[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-76]
THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
AND THE UNITED STATES MILITARY TEN
YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LEON PANETTA
AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 13, 2011
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DUNCAN HUNTER, California LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado BILL OWENS, New York
TOM ROONEY, Florida JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia TIM RYAN, Ohio
CHRIS GIBSON, New York C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE HECK, Nevada BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member
Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, October 13, 2011, The Future of National Defense and
the United States Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives
of Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey......................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, October 13, 2011....................................... 53
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2011
THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES MILITARY TEN YEARS
AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LEON PANETTA AND
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Dempsey, GEN Martin, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff........ 8
Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Dempsey, GEN Martin.......................................... 65
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 57
Panetta, Hon. Leon E......................................... 61
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 59
Documents Submitted for the Record:
U.S. Army Commands and Organizations......................... 73
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 83
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 86
Mrs. Davis................................................... 82
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 90
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 93
Mr. Jones.................................................... 77
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 88
Mr. Owens.................................................... 87
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 96
Mr. Rigell................................................... 92
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 97
Mr. Rogers................................................... 82
Mr. Smith.................................................... 77
Mr. Turner................................................... 79
THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES MILITARY TEN YEARS
AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LEON PANETTA AND
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, October 13, 2011.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Before I
begin. Please let me welcome members of the public who are in
attendance, but remind our audience that our committee will
tolerate no disruptions of this proceeding. This including
standing, holding up signs, or yelling. If anyone disturbs
these proceedings, we will have the Capitol Police escort you
out immediately.
The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive
testimony on the future--the committee will stand in recess
until the Capitol Police escort the disruptive individuals out
of the room and restore order.
[Disturbance in hearing room.]
The Chairman. The House Armed Services Committee needs to
receive testimony on ``The Future of National Defense and the
U.S. Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives of the
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey.'' This hearing is part
of our ongoing series to evaluate lessons learned since 9/11,
and to apply those lessons to decisions we will soon be making
about the future of our Force. As our series draws to a close,
we have received perspectives of former military leaders from
each of the Services, former chairmen of the Armed Services
Committee, as well as outside experts.
Today we will change direction as we look to the viewpoints
of our sitting Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Our witnesses today have spent decades serving
our Nation. Thank you both for being with us and for your
public service. As I continue to emphasize our successes in the
Global War on Terror and in Iraq and Afghanistan, we appear to
be lulling our Nation into a false confidence of a September
10th mindset. Too many appear to believe that we can maintain a
solid defense that is driven by budget choices, not strategic
ones. While I agree that the military cannot be exempt from
fiscal belt tightening, we have to put this debt crisis into
perspective if we are to find our way back into fiscal
responsibility.
Defense has contributed more than half of the deficit
reduction measures taken to date. There are some in government
who want to use the military to pay for the rest, to protect
the sacred cow that is entitlement spending. Not only should
that be a non-starter from a national security and economic
perspective, but it should also be a nonstarter from a moral
perspective. Consider that word, ``entitlements.'' Well,
entitlements imply that you are entitled to a certain benefit
and I cannot think of anyone that has earned that right ahead
of our troops. By volunteering to put their lives on the line
for this country, they are entitled to the best training,
equipment, and leadership our Nation can provide. But all this
talk in Washington lately about dollars doesn't translate well
into actual impacts on the force and the risk to our Nation.
Yesterday, former chairman Duncan Hunter encouraged us all
to answer these questions before we voted to cut anymore from
defense. Isn't our primary constitutional duty to defend our
Nation? Is the world suddenly safer today? Is the war against
terrorism over? I hope our witnesses today can help us
understand the ramifications of these possible cuts in relation
to our force structure as well as our ability to meet future
needs of our national defense. How can we make sure that the
Department of Defense is a good steward of the taxpayer's
dollar without increasing risk to our Armed Forces?
The U.S. military is the modern era's pillar of American
strength and values. In these difficult economic times, we
recognize the struggle to bring fiscal discipline to our
Nation, but it is imperative that we focus our fiscal restraint
on the driver of the debt instead of the protector of our
prosperity.
With that in mind, I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today. The committee will be in recess while the
disrupters are removed.
The committee will be in order and I yield now to the
ranking member of the committee, Mr. Smith from Washington.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 57.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope my comments will
perhaps have a more calming effect on the audience. I doubt it.
I thank you very much for having this hearing. We have had a
series of hearings with a number of experts analyzing our
national security needs and the budget threats that they face,
but now of course we have the two people who are most in charge
of making those decisions. It is a great honor to have the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff here. They do not have an easy job as they try to wrestle
with the budget challenges we face. And I agree with the
chairman, that the cuts that we are facing in our Department of
Defense budget do place national security issues at risk. We
have difficult decisions to make to figure out how to
accommodate even the cuts that have already been put in place
for the next 10 years. There will be difficult challenges that
are contained in that.
And I think we should also point out in addition to the
sequestration threat, and it is not just that sequestration
would require further cuts in defense, and I should say further
cuts in all discretionary spending. And I am concerned about
infrastructure and education and innovation and a number of
other areas that face--that have already been cut, number one,
and, number two, face the severe cuts of sequestration, but I
think it is really important that the committee understands the
way that was crafted, it requires across-the-board cuts. If we
go to sequestration, every line item in the defense budget, and
frankly, every line item in all discretionary spending has to
be cut by the exact same amount, which is, frankly, insane. I
mean, it will get us to the point where we would have to build,
like, one and a half aircraft carriers. Well, you really can't
do that.
So if we go to sequestration, it is not just the cut, it is
the crazy way it was written that would frankly make it
impossible to budget. The second piece that I don't think that
folks have a full understanding of is how devastating running a
government on continuing resolutions is. The gentlemen before
us have to make budget decisions, week in and week out when we
can't pass appropriations bills, and they have to do it on a CR
[continuing resolution] which doesn't really fund the
Government the same way as an appropriations bill. It continues
it from last year, but it doesn't give clear guidance on what
programs are to be continued. That costs us money and creates
problems. So I would strongly urge this Congress to pass
appropriations bills so that we can fund our Government in a
responsible and reasonable way. It is costing us money and
leading to inefficiencies and making it more difficult
certainly at the Department of Defense, but throughout all
discretionary spending to do their job.
So both of those things are threats. But as I mentioned
before with this committee, I am also mindful of the budget
challenges that we face. They are real. Our budget is 40
percent out of whack. We borrow 40 cents of every dollar we
spend. That is not sustainable, and it needs to be fixed and in
fixing it, I believe everything has to be on the table. Now, I
am very much aware of the choices that are faced by the
Department of Defense, the threats and risks that are contained
in making those cuts, certainly above all, the impact on our
troops and our ability to continue to adequately provide for
them and to make sure of the one thing that I think should
always be without dispute and bipartisan agreement. We can
disagree about what the mission of our military should be, but
once that mission is set, there should be no disagreement, that
we have the highest obligation to make sure that we give our
troops the support, equipment, everything they need to carry
out the mission that we have told them to do. It would be
irresponsible not to. And with that challenge, I believe that
we need to put everything on the table in trying to deal with
our budget deficit. As I have said before in this committee, I
am so concerned about cuts, not just in DOD [Department of
Defense], but in other parts of our budget, that I am willing
to say we need more revenue, that we can't take that piece off
the table if we are truly going to meet the concerns that I
think we are going to hear expressed today, and again, as I
will continue to emphasize that also exists for other parts of
the budget as well.
So I hope we will consider that. I look forward to the
testimony of our witnesses and their guidance on how to deal
with the challenges we face both on the budget side and on the
national security side, and I will just close by saying we
could not have two more able people in those positions. And I
look forward to their testimony. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]
The Chairman. Thank you. Now, let me welcome our witnesses
here this morning. We have Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey.
Gentlemen, welcome to your first hearing in your new positions
before this committee. I look forward to a candid dialogue. And
the time is now yours, Secretary Panetta.
[Disturbance in hearing room.]
The Chairman. The gentleman will resume.
STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Panetta. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith,
distinguished members of the committee, it really is an honor
for me to have the opportunity to appear before you. For the
first time as Secretary of Defense, I would also like to join
you in recognizing General Dempsey. Marty Dempsey is a
brilliant soldier, and he is someone who is a proven leader on
the battlefield and off the battlefield. And I am delighted to
have him alongside of me in his new capacity as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs.
On behalf of the men and women of the Department of
Defense, I want to thank the Members of this committee for your
support and for your determination to join me in every way
possible to try to ensure that these men and women succeed in
their mission of protecting America. As a former Member----
The Chairman. The gentleman will suspend.
[Disturbance in hearing room.]
Secretary Panetta. As a former Member of the House for 16
years, I really do believe that Congress must be a full partner
in our efforts to protect the country. And for that reason and
in that spirit, I have had the opportunity to consult with many
of you and will continue to consult with you as we face the
challenges that the Department of Defense must confront in the
days ahead. These are difficult times, and I really do need
your full guidance, your full counsel, and your full support.
I would like to thank you for convening these series of
hearings. This is an important effort that the committee has
engaged in, looking at the future of national defense and the
U.S. military 10 years after 9/11, and for giving me the
opportunity to be here today to add my perspective to that
discussion. We have been at war for 10 years, putting a heavy
burden on our men and women in uniform to defend our Nation and
to defend our interests. More than 6,200 have given their
lives, and more than 46,000 have been wounded during these wars
that we have engaged in since 9/11. The conflicts have brought
untold stresses and untold strains on our service members and
on their families.
The Chairman. The gentleman will suspend.
[Disturbance in hearing room.]
The Chairman. The gentleman will proceed.
Secretary Panetta. These conflicts have brought untold
stresses and strains on our service members, and obviously on
their families as well. But despite it all, we really have
built the finest, most experienced, most battle-hardened, All-
Volunteer Force in our Nation's history. Our forces have become
more lethal and more capable of conducting effective
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.
New or enhanced capabilities, including the growth of
special operations forces, unmanned aerial systems, counter-IED
[Improvised Explosive Devices] technologies and the
extraordinary fusion that I personally witnessed between the
military and intelligence operations have provided the key
tools that we need in order to succeed on the battlefields of
the 21st century.
And make no mistake, we are succeeding. Ten years after 9/
11, we have significantly rolled back Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda's
militant allies. We have undermined their ability to exercise
command and control and to do the kind of planning that was
involved in the attack on 9/11. We are closer than ever to
achieving our strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq. And
we continue to be a bulwark for democracy in confronting
countries like Iran and North Korea and others that would
constitute a threat to our security.
The bottom line here is that these conflicts that we have
been through, that while we are moving in the right direction,
the fact remains that we are at a turning point, a turning
point not only with regards to the challenges we face, but a
turning point with regards to the military as a whole.
As the current mission in Iraq comes to an end, as we
continue to transition security responsibility in Afghanistan
and as we near the goal of disrupting, dismantling and
ultimately defeating Al Qaeda, the Department is also facing a
new fiscal reality here at home. As part of the debt ceiling
agreement reached in August, the Department must find more than
$450 billion in savings over the next decade. Our challenge is
taking a force that has been involved in a decade of war and
ensuring that as we build the military for the future, we are
able to defend this country for the next decade at a time of
fiscal austerity. We need to build a force that can confront a
growing array of threats in the 21st century.
As I pointed out to some Members the other day, one of the
differences is that as we came out of past wars, we essentially
were able to enjoy a peace dividend at a time of relative
peace. Now as we confront the fiscal challenges that this
Nation faces, we are doing it at a time when we are continuing
to confront a series of very real threats in the world to our
national security. We continue to confront the threat of
terrorism. Regardless of what we have been able to achieve and
we have achieved a great deal, there remain real threats out
there, not only in Pakistan, but Somalia, Yemen, North Africa
and other places. Those terrorists who continue to plan attacks
in this country. We continue to have to deal with nuclear
proliferation in the world. We continue to have to confront
rising powers in the world. We continue to have to confront
cyber attacks and the increasing number of those attacks that
threaten us every day. And yet as we confront those threats, we
have to meet our fiscal responsibilities. That will require
setting a very clear set of strategic priorities and making
some very tough decisions.
Working closely with the service chiefs, the service
secretaries and the combatant commanders, I intend to make
these decisions based on the following guidelines: First, we
have and we must maintain the finest and best military in the
world, a force capable of deterring conflict, a force capable
of projecting power, and a force capable of winning wars.
Second, we absolutely have to avoid a hollow force and
maintain a military that even if smaller, will be ready, agile
and deployable. As I said after every major conflict, World War
I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the fall of the Soviet Union,
what happened was that we ultimately hollowed out the Force,
largely by doing deep, across-the-board cuts that impacted on
equipment, impacted on training, impacted on capability.
Whatever we do in confronting the challenges we face now on
the fiscal side, we must not make that mistake and we will not
make that mistake of hollowing out the Force.
Third, it demands a balanced approach and we have to look
at all areas of the budget for potential savings, from
efficiencies that trim duplication and bureaucratic overhead to
improving competition and management and operating and
investment programs, procurement programs; tightening personnel
costs that have increased by almost 80 percent over the last
few years, and reevaluating our modernization efforts. All of
that needs to be considered, all of that needs to be on the
table if we are going to do a responsible job here that
addresses the areas where we can find savings without hollowing
out the Force.
And finally, and most importantly, we cannot break faith
with our men and women in uniform. The All-Volunteer Force is
central to a strong military and central to our Nation's
future. We have a lot of very effective weapons at the Pentagon
and at the Department of Defense, a lot of very sophisticated
technology, but very frankly, we could not be the finest
defense system in the world without the men and women who serve
in uniform. They are the ones that have made us strong, and
they are the ones that put their lives on the line every day in
order to protect this country.
We have got to maintain our faith with those that have
deployed time and time and time again. And that is something I
intend to do. If we follow these four principles, I am
confident that we can meet our national security
responsibilities and do our part to help this country get its
fiscal house in order.
To achieve the required budget savings, the Department also
must work even harder to overhaul the way it does business and
an essential part of this effort will be improving the quality
of financial information and moving towards auditable financial
statements. Today, DOD is one of only two major agencies that
has never had a clean audit opinion on its financial
statements. That is inexcusable and it must change. The
Department has made significant progress toward meeting the
congressional deadline for audit-ready financial statements by
2017, focusing first on improving the categories of information
that are most relevant to managing the budget. But we need to
do better. And we will.
Today I am announcing that I have directed the Department
to cut in half the time it will take to achieve audit readiness
for the statement of budgetary resources, so that by 2014, we
will have the ability to conduct a full budget audit. This
focused approach prioritizes the information we use in managing
the Department, and will give our financial managers the key
tools they need to track spending, identify waste, and improve
the way the Pentagon does business as soon as possible.
I have directed the DOD Comptroller to revise the current
plan within 60 days to meet these new goals and still achieve
the requirement of overall audit readiness by 2017. We owe it
to the taxpayers to be transparent and accountable for how we
spend their dollars. And under this plan, we will move closer
to fulfilling that responsibility.
The Department is changing the way it does business and
taking on a significant share of our country's efforts to
achieve fiscal discipline. We will do so, but we will do so
while building the agile deployable force we need to confront
the wide range of threats that we face. But I want to close by
cautioning strongly against further cuts to defense, and for
that matter, to other discretionary accounts, particularly with
the mechanism that has been built into the debt ceiling
agreement called sequester. It is a blind, mindless formula
that makes cuts across the board, hampers our ability to align
resources with strategy and risks hollowing out the Force. I
understand this formula. When I was in Congress serving on the
Budget Committee, I served on the conference that developed the
so-called Gramm-Rudman approach to dealing with these kinds of
cuts. But even then, every time the cuts were to take place,
Congress basically postponed it because it was mindless,
because it was across the board. It was designed as a gun to be
put to the head of Congress so that it would do the right
thing.
And I guess what I am urging the committee, the ``super
committee'' [Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction] to do
is do the right thing. Come up with the decisions that should
be made, frankly, on the two-thirds of the budget that is still
yet to be considered for deficit reduction. You are working
with one-third of the budget in discretionary spending and it
is taking a trillion dollar hit, and Defense is going to have
to pay up almost half of that. If you are going to be
responsible in dealing with the deficit, you have got to
consider the mandatory programs and you have got to consider
obviously revenue spending as part of that as well.
I truly believe that we do not have to make a choice
between fiscal security and national security. But to do that,
to do that will require that we have to make some very tough
choices. And I have to be frank with you, they are choices that
could have some impact on the constituencies that you care most
about. As a Member of Congress, I have been through this. I
represented an area that had significant military
installations, Fort Ord, and a number of other installations.
During the period following the reductions after the fall of
the Soviet Union, during the BRAC [Base Closure and
Realignment] process, I lost Fort Ord. Fort Ord was taken down.
That represented 25 percent of my local economy. So I know what
it means to go through this process.
We have to do this right, and we can do it right and we can
do it responsibly. But to do that I need your support to do
everything possible to prevent further damaging cuts and to
help us implement a coherent, strategy-driven program and
budget that we will identify in the months ahead as critical to
preserving the best military in the world. This is tough, it is
challenging, but I also view this as an opportunity to create a
military for the future that will meet the threats that we have
to confront. I pledge to continue to work with you closely as
we confront these challenges and I thank you once again for all
of your tireless efforts to build a stronger military for our
country that can protect our people in the future. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Panetta can be found
in the Appendix on page 61.]
STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member
Smith, Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you today on the future of national defense
and our military 10 years after the attacks on September 11th.
I want to begin by introducing the handsome Marine over my
right soldier here who I just recently appointed as my senior
enlisted advisor. So this is Sergeant Major Bryan Battaglia, 32
years United States Marine Corps, served this country and the
Corps with great distinction and great honor. And he has now
been appointed as my senior enlisted advisor, so that he can
help us accomplish the tasks that you just heard the Secretary
articulate and ensure we remain in contact with the young men
and women who--America's sons and daughters who we place in
harm's way. So if you will join me.
[Applause.]
General Dempsey. As this is my first time before you as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I want to make note that I look
forward to our continued cooperation for all of the very
important reasons outlined by the Secretary of Defense. I also
want to affirm that I take seriously our shared responsibility
of maintaining a military that preserves the trust that is
placed in our hands by the citizens of the United States. And I
believe we can sustain that trust while also being good
stewards of our Nation's resources.
In the past decade, over 2 million men and women have
deployed overseas in support of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq
and elsewhere. Our Joint Force has demonstrated great
initiative, great strength and great resolve. The security
landscape has also shifted during this period, and our military
has demonstrated its ability to adapt and to learn. So from my
vantage point and in keeping with the theme of these meetings,
let me point out a few lessons that stand out. First, we live
in an increasingly competitive security environment;
capabilities that previously were the monopoly of nation-states
are now proliferated across the security landscape. As a
consequence, we must learn faster, understand more deeply and
adapt more quickly than our adversaries.
Second, relationships matter more than ever. Coalitions and
partnerships add capability, capacity and credibility to what
we see as shared security responsibilities. Therefore we are
committed, even in the face of some of the budget pressures
that have been described to expanding the envelope of
cooperation at home and abroad.
Third, our Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and our Coast
Guard brothers and sisters combine to field a truly unmatched
team. We still need our Services to maintain and be the masters
of their core competencies and their unique service cultures,
but they must operate as a single cohesive team. We must
continue to value and advance joint interdependence.
Fourth, innovation is instrumental to the future of our
Joint Force. We have expanded many of our--what we referred to
in years past as low-density capabilities and we fielded many
new technologies. We must continue to unleash innovation in the
ranks and challenge ourselves to leverage these emerging
capabilities in new and creative ways.
And finally, leadership remains at the core of our military
profession. It is why we have been able to learn, adapt and
achieve the results that I have described over the past decade.
Now, developing the next generation of joint leaders will
preserve our Nation's decisive advantage over any would-be
adversary.
With these lessons in mind, we are working to build, to
conceive, and then build the Joint Force we need in 2020. This
Force must be powerful, responsive, resilient, versatile and it
must be admired. It must preserve our human capital and have
the capability and capacity to provide military options for our
Nation's leaders. And it must be affordable. Be assured, I am
fully committed to reducing costs without compromising our
Nation's security needs. We must make hard choices that balance
risk and as the Secretary mentioned, avoid hollowing the Force.
These choices need to be deliberate and precise. Indiscriminate
cuts would cause self-inflicted and potentially irrevocable
wounds to our national security.
To close, I would like to again thank the committee for
your commitment, your support to the men and women in uniform
as well as to our families. They deserve the sacrifice--they
deserve the future that they have sacrificed to secure. Thank
you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dempsey can be found in
the Appendix on page 65.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Chairman. Congratulations,
Sergeant Major, on your new appointment. President Reagan once
said that many people go through their lives wondering if they
have had any impact on their fellow men, if they made a
difference in life, and he said Marines don't have that
problem.
Chairman, the first round of cuts from the Budget Control
Act will reduce the funding for the military over the next 10
years by--from $450 to $480, $490 billion. What types of risks
does the Department of Defense face as you implement these cuts
over the next 10 years? Will there be any missions that you can
no longer do? Or is there a fallacy? Will you simply have to do
the same missions with less?
General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman. And as you know, we
are involved in trying to figure out exactly the answer to that
question. But I can share some emerging insights with you. The
emerging insights are that it will require us to look at what
our national security strategy has been, as articulated
currently in the Quadrennial Defense Review. To your point
about missions, in my statement, I mention that what we owe our
Nation's leaders and our Nation's citizens are options.
It is somewhat inconceivable to me that we would roll back
into this committee, to the national--to the leaders of our
national security apparatus and say we are not going to do this
because if the Nation needs us to do it, you know we have to
find a way to do it. That is going to require us to build in--
we will have to prioritize, but we have got to build in some
versatility, because as many have testified to this committee
and elsewhere, we generally find that we don't predict the
future with any degree of accuracy. So it has got to be a
combination of options and versatility. It has got to be
capabilities, and it has got to be capacity. We need the
capability to do things and we need the ability to sustain
those capabilities over time. That is capacity. Tell me what
you want me to do, how often you want me to do it, I can build
you a Joint Force and we are working on that now. But the risks
will accrue as we determine where we have to limit
capabilities, if we get to that point, and it could accrue as
we determine that we need less and then find ourselves using it
more and asking more and more of our young men and women on a
rotational basis that we can't sustain. So the risks are both
to mission but also to the institution.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, many have said that
defense has to be on the table, and I understand that. In the
first tranche of cuts of the Deficit Reduction Act, the
military paid for about half of the table. You know, I have
made the comment that we can't solve the financial problem that
we have on the backs of the military, or who will have our
backs the next time we are attacked?
I don't believe that the DOD should have to pay one penny
more in discretionary budget cuts. I know you commented on this
in your opening statement, and based on our conversations and
our visits up to this point, I think we are of a like mind, but
I would like to confirm your position, get it on the record. Do
you agree with me that the national defense has contributed
enough to deficit reduction and that no further cuts should be
recommended?
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely. The fact is we are having to
cut a half trillion dollars, almost a half trillion dollars out
of the defense budget. And that is going to take, as I said,
some very difficult choices. I think we agree that as tough as
it is, it is manageable. We can do this in a way that protects
our Force for the future, but it is going to take us to the
edge. And if suddenly on top of that we face additional cuts,
or if this sequester goes into effect and it doubles the number
of cuts, and then it will truly devastate our national defense,
because it will then require that we have to go at our force
structure, we will have to hollow it out, we will RIF
[Reduction in Force] people. It will badly damage our
capabilities for the future.
I don't say that as scare tactics, I don't say it as a
threat. It is a reality. And the reason I can say it is a
reality because we have been going through how we take $450
billion-plus out of this budget, what weapons systems do we
look at? What force structure reductions do we make? What kind
of benefits in terms of personnel and compensation do we have
to look at? What do we do with regards to areas that have to be
tightened up in terms of procurement, et cetera? These are all
going to be tough decisions.
Now, as I said, there is an opportunity here and we can do
this the right way. But if suddenly we are facing additional
cuts, and if suddenly we are facing a doubling of those cuts, a
responsible approach to doing this right is going to be
impossible. That is what I am saying.
The Chairman. And I think you mentioned the word RIF. If it
came to that, we would be breaking faith with the very men and
women who have been laying their life on the line for us. I
think that is inexcusable, and I think no one on this committee
would support that. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do think it is
important to emphasize that, you know, we have not said take
defense off the table. In fact, defense has already been on the
table. It was, along with the rest of the discretionary budget,
what was cut as part of the debt ceiling agreement cut as has
been mentioned by somewhere in the neighborhood of $450 to $490
billion, depending on how you add it up, and that is the
challenge you gentlemen are faced with, is how to make that
work.
So we are not suggesting it should be taken off the table.
I think as we look at how we are going to deal with those cuts
and then about the potential of sequestration and trying to
prevent that, it is helpful to sort of understand what the
threat is. And a couple of phrases that are used frequently
that I would like you gentlemen to explain a little bit better
is we have heard that it increases the risk. But that is never
actually explained. What does that mean? And another way of
looking at it is, what missions would we not be able to do
specifically, in terms of, you know, a given region of the
world, a given threat that we wouldn't be as robust against? I
mean, throw it open to both of you. Can you tell us a little
more specifically when you say ``it increases the risk''? What
risks specifically? What won't we be able to do that you think
we should be able to do for national security reasons? Mr.
