[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-91]
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 16, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
TOM ROONEY, Florida JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina BILL OWENS, New York
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
Jesse Tolleson, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Scott Bousum, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, November 16, 2011, United States Marine Corps
Acquisition and Modernization.................................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, November 16, 2011..................................... 21
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 2011
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 8
WITNESSES
O'Donohue, BGen Daniel J., USMC, Director, Capabilities
Development Directorate, Combat Development & Integration, U.S.
Marine Corps; BGen Frank L. Kelley, USMC, Commander, Marine
Corps Systems Command, U.S. Marine Corps; and William E.
Taylor, Program Executive Officer Land Systems, U.S. Marine
Corps.......................................................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G...................................... 25
O'Donohue, BGen Daniel J., joint with BGen Frank L. Kelley
and William E. Taylor...................................... 30
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre........................................ 28
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 41
Mr. McIntyre................................................. 41
Mr. Wilson................................................... 41
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 45
Mr. Wilson................................................... 49
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 16, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m. in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G.
Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Bartlett. Good afternoon. My colleagues are delayed,
but we want to be respectful of your time. Your testimony will
be part of the permanent record of course, but we want to
begin.
The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today
to receive testimony on Marine Corps Ground Force Acquisition
and Modernization Programs. We welcome our distinguished panel
of witnesses, Brigadier General Frank Kelley, Commander of
Marine Corps Systems Command; Brigadier General Daniel
O'Donohue, Director, Capabilities Development Directorate,
Combat Development and Integration; Mr. William Taylor, Program
Executive Officer Land Systems, U.S. Marine Corps.
Of the estimated 210,000 military service personnel
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, approximately 130,000 are in
Afghanistan, and out of this number 21,000 are marines. More
than 6,200 Americans have given their lives, and more than
46,000 have been wounded, in Iraq and Afghanistan since
September 11, 2001.
This is the fourth in a series of hearings the subcommittee
is holding for the purpose of updating our members on the
budget request for fiscal year 2012 and to help better
understand the potential impact of the Budget Control Act of
2011 on our military capability and deployed forces. The
ultimate impact of the Budget Control Act on DOD funding next
year and over the next 10 years remains a major concern of this
subcommittee.
As I have stated before, major reductions in the Federal
budget need to be a major element of correcting the Federal
deficit. The Department of Defense must share in a fair and
balanced way in those reductions, and that process is already
taking place under the Budget Control Act of 2011, with nearly
$500 billion in cuts planned for DOD [Department of Defense]
over the next 10 years. If the Administration had first
reconsidered the national military strategy based on the likely
resources to be available, the changes that are having to be
made by DOD in acquisition programs could be better justified,
but it appears we will only have a new national military
strategy after the fact.
Under the sequestration provision of the Budget Control
Act, up to a total of $1 trillion over 10 years could be
possible under what Secretary Panetta has called the ``doomsday
mechanism.'' As recently as this week, Secretary Panetta
indicated that such a reduction would be, and I quote,
``devastating for the Department.'' Secretary Panetta has
further indicated a $1 trillion reduction possible under the
Budget Control Act sequestration provision would amount to 23
percent if the President exercised the authority to exempt
military personnel. Under current law, the reduction would have
to be applied equally to each major investment and construction
program. And I am not sure how you build three-fourths of an
aircraft carrier.
Finally, the Secretary noted that between 2013, ``Cuts
under a maximum sequestration would equal about $100 billion a
year compared with the fiscal year 2012 plan. We would have the
smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest number of ships
since 1915, and the smallest Air Force in history. The threat
to our national security would not be reduced. We would have to
formulate a new security strategy that accepted substantial
risk of not meeting defense needs.'' This ends his quote.
Today, we will significantly address Marine Corps ground
force acquisition and modernization programs. In order to
perform their missions, whether home or abroad, these marines
must be adequately equipped with the right gear to maximize
their combat effectiveness and provide for their best
protection possible. We cannot lose focus of this objective.
The subcommittee expects to receive an update from the
witnesses as to what changes may have to be made in their
proposed acquisition programs in fiscal year 2012. We would
like to know the views of our witnesses on what the potential
impacts to Marine Corps capabilities are, particularly in light
of the possible reductions in the Marine Corps procurement and
R&D [Research and Development] budgets over the next 10 years.
We also hope to gain a better understanding from our witnesses
on how potential funding reductions would be apportioned for
their programs and how these funding reductions could
potentially impact Marine Corps modernization programs and the
approximately 21,000 marines currently serving in Afghanistan.
One major concern is understanding the potential impact of
budget changes on the affordability of the Marine Corps' ground
combat and tactical vehicle modernization strategy. The
subcommittee expects to gain a better understanding of the
processes used by the Marine Corps in determining what is good
enough in terms of their combat and tactical vehicle portfolios
given the austere fiscal environment projected for the next 10
years. What metrics are the Marines using to determine how much
modernization is needed for the combat and tactical force
fleets, and will the Marine Corps ultimately be able to afford
its currently projected ground vehicle modernization strategy?
I would like to now turn to my good friend on the Democrat
side to see if he has an opening statement or comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Critz. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. No real
opening comments. I don't want to take up too much time. I want
to get to the witnesses' testimony. But you know, as we all sit
here, obviously sequestration and what next year's budgets and
what we are going to be facing are certainly a top priority to
us. And we are anxious to hear your testimony on the strategy
going forward. We had a hearing with the Service chiefs a
couple of weeks ago, and still talking about working through
the cuts to the budget from the CR [Continuing Resolution] from
earlier this year, without a plan for what is going to happen
if we hit sequestration or certain budgets looking forward.
So we have some major issues we have to face. But I
appreciate the opportunity, and I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. I ask unanimous consent
that non-subcommittee members, if any, be allowed to
participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee members
have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there objection?
Hearing none, non-subcommittee members will be recognized at
the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
We will proceed with the panel's testimony and then go to
questions. Without objection, all witnesses' prepared
statements will be included in the hearing record. General
O'Donohue, please proceed with your opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF BGEN DANIEL J. O'DONOHUE, USMC, DIRECTOR,
CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT &
INTEGRATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; BGEN FRANK L. KELLEY, USMC,
COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND
WILLIAM E. TAYLOR, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER LAND SYSTEMS, U.S.
MARINE CORPS
General O'Donohue. Thank you, sir. Chairman Bartlett,
Congressman Critz, and distinguished members of the panel, it
is an honor to be here. On behalf of all marines, their
families, and this team before you, thank you for your
extraordinary support. This will be the one opening statement
for the team here, and then we will proceed to questions, sir.
The Marine Corps is the Nation's expeditionary force in
readiness. As such, we are prepared for all manner of crises,
ensure access for the joint force and the interagency, and by
being ready, mitigate national risks during a period of fiscal
retrenchment.
Ten years ago today, under circumstances no one predicted,
4,400 marines and six amphibious ships were assembling to
strike Al Qaeda after the horrific acts of 9/11. On short
notice they rapidly concentrated from globally dispersed
forward engagement missions to attack hundreds of miles from
the Arabian Sea to Kandahar, and on to Kabul. No other force
had the required readiness, strategic mobility, and self-
sustainment to respond so quickly and decisively. Their
tactical mobility extended the operating area beyond the
enemy's capacity to cope.
This dynamic ability, at a moment's notice, to shape,
deter, defeat, and deny our enemy sanctuary is emblematic of
the crisis response capabilities that we continue to develop in
the current and future force. Our unequivocal top priority is
supporting our 21,000 marines and sailors fighting in
Afghanistan, and 10,000 more that are forward deployed
worldwide. With the continuing support of Congress and a rapid
fielding process, our marines in combat are well equipped for
the current fight even as the enemy adapts.
At the same time, in stride we are transitioning to our
role as the post-OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] expeditionary
force in readiness. In doing so, we will accept risks and
extended ground operations, and reshape the Marine Corps for
scalable crisis response missions such as counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, disaster relief, rescuing Americans,
prioritized security cooperation, and major contingency
operations, and reinforcing our allies. While still globally
responsive, we will rebalance our force posture back to the
Pacific as we withdraw from OEF.
Our judicious modernization strategy supports this force
while recognizing fiscal constraints. Our spare budget focuses
only on what is good enough and what is absolutely required.
The Marine Corps' entire budget, to include supporting Navy
accounts, is only 7.8 percent of DOD's. Our modernization
priorities are the Joint Strike Fighter and MV-22, and an
affordable amphibious combat vehicle, a balanced ground combat
and tactical vehicle portfolio, to include the JLTV [Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle], and Navy amphibious ships.
This testimony addresses ground force modernization, which
is 14 percent of our budget and just .6 percent of DOD's. Our
ground procurement account is approximately $2.0 billion a
year. Fiscal constraints on the relatively small ground
modernization can have a disproportionate impact. Our top
ground priority is the amphibious combat vehicle. A JLTV
addresses shortfalls for select light combat vehicles which
perform our most demanding missions.
