[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-50]
HOW DOES THE NAVY GET READY, AND WHERE ARE WE TODAY?
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 12, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
JOE HECK, Nevada SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
CHRIS GIBSON, New York GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BILL OWENS, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey TIM RYAN, Ohio
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
Jamie Lynch, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Christine Wagner, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, July 12, 2011, How Does the Navy Get Ready, and Where
Are We Today?.................................................. 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, July 12, 2011........................................... 35
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TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2011
HOW DOES THE NAVY GET READY, AND WHERE ARE WE TODAY?
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
WITNESSES
Burke, VADM William, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet
Readiness and Logistics (N4)................................... 4
McCoy, VADM Kevin, USN, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command..... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z................................... 41
Burke, VADM William, joint with VADM Kevin McCoy............. 43
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 39
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Department of the Navy, May 11, 2011, Memorandum for the
Record, Subject: Fleet Readiness Review Panel Report (One
Year Later)................................................ 57
OPNAV 43, February 2011, unclassified Report to Congress on
Impact of Training and Crew Size on Surface Force Material
Readiness.................................................. 65
Two slides submitted by Admiral Burke........................ 80
Three charts submitted by Mr. Forbes......................... 82
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 87
Mr. Forbes................................................... 87
Dr. Heck..................................................... 88
Mr. Kissell.................................................. 88
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 89
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 93
Mr. Kissell.................................................. 95
HOW DOES THE NAVY GET READY, AND WHERE ARE WE TODAY?
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 12, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:12 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Forbes. The hearing will come to order.
I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished
panel of experts to today's hearing that will focus on how the
Navy gets ready and the current state of Navy readiness.
I want to apologize to both our admirals for being a few
minutes late. We just had a long series of votes, as you know,
and our members will be coming in, I am sure, on a sporadic
basis.
No one will dispute that we have the most capable Navy in
the world. However, a dichotomy exists when you contrast the
decline in our Navy readiness posture due to decreased funding,
with the increase in military capabilities of many emerging
powers.
In January of this year, then-Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates admitted that Beijing's military modernization caught the
U.S. intelligence community off-guard. This committee and the
China Caucus have been trying to alert them to that fact for
years, but to no avail.
I juxtapose that against a backdrop of looming defense cuts
in the United States that are expected to be submitted by the
Administration in the very near future. Our Navy already has
insufficient resources to preserve its current fleet, let alone
reverse the negative trends of years of underfunding, deferred
maintenance, and gaping holes in Navy readiness.
According to the Pentagon's quarterly readiness report to
Congress, in many areas the Navy has not met their goals and is
not prepared even with the current level of funding. For
example, currently only 45 percent of our deployed Navy
aircraft are fully combat ready for the hours that they are
sailing.
Everyone can do the math, but I am startled by the fact
that fewer than 5 aircraft out of every 10 in combat are
prepared for their mission. We continue to see shortfalls
throughout the fleet, including an ominous 16 percent backlog
for aircraft and engines, fewer spares available, and more than
$850 million of unfunded maintenance requirements, to cite a
few examples.
During inspections in the last 2 years, more than one in
five Navy vessels were deemed less than satisfactory or unfit
for combat. Coupled with manpower shortfalls, an increased
number of commanding officers being relieved, greater
cannibalization of parts from other vessels, and insufficient
training, all of these statistics add up to glaring
deficiencies that are nothing short of alarming.
Earlier this year before this very subcommittee, Vice
Admiral Bruce Clingan admitted that in his opinion the
Department of Defense, and certainly the Navy budget, is
carrying a level of risk this year, fiscal year 2012 and in the
out-years, that would cause me to suggest that one of the
solutions to the deficit spending that I would not advise is to
diminish DOD [Department of Defense] and certainly the Navy's
budget.
Admiral Clingan went on further to suggest that to decrease
the funding at a time when we are trying to reset and
reconstitute the force and meet an evolving security
environment, would invite multiple concurrent diverse crises
and would in fact increase risk.
Fundamentally, I am very disturbed because over the horizon
I see our adversaries continuing to expand their military
might, while a masthead of a $400 billion cut to national
defense is looming.
In the last few years, the press reported that after
meeting with Admiral Mullen, China's top general recommended
that the U.S. should reduce its military spending, which is
consistent with what we anticipate from the Administration in
the very near future.
And while some in Congress may agree, this is not a
position that I am prepared to accept. Unfortunately, this is
exactly the direction we are headed if we do not take strides
to preserve the budget and our critical investments.
It is incumbent upon this subcommittee to focus on today,
and it is our obligation to preserve and defend strategic
investments for the future. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today not only how the Navy gets ready, but delving
into detailed discussions regarding the current state of Navy
readiness.
Joining us today to discuss these issues are two very
distinguished individuals: Vice Admiral William Burke, who is
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness and
Logistics; and Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy, Commander, Naval Sea
Systems Command.
Gentlemen, as we mentioned earlier, we thank you both for
being here. We are looking forward to your testimony.
And now I would like to recognize the ranking member, my
friend Ms. Bordallo, for any remarks she may have.
Madeleine.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
To both our witnesses, Vice Admiral Burke and Vice Admiral
McCoy, I look forward to your testimony this afternoon.
Today, we are going to take a more comprehensive look at
the United States Navy's fleet readiness posture. The readiness
of our Navy's surface fleet has been a topic addressed in
detail by this subcommittee over the past 2 years under former
chairman Solomon Ortiz.
The Navy has slowly come to realize that it has accepted
too much risk in the maintenance of our non-nuclear surface
fleet over the past decade. These significant risks are due in
part to organizational decisions made by the Navy regarding
ship manning, ship maintenance capability, and crew training as
the Navy responded to institutional pressures to reduce
spending.
While the subcommittee appreciates the Navy's recognition
that its past decisions contributed to the current high risk in
maintenance of the non-nuclear surface fleet, we hope that the
testimony provided by our witnesses today will address when we
can expect to see tangible progress and improvement in the
overall readiness of our Navy fleet.
This subcommittee takes very seriously the material
readiness of our surface fleet. As a result, we increased
funding for the Navy's operation and maintenance account by
$440 million in our fiscal year 2012 authorization bill.
Now, this funding will make whole both the ship depot
maintenance and aviation depot maintenance accounts. I hope
that our witnesses can outline how this additional funding will
reduce risks and what specific benefits this funding would have
on maintenance activities in fiscal year 2012.
Finally, given the results of the Balisle Report,
significant challenges remain for improving Navy readiness. I
have seen the May 11, 2011, memorandum from Fleet Forces
Commander Admiral Harvey regarding changes to address the
issues outlined in the Balisle Report. And I hope our witnesses
today can discuss how these recommended changes will be
institutionalized in the Navy and over the coming years.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 57.]
Ms. Bordallo. Further, what is the cost of implementing and
sustaining these recommendations? Will these recommended
changes be reflected in the budgets for Navy operations and
maintenance over the Future Years Defense Program? What
challenges will possible reductions in the Defense and the Navy
budgets present to implementing these changes?
We do not have a fleet of 313 ships yet, so it is
critically important that we maintain our current fleet of 288
ships for the next near-term. Even though the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan are beginning to ramp down, our Navy's role in
projecting force across the globe will not decrease.
In fact, in many instances, I see the role of our Navy
increasing, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. So
maintaining our fleet is of utmost importance.
And again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
our witnesses' testimony today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bordallo can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you for those remarks, Madeleine.
And as we discussed prior to the hearing, I ask unanimous
consent that we dispense with the 5-minute rule for this
hearing and depart from regular order so that members may ask
questions during the course of the discussion. I think this
will provide a roundtable-type forum and will enhance the
dialogue on these very important issues.
Without objection, that is so ordered.
As I mentioned earlier, we have got two very distinguished
individuals who have served their country very well, bring to
this committee a great deal of expertise.