Secretary, if you want to start and then, General.
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, obviously we are going
through the process now of--what we want to do is establish
what is that larger strategy? So this isn't just numbers
driven. It is not budget driven. It is driven by a strategy
that we can shape that tells us, okay, what kind of force do we
need, we know it is going to be smaller, we want it to be
agile, we want it to be deployable, we think we have to have
multimission kinds of weapon systems to help support that
force. You know, if that is the larger strategy and we are
still shaping that in conjunction obviously with the service
chiefs, but also with the President, once we have done that,
then obviously we are going to have to start making specific
decisions about, you know, where the reductions are made. I
mean, you know, without--without telling you that decisions
have been made and no decisions have been made. You know, I can
give you an example. For example, if we decide that we have got
to maintain our force structure presence in the Pacific in
order to deal with China, and China's expanding role in that
part of the world, and because of the other issues that exist
obviously in that very sensitive part of the world, and if we
decide that the Middle East is also a very important area where
we have to maintain a presence as well, then just by virtue of
the numbers that we are dealing with, we will probably have to
reduce our presence elsewhere, presence perhaps in Latin
America, presence in Africa, and so if you are talking about
risks, part of the risks would be, you know, having less of a
presence in those areas.
Mr. Smith. Play out a little bit what that presence does
for us? I could do it, but I am curious to hear what your
answer is so the American people understand. So we are there,
what does that do for us? Why is that in our national
interests?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir. If I could elevate 10,000 feet
or so and look down and I will eventually land on the African
continent. The way we measure risk is the likelihood of
something occurring and the consequence of it. So thermonuclear
war is highly unlikely with an enormous consequence, and
therefore our nuclear deterrent--we will be able to assess the
risk to our nuclear deterrent as it is affected by potential
budget cuts. If you work your way from nuclear deterrents down
to irregular conflict, we can do that at every grade, if you
will, of the kind of threats we face. But to your point about
what do we get by our presence on the African continent? We are
engaged in a conflict today and have been probably, if we look
back carefully enough at our history--if we look back to about
1993, the attack on the World Trade Center, the first time, we
have been involved in a conflict with violent extremist
organizations, call them terrorists, who are networked
globally, who are syndicated and who are decentralized. So they
are not sitting in one place to be acted against. They are
networked. One of the places they sit is Pakistan. One of the
places they sit, or sat, is Afghanistan. One of the places they
sit is the African continent. In order to defeat a network of
adversaries, we have to be a network. We can't be this
hierarchal cold war military, and we are not any longer.
So our presence on the African continent is part of our
network of building partners, of gaining intelligence and then
when targeting approaches, or targeting reaches the level of
refinement, we can act on it. But we have to be networked
against the specific threat you are talking about and part of
that requires our presence in Africa.
Mr. Smith. That is an excellent answer. I think also part
of our presence is deterring our enemies from doing things. You
know, it is an instructive point that we are now dealing with
the high likelihood that Iran felt comfortable, you know, doing
an assassination on our soil, and part of that has to be at
least a calculation that they don't fear what the consequences
of that would be. And you can extrapolate that out to a North
Korea, to a whole lot of other places, and there are
consequences in those choices. Excellent answers. I thank you
gentlemen. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. We will now proceed to the Members
having the opportunity to ask questions. I know you all want to
ask questions, so I will be following the 5-minute rule and ask
you to consider that in your questions and our witnesses to
consider that in their answers, please. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Usually the resolution of big
issue matters requires the aggregation of decisions about a
number of smaller issues, and today I have a question about two
of our programs that I think could be very effective in
reducing our costs and improving our capabilities. The first
relates to the C-27J. Mr. Secretary, yesterday in our
subcommittee hearing, near the end of the day, your generals
voluntarily brought up the issue of the C-27J. As you may know,
sir, there has been a confirmed requirement for 78 of those
planes for a number of years now. We have procured only 38 of
them as a result of that. As one of your generals said
yesterday, we are flying the blades off the lift helicopters to
meet these lift requirements and these helicopters are
enormously more expensive than the C-27J. Mr. Secretary, just
yesterday I think a letter reached your desk signed by 12
Members of Congress relative to the C-27J. We would appreciate
your personal attention to that, Mr. Secretary, if that is
possible.
Secretary Panetta. You will get that.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. The second issue, the
original acquisition strategy for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
included a competitive engine program because of the thousands
of engines projected to be procured to reduce costs and
development risks through competition, and because of the
Department's positive experience with the alternative engine
for the F-16 beginning in the mid-80s. Contrary to assertions
by some, there never has been an F-35 engine competition where
the 135 [F135 engine] won. In fact, in 2006, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum of understanding with
the F-35 international partners to procure the competitive
engine. That same year, the Department, due to cost pressures
on the F-35 program, sought to cancel the development of the
competitive engine, change its acquisition strategy and use the
R&D [Research and Development] funding planned for the
competitive engine to cover overruns in the F-35 aircraft
program. In spite of these department actions, Congress funded
the competitive engine program through 2010.
Now the manufacturer of the competitive engine wants to
self-fund the R&D for its engine beginning as soon as possible.
The Department of Defense continues to be a major proponent of
the competition in its programs, except for the F-35
competitive engine, opposing self-funded competition of the F-
35 competition engine program.
In your speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center, you said, and
I quote, ``We will look to procurement reforms and improve
competition, cost control and delivery when examining
modernization operating costs.''
Mr. Secretary, what kind of message is the Department
sending to all contractors by opposing the efforts of the
competitive engine manufacturer to self-fund R&D for its own
program?
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, I am a strong supporter of
competition, but I don't want competition to cost me more
money. I want it to be cost efficient. And with regards to the
program, you have identified the problem is that all of those
that have looked at it indicate that it is going to result in
more costs to the Defense Department to proceed on that path.
Now, I will say this, that the manufacturer that wants to
engage in self-funding has developed an approach. I think we
need to look at it to determine whether in fact it is cost
efficient. If, in the end, it is going to cost me more money,
that is not what I call good competition. If in the end it
saves me money, then I am willing to look at it.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that GAO
[Government Accountability Office] continues to contend that
pursuing the 136 engine [F136 alternative engine] will probably
save us money?
Secretary Panetta. There are those that have indicated that
there is some savings here and that we could achieve, you know,
better competition. But frankly, it is disputed within the
Department, and I have got to work through that dispute.
Mr. Bartlett. We would appreciate your attention to that,
sir. As you know, competition always makes things better and
makes them cheaper. It should be no exception here. Thank you
very much for your commitment to look at this personally. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, and,
General, thank you for being here and thank you for your
leadership in these critical times that face our Nation. The
other night, Mr. Secretary, I made mention about the concerns
that were expressed to me last week in a number of meetings
with military families. Today I want to ask a question about
military retirement reform because there is, or there are a
number of proposals, largely through the Internet that are
concerning our retirees. Recent budget pressures within the
Department of Defense have resulted in greater awareness of the
increasing cost of military personnel programs to include
military compensation, health care and military retirement. The
defense business board recently declared that the military
retirement system was unaffordable and proposed a plan that
would convert the military retirement system from a defined
benefit plan to defined contribution plan that is common in the
private sector. Benefits would vest at 3 to 5 years, as opposed
to 20 years, in today's system and would not be payable until
age 60 or 65 as opposed to immediately upon retirement under
the current system. This would seem to be a very significant
change in the culture of our military retirement benefit.
So the questions I have, Mr. Secretary, and also, General,
if you want to comment, have we arrived at the point where
reform of military retirement is necessary? Second, is the
proposal of the Defense Business Board the right solution to
maintain retention and combat readiness? If the Defense
Business Board proposal is not the right solution, what would
be a model that you believe might work?
And finally should the payment of benefits immediately upon
retirement be continued as part of any proposed reform
initiative? I ask those questions because those are concerns
that have been expressed to me several times last week.
Secretary Panetta. Yeah. No, I understand. And as a result
of that report that came out, there were a lot of people that
were nervous that somehow that would be implemented, and again,
the bottom line is that we have made no decisions with regards
to that. As a matter of fact, the President has proposed a
commission--one of the recommendations to the committee was a
proposal to establish a commission that would look at
retirement and provide grandfather protection for those in the
service, and I would support that. But, look, this is what it
comes down to. When we are looking at $450 billion-plus in
terms of where we find savings, I have got to put everything on
the table and take a look at it. And compensation in the
retirement area is one of those. But at the same time, I have
made very clear that we can't break faith with those in the
service. We have made a promise to people who are on duty that
we are going to provide a certain level of retirement. We are
not going to back away from that. We have to maintain that
promise. Those people have been deployed time and time again,
they have put their lives on the line in the battlefield. And
we are not going to pull the rug out from under them. We are
going to stand by the promise that was made to them.
So one of the commitments that I have made is that in any
circumstance related to this issue, we are going to protect
those that are in the service today. And we are going to
grandfather them in. Now, having said that, you know, are there
areas in the retirement area that need to be looked at, for
example, there are individuals that serve 12, 14, 15 years,
when they get out, they have no retirement to take with them
and, you know, is that an area that we ought to look at to
determine whether or not they ought to be able to move some of
those benefits to other areas?
Are there some reforms that can be made along those lines?
I mean, I think those are the kinds of issues that we ought to
be open to consider. But I only think it ought to be done
recognizing that we have to protect those that are on duty.
General Dempsey. And, sir, if I could--thanks for the
opportunity to comment on this, because I do want to address
something I have seen in the discussions about this. I reject
the characterization of our military retirement program today
as kind of gilt-edged, and the comparison to civilian
retirement programs. Look, it might turn out that our current
plan is unaffordable and we will have to do something about it.
But when we put a retirement program together, it is because
these young men and women who become old men and women who
serve for 20 years, who put themselves in harm's way, who move
10 or 15 times, who some of them can buy a house, some of them
can't, their spouses rarely can have employment because we move
them around, not voluntarily, they move because we tell them to
go where the Nation needs them. That retirement program needs
to be fundamentally different than anything you find in the
civilian sector in my view. We can figure it out. We need the
time to do so. If it is unaffordable, we will react. But I want
to reject outright the idea that somehow my retirement program,
or more important, that Sergeant Major Battaglia should be
compared to someone else's.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
today and when I have heard you previously, you have seemed
quite clear that you believe that we should make no further
cuts in the defense budget beyond those which have already been
enacted. Is that true?
Secretary Panetta. Correct.
Mr. Thornberry. Does the President share your view on that?
Secretary Panetta. He does.
Mr. Thornberry. So as Commander in Chief, I think it is
important for him to be able to speak out and also say we have
gone as far as we can go, we have gone to the edge, to use your
words, and that no more cuts should come from the defense
budget. I am hopeful we can have bipartisan agreement on that.
General Dempsey, you used a word that caught my attention
in your statement. You said if there are further cuts, there
could be irrevocable damage to our military. Now, a fair number
of folks here, I think, have the opinion that, okay, so if
there are cuts either enacted by the super committee or through
sequestration, we can always make up for that the next year and
put some more money and everything will be okay. Explain to us
what you mean by ``irrevocable,'' and how can a cut do damage
that can't be corrected the next year with some extra money?
General Dempsey. It comes down to what I have described in
the statement, Congressman, as the core of our profession and
that is, the men and women who comprise it and who we develop
as leaders. You know, we are the military. We consider
ourselves the preeminent leader development institution in
America. And I think we have a case to make that. If some of
the cuts occur in the magnitude, and more important, with the
targets as they are described right now in sequestration and it
causes us to RIF--this goes back to the notion of do we have
the time to reduce the force over time responsibly and
predictably? That is one thing. If we don't, if we begin to
have to RIF to meet the budget targets imposed by
sequestration, we lose that core.
We have seen this happen in the 1980s--correction, 1990s,
right after Desert Storm where we created a ``bathtub'' [chart
bathtub curve], if you will, of captains and majors who exited
the service and then when we had to regrow the Army by 65,000
as a result of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we
suffered was not in the basic rifle infantry men. We can grow
them. We can grow them in 20 to 30 weeks. You can't grow a
captain, a major, a lieutenant colonel, a sergeant major in 20
to 30 weeks. And if we don't--if we are not careful with this
and we have a migration of that talent out of the Army, that is
irrevocable for probably 10 or 15 years.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Secretary, let me turn back to you for
one other question. This series of hearings has been about 9/
11. Ten years ago, one could see a clear trend towards
terrorism, but the method of attack was certainly unexpected.
It is undoubtedly true we will face unexpected things in the
next 10 years that will be affected by our actions here.
One of the concerns I have is that, for things like
research and development, those kinds of not specific programs,
you don't know how they are going to play out, and yet they lay
the foundation for our future. As you all go through
implementing what has already been passed--and hopefully that
is it--tell me how you take into account preparing for
uncertainty. Because it seems to me that that is absolutely
central to national security in a complex world.
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely. In all of the past planning
that has gone into developing the defense budget, the one thing
that everybody agrees is that no one has accurately predicted
the future and has anticipated the kind of attacks and crises
we have had to confront. You can identify kind of large areas
where you would expect that a future crisis might lie. But the
reality is that if we are going to have a strong defense, we
have got to be prepared to react to a surprise. We have got to
be prepared to react to something we are not expecting. And
that is the reason--I mean, I think you have hit on something
very important, which is we need to have research and
development. We need to have those kinds of creative areas of
the Department that look at those kinds of potential problems,
that develop approaches to those kinds of possible crises in
the future. I mean, to have that kind of imaginative look at
where we will be, what kind of potential enemy will we
confront, that gives us the capability to begin to design a
truly agile force that can respond to those kinds of threats.
That is the difference. And I need that. I can't lock in, you
know, there are three or four threats out there and we are just
going to deal with those. We have got to be flexible and agile
enough to respond to any threat, wherever it comes from.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to you
both for your leadership and also thank you for your statements
about the military and their families. I think that is very
important for them to hear and for us to obviously be very
engaged in. And I certainly would encourage all my colleagues
here to join us on the Personnel Subcommittee. Sometimes the
committees are a little slim, and we need all of your support.
I wanted to ask you about our commitments and how we close
the gap because we do know that our resources--if we wouldn't
use the word ``shrinking,'' they certainly would be
diminishing, unlike the unprecedented rise that we saw in the
last 2 years. Is there anything in addition to what has been
said that you would like to share about how we close that gap?
Secretary Panetta. Explain that question.
Mrs. Davis. The gap between our resources and our
commitments. I think the General did speak to that. But I am
just wondering if there is anything additionally from where you
sit, Mr. Secretary, as well that you would like to say about
that.
Secretary Panetta. Well, let me reemphasize a point that I
have made time and time again. You know, the problem is, yes,
we need to make these reductions. We know we are dealing with
more limited resources. But at the same time, I have got a
responsibility to defend this country. And neither Congress nor
the President did away with the challenge of terrorism. That is
still very real out there. We have got terrorists out there who
continue to plan to attack our country. We have got to stay on
top of that. We have got to be able to go after them and
dismantle those kinds of operations.
We still have two wars that we are in. Now admittedly, we
are drawing down in Iraq but we are still fighting a war in
Afghanistan, and we are trying to transition there. But we are
in a war. We have got the threats from Iran and North Korea.
They are engaged in nuclear proliferation. They are trying to
develop a nuclear capability. As we saw within the last few
days, these are pariah nations that constitute a threat to our
security, they constitute a threat to the security of the
world. They are still there. We have still got to deal with
them.
We have got cyber attacks that are coming at us left and
right. We have got to deal with that threat. It is the
battlefield of the future. We have got rising powers in the
world that constitute a challenge to us. I mean, China in the
South China Sea has created concerns for us as to our ability
to be able to use international waters.
Mrs. Davis. Mr. Secretary, if I could just interrupt.
Secretary Panetta. Those are the threats.
Mrs. Davis. Is there a way that Congress and the committee
can better assist you in that strategic planning over what our
role has been today?
Secretary Panetta. You sure can. As we go through the
process of developing that larger strategy, I need to be able
to sit down with you and brief you on that and get your best
input on that because that will be the place where we have to
make choices as to what are those threats, what are the things
we have to be ready for, and also consider what are the risks.
The issue was raised, you know, what are going to be the risks
involved here? There are going to be risks here. I am not
kidding you. When you cut the budget by $450 billion, when you
make the choices we are going to have to make, there are going
to be some risks that are going to be out there. Those risks
have to be acceptable, but there are going to be risks. We need
to know that.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. When General Pace testified just a
few weeks ago, he mentioned that we don't really have a
cohesive national security strategy, and he suggested that we
need something more akin to Goldwater-Nichols when it comes to
interagency collaboration, looking at the whole-of-government
approach. Would you agree with that? And what, again, do you
think that we should be doing to promote it? Should there be
more reporting mechanisms to the committee in terms of what
actually is being done about that? We know things have changed
since we entered Iraq, certainly great progress in many ways.
But on the other hand, I think a lot of us would agree we are
not there yet.
General Dempsey. Yes, Congresswoman. I am not going to sign
up for the extra reporting here. But I would like to respond to
the question about, what are we doing to get after General
Pace's advice. The Secretary has us embarked on a strategic
review, the idea being that we really need to understand what
we must do for the Nation, and we have projected it out to 2020
so we can look back and have four program operating memorandums
to march toward it. So we are trying to jump across the
immediate fiscal crisis, determine what does the does the
Nation need--not what does the Department of Defense need--what
does the Nation need. And one of the answers to that question
is, in fact, greater--we have tremendous integration with other
agencies of government in which those relationships have
accrued over the course of the last 10 years in ways that are
absolutely remarkable. We have got to keep that going, and
those are also some of the ways we can close this gap you
describe between what the military has to do and what the
Nation has to do. That work is ongoing, and it is on a very
fast timeline, being led by the Secretary of Defense.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And Mr.
Secretary, General Dempsey, thank you for being here today.
On Tuesday I had the privilege and honor of visiting Walter
Reed Bethesda and saying thank you to so many soldiers and
marines who have lost both legs that it brings me to this
point. A lance corporal, his mother sitting in the room, asked
me this question: Why are we still in Afghanistan? Mr.
Secretary, I have great respect for you. You are on board and I
know you will develop your own policies and that leads me to my
question. In February of this year, we had Secretary Gates to
testify before this committee. And I am going to read enough
that I think you will understand the question. ``By the end of
this calendar year, we expect less than 100,000 troops to be
deployed in both of the major post-9/11 combat theaters,
virtually all of those forces being in Afghanistan.'' This is
the key point. ``That is why we believe that beginning in
fiscal year 2015, the United States can, with minimal risk,
begin reducing Army active duty end strength by 27,000 and the
Marine Corps by somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000. These
projections assume that the number of troops in Afghanistan
would be significantly reduced by the end of 2014 in accordance
with the President's strategy. If our assumptions prove
incorrect, there is plenty of time to adjust the size and
schedule of this change.''
Well, you are here today, and I support the chairman and
most members of this committee that we don't want to see cuts
to the military that would just decimate the military. But with
$120 billion being spent each year in Afghanistan, Karzai is a
corrupt leader--in fact, a marine general. I hand this out to
everybody that comes to my office. It has got the marines
carrying a flag-draped coffin. And it says the number of people
who have been killed in Afghanistan and the cost. And everybody
that wants to see me about any issue, I hand this to them and I
say, Please call the White House, the Speaker of the House, and
the leader of the Senate and tell them to get our troops home
before 2014, 2015.
So my question is this: How do I answer the lance corporal
who has been there twice, severely wounded the second time, and
many of them who have been over there four, five, or six times,
you can testify to that. Will you reevaluate and not just
accept what Secretary Gates said that we will be there until
late 2014 and significant reduction in 2015? Because, Mr.
Secretary, you know it is a no-win situation, and the General--
I am going to read this and then please, I will give you the
time to answer.
I have had a marine general as my adviser for 21 months.
Any time I email him, he emails me back. What do we say to the
mother and father, the wife of the last soldier or marine
killed to support a corrupt government and a corrupt leader in
a war that cannot be won? We continue to stay there until 2015.
How many more have to die? How many more have to lose their
legs and Uncle Sam will take care of them, as he should take
care of them, for the next 50 years of their lives? So, Mr.
Secretary, if you would give me an answer. Are you willing to
reconsider what Secretary Gates testified to before this
committee?
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, our present strategy in
Afghanistan is one that was developed by the President of the
United States and by our allies in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] at the Lisbon conference which was to gradually
transition our forces out of there by the end of 2014. And that
is what we are doing, and that is what we will continue to work
at in order to do it right.
We are in the process of making that transition. We have
already taken down, by the end of this year, the first 10,000
of the surge that was put in. We will take out the remaining
part of that surge next year by the end of the fighting season.
We will then begin to take down the remaining force through the
end of 2014. So we are on a path to gradually transition down
and remove our combat forces from that area.
I have to tell you that, talking with General Allen, I feel
that as difficult as that war has been, that the fact is that
good progress has been made in terms of security. We have
trained the Afghan army and police. They are operational now.
We are making transitions. We have already transitioned seven
areas. We are going to transition another group of areas in the
fall to Afghanistan security and governance, and we are going
to continue that process through the end of 2014.
Yes, there are concerns. Yes, there are problems that you
have identified. But in the end there is only one reason for
this mission and that lies in the fact that Afghanistan was a
safe haven for the Taliban and for Al Qaeda to conduct the 9/11
attack on this country. And one thing we do not want is
Afghanistan becoming a safe haven again for Al Qaeda. That is
what this mission is all about.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Secretary--last point, Mr. Chairman--we got
bin Laden, and Al Qaeda has dispersed all around the world.
Let's bring them home.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you, Secretary and General, for testifying today. And as we say
in Guam, hafa adai, welcome. My first question is for you,
Secretary Panetta, and has to do with the military buildup on
Guam. In a recent Senate hearing, now-Deputy Secretary of
Defense Carter indicated that the Guam realignment was on the
table for cutting. I fear this comment is in direct
contravention of our country's agreement with Japan which was
reaffirmed in June of this year. These comments along with
certain actions by the Navy have created a sense of uncertainty
about the buildup and that is unhelpful.
Does DOD remain supportive of the Guam realignment as
outlined in the Guam international agreement and the agreed
implementation plan?
Secretary Panetta. Congresswoman, we made an agreement with
Japan related to the situation in Okinawa. Obviously we
continue to stand by that agreement. We will continue to work
with Japan on this. The challenge is going to be to try to make
sure that we do it in a cost-effective way. That is going to be
the challenge. But as to what we need to do, as to, you know,
the effort to try to reduce our presence there, I think that is
something we are committed to.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That is
what I wanted to have on the record.
General Dempsey. Congresswoman, could I add just very
briefly?
Ms. Bordallo. Yes, General.
General Dempsey. I mentioned the strategic review we are
undergoing. One of the questions we have to confront, and we
are, is the issue of forward presence vice power projection.
How much forward, how much from CONUS [Continental United
States], how much rotational? And this conversation will occur
in that context.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good.
The next question is for you, General, as well. There have
been a number of positive developments this year for the
military buildup. But the Senate has raised concerns and
suggests that we rethink the entire program. I believe this is
unwise, given the current threat environment in the Asia
Pacific region. What are we doing as DOD and other interagency
partners in getting the Government of Japan to achieve tangible
progress in Okinawa? And further, what is our Government--
specifically DOD--doing to help the Government of Japan achieve
tangible progress?
General Dempsey. Yes, Congresswoman. Thanks. To kind of
spin off of my earlier answer. I mean, what we are trying to do
is become articulate with our friends and allies about our
intentions. We are not the only nation in the world that is
facing a new fiscal reality. And so our Japanese partners are
facing some similar cases, and we have got some issues on the
Korean Peninsula as well related to our future strategy and the
new fiscal environment.
I can just assure you those conversations are ongoing.
Ms. Bordallo. Good.
Secretary, another problem here is, can the Hill expect to
see a final master plan for the military buildup from DOD? Cost
increases are becoming an issue. I think that is what you
mentioned. Can you give us an answer on that?
Secretary Panetta. First of all, I am not sure about a
military buildup at this point. I think what we are engaging in
right now as a result of the number we have been handed by
Congress is going to be an effort to reduce the budget in a
responsible way. But what I can share with you is that as we
develop a strategy for what we are going to need in the future
and as we develop obviously the decisions that will be part of
our budget presentation early next year, I fully intend to
consult and advise with you in that process.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good.
And one final question. General, as we move to a post-Iraq
and Afghanistan military, what are some of the biggest
challenges that you see that face the military? And what areas
of the world do we need to refocus on to put more emphasis on
in the coming years?
General Dempsey. Again, that conversation is occurring even
as we sit here among those who have been charged by the
Secretary to answer that question. But I mean clearly we have
got some emerging regions of the world that we have somewhat
neglected because of the demands in Iraq and Afghanistan. You
asked what concerns me in the post-Iraq/Afghanistan. I am
concerned that we will convince ourselves that the job of
defending this Nation is complete and that we can somehow go
back to where we may have been in the mid-eighties, which is a
military that wasn't sure of itself or its support. And that
concerns me.
And again, back to one of the earlier questions about
leaders. We have got to keep the right leaders in our military.
That means we have got to train and educate them. We have to
continue to inspire them so that when we need them--and we
will--they will still be there.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you
heard the chairman say we only have 5 minutes. If I had longer,
I would compliment you more on all the things you have done,
which I think have been very good up to this particular point
in time.
