[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
CONFRONTING DAMASCUS: U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN
SYRIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 14, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-98
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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______
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New YorkAs
of October 5, 2011 deg.
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York DENNIS CARDOZA, California
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
ROBERT TURNER, New YorkAs
of October 11, 2011 deg.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESS
Mr. Frederic C. Hof, Special Coordinator for Regional Affairs,
Office of the U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 6
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Frederic C. Hof: Prepared statement.......................... 9
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 30
Hearing minutes.................................................. 31
CONFRONTING DAMASCUS: U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN
SYRIA
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. I want to wish everyone good morning. I want to
welcome all of my colleagues to this hearing of the
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. I am Steve
Chabot, the chairman.
As has been well-documented, the human rights abuses being
perpetrated by the regime in Damascus are simply horrifying.
The Report of the United Nations Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic documents
some of the most appalling and widespread human rights abuses
that have been witnessed in recent memory.
The commission explicitly notes extrajudicial executions,
arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, and, perhaps
most disturbingly, the abuse and murder of children. Witnesses
interviewed by the commission are reported to have witnessed
the torture, rape, and murder of children no older than 15 at
the hands of the Syrian security forces.
One military defector, the report noted, stated that he
decided to defect after witnessing the shooting of a 2-year-old
girl by an officer who affirmed that he did not want her to
grow into a demonstrator.
The English language does not have words strong enough to
adequately condemn the horrifying abuses that have been
committed by the Assad regime and its allies against the Syrian
people.
Beyond questions of legitimacy, these despicable acts are
proof that the Assad regime is morally depraved and it is my
belief that we and all other responsible nations have a moral
imperative to ensure that Assad and his ilk are removed from
power as soon as possible.
According to Navi Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, the civilian death toll in Syria now exceeds 5,000 and
the number of children killed is more than 300. No responsible
nation can sit by and allow this detestable display of
depravity to continue.
Today's hearing, however, was called to examine U.S.
policy. Several months ago, this subcommittee had the privilege
of hearing Assistant Secretaries Feltman and Posner discuss the
Obama administration's human rights policies toward Iran and
Syria. Since that hearing, the administration has taken a
number of steps on Syria for which it deserves credit.
Although it took far too much time and at least 1,900 dead
Syrian citizens, the administration has finally come out and
called for Bashar al-Assad's departure from power on August 18.
It also implemented sanctions against the Government of Syria
and various high-ranking Syrian regime authorities, many of
which have been mirrored by our allies abroad.
Unfortunately, I fear this is not enough. Syria currently
stands on the precipice of full-scale civil war. Recent reports
suggest that the ranks of the Free Syrian Army--the main armed
opposition--continue to swell, likely fueled by a rise in
defections and the intensified violence being perpetrated
against the Syrian people by Assad and his band of thugs.
As a result, the number of confrontations between the
regime and the armed opposition is on the rise. The longer
Assad remains in power, the more likely this conflict is to
degenerate into a prolonged conflict that risks splitting the
country along ethnic and sectarian lines.
To date, the administration has strongly discouraged all
armed opposition in Syria. In his testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and
Central Asian Affairs, Assistant Secretary Feltman stated that
``We do not want to see the situation descend into further
violence. The best way forward is to continue support for the
non-violent opposition while working with international
partners to further isolate and to further pressure the regime
. . . While we understand the Syrian people need to protect
themselves, violent resistance is counterproductive. It will
play into the regime's hands. It will divide the opposition. It
will undermine international consensus.''
This policy of encouraging non-violence in the face of the
brutal tactics of the Assad regime grows more untenable by the
day. It is not our prerogative to tell the Syrian opposition to
eschew armed resistance against the Assad regime when it is
that very regime that continues to torture, rape, and murder
the very citizens who comprise the opposition's ranks. It must
be pointed out to those who maintain that only non-violent
opposition is legitimate that it was the Assad regime and not
the opposition which initiated the violence.
The Syrian people, like all people, have the right to
defend themselves against the brutality of an illegitimate and
repressive regime. Moreover, I challenge any who would defend
the Assad regime by declaring that Assad is merely quelling an
internal insurrection to show the Syrian people by what free
and fair means Bashar al-Assad, or his father, attained and
maintain power.
This regime has declared war on the Syrian people and the
Syrian people have a right to fight back; we must stand with
them in this struggle. As helpful as international consensus
may be, the outrageous and indefensible veto by Russia and
China of a U.N. Security Council resolution against Syria does
not inspire hope that the broader international community will
be galvanized to any kind of consensus in time to stave off
more death and the outbreak of civil war.
When this uprising began, many in Washington were fond of
pointing out that, unlike his father who murdered over 20,000
of his own citizens to quell an uprising, Bashar al-Assad does
not have the stomach for such brutality. They were wrong. It is
time for us to face the fact that there are no depths to which
Assad and his regime will not resort to remain in power and to
crush all legitimate opposition.
Asking Syrian protestors to remain peaceful in the face of
Assad's brutal crackdown is tantamount to asking them to commit
suicide and I fear that doing so may eventually pit us against
a legitimate opposition instead of against an illegitimate
regime.
When this uprising began, many in Washington were fond of
pointing out that, unlike his father who murdered over 20,000
of his own citizens to quell an uprising, Bashar al-Assad does
not have the stomach for such brutality. There were wrong. It
is time for us to face the fact that there are no depths to
which the Assad regime will not resort to remain in power and
to crush all legitimate opposition.
Asking Syrian protestors to remain peaceful in the face of
Assad's brutal crackdown is tantamount to asking them to commit
suicide and I fear that doing so many eventually pit us against
a legitimate opposition instead of against an illegitimate
regime.
I now yield to the gentleman from New York, the
distinguished ranking member from New York, Mr. Ackerman, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Chairman, very much for calling
this very, very important hearing and selecting our excellent
witness today.
I, too, think it is worth considering how far U.S. policy
has moved in the right direction since late July when we met
with Obama administration officials to discuss the situation in
Syria as well as Iran.