And gentlemen, we are both very proud of the service you
have done to your country and grateful that you would take time
to come here and be with us today.
Vice Admiral William Burke, as I mentioned, is the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness and Logistics, and
Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy is the Commander of Naval Sea Systems
Command.
So with that, we look forward to hearing your initial
statements. And Admiral Burke, I am assuming we will start with
you. And please feel free to address the committee.
STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM BURKE, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS (N4)
Admiral Burke. Chairman Forbes, Congresswoman Bordallo, and
distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, it is my
honor to participate in today's hearing representing the Navy
men and women--Active Duty, Reserve and civilian--who work to
ensure our Navy is ready to deliver the full range of
capabilities we possess to defend the Nation.
On their behalf, I also want to express our great
appreciation for the work of this committee in support of their
service, and in particular I appreciate what you just said,
Madam, about the plus-ups in 2012 in the readiness account.
Certainly, we appreciate those and I am happy to address how
those will help us.
I was asked to begin today by discussing briefly how we
generate ready Navy forces to meet the requirements of the
combatant commanders for named operations, presence, or major
combat operations.
Back in 2003, then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern
Clark directed the fleets to develop a new approach to
preparation and deployment of Navy forces. The idea was to
figure out how to get more of them out there at any given time.
So what came out of that was what we called the Fleet
Response Plan. And what it replaced was the IDTC or the Inter-
Deployment Training Cycle.
I would like to begin with a simple slide that explains the
elements of the plan.
Do you have those slides? You do. Okay, good.
So as you look at that first slide, you can see that the
Fleet Response Plan consists of four phases, each designed to
produce or sustain a certain readiness output.
[The slide referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
80.]
Admiral Burke. On the left, it starts with basic training,
and that provides unit-level training to a single ship or
aviation squadron, with training in--focused on being safe and
basic warfare skills.
At the completion of this phase, a ship or squadron is
qualified for certain limited operations, like humanitarian
assistance or counternarcotic.
The next phase is the integrated training phase, and that
provides additional training for Navy forces to be ready for
major combat operations. It is focused on training at the task
group level, with units working together to accomplish combat
objectives.
It culminates with a task force exercise which trains group
commanders in command and control.
At the completion of the integrated phase, the task force
and its associate elements are what we consider a 30-day surge
asset, and they are qualified for the full range of maritime
operations.
Next comes the sustainment phase. That is where the task
force will conduct virtual and live training as necessary to
maintain a high state of readiness, and will normally be
scheduled for one or more rotational deployments, depending on
the length of the sustainment phase and the Global Force
Management requirements.
And I am happy to discuss the Global Force Management
requirements later if that is desired.
Now, after they come back from deployment, ships and
squadrons and the task force in general will maintain
themselves at a readiness level to be a 30-day surge asset for
the length of that sustainment phase.
Then the maintenance phase is set aside to accomplish
maintenance. But from a ship perspective that is when many of
the individual members go off to schools and get individual
training to allow them to contribute to the unit training later
on.
Okay, so the IDTC was focused on building readiness in the
minimum time required--that is the old system--prior to a
single scheduled deployment. The new system is designed to
build readiness over a period of time and sustain readiness for
a significant period of time.
So if you will move to the second slide, you can see two
different schedules on there, the top one being the IDTC. And
what you see there is--in yellow is a maintenance period, a
notional maintenance period of several months, and then a kind
of an open period. And in that area, we didn't have the
direction we had in the current system.
[The slide referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
81.]
Admiral Burke. So ships would do a bunch of things. They
might be a bunch of exercises or operations, but they weren't
focused on getting to a certain level of training.
Then you would go into this work-up phase, which was
dedicated to getting the ship ready to deploy, and then the
single deployment.
And so you can see there is a couple opportunities in
there, circled in red, where those are lost opportunities for
operations.
In the FRP [Fleet Response Plan], on the other hand, you
have the same sort of maintenance period, followed by a basic
phase, where you go through exactly what I just explained. You
build basic skills in the unit level, then go to the
intermediate where you--or the integrated where you build
skills for the task force.
Finally, to the sustainment period in which you can see
that is a significant period of time. It is more than a year in
length. And so there is an opportunity for one deployment, or
two deployments, or a long deployment.
So, we think that that FRP scheme is the right way to go
because it generates the opportunity for greater forward
presence.
Now, the readiness challenge that we have today is that the
continuing demand for forces exceeds that which we have, which
we can provide. So, we have the combatant commanders in a
situation where they drive demand, and their demand is
relatively unconstrained except by the Global Force Management
process. And we have a limited supply of forces.
So, the Global Force Management process addresses that, but
then there is a request for forces that is outside that process
that we have to deal with, and I would be happy to talk about
that as well.
But when you have these additional deployments, you
sometimes impact the maintenance or you impact the training,
which will impact the maintenance. So, what we have is one
event cascading into another and so we don't get either of them
quite right.
And on the family side, an average of 50 ships a year since
2005 have violated one or more of the OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] or Navy standards such as deployment
length, dwell time, or time in home port, compared with an
average of 5 in years prior to that.
Now, my responsibility is the sustainment of our current
force, including Navy shore infrastructure. We must deliver the
expected service life of our current platforms to provide
future capacity to meet the Navy and Nation's needs. And our
shore infrastructure must support our warfighting platforms and
our sailors.
For fiscal year 2012, we focus first on supporting our
deployed forces, and then on achieving expected service life of
all our platforms.
The President's budget for fiscal year 2012 balances risk
across the entire Navy program to achieve the strongest current
and future readiness outcomes.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you and
look forward to discussing the Navy's sustainment programs with
you.
Thank you, sir.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Burke and Admiral
McCoy can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral Burke.
Admiral McCoy.
STATEMENT OF VADM KEVIN MCCOY, USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL SEA
SYSTEMS COMMAND
Admiral McCoy. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo,
distinguished members, it is a pleasure to be here with you
this afternoon with Admiral Burke to discuss this topic.
When I came into my command 3 years ago, the readiness and
sustainment of our surface forces was my number one priority. I
had just come from 3 previous years as the Navy's chief
engineer, and I saw what the increased OPTEMPO [operating
tempo] was doing to our ships.
Where today, for example, on any given day 50 percent of
our surface ships are underway, our ships are reaching midlife
in terms of our major combatant ships, and so therefore they
are going to get more maintenance intensive.
As well as, we build a lot of robustness and redundancy
into our ships early on, and you can underfund and underdo
maintenance early on in the ship's life and you may not
necessarily see it and then it catches up to you, and then
realization that we simply can't build our way to 313 ships.
And in fact, the cheapest way to afford our Navy with the
force structure that we need is to maintain the ships that we
already have.
In fact, over 70 percent of the 313-ship Navy out in the
2020 timeframe we own today. It is out there, it is underway,
it is deployed, it is sitting pierside.
So we brought all of our attention on solving this problem.
And the last piece was a recognition that we have a disparity
between how we were maintaining and sustaining our surface,
non-nuclear surface forces, compared to our submarines and our
aircraft carriers.
So, we implemented three initial series of actions. The
first was to make sure that, just like we do for submarines and
aircraft carriers, we build rigorous, class maintenance plans,
engineering-based, with the fundamentals.
They are required to get each one of our ships to their
full expected service life. And every one of our ships has a
defined service life when we go ahead and build the ship.
For example, a DDG 51 Flight IIA ship we are expecting to
get to 40 years, and LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] is 25 years, a
cruiser is 35 years. And each one of our ships has a defined--
and we base our future force structure plans and our
shipbuilding plan on getting those ships to their expected
service life.
We have no problem doing that with submarines and aircraft
carriers. Matter of fact, I am proud to say that today USS
Enterprise is 49 years and 8 months old, and it is underway on
deployment. Its first deployment was associated with the Cuban
missile crisis. And submarines routinely reach their end of
service life.
