[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
AXIS OF ABUSE: U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY TOWARD IRAN AND SYRIA, PART 2
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 22, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-73
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
68-447 WASHINGTON : 2011
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York DENNIS CARDOZA, California
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Michael Singh, managing director, Washington Institute for
Near East Policy............................................... 6
Mr. Mehdi Khalaji, senior fellow, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy.................................................... 17
Mr. Alireza Nader, international policy analyst, RAND Corporation 25
Mr. Tony Badran, research fellow, Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies.................................................... 32
Jon B. Alterman, Ph.D., director and senior fellow of the Middle
East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies... 39
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Michael Singh: Prepared statement............................ 9
Mr. Mehdi Khalaji: Prepared statement............................ 19
Mr. Alireza Nader: Prepared statement............................ 27
Mr. Tony Badran: Prepared statement.............................. 34
Jon B. Alterman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 41
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 56
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
AXIS OF ABUSE: U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY TOWARD IRAN AND SYRIA, PART 2
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. The committee will come to order. I want to
thank everyone for being here this afternoon. I apologize for
being a couple minutes late. We had a big conference over
there. I left early to get here. And I want to thank Mr.
Ackerman for being here so early. Thank you.
I want to welcome my colleagues to this hearing of the
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, as well as our
witnesses here and those in the audience. As our witnesses
noted in their written statements, the human rights abuses
being perpetrated at the hands of regimes in Tehran and
Damascus are as horrifying as they are widespread.
In the aftermath of the stolen June 2009 so-called election
in Tehran, the world watched as the Iranian regime beat,
tortured, and raped and murdered its way through the protest
that followed. Just over 6 months ago Syria, the Iranian
regime's closest ally in the region, joined Tehran in its
ruthless repression of prodemocracy protests.
As protests intensified, the Assad regime initiated a
brutal crackdown that continues even as we speak. It is now
estimated that over 2,700 Syrians have been killed and reports
coming out of Syria speak of unconscionably heinous human
rights abuses.
Today's hearing, however, was called to examine U.S.
policy. Two months ago this subcommittee had the privilege of
hearing Assistant Secretaries Feltman and Posner discuss the
Obama administration's human rights policies toward Iran and
Syria. Since our last meeting, the Obama administration has
taken a number of steps for which they deserve credit,
especially on Syria.
Although it took far too much time and far too many dead
bodies, the administration has finally come out and called for
Bashar al-Asasad's departure from power. It also implemented
sanctions against various high-ranking Syrian regime
authorities, many of which have been mirrored by our allies
abroad.
Unfortunately, despite these recent developments, my
concerns about our policy remains. This administration, the
Obama administration human rights policies toward Iran and
Syria have been, in my opinion, both feeble and late. Rather
than seizing the historic opportunity presented to it, the
administration dithers by slowly inching toward challenging the
legitimacy of these regimes in any meaningful way. Why, for
example, have we sanctioned the leadership in Damascus and not
the leadership in Tehran?
When the administration does take action, it is usually in
the form of a strong statement such as President Obama's
statement at the State Department in May. Yesterday at the
General Assembly, for example, the President noted that we
have, ``sanctioned those who trample on human rights abroad.''
But we haven't. At least not thoroughly enough. Indeed my
concern is not as much with what the administration is doing as
it is with what the administration is not doing. The result is
a growing disconnect between our words and our actions.
As I am sure our witnesses will discuss, there are many
steps which we should be taking which we are not, individuals
we should be sanctioning, opposition groups we should be
standing with, and regimes we should be condemning at every
possible opportunity. That the administration continues to
avoid calling for a transition to a democratic government in
Iran is evidence of one of two possibilities: Either it still
believes that a grand bargain on the illicit nuclear program is
possible, or it is concerned that to do so will, like in Libya,
create a situation in which it must then ensure that the regime
actually falls.
The fine line that the administration is walking by
condemning, but not seriously challenging the regime in Tehran,
puts it in an untenable position. And from the outside it
appears to be hedging rather than leading. And although the
administration may think that to do so puts itself in an
advantageous position, it seriously underestimates the impact
its actions, or lack thereof, have on actual outcomes.
Indeed, the perception that calling for a democratic
transition requires U.S. military operations to forcibly depose
those in power is an excuse to avoid making a more permanent
break with regimes like the one in Tehran. Words, like many
things, have a currency, and that currency is action. To
highlight human rights abuses and then sanction only 11
individuals and 3 entities is unacceptable. To vacillate
between condemning the Iranian regime and then later offering
it a lifeline pits us against the people of those countries.
I fear, however, these missteps reflect a deeper problem:
That the administration lacks any overarching strategy toward
the region. The administration is fond of saying that although
its foreign policy is guided by core principles such as the
promotion of democracy and respect for human rights, each
country is different and, as such, requires a tailored
approach. Although it is certainly true that no two countries
have the identical set of circumstances, this argument must not
be an excuse for inaction or lack of strategic vision.
Until very recently, the Obama administration's policy
toward Iran and Syria was characterized chiefly by its
engagement with the ruling regimes. Although I did not agree
with this policy at the time, it is all the more wrong today.
The Obama administration must realize that the U.S. can no
longer do business with either of these regimes, they are both
beyond salvation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chabot follows:]
******** INSERT 1-1 ********
Mr. Chabot. At this time I would like to recognize the
distinguished gentleman, the ranking member from New York, my
colleague and friend Mr. Ackerman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. I thank the chairman and appreciate his
remarks.
I would like to thank him for scheduling this second
hearing on the subject of human rights in Syria and Iran.
While much of the world's attention is focused on the
Palestinian's foolish and dangerous gambit to find a shortcut
to statehood at the United Nations, the violence in Syria and
the ongoing oppression in Iran, as well as that country's
illegitimate nuclear ambitions which must be stopped, continue
unabated and thrive in the absence of focused international
attention.
As a global power and guarantor of security in the Middle
East, the United States can't afford to take timeouts on
critical issues such as these. The tyrants, torturers, and
theocrats would all prefer we did. But our interest and
responsibilities require us to be able to walk and chew gum at
the same time, so they say.
Our interests in the Middle East are varied, but all of
them are improved by the weakening of the regimes in Tehran and
Damascus, and all would be significantly aided by the collapse
of the axis between Syria and Iran. Whether it is aiding
Israel's search for peace and security, or protecting Lebanon's
sovereignty, or preventing Iranian hegemony, or undercutting
Hezbollah and Hamas, or nurturing Iraq's development, or
sustaining our partnership with Turkey, or just promoting the
spread of democracy and human rights, every loss for these
regimes is a gain for us and innocent people as well throughout
the region.
The strategic partnership between these two criminal
regimes has produced instability, terror, and violence in
Lebanon, Israel, and Iraq, as well as frontally challenging the
nuclear nonproliferation regime.
These two disgraceful, blood-soaked regimes must, and I
believe they will, end up on history's trash heap with other
discarded and disgraced models of government based on coercion,
violence, and brutality. Iran's Ayatollahs will not rule Iran
forever, and Bashar al-Asssad's days in Syria are likewise
numbered. The collapse and failure of these regimes, when it
occurs, will not be the product of our efforts or our
intervention, but we will surely welcome these developments
when they occur.
The jails or nooses that will hold the remains of Iran's
misanthropic theocrats or the Assad mafia will be in the hands
of free Iranians and Syrians, and we will celebrate from afar
their liberation from the darkness of tyranny.
