[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-55]
TOTAL FORCE READINESS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 26, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
JOE HECK, Nevada SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
CHRIS GIBSON, New York GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BILL OWENS, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey TIM RYAN, Ohio
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
Ryan Crumpler, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Christine Wagner, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, July 26, 2011, Total Force Readiness.................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, July 26, 2011........................................... 33
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011
TOTAL FORCE READINESS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 3
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 2
WITNESSES
Breedlove, Gen. Philip M., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air
Force.......................................................... 9
Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army..... 5
Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S.
Marine Corps................................................... 8
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
U.S. Navy...................................................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Breedlove, Gen. Philip M..................................... 80
Chiarelli, GEN Peter W....................................... 39
Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr.................................. 67
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 37
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W..................................... 54
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 93
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 97
Mr. LoBiondo................................................. 107
Mr. Loebsack................................................. 109
Mr. Owens.................................................... 110
TOTAL FORCE READINESS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 26, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m. in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Forbes. I want to welcome all of our members and our
very distinguished panel of experts to today's hearing focused
on total force readiness and how we resource, train, and equip
our military for the challenges that they face.
No one will dispute that we have the most capable and
professional military in the world. However, I worry about our
state of readiness, not for mastheads on the horizon or columns
of tanks rolling towards us, but for the looming defense budget
cuts many in this Congress seem willing to inflict on our
military.
Two weeks ago, this subcommittee heard about the challenges
the Navy has faced in preserving and enhancing its readiness
and current capabilities. I suspect we will hear today how our
other military services face many of the same challenges and
how they all would be negatively impacted by hundreds of
billions of dollars in budget cuts.
As we consider our deficit, Federal spending, and the
impact on our defense budget, I believe we should be asking
four questions: First, what are the threats we face? Second,
what resources do our combatant commanders need to protect us
against those threats? Third, what do these resources cost and
how can we obtain them as efficiently as possible? And fourth,
what can we afford and what are the risks to our Nation if we
do not supply those resources?
I believe many in Congress and the White House have been
asking only the portion of question four that asks how much
they want to spend, and have been ignoring the other questions
almost entirely.
However, in January, Chairman Mullen was quoted as saying
that any additional budget cuts can almost only be met through
substantial reductions in force structure, which goes against
the national security requirements which we see in the world we
are living in.
Similarly, just before his departure in June, Secretary
Gates warned that no further reductions should be considered
without an honest and thorough assessment of the risk involved,
to include the missions we may need to shed in the future.
I realize that our witnesses today are in a difficult
position. I would simply ask: Help us help you. I hope our
frank discussion during this hearing can help us all better
understand the seriousness of the challenges we face and those
still ahead. We must not let our legacy be one of overseeing
the slow dismantlement of the greatest military on the Earth.
We all have a responsibility to ensure our men and women in
uniform are given all the tools necessary for the job we have
asked them to do, and I look forward to hearing from our very
distinguished witnesses.
Today, we have with us General Peter W. Chiarelli, the Vice
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. We are proud of his service to
our country and we are delighted to have him with us today.
We also have Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations for the U.S. Navy. Admiral, we are proud of
your service, and we are also proud of the work we know you
will do as the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] of the Navy. And
we know they made a good selection there.
Equally important today is the presence of General Joseph
F. Dunford, Jr., the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
for the U.S. Marine Corps. General, we know you have been at
the tip of the spear in all the fights, and we just are honored
to have you with your expertise and experience coming before
our committee today.
And finally, General Philip M. Breedlove, the Vice Chief of
Staff of the U.S. Air Force. General, you have done a great
job, and we are just honored to have your presence with us
today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Forbes. I now turn to my dear friend and chairman of
the full committee, Buck McKeon, for any comments he would like
to make. Mr. Chairman, we are delighted to have you join us for
a portion of this hearing and would love to hear any comments
that you might have.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am just happy to be here. I just got to shake hands with
the chiefs down there and said I feel like I am in--maybe I
won't repeat it. I am honored to be in your presence is what I
said, and I am really looking forward to this hearing. I am
looking forward to your testimonies.
This is something that we have really been focused on. I
think the four questions that the chairman outlined are really
important. I had a chance over the weekend to talk to each of
the chiefs because I am concerned with the cuts that have been
escalating so rapidly over the last year. It is hard to keep up
with where we are, and I just wanted to know from them how
far--how much further they can go, because I was expecting to
hear some requests from our leadership. Fortunately, they
didn't ask for any more cuts in the solution that they are
working on to solve our problem right now.
But thank you. I am glad to be with you and look forward to
your testimony.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Chairman McKeon.
I would now like to turn to my fellow co-chair of the China
Caucus and also the ranking member of this committee, Madeleine
Bordallo from Guam--and she just got back from Guam--for any
remarks she may have. Ms. Bordallo.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Today we continue our discussion on the overall readiness
of our military forces, and we will hear from all of the Vice
Chiefs of our military services. We thank them for their
service to our Nation and for appearing before our subcommittee
today.
Over the past decade, we have asked our All-Volunteer Force
to sustain continuous combat operations, and they have done so
remarkably well. Our men and women who deploy in support of
operations worldwide are some of the best trained and the best
equipped service members that this Nation has ever seen.
I think many of us on this subcommittee can remember back
several years ago when service members frequently deployed
without proper training or necessary equipment. Those were the
days when readiness was at its lowest state, but this committee
took appropriate steps to correct that problem, and now the
readiness rates for our deploying units are consistently high.
Some today are inclined to believe that readiness continues
to decline across the services, but to me that is a false
assumption. Reset efforts and a decrease in operations tempo
and incrementally improved the services' readiness to support
not only ongoing contingency operations but also to prepare for
future challenges. In fact, this year was the first year that
the Army was able to conduct full-spectrum operations training
since the beginning of the war in Iraq, because operational
tempo has decreased and dwell time has increased. Given this
positive development, I hope that our witnesses will address
what we need to do to stay on that track.
It should come as no surprise, however, that we have
readiness challenges, especially among our non-deployed forces.
For one, Congress has not made things easy by passing defense
authorization bills at the 11th hour and providing months and
months of continuing resolutions. But the greater issue causing
readiness challenges is being engaged in two wars for more than
a decade. As long as we remain engaged in ground combat in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, our ability to respond to another event
or contingency, should they arise, will be negatively affected.
This fact concerns me greatly as the elected Representative
of Guam, which sits in the strategically important region of
the Western Pacific, where threats from North Korea and China
remain a constant threat. Case in point: How would we have
responded in Korea if the Cheonan incident had been followed by
further provocations from North Korea?
Finally, like our subcommittee chairman, I am concerned
about possible further cuts to the defense budget. These cuts
will place additional pressures on each service's budget at a
time when combat operations continue to stress and stretch our
forces. I hope that our witnesses today can discuss the
potential impacts that further budget cuts would have on their
ability to perform their missions and meet theater commanders'
validated requirements, as well as their ability to posture for
the future.
The only way to restore readiness across the board is to
decrease the demand for forces, but we should not make the
mistake of not making necessary investments to better posture
our forces to respond to emerging threats.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. And again, I feel that this
hearing is very, very important and continues this committee's
long history of oversight of the readiness of our military.
Having the right mix of manpower, a total force ready to be
employed and engaged as an instrument of national security, is
essential to preserving our way of life. And I look forward to
the testimony from our witnesses this afternoon and their
responses to our questions.
And I thank you and yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Madeleine.
As we discussed prior to the hearing, I would like to
dispense with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and depart
from regular order so that members may ask questions during the
course of the discussion. I think this will provide a
roundtable-type forum and will enhance the dialogue of these
very important issues. We would like to proceed with standard
order for members to address the witnesses; however, if any
member has a question pertinent to the matter being discussed
at the time, please seek acknowledgment and wait to be
recognized by the chair.
We plan to keep questioning to the standard 5 minutes;
however, I don't want to curtail productive dialogue. So I
believe we can do this and still ensure each member has the
opportunity to get his or her questions asked. As we have
explained to each of our witnesses, that helps us to have a
better dialogue.
I think you will find that the expertise of the members of
this committee is quite vast, and we just want to get that
where they have that ability to ask those questions and make
sure that we are getting them answered, if we can.
If we get bogged down, the chair will ask members to hold
further discussion until the first round of questioning is
complete. Do any members have any questions about how we
propose to conduct the questioning?
If not, I ask unanimous consent that for the purposes of
this hearing we dispense with the 5-minute rule and proceed as
described. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Now, we look forward to our statements from our witnesses.
Gentlemen, I know that you have submitted prepared remarks that
we will be introducing for the record. We would love for each
of you to take a few minutes and tell us whatever you would
like to say. This is your opportunity to get before this
committee the importance of the readiness issues that you see.
General Chiarelli, since you happen to be sitting in that
seat, I take it you are going to be the first one up on deck
with your statement, and then we will proceed right on down the
line from there. General.
STATEMENT OF GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY
General Chiarelli. Chairman McKeon, Chairman Forbes,
Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the
committee, I want to thank you for allowing me to appear in
front of you today. As the chairman said, you have my written
statement and I look forward to questions and answers after my
opening comments.
These are challenging times. We have been at war for almost
a decade, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am very, very proud
of the job our soldiers, their families, and our Department of
the Army civilians have done during that almost decade of
conflict. To all this is added a serious fiscal crisis that our
country is going through.
Looking ahead, I think there are three main things that
we--from an Army standpoint, we must ensure. First is that we
must maintain into the future a force that is capable and as
ready as it is today. There is no going back. We must maintain
the edge we have gained over 10 years of conflict. We must
modernize that force so it is relevant for tomorrow, and the
Army has a very, very good modernization plan. And we must
design a force that is affordable, and that is my promise to
you.
Since World War II, we have been 100 percent correct in one
thing, and that is a failure to forecast the fights of the
future. We are in an era of persistent conflict, and I would
argue if we get out of that conflict we will go into an era of
persistent engagement in order to avert conflict. Whatever
reductions are made carry risk, and with reductions we will not
be able to do as much tomorrow as we are able to do today.
Everything we do should be aimed at reducing that risk.
And for the Army there are four points that I would like to
make:
The first is it is absolutely critical that the Army get
itself to a baseline BOG:DWELL [Boots on the Ground:Dwell] of 1
to 2. That means for the active component force, when deployed
for 12 months, we must get them to a baseline of 24 months at
home, going to an optimal BOG:DWELL 1 to 3. For the Reserve
components it should be 1 year mobilized, 5 years at home,
before we request them to go on a second mobilization. That is
absolutely essential for the work that I have been doing in
health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention. That
BOG:DWELL ratio is absolutely critical.
As you well know, the Army has a requirement for 22,000
soldiers that we call the temporary end strength account.
Temporary end strength was created to allow us to get off of
stop-loss and also to help us make up for the medically non-
deployable soldiers that we had in our units.
In addition to that, we have been asked to give up 27,000
soldiers in force structure in 2015 and 2016 based on some
assumptions. We have done the analysis of that drawdown to 520,
and our strong recommendation is that that be a gradual
drawdown, a drawdown of both force structure and the TESI
account, Temporary End Strength Increase, if required to do so.
That is absolutely essential if we are going to take care of
our soldiers and our families. And we would also argue that we
need to maintain a portion of that Temporary End Strength
Increase because of the fact we have over 13,000 soldiers in
the disability evaluation system after 10 years of conflict.
I promise you we will continue to do our part to find cost
savings, eliminate redundancies, and improve business
practices, and the capability portfolio review process that we
have embarked upon and the network integration exercises that
we are running at Fort Bliss are examples that I would be happy
to expand on during questions and answers.
The bottom line: While the current fiscal environment may
require changes or reductions to force structure, we must act
responsibly. We must ensure for the United States Army that
whatever we have is a balanced force. We have a tendency to
protect force structure because we are a people-oriented and -
focused force, not platform-oriented. But we have three dials
we have to turn here. We have to make sure that we have the
required dollars to train. We have to be able to equip our
force and the proper force structure. All those dials must be
moved at the same time so whatever force we have is a balanced
force, able to do the missions the country asks it to do.
I want to thank you for your continued and generous support
and demonstrated commitment to what I think we all believe is
the greatest Army in the world. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli can be found
in the Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General. Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Greenert. Chairman Forbes, Congresswoman Bordallo,
and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Readiness,
thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing
alongside the Assistant Commandant and my fellow service
chiefs.
I am honored to represent the men and women in Active Duty,
Reserve, and civilian who work each day to ensure that our Navy
is ready to perform the full range of capabilities necessary to
ensure the security of the Nation. On their behalf, I want to
express my appreciation and our appreciation for the work of
this committee in support of the sailors' service and the
committee's work to ensure that their welfare, the sailors'
welfare, and the welfare of their family is taken care of.
I also want to say that we in the Navy are pleased and
encouraged by the progress that Representative Giffords has
made. As the CNO mentioned when he addressed the full committee
in March, Representative Giffords is a Navy spouse and a member
of our family, the Navy family, and has been a friend of the
Navy and Marine Corps throughout her career. So our thoughts
and prayers and wishes for her speedy recovery remain with her
as she continues her journey to return, and we look forward to
her return to this committee.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask my written testimony be accepted
for the record.
Our Navy remains globally deployed. Fifty to 60 percent of
our ships are underway on any given day; 27,000 Navy people are
at sea or on the ground or engaged in directly supporting
combat operations in Central Command. We have naval forces
providing deterrence against North Korea; providing maritime
security and executing global maritime partnership initiatives
in Europe, South America, Africa, the Mideast and the Pacific;
providing humanitarian assistance disaster relief, as we have
in Haiti, Pakistan, and Japan over the last year.
The Sixth Fleet is supporting NATO power projection
operations in Libya, and our ballistic missile defense capable
surface ships provide theater ballistic missile defense in
Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Pacific. Also, the
Navy ballistic missile submarines provide the most survivable
element of our strategic deterrent triad. Now, all these
activities are directly aligned with our maritime strategy and
our six core capabilities that that strategy articulates.
Our sailors, your sailors, are doing a superb job in a
myriad of tasks, and the combatant commander positive feedback
that we get testifies to their performance. Our sailors
represent the foundation of our readiness.
Overall, Navy's readiness is acceptable, but as you have
seen in the quarterly readiness report we provided to the
Congress, there are indicators of a declining trend. I view
these indicators and the trend with concern. It is clear to me
that the Navy is under stress. This is reflected in a host of
indicators and resource areas.
Like our partner services, we have been engaged in combat
operations for 10 years while continuing to support other
theater and area of responsibility requirements. For example,
to best meet combatant commander needs for deployed Navy forces
and to simultaneously respond to emerging requirements, we have
increased deployments and we have increased deployed time. This
has resulted in reduced training time, a narrowing of pre-
deployment training for certain units for tailored and mission-
specific tasks. We had to reschedule or descope depot
maintenance periods, and we have had limited opportunities for
unit level training and maintenance, and it has dramatically
compelled us to more routinely exceed personnel op tempo
[Operations Tempo] guidelines.
Your Navy has been a rotational force for decades and
consequently we are used to what we call ``resetting in
stride'' between deployments. This principle has kept core Navy
readiness measures above minimum requirements, but the stress
on the force is real and it has been relentless.
I can't tell you for sure, Mr. Chairman, if we are at an
inflection point or a tipping point, but I don't see how we can
sustain this pace of operations indefinitely and meet the
readiness standards. If we try to do so, I think it will
consume the expected service life of our force structure
earlier than designed and planned and will face a cascading
increase in the cost to achieve the expected service life of
those ships. And reaching that expected service life is a
foundational element of our future ship inventory and,
accordingly, our shipbuilding plan.
Therefore, it is important for us to reestablish, in my
view, a sustainable level of operations consistent with force
structure and supportable by our fleet response plan.