And so how do we build that engineering rigor? And we have
stood up an organization, it is today in Norfolk. We have 120
people that build the engineered class maintenance plants and
keep track of the requirement maintenance on our surface ships
every day. And we have funding laid in now to go ahead and do
that.
The second piece was, we had to build a comprehensive
assessment and sustainment plan for our surface ships. Quite
frankly, we stopped looking in an organized manner through the
late 1990s and the early part of the 2000s. We start looking
with outside eyes and detail at our ships.
And so one of the first things we did was we partnered with
the American Bureau of Shipping and said we want to use what
they use to keep about 10,000 ships in class around the world
every year. And we didn't want to reinvent the wheel, and we
built a very efficient process. And so far we have put about 20
ships through that process.
Actually when the ship goes in dry dock, we do about 5,000
to 6,000 ultrasonic tests on key structure and tanks, and we
inspect distributed systems. The things you need to make sure a
ship will last 30 or 40 years, we go do that now.
And we have a plan through the end of 2017 to just about
get every one of our surface ships through that process.
We also built rigorous assessment and sustainment plans
around the deployment cycle that Admiral Burke just talked
through. So for example, before a ship comes into major
availability, we now send people down to do hand-over-hand
inspections to make sure we thoroughly understand the work
package and pick up any last minute things. Prior to deployment
we do grooms and things like that.
And so the last piece of it, the third leg of the stool, if
you will, was to rebuild capacity and capability at the
regional maintenance centers, and that was for twofold. One was
to oversee contractor cost performance and quality performance,
and the second was to reestablish the intermediate level
capability that we had let atrophy.
And that is so important for ships right next to where they
tie up, to have repair capability so that we don't build this
backlog of little things that become bigger things. And so
sailors can come off the ships and see their equipment tore
down and have a better capability to repair their stuff
underway and be more self-sufficient when they get underway.
And I am happy to say just 2 weeks ago, with Admiral
Harvey, the Atlantic Fleet Forces Commander, we went down to
Mayport and we re-stood up the eye-level capability, and
reopened the shops that we had closed a number of years ago to
service the 19 surface ships that are in that area.
So, I would tell you, for 3 years now we have been working
this. I worked very closely with Admiral Balisle when he was
working on the Balisle Report. And he did a great job of tying
these issues together with other things in terms of manning and
training to build a comprehensive story.
And then, the last piece is we have been working very
closely, have received great support from the two surface type
commanders, the two fleet commanders, the CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] staff and the CNO himself to build the resources
necessary to fund the programs that I just talked about.
So, I am very happy to answer any questions you may have.
And thank you for your interest in this subject.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral McCoy and Admiral
Burke can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral McCoy.
And to both you gentlemen, I just want to tell you a little
bit of the logistics.
Our members ask their questions a little bit different than
some of the committees that have a more formal structure, where
one member will ask something for 5 minutes and then they
alternate. If they have anything related to that subject
matter, they may chime in, so we can have kind of a dialogue
and discussion.
And I want you guys to have all the time you need to
respond. So it is not a gotcha thing. You get a chance to look
at your answers and bring them back.
We want to begin by reiterating what I said at the
beginning, and that is how much we appreciate all you have done
for the service to our country. We recognize that. We thank
you. Both of you bring an enormous amount of expertise to this
hearing.
Admiral Burke, as I understand, in your role, you are
basically in charge of all of the maintenance operations for
our carriers, all of our ships, our aircraft, all of our naval
facilities. All of it is kind of under your auspices.
Is that pretty much accurate?
Admiral Burke. My job, sir, is to get the resources for
those areas, such that Admiral McCoy, his counterparts in the
aviation, can execute the maintenance and execute the
readiness.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And, Admiral McCoy has that with everything
other than the carriers. But you have the surface ships and the
subs. Is that correct?
Admiral McCoy. I am responsible for all of the engineering
and maintenance on the aircraft carriers, submarines and
surface ships. I don't have airplanes. My compadre, Vice
Admiral Architzel, who is Commander of Air--runs the airplanes.
Mr. Forbes. One of the concerns that this committee has is
that oftentimes we are trying to make sure we are answering one
key question, and that is, are we ready?
We see where--I mentioned in my opening statement, in
January the Secretary of Defense said that Beijing's military
modernization caught the U.S. intelligence community off-guard.
Whether he meant that or not, we can only go by his words.
But one of the things that is so frustrating to us is for
years, we sat in hearings just like this and said this is
happening, and we saw guys sitting where you are sitting
saying, ``No, no, no, it is all under control and we don't see
it happening that much.''
Today, it is important for us, because every time we see
somebody come over here with a uniform on, we just assume that
they are coming over to give us their best military expertise
and the experience that they bring to bear with all the great
stuff that they have done.
But I need to ask you how you perceive your role as
witnesses today, so begin, so our committee understands that.
And the reason that I have to ask that question is just a
few weeks ago, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral Mullen, was over here. And we were a little surprised,
because we asked the chairman, we said, ``We know that your
role to the President is being a military adviser and bringing
the collective information that you are getting from all of the
Joint Chiefs to him. Is that the same role you have when you
come testify to Congress?''
And he quickly said no. And we tried to find out what his
role was. And he couldn't tell us. It was kind of like
obscenity--you know it when you see it.
But what we didn't understand was he could come over here
and tell us on Don't Ask, Don't Tell. Before anybody even asked
him the question, he wanted to say what his personal opinion
was.
But when we asked him about troops in Afghanistan, where he
had mentioned that some of the policies that were taken posed a
greater risk than he was willing to accept, a risk to our men
and women in uniform and our mission, he said he didn't want to
answer those questions, to give us that expertise.
So, I guess my first question for you guys today, so the
committee knows just in how to phrase our questions, today as
witnesses, are you coming supporting the President's budget?
Are you coming as support of the Pentagon's position? Or are
you coming with an independent military assessment?
And we don't put a right or wrong on that. We just need to
know which hat we are wearing when we listen to your testimony.
Admiral Burke, maybe you could start off with that, and
then, Admiral McCoy.
Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. I come as a member of the U.S.
Navy to tell you what the President's budget says. And I will
give you my personal opinion if I think that is warranted.
In some cases my personal opinion is probably not
warranted, because I made my personal opinion known in the
deliberations, and it was either not accepted or my view wasn't
broad enough. Because, you know, I have my area of expertise
and there are other people that have a different area, and
there is only so much money to go around.
And so you end up with kind of a mix.
Mr. Forbes. And Admiral, we would still like to hear your
opinion, because we put a great deal of respect on that
opinion.
And one of the concerns that you know, in our oversight
role--we know what our role is. Our role is, first of all, to
represent our constituents, but secondly to do an oversight
role on the Navy. And for that, we need that kind of expertise
and those opinions.
Admiral McCoy, any difference on how you view your role?
Admiral McCoy. Mr. Chairman, I am here, first as a naval
officer. I am also an engineer and probably a lifelong
maintainer of ships.
I intend to give you a straight story on what we need. I
will also tell you what I think the impacts if we don't get
what we need.
But I also--as Admiral Burke said, I also understand that
in the higher roll-up of the budget, that the priorities may
not exactly have come out the way I would have selected it. But
I think I can give you an honest assessment of what the
shortfall will translate into.
Mr. Forbes. And that is what we are asking for--thank you,
both, for that.
Oftentimes, I have found that our services speak a language
that sometimes they don't even, each other, understand, you
know, and we speak a language that the American people don't
understand.
So we try to bring it down to a language that, perhaps,
unifies us all.
When we talk about readiness, the average person listening
to that doesn't really know what we are talking about, because
we sometimes talk around them.
But as I look at readiness, it seems to be our ability to
supply the resources our combatant commanders need to meet
their current and future missions.