The question for us today is twofold: First, to consider
what options are available for us to aid the people of Syria
and Iran in their struggle to free themselves from the
insidious parasites that have seized control of their
government; and second, to think about the strategic
implications of the Arab Spring on these two countries and
their so-called ``axis of resistance,'' which has caused so
much destruction in the region.
When it comes to providing direct aid to the people of
Syria and Iran, I am leery about our prospects of doing too
much. A great deal of our contribution to the freedom of these
nations will come in the form of stringent economic and
political sanctions to choke the life out of these oppressive
regimes and prevent their efforts to acquire or proliferate
weapons of mass destruction.
As much assistance as we can provide we should make
available. We should provide technical assistance to undermine
government control and surveillance of cyberspace. We should
use the influence of the United States to name and shame and
punish companies that break or backfill sanctions, or that
provide critical enabling technologies or consulting services
to the Syrian and Iranian mechanisms of oppression. We should
help facilitate efforts by Iranians, Syrians, to organize
themselves and encourage cooperation between different groups
with the same objective of freedom. We must continue to
advocate universal human rights and rule of law as essential
underpinnings for true democracy.
But as essential as speaking for what we support, we must
also denounce these regimes for their repression at home and
their instigation of violence and terrorism abroad. Constantly
pointing out that these regimes are devoid of legitimacy, that
their leaders are murderers and torturers of innocents is not
an expression of our opinion, it is a statement of fact.
Ayatollah Khomeini is not a cleric, he is a butcher. Bashar al-
Assad is not a political leader, he is a mob boss.
The motives of protesters in Syria and their predecessors
in Iran are fundamentally the same as those of people
everywhere; they want democracy, freedom, dignity, jobs, and
respect for their human civil and political rights.
These things, we Americans know, are not gifts from
governments to the people, but they are the very rationale for
people to institute governments in the first place. These ideas
which empowered our own Revolution are now transforming the
Middle East, and we should have no compunctions about speeding
the work in Syria and Iran.
I thank the chairman for the time, and the witnesses who I
look forward to reviewing their testimony. And I apologize, I
am going to be shuffling back and forth between two hearings at
this time.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We appreciate your opening
statement, Mr. Ackerman. And let me mention that my colleagues
are in a meeting now in the Capitol Building, going over the
fact that our keeping the government funded for the next 6 or 7
weeks went down in flames yesterday. And what do we do, where
do we go from here? And that was sort of a problem. So that is
where they are. We will probably have members trickle in.
We also will have votes on the floor in the very near
future as well. Rather than keep everyone waiting, we thought
we would go ahead and move and then the members will be able to
hear your testimony and read your statements as well at their
own leisure.
So without further ado, I would like to go ahead and
introduce our distinguished panel here this afternoon. If I
mispronounce any names, please accept apologies in advance.
We first have Mr. Michael Singh, who is the managing
director of the Washington Institute and a former senior
director for Middle East Affairs at the National Security
Council. He served in the NSC for 3 years as senior director
for Middle East Affairs, and as director for Iran and for
Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and North Africa. Previously Mr. Singh
served as special assistant to Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice and Colin Powell, and was staff assistant to then-
Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. A
member of the Harvard International Review's board of advisors,
Mr. Singh has written extensively on Iran, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and U.S. National Security Strategy and
Management. Mr. Singh holds an M.B.A. from Harvard University
and earned his B.A. at Princeton University. We welcome you
here this afternoon.
Mr. Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, focusing on the politics of
Iran and Shiite groups in the Middle East. Prior to his work at
the Washington Institute, he was a political analyst on Iranian
affairs for BBC-Persian, and later became a broadcaster for the
Prague-based radio Farda. Mr. Khalaji is the author of five
books. His most recent book, ``The New Order of the Clerical
Establishment in Iran,'' written in Farsi, was published in
2010, and we hope it is a big seller.
And our next witness is Alireza Nader who is an
international policy analyst at the Rand Corporation and the
author of ``The Next Supreme Leader Succession in the Islamic
Republic of Iran 2011.'' His research has focused on Iran's
political dynamics, elite decision making, and Iranian foreign
policy. His commentaries and articles have appeared in a
variety of publications and he is widely cited by the U.S. and
international media. Prior to joining RAND, Nader served as a
research analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis. He is a
native speaker of Farsi, and we welcome you here this afternoon
as well.
Next is Tony Badran who a research fellow at the--you know
I am going to butcher your name, then, if I got all of these
right--at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in
Washington, DC. He focuses on Lebanon, Syria, and Hezbollah.
His research includes U.S. policy toward Lebanon and Syria and
Syrian foreign policy. Mr. Badran's other research has dealt
with Syria's use of information warfare as well as with the
Syrian opposition movement. Mr. Badran also specializes in
Lebanese affairs and Islamic groups in the Levant. Mr. Badran
appears regularly in the media both in the U.S. and abroad. Mr.
Badran is currently completing his doctorate at American
University. He is fluent in English, French, Arabic, and Greek
and has working knowledge of German and Hebrew. Thank you so
much for being here this afternoon.
Last but not least, we have Jon B. Alterman, who is the
director and senior fellow of the Middle East program at CSIS.
Prior to joining CSIS, he served as a member of the policy
planning staff at the Department of State and as a special
assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs. He is member of the Chief of Naval Operations
executive panel and served as an expert advisor to the Iraq
study group, also known as the Baker-Hamilton Commission. In
addition, he teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Johns
Hopkins school of Advanced and International Studies and George
Washington University. Before entering government he was a
scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace and at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy. From 1993 to 1997, Alterman was
an award-winning teacher at Harvard University where he
received his Ph.D. in history. He also worked as a legislative
aide to Senator Daniel P. Moynahan, Democrat, New York,
responsible for foreign policy and defense.
As I said, we have a very distinguished panel here this
afternoon. It is obvious just by reading their bios. As I am
sure the members of the panel may be aware, we have a 5-minute
rule here. You have 5 minutes to address the committee. There
is a lighting system. The yellow light will come on when 4 of
the 5 minutes is up, and a red light comes on when you are
done. We would ask you to conclude by that time if at all
possible.
So, Mr. Singh, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SINGH, MANAGING DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Singh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Ackerman, and distinguished members of the committee.
Thanks very much for the opportunity to talk about the alarming
state of human rights and freedom in Iran and Syria. It is a
matter not only of moral urgency but also vital national
security importance to the United States.
I am going to deliver a condensed version of my remarks in
the interest of time. I would like to discuss the role that the
systematic abuses of human rights play in the strategy of these
two countries. We need to be clear, this is not a recent
phenomenon in Iran or Syria, nor are any human rights
violations there, some sort of excessive--just an excessive
response to the recent uprisings in these countries.
These violations are not deviations from normal practice
for these regimes. These are normal practices for these
regimes. It is a matter of policy to abuse human rights both
for Tehran and Damascus, and these things are instrumental in
the establishment and maintenance of control, which is at the
heart of their versions of authoritarianism.
It is vital that we in the U.S. foreign policy community
arrive at a proper understanding for the nature of the regimes
in Tehran and Damascus, and therefore why they engage in these
atrocious human rights abuses we are here to discuss. The
abuses are fundamentally about establishing and maintaining
control and are common to most authoritarian regimes, past and
present, in one form or another.
