[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-67]
ARMY RESERVE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD READINESS,
TRAINING AND OPERATIONS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 21, 2011
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
JOE HECK, Nevada SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
CHRIS GIBSON, New York GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BILL OWENS, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey TIM RYAN, Ohio
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
Cathy Garman, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, September 21, 2011, Army Reserve, Army National Guard
and Air National Guard Readiness, Training and Operations...... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, September 21, 2011.................................... 39
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2011
ARMY RESERVE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD READINESS,
TRAINING AND OPERATIONS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 3
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
WITNESSES
Carpenter, MG Raymond W., USA, Acting Director, Army National
Guard.......................................................... 10
Stultz, LTG Jack C., USA, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve............... 5
Wyatt, Lt Gen Harry M., III, USAF, Director, Air National Guard.. 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z................................... 46
Carpenter, MG Raymond W...................................... 92
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 43
Stultz, LTG Jack C........................................... 49
Wyatt, Lt Gen Harry M........................................ 82
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Charts submitted by LTG Jack C. Stultz....................... 123
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Reyes.................................................... 127
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 131
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 136
Mr. Scott.................................................... 134
ARMY RESERVE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD READINESS,
TRAINING AND OPERATIONS
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 21, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:00 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Forbes. Well, good afternoon. And I would like to
welcome all of our members and our distinguished panel of
experts to today's hearing that will focus on the training and
operations tempo for our Army Reserve and our Guard and Air
Guard Components.
Just 10 days ago, we marked the 10th Anniversary of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on our homeland. That
day, as we all know, literally changed our world, and led us
into a long-term global war on terrorism, a fight where our
reservists and our National Guard members are full partners. In
the intervening 10 years, our Reserve Components have been
stretched thin as they have been called upon to provide many of
the enabling capabilities for the Active Duty Forces in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn and Operation Enduring
Freedom.
They provide support, such as intelligence gathering,
airlift, close air support and security forces. At the same
time, the National Guard still must fulfill their traditional
mission of supporting the states during emergencies such as the
recent flooding and fires. There is no walking away from either
mission.
Their significant combat support role in Iraq and
Afghanistan makes it clear that we cannot go to the fight
without our Reserve Components. According to the Department of
Defense's recent study, the ``Future Role of the Reserve
Component,'' the Reserve Component is an irreplaceable and
cost-effective element of overall Department of Defense
capability.
The report specifically stated, ``Unless we had chosen to
dramatically increase the size of the active components, our
domestic security and global operations since September 11,
2001 could not have been executed without the activation of
hundreds of thousands of trained reserve component personnel.''
Juxtapose this reliance on our Reserve Components against
the backdrop of large U.S. force structure reductions in the
$400 billion to $900 billion in defense cuts proposed over the
past several months, and you can see how current challenges can
grow to become significant problems. For the Army Reserves and
Guard and the Air Guard, their ability to take on additional
missions that require significant military support will be
severely strained if the force structure in budget era
reductions of the magnitude being discussed take effect. Even
fulfilling their steady-state missions could be severely
impacted.
For example, let us look at just the Army for a minute. As
was noted in our July hearing, general readiness indicators
have gradually improved across the Army Active and Reserve
Components over the past year. However, significant equipment
challenges remain. While deployed units report high levels of
equipment readiness, many home station and Reserve units report
significant shortages of key items needed to fulfill their
assigned missions and to conduct full-spectrum training.
Anticipated budgetary reductions will further challenge
this trend and the Army's ability to simultaneously provide
trained and ready forces for ongoing operations and other
possible future commitments and contingencies. This will be
particularly true as the Army has changed its role.
During the Cold War, the Army Reserve Components were
considered strategic Reserves, which meant that only very
limited training was done during their one weekend a month, two
weeks a year, duty time. Units were not funded for significant
training and had limited equipment sets.
In theory, these units would have significant time after
mobilization to get up-to-date equipment and conduct extensive
training. They would then deploy for the duration of the
conflict, rotate back home afterwards and return to their
strategic Reserve status. However, in the past 10 years, the
Reserve Components have become more operational, which requires
more training before mobilization and involves a reset training
period upon a units return from theatre. It also requires
substantial additional resources to enable more training prior
to a unit's formal mobilization.
But is this model sustainable? I hope our witnesses will
answer that question, especially as we are facing significant
budgetary challenges. Since 1999, the overall Army Reserve O&M
[Operations and Maintenance] funding almost tripled, but I
worry whether we will be able to support such growth.
With regard to the Air National Guard, one of their
important missions is protecting the homeland through the Air
Sovereignty Alert [ASA]. This mission has not been without its
challenges, primarily because it was not adequately resourced,
programmed or budgeted for by the Active Air Force.
Also, unlike the cold war era when Air Force units were
assigned to dedicated air defense units, the units that perform
ASA operations today are part of the Air Force's total force
and deploy overseas to support military operations. This can
cause significant challenges for those Air Guard ASA units that
must train for their primary contingency operations support
missions, while simultaneously training and manning their ASA
mission.
When an ASA Guard unit is deployed overseas, there is
tension in how it also will meet its ASA mission, which is
often accomplished by transferring personnel and equipment from
non-deployed units to fill shortfalls. Here again, I hope our
witnesses will help us understand the resources needed to
maintain these domestic missions at a time when we face
diminishing budgets.
Joining us today to discuss the challenges for resources,
training and budget are three distinguished individuals. They
have served their country well. We are very privileged to have
them here today to provide their expertise, knowledge and
counsel to us.
First, we have Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, the
commanding general of the United States Army Reserve Command.
General, thank you for being here. We also have Lieutenant
General Harry M. Wyatt III, the director of the Air National
Guard. And General, we thank you. And Major General Raymond W.
Carpenter, the acting director of the Army National Guard.
General, thanks for all that you do and for your time this
afternoon.
I now recognize the ranking member, Ms. Bordallo, for any
remarks she may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good
afternoon, gentlemen.
Today, we continue our discussion on the overall readiness
of our Armed Forces. We will hear from the directors of the
Army and the Air National Guard, as well as General Stultz from
the Army Reserve. And we look forward to the testimony from our
witnesses.
As both Generals Wyatt and Carpenter know, I am indeed very
proud that the Guam National Guard has the highest membership
per capita of any National Guard in this country. And I think
that is a real testament to the level of commitment and respect
that our men and women on Guam have for our Nation and the
National Guard.
The last decade of war and conflict has required our
National Guard and Reserves to transform from a strategic
Reserve to an operational force. Beginning on September 11,
2001, and continuing through today, our Air National Guard
began flying combat air patrol missions over our cities and our
most important landmarks. Days later, we saw the Army National
Guard mobilize to provide security at airports throughout the
Nation. Mission requirements expanded with the beginning of
rotations to Afghanistan and then Iraq and other areas.
Our National Guard and our Reserves have answered every
call to duty, and their support for our Nation has been
invaluable. However, the roles and the missions fulfilled by
the National Guard and Reserves have required greater resources
to meet their increased training, equipment and manning costs.
And the Nation's budget challenges will only amplify the
difficulty of maintaining an operational National Guard and
Reserve.
Over the past few years, this committee has taken
significant steps to address critical shortfalls in dual-line
equipment needs through the National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Account. However, the Army National Guard's goal is
to maintain 80 percent of critical dual-use equipment on hand
at any one time. How will this be achieved in austere budget
times?
Also, with the eventual drawdown of end strength in the
Army, it is important for our witnesses to address what impact
this may have on the rebalancing of missions and skill sets
within the National Guard and the Reserves. What impact might
this have on the readiness of these forces? This committee has
also worked to ensure appropriate funding is authorized for
increased training requirements due to continuing high
operational tempo in Iraq, and especially Afghanistan.
In the Army Reserve alone, operation and maintenance costs
have increased from $1.4 billion in fiscal year 1999 to a
requested $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2012. Additional
investments in the operation and maintenance accounts will be
needed to support a home station training concept.
Such efforts are important toward ensuring the continued
accessibility of the National Guard and Reserves. But there
will be challenges in fully implementing this concept. So I
hope the witnesses can discuss these challenges in their
testimony today, and what risks would be associated with
reduced funding for these purposes.
I also remain seriously concerned about aviation assets to
our National Guard. Our House-passed Fiscal Year 2012 Defense
Authorization bill contains a prohibition on retirement of C-23
Sherpa aircraft. What plan does the Army National Guard have to
replace these aging aircraft? At one time, the C-27J joint
cargo aircraft was the replacement. But former Defense
Secretary Gates cut the buy to 38 planes, and shifted the
program to the Air Force.
How will we meet this equipment requirement in a difficult
budget environment? Will homeland defense missions and airlift
capability that is needed to support such missions be factored
into replacing the C-23 Sherpas? I also remain concerned that
the Department of Defense has not acknowledged the need to
incorporate homeland defense mission requirements into certain
planning assumptions. Further, I remain concerned that the
National Guard Bureau has not taken a more prominent role in
working with the various services and secretary-level agencies
to better define these requirements.
I hope that our witnesses, Mr. Chairman, can comment on
when such requirements will be finalized and incorporated into
the Department of Defense planning assumptions. If we do not
have solid homeland defense requirements built into the
planning process I fear we take significant risk in the
readiness of our National Guard and Reserve to be appropriately
trained and equipped to respond to these missions.
And finally, this committee will closely examine future
budgets to ensure that we do not hollow out our National Guard
and our Reserves. To remain an operational force, we will need
to see investment in the training and the equipment accounts in
future years. We must always have a ready, a reliable and an
accessible Reserve Component. And I look forward to the
testimony of our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bordallo can be found in the
Appendix on page 46.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you for those remarks, Madeleine. And as
we discussed prior to the hearing, I asked unanimous consent
that we dispense with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and
depart from regular orders so that members may ask questions
during the course of discussion. I think this will provide a
roundtable type forum, and will enhance the dialogue on these
very important issues. And without objection, so ordered.
I also asked for unanimous consent that non-subcommittee
members, if any, be allowed to participate in today's hearing
after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask
questions. Is there any objection? Without objection, non-
subcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time
for 5 minutes.
Gentlemen, as we mentioned at the outset, we would like to,
as a committee, first of all simply say thank you to each one
of the three of you. Thank you for your service to our country,
for the sacrifices that we know that each of the three of you
have made. But also thank you to the men and women who serve
under you, for the great job that they have done, for the
sacrifices that we know they made for our country.
Your written statements have been introduced. We will be
introducing those to the record. You do not need to read those
again, but we are welcome to hear them if you would like to.
But what we would love to hear is just your opinions as to
what you think this committee needs to know. The unfortunate
thing is no good deed goes unpunished. And because you have
done such a great job, the American people, many policymakers
in Congress, will just assume you are going to continue to do
that, regardless of the resources that we give you.
Many of us fear that we have an enemy coming over the
horizon that we have not seen in years and that is some deficit
reduction cuts that perhaps could impact what you do for a long
time to come. And so it is very important that we hear from you
as to the impact you think these cuts could have on the men and
women that you represent.
So General Stultz, if it is okay with you we will start
with you just because that is where you are seated in the great
lineups. General.
STATEMENT OF LTG JACK C. STULTZ, USA, CHIEF, U.S. ARMY RESERVE
General Stultz. Chairman Forbes, Ms. Bordallo, other
members, on behalf of the over 205,000 Army Reserve soldiers
that I command, first and foremost let me say thank you for
your enduring support. Support in terms of financial, but also
support in terms just of moral support that you give our
soldiers and our families as they continue to perform, as you
indicated in a magnificent way.
And I was just down in Florida on Monday for a segment with
Fox and Friends. And just a little snippet, you know, in-
between their breaks, I had 140 soldiers with me there. And
they cut to me and said, ``What would you like to say?'' And I
just said, ``You know, these people sitting around me in
uniform are a national treasure because it is a volunteer Army
and they don't have to be here.''
``And yet, for some reason they continue to raise their
hand over and over.'' And I said, ``There is Sergeant Dasher
sitting right here in front of me. I just met him. He is a big,
strapping E-7 and he has been to Iraq three times, 2003, 2006
and 2010. And he said, `Sir, when you need me, I will go back
again.' '' That is a national treasure.
And so as you have indicated, it has cost more for us to
become an operational force. But there is a reason for that,
and there is a reason we have got to maintain that support. I
brought along two charts just to illustrate why. The first
chart here is, and I think you have a handout available to you,
it demonstrates what we have done in terms of the force mix in
our Army.
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
123.]
General Stultz. As we have grown the Army from a force of
482,000 in the Active Army to 569,000 we really have not grown
our Reserve Components very much. In the Army Reserve, we are
still at 205,000. That is where we were pre 9/11. I think the
National Guard was at 352,000. They are at 358,000 now in
authorized end strength.
So the growth has come in the Active Force, and that growth
has come in greater combat capability with their great combat
teams and greater aviation capability, with combat aviation,
and other types of things.
At the same time, we have shifted the combat service
support more and more to the Reserve Components. And so between
the National Guard and the Army Reserve, the chart illustrates
that 80 percent of the transportation capability for the Army
is now in the Guard and Reserve. Seventy-five percent of the
engineer capability is in the Guard and Reserve.
In the medical community, 75 percent, roughly, is in the
Guard and Reserve. Civil Affairs, 85 percent. And it goes on
and on. That is why the Army has become dependent on the
Reserve Components is because we are no longer the Reserve. We
are the Army. We are what the Army depends on for these kinds
of capabilities. And yes, it does cost us more to keep those
forces ready because we are utilizing them and we have got to
train them and maintain them.
But we cannot afford as the Army has to come down in end
strength to cut any support for our Reserve Components because
they are going to be even more dependent on the Reserve
Components if they have to come down in end strength on the
Active side. More of this capability is probably going to shift
our way.
And what we have to do is, we have to be good stewards of
the dollars you give us. We have to be efficient and effective.
And we in the Army Reserve have developed the training strategy
that says, you know, we are going to take soldiers and put them
in a 5-year rotational cycle. So in the fifth year, they deploy
or they become available. And then they go back and reset and
start training, and we gradually train them up so that we don't
spend a lot of dollars until we are sure we are going to use
them.
But in that third and fourth year prior to deployment, we
need some extra training days and we need to make sure we have
got the right equipment to train on so they are prepared to go
to war. Because the Army depends on them.
And so my concern is just as you said, Mr. Chairman. As we
are looking at some of these dramatic cuts that someone assumes
we can just take the Reserve back to where it used to be prior
to 9/11/2001. We can't. Because the Army is different today
than it was 9/11/2001 in terms of the way they are structured
and in terms of their dependence on the Army Reserve and the
National Guard.
Now the next chart, if I could, will illustrate my concern.
I call this the ``dip chart,'' if you want to call it. But this
indicates the end strength of the Army Reserve and how it has
changed. But more importantly, it indicates how the Army
Reserve has changed in terms of the composition of the force.
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
124.]
General Stultz. If you go back to 2002-2003 timeframe, we
were at almost 215,000 of a 205,000 authorization, almost
10,000 over strength. And then we went to war. And what we
realized is we had a strategic force. We did not have a force
that was prepared for war. We had soldiers in our force that
were not competent to go to war, physically, mentally, and
other means.
We had soldiers in our force that said, ``This is not what
I signed up for. It is time for me to leave.'' And a lot of
times we gave them a medal, and said, ``Thanks for your
service.''
And that structure, or that end strength, went all the down
to almost 185,000 by 2006, when I came aboard as chief of the
Reserve. That didn't mean we just lost 30,000. Every year we
were recruiting an additional 30,000 into the force. So you
multiply several years of 30,000, plus the 30,000 reduction,
and it is well over 100,000 soldiers we lost out of our force--
over 50 percent of our force.
And then we started building back. And we built back with
soldiers like Sergeant Dasher that I mentioned earlier, with
soldiers who said, ``This is what I am signed up for. I want to
go do something. I want to be something. I want something that
is fulfilling.''
