[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
BOKO HARAM--EMERGING THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 30, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-60
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia, Vice Chair Jackie Speier, California
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Loretta Sanchez, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Brian Higgins, New York
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Kevin Gundersen, Staff Director
Alan Carroll, Subcommittee Clerk
Stephen Vina, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 1
The Honorable Jackie Speier, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. J. Peter Pham, Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center,
Atlantic Council of the United States:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Ms. Lauren Ploch, Africa Analyst, Congressional Research Service:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Ricardo Rene Laremont, Professor of Political Science and
Sociology, Binghamton University, State University of New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Ms. Jennifer G. Cooke, Director, Africa Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
BOKO HARAM--EMERGING THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
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Wednesday, November 30, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Meehan, Quayle, Speier, Hochul,
and Thompson (ex officio).
Mr. Meehan. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to hear the testimony regarding
an emerging threat to the homeland from Boko Haram, a Nigerian
Islamist group. I would like to welcome everyone to today's
hearing. The hearing coincides with the release of the
bipartisan subcommittee report* outlining the emerging threat
to the U.S. homeland from Boko Haram. I would like to thank the
Ranking Member for her willingness to work together in a
bipartisan fashion to call attention to this issue.
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* The document is available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-
112HPRT71725/pdf/CPRT-112HPRT71725.pdf.
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I believe we worked to create a document that will continue
to contribute to the public conversation about Boko Haram, and
will add a valuable perspective to the debate.
In late August, a suicide bomber drove a VBIED, vehicle-
borne IED into the United Nations headquarters in Abuja,
Nigeria, killing 23, and injuring over 80. A sect based in
northern Nigeria, Boko Haram, claimed responsibility for the
attack. The attack on the U.N. headquarters represented a
marked shift by Boko Haram, highlighted by targeting its first
non-Nigerian entity, and using a suicide bomber, which are
hallmarks of al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
It would appear to be, in hindsight, to be a bit of
foreshadowing, one week before the U.N. attack, U.S. Army
General Carter Ham, who is the commander of the African Command
United States, stated publicly that Boko Haram had an intent to
coordinate and synchronize their efforts with AQIM and Al-
Shabaab. Based on the U.N. attacks, General Ham's assessment
seems to have been accurate. The U.S. intelligence community
must not underestimate Boko Haram's intent and capability to
strike at U.S. interests, and most importantly, potentially the
U.S. homeland. Its fast evolution in targeting and tactics
mirrors other al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, and it is worrisome.
While I recognize, and this is important to say, while I
recognize there is little evidence at this moment to suggest
that Boko Haram is planning attacks against the homeland, lack
of evidence does not mean it cannot happen.
As our report makes clear, the U.S. intelligence community
has very recently been wrong about al-Qaeda affiliates' intent
and their capability to strike the homeland with nearly deadly
consequences. The most notable examples include AQAP and TTP,
whose threats to attack the homeland were both assessed to be
aspirational until they deployed suicide bombers to Detroit on
Christmas day 2009, and Times Square in May 2010, and caught us
entirely off guard. Due to the fast evolution of Boko Haram in
the last year, the U.S. intelligence community must increase
intelligence collection on Boko Haram and enhance cooperation
with our Nigerian partners to build their counterterrorism and
intelligence capacity. This subcommittee has held many hearings
this year on multiple terrorist threats, including from AQAP in
Yemen, the different groups operating in Pakistan, including
TTP, and Hezbollah in Latin America.
One thing that I know I have taken away from these hearings
and from the many classified briefings we regularly receive is
that we underestimate emerging terrorist groups at our peril. I
keep harking back to the language in the 9/11 report about the
failure of imagination. I think one of the responsibilities of
this committee is to be the imagination of Congress with
respect to the challenges we face on the terrorism front.
The case of the Iranian terrorist plot in the District of
Columbia is a perfect example. Everyone had assessed they would
never strike in the homeland unless the United States or Israel
were attacked or had attacked their nuclear facilities. This
has proven to be wrong. It is one example that points to the
larger issue, which is we must remain vigilant. In the case of
today's hearing, we must remain vigilant in countering Boko
Haram. I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of
the committee, the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Speier, for
any statement she may have.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
today's hearing on the Nigerian terrorist organization, Boko
Haram, and the threat the group may pose to the United States.
I would also like to welcome our witnesses today, and look
forward to gaining insights from each of you, and to learn more
about how we can partner with the Nigerians to help combat
terrorism. Boko Haram, a terrorist organization based in
northern Nigeria, has been drawing increased attention by
conducting a campaign of violence against the Nigerian
Government, and in an apparent and possibly game-changing
escalation, a recent attack against the U.N. headquarters in
the Nigerian capital.
The group has apparently continued to expand their target
set. On November 5, the U.S. Embassy in Abuja issued an
emergency message to all U.S. citizens in Nigeria that Boko
Haram was planning to attack western hotels in Abuja. Boko
Haram has expanded their capabilities and operations rapidly.
But, in part, due to their rapid rise, very little is known
about the group, and little international attention has been
focused on it. That is why I am pleased to join Chairman Meehan
today in releasing a report on Boko Haram. This report pulls
together the disparate pieces of open source media available on
the group in order to present the fullest picture yet of the
threat posed by Boko Haram, including whether or not it has the
intent and capability to attack the United States, and options
for U.S. engagement and assistance to the Nigerian Government
to counter this threat. Hopefully, this report and our
discussion today can raise awareness of an evolving terrorist
organization whose list of targets has now expanded to include
the international community and could include the United States
homeland.
What makes Boko Haram particularly concerning is how
quickly it has grown over the past few years from a local
militia to a more complex terror organization which earlier
this month carried out a series of coordinated suicide bombings
in several cities across the country, killing dozens of people.
Boko Haram has been able to expand its reach from a traditional
northeast power base southward to the capital Abuja, and
reportedly even further south. The most notable example of Boko
Haram's evolving capabilities and ambitions is the suicide car
bomb attack which the Chairman alluded to earlier. The attack
signaled a willingness on the part of Boko Haram to attack
international targets, and may signify a shift towards a more
global militant ideology. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of
the threat posed by Boko Haram is the reports of increasing
ties between the group and other terrorist groups, including
AQIM in North Africa and Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
The reported commingling of weapons, tactics, and personnel
among these groups may be one reason that Boko Haram has
reportedly been able to quickly develop its bomb-making
expertise and tactics. There is still too much we don't know
about Boko Haram, including its membership strength, its
leadership cadre, and the true nature of its ties to other
terrorist organizations. We must learn more about Boko Haram so
that we do not underestimate the threat they may pose, as has
happened in the past with other terrorist groups such as AQAP
and Al-Shabaab. The subcommittee calls for the U.S. Government
to increase information sharing with the Nigerian government
and outreach with the Nigerian people, particularly the Muslims
in the north, to better understand the underlying factors
contributing to such extremism and the appeal of a group like
Boko Haram.
This is a prudent tactic. But until we can learn more about
this group, their intentions to strike the United States, and
the extent and the exact nature of their cooperation with other
terror groups on the continent, we must be cautious with
proceeding towards any major new commitments in Nigeria. I do
not believe this hearing should telegraph a desire for the
United States' engagement in another international theater.
Rather, our report and hearing today should serve as a solid
starting point to raise awareness of a potential new threat and
spur further discussion and examination to build an effective
strategy for dealing with Boko Haram. Once again, I want to
thank the witnesses for being with us today, and I look forward
to your testimony. I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ranking Member Speier. We are
pleased to have the Ranking Minority Member from the entire
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. At
this point in time, I would like to recognize him for any
opening statement that he may like to make.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
Ranking Member, both, for holding this hearing. I also would
like to thank our witnesses for their testimony also. Today, we
are here to examine whether the Nigerian group known as Boko
Haram poses a threat to the United States. This is a difficult
question because we have a very limited amount of information
about Boko Haram. We know that the group has ties to al-Qaeda.
We also know that Boko Haram capabilities have increased. But
we do not know the size, organizational structure, agenda, or
resources at this point. While we do not know much about this
group, we do know a great deal about Nigeria.
With 158 million people, Nigeria is the eighth most
populous country in the world. About one-half of Nigerians
practice Islam, and about 40 percent of Nigerians are under 14
years of age. Currently, Nigeria is experiencing its longest
period of civilian rule since its independence. In many ways,
Nigeria is a young democracy. In 2008, the civilian authorities
in this oil-rich country began pursuing economic reforms. But
as we know, the path of change is not easy. Every Nation has
found that the road forward is often riddled with the remnants
of the past, the stumbling blocks of the present, and the
distracting dreams of the future. We also know that those who
benefit from the status quo will resist change. These universal
truths are alive and well in Nigeria also. It is clear that
Boko Haram, with its unknown number of followers and unclear
agenda, has become a source of strife. The military, which
formerly ruled this country, has been clear about their
concerns. But the Nigerian people have expressed a desire to
move forward. As part of its effort to reach out in January
2010, Nigeria assumed a non-permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council for the 2010-2011 session.
In August 2011, Boko Haram set off a suicide bomb at the
United Nations headquarters in Nigeria. Some see this U.N.
attack as an attack on western interests. However, given
Nigeria's prior position on the Security Council, the meaning
of this attack is far from clear. For many years, some of my
friends on the other side of the aisle have supported defunding
the United Nations because they claimed that the United Nations
did not support the United States' interests. Now we are
claiming that an attack on a United Nations building in Nigeria
is an attack on United States' interests. I guess things
change. However, what does not change is our need for clear and
certain information before we commit to a position.
At this point, we cannot answer the question: Is Boko Haram
capable of striking the United States or any other of its
interests? To find the answer to this question, we need to work
with the Nigerian government to increase the intelligence
capabilities in their country. We also need to reach out to the
vast Nigerian community in this country and seek their help and
guidance. We must not paint Nigeria as a nation of terrorists.
Our message goes well beyond these walls, and our message today
should be that we need to learn more. With that, Mr. Chairman,
I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ranking Member Thompson. Now, the
other committee Members are reminded that opening statements
may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have as well
a very distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this
important topic. I will go through and introduce each of you,
and then we will ask each of you individually to present your
testimony.
So let me first give the biography of Dr. Peter Pham. He is
the director of the Michael Ansari Africa Center. Dr. Pham was
previously senior Vice President of the National Committee on
American Foreign Policy, and editor of the bimonthly journal
American Foreign Policy Interests. He was also a tenured
associate professor of justice studies, political science, and
Africana studies at James Madison University in Harrisburg,
Virginia, where he was director of the Nelson Institute for
International and Public Affairs. He has served on the senior
advisory group of the U.S. Africa Command since its creation.
Dr. Pham served as a member of the USAID-funded International
Republican Institute delegation monitoring the national
elections in Liberia in 2005. He has also served on the IRI
pre-election assessment and election observation delegations to
Nigeria and Somaliland.
We are joined by Ms. Lauren Ploch, a specialist in African
affairs with Congressional Research Service--did I get that
right, Ploch--where she provides nonpartisan analysis on
African political, military, diplomatic affairs, and U.S.
policy in the region to Members of the United States Congress,
to the Congressional committees, and to the Congressional
staff. She has written extensively on security issues and U.S.
military engagement on the continent, and has testified before
Congress on these topics. Her work has focused extensively on
Nigerian political and security developments. Ms. Ploch speaks
regularly at academic institutions and international policy
fora in the United States and abroad. Prior to joining CRS, Ms.
Ploch managed democracy support initiatives in east and
southern Africa, where she coordinated governance programs
funded by USAID, the State Department, and the National
Endowment for Democracy. Previously, she served as a
legislative assistant in the United States Senate.
Dr. Ricardo Laremont joins us today. He is a professor of
political science and sociology at the State University of New
York Binghamton, and a Carnegie Corporation Scholar on Islam.
He has a J.D. from New York University Law School and a Ph.D.
from Yale University. His principal books include Islamic Law
and Politics in Northern Nigeria, Islam and Politics of
Resistance in Algeria, the Causes of War and Consequences of
Peacekeeping in Africa; Borders, Nationalism, and the African
State, and the forthcoming Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in
North Africa and the Middle East. His research focuses upon
political Islam, Islamic law, conflict resolution,
democratization, and civil-military relations, usually in the
region of North Africa and the Sahel.
Last, Ms. Jennifer Cooke, director of the CSIS Africa
Program, which she joined in 2000. She works on a range of
U.S.-Africa policy issues, including security, health,
conflict, and democratization. She has written numerous
reports, articles, and commentary for a range of U.S. and
international publications. Previously, she worked on the House
Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Africa, as well as
the National Academy of Sciences, with its offices of news and
public information, and its committee on human rights.
Thanks, each and every one of you, not only for your
presence here today, but I know for the extensive work you put
into the preparation of your testimony. I know many of you had
extensive written testimony, which I enjoyed the ability to
review. We are a little limited in our time, so I know that you
will focus on the essence of what you think is at the heart of
your testimony. So I open it and ask you, Dr. Pham, to begin,
and ask you to do your best to keep within the confines of our
unfortunate 5-minute limitations. But thank you, Dr. Pham.
STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, DIRECTOR, MICHAEL S. ANSARI AFRICA
CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Pham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Speier, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I
would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
the extremist sect, Boko Haram, examining not only the threat
that it currently represents to Nigeria, but its potential
impact on the West African subregion and the international
community at large, especially the United States. Since other
witnesses testifying today are better positioned to address
questions relating to administration policy and actions to date
on this issue, I will concentrate on just highlighting five key
points which I believe the United States and other responsible
international actors should bear in mind in assessing Boko
Haram and the threat posed by it, as well as in determining
adequate immediate responses to this challenge and planning for
longer-term engagement with the Sahel region in order to
counter the scourge of violence and extremism.
The emergence of Boko Haram cannot be understood without
reference to the social, religious, economic, and political
milieu of Northern Nigeria. The name Boko Haram is itself
derived from the combination of the Hausa word for book, as in
book learning, boko, and the Arabic term ``haram,'' which
designates those things which are religiously forbidden as
ungodly or sinful. Thus Boko Haram is not only a name, but a
slogan to the effect that western education and such products
that arise from it are sacrilege.
Such a profound alienation is, alas, not unprecedented. The
parallels, for example, with the Maitatsine uprisings of the
early 1980s, which left thousands of dead, and cut a path of
destruction across five northern Nigerian states are, to say
the least, quite uncanny. Certainly there are comparisons to be
drawn between Boko Haram and the earlier movement in terms of
ideology, objectives, and modus operandi. Both can be described
as fanatical sects whose beliefs are distinguishable from the
religious orthodoxy of the majority of Nigerian Muslims. Both,
in their rejection of western civilization, eventually also
came to reject the legitimacy of the Nigerian state itself,
viewing it as evil and unworthy of allegiance, and ending up
waging war against it. While there is nearly a three-decade gap
between the earlier movements and Boko Haram, that passage of
time has only seen the worsening of socioeconomic conditions in
northern Nigeria with respect to economic stagnation, lack of
educational opportunity, corruption, and political
marginalization, all of which serves to swell the ranks of the
ignorant, destitute, and disillusioned, who are easy recruits
for movements promising a radical transformation of Nigerian
society.
Second, far from being destroyed following the repression
of its 2009 uprising, Boko Haram has undergone a dramatic
transformation. In retrospect, the first sign of this was the
al-Jazeera interview given by Abdelmalek Droukdel, the emir of
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in June 2010. The head of al-
Qaeda's North African franchise stated that his group would
provide Boko Haram with weapons, training, and other support in
order to expand its own reach into sub-Saharan Africa.
At the time, that claim was widely dismissed both because
Droukdel was known for his outsized ambitions and because he
was having internal difficulties at the time within his own
group. Shortly afterward, Abubakar Shekau, the new head of Boko
Haram, appeared in a video released by AQIM's media arm, the
first time AQIM has been known to have allowed this outlet to
be used by an outsider. In that video, he threatened attacks
not only against Nigeria, but also against ``outposts of
western culture'' in that country.
The following month, he published a manifesto in which he
linked the jihad being fought by Boko Haram with jihadist
efforts globally. Then as you yourself, Mr. Chairman, have
already highlighted, in June 2011, Boko Haram launched its
first suicide attack using a VBIED. The attack, which targeted
the inspector general of the Nigerian police force, is believed
to be the first suicide attack to take place in Nigeria. This
incident, and the August 26 attack on the offices of the United
Nations in Nigeria, underscored that far from being a spent
force, Boko Haram has not only adopted, but indeed mastered one
of the deadliest instruments in the jihadist arsenal. These
attacks in the Nigerian capital also demonstrate that the
militant group is now capable of carrying out operations far
from its usual area of operation.