We must not only condemn the abuses that are a symptom of
this authoritarianism, but the systems themselves which give
rise to them. We must not only seek to prevent the abuses from
happening, but to break the control of these regimes over their
populations. Opposing human rights abuses in Iran and Syria, if
such opposition is to be meaningful, means supporting democracy
in these countries.
At first glance, these two regimes, Iran and Syria, seem
quite different. One is a radical secular regime in Syria, one
a radical religious regime in Iran. Yet these regimes are close
allies, and in many ways their superficial dissimilarities mask
fundamental similarities underneath the surface. Like so many
authoritarian regimes, both of their systems of government are
based on careful cultivation of certain illusions. I want to
briefly mention three illusions, and then talk about what we
can do.
The first is the illusion of democracy. Despite their
deeply autocratic natures, both the Syrian and Iranian regimes
have adopted the language and trappings of democracy which is
troublingly common in modern authoritarian states. For its
part, Syria has an elected Parliament and has a President who
is confirmed, quote-unquote, by a referendum. Despite the fact
that they have these trappings of democracy, they still have
manipulation. A ridiculous 97.62 percent of Syrians reportedly
voted to confirm President Assad in the last Presidential
referendum.
Iran has the same democratic pretensions. It holds
elections for both the Presidency as well as the Parliament,
but in both cases there are parallel structures which are
unelected and which trump the supposedly elected officials;
that is, the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council.
Even with these authoritarian safeguards in place, however,
Iranian leaders still feel compelled to manipulate the results
of these elections despite the fact the elected officials have
little power. We saw this in June 2009 with the rigged
Presidential election to which you referred, Mr. Chairman.
To be clear, however, even these trappings of democracy,
meager as they may be, are illusory. True power in Iran and
Syria lies not in the hands of elected officials, but with
small cliques who enjoy the backing of massive and well-
rewarded security apparatuses.
The second illusion is the illusion of prosperity. Both of
these regimes have long-trumpeted a message of wealth
redistribution, of championing the poor and dispossessed, and
they still propound this message. We have seen this especially
with Iranian President Ahmadinejad. He was mocked in Iran
during a Presidential election for handing out potatoes in the
countryside, but in fact he was able to generate some support
through this sort of populism.
It is essential as well to the Supreme Leader of Iran, who
talks a lot about class warfare in the way that he frames
issues to his population. The reality, of course, is completely
different. Despite the massive national resource wealth in Iran
and despite the relatively significant economic growth that has
happened in Syria, both of these countries are riddled with
economic problems, poverty, income inequality, unemployment,
and of course have massive corruption. They rank 127th and
146th, Syria and Iran respectively, out of 178 countries,
according to Transparency International's corruption
perceptions index.
Third is the illusion of stability. Both of these countries
have known only two rulers apiece over the last several decades
and both of these men, Bashar al-Assad and Ali Khamenei,
Supreme Leader of Iran, have managed to increase their power
over their tenures rather than see it wane. In a region notable
for its tumult, these leaders can claim, superficially at
least, stability in their countries. But this is also illusory,
because they lack any mechanisms from which to release
pressure, pressure for political change, pressure that comes
from economic discontent. And so the way they deal with this
pressure is, of course, through repression and through human
rights abuses which we are here to talk about.
The accomplishment of the protesters and the opposition in
Syria and Iran is not just coming out of the streets and not
just facing the bullets, which they have done courageously,
especially in Syria, over these last since 6 months, but also
in Iran after the June 2009 elections. Their great
accomplishment is they have shattered these illusions and have
exposed these illusions, and these regimes can no longer claim
to be democratic, prosperous, or stable. And they won't be able
to reconstruct those illusions or those images.
Let me just say very briefly what the United States can do
to support them in trying to expose these illusions and trying
to expose what the regimes truly are. First of all----
Mr. Chabot. We want to follow up in questions, because we
have gone over 5 full minutes at this point. We want to make
sure we have enough time. We are going to be called for votes,
but hopefully I will ask you that end question, what were your
conclusions going to be? Maybe start off with that.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Singh follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Mr. Khalaji, you are next and we would ask the
members, if possible, to stay within the 5 minutes. Thank you
very much.
STATEMENT OF MR. MEHDI KHALAJI, SENIOR FELLOW, WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Khalaji. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ackerman,
distinguished members of the committee, thanks very much for
providing me this great opportunity to witness on the critical
situation of human rights in Iran. I am not going to read my
written testimony. I would like to summarize it and especially
emphasize on two major points. The announcement by U.S.
Government and other Western governments in condemning Iran's
violation of human rights are very effective and necessary. But
I think that it is not enough, because the problem in Iran is
not accidental violation of human rights. The violation of
human rights is systematic and especially it is coming from the
legal system of the country. For example, despite the fact that
Iran has signed the International Convention of Children's
Rights, Iran continues to execute teenagers and underage people
for various accusations. Yesterday in Karaj City near Tehran, a
17-year-old teenager was executed on the streets before the
eyes of 15,000 people. So the problem is that the legal system
of Iran legitimates such violations of human rights. The other
example is stoning women and men for committing adultery.
Another important example is the anti-Bahai policies of the
government. You know that the Iranian legal system is against
Bahais and it deprives them of their basic rights. So it is
very important not just to react to specific cases of the
violation of human rights, but we have to encourage Iranian
regimes to reform and change the legal system to adapt it more
to human rights and democratic rules.
Another issue is that the sanctions on individuals for
being involved in violation of human rights. It is very
important. Especially a joint effort by the United States and
European Union have been very effective. But first of all we
have to publicize cases that these people have applied for visa
and their visa application was rejected. In other words, we
have to get benefit from these sanctions. We cannot just
sanction them. Wee have to tell Iranian people and other people
in the region that their activities and human rights activities
have practical consequences.
The other issue is that it is good to target the
Revolutionary Guard, the Basij militia, Iranian police, or
Iranian judiciary officials who violate human rights in Iran.
But we all know that the power in Iran is centralized around
the Supreme Leader, and this is Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khamenei who is in charge of domestic and foreign policy. And
he is the final decision maker. The violation of human rights
is primarily initiated and implemented by the Office of the
Supreme Leader.
And I would suggest that important members of this office
should be sanctioned, like Hossein Shariatmadari, Khamenei's
representative at Kayhan newspaper, who is a famous person in
oppressing critics, intellectuals, students and women's rights
activists.
Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Khamenei, who mainly runs his
office.
Asghar Mir Hrjazi, another important member of his office,
who is the security deputy of the office.
Vahid Haghanian, who is the right-hand person for Ayatollah
Khamenei.
Muhammad Shirazi, who is the military advisor of Ayatollah
Khamenei, and he supervises both the Revolutionary Guard and
Army.
Ahmad Marvi, who is head of the clergy department in the
Supreme Leader's office. And especially he is in charge of
intimidating political opposition inside and outside Iran.
And finally, Hossein Mohammadi, who is in charge of
designing censorship on different kind of media.
I think these are important people that should be singled
out and be subject of sanction by the United States and
European Union. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. And I especially thank you
for being so specific about who those are that you believe
should be sanctioned.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Khalaji follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. I would like to note the presence of the
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, who has joined us
here this afternoon.
