines flying those as well. Today we have three Marine squadrons aboard carriers and we are currently undergoing a tactical air integration look across the Navy and the Marine Corps to see what the proper mix is of Cs for the Navy and Marine Corps, to make sure that we continue that integration and make sure that marines continue to fly off carriers in strike fighters, as well as in vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. Senator Lieberman. General, could you give me your reaction to this? Is that mix at this point acceptable to the Marine Corps? Am I wrong that you had originally hoped for a pure STOVL variant fleet? General Amos. Senator, you are correct that that was the initial plan. Let me back up just a little bit. We have always been fans of tactical air (TACAIR) integration. As the Secretary said, we have Marine squadrons right now on Navy carriers. On the USS Enterprise right now, we have Marine F- 18s. So we do that. We like that. It's good for both our Services and the naval force. But when we set the requirement in for STOVL aircraft, our hope was we would be able to some day fly those versions off of CVNs, naval aircraft carriers. That's yet to be seen, whether that will be possible. So in the meantime, it would seem prudent that we would buy some number of C variants, even early on, so that we can begin to transition our force there. But it will be a proportional number in the overall buy of the STOVL. The STOVL is still our primary focus. Senator Lieberman. Okay, good enough. My time is up. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. Senator Wicker. Senator Wicker. Thank you. Admiral Roughead, let me follow up on Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman. Given the testimony that we've received today that Libya's air capabilities are relatively modest, that their air defenses are concentrated in a relatively small area, what would General Gaddafi's options be if the United States imposed a no-fly zone? Why would we not expect it to be completely successful? Admiral Roughead. I think the first question, Senator, is, as a precursor, you would be entering into combat operations there. Senator Wicker. We would be entering into air combat operations? Admiral Roughead. I think that in addressing a no-fly zone you want to suppress or destroy any of the air defense systems that could put friendly forces at risk. So that's the first element, I believe, of entering into a no-fly zone, is likely combat operations on Libya. So I think in talking about a no-fly zone there are some precursor steps that have to be taken. Senator Wicker. What would General Gaddafi's options be? Admiral Roughead. To try to defend against that would be the primary options. But the fact is that that would be the first step that would have to be taken. Then it's also the issue of, what forces would be used, where are they postured, what are the basing and the overflight issues. I think all of those have to be sorted through. We've done no-fly zones before and there is a significant infrastructure that backs them up, whether it's naval or land- based. Senator Wicker. That infrastructure is available to us and to our allies, is that not correct? Admiral Roughead. I think that's a function of the countries that would be involved, to make that decision. Senator Wicker. Are you involved in the discussions with the Secretary of Defense as to whether we proceed with a no-fly zone? Admiral Roughead. We have had discussions on Libya in the tank among the Joint Chiefs, and we are involved in positioning our forces to support the efforts that are currently being undertaken in Libya. We're looking at the situation there on a daily basis. Senator Wicker. Thank you very much for getting further into the details about that. Let me shift gears to Navy Week and mention to both Admiral Roughead and to Secretary Mabus how much we appreciate being able to host Navy Week in the State of Mississippi during the week of March 19 through 27. As both of you know, 2012 will mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Seabees and their presence in Gulfport, MS, with our four naval construction battalions based in Gulfport. Let me start with Admiral Roughead. What is the past, current, and future contribution of the Seabees? What role do you see the Seabees playing in your vision of the future of the Navy? Admiral Roughead. Sir, as a matter of fact, I was in Gulfport last Friday meeting with about 3,000 Seabees. If that doesn't energize you, nothing does. But the Seabees I think in the Navy are legendary, and I would even say, beyond that within the military, for their combat engineering skills, their ability to go into unimproved areas and provide the facilities that forces need to operate. I know they're linked very closely to the Marine Corps in that regard. They've been very busy over the past few years, particularly in Iraq and in Afghanistan. In fact, we currently have as many Seabees deployed now as we did during the Vietnam War. So they are extraordinarily busy. But they also function in a humanitarian role, where they will go into countries and develop infrastructure, train some of the indigenous forces that are there. So that's what they have been doing, and I see Seabees doing that well into the future. Senator Wicker. Do you see their role diminishing in the future or increasing in the future? Admiral Roughead. I think the skills and the talent and the competence of the Seabees will prevail. It will be a question of how much usage the combatant commanders demand with regard to Seabees, combat engineers. Clearly, I would predict that as we eventually bring the level of forces down in Afghanistan, of course, Seabees are part of that, so they'll be coming out. So they're probably at a fairly high level right now. But I think the future is yet to be borne out. Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus? Mr. Mabus. I concur with everything the CNO said. I visited with Seabees in Afghanistan and I've joked with them that if you give them a piece of plywood and a Skilsaw they can build anything, maybe even our fleet. But I do think that the skills that they have for the missions that are coming in the future, whether it's combat missions or whether, as the CNO pointed out, humanitarian assistance mission, partnership-building sorts of things, that those skills will be in demand and will be needed. Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. In the few seconds I have remaining, Secretary Mabus, in your verbal testimony and also in prepared testimony, I wanted to make sure that we understand precisely what you're saying about the effect of a year-long CR. You say it will prevent procurement of two nuclear reactor cores. Will it delay it or will it prevent it? And prevent completion of one Arleigh Burke-class modernization. Are you being precise that it will block these two advances? Mr. Mabus. If a year-long CR occurs, we cannot spend any money on either those nuclear reactors or either of the new start Arleigh Burke destroyers. Senator Wicker. It will in effect be a delay, would it not? Mr. Mabus. That assumes that at some point we are allowed to begin spending that money. Under a year-long CR for the remainder of the fiscal year, we would not be able to do that. Senator Wicker. I understand. I would simply observe there are concerns about spending, but I don't see why on a bipartisan basis and a bicameral basis we can't decide as a Congress to fund the military capabilities of this Nation on a permanent basis and then deal with the rest of the discretionary budget at a later time. I don't see a reason why we shouldn't go forward this week or next week with a full defense appropriation aspect of our funding and deal with the other aspects of it later on. So thank you very much, and thank you all for your service. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Reed. Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I can't help but follow up my colleague from Mississippi and the ranking member of the Seapower Subcommittee by commending the Seabees. They were organized in Rhode Island in 1942 and one of their signature contributions to construction was the Quonset hut, named after Quonset, RI. So thank you, Senator. I'm glad we could help out the Gulf Coast. First, Admiral Roughead and Secretary Mabus, one of the critical issues, but it doesn't get a lot of attention, is maintenance of the fleet. Could you comment upon the stress that you're under now in terms of maintenance? We have seen reports that there's an increasing number of failures in the Bureau of Inspection Survey, up dramatically from about 3 percent in the mid-1990s to now 13 percent in terms of ships that are coming in and being inspected, and that the life of the ships, the DDGs especially, is now 25 to 27 years, not 30 or perhaps even 40. Admiral Roughead, you might start and then, Mr. Secretary, your comments. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Looking at that when I came into this position, I looked at the whole approach to maintenance, how are we maintaining our ships. We did several things. We reintroduced the engineered based maintenance cycle for our ships, put resources to the teams that do that work. We're beginning to see the benefit of that now. We also are putting more sailors back on the ships. We had taken them off. With the generosity of Congress, we were able to increase our operation and maintenance funding, so we were able to build that up to the point where we're spending hundreds of millions of dollars now more on maintenance than we were just a couple of years ago. We've taken sailors and put them back into our intermediate maintenance activities, so that more maintenance can be done proximate to the ships in the piers. So I think all of that adds into improving the maintenance of the ships. We've seen some positive trends in our inspection and survey reports and results. So I think we're doing substantive things. We're investing the money in the right place to improve that ship maintenance. Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary? Mr. Mabus. Senator, everything, the details that the CNO just said, have been put in place and, as he said, we're beginning to see some improvements. The Navy, unlike other Services, maintenance is our reset. We reset in stride. So if we're going to get to the fleet that we need to get to, if we're going to get the numbers of ships that we need to get to, we simply have to make them get to the end of their normal or extended service lives. It's one of the things that the CNO has focused on the most closely. It's one of the things that I watch most closely. I do believe that with some of these efforts, putting more intermediate maintenance on the pier, putting more sailors on ships, 2,200 more on our ships, with the specific goal of doing preventative maintenance, so that when a ship comes in for a maintenance period it is more ready and the maintenance will mean more. Finally, I do want to reiterate one thing that I said about the CR. The chairman pointed out that we've already cancelled five availabilities. We face having to cancel up to 29 ship availabilities, and these, to go to what Senator Wicker said, are not postponements. These are cancellations, because we have other ships in queue waiting behind them. Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Again let me address a question first to General Amos and if the Secretary would like to comment. That's on the F-35B. It's slipped in terms of its timeframe. There are some technical challenges. I had the chance to go down to Pax River and talk to your very impressive group of test pilots and program managers. What is the probability that this is the last major schedule change and that we're finally on track? I know that's a judgment call, but any advice, since you're an aviator and you have great expertise, Commandant? Please comment. General Amos. Thank you, sir. Obviously, with that introduction, you know I pay very close attention to it. This, as I said in my opening statement, is critical to our expeditionary capability, and we've talked about that before. My sense right now is that the program management has absolutely the right guy in there with Admiral Venlet running it. I think the oversight at OSD is appropriate. Certainly the oversight in the Department of the Navy is appropriate. I will promise you, as you and I have talked before, the oversight at the headquarters Marine Corps level and at my desk is very appropriate. So my sense where we are now is that, with the generosity of both Congress and the wisdom of Secretary Gates, putting more money back into this, trading some tails so that we could get this program back on track, things are lined up now for success. I'll give you an example of what I'm talking about. Right now the STOVL variant, which is the one that everybody refers to, has flown 140 percent of its scheduled test flights since January 1. So in the last 70 days, the airplane has flown 40 percent more of its scheduled test flights. It's flown about another 200 percent of its scheduled test points. Within each flight it's designed to get five or six specific points of flight test. So it's performing better there. It's already flown I think something like four or five times the number of vertical landings just this year than it did all last year. I took a brief yesterday on the structural issues, the bulkheads, the weight gain. These things are progressing well. So from my perspective as I look at it, I'm going to pay attention to the aircraft performance, how it's doing in flight, both in vertical and horizontal flight, the weight growth in the airplane, which in a vertical landing airplane is very critical. Right now we're on a good glide slope in the weight growth, and we're not going to add a pound that I'm not aware of to that airplane. We have to talk about it. Then, finally, the engineering challenges and the test performance. So my sense is I'm optimistic. We are on a 2-year watch. It's my hope that we can get off that well before 2 years, and it's my intent to some time this spring offer to the Secretary of Defense a set of metrics that he might consider as the threshold for getting the airplane off of probation and getting it back into the regular mindset of production. Senator Reed. Any comments, Mr. Secretary? Mr. Mabus. I can't improve on that answer, Senator. Senator Reed. That's why you're such a good Secretary and a good lawyer. A final question to Admiral Roughead and the Secretary, the Ohio replacement program. I know this is a major issue. It not only touches the fleet, but also our strategic posture, particularly after the recent START Treaty. It's the future of deterrence, nuclear deterrence for the Nation. It's the most survivable aspect of nuclear deterrence. I think you have made significant progress in ensuring that we design a ship that is not only capable, but affordable. But there's still this issue of sharing the costs, because this program is a Navy program, but it has huge, huge implications for the overall strategic posture of the United States, particularly the deterrence posture with nuclear weapons. So why don't you comment on any efforts to provide support, as we've done on other programs like the missile defense program from DOD, not just from the Navy. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, and I appreciate the question. Clearly the Ohio replacement is, as you said, the most survivable. What we're doing is we're building a submarine that will be on patrol for this Nation in 2080. So that's where the research and development is going, and our focus on stealth and mission capability is where we have to go. We also know we'll be introducing that submarine at a time when there are other significant costs being imposed on the shipbuilding budget. While we're early on in the program, I do believe that there has to be a discussion about how the submarine is resourced in the context of everything else. I think we're at the front end of having some of those discussions. Mr. Mabus. In the research and development that's going on now to begin to build the first of the Ohio-class replacements in 2019 to go on its first patrol about 10 years later, we've already taken a billion dollars a boat out of the cost to build this submarine. We're looking to take more money out. Right now we're at about $5.4 billion per boat. The number needs to start with a four in some way for these boats. But even at $4.9 billion per boat, to build 12 of these beginning in 2019 and continuing throughout the decade of the 20s will require substantial resources that, if they all come from the Navy, would put a dent in the rest of our shipbuilding programs. That's one of the reasons we have put it in and tried to be exactly honest and exactly precise about how much this ship will cost and what it will do to the rest of the fleet, so that these discussions, these debates, and these decisions can be made with the facts of what will happen clearly in mind. Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, General, Admiral. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator Collins. Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, first let me join everyone in thanking you for your extraordinary service. It's very difficult for those of us who have worked with you for a number of years to recognize that this is most likely your last Navy posture hearing. I want to thank you for your decades of service. I want to pick up on the issue that Senator Reed just raised. Secretary Gates recently testified that a number of our surface ships that were built during the Reagan years will basically reach the end of their planned life in the 2020s, and that coincides with the time that we will be bringing on the new ballistic missile submarine. Obviously, we need both, but that new submarine is going to swallow up a great deal of the shipbuilding budget. I understand that there are several precedents for national strategic programs that are funded through defense-wide budget lines. For example, ships supporting sealift for all of the military Services are funded through the National Sealift Defense Fund. As has been mentioned, the MDA budget funds for activities related to ballistic missile defense irrespective of the military Service involved. So if we're going to proceed, as we must, with the new submarine, but not harm the shipbuilding budget, which is already below the optimum number that you have said repeatedly is the floor of 313--I believe we're at only 286 or 287 right now--would an alternative worth pursuing be looking at a defense-wide budget line, rather than trying to fund this submarine out of shipbuilding? Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your very kind comments. It's been my pleasure to work with you over these years, not just as CNO, but even before, and thank you for your great support of the Navy. But I do believe that, in addition to the points that you mentioned, in the 20s we're also going to still be refueling our aircraft carriers. To make all of us feel a little bit older, we will also in that decade be taking out of service some of the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers as they reach the end of their 50-year life. So there are those two costs that have to get put in there as well. So there's a significant pressure on shipbuilding. Yet the Nation I believe will still need the global Navy that it has today. Whether it's a defense-wide fund or whether there is consideration for those expenses that are being taken into account, I do believe that that has to be addressed, because if it's not taken on and if it's not thought through with a solution that's different than what we have today, we as a Nation are going to find ourselves shorted in a Navy. Senator Collins. I agree with you and I look forward to working with you and the Secretary and my colleagues trying to come up with a solution. Secretary Mabus, it was so appropriate that you began your testimony today reminding us of the dire impact on the Navy, indeed on all of DOD, of continuing to operate under a CR, particularly one that is extended 2 weeks at a time. That really is an impossible situation. Just last week I filed the defense appropriations bill, the entire bill, as a modification to an unrelated piece of legislation, to try to emphasize to the Senate leaders that this should be our priority, completing work which should have been done prior to October 1 of last year. You mentioned the dire impact on readiness, the effect on our sailors and marines, the fact that we are putting in jeopardy as many as 10,000 private sector jobs at a time when our economy is very, very weak. But isn't there also another adverse impact, and that is that these delays cause disruptions in the supply chain that are costly? They're not only depriving our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of needed technology and equipment, but they're increasing the ultimate costs that we're going to pay. You're going to have to renegotiate contracts. There are disruptions in the supply chain that are costly. Isn't this the case where the longer that we operate under a CR, the more you're likely to have to pay for needed equipment? Mr. Mabus. I think that's absolutely correct, Senator. The ripple effects of this, we're beginning to feel some now. The longer it goes on, the more those effects take place. Senator Wicker pointed out that we're delaying ship starts, perhaps not cancelling them. But if you delay ship starts this year, we have other ship starts due next year and the year after that, and, as I said in my testimony, it will take us years to recover from this, from the second and third order effects of this and the ripples that go out from it. The supply chain is certainly one of them. Breaking multi-year procurements is another that we are saving money on today. If we are unable to fulfill our part of the multi-year, we'll have to go in and renegotiate that, for example on shipbuilding. Senator Collins. I think that's a very important point. Some of my colleagues who are supporting a CR are arguing that it saves money. I think it not only is disruptive, but it's going to end up costing us more money in the long run. Admiral Roughead, just a very quick final question for you. As you may know, Senator Webb and I along with some of our colleagues commissioned a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that found that the Navy's modernization program for our public shipyards, which includes the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, have been underfunded. Indeed, the Navy's own estimate of the backlog at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard alone exceeds $500 million. Are you looking at whether you could use some reprogramming or shifting of funds to try to meet some of the more urgent needs, which also would translate directly into increased efficiency and productivity? So again, it's an investment that saves you money in the long run. Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator. We're always looking at our MILCON and where do we get the most bang for the buck, and it goes beyond the shipyards. But we do look at the shipyards and in fact, even though there is what is considered a backlog of maintenance, we are investing above the percentage that's required by Congress to a certain degree. But I'm always looking at projects, individual ones, to your point, that if we pay a little bit today maybe we can gain in productivity later on, and we're always looking at that. Mr. Mabus. Senator, if I might add that one of the exemptions to the civilian hiring freeze that DOD announced was for shipyards, to meet exactly what you were talking about. Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins. Senator Webb. Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, let me add my own congratulations and appreciation to you for all the service that you have given our country. It's been my pleasure to have known you and worked with you in a number of different capacities for a good 15 years or more. I appreciate the stewardship that you've shown, even in your testimony today, for the people who come after us and what we leave behind. There's been a number of comments today about the situation in Libya. I think it's important for me to at least express my support for the position that Secretary Gates has taken on this issue, and others in DOD. We all know that military commitments, however small, are easily begun and in this region particularly very difficult to end. History shows that. This is a region full of surprises. I, for one, am of the opinion it's not a good idea to give weapons and military support to people who you don't know. When it comes to the opposition in Libya, we don't know them. Secretary Clinton was very clear on that last week in her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So it's very important, I think, to proceed responsibly and very carefully as we approach that particular issue. Admiral, I, as you would expect, strongly agree with your position about the number of ships that we should be providing in the Navy, that 313 should be a floor. I've been very concerned and vocal about my worry that we've taken our eye off of our strategic forces in general as we have spent so much of our money, energy, and people in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past 8 or 9 years. This is particularly true in East Asia, which I view to be the central focus of our long-term strategic goals. We can't ignore what the Chinese military has been doing, not only in this area but in other areas. They've been very active over the last year particularly. But we have an obligation to position ourselves properly in terms of our military forces and our basing systems. In that regard, I'd like to mention my hope that we can do a better job on this situation with Okinawa and Guam. As you may know, Secretary Mabus, I worked as a military planner on this issue many years ago. The attempt at a solution of the Okinawan situation as it moves into the Guamanian situation has now been on the table for 15 years. I was recently last month the keynote speaker at Shimoda conference in Tokyo, which was a gathering of the minds in terms of how we are going to reshape and strengthen the United States' relations with Japan. I can tell you that this issue is one of the most serious problems in our relationships with the Japanese, but also in Japanese domestic priorities. You can see the turbulence that it has put at the very top of the Japanese Government because we have not yet resolved this issue. It also is one of our principal challenges in terms of the structuring of our presence in East Asia. I was out there last year on Okinawa and Guam. I think I'm going with the chairman next month also on a visit there. I just really strongly believe we have to put this on the front burner. It's one of these types of issues that, since it's not hitting us in the face every day, we tend to push it away. But it's now been 15 years. We need answers. Whatever the answers are, we need answers for the stability of our relationships with Japan and for our future in the Pacific. I'm not sure actually who's carrying the ball on this in DOD. I think the Marine Corps--at least they're heavily present when we go out there and talk to people. But, Secretary Mabus, I'm not sure. Who's the executive agent here, and how do we get this thing resolved? Mr. Mabus. Senator, we're the executive agent for Guam. You're right that the Marine Corps is heavily involved. But it is not simply a Navy issue. It rises to the top leadership of DOD. I can assure you from the Marine Corps, from the Navy, and from DOD, it's on the front burner. It takes up a large part of our focus, for exactly the reasons you talked about. It affects our laydown in the entire Pacific. It affects our presence in the western Pacific for the next decades. We had an agreement with the Government of Japan on a way forward. That agreement is several years old now. One of the key components before we begin to move is Government of Japan and the Government of Okinawa movement on replacing our airfield at Futenma. The Marines have to have that air capability on Okinawa regardless of what happens going forward. So we are focused on it. I will quote Secretary Gates in his hearing when he said that he was ``hopeful that progress would be made soon on this issue,'' as we all are. Senator Webb. This is an enormously complex issue in terms of all the moving parts, and I know that there's been some good adjustments already in terms of the Marine Corps footprint on Okinawa, moving it further away from the industrial areas, and also the environmental aspects, particularly on Guam. But I can't say strongly enough how important it is we put good minds and good leaders on this, for all the reasons that I said: the future of our relationships with Japan. I hear it all the time when I'm with the foreign ministry, the defense ministry in Japan, and with their political leaders, and for our future. So I hope we can have some good discussions before the chairman and I go to Japan and Guam next month, and maybe we can come up with a better way to approach this. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb. Senator Brown. Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry I was bouncing back and forth. I had a Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee hearing as well. Mr. Secretary, first of all, and Admiral, thank you also, just to reiterate. I appreciate your service and family sacrifice. Mr. Secretary, just to touch on what Senator Collins was saying, the CR, the 2 weeks, do you think that jeopardizes the safety and security of our country in any way, that continuing on in sporadic means and measures? Mr. Mabus. I think that it, as I tried to lay out in my opening statement, it has some profound implications for the Navy and the Marine Corps. If the CR continues for the whole year, as we said, flying hours will go down, ship steaming days will go down, the availabilities that we have for maintenance for naval ships. The procurement account for the Marine Corps could go down by as much as a third. We will not be able to meet payroll by the end of the fiscal year without moving monies from other accounts, and procurement is one of the few places we can get that. In terms of shipbuilding, we will not be able to start the second Virginia-class submarine, which will break the multi-year on that, which will make those submarines more expensive. We will not be able to start the two Aegis-class destroyers. Senator Brown. In plain English, do you think our safety and security is in jeopardy as a result of the delay? Mr. Mabus. I think that today the Navy and Marine Corps will meet whatever safety and security needs America has. The danger is what happens in the future, what happens to us because of these shortfalls now. Senator Brown. To take it a little step further, do you think the lives of our soldiers are in jeopardy as a result of the delay. If it continues? Mr. Mabus. No, I don't think it risks lives of our marines and our soldiers, because the OCOs are being funded. But I do think--and I know I'm beginning to sound like a broken record, but it's the effects on the future. Senator Brown. I understand. I appreciate your honesty. One of the best ways, I've always felt, and I've heard through testimony from many of you and others, is the open and honest competition. With regard to the LCS, the dual procurement strategy is a perfect example of that type of savings if we strictly enforce competition. Mr. Secretary, can you comment on the importance of implementing competition in our Nation's acquisition strategy, where appropriate, especially when we're deciding to buy massive amounts of equipment costing taxpayers billions of dollars over the course of several years? Mr. Mabus. Competition certainly worked in terms of the LCS. When we competed two manufacturers against each other with two different variants, the price came down pretty dramatically. Now, I will say that the LCS program was unique in the sense that we had always planned on having two suppliers. We had never looked at this program, regardless of how many variants we had, as coming from one shipyard, because we wanted to keep competition in the program. Senator Brown. You're ultimately going to award a contract to one of them, though, based on the specifications, the capabilities, and the like, correct? Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. But whoever--if we had down-selected to one variant, whichever shipyard won had to give us the technical data package, all the drawings, all the engineering, so that we would then the next year bid it out to a second shipyard. We were always going to have two shipyards competing on the LCS. Senator Brown. So competition saved $2.9 billion and a 27 percent reduction on the original cost of that savings estimate. The third and fourth ships are scheduled to be delivered in 2012 on cost and on schedule. I guess I'm trying to wrestle the fact that we have that fair and open competition with a relatively small quantity purchase like the LCS and yet we're dealing with a $100 billion purchase of over 4,000 JSF engines for the U.S. and international partners spanning a period of 20 years, which the GAO has twice concluded will save the taxpayers $20 billion. So I'm wondering if you could explain. Am I missing something in terms of having a sole producer of the engine? For example, what happens if they decide to raise the price? Why is it good for one and not the other? I really haven't gotten a good answer. Mr. Mabus. Two things set those two programs apart. One is what I talked about, about the fact that we always anticipated having two different suppliers for the LCS, regardless of how many variants we had. Second, we have paid for most of the engineering, the research and development, the up-front cost of both variants of this ship, unlike the alternate engine, which has only paid for the research and development upfront costs for one of them. So I think there are two major differences between those. The last thing I would say is, from the Navy vantage point we have rarely had two engines for any of our aircraft, simply because of space concerns. We can't carry two engines on our carriers. We can't carry two engines on our big-deck amphibs. We simply don't have the space for it. We will only be able to buy one engine for these aircraft, as we do today for our F- 18s. Senator Brown. One of the things I'm always concerned is about cost overruns and delivering weaponry on time. My concern is, obviously, about doing that with that particular program. I'd like to just shift gears for a minute. I'm thankful, I think it's about time, that Harvard and the Navy once again are having Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) on their campus. I think it's long overdue. I'm wondering if you could just comment on what your feelings are about the importance of ROTC on our Nation's campuses? Mr. Mabus. I was very happy to sign the agreement with Harvard last Friday to bring ROTC back there. As I pointed out there, Harvard trails only West Point and Annapolis in Medal of Honor recipients. I agree with you, it had been gone for too long. I believe that ROTC and the ability to have different viewpoints coming into our military officer corps, different geography, different viewpoints, different backgrounds, is absolutely crucial. We're continuing to reach out to schools that have, for whatever reason, ended ROTC, to bring it back. The military that protects the Nation ought to be reflective of the entire Nation. Senator Brown. So noted. I'm anxious to see whether and how the military science classes will be taking place on or off campus, and hoping that they will be fully implemented in the ordinary course like every other organization has that opportunity. But I want to thank you for wrapping that up. I saw you smiling a lot in the pictures. Admiral and General, I'm okay with you. I know we've spoken off-line many times about issues, so thank you for your continued service and the good information. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown. Just on two of the statements that you made in response to Senator Brown, if you for the record would confirm or not confirm the following: First, that more than half the development costs on the second engine have already been sunk; second, that the original acquisition strategy did assume two engines for the F-35. Can you confirm or not, for the record, not now? Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. [The information referred to follows:] Yes, more than one-half of the F136 development costs are sunk-costs ($2.9 billion through fiscal year 2010 of an estimated $4.2 billion development program). The estimate includes only those costs required to complete development of the F136 engine and does not include all TBD costs necessary to get the F136 to a competitive procurement posture. With regard to the acquisition strategy, yes, the Department of Defense assumed two engines as part of the original acquisition strategy if funding was available for the F136 program. Chairman Levin. It's not my turn yet. Senator Hagan. Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to state how pleased I am to see all three of you gentlemen here today and once again thank you for your service. My late father-in-law, who passed away a little over a year ago at the wonderful age of 96, was a major general in the Marine Corps Reserve, and he was always very interested in everything that you had to say and your actions, especially during these committee hearings. But, speaking about the ROTC, my husband participated in the ROTC at Chapel Hill, and I think too that it's a wonderful movement forward that Harvard has reinitiated their program. So I think that's great. I did want to ask about the amphibious assault ships. I'm a big supporter of the Marine Corps amphibious capabilities. It's the bread and butter of the Marine Corps to have the ability to conduct forcible entry operations from the sea. I think it's important that the Navy not decommission amphibious assault ships earlier than their expected service lifespans without replacements. I'm concerned that the Marine Corps will not have the sufficient amphibious capabilities to fully support the combatant commanders' requirements within an acceptable level of risk. I'm concerned that the Marine Corps will not have the sufficient amphibious capabilities to meet the demands for all the operational deployments that we're seeing. General Amos, can you discuss how the amphibious forces have been employed during this past year and talk about how this has helped to inform the recently completed force structure review? General Amos. Senator, I'll be happy to. I'm pretty proud of the Navy-Marine Corps team. Just in the last 12 months, you remember, just about a month or 2 from now we had 7 amphibious ships full of 5,000 marines and sailors off the coast of Haiti. When you could only put one airplane or two airplanes on the ground in the airport, everything else was clogged, it was the naval amphibious force that was providing the relief--water, food, medical supplies, evacuation--for 45 days. So that's where the last year began. The 15th MEU sailed off the coast of Pakistan and supported the Pakistan relief operation, flying their CH-53 Echo heavy lift helicopters 400 miles deep into Pakistan, up to the very northern part of Pakistan, to move folks around, provide relief efforts. While that was going on, the Harriers off the amphibious ships were flying combat sorties into Afghanistan in support of the joint force. Interestingly, one of the ships departed, went 1,000 miles due west, captured the Somalia pirates off the Magellan Star. About the same time, the 26th MEU, from your great State, sailed 30 days early. They hadn't even finished their certification yet, and they were able to certify en route. They joined the 15th MEU with their three ships to help support the Pakistani operations. 1,400 marines off of the 26th MEU are now ashore in the Helmand Province, reinforcing success for our forces on the ground there. As you've just seen, the 26th MEU sailed two ships up through the Suez and into the Mediterranean, now joined by marines from your great State as well, the First Battalion, Second Marines, poised off of the Mediterranean. I haven't counted the 31st MEU in the western Pacific, that came on the back side of that super typhoon in the Philippines. So lots--there is no shortage of work for the marine expeditionary amphibious units. They are very successful. Senator Hagan. Certainly. Secretary Mabus, in light of those comments, is the Navy reviewing and reconciling the amphibious requirements, ship retirement schedules, and the 30-year shipbuilding plans? Mr. Mabus. Senator, we keep a close eye on that. We have extended the USS Peleliu for a year, its retirement date. But the amount of effort, the amount of money, and the amount of people it would take to continue some of these very old amphibious ships now--the people are needed for other ships coming on line. The amount of money would take away from the newer ships we're building. We're building toward, and we're in sight of getting there, to having the 33 amphibious ship capacity, 11 big deck amphibs, LHAs, LHA(R)s, 11 LPDs, 11 LSDs. If Congress approves our shipbuilding plan, we will have 11, 11, 11 by 2017. Senator Hagan. Thank you, Secretary Mabus. I also understand that the Department's restructuring of the JSF program, including the recent 2-year probation of the Marine Corps' STOVL, the F-35B. The F-35B is fundamental to the expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps and this aircraft is also essential to how the Marine Corps deploys and utilizes its aviation assets in theater. This aircraft also provides the Marine Corps with the capability to land on the improvised airstrips and launch from the large-deck amphibious assault ships. It also provides the Marine Corps with the ability to rearm and refuel in the forward operating bases (FOB). Currently the AV-8B Harriers are approaching the end of their service life and the aircraft and its parts are no longer being produced. I know that the Fleet Readiness Center in Cherry Point in North Carolina, the engineers there, they actually engineer the replacement parts. Secretary Mabus and General Amos, what would be the impact of terminating the F-35B on the Marine Corps' ability to actually project the power that is necessary in some of these remote expeditionary environments? What effect will that have on the joint force capabilities in theater, as well as the Marine Corps' force structure? What would be some of the near- term milestones that you would expect for the Marine Corps to achieve to get the F-35B back on track? Mr. Mabus. Senator, I will give a very brief overview and then turn it over to the Commandant, who is far more eloquent than I am about the F-35B. The Commandant earlier today pointed out that the F-35B is a critical capability for the Marine Corps, the vertical takeoff and landing, for all the reasons that you have laid out. The 2-year intense look at it, or the probationary period, I think is going to give us an opportunity to focus on it and to make sure that the issues associated with it can be fixed within weight limits and cost limits. The Commandant has stated that he is now a program officer on this, and he gets updates on a very frequent and very routine basis. Some of the milestones that we're looking at: the number of test flights this year, this calendar year, is at about 140 percent of where we expected to be, so we're ahead of schedule there. The number of test points on those test flights, we're almost 200 percent there. They have achieved vertical takeoff and landings, more vertical takeoffs and landings so far in the first a little over 2 months of this year than they did all of last year. It's at least my understanding, and then I'm going to turn it over to the Commandant, that the issues associated with the B version are engineering in nature, and the question is whether those engineering issues can be solved inside weight limits and inside financial boundaries, and that that is what we're concentrating on. General Amos. Thank you, Secretary. Secretary, as I said in my opening statement, the way we employ our airplanes in the Marine Corps, we're the blue collar aviation for the United States of America. We get out, we get dirty. We fly in places where there are unimproved strips. We did it all the way to Tikrit when we crossed the border in March 2003. We had Harriers landing on highways. We flew off of narrow roads. We flew off of bombed-out runways and taxiways, all the way past Baghdad into Tikrit. So that's the way we operate. There are roughly 10 times the number of small airports around the world than there are larger ones. That fits us. We build our own runways when we have to. We have two of them in southern Afghanistan right now. One of them was Poys. We built it in about 30 days out of aluminum matting, so we could fight the fight for Marja a year ago at this time. So that's the way we employ it. We also fly them off the large-deck amphibious ships. So today, with 11 carriers and 11 large-deck amphibious ships, our Nation--this is a national capability--has 22 capital ships flying TACAIR aviation off of them. Now, imagine a couple of years from now being able to have F-35Cs on board those 11 aircraft carriers and F-35Bs flying off of those 11 large-deck amphibs. So our Nation would have for the very first time 22 capital ships with fifth generation capability flying off of them. So this is more than just the Marine Corps. If we lose the F-35B, there is no plan B for fixed wing airplanes on the large-deck amphibs. Our Nation's capability to project power and influence situations will be cut immeasurably, not in half. Certainly there are more airplanes on an aircraft carrier than there are--or fixed wings, than there are on an amphib. But it would be significant, and there is no plan B for that, ma'am. So the F-35B is a requirement. I'm optimistic. What I'm seeing now is very encouraging. Senator Hagan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan. Senator Blumenthal. Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to begin by again thanking all of the three witnesses for your very distinguished service to our Nation. Admiral, I'm new to the committee, but I'm sorry that I'm here for the last of your testimony on this issue, and simply say thank you and congratulate you on your extraordinary service to our Nation. I'd like to pick up, General Amos, if I may, on the last answer that you gave. I assume from your testimony that you would prefer to see the resources that might be devoted to an alternative engine for the JSF devoted instead to the F-35B alternative? General Amos. Sir, we made a decision, the Marine Corps made a decision, in the late 1990s to skip a generation of airplanes, to skip a fourth generation of airplanes, going from our F-18s, which is what we would call a third generation capability, and go on a procurement kind of diet for about 10 or 12 years to buy the F-35B. So that position has not changed, Senator, and that's where we are today. We need the airplane. We're confident in it and it fits the way we operate our airplanes. Senator Blumenthal. You would forego that alternative engine, the second engine, as it's been called, and instead devote those resources to that plane that you need so much? General Amos. Senator, I would, because we are a Navy- Marine Corps team and we operate off of naval vessels, and for the very same reason that the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy articulated earlier, there's just simply not enough room to have different types of engines, different types of test equipment, tool sets, procedures, and that kind of thing on naval vessels. Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I apologize if I may seem to be repeating one or more of the questions that have already been asked, but I want to return to the Virginia-class submarine procurement program, if I may, Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead. Could you outline for us what the impact would be on the procurement program for the Virginia-class submarine if there is no budget for the fiscal years 2011 and 2012 and we continue with a CR? I have in mind particularly the Admiral's testimony that so far the submarines have been delivered under budget and ahead of schedule. So I'm wondering if there could be continuing negotiations, as you've outlined, to continue the two-sub procurement program even with a CR. Mr. Mabus. Senator, under the rules of a CR as they are in place today we could only begin to build one Virginia-class submarine this year. We are scheduled to build two, two each year for the next 5 years. We have entered into a multi-year procurement on the Virginia-class submarine, which has driven the price down even further, giving the contractor some stability in terms of their base, their training, their infrastructure. So if we are unable to begin the second Virginia-class submarine, which would be the case under the current CR, not only would we jeopardize the total number of ships that we have; we would also break the multi-year agreement, which would cause the cost of those ships to rise. We would have to re- enter negotiations because we would not have ordered the number of ships we committed to under the multi-year. Senator Blumenthal. So even with the best of intentions, very likely the cost of that Virginia-class submarine program would rise as a result of continuing with the CR, as opposed to having a budget in place? Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. If we are not given relief on new starts, we will not be able to build the second one and the cost would almost certainly rise. Senator Blumenthal. General Amos, in the time that I have left I'd like to focus on an area that hasn't been covered so far, and that is the very impressive part of the report that you've given us today on some of the work that's ongoing with respect to the diagnosis and treatment of traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress. I am tremendously impressed by the general description that you've given in this report on the focus, the increased priority given to this very troubling area, and in particular the in-theater restoration center that provides comprehensive diagnosis and the proactive outreach that the Marine Corps has undertaken whenever any member of the Marine Corps is involved in a concussive event. I would appreciate further details, perhaps in a later session or in written form, whichever you find best to do, and invite you now just to provide some additional details if you wish. But I would very much appreciate a more detailed briefing, because I think that for all the Services this is a major challenge going forward in this conflict and setting an example for future conflicts. [The information referred to follows:] The Marine Corps is undertaking a proactive, comprehensive approach to address the challenge of Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)/Post-Traumatic Stress (PTS) including prevention, education, early identification, treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration. We are working closely with the Defense Center of Excellence, which is the Department of Defense lead agency on efforts to improve the prevention, identification, and treatment of TBI/PTS. We are actively implementing the requirements of Directive Type Memorandum 09-033 regarding mild TBI/concussion and have launched a mandatory screening protocol for marines exposed to blast events in theater. Our Navy medical personnel and leaders are receiving training on new event-based protocols and Marine personnel receive TBI/concussion training prior to deployment. Marines exposed to a potentially concussive event receive a mandatory medical evaluation and requirements are in place for Marine leaders to report on personnel who are exposed to potentially concussive events. Medical evaluation results are documented in medical records, and extra precautions and evaluations are in place for marines with repeat/multiple concussions. The Marine Corps, with Navy support, has established a Concussion and Musculoskeletal Restoration Care Center (CRCC) in theater. This center provides front-line care to patients with mild TBI/concussion and has dramatically improved identification, diagnosis, treatment, outcomes, and return to duty rates. CRCC provides comprehensive interdisciplinary care for concussion, psychological health, and musculoskeletal injuries. Interdisciplinary services include Family Medicine, Sports Medicine, Mental Health, Physical Therapy, Occupational Therapy, Acupuncture, and Spiritual therapy. Since its inception in August 2010, the CRCC has logged over 8,000 patient encounters, including evaluation and treatment of over 560 patients with concussion. Over 96 percent of patients treated for concussion at the CRCC have had favorable outcomes with return to full duty. In the past, these patients would have required evacuation to Kandahar or Bagram hospitals and/or evacuation out of theater. Processes are in place to screen all marines for TBI/PTS upon returning from deployment. Every marine evacuated from theater for injuries receives a TBI screen. This is primarily done via the Post- Deployment Health Assessment/Post-Deployment Health Reassessment. We are exploring new measures to measure blast exposure and improve detection of TBI, including biomarkers, imaging tools, and neuro- cognitive testing. The Marine Corps continues to pursue advances in personal protective equipment, including next-generation helmet technology to mitigate blast effects. Education about TBI has been shown to reduce morbidity following injury, and we are making efforts to ensure education is provided during predeployment briefs and at all levels of leadership training, from small unit leaders up to senior leaders. General Amos. Senator, I'll be happy to provide you the details, in fact, all the members of the committee, because I think it's encouraging. It hasn't solved it. The whole recognition of what happens to the brain is certainly not a mystery, but it is not clear because it doesn't happen in the same way to every single person. But there was recognition over 2 years ago, and it was really a collaborative effort by myself, or by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps--so I want to give credit to General Chiarelli and the Army--to try to figure out what happens to the brain when it's rattled as a result of an IED or some type of concussive event, and then what are the net effects. The net effects are not necessarily long-range PTS, but it could be. But clearly there was a correlation between getting your brain hit hard with a concussive event and the requirement to let the brain rest. In some cases it's 48 hours, in some cases it's a week, maybe 2 weeks. But the very best thing you can do to prevent further damage is to put that brain in some semblance of rest. So that's what we did. We built a concussive protocol, the one you're referring to in Afghanistan. Marines, soldiers, sailors, when that event happens, they come right back into what we call the wire. They're looked at by a corpsman if that's all we have there. We have cyber technology that allows the doctor at Camp Leatherneck to look in the eye of the wounded marine or soldier or sailor. Then we eventually will move them to that restoration care center at Camp Leatherneck, if required. The whole idea now is to just provide them the ability to step back, let their brain heal, to prevent further damage. Marines are tough. We lie. When a young lance corporal is asked by his company gunnie, how do you feel, he says: I'm good to go; when in fact, the very best thing the leadership can do is say: We're going to stop right here, young devil dog, and we're going to let you sit inside the wire for a day or so. We believe--it's too soon to tell; we don't have the empirical data. But we know in our hearts that this is the right thing to do. We'll be happy to provide you more information. Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. My time is up, but I would like to thank you for returning ROTC to Harvard as you've done and simply offer to be helpful anywhere on any campus, certainly in Connecticut, where I can be helpful if there's any way that we can restore ROTC anyplace where it's lacking now. Thank you. Thank you all. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator McCaskill. Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to say to you that I am excited about Marine Week in St. Louis in June, and I want to thank, commander, your decision to come to St. Louis. We will welcome the marines with open arms and, since our State has proudly contributed so many brave marines over the history of our military, we are thrilled to host you for that important event. Secretary Mabus, I know that our military is the best in the world at combat readiness, but we are really bad at audit readiness. I am continuing to be very frustrated with the business systems within DOD and the ability for us to get a handle on tracking our money and the various services being able to be transparent and viewable across systems. It is a continuing level of frustration. I do want to applaud the Navy and Marine Corps for making some important progress on service-level auditability. I know you have been working on it, and I know you've identified some net savings by improving your financial management processes. The program I want to focus in on today is the enterprise resource planning. You are slated to spend about a billion dollars on that in a supply system called the Global Command Support System. The Army is currently fielding a similar system called Global Combat Support System-Army. Theirs will cost nearly $4 billion. Now, I know you share equipment in theater. That is a reality of the fight, is the sharing of equipment. But these two systems have the same goal, that is tracking supply and equipment, but they're not even going to run on the same software. The Marines are using Oracle and the Army is running on SAP. There's a $3 billion cost differential. My understanding is that the two systems as designed are not even naturally compatible and that DOD will have to continue to pay just to develop interfaces between these two systems. I get a headache when I think about all the money that we have thrown away in the Federal Government on data systems and information technology. Now, part of this is unavoidable because the technology has developed so quickly that when we've tried to develop great big systems, by the time it gets ready to be deployed it's already out of date and antiquated. Some of it is the nature of the rapid transition we've had in this country with technology. But I think particularly within the military there is a problem in acknowledging when we're throwing bad money after good or when we're setting up systems that frankly make no sense in terms of what the ultimate goals are. Tell me your position on what could be done to make the effort at tracking our equipment, at least the ability to track it between the two branches of our Services that are sharing the same equipment? This is just hard for me to imagine, that we're going to continue down this multi-billion dollar road. Mr. Mabus. Senator, you and I share a lot of things. One of them is I know my first elected jobs and one of yours was as State auditor of our respective States. I understand the importance not only of auditability, but of these enterprise resource systems to track the things we do. If you'll also allow me one more moment of personal thing, a friend of mine once described my father as someone who threw nickels around like they were manhole covers, and I am my father's son. I think that we have to be good stewards of the taxpayers' money. In terms of auditability, what you said, we are making some progress on that and we are focused on that. In terms of the overall resource, the enterprise resource, that system began several years ago to try to get real-time information on things like inventory on things like equipment, on things, as it moved through the system. I'll be very frank. I don't know what the interface issues are with the Army. But I will find out, as a result of this. We are spending a lot of money to ensure that we can track on a real-time basis, not a week later or a month later, what's happening to all the assets that the Navy and the Marine Corps have. We should always look for opportunities, though, to be joint, to do things defense-wide. Senator McCaskill. As we are making really difficult decisions in this government over the next decade and we think the hard ones are today and tomorrow and next week, we're going to have hard decisions to make for a long time. What would be an amazing moment would be for the Army and the Marine Corps to sit down, decide whose system is further along, whose system is the easiest to be trained on, whose system is going to have the least amount of support costs ongoing, and to make a decision to use one for both. I don't know that it matters whether it's the Marine Corps system or the Army system. But it just seems unbelievable to me that we are paying for the development of two separate systems that don't speak to each other. This would be a moment that we could save. Since the Army's is more expensive, I'm hoping that yours is the one that could be utilized. This could be a $3 billion moment, and we're looking for $3 billion moments right now. This is the kind of thing that I think, until we can demonstrate to the American people that we can at least do these kinds of savings, I don't think they're going to take us seriously on our ability to deal with our long-term debt. So I would love to see--and I will be following up with Secretary Gates and with Admiral Mullen in terms of seeing how many places are there that we could do something like this. Now, I know this is hard to do, because you've been working on this for a long time, and so has the Army, and there's some separateness been going on for several years, and sometimes it's not wanting to step in and say, okay, all the money we've spent, we're going to abandon that and go forward in a different way. But sometimes that's the smartest thing to do. General Amos? General Amos. Senator, I'm familiar with the GCCS Marine Corps software by Oracle. That effort began--let me back up, just maybe give you a ray of hope. There is a what we call an Army-Marine Corps Board. It's chaired by the three-stars, the head of requirements and the comptroller. So it's the budget and requirements folks. They meet as required, typically about twice a month, and they resolve an awful lot of these issues where both Services come up. It can be a helmet, it can be something like a service weapon, it can be a piece of equipment. Now, we all have different--not all our equipment is the same, and you know that. But a lot of that compatibility and who's going to buy what, what's going to jump on whose program, is solved right there at the three-star level. So there is an effort that is under way. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), chaired by all the Service Vices and the Vice Chairman, also looks at compatibility across the joint force. But back to this GCCS, we got halfway through Iraq. We're talking about 2006, and the truth of the matter is we had a lot of equipment on the ground to satisfy those 35,000 marines and sailors. We thought we knew how much we had and we had a variety of systems, about 15, that were tracking. We said we have to come up with something different. Ergo the birth of the requirement from Oracle. The system right now, I can't speak to the Army's system, but our system is fielding right now in Okinawa and it is probably, of all the software efforts we've ever done in the Marine Corps and spent a lot of money and been disappointed often, this one probably has the greatest hope of all the ones we have. So let us check with the Army. Let us come back to you with a ``here's where we are as two Services.'' We owe you that, ma'am. [The information referred to follows:] The Army and the Marines Corps both used the competitive contracting process to select their respective software applications based on their specific Service requirements. Although the Army and the Marines Corps may share similar logistics requirements, at the highest level they differ in terms of: people; process/mission execution; technology-interfaces; and data. Although at first glance it seems logical and compelling to have different Services use the same solution, as the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System taught the Department of Defense, it is enormously difficult, expensive, and very high risk. In 2005, the IT consulting firm Gartner analyzed this question and concluded it was appropriate, cost effective, and logical for the Services to have chosen two different solutions. Also, there was never a requirement for Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps and Global Combat Support System-Army to be interoperable and pass information, so consequently, at the present time they don't. However, if such a requirement arose, the two systems could be made interoperable through the use of an interface. Senator McCaskill. I understand that JROC was designed to do this, but in other hearings we have had some admissions that the culture of JROC had unfortunately too often been, we'll give you what you want if you'll give us what I want; that there had been some of that, as opposed to, okay, we're going to give up what we want and you're going to give up what you want and see if we can't do it together. I know, because I worked on this in a previous National Defense Authorization bill trying to provide maybe some input from somewhere other than the branches, because it did appear too often that everybody was going along to get along. General Amos. Ma'am, having been the Assistant Commandant for 27 months and been a member of the JROC, I found it almost painful sometimes, how we worked our way through situations. But I will also tell you it's more than culture; it's also the way we deploy, in other words, the kind of systems we need. The software has to support the ability to go aboard ship, to deploy expeditionary in places in North Africa, if required. So there are some differences. But we owe you an answer, ma'am. I understand. Senator McCaskill. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. Senator Shaheen. Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Amos---- Chairman Levin. Your mike. Senator Shaheen. It's on. Is that better? Chairman Levin. No. Maybe you better change your seat. Senator McCaskill. Change that name tag from Senator Manchin. Chairman Levin. For your sake, not for his. Senator Shaheen. I was assuming it was for my sake, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] --I apologize for missing your testimony. I had to preside over the Senate. But I am pleased that you're still here and hopefully I won't take too much time. I know that Senator Collins earlier today raised the question about the backlog of restoration and modernization projects at the four public shipyards. It's a major concern to Senator Collins, being from Maine, and to me, being from New Hampshire, because of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. I know that a recent GAO report that was requested by Senators Collins and Webb made four recommendations to improve the visibility of the Navy shipyards restoration and modernization needs and quality of life issues. I would just hope, Secretary Mabus and all of you, that you will take those recommendations very seriously, and look forward to working with you to implement those. Specifically, as I said, I'm concerned about the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, the fact that no MILCON funds have been allocated to the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard by the executive branch in the last 5 years. So that that means in previous years the shipyard has had to rely on congressionally-directed spending, which included $39.2 million in fiscal year 2008 and $17.2 million in previous proposed fiscal year 2011 spending. So given the current spending environment and the moratorium that currently exists on congressionally-directed spending, or earmarks, how does the Navy intend to support critical MILCON investments at Portsmouth and at the other public shipyards? Perhaps as part of your answer you could talk a little about how you might prioritize those investments and support modernization. Mr. Mabus. Senator, if it's acceptable to you, I'll let the CNO answer this, since he answered Senator Collins, so that we can have an absolute continuity of answers. Senator Shaheen. Shoot, I was going to see if you could answer it the same way. [Laughter.] Admiral Roughead. I'm sure he could, Senator. The shipyards, particularly our four public shipyards, are going to be very critical for us in the future, simply because of the amount of nuclear work that we have coming into the window. Accordingly, we are looking at what must be done, primarily for the safety and security issues, particularly as it applies to our nuclear enterprise, and then productivity and quality of life. Even though we do have the backlog, in point of fact we are investing above what has been the congressional level of sustainment for the shipyards. But we're always looking at what needs to be done for those four areas that I mentioned. I would also, being perfectly honest, that as we have looked at the level of funding going into the shipyards and as circumstances have changed, we're going to have to take a look at what the future looks like and how we apportion the MILCON money, not just across shipyards, but really across all of the facilities that we have. But I think the public shipyards are going to be in a very good position in the coming years from a workforce standpoint, as the Secretary mentioned, being exempt from the hiring limitations, but also they're going to be very busy and very critical to our future. Senator Shaheen. I certainly agree with that and am pleased to hear that you're thinking about that. Can I just press you a little more on, as you point out, you're going to have to prioritize those investments. So have you thought about the factors that you'll take into consideration in doing that? Admiral Roughead. Yes, ma'am. Clearly, nuclear safety and nuclear security are foremost, and that applies to the four public yards that we have, and then also the safety of our workforce is paramount. So those are the opening arguments for me. Mr. Mabus. Senator, in terms of setting priorities, the CNO mentioned this, there is a civilian hiring freeze at DOD right now. Because of the importance of shipyards, we asked for and received an exemption for shipyard hiring, so that we can continue to maintain our industrial base and the work that the shipyards are doing. Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I do appreciate that and think that was very important. I know that at Portsmouth we've had a very competent, productive workforce and we're going to be losing many of those folks because many of them are close to retirement age. So being able to bring on younger people who can start training for those jobs is going to be very important to productivity. On another issue, Secretary Mabus, I certainly applaud your focus on trying to be more energy independent within the jurisdiction that you control. I wonder if you could talk a little bit more about the kinds of steps that you're taking in the Navy to be more energy efficient. It is a critical security issue, as you've pointed out, and I think it's important for us in Congress and for the public to know that we're moving in a direction to make us more energy independent, especially these days as we're watching what's happening in the Middle East. Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. As you pointed out, you don't have to look any further than the headlines to know why we need to do this. We've made a lot of progress toward our goal, which we're going to reach, of by no later than 2020 at least half our energy usage will come from non-fossil fuel sources. We've flown the F-18 on biofuels. We've certified our helicopters also on biofuels, as well as our Swift boats. We are currently working on our large surface combatants in that regard. We are doing a lot of work on efficiencies. We've launched the first hybrid ship. We're looking at putting the electric drive that is on that ship on our new builds as well as retrofitting some of our DDG-51s. On shore, we have vastly expanded our solar capacity. We've done stuff like smart meters so that we know where our energy's going. Finally, I want to particularly brag on the Marine Corps, because, like they normally do, they're leaders in this. They have established two expeditionary FOBs, experimental FOBs, one at Quantico, one at Twentynine Palms, to develop the alternative energy that our warfighters need. What we import the most into Afghanistan is gasoline. The Army did a study that showed that for every 24 convoys of gasoline, we lose a soldier or a marine killed or wounded guarding that convoy. It also takes marines away from doing what they were sent there to do, which is to fight, to engage, to rebuild. The first unit that took some of these things that experimental FOBs designed was 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, which I got to visit right before Christmas in Sangin. Now, they're in some of the toughest fighting in Afghanistan right now, but even in that fight they have taken solar panels and are using them for their command headquarters. They've taken these rollable solar panels and stuck them in their packs. I was talking to a lieutenant there. A foot patrol now saves 700 pounds of batteries that they don't have to take because of this. They are reducing dramatically their usage of fossil fuels. The Commandant has just signed out a requirement, an order, that is going to integrate the training on alternative energy as part of the routine training that marines get before they deploy, so that they'll better be able to use these. But we are seeing real advances. We're saving lives, we're using less fuel, and we're making marines better fighters just because they don't have to lug around so much stuff. Senator Shaheen. That's very impressive. Thank you. Perhaps you can share some of those technologies with the rest of us in government, so that we can be more efficient and more energy independent. My time is up. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen. I think the figure you used on that point was that that unit was saving 90 percent? Is that the right number, of its fossil fuel? The fuel used decreased 90 percent with that company, I believe. Mr. Mabus. That company is saving a lot. It's probably not 90 percent. Chairman Levin. All right. Mr. Mabus. But I can get you a very specific number, but its energy usage, in some of its combat outposts, it's 100 percent; they're using nothing but alternative fuels. Overall for the unit, it's significant, but I don't think it reaches 90 percent. Chairman Levin. What we will do, following Senator Shaheen's suggestion, is to get that experience, if it's not already there, to the other, to the Army as well, because we have the same issue, goal, with the Army, as Senator Shaheen mentioned. [The information referred to follows:] While deployed to the Sangin Province Afghanistan, India Company Third Battalion, Fifth Marines (3/5) operated two patrol bases completely on renewable energy, offsetting 100 percent of their potential fuel use. Based on reports from Marines in the field it is estimated that each patrol base saved 12 gallons per day per location. This means that each month these two patrol bases would have offset approximately 744 gallons per month (31 days 24 gals) or 8,928 gallons per year. It is evident that a small savings at a remote patrol base has significant impacts over the long term, not to mention immediate reduction in risk to our marines moving fuel in a very dangerous area. In addition to the patrol bases operated by India 3/5, they also employed renewable and energy efficient technologies at a company location too. At the company location, fuel use was reduced from 25 gallons per day to 2.5 gallons per day or an initial savings of 90 percent. Targeting renewable and energy efficient technologies at remote outpost immediately reduces the risks to our forces and increases our combat effectiveness. Chairman Levin. Senator Ayotte. Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses here today, Admiral Roughead, Secretary Mabus, and General Amos, for your distinguished service to our country. We're deeply grateful for what you're doing. I also want to thank you for all of those that serve underneath you, for the sacrifices that they and their families are making for our country at a time of conflict. I wanted to follow up on, Admiral, on the questions that were asked by Senator Shaheen. I wanted to join in her comments about the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the importance of that shipyard. I wanted to ask you specifically about the project to consolidate structural workshops at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. This project is a very important one because it would ultimately save taxpayers' dollars through efficiency measures at the shipyard and it would certainly improve efficiency of shipyard operations, reduce cost, and duration of submarine maintenance. Currently, this project is scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 2015. But, given the importance of the project to naval readiness and taxpayers' savings that I believe that we could accomplish with this, given added efficiencies, I think this project should be moved up to fiscal year 2012. Admiral, does the Navy's fiscal year 2012 budget proposal include this project to consolidate structural workshops at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard? Admiral Roughead. Senator, right now it is in the program for 2015. But it has several segments to it. To your point, if we do it by segment it will actually cost us more money. So we can consolidate two of the phases and actually save money, and we're looking at the ability to do that because we see some potential changes taking place in some other MILCON, and my staff knows to look at that, to see if there is the potential to pull it up into 2012. Senator Ayotte. So if we were to consolidate and pull it up into 2012, it actually would result in cost savings, rather than segmenting the project, as it is right now? Admiral Roughead. The way that I see the project, it would cost us about another $8 million if we don't do the consolidation. Senator Ayotte. So I appreciate that you and your staff are looking at this. It also seems to me not only important in terms of the shipyard, but a way to save taxpayers' dollars to achieve efficiencies at the shipyard with the important work that they're doing there. Admiral Roughead. Yes, ma'am. I'm always looking for efficiencies. Senator Ayotte. We deeply appreciate that. Obviously, the shipyard is very important in the Navy's mission and we appreciate your bringing that forward. I'd be happy to work with you on that if you need any assistance. Admiral Roughead. Thank you, ma'am. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus, in your written statement you had noted that rising health care costs within the military health system continue to present a fiscal challenge to DOD, and you've written that DOD's resources devoted to health care costs cannot be sustained. According to a recent March GAO report, there are tremendous opportunities to reduce potential duplication in government programs among the Services in terms of looking at military health care costs. I want you to tell me what steps you thought were appropriate to take in addressing the findings of the GAO report on duplication. Mr. Mabus. I think it's important to separate a couple of things here. One is Active Duty health care. There have been no changes in terms of amounts of money spent or things like that recommended for Active Duty servicemembers. There have been recommendations in terms of more service-wide efficiencies that the GAO report did on that. In terms of my comments that the health care costs were going up, were aimed mainly at health care costs for retirees under the Medicare age, that the Secretary of Defense has made some recommendations on. We fully concur in that. That's where our costs are going up. That, I think, will become unsustainable in the future. The Secretary of Defense on a defense-wide basis has recommended that the costs for a single person go up $2.50 per month, for a family, $5 per month. We're talking about going for a family, from $460 a year to $520 a year in terms of premiums--a very modest increase. It's still far, far below what a Federal employee who is not a military retiree would have to pay. There are also overhead reductions in this. We do think that there can be some savings in overhead in terms of the way we deliver our health care costs. But those two major things, we think, are necessary to keep us sustainable just in terms of how much money we're spending on health care. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to follow up, because obviously with respect to our retirees and our veterans we also have a solemn duty to make sure that we follow through on the promises that we've made to them with respect to health care and other promises, given their service to our country. So this committee certainly will be looking at those proposals. I also wanted to just follow up on the idea of greater coordination to eliminate duplication within the system, to try to save administrative costs, and what your thoughts are, and what some of the issues that were identified in the GAO report were, and what measure you thought that we could take among the branches and even within the Navy to try to save some administrative costs in that area? Mr. Mabus. There are clearly some areas that you can save some administrative costs. We're looking not only between Services, but also between the Services and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) system, for example. We're going to an integrated disability evaluation system so that a servicemember who is disabled doesn't have to go through that twice, once for the Service, once for the VA. That saves one step. That obviously saves some overhead costs. Because of the previous Base Realignment and Closure Commission, Walter Reed, and Bethesda are being merged into one health care center, and we are actively promoting some savings in overhead there. We think that, very frankly, there's too much overhead in the joining of those two very critical military facilities. So you and the GAO are correct that there are efficiencies that we can find just in terms of administrative overhead. We have found some of them based on the efficiencies that Secretary Gates asked us to find. But we are continuing that look, not only in health care, but across DOD, but specifically in health care. Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much for your answer. My time is up. I wanted to thank all of you for the work that you're doing on behalf of our country. I just offer that I certainly am willing to work with you on making sure that we achieve these efficiencies so that we continue to support our soldiers and those who have sacrificed so much for us. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. In your answer to Senator Ayotte, Mr. Secretary, you made reference to the budget's proposed increase in the enrollment fees for retirees under 65. When was the last time those fees were increased, do you know offhand? Mr. Mabus. I believe it was 1995, Senator. Chairman Levin. I'm wondering if I could ask you, Admiral, and you, General, do you support the budget proposal that those fees be increased? Admiral Roughead. I do, sir. I think it's appropriate. I do not believe it is an onerous cost and I'm fully supportive of those changes. Chairman Levin. General? General Amos. Chairman, I absolutely support them. Chairman Levin. Let me ask you about the no-fly zone issue. Our NATO allies, including U.K., France, and Italy, are looking at U.N. resolutions and what the role of NATO might be in any no-fly zone. So that my question is the following: Even without direct U.S. involvement, do our NATO allies have the capability of implementing a no-fly zone over Libya, presumably with the support of members of the international community? Do they have the capability of dealing with any threat by the Libyan air force, such as it is, and by Libyan air defenses, such as they are? Admiral Roughead. Senator, I think that whatever group comes together if, in fact, this were to proceed would have to look at the individual capabilities of that country or those countries and see what it was. But the NATO air capability is significant, sophisticated. I think you have to see what the final outcome is. Chairman Levin. So that in terms of the specific capabilities of those air forces even without our involvement, you're not able to say now whether or not they could successfully carry out that mission? Admiral Roughead. Senator, I think the capabilities reside within the NATO air forces. It's who comes together and contributes what that would determine the effectiveness of that package. Chairman Levin. On the question of Guam and Okinawa, you mentioned, Mr. Secretary, that there need to be some Japanese Government decisions. Do you know whether there are any discussions or negotiations scheduled with the Japanese Government relative to that issue? Mr. Mabus. I know that Secretary Gates in his previous discussions earlier this year was very frank with the Japanese Government on what those decisions need to be, and I think that the Japanese Government understands exactly what actions need to be taken before we can begin to take some substantive steps. Chairman Levin. Do you know whether there are any scheduled negotiations or discussions? Mr. Mabus. No, sir, I don't. Chairman Levin. That's fair. If there are, would you let us know? Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. Chairman Levin. Senator Webb mentioned that the two of us will be heading out that way in about a month and that we should know the status. We'll be briefed, obviously, by you and your folks before we go, but on that issue particularly, if there's anything scheduled, if you'll let us know. [The information referred to follows:] In response to the request for notification of negotiations scheduled between the United States and Government of Japan, although a 2+2 (Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs) had been tentatively scheduled for April 29 in Washington, due to the senior level focus of the Government of Japan and especially the Ministry of Defense, on managing the response to the natural disaster and nuclear crisis, this meeting has been postponed. We are seeking acceptable dates for all parties in the near future. We do not yet have a firm timetable from the Japanese for the landfill permit process, but in our judgment they remain committed to the Roadmap, both for the Guam move as well as the Futenma Replacement Facility and Okinawa. Chairman Levin. Admiral Roughead, you've testified on a number of occasions about your support of the United States signing onto the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). You reiterate that support in your written statement this morning. I think, Mr. Secretary, you've also testified before this committee in support of our supporting that treaty and acceding to it. Is there anything that's happened in the last year that has either changed or strengthened either of your positions on that? Mr. Secretary, let me start with you. Mr. Mabus. It has strengthened my idea that we should accede to this treaty, for a couple of reasons. One is, as other nations who are signatories try to restrict our freedom of navigation, we are less able to push back with as much force as we should be able to were we a signatory to this. I think that you're only going to see that increase, as it has over the past year. Second, I've seen firsthand some of the implications of the Arctic and the perhaps ice-free Arctic in the next couple of decades. The only way we can have a claim to an outer continental shelf area that we can explore for minerals, that we can use as part of our exclusive economic zone, is if we are signatories to the UNCLOS. Those two things have strengthened my stand that we very much need to be signatories. Chairman Levin. Admiral? Admiral Roughead. I would echo those statements, Senator. I think we are letting an opportunity and time pass us by. On top of those two, where the claims in the Pacific in particular have the potential to become more contentious. The opening of the Arctic, where resolution of claims and disagreements will be done through UNCLOS, we will not be there. On top of that, I would submit that our international leadership to those countries that view the seas the same way that we do, that as they come together to address these issues we are not there, and they look to us for that leadership and we are abrogating that leadership. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I indicated to you that there was a couple of questions on that second engine that I asked you to respond to for the record. In addition to those two questions, let me add a third and a fourth just for the record, if you would. One would be how much development money has gone into the first engine and what is the $400 million, I believe, additional request for the Pratt engine development due to the business case, and how much total has gone into that engine in terms of development costs. Finally, I have a long question which I'll get to you both, both you, Mr. Secretary, and you, Admiral, about this issue of special support requirements if there is a second engine. It's a lengthy question raising issues with your responses. I think also you, General, responded on that as well. So I would ask all three of you to take a look at that question that I will get to you, and then you can submit your answer for the record. [The information referred to follows:] Mr. Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Amos. The F135 and F136 engines constitute two different designs by two different manufacturers. The large size of the F135 and F136 (approximately 18.7 feet and weighs 9,300 lbs in its container) necessitates greater sparing aboard ships as neither the assembled engine nor the power section module can currently be replenished underway. Similarly, due to the weight and height of critical engine spares, it is not feasible to store all Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) engine spares in legacy store rooms or stack them aboard ships as is done for the legacy system. This would necessitate work-around in hangar deck spaces normally reserved to store and maintain tactical aircraft. Adding an alternate engine makes the shipboard logistics even more challenging as it is not a one- for-one exchange. While the F136 engine would be interchangeable, there are several engine components that are not interchangeable. The fan, gear box, and power section modules are unique by F135 and F136 propulsion systems. Only the augmenter and exhaust nozzle modules are common by F-35 variant. Supporting two engines would require unique spares, unique support equipment, and unique training. The JSF specification only requires engines to perform to specified criteria and physically fit into the F-35. Maintenance/repair technical requirements are different, requiring different instructions and training with differences in assembly hardware and special tools for off-aircraft repair. [Deleted.] Chairman Levin. I must leave. Senator Ayotte, you're more than welcome to take the gavel and conclude if you have additional questions, if that's all right. I'll hand it to you on the way out. Thank you all. All three of you have performed extraordinary service for this country. Admiral, since this is probably your last appearance here, I just want to reinforce what my colleagues have said about you and that service. We just wish you well if we don't see you again. Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator. It's been my honor. Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, thank you, and General, thank you both. Senator Ayotte [presiding]. I just have a couple of brief questions and then I will wrap this up for sure. I appreciate your patience. Admiral Roughead, I wanted to ask you about the maintenance portion of the budget. Secretary Gates said on March 4 that a lot of our surface ships that were built in the Reagan era will be aging out in coming years pretty quickly. In your written testimony you've echoed this concern, saying: ``Many of our existing cruisers, destroyers, and submarines will reach the end of their service life.'' I notice in the budget proposal for fiscal year 2012 you've funded ship depot maintenance at 94 percent, and wanted to hear from you if you could provide some examples of what type of maintenance would not be accomplished at that level versus 100 percent maintenance level, understanding that in order for us to preserve our fleet we are probably going to have to be doing additional maintenance, given the aging of the fleet. Admiral Roughead. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. We are spending much more on maintenance now than we did just a couple of years ago. So with the support of Congress, we've been able to boost that up. As we got into putting the final touches on the budget, because we have done that little bit of a boost-up and we looked at ship availabilities, maintenance periods, and the ones that are not included in there are not the complex types of work. They tend to be smaller availabilities. Clearly they don't include any nuclear work, nor do they include any of the work that's done in the public shipyards. These are all availabilities in the private sector, relatively small, and I believe that where we have been--some of the changes that we're putting into place with regard to putting more sailors on ships and in maintenance centers, that I consider this a reasonable approach to take. Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much, Admiral. General Amos, I had a question about our detention policy. I had the privilege of going over to visit some of your soldiers in January. I also want to say the work being done by the Marines is just tremendous and so wanted to commend you for your leadership and also just thank the soldiers that serve underneath you. If tomorrow we were able to capture the number two in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, that was actually formerly a detainee at Guantanamo--I believe his name is Saeed al-Shehri-- where would we put him? General Amos. Senator, that's way above my pay grade. I wouldn't know where we would put him. Truly, the truth of the matter is that that would be resolved at a level with much discussion. In fact, I doubt if the Commandant of the Marine Corps would even be part of that discussion. It would be at the very highest levels of our government. Senator Ayotte. One of the concerns that I have is that I've heard testimony now from Secretary Gates as well as Secretary Vickers that because we're in a position where the President wants to close Guantanamo, there is no detention facility to put that type of high-value target that we have under our control. Are you aware of a facility we would have under our control that would be appropriate and not located in the United States, to be able to not only interrogate that individual, but make sure that he doesn't again rejoin the battlefield? General Amos. Ma'am, I am not aware of another facility. Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much. I appreciate all of you being here and I'm sure you're all anxious for lunch, so I will conclude this hearing. I thank you all for your service to our country. This hearing is adjourned. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPEAL OF ``DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL'' 1. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, last December, Admiral Roughead testified that, ``with the exception of the moderate risk associated with projected retention in some Navy irregular warfare specialties, I assess the risk to readiness, effectiveness, and cohesion of the Navy to be low. Based on my professional judgment and informed by the inputs from our Navy, I recommend repeal of 10 U.S.C. section 654.'' General Amos testified: ``based on what I know about the very tough fight in Afghanistan, the almost singular focus of our combat forces as they train up and deploy to theater, the necessary tightly woven culture of those combat forces that we are asking so much of at this time, and finally the direct feedback from the survey, my recommendation is that we should not implement repeal at this time.'' Since that hearing, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy have been working on policy changes and developing training plans needed to implement the repeal. What are your observations of how Navy personnel are dealing with possible repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT)? Mr. Mabus. Our Master Mobile Training Teams and command leadership teams continue to provide regular reports capturing the ``tone of the force'' during this training period. Feedback from our sailors indicates the training they are receiving is comprehensive, well- delivered, and effective. Additionally, we have not observed any impacts to readiness, effectiveness, cohesion, recruiting, or retention. 2. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead and General Amos, what are your current assessments of the risk to readiness, effectiveness, and cohesion in the Navy and Marine Corps if DADT is repealed? Admiral Roughead. I assess the risk to readiness, effectiveness, and cohesion in the Navy to be low and acceptable. According to the results of the Comprehensive Review Working Group servicemember survey, approximately 76 percent of sailors believe the impacts on effectiveness, readiness, unit cohesion, and morale will be neutral or positive. There is approximately 24 percent who believe the impact of repeal will be negative. I am mindful of the concerns expressed by these individuals. However, I believe their concerns can be effectively mitigated through engaged leadership, effective communications, training and education, and clear and concise standards of conduct. Since we have begun training, our commanders have reported no impacts to readiness, effectiveness, or cohesion. I have the utmost confidence in the ability of the men and women of the U.S. Navy to implement this change in the law while setting a positive tone, creating an inclusive and respectful work environment, and maintaining high standards of conduct, mutual respect, and military decorum. General Amos. I currently believe the risk is low to moderate. However, we will not know the actual impact of repeal until it is effected. During the current training phase, we have not observed significant anxiety or push-back from our marines. I am confident that Marine leaders at all levels will ensure our Corps understands the impending change and will ensure that marines treat each other with dignity and respect, thereby mitigating any impact on readiness, effectiveness, and unit cohesion. 3. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead and General Amos, please describe the status of training and education of sailors and marines regarding the repeal of DADT. Admiral Roughead. Navy is on track to meet our training completion goal of 1 July 2011 for all naval personnel. Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces has been appointed the Executive Agent for delivery and tracking of DADT training. Master Mobile Training Teams have been deployed to our Fleet worldwide to deliver training to our command leadership teams (commanding officer, executive officer, command master chief). These individuals will be responsible in turn to conduct the training for all personnel within their command. To date, more than 90 percent of our command leadership personnel (Tier 2) have been trained and are conducting training Navy-wide for all remaining personnel (Tier 3). Specific training for recruiters, military law enforcement, chaplains, legal, Fleet and Family Support Centers, personnel support professionals, housing, senior human resource personnel, equal opportunity, and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) personnel (Tier 1) has been commenced and will be completed by the 1 July 2011 deadline. General Amos. The Marine Corps is complete with Tier 1 (special staff) and Tier 2 (leadership) training. As of 30 June 2011, Tier 3 (Marines) training is 95 percent complete. Our primary method of instruction is face-to-face where leaders are able to interact with their marines, provide information and then have a frank and open discussion about any questions or concerns they may have. 4. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead and General Amos, have you discovered any unanticipated issues as you initiated the training? If so, how are you addressing these issues? Admiral Roughead. Navy has not experienced any unanticipated issues during the training process. Feedback from our sailors indicates the training they are receiving is comprehensive, well-delivered, and effective. Additionally, we have not observed any impacts to readiness, effectiveness, cohesion, recruiting, or retention during the training period. General Amos. We have not observed any significant unanticipated issues during training. The framework for the training is very comprehensive and anticipates many common questions and concerns. SEXUAL ASSAULTS IN THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS 5. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, 17 current and former service men and women recently filed a lawsuit in Federal Court alleging that DOD ``failed to prevent plaintiffs and others from being raped and sexually assaulted.'' Four of the plaintiffs were from the Navy and two from the Marine Corps. Among other things, the plaintiffs allege that DOD failed to investigate rapes and sexual assaults and failed to prosecute the perpetrators. Some reports suggest that up to one-third of the women serving in the military are victims of sexual assault. What is your assessment of the Navy's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program? Mr. Mabus. Nothing has a more corrosive effect on readiness, good order, and discipline than sexual assault. We seek nothing less than a culture of gender respect where sexual assault is completely eliminated and never tolerated. The ``Navy Sexual Assault Prevention Summit'' brought together senior military and civilian Navy leaders to interact with recognized experts in the field. I established a new Navy Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (DON-SAPRO), led by a Senior Executive Service civilian who reports directly to me. DON-SAPRO is my primary agent for developing Secretariat-level policy and for monitoring, coordinating, and assessing the Navy-wide efforts to prevent sexual assaults. The Department of the Navy and its two military Services--the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps continue our commitment to reduce the incidence of sexual assault, provide compassionate support to sexual assault survivors, and focus on prevention. Senior department leadership provide a consistent top-down leadership message, underscored by their actions that sexual assault is incompatible with our core values. Examples of the many initiatives taken by the Navy in fiscal year 2010 include: ``Bystander Intervention'' pilot programs at four locations--educated sailors and marines on recognizing and interrupting risky situations. Further implementation is planned for fiscal year 2011. Engaged a nationally-recognized civilian expert to advise departmental efforts on sexual assault prevention and to help update sexual assault training curricula. Expanded training for military investigators and prosecutors and sponsored ``Sexual Assault Investigation and Prosecution'' mobile training teams. The Marine Corps has revised its training curriculum for Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs), and Victim Advocates (UVAs/VAs). 6. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, have you made any changes in the Navy to improve accountability for Navy personnel who commit sexual assaults? Mr. Mabus. Sexual assaults are crimes that devastate victims, undermine teamwork, threaten unit cohesiveness, and ultimately reduce fleet readiness. Navy has a ``zero tolerance'' sexual assault policy. Expectations of senior leadership for SAPR are outlined in policy and in Naval and Marine administrative messages sent worldwide. Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG), Marine Corps Judge Advocate Division, and NCIS partnered to review cases, analyze characteristics of typical cases, and develop best practices for investigation, evaluation, and prosecution of sexual assault cases. Trends were evaluated to determine the type of training necessary to improve the quality of investigation and prosecution of sexual assault cases. This training was then delivered using mobile training teams throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. Specific Department and Service-level initiatives: Hired two Sexual Assault Litigation Specialists (nationally recognized experts) Developed new courses: Prosecuting Alcohol-Facilitated Sexual Assault; Sexual Assault Litigation and Mentoring Skills; and Trial Advocacy taught by AEquitas Navy JAG Corps implemented the Military Justice Litigation Career Track Marine Corps Trial Counsel Assistance Program implemented Judge Advocate Division conducted Marine Corps-wide Victim Witness Assistance Program (VWAP) training Ensured sexual assault and VWAP were addressed in all leadership training venues Developed joint-service DVD on sexual assault prosecution Expanded NCIS training for Family and Sexual Violence Special Agents DON Sexual Assault Advisory Council established in policy requiring senior leadership participation from all key SAPR stakeholders Ongoing SAPRO team site visits and fleet-wide SAPR Workshops (CONUS and OCONUS) focus on leadership and command responsibility for SAPR SAPR definitions and reporting requirements were added on Navy advancement exams DON Sexual Assault Prevention Summit scheduled for May 2011 with DON senior leadership, Regional and Installation Commanders, and senior enlisted leadership will focus on prevention and management of sexual assault cases 7. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead and General Amos, what measures have you taken as service chiefs to provide a safe environment for sailors and marines so that they do not have to fear being sexually assaulted by fellow servicemembers? Admiral Roughead. Navy continues to maintain a zero tolerance policy toward sexual assault. My goal is to eliminate sexual assault by fostering a culture of prevention which includes effective education and training, a 24/7 response capability to ensure victim support, reporting procedures available worldwide, and accountability that enhances the safety and well being of all. As CNO, I have implemented the following measures: Increased oversight. In September 2009, I appointed Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower Personnel Training and Education (N1) as the Executive Agent (EA) for the Navy SAPR program to provide high level oversight and assessment through regularly scheduled program reviews in which key stakeholders provide inputs on critical SAPR measures of performance and are briefed on the program's effectiveness. To ensure accountability down to the local level, Navy implemented Sexual Assault Coordinating Committees in fiscal year 2010. These organizations provide local oversight of the SAPR program at each installation. Policy update. Navy's SAPR policy has been revised and will be released in the near future. The revision has been issued to improve servicemember confidence in the Navy's SAPR program and to improve the rate and level of victim participation in the legal process. The revision has two significant changes that enhance guidance and factors for commanders to consider about the collateral misconduct of victims of sexual assault and increases the required information dissemination throughout the chain of command following a sexual assault and through the legal resolution. Raising Awareness and Enhanced Training. Navy has engaged with other governmental agencies and internal agencies to raise sexual assault awareness, increase victim and servicemember confidence, promote Bystander Intervention (BI), and ultimately reduce the occurrence of sexual assaults. Navy has also incorporated SAPR into training curricula at all levels, beginning at the accession points for officers and enlisted. It then is reinforced through our specialty school curriculum and our leadership school curriculums. The Navy hired a highly-qualified expert who adds critical expertise to the development of the overall Navy Prevention strategy with the intent of identifying gaps across the continuum of training, prevention, and response initiatives. Synchronized messages. Navy develops and delivers consistent and concise messages through social marketing media channels, Navy Administrative Messages and Sexual Assault Awareness Month events. Messaging is also coordinated with the Navy Safety Center to focus on the link between alcohol misuse and sexual assault. Bystander Intervention. Navy is completing analysis of a 9-month bystander intervention pilot program which was focused on the elimination of sexual assault incidents. This program leveraged peer-to-peer training using real life scenarios. Evaluation of a fleet-wide roll out will be included in the analysis. Victim Support. Navy provides 24/7 response for sexual assault victims through trained Victim Advocates (VA) and Sexual Assault Response Coordinators. Navy is also fully engaged in the roll out of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) sponsored Safe Helpline, a resource which provides expert support to military victims of sexual assault via telephone, text, or chat. General Amos. The Marine Corps has taken aggressive actions to heighten awareness about sexual assault and make prevention a leadership issue. Commanders are responsible for creating a safe environment and a climate of respect for all marines. We have also taken measures to highlight the Sexual Assault Prevention Response Program by partnering with industry experts, promoting a strong prevention campaign, implementing a 24/7 Helpline to support victims of sexual assault, and increasing visibility of this issue in the field. We are also utilizing Bystander Intervention as a training tool to create an understanding that every marine has an inherent duty to be actively engaged in preventing sexual assaults. SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS 8. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, wounded sailors and marines deserve the highest priority for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty, if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. In your view, what are the most critical shortcomings in our providing care for our wounded warriors? Mr. Mabus. Recognizing and appreciating the sacrifices of wounded, ill, and injured (WII) servicemembers and their families remain a priority of the Navy. Through the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery's WII Warrior Support, the Navy Safe Harbor Program, and the Marine Corps Wounded Warrior Regiment, we take care of our own by serving WII sailors and marines who are in Active Duty, Reserve, and veteran status. The past 2 years, I have designated November as our Warrior Care Month. Last year, our theme was ``Focusing on Abilities--Supporting Wounded Warriors throughout Recovery, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration.'' Since 2001, we have had over 12,000 marines and sailors wounded in action in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation New Dawn (OND). Historic advances in military medicine have resulted in personnel surviving injuries that would have been fatal in any previous conflict. That is good news. Our leading military treatment facilities (MTF) are helping them recover and rehabilitate. It is said that critical to reintegration is finding a fulfilling career. But for some of our returning brothers and sisters in arms, reintegration to the workforce in the face of the current economic downturn poses a significant challenge. In addition to weeks, months, or years of recovery, our wounded sailors and marines face the potential travesty of unemployment. Over 140,000 veterans of OIF and OEF are unemployed, or underemployed, with approximately 5,000 WII servicemembers joining the unemployment rolls every year--that is 4 new WII servicemembers every day. Building resumes, getting the training and education required, and finding a civilian career remain a challenge for our wounded warriors, despite many initiatives across government and the service branches to support returning personnel. We need to better coordinate the employment effort. At the Navy, we are making progress in this area. We are streamlining the Navy's wounded warrior hiring process and expanding our Wounded Warrior Training and Education programs. We have established a Wounded Warrior Hiring and Support Initiative tasked to develop solutions to improve wounded warrior hiring and support within the Navy. The initiative aims to increase the number of wounded warriors hired into the Navy, the Federal Civil Service, and the private sector. But there is more to be done. We need to ensure that we are continually working with our sister Services, the OSD, the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA), Department of Labor, Office of Personnel Management, other Federal Government agencies, and non- federal entities in this effort. Our Wounded Warrior Training Programs have become a best practice across DOD. Our Veterans Individual Training Assistant Link is a special program to help wounded, severely ill, and injured marines and sailors, and other servicemembers while recovering in the MTFs to transition from a military career into the Federal Civil Service or other opportunities. While still receiving treatment in our MTFs, wounded, severely ill, and injured marines and sailors, and other servicemembers receive educational and employment counseling, are encouraged to enroll in schooling and, where practical, provided pre- employment job experience in a field that interests them. Our Career Learning and Employment Centers provide education and on-the-job training for disabled veterans. They also provide career assistance and other veteran support to assist the veteran to achieve their career goals. Through these effective training programs, Naval Sea Systems Command hired 282 wounded warriors and disabled veterans in fiscal year 2010 with a goal of 365 in fiscal year 2011. the Navy hired 1,905 wounded warriors and disabled veterans (30 percent and above disability rating) in fiscal year 2010. While it is the WII marine or sailor who physically endures recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration, it is the family unit that serves as a critical support system for healing. To this end, families make many sacrifices. Oftentimes, it is the spouse of a recovering sailor or marine who is the breadwinner of the family. We have made progress in this area too. We are working with the Office of Personnel Management to remove the 2-year eligibility limitation for non- competitive appointment for spouses of certain deceased or 100 percent disabled veterans. This will help the wounded warrior families whose wounded family member is not able to return to full-time employment. Last year, President Obama signed the Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act that ensures that families of veterans severely wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan receive comprehensive, coordinated financial and other support that will enable them to provide these warriors with needed home-care. The Navy supports this and is standing by to ensure appropriate support for caregivers, to include special compensation for those caregivers who face financial hardships as a result of caring for their catastrophically injured sailor or marine, is received. By definition, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) does not start until 30 days after the occurrence of the trauma and the onset may be delayed from weeks to years after the trauma. Many servicemembers may not experience the onset of PTSD symptoms until they have separated from the Service and are under the care of the VA. Because of this wide variability, calculation of an average time to onset is impractical. The Navy and the Marine Corps solution to this issue is a robust program for prevention, early detection, and treatment which makes every effort to remove the stigma and other barriers to servicemembers receiving care at the earliest possible time. The Navy and Marine Corps continue to search for ways to eliminate the stigma and help sailors and marines understand that asking for help is ``OK.'' We also need to ensure that employers of wounded warriors and their staff are educated on PTSD and Traumatic Brain Injury so they can better support our wounded warriors and succeed in the workplace. 9. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, numerous studies document the need to reform DOD's disability evaluation system. The recently adopted Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) has improved the system by integrating DOD and VA systems, but it still takes nearly a year to process through the system. What is your assessment of IDES? Mr. Mabus. The IDES process is achieving the primary goals that were intended when this process was designed in 2007. Most notable of these goals is that our sailors and marines receive both their post- service military and VA benefits on the first day authorized by law. This eliminates the ``benefits gap'' experienced under the previous DES system. To achieve this significant benefit, the IDES process has the secondary impact of keeping our servicemembers in uniform for a longer period of time. This is a concern because the length of time needed to process cases has direct proportional adverse impact on the Services' readiness for their military mission. Those in the IDES remain in uniform longer which, for any given end-strength, reduces the number of Active Duty available for unrestricted assignment. Therefore, the principle focus must be on reducing the amount of time consumed by the process itself without debasing what we do for our WII servicemembers. The simplest and most direct means of monitoring the IDES process is through the observation of case flow--the time servicemembers' cases spend transiting the IDES' waypoints. Tracking and evaluating process time brings clarity for resourcing decisions and process improvements. To this end, based on a review of data from IDES operations over the past 6 months (period ending March 31, 2011), we would like to reduce the average time taken by the Medical Evaluation Board (MEB) Phase of the IDES by approximately 100 days. However, since some of the processing events occurring within this phase are controlled by the MTFs and some are controlled by the VA, reducing the average MEB Phase time requires both departments to ensure resources and internal processes are aligned to support timeliness goal. 10. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, how can we make this system better to support the needs of our wounded warriors? Mr. Mabus. As previously discussed in the response to question #9, the principle focus must be on reducing the amount of time consumed by the process itself without debasing what we do for our WII servicemembers. To significantly reduce the overall processing time, the Navy has recommended specific changes to ``remodel'' the IDES. This IDES remodel allows us to keep what is good about the current IDES process while making needed improvements and renovations. The recommended IDES remodel can be implemented under current laws, avoids any post-service benefit gap, maintains the servicemembers' due process rights, and can be completed in less than half the time required by the current IDES process. This remodel is currently under review by both DOD and the VA for possible near-term implementation. By seizing process design change opportunities, properly resourcing the processes we decide to deploy, and better leveraging existing capabilities, both the WII servicemember and readiness for our military mission will benefit. FORCE SHAPING AUTHORITIES 11. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead, in your prepared statement, you said that: ``We will be challenged to meet our Active and Reserve end strength targets in fiscal year 2012 using existing force shaping measures. As a result of continued high retention and low attrition across the force, we are facing increasing pressure to use involuntary force shaping measures to remain within our authorized end strength.'' What additional force shaping authorities will you need to shape a Navy with the right sailors with the skills and experience the Navy needs? Admiral Roughead. While the Navy will be challenged in meeting Active and Reserve congressional end strength limits for fiscal year 2012, existing voluntary and involuntary force-shaping authorities are sufficient for this fiscal year. Navy will continue to monitor those levers against end strength. Should additional authorities be required, we will consult with Congress and utilize the legislative process as we develop any necessary authority changes. 12. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead, do you plan to ask Congress for this authority? Admiral Roughead. While the Navy will be challenged in meeting Active and Reserve congressional end strength limits for fiscal year 2012, existing voluntary and involuntary force-shaping authorities are sufficient for this fiscal year. Navy will continue to monitor those levers against end strength. Should additional authorities be required, we will consult with Congress and utilize the legislative process as we develop any necessary authority changes. 13. Senator Levin. General Amos, you state that you are ``determined to `keep faith' with [your] marines and their families by designing and executing a responsible drawdown from [your] current 202,100 end strength such that [you] avoid reduction-in-force actions and early retirement boards.'' How do you plan to reduce the Active Duty Marine Corps end strength from 202,100 to 186,800, a reduction of 15,300 marines, without using involuntary measures? General Amos. If the Marine Corps receives the authorities to draw- down over a 4-year period, normal manpower force shaping levers of reduced accession and reduced first term retention will provide the primary reduction methods. Additional shaping measures, such as adjusting high tenure policies, may be required to achieve proper grade and occupational specialty distribution as well as end strength targets. If used, these slight modifications to manpower policies will still provide every marine a competitive opportunity to continue serving. 14. Senator Levin. General Amos, will you need additional legislative authority from Congress to do this? General Amos. We believe that given the proper time (i.e. 4 years), the Marine Corps will not need any additional authorities. However, we may require an extension of current and expired authorities relative to end strength to cover the period of the planned draw-down (i.e. fiscal year 2015-fiscal year 2018). SERVICEMEMBER SUICIDE 15. Senator Levin. General Amos, Congress remains extremely concerned, as I know you do, about the rates of servicemember suicide. While the numbers of suicides in 2010 among Navy and Marine Corps members appear to have decreased compared to 2009, February saw a spike in Navy suicides, so we must continue to focus on suicide prevention and resiliency programs. To what do you attribute the decrease in marine suicides? General Amos. Marine Corps leaders at all levels are fostering individual and unit resilience, and creating an environment that encourages marines to engage supporting resources before stress mounts to the risk of suicide. As they traditionally do, our NCOs have led the way by first undergoing our prevention and awareness training and then administering it to their junior marines. To assist them we included marines of every rank in the development and testing of our prevention courses. As a result, marines are better receiving the message that asking for help is a sign of strength and that getting help early can improve their careers and the readiness of the Corps overall. This effort also aims to reduce the traditional stigma to seeking mental health care. We continue to enhance our Operational Stress Control and Readiness Program, which embeds behavioral health providers in deployment and garrison unit settings, optimizing their proximity to and trust with marines. We train these providers and their support teams. Additionally, we recently began training 40-50 marines per deploying unit to recognize signs of stress and assist fellow marines in getting help when needed. The relationship between individual marines is a powerful tool in the effort to prevent suicide. Amidst these positive trends and developments, we are mindful that we have not ultimately solved the suicide problem. As such we will continue to learn, adapt and do whatever is necessary to combat this tragic and preventable loss of life. 16. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, how is the Navy addressing the recent rise in suicides that you saw last month? Mr. Mabus and Admiral Roughead. Current Navy suicide prevention initiatives include training aimed at front line supervisors to boost understanding of sailors under their command, recognize changes in their behavior and signs of concern, and engaging early with appropriate support when necessary. Leadership seminars focus leader attention during times of transition and stress due to loss, including loss of status or career standing, and address the concept of continuously building and reinforcing connections with families to facilitate communication in times of need. Recognizing that people exposed to suicide are an at-risk group, expanded postvention training and guidance has recently been added to assist leaders, in the aftermath of a tragedy, in preventing future suicides. Other specific actions include: Expanded surveillance and analysis of Navy Active Duty and selected Reserve suicide deaths and attempts. Support of command prevention and stress management programs with printed resource and innovative interactive training materials. Suicide prevention coordinator and first responder training worldwide and at Navy Reserve locations via Navy Reserve psychological health outreach teams. Navy representation in support of DOD, VA, and other cooperative efforts. Assistance with development of DOD response to recommendations from the DOD task force report on prevention of suicide among members of the Armed Forces. Additionally, due to the recent rise in suicides, we are intensifying suicide prevention communication efforts and assessing our current program to ensure we are executing it to the fullest, while incorporating recommendations and feedback from the DOD suicide prevention task force report, the RAND report and the recent DOD/VA suicide prevention conference. IMPACT OF DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILE DEFENSE SHIPS 17. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, in the last few days, the United States deployed the USS Monterey, an Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) cruiser to the Mediterranean Sea as part of Phase 1 of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. There will be additional deployments of improved Aegis BMD capability with each successive phase of the European PAA. How does the Navy plan to manage these deployments so it is able to accomplish all its assigned missions, including--but not limited to-- missile defense? Mr. Mabus. DOD employs a comprehensive Global Force Management (GFM) process to allocate available assets, including BMD-capable Aegis ships, to meet Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) requirements, such as the European PAA. This process considers the GCC surface combatant requirements for all mission areas not just BMD. A key attribute of all Aegis ships is their multi-mission capabilities within the maritime domain, which allows the Navy to employ Aegis ships in multi-mission roles rather than for exclusive missions. These ships can perform a variety of other non-BMD missions such as strike warfare, air warfare, submarine warfare, surface warfare, information warfare, high value asset protection, or maritime interdiction either concurrently or sequentially as the GCC requires. The Navy is not large enough to deploy ships for single mission purposes, and thus, with the exception of deterrent patrols by SSBNs, does not advocate deploying warships for single mission tasking. Single mission use of our Aegis ships for BMD will result in shortages in other mission areas and a loss of operational flexibility for the GCCs. The Navy's operating concept for maritime BMD features a graduated readiness posture that allows BMD-capable Aegis ships to be on an operational tether and available for other tasking when not directly involved in active BMD operations. Aegis ships operating in support of a BMD mission do not lose the capability to conduct other missions; however, specific mission effectiveness may be affected by ships' position and/or application of ship resources to those missions. Admiral Roughead. The Navy currently has sufficient capacity to meet the most critical demands for multi-mission surface combatants; however, Navy does not have the capacity to meet all GCC demands, such as the European PAA, for BMD-capable ships without breaking currently established Chief of Naval Operations Personnel Tempo program limits. Based on threat analysis and current indications from GCCs, and assuming standard 6-month deployment lengths, Navy and MDA concluded that GCC demand for surface combatants with Aegis BMD capability will outpace capacity through approximately 2018. A key attribute of all Aegis ships is their multi-mission capabilities within the maritime domain, which allows the Navy to employ Aegis ships in multi-mission roles rather than for exclusive missions. These ships can perform a variety of other non-BMD missions such as strike warfare, air warfare, submarine warfare, surface warfare, information warfare, high value asset protection, or maritime interdiction either concurrently or sequentially as the GCC requires. The Navy is not large enough to deploy ships for single mission purposes, and thus, with the exception of deterrent patrols by SSBNs, does not advocate deploying warships for single mission tasking. The Navy's operating concept for maritime BMD features a graduated readiness posture that allows BMD-capable Aegis ships to be on an operational tether and available for other tasking when not directly involved in active BMD operations. Aegis ships operating in support of a BMD mission do not lose the capability to conduct other missions; however, specific mission effectiveness may be affected by ships' position and/or application of ship resources to those missions. CONTINUED PRODUCTION OF SM-3 BLOCK IA 18. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is not planning for additional production of the SM-3 Block IA interceptor for the Aegis BMD system, preferring instead to move to production of the next SM-3 variant that has increased capability, the Block IB. However, there have been technical delays with the Block IB which has resulted in production delays. Given that the regional combatant commanders are seeking increased inventories of SM-3 interceptors, do you believe that we should consider additional production of the SM-3 Block IA if there continues to be delays with the Block IB interceptor? Admiral Roughead. Navy has a sufficient inventory of SM-3 missiles to satisfy the present global missile defense requirement. An additional delay in the production of SM-3 Block IB missiles would be a cause for concern. However, Navy and MDA are committed to delivering and fielding the significantly more capable SM-3 Block IB on schedule. We will keep Congress fully informed as these important programs progress. ANTI-SHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 19. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, there has been recent discussion of China's development of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability that could pose a risk to our aircraft carriers in the western Pacific. I know the Navy takes a strong interest in this issue. Without going into any sensitive information, what steps are we taking to protect our aircraft carriers from such a system? Mr. Mabus and Admiral Roughead. Our Navy has made a significant investment in new ships, sensors, weapons, and systems to counter a wide array of evolving threats. Additionally, we have invested heavily in Aegis modernization, to upgrade existing Aegis technology already in the Fleet. These initiatives involving the current and future Fleet will continuously improve our Integrated Air and Missile Defense capability, allowing our forces to continue to operate forward around the world. STRIKE FIGHTER SHORTFALL 20. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead, we have had continuing discussions over the past several years about a potential strike fighter shortfall, with the estimates of that shortfall ranging as high at times as 250 aircraft. This year, we have seen yet another restructuring of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, with a reduction of 65 F-35 aircraft over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) for the Navy and Marine Corps, with an increase in the number of 41 F- 18s, an increase that does not match the loss of F-35 aircraft. Considered alone, that would be going in the wrong direction to try to reduce the gap. However, in addition this year, you have established a service life extension program (SLEP) for existing F-18 aircraft that may help ameliorate the gap. What is the Navy's current assessment of the maximum size of the strike fighter shortfall? Admiral Roughead. Based on the 2012 President's budget, the Navy projects it will experience a peak inventory shortfall of 65 aircraft in 2018, should the following conditions exist: accelerated transition of 10 F/A-18 legacy Hornet squadrons into Super Hornets; the service life extension of approximately 150 legacy Hornets; and procurement of a total of 556 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. As I testified, this aircraft shortfall is manageable. 21. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead, in the face of such potential shortfalls, why did the Navy not increase F/A-18E/F procurement to compensate for the reduction in JSF procurement so that you would at least remain even in your numbers of strike fighter production? Admiral Roughead. The Navy's procurement objectives presented in the fiscal year 2012 President's budget include the procurement of 41 additional F/A-18E/F for a total of 556. With the addition of 41 Super Hornets, Service Life Extension of 150 F/A-18 A-D aircraft to 10,000 flight hours, and the accelerated transition of three additional legacy squadrons, the Navy was able to reduce the estimated strike fighter shortfall to the current value of 65 aircraft, occurring in 2018, without a one-for-one compensation for JSF reduction and F/A-18E/F procurement. This shortfall risk is manageable. NUNN-MCCURDY RECERTIFICATION 22. Senator Levin. General Amos, in February 2007, the Secretary of the Navy notified Congress that the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program experienced what is known as a ``critical Nunn-McCurdy breach,'' meaning that unit costs grew at least 25 percent above the acquisition program baseline that was current at that time. When such a breach occurs, DOD is required to either cancel the program or to continue the program, to certify to Congress that: the program is essential to national security, there are no alternatives which will provide equal capability at less cost, the new cost estimates are reasonable, and the management structure is adequate to control costs. In June 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition provided that certification to Congress. In testimony to the House of Representatives at the end of June 2007, DOD witnesses explained that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, formally examined the requirements for the EFV as part of the Nunn-McCurdy process. The JROC concluded that the EFV requirements ``are essential to national security.'' A second DOD panel examined alternatives to the EFV and concluded that none existed that could meet the EFV requirements at equal or less cost. What has changed since the EFV went through the Nunn-McCurdy certification? General Amos. The requirement to field an amphibious vehicle has not changed. Based on the assessment conducted in support of Nunn- McCurdy certification requirements, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated that ``The Amphibious Joint Forcible Entry Operations capabilities defined by the EFV Capabilities Production Document remain essential to national security.'' However, since then, the operating environment and the increased cost of developing a modern combat vehicle have changed. Throughout the period when the EFV was being developed, threats in the littorals and U.S. capabilities to counter and overcome these threats have evolved. We now believe that our naval capabilities will allow us to launch an amphibious vehicle at a minimum required distance of 12 nautical miles from the coastline--a distance less than that forecasted when the EFV was developed. This launch distance mitigates the need for a high-speed component to a future amphibious tractor, greatly reducing vehicle complexity and cost. Improvised explosive device (IED) threats and the changing operating environment drove increased investments in vehicles to increase protection and network capability. Moreover, lessons learned from the dispersed nature of current operations have led to increased requirements for protective armor kits and network connectivity for all tactical and combat vehicles, adding cost to our entire Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle (GCTV) portfolio. Today's fiscal environment and declining total obligation authority have pressurized all procurement investments, thus making affordability a driving requirement to balance programs and consider risk within the GCTV strategy. The Marine Corps is committed to the capability represented by the cancelled EFV program. As stated by the Secretary of Defense, we are firm in our requirement for an amphibious combat vehicle (ACV), which is essential to facilitating ship-to-shore operations in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments; assuring access where infrastructure is destroyed or nonexistent; and creating joint access in defended areas. BUDGETING FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE PROCUREMENT 23. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, the last time the Marine Corps bought a new amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) was almost 40 years ago. Buying a new armored assault vehicle is a rare event and a major undertaking, since it is a unique and critical element in the Nation's ability to project power ashore. Nonetheless, the Marine Corps and the Navy take the view that expenditures on a new vehicle, combined with expenditures on other needed ground vehicles, cannot exceed the historical average of what the Marine Corps spends year-to-year on ground vehicles. This seems strange and illogical. An important but rare investment would seem to demand an increase in average expenditures in a given budget account. This temporary increase in one area would be compensated for by temporary decreases in other areas where similar periodic investments have concluded. Why should the Marine Corps be forced--or be forcing itself--to make a major investment like the EFV fit within a set budget for a specific type of end article? Mr. Mabus. Marine Corps leadership made the recommendation to cancel EFV based upon recent program performance which included a Nunn- McCurdy breach and multiple schedule slips due to engineering issues with the pump-jet propulsion train. This termination was not necessitated by a need for the Marine Corps to fit programs within any pre-existing or historical level of funding. Since system development for EFV began in 2000, it has had severe cost growth and technological problems. The program experienced substantial cost overruns in 2007 and was then restructured, and EFV costs were growing at a rate we simply could not afford. Its primary technical challenges at this stage pertain to propulsion train and armor reliability. As a result, it was decided that no further investment should be committed to EFV due to current program performance. 24. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, do other budget accounts, such as Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN), vary from historical averages when the Navy makes large purchases, such as is the case with an aircraft carrier? Mr. Mabus. As described in the Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for fiscal year 2011 submitted in February 2010, DOD will average no more than $15.9 billion of annual funding (in fiscal year 2010 dollars) across the 30 years reflected in the report, including those years in which aircraft carrier funding is included. DOD utilizes incremental funding, as approved by Congress, as a mechanism to mitigate the impact of the carrier on the overall SCN appropriation. However, in those years where the carrier funding accounts for a larger percentage of the total SCN budget, the procurement of other shipbuilding platforms is adjusted in order to stay within available SCN funding. 25. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, does the Navy increase the Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) account in terms of its share of the investment budget during the period when it is investing heavily in new aircraft such as the F-35? Mr. Mabus. The Navy's overall investment in the APN appropriation as a percentage of the total investment request varies year to year from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016, but it is consistently between 28 percent and 30 percent. The changes in the percentage and overall APN funding level is not solely attributable to JSF but is a combination of a number of factors and programs. For example, the P-8A investment steadily increases from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016 as the program ramps up production. Others programs overall investment decline, such as the EA-18G program which will achieve its inventory objective in fiscal year 2014. The JSF APN request does steadily increase as a percentage of the APN request from 4.6 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 7.6 percent in fiscal year 2016 as the JSF program ramps up production. The table below shows the year-to-year percentages from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016 for the APN request as a percentage of the total Navy investment request and the JSF APN request as a percentage of the total APN request. [GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION 26. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, we do not yet know whether the Marine Corps can build a new AAV that would meet reduced EFV requirements for an amount that is significantly less than what the EFV would cost to finish. Before we irrevocably terminate work on the EFV, why not finish the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase over the next year while DOD conducts its studies of alternative solutions? Mr. Mabus. The cost of completing the SDD phase would require $242 million in fiscal year 2011, $179 million in fiscal year 2012, and $37 million in fiscal year 2013 for a total of $458 million. The program is not supportable within the context of likely Marine Corps procurement budgets. Even in the wake of the changes since 2007, the simple fact is that the procurement and operations and maintenance costs of this vehicle are onerous. We have examined multiple options to preserve the program, either by reducing the number of EFVs, cutting capabilities, or stretching out the production run. Unfortunately, none of these options meets what we consider reasonable affordability criteria. The program office continues to refine a cancelation plan for USD AT&L approval. This plan identifies which efforts on the EFV contract will be completed in order to better inform the requirements development team in support of the follow-on ACV. The remaining elements of the contract will be shut down using an orderly approach. In essence, we will simply complete those remaining tasks which provide best value to the government. The selected activities are designed to capture performance characterization and may include such things as water speed/power performance and tradeoffs; human factors considerations and performance; and subsystem designs (technologies) that address the AAV capability gaps (i.e., thermal imaging, inertial navigation, laser range finder, crew vision system). These technologies and performance characteristics will better inform requirements and allow us to identify tradeoffs as we develop a more affordable ACV solution. 27. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, we understand that finishing the essential elements of the SDD phase will cost about the same as paying the termination liability. If that is true, we might get something more for the taxpayers' investment and we could preserve the option of going forward with the EFV or a variant of it if nothing better turns up. Are you evaluating that strategy? Mr. Mabus. We have evaluated that strategy. However, finishing the essential elements of the SDD phase does not cost the same as paying the termination liability. The cost to complete the SDD phase requires $242 million in fiscal year 2011, $179 million in fiscal year 2012, and $37 million in fiscal year 2013 for a total of $458 million. The cost to cancel the EFV program is $216 million--all of which is in fiscal year 2011. Furthermore, we designed ongoing work to optimally inform the future ACV program. By selectively testing and developing only relevant capabilities for the future we provide best value to the government and maximize the return on our EFV investment. Our aim is to drive termination costs to effectively zero by leveraging those aspects of the EFV program of continuing value. 28. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, can you identify the relative costs of termination and finishing the essential elements of the SDD program? Mr. Mabus. The cost of EFV termination is $216 million in fiscal year 2011. The total cost to complete SDD is $458 million. Within the SDD completion figure, the cost of finishing essential elements and shutdown of EFV is $242 million in fiscal year 2011; $179 million in fiscal year 2012; $37 million in fiscal year 2013. F136 SPECIAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 29. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead, it has been stated by Navy and DOD officials over the past few budget cycles that by having two competing engines for the F-35, it would require having two sets of everything . . . things like two different sets of spare parts, two different sets of shipping containers, different tools, dual trained maintainers, et cetera. You have been quoted as saying that keeping two different engines for the F-35 on the decks of aircraft carriers would not be advisable as ``space is at a premium . . . therefore you can put me solidly in the one-engine camp.'' As recently as 2001, the Navy was responsible for maintaining nine different type/model/series engines that could be utilized on a carrier. Each of these engines required its own set of unique support equipment, hand tools, intermediate level maintenance, training, et cetera. This situation was all very cumbersome and your argument would make sense from a legacy aircraft point of view. But the situation for the F-35 engine does not appear to present the same situation as that for the legacy aircraft systems to which you compare it. By 2020, and assuming the F136 competitive engine is fielded, the Navy would have to maintain five different type/model/series engines in a carrier strike group. The F/A-18 and the EA-18 will utilize the same engine. The F-35 would have the choice of two interchangeable engines that enjoy 100 percent commonality in hand tools, support equipment, and shipping containers. Of the four major modules that make up the F-35 propulsion system, two of them are 100 percent common between the F135 and F136. DOD had also planned that the same training courses would prepare maintenance personnel to support either or both engines in the fleet. By using this commonality approach, DOD had designed the program to require fewer uniquely qualified people and fewer unique tools, which would translate to fewer dollars necessary to support the engines. DOD also structured the program that way precisely to minimize the logistics footprint and the associated cost of maintaining a variety of engines on the carrier. Would you clarify why you conclude that you don't have room on the carriers to operate an alternate engine for the JSF? Admiral Roughead. The F135 and F136 engines constitute two different designs by two different manufacturers. The large size of the F135 and F136 (approximately 18.7 feet and weighs 9,300 lbs. in its container) necessitates greater sparing aboard ships as neither the assembled engine nor the power section module can currently be replenished underway. Similarly, due to the weight and height of critical engine spares, it is not feasible to store all JSF engine spares in legacy store rooms or stack them aboard ships as is done for legacy system. This would necessitate work-around in hangar deck spaces normally reserved to store and maintain tactical aircraft. Adding an alternate engine makes the shipboard logistics even more challenging as it is not a one-for-one exchange. While the F136 engine would be interchangeable, there are several engine components that are not interchangeable. The fan, gear box, and power section modules are unique by F135 and F136 propulsion systems. Only the augmenter and exhaust nozzle modules are common by F-35 variant. Supporting two engines would require unique spares, unique support equipment, and unique training. The JSF specification only requires engines to perform to specified criteria and physically fit into the F-35. Maintenance/repair technical requirements are different, requiring different instructions and training with differences in assembly hardware and special tools for off-aircraft repair. LPD-17 SHIPBUILDING PROBLEMS 30. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, we have been experiencing significant problems with production of the LPD-17 amphibious transport dock program. There have been problems with manufacturing, design, and quality control, to the extent that upon delivery of one ship to the Navy, the Navy had to immediately place the ship in a separate shipyard availability period before the Navy could operate the vessel. What has gone so wrong with the construction management and oversight of the LPD-17 program that we have had such continuing problems with this acquisition? Mr. Mabus. Thorough reviews of LPD-17 class ships revealed issues in the areas of construction oversight, manning, and training, but corrective actions are now being implemented. Assessments of LPD-17 ship class are now complete and necessary corrections are being implemented. The lessons learned with earlier ships in the class have been incorporated in later new-construction ships. Quality assurance (QA) and production oversight during ship construction were not sufficient by both the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) and the shipbuilder impacting main propulsion diesel engines, lube oil systems, piping welds, and foundation bolts and power train alignment. However, the shipbuilder has now developed new procedures and training for its personnel and additional process QA checkpoints have been added to the shipbuilding inspection process. Additional staffing has been added to the SUPSHIP Gulf Coast staff with a focus on compliance and the Navy has instituted Comprehensive Quality audits of both SUPSHIP and the shipbuilder. The Navy is also strengthening LPD-17 class crew training by establishing more traditional shore-based schoolhouses that will result in a blended philosophy of classroom, on-ship and computer based training, rather than relying on the previous emphasis on computer- based shipboard training. Initial system reliability issues with the engine controls, ship controls, and interior communications systems have been addressed through major software upgrades to each system as well as the replacement of critical obsolete parts with more rugged current technology hardware. The ships' 1990s technology asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) shipboard wide area network (SWAN) is being replaced with a current Gigabit Ethernet technology network hardware and software. A LPD-17 Class Wholeness Task Force was formed by the Fleet to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the overall state of readiness for the entire LPD-17 class of ships. The task force is addressing shipboard manning, adequacy of shore-based infrastructure support, performance of critical mission and propulsion systems, spare parts support, and adequacy of maintenance resources. The combination of the above improvements are resulting in better reliability and operational availability of the currently commissioned ships of the class, while improving the projected operational availability of the ships currently under construction. Recent examples are LPD 21 (USS New York) completing in February a highly successful Bureau of Inspection and Survey final contract trials and LPD 19 (USS Mesa Verde) in March departing early for an overseas deployment in response to real world events. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed LANDING CRAFT AIR CUSHION 31. Senator Reed. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) has been a workhorse of the amphibious force for moving vehicles and cargo from our amphibious ships to shore. They have been and continue to be heavily employed in missions from combat to humanitarian relief worldwide. Despite a Navy SLEP to extend their lives, the LCAC force is wearing out. The Navy budget request for fiscal year 2011 included buying the lead vessel of a new ship-to-shore connector (SSC) class in the Navy's research and development budget. Last year, the Navy planned to purchase the second SSC vessel of this class in 2013. This year, the budget request indicates that the Navy plans to delay building the second SSC vessel until 2014. This development is troubling, given the wearing out of the exiting LCAC fleet and the cancellation of the EFV, both of which would appear to increase the importance of fielding the new SSC program and argue to maintain the previous schedule, not delay it. Why has the Navy delayed the second SSC vessel a year? Mr. Mabus. The second SSC (LCAC 101) was delayed by 1 year to ensure that lessons learned during the construction of LCAC 100 were able to be applied to the follow-on vessels. Although a delay in the start of the second craft shifts IOC by 1 year, a SLEP is underway to extend the service life of a total of 72 LCAC from the original 20-year service life to 30 years. Additionally, a sustaining maintenance program is under development for implementation in the 2014-2015 timeframe to ensure that previously SLEPed LCACs remain serviceable until the SSC reaches full operational capability (FOC) in the 2027-2032 timeframe. Admiral Roughead. The Navy remains committed to our the ability to embark, transport, control, insert, sustain, and extract combat marines and sailors on missions that range from forcible entry to forward deployed crisis response. The second SSC (LCAC 101) was delayed by 1 year to ensure that lessons learned during the construction of LCAC 100 were able to be applied to the follow-on vessels. Although a delay in the start of the second craft shifts IOC by 1 year, a SLEP is underway to extend the service life of a total of 72 LCAC from the original 20 year service life to 30 years. After 30 years of service a craft is considered to be beyond designed service life and additional maintenance actions will be required to continue these craft in operation. Beginning in 2014 and each year thereafter, the active LCAC fleet will be populated with a growing percentage of craft that are expected to serve beyond the 30- year service life. A sustaining maintenance program is under development for implementation in the 2014-2015 timeframe to ensure the LCAC fleet remains serviceable until the SSC reaches FOC in the 2027- 2032 timeframe. 32. Senator Reed. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, will this delay lead to any gap in capability? Mr. Mabus. There will be no capability gap in the Navy's ship-to- shore portfolio and the 1 year delay in the SSC/LCAC 100 acquisition will have only a minor impact in the transition from LCAC to SSC/LCAC 100. The Navy's transition plan combines SLEP for the current LCAC fleet, a post-SLEP LCAC maintenance and sustainment program, and a procurement profile for new connectors which replaces all legacy LCACs with new SSC/LCAC 100s by 2027. The SLEP and post-SLEP maintenance and sustainment program, currently under development, will ensure that legacy LCACs will remain operational until replaced by SSC/LCAC 100s sometime between now and 2027. Admiral Roughead. The Navy remains committed to our the ability to embark, transport, control, insert, sustain, and extract combat marines and sailors on missions that range from forcible entry to forward deployed crisis response. The 1 year of delay in the SSC acquisition will have an affect on the established mitigation plan to address the LCAC capability gap. However, this LCAC capability gap reflects continuation of the current capability with a number of older and potentially more maintenance intensive craft remaining in service while developing and fielding the successor platform. In 2014, the 72 LCAC fleet will begin to exceed its designed service life of 30 years. A number of LCAC will be required to remain in service in excess of the SLEP 30-year designed service life until the SSC reaches FOC in the 2027-2032 timeframe. A maintenance and sustainment program is being developed to retain these craft in service beginning in 2014-2015 timeframe until SSC attains FOC. Craft that operate beyond the design service life will require the additional maintenance prescribed and the overall availability of the LCAC fleet will be impacted. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall RAND REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE FUELS 33. Senator Udall. Secretary Mabus, recently, RAND published a study on alternative fuels that was intended to fulfill the requirement of section 334 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2009 for such a report. I am under the impression that there are aspects of the methodology, findings, and conclusions of the RAND report with which you disagree. Is my impression correct? If so, with what specifically do you disagree, and why do you disagree? Mr. Mabus. In the RAND report, some of the conclusions suggested that the alternative fuel industry is immature, could not scale up to make an appreciable difference as a domestic alternative, and recommended that DOD not invest in this market. We have found that the biofuel industry appears to be well-poised to be of commercial size and ready to meet Navy demands by 2016 for the Secretary of the Navy Great Green Fleet goal. According to Biofuels Digest, there are 110 companies that are currently working on various biofuel products including mixed alcohols, bio-crude oils, and drop-in fuels. The RAND study accurately states that the Navy's switch to biofuels, in and of itself, will not reduce the Nation's total energy consumption by a significant margin. However, the RAND report was not well researched and did not take into account the recent research and development advances in the biofuels technologies. RAND stated in their report that the Fischer-Tropsch coal-to-liquid/biomass-to-liquid fuels are the most promising near-term options for meeting DOD's needs cleanly and affordably. Currently, there are no Fischer-Tropsch plants here in the United States. Additionally, under the guidelines of the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, Section 526, any replacement fuel has to have a greenhouse gas emission profile less than petroleum. In order to meet this guideline, any Fischer-Tropsch coal-to-liquid plant would have to have carbon capture and sequestration incorporated into this overall process. While there is important carbon capture and sequestration research and development ongoing at DOE, there has not been any carbon capture and sequestration process built to commercial scale in the United States. In summary, due to the EISA 2007, Section 526 guidelines and the cost prohibitive carbon capture and storage process, we feel that the Fischer-Tropsch coal-to-liquid/biomass-to-liquid fuels are not the most promising near- term option for meeting DOD's needs cleanly and affordably. While the use of alternative fuels can contribute toward guaranteeing our energy supplies, reducing our operational risks, and during volatile upward price swings in petroleum, could represent additional cost savings, the Navy's energy strategy has not been limited to alternative fuels. We have aggressively adopted proven energy efficient applications and practices commonly found in the commercial sector. We have funded both science and technology/research and development projects in pursuit of increased energy efficiency since these project can potentially and directly contribute to the combat capability of our operating forces by reducing our energy consumption both afloat and ashore, and by achieving significant cost savings. The Navy prefers to see itself as an ``early adopter'' of available biofuels. The military has often led in the development of new technologies where there was a compelling military use, even if the civilian use was ultimately greater (ex. GPS, the Internet). The operational use of alternative fuels by the Navy will be hastened by collaborating with Federal agencies and private industry at every step of the research, development, and certification process. The alternative fuel program establishes the Navy as an early adopter for investors in a nascent industry that could significantly enhance energy security, and thereby national security, in the mid- to long-term. By positioning itself as an early adopter by testing available biofuels and certifying them ``fit for use across our major platforms and leveraging test and certifications accomplished by the other services that meets our specifications,'' the Navy is better poised to reap the following benefits: Cost Savings. Increasing our use of alternative energy sources helps us achieve a level of protection from energy price volatility. For every $10 increase in the cost of a barrel of oil, the Navy spends an additional $300 million a year. Operating more efficiently saves money by reducing the amount we spend for fuel. Savings can be reinvested to strengthen combat capability. The cheapest barrel of fuel afloat or kilowatt-hour ashore is the one we will never use. Guaranteed Supply. Our reliance on energy can be exploited by potential adversaries. Efficiency and alternatives may be our best countermeasure. Energy efficiency increases our mission effectiveness by expanding our range and endurance, and reducing our need for logistics support. Efficiency improvements minimize operational risks of that logistics tether, saving time, money, and lives. Alternative fuels provide the Navy an `off-ramp from petroleum,' mitigating the risk to a volatile and ever more expensive petroleum market. Fossil Fuel Independence. The Navy recognizes that our dependence on fossil fuels and foreign sources of oil makes us more susceptible to price shocks, supply shocks, natural and man-made disasters, and political unrest in countries far from our shores. Combat Capability. Making our ships and aircraft more efficient improves their fuel economy. We can increase the days between refueling for our ships, improving their security and combat capability. We can also extend the range of our aircraft strike missions, allowing us to launch our aircraft farther away from combat areas. Increasing our efficiency and the diversity in our sources of fuel improves our combat capability strategically and tactically. 