[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
U.S. POLICY TOWARD ZIMBABWE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 2, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-109
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
ROBERT TURNER, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State............ 6
Ms. Sharon Cromer, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau
for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development.......... 15
Mr. Mark Schneider, senior vice president, International Crisis
Group.......................................................... 31
Mr. Paul Fagan, regional director for Africa, International
Republican Institute........................................... 41
Mr. Dewa Mavhinga, regional coordinator, Crisis in Zimbabwe
Coalition...................................................... 49
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement................. 9
Ms. Sharon Cromer: Prepared statement............................ 18
Mr. Mark Schneider: Prepared statement........................... 34
Mr. Paul Fagan: Prepared statement............................... 43
Mr. Dewa Mavhinga: Prepared statement............................ 52
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 64
Hearing minutes.................................................. 65
The Honorable Karen Bass, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California: Prepared statement........................ 66
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ
Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri....................................................... 67
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New Jersey: Material submitted for the record..... 68
U.S. POLICY TOWARD ZIMBABWE
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
and Human Rights
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o'clock
p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon.
Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. We will be joined in a moment by Ranking Member
Payne, but I thought I might just start.
I actually have to leave for about \1/2\ hour. The
Immigration Subcommittee of Judiciary is holding a hearing on
one of my bills, H.R. 2121, the China Democracy Promotion Act,
and I am the witness. So, I will be where you are in 25
minutes.
So, I think we ought to start, and when Don comes, we will
just yield to him.
Good afternoon.
Our hearing today will examine the current U.S. Government
policy toward the Republic of Zimbabwe and consider how our
policy toward this southern African nation may develop in the
years ahead. Zimbabwe is considering a new constitution that
will lead to elections in 2012 that had been postponed from
this year.
There has been mutual hostility between the United States
Government and Zimbabwe Government of Robert Mugabe since the
country became independent in 1980. Mugabe and his supporters
blame America for not supporting its liberation struggle, while
the United States has criticized Mugabe's government
consistently for human rights abuses, especially against its
political opponents.
With U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe Charles Ray encouraging
U.S. businesses to invest in Zimbabwe last month, it would seem
that U.S. policy is in the midst of a transformation.
Following independence from Great Britain in 1980, Prime
Minister Robert Mugabe's policy of political reconciliation was
generally successful during the next 2 years, as the former
political and military competitors within the ruling Zimbabwe
African National Union Patriotic Front and rival Patriotic
Front Zimbabwe African People's Union began to work together.
Splits, however, soon developed, as PF-ZAPU leader Joshua
Nkomo was removed from government. When PF-ZAPU was accused of
initiating a rebellion due to the removal of Nkomo from the
Cabinet, government military forces began a pacification
campaign, primarily in his base, which resulted in as many as
20,000 civilian deaths.
In part, through its control of the media, the huge
parastatal sector of the economy and the security forces, the
Mugabe government managed to keep organized political
opposition to a minimum through most of the 1990s. Beginning in
1999, however, Zimbabwe experienced a period of considerable
political and economic upheaval. Opposition to President Mugabe
and the ZANU-PF government had grown, in part, due to the
worsening economic governance issues.
At one point, one U.S. dollar was worth more than 2.6
billion Zimbabwe dollars. Following the seizure of White-owned
commercial farms beginning in the 1990s, food output capacity
fell some 45 percent, manufacturing output dropped 29 percent,
and unemployment rose to 80 percent.
The opposition was led by the Movement for Democratic
Change, or the MDC, which was established in September 1999.
The MDC led the campaign to handily defeat a referendum that
would have permitted President Mugabe to seek two additional
terms in office.
Parliamentary elections held in June 2000 were marred by
localized violence and claims of electoral irregularities and
government intimidation of opposition supporters. Still, the
MDC succeeded in capturing 57 of the 120 seats in the National
Assembly.
The last four national elections--the Presidential election
in 2002, parliamentary elections in 2005, harmonized
Presidential and parliamentary elections in March 2008, and the
Presidential runoff in June 2008--were judged to be not free
and fair by observers. In the March 2008 elections, two
factions of the opposition MDC, known as MDC-T to denote Morgan
Tsvangirai's faction and MDC-M for the group led by Arthur
Mutambara, gained a combined parliamentary majority. Mugabe was
declared the winner of the June 2008 runoff election after
opposing candidate Tsvangirai withdrew due to ZANU-PF-directed
violence that made a free and fair election impossible.
Negotiations subsequently took place, and in September 2008
the three parties signed the Global Political Agreement, or
GPA, a power-sharing agreement under which Mugabe would retain
the presidency, Tsvangirai would become Prime Minister. In
February 2008, Tsvangirai was sworn in as Prime Minister and
new Cabinet ministers and deputy ministers from the two MDC
factions and the ruling party were also sworn in.
There is serious contention within the ruling party for the
right to succeed President Mugabe once he leaves office and
added division within the opposition. Politics in Zimbabwe is
in flux, to say the least.
It is in this environment that the United States faces the
extraordinary challenge of examining our current policy and
determining how best it might be adjusted. I look forward to
hearing from our very distinguished panel of witnesses today on
how U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe may change to help that nation
reach the desired goals of democracy and good governance.
I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague, Mr.
Payne, for any opening comments.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for agreeing
to hold this very important hearing on the policy toward
Zimbabwe. This subcommittee has held a number of hearings on
Zimbabwe over the years, and we must continue to focus
strategically on this very important country.
I also want to thank our distinguished witnesses for
joining us today, Ambassador Carson and Senior Deputy Assistant
Administrator Cromer, who both have been working on Africa
issues for decades. Mr. Carson has been an Ambassador to
Zimbabwe, actually, and has served with distinction, and Ms.
Cromer's record is outstanding, as we have had her testify
before this committee before. I certainly look forward to your
testimonies.
I want to also thank International Crisis Group, IRI, and
the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, as well as Open Society
Foundations and Freedom House, for all of their hard work on
this issue.
In previous hearings, I have discussed Zimbabwe's rich and
complex history. We know of the struggle for independence with
Robert Mugabe and Josh Nkomo leading ZANU and ZAPU during the
years of revolution, where Ian Smith and a quarter of a million
Rhodesians held the entire nation of Zimbabwe, over 7 million
Blacks, in a situation, as we all know, similar to South
Africa, and the persons who struggled and fought for
independence, even Mr. Mugabe and the late Josh Nkomo, should
deserve a place in history.
But it is that history, especially its relatively-recent
independence and effort to overcome hundreds of years of
colonialism and the pillaging of its rich natural resources by
the West, that makes the current political crisis so difficult
to witness today. Also, the outstanding education system that
was put in place by the new Government of Zimbabwe, where even
today throughout the continent Zimbabwean citizens tend to the
highest-motivated in the educational area.
After independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was prosperous and
economic opportunities were abundant. But after years of poor
economic policies, mismanagement, and corruption, political and
economic upheaval began to take place in the early 2000s.
Once a hub for young African visionaries, Zimbabwe lost
millions of young adults to the crisis. Many have left the
country for educational and economic opportunities. It is
estimated 25 percent of Zimbabwe's population lives now outside
of the country. Those who remain behind are clamoring for
change.
Yet, Zimbabwe still has a robust and engaged civil society.
They are active in groups like WAHSA and Zimbabwe Lawyers for
Human Rights. Many of them face violence, intimidation,
detention, and torture. Yet, they continue to stand up for
democracy, for reform, and for civil and human rights. They are
committed to holding the government of national unity
accountable. Some of them are also working to hold SADC
accountable.
I am pleased to welcome Mr. Dewa Mavhinga of Crisis in
Zimbabwe Coalition to represent the views of the Zimbabwean
civil society to our panel today.
In this time of civilian-led uprisings across Africa and
the Arab world, which has led to the demise of such formidable
strong men as Mubarak and Ghadafi, it is difficult to digest
that just 3 years ago a compromise approach to regime change in
Africa was deemed acceptable by some. Of course, the 2008
Global Political Agreement is far from perfect, but many
believed that it was the most viable option for democratic
change at the time.
However, we saw with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in
Sudan, and we still see it, the signing of a political or a
peace agreement does not automatically bring dramatic change
and security, as we can see in Abyei and Southern Kordofan and
other areas of Sudan. Rather, it is a starting point from which
to build. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, as they
say.
Unfortunately, President Mugabe's ZANU-PF and the aligned
security sector leaders have used brutal force to obstruct the
reform process and attempted to divert attention away from the
GPA by calling for hasty elections in March of next year.
Domestic, regional, and international stakeholders have all
stressed that elections should not occur until the Southern
African Development Community, SADC, can facilitate the
necessary framework for free and fair elections. Rushing the
process and failing to implement necessary reforms prior to the
elections could result in increased violence and
destabilization that would threaten the entire area.
Nevertheless, Mugabe continues to campaign, claiming only
God can remove him from the presidency. And his supporters in
the security sector continue to use harassment and intimidation
tactics to suppress the opposition.
I was disturbed to learn that just yesterday police
officers aligned with the ZANU-PF sealed off the MDC campaign
headquarters and used tear gas on MDC supporters and
bystanders.
The guarantors of the political agreement, the Africa Union
and the Southern African Development Community, SADC, have
begun to tire of Mugabe's obstructionist tactics. Earlier this
year, South Africa's President Jacob Zuma and SADC made it
clear to Mugabe that ZANU-PF must adhere to the provisions of
the GPA, end violence against MDC supporters, contemplate
significant changes to the country's governmental operation
procedures, or else forfeit regional legitimacy.
It is against this backdrop of intimidation and violence
that we now consider U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe. Many
observers believe that the new determination by South Africa
and SADC to resolve the crisis presents the United States with
a political opening to reinvigorate our engagement with SADC in
order to help ensure orderly democratic transition in Zimbabwe.