Mr. Nader, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. ALIREZA NADER, INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYST,
RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Nader. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to appear before you today to discuss Islamic
Republic of Iran's human rights abuses. In addition I would
like to discuss the Iranian regime's behavior in light of the
Arab Spring, and current state and the future prospects of the
opposition Green Movement. I will conclude with U.S. policy
recommendations. And I will summarize my written testimony.
The Islamic Republic is one of the worst human rights
abusers in the Middle East. The 2009 Iranian Presidential
election, widely perceived in Iran as fraudulent, led to a
dramatic increase in Iranian State repression. Iranians who
opposed a clerical-led regime are routinely harassed, jailed,
tortured, raped and executed. The Iranian regime has stepped up
its use of force as it faces upcoming parliamentary elections
in March 2012 and Presidential elections in 2013 that could
become occasions for public demonstrations. The regime is also
afflicted by deep internal divisions.
The Arab Spring has also heightened the regime's fears of
similar revolts in Iran. The Islamic Republic has depicted the
downfall of pro-American governments in Tunisia and Egypt as a
major setback to American power in the region. That has also
claimed that Iran's own revolution served as the Arab Spring's
source of inspiration. But the reality is quite different. Arab
populations are increasingly critical of Islamic Republic for
poor treatment of Iranians and for the support it provides
Basar al-Assad's regime as it commits mass violence against the
Syrian people.
More importantly, the Iranian regime remains vulnerable to
the very same forces that have led to the toppling of Arab
dictatorships. Although the regime may have been successful in
silencing the Green Movement's leadership, it has not been able
to crush Iranian aspirations for freer and more democratic
system of government.
Like many of their Arab neighbors, Iranians face a daily
indignity bred by an increasingly oppressive system. Women in
Iran are denied equal rights despite their educational,
economic, and civic accomplishments. Iranian youth languish in
frustration, bereft of the opportunities and freedoms afforded
to their peers across the world. Ethnic, religious, and sexual
minorities live in constant fear.
Conditions in Iran suggest that a Persian Spring is quite
possible. But Iranians have not so far followed the footprints
of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionaries. One reason for
this is that the Green Movement is divided and leaderless. But
the Green Movement faces an even more fundamental flaw. It
seeks to preserve the very same Islam Republic that oppresses
it. Regardless, the Green Movement's inherent weaknesses have
not given way to the total suppression of the democracy
movement in Iran. The Iranians have increasingly engaged in
acts of civil disobedience independently of the Green Movement
and its leadership. They need moral support more than ever
before.
The intense U.S. focus on the Iranian nuclear program
convinced many Iranian democracy activists that the United
States is solely concerned with the security interest in their
region rather than the plight of ordinary Iranians.
I would assert that a more balanced U.S. policy, with a
greater emphasis on the regime's human rights abuses, could
counter negative Iranian perceptions of U.S policies and
intentions.
The United States has recently begun a shift in this
direction by supporting the establishment of a U.N. human
rights monitor for Iran. In addition, the United States has
sanctioned higher-ranking Iranian security officials for their
involvement in human rights abuses. However, additional steps
should be taken. U.S. officials should denounce the regime's
abuses more vigorously and more often. Stronger condemnations
from senior U.S. officials, including President Obama,
Secretary of State Clinton, will be reviewed by Iranian
democracy activists as a sign of encouragement.
In tandem they naturally should sanction additional members
of the Iranian security services, especially top-ranking and
mid-ranking members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
and the Basij paramilitary forces.
Finally, the United States should also strongly question
the legitimacy of Iran's upcoming parliamentary and
Presidential elections. The 2009 Presidential election, which
remains in dispute, effectively taints the results of future
elections. The Islamic Republic has historically depicted
elections in Iran as sign that it is a democracy and is
therefore particularly vulnerable to internal and external
accusations of legitimacy.
The Iranian regime faces great challenges today. Its
survival as a cohesive and functioning system is hardly
guaranteed. The United States can demonstrate that it is on the
side of Iranian democrats who may rule Iran one day.
Again, I thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to
testify before you today and I look forward to taking your
questions.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, we appreciate it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nader follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Mr. Badran, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. TONY BADRAN, RESEARCH FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR
THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Badran. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ackerman and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me to today's hearing. I will keep my comments brief and ask
that my lengthier statement be part of the record.
We have reached a critical moment in the Syrian revolution.
Seven months after it erupted, the Syrian protest movement has
shown remarkable resilience and bravery. There are now
questions as to whether peaceful protest will be enough to
dislodge Bashar al-Assad as his regime's brutal repression
persists and pressure to arm the revolution intensifies.
Since President Obama's August 22nd statement calling on
Assad to step down, there has been little high-level movement
on Syria. The President has publicly shown little personal
investment in the Syrian uprising. His remarks at the U.N.
yesterday were the first he has made publicly in months. The
administration deserves credit for slapping a series of
sanctions on the Syrian regime. However, it is unclear whether
new ideas and contingency plans are being developed. Given the
strategic importance of the Syrian revolution and its impact on
Iranian influence in the region, U.S. leadership is critical.
Though they have had some impact, sanctions cannot
substitute for an integrated American policy guided by clear
strategic goal. That goal can only be Assad's departure and
breaking up the Iranian alliance system. At the outset, the
Obama administration adopted a hands-off approach to the Syrian
revolution. One reason was deference to Turkey. Reticent to
take the lead, the administration effectively subcontracted the
policy to the Turks, who for months urged President Obama not
to call on Assad to step down.
To its credit, the administration finally broke with Turkey
and endorsed the policy of regime change in Syria. It has not,
however, pressed Ankara to follow suit. Nor has the
administration convinced Turkey to take punitive measures
against Assad. In the past 2 days the Turks have said that they
would be discussing sanctions with the State Department. What
specific measures they will adopt or when they will do so
remains to be seen.
The administration has recently done a commendable job in
working with the European allies to increase the heat on the
Syrian regimes, but has not done the same with regional allies
such as Jordan and Iraq. The Syrian Central Bank recently
executed a number of cash transfers in Jordan designed to help
evade future sanctions and potential asset freezes. The Syrians
have also turned to the Iraqis to secure cheap oil. Convincing
our Jordanian allies to freeze such accounts and dissuading
Iraq from extending a helping hand to Assad are but two options
the administration could pursue.
The New York Times reported on Monday that the
administration remains apprehensive about appearing to try to
``orchestrate the outcome in Syria.'' The absence of U.S.
Leadership opens the door for regional middle-range powers to
vie for position and advance their own agendas which could come
into conflict with U.S. Interests.
Washington should be quarterbacking the transition and
directing the actions of players like Turkey and Qatar. Qatar,
for instance, has recently advanced its own political
initiative to end the crisis in Syria, but it had to run this
initiative with the Iranians and assure them that their
interests in Syria's ``security doctrine,'' meaning its support
for resistance movements that Iranian supports will be insured.
Without U.S. leadership, Iranian will fill the role.
The administration has been working toward a peaceful
transition to democracy, mainly relying on tools such as
sanctions, while urging the opposition to unite around a
platform that all Syrians could endorse. But the mechanism for
this transition has not been properly articulated. The
administration's assessment now is that the current stalemate
could last for a while, increasing the likelihood of violent
conflict.
The strategic stakes high, the Iranians note this is a war
for their position in the eastern Mediterranean. The Obama
administration needs to frame the Syrian situation in such
strategic terms and to make it a priority in its regional
agenda.
