[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
IRAN AND SYRIA: NEXT STEPS, PART II
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 14, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-76
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
___________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New YorkAs
of October 5, 2011 deg.
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Wendy R. Sherman, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 9
The Honorable David S. Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury........ 31
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Wendy R. Sherman: Prepared statement............... 11
The Honorable David S. Cohen: Prepared statement................. 33
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 70
Hearing minutes.................................................. 71
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 73
Written responses from the Honorable Wendy R. Sherman to
questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Brad
Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State of
California..................................................... 75
Written responses from the Honorable Wendy R. Sherman to
questions submitted for the record by the Honorable David
Rivera, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida. 79
IRAN AND SYRIA: NEXT STEPS, PART II
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FRIDAY, OCTOBER 14, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order.
Before we proceed with this hearing, I would like to say a
few words and invite my friend, Mr. Berman, to do so as well,
in noting the passage of Deputy Assistant Secretary Dibble, who
was responsible for Iran within the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs.
Mr. Dibble was a long-serving member of the Foreign
Service, having arrived in Beirut the day after the 1983
bombing. He subsequently served in Saudi Arabia, Tunisia,
Pakistan, and as the deputy chief of missions in Damascus and
was previously principal deputy assistant secretary in the
Bureau of International Organizations. His service to his
country over many decades was exemplary and serves as a model
for successive generations of Foreign Service and civil
officers to follow.
I know I speak on behalf of all members of the Foreign
Affairs Committee when I express our deepest condolences and
sympathies to Mr. Dibble's wife, Liz, and their children. They
are in our thoughts and in our prayers.
And I would like to turn to the ranking member, Mr. Berman
for his statement on this.
Mr. Berman. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
The fact is Philo Dibble was one of the Department's true
experts on the Middle East. In fact, the Department lured him
out of retirement to take on the highly sensitive post of
deputy assistant secretary with responsibility for Iran. One of
his final achievements was the successful coordination of the
diplomatic effort that led to the release from Iranian
captivity of American hikers Shane Bauer and Josh Fattal just
last month.
He was an exemplary officer, intelligent, honest, direct,
and decent in every way, his passing all too untimely. The
turnout at his memorial service from the secretary on down
shows he was both respected and beloved. He will be missed by
those on the Hill who knew him and worked with him.
His wife, Liz, is principal deputy assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs, a position Philo himself held
some years ago. Together, they have been a remarkable Foreign
Service couple, talented, successful, and fully committed to
the service of this Nation.
So I join you in extending condolences to Liz and the
children and the State Department family.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I thank the gentleman for his
remarks.
I will tell the members and the audience--and thank you to
our friends for joining us this morning--that I will recognize
myself and the ranking member for 7 minutes each for our
opening statements on today's hearing topic. I will then
recognize the chairman and the ranking member of the Middle
East and South Asia Subcommittee for 3 minutes each for their
statements, and I regret that I don't think that we will have
time to recognize members for the 1-minute opening statements
due to votes that will interrupt our hearing and we will come
back.
We will then hear from our witnesses, and I would ask that
you summarize your prepared statements in 5 minutes each before
we move to the questions and answers with members under the 5-
minute rule.
So, without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements
will be made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days
to insert questions and statements for the record subject to
length limitation in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes for an
opening statement.
Today's hearing is part of a broader oversight effort by
the committee to examine U.S. policy options to address the
twin threats presented by Iran and Syria. On October 11, 2011,
the United States approach to the Iranian regime should have
undergone a major change. On that day, it was revealed that the
Iranian regime was actively planning an attack on a foreign
diplomat in the United States and was willing and able to kill
and maim innocent Americans in the process.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton noted in an
Associated Press interview that this plot ``crossed the line
that Iran needs to be held accountable for.'' Yet it was
revealed in yesterday's New York Times and reinforced by the
testimony of our witnesses before the Senate banking committee
yesterday that the administration does not plan to alter its
course of pressure and persuasive engagement with the Iranian
regime.
Via the failed plot, it became clear for any who still had
their doubts that the Iranian regime would use all available
options to threaten U.S. security, our interests, and our
allies. They brought the battle to our homeland, but our policy
response is to essentially remain the same?
Let me be blunt. This planned murder for hire must serve as
a wake-up call regarding the determination and capability of
the Iranian regime. If the regime feels secure enough in
planning a U.S.-based attack now, imagine how much more blatant
its aggression will be if it had nuclear weapons.
This lesson is not lost on the Syrian regime, whose state-
appointed mouthpiece has warned Western countries against
intervention in Syria, including threats to retaliate with
suicide bombings in their countries. These are not idle threats
from Damascus. One needs only to recall that not too long ago
Syria was caught red-handed pursuing nuclear weapons
capabilities; and, most recently, a Syrian spy was arrested
after targeting in the United States American citizens of
Syrian-origin opposed to the regime.
So I kindly and respectfully ask Under Secretary Sherman
what action do you intend to take to hold Iran to account, and,
in so doing, send a clear message to the Syrian regime that we
will not tolerate actions that threaten our Nation?
We also cannot rely on the United Nations to provide an
adequate deterrent to Iran. If after a plot to kill Americans
and foreign diplomats in Washington the administration's
response is to return to the United Nations Security Council
and plead with Moscow and Beijing to permit a resolution
slapping Iran's wrist, then the message sent to the regime in
Tehran will be that there will be no cost for any outrage that
it may commit.
Working with responsible nations, democratic allies to
increase pressure on Iran is one thing. But waiting for the
U.N. to do what is right as the threats from Iran and Syria
grow is foolhardy and dangerous.
Russia and China showed their true colors last week in the
Security Council when they vetoed a resolution rebuking Syria's
Iran-backed dictatorship for its assaults on its unarmed
population. They will still form an impassable obstacle to
effective multilateral action on Iran.
The draft Syria resolution was reportedly watered down
multiple times and only hinted at the possibility of sanctions,
all in an attempt to placate Moscow. But Russia vetoed it
anyway.
Instead of begging for help, we need a realistic policy
that reflects the urgency and the multifaceted nature of the
Iranian threat. We also need a policy that goes beyond merely
sanctioning individuals in the Assad regime to one that
provides a comprehensive strategy toward Syria.
Last year, Congress took a major step forward in the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act
of 2010. We are again taking the lead with the Iran Threat
Reduction Act, which I authored along with Ranking Member
Berman and with significant input from Mr. Sherman, Mr. Deutch,
and many other members of our committee. It now enjoys the
support of more than 320 co-sponsors in the House.
I have worked closely with Mr. Engel in authoring the Syria
Freedom Support Act, with Mr. Sherman in authoring the Iran,
North Korea, and Syria Non-Proliferation Reform and
Modernization Act, which, combined, would require additional
crippling sanctions on both the Iranian and Syrian regimes.
For U.S. and global security, these regimes must be made to
understand that the cost of their aggressive actions will be
too great for them to bear and that they must immediately
abandon their nuclear weapons program, their unconventional
weapons and ballistic missile development, and support for
violent extremists, and the repression of their own people. The
time is now.
I now turn to my good friend, Mr. Berman, for his opening
statement.
Mr. Berman. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Thank you for holding this hearing.
I want to go off script for just a moment.
Nothing we do, nothing any administration has been doing,
can truly be deemed effective with respect to Iran until Iran
stops its nuclear weapons program, ends its support for
terrorism, and in the real, longer-term sense, becomes a
government that represents its people.
But I simply have to say at the beginning, there is no
administration that has spent more time, more focus, and been
more effective in assembling the kind of international
coalition to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon than this
administration. The fact that on any given day they do not
announce to the world the exact details of a response to a
particularly heinous action is not evidence that it is business
as usual, they don't care, they are not--they are not going to
do anything. And I do think it is unfair to leave an impression
that this administration is not deeply focused on the goal that
we share.
I mean, yesterday, we disagreed about nothing. The great
thing about this subject matter in this committee is, on this
issue, you and I and I think Democrats and Republicans are of
common mind and deeply committed both to the importance of
achieving that goal and achieving that goal before Iran crosses
that very dangerous threshold.
And I just wanted to make those comments initially and then
try to shorten the rest of my remarks here. Because we are
sickened by what Iran--their twisted and despicable plot to
assassinate the Saudi Ambassador and possibly bomb the Israeli
and Saudi Embassies.
And you are right. The involvement of the Quds Force is
telling. This scheme was not hatched by some rogue operator but
by a very elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps,
the very essence of the regime.
Iran and Syria do form the heart of Middle Eastern anti-
Americanism and Middle East terrorism. Syria is Iran's forward
operating base in the Arab world. Iran is Syria's major
external supporter, helping the Assad regime murder the Syrian
people now fighting for their freedom.
We share the concerns about both regimes. Broadly speaking,
we have used the same tools to deal with threats coming from
Iran and from Syria, namely sanctions; and those sanctions have
been at least partially successful. They haven't yet achieved
the goal. Financial sanctions on Iran have complicated Iran's
ability to do business in the world, including selling its oil,
the industry that produces 90 percent of Iran's revenue. The
legislation we authored last Congress, CISADA, has led to a
significant decline in Iran's ability to purchase refined
petroleum and a near halt in the development of their oil and
gas industries.
Just this week, the International Air Transport Association
announced that Iran's national airline would no longer be
included in worldwide ticketing networks because of sanctions-
related complications.
The message to Iranians is clear. Their government's
illegitimate nuclear policies are undermining their prosperity
and isolating them from the international community.
Syria's situation is more desperate than Iran's and likely
to become even more so when the EU boycott of Syrian oil fully
kicks in next month. The Syrians claim they have 2 years worth
of foreign currency reserves. Most experts believe they will be
out of cash well before that.
Despite these successes, it is increasingly apparent that
current levels of sanctions aren't enough to get the job done
quickly in Syria or to get it done at all in Iran.
In Syria, more pressure is needed. Turkey, a major Syrian
trading partner, has significantly modified its decade-old
policy of intimacy with Assad, but it has not yet implemented
the sanctions it has pledged.
Syria's other major trading partner, Iraq, unfortunately
continues to support the Syrian regime. If Assad is to be
removed soon, as we all desire, we need more pressure from
Syria's neighbors.
As for Iran, although knocked off balance by sanctions, its
economy is far from broken thanks to high global oil prices.
The Iranian nuclear program continues to progress rapidly. The
threat has grown more urgent than ever. The most recent
inspection report by the IAEA shows that Iran's stockpiles of
low enriched uranium continue to grow. It has been concluded by
one respected analysis that Iran now has almost enough low
enriched uranium to produce four nuclear weapons. If it were to
kick out international inspectors and further refine this
material to weapons grade levels, Iran could then produce its
first bomb within 6-12 months and several more in the year
after that. They are installing centrifuges six times as
efficient as the current model in a large enrichment facility
in Natanz. This could reduce Iran's breakout time to 2-3
months.
