[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
VENEZUELA'S SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND
SOUTH ASIA
of the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 24, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-71
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Serial No. 112-79
Committee on Foreign Affairs
__________
Printed for the use of the Committees on Oversight and Government
Reform and Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://www.house.gov/reform
http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71-297 WASHINGTON : 2012
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
JOHN L. MICA, Florida Ranking Minority Member
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
RAUL R. LABRADOR, Idaho DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee PETER WELCH, Vermont
JOE WALSH, Illinois JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida JACKIE SPEIER, California
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
Robert Borden, General Counsel
Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
RAUL R. LABRADOR, Idaho, Vice JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts,
Chairman Ranking Minority Member
DAN BURTON, Indiana BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PETER WELCH, Vermont
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
CONNIE MACK, Florida, Chairman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DAVID RIVERA, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York DENNIS CARDOZA, California
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on June 24, 2011.................................... 1
Statement of:
Benjamin, Daniel, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State; Kevin Whitaker,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere
Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Thomas Delare, Director
for Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy, U.S.
Department of State; and Adam J. Szubin, Director, Office
of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury. 13
Benjamin, Daniel......................................... 13
Delare, Thomas........................................... 22
Szubin, Adam J........................................... 24
Whitaker, Kevin.......................................... 24
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Benjamin, Daniel, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, prepared
statement of............................................... 16
Mack, Hon. Connie, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, prepared statement of.................... 6
Szubin, Adam J., Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
U.S. Department of the Treasury, prepared statement of..... 27
VENEZUELA'S SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY
----------
FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 2011
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National
Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, joint with the Subcommittee
on the Western Hemisphere and the Subcommittee
on the Middle East and South Asia, Committee on
Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz
(chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland
Defense, and Foreign Operations) presiding.
Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Labrador, Platts,
Tierney, Welch, Quigley, and Cummings.
Present from Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere: Representatives Mack, Schmidt, Rivera, Marino,
Sires, and Faleomavaega.
Present from Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South Asia: Representatives Chabot, Mack, Marino,
Ackerman, Connolly, and Deutch.
Staff present: Thomas A. Alexander, senior counsel; Molly
Boyl, parliamentarian; Kate Dunbar, staff assistant; Adam P.
Fromm, director of Member services and committee operations;
Linda Good, chief clerk; Mitchell S. Kominsky, counsel; Cecelia
Thomas, minority counsel/deputy clerk; and Carlos Uriarte,
minority counsel.
Mr. Chaffetz. Good morning. The committee will come to
order.
Welcome to today's hearing: Venezuela's Sanctionable
Activity. This is a joint hearing between the Oversight
Committee's National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations Subcommittee, the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere, and the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the
Middle East and South Asia.
We are joined today by the chairmen of those subcommittees,
Chairman Connie Mack of Florida and Chairman Steve Chabot of
Ohio.
I would also like to welcome Ranking Member Tierney of
Massachusetts, Ranking Member Ackerman of New York. Mr. Sires
of New Jersey will be sitting in for the Ranking Member Engel
today.
Thank you all for being here.
Today we are examining the administration's policies to
conduct national security threats abroad through the use of
sanctions. For the past decade, the United States has focused
much of its attention on the Middle East. Since the 9/11
attacks, Americans have invested over a trillion dollars
fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 2001, 6,072
Americans have died in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi
Freedom, and New Dawn. Another 44,266 have been injured. In
Afghanistan alone these numbers have risen dramatically since
our current President took office in 2009.
Wednesday evening, President Obama announced the intent to
withdraw 33,000 troops from Afghanistan by the fall of 2012.
This will leave approximately 67,000 troops behind, which is
twice as many when President Obama entered office.
While I support a withdrawal, it must be rooted in
prudence, not politics; because it is the right thing to do
based on the facts, and not because it is convenient.
While we combat terrorism in the Middle East, we must not
neglect threats that we face in our own hemisphere. In recent
years, Venezuela has grown significantly closer to regimes that
are openly hostile to the United States and its interests.
Venezuela has been a willing partner to countries such as Iran,
Syria, North Korea, and Cuba.
With the exception of North Korea, each of these countries
has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S.
Government. Senior officials within the Venezuelan government
have also provided material support to Hezbollah, a terrorist
organization. They have also maintained ties with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC; ELN; and ETA.
President Hugo Chavez has accused the United States of
being ``the first state sponsor of terrorism.'' President
Chavez has also called sanctions against Iran illegitimate and
that the Venezuelan government will ``back Iran under any
circumstances and without conditions.''
There is little question that Venezuela's behavior is
sanctionable. The question before us today is how the U.S.
Government should respond to these activities in the future.
What options are available? Should we continue to impose anemic
sanctions that are merely cosmetic or should we impose
sanctions that truly impact Venezuela's ability to threaten the
United States of America?
Before we begin that analysis, I want to express my deep
frustration with the administration. Time and again this
administration has frustrated the work of this subcommittee by
refusing to provide witnesses it has requested. Instead, it
insults this body by sending only witnesses it believes are
``appropriate.'' It does so without any regard to the judgment
and prerogative, of elected representatives.
This Congress, and especially the Oversight and Government
Reform Committee, has a constitutional obligation to oversee
the management, efficiency, and operations of the executive
branch. This duty is without question and without exception. At
the same time, this administration has a responsibility to
provide information the American people seek through their
representatives. This critical check and balance is designed to
ensure that the Federal Government does not overstep its
boundaries and adheres to the will of the people.
When the executive branch does not respond appropriately to
congressional inquiries, it breaches the duty of the American
people. This is the third time that Congress has attempted to
hold this hearing. On the first two occasions, the
administration either refused to provide any witnesses or
claimed it had too little time to prepare. It is unacceptable
that the administration requires more than 2 weeks to formulate
a thought about a matter it studies and briefs to executive
branch leaders and policymakers on a regular basis.
It is equally unacceptable that the administration did not
submit written testimony for today's hearing until late
yesterday. The administration had over 3 weeks to prepare
testimony for this hearing and have known about this topic for
nearly 3 months. It is unacceptable that the administration was
unable to adhere to our simple 48-hour deadline by submitting
testimony at the last possible minute. Perhaps this committee
should investigate the management and efficiency of the
executive branch in this regard.
I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses about
the success and challenges they face. This subcommittee is
ready to work with the Departments in any way possible. We do
appreciate your being here today, but understand the
frustration of this committee in not being able to do its work
because you are unable to do your work in giving us the
documents that we deserve and need to have so we can do our
job.
I would now like to recognize the distinguished ranking
member for the National Security Subcommittee, the gentleman
from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
witnesses for being here today as well.
We all are familiar with the 2010 comprehensive Iran
sanctions, the Accountability and Disinvestment Act of 2010,
and we also understand the Secretary has made a finding that
gasoline sales have been made in contravention of that law. So
the question really does come down, as the chairman said, to
what are we going to do and what should we do.
I think that we have to have a real clear understanding of
the current sanctions regime, which I hope you gentlemen will
be able to share with us today; a full appreciation of how much
we have discussed these diplomatic priorities for that region;
what are our goals; how is it exactly that we think we are
going to be able to accomplish them; and what will the current
sanctions do to drive us toward those goals and what would any
additional sanctions do toward moving in that direction and how
should they be structured. And we have to understand the impact
of any ramping up of sanctions before we start moving in that
direction.
So I think it is a good time for that conversation. I think
that, hopefully, between the four of you, you will be able to
give us all that information in a form that can benefit us as
we move forward.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I just ask unanimous consent that
my formal remarks be placed in the record.
Mr. Chaffetz. Without objection, so ordered.
I now recognize the chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, the gentleman from Florida,
Mr. Mack, for his opening statement.
Mr. Mack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate
myself with your opening statement and also the statement of
the ranking member.
Before I begin my formal opening statement, I just want to
say that the frustration runs deep, and I know you guys know
this. We first asked for you to come in front of the
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and you refused. You put
up roadblock after roadblock and just flat out refusal, and I
hope this serves as a warning that next time we ask you to come
in front of the subcommittee, you will come, because either you
will come there, you are going to come here, and if we have to
use our subpoena power, we will do it. So let's not go through
this circus another time, okay?
Today, in light of the U.S. State Department's recent
actions in sanctioning PDVSA, the purpose of this hearing is to
review and better understand the role of the State Department
and Treasury Department in utilizing sanctions as an instrument
of U.S. foreign policy. Specifically, I would like to
concentrate on the sanctions available under U.S. law and
discuss their potential application in cases where Venezuelan
individuals, businesses, and the government are able to be
sanctioned.
Venezuela has become the Wild West under thugocrat Hugo
Chavez. This is true for the following reasons: first, there is
rampant drug trafficking and corruption; second, terrorist
organizations like Hezbollah and the FARC are officially linked
to government officials; and, third, Venezuela is supporting
Iran and Iran's desire for a nuclear weapon.
Under Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has become a hub in our region
for money laundering and transshipment of illicit goods. In
recent years, the relationship between drug trafficking and
terrorist organizations has become closely intertwined.
If you will notice up on the screen we have the definition
from the State Department of what a state sponsor of terrorism
is, and I will let you read that on your own.
It is widely acknowledged that terrorist groups have turned
to drug trafficking as a source of revenue.
And if we can put up the other slide. This slide
represents, in 2003, the drug trafficking flight patterns in
Latin America.
Then if you will go to the next slide. This is what it
looks like in 2007. Unfortunately, we can't show the slides
from today because those are still protected and classified.
But the difference between 2003 and this map is in 2005 Hugo
Chavez kicked out our DEA.
As Chavez has provided Venezuela as a safe haven for these
narcoterrorists, the FARC, a drug trafficking and terrorist
organization who largely operates in remote sections of
Colombia, have long received assistance, relief, and material
support from Venezuelan authorities. And I think this is pretty
well documented. When Colombia took out Reyes and they took the
computers, Interpol was able to review those hard drives and
found significant cooperation with officials from Venezuela,
the Venezuelan government and the FARC. So clearly, if we go
back to the definition of state sponsor of terrorism, you can
check that box off, that there is a close tie and relationship
between terrorist organizations and the government in
Venezuela.
I also want to talk a little bit more about the drug
trafficking. Recently, the arrest of a drug kingpin by the
United States, Makled, was arrested. Makled was then extradited
to Colombia. Makled has said over and over again, and also
talked about payments to government officials in Venezuela. So
the drug trafficking organizations know that they have a friend
in Hugo Chavez.
We also, as I talked about, know that there is a
relationship between the FARC and Hezbollah, and the Treasury
has sanctioned members of the Venezuelan government for their
relationship in Venezuela.
Last, I want to talk about Venezuela and Iran. After many
discussions and not until a hearing when I was able to supply
the State Department with specific evidence of the shipment and
sale of gasoline, we finally sanctioned Venezuela.
