[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-84]
READINESS IN THE AGE OF AUSTERITY
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 27, 2011
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71-455 WASHINGTON : 2012
___________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer
Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or
866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
JOE HECK, Nevada SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
CHRIS GIBSON, New York GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BILL OWENS, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey TIM RYAN, Ohio
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
Ryan Crumpler, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, October 27, 2011, Readiness in the Age of Austerity.... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, October 27, 2011....................................... 37
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2011
READINESS IN THE AGE OF AUSTERITY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
WITNESSES
Breedlove, Gen Philip M., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.... 8
Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.......... 3
Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr., Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps, U.S. Marine Corps....................................... 6
Ferguson, ADM Mark E., III, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S.
Navy........................................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Breedlove, Gen Philip M...................................... 65
Chiarelli, GEN Peter W....................................... 43
Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr................................... 59
Ferguson, ADM Mark E., III................................... 54
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Courtney................................................. 77
Ms. Hanabusa................................................. 77
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 83
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 91
Mr. Rogers................................................... 90
READINESS IN THE AGE OF AUSTERITY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Thursday, October 27, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m. in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, please sit down. We are just waiting
for Ms. Bordallo to get here and as soon as she gets here, we
will start. Thank you for your patience. So, we are waiting for
Ms. Bordallo.
I will just tell everybody what we have been talking about.
Apparently votes are scheduled around 10:15 today. We are not
sure exactly when, so we may have to break for some votes and
come back, but we will be coming back to complete the hearing.
So please work around us and with us, and as you know, they
never call us and ask if it is a convenient time to take the
votes. So they just have to have them, so we will work around
what we have to do.
I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished
panel of experts to today's hearing, focused on how we maintain
readiness in an age of austerity. Or more particularly, what is
the risk to the national defense of our country if we continue
making some of the cuts to defense we hear being discussed in
Washington?
I want to thank our witnesses for being with us this
morning. And I know several of you had to cancel longstanding
personal commitments to be with us this morning. I appreciate
your willingness to testify before this subcommittee once again
on this most important topic. In the interest of time, because
we know we could have votes coming any time and we may have to
recess and do those votes and then come back, because this is
important and we want to get all of this on the record, I am
going to dispense with any normal opening remarks.
Since Ms. Bordallo is not here, we will dispense with her
remarks and have both of them put in the record. I would like
to, however, look at a procedural matter that we use in this
committee, and that is we discussed prior to the hearing that
we would like to dispense with the 5-minute rule for this
hearing and depart from regular order, so that members may ask
questions during the course of the discussion.
I think this will provide a roundtable type forum and will
enhance the dialogue on these very important issues. We would
like to proceed with standard order for members to address the
witnesses; however, if any member has a question pertinent to
the matter being discussed at the time, please seek
acknowledgement and wait to be recognized by the chair.
We plan to keep questioning to the standard 5 minutes,
however, I don't want to curtail productive dialogue. I ask
unanimous consent that for the purposes of this hearing, we
dispense with the 5-minute rule and proceed as described.
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Gentlemen, we are delighted to have you here with us today.
We have the honor of having General Chiarelli with us, who is
the Vice Chief of the United States Army. He has been such
since August 4, 2008. He has commanded at every level from
platoon to corps. He has commanded the United States European
Command, the Director of Operations and Readiness and
Mobilization at headquarters, the Department of the Army.
We also have Admiral Ferguson, and Admiral, we are
delighted to have you with us. He is the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, Navy Personnel Command. And he is the Chief of
Legislative Affairs and Chief of Naval Personnel.
Also General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. He is the assistant
commandant of the Marine Corps. General Dunford has gone
through the U.S. Army Ranger School, Marine Corps Amphibious
Warfare School and U.S. Army War College. He has a very
distinguished career and we appreciate the expertise that he
brings to this panel.
And last, but certainly not least, is General Breedlove.
And General, we appreciate you once again being with us.
General Breedlove is the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air
Force. He is a Georgia Tech graduate. And General, we enjoyed,
as a graduate of the University of Virginia, playing you the
other week.
[Laughter.]
And it may be the one bright spot we will have this year,
but thanks for your help and cooperation in that. He is also a
graduate of Arizona State University, where he had his Master
in Science Degree, and the National War College.
And without further ado, we want to get right to your
opening statements. We are pleased to have--the ranking member
has joined us now.
We also have with us the chairman of the full committee. I
know we talked about before you got here with dispensing with
our opening statements and putting them in the record, because
they are going to call votes at about 10:15.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to welcome
our witnesses today and also to place my statement into the
record.
Mr. Forbes. And we just appreciate your service to this
committee. And Madeleine and I work as very close partners and
we have a special relationship. And I just appreciate her help
with this committee and the great work that she does.
With that, we are going to do something a little bit
different today. We are going to put your statements in the
record, and they have already been made in the record. And as I
told all of you before, we want you just to tell us the
importance of what we have. And I am going to tee each of you
up with a question, but then I want you to expound on it with
your testimony, anything that you want to say.
And we will start, General Chiarelli, with you. And as you
know, we have heard the--we have already had about $465 billion
to cuts to national defense taking place in the country. Some
people talk about an additional $600 billion coming. There are
discussions that that is going to significantly reduce the
force that we have in the United States Army.
General, you have been serving for a long time. You have
served in almost every capacity in the Army. When we talk about
risk and the risk that these cuts could have, sometimes we talk
about them in terms of institutions and missions, but it really
comes down to men. You have seen that historically.
What have these kinds of cuts done to the risk to your men
that will serve under you? Would you please address that
question, and then any other comments you would like for your
opening statement. And we now turn it over to you.
STATEMENT OF GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S.
ARMY
General Chiarelli. Well, Chairman Forbes, Chairman McKeon,
Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members, I thank you for
allowing me to be here today. These are for sure challenging
times. You have heard me say that before. We are past a decade
of war with an All-Volunteer Force. We have always had
volunteers in our force, but I think it is important to note
that we have never done this before.
We have never fought for 10 years. We have never fought
with an entirely volunteer force. That force is amazingly
resilient, but at the same time, it is strained. Its equipment
is strained. The soldiers are strained. Families are strained.
But they have been absolutely amazing over these 10 years of
war.
I would like to leave you with three key points in my
opening statement. The first is that we recognize budget cuts
and corresponding reductions to force structure will be made.
However, we must make them responsibly, so that we do not end
up with either a hollowed out force, and I can expand on that
later on, or an unbalanced force.
Our Nation is in the midst of a fiscal crisis and we
recognize we must all do our part. We are continuing to
identify efficiencies. We worked very, very hard on our
capability portfolio review process, which have found many of
those efficiencies. And we will book many, many more.
When we appeared before the committee in July, we were
looking at cuts in the vicinity of $450 billion over 10 years.
If the Army's portion of that cut is at historical percentages,
at about 26 percent, that will be in fact tough, but as the
Secretary of the Army and the chief of staff of the Army have
said, it will be doable. I am the vice. I get paid to worry
about things, and I worry our cut may be a little higher than
that. And that causes me some angst.
But above and beyond that, will directly and deeply impact
every part of our Army and our ability to meet our national
security objectives and effectively protect our country against
all threats. Whatever cuts are made carry risks. And
historically, it is amazing to sit here as the vice chief of
staff where so many of the 32 before me--or 31 before me have
sat--at a similar time in our history and had to make some of
the same arguments, answer some of the same questions.
I am sure that was true in the debate after the war. I was
in Indianapolis recently, and I saw a war memorial to ``the''
war. Of course, it was World War I, and we cut our Army down to
just over 300,000 folks. Only to grow it to 8.5 million to
fight that 4-year war.
At the end of that war we cut our Army again, down to about
530,000 folks--soldiers. The number sounds familiar, I hope.
And we ended up with the Korean War. And in the Korean War, the
first battle of that war was, for the Army, a very famous Task
Force Smith. An ill-equipped, ill-trained force that had
infantry battalions that were incomplete, infantry battalions
that were missing, and the results were predictable.
And it is interesting to note that General Bradley, when
the cuts were talked about after World War II, supported them.
He went on to say that the strength of the military depended on
the economy, and we must not destroy that economy. But in his
autobiography after the Korean War, Bradley wrote, ``My support
of this decision, my belief that significantly higher defense
spending would probably wreck the economy, was a mistake.
Perhaps the greatest mistake I made in my post-war years in
Washington.''
I lived through an Army that came out of Vietnam and did
some of the same kind of things. And for 10 to 12 years we had
to rebuild that Army. These questions, these decisions have
been made before, and there is just a tendency to believe at
the end of a war that we will never need ground forces again.
Well, I tell you that we have never got that right. We have
always required them. We just don't have the imagination to
always be able to predict exactly when that will be.
My final point is that whatever decisions are made,
whatever cuts and reductions are directed, we must--we must--
ensure we do not lose the trust of the soldiers, the brave men
and women who have fought for these last 10 years, and their
families.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli can be found
in the Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General. And we hope to get into
that in a little more depth as this hearing goes on, and what
that compensation cuts could mean to your force. But thank you
for that.
Admiral Ferguson, you are facing a tough time now as we tee
up your opening remarks. You are looking at a Navy, as we
understand the facts, that--we can argue about numbers--China
right today has more ships in their navy than we have in our
Navy, according to Admiral Willard. And again, we can pick or
choose some them. Not through any fault of yours, but through
dollars and cents we have sent to you.
You have got a $367 million shortfall in your maintenance
budget, because of dollars we haven't given to you. We
recognize that on surface-to-surface missiles we have a
distinct challenge between Chinese missiles and our missiles,
because we haven't give you dollars we needed for technology.
And in addition to that, we see the projection for our subs
that could put us in the next 10 years where China would have
78 subs to roughly 32 for ours. And we can argue a little bit
around the edges of those. But what do these cuts mean to you,
this $465 billion that we have already done to your men and
women serving under you to the United States Navy? And what
would it mean if we put additional cuts out to you?
Anything you want to put in your opening remarks, we want
to hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF ADM MARK E. FERGUSON III, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Ferguson. Well, thank you, Chairman Forbes,
Chairman McKeon, and Ranking Member Bordallo, and distinguished
members of the Readiness subcommittee.
It is my first opportunity to testify before the committee.
And it is my honor to represent the men and women of the Navy
Active Reserve and Civilian, who do stand watch around the
globe today. I would like to offer my appreciation on their
behalf for the congressional support of them and their
families.
In an era of declining budgets we are ever mindful of the
lessons of the past when we assess force readiness. Taken in
sum or in parts, low personal quality, aging equipment,
degradation in material readiness, and reduced training will
inevitably lead to declining readiness of the force. We remain
committed to maintaining our Navy as the world's pre-eminent
maritime force.
And to do so, we must sustain a proper balance among the
elements of current readiness, and to the long-term, and those
long-term threats to our national security. Those elements or
readiness may be simply stated. Sustain the force structure
that possesses the required capabilities to pace the threat.
Man that force with high quality personnel with the requisite
skills and experience. Support with it adequate inventories of
spare parts and weapons. Sustain the industrial base that
sustains that force, and exercise it to be operationally
proficient and relevant.
So our objective and challenge in this period of austerity
will be to keep the funding for current and future readiness in
balance, and holding acceptable level of risk in the capacity
of those forces to meet the requirements of the combatant
commanders. How we shape ourselves in this environment must be
driven by strategy. And we feel that is extraordinarily
important.
The cuts that are contained that you discussed, Chairman
Forbes, we will accept as part of that. Some reductions in
capacity. It will affect certain areas of presence that we have
around the world, our response times. But the decisions will be
tough, but they are executable. And we think that in looking at
the strategy with you that is going on in the Department, we
can meet those challenges. And we will meet those challenges
that are contained in the Act.
We intend to take a measured approach. And we will look at
both efficiencies in our overhead, our infrastructure,
personnel costs, our force structure, and our modernization.
Absent the support of the Congress, and you alluded to the
impact of sequestration. That impact on our industrial base in
our Navy will be immediate, severe, and long lasting, and
fundamentally change the Navy that we have today.
So, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Bordallo, members of the
committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify, and look
forward to answering your questions as we go forward.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ferguson can be found in
the Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral Ferguson.
And General Dunford, you have also served your entire
career with the men and women under you in the Marines. And one
of the things that a lot of people believe is that once we get
out of Iraq, and we get out of Afghanistan, you will have all
the resources you need to do everything you need to do around
the world.
If you look at the cuts that have already been made, and we
look at these potential cuts from sequestration, the
projections are that your forces could go down as low as
150,000 men and women. If that were to occur, what would that
impact be on you? And would you be able, even if we were out of
Iraq and Afghanistan, to conduct a single contingency around
the world?
And with that, if you would answer that question in any
opening remarks that you have, General. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
OF THE MARINE CORPS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Dunford. Chairman McKeon and Chairman Forbes,
Ranking Member Bordallo, members of the committee, thanks very
much for the opportunity to appear before you today to talk
about the readiness in the Marine Corps, and more importantly,
to have the opportunity to thank you for your support of your
Marines.
As we meet this morning, almost 30,000 around the world
doing what must be done, 20,000 of those in Afghanistan. I want
to assure this morning that those marines remain our number one
priority. And with your support they are well-trained and ready
to do the mission.
Like you and my colleagues, I recognize that the Nation
faces an uncertain security environment, and some difficult
fiscal challenges. And there is no doubt we have some tough
decisions to make. That to support the difficult decisions we
have to make, we have recently this year gone through a force
structure review effort. We have shared the results of that
with the committee in the past, and would offer that that
framework will allow us to provide recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense, and frankly, to frame the issues similar
to the ones that the Chairman asked me as his opening question.
I want to assure you that we recognize the need to be good
stewards of resources. And we are working hard to account for
every dollar. We are also looking to make sure that every
dollar is well spent. In the end, we know we are going to have
to make cuts. As we provide our input, I think we need to
address three critical considerations: strategy, balance, and
keeping faith.
With regard to strategy, we simply need to know what the
Nation requires us to do, and then with the resources available
we will build the most capable force we can to do it. As
Secretary Panetta refines the strategy, the command is going to
use what we learned during the force structure review effort to
make recommendations.
With regard to balance, we don't want to make cuts in a
manner that would create a hollow force. We have certainly seen
that in past drawdowns. Like General Chiarelli mentioned, I
have seen that personally in the 1970s as a young lieutenant.
And we don't want to go back to the days where we have an
imbalance between our training, between our equipment, and
between our modernization efforts.
What the command is committed to is that regardless of the
size of the Marine Corps at the end of the day, every unit that
is in the United States Marine Corps will be ready to respond
to today's crisis today. Finally, we have to keep faith with
our people. And we need to do that, because it is the right
thing to do, and because it is necessary for us to maintain a
high-quality All-Volunteer Force.
In all of our deliberations we need to send a loud and
unmistakable message that the contributions that our men and
women have made over the past 10 years are recognized and
appreciated. And there are certainly many different definitions
of keeping faith. And I think something attributed to George
Washington gives us a good baseline for our discussion this
morning.
Washington said, ``The willingness of future generations to
serve shall be directly proportional to how they perceive
veterans of early wars were treated and appreciated by our
nation.'' And those words to me seem as relevant today as they
were over 200 years ago.
Chairman Forbes, to get back to your specific question,
what happens if the Marine Corps is at 150,000? When we went
through the force structure review effort, we came up with a
size Marine Corps of 186,800. That is a single major
contingency operation force. So that force can respond to only
one major contingency.
One hundred and fifty thousand would put us below the level
that is necessary to support the single contingency. The other
thing I would think about is what amphibious forces have done
over the past year. Humanitarian assistance, disaster relief
efforts in Pakistan. Supporting operations in Afghanistan with
fixed wing aviation. Responding to the crisis with pirates on
the M.V. Magellan Star. Supporting operations in Libya.