There are additional steps that must be taken; and in
particular, our bill, the Iran Threat Reduction Act, will
tighten the screws further. I know we will be marking that bill
up soon.
Another is stricter enforcement of current sanctions, and I
look forward to a more vigorous enforcement from an
administration which I know shares our goals.
Two examples: The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps owns a
company that controls virtually every port in Iran, yet I have
not heard that we are sanctioning ships that use that company's
port services, as CISADA requires. President Ahmadinejad and
many other senior officials who are guilty of the worst human
rights abuses in Iran have not been sanctioned under CISADA.
These are but two of many possible sanctions that could be
imposed.
Another important step would be a decision by the Gulf Arab
states, perhaps the states most directly threatened by Iran, as
the plot revealed this week should remind them, to ramp up
their oil exports. That would result in ramping down oil prices
and would significantly diminish Iran's income.
Can I have unanimous consent for an additional minute?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely. Yes, the gentleman is
given the time.
Mr. Berman. Our best hope for slowing the Iranian nuclear
train is to bring its financial machinery to a grinding halt,
and sanctioning banks and companies in other countries that do
business with Iran's central bank would have a uniquely
powerful impact on the Iranian economy. That is why I think the
most dramatic measure we could take in terms of this
legislation is designating Iran's central bank as a facilitator
of terrorism and the development of weapons of mass
destruction.
Until now, we have sanctioned only Iranian banks that were
directly tied to terrorism or weapons of mass destruction
proliferation. But having peeled away the skin of the onion, it
is now clear that at the core of this banking network sits the
central bank, the ultimate enabler for all Iranian terrorism
and WMD proliferation.
For years, there has been speculation about whether a
nuclear-armed Iran would actually use the bomb. As the
revelation of the Washington bombing plot underscores, we know
that nothing is beyond the realm of possibility regarding
Iran's willingness to employ violence in pursuit of its
objectives and to do so in the most vicious and amoral fashion.
I cannot conceive of a more irresponsible or frightening finger
on the nuclear button than that of the Iranian regime.
I appreciate the courtesies you have given me of that
additional time, and I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I thank the gentleman. Perhaps if I
didn't agree with your policy suggestions, I wouldn't have
given you that extra time. The beginning was a little weak, but
the end was great.
I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the subcommittee chair
of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, Mr. Chabot of
Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chairman; and thank you for
calling this timely and important hearing.
Since taking office, the Obama administration's policy
toward Iran and Syria has been characterized chiefly by its
engagement with the ruling regimes. Whether or not that was the
right policy at the time, the situation we face today with
respect to these two countries is vastly different than it was
back in January 2009.
Recent actions make this conclusion irrefutable. Damascus
is not only continuing to arrest, beat, torture, and murder its
way through the current protests, but it is now exporting its
brutality to Lebanon in flagrant violation of international
law. Over the past several weeks, the Syrian army has on
numerous occasions violated Lebanese territorial sovereignty.
One recent incursion culminated in the death of a Lebanese
farmer after Syrian armored vehicles allegedly penetrated
approximately 2\1/2\ miles into Lebanese territory in clear
violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701.
Meanwhile, Tehran, as we all know, plotted to assassinate the
Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. on American soil.
The actions by both regimes show a disdain for
international law and norms that is incompatible with the
values and interests of the United States. Plainly speaking,
the blood on their hands and the impunity with which they
continue to act shows that these regimes are beyond salvation.
But anyone who is surprised that the thugs in Tehran and
Damascus would take these actions has been living in a
dangerous state of denial. Both regimes continue to respond to
carrots and sticks alike with ridicule as they mock the
legitimate concerns of the international community.
From the outside, however, it appears that this
administration's policies have remained distressingly
unresponsive. In the case of Iran, for example, I am concerned
that there are still those in the administration who hold out
hope of a grand bargain on the nuclear program. It is long past
time to jettison this dangerous fantasy as it is presently
warping our entire policy toward the region.
There is no question that the illicit Iranian nuclear
program must remain at the top of our priority list. The
nuclear program is, however, a symptom of the disease, rather
than the disease itself. I want to be clear: The Iranian
nuclear program is a paramount challenge to U.S. core national
security interests as well as those of our allies, and it must
be addressed. But to speak of the nuclear program independently
of the regime which pursues it is in effect putting the cart
before the horse. A nuclear program is not in and of itself
what makes the regime nefarious. It is the perverse nature of
the regime that makes the nuclear program so dangerous.
It is for this reason that it is time to close the door on
engagement with the regime in Tehran and call for its
departure. Not only has the regime shown itself unwilling to
budge, but continued engagement only risks abandoning and
alienating the Iranian people who I hope--sooner rather than
later--will be in the driver's seat.
I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to the gentleman
from Ohio.
The ranking member on that subcommittee, Mr. Ackerman, of
New York is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. The single question I have for the witnesses
regarding Iran today is, what is left?
Because unless you have means to apply more pressure to
Iran diplomatically, politically, and economically, we are near
the point where other options will have to be considered. For a
variety of reasons, I think we would all like to avoid those
options if we can.
Thanks to the good work done by the previous Congress and
with the support of the Obama administration, we have massively
increased the pressure applied by American economic and
particularly financial sanctions. Picking up where the Bush
administration left off, President Obama and Secretary Clinton
did tremendous work to build a new consensus now enshrined in a
U.N. Security Council Resolution to isolate Iran diplomatically
and to restrict many of its avenues of trade. But those efforts
are, frankly, not enough. The pressure on Iran has gone up, but
this new heightened pressure is nowhere near the point of
forcing the ayatollahs to deal away their nuclear capabilities.
What kind of pressure would suffice? It is hard to predict,
but here is what I would like to see.
The Iranian central bank and the entire Iranian banking
sector need to lose whatever capacity they retain to facilitate
Iran's international commerce and trade. These institutions
sustain Iran's criminal regime, underwrite terror, and
facilitate Iran's illicit WMD programs.
Let us be clear. Sanctions have to hurt. If they don't
hurt, they are not effective. The goal is not for us to pat
ourselves on the back and issue press releases here. It is to
inflict crippling economic pain over there. Iran's banking
sector needs to become the financial equivalent of Chernobyl--
radioactive, dangerous, and, most of all, empty.
Other countries may object to this approach. Our response
to them should be simple and frank. Either assist us in
cranking up the pressure on Iran by economic and financial
means, or accept that the United States and other like-minded
states will be compelled to deal with Iran's unresolved nuclear
issues by other means.
It has been 10 years since the Bush administration revealed
Iran's secret enrichment capabilities, and the threat has only
grown since then. Iran's efforts to acquire the means to
produce nuclear arms must be stopped. President Obama told the
nation that he would use all possible means at his disposable
to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear arms threshold. I
would say there are still means that are yet unused, and we
need to use them now.
Finally, I would like to express my deep dismay about the
administration's truly pathetic and inadequate execution of the
Iran human rights protections provisions passed into law last
year. I refuse to believe that the State Department, after
exhaustively examining Iran's massive machinery of repression,
torture, rape, and murder can only identify 14 Iranian
officials to be targeted by human rights sanctions. Here is a
bunch more. Iranian officials could do a lot better and,
frankly, a group of Iranian boy scouts could even do better.
This abject failure to execute the law is totally
unacceptable; and I would like to ask you, Secretary Sherman,
if you would carry this letter, which, unlike the State
Department, actually names of a bunch of Iranian officials. And
if you would please deliver this to Secretary Clinton.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. If someone could grab
that from Mr. Ackerman.
I didn't mean you, Mr. Mack.
Does the gentleman yield back?
Mr. Ackerman. Yes, thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you very much.
The Chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses.
Ambassador Wendy Sherman is a good friend of our committee.
Welcome back.
She was sworn in as Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs in September of this year. Prior to this position,
Under Secretary Sherman served as vice chair of the Albright
Stonebridge Group, a global strategy firm and a member of the
investment committee of Albright Capital Management, an
affiliated investment advisory firm focused on emerging
markets.
Ambassador Sherman served as Counselor for the State
Department from 1997 to 2001, as well as Special Advisor to
President Clinton and Policy Coordinator on North Korea. From
1993 to 1996, under Secretary of State Warren Christopher, she
was Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs.
Our next witness is the Honorable David Cohen, who was
confirmed by the United States Senate to serve as Treasury's
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence in
June of this year. Prior to his current position, Under
Secretary Cohen served as the Department of Treasury's
Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing.
We welcome you both, and your written statements will be
made a part of the record.
We will begin with you, Ambassador Sherman.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WENDY R. SHERMAN, UNDER SECRETARY
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. It is
always a pleasure to be here. So thank you.
Ranking Member Berman, distinguished members of the
committee, I appreciate the invitation to appear before you
today to discuss our goals, our whole-of-government approach
with regard to Iran and Syria, and the strategy we are
implementing to achieve them.
Before I start, I would like to add my own dedication of
this testimony to Philo Dibble, who, as the chairwoman and Mr.
Berman said, passed away unexpectedly 2 weeks ago. He was a
dedicated Foreign Service Officer and was the heart of our Iran
team, and he is sorely missed.
Let me comment first, and briefly, on the conspiracy to
assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in Washington that was
directed by elements of the Iranian Government. As the
Secretary and the President have said, this plot was a flagrant
violation of international law and a dangerous escalation by
Iran. I am deeply grateful to our law enforcement and
intelligence professionals who probably saved the lives of
scores of bystanders, along with the life of an ambassador. The
regime must be held accountable for its actions.
Just this week, as Under Secretary Cohen will explain, the
administration quickly designated five individuals, adding to a
growing list of sanctioned individuals and entities. We are
hard at work, meticulously and rationally laying out the facts
of this plot. All countries should deny Quds Force officers any
platform to operate within their territory and work with us
even harder to enforce all sanctions already on the books.
This administration is committed to addressing the
continued threat posed by the Iranian regime's nuclear
ambitions, its support for international terrorism, its
destabilizing activities in the region, and its human rights
abuses at home.
American policy regarding Iran remains unambiguous. First
and foremost, we must prevent Iran from developing nuclear
weapons. Its illicit nuclear activity is one of the greatest
global concerns our country faces, and we will continue to
increase the pressure, as the President said yesterday, as long
as the Iranian regime refuses to engage the international
community with seriousness or sincerity.
We now have the toughest sanctions package in three
decades. Since the passage of CISADA, we have imposed
additional sanctions on a growing list of individuals and
entities responsible for Iran's expanding scope of unauthorized
activities. These sanctions have raised the cost, time, and
energy required for Iran to pursue its current course and
provided a platform upon which the European Union, Norway,
Australia, Canada, South Korea, Switzerland, and Japan
implemented strict measures of their own.
In the aftermath of our calls on the conspiracy, as
Secretary Cohen will elaborate, the EU just today sanctioned
Iran's commercial bank.
Using CISADA, we have designated eleven individuals and
three entities for human rights violations, and we continue to
compile more information. I appreciate, Congressman Ackerman,
your list and evidence that will allow us to identify more
murderers, torturers, and religious persecutors.