Unfortunately, those sanctions have no teeth. The things that
you sanctioned we currently aren't engaged in with Venezuela in
the first place. So on one hand I am thankful that we actually
did put sanctions on Venezuela, it is a good start, but this is
a guy who supports terrorist organizations, drug kingpins,
narcotrafficking, and Iran.
Hugo Chavez should be, and deserves, labeled a state
sponsor of terror, and our Government, the gentlemen in front
of us, need to explain to us why he is not on the state sponsor
of terrorism.
With that, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Connie Mack follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 71297.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 71297.002
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey,
Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, for holding this
hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
Since leaping to power in 1998, Chavez has cast his
revolution as that of the poor majority against the wealthy
oligarch. He continues to impose an authoritarian populist
political model in Venezuela, undermining democratic
institutions and stifling the freedoms of the Venezuelan
people. However, the president's once stellar approval ratings
have stumbled, and in the most recent legislative election his
body's majority shrank below a key threshold, setting the stage
for heightened tension with a freshly emboldened opposition.
The results of this election show the Venezuelan people
desperately want change and that Chavez is losing his grip.
As anti-Chavez sentiment continues to grow in Venezuela,
Chavez has further intensified restriction on freedom of speech
and press. The government has systematically undermined
journalists' freedom of expression, workers' freedom of
association, and the ability of human rights groups to promote
human rights, completely disenchanting all civic engagement
within the country.
Officials harassment and intimidation of the political
opposition has grown, including the persecution of elected
state and local government officials and media outlets, such as
Global Vision and RCTV International, that have been critical
of the government.
Internationally, Chavez continues to cultivate
relationships with countries that are state sponsors of
terrorism like Cuba, Iran, and Syria. I cannot emphasize enough
how troubling the relationship between Venezuela and Iran is.
With weekly flights that connect Iran and Syria with
Caracas, collaboration between these two countries has hit a
new height. I have often discussed before the Western
Hemisphere Subcommittee my concerns about these flights, and I
hope that representatives from the State Department can
elaborate on this topic, as well as acknowledge the threat this
poses both to the United States and the free nations.
I commend the State Department for its most recent
sanctions on two companies in Venezuela who have been connected
to Iran's proliferation activities. Thus far, our strategy has
been thoughtful and pragmatically. Hastily attacking Chavez
could prove to have a detrimental effect on progress that has
been already made and further embolden his populist agenda. We
must continue to make smart decisions in regards to U.S. policy
toward Venezuela to further disable Chavez's control and to
encourage citizens to support democratic institutions and
principles.
Recently, Chavez's influence seems to have peaked. But we
must remain vigilant, for he is likely to support like-minded
political allies and movements in neighboring countries that
seek to undermine moderate governments. He continues to oppose
nearly every U.S. policy initiative in the region, including
the expansion of free trade, counterdrugs, and counterterrorism
cooperation in the regional security initiatives.
Venezuela continues to extend a lifeline to Colombian
narcotrafficking organizations by providing significant support
and safe haven along the border, and it remains one of the most
preferred trafficking routes for the transit of cocaine out of
South America. U.S. sanctions have successfully targeted and
applied financial measures against narcotic traffickers and
their organizations in Venezuela, helping to ensure regional
security. Venezuela has proven that it cannot be trusted and
the United States should take the necessary measures to stifle
its powers and ensure regional security, but we must do so in a
tactful manner, as not to further empower Chavez. The national
security threats posed by Venezuela are complex. We must
implement the appropriate measures to protect the people of
Venezuela and promote U.S. interests.
I would like to, again, thank our witnesses and look
forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
We will now recognize the chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, the gentleman
from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank my two
fellow chairmen for putting together this important hearing. I
know Chairman Mack and the Western Hemisphere staff have been
trying to hold this hearing for some time and have met with
considerable resistance from the administration, and I commend
my colleague for his persistence.
As chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee,
I and the other folks on the committee frequently confront the
threats posed by Iran and global terrorist networks more
globally, especially, of course, in the Middle East. The
possibility, however, of an Iranian-Venezuelan alliance is
particularly concerning.
When not oppressing its own people, the tyrannical regime
in Tehran devotes a great deal of its energy to threatening
American national security, as well as the security of our
allies in the region. The threat posed by Iran takes on a new
and more ominous geostrategic significance when coupled with
the potential of an Iran base of operations in our own
hemisphere. This prospect harkens back to the days of the cold
war, when all of a sudden we were no longer separated from our
enemies by oceans, but faced threats in our own backyards.
Although the nature of the threat may have changed, such a
situation is just as unacceptable today as it was decades ago.
I hope that the witnesses today can shed light on the nature of
this threat. More importantly, however, I hope they can outline
a clear and cogent policy to address it.
One of the most fundamental roles of government is to
provide for the security of its citizens. We are having enough
trouble combating Iranian meddling and dismantling terrorist
safe havens on the other side of the globe. The last thing we
need is for threats from bad actors even closer to the American
homeland.
Again, I want to thank my fellow chairmen and also the
ranking members for holding this hearing today, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
panelists for being here today. I listened with great interest
to my friend from Florida berate you for not being here
previously. I serve on both the Oversight Government Reform
Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, and I must say I
have not particularly been struck with the reluctance of the
administration to acquiesce to hearing appearance requests, but
perhaps in the subcommittee there was a problem I don't know.
In any event, we are glad you are here.
Each sovereign nation has the right to develop alliances
beneficial to its national interests, but not at the expense of
its neighbors. That is the point we have reached with
Venezuela's relationship with Iran. As a result, the Obama
administration, for example, recently sanctioned Venezuela's
state-owned oil company, PDVSA, for its business with Iran,
several illegal activities in Latin America connected to the
government of Iran. Example, Iran-backed Hezbollah has actually
undertaken illicit activities in the tri-border area of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.
The terrorist group has profited from film piracy and drug
trafficking in that area. The group is also suspected in two
bombings in Buenos Aires that killed a total of 115 people, the
1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy, and the 1994 bombing of
the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association. Eight of the nine
original arrest warrants issued for that bombing were for
Iranian government officials.
Though Iran and Venezuela have been linked since the
founding of OPEC in 1960, the two countries recently
strengthened that relationship. It is especially troubling
because of potentially harmful activity undertaken under the
guise of diplomatic relationships. One example is the absence
of customs enforcement, for example. On weekly flights from
Caracas to Tehran via the Venezuelan airline Conviasa, it is
unclear who or what is being transported, but reports indicated
that the flights do carry weapons for terrorists.
These developments are troubling enough. They are further
complicated by Iran's audacity in the nuclear area,
specifically its missile tests and air swell secret enrichment
facilities in Kohm. The nuclear issue is pressing and does not
exist in a vacuum. In 2009, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
expressed his support for Iran's nuclear energy development and
there have been mixed reports signaling a possible Iranian
assistance to Venezuela in its search for uranium deposits.
The Iran-Venezuela relationship is even more troubling
because Venezuela serves as a diplomatic conduit for Iran,
playing an important part in cultivating a relationship between
Iran and the Latin American countries of Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Nicaragua. Venezuela's involvement with Iran is a cause for
concern and illegal activities in both hemispheres that have
been directly linked to the Iranian government, and I welcome
today's hearing to explore that further and to look at U.S.
diplomatic options with regard to this troubling and growing
relationship.
With that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
We will now recognize the gentlewoman from Ohio, Mrs.
Schmidt.
Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
very important hearing. I don't think it should be any surprise
to anyone that there is a special link between Venezuela and
Iran, and perhaps it should be no surprise that Hugo Chavez is
aggressively working to strengthen his countries ties with
Iran.
If you look at just what has occurred in the last 7 years,
I think the facts speak for themselves. In 2006, Venezuela
integrated itself with Iran by aligning with Cuba and Syria as
the only countries to vote against the U.N. Atomic Energy
Agency resolution reporting Iran to the Security Council for
its failures to comply with U.N. sanctions to terminate its
nuclear program.
In April 2008, Iran and Venezuela signed a pact of mutual
military support. In April 2009, the two countries inked an
agreement that would create a development bank whereby each
country would invest $100 million for bilateral economic
development projects. In October 2010, the two countries signed
11 mutual cooperation agreements on such issues as trade,
energy, shipping, finance, and public housing.
According to an article published in the German newspaper
Die Welt, in November 2010 one of the agreements signed between
Iran and Venezuela in October 2010 would establish a military
base on Venezuelan soil to be jointly operated by both
countries on which medium-ranged missiles would be placed. On
May 13, 2011, Die Welt further reported that Chavez met with
the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's Air Force in
February 2011 to discuss the final details of the construction
of the missile base, which now is being built only 75 miles
from the Venezuelan-Colombian border.
It is also believed that Iran is pursuing the exploration
of uranium in Venezuela, an obvious ingredient necessary for
Iran's continued development of nuclear weapons.
Last year, RIA Novosti, the Russian international news
agency, reported that Russia, which signed a deal with Iran in
2007 to sell its five battalions of sophisticated air defense
systems, would abrogate the agreement due to the new U.N.
sanctions that now had been imposed against Iran. It is
believed that Russia may now sell the air defense systems to
Venezuela--how convenient--who in turn could sell them to Iran.
Just recently, on May 24, 2011, the United States imposed
sanctions on Venezuela's state-owned oil company, the PDVSA,
for assisting Iran in its production of gasoline and petroleum
production. Specifically, the PDVSA was sanctioned for selling
$50 million worth of petroleum products to Iran between
December 2010 and March 2011, in violation of the 1996
Sanctions Act. According to the State Department's Web site,
the sanctions we have imposed on PDVSA prohibit the company
from competing for U.S. Government procurement contracts, from
securing finance from Export-Import Bank of the United States,
and from obtaining U.S. import licenses.
Mr. Chairman, I applaud the Department of State for its
decision to impose these sanctions. Unfortunately, it is not
enough. We need to do more. Every Venezuelan company doing
business with Iran should be investigated and a determination
should be made as to whether it is in violation of the 1996
Sanctions Act. In those instances where Venezuelan companies
are in violation of the act, sanctions should be imposed
immediately.
We need to show Chavez that we are serious and that there
will be penalties to pay for assisting and accommodating the
terrorist Iranian regime of Mohammed Ahmadinejad.
Thank you and I yield back my time.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
We will now recognize the gentleman from American Samoa,
Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to
commend both you gentlemen for calling this joint committee
hearing this morning.
I have listened with interest in terms of this issue of
providing sanctions to those countries that violate our laws,
as well as international laws. I think we have gotten to the
point that we have become sanctionitis. Just about everything
we do we put sanctions, we put sanctions, and I have my own
serious questions about the consistency of how we apply our
foreign policies when we apply sanctions against countries.
I am not suggesting that we don't put sanctions on
Venezuela, but there seems to be a whole bunch of
contradictions here. We put sanctions and yet I believe
Venezuela is one of our biggest suppliers of oil coming to our
country, and I am very curious from our witnesses if you can
give us more information on the subsidiary of Citgo, I believe,
that currently is one of the biggest distributors of oil in our
country. It seems to me that every time we put sanctions, but
as long as there are holes in between, allowing these countries
to obtain whatever their needs are, the sanctions become
somewhat useless.