Back in July the central policy questions regarding Syria
were, when would the United States finally and explicitly call
for Bashar al-Assad to step down, when would we finally impose
the sanctions available to us, and when would American
leadership work to move the international community to
recognize and respond to the vast horror of the Assad regime's
oppression.
The answer to those questions came in August when the Obama
administration moved decisively on all three elements. Later
than some of us wished, but with more effect than many
expected.
The international sanctions organized by the administration
in consultation with allies in Europe and with Turkey, together
with subsequent sanctions by the Arab League, have made it
clear that the Assad regime's days are numbered.
The Assad gang's rule, which has been characterized at home
by unparalleled brutality and endemic corruption, and abroad by
support for Iranian hegemony, the subversion of Lebanon's
independence, state support for terrorism against Israel, and
illicit efforts at nuclear proliferation, is doomed and
deservedly so.
Clearly, the people of Syria have embraced their
fundamental right to determine not only who will govern Syria,
but the form of government as well. We wish for them what we
desire for ourselves; a democratic government circumscribed by
law, accountable to the public and bound to respect the
fundamental rights of the people from whom its powers are
derived.
In Syria today there are sharp divisions between
ethnicities and religions, between believers in non-violence
and proponents of violent resistance to tear down the Assad
regime. There are splits between internal activists and
external dissidents, between Army defectors and civil society
leaders.
I would say to all those Syrians distraught by the lack of
unity and common purpose, welcome to the wonderful world of
democratic self-government. Your freedom will not come easily
and certainly not without a great struggle to create a common
front in throwing off the Assad tyranny.
And it won't get easier. It just won't. Self-government is
the hardest form of government and the most complex. But if you
want simple and easy, stick with what you have. Bashar al-Assad
and his piggish band of crooks, killers and torturers of
children will gladly go back to the way things were.
As we in the United States contemplate the end of the Assad
regime, events in other parts of the region are giving many
here some pause in their enthusiasm. The Syrians who replace
the Assad tyranny may not be Jeffersonian democrats.
As in other Arab countries, the most politically coherent
and well-organized forces in Syrian society are apt to be those
who are organized around religious beliefs. These men and women
are not likely to consider themselves our natural allies. This
fact does not necessarily imply that they are, or need to be,
our enemies.
In the years to come, a great experiment will likely take
place throughout the Middle East to determine whether Islamic
and democratic norms can comfortably co-exist. Some may doubt
it.
It often seems to me that many of those most insistent that
the conflict between mosque and state is irreconcilable seem to
also be among the most enthusiastic when it comes to lowering
the wall between church and state here in America. Perhaps they
know something the rest of us do not.
I believe there is reason for hope as well. Democratic
norms that are won by the people who have championed these
principles in their own voices, and who have won their freedom
with their own courage, may prove difficult to set aside, in
the Middle East as much as anywhere else.
Moreover, we see in a number of other Islamic nations
outside of the Arab world the development of governments that
while not perfect, are recognizably legitimate, democratic and
bound by the rule of law.
Just as we cannot assume success, it would be equally
unwise to assume that the Arab revolutions cannot ultimately
flower into democratic forms. These new Arab governments will
likely take different forms than we would desire for ourselves,
but may still remain legitimate and acceptable to their owners.
It is, at any rate, too soon to tell.
Our role in these momentous events is to lend what aid we
prudently can and to remain consistent advocates of the truths
declared to the world on July 4, 1776: That all people are born
free and equal; that governments derive their just powers from
the consent of the governed; and that each of us is endowed
with inalienable rights.
If we believe these things are as right and true today as
they were on that glorious July 4th, we must also believe they
are right and true everywhere, and not least where the bloody
hand of oppression lies most heavily.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
The chair will now recognize members for 1 minute if they
would like to make an opening statement in the order that they
arrived.
Mr. Rohrabacher from California, the chair of the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, is recognized for
1 minute.
Mr. Rohrabacher. First of all, I would like to thank the
chairman, Mr. Chabot, for holding this hearing. I think that we
have many jobs as Members of Congress and one is to make sure
that the word gets out to the American people about things that
are happening overseas that are dealing directly with out
values as a people.
As we have just heard from the ranking member, that there
is an uprising going on in Syria that goes right to the heart
of what our ideals are as Americans. I am anxious to hear the
details. This has been one conflict that I have actually been
looking at from a distance and have not really been able to
determine what those details are.
I am looking forward to the witness. Let me just note that
when we talk about the Assad family, the dictatorship they have
had, that is a secular dictatorship, something that we oppose.
The mullah dictatorship in Iran is also something we oppose
even though that, of course, is a totally religious mullah
dictatorship. I guess what Americans are all about is that we
are against dictators and dictatorships and brutality and want
to hear the details. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
The gentlemen from Kentucky, Mr. Chandler, is recognized if
he would like to make a statement.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope that these
hearings will encourage a defined and proactive U.S. policy
toward the removal of Assad. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing. I am pleased to see that President Obama and
leaders around the world have called on Bashar al-Assad to step
down. The oppressive Assad regime has terrorized the Syrian
people for far too long. The brutal actions threaten humanity
and they need to be stopped.
Our country, along with the European Union, has the right
to issue strong sanctions against Syria to deny them revenues
that are used to finance their abuse of the Syrian people. We
must remain steadfast in our efforts to give the Syrian people
what they want and deserve.
That being a government representative and responsive to
the people. I look forward to hearing the testimony of the
witnesses today and engaging them in how we can help the
Syrians who have been oppressed for too long to finally have
the government they want and deserve. I held back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest
of time I will yield back but I would like to thank the witness
for appearing today and for your willingness to hold this
hearing.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Looking
forward to the testimony today. I think we have learned a lot
of lessons over the past decade about the difference between
unilateral action and multilateral action. With the cooperation
and willingness of Turkey and the Arab League to join with us
in whole or in part in some of these actions to put pressure on
the Assad regime.