The second topic of this hearing is Syria, which depends
more and more on Iran for support as it becomes further
isolated from the international community. The Syrian regime
has responded to the calls for Assad to step aside with hollow
promises of reform, conspiracy theories, and escalating
violence.
In its effort to cling to power, the regime is executing a
deliberate and bloody strategy of channeling peaceful protest
into armed insurrection. Its brutal actions have resulted in
over 3,000 deaths and many more thousands of cases of assault,
arbitrary detention, and torture since the unrest began in
March.
The regime is also stroking the fears of Syria's minority
communities with blatant propaganda.
Make no mistake, the regime is responsible for the cycle of
violence and sectarianism.
We have pursued targeted financial measures to increase
pressure on the Syrian regime and its corrupt business cronies.
On August 18th, President Obama signed a new executive order
that blocks the property of the Syrian Government, bans U.S.
persons from new investments in or exporting services to Syria,
and bans U.S. imports of and other transactions or dealings in
Syrian origin, petroleum, or petroleum products. These are some
of the strongest sanctions the U.S. Government has imposed
against any country in the world.
Europe's actions to ban the purchase of Syrian petroleum
products, the regime's most important source of foreign
exchange, will have a significant impact.
Actions by the United States and the world community to
counter Iran and Syria's domestic, regional, and international
belligerency are unmistakably escalating the cost of doing
business as usual for both countries. Their leaders must stop
attacking their populations, undermining regional security, and
threatening international security. Their actions run counter
to the aspirations and hopes of their people and their
neighbors.
In my new role as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, I
look forward to continuing to work closely and transparently
with members of this committee and with the entire Congress.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID S. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
TERRORISM AND FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Berman and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Treasury
Department's efforts to implement and enforce sanctions on Iran
and Syria.
The focus of my testimony today will be the progress we are
making in our financial strategy to increase pressure other
than the Iranian and Syrian regimes. But, first, I, too, would
like to say a few words about this week's revelation that we
disrupted an Iran Quds Force plot to assassinate the Saudi
Ambassador here in Washington.
This is a dramatic reminder that the urgent and serious
threat we face from Iran is not limited to Iran's nuclear
ambitions. We have been working for several years to address
the full spectrum of Iranian illicit conduct, including nuclear
and missile proliferation, human rights abuses, misuse of the
international financial system, and support for terrorist
groups worldwide. This week is no different.
On Tuesday, Treasury imposed financial sanctions against
five individuals, including the commander of the Quds Force and
three other senior Quds Force officers connected to the
assassination plot. In taking this action, Treasury exposed the
Iranian Government's involvement in the plot through the Quds
Force, Iran's primary arm for exporting terror.
And Wednesday we took another action targeting Quds Force
involvement in terrorist activities, this time by imposing
sanctions on Mahan Air, Iran's second-largest airline, which
was secretly ferrying operatives, weapons, and funds on its
flights for the Quds Force.
Actions like these, along with a raft of additional
sanctions we have imposed on Iran over the past several months
and years, have put increasing financial pressure on Iran.
CISADA has markedly amplified this pressure and deepened
Iran's isolation. As we have explained to banks and governments
in nearly 50 countries all around the world, CISADA offers a
clear choice. A foreign bank can have access to the largest and
most important financial sector in the world, the United
States, or it can do business with sanctioned Iranian banks.
But it cannot do both.
For the overwhelming majority of foreign banks, the choice
has been a simple one. Those with potentially sanctionable
relationships quickly elected to stop that business. And where
we learned of potentially sanctionable activity under CISADA,
we have actively investigated.
Our efforts are paying off. Iran is now facing
unprecedented levels of financial and commercial isolation. The
number and quality of foreign banks willing to transact with
designated Iranian financial institutions has dropped
precipitously over the last year. Iran's shrinking access to
financial services and trade finance has made it extremely
difficult for Iran to pay for imports and receive payment for
exports. Iran's central bank has been unable to halt this
steady erosion in the value of its currency, and Iran has been
increasingly unable to attract foreign investment, especially
in its oil fields, leading to a projected loss of $14 billion a
year in oil revenues through 2016.
Our efforts in Syria are also yielding results. Since the
uprising in Syria began in March, President Obama has issued
three new executive orders to establish sanction programs that
have systematically escalated the financial pressure on the
Assad regime. These U.S. sanctions, which targets human
abusers, block the assets of the Government of Syria, impose an
import ban on Syrian petroleum products, and prohibit new
investment in Syria, are intended to pressure Assad to
relinquish power.
Our efforts have been echoed by our European partners, who
have established an embargo on Syrian oil and imposed financial
sanctions targeting officials responsible for Syrian
repression.
And echoing an action that we have taken, just this morning
the EU announced sanctions on the Commercial Bank of Syria, by
far the largest bank in Syria and its key remaining link to the
international financial system.
As a result of these sanctions, the Assad regime is
struggling to find buyers for its oil, to access foreign
currency, and to maintain economic stability.
The IMF has revised its projections downward for the Syrian
economy this year, from 3 percent growth to a 2 percent
contraction, and predicts increasing pressure on Syria's
foreign currency reserves and ability to finance imports.
We are making progress in both Iran and Syria, but there is
still much to be done to prevent both Iran and Syria from
evading sanctions already in place and to take new steps to
increase the pressure on these regimes.
In the case of Iran, we continue to focus on the Central
Bank of Iran, the CBI. Although U.S. financial institutions are
already generally prohibited from doing business with any bank
in Iran, including the CBI, further U.S. action against the
CBI, if it attained multilateral support, could further isolate
the CBI with a potentially powerful impact on Iran.
I can assure the committee, as Secretary Geithner said in
his letter to Congress of August 29th, all options to increase
the financial pressure on Iran are on the table, including the
possibility of imposing additional sanctions against the CBI.
We will also continue to work with governments in Europe,
the Gulf, and elsewhere to impose financial measures that will
ratchet up the pressure on Assad to step down. If the Iranian
and Syrian regimes continue to choose the path of defiance, we
will continue to develop new and innovative ways to impose
additional costs on them.
I look forward to working with the Congress and this
committee to advance our national security interests.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
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----------
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I thank our witnesses for your
statements.
I will recognize myself for a question.
Ambassador Sherman, when asked by the informant if the
assassination of the Saudi Ambassador needed to go forward even
if doing so could cause mass American casualties, the accused
perpetrator responded, ``If hundreds go with them, expletive
them.''
Is engagement with the Iranian regime, bilaterally or
through the P5+1, still a part of the administration's policy?
And does the administration still adhere to this package of
incentives for Iran based on that regime's suspension of
uranium enrichment? And, if so, will the administration seek
waivers on legislative restrictions that have been proposed and
will be proposed in order for the U.S. to continue to
participate in this incentive package? Is the U.S. position
merely to ask Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment program or
to verifiably dismantle its nuclear program and stop other
aggressive actions?
And tied to this assassination plot--and I know we won't
have time to answer them all--the administration sanctioned
four individuals, one who has for years had American blood on
his hands. This Quds Force officer reportedly planned the
January, 2007, attack on U.S. soldiers stationed in Iraq. That
attack left five U.S. soldiers dead and wounded three others.
And this same Quds Force officer coordinated the murder-for-
hire plot recently in the U.S. that was just foiled this week.
And this Karbala raid was daring. It was sophisticated.
Iranian-trained terrorists posed as American soldiers.
Two years later, however, the Obama administration approved
the release of two brothers who were members of the Karbala hit
team and leaders of one of the infamous Iranian-directed
special groups; and the public rationale offered for their
release was that it was part of an Iraqi reconciliation effort.
So why did the administration not designate Shalai--the
gentleman who is no gentleman--the one that was complicit in
this murder-for-hire plot at that time, given that he was the
key enabler of this deadly attack on Americans, and was not
designating Shalai at that time part of the administration's
engagement with the Iranian regime?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much for your questions, Madam
Chair.
The administration is very clear. Our policy toward Iran is
to get them to verifiably end their nuclear weapons program and
their nuclear weapons ambition. There is no question about
that, and we are quite unambiguous about that objective.
There has been a two-pronged approach to that objective and
they interact with each other. We want to create the maximum
pressure on Iran. To do so, we not only need to impose, which
we have, the strongest sanctions regime in three decades
bilaterally against Iran, but we need to mobilize the
international community. Because sanctions are most effective
when they are severe, when they are enforced, and when they are
taken forward by multiple countries.
We are very powerful, and we are very strong, and we are
very consequential to Iran, but when we have a United Nations
Security Council resolution signed on to by the entire Security
Council and they bilaterally move forward in enforcing those
sanctions, we increase the severity and the impact of
sanctions. It is always good for us to do it. It is even better
when we have others do it with us.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. And if I could interrupt, it is
always good when we do it when we have all of these options on
the table, but we don't do even our own.
Ms. Sherman. We are absolutely committed to following
through on the enforcement of all of our sanctions, and I will
get to that in a moment.
So we have one track which is sanctions and increasing the
pressure on Iran and doing that in every single possible way
that we can, and we are greatly appreciative of CISADA as an
incredibly useful tool in doing that.
The second prong is, rather than engagement, I would say
seeing in fact whether there is an on ramp to having a
discussion with Iran to actually end their nuclear weapons
program.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. So you believe--if I could
interrupt, you believe that engagement with a country whose
leaders have reportedly sanctioned this assassination plot,
because money transfers would have been very difficult in a
country like that were it not approved by higher-ups, that
engagement with this country is possible?
Ms. Sherman. So far, the answer has been no.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. But you will continue?
Ms. Sherman. Iran has not been serious. Iran has not been
sincere. And, in fact, right after I was confirmed, I went up
to the United Nations General Assembly, had a meeting with the
P5+1, and I want to read to you and this was----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And I am sorry. My time
is up. But we will go to Mr. Berman's time.
I apologize. I asked a lot of questions. But I just don't
know what it would take for us to wise up and realize that they
are not willing to negotiate, and they don't wish to negotiate.
Ms. Sherman. May I add one sentence, Madam Chair?
The one sentence I would add is, out of that P5+1 meeting,
all of us agreed that there should be no conversation with Iran
unless there is any seriousness and there is a way to verify
that seriousness. So we agree with you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. We just had a conversation yesterday
at the U.N.--anyway, thank you so much.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. I will ask my own question.
Yesterday, we--and I have three questions, so I would
appreciate short answers. I will try to make the question
short.
Yesterday, we passed a bill that would result in the United
States cutting most of its contributions to the U.N. Since
nothing works in the context of getting Iran to change its
behavior unless--we have already sanctioned Iran for decades,
totally, in terms of our embargo. Unless we get others, other
companies and other governments to do it, how would the passage
of that kind of law and a massive cut in our assessments affect
your international strategy? And I ask you, Secretary Sherman.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Congressman.
