[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN CENTRAL
AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LORD'S
RESISTANCE ARMY DISARMAMENT AND
NORTHERN UGANDA RECOVERY ACT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 25, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-77
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New YorkAs
of October 5, 2011 deg.
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Donald Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 8
The Honorable Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense. 15
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Donald Yamamoto: Prepared statement................ 11
The Honorable Alexander Vershbow: Prepared statement............. 17
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 46
Hearing minutes.................................................. 47
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Statement by the Honorable James M. Inhofe, a U.S.
Senator from the State of Oklahoma............................. 49
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement............... 51
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 53
The Honorable Karen Bass, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California: Prepared statement........................ 55
DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN CENTRAL AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY DISARMAMENT AND NORTHERN UGANDA RECOVERY ACT
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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order.
That was my gavel. We improvise. But before we begin, I'd like
to acknowledge the presence of Ms. Evelyn Apoko.
Evelyn, is that you right there? Thank you, Evelyn. Evelyn,
if you could stand a second? Thank you. Evelyn is an LRA
survivor who has traveled to Washington to witness this
important hearing firsthand. We thank her for coming and for
her continued efforts on behalf of children impacted by this
horrific conflict.
After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr.
Berman, for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will
recognize the chair and ranking member of the Africa Global
Health and Human Rights Subcommittee for 3 minutes and the
chair and ranking member of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
and Trade Subcommittee also for 3 minutes each for their
opening remarks.
We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection
the witnesses' prepared statements will be made a part of the
record. And members may have 5 legislative days to insert
statements and questions for the record subject to the length
limitations in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. The
Department of State has included the Lord's Resistance Army,
LRA, on the ``Terrorist Exclusion List'' since 2001. In 2008,
its leader, Joseph Kony, was designated as a ``Specially
Designated Global Terrorist'' (SDGT). The LRA is responsible
for one of the longest, most violent, yet most under reported
conflicts in Africa--a conflict which has spread from Northern
Uganda to South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and Central African Republic--and threatens costly U.S.
investments in peace and stability in the region. It is a
predatory, guerilla force which has perpetrated some of the
most deplorable human rights atrocities known to man.
The LRA makes no attempt to hold territories but murders,
mutilates, tortures, rapes and loots with impunity. They move
in small groups with limited communication, striking remote
villages, slaughtering civilians, abducting woman and children
to serve as fighters, porters, and sex slaves. It has been
estimated that more than 80 percent of the LRA is comprised of
abducted children. These children are forced to commit
atrocities in front of their families and participate in
bizarre indoctrination rituals before being forced to fight.
Those who manage to escape find it difficult, if not
impossible, to return home.
But we are not here today to determine whether Joseph Kony
is evil. We know that he is. We are here because in May 2010,
the President signed into law the Lord's Resistance Army
Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. With the backing
of thousands of committed advocates, including from my own
District, and with over 200 co-sponsors in the House and some
64 co-sponsors in the Senate, the act enjoyed overwhelming
support. It required the President to develop a comprehensive
strategy to deal with the LRA and established that it shall be
the policy of the United States to: ``Provide political,
economic, military, and intelligence support for viable
multilateral efforts to protect civilians, apprehend or
eliminate top LRA commanders, and disarm and demobilize
remaining LRA fighters.''
The President's strategy was released in November 2010. It
set four strategic objectives: (1) increased protection of
civilians;(2) apprehension to or ``removal'' of Kony and other
senior LRA commanders; (3) promotion of defections from the LRA
and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of
remaining LRA combatants; and lastly, provision of humanitarian
relief to affected communities.
The strategy emphasized that the U.S. will ``work with
national government and regional organizations'' to accomplish
these goals. What steps did the U.S. undertake in the last year
to achieve the objectives outlined in this strategy? That is
what we will be focusing on with our witnesses.
Further, I would to ask our distinguished witnesses to
summarize for the committee, what progress had been achieved
toward meeting the strategic objectives before the President's
recent announcement that U.S. troops were being deployed to
central Africa? On October 14, 2011, the President transmitted
a report, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, informing
the Congress that: ``In furtherance of the Congress' stated
policy, I have authorized a small number of combat-equipped
U.S. forces to deploy to central Africa to provide assistance
to regional forces that are working toward the removal of
Joseph Kony from the battlefield.'' He further stated:
``Although the U.S. forces are combat equipped, they will only
be providing information, advice, and assistance to partner
nation forces, and they will not themselves engage LRA forces
unless necessary for self-defense.''
As the sole House committee of jurisdiction for the LRA Act
and the primary committee of jurisdiction over the War Powers
Act, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that this action
complies with both the letter and the spirit of the law and
further U.S. national security interests. Pertinent information
related to this mission, such as the anticipated cost, the
scope the duration of this deployment, was omitted from the
report to Congress. We need clarity on the rules of engagement,
the mission parameters, and the definition of success, as well
as how U.S. military presence in central Africa furthers U.S.
national security interests and the objectives outlined in the
President's November 2010 strategy. What is the precise nature
of the assistance that will be provided to our partners, and
how will these partners be vetted? Does the submission of the
October 14th report to Congress start the clock on reporting
and authorization requirements, consistent with the War Powers
Resolution? If not, why? Does the administration interpret the
LRA Act as an authorization of use of force?
We intend to address these issues and more throughout the
course of the hearing.
Thank you to the Assistant Secretary Vershbow for attending
and the Ambassador, for making yourselves available to testify
on this very important issue today. We thank both of you,
gentlemen.
I now am pleased to recognize my good friend, Mr. Berman,
the ranking member for his opening remarks.
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Two weeks
ago, the Obama administration announced that it would send
about 100 U.S. military advisors to central Africa to support
regional efforts to defeat the Lord's Resistance Army or LRA.
Following that announcement, many questions were raised about
the deployment. Why the LRA? Why now? And what specific role
will our forces play on the ground? This timely hearing
provides an excellent opportunity to discuss those important
issues.
As noted in President Obama's October 14th letter to the
Speaker, and as reflected in the title of this hearing, it is
Congress that played a leading role in putting the LRA on our
foreign policy agenda. For years, the House and Senate passed
resolutions drawing attention to the LRA's reign of terror. And
in 2010, as noted, Congress passed The Lord's Resistance Army
Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. That bipartisan
legislation which President Obama signed into law, required the
administration to develop a comprehensive strategy for
dismantling the LRA and protecting civilians throughout the
region.
We've all heard about the horrors perpetrated by the LRA
and its deranged leader, Joseph Kony: Mass killing, rape,
mutilation of innocent civilians, children forced to kill their
neighbors and family members, more than 20,000 children
abducted and forced to become soldiers or sex slaves, nearly 2
million people displaced, and tens of thousands murdered.
While the LRA may not pose a direct national security
threat to the U.S. in narrowly-defined terms, it does threaten
the stability of a large swath of central Africa, the size of
California. This region includes South Sudan, the newest nation
in the world, whose independence efforts the U.S. strongly
supported; Uganda, one of America's strongest allies in the
fight against Al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda linked terrorist
organization; the Central African Republic and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, two countries that face significant
challenges policing their territories and whose civilians are
currently suffering the brunt of LRA's atrocities.
I believe it is squarely in our national interest to build
the capacity of allied forces so that they can fight bad actors
on their own and to support our allies when they need
assistance as we expect them to do for us.
The U.S. and the international community have long
recognized that the LRA poses a serious threat to the stability
of central Africa and have taken a number of steps to stop
their barbaric behavior. In 2005, the International Criminal
Court indicted Joseph Kony and three of his commanders for
crimes against humanity. The U.S. placed the LRA on the
terrorist exclusion list and Joseph Kony on the specially-
designated global terrorist list.
From 2006 to 2008, Uganda tried to negotiate a peace
agreement with the group only to have Kony walk away from the
final deal. Uganda, Southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo then launched a joint military operation, but
failed to apprehend Kony or stop the LRA.
I'm very hopeful that the administration's comprehensive
strategy, including the deployment of a modest number of
combat-equipped advisors will finally help turn the tide in the
struggle against the LRA. While most of the focus has been on
the military dimension of the strategy, it's important to
remember that civilian-led programs are also an integral part
of this effort. These include constant diplomatic engagement
with all of the central Africa countries to maintain strong
cooperation; a robust demobilization, disarmament,
repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration program;
effective public awareness campaigns to encourage child
soldiers and mid-ranking LRA members to abandon the group; and
reconstruction assistance for devastated communities.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the
goals and expectations for the military deployment, as well as
the details of these critical civilian efforts.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Berman, for your
opening statement. I'm pleased to yield 3 minutes to Mr. Royce,
the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Madam Chairman. The LRA has been
pillaging central Africa for a generation now under the
sadistic Joseph Kony. That group exists for one reason: To
kill, capture and to resupply for the next plunder. There is no
other reason for the Lord's Resistance Army's existence. And
this savagery has landed Kony and his LRA on U.S. terrorism
lists. His targets are children; 70,000 girls and boys have
been abducted and I must say it's good to see Evelyn here. We
appreciate her efforts on behalf of other abducted girls and
boys. But one boy told how he was forced to kill eight other
children. The victims were surrounded in a circle. Children
were forced to take turns bashing them with a bat in a
collective kill. Now if this is not a crime against humanity, I
don't know what is. And it was orchestrated by Kony. And with
these horrors in mind, Congress passed legislation to counter
the LRA threat.
We pressed the administration to be bold, to develop a plan
to help apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders
from the battlefield. A broad coalition of young activists was
key to passing this legislation. So the administration is now
sending small teams, specializing in training foreign units to
give information and advice. This is the reason the U.S. Africa
Command was created. This mission, which recognizes the need
for a light footprint is targeted assistance. This is far from
the peacekeeping model that has proven unsuccessful and
wasteful elsewhere.
