[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-75]
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE
COMPONENT ACQUISITION
AND MODERNIZATION
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 12, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
TOM ROONEY, Florida JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina BILL OWENS, New York
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
Jesse Tolleson, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Scott Bousum, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, October 12, 2011, National Guard and Reserve Component
Acquisition and Modernization.................................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, October 12, 2011...................................... 31
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 3
WITNESSES
Carpenter, MG Raymond W., USA, Acting Director, Army National
Guard.......................................................... 7
Stenner, Lt. Gen. Charles E., Jr., USAF, Chief, U.S. Air Force
Reserve........................................................ 11
Stultz, LTG Jack C., USA, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve............... 4
Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III, USAF, Director, Air National Guard 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G...................................... 35
Carpenter, MG Raymond W...................................... 72
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre........................................ 38
Stenner, Lt. Gen. Charles E., Jr............................. 105
Stultz, LTG Jack C........................................... 40
Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III................................ 97
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Chart of ``Army Reserve: Indispensable Capabilities of the
Operational Force,'' Submitted by LTG Jack C. Stultz....... 117
``Dip Chart'' Showing U.S. Army Reserve End Strength, Fiscal
Years 2002 through 2011, Submitted by LTG Jack C. Stultz... 118
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 121
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 129
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 12, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m. in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G.
Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Bartlett. Our subcommittee will come to order.
Today, the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets
to receive an update on the equipment status and requirements
of the Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve
Components.
Given the significant change in the budget outlook for
fiscal year 2012 and beyond, we believe it necessary to obtain
the current views of the Guard and Reserve senior leaders for
the potential impact on their programs. We will also hear from
the military services in two subsequent hearings later in the
month.
We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses: Major
General Raymond Carpenter, the Acting Deputy Director of the
Army National Guard; Lieutenant General Harry Wyatt, Director
of the Air National Guard; Lieutenant General Jack Stultz,
Chief, U.S. Army Reserve; and Lieutenant General Charles
Stenner, Jr., Chief, U.S. Air Force Reserves.
Major reductions in the Federal budget need to be an
element of correcting the Federal deficit. The Department of
Defense must share in a fair and balanced way in those
reductions. That process is already taking place under the
Budget Control Act of 2011, with nearly $500 billion in cuts
planned for DOD [Department of Defense] over the next 10 years.
However, cuts beyond that, up to approximately $1 trillion over
10 years, are possible under what Secretary Panetta called the
``doomsday mechanism'' sequestration provision of the Budget
Control Act.
Secretary Panetta and Director Lew of the White House
Office of Management and Budget have stated that budget cuts to
the Department of Defense as a result of the sequestration
provision ``could impose a significant risk to national
security. DOD would most certainly be forced to furlough large
numbers of civilian workers. Training would have to be
curtailed, the force reduced, and purchases of weapons systems
would have to be cut dramatically.''
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn recently
stated that ``the imposition of the sequestration provision of
the Budget Control Act on our Armed Forces could be
catastrophic. Sequestration would give us the smallest Army and
Marine Corps in decades, the smallest Air Force in history, and
the smallest Navy since McKinley was President. The debate is
not whether sequestration would wound our military; it is about
whether sequestration is equivalent to shooting ourselves in
the foot or the head.''
Against the backdrop of the Budget Control Act for 2011,
today's hearing is to get an assessment of the modernization
needs and equipping challenges of the Army National Guard, Air
National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve. We
recognize the Department is making major improvements and
progress in providing adequate funding to equip the National
Guard and Reserve Components to enhance its role as an
operational reserve. Sustaining this funding, however, will
continue to be a major issue, given the acute national economic
challenges we currently face.
During the April hearing, the subcommittee learned the
importance of equipping and resourcing the Reserve Component as
an ``operational reserve'' rather than the Cold War model of a
strategic reserve. We also heard our witnesses testify that,
since 2001, the Department has made significant strides in
providing adequate resources to equip the Reserve Component as
an operational reserve.
The Guard and Reserve Components have proven to be an
invaluable asset during Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation
Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn. These past 10 years have
justified the need for an operational Reserve Component force
that must be adequately manned, trained, and equipped.
Since September of 2001, almost 600,000 guardsmen and
reservists have deployed in support of combat operations,
representing 40 percent of the total Reserve force of 1.4
million troops. All 34 Army National Guard Component brigades
have deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan, and more than half
of the force has combat experience. There are reservists
operating in over 100 countries.
Over the past decade, the majority of modernization funding
for the Reserve Components has come from supplemental overseas
contingency operation funding requests, meaning funding that is
not part of the base budget request. What happens when these
so-called ``OCO'' [Overseas Contingency Operation] requests are
no longer requested or funded? How will we continue to sustain
the operational reserve and equip them for their missions?
Congress has not hesitated in trying to address the
equipment-readiness needs that we have noted in many Guard and
Reserve units over the years. National Guard and Reserve
Component procurement from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2011
has totaled approximately $47 billion, averaging almost $6
billion per year. Since 2004, Congress has authorized
approximately $7.7 billion in the National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Account. The National Guard and Reserve Equipment
Account helps maintain combat capability and should help to
guarantee that equipment is relevant and upgraded in a timely
manner. This funding has enjoyed sustained bipartisan support,
both on this committee and throughout Congress.
The Department of Defense and Congress have made
substantial progress in terms of adequate funding for and
reorganization of the Reserve Components. But I am concerned
that these anticipated budgetary challenges we currently face
could potentially negatively impact the current operational
status of the Guard and Reserves.
The ability to maintain a sustainable operational Reserve
force with sufficient operational capability is predicated on
having sufficient manpower and adequate resources. I want to
express how much the subcommittee appreciates the contribution
of the Guard and Reserve Components and want to recognize that
they are maintained at a fraction of the cost of the regular
military. We, as a nation, clearly cannot fight without them,
because there is no way a 19-year-old can have the skill set
and experience of a 39-year-old.
Before we begin, I would like to welcome--well, the
subcommittee's newest member is not here, but let me tell you
that we are very pleased to have Kathy Hochul from New York.
And when she comes, we will welcome her officially to our
subcommittee.
I would like now to turn to my good friend and colleague
from Texas, Silvestre Reyes, for any comments that he might
like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would like to add my welcome to the panel and most
especially to the three young men in the front row that
recently returned from Afghanistan. We appreciate your service,
and thank you for joining us here today.
Mr. Chairman, this past April, the subcommittee received
testimony from the leadership of the Army and Air Force Reserve
Components. Today, we have these same leaders back for an
update on the equipment needs of the Army and Air Force
Reserve.
During the April hearing, we heard that our Reserve
Components remain as busy as ever; that the proposed FY [fiscal
year] 2012 budget request would allow us to maintain the high-
quality Reserve forces that we have today. We also heard that
there were additional equipment needs for all of our Reserve
Components. As a result, the full Armed Services Committee bill
included $325 million in additional funding in the National
Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. The House appropriators
went even further, proposing an additional $1.5 billion for the
same account, with the Senate appropriators proposing $500
million.
So the good news is that it appears that Congress will
continue to provide support to the Guard and Reserve equipment
needs over and above the budget request.
On the other hand, however, the Budget Control Act of 2011
will likely result in a substantial cut to the DOD base budget
in FY 2012, perhaps as much as $26 billion. In addition, the
Budget Control Act mandates approximately $450 billion in
additional DOD cuts over 10 years when it is compared to the
current DOD projections. And, finally, if the so-called ``super
committee'' [Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction] does
not reach its goal of $1.5 trillion in additional reductions,
the DOD could face additional significant cuts starting in FY
2013.
However, at this point, we don't know how DOD will propose
dealing with these budget restrictions. What we do know,
however, is how similar cuts have been applied in the past. In
previous budget reductions, DOD has often taken an across-the-
board approach to making cuts, rather than a more focused, more
thoughtful path.
Today, Mr. Chairman, I am concerned that if an across-the-
board, cookie-cutter approach to funding reductions takes place
across the entire force, including our Reserve Components, they
will incur significant damage. For example, if the Air Force
further reduces fighter aircraft fleets in the Active Duty
Force, will similar cuts flow down to the Reserve Components?
If Active Duty Forces are reduced by DOD, are there plans to
increase the size of the Reserve elements to compensate for
those cuts? If DOD is seeking budget efficiencies, does it make
sense to strategically expand some elements of the Reserve
forces? I certainly hope that those questions are being asked
as part of the ongoing DOD strategic review.
The Nation has invested billions of dollars in additional
funding to create the highly effective Reserve forces that we
have today. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, they have been more
active than ever in the history of this country. With this
subcommittee adding additional billions to that investment
every year, to us it just makes good and common sense.
Beyond the immediate needs of our Reserve Components, I
think it is also critical that we focus on the long term. If we
get this right, we can end up with a high-quality Reserve force
that also saves the Nation billions of dollars which in today's
budget system desperately may be needed elsewhere.
So I look forward to hearing our witnesses' thoughts on
these major issues facing the entire DOD, but in particular the
Reserve Component is most critical to get your input.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I relinquish my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
We will proceed with the panel's testimony at this point.
Without objection, all witnesses' prepared statements will be
included in the hearing record.
General Stultz, please proceed with your opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF LTG JACK C. STULTZ, USA, CHIEF, U.S. ARMY RESERVE
General Stultz. Thank you, Chairman Bartlett, Congressman
Reyes, and other members of the committee. It is truly an honor
to be here today before you to testify.
And I didn't plan this or orchestrate this, but I did find
out that one of my units was at Fort Dix, New Jersey, just
arriving back from Afghanistan, and some of the soldiers asked
if they could come down, just to sit in and listen to what goes
on in the halls of Congress. And so I am going to use them as
an illustration of why we have to do what we have to do, us and
you together.
I put one chart up here in front of you, and I think there
are copies on your tables in front of you. But this question of
whether or not we need an operational reserve to me is not a
question. We have to have the Reserve Components as part of the
operational force, and the reason we have to is because the
Army is dependent on us.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 117.]
General Stultz. The chart there shows you that, over time,
as we have grown the Active Force from 480,000 to 569,000, we
have continued to push more of the combat-support/service-
support capability into the Guard and Reserve. Today, as the
chart shows, 83 percent of the transportation capability of the
Army is in the Reserve; 75 percent of the engineer capability
of the Army is in the Reserve; 70 percent of the medical
capability is in the Reserve. And I can go on and on.
So it is not a matter of, do we want to make the Reserve an
operational force? We have to. We have to make it part of the
operational force, because we know the end strength of the Army
is going to come down. And as the end strength of the Active
Army comes down, currently projected to come from 569 [569,000]
to 520 [520,000], the Army is going to be even more dependent
on the Guard and Reserve, which means we have to resource the
Reserve Component as an operational force.
And as you have indicated in your opening statements, it is
a great return on investment. For what you would give us to
invest in the Reserve, we give you a great return. These
soldiers sitting behind me are evidence of that.
The soldiers here are out of the 744th Engineer Company of
Ogden, Utah. First Lieutenant Tovey, I first met him in 2006
because I went out to Ogden, Utah, to welcome home this unit
when they came back from Iraq. They had been out doing route
clearance in the Anbar Province. They had taken a beating, lost
soldiers in action, had a number of Purple Hearts that we
handed out, Senator Bennett at the time and myself. And
Sergeant Tovey helped me hand out coins. Sergeant Tovey got a
direct commission to lieutenant. He is continuing his education
today at Idaho State University, making a contribution back in
his community, and now coming back from his deployment in
Afghanistan.
Sergeant Lissy, you look at him and you say, he is in a
different uniform. Well, he is in a different uniform because
during this deployment he was severely wounded, shot through
the leg, and the bullet traveled up and almost through the
spine. So he has been back home recovering, but he wants to
keep serving his country.
And then Corporal Pratt. Corporal Pratt hasn't been in the
Army very long. He enlisted in February of 2009, finished his
training in 2010, and now he is a combat veteran, back home in
Utah.
They have been doing route clearance. They remove the IEDs
[Improvised Explosive Device]. They detect; they get out there.
They are the lead in harm's way. The equipment they use in
Afghanistan is the best the Army has. The training they got
before they went to Afghanistan is the best the Army can give.
The challenge we have is, that equipment is not setting
back in Ogden, Utah. The equipment setting back in Ogden, Utah,
is not modernized equipment. The training we do on that
equipment back in Ogden, Utah, is not going to be the same
level of training that we need to do for them to go back to
Afghanistan or wherever we need them in the future.
And the fact of the matter is, 75 percent of the Army's
capability sets right here behind me and in the National Guard.
It is not as if we have another force out there to go to if we
don't give them the equipment and the training they need. And
so what we together, you and I, have to do is we have to band
together, use the investments you give us wisely, modernize
where we have to modernize, train where we have to train. And,
by God, we can't waste it; we can't afford to.
Now, I have one other chart I would like to show you that I
think is on your desk, and that is--this is what I call the
``dip chart.'' And these soldiers here illustrate what is on
this chart.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 118.]
General Stultz. You see, when we first went to war in 2003,
in the Army Reserve we were almost 10,000 over-strength in
soldiers. We were fat and happy. But we weren't trained and
ready. And as we started trying to call the soldiers to the
front, we found out we had a lot of holes in our formation. We
had a lot of medically unready soldiers, we had a lot of
morally unready soldiers, we had a lot of soldiers on the rolls
that we couldn't find. And then we had a lot of soldiers who
said, ``This is not what I signed up for.''
And so, by 2006, when I first came into this job, we were
down to almost 20,000 under-strength. And we lost that 10,000
over to 20,000 under while we recruited another 25,000 every
year during that time period. So it wasn't just like we lost
30,000 soldiers.
And then we started growing back, and we grew back to over
206,000 soldiers. And that was the Sergeant Lissys, the
Corporal Pratts, the Lieutenant Toveys that joined our force.
They joined our force to say, ``I want to go be something. I
want to go do something.'' And they tell me three things: Give
me some predictability, because I have another life and I have
an employer or a school. Don't waste my time; train me, and
train me to the standard I need to be trained to, and hold me
to that standard. And, thirdly, use me. I didn't sign up to go
back to strategic reserve that is one weekend a month, two
weeks in the summer. I want to be utilized.