Third, while one should be cautious about asserting
connections between different terrorist organizations and
militant groups, one should also be wary of biases introduced
into threat analysis by arbitrary distinctions and
classifications which do little justice to fluid realities. A
good case in point is the Sahel, the belt connecting North
Africa and West Africa and straddling ancient trade and
migration routes from Mauritania on the Atlantic Ocean to
Somalia on the Indian Ocean. This region is strategically
important for several reasons, including its role as a bridge
between the Arab and Berber Maghreb and black sub-Saharan
Africa as well as its important natural resources. Moreover,
the Sahel belt touches upon several countries with serious
security challenges of their own, which could or can or have
easily spilled over their borders. The Sahel also shelters a
variety of armed groups, ranging from al-Qaeda's regional
franchise to the Polisario separatists, to Somali pirate
syndicates, all very different ground groups, but very capable
of opportunistic cooperation for their nefarious ends. Today,
the Sahara and the Sahel form a single space of movement, which
for purposes of the geography of terrorism should be considered
as a continuum, something that the territorial approach to
states and geopolitics often prevents us from understanding.
Fourth, an alliance with Boko Haram is a very attractive
option for any number of outside groups. Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb, for example, has never hidden its ambition to
bring in the Islamists of Nigeria and exploiting the sectarian
strife and conflict in that West African nation. Nor, given the
operational pragmatism as shown in recent years would AQIM
necessarily be put off by the more questionably orthodox
aspects of its potential Nigerian partners. One should also
keep in mind that the successful establishment or acquisition
of an active affiliate in sub-Saharan Africa has been a goal of
al-Qaeda for some time.
More than 5 years ago, for example, Sada al-Jihad, the
magazine of what later evolved into al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, published a lengthy article on al-Qaeda's moving to
Africa, in which the author was quite up-front about the agenda
for Africa. Finally, it would be useful to recall why Nigeria
is so important, both in its own right and for U.S. interests,
a strategic significance that goes beyond the country's
acknowledged importance as our fourth-largest source of
petroleum imports. The fact that Boko Haram, Mr. Chairman, has
been able in recent months to expand its operations beyond its
base in northern Nigeria and to make a significant qualitative
leap in its tactical capabilities ought to be a wake-up call to
both the Nigerian government and the international community.
Certainly, the suicide bombings targeting symbols of
Nigerian state authority and the international community
represent a major advance in Boko Haram's capabilities and a
significant shift in its messaging. The effect was not only to
discredit the efforts of some Nigerian officials to trivialize
the group as an insignificant local problem, but also to call
into question the assumptions of security analysts outside
Nigeria who have long minimized the risks faced by Nigeria and
by the international community, including the United States.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee, I thank you for
your attention, and look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Pham follows:]
Prepared Statement of J. Peter Pham
November 30, 2011
I would like to thank you very much for the opportunity to testify
today on the extremist militant sect Boko Haram, examining not only the
threat that it currently poses to Nigeria, but also its potential
impact on the West African subregion and the international community at
large, especially the United States.
THE EMERGENCE OF BOKO HARAM
While Boko Haram first received widespread attention for the armed
attacks it launched against police stations and other public buildings
in the towns of Geidam and Kanamma in Nigeria's northeastern Yobe State
on Christmas Eve 2003, the emergence of the militant sect cannot be
understood without reference to the social, religious, economic, and
political milieu of northern Nigeria.
Nigerian sources differ in their accounts of the precise origins of
the group, but most agree on the parallels with--if not direct
connection in terms of individuals linked to--the Maitatsine\1\
uprisings of the early 1980s which left thousands dead and a cut a path
of destruction across five northern Nigerian states. Certainly there
are comparisons to be drawn between Boko Haram and the earlier movement
in terms of ideology, objectives, and modus operandi. Both the Yan
Tatsine and Boko Haram can be described fanatical sects whose beliefs
are distinguishable from the religious orthodoxy of the majority of
Nigerian Muslims. Both, in their rejection of Western civilization,
eventually also came to reject the legitimacy of the secular Nigerian
state, invariably described as dagut (``evil'') and unworthy of
allegiance, and ended up waging war against it in an effort to bring it
down, to be replaced by a ``purified'' Islamic regime. In both cases,
police were unable to quell the outbreak of violence and military
forces had to be deployed. And while there is nearly a three-decade gap
between the Yan Tatsine and Boko Haram, that passage of time has only
seen the worsening of socioeconomic conditions of northern Nigeria with
respect to economic stagnation, lack of educational, corruption, and
political marginalization--all of which serves to swell the ranks of
the ignorant, destitute, and disillusioned who are easy recruits for
movements promising a radical transformation of Nigerian society.
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\1\ The Maitatsine movement took its name from a religious
preacher, Muhammadu Marwa, who moved from his native Cameroon to
northern Nigeria around 1945. His polemical sermons, ostensibly based
on the Quran and aimed at both religious and political authorities,
earned Marwa the sobriquet by which he was generally known,
``Maitatsine'' (in the Hausa lingua franca of northern Nigeria, ``he
who curses''), as well as the ire of the British colonial authorities
who had him deported. Maitatsine eventually returned to Nigeria
sometime after its independence and, by the early 1970s, had gathered a
large and increasingly militant following, the ``Yan Tatsine''
(``followers of Maitatsine''), drawing heavily from youth, unemployed
migrants, and others who felt that the official Islamic hierarchy was
unresponsive to their needs. Maitatsine proclaimed himself a prophet
and became increasingly anti-government in his pronouncements. He was
killed by security forces during a December 1980 insurrection in Kano,
but his followers rose up again in 1982, 1984, and 1985. See J. Peter
Pham, ``In Nigeria False Prophets are Real Problems,'' World Defense
Review, October 19, 2006, http://worlddefensereview.com/
pham101906.shtml.
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The name Boko Haram is itself derived from the combination of the
Hausa word for ``book'' (as in ``book learning''), boko, and the Arabic
term haram, which designates those things which are religiously
forbidden as ungodly or sinful. Thus ``Boko Haram'' is not only a
proper name, but also a slogan to the effect that ``Western education
(and such product that arises from it) is sacrilege.'' More recently,
the group's spokesmen have adopted the Arabic name Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna
Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (``group committed to the teachings [of the
Prophet], preaching, and jihad'').
After its late 2003 attacks were repelled, Boko Haram followers
regrouped at a base on the border with Niger which they dubbed
``Afghanistan'' where, in 2004, they were joined by students from
various local universities who withdrew from school and joined the sect
for Quranic instructions. Later that year, Boko Haram members attacked
police stations in Borno State, killing several policemen and stealing
arms and ammunition. The police counterattacked the group and killed
two dozen members. This set pattern for the next few years with Boko
Haram members carrying out occasional assaults on police, who responded
with raids and arrests.
One of these isolated skirmishes, a security raid on a Boko Haram
hideout in Bauchi State in late July 2009, however, led to reprisal
attacks on police and subsequently 5 days of rioting which spread
across Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, and Borno. The violence was finally petered
out after Boko Haram's leader, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf was captured and
killed--supposedly while attempting to escape--but not before more than
700 people were killed and numerous public buildings, including
government offices, police stations, schools, and churches were
destroyed.
With its leaders as well as several prominent financial backers,
including Alhaji Buji Foi, a former commissioner for religious affairs
in the state government of Borno, dead, the group receded from public
attention and a number of analysts argued that it was either finished
or hopelessly fractured.
BOKO HARAM SINCE 2010
Far from being dead, however, the group had undergone a dramatic
transformation. In retrospect, the first sign of this was a June 14,
2010, al-Jazeera interview given by Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, a.k.a.
Abdelmalek Droukdel, the emir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM). The head of al-Qaeda's North African franchise stated that his
group would provide Boko Haram with weapons, training, and other
support in order to expand its own reach into Sub-Saharan Africa. At
the time, this claim was widely dismissed, both because Droukdel was
known for outsized ambitions and because he was having internal
difficulties at that time with the more dynamic southern commanders
within his own group.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See ibid, ``Foreign Influences and Shifting Horizons: The
Ongoing Evolution of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,'' Orbis 55, no. 2
(Spring 2011): 240-254.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly afterward, Mohammed Yusuf's former deputy, Abubakar bin
Muhammad Shekau, who was thought to have been killed in the suppression
of the previous year's uprising, surfaced in a video that might best be
described as ``classic al-Qaeda.'' Wearing a headdress and framed by an
AK-47 and a stack of religious books, Shekau proclaimed himself the new
head of Boko Haram and promised vengeance for the casualties suffered
the year before. Significantly, he threatened attacks not only against
the Nigerian state, but also against ``outposts of Western culture'' in
the country. The following month, Shekau published a manifesto in which
he linked the jihad being fought by Boko Haram in Nigeria with the
jihadist efforts globally, especially that of ``the soldiers of Allah
in the Islamic State of Iraq.''
Two months later, on September 7, 2010, Boko Haram fighters
dramatically broke into a Federal prison in Bauchi and freed more than
100 of their fellow members who had been detained there awaiting trial
since the previous year's uprising. In the process of the assault,
involving bombs and automatic weapons, the militants also let out more
than 750 other prisoners and scattered leaflets warning of further
violence.
The latter was not long delayed. On Christmas Eve 2010, the group
set off a string of 7 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Jos,
Plateau State. The bombings, which targeted the town's Christian
communities, left 32 people dead and scores of others wounded. While
the group subsequently carried out a number of other attacks--mainly
small IEDs thrown from moving vehicles or planted near the target,
although there was also the occasional prison break--it was only at the
middle of this year when it achieved what should be considered a very
significant and ominous tactical and operational upgrade in its
capabilities.
On June 16, 2011, Boko Haram launched its first suicide attack
using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). The attack,
believed to also be the first suicide attack to take place in Nigeria,
targeted the Inspector General of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF),
whose convoy the terrorist followed into the Louise Edet House
headquarters compound of the NPF in the Federal capital of Abuja. While
the target escaped harm because security detained the suspect vehicle,
the explosion was large enough to nonetheless destroy several dozen
police vehicles parked nearby. In fact, the incident showed that far
from being a spent force, Boko Haram had adopted and, indeed, mastered
one of the deadliest instruments in the jihadist arsenal. Moreover, it
also demonstrated that the militant group was now capable of carrying
out operations far from its usual areas of operation.
Two months later, on August 26--after having spent the interim
carrying out a half-dozen smaller attacks on government officials,
establishments that served alcohol, and churches--Boko Haram carried
out another major attack, sending another suicide bomber with an
explosive-laden car to the offices of the United Nations in Abuja.
Twenty-one people were killed and at least 70 were wounded in what UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon characterized as an ``assault on those
who devote themselves to helping others.'' This attack, the first by
the group against a transnational target, put it in the ranks with
jihadist terrorists who have targeted U.N. agencies in places
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Algeria.
Earlier this month, on November 5, the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria
issued a warning, indicating that it had received intelligence that
Boko Haram was planning bomb attacks against several targets in the
Nigerian capital in conjunction with the Muslim feast of sacrifice, Eid
al-Adha. The warning specifically singled out as possible targets were
the Hilton, Nicon Luxury, and Sheraton hotels. While the holiday passed
without any terrorist incidents in Abuja, Boko Haram did strike at
multiple targets in three northern cities, including a security
tribunal in Damaturu and a military base in Maiduguri, killing more
than 100 people in the process. Two of the attacks reportedly involved
VBIEDs.
Just this past weekend, Boko Haram militants armed with automatic
weapons and explosives attacked several targets in Yobe State,
including a police station and a bank in Geidam, the same town where
the group first burst upon the scene with its Christmas Eve assaults 8
years ago.
EXTERNAL LINKS
While one should be cautious about asserting connections between
different terrorist organizations and other militant groups in the
absence of credible evidence, one should also be wary of biases
introduced into the threat analysis by arbitrary distinctions and
classifications which do little justice to more fluid realities. A good
case in point is the Sahel, the belt connecting North Africa and West
Africa and straddling ancient trade and migration routes from
Mauritania on the Atlantic Ocean to Somalia on the Indian Ocean. The
region is strategically important for several reasons, including its
role as a bridge between the Arab (and Berber) Maghreb and black Sub-
Saharan Africa as well as its important natural resources, both
renewable and nonrenewable. Moreover, the Sahel belt touches several
countries--including Algeria, Nigeria, and Sudan--with serious security
challenges of their own that could easily spill over their borders. In
fact, a number of scholars have argued that the Sahara and the Sahel
form ``a single space of movement'' which, for purposes of the
geography of terrorism, ``should be considered as a continuum,
something that the territorial approach of states and geopolitics
prevents us from understanding.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Olivier Walther and Denis Retaille, ``Sahara or Sahel? The
Fuzzy Geography of Terrorism in West Africa'' (working paper, CEPS/
INSTEAD, Luxembourg, November 2010), 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That being said, there are some tantalizing linkages between Boko
Haram and other militant movements. The former has clearly absorbed
what many regard as a signature tactic of some of the latter, the use
of VBIEDs in repeated attacks against high-profile public targets,
resulting if not in a significant increase in the number of operations,
certainly a potentially spectacular increase in the casualties
resulting from each, especially in cases where the bombs are deployed
in near-simultaneous or otherwise coordinated attacks. At the very
least, the existence at all of suicide attacks indicates a level of
foreign ideological influence since they practically unknown in Africa,
even during the height of the Algerian civil war which left hundreds of
thousands dead or wounded, until more recent years when they were
legitimized by ideologues close to al-Qaeda and became increasingly
commonplace in AQIM's repertoire.
AQIM itself has had a discrete number of Nigerian recruits since
Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC,
``Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat'') was rebranded as al-
Qaeda's franchise in the region, a fact acknowledged as Abdelmalek
Droukdel acknowledged as far back as 2008 when he gave an extensive
interview to the New York Times. And the group has never hidden its
ambition to bring in the Islamists of Nigeria in particular, exploiting
the sectarian strife and conflict between Muslims and Christians in the
West African nation. Nor, given the operational pragmatism it has
evinced in recent years, would AQIM necessarily be put off by the more
questionably orthodox aspects of the lives or beliefs of its potential
Nigerian partners.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See J. Peter Pham, ``The Dangerous `Pragmatism' of Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb,'' Journal of the Middle East and Africa 2, no. 1
(January-June 2011): 15-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is noteworthy, in fact, that both AQIM and Boko Haram leaders
have issued statements complimenting each other and pledging mutual
support. Tellingly, AQIM has permitted the Nigerian group's Abubakar
Shekau to employ its media operation, al-Andalus, to spread messages.
Furthermore, there is the question of the role currently being
played within the movement by the Chadian-born Mamman Nur, formerly
third-highest-ranking figure in Boko Haram's leadership after Mohammed
Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau. After Boko Haram members dispersed in the
aftermath of the government crackdown in 2009, Nur is believed to have
gone to Somalia, where he and his followers trained in camps within
territory controlled by the insurgents of the Harakat al-Shabaab al-
Mujahideen (``Movement of Warrior Youth,'' al-Shabaab) and forged links
with transnational jihadist networks. He returned to Nigeria earlier
this year and is alleged by Nigerian authorities, who placed a 25
million naira ($175,000) bounty on his head, to have masterminded the
attack on the U.N. building in Abuja in August. One should also keep in
mind that the successful establishment or acquisition of an active
affiliate in Sub-Saharan Africa has been a goal of al-Qaeda for some
time.\5\ In June 2006, for example, Sada al-Jihad (``Echo of Jihad''),
the magazine of what was then al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia--which later
evolved into al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)--published a
lengthy article by one Abu Azzam al-Ansari entitled ``Al-Qaeda is
moving to Africa.'' The author of the article was quite up-front about
the jihadist agenda for Africa: ``There is no doubt that al-Qaeda and
the holy warriors appreciate the significance of the African regions
for the military campaigns against the Crusaders. Many people sense
that this continent has not yet found its proper and expected role and
the next stages of the conflict will see Africa as the battlefield.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See ibid, ``Next Front? Evolving U.S.-African Strategic
Relations in the `War on Terrorism' and Beyond,'' Comparative Strategy
26, no. 1 (2007): 39-54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With analytical precision, Abu Azzam then proceeded to enumerate
and evaluate what he perceives to be significant advantages to shifting
terrorist operations to Africa, including: The fact that jihadist
doctrines have already been spread in many African countries; the
political and military weakness of African governments; the easy
availability of a wide range of weapons; the geographical position of
Africa vis-a-vis international trade routes; the proximity to old
conflicts against ``Jews and Crusaders'' in the Middle East as well as
emergent ones like Darfur, which is explicitly mentioned; the poverty
of Africa ``will enable the holy warriors to provide some finance and
welfare, thus, posting there some of their influential operatives'';
the technical and scientific skills that potential African recruits
would bring; the presence of large Muslim communities, including ones
in conflict with Christians or other Muslims; the links to Europe
through North Africa ``which facilitates the move from there to carry
out attacks''; and the fact that Africa has a wealth of natural
resources, including hydrocarbons and other raw materials, which are
``very useful for the holy warriors in the intermediate and long
term.'' What Abu Azzam wrote about Africa in general could very well be
interpreted to point to Nigeria in particular.
In short, while conclusive evidence is not available--at least in
on open-source basis--of connections between Boko Haram and other
extremist networks, there is sufficient plausible basis to warrant the
commitment of greater resources to examining the possibilities as well
as enhancing our understanding the overall geopolitical and socio-
cultural dynamics of the Sahel.
POSSIBLE IMPACT
It might be useful to recall why Nigeria is so important, both in
its own right and for U.S. strategic interests. With proven petroleum
reserves conservatively estimated to amount to some 36 billion
barrels--the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa and the tenth-largest in the
world--Nigeria is America's fourth-largest supplier of oil imports.