I will go right to my question. Less than a month ago when
you appeared in a Senate committee similar to ours, you made a
statement that if we allowed the trigger of the sequestration
to take place and had $600 billion of additional cuts, it would
be like shooting ourselves in the head. I think that was a good
analogy. But I will also come back and say, that was more than
just the fact that these are across-the-board cuts. Because
even if we said $600 billion but you allocate to cuts, it would
still be like shooting ourselves in the head. But I took it
from that, that what you really mean is that for us to ask to
make $600 billion of additional cuts to defense before we have
done a strategic analysis and review would be perhaps reckless,
irresponsible, even dangerous to the country. Is that a fair
depiction?
Secretary Panetta. All of that.
Mr. Forbes. If that is the case, Mr. Secretary, then would
it not also be reckless, irresponsible, and dangerous for us to
do the $450 billion of cuts we have already done before we did
a strategic review and analysis in the same way? And if not,
differentiate for me the two.
Secretary Panetta. Well, the reality I am dealing with is
that Congress----
Mr. Forbes. I am not blaming you.
Secretary Panetta. No, I understand. But I am dealing with
the reality of having to reduce $450 billion and do it over
these next 10 years. I mean, obviously the better approach--had
we the resources in this country and had we managed our budgets
more responsibly, the better approach would have been to
develop the strategy to be able to discuss exactly what we
need, determine what the resources would be in order to meet
that strategy and then come to you and say, this is what we
need in order to do the job.
Mr. Forbes. But the two are essentially the same. So if one
of them was perhaps reckless and irresponsible and dangerous,
you can make the argument that the other one would be too. And
the other thing that I wanted to raise is we have heard a lot
about risk. And both you and the chairman mentioned that there
were risks to missions and institutions.
But as you probably know, yesterday we had three former
chairmen in here, all who had tremendous wisdom and expertise.
Former Chairman Skelton made an interesting observation. I
asked him to give us the biggest warning that he would offer us
as a committee, a Congress, and a Nation. And he said was over
his tenure in Congress he had seen 13 different contingencies,
conflicts; 12 of them were unpredictable. That means that the
President, whoever he might be, is going to have similar
unpredictable missions that we can't foretell right now. When
we talk about acceptable risk, isn't it true that we are not
just talking about risk to the mission or the institution but
we are talking about risk to the men and women's lives who are
performing those missions, if we make those and we are wrong?
Secretary Panetta. You are absolutely right.
Mr. Forbes. Good. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Thank you both for your service to our country and for being
here today.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
the witnesses and congratulate them on your new positions.
I also want to take a moment to at least highlight your
announcement today about moving up the auditability target to
2014. I sit on the subcommittee with Mr. Conaway and Mr.
Andrews. This committee actually has been moving on this issue.
That is no mean feat, what you have announced here today. But
it will in fact help us get towards the goals that we are
talking about this morning in a smart way. And certainly waste,
fraud, and inefficiencies are things that I think having an
auditable set of books really helps us accomplish and doesn't
affect our ability to defend ourselves. So congratulations on
that announcement.
Secretary Panetta. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney. You said a moment ago that you want to have a
military that is capable of reacting to surprises. Last March,
President Obama had to react to a situation that arose in Libya
where we had a humanitarian disaster in Benghazi on the brink
of happening. What he did at that time, which I think was the
right call, was exercise what I think he described as ``unique
capabilities.'' To help NATO intervene, we had a submarine
fleet in the Mediterranean, the Scranton, the Providence, the
Florida which in a matter of 48 hours neutralized Qadhafi's air
defenses. And you know in this era--I mean there are some
people who feel that our submarine fleet is sort of a cold war
relic. Obviously the events in Libya demonstrated that it gave
this country the ability to react to a surprise. We are at a
point though where all three of those boats are going to be
going offline in roughly 10 years. We are now at a point where
our sailors are being deployed at 7-month stints undersea as
opposed to 6 months, which has always been the Navy's--again,
to deal with a shrinking fleet size.
And I just wanted to ask you, Mr. Secretary, to just sort
of get your views on the roles of our submarine fleet post-9/
11, particularly in terms of other areas of the world that you
mentioned earlier where undersea warfare seems to be sort of on
the upswing with some of our potential threats.
Secretary Panetta. I have always considered our submarine
fleet to be an essential part of our forward presence, our
projection, and also the capability of being able to respond to
the kind of surprises that we run into in the defense business.
I think we need a full range of capabilities in order to be
able to address the threats of the future and the threats of
the present. Submarines have actually provided that additional
arm, particularly with regards to our fleets, that I think is
absolutely essential to our defense in the future.
Mr. Courtney. Good. Well, thank you. And maybe we can get
you to come up for the commissioning of the Mississippi in
December in Groton, Connecticut.
Secretary Panetta. I suspect I will do that.
General Dempsey. And if I could add, Congressman, except
for one Saturday every year in December, I completely support
the United States Navy.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
A corollary though to that issue is obviously the SSBN
[Ballistic Missile Submarine] replacement program which, again,
we have spent a lot of time in this committee and in the
Seapower Subcommittee. You mentioned, General, the issue of
nuclear deterrence which is, thankfully, a low risk situation
right now but nonetheless a risk. And I just wonder if you
could share your thoughts in terms of the need to move forward
with the SSBN replacement program that the Navy has worked hard
on.
General Dempsey. Well, as you know, we have been studying
and must continue to study the capability given to us by the
triad. And of course the SSBN fleet is our most survivable leg
of the triad. And therefore, I consider it to be indispensable.
As we go forward and as we understand the future of nuclear
nonproliferation talks, I mean, that could change. But for now,
I think we are exactly where we need to be.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. One last question.
Mr. Secretary, Secretary Gates about a year and a half ago
announced an initiative within the Department of Defense to
really look at our regime of export controls.
Secretary Panetta. Yes.
Mr. Courtney. Which, again, really are sort of in a cold
war mentality. Again, I realize you are pretty new into the
saddle. But any updates you can give us in terms of how that is
progressing in your own views in terms of how we get there.
Secretary Panetta. I fully support what Secretary Gates is
trying to do in that arena. We really do have to update our
export laws and begin to bring them into the 21st century,
frankly. Not only for purposes of the technology and the
industries that we have here, but I think we are at a stage now
where, very frankly, as we develop those alliances, as we
develop--I mean NATO performed pretty well in terms of Libya.
And the real question is, if we are going to develop those
kinds of capabilities, if we are going to develop those kinds
of alliances, they have got to be able to have the latest in
terms of technology and in terms of weaponry. And that means
that we have got to be able to share that kind of technology.
So I am working very hard to try to see if we can try to do
away with some of the barriers that were established by those
laws.
Mr. Courtney. Some of us would want to work with you on
that effort.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. This would probably be a good time
to wish the Navy a happy birthday.
Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, General Amos has been pretty adamant about
the F-35B, and I agree that it does increase capacity certainly
in range. But I am interested in knowing, since this is the
first opportunity we have had to hear from you directly, do you
share his enthusiasm for that aircraft? And will you commit to
helping make sure that we move forward with it?
General Dempsey. I am supportive, without caveat, of the
development of a fifth generation fighter. I am concerned about
the three variants and whether, as we go forward in this fiscal
environment, whether we can afford all three. But I am eager to
learn more about that. And I do have great respect for General
Amos' judgments. But I will tell you, that is something we have
to keep an eye on. Three variants create some fiscal challenges
for us.
Mr. Miller. Secretary Panetta, good to see you. I look
forward to working with you in your new capacity. Also talking
about the STOVL [short take off and vertical landing] aircraft,
I watched a video last week of it landing on the Wasp and my
question is, with sea trials ongoing now, basically, and the
aircraft appears to be performing well, it has been on
probation--which the term ``probation'' doesn't exist in any of
the acquisition areas, and I think probably it has created or
could be considered a black mark on the STOVL aircraft. But
what remains now as far as items that would allow it to be
removed from its probationary status?
Secretary Panetta. You know, all of these planes are now
being fully tested, and that is one of the good things. I mean,
this is the fifth generation fighter. It is something we
absolutely need. It is a remarkable plane, and it really does
the job well.
But what we want to do is to make sure that as it goes
through this test period we are able to understand all of the
issues involved with it, that we are able to be fully confident
that this plane, once it goes into production, is going to be
something that will be totally effective and will be totally
capable of serving the mission that it is required to do. So,
yeah. I mean, the term ``probationary'' is out there. But
frankly, what that essentially means is, give us a chance to
test it, give us a chance to see how it performs, and if it
performs well then obviously it will be able to make the grade.
Mr. Miller. Thank you. And the other thing was, OMB [Office
of Management and Budget] released guidelines for 2013 in the
budget where it actually states that the Department should
identify programs to double down on because they provide the
best opportunity to enhance economic growth. I did have the
opportunity to go visit the line in Fort Worth for the F-35.
127,000 direct and indirect jobs right now. Certainly if we can
remove some of the instability in our purchasing of this
aircraft and move forward with what we originally intended to
do--and I understand the budgetary constraints that we are in
right now. I still contend--and I don't think you meant it the
way you said it. We have the resources. We don't have a tax
revenue problem in this country. We have a spending problem and
an allocation of where those dollars go. But I would hope that
if that is what the administration would like and we are trying
to increase jobs and this is an aircraft that we do want to go
forth, looking at what China is doing and how fast China is
producing their aircraft now, significantly quicker than what
we originally anticipated, I hope that you would look at the F-
35 very carefully as meeting OMB's challenge.
Secretary Panetta. I will certainly do that.
Mr. Miller. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Loebsack.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to thank both of
you for your service. I look forward to continuing to work with
you into the future. I think we can all agree that under the
current fiscal constraints that we are operating under we have
got to make wise decisions, the best decisions we can make. I
think we can all agree with that on a bipartisan basis, make
sure that we don't draw down too much because, as Mr. Forbes
said, Ike Skelton said, there are contingencies, things are
going to happen. We are going to have to be prepared. There is
no doubt about it. And I have two areas of inquiry I want to
explore with you briefly.
The first has to do with our organic manufacturing base at
installations like the Rock Island Arsenal. In the past I think
it could be argued that we probably drew down too much. And so
when contingencies came up, when issues came up, it took too
long for us probably to go back to that organic base, build
that up again and those capabilities. Congressman Schilling and
I and this committee, we have been working across the
Mississippi River, across the political aisle to make sure that
facilities like the Arsenal can engage in unlimited public-
private partnerships so we can maintain those skills of those
workers there, not let the organic manufacturing base decline
to such an extent as we did before.
The second issue has to do with the Reserve components, the
Guard and Reserve. A lot of us have concerns that as we begin
to draw down that we are going to see the capabilities of those
forces also decline and across the spectrum, including Title 32
duties that they have as well.
So first I would like to ask the both of you to respond to
the issue of the organic manufacturing base. How does that fit
into the overall plan, making sure those capabilities remain,
that they don't decline the way they did before.
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, thank you for the question.
Two very important issues. One, one requirement that I have
with regards to our overall strategy is to make sure we
maintain our industrial base. I absolutely have to have that.
If we are going to be able to have a strong defense, if we are
going to be able to maintain a strong defense, if we are going
to be able to respond to the crises of the future, I have got
to have an industrial base that can respond to that. If we have
to mobilize quickly, if we have to weaponize quickly, I have
got to have that industrial base in place. And if we cripple
that, we will cripple our national defense. So what I am asking
is, as we develop a strategy and as we go through some of these
decisions, we make very sure that we are protecting the base
that you talked about so that those skills, those capabilities
are always going to be there for us when we need them. It is
going to require some decisionmaking here. We are going to have
to be able to get the cooperation of the private sector as well
in this effort. But I have met with them, and I am fully
confident that we can get that done.
On the Reserve and Guard--and I will let the General speak
to that. The Reserve and Guard, we have gone through a
remarkable period where the Reserve and the Guard have really
performed in an outstanding fashion with regards to the wars
that we have been in. We have been able to rotate them in. They
have gotten battle experience. They are better. They are more
capable. They are more experienced. I don't want to lose that.
And as we go into the future, what I want to do is, A, try to
retain that kind of experience to the best we can. But
secondly, I would like to keep them on some kind of operational
capability so that we can basically move them into roles that
will continue to benefit from that experience that we have
gotten from them.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you. General.
General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
I don't have anything to add on the defense industrial
base, other than to assure you that it is prominent in our
strategy review. As far as the Reserve Component, if we are
true to what we say we are, which is a learning organization,
we need to learn some lessons as our relationship with the
Reserve Component has changed over the last 10 years. And as we
develop this strategy, we might find things that we decide we
don't need immediately; they can be placed into the Reserve
Component; and things that were in the Reserve Component that
we now realize we need immediately, we might migrate them into
the active. So I would say what you will see and what is
ongoing right now is a very healthy discourse among the three
components, Active, Guard and Reserve, to determine what is our
new relationship now based on the last 10 years of war.
Mr. Loebsack. I thank both of you for your service, for
your support for these issues. And General, just one little
area of disagreement, in December, that we are going to
disagree on the outcome of that game. I have two children who
are Naval Academy graduates. I apologize. But that is how it
is. Thanks very much.
General Dempsey. Congratulations. I have two children who
are West Point graduates. So we are really at odds.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you. And I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Secretary, for being here and General Dempsey. Thank you both
for your service. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your
clarity of your response that there should be no further cuts
in our military defense. Equally, I appreciate you stating your
belief that that is the position of the President. This is so
important that our country know and that our adversaries around
the world know that we will be prepared and we will be able to
defend the American people. And General Dempsey, in fact with
the number of threats the Secretary identified that are
rising--not being reduced--it is very important that we be able
to fight a two-conflict war. I am very concerned with the
drawdown, the Army below 520,000, the Marines below 186,600,
that that puts us at risk. Will we be able to face a two-front
war?
General Dempsey. That analysis is ongoing, Congressman. But
what I can assure you is that I would never advocate a strategy
for this Nation that would limit us to being able to do one
thing at a time because that is not the world we live in.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And Mr. Secretary, I am
really honored. I work with Ranking Member Susan Davis to
promote military families, service members, veterans. An
extraordinary benefit that they have is the resale system, PXs
[Post Exchanges], NAVXs [Navy Exchanges], MCXs [Marine Corps
Exchanges], commissaries. They operate in the most bizarre
locations around the world. It is a really great morale
builder, a way of showing our respect to our military. And we
have extraordinary facilities, such as at Fort Jackson in
Parris Island that I represent. What is your view about our
military resale system? In light of the budget constraints, can
we count on this benefit to be available?
Secretary Panetta. I view that as a very important benefit
for the families that are out there. I mean having served 2
years myself and had my family benefit from that, I understand
how important that is. And it is something we will continue to
provide. As we go through the process of looking at the
infrastructure, there may be some areas where we may have to
reduce the presence. But for the overall benefit, that is one
that we think we believe we ought to maintain.
Mr. Wilson. And a side issue that has been raised is the
number of military families that work in the resale in remote
areas around the world that simply couldn't find employment
otherwise. And so it has so many side benefits that should be
considered. And I am really pleased that Congressman Loebsack
has really already brought this issue up, the importance of the
National Guard and Reserves. As a 31-year veteran of the
Reserves National Guard and extremely proud father of three
sons in the Army National Guard, as we really get into the
circumstance of budget cutting and determining prioritization,
if you could state further--I can't hear enough because I do
know firsthand of the extraordinary success, like the 218th
Brigade in South Carolina of their service in Afghanistan, how
much our Guard and Reserve appreciate serving overseas and in
the country.
Secretary Panetta. There is another factor here that I
think is extremely important to the Reserve and the Guard,
which is that the Reserve and the Guard reaches out into every
community across this country and it makes every community a
part of our national defense system. And to some extent, every
community has to participate not only in service but in the
sacrifice that is involved when we defend this country. So for
that reason, I think the grassroots operation of having a
strong Reserve, strong Guard that can help us as we confront
the crises of the future is something that I want to assure you
we are not only going to maintain but strengthen.
General Dempsey. And I will add, Congressman, that having
served multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and having--most
of the time when I get on a C-130 to go someplace, it is an Air
National Guardsman. I have driven up Route Irish between the
airport and the center of Baghdad and being defended by the
fighting 69th out of New York. And the highest compliment I
think we can pay the Guard and Reserve now is, you can't tell
what soldier is an Active, what soldier is a guardsman, and
which soldier is a Reserve component soldier. We are truly one
force now.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you so much.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Welcome. It is so good to see you both here
for your first testimony before this committee, and we look
forward to many more to come.
I don't relish the job you have. You have a very difficult
task in view of the extraordinary challenges we face as a
country. We all have known for some time that, as we face the
debt and the deficit, the Defense Department was going to have
to absorb its fair share. But we all know we want to do it in
as thoughtful a way as possible. And what I appreciated,
General Dempsey, was when you said you are a learning
organization. And as you have talked about the assessment of
risks, how you develop strategies as you assess those risks,
just a comment, I would hope you also take into account that
not every risk can be dealt with through a military response,
that there are limits to our capacity to deal with every threat
militarily, that there are perhaps other ways as well. So just
a comment for the record. And as a learning organization, I am
sure that that is something you will take into account as well.
And also, I wanted to reiterate the importance of the
National Guard and Reserves. I know in the Fifth District of
Massachusetts, most who are serving today are doing it through
either one of those great organizations, and they have done it
with such dignity and professionalism.
But I wanted to go in a slightly different direction.
Yesterday the former chairman of our committee, Ike Skelton,
testified in a hearing that ``The strength of the U.S. military
flows from the dedication and skill of our All-Volunteer Force.
Indeed, the new Defense budget must maintain our Nation's
security by keeping `the profession of arms' professional.''
And I believe this is a view you both share.
With women now playing an ever-increasing role in our
military, supporting our All-Volunteer Force requires an
understanding of the issues and challenges confronting both the
serviceman and the servicewoman. An issue I would like to
address today is the issue of sexual assault in the military
which is reported with alarming frequency. Mr. Secretary, in
2010, there were 3,230 reported sexual assaults in the
military. But by the Pentagon's own estimate, as few as 10
percent of sexual assaults are reported. The VA [Department of
Veterans Affairs] estimates that one in three women veterans
report experiencing some form of military sexual trauma. And I
can tell you that from the anecdotal evidence I hear, the
stories I hear, from returning women veterans but also the VA
organizations in Massachusetts, that those numbers are
accurate. Obviously it is unconscionable to begin with that so
many of our brave service members are subjected to this
criminal and predatory behavior. However, what also concerns me
is that this systematic abuse will hurt our readiness by
deterring highly skilled and patriotic women from enlisting or
re-enlisting in our Armed Forces.
In a time of two wars and massive budget cuts, our military
needs to attract and retain the most capable personnel
possible. In 2008, when Ann Dunwoody became the first woman in
our Nation's history to be confirmed as a four-star general,
women made up 14 percent of our Active Duty personnel. We must
make sure these women's needs are being met.
The House version of this year's National Defense
Authorization Act, which passed in May, takes several important
steps to address sexual assault in our Armed Forces. This work
has been done through the combined efforts of many of my
colleagues, Representative Davis, Representative Pingree and
Representative Turner. When he appeared before our committee in
February, I raised this matter and our responses to it with
your predecessor Secretary Gates and asked him why the
Department had previously resisted efforts to put certain
protections in place. He responded he hadn't realized that the
Department had resisted. He would look into it and find out why
they oppose it, why not, and why they shouldn't go forward.
I have a very simple question to Secretary Panetta. In this
time of austerity where we face massive budget cuts to the
Department of Defense and potentially threatening cuts, if the
sequester is exercised, can I count on your support to fund new
initiatives aimed at preventing sexual assault in our Armed
Forces? I don't want to see this budget environment become an
excuse to not fund these initiatives.
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely. I thank you for your
leadership on that issue. It is an issue that I am paying a lot
of attention to because women are performing in an outstanding
fashion for the Department of Defense. They put their lives on
the line. They are doing great in terms of helping to defend
this country. And I think we have to make sure that we provide
all of the protections necessary so that what happens in these
horrendous sexual assault cases, A, should not happen but, B,
if it does happen that justice is rendered quickly.
Mr. Tsongas. Thank you. I look forward to working with you
on this.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, in your discussion of the range of threats that we
might face, you said that nuclear conflict is unlikely. It is
unlikely because of the strength of our nuclear deterrent. It
is both credible and reliable. Cuts that are currently pending
before Congress to our nuclear deterrent could affect both that
credibility and its reliability. At a time where China and
Russia are investing in nuclear weapons infrastructure, we are
looking at proposed cuts that would create vulnerability and
instability. After years of disinvestment, our current proposed
plan for modernization really looks at the issue of deferred
costs.
Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask you a question that I know
your answer--because we had the opportunity to discuss this at
the Pentagon on Tuesday. I appreciate your commitment to fully
funding the modernization program of the NNSA, of our National
Nuclear Security Administration. It is important though in this
venue to have you express those opinions because, as you know,
we are right now heading to the prospects of an omnibus in
which there could be significant cuts that occur to our nuclear
weapons infrastructure.
Now I know you are aware that as the New START [Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty was being proposed, the President
came forward and was asked for a commitment to modernization of
our program. The President and the Senate, taking up the issue,
recognized that as you go to lower numbers that you actually
have to set aside increased dollars so that we can have both
security and, understanding that we have had deferred
maintenance, that we need to go forward with our modernization
program. The President said, ``I recognize nuclear
modernization requires investment for the long term. In
addition to this 1-year budget increase, this is my commitment
to Congress, that the Administration will pursue these programs
and capabilities for as long as I am President.'' The program
included an $85 billion investment for modernization. And I
know, as you both are aware, that this program resides in DOE,
the Department of Energy, as opposed to DOD, the Department of
Defense. And Secretary Gates, in showing his commitment to that
program, set aside $8.3 billion over the next 5 years to invest
in that program. Gates, then saying, ``This modernization
program was very carefully worked out between ourselves and the
Department of Energy. And frankly, where we came out on that I
think played a fairly significant role in the willingness of
the Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the risks are
to our own program in terms of being able to extend the life of
our weapons systems. This modernization project is in my view
both from a security and political standpoint really
important.''
Mr. Secretary, so my question to you is, do you agree with
Secretary Gates and the importance of this modernization
program? And what is your assessment of the proposed cuts? As
we know, the modernization program, in addition to coming
across from the President's budget as fully funded, was
included in the House budget as fully funded. It came out of
this committee with our National Defense Authorization Act as
fully funded and then stumbled as it came out of the
Appropriations Committee, both the House and the Senate
Appropriations Committees taking a whack at the program.
As we know, with the omnibus moving forward, your
statements are even more important now. And I want to highlight
that one of the issues with Gates' and your support of $8.3
billion to the Department of Energy programs is that as those
funds come out of the Appropriations Committee with cuts, in
effect your funds with being stolen for water projects across
the country, and I think you might have an opinion about that.
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Panetta. Well, as a former Member, I know in
those committees, they are going to reach for whatever they can
in order to try to see if they can fund those projects. I mean,
I understand that process. But I think it is tremendously
shortsighted if they reduce the funds that are absolutely
essential for modernization.
I and Secretary Gates are in lockstep with regards to our
positions and, frankly, with the President that we have got to
fully fund--fully fund the modernization effort with regards to
the nuclear area. I mean, this is too important. We have always
been at the cutting edge of this technology, and we have to
stay there. There are too many other countries that are trying
to reach out to develop this capability. And if we aren't
staying ahead of it, we jeopardize the security of this
country. So for that reason, I certainly would oppose any
reductions with regards to the funding for weaponization.
Mr. Turner. I appreciate it. Because your statement is very
important to identify that this is not an area where we can
find savings, this is an area where cuts actually expose risks.
Secretary Panetta. That is right.
Mr. Turner. General, if you might wish to comment on the
modernization. As our warheads continue to age, the
infrastructure continues to atrophy, and it becomes a decrepit
state that we look to our nuclear deterrent. As we look to
lowering numbers, we lessen our ability to hedge as our nuclear
weapons infrastructure ages and has disinvestment.
Do you have a comment on that?
General Dempsey. Just to reinforce what you said.
The Chairman. General, could you please do that for the
record?
General Dempsey. I can.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Ms. Pingree.
Ms. Pingree. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for being before our
committee today and for your diligence in answering a great
diversity of questions.
I want to first just echo the remarks of my good friend and
colleague Mr. Jones. And I know he is no longer in the room,
but I really do appreciate his vigilance and courage in
continuing to highlight the importance of ending the war and
bringing the troops back home. I know we started the day with
protesters in the room, and sometimes they seem disruptive or
their tactics are some we might argue with. But frankly, we are
facing a time when there are protesters in almost every city
where we reside or represent. And there is huge dissatisfaction
in our country about the representation that they feel many of
us them give in Congress. And one key area is about ending the
war, the fatigue that people have. Many people feel we were
misguided getting into Iraq, that we have been in Afghanistan
for too long, and in this time of budget deficits we can just
not justify $120 billion a year.
And I just want to echo Mr. Jones in saying that I have
been on this committee only--this is my third year. But I have
that feeling that we find ourselves often in somewhat of an
unconscionable inertia around the war. It is hard to end. 2014
turns to 2015 turns to 2016, and people continually wonder when
will we end the war, particularly after the capture of bin
Laden, after the reduced number of Al Qaeda operatives and, in
fact, in the light of, as you said, huge security concerns in
countries all over the world which we are not adequately
prepared for or perhaps ready to defend ourselves.