And that is the heroes that we have today that is a
national treasure. Those are those soldiers that stand there on
Christmas Day with me in Baghdad with their hands raised,
taking an oath of reenlistment to stay in the uniform, knowing
that they are risking their lives every day they go into
battle.
We can't afford to lose that. The Army is dependent upon
that. That is a national treasure. And my fear, if we start
cutting the force, if we start cutting resources, that dip will
occur. It will occur again as those soldiers who are in our
force today say, ``I am not going back to a strategic 1-
weekend-in-a-month, 2 weeks in the summertime force. I want to
be part of something.''
What we owe our Nation is to maintain that investment that
we have got because we know our Reserve Components are a
tremendous return on investment in terms of what it actually
costs for a soldier in the Reserve versus a soldier in the
Active Army.
We know that is a huge savings in terms of capability as
long as you are confident it will be there when you need it and
it will be ready when you need it. And we have got that today.
We have got to maintain it because if we are going to have to
cut spending in the total defense budget, I think the Reserve
Components are going to become even more critical as a way of
saving capability and spending less.
And so my pledge to you is I will do everything I can to be
as efficient, as cost-effective as I can. But I owe it to my
soldiers to maintain their readiness, to give them the
equipment they need to train on and the equipment they need to
go to war, and to take care of their families while they are
gone.
So I will look forward to your questions, sir. But again,
thank you for all of you for your support for us.
[The prepared statement of General Stultz can be found in
the Appendix on page 49.]
Mr. Forbes. General, thank you. And we owe them the same
thing and thank you for helping us provide that to them.
General Wyatt.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF, DIRECTOR, AIR
NATIONAL GUARD
General Wyatt. Let me just say that it is an honor and
privilege to be here with you today, and on behalf of the
106,700 Air National Guardsmen that are representing our
country so well.
As we meet here today, there are over 6,289 Guard airmen
deployed around the world in Iraq, Afghanistan, providing, for
example, air logistic support to the National Science
Foundation in Antarctica and Greenland, and helping to defend
U.S. interests in every continent around the globe.
In addition, 3,437 Air National Guard men and women are
protecting our homeland, including protecting the sovereignty
of American airspace. And then, Mr. Chairman, you and Ranking
Member Bordallo both referenced the ASA mission. I learned just
recently that the mission that I traditionally referred to as
ASA is now referred to by NORAD [North American Aerospace
Defense Command] as ACA, Aerospace Control Alert.
So if I lapse back into an old vocabulary, please forgive
me. They are one in the same, sir. So ASA, in my mind equates,
to ACA. But these 3,437 Air National Guard airmen that are
defending the homeland right now include not only those ASA-ACA
folks, but assisting several authorities in the protection of
life and property in the United States, flood control as we
have recently seen here on the East Coast, tornado recovery
efforts in the Midwest, and fire support in the southwest part
of the country.
Air Guard members are helping U.S. Customs and Border
Patrol on the border as we speak. And so far, in regard to
that, the mobile air firefighting system, the Air National
Guard, has delivered over 360,000 gallons of fire retardant in
support of the National Forest Service interagency help.
When the air campaign of Operation Desert Storm began in
January 1991--I am going to take you through just a really
brief history of the percentage of support that the Air
National Guard has given our United States Air Force--back in
Operation Desert Storm, 1991, 11 percent of the U.S. Air Force
aircraft that were flown in that operation were maintained by
Air National Guard airmen.
Fast forward to April 1993, when the U.S. Air Force was
called upon to support NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] in the campaign to protect civilians in Bosnia.
Recall also that, as a byproduct of Operation Desert Storm, we
were also doing Operation Northern Watch and Southern Watch
over Iraq.
Continuing to support national security requirements around
the world at that point in time, the Air National Guard
provided 45 percent of the deployed United States Air Force
aircraft for Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Watch, and Southern
Watch, in addition to providing countless support operations
around the globe.
As demands upon the U.S. Air Force expanded beyond flight
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Air National Guard men
and women were there providing medical assistance around the
world. I had the privilege yesterday of attending the Air Force
Association awards banquet. General Johns, representing Air
Mobility Command, one of his units, his MAJCOM [Major Command]
gained units, won an award for the medical assistance.
And he summoned General Stenner and myself to the stand, to
the awards stand, because he recognized that 94 percent of the
United States Air Force medical capability resides in the
Reserve Component. This is a dual-use capability, as Ranking
Member Bordallo pointed out, that is also available to our
governors.
As you recall, Secretary Gates recently directed the
National Guard to stand up 10 homeland response forces
comprised of Army National Guard and Air National Guard
members. They are about 556 strong. And one of the large pieces
of that, on behalf of the Air National Guard, is this medical
assistance, where we are able to deploy those skills that we
have to support the warfighter overseas in support of our
citizens here at home when we have a natural disaster or
terrorist attack.
And in addition to medical assistance, some of the other
capabilities that we provide, non-flying, our explosive
disposal experts, security forces, battlefield airmen, and
other combat and support task. Today, Guard airmen are serving
alongside our Air Force Joint Force and coalition partners
around the world. I provide some of these statistics to
emphasize that the men and women of today's Air National Guard
are ready. And not only are they ready, but they are willing
and, in fact, anxious to serve their Nation both here at home
and abroad.
As we look to the many challenges of this country ahead, my
goal is to lay the foundations for an Air Force that has the
capability and the capacity to meet tomorrow's challenges,
within the constraints that we can foresee. I believe that the
Air National Guard, as well as the Air Force Reserve, are a
part of the solution. We have proven time and again to be
ready, willing and accessible.
Operation Odyssey Dawn, Operator Unified Protector, the
aerial tanking refueling was done by 22 aircraft, 16 of which
were Air National Guard. There was no mobilization authority,
but over 800 Air National Guard's airmen deployed in support of
that operation, without any mobilization authority--100 percent
volunteers.
After the Vietnam War, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
created the Total Force Concept, realizing that by increasing
reliance on the Reserve Components through improved equipment
and increased training the Nation could maintain defense
capability at a lower cost.
That concept is even more valid today than it was back in
1970. And your investment in the National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Account has been a critical component to the Air
National Guard as we increased our readiness through the last
20 years. For example, without that investment our Block 30 F-
16s, which are the backbone of protecting America's skies,
would have been irrelevant by now.
The Air National Guard is a cost-effective, professional,
ready airspace and cyberspace force. Based upon its traditional
part-time professional workforce, and because we operate
primarily from civilian airports and small community bases, we
provide the cost-effectiveness that this country needs at this
critical time.
You have created the most the professional combat-ready
force in the history of the Air National Guard. Today's Guard
airmen understand that the Nation needs more of them than one
weekend a month and 2 weeks in the summer. And they are ready
and willing to answer the call. All they ask is that we
continue to provide them with the equipment, the training and
the resources they need to accomplish the mission.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in
the Appendix on page 82.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
General Carpenter.
STATEMENT OF MG RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, USA, ACTING DIRECTOR,
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
General Carpenter. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member
Bordallo, it is an honor and a privilege to be here today to
represent the 360,000-plus Army Guard soldiers. Currently there
are 39,485 soldiers mobilized, and more than half of our force
has combat experience. The sacrifice of our soldiers, their
families and employers has been tremendous, and they deserve
our deepest gratitude.
Looking back on the past decade, the Army National Guard
has been there from the very beginning. The New York National
Guard was among the first on the scene at the World Trade
Center on
9/11, as was Maryland and Virginia in the days after the
Pentagon was attacked.
Beginning with the 9/11 response, the Army National Guard
has continued to shoulder our responsibilities in the overseas
fight in Afghanistan and Iraq, while simultaneously responding
to events in the homeland, the largest of which was Hurricane
Katrina.
And the service of our Army National Guard continues. For
example, the weekend of August 26 through the 29th past, the
National Guard had more than 63,000 National Guardsmen on duty
protecting this country at home and abroad. Over 47,500
National Guardsmen were deployed in support of overseas
contingency operations and partnership-building missions.
Almost 10,000 members of the National Guard on that
weekend, from 24 states, responded to Hurricane Irene. We
staged three ground task forces, three air task forces, and we
pre-staged them in anticipation of landfall for Hurricane
Irene. Another 1,000 National Guardsmen provided security on
our Nation's southwest borders. An additional 4,000 National
Guardsmen responded to a range of domestic emergencies across
this country.
The experience of the past decade has transformed the Army
National Guard to an operational force--``our national
treasure,'' in the words of a recently-retired, four-star
Active Duty general. As an operational force, the Army National
Guard represents the best value for America. Force structure
and military power can be sustained in the Army National Guard
for a fraction of the regular cost. The Army National Guard is
one-third of the total Army, but accounts for approximately 10
percent of the total Army budget.
Supporting capability in the Army National Guard makes good
business sense. The Army National Guard could not have evolved
into the operational force without the support of this
committee and Congress. Our Nation has invested over $37
billion in equipment for the Army National Guard in the past 6
years. The delivery of that equipment has increased Army
National Guard equipment on-hand rates for critical dual-use
equipment by 14 percent.
Because the Army Guard is a full partner with the Active
Component, it is vital for the Guard to continue modernizing
equipment. Modernization and interoperability are essential for
training during the Army National Guard pre-mobilization
periods, and critical for deployments.
It is no secret that the Department of Defense and the Army
are facing reduced funding. We in the Army Guard understand
that, and have already set about garnering efficiencies and
developing new strategies that will allow us to continue to
meet our dual-mission responsibilities with less funding. Those
two missions have required an Army National Guard of 360,000
soldiers formed into 54 joint force headquarters, 8 combat
divisions, 28 brigade combat teams, 8 combat aviation brigades,
and over 70 enabling brigades during the past 10 years.
We are reminded regularly that we live in a very dangerous
and unpredictable world. And it seems like the predicted 100-
year natural disaster events are coming closer and closer
together. We have built a capability to respond to the needs of
our citizens at home and abroad. We ought to fully understand
the risk associated with reducing that capability. Because, in
the words of a combat commander in Afghanistan, ``Sometimes all
it takes is all you have.''
The Army National Guard is a force forward-deployed in the
area of operation, the homeland. We have built great capacity
in the National Guard by establishing forces specifically
designed to deal with emergencies, disasters and potential
terrorist attacks.
Those units include Guard civil support teams, of which
there are 57, 17 chemical-biological emergency response forces,
10 homeland response forces. General Wyatt mentioned that we
are in the process of building the last eight of those in this
next fiscal year, and two domestic all-hazards response teams.
By one estimate, 96 percent of the events that happen
across our country are handled by local first responders,
policemen, firemen and the National Guard. Only 4 percent
require Federal support. It has taken years to build these
organizations. We should not rush to reduce the size, structure
or capability of the Army National Guard without significant
analysis and thorough deliberation.
I would like to specifically address a separate issue. And
that issue is access to the Army National Guard and the Army
Reserve in non-named contingencies. The Department of Defense
requested a change in the statute section 12304 which would
allow the Reserve Components to be involuntary called with
prior coordination at the service-chief level, as well as the
necessary budgetary authority to support the deployment.
The Army National Guard and the adjutant generals are
staunch advocates of the change in statute. We think that it
will allow for the continued critical contributions of our
soldiers and units in the effective use of soft power--that is,
theater security and cooperation--in the hope of reducing the
possibility of mobilized military response in the future.
We think our soldiers, equipped with their battlefield
experience and civilian skills as well as their strong desire
to be used, can make meaningful contributions to their state
and nation, are the right force at the right time. Without the
change in statute, they will be denied the opportunity.
In the end, we have asked for the Army National Guard's
share of the budget reductions to be given to us, the Army
Guard. Let us, the Army Guard, figure out where to pay the
bill. Don't direct reductions in Guard brigade combat teams or
end strength.
In closing, the Army National Guard is battle-tested, and
well-equipped for both of our missions. And this committee has
been critical in building and sustaining the best manned,
trained and equipped National Guard I have seen in my career.
Truly a best value for America. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Carpenter can be found
in the Appendix on page 92.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you gentlemen. And we have got some
individuals on this subcommittee who have a great deal of
expertise when it comes to the Reserves and Guard, so we want
to get to their questions. I am going to defer most of my
questions until the end, but I do have two that I would like to
just set up for you at the beginning.
General Stultz, the chart that you have does not reflect
what I think is just a tremendous story for the Reserve and
Guard that you gentlemen have played in it. And that is, how
you have changed kind of the overall complexion of the Reserve
and the Guard units.
As you mentioned, if you go back 15 years ago, maybe 20
years ago, I know a lot of people you talked to as to why they
served in the Reserve or the Guard it is because it was easy. I
mean, you know, they would do their one weekend a month and
their 2 weeks. And we heard that a lot. Even when we began the
beginning of this last decade we heard that from some people.
Something happened. You transformed that. And when most of
us travel to Afghanistan and Iraq, we are trying to find those
individuals now and we can't. When you go to anybody and say,
``You know, here everybody says that you want to be home. How
tough is it?'' They all look you in the eye and say, ``This is
what we want to do. This is what we have signed up to do.''
And so my question to all three of you, if you can help us
with this is, why do men and women want to serve in the Reserve
or the Guards today, you know, as opposed to the Active Duty?
You have done just a wonderful job in recruiting top-flight
people who are willing to pay those prices. What is it that
draws them? And what risk do we have of losing that if we had
these huge cuts?
And one other thing. General Stultz, can you just clarify
for me in the chart you gave me? As I look at this, when I look
at the medical between the Reserve and the Guard, it looks like
to me that 74 percent of all the medical for the Army is being
provided by the Reserve and the Guard, and 79 percent of the
transportation. I just want to make sure I am not misreading
that, and when we state that, it is accurate.
So, if all three of you would have at that.
General Stultz. Yes, sir. With the question you just asked,
the chart that I showed is the number of units in the Active
and the Guard and in Reserve. And out of the total units in the
medical force, 74 percent of them are in the Guard and Reserve.
Out of the total units in the transportation force, 79 percent
are now in the Guard and Reserve. So, it is the total number of
units. So, it is that capability. Because that is what we
deploy. We deploy units on the battlefield.
With regard to your first question, you know that is one of
the things I said. And as I meet with soldiers in Iraq,
Afghanistan, I ask myself and I ask them a lot of times--
``Why?''
You know, when you are sitting there across the table
having dinner with Lieutenant [inaudible] several years ago--he
is from California--and I said, ``So where did you go to
school?'' And he said, ``Grad or undergrad?'' So, I said,
``Okay, grad school.'' And he said, ``So I got my Ph.D. from
MIT.''
And I said, ``So what do you do? What did you major in?''
And he gave me this look like ``You are not going to understand
this.'' And he proceeded to prove himself because he talked
about thought patterns turning into speech patterns and the
processes and the neurons. And I said, ``What do you do for a
living?'' And he said, ``Sir, I develop artificial
intelligence.'' And I said, ``What are you doing here?''
And he said, ``Sir, I was in grad school at MIT when 9/11
occurred, and I just felt compelled to serve my country. But I
don't want to give up my civilian career and my education. I
don't want to be a full-time soldier all the time. And the Army
Reserve lets me do that. It lets me pursue my civilian goals,
and also be part of something special, this brotherhood and
sisterhood of men and women in uniform.''
And I think that is part of the answer. It is this
generation that we have got today that they are living the
American dream, in some cases with good education, good jobs.
But they just want to give back. But they don't want to give up
what they have earned. And so the Reserve Component allows them
to do that.
And for our military, you put a Reserve soldier, Guard or
Reserve, on the battlefield you put a force multiplier on the
battlefield. Because they bring civilian education and skills,
in a lot of cases, that the Active Army just can't develop.
You know, when I am in Afghanistan, and I have a young
sergeant come up to me and say, ``Hey, sir. I want to get my
picture taken with you because I work at Procter & Gamble,
too.'' And I said, ``Well, I retired from P&G when I took this
job.'' And he said, ``I know, sir. But I want to get my picture
taken with you.'' And I said, ``So what do you do at P&G?'' And
he said, ``Sir, I am a scientist.'' And he says, ``What did you
do?'' And I said, ``Don't worry about it.''