I agree that the United States and international community
must do whatever we can to support SADC's mediation efforts
while also engaging reform-minded elements within Zimbabwe's
unity government. And, of course, we should also continue to
engage and support Zimbabwe's civil society leaders in their
effort to press for reform.
Beginning in 2003, under President Bush and continuing
under President Obama, the United States has implemented
targeted sanctions against leaders of the ZANU-PF party for
their violations of the rights of the Zimbabwean people. In
addition to sanctions, the U.S. has placed restrictions on the
aid that can be granted to Zimbabwe. Due to defaults in its
debt service to the U.S., the unity government is ineligible to
receive direct assistance.
While I certainly agree that we should mount significant
pressure on any government officials who suppress the
democratic will of the people, I want to ensure that our
efforts to punish unjust leaders do not inadvertently harm
innocent civilians. I am pleased that the State Department
continues to review and revise the sanctions list to ensure
that entities that do not belong on the list are removed.
What's more, in the case of Zimbabwe, we must be doing
everything in our power to support reform-minded leaders in the
unity government, such as MDC's Minister of Finance, Tendai
Biti, who has implemented innovative and impactful reforms
under extreme, difficult circumstances.
That is why in the previous Congress I introduced H.R.
5971, the Zimbabwe Renewal Act of 2010. This act would
authorize debt forgiveness with Zimbabwe by U.S. Government
agencies. I have not yet reintroduced a bill for this Congress
because I want to take the testimony we hear today into careful
consideration before revising the legislation.
I am particularly interested to hear from our witnesses on
the assessment of the progress that Prime Minister Morgan
Tsvangirai and the MDC formations have made in implementing
critical reforms as well as recommendations on how the U.S. can
best support those reforms and meaningful democratic transition
in Zimbabwe.
Thank you again, Chairman Smith, for agreeing to hold this
important hearing. I look forward to the witnesses' testimony.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne.
Without objection, the full bios of our distinguished
witnesses will be made a part of the record.
But, in short form, Ambassador Johnnie Carson currently
serves as Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African
Affairs, a position he has held since May 2009.
Ambassador Carson has a long and distinguished career in
public service, including 37 years in the Foreign Service,
including serving as our Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda, and as
Mr. Payne reminded us, to Zimbabwe itself. Ambassador Carson
has also served as the staff director of the House Africa
Subcommittee and as Peace Corps volunteer in Tanzania.
Ambassador Carson is also the recipient of numerous awards for
his service from the U.S. Department of State.
We will then hear from Ms. Sharon Cromer, who is currently
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Africa Bureau of
USAID, a position she has held since May 2010. Ms. Cromer is a
Senior USAID Foreign Service Officer with more than 20 years of
experience in the international humanitarian and development
assistance area.
Upon her return to Washington in 2009, Ms. Cromer served as
Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict,
and Humanitarian Assistance on a temporary basis before
assuming the position as Deputy Administrator in the Bureau of
Management.
Ambassador Carson, if you could begin?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Carson. Thank you very much. Chairman Smith and
Ranking Member Payne, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you concerning the situation in Zimbabwe and about U.S./
Zimbabwean relations.
Zimbabwe is a country of enormous economic, agricultural,
and mineral potential. Unfortunately, a history of fiscal
mismanagement for governance and a culture of political
violence have limited that potential for nearly 15 years. While
some visible improvements have been made, serious challenges
remain.
After a deeply flawed and violent election in 2008,
Zimbabwe's former opposition parties are now part of a
transitional coalitional government that has lasted nearly 3
years. This coalition government was established under the
stewardship of the Southern African Development Community as a
key element in the Global Political Agreement which was
negotiated between the two opposing parties to end political
violence and move past the contested elections.
Although significant challenges remain on the political
front, there has been some progress. A tripartisan
parliamentary committee has sought input for a new draft
constitution from millions of Zimbabweans.
Zimbabwe's economy, which was dollarized in 2009, has made
a remarkable recovery. The International Monetary Fund
estimated that Zimbabwe's gross domestic product grew at
approximately 9 percent in 2010.
Humanitarian need has decreased significantly since 2009,
when 7 million people received humanitarian aid. In January
2012, the number of people needing humanitarian assistance is
projected to be just 1 million. Schools and health clinics
previously closed due to a lack of staff and supplies have been
reopened and are providing vital social services to the
Zimbabwean people.
At the same time, substantial progress has been impeded by
censorship, weak rule of law, and the continued political
manipulation of state institutions. Politically motivated
harassment, intimidation, and violence continue, and state
institutions are beholden to partisan agendas.
The United States has always supported the aspirations of
the people of Zimbabwe to create a country that would truly
empower its citizens. In the 1960s and 1970s, we supported
United Nations' efforts to pressure Rhodesian authorities to
accept majority rule. The United States was the first country
to extend diplomatic relations to the newly-independent
Zimbabwe in April 1980. We have also voiced our concern when
the liberation era leadership has taken actions that have
threatened Zimbabwe's stability, prosperity, and development as
a modern, democratic state.
The United States sanctions program is the most visible
manifestation of our concern. Today our sanctions target 121
individuals and 69 entities, pursuant to Executive orders
issued to focus on those individuals and those institutions
undermining democracy in Zimbabwe. These sanctions began in
March 2003.
Much has changed in Zimbabwe since then, and our sanctions
regime has reflected those changes. Over the past year, the
Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control has
modified the sanctions list, adding or deleting names on the
list to reflect some of the political changes occurring in
Zimbabwe itself. The administration will continue to ensure the
targeted sanctions program remains meaningful and accurate and
relevant.
At the same time, the United States is working to help to
develop a strong, democratic, market-oriented Zimbabwe and to
respond to the country's humanitarian needs. We have provided
nearly $1 billion in assistance to Zimbabwe from Fiscal Year
2006 through Fiscal Year 2011.
I will defer to my USAID colleague, Senior Deputy Assistant
Administrator Sharon Cromer, to talk more in-depth about USAID
programs.
The next 2 years will be a test for Zimbabwe, and the world
will be watching very carefully to see if its political leaders
stick to the commitments that they made to hold free and fair
elections according to a roadmap negotiated with the assistance
of the Southern African Development Community.
Zimbabwe's future will not depend on the actions of any one
individual or even one political party. It will depend on the
collective decisions Zimbabwe's people make to replace a legacy
of political violence and one-party rule with a culture of
tolerance, reconciliation, and the depoliticalization of state
institutions.
We are contributing to empowering Zimbabweans to build the
markets and the institutions necessary to determine their own
future. The United States values partnerships with nations
whose leaders demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law and
the free flow of information. These features form the
foundation of stable, growth-oriented democracies all over the
world and will be a key factor governing our relationship with
the Government of Zimbabwe in the years to come.
If Zimbabwe's political parties implement the commitments
that they, themselves, have made in the Global Political
Agreement and the electoral roadmap, there will be clear
imperative for the United States to reconsider our current
sanctions policy.
Specifically, this would mean the holding of free, fair,
and internationally monitored elections. It will also require
state institutions to be delinked from ZANU-PF. The Department
of State will continue to press for the protection of human
rights and accountability for those who abuse them, while
acknowledging progress where and when it is made.
It would be a mistake if I did not mention Zimbabwe's
importance to the Southern African region. Zimbabwe shares
borders with South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique. It
is a critical transportation hub, a rich resource of talent,
and a country with great economic potential and promise.
Unfortunately, as we saw in 2008, the unstable political
situation in Zimbabwe affects all the countries around it.
Partisan influence over elements of the security sector and the
use of these forces for violent actions and intimidation
against political opponents has led to a darkening of the
security sector's reputation, both at home and abroad.
Zimbabwe's neighbors are still feeling the effects of the
refugee flows and the economic collapse that occurred in
Zimbabwe earlier.
It is important to note the areas of concern and also those
of stalemate, as we often do, but also to recognize progress
and change when it occurs in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is a young
nation with a long colonial legacy to overcome. Social,
political, and economic advances do not happen quickly, nor
will they necessarily follow an American or Western model.
Implementation of the Global Political Agreement has been
problematic from the very beginning, but the Southern African
Development Community takes its mediating role seriously. And I
am confident that they will not allow elections to go forward
if it appears that the prevailing conditions will lead to a
repeat of the 2008 crisis.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Payne, I want to thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you today. I will be
happy to answer any questions that you may have. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, thank you so much for your
testimony.
Ms. Cromer?
STATEMENT OF MS. SHARON CROMER, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Cromer. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Member Payne, and members of the subcommittee. I would like to
thank you for inviting me to speak today.
I appreciate your continued interest in how U.S. policies
and assistance programs can bring about positive change in
Zimbabwe.
I would also like to thank Assistant Secretary Carson for
his continued commitment to this issue and his unyielding
support of USAID.
Today I would like to share three points. First, I will
provide an update on USAID programs. Second, I would like to
discuss how U.S. Government resources are carefully targeted to
ensure they comply with policy and legal restrictions. And
lastly, I would like to share how, in line with USAID reforms,
we are strengthening capacity of local organizations.
First, our program. In Zimbabwe, supporting the return of a
stable, representative democracy is our number one priority.
During the past decade, a country that was previously the bread
basket of southern Africa has deteriorated into chronic food
and security and abysmal health and nutrition conditions. It is
clear that the backsliding we have seen in Zimbabwe is directly
related to poor governance.
For these reasons, Zimbabwe is a tragic, but notable
example of the linkages between governance, food security,
poverty, and health. Our program addresses these elements and
makes these linkages.
One of the most critical reform efforts that USAID supports
is the parliamentary-led, constitution-making process. USAID
has supported the Parliamentary Select Committee and civil
society in their efforts to solicit public input and debate
issues of national interest. This provides an important avenue
for peaceful political participation, particularly among youth.