I don't think it is unrelated that we are facing these huge
needs for budget cuts and there is this dissatisfaction out
there with the way we do things. On the right, it is about our
growing deficits and the irresponsibility many people feel
around that. On the left, it is this idea of, why don't we end
the war and why are we spending $120 billion if we
significantly need to cut defense?
Ms. Pingree. And I think that is why we are facing such
difficult cuts today. And I just feel--it is important to echo
that. I agree with so many of my colleagues that we need to
have a strong defense, and I am proud to represent the Bath
Iron Works and the greatest shipbuilders in the world, the
naval shipyard where we keep our submarines safe and working,
and I understand that we don't have a strong enough Navy, that
there are pending threats from China, and we don't want to be a
smaller force than they are there. There are true needs in our
military. There are huge security needs around the country. I
just believe that this war, which has been crippling us as a
Nation, which has had excessive costs, which has forced us to
prepare for exclusively ground wars and not be prepared in
other areas has to end.
All that said--and I know you have stated your own opinion
on that, so I just feel the importance of reinforcing it and
think that I reflect the thoughts of many, many of my
colleagues in Congress, and certainly the majority of residents
in my district. It is an issue I hear about frequently.
On a completely different topic, as you are pondering the
difficult cuts that will need to be made one way or the other,
I want to echo the remarks of my colleague, Mr. Reyes, who
talked about the Defense Business Board. And I do appreciate
your response to that, that it is still a plan that is under
consideration.
Thank you very much, General Dempsey, for really talking
about the difference in a retirement system for the military
than in civilian life. You, I think, said it extremely well,
that people move constantly, they serve their country in ways
that we don't do in other lives, that people's spouses often
can't work and build a retirement, and I strongly oppose that
plan. I disagree with the idea of making those kinds of cuts.
And I, frankly, would say that with the Commission on Wartime
Contracting funding, that we have wasted between $30 and $60
billion in Iraq and Afghanistan and a billion more--billions
more in wasted weapons programs that never make it in
warfighters' hands, it is hard to justify targeting military
families, those that serve our country when it seems to me,
again, there are other places to be cut.
You have stated your opinions eloquently on both of these
things. If you have other comments, I am pleased to hear them,
but I wanted to add my voice to others who feel like we are not
moving fast enough on ending the war.
Secretary Panetta. Obviously, I respect your concerns and I
recognize the frustration, you know, having been through these
wars and the losses that we have incurred. But we are--you
know, we are in the process of ending the war in Iraq. By the
end of this year, we will have withdrawn all of our combat
forces from Iraq. That is going to happen. And with
Afghanistan, I am fully confident that the President of the
United States is committed to ensuring that we transition our
combat forces out of their by 2014.
We just have to do this right. I mean, what I don't want to
happen and I think what all of us need to be concerned about,
if we do this in the wrong way, if we do it so fast that all of
a sudden Afghanistan falls apart again, it becomes a safe haven
for the Taliban or Al Qaeda and suddenly we are subject to
attacks again, then, you know, the world is going to look at us
and say how could you have let that happen? So that is what I
am trying to prevent, is to be able to do this, but do it
responsibly.
Ms. Pingree. Thank you for your comments.
General Dempsey. I would like to answer that for the record
too, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Would you please. Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen. And congratulations on your appearance here in your
new roles. I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your
comments about responsibly disengaging from Afghanistan and not
precipitously so. I mean, we have many, many of our sons and
daughters who have served, are serving and will serve there. It
would be a terrible, terrible disservice to them for them to
serve with no chance of succeeding as well as an incredible
danger to our own country.
So thank you for that. And I want to congratulate you sort
of. I want to congratulate you on your announcement about 2014
and 2017, way, way, long overdue to have an audit. 2017, I
daresay that perhaps neither one of us will be here, so I am
cautiously optimistic that that might occur. But nevertheless,
I really appreciate your take in the bit in the teeth so to
speak and trying to get that done.
Looking at these budget cuts, those in the works and
horrifyingly those that are potentially out there, I am mindful
of a former chief of staff of the Army who used to talk about
the tyranny of personnel costs. And I know that is of some
concern as we have stepped up to meet our obligations to the
men and women who are serving in terms of medical care, pay
raises, retirement benefits and so forth. And I am very
concerned that we honor your pledge to keep faith with those
who have served, and I want to get to the question and
underscore a discussion that I think was started by Mr. Reyes
about retirement benefits.
As it happens, I was recently in Fort Bliss, Texas visiting
my favorite soldier and his family and talking with families
and soldiers about the story that was ripping around the United
States Army in The Army Times and elsewhere and the high, high
level of concern that the retirement benefits that they had
served and worked for were going to be yanked away. And
clearly, I think that would be breaking faith with those who
have served and horribly irresponsible. And the same can be
said of other benefits that we have put forward.
But I want to focus on this retirement rumor which is
ripping through and which they were taking as real and which
was being actively considered, that after having served 20 or
15 or a number of years, that they were going to get something
substantially less than what they had signed up for.
So for the record, I am absolutely clear, I would like to
hear from both of you that you are adamantly opposed to that
happening, to changing those retirement benefits for our
serving men and women.
General Dempsey. I am adamantly opposed to changing the
retirement benefits for those who are currently on active duty,
but I am also open to look at potential changes to the
retirement system as part of our overall look at compensation
for the future.
Mr. Kline. Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely. We cannot break faith with
those that have served and deployed time and time again and
were promised the benefits of this retirement program. Those
benefits are going to be protected under any circumstance.
Mr. Kline. Thank you. Outstanding. Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Panetta,
General Dempsey, I want to congratulate each one of you all for
your new positions and look forward to working with you. I have
served on this committee for almost 5 years now and one thing I
have noticed is that from time to time, we have needed the
presence of our Capitol Hill police officers to maintain order
in the room while we conduct our business, and I certainly
respect the rights of people to come in and protest what we are
doing, but you don't have a right to interrupt our meetings.
We had a large contingent of protesters today and we were
able to proceed with the meeting because we had adequate
resources to maintain order, the Capitol Hill Police
Department. I appreciate their service. I have also noticed
during history that, from time to time, there are disturbances
throughout the world, and these disturbances may interrupt some
of our various interests around the world, and it is necessary
for us to have some kind of force to maintain order. And I hate
that human beings have to have some protection, the weak over
the--excuse me. The strong over the weak, the weak who seek to
get stronger and then take over from the then-strong folks. But
this is just something, it is like competition, like
capitalism. It is just a natural human phenomenon. And we must
have sufficient force when necessary to bring about the kind of
relief that we need in terms of maintaining order throughout
the world. And that is why we need a sufficient military force
that is ready to respond immediately to whatever the
circumstances may be.
And, of course, people are always trying to get more
innovative and coming up with new ways of doing things of
hurting people, and hurting us, Americans. So we have got to
stay a few steps ahead of that at all times. If we don't, then
we are not taking care of our business as elected officials in
this country.
That having been said, Mr. Secretary, I believe that global
nuclear disarmament is necessary if our country and our species
are to survive and flourish. I understand the need to maintain
a deterrent capability for the time being, but we can,
nevertheless, dramatically cut our stockpiles and slow
investment in new weapons. Mr. Secretary, do you agree that
nuclear weapons programs should be on the table as the
Department of Defense determines how to reduce its spending
over the next 10 years?
Secretary Panetta. Again, you know, we obviously, strongly
believe that we have to maintain a strong deterrent against
those countries that could potentially use nuclear weapons
against us. With regards to reducing our nuclear arena, I think
that is an area where I don't think we ought to do that
unilaterally, we ought to do that on the basis of negotiations
with the Russians and others to make sure we are all walking
the same path.
Mr. Johnson. Certainly. And I definitely agree with that
comment. The Army has spent $2.7 billion trying to build an
intelligence analysis platform, the Distributed Common Ground
Systems, a program known as DCGS-A. That program is now 5 years
behind schedule, vastly over budget and fails to meet the needs
of our soldiers. An article appeared in Politico earlier this
summer detailing some of those failures and it explained that
the program was unable to perform even the simplest tasks and
frequently crashes. Is this system--we have already spent $3
billion on this system.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Secretary,
and, Mr. Chairman, I welcome you both to the committee also.
And I congratulate you both on your new responsibilities, I
think. And I look forward to many more sessions with you. My
first question has to do with missile defense. Mr. Secretary,
as you know, the President's budgets to date have cut a total
of $1.65 billion out of the ground-based missile defense
system, the only missile defense system currently in place to
defend our homeland. Are you committed to the adequate
resourcing of the ground-based missile defense system in the
future?
Secretary Panetta. I am committed to adequately resourcing
what we have in place.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, then as a follow-up, do you believe
there are now an adequate number? I think it is too limited of
a number, but do you think there is an adequate number of
ground-based interceptors both to counter the threat to our
homeland and to provide for testing?
Secretary Panetta. I have had the chance to visit NORAD
[North American Aerospace Defense Command] and STRATCOM [U.S.
Strategic Command] as well. And I had a chance to really look
at our capabilities. I mean, I think we are in good shape with
regards to our ability to respond. It doesn't mean that we
shouldn't continue to upgrade. It doesn't mean that we
shouldn't continue to look at other ways to try to expand that
capability. But, you know, we really do have a very remarkable
defense system set up to deal with that challenge.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, I look forward to continued
conversations on this with you both. And now a separate
question, but it has to do with capability. This is for both of
you. As already scheduled budget cuts to the Department of
Defense in excess of $400 billion for the next 10 years begin
to take place and apart from sequestration, do you anticipate
the Army reducing the number of brigade combat teams?
General Dempsey. As the former chief of staff of the Army
and currently chairman, I do anticipate that the Army will
reduce the number of brigade combat teams, but not just because
of the pressure of a new fiscal environment. Again, I am all
about trying to understand what the Nation needs in 2020. What
have we learned over the last 10 years of war?
So there is a plan that General Odierno, the current chief,
is working with my support, to take a look at how many brigade
combat teams you need if you change the nature of the brigade
combat team. So roll back in another maneuver battalion, some
intel assets. Things that we didn't know we needed 10 years
ago, now we know we need them. So we will reduce the number of
brigade combat teams, but the number remaining will be more
capable.
Mr. Lamborn. Are you talking about doing something
simultaneously with anticipated drawdowns of the numbers of
troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Dempsey. Stated another way, even if we had all of
the money we needed, we would want to make some changes based
on the lessons of the last 10 years of war. So we need to do
that.
Mr. Lamborn. But are you mostly anticipating a reduction of
the number of teams that would correspond to the number of
troops being brought home from those two countries?
General Dempsey. No, sir. There is a relationship between
what the combatant commanders establish as a demand. So we know
what a steady state demand is. And part of that demand is
articulated by what we see as the future of Iraq and
Afghanistan. So we know, for example, if the demand is 10, we
have to have a minimum of 30, because there is one in the
demand cycle, one just out, one getting ready to go. 30 is not
the number, but I am just using that illustratively.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Now, if there is sequestration, how
would that impact the ability of our military to address the
kinds of threats that you both talked about earlier in your
testimony?
Secretary Panetta. All bets are off because it would--
sequestration would demand such drastic across-the-board cuts
that it is pretty clear that the force structure would be
reduced drastically. We would be looking at having to increase
the number of risks within the military. And in addition to
that, there is no question that we would hollow out the force
because it would require these drastic, deep across-the-board
cuts that would affect training, equipment and everything else.
It would really be devastating in terms of our national
defense.
Mr. Lamborn. General, is there anything you would care to
add to that?
General Dempsey. As a former service chief, the way that a
service chief maintains the balance of his force, as he has
three rheostats. One is manpower, end strength, one--that is
one. One rheostat. The other end strength is modernization and
equipment. The other is training and maintenance. The impact of
the sequestration is not only in its magnitude, it is in what
it does, what it directs the service chiefs to do in each of
those rheostats. We lose control. And as we lose control, we
will become out of balance and we will not have the military
this Nation needs.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. Ms.
Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary. And thank you, General. Let me begin, first, with
Mr. Secretary. My questions are on the line of the future. As
you know, the chairman has put the series of hearings together
about 9/11 and the future. And you are the fifth in the series.
General Cody, retired, said this in his testimony, and I
have written it down because it is something that stuck with
me. He says the real question with regard to Services budget
are simple: What missions do you want our military to continue
to perform? What threats do you want our military to counter?
What level of readiness do you want the military to sustain?
And history has taught us that we are not very good at any of
that. We don't predict well. But we are here and that is almost
what we are kind of forced to do.
So, Mr. Secretary, from your vantage point, what is this
vision that you want to share with us that you perceive this
military has got to look like? And, General. So you can start
thinking about your response, I am very curious about your 2020
Joint Force statement and if you could start with that. But,
Mr. Secretary, could you begin with that, first?
Secretary Panetta. I think the General who testified, you
know, hit the right buttons. We have got to look at the threats
that are out there. And as I indicated, we are dealing with a
variety of threats that remain out there that are serious and
that challenge our security. It begins with terrorism, the
ability to respond and keep the pressure on terrorism so that
people can't attack this country, the ability to bring these
wars that we are engaged in to an end. We are involved in those
wars. We have got to bring them to an end.
Thirdly, the area of dealing with Iran and North Korea and
not only the nuclear proliferation from those countries, but
the threats that they constitute in the regions that they are
involved in. We have got to be able to deal with the Middle
East and the unrest that is going on in the Middle East. We
have got to be able to deal with the challenge of China and
rising powers. We have got to be able to deal with cyber.
That is a quick rundown of the threats that are out there.
We have got to be able, if we are going to defend this country,
be able to have an agile, deployable, effective Force that can
respond to each one of those threats. That is what we have got
to do. And that is the vision that we have got to create.
Ms. Hanabusa. Before I get to the General. But, Mr.
Secretary, isn't that the problem? I mean, I have had these
discussions and I represent Hawaii. And, of course, China and
North Korea, they are very real. Is the fact that--to be agile,
aren't we looking at different types of forces? I mean, we have
always thought about, I think force-on-force, I think, is one
of the words that the General used before, but we have
counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and all of that are
different to attack different kinds of problems. Now, if you
have got a limited amount of resources, what rises to the top?
Or can anything not rise to the top and we have just got to do
it all?
Secretary Panetta. You have got to be damn flexible, and
that is what we are going to have to be in the future.
Ms. Hanabusa. General. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Dempsey. And I thank you, Congresswoman. Well, this
is exactly the conversation we are having with ourselves. So if
you are not too busy, we wouldn't mind having you on our
committee.
Ms. Hanabusa. I would love to come.
General Dempsey. Okay. The sort of intellectual framework
is that when we get to 2020, we need to have taken into account
the capabilities that we--10 years ago, we didn't have a
capability in cyber. Ten years ago our special operating forces
were nowhere near as capable as they are today. These two areas
are exponentially more capable. So what we are looking at in
2020 is what is this exponential improvement in capability in
those two areas that didn't exist 10 years ago 10 years from
now, what will that allow us to do with the conventional Force
and how do we integrate those capabilities, not just keep
piling them on top of each other? Because as we continue to
pile, we run the risk that you just articulated of becoming
unaffordable. So that is one answer to your question.
Secondly, we will have to make some decisions about where
in the world we will take more or less risk. And that is a
matter of understanding demographic change, climate change,
economic change and which countries in the world are appearing
to align themselves against our interest. And our interests are
actually not going to change. We need access to resources, we
need to have freedom of navigation, and we need to be partnered
on issues of common interests with our allies and partners.
So we will be able to articulate that world and then look
back at where we are today, and use the next 4 years when we
submit 4 POMs [Program Objective Memorandum], 1317 through
1620, to build that Force.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Panetta,
General Dempsey, thanks so much for joining us today. Thanks
for your service to our Nation. And thanks for coming here to
discuss with us what we know to be some of the most important
decisions that we all will make in a long time. Secretary
Panetta, I begin with you. Your statement earlier talking about
those four decision making guideline, I am in full agreement
with clear strategic priorities, making sure we have a ready,
agile and deployable force, making sure we have the capability
and the capacity as was spoken of. I think those are absolutely
critical.
As we look at that clear strategic program plan, whatever
you want to call it, for the Department of Defense, as you
spoke of, there are going to be some risks that are out there
within that decisionmaking framework. The question then
becomes, as you are faced--both of you are faced with $450
billion in reductions in the next 10 years is how do you
calculate those risks? How do you make priority decisions in a
realm that, as you said, is very dynamic, changes all the time,
threats emerge, threats disappear?
My question is this: As you look at prioritizing, can you
tell us this: Prioritizing--what are the three areas that you
say have to be preserved and what are three areas most likely
to be cut?
Secretary Panetta. You know, again, it really wouldn't be
fair to try to throw those issues out there because we are
really in the process of looking at all of those areas and
trying to decide, you know, as we deal with the threats that
are out there, what do we need to confront those threats and
how can we respond, and where is it that we can seek some
reductions?
Now, you know, look, let us just begin with what I think is
going to be, you know, something that is pretty clear. We are
going to have a smaller force. If you have a smaller force, you
are not going to be able to be out there responding in as many
areas as we do now. So the decision then is going to be, you
know, what are the areas we have to prioritize? For example,
Korea, you know, we have a large presence in Korea. Korea
remains a real threat. I think we have got to maintain our
presence there. Are there other areas, then, where we deploy,
for example, in Europe, we have got a base structure in Europe
that is pretty broad. You know, do we need to maintain all of
that at the same time we are dealing with these other needs?
So you can see the kind of tradeoffs that are going to have
to be made, based on the threat, based on the nature of the
threat. But by doing that, you know, I guess what I need to
make clear to everyone, particularly on this committee, is that
when you do that, then there are some risks associated with
that. What are the risks, for example, if we reduce our
presence in Europe? Well, it is the relationship with NATO, and
the role that NATO plays. You know, are we going to be able to
provide the kind of support that NATO needs in order to do its
job. Those are the kinds of issues that I think are going to
have to be.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. General Dempsey.
General Dempsey. Yes, Congressman. Just to be clear about
the end state, I mean, we--I didn't become the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs to oversee the decline of the Armed Forces of the
United States, and an end state that would have this Nation and
its military not be a global power. So you are never going to
hear us say, we are going to be really good in the Pacific but
we are going to completely ignore the Indian Ocean and its
littorals. We just can't do that. That is not who we are as a
Nation.
And so we will remain a global power and the Armed Forces
of the United States will remain the most dominant military on
the planet. I mean, we owe the country and we owe the young men
and women we send into harm's way that.
So as we look at the future and prioritization, it is not a
matter of ignoring anything, because again, we can say that, it
will look good on a PowerPoint slide, it will make us feel
good, but at the end of the day we are not going to ignore
anything that threatens our Nation or threatens our interests.
Risk is generally managed in terms of time. Now, that is
kind of an indelicate answer. I could certainly flesh it out
for you over time. So if we were to say that we have to do two,
three, four things at a time, we could add up the resources
required, I could put a bill on the table for the SECDEF
[Secretary of Defense] and say here is what we need, but I know
you don't have that kind of--so you are going to take all the
risk. I am just telling you that. And that is not where we need
to go. Where we need to go is say, look, there are ten things
we need to be able to do. These we can actually take some risk
in terms of time, whether it is the time to activate the
Reserve component, whether it is the time to generate it. So
time is the independent variable here, and we are trying to
determine how to use it.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And congratulations to
both of you. Secretary Panetta, my mom is 100 percent Italian,
so congratulations on being the second Italian-American
Secretary of Defense. Let me associate myself first with
Congressman Loebsack's remarks regarding the defense industrial
base. I represent a district in northeast Ohio, as you know,
and it is critical that we have this money that we are
spending, the billions of dollars invested back into our
country. And I spent years when I was first on this committee
dealing with the Berry amendment. And sometimes the waivers
that were granted through the Berry amendment for specialty
metals was happening way too often when we have American
companies, titanium and others, who could provide the materials
for the military.
So I hope as you continue to push down through the
bureaucracy, your view and your vision that some of this is
taken into consideration. The one issue I do want to talk to
you about, we see often in our districts when young kids come
back and they have been killed in action, they are on the front
page of the paper and we have parades and gut wrenching
services with their high school buddies and the whole nine
yards. One of the issues that I have been concerned with too is
the issue of the kids who come back, can never get
reestablished. They are dealing with high levels of PTSD [post-
traumatic stress disorder], and they are in the obituary
section in the back of the paper and there aren't parades, and
there is no banners and there is not huge services and
community recognition.
And one of the issues I think that is dealing this blow to
these kids is the extreme and prolonged levels of stress that
they have in multiple tours and being able to deal with this.
Not only as combat troops, but also trying to deal with the
stress afterwards. So I want to call to your attention a
program called the Mindfulness Base Mental Fitness Training
Program that was established by a woman named Liz Stanley at
Georgetown. And it is beginning to show both in trials within
the Army and in the Marines. There was an article in the Marine
Corps Times a couple of weeks ago called ``Bulletproofing Your
Brain.'' And it basically helps these folks deal with the
stress levels that they deal with in combat. And we see with
high levels of stress, prolonged and extreme levels of stress,
you have diminishment in your cognitive abilities, diminishment
in your situational awareness, your ability to focus and causes
a lot of problems while in theater. But what they are starting
to see here and study in the field of neuroscience is that you
can actually change the shape of your brain. You can make new
neural connections, and I think this is important when you
begin to teach these soldiers, both to raise their performance
and improve their performance as soldiers being able to focus
better, having more efficient use of their faculties as they
are dealing with this stuff, increased levels of situational
awareness, but also being able to deal with the stressful
situations afterwards when they come back.
And I think this program, if you will look at it, and start
looking at what some of the studies are suggesting, I think it
can have a transformational effect. It is my own personal
opinion. The science is still--the case is being built. But I
think it can have transformational effects on giving these
soldiers the tools that they need for when they go back home.
Benefits now and benefits when they go back home. And the
reports we are getting back in some of these articles from
people in the Marines and the platoons is that they think
something is there. They feel it work and one quote from the
Marine Times article was a soldier who has been to, I think,
Afghanistan once and Iraq twice learned this program after he
got back and he said, boy, I wish I would have had this before
I went over.
So I want to bring that to your attention, ask your
opinions on trying to look at some of these alternative
approaches to training our soldiers and getting them maybe
prepared in better ways to deal with what they are going to
see, hear, smell and have to deal with in war. So----
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, I want you to know that I
am willing to look at anything, anything that can help be able
to serve these men and women when they come back from the
battlefield to be able to adjust and be able to deal with the
pressures and the stresses that they bring back with them. This
is a real problem. You know, we have too high a rate on
suicides taking place. And it is an issue that bothers me
terribly because I am writing condolence letters now to those
families, and that just--you know, it is unacceptable. We have
got to--we ask these guys to go into horrendous conditions,
they put their lives on the line, they have to face incredible
threats to them and to their buddies and suddenly, you know,
they are pulled out of that and brought back to this country
and having to face some of the pressures here of having to
adjust. Whatever----
Mr. Ryan. I would love to work with you on this program and
with the General as well. Hopefully at some point we could have
a committee hearing on it and bring the neuroscientists, bring
Liz and bring the crew here from some of the folks who have
experienced it already.
The Chairman. Good idea. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary, and General, for your service and dedication to
duty. And it is an honor to be with you today. One, General, I
am reassured by your comments you just made. It sounds like you
just said not having a global influence is not an option, but
it is if a trillion dollars' worth of cuts goes into effect
over the next 10 years.
So a lot of folks and my colleagues on both sides have hit
on the high-level points, but I think what we need to do is
have the conversation with the American people that if we have,
like, a Checkpoint Charlie Berlin situation in the Luzon Strait
or the Strait of Taiwan, we have to build up there for some
reason and we have a humanitarian disaster, we have a nuclear
fallout in Japan like we had with their nuke plants, the
Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean like you mentioned, other parts
of the South China Sea, Atlantic, Pacific, there is not going
to be a way for us to respond to everything if we break down
the military with those cuts.
So we are going to have to have the conversation with the
American people, do you not want to help Israel? Because we
can't help Israel if we have a buildup at Taiwan or some other
area where we have to stare the bad guys in the eye and build
up in that region. I just think we have to have that
conversation because I don't think the American people realize
that not helping Israel, for instance, is one of the options
that will need to be on the table if one of those cuts go
through. So bringing it down from that 10,000 foot view down to
ground level, let us talk about IEDs. I think that a lot has
happened under Secretary Gates. You had the UAV [Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle] Working Group, the IED Working Group, Dr.
Carter, General Paxton, JIEDDO [Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Organization], all of these different groups
getting together. But it still takes a long time, sometimes
months, sometimes years to feel deployed, do R&D and get stuff
to the field, even if it is only an 80 percent solution.
For instance, the newest thing with the Marine Corps--I was
there literally not as a Marine, but as a civilian when they
got the silk underwear because of the IEDs and the way that
things were going with IEDs and the types of injuries they
have. But that is the extent of what the American might and the
American industrial base can provide to our Marines and
soldiers, is hopefully a cleaner extraction of the
fragmentation as opposed to a way to combat.