Last year, the United States imported an average of 1,025,000 barrels
of oil per day from the West African country, according to the
Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (by
comparison, an average of 2,532,000, 1,280,000, and 1,094,000 barrels
per day were imported from Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia,
respectively). Nigerian output and, consequently, exports to the United
States, would have been considerably greater if insurgents and criminal
gangs in the oil-rich Niger Delta did not routinely disrupt operations
and cause oil companies to declare force majeure and suspend
production. Moreover, Nigeria's export blends tend to be the light or
``sweet'' crudes preferred by U.S. refiners as a gasoline feedstock
because they are largely free of sulfur, unlike the heavy, high-sulfur
oils hailing from Caribbean or Persian Gulf sources.
Nigeria's significance to American interests goes beyond its
acknowledged importance as an energy supplier. Nigeria's population of
just shy of 150 million people makes it the eighth-most populous
country in the world and by far the most populous in Africa.
Historically, the country has played a major role in resolving the
conflicts besetting the continent and has long been the largest African
contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Currently, 5,622
Nigerian military and police personnel are deployed in seven United
Nations operations in Africa--the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara (MINURSO), the U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the African Union/
U.N. Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the U.N. Interim Security
Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the U.N.
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the U.N. Operation in Cote
d'Ivoire (UNOCI)--in addition to those working with blue-helmeted
forces in places as far away as Haiti, Lebanon, and Timor L'Este. Given
that America's willingness to undertake such assignments is rather
limited even if U.S. forces were not themselves stretched, the value of
such a reliable regional partner should not be underestimated. As
President Obama emphasized in his meeting last year with Nigeria's
President Goodluck Jonathan, ``a strong, democratic, prosperous Nigeria
is in the U.S. National interest.''
Thus there should be considerable concern that a country of such
geopolitical importance should find itself threatened by a terrorist
group like Boko Haram, which has for its mission the bringing down of
the Nigerian state itself. And the concern should be magnified in the
face of the somewhat lackadaisical attitude of Nigerian senior Nigerian
officials to the challenge they are confronted with. The late President
Umaru Musa Yar'Adua left for a state visit to Brazil right in the
middle of the 2009 uprising and, only upon his return, set up a
commission of inquiry headed by the then-National Security Adviser,
retired Major General Abdullahi Sarki Mukhtar. That panel never
formally published its findings into the death of Boko Haram's leader
and its work was eventually superseded by another commission appointed
by President Goodluck Jonathan. Moreover, worse than the less-than-
fully-committed reactive capacity are the instances of actual
complicity with the militants. As with the post-electoral violence
across northern Nigeria earlier this year following what was arguably
the best-run elections in the country's history, there have been no
shortage of politicians willing to exploit religious and other divides
in the furtherance of their own ambitions. Just last Tuesday, a sitting
federal senator from the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP),
Mohammed Ali Ndume of Borno State, was arrested for his ties to Boko
Haram.
While, at least for the moment, the threat which Boko Haram might
pose to oil and natural gas producing areas in the southeastern Niger
Delta and off the Nigerian coast in the Gulf of Guinea is minimal--
distance aside, ethnic differences between the Hausa-Fulani of the
north and the Yoruba, Igbo, Ijaw, and other peoples of southern Nigeria
represent not insignificant hurdles for Boko Haram militants aspiring
to operate there--it should be recalled that less than a year ago quite
a number of Nigerian and international analysts assured themselves that
the group could not project power as far as the Federal Capital
Territory. Furthermore, it should not be so quickly forgotten that it
was just a few years ago, between 2006 and 2009, that local militant
groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND), which were poorly armed and trained in comparison with Boko
Haram, succeeded in slashing Nigeria's oil production from 2.6 million
barrels a day to as low as around 1 million barrels a day.
There is also reason to be concerned about U.S. and other
expatriate persons and business interests in Nigeria and the threat to
them posed by Boko Haram. On May 12, 2011, for example, two engineers--
a Briton and an Italian--employed by B. Stabilini, an Italian
construction firm that was building a branch office of the Central Bank
of Nigeria in Birnin Kebbi, the capital of Kebbi state in northwestern
Nigeria on the border with Niger and Benin, and were seized by armed
attackers from their company apartment. A ransom video delivered to a
news agency subsequently claimed that the two men were being held by
AQIM. The suspicion is that Boko Haram or groups linked to it, either
in imitation of or in collaboration with AQIM, were actually
responsible for the operation and the claim of responsibility for AQIM
was an attempt to exploit the latter group's fearsome ``brand name'' in
the Sahelian kidnapping-for-ransom racket.
The Nigerian response to all of this has fluctuated between
attempts to minimize threat perception to ham-fisted security
operations like the ``Operation Flush'' security sweeps in the
northwestern part of the country which have further inflamed public
opinion against the government. While Nigeria is an important partner
on the global stage--one that aspires to an even more prominent role
within the international community--its friends, including the United
States, would do well to help it see the importance of getting its
house in order first. This entails not only improving its political,
legal, and security responses to terrorist threats, but also attending
to multiple fault lines--religious, ethnic, regional, economic, and
political--which criss-cross Nigerian society.
CONCLUSION
All indications are that Boko Haram's support networks, both within
Nigeria and outside the country, are still somewhat limited.
Nevertheless, the fact that the group has been able in recent months to
expand its operations beyond its base in northern Nigeria ought to be a
wake-up call to both the Nigerian government and the international
community. Certainly the suicide bombings targeting symbols of Nigerian
state authority and the international community represented a major
advance in Boko Haram's capabilities and a significant shift in its
message. The effect was not only to discredit the hitherto efforts of
Nigerian officials to trivialize the group as an insignificant
localized problem--rather than the direct challenge to the state that
it constitutes--but also to call into question the assumptions of
security analysts abroad who have long minimized the risks faced by a
Nigeria whose vast natural and political resources, rather than
powering growth and development to the benefit of all Nigerians, have
sadly for most of the last half century been consumed in a downward
spiral of corruption, internal conflict, and violence.
Moreover, the recent attacks, when coupled with developments
elsewhere in the Sahel, are a vivid reminder that extremism and
violence cannot easily be contained by arbitrary divisions, whether on
maps or in analytical frameworks. Consequently, the emergence of Boko
Haram and its burgeoning capacity for violence ought to be seized upon
by the United States and its partners as opportunity to more closely
examine, better understand, and be more proactively engaged in
confronting common challenges and advancing geopolitical, economic, and
other strategic interests in this very dynamic and fluid region.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See ibid, ``U.S. Interests in Promoting Security across the
Sahara,'' American Foreign Policy Interests 32, no. 4 (July-August
2010): 242-252.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you for your testimony, Dr. Pham.
Ms. Ploch.
STATEMENT OF LAUREN PLOCH, AFRICA ANALYST, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE
Ms. Ploch. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, and
distinguished Members of the House Subcommittee----
Mr. Meehan. You may not have hit your microphone.
Ms. Ploch. I did not. Thank you. I will start again. Mr.
Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members of
the House Subcommittee, thank you for inviting CRS to testify
today regarding the threat posed by Boko Haram. My written
statement provides details about Boko Haram's origins and
recent operations, so I will save you the time and summarize my
statement.
In the interests of time, I am going to summarize the
information and identify key issues facing the U.S. Government
and the United States Congress. Boko Haram emerged as a small
radical Sunni Islamist sect that advocated a strict
interpretation of Islamic law for Nigeria. While the group's
name refers to--while the group refers to itself by a longer
name in Arabic, local communities gave the group the nickname
Boko Haram to describe its view that western education and
culture have been corrupting influences in Nigeria.
Until this year, the Nigerian government appears to have
primarily considered Boko Haram to be merely a nuisance,
particularly in comparison to the militant groups operating in
the Niger Delta region, where Nigeria's oil is produced. Boko
Haram responded in 2009 to a security crackdown by fading away
and surging back in force late last year. In the course of that
violence, the group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed in
police custody. As this graph indicates, which has been
compiled by CRS from open sources, the group's attacks have
increased significantly in the last year both in frequency,
reach, and lethality, now occurring almost daily in northeast
Nigeria. These attacks now periodically also reach as far as
Abuja, the capital city, which is located in the center of
Nigeria.
The group is primarily focused on State and Federal
targets, but has also targeted civilians in churches, mosques,
and in beer halls. The apparent aim of these attacks is to
discredit and delegitimize the Nigerian state by exposing the
weakness of its security apparatus and by creating generalized
insecurity. According to Human Rights Watch, more than 425
people have been victims of attacks attributed to Boko Haram.
While Boko Haram has remained primarily focused on a domestic
agenda, there are some indications that some of its members may
be expanding ties with more developed violent Islamist groups
in Africa, particularly the regional al-Qaeda affiliate AQIM.
Attacks attributed to the group since 2010 have increasingly
featured improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, car bombs, and
more recently, suicide attacks.
The targeting of the U.N. building by a suicide bomber on
August 24 marks a major departure from the group's previous
focus on domestic targets. Spokesmen for the group claim the
attack was retribution for the state's heavy-handed security
response against its members, and they have referenced U.S. and
international collaboration with Nigerian security forces as a
rationale for targeting the United Nations. The bombing may
indicate an aspiration by some in Boko Haram to move beyond
local politics toward an international jihadist agenda, or it
may be part of an effort to elicit backing from international
jihadists for the group's domestic agenda.
By most accounts, Boko Haram is not a monolithic
organization. In fact, it appears increasingly diffuse. Its
cells appear to operate largely autonomously, under state or
regional level leadership. According to U.S. Government
sources, the core group of Boko Haram militants may number in
the hundreds, but the group may also draw support from a
broader following of several thousand Nigerians, primarily from
the northeast. Some observers have suggested that the attacks
attributed to Boko Haram may actually be the work of several
different groups, including criminal gangs. Others suggest that
Boko Haram may be susceptible to fracturing, with a segment of
the leadership working to build ties with the international al-
Qaeda franchise, while most other elements of the group remain
focused exclusively on a local agenda.
I want to highlight some of the key questions facing the
administration and Congress with regard to this complex
challenge. First, is Boko Haram a threat to the U.S. homeland
and to U.S. interests in Nigeria? As you note, this is a
complicated question. Earlier this year, and prior to the U.N.
bombing, the Director of National Intelligence testified that
Boko Haram appeared to remain largely focused on domestic
issues. But he also suggested that Boko Haram may be pursuing
interests it shares with AQIM. U.S. intelligence officials
continue to warn that despite al-Qaeda's reportedly degraded
capacity to carry out attacks against the United States, its
sympathizers and affiliated groups still pose a significant
threat. As CRS has noted, AQIM continues to pose the main
transnational terrorist threat in North Africa and the Sahel.
But to date, none of its actions indicate a clear threat to the
U.S. homeland. The group does, however, continue to threaten
U.S. and western targets in Algeria and the Sahel. If it were
to work together with Boko Haram, the two groups could expand
their operational reach.
AQIM and Boko Haram officials, as my colleague, Dr. Pham,
has noted, they have both referenced growing ties in their
public statements. Although many observers suggest that their
relationship has been more aspirational than operational, U.S.
officials report that contact between members of the groups is
increasingly frequent. If reports of AQIM providing weapons,
personnel, and training are accurate, they warrant increased
vigilance. Some analysts caution, however, that the group's
relationships may still be fairly limited in scope, and that a
nominal link between Boko Haram and AQIM may be mutually
beneficial to both groups. Publicly linking the two may serve
to enhance Boko Haram's credentials among radicals to
facilitate both recruitment and financial support. My
counterparts are probably also going to discuss in their
testimony the possibility that Boko Haram or AQIM may try to
acquire weapons systems from former Libyan stockpiles,
including surface-to-air missiles, which, according to some
reports, may be flowing south through Niger. Nigeria is one of
only a handful of West African countries to which the U.S.
airlines like Delta may fly directly from the United States. So
this is of concern. President Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria's
president--excuse me, sorry, I skipped a page. My apologies.
What is the basis of Boko Haram's appeal among Nigerians?
The expansion of groups like Boko Haram in northern Nigeria has
raised concerns that other Nigerians may be susceptible to
recruitment by al-Qaeda or to groups hoping to use violence
against international targets in Nigeria or abroad. To
understand Boko Haram's appeal among some Nigerians in the far
north, we need to understand the underlying development
challenges facing northern Nigeria, where high rates of poverty
and unemployment are exacerbated by extreme population growth
and low levels of literacy.
This map indicates, as you will see, some of the low levels
of development, particularly in the north, but throughout the
country. These factors, combined with weak governance, rampant
corruption, and inadequate public service delivery, have
contributed to widespread disaffection that many suggest may
facilitate Boko Haram recruitment. Some observers contend that
elements of the northern political classes have tolerated Boko
Haram out of frustration with the government and sympathy for
some of the group's political aims.
A second question you may be considering is what are the
Nigerian and U.S. governments doing about Boko Haram, and is it
working? Boko Haram is a threat that most observers agree must
ultimately be dealt with by the Nigerian government. But many
consider the government's responses to date to be ineffective.
Indeed, some critics contend that the government has
contributed to the problem. The Nigerian government has
deployed a joint task force, with military and police forces,
to the area most affected by Boko Haram. It has established a
heavy security presence in the capital of Borno State,
Maiduguri, conducting house-to-house searches and generating
considerable ill will among local communities for its at times
aggressive response.
Many Nigeria experts caution that if Nigeria's security
services continue their heavy-handed responses in the
northeast, it may further alienate local communities. President
Jonathan, president of Nigeria, has acknowledged the need to
foster development in the north and to address the perceived
marginalization that has fueled periodic protests against the
government. It is unclear, however, if his government has the
political will or clout to effect major changes. I want to note
that the Obama administration considers Nigeria to be a key
partner, and is providing the country with military training
through a range of programs. An emphasis on human rights and
civilian control of the military is an important component to
these programs given Nigeria's history of military rule.
Mr. Meehan. Ms. Ploch, could I ask you to try to--because
we will be able to get to some of this as well in your direct
testimony. So could I ask you to try to summarize?
Ms. Ploch. I will sum it up. In approaching the Boko Haram
threat, the State Department has urged that the Nigerian
government balance its security response with efforts to
address some of the legitimate grievances of the northern
Nigerian communities. Administration officials recognize the
need to help Nigeria bolster its counterterrorism capabilities,
but they are also pressing the Nigerian security forces and the
federal and state governments be more effective in their
response to Boko Haram.
Going forward, U.S. policymakers must determine the various
risks, benefits, and trade-offs associated with the different
counterterrorism and counterradicalization measures, and they
must weigh their effects against other U.S. policy goals in the
wider region. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ms. Ploch.
[The statement of Ms. Ploch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lauren Ploch
November 30, 2011
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members
of the House Subcommittee, thank you for inviting CRS to testify today
regarding the threat posed by Boko Haram, a violent Islamist group in
northern Nigeria that has grown increasingly active in the past year.
While Boko Haram has remained primarily focused on a domestic agenda,
there are indications that some elements of the group may be expanding
ties with more developed violent Islamist groups in Africa,
particularly the regional al-Qaeda affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM).
Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s as a small, radical Sunni
Islamic sect that advocated a strict interpretation and implementation
of Islamic law for the country. Calling itself Jama'a Ahl as-Sunna Li-
da'wa wa-al Jihad (JASLWJ; roughly translated from Arabic as ``People
Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad''),
the group is more popularly known as Boko Haram (``Western education is
forbidden''), a nickname given by local Hausa-speaking communities to
describe the group's view that western education and culture have been
corrupting influences in Nigeria. Periodic skirmishes with police
occurred in Boko Haram's formative years, but the group's activities
were limited in scope and contained within several highly impoverished
states in the predominately Muslim northeast. Until this year, the
Nigerian government appears to have primarily considered Boko Haram to
have been merely a nuisance, particularly in comparison to secular
militant groups threatening oil production in the southern Niger Delta
region.
In July 2009, the Nigerian government's attempts to stop Boko
Haram's attacks on police stations and other government buildings
resulted in at least 700 deaths. In the course of that violence, the
group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic young cleric who had
studied in Saudi Arabia, was killed while in police custody.\1\ A
sizeable number of Yusuf's followers were also killed or arrested.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Islamic Death `Good for Nigeria','' BBC, July 31, 2009.
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Boko Haram appeared to dissipate after the heavy-handed security
crackdown, but reemerged a year later, orchestrating a large-scale
prison break in September 2010 that freed 700 prisoners, including more
than 100 of its own members. The group's attacks have since increased
substantially in frequency, reach, and lethality, now occurring almost
daily in northeast Nigeria. They now periodically reach as far as the
capital city of Abuja. The group has primarily focused its attacks on
state and federal targets such as police and military facilities and
other government buildings, but has also targeted civilians in
churches, mosques, and beer halls. Bank robberies have also been
attributed to the group and may contribute to its financing, although
Nigerian authorities warn that criminal groups may also be
opportunistically posing as Boko Haram militants.