As a result of USAID support, the parliamentary committees
now regularly hold public hearings on key pieces of
legislation, including those addressing human rights and
electoral processes. In addition, parliamentary standing rules
now allow the Prime Minister a question-and-answer period for
the first time.
Our work to support democracy in governance is a critical,
standalone objective of our program, as well as the foundation
for our work in other sectors. Under Administrator Shah, USAID
as a whole is reemphasizing the importance of integrating
democracy, human rights, and governance into the three
Presidential initiatives being implemented worldwide.
Through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief,
USAID assistance supports 80,000 HIV-positive individuals with
lifesaving antiretroviral therapy, representing about one-
quarter of all clients in the country, and counseling and
testing for 350,000 individuals per year.
We also provide education, social, and medical support for
60,000 orphans and vulnerable children. Our maternal and health
assistance programs not only strengthen routine immunization
services, but will also introduce vaccines that prevent two
major causes of child deaths, pneumonia and diarrhea.
USAID works with small-holder farmers and small-scale
traders and producers to increase agricultural production and
marketing, enhance value-chain competitiveness, improve food
security and nutrition, and increase rural incomes. USAID is
also engaging the Government of Zimbabwe in important food
security policy and strategy discussions.
Zimbabwe has seen a decline in the need for humanitarian
assistance, as the Assistant Secretary has said, over the past
3 years, from 7 million people requiring emergency food
assistance in 2009 to an estimated 1 million in 2012.
USAID also supports activities that improve access to clean
water, provide hygiene education, and mitigate the risk of
waterborne diseases, such as cholera.
It is important to acknowledge that while humanitarian
needs have decreased rapidly, USAID may still need to provide
humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable until the
Government of Zimbabwe can do so.
The second point is that USAID, in consultation with other
donors and our Embassy in Harare, remains diligent in ensuring
that none of our assistance is diverted or misused. U.S.
Government sanctions against designated individuals and
institutions are carefully observed in the award of contracts
and grants and the designation of beneficiaries of assistance.
All USAID funding in Zimbabwe is obligated through unilateral
agreements with individual contractors and grantees. None of
the funding is channeled through the Government of Zimbabwe,
either directly or indirectly as a subawardee. The agency's new
requirement to conduct a security risk assessment prior to
obligation also serves as a mission-level control to keep U.S.
foreign assistance funding out of the hands of the government
as a whole and sanctioned individuals in particular.
While some activities, such as technical assistance to
strengthen ministries, are for the benefit of the Government of
Zimbabwe, such funding will continue to be channeled through
NGOs and possibly contractors, provided that they are given
required waivers, until the Government of Zimbabwe demonstrates
adequate progress on key benchmarks and legal restrictions are
lifted.
All of our activities are done in close consultation with
Congress, the State Department and Treasury Department, and the
national security staff, and are consistent with the U.S.
Government's overall strategy and policy for this period.
The third and final point is that, in harmony with the
letter and the spirit of restrictions on our assistance, we
seek partnerships to strengthen local organizations that are
providing key services and support to the local population. We
are committed to building democratic African institutions, so
that Africans can decide their own future.
In this vein, we identify and work with organizations that
can contribute technically to USAID program implementation and
strengthen the sustainability of our efforts. But we also
provide, in addition to this technical program assistance, we
provide to these organizations training in business skills,
strategy formulation, project implementation, and advocacy.
Currently, Zimbabwe poses an extremely difficult operating
environment for civil society organizations that are trying to
improve health, livelihoods, freedom, and human rights for
their fellow Zimbabweans. They face harassments and threats
from the very government that should be their ally.
U.S. support will continue to be flexible and responsive,
emphasizing Zimbabwean efforts to establish participatory
processes and capacity development of reform-minded and reform-
oriented institutions, both at the national and local levels.
This approach sets the foundation for Zimbabwe, when it
eventually achieves a truly representative system, to be able
to reclaim its previous successes.
Change must come from within the country, and it will not
happen overnight. At the same time, U.S. support has been able
to make targeted gains toward improving health, economic
sustainability, and democratic systems in Zimbabwe, while
ensuring those subject to sanctions do not benefit from our
assistance.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I
welcome your questions and look forward to continuing our
discussion. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cromer follows:]
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Mr. Fortenberry [presiding]. Thank you, Ms. Cromer, for
your testimony, and we appreciate your willingness to be here.
I am quickly getting caught up. I am sorry I missed the
first part of the hearing, but we will turn now to questions.
Ambassador Carson, thank you as well for your testimony. I
will start with you.
The United States was the first country to extend
diplomatic relations to Zimbabwe. You were once the Ambassador
there. Could you go a little bit more into the history of why
the relationship has been so contentious for so long, even
predating our recent appropriate criticism of human rights and
the political process or the breakdown of political process
there?
Ambassador Carson. Thank you very, very much for that
question.
The relationship with Zimbabwe has not always been
contentious. It has had its ups and its downs. I would say that
in early 1980, as reflected by the fact that the United States
was the first country to recognize Zimbabwe, that in the early
years of that relationship we got along reasonably well with a
new Zimbabwean Government, a Zimbabwean Government that
benefitted from our diplomatic efforts along with British
diplomatic efforts to lead to that country's independence.
The United States Congress, in the late 1970s, played a
critical role in maintaining sanctions on the Smith regime. I
believe the new Zimbabwean Government appreciated that greatly.
Relations started to deteriorate somewhat in the mid-1980s
because of the violence that was perpetrated by ZANU against
its main rival, ZAPU, in which hundreds, tens of hundreds of
people were killed in Matabeleland. We protested those human
rights records and encouraged reconciliation. That
reconciliation did, in fact, come and it resulted in the merger
of ZANU and ZAPU into what we now have as ZANU-PF.
Our relationship, fast-forward, started to deteriorate
quite rapidly in the late 1990s, largely as a result of the
government's allowing of massive land invasions and undermining
the legitimacy of land titles and human rights in that country.
We also were alarmed at the increasing rise of corruption in
the government and, also, the harassment of political
opposition movements that were opposed to ZANU-PF.
It has been an episodic up and down, but it has not always
been a bad relationship. As I said, in 1980, if we had gone
back and looked in time, half of the Cabinet that came in in
1980 was U.S.-educated, educated as a result of scholarships
given by the U.S. Government to many of those ministers.
Let me say that one of the things that Mr. Mugabe
constantly raises and criticizes the United States about is the
fact that he believes, I think quite wrongly, that the United
States promised to provide a massive amount of money to his
government in order to help buy White Zimbabwean-owned farms
and transfer them to Black Zimbabweans. The historical record
on that has been examined many times. In fact, there was no
commitment of the type that he suggests was made.
I can go into some degree of detail because we have over
time said to the Zimbabweans we were willing to help them
engage in transparent, legitimate, and meaningful land reform,
but it had to be transparent; it had to be based on a willing
seller/a willing buyer basis; that government officials could
not themselves be a part of the process, and that the
transparency of this had to be done in a way that all were able
to participate, knowing that there was no preference for those
in one party or for part of the leadership.
I think that is a quick summation, but it has been an
episodic relationship.
Mr. Fortenberry. Well, thank you for that and, also, for
reminding us of the difficulty in terms of the undermining of
the rule of law and legitimate land title issues that clearly
are part of this episodic problem, as you rightly point out.
Thank you.
Ms. Cromer, let me turn to you and ask you a related
question in this sense: In Zambia we saw an excellent example
of fair and free elections and a peaceful transition from
power, as you point out, and an effort that was led and
determined by the Zambian people.
Given the proximity and the neighborhood, explain why
similar dynamics cannot seem to arise in Zimbabwe?
Ms. Cromer. Thank you for that question.
It is difficult for free and fair elections to arise in a
country where the majority of the population aren't allowed to
voice opinion and participate in a democratic process. We are
working very diligently with the Parliament and certain parts
of the unity government to support reform-minded individuals
and processes to allow the citizens of Zimbabwe to have such a
voice, particularly the youth, to give them an opportunity for
peaceful engagement and meaningful engagement.
The mechanics of an election are important. That process,
that democratic process is important, but we also believe that
the daily opportunities of individuals to share in the decision
making that goes on in their country is also a critical part of
democracy. So, it is not a particular election that is
important, but it is the entire democratic process.
Mr. Fortenberry. Well, I would like to point out democracy
cannot bring about the values upon which it rests. So, is this
repression, fear, but also a structural problem in terms of
civil society that does not empower the organization, the
advancement of people, the willingness of people to come
forward and promote this type of civil society structure? Is it
all of the above?
Ms. Cromer. You have a courageous civil society in
Zimbabwe. There are civil society organizations, like the one I
think you will hear from in the next panel, that are making
courageous attempts to give voice to the aspirations of the
people of Zimbabwe, and to provide basic services to those
people. But they are constantly harassed and their efforts are
diminished.
So, under USAID's reform efforts, we are putting a great
deal of emphasis on building the capacity of local
organizations to not only deliver technically, but to also
serve as advocates for reform and change and to work more
effectively. But, again, these organizations come under
enormous pressure, and we appreciate their courageousness and
their willingness to step forward.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.
With that, I will turn to our ranking member, Mr. Payne of
New Jersey.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask, Secretary Carson, what in your assessment of
Zimbabwe's coalition, what is your assessment of the coalition
government, and how do you see the influence or lack of
authority from Prime Minister Tsvangirai? Is there any kind of
parity in the government in your opinion?
Ambassador Carson. The coalition government has worked only
marginally well, marginally well. It has many more shortcomings
than it does have positive assets and benefits.
The most positive thing that can be said about the
coalition is that it has brought all three parties together.
They are working as a team, sometimes not very efficiently or
well, but it has brought them together to enter into
discussions and to debate and discuss public business.