As you know, we have articulated very strong opposition to
this legislation and our deep concerns about the impact. As
Secretary Clinton pointed out, restricting U.S. participation
and withholding 50 percent of U.S.-assessed contributions
absent a shift of voluntary funding would have severely
undercut our ability to stop nuclear nonproliferation, combat
terrorism, and fully implement the U.N. sanctions on Iran.
As you know, it would mean that we would have to curtail
our work with the Sanctions Committee, with the Panel of
Experts, that the IAEA would be unfunded to an extent that they
would not be able to carry out what we are all trying to
achieve, that, in fact, all of the critical tools that we use
to monitor, to verify, to in fact do exactly as the chairwoman
suggested, make sure that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons
program, would be severely hampered.
Mr. Berman. Thank you.
Under Secretary Cohen, the two of you--by the way, welcome.
You have replaced Bill Burns and Stuart Levy, big shoes to
fill, but you are the two that can do it. So glad to have you
here.
There is growing support I think for the notion of
sanctioning the Central Bank of Iran. Nothing will have the
impact on Iran's economy and Iran's revenue than those
sanctions. Secretary Cohen, you testified that they are an
option if there is multilateral support. Is the U.S. engaging
in trying to develop the support for those kinds of sanctions
as you did in the prelude to CISADA?
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Congressman, for the kind words,
first of all.
And in response to your question, yes, we are engaged in an
effort to develop the multilateral support that would be I
think critically important in having an action against the CBI
really be effective. And I think the important point to
recognize here is that, as you noted, we have comprehensive
sanctions on Iran and have so for almost two decades and that
includes the CBI. So there is no U.S. financial institution
that has any dealings with the CBI, including the Federal
Reserve. So the CBI is essentially completely cut off from the
United States.
So the real question is, can we, by taking another action
against the CBI, by designating the CBI, as you suggested,
either under our nonproliferation authority or under our
counterterrorism authority, can we elicit multilateral respect
for that action? And that work is under way.
Mr. Berman. And that is where, by the way, if you dismiss
the option of ever dealing with the Iranians should they decide
to change their process, you weaken your ability to get the
international support to impose the sanctions that could be
effective. Since we have already imposed all the sanctions we
can impose, we have to have other companies and countries
changing their behavior.
But I do have to say, unless we deal with the central bank,
it seems to me we have a huge gap in our effectiveness of the
financial sanctions.
And finally in my last few seconds, is there an opportunity
to get the Saudis and others to increase their oil production
to help. In addition to the central bank, the other compelling
thing would be if we could bring down the price of oil $10 or
$20 a barrel. Increased production by the Saudis, who have much
motivation to do so, would bring that about faster than
anything. That would really put the pressure on Iran.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, And the
gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Royce, the chairman on the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a couple of
questions.
First, Secretary Sherman, let me ask you this question; and
it has to do with whether or not people in Iran have access to
Google Plus and Flash and other Web sites. Because we want to
have brave activists have the ability to obtain information, to
get ahold of the tools that they need. But are there
impediments to them accessing these sites and are there any
impediments on our end?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much for that very important
question.
We do in fact have programs in place that do training and
offer technologies that might help the people of Iran escape
the repression and the lack of access to exactly the Internet
and the programs that you suggest.
I, unfortunately, need to say, Congressman, that I would be
glad to discuss this further in another setting. Because, given
the repressive nature of the Iranian regime, further discussion
in this setting would put people at risk.
Mr. Royce. I would be happy to do that.
The other question I have has to do with Iran's central
bank, which is an arm of the regime. Reportedly, it has
assisted the regime in sidestepping U.S. financial pressure.
Reportedly, it has also assisted in the nuclear weapons program
in terms of financing. And, in addition, there are reports that
it has helped fund Hezbollah. Secretary Geithner has said all
options are on the table when it comes to sanctioning the
Central Bank of Iran, and I was going to ask you about that.
Are you currently looking at that?
Ms. Sherman. As Secretary Cohen articulated, we are indeed
looking at that. And, as he pointed out, we already have cut
off all U.S. connections and relationships with the central
bank; and the question is whether we can do so in a way
internationally that we can sustain.
Mr. Royce. But we know we have a way. Because when we wrote
section 104 or 104(e) of the law, it gave the Treasury
Department the responsibility to pursue relentlessly, as we
said, foreign banks engaged in business with blacklisted
Iranian entities. So I suspect at this point in time we must
have a laundry list that we have put together of foreign banks
that have done that, and I wanted to talk to you a little bit
about that enforcement action. Because I have a concern about
how long we drew out the process on the rule itself. It looked
as though we were trying to avoid moving forward on this front.
And, as you can tell, there is a consensus, at least in this
institution, of opinion that this should have already been
done.
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, let me first address the issue of
the 104(e) rule, and then I will return to the central bank
question.
We issued that rule earlier this week. It has gone into
effect, and we have already sent out to U.S. financial
institutions a request for information with respect to a number
of foreign banks where we have reason to believe that they may
be involved in potentially sanctionable activity under CISADA.
That being said, we have, as I noted in my testimony, been
very aggressively implementing CISADA really since the day it
was enacted; and what we have done, frankly, using other
sources of information is understood where there may be banks
that are continuing to do business with designated Iranian
banks, and we have gone out as part of our, you know, worldwide
effort--we have gone out specifically to those jurisdictions
and those institutions where we thought there might be
sanctionable activity. And, as I noted, we have had an
extraordinarily positive response. And the result of this--and
I think this also may be something that would be better
discussed in a different setting--but the result has been a
tremendous reduction in the number of banks doing business with
designated----
Mr. Royce. Now would be the time to lean in. We have
already got North Korea using a Jordanian-based bank as a
conduit to receive funds from Syria and Iran. And, of course,
North Korea was the entity providing Syria with a nuclear
reactor right in the middle of the Six-Party Talks, by the way,
and has provided Iran with missile technology. And Kim Jong Il
doesn't do that for free.
So, clearly, these financial institutions that serve as
conduits in this capacity making an example of those
institutions and leaning in to do that sends a message to the
next institution that might be engaged with the other rogue
regimes, and that is why we----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Royce.
And the committee will recess. We have two quick votes. And
when we come back, we will turn to Mr. Ackerman for his
questions.
The committee stands in recess. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee is once again in
order, and Mr. Ackerman is recognized for 5 minutes of
questions.
Mr. Ackerman. I thank the chairman. Thank you especially
for this second of a series of two very important hearings.
I want to thank both of our expert witnesses for their very
important testimony and thank them and the administration for
the great work you have continued to do on pressing this. But
my question really remains: What is left to do? If we had our
wish list of all of the sanctions and actions that we could do,
short of the ones that we don't want to necessarily contemplate
or do, what would that list be?
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Congressman.
There are things that we are working on in addition to the
CBI which we talked about. One area where we have been very
active and I think where we will continue to focus is on the
IRGC, which Iran has used increasingly to take over parts of
the economy to the detriment of----
Mr. Ackerman. They are already on the list.
Mr. Cohen. They are, but there are--but what we can do and
what we have done in the last several months is to add IRGC-
affiliated entities for sanctions. So the sanction that we
imposed on Tidewater, which Ranking Member Berman mentioned,
was done because the IRGC in the last 2 years or so took over
Tidewater from a private owner.
Mr. Ackerman. So you are saying we should list all of the
affiliates, agencies, subsidiaries of the IRGC?
Mr. Cohen. And we are working to do that. And----
Mr. Ackerman. Can we expect to see that soon?
Mr. Cohen. Well, we have done the ones that we are aware
of. The Iranians continue to offer up to us new targets as they
turn over more and more of their economy to the IRGC. As they
do that, that provides targets for us to go after.
Mr. Ackerman. And assuming we had the entire list and we
did the entire list, what then? You know, we have kind of had
sanctions on Cuba for 40-some odd years. Are we prepared to
wait 40-some odd years? Cuba doesn't seem to be presently
developing a nuclear weapons program.
Mr. Cohen. I think the IRGC----
Mr. Ackerman. The point being we don't have 40 years in
Iran. And the longer we wait, the time benefit is exclusively
theirs, not anybody else's.
Mr. Cohen. I think we all share the sense of urgency.
Mr. Ackerman. And the underlying point is, if we pounced on
every sanction on every organization and every individual--and
I have given you a list of some additional targets--what then?
I mean, with the events that occurred over the last several
days, this egregious act to commit an immense crime, an
international crime, in addition to being a crime to our
country, to blow up a large number of people, including an
ambassador that we are duty bound to protect, what is left to
do? And, also, if they were--heaven forbid--would have been
successful in that attack, what would have been our response?
Mr. Cohen. Well, I can't speculate on what our response
would have been had this plot not been disrupted. And I am
thankful that it was, as Under Secretary Sherman----
Mr. Ackerman. But our response to the potential of the plot
being effective is more of the same?
Mr. Cohen. I don't know that it is more of the same.
Mr. Ackerman. Well, it is additional sanctions. Are we
considering something other than additional sanctions?
Mr. Cohen. From the Treasury Department's perspective, that
is what we have in our quiver.
Mr. Ackerman. Yes, that is your quiver. Let's say you blew
the whole load. All sanctions. Everything we know of and
conceivably could know of.
Ms. Sherman. If I may, Congressman, I think a couple of
points. One, as the Under Secretary said, we absolutely share
your sense of urgency and that time is not on our side. We get
that.
Mr. Ackerman. Not on my side, because I am not going to get
an answer because we don't have one. Are we doing anything to
dissuade the Saudis from responding?
Ms. Sherman. We have talked with the Saudis. They have put
out a rather robust statement of holding the Iranian Government
accountable for these actions. We have from the President, the
Secretary----
Mr. Ackerman. I don't know what any of this means. It is
like in the previous administration and the administration
before that, the only thing that we would do when bad things
happen is say this is not acceptable.
Ms. Sherman. Well, no, because what we are trying to do
is--as you said, we have undertaken a number of sanctions. And
I looked briefly at your suggestions, which I think are
excellent and also gives us a whole sector to pay attention to,
which I think we probably need to pay more attention to than we
have, so we thank you very much for that suggestion.
But I think what we need to do is to get every single
country we can to imagine exactly what you said, Congressman,
what would have happened if this had been successful? And once
you think about that, you, Country X, ought to enforce all of
the sanctions that we have put on the table. You ought to make
sure the Qods force cannot operate in your country. You ought
to make sure that high-level visits don't occur. There has to
be international pressure.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I am sorry----
Mr. Ackerman. I thank the chair. I yield back my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Ackerman; and
Mr. Chabot is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
As I noted in my opening statement, I am deeply concerned
that we are pursuing essentially the same Iran policy as we had
on January 20th back in 2009, namely engagement and pressure.
And that, after 3 years, it is safe to say that this policy has
failed, as far as I am concerned, to cause Iran to
fundamentally alter its commitment to achieving a nuclear
weapons capability.