Supporting our friends in the Philippines and Japan. And quite
frankly, at 150,000 marines we are going to have to make some
decisions.
We will not be able to do those kinds of things on a day-
to-day basis. We will not be able to meet the combatant
commanders' requirements for forward-deployed, forward-engaged
forces. We will not be there to deter our potential
adversaries. We won't be there to assure our potential friends,
or to assure our allies. And we certainly won't be there to
contain small crises before they become major conflagrations.
So I think that 150,000 marines I would offer there would
be some significant risk both institutionally inside the Marine
Corps, because we will be spinning faster and causing our
marines to do more with less. But as importantly, perhaps more
importantly, the responsiveness that we will have, combatant
command's contingencies and crisis response, would be
significantly degraded.
[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in
the Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
And General Breedlove, we thank you for working in your
schedule to be here. Oftentimes, we hear everybody talking
about leaving Iraq and Afghanistan. But we know when the Air
Force, when everybody else might come home, the Air Force
oftentimes does not come home. They still have to stay there
and continue to do operations.
I would like to have any comments that you have about what
these cuts have made to the Air Force already and what future
cuts could do?
And the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S.
AIR FORCE
General Breedlove. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Chairman
McKeon and Congresswoman Bordallo. Thanks for the opportunity
to talk to you today about 690,000-plus proud airmen who serve
as a part of a joint team that you see in front of us.
These are challenging times and the Air Force has been at
war for more than two decades. We have fought alongside our
joint team in Afghanistan since 9/11, and we went to the Gulf
in the Gulf War in the beginning of the 1990s, and we didn't
come home.
To your point, sir, quite often when the mission comes back
from a war we leave significant assets to overwatch remaining
forces to provide support to those who would remain behind in
the regions. And that was witnessed, as you know, in Northern
Flywatch and Northern--Southern Watch. And the Air Force stayed
there and kept pretty high OPTEMPO [operations tempo].
The cuts that we see in front, I think my remarks we will
talk about in just a minute. They are challenging times and the
``ops [operations] tempo'' is exacerbated I think by the fact
that our Air Force has, since the opening of the Gulf War, has
34 percent fewer aircraft than we started that war with, and
about 26 percent fewer people. So the tempo that we face which
we don't see a change in, in the future, puts a pretty big
stress on the force. And that has led to a slow but steady
decline in our unit readiness, as we have discussed with this
committee before.
We have tried to reset and in the middle of that, to pick
up new missions. As you know, the Air Force has built mission
inside, as we have been asked to support this joint team in
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. We have also
been asked to build an increased capacity in special
operations. And we will continue to meet both of those
requirements as a part of this joint team and answer the call
in the future.
All the while the strain put on our force in the need to
recapitalize our aging fighter, tanker and bomber fleets. As
you know, we are flying the oldest fleet that the Air Force has
ever flown, and we do need to desperately get to
recapitalization during this age of fiscal austerity.
The Department of Defense we know will have to be a part of
this recovery, and the Air Force will play its part in that
recovery. Our goal is to do two things. And you have heard
several of my predecessors remark on them. First of all,
maintain a credible military force. We expect that it will be
smaller, and quite frankly, much smaller in some areas. But we
need to renew a credible and capable force as we get smaller.
And second, to avoid becoming a hollow force, like Joe and
Pete mentioned. I was in the Air Force in the 1970s and saw
what a hollow Air Force looked like. Flight line with airplanes
that couldn't fly and buildings with many people who had no
training or ability to go out and accomplish a mission if the
airplanes had flown. And we don't want to go there again. We
will get smaller to remain capable with the forces that are
left behind.
Many of the challenges we see will come on our people and
on the backs of our people. As we get smaller and as we expect
the tasking does not change, as we mentioned, in many cases we
stay behind when there is a peace dividend, the deployed to
dwell times and the OPTEMPO on our airmen will only increase.
And more importantly, I think the OPTEMPO on our proud Reserve
component, which you know is an integral part of our Air Force,
will have to increase, because they will become ever more
important in a diminishing force.
Finally, sir, if the sequester cuts envisioned in the
Budget Control Act are allowed to take place, we are going to
have to go beyond just getting to our capacity. We believe we
will have to then begin to look at what are the capabilities
that we will have to shed and no longer offer to this joint
team. A reduction in size would reduce the number of bases that
we could support, the number of airmen that we could keep on
board the Air Force. The impact to the size of our industrial
base will certainly be important, just as it is to the Navy.
And then finally, much as Joe has mentioned, as we
downsize, some of the first missions we will have to shed is
that engagement that we see around the world, where we preclude
further conflict, or where we build allies that will help us to
come fight. We will not be able to make those contributions.
I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Breedlove can be found
in the Appendix on page 65.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
And as each of you know, this is probably the most
bipartisan committee in Congress. We work together very, very
well and it is a privilege to have all of our members here. We
are also honored today, we have the chairman of the full
committee. And part of that reason that we serve in such a
bipartisan and effective means is because of his leadership. He
has graciously said that he would like for our members to be
able to ask questions, so I don't think he is going to ask any
questions. But I would like to defer to him now for any
comments that he might want to make.
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
being here and for your comments.
I think that the cuts that you are all working hard to put
into place, I met with Admiral Mullen, oh, probably a month and
a half ago, and he said that he had assigned to the Chief's
$465 billion in cuts. And that came from the President's speech
of cutting $400 billion, and the $78 billion that they had
found, and the $100 billion that you had gone through in
efficiencies, and what we did in the CR [Continuing
Resolution]. It is an accumulation of a lot of things, and it
is hard to actually get the exact number.
I know when the Secretary came up a couple of weeks ago he
was 450-plus. I have also heard 489, so it is somewhere between
450 and $500 billion that you are dealing with that we will
start hearing the details on, I am sure, in January. But I
think many in Congress, and I think most people in the country,
do not understand. They are focused on the ``super committee''
[Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction] and the $500-to-
$600 billion that we will be hit with if they are not able to
do their work.
But they don't realize the extent of the cuts that you have
been working on now for a period of time, and that will be
hitting us next year. And we are talking--well, we have had
five hearings at the full committee level, not counting all of
the committees' meetings, subcommittee levels, to try to get a
handle on this and to try to educate the rest of the Congress
and the rest of the populace of the country as to what really
is going to happen to our military. The first five hearings
were the impact of--on the actual military, the men and women
that you serve with, those who are laying their life on the
line right now as we talk.
I have seen in my lifetime lots of drawdowns. I have never
seen us do it when we are fighting a war. And so, I think it is
really incumbent upon us to try to get the word out, the
message, to see if this is really what people expect. When I go
home and talk to people and tell them what is happening, they
said, no, that isn't what we wanted. You know, we wanted to get
the troops out of Germany, or we wanted to cut the waste, or we
wanted to get the troops home from Korea or somewhere. They do
not realize the extent of what has already been done, let alone
what will happen with that super committee.
And then yesterday, we had another hearing where we had
three economists and they talked about the financial impact to
our economy. When we are already in a fragile economy with a 9-
percent unemployment rate, they are talking about job losses of
a million and a half, which would increase that unemployment
rate up over 10 percent. And I think when all the members start
looking at their districts and at their homes and the lost
jobs, the combination of all of this I am hoping will make us
sit back and take another breath and say, wait a minute. You
know, is this really what we want to do?
This economic problem that we are in right now, that we
have been building over decades, cannot be solved in one budget
cycle. I think we have to have some real understanding of what
we are doing here. And is this really what we want to do, given
the risks that we see facing us around the world?
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I thank you for being
here. And it looks like we are going to be having votes, by the
way, which is unfortunate. But I am hopeful that we return
after the votes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to defer all my questions until the end, so we
can get to as many members as we can.
I would like to now recognize the gentlelady from Guam for
any questions she might have.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I hope
everyone bears with me. I have a very bad cold.
I have a couple of questions. And I understand we are
coming back for a second round? All right.
My first question, as I pointed out in my opening
statement, Admiral Greenert stated in July that further
efficiencies and budget cuts would be determined through a
comprehensive strategic review. So I am asking to what extent
are each of the Services involved with OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] in developing this review, what are some
of the key tenets of this review? And without a strategic plan
in place, why are we proceeding with arbitrary cuts? Why not
wait until such a plan is developed?
So I ask this, because I do not understand the rationale
for the reductions in force at Naval Facilities Command
Pacific, or the deactivation of the two Seabee battalions.
So I guess we will start with Admiral Ferguson?
Mr. Forbes. And if the gentlelady would just yield for a
second. Just logistically to our members, they have called a
vote I understand now. If any of our members need to go to that
vote we will be coming back afterwards for anyone who can come.
Ms. Bordallo's questions will be the last ones we take before
we recess to go to the vote.
So, and with that, if you would like to answer?
Admiral Ferguson. Ms. Bordallo, by all the Services are
participating at the service chief level and at the vice chief
level in the forums that is the ongoing strategy review at the
level of the Secretary of Defense, as is the Joint Staff. And
those discussions that are ongoing presently are looking at the
budget submission that the Services have done, and then
looking--and they were primarily given a fiscal target, as you
alluded to, for us to reach.
And now, they are looking at those fiscal submissions and
then looking at the overall strategy as we go forward. And
then, we will take action as we make those decisions through
the fall part of the budget submission about balancing between
those portfolios in terms of both capabilities and capacity,
and does it meet the strategy that we see going forward?
Ms. Bordallo. So what you are saying, Admiral, is that the
reviews are not completely finished; is that correct?
Admiral Ferguson. That is correct. From our perspective,
the decisions regarding the final form of the budget submission
are not completed yet. And those discussions are ongoing. And
there is very active participation by the service chiefs on
that.
Ms. Bordallo. Do we have time for any of the other answers,
or do we have to----
Mr. Forbes. Yes, let us let any of them answer that want
to, and then, Madame Secretary, we will come back to any
additional questions you have.
Ms. Bordallo. All right.
Mr. Forbes. Because you and I will be here.
Ms. Bordallo. Okay.
Mr. Forbes. Would anyone else like to respond to the
gentlewoman's question?
Ms. Bordallo. General Dunford.
General Dunford. Congresswoman, thank you. We are also--I
mean, Admiral Ferguson got it exactly right. We are
participants fully in the process to do the comprehensive
strategic review led by Secretary Panetta.
We have an opportunity to provide input in that
comprehensive strategic review and we are confident that the
results of the strategic review will be the framework within
which specific cuts are made.
As Admiral Ferguson alluded to, necessarily what we had to
do in the initial going was take a look and assume proportional
cuts across the board as we went through the drill of
approximately $450 billion. But, again, at the end of the day
as we get towards December, the strategic review, at least the
major tenets of the strategic review, will be complete and at
that point, we will be able to talk about the specific
decisions that I think that Secretary Panetta will make.
But our understanding is that he has not made any final
decisions about the specific cuts that would be made in order
to achieve that initial goal.
Ms. Bordallo. So pretty much the other witnesses have the
same answer?
General Chiarelli. I would argue from the Army's standpoint
that is exactly--we are participating in the internal debate in
the building. But like when I get up in the morning and I see
the futures, how they are doing in the stock market, if I had
to look around town and read what all the think tanks are
saying, they seem to be discounting the requirement for ground
forces, which is a natural tendency after what we have been
through in the last 10 years. But every other time we have done
that in our history, as I indicated before, we have done soon
the backs of service men and women, soldiers on the ground.
And quite frankly, let us be honest. It has cost us lives.
It cost us lives at Kasserine Pass. It cost us lives at Task
Force Smith in Korea. It cost us lives every single time.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, and we haven't done this when a war is
going on as our chairman mentioned. What is the timeline for
the review completion?
Mr. Forbes. I am going to ask you guys to do this. Let us
hold that until we get back, because we have just got a few
minutes to get up for vote. So we are going to recess until
right after the votes. Anyone that can come back then, we will
be there.
[Recess.]
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, once again we apologize to you for
the inconvenience of us having to go over there and do those
votes. But that is what we are here for. So we thank you for
your patience.
And we were continuing with Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Breedlove, we will begin with you. What is the
timeline now for the review completion?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, as we were walking out, we all
looked at each other, and came to the same conclusion. We
expect that the review should wrap up in December. And then as
we are working on the budget issues between now and then, as we
understand the facets of the review that apply to our budget
processes, we do that.
And ma'am, I would just echo with my three compatriots as
they said, we are to this point, and we have been a part of
formulating that strategy.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. So that is the end of
December, did you say?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, that is our collective wisdom. We
all have the same date in mind.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Thank you.
And then, Admiral Ferguson, you didn't answer fully the
question that I asked about the review process. I said I did
not understand the rationale for the reductions in force at
Facilities Command Pacific, or the deactivation of the two
Seabee battalions. Could you answer that?
Admiral Ferguson. As we looked at the force structure of
the Construction Battalions around the globe, the initial
budget submission that we prepared had a reduction in order to
meet the commands of the combatant commanders. And as we size
our forces, those forces are really on call to the combatant
commanders to serve what we see as a future demand.
As I alluded to in the opening statement, we had to take
reductions in certain elements of capacity across the force in
order to meet the budget targets that we had. And then we
looked at that, areas of the Seabees in particular as a
potential reduction. As we go forward in this review process,
that is part of the effort that we are looking at as to what
the final force structure of the Construction Battalions would
be.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Now, I have one other question.
Why would Congress consider any potential changes to recruiting
and retention incentives such as military retirement and health
care, or reductions to essential training accounts, when the
military departments can't identify the cost of what they pay
for contracted services?
The Army has fulfilled the requirements of the fiscal year
2008 National Defense Authorization Act that requires
contracts, or requires an inventory of contracts, for services.
But for nearly half a decade while this Nation has been at war,
the Air Force and the Navy and the defense agencies have failed
to implement this law, which would help us control the
skyrocketing costs and expenditures on contracted services.
So what is each of your military departments doing to
reduce contracted services and work requirements, instead of
just reducing dollars? If you are only reducing dollars then
you are likely setting up conditions to default to contractors
in light of the current civilian hiring freezes.
So I guess Air Force will answer that first.
General Breedlove. Congresswoman Bordallo, thank you for
the opportunity. We are, as are other Services, looking at
everything we do contractually, especially as we learned the
lessons of the wars that we have been in for the past 10 years.
What is inherently governmental and what should we be retaining
as a blue-suit requirement, versus those things that we
contract for, most specifically in combat zones.
And every facet of what we do via contract has been
reviewed to see if this is something that we either want to
eliminate, do we need to repurchase and bring back into our
service those things in a military way? Of course, this is in a
time when we expect that our Air Force will get smaller rather
than larger, so there is a lot of pressure on that process.
And what are, or how does that relate to those jobs that
typically our civilians also do, civilians who are a part of
our Air Force? So we are in an ongoing review. We are focusing
most specifically on those things that are done in combat zones
and whether they should be a blue-suit job or a contract job.
And we are putting fiscal pressure on what we spend on
contracts to help us incentivize looking at how to get at that
approach.
Ms. Bordallo. Anyone else care to answer?
Admiral Ferguson. I know that in the Navy the Secretary--
Office of the Secretary--is leading an effort that goes across
all our budget submitting offices to look at service contracts
in particular and other contracts that we have along the same
lines that the other Services are, to see what is inherently
governmental and where are we paying excessive overhead and
charges in that area?
Ms. Bordallo. Are you all in agreement?
General Chiarelli. We are doing exactly the same thing. We
have appointed, I believe it is a deputy secretary to handle
contracts and service contracts, going through a complete
review of them to understand where there are redundancies,
where there are places that we in fact can cut and where there
are certain areas that may fall under the purview of being able
to use soldiers to help us in some of these areas.