The U.S. has made a big commitment in South Sudan. The LRA
threatens to destabilize this new country. We provided
humanitarian relief when LRA attacks forced millions to flee
their homes. This deployment seeks to eliminate the root of
these problems and the need for these commitments.
The Africans aren't sitting on their hands. The Ugandans
are fighting al-Qaeda terrorists in Somalia, but they'd like
some help getting Kony. That is a fair deal. Sometimes just
getting rid of one person does make a big difference. History
is full of captivating leaders with bad ideas who do great
damage. Liberian Charles Taylor devastated neighboring Sierra
Leone. And after his removal, the region is mainly peaceful.
Kony's removal won't guarantee peace, but it is the one thing
that makes peace possible in that region. We tried this mission
once before against Kony in late 2008. Let's succeed now at
sidelining this terrorist.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce. I'm
pleased to yield 3 minutes to Mr. Payne, the ranking member on
the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you very much for
calling this very important hearing and our
deg.Ranking Member Berman.
After years of congressional bipartisan support and
resounding support from the American people, the administration
has taken action to bring an end to the predatory military
group known as the Lord's Resistance Army or the LRA. Over the
last nearly 25 years, the LRA has murdered, raped, abducted
tens of thousands of innocent men, women, and children. In June
2011 alone, the LRA reportedly carried out as many as 52
attacks, killing 32 civilians and abducting 39 while looting
the villages. I was in Uganda in the early '90s when we heard
about the Lord's Resistance Army who at that time, with the
support of Bashir from Sudan, was reaping havoc on the
community.
There is no doubt that without bold and sustained U.S.
action, Joseph Kony, the brutal leader of the LRA and his gang,
will increase their attacks on civilians and the abduction of
children to be soldiers. Kony has taken advantage of the
growing security vacuum in the LRA-affected areas and appears
to be regrouping and reorganizing the LRA with the large number
of senior commanders recently from the Central African
Republic.
In August, I traveled with CARE to eastern Congo where I
met with women who were raped and sexual violence was used as a
weapon of war by Joseph Kony. I spoke to women there who had
been victimized and some of them lost their children, ages 11
and 12, abducted from their villages.
I'm looking forward to hearing from our witnesses today
about the details of the deployment and the strategy that will
be used. I was very pleased that my friend, Senator Inhofe,
recently stated on the Senate floor the statement that the LRA
must be eliminated. And he said that we are not at war with the
LRA. The troops are specifically prohibited from any kind of
combat aside from self defense.
As you know, last year we passed the LRA Resistance,
Disarmament in Northern Uganda Act and the bill directs the
administration to develop a plan. The President announced
expressly that the troops will follow the letter of the law.
I have gotten in my District alone over 13,000 people who
have called or have written saying that we should do something
to eliminate this scourge from the face of the earth. And I
strongly support the President's action. We must eliminate this
murderer of known people and we have a right to protect. I urge
our Government to go after this with all earnest, with training
the troops in Uganda to do the job.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne, for
that eloquent statement. I will now yield 1 minute to any
members who wish to make opening statements. Mr. Fortenberry
had indicated that he would like to make an opening statement.
He's recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair, for convening this
important and timely hearing. I believe that it's important for
the public to know that we never take lightly the use of
military force and personnel around the world. But the U.S.
forces are engaged in more than 50 countries around the world
and more than 1,000 forces are providing support in more than
20 African countries alone.
Many Americans are rightly concerned about the magnitude of
our military presence throughout the world, but I am hopeful
that this limited military and technical assistance mission
which has been discussed and approved on multiple occasions by
the House and the Senate is critical to both our national
security as well as global stability.
Unfortunately, I fear there is widespread information about
the current mission and even a defense of the Lord's Resistance
Army. This body and good Americans watching the hearing right
now know that the Lord's Resistance Army has terrorized central
Africa with impunity for more than 25 years. It's leader,
Joseph Kony, is a war criminal guilty of unspeakable crimes.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The gentleman's time has expired.
Thank you.
Mr. Carnahan is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member
Berman for holding this hearing regarding the U.S. Government's
strategy to end atrocities of the Lord's Resistance Army in
central Africa. With the administration's recent deployment of
100 military advisors to the region, this hearing is especially
timely and helpful.
The LRA led by Joseph Kony has terrorized civilian
populations in Uganda, Southern Sudan, Central African Republic
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for over two decades.
Its tactics have included the employment of child soldiers,
sexual violence, widespread killings, abductions and
enslavement. The United Nations estimates that 385,000 people
have been displaced as a result of LRA brutality.
Last Congress, this body took an important step in passing
the LRA Disarmament in Northern Uganda Recovery Act reaffirming
the U.S. efforts to support regional partners in combating the
LRA. The deployment of military advisors is but one pillar of
the comprehensive strategy. I look forward to an update on this
broader approach including humanitarian assistance,
reconciliation and reintegration of post-conflict recovery.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. I'm very
pleased to yield my friend, Ms. Buerkle, the vice chair of the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.
Ms. Buerkle. Thank you, Madam Chair. In the last decade,
the LRA has killed thousands of innocent civilians, displaced
hundreds of thousands of people and most horrifically, used
thousands of abducted children to carry out its campaign of
terror against the people of Uganda and their neighbors in
central Africa.
The President's recent authorization of combat-equipped
U.S. forces to deploy in central Africa to work with regional
partners toward the removal of Joseph Kony is ostensibly in
support of the 2010 strategic objectives.
I look forward to hearing the perspectives from our
witnesses here this morning on the wisdom and on the
effectiveness of the proposed actions involving U.S. forces in
central Africa.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Connolly
of Virginia is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for
our witnesses today. The LRA is a destabilizing presence in
Africa. And the decision by the President to dispatch 100
military advisors to assist in the effort to address that
threat is consistent, it seems to me, with congressional intent
in the passage of previous legislation.
It is important and we need to hear in the testimony today,
however, exactly what the rules of engagement are going to be
and how the United States in a very specific and targeted way,
which I certainly support, can be of assistance without being
dragged into somebody else's right in central Africa. The
President has demonstrated leadership in Libya in the fight
against terrorism and I think he's demonstrated leadership here
in this limited strategic and targeted intervention.
I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. Mr. Manzullo, the
chair of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific is recognized
for 1 minute.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this
important hearing. The LRA is, without a doubt, a heinous and
horrible group that have brutally murdered, tortured, and raped
hundreds of thousands of people in Uganda, in the border
regions between the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In their reign of terror
is obviously welcome our concern regarding the President's
report to Congress is that this mission may be an expansion of
U.S. military presence in a role that does not directly bolster
the national security of our nation. The announcement that this
was occurring, I believe came out on a Friday afternoon just
before members were breaking for a week to go back for our
District work periods.
I have a lot of concerns, a lot of anxious moments about
whether or not the number of troops will grow to 200, 300 or
even more. With this in mind and despite having these concerns
I'll try to reserve judgment of this deployment until there's
more information regarding the size and the scope of the
operation including an exit strategy.
Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I thank the gentleman. And now the
chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses. First, I would like
to welcome Donald Yamamoto. He is the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. He previously served
as the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia from November 2006 to July 2009; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State and the Bureau of African Affairs from 2003
to 2006; and U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Djibouti from
2000 to 2003. We thank you for being here, Mr. Ambassador.
And then we will welcome Mr. Alexander Vershbow. He is
currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, ISA. Prior to his appointment he served as
U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from
1998 to 2001; U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation from
2001 to 2005; and U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from
2005 to 2008.
I'd like to kindly remind our witnesses to keep your oral
testimony to no more than 5 minutes and without objection, the
witnesses' written statements will be inserted into the record.
We will begin with you, Mr. Ambassador Yamamoto.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD YAMAMOTO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Yamamoto. Thank you so very much, Madam Chairwoman,
Congressman Berman, and the honored members of this committee.
Thank you so very much for having this hearing here today on a
very important and very difficult topic and for the opportunity
to brief this committee on the implementation of the on-going
U.S. strategy to help our regional partners mitigate, eliminate
the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army.
We are deeply grateful for Congress' widespread bipartisan
support for the LRA Disarmament in Northern Uganda Recovery Act
that was signed last year. The legislation sent a very strong
message, not only the support of Congress, but of the American
people that we will help to protect civilians and bring an end
to the LRA threat.
We also want to express our deep appreciation to the
hundreds of thousands of Americans who have sent and mobilized
and expressed their concern for the communities under siege by
the LRA and also the people who are here today and those who
have the courage to stand up to the atrocities of the LRA.
For two decades the LRA has terrorized innocent people
across central Africa. The LRA has filled its ranks with
abducting tens of thousands of children and forcing them to
become child soldiers and sex slaves. From 2005 to 2006, the
LRA moved from Uganda into the more remote border regions of
Central Africa Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and what is now known as the Republic of Southern Sudan. In
that region, the LRA has continued to commit atrocities. The
United Nations estimates that over 385,000 people are currently
displaced in this region as a result of the LRA activities and
according to the U.N., there have been over 250 attacks
attributed to the LRA this year alone.
Over the recent years, regional militaries have worked
together to pursue the LRA across a vast area of densely
forested and difficult jungle terrain. They have had some
success in reducing the LRA's numbers and keeping them from
regrouping. However, as long as the LRA's leader, Joseph Kony,
and other top commanders remain at large, the LRA will continue
to pose its serious regional threat which undermines stability
and development.