For our entire portfolio, and especially the amphibious
combat vehicle and JLTV, the Marine Corps, working with the
Department of Navy, has taken an aggressive and innovative
approach, distinguished by integrating mature technology,
stressing affordability as a key performance parameter,
conducting comprehensive system engineering and cost analysis,
creating a transparent and open dialogue with industry, OSD
[Office of the Secretary of Defense], and Congress, employing a
streamlined acquisition process, with an emphasis on
competition, and most importantly, at inception creating an
integrated requirements and acquisition team that makes cost-
informed trades in requirements. The acquisition requirements
team testifying before you today works together daily and at
every step. We are completely integrated, and we ensure best
value for the Nation for essential capability.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The combined prepared statement of General O'Donohue,
General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor can be found in the Appendix on
page 30.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, General. I understand that you
have the only oral testimony, that all three of you are
available for questions. Is that correct?
General O'Donohue. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. As is my usual practice, I will
reserve questions until the other panel members, including our
guest panelists, have had an opportunity to ask their
questions, hoping that my questions will have been asked by the
other panel members. So I turn now to Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General O'Donohue,
General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor, thank you so much for being
here today. Thank you for your service to our country. I
actually have just a couple of quick questions, and then I will
allow other members to talk.
I am heartened by the strategy that the Marine Corps is
working with the Army on the JLTV program to try to move that
quicker and come to a resolution. And it brings up an issue, is
that the remote weapons station that sits on top of a lot of
Army vehicles is something that the Marine Corps hasn't really
looked at in the same way. And I am just curious as to as you
move forward, the CROWS [Common Remotely Operated Weapon
Station] it is called on the Stryker vehicles, it is on the
Humvees [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle], and I am
wondering because of all the technology advancements that have
been made because of the Army's use of it if the Marine Corps
is looking at the CROWS as being part of any system as they go
forward on their vehicles.
Mr. Bartlett. Excuse me, they have not provided us with the
world's best microphones. If you could hold those very close to
your mouth, we will hear you better. Thank you.
General O'Donohue. Sir, from the requirements perspective,
particularly for the amphibious combat vehicle, we have a
requirement for lethality. We have studies to look at the best
way do it, to include remote weapons systems. So it is in the
consideration of Marine Corps planning. We work closely with
the Army on everything they do, to look at things that we can
spiral into our programs in every aspect. We have the Army and
Marine Corps Board that works at every level to make sure we
are sharing what works between the two Services. So we
certainly have a strong look at lethality, particularly for the
amphibious combat vehicle and remote weapons stations. We do
not have a decision yet on it though, sir.
Mr. Critz. Okay. It won't be on the amphibious vehicle. It
is on the JLTV, it will be on Stryker and those types. So it is
the land-based systems more so than underwater.
General O'Donohue. Yes, sir.
Mr. Critz. And this is an issue that I am still trying to
grasp, and the reason I bring up the CROWS is because of the
IED [Improvised Explosive Device] issues that we have, and
snipers. It certainly helps in the safety of our men and women.
But one of the issues that I am still trying to grasp, and I
can't really get a hold on, is, you know, we are in a budgetary
scenario now where everyone is looking to pinch pennies. And
the move from the Humvee to the JLTV program, I am trying to
understand what the Marine Corps' plan is. As I look at your
chart and you are going from approximately 25,000 now down to
12,500 in 2014, it looks like the JLTV starts to come online
2017, 2018. And, you know, I saw in some of the reporting as
well that the recapping of the Humvee is about half the price
of building new. So there is a financial benefit to this. So I
just want to know what is the Marine Corps' plan, and how is it
that it is going to impact your budget, 14 percent of your
budget being ground vehicles? What is the impact to your
budget, and where are we going to see--are we going to see some
pinch points here?
General O'Donohue. Sir, I will start and then we will pick
it up on the acquisition side. From the requirements
perspective, we have scrubbed our light combat vehicles. We
started with a base of about 26,000. We have reduced that by
8,000. We have gone through and leveraged based on the force
structure review, looking at the expeditionary force and
readiness. We have cast a post-OEF Marine Corps which is not
for extended campaigns ashore, but to be a crisis response
force. And as we looked at the missions and as we come from a
202,000 Marine Corps to about 186,800 we took a corresponding
look at vehicles. And the first step towards efficiencies was
to remove that amount of the requirement. That amounted to
about 8,000 vehicles. That left about 18,600 in the light
category. These are vehicles that we can't take off the FOB
[Forward Operating Base] now. The MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicle] was a substitute in a high IED threat, but
isn't applicable in places we might go otherwise. So we
addressed that base of 18,600. We took a small subset of that,
about 5,500 vehicles, and these are the ones that shoot, move,
and communicate forward. They have the most demanding mission
profile. And these are the ones that we are looking for the
JLTV.
So we have looked at selective aspects of the portfolio. We
are going to manage just those high priority ones for the JLTV,
and then we are going to sustain the Humvee fleet. And we will
look at a process of, for the remaining bulk of the majority of
the fleet, those not modernized by the JLTV, and have a reduced
mission profile, we will do a sequential modernization. We will
buy up front those in the most need and most demanding profile,
then we will hit our amphibious combat vehicle. And then at the
back end of that, we are looking at the late 2020s, those
vehicles we sustained over that period, the bulk of them, about
13,000 that you talked about, we would be looking at
modernization in the late 2020s.
Mr. Taylor. I will add that we have looked at the business
case between the two programs. And I would respectfully
disagree that Humvee recap would equate to about half the cost.
Our best estimates of what it would take to overcome the
engineering deficiencies in order to provide a durable Humvee
range somewhere between 240 to 260 K. So at that cost you are
bumping up against the cost of a new vehicle that would provide
much more capability.
We have also done some durability testing on the Humvee.
And what we found is extreme engineering issues over their
designed gross weight. These have led to cracks in everything
from the suspension, to radiator mounts, to even the frame
itself. And one of the inherent design features of the original
Humvee, as designed, was to provide a torsional twisting in the
frame. We lose that as we try to beef up the Humvee through
rigid measures like capsules or anything like that.
So my point here is that the procurement costs alone are
bumping up against a new vehicle cost, yet we haven't even
begun to scratch the surface on what a Humvee recap might cost
us ultimately in O&S [Operating and Support] costs.
General O'Donohue. Sir, just to follow up on the
requirements aspect of it, a Humvee recap does not meet the
requirement that the JLTV will. We have a requirement for a
strategic transportability, mobility, protection, and payload.
And while we can get any one of those elements in a lighter
vehicle, we can't get the full range of it. So a Humvee recap,
which the Marine Corps is not pursuing, would not meet the
requirement.
Mr. Critz. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Ms. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your service.
I just wanted to start off asking just general questions
about the impacts of the budget. So how are the DOD and the
Department of Navy's implementation of the Budget Control Act
of 2011 potentially impacting the Marine Corps acquisition and
modernization programs?
General O'Donohue. We have addressed the fiscal austerity
with a current program that reflects the cuts proposed by the
President. And what we have done is take sequential
modernization. We have carefully timed an initial buy of JLTVs,
a subsequent buy of ACV, the amphibious combat vehicle, which
is our number one priority, and then we will follow with JLTV
and modernization over a period of we are talking about 20
years. That becomes unhinged by delay for any reason. The
continuing resolution, if we are not able to execute these
accounts and we don't get special authorization, or we get
something as severe as sequestration, what we are going to do
is create a bow wave of requirements at the back end that are
difficult to handle. Again, we have a small account for
modernization. There is a disproportionate impact if we have to
absorb something bigger than already planned. And then I think
larger and more strategically, we unhinge strategy and ways and
means. And there probably will have to be a relook at the OSD
level. And again, the Marine mission is to provide the
insurance, be the kind of the ready force, which requires an
O&M [Operations and Maintenance] expenditure, kind of keeping
faith with people and having the force structure to allow us to
do the job, and the judicious modernization to field that force
to be a force in readiness. That strategy becomes unhinged if
we take a blind proportional reduction.
Mrs. Hartzler. Absolutely. I see in the chart that you
provided that we are down to 850 MRAPs now compared to 2,225 in
2009. Is that correct?
General O'Donohue. Ma'am, we have about 4,000 currently on
the battlefield. We have a plan to reduce to something about
2,500. And of those, those are divided in two parts. We have an
enduring mission for the MRAPs and the MATVs [Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected All Terrain Vehicle] for about 1,100 or so
vehicles. These are for engineers, it is for EOD [Explosive
Ordnance Disposal], for those really at risk and can afford to
be roadbound. We have for the remaining balance, these will be
things that we preserve that could be used in case we were in
the unusual circumstance that we need the MATV, either a
counterinsurgency or where the mobility limitations of the MATV
are suitable. So we don't see it as a general purpose fleet
vehicle. We see, one, that we have a selective group that we
are able to equip a force if we had the special circumstances
where the MATV is appropriate, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Thank you. As far as the warfighter, I
am always concerned about their safety, the weight of their
total gear that they carry, their body armor. And I just want
to ask a couple questions about that first regarding them. The
vehicle, the Stryker, I know the Army has been testing an
improved version of the Stryker with a double-V hull for
deployment to Afghanistan. I have seen something very similar
at Fort Leonard Wood, which is in my district, and I know that
has been helpful. So what is the Marine Corps doing to improve
the survivability of its light armored vehicle fleet?