Our responsibility is to provide a Navy ready today to do
today's mission. It is also our responsibility to be ready to
meet tomorrow's challenges. So, accordingly, the CNO strives to
carefully balance modernization and procurement with current
readiness requirements in developing our budget submission.
For example, we have taken steps in the 2012 budget request
to reduce our reliance on overseas contingency operation
funding, particularly in the operating accounts. However, we
remain dependent upon some level of OCO [Overseas Contingency
Operations] to fully meet today's baseline readiness
requirements. Our readiness would be dramatically impacted if
OCO's funding is further reduced or terminated without a
corresponding reduction in those operating requirements.
So, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Bordallo, and members of
the committee, you can be proud of the work of the men and
women serving your Navy. They get it done on behalf of the
combatant commanders around the world, and I appreciate the
opportunity to be with you today, and I look forward to the
discussion. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert can be found in
the Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral. General Dunford.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Dunford. Chairman McKeon, Chairman Forbes,
Congresswoman Bordallo, distinguished members of the committee,
thanks for the opportunity to join you here today. It is an
honor to represent your Marines.
I would like to begin by offering a few key observations
regarding our current and our future readiness. Today, of the
202,000 marines on Active Duty and the 39,000 in the selected
Marine Corps Reserve, 30,000 are forward deployed; 20,000 are
actually in Afghanistan. Due to the support of the Congress,
those forward-deployed forces are well-manned, trained, and
equipped in keeping with our Commandant's number one priority,
but our forward-deployed units have personnel and equipment
requirements that exceed standard allowances. The additional
equipment is due to the nature of the fight and the very
distributed of operations in Afghanistan. The additional
personnel are required to support staffs and trainers for
Afghan security forces.
We meet those additional requirements by pulling equipment
and personnel from home station. As a result, units at home
station continue to experience significant personnel and
equipment shortfalls. In fact, approximately two-thirds of our
units at home station are in a degraded readiness state.
Home station readiness is a particular concern for the
Nation's expeditionary force and readiness. The forces at home
station represent our capability to respond to unexpected
crises and contingencies. Last year, units at home station
responded to several unplanned requirements, including those in
Afghanistan, Libya, and Japan. Marines were also called to
reinforce embassies in Egypt, Bahrain, Guinea, and Kyrgyzstan.
In these cases, Marines had days, in some cases hours, to
respond.
We are reminded that crisis response is come as you are. If
the Marine Corps is asked to support another major contingency
at this time, we would respond, but home station shortfalls
would affect our ability to meet the timelines established by
the combatant commanders. Also, we are not currently meeting
the combatant commanders' demand for forward-deployed marines.
Even as we work to meet current requirements, we are
looking ahead. We have conducted an assessment of the future
security environment and of force structure review. Based on
our analysis, we plan for a force with the right capabilities
and capacities to provide the Nation with an expeditionary
force and readiness that meets the vision of the 82nd Congress.
Our intent is to reset our forces coming out of Afghanistan
and reconstitute an Active Force of 186,800 marines with 39,500
in the selected Marine Corps Reserve. That force will be manned
and equipped as a force in readiness and will be designed to be
forward deployed and engaged, and it will be prepared for a
wide range of crises and contingencies.
With your continued support, tomorrow's Marine Corps will
remain a force that is ready to respond to today's crisis, with
today's forces, today.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in
the Appendix on page 67.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General. General Breedlove.
STATEMENT OF GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Breedlove. Chairman McKeon, Chairman Forbes,
Ranking member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the
committee, it is my pleasure to be here today representing the
more than 690,000 Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian
airmen. Thank you for providing me the opportunity to update
you on the readiness of your United States Air Force. My intent
today is to address a few Air Force readiness trends and
highlight some of the challenges we are facing.
I am pleased to report that America's Air Force continues
to provide the Nation with unmatched global vigilance, reach,
and power as a part of this joint and coalition team. The Air
Force remains a mission-focused and prepared force, an
increasingly difficult task given 20 years of constant deployed
combat operations dating all the way back to Operation Desert
Storm.
Notably since 2003, we have seen a slow but steady decline
in reported unit readiness indicators. This makes our ability
to be ready for the full spectrum of operations at an
acceptable risk quite challenging, especially for the combat
Air Forces and for our limited supply of high-demand units.
Our enduring commitment to readiness in the joint fight is
evidenced by the 40,000 American airmen deployed to 285
locations around the globe. Of this group, nearly 28,000 are on
a continually rotating basis to directly contribute to
operations in U.S. CENTCOM [United States Central Command],
including 10,000 airmen in Afghanistan providing close air
support to U.S. and coalition ground forces, airlift, air
refueling, personnel rescue, air medical evacuation, and
training to develop our partner Air Force there.
An additional 57,000 total force airmen, or 11 percent of
our force, are forward stationed overseas, providing
capabilities in direct support of our COCOMs [United States
Combatant Commands]. And from their home stations in the United
States, 220,000 total force airmen, 43 percent of the Air
Force, provide daily support to worldwide operations, standing
nuclear alert, commanding and controlling our satellites,
analyzing intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance data for
the forward troops, and much, much more.
This high operations tempo continues to stress 16 of our
enlisted specialties and 6 of our officer specialities, well
below the 1 to 1 acceptable minimum.
Aircraft readiness: Through the dedicated work of our
airmen, the Air Force's aircraft inventory remains ready
despite extensive use in contingency operations and increases
in fleet average age. The mobility Air Forces are in good
shape. Our modernization and recapitalization efforts, most
notably the KC-46, remain on track. The combat Air Force's
readiness is adequate despite the challenge of rapidly
accumulating hours and the fleet faster aging than we
originally planned, as well as delayed modernization and
recapitalization efforts.
To keep our legacy platforms viable well into the future,
the Air Force intends to use funds saved through our efficiency
efforts to subsidize modernization. A good example is our plan
to retire six B-1 bombers to fund B-1 fleet upgrades.
In addition to air power, Air Force continues to reliably
provide the Nation with required space and cyber capability,
precision navigation and timing through GPS [Global Positioning
System] and secure satellite COM [communications], missile
warning and network defense against a barrage of cyberspace
attacks. We have achieved a record 80 consecutive, successful,
national security space launches since 1999, and our space
readiness meets the requirement.
Likewise, as a critical component of our Nation's strategic
deterrence, the Air Force has maintained our 450 ICBMs
[Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] on continuous alert at
greater than 99 percent readiness rate. This is a mission we
cannot fail in.
Mr. Chairman, committee members, the Air Force remains
steadfastly committed to providing global vigilance, reach, and
power for America and the joint team. Despite fiscal challenges
and high ops tempo, Air Force personnel, weapons systems, and
organizations prepare and are prepared for today's fight. Thank
you for your continued support of your United States Air Force,
for our airmen and for their families.
I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Breedlove can be found
in the Appendix on page 80.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General. And to each of our
panelists we thank you for being here. As Chairman McKeon
indicated at the beginning, we view each and every one of you
as true American heroes. We don't say that lightly; we believe
that. And equally important, we believe that the men and women
who serve under you are true heroes for this Nation, defending
freedom.
As I look out upon the world that we face, my biggest
concern is not an enemy masthead that I see coming over the
horizon. It is not a new missile that we don't know about, and
it is not even a group of planes that could be flying over
there. One of the biggest fears that I have is these enormous
budget cuts that we see coming down the pike. We have heard
tunes of anywhere from $400 billion to $1 trillion.
As I look at it, the questions we need to ask for national
security are pretty straightforward. They are commonsense
questions.
The first question that we have to ask is this: What is the
true risk? What are the threats that America faces, both today
and in the near and far future? In doing that, we have a number
of different tools. We use the Quadrennial Defense Review that
each of you are very familiar with, the National Security
Strategy. Many of these are unclassified. We know that you have
a number of documents that you use to bring together to assess
that risk and to make sure we know what it is. But at some
point in time we have to ask the question: What is the risk
that America is facing?
The second question that we have to ask is: What resources
do our combatant commanders need to fulfill the missions
necessary to defend America from those risks?
The third question is: How much are we paying for those
resources and how can we do it as efficiently as possible?
And then the fourth question is: How much can we afford,
and what is the risk to America if we don't provide those
resources?
I can tell you that I believe with every ounce of strength
that I have that the debate that we have had in the United
States over the last several months has been around only one
portion of one of those questions. And it is: What do we want
to spend and how much can we afford? But we are not looking at
the risks that we are assuming by not expending those moneys.
I know the tremendous pressure each of you are under as you
come here today, and I also know this: If we don't ask those
questions, we may all be presiding over the dismantling of the
greatest military the world has ever known. That will not be
our legacy.
The chairman has given me this gavel, and he has done it
because he knows that I will ask those tough questions, and we
will do that today. And he also knows that we are prepared if
we need to, and you think we need to, we are all set up, we
will gavel this session and we will go into a classified
setting if that is necessary. But we won't leave the men and
women who serve under you without the resources they need to do
the missions necessary to defend this country.
General Dunford, your marines have been at the front of
almost everything we have done over the last several decades.
They have risked their arms, their legs, their quality of life,
their life itself, in doing that fight. So I think we should
come to you first.
And the question that I want to ask you which is at the
heart of it, if we believe that readiness is the ability of the
military services to provide the combatant commanders with the
resources necessary to meet the operational requirements
necessary to defend us from the threats we face, the question I
would ask you is this: In your best professional military
judgment, given the tremendous demands on your service, are you
currently able to provide the combatant commanders with the
resources--all the resources they need to meet their
operational requirement?
General Dunford. Chairman Forbes, thank you for that
question. First, as I mentioned in the opening statement, I am
absolutely confident that in the case of the United States
Central Command, we are providing that combatant commander with
all the Marine forces that he needs. And those forces, as is
the Commandant's number one priority, those forces are the best
trained, best equipped, and best manned units that we can
provide.
The requirement to meet the Central Command demand has
caused us to accept risks in other areas of operations. So
currently we are not able to meet all the forward presence
requirements of the other combatant commanders in the Pacific
Command, in the Southern Command, European Command, and Africa
Command.
Also, in the case of another major contingency operation,
the United States Marine Corps would not right now be able to
meet the timelines of the combatant commanders in response to
another major contingency operation, should it occur
simultaneously with current operations in Afghanistan.
Mr. Forbes. General, you have heard the same statements
that we have heard about potential cuts from different sources,
$400 billion to a trillion dollars. Assuming that we divided
this equally and the Marine Corps had to take as much as $200
billion of cuts over the next 10 years, could you absorb those,
and what would the impact be on the readiness state of the
Marine Corps if that were to come your way?
General Dunford. Chairman, we have taken a look at the
figure of $400 billion, and we have taken a look at what our
fair share would be it if would come down to the Department of
the Navy and we would take a pro-share cut of those reductions
inside the Department of the Navy.
I think within $400 billion, we would have some challenges
in taking those cuts. I think if they were to exceed $400
billion we would start to have to make some fundamental changes
in the capability of the Marine Corps.
Mr. Forbes. Would your reductions come in the nature of
personnel and force structure?
General Dunford. Chairman, as a result of the way that we
are organized, 60 percent of our total obligation authority
actually goes to people. So if we were forced to take cuts,
they would absolutely come in the form of capacity.
Mr. Forbes. General Breedlove, I know you have talked about
the aging of your fleet, and so my first question to you is the
same one to General Dunford. Given the demands on the service
right now and the Air Force and your best professional military
judgment, are you currently able to meet all the demands from
our combatant commanders with the resources they need to meet
their operational requirements?
General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, my answer starts very
similar to General Dunford's. In the case of CENTCOM, I believe
we can meet all of those requirements. I will tell you that
some of our low-density, high-demand requirements--personnel
recovery, ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance],
and a few--are right at the ragged edge, and as we continue to
be challenged by new tasks around North Africa and other
places, we are right at the limit of supporting CENTCOM in
those low-density, high-demand assets.
Similarly, once you get outside of CENTCOM, we would have
some risk, and those risks fall in these familiar areas:
personnel recovery, ISR, some of our intel assets' limited
demand, are being pretty much consumed by the CENTCOM fight.
And therefore, we would accept risk as we would approach other
COCOM requirements around the world that we have.
Mr. Forbes. And some of those would include PACOM [United
States Pacific Command], for example?
General Breedlove. Yes, sir, exactly.
Mr. Forbes. In addition to that, General Dunford addressed
the impact that cuts would make on the Air Force. I am looking
right now at the average age of some of your fleet, and it
could be a few years either way, but as I look at it, your
strategic bombers are about 34 years old; tanker aircraft, 47;
your airlift aircraft, 19. What impact would those cuts have on
the readiness for the Air Force?
General Breedlove. We have also looked at the conversation
which is happening about our fair share of 400, and it would
cause us quite some concern in the recapitalization of just
what you talk about, Mr. Chairman. We do have an attack air
fleet and a bomber fleet that is in bad need of
recapitalization, and our plans throughout this period would be
challenged by those cuts.
Similarly to General Dunford, what we have looked at is
that in a $400 billion cut, our capacity would have to come
down. We have determined that we will not go hollow. When I
came into the flying business in the seventies, I looked at
what hollow was on Air Force bases. As I walked down the line
and saw holes in aircraft where there were no engines and we
had maintained a certain amount of infrastructure and iron, but
it was unflyable. And we can't afford to go there with the
requirements of our COCOMs today.
So a $400 billion cut would force us to constrict our force
in order to maintain a ready and fit force to fight, and we
come to almost the same conclusion that General Dunford did.
Beyond $400 billion, we would have to go into a fundamental
restructure of what it is our Nation expects from our Air
Force.
Mr. Forbes. General, you and I have also had some
discussions regarding the importance of technology and advanced
technology for the Air Force. We see as one of the forces
around the world, obviously, the Chinese and what they are
doing with a huge modernization. In your best professional
military judgment from assessing what the Chinese have been
doing in the last several years, when they make commitments or
promises that they are going to have various numbers of
aircraft online within certain years, do they deliver on those
promises?
General Breedlove. They do, sir, and that is probably the
most scary thing about what they are doing. Clearly, we are
some number of decades ahead of the Chinese in stealth and in
the capability to employ stealth and to do these high
technically pieces of work in the military. You don't catch up
that 3 or 4 decades overnight. Normally, it would take you 3 or
4 decades to do it, but quite frankly, the way that they are
intruding into the nets of our manufacturers and our
government, they are catching up in an increased rate because
of what they learn in those cyber intrusions.
So, yes, sir, it does scare me. When they say they are
going to build 300 J-21s in the next 5 years, they will build
300 J-21s in the next 5 years. They will put the money to
whatever they decide to do, and that scares me because of the
determination and the fact that they will deliver.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
General Chiarelli, again thank you for being here. No
surprise question to you. You have heard the questions that I
have asked to General Dunford and also to General Breedlove. I
would like to ask you the same thing.
In your best professional military judgment, given the
demands of the Army currently, are you currently able to
provide the combatant commanders--all of our combatant
commanders--with the resources they need to meet the
operational requirements of the missions that they currently
face?
General Chiarelli. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for that
question, and I would add that we have been shoulder-to-
shoulder with our Marine brethren throughout both conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan from the beginning.
Mr. Forbes. And we know you have.
General Chiarelli. And I would tell you, yes, in CENTCOM we
are, but not without a cost. I think you know that our aviation
assets are on the 1 to 1 BOG:DWELL today. I recently visited an
aviation brigade in Fort Hood, Texas, that had just returned
from the theater, and 12 months to the day after they returned
they were back for another 12-month deployment, and currently
at 1 to 1, and a majority of our forces we have over there are
below 1 to 2. That is 12 months at home--12 months deployed, 24
months at home.
No, we cannot meet all the other COCOM commanders'
validated demands. Those are prioritized through the global
force management process. We work hard to meet them. We are not
able to meet them all, and we help them manage that risk.
We are looking very, very hard at a $400 billion cut. We
don't totally understand the total impact that is going to have
on the force, but when you double that to $800 million or
more--or $800 billion or more, that is--you are reaching an
area there that I think would definitely--we would have to look
very, very hard at our strategy, what we can and cannot do.