Is that a fair assessment, Admiral Burke, or how would you
change that?
Admiral Burke. I am sorry. I think that is probably a fair
assessment.
I do think, though, that the combatant commanders live in a
different world than we do, in that they are not constrained by
resources and we are.
And I don't mean to make that sound like we don't have, but
I think we only have so many ships today. They can't be in all
the places they are asked for.
And I think the services, in particular the Navy in this
case, has to be stewards of that resource for the future. So
using it up today puts a future combatant commander at risk if
we don't husband that resource in the near term.
Mr. Forbes. And Admiral Burke, and I don't want to belabor
this but, but these are important issues for us. That is why I
am taking a few more minutes than I normally would.
But when we are looking from this committee at making sure
we are ready, that we have the readiness we need as a nation,
we have got to not only look at today's missions, but our
future missions as well.
But our goal for readiness is to make sure those combatant
commanders have what they need to be able to fulfill their
missions.
Now, we may be restrained by budgets and have to say how do
we deal with that.
But isn't that the essence of readiness, to make sure that
those combatant commanders have what they need to fulfill their
missions, whatever those missions might be?
Admiral Burke. Sir, I would agree that in general that is
true. I am just simply making the point that there is a
combatant commander today and there is a combatant commander
tomorrow.
If the combatant commander today uses it all up, then it
won't be there for the combatant commander tomorrow.
So it is--I know it sounds like I am hedging, but I am
trying to say that there is a future readiness piece to this as
well.
Mr. Forbes. And I don't disagree. What I have a hard time
with is when our combatant commanders are on the field, trying
to fulfill the missions that we have tasked them to fulfill, we
want to make sure they have the resources to do those missions.
That is what this committee should be about, I would think,
as a Readiness Subcommittee.
And do you disagree with that?
Admiral Burke. I don't disagree with it. I am just saying
there is a caveat to it that I think the committee ought to
recognize.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral McCoy.
Admiral McCoy. I think the piece that I would probably
elaborate on a little further is, for example, if a combatant
commander decides he needs the force structure such that we
don't do maintenance availabilities for 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 years.
There is a cost to that, such that that ship is no longer a 35-
or a 40-year ship.
And that has to be accounted for in the shipbuilding plan
and in our ship inventory for future years. That is the piece.
And it may be to the point where we technologically, you
know, we have to be on a cycle, a maintenance and sustainment
cycle, that with our inventory of ships that doesn't allow us
to provide the readiness at very high levels for sustained
periods of time.
Mr. Forbes. When are you going to look at our combatant
commanders and say, ``You shouldn't have the resources you need
to fulfill your mission?''
I don't understand that.
I understand that you may differ with them on what those
resources may be. But I just don't understand, when we have a
combatant commander anywhere in the world that we are going to
look at him and say, ``We are not going to give you the
resources you need to fulfill your mission.''
That is different than saying, ``We are going to give you
everything you want.''
But shouldn't we be about saying we are going to give them
all the resources they need to fulfill their mission?
Or are we saying that we are making budgetary decisions
here today and we are making them over at the Pentagon that are
not giving them the resources they need to fulfill their
mission?
I guess that is my question. And that is where I am having
a hard time getting a yes or no answer.
Admiral Burke.
Admiral Burke. They should have the resources to do their
mission. The process in the Pentagon is such that there is a
Global Force Management process that adjudicates the requests
from the combatant commanders.
And so, that is a way of taking the resources and
allocating them to the level of what we have. So trying to take
what we have, divvy it up in an appropriate fashion, you get X,
you get Y, you get Z, et cetera.
But then there is a piece outside the process, where there
are requests for forces that we try to address. But they come
in outside of the process, and so in doing some of that, we end
up with what Admiral McCoy is talking about with potentially
using up our fleet.
It is not so obvious with ships, but it is very obvious
with aircraft. Aircraft only have a certain amount of life in
them. They can only fly so many hours. When you use those up
today, you don't have them tomorrow.
Mr. Forbes. And, Admiral, I don't disagree with that at
all. I mean, that is kind of the given. We understand that.
What I am saying is it looks like to me, this committee and
the full committee should be asking ourselves this question
when we are looking at readiness. Do our combatant commanders
have the resources they need to fulfill the missions we task
them with?
If we don't have those resources, we shouldn't be tasking
them with the missions. But if we task them with the missions,
don't we have an obligation to make sure they have the
resources necessary to fulfill those missions?
That seems to me to be a pretty straightforward question
for us. And we shouldn't be back over here in the Pentagon or
over here saying, ``No, we are just going to give you a portion
of what you need to fulfill your mission, because we don't want
to spend the money to do it.''
So my question to you is at what time do we look at any
combatant commander and say, ``We are giving you a mission, but
we are not going to give you the resources to fulfill your
mission?''
That is different than a wish list. That is when do we look
and say, ``We are not going to give you the resources you need
to fulfill your mission?''
Admiral Burke. I don't think we do. I think if they don't
have the resources, then we would change the mission or----
Mr. Forbes. So then, it would be fair to say that from our
perspective as the committee, we should be looking to determine
readiness based on whether or not we are able to give the
resources that our combatant commanders need to fulfill their
missions, both today and the future missions they have.
Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Is that fair?
Admiral McCoy, would you disagree with that?
Admiral McCoy. No, that is fair. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Now in making that assessment, do we have
any objective bars, thresholds, or standards we use to make it,
or is all this just kind of subjective, that we kind of know it
when we see it?
Admiral Burke. We have a--it is not ``we will know it when
we see it.'' We have, as I described in my opening, a process
by which we generate maintenance--or generate readiness.
That process has specific requirements that the units
complete, that the task group or task force completes before it
is certified by the Second or Third Fleet Commander to go
forward and do its deployed business.
Mr. Forbes. In determining our readiness, do we rely on the
QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] at all?
Admiral Burke. No, sir.
Mr. Forbes. So you don't look at the QDR at all to
determine--how do you know what the missions are going to be
for our combatant commanders, both today and in the future?
What do you use as your touchstone to measure those missions
against?
Admiral Burke. Let me make sure--the Quadrennial Defense
Review?
Mr. Forbes. Yes.
Admiral Burke. No, sir. When the COCOM [combatant
commander] requests forces, he has some idea what he wants
those forces to be able to do, and that allows us to tailor the
training package, if necessary.
But what we endeavor to do is train the deploying force to
a wide variety of missions, because what we think is going to
happen isn't always what happens, so we want them to be ready
for----
Mr. Forbes. So, what role does the QDR play? In other words
if we are looking at this laydown of what we believe our risk
assessment is, what role does that play?
Does that play no role at all in determining our readiness
posture?
Admiral Burke. I think the QDR, sir, is designed to look at
what the future might be and what the force is necessary to
deal with the QDR would be. So I believe it is more a force
planning document than a force readiness document or force
readiness generating document.
Mr. Forbes. So, do you not use the QDR to know the forces
that you are going to need to be able to do your planning with?
Admiral Burke. I think we are talking past one another,
sir, and I will try to remedy that.
The QDR helps us decide what forces we procure. The COCOM
demand signal helps us determine how we prepare those forces to
deploy.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. I am going to hold off now and come back,
because I have got a series of questions I would like to follow
up with you on that and some of the reports that we have from
that.
But I would like to recognize the ranking member now, Ms.
Bordallo, for any questions that she has.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
My first question is for either of the admirals.
I do know the Navy has been operating at a very high
operational level for the past 10 years. And in order for the
Navy to meet the ongoing, intense operational requirements, are
we increasing our fleet deployment schedule too much?
Or are we investing sufficient time into preventative
maintenance, training our sailors, and building an adequate,
managed structure to maximize our fleet readiness in the
future?
I guess I will hear from both of you.
Admiral Burke. I will take it.