Mr. Taylor. We are looking across the entire spectrum of
technology that is available, to include what the Army is
doing. This will be part of the development process of some of
our new amphibious vehicles. So we are looking at the entire
spectrum of what is available and mature.
Mrs. Hartzler. That is great. What about, what do you think
is a reasonable weight for body armor? Can we achieve adequate
protection with less weight?
General Kelley. Ma'am, I believe that we can. We continue
to challenge industry to provide anywhere from a 10 to 20
percent reduction in body armor. One of the things that I do
think that we have done as a Marine Corps proactively, and that
is provided some options, alternatives for commanders out in
the field for what type of body armor that they would like
their marines to be wearing. So we have the improved modular
tactical vest (IMTV) that is about a 33-pound vest, obviously
provides more comprehensive protection. And that is about a 3-
pound reduction in the modular tactical vest that we produced
before that. We have also allowed commanders in the field to
dictate what level of protection their marines will wear. And
that is at the Lieutenant Colonel level and above for their
battalions. So the real choice is not between the old vest and
the new vest, but it is really between this scalable approach
to body armor. I have already discussed about the IMTV, or the
improved modular tactical vest. That is going to be, another
option there is going to be the scalable plate carrier, which
is about a 21-pound solution in terms of providing protection.
Obviously, it has got less material, provides the ventilation
that is one of the areas where we have discovered that that
causes some fatigue. So we are talking about something that is
about 33 pounds, or choosing to go down to, you know, about 21
pounds.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. I would now like to turn to my
good friend and ranking member, Mr. Reyes, who this afternoon
was a victim of Washington traffic, which I understand may now
have eclipsed Los Angeles traffic as the worst in the Nation.
Mr. Reyes.
STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
Mr. Reyes. I can give you personal testimony that having
been in L.A. [Los Angeles] this was as bad as it gets. I think
part of it is the rain and the complications that it brings. So
I wanted to apologize for being late and not being here for
your opening statement. Oh, and Mr. Chairman, can I ask
unanimous consent to enter my statement for the record?
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the
Appendix on page 28.]
Mr. Reyes. Thank you. I did read your statement last night.
And I wanted you to know that when you made reference to the 10
years ago, the 2 Marine expeditionary units of 4,400 Marines
going into Afghanistan and working with the Special Operations
Forces that were there, I happened to have had the opportunity
to go with one of our chairmen at the time, Chairman Hobson, we
were actually in Tashkent because of discussions about the
opening of the K2 [Karshi Khanabad] facility, but we did get an
opportunity to actually go and see some of those marines and
the Special Operations folks there. And it made us all very
proud the way that we were working with the Northern Alliance.
So I wanted you to know that.
And coincidentally, last week, having been in the district
and going to several Veterans Day commemorations, one of the
questions that I was asked, and this was by a marine who was--
we were doing a Homes for Troops, where one of the marines,
there was a home that was built specifically for him because he
was a double amputee, so we were there, but one of the marines
that was there for that ceremony was asking me if we had any
plans--and this all goes back to everyone talking about the
budget, and saving money, and concerned about their retirement
and all these kinds of issues--so he was asking me, he says do
we have any plans to integrate the uniforms? At one point the
Army and the Marine Corps had the same uniforms. And he said
today we have different uniforms than the Army does. This is
him talking. He says it makes sense to us to save money by the
Army going to the Marine uniform. I said, okay, that makes
sense to have one uniform. I am not sure the Army would agree
that it be the Marine uniform. But be that as it may, do we
have any plans to do that any time in the future? Because I
didn't know the answer to that. And I haven't had a chance to
ask any of my colleagues here on the committee if we were even
contemplating that. But I guess for 10 years now, according to
him, we have had different uniforms. And they are similar, but
not exactly alike. And are there uniqueness or unique things to
the Marine uniform versus the Army or vice versa?
General O'Donohue. Sir, when it comes to requirements, the
Marine Corps and the Army, wherever their mission profiles
converge, collaborate. In the case of the uniform, the Marine
Corps has picked, as we do with the mobility for our vehicles,
the places that we think we are going to be most likely
deployed, and we created a uniform for that independently. And
the Army has done its own mission analysis. And there are areas
we converge, like the JLTV. There are other areas where the
mission requirements are different. I don't know of any move to
have a similar--there have been discussions I think outside.
But the Army and the Marines both look at their requirements.
And in this one, they obviously came up with different
solutions. There is nothing that prohibits a single uniform
except, again, the mission profiles that we both have. In some
areas they overlap, and others they are distinct.
Mr. Reyes. Mr. Chairman, that may be something we want to
either look into or consider, which brought this question up.
Have the Marines participated in the network integration
exercises with the Army?
General O'Donohue. We are on the second one, which is right
now. In fact, tonight I fly out there to observe both the Army
and the Marines. So the first one that went off we were in
observer status. This second one we are participating. And as
we get units back from Afghanistan and have more depth, we will
participate fully. There have been discussions at the Vice
Chief, Assistant Commandant Marine Corps both saying this is an
area of collaboration. So senior leadership is fully behind it.
My responsibilities are in capabilities development. And I will
be there tomorrow.
Mr. Reyes. Great. Well, thank you. Mr. Chairman, that is
all I have for the moment. I yield back. Thank you all very
much.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Mr. Runyan.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Chairman. And gentlemen, thank you
for your service.
Just a quick question about the JLTV, learning our lessons
from what we needed from the Humvee, what we need from the
MRAP. And knowing that you guys aren't talking about it, but,
you know, up-armoring the old Humvees to make them more
sustainable and be able to push that off. In the procurement
process, are we putting in room to grow in the JLTV so we don't
run into this situation as soon in the future?
General O'Donohue. Again, as I mentioned before, Humvee
recap, and we have had a lot of experience with it, we have
done a lot of experimentation and looked at that problem hard.
A vehicle in the category of 16,500 pounds or so will not give
us all the characteristics to include payload. And that is one
of the key distinguishing characteristics between the JLTV and
any Humvee recap. So the growth path in every respect is higher
with the JLTV. So as we look at making an investment for a
vehicle that we are going to have for decades, a growth path is
one of the key considerations. And that is shown even in
specific of reliability. There is an O&S cost associated with
that. If you are at a vehicle at the very edge of its
performance characteristics, it starts losing mobility, starts
losing transportability, it starts having maintenance problems.
And then you don't have the payload to get the mission done. So
a key distinguishing factor between the JLTV, and the reason we
are going for it, is in fact payload and that growth for a
vehicle that we are going to have to have for quite some time,
sir.
Mr. Runyan. Yes. And going back to MRAPs and MATVs, have
you had any experience with parts and getting those actually
out in the theater?
General Kelley. Sir, no, we haven't. Actually, the MRAPs
are being well supported. We certainly want to thank Congress
for all the help and support that they have provided us there.
As you know, on the MATV side of the house, while we continue
to respond to the threat, we come up with fixes that will help
provide safety on the MATV side of the house. And we are
currently in the middle of installing what is called the UIK
[Underbody Improvement Kit], which is an improvement package
that will help, not only help with the overall vehicle safety
but also the passengers inside the vehicle. And we are on path
to continue with those upgrades. One issue is tires for all of
our tactical vehicles, and industry is performing well in this
regard with the larger R-2000 tires.
Mr. Runyan. Going on to obviously what is going to be our
largest medical issue of this combat, TBI [Traumatic Brain
Injury], I know the Army has taken a program to actually in
some cases have sensors in the helmet to predetermine that. Are
you guys a part of that program and/or looking into it?
General O'Donohue. In every respect. In every vehicle. We
have ways of measuring blast, which is a key. The idea to
protect mobility, both dismounted and mounted, is going to be a
factor, obviously in this war and future ones. And how you
measure that. And one of the most pernicious aspects of it is
the mild TBI. The severe symptoms are ones that we are first on
in collaboration with the Army. It is the ones that are very
difficult to detect that sometime have the appearance of a
concussion but have long-standing consequences. And that area
is a particular focus. So in every way, from the Commandant on
down this is the issue of this war. And it is one that we are
working closely with the Army, sir.