And that is what we are building the Reserve of today
around. And all we ask of Congress is, help us get the
resources we need to maintain this operational readiness we
have, to maintain that national treasure. Because if we don't,
we will repeat that dip chart one more time because these young
men won't stick with us, because they want to do something,
they want to be something, they have too much invested, and
they have too much pride in what they are doing. So my
commitment to you, sir, is, the resources you give me I will
invest in them, I won't waste.
So I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Stultz can be found in
the Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
General Carpenter.
STATEMENT OF MG RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, USA, ACTING DIRECTOR,
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
General Carpenter. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes,
it is an honor and a privilege to again appear before this
committee and represent the 360,000-plus soldiers of the Army
National Guard.
Currently, we have almost 40,000 Army guardsmen mobilized
and deployed, and, as you know, more than half of that force
has combat experience. The sacrifice of our soldiers, their
families and employers has been tremendous, and they deserve
our deepest gratitude.
And I, too, would like to acknowledge the service of the
three soldiers that General Stultz has accompanying him today.
Coincidentally, I am an engineer officer. These three soldiers
are engineers. I got to tell you, my connection with them as an
engineer is a very strong connection. And I think those three
soldiers could just as easily be from the Army National Guard,
they could just as easily be from the Active Component, because
we are seamless now as an Army.
And so, thanks for your service, gentlemen.
As I have noted before, the Army National Guard has been
there from the start of this decade, from the very beginning.
The New York National Guard was among the first on the scene at
the World Trade Center on 9/11, as was the Maryland and
Virginia Guard in the days after the Pentagon was attacked.
Beginning with the 9/11 response, the Army National Guard
has continued to shoulder our responsibilities in the overseas
fight in Afghanistan and Iraq while simultaneously responding
to events in the homeland, the largest of which was Hurricane
Katrina. And the service of your Army National Guard continues.
Let me illustrate with a snapshot in time, the weekend of
August 26th through the 29th. During that weekend, the National
Guard had more than 63,000 National Guardsmen on duty
protecting this country at home and abroad. Over 47,500
National Guardsmen were deployed in support of overseas
contingency operations and partnership-building missions.
Almost 10,000 members of the National Guard from 24 States were
responding to then-Hurricane Irene. Another 1,000 National
Guardsmen provided security on our Nation's southwest border,
and an additional 4,000 National Guardsmen responded to a range
of domestic emergencies across this country.
The experience of the past decade has transformed the Army
National Guard into an operational force, ``a national
treasure,'' in the words of a recently retired four-star Active
Duty general.
As an operational force, the Army National Guard represents
the best value for America. Force structure and military power
can be sustained in the Army National Guard for a fraction of
the regular cost. The Army National Guard is one-third of the
total Army but accounts for approximately 10 percent of the
total Army budget. Supporting capability in the Army National
Guard is not only the right thing to do, it makes good business
sense.
The Army National Guard could not have evolved into the
operational force without the support of Congress. Our Nation
has invested over $37 billion in equipment for the Army
National Guard in the past 6 years, much of that from the NGREA
[National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation] account.
The delivery of that equipment has increased Army National
Guard equipment-on-hand rates for critical dual-use equipment
by 14 percent.
Because the Army National Guard is a full partner with the
Active Component, it is vital for the Guard to continue
modernizing its equipment. Modernization and interoperability
are essential for training during the Army National Guard pre-
mobilization periods and critical for deployments, as General
Stultz has pointed out.
I know this committee is interested in what has changed
since our appearance here last spring. Simply put, it is the
budget. Inside the Army, we have worked through multiple
iterations of budgets based upon the latest proposed budget
reduction. Secretary Panetta said on Tuesday that we would face
difficult choices. He also cautioned that we should make budget
choices based on strategy rather than expediency. He also
suggested that modernization of weapons systems and maintenance
programs were being examined as part of spending cuts and,
specifically, contracts were being reviewed for savings.
We in the Army Guard understand that future funding will be
less than in the past, and, frankly, we are prepared to
shoulder our proportional share of the burden. To that end, we
have already set about garnering efficiencies and developing
new strategies that will allow us to continue to meet our dual-
mission responsibility with less funding.
Those two missions have required an Army National Guard of
360,000 soldiers, 54 joint force headquarters, 8 combat
divisions, 28 brigade combat teams, 8 combat aviation brigades,
and over 70 enabling brigades over the past 10 years.
We are reminded regularly that we live in a very dangerous
and unpredictable world, and it seems like the predicted 100-
year natural-disaster events are coming closer and closer
together. We have built a capability to respond to the needs of
our citizens, home and abroad. We ought to fully understand the
risk associated with reducing that capability, because, in the
words of a combat commander in Afghanistan, sometimes all it
takes is all you have.
The Army National Guard is a force forward deployed in our
area of operation, the homeland. We have built great capacity
in the National Guard by establishing forces specifically
designed to deal with emergencies, disasters, and potential
terrorist attacks. Those units include Guard Civil Support
Teams, CBRNE [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and
High Yield Explosives] Emergency Response Forces, Homeland
Response Forces, and Domestic All-Hazards Response Teams. By
one estimate, 96 percent of the events that happen across our
country on a daily basis are handled by the local first
responders--the policemen, the firemen, and the National Guard.
Only 4 percent require Federal support.
It has taken years to build these organizations. We should
not rush to reduce the size, structure, or capability of the
Army National Guard without significant analysis and thorough
deliberation. I think it is very important to note that
eliminating a soldier from the Army National Guard is a double
hit because you not only take a soldier out of the warfight,
you also take a soldier out of the emergency response team at
home.
In the end, we have asked that the Army Guard's share of
the budget reductions be given to us, the Army National Guard,
and let us figure out where to pay the bill. Don't direct
reductions in Guard brigade combat teams or end strength,
because when that happens we will be forced to close armories,
move out of communities, and be driven to a lower readiness
level. Consistent with Secretary Panetta's comments, we think
we can examine our contracts and our programs and become more
efficient while maintaining our end strength and our force
structure.
In closing, the Army National Guard is battle-tested and
well equipped for both of our missions. And this committee has
been critical in building and sustaining the best-manned, best-
trained, and best-equipped National Guard I have seen in my
career--truly a best value for America.
Again, it is my privilege and honor to appear before this
committee today, and I look forward to your questions and
comments. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Carpenter can be found
in the Appendix on page 72.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
General Wyatt.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF, DIRECTOR, AIR
NATIONAL GUARD
General Wyatt. Chairman Bartlett and Ranking Member Reyes,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on
behalf of the 106,700 Air National Guardsmen--combat-proven,
dedicated, professional men and women--serving around the
world. I thank you and all members of the committee for your
support, continuing support, in these challenging times.
As we sit here today, over 6,000 Air National Guardsmen are
deployed around the world in helping to defend U.S. interests
on every continent, including Antarctica. In addition, nearly
3,500 Air National Guard men and women are helping to protect
our homeland by protecting the air sovereignty of the American
airspace, flying the Aerospace Control Alert mission; also by
assisting civil authorities in the protection of life and
property in the United States, including assisting flood and
hurricane recovery efforts in the Midwest and in the Northeast.
Air Guard members are currently helping the U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol secure our southern borders. And this summer, Air
National Guard aerial firefighting units dropped over 360,000
gallons of fire retardant on wildfires across the Southwest in
support of the National Forest Service.
For the last 20 years, the Air National Guard has been at
war alongside our Air Force Reserve and regular Air Force
brothers and sisters. When the air campaign of Operation Desert
Storm began in January of 1991, 11 percent of the U.S. Air
Force aircraft were flown and maintained by Guard airmen. And
the men and women of the Air National Guard have continued to
answer the call to service ever since, adapting rapidly to the
changing demands of the post-Cold War security environment.
Today, the Air National Guard provides approximately 34 percent
of the total Air Force capability, at a fraction of the Air
Force total budget.
As we look to the many challenges ahead, my goal is to lay
the foundations for an Air Force that has the capability and
the capacity to meet tomorrow's challenges within the
constraints that we can foresee.
As you know, the Air National Guard relies on the Air Force
for major modernization initiatives and weapons systems
procurement. However, we work with the air staff to encourage
them to equip the Air Guard in a manner that is concurrent and
balanced with the Active Component, because I believe that if
the Air National Guard is going to continue to be a reliable
partner, able to integrate seamlessly into Air Force joint
operations, it must have the equipment that is equal to the
task and compatible with our Air Force Reserve and Active Duty
partners.
The funds that Congress provides directly to the Air
National Guard via the National Guard and Reserve Equipment
Appropriations, the NGREA account, have made a significant
impact on our ability to support both the warfighter and civil
authorities. We strive to use these funds as efficiently as
possible by pursuing lower-cost, 80-percent solutions to the
immediate needs of our warfighters at about 25 percent of the
cost--needs that are identified directly by our warfighters and
first responders out of our weapons and tactics classes.
Your investment through NGREA has been a critical component
to the Air Guard increased readiness. For example, without
NGREA, the Block 30 F-16, the backbone of protecting America's
skies, would be irrelevant today. Given the future budget
uncertainty, we have shifted NGREA focus in FY '12 to ensure we
finish as many existing modernization initiatives as possible
to avoid expensive and disruptive production breaks should the
amount of NGREA be substantially reduced.
Ladies and gentlemen, you have created the most
professional, combat-ready force in the history of the Air
National Guard. Today's Guard airmen understand that the Nation
needs more of them than one weekend a month and two weeks in
the summer, and they are willing to answer the call. All that
they ask is that we continue to provide them with the
equipment, training, and resources they need to accomplish the
mission.
If I could share with you an experience this morning that
kind of puts all of this in perspective, I had the honor and
privilege of going to Arlington and attending the services of
Specialist Christopher Horton, a sniper with the 45th Infantry
Brigade Combat Team, Oklahoma Army National Guard. I knew this
young man because he signed up to join the 45th when I was the
adjutant general in the State of Oklahoma. He was killed in
action in Afghanistan on September 9th this year, along with
two other members of the Oklahoma Army National Guard, when
they were caught in an ambush.
I thought about other Oklahomans that were serving in
harm's way today. My old 138th Fighter Wing, F-16 wing out of
Tulsa, Oklahoma, currently flying combat missions in Iraq,
trying to prevent what happened to Specialist Horton and his
compatriots, trying to prevent that from happening. That F-16
unit would not be able to do the combat operations that it is
doing today, protecting people on the ground, had it not been
for the NGREA accounts that allowed us to develop the targeting
pods that those aircraft carry today. That is the importance of
the NGREA account.
We have a tendency, as we meet here today, to talk about
resources and talk about modernization and talk about funds and
talk about equipment, talk about stuff. But when it comes down
to it, what we are really talking about is providing the
equipment, the training, the resources that our young men and
women, regardless of service and regardless of component, need
when they go into combat. That is the importance of why these
gentlemen are here today and why all of you are here today.
It is an honor and privilege to be here, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in
the Appendix on page 97.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Now General Stenner.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CHARLES E. STENNER, JR., USAF, CHIEF,
U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE
General Stenner. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes,
committee members, thank you for inviting me to appear before
you today.
I am here to report that the Air Force Reserve continues to
be seamlessly integrated with the Active Component and the Air
National Guard to complete all of the Air Force missions we are
assigned. We accomplish this while continuing to provide a
cost-effective and combat-ready force available for strategic
surge and ongoing daily operations.
My written testimony outlines our modernization strategy
and priorities. Today, I would like to discuss the profound
impact NGREA funding has on our force readiness.
But, first, let me take the opportunity to introduce and
thank Chief Master Sergeant Dwight Badgett. As the Air Force
Reserve Command Chief for the past 2\1/2\ years, Chief Badgett
has served as my senior enlisted advisor. He will be departing
Air Force Reserve Command to join Northern Command's Joint Task
Force North as the senior enlisted leader. There is no better
example of jointness and total force than the selection of this
highly capable and well-qualified chief to this post.
Chief, thank you for your continued service.
The Air Force Reserve has never had a more seasoned and
capable force equipped to support missions around the globe.
Our contributions range from the training of our institutional
forces in associations and basic military training and pilot
and navigator training to our continued involvement in joint
and coalition combat operations and humanitarian airlift
operations abroad.
Just a quick outline: To the left here on this chart is, as
a percentage of what the total Air Force does, is what we as an
Air Force Reserve bring to this fight. And I know my partner in
the Air National Guard has a chart similar to that. And when
you put those two Air Reserve Components together, you have a
very powerful piece of what the Air Force brings to this
Nation's defense.
We have also expanded our efforts in cyber, remotely
piloted aircraft, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
based on Air Force and combatant commander requirements. The
Nation depends on us, and it is therefore crucial that we
continue to provide that force with the equipment, the
training, and the resources they need to accomplish the
missions that we have been asked to execute.
The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account is
absolutely vital to the way the Air Force Reserve operates
today. It impacts every facet of our operational readiness and
is the primary means of ensuring the Air Force Reserve is
equipped with the most relevant, modern, and compatible fielded
technologies, preserving our combat capability on a cost-
efficient basis.
Since 1982, NGREA has allowed the Air Force Reserve to
upgrade our operational equipment with better targeting, self-
protection, and communication capabilities, all of which have
proven to be critical, time and again, to supporting operations
wherever we are called to serve around the globe. For more than
29 years, NGREA-funded programs tested and recommended for
fielding by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
Command Test Center have resulted in multiple weapons systems
and equipment being fielded to frontline operators through
system program offices that support the total force warfighter.
Current levels of NGREA and supplemental funding have
allowed the Air Force Reserve to make significant strides in
meeting urgent warfighter requirements. For example, NGREA made
possible state-of-the-art avionics upgrades unique to the Air
Force Reserve and Air National Guard F-16 Block 30 weapons
systems, a highly sought-after capability during Operation
Enduring Freedom.
Today, as another example, with NGREA funding, we are
saving lives. A tool called the Smart Multi-Function Color
Display provides air combat search and rescue helicopters, the
HH-60Gs, Pave Hawks, with enhanced data link and situational
awareness capabilities. In less than 20 months from contract
award, the display was in use by tactical units in Afghanistan.
This NGREA effort directly contributed to saving 331 lives with
268 assists during Operation Enduring Freedom.