Mr. Chairman, the strategic calculus is simple. An outcome
other than Assad's ouster would be a blow to U.S. Interests and
a boost to Iran. The administration should continue with hard
economic pressure. Specifically, it should pressure regional
allies to impose sanctions. It should also consider targeting
banks in the region used by the regime to circumvent sanctions.
Moreover, the ban on investment in Syria should be expanded to
include foreign companies. Finally, as the probability of an
armed conflagration in Syria increases, the administration
needs contingency plans. Deferring such difficult decisions by
subcontracting policy to regional players is likely to fail
again. The U.S. has to take the lead.
Mr. Chairman, I will conclude. Ensuring the end of the
Assad regime in Syria must be viewed as an opportunity to break
the Iranian alliance system, which will do a great deal to
advance the interests of the United States and its allies in
the region.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify here
today.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Badran follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. And our final witness here this afternoon will
be Mr. Alterman, and you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JON B. ALTERMAN, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW
OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Alterman. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman and
distinguished members of the committee. Syria and Iran have a
big problem. On the one hand they have crafted strategies that
cast themselves as the voice of the common man in the Middle
East, standing up against Western oppression and protecting
Palestinians. On the other, they are emerging as oppressors of
their own people, cynical authoritarian holdouts in a world
increasingly inspired by popular protests against oppressors.
Now the Middle East is changing. The caricatures they drew
of other regional leaders are dissolving, as those leaders
either lead efforts toward reform or are swept away by a tide
of protests. Meanwhile, the leaderships of Syria and Iran
themselves have come to typify a rotten status quo that
manipulates public emotions but does not serve them.
Shifting circumstances in the Middle East begged the
question of what the United States should do about it. There is
an understandable instinct to revel in hostile countries'
difficulties, to capitalize on their weaknesses, and to exploit
their contradictions. Few in these populations would mourn the
fall of their governments, and the United States should do
nothing to prop them up.
At the same time, the greatest favor the United States
could do for these regimes is to somehow make their problems
into a confrontation with the United States rather than ones
that arise out of the internal contradictions of these
countries' own governance. An ability to concentrate attention
on the United States and a foreign power would be a lifeline to
these governments, shifting the focus from their own repression
and allowing them to sound nationalist themes and boost their
own popular support. An overt U.S. Embrace of opposition groups
would certainly lead to accusations that these groups are
agents of the United States or that their success somehow
serves Israel's interests, thereby reducing their influence and
their credibility.
To be clear the United States should not remain passive or
mute in the face of sustained repression; our history and our
values call for us to do more. Yet no government looks
anxiously at finely honed U.S. Statements when its very
survival is at risk, nor do protesters look to Washington for a
sign when deciding whether or not to risk their lives in the
street. Ultimately it is not about us; it is about them, and we
do a disservice to them when we act as if it is all about us.
Instead we need to do what we do in the company of other
governments, especially from the Middle East, which are
distressed by events in Syria and Iran and have sounded the
alarm.
The key strategic asset that these governments have to
nurture is their legitimacy. Regional voices have far more
credibility with a targeted population than governments halfway
around the world. This is not abdicating leadership nor leading
from behind; rather, it is a quiet and confident leadership
that arises from the understanding that these governments'
repression stripped them of their legitimacy, and that in
today's world it is increasingly hard to maintain control
merely through repression.
None of this is to say that anti-Americanism or anti-Israel
sentiment in the Middle East is about to go away. What we have
seen in Egypt and elsewhere is an important indicator that many
of these trends will be with us for some time. But it does
signal trouble for the particularly murderous and vociferous
forms of anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment that these
governments have tried to nurture through proxies in the Levant
and elsewhere. I would be the last to forecast the date and
manner of the change of government in Syria and Iran.
The Government of Egypt which was a more robust government
than either Syria or Iran fell in a mere 18 days, but
dislodging Muammar Qadhafi took 6 months and considerable NATO
airpower.
Even so, these systems are increasing frayed. Regional
trends are clearly moving against them and the demands of their
own populations are rising. The contradictions of their rule
are apparent, and protestations in favor of the oppressed ring
increasingly hollow as it becomes apparent that they oppress
their own people.
A dictum of politics is if your opponent is shooting
himself, don't stop him. We would do ourselves a disservice if
we threw all the instruments of a national power into hastening
the demise of these regimes. Such an effort would be more
likely to have the opposite affect. Because we have been so
appalled by the actions of these regimes over the last several
decades, we have only very few ties with them and there is
little else of value to them that we can jeopardize on our own.
Our instinct is surely to trumpet our disapproval. Our
interests require a different strategy, however. The quiet and
difficult work of building broad coalitions is likely to yield
much better results than noisy condemnations that can be easily
tuned out. There is little we can achieve immediately but much
we must accomplish in the longer term.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Alterman.
[The statement Mr. Alterman follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. I would like to thank all five of the witnesses
here this afternoon for what I felt were excellent statements
from each and every one of you. We appreciate that. Your full
statements will be made a part of the public record, without
objection.
I also note the presence now of the distinguished gentleman
from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. Connolly, this afternoon
as well.
Now we are going to begin our 5-minute questioning and I
will start with myself, and we will also hold ourselves to the
same 5 minutes that we held you all to. We may go to a second
round depending on votes on the floor, which could happen at
any time.
Mr. Nader, I will begin with you if I can. In your
testimony you note that ``The Islamic Republican has portrayed
U.S. And international policies on the Iranian nuclear program
as part of an effort to deny Iran both advanced technology and
its perceived place among the world's great nations. Thus, U.S.
opposition to the Iranian nuclear program, while necessary
given the threats posted by a potential Iranian nuclear weapons
capability, has also had the effect of strengthening the regime
among its core supporters.''
Mr. Khalaji, you also I believe raised a similar point,
noting that it is very important that we convey to the people
of Iran ``that the Iranian Government organizations primarily
involved in human rights abuses are the same organizations that
run the military and the nuclear program.''
The concern you both raise that the American policy toward
the nuclear program could inherently weaken our credibility
with Iranian people is a real and legitimate concern. Both
issues, however, are central to U.S. interests, and neither can
nor should be abandoned at the expense of the other.
Can you and anyone else who is interested suggest how we
can strike a balance between these two priorities? How can we
best manage this tension? And I would like to hear from both of
you if we could, Mr. Nader.
Mr. Nader. Thank you. I do think there has been for obvious
and necessary reasons a focus on the nuclear program. It
presents a fundamental challenge to U.S. and allied interests
in the Middle East. However, the Islamic Republic has used this
issue to portray the U.S. policy toward the nuclear program as
part of an effort against the Iranian people, against Iran's
perceived rightful place in the Middle East.
And I do think that recently, as I suggested, there has
been a shift in terms of focusing on human rights, depicting
the regimes abuses. I think the United States needs to do more
of this in terms of striking a balance.
You mentioned the possibility of a grand bargain between
the United States and Iran. I do not think a grand bargain per
se is a possibility at this stage. I don't think we should give
up efforts of engagement with the Islamic Republic. It is a
valuable tactic in terms of the United States achieving its
objectives. I think Iran's total diplomatic isolation benefits
the regime actually, because it isolates the Iranian people.
But, again, I think engagement is increasingly an unsuccessful
strategy, if you will.