Mr. Forbes. General, if you can't meet the combatant
commanders' need for the resources for their operational
requirements today, and you were to have these cuts coming
down, how are you right now in terms of your equipment needs,
and would these cuts come out of equipment or would they come
out of personnel?
General Chiarelli. We are absolutely focused on whatever
force we have is a balanced force. And there is three big dials
that we have to turn. We have a tendency to hold on to force
structure longer than we should because, as I indicated in my
opening comments, we are people-focused. We are not platform-
focused, but we have made a commitment, both the Secretary of
the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, that whatever
force we have, if cut, whatever force is left will be a
balanced force. We will have the necessary funds to train that
force to do the missions we ask it to do. We will equip and we
will ensure that force is a modernized force going into the
future, and we will have the force structure that allows us to
man that equipment, but we will not in any way favor one
account or the other.
Mr. Forbes. Would it be fair to say that if you have those
budget cuts you would have to further reduce the resources that
you could supply to our combatant commanders?
General Chiarelli. That is fair to say.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, again, we thank you for your presence
here, look forward to your service as CNO. You know that there
have been some somewhat substantiated rumors floating around
Congress that I mentioned to you the other day regarding our
aircraft carriers, and particularly the possibility of delaying
the construction of current aircraft carrier underway from 5
years to 7 years, and also doing away perhaps altogether with
the next carrier that is on deck.
In your best professional military judgment, if that
proposal was presented to this committee, should we embrace it
and support it, or should we fight against it?
Admiral Greenert. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, I would have
to say that in the deliberations of our fiscal year 2013 budget
there are a whole host of items on the table, but the best--we
have found that the best center for aircraft procurement and
construction, and that is, if you will, interval between
construction, I think we are talking about, is 5 years. And
that is our program of record right now for CVN-79. That is the
carrier in question.
We find that when you go beyond that you have an overhead
cost, you have a labor cost increase, and you lose the skill,
the proficiency of the workers. So that is kind of about in the
sweet spot. So we would prefer not to do that. That is not the
best way to build an aircraft carrier if you have that option.
The CVN-79 is the intended relief for the Nimitz, which as
retired, if I am not mistaken, in 2025. So anyway, what I tell
you, any rumor to that extent is definitely predecisional.
There are a lot of things under deliberations right now, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, we recognize that. Let me ask you
this: In your best professional military judgment, given all
the demands on the Navy now, are you currently able to provide
the combatant commanders with the resources they need to meet
their operational requirements?
Admiral Greenert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our validated
signal, if you will, for providing the combatant commanders
what they need is the global force management allocation plan.
That is the result of deliberations in the joint staff with the
combatant commanders, with the services, and the Secretary of
Defense's staff. The combatant commanders unconstrained, if you
will, what they believe they need is the input to this process.
That is reviewed for validity, if you will, for policy, for
strategy. The outcome of that is the global force----
Mr. Forbes. And Admiral, I want to make sure I phrased my
question to you correctly, so I am sorry to interrupt you, but
I didn't say what they wanted; I said what they needed.
Admiral Greenert. What they--my signal to me, what they
need, is the global force management allocation plan. We meet
that plan right now, with the caveats I gave you in my oral
statement. We are on the edge right now. There are some aspects
of my fleet response plan, my covenant to provide rotational
forces forward that I find that I am concerned about some of
those trends, and I described those to you.
So to answer your question, yes, we meet those. An
unconstrained combatant commanders' demand, I would need, doing
some analysis, about some 400 ships. I have 285 ships today.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, last question I am going to ask this.
When Admiral Burke was here little over a week ago he said that
the COCOM demand was for about 16 or 18 subs at any one time.
He said we could only deliver about 10 subs at any one time,
not because they didn't need them, but because that is all we
could afford to deliver. Big difference.
I am looking at the shipbuilding plan that has been
submitted by the Navy, and looking out. We had Admiral Willard
testify before one of our subcommittees a little over a year
ago, that the Chinese now for the first time in their lifetime
had more ships in their Navy than we did in ours. And I know we
can argue about capability, but at some point in time numbers
become capability.
The second thing we looked at is the Navy has said we
needed a floor of 313 ships. Then they came back and somewhat
tweaked that and said 328. You know, and we have chatted about
this before, in the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review]
independent panel that did an analysis on that number, they
came up and felt we needed 346 ships. Regardless of whether it
is 313, 328, or 346, in CBO's [Congressional Budget Office]
review of the shipbuilding plan that has been brought forward,
they asked the question how the numbers work out, because based
on their numbers and the cost of the ships they feel instead of
going to 313, we could be going down to 270, 250, even 170
depending upon the cost of the ships.
Here is the question I have for you. This year this
committee put $14.9 billion in shipbuilding. The average over
the last 3 decades, as you know, has been $15 billion that
Congress has put in for shipbuilding. We know we can't supply
enough subs right now for our combatant commanders' request. We
know, as you mentioned and also as CRS [Congressional Research
Service] has come out and told us, if we were to delay a
carrier, that carrier cost for either not building one or
delaying them would increase not just our carrier costs, but
the cost of our subs and the cost of doing the maintenance on
our ships. We also know that last year the Navy had a $367
million shortfall in their ship repair accounts.
Admiral Burke, Admiral McCoy testified about a week or so
ago, that when we don't do the maintenance on the ships, we
reduce the lifecycle for those ships and we increase the cost
of the maintenance. The number differentiation on that
shipbuilding plan is this: If we had the $15 billion, we can't
reach even a 313-ship goal.
You heard General Breedlove say when the Chinese say they
are going to do something, they normally do it. And they are
talking about building a lot of ships over the next few years.
My concern to you is, if we are short already--and I think the
numbers are between that we need 17- to $19 billion, so we
could be short $2\1/2\ billion to $19 billion. What in the
world would the Navy do on its shipbuilding plan if you had to
take further reductions coming down from some of these budget
hits?
Admiral Greenert. Well, Mr. Chairman, you have really
eloquently described the conundrum.
Mr. Forbes. I tried.
Admiral Greenert. The balance--and it is really all about
that balance.
If we had a reduction of a kind that was passed around
here, $400 billion, $886 billion, without a comprehensive
strategic review, a fundamental look at what we are asking our
forces to do, without a change in activity as I described, we
won't be able to meet the global force management plan today. I
am pretty sure of that. It will exacerbate our readiness trends
which you are familiar with, and if we have to go to force
structure, reduction of force structure, which you mentioned, I
am concerned about the industrial base. You are familiar with
it, and you know that it is a fragile item.
Mr. Forbes. And Admiral, of that comprehensive strategic
review, the one part of that we cannot change is what the
threats are; would that be fair to say? We can change our
analysis and the missions we are going to do to fight this, but
we can can't change the threats as such.
Admiral Greenert. I would only add a caveat. You can't
change a threat. You can determine what you view to be in your
vital interests, your national interests. Threats are certainly
a part of that equation.
Mr. Forbes. Good. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a
couple of questions for each of the witnesses, and I guess in
the interest of time, if you can be brief in your response, I
know we have votes later on.
How long will it take to return your service's forces to
their pre-2001 readiness posture? How much will it cost to
achieve that level of readiness? And will we ever again attain
that level of readiness? And is that even the correct standard
of measurement? I guess we will start with General Chiarelli.
General Chiarelli. Ma'am, we never want to go back to 2001.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, I am talking about prewar.
General Chiarelli. Even prewar. Our level of readiness
today is much better than it was in the prewar period, much
better than it was in the prewar period, but that does not--you
still have to understand we have got a force that has been
fighting for 10 years, and from a strained standpoint is a
force that has been strained over time. We have equipment that
has to be reset and when that equipment returns from theater,
we will need the funds to reset that equipment. But we have
never had a force that is more combat-tested than the United
States Army of today. Ten years of fighting with an All-
Volunteer Force, soldiers who have been on three, four, five,
and six deployments, gives you a level of readiness when it
comes to their ability as soldiers that I don't believe has
ever been as high as it is today.
Ms. Bordallo. So even cost, the whole package, is much
better today?
General Chiarelli. Level of readiness is greater. We never
want to go back.
Ms. Bordallo. All right.
General Chiarelli. But that doesn't mean there aren't
things we need to fix.
Ms. Bordallo. Admiral.
Admiral Greenert. Thank you, ma'am. I think I need to
characterize our force in 9/11 first, and then I will answer
your question. We had 316 ships on 9/11. We have 285 today. On
9/11 we had 385 [385,000] sailors in the Navy. Today we have
325 [325,000]. So we are a different Navy. We are a smaller
Navy.
Our readiness posture today, the foundation of it, is the
process, the fleet response plan. We owe and have a covenant
with the combatant commanders to meet a global force management
plan. To meet that, I think our unfunded requirement probably
best describes where we want to be in maintenance, and that is
$367 million in ship depot maintenance and $317 million in
aviation spares.
That would give you my best estimate of where I would like
to be to meet a readiness standard cost-wise, to quantify it
for you, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. So you take a different view, then. In other
words, you are a smaller Navy today than you were back then.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. And our next one is General Dunford.
General Dunford. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo.
Let me answer the question about the pre-9/11 benchmark
first. When we looked at the future and we developed what we
believe to be the Marine Corps that the Nation will need
tomorrow, we didn't look at 9/11, we looked at the threats in
the future. So we don't benchmark our readiness for tomorrow
based on where we were yesterday.
I agree with General Chiarelli with regard to the quality
of the force. We have never had a force that is more capable
than the one that we have today.
Having said that, we have seen significant degradation,
particularly in the category of equipment readiness, over the
past 10 years. So when we look at the cost of resetting--that
is, replacing or fixing the equipment that will come out of
Afghanistan--as well as the cost of modernizing, our initial
figures are on the order of $12 billion. That $12 billion,
again, is to reset the equipment that will come out of
Afghanistan as well as modernize to the degree that we have
done the analysis right now.
I would qualify that figure somewhat by saying that there
are many lessons learned from Afghanistan and from Iraq right
now that we haven't yet institutionalized. We are in the
process right now of examining our equipment standards, how
much equipment a unit rates. And I suspect that we will find
that particularly in the case of communications gear and, in
some cases, mobility capability that we will need additional
equipment.
But $12 billion is about the number right now that we have,
and that is a combination of reset and reconstitution.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General.
General Breedlove.
General Breedlove. Thank you, ma'am.
I will echo just a couple of comments of my Navy colleague.
The Air Force is smaller now than it was in 2001 by some 250
fighters and some other forces. So I don't think that it is
likely that we will return to the size and the capacity that we
once had in the fiscal environment we face. We will be a
smaller force.
I will also echo the remarks of my fellow vices, in that,
while we were ready in 2001, we are a combat-tested and
incredibly ready force now as we deploy. That sometimes comes
at the expense of the non-deployed forces, as we make sure that
those forces that are forward get the supplies and the
abilities that they have.
Our small capabilities, limited-number but high-demand
capabilities, have been rode hard for the last 10 years. To get
back to the material readiness that the vice commandant speaks
about is a tough road to hoe in what we see to be the next
fiscal environment.
Ms. Bordallo. Uh-huh. So in a few of your cases, then, you
are a smaller organization, but you are far more ready and
qualified today. Is that the message?
General Breedlove. When it comes to the capability----
Ms. Bordallo. That is correct.
General Breedlove [continuing]. Of our airmen as they fight
on the ground and in the air, we are a battle-tested and proven
force and ready there. It is our material readiness that is
strained, in our aircraft and our high-demand, limited-density
assets.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, I thank you very----
General Chiarelli. May I add something, ma'am? I am sorry.
Ms. Bordallo. Yes.
General Chiarelli. I was wondering if I could add
something.
We are a larger force today, but we didn't get large quick
enough. I don't know if everyone remembers, but there was a
period in time, because we could not grow the force as fast as
demand was requiring, that we had to go to 15-month
deployments. When I say we never want to go back to that again,
we never want to go back to that again. What that did to
soldiers and to families was nothing any of us want to see
again.
So when I say we don't want to go back, it is much easier
to take down this force, and quicker, than it would be to build
it up, should something that we don't foresee happen in the
future.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General.
I have another question. This will be my last. I would like
to ask about training opportunities in the Pacific. Now, I know
that some of you are more apt to answer that than the others.
But it appears that training opportunities in the Pacific are
trending in the wrong direction, particularly in Okinawa.
What steps is the Department of Defense and each of the
services taking to address broader training issues in the
Pacific? And to what extent is each of the services
participating in environmental impact statements funded by the
Pacific Command but led by the Marines to look at Pacific
training? And how do we get training right in the Pacific?
I guess I will start with you, General.
General Dunford. Congresswoman Bordallo, as you know, we
are actively involved in implementation of the DPRI [Defense
Policy Review Initiative] agreement. And as you pointed out,
one of the biggest challenges we have as we look at the proper
laydown of Marine forces after we come out of the war is
ensuring that they have training opportunities for the entire
Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Those opportunities right now are
limited and don't fully meet all of our requirements.
As we become more desegregated in conjunction with the
DPRI, those training requirements will actually increase. We
will need to find other opportunities to increase training
opportunities.
We have identified our training requirements; we have done
a detailed analysis. We provided that analysis to the U.S.
Pacific Command. We provided that analysis to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. And we are actively involved both in the
environmental impact studies as well as the negotiations that
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] is leading with a
number of countries in the Pacific to ensure that our training
requirements in the future are met.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, General.
General Breedlove.
General Breedlove. Yes, ma'am. As you well know, with your
familiarity of the Pacific, as Korea and Japan become much more
dense with people and their use of airspace becomes much more
constricted for our aircraft, and as our aircraft get more and
more sophisticated and need more room in which to practice, we
are severely challenged in Japan and in Korea to meet our
training needs.
And so we are forced now to seek our training actually in
the continental United States, in Alaska, or maybe back at
Nellis. So we have to move the forces from the forward area
back to the rear area to get them training, which, of course,
is expensive and takes time out of their training. So we, too,
are looking for opportunities to increase our training
capability.
As far as the issue of the Marines, we are working and
partnering with our Marine brothers and sisters to best meet
the demands should we have to do joint basing and look at those
opportunities around.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General.
Admiral Greenert, you were once stationed in Guam, so I am
sure you are quite familiar with the region.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
First of all, we are quite pleased with the support we get
in Guam for training. We have been training there for years.
Our explosive ordnance disposal, our SEALs [Sea, Air, and
Land], our maritime expeditionary support forces, our RIVRONs
[Riverine Squadrons] all train there. And so I would say, for
expeditionary warfare, it is hard to find a better site than
the islands in and around Guam and the government of Guam's
support.
Other training opportunities we have to continue to
develop: missile defense. And, in this case, it is the Pacific
Missile Range in Kauai. We have to continue to upgrade that and
make sure that it stays technologically in synchronization with
the development of missile defense technologies that we have to
test out.
Acoustic training. Antisubmarine warfare is a skill set
unique to us, and we have to dominate the undersea domain. And
so, finding those ranges, whether it be ad hoc where we use our
own, if you will, organic equipment or, if you will,
instrumented range, those are our challenges, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Admiral.
And General Chiarelli.
General Chiarelli. Well, ma'am, as we all know, a majority
of our training is in Korea and Hawaii. We were able to train
at both locations. I recently toured Hawaii and the training
facilities there. We work both environmental and cultural
issues there. But have absolutely outstanding training
facilities for the 25th and other visiting units.
In addition to that, we have elements in Kwajalein that are
able to do excellent missile defense training in that area.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. It is
encouraging news.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Madeleine.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Breedlove, as you know, Robbins Air Force Base is
the heart of my district, and Fort Benning is just to my west,
Kings Bay to my east. The Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany
is also in Georgia. And I want to thank all of you for what you
mean to my State. And I, for one, want to do anything and
everything that I can to help you be successful in your job.