Air Force Reserve NGREA funding of at least $100 million
per year will permit us to start modernization initiatives
vital to maintaining our combat edge and to complete ongoing
efforts that are essential to continuing our effective
contributions to the total force and its wartime missions.
Properly equipping the Air Force Reserve preserves our
capacity to continue providing forces as an operational
reserve. The work of this committee, especially its
consideration of Reserve Component modernization efforts, is
essential to our support of joint and coalition operations.
Thank you for your work. And, again, thank you for asking
me here today to discuss these important issues affecting the
readiness of our airmen and our equipment. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Stenner can be found in
the Appendix on page 105.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much.
As is my usual policy, I will reserve my questions until
the end, hoping that they will all have been asked by my
colleagues.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for your testimony here this afternoon.
In your written testimony, all four of you mention that
Reserve Components offer a more cost-effective way to maintain
and deploy military capabilities. In fact, some of the
percentages that you cited were very impressive. But from time
to time on the Active Duty side, others say otherwise,
specifically pointing out to the high training cost for
deploying Reserve forces.
So I have three questions for all of you: Does the DOD have
an agreed-upon baseline to use in comparing the cost of Reserve
versus Active Duty Forces? The second question is, what is your
view of the right numbers that should be used to compare? And
then, should we look at the--third one--should we look at the
overall cost per service member or compare similar units to
each other?
General Stultz. Yes, sir, I will lead off.
To answer your first question, no, sir, I don't think we
have an agreed-to number. I know there are a number of studies
out there, and part of the challenge we have in identifying
what is the agreed-to number are, it is not just pay and
allowances and it is not just training days associated with it.
We have to pay into accruals for medical and retirement. And
because our retirement system is deferred--we don't draw
retirement and don't become eligible until age 60--it is a
lower accrual rate, which, in fact, says a Reserve soldier on
active duty actually costs less than an Active Duty soldier on
active duty because the accruals are lower. Not everyone agrees
with--``Well, we don't count it that way.''
My Reserve soldiers don't live on an installation, and all
the costs associated with funding an installation and
everything that goes with that. They drill in a Reserve center,
which is a much lower cost facility to operate. But, again, a
lot of the cost models say, ``Well, we don't consider that when
we are looking at it.''
So I think part of the challenge we got is trying to get
everybody to agree as to what really does a soldier cost us and
what are all the things that go with it. So, no, we don't have.
Now, the second thing I would tell you is, in the cost
analysis we have run on the Army Reserve, the cost of an Army
Reserve soldier today, to get him deployed to Afghanistan--I
will tell you, the cost of deploying the 744th today versus the
cost of deploying the 744th back in 2004 and 2005 is much
lower. And the reason is the chart right here. In 2003-2004, we
weren't ready. And so, most the units mobilizing in the Army
Reserve took 60, 90, 120 days just to get trained, which only
left us 6 or 7 months of boots-on-the-ground time. And so, in
the cost analysis, when you use those figures, you say, ``Oh,
yeah, I need two of these for every year because I only get 6
months out of them.''
The cost of deploying this unit today is much less because
I am able to train and deploy most of the Reserve units in the
Army Reserve in 30 days or less because they are combat-
seasoned, they are already trained in a lot of their skill
sets, and they come together very quickly and we are able to
push them out. So now we get 10 to 11 months of boots-on-the-
ground time out of them versus 6 or 7 that we used to.
So that reflects the right side of that chart that says,
here is a trained and ready force, and once you get it trained
and ready, it is much more cost-effective because you don't
have to invest as much up front as long as you maintain what
you have already got. And so, our figures come out somewhere
around a third of the cost.
And then the third thing we have said is, if we are going
to train and get this force as an operational force, we don't
necessarily have to utilize it in the future for 12 months at a
time and 100 percent of the force. We can take an engineer
battalion and I can go to a combatant command like AFRICOM
[U.S. Africa Command] or SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] and I
can say, let me give you the battalion that the 744th belongs
to, but here is what I want you to do: Just use one company at
a time for 90 days, and go do humanitarian--build schools,
build medical clinics, do things like that.
And these gentleman back here go to El Salvador or Panama
or Ethiopia or Uganda or Kenya for a 90-day rotation, followed
on by their sister company out of Pocatello, followed on by
their sister company out of Crater Lake. And we use the entire
battalion during the year, but we only pay 25 percent of it at
a time.
So the model I have for the use of the Reserve for the
future is very cost-effective. And I think we are still going
to have challenges on coming to the right number, what is the
right number. But I can tell you, whatever the right number is,
it is much lower in the Reserve Components than our Active
counterparts.
General Carpenter. Congressman, first of all, I would like
to point out that each one of the three components has a role
to play in the total Army. We, in the National Guard, have two
missions: The homeland mission and the Federal mission. The
Active Component has a primary mission for being the first
response in terms of a national requirement, and General
Stultz's force is providing the majority of enablers, in most
cases, as that Active Force goes downrange.
So nobody should think that there is a cost savings to be
had across the entire force by turning us into a purely Reserve
or purely a National Guard organization. That is not the
discussion at all.
On the surface of it, though, you have to accept the fact
that when the National Guard only takes up 10 percent of the
budget, we are definitely a lesser-cost organization from a
Reserve standpoint. One-third of the cost is the calculation
that we have as we look across the pay and allowance and the
costs associated with having a unit in the Reserve in the
National Guard.
There is no question, as we go toward mobilization, that
that cost rises and we get close to 100 percent, close to the
same parity as our Active Component counterparts. But to
General Stultz's comment about the operational force, for a
very modest investment we can sustain the combat edge, sustain
the training and proficiency that we have garnered here in this
operational force courtesy of the last 10 years of war.
And so, our pitch to the Active Army and to the Department
of Defense is, it would make good sense to invest in this
operational force and, for a modest amount, to be able to
sustain that.
In terms of the right numbers, I think that in the
discussions we have had with the Army, the Army recognizes the
metric that I just described to you.
Overall, the cost per service member in comparison, you
know, in some cases it depends on whose figures you are relying
on and what all is factored into it. But in the final analysis,
there is no question that the Army National Guard and the Army
Reserve are a great investment for this country and provide a
huge bang for the buck.
General Wyatt. Congressman Reyes, the question you asked is
an interesting one. And I would agree with my contemporaries
here that I don't think the Department of Defense has an
agreed-upon computation. There are lots of studies out there.
I would suggest that it would behoove all of us to ask
questions of the analysts that try to answer that question and
to consider the source of those analysts. I gave up a long time
ago trying to out-analyze the Active Duty in the United States
Air Force, because they outnumber me. They have a lot of
Ph.D.'s and they are A9 [Analysis Directorate]. I don't even
have an A9, you know?
We have 98 percent--98.5 percent of Air National Guardsmen
are in warfighting UTCs [Unit Training Code]. Our core
competency is not analysis. Our core competency is not weapons
development. Our core competency is not acquisition. Those are
all core competencies of the United States Air Force that adds
to the cost of the Active Component. I recognize that.
But when you compare the cost of a warfighter to the cost
of a warfighter, Active and Reserve, I prefer to look to
sources of information that are not Active Duty and not Air
National Guard.
If you consider the Government Accountability Office on
Military Personnel, they say the relationship is one-sixth the
cost--an Air National Guardsman costs one-sixth as much as an
Active Component. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
says about one-fourth. The Heritage Foundation says about one-
sixth. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserve said
that they looked at all the studies that were out there, and
while they all varied a little bit, they were all consistent,
in that guardsmen and reservists cost less, especially if you
consider the lifecycle.
Now, if you took all 106,700 of my Air National Guardsmen
and you called them to Title X service and you put them all on
active duty at the same time, yes, they would cost as much and
perhaps maybe a little more than the Active Component, because
we do need to train up a little bit--not much, because the Air
Force already funds the Air National Guard to organize, train,
and equip to the same standards as the Active Duty Air Force.
So we don't need the boost in training to get to that level
that the Air Force expects us to have.
Our DOC statements, our description of capabilities
statements, in the Air National Guard for our units requires
the same response time, the same level of response as the
Active Component.
So when we say that the Air National Guard provides 34
percent of the Air Force warfighting capacity, that is what we
are talking about. And if you look at our budget compared to
the total Air Force budget, it is about 6 percent. We think
that is cost-effectiveness.
General Stenner. Congressman, I do have an A9. They do
analysis. But I quit doing dueling data. It doesn't help.
My baseline--and your first question went to, what is the
agreed-upon baseline, do we have one? Mine is intuition. First
of all, if you are only paying somebody when they are actually
being used, intuitively they are cheaper than somebody that is
being paid 100 percent of the time. So the next trick is, is it
a third, is it a quarter? Doesn't matter; it is less.
And to your next question, what are the right numbers, it
goes to balance. Every single mission has got to be looked at,
in my opinion. What is the requirement for strategic depth? How
much do you need in Reserve? And then how much is the combatant
commander requiring of you? How much, then, do we need for the
Active Force? And we put the rest of it in, in the Air Force
anyway, the Guard and Reserve as appropriate by mission set.
So there a balance in each mission. And there is no real
template that you can go to across all the missions and say,
this is right. The mobility air forces, we have a significant
portion of that, both the Guard and Reserve, on a daily basis.
And we are paid for when we operate those airplanes around the
world and not paid for when we are not operating those
airplanes around the world.
Lastly, it is by mission set with the balance, and Air
Force Reserve and Air National Guard, in my opinion, are the
catcher's mitt for folks who, in fact, make a life-changing
decision and decide that they need to move to a Reserve or
Guard Component, and I want to give them the opportunity to
serve in a part-time capacity, because there are huge costs
included in retraining somebody. It takes how long to replace a
10-year staff sergeant? Ten years. Huge training costs. I want
to keep that trained individual in our Reserve Component to
ensure that they are there when the Nation needs them.
Capture them, comparing that to the training costs, we are
definitely a cheap and effective and efficient--I don't want to
say ``cheap''--effective and efficient, cost-effective way to
do business.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much for a good question and
good responses.
Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and thank you all for
your service to our country.
General Wyatt, we have had some discussions in the past.
And I was hoping you could provide us with your best
professional military opinion on the issue of replacing F-16
Block 30 fighter jets within the Air National Guard.
I understand that the Air Force has always stated their
commitment to ensuring that the Air National Guard has the iron
necessary to perform critical missions. However, has the Air
Force presented you with a formal plan for dealing with the
timeline and the numbers that you can expect to recapitalize
your fighters over the next 5 to 10 years?
And I ask this question because I believe, you don't have a
plan unless it is on paper. So people can talk about a lot of
different things, but that changes. And this committee, I
think, really needs to have a better understanding of the path
going forward, because, as we enter a new climate of defense
spending, we really need to understand the justification for
decisions before they happen, not after they happen.
And, additionally, as the F-35 keeps slipping to the right,
I think this is going to have a huge effect on swapping out our
aging Air National Guard fighters.
And I would really appreciate your comments on this.
General Wyatt. Thank you, sir.
You know, we have had a discussion before about the age of
the Block 30 F-16s in the Air National Guard. The Air Force has
committed some money for structural sustainment that will buy 2
to 3 more years of life. But you are correct; in the next 10
years, these aircraft will age out. Some of them will start
aging out before then.
There are a lot of different options: Flowdown of Block 40
F-16s, flowdown of Block 50 F-16s from the Active Component to
the Guard as the F-35 is bedded down on active duty. Bedding
down the Active Duty with F-35s in those units that performed
ACA [Aerospace Control Alert] so that they could do not only
the air sovereignty, the Aerospace Control Alert mission, but
also the AEF [Air Expeditionary Force] rotations overseas, as
they do.
But I think your question went to, has the Air Force shown
you a written plan that shows you the numbers of aircraft, the
types of aircraft, and the years that they will flow to the Air
National Guard to replace the old Block 30 F-16s? Was that your
question?
Mr. LoBiondo. Yes, sir.
General Wyatt. The answer is, no, sir, they have not. I
have not seen that plan yet.
Mr. LoBiondo. So, this is kind of troubling. Have you
requested--have you made a request for a formal plan?
General Wyatt. Yes, sir, I have. We began requesting a
couple of years ago when I first--well, a little over 2 years
ago when I first became the director, and we have been making
some progress. I have seen some general plans but nothing that
would show me, for example, how many jets may be coming to the
Air National Guard in the next 3 or 4 years to replace an
aging-out aircraft.
That is the type of detail that we would really need to be
able to go forward to determine whether or not we are going to
be recapitalized. But I have not seen that plan yet, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Well, Mr. Chairman, you have been good on
this, Chairman Bartlett. And I would like to think that this is
a critical issue for the entire committee, but especially this
subcommittee. And I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that we could
find ways to address directly with the Air Force leadership. We
have been posing this question now for a number of years. We
keep getting sort of a dodge-and-weave on this. And, at a
certain point, we are going to run out of time to be able to
make accommodations, if we need to do that.
I think it is critical, given the integration that the Air
Guard has had with the full Air Force, what they are doing,
being deployed in the war against terrorism. And I would hope I
could work with you directly on this matter to get a more
substantial answer that we could put our arms around and decide
whether they actually have a plan or they are just giving us
lip service.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. I concur with your
concerns, and I will be happy to join you in a request for
clarification of this to the appropriate people. Thank you very
much.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett. Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you all for your testimony and for your
service.
I represent a district in which many members of the Guard
and Reserve have gone to serve in Afghanistan and Iraq, and see
their extraordinary professionalism, the tremendous training
that you have put in place so that they can do the tasks they
are handed, and the various wounds that they sustain as a
result of their deployment. So I just want to thank you and the
fine young men who are with you today for your great work on
behalf of our country.
And we are all looking at the budget cuts that we are
facing as a Nation, and the Defense Department obviously having
to absorb a significant portion of them, but we also want to be
very thoughtful and careful. And so I appreciate your testimony
today.
I have a question about the Quadrennial Defense Review. I
am curious as to whether or not it provides a constructive
template for future employment of the operational force that
you have worked so hard to develop. And what impact will the
Budget Control Act of 2011 and the possibility of sequester if
we cannot come to an agreement have on some of the QDR's
[Quadrennial Defense Review] underlying assumptions with regard
to the Guard and Reserve?