In its report to Congress in November 2010, our strategy
centers on four areas: The increased protection of civilians,
apprehension and removal of Joseph Kony and his senior LRA
commanders from the battlefield, the promotion of defections
from the LRA and support of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration of remaining LRA fighters, and finally, the
provision of continued humanitarian relief to afflicted areas.
Over the past year, the United States has continued to work
with the United Nations, the African Union, and the regional
governments to sustain and increase diplomatic and military
pressure on the LRA. We have provided logistical support,
training to the regional militaries pursuing the LRA. The
United States has a strong interest in supporting our partners
in the region to develop their capacity and to address the
threats to peace and security posed by the LRA.
The United States is now deploying U.S. military advisors
to improve our support to the regional coalition, to increase
the likelihood of successful military operations against the
LRA. And I would defer to my colleague, Ambassador Vershbow in
the Department of Defense to describe the details of those
operations.
We continue to consult with all the regional leaders and
they have all said, granted their consent for the deployment of
these advisors to the field. Remember, this is a short-term
deployment with specific goals and objectives. We believe the
U.S. advisors can provide critical capabilities to help
regional forces succeed. We will regularly review and assess
whether the advisors' effort is sufficient to enhance the
regional effort to justify continued deployment.
Our Ambassadors and Embassy staff will work closely with
these advisors and make sure that they are sensitive to
civilian protection consideration and local regional political
dynamics. The State Department has also deployed an officer to
the region to help coordinate all of our efforts in the field
to counter the LRA with the work of the advisors.
The administration is funding projects to help communities
in the DRC that involve protection plans and join an early
warning network. This includes setting up high frequency radios
and cell phone towers. The same kind of early warning and basic
telecommunication capacity does not yet exist across the border
in the CAR. We recognize this gap and we hope to work with our
partners over the coming year to help address this.
We will continue to call on the LRA fighters to peacefully
disarm and leave the organization ranks and to come home. And
currently, there are about 12,000 who have done so.
Over the coming months, we will continue to work with the
regional governments to ensure that the rank-and-file fighters
and abductees who escape the LRA have the necessary support to
be reunited with their families and reintegrated into normal
society.
Madam Chairwoman, again, we appreciate and we are grateful
to you and the members of both the House and the Senate for
this bipartisan support in countering the LRA. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir.
Ambassador Vershbow.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Vershbow. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Congressman
Berman, and distinguished members of the committee. I want
thank you all for inviting me today to discuss with you our
efforts to assist the central African militaries encountering
the Lord's Resistance Army.
As has already been mentioned, there are four pillars to
the administration's comprehension strategy to help our
regional partners end the threat posted by the LRA. The second
of these is the apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and
other top LRA commanders from the battlefield. That's the focus
of DoD's efforts and will be the focus of my remarks this
morning.
The Ugandan military in cooperation with other regional
militaries has been pursuing the LRA for several years. They've
reduced the LRA's strength significantly. The LRA has moved out
of northern Uganda completely. It's now operating in small
groups across the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central
African Republic and South Sudan. While weakened, LRA leader
Joseph Kony and other top commanders remain at large and they
continue to direct the group's members to commit unspeakable
atrocities.
So consistent with the LRA Act and with the consent of the
regional governments, we have deployed a small number of U.S.
military personnel to the LRA-affected area to advise and
assist the regional forces who are pursuing the LRA.
The personnel deploying under this mission will travel out
to field locations with the regional forces where they will
work in an advisory and liaison role. These U.S. personnel,
which are primarily U.S. Army Special Forces, will collaborate
with the regional militaries engaged in the counter LRA effort
to strengthen information sharing, operational cooperation and
overall effectiveness.
While the Department of Defense isn't in the lead with
regard to the other pillars of the President's strategy, our
advisors working alongside regional forces will be sensitive to
the challenges of civilian protection and they'll work to
ensure that protection considerations are incorporated into
operational planning by our partners. They'll also seek to
encourage defections and to strengthen the relationships in
sharing of information between regional militaries and local
populations, officials, and humanitarian actors.
The approach we're undertaking reflects lessons learned
from prior regional operations in pursuit of the LRA and it is
designed to fill key capabilities gaps by enhancing regional
forces' ability to fuse intelligence with operational planning.
This approach will deliver maximum operational impact while
exposing U.S. forces to minimum risk. Although roughly 100
personnel will ultimately deploy for this mission, we expect
that only a portion of the personnel will directly advise and
assist forces in the field pursuing the LRA. Most of the U.S.
personnel will carry out logistical and other functions to
support the advisors.
To be clear, U.S. forces deploying to this mission will not
themselves engage LRA forces, but given the potential need to
defend themselves, they will be equipped for combat. That's why
consistent with the War Powers Resolution, the administration
provided a formal report to Congress on their deployment.
We appreciate the strong congressional interest in and
support for this effort and we are committed to continuing to
engage with the Congress to keep you informed about the
progress of our effort as it moves forward. I would say that
this is a great example of a joint initiative between the
Executive and Legislative branches.
Despite the strong bipartisan support, we know that there
are still many questions. Many of them were posed by you, Madam
Chairman, and by Mr. Berman at the outset. I'd like to address
several of these questions in the remainder of my remarks.
First regarding the purpose and timing of the deployment,
we're providing advisors to the regional forces because Joseph
Kony and the other senior leaders have proven unwilling to end
the conflict peacefully and have continued to commit atrocities
against innocent civilians. As you know, there was an
opportunity for a negotiated peace agreement during the Juba
talks in 2006, 2008, but they ended when Kony refused to sign
and conducted new attacks and abductions. So regional
governments have had to continue to pursue a military approach
to end the LRA threat.
As for our regional partners, we have provided significant
assistance to the region's militaries in recent years, training
the 391st Battalion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's
armed forces, assisting in professionalization of the Sudan
People's Liberation Army, providing equipment to the armed
forces of the Central African Republic and supporting the
Ugandan People's Defense Force, so it can both counter the LRA
and maintain its critical presence in Somalia. But we think
despite the assistance to date, the Ugandan and other regional
militaries would benefit from increased capacity to acquire and
process actionable information on the locations of LRA leaders
and to convert that information quickly into operational plans.
The U.S. advisors deploying for the operation have the
right skill sets to help address these capability shortfalls
and the specific timing of the deployment was predicated in
part upon the availability of the approach U.S. forces.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vershbow follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Maybe we'll get to the
rest.
Mr. Vershbow. Measuring success and what is the U.S.
national interest.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. We'll ask you about that. Thank you
very much. Thank you to both of you for excellent testimony. We
will begin our question and answer segment now.
I wanted to ask you if the President's October 14, 2011
report to the Congress transmitted consistent with the War
Powers Resolution trigger the reporting and authorization
requirements under Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution and
if not, why?
And secondly, what is the anticipated scope, duration and
cost of this deployment and from where in the budget will those
costs be absorbed? And how does this deployment square with the
Department of Defense's effort to cut $350 billion over the
next 10 years. And the Secretary's suggestion to the House
Armed Services Committee that cuts may force DoD to pull back
from Africa.
Ambassador Vershbow?
Mr. Vershbow. Madam Chairman, on the war powers issues, I
think the reason why we made the notification was based on one
simple fact, that the nature of the weapons that our forces are
carrying for self defense are considered--make those forces
considered to be equipped for combat, a phrase that is in the
War Powers Resolution itself. So even though they're not going
to be engaging in combat, but only carrying those weapons for
self defense, the fact that they're equipped for combat
triggered the requirement to file a report to Congress when
they are going to be entering the territory of a foreign
nation.
I don't know if Don may have more on the legal aspects of
that. I'm not a lawyer, but we can give you a more detailed
response for the record, a full legal analysis.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. We would appreciate it because we
have some of our members and I have many questions about the
legal analysis of when the War Powers Act is triggered and what
in this operation would constitute that and your interpretation
of it.
Mr. Vershbow. Okay, we will do that.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Then on the cost, the scope, the
duration, and from where these monies will be coming.
Mr. Vershbow. Well first, I think that the clear goal for
this advisory mission is to enhance the capacity of the
regional forces so that they can better protect their
civilians, track down Joseph Kony, and end the threat posed by
the LRA. So I think we will be measuring success in a number of
ways. We'll be looking to see whether the regional forces are
able to successfully apprehend or remove top LRA commanders
from the battlefield. That would be a very clear-cut measure of
success, whether we can encourage larger numbers of defections
from the LRA, whether we can see a substantial reduction in LRA
attacks, and whether we can see a visible and measurable degree
of professionalization of the forces engaged in this effort so
that they have greater capacity, both to protect their citizens
and conduct counter-LRA operations.
But we have made very clear that this is not an open-ended
commitment. As part of the decision to deploy our advisors, we
have agreed that there would be a review after several months
in order to assess whether our advisors are making sufficient
progress for our objectives. Continuing this deployment is
conditional on a number of factors including a sustained
commitment and sustained cooperation by the regional
governments in addressing the LRA threat. So it is not open
ended. We don't have a specific time line that we've adopted.
As I said, we will be reviewing the state of affairs.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. I don't know that
that answered the question, but we'll follow up with that. This
has been going on sadly for so many years. What assurances can
you offer that we won't be in this entrenched and expanded
protracted conflict, as you point out?
Mr. Vershbow. I think that we've already seen a lot of
progress by the Ugandan and other regional militaries in
conducting this mission and reducing the LRA's numbers,
inhibiting their efforts to regroup. So we think we're building
on a fairly strong foundation here. But we do, as I said in my
remarks, feel that the regional forces have been limited by
their capacity to acquire and process actionable information
and so that giving them the greater skills in terms of fusing
intelligence with operational plans could create a significant
improvement in their ability to track the leaders and hopefully
take Kony and other leaders off of the battlefield.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. So I look forward to
getting some written responses about the cost, the scope, the
duration, where the funds are coming and about triggering the
War Powers Act. So if you could provide that in writing, I'd be
very grateful.