With that said, I would like to just ask a simple question.
And as I listen and watch the news, the thing that we keep
coming back to with regard to inefficiencies, if you will,
seems to be driven by uncertainty, not knowing what your budget
number is going to be, whether it is going to be a flat line or
a 3 percent up or a 3 percent down.
Would you be better served if the difference was split and
you knew exactly what it was going to be, than the
inefficiencies of not knowing? Would you be better off if you
knew you were going to have 1 percent less if you absolutely
knew that you were going to have it? Could you accomplish more?
General.
General Chiarelli. It is very, very difficult to do the
work necessary to prepare a budget the size of the Army's
budget in the amount of time I fear we are going to have to be
able to do that. It creates all kinds of inefficiencies that we
worry about because so many of our programs are interrelated.
I ran into a particular program while doing capability
portfolio reviews where I had over 200 launchers but only 100
missiles, which made absolutely no sense. There was no one who
planned to do that. And I am sure that something like that
happens when you are forced at the last minute to put together
all the documentation required to submit a budget without the
appropriate time to do that in a very, very focused and correct
way.
So it does make it more difficult, and I believe it
generates inefficiencies.
Admiral Greenert. I would echo what General Chiarelli said.
The mechanics of putting together a budget is extraordinary in
the Navy and the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force.
I would add that we need a strategy, you know, given a
dollar value, even if it is a percentage, in my opinion, a
strategy and guidance to deal with that change, be it up or be
it down, I think is important, because that enables us to have
a deliberate process that can be collaborative, and then we can
pursue a joint or interagency solution, which tends to be more
efficient than a rapid service-only kind of solution, which can
be the manifestation of a short timeframe.
General Dunford. Congressman, I would echo Admiral
Greenert's comments. I think if we had a clear strategy, with
predictability with resources that would be available, we would
be more efficient.
General Breedlove. I will pile on that remark. If we
understood the strategy and the demand, that makes it easier
for us to determine how to meet that demand.
To your first point, Mr. Congressman, if we have a certain
amount of budget cut, we can go to our force and constrict that
force and maybe retain all of the different capabilities of
that force. If the cut becomes so deep that you cannot find
those efficiencies by taking portions of several capabilities,
you may have to take an entire capability out in order to get
to the deep savings that you need in depots, in modernization,
in force structure and people and basing when you take an
entire slice out.
So understanding the depth of the problem up front allows
us to make good decisions about how we would go after force
structure as we are going to constrict.
Mr. Scott. So if we did the budget on a 2-year basis, how
much would that help, if you had a 24-month planning and
execution timeline on the budget?
General Breedlove.
General Breedlove. Sir, I will step up to that first.
Any stability in these kind of budgets are helpful. In
fact, when we look at how we buy in space and other large
procurement programs, the ability to put stability into a
purchasing program allows the subcontractors and others to
predict and count on and then produce in good quantities. So
stability in budget is always helpful as we plan for these
types of things.
Mr. Scott. Gentlemen, my time has expired, but thank you
for being here, and thank you for what you do for our country.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Austin.
The distinguished gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
calling this hearing.
And, gentlemen, thanks for being here, and thanks for your
service.
Discussing this issue is always, I think, from my
perspective, tenuous, because you don't want to give too much
information to those that are wanting to know exactly what our
status is, but I think it is very useful to us to be able to be
in a position to see how we can best help, in terms of making
each of the services ready and prepared for whatever challenge
we have.
My question is for General Chiarelli. And, you know, we
have talked from time to time about the Army's plans to ensure
that our soldiers in the field have that communications network
that they need and that they have come to rely on here in
carrying out the fight in the 21st century.
So perhaps I will start by asking you to tell us a little
bit more about the Army's network modernization strategy. And,
most importantly, I think most of us are interested in, how is
the Army prepared to stay ahead of the changes that technology
makes literally every 6 months?
General Chiarelli. Well, sir, thank you for that question.
We are very, very pleased in something I indicated in my
opening statement, the network integration exercise that we
just conducted out of Fort Bliss, Texas. For the very first
time here in the United States, we had the entire network
deployed across Fort Bliss and White Sands. And it was an
amazing, amazing exercise where we were able to see for the
first time how the network integrates and, in fact, do many of
the integration challenges that commanders are going to have
downrange. We will have that next exercise in October.
We published a sources-sought document--and this is what I
find very, very exciting--out to the industry where we and
TRADOC [United States Army Training and Doctrine Command] had
seen gaps in network capabilities. Within 30 days, we had 71
white papers come in, where industry had spent their own dime
to put together products that fill those gaps. Many of them
will be tested in October for the first time. This is
noteworthy because, rather than using our R&D [Research and
Development] money, industry has used theirs to bring to us
products that they believe will fit the needs of the Army.
We are pushing the network down to the tactical edge. And
the network integration exercises to be conducted every 6
months at Fort Bliss are going to prove to be valuable--
valuable to the COCOM commanders, to the warfighters, and, I
believe, to the American taxpayers.
Mr. Reyes. In terms of this first test that occurred--and I
say that because, you know, we have gone from the introduction
of the iPhone to now the iPhone 4. And that is an example of
how that technology evolves and changes so quickly. So how is
the Army--I want to get back to the question of, how is the
Army preparing itself to stay ahead of that curve?
Because I don't want to--the only thing I can relate this
to is the B-52 bombers that were old when I was in Vietnam, and
today we are still using them. Nothing against the B-52s, but
in today's world technology changes so fast that I think we are
in the position to make sure that we at least keep up with it.
General Chiarelli. Well, we have done a couple of things.
The first is to publish the first-ever operating environment,
where we have set the left limits and the right limits of the
Army's network and asked industry to build within that left and
right limit. If they don't, we are not going to buy.
We have changed our acquisition strategy. We are going to
only buy as many as we need. The tendency has always been in
the Army to find something and buy one for everyone. That is
not what we are going to do. In capabilities packages that go
over 2-year periods, we are going to buy what we need and then
look for changes in technology to provide to follow-on forces
in successive capabilities packages.
All this is possible because of the network integration
exercises that we are doing at Fort Bliss. And I really think
it is going to change the way the Army acquires, in so many
different ways.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
And, Mr. Chairman, I would invite and the ranking member
come out and see, perhaps in October, the test, the second test
on that. It is really remarkable, the way that it has been
integrated, and I think it is the way of the future.
Mr. Forbes. We would like to do that. And we are planning
right now some trips to our various yards to look at them, and
maybe we can put that on the list.
The distinguished gentleman from Mississippi is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Palazzo. Mr. Chairman, thank you for hosting this
hearing today.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here and for the
service to our country. I appreciate it.
Ensuring the readiness of our Nation and our ability to
respond to global threats is one of my number-one priorities
here in Congress. We are, no doubt, in a time of serious
uncertainty when it comes to the national debt limit and the
path forward. Some in Congress have suggested that cutting
defense spending is an acceptable way to meet the goals of
deficit reduction. I couldn't disagree more with some of my
colleagues that think of that.
I have a few questions regarding our current issues of
readiness. And if we have a little extra time, I would like to
hear your thoughts about defense spending cuts.
Admiral Greenert, I know the Navy has chosen to reduce the
Marine Corps prepositioning stock in EUCOM [United States
European Command]. Can you talk a little more about the
decision to move two maritime prepositioning squadrons in the
reserve status back to Jacksonville, Florida?
Admiral Greenert. Well, actually, Congressman, what I am
familiar with is moving the maritime preposition squadron
readiness to what we call the ROS-5 [Reduced Operating Status-
5] status. I can speak to that. We did that in deliberation
with the Marine Corps within the Department.
There are three squadrons. The first two squadrons, which
are very committed to a timeline to meet an operational plan
requirement, that is on track. And the ROS-5, as we say, ready
in 5 days, we view as an acceptable risk, again, in
consultation with the Marine Corps. We have found that the
Maritime Sealift Command has been very reliable in delivering
in that ROS, be it ROS-5, -15, -30. And, again, after
consultation and deliberations, we believe it is an acceptable
risk.
The movement of squadrons back to Jacksonville, I will
research that, and I will have to get back to you on the detail
of those particular individual squadrons.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 93.]
Mr. Palazzo. Okay. Thank you.
And I guess for General Dunford, with a smaller footprint,
are we able to meet COCOM requirements?
General Dunford. Congressman, the primary purpose of
maritime prepositioning is to meet the combatant commander's
operational plan requirements. Two squadrons would meet the old
plan requirements.
What is more important than the numbers of squadrons is the
actual composition of the squadrons. And as long as the two
remaining fully operational squadrons can carry about 80
percent of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade's equipment, then I
am comfortable that we can meet the combatant commander's
requirements with two squadrons.
What you lose with the loss of a third squadron actually is
the day-to-day support for theater security cooperation and
phase-zero shaping operations in the other combatant
commanders' areas of operation.
Mr. Palazzo. Do you believe the current mix of equipment is
correct?
General Dunford. Congressman, the equipment that we have
aboard those ships right now are legacy construct. We are in
the process, as I mentioned, of doing a detailed force
structure review. Part of that detailed force structure review
will take a look at what the organizational construct will be
for the Marine Corps, and that will drive some changes in our
equipment.
So the current legacy squadrons are correct for today. We
are going to make some changes to our tables of equipment, and
that will incur some changes, as well, in the organizational
construct of the squadrons.
Mr. Palazzo. Do you have any idea of what kind of financial
commitment we would be looking at, to go from legacy to the
new--what you envision the force going to?
General Dunford. Congressman, I don't have that available
right now. We are in the process--this is a complicated issue.
We are working with United States Transportation Command on
some of the platforms that might be available, working very
close with the Navy on the ships that would be available. And,
of course, we are doing our own internal analysis on the actual
equipment that we will require aboard those ships.
So all that analysis will go on over the next several
months. And I think, certainly, by the spring of next year, we
will be prepared to come back and articulate the future of
maritime prepositioning.
Mr. Palazzo. That is all I have. Thank you, gentlemen.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all the witnesses for your testimony
today.
Admiral Greenert, great to see you. Congratulations on the
news that pretty soon----
Admiral Greenert. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Courtney [continuing]. It will be ``CNO'' only in front
of your name.
And I wanted to ask you a couple questions. Mr. Forbes
talked a little bit earlier about some of the speculation
regarding aircraft carriers. One of the other sort of topics
that has been out there, in terms of the budget pressures--in
fact, I think it was General Cartwright gave a speech recently
where he talked about the SSBN replacement program and possibly
looking at alternatives, such as a stretch Virginia, which,
superficially, seems to have some attraction. In fact, this
committee looked at that concept last Congress.
And, I mean, given the fact that it would require a smaller
missile, ICBM, that is not built right now, and I think there
are lots of other questions that the design of that vessel
would generate in terms of complications and certainly
potential costs, I was wondering if you had any comment
regarding that speculation that, again, is in the press about
that as an alternative, a cheaper alternative to the Ohio
replacement.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir. I know a little bit more about
it than what you have read--you and I have read in the press.
General Cartwright, I have a lot of respect for him and his
vision, and so it is probably worthy to look into. But what we
know about it, we looked at a Virginia, if you will, module as
one of the alternatives. That was reviewed by the Defense
Science Board. And the SSBN-X concept that we are preparing for
today was the ultimate outcome of that.
I think we have to look at the survivability of such a
vessel, a Virginia, with that missile compartment, the range of
a missile. A smaller missile might limit options. And those are
all part and parcel for the key performance parameters of the
overall system that, again, we would have to look into.
And redesigning the missile will obviously add cost, rather
than just using the D-5 missile, and that could change the
balance.
So all of those items would have to be looked at again,
because I think they would play into bear on the affordability.
Mr. Courtney. And, again, this is really a mission that
really is a core strategic goal which the Nuclear Posture
Review and Quadrennial Defense--I mean, really, it has just
been across the board that this is something that we have to
build into risk assessment in terms of having a sea-based
deterrence.
So, again, I think the Navy did a terrific job, in terms of
bringing down the cost per vessel with that process that you
just described. And I am sure there are going to be additional
efforts to try and see if there are other ways to find savings.
But that concept just seems like fraught with delay and costs
that, again, I think could really just boomerang in terms of
what, you know, people are trying to achieve.
The other question I wanted to ask you was, when myself and
Mr. Forbes and others were pushing to boost the shipbuilding
program for Virginia a few years back, I mean, we were
certainly looking at numbers at the time that mission requests
from combatant commanders for submarine deployments was roughly
about 50 percent, in terms of what was actually being met. And
I think those were, like, 2009 figures.
I was wondering, again, just sort of put it in context, in
terms of where--your testimony today, in terms of where we are.
Are we going up, down, in terms of that? Or is that percentage
pretty much the same today?
Admiral Greenert. The percentage is, I would say, a little
down. In other words, a number of years ago, the request by
COCOM was 19, and we were able to provide 11 based on force
structure--or, earlier mentioned, 16 versus 10. And these are,
as you know, SSN days, SSNs out there deployed. So that is the
context of that.
Now, as you well know, if you look at our ship inventory,
when it comes to submarines, 48 is the number that we testified
a need to. That is the requirement. And we won't be able to
meet that requirement through the years, which is why we are
very focused on two Virginia-class submarines, a year to
construction, to help meet that COCOM demand.
Mr. Courtney. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
General Dunford, Mr. Rogers had a question. He had to leave
to go to another hearing, but he wanted me to ask this
question. If you were required to reduce your forces by 10,000
or more within the next 18 to 24 months, how would that impact
the Marine Corps?
General Dunford. Chairman, first of all, we are at 202,000
right now, and we still have many units that are well below the
one-to-two deployment-to-dwell that General Chiarelli referred
to earlier. So, until we draw down from Afghanistan, we can't
significantly reduce our overall end strength.
And we would have to, when we do reduce our end strength,
do so in a measured way, so as not to break faith with the
Marines that have done so much over the past 10 years. And the
numbers of Marines that we can draw down in any given year is
directly related to the numbers of Marines we enlisted 4 years
prior.
So our number for planning, for example, is somewhere in
the vicinity of 4,000 a year is the maximum number of Marines
that can be drawn down in a given year. Some years, it is a
little bit less. But, on average, our planning figure is we can
draw down about 4,000 Marines a year without breaking faith
with Marines or their families.
Mr. Forbes. Good.
Admiral Greenert, I had another question for you regarding
in the Air-Sea Battle concept. You know, we know that has been
requested by Secretary Gates for, I think, over a year now. Any
idea when we might be seeing that and how close we are to
getting that out?
Admiral Greenert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The study, if you will, is in Mr. Panetta's office--
Secretary Panetta. We anticipate he will look at it soon, give
his comments. And we look forward to being able to release
appropriate aspects of it in unclassified and classified form
as appropriate. We look forward to that.
Mr. Forbes. So we think that is pretty close?
Admiral Greenert. I hope so, sir. You know, we are focused
on it.
Mr. Forbes. And just a couple more questions.
General Dunford and General Chiarelli, you both talked
about the reset portion and how important that was to you. I
think, General, you talked about $10 billion for the Army if--
or how much was that for the Army?
General Chiarelli. We are looking at $25 billion to $20
billion.
Mr. Forbes. Twenty-five-point----
General Chiarelli. Twenty to $25 billion is going to be the
total cost for reset----
Mr. Forbes. Twenty to $25 billion.
General Dunford, I think you said 12.
General Dunford. Chairman, that figure combined our
reconstitution and our modernization, as well. We have
requested in the 2012 budget approximately $3 billion of reset.
We have estimated that we will require an additional $5 billion
of reset at the conclusion of hostilities, and need OCO funding
for approximately 2 to 3 years after coming out. And then what
I added in to that $12 billion was actually our initial
estimate of modernization of $5 billion. So that is how I got
to approximately $12 billion.
We did have some other resources that we requested in 2011.