Ms. Bordallo. General.
General Dunford. Congresswoman, we are a part of the same
process that Admiral Ferguson described within the Department
of the Navy.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. When is the timeline for this
review?
General Dunford. I will be honest, I am not sure. You know,
process within the Department of the Navy, I do not know what
the timeline is for the review. My assumption is that it is in
conjunction with the budget that will be due in December. I
know we will at least have initial assessment of our
contracting at that time. And I will get back to you if it is
going to extend past December.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. And the gentlelady from Guam has yielded back.
I know she has some additional questions, but she has
graciously deferred those until the end so that some of our
members can get their questions in.
We now will have the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And gentlemen, one of the things I would hope that you will
continue to do is to inform the committee of things maybe that
are in the code sections that we could take out that are
increasing your cost of operations, things that we would like
to pretend that we can afford, but we can't.
Such as some of the energy mandates and other things that
are running up the costs of operations. General Breedlove, as
you know, I represent Robins Air Force Base and I would like to
once again invite you down to the Air Logistic Center and the
JSTARS [E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System]. And
if you will come in hunting season I promise I will make it a
worthwhile venture.
I will even get you to a Georgia Tech game, although I
might wear a different hat at the game than you would. But
Georgia Tech would be a great opportunity for you to come as
well. But the men and women in our area are very grateful for
the commitment of the three-depot strategy and just want to
again ask that question, make sure that that is a commitment
from the Air Force that we have to maintain the three depots?
Thank you. Thank you so much for that, and I hope that as
we go through these cuts that--let me say this as a member of
Congress, I know that you know more about running your
agencies, your different departments, I should say, than I do.
And I hope that you will be very forthcoming with us about what
we can do to help you in doing that.
And I want to be an ally for you. I am sorry that we are
going through this. I am quite honestly embarrassed that we
have more discussions in this Congress about cuts to the
military than we do about cuts to social programs. I think that
is something that quite honestly is carrying America down a
very, very dangerous path. And I know America is tired of the
wars in Afghanistan. And I know that our men and women that
have been over there will continue to go.
But I also know that they are ready for more time with
their families. But I am not so sure that when we come out,
that the world is not going to be a more dangerous place than
it is today. So again, I want to thank you for everything you
have done.
And General Breedlove, again, thank you for your support of
Robins. And if I can ever help you, please feel free to call on
my office.
General Breedlove. Congressman, thank you and we do have a
commitment to the three depots, that we think that is the
minimum. And we thank you for your support to us. And as all of
us, I think, look at what we can do to address the tail of our
forces to add to the tooth, and that will continue to be
important as we go forward.
The depots, as you know, bring a capability to all our
Services that is unmatched around the world to make sure that
our Services, our Air Force, and the airplanes that they fly
are ready to do the mission, and our commitment is strong
there.
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir. And the other aspect of it is that
those cuts, you know, we need to rebuild a lot of our machines
that we have used. And when every dollar that we take out of
the rebuilding of those machines is a dollar that comes out of
a man or a woman's pocket that is working on that assembly
line. So if you want to create jobs in the country, I would
respectfully submit that this is the place where you do it.
The country, every citizen gets a direct benefit from a
strong, well-equipped military. And every dollar that we spend
in rebuilding our equipment is a dollar that goes back into an
American working man and working woman's pocket to take care of
their families.
So, thank you again for what you have done for our country,
and I will continue to stand ready, willing and able to help
you.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this hearing, and to the witnesses for spending some
time with us here today.
First of all, I guess I just want to ask a question about a
very specific issue, which is the C-27 cargo aircraft, which it
appears that a full production sort of plan has sort of been
sort of put on hold, or at least partially delayed. And, you
know, obviously for the Army that is a big issue in terms of
having that lift capacity, because it is a pretty old group of
Sherpas that are left there.
I just wondered if somebody can give me an update in terms
of where that decision stands, whether it is related to the
$465 billion, or are there other issues that are at work here?
And I don't know whether either General wants to comment,
but----
General Breedlove. Sir I will be first to comment on that.
I cannot speak specifically to what you mention about a
decision on full-scale production. We will take that for the
record and get back to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
General Breedlove. As far as the C-27 and the mission of
supporting the Army in its what would probably be called the
last portion of the delivery of goods to our ground forces,
both Marine and Army, the Air Force has a full commitment to
that mission.
We will not back off of the requirement for the Air Force
to meet that mission. If that mission is to be done with C-27s
or C-130s is a decision that is still pending, and is a part of
this ongoing budget review. But that will be worked out in the
next few months.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
General, if you wanted to comment.
General Chiarelli. Well, the Army is very committed to the
C-27. We feel it fills a gap. Right now my rotary wing aviators
are at about a 1:1 BOG:Dwell [Boots On the Ground:Dwell], that
means boots on the ground for 12 months. And they are coming
home from anywhere from 12 to 14 months. Rotary wing is the
coin of the realm down range today, and a lot of it is moving
from airfield to airfield where the C-27 could fill in a gap
that we think is absolutely critical.
Even in Afghanistan, but if you take it to other places in
the world I think it is even more convincing. Plus, it provides
a tremendous capability for homeland defense, and that is one
of the things that was critical about the C-27 and its ability
to get into air fields here in the United States that other
aircraft can't get into in the event of homeland defense kinds
of missions. So we are totally committed to it.
Mr. Courtney. And again, if we can get that follow up, that
would be great. A number of us are definitely interested in
helping, you know, push that along if there is a way that we
can.
Admiral, I think the Chairman in his opening remarks talked
about some of the shortfalls in the repair and maintenance
account. And you know, in many respects this should be sort of
a milestone year for the Navy in at least one aspect, one that
probably did for me ad nauseam around here about, which is the
submarine fleet, but, you know, we are now at to a year of
production for the first time in 22 years, you know?
We are doing, again, full startup of R&D [Research and
Development] for the Ohio Replacement Program. But obviously,
you know, this is progress that could be challenged if the
sequestration goes into effect. And I guess, you know, maybe if
you could talk a little bit more about Mr. Forbes' comment
regarding the repair and maintenance account, in particular in
terms of the impact on the fleet size and capability and----
Admiral Ferguson. Sure. It is an important point, because
the Navy we reset in stride. And so, we deploy and, in fact,
over half our forces are under way, ships and submarines, on a
given day, and about 40 percent are forward-deployed.
The demand for those forces is going up. So we don't have
the luxury of taking them offline for prolonged periods of
time. And so, the maintenance funding that we have when we
bring them home for their turnaround is absolutely essential to
sustain that force, to reset it and then prepare to go both the
amphibious lift for the Marines, as well as aircraft carriers,
submarines and surface ships.
And so we have watched the trend in readiness over time. We
are operating within acceptable levels, but as Admiral Greenert
testified previously, there is a negative trend over the long
term as we shrink those maintenance funds.
And so, as we go forward, we are actually committed to
keeping the force whole and ensuring that those forces that are
operating are well-maintained and equipped and go forward. But
it does present a challenge to us in an era of declining
budgets.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, you are recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank all of you for being here.
The DOD [Department of Defense] in this current year budget
had projected fuel costs for a barrel of oil to be $131 and DLA
[Defense Logistics Agency] has recently pegged it now at $166 a
barrel, and is projecting that that level will be sustained
throughout the balance of this fiscal year.
How are you all going to deal with that?
General Breedlove, let us start with you and let us go down
the other----
General Breedlove. Sir, thank you for the opportunity to
talk to it. We do have an aggressive program in our fuel
savings and are looking at numerous opportunities, both
existing technologies and new technologies, to get after it.
A good example is re-coring of our C-130 engines. If we can
get to a new core of those aircraft on those aircraft engines
running cooler and running more efficiently, the fuel savings
is quite important.
Simple things that we are doing across our aircraft fleet
like winglets on our larger aircraft and changing, as we buy
new aircraft, some of the exterior hull designs, cuts down on a
little bit of fuel.
You would think that that is not significant, but we
understand, as you do as well, sir, that the Air Force is the
number one user of fuel in the United States. And so, every
little bit that we can cut saves money to roll back into things
that are really needed in our force.
So we are attacking this, because it is the most important
thing to get at for Air Force savings and energy.
General Dunford. Congressman, thanks so much for the
question. We share your concern about that, what I perceive to
be a critical vulnerability, a rise in fuel, not only from a
cost-perspective, but also from a strained line of logistics as
we have seen in Afghanistan, the criticality of getting fuel to
our forces. And what that does in terms of putting people in
harm's way to deliver that fuel.
All of our units that are on the ground right now in
Afghanistan have been fielded with renewable energy sources
that started as an experiment, and within about 14 months it
has now become every unit that goes over there has renewable
energy. And that includes not only solar panels, it includes
tent liners, it includes low-energy or energy-efficient
lighting.
As we look at our requirements as we acquire new equipment,
fuel efficiency is a critical part of our requirements
documents as we seek to add new equipment in the future. And
then as a whole within the Department of the Navy, the
Secretary of the Navy has led a very aggressive effort to
replace our fossil fuels with some alternative fuel sources and
other initiatives in developing technologies that might be
available to release us from truly the shackles of fossil
fuels. Again, not only from a cost perspective, but from a
challenge in delivering that to the battlefield.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I guess I am hearing from both of you all
that this 25 percent increase in cost that was not budgeted for
something you think you are going to be able to adequately deal
with?
General Dunford. Congressman, what we are doing is we are
making choices. I mean, there is other ways that we can, you
know, we increase in the reliance simulation, as an example, to
develop proficiency for both our pilots and for our ground
forces.
We will make tradeoffs within our operational maintenance
accounts to ensure that we can maintain a high state of
readiness and still pay all of our bills.
I am not going to say it is not going to be difficult. It
is going to be a challenge. This does exacerbate an already
stressed operations and maintenance account. But right now, we
are trying to work within the resources that we have, again, to
ensure that our folks maintain proper training before they
deploy. And we have no issue with delivering fuel obviously to
our forces that are forward-deployed as our number one
priority.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Admiral.
Admiral Ferguson. We are also a part of the very aggressive
energy efforts led by the Secretary for all our basing, but I
think more to your point is the challenge in this fiscal year
that we are facing.
And should the current prices be sustained, and lately we
have seen them start to come down a bit, but if they were
sustained for the entire year for the Department of the Navy,
the shortfall would be around $1.1 billion that we would face
in fuel costs.
We would have to offset those by reductions in other areas
of the operations and maintenance account to pay for that, or
seek a reprogramming or other action from the Congress to
address it.
And because it is in execution here, the horizon of many of
our efficiency initiatives won't generate those savings in
order to generate them this year. But what we won't do is
reduce the commitment of those operating forces to the
combatant commanders and be able to sustain what we need to
train and operate forward.
General Chiarelli. I have little to add except for the fact
that the Army is working in three specific areas in operational
energy where our force is deployed. And, again, we will do
whatever we have to do and balance whatever accounts we have
to, to ensure that they have what they need, but we are looking
at ways to reduce their reliance.
One of them is replacing all our generators with new fuel-
efficient generators, and the fuel savings alone down ranges is
huge.
Both the request for proposals for the ground combat
vehicle, the infantry fighting vehicle, and the JLTV, the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle, include energy savings. And I think
that is a big selling point when you look at the total
lifecycle cost of those vehicles once we bring them onboard.
And at post camps and stations, we are working with a net
zero pilot at least three installations. We are using solar at
the National Training Center and other locations to help with
our energy needs. And also, we are--the Human Resource Command,
the new personnel command of the Army out of Fort Knox,
Kentucky--uses geothermal to produce both its heating and
cooling in the summertime.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you all.
Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Hanabusa, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My question is first directed at General Dunford. By the
way, I think we owe you a happy birthday to the Marine Corps.
And you guys are all celebrating in the next couple of days or
so.
Let me first begin with statements that you have made in
your statement. I am curious about the fact that you said that
our Nation needs an expeditionary force that can respond to
today's crisis with today's force today.
Now, first I would like you to explain what you meant by
the expeditionary force? And also, then tell me, you are
talking about today's crisis with today's force today, but I
think what we are looking at as we look forward in a 10-year
budget, what is the force to look like in the year 2020? And
those, of course, are discussions that we have been having with
Secretary Panetta, as well as General--the new chief.
So if you could, proceed accordingly?
General Dunford. Congresswoman, the first question
concerned expeditionary and what that means is a couple of
things. Number one is we wouldn't be reliant on political
access being provided by somebody else. If we needed to go some
place, naval forces are uniquely capable of being able to do
that.
We are capable of operating in an austere environment. So
when we come someplace, we come with the water, the fuel, the
supplies that our marines and sailors need to accomplish the
mission.
And so, that is in general terms what we mean by
expeditionary. With regard to today's forces today, you know,
as I alluded to in my opening statement, physical presence
matters. And physical presence matters for a couple of reasons,
you know?
Number one, it absolutely shows a sign of our economic and
our military commitment to a particular region. It deters
potential adversaries. It assures our friends. And as you start
moving up the range of military operations, it also allows you
to respond in a timely manner to crises.
Many times you have hours, if not minutes, to provide the--
to respond to a crisis, and you certainly can't do that from
the continental United States. The naval forces are there on
the scene able to be able to do that.
The other thing that it does is it allows you to buy time
and space for decisionmakers. When you have some forces there,
they can contain a crisis as the rest of the joint force gets
prepared to respond to something that may be a bit larger than
the crisis that is being dealt with on the scene.
So from my perspective, when you look at expeditionary
forces and you talk about responding to today's crisis today,
what you really have with four deployed naval forces, which is
what I was talking about, is the ability to turn the rheostat
up from day-to-day shaping operations, day-to-day engagement
with our allies. In the sticker price of that same force, you
can then respond to a crisis and in the sticker price of that
same force you can then enable a joint force to respond to
something larger on the seismic contingency.
Ms. Hanabusa. Now, you also went on to say about regarding
to Secretary Panetta's announcement that he directed the
Department to cut in half the time it takes to achieve
readiness.
Now, I assume that that is one of the reasons what you are
speaking to here. However, isn't the underlying assumption that
we all have is that we know where we are going to be? So
doesn't there also have to be some kind of analysis that if you
are going to be ready to go within a couple of hours or
whatever it is, that we know where we would most likely be,
that your Services are most likely going to be needed?
For example, I am from Hawaii. So have Kaneohe. I mean, you
know, if you are going to be deployed in Afghanistan, it is not
going to be a couple of hours.
So what is the, I guess, the perceived theater as far as
your concern as to where--and we have to make these choices,
because of the fact that we just don't have money for
everybody.
So where is it that we are going to put our resources? Or
where, if you had your magic wand, you would put your
resources?
General Dunford. Congresswoman, it is pretty clear, I
think, to all of us and it certainly has been stated by the
Secretary of Defense that the Pacific is the future of our
country from both an economic and a military perspective. That
is the number one priority.
We will still, for the foreseeable future, for many, many
years to come have security challenges in the United States
Central Command from Egypt to Pakistan. And so that is another
area where we would expect to see significant military
presence.
But I would offer to you that if there is one thing that we
are not very good at is predicting the future. And so, as sure
as we talk about the priority of the Pacific, and then the
challenges that exist in the United States Central Command,
some place else will cause us to respond, and we don't know
where that will be.
And so, when the combatant commander is asked for forward-
deployed naval forces to be out there on a routine basis, each
of them asks for that. And they ask for that as a mitigation to
the risk of the unknown. And that is what I believe we provide.
So again, from the priority perspective, certainly we will see
the preponderance of effort in our commitment to be in the
Pacific Command, in the Central Command. But priority can't be
exclusivity.
And we are still going to have to satisfy the requirements
of the other combatant commanders, again, to do not only the
day-to-day shaping, but as importantly, as a hedge against the
risk of the unknown.