But I am very, very curious and want to hear from our
witnesses this morning in terms of how our whole fabric of
applying sanctions have really been effective or have they just
been another sanction and another thing.
A classic contradiction, as you know, Mr. Chairman, as I
indicated, when sometime goes wrong, we put sanctions against
Thailand, against Fiji, all these, and yet, at the same time,
we waive sanctions when Musharraf, by a military coup, took
over Pakistan for some 10 years, despite the promises that he
made that we were supposed to have a democracy in that country,
and that never happened.
But I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses in
terms of where exactly Venezuela comes in as far as the whole
host of sanctions that we put against this country.
I will say, interestingly enough, the close ties of
Venezuela and Iran has because of the nuclear issue, I believe
that what happened in Japan recently has caused Mr. Chavez to
have second thoughts about establishing a nuclear relationship
with Iran. But I do look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Do any other Members wish to make an opening statement?
[No response.]
Mr. Chaffetz. Members may have 7 days to submit opening
statements for the record.
We will now recognize our panel. The Honorable Daniel
Benjamin is the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State
Department; Mr. Thomas Delare is the Director for Terrorism
Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy at the State Department;
Mr. Kevin Whitaker is the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Western Hemisphere Affairs at the State Department; and Mr.
Adam Szubin is the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control at the Treasury Department.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in
before they testify. Please rise and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Chaffetz. Let the record reflect that all witnesses
answered in the affirmative. Thank you. You may be seated.
In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your
testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written statement will be
made as part of the record.
We will now go ahead and recognize Mr. Benjamin.
STATEMENTS OF DANIEL BENJAMIN, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, COORDINATOR
FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; KEVIN WHITAKER,
ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; THOMAS DELARE, DIRECTOR FOR
TERRORISM FINANCE AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS POLICY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND ADAM J. SZUBIN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
STATEMENT OF DANIEL BENJAMIN
Mr. Benjamin. Thank you very much, sir. Distinguished
members of the committees, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss Venezuela's sanctionable
activities. I am pleased to be here today with my Treasury
colleague, Adam Szubin, and State Department colleagues Tom
Delare and Kevin Whitaker.
Mr. Chairman, let me be clear from the outset. With respect
to global efforts to counterterrorism, developments in
Venezuela over the last decade have been deeply troubling.
Instead of meeting his international obligations since coming
to power in 1999, Hugo Chavez has chosen to develop close
relations with Iran and Syria, both state sponsors of
terrorism. Senior members of his government are directly
implicated in providing support to U.S. designated foreign
terrorist organizations, particularly the FARC and the ELN.
The administration has significant concerns about
connections between members of the Venezuelan government and
ETA as well. All of these issues have been reported on in the
press, and as we have reported in the past, Hezbollah has a
presence in Venezuela, and the Department of Treasury has done
much to reveal these connections.
I do, however, want to emphasize that the information
available to us indicates that Hezbollah activity in Venezuela
is limited to fundraising. We remain alert to indications of
other activities, particularly operational activity, but to
date there is no information to support any such connection.
Venezuela must fulfill its obligations under U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540, which forms part of the
legal basis of international counterterrorism efforts. These
resolutions, adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
require all states, including Venezuela, to take a series of
measures to combat terrorism and prevent weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery from getting into the
hands of terrorists. It is our view that Venezuela has not done
enough in this regard.
The Obama administration is pursuing a policy to press
Venezuela to change its behavior. Our approach is about
effectiveness. We are ratcheting up the pressure in a way that
our analysis suggests will be most effective. We are increasing
the cost on the Chavez government for its actions, including by
publicly exposing our conclusions about that government's
activities. We are carefully avoiding falling into the trap of
providing Chavez with an opening to increase his demagoguery
and exploit nationalist sentiment by falsely attempting to turn
this into a bilateral issue with the United States rather than
what it is, Venezuela's failure to live up to its international
obligations with respect to counterterrorism. We believe this
approach, combined with regional efforts to moderate
Venezuela's behavior, is slowly but surely bringing positive
change.
Imaginative and effective Colombian diplomacy has taken
advantage of this environment. Since President Santos took
office a year ago, we have seen a marginal but significant
improvement by Venezuela. Venezuela has arrested and deported
to Colombia seven senior members of the FARC and ELN, including
members of the FARC headquarters section and the FARC's key
European fundraiser. Most recently, Venezuela arrested a member
of the FARC, General of Command Jose Conrado, based on a
Colombian arrest warrant.
The Venezuelan and Colombian ministers of defense have
developed a channeled communication to discuss border security.
Chavez has also publicly moved away from the FARC by calling
for that organization to join a political reconciliation
process and by disavowing as unauthorized any discussions
between Venezuelan government officials and the FARC about
establishing bases in Venezuela.
Our actions have been targeted, well justified, and well
understood in Venezuela. For the last 5 years, pursuant to
Section 40(a) of the Arms Export and Control Act, Venezuela has
been listed as a not fully cooperating with the United States'
antiterrorist and efforts country. Because of its inadequate
response to our counterterrorism efforts, the effect of this
listing is a prohibition against the sale or licensing for
exports to Venezuela, defense articles, or services. This
sanction is a useful tool in itself and for signaling that we
are not satisfied with Venezuela's counterterrorism
cooperation, and it is used when a state may not meet the high
threshold for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
We have also employed an array of targeted sanctions
against elements of Chavez's government. My colleagues from the
Department of the Treasury and our Economic and Energy Affairs
Bureau will explain the work we have done to target elements of
the Venezuelan government via the Drug Kingpin Act, via
Executive Order 13224, and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions
Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010.
Much more work remains to be done and we will continue to
closely monitor Venezuela's actions. We you know, secretaries
of state have used the state sponsor of terrorism action
sparingly since its creation in 1979. In fact, it has been more
than 18 years since this power has been invoked. But this does
not mean that we are unwilling to use this authority. All
options are on the table, including designating Venezuela as a
state sponsor if the circumstances warrant.
We look forward to working with Congress and with our
partners in the region to further encourage Venezuela to behave
as a responsible international actor. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Benjamin follows:]
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Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. It is my understanding that given
that there are three witnesses from the State Department, that
there was going to be just one single statement, or are we
doing individual statements as well? Did I have that right,
there is just the one statement?
Mr. Benjamin. No, my colleagues also have brief statements.
Mr. Chaffetz. Oh, yes.
Mr. Delare.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS DELARE
Mr. Delare. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear here today with my colleagues.
In the Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs at
the State Department, we have responsibility for the
implementation of sanctions targeting Iran's energy sector.
Naturally, we also have very serious concerns about Venezuela's
relationship with Iran in this area.
Venezuela is Iran's closest political ally in the western
hemisphere, as we have heard this morning. President Chavez
continues to define Iran as a strategic ally. The highly
publicized bond between Mr. Ahmadinejad and Chavez has led to
declarations about broad economic, military, and political
cooperation, although the extent of actual cooperation is not
clear.
Under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act
[CISADA], the State Department is the agency primarily
responsible for implementing the provisions which relate to the
energy, shipping, transportation sectors, and sensitive
telecommunications technology non-proliferation and human
rights issues. The Department of Treasury has primary
responsibility for implementing the financial sanctions
contained in CISADA. I know my colleague, Adam Szubin, will
discuss Treasury's role in detail. Let me just add that not
only at State do we work extensively and collaboratively with
Treasury; we do the same with many other agencies in the
Government.
On May 24th the Secretary of State imposed sanctions on
Petroleos di Venezuela [PDVSA], along with six other companies
for their activities in support of Iran's energy sector. We
sanctioned PDVSA because on at least two occasions the company
provided cargoes of reformate, an additive used in gasoline, to
the National Iranian Oil Co. These shipments were valued at
over $50 million, well above sanctionable thresholds
established in ISA.
Under the Iran Sanctions Act [ISA], the Secretary has the
authority to calibrate sanctions on a case-by-case basis,
something that many of you have alluded to this morning.
Sanctions can range from prohibitions on certain types of U.S.
Government assistance to a complete blocking of all property
transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
In the case of PDVSA, the Secretary chose three sanctions
that limit PDVSA's activities in the United States, but do not
impact their subsidiaries or the export of crude oil from
Venezuela. It is important to note that this calibrated
approach was chosen because it is our goal to persuade PDVSA to
make the right choice and stop shipments of refined petroleum
to Iran. If PDVSA does not stop, and we have seen no evidence
of any further actions since the imposition of these sanctions,
we have made it very clear in our conversations with them that
we reserve the right to impose additional and more severe
sanctions.
In the case of PDVSA, we do not know what the ultimate
result of these important actions will be. We are confident,
however, that we have their attention based on comments from
PDVSA and Venezuelan government officials.
The Department of State has a very good record of
convincing companies to stop supporting Iran's energy sector.
Last fall we secured the formal withdrawal from Iran of five
large multinational energy companies: Royal Dutch Shell, ME,
Impacts, Statoil, and Total. They have all removed themselves
from projects in Iran. These firms have since been joined by
scores of other companies, both in the energy sector and in
other sectors, who have simply recognized that the risks of
doing business with Iran are just too high.
We will continue our dialog with Venezuela about this
subject and we will continue a very vigorous outreach process
that we have engaged in to talk to the business community
worldwide about the risks of doing business with Iran.
I should note that also on May 23rd the State Department
imposed sanctions pursuant to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act [INKSNA]. This was against the Venezuelan
Military Industries Co. [CAVIM]. INKSNA provides for penalties
on entities that engage in the transfer to or acquisition from
Iran, Syria, or North Korea of equipment or technology
controlled by one of the four multilateral regimes, that is,
the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Vasinar Convention. These
agreements regulate the export of advanced conventional
weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and cruise and ballistic
missile technologies.
Let me conclude by stressing that we pay constant attention
to the activities of Venezuela with regard to Iran. We work
with all the relevant agencies of the U.S. Government to
utilize the tools that the Congress has given us, and I can
assure you we will react to concrete examples of sanctionable
behavior as we see them.
So at the conclusion of statements I would be happy to
address any questions you might have. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
I want to go back to this point, though, for a moment here.
The three representatives from the State Department issued one
statement. Congress asked that you submit these statements 48
hours in advance. You couldn't do that. And now you each have
three statements. We are going to hear from you. We want to
hear from you; that is why you are here. Why couldn't you
submit your statements in accordance with our rules? What was
the hindrance?
Mr. Benjamin. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for the lateness of
the submission. As you can see from those who are present here,
this is an issue that takes very intricate and complex
coordination both within the Department and across agencies.
There was a great deal of work that needed to be done in
preparation for this hearing; we wanted to have the best
information available. We will certainly do our best to make
sure that we meet your deadlines in the future.