So highlighting human rights is very important. I do think
that the Islamic Republic is very unstable. It is not going to
escape the effects of the Arab Spring. To some extent, I do
think that the 2009 election in Iran influenced the Arab
populations. The Iranians have been influenced by Arab
populations in return, and the Islamic Republic is not going to
last forever.
We have the opportunity to slow down the Iranian nuclear
program through sanctions, through political pressure, and
other means. Various U.S. assessments have shown that an
Iranian nuclear weapons capability is not eminent.
So if we come out on the side of the Iranian people and the
side of Iranian democrats and strike a balance in a U.S.
policy, we could achieve our objectives in a more efficient
manner.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Mr. Khalaji.
Mr. Khalaji. It has been 32 years that Iranian Government
tries to portray the United States as the main enemy of the
Iranian people rather than an enemy of the Iranian regime's
policy. So it is very important to strengthen public diplomacy
for the Iranian people.
Since we don't have a diplomatic relationship with Iran and
we don't have physical presence in Iran, it is very important
to capitalize on different sources of the public diplomacy we
have. Especially I think it is very important to raise the
budget for the Persian section of Voice of America and try to
make it more professional and convey our messages to Iranians.
It is very important to communicate with the Iranian people and
explain to them if we are critical of Iranian policy, why is
this criticism and why is the international community so
concerned about Iran's nuclear ambition.
Also we have to be more supportive to different groups of
human rights activists in the United States and in Europe who
work on Iran issue. It is very important that people-to-people
exchanges, it is important to facilitate visas for Iranian
citizens. You know that Iranians are among the few nations in
the world that cannot get visa for the United States very
easily. And when they get it, it is only one entry. The
initiation by the State Department to give some--to let Iranian
students to get multiple visa was very important, and it sends
a message to the Iranian people that United States is a friend
with Iranians, and only we have problem with the government.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. My time has expired. I
would like to yield now 5 minutes to the gentleman, also from a
commonwealth, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I think four
of our States are commonwealths and two of them are represented
here today.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, I come from both of them. I was
born in Boston.
Mr. Chabot. There you go. Amazing. What do you have against
States anyway?
The gentleman from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mr.
Keating, is recognized.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Quickly I just want
to go back with Mr. Bedran just to clarify something, I'm not
sure. You used the term that the U.S. should direct Turkey in
terms of joining with us in our efforts in Syria and with Iran.
Could you describe the means by which we could do that or what
actions we could take in that regard?
Mr. Badran. Thank you. I did say that we should be
directing the actions of Turkey and Qatar in the sense as we
saw in August, as recently as early August, the Turks took an
initiative on their own to go to Syria to talk to Assad, extend
him a 2-week window with which to ostensibly change his
behavior, after we had already come out and said he has lost
his legitimacy and so on. So that kind of action undermined our
policy at the time.
What tools do we have? Obviously, quiet diplomacy among
allies is clearly the most effective, but also the Turks have
been asking the United States for a number of asks with regards
to their fight with the PKK, for instance. In Iraq, they have
asked for predator drones to be based in Turkey to use against
the PKK, and other intelligence cooperation.
So there are multiple avenues that we share with the Turks
that could be easily used to establish a mutual relationship in
that regard.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. This question to any of
panelists. One of the concerns, despite the despicable
treatment Syria has shown to the demonstrators, has been the
treatment and detainment of innocent journalists at the hands
of the Assad regime.
Can the United States do more to use its leverage to
protect foreign and domestic journalists on the ground, to help
make sure that there is free press--a freer press? Certainly
the second part of the question is, do you think the social
media can be helpful in that regard, too?
Mr. Badran. It would be great to be able to assist foreign
journalists in Syria were they able to go to Syria. The problem
is the regime has shut down the ability of the foreign
observers except the ones that it picks and chooses. They even
invited CNN reporters and others to come in, but they have very
severely curtailed their ability to move.
With regard to domestic journalists, they have definitely
born the brunt of the repression, those who have actually come
out. But what is interesting about the Syrian uprising is that
it has developed really remarkable creativity and other
creative methods to lay out its version of the events or the
facts of the brutality of the regime to the outside world,
using, as you mentioned, the social networks and YouTube and
Facebook and other such instruments. And that would be one of
the ways we could help them by establishing, say, WiFi zones in
neighboring countries that could extend their ability to
continue to do that in other secure communications so they
could continue to report.
Mr. Keating. Good point. Thank you.
Mr. Alterman. Mr. Keating, one of the things that I think
has been of increasing concern in the last several weeks is the
number of reports of Western countries who have sold equipment
and software to intelligence services in the Middle East, which
were then used to report--monitor all these groups. There was a
report recently about a British firm who sold equipment to the
Government of Egypt. Certainly with Libya, we have understood
the extent of the monitoring.
I am sure that an open hearing is not the place to discuss
it, but I certainly would hope that people in Congress would
think about what ways Congress has to the influence the ability
of authoritarian regimes to use these tools unmonitored.
Mr. Keating. The deep packet, technology.
Mr. Alterman. Absolutely.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. I don't think I have much time for
response, but just the apparent contradiction with the Arab
lead, where they joined in a multilateral action in Libya, but
their inability to act here.
Any thoughts on how that could be encouraged at all or if
that is at all in the offing?
Mr. Alterman. I think it is much harder because Muammar
Qadhafi had always walked away from his Arabism, only to come
back. Bashar al-Assad has always tried to wrap himself in his
Arabism.
With that being said, I think we have seen a number of
indicators in the last several months. Certainly the Gulf
States, Saudis, and others have grown increasingly alarmed at
the direction that Bashar al-Assad has taken. I think you are
not going to see the same repudiation that you saw of Muammar
Qadhafi, because in many ways it followed many episodes of
repudiation by Qadhafi himself, but certainly there are
opportunities to get more solidarity on a number of issues from
the Arab league that I think we should actively pursue.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Thank you. The gentleman's
time has expired. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to ask all of you a simple question--I know it
is not a simple analysis--and then I want to talk about Iran. A
simple question rating high, medium, low, the probability of
regime change in Syria given the events going on. Mr. Singh,
why don't we start with you?
Mr. Alterman. What time frame, Mr. Connolly?
Mr. Connolly. You can pick one. Let's say in the next 3 to
6 months. But if you want to say a year, I will need a year,
that is fine too. Mr. Singh.
Mr. Singh. I would say medium. That sounds like a safe
response. What we haven't seen so far--we have seen great
courage by the protestors coming out, facing the bullets every
day, which is a remarkable decision to make. I think we need to
recognize that. What we haven't seen yet is what we saw very
quickly in Libya, which are sort of the high-level defections,
the real cracks forming in the regime, and that is frankly what
I would look for.
My hope is that it falls tomorrow, but I think so far it
has proven that it is able to hold itself together so far. And
there are lots of reasons for that which I won't go into right
now.
Mr. Connolly. Okay. Mr. Khalaji.
Mr. Khalaji. I am not an expert on Syria.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you very much. Mr. Nader?
Mr. Nader. I would like to pass on that, please.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Badran.
Mr. Badran. I believe that the Assad regime will fall. The
assessment now of the United States administration is that he
has a good chance of hanging on for a while, although he has no
ability to come back from the trajectory he is on. It all
depends on the course that the revolution is going to take. For
now it has been peaceful.