Ms. Hanabusa. I am out of time. But if you could respond to
me in writing, I am curious as to what an expeditionary force
would be comprised of. And I am talking about ships,
helicopters, amphibious vehicles, whatever that is? If you
could give me an idea, so that when we vote on what are the
things are no longer necessary, I have an idea whether or not
we know what we are talking about.
General Dunford. Congresswoman, I will be glad to do that.
And the good news for you is that there is expeditionary
capabilities on the islands of Hawaii, and are available in the
Pacific in time of crisis. But I would be happy to get back to
you in the detailed organization of Marine expeditionary
forces, as well as the naval forces that are absolutely
critical to our ability to do our job.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much.
General Chiarelli. And I would be glad to do the same for
the Army.
Ms. Hanabusa. And the Air Force?
And if you call it something other than ``expeditionary
force,'' you can tell me that, too.
Thank you very much.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
General Chiarelli. I just have to underline something that
was said. We just don't know. We have been 100 percent right in
something. And that is never getting it right.
Ms. Hanabusa. General Dempsey said the same thing.
General Chiarelli. It is true. It is true. And all you have
to do is look at history. And when we don't have a balanced
force that can meet wherever U.S. national interests are
threatened, where the National Command Authority says that we
must provide military force, that is when we get ourselves into
trouble.
And I think that is very important to look at the history
of how we have done. We are repeating a cycle here that is
something that has happened many, many times in our history.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Forbes. And, gentlemen, I want to thank you for your
patience. We have got just a few more questions. But I know
that General Breedlove has a hard stop that he has to make.
I am going to ask the gentlelady from Guam if she can ask a
quick question of him.
And then I just have one, if you have the time before you
have to leave.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
This is for you, General Breedlove. What shortages in
critical skill sets in your respective Services--well, actually
a question for all of you--are you already experiencing because
of manpower reductions already taken? And what impacts would
you anticipate from further reductions? How are these shortages
affecting your warfighting capability?
And General, why don't you go first, since we know that the
Air Force has experienced shortages in more than a dozen
enlisted NCO [Non-commissioned Officer] and officer skill sets,
especially in the aircraft maintenance area.
Mr. Forbes. And I am going to ask General Breedlove if he
would address that, and then we will come back to you gentlemen
after General Breedlove has left, if that is okay?
General.
General Breedlove. Ma'am, thank you for the question. And
you are absolutely right. There are several skill sets, both in
our officer and enlisted corps, that have come under pressure.
And I think it talks to capacity, much as General Dunford
talked to capacity earlier.
In our Air Force, some portions of our Air Force, such as
our lift and others, have a good capacity to handle the first
fight. And then we will be stretched a little bit on the second
fight. But already in a scenario where we have one full-up
warfight, or where we are engaged just like we are now in
Afghanistan and Iraq, we are already stressed in some very key
areas. And you mentioned several of them.
In our enlisted corps, our crypto linguists, we are growing
so fast in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, that
we are struggling to keep abreast of the requirement for those
people who take the data that is coming into the system, and
break it down for use by our ground forces in others.
Our battlefield airmen that were built for a certain model
during the Colder War, we are catching up to the requirements
for our battlefield airmen. All of the units on the ground are
supported by those TACPs [Tactical Air Control Party], those
EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal], those air combat control
folks. CCT [Combat Control Team], meaning our special tactics
folks, and our pararescue. And those are all under pressure now
in a one-war scenario, and we have to work on those.
Special operations, weather, and our security forces, as we
have picked up more and more of the responsibility of defense
around bases are all under pressure. In our officer career
field, some of the things that you would have never thought
about just simply because of the way that the Services do
differently.
We have a lot of senior contracting NCOs and officers. The
other Services typically do these with civilians. And so, our
expeditionary officers in some of these critical career fields
like airfield ops, contracting, and some of our specific
airfield civil engineering sets, are all under pressure. And
are things that we need to move forward on.
As we constrict our force, and we will across these budget
battles, we are going to be keeping our eye on growing those.
So the Air Force will come under pressure, I think, in other
areas. But we will have to keep an eye on those very critical
ones that I mentioned, so that we can grow to a better and more
acceptable level of risk in those areas.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Forbes. And we will come back to that question as soon
as the general has just answered one more question.
General, since the Korean War it is my understanding that
there has not been a single soldier or Marine who lost his life
in combat due to a threat from the air. That is 58 years. And I
may be inaccurate, but that is a statement that was given to
me. Oftentimes, we call that air dominance. If we were to move
to those cuts that sequestration could bring about, would that
put into question our continued ability to have that kind of
air dominance?
General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, I would never--we never
beg to correct. But I would just correct in one way. We have
since the Korean War suffered an air attack by Scuds, and some
others who have taken the lives of our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines on the ground. So, just with that small
correction.
I think the point that you make is the one that is often
talked about. And that is to fixed wing air to our opponents'
air forces, our naval air forces, we have not lost--been under
attack since the latter part of the Korean War. And that is
something that our Air Forces, centered on our Air Force, but
certainly our Marine air and naval air, and to some degree even
the rotary ring of the Army, we have put together what you call
``Air dominance'' across the years to give our ground forces
the ability to react and to fight under that protection.
I give you one small example that my friend from the Army
will chuckle about. And that is, when I was an ALO [Air Liaison
Officer] in Europe during the late 1980s, and we would practice
for the big war on the plains of northern Germany, we would go
out in our brigade formation when I was a brigade TACP. And
when we came under attack from supposedly Soviet force air, we
would do herringbone maneuvers and all kinds of things to react
to, so that the air defenders could set up and defend us and so
forth.
And we have now come to an age where we are so used to, and
so enabled by, that air dominance that the joint team brings to
the battlefield, that I can't remember even talking about a
herringbone maneuver in the last few years.
Our situation on the ground and on the sea would change
drastically were it not for the joint air forces that bring
this capability. Certainly, we will all be under pressure under
the new budget regimes, and especially if we go to a sequester.
And I would just say that I think that without starting a long
conversation about areas of the world where we talk about the
paradigm of area A2AD--Anti Access Area Denial Events. So that
our opponents build an area that is so constrictive to our
ability to enter the area or fight in the area due to their
ability to put up air defenses, sea defenses, ship defenses
that keep us at range.
That the future budget scenario which would severely
constrict our ability to approach those requirements, those
weapons, those new aircraft or other weapons that would give us
a capability in this A2A2--or A2AD anti access sort of
environment. I think that is where the pressure will be.
And quite frankly, in some portions of the world if we are
not able to break that A2AD environment, I believe that we will
be in a position where we will not be able to guarantee that
air dominance, or air supremacy, to our sea and land forces as
we operate over them.
Mr. Forbes. Yes. General, thank you so much for being here.
I know you have to go, and we are excusing you from the hearing
now. And please know how proud we are of your service, and the
men and women who serve under you in the United States Air
Force. And thank you for being with us today.
General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
the opportunity.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you. And, gentlemen, we are not going to
hold you very much longer. But just a couple things that we
would like to get for the record, so that we can get to other
members. I want to yield back to Ms. Bordallo, so we can finish
her question that she had for the generals to answer.
Ms. Bordallo. We will start with the general.
General Dunford. Congresswoman, getting back to our current
shortfalls, and then the impact of future reductions. I
mentioned in my opening statement that our forward-deployed
marines have all that they need with regard to training,
equipment, and leadership to accomplish the mission. That is
our absolute number one priority.
The cost of ensuring that they have all that they need has
been felt by those units back at home station. In fact, about
two-thirds of our units that are back at home station are
currently in a state of degraded readiness. And that, of
course, impacts on our ability to deal with another
contingency, or certainly the unexpected.
There is also a cost when we come back out of Afghanistan
to reset the force. To address those equipment shortfalls, and
to refresh the equipment that will be coming out of
Afghanistan. And we currently estimate that bill at about $3
billion. In some ways that is a good news story, because a
couple years ago that bill was in excess of $15 billion. And
with the help of Congress over the last couple of years we have
been able to do some resetting, even as we continue to support
operations both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
So as we look to the future, I would be concerned about two
things. One, I would be concerned that we actually do reset the
force. We actually do address those deficiencies and replace
that equipment set that is worn out from operations in
Afghanistan as we move to the future.
The second thing I would be concerned about is our ability
to continue to modernize and keep pace with modern threats. And
over and above the reset cost, which really gets us back to the
force that we had before we went to Afghanistan, replacing that
equipment, we need to keep apace and modernize our equipment.
And I would be concerned that further reductions would
preclude our ability to modernize. And over time we would get
back to that same state we were in, in the 1970s, where our
equipment was antiquated and worn out. And that is exactly what
we want to try to avoid. And again, that is one of the key
aspects of hollowness.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much.
Admiral.
Admiral Ferguson. As we look at the manpower issues, the
force is under pressure. Our average deployments, as I alluded
to earlier, 50 percent of our ships underway are stretching out
to about 7 months. Some ships are doing longer, in order to do
operational commitments overseas. And so, they are under
stress.
And within that area we have a group of very critical
specialists. And I am thinking of our nuclear operators, our
linguists, our cryptologists, those involved in highly
technical fields like acoustics and aviation maintenance and
electronics, where, because the outside economy is presently
not hiring to the level where they could, you know, think about
leaving, they are staying with us.
And my concern as we go forward into this environment,
which echoes my fellow vice-chiefs, is concerning this element
of keeping faith with the force that we have. And ensuring that
we sustain their compensation in an area under high stress, so
that should the economy--and hopefully it turns soon--gets
better, we might lose those individuals for retention in the
future. So the retention element is one that we watch very
carefully.
We are enjoying great recruiting right now from the Nation
with the highest quality force we have ever had, and we are
very appreciate of that. But I think in the long term manpower,
it is our highly skilled critical specialties that we are most
concerned about for the future.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
From the Army, General.
General Chiarelli. Recruiting and retention has never been
stronger. It is just absolutely amazing, and if you would have
told me this 10 years ago before we got into this fight, I
would have said there is no way we could hold this together for
10 years and have it be as strong as it is today. It is
absolutely amazing.
But at the same time, again, as the guy who gets the pay to
worry about things, I also believe it is fragile. I worry about
rotary wing aviators. That is an area, as I indicated earlier,
that my folks are spending 12 months in theater, coming home
for 12 to 14, maybe 15 months right now, and then right back
down. I have got aviators that have got six and seven
deployments. We are increasing our contracting, uniformed
contracting corps.
The Secretary of the Army has made a decision to add
additional uniformed contracting specialists, officers and
senior non-commissioned officers and warrants, to the United
States Army even as we downsize the force, because we realize
it is absolutely critical. And electronic warfare is also an
area where we are adding to our rolls, even as we downsize.
I would like to pile on to what General Dunford said. What
really concerns me is in the modernization area. I will tell
you, the ground combat vehicle, the infantry fighting vehicle,
is absolutely critical for the United States Army. We are not
talking about going into full-rate production at this
particular time on the ground combat vehicle.
All we are trying to do is get from milestone A to
milestone B to see what the industry can give us at a point
where we can make a decision 2 to 2\1/2\ years from now whether
to go to a new build that industry brings us, while at the same
time in that 2\1/2\-year period, we are going to look at some
off-the-shelf solutions to an infantry fighting vehicle. And
there are many.
And then, when those two lines of effort converge, 2 to
2\1/2\ years from now, we will make a cost-informed decision on
what we can afford. But to cut that off now, to not provide us
the ability to do that, will only put us 2 years behind a
modernization program that is absolutely critical to the Army.
I would argue I think we are doing the same thing with the
JLTV, the Joint Light Tactical-Wheeled Vehicle. We are looking
at the possibility of recapping Humvees and what that would
cost. At the same time, we have entered into a partnership with
the Marines and really driven down the requirements on JLTV, so
that we believe we can buy this vehicle for somewhere between
200 and $240,000 a vehicle.
We have done that in partnership to drive down those
requirements, but that, too, will enter into what they call a
technical development phase, and it will come together with
what is being looked at with the recap of Humvees. And there
will come a point down the road, not probably more than 2 years
or shorter than 2 years, where we will be able to make a
decision on what is smarter? Do we recap Humvees, or do we go
with a new JLTV?
I just think it is absolutely essential that we be allowed
to continue that critical work, or we will end up with a force
that is not modernized. And a force that is not modernized is
an unbalanced force, and in the end, it will cost us lives.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. That has been very
informative.
General Chiarelli. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, one of the things that all three of
you have talked about--and first of all, I compliment you. All
three of your Services have done a great job in retaining your
troops and recruiting. And I have looked and I have seen the
pride in each of your eyes as you look at the products that you
are able to train and turn out.
But I also hear you using a phrase that I don't think the
public always understands, which is ``keeping faith'' with
those troops. And part of that keeping faith is the
compensation package.
And each of you told me privately it is kind of a holistic
approach. It is more than just the dollars. It is everything.
It is the commissaries that they go to. It is the schools that
they use. It is the programs that they have as an overall
package when someone sits down and determines whether or not
they are going to re-up, or whether they are going to sign-up
in the first place.
But the question I have for you is if you could elaborate
for me a little bit your concerns with this keeping faith? And
specifically, I want to ask you this. When we had a major
policy change recently in the military with ``Don't Ask, Don't
Tell,'' and I am not asking you to weigh in on for that or
against that, either one. But we did an in-depth study,
surveys, focus groups, that were done, too, before we
implemented that policy.
I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit what the Army
did, the Navy did and the Marine Corps did in terms of that
policy, focus groups, survey, and et cetera? And then compare
that to what we have done with the compensation packages? Have
we done any similar types of analysis of that?
And General Chiarelli, why don't we start with you?
General Chiarelli. Well, we haven't, because the proposals
have been coming from every direction. And you are so correct
that this is a holistic review. It needs to include those
benefits that you are going to have for medical care,
retirement, educational benefits. They all have to be looked at
in a holistic package, and not looked at as individual
programs, because they are all interrelated.
We need to do those focus groups. We need to know what the
educational benefits mean to the 19-year-old kid coming out of
high school, coming into the United States Army. What role did
that play in his decision to sign up during the time of war? It
is very interesting, when the Defense Business Board published
their plan for looking at military retirement, the Secretary of
the Army and the chief of staff went out and talked to
soldiers.
And they were expecting to get questions, based on the Army
Times article, from captains, majors, lieutenant-colonels, and
colonels, and senior non-commissioned officers. That wasn't it.
They got it from a 19-year-old kid who said, ``Mr. Secretary,
what are you doing to my retirement?''
Now, we know the numbers. Less than 70 percent of those
will ever reach retirement. But it leads one to believe that
that retirement package had a role in this individual making a
decision to join us during a time of war. And if we go back to
what we just talked about recruiting and retention, these are
huge in our ability to be able to maintain this force over
time.
So I would only echo what you say, Chairman. We really need
to take the time to look at this. We understand it needs to be
looked at; yes. But please, let us do it holistically, and let
us take time to put together a total package and understand
where that is going to take us.
Mr. Forbes. General, I know, but for the record, how many
years have you served in the Army?
General Chiarelli. Just short of 40.
Mr. Forbes. And during----
General Chiarelli. I don't look it, do I?
Mr. Forbes. No, you don't.
[Laughter.]
I would have thought 19.
General Chiarelli. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. But with all of those years experience, would
you say that it would be foolish, at least unpredictable for
us, to begin to launch off of some of these compensation
packages before we have done an analysis to what it is going to
do to the force?
General Chiarelli. Yes.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral Ferguson.
Admiral Ferguson. I would echo General Chiarelli's
comments, and say that when I go out and I travel to the force
and I visit, it is the number one question that I get. And part
of the benefit of the review process that happened under the
study for the repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' was that we
not only did focus groups, but we allowed a very methodical
review of the policy issues.