But to suggest that it has gone smoothly would be a great
mistake. Over the last 3 years, there have been numerous
occasions when Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai has publicly
stated that the Global Political Agreement has not been honored
by President Mugabe, that President Mugabe has not consulted
him on Cabinet appointments, on the selection of district
administrators, on the appointment of Zimbabwean ambassadors
abroad. And he has also not consulted him on policies in which
the Prime Minister should be directly involved.
There have been numerous occasions in which the Prime
Minister has said that he was on the verge of leaving the
coalition because of the failure to consult and to make
progress on elements related to the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement.
There have been continued reports of harassment of MDC/
Tsvangirai political officials by ZANU-PF security personnel,
both the police and the military. MDC has had great trouble
organizing itself and protecting its constituents.
Where we have seen some benefit is in the leadership of the
Finance Minister, Mr. Tendai Biti. There is absolutely no
question that he has brought a sense of management and fiscal
responsibility and organization to the Ministry of Finance that
was not previously there. There is a great deal of
accountability, and he seeks to ensure that budgets are
established in a transparent way, that funds coming into the
treasury are distributed according to the manner in which
Parliament has determined they should be, and that these funds
get out to government ministries and officials.
So, Tendai Biti has been successful. He has had
difficulties working with the bank Governor, who remains very
close and loyal to Mr. Mugabe. But he has done, given the
constraints, an excellent job.
Several of the other ministers who are a part of the MDC
have also acquitted themselves extraordinarily well. But they
have done this in very difficult situations, as I said, under
political harassment in the field. You, yourself, mentioned in
your opening remarks about a demonstration that occurred just
in front of Harvest House, which wasn't directed initially at
the MDC. But there are these concerns that continue to linger.
It has been a difficult and sometimes strained marriage
that has been held together by the marriage counseling provided
by South Africa and SADC.
Mr. Payne. Just a quick point on that. As we remember,
former President Mbeki was sort of non-decisive as it related
to Zimbabwe. It seems like President Jacob Zuma has taken a
stronger stand. Do you see a real difference in the new
approach from President Zuma, and do you think this will push
Mr. Mugabe to really consider reforms?
Ambassador Carson. I think that South Africa's stewardship
of the process of reconciliation or promoting reconciliation in
Zimbabwe has been strengthened during the period in which
President Zuma has been the head of state in South Africa. I
think there have been two very good, recent SADC conferences in
which SADC, under the leadership of South Africa, has placed
some clear requirements for progress on Zimbabwe. We hope that
the Zimbabwean Government will heed those requirements and
criteria.
First and foremost, clearly, has been the requirement that
the new constitution be completed and that there be a
referendum on that constitution prior to the holding of any new
national elections. Mr. Mugabe would clearly like to have
elections early, but it is clear from what we are hearing from
SADC and from the South Africans that they want the ZANU-PF
leadership to follow the roadmap that SADC has laid out, which
is in line with a full implementation of the Global Political
Agreement, a new constitution after consultations, a
referendum, and then national elections. There are other things
that are also required that have to be done as a part of the
roadmap.
Mr. Payne. My final question, as my time has about expired.
Deputy Administrator Cromer, in your testimony you discussed
the USAID's democracy-in-governance efforts, including your
role in facilitating civil society input in the formation of
the new constitution and engaging reform-minded elements within
the unity government. It is my understanding that USAID's
democracy-and-governance program for Zimbabwe is currently
under review.
Would you be kind enough to elaborate on the program,
particularly any challenges you have faced in dealing with the
unity government and what assistance, if any, is the U.S.
providing to ensure Zimbabwe's next election is fair and free,
and maybe when it might be held in 2012, what portion of it, if
you would? And the constitution review, are we involved in
helping them on that constitutional review?
Ms. Cromer. Thank you.
Given the significant delay in finalizing a new
constitution, and the need for a referendum, as the Assistant
Secretary has said, in advance of the next elections, like the
Assistant Secretary, we don't believe that the groundwork has
been laid for elections in the near-term. We think late 2012 at
the earliest, but a lot of work needs to be done.
The overall goal of assistance in this area is to
contribute to creating conditions for credible electoral
processes in Zimbabwe, including the constitutional referendum,
working on election administration, domestic observation,
political party strengthening for Presidential, parliamentary,
and local elections. It is a big order. Support to the
Zimbabwean Electoral Commission aims to develop a transparent
and credible process for electoral administration.
In a country-specific and tailor-made way, responses to the
knowledge and capacity gaps in the Electoral Commission system
in Zimbabwe have to be analyzed and the capacity-building
efforts have to be focused on the needs specific to the
Electoral Commission in Zimbabwe. We anticipate that training
support, voter registration, civic and voter awareness,
political finance, and voter dispute resolution are all things
that need to be addressed.
Lastly, domestic observation needs to focus on greater
transparency and accountability in the Zimbabwe electoral
process, and strengthening the civil society's ability to serve
as observers of the election process is going to be critical.
So, all of this is what was seen in Zambia, I am sure, and
what we don't see at this point in Zimbabwe, and we will need
to work hard to achieve this.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.
Mr. Turner from New York, did you have any questions?
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, not at this time.
Mr. Fortenberry. Let me ask a final quick question of you
both. According to press reports, the international diamond
regulators have agreed to allow Zimbabwe to trade up to $2
billion in diamonds. Does this have the potential to underwrite
the ruling elite and undermine legitimate electoral process?
Ambassador Carson. Sir, let me, if I could, respond to
that. Occurring right now in Kinshasa, the DRC, is one of the
yearly intercessional meetings of the Kimberley Process. The
Kimberley Process was established over a dozen years ago in
order to prevent conflict minerals, and diamonds in particular,
from getting into the marketplace, diamonds that were used by
rebel groups to fund their criminal activities undermining
governments and destroying the lives and human rights of
citizens across the continent.
The Kimberley Process has, in fact, been very effective in
dealing with conflict diamonds in places like Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Central African Republic, Angola, and others. I say this
as a preface because the Kimberley Process has been under
enormous stress over the last 2 years, 3 years, because of the
discovery of diamonds in an area called Marange in Zimbabwe,
and the use of government elements to go in and exploit these
diamonds in a way in which the human rights of artisanal miners
and others have been undermined and destroyed.
The Kimberley Process and we have been pushing very hard to
try to come up with a way to ensure that the diamonds from
Marange would, in fact, be brought under some kind of
supervision, that there would be a monitoring of the diamonds
taken out of these conflict areas in Zimbabwe, that civil
society would have an opportunity to go in and view for
themselves whether there were illegal or criminal activities
going on there.
We have been working very hard inside of the Kimberley
Process to encourage greater respect. This has resulted, in the
last 2 days, an agreement has been reached, an agreement that
was pushed forward by the European Union. It is an agreement
that has been endorsed by the Kimberley Process countries.
The agreement is far from perfect. The United States did
not vote for it. We abstained because we thought the barriers
were a little bit too low.
But it does represent an opportunity again for the
international community to go in and ensure that diamonds
coming out of Marange are not the result of human rights
violations, and that they are monitored, the sales of these
diamonds are monitored in a transparent fashion.
Revenues from these diamonds will, in fact, go into the
hands of a variety of individuals, including the government.
But it does, in fact, establish a level of procedure that will
ensure that human rights violations are not occurring and that
some of the egregious activities that were undertaken by the
Zimbabwe military several years ago will stop, and if they do
occur, will be monitored and reported on.
So, it is a step forward. It is not a perfect step because
this is not a problem that was originally anticipated when the
Kimberley Process was established. It was established to
monitor the diamonds being sold by rebel groups, not diamonds
which were being handled by a government.
Mr. Fortenberry. Well, you answered one side of the coin in
regards to a potential process to stop the exploitation of
vulnerable people, but the other side of the coin as to where
this revenue is going to go leaves us a little bit uncertain as
to the answer to my question, whether this could potentially
undermine legitimate electoral reforms.
I just give you a sense of this based upon the quote from
the Mining Minister who said, ``We are going to shock the
world. We are going to unleash our worthiness. Zimbabwe will no
longer be begging for anything from anybody,'' which suggests
that this is not necessarily an attempt to join a responsible
community of nations in some sort of organized trade fashion.
So, I just submit that to you. I respect what you said in
terms of this process being partially effective in preventing
the type of exploitation of vulnerable folks, but, again, where
is the money going to go? That is, I think, a very open-ended
question here.
Ambassador Carson. If I could respond? The response is
clearly this amount of money will be a shot of adrenaline, but
it will not, in fact, be long-term sustenance. The Zimbabwe
economy will take more than just Marange diamonds to recover
from the low level in which it has been operating over the last
decade and a half.
Zimbabwe needs to rebuild its agriculture, reestablish its
tourism, rebuild its mineral sector, and rebuild the financial
basis on which it has been able to operate.
Mr. Fortenberry. All excellent points.
Ambassador Carson. It is a shot of adrenaline, but not very
much----
Mr. Fortenberry. But can we be assured that these funds
will actually go toward that capacity-building? I think that is
perhaps a question that could be further explored, maybe even
in the next panel.
But Mr. Payne?
Mr. Payne. Right, and I agree. There already have been some
complaints by Mr. Biti, the Finance Minister, that the funds
are not getting where they should be. But we certainly should
encourage them to go to improve the quality of life for the
people in the country, and not to bolster the government to
strengthen the military or some other nefarious kind of
activities that would not be beneficial.
I have a quick sort of similar question to Ambassador
Carson. You mention in your testimony that the State Department
is doing what you can within the confines of the targeted
sanctions program to promote Zimbabwe's economic recovery and
to highlight opportunities to invest for investments that will
benefit U.S. and Zimbabwe businesses.
Could you elaborate on that? What are we doing? And are we
engaging small and medium-sized or minority businesses? Are we
engaging Zimbabwe and the American diaspora community?