Mr. Runyan. I thank you for that, because it is--I also sit
on the VA [Veterans' Affairs] Committee. So it is going to be
one that is going to be a challenge, as we are still dealing
with Agent Orange from the Vietnam era also. So thank you for
that.
Also dealing with, you know, there has been complaints
regarding the helmet pad suspension being too hard and it has
had occasion to fall apart. Have we looked at ways to enhance
that? I know myself, spending 14 years in the National Football
League, that having uncomfortable head gear doesn't make your
job any easier.
General Kelley. Sir, I have not personally heard of anybody
coming to me and complaining about the helmet mounting system.
As you know, we have the Team Wendy suspension system in the
helmets that we are currently fielding. And also that is the
plan for the ECH, the enhanced combat helmet. We are working
closely with the Army, Natick Soldier Systems Center, and also
with PEO [Program Executive Office] Soldier to make sure that
we are not making our marines, and soldiers for that matter,
uncomfortable. And certainly I agree with you that being
uncomfortable can be as big a detriment as, you know, not
having a safe helmet at all to begin with.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. Now to our visiting
member, Mr. Coffman, who is one of the hardest working members
of our full committee. Thank you for joining us, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
your service to our country and your testimony today. I know
the United States Marine Corps is trying to transition to
become a lighter force. And so I wonder if you can, in respect
to that statement, in what we are talking today, tell me
about--drill down a little bit more in the transition of where
you see us moving to. Because, you know, we have got a lot of
heavy vehicles. You know, the United States Marine Corps is an
amphibious force. It is an expeditionary force. It is supposed
to be a lighter force. And yet it has become a very heavy
force. And so I wonder if you can shed some light on that.
General O'Donohue. Yes, sir. I will start, and then pass
it. Tied to our mission, obviously an expeditionary force and
readiness, as we come out of a protracted counterinsurgency we
have shed vehicles, as I talked about before, even just in
numbers, as we look to be lighter. The Commandant has cast us,
and it was confirmed by SECDEF [the Secretary of Defense], that
we are the middle weight force. What that means in part is that
we are strategically transportable. We can get there. We are
optimized for one of the scarcest and dearest assets we have in
terms of strategic mobility, whether it be amphibious shipping,
prepositioning, or airlift. So light is in some ways a matter
of degree. Much lighter, obviously, than the Army, heavier than
SOF [Special Operations Forces] in terms of being scalable. And
then we have a range of missions we have to accomplish, from
theater security cooperation, crisis response, all the way to
major at least initial entry force for an MCO [Major Combat
Operation]. So our gear has to be able to span that range. And
obviously with the fiscal constraints in terms of how we
transition is also a factor. It is one the Commandant has
charged us with. It could be as small as a countersniper device
on a helmet that weighs four ounces. The Commandant is asking
how much does it weigh. So we have made weight and strategic
mobility a key performance parameter in the systems we have.
And we are looking at from the individual to the squads and the
entire MAGTF [Marine Amphibious Group Task Force] reducing it.
And there are a number of initiatives, from R&D, to
acquisitions, to just getting to a smaller profile in terms of
number of vehicles that are part of that. So it is a wide-
ranging campaign.
And I know my partners here have some more on that, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Maybe you can drill down on this. And that is
let's assume at some point we are out of Afghanistan. Let's
draw the scenario that we are no longer in Afghanistan, no
longer in Iraq.
General O'Donohue. Yes, sir.
Mr. Coffman. So the Marine Corps is not then engaging in an
active counterinsurgency war. So what do you do with all these
MRAPs in terms of where do they organizationally fit in terms
of as far as the table of equipment goes?
General O'Donohue. Yes, sir. We are under extensive review.
And the MRAP is a perfect example. We do core missions that
every Marine unit is equipped with as a force in readiness. And
they are there as kind of core plus, they are above their
standard mission set. The MRAP fits the category above the
standard mission set. So we can reduce from a combination of
MATVs and MRAPs of about 4,000 to a range of somewhere between
1,500 to about 2,500. Those are kept and preserved. There will
be a limited amount for training. And then if we get into
circumstances where they are required, that smaller equipment
set, and we shed the burden of carrying a much larger force for
tactical and counterinsurgency is available.
Mr. Coffman. So they are not going to be, obviously, let's
say we are not--we go back to the Marine Corps prior to 9/11
more or less. I mean we have obviously learned some things we
changed from that. So they are not going to be organic to an
infantry battalion. Is there anybody that they would be organic
to?
General O'Donohue. A few. EOD, engineers, a small category
of those numbers. The other important point is our mission set
is we focus on mobility, not just strategic, but also
operational and tactical. So our vehicles have a weight limit,
and we put a high premium on giving options to the commander.
He can cover a lot of uncertain ground, he is not channelized
to roads like the MRAP is. So part of being that light middle
weight force is making sure we build in our vehicles and in our
marines the ability to be mobile. And that is reflected in the
entire equipment set. JLTV, rather than MRAP, our amphibious
combat vehicle, the premium is on keeping it low weight and
keeping it survivable, but also mobility gives you a
survivability because you have many more choices for a
commander, and the enemy can't predict where you are going to
be.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Wilson, do you have questions?
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
thank our witnesses for being here today. I am very grateful
and honored to represent Parris Island. And my experiences
there, Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, the Naval Hospital in
Beaufort, it is just inspiring. Just last month, Chairman Jeff
Miller of the Veterans' Affairs Committee was one of the
reviewing officials for graduation. And it just is such an
awesome and wonderful reminder of the opportunity that young
people have to serve who are serving in the Marine Corps. So
thank you for your service.
And General Kelley, you have stated your support for the
joint light tactical vehicle, JLTV, program. I understand that
there are some manufacturers who could provide vehicles in the
same rapid timeline as the mine-resistant ambush-protected
vehicle, MRAP. The current engineering and manufacturing
development phase for the JLTV is scheduled to take 34 months.
Would the Department consider revising the JLTV acquisition
strategy to move into production more quickly along the lines
of the MRAP?
Mr. Taylor. Sir, I will take that. The JLTV actually falls
under my portfolio. I will address it in this manner. Our best
estimate right now is that the EMD [Engineering and
Manufacturing Development] phase will take approximately 33
months. I am going to steal one of those months away from you.
In addition to that, we are never satisfied with either cost or
schedule. We are always looking for ways to drive those down.
We had a meeting just this morning with the Commandant. And I
can tell you with respect to requirements, we have done all we
can. And General O'Donohue can elaborate on that. But we have
done all we can early in the development effort in terms of
cost-informed trades. So the requirements, there is no gold
plating. The General expounded on that. But we are where we are
with requirements. So about all that remains to focus on in
terms of trying to reduce cost and schedule is schedule itself.
So we would consider the potential for trading schedule for
cost or vice versa. But we plan on continuing to look at ways
within the Department to do that.
There is risk in terms of industry's side. We want to keep
the competition field as broad as possible, because that
benefits not only the government in terms of keeping the unit
price down, but it also has benefits for the industrial base.
So we want to keep the competitive field as broad as possible.
So there are potential risks to schedule if we compress that
time frame too much in terms of keeping the large competitive
field.
So where we are really focusing our attention is inside the
building, and what we can do in terms of documentation
requirements, oversight requirements, testing, et cetera. So
that is where our primary focus is right now, to see if we can
free up additional schedule.
General O'Donohue. Sir, just to pick up on that, there is a
narrow window where the Marine Corps can afford to buy the JLTV
as we sequentially modernize and phase the ACV. We have a very
aggressive schedule that starts in December with a proposal for
an RFP [Requests for Proposal]. So any delay, whether it is
continuing resolution and we don't get special authorization,
or any other kind of actions, would kind of unhinge the
strategy. So time for the Marine Corps and schedule is an
imperative in every respect, sir.
Mr. Wilson. And General O'Donohue, you have very
interesting challenges as you are looking at different issues.
One that is ahead is in regard to possibly the Marine Corps
participating in the Army's new infantry carbine program. Will
you participate or not?
General O'Donohue. Sir, we have looked hard at our infantry
weapons. And there are several aspects of it. How do you train
the marine? What ammunition do you use? And the weapon itself.
We even considered our new IAR [Infantry Automatic Rifle], the
automatic weapon that replaced the SAW [Squad Automatic Weapon]
with more precision and less weight. We believe the most cost-
effective means of meeting our profile right now is product
improvement to the M16A4. We have a different mission profile.
We are dismounted. We have got infantry. There is caseless
ammunition, which is in the future, which we are doing a lot of
research and development. Not ready yet. A threshold difference
like that would cause us to reconsider our service rifle. Right
now the most cost-effective strategy is product improvement to
the M16A4, sir.
Mr. Wilson. And in line with that, do the Marines plan to
procure a new carbine to replace the M4 or M16? What is the
Marine Corps' current and future strategy or plan for a new
primary small arms weapon?