That is one of my concerns, madam. And it gets back to a
conversation I was just having with the chairman.
It is the potential overuse of our platforms. And so, that
overuse makes them last less time or precludes the opportunity
to do the necessary maintenance, and what the ground forces
will call reset, and we call ``reset in stride.''
That is, they need to get a certain amount of maintenance
every so often at the engineered required level. And if we
don't do that, we are not going to achieve service life. That
is the ships side.
On the air side, we are going to fly the wings off them.
They only have about 6,000 or 8,000 hours in those planes, if
we don't get them--if we use that up in 10 years or 12 years.
But we plan on them lasting 20, 25 years.
The other thing that happens with some of the deployments
we had is those deployments optimize for the combatant
commanders' requirements.
That is what we have done, and so now what happens is you
run into a maintenance issue gets shortchanged or a subsequent
[inaudible]. So one cascades into another, which cascades into
another, which cascades into another, and you end up with a
less ready ship or less ready [inaudible] because of that.
Ms. Bordallo. Admiral.
Admiral McCoy. No, it is--I think this is an issue,
something that we are working closely with surface maintenance,
particularly now that we are putting the resources and the
focus on it.
One area where you have a series of smaller compressed
availabilities is you can't efficiently do the deep maintenance
that you need to do.
Looking at a cycle similar to what we do with aircraft
carriers, where we have, say, a certain cycle that allows us a
6-month period in there to do deep maintenance. What is the
right mix in there for surface ships? This is one issue that we
are tackling right now inside of Navy.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
My next question also is for both of you. I am not familiar
with the technical nuances of combat operations of the ship,
but I have heard repeatedly about the tactical data link
coordination and standard protocol on board our surface
combatants.
I think the network is called [inaudible] 16, and I am
wondering if you plan any improvements to establishing a high
fidelity, common operational picture to ensure a more stable,
dependable depiction of the domain operations at any point in
time.
And I would like to hear from both of you.
Admiral Burke. Madam, there are technologies in that area.
You have it absolutely right.
We are working on that one. I don't know specifically what
the progress is that we have made. And I would be happy to get
back to you on that.
Ms. Bordallo. All right.
Admiral.
Admiral McCoy. It is an area that we are working on, madam.
It has to do with interoperability between sea and air assets.
And we would like to take that one for the record and get you
and up-to-date response.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 87.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today.
For your service to our country, thank you very much.
Our U.S. Navy is the world's greatest power projection
force, and despite being at the lowest ship levels in decades,
the fleet remains one of our greatest national assets. This is
an asset that we should be nurturing and ensuring. And we must
continue to grow this asset to meet all of our current
requirements and ensure that future capability needs are met.
In my opinion this means continuing to grow our fleet,
supporting a robust shipbuilding plan, and ensuring that our
current ships meet their projected service lives without major
problems.
One thing I am curious about is the use of composite
materials in our Navy as both replacement parts and original
parts.
So, Admiral McCoy or Admiral Burke, whoever is the most
knowledgeable on the subject, while much of the discussion has
been focused on the Navy's past performance with respect to the
operation and maintenance of the surface fleet, I would like to
shift the topic slightly to talk about, you know, composites.
So, I have a number of material manufacturers in my
district, composite materials, and I am aware that composite
materials have been introduced in several Navy ship programs.
What is the Navy's experience to date with composites?
Admiral McCoy. Yes, sir. We are trying to use composite
replacement parts everywhere we can. Great examples are, for
example, topside electrical boxes, telephone boxes, electrical
plug-ins all over the ship.
Great success stories--composite deck gratings. Every place
we can, we are trying to use composite. So particularly on, for
example, LCS-1, we see in the waterborne mission zone that use
of composites really improved corrosion performance.
Corrosion is one of our biggest cost drivers in the Navy,
and so we are trying to use composites everywhere we can, sir.
Mr. Palazzo. I understand that these composites offer some
valuable advantages as far as strength and weight efficiency.
And some studies have concluded that composites are able to
meet Navy service life requirements on several ship classes.
Do you anticipate the Navy will rely on these types of
materials even more in the future?
Admiral McCoy. I do. And in fact, you know, we are building
a ship right now, the DDG 1000, with an all-composite deck
house that we will get valuable experience on.
But at the component level, it is the way to go,
particularly for replacement of steel enclosures and things,
and topside structure.
Mr. Palazzo. Are you satisfied with the amount of composite
materials going into the future ship plans, or could we do
more?
Admiral McCoy. I think we could always do more. And I think
that is the partnership that we have to continue to have with
the shipbuilders, who are really, kind of, the deck plate
experts, and they are giving us ideas and opportunities on how
to further expand the composite use.
Mr. Palazzo. All right. Is there anything I can do or our
colleagues on this committee can do to help the Navy use more
composite materials?
Admiral McCoy. No, I will get back to you. If I see the
opportunity, I will tell you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 89.]
Admiral McCoy. You know, for example, I just spent a day--
twice a year, there is a big group of Navy and industry folks
that get together. It is called Mega Rust. And I go at least
once a year.
It doesn't sound very exciting, but there is hundreds of
people. Some people estimate 20 percent of, you know, all DOD
budget goes to fighting corrosion.
But I regularly have people coming into my office showing
me their products, and we try and fast-track it. It is not just
composites. It is things, different metal treatments for
corrosion-resistant. This is one of those things that gets an
open door to my office.
Mr. Palazzo. Let us know how we can help.
Admiral McCoy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate it.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
And the chair recognizes now the gentleman from
Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you for
holding this hearing. And thank you to both witnesses.
At the outset, first of all, I just want to state that I
have had an opportunity to work, over the last 2 years, with
Admiral McCoy's office, dealing with issues regarding repair
and maintenance work up at the Groton Shipyard at Electric
Boat.
And I just want to say I think we are blessed to have your
service.
And again, I just think your balancing act that you perform
constantly is really impressive. And on behalf of the people in
southeastern Connecticut, I just want to publicly thank you for
your great work.
You know, one of the things that I did, sort of, get a peek
at during that whole process of, you know, trying to figure out
availabilities that some of the workers could, you know, fit
into was when we went through the CR [continuing resolution]
process last spring.
You know, when we talk about, you know, readiness and
making sure that, you know, the maintenance requirements that
your testimony describes is really going to be part of the
effort to get to 313 ships.
I mean, when there is these sort of uncertainties regarding
funding, that obviously has got to be a factor. And I just
wonder if you could talk about that for a little bit, in terms
of, you know, what was going on last spring when the CR was up
in the air and what that meant in terms of availabilities, and
how that would affect readiness, if Congress really doesn't
operate in regular order as far as getting budgets passed?
Admiral McCoy. Yes, first of all, thank you very much for
your kind remarks, Congressman.
As you know, I think it is a waste to have any qualified
mechanic, particularly a submarine mechanic, not doing his
trade. And we have been very successful at using the folks at
EB [Electric Boat] to really help our tremendous needs on the
Navy side.
The CR process was incredibly disruptive. I think, luckily,
we will be able to come out of it with the majority of the
availabilities that we wanted to accomplish, most of that
maintenance done. But it is incredibly disruptive.
For example, Peleliu was supposed to be done in the early
spring at NASSCO [National Steel and Shipbuilding Company] in
San Diego, and it is getting done at the end of the year.
We were not able to let contracts. We had to defer
maintenance, and we had to change ship schedules around. We
were not able--for example, we needed help in our public
shipyards to do some work and we were not able to write the
contracts to the Electric Boat workers to have them come down
and help us.
And so, to the extent we can have a budget on time, boy,
you really help us out with the maintenance and sustainment
piece and keeping the fleet schedules on track.
Mr. Courtney. And--go ahead, Admiral.
Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, Mr. Courtney.