By most accounts, Boko Haram is not a monolithic organization. As
it has evolved, it appears increasingly diffuse. Its cells appear to
operate largely autonomously under state or regional-level leadership,
although leadership is generally attributed to Yusuf's former second-
in-command, Abubakar Shekau. According to U.S. Government sources, the
core group of Boko Haram militants may number in the hundreds, but the
group also draws support from a broader following of several thousand
Nigerians, primarily from the northeast. Some observers suggest that
attacks attributed to Boko Haram may actually be the work of several
different groups, noting variations in the tactics and bomb-making
styles employed in recent attacks. Others suggest Boko Haram may be
susceptible to fracturing, with a segment of the leadership working to
build ties with the international al-Qaeda franchise while most other
elements of the group remain focused exclusively on a local agenda.
Since its reemergence, Boko Haram has appeared increasingly
committed to acts that aim to discredit and delegitimize the Nigerian
state by exposing the weakness of its security apparatus and creating
generalized insecurity. Targeted shootings from motorbikes have been a
hallmark of Boko Haram, although attacks attributed to the group since
2010 have increasingly featured improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
car bombs, and, more recently, suicide attacks.\2\ In a region where
small arms are fairly easy to acquire, the low-cost use of gunmen to
intimidate opponents, instill fear, and create a heightened sense of
insecurity has been remarkably effective. The state of Borno, where
many of Boko Haram's attacks have occurred, is now described by some
observers as a police state, albeit an ineffective one. On November 4,
armed men claiming affiliation with Boko Haram committed the group's
most deadly spate of bombings and shootings to date, killing as many as
130 people in attacks against government buildings, banks, churches,
and mosques in the northeastern state of Yobe. According to Human
Rights Watch, more than 425 people, including politicians, community
and religious leaders, members of the security forces, and civilians
have been killed in attacks attributed to Boko Haram.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The June 2011 attack on the National Police Headquarters in
Abuja is reported to be Boko Haram's first use of a vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device.
\3\ Human Rights Watch (HRW), ``Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks
Indefensible,'' November 8, 2011.
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IS BOKO HARAM EVOLVING FROM A DOMESTIC TO A TRANSNATIONAL THREAT?
The August 24 suicide bombing of the United Nations building in
Abuja has put Boko Haram under increased international scrutiny. The
targeting of the United Nations by a suicide bomber marks a major
departure from the group's previous focus on domestic targets.
Likewise, it was Boko Haram's first clearly intentional suicide
bombing.\4\ Spokesmen for the group have claimed responsibility for the
attack, declaring it to be retribution for the state's heavy-handed
security response against its members. They have also have referenced
U.S. and international ``collaboration'' with the Nigerian government
and its security apparatus as rationale for targeting the United
Nations.\5\ As the group's first known operation against an
international target, the U.N. bombing may indicate an aspiration by
some in Boko Haram to move beyond local and national politics toward an
international jihadist agenda, or it may be part of an effort to elicit
backing from international groups for its domestic agenda.
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\4\ Some refer to a June 2011 bombing of the police headquarters in
Abuja as a suicide attack, but others suggest the bomber's death may
not have been intentional.
\5\ ``Alleged Islamic Sect `Spokesman' Claims Deadly Attack on U.N.
in Nigeria,'' AFP, August 26, 2011; and ``Nigerian Islamists Claim
Responsibility for U.N. Building Blast,'' Xinhua, August 28, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Media reports suggest that, in the wake of the July 2009 crackdown
against Boko Haram, some of its members and senior leaders may have
dispersed to neighboring countries to regroup and receive paramilitary
training at AQIM camps. Cross-border transit by Boko Haram militants to
and from neighboring Chad and Niger remains a serious concern. Experts
have noted that Boko Haram's attacks show increasing coordination and
sophistication and that their tactics at times resemble those of al-
Qaeda and its affiliates. The U.N. attack is reminiscent of the deadly
2007 attack by AQIM on a U.N. building in Algeria. That attack,
conducted in coordination with bombings of several government
buildings, marked a shift in AQIM's tactics to large-scale suicide
attacks after the Algerian militant Islamist group formerly known as
the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) changed its name to
AQIM.
In Congressional hearings earlier this year, Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper highlighted a range of security concerns in
Nigeria as potential threats to U.S. National interests, touching on
political and sectarian violence and militancy in the Niger Delta as
well as in the northeast, where Boko Haram was becoming increasingly
active.
In his testimony, he suggested that although Boko Haram appeared to
remain largely focused on domestic issues, ``it may be pursuing
interests it shares with'' AQIM.\6\ More recently, CIA Director David
Petraeus named the group during a joint hearing of the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees on threats to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See the February 2011 hearings by the House and Senate
intelligence communities on worldwide threats. See also a joint hearing
by the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees, ``Threats
Against the United States Since September 11, 2001,'' held on September
13, 2011.
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U.S. intelligence officials continue to warn that despite the
reportedly degraded capacity of al-Qaeda to carry out attacks against
the U.S. homeland, al-Qaeda sympathizers and affiliated groups still
pose a significant threat. As CRS has noted in its coverage of al-
Qaeda's affiliated groups, AQIM continues to pose the main
transnational terrorist threat in North Africa and the Sahel, but to
date none of AQIM's actions indicate a clear threat to the U.S.
homeland.\7\ AQIM does, however, continue to threaten U.S. and Western
targets in Algeria and the Sahel, and if it were to work together with
Boko Haram the groups could expand their operational reach. AQIM has
expressed support for the creation of an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria,
and AQIM leader Abdelmalik Droukdel publicly offered Boko Haram
assistance in early 2010.\8\ In October 2010, AQIM's media arm
published a statement by Shekau that is cited by analysts as the first
time AQIM had disseminated an official message from another group.\9\
AQIM and Boko Haram officials have referenced growing ties in public
statements, although many observers suggest their relationship has been
more ``aspirational'' than operational.\10\ U.S. officials report that
contact between members of the groups is increasingly frequent.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and its Affiliates, by John Rollins
et al.
\8\ ``Fertile Ground: The Potential for Jihad in Nigeria,'' Jane's
Intelligence Review, September 2010.
\9\ Open Source Center, ``Terrorism--AQLIM Publication of Boko
Haram Statement Indicates Ties,'' OSC Report FEA20101020010563, October
19, 2010.
\10\ See, e.g., ``Boko Haram `Spokesman' Claims Al-Qa'ida Links,''
AFP, November 24, 2011.
\11\ Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, ``Al Qaeda-Linked Group Finds
Fertile Territory in Nigeria as Killings Escalate,'' CNN, November 18,
2011.
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If reports of AQIM providing weapons, personnel, and training are
accurate, they warrant increased vigilance.\12\ Boko Haram's explosives
have reportedly grown increasingly sophisticated and by some accounts
may bear hallmarks of bomb-making techniques used by al-Qaeda
affiliates. Some analysts caution, however, that the groups'
relationship may still be fairly limited in scope and that a nominal
link between Boko Haram and AQIM may be mutually beneficial to both
groups. Publicly linking the two may serve to enhance Boko Haram's
credentials among radicals to facilitate recruitment and financial
support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Robyn Dixon, ``Nigeria Militant Group Boko Haram's Attacks
Attract Speculation,'' Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Concerns have been raised that Boko Haram may follow through on
threats to target Nigeria's oil infrastructure, although many analysts
argue that it would have a difficult time operating in the south, where
the oil is produced. The May 2011 kidnapping of British and Italian
citizens from northern Nigeria highlights a threat to foreign citizens
in the region, and some experts speculate that Boko Haram may try to
fundraise through kidnappings-for-ransom, a hallmark of AQIM and other
Nigerian militant groups. Also of concern is the possibility that Boko
Haram or AQIM may try to acquire weapons systems from former Libyan
stockpiles, including surface-to-air missiles, which according to some
reports may be flowing south through Niger.\13\ Nigeria is one of only
a handful of West African countries to which U.S. airlines may fly
directly from the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See, e.g., ``Report Reveals Inflow of Arms Into Northern
Nigeria Through Niger, Chad Borders,'' Nigerian Tribune Online, October
3, 2011.
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Given the jurisdiction of your committee, I understand that the
attempted terror attack in December 2009 by a Nigerian passenger, Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab, on an American airliner en route to Detroit
heightens concerns regarding radicalization within Nigeria's sizeable
Muslim population and raises questions as to whether one of Boko
Haram's followers might attempt something similar. Abdulmutallab, the
son of a respected Nigerian banker and former government minister, had
no known ties to Boko Haram; instead reports suggest that he became
radicalized while living abroad. He received training and sponsorship
in Yemen from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Nevertheless,
the expansion of groups like Boko Haram in northern Nigeria have raised
concerns that other Nigerians may be susceptible to recruitment by al-
Qaeda or other groups hoping to use violence against government or
civilian targets in Nigeria or abroad.
BOKO HARAM IN THE CONTEXT OF NIGERIA
Understanding Boko Haram's appeal among some citizens in Nigeria's
far north requires an examination of the underlying development
challenges facing northern Nigeria, where high rates of poverty and
unemployment are exacerbated by extreme population growth and low
levels of literacy. These factors, combined with weak governance,
rampant corruption, and inadequate public service delivery, have
contributed to widespread disaffection that some suggest may facilitate
Boko Haram recruitment. Some observers contend that elements of the
northern political classes have ``tolerated'' Boko Haram out of
frustration with the government and sympathy for some of the group's
political aims.
Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, with over 150 million
people, roughly half Muslim and half Christian. It is also Africa's
second-largest economy, after South Africa, and its largest producer of
oil. Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria remains severely underdeveloped,
and development indicators are lowest in the north (see attached maps).
Poor governance and widespread corruption nationwide have severely
limited infrastructure development and the provision of social
services, thus hindering economic growth and leaving much of the
country mired in poverty.
Northern Nigeria was governed separately from the south under the
British colonial administration. Military leaders from the north
dominated Nigerian politics until the transition to civilian rule in
1999, but the north shows little sign today of having benefited from
their influence in government. The north is predominately Sunni Muslim,
and twelve northern states have adopted sharia law since 1999 to
adjudicate criminal and civil matters for Muslims.\14\ In some states,
the introduction of sharia was a flashpoint between Muslims and
Christians.\15\ The State Department reports that sharia ``technically
does not apply to non-Muslims in civil and criminal proceedings,''
although observers note that Islamic mores are often enforced in public
without regard for citizens' religion. In some areas, state-funded
vigilante groups known as hisbah patrol public areas to enforce sharia
rulings. Many analysts nonetheless see the interpretation and
implementation of Nigerian sharia as moderate in comparison to that of
some other Muslim-majority countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Nigerian law protects freedom of religion and permits states
to establish courts based on common law or customary law systems. Non-
sharia based common law and customary law courts adjudicate cases
involving non-Muslims in these states, and sharia-based criminal law
courts are elective for non-Muslims.
\15\ In 2000, for example, an estimated 2,000 people were killed in
Kaduna in clashes sparked by the introduction of Islamic law in the
state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Nigeria, divisions between ethnic groups, between regions, and
between Christians and Muslims often stem from perceived differences in
access to land and social and economic development. Clashes among
communities in the culturally diverse ``Middle Belt'' (where north and
south meet) in the past decade reflect tensions that are both religious
and ethnic. These tensions stem from a competition over resources--
land, education, government jobs--between ethnic groups classified as
settlers or ``indigene'' (original inhabitants of the state), a
designation that conveys political and economic benefits.\16\ Some
political elites fan communal resentments, leading periodically to
considerable unrest and displacement. By some estimates, as many as
13,000 Nigerians have been killed in sectarian violence since the
return to civilian rule. Some analysts warn that these tensions, if
left unaddressed, may ultimately threaten both the stability of the
state and the wider region. The U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom suggests that the government has tolerated the
violence by failing to prevent or respond to it.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Communities classified as indigene vary from state to state.
\17\ U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual
Report 2011, May 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A history of poor governance, corruption, and flawed elections has
undermined the authority and legitimacy of the Nigerian state.
Elections in the 2000s were deemed progressively worse than the last.
Most observers, including U.S. officials, consider the April 2011
elections to have been a significant improvement, but the elections
were not without problems.\18\ Supporters of the leading opposition
candidate for the presidency, a former northern military leader,
alleged that the ruling party had rigged the poll to favor incumbent
President Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian.\19\ The widespread
post-election rioting and violence that broke out across the north in
protest of Jonathan's win highlighted mistrust and grievances that many
northerners feel have yet to be addressed. During that violence, which
occurred largely along religious and ethnic lines, at least 800 people
were killed, and more than 65,000 displaced.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See, e.g., the White House, Statement by President Obama on
Elections in Nigeria, May 4, 2011; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
Press Release: Election in Nigeria, April 19, 2011. Several political
rallies were marred by bombings, predominantly in one of the Niger
Delta states. There were at least six bombings in Borno state. Boko
Haram claimed responsibility in January for the assassination of
Borno's leading gubernatorial candidate and several of his supporters.
Responsibility for the bombing of the state election commission
headquarters in Niger state remains in question.
\19\ There has been an unwritten agreement since 1999 that the
presidency should rotate among regions. The death of President Umaru
Yar'Adua in office in 2010 complicated that rotation. Yar'Adua, a
northerner, was succeeded by his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, a
Christian from the Niger Delta. Jonathan won the support of key
northern ruling party leaders to stand as the party's candidate in the
2011 elections, despite warnings that suspending the regional rotation
could increase the potential for regional conflict.
\20\ HRW, ``Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800,'' May 16,
2011.
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According to the State Department, corruption in Nigeria is
``massive, widespread, and pervasive.''\21\ The country is a major drug
trans-shipment point and a significant center for criminal financial
activity. It is also considered by the State Department to be a major
center for money laundering, and the government only recently
criminalized terrorist financing.\22\ Observers suggest Nigeria's
development will be hamstrung until it can reverse its perceived
culture of impunity for political and economic crimes. Last week,
Nigeria's President replaced the head of the country's anti-corruption
agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), as part of
his effort to ``revitalize the fight against corruption''.\23\ Critics
remain skeptical of the agency's effectiveness.\24\
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\21\ U.S. Department of State, ``Nigeria,'' Country Report on Human
Rights Practices 2009, March 2010.
\22\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Volume 2, March 2011, and Money Laundering and Financial Crimes
Country Database, May 2011.
\23\ ``Nigeria's Anti-Corruption Chief Farida Waziri Sacked,'' BBC,
November 23, 2011.
\24\ HRW, Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria's Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission, August 25, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Nigerian government faces mounting, and at times competing,
internal and external pressures to implement reforms deemed key to
addressing corruption and other development and security challenges.
Its ability to address real grievances in both the restive Niger Delta
region and in the populous north are critical to achieving the
government's overall development goals and attracting much-needed
foreign investment.
THE NIGERIAN RESPONSE TO BOKO HARAM
Boko Haram is a threat that most observers agree must ultimately be
dealt with by the Nigerian government, but many consider its responses
to date to be ineffective. Indeed, some critics contend that the
government has contributed to the problem. In September 2011, a
commission appointed by President Jonathan to investigate the security
challenges emanating from the northeast reported that security force
lapses and heavy-handedness, weak governance, and underdevelopment had
all contributed to the rise in violence in the region.
The commission also recommended that the government engage Boko
Haram in a dialogue, in effect trying to replicate negotiations with
Niger Delta militants that led in 2009 to an amnesty and rehabilitation
program that has, to date, been fairly successful in quieting militia
attacks. Views on the proposed negotiations are mixed, given Boko
Haram's loose organizational structure and perceptions that the demands
of the hardline leadership of the group are not open to compromise. The
Jonathan administration has been skeptical of negotiations, but has
acknowledged the need to foster development in the north and address
the perceived marginalization that has fueled periodic protests against
the government. It is unclear, however, whether the Jonathan government
has the political will or clout to affect major changes.
Some reports suggest that Boko Haram may receive political
patronage and sponsorship from certain northern elites.\25\ Nigerian
police recently arrested a ruling party senator on suspicion of
providing funding for the group, after an alleged Boko Haram spokesman,
now in custody, reportedly linked him to the group. The motivations for
certain elites to support the group are likely varied. Some may seek to
embarrass President Jonathan or discredit the security services, while
others may seek to use the group to serve local political ambitions or
settle scores with opponents. The use of private militias by
politicians has been an all-too-common occurrence in Nigerian politics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ An alleged Boko Haram spokesman, Ali Sanda Umar Konduga, who
was arrested in November 2011, has reportedly implicated Senator
Mohammed Ali Ndume of the country's ruling party as a sponsor. Ndume is
a member of a committee appointed by President Jonathan to consider
peace negotiations with Boko Haram. Konduga may also have implicated
other former members of the Nigerian government, including an
ambassador who is now deceased and a former governor. ``Arrest of
Senator, Alleged Voice of a Radical Muslim Sect in Nigeria Brings More
Questions,'' Associated Press, November 23, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While successive Nigerian administrations have been supportive of
international counterterrorism initiatives, the government has been
slow to adopt anti-terrorism legislation. The Nigerian parliament
finally adopted long-debated anti-terrorism and money laundering laws
earlier this year amid mounting political pressure after a series of
bombings. If allegations of financing by northern elites are credible,
the Nigerian government may benefit from technical assistance in
forensic accounting. Given sensitivities regarding general corruption,
however, it is unclear whether the government would welcome such an
offer. Interested donors may also consider efforts to support the
Jonathan administration's attempts to increase interagency coordination
and restructure the Nigerian security services to better respond to
terrorist threats.