General O'Donohue. Sir, there is no replacement for the
carbine. In the small arms, sir, are you talking about the
pistol or----
General Kelley. Sir, I know that we have a close quarter
battle pistol program that we are considering right now. And I
can take that one for the record if you like, sir, to get you a
little bit more detail on that.
Mr. Wilson. That would be fine.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 41.]
General Kelley. About our infantry assault rifle, I don't
know if that was the point you were trying to make there, sir.
Mr. Wilson. If you could go into that also.
General Kelley. Certainly, sir. The infantry assault rifle,
you know, we should start--we have already fielded some in
limited quantities out in Afghanistan to get our marines' user
assessment. It is performing exceptionally well. We should
start fielding that weapon in February of 2012, so next year.
And we should complete that fielding of about 4,000-plus
infantry assault rifles, that should finish up in about April
of 2013, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And I also want to commend
you on my visits to Parris Island to see the marksmanship
training, to see the sighting. It is just so impressive and how
capable these young people are. It just warms your heart. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. In my opening comments I regretted
the fact that we have not developed a new national strategy for
how we will use our military in the future. About every 6 hours
we have another billion dollar deficit, which means another
billion dollars in debt. We spend almost as much on our
military as all the rest of the world put together. And we
spend more on our military than the next 11 countries in the
world combined. And nine of those are allies of ours.
The Ryan budget, which is a very tough budget, doesn't
balance for 25 years. With the reality of where we are
budgetwise in our country, there are obviously going to be
those who will say that we will never balance the budget, that
our country will go bankrupt unless there are additional cuts
to defense. There is no way of knowing where this dialogue will
end.
What I would like you to do for the record is to assume the
sequester sets in and that the Congress has the wisdom to
permit you to use that money as wisely as you can, rather than
across-the-board cuts the way it is now structured, so that you
can develop the best possible Marine Corps with the moneys that
you have. This will be very useful in advising the development
of a new national strategic strategy, new national strategy,
whatever the amount of money available might be.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 41.]
Mr. Bartlett. I have a few questions I need to ask that
were not asked by my colleagues. Most of them were. What is the
status of the Marine Personnel Carrier program? Given the
current budget environment, do you believe this program is
affordable and justified?
General O'Donohue. Sir, right now the MPC [Marine Personnel
Carrier] is in research and development. It has a utility in
multiple ways. It is a highly leveraged RDT&E [Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation] funding that is in the
fiscal year 2012 budget, and it is in several respects, and I
will describe those. The first is as we start looking at an
amphibious combat vehicle, and we are in the process of doing
analysis alternatives, having a connector with the wheeled
vehicle, which would be the Marine Personnel Carrier, MPC,
would be one of the options for it. This summer or in the early
fall we will have a decision on that.
Secondly, in our portfolio we are looking at mixed wheeled
and tracked vehicles. We talked about earlier in the testimony
the advantages of the Stryker. The survivability of wheeled
vehicles is high, the mobility as well. And we are working in
fact with a state of the art technology demonstrator that
proves to us that we can get a commercial-off-the-shelf
capability that is very effective.
The other aspect, we are managing our three replacement
programs for the EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle], the AAV-
SLEP [Amphibious Assault Vehicle-Service Life Extension
Program], the ACV, and the MPC under one program manager. And
we are using the money that is in the current budget to
experiment with aspects that affect all of them. So the money
is really in the category of experimentation.
And then lastly, as we look at an LAV [Light Armored
Vehicle] replacement, we are learning things from the RDT&E.
Very highly leveraged. We are looking at fiscal year 2014, a
decision point. If we have survivability in the ACV that makes
it a common fleet vehicle, then we will shift from eight and
four mix, eight battalions of the ACV and four battalions of
MPC, we would be able to shift over maybe to a pure fleet.
So the money we have right now doesn't reflect a program
decided. It reflects a judicious investment so we can learn and
leverage and inform the different areas that I described, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. What is the schedule for the
enhanced combat helmet? When do you expect to begin fielding
this helmet in Afghanistan?
General Kelley. Sir, I know I am probably not supposed do
this, but thank you for asking that question. Based on a
comment I made last March, the enhanced combat helmet program,
we had noticed some anomalies last March, if you remember when
I had a chance to talk to you the last time. Today, November
16, the enhanced combat helmet is going to enter into its First
Article Test series number two. And we are really looking
forward to that test. This has been probably one of the best
collaborative ventures that I have seen between industry,
director of operational test, our own Marine Corps operational
test and evaluation activity, and our program manager at Marine
Corps Systems Command.
We think after having flushed out the test protocols
rigorously this past summer that ECH is going to pass its First
Article Test well. It will pass its full up system level
testing immediately to follow that. There is a series of
reports, as you well know, one that will have to come to the
Congress, and also a Beyond LRIP [Low Rate Initial Production]
report, and then we should start fielding in late spring, early
summer of 2012, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. In your opinion, are there
opportunities to improve commonality and jointness between the
Army and Marine Corps across the modernization account? For an
instance, how do the Army and Marine Corps coordinate on the
development and fielding of tactical wheeled vehicle solutions
that address similar needs and requirements of both Services?
General O'Donohue. Sir, the story of this war has been
almost complete integration between Army and Marines, both
tactically, where Marine battalions have worked for Army
brigades, and Army brigades have worked for Marine divisions.
Likewise, actually in the requirements and acquisition, we work
very, very closely. We meet almost every other month, it is
actually monthly at some level, every other month at the
general officer level with the Army leadership to discuss
opportunities like that. General Bo Dyess is my counterpart. We
meet quarterly with our full staffs to do a staff review. So in
every respect--in fact, the JLTV is a shining example of where
we went through some knowledge points, worked together as a
Service, and were able to come up with a program that meets
both Service needs, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Sir, I would also add that on the programmatic
and development side we go to where the infrastructure exists.
In fact, we have actually signed a memorandum of agreement with
the Army's TARDEC [Tank Automotive Research, Development, and
Engineering Center], and we actually take advantage of their
engineering infrastructure to work some of our joint
engineering issues.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. I have no questions right now. Thank you, Mr.
Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Let me ask the other members of our
subcommittee, do you have additional comments or questions?
Mr. Reyes. I just wanted to follow up on a question that my
colleague from Missouri asked, and maybe get a little more
detail. When she was talking about the mandated cuts of the
Budget Control Act, I think she asked how big a portion of
those cuts would be made from the Marine Corps procurement
accounts. But I am not sure I heard the answer. Can you tell
us? Do you have that information?
General O'Donohue. Sir, I don't. I know the Commandant has
talked about how we have three areas that we go at it. And that
would assume how DOD would apply them based on strategy. Again,
we have made the payroll, as the force and readiness, O&M is
obviously key to that, that we would have to maintain to be
ready. There is a personnel piece, keeping faith with the
marines. Again, the Marine Corps has gone through a
capabilities-based review. We start with a 202,000 Marine
Corps. Based on strategy, based on the roles of force and
readiness we have come with a 186,800 force. It would require,
to keep faith with the marines, a judicious drawdown. We are
not doing RIFs [Reduction in Forces] to combat veterans and
those things. So the timing of it is important in terms of
degree, in terms of going after that. And then we have talked
about how small the Marine Corps modernization account is on
the ground side, about .6 percent of DOD. So a minor impact--or
a minor cut has a large impact. Those things I think have to be
sorted out at the OSD level in terms of prioritization rather
than just a strict proportionality. If it were strictly a
proportional cut it would be damaging to the Marine Corps, and
we would have to reevaluate the strategy in terms of how we go
about doing that.
Mr. Reyes. So based on that answer, at what point do you
think you will be able to tell the committee, you know, the
types of cuts that you would be forced to make as a result of
this act? Because a number of us are concerned about not just
these cuts, but any additional cuts that might be taken out of
the Marine, the Army, and other budgets.
Mr. Taylor. I can't speak to specific impacts to specific
programs, but I can talk in general themes. In terms of
government programmatics, it will obviously become extremely
difficult at best or near impossible at worst to launch new
programs, and it will certainly be extremely difficult to keep
existing programs stable in terms of funding and schedule. In
fact, some of the detailed implications are stretching out both
development and procurement rates to field the ultimate
capability.
And then there is also implications for industry and there
is a most recent example, very similar to what we are
experiencing on the shipbuilding front, now on the ground
vehicle side we are starting to see some contraction. Just
recently it was announced that General Dynamics may procure FPI
[Force Protection Incorporated]. We have also seen vendors who
are not normally in the ground vehicle business. They are now
trying to partner. They may not survive in certain scenarios.
Some of the specific implications of that, perhaps a part
of foreign pricing rate agreements that vendors must negotiate
with DCAA [Defense Contract Audit Agency]. Part of that
equation is assessing the current state of their business base
and, in addition to that, another aspect of the equation is
making predictions about their future business base. What this
equates to to the government is probably a higher forward
pricing rate agreement whether this comes to fruition or not.