We have received those resources, and now we are currently
analyzing our request for 2013.
Mr. Forbes. For both of you, if budget cuts came down and
impacted your ability on that reset, the dollars that you had,
how would that impact your timeline capability of doing the
reset that you need?
General Chiarelli. There are a number of answers to that
question, sir.
First of all, the bill doesn't go away. And we have been
counting on 2 to 3 years after the end of hostilities being
able to get OCO money, because that is a true cost of war, to
do that reset.
One might look at this year's reset budget and say, ``Army,
you have $775 million that you are not going to be able to
execute.'' That is correct, but that is because 41,000 pieces
of equipment went into Afghanistan when we thought it was going
to be coming back home to take care of the surge in
Afghanistan. And, as you know, we make the estimates for reset
2 years before the money actually gets to us. So, when changes
occur, we have to have the equipment back in the States to do
the reset; if the equipment doesn't come back, we can't do the
reset. That is why we have that additional money this year.
But that don't make the bill go away. That equipment is
going to come back at some point in time, and when it does, it
is going to have to be reset.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
General Dunford.
General Dunford. Chairman, our total procurement account in
the Marine Corps, it runs about $2 billion. It has been steady
for about 20 years. During this FYDP [Future Years Defense
Program], we are projected to be at a high of about $2.7
billion during the FYDP.
So you can see what a $5 billion reset would do to our
modernization account. It would have a significantly adverse
effect if we were forced to pay the reset bill out of our
baseline budget. Quite frankly, we wouldn't be able to get to
where we need to get to along the timeline that we believe is
critical.
Mr. Forbes. And, Admiral Greenert, the last question I have
for you. Going back to the numbers we were chatting about
earlier on our shipbuilding plan, I think it would be fair to
say that the Congress has been averaging about $15 billion over
last three decades. This year, we put in $14.9 billion.
As you know, CBO has come out with their report suggesting
that, to follow your plan, you would need about $19 billion per
year. I think some of your own figures--but I don't want to
throw these at you--show that we would need about $17.3
billion. But let's just take the CBO figures.
How realistic do you think it is, with the budgets that we
are seeing and proposed cuts, that we are going to have those
kind of increases going into the shipbuilding plan over the
next several years? And if we can't come up with a realistic
scenario of getting those dollars, does that mean our
shipbuilding plan is not a realistic plan?
Admiral Greenert. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I looked at the
CBO report, and, as we know, the differences vary by year, if
you will, by tranche of years. First 10 years, we are pretty
close. It is about inflation indices, labor differences, cost
differences, and, really, the foundation, if you will, or the
assumptions put into the design of the ships. We vary slightly
on what the future ship might look like.
But, nonetheless, to get to your question at hand, if we
receive a reduction of the ilk we were talking about, $886
billion, and we have to reduce force structure and we can't
build ships to the level that we need to, then our shipbuilding
plan--it gets back to strategy. I would have to change the
strategy. So, as stated by all our leadership, we need a change
in strategy.
Mr. Forbes. Good.
Now, for any of our four witnesses, anything that we have
left out that you want to get on the record? Anything you would
like to change that you have stated? We want to make sure you
have the time to do that.
General Chiarelli, any last comments that you have for us?
General Chiarelli. Mr. Chairman, I can't think of any. I
think you have done a very, very good job of covering the
waterfront, so to speak.
Mr. Forbes. Good. Well, thank you, General.
Admiral, anything?
Admiral Greenert. You covered our waterfront, as well, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Good, good.
General Dunford.
General Dunford. Chairman, I would just probably echo
something that General Breedlove said earlier. I think all the
witnesses today joined the military in the 1970s, and probably
what we found when we joined was certainly what looked to me
like a hollow force with regard to equipment readiness and
training and so forth. And we very much appreciate your efforts
to ensure that, when we do draw down a force and we do take a
look at where reductions might be taken in the budget, we do so
in a measured way so that we don't end up, at the end of the
day, with a force that is hollow in the future.
Mr. Forbes. Good.
And General Breedlove.
General Breedlove. Sir, we just thank you for your
stewardship of our military services. And if we do have to face
the kind of budget cuts that we are hearing about, we look
forward to being a partner with you to make sure that we get
our forces right for the future.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
And I think, if you could just be patient, I think Ms.
Bordallo has one last question.
Ms. Bordallo. I thought we might end on a positive note.
And I would like to ask all of the witnesses, how do we build
on the progress that each of you discussed in terms of
retaining the very capable force that we have now?
We will start with you, General.
General Chiarelli. Well, we can't lose their trust. And
that is absolutely critical.
The Chief of Staff of the Army has a great picture where it
shows a soldier who is talking into a microphone, a lieutenant
out in the field. And we really don't know what he is saying,
but, as the chief often says, we are the only army in the world
where, if he is asking for something, anything, he knows he is
going to get it.
And that is a level of trust we have with the soldiers of
the United States Army. And we just need to make sure that,
whatever we do, we never take away his ability and his belief
that, if in combat he asks for it, he is going to get it, or
she is going to get it.
Ms. Bordallo. Admiral.
Admiral Greenert. Very eloquently done by General
Chiarelli. And I think he has hit a key part of it. Our sailors
want to be challenged, and they want to feel that what they are
doing is relevant. And they want to be--they need to be
motivated, remain motivated.
But the old saying in the Navy, I think, applies: You
enlist the sailor; you reenlist the family. We have to be sure
that our sailors believe that we will also take care of their
families while they are away, deployed.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Admiral.
General.
General Dunford. One of our commandant's top priorities he
describes is keeping faith with our Marines and their families.
And I think there are two parts of that. The first is
ensuring that if we are going to send them in harm's way, they
have the wherewithal to accomplish the mission with a minimal
loss of life or equipment.
And the other part is that when they are focused on the
mission, they don't have to look over their shoulder to see if
they are well-supported back home. They know, as General
Chiarelli said, that they can trust that the United States
Marine Corps is taking care of their family and their loved
ones when they are forward deployed.
And I think those are the two key elements of maintaining a
quality force in the future.
Ms. Bordallo. General.
General Breedlove. Thank you, ma'am. And I would echo a
couple of the things my compatriots have already said.
First of all, trust. And part of that trust is we don't
send American soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines to the
battle with the second-best equipment or the second-best
training. We have to continue to equip and train our force so
that they can overcome anybody that gets in front of them.
Second, again, is to challenge them. How do you train
troops who are the most battle-tested we have ever had in our
service? We have to continue to invest and to put our efforts
toward giving them quality training that will not only prepare
them for today's fight but the future fight that may be very
different than today's.
And then, finally, recognize their sacrifice and the
sacrifices of their families as we go forward.
Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank all of you gentlemen for the service
that you have donated to our country. You have placed your
entire life, your careers. And I think I join the--I am sure I
join the Chairman in saying that we are tremendously proud of
our men and women in the military service. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. We echo that.
And, General Chiarelli, we will just tell to all four of
you, it is the commitment of this subcommittee and this full
committee that we are going to make sure that when those men
and women are on that line and that microphone, that we are
over here listening and making sure they get those resources.
And thank you all for helping us do that.
I now ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members
be allowed to submit questions for the record for today's
hearing. Is there any objection?
And, without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Forbes. With that, thank you all so much.
And we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 26, 2011
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July 26, 2011
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 26, 2011
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO
Admiral Greenert. The Mediterranean-based Maritime Prepositioning
Squadron (MPSRON 1) will be relocated to the U.S. East Coast. Bids for
layberths have yet to be sought, but the Blount Island Command in
Jacksonville, FL, is one of many potential layberths on the East Coast
being considered. The vessels do not have to be consolidated in a
single homeport.
The two other MPSRONs, based in the Pacific Ocean, meet all OPLAN
and CONPLAN time requirements. [See page 25.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 26, 2011
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased
force structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility.
We seem to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a
future smaller force to meet the increased needs in these and other
areas?
General Chiarelli. Anticipated reductions of forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan will enable us to restore our strategic depth and allow us
to meet other security obligations by reapportioning available forces
to meet the current strategic guidance. Reducing the numbers of
deployed forces will result in increased presence and activity at CONUS
and OCONUS basing locations. This more stable force will be able to
return to predictable training programs to prepare for full spectrum
operations thereby placing increased requirements on our current
facilities but resulting in better prepared forces to meet Combatant
Commander (COCOM) requirements. These theaters do retain important
capabilities and enablers. More effective force structure can be
realized from the continued transformation of Headquarters (HQs) when
appropriate and reallocation of selected enablers to the global force
pool. The end state is increased capability the Army can provide to the
COCOMs in support of full spectrum operations. Total Army Analysis for
Fiscal Years 2014-2018 is currently ongoing and will enable the Army to
provide the correct mix of organizations required to maintain a
balanced and affordable force that is able to meet COCOM requirements.
Mr. Forbes. The budget cited numerous ``efficiencies'' found in
reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated
with insourcing initiatives and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly,
the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further
savings in the reduction of contracted work. Where are we accepting
risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking
large reductions in force structure?
General Chiarelli. At this time, the Army is confident it is taking
the necessary steps to mitigate the potential risks associated with
reductions in the contractor and civilian workforce. Through a
deliberate process, the Army works with commanders to right-size the
civilian and contractor workforce and ensure there is no reduction in
the level of services provided for soldiers and families. As force
structure is reduced, we will make appropriate adjustments so that the
workload and the work force remain balanced.
Mr. Forbes. Please update the subcommittee on your Service's
efforts to reset the force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or
scaled-down reset and reconstitution (R2) effort? How would such a
reduction affect your mission capability? Are current OMB guidelines on
modernization through reset too restrictive?
General Chiarelli. Since the Reset Program began in 2002, we have
Reset over 2.5 million pieces of equipment and, on average, 25 brigade
sets of equipment annually. As a result of these efforts, our
operational readiness rates of equipment in theater has generally met
or exceeded 90 percent ground equipment and 75 percent aviation
equipment. To date in Fiscal Year 2011, the Army has Reset over 80,000
pieces of equipment at the depot level and over 500,000 pieces of
equipment (e.g., small arms, Night Vision Devices, and chemical and
biological protective items) through our Special Repair Teams. A scaled
down Reset effort would cause the Army to experience a decline in the
aggregate number of trained and ready combat capable formations to
respond to any unforeseen contingency operations. Additionally, it
would disrupt the current pace of equipment Reset at our national
maintenance facilities.
There is no degradation in equipment readiness attributable to
current Office of Management and Budget Reset guidelines.
Mr. Forbes. What are the long-term strategic implications to the
force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense
of non-deployed units?
General Chiarelli. The high demand for forces over the course of
the last decade has created a situation where the Army has to shift
resources from the generating force to the operating force in order to
maintain our required levels of manning for deploying units. From FY08-
FY11, non-deployable Soldier rates have increased approximately two
percent each year, with the current non-deployable rate just over 16%
of the active force. Of that percentage, 11,000 Soldiers are in the
Disability Evaluation System (DES) with approximately 7,000 in the
operating force and 1,900 currently assigned to units with a Latest
Arrival Date (LAD). To ensure deploying units meet the deployment
criteria at 90 percent available strength at departure for deployment,
Human Resources Command (HRC) must over-man deploying units to ensure
the deployment manning criteria is met. Non-deploying formations have
reduced levels to provide the needed Soldiers. This impacts the ability
of the Army to generate enough manpower to fill a deploying unit prior
to participation in critical Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) which
usually occurs within 90 days prior to deployment. Consequently units
are not as highly trained on collective tasks because all unit members
did not participate in the MRE. Additionally, meeting administrative
requirements and making up individual training for late arriving
Soldiers places an additional burden on small unit leaders during a
time when their focus should be on preparing the unit for deployment.
The Army has also decremented the generating force to ensure our
war fighting units are manned at an acceptable level for deployment in
support of the full range of operations. If projected demand reduces in
parallel with the reduction in Army force size and structure, the long-
term strategic implications are more manageable. However, if the future
demand exceeds future supply, the Army will continue to have difficulty
maintaining those institutions that facilitate unit deployments and
provide for the professional development and training of our force.
Mr. Forbes. To the extent possible in open session, please describe
the impacts that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum
training?
General Chiarelli. Equipment shortages do adversely impact full
spectrum training. We know that 55% of units in the Army have less than
80% fill across their authorized equipment sets. It has been a number
of years since our Brigade Combat Teams have had enough dwell between
deployments that they could focus on anything other than the counter-
insurgency training necessary for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
As a result we have not had the benefit of unit commander's feedback to
fully understand the second order impacts to full spectrum training.
In the aggregate, the Army can provide most major systems (combat
vehicles such as tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, tactical wheeled
vehicles, howitzers, weapons, etc); however, we continue to work
through modernization issues (most notably C4ISR/network-related
shortfalls) and selected shortages of low density but nonetheless
important equipment like specific types of tool sets and test
equipment, armored ambulances, etc. These shortfalls continue to
adversely impact full spectrum training, and the Army expects that
these impacts will become more apparent as more and more units are able
to conduct full spectrum training. At the same time, the Army is now
delivering much of what the Army invested in during the past five
years; this, coupled with the reduction in numbers of Army units
deployed in the CENTCOM area, should enable the Army to continue to
make steady progress in improving our equipment on hand posture across
the Army to support full spectrum training.
Mr. Forbes. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011?
What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied
against you?
General Chiarelli. With the Army still heavily engaged in
operations in Afghanistan and to a lesser degree in Iraq, the $5.7
billion reduction to our FY 2011 budget request required us to take a
hard look at balancing what is required for meeting our current
national security obligations while reducing risk to support future
contingencies. The Army was able to adapt to some of the FY2011
budgetary reductions by leveraging previous efficiency efforts such as
reducing reliance on service support contractors and reducing civilian
personnel to FY10 levels. However, the majority of the FY 2011
reductions occurred in the Research, Development and Acquisition
appropriations. The Army was able to work closely with congressional
committees to identify areas with the lowest risk and greatest
flexibility to absorb reductions and deferrals but these changes will
still affect the delivery of capabilities in the future years.
Additional reductions to the FY 2012 and 2013 budgets will require
the Army to bring down manpower, readiness and procurement accounts in
a balanced way to avoid creating hollowness in this force. Significant
reductions would be extraordinarily difficult and impact nearly every
Army equity, program and community. We must maintain faith with our
Soldiers, Families and Civilians while meeting our critical
modernization needs, resetting the force through our depot maintenance
and sustainment operations and taking care of the behavioral health
needs of our force.
Mr. Forbes. The Army recently alerted this committee to roughly
$751 million in excess reset funding due to improved condition of
returning equipment, retention of equipment in Iraq for risk
mitigation, and to accommodate growth of theater provided equipment
(TPE) sets. How confident are you about your FY12 reset forecast? When
does the ``bow wave'' of TPE reset hit? How are we leveling workload to
ensure capacity across this trough for the coming wave? What happens if
we stay in Iraq at their request beyond December 2011?
General Chiarelli. The $751M excess in FY11 was a result of the
late return of equipment from Iraq due to combatant commander risk
mitigation. TPE in Iraq was retained beyond unit redeployment dates in
order to ensure immediate equipment availability if a temporary troop
increase was required to react to a crisis.
Based on current National Strategy, the Army is confident that we
have requested adequate funding for our FY12 Reset requirements. The
Army estimates that the ``bow wave'' of TPE Reset for Operation New
Dawn will occur between FY12 and FY14. Another ``bow wave'' will occur
upon conclusion of operations in Afghanistan.
We have the capacity and flexibility within our Industrial Base,
both organic and private industry, to adjust to equipment Reset
requirements as the operational system dictates. Additionally, a
portion of our equipment Reset is completed by our units and our
installations.
Any delay in return of equipment from Iraq beyond December of 2011
will result in an adjustment for future year Reset funding as our Reset
requirements and liability is delayed further into the out years for
execution.