Mr. Vershbow. Okay.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Berman is recognized.
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Just a few
points. On the issue raised by the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Manzullo, regarding briefing, the fact is that the
administration pursuant to congressional law prepared a
strategy which specifically included references to a military
objective to remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the
battlefield and U.S. assistance in achieving that. It was a
public document done almost a year ago and that doesn't even go
into any classified private briefings on more specific
subjects. So this has been out there for almost a year.
Secondly, I'd like to ask a few questions. First, the
historically tense relationship between Uganda and Democratic
Republic of the Congo, in light of that, do you see a Ugandan
military as the force leading operations in DRC or will we have
some of our Special Forces working with the DRC's 391st
Battalion that was trained by AFRICOM?
Mr. Yamamoto. Thank you very much, Congressman Berman. On
the issue of Kony militarily, I think we need to focus that the
approach is a multi-faceted comprehensive approach, not only
militarily, but it has to be also addressing the problems with
the crises from the victims who have been----
Mr. Berman. I understand that, but----
Mr. Yamamoto. The other issue is politically is to help
politically, militarily, and economically, all these countries
that are victims of Kony, to coordinate much better to go after
Kony.
Mr. Berman. Will our forces be working with the Democratic
Republic of the Congo's 391st Battalion?
Mr. Yamamoto. That's correct.
Mr. Berman. Yes?
Mr. Yamamoto. Yes. That's correct. And in that effort, we
have, the State Department, has trained the 391st Battalion.
They're right now on the border area. The issue of Ugandan
troops in the area, it has to be a coordination between the DRC
and the Ugandan troops. And of course, the issue of sovereignty
is to coordinate the work between those two forces and how they
will corner Kony's forces and how they would eliminate.
The issue is--I'll give you one example. When we
transferred the MONUC which was the DRC peacekeeping operations
to MONUSCO, in there was one aspect of having a focus on the
LRA and better coordination between these two forces. And
that's something that we've been trying to do over the last
decade.
Mr. Berman. Do you envision that our advisors will be
deployed at the brigade level, at the platoon level? Are they
authorized to be deployed with Ugandan forces in the field? Or
is this more of a headquarters deployment?
Mr. Vershbow. Thank you. As Ambassador Yamamoto said first
of all, anything we do will be based on full coordination and
consent on the part of the respective governments. And while
they've all come out in support of this initiative, we take
nothing for granted. There will be continuing consultation to
ensure that any steps we take to execute will be with their
consent.
So it's certainly within the concept of operations that we
would deploy forces forward into the DRC, possibly at the
platoon level and/or at the headquarters level. It's what would
be most effective and what our partners----
Mr. Berman. There's no artificial constraint on where you
might deploy then?
Mr. Vershbow. No. But there will be full consultation.
Mr. Berman. I understand. But they could well be deployed
at the platoon level in the field?
Mr. Vershbow. That's right. It's still in an advisory and
assistance role.
Mr. Berman. I understand. What will the trainers be
equipped with, our military trainers and advisors? When you say
they're going to be combat equipped, that's what triggered the
report.
Mr. Vershbow. I'd have to give you a specific answer after
the hearing for the record. I mean they will basically be
carrying small arms for their own self protection and there may
be other communications gear of course. But beyond that, I
think I'd like to consult with my colleagues back in the Joint
Staff to give you a more specific answer for the record.
Mr. Berman. Okay, thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I would encourage the
esteemed Ambassadors to be a little more precise about the
answers to the questions that we're posing, but thank you for
getting it for us later.
Mr. Royce, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade is recognized for his questions.
Mr. Royce. The question I was going to ask has to do with
the reality on the ground that the Ugandans have been doing
some pretty heavy lifting in Somalia. They've been fighting and
dying there, and given that effort, I've heard concerns that
they might be a little distracted on the follow through on
this. Obviously you have a different read.
Can you tell me your discussions with Uganda's Ambassador
and how you read their willingness on this?
Mr. Yamamoto. I did met with President Museveni on separate
issues, but on this issue as well. We have had very close
discussions with President Museveni as well as the other
leaders. President Museveni is fighting a multi-frontal
conflict, not only the LRA but also AMASOM in Somalia. It does
not mean that he has lost or he is distracted because of these
two conflicts. He is equally focused on both areas and both
fronts. And on the LRA and the violence that has been
perpetrated against Uganda that still sits very much in the
psyche of the Ugandan people. When you still have 1.8 million
who are displaced in the northern part, you still have 66,000
kids who are----
Mr. Royce. We understand that. But to the extent that we
can keep him focused on this is going to be part of our task
and then the other question is about Ugandans operating in
Congolese territory. How are we planning to address this? Are
you able to dialogue with the Congolese on that issue?
Mr. Yamamoto. Yes. We spoke to President Kabila and we're
trying to do processes in which he and President Museveni will
arrange how these forces will coordinate their forces against
the LRA.
Mr. Royce. What steps are you taking to try to improve
intelligence, because that's been one of the big failings in
the past, one of the missing pieces on the location of Kony and
his commanders?
Mr. Yamamoto. The issue is trying to get the intelligence
that each of these countries have and then to fuse it together
and then to analyze it and that's why the U.S. military will be
very helpful in that effort.
Mr. Royce. Let me suggest though that that is somewhat
limited, their intelligence is somewhat limited. You've got the
ability to utilize leaflets, radios, in order to try to get
defectors. To the extent that you can get defectors out of the
LRA, your boots on the ground are going to be able to advise
and direct the Congolese and Ugandans. Will U.S. personnel be
deployed in that kind of an effort? I would suggest it would be
wise to do so.
Mr. Vershbow. The U.S. forces will be able to help advise
and train the indigenous forces, improving their skills in
terms of civil affairs, outreach to local communities,
encouraging as you suggested, Congressman, that people provide
tips to the forces, early warning.
Mr. Royce. We need better intel than we had in 2008 on that
mission. And to do that, we're going to have to drive the
intelligence-gathering capacity by getting defectors to come in
and give us the information needed for that mission.
The Army Special Forces teams specializing in training
foreign units are going to provide advice and assistance to
these units. My expectation would be that you would have some
at the platoon level, but I would imagine the bulk of them
would be back in Uganda coordinating the logistics and the
intelligence and the communications. Would that be correct?
Mr. Vershbow. Yes, Congressman. The bulk of the overall
roughly 100 people would be in Uganda, but small teams would
deploy forward in partnership with the local forces to sort of
help them improve their skills on the front line.
Mr. Royce. And Special Operations Command Africa is headed
by Rear Admiral Brian Losey. He's a Navy SEAL who previously
commanded U.S. forces in the Horn, so he knows the region well.
Is he assigned to oversee this operation? I was wondering how
that would be engineered.
Mr. Vershbow. I believe that is the case. It is under the
overall direction of SOCAF, yes.
Mr. Royce. Well, I yield back, Madam Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce. Mr.
Payne, the ranking member of Africa, Global Health, and Human
Rights Subcommittee is recognized.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. As I mentioned, I was at an
IDP camp last month and visited with people from villages that
had been disrupted by the LRA and they were in Goma. So we see
the destruction that is continuing on. I think a number of
people wonder well why are we going after the LRA and why
should we care about Uganda?
I think we all know that Uganda has tremendous number of
troops in Somalia. I had the chance to go to Mogadishu several
years ago and saw them. As a matter of fact, I was escorted by
the Ugandan troops throughout Mogadishu and they were doing an
excellent job and I think that we have somewhat of a
responsibility because of the fact that al-Qaeda is supporting
Al-Shabaab. It was al-Qaeda that destroyed the USS Cole off of
Yemen and so it's all connected. We wonder, well, why do we
have any concern?
It's very clear why we ought to be there and the fact that
Kenya now is being attacked by al-Qaeda because of them going
after Somalis. The Kenyan Embassy was bombed because Kenya
voted with the United States most of the times in the U.N., all
the time, and was one of the strongest supporters of the U.S.
democracy around the country. And therefore they were the
target where hundreds and hundreds of Kenyans died, and the
same thing with Tanzania, because of our relationship. So I
think this business is kind of intertwined and I think that
when countries are going out to support our causes around the
world, I think at least we have a reciprocal for having 100
U.S. troops train folks there.
I just want to ask quickly, Ambassador Yamamoto, what
impact will the elections in DRC have? How is that going and
will any of this disruption of LRA impact on the election
there?
Mr. Yamamoto. The elections in the DRC are very, very
tight. It's not clear whether President Kabila could be
reelected or the presence of the opposition from Tshisekedi to
the others. The issue comes in as the commitment on the LRA
operations by the DRC and Uganda still remains pivotal and
we've discussed this closely with President Kabila and
President Museveni.
Mr. Payne. What about President Bashir in Sudan? As you
know, Bashir supported the LRA and its formation. That's when
al-Qaeda was in Sudan. Bashir supported al-Qaeda and LRA
together. Is there any evidence that Bashir government is
supporting LRA today?
Mr. Yamamoto. We have not seen any of the intelligence or
evidence since about the middle of 2002 and beyond. We have
been, obviously, had very close discussions with the Sudanese
military issue, but we've not seen evidence that there is
support.
Mr. Payne. And what about the LRA's activity in Southern
Sudan? As this new country is trying to put together its
government, are the LRA there in any large numbers? And what
has the SPLM been able to do? And will they be a part of the
training?