As the violence in the northeast escalated in mid-2011, the
Nigerian government determined that the police lacked the capacity to
counter the threat posed by Boko Haram and deployed a Joint Task Force
(composed of military and police) to the northeast. The Task Force has
established a heavy security presence in Maiduguri, the capital of
Borno state, conducting house-to-house searches, and generating
considerable ill-will among local communities for its at times
aggressive and intrusive response. Several respected northern leaders
have called on the government to withdraw the force. Nigerian security
forces, particularly the police, have historically been accused of
serious human rights abuses. Activists suggest that the government has
done little to address issues of impunity and corruption within the
police force. In 2007, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture reported
that ``torture is an intrinsic part of how law enforcement services
operate within the country.''\26\ The State Department's annual human
rights reports on Nigeria document numerous serious abuses by security
forces. Many Nigeria experts caution that if Nigerian security services
continue their heavy-handed response in the northeast, it may further
alienate local communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ U.N. Press Release, ``Special Rapporteur on Torture Concludes
Visit to Nigeria,'' March 12, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The State Department's 2009 human rights report noted serious
abuses by both police and soldiers during the July 2009 Boko Haram
uprising and cited ``credible media reports'' claiming that police
executed Yusuf. Nigerian officials have acknowledged some abuses, and
in July 2011 criminal charges were finally filed against five police
officers, including three who hold fairly senior positions, for the
killing of Yusuf and his followers. In August 2011, the military
commenced the court marshal of a military commander in charge of forces
responsible for the deaths of 42 militants during the June 2009
violence.
U.S. INTERESTS IN NIGERIA AND U.S. ENGAGEMENT ON THE BOKO HARAM THREAT
The Obama administration considers Nigeria to be one of its key
strategic partners on the continent, and various U.S. Government
agencies appear to be considering the threat posed by Boko Haram
through different lenses. The United States and Nigeria, which
currently sits on the U.N. Security Council, often find common ground
in international fora. The country plays a significant role in peace
and stability operations across Africa and is a major troop contributor
to U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world. Its geostrategic
position in West Africa and its role as significant supplier of oil to
the United States are also key considerations in U.S-Nigeria relations.
Additionally, Nigerians comprise the largest percentage of African
immigrants living in the United States.
Given Nigeria's strategic potential, the United States provides the
country with military training, emphasizing professionalism and respect
for human rights and civilian authority through a range of programs.
Efforts to enhance Nigeria's peacekeeping capabilities are a primary
focus, as are initiatives to secure its land and maritime borders.
Nigeria participates in the State Department's Trans Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that
aims to increase border protection and regional counter-terrorism
capabilities. However, it has historically played a comparatively minor
role in that initiative in contrast to the Sahel states affected by
AQIM. The Nigerian military has also received counterterrorism
assistance through the Department of Defense, although the amount it
has received is smaller than that received by the Sahel states or the
East African countries neighboring Somalia. Human rights and corruption
concerns have limited U.S. assistance for the Nigerian police.
The United States is the largest bilateral donor in Nigeria,
providing over $600 million annually in recent years to bolster
democratic governance, agriculture and economic reform, education and
health services, and to professionalize and reform the security
services. The overwhelming majority of that aid is focused on health
programs. The U.S. Government has urged greater attention to
development in the north, and USAID implements several ``flagship''
programs in two northern Nigerian states: Sokoto and Bauchi (the latter
is located in the northeast and has suffered Boko Haram attacks in the
past year). These programs, which are designed to concentrate resources
and achieve maximum impact, aim to strengthen state and local
government education and primary health care systems, and to build
local public-private partnerships in an attempt to improve
accountability and service delivery. Other programs that may benefit
the north include U.S. efforts to support reforms to the country's
power sector that may increase access to electricity. The Obama
administration is also initiating new conflict mitigation programs to
address extremism in the north. The State Department maintains 10
``American Corners'' (regional resource centers) in Nigeria to share
information on American culture and values.
Cooperation on counterterrorism reportedly improved in the
aftermath of the December 2009 airliner bombing attempt, although some
government officials remain sensitive to perceived foreign intrusion in
domestic affairs. The Nigerian government has coordinated with the
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration,
and the International Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen
security systems at Nigeria's international airports, and began using
full body scanners in 2010. The Nigerian government has also reportedly
been receptive to post-blast investigative support by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation since the August 2011 U.N. bombing.
In approaching the threat posed by Boko Haram, the State Department
has urged the Nigerian government to balance its security response with
efforts to address some of the legitimate grievances voiced by northern
communities. Obama administration officials have recognized the need to
help Nigeria bolster its counterterrorism capabilities and secure its
borders, but will likely press for more effective responses from
Nigeria's security forces and its federal and state government
structures in responding to the Boko Haram phenomenon. Boko Haram may
not find widespread support for its tactics in northern Nigeria, but it
does enjoy some sympathy for its cause. Going forward, U.S.
policymakers must determine the various risks, benefits, and tradeoffs
associated with the different counterterrorism and counter-
radicalization measures in their toolkit and weigh their effects
against other U.S. policy goals in the country and the wider region.
Mr. Meehan. Dr. Laremont.
STATEMENT OF RICARDO RENE LAREMONT, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY, BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY, STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW YORK
Mr. Laremont. Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and
other distinguished Members of this subcommittee, thank you for
this opportunity to discuss my views concerning Boko Haram, al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and Al-Shabaab. NATO's
prosecution of a combined counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency campaign in Pakistan and Afghanistan have
decimated the ranks of what has been known as al-Qaeda Central,
and has caused its remnants to seek--hereinafter as AQ--to seek
havens elsewhere, notably in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, North
Africa, and the Sahel.
Al-Qaeda has an established pattern of attempting to create
safe havens for operations in regions of the world where
governmental presence is minimal. While America and NATO have
surged in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda has also surged in
the regions mentioned above. One of our tasks today is to
assess both the evidence and the potential threat of
collaboration among Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, and Al-Shabaab.
Now, as has been mentioned by both the Members of this
committee and the members of this panel, Boko Haram was
established in 2002. It is essentially an Islamist religious
sect, and it has operated principally in the northeastern
Nigerian states of Borno and Yobe, which are substantially
isolated from the rest of the country. Boko Haram has opposed
the Government of Nigeria because it claims that the government
is both secular and corrupt. Boko Haram is offering an
alternative, to create an Islamic state in Nigeria that would
render justice and provide transparency in government in
Nigeria. It is trying to do this even though Nigeria is
essentially a bi-religious society, with approximately 55
percent of the population being Muslim, and the remainder being
Christians or practitioners of African traditional religions.
Since 2009, Boko Haram has attacked police officers and Army
officers, and politicians and clerics, and even ordinary
citizens, but primarily in northeastern Nigeria. They have been
doing so by using assailants who use mopeds in drive-by
attacks, and they have used handguns, rifles, and small
explosives.
The key event that has caused perhaps the attention of this
committee is that in the beginning of June 16, 2011, Boko Haram
changed its choice of targets for the first time, and also
moved from attacking northern Nigeria to striking the capital.
On that date, it exploded a car bomb in the parking lot of
police headquarters in Abuja, not killing anyone, but
destroying 40 vehicles in that parking lot. This, however,
signaled a shift from the United States of drive-by assailants
on mopeds to the first use of a vehicle and improvised
explosive device.
Subsequently, on August 26, 2011, the Boko Haram launched a
second attack against U.N. headquarters in Abuja, killing 18
persons in that attack. Since then, soft targets, including
upscale hotels in Abuja, including the Hilton, the Sheraton,
and the Nikon Luxury have been targeted. I can't believe I have
1 minute left.
Let me, with my remaining 60 seconds, cut to the chase,
although I won't touch on all the issues that are particularly
relevant. I think that what this committee needs to focus upon
is on what other panelists have said. North Africa and the
Sahel need to be seen as a continuum, one that extends from
southern Algeria and southern Libya to northern Nigeria, and
embracing a region from the west with Mauritania, and ending in
Sahel. What the intelligence community and what the Congress
has failed to do is to look at this region the way AQ looks at
this region. That is that the Sahel is a continuum. I have zero
time left, so let me add one more thing that I think is
relevant to what you need to think about moving forward. That
is that the fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya is the single
most important development upon which we need to focus our
attention.
The looting of high-grade armaments from the Ajdabiya and
Benghazi arms depot has meant that those armaments have been
sacked by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb has already indicated, by its public
declarations, that it seeks to link with both Boko Haram and
Al-Shabaab. So to underline what I am trying to say is that in
this space where there is limited governmental operations, we
have a series of groups operating who have clearly, in their
public declarations, signaled their intent to unify. When we
take their intent with the availability of the sophisticated
armaments that have been looted in Libya, we have a--well, it
is the potential for an extraordinarily destabilizing
combination.
In order to address that concern, the United States
Government needs to acquire the information that it does not
have, which is: How many persons are actually engaged in this
insurgency, what are their aspirations, which we have a sense
of, but more importantly, what is their capacity? Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Laremont follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ricardo Rene Laremont
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
discuss my views concerning Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, and Al Shabab.
NATO's prosecution of a combined counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency campaign in Pakistan and Afghanistan has decimated
the ranks of what has been known as al-Qaeda Central and has caused its
remnants (hereinafter AQ) to seek safe havens elsewhere, notably in
Yemen, the Horn of Africa, North Africa, and the Sahel. AQ has an
established pattern of attempting to create safe havens for operations
in regions of the world where governmental presence is minimal. While
America and NATO have ``surged'' in Afghanistan and Pakistan, AQ has
also ``surged'' in the regions mentioned above. One of our tasks today
is to assess both the evidence and the potential threat of
collaboration among Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and Al
Shabab.
Boko Haram, which was founded in 2002, is an Islamist religious
sect operating primarily in the northeastern Nigerian states of Borno
and Yobe. Boko Haram opposes the government of Nigeria because it
claims that the government is secular and corrupt. Boko Haram endeavors
to create an Islamic state in Nigeria that it claims would render
justice and provide transparency in government in Nigeria. It is
seeking to establish an Islamic state even though Nigeria is a bi-
religious society with approximately 55% of the population being Muslim
with the remainder being Christians or practitioners of African
traditional religions. Since 2009 Boko Haram has attacked police and
army officers, politicians, clerics, and ordinary citizens, primarily
in northern Nigeria. Its attacks have mostly involved assailants who
use mopeds in ``drive-by'' attacks employing handguns, rifles, or small
explosives. Beginning on June 16, 2011, however, Boko Haram changed its
choice of targets by striking beyond northern Nigeria for the first
time. It struck Police Headquarters in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria,
destroying 40 vehicles in the Police Headquarters parking lot. It also
changed tactics by moving from ``drive-by shootings'' to detonating an
improvised explosive device (IED). The use of an IED in this attack
involved a level of sophistication regarding bomb construction that
arguably was obtained elsewhere, most likely from resources within the
al-Qaeda network. On August 26, 2011 Boko Haram undertook a second IED
attack in Abuja, this time using a suicide bomber who drove an
explosives-laden truck into the headquarters for the United Nations,
killing 18 persons in that attack.\1\ Since the attack on the United
Nations headquarters, Nigeria's State Security Service has disclosed it
has information that Boko Haram intends to target up-scale hotels in
Abuja, notably the Hilton, the Sheraton, and the Nikon Luxury.\2\ This
shift in tactics and location of attacks changes the nature of Boko
Haram's threat with Western interests now being targeted. Also of
interest for the security community has been an alleged attempt to link
the operations of Boko Haram with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,
which is a larger, more effective, and more lethal Islamist jihadist
group presently operating in Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and
Chad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/26/nigeria-attack-
islamists-claim-responsibility, accessed 23 November 2011.
\2\ http://www.nigeriadailynews.com/general/30688-luxury-hotels-in-
abuja-deserted-over-threat-of-attack-by-boko-haram.html, accessed 23
November 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an Islamist jihadist
group that originally was formed to depose the government of Algeria
but it has become a transnational group operating in Algeria,
Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and now--because of possible linkages
with Boko Haram--Nigeria.\3\ While AQIM in northern Algeria primarily
focuses upon attacking police and military officials in a region that
extends from the capital Algiers and then moves towards the east into
the Kabylie mountains, AQIM in the Sahel is an organization that hopes
to play a greater and clearly destabilizing role in that region. AQIM's
aspirations for expanded range of operations and tactical effectiveness
may increase in the near future because of the security vacuum that has
been generated by the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime in Libya,
which was a regime that was firmly opposed to Islamist jihadism in the
Sahel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ For more on AQIM, see Ricardo Rene Laremont, ``Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel,'' African
Security. Vol. 4 (2011): 242-268 and Steven Harmon, ``From GSPC to
AQIM: The Evolution of an African islamist terrorist group into an Al-
Qa'ida Affiliate and its implications for the Sahara-Sahel region,''
http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/bulletin85harmon.pdf, accessed
23 November 2011.
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When security analysts examine the possibility for instability in
the Sahel they cannot assess Boko Haram, AQIM, and Al Shabab in
isolation. The Sahel--which stretches from Mauritania to Somalia and
from southern Algeria to northern Nigeria--must be understood as a
continuum. The Sahel is either desert or savannah and its residents--
from pastoralists to manual workers--largely disregard the borders of
the countries that comprise it. Similarly, violent jihadists of various
schools--from Boko Haram to AQIM and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
and the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group--also understand this region as
a united continuum upon which they plan their future operations.
In the wake of the fall of the Qaddafi's regime in Libya, it is
rather clear that AQIM and its potential allies of Boko Haram and Al
Shabab aspire to expand their operations. Muammar Qaddafi opposed
Islamist jihadist groups in the region and he used either money (by
funding social, education, or construction programs) or arms (using his
security forces) to inhibit their operations. With Qaddafi gone and a
security vacuum being created, AQIM and its allies find themselves in a
situation within which they plan to expand. We must obviously concede
that there will be gaps between AQIM's and Boko Haram's aspirations for
expansion and their accomplishment of these objectives.
Nevertheless, there is evidence being obtained from various
sources--including open-source materials, newspaper accounts, and
interviews with officials in the Sahel--that lead us to conclude that
AQIM in particular hopes to seize upon the chaos created by the fall of
Qaddafi to advance their regional objectives. In Algeria, Mauritania,
Mali, and Niger AQIM intends to expand their already existing links
with local Tuareg tribes who have episodically opposed central
governments in the region. Also, in these same countries discussions
have already taken place to establish better working relationships
between AQIM and former Malian and Nigerian Tuareg soldiers who had
been in the employ of Qaddafi's now disbanded African Legion. That
Legion employed approximately 1,000 soldiers who fought for Qaddafi.
These soldiers have seized high-quality armaments in Libya, including
anti-aircraft artillery, SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, and other
armaments.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Daya Gamage, ``Libyan Rebel Commander Admits Link to al-Qaeda:
Chad President says al-Qaeda-Acquired Weapons in Rebel Zone,''
www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/03/28/libyan-rebel-commander-admits-
link-al-qaeda-chad-president-says-al-qaeda-acquired-we, accessed March
30, 2011; Felipe Pathe Duarte, ``Maghrebian Militant Maneuvers: AQIM as
a Strategic Challenge,'' http://csis.org/publication/maghrebian-
militant-maneuvers-aqim-strategic-challenge, accessed 23 November 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Besides expanding their operations in Algeria, Mali, and Niger,
AQIM will also attempt to relink with members or former members of the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), some of whom are participating in
the formation of Libya's new government. Among LIFG members playing
prominent roles in Libya's National Transitional Council include Abd
al-Hakim Belhaj (the commander of Tripoli's Military Council) and
Abdel-Hakim al-Hasidi.\5\ Belhaj has publicly alleged being tortured by
the CIA in Bangkok and he has also acknowledged past ties to al-Qaeda
and to his having met Osama bin Laden. He now claims to have modified
his political views and he has declared his desire to create a
pluralist and inclusive political structure in Libya that will be
tolerant of diverse points of view.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Praveen Swami, Nick Squires and Duncan Gardham, ``Libyan rebel
commander admits his fighters have al-Qaeda links,'' The Telegraph, 23
November 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
africaandindianocean/libya/8407047/Libyan-rebelcommander-admits-his-
fighters-have-al-Qaeda-links.html, accessed 23 November 2011; Omar
Ashour, ``Ex-Jihadists in the New Libya,'' Foreign Policy, 29 August
2011, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/29/
post_qaddafi_libya_islamists_arms_and_democracy_0, accessed 23 November
2011; Souad Mekhennet and Eric Schmidt, ``Exiled Islamists Watch
Rebellion Unfold at Home,'' The New York Times, 18 July 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/world/africa/19rebel.html, accessed 23
November 2011.