So my question is, what fresh thinking, what kinds of
outside-of-the-box ideas are you bringing to the fight on the
number one threat to our men and women, 70 percent of our
casualties and KIA [killed in action] are caused by that.
Historically, low casualty rates compared to any other war in
human history, but it is still there and that is my question.
And then if I could, how will these budget cuts if they go
into effect, affect our counter-IED fight? Thank you.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Congressman. Thinking of
defeating the IED is thought about in three aspects. You have
to defeat the device. You also have to defeat the network that
produces it, which is the supply chain, the leadership, the
facilitation, the financing of it. And then there is an issue
called signatures, which is one of the creative ways we have
been getting after identifying with--through various sensors
the signature component of an IED so you can track the network
and defeat the device. And that work is ongoing. What we have
done in the Army is essentially said the IED is the enduring
threat to our force for the foreseeable future. So we need to
institutionalize--it can't any longer be thought of as a one-
off threat. It is there and it will always be there because the
enemy knows that asymmetrically they can attack us that way.
JIEDDO is an important organization. It is fully funded in the
budgets that we have submitted so that we can do the kind of
work that you are describing. And so at this point, I can tell
you that even in the $450 billion-plus cut or reduction, we can
account for what you said. If the reduction goes deeper than
that, I would have to--we will have to take a look. But
everything will be affected if there is another phase of this
thing.
Secretary Panetta. I think one of the real success stories
in my predecessor was the ability to develop the vehicles that
had to be done on a quick timetable to get them out to the
battlefield. Under most circumstances, that would have taken 8
or 10 years. What they did was they basically said we need
them, we need them now. They made the contract. They required
that it be produced within a timeframe. They got it done. We
got it out there and we provided it out in the battlefield.
That is the model I think we have to follow as we deal with
these kinds of threats. We can't just sit back and allow this
thing to go over a long period of time. We have got to get it
and get it done now.
Mr. Hunter. The normal acquisition process had to be
bypassed by this Congress and by your predecessor for that to
happen. Thank you both. I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Gentlemen, thank you very much. Mr. Panetta,
it is always good to share a table or at least an opportunity
with you. And, General, thank you for your service. I have a
series of questions. Actually three. I will send them to you in
writing and save a little bit of time around here. In
discussions about maintaining our industrial base, which we
like to call Make It in America, there are numerous questions
that have arisen about the outsourcing to other countries of
key military equipment. For example, the fuel for the hellfire
missile is made in China. It raises a bit of a question. Many
of the components that deal with the targeting of critical
weapons are also made overseas in China and other places. This
is a major concern, and I will send you a more detailed
question on it.
The other point that I will just make is that from the far
left to the far right, various think tanks have been thinking
about what to do with the military. A very interesting matrix
can be put together. It was put together by my military fellow,
and it is very interesting where both come down from the far
left to the far right and in the middle about things that can
be done. I will send you that matrix and I think you might find
it a useful exercise--maybe you have already done it--about
where at least those two spectrums, far out spectrums, find
similar potential. I will let it go at that. You can comment if
you would like. Take a deep breath and take a pass. Thank you
very much.
Secretary Panetta. Thank you, John.
Mr. Palazzo. [Presiding]. At this time, Mrs. Roby from
Alabama.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you. I just want to say personally what an
honor to be here in front of you both today and I just
appreciate your willingness to serve our country in this
capacity. I want to touch on something a little bit more on the
personal side as it relates to our troops. We have talked about
strategic planning and certainly that is very important as we
move forward with these cuts. But we have got to talk about the
morale of the men and women who are currently serving our
country, both here and abroad and what this whole discussion is
doing to them as they move forward in their day and nights away
from their families and really what that looks like.
I had the opportunity several months ago to sit down with
some soldiers at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and talk to them about
what can we do to help support them. And this one soldier
looked at me and his pregnant wife was sitting at his side and
he looked at me with tears in his eyes and said, Mrs. Roby,
don't worry about me, just take care of her.
And we are fast approaching, as we move towards the
realness of the sequestration, because as I have said many
times, that this Joint Committee in a lot of ways is a
microcosm of all of the problems we already have in Congress.
And as we move towards this deadline date, it is that soldier
and his wife and his family that is the real victim in this.
Time and time again over the course of my short time here in
Congress, our military families have been the ones that have
been the insurance policy against political debate here in
Washington, and I think it is unconscionable, and I think what
all of your answers that you have provided today are important
as they relate to specific operations within our military. But
I just really want to give you both an opportunity to talk
about the effectiveness, and with the 24/7 news cycle, our
military families are certainly not immune to the very
discussions that we are having here. And I have small children
and I work, my husband and I, very hard to ensure that they
know that they are loved and that they feel secure. And when
you have a soldier serving overseas whose spouse is at home
having to worry about whether or not that paycheck is going to
come for them to put groceries on the table or to make the car
payment or the house payment.
You, General, said that no matter how awesome our
technology is at moving forward as a progressive military, our
men and women in uniform are what make this military great. So
I just wanted to give you an opportunity to both respond to
that aspect of what we are looking at down the road.
Secretary Panetta. Congresswoman, I thank you for that
question. Our men and women are out there putting their lives
on the line in order to defend our democracy. I think that one
of the great national security threats is the dysfunctionality
of Congress and its inability to confront the issues that we
face now. And I think your concern is that this committee that
has been established might fail to provide the leadership that
it has been given, or the responsibility it has been given to
be able to come up in a responsible way with additional deficit
reduction. That concerns me as well.
I have to share with you, I served in this House for 16
years. During that 16 years, we faced a lot of great threats.
We faced a lot of problems. But the leadership was there on
both sides of the aisle, Republicans and Democrats, to work
together to try to find solutions to these issues, not to walk
away from them. And I think what is very important for this
super committee and for all Members of Congress is to take the
time to think about the sacrifice that those men and women go
through to put their lives on the line in order to be able to
defend this country. And if the Members of Congress would be
willing to engage in the same kind of sacrifice, then I think
they will have earned the right to represent those constituents
in Congress.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, I appreciate that. General.
General Dempsey. It is hard to do a better job of answering
your question and the concern behind it than the Secretary just
did. In everything we are doing right now, in every
deliberation about strategies and how we are going to absorb
different reductions, the family, the soldier, the family, the
veterans, the wounded warriors, gold star families are always
the first issue that we discuss. And if we only end up with 1
dollar at the end of all of this, it will go to a family.
Mrs. Roby. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Palazzo. The chair now recognizes Mr. Coffman from
Colorado.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, thank
you so much for your decades of distinguished service.
Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and for your dedication to
maintaining a strong military. I am reminded of the history of
Great Britain after World War II where they still saw
themselves as a world power but they came out heavily in debt,
they were weakened by World War II. They were still engaged in
anti-communist operations in Greece and Turkey but then they
had to turn to the United States, and we assumed that role and
there is nobody behind us.
China is a rising power and I don't think we would ever
want to turn that responsibility over to China. So we have to
maintain that strong military, that global power as both of you
have so well articulated today. Let me put three questions
forward and if we run out of time in terms of answering them,
then if you could answer them on the record. The first one is
that we still have a Selective Service system in place. Yet,
according to the Army recruiting command, individuals between
the ages of 18 and 22, 75 percent of them, I believe, are
ineligible today for enlistment in the United States Army of
young people between the ages of 18 and 22.
In 1973 was the last year that we had the draft. In 1974,
we disbanded Selective Service. In 1979, Jimmy Carter put it
back on the table as a response to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. And it still exists today, and it is not even in
your budget. It is an independent agency and it is under the
Financial Services Committee. It is not even under this
committee. So the question is, do we still need it? The second
is in South Korea, I believe we are moving from 1-year
assignments to 3-year unaccompanied--3-year accompanied tours
for our 28,000-force presence there. That decision was made, I
think, really during the height of the Iraq war when dwell
times were next to nothing. But we are phasing out of Iraq now,
we will be phasing down in Afghanistan, dwell times will expand
and the question is, do we really need to spend the $13 billion
that I believe is necessary in military construction to
accommodate that change in policy? Can we do something that is
more cost effective given the expansion of dwell times like
deploying battalions for 6-month rotations to and from CONUS.
The last issue is concerns--I think we have rank inflation
in the military and I would like you to take a look at that. I
believe if we look at the height of the cold war when I was in
the United States Army, we had a military much larger than. But
I believe that there are more 4-star flag officers in the
military today and a much smaller Force. I think we have as
many admirals as we have ships in the United States Navy. And I
think that that is duplicative to the rest of the military. And
I would certainly like you to take a look at that and the costs
associated with that. Could you go through those three
questions, please.
General Dempsey. I will go from bottom to top and the
Secretary will take the question about Selective Service. We
are looking at rank. Some of the rank inflation is a result of
international partners and their desire for flags, but we are
looking at that, believe me. Secondly, on Korea, tour
normalization, it is part of our strategy review to look at our
forward presence--wherever we happen to be, but notably in
Korea and in Europe, and again, to determine how best to do it
in an affordable way and I assure you that we are alert to the
fact that tour normalization to 3-year tours might become cost
prohibitive. We do need some structure there with families
because of the message it sends and the readiness increases
when you have soldiers there for a longer period of time.
Secretary Panetta. I mean, we are in the process of looking
at everything that costs a lot of money and that is one of the
things that costs a lot of money that we need to look at and
determine whether or not we can find some savings in the way we
approach that. On the selective service, the registration,
registration is still required. You are right, that there is a
system. It is not associated with us. But, you know, my view is
that we ought to maintain the registration aspect because
particularly as we go through these budget cuts, particularly
as we go into the future, if we face, you know, one of those
surprises, if we face one of those crises that suddenly occur,
we have to have some mechanisms in place in order to be able to
respond. And while right now I have to tell you the volunteer
force is the best, I wouldn't trade it for anything, it really
has served its purpose, but I think we always have to be ready
for that possible contingency in the future if we suddenly had
to face an unexpected event.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. May I have 30 more
seconds?
Mr. Palazzo. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In terms of looking
at forward bases and whether or not we can demonstrate our
support for our allies, whether NATO or South Korea through
scheduled regular routine joint military exercises, we are
spending almost 4 percent of our GDP [Gross Domestic Product]
on defense. I think only 4 of our 28 NATO allies are spending
the required 2 percent required under the NATO charter.
In South Korea, they are spending 2.7 percent of their
gross domestic product on defense. I believe we are at north of
3.6 percent. It seems like we care more about defending the
South Koreans and the Europeans than the Europeans and the
South Koreans. So I think that we need to strike a balance in
that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Palazzo. The chair now recognizes Mr. Scott from
Georgia.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, Mr. Secretary,
I appreciate you being here and we have talked a lot about the
cuts on the top line. And I represent Robins Air Force Base in
Georgia and we have Moody to my south, Benning to my west,
Kings Bay to my east, Stewart, Gordon. I should not have
started naming all of the bases, but the military industrial
base and the men and women of the Armed Services are very
important to us, and I did not vote for the sequestration. I
think it is too much.
Now, I do believe that properly managed, we can take our
cuts and I believe that--I couldn't think of a better person to
help us manage through that than you, Mr. Secretary. One of my
concerns is when I look at the things that we are doing that
are cost drivers, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 says that, in
our new facilities, we can have zero percent of fossil fuels in
providing the energy for those facilities by 2030. That means
no natural gas, it means no coal, it means no petroleum. And I
guess one is, is that realistic? And two is, I think this is
just one example I would say of a policy that has been put in
place with well-meaning intentions, that is going to take
energy as a percentage of your operations from approximately 3,
3\1/2\ percent as I understand today, up to a much more
significant portion of your budget. And I guess my question is,
what other cost drivers are there like that that we could make
some changes to that would help you in reducing your costs?
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, you know, as part of the
strategy approach to look at, first of all, the overall needs
and then determine where we go, I really do have to--I have got
to put everything on the table including what you just
discussed. I mean, I think we have to look at all of that to
make sure that we are implementing the most cost-efficient
approach to dealing with these issues. I mean, I understand,
you know, at a time when, you know, we we're getting a blank
check and things were doing fine, you could do all kinds of
things. But now I am in a situation where I frankly have to
tighten the belt, and that means I have to look at everything.
And I think the areas you have pointed out are something we
have to look at to make sure it makes sense.
Mr. Scott. I hope you give us a list of the things that you
need us to help you with along those lines because I do believe
that in order for us to reach our top line goals without
affecting national security, that we are going to have to look
at the cost drivers like that. And with that said, I know that
you all waited 3 hours for me to ask that question. I will just
tell you we are ready, willing and able to work with the two of
you to solve this challenge. I yield back my time.
Mr. Palazzo. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Young, from Indiana.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary and General Dempsey, so much for visiting us today. I
have to say I have been incredibly encouraged, more so than any
HASC [House Armed Services Committee] hearing I have attended
thus far during my first term here because you discussed, in a
very direct way, the need to assess risk, to accept risk, to
articulate precisely which risks we are willing to accept, to
do the whole probability of risk times anticipated costs of any
given threat. That is exactly the sort of analysis that I have
been pushing for months here and I know others have as well.
So I thank you for your leadership. Coming out of that
analysis, of course, we will be able to, of course, prioritize
missions and that, in turn, will inform our spending decisions
here in Washington, where do we fund personnel? Where skills
sets are needed? What weapons platforms? That is the way we do
business and it is really refreshing.
I am going to pivot a bit having given you those kudos to
the war in Afghanistan where I see less clarity and I hope in
coming weeks and months, perhaps years, we will be required to
get some more clarity as to what our Nation's doctrine is. Mr.
Secretary, you indicated that we are in Afghanistan to keep
Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorism. True, it
seems. And I hear that from many. It is a bit too vague for me.
We did, as Mr. Jones said earlier, we got bin Laden. Al Qaeda
has dispersed around the world. If a safe haven for terrorists
exists, it is right next door in Pakistan.
So what is this doctrine that justifies a massive ground
presence in Afghanistan? How do we measure success in that
theater in particular, but also in other theaters, if it is
justified, to have an American presence there? What is the exit
strategy? It is going to take well past my reserve time here
for you to be able to answer that. But as you get halfway into
answering the first question of that litany, my time will
expire.
So I just want to encourage you to clarify these things.
People are losing their legs, people are dying and we owe it to
all of them and their families and the United States of
America. I am going to focus narrowly on one aspect of our exit
strategy, though. And that is our fiscal commitment to the
region. It remains open-ended. Right now we are spending $120
billion a year, and as far as the eye can see from my vantage
point, we are going to continue to spend money in that region
in the form of foreign aid and military assistance to harden
the police and military forces there.
What is this Administration, Mr. Secretary, what is this
Administration's economic strategy for Afghanistan, which,
under the law, it was required to present to this Congress
before you were sworn in back in June. We are still waiting on
it.
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, again, I really understand
the concerns and all of the issues you raised, and I think we
frankly, both of us, can more fully respond to it. But I mean I
didn't support going into Iraq. But when you look at Iraq
today, Iraq is a more stable country and in a very important
region that is exercising self-government, is exercising the
kinds of rights and responsibilities that it never enjoyed in
the past. And as a result of that, it becomes a more secure
area and it becomes an area in which they can govern
themselves. And more importantly, they themselves can exercise
the responsibility of maintaining stability there. That is an
important achievement. That is an important achievement. I hope
that we can do the same in Afghanistan.
Mr. Young. And so that is, as you have articulated at least
in summary fashion, the economic strategy for Afghanistan? That
is narrowly what I am asking for here. And if you wish to
follow up, I would certainly understand that.
Secretary Panetta. Well, I think--obviously in Iraq, the
economic strategy is a lot easier because they have an oil
resource. In Afghanistan, it is much tougher. Now they do have
minerals. They do have resources. None of that has really been
fully developed. But I think providing that kind of support and
allowing them to be economically independent is going to be
part of the solution here; otherwise, it is not going to work.
Mr. Young. And as you say independent, I think trade. Might
trade be part of the answer, not just in Afghanistan but
regionally?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. Very much.
Mr. Young. Well, I am very encouraged to hear that and I
look forward to working with the administration, this
Department, and others to move that ball forward. Thank you.
Mr. Palazzo. The chair now recognizes Mr. Platts from
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Dempsey, I am honored to be with
you. And I first want to thank both of you for your many, many
years of dedicated service to our Nation. We certainly are
blessed by both of you, what you have done in the past and what
you continue to do now in your new positions.
I want to first express, on policy, gratitude to the frank
assessment of where we are; that while we are addressing the
fiscal challenges of our Nation that we don't do it on the
backs of our courageous men and women in uniform and at the
risk of our national security. And you both play very important
roles in your assessment of where we are with the $450 billion-
plus cuts that are already coming and what that will do to
national security and our commitment to our men and women in
uniform and their families is so important to this dialogue,
this debate that is ongoing. So I thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I want to also commend you and your
testimony. I am running back and forth between a markup in
Oversight and Government Reform. But I did get to hear on C-
SPAN radio your opening statements, although I wasn't here in
the room, and your focus on financial management within the
Department. In the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, I
chair the Subcommittee on Financial Management. Just 3 weeks
ago, I had Under Secretary Hale's deputy before us and talking
about where DOD is, moving to 2017. I was delighted as I
listened to the radio this morning and heard your reference to
trying to expedite the process in getting to that clean audit.
And just, I guess two words of caution is one that it is so
important that we get there because it will allow a better
management of your resources, especially in tight fiscal times,
but that it be true systemic changes, not ultimately a heroic
effort to get a clean audit. And you reference in your
testimony financial controls. Internal controls is where it is
at. And the second is that we not repeat the errors of the past
with the DIMHRS plan, Defense Integrated Military Human
Resource System, that over 12 years, we spent over $1 billion
on and unfortunately did not get a result from $1 billion of
taxpayer funds. We learned from that and not to repeat that.
But your leadership on financial management on the civilian
side and General Dempsey on the uniformed side is going to be
key. And this ultimately is making sure we have the resources
to provide the training, the equipment that our men and women
need and we do right by them and their families. So your focus
on that.
A final one, really maybe beyond the general scope of
today's hearing. But just a concern I have regarding our
efforts in Afghanistan. And that is, when the President
announced the surge, which I commended, back in December of
2009, and then the goal of starting to draw down troops this
year, an important aspect of his statement was based on the
facts on the ground. And I accept the decision. He is Commander
in Chief and our military leadership at the Department that we
can begin that 10,000-troop drawdown this year. My concern is
that we are already committed to 23,000 next year when we don't
know what the facts on the ground will be next year. And if we
are going to stick by that number, I hope within the Department
and with the Joint Chiefs that we will look at at least moving
it back to December 31st once the winter sets in and the true
fighting season is over because now I think it is currently
September 30th, and I think that creates a hardship for our
commanders on the ground in how to deal with the full fighting
season in Afghanistan next year.
So no questions. I will let you wrap up. You have been very
patient with all of us. But again, I will just conclude with
thanks for both of your leaderships. We are blessed because of
both of you being in the position you are in.
Secretary Panetta. Congressman, thank you for all of your
remarks.
On the last point, I want to assure you, General Allen has
just been outstanding in the way he has addressed his command
position there. And I am going to rely a great deal on his
recommendations as we go through this process.
Mr. Platts. Great to hear. Thanks again. And I wish you
both great success in your new assignments. And again, as a
Nation, to have both of you in those positions is a blessing
for our Nation and for our security.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Palazzo. All right. The gentleman yields back. And
seeing no more questions, I will reserve the last question for
myself.
Secretary Panetta, as others advocate for immediate and
sharp cuts to defense, the actual implementation of such cuts
are rarely discussed. I am concerned that such a rapid decline
in funding could result in an increase, not a reduction in
short-term costs for things such as termination cost on
contracts you have already committed to and increased unit
procurement costs as production quantities are reduced. Can you
describe to the committee how such unplanned reductions, should
they result, be implemented? And what liability could we face
because of the termination of many of the planned procurements?
Secretary Panetta. I think we have got to take those issues
into consideration. Otherwise I don't want to cut off my nose
to spite my face in this process. And if we try to get savings
that we have identified, and it will wind up costing us more
because we have done it in a stupid fashion, I think that is a
mistake. As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, I went through
the BRAC process. And I know that all of the dollars that
people looked at for, you know, huge savings in BRAC. And yet
they didn't take into consideration the cleanup. They didn't
take into consideration all of the work that had to be done.
They didn't take into consideration all of the needs that had
to be addressed. And in many cases, it wound up costing a lot
more. I don't want to repeat that mistake.
Mr. Palazzo. Very well. Again, seeing no questions, Members
may have additional questions. Please respond to them in
writing.
I want to thank the witnesses for their service to their
country and for their testimony here today. The witnesses are
excused. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
October 13, 2011
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 13, 2011
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Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military Ten
Years After 9/11: Perspectives of Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Martin Dempsey
October 13, 2011
The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive
testimony on ``The Future of National Defense and the U.S.
Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives of Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Martin Dempsey.''
This hearing is part of our ongoing series to evaluate
lessons learned since 9/11 and to apply those lessons to
decisions we will soon be making about the future of our force.
As our series draws to a close, we have received perspectives
of former military leaders from each of the Services, former
chairmen of the Armed Services Committees, as well as outside
experts. Today we will change direction as we look to the
viewpoints of our sitting Secretary of Defense and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our witnesses today have spent
decades serving our Nation. Thank you for being with us and
your public service.
As I continue to emphasize, our successes in the global war
on terror, and in Iraq and Afghanistan, appear to be lulling
our Nation into the false confidence of a September 10th
mindset. Too many appear to believe that we can maintain a
solid defense that is driven by budget choices, not strategic
ones. While I agree that the military cannot be exempt from
fiscal belt-tightening, we have to put this debt crisis into
perspective if we're to find our way back into fiscal
responsibility. Defense has contributed more than half of the
deficit reduction measures taken to date. There are some in
government who want to use the military to pay for the rest, to
protect the sacred cow that is entitlement spending.
Not only should that be a non-starter from a national
security and economic perspective, but it should also be a non-
starter from a moral perspective. Consider that word,
entitlements. Well, entitlements imply that you are entitled to
a certain benefit, and I can't think of anyone who has earned
that right ahead of our troops. By volunteering to put their
lives on the line for this country, they are entitled to the
best training, equipment, and leadership our Nation can
provide.
But all this talk in Washington lately about dollars
doesn't translate well into actual impacts on the force and
risk to our Nation. Yesterday, former Chairman Duncan Hunter
encouraged us all to answer these questions before we voted to
cut any more from defense:
LIsn't our primary Constitutional duty to
defend our Nation?
LIs the world suddenly safer today?
LIs the war against terrorism over?
I hope our witnesses today can help us understand the
ramifications of these possible cuts in relation to our force
structure as well as our ability to meet future needs of our
national defense. How can we make sure DOD is a good steward of
the taxpayers dollar, without increasing the risk to our Armed
Forces?
The U.S. military is the modern era's pillar of American
strength and values. In these difficult economic times, we
recognize the struggle to bring fiscal discipline to our
Nation. But it is imperative that we focus our fiscal restraint
on the driver of the debt, instead of the protector of our
prosperity.
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military Ten
Years After 9/11: Perspectives of Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Martin Dempsey
October 13, 2011
I would like to join the Chairman in welcoming Secretary
Panetta and General Dempsey in their first appearance before
the House Armed Services Committee. In these times of budgetary
uncertainty, your testimony is particularly important.
Secretary Panetta, as a former chairman of the House Budget
Committee and director of the Office of Management and Budget,
you know the realities as well as, if not much better than, any
of us sitting on this dais.
Our country faces a budget dilemma--we don't collect enough
revenue to cover our expenditures. According to the House
Budget Committee, we currently must borrow about 40 cents for
every dollar the Federal Government spends. This problem must
be addressed in two ways: Spending will have to come down, and
we're going to have to generate new revenues.
Like many, if not most, of our members here, I share the
view that large, immediate cuts to the defense budget would
have substantially negative impacts on the ability of the U.S.
military to carry out its missions. I am sure that both our
witnesses share this view, and I hope General Dempsey can help
us understand the impacts of additional potential cuts. I am
also deeply concerned about cuts to all non-entitlement
spending, which bore the brunt of the recent deficit deal. If
the ``super committee'' fails to reach a deal, then cuts
through sequestration will only impose deeper and more
dangerous cuts to our military and non-entitlement spending
such as infrastructure, education and homeland security.
I believe that we can rationally evaluate our national
security strategy, our defense expenditures, and the current
mission sets we ask the military to undertake and come up with
a strategy that requires less funding. We on this committee
like to say that strategy should not be driven by arbitrary
budget numbers, but by the same token not considering the level
of available resources when developing a strategy is
irresponsible. To that end, I congratulate our witnesses, and
their predecessors, for undertaking a comprehensive review of
our current strategy. I know we all are looking forward to the
results of that ongoing review, and I hope that you can give us
some insight into how and where it is going. I for one believe
that we can and must spend smarter and not just more.
It is also important that we address the revenue side of
our budget problem. We must consider raising additional
revenue. In order to avoid drastic cuts to our military and
other important programs, revenue streams must be enhanced.
It is my hope that this hearing will help remind everyone
here that we have to make some serious choices. Our budget must
be looked at in a comprehensive manner. If we are serious about
not cutting large amounts of funding from the defense budget,
something else has to give. Large, immediate, across-the-board
cuts to the defense budget, which would occur under
sequestration, would do serious damage to our national
security. In order to avoid large cuts to the defense budget,
we're going to have to stop repeating ideological talking
points and address our budget problems comprehensively, through
smarter spending and increased revenue.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
And thank you to our witnesses for appearing here today.