I mean, that is the quality of soldiers that we have got in
our force today, and we can't afford as a nation to lose them.
That is that right side of that chart. That is those
individuals that said, ``I just want to be part of something
and give back to America, and still be a civilian career and
education that I have got.''
If we cut support to them it is not just going to be a blow
to the Reserve, it is going to be a blow to this Nation.
Because the talent and the quality we have in our force--and
for one-third of the cost, in a lot of estimates of what it
costs for a full-time soldier--what we get in return is
remarkable.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
General Wyatt.
General Wyatt. Chairman Forbes, a lot of the things that
General Stultz indicated are true in the Air Guard, too. I
think, broadly, patriotism. And I will link that to some of my
other comments here. But patriotism, the ability and the
privilege to serve alongside Americans that are of like ilk.
I think the good feeling of joining an organization, a
professional organization, that is trained to the same
standards as our Active Duty brothers and sisters, an effective
force, an opportunity to continue that service to country, the
ability to live where they want to live and pursue the dreams
that they want to pursue, both militarily and in their civilian
lives.
I am no different than any other Guardsman. But I served my
first 6 years on active duty. I had always wanted to go to law
school, but back in the Vietnam days I decided to join the Air
Force, and I wanted to be a fighter pilot.
And after I was a fighter pilot for about 6 years, that
desire to get into law school came back, and I started checking
out some programs. And the Air Force would send me to law
school, but then I couldn't be a pilot anymore. I had to be a
JAG [Judge Advocate General], and I wanted to be both. And the
Air Guard offered me the opportunity to pursue both of my
dreams.
I continued being a fighter pilot. I continued to go to law
school. I graduated, practiced law. One point in time, when I
was the wing commander at Tulsa in the F-16 unit, I was also a
state court trial judge. And I tell people that, and they say,
``How do you do that?'' I say, ``The same way that all the
other Air National Guardsmen do it. Because we want to, because
we can, and that is what we want to do. We want to serve this
country, but pursue our individual dreams, too.''
And I think when you can join an organization that has
transitioned from being a strategic Reserve, like the Air Guard
was when I first joined, into an operational force where you
can't tell the difference, you go into combat and everyone,
Guard, Reserve and Active Component are trained at the same
standard.
You know, when you take a look at the contributions of that
flight of four that took down al-Zarqawi in Iraq, it was Active
Duty, Guard and Reserve. It was an Air National Guard targeting
pod provided by Engria that spotted the guy and got him. That
is how the total force works, and the Air National Guard gives
our individuals that opportunity to make their contributions to
the national defense in the way that they want.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
General Carpenter.
General Carpenter. Chairman Forbes, we have a chart not
unlike what General Stultz has in the Army Reserve in terms of
our history with regard to end strength. And it is similar in
terms of the dip that you see in 2005-2006. And what we saw in
2005-2006 was the change in the Reserve Component from the
strategic Reserve to this operational Reserve that we have
today.
And what happened in 2005-2006 is, we had a cohort that had
joined back before 9/11. And we had talked and we had sold
college benefits and those kinds of things in terms of service
to country. And to their credit, they went down-range and they
did a terrific job.
But when they came back and they were reunited with their
families and their employers, there was an influence there that
said, ``You know what? I am not sure we are willing to do this
again.'' And we saw a lot of those soldiers make a decision,
for the right reasons, to leave our formations.
At that point, we began changing the way we recruited
people, the way we recruited soldiers. And what we did was, we
recruited them for patriotism, for service to country. And we
had soldiers who wanted to be part of something, who wanted to
be part of a team, who wanted to go do something for their
country, and yet were not interested in residing on Fort Hood
or Fort Bliss or in the Active Component. And that Army
National Guard team, that Army National Guard family, you find
throughout our organization.
I was at the Gulf oil spill a year ago. I met a father-and-
son team. They had both come into the National Guard since 9/
11, and they were very proud of their service. They were not
only doing work on the oil spill in Louisiana, they were
getting ready to deploy into Afghanistan. And they have been
mobilized, and they are down-range together. The son, by the
way, has graduated from OCS [Officer Candidate School] and he
is a second lieutenant. His father is an E-5 sergeant, about to
be a staff sergeant.
I ran into a mother-daughter team at the southwest border
in Texas 6 months ago when I was down there. Same story. They
had joined since 9/11. The mother was so proud of her service,
and she wanted her daughter to be part of something. And she
invited her daughter into the organization, and invited her to
be part of the Texas National Guard.
People don't do that if they don't feel good about their
service, if they don't like what they are doing. As a matter of
fact, their tendency would be to serve and leave as opposed to
invite their friends and, in this case family members, to be
part of this organization.
So, we think we have got a great team in this Army National
Guard. We think we have a treasure across this country, not
unlike the other Reserve Components. And so it is my pleasure
to represent them here today.
Mr. Forbes. Well, thank you, gentlemen. Thank all three of
you for the great job you have done.
Ms. Bordallo is now recognized for any questions she may
have.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I decided
I am going to go ahead with my first question, on behalf of
Congresswoman Gabby Giffords. General Wyatt, I believe this
question might be for you.
As you know, Congresswoman Giffords is very proud of the
brave men and women of Tucson's 162nd Fighter Wing. And she
feels strongly their primary mission of building international
partnerships via training tactical skill sets is a strategic
imperative during these fiscally austere times.
So, as the Joint Strike Fighter comes online, how do you
envision the Wing's mission evolving? And can you discuss
strategic significance of the Barry Goldwater training range?
General Wyatt. Ms. Bordallo, thank you very much for the
question. I had the honor and privilege of being in Tucson last
Thursday. We were at part of the 162nd Fighter Wing. An
attendant unit there is the Air Force Reserve and Air National
Guard Test Center. And I was getting some out-briefs on our
weapons and tactics conferences. This is where our warfighters
come in across all of the core functions of the United States
Air Force and tell us the equipment and the training that is
critical to them in order to be a front-line military force.
It is a great treasure that we have in Tucson at the 162nd
Fighter Wing. The Wing's main mission, as Ms. Giffords knows,
is to train foreign military students in the F-16 and the
skills that are necessary to do that. Not only do you have to
have the skills of being a fighter pilot, but you have to be
able to teach the skills. And there is a big difference in
being able to do it, and being able to do it and teach it.
And you throw in the additional challenge of having
students who may not be quite as proficient in the English
language as we would like them to be, it takes a special
talent, special skill, that exists nowhere else in the United
States Air Force except Tucson, Arizona. So it is a national
treasure.
As we are seeing in the paper, and we are following the
development of the F-35, we know that in addition to the
coalition partners that have signed on as part of the Joint
Strike Fighter F-35 program there are a lot of other countries
now who are recognizing the capability that this aircraft
offers, and they are approaching the United States for
opportunities to buy that aircraft.
I see a need, a continuing need, for the 162nd to continue
doing not only the F-16 foreign military training mission, but
to gradually transition into the F-35 as more and more of the
F-35 become available to our coalition partners and allies that
desire to get into that airplane. So I do see them
transitioning into the F-35.
In fact, they were one of the training bases that was
identified a year ago this last July by the Secretary and the
chief of staff as one of the potential bed-down bases for F-35
training. They were not selected as the primary location--I
think Luke was and Eglin--but they were certainly on the list.
And I would think, as this aircraft comes into the inventory,
they will get closer and closer to realizing that mission.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, General. And I know that
Congresswoman Giffords will appreciate what each of you do for
our country, and we look forward to having her back with us
again soon.
My question then for, I guess, each of the witnesses; what
would be the impact on the National Guard and Reserves if you
had to go back to the strategic Reserve model of training and
deployments?
If you can just quickly answer that, beginning with you,
General?
General Stultz. Yes, ma'am. As I indicated, the chart here
I think is indicative. I think we will lose a lot of soldiers.
Just what Chairman Forbes asked, ``Why are they here?'' They
are here because they want to serve and they want to do
something, will say, ``If I am not going to have the
opportunity, if I am going to go back to a strategic one-
weekend-a-month service, I don't want to stay in.''
So we will lose that investment, and we will lose that
talent. But additionally, this Nation will lose their ability
to respond because of the capabilities that we have. We are the
ones that open the theatre. We are the trucks, we are the
boats, we are the logistics, we are the people who push that
force into the theatre to respond to a contingency.
And if we don't invest and if we don't maintain this
support we will lose that ability also. And the next time we
have to respond to a contingency somewhere else in the world it
will take us longer as a nation to respond and get the forces
in, in the magnitude that we need.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
General.
General Wyatt. Congresswoman, I think the answer is very
similar. If we were relegated back to strategic Reserve, a la
the Air National Guard that I joined back in 1977, I think we
would have a mass exodus of people. Because they are joining
our organizations now because they know they train to the same
standards, they know they are as good as, they know they
provide the top line combat capability, and they want to
continue doing that.
We offer them the opportunity to do that at a significantly
reduced cost to the country. And they recognize that they are
the best bang for the buck as far as providing that military
capability. If we put them back on the burner as a strategic
Reserve they will still cost the country money, but they won't
be able to provide that front-line--respond at the same speed
of light--that the Active service responds. They won't be able
to provide that capability.
The other thing we do is, we take away the abilities of the
governors and the adjutants general to respond to the domestic
demands of their offices as those guardsmen are in Title 32
status. We train to such high standards in the military, and we
use the level of that training in response to our state
missions, too.
So if we do that, we would actually be taking a double hit.
We would lose military combat capability, besides losing our
people. And we would lose the ability to respond on a moment's
notice on behalf of the governors and the adjutants general.
Ms. Bordallo. I think that what comes to my mind is the
experience they bring. I mean, that is just invaluable. It is--
--
General Wyatt. Well, if I may----
Ms. Bordallo. Yes.
General Wyatt [continuing]. Along those lines, one of the
reasons that we are cost-effective--and I will talk about
fighter pilots because that is what I am most familiar with--is
because of the experience level that we have in the combat air
forces inside of the Air National Guard, our experience level
is--this is based on the number of hours and sorties and
numbers of deployments and other things, skill levels--we have
a 90 percent skill level in the Air National Guard. The Active
Component is 40 percent.
This allows us to maintain that high level of proficiency
while we fly our people two less sorties per month than the
Active Component gets. When you talk about an aircraft that
costs $10,000 to $20,000 an hour to fly, we save perhaps a half
million dollars per pilot a year just because of our experience
level. And we can do that because of that experience level.
Ms. Bordallo. General Carpenter.
General Carpenter. Ma'am, I would echo everything that
General Stultz and General Wyatt had to say. I would add this.
With regard to returning to a strategic Reserve, there is no
funding in the Army's base budget to support the mandates and
the additional requirements that go along with this operational
Reserve.
We have built this operational force on OCO [Overseas
Contingency Operations funding], and when OCO goes away we in
the Guard and the Reserve are going to be back to 48 drills and
15 days of AT [annual training]. So there will be no
requirement for anybody to do anything except watch as this
force is put back in the box, back to 48 drills and 15 days of
annual training.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much. And one other
quick question I have. This is in regard to the future of the
C-27J. Can you talk about the future viability of the fleet,
and the intended platform mission sets, given the growing
concern that the reduced inventory will not be able to
adequately support crew proficiency, operational readiness, and
infrastructure investments?
As you know, this committee remains concerned that the
Department plans to retire the C-23 Sherpas without accounting
for how the tactical airlift will be accomplished. The C-27J
was the replacement aircraft, but the program was significantly
cut and shifted to the Air Force. So what are the plans to
support domestic emergency operations and other contingencies?
General, begin with you.
General Wyatt. Congresswoman, that is an excellent
question, and one that I think is hard-pressed to answer right
now. Let me just review a couple of things that have happened
in recent years, talking about the C-27. I will let General
Carpenter talk about the C-23.
But if you go back to 2005, BRAC [Base Realignment and
Closure], the Air National Guard lost over 20 percent of its C-
130s as a result of BRAC. We were able to respond to Katrina
with over 220 aircraft because the effects of BRAC had not
begun to be implemented. Now our numbers are well below that
200 level, coupled at a time when the Army has put the C-23,
perhaps, on the chopping block. And I will let General
Carpenter address that.
As has previously been referenced, the program of record
right now for the C-27J is 38. And so, we are marching to that
tune. As we speak, the C-27 is deployed in Kandahar,
Afghanistan. The Mansfield Air National Guard is flying that
aircraft in combat today.
The anticipation of the need of this aircraft being flown
in direct support to the Army in the theatre, and the reduced
numbers, drives the Air National Guard then to consider ways to
meet those mission requirements overseas with all the airplanes
that will eventually be deployed overseas, at the same time as
continuing our training here at home to keep our pilots and air
crew proficient and also bring on new pilots and air crew.
This has required us to up the crew ratio per airplane--
traditionally somewhere around two crews per airplane for an
airlifter--to five, to allow enough air crews to do the
deployment mission overseas and continue training here. So that
is how that has affected us.
We continue to look forward to continue feeling of the C-
27J. The demands for the domestic operation are where I have
great concern. Because while the Air Force will tell you that
there is sufficient airlift to handle the demands of the
country around the world, the question I ask is, ``Okay, but
how long does it take us as an Air Force to do that?''
We look at the requirement for domestic operations, 72
hours is a lifetime. It is an unacceptable time-response frame.
When the governors call upon airlift, they need the airlift
right now. It speaks for a need of what I would call ``organic
airlift,'' airlift that is in the Air National Guard at the
behest of the governors so that they can respond to national
emergencies.
The Mobility Capabilities Requirement Study 2016 that came
out addressed support to the homeland, but it referenced the
access to the Active Duty airplanes which will be available.
But most of them are deployed, and I would submit to you it
takes about 3 days to get a C-130 from Japan home. That is 72
hours.
Ms. Bordallo. Oh, I agree with that, sir.
General Wyatt. You know the time and distance. The response
to the civilian fleet is the same thing. It takes about 96
hours to get a civilian aircraft on contract to do a domestic
mission. All those are too late for the response to the
homeland. So I am working with the Air Force, and I am getting
a lot of support to go back and look at the domestic
requirements for airlift. Especially in view of the fact that,
subsequent to the Mobility Capabilities Requirement Study,
Secretary Gates said, ``Stand up these 10 homeland response
forces, 556 soldiers and airmen, to be able to respond.''
Sometimes needing airlift, most probably needing airlift,
as the National Level Exercise 11 in May showed us when we
practiced for the fault line earthquakes--Mississippi, Ohio, et
cetera. There is a need.
I think we need to determine what the requirements are for
the homeland. I have asked for the help of NORTHCOM [Northern
Command], and NORTHCOM is helping us develop those requirements
in conjunction with Air Mobility Command, Transportation
Command, so that we can get a true handle on the requirements
for the domestic airlift, in addition to the warfight airlift
requirements.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you General.
And quickly, General Carpenter. I know I have overstayed my
time, I guess.
General Carpenter. Yes, Congresswoman. A couple of key
points. All the C-23s are in the Army National Guard. Because
of a budget decision, we have been directed to divest ourselves
of all of those C-23s by FY [fiscal year] 2015. We currently
have four that are parked on the ramp in Texas. They are no
longer available for us to use and we will progressively park
the rest of them over the next 4 or 5 years.
We think that the gap that General Wyatt alluded to right
now in terms of homeland defense and support, that is coming
and is being accomplished by the C-23s. But for the C-23s, we
wouldn't be filling that gap in terms of short takeoff and
landing and tactical air kind of things that are being provided
by the C-23s. We think that it is a pretty valuable aircraft.
I was in Balad 6 months ago, in Iraq. There were 10
aircraft on the ground there, 9 present for duty because 1 was
in transit. All nine of those aircraft flew that evening. And
they supported everything from Special Ops [Special Operations]
to normal flights back and forth. And so this aircraft provides
that kind of capability. It also provides observer support
during the oil spill, for domestic operations.