Mr. Chaffetz. I would appreciate that. It is unacceptable
to do this. You obviously prepared some opening remarks, yet
you failed to submit them to this body, and we find that
unacceptable.
Mr. Whitaker, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN WHITAKER
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you. Chairman, ranking members,
distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear
here today. Let me make just two points.
First, the Department shares your concerns about
Venezuela's relationship with Iran, its support for the FARC,
its failure to cooperate on counterterrorism, and its
demonstrable failure to meet its international counternarcotics
obligations. We have taken a series of steps over time, using
tools provided by Congress, to address these failures. We are
constantly reviewing all the information pertaining to these
matters to determine if the substantial targeted and
interactive steps we have taken are appropriate and sufficient
in light of the information available to us. Taken
collectively, these steps demonstrate our commitment to act
responsibly and consistently with legislation and policy to
confront specific activities by Venezuela and Venezuelan
persons.
Second, let me draw your attention to Colombia's superb
diplomacy with Venezuela. The resulting rapprochement between
these two nations has resulted in useful and, in context,
unusually productive and effective counterterrorism
cooperation. Bilateral cooperation on terrorism and security
matters is increasing and being systematized, yielding notable
results, including the deportation to Colombia of seven senior
members of the FARC and the ELN. While we still have serious
concerns about Venezuela's overall cooperation on
counterterrorism matters, these are steps in the right
direction and demonstrate that counterterrorism efforts work
best when nations collaborate.
What we seek from Venezuela is its collaboration in
confronting narcotics trafficking and terrorism. In the absence
of such cooperation, and when possessing evidence that
Venezuela or Venezuelan entities are not meeting their
international obligations or failing to comply with applicable
U.S. laws, we have demonstrated our willingness to act. The
Department has strongly urged Venezuela's leaders to pursue a
path of cooperation and responsibility, rather than further
isolation, and will continue to do so.
We continue to monitor Venezuela, as well as other
countries, for activities that indicate a pattern of support
for acts of international terrorism. No option is ever off the
table and the Department will continue to assess what
additional actions may be warranted in the future.
I am happy to be here and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
We will now recognize Mr. Szubin for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ADAM J. SZUBIN
Mr. Szubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz,
Chairman Mack, Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Tierney,
Congressman Sires, and distinguished Members, thank you very
much for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
Venezuela's sanctionable activities. I am pleased to be
testifying alongside my colleagues from the State Department.
We at Treasury have been intently focused on dangerous
activities stemming from Venezuela over the last few years.
During this period, we have uncovered and acted against a range
of illicit actors operating out of Venezuela, including
terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and those who have
facilitated Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
Our concern regarding the activities of terrorist groups in
Venezuela is longstanding, particularly Venezuelan links to the
Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah. As but one example, I would draw
the committees' attention to an action we took in 2008
targeting a Hezbollah facilitator and Venezuelan diplomat,
Ghazi Nasr al Din. Nasr al Din was a Venezuelan diplomat who
served as their Charge d'Affaires in Damascus, Syria, and
utilized his position in the Venezuelan government, and is the
president of a Caracas-based Islamic center, to provide
financial support to Hezbollah. Among his activities were
providing Hezbollah donors with specific information on how to
route their contributions such that they would go directly to
Hezbollah. Nasr al Din met with senior Hezbollah officials in
Lebanon to discuss operational issues and facilitated the
travel of Hezbollah members to and from Venezuela.
At the same time as we took action against Nasr al Din, we
also exposed and sanctioned another Venezuelan-based Hezbollah
supporter, Fawzi Kan'an, and two travel agencies that he
operated out of Caracas.
Of course, Venezuela has also been deepening its economic
and diplomatic ties with Iran, as the committees' members have
noted. The growing ties between Venezuela and Iran are very
worrying, especially as they stand in such stark contrast to
the global trend in which the world is moving to isolate Iran
because of its pursuit of nuclear weapon and other
destabilizing activities.
In 2008, the Iranian government established the
International Development Bank of Caracas, or Banco
Internacional de Desarrollo, in Venezuela. Shortly after its
opening, we moved to sanction this bank under our
counterproliferation authorities due to the bank's relationship
with the Export Development Bank of Iran. We will act firmly
and quickly to deny a purchase to any attempted successor.
We have also named under our sanctions authorities the
Iranian oil company Petropars and targeted its operations in
Venezuela in particular.
Finally, we have been extremely active in the field of
combating narcotics trafficking and have sanctioned thousands
of entities across Latin America, including in Venezuela. Among
those we have sanctioned, high level Venezuelan officials who
were involved with the FARC, including the head of Venezuela's
military intelligence agency, their chief of state security,
and their former interior minister.
The threats posed by Iran, terrorism, and narcotics
trafficking are complex and we work closely with our
interagency colleagues to bring all of our tools to bear
against these threats in Venezuela as elsewhere, and our work
can and must continue.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Szubin follows:]
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Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Appreciate that.
I am now going to recognize the chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Mr. Mack from
Florida, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for your testimony here today. I
don't think we need to continue to harp on this, but we look
forward to more open dialog and cooperation from all of you.
So it sounds to me that we are in agreement that Chavez is
sponsoring terrorism, whether through narcotrafficking, through
his cooperation with Iran, through support of Hezbollah and the
FARC and other terrorist organizations. So it sounds to me that
there is agreement. I think where the problem lies is what do
we do about it.
So I first want to make this point, and I will say it
again. We are happy that there were sanctions placed on Chavez.
What we are not happy about is that the three sanctions that
were placed on PDVSA, the denial of export-import bank loans,
credits, denial of licenses for the U.S. export of military and
militarily useful technology, and prohibits on U.S.
Government's procurement from entities, these are things that
are already not happening. So we can also agree that these are
toothless, is that right?
Mr. Delare. Chairman Mack, I would respectfully disagree
with that final evaluation. I wouldn't say they are toothless,
because what we have done is warned the international business
community that there is a danger of dealing with PDVSA.
Mr. Mack. Okay, so the designation of being sanctioned is
important, but the actual sanctions that took place don't have
any teeth, because these are things that we are currently not
doing with Venezuela.
Mr. Delare. Chairman Mack, the fact is Congress has given
us a calibrated set of tools to use in instances like this,
basically implying that we have to make a very complicated
calculation as to U.S. interest in each one of these instances.
Now, we had to judge whether the sanctions would induce PDVSA
to stop its behavior. So far we have----
Mr. Mack. I understand that. I am sorry. So the fact that
you made the sanctions is important here. What you sanctioned
isn't important because these things are currently not being
done with Venezuela in the first place. So that is my take, and
I think that is most everybody else's take. There are other
tools that are available.
Mr. Delare. Yes, we do.
Mr. Mack. Restriction of imports, also prohibiting the
sanctioned entity from acquiring, holding and trading any U.S.-
based property. So there are other sanctions that we can use.
First of all, let me ask you this. Who owns PDVSA?
Mr. Delare. It is 100 percent owned by the Venezuelan
government, sir.
Mr. Mack. So there is no mistake, then, that the actions of
PDVSA isn't by some company, it is by the government of
Venezuela.
Mr. Delare. I think we can assume there is an intimate
relationship there.
Mr. Mack. I would assume that Chavez has full control over
PDVSA.
Mr. Delare. But, sir, we also make a calculation as to U.S.
interest. And if 10 percent of US. Oil imports are coming from
Venezuela, with three U.S. refineries dependent on Citgo, 6,000
gas stations, 3,000 other employees, we have to weigh those
factors as well, especially, during the period of spiking oil
prices.
Mr. Mack. Sir, then I would suggest that the State
Department sign off on the Keystone XL pipeline, which will
then be able to take over for any oil that we are getting from
Venezuela. It seems to me that if you or the State Department,
if you are going to continue to say we have a strategic
interest in their oil and we have the ability to get oil from
somewhere else, then we ought to get it somewhere else.
Wouldn't you agree?
Mr. Delare. I would say generally that is a fair point of
view.
Mr. Mack. So we can expect the State Department to sign off
on the Keystone XL pipeline?
Mr. Delare. I can only promise to take your views back,
sir.
Mr. Mack. I think they know my views.
So, again, the definition countries determined by the
Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts
of terrorism, that is the State Department's definition of a
state sponsor of terror, correct?
Mr. Benjamin. That is the basis for the designation, yes.
Mr. Mack. But that is the definition, that is what is
posted on the Web site, that is what the State Department says.
So how can you not designate Chavez as a state sponsor of
terror when we know about the narcotrafficking, the support of
Hezbollah? Even if it is just fundraising. By the way, I
thought that was kind of interesting, I don't remember who said
it, that it's only in fundraising. But fundraising is the
mechanism that allows Hezbollah to work. So we know drugs,
terrorist organizations, support of Iran, all three of these
things would be determined by the Secretary of State to
repeatedly provide support for terrorist organizations.
Mr. Benjamin. Well, the statute, sir, allows the Secretary
discretion to decide when repeatedly is sufficient enough to
merit the imposition of this designation. And as I said in my
oral statement, sir, our approach is very much predicated on
effectiveness and what it is that is going to get Venezuela to
stop behavior that we believe is unacceptable. That is why we
have instituted a calibrated iterative process in which we are
escalating pressure, as appropriate, without having follow-on
or side effects that we believe would harm our own national
security and harm the interests of those who we cooperate with
very closely, including to contain Venezuela's behavior.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Given the number of Members on this panel, I would ask Members
to keep within the 5-minutes, but we will allow our witnesses
to answer past that moment.
We will now recognize the ranking member of the committee,
Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Obviously, when you talk about the sanctions, Congress
passed a bill that allowed the Secretary some discretion into
how she applied those sanctions, am I right, Ambassador?
Mr. Benjamin. Absolutely correct.
Mr. Tierney. So the task for the Secretary at that point in
time is to calibrate, as you say, or to make a determination as
to which sanctions to implement at any given time and try to
get the response she wants from that, while at the same time
taking into other considerations of what may happen to impact
our allies or our own interests, is that right?
Mr. Benjamin. Correct.
Mr. Tierney. So I don't want to get into negotiating here
in public with Venezuela or anything of that nature, so can I
ask you to give us a broad range of all of the competing
interests that we have there? When the balancing is going on,
give us a range of what types of things we are balancing, the
cooperation with Colombia in terms of drugs and borders, other
things like that. Just give us some idea of all the different
interests.
Mr. Benjamin. Well, I will defer in a moment to my
colleagues from the Regional Bureau from Western Hemisphere
Affairs, but certainly the diplomacy with Colombia is very
important. Colombia would be very, very sharply affected by
such a designation. Since Colombia is at this time making
significant progress in dealing with Venezuela and in
curtailing those activities that we find objectionable, it
would seem to be counterproductive to do that at this time.