Looking forward to comments today from a witness as to how
we can move forward with partners in seeking an outcome that is
best for the region and best of the people of Syria and the
United States.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
I will now introduce our distinguished witness here this
morning, Frederic C. Hof. He is the Special Coordinator for
Regional Affairs. Returned to government service in 2009 to
lead the Special Enjoy for Middle East Peace efforts to achieve
Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli peace agreements, and to
advice the Secretary of State and other senior U.S. officials
on Levantine political and security issues.
Since early 2010 he has coordinated the Department of
State's and broader U.S. Government's response to the crisis in
Syria. Mr. Hof previously held senior positions at the
Departments of State and Defense before serving as present and
CEO of AALC, an international consultancy. He is a Vietnam War
Veteran and holds a Purple Heart along with other military
decorations and civilian awards.
We want to particularly thank you for your service to our
country, Mr. Hof. Without further ado, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. FREDERIC C. HOF, SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR
REGIONAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR MIDDLE
EAST PEACE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Hof. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ackerman,
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am deeply honor to
have this opportunity to discuss Syria with you this morning
and I greatly appreciate the invitation to do so.
You have my statement. I will dispense with reading it. I
have a few comments that I hope sincerely will help us frame
the discussion we can have this morning.
Nine months ago the President of Syria elected to respond
to peaceful protest with violence and brutality. For 9 months
he has stayed on course, a course featuring death,
incarceration, torture, and terror. Is it any wonder that
peaceful protest threatened to morph into violent resistance?
Is it any wonder that a regime and its death throes trying to
save itself would rather risk civil war than implement the
modest steps called for by the Arab League to restore the
peace.
In his recent interview with Barbara Walters, the person
who slings to the title President of the Syrian Arab Republic
disclaimed any personal responsibility for the regime's war on
the Syrian people. ``They are not my forces'' he protested.
``They are military forces belonging to the government.''
It is difficult to imagine a more craven disclaimer of
responsibility. Perhaps it is a rehearsal for the time when
accountability will come. For now, however, it is a clear
message to all who serve this regime. Your President claims to
see, hear, and know nothing. Whether you are a private in an
infantry squad or a minister of government, your President will
place the blame for crimes committed squarely on you.
In another sense, however, President Assad performed an
important, if accidental, service in drawing a distinction
between himself and the Syrian state. It is a distinction that
the Syrian opposition led by the Syrian National Council is
making as it draws up detailed plans for Syria's transition
from dictatorship to rule of law. It is the distinction between
a corrupt and competent, brutal and, yes, dying regime and the
state to which it has attached itself like a barnacle.
It is the distinction between a family enterprise that has
exploited the labor of over 20 million Syrians to enrich itself
and a state structure which at least in theory is suppose to
provide basic services to its citizens.
The Syrian National Council is making it clear that the
regime, the Assad-Makhlouf family clique, must go. Yet, the
state for all of its warts and weaknesses, must stay to provide
basic services and to help facilitate the transition.
By drawing this distinction, Syria's opposition is
performing two vital services. It is helping to guarantee that
if the regime leaves peacefully and quickly there will be no
prospect of state failure. No prospect of chaos. It is reaching
out to Syria's minorities who fear the prospect of wrenching
change even as they despise the corruption, incompetence, and
brutality of the regime.
Still, there is scant evidence that this regime has any
intention of saving Syria as it tries to save itself. The
longer this regime remains in power, the greater the chances
are that Syria will dissolve into bloody sectarian conflict.
This would be disastrous for Syria. It would be disastrous for
its neighbors.
How to avoid it without the voluntary stepping aside of a
reckless regime is problematical. No one, least of all the
United States, is seeking to militarize the situation. The
closest we have to international consensus at the moment is
that the regime must implement the steps called for by the Arab
League immediately and unconditionally. But it will not likely
do so.
One of our most urgent tasks is to work with others to try
to prevent this peaceful uprising from morphing into armed
insurrection that would discredit the opposition, reinforce the
regime's narrative, complicate international support, and most
likely lead to a bloody and protracted conflict.
Therefore, my bottom line is this; Bashar al-Assad's policy
of violent repression will run Syria's economy off the rails.
If he is willing to preside over Pyongyang in the Levant and if
he keeps what the Gulf Cooperation Council has labeled his
killing machine intact, he may hang on for a period of time. We
will certainly keep up the pressure and try to peal away his
apologists and enablers in the international community but the
nightmare of the Syrian people may be far from over.
Their nightmare will, however end. Our job is to try to
ensure it ends sooner rather than later and with as little
damage to the institutions of the Syrian state and the unity
and the well being of the Syrian people as possible.
Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle can best contribute to
the welfare of their countrymen by stepping aside now without
delay. When the regime is gone, the Syrian people can be
assured that they will have plenty of help in rebuilding and
reforming their state and recovering the honor and dignity
squandered by those who have served themselves at Syria's
expense.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to comments and
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hof follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Hof. We appreciate
your testimony here this morning. We will now each have 5
minutes to ask questions and I recognize myself for 5 minutes
for that purpose.
In my opening statement I had raised my concern about the
administration's continued calls for all opposition to remain
peaceful. There is a logic to the administration's policy which
I do understand. By resorting to violence the administration
fears that the opposition may lose some international consensus
and also give the regime fuel with which to drum up support.
I do not, however, agree with the logic. First, it supposes
that countries like China and Russia, the latter which recently
delivered over 70 antiship cruise missiles to the Assad regime,
would ever break with the regime. My sense is that given the
brutality we have witnessed, if they have not already broken
with Assad, they are unlikely to be swayed by more dead bodies.
Second, this puts us in a difficult position insofar as it
brings into question whether we could continue to support the
opposition if it were to fight back against the regime's
brutality.
In your written testimony you state that we ``Urge against
the violent resistance not because we are naive but because we
firmly believe the effort to extract this regime from the
Syrian state will succeed more quickly and bloodlessly if the
revolution remains entirely peaceful.''
My question is why? One recent report suggests mass attacks
on army defectors and pro-democracy activists. Do we honestly
expect the opposition to stand there and be murdered? Has the
administration met with the free Syrian army and, if not, why
not?
And does it have any plans to? If, indeed, the wider
opposition decides that it can no longer remain nonviolent in
the face of the regimes onslaught, will we abandon support? At
what point would the Obama administration reconsider its policy
of eschewing support for armed opposition?