I would like to take this opportunity to read a few quotes
from the administration that I believe illustrate this concern.
On May 18th, 2009, at a press conference with Israeli Prime
Minister Netanyahu, President Obama outlined the contours of
the administration's policy when he said, and I quote:
``We are engaged in a process to reach out to Iran and
persuade them that it is not in their interest to
pursue a nuclear weapon and that they should change
course. But I assured the Prime Minister that we are
not foreclosing a range of steps, including much
stronger international sanctions and ensuring that Iran
understands that we are serious.''
I will read another quote. On July 12th, 2009, just over 1
month after the regime in Tehran perpetrated one of the most
flagrant instances in election fraud history, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton stated,
``Neither the President nor I have any illusions that
dialogue with this Islamic republic will guarantee
success of any kind, and the prospects have certainly
shifted in the weeks following the election. But we
also understand the importance of offering to engage
Iran and giving its leaders a clear choice whether to
join the international community as a responsible
member or rather to continue down a path to further
isolation. We remain ready to engage with Iran, but the
time for action is now. The opportunity will not remain
open indefinitely.''
And then nearly 2 years later, on July 3rd of this year,
National Security Advisor Tom Donilon outlined the exact same
policy, and I quote again:
``We offered the Iranian Government quite directly a
bona fide offer of engagement. The Iranian Government,
the leaders of Iran, have chosen not to take that up.
So the pressure tack, unfortunately, I think is where
we are today, again, with the opportunity for the
Iranians, if they are willing to take it, to have a
conversation with us and the world community about
their nuclear program.''
And yet again this morning, Madam Secretary, in your
written statement just a little while ago, in the statement you
have, and I quote: ``We will continue to increase the pressure
until the Iranian regime engages the international community
with seriousness and sincerity.'' And then it goes on: ``We
have offered to meet with Iran and have proposed confidence-
building and transparency arrangements that offered practical
incentives.''
You know, it sounds like more and more carrots to Iran to
me. As we approach year three of this policy, it seems to be
painfully obvious that our policy not only remains unchanged
but that it has failed to achieve our core objective, and that
is persuading the regime in Tehran to abandon its pursuit of
nuclear weapons capability.
I am sure that our witnesses can outline numerous measures
that the administration has taken in support of these policies,
but these measures are merely means of trying to coax or
pressure the regime to change its calculus, not policies in and
of themselves.
So my question is, first, how has the administration's
overall policy actually altered--not just what we have done but
how have we actually altered Iranian actions or its strategic
calculation regarding its nuclear program? And, conversely, why
has 3 years of Iranian rejection and escalation not altered our
policy?
And I will yield.
Ms. Sherman. If I may, let me speak very briefly and turn
it to Under Secretary Cohen.
I understand and we share your frustration that more
progress has not been achieved. But, in fact, the incredibly
robust sanctions have only been in place for a very short
period of time in the history of sanctions imposition. And
indeed it was not until this administration that we had the
most extensive, deepest, most multilateral sanctions ever
imposed on Iran ever; and indeed it has begun to have some
bite. It has hurt their economy. Stopping transshipment has
meant they cannot procure some of the elements they need for
their nuclear weapons program----
Mr. Chabot. And I am almost out of time. I don't want to
interrupt you, but I will, just to say this. And, again, my
question, how has it altered their policy? You are saying we
have done different things.
Ms. Sherman. It has--a number of things we have done have
slowed--although they have moved forward, they have not moved
forward at the pace at which they had hoped to.
I don't disagree with you, Congressman, that we would like
to have made more progress. We don't disagree with you that
time is not on our side. As the President said yesterday, we
are looking to increase even further the efforts that we are
taking for Iran to be held accountable for what it has done
here, particularly in the wake of this conspiracy to
assassinate the Saudi Ambassador. But this is a very difficult
problem; and the options on the table, all of which are on the
table, are difficult.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Mack is recognized.
Mr. Mack. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to kind of follow up on this. So I hear that you are
frustrated, and you can imagine that we are frustrated. And the
American people are frustrated, and the world I think community
is frustrated.
So let me ask you this. Because a lot of times what happens
is we are told that we are using the best of the ability under
law to do what we can do and we are kind of hamstrung and those
types of things. But when people like me ask--and I am going to
ask you again--what do you need from the Congress to be
successful so you are not frustrated with yourself and
everything else that is happening in the State Department, then
we hear that, well, we don't hear any concrete steps that you
are asking the Congress to do.
So, you know, what tools do you need to really have an
impact with Iran?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Congressman. Again, I will turn to
Secretary Cohen in a moment.
One thing I would say, besides some of the legislation that
you have put on the table like CISADA, which was incredibly
useful, and I think Congressman Ackerman may have come up with
a sector we should take a look at in a way, quite frankly, we
should not unfund the U.N., because we need the oversight
bodies to be able to know where facilities are, to monitor what
is going on, to be able to act when we need to act.
Secondly, I would say----
Mr. Mack. So you would rather us be part of an organization
that works against our own interests at times?
Ms. Sherman. I understand that it doesn't do everything we
want them to do, but the IAEA has been a valuable tool in our
ability to stop nuclear proliferation.
Similarly, I would say we need a budget that allows us to
do the kind of programming that Congressman Royce raised around
how we, in fact, help get Internet tools to people in
repressive societies.
Mr. Mack. So that is our answer? More Internet tools?
Ms. Sherman. No, I am saying that----
Mr. Mack. With all due respect, with all due respect--
excuse me, please. With all due respect, I am not sure with
those comments that I have got a lot of confidence that the
threat is being taken seriously enough.
You know, we now have recently seen Iran coming through
Mexico and a plot here in the United States. And when I start
talking about whether or not the cartels in Mexico are an
insurgency, using terrorist activities, typically from
government witnesses we hear, oh, I wouldn't really say that,
or--although to Brownfield's credit, he would agree, and he has
agreed. But most just kind of, oh, I wouldn't go that far.
So it almost appears that we are afraid to really go after
in what is in our interest. So turning everything over to the
U.N. and then sitting here and saying we need more social
networking as the answer leads me to believe that--I don't
know--either you don't understand the seriousness of what is
happening or you are so--you are unable to articulate to this
committee what it is that you really need because it may not
fit in what the administration has decided it wants to do. That
is the frustration.
Ms. Sherman. I understand that frustration, Congressman. I
was suggesting--we did that yesterday--I was suggesting some
tools that would be useful to us.
I quite agree with you that what the fundamental policy
must be is to increase the pressure on Iran and to get them to
eliminate their nuclear weapons program. And, as I said earlier
and Secretary Cohen has said, we have the most extensive, the
most robust set of sanctions, and we welcome the ongoing
discussion with Congress around CBI and about other sectors
that we can attack to solve this problem.
Mr. Mack. Again, with all due respect, this is double-talk.
You have done great. We have eaten up 5 minutes. But I have
heard nothing about what it is that you are suggesting that we
need other than more social networking. And that is
frightening. It is frightening to think that your position is--
and the position of our Government is--it appears so inadequate
and not really understanding what the threat is.
Anyway, my time has expired. And, Madam Chair, I appreciate
the time. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Mack.
Mr. Deutch, my other Florida colleague, is recognized.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Secretary Sherman, let me just start with a local issue for
me, which is also part of the subject of this hearing.
Robert Levinson is a constituent of mine missing since
2007. His wife lives in Coral Springs, Florida. In
conversations that I had with Assistant Secretary Feltman
during the summer, there was some belief that suggested that he
was being held in Asia, that the Iranians may be involved, may
know. In light of the recent release of the hikers, we have to
continue to press the Iranians on this issue. Is there
anything, any additional information you can provide for me or
for Mr. Levinson's family?
Ms. Sherman. Congressman Deutch, as you know, this
administration shares your deep concern, and we will leave no
stone unturned. Shortly after I became Under Secretary, I
called Mrs. Levinson to talk to her personally to let her know
that I would persevere as much as my predecessor did.
And I know this morning there is an AP report about a
recent meeting between U.S. officials and the Cubans. And we
have always said we would use all diplomatic channels to try to
get Alan Gross home. We continue to call on the Cuban
Government to release Mr. Gross on humanitarian grounds and to
allow him to return to his family and bring to an end the long
ordeal that began well over 1\1/2\ years ago. And I can confirm
that such a meeting took place.
Mr. Deutch. The Department is working hard to locate and
bring Mr. Levinson home and Mr. Gross as well.
Ms. Sherman. Absolutely. I am sorry. I was talking about
Mr. Gross and conflated the two. My apologies. Let me be clear.
On both cases, Mr. Gross in Cuba, Mr. Levinson in Iran, we are
doing everything we can with every channel we have.
Mr. Deutch. I appreciate your answering my second question.
Thank you.
I also wanted to talk about these reports about China
scaling back their activities. There was a recent story, a
Reuters report, where Foreign Minister Salahi said that the
Chinese are very active in Iran. There may be one or two
projects that may have been reported in the media. One or two
projects may be slow, but that is no problem.
I guess the question I have, under the existing sanctions
law--and this gets to the broader question of are we doing
everything we can right now--under the existing sanctions law,
there are, if I understand the law correctly, three options.
We can--if we know that company is violating the law, we
can impose sanctions, we can with waive sanctions for national
security purposes, or we can designate that that company is
subject to the special rule.
The news that some Chinese companies may have scaled back
tells us that those Chinese companies are operating there. And,
if that is the case, then those companies have to be treated in
one of those three ways if these sanctions are going to have
any import at all. So are we--is that where we are going, and
why haven't we done that yet?
Ms. Sherman. We share the concern, particularly about what
China is doing in the energy sector. The President, the Vice
President, and the Secretary have all raised this directly with
the Chinese. We have, in fact, designated one Chinese company
under INKSNA for its activities regarding foreign persons that
are helping on WMD.
But, as you said, it appears that the interventions at the
highest levels to get them to slow down existing activities,
not conclude new deals and not to backfill is producing some
progress. The Secretary is continuing to look at this.
Mr. Deutch. I am sorry. We all have limited time.
But the question is not just about whether these companies
have slowed down and whether that is having an effect. The
question is, is the sanction law doing what it should? And for
it to be effective not just with respect to those Chinese
companies but with respect to companies all around the world
they have to know that we enforce the sanctions or we will at
least identify the companies and then waive the sanctions.
Ms. Sherman. Absolutely.
Mr. Deutch. I would suggest that those companies that we
are gratified are slowing down should be identified; and if
they are slowing down and have committed to leave, they should
be subject to the special rule. If we are gratified they are
slowing down and for national security purposes that is
sufficient, then let's say that. But let's identify those
companies so that every other company around the world who does
business in violation of our sanctions law understands what the
ramifications would be.
And, unfortunately, my time is up. Madam Chair, I yield
back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Deutch, another Florida colleague, will be recognized
later, and we also have Mr. Rohrabacher, but now we go to Mr.