And I will take an answer from any and all of you.
General Stultz. I will lead off, and I will try to make it
concise.
I think the QDR provides a framework for the Army, in terms
of the role of the Army or the land component. And that, in
turn, if you want to call it trickle-downs, but it shapes what
kind of capability we need to have in the Reserve to support
the role of the land component. And then I think the QDR also
defines what we need to protect our Nation back home, our own
soil, and respond to our disasters back here.
And I know there is legislation that is being put in place
today to allow the Title X Reserve to be more of a homeland
capability, not to get involved with the National Guard,
because they do--and, as Ray indicated, 90, 95 percent of the
time, everything is fine and handled at the State level. But
when it comes to we need the Federal force to help us, today we
revert to the Active Component, when, in many cases, there is a
Reserve unit, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps right
there in your State with the capability you need, but legally
we can't touch them.
So we are pushing that, and we appreciate your support to
say, let us be part of the solution and let the QDR help us
shape that.
Now, for the second part of your question, I think it could
be devastating, ma'am. I think it could be devastating if we go
forward into the sequester, because it is going to force cuts
across the military. And I think it could lead, one, to
parochialism, because they are going to be fighting for
aircraft while I am fighting for soldiers, because we are all
in it. And we are not fighting because we are, you know, too
protective or jealous. We are fighting because we say our
Nation's security is at risk. And if we allow that to go
forward, in the cuts we have, can I do what needs to be done to
protect this Nation? Can I produce the 205,000 soldiers that
the Army needs with all the capabilities I listed before, or am
I going to not have the equipment, not having the training
days, not having anything, and we go back to a 9/11/2001 stance
with our Reserve, which is a hollowed-out strategic force?
So I think if we let these budget cuts go forward to the
level that they could, it could have a devastating impact on
our national security.
General Carpenter. Congresswoman, a couple of observations.
The 2010 QDR was actually a study that was done in 2009
reported out in 2010. We find ourselves now in 2011 about ready
to go into 2012. The reason why we do a Quadrennial Defense
Review every 4 years is because things change. And, as
Secretary Gates observed, our ability to predict the future--we
have been 100 percent wrong across the board. And so, what we
saw in the analysis in 2009 in terms of what the world looked
like pre-Arab Spring, pre-budget issues, those kinds of things,
are not factored into the QDR that we see now in 2010.
One of the things that the QDR did represent, however, was
the building of Homeland Response Forces, which we are
currently in the process of doing. And we validated 2 of those
10 last year, and we are about ready to validate another 8. It
did recognize the responsibility to minimize the risk in the
homeland and to try and make sure that we would prevent and
deal with any terrorist attacks on our own soil. That is an
enduring requirement.
I think that as you look at where we are at right now with
regard to the relationship that we have inside the Army, the
three components of the Army, and the budget issues that are
out there, I agree with the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army in
their observation that if we end up having to take the
reductions that are out there, it will decimate the Department
of Defense.
And as you take a broader view, even if you dedicated the
entire Defense Department budget against the requirement we
have out there, it wouldn't solve--it wouldn't be the solution,
because it is a much larger problem than inside the Department
of Defense. It is going to take a shared sacrifice here to get
us back into a configuration where we can sustain the economy
we have right now.
And so, to Secretary Panetta's comment about we ought to
take a strategic view of this rather than be expedient, I think
that is exactly the right course.
General Wyatt. You know, we talk about efficiencies, we
talk about doing more with less, we talk about being lean and
mean and moving tail to tooth--all these expressions. I would
submit to you that the Air National Guard has been lean and
mean before lean and mean was cool. We were efficient before
efficiency was cool.
We had to because of the nature of our force. We often fall
below the resourcing line--and I understand that--because the
demands of our Air Force are such that a lot of times the
resources aren't enough to pay for what the country expects the
Air Force to do. The Air Force Reserve and the Air National
Guard play a big part of that.
So all this talk recently about, ``Well, we need to become
more efficient,'' I agree, we need to continue trying to find
efficiencies. But in the Air National Guard I think we have
squeezed just about all the blood out of this turnip that we
can squeeze. We are at the point now that any further
reductions, cuts, drawbacks, will adversely affect our
readiness. You know, I am committed not to sending airmen into
harm's way unless they are fully trained, fully equipped, very
capably led, and we won't back off that standard at all.
So when you combine the two of those, the only thing I can
say is that we may need to start taking a look at not doing
some of those missions that the QDR laid out for the United
States Air Force to do. That is a decision that will be made
way above my pay grade, but as far as the Air Guard is
concerned, I think we are at that point right now.
General Stenner. Your first question was, did the QDR
provide a template? And, ma'am, no such thing.
There were several different scenarios, different sets of
conditions that we were looking at and attempting to
understand. And as General Carpenter has said, we have moved on
to something that now is a fiscal reality. And regardless of
which piece of QDR you look at, the Air Force Reserve needed to
be and must be, would have been, a part of every single one of
those and solution set in force-sizing.
And that is the real trick, is what is the force-sizing
construct that we are looking at right here? And how do we
handle that major combat operation and still be able to do the
rotational force we are doing on a daily basis with the
contingencies around the world and make sure we continue to be
able to train and continue to be ready for either of those
other two conditions? That now is couched in fiscal reality.
And to your second question, your second comment,
sequester, when I go back to what I just said and I apply
sequester to the force-sizing that we are trying very hard to
figure out and the balance we are trying to figure out, there
is no strategic look at sequester. And we will absolutely
destroy some piece of the mission that we didn't intend to do
without a strategic discussion, and not just within the Air
Force but likely across the Services.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you all.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Runyan.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimony, and thank you for your
service.
A question for all of you. Specifically, I know on the Army
side we have talked a lot about personnel, but from an
equipment perspective and the ability to do all your missions,
compare equipment-wise pre-9/11 to now. Because we know that
Active Duty, a lot of times, is taking the equipment you have
and your ability to train your troops to the level they need to
be trained.
General Stultz. Yes, sir. We have--thanks to Congress
giving us the appropriations they have and the NGREA funds that
we have been able to get and apply, our equipping posture in
the Army Reserve is better than it has been in history.
However, it is not where we need it to be. And the
challenge we have is, you can look and say, we are at 91
percent of our authorized equipment on hand; we are in pretty
good shape. The problem is, we are at about 67 percent
modernized. It is equipment that is a substitute for the modern
equipment. And, more importantly, when you get into some of the
critical pieces of equipment, the figure says you are at 90
percent on hand, but actually it is 29 percent modernized or 25
percent modernized.
And why is that important? Well, the importance is what I
said earlier about this route clearance unit. They need that
modernized equipment back home to train on because that is what
they are going to be expected to operate when they get to Iraq,
Afghanistan, or wherever the next call is.
We need the modernized equipment because the modernized
equipment has the ability to put add-on armor. You see, I have
probably 90 percent of my Humvee [H164 Mobility Multi-Purpose
Wheeled Vehicle] fleet, but only 15 percent of it can have add-
on armor. So it is not really practical for use in an IED
environment that we can counter. I would have to be dependent
of somebody else giving me the equipment.
A lot of my 915 line-haul trucks that I have that haul all
the containers that moved everything into Iraq and move a lot
of stuff around Afghanistan are the old models that aren't add-
on-armor-capable. We use what we call ``ghetto armor''; we just
slap what we can on there to protect them. We need the 915 A5s,
which are the modernized cab that allows you to put an A or a B
kit, depending on what level of threat is out there.
And just as you know in your district, sir, Fort Dix, New
Jersey, is one of our premier training platforms. That is where
all the soldiers we have--Active, Guard, and Reserve, in a lot
of cases--go through there in their training getting ready to
go to theater. And we need that equipment sitting there at Fort
Dix as a training set so that I don't have to pay to transport
a piece of equipment up there for the unit to train on and then
transport it back home to them to be back in their motor pool.
So, to me, the bill out there, it is the modernization
effort. To get the Army Reserve today to 100 percent
modernized, 100 percent of everything we have and 100 percent
modernized, is about an $8.9-billion bill that is still out
there. And that is because equipment has continued to change
and that is because units have continued to change, but we
can't stop.
We have to be effective and efficient in how we use it. If
I am going to outfit a heavy transport truck company with 96
HETs [Heavy Equipment Transporters], I don't need 96 sitting in
their motor pool back in Las Vegas, Nevada, but I need 96
setting at Fort Hunter Liggett, probably, so they can train on
them, and for sure I need 96 modernized HETs to go with them
where they go in theater.
So the modernization, to me, is much more important than
the on-hand figure that we quote.
Mr. Runyan. General Wyatt, do you have anything? I am sure
you have a similar concern in the Air Force.
General Wyatt. I do, sir. You know, we face the same issue
in the Air National Guard that General Stenner does in the Air
Force Reserve and the Active Duty does, and that is that we
have a lot of old stuff out there--you know, fighters that are
25 going on 30 years old, tankers that are over 50 years old.
And so we have this recapitalization challenge.
We know in the Air National Guard that unless we go and the
Air Force goes with concurrent and balanced recapitalization
across the total force, that we are in the Air National Guard
looking at obsolescence of equipment here before we see
replacement equipment.
In the meantime, we can make that legacy equipment last a
little longer with some modernization funds. Thank goodness for
NGREA money because we use a lot of that to modernize our
equipment. Although we look to the Air Force to modernize and
equip us, we know that a lot of our needs fall below the
funding line, and that is why NGREA is so important.
Our equipping levels are steadily dropping. We are losing
the effectiveness of our equipment. And I am not necessarily
talking about the aircraft. We have adequate aircraft to do the
mission right now. We have weapons sustainment moneys. We will
be able to fly the missions for a little while longer, but it
is getting more difficult because these jets and our rolling
stock is getting older and older, more difficult to maintain. A
lot of the parts are not in production anymore. A lot of our
radar systems are old mechanical scanned array, as opposed to
the new electronically scanned array. And all that affects our
combat capability and our readiness. It is getting more and
more difficult and more and more expensive to maintain these
legacy platforms.
So we face the same problem that the Air Force does, except
our stuff is just a little bit older and a little bit more in
need of modernization.
General Carpenter. Congressman, if I could make a quick
comment----
Mr. Runyan. Sure.
General Carpenter [continuing]. Relative to New Jersey and
the recent floods that were sustained in New Jersey because of
Hurricane Irene.
The New Jersey National Guard was in a lot better shape to
respond to that hurricane because of the modernized FMTVs
[Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles] that were available for
use to respond to the requirements of the citizens of New
Jersey. And I think, as you look at that, if they hadn't had
the modern equipment that they did have on hand, the response
would have been a little bit more difficult and probably a
little slower.
So, courtesy of this committee and the National Guard and
Reserve Equipment Account and the $37 billion that has been
plowed into our equipment over the last 6 years, it not only
benefits the warfight but it benefits people in the homeland.
General Stenner. Congressman, if I could just put one more
point on this particular discussion, because NGREA is hugely
important.
The modernization pieces have all been talked about, but I
think that there is one perhaps unintended positive consequence
of NGREA, and that is that it is execution-year dollars. It
meets the urgent operational needs that come from combatant
commanders. And, in several cases, the Guard and Reserve Test
Center has responded to these urgent operational needs with
commercial-off-the-shelf kinds of hardware and software that
are able to be put on some of the airplanes, not only on Guard
and Reserve, but started on Guard and Reserve airplanes and
migrated to the Active Force.
We can get that quicker with NGREA dollars than you can get
programmatically putting it into the funding streams. And it
ends up migrating that direction, to the Active Force as well.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you all very much.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Generals, for being here. Thank you for your
service.
For those in the audience, thanks so much for being here
with us, and thank you for your service.
General Carpenter, I just have one quick question for you,
is that the Department of the Army is going to divest itself of
the ``Sherpas,'' the C-23s. And, from my understanding, they
have been used pretty extensively in theater. And I am just
curious as to what the plan is, going forward, and what the
impact will be to the Army National Guard.
General Carpenter. Because of the resource management
decision that was made last year, we are directed to divest
ourselves of the C-23s ending in FY '15. We have actually
parked four of them on the ramp in Texas right now, and they
are no longer available for our use.
There is, in my estimate, a gap that is created by parking
those C-23s both in the homeland and in the overseas
operations. As I mentioned before a different committee
recently, when we were in Iraq there were 10 Sherpas that were
deployed to Balad. Nine were on the ramp that evening, and all
nine flew operations. And the information that I got was that
the combatant commander was actually looking for more Sherpas
to be able to use in that mission.
We have two Sherpas now that are flying observations in MFO
[Multinational Force and Observers] Sinai, in terms of the
peacekeeping force there. They are, in the words of the
Ambassador and the officials on the ground, the best aircraft
that you could possibly have for that mission.
In the homeland--I am a South Dakota guardsman. Our C-23s
flew pilots from North Dakota back and forth as they carried
out the CAP [Combat Air Patrol] mission--the CAP mission in the
east coast. And they ferried--not only that, but they ferried
parts and various supplies to New York as they dealt with 9/11.
I think they provide a critical--a critical--part of the
homeland mission and do great service in the overseas mission.
We are concerned about what does that leave in terms of the
effect after we have divested ourselves of all 15 of those--or,
excuse me, all 42 of those.
Mr. Critz. Thank you.
General Wyatt, one thing that I just learned is that, you
know, we are hearing that the Active Air Force is planning--may
be planning significant retirements of Air National Guard
aircraft--all C-5As; 3 F-16 wings; 72 C-130s, many of which
were at the Guard; and some number of A-10s--and then
terminating acquisition of the C-27J aircraft as a possible
response to budget cuts.
Has the Guard been actively involved or consulted regarding
these cuts? And, if so, how would the loss of these aircraft
affect the Air National Guard? And then what alternative
missions will those men and women who operate those platforms--
what other missions will they be able to do with the loss of
those aircraft?
General Wyatt. The platforms that you have referenced, a
lot of those are flown exclusively by the Air National Guard,
C-27 being one of those. C-5As--we have two C-5A wings
remaining in the Air National Guard. I believe General Stenner
has some C-5As in his fleet.
When the Air Force leadership says that everything is on
the table, I believe what the Air Force leadership says. I
think it is too early in the budgeting process to reach any
conclusion as to what may or may not survive. And we are still
looking at, you know, what is the total budget bogey going to
be.