\6\ Abdel Hakim Belhaj, ``The revolution belongs to all Libyans,
secular or not.'' The Guardian, 26 September 2011, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/27/revolution-belongs-to-all-
libyans, accessed 23 November 2011; Hadeel Al-Shalchi and Maggie
Michael, ``Abdel Hakim Belhaj, Libya Rebel Commander, Plays Down
Islamist Past,'' The Huffington Post, 23 November 2011, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/02/abdel-hakim-belhaj_n_946518.html,
accessed 23 November 2011; David Poort, ``Q&A: Top NTC commander Abdel
Hakim Belhadj.'' http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/11/
20111117102116501736.html, accessed 23 November 2011; [sic].
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Moving beyond Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Libya, we will see that
AQIM will attempt to link with and assist Boko Haram in Nigeria.
Indeed, AQIM's leader, Abu Musab Abd Al Wadoud told Al Jazeera that his
group would provide Boko Haram with support.\7\ The Nigerian and the
Algerian governments are right now investigating now to see whether a
Boko Haram-AQIM link exists.\8\ While the evidence at this moment in
time is weak and inconclusive, we should remain vigilant because a
viable connection between AQIM and Boko Haram makes sense from AQIM's
and Boko Haram's strategic perspectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ STRATFOR, ``The Rising Threat from Nigeria's Boko Haram
Militant Group, 10 November 2011, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/
20111109-rising-threat-nigerias-boko-haram-militant-group, accessed 24
November 2011.
\8\ Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, ``Al Qaeda-linked group finds
fertile territory in Nigeria as killings escalate,'' http://
www.cnn.com/2011/11/18/world/africa/nigeria-militants/index.html,
accessed 23 November 2011; Karen Leigh, ``Nigeria's Boko Haram: Al-
Qaeda's New Friend in Africa?'' Time Magazine, 31 August 2011, http://
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2091137,00.html, accessed 23
November 2011; Robyn Dixon, ``Nigeria militant group Boko Haram's
attacks attract speculation,'' The Los Angeles Times, 13 September
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/13/world/la-fg-nigeria-boko-
haram20110914, accessed 23 November 2011; Lamine Chikhi, ``Algeria says
Nigeria's Boko Haram tied to al Qaeda,'' Reuters, http://
af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE7AD01H20111114, accessed 24
November 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If AQIM were to link successfully with Boko Haram in Nigeria, this
development would not only affect Nigeria; such a development would
arguably have destabilizing effects throughout West Africa. Nigeria is
the pivotal state in West Africa. When it becomes weaker or unstable,
the entire West African region is affected. That is why this issue of
Boko Haram and AQIM that we are examining in this hearing needs to be
dealt with now while it is in its earliest stages, before what
presently seems a weak and inconclusive link becomes more real and
dangerous. It would seem that a thorough-going security analysis of the
political, social, and economic factors that make northern Nigeria
particularly susceptible to targeting by jihadist groups would be in
order. It would seem that an investment in the acquisition of relevant
data for security analysis now would enhance the security of the United
States and would cost less than waiting until these trends worsen (as
they did previously in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen).
This needed security analysis would lead us to understand why
northern Nigeria in particular has become fertile ground for Islamist
jihadist recruiters. Nigeria is a diverse country with its residents'
religious affiliations being arranged over a Muslim-Christian divide.
That is one reason for tension between the religions. Furthermore, wide
differences in wealth exist between an essentially destitute northern
region and a somewhat more prosperous south. (The south substantially
obtains most of its income from petroleum exploration and sales.) Given
the extraordinary levels of poverty in the north and its widespread
rates of illiteracy, we can understand why dissidents within the north
often choose to affiliate with Islamist movements that claim that they
will improve the living standards of the poor by establishing a more
just and transparent government that would be ruled by Islamic law.
According to some analyses no more than 40 percent of males in northern
Nigeria are literate while female literacy hovers around 20 percent.
These figures contrast with Nigeria's south where the literacy rate for
males is approximately 74 percent while the rate for women is between
55 to 60 percent. Professor Ibrahim Gambari, Special Advisor to the
United Nations Secretary General, recently disclosed vast disparities
regarding the education of girls in Nigeria. He said that while 85
percent of girls were being educated in the southeastern and
southwestern regions of the country, school enrollment rates for girls
in the northeast were 20 percent while in the northwest they were 25
percent.\9\ Jobs simply cannot be created with such high levels of
illiteracy and under-enrollment of children in schools. Going forward
with our security analysis we will need to recognize that northern
Nigeria's poverty is extreme and structural and that this impediment
will have to be addressed if we are to deal with the security threat
being created by Boko Haram and its possible alliance with its larger
and more effective affiliate AQIM. A comprehensive security analysis of
both Nigeria and the Sahelian region is in order because it is both
clear and predictable that it is within the Sahel and also the Horn of
Africa and the Arabian peninsula that al-Qaeda and its affiliates hope
to expand their operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Emma Ujah & Luka Binniyat, ``Northern Nigeria Has World Highest
Illiterate--World Bank'', www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/53569/1/
northern-nigeria-has-world-highest-illiterate-worl.html, accessed 24
November 2011.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Dr. Laremont. But please recognize
as well your written testimony is fully part of the record, and
available not just for us to review, but for those who follow
the important testimony of this hearing. I thank you for that.
Mr. Meehan. Ms. Cooke.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER G. COOKE, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Cooke. Yes. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Speier,
and distinguished Members. My colleagues have covered a lot of
ground, so I thought I would limit my remarks to just a few
points on Boko Haram and offer some thoughts on implications
for U.S. policy. First, since the death of founder Mohammed
Yusuf, the group's structure is fractured and evolving.
Although the overall structure is nebulous, observers point to
the emergence of three main groups, a religiously ideological
element, a more politically oriented faction funded by state
and national political figures, and a more opportunistic which
uses the Boko Haram brand as a cover for criminal activity.
These divisions within Boko Haram are not always clear-cut,
and the group's leadership will often issue conflicting and
competing public messages. Second point is the possibility for
dialogue and negotiation remains on the table. There is some
suggestion that elements of Boko Haram remain open to this
possibility. Nigerian President Jonathan has indicated that he
might be willing to engage. That is a position encouraged by
Borno state government, by local traditional authorities, and,
according to a recent national poll, by the majority of
Nigerians. Third, although its methods at present are rejected
by most northerners, Boko Haram is a product of deepening
economic decline and growing political alienation in the north.
My colleagues have mentioned this.
The traditional mainstays of Nigeria's northern economy,
agriculture, textiles, manufacturing, have collapsed since the
advent of the oil economy. Unemployment, indicators in health,
education, sanitation, are among the worst in the country. The
violent response to President Jonathan's reelection in 2011
reflected the perception of northerners that they are the
losers in the zero sum game of Nigerian politics.
My fourth and final point is that Boko Haram does not, at
present, enjoy broad community support in the areas in which it
operates. This is an important advantage and opportunity in
crafting an effective national and international response. It
is an advantage that the Nigerian government and its partners
should do their utmost to preserve. Heavy-handed security and
counterterror tactics risk alienating a potentially vital
source of cooperation and intelligence. That is the
communities.
So, and this is very abbreviated, what are the implications
for U.S. policy? First and foremost, the U.S. approach should
be nuanced and low-key, being careful to avoid actions that
escalate the crisis, alienate communities, and limit options
for negotiation. Diplomatically, the United States should press
the Nigerian government to articulate a national security
strategy--it has not done so yet--that commits the government
to a comprehensive, balanced approach that can help guide
Nigerian agencies and international partners. Second, because
Boko Haram's leadership and structure do appear to be
fractured, the United States should be very careful and give
very careful consideration to potential consequences of
designating the group as a foreign terrorist organization. In
the short term, the designation risks further radicalizing Boko
Haram, lending a coherence to a group that already appears to
be fracturing, and narrowing the opportunity for dialogue and
negotiation, which as I said, is still possible with some
elements of the group.
Third, the United States should seek ways to engage more
fully and meaningfully with the communities in northern
Nigeria, particularly in northeastern states of Borno and Yobe.
As a first step, the State Department's Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization might undertake an in-depth assessment to better
gauge northern priorities, northern community priorities in
development, economic growth, security, conflict mitigation,
and identify areas of opportunity for U.S. engagement.
Finally, in responding to Boko Haram, the United States
should limit its security engagement to strengthening Nigerian
intelligence capacities, advising on civilian protection
measures, promoting community engagement, and encouraging
professionalism, restraint, and accountability. More direct
engagement risks association with intrusive and deeply
unpopular security responses to Boko Haram and creates a
perception that the United States is powering the federal
government to take coercive action against northerners.
In the longer term, I have a few suggestions. The United
States have a greater focus on West African cooperation. On
security and counterterrorism, it is doing this. It will need
to expand that in the future. Consider broadening diplomatic
presence in Nigeria's north. For example, the suggestion of a
consulate in the state of Kano has been raised before as a
means of engaging local, state leaders, civil society,
religious leaders.
Then finally, encouraging the Nigerian government in a
longer-term strategy of economic revitalization in the north.
Seeking opportunities for foreign direct investment,
infrastructure enhancement, investment in agriculture
productivity and processing, employment, and incentives to
state governments and local governments for good governance. I
know this isn't really within this subcommittee's purview, but
it is important, I think, to have your voices at the table in
pushing for that comprehensive approach to dealing with Boko
Haram at its source. Thank you very much, and I am happy to
take your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Cooke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jennifer G. Cooke
November 30, 2011
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members
of the House subcommittee, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to
testify today on Boko Haram.\1\ I will limit my remarks to a few brief
points on Boko Haram's evolution and the context in which it operates
and offer some thoughts on implications for U.S. engagement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Boko Haram, meaning ``Western education is a sin,'' is the
colloquial name given to the group which formally calls itself Jama'atu
Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal Jihad (``People Committed to the
Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad,'' in Arabic). At its
inception, the group was also locally known as the Nigerian Taliban.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Established in 2002, Boko Haram's initial incarnation was as a
fairly narrow, insulated sect operating in the remote northeast corner
of Nigeria in the Borno state capital of Maiduguri. Its founding leader
Muhammed Yussuf called for a rejection of the corrupting influence of
western culture and state authority and of traditional religious
authorities who were seen as degenerate collaborators in a
fundamentally immoral government system. The group drew its adherents
largely from disaffected university students and unemployed youth, with
few prospects of economic opportunity or social advancement. Boko Haram
is not the first group to violently oppose secular and religious
authority structures in northern Nigeria, but its expanding array of
targets and gradual adoption of modern terror tactics is a new and
deeply alarming turn, setting a dangerous precedent for potential
successor groups that may arise from among Nigeria's politically
alienated, economically marginalized, and largely youthful northern
populations.
The suicide attacks on U.N. headquarters in Abuja on August 26,
2011, propelled the group to international notoriety. But they also
revealed a Nigerian federal administration wholly unprepared to deal
with the escalating threat in a coherent, strategic, and calibrated
way. Coming on the heels of the April 2011 post-election crisis that
left some 800 northerners dead, the attacks further underscored the
failure of successive Nigerian administrations to bridge the growing
economic and political rift between the country's north and south. Boko
Haram is simply one manifestation of the profound failure of successive
Nigerian governments to curb corruption, deliver public services,
generate economic opportunity, establish accountable security
institutions, and engage communities in both the north and south in a
more fully national polity.
The Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram will need to be
integrated into a comprehensive political, economic, and security
strategy that offers some promise of real improvement to northern
populations and communities and limits the appeal of Boko Haram and its
potential successors. The United States would do well to avoid any
association with ham-handed, short-sighted security responses emanating
from Abuja and instead press the government to plan and pursue a
comprehensive and strategic approach with urgency and commitment.
The core aims of Boko Haram appear at present to remain limited to
the Nigerian domestic scene, even though western targets within Nigeria
will appeal because of their visibility and political impact. There is
the possibility of greater collusion with al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, with
reports of members training with AQIM in Mauritania and Mali and
possible sharing of information on tactics and technologies. But there
is little sign at present, apart from an occasional rhetorical
flourish, of any global or even regional ambitions on the part of Boko
Haram leadership.
Boko Haram poses little immediate threat to the U.S. homeland,
although U.S. citizens and assets in Nigeria may well be vulnerable as
the group seeks high-profile, high-impact targets. The more imminent
threat is a fundamentally destabilizing crisis within Nigeria, which as
an important energy supplier, security partner, and regional and
continental powerhouse, is one of the United States' most strategically
important allies in Africa.
Some points to keep in mind:
BOKO HARAM IS FRACTURED AND EVOLVING
The group's fluidity and seemingly divided leadership will pose an
intelligence challenge but may also offer opportunities to ``peel
away'' individuals or factions and isolate more purely criminal or
recalcitrant elements.
The killing of founder Mohammed Yussuf while in police custody in
July 2009 marked something of a turning point for the movement. Along
with an escalation of tactics and an expanding range of targets, the
vacuum left by Yussuf has led to an apparent fracturing of its
leadership and coherence. There remains a great deal that is unknown
about Boko Haram's inner workings; nonetheless, observers point to the
emergence of three main groups: The first is a more religiously
ideological hard-core element, led by Abubakar Shakau, a close
associate of Yussuf. Despite this faction's ideological bent, some
observers suggest that Shakau may be open to a negotiated settlement
with federal authorities.
A second faction is thought to derive support from state and
national political figures whose ambition is to undermine local
authorities, or reveal President Goodluck Jonathan as weak and
ineffective, possibly precipitating a recall by ruling party leadership
or at the very least assuring the return of the presidency to the north
in the country's next national election.
Finally, observers point to a more opportunistic grouping, which
many allege simply uses the Boko Haram brand and associated insecurity
as cover for criminal activity and self-enrichment. This group may draw
inspiration from the money-making tactics and kidnap-for-ransom
operations by militants in the Niger Delta or Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb
affiliates in the Sahel. These divisions within Boko Haram are not
always clear-cut, and the group's ``leadership'' will often issue
conflicting public messages.
A POSSIBILITY FOR DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION REMAINS ON THE TABLE
There is some suggestion, as noted above, that Abubakar Shakau
remains open to the possibility of dialogue and negotiation. Nigerian
President Goodluck Jonathan has indicated that he is open to dialogue,
although his enthusiasm may be waning. A presidentially-appointed panel
concluded in September 2011 that ``the federal government should
fundamentally consider the option of dialogue and negotiation which
should be contingent upon the renunciation of all forms of violence and
surrender of arms to be followed by rehabilitation.'' Borno State
governor Kashim Shettima has reiterated the call for ``sincere
dialogue,'' and a group of Borno state elders have called on President
Jonathan to initiate engagement. A national opinion poll by the
Nigerian CLEEN Foundation indicates that 58 percent of Nigerians
support dialogue (80 percent in the northeast region most affected).
The group's demands range from the improbable--including full
implementation of Shari'a in northern Nigeria (with some adherents
advocating Shari'a for all of Nigeria), to the more plausible--
including full accountability for police and security forces involved
in the extra-judicial killing of Yussuf and the associated violence
that left 700 dead; public access to a former national security
adviser's investigation and report on the 2009 crackdown; the release
of imprisoned Boko Haram members; and the rebuilding of mosques and
other buildings destroyed by security forces.
Any strategy to engage Boko Haram--whether negotiations, pay-offs,
or amnesty offers--will have inherent risks. Negotiations with one
element of Boko Haram may cause further splintering or hardening among
other factions. Pay-offs set a dangerous precedent in creating
incentives for other actors to take up arms, and broad amnesty offers
may create a culture of impunity that leaves victims without recourse
to justice. But while Boko Haram remains a relatively new grouping and
its leadership and structure in flux, there may be opportunities to
peel off factions and leaders more amenable to negotiation and isolate
less intractable factions. Dialogue is worth pursuing, and compromise
on objectively reasonable demands, such as police accountability and
community reconstruction warrants testing.
boko haram is one manifestation of growing alienation in the north that
MUST BE ADDRESSED IN A LONG-TERM RESPONSE
Although its methods are at present rejected by most northerners,
Boko Haram is a product of deepening economic decline and growing
political alienation in the north. This decline has seen a loss of
respect for state and local authorities who have failed to deliver even
the most basic services to their constituents, and to some extent an
erosion of traditional religious authorities who are often perceived to
be in collusion with a corrupt political establishment.
The greatest axis of division and resentment is the growing
economic disparity between the northern Nigeria and the wealthier south
and the perception that southern political elites have ignored the
interests and priorities of northern populations. Many northerners felt
it was ``their'' turn at the presidency in 2011, since the late
President Yar'Adua failed to serve his full term. The violent response
to President Jonathan's victory reflected the perception of northerners
that they are the losers in the zero-sum game of Nigerian politics.
The traditional mainstays of Nigeria's northern economy--
agriculture, textiles, manufacturing--have collapsed since independence
as successive governments (of both northern and southern origin)
focused exclusively on the lucrative oil sector. Unemployment in some
northern states is estimated at 90 percent, and indicators in health,
education, and sanitation are among the lowest in the country. Poverty
alleviation and development efforts have largely bypassed the north,
focusing instead on the volatile Niger Delta region, where militant
groups have threatened international companies and the global oil
supply.