We have two of them in the MFO [Multinational Force] Sinai
mission that provide observer support in that venue to support
the MFO Sinai mission there. So we think they are a great
aircraft. Unfortunately, we are going to be divesting ourselves
of those particular aircraft over the next 4 years.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. Thank you, General.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Nevada, Dr. Heck is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Heck. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all three of
you for your lifetime of selfless service to our Nation. And in
the interest of full disclosure, I will say that I am one of
the over 205,000 Army Reservists that General Stultz commands.
Just a quick comment at first. I won't take away from the
idea that those that join now do so out of patriotism, but I
think it is also important to know it is a two-way street.
Folks join the Reserves so they get to do some pretty neat
things that they don't get to do--that that scientist at P&G
[Procter and Gamble] or the MIT Ph.D. is not going to get an
opportunity to jump out of airplanes, fast rope out of
helicopters, and not to mention the incredible leadership
training opportunities that will set them up for success in
their civilian careers. So it is a two-way street.
General Stultz, as you know my area of concern mostly is
military medical readiness, and we have had several discussions
on that. First, I want to start off by congratulating Major
General Stone and Colonel Kiernan for the things that they have
done to help clean up some of the issues that we have seen with
overdue profiles.
My question is, has there been an audit done of the LHI
[Logistics Health, Inc.] contract and the costs associated with
those mass events per unit soldier, the cost and the impact of
no-shows on vouchers, and ways to look at cost containment by
pushing more of what LHI does back to our military force?
I know we are doing ORWs [Operation Ready Warrior] for
dental, which have been successful, rolling perhaps those out
to include vision and immunizations, having our medical
personnel perform the physical examinations for those that are
being jammed up by temporary profiles.
So one, has there been an audit? If not, are there plans to
have an audit? And what are the plans to move forward to push
some of those activities being contracted out back to our TPU
[Troop Program Unit] soldiers?
General Stultz. To answer the first question, as a formal
audit I can't say that we have done a formal--if you want to
call it an audit--to run the traps on it. We have looked at how
much we are spending and what it is costing us and is it cost
effective.
As you well know, we have gone back to LHI to renegotiate
some of the provisions of the contract to limit what they
actually do for us. And I think the big question I have asked,
to be perfectly straight with you, in the process of what LHI
does for us when a soldier fills out the personal health
assessment, a doctor from LHI who has no access to that
soldier's records makes a determination of what care or what
profile he needs.
But it still has to go to our Regional Support Commands to
get further looked at by a doctor. And in a lot of cases
further on, I am not sure what the value is there exactly. And
what we have to do, I think, as we are going to be forced to
draw down in our budgets, is do what we have already started,
as you allude to.
We are going to have to do a lot of this stuff ourselves,
and use our own resources. Now in the past, we have gotten away
from that because of the demand and the op tempo [operations
tempo] and the training needs and everything else we have had
on our medical force.
But as that demand comes down, as we draw down out of Iraq
and as we gradually draw down out of Afghanistan, those medical
resources that we have got within our Reserve are going to
become more available to us. We have got to take advantage of
them. We have got to get back to the traditional, where we use
our own resources to perform those medical examinations, those
medical determinations, because we can do that on our time.
You know, when we try to send a soldier to get a medical
exam, we have to do that based on when the doctor is available.
And quite often we take that soldier away from his civilian
job. When we use our own resources, we have a little bit more
control over saying, ``You are going to go here on this
weekend, where the soldier is already there, and you are going
to give him that examination and all.''
So yes, sir. I am all for, and have our staff looking at,
shifting more and more of that, as we started in American
Samoa, as we have started in Alaska, as we have started in
other areas where we are providing medical and dental support
to our soldiers on exercises. Now, how do we get to them on the
drill weekends and continue that support?
Dr. Heck. I appreciate that, and it is very encouraging.
And I would encourage at some point that there is a full audit
done of LHI to see whether or not what they are providing has
been cost-effective. And as we start to move some of those
activities back to our TPU or ARS [Army Reserve Soldiers]
soldiers, that we can see whether or not it is truly cost-
effective.
So thank you and thank you for your forthrightfulness.
General Stultz. Roger, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you Dr. Heck.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. LoBiondo is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, thank you
for being here. Thank you for your service.
General Wyatt, you know my sympathies were focused on the
177th and I classify them--I don't know if all of my colleagues
would agree--as the premier homeland security base, primarily
because of their strategic location and what they can bring to
the fight in so many ways.
But could you give us some insight on where you see--and I
am going to go with the old name too, ASA, because it is going
to take me a while to get switched over--the ASA mission going
and its construct in the future, in light of the Air Force
budget cuts which may have an effect on critical Air National
Guard missions?
And additionally, I am wondering if you have been speaking
with the Air Force brass, their leadership, to ensure that the
ASA units receive the upgrades necessary. I have been talking
about this, and Mr. Chairman you have been helpful with this
and this committee has been helpful. But some of these Air
Guard units are running with iron that is just--their wings are
going to fall off.
And if they can't fly they don't have a mission. So I would
hope you could talk to us a little bit about this.
General Wyatt. Mr. LoBiondo, first of all 177th, great
organization. You are right. Their strategic location, along
with probably the 113th here in DC to protect the National
Capital Region, is strategically probably the two most
important locations that we have. They are all important
because they protect the American citizens.
But I see the ASA-ACA mission as one imperative for the
safety of this country. It is mission number one. There has
been a recent study done by a former commander of NORTHCOM,
Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, who is now the vice chairman of the
Joint Chiefs. Some of that is classified, and I won't get into
that.
But I think that a review of that report shows the
importance of that mission for homeland security. So I see a
continuing reliance upon the Air Sovereignty Alert mission for
the safety of this country.
On September 11, 2001, we were up at seven locations.
Today, in the continental United States, we have 16 locations.
All of those are flown by the Air National Guard. The United
States Air Force flies one in Alaska with F-22s.
We get into this discussion about whether you need fifth-
generation fighters to do the Air Sovereignty Alert, not
necessarily for the stealth, but for all the other capabilities
that fifth generation brings--ESR [electronically scanning
radar] radar, integrated sensor fusion among not only the
sensors on the aircraft itself, but all of the other sensors
available--land-based radar, radio reports, chats, a lot of
different sources for some information to help us in the
intercept of these targets.
And then Hawaii Air National Guard location, who will be
flying the ASA-ACA mission in F-22s. The airplanes, most of the
airplanes, that we do the ASA-ACA mission with are the oldest
F-16s in the inventory. And you are very familiar with that
because the 177th flies a Block 30 F-16.
The Air Force has put in some weapons system sustainment
money that will keep the airframes themselves viable, we think,
for a couple of more years. We thought 2017-2018 would be the
structural limitations. We think there are sufficient monies to
keep them flying until 2019, maybe 2020. But the structural
part is just a part of the issue.
The other part, and probably for the mission equally as
important, is the ability to detect, meaning these aircraft
need state of the art radars. The ones that they are flying
with now are extremely expensive and difficult to maintain. A
lot of the parts are no longer manufactured.
Only because we have the best maintenance people in the
world in the Air National Guard are we able to keep some of
these support systems onboard the aircraft working. They lack
beyond line of sight radio communications that are necessary
for this mission. They lack the ability to integrate and infuse
all of the sensor data that is available for intercepts.
And so we are kind of operating with our hands behind our
back here as we go forward. We can still accomplish the mission
in the short term. My concern is the long term. And if we don't
put money either into these aircraft to give them the
capabilities that they need to continue, or if we don't replace
them with the F-35 aircraft, we face a continuing rising
expense, perhaps cost prohibitive, if there is such a thing for
the Department's number one mission. Or we are going to see
mission failure because we simply cannot stretch the life of
these airplanes out any longer.
Right now, the only Air National Guard unit that performs
Air Sovereignty Alert that has been named to receive the F-35
is Burlington, Vermont. No other Air National Guard unit has
been named. And you have got to remember that the units that do
ASA and ACA, that is not their only mission. They also rotate
and do the AEF [Air Expeditionary Force] mission OCONUS
[outside of contiguous United States] overseas, Iraq and
Afghanistan, and other possible locations in the world where
stealth is a requirement to be able to get into access-denied
areas.
So I think a healthy investment in the F-35 and the Air
National Guard is great, is required not only for the foreign
fight overseas, but more importantly for the defense of this
country with the ASA-ACA missions.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, General.
Mr. Chairman I had a couple of more questions, but maybe I
can submit them for the record.
Mr. Forbes. We would be glad to take those into the record.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Gentleman from Texas recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thank
you for being here this morning. I apologize for having to
leave, but we have got some conflicts in some of our
committees.
As I fly home almost every weekend through Dallas, I get a
chance to interact quite a bit with not just regular duty
soldiers and airmen and sailors going through Dallas, but also
recently a bunch of National Guard and Reserve individuals as
well.
And one of the things I asked them, you know--particularly
since 9/11--we have asked a lot of our Reserves and National
Guardsmen. And one issue that keeps coming up is the
predictability of military service. And it may be a
contradiction in terms because it doesn't make sense. Because
they tell me prior to 9/11 they had a good idea of whenever
they might be called up because of floods, hurricanes, those
kinds of weather-related issues.
Post 9/11, however, it is a completely different situation.
We are asking a lot of them. We are asking them to leave their
jobs for extended periods.
So my question is, how do you plan--or maybe it should be
can you plan--to somewhere, at some point, normalize again the
activation and mobilization of our Reserves and National
Guardsmen. Is that viable now, post 9/11? Are we, at some
point, going to be able to give them that predictability for
activation?
Because retention is the big issue. You know, so many of
them say, as my colleague was saying, ``We get to do some
pretty neat stuff.'' And in the old days it was under more of a
normal environment. So I kind of would like to get each of your
comments on that aspect of it.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
General Stultz. Yes sir. From the perspective of the Army
Reserve, yes sir, I think we can. When I talk to soldiers and I
ask them, ``What do you want?'' They really give me three
specifics usually, the first one being predictability.
``Because I have got another job, I have got another life, and
I need to be able to predict when the Army is going to use me
and when I am going to be able to focus on my other career.''
Then their second thing is, ``Don't waste my time. If you
are going to train me make it effective, make it worthwhile.
Don't just waste my time.'' And the third one is, ``Use me. I
have signed up to do something, I want to do something, so use
me.''
And what we have adopted is, you have heard of the
ARFORGEN, the Army Force Generation model, which is a 5-year
model for the Army Reserve. For every 1 year, or whatever you
are called up, you get 4 years back home of stability and
progressive training readiness to get back to that fifth year.
Soldiers have said, and employers have said, ``If you can
give me that predictability, I can live with that. Because 4
years in a 20-year career, that means I would be used about
three, four times at most. It gives me about 4 years back
home.'' Which for most of our kids--and I call them kids--they
change jobs about every 4 or 5 years. So they start a different
career anyway in a lot of cases. So they are used to kind of
starting over.
That is the key. And the key to getting that ARFORGEN model
is, one, we have got to be able to get the Army to say this is
what we need from you each year. And then we have got to slice
it into five slices, and build our force structure so we can
give the Army what they require every year in a predictable
manner.
And then we have got to build that training and equipping
model, which requires the resources to be able to give that
soldier what he wants, meaningful training. ``Don't waste my
time.'' It is going to be meaningful whether it is simulations,
or whether it is in-the-dirt training with the modern
equipment. And if we can do that the soldiers will say, ``I
will be here with you,'' and employers say, ``We will be here
with you also.''
General Carpenter. Sir, not unlike the situation that
General Stultz just described for the Army Reserve, it is
essentially the same for the Army National Guard. The Army
Force Generation model has provided that level of
predictability that we didn't have before.
On January 19, 2007, then Secretary of Defense Gates made
the announcement the Reserves, the National Guard, would be
mobilized for 1 year and 1 year only. And that provided the
predictability in terms of how long you were going to be away
from your job and be away from your family. A huge step forward
for us in the Army National Guard.
Separate from that, when we started into this we did very
short-term notification and mobilizations. And it was painful.
Some of our units were notified, and at the MOB [mobilization]
station and going down-range inside of 30 days at the start of
what we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that was certainly a
shock to the system.
What we have derived to is a notification of sourcing. That
is, notifying the unit at least 2 years in advance that they
are going to be used, alerting them at 1 year out, and then
providing the mobilization order 180 days out. And the 180 days
out is very key because that allows for the soldier to have the
TRICARE benefits that they didn't have before.
So if they do not get the mobilization order they don't get
that TRICARE benefit. And we are seeing, as we come down now
out of Afghanistan and Iraq, the off-ramps, first of all,
delays in issuing the mobilization order for good reasons.
Because we want to ensure that these soldiers are, in fact,
going to go. And so they are being disadvantaged because they
don't have the TRICARE eligibility.
And then beyond that, we are seeing some units off-ramped,
in other words not going to the mobilization station. We
recently had a Utah unit of about 400 soldiers that were
planning on being mobilized and going down-range here on the
15th of September, and their mobilization was canceled because
there was no requirement for the unit.
We have worked with the Army, and identified soldiers who
have hardship cases and ones who left their jobs and don't have
employment, those kinds of things. And we have found ways to do
tours of duty separate for those particular soldiers. In the
case of the Utah unit, TAG [The Adjutant General] Utah made
arrangements with the schools. And they have got 25 percent of
those soldiers now back in school doing college instead of
missing a semester.
So it is a painful process, but the predictability is
absolutely key.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Wyatt, first of all I represent Robins Air Force
Base in the 116th. I would like to invite you to visit us, see
our J-STARs [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System],
and talk with you about the future of that program. Do you
think we have enough J-STARs, just offhand?
General Wyatt. I think we need more of the capability.
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir.
General Wyatt. Whether it is in that particular platform or
another one is, I guess, up for debate and something that we
could talk about.
It has been several years since I have been to the 116th,
but I have been down. And I know that with the GMTI, the Ground
Moving Target Indicator, that that particular platform
provides, it is in demand all over the world. The 116th is one
of those high operations tempo Air National Guard units because
there is, in my opinion, not enough for the GMTI capability.
The Air Force is trying to robust that capability through
not only enhancement of the J-STARs, but other platforms that
can provide similar capabilities. Not the same kind, because in
the J-STARs you have the sensor operators and the folks in the
back that can give you real-time analysis of what they are
seeing through the sensor systems.
The sensor systems themselves are getting old and worn out.
And, again, Air National Guard Maintenance keeps those things
flying. But it is a great unit. To answer your question, we
need more of the capability, and we can talk about how that
might be provided.
Mr. Scott. Well they do an excellent job for this country
and our allies. And if you get the opportunity, we would love
to host you down there and do a tour of the planes.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service and the men and women
that you represent. General Carpenter, I want you to know that
I heard what you said--don't micromanage my command. Give me my
budget number and let me handle it. And I hope that is the way
we do it.
And one last question, if I could, General Carpenter. How
many different budget numbers do you get in a year? How often,
with continuing resolutions and other things, is your budget
changing and how much difficulty creating for you and your
command?
General Carpenter. I think what we saw last year with the
continuing resolutions and the stutter starts and stops were
concerns by our soldiers about whether or not they were going
to get paid or whether they weren't going to get paid.
I know that Congress, and I know the President have gone
the extra mile to try and ensure that that worry goes away. But
frankly last April when I was in Iraq and when we had the issue
with the continuing resolution, it spread like wildfire across
that community about the situation with regard to pay and
allowances and benefits.
The goal here is for those soldiers down-range to
concentrate on their mission.
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir.
General Carpenter. To do what they need to do, to not be
distracted. And our goal, and I am sure yours is the same, I
think the extent that we are successful in that then we are
going to see soldiers that are going to be successful in their
mission.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, sir.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank the gentleman for his questions.
The gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs. Hanabusa, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Carpenter, you have said certain things that have
piqued my interest. First of all, you mentioned an amendment to
a statute, I think it was Section 12304. Or did I hear you
correctly? You want a change in the statute. Was that the right
section?
General Carpenter. Yes, ma'am, it is Title 10, Section
12304.
Ms. Hanabusa. And what exactly is the change that you are
looking for?
General Carpenter. The situation inside of the Army
National Guard and the Army Reserve, and the Air National Guard
and Air Reserve, right now is that we have no authority to
involuntarily call our soldiers to duty unless it is a named
operation like Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring
Freedom.
If we want to continue to use this operational Reserve and
not use it for those kinds of contingencies--use it for theatre
engagement, theatre cooperation, in our case, State Partnership
Program initiatives, those kinds of things--we have got to be
able to involuntarily call our soldiers to active duty as a
team, as a unit, to be able to do that.
This modification of 12304 allows that. Initially, the
proposal was that inside of the defense budget, the President's
budget, was going to be the authority for 60,000 reservists to
be called to duty during that budget year. And that those
60,000 soldiers or reservists would have a funding line
associated with them.
So it was going to provide the authority, provide the
funding. And that by way of it being inside of the President's
budget de facto, it was the President's consent----
Ms. Hanabusa. Call.
General Carpenter [continuing]. To be able to call those
reservists to active duty.
I think that the Senate version, as I understand it,
reduced that 60,000 to 10,000. And even at 10,000, at least it
provides the opportunity for us to do the involuntary call-up.
Ms. Hanabusa. The reason it piqued my interest is because
one of the issues that I raise with almost everyone who comes
before us that is National Guard and/or Active is, that issue
arises is really the conflict between Title 10 and Title 32
status, which, of course, involves the two of you there.
And something else that you said is also, I think, critical
in understanding another issue. I think you also said that as
the end strength comes down you are concerned about OCO funding
because a lot of the operational status of the Guard is tied
to, basically, OCO, our overseas operation.
Pending, I think an issue that is dear to both of your
hearts, is whether or not there will be, quote/unquote--a
``fourth seat,'' or the seat for the Guard on the Joint Chiefs.
And it would seem that unless there is some understanding of
all of us as to what exactly this change to Section 12304 would
be one step, is that as we cut the end strength, or as maybe
OCO starts to cut, which is anticipated by everyone's budget,
and if you go back to a strategic kind of command for the
National Guard Reserves is always Title 10, does that not call
into question this whole debate that they are now having about
whether or not the Guard should then have a, quote/unquote--
``seat'' with the Joints. Because of the fact that if you go
back to the pre 2005-2006 timeframe, the question will be how
would that then be justified, because most of your rank and
file would technically be under state control because they
would be Title 32 status.
General Carpenter. Ma'am, actually, unless called by the
President we are in a Title 32 status. And the only exception
for that, for the most part, are people who are mobilized and
deployed down-range in Afghanistan and Iraq. And the response
to Hurricane Irene, for instance, was totally done in a Title
32 state Active Duty status.
I think the great news story for us in the National Guard
is that we do now have a four-star general to represent our
interests. And his responsibility by the Guard Empowerment Act
is to provide counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and
to the Secretary of Defense on homeland matters and
capabilities and requirements inside the National Guard.
So I think that is a very positive step forward.
Ms. Hanabusa. But the purpose of him being on equal status
on the Joint Chiefs is for, I would assume, equal status in
terms of military decision-making as well.
General Carpenter. He does not have a seat on the Joint
Chiefs.
Ms. Hanabusa. No, but there is an issue of whether he will
have a seat. That is something that I think every one of your
adjutants, your TAGs, have written in every local newspaper
about why we should have it.
General Carpenter. Yes, ma'am, they have.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Gibson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
generals being here today.
The first question has to do with current readiness. And
then if time, I will talk about future readiness. But with
regard to current readiness, given the drawdown in Afghanistan
and how the command over there is dealing with that and
adjusting, in your view, to the panel, are you getting adequate
preparation and adequate timing of the specific missions for
your units so that they can go through man, equip, and train to
prepare?
And particularly, now I am concerned about smaller units
and how much lead time they are getting in terms of where they
are going and what specific mission they are getting.
General Stultz. Well, I think from the Army Reserves
perspective, one of the metrics I can give you. If you went
back 3, 4 years ago, when we mobilized a unit it was taking
somewhere upwards to 60 days to 90 days post-mobilization to
get them ready before we were confident they could go into a
combat.
Today, the average unit in the Army Reserves spends less
than 30 days. One, because you do have a lot of experience,
previous deployers in those formations. Two, because we have a
training strategy that trains them, prior to getting mobilized,
on a lot of the skills that they need.
The concern I have got is not the forces deploying to Iraq
and Afghanistan. That is kind of the easy one because I know
where they are going, I know when they are going, and I know
what their mission's going to be. My concern is the contingency
forces of the future.
Those are the forces that we are going to train and have
standing ready if this Nation needs them. And for those forces,
I don't know when they are going to need to go, I don't know
where they are going to need to go, and I am not going to have
much time.
Mr. Gibson. Yes.
General Stultz. And so that is why we have got to focus on
it is easy to fall in on existing equipment, it is already
modernized, and existing systems that are already there and set
in place. What we have got to focus on is, how do we train a
force for the future, the Army depending on us, that is trained
and ready and equipped prior to being needed, not afterwards.
Mr. Gibson. Yes.
General Stultz. And if you run the contingency plans we
have for our op [operations] plans in other parts of the world,
most of my forces are needed within the first 30 days. That is
when they are most needed.
General Wyatt. Sir, I would, on behalf of the Air National
Guard, a little bit different model that the Air Force uses
than the Army instead of mobilize, train, and deploy. Because
we provide 34 percent of the combat capability of the United
States Air Force, the Air National Guard does, at 7 percent of
the budget.
We have to be trained, and then mobilized or volunteered,
and deployed. So a little bit different structure. This
requires an investment by the Air Force into the Air National
Guard. And I am proud to say the Air Force has made that
investment. They provide the Air National Guard, which is an
organize, train, and equipped organization, with sufficient
funds to train to the same level as they train to.
Our DOC statements, our description of capability
statements, require Air National Guard units to be able to
answer the call, muster, deploy within 72 hours, and generate
combat sorties in-theater within 72 hours. Same requirement as
the Active Component.
My concern as we go forward is, will there be sufficient
funds to continue that level of training. I think there has to
be for this country to have a viable Air Force. We are probably
the leanest component, when you look at the Air Force, as far
as combat capability.
Ninety-eight point five percent of our 106,700 people
belong to UTC [Unit Task Code]-task units. They are the
warfighters. We are a wing-centric organization. Most of our
people are in wings and below. So that is our warfighting
construct. Only 1.5 percent is what I would call what I do. You
know, administration, policy and that sort of thing.
I think it is a key for the Air Force not only to continue
organize, train, and equip funding to the Air National Guard to
at least the level that it has this year, but continuing in the
future. But also plan sufficient MPA [Military Personnel
Appropriation] days so that once we are up on the step if we do
have some sort of requirement nationwide we can respond and
send our airmen in harm's way to bid the Nation's call.
Mr. Gibson. Yes. And I will tell you that the 109th is not
in my district, but it is very close. And I share that with
Paul Tonko. I have had visits there, and I was really struck by
the fact that for a very small portion of the budget they do an
enormous number of requirements and do them very well.
And General Carpenter.
General Carpenter. Congressman, I know you have got some
background in this, based upon your service in the Army. We
have come a long way since Desert Storm, when it took 180 days
for the 48th Brigade out of Georgia to meet at least the
standard set, at that point, for mobilization and deployment.
I know that you know that the 27th Brigade is in the queue
to go down-range into Afghanistan. They are in the process
right now of going to the National Training Center for an NTC
rotation out there in anticipation of that mobilization.
Because of that planning--the notification, the sourcing, the
alert and that whole process--they have been able to plan for
that mobilization, they have been able to prepare, and they
have been able to increase their readiness.
When they get to the mobilization station, we anticipate
they will spend a little bit more than 60 days before they
deploy down-range on that mission. That is a long ways from
where we started in this business, and I think it is a tribute
to the New York unit and it is a tribute to the Army and it is
a tribute to where we have come in this operational force.
Mr. Gibson. No question on that. Good. Totally concur.
Did spend some time with them at their pre-mobilization
family fair day. It was fantastic. I have got to tell you, it
rivaled anything that we did on active duty the way they laid
the whole community's resources out so families could come in
and have access to health care questions, education questions,
deployment type questions. It was quite extraordinary.
The genesis of the question actually was, I do hear
periodically--not with the 27th, but with the dynamic, the
changing in Afghanistan--that as the command comes to grips
with that, given the changing scenarios, that is giving less
time for Guard and Reserve units to know explicitly what their
specific mission is going to be. And that is having cascading
impacts on man, equip, and train going forward.
I know that you are monitoring that and doing everything
that you can on that. I am short on time. I will tell you that
I am working with Peter Welch from Vermont on the Yellow Ribbon
Program. This is something of great interest to me.
I think it is a good program, but I think it can be even
better. As we look to the mark next year, you know, certainly
welcoming all your feedback on that so we can perfect that
program.
General Carpenter. Sir, one of the biggest problems that we
are facing right now is behavioral health issues, and the
Yellow Ribbon Program has been key in that. I think you know
the Army has a suicide problem. We have been fortunate to trend
ours down a little bit in the Army Guard. But, you know, one
data point does not a trend make. Yellow Ribbon is key in that,
and the funding for that program is essential.
Mr. Gibson. Yes.
And gentlemen, I am out of time, regrettably. But I just
want to thank you for your service, your tremendous leadership
you provide, and I look forward to working with you going
forward.
I yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
And the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schilling, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Schilling. Very good. Thank you, Chairman.
Chris had touched on a few of the things I was going to
talk about or ask questions about. Anyway, first I want to
thank you for your service to our country.
One of the concerns that I have for our country is with the
debt problem that we have because I think we all understand
that it is going to be a huge problem. I guess my concern is
the warfighter because, basically, what is going on in the
Middle East is definitely not going to go away anytime soon.
And basically, what I would like to know is what you gentlemen
are seeing with the cuts that are coming, how that is going to
adversely affect us. And then, you know, basically anything
that we can do to try to help out.
And General Carpenter, you know, I want to say one of the
things that I think is totally wrong is when we have these CRs
[continuing resolutions] and our warfighters are over there
risking their lives. Literally, the worst thing that we can do
here in the United States Congress is having them on the table
whatsoever for any type of negotiating.
I think that they should be completely taken off the table,
you know, because they have got enough on their mind. To have
to worry about the paycheck for just one split second is all it
takes, when they are out there trying to do their job and
protect this great Nation.
So basically, just maybe some information on your thoughts
on how this is going to affect us in the future warfighters.
General Carpenter. You know, I think first of all I
mentioned that we are looking at funding strategies and
developing efficiencies inside of the Army and the Army
National Guard. And it is a team effort between the Army
National Guard, the Army, and the Army Reserve.
For instance, family programs are essential to us. And I
mentioned the Yellow Ribbon Program. Family programs are just
as key. But we have hundreds of family programs out there. Many
of them are duplicative. Some of them are redundant. Some are
not even used. And so with the Army in the lead, we are looking
across all those programs to try and determine which ones we
can consolidate.
And we are not trying to reduce the service provided to the
family by any means. But we think we can deliver it in a lot
more efficient, effective manner. Those kinds of things are
areas of opportunity for us across the Army to harvest those
funds and redirect them into priorities and into essential
areas.
But frankly, the Defense Department didn't get us into the
budget problems we got right now, and the Defense Department is
not going to get us out. But we are going to pay our fair
share, at least from my perspective. So we are up for that. But
again, before we default to reducing capability and deciding to
hollow out the force or shallow the force, make it a lot
smaller, we ought to look at those aspects first.
General Stultz. I would just echo what Ray has said. And I
think, as has been stated here by many of the members of the
committee, one of the things that has been proven is the
Reserve Component is a great return on investment for this
Nation. And so as we look at trying to reduce defense cost, I
think you have got to look at the Reserve Components and say
what more can you give us. Are there other capabilities that we
can invest in to save money, but also that confidence that they
are going to be trained and ready when we need them and that we
have got access to them.
And then just as Ray had said, we have got to look
internally within our organizations and say, okay, where can we
get more efficient and more effective? One of the things we are
looking at in the Army Reserve is, as we get new modernized
equipment I have said to my commanders, ``You are not going to
get a full set sent to your home station because at home-
station training, you are probably going to train at platoon
level. And so what I want to do is give you a set of modernized
equipment to train on at that level.''
Then I am going to take a set and put it at Fort Hunter
Liggett, California, or Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, so that when you
go for your 3 weeks of training the equipment's waiting there
for you that is modernized, and we don't pay to transport your
equipment up there. I mean, there is a lot of those kinds of
things we can say to save money ourselves internally to help
fund the bill.
General Wyatt. Just briefly, we learned in Desert Storm One
that when so-called hostilities supposedly ceased there is
still a need for some air presence. And we anticipate that
there will be continued need, if those countries desire, for
continued air presence.
With the budget threats, you know, in my mind we have an
option of either just shrinking the entire United States Air
Force to meet those budgets which sacrifices not only
capability but capacity, or we can take a look at force
structure and recognize the cost efficiencies offered by the
Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. And maybe take a
look at, instead of sending airplanes and capability to the
boneyard, maybe placing those in the Reserve Component, which
can operate them less expensively.
It provides that capability, it provides that capacity.
Because I think there is probably going to be another event one
of these days, and we are going to need that capability and
capacity. Just a thought.
Mr. Schilling. Very good. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Forbes. Thank the gentleman for his question.
The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Am I the last one to
go? Can I have more than 5 minutes?
Mr. Forbes. You are next to the last, and you can have 4
minutes and 50 seconds.
Mr. Palazzo. Oh, great, great. No.
Thank you all for being here today, definitely to testify.
But more importantly, thank you for your service to our
country. We greatly appreciate that.
Today I had the awesome honor of receiving 86 World War II
veterans as a part of Mississippi's Honor Flight program. We
have, in the past, had to depend on Alabama's Honor Flight
program. So we decided to start our own, and we actually had
some Alabama participants on the Mississippi Honor Flight.
Two of my major questions have pretty much been addressed,
but I think it is worth asking again. And one is the CR. The
multiple CRs that we had last year was just unnerving at so
many levels. Lucedale's National Guard Unit is the 287th
Engineering Company sapper platoon. They had the most dangerous
mission, and they did an excellent job and came back 100
percent thanks to MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
Vehicles] funded through prior Congresses and others and the
support from the Guard.
But they had the most dangerous mission, the roadside
clearance and IED [improvised explosive device] detection and
stuff like that. The last thing these soldiers needed was to be
worried about whether their spouses and their children were
receiving their check so they could put gas in the car, food on
the table, pay the rent. Because you know, we have to focus on
our mission. It is dangerous enough, and then if you are
distracted not only are you a danger to yourself, you are a
danger to your teammates.
So again, could you just elaborate--because I think we just
need to constantly reiterate this to my colleagues throughout
the House and both parties--the dangers that we face doing
multiple CRs.
General Stultz. Well, I think it is--and I will make it
real quick so that Ray and Bud can talk too--morale, obviously,
as you have already alluded to. But also in terms of us being
able to train our force professionally and productively when we
don't know how much money we are going to have.
And I have got a 3-week training event for this soldier to
go to that is going to be a good experience for him, and I have
also got a school that he wants to go to improve himself
professionally or technically, and I say, ``But I can't afford
to send you to both because I am not sure I am going to have
enough money.''
Then come the summertime or whatever, and we have got the
money, but the soldier says, ``You know, I can't go now because
I have already committed my time and everything.'' We have lost
an opportunity to improve a soldier, improve his capability.