An ability to socialize discussions with the force, that
allowed people to work through and air the questions and things
that they had about that policy development. And it was a
pretty thorough process of both surveys, policy development and
analysis, and communication.
I think in an issue that is as important as retirement to
our force, and for their decision about retention, that a
similar type review of that thoroughness and nature would be
important, as well as the ability to have the force be
communicated with on the elements that are under consideration.
I just think that is essential for the long-term viability of
the force.
Mr. Forbes. Thanks, Admiral.
General.
General Dunford. Chairman, thank you for that question, and
I would agree with the characterization that you laid out with
regard to compensation, General Chiarelli and Admiral Ferguson.
And just summarize with a key point, and that is this. There
have been many proposals about compensation that are out there
that talk about how much money we will save. I have not seen a
single proposal that provides the analysis on what the effect
on the force would be.
And at the end of the day, what compensation is about, it
is about our ability to continue to recruit and retain the
high-quality force that we have had in harm's way over the past
10 years. And if you play it forward, I mean, it really is
about a conversation that some young sergeant may have with his
spouse a couple of years from now.
And the spouse will say, hey, your 4 years are up, what are
you going to do? You know, you have been deployed two or three
times. You have been away from home 180 days out of every 365
days. This is really hard. You are missing many of the key
milestones of your children's lives. Are we going to stay in,
or are we going to get out?
And at that point, the family is going to look holistically
at the housing, the education for their children. They are
going to look at medical support, they are going to look at
behavioral health support that exists. They are going to look
at some of the intangibles like is their service valued? Do
they have respect in the community? Do their leaders treat them
with trust? If so, all of that is really the intangible and the
tangible aspects that cause people to serve.
And when we talk about compensation, we need to talk about
it in that light. It needs to be a holistic approach to ensure
that at the end of the day, when that sergeant has that
conversation, that the compensation for his service and the
value that we place on his service exceeds the challenges and
the risks that we ask him to endure.
Mr. Forbes. General, I am going to ask you the same
question I asked General Chiarelli. And despite your young,
youthful looks, how many years have you served in the United
States Marine Corps?
General Dunford. I have served, Chairman, a mere 35 years
in active duty.
Mr. Forbes. And in that 35 years with all of your
experience and the capacity, how detrimental do you think it
would be to your force if we launch out changing these
compensation packages before we have done these kinds of
reviews?
General Dunford. Chairman, I think it would be reckless to
make changes in our compensation packages right now without an
understanding of the effect. And I think that each of the
gentlemen that sit at this table and most of us all remember
the quality of force that we had in the late 1970s. And that is
exactly what we don't want to go back to.
As long as our Nation has made a decision that we are going
to have an all-volunteer force, then the critical aspect is
that we have to make sure that the compensation meets the
requirements of the all-volunteer force. And so whether it is
expensive or not really is relative to what you get from it.
And how much it costs may or may not be expensive when you
think about it in those terms.
And from my perspective, again, the chairman has said we
should look at compensation. We should study compensation. I am
not for a minute suggesting that there may not be rational and
good changes that we might make in compensation. But again, at
the end of the day we have to do that in a way that ensures
that we continue to recruit and retain that high-quality force.
And folks who lose sight of that I think are actually
heading down a path they have no idea what is on the other end.
Mr. Forbes. I would like to shift gears just a little bit.
And we hear a lot of discussions, both in Congress and across
the country today. If we were to not be forward-deployed, if we
would pull all of our troops, all of our assets, from across
the globe and bring them all back into the United States, that
that would be a more inexpensive way for us to conduct our
national defense and our foreign policy.
General Dunford, can you tell us how that would impact the
Marines if that was done? And whether or not you think that
would be a good policy for us to undertake?
General Dunford. I could, Chairman. First of all, as I
mentioned when the Congresswoman from Hawaii asked me, you
know, our forward-deployed and forward-based forces, you know,
provide an unmistakable sign of our commitment, both
economically and militarily, in a region. And they contribute
to regional stability. Being forward-deployed and forward-
engaged, again, allows us to shape the environment, as opposed
to reacting to the environment.
Being forward-deployed and forward-engaged allows us to
respond to crises in a timely manner and being forward-deployed
and forward-engaged certainly deters, you know, our potential
adversaries. To give you an example, from a time and space
perspective, of the impact of going back to the continental
United States, if you took the Third Marine Expeditionary Force
that is currently located on mainland Japan and in Okinawa and
soon to have elements on Guam, if you took that force and moved
it back to the continental United States, in the event of a
crisis or contingency, Chairman, it would take months to move
that force to the Western Pacific and seven consecutive
miracles in terms of synchronizing the planes, trains and
automobiles associated with moving that force.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral Ferguson.
Admiral Ferguson. Just a little over a week ago we had an
International Sea Powers Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island.
Over 100 navies were represented around the globe and nearly
all were chiefs of their navy that came to talk. An issue that
they raised repeatedly was, will you still be here with us? Are
you going to be forward and operate? And each of them in the
various regions of the world articulated the need for stability
against piracy.
To provide missile defense ships, to provide a shield for
our allies in Europe. A nuclear deterrent that is forward to be
able to operate with our partners, the Marine Corps. To be able
to project power both from a carrier air wing, from a
submarine, an SSGN [Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Submarine],
or from the amphibious forces. But the primary element is that
stability and surety to our allies, and the ability to be
forward and to respond quickly.
The demand for naval forces forward from the combatant
commanders has never been higher, both in Central Command and
in the Western Pacific, but also in other regions, be it
counter-drug or in Africa where humanitarian assistance is
needed. Or, to support Special Forces from international
waters. So we see that pulling back those forces and their
presence would abdicate the Nation's maritime leadership in the
world. And would really reduce our ability to influence, shape
events around the globe and provide stability.
Mr. Forbes. Thanks, Admiral.
General.
General Chiarelli. We understand that adjustments are going
to have to be made to forward-deployed Army forces. But at the
same time, we think it is absolutely critical. We think it is
absolutely critical from an engagement standpoint. The
relationships that are made when a young captain meets another
captain from another Service and they grow up together in their
own Services and have those connections back and forth are
absolutely critical.
Particularly in a strategy that is going to rely on the
ability of allies to assist us. Without that forward
engagement, that living and working and training with those
forces, we lose so much. So I would be very, very careful at
taking a look at just what the green eyeshade people would look
at when they look at forward-deployed-and-stationed forces.
I would look at some of the second and third order effects
and the intangibles of the relationships that are built and how
critical those relationships are in a time of crisis. It is
always good to have someone on the other side you can call. And
many of these engagements provide that to us.
Mr. Forbes. One of the other discussions we have had up
here from a lot of people, we sometimes get lost in the
nomenclature and the syntax and people will say, well, if we
make all these cuts we just simply have to come back and redo
our strategy so that we can't do as many missions. The Chairman
was kind enough to have, or smart enough, I guess, to have the
three former chairmen testify before our full committee a
couple weeks ago I guess it was. We had former Chairman Hunter
and Skelton and also former Chairman John Warner from the
Senate.
I asked each of them what warning would you want to give to
our committee, or to the Congress, from all of your years of
experience. And Congressman Skelton said that throughout his
tenure in Congress there were 13 contingencies. Twelve of those
were not predicted. Only one of them was predicted.
No matter what we do with our strategy in terms of changing
that, do any of you know of a time when any of your Services
were asked by the President of the United States to go perform
a mission, but you said, no, we can't do it, because it is not
in our strategy?
General Chiarelli.
General Chiarelli. No.
Mr. Forbes. No.
General Chiarelli. And I will give you an example from my
own career. When I was a division commander I spent a year in
Iraq. I came back and went into a reset phase. I was back for 3
months when Katrina hit the continental United States. I was
told at a time when I was at the lowest readiness level of
probably any unit in the United States Army, to pick up a
brigade and send it to New Orleans from Fort Hood, Texas,
within 24 hours.
When I asked the question, are you kidding me? We just got
back from Iraq, I was told, you don't understand. You pick up
your brigade, you be in New Orleans in 24 hours. We will never
fail you. We will always do it. But if we are not trained, if
we are not equipped, if we don't have the proper force
structure, the results will not be good. They will not be good.
Mr. Forbes. And General Chiarelli, would it be fair to say
that when you say the results would not be good, that includes
the number of men and women that come back from----
General Chiarelli. And that is exactly what I was trying to
show in my historical examples of the Kasserine Pass and Task
Force Smith. No one ever said, no, we are not going to take
Task Force Smith into Korea. They said ``Roger, we will do
it.'' But they went in with incomplete infantry battalions, a
poorly equipped and trained force, and they took 40 percent
casualties.
That is what happens. We will never say no. That I think we
all will promise you. But the key is the results when we do
that mission.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral Ferguson.
Admiral Ferguson. I would echo that. In the history of the
Nation we have never said no and we won't say no into the
future. And so, you know, our forces forward, they will be as
ready as we can make them. And we will operate forward. We will
be ready and we will take risk at home, rather than in any way
keep the forces that we have able to achieve the mission.
Mr. Forbes. Would you agree that if that risk is increased,
that risk means the risk of the number of men and women that
may come back from that mission, if we send them in unprepared
and unready?
Admiral Ferguson. I think all of us in the Service accept
that risk as part of the business of wearing this uniform and
serving the Nation. And we accept that as part of the calculus,
and that our mission as leaders is to make them as ready, to
give them the equipment and minimize that as much as possible.
Mr. Forbes. General Dunford.
General Dunford. Chairman, saying no to the commander in
chief is not in our DNA. We will never do that, we never have.
I would agree with what you and General Chiarelli and Admiral
Ferguson said. We will never say no, but if we do go into
harm's way without adequate equipment, without adequate
training, without adequate leadership, the cost of going into
harm's way without being ready, which is what we have
articulated here today, is the requirement to keep our forces
at a high state of readiness, not to have hollow forces, to be
prepared for the unexpected.
But the cost of going into harm's way without having been
attentive to balanced readiness is absolutely the cost of young
Americans.
Mr. Forbes. And one of the things that I mentioned that we
asked the former chairman was if you could give us one warning
about these cuts that are coming down, the things that would
happen. What would the warning be that you would give to this
subcommittee, that we could give to the full committee, that we
could give to Congress, from all of your years of experience?
What concerns you most?
And with that, please feel free at this time to tell us
anything that we have left out that you feel you want to get on
this record, so that we can give you that opportunity to do
that.
And then I am going to wrap up by letting the Chairman and
Ms. Bordallo have any final comments that they might want to
make.
Anybody want to start?
General Chiarelli. My biggest fear is that we will not be
able to--and we understand we are going to have to downsize the
Army. We already know we are going to 520--520,000--that is in
the books, 27,000 in force structure and 22,000 in a temporary
end-strength increase. I am concerned about losing the entire
temporary end-strength increase, because I have such a high
number of individuals that are in the disability evaluation
system and it is taking me way too long to get through that.
I won't go into it in great detail, but I would hope
someday we will look at the disability evaluation system, and
look to design a system built for an All-Volunteer Force,
rather than a system that currently is built for a conscript
force. I think that is a huge issue out there when it comes to
readiness that we have to look at.
But my fear is we won't do this in a balanced way. Whatever
size force we have at the end has got to be modernized, it has
to be well trained and maintained. That is absolutely critical.
And besides shrinking our force, the real mistake we have made
in the past is to take some kind of solace in the fact that
from the Army's standpoint we maintained a force structure of
X, you name it.
After World War II it was 530,000 folks. But it wasn't the
size of the force that got Task Force Smith into trouble. It
was the modernization of that force and the training of that
force that got it into trouble. That is what caused the
problem. That is what caused the 40-percent casualty rate.
So I just ask, as we look at this, that we do it with those
three rheostats that I talked about earlier on, that we look at
force structure, we look at modernization, and we look at
training and maintaining that force. And ensure that whatever
size the Army is at the end of this thing, that it is a well-
trained, modernized force that can do what the Nation asks it
to do.
Admiral Ferguson. I firmly believe America is a maritime
nation faced by two oceans, and our prosperity and our standing
in the world in many ways is ensured by the naval forces that
we are able to deploy forward.
Around the globe, potential competitors are working to
negate that advantage through anti-access aerial denial
capabilities, and we have to be able to pace that in the
modernization of our forces as we go forward.
Our allies and our friends look to us to provide stability
in the global common that is the sea. And we have assured them
that we are committed to do so. And I think that is an
important point of our security as we go forward.
As I think about the future, the element of balance within
the naval portfolio is important. It is about ensuring the
forces that we have, whatever level that we set on those from
the strategy and the fiscal environment, are extraordinarily
capable to meet that threat, they are able to be forward, they
are ready with adequate weapons, people, training, such that it
delivers to the President and to the Nation options that he can
use forward, away from our shores.
As I leave you with, you know, thoughts or things that
really affect me, I had the occasion to attend the memorial
service for the SEALs [Sea, Air, and Land teams] who were
killed in that crash in Afghanistan. And the strength of their
families and the commitment of those individuals who are
operating on a 700-day cycle, and they are gone for about 500
days of it, they have been doing this for 10 years of war, that
core of people in the United States who are willing to raise
their right hand and serve, to me we can never lose that. And
that is the most essential element.
Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. General Dunford.
General Dunford. Chairman, what concerns me is really what
I opened up with, and that is that we will make these cuts
without an adequate appreciation of the strategic implications,
the implications on our readiness, or the implications of
breaking faith, as Admiral Ferguson talked about.
And also, what concerns me is that folks would think that
if we get it wrong, well, we can just simply fix it in a year
or two. That is not possible, particularly in the latter
category. And if we break the trust of our marines, sailors,
soldiers and airmen today, it would be decades before we get it
back.
And so, some of the decisions that we make, both from an
industrial base perspective, but as importantly, from a human
factors perspective, the decisions we can't possibly get wrong.
We are not going to get it exactly right, but we can't afford
to get it wrong. And so, I am concerned about those two things.
And I think probably the last thing is that people would
assume that if the United States of America reduces in
capability, well, someone else will just be out there to pick
up the slack. Chairman, I don't know who that would be. And I
think who will pick up the slack are people who do not have
interests that are consistent with the United States of
America.
And I think we will assume extreme risk in regions that are
critical to the United States if we are not there, we are not
forward-deployed, we are not forward-engaged, we are not
assuring our allies, and we are not deterring our potential
foes. Those are the things that concern me.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
And we have been joined again by our Chairman. I would just
like to ask if he has any follow-on final questions or comments
he would like to offer.
The Chairman. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Not to drag this out, but I had a call several weeks ago
from a young man that I watched grow up. His dad is a good
friend of mine. And he is an Air Force officer. He is a
physician stationed down in San Antonio. And I guess he had
been talking to his dad, and his dad told him to call me. And
he said he has been in 12 years, he is looking at re-enlisting,
and he wanted to know what can I expect? What is my future?
What will be my retirement? He is enjoying the service, but he
is very concerned.
And I couldn't tell him. You know, I don't know what his
future is, because I don't know where all of this that we are
going through. And I was down at Camp Lejeune a couple of weeks
ago, and I was visiting with some marines and their wives. The
wives spoke up. And they are very concerned. Same questions.
You know, what happens on--can we look forward to a career?
I have seen this. I have seen this movie before. When I was
pretty new in the Congress, I was going up to visit West Point,
and I had a lieutenant colonel with me. They don't let us go
anywhere alone. And his dad had been the chief of the Army. No,
his grandpa had been the chief of the Army. His dad had been
the youngest brigadier in the Army. And then he suffered a
stroke, and that ended his career.