Mr. Yamamoto. The LRA has been operating in Southern Sudan.
Of course, the 285,000 who are displaced, part of them are in
Southern Sudan as well as the CAR and DRC. But the forces of
the LRA which is now depleted to probably around 150 to 200
core fighters, 800 total accompanying people, are either in the
CAR or DRC area.
Mr. Payne. And what about a special advisor to the Great
Lakes Region that's been suggested. I didn't use the word
special envoy, but a special advisor. Is this in the making and
what's the prospect of that?
Mr. Yamamoto. We are taking it under advisement, very
serious advisement based on your recommendations, Congressman,
and from your committee.
Mr. Payne. And the fact that we know that there's an
expansion of mobile phones and FM radios, will you be using
that technology to try to get words out to ask for deflection
from LRA fighters?
Mr. Yamamoto. That's correct, sir. The US AID has provided
cell towers and the use of cell phones and right now they're
using UHF radios, but the cell towers now are--the communities
are calling in on a regular basis to say where the LRA is
located, so better communications and better coordination.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Mr. Duncan of
South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Back in the spring
in March or April, the Deputy National Security Advisor Ben
Rhodes was talking about the Libya involvement and he said
this, ``I think what we're doing is enforcing a resolution that
has a very clear set of goals which is protecting the Libyan
people, averting a humanitarian crisis in setting up a no-fly
zone. Obviously, that involves kinetic military action,
particularly on the front end. But again, the nature of our
commitment is that we are not getting into an open-ended war, a
land invasion in Libya.''
And according to STRATFOR Global Intelligence, since 2008,
the U.S. has helped finance regional military efforts to
capture LRA commanders where the U.S. has spent $497 million
strengthening the Ugandan army. Presently, the LRA is estimated
to have somewhere between 200 and 400 fighters which lacks the
numbers, I think, or the weapons from what I understand for a
sophisticated insurgency. So as we delve into this, I have to
ask myself and ask you guys today before deciding to deploy
approximately 100 U.S. military personnel, did the
administration receive a request from Uganda, the DRC, CAR or
the African Union to provide this assistance? I'll ask
Ambassador Vershbow.
Mr. Vershbow. Well, this has been a continuing effort, as
you've just said, Congressman. We've been working in
partnership with the regional states and they have, I think,
welcomed the assistance to date and I think they've been
indicating that additional support would be needed.
We looked at the experience from 2008 when we did provide
advisors to Uganda at the request.
Mr. Duncan. Did they specifically ask for boots on the
ground, American personnel?
Mr. Vershbow. I think they understood, as we have judged,
that they lack this critical capability of fusing intelligence
with the operational plans that have been the main handicap to
finishing the job. They have made substantial progress in
degrading the LRA, but they're still out there. They're still
committing atrocities. So I think they indicated that they
would welcome this kind of hands-on training.
Mr. Duncan. So what we're doing is training, mainly. No
predator drones, no--could you define kinetic military action?
I'm struggling with that term. What does that mean?
Mr. Vershbow. I understand the term kinetic to mean the use
of actual lethal force.
Mr. Duncan. Did we use kinetic military action in Libya
which was lethal force?
Mr. Vershbow. At the front end of the operation, we used
considerable kinetic force to take out the air defenses of
Libya as part of the first week or 2 weeks of the operation.
Then most of the kinetic activity was carried out by our
partners and NATO allies who conducted the lion's share of the
air strikes in the civil protection mission.
We did continue, when necessary, to support the suppression
of enemy air defenses. And we did, on occasion, use armed
predators for specific targets that no other ally had the
capability to hit.
Mr. Duncan. Did we in this action and in Uganda, did we
garner tangible financial or military support from other
countries such as the U.K. and France, like we did in Libya or
are we there alone?
Mr. Vershbow. There has been assistance by our partners. I
would defer to my colleague who may know more.
Mr. Duncan. Is this a NATO action, I guess----
Mr. Vershbow. This is a U.S. initiative, but there's been
other assistance over the years.
Mr. Yamamoto. Yes, we have very careful coordinations,
French in CAR, the U.K. in Uganda, but yes, that's true in the
sense that we're providing the bulk of the assistance as far as
the military training, etcetera. The other donor communities
are doing the other parts on humanitarian assistance and
rehabilitation, reconciliation.
Mr. Duncan. How long do we anticipate the U.S. forces being
there? Do we have some sort of time table at all?
Mr. Vershbow. We don't have a specific time table. We are
talking, I think, months, but I wouldn't put a number on it at
this point. But we will review the operation in a few months to
see whether it's achieving the desired effect through this
enhanced qualitative change in the nature of the training that
we're providing and to see whether it's having effects on the
ground in terms of further eroding the LRA.
Mr. Duncan. What do you define as success?
Mr. Vershbow. I think we define success first and foremost
on the basis of whether Kony and other commanders are actually
captured, whether we see further fracturing of the LRA and more
defections, whether we see tangible improvement in our
partners' capacities out in the field to succeed and that
includes not just the kinetic parts of it, but in terms of
whether they are also more capable of engaging with the local
population to develop the climate in which people report on and
turn in LRA sympathizers.
Mr. Duncan. When we put Americans in harm's way like this,
I think we need to be very clear what we do. We need to be very
clear when the President comes to Congress with the War Powers
Resolution and I'm out of time, so I yield back, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Mr. Carnahan is
recognized.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to our
witnesses for being here today. I wanted to start with really a
general question about how the U.S. is working with the
international and regional partners to strengthen coordination.
In particular, what are the strategies and approaches, both
diplomatically and otherwise that the U.S. Government is
utilizing to ensure a more effective collaboration among key
actors to counter LRA efforts. And let me start with Ambassador
Yamamoto.
Mr. Yamamoto. In that effort, we have not only been talking
directly to the Presidents Kabila, Bozize, Salva Kiir and
Museveni, at that level, but also within their command
structures, militarily, as well as diplomatically to see how we
can coordinate better on our efforts, not just militarily, but
comprehensively against the LRA. That's the first of it.
The second thing is that we're talking to the African
Union, to regional groups, as well as to the donor community,
to see how we can all bring to bear some of our own specific
assets that we have. For instance, we will do the military
training program, U.K., France, others are doing humanitarian
programs. The African Union is doing a lot on coordination from
other countries.
Mr. Carnahan. And Ambassador Vershbow?
Mr. Vershbow. Well, I would also add that what we're doing
in this specific case is a subset of the broader efforts that
we are making throughout Africa to promote professionalization
of militaries, to promote capacity of the African countries to
solve their own problems. And part of that is to invite
countries to participate in both bilateral and multi-national
training and exercises which would hopefully inculcate a
greater pattern of cooperation among them. I think this
initiative in addition to hopefully achieving the specific goal
of taking Joseph Kony off the battlefield will also encourage
greater military cooperation among the four key states involved
that would be a factor for longer term stability in the region
so that we don't have to intervene in the future.
Mr. Carnahan. Let me next turn, I guess a more particular
question for these operations. Is this, in your opinion, a
unique model that is being used in central Africa? Or is this
comparable to some other operations like in southern
Philippines? Chairman Rohrabacher led a delegation there a few
months ago where we got to see a unique operation there where a
limited number of U.S. military were advising, not engaging in
combat, but trying to be very focused on the safe havens and
training campus there.
Again, is this a unique model? Is this drawing on some
other experiences in other places that have worked? And let me
start with Ambassador Vershbow.
Mr. Vershbow. Congressman, this is not a unique model in
the sense that training and equipping partner forces is
something that we've done for many years in many parts of the
world. My experience, if you look at my bio, is more in Europe.
We've had training and equip programs to train the Bosnian
armed forces after the Dayton Accords. We helped train the
Georgia armed forces to try to deal with terrorist forces in
the border regions with the Russian Federation. So each mission
is tailored to the specific circumstances and the requirements
of the partner involved. But this sort of advice and assist so
that they can then deal with the problem more effectively and
more professionally is a well-established model that has proven
its value.
Mr. Carnahan. And Ambassador Yamamoto?
Mr. Yamamoto. And I think it's in the context of if you
look at Africa as far as really good cooperation and
coordination between the Department of Defense and Department
of State and looking at how we can do training on not on a
specific area, but also continent wide. For instance, as you
know, the State Department has trained about 160,000 troops for
peacekeeping operations in 24 countries. We use that also with
the Department of Defense for guidance and advice and
coordination. In this context as well, you have the State
Department helping to do diplomatic coordination or doing also
assistance as far as money-wise to provide logistical support
and of course, DoD is providing the actual individuals to do
some training. So those are issues that were kind of a model
for this area, but also we're looking at other areas and parts
of Africa.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Carnahan. Ms. Schmidt
of Ohio is recognized.
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you very much. Ambassador Vershbow, I
read your report and I'm a little confused by it. In one point,
on page four, you refer to this as really nothing more than
what we already do with AFRICOM that we have in place in
Africa; and I've been over there and I've studied it, and
that's basically, unless I'm wrong, an educational tool that we
use to help African nations develop a more professional
military. We also do some building of schools and hospitals on
the ground. But you add in your report that the reason why we
had to go, why the President had to go to Congress, is because
there might be a potential need to defend themselves, the
troops that are on the ground, and so, therefore, the War
Powers Resolution was put in place.
What confuses me is this: Is this what we do under AFRICOM
or is this different, because under AFRICOM there's always the
danger that they might have to defend themselves so there
wouldn't have to be any need to come to Congress and say the
War Powers Act may be invoked? Or, are we really, and not just
anticipating, but expecting some conflict to arise, so that
this is a heads up? That's question number one.