Turner of New York.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I have no doubt about the efficacy of the sanctions in
slowing this matter down, but how much weight is given to the
world view, the mind-set of the Iranian regime? We listen to
the rhetoric coming out of there from both a theological, their
eschatology, it is far more frightening. How is this weighed
in? Is it given a weight? A consideration? Are they believed?
Ms. Sherman. Well, Congressman, I think that everything
that Iran has said to date has not been particularly useful, to
say the least.
Mr. Turner. Indeed.
Ms. Sherman. Indeed, Iran's response to this plot that we
recently uncovered and disrupted was to basically call it a
fantasy. If wanting to bomb the Saudi Ambassador on U.S. soil
and also kill a group of innocent bystanders is fantasy, then
obviously Iran in a different world. And I think that everyone
on this committee would agree that they do, and it is why the
chair and the ranking called this hearing today. Because,
indeed, I would quite agree with you. What they say has no
weight to it so far as we proceed forward.
Mr. Turner. If you believe what their speeches are, you
would think the sanctions--we are throwing spitballs at a tank.
Ms. Sherman. We know, Congressman, through a variety of
means that in fact what we are doing has had an impact, that,
in fact, it has created problems in their economy. It has
created some dissension within their government. It has put the
screws to what they are trying to do. But there is no doubt
there is a considerable path to go yet to get them to eliminate
their nuclear weapons ambitions.
Mr. Cohen. If I could--I completely agree with everything
that Secretary Sherman said, but if I could just add a couple
of points on that.
I think it is important to separate Iranian rhetoric from
the reality, and we are able to measure reality in two
important respects. One is--and I detailed this somewhat in my
testimony--we can see the economic impact of the sanctions that
we have been applying. We can see it in their oil field
developments. We can see it in their much, much more
constricted and isolated financial networks that have made it
increasingly difficult for Iran to engage with the outside
world.
Mr. Turner. If I may, the sanctions are designed to change
their behavior. I think we are dealing with North Korea. They
are materialistic, they understand what they want, and it has
some effect. We are dealing with a different animal here, are
we not?
Mr. Cohen. This is a country I think actually, unlike North
Korea, that cares very much about its ability to integrate into
the broader world. Iranians I think feel even more intensely
the isolation that the sanctions have brought to bear than the
North Koreans. So I do think that the sanctions in fact are
having an effect, notwithstanding the rhetoric.
The other point that I would make is we hear often from the
Iranians about projects or new banks that they have established
and new relationships that they have concluded; and, quite
frequently, it is just bluster. There is no reality to it.
Which is not to say that we should ignore the egregious and
vile rhetoric that often comes from the Iranian leadership. But
I do think it is important to separate it out from----
Mr. Turner. Is it then your opinion that that is not to be
believed?
Mr. Cohen. I am sorry?
Mr. Turner. Their rhetoric. At its core is nothing more
than----
Mr. Cohen. No--well, I want to be very clear. I think the
basic direction of the Iranian regime is something that we have
to take at face value and take very seriously. I am talking
about more specific claims and assertions of sanctions not
having an effect and that sort of thing.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Engel is recognized.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Madam Chair, and welcome to both of
you. You both do great work.
As you know, with the good help of our chair, I was the
author of--sponsor of the Syrian Accountability Act. Chairman
Ros-Lehtinen and I went around for a number of years trying to
get support in Congress. We did. The President signed it. And
now, from what I understand, the President is placing a robust
series of sanctions and penalties on the Syrian regime as a
direct result of our Syria Accountability Act.
Does the administration require any additional tools from
Congress to place additional sanctions on Syria's assets? And
if so, what? And what can we do? What are the regime's
remaining pressure points?
Ms. Sherman. Congressman, thank you very much, and thank
you for your leadership along with the chair and the other
members of this committee on bringing forth the Syria
Accountability Act.
The administration has implemented almost all of the
sanctions listed in that Act. I can walk through all of the
things that have occurred.
Most recently, as you know, on August 18th, the President
signed an executive order, 13582, blocking the property of the
Syrian Government, banning U.S. persons from new investments in
or exporting services to Syria, banning U.S. imports of and
other transactions or dealings in Syrian-origin petroleum and
petroleum products, therefore fulfilling all of the rest of the
sanctions.
We have also imposed travel restrictions on the Syrian
Embassy and followed through on the other elements of the
Syrian Accountability Act. So we think you have given us a tool
that is allowing us to impose really extraordinary sanctions on
Syria, and we are grateful.
At the moment, we are busy, since this is a relatively new
instrument, fulfilling all of these, executing on all the
sanctions that are possible under it. So, right now, I think we
have the tools that we need. I would let David add anything he
would like to add.
Mr. Cohen. I quite agree. With the executive order that was
issued in the middle of the August we now have comprehensive
sanctions on Syria. It is entirely cut off from the United
States.
The difficulty, as I am sure you know, Congressman, is that
there was not much interaction between the United States and
Syria to begin with, and so the effect of the sanctions that we
apply, you know, there is a limit to that. But what we have
been doing, working with our colleagues at State in particular,
is working with the EU to ensure that the EU applies very
powerful sanctions that complement what we have done. And we
have had very good success on that.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you.
Let me ask you this. Initially, it seemed like we and the
rest of the world were reluctant to do anything to undermine
the Assad regime, which I thought was a mistake. But even the
Israelis were reluctant because it was sort of like better the
devil you know than the devil you do not know. I think that
reluctance is gone because I think we see Assad murdering his
own people.
So I just want to ask you about the newly formed national
council, the Syrian opposition governing body. Are they the
legitimate representatives of the entire opposition and what do
we know about them?
Let me ask you this. If the Syrian regime, the Assad regime
is toppled--I realize it is a bit of a crapshoot, because we
really don't know what is going to come, but does it not
potentially have positive ramifications for the area? In other
words, Syria right now is right back in the middle of Lebanon.
We thought we had them out. They are right back in the middle
of it. Would it not be a blow to Hezbollah and to the Iran
regime if Syria were to go? Wouldn't it show the Iranians who
are oppressed, the average person, that there is some hope and
maybe cause an undermining of the Iran regime?
Ms. Sherman. Congressman, I think, going to the end of your
comment, we would agree. In fact, one of the premises of this
hearing is the tremendous interaction between what is happening
in Iran and what is happening in Syria, and that Syria has
really turned to Iran more and more as the only support it has
as it has gotten further isolated from the international
community, just as you have described.
And so, a change in leadership and an opening to all of the
people of Syria who want change would in fact have an impact on
Iran to further isolate it as standing by itself and no longer
having it as easily to, as you say, interject itself not only
into Lebanon but to be a destabilizing factor throughout the
region. So we quite agree with you.
As for the opposition, we are and I think Ambassador Ford
has done a superb job trying to meet with everyone and to
understand who all the characters are. And I don't think we
know yet how all of this will form.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Poe is recognized.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Madam Chair.
In 1979, 444 Americans were held hostage--rather, 52
Americans were held hostage for 444 days by the Iranian
tyrants. The United States, in my opinion, has held the MEK
political hostage for 450 days for its failure to abide by a
court order and the court saying 15 months ago that the MEK was
denied due process by our State Department, and our State
Department has failed to make up its mind one way or other
whether the MEK should be delisted or stay on the list. I think
that is not a good situation for the United States State
Department to be in, that it should make a decision.
And sanctions historically have never worked. It just
prolongs the inevitable, whatever that may be.
My question, Secretary Sherman, is does the United States
have a policy that supports a regime change in Iran through the
people of Iran?
Ms. Sherman. The administration has a policy to eliminate
Iran's nuclear weapons program and ambitions, to stop its
international terrorism, to stop its destabilization----
Mr. Poe. Excuse me, Secretary Sherman. I only have 5
minutes, and I don't want you to talk so much that I don't get
an answer. Does the United States Government have a policy that
we support the regime change by the people of Iran in their
country?
Ms. Sherman. I think what we have seen throughout the Arab
spring is that, and in the situation in Syria, is when people
themselves make choices about what they want for their future
the international community should support people in that
effort. But it is up to the people of Iran.
Mr. Poe. But do we support the regime change? If the people
of Iran want a regime change, do we support it? Would we
support it?
Ms. Sherman. I think we would support the people of Iran
having the same freedoms all the rest of us have.
Mr. Poe. I am sorry. Is that a yes or a no or you don't
know?
Ms. Sherman. It is exactly what I said, Congressman, which
is we support the aspirations of the Iranian people.
Mr. Poe. I think one way that we could help a regime
change--and I do believe that is the greatest hope for peace,
is that there is a regime change and that the little fellow
from the desert, Ahmadinejad, be replaced by his own people.
That is the most secure and best way for world peace, is to
replace him through the people.
But one way we can do that is show support by making up our
mind on whether the MEK should stay on the foreign terrorist
organization list or not. We just need to fish or cut bait on
that issue. And I think that, of course, that we should make
the decision that they should be delisted and let the people of
Iran in their own way change the regime, as has occurred in the
Arab spring in some other countries.
When is Iran going to have nuclear weapons, Secretary
Sherman? When do you believe they will have them?
Ms. Sherman. There is a lot of discussion about what that
timing might be, and it is certainly not a good sign that they
have declared that they have moved to 20 percent enrichment,
and they have moved some of their centrifuge capabilities to
what was a previously covert center at Qom. But I couldn't give
you today in this setting an assessment but would be glad to
have a separate briefing to get the Intelligence Community's
best estimate of that.
Mr. Poe. It appears to me that, no matter what we done and
what the international community has done, Iran is still
determined to have nuclear weapons, another example that
sanctions have not been successful.
The latest situation with the Iran Government in my opinion
working with who they thought were al-Qaeda--excuse me, Zeta
operatives in Mexico to commit crimes in the United States, is
there any further policy of the United States other than to
isolate Iran, whatever that means? Are there further plans with
the United States as far as the policy goes?
Ms. Sherman. The President said yesterday, Congressman,
that he wants to ensure that we have the strongest response
toward this latest horrific act by Iran. We are working
assiduously to make real that commitment that he stated
yesterday. And we will be doing everything we can, and have
been from the President on down, to try to move in that
direction some of those things have been discussed here today,
but there are others in consideration. And, as the President
has also said, every option in circumstances like this always
remain under consideration.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Judge Poe.
Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Welcome to you both. Thank you for being here today. And
congratulations, Under Secretary Sherman, for your new role. We
look forward to working with you.
I wanted to start really talking about Iran. We hear
reports about increasing divisions. We see in the region the
movements of the Arab spring in different stages in different
countries. The regime has certainly repressed talk of any
reforms there very well in recent years. But what do you think
is the viability for renewed democracy movements in Iran, given
movements elsewhere in the region? And I want to start with
Under Secretary Sherman.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Congressman, and thank you for your
good wishes. I appreciate it.
I think we were all heartened when we saw the Green
movement emerge in Iran some time ago and deeply saddened when
we have seen the tremendous repression to try to squash any
ability of an opposition to form. At the same time, I think we
all believe that the aspirations of the Iranian people are to
have the same freedoms that the rest of us do.