There is a lot of, you know, agitation now and questions
whether it should be armed, moving forward. And this is the
thing that I raised, the issue that I raised with regard to the
mechanism that the administration has in mind for how to move
forward. As Mike said, basically now the hope is that there
will be cracks in the regime, a unified opposition that could
rally support from members within the regime and the elites,
and hopefully somehow that will translate into a transition.
Unfortunately, there is a good possibility that it doesn't work
out that way and that it goes into a much more violent course,
in which case we will see regional players involved.
Mr. Connolly. But in any case, your bet is we will see
regime change?
Mr. Badran. I do believe so.
Mr. Connolly. Okay. Mr. Alterman.
Mr. Alterman. I think the odds are low in the near term. I
think they get up as we move out the timeline. Because I know
you well enough from our working together 25 years ago, you
like the creative stuff. I think at some point--see, it is
true. At some point it is not unlikely there is a military coup
in Syria. I don't know what precipitates it. I don't know what
part of the military does what. I don't know if there is any
external involvement in any of this. But I would say it is very
likely sometime over the next 5 years that there is a different
government in Syria, probably over the next 2.
Whether they are much different in their orientation is
unclear, because it seems to me that a huge number of the
external actors, including the Israelis, would actually be okay
with a government that is not terribly, terribly different from
the government of Bashar Al-Assad in its orientation toward
regional foreign policy.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. And if I may, Dr. Alterman, start
with you on this one. What are we to make of the apparent
friction, if not break, between the ruling Muslim clerics in
Tehran and President Ahmadinejad? After all, he began as their
guy. And we see all kinds of political statements and actions
seem to rein him in and maybe even isolate and embarrass him.
Or is that just wishful thinking by a western press?
Mr. Alterman. I know my friends well enough that I am just
going to talk very briefly, and Mehdi and others can talk
eloquently about this. It seems to me two things are going on.
One is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad isn't who he was when he first came
up. They feel he has gotten too big for his britches, that he
doesn't understand what his role is, and there is an effort to
provide a comeuppance.
It seems to me as well, there is a genuine possibility of a
split in the clerical establishment in Iran, that it is not
just Ahmadinejad against the clerics, to some extent it is
cleric against cleric. And again, if you want to be creative
and look forward, it seems to me the most likely cause of a
change of Government in Iran is some sort of split in the
clerical establishment which takes down the legitimacy of this
regime which he has been clinging to since the Islamic
Revolution.
Mr. Connolly. Can I just interrupt you 1 second? I really
think this is an important question, Mr. Chairman, but I do not
wish to impose on the chair. Would he indulge the panel to be
able to answer this question?
Mr. Chabot. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair. Thank you, Mr. Nader.
Mr. Nader. I do think that the divisions between
Ahmadinejad, President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader are
very serious and indicate the deep trouble the Islamic Republic
is in today. President Ahmadinejad is challenging the Supreme
Leader's authority. And the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei,
has been challenged from the left and the right. And this shows
that the Islamic Republic as a system lacks legitimacy.
When you have somebody like Ahmadinejad, who owes his
Presidency to a large degree to Khamenei, challenge him in this
fashion shows that even figures like Ahmadinejad realize that
the system is in trouble. And I think this provides
opportunities for the United States. Not direct action
necessarily, but it shows that Iran, which is I think sometimes
portrayed as a more--as a stronger form of government than it
is, faces a very uncertain future.
Mr. Khalaji. I have a structuralist understanding of Iran
politics. I think that the fate of Mr. Ahmadinejad is not much
different than the fate of other Iranian Presidents. Even
Ayatollah Khamenei, when he was President in the first decade
of Islamic Republic, he had lots of problems with the Supreme
Leader at that time, and he was weakened by different
mechanisms implemented by the Supreme Leader.
All Iranian Presidents come to office with an ambitious
agenda, whether economic or political, reformist or hardliner,
but they leave the office very, very weak. And the story of Mr.
Khatami, the foreign former President, and the story of
Rafsanjani is repeating again this time. The hard core of power
in the Islamic Republic is the Supreme Leader. Supreme Leader
relies on Revolutionary Guard and armed forces, intelligence,
and judiciary. That would not change. And I think as long as
the Islamic Republic is in place, we would not see any major
political shift in Iran.
Mr. Singh. I will just say I am in large agreement with
Mehdi. I think that the Iranians in many ways are their own
worst enemy. I think that President Ahmadinejad is a good
example of that. He is his own worst enemy. He also has made
life very difficult for the Iranian regime in many ways.
I do think, though, that we tend to focus too much on
President Ahmadinejad. And it is worth looking underneath the
surface at what has actually happened inside the regime. Their
base of support inside Iran, inside Iranian elites, has
narrowed. It is a regime that now relies largely on simply the
hardliners and the IRGC and the broader security apparatus, and
you don't have the reformists and the traditional conservatives
inside the inner circle anymore. To me this is both dangerous
for the regime itself, because it suggests a regime that is
more brittle and has less support. It is also dangerous for the
world and for us, however, because that element which still
supports the Supreme Leader is the most dangerous element, the
most militarized element.
Mr. Chabot. Did you get everybody, Gerry?
Mr. Connolly. Pardon me?
Mr. Chabot. Did you get everybody?
Mr. Badran. I am going to pass.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for your indulgence.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We will go to a second
round. And I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Let me begin, if I could give you maybe a minute, minute
and a half, Mr. Singh, I cut you off right at the beginning,
and you were getting ready to say here is what the United
States can do to meet these challenges, one, two, three, or
whatever. Now I would like to hear what we can do to meet those
challenges--and if you can recall what the challenges were.
Mr. Singh. There are so many. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
will say I want to say something in response to your earlier
question about balance. And I think that balance is the wrong
way for us to think about our policy with respect to Iran. I
don't think it is a matter of there is a spectrum between the
nuclear issue on the one hand and human rights on the other. I
think we need to be fully focused on both issues.
You know, the goal is not to get, frankly, the Iranian
opposition on board with our agenda. They, frankly, will not
have the same view we have on the nuclear issue. And frankly,
Mir Hossein Mousavi, the opposition leader, probably scored
some political points by taking a position which was against
ours on the nuclear issue.
Our goal really is to just help them do what they want do
anyway, which is to topple their regime, frankly, which is to
change the nature of the system of government in Iran. And I
think we can do both.
My points about sort of what should we be doing with Iran
and Syria are fourfold. And I will just go through them
extremely quickly so my colleagues have a chance to talk.
First, I do think we need to use our bully pulpit, the
White House, the State Department, Security Council, to shed
greater light on what is happening inside these countries. You
know, I take a slightly different view from some of my fellow
panelists here that sanctions are great, but they are--frankly,
it is very hard to reach many of these individuals through
sanctions. And I think we need to be frequently making
statements about individual cases, individual situations of
human rights activists and dissidents inside these countries.
Second, I think we need to try to break the control that
these regimes exercise over information. And this gets to a
couple of the questions which have been asked. And that has
both offensive and defensive components. I think we need to
push back on the propaganda effort of these regimes, which is
now extremely aggressive. And we need to deny them space on
satellites and so forth to the extent we can. But we also need
to give people inside these countries, actors inside these
countries, the tools they need. Frankly, the Obama
administration has done some good things on that front, and
that deserves more support and more funding to the extent it is
available.
Third, I think we need to deny the Iranian and Syrian
regimes the tools of repression to the extent we can. And here
I agree with Dr. Alterman about trying to deny them
technologies, and trying to provide technologies to the
activists.