It also impacts ship operations as well. So there are some
deployments that are lesser deployments than others. And so we
are forced to decide whether to do those or not and try to, you
know, kind of, bet on the come there will be a budget or not.
Ship visits, you know, a number of those are canceled to
various wonderful ports around the east and west coasts that--
you know, not too many as it turns out, but it also creates
churn.
You know, what are we going to do with the schedule? What
is the ship going to do? And so that, the combination of
maintenance and operations are--they are both impacted by a
continuing resolution.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
And Admiral McCoy, I was wondering if you could just, sort
of, describe for the committee again the process that you use
with that, sort of, you know, industry working group, in terms
of looking at, maybe, shortfalls of workers in one yard versus
another and how that operates.
Because, frankly, I think that is helpful for us to
understand how you are trying to balance the maintenance needs.
Admiral McCoy. Yes, sir.
We have inside NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems Command] is about
60,000 civilians. About half of them turn a wrench every day
for a living. About a little less than 30,000 turn a wrench for
a living, and work on our nuclear ships or submarines and our
aircraft carriers.
We experience peaks and valleys through the year. And we
rely heavily on augmentation of our organic workforce at the
four nuclear shipyards. We rely on Electric Boat and Huntington
Ingalls down in Newport News.
The folks that work on nuclear ships are highly skilled.
They have a significant amount of experience. And it is not
somebody that you can just hire off the street.
As a matter of fact, we tell people it takes longer to
train a nuclear welder in this country than it does a surgeon,
because of the level of experience that they have.
And so, we meet every single month with the four naval
shipyards, Electric Boat, and Huntington Ingalls, and we go
through not only at the trade, you know, Shop 38 mechanic, an
outside machinist mechanic, but also the individual trade
skills below that, an air conditioning and refrigeration
mechanic, a hydraulics mechanic, all within that Shop 38.
And we project out for the year how many people we need at
each place and how many people we have. And we are constantly
moving workers around.
On any given day, there are about 200 workers in the six
nuclear yards, the four public yards, and the two private
yards. There is about 200 or so workers. Some months, it is
more.
For example for the next couple of months, 170 Electric
Boat workers will be required to augment the public shipyards
to get the Nation's nuclear work done.
And so, we treat the workforce of the six nuclear yards as
a very precious commodity and are constantly balancing the
pluses and minuses and sending folks here and sending folks
there. And we have been very successful at doing that, and we
continue on.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
I yield back now. I will save a question for later.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
Now, the chair recognizes Dr. Heck from Nevada.
Dr. Heck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today.
And interested to see the Navy go into the Fleet Response
Plan, I think you will find it very successful, as the Army has
found the ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] model to be very
successful in a similar pattern. And that will be my only
gratuitous Army comment for today. Hooah.
You know, we have talked a lot about hardware ships. But I
tend to concentrate more on the personnel readiness side,
considering that we can have the best hardware in the world,
but if we have got nobody to man it or staff it, it really
doesn't do us any good.
In the final report of the Fleet Review Panel of Surface
Force Readiness from last February, some of the corrective
actions that were to be taken for manning were to increase
billets, primarily--I think it was, what, 1,120 personnel
billets for optimally manned ships in order to perform
preventive and corrective maintenance, and then an additional
285 shore billets.
Where are those billets coming from? Is that within the
current manning caps? Is that a movement of billets from one
location to another?
But where are you going to find those available billets?
Admiral Burke. Sir, those are within the current caps. So,
they will come from things that we consider less important.
Dr. Heck. So the risk analysis has been done to identify
which billets can be given up without incurring any risk in
those other areas where you are going to shift over to shore up
these areas?
Admiral Burke. I wouldn't say that there is no risk. I
would say that----
Dr. Heck. But the risk-benefit analysis says that the risk
is acceptable to move those billets?
Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.
Dr. Heck. The other thing I found interesting was that
there was only a 61 percent fit classification on board ships.
Why such a low percentage?
And the goal was to get it up to 85 percent. What eats away
that only has you at a 61 percent fit classification?
Admiral Burke. This is not my area of expertise, but I will
take it for the record. But let me tell you roughly what I
think on this one.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 88.]
Admiral Burke. For years, we operated on a fill model. So
that was essentially, you have a billet, we will put a person
in it. Fit says that not only will we put a person in it, but
we will put the right person in it, and that will be both rate,
Fire Controlman, and NEC [Navy Enlisted Classification], which
is specific schools or specific capability within that.
And so in many cases, we now have the right person at the
right grade, but we don't have the specific school. So that
person may need to go to another level of fire control school.
And so that is the challenge we have right now, and so we are
trying to remedy that.
Dr. Heck. And I know, if it is anything like the issues
that we have in the Army, getting enough school slots is always
a problem.
Are you finding that a big--and maybe you don't know, but
you can find out. Is part of the issue having enough available
school slots to get these individuals in to be trained, or what
is the issue with them not attaining the level necessary to be
classified as fit?
Admiral Burke. I will definitely take that one for the
record, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 88.]
Dr. Heck. Thank you. And I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today.
Admiral Burke, you said a couple times, ``a limited supply
of forces.'' What were you referring to in the big picture
there, and what does that affect?
Admiral Burke. What I am referring to when I say we have a
limited supply is we only have 285 ships. And I as a
submariner, I am most familiar with the submarine model, where
COCOM demand is for about 16 or 18 sub SSNs at any one time.
We deliver about 10 SSNs at any one time. And why do we
only deliver 10? Because that is all we can afford to deliver,
so----
Mr. Kissell. When you were talking about limited supply of
forces, you were talking about specifically ships, and not
personnel, not aircraft, not missiles, or equipment for the
ships? You were talking specifically for ships?
Admiral Burke. I am talking about ships as a representative
of the entire Navy. So the same sort of thing happens with
aircraft.
But the aircraft in the Navy are typically on ships. So
they are part of that process. So in other words, we frequently
get asked to deliver more carrier presence with the carrier and
the aircraft than we can deliver.
Mr. Kissell. So for every ship that we are short, then you
are saying there is just a multiplied shortness there of
everything that you could want or imagine or need with that
ship, and that is what kind of--I was just curious more about,
when you say, limited supply of forces, just, you know. So that
is kind of a--for every ship, then, what comes with that ship,
we are missing?
Admiral Burke. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kissell. Okay.
And Admiral McCoy, you mentioned a percentage of ships
being deployed. And I know we had some charts here, and I
probably--it is on there somewhere and I just missed it.
But is there an optimum level that we operate against in
saying this is the percentage that we would like to have
deployed at any one time, in order to have the rest and
retrofitting and everything else that we need going on at one
time?
Is there a percentage that we shoot for, or is it just kind
of vary to tempo levels, or----
Admiral Burke. Let me take that one.
Mr. Kissell. Okay.
Admiral Burke. First of all, there are about 12 percent of
our forces forward deployed. In other words, it is homeported
in Sasebo, Yokosuka, Japan or in Bahrain. So those forces are
always forward, if you will.
That number has essentially doubled over the last 10 years,
effectively doubled, given the increase in forces forward and
the decrease in overall forces. So the 40 percent includes
that.
What we have done over the last several years is, by
increasing those that are forward deployed, we have taken those
that are rotationally deployed--those that deploy from Norfolk
and Groton and San Diego and Hawaii to go other places.
We have taken that number and kept it the same, even though
the force is dropping, the force size is dropping. So where we
are today is we are not at a sustainable level. Forty percent
is not sustainable in the long term.
Mr. Kissell. Is there a percentage that would be, you know,
all things being equal, more sustainable?
Admiral Burke. Well, in the submarine force that number is
about 22 percent.
Mr. Kissell. Okay.
Admiral Burke. So 22 percent are forward at any one time.
Mr. Kissell. And one other question, Admiral Burke.
You talked about that with aircraft, that there is a
certain number of hours you get to fly them. And with the
delayed delivering of the F-35 and the more hours that we are
flying on the wings we have now, where are we heading to?