And the other thing I wonder, how can U.S. businesses
engage with Zimbabwean businesses while still complying with
U.S. sanctions? Someone in my district said he was going to try
to do a small business in some kind of stones, not diamonds or
anything, but Zimbabwe means rock, actually. There is a certain
kind of rock stone that is used in kitchens, or whatever, and
he was interested in getting involved in that. So, I wonder,
what is the stance that we have as it relates to small
businesses or things of that nature?
Ambassador Carson. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
It is worth iterating again that we do not have
comprehensive sanctions against Zimbabwe. We have very precise
and targeted sanctions against those individuals in senior
leadership positions who are most responsible for undermining
the democracy of the country and the human rights of its
citizens, 121 individuals and three dozen companies, companies
that are owned by ZANU-PF, companies that are owned and run and
operated by the military.
There is no prohibition that would limit an American
company from being able to go in and to effectively do business
in Zimbabwe. If, for example, Coca-Cola or Pepsi-Cola or
somebody like that has an operation there, they could continue
to operate. If there were agricultural companies, Pioneer,
Cargill, Monsanto, they can continue to operate there. They can
sell seed and fertilizer. They can buy product. They can
process product and sell it in-country.
And so, it is not designed, these sanctions are not
designed to hurt the Zimbabwe population, but to hurt those
individuals in senior leadership positions in Zimbabwe who are
most responsible for undermining the rule of law in that
country. That is where we go.
We have, through our USAID programs, been engaged in trying
to help small-scale agriculture and agriculturalists in
Zimbabwe, including establishing some new admittedly small
programs since the MDC joined the government. We have given out
small grants to farmers to help increase their agricultural
production. We hope that some of this will be used not only for
subsistence, but also surplus to be sold into the marketplace.
So, there are programs and there are ways to work with
small-scale operators through some agricultural programs and,
also, through some micro finance and micro lending operations.
And, yes, our Ambassador in Zimbabwe recently helped to bring a
group of Zimbabwean businessmen here to try and promote
business in Zimbabwe. None of that is against any law or
against any sanction.
I would be the first to say that, given the macroeconomic
conditions in the country, given the way in which the
government has talked about indigenization plans, the way in
which the courts have operated inconsistently and unfairly in
the protection of both civil liberties and corporate liberties,
the companies will think more than once about going in there,
but it is not against the law for them to think about it and to
be able to exploit opportunities as they come up in the
country.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Fortenberry. I thank the gentleman.
I think that will conclude our panel. Thank you, Ms. Cromer
and Ambassador Carson, for coming today and for your insightful
testimony.
Mr. Ambassador, I learned something about you a moment ago.
I understand that much earlier in your career you were staff
director for this very subcommittee. We are very happy to see
that we helped launch you into such a successful career
trajectory. So, thank you for your service.
Ambassador Carson. Let me say that it is true; I can't run
away from my history. I spent 4 years here. I was, in fact, a
Foreign Service officer at the time when I was asked to come up
here.
Mr. Fortenberry. Well, you wear the scars well. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Carson. Let me just say I learned a great deal
from being up here. I hope that my Foreign Service career was
well on a positive trajectory before I arrived. Maybe it got a
little bit of a catalyst while I was here, but that is subject
to debate as well.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you both for coming today.
We will move now to our next panel. We welcome you all
today. Thank you so much for joining us.
Let me first introduce Mr. Mark Schneider of the
International Crisis Group. Mr. Schneider joined the
International Crisis Group in the spring of 2001 as senior vice
president and special advisor on Latin America. He directs the
Washington Advocacy Office, conveying Crisis Group analyses and
recommendations to the White House, the State Department, the
Department of Defense, Congress, as well as the World Bank. He
also serves as special advisor on Latin America and on HIV/AIDS
and security.
Before joining the International Crisis Group, he served as
Director of the Peace Corps and as Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Human Rights.
Welcome, Mr. Schneider.
I will introduce all of you, and then we will turn to you,
Mr. Schneider, for your opening remarks.
Mr. Paul Fagan is with the International Republican
Institute. Welcome.
Mr. Fagan began his career at the International Republican
Institute in 1995. He currently serves as the regional director
for Africa, where his duties include oversight of the program
in Zimbabwe. He served as the first East Africa resident
regional director based in Kenya and as IRI's resident country
director for Zimbabwe. He served in this position through
Zimbabwe's parliamentary elections in 2005. He later served as
acting deputy director for Africa and has served on election
observation missions in African, European, and Asian countries.
Welcome.
Mr. Dewa Mavhinga is with the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition.
Mr. Mavhinga is a human rights lawyer and activist currently
working as regional coordinator for the Crisis in Zimbabwe
Coalition, based in South Africa. Mr. Mavhinga has previously
worked with Human Rights Watch, in London, in the African
Division as a researcher on Zimbabwe.
He has conducted extensive research on the human rights
situation in that country and has lobbied at the Southern
African Development Community, the Africa Union, and the United
Nations Human Rights Council.
Welcome as well.
Mr. Schneider, would you care to begin, please?
STATEMENT OF MR. MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
Mr. Schneider. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank the chairman and the subcommittee, the ranking member,
and the other members for the opportunity to testify today.
I think it is extremely important, the timing of this
hearing. As we heard earlier, only yesterday the Zimbabwe
security forces tear-gassed and invaded the headquarters of the
opposition MDC party in Harare.
Crisis Group is an independent, non-governmental, non-
partisan organization that, through field-based analysis,
policy recommendations, and advocacy, seeks to prevent
conflict. We are active in some 62 countries around the world.
In Africa, we have four subregion programs that focus on the
Horn of Africa, Central Africa, West Africa, and Southern
Africa.
Mr. Chairman, Zimbabwe currently is in the midst of another
national struggle. As we heard earlier, its first one was for
independence. It is now in another struggle to move from what
has been dictatorship to democracy.
For 30 years, since its independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe
has ruled uninterruptedly. His age and ill health now virtually
guarantees new national leadership. It is that very prospect
that has been the core of resistance to democratic change by
his party, ZANU-PF, and by Zimbabwe security forces.
To some degree, what we have seen since 2000 is the obvious
exhaustion of that de facto one-party state and the rejection
by the population of efforts to sustain it. As a result, he has
remained in power essentially through repression, flawed
elections, and, unfortunately, economic measures that, as you
have heard, have sent Zimbabwe basically into the lower ranges
of global human development. The UNDP's ranking for Zimbabwe
now is in the 170-173 range of the countries of the world.
Just as one example, even today with a slight increase last
year in GDP, there is somewhere between 90 and 95 percent
unemployment in the country. As you have heard, since the
violent and tainted electoral process in 2008, only massive
diplomatic intervention by SADC and the African Union prevented
a major implosion in the country.
And the Global Political Agreement that was signed then and
that set up this coalition government was aimed at doing two
things fundamentally: One was normalizing political processes,
and the other was fostering the conditions for free and fair
elections. Unfortunately, I would even go further than the
earlier testimony. Most of the major GPA reforms have not been
achieved. Particularly, the ZANU-PF forces have impeded or
ignored its implementation. Commissions have been named, but
not staffed. Laws have been passed, but not enforced.
And the building blocks of credible elections are yet to be
put in place. I think that you have heard there has been an
effort made to push through early elections, even in the
absence of those building blocks, adequate voting rolls, a
balance in the secretariat of the Zimbabwe Electoral
Commission. The same people who ran the 2008 election continue
to staff that body, and that has been a major concern.
SADC and the African Union were co-guarantors of the GPA
and given the responsibility to monitor it. I will say that
only this year have we seen the first really strong critique
from SADC that came about in April of this year. There were
promised deployments that have still not materialized in terms
of support for a monitoring process.
I think that the sine qua non for progress right now is the
approval of a roadmap to elections. It was tentatively drafted
in April with the support of SADC. In July, the negotiators
said, ``We agree to this.'' There are still gaps, but the party
leaders have not yet approved it. Until there is movement to
put that roadmap into effect, we are not going to get to
credible elections. The result could well be another violent
experience that occurred in 2008.
Just quickly, there are three key issues: One is an end to
state-sponsored violence; the second is achieving some degree
of security sector reform; and a third is, as I said, altering
the control by ZANU-PF of the Electoral Commission secretariat.
That is the only way that we are going to see clear movement,
get constitutional reform, the referendum, and then movement
toward general elections.
In addition to what you have heard today, the state-
sponsored violence has also included not simply the attack
yesterday and this tear-gassing, but several weeks ago, again,
the invasion by a ZANU-PF militia of the head party
headquarters. The rallies by MDC have been broken up by
physical force. The members of the MDC who are members of the
Cabinet, a half a dozen of them have been arrested since last
April, then released, all on bogus charges. Just to give you
some sense, about a third of the MDC members of Parliament who
have come into the Parliament since 2008 have been arrested at
least once by the security forces.
Also, it wasn't mentioned, but I think it is important to
note that the former defense head, Solomon Mujuru, died in
August at his farm under very questionable circumstances.
Within the governing party, he had been a source of moderation,
and his wife, as you know, is Vice President. They had been
seen as elements that were looking for a compromise and for
moving forward on GPA. So, it is of great concern that this has
occurred.
Second, I think that on security sector reform, there are
key things that were in the roadmap that seemingly were agreed
to that have not moved forward. As I said as well, the Zimbabwe
Election Commission secretariat needs to be more balanced and
more professionalized.
I think the key outside actors are SADC and the African
Union, but the United States does have a critical role to play.
I will simply note here that the U.S. engagement needs to be
done in lockstep, if you will, with SADC and with the efforts
of the facilitator, President Jacob Zuma. That is the only way
that we are going to be able to support a process in which the
GPA and the roadmap will move forward.