Additionally, there are such second and third order effects
as catching the business dealings of lots of closely allied
countries up in the state sponsorship net, if you will, that if
other countries that were doing business with Venezuela
suddenly found themselves to be in danger of being sanctioned,
that would be problematic. I believe Mr. Delare has spoken to
the issue of our energy concerns in this regard. So there is a
whole array of different interests that need to be taken into
effect, and I think Mr. Whitaker may have more to add on that.
Mr. Whitaker. If I could just add on a couple of points
here. U.S. policy in Venezuela is a number of folks want
democratic development, supporting U.S. persons, U.S. national
security, and then counternarcotics and counterterrorism. All
of those are very important to us. We would need to weigh, it
seems to me, the effect of any sanction we take on issues like
that. Ambassador Benjamin mentioned the effect it would have of
a sanction against Venezuela when Venezuela views Colombia as a
close ally of the United States. How would Venezuela then react
with respect to its diplomatic efforts in Colombia? That is
unknown to me, but it is out there.
Venezuela consistently tries to define the democratic
opposition in Venezuela as tools of the United States. Again,
that might be an avenue or a place where the Venezuelan
government would seek to identify that group and take some
action in response to an action that we took.
Finally, we have many U.S. companies in Venezuela and it is
our goal as the Department of State to understand their
interests, defend their interests, and we would need to take
into account, as well, any impact in that regard with respect
to those companies that continue to do business in Venezuela.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. If the Secretary has just decided
to throw the book at Venezuela and just take the more extreme
sanctions on that, what would the anticipated, current
anticipated response of the Venezuelan government be?
Mr. Whitaker. It is hard to say. I have worked on Venezuela
since 2005 and Hugo Chavez can be unpredictable. But one of the
threads of his policy since taking office in 1999 is
consistently to try to turn whatever problem or issue that
arises into one of him versus the United States, whether that
is accurate or not. I think that he would do this, he would
seek to turn this into a matter of a U.S. attack on his
government and seek to use it for internal political purposes.
How that would manifest itself, whether in diplomatic policy or
with respect to democratic opposition in Venezuela or with
respect to U.S. companies, is difficult to predict.
Mr. Tierney. So in striking this balance so far, and I
assume that you recalibrate frequently on this, look on that
basis, how would you rate the performance so far? Are you
getting the results you want? Are you considering further
sanctions? Are you thinking that things are moving along the
way you want them to or are you just thinking that we have to
do something else, you are just not sure what yet?
Mr. Benjamin. I would say that it is early to issue the
report card given the recent activities, the recent sanctions
that have been imposed. We are, I would say, somewhat
optimistic because of the actions that Chavez has taken in
terms of extraditing FARC operatives from Venezuela to
Colombia, encouraged by his apparent solicitousness of
Colombian demands, and encouraged as well by the fact that
there haven't been--and I will let Mr. Delare clarify this, if
he wants--that there haven't been further shipments of the
kinds of petroleum additives, gasoline additives of the kind
that were recently sanctioned. So at the moment we are
cautiously optimistic.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
We now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Chabot. I thank the chairman. Just a couple of
questions, maybe an observation first.
Obviously, in our capacity as Middle East and South Asia,
that is where we devote most of our energy and time, I happened
to be in the region there recently and Saudi Arabia is
obviously very concerned at this time about Iran exploiting the
so-called Arab Spring, or whatever terminology one prefers, and
they seem themselves as being encircled, whether it is Yemen,
Egypt has closer relations with Iran than it did before,
Bahrain, and we saw the Saudi reaction there.
But certainly Iran is flexing its muscle and I really do
welcome and commend my fellow chairs for talking publicly about
this, Venezuela in connection with Iran, because it is of great
concern; it shows that this Iranian threat is really global in
nature. And, obviously, Saudi Arabia, you know, a lot of oil
there, but the most known resources in the world at this time,
Iran is second or third depending on the study that you see.
But the point I would like to get to at this point is oil
is a commodity obviously on the world markets, and what we pay
here in the United States is affected by that supply, so our
interest here, whereas we do import Iranian oil and it affects
the price here, depending on how much we get from there and
elsewhere, I think many of us believe that we made really a
terrible mistake becoming so dependent upon foreign oil in many
ways, and some of that is by restricting access to our own
resources, whether it is Anwar or the Outer Continental Shelf
or a whole range of other things here.
But relative to Venezuela, and I would invite this from
anyone, are we putting ourselves in a much more vulnerable
position when essentially we are reliant upon this Venezuelan
oil; the money goes down there and they are clearly one of the
bad actors in this hemisphere right now, and what they are
doing is against our best interest? So this continuing to be so
dependent upon foreign sources of energy, our policies in that
area have been counterproductive here. Would you agree with
that, Mr. Delare? I would ask you if you would like to take
that.
Mr. Delare. Well, I think there is little to argue about in
your statement there, sir, because it is a fact that our
sanctions policies are often directed at those countries who
are oil producers and, of course, we are dependent on that
external source of energy. I think we all wish it were true
that we had many alternate sources of energy to depend on, but
at this historical point in time we have to move very carefully
as to how we apply some of the tools that have been provided to
us so we can maintain the flow of energy to our market, while
still demonstrating a strong political message that certain
kinds of behaviors are unacceptable.
Mr. Chabot. And I think it is clear that Venezuela, and
Chavez in particular, has been using American money,
essentially, either to bribe or influence other nations in this
hemisphere, and the actions that they are encouraging them to
take are oftentimes diametrically opposed to what is in the
U.S.' best interest. I think we basically have in Venezuela now
what we had in Cuba over the last number of decades, the
difference being, of course, Cuba didn't really have a
resource; they were dependent upon the former Soviet Union.
Venezuela has oil, so it is perhaps even more dangerous than
Cuba was over these last decades.
I would, at this time, I didn't give them a lot of time
there, it wasn't much of a question, but I would like to yield
to the gentleman for any time I have remaining.
Mr. Mack. Thank you. And to that point I believe that we
are sending basically $117 million a day to Venezuela through
PDVSA, so we are funding someone who we have sanctioned. We are
funding this activity that supports terrorist organization
through this funding. And once again I think the State
Department needs to look at alternative ways, instead of
continuing to buy oil from Chavez, we need to find alternative
ways to get that oil.
Mr. Chaffetz. The gentleman's time has expired.
I would like to let Members know we have one vote on the
floor. It is the intention of the Chair to recognize Mr. Sires
for 5 minutes for his questioning, then stand in recess until
10:30, then we will resume the remainder of the hearing. So,
with that, we will recognize Mr. Sires for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to get back to this question of Iran and the flights
into Venezuela and the activity in Venezuela. I had dinner with
a group of people and they tell me that the amount of people in
the Iranian embassy in Venezuela is one of the largest in the
world. I talk to other people; they tell me that that is not
true.
In your best estimation, what is the embassy in Venezuela
from Iran, the personnel, how many people do they have there?
How active are they? How many flights a week do they have? Does
it conform with the--I don't want to say conform, but the
amount of flights that you have into Venezuela, would eight
people be enough? Can anybody respond to that?
Mr. Whitaker. I can try, Congressman. There was, some
months ago, a direct flight initiated between Tehran, Damascus,
and Caracas. Our information is that as of September 2010 that
flight, the Tehran link was dropped and it is now a Caracas-
Madrid-Damascus flight and return. There are continuing rumors,
as I think you mentioned in your opening statement, that the
individuals who arrive in Venezuela are not subject to customs
and immigration controls. We have heard those stories too. We
don't have a way of verifying them.
Since 2006 we have attempted to conduct, DHS has attempted
to conduct the statutorily required inspections of the airports
in Venezuela because they are endpoints for flights to the
United States. Because Venezuela refused to permit those
inspections, safety inspections, security inspections, in
September 2008, DHS issued a public notice on this point
informing passengers of our inability to do the inspections.
In an example of I am not going to call it progress, but
there has been a change and TSA was able to make a visit to
Venezuela last week. They spoke to Venezuelan security
officials. This is not the end of a process, but for the first
time since 2006 we actually had a meeting on this topic.
Now, in terms of the size of the Iranian embassy in
Venezuela, according to the diplomat list, there are 14
diplomats there. There are many embassies in Venezuela,
including our own, that are far larger than that. I was DCM in
Venezuela. I didn't consider it to be a particularly active
embassy in terms of diplomatic activities; showing the face,
public diplomacy, etc. What we can't judge, of course, is how
active they were within the Venezuela government.
But there is additional information on this and, if
appropriate----
Mr. Sires. So how many flights do you have a week now?
Mr. Whitaker. It is a weekly flight.
Mr. Sires. Just one.
Mr. Whitaker. And it doesn't go to Tehran.
Mr. Sires. So all these things, all these rumors that there
were two or three flights a week, all these crates that are
coming in and out, you can't confirm any of that.
Mr. Whitaker. There previously was a weekly flight; there
is no more.
Mr. Sires. Currently, Chavez is in Cuba. Do you have any
information on that? I mean, supposedly he got an operation in
Cuba.
Mr. Whitaker. What we know, what we can talk about here is
in early May he had what he defined as a knee operation. In
June he came out publicly and said that he had a pelvic abscess
drained. He has not appeared in public for some weeks now. He
has----
Mr. Sires. He is convalescing with Castro, maybe.
Mr. Whitaker. There was a picture of the two of them
together, and Castro looked better than Chavez in the picture.
Mr. Sires. Unfortunately.
Mr. Whitaker. And he has not tweeted in his Twitter account
for some weeks, which sounds jocular, but in fact he is a very
active tweeter, and it is interesting that he has gone off
line.
Mr. Sires. I don't know if that is a good idea.
Are we helping the opposition? I know the opposition is
growing in Venezuela. Are we assisting the democracy process in
Venezuela?
Mr. Whitaker. Sure. Thank you for the question. Since 2002,
the United States, through USAID, has provided support to
encourage the development of civil society and democratic
practices in Venezuela. Much of what we have done in recent
years has focused on get out the vote, defend the vote, protect
the vote, and these kinds of activities to ensure that the
maximum number of people can vote in free and fair conditions.
I think it is important to note that we do this in an
ecumenical way; it is not designed to approach any particular
political end, but to support democracy as democracy.
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. The gentleman's time has expired.
We have roughly 8 and a half minutes left in the vote. This
committee will stand in recess until, let's call it, 10:35 now,
and then we will resume the remainder of the hearing.
[Recess.]
Mr. Chaffetz. The subcommittee will now come back to order.
We thank you for your patience and understanding as we had a
vote on the floor.
We will continue and I am going to recognize myself for 5
minutes and we will go from there.
According to the records, the U.S. Government provides
approximately $5 million to Venezuela annually for democracy
related assistance. What is happening with that money? Why do
we give it and how do we monitor where it goes?
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you for the question, Chairman. The
purpose of our democracy funding is to encourage the
development of civil society in order to ensure that Venezuelan
democracy be as robust and inclusive as possible. We have used
a number of different tactics over time. This program has been
in place since 2002 and has averaged about $5 million a year.
It has gone up and it has gone down.