But, you know, if those platforms were removed from service
for whatever reason, budgetary or whatever, in essence what you
would have is you would have the ``Air'' being taken out of the
Air National Guard.
Mr. Critz. Yeah.
General Wyatt. There are other missions out there that we
could certainly roll into, and we are already doing that.
Remotely piloted aircraft, we already provide about 20 percent
of the total Air Force capability in remotely piloted aircraft.
We would look to see if we could get more of that mission.
Cyber, I believe, is one of the areas identified where the
Department of Defense needs to enhance its cyber capabilities.
And we believe Air National Guardsmen are ideally suited for
this role because a lot of our citizen warriors already work
for some of the big IT [Information Technology] and computer
firms across the country. They are already cyber-warriors in
their civilian capacities. And those are the type of
individuals that would find cyber-warfighting a patriotic thing
to do.
So there are some things that we could do to step into
other mission sets. We haven't talked about, you know, RED
HORSE [Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair
Squadron Engineers] engineering, communications, security
forces. There are some other things that we could do. But if we
lost those airframes, in essence you are taking the ``Air'' out
of the Air National Guard.
Mr. Critz. And we are just--we are hearing about this, and
that is why I am curious, too, are you part of any discussions
about targeting certain airframes for possible retirement or
lack of use?
General Wyatt. Well, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary
have both said that there are some difficult decisions that we
will have to make. The Air Force does include the Air National
Guard and the Air Force Reserve into decisionmaking processes.
And General Stenner and I have cast our votes. I don't know
what the final verdict is going to be.
Mr. Critz. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Stultz. Sir, if I could just add also, from the
Army's or at least from my perspective, that has a huge impact
on us. Because, originally, we had part of the C-27 program
designed to take the load off our CH-47s, and then we handed it
over entirely to the Air Force. Our CH-47s, our aviation are
some of the highest OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo]; we are flying
the blades off of those things. And if we don't get the C-27s
to take the load off of it, it is going to have a significant
impact on our CH-47 fleet.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will be brief. A number of my questions have been
addressed, and especially the one regarding the impact on all
the military and especially our Guard and Reserve units if
sequestration of $1.2 trillion or more occurs come January. And
your frankness in assessing that is, I think, critically
important to this committee and the full House and Senate in
understanding the importance of avoiding that, and that the
$400-billion-plus already taken out of defense is going to
create some hardships as is, let alone more, another $600
billion.
The other, just a comment of gratitude. I certainly
interact with the Guard and Reserve units in my district; we
are close by a lot. With the 193rd Special Ops, I don't have
the privilege of hosting the base, but many of their pilots and
aircrews, support personnel are in my district. And with the
Guard and reservists, in my 11 visits to Iraq and 8 to
Afghanistan I see firsthand the amazing work they are doing.
And your leadership and advocacy for those men and women is
so important and, I think, all the more important because of
the fiscal challenges facing us. And, you know, whether it is
one-third, one-sixth, a quarter, whatever that savings number
is, we know we have an absolute professional soldier or airman
out there at a fraction of the cost, but when we need them. So
what you and your officers and soldiers and airmen are doing is
much appreciated, and we, as a Nation, are indebted to you.
So, with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
General Carpenter, what percent of the Army fighting
capability is represented by the Army National Guard?
General Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, 40 percent of the
operational force of the Army is resident in the Army National
Guard. Inside of the Army National Guard formations, 51 percent
of our formations are combat brigades and combat aviation
brigades, combat organizations.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
General Wyatt, a similar number for the Air National Guard?
General Wyatt. Mr. Chairman, we have about 34 percent of
the combat capability of the Air Force. You can break that
down. Tankers are around 43 percent; C-130 lift, about 30
percent, perhaps 29, just a little bit below that; fighter
aircraft, about 32 to 33 percent; RPA [Remotely Piloted
Aircraft] I mentioned, about 20 percent.
Cyber is kind of hard to count because we are still in the
early stages in the Air Force of standing up cyber units and
the capabilities that the Air Force needs to lend its support
to national defense. But a large portion, depending upon how
you count combat communications, perhaps up to 10 to 11 percent
of our total force, could be interpreted of being in cyber
already. So we see that as an opportunity to contribute to the
defense of this country.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
General Stultz, U.S. Army Reserve, what percent?
General Stultz. Sir, we have a relatively small percentage
of the combat force, because I have one light infantry
battalion, which is out in the Pacific--Guam, Saipan, Samoa----
Mr. Bartlett. Overall, what is your percentage, would you
say?
General Stultz. But our percentage of--we have 205,000
soldiers in the Army Reserve out of the 1.1 million force. And
of the combat support/service support, on average I would say
we are a full third of that force.
But we also have another force that we really never talk
about very much, and that is in the generating force. I have
48,000 soldiers that are part of the Army's generating force. I
have the training divisions that do the basic training mission
at places like Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Benning,
Georgia; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; the drill sergeants that
are down there training Active Duty Guard and Reserve soldiers.
I have the AIT [Advanced Infantry Training] battalions that are
training them in their MOS [Military Operation Specialty]
skills. I have the 75th Battle Training Division that does the
mission command training for the Army in the warfighter
exercises.
So a huge piece of the Army's generating force is coming
from my force, as well as the operational force. So you start
putting those together and it gets somewhere around 33 to 40
percent, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. General Stenner, a similar number for the Air
Force Reserve?
General Stenner. Yes, sir. If you break it down by mission
set, it is as I have depicted it here on this board. But as an
overall number, very briefly, I would have to say it is
approaching 20 percent.
Mr. Bartlett. Twenty percent.
Okay, I would--these numbers are pretty big for the Army.
Something like 73 to 80 percent of the total fighting force is
represented in the Guard and Reserve. Since it is very much
less expensive to maintain capabilities in Guard and Reserve,
obviously, the bigger percentage the Guard and Reserve is of
the total fighting force, the less it is going to cost us. But
there are limits to that, and I just wanted to get a number
from each of you. And I would like for you to write that number
down so you are not influenced by your neighbor's response. And
I will ask you for that number.
With due consideration to training and integration, what
total percent of our fighting capability could be resident in
Guard and Reserve if we are up against tight budget constraints
and wanted to get the most for our dollar? If you would just
write that figure down.
I know you are either in the Guard or the Reserve, but if
you will for now combine the Guard and Reserve in your answer.
And I will give you a moment to write that down, then I will
just go down the line and ask you for the number that you have
written down.
Okay. General Stultz, what number have you written down?
General Stultz. I wrote down 65 percent, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Well, you already had 73 to 80 percent.
General Stultz. Yes, sir. And what I am taking into account
is that we right now, out of a 1.1-million-man force, the Guard
and Reserve make up a little over 50 percent of that force in
the total force. So if you were to say what could we be, I
would say more along a 60/40, 65 percent.
Mr. Bartlett. Are you talking about only the Reserve now or
Guard? Because the answers I got----
General Stultz. No, sir, I am talking about Guard and
Reserve combined.
Mr. Bartlett. Because General Carpenter told me that 40
percent of the fighting capability is represented by the Guard,
and you told me 33 to 40. If I add those up, it is somewhere
between 73 and 80 percent already is represented by Guard and
Reserve.
General Stultz. But I am talking about the combat support/
service support. And I am not sure if he is talking about the
combat arms. See, that is where you--when you start talking
about the fighting force and what I make up of that, I make up
the service-support side of it, not the combat side of it.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay. And that is how much bigger than the
current number? You are 63 percent----
General Stultz. Well, currently, today, between the Guard
and Reserve, we make up a little over 50 percent of the Army's
force.
Mr. Bartlett. And you think that could grow from 50 to 65?
General Stultz. Yes, sir, 60 to 65 percent.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay.
General Stultz. And I think part of that is going to happen
as we come down from 569 [569,000] to 520 [520,000] to whatever
number. If we just stay the same, it is going to change that
balance.
Mr. Bartlett. General--let's see--General Carpenter, what
number did you write down?
General Carpenter. I feel like I am taking an open-book
test here a little bit.
Mr. Bartlett. Well, you know the total already that you
gave me was 64 percent, 34 and--I am sorry, 54 percent, 34 and
20, 54 percent.
General Carpenter. And let me qualify this a little bit. It
goes back to Secretary Gates' comment about being able to
predict the future. And part of the discussion here has to be,
what risk are we willing to take as we look at a very
unpredictable and very dangerous world?
Post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan, the number I wrote down is 70
percent. But I have to tell you, you need to make sure you
understand the risk associated with that.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand. The higher that number is, the
higher the risk is.
General Carpenter. Absolutely.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand that. Okay. And that is
something you would have to factor--we would have to factor in.
General Wyatt, what was your number?
General Wyatt. Well, at the risk of sounding greedy, I had
100 percent, but I thought that probably----
Mr. Bartlett. That would be nice.
General Wyatt. I think a lot would depend upon the
particular mission set that you are talking about. Certainly,
there are some mission sets in the Air Force that are better
suited to the Guard and Reserve, other mission sets where the
Active Duty is more suitable.
And I touched on this a little bit earlier when I was
talking about warfighting UTCs. That is our specialty, is
warfighting UTCs. We don't do very good acquisitions. We don't
do very good research, development, test, and evaluation. We do
some special operations. We do some special operations with the
193rd SOW, a special operations wing in Pennsylvania. But that
is not our forte. Those folks are very, very good, but we don't
have large numbers of those types of special forces. Space, we
do some space, but a lot of those space missions are 24 hours a
day, 365; that really doesn't fit the Guard construct.
So I think you have to--you know, if you asked me, you
know, how much higher headquarters research and development
acquisition should the Guard do, I would say probably zero. But
when we are talking about the type of capability that the
country needs to ramp up for a fight and then ramp down for a
fight and then ramp up for a fight, you are talking about
combat unit training codes in the United States Air Force. And
I think that the appropriate answer, in my mind, would be 60 to
65 percent of that capability.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay. Good. Thank you very much.
General Stenner.
General Stenner. Yes, sir. If I could qualify this by
saying I need to go find my A9 analyst and see if we can't come
up with a--but I will qualify with some assumptions.
First of all, if we continue with the same concepts we have
within the Air Force right now--we are trained to the same
standards, we are seamlessly integrated, we can deploy within
72 hours--maintaining those kinds of assumptions, maintaining a
baseline number of MPA [Military Personnel Appropriation]
dollars that we can in fact access--and that is a big concern
of our Active Force compatriots, is the access to the Guard and
Reserve, and I read ``access'' to mean military personnel
appropriation dollars that get us into the exercises, into the
theater security packages--doing all those kinds of things and
getting it right in the baseline and, again, with the
qualifiers on the institutional force, I threw 50 percent on
the table.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Thank you all very much.
I wanted to note my appreciation for the questions and
answers relative to the C-27J. I have been concerned for a
number of years that that was an airplane which the Army wanted
and had considerable need for. In their wisdom, the Pentagon
gave that plane to the Air Force and then asked the Air Force
to please be Johnny-on-the-spot when the Army needed them. That
was not anticipated to work very well. I am not sure that it is
working very well. I do not believe that this program has been
adequately resourced. And I am very appreciative that we got
that question and answer without me asking the question to get
the answer.
Thank you all very much.
Because we want to make sure that we have all the
information that may be necessary to make certain that we make
the best possible case for making sure that you have all that
you need in the future, there may be questions that we will
need to ask for the record. So if you could respond to those,
we would be very appreciative of that.
Thank you all very much for your testimonies.
Thank you, members of the subcommittee, for coming.
The subcommittee now stands in adjournment.
[Whereupon, at 3:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
October 12, 2011
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 12, 2011
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces
Hearing on
National Guard and Reserve Component Acquisition
and Modernization
October 12, 2011
Today, the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets
to receive an update on the equipment status and requirements
of the Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve
Components. Given the significant change in the budget outlook
for fiscal year 2012 and beyond, we believe it necessary to
obtain the current views of the Guard and Reserve senior
leaders for the potential impact on their programs. We will
also hear from the military services in two subsequent hearings
later in the month.
We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses:
LMajor General Raymond W. Carpenter, the
Acting Deputy Director of the Army National Guard,
LLieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III,
Director of the Air National Guard,
LLieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Chief,
U.S. Army Reserve, and
LLieutenant General Charles E. Stenner, Jr.,
Chief, U.S. Air Force Reserve.
Major reductions in the Federal budget need to be an
element of correcting the Federal deficit. The Department of
Defense must share in a fair and balanced way in those
reductions. That process is already taking place under the
Budget Control Act of 2011, with nearly $500 billion in cuts
planned for DOD over the next 10 years.
However, cuts beyond that, up to approximately $1 trillion
over 10 years are possible under what Secretary Panetta has
called the ``Doomsday Mechanism'' sequestration provision of
the Budget Control Act.
Secretary Panetta and Director Lew of the White House
Office of Management and Budget have stated that budget cuts to
the Department of Defense as a result of the sequestration
provision ``could pose a significant risk to national
security'' and ``DOD would almost certainly be forced to
furlough large numbers of its civilian workers. Training would
have to be curtailed, the force reduced, and purchases of
weapons would have to be cut dramatically.''
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn recently
stated that the imposition of the sequestration provision of
the Budget Control Act ``on our Armed Forces could be
catastrophic. . . . Sequestration would leave us with the
smallest Army and Marine Corps in decades, the smallest Air
Force in history, and the smallest Navy since McKinley was
President. . . . The debate is not whether sequestration would
wound our military. It is about whether sequestration is
equivalent to shooting ourselves in the head or the foot.''
Against the backdrop of the Budget Control Act for 2011,
today's hearing is to get an assessment of the modernization
needs and equipping challenges of the Army National Guard, Air
National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve.
We recognize the Department is making improvements and
progress in providing adequate funding to equip the National
Guard and Reserve Components, to enhance its role as an
operational reserve. Sustaining this funding, however, will
continue to be a major issue given the acute national economic
challenges we currently face.
During the April hearing the subcommittee learned the
importance of equipping and resourcing the Reserve Component as
an ``operational reserve'' rather than the Cold War model of a
strategic reserve. We also heard our witnesses testify that
since 2001 the Department has made significant strides in
providing adequate resources to equip the Reserve Component as
an operational reserve.