And this lieutenant colonel, his whole life, that was all
he ever wanted to do was serve in the military, and he was
being ``RIF'd'' [Reduction in Force], because his class at West
Point--they were about 3-year class--this was the drawdown
under Bush and Clinton earlier in the 1990s. And he didn't want
to leave. And he didn't have a choice.
And when we got to West Point, we were greeted by a
lieutenant colonel there, and he was also being RIF'd. It
didn't matter as much to him. I mean, he didn't want to leave,
but it--to the first guy, it meant a lot. And, you know, I
thought, that does break faith, as far as I am concerned. You
start somebody out on a career, you send them to West Point or
Annapolis, or Air Force Academy, and you make certain promises,
and then you break those promises, that is basically what has
happened.
And then I think about these young men that are going
outside the wire over in Afghanistan every day on patrol and if
they are having to think about what is happening about my
future, instead of concentrating on IEDs [Improvised Explosive
Device], or on snipers, or on ambushes, or just not being able
to be totally focused on their job. That puts them at risk
today, needlessly.
And I just--I----
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, we thank you for those comments
and for that passion that you have for our men and women who
serve in our military.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank General Dunford for his comments about the
Pacific area and how important it is that we continue to
increase our force structure. This is a troubled area. And, Mr.
Chairman, Mr. McKeon, and our Chairman of our subcommittee, I
live there. That is my home. And I want to know that we
Americans living in Guam and other islands surrounding us are
protected.
And to all of you who gave us information this afternoon, I
found it very valuable and how important it is to keep up the
strength of our military forces.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, too, all three of you, we thank you
for your service to our country, for the men and women who
serve under you. And I think you can tell from listening to
your testimony, you can tell from listening to the comments up
here, this is not just about procurement. It is not just about
aircraft carriers. It all does come down to individuals and
those men and women who serve under you.
All of us have those stories, stories that make this very,
very real. Mine was a young Marine, Colby Childers. Cody, all
he wanted to do from the time he was 11 was serve in the Marine
Corps. When he was 18, he became a Marine. When he was 19, I
was speaking at his funeral.
And Colby had two tattoos. One of them was an American
flag, red, white and blue. And one of them was his family. And
I was thinking at that funeral, as I looked, this is the
absolute best that America has to give.
And one of the things that we have got to make certain of,
General Chiarelli, you mentioned it, we don't break that faith,
that we continue that. Because, Admiral Ferguson, as you
mentioned, if we lose those people, if we lose those families,
this country has a tough, tough road for us to travel down.
And so, I think you can tell from this subcommittee we
don't plan to go quietly in the night. We plan to fight as much
as we can to make sure you guys never have a fair fight. We
don't want you to have a fair fight. And we want to make sure
the men and women who serve under you, who raise their hand,
that we are keeping that faith with them. And that we are
making sure they are the best-trained, best-prepared, best-
equipped military in the world.
And thank you for your careers and helping to make that
happen. And thank you for giving us a record that we can share
with other members of Congress to help make that a reality.
So thank you.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
October 27, 2011
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 27, 2011
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness
Hearing on
Readiness in the Age of Austerity
October 27, 2011
I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished
panel of experts to today's hearing focused on how we maintain
readiness in an age of austerity.
I want to thank our witnesses for being with us this
morning. I know several of you had to cancel long-standing
personal commitments to be with us this morning, and I
appreciate your willingness to testify before this subcommittee
once again on this most important topic.
I believe it is vital that you are all here with us today,
as I suspect this is one of the last opportunities for members
of this subcommittee to hear from the Services on the impacts
of the Budget Control Act before the ``super committee''
delivers its recommendations to the Congress.
All this year we have been exploring our current state of
readiness and discussing how we remain prepared to meet the
challenges we are likely to face in the future.
In July we explored our numerous challenges to readiness
and the difficulties we face in meeting COCOM requirements with
a force that Gen. Breedlove referred to as ``on the ragged
edge.''
Today we again explore readiness in the context of the
Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) and its potentially disastrous
effects on our military. While there seems to be a prevailing
consensus that sequestration under the BCA would be devastating
to the military, I remain concerned that we may have already
gone too far.
Over the last 20 months, the Department has reduced its 10-
year budget authority by $754 billion from the levels submitted
with the President's budget for Fiscal Year 2011.
It has already cancelled many of its most advanced systems
like the CG(X) next-generation cruiser program, the F-22, the
Army's Future Combat Systems, and the transformational
satellite program (TSAT), among others.
DOD has also already made tough decisions on force
structure and civilian personnel, shrinking the Marine Corps by
more than 15,000 marines, the active Army by 49,000 soldiers,
and freezing DOD civilian jobs at FY10 levels.
In short, for the past couple of fiscal years DOD has been
doing its part to reduce Federal spending. Tough choices have
already been made and the low-hanging fruit harvested.
The fact is, we now face strategic uncertainties.
Uncertainties such as whether the U.S. can maintain its proud
tradition of air superiority or whether the vital amphibious
capability of the Marine Corps is sustainable.
No doubt, there are many contributing factors that got us
where we are today. Many tough decisions still lie ahead, but
we all have a responsibility to ensure our men and women in
uniform are given all the tools necessary for the job we have
asked them to do.
I look forward to learning more about the real-world
impacts of the decisions we make here in Washington and hearing
from our witnesses about how we cope with these challenging
fiscal times while also maintaining a robust and capable
military.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
October 27, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
General Breedlove. The C-27J program is currently in the Low Rate
Initial Production phase. A Full Rate Production (FRP) decision review
was planned for June 2011, but was postponed in order for the Air Force
to consider options to reduce program life cycle costs. The FRP
decision remains on hold, pending the outcome of internal Department of
Defense programmatic and budgetary deliberations. [See page 16.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA
General Chiarelli. Over the past decade the Army has transformed
from a forward-deployed Army to an expeditionary Army capable of
providing the critical land component element of the Joint Force. The
Army has developed two specific expeditionary capabilities.
The Army's contribution to the Nation's Global Response Force (GRF)
consists of an Airborne Infantry Brigade Combat Team. This unit is
trained to execute a full spectrum of missions from fighting a modern
nation state military to conducting security force assistance with our
allies to providing humanitarian assistance. The Army provides a
tailored package of enablers to augment the Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
and ensures it has all the required capabilities to accomplish its
mission. In total, the Army's GRF consists of 8000 soldiers ready to
deploy on short notice. In conjunction with its joint partners, the
Army is prepared to deploy the GRF wherever the Nation's interests
require it.
In addition to the GRF, the Army has developed a sustainable 1-5-
20-90k expeditionary capability. This expeditionary force consists of a
Corps Headquarters, 5 Division Headquarters, 20 BCTs and a tailored
package of 90,000 enablers that can be sustained anywhere in the world
indefinitely with a partial mobilization of the Reserve Component, the
Total Army expeditionary force is a vital component of national
strategy. This is the capability the Army has deployed successfully to
Iraq and Afghanistan for the past decade. The downsizing of the Army
will reduce the size of the force but the capability will be sustained
as the land component of the Joint Force. [See page 22.]
Admiral Ferguson. Naval expeditionary forces are comprised of four
distinct pillars that combine capabilities to project power on land;
Amphibious Warfare, Mine Warfare (MIW), Navy Expeditionary Combat
Command (NECC), and Naval Special Warfare (NSW). Naval expeditionary
forces are manned, trained, equipped, and task-organized to support
operations from the sea. Unlike garrison forces, maritime expeditionary
forces provide the United States an asymmetric advantage by conducting
forward presence and force employment from international waters. This
capability has been tested across the full spectrum of operations to
include: Non-Combatant Evacuation in Lebanon; Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Relief in Pakistan/Japan; Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and
Personnel in Libya; Anti-Piracy operations off the coast of Somalia,
and combat operations in Afghanistan. The Navy's fleet of amphibious
ships--LHA, LHD, LPD, and LSDs--enables Navy and Marine Corps forces to
sustain forward presence, exert sea control over large areas, and
project power ashore. These survivable ships are equipped with rotary
and fixed wing aviation capabilities, surface assault landing craft,
assault forces, logistical sustainment, and joint command and control
capabilities. The agility and forward presence of naval expeditionary
forces provide combatant commanders flexible options and the ability to
rapidly employ forces in access denied areas. Additionally, forward-
deployed naval expeditionary forces are engaged in building partner
capacity with our coalition partners and allies across the globe. The
Navy's mine warfare capability includes support to operational
commanders with deployable staffs and operational/contingency plan
development, focusing efforts across numerous organizations and
operational commands to ensure Navy-wide competency in MIW. NECC
provides rapid deployable and agile expeditionary forces to warfare
commanders in support of maritime security operations around the globe.
NECC's capabilities include: Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD),
Riverine, Naval Construction (Seabees), Maritime Civil Affairs and
Security Training, Expeditionary Intelligence, Expeditionary Training
Group, Expeditionary Guard Battalion, Mobile Diving and Salvage,
Maritime Expeditionary Security, Expeditionary Logistics, and
Expeditionary Combat Readiness. It is comprised of several different
organizations and includes both active duty and reserve mission
specialists. NSW prepares and deploys individuals, elements and forces
with capability across the spectrum of defense, from cooperation to
combat, to meet the exercise, contingency, and wartime requirements of
the regional combatant commanders, theater special operations commands,
and numbered fleets located around the world. NSW forces are comprised
of Special Warfare Operators (SEALs), Special Warfare Boat Operators
(Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen--SWCC), and support personnel.
While these forces are directly in support of operations ashore, all
naval forces to include carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines
(SSGN) are considered expeditionary in that they are rotational and
project power ashore. Navy welcomes the opportunity to provide an in
depth brief of both the composition of its expeditionary forces as well
as a concept of operations in support of the Committee's desire to
fully understand this most important naval capability. [See page 22.]
General Dunford. During recent testimony you asked me to describe
the composition of an expeditionary force. I am pleased to do so and
appreciate your interest.
Expeditionary forces possess the capability to deploy to an area of
interest, to provide presence or response, and sustain themselves
without extensive reliance on host-nation support or overseas
infrastructure. They can survive and thrive under austere conditions.
They are flexible and adaptable, and have the ability to withdraw from
an operation, reorganize, and deploy to a different operation, all
without returning to their home stations.
Marine Corps Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) fit the definition of
expeditionary forces. They are established for specific missions, or in
anticipation of a wide range of possible missions. They have long
provided the United States with a broad spectrum of response options
when U.S. and allied interests have been threatened, be it from human
aggression or natural disasters. Selective, timely and credible
commitment of expeditionary air-ground units have, on many occasions,
helped bring stability to a region and sent signals worldwide to
aggressors that the United States is willing to defend its interests,
and is able to do so with a significantly powerful force on extremely
short notice.
MAGTFs are organized around four organic elements: command, ground
combat, aviation combat, and logistics.
The Command Element contains the MAGTF headquarters and
complimentary units that provide intelligence, communications, and
administrative support. It provides the command and control essential
for effective planning and execution of operations, and it synchronizes
the actions of each of its subordinate elements.
The Ground Combat Element (GCE) provides the over-land combat power
of the MAGTF. It can include infantry, artillery, reconnaissance,
engineer, armor, light armor, assault amphibian, and other forces as
required. The GCE can vary in size and composition. It can consist in
many forms from of a light, air-transportable battalion up to a
relatively heavy and mechanized unit of one or more divisions.
The Air Combat Element (ACE) provides a surveillance platform, lift
capability, assault support and close air support. It is formed around
an aviation headquarters with appropriate air-control agencies, in
addition to fixed and/or rotary wing aircraft units and air defense
units. An ACE can have a diverse mix of aircraft; from F/A-18 and AV-8B
jets to MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft to AH-1, UH-1, and CH-53 helicopters.
The Logistics Combat Element provides the supply and maintenance
support, ensuring the MAGTF's readiness and sustainability. It enhances
the mobility of the unit and allows the unit to establish architectures
that don't exist such as expeditionary runways. Its capabilities
include supply, maintenance, transportation, explosive ordinance
disposal, military police, water production and distribution, medical
and dental services, fuel storage and distribution, to name a few.
A MAGTF does not have a specific roster of equipment because, by
its very nature, it is scalable and task organized. To give you an idea
of the equipment that comprises a MAGTF--the Marine Corps has seven
rotating MAGTFs called Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). MEUs are the
smallest of the standing MAGTFs. They typically deploy with
approximately 200 marines in their Command Element, 1,200 in their
Ground Combat Element, 500 in their Air Combat Element, and 300 in
their Logistics Combat Element. Their major equipment items include
M1A1 tanks, M777 Howitzers, assault amphibian vehicles, high mounted
mobile wheeled vehicles, light armored reconnaissance vehicles, 7-ton
trucks, MV-22 Ospreys, CH-53 E Super Stallion helicopters, AH-1W Super
Cobras, UH-1N Hueys, AV-8B Harriers, and KC-130s.
Three critical components of naval expeditionary forces that
support MAGTFs are Navy ships, pre-positioning ships, and connectors.
Amphibious ships such as LHDs, LPDs, and LSDs give Marine Corps
expeditionary forces staying power by providing sovereign territory to
operate from at sea, and logistical sustainment obviating the
requirement for host nation support. Ships allow the U.S. military to
operate in areas without fixed bases. Pre-position ships allow
expeditionary forces to fall in on equipment already in the region.
Connectors, such as LCACs and LCUs, enable expeditionary force
personnel and equipment to embark on and debark off ships.
Thank you for your interest in our expeditionary force construct.
Please let me know if you have further questions. [See page 22.]
General Breedlove. Our expeditionary task force organizes
capabilities from across the Air Force to provide combatant commanders
with forces tailored to meet their specific requirements. Currently,
the expeditionary Air Force forces, comprised of squadrons, groups, and
wings, are filled by individuals or small teams from across the Air
Force, forming an Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF). While
this composition has served us well for the past 10 years, we realize
our expeditionary force presentation must evolve to better respond to
global crises.
Therefore, in the future, the Air Force will present its
expeditionary forces in terms of capability-based Airpower Teams
(APTs). The APTs will account for all elements of combat airpower, to
include the enabling functions of the Air Force, and will provide the
following expeditionary capabilities to the combatant commander:
strike, mobility, command and control, intelligence and surveillance
(C2ISR); space and cyberspace; special operations; and agile combat
support. The AETF will still be formed by squadrons, groups, and wings,
but will be filled by right-sized, capability-based APTs who train and
deploy together, thus improving the stability, predictability and
visibility for Airmen fulfilling Combatant Commander requirements. [See
page 22.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
October 27, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. Earlier this month, Army Chief of Staff GEN Raymond
Odierno said that the Army's end strength will likely shrink below the
preferred size of 520,000 soldiers that set before the Budget Control
Act was enacted. Given today's strategy, would you be able to
effectively prosecute your mission with a force of 500,000 or smaller?
General Chiarelli. The reduction in end strength will challenge the
Army's ability to project land power and execute Decisive Action in
many of the world's potential hot spots. This reduction will reduce the
Army's ability to build partnership capacity, to prevent and deter
conflicts, and protect American and Allied interests. The Army expects
an impact on its forward engagement presence and its ability to sustain
any long duration stability and support operations. The Army will
respond to any contingency that threatens our Nation and our way of
life, however, our ability to rapidly respond simultaneously will be
limited and could place our Soldiers and allies at risk. As the Active
Army decreases in size, the lesson of Task Force Smith must not be
forgotten. In post-World War II defense budgets, the Nation failed to
provide the resources required to enable the Army to adequately train,
equip, and organize itself for battle. The parallel between Task Force
Smith and now is most compelling. As a nation, if we fail to fully
resource the training, manning and equipping accounts for the Army that
remains, our Soldiers will pay the price in battle. The Army will
always answer the call, but the cost like in Korea in 1950 will be high
if the readiness accounts are not properly resourced. The current
strategy requires an Active Army that is more responsive to rapid
deployment. The requirement for an immediate response is the
justification for fully resourcing the Army's readiness accounts for
the Active and Reserve Component. As the early deployers are beginning
movement, key decisions on mobilizing the Reserve Component and
increasing Active Component readiness out of the reset pool must be
made in order to provide a sustained force presence.