Initially, the democracy program was intended to encourage
reconciliation in the wake of the 2002 coup. Over time,
government-affiliated, Chavez-affiliated actors have refused to
participate in these programs, which we regret because they are
intended to be ecumenical in nature, that is, open to all,
politically balanced, and in support of the process rather than
any particular----
Mr. Chaffetz. The details of what is going on in that
program and how that money is spent, is that something you can
provide to the committee in, say, 30 days? Would that be fair?
Mr. Whitaker. Absolutely. More than enough time.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
I would like to yield now to the gentleman from Florida,
Mr. Mack, for the remainder of my time.
Mr. Mack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just for the committee's
knowledge, my recommendation to the full committee is that that
budget be zeroed out moving forward.
I want to go back to kind of the sentiment that Chavez will
use this kind of struggle between the United States for his own
benefit. I have been pretty consistent on the other side of
this feeling. So what we have in Hugo Chavez is a classic
bully. So he tries to get people to do things based upon fear
of what he might do.
And I think this is an important point. Instead of looking
at what it is that we are fearful that Chavez might do, we
ought to look at what is the right thing to do for national
security, what is the right thing to do for the people of this
country, and what is the right thing to do for our friends in
Latin America and around the world; not because of threats from
a bully. So I hope that--I would love to hear, if you want to
make comment on that, but let me just add this one other piece
to that.
You also talked about that we have had beginnings of some
strides where there has been some extraditions from Venezuela
to Colombia of some drug kingpins. But the reality is that is
not due to the actions of the United States; that is due to the
actions of the president of Colombia, Santos. I will remind you
of the Makled case where we fell asleep at the switch. He was
arrested on a war warrant. When they arrested him, the
Colombians asked if we wanted them and we said we are not
interested, and then they sent him to Venezuela. That is why
the extraditions are happening, not because of some great
policy position or foreign policy by the U.S. Government.
If you care to react to those two statements, I would love
to hear it.
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the first point,
I think that the reaction or potential reaction of Chavez with
respect to the United States and trying to demonize the United
States with respect to Colombia, with respect to the democratic
opposition in Venezuela are all matters that one can make
analysis about. They are factors. I wouldn't say that any one
is necessarily the determining factor. What we are looking for
is results. In the case of the CISADA sanctions, for examine,
there is a very specific result that we want and the sanctions
were designed in order to achieve that result.
On the extraditions, actually, and I don't want to overplay
this because there is much more that Venezuela could do, but
just since July 2010 we have gotten on the order of 10 senior
narcos who were deported directly to the United States, removed
from Venezuela directly to the United States----
Mr. Mack. I am going to go through, because I just want to
hammer this point home that Hugo Chavez--well, my time is
running out, so I will thank you and I will apparently have
another opportunity to speak with you again. Thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
We now recognize the gentleman from American Samoa, Mr.
Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do thank our witnesses for their testimony this morning.
I just want to follow up on a couple of issues or questions
that were raised, at least I would like to raise at this point.
We do recognize, gentlemen, that you are just simply
following what the statute, or at least what we did in the
Congress, passed laws and statutes. You are just simply trying
to enforce these sanctions, laws, whether it be for economic
reasons or whatever. I noted with interest that earlier
Chairman Chabot, the subcommittee had asked the question about
Venezuela's oil supply, and I am just curious, for the record,
what is the total dollar value of oil that we import from
Venezuela, say just last year or say in the period of the last
5 years?
Mr. Delare. Congressman, the figure I used earlier in my
testimony, or maybe I didn't, was 900,000 to 1 million barrels
per day. I would have to get back to you with a formal response
and cost it out for you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Yes. I would think it is important that
we need to know. My next question for the record, exactly how
many sanctions do we have against Venezuela at this point in
time? You know, I know there are sanctions against individuals,
sanctions against companies, sanctions against officials of the
government, sanctions for terrorism, sanctions on nuclear
transfer, on nonproliferation. What is the total number of
sanctions that we currently have against Venezuela?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, we can go through them. There is not
fully cooperating on counterterrorism matters, which was
imposed in May 2006. Every year since 2005 they have been found
to have demonstrably failed in their international
counternarcotics obligations----
Mr. Faleomavaega. Well, as I listened to your statements,
do I see maybe a count of 9 or 10 different sanctions that we
put against Venezuela, small sanctions?
Mr. Whitaker. And then there are sanctions against
individuals. So when you net it all out, there are a number of
sanctions that have been applied.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Yes, at least how many, 9 or 10? Be more
specific. I would appreciate it.
Mr. Whitaker. Some of these are broader sanctions. For
example, the not fully cooperating on terrorism implies other
actions, for example, a ban on the sale of defense articles. So
do you count that as a single sanction? Then that would be one
sanction.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Well, here is my whole point----
Mr. Mack. Would the gentleman yield for just a quick
second?
Mr. Faleomavaega. I would be glad to yield to the chairman.
Mr. Mack. Thank you. On the question that you asked
earlier, how much are we sending, it is approximately $117
million a day.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And that includes Citgo Oil Co.?
Mr. Mack. That is what we are sending PDVSA.
Mr. Faleomavaega. The money that we are paying, the oil
that we are getting from Venezuela?
Mr. Mack. It is $117 million a day.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Do you gentlemen agree to that figure,
$117 million a day that we are paying Venezuela?
Mr. Delare. Well, sir, it obviously goes up and down
depending on the production levels in Venezuela, the
consumption levels of energy in Venezuela and the market. As I
mentioned, I would be happy to give you a more formal reaction
in writing.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And I thank the chairman for that figure
because the point I want to make is that we are putting all
these sanctions into one zap, the fact that Venezuela has this
whole bunch of oil that it exports to our country, and doesn't
it make our sanctions look somewhat a little oblivious to the
idea that, so what, you put sanctions but we are still getting
your money? Does this make our sanctions laws somewhat a little
effective?
Mr. Delare. If I may. The sanctions we are talking about
are the sanctions directed against the government in Tehran.
Now, of course, they capture Venezuelan activities in Tehran. I
am sorry, in Venezuela because of this active economic
partnership. But that is the focus of this particular sanction.
So, no, I don't think it looks silly. By the same token, we
have just sanctioned an Israeli company, a U.K. company, a
Singaporian company.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am not trying to say that it makes it
silly. My point is the point of being effective. Have they been
effective if we really wanted to do as part of our foreign
policy toward Hugo Chavez's regime and all that he has done,
supposedly, contrary to our basic fundamental principles of
democracy and all of this?
Mr. Delare. Well, sir, I will just speak to the Iran side.
We look at----
Mr. Faleomavaega. No, I am not talking about Iran; I am
talking about Venezuela.
Mr. Delare. Okay. Well, we continue to provide him,
obviously, with a flow of revenue. Now, if a decision is taken
to somehow create another mechanism that we would want to
restrict that, or if PDVSA continues to ship----
Mr. Faleomavaega. But would you say there is somewhat of a
contradiction that we have here? We are putting a whole bunch
of sanctions against Venezuela and yet, at the same time, we
are paying Venezuela $117 million a day for its oil supply.
And I am sorry, my time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Rivera, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Congressman Sires alluded moments ago to the relationship
or that nexus between Venezuela and Cuba. I want to try to
drill down a little bit more, and I know we are going to have
another round, so if we don't get through it all, I will
continue on the next round.
For Mr. Benjamin, you are the coordinator for
counterterrorism at the Department of State. How many countries
are on the list, the U.S. State Department list of sponsors of
state terrorism?
Mr. Benjamin. Currently on the list, Iran, Syria, Cuba, and
Sudan.
Mr. Rivera. So four countries. And with respect to Cuba,
why is Cuba on that list?
Mr. Benjamin. Cuba was put on the list, I believe, in 1982
because of its support, principally for its support of various
terrorist and revolutionary movements within the hemisphere.
And I think it is important to underscore that Cuba has not met
the standard for recision, which is to say that we need to be
able to either certify that there has been a fundamental change
in leadership and the country has ceased to support
international terrorism or that the administration can certify
that Cuba has gone 6 months without support to foreign
terrorist organizations and has given assurances that it will
not support any international terrorism in the future. Because
of its continued relationship with the FARC and the ELN, Cuba
has failed to meet that standard.
Mr. Rivera. So Cuba has a relationship with the FARC, the
ELN, both terrorist organizations. What about ETA?
Mr. Benjamin. It is a good question, sir. I don't recall if
there is any continued relationship with ETA, but I can get
back to you and confirm that.
Mr. Rivera. What about any Middle East based terrorist
organization, Hamas, Hezbollah?
Mr. Benjamin. I am unaware of any fundraising activity or
operational activity from either of those groups in Cuba, but I
would double check, too, and ensure that is correct.
Mr. Rivera. Is Cuba harboring any terrorists?
Mr. Benjamin. Cuba has, over time, harbored members of the
FARC and the ELN, and I believe also ETA, although I don't know
if they are currently doing so.
Mr. Rivera. You don't know if they are currently
harboring----
Mr. Benjamin. ETA.
Mr. Rivera [continuing]. ETA. But currently they are
harboring FARC and ELN terrorists?
Mr. Benjamin. Yes, they have.
Mr. Rivera. How about members of the FBI Most Wanted list?
How many of those do we have in Cuba?
Mr. Benjamin. Frankly, sir, that is in the law enforcement
channel, and I would have to get back to you on that.
Mr. Rivera. Well, let me refresh your memory. Does the name
Janet Chesimard mean anything to you? Would you consider her a
terrorist?
Mr. Benjamin. Sir, I would have to get back to you. I am
not familiar enough with the case.
Mr. Rivera. You are not familiar with the Chesimard case?
Mr. Benjamin. No, not sufficiently to give you a----
Mr. Rivera. I am going to yield for a moment to Congressman
Sires to perhaps give us a little bit of the background, since
this occurred in his home State.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman. There is currently a $1
million bounty on Chesimard. She was accused of shooting a
State police officer point blank on the highways in New Jersey,
so that is the reason. The State police has put a reward of $1
million. She has been in Cuba now for a number of years.
Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Congressman.
And I believe that that was not just a random robbery
against the trooper; it was politically motivated. And I think
most people would consider that a terrorist act. So I hope you
will become a little more familiar with that case in
particular.
What about narcotraffickers in Cuba?
Mr. Benjamin. I think some of my colleagues may have more
to say on the narcotrafficking issue. Mr. Whitaker.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes. As Ambassador Benjamin noted, there is
evidence in the past of ELN and FARC members having been
present in Cuba. There are continuing allegations of Cuban
government involvement in narcotrafficking, but nothing that we
have been able to act upon. Again, as Ambassador Benjamin
noted, much of this is in law enforcement channels. I would
note that we have tried to reach out to the Cuban government
and we have a Coast Guard attache who tries to work with the
Cuban government in order to identify and interdict----
Mr. Rivera. Before my last few seconds, just let me say
that in my next round I want to follow up on this because it
seems as though we are placing sanctions on Venezuela, which is
not on the terrorist list, but more recently we are lifting
sanctions on Cuba, and I will get into that in the next round,
which is on the terrorist list and in fact is harboring a cop
killer from this country. So I will go into that in the next
round.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
I will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Deutch, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize, I was
a little late getting back, so let me ask if you have addressed
this. Have you spoken about the Venezuela airline Conviasa at
this point?