Failure to address these fundamental vulnerabilities may ultimately
lead Boko Haram and potential successors to make common cause with
growing segments of Nigeria's northern population. An accumulation and
convergence of grievances with combined with an escalation of violent
confrontation and terror tactics could prove a profoundly destabilizing
to the Nigerian state. Reversing the north's long-standing economic
decline and bridging the north-south divide will constitute a long-term
endeavor, but it is one that should begin immediately and with urgency.
BOKO HARAM DOES NOT ENJOY BROAD COMMUNITY SUPPORT
At present, Boko Haram enjoys little support in the communities in
which it operates, and this is perhaps the greatest advantage and
opportunity in crafting an effective national and international
response. It is an advantage that the Nigerian government should do its
utmost to preserve.
Unlike militant groups in the oil-producing Niger Delta, Boko Haram
has not presented itself primarily as an interlocutor for poor and
disenfranchised northern populations. Although its adherents are
influenced by the same political and socioeconomic factors that have
led to a widespread sense of alienation and resentment among northern
populations, the group's political/religious agenda and demands have
had little resonance across the north. Thousands have fled the towns in
which Boko Haram has launched its attacks, and local community members
have been intimidated by assassinations of clerics who disagree with
the group's preachings or individuals suspected of collaborating with
security forces.
The Nigerian government should seek to capitalize on this lack of
popular support for Boko Haram and engage the communities that
ultimately will need to be part of a comprehensive solution. Instead,
however, the government's heavy-handed and overwhelmingly security-
focused response have led to further alienation and deepening distrust.
A major Joint Task Force deployment (of military and police personnel)
to Borno in summer 2011 inflamed tensions, with widespread accusations
of arbitrary arrests, extra-judicial killings, torture, and
intimidation. Police corruption and abuse has become one of the
defining grievances of Boko Haram and one that is very likely to
resonate with communities in the north (and nationally). The federal
structure of Nigeria's police means that officers are usually not from
the areas to which they are deployed, have little empathy with, or
understanding of, local communities, and generally have adversarial
relations with local populations.
THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY IS NOT YET CLEAR
Ultimately, for better or worse, the onus of responding to Boko
Haram rests with the Nigerian government. There is considerable concern
that the government may lack the capacity and political will to mount
an effective, comprehensive response. The most visible response to date
has been an overweening security presence in the north that has
antagonized and intimidated local populations. At present, there appear
to be divisions within the federal government on how best to engage
with Boko Haram; little coordination, communication, or intelligence
sharing among the government's multiple security agencies; suggestions
of a potential free-for-all with private security firms bidding for
government contracts; and no clearly articulated national strategy or
security framework to guide a comprehensive response. President
Jonathan has promised that ``with the renewed vigour [sic] by Nigeria's
security agencies to curb the menace of Boko Haram, the existence of
the group in the shores of Nigeria will soon be history.'' But this
claim holds little promise for a nuanced, calibrated response that
engages communities or addresses urgent long-term vulnerabilities.
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY?
What do these various factors mean for U.S. policy? First and
foremost, the U.S. approach should be nuanced and low-key, being
careful to avoid actions that escalate the crisis, alienate
communities, and limit options for negotiation.
In the short term:
Diplomatically, the United States must press and encourage
the Nigerian government to formulate and articulate a national
security strategy that commits the government to comprehensive,
balanced approach and can help guide a more coordinate and
effective national and international response.
Because Boko Haram's leadership and structure appear to be
fluid and fracturing, with some elements open to the
possibility of dialogue, the United States should give careful
consideration to the potential consequences of officially
designating the group as a foreign terrorist organization. In
the short term, the designation risks further radicalizing Boko
Haram, lending coherence to a group that appears to be
fractured, and narrowing the opportunity for dialogue and
negotiation, which the majority of Nigerians, particularly in
areas most affected by Boko Haram, appear to support.
The United States should seek ways to engage more fully and
meaningfully with communities in northern Nigeria, particularly
in the northeastern states of Borno and Yobe. As a first step,
the State Department's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations might consider working with the U.S. Embassy in
Abuja, the Nigerian government, and nongovernmental
organizations to better gauge northern community priorities in
development, economic growth, security, and conflict mitigation
to identify areas of opportunity and help guide a longer-term
U.S. (and possibly Nigerian) interagency response.
The United States Government should consider working with
the Nigerian federal government and northern state governments,
to devise quick-impact projects that give some sense of renewed
government engagement on local needs and development
priorities, whether in infrastructure, construction,
sanitation, health. The purpose would be to win some short-term
good will from local communities and leaders, although they
should not be viewed as substitutes for longer-term investments
in sustainable development.
In responding to Boko Haram, the United States should limit
its security engagement to strengthening Nigerian intelligence
capacities; advising on civilian protection measures; promoting
community engagement; and encouraging professionalism,
restraint, and accountability. More direct engagement risks
association with intrusive and deeply unpopular security
responses to Boko Haram and creates a perception that the
United States is empowering the federal government to take
coercive action against northerners.
In the longer-term:
The United States should consider opening a U.S. consulate
in the northern Nigeria to expand contact and engagement with
state and local government leaders, civil society, business
leaders, and ordinary citizens. Establishment of a consulate in
Kano has been under consideration for some time: The 2011 post-
election crisis in the north and the rise of the Boko Haram
phenomenon warrant greater diplomatic engagement, not
withdrawal.
The United States should encourage the Nigerian government
in a longer-term strategy of economic revitalization in the
north, seeking opportunities for foreign direct investment,
infrastructure enhancement, investment in agricultural
productivity and processing, employment generation, and
offering incentive programs to state and local governments that
make good faith investments in development, social service
delivery, and transparency. In a country the size of Nigeria,
the administration might consider devising a Millennium
Challenge Account model that could operate at a sub-national
level to incentivize and reward good governance and unlock
economic potential.
The United States should continue to strengthen regional
security cooperation and intelligence sharing within ECOWAS
(the Economic Community of West African States) and the states
of the Maghreb to improve capacities to monitor and interdict
flows of arms and personnel and to track possible links among
criminal or terrorist networks.
Mr. Meehan. Well, I want to thank each of the panelists for
your testimony. I appreciate the need to try to take such a
complex issue and simplify it is--we need that for time
constraints, but this is the opportunity for us, as we ask
questions, to develop the essence of your points, I think, a
little bit each.
So at this point in time the Chair will recognize himself
for 5 minutes of questioning. The testimony that I was able to
review from each of you was compelling. A common theme I see,
of course, is the recognition of Nigeria's importance
throughout the entire African region, and the fact that it
really is a critical state not only in relations with the
United States, but with respect to the integrity of an economy
of the entire continent. There also appears to be an
appreciation for a great amount of opportunity in those regions
because of the unsettled nature of many of those and the
metastasization of al-Qaeda, which they are looking for places
to be able to spread their interests.
Does this create a fertile area? We are trying to assess
how that dynamic may create a threat here to the United States
homeland. But of course, in addition to the United States'
interests. Dr. Laremont, I was struck by your written testimony
in which you talk about the issue of destabilization in West
Africa, its pivotal role, as I have said, but the need for this
issue of Boko Haram and its association with AQIM to be dealt
with now, while it is in its earliest stages, because there is
what--before a weak and inconclusive link becomes real and
dangerous. The panel did a very good job, I think, of
identifying this dramatic transformation that has taken place.
Dr. Pham, those were your words in your testimony, written
testimony, I think a dramatic transformation that we have seen
of Boko Haram in just a very short period. We have seen the
ability for them to not only reach against Nigerian targets,
but against outposts of western culture as well.
The panelists have identified the tactical and functional
upgrade of its capabilities. Panelists have also talked about
the expansion of its tactics, including sophisticated vehicle-
borne IEDs and the use of suicide bombers. Panelists have
talked about the expansion of their territorial reach beyond
the north now down into Abuja, hitting soft targets. The
panelists have talked about the choice of target, the
identification of the United Nations offices, not just strictly
a Nigerian place. The panelists have talked about the
connections with the existing al-Qaeda-affiliated
organizations, particularly the Islamic Maghreb among them.
We have identified that there may be splits going on
simultaneously. An awful lot of dynamics. Those are some of the
signals that we seemed to miss when we earlier evaluated TTP,
we earlier evaluated the al-Qaeda influence in Yemen. Both of
them ended up with strikes against the United States. So what
we are really asking today is, and I am going to ask each of
the panelists, does the Boko Haram leadership, in their intent
to unify with al-Qaeda or others, have any intent or capability
to cause harm to the people of the United States either here or
abroad? That is the fundamental question we are trying to ask.
There is a lot more to it to be sure, and a lot of other
follow-up, but a sense, what is your sense of whether or not
Boko Haram creates a threat to the United States? Dr. Pham, let
me begin with you.
Mr. Pham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Does it have the intent?
I think it is evolving very quickly in that direction. We have
gotten signals, most recently in the pronouncements of Abubakar
Shekau, where he links the jihad that he is fighting with a
transnational global jihad, salutes in fact the so-called
martyrs in Iraq who were targeting U.S. troops there. So the
aspiration is there. As this transformation of its
capabilities, if the opportunity presents itself, I think they
would seize upon it. It would certainly raise their stature
within the terrorist networks in which they are trying to link
up with. So if the opportunity presents itself, I think they
will use it accordingly.
Mr. Meehan. Ms. Ploch.
Ms. Ploch. Thank you. I think Dr. Pham raises several very
valid points. I want to caution when we talk about Boko Haram
as a group and its intent that there are likely several
intents. He mentioned Shekau's statements, clearly indicating
some inspiration, aspiration to target U.S. and western
interests. I think those should be taken with extreme
seriousness. I don't see currently from reporting that the
larger Boko Haram following intends to target the United States
or U.S. interests. Notable, though, is AQIM's regular practice
of kidnapping of western targets. Back in May, we had the
targeting of a British and an Italian citizen from northern
Nigeria. Their whereabouts are debated right now, but some
indications they may still be in northern Nigeria. We don't
know whether Boko Haram was responsible for that kidnapping or
not, but we do need to be very concerned about U.S. citizens in
northern Nigeria and the potential they may be kidnapped by
AQIM, Boko Haram, or others.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you. Dr. Laremont.
Mr. Laremont. Chairman Speier and other Members of the
committee, I think, with all respect, it may not be a question
of looking for a smoking gun, we have found a document that
indicates that, you know, we, Boko Haram, intend to attack the
United States or its interests in Europe, et cetera, et cetera.
I don't think that is really the right way of looking at this
particular question.
I think you have to think about what is the right question
to ask? All right. I think the right question to ask is: What
is the operational space and where are we at this moment in
time? The operational space that we are considering, whether we
are talking about Boko Haram or we are talking about Al-
Shabaab, or we are talking about AQIM, is an operational space
in which there is not governmental capacity. AQ always operates
in spaces where there isn't governmental capacity. That is why
they went to the frontier region of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
That is why they are redeploying to Somalia and Yemen, and why
they are redeploying to the Sahel.
So that is the first question to ask. You are not looking
for a smoking gun. What is the operational space? The second
and most important thing for this committee to consider is the
moment in historical time. This is 2011. This is a
revolutionary year. This is a year similar to the Iranian
revolution in 1979. It is similar to the revolutions of 1968.
It is similar to the Russian revolution of 1917 and the
European revolutions of 1848. This is a revolutionary moment,
which has transformed North Africa in terms of how we need to
position ourselves with regard to emerging governments in North
Africa. It also requires us to realize that because it is a
revolutionary time, we need to think about this space called
the Sahel in a different way than we have considered it in the
past. Once we do that, once we recognize those two key factors,
then we can proceed with our analysis of what is in the
security interests of the United States? But unless you frame
the question properly, and unless you understand the historical
moment, and if you are looking for a smoking gun then you are
not going to get the right answers.
So that is what I would propose to the committee, you have
to understand the space. We have understood that before. AQ
always goes into spaces----
Mr. Meehan. Dr. Laremont, let me do this. I want to follow
up with some questions on that. But let me get Ms. Cooke,
because I have to be careful about my minutes. I need to get to
my colleagues. But I will follow up with that. Thanks.
Ms. Cooke. My sense at present is that Boko Haram poses
little imminent threat to the U.S. homeland, although I do
think U.S. citizens and assets in Nigeria may well be
vulnerable. As the group seeks high-profile, high-impact
targets, and the U.N. building was a step up from local police
units or even the police headquarters in terms of garnering
Nigeria's national attention. Nigerians, unfortunately, are
fairly inured to fairly high levels of political violence. You
have hundreds and hundreds of people killed in the post-
election violence. You know, the country does go on. I think,
you know, that is one of the troubling aspects of Nigeria. But
I think hitting an international institution garnered very
quick attention. I think the core aims of Boko Haram, despite
occasional rhetorical flourishes, remain centered on limited to
Nigerian domestic politics. There is growing evidence of ties
from local politicians who are trying to make Goodluck Jonathan
look ineffective or undermine local government authorities.
So obviously, the possibilities are always there. I guess
it is your task to gauge the plausibility of that. The
possibility is there. The plausibility is perhaps much less
than the possibility. You do have lone wolves like the
underpants bomber, Umar, I am sorry--that is the wrong phrase--
who did not grow up in Boko Haram. He was raised mostly in
England, trained in Yemen, and so forth. There is always going
to be the potential of that kind of alienated young person
isolated who falls prey to influences, whether external, and so
forth. But Boko Haram as a unit seeking to launch targets
against the United States at this time, I think that is
minimal.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you. I now turn to the Ranking Member,
Ms. Speier, for her questions.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, each of
you, for really a very thoughtful discussion on this issue. I
really very much appreciate it. At the outset let me say that
after my questioning, I am going to have to leave because I
have a bill up in another committee that I really must attend
to. But I want to try and get my arms around this, which is, I
think, a little hard to do. I don't think we pay enough
attention to Africa as a hotbed of concern that we should.
I think the fact that in Nigeria right now, we have a very
young population. The Pew study, poll, showed that only 38
percent of Nigeria's 75 million Muslims have a favorable view
of the United States compared to 90 percent of the Nigerian
Christians. All of you touched on the fact that northern
Nigeria is impoverished, that agriculture has been left fallow,
that the poverty may be, in many respects, fueling
organizations like Boko Haram. I guess my question to you is,
one: How large do we think Boko Haram is in numbers? How are
they financed? Are we best served by engaging in northern
Nigeria in a way where we are helping the country, the young
with employment opportunities and educational opportunities to
somehow bridge the gap that exists in terms of how they
perceive the United States?
So if I could just have you answer those three or four
questions as you feel that you can. Dr. Pham, would you like to
begin?
Mr. Pham. Thank you, Representative Speier. How large of a
group, I think the consensus of most analysts is probably a
core group of no more than several hundred, but a wider
community of support, which leads to the financing question.
Just last week, the Nigerian government arrested a sitting
senator from the ruling party, the PDP, accusing him of having
ties and financing with Boko Haram. Whether the accusation is
true or not, we leave to the judicial process. But it does ring
true that certain elements of northern political elites have
tried to hijack the alienation, the sentiments of the youth
population and the general population for their creating a
perpetual crisis for their own political ends. So I have no
doubt that there is some financing there. As well as from
other--the Sahel, as Dr. Laremont's point, the space is full of
all sorts of financing opportunities, from drug running to
protection to narcotraffickers, we have seen AQIM engage in
both, to even hiring out of mercenaries from various
disaffected groups. AQIM has contracted out kidnappings to
mercenaries or to Polisario fighters.
So there is all sorts of financing opportunities. As for
U.S. engagement, I would say we have to be very careful on our
CT, counterterrorism engagement, to not look like we are
driving the Nigerian Government. But on development and those
other issues, certainly I think there is a role to be played.
We have talked for more than a decade about getting a U.S.
diplomatic presence up and running in northern Nigeria. For a
variety of security concerns, as well as budgetary concerns,
that has never taken place. So we have an embassy in Abuja, we
have a diplomatic presence in the largely Christian south, but
we have nothing in the north.
Ms. Speier. Thank you. Ms. Ploch.
Ms. Ploch. Thank you. I think Dr. Pham has covered the
financing issue fairly well. I would also add that a number of
bank robberies have been attributed to the group. Some of these
may be the acts of other criminal gangs that the Nigerian
security forces are claiming are Boko Haram. But it would
provide some financing opportunity. On the issue of the U.S.
Government response in northern Nigeria to underdevelopment,
the U.S. Government provides about $600 million a year to
Nigeria in foreign assistance. Of course that is nationally,
and a lot of it is focused on health programs. But USAID in the
last few years has focused on two flagship programs in two
northern states. Their attempt, with a country the size of
Nigeria, was to really kind of maximize impact in a few places.
So they have been working with the state governments of
Bauchi State and Sokoto. Bauchi is in the Boko Haram-affected
area of northeast, and Sokoto is in the northwest. They have
been working with the local government in trying to improve
their education and service delivery, health care programs, and
also to build between the state and federal government some
public-private partnerships with local businesses.
So I think that is one area. Also in terms of U.S.