Mr. Forbes. LTG Stevenson testified earlier this year that the
Army's reset liability is around $10 billion and will take about 2-3
years to complete after major operations in CENTCOM end. What impact
would significant reductions in budget authority such as the Senate's
``Gang of Six'' $866 billion proposed cut have on Army reset and its
readiness assuming ``persistent engagement'' bendy OEF/OND? How would
it impact depots, arsenals, and ammo plants?
General Chiarelli. Loss of Reset buffer of 2-3 years beyond the end
of operations will result in difficult choices for the Army. The Army
will likely be forced to decrement funding of essential equipment
repair, training, Soldier services, and similar Army programs.
The impact to arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants is equally
significant. Adverse impacts could include civilian workforce
reductions, dormant repair and production lines, reduced throughput,
and decreasing equipment readiness.
Mr. Forbes. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased
force structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility.
We seem to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a
future smaller force to meet the increased needs in these and other
areas?
Admiral Greenert. Navy must address several competing demands with
the current force, which we adjudicate through the Global Force
Management (GFM) Process. This process, led by the Office of SECDEF and
Joint Staff, decides how to allocate operating ships and aircraft among
the six regional Combatant Commanders based on the Guidance of
Employment of the Force (GEF).
Today, Navy is meeting the JCS-directed (via GFM) Combatant
Commander needs. We don't have the capacity, though, to meet all
unrestrained Combatant Commander requests for forces.
Looking forward, our current shipbuilding and aviation plans
balance the anticipated future demand for naval forces with expected
resources. With anticipated funding being flat or declining in the
future, we focus our investments to ensure the battle force has the
capability for Navy's core missions with the capacity to be present
forward in the most critical regions. At the same time, our plans take
into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national
shipbuilding design and industrial base.
Assuming Navy forces will continue to be allocated by the GFM
process to Combatant Commanders, the investment choices we make today
will either enable or constrain what will be available. Given the
potential for dramatic fiscal reduction, we need a comprehensive
strategic review that takes a fundamental look at what we are asking
our forces to do in an era of constrained resources. If Navy force
structure is significantly reduced, a review is recommended in order to
meet the global force management plan today and balance the needs of
tomorrow.
Mr. Forbes. The budget cited numerous ``efficiencies'' found in
reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated
with insourcing initiatives and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly,
the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further
savings in the reduction of contracted work. Where are we accepting
risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking
large reductions in force structure?
Admiral Greenert. In-sourcing is one of the tools the DoN and DoD
will use to establish the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and
contractor employees in our workforce to affordably accomplish its
roles and missions. In addition to having the right skill set, our
workforce must also be appropriately sized with the appropriate skill
set. We are eliminating some civilian positions and reducing new hires
to gain efficiencies and reduction in overhead. This reduces the number
of overall positions we will in-source but balances the skill set,
alleviating redundancy. The Department of the Navy is currently
monitoring the impact of these reductions from FY11 and will continue
doing so in FY12.
Mr. Forbes. Please update the subcommittee on your Service's
efforts to reset the force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or
scaled-down reset and reconstitution (R2) effort? How would such a
reduction affect your mission capability? Are current OMB guidelines on
modernization through reset too restrictive?
Admiral Greenert. Navy is different in some respects from other
Services in that we ``reset in stride''; that is, we rely upon regular,
rotationally scheduled maintenance of our ships and aircraft, and
training and certification of our crews between deployments, to sustain
the long-term material condition of our force. Our Navy's reset in
stride, when executed properly, translates into decades of assured
service for each ship and aircraft, a good return on investment. This
reset is intended to be funded every year, as opposed to only during a
reset and reconstitution effort after contingency operations. As such,
it should eventually be part of our baseline funding. Navy platforms
will not reach Expected Service Life if OCO funding is not aligned with
contingency operations, enabling ``reset in stride.''
For expeditionary equipment used in operations ashore in Iraq and
Afghanistan, it is estimated to take approximately two years to
complete depot maintenance reset; the equipment will be reset after
contingency operations are complete. Most expeditionary equipment is
used for contingency operations, so maintenance is funded with OCO
appropriations. If contingency operations cease without OCO funding for
reset, expeditionary equipment readiness will be severely impacted.
Navy does not deem current OMB guidelines on modernization through
reset to be overly restrictive.
Mr. Forbes. What are the long-term strategic implications to the
force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense
of non-deployed units?
Admiral Greenert. To pay for ``ready deployed'' readiness expenses
that are emergent or unplanned, we sometimes are compelled to reduce
operating funding for non-deployed units to assure readiness of
deployed forces. From a strategic perspective, this affects Navy's
ability to support surge requirements. From a force provider
perspective, this tends to reduces non-deployed maintenance and
training funding as forces prepare to re-deploy to meet emergent
requirements (deployed). This makes it difficult to maintain (long-
term) the material readiness of the force, and in some cases requires
us to tailor training and certification of deploying units to
``mission-specific'' qualifications, instead of the full spectrum of
naval operations. In addition, reduced time non-deployed is a stress on
our Sailors and Families.
Mr. Forbes. To the extent possible in open session, please describe
the impacts that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum
training?
Admiral Greenert. With one exception, Navy training has not been
impacted by equipment shortages. The exception is in Navy P-3
squadrons, where wing fatigue life required the grounding of
approximately one-third of the aircraft fleet. This has required
mission-tailored training for deploying aircrews due to training
aircraft availability. The corrective action is well underway and
currently ahead of schedule.
Mr. Forbes. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011?
What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied
against you?
Admiral Greenert. In FY11, budget constraints inherent in the
ongoing Continuing Resolution required the Navy to freeze new civilian
hiring, limit some support functions, and adjust the schedules of some
procurement contracts. We also identified efficiencies to reduce
overhead costs--the impact of which we are still assessing.
In FY12 and beyond, there are no obvious programs or activities in
which to make further efficiency reductions, pending additional
analysis and internal policy change. In the FY12 budget Navy proposes
to cut overhead to reinvest in our ability to provide forces. It would
be imprudent to make further overhead reductions without first
evaluating the impact of these cuts.
Mr. Forbes. At one time we relied heavily upon the Navy and Air
Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force
requirements in CENTCOM. What is that level of dependence now and how
has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet ground force
requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force?
Admiral Greenert. The Joint force still depends on Individual
Augmentee (IA) Sailors to meet evolving ground force requirements in
Iraq and Afghanistan as these conflicts have progressed through various
phases. The Navy provides over half of its IA support in core Navy
skill areas, such as cargo handling, airlift support, and Seabees. As
of 01 September approximately 4,800 Sailors were serving in these
``core'' missions. Navy also provides approximately 4,100 Sailors for a
range of ``non-core'' missions, such as provincial reconstruction,
detainee operations, civil affairs, and customs inspection. The Joint
sourcing process to meet both ``core'' and ``non-core'' requirements is
deliberate and currently focused on reducing IA requirements without
unduly increasing the risk to mission success.
Navy's FY12 end strength anticipates a phased reduction in IA
demand for Iraq and Afghanistan. Should IA demand remain at current
levels or increase, we will be challenged to meet manning requirements
for the Fleet.
Mr. Forbes. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased
force structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility.
We seem to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a
future smaller force to meet the increased needs in these and other
areas?
General Dunford. Tomorrow's Marine Corps, though smaller than the
force conducting current overseas contingency operations, is not simply
a reduced version of today's Marine Corps nor is it a reversion to the
pre-9/11 posture. The imperative for the Marine Corps is to preserve
capabilities developed since 9/11, expand our engagement efforts,
respond to crisis, and still be able to project power for the most
dangerous threat scenarios. To that end, we accept a degree of risk by
reducing our active component capacity for conducting multiple, major
sustained operations ashore, relying on an ``operationalized'' reserve
component to mitigate that risk. Of necessity, our force structure
represents many judiciously considered factors and makes pragmatic
trade-offs in capabilities and capacities to achieve a posture that
creates opportunity and provides an operational stance that enables
flexibility and rapid response. The resulting force structure provides
a force optimized for forward-presence, which facilitates both ongoing
engagement activities and rapid crisis response; provides readiness for
immediate deployment and employment; re-shapes organizations,
capabilities, and capacities to increase aggregate utility and
flexibility across the range of military operations; properly balances
critical capabilities and enablers; creates an operationalized reserve;
and creates opportunity for more closely integrated operations with our
Navy, Special Operations, and inter-agency partners.
We will use a conditions based approach to enable tomorrow's Marine
Corps. As our forces draw down in Afghanistan, we will reorganize over
time to the 186.8K structure. Although we will be smaller than today's
force, we will ensure a robust forward presence in PACOM through a mix
of forward deployed forces and a restart of the unit deployment
program.
Mr. Forbes. The budget cited numerous ``efficiencies'' found in
reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated
with insourcing initiatives and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly,
the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further
savings in the reduction of contracted work. Where are we accepting
risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking
large reductions in force structure?
General Dunford. In meeting the Secretary's (SECDEF) efficiency
initiatives the Marine Corps is heavily engaged in many efforts aimed
at improving our warfighting business operations. A thorough assessment
of civilian labor across the Marine Corps, to include contractors, is
one of the major actions the Commandant of the Marine Corps has
undertaken to achieve efficiencies throughout the Marine Corps. To
support this effort the Marine Corps implemented an enterprise wide
freeze on all internal and external hiring actions for all appropriated
fund positions back in December 2010. This action was designed to
assist Headquarters Marines Corp activities and commands across the
Corps in reconciling their current civilian workforce against manpower
requirements and budgetary constraints. While hiring has resumed for
some activities and commands, hiring actions will continue to be
closely scrutinized to ensure requirement are balanced against fiscal
constraints. To complement these efforts the Marine Corps has reduced
personnel associated with infrastructure and headquarters support
activities, with particular emphasis on duplicative functions across
the enterprise. This reduction in ``tail'' functions and activities
will allow rebalancing towards ``tooth'' functions and activities, thus
sustaining the Marines Corps war fighting priorities. Additionally, the
Marine Corps reduced civilian billets programmed for the future as a
result of insourcing initiatives in order to meet reduced funding
levels. While the Marine Corps is accepting risk in some of its
management and oversight functions, the on-going strategic review of
civilian and contractor requirements will allow the Marine Corps to
mitigate that risk by rebalancing its civilian workforce based on
validated requirements at all levels and functions across from an
enterprise perspective.
Mr. Forbes. Please update the subcommittee on your Service's
efforts to reset the force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or
scaled-down reset and reconstitution (R2) effort? How would such a
reduction affect your mission capability? Are current OMB guidelines on
modernization through reset too restrictive?
General Dunford. The Marine Corps has been planning a methodical
reset of equipment from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) while
simultaneously executing Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) reset actions.
This month marks the end of successfully resetting equipment that
returned from OIF. Planning efforts for resetting equipment returning
from OEF began early this year with a symposium to capture lessons
learned from the draw dawn and reset of equipment deployed to OIF. The
Commandant of the Marine Corps completed a Force Structure Review to
realign personnel, and equipment structure to meet the requirements of
the modern post-OEF Middleweight Force. A series of planning
conferences have been conducted to refine our plans for redeployment
and retrograde out of Afghanistan to leverage resources to enable an
in-stride reset and reconstitute the force. The planning actions over
the past year have enabled the Marine Corps to draft a strategic-level
OEF Ground Equipment Reset Strategy scheduled for release in October,
2011. As an enabler to Reset and Reconstitution, the Marine Corps will
publish an OEF Reset Playbook that will synthesize our reset actions
across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in order to
reconstitute to the Middleweight Force.
A delayed and/or scaled down reset and reconstitution effort will
result in persistent equipment and training shortfalls for a
significant part of the Marine Corps. These shortfalls would require
the Marine Corps to emphasize readiness for deployed and next-to-deploy
units at the expense of the non-deployed force. The inability to
properly resource non-deployed combat units to high levels of readiness
would compel the Marine Corps to further adopt a form of ``cyclical
readiness'' rather than steady force-wide readiness.
A scaled down reset and reconstitution effort would negatively
impact the Marine Corps' capacity to respond to unexpected crises or
contingencies with non-deployed forces. Since a degraded non-deployed
force would likely respond to an emergent crisis or contingency
operation, the employing Combatant Commander loses depth, flexibility,
and responsiveness for the unexpected. The strategic implication is
increased time to respond to unexpected crises or large-scale
contingencies.
OMB has been supportive of the Marine Corps buying the latest
versions of equipment to replace equipment losses from OEF. However,
based on the current restrictions for spending reset funding, the
Marine Corps is restricted from resetting aging equipment used for
training our forces at home station. Thus, operational units preparing
for deployment using equipment sets (e.g. Mojave Viper) for training do
not meet the OMB criteria. We believe these equipment sets should be
included in reset funding requests.
Mr. Forbes. What are the long-term strategic implications to the
force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense
of non-deployed units?
General Dunford. The non-deployed force provides the Nation depth
and responsiveness for the unexpected. The long-term strategic
implications of underfunding non-deployed units are:
Increased risk in the timely execution of unexpected
crises or large-scale contingencies
Increased risk in the successful execution of a
military response to unexpected crises or large-scale
contingencies at tolerable cost in American lives and materiel
Increased risk in achieving a successful strategic
outcome to the crisis or contingency; the larger the crisis or
contingency, the greater the risk
This question infers the long-term strategic implications of tiered
readiness. Tiered readiness is the deliberate attrition of the non-
deployed force's combat capability and deployability in favor of
sourcing planned rotational requirements; readiness is optimized for a
known deployment.
The major shortcoming with tiered readiness is meeting known,
planned requirements is only one facet of readiness; the ability to
respond to crises and contingencies with the non-deployed force is also
important--something tiered readiness fails to properly take into
account. Congress requires the Marine Corps to be most ready when the
Nation is generally least ready. Tiered readiness is at odds with this
mandate. The Marine Corps will leverage its non-deployed forces and
task organize to meet crises and contingencies.
Mr. Forbes. To the extent possible in open session, please describe
the impacts that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum
training?
General Dunford. The Marine Corps' training is focused on preparing
forces for counterinsurgency operations (COIN) in Afghanistan. In pre-
deployment training, we strive to provide the same equipment that our
Marines will use in theater. While there have been equipment shortages
in both home station and at Service level training locations, these
deficiencies have not significantly impacted our ability to meet pre-
deployment training requirements. Our equipment shortages reside in the
following areas: 1) Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED)
equipment; 2) Command and Control (C2) equipment; and 3) Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and other sensor systems.
CIED Equipment: Effective C-IED operations require unique skill
sets that are first developed through a progressively-challenging
training program that encompasses individual and collective skill
development at all levels of leadership. Examples of this highly
specialized equipment include IED detection kits, metal detectors,
counter-radio controlled IED electronic warfare systems (CREW) and C-
IED training lanes. The majority of these systems are fielded to
support operational requirements in theater. To mitigate the finite
amount of systems available for training, we provide support for
standardized, home station training to the operating forces on all
bases including equipment and technical expertise, as well as support
for institutional pre-deployment exercises such as Enhanced Mojave
Viper. Once deployed, Marines continue to train in order sustain their
CIED skill-sets and integrate any newly fielded systems--often
incorporating immediate lessons learned. Training and Education Command
currently has personnel forward deployed to ensure this in-theater
sustainment training and the lessons learned are institutionalized.
Additionally, our Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is working with
the Joint IED Defeat Office to further update equipment and mitigate
any shortfalls.
C2 Equipment: Units deploying to Afghanistan are directed to
maintain specific C2 systems while in theater and to incorporate these
systems into pre-deployment training. Due to technological advances,
many of these systems are fielded rapidly to support operational
requirements and most of the equipment resides in country. To mitigate
the finite amount of systems available for training, we maintain MAGTF
Integrated Systems Training Centers (MISTCs) at all major Marine Corps
Bases. The MISTCs provide standardized, home station training to the
operating forces on multiple C2 systems. Additionally, many of the C2
system program initiatives allocate funding for Field Service
Representatives (FSRs) from respective companies to both train Marines
and provide on-site technical support.