The Guard and Reserve Components have proven to be an
invaluable asset during Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn. These past 10 years have
justified the need for an operational Reserve Component force
that must be adequately manned, trained, and equipped.
Since September 2001, almost 600,000 guardsmen and
reservists have deployed in support of combat operations,
representing 40 percent of the total reserve force of 1.4
million troops. All 34 Army National Guard combat brigades have
deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan and more than half of
the force have combat experience. There are reservists
operating in over 100 countries.
The Army Reserve Components also comprise roughly 74
percent of all medical units, 80 percent of all transportation
units, 75 percent of engineer units, and 70 percent of military
police units in the Army. These are critical combat enablers
for any type of combat operation.
The National Guard also has a dual-role responsibility and
has to be mission-ready to rapidly respond to local, State, and
Federal emergencies.
For example, for the Air National Guard, one of their more
important missions is protecting the homeland through the
Aerospace Control Alert mission. This mission has not been
without its challenges--primarily because it was not adequately
resourced, programmed or budgeted for by the active Air Force.
Since 2001 the majority of modernization funding for the
Reserve Components has come from supplemental, overseas
contingency operation funding requests, meaning funding that is
not part of the base budget request. What happens when these
so-called OCO requests are no longer requested or funded? How
will we continue to sustain the operational reserve and equip
them for their missions?
Congress has not hesitated in trying to address the
equipment readiness needs we have noted in many Guard and
Reserve units over the years. National Guard and Reserve
Component procurement from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2011
has totaled approximately $47.0 billion, averaging almost $6.0
billion per year.
Since 2004, Congress has authorized approximately $7.7
billion in a National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. The
National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account helps maintain
combat capability and should help to guarantee that equipment
is relevant and upgraded in a timely manner.
This funding has enjoyed sustained bipartisan support both
on this committee and throughout Congress.
The Department of Defense and Congress have made
substantial progress in terms of adequate funding for and
reorganization of the Reserve Components, but I am concerned
that these anticipated budgetary challenges we currently face
could potentially negatively impact the current operational
status of the Guard and Reserve.
The ability to maintain a sustainable operational reserve
force with sufficient operational capability is predicated on
having sufficient manpower and adequate resources.
I want to express how much the subcommittee appreciates the
contribution of the Guard and Reserve Components and want to
recognize that they are maintained at a fraction of the cost of
the regular military. We, as a Nation, clearly cannot fight
without them because there is no way a 19-year-old can have the
skill set and experience of a 39-year-old.
Statement of Hon. Silvestre Reyes
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces
Hearing on
National Guard and Reserve Component Acquisition
and Modernization
October 12, 2011
This past April, the subcommittee received testimony from
the leadership of the Army and Air Force Reserve Components.
Today, we have those same leaders back for an update on the
equipment needs of the Army and Air Force Reserve Components.
During the April hearing, we heard that our Reserve
Components remain as busy as ever, and that the proposed FY
2012 budget request would allow us to maintain the high-quality
Reserve forces we have today. We also heard that there were
additional equipment needs for all the Reserve Components. As a
result, the full Armed Services Committee bill included $325
million in additional funding in the National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Account. The House Appropriators went even further,
proposing an additional $1.5 billion for this same account,
while the Senate Appropriators proposed $500 million.
So, the good news is that it appears that Congress will
continue to provide support for Guard and Reserve equipment
needs over and above the budget request.
On the other hand, the Budget Control Act of 2011 will
likely result in a substantial cut to the DOD base budget in FY
2012--perhaps as much as $26 billion. In addition, the Budget
Control Act mandates approximately $450 billion in additional
DOD cuts over 10 years, when compared to current DOD
projections. And finally, if the so-called ``super committee''
does not reach its goal of $1.5 trillion in additional
reductions, the DOD could face additional significant cuts
starting in FY 2013.
However, at this point we don't know how DOD will propose
dealing with these budget reductions. We do know, however, how
similar cuts have been applied in the past. In previous budget
reductions, DOD has often taken an ``across-the-board''
approach to making cuts, rather than a more focused, thoughtful
path.
I am concerned that if an across-the-board, cookie-cutter
approach to funding reductions takes place the entire force--
including the Reserve Components--will suffer significant
damage. For example, if the Air Force further reduces fighter
aircraft fleets in the Active Duty force, will similar cuts
flow down to the Reserve Components? If Active Duty forces are
reduced by DOD, are there plans to increase the size of the
Reserve elements to compensate? If DOD is seeking budget
efficiencies, does it make sense to strategically expand some
elements of the Reserve forces? I certainly hope those
questions are being asked as part of the ongoing DOD
``strategic review.''
The Nation has invested billions in additional funding to
create the highly effective Reserve forces we have today--with
this subcommittee adding additional billions to that investment
every year.
Beyond the immediate needs of our Reserve Components, I
think it is also critical that we focus on the long term. If we
get this right, we can end up with a high-quality Reserve force
that also saves the Nation billions of dollars desperately
needed elsewhere.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses' thoughts on these
major issues facing the entire DOD, but the Reserve Component
in particular.
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 12, 2011
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
October 12, 2011
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Bartlett. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the
Department of Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these
anticipated cuts would impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve
Components.
General Stultz. The Army Reserves is currently resourced at a lower
per capita rate than any other Army component. While the Army expects
the Army Reserve to be capable of conducting Full Spectrum Operations
that capability will not exist if additional investments are not made
in equipment, personnel and training.
Additional days for any schooling, professional development,
combatant command support, exercises and overseas training are over and
above the statutory level. The statutory requirement for training is 39
days for the Army Reserve. The current structure of the Army is
dependent upon the Combat Support and Combat Service Support
capabilities predominantly resident in the Army Reserve. That
capability cannot be built and sustained with 39 days of training per
Soldier per year. The Army Reserves has proven itself in every
contingency, manmade or natural, for the last two decades. It has done
so by using limited resources and applying them in an efficient and
cost effective manner. It must continue to have resources to man, equip
and train its Soldiers and Units.
Mr. Bartlett. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response
to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and
the amount of equipment needed to fill out the brigades and other
units? If so, to what extent will that help to balance the equipment
capabilities between the active and Reserve Components? For example, I
have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall will be
reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 AIMs in the Army National
Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component.
General Stultz. The Army will have to reduce force structure in
response to the pending budget cuts. The extent of the overall cut and
the specific units to cut has not been decided yet. The Army is
addressing these decisions as part of the ongoing Total Army Analysis
2014-2018 process. Once the specific reductions are decided the
equipment requirements will be analyzed to determine what equipment can
be moved from the Active Component to fill Reserve Component shortages.
Equipment on-hand levels are similar across the Army Components;
however, the Army Reserve remains the least modernized at 67%. We are
hopeful that cascaded equipment from the Active Component will displace
older equipment in the Army Reserve resulting in improved modernization
levels.
Mr. Bartlett. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as
reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions?
General Stultz. Other Army initiatives (e.g. Reset) currently have
minimal to no impact on Army Reserve Training and Mission execution.
However, as theater provided equipment is returned, reset and
redistributed to all components, both equipment on-hand and
modernization levels should improve. This will enhance our ability to
train with modernized and compatible equipment.
Mr. Bartlett. As the Services down-size their inventories of older
model HMMWVs, is that expected to impact the Army National Guard and
Army Reserve more than the Active Component?
General Stultz. No. The Army Reserve supports the acquisition
strategy for HMMWVs. The AR is 94% equipment on hand for HMMWVs.
The Army Reserve is 17% armored capable and 83% of non-Armored
capable. As we divest of these older non-Armored capable models, we
will work with Army to fill the shortfall with Reset HMMWVs as they
return from theater. We anticipate that the USAR HMMWV armored-capable
and reset fleet will increase.
The Army's tactical wheeled vehicle investment strategy is to
balance the quantity, quality, and sustainment of the fleet through new
production, rebalancing and fleet Recapitalization (RECAP). We are
working with Army to rebalance our fleet and to send older vehicles
through RECAP programs to provide the AR with the more armored capable
vehicles to support full spectrum operations.
AR HMMWV Required: 21,624 On-Hand: 20,334 or 94% On-Hand.
Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH)--3,051 (15%) of On-Hand
Extended Capability Vehicle (ECV) (armored)--406 (2%)
of On-Hand
Legacy--8,541 (42%) of On-Hand
M1097R--8,336 (41%) of On-Hand
The M1097R is non-armored capable. The RECAP extends the life of
vehicle. All future RECAP distributions will be Armored Capable. The
last M1097R was delivered to the AR in FY 10. HMMWV Production was FY
05-10.
Mr. Bartlett. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the
Department of Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these
anticipated cuts would impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve
Components.
General Carpenter. The Army National Guard is capable of executing
the full spectrum of operations, given the appropriate time and
resources, and consistently found to be an affordable, effective, and
efficient component of the Army's Operational force. Major budget cuts
would adversely impact the Army National Guard's capabilities across a
broad spectrum of functional areas. Below are the immediate capability
concerns:
Personnel: The Army National Guard has refined its capacity to
provide ready, trained, and equipped forces to the Army since 9/11 by
recruiting and retaining a quality campaign force. The Army National
Guard continues to provide the Army a vehicle by which critical force
structure and personnel are retained at a significant savings (the Army
National Guard operating budget is pennies on the dollar when compared
to the Active Component). However, major budget cuts will reduce
capabilities across every personnel management sector, which in turn
adversely affects the depth and breadth of the Army National Guard's
domestic and global capabilities in support of the Operational Force.
Medical: Medical readiness is a critical component of attaining the
personnel readiness status required by the Department of the Army for
deployable units. Without appropriate levels of medical readiness
funding, the Army National Guard will not be able to provide medically
ready Soldiers or units to support State and Federal operations in
accordance with Department of Defense requirements and regulations in
the following areas:
1. The Army National Guard will be unable to reach regulatory
goals for mandated dental and medical requirements, which then
decreases the number of fully medically ready Soldiers and
units the Army National Guard can provide for Federal or State
missions.
2. Lack of funding will significantly and negatively impact
important occupational health requirements.
3. Major funding cuts will directly impact the ability of the
Army National Guard to provide specialized Case Management to
mitigate service connected injuries sustained by the force
following the previous ten years of sustained war.
4. Funding cuts will impact the ability of the Army National
Guard to maintain medical readiness data repository and
reporting systems.
5. The ability of the ARNG to train for and meet the recently
proven domestic standard of trauma and critical care will be
eliminated. Fifty-six percent of Army medical evacuation assets
reside in the Army National Guard.
Family Support: Army National Guard Soldiers and families face
unique challenges in accessing services due to the geographic
dispersion unique to this service component. Budget cuts to existing
Soldier and Family Support programs will further impair the capability
of the Army National Guard to provide baseline services in support of
State and Federal roles. In addition to adversely affecting support to
geo-dispersed Army Soldiers outside the footprint of the Active
Component installations, the following capabilities will significantly
degrade by cuts across these programs:
1. Family Assistance Centers: a vital resource to National
Guard families. They are the Reserve Component equivalent of
the installation-based Army Community Services and these
locations (more than 380) cover the gap in services between an
active duty installation and the 2,900 Army National Guard
communities.
2. Family Readiness Support Assistants: support traditional,
drilling Army National Guard units with full-time support,
assistance to unit Family Readiness Groups, and enhanced family
readiness throughout the Deployment Support Cycle.
3. Resilience programs: improve the abilities of Citizen-
Soldiers to train, deploy, and reintegrate effectively by
applying enhanced coping skills and the awareness of post-
deployment challenges.
4. Risk reduction and mitigation programs: suicide
prevention, substance abuse prevention/response, and sexual
assault prevention remain underfunded for the Army National
Guard and are vital to readiness. In many cases, the minimal
expense for prevention and basic substance abuse or behavioral
health treatment options provides a significant return on
investment when compared to the training and replacement costs
for Soldiers with service-related issues. Resource reductions
in these areas will increase recruiting and training costs
because quality Soldiers will not be retained.
Aviation: All Army National Guard rotary-wing airframes are being
replaced or upgraded. Reduced funding may cause aircraft fielding
delays or cancellations, which increases long-term fleet costs for the
aging airframes maintained in our inventory. Major budget cuts will
result in a decreased ability to support Army National Guard aviation
missions and readiness reductions for fiscal year 2012 and beyond.
Training: Army National Guard unit readiness is predicated on
trained Soldiers. (Individuals are qualified in their military
occupational specialties, critical functional skills, and for Officers
and Non-commissioned Officers, timely completion of required
professional military education). Major budget cuts to the Army
National Guard will cause the number of Duty Military Occupational
Specialty Qualified Soldiers in the Guard to fall potentially impacting
unit mobilizations without additional post mobilization time and
resources. In fiscal year 2012, Army National Guard requirements for
individual training were funded at only 64 percent (Army National Guard
received $496 million to meet a $771 million training requirement). The
current funding gap results in critical skills training shortfalls,
increased backlogs for professional military education, and military
occupational specialty qualifications. Further budget cuts could impact
the Army National Guard's ability to provide ready units in support of
operational requirements at home and abroad, placing the Nation at
risk.
Logistics: Cuts in Ground Operations Tempo funds impact the day-to-
day operations of all Army National Guard units, as well as the
collective training for units designated in upcoming rotations for the
Army Force Generation Model strategy. Major budget cuts would result in
the degradation of mission execution across numerous logistics venues:
depot-level maintenance, reset operations, the National Maintenance
Program, unit Readiness Reporting, calibration monitoring for sensitive
equipment, repairing tactical wheeled vehicles to fill critical
shortages, and tracking Army ``payments'' back to the Army National
Guard for equipment the Army requested to remain in theater after
national Guard deployments (Department of Defense Directive 1225.6).
Further budget cuts impact the Guard's ability to purchase repair
parts. For example, many weapons systems fall below required readiness
levels if repair parts are not in place in a timely fashion. Overseas
Contingency Operations Reset funding cuts can be highlighted by the
following:
1. A 15 percent reset budget reduction equates to five Army
National Guard Brigade Combat Team equivalents failing to
achieve Field Level Reset in 365 days.