Mr. Forbes. What impact to training (i.e. training miles, flying
hours, training ammo, spares, etc.) will the Budget Control Act have?
How would sequestration affect this important component of readiness?
General Chiarelli. Based on Budget Control Act required funding
level, the Army will potentially have to reduce the Ground Operations
Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Flying Hour Programs. This can impact on the Army's
ability to provide units trained for Decisive Action by reducing funded
miles and crew hours, thereby curtailing the number and intensity of
training events at home stations and at the Combat Training Centers.
This reduction in training would result in a reduced demand for
purchase of repair parts and would reduce required repairs of Depot
Level Reparable components and the workforce required to make those
repairs. The Army may have to curtail units scheduled to train at the
Combat Training Centers or send only portions of those units, limiting
the training value derived from training with world class Opposing
Forces, detailed and impartial After Action Review from the Observer
Controllers, and a robust Contemporary Operating Environment enabling
concurrent and simultaneous training in multiple environments against
hybrid threats. As a consequence, the Army could be challenged to
prepare for contingencies across the spectrum of conflict and may
require more time to prepare larger formations for deployment to meet
strategic objectives.
Budget Control Act reductions could also impact the Army's ability
to execute home station individual and collective gunnery training by
limiting the availability of ranges and deferring replacement of
damaged targets. Range modernization efforts may be impacted as the
construction footprint of several military construction (MILCON)
projects will not have Unexploded Ordnance clearance completed.
Reductions to Mission Training Complex capabilities could limit
Battalion, Brigade, Division, and Corps staff proficiency on their
mission command systems in a realistic training environment. Training
Support Centers may not be able to provide Instructor/Operator support
for numerous complex virtual trainers, including for flight simulators
and support for Medical Simulation Training.
Budget Control Act reductions may also impact on the Army's
Institutional Training capability to conduct Initial Military Training
and critical functional skills training. This could result in a back
log of recruits awaiting training at the institutional training base.
Soldiers may not receive duty specific skill training required by the
Soldier's unit thus contributing to degradation in unit readiness.
Additionally, funding reductions may impact the Army's ability to
develop agile and adaptive leaders at all levels by reducing the Army's
capacity to conduct Professional Military Education.
Mr. Forbes. If sequestration severely degraded our depot
maintenance capability, how would that impact your ability to
successfully prosecute your mission as it stands today?
General Chiarelli. With sequestration, we estimate depot
maintenance funding would support only 50% (or less) of Depot
Maintenance Requirements. This would have a detrimental impact on the
overall readiness of the Army and our ability to meet current and
future contingency operational requirements. A 50% funding level
reduces the Army's ability to sustain critical organic depot core
capabilities. This funding level would require the Army to reassess and
rightsize the workforce, leading to releasing all contractor and
temporary/term Government employees who were hired to support critical
wartime surge requirements. It is likely the Army will need to release
some permanent employees who possess the critical workforce skills
necessary to support our current wartime requirements. These workforce
reductions would degrade the Army's ability to surge in support of
future contingency operations.
Mr. Forbes. If sequestration were to occur, my understanding is
that every discretionary account would be cut equally. What are the
repercussions of a cut of such a large magnitude and indiscriminate
nature? How does it affect the All-Volunteer Force?
General Chiarelli. Although equal, across-the-board cuts would only
apply to Fiscal Year (FY) 13, the magnitude of cuts under sequestration
to both military and civilian force structure, readiness, and
modernization would be devastating. The indiscriminate nature of these
large and arbitrary cuts in FY13 does not allow the Army to provide the
necessary flexibility to react to the uncertain security environment.
Overall, such reductions would result in lower readiness levels of
units, adversely impact our modernization efforts, and degrade the
defense industrial base. Moreover, we risk breaking faith with our
Soldiers and their Families who have performed superbly over ten years
of continuous conflict. Sustaining the all-volunteer force is
absolutely essential for the Army's ability to support our Nation's
defense.
Mr. Forbes. Since the FY11 budget submission, the Department has
seen its budget erode through H.R. 1, the ``Budget Control Act,'' the
$178 billion efficiencies initiative, and most recently, OMB guidance
for FY2013 that holds spending at FY2010 levels. Many would argue that
the military has already done its share for deficit reduction. Do you
agree with that assessment? Should DOD be immune from further cuts?
General Chiarelli. While recognizing the Nation's deficit
challenges, it is imperative that any future reductions to Army's
budget be based on comprehensive strategic analysis. Further we must
ensure that we preclude hollowing the Army by maintaining balance in
force structure, readiness, modernization efforts, and commitments to
the all-volunteer force. The Army will take a comprehensive approach
towards executing these potential cuts to ensure we do not create a
hollow Army.
Mr. Forbes. How would a long-term CR further exacerbate the cuts
prescribed under the Budget Control Act?
General Chiarelli. Acquisition strategies and military construction
projects generally avoid contracting efforts (new start, production and
construction contract awards) in the 1st quarter of any fiscal year due
to the likelihood of a CR. Additional CR's that extend into the 2nd
quarter of FY12 may impact the Army's investment strategy.
Additionally, the lack of an appropriation holds the Army to draft
congressional language, which includes rescissions (reductions to prior
year funding) and marks (reductions to current year requests). Finally,
there would be no funding for expansion of ongoing programs, new
starts, or new multiyear procurements using advance procurement
funding. The results would be limiting procurement to last year's
efforts, no ability to assimilate new technologies against an evolving
enemy, or gain efficiencies through economic order quantities.
Mr. Forbes. What impact to training (i.e. training miles, flying
hours, training ammo, spares, etc.) will the Budget Control Act have?
How would sequestration affect this important component of readiness?
Admiral Ferguson. Should sequestration occur, it is expected to
have an adverse impact on Navy training. In general, we will experience
reduced flying hours and steaming days, with a resulting decrease in
overall readiness and operational capability of the force. Reductions
in our training accounts will limit the ability of our forces to meet
combatant commander requests for forces in a timely manner.
Mr. Forbes. If sequestration severely degraded our depot
maintenance capability, how would that impact your ability to
successfully prosecute your mission as it stands today?
Admiral Ferguson. Reduced depot maintenance would adversely impact
mission readiness and our industrial base. While the Navy's approach of
``resetting in stride'' between deployments has enabled it to maintain
an acceptable and stable overall readiness posture, the current
increased demand has compressed the time to execute intermediate-level
and unit-level maintenance. If sustained, reduced funding for
maintenance would decrease the service lives of our ships and aircraft
as well as increase maintenance expenses over the long term. Reductions
over the long term in maintenance funding would reduce our industrial
base, as there would be insufficient work to sustain our private sector
repair yards. A reduction in capacity would limit our ability to both
prevent maintenance backlogs and recover from them in the future.
Mr. Forbes. If sequestration were to occur, my understanding is
that every discretionary account would be cut equally. What are the
repercussions of a cut of such a large magnitude and indiscriminate
nature? How does it affect the All-Volunteer Force?
Admiral Ferguson. Sequestration applies uniform percentage cuts to
each ``program, project, and activity'' which means that every weapons
program, research project, and military construction project will have
to cut by an equal percentage. Under current law, the Department of the
Navy is not granted the discretion to adjust or prioritize these
reductions causing our readiness and procurement accounts to face a
reduction of about 18 percent. This reduction would increase to
approximately 25 percent in the event military personnel funding is
exempted from full sequestration. The size of these cuts would
substantially impact our ability to resource the Combatant Commander's
operational plans and maintain our forward presence around the globe.
The Navy will continue to be able to perform its missions but will be
smaller--and less globally available--than the Navy today. With fewer
ships, response times to crises will be longer, non-deployed forces
will be less ready and sustained naval presence will not be possible in
some regions. The development of new capabilities will be slowed and
the fleet may be unable to overcome improvements by our potential
adversaries in their efforts to deny Joint operational access.
With this magnitude of reduction, the Navy would face severe and
long-lasting impacts:
Programs involving a purchase, such as construction
of a ship, submarine, aircraft, or building, could not be
executed as currently programmed. Cuts of this nature would
result in the breaking of existing multiyear contracts, and
could severely disrupt our suppliers and the industrial base;
Reduced funding for other weapons procurement
programs would drive up unit cost, resulting in reduced
quantities and delivery delays;
Research and development programs would be delayed or
cancelled;
Flying hours and steaming days would be reduced;
Selected depot maintenance availabilities would be
cancelled;
Civilian personnel would be at risk for furloughs;
and
Funding for readiness and training would be reduced.
All of these cuts would affect our all-volunteer force with
reductions in training, extended deployment cycles, postponement of
facilities restoration and modernization projects on our bases,
curtailment of all non-readiness travel, and degradation of facilities
service levels.
Mr. Forbes. Since the FY11 budget submission, the Department has
seen its budget erode through H.R. 1, the ``Budget Control Act,'' the
$178 billion efficiencies initiative, and most recently, OMB guidance
for FY2013 that holds spending at FY2010 levels. Many would argue that
the military has already done its share for deficit reduction. Do you
agree with that assessment? Should DOD be immune from further cuts?
Admiral Ferguson. We recognize the fiscal challenges facing our
Nation. It is clear that, particularly in this environment, the Navy
must use its resources in the most efficient manner possible to achieve
the maximum return on investment to the U. S. taxpayer. Additional
reductions to DOD funding should be based upon our national security
strategy and balanced against the other demands for federal funding.
Mr. Forbes. How would a long-term CR further exacerbate the cuts
prescribed under the Budget Control Act?
Admiral Ferguson. The combination of a long-term Continuing
Resolution (CR) and the budget cuts prescribed in the Budget Control
Act would have significant impact on our operations and manpower
accounts due to our limited ability to recover deferred work and
actions in future fiscal years.
Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) funding is our most significant
challenge under a CR. Near term effects will be the deferral of nearly
all PCS orders not associated with separations or retirements starting
in January, 2012. If we operate under a full year CR for FY12, we will
have shortfall of approximately $1.6B in our pay accounts. To overcome
this shortfall, our primary recourse would be an Above Threshold
Reprogramming (ATR) to shift funds from procurement and readiness
accounts into MPN because there is not sufficient flexibility in our
manpower account to accommodate the entire shortfall.
As the length of time the Navy must operate under a CR in FY 12
increases, the flexibility to manage our Operations and Maintenance,
Navy (OMN) accounts decreases. This shortfall may be mitigated, but not
without consequences. Actions we will be forced to take include the
deferment of depot maintenance on our ships and aircraft, postponement
of almost all facilities restoration and modernization projects on our
bases, civilian hiring freezes and reduction or cancellation of bonus
programs, reductions in post-deployment training phases, curtailment of
all non-readiness travel, and degradation of facilities service levels.
If we operate under a full year CR for FY12, we face an OMN shortfall
of approximately $2.6B.
For our investment programs, long-term operation under a full year
CR for FY12 will result in impact to procurement due to the inability
to execute multi-year contracts, achieve quantity increases, and
commence new start programs.
As the Budget Control Act reductions take place in FY13, the near
term effects of a CR are more critical and the Departments seeks
approval of the FY12 appropriations before January, 2012.
Mr. Forbes. What impact to training (i.e. training miles, flying
hours, training ammo, spares, etc.) will the Budget Control Act have?
How would sequestration affect this important component of readiness?
General Dunford. The full impact of the Budget Control Act and
subsequent sequestration increase risk and degrade our ability to
maintain readiness. Fiscal reductions will not be focused in any one
single category of Marine Corps funds; spending reductions will likely
span each of the Marine Corps accounts: manpower, operations and
maintenance, and investment. A reduction in funding to any one or all
of these accounts will have a negative impact on readiness.
Manpower: Unless demand for Marine Operations
declines proportionately, lower investment in manpower
translates to fewer marines. If fewer units are available to
respond when needed, dwell times between deployments for
marines will shrink. Less dwell time between deployments means
less time to train, maintain equipment, and increases stress on
marines and families, ultimately placing at risk the all-
volunteer force.
Operations & Maintenance: A reduction in funding to
the operations and maintenance account will degrade Marine
Corps training at every level, from the small-unit to the large
scale Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). In addition,
forward-deployed training with partner nations and allies will
be reduced.
Investment: Reducing the investment account causes
our equipment to age more quickly that it can be replaced or
refurbished. This not only increases the operations &
maintenance funding required, but eventually causes a gap when
the equipment cannot be maintained at required readiness
levels, at required quantities, or the equipment becomes
technologically obsolete. It ultimately places modernization at
risk and negatively affects our ability to incorporate
innovative technologies and warfighting capabilities.
Mr. Forbes. If sequestration severely degraded our depot
maintenance capability, how would that impact your ability to
successfully prosecute your mission as it stands today?
General Dunford. If sequestration occurs, the Marine Corps will
have to make difficult choices about the allocation of funding in all
accounts--including depot maintenance. The Marine Corps relies on our
depot maintenance facilities and providers to rebuild equipment marines
have worn out over the last decade, in both combat/stability operations
overseas and home station training. Our depot maintenance providers
will be critical as we bring equipment back from theater and then rely
on it to return units to their prewar readiness levels. Sequestration
will create additional risks to the Marine Corps mission as America's
``Force in Readiness.'' The Commandant has made clear that the Marine
Corps will ask only for what is required to prosecute our mission
successfully, and depot maintenance funding is a requirement.
Mr. Forbes. If sequestration were to occur, my understanding is
that every discretionary account would be cut equally. What are the
repercussions of a cut of such a large magnitude and indiscriminate
nature? How does it affect the All-Volunteer Force?
General Dunford. Large, across-the-board cuts to our budget harm
the Marine Corps and the Joint Force we leverage for success in crises.
Marines serve our Nation by leveraging a frugal blend of joint
capabilities, especially lift, acquisition, and logistical support. We
maintain a very lean organizational structure with significantly lower
overhead than the other Services while generating the highest tooth-to-
tail ratio in DOD. We have fewer General Officers and the smallest
percentage of civilian employees when compared to our sister Services.
In our all-volunteer force, Manpower comprises 60% of our Total
Obligation Authority, the largest percentage among the Services. Given
this already lean force, a cut applied equally to the Marine Corps
removes a disproportionate amount of operational capability from the
Nation's Expeditionary force in readiness.
Mr. Forbes. Since the FY11 budget submission, the Department has
seen its budget erode through H.R. 1, the ``Budget Control Act,'' the
$178 billion efficiencies initiative, and most recently, OMB guidance
for FY2013 that holds spending at FY2010 levels. Many would argue that
the military has already done its share for deficit reduction. Do you
agree with that assessment? Should DOD be immune from further cuts?
General Dunford. The Marine Corps is fully aware of the fiscal
challenges facing our Nation and will remain faithful stewards of
funding that we receive. Over the past two years, the Marine Corps has
aggressively sought and found efficiencies in how we spend our scarce
resources. These efficiencies have created a lean Marine Corps that
remains capable of serving as America's ``Force in Readiness''.
However, further cuts significantly increase readiness risk and will
further challenge our efforts to train and equip marines. As Congress
moves forward with the difficult fiscal challenges ahead, the Marine
Corps remains committed to its tradition of frugality. Additional
indiscriminate funding cuts beyond those already imposed will have a
devastating impact on the Marine Corps ability to meet known
warfighting requirements.
Mr. Forbes. How would a long-term CR further exacerbate the cuts
prescribed under the Budget Control Act?