I think that it is clear from the earlier testimony that we
see President Zuma as taking a much more active role now. The
U.S. can play a significant role, but needs to support that
process. And we can go into the details of my testimony, which
I hope would be put into the record, about some of the elements
in terms of support for the electoral process, the electoral
observation, the effort to carry out some sort of countrywide
dissemination of the constitutional reforms before the
referendum. So, support for that process would be very
important.
Similarly, on the media reform, the U.S. can support the
efforts by SADC to push that forward. These would be some of
the areas where we believe it would be possible to strengthen
the process of moving this situation from where it is today. If
it continues on the current path, it is more likely to implode
than to progress.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
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Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you for your testimony, Mr.
Schneider.
If there is no objection, all testimonies will be included
in the record today. Hearing none.
Mr. Fagan, we will recognize you now.
I am going to try to expedite the hearing a little bit and
put on our time clock here, so that we have ample time to
unpack all the issues. So, if you could stay within the 5-
minute limit, that would be helpful.
STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL FAGAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA,
INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE
Mr. Fagan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Payne, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify today.
This is a summary of my statement.
This testimony marks the third time since 2005 that a
representative from IRI has come before this committee to talk
about Zimbabwe. Looking back on the 6 years, what is striking
is that, while much has changed, Zimbabwe's democratic growth
and U.S. policy toward it have remained rather static.
This is perhaps due to the fact that Zimbabwe poses a
difficult, but unique policy challenge to the United States.
The very nature of Zimbabwe's coalition government often
shields Mugabe and ZANU-PF from action by the opposition.
Further, overt condemnation of Mugabe, his party, and his
government for things other than the most egregious of crimes
has a potential to backfire. Mugabe has been successful at
blaming Zimbabwe's ills on external intervention. Finally, the
coalition government has managed to bring just enough stability
to Zimbabwe to enable it to be overshadowed by other
emergencies on the African continent.
It is time, however, to start paying more attention to
Zimbabwe. The imminent constitutional referendum, the national
elections, have the potential to graduate the crisis from a
steady, but manageable simmer to boiling over.
The merits of Zimbabwe's power-sharing agreement have been
debated from the start. On the one hand, the
institutionalization of the MDC into government has resulted in
some tangible progress for the country, particularly with
regard to the economy. On the other hand, power-sharing
agreements have become an oft-considered diplomatic tool to put
an end to rampant political violence in Africa.
While ending violence is always a worthy and immediate
goal, IRI and other democracy organizations rightly become
concerned when the will of the people is ignored. Further, the
government of national unity can generally be characterized as
an unholy marriage of contradicting interests, with the
constitutional reform process and the roadmap to national
elections currently proving to be the greatest stumbling blocks
to the Global Peace Agreement implementation.
The constitutional reform process, while important, has
been marred by difficulties from the start. Logistical
difficulties and high levels of violence tarnish this
opportunity for citizens to engage in the democratic process,
leading Prime Minister Tsvangirai to publicly refer to the
constitutional reform process as ``a circus.'' A draft of the
revised constitution is now optimistically expected in
December, pushing the referendum, originally scheduled for mid-
2011, to sometime early next year.
On numerous occasions, the government of national unity
partners have looked to quick elections as only an escape from
the difficult and often ineffective arrangement that binds
them. This July, a SADC facilitation team was able to achieve
consensus from all three party partners that elections should
be held in late 2012, but President Mugabe made a public
statement shortly thereafter declaring his intent to
unilaterally call elections for next March.
Assuming that the GPA partners can come to a final
agreement on an election date, numerous conditions must also be
met for free and fair elections to occur, which have been
mentioned here previously, including the institution of an
impartial election commission through creation of an accurate
voters' roll, the opening of space for independent media,
meaningful electoral reform, and, most importantly, an end to
tactics of violence and intimidation.
As the U.S. Government reviews its policy for engagement
with Zimbabwe, I would encourage the following recommendations
to be taken into consideration: One, the U.S. should develop a
more robust policy toward Zimbabwe that extends beyond targeted
sanctions and involves a higher level of direct engagement with
the ongoing crisis. Further, the U.S. must articulate that the
only acceptable outcome for Zimbabwe is one reached through a
peaceful, free, and fair democratic process.
Two, SADC should be the leading force in resolving the
Zimbabwe crisis. Southern African leaders have historically
taken a soft position toward Mugabe, but this stance has
steadily eroded.
If there is something positive to be taken from the
Zimbabwe crisis, it is the extent to which SADC has come to
take seriously its role as the guarantor of the GPA, and any
action taken by the U.S. should be done in a manner that
complements and supports SADC efforts.
Third, it has been long rumored that Mugabe is suffering
from poor health and that ZANU-PF is plagued by internal
conflict. A post-Mugabe era could spur the ascendency of
moderate or hard-line factions of ZANU-PF to party leadership
positions and government positions. The U.S. should prepare
contingency plans for both scenarios, as either would
drastically alter the status quo with significant ramifications
for U.S. engagement.
Finally, the United States has at its disposal a number of
key State Department officials who will prove great assets in
the design of a cohesive, comprehensive policy, including
Secretary Carson; of course, the U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe,
Charles Ray; the U.S. Ambassador to Botswana, Michelle Gavin,
who is also the United States representative to SADC; Under
Secretary Maria Otero, and Assistant Secretary for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, Michael Posner. To the greatest extent
possible, these and other U.S. key government partners should
play a more proactive and integrative role in the design and
implementation of U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a pleasure.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fagan follows:]
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Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Fagan.
Mr. Mavhinga?
STATEMENT OF MR. DEWA MAVHINGA, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, CRISIS IN
ZIMBABWE COALITION
Mr. Mavhinga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. It is a singular honor for me to address this
distinguished committee to give testimony on the U.S. policy
toward Zimbabwe. I wish to thank you profoundly for taking time
to reflect on the initiatives to support the people of
Zimbabwe.
My work as regional coordinator for Crisis in Zimbabwe
Coalition, a grouping of civil society organizations that are
working to help create a genuinely free and democratic
Zimbabwe, keeps me in touch with the ongoing efforts to resolve
the governance crisis in my country.
Since the signing of the Global Political Agreement, the
GPA, in September 2008, which created the inclusive government
between the former ruling party ZANU-PF and the two factions of
the MDC, some progress has been made to reverse the country's
catastrophic economic decline and restore normalcy to people's
lives. But several critical steps remain to be taken by both
Zimbabwe and the members of the international community,
including the U.S. Government, to guarantee sustainable peace
and development.
Mr. Chairman, largely due to President Robert Mugabe and
ZANU-PF party's unwillingness to institute fundamental reforms,
Zimbabwe has failed to restore the rule of law, to ensure that
the next elections are free and fair, and to provide justice
for victims of abuses or to bring the perpetrators of those
abuses, particularly the horrific electoral violence of 2008,
to account and to create a viable roadmap that will pave the
way toward a genuine transition to a free, democratic, and open
society.
But for the following reasons, among others, Zimbabwe is
not ready to hold democratic elections: Key state institutions,
particularly those responsible for the administration of
elections, remain unreformed and partisan toward ZANU-PF.
Although the inclusive government has appointed a new Zimbabwe
Electoral Commission, its secretariat has not been reviewed to
ensure independence and non-partisanship in the discharge of
its mandate.
Zimbabwe's voters' roll cannot be used for elections, as it
remains outdated and largely inaccurate. A survey released
earlier this year estimated that a third of the voters on the
roll were dead.
Senior leaders within the security sector continue to
publicly, and unconstitutionally, proclaim partisanship toward
ZANU-PF. For instance, on 27 May 2011, Brigadier General
Douglas Nyikayaramba of the Zimbabwe National Army told a
weekly paper that the military wants elections held in 2011,
which will be won by ZANU-PF, adding that, ``Truly speaking, I
am in ZANU-PF and ZANU-PF is in me and you cannot change
that.''
Uniformed members of the security forces have also been
implicated in perpetrating violence against perceived ZANU-PF
opponents and in directly campaigning for ZANU-PF. The security
sector played a key role in preventing the MDC, which clearly
won the 2008 elections, from taking power, and there is little
likelihood of a genuine and peaceful transition without the
transformation of the security sector.
While the government has lifted restrictions on print
media, it has maintained tight control over ZANU-PF-aligned and
state-owned radio and television stations. There are no private
radio or television stations operating in Zimbabwe.
The constitutional reform exercise is yet to be finalized.
Some progress has been made in the area of drafting a new
constitution under the GPA, but the constitutional review
process is over a year behind and is taking place under
difficult circumstances of extreme polarization, conflict,
intolerance, and inadequate funding. There is the expectation
that, now with legal drafters in place, there should be a
national referendum for the constitution by March 2012. We
demand that there be a new constitution in place before
Zimbabwe can be ready to hold fresh elections that are
credible, free, and fair, and where violence and intimidation
play no part.
Our regional bloc, SADC, has made a significant policy
shift on Zimbabwe. Driven largely by its mediator, South
Africa, SADC has condemned violence and intimidation in its
resolution in March 2011. SADC has also rejected ZANU-PF's push
for elections in 2011 and has insisted on the full
implementation of the GPA. SADC urged its Troika organ on
defense, politics, and security to deploy representatives to
participate in the monitoring of the implementation of the GPA
and the election roadmap.
The inclusive government has managed to restore a measure
of stability to our economy by scrapping our local currency in
favor of a multi-currency system driven by the U.S. dollar. Our
agriculture and local industries are performing way below
capacity, and for the ordinary Zimbabwean, life continues to be
a huge struggle with unemployment. Well over 90 percent and at
least 70 percent of our population lives on less than $1 per
day.
While there is economic growth that has been witnessed over
the past few years, this economic gain is unsustainable if
there is no solid political foundation. And the debate around
the indigenization bill that seeks to take over 51 percent of
shares from foreign-owned companies raises serious concerns and
undermines possibilities for foreign direct investment.