Mr. Hof. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Neither you nor the
members of this committee, nor the members of the Syrian
opposition, nor the Syrian people, are going to hear any
sermons from me or anybody in this administration about self-
defense.
It is clear what the strategy of the Assad regime is. It is
to attempt to channel peaceful resistance which it cannot
handle. It has no clue how to handle peaceful resistance.
Channel it as best it can in the direction of insurrection
because it believes it knows how to handle insurrection. This
is the kind of language that regime understands quite well.
What we are hoping may still happen mainly by virtue of the
Arab League initiative and there is going to be a key meeting
this weekend. Somehow the Arab League will be able to persuade
the Syrian regime to accept monitors, witnesses on the ground.
Our view is that it is much less likely that this regime will
do its worst is there are witnesses present.
Our view is that the best scenario for Syria's future, the
best scenario for a stable transition that preserves stability
in the region is one that would be peaceful. But, Mr. Chairman,
this regime has a vote in how all of that turns out and I am
not about to tell people trying to defend their houses and
their families that they shouldn't do it. I am not about to
tell Syrian soldiers who are ordered to commit crimes that they
should follow those orders so it is a real dilemma we face here
and there are no easy answers to this, sir.
Mr. Chabot. I hope you are right. I fear you may not be.
Certainly when you have opposition who is being peaceful and
they are being gunned down and their children are being
tortured, there is a natural inclination, of course, to fight
back. I guess you could look at Egypt as one example where
violence wasn't necessary.
The regime did come down. Libya, on the other hand, was a
different situation and had there not been an armed uprising, I
don't see a clear way that Gaddafi could have been overthrown
so only time will tell. We certainly appreciate your insight
and you are certainly an expert in this area. Thank you again
for your service to our country.
I will now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Ackerman, for 5 minutes as well.
Mr. Ackerman. I thank the chairman. I just wanted to
personally recognize the witness myself insomuch as he grew up
on Long Island and Port Washington, very much a part of my
constituency. He is also a graduate of Shriver, one of the most
prestigious public schools that we have. Is there any chance
that the Assad regime survives?
Mr. Hof. Congressman, our view is that this regime is the
equivalent of Dead Man Walking. The real question is how many
steps remain. I think it is very, very difficult to predict or
project how much time this regime has. The more time it has,
the worse for Syria, the worse for the region. That is very
clear. No, I do not see this regime surviving.
Mr. Ackerman. I would strongly agree with you. My view has
always been in the end the street wins but how long it takes to
get to the end is sometimes measured in a lot of blood. What is
there that we or others could be doing to speed up the demise
of the regime that we are not doing right now?
Mr. Hof. Congressman, one of the tasks that has been
assigned to me by the Secretary of State is outreach to the
Syrian-American community. Outreach to Syrian-Americans of
various faiths, various political beliefs. I think one of the
things that members of this committee can do, I am sure each
and every one of you has Syrian-American constituents. Each and
every one of you is aware of what Syrian-Americans have
contributed to the United States of America to the extent you
are willing and able to reach out to these communities, to
engage them in dialogue and, if necessary, point them in my
direction.
Mr. Ackerman. What do we tell them to do?
Mr. Hof. I think what we tell them to do, particularly in
the case of what are in Syria minority communities, Christians,
I think we need to assure them, Number one, change is coming
and, number two, their government, the United States
Government, is absolutely committed to seeing Syria's
minorities playing a central role in the new Syria.
This is part, a big part, of our ongoing discussion with
the Syrian opposition. The need to make absolutely sure that
all communities in Syria are (a) comfortable with the fact that
change is coming, and (b) knowing that they are going to play a
central role in this.
The Syrian opposition holds very strong cards and is really
the determinant factor of what is going to happen ultimately in
Syria. I think it was very important that Ambassador Ford did
return so that among the many things he has to do is build our
ties with the next generation in Syria with the Syrian leaders.
Mr. Ackerman. What can you tell us in our very public
setting here about contacts that we have made with the Syrian
opposition that would assist them in their struggle and are we
doing everything that we can specifically with regard to
determining what the attitudes are and helping shape those
attitudes under a new regime, specifically toward the Christian
community which seems to be in grave danger in so many parts of
the Arab world?
Mr. Hof. I think, Congressman, that is an extraordinarily
important point. We are not shy about the fact that we reach
out to the Syrian opposition. It is a major part of Ambassador
Robert Ford's mission in Damascus. It is a major part of my
mission on the outside. It is a major part of the mission of
the Assistant Secretary Jeff Feltman.
We have sustained contacts with the opposition. The
opposition, obviously, is not a creature of the United States
of America. It is very independent. It is made up of a
coalition of extraordinarily independent people. They have
their own thoughts on how to proceed. They have their own
thoughts on what the transition from dictatorship to rule of
law should look like.
One of the points we have made to the opposition, and I
must say they get it, is that they really do need to do a more
sustained steady job of outreach to Syria's minorities, to
Christian, Alawis, Kurds, Druze. The list goes on because it is
the concerns of these minorities, particularly Christians and
Alawis, I think, that the regime is hiding behind right now.
It is probably the key reason why the central parts of
cities such as Damascus and Aleppo have remained quiet while
the rest of the country is experiencing protests on a daily
basis making sure that Syrian Christian and other minorities
understand that they are part of the solution here. That the
Assad regime is not only part of the problem, it is the
problem.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I didn't quite get the point that you were
just making. Why is it that those areas are quiet? Because
what? You were just saying areas in Damascus are quiet and that
was some sort of success of something. I wasn't quite sure what
point you were making.
Mr. Hof. No, Congressman. My point is that to a very large
degree this regime is both stalking and hiding behind the fears
of minorities in Syria. Fears about what their role would be in
the future of Syria. And that this tactic, this, if you will,
strategy on the part of the regime helps account for the fact
that central parts of Damascus and Aleppo have been relatively
quiet.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Does that mean----
Mr. Hof. One more point. By the same token what our Embassy
is seeing is a great deal more in the way of security presence
in downtown Damascus so the regime is clearly worried about
what the future holds.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And you are saying about these
neighborhoods that they are the Christian and the minority
neighborhoods? Is that what you are saying? I am just trying to
get the understanding.