So we are probably already incurring risk as a result--very
much like the markets, just reaction to the perception of risk
will probably drive up labor rates.
Mr. Reyes. And that is very helpful because oftentimes we
have to articulate those consequences, you know, internally as
we debate how we move forward and--because the reality is that
it is such a huge defense budget that there are knives at every
level that are looking for chunks to cut out. So that is why we
ask these questions. So I appreciate that answer, and I want to
associate myself with the chairman, that we--it is important to
have a national strategy, a cohesive understanding of how our
military is going to move forward as we deal with these budget
shortfalls.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Now we return to Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, given the
constrained budget environment, what concerns do you have about
the ability to maintain night vision goggle production capacity
and technological capability? And specifically what planning,
review or assessment are you undertaking to better understand
these challenges so that we can sustain this critical program?
General Kelley. Currently, sir, we don't have any further
requirements for purchasing of night vision goggles. In our
plan right now we are really just planning for replacement in
the outyears.
Mr. McIntyre. Do you believe that strategy is going to be
adequate given the demands of the theater?
General Kelley. Given the current demand right now, we feel
that the budget is adequate, sir.
Mr. McIntyre. With regard to vehicle protection, my
understanding is there is research being done by the DOD, by
the Army and the Marine Corps advancing both material and
nonmaterial solutions to the constantly changing threat of
IEDs. Are these various research efforts sufficiently
coordinated to bring forth solutions in the most timely manner?
Is there any coordination going on between these three aspects
of research?
Mr. Taylor. There is coordination at multiple levels, both
in the S&T [Science and Technology] world, across numerous
fronts and then also in the actual later development efforts,
again as previously mentioned, an MOA [Memorandum of Agreement]
that we entered with the Army's TARDEC. There is a joint center
for ground vehicles and that is one of the themes that has been
raised in numerous forms. So there is joint collaboration and
communication on this front. But to the best of my knowledge
there has been no new alloys discovered. So for the most part
it comes down to things like composites or specialty metals,
and certainly that becomes part of the discussion in cost in
foreign trades in terms of the cost to provide these new
technologies.
Mr. McIntyre. So you mention composite and materials and
alloys. So there is not other technology that we can anticipate
that is about to emerge other than looking at the
lightweightness of the armor, so to speak?
Mr. Taylor. I didn't mean to allude that those were the
only areas. I wouldn't consider myself a subject matter expert,
but I am certain there are.
Mr. McIntyre. Does anybody else know on the panel? Okay. If
you could check into that and get back to us. Mr. Chairman, I
would ask if you would in 5 business days let us know what
those other areas may be.
Mr. Taylor. Yes.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 41.]
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. Another element in the
discussion as to how much money we will spend in the future on
defense is the recognition that our robust defense spending in
the past and our willingness to protect has encouraged many of
our allies to be quite parsimonious in their defense spending.
So much so that in this little operation in Libya, our NATO
allies ran out of missiles, bombs and ammunition. Hopefully a
new assessment of what is there in defense spending will create
a foreign sales market that may help ease the challenge we have
where about every 12 hours there is another billion dollar
trade deficit.
When we have had a chance to review your testimony and the
questions and answers, we may need to ask you additional
questions for the record. We trust that you will be available
to answer those. If there are no additional comments on part of
my colleagues, I will thank you very much for your service and
for being with us today, and our subcommittee now stands in
adjournment.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
November 16, 2011
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November 16, 2011
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=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
November 16, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
General O'Donohue, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. The Marine Corps
conducted a capabilities-based Force Structure Review (FSR) one year
ago in order to evaluate and refine the organization, posture and
capabilities required of America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness in
a post-OEF security environment. The Marine Corps employed a panel of
senior officers (colonels) representing all elements of the Marine
Corps. The panel received guidance from the Commandant, applied
operational planning scenarios of the future, and developed a force
structure that satisfied both from a capabilities perspective. In this
way, the Marine Corps directly tied anticipated operational workload to
planned reductions in manpower. The results of the FSR detailed a
Marine Corps force that is specifically tailored in capability to
anticipated workloads. Additionally, the Marine Corps is presently
conducting a review of all civilian billets and service contracts. This
three phase review began in July of 2011. We are also developing
policies supporting the direction given by USD (P&R). These policies
will be published in Marine Corps Orders which guide the development of
our total force.
Although the world is continuing to change and budgets continue to
fluctuate, America's requirement to maintain a forward based force-in-
readiness remains. Physical presence matters. It shows our economic and
our military commitment to a particular region. It deters potential
adversaries, assures our friends, and permits response to crises in a
timely manner. Our current combination of amphibious, air borne and,
prepositioned forces provide the minimal capacity to realistically
address this challenge. During these times of constrained resources, we
remain committed to refining operations, identifying efficiencies, and
reinvesting savings to conserve scarce public funds. [See page 15.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCINTYRE
Mr. Taylor. The Marine Corps is actively pursuing emerging
technologies such as lightweight materials and ammunition, improved
fire control systems, and an integrated approach to the next generation
of small arms weapons, optics, enablers, and ammunition. Joint Service
Combat Developers are leveraging recent capabilities based analysis to
define the Joint Service Small Arms Modernization (JSAM) Initial
Capabilities Document (ICD). [See page 19.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
General Kelley. The Marine Corps currently has three pistols in
operational use: the M9 9mm Service Pistol, the M9A1 9mm Pistol, and
the M45 .45 Caliber Special Operations Pistol. The M9 is the service
pistol issued to senior Marine Officers (O-6 to O-9), all Navy
Officers, and senior Navy enlisted (E-6 to E-9). The M9A1 provides a
rail to mount laser pointers and lights and is issued primarily to
security forces and law enforcement personnel. The M45 is the .45
caliber pistol issued to reconnaissance and Marine Corps Special
Operations Command (MARSOC) personnel.
We are currently in source selection for a commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) materiel solution to replace the Quantico Weapons Training
Battalion, Precision Weapons Section (PWS) hand-built M45. The new COTS
pistol will be a modified 1911 with Picatinny Rail and classified as
the Close Quarters Battle Pistol (CQBP). The CQBP approved acquisition
objective is approximately 4,000 pistols.
Along with the U.S. Army, the Marine Corps is evaluating the
service pistol requirement and M9 service life. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council has already approved a Modular Handgun System (MHS)
Capabilities Production Document (CPD) that would provide the
requirements foundation for the next generation Joint Service handgun.
Marine Corps combat developers actively participated in MHS CPD
development, which focused on ergonomics, lethality, interoperability
and reliability. Based on the satisfactory performance of the M9,
relatively limited distribution of the service pistol, the increasingly
constrained fiscal environment, and competing priorities for limited
resources, the Marine Corps has not adopted the MHS requirement. The
MHS remains an option to fill our service pistol requirement should the
demand signal arise and resources become available. [See page 14.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
November 16, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Bartlett. If Budget Control Act automatic proportional cuts are
required for procurement, RDT&E and O&M for the Marine Corps then what
impact would that have on the Marine Corps' ability to execute the
National Military Strategy? Essentially, what is keeping you up at
night?
General O'Donohue, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. Cuts at the
level anticipated with sequestration will likely cause irreversible
damage to the Marine Corps as well as our industrial base. It will
hollow the Marine Corps and cause us to be out of balance in manpower,
procurement and modernization. Summarily reducing procurement accounts
will damage the industrial base, which may not recover. The result of
such cuts would deny our nation the military superiority required in
the current and future complex and challenging security environment.
Sequestration would require the Department to completely revamp the
National Security Strategy and reassess our ability to shape the global
environment in order to protect national interests. The nation would
incur an unacceptable level of strategic and operational risk, which
may prove catastrophic the next time our nation is called upon to
respond to a global crisis.
Mr. Bartlett. Please walk us through the Army and Marine Corps
Requirements Board process: How often do you meet? What have been some
of the major results of your meetings? Are joint requirements generated
during these meetings?
General O'Donohue, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. The Army-Marine
Corps Board (AMCB) is a 3-star level deliberative body co-chaired by
the Service resource directors--the Army G-8 and Marine Corps Deputy
Commandant, Programs and Resources (DC P&R). Regular members include 3-
star or equivalent representatives from the operations and plans,
requirements, doctrine, and acquisition communities. There are 4 steps
involved in bringing topics before the AMCB:
1. Issue Identification. Topics are normally high level Army/USMC
focused issues, e.g., concepts, capabilities/requirements, programs.
These issues may come from the previous POM cycle, OSD Program Reviews,
or as a result of new initiatives. The topic list is ever-changing as
issues emerge.
2. Issue Development. The AMCB will assign issues to responsible
subject matter expert (SME) teams and provide guidance concerning
scope, timing and desired output. These SME teams, who are comprised of
both Army and Marine members, will then develop assessments
incorporating capabilities, Service approved requirements, and cost.