So my question is as follows: The United States announced
that it is going to sanction Iran Air for its role in shipping
sensitive technology and weapons. Conviasa routinely flies
Caracas to Tehran. Can you speak to the possibility of
sanctioning that airline? And wouldn't it be possible, as well,
to sanction any airline that flies in and out of Tehran if it
can be linked to the shipping of sensitive technology and/or
weapons?
Mr. Benjamin. I will give the preliminary answer, and then
my colleagues may want to follow up.
As a practical matter, we do not discuss designations in
public because of the possibility of tipping potential
designees. Regarding the hypothetical of whether others who are
involved in supporting Iranian efforts to advance their nuclear
program, it is certainly within the scope of the legislation to
do that, and we would certainly look hard at doing that.
But, again, I will let those who deal with sanctions and
the Venezuelan case specifically----
Mr. Deutch. And before they do, Mr. Benjamin, my point here
is I would very much like to tip off, that is the purpose of
the question. I would like to tip off any airline that is
engaged in transporting this sort of sensitive technology and/
or weapons into or out of Tehran that they would be subject to
these sanctions. That is what I am trying to confirm.
Mr. Benjamin. I think that that is a well known fact, that
airlines and other businesses in support of that effort can be
sanctioned.
Mr. Deutch. Then let me just move on to the sanctions
regime.
Mr. Delare, your office commences and conducts all of the
investigations of the companies that may be subject to
sanctions?
Mr. Delare. Mr. Deutch, no, we primarily work on the energy
side of things.
Mr. Deutch. Right.
Mr. Delare. We work closely, of course, with Mr. Szubin on
a variety of other things, but----
Mr. Deutch. But under CISADA, the focus on investments in
the energy sector, those would be your investigations.
Mr. Delare. Correct.
Mr. Deutch. How many people do you have in your office who
are conducting those investigations?
Mr. Delare. At the present time we have four, plus support
from our legal staff and the intelligence and research bureau.
Mr. Deutch. Four full-time employees?
Mr. Delare. Call it three and a half.
Mr. Deutch. Three and a half full-time employees who are
responsible for conducting the investigations to determine
whether a company could be subject to sanctions under CISADA?
Mr. Delare. That is correct.
Mr. Deutch. I won't ask you if whether that is a sufficient
number, but I will ask whether it will be possible to--let me
do it this way. How many more investigations could be conducted
at one time? How many can be conducted by one person? Let me
start with that.
Mr. Delare. That is an interesting question. As it now
stands, we have it divided by sectors, and I have, I think,
everyone in the office doing a number of things simultaneously
because various--let's face it, a lot of media reports come in
the door; they have to be evaluated. We then begin checking
trade press, embassies, businesses, the intelligence community.
So it is a constant pushing things through a process with lots
of things at different stages, so it is hard to answer that
correctly.
Mr. Deutch. Well, let me be a little more direct. For those
of us who have expressed frustration that the pace of the
investigations--well, it is not even the pace; we are not sure
the status of some of these investigations because we are not
informed until the end--but the frustration that they don't
seem to be moving quickly enough, could that be addressed if
you had additional investigators, if you had more than the
three and a half people who are responsible for all
investigations?
Mr. Delare. I think that is a fair assessment. But let me
also make two points in regard to that. CISADA is a relatively
new piece of legislation, even though it dates back to last
July. Now, in the intervening period since then we have set up
a procedure that never existed before. We have been exceedingly
careful to do due diligence on everything we have done. Hence,
we probably have spent a little more time as we get used to
this than would be necessary, double checking facts----
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Delare, I am sorry, I only have 10 seconds
left.
Mr. Delare. I am sorry.
Mr. Deutch. Let me just ask one last question. If companies
were required to disclose in their filings made to the SEC,
those companies that trade on American stock exchanges, whether
they are doing business in Iran, that would be considered
credible evidence and should immediately subject them to the
possibility of sanctions, correct?
Mr. Delare. It seems like that may be so. Let me get back
to you more formally.
Mr. Deutch. I appreciate that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
We will now start the second round by recognizing the
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mack, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, could you tell us again why Cuba was put on
the state sponsor of terrorism list in 1982?
Mr. Benjamin. It was put on the state sponsorship list for
supporting foreign terrorist organizations engaged in
activities primarily in this hemisphere, but, again, for
repeated acts of support of international terror.
Mr. Mack. Okay. And then in answering questions from my
colleague, Mr. Rivera, you outlined some of those terrorist
activities. Can you tell me what the difference is between Cuba
and Venezuela?
Mr. Benjamin. I think it is important to underscore that
the process of putting a state on the list and the process of
taking another state off the list are two very different
things. We have a very high bar for taking countries off the
list. We want to make sure that when we put countries on the
list, that we are not setting such a low threshold that we will
both incur, create side effects that will undermine our efforts
and our broader national security interest. As a result, one
secretary of state after another has looked very carefully at a
number of different countries over the years for a possible
listing----
Mr. Mack. But you gave us the definition of why Cuba was
put on the state sponsor of terrorism list, which is exactly
what Chavez is doing in Venezuela. So why is it that we have
Cuba as a state sponsor of terror and not Venezuela? And it
goes to this point, the inconsistencies that I think another
member brought up. On one hand we have restricted visas to
people in Honduras who have fought for and defended their
constitution, the rule of law, their freedom, and their
country.
On the other hand, there are people in Venezuela who are
not restricted and they are supporting terrorist organizations.
So how can Cuba, under your definition, be put on the state
sponsor of terrorism list and then Venezuela, doing the same
thing, not be placed on the state sponsor of terrorism list?
Mr. Benjamin. First of all, I am not conversant with the
Honduran case, but let me just say----
Mr. Mack. Take my word for it.
Mr. Benjamin [continuing]. As I said, this is about
effectiveness and about using the appropriate tools at the
appropriate time to elicit the correct response.
Mr. Mack. When is the appropriate time?
Mr. Benjamin. I think that is a matter that we have to
evaluate on the basis of the activity going on. And I would
say, sir, as we noted earlier, if the indicators are going in
the right direction, it would seem not to be the right time
to----
Mr. Mack. You mean the indicators that are being brought
about because of another country's actions, not ours?
Mr. Benjamin. We judge countries by the totality of their
activity, and if other countries can elicit good behavior, then
we certainly view that as a positive development.
Mr. Mack. Well, I just want to, real quick, if you can put
up the first slide.
You are familiar with that, right? If it walks like a duck,
quacks like a duck and looks like a duck, then it is a duck,
right?
Next slide.
If it walks like a terrorist, talks like a terrorist, and
acts like a terrorist, then it is a terrorist. And you
recognize Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro, Raul Reyes, and
Ahmadinejad. We can agree with that?
Next slide.
Hugo Chavez, ``Enough of the imperialist aggression. We
must tell the world down with the U.S. empire. We have to bury
imperialism this century.''
Isn't Hugo Chavez a sponsor of terror?
Mr. Benjamin. As I said before, sir, Venezuela is engaged
in activities that we find unacceptable, and we are engaged in
a sustained effort to get them to stop those activities, and I
think that we are taking the appropriate measured approach to
get them to stop those activities in a way that will produce
results. We may have differences over the means to do it, but I
believe that we are searching for the same goal.
Mr. Mack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. The gentleman's time has expired.
We will now recognize Mr. Sires of New Jersey for 5
minutes.
Mr. Sires. Can you talk a little bit about the arms build-
up in Venezuela? I understand that they have bought a
considerable amount of weapons.
Mr. Whitaker. That is correct, sir. The principle purchases
that Venezuela has made over the course of the last several
years have been from Russia, and they include high performance
jet aircraft Sukhois, which have been delivered; they include
T-72 tanks, which have not been delivered; air defense systems;
and notably in excess of 100,000 AKM, AK-47 rifles.
So there has been a significant arms purchase program by
the Venezuelan government. Some of these purchases could
probably be defined as purchases to replace superannuated, old,
antiquated equipment. You might, for example, say that with
respect to the Sukhois. Venezuela had long been a nation which
purchased U.S. jet aircraft. We sold F-16s to Venezuela in the
1980's. Those aircraft are at the end of their service life and
the Venezuelan government chose to replace them with Sukhois.
So that is an example of replacing superannuated equipment.
Then you have examples of new capabilities, and the T-72
tanks would be a new capability which traditionally Venezuela
has not had.
Mr. Sires. Isn't there also a factory that was built in
Venezuela to make AK-47s or something like that?
Mr. Whitaker. Venezuela and Russia have signed a contract
to build such a factory that would produce AKM assault rifles.
That factory is not presently in operation. There is actually
more that we can provide to you on this in a different setting.
Mr. Sires. The reason I ask that is because I had
conversation with members of other countries, and one of the
countries that I had conversations with was Panama, and they
have found that Venezuela has tried to influence the people in
the interior of Panama, the farmers, especially, so I am
concerned that maybe some of these farmers are going to find
their way through different countries in South America. Do you
have any concerns about that?
Mr. Whitaker. It would be a significant concern if
Venezuela were to start exporting weapons of war to other
nations. I think that what we have seen principally over the
course of the last several years is rather than exporting
munitions and weapons and things like that, is more trying to
buy influence with money. That is the tactic that the
Venezuelans have engaged in principally, in Central American,
in the Caribbean, in Bolivia, for example. There are limits to
Venezuelan largesse. Venezuela, as a matter of policy, has
chosen to spread a lot of money into the population, and this
has meant less money available to support these foreign
activities that they would engage in.
Mr. Sires. Talking about money, how much do you think
Venezuela is sending to Cuba currently?
Mr. Whitaker. The truth is we don't know the answer to that
question. Publicly available information indicates that 50,000
barrels of oil a day go to Cuba, and that would be free or
virtually free. In addition, Venezuela has agreed to re-
engineer, rebuild a refinery in Cuba; that activity has not
been completed.
And then, finally, Cuba apparently charges for the doctors
and other experts that it provides who work in Venezuela, the
numbers of which, I mean, they are estimates and we don't have
precise figures, but the estimates are 30, 40,000 individuals,
and there is a fee that the Cuban government charges per person
to the Venezuelan government.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Sires. Yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I just wanted to know, from Chairman
Mack's statement, that we buy $117 million worth of oil a day
from Cuba. By my limited knowledge----
Mr. Sires. From Venezuela, you mean.
Mr. Faleomavaega. From Venezuela. I am sorry. It is $42.7
billion worth of oil that we buy from Venezuela each year. That
is my limited knowledge of mathematics. But that is not
peanuts, in my humble opinion.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Sires. Now that I lost my train of thought.