Mr. Hof. Yes. These are areas where there is a heavy
minority population.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you are suggesting that perhaps the
minority communities, the Kurds, the Druze, the Alawis, the
Christians in this insurrection may be attracted to support the
Assad regime?
Mr. Hof. What I am saying, Congressman, is that there is
virtually no one in Syria who has any illusions about the
corruption, the incompetence, and the violence, the brutality
of this regime. No one. Not even the people in the inner circle
of the regime have those illusions. But minorities in Syria do
have some concerns about what comes next. A major mission for
the opposition is to address those concerns and do it
satisfactorily.
Mr. Rohrabacher. How does the opposition address those
concerns?
Mr. Hof. It is coming along, Congressman. It is a work in
progress.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You have a regime that is supposedly a
secular regime. The greatest ally of Syria is the most
religious of all the regimes, the Mullah regime in Iran. They
are the most fanatical and you have this alliance so you are
suggesting that perhaps the insurrection hasn't made it's
position clear on whether or not people of other faiths will
have more freedom under a democratic government?
Mr. Hof. Congressman, the opposition is saying all the
right things. If you read the statements, you read the
proclamations, you read the text of speeches that have been
given, it is all fine. What we have suggested to the opposition
is that its messaging into Syria needs to be more disciplined,
more sustained, more powerful.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would hope that if there is any
ambiguity about whether or not the minorities' rights will be
respected under a new democratic government I would hope that
would be cleared up.
Let me ask you about one point that seems to be a central
point that you are making here today, and that is we in some
way are opposing an insurrection. I don't know. Maybe the State
Department burned their history books over there. I don't see
where tyrants have ever gone down without a fight and, if they
are, I mean, the United States we had an insurrection. I mean,
our revolution was an insurrection.
Mubarak and these others that we have seen where there
weren't insurrections, these people were tied to the west. Yes,
they were less than free governments but they weren't the
brutal dictatorship that we see in the countries that do
require insurrection to get rid of.
Frankly, from what you are saying, I think we are sending
the wrong message. We should be sending the message that yes,
we support the brave people who are struggling for their
freedom. If guns come to play, which they will, we hope they
win.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. You may go
ahead and answer the question if you wish.
Mr. Hof. Thank you, Congressman. I take your point. I take
your point. What we have seen from the beginning is this regime
as its central strategy pushing events in the direction of
insurgency. That is what we have seen. It appears that they may
be succeeding.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
The gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Chandler, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Chandler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Hof, for your testimony. I think this is an
incredibly important subject. Nobody, I think, in this country
is a fan of the Assad regime and I think we would all like to
see it leave.
If you look at the history of the regime, they have done a
number of things to maintain power. I know what you are saying
about the minorities. They have for many years caused the
minorities to live in fear of rule by the Sunni majority. I
know that they are continuing to scope that sort of feeling
amongst the minorities.
They have also, of course, used Israel as a boogie man for
a long time to, again, maintain their position at the top of a
country as a minority, the Alawite minority. With all of that
in mind, what leads anybody to believe that they would agree to
some kind of settlement or to leave voluntarily? What is in it
for this regime to leave voluntarily? They are guilty of a lot
of crimes obviously so there is going to be a desire to
prosecute leading members of the Assad regime.
I have a hard time seeing that this thing will go anywhere
but the direction of a fight to the finish because I don't see
that there is anything in it for Assad and for his henchmen,
who are in charge of the regime, to leave without a fight and
no benefit for them to leave.
The second thing that I would like for you to address, if
you don't mind, give us some idea where Turkey is. I know that
they are sheltering some of the opposition, but just how far
along in that effort are they? Are they looking at the
possibility at some point of armed intervention across their
border? What is going on with Turkey's efforts to remove the
Assad regime?
Mr. Hof. Thank you, Congressman. First of all, on the
scenario of the fight to the finish, there is plenty of
historical precedent that substantiates your view on this. I
think Syrians across the board recognize that the cost of a
fight to the finish will be really prohibitive. It will be
prohibitive for the country. It will be prohibitive for the
region.
Nevertheless, we cannot discount the strong possibility
that this is the direction the regime is going to choose to go
in. The Syrian opposition in coordination with the Arab League
is trying to pull out all the stops as we speak to try to
prevent that scenario from taking place. The opposition will be
going to Cairo with a transition plan that it will discuss in
some detail with the Arab League.
It is a plan that involves deep Arab League involvement in
offering some kind of protected asylum to the regime. I think
from the point of view of the opposition it owes itself. It
owes the Syrian people the opportunity to try to run that to
ground. It may not work but they are going to try and I think
they should.
With respect to Turkey I think the big thing that has
happened over the past several months is a basic change in how
Turkey analyzes the central nature of the problem here. Turkey
has gradually but irreversibly come to the conclusion that
Bashar al-Assad is not part of the solution. He is part of the
problem. He poses an unbelievable national security threat to
Turkey.
As you mentioned, Turkey has provided shelter to the free
Syrian army. What the Turks tell us, and we have no reason to
disbelieve them, is that they are not arming these folks and
sending them across into Syria. That is their position and we
have no reason to disbelieve it.
I am sure that Turkey is examining many, many, many
different options and contingencies right now based on a
variety of scenarios that could come up. I am not aware of any
near-term plans to establish safe zones, or whatever, on Syrian
territory.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, is recognize for 5
minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think this regime is a lot closer to Libya and Iraq of 10
years ago. I don't think either of these there would have been
a regime change without some outside help, clearly in Iraq. Do
the insurgents or rebels hold any territory? Is there any
method or support they are getting in terms of arms or
equipment? Is there any outside help? Would we be, the United
States, adverse to supplying some of that, or NATO?
Mr. Hof. Congressman, as far as we are able to tell, the
Syrian opposition does not hold territory in Syria. Of course,
there are opposition people located in various urban
neighborhoods. There are opposition people who move back and
forth across various borders.