And in response to Congressman Royce's question earlier
today, the government--we have quite an extensive program to
try to ensure that information can reach the Iranian people,
that they have the technology to have access to that
information. There are other things that we can do to be
helpful in supporting the aspirations of the Iranian people,
and we would be glad to give you a more detailed understanding
of that in a different setting. Given the repressive nature of
the government, we are limited in what we can say here.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you.
And Under Secretary Cohen?
Mr. Cohen. I think I have nothing to add to Secretary
Sherman's I think very apt comments.
Mr. Carnahan. Then I will move on. Thank you.
Next, I want to turn to Syria, the U.S.-backed resolution
calling for an end to ongoing violence vetoed by China and
Russia. Secretary Rice, you know, led that effort vigorously.
But I guess my question is, what is our strategy moving
forward? There has certainly been progress made in building
international consensus. And I guess the question is, what are
our next steps and what specifically do we need to do to work
with China and Russia to address their concerns?
Ms. Sherman. We have not stopped that effort, as you
indicate, Congressman. And indeed, as Secretary Cohen said
earlier today, today the European Union--and I had misspoke, I
said the Commercial Bank of Iran, and I meant to say the
Commercial Bank of Syria--they designated the Commercial Bank.
And, obviously, the EU's earlier sanction of stopping
petroleum--oil and gas between Europe and Syria was quite
crucial because it is an important market.
So the European Union, which has much greater ties to Syria
than the United States has had for some time, probably can be
more effective on the sanctions front than even we can be,
though we continue to use the Syria Accountability Act to
fulfill all of the tools that you all have provided to us.
I think today also the head of the Human Rights Commission
has indicated that there really is a tremendous effort under
way by the Syrian Government to repress and kill and persecute
all of its citizens and really calls on the international
community to take urgent action to stop such things. So we will
see what the response is to that as well.
Mr. Carnahan. And specifically I wanted to ask about our
strategy dealing with Russia and China, addressing their
concerns.
Ms. Sherman. We have continued conversations with them to
try to address their concerns. But my sense, Congressman, is we
need to proceed to mobilize those who are ready to act while we
try to bring Russia and China around.
Mr. Carnahan. And Under Secretary Cohen?
Mr. Cohen. I would add only this. That as we continue to
work with Russia and China I think we also need to work with
other countries that may look at this as an opportunity to get
into the Syrian market. I think India, for instance, is another
country we need to pay attention to.
For our part, although we have comprehensive sanctions on
the Government of Syria now, we still also have the opportunity
through the pre-existing executive orders, the one in
particular that addresses human rights violations, to identify
individuals and entities in Syria or outside of Syria,
including in Iran, that are involved in these human rights
abuses.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
First of all, for the record, I am appalled that it takes
the attempted murder of a Saudi Ambassador for the U.S. to do
something serious--serious soul searching what further actions
we can take to try to rein in the Mullah regime's dictatorship
and repression and threat to other people and other regimes and
other governments in that region.
Iran has murdered hundreds of our own military personnel by
providing Shiite militias in Iraq with high-powered IEDs over
the years. This has been going on for years. And I don't mean
to downplay this assassination attempt and how important it is,
but we should have responded with a very tough reaction the
minute we found out that Iran was providing these weapons to
people who were killing American soldiers. But we just sort of
let it off, shrugged it off. We have a certain level of
sanctions that obviously they can live with, because they have
been living with it.
Then we have, you know, like these folks here with the MEK.
I mean, clearly, the MEK has been labeled a terrorist
organization because they opposed the Mullah regime. And we are
doing that and trying to curry favor with the Mullah regime.
And how much does it take before we quit trying to curry favor
with them by treating people who oppose them as if they are
criminals? It is the Mullah regime who are terrorists, not the
MEK. The MEK wants to establish a democracy there.
I am not saying I agree with everything they stand for. But
by designating them terrorists we are giving the Mullahs the
idea that we are weak. How do we expect to get anywhere in this
world when we treat our friends who believe in democracy as if
they are enemies and our enemies if they are our friends? Seems
to me that is what is going on here.
And I agree with Mr. Mack's frustration. Look, we are at a
point where we have a representative of our Government who
can't even say we believe in regime change with a Mullah
dictatorship that is building nuclear weapons and undermining
governments throughout that region and now is engaged in hiring
an assassin to commit an act of assassination and a bomb
explosion here in our Nation's capital. And we don't even have
a government--our Government suggesting that we--that
government--there should be a new regime there.
Of course, that is seen as weakness. We are seen as
weaklings. Not as--so what if we side emotionally with the
people of Syria? We couldn't even--we had a tepid--this
administration has a tepid response to the brutal and murderous
repression of the Iranian people when they went into the
streets to protest the stolen election. A stolen election means
you have a group of people who are superimposing power over
others illegitimately. This is not a legitimate government, and
we can't even say we believe in regime change? I can see why
the Mullahs now think we are so weak that they can go into
conspiracies to set off bombs in our Nation's capital.
Look, all of these years we have known what the Mullahs are
all about. They have expressed their hatred toward the West and
toward the United States, their commitment toward and utilizing
brutality and murder to achieve their ends. And yet we can't
take them off the terrorist list for just their opposition, and
much less can we support all of the ethnic groups and the young
Persians in Iran who are struggling and risking their lives
against the Mullahs. We haven't provided any material support.
We haven't provided any weapons. We haven't provided any way
that they can actually impact the Mullah's dictatorship and
control in Iran.
Shame on us. Our Founding Fathers and generation after
generation of Americans have fought for freedom. We are not
even willing to take the risk of saying there should be a
regime change in Iran. Shame on us.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Connolly is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Let me say at the outset, I have been
impressed, and I know others have been as well, with the fact
that we now finally have an ambassador in Damascus in
Ambassador Ford, on behalf of this administration, I would say
to my friend from California, who has put his life on the line
to associate with the forces arguing for opening up Syria to a
democratic form of government. And that is pretty bottom line
basic.
So there are many ways for a great country and a great
power to express its views. Not all of them are pounding the
dais here in Congress. And there are diplomatic ways and there
are nondiplomatic ways. And I think the witness given by our
Ambassador in Damascus is very profound and to be commended and
I think speaks volumes, and I would regret any imputation of
the administration with respect to its communications in Syria.
Sometimes there are ways of trying to avoid strengthening
those forces we don't want to strengthen. It would be easy,
clearly, for the United States at this time, for example, to
outright call for regime change in Iran. My guess is that
strengthens the hands of the Mullahs at precisely the time
their hand may be weakening because they can use it to great
effect pounding about outside interference in domestic politics
in Iran.
It is a sensitive matter not easily traversed, and I think,
as the ranking member said in his opening statement, no
administration has been as forthright and as forceful in taking
on Iran at every level and using every lever at its disposal to
do so. And, again, I would regret any imputation to the
contrary. It is not true. It is not true.
We can be impatient about progress and results. I am sure
that is shared by our two witnesses today and by the Secretary
of State and by the President. But it is not because for want
of trying at many, many different levels, not all of which are
public.
So speaking at least for this member, I take exception to
the critique we just heard. It is easy to do, but it in fact
doesn't reflect the reality on the ground or the reality of
American diplomacy.
Welcome both of our witnesses. Madam Under Secretary, let
me start with you, if I may.
The Qods force, what is our understanding of its
relationship to the Government of Iran? And I pray for concise
answers, because I have a couple more that I want to get to.
Ms. Sherman. Okay. I will be concise, and if I may defer to
my colleague.
Mr. Connolly. Of course.
Ms. Sherman. We see the Qods force as a very serious part
and becoming probably a stronger and stronger part of the
Iranian Government and taking over a lot of the economic sector
of the Iranian Government and also really directing all of its
international terrorism.
Mr. Connolly. And I assume you concur, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Cohen. I do.
Mr. Connolly. So in light of that answer, we can't treat
this as some rogue element that probably is separated from the
Ahmadinejad government and the clerical ruling elite.
Ms. Sherman. We agree.
Mr. Connolly. What representation have we made through
third parties or directly to the Iranian Government, given that
answer, with respect to this incident which the administration
believe it has convincing evidence for?
Ms. Sherman. We have--in fact, as Secretary Cohen outlined,
we have sanctioned the IRGC in a number of instances. And I
would remind all of us that Iran is already designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism, and the sanctions that are imposed
as a result of that are more profound than any other individual
set of sanctions that we have. So we have made a very clear
declaration to the Iranian Government that the IRGC and the
Qods force, which is a part of it, are in fact very tangible
directors of all that is wrong with Iran.
We have also, as I said in my opening statement, as part of
the follow on and to intensify that activity have been asking
governments in reaction to this assassination attempt as well
as to previous behavior, to not allow the Qods force to operate
in their country.
Mr. Connolly. My time is up. But, Madam Chairman, I point
out for the record since we are having this series of hearings
we had a witness the other day from Brookings who said it was
premature and inappropriate to assign responsibility and blame
to the Iranian Government at this time; and we have just heard
official United States Government testimony saying, actually,
no, it isn't. It is perfectly appropriate, and it is time to
assign blame, given the relationship of the Qods force to this
government.
I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. No doubt. Thank you so much.
Mr. Rivera is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Madam Chair.
My questions are for Secretary Sherman.
My understanding has always been that it is the policy of
this Nation not to negotiate with terrorists. I don't know if
you saw the AP story today: U.S. offered Cuba swap for
American. And I will read briefly. It says the United States
offered to let a convicted Cuban spy return home in exchange
for the release of an imprisoned American, but Cuba rebuffed
the offer, U.S. officials who spoke on condition of anonymity
because of the sensitivity of the issue said. Says the Gross-
Gonzalez swap--you mentioned Alan Gross earlier--was raised by
former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson as well as by senior
U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials.
Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross'
release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez
that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of
interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S.
list of state sponsors of terrorism, reducing spending on Cuban
democracy promotion programs, authorizing U.S. companies to
help clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling,
improving postal exchanges, and ending a program that make it
easier for Cuban medical personnel to defect to the United
States.
So my question is a yes-or-no question. Has anyone in the
Obama administration discussed the possibility of making any
concession or accommodation whatsoever to the terrorist Castro
dictatorship in exchange for the release of American hostage
Alan Gross? Yes or no.
Ms. Sherman. What I can say, Congressman, is that, as I did
earlier, even though I conflated two things, I can confirm that
a meeting between U.S. officials and the Cubans did take place
as part of our efforts to get Alan Gross home. I cannot comment
on what was said in that meeting. But I can say to you,
Congressman, that we have laws and restrictions, and we will
obey and follow those laws and restrictions.
Mr. Rivera. Has anyone talked about making an accommodation
to the Castro regime for the release of Alan Gross, any
accommodation whatsoever or concession? Are you telling me yes.