Most of the revenue from diamonds, which could play a
pivotal role in boosting the state spending on key social
sectors and supporting overall economic development, has
largely bypassed the formal government structures controlled by
Finance Minister Tendai Biti of the MDC. Lack of transparency
and accountability for the vast diamond revenue raises serious
risk that the money could be used to finance a violent
election, if one is called prematurely in the absence of
mechanisms to prevent state-sponsored violence.
I wish to thank the U.S. Government for its humanitarian
support to the people of Zimbabwe and support to civil society
groups, and I wish to submit the following recommendations for
your consideration: The U.S. Government should actively
encourage and support the emerging SADC consensus on Zimbabwe
relating to the need to establish a legitimate government
through genuinely free and fair elections that are preceded by
a new constitution and other necessary reforms.
The U.S. Congress should avoid any legislative initiatives
on Zimbabwe at the moment, including repealing ZDERA, the
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, or targeted
sanctions, until after genuinely democratic elections have
ushered in a legitimate government reflective of our people's
wishes.
The people of Zimbabwe have benefitted greatly from the
support rendered by the American people to civil society groups
working in the fields of democracy and governance. We
understand that support is being cut. I would urge the U.S.
Government not only to reverse those cuts that are threatening
to undermine the work of critical organizations, but also to
consider increasing support to democracy and governance work
through USAID at this vital stage in our transition. The key
areas of work include: Finalizing the constitution review
process; instituting and promoting electoral reforms;
protecting human rights defenders; promoting human rights
education and advocacy, and long-term monitoring and
observation of elections.
The U.S. Government should support the United Nations'
deployment of a human rights advisor based in Zimbabwe and
long-term deployment of election observers in order to prevent
state-sponsored violence and intimidation.
Issues of transparency and accountability and the rule of
law must be included in a prudent Kimberley Process mandate and
must be used to assess the entire diamond production chain from
the negotiation and signing of contracts to production, tax
payment, and revenue management. The Kimberley Process mandate
should be expanded to involve the monitoring and oversight of
the investment and the disposition of revenues and from
resource extraction.
Thank you so much for this opportunity to address you. I
welcome questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mavhinga follows:]
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Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Mavhinga.
Let me go to you first, and along with Mr. Fagan, because I
want to reconcile statements that each of you made, if that is
possible.
Mr. Fagan, you alluded to the fact that regional leaders
have taken a soft position on Mugabe. And yet, Mr. Mavhinga,
you spoke of an emerging southern consensus for a legitimate
electoral process. I would like to understand that dynamic.
Mr. Mavhinga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our understanding is that over the years, particularly if
we look at the role of South Africa from President Mbeki's era
where there was focus on building consensus among the political
parties in Zimbabwe, and certainly within SADC, to the current
arrangement for Zimbabwe, President Zuma is actively pushing
for Zimbabwe to comply with electoral demands. It is due to the
work of SADC and other additional players that ZANU-PF's push
for elections this year was defeated. So, for us, it is
significant that SADC is now making the right kind of noises to
stop elections in Zimbabwe and to insist on benchmarks before
elections can be held, which include a new constitution.
Mr. Fortenberry. Do you care to comment on this, Mr. Fagan?
Mr. Fagan. Sure. I think I agree. I think in the past what
we saw, especially with President Mbeki, was this soft
diplomacy that was characterized throughout his presidency, and
it didn't have much impact on the crisis in Zimbabwe. Now we
see, I would say, a much more dramatic change in what
President----
Mr. Fortenberry. So, these aren't irreconcilable positions?
It is just a changing dynamic on a timeline?
Mr. Fagan. I believe so, yes.
Mr. Fortenberry. Okay. Let me ask all of you a hard
question because it is a question that the Representatives here
have to constantly answer, and it is an important question that
many Americans ask. Why should we be involved here? Now I will
give a partial answer to it, but I would like to also hear
yours.
It is, first of all, very difficult for Americans to sit
idly by while other people are being repressed or even killed
or they are rendered hopeless because of their political
situation. We have a great deal of heart in this country and a
great deal of generosity for the cries of humanity. Second is
we also like to benefit from mutual exchange, whether that is
cultural or trade. And third is it is for our own national
security interest. Those combinations of converging factors
generally create the dynamic in which we have an active foreign
policy.
But I think it is important for you all to answer that
question in the context of this specific country, where, using
the Ambassador's language, our relationship has been so
episodic with its ups and downs.
Mr. Schneider, do you want to try that?
Mr. Schneider. I will be happy to, but I will say, Mr.
Chairman, that you gave a fairly good framework there for the
response. But I think that it is not simply Zimbabwe. It is
southern Africa, and that what happens in Zimbabwe, whether
they succeed in moving toward political stability, a democratic
process, and restoring what was a very dynamic economy, will
affect the future of the entire region. There you are talking
about a region that really does have not just significant
economic but political security issues.
To be frank, over the course of several decades, it is
clear the United States is simply unable, nor should it, to
remain unaffected when it sees an entire region, essentially,
under threat, vulnerable, and possibly vulnerable to
involvement by criminal or other organizations that do pose
threats to the region as a whole and to this country.
But I think the fundamental reason is the one you said
earlier. If we have an opportunity to assist countries in
moving in the right direction, it is important to do so. And,
clearly, we do in this case.
Second, the opportunity for Zimbabwe and southern Africa to
increase their prosperity is very clear. If this moves in the
right direction, Zimbabwe should be able to move back on a
steadily-progressive slope to restore its economy. Remember,
its economy declined 50 percent. GDP in Zimbabwe declined 50
percent since 1998.
And so, what you want to do is to see what you can do to
help move that in the right direction. As you said, there is a
security issue, and it is not just focused on Zimbabwe; it is
focused on Southern Africa as a whole.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.
Mr. Fagan?
Mr. Fagan. Sir, I think that is a very difficult question
to answer. I have an emotional attachment to Zimbabwe, so I
might have a different response personally than I do maybe, you
know, if you are coming from the American public side.
I would probably just point to the fact that Zimbabwe is
not maybe as strategically as important to American security
interest as maybe Nigeria, Angola, because of oil issues and
other natural resources. It might not be as important as
Somalia with the issue of terrorism and Al-Shabaab, and how it
really does pose a security risk to the United States.
But I would liken it to the situation of Rwanda of 1994.
Did the United States have as much of a security interest in
Rwanda? But what did we deal with in the aftermath? Almost 1
million people died in a very short period of time.
In Zimbabwe, we have a similar situation where a crisis has
occurred over the past decade. I don't think you will see a
country on the continent that has changed so dramatically
without an actual conflict. There hasn't been war. There has
been obviously constant violence and intimidation on behalf of
ZANU-PF.
But, as the United States, I believe we are a leader in the
area of promoting democracy on these issues, and we can't stand
idly by just because Zimbabwe poses less of a security interest
than, say, Angola, Nigeria, Somalia, and Kenya. But I would
agree with Mr. Schneider it is a regional issue. If you
continue to let Zimbabwe deteriorate, it has had a major
implication on the economy of South Africa, if you look at
their own unemployment numbers. There has been a dramatic
backlash against Zimbabweans and other nationalities in South
Africa. It poses a huge economic problem for Botswana and
Mozambique, Zambia. So, economically, it poses----
Mr. Fortenberry. Well, this is a tough situation because,
clearly, it is coming out of a difficult post-colonial period
in which things clearly had to change and put itself on a
trajectory to potentially be a strong country. And yet, these
self-inflicted wounds by the political leadership and the
irrationality, it is simply hard to understand, basically
creating implosion internally simply to hold onto power, or for
whatever is the irrational motive that is going on there. It is
very hard to understand.
But I appreciate your insight, your answer.
Mr. Mavhinga, do you live in Zimbabwe?
Mr. Mavhinga. Yes, Mr. Chairman, but I work out of South
Africa.
Mr. Fortenberry. Yes.
Mr. Mavhinga. Only last week I was in----
Mr. Fortenberry. So, what are conditions like for you? Are
you free to speak in this way at home as you are to us? And
thank you for your courage in doing so.
Mr. Mavhinga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Conditions are very difficult. We are living under serious
difficulties economically. But perhaps to answer your first
question, we believe in terms of the defense of values of human
rights, good democracy values, that there isn't enough for us
to appeal to the U.S. Government to support the promotion of
strong democratic institutions.
Mr. Fortenberry. I find it very interesting, and I thank
you for saying that. Again, when we are answering the hard
question before the American people as to why we should put
resources into any particular area, based upon the criteria
which I laid out, the humanitarian cause, the opportunity for
benefits of mutual exchange, or national security concerns, I
am constantly amazed, and frankly refreshed, by the fact that
so many other people who are struggling for the types of
stability and liberties that we enjoy here, even though the
United States' reputation seems to be deteriorated
internationally, yet there is a constant turning to us because
of the fundamentals that are in place here and the ideals that
we invest in, both philosophically and culturally; namely, that
each person has inherent dignity and, therefore, rights. And
that becomes a model for the proper use of authority in our
country.
So, you are asking the hard question, ``Please continue to
support us,'' but I think in doing so it compliments who we
are. I don't mean to project on you what you are thinking, but
I assume shaking your head means yes.
Yes, thank you very much.
Mr. Payne?
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, and thank you for coming
all the way here to our hearing. We appreciate you, Mr.
Mavhinga, for the work that you do and the struggle that you
continue.
Let me just maybe ask, and any of the panelists can
certainly answer, do you think that the SADC troika now is
really serious, and do you think that they will make a real
difference? Anyone can answer.
Mr. Schneider. I think the honest answer is that we hope
so. In recent discussions, as I said, since March, they have
issued the first public critique of the failure of the
political party leaders to move forward.