I think the key thing right now before we try to determine
how we are going to relate to all of this, the Syrian
opposition it self, particularly in the form of the Syrian
National Council, is still trying to figure out how it relates
to the free Syrian army and to Syrian army defectors.
I don't think we want to jump ahead of that. I think we
need to see how things play out with the Syrian National
Council and its own relationship building and the Syrian
National Council in relation to the ongoing Arab League
initiative.
Mr. Turner. Is the pre-Syrian army anything more than a
name? Are there actual units?
Mr. Hof. You know, it is very difficult, very, very
difficult for us to get a good handle on this, Congressman. You
know, it does appear that several thousand Syrian soldiers have
in essence voted with their feet. They have decided that they
no longer want to be put in a position of having to support
criminal activity against their own citizens.
It does not, however, appear that the free Syrian army is
the kind of organization on which one would do a sort of formal
order of battle analysis in terms of battalions, brigades and
so forth. It does not appear to be organized at this point in a
conventional military way.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I would yield back.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from
New York, Mr. Higgins, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to follow up, unlike Libya, the Syrian rebels don't
appear to control any defined or strategic territory. Nor have
their been any major defections from the Assad government. Who
are the leading forces in the rebel opposition and who are they
aligned with?
Where is this thing going? If you are an insurgent effort
and you don't have momentum, you are not winning. Would you
characterize the opposition here as having momentum and able to
sustain momentum?
Mr. Hof. Congressman, that is an extraordinarily difficult
question for me to give a definitive answer to from my
perspective. If you had asked me a couple of months ago would
there be the level of defections we are seeing now, I frankly
would not have known the answer to that question then.
It is difficult for me to speculate what things are going
to look like 60 or 90 days from now. The main thrust of the
Syrian opposition today remains that part of the opposition
that is absolutely committed to peaceful transition in Syria.
We are talking about mainly the Syrian National Council and
other organizations.
These are organizations that are absolutely determined to
do their best to avoid civil war. That is the main event right
now. It is those organizations and it is their relationships
with the ongoing Arab League initiative. This is the main game
in town right now.
Mr. Higgins. So this went from peaceful calls for reform to
a growing earned insurgency into what could eventually evolve
into a civil war. The allies of Assad are Russia and China and
they have blocked U.N. Security Council condemnations of
Damascus.
However, the Unite States is aligned with the European
Union and the sanctions imposed on the Syrian Government seem
to be having somewhat of an impact in terms of oil revenues, in
terms of foreign investment that's been halted, in terms of
deterioration of the tourism economy of Syria. Do you car to
comment on that?
Mr. Hof. Yes, Congressman. I think when we are talking
about sanctions, first of all, truth in advertising. My
colleagues in the Department of the Treasury are the real
experts on this. We have identified over time basically seven
categories of sanctions; Central Bank of Syria, Commercial Bank
of Syria, other financial institutions, government officials,
other individuals involved in repression, governmental
entities, and non-government entities.
These are the general categories of things to target. In
those seven categories over time the United States is seven for
seven. The European Union is six for seven including perhaps
the most significant of the sanctions which is the cut off of
imports of Syrian oil. The Arab League if it goes through with
sanctions will at this stage be three for seven.
Turkey will be three for seven so I think in the future
much of our effort will be in working with Turkey and with the
Arab League to see if additional work can be done in that area.
But it is having an impact but I hasten to add the impact of
sanctions is dwarfed by the impact of Bashar al-Assad driving
that economy straight off the cliff through his policies.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you
very much.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman.
I so appreciate you being here and I thank you immensely
for your distinguished military service. Correct me if I am
wrong. I apologize for walking in a little late but did you say
that you were hoping that the Arab League has influence on
Assad to the point where if not stepping down he will change
his attitude and his mind as to where things are going at this
point?
Mr. Hof. Congressman, it is difficult for me to measure the
precise amount of influence the Arab League is going to have on
Bashar al-Assad calculations. Clearly the steps the Arab League
has taken to date has sent this regime into a state of shock
because the message is rather clear. Syria itself is a founding
member of the Arab League. Syria has always been a central part
of Arab League deliberations. The message from the Arab League
is Syria is important. Syrian people are important.
Mr. Marino. Let me interject here.
Mr. Hof. This regime has divorced itself from the Arab
world.
Mr. Marino. You aren't suggesting that Assad be granted
immunity for all the murderous criminal acts that he's
committed, are you?
Mr. Hof. Congressman, this is not my suggestion. It's not
the suggestion of the United States Government.
Mr. Marino. How about the Arab League?
Mr. Hof. The critical vote here will be cast by those who
will replace this regime and manage Syria's transition to
something better. They are the ones who are in charge, not us.
Mr. Marino. But certainly I would hope that we would more
than suggest that this man be punished for the crimes that he
has committed in the name of humanity. I see that the United
Nations Human Rights Commission wants to refer Syria to the
International Criminal Court.
Practicing criminal law for as many years as I have I have
found that the International Criminal Court is probably not the
most aggressive court and certainly cannot implement any type
of punishment that would be satisfactory. Where do you see the
International Court coming in on this and to what effect would
they have?
Mr. Hof. Congressman, I don't know whether the ICC plays in
this in the long run or not. The only thing I think I know is
that these are basic calls that need to be made by the Syrian
opposition. I can't rule out the possibility that the
opposition itself could come to the conclusion that there is a
price to pay.
Yes, a distasteful price. Yes, a disgusting price even. But
if it gets this click out of the country before it can take the
country down, is it conceivably a price worth paying? Again,
it's not a price for us to exact. There are people who are
going to be responsible for running that country when this
nightmare is over.
Mr. Marino. I find it quite ironic that of all countries
Russia opposes Syria from going before the International
Criminal Court. With that said, I yield back my time. Thank
you, sir.
Mr. Hof. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for calling
this very important hearing, very timely hearing.
Mr. Hof, Syria is in a critical crossroads, as you said,
and we have an opportunity to do the right thing and take the
right steps. We may have faltered early on in the so-called
Arab Spring, in my opinion. I am distressed by what is
happening to the religious minorities in Egypt, specifically
the Coptic Christians.