UAV/Sensor Systems: Much like C3 equipment, UAV and other sensor
systems have been fielded rapidly, resulting in shortages of systems
available at home-station. We alleviate our shortages through
collaborative training with other Services and use of simulators. Units
are also augmented with appropriate contracted field support from FSRs
in Afghanistan.
Mr. Forbes. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011?
What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied
against you?
General Dunford. The Marine Corps maintains a long-standing
reputation in the Department of Defense as being a frugal, lean Service
that delivers the best value for the defense dollar. As such, the
Marine Corps has adapted to budgetary reductions by continuing our
tradition of pursuing ways to streamline operations, identifying
efficiencies, and reinvesting savings in order to get the most out of
every dollar. It is this mentality that has allowed us to continue to
provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan, even
in this era of constrained resources.
The Marine Corps recognizes the fiscal realities that currently
confront the United States, and we are already making hard choices
inside the Service and ensuring that we ask only for what we need as
opposed to what we may want. The Marine Corps is currently taking steps
to rebalance the force while simultaneously posturing it for the
future; additionally, we are continuing to maintain our forward
presence and provide Marine combat forces to Afghanistan. We understand
that the nation will face difficult resource decisions in the future,
and additional cuts will impact the manner in which we address the
challenges presented by an uncertain and ever-changing world. As such,
the Marine Corps will resource the appropriate capabilities to remain
the nation's expeditionary middleweight force and has a well analyzed
plan for the reset and reconstitution of equipment which has been
severely used during the last decade of war. Commensurate with our
responsibility to maintain warfighting readiness, we must ensure that
we keep faith with our Marines and their families. Additional budgetary
reductions will influence our ability to accomplish all of these
objectives while simultaneously continuing to conduct combat operations
in Afghanistan. Accordingly, such budget reductions will result in
increased risk, requiring careful consideration to ensure we maintain
an effective and efficient force capable of providing operational reach
and agility during times of
crisis.
Mr. Forbes. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased
force structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility.
We seem to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a
future smaller force to meet the increased needs in these and other
areas?
General Breedlove. The Air Force will carefully enhance and
modernize the capabilities of our legacy and fifth generation aircraft
so as to balance our ability to meet the increased needs and Combatant
Commander (COCOM) requirements within NORTHCOM and PACOM. The Air Force
will continue to participate in the Department's Global Defense Posture
discussions and will support the integrated process through which the
Department validates and prioritizes defense posture initiatives and
implementation. We will continue to work closely with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, other Services, and the COCOMSs
as part of the ongoing Department of Defense Comprehensive Review to
ensure our force structure is consistent with and fully advances U.S.
National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy objectives. In
the face of an increasingly austere defense funding environment, the
Comprehensive Review will guide future force structure decisions based
upon sound strategy development. You can be assured the Air Force will
endeavor to field the most capable force available, within size and
funding constraints, to meet the requirements of the Joint warfighter,
while balancing risk across the spectrum of operations.
Mr. Forbes. The budget cited numerous ``efficiencies'' found in
reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated
with insourcing initiatives and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly,
the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further
savings in the reduction of contracted work. Where are we accepting
risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking
large reductions in force structure?
General Breedlove. We accepted risk in overhead and support
services to ensure risks are reduced across mission capabilities and
readiness, i.e. moving resources from tail to tooth. The contract
efficiencies are aimed at reducing the Department's reliance on
contract services. These reductions include service support contracts,
knowledge based services, acquisition program overhead, and contractor
supported studies.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense efficiency objectives limits
Air Force civilian growth above fiscal year 2010 levels. The Air Force
is minimizing potential risk by conducting a highly-focused, strategic
review of our entire workforce. We are reviewing all core functions and
assessing trade-offs, to include reevaluating in-sourcing plans and
implementing hiring controls to rebalance the workforce within existing
resources. This review is also focused on reducing manpower in overhead
and support functions to realign dollars and manpower to the most
critical force structure and mission needs. Specific adjustments will
be programmed as we work through our FY13 President's Budget. The Air
Force will continue to reassess the need for additional steps to
achieve necessary civilian workforce levels while minimizing the impact
on current personnel.
Mr. Forbes. Please update the subcommittee on your Service's
efforts to reset the force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or
scaled-down reset and reconstitution (R2) effort? How would such a
reduction affect your mission capability? Are current OMB guidelines on
modernization through reset too restrictive?
General Breedlove. There are no immediate impacts of a delayed and/
or scaled down reset and reconstitution effort to the Air Force. The
Air Force R2 is structured and calendar driven. Aircraft and engines
are continuously returned to meet regularly scheduled depot
maintenance. For vehicles and support equipment, when the mission is
complete a majority of these assets will remain in theater, with the
exception of special purpose vehicles and generators which return to
depot as needed. A reduction in overseas contingency operations funding
will impact the Air Force's ability to meet future requirements.
Current Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines on
modernization reset are not too restrictive. There are no immediate
operational aircraft or equipment shortfalls due to current OMB
guidelines; however, stressed fleets due to high operations tempo are
accelerating service life, and mitigation strategies require longer-
term investments.
Mr. Forbes. What are the long-term strategic implications to the
force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense
of non-deployed units?
General Breedlove. The Air Force established a predictable,
standardized battle rhythm to ensure rotational forces are organized,
trained, equipped, and ready to respond to combatant commanders'
requests for forces. Using a rotational construct, each unit undergoes
a period of reconstitution before entering another deployment
vulnerability period. When combatant commander requirements exceed the
forces available in the vulnerability period, the Air Force either
reduces the reconstitution period of ``non-deployed'' units or selects
individuals from organizations with no designated combat capability
(e.g., those who fulfill Air Force-level organize, train, and equip
Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) responsibilities).
Continued periods of reduced reconstitution have long-term effects
on unit readiness and affect the health and welfare of Airmen and their
families. Additionally, sustained deployment of over 20 percent of our
individual Airmen from organizations with Service-level OT&E
responsibilities will reduce our ability to sustain operations and
provide ready, trained, and equipped Airmen for future engagements.
Mr. Forbes. To the extent possible in open session, please describe
the impacts that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum
training?
General Breedlove. Ongoing operations continue to pose a challenge
to Air Force equipment and supplies. Overseas contingency operations
(OCO) funding has been instrumental in avoiding shortfalls and
maintaining critical capabilities for our Joint force commanders.
The Air Force is currently experiencing a shortage of advanced
targeting pods (ATP) that are used during operational deployments on
Combat Air Forces aircraft. Because the quantity of ATPs available is
below the requirement, the Air Force can only support pre-deployment
training and deployed operations, leaving a limited number of pods to
support day-to-day training.
ATPs are not permanently assigned to a particular aircraft or unit;
rather they are moved between units to support the priorities set by
Air Combat Command as follows: current combat/contingency operations;
Air Expeditionary Force spin-up training for units within the four-
month prior to deployment window; test requirements; continuation
training for operational/combat-coded units; and lastly, flying
training units (FTU).
Mr. Forbes. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011?
What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied
against you?
General Breedlove. The budgetary reductions presented execution
challenges and impacted areas requiring mitigation strategies that
drove risk and tradeoffs. Congressionally-mandated operations and
maintenance (O&M) reductions were absorbed in areas such as civilian
pay, base support, and facilities, sustainment, restoration, and
modernization (FSRM). The reductions delayed new mission beddowns,
airfield, runway, dorms, and utility infrastructure projects. They
drove operational workarounds and inefficiencies and increased
sustainment costs. Reductions also slowed the civilian hiring process.
The Air Force is committed to achieving efficiencies across the force
and will continue to make tradeoffs to preserve our most important
capabilities while supporting current operations and taking care of our
men and women in uniform. This late in the execution year, we do not
expect any additional budgetary reductions.
Mr. Forbes. The Air Force has reduced its flying hour training
program and reexamining its mix of live and virtual training including
opportunities to rely more on the use of simulators. How will the Air
Force measure the impact of changing the mix of live and virtual
training on the quality of training as well as individual and unit
readiness?
General Breedlove. The Air Force leverages critical live fly
training with increasingly capable virtual training devices and
simulators. In a continual process, the Air Force reassesses the mix
between live fly and virtual training to strike the right balance. As
simulator technology and fidelity improve, training methods and
simulator capabilities are assessed to ensure requirements are met as
efficiently and effectively as possible. The Air Force has already
shifted a significant amount of live fly training into our simulators.
Reductions in flying hours require investments in infrastructure and
training system upgrades and procurement.
Unit commanders assess unit readiness on a monthly basis via the
Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) and the Defense
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Individual readiness is tracked with
unit training programs. Any negative training impact to Air Force
operational readiness would be reported and tracked through those
reporting systems.
Mr. Forbes. Each Air Force unit is designed to perform a specific
mission requiring a particular skill set. However, Air Force personnel
may be assigned to support current operations by deploying to perform a
related mission that does not necessarily require their full skill set.
When individuals are engaged in operations that require only a subset
of their full skill set, their competence in some other skills may
erode because the individual is unable to complete the full extent of
their training requirements to remain qualified in their core mission.
To what extent has the Air Force identified unit types or career
specialties in which assigned personnel are not receiving comprehensive
training for their core missions and what steps, if any, have been
taken to mitigate any identified gaps in training?
General Breedlove. The Air Force approved specialized procedures
for maintaining specialty skills to include comprehensive training
management processes. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2201, Air Force
Training Program, requires supervisors to review the training records
of enlisted Airmen prior to their deployment to ensure the training
continuum is not broken. In turn, the supervisors document any
remaining upgrade training requirements and training remarks as
appropriate on the On-the-Job Record Continuation Sheet, or automated
version. If Airmen are out of their career specialties long enough to
diminish the proficiency in their particular specialty skills set,
Airmen will increase their proficiency in lost competencies through
force development programs that include any combination of education,
training, and experience (i.e., Career Development Courses, on-the-job
training, and/or specific placement in development positions).
Additionally, the Air Force trains rated personnel in accordance
with 11-series Mission Design Series (MDS)-Specific Volume 1 AFIs,
which identify events that must be accomplished for aircrew personnel
to maintain mission qualification and currency. Depending on real-world
mission requirements, some skill sets may experience a loss in training
in order to accommodate immediate mission requirements, which reinforce
other skill sets. When personnel return to their unit, individuals
receive the necessary training to regain proficiency in unit mission
tasks and accomplish training events as necessary to comply with Volume
1 requirements. This is a recognized issue associated with the Air
Expeditionary Forces (AEF) cycle, and it is provided for in the cycle
dynamic. The Air Force is standardizing deployment lengths to 179 days
and increasing dwell to afford more time for reset and training
opportunities. The Air Force restructured the AEF to include tempo
banding for high-stressed capabilities in response to the long-term
surge.
Mr. Forbes. The Air Force has been flying CENTCOM sorties since
Operation Desert Storm. General Breedlove, do you anticipate a similar
operational tempo post-Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom? What
is the impact to the Air Force's aging fleet of aircraft? How
important, then, do reset and modernization become? How would deep cuts
impact your ability to modernize/recapitalize?
General Breedlove. Yes, we anticipate a similar operational tempo
post-Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. The readiness of Combat
Air Forces aircraft is adequate despite challenges from accumulating
hours on our fleet due to continuing combat operations in multiple
theaters of operation.
Delays in the F-35 program increase our reliance on an aging legacy
fighter fleet, driving the need to extend legacy fighters' service life
and modernize their combat capability. Air Force actions to extend and
modernize the legacy fleet are a bridge to 5th generation capability
and are not considered replacement actions. The F-16 Service Life
Extension Program (SLEP) is one example of the effort to mitigate the
fighter force capacity shortfall. Additionally, development of a Long
Range Strike family of systems, including a new Long Range Strike (LRS)
bomber and next generation, extended-range standoff missiles, allows
the Air Force to address anticipated threats.
To keep our legacy platforms viable, the Air Force intends to use
funds saved through efficiencies to subsidize modernization. One such
example is our plan to retire six B-1 bombers and use the savings to
fund modernization and sustainment upgrades for the B-1 fleet.
Restrictions on the proposed B-1 retirements would reduce our overall
savings by a minimum of $290 million (an 80 percent reduction in
savings), limiting our ability to maintain a viable B-1 fleet.
The readiness of the Mobility Air Forces remains high while meeting
robust and dynamic operational requirements. Our airlift fleet
continues to provide strategic airlift as well as theater and direct
support airlift missions moving personnel and a wide variety of
equipment and supplies. The awarding of the KC-46A contract starts the
timeline for recapitalizing our aerial refueling aircraft. Delays or
reductions in KC-46A production will have impacts on Air Force
readiness and ability to meet operational requirements. Reset and
modernization are essential to ensure continued readiness of our fleet
inventory.
Mr. Forbes. The Air Force just released figures to the HASC that
they have spent $433M of O&M on Libya. Where in O&M did that money come
from? What is the impact? Does this indicate significant financial
commitments we should consider beyond OEF/OND when making budgetary
decisions?
General Breedlove. Approximately three-quarters of the Libya costs
are attributed to flying hours, which are being paid for within the
flying hour program. The Air Force flying hour program has not been
reduced, nor have air operations training been deferred, to support the
U.S. participation in Libya operations. However, unused/available
flying hours from the F-22, C-130, and C-17 platforms have been
realigned to KC-135, KC-10, operational support aircraft (OSA), and F-
16 platforms to support emerging and high priority flying/training
requirements, one of them being the Libya operation.
The accrual of unused/available flying hours can be attributed to a
variety of reasons:
Mobility Air Force (MAF) hours were available from the following
weapons systems: C-130s: Aircraft are being used to support increased
US Transportation Command operations and are not available for
programmed training hours; PACAF C-17s: Hours available due to
execution slightly below programmed hours.
Unused/available MAF flying hours were moved to the KC-135, KC-10
and OSA flying hour programs. In the Combat Air Forces (CAF), F-16
execution rates are much higher in support of Libya operation than at
home station. CAF was able to cover approximately 70 percent of the
increased flying hour requirement with F-22 hours available due to the
stand down of that platform. The remaining Libya costs represent, in
part, airlift bills sourced from unused Airlift Readiness Account
funding available because Transportation Working Capital Fund cash
balances are sufficient. Additionally, other costs (e.g. travel,
command, control, communications, and computers, and global lift &
sustain) were cash-flowed by major commands and are being offset by
deferred facilities sustainment and restoration expenses and reductions
in contractor support.
The Air Force will continue to support the Department of Defense
contingency operations as high-priority requirements, and there will
likely be significant financial commitments required to support those
operations in future years. However, in a fiscal environment with
declining toplines, identifying, budgeting, and justifying dollars for
unforeseen contingencies will be increasingly important to maintaining
critical Air Force warfighter capability.
Mr. Forbes. At one time we relied heavily upon the Navy and Air
Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force
requirements in CENTCOM. What is that level of dependence now and how
has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet ground force
requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force?
General Breedlove. The Air Force currently has 4,893 personnel
deployed to support Joint Expeditionary taskings (ground forces) and
2,541 supporting Individual Augmentee (headquarters staff) taskings--a
total of 7,434. This is a decrease from 12,896 in 2009.
Although certain career fields are experiencing high opstempo which
presents challenges regarding dwell times and individual training, the
Air Force will continue to use innovative approaches to mitigate
operational impacts. Current unit reporting via the Status of Resources
and Training System (SORTS) and the Defense Readiness Reporting System
(DRRS) indicates no adverse impact to overall Air Force operational
readiness from supporting joint fight requirements.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
Mr. LoBiondo. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M
funding reductions to training?
General Chiarelli. Given the current fiscal environment, the Army
is examining possible negative impacts of potential operations and
maintenance (O&M) funding reductions to training by assessing
adjustments through the three dials I spoke of in my opening statement.