Second, at the last meeting of SADC, they took this draft
roadmap that had been negotiated supposedly in July and they
went through it. It is our hope that they will, in fact, do
some things like send staff to support the joint monitoring
effort, send staff from SADC into Zimbabwe to help with the
electoral machinery, and send staff in to set up very early, 6
months at least before the election, a nationwide observation
process to support the national one. But it is crucial for SADC
to be on the ground throughout Zimbabwe if there is to be any
hope for this process to work successfully.
Mr. Mavhinga. Thank you for that. There is hope to believe
that SADC is now much more focused and is clear about the
challenges in Zimbabwe which relate to the central question of
legitimacy of the state in that they have insisted on the need
to have elections that meet SADC minimum conditions governing
democratic elections. So, SADC is onsite.
What we hope will happen is that the international
community, including the U.S. Government, would then rally
around the emerging consensus within SADC to support that move
and to support mechanisms for free and fair elections.
Mr. Payne. Right. I think that we want to be helpful.
However, in many instances if the U.S. gets involved in front
of the movement, then the people in power then use that as
saying the U.S. is trying to dominate, sort of like we did in
Libya. We let the Europeans take the lead, and then we were in
a supportive role. Hopefully, we will be able to do that with
SADC taking the leadership, but we could have the technical
assistance, be in the background, have the financial resources
that are important.
I wonder, Mr. Mavhinga, how am I doing with your name?
Pretty good or fair? Okay, you know who I am talking about,
right? Okay.
What do you think the hard-liners, do you think that Mr.
Mugabe is partly a prisoner, people wanting him to stay
because, if he leaves, some of the bad fellows feel that they
have no more protection? I have heard that argument.
And about the women there, are the WOZA women, who have
been so strong by approaching military people with flowers as
they are beaten sometimes by the police and by the military
authorities, is their movement still moving forward?
Finally, how is the teachers' union holding up? Are they
showing any resistance to Mr. Mugabe and his government?
Mr. Mavhinga. Thank you for that. On the question of hard-
liners or whether President Mugabe is a prisoner, my considered
view is that it is a complex situation, but President Mugabe is
not certainly a prisoner, but perhaps he is prisoner of the
circumstance of his own making, in the sense that he left ZANU-
PF too late to make arrangements for legal transition and
leadership renewal within his party and in government. So that
now creates complications for him in terms of controlling the
various factions within his party.
Certainly, there are those within his inner circle around
him from the military who fear prosecution, but not only that,
they also wish to defend their economic interests. President
Mugabe has had in place an elaborate system of patronage that
has benefitted those around him. So, they need to keep that
arrangement going, and this is one of the reasons why they
would want to fight off any succession or to insist that
President Mugabe should continue to be their Presidential
election candidate next year, when he turns 88.
In terms of WOZA, the Women of Zimbabwe Arise, movement
going forward, the challenge that we have in Zimbabwe is that
of a de facto military state in terms of the control of balance
on the population and the use of fear. So, there is a lot of
repression coming from sections of the military and the police
that blocks the movement by WOZA and other civic groups to
rally and demand change. The same applies with the teachers'
union and resistance from other quarters within the civic.
We are trying very much, but, as we have heard in the last
few days, even yesterday, the sections of the police loyal to
President Mugabe continue to unleash violence on civilians,
continue to unleash violence on civil society actors. So, these
are the circumstances within which we are operating at the
moment.
Mr. Payne. I know that it is a tough question. I don't want
to get you in the middle of politics, but I think when Prime
Minister Morgan Tsvangirai started MDC, he started with the
local elections. They won overwhelmingly. There was so much
support for MDC. Somehow it seems that his focus became
lessened and MDC split off a little bit, and he sort of seemed
to have lost some of the luster.
Do you feel that Mr. Tsvangirai, the Prime Minister, still
has that zeal that began or is there another candidate that
could possibly topple Mr. Mugabe?
Mr. Mavhinga. I believe that Prime Minister Morgan
Tsvangirai and the MDC have got truly a number of challenges
over the last decade that they have been in existence and in
political leadership of the opposition. Perhaps there were
challenges around the decision to go into the inclusive
government and the politics of appeasement, an approach that
perhaps Prime Minister Tsvangirai took in the hope that to
appease Mugabe would be to draw concessions out of him.
This has not worked. The hard-liners and those around
President Mugabe insisted that there would be no reforms. So,
although we have the commitments on paper in terms of the
Global Political Agreement, those reforms have not come into
being. So, that has weakened the position of Prime Minister
Tsvangirai and the MDC.
But I am convinced that if we have a conducive environment,
free and fair elections, and free political activity, then
Prime Minister Tsvangirai will win the election overwhelmingly
and will be able to deliver change. The challenge that is there
is the continued control of the political and the electoral
space by the military or the captains of the military who are
loyal to President Mugabe and who are openly partisan to ZANU-
PF.
Mr. Payne. Okay. My time has expired. But, as you may or
may not know, I was able to get a meeting with President Mugabe
about 2 years ago, being the first American to really get him
to meet.
Of course, I had been in Rhodesia way back, and I, of
course, knew about his--I was there when the Rhodesia military
was out hunting down ZANU and ZAPU Freedom Fighters. And so, he
was aware of that, and I had been an admirer of him and Joshua
Nkomo for many years during the day of the struggle, which he
knew, and I did relate after he talked a long time about the
persecution of the West and how they were mistreating them.
But in the last several-hour meeting, I did get an
opportunity to talk about the legacy they left, the education
that they had done, the struggle that he had won, the fact that
they led the way even for South Africa to defeat, when they
defeated Ian Smith, that P.W. Botha's regime came down, and
that they supported the arms struggle in South Africa; and that
all of this is being lost on these years when you are having
your officers beat women; you have judges who are giving
decisions; you have people in your security force who torture.
And how could you go from being such a revered leader to me as
a young person, when he was in such leadership, to the position
where he would allow these things to occur? And we really did
have a frank discussion.
But it is unfortunate that he has allowed himself to
deteriorate to the point, and all that legacy of--as you know,
the education of the Zimbabweans surpassed anyone in Africa,
sub-Saharan Africa. As a matter of fact, it was part of a
xenophobia problem in South Africa because of that situation of
highly-educated Zimbabweans in South Africa, and their feeling
they had taken their jobs, and so forth.
So, I hope that one day he might once again just see the
light and remember those days and come back to sanity.
But thank you so much for coming.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Turner of New York?
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to think the United States is trying to help
promote democracy, prosperity, the rule of law. To that end,
next year there is a requested appropriation for over $100
million in non-humanitarian aid.
In your opinion--and I can ask this collectively--will this
be helping prop up a basically criminal regime? Are we working
against our own purposes? And if we are to do this, are there
recommended checks we can do, so that we are not working
against ourselves or against the people of Zimbabwe?
Mr. Schneider. Thank you very much for the question.
Actually, I think that when you look in detail at the kinds of
programs, virtually none of the programs are going through the
government. Most of the programs are going to non-governmental
organizations and civil society organizations. There is a lot
of focus on the human rights activist organizations. There is
an effort to strengthen the capacity of micro-enterprise and
small business.
So, I think to some degree what they are trying to do
through this program is to provide the building blocks
ultimately of democracy. So that, if the political leadership
moves in the direction that it should, that this kind of
program can support civil society and activists participating
in the next stage in Zimbabwe's development.
Also, they are primed, as I understand it, to work to
strengthen the technical capacities of the Election Commission
once they make the right decisions.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Fagan. I would go a step further and say I am not sure
exactly what that money is going to be used for. But in the
past, I would say a lot of the groups have benefitted from the
U.S. support to democratic activists, whether they----
Mr. Schneider. Is your microphone on?
Mr. Fagan. I think it is. Sorry, I was stepping away.
So, I don't think the funding that has gone to and will go
toward Zimbabwean activists helps support the regime. I think
it helps support democratic activists, keeping the space open,
whereby if the United States didn't support these activists and
organizations, you would see a much smaller democracy movement.
You would see a much less vibrant opposition.
I think it remains critical that the United States remain
engaged in this way. I think we have done a fairly decent job
in the past, but it is a difficult situation. It is a difficult
country to operate in. So, the support is necessary and very
helpful. It doesn't go to support, I would say, ZANU-PF and the
regime.
Mr. Mavhinga. Thank you. I would want to agree, yes, that
the support has likely benefitted civil society groupings, and
that in terms of supporting reforms, under the framework of the
Global Political Agreement, there is a fairly accountable and
transparent mechanism that is controlled by the Finance
Minister, Tendai Biti, who is from the MDC, who has done a lot
to clean up the system. Much of the support bypasses the
central bank of Zimbabwe, where the leadership has politically
been aligned to ZANU-PF and to President Mugabe.
So, there are mechanisms that are in place to ensure
accountability and transparency, and to prevent the money
falling into the wrong hands. So, the support is appreciated.
We believe that during this transitional period we really need
to increase support to civil society groups and to supporting
reforms in the area of electoral reforms, constitutional
reforms, and also to support initiatives and a multilateral
fund through the United Nations' arrangements to support what
is happening in Zimbabwe toward democratic transition.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Fortenberry. Yield back?
Mr. Turner. I yield back.
Mr. Fortenberry. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Schneider. One other point is that a significant
portion of that, about $44 million, goes directly to non-
governmental maternal/child health programs and HIV/AIDS
prevention. So, again, it is going directly in that case for
humanitarian and basic human needs.
Mr. Fortenberry. The first part of the testimony, before
you were able to join us, Mr. Turner, covered some of that
ground, but it is an appropriate question to re-ask.
And thank you, gentlemen, for answering it.
Well, that concludes our panel. I want to thank you all for
joining us today and for your leadership on this important
issue.
With that, we will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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