Question number two, in the report you said that you felt
we would be asking about the purpose and the timing of the
deployment and how we are going to judge success of the
mission, and yet I didn't hear any real clear answers as to
what success is or the timing of this deployment.
And my final is this: I think we should, somebody should
know what the cost is per day for these troops to be on the
ground, just real costs right now and anticipated costs if they
have to go into combat. So those are my questions.
Mr. Vershbow. Thank you, Congressman. Good questions. I'm
sorry if my statement confused you a bit. I think that when we
say that this is not fundamentally different from previous
AFRICOM missions it's because the overall concept of training
and advising and assisting partner forces is kind of the
watchword of U.S. AFRICOM. We do it in other parts of the
world, too, but I think we have a particular----
Ms. Schmidt. Right, we've created AFRICOM because we wanted
specific attention to the region.
Mr. Vershbow. More attention and help develop a greater
expertise of how to deal with the region than we have by
borrowing forces from other combatant commanders.
Ms. Schmidt. Exactly.
Mr. Vershbow. This is a little different though in some of
the specifics in the sense that we don't always put our
advisors and trainers in the field with the forces that are
going to be carrying out the actual military operations and
that's what in this specific case led to the judgment by our
military planners and commanders and then by the President when
he approved this that despite their mission not including any
engagement in combat, they could be in a hostile environment in
some circumstances and that they should be carrying the kinds
of weapons needed to defend themselves. And that's what, in
turn, triggered the war powers notification. But we don't
anticipate that they'll get into the midst of conflict, but I
don't want to exclude that possibility. But they will have the
capacity to defend themselves if the need should arise.
In terms of defining success, I think beyond the very
specific metric of capturing or killing Joseph Kony and other
commanders, it's going to be a judgment call as to whether our
partners are making substantial gains, they're making effective
use of the additional training, that they've learned this
fusion of intelligence and operational planning that we think
is the missing piece that has prevented them from going from
reducing the LRA to actually eliminating the threat.
But we will consult with the Congress and inform you of our
assessment of the operation as it unfolds because as I said,
this is a unique example of executive legislative
collaboration, so we want to work with you all the way along.
In terms of the cost, I apologize for not having the bottom
line. I can actually say more about some of the State
Department expenses than the DoD expenses. U.S. AFRICOM is
drawing on existing operations and maintenance funding to
support the operation, but we're still working on an overall
cost assessment to give you that day-by-day estimate and we
will provide it to the committee once that estimate has been
refined.
Ms. Schmidt. I'm almost out of time. Do you have any idea
when we're going to get that cost? I mean is it tomorrow, the
next day? It should be relatively easy.
Mr. Vershbow. I don't want to give you a specific
commitment. We'll try to get it to you very soon.
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Schmidt. Mr. Connolly
is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I'm sure Mr.
Assistant Secretary, you can understand the sensitivity up here
about the cost of military operations. The previous
administration low balled the cost of Iraq and Afghanistan and
here we are well in excess of $1 trillion later, a significant
contributor to the United States debt which so many of my
colleagues express concern about. And yet, we accepted false
assurances or very loose assurances about the cost of those
engagements.
I think it's a reasonable question to ask, what is this
going to cost? or what is your estimate of what it's going to
cost? and to get that information obviously in a timely
fashion. Let me ask, what is the rationale for putting troops,
U.S. military advisors into Uganda? What is the goal?
Mr. Vershbow. Well, Congressman, first of all, I'll
reiterate, we'll get you the cost figures as soon as we can.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Vershbow. But this will certainly be much more modest
than the costs of actual combat operations. As for the reasons
why we're there, I think there's a continued threat to
civilians and threat to stability in the region. We think that
this very discrete, specific increase in the scale and form of
our military assistance can make a difference in ending the
threat of the LRA.
Mr. Connolly. Okay, Mr. Assistant Secretary, so is the
goal, given what you just said, to in fact, defeat the LRA and
to disband it? Or is the goal to lessen the threat to civilian
control in the region?
Mr. Vershbow. We would certainly hope that this additional
support will lead to the breakthrough of capture of Joseph Kony
and the other commanders and the literal destruction of the
LRA, but we will not necessarily wait for that to happen. This
is going to be an operation that runs in the months, not an
open-ended operation. And we will evaluate whether the
assistance has achieved its purpose in terms of raising the
capacity of our partners and we may disengage even as they
continue the fight on their own.
Mr. Connolly. Okay, but is the ultimate goal the deposing
of Mr. Kony and the dismemberment of the LRA?
Mr. Vershbow. That is the stated goal. That's one of the
four parts of the strategy, removing the battlefield----
Mr. Connolly. I think it's very important that we have a
clear mission. Okay.
Mr. Vershbow. There's also a broader objective that we're
serving which is to support partners in Africa so that they can
address the threats to their citizens, to achieve stability,
and become more productive contributors to security in the
region and more broadly. We've seen some of them stepping up as
has been mentioned in Somalia at great risk and loss of life.
This is a problem that is debilitating for several countries,
so to the extent that we can help them finally put an end to
this threat, I think we'll help their security and make them
better partners for us going forward.
Mr. Connolly. Was there a perception in making this
decision that our partners were on their own not capable of
meeting that goal?
Mr. Vershbow. I think--yes, Congressman. The judgment was
that while they've made a lot of progress, we've seen the LRA
size reduced substantially, going that final distance to
destruction of the LRA was something that they were not quite
capable of and that this assistance could make the critical
difference. So we thought it was a worthwhile investment to
make.
Mr. Connolly. Moving to 30,000 feet, a devil's advocate
question for you, as well, Mr. Ambassador, what is the
strategic interest of the United States in this in doing this?
There are lots of unpleasant people in the world. There are
lots of insurgencies and terrorist movements in the world. The
United States obviously cannot try to dethrone every one of
them. What is our strategic interest here?
Mr. Vershbow. Well, I would say that we've seen in today's
world that everything is increasingly connected to the extent
that eastern and northeastern Africa is unstable, under
developed, an ungoverned space in which these kinds of
rapacious extremists and terrorists can run amok. It ultimately
can affect our interests. It creates the conditions in which
other radical threats could emerge. We've seen the worst case
in Somalia with both the breakdown of governance and the rise
of the Al-Shabaab terrorist movement. While that is not
directly linked to the LRA threat, it's all part of a challenge
to stability in the region that ultimately jeopardizes our
interest.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chair. A question for
Ambassador Vershbow. If the stated goal is to decapitate the
leadership of the LRA, as I understood from your question
before, we are not using aerial drones or observation and would
we be authorized to use predators to take out the leadership if
they were seen and observed?
Mr. Vershbow. Congressman, at the present time, the use of
drones is not envisaged in this operation. I think that the
kind of intelligence that is most important to the success of
this operation is the human intelligence gathered on the
ground. That depends on closer ties between the military forces
of the countries involved and the local population. And so our
training and assistance has, as part of its broader objectives,
helping them to acquire and make better use of that kind of
ground intelligence that could make the difference.
I think the questions of authorities for drone strikes
against extremists in terms--there's a more delicate matter
which is probably not suitable for commenting on in this open
session, but again, the focus is on advising and assisting the
forces on the ground so that they can gather and use
intelligence more effectively to do the job.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner. Mr.
Higgins also of New York is recognized.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair. The Lord's Resistance
Army emerged from northern Uganda in the 1990s. Since that time
has murdered, killed, mutilated some tens of thousands of
people. Joseph Kony was indicted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity in the tribunal at The Hague. Kony is also
designated as a specially-designated global terrorist. Some 300
fighters originating out of Uganda now more prevalent in
central Africa.
I mean the United States deploys 100 military advisors who
happen to be Special Forces. I think we should just call this
what it is. It's a kill and capture mission. I would ask you to
comment on that.
Mr. Vershbow. Well, Congressman, I think we certainly are
trying to enhance the capacity of our partners to capture or
kill Joseph Kony and other commanders, but they will be doing
the actual military mission on the ground. We will be advising,
assisting them so that they can be more effective in doing it.
So yes, I don't disagree with you on terms of one of the
end results of this, if it works, but I think it makes sense
from the United States' point of view to enable partners to act
when they have the capacity to do so. As we've said, they have
some capacity and they've done a lot and we've helped them get
to this stage, but to go the final distance requires this
additional support and we think it's a good investment in our
long-term security and theirs.
Mr. Higgins. Ambassador?
Mr. Yamamoto. Yes, you're absolutely correct. The main
objective is to support these countries to do the jobs
themselves and to build the capacity and that's what we've been
trying to do for the last decade.
Mr. Higgins. I just think there's a tendency sometimes to
dance around this stuff. And obviously Joseph Kony is a bad
guy, doing bad things to otherwise good people in a region that
is strategically important to us and I just think sometimes we
need to call it what it is and this clearly, to me, not unlike
our involvement with military advisors in other regions,
troubled regions, of that region of central Africa, north
Africa, and the Middle East. We send advisors there, obviously,
very well trained. Have a particular expertise at doing certain
things, in particular, taking bad people out and I think that
this is indicative of that.
It's a religious group, the Lord's Resistance Army,
presumably Islamists?
Mr. Yamamoto. No, it's not religious.
Mr. Higgins. Published reports indicate that it is.
Mr. Yamamoto. It uses images or statements as an ideology
to justify their terror. I know that Kony said in the early
days that he was related to Christ.
Mr. Higgins. Any relationship to al-Qaeda?
Mr. Yamamoto. We have not----
Mr. Higgins. Any relationship to the Janjaweed?
Mr. Yamamoto. No.