Therefore, I would like to know the nature of discussions
the State Department may have had with the Syrian National
Council and other opposition groups. Have any of those
discussions centered on developing a constitutional framework
that protects Christian--of course, all religious minorities,
and allows the free practice of religion? As that been the
case? Have they had discussions? If not, why not?
Mr. Hof. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you for
your question. The issue you have raised has been precisely the
focus of every single interaction we have had with the Syrian
opposition. We focused on two points in particular. Again, this
is mainly with the Syrian National Council but it would apply
across the board to other organizations.
Number one, it is absolutely essential that minorities
whether they be Christians, Alawis, Kurds, whatever, be
adequately represented on the inside in these organizations.
There is significant progress being made in that direction.
Number two----
Mr. Bilirakis. Could you elaborate a little bit on the
progress being made?
Mr. Hof. Well, there are people being incorporated into the
organization, particularly the Syrian National Council. The
Syrian National Council is actively recruiting people and it is
having some success.
Now, in some cases, and I am sure you will understand why
this is the case, particularly for Syrian National Council
members living inside Syria, it is important that their
identifies be protected so you are not going to see a great
deal of publicity about this.
The second point we have been making is that the Syrian
opposition has to be absolutely relentless, absolutely
consistent in its messaging do all Syrians, but in particular
to minorities because Syrian minorities are indeed worried
about the future even as they acknowledge the rottenness of
this regime.
The regime is so bad that Syrian Christians have often been
at the head of immigration lines to head to places like the
United States, Canada, France, Australia, places where there
can be actual opportunity, places where there can be political
freedom. I think what the opposition is looking for is a
situation where Syrian Christians and other minorities don't
feel compelled to leave the country.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman yields back. Thank you.
We will go through a second round here, although I think it
will be relatively brief because most of the members have gone
onto other things. I'll recognize myself for 5 minutes.
I guess, you know, one of the things that we are struggling
with here is ultimately whether or not physical force is going
to be necessary to remove this tyrant from power or not.
Certainly your indications are, your hope is that ultimately
won't be necessary. There won't have to be armed conflict to
get rid of this guy. I ultimately think it probably is going to
be necessary.
There are certainly different examples. We have seen
examples like Idi Amin, maybe Baby Doc, Ben Ali and others that
saw the writing on the wall and ultimately, you know, fled
often times into somewhat luxurious exile.
Then you have other examples holding onto the bitter bloody
end like Saddam Hussein and Gaddafi to name but a few and it is
not clear at this point which direction this is going to go. I
see a nodding so you would agree with that, Mr. Hof.
Let me go in a different direction. First of all, Lebanon.
Syria has a long history of intervening in the sovereign
affairs of the Lebanese Republic and its problems often become
Lebanon's. Since the uprising in Syria began, violence and
unrest has spilled over into Lebanon to varying degrees.
Recently a number of accounts have surfaced in Lebanon
regarding the violation of Lebanese sovereignty by the Assad
regime's army, the mistreatment of Syrian refugees, and the
kidnapping of Syrian dissidents allegedly with the complicity
of the Lebanese authorities.
Given the close ties between the two countries, there is
significant risk that continued unrest and sectarian conflict
in Syria could spill over into Lebanon. What implications is
the unrest in Syria having on neighboring Lebanon and in the
Lebanese Armed Forces, the LAF? Is it capable of confronting
the challenge posed by prolonged Syrian unrest?
Mr. Hof. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is an
extraordinarily important and difficult question. The Lebanese,
of course, are beyond being worried about the potential
implications for Lebanon of what is happening in Syria. There
has been refugee movement into northeastern Lebanon. There
could easily be more in the future.
The capacity of the Government of Lebanon to handle this is
limited. The capacity of Lebanese security forces is certainly
challenged. All I can say at this point is that this is a major
central agenda item for our Embassy in Beirut and its contacts
with the appropriate people in the Lebanese Government and the
Lebanese military and the internal security forces. You are
right, Lebanese are deeply, deeply worried about this and they
should be.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Let me conclude with Russia. Mr.
Marino had raised Russia but let me follow up a little more and
expound upon that a little bit. Since the unrest in Syria
began, I think you would agree that Russia has proven
remarkably un-counterproductive.
Not only has Moscow outrageously thwarted efforts of the
United Nations to ramp up pressure against the Assad regime,
but it has gone so far as to deliver the regime, as I mentioned
before, antiship cruise missiles.
In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian
Affairs, the Assistant Secretary Feltman testified that this is
a matter that the U.N. Security Council should be dealing with.
We would hope that Russia and China in looking at how the Assad
clique has just refused all attempts of mediation from others
will not realize it is time for the security council to act.
Is there anything that you believe could persuade Russia or
is it just simply a hopeless case? If we are not able to get
the Russians and the Chinese on board, doesn't this really rule
out the U.N. as a realistic option? If so, what are the
administration's steps in response to that?
Mr. Hof. Mr. Chairman, if indeed it is a hopeless case, the
one thing I know is that we cannot act as if it is a hopeless
case. We have to redouble our efforts with Moscow to persuade
it. Its backing of this regime is not only helping to
facilitate a humanitarian catastrophe but it is manifestly not
in the interest of the Russian Federation because change is
surely coming to Syria.
I think there is another important element of this.
Something that the Russian Federation has to take into account
and that is its relationship with the balance of the Middle
East, particularly the balance of the Arab world.
What we have now unfolding is a very important and
unprecedented Arab League initiative to get Syria to accept a
series of very, very, very reasonable conditions to turn the
temperature down and create a possibility of a negotiated
settlement.
I think Moscow is watching Syria's performance very
carefully in all of this. You know, it is one thing for the
United States to keep up the effort to persuade Moscow. I think
others may have some leverage as well and that may be the
soundest most hopeful way forward.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. My time has expired.