3. Issue Review. AMCB issue briefings normally employ a two-step
review process. First, a Council of Colonels will meet at least three
weeks prior to convening the AMCB to refine the issue briefing. Next, a
Flag/General Officer review (one/two star level) will convene two weeks
prior to ensure the issue is sufficiently developed and merits three-
star consideration.
4. Issue Resolution. SME team leaders will brief the issues,
analyzed courses of action (COA), and recommendations to the AMCB. The
AMCB will either make a decision and assign actions to members; elevate
the issue to the Chief of Staff, Army and Commandant of the Marine
Corps for adjudication and resolution; or refer the issue to the SME
team for further assessment and COA development.
The AMCB meets approximately eight to ten times a year.
AMCB accomplishments over the past four years include the
following:
Agreement on Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicle requirements and, more recently, MRAP All Terrain Vehicle
(MATV) requirements.
Agreement on the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
requirements.
Continued collaboration on body armor and helmet
requirements.
Continued collaboration on small arms requirements.
Convergence on Service ammunition requirements.
Continued collaboration on JLTV.
Joint requirements are not generated by the AMCB. The AMCB serves
as a forum for collaborating on and discussing Service and joint
requirements that impact both land components. Formal requirements are
generated through the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System
(JCIDS).
Mr. Bartlett. What impact is the continuing resolution (CR) having
on modernization programs for equipping dismounted soldiers and
marines?
General O'Donohue, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. While the
Continuing Resolution (CR) that extends through December 16 does not
pose significant challenges to the Marine Corps' modernization
programs, the impacts grow dramatically as the year continues. Under a
CR, Department of Defense policy requires the Services to manage funds
at the line item or program level vice at the appropriation level,
thereby limiting flexibility to reallocate funds to higher priority
requirements requested in the pending appropriations legislation. New
starts and military construction cannot be initiated under a CR without
specific approval; and individual projects must be specifically
authorized and appropriated.
A CR extended beyond the end of the calendar year would begin to
create problems with modernization programs. The more significant
problem created by an extended CR would be an unmanageable shortfall in
the Marine Corps manpower account. Ultimately, a long term CR creates
challenges for equipment levels, training readiness, and our Marines'
quality of life until there is a final appropriations bill.
Mr. Bartlett. Does the Marine Corps plan to pursue a new handgun?
Does a validated requirement exist for a new handgun and if so, is a
new handgun a high priority for the Marine Corps?
General O'Donohue and General Kelley. The Marine Corps currently
has three pistols in operational use: the M9 9mm Service Pistol, the
M9A1 9mm Pistol, and the M45 .45 Caliber Special Operations Pistol. The
M9 is the service pistol issued to senior Marine Officers (O-6 to O-9),
all Navy Officers, and senior Navy enlisted (E-6 to E-9). The M9A1
provides a rail to mount laser pointers and lights and is issued
primarily to security forces and law enforcement personnel. The M45 is
the .45 caliber pistol issued to reconnaissance and Marine Corps
Special Operations Command (MARSOC) personnel.
We are currently in source selection for a commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) materiel solution to replace the Quantico Weapons Training
Battalion, Precision Weapons Section (PWS) hand-built M45. The new COTS
pistol will be a modified 1911 with Picatinny Rail and classified as
the Close Quarters Battle Pistol (CQBP). The CQBP approved acquisition
objective is approximately 4,000 pistols.
Along with the U.S. Army, the Marine Corps is evaluating the
service pistol requirement and M9 service life. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council has already approved a Modular Handgun System (MHS)
Capabilities Production Document (CPD) that would provide the
requirements foundation for the next generation Joint Service handgun.
Marine Corps combat developers actively participated in MHS CPD
development, which focused on ergonomics, lethality, interoperability
and reliability. Based on the satisfactory performance of the M9,
relatively limited distribution of the service pistol, the increasingly
constrained fiscal environment, and competing priorities for limited
resources, the Marine Corps has not adopted the MHS requirement. The
MHS remains an option to fill our service pistol requirement should the
demand signal arise and resources become available.
Mr. Bartlett. Given limited industrial base for night vision
goggles and the future constrained budget environment what concerns do
you have about the ability to maintain Night Vision Goggle (NVG)
production capacity and technological capability?
General O'Donohue and General Kelley. There are no planned
procurements for Image Intensifier systems in FY2012 and only a limited
quantity to replace losses in future years (planning figure of 300 per
year). A 2010 Image Intensifier (I2) Tube Industrial Capability
Assessment conducted by DCMA's Industrial Analysis Center (IAC)
concluded that, ``[i]f DOD requirements decrease as projected, there is
a strong possibility that one competitor will exit the market and the
remaining producer will likely rationalize their current operations to
meet the market demand.'' This would ``likely result in lack of
competition, stagnation of future innovation and development, decreased
surge capacity as well as the potential for increased unit cost.'' DMCA
IAC recommended ``a periodic assessment of the financial viability of
key companies engaged in I2 tube production.'' The Marine Corps
continues to engage with Industry and the Department of Defense to
monitor I2 industrial base concerns.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand the Marine Corps plans to divest
approximately 10,000 vehicles from its tactical vehicle fleet and
further the Marine Corps is in the process of revising many acquisition
objectives across the combat and tactical vehicle fleets. Can you walk
us through your ground combat and tactical vehicle strategy? How are
you factoring in MRAP vehicles?
General Kelley and Mr. Taylor. The Marine Corps requires the
ability to maneuver and sustain combat power across the range of
military operations and in various environments. The combat and
tactical vehicles required to achieve this must provide appropriate
force-level maneuver and sustainment capabilities that are both
compatible with rotary-wing and surface assets and complementary to
enhance tactical flexibility and minimize risk. The Ground Combat and
Tactical Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) has, since 2008, been the framework
within which the Marine Corps manages the future inventory of heavy,
medium, and light vehicle categories, which are further divided into
combat and tactical vehicle types. Combat vehicles facilitate maneuver
of combat teams, while tactical vehicles facilitate the distribution of
sustainment material and services by logistics teams. The three combat
vehicle and three tactical vehicle categories are correlated to the
range of military operations and operating environments to meet
performance, protection, payload, and transportability characteristics.
The entire portfolio of vehicles will possess these characteristics, so
as to:
Support rapid transition between concentration and
dispersion of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) combat power by
fielding vehicles with modular and adaptable armor in multiple
capability categories
Support strategic deployment concepts by closely managing
transport weights and prepositioning objectives
Provide capacity to meet and sustain simultaneous Marine
Corps commitments worldwide by maintaining operational availability and
optimizing mix and distribution across the enterprise
In 2010, the Marine Corps concluded that a 10,000 vehicle reduction
is feasible as reconstitution occurs post-OEF. That reduction supports
the Marine Corps' re-orientation to its amphibious mission by reducing
the `footprint' of MAGTFs. That USMC vehicle inventory has also been
sized to support MAGTFs that employ the concept of \2/3\ of the Marines
maneuvering by vehicle and \1/3\ of the Marines maneuvering by foot or
air.
This 2010 vehicle reduction was directed during Phase II of the
GCTVS, during one of the four pre-planned Decision Points that control
execution of the strategy to meet the GCTVS objectives. Future decision
points will guide planning to inform Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
14 and POM 16 decisions regarding ground mobility investments. The
information supporting each decision point will provide cost,
effectiveness and risk information on alternative courses of action
relevant to the issues challenging successful fielding of the future
fleet.
As we factor use of MRAPs into our vehicle strategy, we start with
the observation that a significant challenge presented by IED
protection is its impact on vehicle dimensions. The MRAP-ATV and other
MRAPs fit into the GCTVS as medium and heavy vehicles conducting light
vehicle missions in most mission sets. Light vehicles are characterized
as those that are rotary wing transportable, can be used on Class 12 or
lighter Route and Bridge networks, and exhibit good soft soil mobility.
Light tactical vehicles carry less than three tons of cargo and provide
services associated with small teams of two to five personnel. Light
combat vehicles are characterized as those that maneuver combat and
combat support teams of three to five personnel and carry mission
essential equipment, usually less than two tons.
A predominance of the 1,100 MRAP vehicles in the Active and Reserve
force will be used by Engineer and EOD units to conduct Route
Reconnaissance and Clearance missions (as conducted in theater),
provide protected mobility to EOD teams, and provide protected mobility
to combat engineers that are at times called upon to supplement our EOD
forces for mine and obstacle clearance.
The Marine Corps is evaluating the full cost of retaining an
additional 1,400 MRAPs to serve in both light tactical and some light
combat mission roles in high IED, restricted maneuver environments as
was the case in Iraq. The full cost of storing these vehicles in CONUS
and forward positioned sites, when evaluated within the context of the
projected future budgets, will determine the quantity and extent of the
Marine Corps' ability to retain these additional vehicles.