Ms. Sherman. All I am saying, Congressman, is I can confirm
that a meeting did take place recently between U.S. officials
and the Cubans. I cannot comment----
Mr. Rivera. How recently?
Ms. Sherman [continuing]. On the content of that, but I
would be glad to get back to you with any further information.
Mr. Rivera. How recently? I want it on the record in public
here. How recently?
Ms. Sherman. I don't know the exact date, but it was quite
recent.
Mr. Rivera. Weeks, days, hours, months?
Ms. Sherman. I don't know.
Mr. Rivera. You are the Under Secretary for political
affairs; is that correct?
Ms. Sherman. That is correct.
Mr. Rivera. Days, weeks, months? When was this meeting?
Ms. Sherman. Quite recent.
Mr. Rivera. Quite recently. Who authorized Bill Richardson
to make these offers to the Castro dictatorship?
Ms. Sherman. I don't know that anyone authorized Governor
Richardson to make such a trip or to make such concessions.
Mr. Rivera. Who interfaced with Bill Richardson before he
went to Cuba in your administration?
Ms. Sherman. I don't know that anybody did. It was before I
became Under Secretary, but I would be glad to check with----
Mr. Rivera. No, no. The administration confirmed on the
record that they knew Richardson was going, he was going as a
private citizen, but that he had had conversations with the
administration about his visit. Who did he interface with in
the administration regarding his visit to Cuba?
Ms. Sherman. I don't know that answer, but I will be glad
to get it for you, Congressman, very specifically.
Mr. Rivera. I need that answer. Who would have been
responsible for these discussions, recent discussions with the
Castro dictatorship?
Ms. Sherman. I don't know that answer either, but I will
get it for you, Congressman.
Mr. Rivera. You don't know who speaks to the Cuban
Government on behalf of our--on the Obama administration?
Ms. Sherman. Congressman, you know, I don't usually use as
an excuse that I am brand new and recent to this job, but in
this case unfortunately I have to. I have only been in the job
less than 3 weeks. So I will get that answer for you and I will
get it to you promptly.
Mr. Rivera. It is the policy of this administration not to
negotiate with terrorists?
Ms. Sherman. Of course.
Mr. Rivera. And you recognize that Cuba has been designated
as a terrorist nation by our Government?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Mr. Rivera. Well, in the last seconds that I have, I would
just tell you that this report is outrageous, that we would be
negotiating with a terrorist regime to release an American
hostage, negotiating with the same hostage takers that we have
designated as terrorists. I will yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rivera. Mr. Sherman
is recognized.
Mr. Sherman of California. A couple of opening comments. I
agree with Mr. Rohrabacher that this attack demonstrates that
Iran perceives us as weak and not without good reason. I will
point out that we have got a number of people in the audience
with yellow T-shirts that remind us that 450 days ago, a court
declared that the State Department should carry out the law,
since they don't carry out the other laws we pass given about
Iran, it is about time that the judicial branch as well as the
legislative branch can be frustrated. But in this case, I would
say that the only time that the administration wants to--seems
to really want to enforce our terrorist laws with regard to
Iran or the only time that they can be accused of going
overboard is with an entity that is an anathema to the
government that is trying to kill people on American soil.
I want to focus on the airplanes that Iran Air and Mahan
Air acquired in the 1970s. These have General Electric engines.
The engines need repair and are unsafe. A number of our
colleagues joined with me in a letter saying that the planes
should be grounded until Iran changes its policy and that we
should not repair them. Under Secretary Sherman, is it still
the position of the State Department that we should grant a
license to repair these planes?
Ms. Sherman. Congressman, I am going to defer in a moment
to Under Secretary Cohen, since we have just designated Mahan
Air in the last day. But indeed, previously we did feel it was
a responsibility and we may continue to for civilian air
safety, that we not allow planes to fly where people might die.
Mr. Sherman of California. Well, obviously there are a lot
of unsafe planes in the air. It is our responsibility to bring
those to the attention of world aviation authorities. But it is
interesting that other unsafe planes aren't being fixed because
nobody will pay to fix them. We are not going to fix planes in
Africa, but--or any other poor part of the world. So we don't
mind there being unsafe planes, except where Iran is willing to
pay to make them safe. You point out that these are ``civilian
planes.'' These planes unify the purpose of today's hearing.
These supposedly civilian planes or at least other supposedly
civilian planes owned by Mahan Air and owned by Air Iran are
used to take weapons and thugs from Iran to Syria to kill the
Syrian people. Now, I would say that is contributing to the
unsafety of civilians and yet the State Department in a desire
to once again, I don't know, eviscerate our sanctions is
supportive of this license. The idea that it is fine for
thousands of Syrians to die at the hands of Iranian weapons and
Iranian thugs, that is okay, but we have got to make sure that
the planes that the thugs use are safe.
Now, let me turn to another issue. Under CISADA, we
directed the State Department to prevent--to sanction those
firms that give Iran the technology to suppress the Internet,
and there is a Chinese company that is--that we have great
concerns is just about to do that, recently having sold Iran
Internet monitoring equipment.
The State Department, consistent with its policy under the
Iran Sanctions Act, has a policy of just ignoring the law and
has refused to identify any item of equipment that would
trigger this provision of CISADA. I know it has taking you 450
days to deal with the court decision and this is less time than
that. Any chance that the State Department will, since this
committee passed at least at the committee level, a provision
directing you to do so, identify those items of equipment that
are sanctionable under CISADA dealing with Internet
suppression?
Ms. Sherman. Congressman, we certainly want to follow
through on the law as it has been executed by you all and
signed by the President, and I will come back to you with
further information on that.
Mr. Sherman of California. Any chance you will get it done
within 450 days?
Ms. Sherman. I understand your concern.
Mr. Sherman of California. Any chance you will get it done
under the current administration?
Ms. Sherman. I understand, sir.
Mr. Sherman of California. Given the fact that Iran is
engaged in an act of war against the United States, you would
think that the State Department could act a little more
quickly. Finally, is there any chance that you are going to
sanction any multinational corporation under the Iran Sanctions
Act for Investment in the Iranian oil sector except for those
companies owned by Iran themselves?
Ms. Sherman. There have been, in fact, a number of
sanctions, if I may, let Under Secretary Cohen speak to this
issue.
Mr. Sherman of California. Sanctions under the Iran
Sanctions Act, can you identify one company not owned by Iran
that was subject to sanctions for investment in the Iranian oil
sector?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. And maybe we will leave that for
discussion after the hearing is over. Mr. Manzullo is
recognized.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you. Welcome, Ambassador. I would like
you to walk me through this very troubling relationship we are
having with Iran. Please provide a list of options, starting
with the most extreme that the United States could take with
Iran and then moving down the list. Obviously, we are not
talking about an act of war which would be the most extreme,
but enlighten me and the American public as to what options are
out there.
Ms. Sherman. As you point out, Congressman, the most
extreme is one that I think none of us want to see, though the
President has said in instances like this, we always leave all
options on the table and that is true here. None of us want and
hope to go there. Short of that, international isolation of the
most extreme variety is probably what has the most impact on
any country and that means their inability to have economic
means, their ability to operate in the world, their ability to
move in the world, their ability to be recognized in the world,
their ability to function in the world. And with the help of
CISADA and other Acts that Congress has passed and executive
orders that the President has put in place, we now have the
most robust set of sanctions on Iran in the last three decades.
That does not mean we have designated everybody who can be
designated, nor sanctioned everyone who can be sanctioned, nor
gotten all of the world to do likewise, but that is what we are
attempting to do. And if I may defer to my colleague to add to
that.
Mr. Cohen. I, again, completely agree with Secretary
Sherman that what remains to be done is to increase Iran's
economic, commercial and human, as it were, interaction with
the outside world.
Mr. Manzullo. If I could stop you right there. What more
would you want to see done that has not occurred? Because
obviously, it is not working to everybody's understanding. What
more needs to be done at this point?
Mr. Cohen. It is very much the policy of this
administration to continue to increase, and to ratchet up the
pressure on Iran in an effort to try and achieve the objective
that Secretary Sherman laid out. So we are going to, and we
have been, and we will continue to apply additional pressure on
Iran, both unilaterally and----
Mr. Manzullo. Is that sufficient? Is it actually working
according to what you envision? What more can be done or what
more can other countries do, what more can the United States do
to encourage other countries to ratchet it up?
Mr. Cohen. We are working, and have been working very hard
to internationalize to the greatest extent possible the
sanctions on Iran. The United States, as you know, Congressman,
has had for many years, a complete embargo on Iran. The rest of
the world is not there yet. We are working with our colleagues,
whether it is in Europe or in Asia, around the world to try and
internationalize and extend the isolation of Iran and the
pressure on Iran. And frankly in response to the most recent
episode that was revealed this week, using that to illustrate
to our partners around the world why it is that they should
take complementary action, to isolate Iran to a great extent.
Mr. Manzullo. Ambassador Sherman, you had a very specific
list of accomplishments that occurred in the economic boycott
of Iran. What do you want to see added to what your testimony
already has pointed out?
Ms. Sherman. I am sorry. I didn't hear you, sir. What do I
want to see?
Mr. Manzullo. What additional results would you want to be
able to put into your testimony regarding things that you are
working on but you have not achieved the desired result yet?
Ms. Sherman. What we would like to see as Under Secretary
Cohen said is we would like to see every other country in the
world take the kinds of actions that we have to isolate Iran.
We have begun to see that happening. We think an enormous
amount more can be done. And over weeks and months before I got
this job, and even in a more accelerated pace since this latest
horrific plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador, we have
spoken from the President on down to every single capital in
the world in the last 48 hours, every single capital in the
world has been touched to, in fact, say this is, as the Under
Secretary said, this is one more proof point in why you should
take immediate action to not only condemn this act, but to, in
fact, keep any Quds Force from operating in your country, look
at enforcing all sanctions.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank
you, Mr. Manzullo. Before we adjourn, I neglected to point out
the pictures that we have on the side of the committee room.
And I think that they summarize the clear threat that the
Syrian and the Iranian regimes opposed to U.S. national
security, to our interests, to our allies as well as the threat
they pose to their own people as we can see there. They should
serve as a call to action to compel those regimes now, to end
their pursuit of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological
weapons, their advance missile programs, their state
sponsorship of global terrorism and their gross violations of
the basic human rights of its citizens. This means we need a
single focused U.S. approach that identifies these regimes for
what they are and stops legitimizing Iran by holding onto the
hope that its leaders will be seduced into doing the right
thing through engagement or by offering them concessions or
incentives. And the time is now, we all agree, if we are to
shut down these regimes, the time is now.
I thank Ambassador and Mr. Secretary for being here. We
look forward to further discussions on legislation and
crippling sanctions. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Written Responses from the Honorable Wendy R. Sherman, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Questions Submitted
for the Record by the Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Written Responses from the Honorable Wendy R. Sherman, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Questions Submitted
for the Record by the Honorable David Rivera, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Florida
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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