2. A 30 percent reset budget reduction equates to nine Army
National Guard Brigade Combat Team equivalents failing to
achieve Field Level Reset in 365 days.
3. A 40 percent reset budget reduction equates to eleven Army
National Guard Brigade Combat Team equivalents failing to
achieve Field Level Reset in 365 days.
The Army National Guard brings a broad array of capabilities to the
Nation's defense--all for a minimal cost--at home and abroad. We
understand each component must continue to provide services at the
highest level even with planned budget decreases. However, major cuts
to the already proportionally smaller Army National Guard budget would
slice deep into our dual-mission capabilities and adversely affect the
Nation at home and abroad.
Mr. Bartlett. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response
to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and
the amount of equipment needed to fill out the brigades and other
units? If so, to what extent will that help to balance the equipment
capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components? For example, I
have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall will be
reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 AIMs in the Army National
Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component.
General Carpenter. The Army is currently examining force structure
changes, and anticipates releasing a complete analysis in the second
quarter of fiscal year 2012. The Army analysis will determine the
proper mix of organizations required to comprise a balanced and
affordable force necessary to meet the guidance issued by the
President, Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Army
leadership. Once the Army Analysis is complete, the Army will then
determine any potential equipment modernization impacts, to include the
Combat Vehicles for the Army National Guard.
Mr. Bartlett. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as
reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions?
General Carpenter. Since 9-11, the Army National Guard operates at
a pace unlike any other time in its history. The current strategic
environment places high demands on both personnel and equipment. The
Army National Guard continues to be a resilient and committed
professional component in the Army's Operational Force. Unfortunately,
the Total Force is out of balance and must Reset to restore personnel
and equipment capabilities for future missions. Reset establishes a
balanced process after an extended deployment. It systematically
restores deployed units to a level of personnel and equipment readiness
that permits the resumption of training for future missions. The fully
implemented Reset model will accelerate reconstitution of the force,
increase unit readiness, and improve preparation for next-to-deploy
units. Reset improves the readiness of the force, increases training
time on unit equipment prior to deployment, and demonstrates good
stewardship of funding. Equipment readiness is key to the Army National
Guard's Reset Strategy and vital to the Army's efforts to build
sufficient strategic flexibility and operational depth to deal with
unforeseen contingencies. In a strategic environment of uncertainty and
unpredictability, it is imperative that the Army National Guard
supports these efforts by accurately tracking and reporting equipment
repair, replacement, recapitalization, and expenditures to ensure the
Army sustains equipment readiness at a rate that meets or exceeds
operational demand.
Mr. Bartlett. Earlier this year, the Army announced the
cancellation of the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air
Missile (SLAMRAAM) program. The SLAMRAAM program was scheduled to
replace the old Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System
(NASAMS), which is currently being used in defense of the National
Capital Region (NCR). What impact, if any, does the cancellation have
on the National Guard units conducting the NCR mission?
General Carpenter. The impact of Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-
Range Air-to-Air Missile program cancellation on the Army National
Guard is that a replacement for the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air
Missile System for the National Capital Region Mission is still
undetermined. The contract for the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air
Missile System ends in fiscal year 2017. The Army National Guard
Avenger rebuild program is scheduled through fiscal year 2015; while
Avenger sustainment concludes in fiscal year 2018, and currently no
decision to extend either program. There are only small levels of
modernization planned for the Avenger platform and no planned
replacement currently identified.
Mr. Bartlett. The Army National Guard operates more than 800 Black
Hawk helicopters for both domestic and overseas missions. However, as
you know, more than 500 of these are the older ``A'' models, which are
quickly becoming obsolete. The active Army is slated to receive funding
for at least 75 new UH-60M and HH-60M Black Hawk helicopters in FY2012,
and only 4 of those 75 will go to the Guard, despite the fact that they
fulfill 40 percent of the missions. Can you talk about the current
state of the Black Hawk fleet and the impact that using older Black
Hawks and not receiving the newer ``M'' models will have on the Army
Guard?
General Carpenter. The Army National Guard is programmed to receive
six (6) HH-60M Black Hawk aircraft to complete a twelve (12) aircraft
company requirement in fiscal year 2012. The Army National Guard's
position with the Army states that sourcing and deployments guide
fielding plans to ensure units operating in combat areas are equipped
with the newest and most capable aircraft. In terms of costs, the UH-
60A is more expensive to operate per flight hour, less modern, and more
difficult to maintain than the HH-60M. Conversions of UH-60A aircraft
to UH-60L models, a cascade of UH-60Ls from the Active Component, and
fielding of the newer UH-60Ms will retire most of the remaining UH-60A
model aircraft in the Army National Guard. As long additional budget
cuts do not reduce the number of UH-60A to UH-60L conversions or UH/HH-
60M procurements, the current plan to retire Army National Guard UH-
60As will conclude roughly in 2023.
Mr. Bartlett. The current Department of the Army plan is to divest
all Army National Guard C-23 Sherpas by 2015. What impact will this
have on the ability of the Army National Guard to respond to domestic
situations, as well as the overseas mission, where the Sherpa has been
heavily used to provide intra-theatre airlift?
General Carpenter. The current Army plan will reduce the number of
Army National Guard fixed wing aircraft available for domestic
operations from 114 aircraft to 64, or potentially as low as 48
aircraft. This plan also includes the divestiture of 42 C-23 Sherpas.
The Army approach to domestic fixed wing requirements is one in which
the Army National Guard utilizes those Army National Guard fixed wing
assets not deployed in federal service.
These facts, coupled with the Air National Guard fielding of C-27J
aircraft to replace Army National Guard C-23s, the likelihood of Air
National Guard deployments with their C-27Js, and the extensive
equipment training requirements for this aircraft will limit routine
Army National Guard logistical support requirements, as well as Army
Service-specific missions. Airframe inventory reductions and diminished
access to fixed wing capabilities decreases Army National Guard
capabilities for future domestic operations and catastrophic incidents.
Mr. Bartlett. In 2010, Army Materiel Command outlined a plan for
the drastic reduction/elimination of the National Guard's participation
in the National Maintenance Program by 2013. Do you agree with this
decision? Do you believe the National Guard's participation in the
National Maintenance Program offers the potential for further cost
savings, enhanced performance and mission accomplishment?
General Carpenter. National Maintenance Program is a reimbursable,
requirements driven program designed to save the Army money by using
excess maintenance capacity. Since requirements vary annually based on
Army Working Capital Fund supply requirements, the Army National
Guard's participation would fluctuate as well. Therefore, it is
advisable to view the Army National Guard's participation on a
percentile basis of the total annual National Maintenance Management
program. The fiscal year 2010 Army National Guard share was 18.2
percent. The fiscal year 2011 Army National Guard share is at 24.97
percent (as of 31 May 2011). The fiscal year 2012 projection ranges
from 19 to 25 percent. The Army National Guard has not received fiscal
year 2013 National Maintenance Management program projections.
Army Materiel Command seeks to maximize their efficiencies through
increased work at depots, and repeatedly stated that this will occur
when economically prudent. The Army National Guard has a collaborative
relationship with Army Materiel Command, one built on quality service
and products at reasonable prices. The Army National Guard, through the
National Maintenance Program, has a proven surge capability for Army
Materiel Command.
Mr. Bartlett. To what extent do Guard and Reserve units get to
operate and train with Up-Armored HMWWVs and MRAP class vehicles? Other
than when they deploy overseas, do they have any need for tactical
wheeled vehicles with high levels of protection?
General Carpenter. Units do not have Up-Armored HMWWVs or MRAPs in
the continental United States, and most of the actual vehicles are in
theater. The Army National Guard does, however, use simulators which
focus on how to survive vehicle rollovers, and driver trainers which
simulate multiple vehicles to include MRAP variants, Tanks and
Strikers. The driver trainers focus on driving and maneuvering through
cities and off-road as part of convoys, route clearance missions etc.
Mr. Bartlett. As the Services down-size their inventories of older
model HMMWVs, is that expected to impact the Army National Guard and
Army Reserve more than the Active Component?
General Carpenter. No, the down-sizing of older model HMMWV
inventories will not impact the Army National Guard more than the
Active Component Army. The Army National Guard achieved 100 percent
Equipment On Hand during fiscal year 2011 and the Army National Guard
up-armored HMMWV rate is commensurate with the Active Army. However,
the Army National Guard will still retain approximately 4,000 legacy
HMMWVs after downsizing.
Mr. Bartlett. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the
Department of Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these
anticipated cuts would impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve
Components.
General Wyatt. The Air Force plans and programs for its components
as a Total Force and ensures the same level of readiness across the
entire force. Any major budget cuts have a potential of greatly
affecting the equipping and readiness of the Air Reserve Components.
The Air National Guard is deeply concerned that any additional budget
demands have the potential to severely degrade of its overall
capability. Due to an already lean business model, the Air National
Guard is able to operate with less than 6-percent of the Total Air
Force Budget, while representing more than 34-percent of overall
capability.
For perspective, for 2011, the Air National Guard has supported
worldwide contingencies with more than 6,000 deployed per month. In
addition, on October 1, 2011, there were 3,434 Guard Airmen actively
engaged in homeland defense and support to civil authorities including
protecting American skies through Aerospace Control Alert, assisting
with critical infrastructure protection, and assisting their local
communities with disaster recovery in North and South Dakota, Missouri,
and Nebraska. This also includes 578 Guard Airmen supporting local and
national counterdrug programs and 121 Airmen assisting the US Border
Patrol on our southwest border. Air National Guard Modular Aerial Fire
Fighting units dropped 20,000 gallons of fire retardant supporting the
National Forestry Service in the Southwest. This level of contribution
is provided with less than two-cents on every dollar spent on defense.
Mr. Bartlett. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response
to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and
the amount of equipment needed to fill out the brigades and other
units? If so, to what extent will that help to balance the equipment
capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components? For example, I
have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall will be
reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 AIMs in the Army National
Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component.
General Wyatt. The Secretary of the Air Force has produced plans to
reduce the number of weapon systems throughout the Air National Guard
(ANG). While this reduces the number of aircraft and support equipment
in the ANG, it does not create any sort of equipment equity between the
Active Component and the ANG, rather it will reduce the ANG's overall
capability. Furthermore, the plan creates potential barriers for the
National Guard to support its domestic requirements.
Mr. Bartlett. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as
reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions?
General Wyatt. The House Armed Services Committee was recently
briefed on the status of Aviation Assets for the National Guard on 1
June 2011 in accordance with House report 111-49-257. In addition,
concerns from the Chief, National Guard Bureau that Department of
Defense programmatic decisions may have degraded National Guard
aviation capabilities to adequately support Homeland Defense/Defense
Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA) missions prompted the Chief to
request a Capabilities Based Assessment to analyze the National Guard
aviation capability and its support for Domestic Operations. Air
National Guard staff is guiding the assigned Capabilities Based
Assessment, but because of the sheer size and scope of the study, it
has been outsourced for commercial contract. The Capabilities Based
Assessment to analyze the National Guard aviation capability is
currently in the contracting process and is expected to be completed
240 days from contract signature. Once the Capabilities Based
Assessment is complete, the National Guard should be able to provide
the House Armed Services Committee a clearer picture of the National
Guard's capability to support Domestic Operations. The following
observations have been made:
Programmed changes to domestic airlift present the
most eminent impact for successful completion of current and
future domestic operations missions. Since 2005, and with
current programmed reductions in FY11 and FY12, the Air
National Guard will have lost 22% of its C-130 fleet, 226
aircraft, down to 175.
Mission requirements and demands levied on the NG
routinely are difficult to codify as to which missions are
requirements and which are demands. The NG has requirements
that are federally recognized, defined by joint and service
doctrine and demands only defined by National Guard Regulation.
A New Madrid Earthquake scenario could create an
estimated need of 1000 C-130 sorties for aero-medical
evacuation alone. This is in addition to moving our CBRN
Enterprises, supplies and equipment.
National Guard Aviation assets currently available to
supply major military support to civilian authorities are
stressed to meet all emergency response requirements and
scenarios.
Mr. Bartlett. Recently, the Air Force has concluded that its
requirement for fighter aircraft has been reduced from 2,200 in 2008,
to 2,000 in 2010. How will that reduction of 200 aircraft affect the
Air National Guard's ability to perform the Aerospace Control Alert
(ACA) mission?
General Wyatt. The reduction in fighter aircraft does not directly
affect the Air National Guard's ability to perform the ACA mission. The
Air National Guard has the ability to manage the reductions to prevent
ACA locations from losing aircraft and making the reductions at non-ACA
locations.
Mr. Bartlett. We understand that the Air National Guard operates 16
of 18 Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) sites and that by 2013, retirements
of F-16 aircraft will affect 10 of 18 ACA sites. Are plans in place to
replace the retiring force structure for all of the Air National
Guard's ACA sites?
General Wyatt. The Air National Guard (ANG) operates 17 of 18 ACA
sites. Currently, there are no ANG programmatic retirements of F-16
aircraft in 2013; however the F-15s and F-16s executing the mission at
these sites are the oldest in the in Air Force's inventory. The F-22s
that replaced the F-15Cs at Hickam AFB, HI, and the F-35s scheduled to
replace the F-16s at Burlington, VT are the only two planned 5th
generation ANG bases. Analysis indicates there will be sufficient ACA
capable aircraft to accomplish the ACA mission for the foreseeable
future; however, presently there is not a specific plan to recapitalize
ANG ACA units with 4th and 5th generation aircraft.
If in the future, there are fighter force structure changes that
affect ANG ACA units, the Air Force needs to produce a well articulated
recapitalization plan. The ANG requires a concurrent and balanced
recapitalization approach if America is to maintain air dominance over
our sovereign skies.
Mr. Bartlett. The recent Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study
identified an overmatch in C-130 tactical airlift force structure. How
will future reductions affect ANG units? Have you, the Adjutants
General, and Governors been consulted on potential future force
reductions?
General Wyatt. If the Air Force C-130 fleet is reduced, there will
be a reduction to the ANG C-130 units as well. To further complicate C-
130 reductions, the Active Component vs. Reserve Component C-130
distribution, or ``AC/RC mix'' debate continues.