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is specifically being developed to
provide M-ATV-like protection within the light vehicle class. It will
have the rotary wing lift, mobility, weight, height and payload values
that characterize the light vehicle. This is important to the Marine
Corps as it strives to maintain its expeditionary nature (deployable by
L-Class vessels and USMC aircraft), while providing protected mobility
to its forces that are deployed in environments with poor or damaged
infrastructure or in environmental extremes. The JLTV will be
complemented by the HMMWVs and MRAPs that remain in the inventory to
provide a portfolio of vehicles, which in combination allow MAGTF
Commanders to tailor equipment for the mission at hand.
Mr. Bartlett. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) acquisition
strategy has been restructured to make the program more affordable and
to streamline performance requirements. Can you provide more detail on
this revised strategy and indicate to the committee whether the Marine
Corps supports the JLTV program?
General Kelley and Mr. Taylor. The JLTV is the most cost-effective
program to meet capability gaps for those light combat vehicles with
the most demanding missions. The Marine Corps supports the JLTV program
and is aligned with Army on requirements and affordability. We are
working together as the program moves toward a Milestone B (MS B)
decision in April 2012. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) and
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) have worked together to
drive down cost and inform industry regarding JLTV requirements. The
Capabilities Development Document (CDD) is presently in Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) staffing, and is on track for
expedited approval.
Informed by Technology Development phase, both Services have
defined a JLTV program that:
- is an affordable solution to essential capabilities including
transportability, protection, mobility and payload,
- is low risk, enabling a streamlined acquisition strategy.
The streamlined acquisition strategy enables fielding of the JLTV
meet the most critical light vehicle capabilities (gun trucks, SABRE/
TOW, forward C2) prior to modernization of the Amphibious Combat
Vehicle. Sequenced modernization of JLTV then ACV is key to affordably
modernizing the two most critical shortfalls in the Marine Corps'
Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle fleet.
The revised Acquisition Strategy is a direct result of VCSA and
ACMC engagement and cooperation between the Army and Marine Corps. The
Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) phase has been
reduced from 48 months to 33 months, reducing cost and schedule,
resulting in expedited delivery of affordable JLTV capability to our
warfighters. The EMD phase features the following:
Up to three vendors to participate in EMD with a down
select to one in production.
Firm-fixed Price contract approach for both EMD and
production; appropriate given the competitive nature of the program.
12 months for competitors to deliver, test, and integrate
vehicles in preparation for demanding 14 month government testing and
evaluation period.
Mr. Bartlett. The Army is pursuing the Modernized Expanded Capacity
Vehicle (MECV) program which competitively recapitalizes their Up-Armor
HMMWV fleet. Are the Marines conducting a similar program? If yes, then
how does it align with the Marine Corps light tactical vehicle
strategy?
General Kelley and Mr. Taylor. The Marine Corps strategy for light
vehicles is to procure 5,500 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles to meet
light combat vehicle missions and to extend the service life of the
remaining 13,000 HMMWVs serving in light tactical missions out to 2030.
The HMMWV Modification effort was developed in early 2011 as a
complementary effort to JLTV in order to extend the service life a
significant number of the HMMWVs which will still make up the majority
of the light tactical vehicle fleet.
The Army and Marine Corps collaboratively developed JLTV and
complementary HMMWV recapitalization requirements and programs during
this period.
However, Marine Corps requirements for a mobile, protected, durable
light tactical vehicle cannot be met by the Army's MECV requirement
set. For light tactical missions, the Marine Corps needs a two-man
vehicle that can distribute a 4,000 lb mission payload of support
services and supplies and a limited number of four-man vehicles that
can carry 2,300 lbs of mission payload, both of which must travel 70%
off-road when armored. The Army does not intend to invest to meet this
requirement.
The Marine Corps approach for the HMMWV Modification effort is to
explore the use of state-of-the-art automotive technologies to restore
the current HMMWV platform to pre-armoring levels of performance in the
areas of safety, durability, payload, mobility and reliability. These
improvements will be incorporated into a kit or kits for installation
at the Marine Corps Depots on the current rebuild lines or competed to
industry based on best value to the Government. Phases one and two of
the effort are planned to begin in FY 12 with the selection of
modification kits, finalization of the design of the kits, and
integration of the kits onto the HMMWV platforms. The production kit
testing and technical drawing package development (Phases 3 and 4) will
continue in FY 13. Proof of principle testing of the production kits
will be conducted in FY14, with full rate production and integration of
the kits onto selected HMMWVs commencing in FY15. In addition to the
HMMWV Modification R&D efforts, the Marine Corps program office will
also continue to monitor Army Phase One Modernized Expanded Capability
Vehicle (MECV) efforts that could be leveraged and incorporated to
improve Marine Corps vehicles.
Mr. Bartlett. How does the MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle and other MRAP
vehicles fit into the Marine Corps wheeled vehicle fleet along with
HMMWVs and JLTVs? Why not just use the M-ATV and MRAPs which have
proven to be combat effective?
General Kelley and Mr. Taylor. One of the significant challenges
presented by IED protection is its impact on vehicle dimensions. The
MRAP-ATV and other MRAPs fit into our Ground Combat and Tactical
Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) as medium and heavy vehicles conducting light
vehicle missions in most mission sets. Light vehicles are characterized
as those that are rotary wing transportable, can be used on Class 12 or
lighter Route and Bridge networks, and exhibit good soft soil mobility.
Light tactical vehicles carry less than three tons of cargo and provide
services associated with small teams of two to five personnel. Light
combat vehicles are characterized as those that maneuver combat and
combat support teams of three to five personnel and carry mission
essential equipment, usually less than two tons.
A predominance of the MRAP vehicles in the Active and Reserve force
will be used by Engineer and EOD units to conduct Route Reconnaissance
and Clearance missions (as conducted in theater), providing protected
mobility to EOD teams and providing protected mobility to combat
engineers that are at times called upon to supplement our EOD forces
for mine and obstacle clearance.
The Marine Corps is evaluating the full cost of retaining an
additional 1400 MRAPs to serve in both light tactical and some light
combat mission roles in high IED, restricted maneuver environments as
was the case in Iraq. The full cost of storing these vehicles in CONUS
and forward positioned sites, when evaluated within the context of the
projected future budgets will determine the quantity and extent of the
Marine Corps ability to retain these additional vehicles.
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is specifically being developed to
provide M-ATV like protection within the light vehicle class. It will
have the rotary wing lift, mobility, weight, height and payload values
that characterize the light vehicle. This is important to the Marine
Corps as it strives to maintain its expeditionary nature (deployable by
L-Class vessels and USMC aircraft), while providing protected mobility
to its forces that are deployed in environments with poor or damaged
infrastructure, in environmental extremes. The JLTV will be
complemented by the HMMWVs and MRAPs that remain in the inventory to
provide a portfolio of vehicles, which in combination allow MAGTF
Commanders to tailor equipment for the mission at hand.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand MRAPs and MATVs are being outfitted with
safety, survivability, and mobility upgrades, most notably the MATV
underbody improvement kit (UIK). Can you walk us through some of these
product improvement modifications and provide status updates on them,
particularly the UIK program? What are the funding issues, if any,
associated with them?
General Kelley. The premier safety and survivability enhancements
that JPO MRAP is in the process of adding to the MRAP Family of
Vehicles includes improved energy absorbing seats, the underbody
improvement kit (UIK2) for M-ATV, blast attenuating floor mats, rocket
propelled grenade nets, and the Universal Combat Lock Tool. There are
no funding issues associated with the product improvement
modifications.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. In the wake of potential Department of Defense (DOD)
budget cuts and protecting our warfighters, what is the DOD doing to
ensure it does not do business with companies who are under serious
investigation for fraud, corruption and questionable business practices
that threaten a company's financial stability?
General O'Donohue, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor. We require all
contracting officers to utilize the Excluded Parties List System to
verify whether a prospective awardee has been suspended or debarred
from receiving a government contract. Award will not be made if the
contractor is on this list. Another line of defense to find fraudulent
contractors is through the evaluation of past performance. Department
of Defense (DOD) contracting officers are required to use past
performance as a mandatory source selection evaluation factor.
Additionally, our contracting officers must perform one further check
on prospective awardees prior to execution of a contract. Specifically,
DOD contracting officers must evaluate the contractor's overall record
to determine its responsibility. No award may be made unless the
contracting officer makes an affirmative determination of
responsibility for the contractor. As part of the process to determine
responsibility, contracting officers must check and evaluate
information contained in the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity
Information System. Contracting Officers are also responsible for
analyzing the financial capability of potential contractors. A
contracting officer's decision on contractor responsibility must
consider whether the offeror has adequate financial resources or the
ability to obtain them to adequately perform the contract. These
multiple steps provide the government with an increased ability to weed
out fraudulent contractors.
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