General Dunford. The Marine Corps is fully aware of the fiscal
challenges facing our Nation. Under a Continuing Resolution (CR), OSD
policy requires the Services to manage funds at the line item or
program level vice at the appropriation level, thereby limiting
flexibility to reallocate funds to higher priority requirements
requested in the pending appropriations legislation. New starts and
military construction cannot be initiated under a CR without specific
approval; and individual projects must be specifically authorized and
appropriated.
The impacts of a long-term CR are manageable at the beginning of
the fiscal year but grow dramatically as the year continues. A CR
extended beyond the end of the calendar year creates an unmanageable
shortfall in the Marine Corps manpower account. While the Marine Corps
can mitigate some of this manpower shortfall through management
actions, a significant reprogramming action will require offsetting
resources from other critical accounts (investment or operations and
maintenance) which are already reduced to minimum levels, and create
challenges for equipment levels, training readiness, and our marines'
quality of life until there is a final appropriations bill.
Mr. Forbes. Gen. Breedlove, you have mentioned on several occasions
that the Air Force will likely have an enduring mission in CENTCOM
after our troops leave Afghanistan and Iraq. Similarly, you have been
called upon to support a host of other operations in support of NATO in
Libya and humanitarian lift in South America and Asia. Will the Air
Force be able to meet all these commitments in the future with the cuts
contained in the Budget Control Act or under sequestration? Will we be
forced to make tradeoffs supporting important mission like Air
Sovereignty Alert and support for the other combatant commanders?
General Breedlove. The Air Force has accepted increased risk to the
total force in order to maximize support to the geographic commanders.
As demands for our assets increase, the Air Force has capability areas
that are rotating at or near one to one dwell. To mitigate our
personnel readiness concerns, the Air Force uses a modified deployment
construct to account for surge and to capture actual risk levels. To
continue to meet geographic commanders' taskings, through the Global
Force Management process, the Air Force will provide capabilities to
meet the demand. As budget reductions take effect driving the Air Force
to a smaller force, we will have to re-examine our capabilities and
determine what we would no longer be able to provide the joint team.
Sequestration could require the Air Force to stop performing lesser
priority tasks and redirect resources in order to ensure we preserve
readiness in core functions. The Air Force will meet Aerospace Control
Alert (new terminology for ``Air Sovereignty Alert'') mission and other
missions with trained, ready, and capable airpower with a balanced
approach across the total force.
Mr. Forbes. In July you mentioned that the Air Force had the oldest
fleet in its history. Given that the Air Force has been challenged in
recent years to keep backlogged aircraft maintenance low and mission
capable rates up, even as OPTEMPO remains high, how does the Air Force
intend to keep platforms going beyond their expected service life in
this constrained budgetary environment?
General Breedlove. The Air Force remains focused on maximizing
aircraft service life through a number of formalized fleet health
sustainment programs. Most platforms leverage proactive integrity
programs, such as the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program, in which
areas such as airframe strength, durability, damage tolerance,
corrosion control, and material defects are closely managed.
Additionally, avionics modernization programs focus on continuous
avionics and software systems upgrades to capitalize on emerging
technology to address diminishing manufacturing sources and retain
capability in dynamic threat environments. Furthermore, many platforms
undergo formal Service Life Extension Programs in which structural,
propulsion, avionics, and mechanical subsystems are extended and/or
upgraded. Also, the Air Force utilizes the Fleet Viability Board to
provide the Secretary of the Air Force/Chief of Staff of the Air Force
with technical assessments of aging Air Force fleets, leading to
sustainment or retirement decisions. Lastly, the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board promotes the exchange of the latest scientific and
technical information to enhance the accomplishment of the Air Force
mission. These proven programs are critical to ensuring continued
airworthiness for service life extensions. Adequate funding will ensure
supply chains, maintenance operations, and flying operations avoid
further stress, which could negatively impact war readiness engine
levels, aircraft availability, and mission readiness. However, even if
all those programs are funded robustly, the Air Force legacy platforms
continue to be operated with increased risk due to a variety of
``unknowns'' associated with the oldest fleet in Air Force history.
Mr. Forbes. Gen. Breedlove, the Air Force has already had to reduce
its flying hour training program and is currently reexamining its mix
of live and virtual training, including opportunities to rely more on
the use of simulators. How will the Budget Control Act and
sequestration impact this vital component of individual and unit
readiness?
General Breedlove. The Air Force will continue to leverage critical
live fly training with increasingly capable virtual training devices
and simulators. The Air Force continually reassesses the mix between
live fly and virtual training to strike the right balance. As simulator
technology and fidelity improve, training methods and simulator
capabilities are assessed to ensure requirements are met as efficiently
and effectively as possible. The Air Force has already shifted a
significant amount of live fly training into our simulators. Reductions
in flying hours require investments in infrastructure and training
system upgrades and procurement. Unit commanders assess unit readiness
on a monthly basis via the Status of Resources and Training System
(SORTS) and the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Unit
training programs track Individual readiness. Any negative training
impact to Air Force operational readiness would be reported and tracked
through those reporting systems. During these fiscally constrained
times, the Air Force will balance our resources to meet our priorities
with our total force. As budget reductions take effect driving the Air
Force to a smaller force, we will have to re-examine our capabilities
and determine what we would no longer be able to provide the joint
team. Sequestration could require the Air Force to stop performing
lesser priority tasks and redirect resources in order to ensure we
preserve readiness in core functions.
Mr. Forbes. Gen. Breedlove, there have been several press reports
calling into question the viability of the current and future bomber
fleet in this challenging budgetary environment. How vital is our
bomber fleet to current mission requirements? What level of risk would
we be accepting if we divest ourselves of our bomber capability?
General Breedlove. A viable and capable conventional force is
critical to the shaping, deterrence, seizing the initiative, and
dominate phases of military operations. Our current and future bomber
force is vital in each of these phases. Long range bombers provide the
Joint Force Commander with unique capabilities to assure allies and
persuade potential adversaries in a deliberate and controlled manner.
In deterrence operations, bombers offer unique attributes: they are
survivable and responsive when generated, inherently able to signal
resolve, and critical to extended deterrence and assurance. Should
shaping and deterrence efforts fail, the bomber force is especially
capable of quickly seizing the initiative in a joint operation.
Examples of this are the beginning air strikes in OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM flown by B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s and, more recently, the first
air strikes flown by B-2s in Libya, OPERATION ODYSSEY DAWN.
Contributions of the bomber force in the dominate phase of operations
is unparalleled due to the persistency, range, and payload of the
bomber force. In OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, B-2s flew less than one
percent of the sorties but dropped 11 percent of the bombs. In OIF/OEF,
B-1s have flown five percent of the sorties and account for 40 percent
of the bombs delivered. Under the Budget Control Act, the Air Force may
have to incur greater risk to our warfighting strategy by reducing
bomber force structure and modernization programs. Should sequestration
occur, the Air Force would be forced to take even more risks within the
bomber force. This could result in a much higher campaign consequences
such as higher Coalition losses and longer campaign timelines.
Mr. Forbes. What impact to training (i.e. training miles, flying
hours, training ammo, spares, etc.) will the Budget Control Act have?
How would sequestration affect this important component of readiness?
General Breedlove. Further reductions driven by the Budget Control
Act would require an enterprise-wide review of all resources and the
potential elimination of training for lower priority missions and
capabilities. The Air Force will continue to leverage critical live fly
training with virtual training devices and simulators to ensure our
force meets requirements as efficiently and effectively as possible.
As budget reductions take effect driving the Air Force to a smaller
force, we will have to re-examine our capabilities and determine what
we would no longer be able to provide the joint team. Sequestration
could require the Air Force to stop performing lesser priority tasks
and redirect resources in order to ensure we preserve readiness in core
functions. The impacts of sequestration will not produce an across the
board reduction in readiness. The Air Force must assess the risks then
balance available funds among force structure, readiness, and
modernization accounts to deliver trained, ready, and capable airpower
for the highest priority mission areas.
Mr. Forbes. If sequestration severely degraded our depot
maintenance capability, how would that impact your ability to
successfully prosecute your mission as it stands today?
General Breedlove. In a sequestration environment, the Air Force
would need to make sustainment and modernization decisions to optimize
readiness. The Air Force would identify maintenance to defer based upon
capability priorities in line with Department of Defense strategies and
guidance. The impact of this deferred maintenance would likely be to
reduce the size and flexibility of our industrial base, to include the
three organic depots. The Air Force would make a more precise
assessment of impacts to mission accomplishment upon our receipt and
analysis of a funding status on force structure changes, flying hour
distribution, and prioritized distribution of sustainment funds.
Effective management of force structure and depot maintenance
requirements would be key components in maintaining maximum possible
mission readiness. Presently, the Air Force has not deferred any
required depot maintenance.
Mr. Forbes. If sequestration were to occur, my understanding is
that every discretionary account would be cut equally. What are the
repercussions of a cut of such a large magnitude and indiscriminate
nature? How does it affect the All-Volunteer Force?
General Breedlove. Sequestration would drive an additional
reduction above the first phase of the Budget Control Act reductions to
the Air Force FY13 budget request. Additional programs would need to be
restructured, reduced, and/or terminated. All investment accounts would
be impacted including our high-priority Acquisition Category I
modernization efforts such as MQ-9, Joint Strike Fighter, and KC-46A.
Sequestration would drive potential internal realignment and loss or
de-scoping of military construction projects. The Air Force would need
to implement actions to the operations & maintenance appropriation such
as reductions to flying hours and weapon system sustainment; curtail
training; slowdown civilian hiring and implement potential furloughs or
reductions in forces; reduce daily operations to emphasize mission
critical operations (i.e. training, supplies, equipment); and defer/
stop infrastructure investments and mission bed downs. Absorbing these
reductions would drive readiness impacts, potentially ``hollowing out''
the force while making our ability to cover any emergent execution year
requirements (i.e., fuel price increase or Libya operations) extremely
difficult.
Sequestration would undoubtedly have negative long-term effects on
the all-volunteer force, which will ultimately diminish the Air Force's
ability to recruit and retain the best Airmen. Recruiting funds would
be reduced, resulting in less contact with potential Airmen and limited
recruitment opportunities. Top talent would be increasingly influenced
to seek opportunities in the private sector. Reductions in training
resources would reduce agility and make it more difficult for the Air
Force to shape the force into the remaining and emerging mission areas.
Civilian workforce reductions would need to occur, putting increased
demand and responsibility on a shrinking force. When the economy
recovers, the Air Force's ability to retain experienced Airmen would
become increasingly difficult.
The President has indicated that he would exempt the military
personnel appropriation from sequestration meaning that larger
reductions would be required in other areas. Programmatic decisions
could ultimately drive associated changes in authorized end strength.
However, it is not possible to determine the specific manpower impacts
until a corporate strategy is developed.
Mr. Forbes. Since the FY11 budget submission, the Department has
seen its budget erode through H.R. 1, the ``Budget Control Act,'' the
$178 billion efficiencies initiative, and most recently, OMB guidance
for FY2013 that holds spending at FY2010 levels. Many would argue that
the military has already done its share for deficit reduction. Do you
agree with that assessment? Should DOD be immune from further cuts?
General Breedlove. The Department of Defense has proactively
pursued a budget reduction/efficiencies strategy and the Air Force has
taken its share of reductions over the past few years. As the
Administration moves forward to reduce the deficit, no one will be
immune from further cuts. However, any further cuts should be based on
reductions in force structure or mission changes. Reductions without
programmatic content should be avoided.
Mr. Forbes. How would a long-term CR further exacerbate the cuts
prescribed under the Budget Control Act?
General Breedlove. A long-term Continuing Resolution (CR) would
create significant impacts within the investment, Military Construction
(MILCON), and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations. For the
Military Personnel (MILPERS) appropriation, a long-term CR would not
drive significant issues as long as Congress authorizes the military
pay raise and other incentive authorities on 1 January 2012 and an
appropriation is received before the last payroll of the fiscal year.
A long-term CR would drive potential breaks in contracts or delays
in production, forcing a major restructuring of Air Force acquisition
programs. Without specific authority, MILCON projects cannot be awarded
and would drive inefficient management and workarounds. For O&M, a
long-term CR would drive inefficient management of contracts which
drives additional workload to process various contract modifications
for each CR period. It also decreases the Air Force ability to make
strategic decisions to properly fund Air Force missions. To stay within
CR limits, the Air Force would need to defer infrastructure and mission
bed downs, continue hiring slow downs, reduce daily operations such as
travel, training supplies and equipment along with applying reductions
to aircrew training and weapon system sustainment. In addition,
covering unplanned execution year bills such as fuel price increases or
cash flowing Libya or similar operations would further reduce O&M
flexibility. A long-term CR bow waves requirements into out-years with
ripple effects into the POM. Programs that were scheduled to start or
increased quantities in FY12 would not be allowed to go forward without
specific Congressional language and would impact programs scheduled for
FY13.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. The Stryker vehicle has grown considerably in weight
and size over the last decade with the addition of valuable capability
enhancements and protection to support its mission. The addition of
Slat armor for RPG protection when first installed added nearly 6,000
pounds and 36 inches of width to the vehicle. This increased weight and
size has significantly impacted the initial mobility of the platform.
My question revolves around what has the Army done to reduce the weight
of the vehicle to recapture this mobility? I understand that
improvements to the slat armor reduce that kit weight to 3500 pounds
several years ago but net-based improvements in RPG protection since
then have not only increased the protection level but have reduced the
kit weight to around 1100 pounds. Are these net-based RPG protection
kits being installed and deployed on the Strykers today and if not, why
are we not capitalizing on this enhanced protection and significant
weight reduction?
General Chiarelli. The net-based Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG)
protection kits are not being installed and deployed on Strykers today.
The Capabilities and Limitations Report published in October 2011 by
the Army Test and Evaluation Command states that the net-based RPG
protection kits provide less protection than Slat Armor. The Project
Management Office for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team has questioned
this finding and is requesting additional information from the Army
Evaluation Center to determine what test data this assessment was based
on, and to assess if additional testing is required to do a more
rigorous comparison between the two protection kits. This effort is in
the initial stages and it is too soon to establish the number and type
of tests required. This data is needed to complete a detailed schedule
for the assessment. Most importantly, I assure you and the American
people that we will make the right decision that provides our Soldiers
the very best protection possible.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Robey. In working with the bases in my state, I understand the
Army has a goal to have a joint multi-role aircraft for rotary wing
transport on the books by 2030. The concern is that emphasis has been
placed on modernizing our current rotary wing fleet and we may have
lost sight on moving to a new platform. Current platforms are going
limited even with modernization in several areas that we must move
forward including: need crafts to go faster than 200 knots, reducing
logistic footprint and reduce fuel consumption. With all of the
concerns of what the action of Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction will have on DOD appropriations, what will the possible
reduction in appropriations do in impacting that deadline?
General Chiarelli. Reductions in appropriations for the Department
of Defense could delay the development of technologies that could be
applicable to the Joint Multi-Role Aircraft (JMR). Stable funding is
key to developing and maturing these required technologies.
The Army fully intends to continue to pursue development of the JMR
in an attempt to fill capability gaps that cannot be addressed now
because current technologies are either infeasible or too immature.
These capability gaps are in the areas of survivability, lethality,
performance, maintainability, supportability, flexibility, and
versatility. Development of the JMR will lead to common aircraft
components that will be scalable in size and will provide a common
aircraft architecture that will support mission-specific equipment
packages to meet future vertical lift requirements.
While the Army pursues the development of the JMR, it must also
continue with modernization efforts on current platforms to ensure that
Army aviation units are modular, capable, lethal, tailorable, and
sustainable. These modernization efforts mitigate capability gaps until
the JMR technologies mature.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