Due to the sensitive and pre-decisional nature of future program
deliberations, Adjutants General and Governors are not consulted.
However, consistent with the National Guard Bureau's statutory
responsibility of providing advice on the federalized and non-
federalized National Guard, I was consulted on the Air Force's FY13 POM
position.
Mr. Bartlett. Given the acknowledged importance of the Aerospace
Control Alert (ACA) mission, why do the readiness ratings of ACA units
not reflect their ACA mission? What is being done to insure that
readiness assessments and inspections include the ACA mission?
General Wyatt. The readiness ratings of ACA units are not directly
shown due to the lack of a formal and complete tasking process to
account for this combatant command requirement in the Global Force
Management/Joint Operations Planning and Execution System process. The
ACA mission does not have the manpower and equipment specific details
normally used in the process Combatant Commanders use to request
forces. This missing information hides the level of effort for this
tasking and makes ACA specific accounting difficult. Currently, an
effort to garner this specific information from the combatant command
through the force providers is underway. Once accomplished, the level
of effort necessary for this tasking will be reflected in the already
existing readiness system. By formalizing this process, we will have
the ability to show each ACA unit's level of commitment to the mission
and also provide information about the remaining capacity at each unit
for additional tasking.
Mr. Bartlett. O&M costs (flying hour costs) vary by aircraft type
as do the overall costs to operate any given aircraft between the
Active Air Force and the Reserve Component. If an aircraft costs more
to fly but is flown less by more experienced pilots in the Reserve
Component, wouldn't it make fiscal sense to put those aircraft in the
Air National Guard rather than the Active Air Force? And, wouldn't we
get a longer lifetime out of those aircraft this way?
General Wyatt. This is a scenario based question based upon the
aircrew readiness of the fleet's aircrews and the pilot management of
the fleet and therefore, out of the Air National Guard's purview.
However, given that the Reserve Component could squeeze aircrew
training efficiencies out of its Rated Aircrew Program (RAP), then the
weapon system would ultimately be cheaper and last longer in the Guard
or Reserve. Historically, the Reserve Component has enjoyed more
experienced aircrew than the Active Component and has been able to
schedule fewer training sorties to maintain flying qualification.
Mr. Bartlett. The Air Force ``Strategic Basing'' Process (AFI 10-
503) is used to make basing and bed down decisions for current and
future weapon systems. There are 21 representatives who sit on this
steering group, including representatives from Air Force Public Affairs
and Air Force Legislative Liaison . . . but only ``one'' representative
from the Air National Guard (NGB/CF). Considering the fact that the Air
National Guard represents 43 percent of the air-refueling mission, 33
percent of the fighter mission, 30 percent of the cargo and transport
mission, 20 percent of the remotely piloted aircraft mission, and 20
percent of the distributive common ground station mission, in your
opinion, does the Air National Guard have an equitable voice in this
process?
General Wyatt. Yes. Each member of the Air Staff has a single
representative on the steering committee. Numbers of representatives
are not proportional to mission percentages, however no voting takes
place. The current system makes it imperative that one builds a
consensus among the other members of the steering group in order to get
basing action approval. As a force provider, the Air National Guard
normally gains major command (MAJCOM) support for the missions that are
in the best interest of the MAJCOM. As a result, the Air National Guard
is able to obtain appropriate and sufficient support to obtain approval
for necessary Air National Guard basing actions.
Mr. Bartlett. We often hear from the Air Force that the Air
National Guard is not ``accessible.'' What do they mean by this? Has
the Air National Guard ever turned down a request from the Air Force to
fulfill a mission? And, on average, how many aircraft does the Air
National Guard provide to combatant commanders compared to the Active
Air Force?
General Wyatt. Accessibility is often misunderstood and we continue
to educate Air Force senior leaders on how to access the Air National
Guard. In our view, there are three components to accessibility:
Law: Voluntary mobilization--the ANG has historically
fulfilled more than 85% of requests through volunteerism.
Involuntary mobilization--full or partial--allows for
unencumbered access.
Policy: Currently established through SECDEF
memorandum and places minimal restrictions on access.
Funding: The ANG is funded to train and prepare for
its federal mission; therefore access to the ANG requires
allocation of resources through Military Personnel
Appropriation Days.
The Air National Guard is accessible. To date, we have answered
every request for forces with more than 85% volunteerism. On average,
we provide 25% of Air Force capability used to meet Combatant Commander
requirements. Some examples Air National Guard accessibility: within
six minutes of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 Air National Guard
aircraft were airborne protecting America's skies. On 17 March 2011,
the United Nations passed the no-fly resolution for Libya. Air National
Guard tanker aircraft were the first on station, and within 48 hours,
Air National Guard tankers were flying missions and provided 14 of the
24 tanker aircraft involved in the effort.
Mr. Bartlett. We are hearing that the Active Air Force may be
planning significant retirements of ANG aircraft (all C-5As, 3 F-16
wings, 72 C-130s--many of which are in the Guard, and some number of A-
10s) and terminating the acquisition of C-27J aircraft as a possible
response to proposed defense budget cuts, especially if the cuts exceed
the $400 billion mark over 10-12 years. Has the Guard been actively
involved or consulted regarding these possible cuts? And, if so, how
would the loss of these aircraft affect the ANG, and what alternative
missions is the Air Force offering to ensure the highly trained men and
women who currently operate these aircraft have a new mission?
General Wyatt. Air Force budget deliberations are ongoing. We are
hopeful that the Air National Guard's proven lean business model, the
age of its equipment and its contribution to the Total Force will be
considered as the Air Force seeks solutions in this greatly constrained
budget environment. Any major budget cuts have a potential of greatly
affecting the equipping and readiness of the Air Reserve Components.
The Air National Guard is deeply concerned that any additional budget
demands have the potential to severely degrade of its overall
capability. Due to an already lean business model, the Air National
Guard is able to operate with less than 6-percent of the Total Air
Force Budget, while representing more than 34-percent of overall
capability.
Mr. Bartlett. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the
Department of Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these
anticipated cuts would impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve
Components.
General Stenner. Depending on where cuts were targeted in the
language of the NDAA and Defense Appropriations, major budget cuts
could impact the capability of the Air Force Reserve. Cuts to reduce
manpower costs would result in lower participation in military airlift,
combat air forces, space and ISR missions. It could also potentially
eliminate Air Force Reserve contributions in entire mission areas.
Force structure reductions to aircraft would immediately affect the
targeted mission area (airlift, combat, etc.) and drive personnel
cross-training and relocation costs.
Lower ``life cycle costs'' achieved through part-time duty, a
delayed points-based retirement system, and lower healthcare costs
ensure combat capability at reduced costs.
Rebalancing the Active Component/Reserve Component mix toward the
Reserve Component would reap immediate savings. The Citizen-Airman
model has served the Air Force well for over 60 years, and expanded use
of this construct will provide more combat capability for lower cost in
this fiscally constrained environment.
Mr. Bartlett. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response
to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and
the amount of equipment needed to fill out the brigades and other
units? If so, to what extent will that help to balance the equipment
capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components? For example, I
have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall will be
reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 AIMs in the Army National
Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component.
General Stenner. With regards to Air Force Reserve (AFR) readiness
and equipment modernization--any budget-driven force structure
reductions will be accomplished through the Air Force corporate process
and will balance the needs of war-fighters, combatant commands, the
national military strategy, and the AFR. The Air Force corporate
process takes into account the vast experience of our Citizen-Airmen
and ensures the cuts do not disproportionally benefit one component to
the detriment of another. AFR Airmen provide the same capability as
Active Component Airmen, and we will continue to do so as the USAF maps
out its modernization and recapitalization plans.
Mr. Bartlett. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as
reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions?
General Stenner. In order to Recapitalize Infrastructure, meet
Emerging Mission/TFI Requirements, and meet the Air Force's 20/20 by
2020 Facilities and Energy Goals, the Air Force Reserve requires $125M
in MILCON per year. Additionally, $200M in O&M per year is required for
Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization to recapitalize
infrastructure and support new missions through adaptive re-use of
existing facilities.
In these economic times, we fully understand that difficult
budgetary decisions must be made. In 2007, AFRC instituted a program we
call FOCUS (Facilities Operational Capabilities Utilization Survey) to
independently validate our real facility requirements and guide
decisions on where to get the greatest return on investment. This
program has validated $1.24 Billion backlog in unfunded MILCON
requirements supporting on-going AFRC missions, as well as improved
resource utilization through Total Force Integration initiatives with
our Active Duty and Air National Guard partners.
Underfunding AFRC MILCON has increased our average facility
recapitalization rate for FY11-15 to 376 years, a 33 percent increase
above last year's projection.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. I know you are given your equipment by Army and Air
Force, so with this in mind:
With the Reserve Components taking on a huge volume of deployments,
weekend training is crucial. If our warriors are being asked to deploy
into the fight, and they were trained on anything other than the exact
same equipment they will use in theater (other than minor differences),
this is an unacceptable situation. If this is the case, I have to
wonder how valuable their training really is. Granted not every UTA
involves operational training, but when operational training does
occur, are we giving them the best, most applicable training that we
can give them? There is no argument that they deserve our very best.
We all know that the Reserve Components are vital to the success of
our national defense efforts, but I ask you are we setting our warriors
up for failure if we are training them on sub-standard equipment?
General Stultz. No, we are not setting our Soldiers up for failure.
The Army Reserve equipment modernization rate is currently at 67%
and with funding in the base POM and through the National Guard and
Reserve Equipment Appropriation we are working towards reaching the
100% modernization goal.
Training on exactly the same equipment we'll use in theater is
certainly the optimal solution. Soldiers use the most up-to-date
equipment available to the Army Reserve at Annual Training exercises
just prior to mobilization. In conjunction with US Army Forces Command
and the Army Service Component Commanders, the Army Reserve ensures
that our Soldiers receive training on the most up-to-date, but limited
supply, items at the post-mobilization sites or in theater prior to
assuming their operational mission.
The Army Reserve continues to improve its use of both low and high
fidelity simulators to train Soldiers on the latest equipment
available. Low-fidelity simulators focus on operator controls and
generic safety procedures while high-fidelity simulators allow multiple
simulators to work together in a virtual world allowing equipment
operators and their leaders to plan and execute missions. These
simulators are cheaper than actual equipment, are generally available
as Commercial off the Shelf, and can be used at Unit Training Assembly
sites/Reserve Centers without major facility improvements. As with
actual equipment, funding shortfalls hinder our fielding of simulators
to each unit.
Mrs. Roby. I know you are given your equipment by Army and Air
Force, so with this in mind:
With the Reserve Components taking on a huge volume of deployments,
weekend training is crucial. If our warriors are being asked to deploy
into the fight, and they were trained on anything other than the exact
same equipment they will use in theater (other than minor differences),
this is an unacceptable situation. If this is the case, I have to
wonder how valuable their training really is. Granted not every UTA
involves operational training, but when operational training does
occur, are we giving them the best, most applicable training that we
can give them? There is no argument that they deserve our very best.
We all know that the Reserve Components are vital to the success of
our national defense efforts, but I ask you are we setting our warriors
up for failure if we are training them on sub-standard equipment?
General Carpenter. Training on the exact equipment used in an
operational situation absolutely enhances the Army National Guard
training experience. When the Army National Guard lacks the modernized
equipment used during deployments, pre-mobilization readiness and
``boots on the ground'' time can be affected. The recent increase in
both quality and numbers of Army equipment transferred to the Army
National Guard greatly aid in rapidly building and maintaining pre-
deployment readiness standards--consistent with a fully operational
force. However, tactical training on similar equipment still has value
and the Army National Guard trains on any and all available equipment.
Mrs. Roby. I know you are given your equipment by Army and Air
Force, so with this in mind:
With the Reserve Components taking on a huge volume of deployments,
weekend training is crucial. If our warriors are being asked to deploy
into the fight, and they were trained on anything other than the exact
same equipment they will use in theater (other than minor differences),
this is an unacceptable situation. If this is the case, I have to
wonder how valuable their training really is. Granted not every UTA
involves operational training, but when operational training does
occur, are we giving them the best, most applicable training that we
can give them? There is no argument that they deserve our very best.
We all know that the Reserve Components are vital to the success of
our national defense efforts, but I ask you are we setting our warriors
up for failure if we are training them on sub-standard equipment?
General Wyatt. In order to Recapitalize Infrastructure, meet
Emerging Mission/TFI Requirements, and meet the Air Force's 20/20 by
2020 Facilities and Energy Goals, the Air Force Reserve requires $125M
in MILCON per year. Additionally, $200M in O&M per year is required for
Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization to recapitalize
infrastructure and support new missions through adaptive re-use of
existing facilities.
In these economic times, we fully understand that difficult
budgetary decisions must be made. In 2007, AFRC instituted a program we
call FOCUS (Facilities Operational Capabilities Utilization Survey) to
independently validate our real facility requirements and guide
decisions on where to get the greatest return on investment. This
program has validated $1.24 Billion backlog in unfunded MILCON
requirements supporting on-going AFRC missions, as well as improved
resource utilization through Total Force Integration initiatives with
our Active Duty and Air National Guard partners.
Underfunding AFRC MILCON has increased our average facility
recapitalization rate for FY11-15 to 376 years, a 33 percent increase
above last year's projection.
Mrs. Roby. I know you are given your equipment by Army and Air
Force, so with this in mind:
With the Reserve Components taking on a huge volume of deployments,
weekend training is crucial. If our warriors are being asked to deploy
into the fight, and they were trained on anything other than the exact
same equipment they will use in theater (other than minor differences),
this is an unacceptable situation. If this is the case, I have to
wonder how valuable their training really is. Granted not every UTA
involves operational training, but when operational training does
occur, are we giving them the best, most applicable training that we
can give them? There is no argument that they deserve our very best.
We all know that the Reserve Components are vital to the success of
our national defense efforts, but I ask you are we setting our warriors
up for failure if we are training them on sub-standard equipment?
General Stenner. Air Force reservists train and deploy with the
same equipment. In some instances our equipment is older than the
Active Component's. However, it is well maintained due to the highly
experienced Citizen-Airmen who often work on the same equipment their
entire career. This personal investment pays off with Air Force Reserve
mission-capable rates among the highest in the Air Force.
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