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 13, 2011
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
October 13, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES
Mr. Jones. Yesterday in the hearing, I was not able to stay for the
second round of questions. As you recall, you agreed with former
Secretary Gates' Afghanistan withdrawal assessment. He made these
before the HASC on February 16, 2011. I have enclosed his testimony for
your information. Please write back to me as to your assessment on how
many American service members will be killed and wounded in action by
the time we withdraw our forces in Afghanistan by the end of 2014?
``As we end the U.S. troop presence in Iraq this year, according to
the agreement with the Iraqi government, the overall deployment demands
on our force are decreasing significantly. Just three years ago, we had
some 190,000 troops combined in Iraq and Afghanistan. By the end of
this calendar year we expect less than 100,000 troops to be deployed in
both of the major post-9/11 combat theaters, virtually all of those
forces being in Afghanistan. That is why we believe that, beginning in
FY 2015, the U.S. can, with minimal risk, begin reducing Army active
duty end strength by 27,000 and the Marine Corps by somewhere between
15,000 and 20,000. These projections assume that the number of troops
in Afghanistan would be significantly reduced by the end of 2014, in
accordance with the President's strategy. If our assumptions prove
incorrect, there's plenty of time to adjust the size and schedule of
this change.''
Secretary Panetta. The United States' focus in Afghanistan is to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida and to ensure Afghanistan does
not again become a safe haven from which terrorists attack the United
States. We are extraordinarily fortunate that so many brave Americans
are willing to defend the country from those who wish us ill. Through
their service we are all safer. The risks of the battlefield are very
real, and casualties are a consequence of war not taken lightly.
The Department of Defense is doing everything it can to give
servicemen and women the training, equipment, and support required. I
can assure our forces and their families that my commitment, and the
commitment of our military leadership, is to ensure they have the
resources and training they need to carry out their missions. Our
forces are made up of our nation's finest, and they deserve nothing
less.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. I want to call your attention to a legislative issue
that has national security and budgetary implications for our efforts
in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere. The current CR does
not include an explicit extension of certain counternarcotics (CN)
authorities that expired in FY2011. Extensions are included in both the
House and Senate versions of the FY12 NDAA and were included in the
Department's requests for the CR.
We do not believe it was the intent of Congress for these
activities to stop, but due to a decision by the DOD GC, the lack of an
extension for these authorities, particularly for section 1004 support
for law enforcement, is causing considerable difficulty and jeopardizes
a wide range of CN activities, including some key efforts in the
Afghanistan theatre. Is there a way you can help us bridge the gap
until the NDAA is passed or ask the DOD GC to re-visit his decision?
Secretary Panetta. As several Combatant Commanders, the Director
for National Drug Control Policy, and others have argued, the temporary
lapse in DOD's counternarcotics authorities is indeed having
significant national security implications for programs in Afghanistan,
Colombia, Mexico, and along the Southwest border. While I agree that it
does not appear it was Congress's intent for these activities to stop,
the fact that these authorities do not exist in law left the Department
no other choice but to suspend certain counternarcotics support
activities.
For the past six weeks, the Department has been working with the
committee and other congressional leaders to resolve this situation. I
understand that last week the DOD General Counsel briefed you and
Chairman McKeon on the rationale behind his determination, and I am
unaware of any legislation or other information that would contradict
the Department's position. DOD made every effort to mitigate the impact
of this lapse in authority, but many of these efforts are incomplete
and/or temporary solutions. Unfortunately, there is simply no way to
``bridge the gap'' any further. In fact, many of the mitigation efforts
will have run their course over the next several weeks, since
alternative authorities and related funding sources will have been
exhausted. The Department has therefore asked the committee to provide
legislation extending these authorities in the next continuing
resolution. I would ask that this issue be given the highest priority
consideration as you complete work on the continuing resolution and the
FY 2012 Defense Authorization bill.
Mr. Smith. We focus on GTMO, but I understand there are issues
involving detainees charged with serious offenses in Iraq (Daqduq) and
the UN report regarding humanitarian concerns in Afghan prisons. How do
these affect our ability to detain enemy fighters? What is the
Administration planning to do regarding Daqduq? Are we reaching a point
in Afghanistan where US prisons will reach capacity? If so, what is our
plan?
Secretary Panetta. The President recently announced that all U.S.
military forces will leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. In this context,
the Administration continues to look at its options for adequately
mitigating the threat posed by Daqduq. Regarding Afghanistan, the
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) report
involved several detention centers run by the National Directorate of
Security and the Afghan National Police. The Commander, International
Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) has suspended the transfer of
detainees captured by ISAF forces, including U.S. forces operating
under NATO operational control of COMISAF, to these Afghan detention
centers and jails pending further investigations of the allegations,
inspections of the Afghan facilities implicated in the report, and
other remedial measures. We will continue to support the actions of the
Afghan government to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and
hold those responsible accountable. This temporary suspension does not
affect detainees captured by U.S. forces operating under U.S. Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) authority and transferred to the U.S.-run
Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), since such detainees are not sent
to the Afghan facilities implicated in the report.
U.S. detention capacity at the DFIP is nearing its current capacity
due to the persistently high rate of new captures by U.S. forces
conducting combat operations under OEF authority and the limited
capacity of the Afghan government to accept detainee transfers for
purposes of criminal prosecution or other appropriate disposition. To
address these issues, DOD is expanding the DFIP and reassessing how
best to transition detention facilities and operations to Afghan
control. Building the judicial capacity of the Afghan government
remains a top priority.
Mr. Smith. There is much concern raised about the risk of
transferring detainees from GTMO. Is there similar risk if we don't
transfer anyone else from GTMO? What would it be?
Secretary Panetta. The inability to transfer detainees from
Guantanamo attracts criticism from non-governmental organizations and
the international community. Presidential Executive Order 13492
mandated the closure of detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and
directed a review of each Guantanamo detainee. A Department of Justice-
coordinated Guantanamo Review Task Force completed its work in January
2010 and recommended that a number of detainees be transferred from
GTMO, subject to appropriate security assurances from the countries to
which the detainees would be transferred.
Mr. Smith. I want to call your attention to a legislative issue
that has national security and budgetary implications for our efforts
in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere. The current CR does
not include an explicit extension of certain counternarcotics (CN)
authorities that expired in FY2011. Extensions are included in both the
House and Senate versions of the FY12 NDAA and were included in the
Department's requests for the CR. We do not believe it was the intent
of Congress for these activities to stop, but due to a decision by the
DOD GC, the lack of an extension for these authorities, particularly
for section 1004 support for law enforcement, is causing considerable
difficulty and jeopardizes a wide range of CN activities, including
some key efforts in the Afghanistan theatre. Is there a way you can
help us bridge the gap until the NDAA is passed or ask the DOD GC to
re-visit his decision?
General Dempsey. We agree that it was not the intent of Congress
for these activities to stop. As you mention, both the House and the
Senate versions of the FY12 NDAA contain language extending these
authorities. It is my understanding that an agreement has been reached
between the Department and Congress on resolving the expiration of the
CN authorities in the Statement of Managers that will accompany the
next continuing resolution (CR). The proposed language directs the
Department of Defense to continue to carry out, for the duration of the
CR, the CN programs conducted in fiscal year 2011. Once the CR is
signed, the Department will begin to restore CN programs impacted by
the expiration of the CN authorities. All geographical combatant
commands, Special Operations Command, and the Services implemented
temporary fixes to minimize the impacts caused by the expiration of the
CN authorities. However, temporary fixes were not necessarily a `one
for one' replacement and in some cases there were no temporary fixes,
requiring the subsequent cancellation or postponement of a mission or
program.
Mr. Smith. We focus on GTMO, but I understand there are issues
involving detainees charged with serious offenses in Iraq (Daqduq) and
the UN report regarding humanitarian concerns in Afghan prisons. How do
these affect our ability to detain enemy fighters? What is the
Administration planning to do regarding Daqduq? Are we reaching a point
in Afghanistan where US prisons will reach capacity? If so, what is our
plan?
General Dempsey. As you know, the President recently announced that
all U.S. military forces will leave Iraq by 31 December 2011. The
Administration continues to look at its options for adequately
mitigating the threat posed by Daqduq. Regarding Afghanistan, the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report
involved several detention centers run by the National Directorate of
Security and several jails operated by the Ministry of Justice. The
Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) has
suspended the transfer of detainees captured by ISAF forces, including
U.S. forces operating under NATO operational control of COMISAF, to
these Afghan detention centers and jails pending further investigations
of the allegations, inspections of the Afghan facilities implicated in
the report, and other remedial measures. We will continue to support
the actions of the Afghan government to investigate allegations of
human rights abuses and hold those responsible accountable. This
temporary suspension does not affect detainees captured by U.S. forces
operating under U.S. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) authority and
transferred to the U.S.-run Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), since
such detainees are not sent to the Afghan facilities implicated in the
report.
U.S. detention capacity at the DFIP is nearing its current capacity
due to the persistently high rate of new captures by U.S. forces
conducting combat operations under OEF authority and the limited
capacity of the Afghan government to accept detainee transfers for
purposes of criminal prosecution or other appropriate disposition. To
address these issues, DOD is expanding the DFIP and reassessing how
best to transition detention facilities and operations to Afghan
control. Building the judicial capacity of the Afghan government
remains a top priority.
Mr. Smith. There is much concern raised about the risk of
transferring detainees from GTMO. Is there similar risk if we don't
transfer anyone else from GTMO? What would it be?
General Dempsey. Presidential Executive Order 13492 ordered the
closure of the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and directed a
review of each Guantanamo detainee. The Department of Justice-led
Guantanamo Review Task Force completed its work in January 2010. The
task force recommended that a number of detainees be transferred from
GTMO, subject to appropriate security assurances. The inability to
transfer detainees from Guantanamo attracts criticism from both
domestic groups, including non-governmental organizations, and the
international community.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. Do you agree with Secretary Gates that the
modernization project is very important both from a national security
standpoint and from a perspective of sustaining political support for
the New START Treaty?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. The nuclear enterprise remains, today and
for the foreseeable future, a foundation of the U.S. deterrence
strategy and defense posture. The U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure
requires significant investment. In order to remain safe, secure, and
effective, the U.S. nuclear stockpile must be supported by a modern
physical infrastructure and staffed by the most promising scientists
and engineers of the next generation.
Mr. Turner. What is your assessment of the cuts proposed for NNSA,
given that DOD transferred top-line authority specifically to support
these important defense programs?
Secretary Panetta. The Department of Defense (DOD) relies upon the
NNSA to provide and sustain the nation's nuclear warheads, and develop
and maintain the Navy's nuclear reactors in support of our strategic
deterrence mission. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, U.S.
nuclear weapons have endured well beyond their originally planned
lifetimes. The 1251 report submitted to Congress last February outlined
DOD and Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA nuclear enterprise funding
requirements. If authorized and appropriated by Congress, a fully
funded NNSA enables weapon Life Extension Program (LEP) execution and
investment in a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. These
investments are necessary for continued confidence in the nuclear
deterrent. Reducing or diverting Fiscal Year 2012 appropriations from
the U.S. nuclear weapons program, as proposed in the Energy and Water
Appropriations Subcommittee, will compromise the ability to carry out
the required modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and
sustainment of the nation's nuclear weapons. Without the refurbishment
and modernization of existing nuclear weapons and associated
infrastructure, the military will need larger quantities of hedge
warheads to ensure that military capabilities can withstand potential
failures of aging nuclear weapons. It also will adversely affect our
ability to certify the stockpile's nuclear performance without the need
for underground nuclear testing.
Mr. Turner. It seems unlikely that Secretary Gates was trying to
pay for water projects when he gave this DOD money to NNSA, do you
agree? How do you propose we solve this problem? What are your concerns
about DOD's budget contributions being diverted to parochial water
projects instead of their intended national security purpose?
Secretary Panetta. I am concerned that there is insufficient
transparency to determine whether the $8.3 billion DOD transferred will
be utilized as agreed upon by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
between the Secretaries of Defense and Energy making key Life Extension
Programs and other deliverables at risk. However, I also understand the
change in economic realities that occurred since the transfer and the
development of the MOU. DOD is currently working with NNSA and the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop a plan with which to
move forward into the future. This makes even more critical the full
support of Congress in authorization and appropriation of both DOD and
NNSA nuclear weapon budgets each year.
Mr. Turner. We're aware that the Administration is claiming that
every Administration conducts a targeting review. That is not disputed.
What appears unique here, however, is that it sounds like the
Administration has already decided to go lower, is that right? In view
of robust Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons programs, the illicit
nuclear weapons programs of North Korea, Iran and Syria, is this mini-
NPR pre-ordained to only recommend reductions to U.S. nuclear forces?
Secretary Panetta. The Administration is conducting a Nuclear
Posture Review implementation study to determine the nuclear force size
and structure needed to support U.S. national security requirements and
meet international obligations in a dynamic security environment. The
President directed the ongoing study as part of the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review. As stated in the NPR, the United States intends to
pursue further reductions in nuclear weapons with Russia. When
complete, the analysis of deterrence requirements and force postures
will inform the development of any future arms control objectives.
The analysis from this study will provide options for the
President's guidance to the Departments of Defense and Energy on
nuclear planning with respect to the force structure, force posture,
and stockpile requirements needed to protect the United States and its
Allies and partners and to inform plans for the employment of nuclear
weapons in the event that deterrence fails.
Mr. Turner. Chairman McKeon and I sent you a letter on September 13
asking you to assist this Committee in its oversight of the nuclear
weapons guidance by reconstituting an oversight process that existed
while you were in the Congress in the early 1990s. Can you tell us when
we might expect an answer?
Secretary Panetta. You should receive a reply in the near future. A
formal response is being drafted.
Mr. Turner. Because of your experience as a former senior member of
Congress (and Budget Committee Chairman), former director of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), and now current Secretary of Defense,
you bring a unique perspective to a question I have: What is your
assessment of the cuts proposed for NNSA, given that DOD transferred
top-line authority specifically to support these important defense
programs?
Secretary Panetta. The Department of Defense (DOD) relies upon the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to provide and sustain
the nation's nuclear warheads, and develop and maintain the Navy's
nuclear reactors in support of our strategic deterrence mission. As
stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, U.S. nuclear weapons have endured
well beyond their originally planned lifetimes. The 1251 report
submitted to Congress last February outline DOD and Department of
Energy (DOE)/NNSA nuclear enterprise funding requirements. If
authorized and appropriated by Congress, a fully funded NNSA enables
weapon Life Extension Program (LEP) execution and investment in a
responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. These investments are
necessary for continued confidence in our nuclear deterrent.
Reducing or diverting Fiscal Year 2012 appropriations from the U.S.
nuclear weapons program, as proposed in the Energy and Water
Appropriations Subcommittee, will compromise the ability to carry out
required modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and sustainment
of U.S. nuclear weapons. Without the critical refurbishment and
modernization of our nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, the
military will need larger quantities of hedge warheads to ensure that
military capabilities can withstand potential failures of aging nuclear
weapons. It also will adversely affect the ability to certify the U.S.
stockpile's nuclear performance without the need for underground
nuclear testing.
Mr. Turner. On October 7, 2011 four members of the Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction sent a letter to President Obama urging
that he direct the Office of Management and Budget to re-examine and
consider ``to make more efficient use of federal government spectrum
and reallocate some of it for commercial broadband use. In particular,
we should put every effort into making available paired,
internationally-harmonized spectrum below 3 GHz in sufficient block
sizes to support mobile broadband services within the next 10 years.''
We understand that this involves spectrum (specifically 1755-1850MHz)
that is currently allocated to and being used by the Department of
Defense and other federal agencies for a variety of critical
capabilities. How is the DOD addressing this issue and by what process
will the decisions be made? Additionally, what are the technical, cost,
and schedule impacts to the DOD of the potential reallocation?
Secretary Panetta. The Department is addressing this issue through
the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration (NTIA), in cooperation with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). These efforts are in line with the
President's directive to identify an additional 500 MHz of spectrum for
broadband. Specifically, as directed by NTIA in January 2011, DOD is
involved in a year-long study to determine the feasibility of
relocating systems from the 1755-1850 MHz band. The results of the
study are documented in an NTIA report that is currently being
coordinated through the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Inter-
Agency Review process.
Decisions are guided by P.L. 106-65 which directs that DOD not
surrender the use of a band of which it is a primary user until the
Secretaries of Commerce and Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
jointly certify to the House and Senate Armed Services and Commerce
committees that alternative spectrum with comparable technical
characteristics is identified to ensure no loss in essential military
capability.
Following report coordination, DOD anticipates that the FCC will
solicit industry comments through a Public Notice Process on the
results of the report, to be followed by rulemakings that set service
rules and auction rules. Industry comments will influence future
negotiations regarding the 1755-1850 MHz band and any potential
alternative spectrum relocation scenarios/studies, as the Commission
considers feedback in order to hold a successful auction.
DOD's 1755-1850 MHz study results indicate that it is feasible to
relocate from the 1755-1850 MHz band within 10 years, provided that
$12.93B is afforded to accommodate the relocation, comparable spectrum
(2025-2110 MHz and 5150-5250 MHz) is made available for DOD systems to
relocate, and exclusion zones are established to protect critical
capabilities in the transition.
Note: DOD studied the feasibility of relocating from the entire
1755-1850 MHz band (95 MHz) within 10 years. Also, DOD studied the
feasibility of an early transition from the 1755-1780 MHz band (lower
25 MHz) within 5 years as an interim step to the full relocation.
Deviations from the original study requirements (i.e. alternative
scenarios, etc.) will require additional time to study the technical,
operational, cost, and schedule impacts.
Mr. Turner. In what way does the military rely on NNSA's defense
activities? What are the military implications of not carrying out this
modernization, particularly as the warheads continue to age and as the
infrastructure continues to atrophy from its already ``decrepit''
state--as it was described by the Strategic Posture Commission?
General Dempsey. The Department of Defense (DOD) relies upon the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to provide and sustain
the nation's nuclear warheads, and develop and maintain the Navy's
reactors in support of our strategic deterrence mission. NNSA's
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan compliments DOD's force
structure plans to ensure sufficient capability to keep our stockpile
safe, secure and reliable.
As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), our nuclear weapons
have endured well beyond their originally planned lifetimes. If
authorized and appropriated by Congress, a fully funded NNSA will
enable weapon Lifetime Extension Program (LEP) execution and investment
in a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. These investments are
absolutely necessary for continued confidence in our nuclear deterrent.
Mr. Turner. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review says that, ``by
modernizing our aging nuclear facilities and investing in human
capital, we can substantially reduce the number of nuclear weapons we
retain as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise.'' It goes
on to say that these modernization investments ``are essential to
facilitating reductions while sustaining deterrence under New START and
beyond.'' If we do not carry out the modernization program, what is
your military opinion of the risks associated with nuclear stockpile
reductions?
General Dempsey. As long as nuclear weapons exist, we must have a
national commitment to sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent. I believe the NPR outlined the goals and capabilities
required to modernize our nuclear enterprise to ensure lasting
confidence in our Nation's nuclear deterrent force. The NPR articulates
the importance of a modern nuclear infrastructure for our ability to
size our nuclear weapons stockpile appropriately.
While I recognize the nation's fiscal realities will constrain
spending on national security programs, our nuclear enterprise
investments are critical to ensure long-term viability. The long-term
sustainment of the nuclear investments is critical to facilitating a
shift away from the recent U.S. strategy of retaining large numbers of
non-deployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical
surprise. Our weapons and delivery systems need life extension
programs. Our industrial base requires safe and modern facilities with
adequate capabilities and capacity. Lastly, we must attract the
brightest young minds to scientifically verify the safety, security,
and effectiveness of today's weapons without a return to underground
testing and to dismantle unneeded weapons.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS
Mrs. Davis. Can you tell me more about the group that is currently
working on the strategic 2020 assessment? Is this group looking at
strategy with regard to budget constraints and the limited resources
that you have mentioned (unlike the QDR which is required to not take
budget constraints into account)? Can you provide me with a list of
names or positions of those who comprise this group? When can we expect
to see the final result?
Secretary Panetta. The strategic choices group is one venue in
which the Department is considering the emerging defense strategy and
the translation of that strategy to the FY13-17 and future Presidential
Budget Submissions. The group is composed of the Secretaries of the
Military Departments, the Service Chiefs, and the Under Secretaries of
Defense in direct support of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The group will help
determine the desired attributes and capabilities of the future joint
force, and weigh the capacity of that force to provide needed
capabilities against cost and risk.
Mrs. Davis. Can you tell me more about the group that is currently
working on the strategic 2020 assessment? Is this group looking at
strategy with regard to budget constraints and the limited resources
that you have mentioned (unlike the QDR which is required to not take
budget constraints into account)? Can you provide me with a list of
names or positions of those who comprise this group? When can we expect
to see the final result?
General Dempsey. The strategic choices group is one venue in which
the Department is considering the emerging defense strategy and the
translation of that strategy to the FY13-17 and future Presidential
Budget Submissions. The group is composed of the Secretaries of the
Military Departments, the Service Chiefs, and the Under Secretaries of
Defense in direct support of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The group will help
determine the desired attributes and capabilities of the future joint
force, and weigh the capacity of that force to provide needed
capabilities against cost and risk.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. As the Defense Department considers possible cuts I
think there has been an evolution since the early 1990s in new Commands
and organizations that should be reviewed. Please provide me a list of
all the Army Commands and organizations that have been formed or
realigned, outside the BRAC recommendations, and numbers of people that
are currently assigned to those commands/organizations. I also ask that
you provide me with the increased number of General/Flag Officer and
Senior Service positions that have been created to lead or manage the
new Commands and organizations.
Secretary Panetta. In October 1992, the Army organized under
fifteen Major Army Commands (MACOMs). In 2005-2006, the Army Command
Structure was reviewed and reorganized to better support Combatant
Commands and the Army's modular formations. This established three (3)
types of command organizations: Army Commands (ACOMs), Army Service
Component Commands (ASCCs) and Direct Reporting Units (DRUs).
The Army currently has 23 commands: 3-ACOMs, 10-ASCCs and 10-DRUs.
The significant difference in the number of commands from the 1990s is
due to the Army's establishment of four ASCCs (U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Command, U.S. Army North, U.S.
Army Africa/Southern European Task Force, and U.S. Army Cyber Command)
to support newly formed Combatant Commands, and the re-designation of
U.S. Army Central as an ASCC. The Army also activated the U.S. Army
Installation Management Command to oversee the Army's facilities and
standardize base operations services across the Army. In addition, the
Army designated the following existing organizations as DRUs: United
States Military Academy, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, and
U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center. Throughout the period considered,
the documented Army general officer requirements always exceeded the
Title 10 general officer authorization limits. Consequently, there was
no growth in the number of general officers to meet structure
requirements. Rather, changes to the Army's organizational structure
require the Army leadership to make recurring assessments about which
positions to support/fill with a general officer based on roles/
missions/priorities.
The Army reduced more than 30 Senior Executive Service (SES)
allocations between the 1990s and today. During that same period, there
were changes to organizations that resulted in both additions and
deletions in executive positions. However, since agencies are expected
to manage their executive resource needs within the levels set during
the biennial allocation process, leadership needs for new organizations
were met by reprogramming existing resources to meet the agency's
highest priority requirements and unanticipated needs. [See the
document on page 73 for more information.]
Mr. Rogers. How do you plan to protect and preserve the organic
depot structure and enforce statutory provisions to assure the
viability of an organic logistics capability necessary to ensure
military readiness?
Secretary Panetta. The Department agrees that it is essential for
national defense that the United States maintains organic depot
maintenance capabilities that enable our forces to respond to national
defense contingencies and other emergency requirements. DOD policies
and actions support the preservation of core capabilities and balance
the maintenance workload across the public and private sectors.
The Department applies and enforces the core concept through a
biennial capability and workload review, completed by the Military
Services and reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The
purpose of this review process is to ensure a ready and controlled
source of technical maintenance capability owned and operated by the
Government. The Department's organic depot maintenance capability is
subject to title 10, U.S.C., section 2466, which directs that no more
than 50 percent of each Military Department's annual depot maintenance
funding can be used for work done by private sector contractors. The
Department provides this comprehensive information of depot maintenance
spending in a report to Congress annually.
In addition to these formal processes and reporting requirements,
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
Materiel Readiness oversees programs and initiatives designed to
support the effective execution of the Department's maintenance
requirements. A key element of these programs is the stewardship of the
U.S. organic depot structure.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. As you are aware, Public Law 110-229, the
Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008, converted the Guam-specific
visa waiver program into a joint Guam-CNMI regional visa waiver
program. P.L. 110-229 expressly intended to include visitors from
countries of ``significant economic benefit'' to the CNMI in the Guam-
CNMI VWP. As Congress intended, and as DHS acknowledged in implementing
the rule, these countries were the China and the Russia. However, the
interim final rule promulgated by DHS did not include China and Russia.
Instead, in October 2009, Secretary Napolitano exercised her
discretionary parole authority to allow Chinese and Russian tourists to
travel to the CNMI only. The ability of Chinese and Russian tourists to
visit Guam visa-free is crucial to the development of Guam's economy.