And we end up giving that money back.
General Wyatt. We see the same concerns about pay. But in
addition to that, what we see is our wing commanders who are
responsible for handling the budgets at the wing level become
very conservative. They begin, as General Stultz said, taking a
look at the training cost. And because some of this is lead
time required for planning to set up training events and
exercises, out of an abundance of caution they will begin
canceling. And we lose training opportunities that you can't
make up after.
In the acquisition world, a lot of our contracts have lead
times. And if there is no assurances that the money is going to
be there in subsequent years we will cancel contracts. And then
if the money does flow at a later date, the cost of reinstating
that contract goes up and we get less value for the dollar. So
those are just some of the things that we face.
General Carpenter. Sir, I already made part of my comments.
And far be it from me to tell anybody how to do their business.
But somebody mentioned earlier the exclusion of at least
soldiers that are mobilized and deployed from that process
would be helpful and would alleviate maybe that issue in terms
of the angst associated with not getting paid.
The other issue that General Wyatt alluded to is, last
year, when we finally got our budget for NGREA [National Guard
and Reserve Equipment Appropriation] and when we got our
military construction budget it was midyear. And so we
essentially had 6 months to execute that budget. We, at least
my team I think, has done a terrific job in execution of NGREA
for 2011, and we are going to hit the threshold of 80 percent.
But I am telling you, we have had to do a lot to make that
happen. So it causes some problems.
Mr. Palazzo. I am kind of running short on time so I will
just make some comments. First of all, I think it is extremely
important that the National Guard has a seat at the table for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't see our Guard and Reserves
ever going back to a strategic Reserve. It is just the world we
live in, it is the reality we have to face, and you all are
part of our operational forces.
As a citizen soldier that was a part of this strategic
Reserve and a part of the operational Reserve, our force, that
is just not going to happen. There is some discussion in the
National Defense Authorization bill to do just that. And
hopefully the Senate and the House can agree on that.
And the Yellow Ribbon Program is a wonderful program. I
have participated in that, and I thank them for their service.
This is not only returning, but also deploying soldiers. So we
were taking advantage of both of them on the Mississippi Gulf
Coast. And I offered all of them and their families that my
office is open to assist you in any way possible. Just be sure
to use your chain of command, and they will help you.
So thank you all for your service.
Mr. Forbes. Thank the gentleman.
And as you just pointed out, one of the things I think this
committee is going to work very, very hard on, as Mr. Schilling
raised, was to make sure that we try to get the pay and benefit
for our men and women in uniform out of these discussions.
But the second thing we just want to alert you to and
everyone who cares about defense. Everything is kind of
relative, and it used to be we worried about the timing issues
for our supplementals and the contingency questions there. Now
we are worried about whether the money is ever going to come,
not just the timing issue. So we have a different fear that we
are looking at.
Mr. Conaway from Texas was very patient. He stayed from
gavel all the way until he had to go to another committee. But
General Wyatt, he had a question for you regarding missions on
the border. And the question was this. What interaction do you
have with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], and are
there problems with flying remotely piloted aircraft along the
southern border?
General Wyatt. The answer is yes to both of those. There is
an issue with getting remotely piloted aircraft into the
national airspace. FAA does have that authority. We work very
closely with them with the support of NORTHCOM and the United
States Air Force, not only just for mission effects, but also
for training.
To launch and recover some of these aircraft, move them
from their base to a training area, sometimes you have to
transit Federal Aviation-controlled airspace. It is not
dedicated military airspace. We are not necessarily interested
in changing the shape and the structure of the training
airspace, but these aircraft are very sophisticated.
And while the FAA operates on principally a see-and-avoid--
very conservative, and rightly so--safety measure, some of
these RPA [remotely piloted aircraft], even though you don't
have the pilot actually in the vehicle, with the sensing and
the video and everything else that is in the airplane really
can see better than a pilot can.
And we have got to prove that to the FAA, to their
satisfaction that we can operate remotely piloted aircraft in
the national airspace. We are making great process in doing
that, and I think that day will come, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And General, if you don't mind, if you would
have somebody maybe from your staff contact Mr. Conaway's
office to see. I think you have a great ally there. He wants to
help you with that in any way he can.
I have one follow-up question. I think Ms. Bordallo has one
question. Because I know we are about ready for votes.
But can you tell us how important it is for you to have
additional access to equipment for training, especially
simulators? Because I know you don't always have the access to
some of the types of simulators and all, maybe, that the Active
forces have. And what can we do to help you guys with that?
General Stultz. Yes, sir. I have, in the last 2 years, been
particularly focused on simulators. What is available, what is
out there, what is over the horizon. I have made a number of
trips down to the Orlando, Florida, area to visit simulation
training command and some of the corporations that are down
there.
Because as I said earlier, what my soldiers say is, ``Don't
waste my time.'' So if they are going to come in on a weekend
drill period, they want to come in and do something meaningful
and put them back in that same environment they have come from.
And that is where simulations come in.
But additionally, what was asked earlier about can we save
money. One of the ideal examples for me is weapons training. In
the Army Reserve, as you probably already know, we don't live
close to an installation. So we look and say, ``Where can we go
do effective range fire?'' Because we are required twice a year
to do live fire.
In some cases, like in Florida where I have commanded a
unit, we have to go all the way up to Camp Blanding, which
means we got to put them on a bus. We got to take time, get
them up there, feed them, house them, bring them back for our
training. Or we default to go into the local sheriffs range,
which is really not an effective training.
Meanwhile, we have got these Engagement Skills Trainers,
EST 2000s, that can stimulate an M16, and M4, a 9-millimeter,
whatever you want. And it can be more effective, really, in
terms of training a soldier on breathing and aiming and
everything else than ever putting him on a range.
And so I have said that is what we ought to be doing. Those
types of training simulators where we can put them in that
environment in their Reserve center and get just as effective
and save a lot of money because we are not using ammunition, we
are not paying travel, we are not doing any of that. And the
soldier walks away that weekend saying, ``This was a good
experience. What are we going to do next month when I come
back?''
General Wyatt. Simulation in the United States Air Force
has taken quantum leaps in the last few years. Used to, you
could not get very realistic training unless you actually
accomplished the mission in the airplane.
But with the high-fidelity simulators that we have now, the
ability to link simulators and to fuse some of the sensors, and
virtually create situations in the simulator, it is an
excellent opportunity to train. Saves gasoline, saves petrol,
saves wear and tear on our airplanes, and it is the wave of the
future, I think, in a lot of our training. You cannot do all of
it in the simulator, but we can do an increasing amount.
The problem is that just about all of the simulators are
located on Active-Duty fields. We have only two F-16 units that
have a simulator, only two C-130 units, three KC-135 units.
That leaves 10 F-16 units, 5 F-15 units, 17 KC-135 units, and
15 C-130 units that to get access to a simulator they have got
to travel now to an Active-Duty base to access the simulator.
The Active Component works with us to provide, in our
budget, money to do that. But it is time-consuming, it is
expensive, it burns fuel--not military fuel, but civilian
fuel--to get there. And I think for us to really leverage the
technologies that we have, save money--this is another cost
efficiencies thing that we can do in the Air Force--we need to
invest money in the simulators and get those out to the people
that are going to use them.
General Carpenter. Sir, with regard to the Army Guard,
simulations is a big deal in the aviation world for us, the
Army aviation world, because of the op tempo associated with
Army aviation. We need to make sure that we do the advance
scheduling so we do have access to those simulators. If we do
that, it seems to work out. We do not have a simulator that I
know of right now for the LUH [Light Utility Helicopter]
Program, although we are getting sufficient flight hours to
work those.
And then beyond that, to get to General Stultz's point, you
know, with the huge leaps and bounds that we are making in
technology we see all kinds of computer simulation that can run
everything from battle drills for Humvee evacuation to squad-
on-patrol. So those kinds of simulations are going to save us
in the long term as opposed to spending 4 or 5 hours to get to
a training area and then 4 or 5 hours back. So it is a huge
facet to our program in the future.
Mr. Forbes. If you will just have your staffs work with our
staffs we will see what we can do to help get you those
simulators that you need.
Ms. Bordallo is recognized for the last question.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Generals Wyatt and Carpenter, as I indicated in my opening
statement I am concerned that the Department of Defense does
not accurately account for homeland defense requirements. This
hampers the ability of the Department to equip the National
Guard or Reserve for such missions. What role is the Guard
taking to work with the Department to make these requirements
clear?
General Carpenter first.
General Carpenter. Yes, a couple of things. The critical
dual-use equipment discussion that we had earlier with regard
to equipment that we have inside of our formations in the Army
Guard that can be used both for deployment down-range and use
in the homeland mission has been very, very important. We
started out 5 years ago with Katrina and we had M35s. We did
not have the right vehicles. We did not have high-water
vehicles.
Fast-forward to what we saw with Hurricane Irene in North
Carolina and New Jersey across the eastern border, we had
modern equipment that provided capability out there to make
sure that we could meet our responsibilities.
We are concerned about what is the future of funding for
homeland defense, homeland security. We have, as I mentioned,
civil support teams, homeland response forces. In order for
them to maintain their proficiency they will have to be funded,
and we would not like to see them be a casualty in the budget
process.
Ms. Bordallo. So you are working with the Department, would
you say?
General Carpenter. Yes, Congresswoman. We are.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. General Wyatt.
General Wyatt. Inside the United States Air Force, I see a
continuing increasing focus on the homeland, homeland defense,
homeland security. But we are not quite there yet. We have 12
core functions in the United States Air Force, and all of those
do support the homeland, homeland defense, homeland security.
But I think we need a core function that is domestic
operations.
And so we are working with the Air Force to try to gain
acceptance, recognizing domestic operations as a core function
of the United States Air Force. If we are able to do that,
there would come with that budget funding for training for
domestic operations. There is not now. Even though we have
authority from the National Guard Bureau and regulation to
conduct training, there is no funding line for that.
The important thing to recognize is that a lot of the
training that we do for the warfight overseas, with the dual-
use equipment and the dual capabilities, mirrors for the
homeland. So we get, as kind of a byproduct of our training
line for the Air Force, to train for domestic operations in
some of those core functions.
But there are some differences, and I talked about our air
medical evacuation folks. Ninety-four percent of that
capability in the Guard and the Reserve. And we are very good
at getting soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines out of tight
spots, taking care of them in that golden hour, getting them
the health care they need, transporting to Landstuhl and back
here for treatment.
But when we get into a Katrina or an Irene, where we are
transporting elderly geriatric patients or we might be
transporting, you know, birth incubator-type youngsters out of
harm's way, it takes a special type of training. That is just
one example. We don't have a funding line for that.
So we are working with the Air Force. I see an increasing
recognition of the importance of that, but we are not quite
there yet.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. General, just one last question.
Commentary recently, from General Schwartz and Secretary
Donley, seemed to indicate that core mission sets for the
Active, the Reserve and the Guard Components will be
transferred in the future because of budget limitations, when
they are addressed.
Can we expect to see the Air Guard have a future role in
ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] and long-range
strike missions?
General Wyatt. I think it makes perfect sense, Madam
Congressman, for that to happen. When you talk about the cost
of being able to provide those capabilities, my answer to that
would be yes in both arenas.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good.
And I just want to close, Mr. Chairman, by saying that you
have my full support--the Air Guard, the Army Guard and the
Reserves. Thank you very much.
Mr. Forbes. We thank the ranking member for her questions.
Once again, thank all of you gentlemen. I think you can
tell by the participation of this committee how much they care
about what you are doing and want to be a part of it. We just
want to once again thank you, and the men and women who serve
under you, for the great job they do in defending our country.
And with that, we are dismissed.
[Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 21, 2011
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 21, 2011
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 21, 2011
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
September 21, 2011
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES
General Wyatt. The Air National Guard (ANG) is currently deploying
Airmen in several duty statuses, which affords our Airmen different
levels of predictability for future deployments. In the mobilization
(non-volunteers) process, the units identified to be activated are
notified in a two-year planning document. This gives the units two
years of predictability, enabling them to discuss with unit members the
possibility of future mobilization deployments. The individual members
which are specifically identified for mobilization are notified of
their pending activation at approximately 330 days out from the
mobilization start date. This gives the member approximately 330 days
to initially notify their employers of the pending activation. The
member will receive orders in hand 180 days from the mobilization start
date, giving the member and their employer an official document
indicating the member will be placed on non-voluntary mobilization
orders. ANG members that are placed on mobilization orders are also
given a means of future predictability by means of AF Mobilization
Business Rules. These rules guarantee a member a minimum of one year
dwell, time before they can be mobilized again, after being placed on
mobilization orders. These rules also guarantee the member a minimum
dwell period based off the total mobilization time period. A typical
179-day deployment will give the member the predictability that they
will not be mobilized again for another 1105 days.
Not all ANG Airmen are receiving the early notification as outlined
above. The predictability afforded our Airmen is hindered when the
planning objectives of a deployment are changed or cancelled. Examples
would be when an Aviation KC-135 mobilization plan is altered due to
the changing number of requirements, or the start dates of the
deployments changing. If the requirements are reduced, ANG Airmen that
were planning on deploying, some of whom may have already notified
their employer, no longer are required to be activated. As activation
dates change, the member must repeatedly coordinate with their employer
their expected date of departure from their job.
Other ANG members are not receiving the early notification
mentioned above because of ``Emergent'' requirements needing to be
filled in a relatively short period of time. These ANG Airmen are
receiving notification of their deployment 30-90 days before the
deployment start date. There is no way of giving ANG Airmen
predictability in this case, because of the nature of ``emergent''
needs.
ANG members that are deploying on a volunteer duty status are also
afforded approximately 330 days of predictability. The process
established for volunteerism outlines a Projected Participation Plan
which accounts for the members to volunteer for activation 11 months
before the deployment date. These members are receiving orders for
their employers 210 days before the activation start date.
The majority of ANG Airmen who are volunteering to be activated are
filling ``help-wanted'' requirements. These ANG Airmen are volunteering
to fill Active Component shortfalls, sometimes with as little as two
weeks' notice before the activation start date. On the average, the
notification time for these volunteers is approximately 90 days before
the activation start date. [See page 24.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 21, 2011
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. What are some examples of the impact to training of O&M
funding reductions?
General Stultz. The Army Reserve is presently not funded to train
for full-spectrum combat and Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations--two
of the most likely requirements posed by the threats in the next
decade. The O&M funding level currently supports training proficiency
at the platoon level. The following are examples of the impacts of O&M
funding reductions:
1. Maintenance on vehicles and equipment will be deferred. This
could significantly impact the readiness of older equipment that
already requires intensive levels of maintenance.
2. Supply purchases will be scaled back.
3. Repair part purchases will be reduced allowing only the highest
priority items to be ordered.
4. Shipment of equipment and travel of Soldiers to training events
will be curtailed.
5. Building renovations will be delayed or cancelled.
6. Base operations service levels will be reduced at the four Army
Reserve installations. For example, trash may be picked up less
frequently and grass cutting could be reduced.
7. Soldiers will only be trained to proficiency below the platoon
level. This will affect unit performance on deployments and other
operational missions.
Mr. Forbes. How are you adapting to the $73 million reduction in FY
2011? What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be
levied against you?
General Stultz. The reduction in Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
funding in FY11 impacted training and base operations. Reduced
Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) funding forced the Army Reserve to curtail
year-end maintenance operations, supply purchases, and travel. The
decrement to base operations funding resulted in postponement of two
major building renovations and reduction of service levels provided at
Army Reserve installations. If additional cuts to O&M are levied, the
Army Reserve will be challenged to adequately train its Soldiers and to
fund the installations that support the Army Reserve training base.
More maintenance of equipment will have to be deferred, supply
purchases will be cut back, and travel and shipment of personnel and
equipment to training exercises and other key events will be reduced.
Mr. Forbes. What barriers continue to slow or prevent the
transition from a strategic force to an operational force? And what
would be the impact on the Army Reserve if you had to go back to the
``strategic reserve'' model of training and deployments?