And then fourth, very simply, I think we need to deny these
regimes international cover. They seek support outside when
they can't find it inside or in their region. So they seek
support at the United Nations, in multilateral institutions,
with proxies and allies and so forth, and we need to be very
aggressive all over the world in pushing back on that. Thank
you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. I guess there is about
enough time to get one more question in here. Mr. Badran, in
your testimony you note that, and I will quote this, ``In sharp
contrast with its handling of the Egyptian revolution, the
Obama administration appeared very reticent to take the lead on
Syria. Instead, it effectively subcontracted the policy to
Turkey, under the belief that Ankara had the most influence
with Assad, and could persuade him to respond to the
protesters' demands. It was a critical mistake to cede
leadership to the Turks, just as it was in error to assume they
shared our interests.''
Could you expand on that a bit? How do our interests and
those of the Turks, especially vis--vis Syria, diverge? And
what has been the consequence of this retreat of American
leadership? And I would invite your response, and maybe yours,
Mr. Singh, as well on this, if you would like to comment on
that.
Mr. Badran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that the
assessment by the administration on Turkey's--the extent of
Turkey's influence and leverage, and also the misassessment of
their vulnerability with regard to Syria, was at the basis of
their ceding the leadership to Turkey. Meaning they thought
that because Turkey had established such a close relationship
because of its engagement with Syria--I mean Syria was really
at the heart of Turkey's quote-unquote deg.``no
problems with neighbors,'' or zero problems with neighbors
policy. And Prime Minister Erdogan and Assad developed even a
close friendship. So it was assumed that somehow Turkey could
persuade him to change course and that its soft-power
quote-unquote deg.``influence'' would be able to make
him reform and so on. And the administration went with that for
a while.
It was a critical error from the beginning. On the one
hand, and as we saw, Turkish soft power really was completely
irrelevant in this case. And for the last 6, 7 months now, we
have not yet seen a single actual concrete punitive measure by
Turkey against Assad, economic or military or otherwise until
now. Now we are starting to hear that Turkey may consider doing
sanctions and so on. So that was the error, I believe.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Singh, would you comment very briefly on that, because
my time is exhausted at this point, so like 30 seconds.
Mr. Singh. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I think that Turkey is
simply not in a position to assemble or lead any kind of
regional or international coalition on Syria. That is something
the United States is going to have to do. And we are going to
have to be at the front of that effort. And there is a trade-
off here between trying to seek regional and international
cover, and being willing to stick our necks out and provide
leadership to this effort. And I think we have to do the
latter.
You know, to the member's point about waiting for the Arab
League, we would be waiting for the Arab League for a very long
time to provide us cover on Syria. And I think the same is true
with Turkey. So U.S. leadership is really needed here.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. My time has expired. And I
would go back to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, if
he would like an additional 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair. Did the chair want to
finish his line?
Mr. Chabot. No, I am good.
Mr. Connolly. All right. Let me ask, what should we read in
recent statements and actions by the Turkish Government? And
let me preface it by saying that, you know, we are elected
officials, sometimes called politicians. We surely can
understand domestic political pressures and why somebody says
or does something that may not be for international
consumption. Nonetheless, we are big boys and girls, and we
understand that our words can have consequences nonetheless.
What should we read in recent Turkish actions and words?
And how serious do you think the breach between Turkey and
Israel is? I happen to believe a serious breach between the two
is very harmful to Middle East peace prospects, and that the
relationship is critical for the United States and for the two
partners. Dr. Alterman, begin with you.
Mr. Alterman. Thank you. I think Turkey is trying to
reposition itself. Turkey had been a fellow non-Arab power in
the Middle East, trying to get into Europe, and saw itself as a
natural ally of Israel. As Turkey has been rethinking its role
in the Middle East, its relationship to the Middle East, its
relationship to Europe, I think it has decided to rethink its
relationship to Israel, among others, not because it wants to
cut its relationship with Israel, but it wants to be less
close. I think what we have seen in many ways is an alignment
less toward Israel, more toward Saudi Arabia, which in the case
of Syria and Iran is not all against U.S. interests. Because
having Turkey, a country on the border of Syria and Iran, with
trade with Syria and Iran, a lot they can hold hostage to Syria
and Iran, creates an opportunity to have tremendous influence
on the calculations of these governments as they think about
the relationship to the outside world.
I don't think Turkey is a lost cause. I think Turkey is
repositioning itself. I think Turkey is perceived, in the
absence of a strong government in Iraq, in the absence of a
strong government in Egypt, is perceived as the only potential
Middle Eastern power which can really help the Saudis, in
expanding power in the Middle East. I think we have to guide
the development of Turkey's outreach into the Middle East,
partly looking at how its relationship with Saudi Arabia
develops, partly how its relationship to Egypt develops. I
think Turkey is going to be a growing factor in the Middle East
over the next decade or so. And we are well to try to engage
with that in a constructive way rather than getting into a
name-calling exercise that tries to have them respond to our
diktats. At a time when we had much more power in the Middle
East, we tried to have our troops go into Iraq from Turkey, and
we were unsuccessful.
Mr. Badran. Thank you. I think something that Mr. Singh
said earlier is very pertinent here, that Turkey is a regional
power, but Turkey is not a great power. But nevertheless,
Turkey has self-conceptions of itself as a great power. And the
problem that Syria exposed with regard to Turkish foreign
policy was how fragile its central doctrine of zero problems
with neighbors was.
If you now survey Turkey's relationships with Cyprus, with
Greece, with Israel, with Syria, and to a certain extent
uneasiness with Iran, you see that you have a set of failures,
or definitely much more failure than success in all of them. So
a lot of this is due to Turkish domestic constraints, the
civil-military relationship, the very deep structural identity
issue that Turkey has, is trying to redefine itself,
specifically with regard to its relationship with its Kurdish
minority.
And as now Erdogan and the AKP government lead a campaign
against the PKK and Iraq, for instance, this is coming to the
fore, exposing the rifts inside Turkish society. So I think to
make Turkey into a regional pillar has to be very delicately
handled, because it is a very vulnerable regional ally.
Mr. Nader. Turkey increasingly sees itself as a major
regional power. And especially under the Justice and
Development Party, Turkish foreign policy has changed quite a
bit in response to domestic issues. But I do think that Turkey
and its ruling party now have this vision of perhaps a new
Ottoman policy, that Turkey can have influence in the Middle
East in areas where it ruled before, whether in Syria and Iraq,
or in Libya.
I do think that sometimes our interests converge, and
sometimes they diverge. Turkey is a NATO ally, but at the same
time it has used hostility toward Israel in the region to gain
popularity among the Arab populations. In some ways, it may be
even trying to take Iran's place as one of the key players on
the Israeli-Palestinian issue. At the same time, as it
challenges Iran, it has strengthening relations with Iran,
economic relations, security relations. So this shows in a lot
of ways that, although Turkey is a U.S. ally, its path may
diverge from our interests in the future.
Mr. Chabot. Okay.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. Without
objection, members will have 5 days to submit statements or
questions for the record, or make revisions thereof.
I want to thank this very distinguished panel for their
statements this afternoon and answering the questions. We
appreciate it. You have given us, I think, tremendous insight.
And if there is no further business to come before the
committee, we are adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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