Mr. Higgins. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Using the Lord's name in
vain, not a good thing. I'm pleased to yield to Mr.
Fortenberry.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to return
to a question that was posed earlier. It's important in light
of that. We need to make sure that our efforts in the region
are not discordant, that they're not piecemeal. We have
requested through a number of hearings the reappointment of a
special envoy to the Great Lakes Region.
Ambassador Yamamoto, you said we would continue to take
that under advisement. We've gone this direction before, but
can you explain, if you are resistant, as to why this has not
happened or are there other concerns that we may not be aware
of?
Mr. Yamamoto. As you know, we had the Special Envoy Howard
Wolpe who did a fantastic job. I think after that the issue is
to assess where do we go from here? And I think we heard loud
and clear from the Congress that a special envoy is needed.
We're taking that----
Mr. Fortenberry. How long has the position been vacant
though? It's been some time.
Mr. Yamamoto. It's been over a year now, a year and a half.
Mr. Fortenberry. Well, again, given the heightened
intensity of these measures, I think this is the appropriate
time to revisit this question with a certain sense of urgency.
Let's return, as well, to gain a broader understanding of
who are the other international partners involved here,
specifically in military operations. We talked about other
international donors for relief work and then specifically what
is the Ugandan army's effort going to be? It has been in the
past to specifically demobilize Joseph Kony and the LRA.
Mr. Yamamoto. You're absolutely correct. The specific
amount of assistance of militarily supporting the UPDF in this
effort has been the United States. I mean $40 million from the
United States in the last 3 years, specifically aimed at
providing logistical support as the LRA moved from Uganda into
the CAR. The other countries are providing other types of
support other than the military.
Mr. Fortenberry. You're talking about the affected
countries, not other international donors?
Mr. Yamamoto. No, the other international donors, that's
right. As far as the other countries are concerned, the
Ugandans themselves are also providing support and assistance
through providing their own equipment and military tactics and
of course, the troops itself. The CAR, that is a coordination
effort with the FACA troops by the Ugandans and the CAR because
Ugandan troops are in the CAR in a sovereign country and that
is the coordination between President Bozize and President
Museveni to work out those logistical issues.
Mr. Fortenberry. Those two countries, then in a coordinated
effort, are the primary drivers currently of the military
operation, correct?
Mr. Yamamoto. But also the DRC is getting involved because
the LRA has gone in and out between the CAR and DRC.
Mr. Fortenberry. Are there other international countries
such as France who are engaged militarily?
Mr. Yamamoto. Only insofar as training the CAR troops.
Mr. Fortenberry. So France is involved in the CAR?
Mr. Yamamoto. Yes.
Mr. Fortenberry. All right, what other international actors
are involved beyond the military operation to coordinate
disarmament efforts and rehabilitation efforts, reintegration
efforts?
Mr. Yamamoto. The United Nations and the African Union. The
United Nations from the DRC side which was the establishment of
MONUSCO or the reestablishment of MONUSCO basically to
coordinate those efforts between the FARDC troops in DRC and
the UPDF and Uganda----
Mr. Fortenberry. Okay, I think we probably ought to stop
using the acronyms because it gets too confusing too quickly.
Mr. Yamamoto. The Congolese troops and the Ugandan troops
to coordinate together.
Mr. Fortenberry. Okay, but then the African Union's
involvement?
Mr. Yamamoto. The African Union is not as extensive as the
U.N. It's basically the leadership under Chairman Ping and his
group to talk to the leaders.
Mr. Fortenberry. I'm sorry, explain that further?
Mr. Yamamoto. In other words, to discuss with the
Presidents and the leadership when these countries on the LRA
problem and what more they need to get the job done.
Mr. Fortenberry. So African Union effectively is not
involved here other than in conversation?
Mr. Yamamoto. Discussions.
Mr. Fortenberry. Is that a potential development?
Mr. Yamamoto. That's right. It is.
Mr. Fortenberry. The reason for pressing the issue is
clearly that the United States cannot solve all problems for
all people and you have been authorized by Congress to engage
in this activity. And again, we're all hopeful for a positive
and quick outcome. But to continue to press the international
community for switch engagement as is appropriate as well needs
to be a part of this broader, comprehensive effort.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. First
of all, let me just note that I don't know if I'm disappointed
or what, but not even having a cost estimate for us coming
before Congress, letting us know that there's a military
operation, have the troops already been, are these 100 troops
already been sent or are they on the way?
Mr. Vershbow. Only some of the initial personnel have
arrived. The full 100 have not yet deployed.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So the mission is actually under way. You
actually have some people who have already been sent, but you
don't have a cost estimate of what it would cost? Even an
estimate?
Mr. Vershbow. I apologize, Congressman. I'm embarrassed not
to have a more specific answer for you. The forces that are
already there are being funded by regular operations and
maintenance funds, but when we get further along, there will be
more costs incurred and we will definitely have that estimate
for you before we reach that state.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I take it the 100 troops are also going to
bring with them their equipment.
Mr. Vershbow. Correct.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now I don't think it's our place to ask
about specific equipment going into a combat area, but that's
considerably costly as well.
I noticed in your testimony you said that this LRA has been
reduced to approximately 200 core fighters? So it might be
significant for us to know if the cost of this mission is going
to be $500 million or whether it's going to be $100 million or
$20 million in terms of the cost of getting 200 fighters who
are people who are criminals, we could basically call them, 200
organized criminals in central Africa.
I take it also that if they're reduced to 200 men and what
we've got are the armies of these various countries you're
talking about, we're talking about 200 men who are now fighting
thousands of other armed troops, but we feel compelled to send
200 of our own troops there. I'm not sure whether or not that--
I'll look closely at this and I think the American people will
as well, whether or not this was a right decision.
Would you say that tribal loyalties have anything to do
with the ongoing strength of the LRA?
Mr. Vershbow. I'll defer to my colleague who knows more
about the context.
Mr. Yamamoto. The LRA obviously was originally a northern
Uganda Acholi base, but right now it's kind of morphed because
it has gone into--it does have groups from Southern Sudan,
Congo, and the DCAR.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You would think tribal allegiances have
something to do with the survivability of this and the
effectiveness of the LRA?
Mr. Yamamoto. It's the open areas that are terribly hard to
track people. That's his cover. That's how he's been able to
escape for two decades without capture.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I take it that was a yes?
Mr. Yamamoto. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we're sending our troops in take on
head on this whole tribal challenge in Africa. Let me just note
that that doesn't sound very good to me in terms of possible
success, but there again, this force may be evil enough to
justify sending our troops in.
Let me ask you, you were involved in Ethiopia. You were our
Ambassador to Ethiopia.
Mr. Yamamoto. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. During that time period there was a border
dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia?
Mr. Yamamoto. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That went up to arbitration.
Mr. Yamamoto. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The arbitration ended up deciding what on
whose favor?
Mr. Yamamoto. The EBC made a determination on the border
between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right, and they decided basically that
Eritrea had the rightful position, is that correct?
Mr. Yamamoto. Only in the Bdame area. But the other area
went to Ethiopia.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, so did our Government at that time
while you were Ambassador recommend that Ethiopia respect the
arbiters or did we--we did?
Mr. Yamamoto. We did.
Mr. Rohrabacher. When Ethiopia rejected the arbitration
over our advice, what did we do and what was our Government's
position on Ethiopia considering that we have since the time,
that they decided not to settle their dispute through
arbitration, but instead decided to thumb their nose at
arbiters, have we provided Ethiopia with weapons and training
and guns since then?
Mr. Yamamoto. We have not provided weapons. We have
provided training because of their forces in Darfur and now in
Abyei.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. So--but we haven't sold them any
weapons or anything?
Mr. Yamamoto. No, no weapons.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And Mr. Marino
will now be recognized and I thank him because he will be
asking questions that have been submitted through our
committee's Web site which connects our constituents more
directly to our work in Congress and we're also asking the
public to enter their questions when we have the honor of
having Secretary Clinton appear before our committee on
Thursday.
So thank you, Mr. Marino, for using those questions.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Madam Chair. And in addition to the
questions that were submitted to the committee, I have a Web
site for my District and I asked my constituents to send
questions to me prior to my hearings, so the questions I'm
going to ask are going to be repetitive, but if you could
answer them in a different light. Please bear in mind I have
now less than 4\1/2\ minutes. Please be succinct and whoever
feels that they can answer the question to satisfy my
constituents, please jump in.
First question comes from Sharon, ``Who will be paying for
this troop deployment and what is the anticipated cost and how
many troops will be involved for how long?''
Mr. Vershbow. The United States will be paying for this
operation and as I've said sheepishly to Congressman
Rohrabacher, we don't have precise costs, but I can assure him
that it's like to be in the tens of millions of dollars, not
the hundreds or the $500 million. We think it's an investment
worth making in terms of just advising and assisting local
forces we can eliminate a very evil force from the earth.
Mr. Marino. From Titus: ``How will U.S. forces in central
Africa help address widespread development needs of the region?
And if the LRA is removed without making improvements to the
economic and social stability of the region, then another
military force could easily replace it.''
Mr. Yamamoto. It's not much the U.S. military as it is the
efforts of US AID, the U.S. diplomatic efforts in coordination
with the international donor community, international
organizations and the regional states to look at how we can
establish economically develop these countries.
Mr. Marino. From Michael: ``What are the Europeans and
other allies doing to help stop the LRA?''
Mr. Yamamoto. Raising consciousness, supporting, assisting
what's rehabilitation, reconciliation, rehabilitation of
victims, and also supporting the governments in their efforts
to go after the LRA.
Mr. Marino. How about any money?