General Stultz. The prevailing barriers that continue to impede our
transition from a strategic force to an operational force are funding
and access to reserve personnel.
While fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 10 years, the
operational reserve has been funded through the use of OCO dollars.
With the reduction of OCO funds, dollars must be programmed into the
base budget in order to maintain an operational reserve.
If costs to sustain readiness of the RC are not migrated into the
base budget, what will remain post-OCO are the statutory 15 days of
annual training and 48 unit training assemblies--resourcing levels we
know will reduce the Army's operational depth--and RC readiness in
particular. This strategic Reserve level of funding will prevent us
from building a level of readiness in ARFORGEN to adequately meet the
Army's contingency needs. Extended post-mobilization, pre-deployment
training periods will again be required to prepare RC units for
deployment.
For the Army Reserve to continue as an Operational Force the Army
needs to have access to us. Currently, authority to use Army Reserve
forces falls within two areas: Annual Training and mobilization and
revisions to existing mobilization. However, ``Assured Access'' to the
Army Reserve for ``Non-Emergency'', and ``Steady-State Security
Cooperation Missions'' requires changes to current legislation and the
language in the current Senate Bill is a big step in the right
direction. By giving the Service Secretary Authority, we can take full
advantage of the hard-won operational experience of our Army Reserve
Soldiers and sustain that experience through predictable regular use.
The Army is dependent on the Army Reserve as mission ``enablers'' that
are critical when generating and sustaining theater forces. This is a
fully integrated total Army. USAR enablers provide a best value
capability to the nation. Changes to legislation are critical to the
national defense of our nation as we leave Iraq and Afghanistan and
shift our focus to preventing conflict in the future. Combatant
Commands are asking the Army for engineer, medical and logistics
capability for theater security cooperation missions--all capabilities
that exist primarily in the Reserve Component. This isn't a matter of
back filling the Army. We are uniquely capable of responding to
immediate global requirements across the full spectrum of operations.
Security Cooperation and Capacity-Building Partnerships present
opportunities to draw from the unparalleled experience and training
levels of an operational force. The Army Reserve must remain an
enduring operational force within the Total Army. If the Army Reserve
had to go back to a strategic reserve, it would be very detrimental to
the Army. The Army Reserve is a crucial element of the Army's overall
deployable strength and war fighting team. We provide support units and
specific functions integral to the operational force. Army Reserve
enablers provide cyclical capability across the Army Force Generation
(ARFORGEN) model, including the flexibility to surge forces. This
contribution is particularly important if the Army encounters security
demands and global commitments that exceed the steady-state capacity of
supply-based ARFORGEN.
Today and in the future the Army will require recurrent, assured
and predictable access to the RC to meet operational requirements as
requirements increase for Army forces to conduct overseas engagement
activities. This can best be accomplished through leveraging an
Operational Reserve.
It is essential that the Army sustain the increased levels of RC
readiness and availability achieved since 2001. America's enemies have
demonstrated both resiliency and adaptability. Against such an enemy,
America's Army must be able to sustain steady state engagement and be
prepared to surge a sustained response to the unexpected. Operational
depth and fiscal advantages make an operational reserve force essential
to meeting this challenge. Our Soldiers are a national treasure that
must continue to be used in a meaningful way or we will lose them, and
we simply cannot afford that as a nation.
Mr. Forbes. What are some examples of the impact to training of O&M
funding reductions?
General Wyatt. The overall impact of O&M funding reductions has
been minimal on the Air National Guard's (ANG) Non-Prior Service
Training, Formal Training, & Flying Training Programs because 99
percent of our formal schools training dollars are resourced through
Military Personnel Appropriations funding. Only one of these three
programs, the ANG Formal Training Program, has O&M funding attached to
it ($1.135M in FY12 O&M), which funds civilian instructor personnel at
the ANG's Training Education Center and Academy of Military Science,
and provides administrative supplies/equipment for these two training
sites.
However, O&M reductions can impact day-to-day training at the unit
level by reducing flying hours, Dual Status Military Technician pay,
supplies and equipment, travel, and facilities. The impact of these
unit level reductions could result in pilots not retaining currency,
inability to maintain mission capable aircraft, and the inability to
provide training for our maintenance and a host of support personnel.
Mr. Forbes. How are you adapting to the $73 million reduction in FY
2011? What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be
levied against you?
General Wyatt. While the ANG did not take a reduction in FY2011,
additional cuts beyond those scheduled through the President's Budget
submission for FY12, depending on the depth, could seriously impact our
ability to organize, train, and equip our troops in preparing for
domestic and federal operations. As the ANG is already a lean
organization, further reductions could impact our ability to induct our
aircraft for depot maintenance, create shortfalls in funds utilized by
the unit commanders to effect training, and/or reduce our flying hour
and civilian pay programs.
Mr. Forbes. NORAD's ASA and Operation Noble Eagle report stated
that the National Guard Bureau traditionally runs a deficit in
execution-year funding for the ASA mission. To what extent is the Guard
experiencing cost overruns while conducting ASA operations? What are
the underlying causes for these overruns? What, if any, impact do these
cost overruns have on the Guard's other missions? What impact do
continuing resolutions have on your execution of funding?
General Wyatt. The ANG coordinated response to the NORAD ASA (now
referred to as Aerospace Control Alert, or ACA) and ONE report
indicated the ANG continually runs a deficit in execution-year funding.
This deficit, while not always the same amount, was approximately $4.0M
dollars per year over the past two to three years. This is caused by
unforeseen changes in requirements that the COCOM must react to in
mission. A recent example is the hurricane, which prompted significant
movement in locations due to evacuation, which in turn prompted
airborne coverage over certain areas. Also, runway repairs and
closures, inspection failures, backfills, and facility upgrades that
drive re-locations, all incur additional costs. Air Combat Command
contributes Military Personal Appropriations day funds when they are
available. However often these funds are not available and the ANG is
ultimately responsible.
This impacts the ANG's ability to fund their training requirements.
The Active Duty Operations Support (ADOS) coding of the funds utilized
for the ACA mission is the same as our Special Training (ST) Days fund.
Therefore, the ANG ``assumes financial risk'' in their ST Day accounts
to pay for these deviations from the program. The ANG must limit
exercise or individual unit training funding from this account to
provide the funds to the ACA mission. Additionally, even if the funding
is repaid at the end of the fiscal year, the opportunity to attend the
exercise or specific event has often already passed. Hence, there is a
financial cost when the funds are not repaid and an opportunity cost
involved even if the funds are repaid.
The continuing resolution also impacts the ANG's ability to provide
training funds. Approximately 4 of every 70 personnel at an ACA unit
are funded through the ADOS funding line. During a continuing
resolution, the ANG is permitted to commit a percentage of their funds
that equates to a portion of the fiscal year that the budget is
approved. A first quarter continuing resolution allows the ANG to spend
25% of the previous years' funding. However, for the ACA mission, it is
not practical to do such time limited funding. Therefore, the ANG will
maximize the timeframe the ACA mission personnel are funded, which in
turn decreases the amount of funds available for the other items. Since
the number of pilots doing the mission on ADOS funding is small, the
ANG can place these limited individual on 365 day orders and use the
remaining money to fund all the other items for a smaller amount of
time (possibly 70 days). The total amount utilized is within the
continuing resolution amount (25% of the year) but the money spending
is now unevenly spread to ensure the ACA mission does not suffer from
the ``stop and go'' funding.
Mr. Forbes. Both the Army and Air National Guard are divesting
fixed-wing airframes. What impact will the loss of airframes have on
the National Guard's capability to conduct routine domestic operations
and catastrophic incidents today and in the future?
General Wyatt. Since 2005, and with current programmed reductions
in FY11 and FY12, the Air National Guard will have lost 22% of its C-
130 fleet, from 226 aircraft down to 175. Programmed changes to
domestic airlift could impact successful completion of current and
future domestic operations missions. In addition, mission requirements
and demands routinely levied on the NG are difficult to codify as to
which missions are requirements and which are demands. The NG has
requirements that are federally recognized, defined by joint and
service doctrine and demands only defined by National Guard Regulation.
A New Madrid Earthquake scenario could create an estimated need of 1000
C-130 sorties for aero-medical evacuation alone. This is in addition to
moving our CBRN Enterprises, supplies and equipment. National Guard
Aviation assets currently available to supply major military support to
civilian authorities are stressed to meet all emergency response
requirements and scenarios.
Concerns that these programmatic decisions may have degraded NG
aviation capabilities to adequately support Homeland Defense/Defense
Support to Civil Authorities missions prompted the Chief, National
Guard Bureau to request a Capabilities Based Assessment to analyze the
National Guard aviation capability and its support for Domestic
Operations. Once the Capabilities Based Assessment is complete, the
National Guard should be able to provide a clearer picture of the
National Guard's capability to support Domestic Operations.
Mr. Forbes. What are some examples of the impact to training of O&M
funding reductions?
General Carpenter. Reductions to base training funds will impact
the ARNGs ability to sustain Individual/Crew/Squad levels of readiness
by reducing training events such as Combat Training Centers, inactive
duty training (drill) and Annual Training opportunities. Current O&M
funding level provides Individual/Crew/Squad levels of readiness. Units
preparing for mobilization must report to their mobilization station at
or above platoon level readiness.
Additional resources provided through Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding enables the ARNG to meet readiness
requirements of deploying units. These additional OCO funds typically
prepare deploying ARNG units to achieve Platoon level of proficiency.
Upon full mobilization, ARNG units conduct additional training in order
to achieve Company level of proficiency. Training conducted under post-
mobilization and prior to and during deployment is funded through Army
Active Component OCO funds.
Mr. Forbes. How are you adapting to the $73 million reduction in FY
2011? What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be
levied against you?
General Carpenter. Army National Guard (ARNG) absorbed $73 million
in Congressional reductions from Operations and Maintenance
Appropriations ($42 million spread across multiple Operating Forces
funding accounts) and Administrative Support ($31 million). The
Operating force programs most impacted were Sustainment Restoration and
Modernization (SRM). Due to this reduction, the ARNG pushed a number of
SRM projects into future fiscal years. Our force was able to absorb
much of the Administrative Support budget reduction from efficiencies
gained in recruiting and retention advertising.
Continued annual funding cuts force the ARNG to regularly postpone
SRM projects into fiscal out-years. The shift to an Operational Force
structure/Army Force Generation Model has shown the ARNG to be more
than capable of successfully accomplishing our Constitutionally-
mandated missions both here and abroad. However, the increased usage
levels our facilities must now meet to ensure our future mission
success equates with increased funding for proper maintenance. Large
reductions in budget out years will directly--and negatively--impact
Air and Ground operations tempo and training for the ARNG.
Mr. Forbes. Both the Army and Air National Guard are divesting
fixed-wing airframes. What impact will the loss of airframes have on
the National Guard's capability to conduct routine domestic operations
and catastrophic incidents today and in the future?
General Carpenter. The current Army plan reduces the number of Army
National Guard (ARNG) Fixed Wing (FW) aircraft available for domestic
operations from 114 aircraft down to 64, or, potentially as low as 48
aircraft. This decrement includes the divestiture of 42 C-23 Sherpa
aircraft. The current Army approach to domestic FW requirements is a
derivative approach: the ARNG utilizes ARNG FW assets not deployed in
federal service. With the Air National Guard (ANG) fielding C-27J
aircraft that replace ARNG C-23s, ANG C-27J deployments and extensive
new equipment training requirements will likely limit the availability
of these assets for routine ARNG logistical support requirements and
Army Service-specific missions. Loss of airframes--coupled with reduced
access to fixed wing capabilities--increases the concern that the ARNG
will fall short of needed fixed wing capabilities for future domestic
operations and catastrophic incidents.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Given the high ops tempo of your Joint STARS Wing, how
well is the system doing in supporting increased COCOM requirements,
and what stresses are you seeing on the system?
General Wyatt. JSTARS is providing exceptional support to increased
global requirements. To date, JSTARS has flown over 77K combat hours
and has been continuously deployed for more than 3.6K days. In FY11,
JSTARS supported five COCOMs, the highest level of support in the
history of the weapons system. The Active Component is maintaining an
average 1:2 dwell rate; ANG personnel are maintaining an average
equivalent dwell rate of 1:4 through volunteerism.
Increased Operational Tempo continues to stress JSTARS personnel
and the E-8C fleet. The E-8C fleet remains postured to meet COCOM
requirements, but does so at a cost to home station operations. Surge
operations in support of increased COCOM requirements directly affect
the availability of resources for the co-located JSTARS FTU. In FY11,
high levels of support for deployed operations caused JSTARS to fall
short of the Air Combat Command standard for Mission Capable rate of
78% by 0.4%. There were also numerous shortfalls in key maintenance
metrics, driven by engines (top contributor to Non-Mission Capable
Rate) and the Oil Pressure Indicating System (number one cause of air
aborts in theater).
Mr. Scott. Given the small size and increasing demands on Joint
STARS fleet, is the USAF doing all it can to ensure sufficient Joint
STARS are operationally ready and available to meet the demands?
General Wyatt. COCOM requirements significantly exceed JSTARS'
sourcing capacity. The 116 Air Control Wing and 461 Air Control Wing
deploy forces at the maximum sustained level and have dynamically
conducted surge operations in support of increased COCOM requirements.
Improvements to operational readiness and availability can be made by
addressing personnel and fleet availability issues including:
Personnel
Taskings in support of the MC-12 program and Task
Force Torch directly increase the dwell rates of JSTARS
Airborne Mission System Specialists and Airborne Battle
Management Specialists enlisted aircrew positions to almost
1:1. These requirements negatively impact the OPTEMPO for both
Active Component and ANG aircrew members. Reducing or removing
these additional taskings would improve OPTEMPO and raise
overall aircrew readiness levels.
Fleet availability
Disposition of Aircraft -0597: This aircraft has been
in non-flyable condition at the CENTCOM Forward Operating
Location since 13 Mar 2009 following a fuel system related
Class A Mishap. The repair of aircraft -0597 would preserve a
critical fleet asset and the associated manpower and ensure
JSTARS support to COCOM requirements is not degraded by 17%.
However, repair of this aircraft is not currently funded.
Aircraft -0416 (flight deck proficiency trainer):
This aircraft has significant structural and corrosion issues
and the ability to return the aircraft to service is currently
being assessed. It is utilized at maximum capacity and handles
61% of JSTARS annual flight deck proficiency training
requirements. Loss of this aircraft increases the homestation
requirement, thereby reducing resources available for OCO
support.
E-8C engines are the single highest contributor to
fleet-wide non-mission capable rates. The re-engining program
is not funded past the development stage.
Mr. Scott. What upgrades are being considered to improve Joint
STARS performance and readiness to better support the Joint STARS
crews, maintainers, and users of the Joint STARS information?
General Wyatt. Air Combat Command (ACC) is the lead command
responsible for planning and budgeting for JSTARS modernization. The
National Guard Bureau is responsible for JSTARS sustainment.
ACC's currently planned modernization upgrades include:
1. Enhanced Land Maritime Mode: provides JSTARS the capability to
accurately track, target, and engage moving land and maritime targets
using GPS-guided weapons from other aircraft.
2. Multi-Functional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical
Radio System-Joint Tactical Information Distribution System: datalink
replacement for diminishing manufacturing sources.
3. Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below ``Blue Force
Tracker''. A scheduled upgrade of the system will render JSTARS'
version obsolete. This upgrade ensures continued access to US Army and
US Marine Corps tactical datalink. Phase 1 is funded. Phases 2 and 3,
which enable access to new secure system, are currently unfunded.
4. Prime Mission Equipment/Diminishing Manufacturing Source:
replaces current onboard mission equipment, such as the Radar Airborne
Signal Processor and Clipper Operating Work Stations computers, that
have become obsolete from the manufacturing sources.