I just want to add, following up on my friend, Congressman
Rivera, there are more than just one felon in Cuba that are
currently, it is not just Chesimard. There are close to 100
that have escaped the United States and are in Cuba, basically,
with sanction, living there, enjoying the beach, and everything
else. Thank you.
You have any comment about that?
Mr. Whitaker. All I can tell you, sir, is, actually, in the
past I worked on Cuba and I can tell you this is a regular
topic of conversation we have with the Cubans, including with
respect to Joanne Chesimard and other fugitives from U.S.
justice.
Mr. Sires. I can tell you that New Jersey State troopers
are not going to ever give up the request to have Chesimard be
expelled out of Cuba so she can be brought here to trial again.
Mr. Whitaker. And we join them in that.
Mr. Sires. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. The chairman yields back.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Whitaker, isn't the only reason we haven't put
Venezuela on the state sponsor of terrorism list, isn't the
only reason because we consume a lot of their oil? Is that fair
to say?
Mr. Whitaker. Chairman, I would associate myself with what
Ambassador Benjamin said. We are trying to engage in
substantial iterative sanctions designed to accomplish
different ends, and there are a number of factors that go into
this process, including the economic effects we talked about,
including the effects on democratic development.
Mr. Chaffetz. So what other major economic effect is there
other than oil? I mean, oil is a big one; we cited the number
several times. That is the administration's concern, right? We
consume a lot of their oil. That is the only thing that is
holding us back, isn't it?
Mr. Whitaker. Again, Mr. Chairman, I think that it is
broader than that. I think that that is a factor. I think that
the economic relationship, broadly stated, there are dozens and
dozens of U.S. companies that do business in Venezuela today,
some of which are intimately involved in the oil industry,
provide oil support, oil services, some of which are
international oil companies like Chevron, some of which are
like Xerox, American Airlines. So these kinds of factors need
to be taken into account as well, in addition to the effect on
democratic development within Venezuela, the diplomatic
outreach that our neighbors have engaged in.
Mr. Chaffetz. Let me go to Mr. Szubin there. Let's talk
about all this money that does flow in. Where does that money
go once it gets to--do we have any idea or sense of where these
oil profits go once they get to Venezuela? Does Treasury not
track that at all? I mean, we send them over $100 million a
day, so what is happening with that money?
Mr. Szubin. I can't speak to Venezuelan government revenue
allocation. Our office focuses on----
Mr. Chaffetz. But it does go to their government.
Mr. Szubin. Yes.
Mr. Chaffetz. I am sorry, did somebody else want to address
that? Mr. Whitaker.
Mr. Whitaker. PDVSA's receipts go directly--this is a
change from the past. In the past, PDVSA operated as--it was
government owned, but it operated as an independent entity with
its own financial structure. One of the changes that Chavez
made was to insist on PDVSA's receipts going directly to the
government. So if your assertion is that PDVSA receipts go
directly to the government, I think that is accurate.
Mr. Chaffetz. In comparison to other parts of their
economy, what portion of their oil proceeds, of their economic
input, how big is that in their economy?
Mr. Whitaker. If you are talking about government receipts,
it is about half of government receipts. If you are talking
about exports, it is the lion's share of exports. I can get you
the precise number, but it is in excess of three-quarters of
the total receipts from exports.
Mr. Chaffetz. Okay. Very good.
Yes, yield to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mack.
Mr. Mack. So half of the receipts to the government come
from the oil that is sold here to the United States, is that
what you said?
Mr. Whitaker. Half of government receipts come from
proceeds to PDVSA. Not all of PDVSA receipts come from the
United States.
Mr. Mack. Okay.
Mr. Whitaker. The majority of exports by PDVSA go to the
United States.
Mr. Mack. Right. So I think what you are hearing from us is
that we want to see some sanctions that affect the oil industry
in Venezuela. And let's not make--it is not an industry, it is
Chavez. Right now all of that oil, we are funding his ability
to continue to sponsor terror. And, again, I think a lot of us
are wondering--and this is, obviously, a bipartisan issue;
everybody is talking about the same thing.
Why aren't we putting these sanctions on PDVSA, especially
when the State Department, the Secretary, with the signature of
her pen, can allow the Keystone XL pipeline to move through,
move forward, which then we wouldn't need to buy the oil from
Venezuela. And if we don't buy the oil from Venezuela, he
cannot continue to sponsor terror. So it seems pretty simple.
Maybe you can explain it why it is not that simple.
Mr. Delare. I would hesitate to ever tell a Congressman
that it wasn't that simple, but it isn't.
Mr. Mack. Go for it.
Mr. Delare. Well, in fact, I fully appreciate your argument
about alternate energy sources and, in fact, the oil sands
project will probably take 10 years to come online.
Mr. Mack. But we get that argument all the time.
Mr. Delare. Of course.
Mr. Mack. And isn't it true that there has been study after
study already, all the time the study comes back in a positive
way, but then the environmentalists whip it all up again? I
mean, we are going to continue to buy this oil from Chavez when
we can get it from our friends in Canada.
Mr. Delare. That is very true, but we have to look at the
market as it stands today. And we are in a very difficult
economic patch, as you well know, sir, and----
Mr. Mack. You can't look at the market in just today.
Mr. Delare. Well, I will even look at it for the next 5
years and say we have to make adjustments, but in the meantime
we have to get that energy from somewhere.
Mr. Chaffetz. I guess, as I wrap up here, I would just say
there is a concerted effort to say we are okay with the
terrorism as long as we keep the price of gas low down here.
And that is the concern that I think a lot of us have. I think
the administration is making a very concerted effort. We can
give them half, three-quarters of their revenue to Hugo Chavez.
It is okay, even though they are participating in terrorism, as
long as we keep that price of gas down at 7-11.
I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Rivera.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you very much.
For Mr. Szubin, you are the Director of the Office of
Foreign Assets Control, so you are in charge of regulating the
Trading with the Enemies Act, is that correct?
Mr. Szubin. Yes.
Mr. Rivera. Cuba is regulated under that act.
Mr. Szubin. Our sanctions against Cuba were issued pursuant
to the Trading with the Enemy Act.
Mr. Rivera. So Cuba is an enemy of the United States.
Mr. Szubin. The title of the statute that Congress passed
is the Trading with the Enemy Act, and that is our authority
under which we use these sanctions.
Mr. Rivera. So I would presume Cuba is considered an enemy
of the United States.
Mr. Szubin. That is not for me to characterize, but you are
correct as to the title of the statute.
Mr. Rivera. How many flights were there between Iran and
Venezuela? I heard one flight a week that no longer exists, is
that correct?
Mr. Szubin. What Mr. Whitaker mentioned earlier is that
there had been a period of one flight a week, and we believe
that has now stopped.
Mr. Rivera. How many flights are there between the United
States and the other countries who are on the terrorist list,
direct flights, North Korea, you said Sudan and Iran? How many
direct flights a day?
Mr. Szubin. I don't know, but I would be happy to look into
that and get back to you.
Mr. Rivera. Do you not regulate those? Trading with the
Enemy Act, would that not fall under your purview?
Mr. Benjamin. Sir, I can answer that.
Mr. Rivera. Yes.
Mr. Benjamin. There are none.
Mr. Rivera. There are none. How many flights are there
between the United States and our enemy, Cuba, a day?
Mr. Benjamin. If you are talking about----
Mr. Rivera. Direct flights.
Mr. Szubin. Private charter flights?
Mr. Rivera. Airplanes, airplanes that fly between the
United States and Cuba daily.
Mr. Szubin. I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Rivera. Do you not regulate?
Mr. Szubin. Yes, we do, and I would be happy to get the
answer for you, but I don't know it offhand.
Mr. Rivera. You are the Director of OFAC.
Mr. Szubin. Correct.
Mr. Rivera. You regulate the Trading with the Enemies Act.
Flights between the United States and Cuba, an enemy, are
regulated by you.
Mr. Szubin. Yes.
Mr. Rivera. The only flights that exist, according to the
enemies list, North Korea, Sudan, and Iran, is zero. Cuba is
the only--you don't know how many flights?
Mr. Szubin. That is right.
Mr. Rivera. Okay. I would like for you to get me that
information.
Mr. Szubin. I would be happy to, Congressman.
Mr. Rivera. And I would like to know not only how many
flights, but who is chartering those flights, what companies
own the airplanes that are chartering those flights. Are you
familiar with that, who are chartering or what companies own
the planes?
Mr. Szubin. What I can tell you is that to operate a
charter service with respect to Cuba, you need to be licensed
by our office. So there is an elaborate process which travel
service providers or charter service providers need to come in,
they need to make all sorts of showings as to exactly the
questions you are talking about, their ownership and----
Mr. Rivera. So you should be intimately familiar with these
flights.
Mr. Szubin. If I had a better memory, I could recite the
names of all these charter companies for you offhand, but that
is not something----
Mr. Rivera. Would you say the number is more than 10, less
than 100, more than 1,000?
Mr. Szubin. As I said, Congressman, I don't know the number
of flights a day going to Cuba.
Mr. Rivera. Mr. Whitaker, recently I understand that there
was a summary that was produced of a phone conversation you had
with the Charges d'Affaires of Venezuela, Angelo Rivero Santos.
Are you familiar with this? Did you recently have a phone
conversation?
Mr. Whitaker. I have spoken to him on the phone. I am not
aware of any transcript being published.
Mr. Rivera. Well, I received information of it being
published where you did a few things; you congratulated him on
the excellent diplomatic work done on the Honduran crisis, you
invited him to meet with Secretary of State of Venezuela, we
assured him that Venezuela was well represented in the State
Department and a desire to work together to improve relations.
Does any of this sound familiar?
Mr. Whitaker. It does not. That is not a conversation that
I had, sir.
Mr. Rivera. No conversation between you and----
Mr. Whitaker. As I say, I have spoken with Charges
d'Affaires Rivero on the phone.
Mr. Rivera. Recently?
Mr. Whitaker. I would have to go back and check, but that
is not--what you just said is not a conversation that I----
Mr. Rivera. What was the tenor of that conversation?
Mr. Whitaker. Sir, I rarely speak with him. I did have a
recent conversation; it was highly operational in nature, and I
would be happy to discuss that with you. But the factors that
you just mentioned----
Mr. Rivera. Were not part of that conversation?
Mr. Whitaker [continuing]. Were not part of that
conversation and they are not things that I would say.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
If there are no further questions, we will thank the
witnesses for appearing here today. I would just implore you
again, in the future, and I would ask that the administration
work with us in, A, providing witnesses in a timely manner and
providing testimony, the written statements, 48 hours in
advance so that we can do our jobs as well. I appreciate your
patriotism, your commitment to our country, your sacrifice and
your service to the country. I hope you find that it wasn't too
painful to come before this committee, and perhaps we will have
you here again, but we do appreciate your testimony here today.
The committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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