Are we heading towards to the point we don't have the
aircraft that we need? And how soon might we be there or the
consequences--what do you foresee there?
Admiral Burke. The delay in the arrival of the F-35 is a
challenge for us. It will add hours on those other aircraft
that we call legacy aircraft. It will add hours to them. And
those hours are costly, particularly at the end of the
aircraft's life.
Mr. Kissell. And how many more hours do you think we have
there? When are we going to reach the point where those lines
start coming too close to each other?
Admiral Burke. Well, we are addressing that now. We have a
surface life assessment program and a surface life extension--
excuse me, a service life extension program for our F-18s.
And we are in the middle of actually assessing and
extending some of those aircraft. So they are built as a 6,000-
hour aircraft. And we are doing the engineering analysis.
And we think we can get them to 8,000. And then there is
additional analysis that is going on, to try to get longer life
out of them. But there is only so far you can go.
The other thing we are trying to do in that regard is to
add simulation time. So, if we can--a simulator hour is one,
cheap--if we can make if effective, we can reduce the hours on
the actual airplane.
Mr. Kissell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the admiral
to get some more information on that and to kind of project
where these lines may be going. Because if we don't get the F-
35 in and we can't get the hours there, you know, how soon is
that crisis point coming?
Admiral Burke. I would be happy to do that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 88.]
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Larry.
Admiral, I want to come back to the questions we were
asking, because--and I want to just be honest with you.
I do not understand--and these aren't just to you two
individuals as much as they are to the Pentagon and to the
questions--when we are grappling with trying to make sure we
have the right readiness posture, it would seem to me that it
would be without question that we would determine readiness to
be our ability to supply the resources our combatant commanders
need to meet their current and future missions.
It baffles me that we can't even answer that question first
and agree on that question.
Now, we might say we just don't have the budget to be able
to do it. We don't have the dollars, and we need more dollars
to do it.
We might even say that our combatant commanders ask for too
much. Maybe they don't need all that they are asking for.
But to suggest that readiness is not our ability to supply
the resources our combatant commanders need to meet their
current and future missions baffles me, you know. So, I just
want to say at the outset, I don't understand that.
The second thing is I don't know why we have the QDR if the
QDR isn't going to help us make some assessments on our
readiness. We have been asking for, for the longest time, in
the full committee, to get a true threat assessment of what we
have got out there and the risks that we may have for future
missions, as well as current, so we know if we are ready,
because we can't turn these things on a dime in 2 years or 3
years. Sometimes it is a longer period of time.
We are constantly told, when the Navy wants something or
the Pentagon wants something, well, look at the QDR. So, I
would think we would need to look at the QDR for our readiness.
But I want to cite you this, which is disturbing to me.
This comes from the independent panel, bipartisan. Everybody
agrees that they had a consensus that said this: ``The natural
tendency of bureaucracy is to plan short-term, operate from the
top-down, think within existing parameters and affirm the
correctness of existing plans and programs of record.''
That is exactly what happened to the QDR process. ``Instead
of unconstrained, long-term analysis by planners who were
encouraged to challenge preexisting thinking, the QDRs became
explanations and justifications, often with marginal changes of
established decisions and plans.''
I think that is what happens sometimes when we are talking
about readiness.
Admiral Burke, yesterday, you and Admiral McCoy were kind
enough to come meet with me prior to this meeting. Putting it
in a simple language, I asked you on readiness were we good to
go. And you said yes.
I want to put up a chart, if you don't mind now on our
INSURV [Board of Inspection and Survey] inspections, which I
asked you about yesterday, and ask you guys to respond to this.
Assuming that we are not going to just rely on our
combatant commanders to tell us what they need, I would think
we would have some kind of objective criteria.
If you look at this chart--and I think the members have it
in their materials, that they can look at if they can't see up
there--if you go back to 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, on our
INSURV inspections, of the ones that came back either
unsatisfactory or unfit for combat, it was 8 percent in 2007,
12 percent in 2008, 18 percent in 2009, 24 percent in 2010 and
22 percent so far this year.
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
82.]
Mr. Forbes. Is there any objective goal that we look for,
for those failures? Any percentage, Admiral McCoy, that you
would say--that you would be looking for us to say we are good
to go when it comes to our INSURV inspections?
Admiral McCoy. Yes. Let me first say, referring back to our
conversation yesterday, I told you I thought we had a good
plan, that we had built, over the last 3 years, that we were
started off on it and that the key is to sustain the funding
and to sustain that effort. And I believe that.
We are not good to go today. And I will you that, in the
near term, I suspect that some of these indicators will
actually, in the near term, turn a little bit harsher.
And the reason I say that is, for a long time, we were not
doing the deep, deep looks. And we are doing the deep, deep
looks right now. And so that, you know, we are going to see a
backlog of CASREPS [casualty reports] actually go up.
We are going to see a backlog of 2-kilos [repair work
requests] that need to be completed go up, because we are doing
hand-over-hand inspections. We are doing the grooms with the
ships in the middle of the period, getting ready for
deployment.
And so, I would tell you, one of the things we are trying
to answer right now with the two fleet commanders is so what
are the key metrics that show we are making progress?
And what do we think that our trajectory is going to be?
That is something that we are working on right now,
Congressman Forbes. I think we have the right elements in
place. We have laid in the right engineering rigor. We have
laid in the right inspections. We have laid in the right
staffing at our maintenance facilities.
The type commanders have laid in the additional people that
they need shipboard to keep up with the maintenance period. The
top-down involvement, from the fleet, in terms of the standards
and hands-on work with the ships, not only to get ready for
INSURVs, but to get ready for deployment.
All of that is in the right direction. And, right now, we
are trying to figure out exactly what those key measures of
success are going to be, and how long it is going to take us to
get there. But I will tell you it is going to take us another
couple of years.
And we are going to see some of this kind of data for the
next year or two, I think, as we get the deep looks, get the
inspections done. I will give you a great example, and I think
it is kind of the poster child for why we need to continue
doing what we have laid in place.
I was on a ship a couple of weeks ago, USS Chosin, a
cruiser out in Hawaii. And the availability started out at
about $35 million. It was supposed to finish in July.
The availability is now about $70 million, mostly because
of deep structure, tanks, hull that once we put the ship in dry
dock that needed to be addressed and it is going to extend the
availability about 3 months and add about $35 million--almost
100 percent growth to the ship.
That is the kind of thing that we are going to see for the
near term as we do these inspections, but it will ensure that
our ships get to their full service life. I am convinced,
because we have put in place for surface ships the same model
that we use for submarines and aircraft carriers that we know
works.
And now, I think we have to stay the course. We are not
where we want to be. We are on the right path. We are moving in
the right direction, but we have to stay the course, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And Admiral, I want to repeat what I said
earlier. I have the utmost respect for both of you guys. I am
not pointing fingers at either one of you. I also have the
utmost respect for your opinions.
Here is what concerns us as a committee. We have to look at
objective criteria. And when I look at this kind of chart, it
worries me that I see this trajectory that I have got up here,
and I think you would agree when we look at 24 percent and 22
percent, that is concerning.
The second thing that worries me is exactly what you said
with the Chosin. We look at a situation where we see folks from
the Pentagon sitting on the other side of those tables telling
us, ``We have got a plan. We are turning it around.''
We watched as time after time they come over here when they
have a statutory requirement to audit their financial
statements and they said the exact thing. ``We have a plan.''
In fact, the Secretary said that in 2007, had it up on his
Web site that he was going to have them all audited by 2010--
got a plan, taking care of it, it is a high priority. He missed
it by 100 percent.
They didn't audit any of them in 2010 and they said they
would do 100 percent.
Chosin, you are right. We had people telling us it was
going to be $35 million, you know. It is coming out $70
million.