The gentleman from New York is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess it was a
couple or 3 years ago the Syrian nuclear program in its very
nascent form, thanks to a gift from North Korea, was basically
destroyed. Evidence seems to indicate that the Israelis might
have had something to do with that depriving them of that
avenue of further terrorist risk and threat to the region and
to the world.
That being the case, it does not take away from the fact
that Syria is the possessor of large amounts of chemical and
biological stuff and ballistic stuff that nobody has publicly
addressed right now. Are we talking to the opposition? Perhaps
that is why reading the nuance of your statements and responses
you have carefully steered away from exacerbating the
possibility of a civil war in Syria.
Are we discussing with any of the possible future leaders
of Syria what happens with that material and equipment and have
we made progress or is this not the venue to discuss that?
Maybe the chairman can arrange a different meeting with you in
which we could discuss that unless there is something you can
tell us openly.
Mr. Hof. Thank you, Congressman. I think a different venue
would be appropriate but what I can say in terms of discussions
with the opposition, this may well be a subject that could come
up sometime in the future. Most of our discussions with the
opposition to date have focused on challenges that are right in
front of our faces right now in terms of getting this
transition started. As to the substance of your question, I
would respectfully suggest a different venue.
Mr. Chabot. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Ackerman. I would be happy to.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman yields. We would be happy to work
with the gentleman's staff to set up such a hearing.
Mr. Ackerman. That would be great.
Mr. Chabot. Yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. The international community has been
incredibly active on the Syrian issue. Specifically, the Arab
League has done things and acted in ways that some of us might
not have thought possible at the beginning of this much to
their credit unlike their level of activity in some of the
other countries that are experiencing shifts in power.
The Russian's and the Chinese's bad behavior seem to have
created hopefully an understanding on the part of the Syrian
street that those countries and their blocking United Nation's
activities puts them squarely in opposition to the street in
Syria.
One might assume that there is a fissure that has developed
between the future leaders of Syria and the current leaders of
those two large powers. I would think that this presents an
opportunity for us to take advantage of that. The question is
are we so doing?
Mr. Hof. Thank you, Congressman. I must say that if I were
given the choice right now I would rather have the full
cooperation of the Russian Federation in bringing pressure on
this regime. I would rather see the Russian Federation redo the
arithmetic on this and come to the conclusion that it's losing
the Syrian street and that an adjustment is necessary.
Mr. Ackerman. I would agree to you in humanitarian terms
because that would bring in much quicker, hopefully, resolution
to this situation. Given the fact looking at the long-term
prospect, our real competition is going to be China especially.
I would think that if I had my druthers when we don't, we
would take a look at what the real world opportunities are and
how to take advantage of the fact that this is a very important
region, an Islamic region with 22 Muslim countries within the
Arab world and others watching very carefully to show that it
is we who are more concerned with the people in Syria who are
supported by the Arab League to prove our bona fides to the
humanitarian concerns and interests and the well being and
future of the people in that region.
Mr. Hof. I think, Congressman, that from the point of view
of 23 million Syrians there is no question at this point as to
who stepped up to the plate and who hasn't.
Mr. Ackerman. Keep up the good work.
Mr. Hof. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The final questioner here this morning would be the
gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again,
thank you for holding this hearing. I have often thought about
writing a book about diplomacy and I think if I ever do, it is
going to be entitled, ``The Art of Juggling,'' because I know
that people like yourself have so many factors that you are
juggling in the air that it is hard to come up--it is not hard
but almost impossible to come up with a definitive position
that takes into account all of those things that you have to
take into account.
Let me just suggest that you have a lot of other things
that you are juggling that I am not. So when I say that I am
disappointed, let me just say that I respect and appreciate the
job that you and other American diplomats are doing, especially
in situations like this.
I am disappointed today in the apprehension that I am
hearing about armed resistance to tyranny. I think one of
America's greatest assets is that people who want freedom and
liberty and justice in this world see America and Americans as
their ally. That is one of our greatest assets.
I think it is disturbing to people who are under attack
whose children may have been killed and soldiers who were about
to change sides to the side of democracy and cast their fate
with those who are struggling for a freer society in Syria and
other places to hear an American representative being so, how
do you say, not opposed to but so conflicted about whether or
not violence is justified and violence's way of defending
oneself and achieving freedom.
We certainly would not have achieved freedom in the United
States, and I don't know many countries in the world that would
have achieved their freedom, with this idea that people can go
to the streets and face down tanks or whatever and maybe hold
hands and sing Kumbaya.
That is not what brings about freedom in this world. It is
a commitment that people make when the guns start going off
that they will stand firm for their beliefs. Americans did that
and others have done that. I would hope that nobody gets the
idea from what you are saying today that we Americans are in
some way hesitant to support those who are fighting for freedom
in their own countries.
Mr. Hof. Congressman, thank you very much. As I mentioned
at the beginning, there will be no sermons from me or from
anybody else in the administration about people not having the
right to defend themselves. This regime has tried from the
beginning to produce the result that it is facing today.
The Syrian National Council, the Arab League, and others
are trying to pull Syria back from the brink because the
consequences of this getting out of hand can be terrible for
the country and for the region. Now, it may be inescapable. You
have cited some historical precedence.
These precedence may be the guideposts of the future, but I
can't blame the Syrian opposition for hoping that this cup
passes for hoping that there may be a way to stave off civil
war, to see an end to this regime, and to see a transition to
something decent. Please, please, I am not a career
professional diplomat.
I admire people who are. People in the State Department are
working this night and day and they are sacrificing a great
deal. I am a former soldier. I appreciate the right and the
necessity of self defense. Please, please don't see in my words
any compromise on that principle.
Mr. Rohrabacher. One that note. Self defense is one thing.
Conducting a fight for liberty and justice is another. I think
we as Americans do support the right of people to fight for
their freedom and to win their freedom against tyranny. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Hof. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you
very much.
It was brought to my attention Mr. Connolly is one his way
but we were wrapping up here and if he doesn't make it, we are
going to have to wrap up without him. All right.
I want to thank the witness particularly for his testimony
here today. I thought it was excellent. If there are no
objections, members will have 5 days to submit statements and
questions for the record. If there is no further business to
come before the committee, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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