5. JSTARS Radar Modernization: radar improvement demonstration to
improve radar area rate coverage; provides the ability to detect, track
and identify both stationary and moving ground vehicles. Funded through
a Congressional mark in FY08/09. Demo will continue through FY12.
The following upgrades to JSTARS are being considered by ACC but
are not currently funded:
1. Organic Combat Identification: provides the ability to
independently identify ground targets, removing reliance upon other
traditional and non-traditional Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance sensors.
2. Diminishing Manufacturing Source Replacement of Avionics for
Global Operations and Navigation: system upgrade is required to
maintain access to global navigation.
3. Intelligence Broadcast Service: would provide access to beyond
line of sight self-defense information; current system is obsolete.
4. Maintenance and sustainment upgrades: include updates to the
oil pressure indicator system, fuel flow transmitter, aft thrust
reverser and E-8C radio system evaluation and adjustment tool.
5. JSTARS Network Enabled Weapons Program: allows JSTARS to
acquire and engage targets using weapons, such as Joint Air to Surface
Standoff Missile-Air Surface Warfare-Anti-Surface Warfare, from other
aircraft via a Link 16 communications network.
Mr. Scott. Do you see an opportunity to provide additional support
to NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM as a result of deblending the Joint STARS wing
into separate Guard and Active wings?
General Wyatt. The Active Associate organizational structure of
Team JSTARS between the Air National Guard 116 Air Control Wing and the
Active Component 461 Air Control Wing does not affect the overall level
of COCOM support that JSTARS can provide. Organizational changes have
aligned how the two wings organize, train and equip forces with respect
to Title 32 and Title 10 authorities. Under the current COCOM taskings,
JSTARS is able to provide support to NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM through
utilization of homestation sorties on a non-interference basis.
Additional support to these two COCOMs would require a reduction in the
current CENTCOM and AFRICOM taskings.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO
Mr. Palazzo. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would
be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the
Guard Bureau were to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on
maintenance of training systems?
General Stultz. From the perspective of the Army Reserve,
``maintenance of training systems'' is a potential requirement most
likely appropriate for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding.
Traditionally, National Guard and Reserve Equipment (NGRE) funds
provided to the AR have been for procurement purposes. Should the
Congress choose to supplement the President's budget request for the
purpose of ensuring adequate maintenance of Reserve Component training
systems, it is our view that this is best done by adding resources to
the appropriate areas of the O&M appropriation.
Mr. Palazzo. We are currently looking at passing a CR to continue
funding the government until the end of the year. When I first came
into office last January, we passed multiple CRs to keep our government
functioning because of the failure of the previous Congress to pass the
annual appropriations bills. Now we are looking at another CR, likely
followed by an omnibus, that will carry us through. While we were
working on the CRs we received a great deal of testimony from the DOD
officials about the problems that CRs cause in their planning process.
Could you elaborate on the issues you will have to deal with if
Congress ends up producing another series of CRs? What is the overall
effect on the readiness of the Guard and Reserve Components?
General Stultz. There are numerous issues caused by a series of
CRs. The Army Reserve is reliant on contracts for much of its daily
operations. Under a CR, many contracts must be incrementally funded
instead of being fully funded when approved. This creates a significant
additional workload for the organization that has the contract
requirement and for the contracting office that is processing the
action. Additionally, the incremental funding of contracts creates
uncertainty for all of the vendors that are providing products and
services to us. Contract bids are valid for 90 days in many cases--when
the bids cannot be exercised due to funding restrictions under a CR,
the process must be restarted. MILCON projects are also significantly
disrupted due to the lack of authority to start new projects.
A CR also causes problems for the Army Reserve offices that manage
and that execute funds. Each additional CR period requires calculation
of spending authority to be distributed and distribution of the
approved amounts to all organizations falling under each office that
manages funds. This is a tremendous administrative burden that would
not be necessary if appropriations were received at the beginning of a
fiscal year. Also, trying to get be good fiscal stewards in an
environment of uncertainty, absent total funding, commands may not take
advantage of all training opportunities available.
The overall effect on the readiness of the Army Reserve is limited,
but could become more significant as CRs become the norm year after
year. We are able to fund and complete training under a CR even though
there is a dramatic increase in administrative workload. The most
significant impact is likely the uncertainty generated by a series of
CRs year after year. Soldiers that are deployed and already under
stress are burdened by the thought that a government shutdown or delay
in funding could impact their pay and their families back at home. The
Army Reserve financial workforce is forced to set aside the normal
analysis that could lead to more efficient operations to complete the
repeated distribution of funds required under a CR or series of CRs.
Mr. Palazzo. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would
be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the
Guard Bureau were to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on
maintenance of training systems?
General Wyatt. No. The ANG does not feel that expanding the uses of
NGREA to include maintenance of training systems would be advantageous
to increasing operational readiness capabilities.
While NGREA is used to purchase equipment, fielding of this
equipment drives a sustainment bill that includes daily maintenance,
training, and support. The NGREA process includes identification of
these issues, funding requirements and submissions into the ANG POM.
Changing the purposes for which NGREA can be used would be counter
to the current laws and regulations governing the uses of the money and
would divert funds away from critical equipping and modernizing
efforts.
NGREA is a procurement appropriation, while maintenance on existing
systems of any kind, to include trainers, is currently funded with
Operations and Maintenance funds, one year funding. Expanding uses of
NGREA across ``purposes'' is a violation of current law. Granting an
exception would legally complicate what heretofore has been a clearly
defined set of laws and policies.
More importantly, allowing NGREA to be used for O&M would detract
from the intended purpose of NGREA: to equip and modernize the ANG in
areas where ANG equipment lags the active component or in mission areas
such as domestic operations where the active component does not provide
funding.
Mr. Palazzo. General Wyatt, as you know, the Air Force announced
that it would beddown four operational C-27J aircraft and two
additional training aircraft at Key Field Air Guard Station in
Meridian, MS. Unfortunately, the documented permanent manning positions
required to stand up this operational mission has yet to be provided
and the base has had to rely on temporary manning slots for the past
two fiscal years. Do you foresee NGB providing Key Field with the
needed permanent positions later this year? If not, when do you expect
these positions to be provided? Also, this unit has been asked to lean
forward in preparation for the training piece of this mission. Can you
tell me if that manning will be provided on time?
General Wyatt. NGB understands the resourcing challenges for
Mississippi this fiscal year. Despite our desire to provide the state
clarity on permanent funding, due to the lack of an FY12 approved
appropriations bill and the current H.J. Res 79, Continuing Resolution
to fund the government through 18 November 11, NGB is unable to provide
further information on the timeline of receipt of permanent funding.
Every effort is being made by the NGB staff to communicate the current
status of the budget and how it affects the individual units. NGB is
standing ready to update the Manpower Resource Vouchers to reflect
programmatic funding as soon as the budget is passed or the Continuing
Resolution allows. Currently the Manpower Resource Vouchers indicate
that the fulltime positions will remain capped at FY11 levels and show
projected funding until 1 April 12. To alleviate personnel impacts, Key
Field Air Guard Station currently has FY11 resourcing extended through
FY12 with execution year funds.
Mr. Palazzo. General Wyatt, as a Congressman representing a
district that is especially prone to natural disasters such as
hurricanes, I anticipate the capabilities of the C-27J will be very
important to my district and others like it across the country. Do you
foresee budget cuts affecting this program?
General Wyatt. The C-27J was designed by the Army to deliver Time
Sensitive/Mission Critical personnel and equipment to strategic points
across the battlefield. It is currently serving and meeting that
expectation overseas at this time. The C-27J can provide that same time
critical airlift for states and first responders during national or
state emergencies. The aircraft is right-sized to deliver tailored or
specialized response and support assets to those areas impacted by an
emergency. The C-27J program is now completing its Low-Rate Initial
Production, and delivering the first 21 aircraft to the first four of
the seven designated Wings. The Systems Program Office is presently
awaiting its Full Rate Production decision from the AF and Office of
the Secretary of Defense. However, the decision has been delayed due in
part to present state of the budget. This will likely impact delivery
of final 17 aircraft to final three Wings, but will not deter the NGB
from supporting this mission. Given the lack of an FY12 approved
appropriations bill and the current H.J. Res 79, Continuing Resolution
to fund the government through 18 November 11, NGB is unable to provide
further information on any foreseeable budget cuts and what impacts, if
any, would be forced upon this program. NGB staff is committed to this
program and continues to aggressively train, equip, and field the C-27J
in order to provide its defined capability not only to the warfighter
but also to our states for domestic operations.
Mr. Palazzo. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would
be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the
Guard Bureau were to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on
maintenance of training systems?
General Wyatt. The ANG does not feel that expanding the uses of
NGREA to include maintenance of training systems would be advantageous
to increasing operational readiness capabilities.
While NGREA is used to purchase equipment, which drives a
sustainment bill to include daily maintenance, training, and support.
The NGREA process allows the ANG to identify these funding requirements
and plan for future budget submissions.
Changing the purposes for which NGREA can be used would be counter
to the current laws and regulations governing the uses of the money and
would divert funds away from critical equipping and modernizing
efforts.
NGREA is a procurement appropriation similar in purpose to the
three year AF 3010 or 3080 funding. Maintenance on existing systems of
any kind, to include trainers, is currently funded with Operations and
Maintenance funds, one year funding. Expanding uses of NGREA across
``purposes'' is a violation of current law. Granting an exception would
legally complicate what heretofore has been a clearly defined set of
laws and policies.
More importantly, allowing NGREA to be used for O&M would detract
from the intended purpose of NGREA: to equip and modernize the ANG in
areas where ANG equipment lags the active component or in mission areas
such as domestic operations where the active component does not provide
funding.
Mr. Palazzo. We are currently looking at passing a CR to continue
funding the government until the end of the year. When I first came
into office last January, we passed multiple CRs to keep our government
functioning because of the failure of the previous Congress to pass the
annual appropriations bills. Now we are looking at another CR, likely
followed by an omnibus, that will carry us through. While we were
working on the CRs we received a great deal of testimony from the DOD
officials about the problems that CRs cause in their planning process.
Could you elaborate on the issues you will have to deal with if
Congress ends up producing another series of CRs? What is the overall
effect on the readiness of the Guard and Reserve Components?
General Wyatt. Overall, the productivity and economic costs
associated with CRs are not in our best interest, however the effects
of the CR depends on the level of funding, and length of the
authorities. A CR that keeps funding at current or expected levels for
greater periods of time tends to reduce negative impacts. Inversely, we
have begun operating in FY12 under a reduced authority for a short
period, which is causing all units across the ANG to inefficiently
manage their daily obligation rates. There are inherent costs
associated with short term funding cycles, such as the loss of training
opportunities and increased expenses associated with the inability to
negotiate longer term contracts for services and supplies. Additional
reductions beyond those scheduled through the President's Budget
submission for FY12, depending on the depth, could seriously impact our
readiness. Specifically, further reductions could impact our ability to
induct our aircraft for depot maintenance, create shortfalls in funds
utilized by the unit commanders to accomplish training, and/or reduce
our flying hour and civilian pay programs.
Mr. Palazzo. Many of my colleagues are familiar with these efforts
and I assume you are too but I would like to know your thoughts on the
matter. Earlier this year, in the House Defense Authorization Bill a
provision was included that would include a seat of the Joint Chiefs
for the National Guard. It is my understanding that a similar provision
is being worked on for the Senate version of the bill. Could you give
me your thoughts on the necessity of a National Guard Representative on
the Joint Chiefs of Staff? We have seen a largely increased role for
the National Guard during this past decade, but do you believe that
another 10 years down the road a seat with the Joint Chiefs will be
necessary or warranted?
General Wyatt. During the 10 Nov Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing, General McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau stated:
It is now in the best interest of the American people for the
Chief of the National Guard to be made a full member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . Only full Joint Chiefs of Staff
membership for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau will
ensure that the responsibilities and capabilities of the non-
federalized National Guard are considered in a planned and
deliberate manner that is not based upon ad hoc or personal
relationships, but is, instead, firmly rooted in the law and
the national strategy.
The domestic mission of the National Guard must be taken into
account when making military contingency plans, when allocating
scarce readiness resources, and when advising the President,
the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and
the Homeland Security Council on strategies and contingency
response options. . . .
Adding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the JCS, in
my opinion, would ensure that in the post-9/11 security
environment the National Guard's non-federalized role in
homeland defense and civil support missions will be fully
represented in all JCS deliberations. This would not detract,
in my opinion, in any way from its other critical JCS
functions.
Mr. Palazzo. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would
be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the
Guard Bureau were to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on
maintenance of training systems?
General Carpenter. As defined in Department of Defense Financial
Management Regulation, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account
procurement funds should not be used for sustainment and maintenance
expenses. These funds are not programmed--they are annually
appropriated--and are for procurement appropriations. An increase in
National Guard Operations and Maintenance funding would directly and
positively impact the maintenance and sustainment of ARNG training
systems, as well as provide the flexibility of National Guard Bureau to
focus those funds where most needed.
Mr. Palazzo. We are currently looking at passing a CR to continue
funding the government until the end of the year. When I first came
into office last January, we passed multiple CRs to keep our government
functioning because of the failure of the previous Congress to pass the
annual appropriations bills. Now we are looking at another CR, likely
followed by an omnibus, that will carry us through. While we were
working on the CRs we received a great deal of testimony from the DOD
officials about the problems that CRs cause in their planning process.
Could you elaborate on the issues you will have to deal with if
Congress ends up producing another series of CRs? What is the overall
effect on the readiness of the Guard and Reserve Components?
General Carpenter. When operating under a Continuing Resolution
(CR), a portion of the budget is withheld from the Army National Guard
(ARNG) in anticipation of Congressional downward adjustments. This
process creates uncertainty at the execution level for the ARNG,
because the States lack a clear picture on their programmatic funding
for the year. Unplanned requirements directed by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense or the Executive Branch to the ARNG place
additional risk to funding. The longer the CR, the greater the level of
uncertainty, and the greater the number of negative impacts observed at
the local level to funding obligations and execution.
Once the Department of Defense (DoD) appropriations bill was
passed, it took roughly three weeks for Office of Management and
Budget, DoD, and Department of the Army to complete all the fiscal
transactions necessary to provide funding to the ARNG. The ARNG
appropriations were balanced in May, seven months into Fiscal Year
2011. Due to the severely curtailed budget window, the ARNG was unable
to execute an 80% obligation rate for its Operations and Maintenance
appropriation.
Mr. Palazzo. Many of my colleagues are familiar with these efforts
and I assume you are too but I would like to know your thoughts on the
matter. Earlier this year, in the House Defense Authorization Bill a
provision was included that would include a seat of the Joint Chiefs
for the National Guard. It is my understanding that a similar provision
is being worked on for the Senate version of the bill. Could you give
me your thoughts on the necessity of a National Guard Representative on
the Joint Chiefs of Staff? We have seen a largely increased role for
the National Guard during this past decade, but do you believe that
another 10 years down the road a seat with the Joint Chiefs will be
necessary or warranted?
General Carpenter. During the 10 Nov Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing, General McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau
stated:
It is now in the best interest of the American people for the
Chief of the National Guard to be made a full member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . . Only full Joint Chiefs of Staff
membership for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau will
ensure that the responsibilities and capabilities of the non-
federalized National Guard are considered in a planned and
deliberate manner that is not based upon ad hoc or personal
relationships, but is, instead, firmly rooted in the law and
the national strategy.
The domestic mission of the National Guard must be taken into
account when making military contingency plans, when allocating
scarce readiness resources, and when advising the President,
the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and
the Homeland Security Council on strategies and contingency
response options. . . .
Adding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the JCS, in
my opinion, would ensure that in the post-9/11 security
environment the National Guard's non-federalized role in
homeland defense and civil support missions will be fully
represented in all JCS deliberations. This would not detract,
in my opinion, in any way from its other critical JCS
functions.
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