DHS is currently considering the final rule implementing the Guam-CNMI
VWP. DHS indicated that it has requested DOD's opinion on whether
either the expansion of the visa waiver program to China and Russia or
the extension of the existing parole authority to Guam would present
any concerns with respect to security of local DOD bases on Guam. Local
military commanders on Guam have stated publicly that they are not
opposed to expanding the visa waiver program to Chinese or Russian
visitors, and that any security-related concerns can be effectively
mitigated. This position comports with DOD's long-standing view, as
expressed in the Guam & CNMI Military Relocation EIS, that the military
build-up on Guam must be balanced with Guam's economic development. Can
you confirm that: (a) DOD is actively working to provide DHS with the
requested response regarding any security concerns to DOD from
expanding the Guam-CNMI VWP or extending parole authority to Guam; (b)
as expressed by the local military commanders on Guam, any potential
security concerns to DOD can be sufficiently mitigated, either within
the visa waiver mechanism or through conditions imposed pursuant to
DHS' parole authority?
Secretary Panetta. The Department of Defense is currently
evaluating the merits of the application of this program to Guam as
they relate to Departmental equities and requirements. DOD looks
forward to interagency discussion once the Department of Homeland
Security provides its formal proposal to all relevant Departments and
Agencies.
Ms. Bordallo. As you know, 10 USC 235 states that ``In the budget
justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the
Department of Defense budget for any fiscal year . . . the Secretary of
Defense shall include the information described in subsection (b) with
respect to the procurement of contract services . . . the number of
full-time contractor employees (or the equivalent of full-time in the
case of part-time contractor employees) projected and justified for
each Department of Defense component, installation, or activity based
on the inventory of contracts for services required by subsection (c)
of section 2330a of this title and the review required by subsection
(e) of such section.''
How can DOD have the ``ability to conduct a full budget audit'' if
DOD is not able to prepare a compliant budget in accordance with
section 235 because DOD doesn't have an inventory that is compliant
with section 2330a(c) or conduct the review required by section
2330a(e)?
Secretary Panetta. The 2010 NDAA requires that DOD financial
statements be validated as ready for audit by September 2017. The
Department has a plan to accomplish that goal and is making significant
progress as described in the latest biannual report to Congress. I have
also directed that this effort should be expedited, with a 2014 target
to make out statements of budget resources audit ready. The first
priority in the plan focuses improvements on the controls and systems
associated with budgetary information. The goal is to improve
information to better inform decisions--not just to ensure the funds
are spent.
The financial statements and the budget justification are prepared
from the same data and processes which the DOD is focused on improving.
While the audit of DOD financial statements will not validate our
budget justification materials directly, I feel that the audit will
provide Congress assurance that our underlying financial information is
reliable.
Ms. Bordallo. In response to the GAO report on the inventory of
contracts for services released in January 2011, DOD indicated that it
``would develop a plan of action, including anticipated timeframes and
necessary resources, to facilitate the Department's stated intent of
collecting manpower data . . . '' and ``assess ways to improve the
Department's approach to estimating contractor full-time equivalents
until the department is able to collect manpower data from
contractors.''
What specifically has the department done since then to meet these
objectives?
Secretary Panetta. Following the GAO's report issuance in January
2011, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) began formal coordination of a proposed policy
issuance, ``Development, Review, and Analysis of the Inventory of
Contracts for Services'' (ICS). This issuance establishes policy,
assigns responsibilities, and provides uniform definitions and
guidelines to ensure consistency DOD-wide for the development, review,
and analysis of the ICS--consistent with the statutory requirements of
sections 235 and 2330a of title 10, United States Code.
This proposed issuance requires that as new contracts for services
are issued, and as options for existing contracts are exercised, DOD
requiring activities ensure that each statement of work (SOW) include
specific data elements required to meet the requirements of Title 10.
Specifically, the requirement to collect direct labor hours and
associated costs would be included as a deliverable. All services
provided in support of, or of benefit to, a DOD organization,
regardless of the source of the funding or acquisition agent and the
dollar amount of the vehicle, would be reported in the inventory of
contracts for services. Additionally, the issuance proposed guidance
with regards to completing a thorough review and analysis of the
contracted services to ensure they are validated against mission
requirements, as well as being justified against current and proposed
expenditures during annual program and budget reviews.
Based on feedback from the coordination process and as a result of
the passage of Public Law 112-10, OUSD(P&R) determined to reassess the
scope and content of this proposed issuance. Section 8108(c) of Public
Law 112-10 required each military department, agency, and activity of
the Department to develop a plan to collect direct labor hours and
associated costs from contractors. Nearly all Components have submitted
their plan in accordance with section 8108(c).
On November 22, 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness, jointly with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics, delivered a consolidated
Department-wide plan to the Congressional defense committees. Based on
individual Component submissions, this plan delineates both short- and
long-term actions to be taken by the Department to begin collecting
data from private sector firms and fully comply with requirements of
sections 235 and 2330a of Title 10, United States Code. Among the long-
term actions delineated in this plan is the completion of a
comprehensive DOD issuance that would formalize Department-wide
processes and responsibilities for compliance with these provisions.
Ms. Bordallo. In a recent prepared statement to the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Dr. Clifford Stanley stated OUSD Personnel and
Readiness is working with all DOD organizations to move towards
collecting data from the private sector firms providing services for
the department.
What progress has been made and have DOD organizations begun steps
to collect such data?
Secretary Panetta. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness' May 2011 statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee
was based on his request to each of the Department's organizations to
designate representatives to comply with the reporting requirements of
section 8108(c) of the Public Law 112-10, the Department of Defense and
Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011. These representatives
comprised a working group including the three Military Departments, 27
Defense Agencies/Field Activities, Joint Staff, 9 Combatant Command
organizations, OSD staff, and other DOD organizations. Led by
OUSD(P&R), this group discussed (1) how to respond to the specific
requirements of section 8108 and (2) how to improve the Departments
inventory of contracts for services both in the near and long term.
In coordination with P&R, each Component developed a plan to
collect data from the private sector firms providing services for their
organization. On November 22, 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, jointly with the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics (USD (AT&L)), delivered a
consolidated Department-wide plan to the Congressional defense
committees. Based on individual Component submissions, this plan
delineates both short- and long-term actions to begin collecting data
from private sector firms and fully comply with requirements of
sections 235 and 2330a of title 10, United States Code. The
Department's plan will follow the Army's best practice to modify
statements of work/performance work statements to require reporting of
contractor manpower data into a web-enabled database. To support these
plans, the Army made the source code for its web-enabled data system
available to all Components for modification and DOD will support a
review of the system to modify it and make it available to their
organizations.
Ms. Bordallo. Additionally, Dr. Stanley stated that OUSD(P&R) ``is
engaged to assist the Departments of the Navy and Air Force, to enhance
their service contracting governance ability by leveraging the Army
system as directed in the FY11 appropriations bill; and to also assist
the Defense Agencies and Field Activities as they report their plans to
collect this information.'' In July, in a letter to the chairman, Dr.
Stanley stated that the Components would be sending their plans.
The Committee has yet to see those plans or any indication from the
department that steps are being taken to leverage the Army process.
Why?
Secretary Panetta. With passage of Public Law 112-10, the
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act,
2011, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD
(P&R)) sent a memo to all DOD organizations, dated April 27, 2011, to
designate representatives to comply with the reporting requirements of
section 8108(c). These representatives comprised a working group
including the three Military Departments, 27 Defense Agencies/Field
Activities, Joint Staff, 9 Combatant Command organizations, OSD staff,
and other DOD organizations. Led by OUSD(P&R), this group discussed (1)
how to respond to the specific requirements of section 8108 and (2) how
to improve the Departments' inventory of contracts for services both in
the near and long term.
As a result of these meetings, on July 18th, USD (P&R) signed an
interim response to Congress. Following that OUSD(P&R) continued to
work with all Components of the Department to develop and coordinate on
those plans. On November 22, 2011, the USD (P&R), jointly with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics
(USD (AT&L)), delivered a consolidated Department-wide plan to the
Congressional defense committees. Based on individual Component
submissions, this plan delineates both short- and long-term actions
being taken by the Department to begin collecting data from private
sector firms and fully comply with requirements of sections 235 and
2330a of Title 10, United States Code.
Ms. Bordallo. In June, Dr. Stanley submitted the report on
``Public-Private Competitions'' in accordance with Section 325 of the
FY10 NDAA, recommending lifting the suspension on A-76. That same
provision requires the Department to certify compliance with 10 USC
sections 235 and 2330a in order for the suspension to be lifted.
Considering the lack of observed progress per the above, could the
Department justify certification to lift the suspension on public-
private competitions within DOD?
Secretary Panetta. No, the Department is not currently prepared to
certify compliance with 10 USC sections 235 and 2330a, as required by
section 325 of the FY10 NDAA, in order to lift the suspension on
public-private competitions within DOD. While the recent report to
Congress noted the utility in having the public-private competition
tool as a process by which to shape the workforce and appropriately
align functions between the public and private sectors, there remains a
lack of true visibility and fidelity regarding the contracted services
element of the Total Force. The Department made progress in the past
six months to meet the spirit and intent of 10 USC 2330a, and will
improve the reliability of data reported in accordance with 10 USC 235.
Once the recommended improvements to the inventory of contracts for
services are implemented, the Department will be better able to make
the certifications required by section 325 of the FY10 NDAA.
Ms. Bordallo. With respect to the component plans that were
coordinated by OUSD P&R, how many committed to follow the Army's plan
to modify SOW/PWSs to require contractors to report direct labor hours
and costs annually, and to use the Army system directly, or asks for a
DOD-wide Contractor Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA)-like system
to report this data?
Secretary Panetta. Of 44 DOD Components, P&R reviewed and
coordinated on 41 plans. Of these, 23 follow the Army's plan to modify
SOW/PWSs requiring contractors to report direct labor hours and costs
annually. These 23 organizations intend to either use the Army system,
or have requested a DOD-wide Contractor Manpower Reporting Application
(CMRA)-like system to report data. The other organizations submitting
plans proposed implementing contract clauses, modifying existing
agreements, or in the case of the intelligence agencies, already have
processes in place to capture data. Some of these organizations also
have data systems in place to record this information, or would like to
use a DOD-wide Contractor Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA)-like
system to report data.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. Secretary Panetta, I want to applaud your initiative
to make financial management reform and auditability a priority for the
Department of Defense. I am encouraged that you have directed the
Department to accelerate key elements of the Financial Improvement and
Audit Readiness (FIAR) plan, but also recognize there will be
challenges in achieving these goals. I am interested in more
information on how you determined the 2014 Statement of Budgetary
Resources audit readiness date. In addition, as the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) works to update the FIAR plan, I request to be
kept informed on the status.
Secretary Panetta. Shortly after I took office, I directed the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
(USD(C)/CFO) Robert Hale to review DOD/Component FIAR plans with
appropriate DOD leaders to determine what improvements could be made to
speed progress, given my keen interest in audit readiness. Two of the
military Services (Navy and Marine Corps) had plans for their Statement
of Budgetary Resources to be audit ready by 2013, Army would be ready
in 2015 and the Air Force would be ready by 2017. In consultation with
USD(C) Hale, I established reasonable but aggressive stretch goals in
order to push the organization to meet the overall 2017 goal for
auditability of all financial statements. The resulting goal for the
Statement of Budgetary Resources cuts in half the time for the whole
Department to achieve auditability of the Statement of Budgetary
Resources for general funds. With CEO involvement, this is achievable.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS
Mr. Owens. Secretary Panetta, as we draw down forces overseas,
training for our UAS operators will need to take place in the United
States. There is a pressing need to integrate UAS operations into the
National Airspace System (NAS) so pilots and sensor operators can
maintain combat effectiveness and flight proficiency. Currently, UAS
operations are limited to very small segments of airspace. The process
for securing Certificates of Authorization from the FAA to expand
access is lengthy and cumbersome.
For example, in my district, Fort Drum is where the 174th Fighter
Wing will soon be launching and recovering the MQ-9 (Reaper) aircraft.
After two years of working with the FAA, the unit is close to receiving
permission to fly in restricted airspace and above 18,000 feet in
special use airspace.
In order to conduct more appropriate and realistic training, the
MQ-9 will need to fly between restricted airspace, special use airspace
(military operating areas--MOAs) and the National Airspace System (NAS)
and take advantage of the entire airspace (from 5000 feet to 30,000
feet). This is required to avoid weather and to train with the full
capability of the weapons system. This is the ability to train
dynamically. Ultimately the Air National Guard needs to be able to fly
from joint civil military use airports.
Can you share with us how the Department of Defense is working to
solve this problem and expedite the approval process? For example, what
kind of research or pilot programs is the Department of Defense
conducting to facilitate the integration of UAS into the NAS?
Secretary Panetta. The Department of Defense (DOD) is addressing
the major issues enabling Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) integration
into national airspace through a joint, unified effort led by the DOD
UAS Task Force. The UAS Task Force serves as the Department's advocate
for shaping the regulatory policies, procedures, certification
standards, and technology development activities that are critical to
the integration of DOD UAS into the NAS. The Task Force developed the
DOD Airspace Integration (AI) Plan and the Joint Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) for UAS AI, which guides development of DOD policy and Service
CONOPS development. The Task Force AI effort is broken down into short-
term and long-term activity.
As part of the short-term activity, UAS Task Force leadership, in
partnership with the DOD Policy Board on Federal Aviation, serves and
supports the multi-agency UAS Executive Committee (ExCom). One of the
ExCom's key goals is to coordinate and align efforts among member
agencies (Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOD, Department of
Homeland Security, and NASA) to ultimately achieve routine safe Federal
public UAS operations in the National Airspace System. Through the
ExCom, the Department recommended specific improvements to FAA policy
and guidance that it believes will simplify the Certificate of Waiver
or Authority (COA) approval process while greatly reducing the time and
effort it takes to process and approve a COA application. These
recommendations are under active consideration by the FAA, and the
larger ExCom is awaiting formal notification of adoption or other
disposition.
The Department's long-term goal is to reduce, and ultimately
eliminate, the need for the FAA's COAs for the vast majority of DOD UAS
operations. The Department has a number of efforts underway to achieve
that goal, including development of Sense and Avoid (SAA) capabilities.
Over the past 3 years, the Department made significant investments in
SAA technologies enabling broader access to the NAS for DOD UAS. During
this time period, DOD engineers and technicians worked closely with
designated FAA staff to clarify the requirements and standards that
would enable approval and eventual certification of ground-based
systems for broad deployment throughout the Department and across the
United States.
The Department's laboratories, program offices, and industries have
long been involved in technology development and flight testing of
airborne SAA (ABSAA) systems to provide even broader, more flexible NAS
access for military UAS. The Navy and Air Force are working together to
leverage a common ABSAA functional baseline for the RQ-4B Global Hawk
(GH) and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) aircraft. The Navy is
leading development of a joint solution, building upon Air Force
Research Laboratory and Global Hawk technology efforts to develop a
Pilot-In-The-Loop capability, which will then be leveraged to develop
an autonomous SAA capability for GH/BAMS. This technology can provide
future capability for the Air Force MQ-9 Reaper and the Army MQ-1C Gray
Eagle.
Some of the potential technology solutions being evaluated include
radar systems and associated algorithms specifically designed for
autonomous SAA, commercial-off-the-shelf electro-optical (EO) sensors
for sensing non-cooperative aircraft, and short wave infra-red sensors
that have greater sensitivity for detecting air traffic under
conditions that are difficult for EO cameras. Other longer-term
technology options to improved SAA include Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast implementation that will leverage coming
improvements to the NAS under the FAA's NextGen effort.
The Department remains committed to achieving safe and efficient
UAS NAS access as quickly as technology and regulatory revisions will
allow. DOD is closely engaged with industry and academia to cross-
leverage both technology and aviation processes that will accelerate
this effort as much as possible.
Mr. Owens. Secretary Panetta, I have heard from a number of
constituents regarding the economic development implications of the F-
35 for Upstate New York. I understand that today the F-35 program
supports some 127,000 direct and indirect jobs across the country, with
potential for greater benefits down the road. Is the Department still
fully committed to this platform, and do you believe as others have
testified in the past that the F-35 presents a critical capability for
which there is no alternative?
Secretary Panetta. The Department is committed to the F-35 program.
The program was reviewed following a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach, and in
June 2010 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics certified that there are no alternatives to the program
that will provide acceptable capability to meet the joint military
requirement at less cost.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. The President's budgets have cut a total of $1.65
billion out of the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system, the
only missile defense system currently in place to defend the United
States. It was this system that Secretary Gates turned to in 2006 when
information and warning revealed potential launch activity of long-
range ballistic missiles by North Korea. Can you update us on the
status of the ``hedging strategy'' this committee has been waiting on
for almost two years? This strategy, as you know, is supposed to
provide the answer of how we will respond to developments of the
ballistic missile threats to the United States, such as a more rapid
development of long-range ballistic missiles by Iran or North Korea?
Secretary Panetta. Protecting the United States from the threat of
ballistic missile attack is a critical national security priority, and
missile defense of the homeland remains the first priority of the
Department's missile defense efforts.
The United States now possesses a capacity to counter the projected
threats from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future with the
current Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. Because of the
uncertainty about the future ICBM threat, it is important that the
United States maintain this advantageous position. In order to maintain
this advantageous position, the Department has committed to
implementing additional steps to maintain and enhance protection
provided by the GMD system. These improvements to the program of record
include:
Procurement of additional GBIs (which will keep
production lines warm through 2016);
The deployment of additional sensors;
Upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle Management
and Communications system;
Placement of an additional In-Flight Interceptor
Communications System Data Terminal on the East Coast;
Upgrades to the Early Warning Radars at Clear, Alaska
and Cape Cod, Massachusetts; and
An aggressive GBI reliability improvement program in
order to reduce the number of GBIs required per intercept,
which will increase the number of ICBMs that can be defeated by
the GMD system.
In addition to the improvements to the GMD system, the
Administration is also implementing a number of measures to strengthen
the U.S. hedge posture, including:
The construction and activation of Missile Field 2 at
Fort Greely, Alaska, which will accommodate a contingency
deployment of eight additional GBIs, if needed;
Placement of six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort
Greely in storage mode instead of decommissioning, allowing
their return to service within 18-24 months, if necessary; and
The continued development and assessment of a two-
stage GBI, which will continue to preserve future deployment
options.
The Administration is also committed to implementing all phases of
the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), including developing and
fielding the SM-3 IIB interceptor. The EPAA will improve our homeland
defenses while providing missile defense against the regional threat to
our deployed forces, Allies, and partners in Europe. The EPAA augments
homeland BMD defense by deploying a forward-based radar in Turkey,
which will provide data to augment the missile defense coverage of the
United States. Additionally, the SM-3 IIB interceptor will provide an
early-intercept capability against potential Iranian ICBMs targeting
the United States.
The United States continuously analyzes threat developments and
future capabilities to identify additional measures that could be taken
should new threats emerge. The analysis conducted for the hedge
strategy is informing the budget decisions under consideration as part
of the development of the Department's fiscal year 2013 budget request.
The Department will ensure that Congress is briefed on the results of
the hedge strategy at that time.
Mr. Lamborn. As you know, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore
in June, outgoing-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that, ``With
the continued development of long-range missiles and potentially a
road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile and their continued
development of nuclear weapons, North Korea is in the process of
becoming a direct threat to the United States.'' And two weeks later he
said, ``North Korea now constitutes a direct threat to the United
States. The president told [China's] President Hu that last year. They
are developing a road-mobile ICBM. I never would have dreamed they
would go to a road-mobile before testing a static ICBM. It's a huge
problem. As we've found out in a lot of places, finding mobile missiles
is very tough.'' Do you concur with Secretary Gates' statements? If
North Korea begins fielding an array of road mobile ICBMs, and if they
proliferate this technology to Iran and other countries as in the past,
what does such activity do to current judgments about the adequacy of
the current inventory of Ground Based Interceptors?
Secretary Panetta. One of the most significant threats to the U.S.
homeland is the continued progress of regional actors in developing
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them by ballistic
missiles. North Korea's demonstrated nuclear ambitions and continued
development of long-range missiles remain a primary focus of the
development and deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS).
At present, the capabilities developed and deployed as part of the
integrated BMDS protect us from the potential emergence of an ICBM
threat from Iran or North Korea. To maintain this advantageous
position, the Administration is taking steps to improve the protection
of the homeland from the potential ICBM threat posed by Iran and North
Korea. These steps include the continued procurement of ground-based
interceptors (GBIs); the deployment of additional sensors; and upgrades
to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications system.
Improvements to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, in
particular, will better protect us against future ICBM threats, whether
from Iran, North Korea, or other regional actors. The Department's BMD
hedging strategy, to be provided to Congress in the coming months, is
addressing how to best posture ourselves to address potentially larger
threats.
Mr. Lamborn. The National Missile Defense Policy Act of 1999
requires the U.S. to develop a missile defense system capable of
dealing with threats to the homeland from rogue regimes as well as
unauthorized or accidental launches from other states, presumably
Russia and China. Would you be surprised to learn that neither NORTHCOM
nor MDA have developed training to deal with the unauthorized or
accidental launch scenario? Would you please take steps to learn why
and to resolve this situation and would you report back to the
Committee?
Secretary Panetta. The Department of Defense developed and deployed
an operational missile defense capability to defend the homeland
against limited ballistic missile attack. In the event of an accidental
or unauthorized ballistic missile attack by any state, the U.S. would
employ the GMD system in defense of the U.S. homeland.
U.S. Northern Command is responsible for determining how the system
is employed, as well as for oversight of the training for assigned
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) mission crews. Personnel assigned
to GMD crews routinely train on different types of launch scenarios,
with the primary focus of training on actions required to defend
against a missile threat to the homeland. Training ensures proficiency
in the execution of the system for launches against the United States
regardless of their origin.
Mr. Lamborn. Do you believe, as you execute budget drills to
implement the $489 billion in cuts that have already been sustained to
the Defense Department budgets, that the country can continue to afford
a robust national missile defense as well as a regional missile defense
architecture like the EPAA, which will not contribute anything to the
defense of the United States until, perhaps 2020--though this is now in
doubt thanks to the cuts sustained to the SM-3 IIB development by the
Senate Appropriations Committee? Is it your understanding that the U.S.
is deploying the EPAA to defend Europe as its ``national contribution''
to NATO? If so, how much will that cost the United States to defend
Europe in this way?
Secretary Panetta. The Administration is committed to sustaining
and enhancing the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program for the
protection of the homeland, while also implementing phased adaptive
approaches to regional missile defense starting with NATO with Phase I
of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The administration is
committed to all four phases of the EPAA including the SM-3 IIB in
Phase 4.
Beginning in 2011, as part of Phase I, the EPAA augments defense of
the U.S. homeland, and is the United States national contribution to
NATO. Since President Obama's September 2009 announcement of the EPAA,
a key U.S. goal has been to implement the EPAA in a NATO context. At
the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, Allies agreed to pursue a
territorial missile defense capability to protect NATO European
populations and territories.
The Department has a budget and acquisition schedule for regional
missile defense, including elements associated with the EPAA. The costs
specific to EPAA are relatively modest, and associated with the planned
forward based AN/TPY-2 radar and fixed Aegis Ashore sites in Romania
and Poland. There are regional missile defense costs that cannot be
assigned exclusively to the EPAA (or to any other specific region)
because the research, development, and operation of these systems is
conducted in the context of ballistic missile defense writ large. For
example, the development and procurement costs for advanced versions of
the SM-3 interceptor and Aegis BMD software upgrades are part of the
EPAA, but will also be available for deployment in other regions. The
costs of the elements of the BMDS are provided annually to Congress in
the BMDS Assessment Report (BAR).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Secretary, please tell me and the House Armed
Services Committee how much the Department of Defense is planning to
spend on the Overseas Contingency Operations Account between 2012 and
2025? Please provide a year-by-year breakdown. Based on best estimates,
how much will this spending contribute to anticipated budget deficits
each year? Do you see the rising deficit as a problem for our national
security?
Secretary Panetta. The Department of Defense (DOD) requested
approximately $118 billion in its FY 2012 Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) President's Budget request for war requirements, a
drop of 26 percent from the FY 2011 OCO enacted level. The DOD OCO
budget is a bottom-up budget preparation each year, and it is
configured to support current military strategy and the Commander's
assessment of needs on the ground. Consequently, the Department does
not project OCO requirements beyond the budget year. The Office of
Management and Budget included a ``placeholder'' of $50 billion per
year for FY 2013 through FY 2021 in the President's FY 2012 Budget
request.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to get your thoughts on the
decline of the U.S. manufacturing base and the implications you see for
our nation's security interests. We must make it in America.
Unfortunately, all too often, we do not. For example, Department of
Defense officials have testified that the propellant for Hellfire
missiles is no longer going to be produced in the U.S. and that we will
have to procure it from foreign sources--reportedly China. We are now
dependent on China for supplies of rare earth minerals, which they
continue to ration. Those elements are critical to a vast array of
products, including the guidance system in our Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAMS). Are you concerned with the decline of our
manufacturing base? What do you view as critical to our security and
therefore, should be produced in the U.S.?