34. Senator Udall. Secretary Mabus, section 334 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 required a related report. Are you aware of the status of that report? Mr. Mabus. The Navy is aware of this report being prepared by LMI. Our understanding is that this report is still undergoing review with all pertinent energy offices, and is expected to be out by the end of May. ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES 35. Senator Udall. Secretary Mabus, you have set as an ambitious goal: committing the Navy and Marine Corps to generate at least 50 percent of all the energy you use to come from alternative sources no later than 2020. Can you speak to what qualifies as alternative sources, where you have had the most success and where you believe you will attain the remaining percentage under this goal? Mr. Mabus. The Navy has set two priorities that illustrate the Navy's role in investing in alternative sources of energy which are energy security and energy independence. The Navy will achieve energy security by utilizing sustainable sources that meet tactical, expeditionary, and shore operational requirements and force sustainment functions. This allows the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs. Second, energy independence is achieved when naval forces rely only on energy resources that are not subject to intentional or accidental supply disruptions. As a priority, energy independence increases operational effectiveness by making naval forces more energy self-sufficient and less dependent on vulnerable energy production and supply lines. The Navy uses many different types of alternative energy on our naval installations such as solar, wind, and waste to energy. We have over 100 MW of solar planned to be installed in the next few years, and we have 22 anemometer (wind) studies ongoing. On the operational energy front, we have flown an F/A-18 Hornet on blended fuel, operated a 50/50 blend of biofuels on the Riverine Command Boat (RCB-X), and test flown a Seahawk helicopter on a 50/50 blend of biofuels. The Navy has also commissioned the USS Makin Island, which is designed with a gas turbine engine and electric auxiliary propulsion system. We also consider our nuclear fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines as part of our alternative energy program. In our expeditionary forward operating bases, we are using flexible solar panels to recharge batteries and light the inside of the tents with LED lighting. These are just a few examples of the different types of alternative energy sources that the Navy is currently using. Much of our success is in the technologies that are tried and true--solar, wind, and geothermal. We are continuing to explore geothermal resources on our installations in the southwest. We are making great strides in helping stand up a biofuels industry that will supply biofuels to the fleet. This effort will be a key factor in our overall success of the 50 percent goal. We have to continue to institute energy efficiency into our processes and programs. We are designing and constructing all of our new buildings to LEED Silver criteria. The bottom line is that the most efficient BTU or KW-hr is the one that is not used. 36. Senator Udall. Secretary Mabus, in your testimony you said that you are actively exploring for new geothermal resources to augment our existing 270 MW geothermal power plant at China Lake. What technologies are you seeking to employ to expand geothermal energy use? Mr. Mabus. Currently our geothermal development program is seeking areas on our installations with medium to high temperature hydrothermal resources where there is adequate faulting or permeability of the rock to allow movement of the steam and available ground water. This `hot' geothermal is a large scale power source but the effectiveness of the use of geothermal heat depends on site specific characteristics. These locations are primarily in the western United States, although we have received requests to study geothermal potential in Guam and Japan. These requirements are necessary for conventional geothermal power plants, like the Navy's NAWS China Lake facility. Additionally, in locations with permeability with lower temperature hot water, we would use a binary system, but these systems have reduced power output. We are also concurrently monitoring the maturity of the Enhanced Geothermal System (EGS) which could have a much broader applicability throughout the United States. EGS would be used where we have heat but no faults or water, but this is a relatively new technology and issues pertaining to earthquakes and possible contamination of water supplies need to be resolved. Additionally, Navy is actively constructing numerous ``shallow- drill,'' lower temperature gradient geothermal systems to use renewable resources to partially replace fossil fuel consumption in our individual building heating and cooling systems. We are also installing innovative ``no-drill'' solutions wherever viable. Navy's Dam Neck ``no-drill'' system won a 2009 Presidential Award for Leadership in Federal Energy Management. Dozens of these active systems are employed by the Navy today utilizing simple ground-loop or shallow-vertical indirect (closed loop) heat exchange systems. These systems save over 500 billion BTU annually, are a considerably lower risk to install, have minimal environmental impact, and have favorable ROI in most locations. 37. Senator Udall. Secretary Mabus, are you considering shallow- drilling geothermal heat pump systems to power small-scale residential facilities and the like at domestic installations or are you exploring areas where you could tap hyper-deep geothermal energy resources and supply power to an entire installation? Mr. Mabus. The Navy has been installing geothermal systems of all types at our installations since the early 1980s. We have installed them for family housing and small office buildings, as well as whole- base solutions. Both hyper-deep and shallow-drill systems are a major part of the Navy's plans for future Renewable Energy development. The Navy is the lead service for hyper-deep geothermal energy production. Additional resource exploration is underway at NAS Fallon's Dixie Valley Bombing Ranges, NAF El Centro, and NAWS China Lake South Range. Our 270MW geothermal plant at NAWS China Lake is the third largest plant of its type in the United States. Additionally, Navy is utilizing ``shallow-drill'' geothermal systems, both large and small scale, to replace fossil fuel consumption with renewable energy. We are also installing innovative ``no-drill'' solutions wherever viable. Some examples: Oceana shallow-drill geothermal systems save over 210,000 MBTU and nearly 20 million gallons of water annually, by placing 470,000 square feet of Navy Facilities onto Ground Source Heat Pump (GSHP) systems. The second phase of this project recently became operational in January 2011, 6 months early. These systems enabled closure of the large, aging, and inefficient central steam system. Dam Neck Annex's ``no-drill'' system utilizes seasonal heating and cooling from the Hampton Roads Sanitation Division (HRSD) Atlantic Treatment Plant effluent to save 244,000 MBTU annually, as well as enabling demolition of the central heating system. Our most recent Annual Energy Management Report specifically identified approximately 12 other small-scale GSHP systems saving approximately 14,000 MBTU annually. Additional systems exist, but are often difficult to identify since they are often considered part of the building heating and cooling systems and not identified separately. 38. Senator Udall. Secretary Mabus, are you aware of work within DARPA and/or collaborations with the Department of Energy's (DOE) ARPA- E program to advance the deployment of such technology? Mr. Mabus. The Navy does not use the term ``hyper-deep geothermal energy resources.'' The Navy was funded by Congress in 2001 to drill two 15,000-20,000 foot wells. The drilling failed due to instability and fractures in the holes. The Navy geothermal project at China Lake does have a 13,500 ft. deep well which is deeper than most commercial wells. Navy geothermal staff attended a DARPA geothermal meeting last year. The DARPA agenda was focused on EGSs, geothermal systems for forward operating bases, and geothermal systems for Guam. There was no discussion of hyper-deep wells. Our Navy geothermal office does share technical information with DOE and has offered to partner with them in proving new technical concepts for geothermal. We are not aware of any on-going work at DARPA or DOE on hyper-deep resources. EXPERIMENTAL FORWARD OPERATING BASE TECHNOLOGIES 39. Senator Udall. Secretary Mabus and General Amos, the Experimental Forward Operating Base (exFOB) was cited by Secretary Mabus as a model for energy security in the theater. It is remarkable that such technologies allowed a foot patrol to operate for 3 weeks without battery resupply, reducing their burden by 700 pounds and saving more than $40,000. Is such a project scaleable to other FOBs as well? Mr. Mabus. Yes, the capability referenced--the backpack-portable solar powered battery recharger called Solar Portable Alternative Communications Energy System (SPACES)--is scalable and it makes sense to deploy it broadly to our FOBs and Marine units. We introduced SPACES to the Fleet via ExFOB in summer 2010, and India Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines successfully used it in Afghanistan beginning in December 2010. As a result, and in response to the clear value demonstrated to the mission, we now have 1442 units in the operating forces, with 446 units in Afghanistan. We are accelerating deployment of this capability to our forces. General Amos. The capability referenced--the backpack-portable solar powered battery recharger called SPACES--is scalable, and it makes sense to deploy it broadly to our forward operating bases and units. We introduced SPACES to the Operating Forces via our ExFOB in the summer 2010, and an infantry company from 3rd Battalion 5th Marines successfully used it in Afghanistan in late 2010. As a result, and in response to the clear value demonstrated to the mission, we now have over 1,500 units in our Operating Forces for use in our Afghanistan force rotation and our training allowances. 40. Senator Udall. Secretary Mabus and General Amos, what challenges do you foresee in expanding exFOB technologies? Mr. Mabus and General Amos. One challenge we face is how to rapidly transition new capabilities to our Operating Forces, and ultimately into fully supported programs of record. Our ExFOB is an effective process that brings together the key players from our combat development, acquisition, and science and technology communities to identify and evaluate new capabilities. It informs our requirements, mitigates investment risks, and builds marines' confidence with innovative capabilities. Consequently, ExFOB helps to bridge the so- called `valley of death' as it relates to technology transition. However, this process takes time, and these long lead times make it difficult for small companies seeking to do business with the Marine Corps, to engage in the process. 41. Senator Udall. Secretary Mabus and General Amos, what are the benefits? Mr. Mabus and General Amos. The ExFOB capabilities we have evaluated in Afghanistan have helped our marines operate lighter, with less reliance on resupply. Our forces today are widely dispersed across the battle space: a company today may cover an area of 50 square miles or more, manning multiple outposts, and executing extensive dismounted operations. Our marines depend on communications gear and equipment, and rely on frequent resupply to support fuel, battery, water, and food needs. By providing a new source of power-solar and hybrid solar energy--and reducing the power demand of equipment, we have reduced mission risk, and increased our commanders' options. Ultimately, our goal is fewer marines at risk on the road hauling fuel and protecting fuel convoys. In less than a year, through our ExFOB process, we evaluated capabilities at Twentynine Palms and on the battlefield in Afghanistan with India Co. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. While engaged in nearly constant combat, these marines used small scale solar solutions, man portable solar battery rechargers, hybrid-solar generators, plus energy efficient lighting and shelters, with positive results: Two patrol bases operated completely on expeditionary solar power generators. They have done this even while engaged in near constant combat. Another patrol base reduced its fossil fuel need by approximately 90 percent--from 20 gallons of fuel a day to 2.5 gallons a day. Using the SPACES back portable solar power system to recharge their radio batteries they were able to patrol for 3 weeks with no battery resupply. Typical battery resupply is every 2-3 days. Because of the mission benefits we have seen, the Marine Corps is now looking at deploying these solutions broadly to our forward operating units in the coming months. 42. Senator Udall. Secretary Mabus and General Amos, are you aware of any compromises to warfighting capability or strategic flexibility that were incurred as a result of utilizing the unique technologies at exFOB? Mr. Mabus. Prior to battlefield evaluation of new capabilities, we conduct detailed evaluations in the lab with actual users who employ the equipment in similar operating environments and under similar stresses. Mission effectiveness is a top priority; solutions that cannot perform required mission tasks do not progress beyond the lab. The exFOB capabilities meet our requirements and have benefited our warfighting capability. General Amos. ExFOB capabilities have benefited our warfighting capability. Prior to battlefield evaluation of new capabilities, we place them through detailed evaluations in our laboratory, with actual users who would employ the equipment in operating environments similar to that in Afghanistan, under similar stresses. Mission effectiveness is a top priority; solutions that fall short do not progress to the next level of our process. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES 43. Senator Manchin. Admiral Roughead, we've seen price fluctuations right now in foreign oil based on political instability in the Middle East and North Africa--I'd like to talk about using alternative energy sources from home. Will you speak about the costs of aviation fuel and alternative jet fuels--are you considering coal-to- liquid fuels? Admiral Roughead. The Navy fully supports the use of using alternative source aviation fuels that meet all military performance requirements and technical specifications and would prefer, wherever possible, that the United States be the source of these fuels. Testing and certification of coal-to-liquid fuels are not in the Navy Program of Record because of congressional restrictions prohibiting procurement of alternative source fuels that may have greenhouse gas emissions or a carbon footprint greater than the petroleum based fuels which they would replace. Capital costs associated with commercial coal-to-liquid plants are expected to be in the billions of dollars and the technological hurdles associated with carbon sequestration present enough unknowns that there is little commercial transportation industry interest in this approach. As the commercial transportation industry and the Navy have focused on the use of next generation biofuels engineered to mix seamlessly with existing fuel supplies. As with any commodity, the costs of any alternative fuels will be a function of supply and demand. Industry and academia forecast the future costs of these fuels will be competitive with petroleum based fuels. 44. Senator Manchin. Admiral Roughead, what are the challenges using such fuels in the war zone? Admiral Roughead. Once the alternative fuels are certified in 2012, there will be no restrictions on using these fuels in combat. We will deliver the quantity and quality of fuels required to our forces when and where they are needed, and the source of these fuels will be transparent to the end users, the fuels will mix seamlessly with our existing fuel supplies, and the technical parameters of the fuels will deliver similar combat capability. The purpose of the Navy alternative fuels test and certification program is to certify that these alternative source fuels meet the specifications that our petroleum-based fuels must meet. The test and certification process of the fuels necessary for the Great Green Fleet is currently underway. Current funding puts the Navy on track to complete the fuel certification required for ship and aircraft systems to conduct the demonstration of the Green Strike Group in 2012. They will be functionally identical and `drop in' replacements to the current fuels that we use and will have no impact to the engines that use them. 45. Senator Manchin. Secretary Mabus, you have pledged your commitment to have the Navy and Marine Corps accelerate the exploration and exploitation of new ways to ``procure, produce, and use energy.'' You have also stated that your goals for energy security include a commitment to generate at least 50 percent of all the energy the Navy and Marine Corps use from alternative sources no later than 2020. What progress have you made in achieving this goal and what is the makeup of alternative energy sources? Mr. Mabus. The Navy has set two priorities that illustrate the Navy's role in investing in alternative sources of energy which are energy security and energy independence. The Navy will achieve energy security by utilizing sustainable sources that meet tactical, expeditionary, and shore operational requirements and force sustainment functions. This allows the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs. Second energy independence is achieved when naval forces rely only on energy resources that are not subject to intentional or accidental supply disruptions. As a priority, energy independence increases operational effectiveness by making naval forces more energy self-sufficient and less dependent on vulnerable energy production and supply lines. The Navy uses many different types of alternative energy on our naval installations such as solar, wind, and waste to energy. We have over 100 MW of solar PV projects planned to be installed in the next few years, and we have 22 anemometer (wind) studies ongoing. On the operational energy front, we have flown an F/A-18 Hornet on blended fuel, operated a 50/50 blend of biofuels on the Riverine Command Boat (RCB-X), and test flown a Seahawk helicopter on a 50/50 blend of biofuels. The Navy has also commissioned the USS Makin Island, which is designed with a gas turbine engine and electric auxiliary propulsion system. We also consider our nuclear fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines as part of our alternative energy program. In our expeditionary forward operating bases, we are using flexible solar panels to recharge batteries and light the inside of the tents with LED lighting. These are just a few examples of the different types of alternative energy sources that the Navy is currently using. Much of our success is in the technologies that are tried and true--solar, wind, and geothermal. We are continuing to explore geothermal resources on our installations in the southwest. We are making great strides in helping stand up a biofuels industry that will supply biofuels to the fleet. This effort will be a key factor in our overall success of the 50 percent goal. We have to continue to institute energy efficiency into our processes and programs. We are designing and constructing all of our new buildings to LEED Silver criteria. The bottom line is that the most efficient BTU or KW-hr is the one that is not used. 46. Senator Manchin. Secretary Mabus, are each of these sustainable, especially in the war theater, and if not, why not? Mr. Mabus. Yes, they are all very sustainable in a war theater as well as elsewhere. A good example is that while deployed to the Sangin Province Afghanistan, India Company, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines (3/ 5) operated two patrol bases completely on renewable energy, offsetting 100 percent of their potential fuel use. Based on reports from marines in the field it is estimated that each patrol base saved 12 gallons per day per location. This means that each month these two patrol bases would have offset approximately 744 gallons per month (31 days