Government responses, the U.S. Government has been working with
Nigeria's anti-corruption authority for several years. In terms
of forensic accounting, if, as Dr. Pham mentions, the reports
of northern elites potentially financing elements of Boko Haram
are true, there may be an avenue for us to expand engagement
with the financial authorities in Nigeria to track down the
sources of potential elite financing.
Mr. Laremont. I concur there are several hundred militants
within Boko Haram. What the committee needs to grasp is that
there are many Nigerias, but there are really two Nigerias.
There is a southern Nigeria that is substantially more wealthy
than the north and better educated. I have spent time in
Maiduguri, so I know it. The levels of poverty, the levels of
illiteracy, especially among girls, is extraordinary. So that
if we were to have an impact with regard to this question, I
concur with Dr. Pham that escalating military collaboration
isn't probably going to solve the problem. What we really need
do is we need to have a greater diplomatic presence in the
north, starting with Kano, and then with Kaduna, and then
possibly Jos, because they are more populous. But then the
heart of the Boko Haram question would then be Maiduguri.
In an era of contracted resources in the United States and
a contraction of our operations on the diplomatic front, we
need to, as a country and as a committee, assess whether that
is really in our interests. No one is in the north from the
U.S. diplomatic community. Consequently, we don't know what is
going up in the north. Just a few academicians. No one is in
Maiduguri. I have been there. Very few people are in Kano. A
few more in Kaduna. So how can you possibly form policy when
you don't have any information? So if this committee is charged
with trying to secure or obtain the security of the United
States, we then need to assess, even in constrained financial
circumstances, what kinds of investments on the diplomatic side
and on the informational side we need to do to assess the
threat. That is your job. Okay. But that is my bit of advice.
The military not so much. Diplomatic presence doesn't exist
outside of Abuja. The north is not--there are no consulates in
the north. Consequently, we don't have any information.
Ms. Speier. My time is really expiring. I would like to get
to Ms. Cooke. Thank you, Doctor, very much.
Ms. Cooke. Well, I don't have too much to add. I would like
to echo Lauren Ploch's point on the forensic accounting, the
possibility of cooperation there. It is problematic in Nigeria
because once you run up against vested interests, those kinds
of investigations are often blocked politically. That has
happened in the Niger Delta. That is a diplomatic issue that we
just have to keep pressing the Nigerian government on.
Development in the north, absolutely. Economic revitalization
that provides jobs, meaning, and hope for the disenfranchised
young people there. An expanded diplomatic presence. You know,
there are partners with whom we can engage on these things to
better understand institutions, civil societies, universities.
There is lots of options for people-to-people engagement as
well that I think will be important going forward.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ranking Member Speier. I appreciate
the need to attend to other committee work. But I thank you for
your attendance here this morning for this important part. I
would like to turn to the questions now to the Ranking Member
of the full committee.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
thank the witnesses for what I think has been very enlightening
testimony. My takeaway is that this committee ought to be
looking at the broader public policy questions of: How do we
address organizational problems like the one we are talking
about here rather than focusing on the individual group? I have
been to Abuja. I talked to a lot of the leadership in Nigeria
as a country. I agree with everyone here, it is a fractured
country. But it is also one that is ripe for an entity like
this one.
The operational space is void in an area, bad people take
advantage of it. So I understand that. So from my perspective,
our committee should be saying what is it we can put in place
so that entities like Boko Haram won't be as viable?
Now, what I hear is rather than trying to go the
conventional route of saying this is a terrorist organization,
they are bad people; it might behoove us to say: Well, what are
we doing on the diplomatic side to engage the country they
operate in to do more so that these things don't occur? I say
that is a problem. When I look at our foreign aid to Africa as
a whole, and the population of Africa, it is a pittance
compared to the rest of the world.
So if we are serious about engaging this threat, and if the
United Nations and other entities are our partners, we have to
invest in it. So I am happy that our witnesses across the board
said we have to invest in diplomatic efforts, whether it is
consulates in the north, whether it is more USAID-type funds to
do basic things we know that countries need and deserve.
So I am going to give each Member to give the committee the
public policy position on addressing organizations like Boko
Haram not as a specific entity, but as the public policy--when
these entities come up, what would you suggest that we do to
address it rather than just take the quick fix and say that
these are bad people and we need to label them? What are the
points before you get to that labeling that we should make sure
we have done? Dr. Pham.
Mr. Pham. Well, thank you, Mr. Thompson. I agree with what
you have said about the need for the investment, the need for
the aid. If there is one thing I could ask the committee and
really recommend to the United States Government in general, we
need to invest in knowledge. For example, if you look at the
strategic importance of Nigeria and Africa for our national
interests, economic, political, humanitarian, we have very
little information. That is even less when you look at the
space of the Sahel. We have invested next to nothing in
acquiring information. So we need to get information to know
the space, and then we can begin crafting all these policies
and specific initiatives to deal with all these issues. But we
need to invest in acquiring that knowledge of the geopolitical
space as such. We have had 50 or more years to do that with the
Middle East and we still stumble. In this part of the world, we
haven't even begun to build that base. Once we build it, then I
think a lot can come out of that. But we need to invest in that
knowledge. That can inform everything from intelligence to,
when necessary, military operations, to economic policy, to
diplomatic initiatives.
Ms. Ploch. Thank you. I will start with the security
response and U.S. engagement with Nigerian security forces. I
think we have heard over and over again from Nigeria experts
that the response has, to date, been heavy-handed, and that
Nigerian security services are often seen more as attacking
Boko Haram rather than protecting citizens. What happens often
in that case is that the local citizenry feels increasingly
disenfranchised, and quite frankly may be more likely to
tolerate the activities of Boko Haram than the security forces.
These door-to-door searches have reportedly been a significant
problem.
On the other hand, we do need to be working with the
Nigerian security forces to enhance their border security
capacity. I think one of the more frightening aspects of all of
this, as we have talked about this continuum of the Sahel and
these borders, which are not well-policed, and the idea that
some of these Libyan weapons may be traveling south, and the
Nigerian security forces may not be able to catch those. So
border security is really important here. On the development
aspects, I think we have gone into this in a fair amount of
detail. You have a very large, young population in northern
Nigeria with very few job prospects. When they have nothing
else to do and there are charismatic preachers preaching a
different line of thought, it brings some people into the fold.
So we need to be looking at some of those development issues.
My engagement with administration officials responsible for the
issue of Boko Haram and Nigeria suggests that they take the
threat very seriously and they are open to consulting with you
on possible responses.
Mr. Laremont. Well, as they say in church, the Lord works
in mysterious ways. You know, because this is entirely
unplanned, but let me make three points. The first is, in terms
of public policy initiatives, would be to increase the
diplomatic presence in the north, first in Kano, second in
Kaduna, third in Jos, and fourth in Maiduguri. That is in
declining level of population. If you don't have a diplomatic
presence in the north, that is where you begin. First Kano,
then Kaduna, then Jos, then Maiduguri.
I say the Lord works in mysterious ways because Dr. Pham
said we need information. We don't have information. Well, I
presently have a proposal before DOD for a program to acquire
information on the Sahel. That was entirely unplanned. But
there are ways of acquiring information about threats in this
area in a cost-effective way. Third, if you really want to make
an impact in terms of public policy, I would focus on two
things in the longer term, and this would implicate USAID and
other agencies, would be to focus on fertility and literacy.
When you look at how violence declines over time in a variety
of cases across the world, it is as fertility decreases to 2.0,
2.1 or 1.8 per child, then the demographic pressures on the
economy simultaneously decrease. So if we were to think cost-
effectively about moving forward, focus on fertility.
The second thing is not focus on economics, but maybe even
before economics is the question of literacy. You cannot have
economic growth in the north when 20 percent of the women in
the north are literate and 80 percent are illiterate. So the
third public policy takeaway would be to focus on fertility and
literacy.
Ms. Cooke. Yeah, I think understanding the context and the
dynamics at play is something that we have not always been
particularly good at in complicated places like Somalia, for
example. So things that we do for a short-term purpose have
unintended consequences and backlash. I think we have to be
very careful about that in places like northern Nigeria, where
we haven't had a lot of long-term partnerships, intelligence,
and kind of community engagement. So kind of slapping labels,
you know, on fundamentalists, you know, these kind of things
create backlash that we don't intend, but can complicate our
engagement.
So avoiding the good guy-bad guy dichotomy, in Nigeria, in
particular, you know, these communities do have real, real
grievances with their local, their state government, and the
central government, and have seen a steady decline since
independence of the economy, while the south grows. So there is
something real there that we have to acknowledge and focus on.
Engaging the communities, as I have said, I think it is
extremely important. Working with security forces on a kind of
a nuanced professional approach.
The Nigerian police have become--one of Boko Haram's core
grievances is against the unprofessionalism and police abuse.
That is something that all Nigerians complain about, and
something that the Nigerian Government has to take more
seriously. We don't do a lot in terms of helping governments
with police reform. I think it is an area we need do more of,
particularly in an era of counterterrorism, drug trafficking,
where the police are often the closest to the communities, but
the least well-equipped security force to deal with those kind
of challenges in an effective way.
Then obviously, to embed our security engagement, which you
wish to promote in nuanced, calibrated approaches, within a
broader political and economic strategy. I have talked a little
bit about revitalizing the economies. Perhaps our greatest
counterterror tool is to create job opportunities in the
northern Nigeria over the longer term. So I will end there.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you for your thoughts. I would like to do
one more question for the group myself personally. I think you
have developed the picture of a complex region. We appreciate
the challenges that are associated with the poverty, lack of
education, and the opportunity that creates. How do we
reconcile the need to try to address those as a world to
approach those problems and challenges with the recognition
that to some extent we have this exploitation of that by AQIM,
coupled with this potential presence of new weaponry from
Libya, so that we--how do we find the balance of sort of in
effect not accusing before the act, but not sitting back and
missing the potential that those weapons get used, groups get
radicalized, and they act out in the manner that al-Qaeda has
acted out by taking advantage of some of these same factors in
other parts of the world?
There may be a difference here between people acting out of
poverty versus those like we see in the Middle East who are
saying they don't want any American presence, they are trying
to get rid of. But do we have to be concerned about the threat
while we are trying to determine whether there is ways that we
can help Nigeria develop itself into an economy and a
government that can sustain itself on its own merits?
Let me start with you, Ms. Cooke, and we will go the
opposite direction, because you always have to wait for
everybody else.
Ms. Cooke. No, then I have to say something original. Yeah,
I mean, I think we have to understand that you can't do
security or development in a vacuum. You do have to do both.
But I think you have to recognize that unless that security
response, or the development response is given adequate weight,
you are going to have to come back again and again to do the
security capacity-building and so forth.
Mr. Meehan. Do you think it is a mistake for us to identify
this group, Boko Haram, as a foreign terrorist organization?
Ms. Cooke. Well, as I said in my testimony, just that
formal label might not get us very far in terms of what we gain
from it. But because the group is in flux, it may then create
kind of a hardening of lines, create a coherence that is not
there right now, and create some blowback that we might not
have anticipated. While it doesn't get us--it doesn't give us
many gains, it may have potential consequences, particularly at
this early stage when the group is still trying to formulate
and is fissured. That is my take on that.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you. Dr. Laremont.
Mr. Laremont. You know, we have been studying al-Qaeda and
its various manifestations for 10 or 11 years now. Now we
understand that there is a predictable game plan. That is it
will always seek to develop itself in areas that are poorly
governed, where there isn't a governmental presence. So if we
know that, and now that we have 10 years of experience, we can
predict that their next places of principal operation will be
Somalia, Yemen, and the Sahel. Now that we have the benefit of
those 10 years, now the question is what is it that we need do
because we are smarter than we were 10 years ago. So we need to
have a buy-back program for those armaments. That would
probably take place in Libya and in Mali, and to some extent in
Niger, because that is where the armaments are. I don't think
they have gone as far south as Nigeria.
Mr. Meehan. Can something like that be successful,
appreciating the broad number of weapons that are out there? Do
you ever get enough weapons back that you can assure that you
are now safer?
Mr. Laremont. You may not get them all, but you will get
some. I was in Mali this summer and ran into some of--ran into,
I sought them out, rebels who were moving into Libya. You know,
they would go to work for Qadhafi for a week and make a
thousand dollars a week. So they work for 3 weeks and they come
home. They are not really interested in fighting, they are
interested in getting paid. So if they have these armaments,
some of them, not all of them, will surrender these armaments
in a buy-back program. It won't be completely successful, but
it will be partially successful. But going back to my original
set of statements, if we have been studying AQ for 10, 11 years
now, and we know their game plan, and we know that they are
going into ungoverned spaces, from the benefit of that
experience let's go out there and get the information so they
don't get a chance to reassemble themselves in these less-
governed places. The third point then focuses on what elsewhere
has been discussed is that you have this terrain of
underdevelopment in which you have high levels of fertility and
high levels of illiteracy. So you do the buy-back program, you
do the informational program, and then you focus on fertility
and literacy. I think you can make a big impact.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you. Ms. Ploch.
Ms. Ploch. Thank you. I am trying to figure out the best
way to tackle this. You know, I think when we look at places
that al-Qaeda and some of its affiliates are operating, we are
talking about the term ``ungoverned spaces.'' Of course,
northern Nigeria is not an ungoverned space, it is a poorly
governed space. To tackle that, this is, as I mentioned before,
really the Nigerian government's responsibility to deal with. I
think most people feel that they could do better and they could
do more. So we have a real diplomatic challenge here in the
United States in engaging a very important partner for the
United States Government, the Nigerian government, in a
responsible way to push them to hold their security forces
accountable, to hold their politicians accountable, to provide
government services to these poor youth who may be looking for
things to do. Basically to help delegitimize the message that
al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups are sending out, that Boko
Haram is sending out, that this is not an accountable
government, that it is full of corrupt politicians who have
been influenced and bought off by the west. So it is the
different ways that we can find to massage that diplomatic
relationship I think that are probably going to be key.
Recognizing that the term ``ungoverned spaces'' and how we get
to that with each of these various groups is important. The
same thing in Somalia with the Somali Federal Government not
really being able to provide enough services to its people, and
not being able to at this point in time respond to the current
humanitarian crisis there.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you.
Mr. Pham. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make two points. I
think one is I think the subcommittee has done a great service
by preparing the report it has prepared. Because I think one of
the problems I have encountered repeatedly in Africa and
studying of violence, extremism, has been biases introduced
into the analysis which become hardened so we end up repeating
mantras and cliches, and are blindsided when things happen.
So I think raising the question, playing the devil's
advocate, I think, is a very useful function. It actually
raises our need to understand better this threat. Second point
with regard to the designation of Boko Haram as a foreign
terrorist organization formally under U.S. law, I think we are
perhaps a little soon on that in the sense we need to gather a
little more information.
However, I think the threat of declaring it a foreign
terrorist organization might be useful as a diplomatic tool to
push our Nigerian friends to be more proactive and to deal with
it, with the threat of the embarrassment of having a declared
foreign terrorist organization operating on their soil. Once we
acquire the additional information on the organization,
understand better its operations, then a designation might also
be useful because then we can target those senior officials or
others who engage in financing it individually and
collectively.
So that presents us with another tool. So as a tool in the
toolkit of broader U.S. power, U.S. diplomacy, I think it is
something that should be left on the table and perhaps waived
to incentivize the type of behavior we seek in greater
cooperation.
Mr. Meehan. I want to thank each of the members of the
panel for your insight. Dr. Pham, thank you for categorizing it
in that way, and your identification of really what the
objective of the committee is. Part of the report was to begin
to frame the question. I think hearings like this allow us to
start framing the question and then to take it to the logical
conclusion--not logical conclusion, to be able to ask the next
logical questions. First, to give it the right context, and
then to ask the questions within the context, as Dr. Laremont,
you identified with regard to this continuum that we need to
appreciate of this region and the appropriate way we should be
asking questions about the environment that is in there right
now.
So, this has been very helpful in our continuing effort to
try to create the baseline of understanding, which I take from
the testimony of each of you is the importance of, and frankly
the lack of the real knowledge that we need to have about what
is going on in that area, to then legitimately be able to
assess the extent to which we have a threat, so to speak, but
to understand what the real nature of this relationship is from
Boko Haram and the threat that we do appreciate, which is al-
Qaeda.
So this has been a very instructive hearing, certainly from
the perspective of those of us here in the Congress. I thank
you for your efforts, because you are the experts who best
understand that region to the extent that we do have knowledge.
If there is something for a minute or two that each Member
believes we should have as part of the record, I will invite
you to make any kind of a closing observation if you think
there is something that we missed or an important point that
you think we ought to consider moving forward. But it is not
necessary. I just, you are a very engaging and knowledgeable
panel on an area in which admittedly we don't have enough
understanding. So I really want to give you the opportunity to
conclude with anything that you think we may be missing or we
ought to further consider.
There doesn't have to be. That gives me an opportunity for
another long speech. I just want to express my deep
appreciation to each and every one of you for your testimony
and for the work that you put in preparing for this. There may
be questions from time to time that other panelists may have,
and I ask you if we do have those and they submit them to you,
you do your best to try to be responsive to those for the
record.
The record of the hearing will be open for 10 days, which
is customary. So without objection, the committee stands
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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