Secretary Panetta. The Department has a deep interest in the health
of the manufacturing base and the larger industrial base supporting
defense. Several factors play into actions that are considered to
ensure DOD maintains a healthy, robust base. First, certain defense
industrial activities rely on specific labor skills--high-skill jobs
that depend on experience learning a craft for which future workers
cannot readily be hired to replace workers laid off today. Second, the
Department has greater responsibility for maintaining defense-unique
capabilities, whereas the Department does not need to be as concerned
to ensure the long-term health of capabilities that draw readily on the
commercial marketplace. Third, the Department is most concerned with
industrial capabilities that are the most likely needed in the future;
the least likely to be superseded by innovation or changes in the
strategic environment; and the most expensive to reconstitute if a
capability had to be rebuilt later to replace one lost today for lack
of demand. The U.S. defense industrial base is critical to equipping
our military with superior capabilities; and a strong, technologically
vibrant, and financially successful defense industry is therefore in
the national interest.
The Department recognizes that the overall industrial base is
increasingly global and DOD must deal with the implications and
mitigate risks when warranted. Buying from a more global environment
offers many benefits including increasing competition and reducing
costs; allowing for the introduction of new technologies and concepts;
and supporting coalition warfighting efforts through increased
interoperability with allies and partners. On the other hand, while
there are many benefits, I am well aware that there are also potential
risks.
The Department is committed to ensuring sources of supplies,
whether U.S. or foreign, are reliable. The Department complies with the
Buy American Act, the Berry Amendment, and other domestic content laws.
In general, the Department does not support imposing additional
domestic restrictions on its sources of supply. However, the Department
has the authority to formally establish restrictions on the use of
foreign products, when necessary, to ensure the survival of domestic
suppliers required to sustain military readiness. These foreign product
restrictions are imposed by administrative action, as opposed to
statute, and they have been imposed, where necessary, to ensure
national security.
In terms of the two examples raised, the Department is currently
procuring one ingredient--butanetriol (BT)--for the Hellfire missile
propellant from China. The sole domestic supplier of BT decided to exit
the business due to a small market and environmental implications.
After an exhaustive global search for a supplier, the only company able
to supply the chemical was in China. DOD is actively working with
industry to develop a domestic source since it became aware of the BT
source issue in 2007 and continued development efforts show promise.
Regarding rare earth materials, most of the domestic supply chains are
intact in the sense that U.S. producers are typically available to make
rare earth products, components, and systems. The major exception is
sintered neodymium-iron-boron magnets, for which there is no current
U.S. production. In the case of the Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM) Program, while some potential risks to the supply of neodymium-
iron-boron magnets for the system do exist, the Department believes
that existing JDAM inventories mitigate risk significantly for that
particular system at this time, and performance would not be diminished
by the substitution of different magnets. Beyond the JDAM inventory,
the Department devoted intensive attention to rare earth elements over
the past several years and continues to monitor the issue carefully to
ensure the critical elements upon which our systems depend continue to
be available to system integrators.
Mr. Garamendi. Do you believe maintaining anywhere from 100,000 to
68,000 troops in Afghanistan over the next three years is the most
efficient and/or effective way to address the threat of international
terrorism? If so, why? Are there other strategies that might be more
efficient or effective? General Dempsey, you seemed to refer to a
network approach; can you please expand on your idea?
Secretary Panetta. I believe our strategy in Afghanistan is
critical to the disruption, dismantlement, and ultimate defeat of al-
Qa'ida and to ensuring that Afghanistan does not again become a safe
haven from which al-Qa'ida and its network of extremist affiliates can
threaten the United States or our allies. It was in Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan that al-Qa'ida found the safe haven it needed to conduct
the attacks on our country ten years ago, and we have a compelling
national security interest in preventing such a situation from arising
again.
As the President announced in June 2011, we are now drawing down
our 33,000 surge forces, so that by the end of summer 2012 we will have
a total of 68,000 forces in Afghanistan. We are working closely with
the Afghans and our NATO Allies and other partners to train and develop
Afghan forces capable of taking the lead role for security in
Afghanistan so that Afghanistan can never again be used as a safe haven
to attack others. We will complete this transition process by the end
of 2014.
The end of this transition does not mean the end of our efforts to
address the threats that emanate from the region, which remains a nexus
for insurgents and terrorist facilitation networks. A network approach
links the efforts of US, NATO, and other partners and maximizes the
effectiveness of Special Operations Forces, intelligence surveillance
and reconnaissance systems, cyber, and other capabilities to
collectively attack the insurgent network. Investing in the
sustainability of the ANSF and negotiating a strategic partnership with
Afghanistan beyond 2014 will assure Afghanistan--and the region--that
it will not again be abandoned.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Secretary, as you know several organizations
have proposed recommendations for Department of Defense savings. My
staff developed a matrix to compare the various programs which we
provided to your office. Across the political spectrum there are
numerous similarities. Therefore, as you consider your proposed cuts
please tell me and the House Armed Services Committee why those cuts
that both the left and right agree on, should or should not be made?
Secretary Panetta. Many of the proposals listed in your matrix are
under consideration for how the Department will achieve cutting over
450 billion dollars out of the budget over the next 10 years.
Everything is on the table. DOD is looking at reducing force structure;
it is looking at slowing the growth of compensation and benefits; and
it is pushing further for efficiencies and tightening areas like
procurement. These are all going to be tough decisions, and the
Department must pursue savings in areas that were previously considered
sacrosanct.
Every decision will entail some form of risk but the Department
must make the right cuts in the right places to meet this nation's
security strategy and manage risk. DOD is working hard to deliver in
the months ahead a coherent, strategy-driven program and budget that
preserves the best military in the world.
Mr. Garamendi. Do you believe maintaining anywhere from 100,000 to
68,000 troops in Afghanistan over the next three years is the most
efficient and/or effective way to address the threat of international
terrorism? If so, why? Are there other strategies that might be more
efficient or effective? General Dempsey, you seemed to refer to a
network approach; can you please expand on your idea?
General Dempsey. Following the recovery of surge forces,
approximately 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands of international forces
will remain in Afghanistan. These forces will continue to work side-by-
side with over 300,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as they
begin their transition to security lead. Moreover, the ANSF continues
to demonstrate growth in quantity, quality, and operational
effectiveness increasing their capacity and capability to counter the
influence of insurgent safe-havens in Pakistan and limiting the ability
of those insurgents from re-occupying ungoverned space in Afghanistan.
However, the insurgency is a complex network that is most
effectively countered through a network approach. Our approach must
cast a comprehensive net that includes threads from our interagency
partners, conventional and special operations forces, ISR, and cyber
capabilities to find and disrupt the multiple layers of an insurgency.
Addressing only one facet of the insurgency allows it to continue to
recover and to adjust.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RIGELL
Mr. Rigell. In the hearing, you testified that we have cyber-
attacks coming at us left and right.
1. To what degree are those attacks planned and executed or in
close collaboration with foreign governments compared to an individual
actor or actors?
2. Would you please identify the top three countries where those
attacks originate?
3. Also, if the attack originated from a foreign government, would
the Department of Defense consider that to be an act of war?
Secretary Panetta. 1 and 2. [The information referred to is
classified and retained in the committee files.]
3. The phrase ``act of war'' is frequently used as shorthand to
refer to an act that may permit a state to use force in self-defense,
but more appropriately it refers to an act that may lead to a state of
ongoing hostilities or armed conflict. Contemporary international law
addresses the concept of ``act of war'' in terms of a ``threat or use
of force,'' as that phrase is used in the United Nations (UN) Charter.
International legal norms, such as those found in the UN Charter and
the law of armed conflict, that apply to the physical domains (i.e.,
sea, air, land, and space) also apply to the cyberspace domain. As in
the physical world, a determination of what is a ``threat or use of
force'' in cyberspace must be made in the context in which the activity
occurs, and it involves an analysis by the affected states of the
effect and purpose of the actions in question.
Mr. Rigell. If the adverse consequences of operating under a series
of continuing resolutions, as compared to operating under a properly
legislated budget and appropriations, could be quantified and expressed
as a percentage (with the percentage representing inefficiencies), what
would you estimate the percentage and cost to be?
Secretary Panetta. There are many different aspects of the
continuing resolution (CR) process that create inefficiencies in the
Department of Defense. It would be impossible to adequately quantify
the impacts of operations under repetitive continuing resolutions.
Each account in the budget is affected by a CR in different ways
because of the various legal restrictions on use of funds. For example,
Military Construction accounts (totaling over $13.4 billion in the FY
12 request) require both Authorization and Appropriation of each
individual construction project. Since each year's budget contains an
entirely different set of construction projects, a CR that is an
extension of the previous year's budget means that all new military
construction stops--these accounts could be said to be more than 90%
inefficient during a CR. As another example, in Procurement accounts
(totaling over $113.0 billion in the FY 12 request), the Department is
unable to start production of a new item or to increase the rate of
production of an existing item, despite the fact that DOD planned to do
so for years, have carefully budgeted the funds, and negotiated the
contracts for these purchases. For the FY 2012 budget request more than
30 major programs were precluded from starting or increasing the rate
of production due to operation under the CR. For these aspects of the
Department's long range modernization plan, this is virtually complete
inefficiency.
The impact on other accounts within the budget is not as easy to
quantify. There are untold costs associated with contract delays, work
stoppages/restarts, and discounts forgone. These effects often carry
into future years, as they impact the long-term costs of projects.
Additionally, operations under continuing resolution are complex--
beginning with the calculations, and further complicated by the
interpretation of what the law allows--determining what we can and
cannot execute is often very difficult. Lack of a National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) also affects the Department's execution during
a CR because many of these authorities are not included in the CR
legislation, and the Department is required to cease operations until a
new NDAA is enacted. I cannot quantify the long-term costs of the CR,
either in terms of dollars or inefficiencies, but I can assure you they
are great.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
Mr. Johnson. The Army has spent $2.7 billion trying to build an
intelligence platform, Distributed Common Ground Systems-Army (DCGS-A).
It is years behind schedule, significantly over budget, and under-
performing.
A Politico article (``Army's faulty computer system hurts
operations,'' 6/29/11) detailed some of its failures. It quoted one
former intelligence official: ``Almost any commercial solution out
there would be better.'' Another added: ``It doesn't work. It's not
providing the capabilities that they need.''
An article in Defense News (``U.S. Army Intel Software Crashes
During Exercise, 10/22/11) describes another failure during recent
military exercises:
``When American intelligence analysts tried to use the software to
track simulated North Korean troop movements, the screens on their
DCGS-A workstations sometimes went black, forcing them to reboot the
software. . . . ' What happened is the volume of information
essentially crashed the software,' the senior intelligence official
said. `We learned to manually do [data retrieval] in chunks of
information so DCGS would not crash.' ''
I am concerned that DCGS-A is an incompetently developed program
that is wasting money and might fail our forces during real conflict,
risking American lives.
DCGS-A has been in development for more than a decade, costing
taxpayers more than $2.7 billion, with an additional $2 billion slated
to be spent in coming years.
Version 4 of DCGS-A was supposed to be delivered in 2007/2008 and
we have spent upwards of $355 million on it. Since it is now October
2011 and we still haven't seen Version 4 in the field, can you give
this Committee an update on this project?
And can you explain to taxpayers whether continued DCGS-A
development is a good use of scarce DOD resources when other services
use other tools to accomplish the same objectives at less expense and
with greater reliability and effectiveness?
Secretary Panetta. The DCGS-A program is meeting the requirements
outlined in the Joint Urgent Operational Needs statement and continues
to improve the intelligence architecture in Afghanistan to increase
capabilities and support to disadvantaged users. The accelerated DCGS-A
program of record meets all of the requirements of the Joint Urgent
Operational Needs (JUON) statement, moreover initial feedback from
theater indicates that users are pleased with the DCGS-A program.
As they exist today, stand-alone commercial capabilities do not
provide access to all DCGS-A data sources and do not interoperate with
Army mission command systems. Additionally, other proprietary
capabilities are not interoperable with our Coalition and mission
partners' systems and do not deliver the broad range of multi-
intelligence, full spectrum capabilities that DCGS-A provides. To date,
no other Service or stand-alone commercial intelligence capability is
able to address the operational needs and intelligence requirements of
our commanders and Warfighters as well as DCGS-A.
The DCGS-A system is an open architecture, government-owned system
that allows the Army to integrate the newest capabilities from industry
while reducing costs by maintaining a common architecture controlled by
the Government. In direct coordination with several agencies in the
Intelligence Community, DCGS-A provides a sustainable framework for
continued modernization as new capabilities and technologies become
available. The Tactical Cloud Integration Lab at Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland also provides industry and DOD partners the
opportunity to collaborate on cutting edge technologies and advanced
analytics, and to test the viability of integrating their capabilities
within the DCGS-A enterprise.
Specific to the JUON in question, the Army established one Secret
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) and one Afghan Mission
Network (AMN) Cloud node in Afghanistan, with Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) achieved in April and May 2011, respectively. To
interoperate with the clouds and to provide enhanced intelligence
capabilities, the DCGS-A client software required upgrading to Version
3.1.6. Additionally, the Army added 253 Portable Multi-Function
Workstations (P-MFWS) and 12 Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) Fusion Servers (IFS) to theater provided
equipment. With Army units' organic DCGS-A systems, there are 981 P-
MFWS and 67 IFS in support of JUON CC 0419, throughout the theater.
Data from the worldwide DCGS-A fusion brain architecture is made
available to the cloud data stores. Within the DCGS-A architecture, the
IFS provides a subset of data to Brigade Combat Teams, Battalions, and
some remote locations in theater. This subset of data provides the
ability to conduct limited analysis while disconnected. When
reconnected, data feeds begin to update. Additionally, through the
units' organic communications, disadvantaged users may leverage some
cloud capabilities due to the low bandwidth queries made possible by
the ``widget'' web applications and Ozone framework on the P-MFWS.
In August 2011, PM DCGS-A began the integration of DCGS-A cloud
software on a series of ``tactical edge node'' servers. Tactical edge
nodes extend the cloud architecture and provide more robust advanced
analytics capabilities and even greater storage capacity compared to
the IFS. The tactical edge nodes will interface with the larger SIPR
and AMN cloud nodes. This will provide theater users full cloud
capabilities without requiring constant direct communications. The ISAF
Joint Command in theater has opted to wait until the release of DCGS-A
Standard Cloud baseline (V) 1.5.3 in January 2012 for the deployment of
the initial tactical edge nodes.
Mr. Johnson. In a July 2, 2010 Joint Urgent Operational Need
Statement (JUONS), General Michael Flynn, then the top U.S.
intelligence officer in Afghanistan, wrote that ``intelligence analysts
in theater do not have the tools required to fully analyze the
tremendous amounts information currently available in theater,'' that
``this shortfall translates into operational opportunities missed and
lives lost,'' and requested a specific ``Advanced Analytical Capability
in Afghanistan.''
DCGS-A was available to U.S. forces in Afghanistan at the time
General Flynn issued this Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement,
demonstrating that DCGS-A was not meeting the needs of U.S. forces.
General Flynn specified that the capability needed included ``the
ability to support low-bandwidth or frequently disconnected users with
a data sub-set tailored to their area of operations and the
applications use it, as well as the capability to report and updated
information when re-connected to the network.'' The JUONS specified
that ``This data set should update while the user is connected to the
network and should also feed user reports/work back to the central
database for wider use.''
Does DCGS-A currently provide ``the ability to support low-
bandwidth or frequently disconnected users with a data sub-set tailored
to their area of operations and the applications use it, as well as the
capability to report and updated information when re-connected to the
network,'' and can such data set ``update while the user is connected
to the network and should also feed user reports/work back to the
central database for wider use''?
Have DOD efforts to meet the requirements outlined by General Flynn
in the 7/2/10 JUONS been in compliance with 10 USC 2377 (proven
commercial alternatives, partial or whole). And have other DOD services
or government agencies adopted more successful approaches to solve
these requirements at a lower cost?
Secretary Panetta. The DCGS-A program is meeting the requirements
outlined in the Joint Urgent Operational Needs statement and continues
to improve the intelligence architecture in Afghanistan to increase
capabilities and support to disadvantaged users. The accelerated DCGS-A
program of record meets all of the requirements of the Joint Urgent
Operational Needs (JUON) statement. Moreover, initial feedback from
theater indicates that users are pleased with the DCGS-A program.
As they exist today, stand-alone commercial capabilities do not
provide access to all DCGS-A data sources and do not interoperate with
Army mission command systems. Additionally, other proprietary
capabilities are not interoperable with our Coalition and mission
partners' systems and do not deliver the broad range of multi-
intelligence, full spectrum capabilities that DCGS-A provides. To date,
no other Service or stand-alone commercial intelligence capability is
able to address the operational needs and intelligence requirements of
our commanders and Warfighters as well as DCGS-A.
The DCGS-A system is an open architecture, government-owned system
that allows the Army to integrate the newest capabilities from industry
while reducing costs by maintaining a common architecture controlled by
the Government. In direct coordination with several agencies in the
Intelligence Community, DCGS-A provides a sustainable framework for
continued modernization as new capabilities and technologies become
available. The Tactical Cloud Integration Lab at Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland also provides industry and DOD partners the
opportunity to collaborate on cutting edge technologies and advanced
analytics, and to test the viability of integrating their capabilities
within the DCGS-A enterprise.
Specific to the JUON in question, the Army established one Secret
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) and one Afghan Mission
Network (AMN) Cloud node in Afghanistan, with Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) achieved in April and May 2011, respectively. To
interoperate with the clouds and to provide enhanced intelligence
capabilities, the DCGS-A client software required upgrading to Version
3.1.6. Additionally, the Army added 253 Portable Multi-Function
Workstations (P-MFWS) and 12 Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) Fusion Servers (IFS) to theater provided
equipment. With Army units' organic DCGS-A systems, there are 981 P-
MFWS and 67 IFS in support of JUON CC 0419, throughout the theater.
Data from the worldwide DCGS-A fusion brain architecture is made
available to the cloud data stores. Within the DCGS-A architecture, the
IFS provides a subset of data to Brigade Combat Teams, Battalions, and
some remote locations in theater. This subset of data provides the
ability to conduct limited analysis while disconnected. When
reconnected, data feeds begin to update. Additionally, through the
units' organic communications, disadvantaged users may leverage some
cloud capabilities due to the low bandwidth queries made possible by
the ``widget'' web applications and Ozone framework on the P-MFWS.
In August 2011, PM DCGS-A began the integration of DCGS-A cloud
software on a series of ``tactical edge node'' servers. Tactical edge
nodes extend the cloud architecture and provide more robust advanced
analytics capabilities and even greater storage capacity compared to
the IFS. The tactical edge nodes will interface with the larger SIPR
and AMN cloud nodes. This will provide theater users full cloud
capabilities without requiring constant direct communications. The ISAF
Joint Command in theater has opted to wait until the release of DCGS-A
Standard Cloud baseline (V) 1.5.3 in January 2012 for the deployment of
the initial tactical edge nodes.
Mr. Johnson. Colonel Peter A. Newell wrote in a July 28, 2010
letter to Congressman Norm Dicks of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense that the DCGS-A Cloud would be deployed to
Afghanistan in November 2010.
According to Army records, by the end of Fiscal Year 2011, the Army
will have spent nearly $120 million to develop the DCGS-A Cloud.
Given that Colonel Newell estimated that the DCGS-A Cloud would
have been deployed in the field eleven months ago, and we've already
spent $120 million on its development, I would expect that this system
is currently widely used by our forces in Afghanistan.
Can you please provide me with the exact number of U.S. Army BCT
personnel who are currently using the DCGS-A cloud while deployed in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta. The Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNet) Cloud equipment shipped to theater in November 2010. The
SIPRNet Cloud achieved Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in April
2011. The Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Cloud reached IOC in May 2011.
Thus, the clouds have been available for use for five-to-six months. In
the DCGS-A architecture in Afghanistan, there are 6,128 unique accounts
(users) operational in Afghanistan. As of November 2011, there are over
115 regularly active users of the cloud widgets supported by the cloud
capabilities in Afghanistan. These users are supporting the
intelligence requirements for the commanders of seven (7) Brigade
Combat Teams and 14 Brigade sized combat enablers.
Mr. Johnson. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I want to address the
possibility of expanding the DCGS program to serve the Department of
Justice or the Department of Homeland Security, as some have discussed.
As a member of the House Judiciary Committee, in light of this
program's decade-long track record of failure and disappointment, its
high cost and poor performance, and its flawed underlying technological
architecture, I'd like the record to reflect that I would have grave
reservations were the Department of Justice to acquire and use the DCGS
system.
Secretary Panetta. Each Service maintains a Distributed Common
Ground System program of record. Joint Forces Command successfully
evaluated and exercised multiple Service DCGS programs and their
interoperability with Coalition Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) systems at the Empire Challenge event in July
2011. Empire Challenge 2011 proved that the DCGS Integration Backbone
(DIB) provides timely information with access to all Enterprise
intelligence dissemination nodes. The DIB filters data to achieve
relevant results and supports real-time Cross-Domain data queries and
retrieval across Coalition and other security domains. The joint
standards that are set and maintained by DIB nodes allow DIB users
access to terabytes of data from the Services as well as Coalition and
Agency partners. The whole DCGS enterprise is greater than the sum of
its parts. Specific to the performance of DCGS-Army, in August 2011,
the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) conducted a forward
operational assessment of DCGS-A in Afghanistan. ATEC concluded that
DCGS-A supported Warfighter needs by providing access to theater and
national intelligence collection, analysis, and early warning and
targeting capabilities. DCGS-A provides access to hundreds of tactical,
strategic and national data assets on Coalition, Secret and Top Secret
networks. One key success of the DCGS-A system (like the larger DIB
network) is that the data is available via a DCGS-A web portal, to
anyone allowed access to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNet) or Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
(JWICS). If interested, the Department of Justice and Department of
Homeland Security could register for accounts and gain access to the
same information provided to our Warfighters. The DCGS-A brain web
portal provides limited analytical tools compared to the full suite of
DCGS-A thick client applications; however, the DCGS-A Cloud widgets on
the SIPRnet are intuitive and easy to use. Audit information of DCGS-A
usage shows that DCGS-A provides DIA, CIA, NGA, COIC, JSOC, USASOC and
other Services with large volumes of data each month. While the
ingestion of certain types of data regarding the Justice Department or
dealing with US persons would require special restrictions, the simple
addition of the DOJ and DHS staff members to our user base would be
easily established.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO
Mr. Palazzo. Recent news reported ``the Pentagon which previous
warned that reliable military spending figures could not be produced
until 2017, has discovered that financial ledgers are in worse shape
than expected and it may need to spend a billion dollars more to make
DOD's financial accounting credible, according to defense officials and
congressional sources.''
Mr. Panetta, this seems opposite of your written statement where
you believe that the Department can be audit-ready by 2014.
For months now my colleagues on the Panel on Defense Financial
Management and Auditablity Reform have been asking what we can do to
streamline this process and this is the first time I have heard
anything about additional funds being needed to achieve this goal.
Could you respond to these reports?
Secretary Panetta. The article you reference mischaracterized the
extent of resources expected to be required for Financial Improvement
and Audit Readiness (FIAR) efforts. As the Department reported in the
November 2011 FIAR Plan Status Report, it is devoting significant
resources, approximately $300 million per year, to achieving auditable
financial statements. DOD is not spending $1B more than reported in our
recent reports to Congress. I directed DOD Components to revise their
FIAR plans to achieve auditability in the Statement of Budgetary
Resources for general funds by 2014. As part of these efforts,
Components are assessing whether additional resources are required to
achieve the accelerated goal. Reasonable requests for additional funds
will be considered and future reports to Congress will reflect any
updated funding approved.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. One focus has been about making the defense programs
more efficient, cost-effective, and with high performance. How do we
assess research and development programs that often have with it a high
risk in developing cutting-edge research but at the same time has
significant and large payoffs?
Secretary Panetta. The Department's research and development
program is a balanced investment between higher risk, high payoff
technology and lower risk, and evolutionary technology. Throughout the
past several decades, both the Department and the country benefited
from high-risk defense research; among the advances, there was the
Internet, stealth technologies, the Global Positioning System, and
other advanced capabilities. As DOD moves forward to improve
efficiency, it is important to place higher risk development under
scrutiny. The Department must continue to develop new, high payoff
technologies--but it also must be ready to terminate efforts that are
not cost-effective. One successful model was the way the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency assesses high risk projects with
interim milestones or development gates. If the research is not
progressing, the program is stopped. Using this model, DOD is able to
continue high-payoff projects with enhanced efficiencies.
Mrs. Roby. One focus has been making the defense program more
efficient, cost-effective, and with high performance. What impacts,
both short-term and long-term, would a reduction in current RDTE
accounts, particularly basic research, have on military capability?
Secretary Panetta. In this fiscal environment, every program,
contract and facility will be scrutinized for savings that does not
reduce readiness or the ability to perform essential missions. These
cuts must be carefully targeted to avoid a hollow force, to ensure a
robust industrial base, and to protect the new military capabilities
required to sustain military strength. Research, development, test and
evaluation (RDT&E) accounts are a large part of the equation. While the
Department must be cost conscious, it must also take every possible
step to protect emerging military capabilities.
DOD cannot make a linear extrapolation of the impacts of RDT&E cuts
to the future force; but I can say that without RDT&E investment,
future military capabilities will be greatly reduced.
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