Potential reductions carry different risks, and our analysis continues
to be aimed at reducing the impacts of that risk while maintaining a
versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a
rotational cycle to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready
forces for full spectrum operations and to hedge against unexpected
contingencies--all at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for
our all-volunteer force. Potential reductions to the Ground OPTEMPO and
Flying Hour Programs may impact on the Army's ability to provide units
trained for Full Spectrum Operations by reducing the funded miles and
crew hours thereby curtailing the number and intensity of training
events at Company, Battalion and Brigade levels at home stations and at
the Combat Training Centers. As a consequence, the Army could be
challenged to prepare for contingencies across the spectrum of conflict
and may require more time to prepare larger formations for deployment
after notification of a requirement to deploy. Potential reductions
could also impact the Army's ability to execute home station individual
and collective gunnery training by limiting the availability of ranges
and deferring replacement of damaged targets. Range modernization
efforts may be impacted as the construction footprint of several MILCON
projects will not have Unexploded Ordnance clearance completed.
Reductions to Mission Training Complex capabilities could limit
Battalion and Brigade staff proficiency on their mission command
systems in a realistic training environment due to facility
availability and exercise design limitations. The Training Support
Centers may not be able to provide Instructor/Operator support for
numerous complex virtual trainers, including for flight simulators and
support for Medical Simulation Training and other training devices. The
Army may have to curtail units scheduled to train at the Combat
Training Centers or send only portions of those units limiting the
training value derived from training with a world class Opposing Force
(OPFOR), detailed and impartial After Action Review from the Observer
Controllers, and a robust Contemporary Operating Environment enabling
concurrent and simultaneous training in multiple environments against
hybrid threats. Potential reductions may impact on the Army's
Institutional Training capability to conduct Initial Military Training
and critical functional skills. This could result in a potential back
log of recruits awaiting training at the institutional training base.
Soldiers may not receive duty specific skill training required by the
Soldier's unit thus contributing to degradation in unit readiness.
Additionally, funding reductions may impact the Army's ability to
develop agile and adaptive leaders at all levels by reducing the Army's
capacity to conduct Professional Military Education. We are looking to
Congress to help the Army maintain balance. As the committees consider
their reductions the Army is ready to assist by providing our
assessment of any and all specified reductions.
Mr. LoBiondo. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M
funding reductions to training?
Admiral Greenert. Navy O&M funding in support of training is
adequate in the current execution year (FY11), and as proposed in the
Navy budget submission for FY12.
Mr. LoBiondo. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M
funding reductions to training?
General Dunford. The Marine Corps remains committed to continued
success in Afghanistan by providing the best trained and equipped
forces. The Fiscal Year 2013 budget submission continues to fund core
skills required for continued success in Afghanistan while also
investing in irregular warfare capabilities like MARSOC, MARFORCYBER,
and five new Marine Expeditionary Command Elements. Impact of funding
reductions will be in the form of reduced capacity in the following
areas:
The Marine Corps' force structure must provide a
strategically mobile, middleweight force optimized for rapid crisis
response and forward-presence.
Budget cuts have a disproportionate impact on the Marine
Corps. For 8.5 percent of the annual Defense budget, the Marine
Corps provides approximately 31 percent of the ground operating
forces, 12 percent of the fixed wing tactical aircraft, and 19
percent of the attack helicopters in the Joint Force.
A reduction in training will further challenge the
Marine Corps to respond to 2 large scale regional contingency
operations.
A reduction in Operations and Maintenance funding will
impact training across a wide spectrum of activities.
Capacity to support Geographic Combatant Commanders
requirement for forward deployed presence. Demand to support
Theater Security Cooperation requirements outpaces the Marine
Corps capacity to satisfy the demand.
Enhanced small unit training (squad and below) would be
at risk. Small unit training is essential for success in
distributed operations such as in our most recent campaigns in
(OIF and OEF).
Large scale training would be impacted at the Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) level. Immersion of Marines into
large scale decentralized training environments has been a
vital part of pre-deployment training programs and has improved
leadership decision making at all levels.
Mr. LoBiondo. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M
funding reductions to training?
General Breedlove. The high tempo of Air Force operations and the
use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)/Transportation Working
Capital Fund (TWCF) hours in support of Combatant Commander taskings
has masked our true training flying hour requirements. The Air Force
base budget for the operations and maintenance (O&M) flying hour
program has declined 29 percent in the last seven years. Failure to
smoothly transition the appropriate number of hours from OCO/TWCF to
normal O&M flying hour programs as overseas contingency operations wind
down will result in readiness challenges for the Air Force.
Additional reductions could have cumulative impacts on future
years, such as reducing the number of aircrew members who gain
``experienced'' status in their first operational assignment. This, in
turn, could create deficits in filling critical flight instructor and
rated staff positions.
Mr. LoBiondo. What do you believe is the recapitalization solution
for the ASA units that sit alert for NORAD while also training for and
supporting other combatant commanders through overseas deployments,
especially given some of the findings of the ASA report issued to
Congress a couple of months ago?
General Breedlove. Defending the homeland remains a priority for
the Air Force as we organize train and equip forces for the joint
warfighter. Recapitalization of the Aerospace Control Alert (ACA)
force, previously known as Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA), is one part of
the much broader perspective of having the right mix of capabilities in
the right components (active, Guard, Reserve) performing the right
missions. We will find the right balance between anti-access
capabilities (5th generation stealth) across all components balanced
with an alert aircraft fleet that is capable of performing the air
sovereignty mission of defending the homeland.
As the Air Force completes the final moves of the Combat Air Force
(CAF) Redux plan (FY 08-12) this coming year, all Air National Guard
(ANG) units, including those who sit ACA duty, will have the necessary
platforms to perform their assigned missions. In support of this plan,
Burlington Air Guard Station, Vermont has been identified as the
Preferred Alternative for the first F-35A ANG unit, with the final
basing decision expected to be made in the summer of 2012. As the
various models of F-15s and F-16s approach the end of their forecasted
service lives, the Air Force will continue to use the principles of
Total Force Integration to balance the proper capabilities across all
components.
As such, NORAD's recent report to Congress on the ACA mission, in
the Air Force's view, did not warrant any immediate recapitalization
solutions. Overall, the Air Force assesses current capabilities across
the joint community are well-matched to the estimated threat level.
Mr. LoBiondo. The Air Force has been challenged in recent years to
keep backlogged aircraft maintenance low and mission capable rates up,
even as optempo remains high and aircraft continue to age. What is the
Air Force doing to keep platforms going beyond their expected service
life? Do you expect that optempo will remain steady? If so, how vital
then is adequate funding for aircraft operation and maintenance?
General Breedlove. The Air Force remains focused on maximizing
aircraft service life through a number of formalized fleet health
sustainment programs. Most platforms leverage proactive integrity
programs, such as the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program, in which
areas such as airframe strength, durability, damage tolerance,
corrosion control, and material defects are closely managed.
Additionally, avionics modernization programs focus on continuous
avionics and software systems upgrades to capitalize on emerging
technology to address diminishing manufacturing sources and retain
capability in dynamic threat environments. Furthermore, many platforms
undergo formal Service Life Extension Programs, in which structural,
propulsion, avionics, and mechanical subsystems upgrades are combined
into one modernization effort. The Air Force also utilizes the Fleet
Viability Board process to provide an independent source for
operational health, associated availability, and cost of continued
ownership to assist with sustainment and recapitalization investment
decisions. Lastly, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board promotes the
exchange of the latest scientific and technical information to enhance
the accomplishment of the Air Force mission. These proven programs are
critical to ensuring continued airworthiness for service life
extensions.
We expect the tempo for Air Force operations to remain the same.
The required capability areas will shift with mission requirements but
the overall Air Force support will be largely unchanged. Adequate
funding will ensure supply chains, maintenance operations, and flying
operations are not further stressed, which could negatively impact war
readiness engine levels, aircraft availability, and mission readiness.
As such, adequate funding to support these programs is vital to mission
capability across the entire fleet.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
Mr. Loebsack. One of the concerns I have regarding our readiness as
we draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan and as we review future budgets
and our future readiness posture is that we don't repeat the mistakes
of the past when we lost critical organic manufacturing capabilities.
It makes little sense to lose the workforce that has built the
equipment for our troops in combat over the past ten years and to
shutter the manufacturing base that has produced that equipment. That
is why I've been working with Congressman Schilling to expand the
authority for the Army's industrial facilities to enter into public-
private partnerships to maintain the critical skills and workforce that
are essential to Army readiness. But I am concerned that the Army does
not have a long-term plan in place for workloading the facilities.
Can you outline what plans the Army is pursuing to ensure that the
Army's organic manufacturing base has the workload necessary to
maintain its critically needed capabilities?
General Chiarelli. The Army continues to employ a multi-pronged
approach to maintain sufficient workloads at the Army's manufacturing
Arsenals in order to ensure their workforce strengths and skill sets
are sustained to meet future contingency operations.
The Army has taken the following steps to mitigate projected
workload reductions in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funded
workloads at the Army manufacturing Arsenals: The Army has drafted an
Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan (OIBSP) that provides the
framework for ensuring that the Army's Arsenals and Depots remain
viable and relevant in a post-OCO funded environment. The four pillars
of the Army OIBSP are:
(1) Modernization, which requires investment in new
technology, training and plant equipment at the same rate that
the Army modernizes its weapon systems;
(2) Capacity, which identifies and aligns core competencies
and workloads to support current and future surge requirements
while maintaining effectiveness and efficiencies at each
facility;
(3) Capital Investment, which requires the investment in our
facilities to maintain ``state-of-the-art'' capabilities and
quality of work environment (QWE) standards; and
(4) Resource Alignment, which requires the Army to prioritize
funding in support of these four pillars to achieve the desired
end state--viable and relevant OIB facilities.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS)--The Army is exploring
opportunities for Army Arsenals to manufacture replacement gun tubes
and other components for nations that purchase Excess Defense Article
(EDA) howitzers and other equipment. A Security Assistance option with
increasing potential is the EDA program that allows countries to
acquire excess defense items or equipment at either reduced or no cost
to eligible foreign recipients on an ``as is, where is'' basis.
The Army Materiel Command's (AMC's) TACOM Life Cycle
Management Command, the Army's parent organization for Army Arsenals,
recently hosted a 3-day summit for its commercial partners, Army
Program Executive Offices (PEOs), Program Management Offices (PMOs),
and the Army's OIB activities. The objective of the 3-day summit was to
highlight the Army's OIB capabilities and identify opportunities for
the Arsenals to partner with commercial firms in order to meet future
PEO/PMO requirements.
We continue to invest in the manufacturing Arsenal
infrastructure to ensure that the facilities are modernized with
advanced technological capabilities. Capital investment improvements
total close to $25 million in FY11 and are expected to remain at this
level through the Five Year Defense Plan.
The Army also supports current HASC and SASC legislative language
in the National Defense Authorization Act which authorizes the
Secretary of the Army to designate Army Arsenals as Centers of
Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITEs) in the recognized core
manufacturing competencies and also enhances the Arsenals' ability to
establish workshare agreements with private industry through Public
Private Partnerships. CITE designation will recognize and preserve Army
Arsenal core manufacturing competencies, enhancing their ability to
better compete for work and gain greater PEO/PM recognition.
The bottom line is that the Army OIBSP recognizes the critical role
of the manufacturing Arsenals within the integrated industrial base and
is aggressively pursuing opportunities to increase Arsenal workloads at
a sustained level over time.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS
Mr. Owens. As the Representative for Fort Drum I'm sure you
understand that I have paid particular attention to the proposed end
strength put forward by the Army. To that end, you note in your
testimony that the Army is working towards ``achieving the authorized
end strength of 547.4K by the end of FY13'' and ``520.4K by the end of
FY16''. Further, you noted that this will be accomplished through
reducing recruitment goals, lowering retention requirements and natural
attrition. It seems to me that these built-in, environmental measures
for reducing end-strength may limit sudden disruption to Army units,
but they also reduce the amount of control the Army will have over how
they occur. What measures can the Army take to ensure that any force
reduction occur in a manner that allows installations and commanders,
as well as military communities, to fully prepare for any future end
strength reductions?
General Chiarelli. The Army Staff is actively engaged with
supporting the development of OSD plans to help ensure that
installations, commanders, and military communities can adequately
prepare for any future end strength reductions. Planning includes a
full range of options under varying timelines to ensure any DoD
reductions are completed in accordance with OSD directives taking into
consideration operational readiness and the impact on the Army's most
valuable resource, Soldiers and Families.
The Army is seeking reinstatement or creation of separation
authorities to enable voluntary and involuntary force shaping actions
between now and 2017. The Army will likely need to exercise the full
extent of voluntary and involuntary force shaping measures to maximize
flexibility and minimize the impact on Soldiers and Families as we size
and shape our force to achieve a balanced end-strength. We are
currently working within DoD to scope the measures that will be
necessary, and, where appropriate, the Department will seek legislative
authority to help us shape the force.
Mr. Owens. It is no secret that the U.S. Army has a difficult
history in the procurement of major weapons programs. As reported in
the Washington Post earlier this year, a recent study commissioned by
the Army shows that between 1995 and 2009, the Pentagon spent more than
$32 billion on weapons programs that were eventually cancelled. These
include the Crusader Cannon, the Comanche Helicopter and others. While
the scope of this hearing does not include specific systems, I remain
concerned about the potential to spend funds on assets that will never
help our men and women in the field, while installations like Fort Drum
in my Congressional District continue to make sacrifices to meet new
budget realities. Do you believe the Army is taking sufficient steps to
prevent a reoccurrence of these weapons cancellations, and is there
potential to use even a portion of those savings to meet budget
shortfalls at installations here at home?
General Chiarelli. In order to address the challenges with the
development of major weapons systems, the Army undertook an
unprecedented review of the Army Acquisition process. The Decker-Wagner
panel, commissioned by the Secretary of the Army, examined weapons
system procurements from ``cradle to grave'' with a key focus on
properly defining requirements. The panel discovered that many of the
Army's development and procurement problems stemmed from pursuing
requirements that ultimately did not match the needs of the Soldier,
were cost prohibitive or were technologically infeasible. The Army has
been working to rapidly review and implement many of the innovative
recommendations.
These efforts will not only support a stable modernization
strategy, but will also result in producing systems that are timely,
within budget parameters, and meet the needs of the Soldier. As the
Army implements sweeping changes to its acquisition system, lessons
learned from its efforts will be infused into other procurements across
the Services and the Department.
As part of his comprehensive efforts to reform Army acquisition, in
February 2010, Secretary McHugh ordered Army-wide ``capability
portfolio reviews'' (CPR) to revalidate requirements through a wide
range of criteria, including Combatant Commander requests, wartime
lessons learned, the leveraging of emerging technologies, elimination
of redundancy, and system affordability. Each review examines systems
across a certain spectrum to make recommendations for modernization
improvements or, if appropriate, project terminations. The Army is
already realizing significant savings through terminations and
avoidance of unnecessary program costs. CPRs are designed to get the
right system, with the best technology to the warfighter at the right
time.
The Army's top modernization priorities--the Ground Combat Vehicle
(GCV) and the Network, provide opportunities to leverage proven
technology, as well as use lessons learned from other programs. The
Army must have a combat vehicle fleet and information technology
infrastructure that allows our primary ground forces to handle full
spectrum missions from regional conflicts, hybrid threats, hostile
state actors to natural disasters and humanitarian relief efforts.
Regarding the GCV, our Soldiers need a single, modern armored vehicle
to take them to the fight. The Army's Network modernization will enable
the rapid flow of large amounts of critical data on the battlefield,
down to the individual Soldier. Both programs are seeking to leverage
harvested technologies, as well as state-of-the-art developments, to
ensure the systems are affordable and ready for adaptation to
accommodate needed future capabilities.
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