Mr. Yamamoto. The assistance, right, and again, our money
so far for the region has been around $50 million in total for
the last 3 years, just on the LRA operations, but then overall
on the LRA operations, the Europeans, the U.N. and other
organizations are also contributing money. I don't have the
specific amount.
Mr. Marino. This is from Greg: ``Is this a peacekeeping/
humanitarian mission or more of an advisory role?''
Mr. Vershbow. It's clearly an advisory mission, helping to
prepare partner forces to do the job themselves more
effectively, but it certainly has a humanitarian motivation,
namely, that there's been long suffering for more than two
decades by the population at the hands of the Lord's Resistance
Army.
Mr. Marino. This is from Danielle. First of all, and to
show that I'm trying to cover both sides of the story here,
``Thank you to the Members of Congress who have decided that
the destruction of human life in central Africa at the hands of
the LRA matters and have taken important action steps toward
bringing peace to those affected? Could you gentlemen be more
specific about the ways in which the troops deployed have been
trained to advise, specifically in the hunt for Kony as opposed
to other large-scale tactical planning?''
Mr. Vershbow. I think that it should be understood that our
forces are going there to help train and improve the
capabilities of the local militaries who will then carry out
the actual operations in the field. The key thing we're hoping
to help them with is fusing the intelligence information with
the operational plan so that they can more quickly respond to
reports that the LRA is active and engage and we hope eliminate
the remaining leadership of the LRA. We're not taking on a
combat role ourselves.
Mr. Marino. Most of these questions were from my
constituents in Pennsylvania 10, north central and northeast
Pennsylvania, but here's my question. Do you have an exit
strategy?
Mr. Vershbow. We do because we said from the outside that
this is not an open-ended mission in terms of its goals or its
duration. We certainly hope that it achieves the over-arching
goal which is eliminating Joseph Kony and the other commanders
from the battlefield, but we will not go on indefinitely even
if that maximum goal isn't achieved. We will judge whether
we've been effective in improving our partners' capacity to
deal with the threat, to engage the LRA, to encourage more
defections, to substantially reduce the threat and then we will
pull back and we hope that they will be able to continue with
this experience and training to finish the job.
Mr. Marino. And quickly, this should be a yes or no from
both of you, are we following the money or just handing a check
over? Are we following the money or are we just handing a check
over?
Mr. Yamamoto. We're accounting.
Mr. Vershbow. We're following the money as we will be there
on the ground ensuring that what we use the taxpayers' money
for is achieving positive results.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Marino, I don't know
how that could have been answered with a yes or no, given two
choices, but well done. And you have very wise constituents.
They ask excellent questions and I encourage all of my members
to try to bring in our constituents to the committee process.
Thank you, Mr. Marino.
Mr. Sherman from California is recognized.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Yamamoto, in this enterprise, are we
introducing American armed forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated?
I'm citing the War Powers Act.
Mr. Yamamoto. Right, I mean the reason why they're there is
they're mainly for advice and support and assistance. However,
if obviously to defend themselves they need to be fully
equipped.
Mr. Sherman. Well, the U.S. Marines in the London Embassy
would defend themselves. In Vietnam, we used the term training
to mean American troops going out on combat missions when a
company by indigenous forces. Are they in safe areas training
or are they out training through engaging the enemy?
Mr. Yamamoto. I'll defer to my colleague.
Mr. Vershbow. Congressman, some of the training will take
place in safe areas at bases far removed from the area of
conflict, but under the mission approved by the President, our
forces will have the possibility based upon what the commanders
judge to be most effective and based on what the partners feel
would be most effective to deploy to the field to advise and
assist at the front line level. But we don't believe that it is
highly likely that our forces will be engaged in hostilities.
Mr. Sherman. Will we be shooting at the enemy?
Mr. Vershbow. Only in self defense.
Mr. Sherman. Will be placing ourselves within 100 yards of
the enemy such that self defense would obviously be necessary?
Mr. Vershbow. Congressman, I honestly don't know whether
they would be within a 100 yards or 200. At this point, it's
hypothetical because we're just at the early stages.
Mr. Sherman. I mean the Constitution said provides the
Congress with authority to declare war and engage in war and
now you're telling me that that decision will be made by
lieutenants.
We've seen in Libya a terrible lesson brought home to the
American people. If you shred the war powers provision of the
Constitution, good things happen in the world. My fear is that
you're going to be teaching the American people this lesson a
second time, that is to say I think you may very well
accomplish something good in eastern Africa, but will we do so
in a way that constitutes a second intentional violation of the
War Powers Act?
And both of you have been rather vague on what our forces
are going to do except that lieutenants and captains and majors
on the ground will decide what to do. Are these combat officers
authorized to bring their forces into hostilities?
Mr. Vershbow?
Mr. Vershbow. I think the short answer is no, that the only
condition in which they might use the weapons that they're
carrying is if they're fired upon in an act of self defense. I
would ask to defer to my legal experts at the Pentagon as
exactly what----
Mr. Sherman. That's as good an answer as I'm likely to get.
Let me shift over to Mr. Yamamoto. Let's say the mission
changes and in fact it is necessary to introduce the armed
forces of the United States into situations where imminent
involvement and hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances. Will the administration follow the War Powers
Act?
Mr. Yamamoto. We're following the War Powers Act in this
instance.
Mr. Sherman. Are you acting in serendipity--acting parallel
to the War Powers Act or are you conforming to the War Powers
Act? Is that act the law of the land that you are following?
Mr. Yamamoto. We are expecting the intent of the U.S.
Congress in providing that.
Mr. Sherman. Are you respecting the law or just kind of the
free-floating intent?
Mr. Yamamoto. The law.
Mr. Sherman. Okay, so it's the law of the land and you're
going to follow it. Is that correct?
Mr. Yamamoto. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. That's all I need. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Rivera, my colleague from Florida is recognized.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Madam Chair, and with your
permission may I yield to my subcommittee chair, Mr.
Rohrabacher?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. Let me just state for
the record, even though we have questions that are pointed
questions, that should not necessarily indicate whether we
support or oppose this particular mission.
I happen to believe that missions like this are positive
and can play a positive role and a positive strategy in post-
Cold War strategy should be helping other people fight for
their freedom. The cost is really an important factor because
the United States can't afford to pay the price to win everyone
else's freedom in the world.
The Libyan operation that this administration just engaged
us in is perhaps a good example of that and if indeed the
Libyans now and I would challenge the Libyan authorities now to
step forward and announce that they will repay the United
States for every dime that we spent in helping them win their
freedom, we are in a financial crisis. They are sitting on the
biggest deposits of oil and gas in the world. They should repay
us. If indeed they do, then it was the right thing for us to
help the people of Libya overthrow their tyrant.
If indeed the cost of this mission is repaid to us from
those who benefit from it, then this type of mission, helping
others fight against evil forces in the world is justified and
speaks well of the United States of America.
What doesn't speak well of us is when we become intertwined
with dictatorships and that's why I am asking, have been asking
questions about Ethiopia and I would ask our former Ambassador
to Ethiopia was there an election held while you were
Ambassador in Ethiopia?
Mr. Yamamoto. I came in after the election.
Mr. Rohrabacher. After the election. Was that election that
happened right before you became Ambassador, did the winners of
that election then take over the government or did they arrest
those who won the election?
Mr. Yamamoto. To answer your question----
Mr. Rohrabacher. They arrested those who won the election,
Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Yamamoto. The Parliament took out their seats because
we negotiated with them behind the scenes to do so. The issue
was the City Hall. They refused to--they did not take up their
seats and in the context that they were arrested.
And we worked with the government and the communities----
Mr. Rohrabacher. You answered the question is that they
arrested the ones who won the election. Those who lost the
election stayed in power. Those who won the elections ended up
in jail and during that time period, OPEC decided that there
were several cases in Ethiopia, where American citizens owned
property and the Ethiopian Government, now run by those who
didn't win the election, but imprisoned those who did, had
expropriated property of Americans and was illegally refusing
to give it back to them.
Do you believe--and OPEC still has that standard, by the
way, still is that finding. Do you agree with that finding?
Mr. Yamamoto. First, the Carter Center declared the
election, the winners, the winners. They declared that the
government of Meles had won as was their----
Mr. Rohrabacher. The government declared that?
Mr. Yamamoto. No, Carter Center. And we abide by what the
Carter Center and the international observers had stated. Now
the second issue is as far as the OPEC, the person you're
referring to his property was confiscated under the communist--
--
Mr. Rohrabacher. I'm not talking about a person. I'm
talking about the general theory that Americans have property
claims that have not been adjudicated by the Ethiopian
Government.
Mr. Yamamoto. We've tried to help adjudicate with the
government.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We have. That's correct and that was why
OPEC declared that Ethiopia was now no longer eligible for OPEC
loan guarantees. They have not yet changed that policy,
correct?
Mr. Yamamoto. Because of restrictions.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. The restrictions were based on the
fact that American citizens still had property claims that were
not being met.
Now back to Ethiopia and Eritrea. There was an agreement
between Eritrea and Ethiopia to abide by an arbitration. In the
end, it is my understanding that the arbiters actually decided
at least for a major part of that in Eritrea's favor, yet we
permitted the Government of Ethiopia to renege on the agreement
to follow the arbiters. Is that correct?
Mr. Yamamoto. No. In 2003, we announced that it was final
and binding because the parties said so, so therefore we held
both parties accountable to the results.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much and Mr. Rivera's
time has expired.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before us. We
look forward to your written answers and I remind the committee
members, if you could join me to say hello to Evelyn Apoko. It
is a true delight and an honor to have you here with us. Thank
you.
And the committee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a
Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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