In Guam, when they came in and sat right where you are and
told us it is going to cost $10 billion, the last report we got
it is going to be $18 billion, you know, not $10 billion. And
so, we are sitting here saying how do we have confidence in the
fidelity of these models if we don't see objective criteria
turning them.
Now, I would like to put up another--actually, I think it
is on the bottom of that. Look at the maintenance that we have
a shortfall on.
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
82.]
Mr. Forbes. Admiral Burke, this is one I would like to ask
you on. I raised it last night, and for the members, it is at
the bottom of the chart, I think, that you just had.
We had this year in the President's budget a $367 million
shortfall in our ship maintenance.
Admiral Burke, I am coming back to what you told me at the
beginning of today's hearing that if we don't do the
maintenance, we are going to have shorter life cycles, and we
are going to have greater costs down the road.
Ultimately, this is something that came over. Your office
had to look at it. How do we justify having a $367 million
shortfall for ship maintenance if I am looking at INSURVs that
are continually growing in terms of failures, and I am looking
at your statement that we are going to have shorter life cycles
and greater costs?
Admiral Burke. I am not happy about the $367 million.
However, it was a decision that was made based on a bunch of
other priorities. And ship maintenance came out short a few
hundred million dollars.
The impact of that is significant. The impact is that we
will go without approximately 40 availabilities.
Mr. Forbes. And Admiral, my concern about, first of all,
again, you know, I am not pointing at you. Because I know you
needed that money and had it in there.
I am just saying when the Pentagon comes over and tells us
everything is good to go, it is okay, we are $367 million
short, that is a problem for us, especially when I am looking
every day at China growing in the terms of ships they have got.
And I know that that is having an impact on us.
Can I put up another chart on our Navy aircraft? Now, these
are deployed aircraft.
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
83.]
Mr. Forbes. If you would look at that, it is less than 5
out of 10 of our aircraft are fully mission capable. Our goal
is 60 percent and we are not reaching 45 percent. And yet I see
shortfalls of $72.7 million for our aircraft depot maintenance
and our aviation logistics of $27 million.
How do we justify those proposed shortfalls in the budget
that came over here if we are only at less than 5 out of 10 of
our aircraft--these are deployed aircraft. These aren't ones
that are sitting back somewhere. They are deployed.
How do we justify those kinds of shortfalls?
Admiral Burke. There is not a good justification for those
shortfalls. I will say that they are within the realm of what
we have been doing for years, but it is a problem. We are short
on spares and that is part of the issue here is having the
parts that are available to fix these aircraft.
Mr. Forbes. So, it would be fair to say that we are not
good to go on those?
Admiral Burke. We are meeting the COCOM demand, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Be careful. You are telling me, are we meeting
the demands of our combatant commanders?
Admiral Burke. We are meeting the missions of the combatant
commanders. We are not missing missions today, sir.
Mr. Forbes. All right.
Admiral Burke. But I will say that----
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, I want to ask you this. Have you read
this quarterly readiness report from our combatant commanders?
Admiral Burke. I would have to look at it to tell you if I
have read it.
Mr. Forbes. It is--and let me just say this. I can't talk
about all this. This is the unclassified version. We have got
the classified version.
I want you just to look at that classified version. I am
tempted to go into a classified setting, but I encourage our
members to look at it and then come back and let me ask you
that question about whether or not you want to say that our
combatant commanders feel they are ready to meet those
missions.
But let us look at these objective facts, which is not
classified. I think you would agree with me we are not reaching
the goals we have set for ourselves, which are low goals. They
are only 60 percent. But we are just at 45 percent. So that is
a concern, isn't it?
Admiral Burke. It is definitely a concern.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Now, the next thing I would like to put
up is on our Naval facilities. I think we have a chart.
We don't have a chart on that, but let me just say this. I
come back to what you said, which I agree with you, if we don't
do our maintenance we have shorter life cycles and greater
costs.
This year, the budget that came over from the Pentagon
required that we only do 20 percent of the required maintenance
on all of our facilities. All the facilities--I am sorry, 80
percent, that we didn't do 20 percent of it. We only did 80
percent.
We had a shortfall of $349 million. How do we justify that
kind of shortfall and not doing the maintenance on those
facilities?
Admiral Burke. The model that we used for that is a
resourcing model that doesn't necessarily relate directly to
the way in which we do the maintenance. But I will agree with
you that in the long term if we don't pay for the maintenance
today, we will pay more for the maintenance in the future.
Mr. Forbes. Well, let us come back. You don't disagree that
we have a $349 million shortfall on the facility maintenance,
do you?
Admiral Burke. Well, I think in the past, I think there
is--you won't find that anybody is funded to 100 percent
because there is some concern about the miles. So, I would
say----
Mr. Forbes. That is not my question, though, as you know.
My question is, we had--I am taking your numbers. These aren't
our numbers. I am taking your numbers of $349 million
shortfall.
Tell me what the numbers are. If this is a hearing on
readiness and we need to know whether our facilities are being
maintained or we are going to have shorter lives and greater
costs down the road, what is the number if it is not $349
million?
Is it $300 million? Is it $280 million? What is the figure?
Admiral Burke. If you were to fund fully to the readiness
model, it would be--I am sure the number you are using is
right. It is roughly $350 million and it is about $175 million
delta between 80 and 90 percent.
Yes, sir.
Yes, that is all I have to say.
Mr. Forbes. And the reason I ask this is not to push on
you, but these are the numbers we put in our bill because we
want to be good to go. We don't want to be coming in telling
our combatant commanders they don't have the resources to meet
those missions.
Now, just a couple of other questions--last week, we had a
bill, DOD authorization--I mean, not DOD authorization, but a
DOD appropriations bill cut $8.9 billion out of the defense
budget that the President submitted.
What impact is that going to have on readiness?
Admiral Burke. Sir, I am sure it will have some impact, but
I don't know what the--I have not seen that, so----
Mr. Forbes. When you get a chance, would you look at that
and give us those figures? I am concerned when we start cutting
almost $9 billion.
Because I am assuming you guys had already cut to the bone
before you got here, and then to cut $9 billion, just concerns
me. And I would just like to hear it from you as to the impact
it is going to have on you.
If it is not going to have an impact, my question would be
why didn't we cut the $9 billion out before the budget came to
us? If it is going to have an impact, we need to know what that
impact is and we would love to hear you guys just submit that
to us for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 87.]
Mr. Forbes. The other thing I think you need to be looking
at, and we would love to have some insight on, we are just
talking about the $9 billion because we have got shortfalls
right now that we have just pointed out. And I am looking over
the horizon at all these reports of $400 billion to $1 trillion
of cuts coming down.
I am really worried about what that does to our readiness
posture. And I know you guys have to be concerned about that a
little bit.
The last two questions I have for you are these. I have
heard rumors. We had one report in a media outlet that said the
Navy was thinking about deferring for 2 years, the aircraft
carrier that we currently have underway in construction.
Is there any truth to those rumors that you can share with
us today?
Admiral McCoy. I would have to take that one for the record
and let ASN-RDA [Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development & Acquisition] response formally on that, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Would you mind getting us a response on that?
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. And also, we heard that they were talking about
taking the future carrier off the shipbuilding plan altogether,
and Admiral, if you could just get us a response on that to the
extent that you can do it.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 87.]
Mr. Forbes. Final thing I want to just close my part with,
and then I think Mr. Courtney had an additional--oh, I am
sorry, Madeleine has a question.
As I mentioned earlier, also we had a Chinese general
recommending that--to the Administration, that we cut military
spending in the United States. Since you guys told me that we
can have your expertise and your experience, I am going to ask
you--do you feel we should be cutting military spending in the
United States?
Admiral Burke. I would prefer not to cut military spending
in the United States. I would even more prefer not to cut
spending on the Navy in the United States.
Mr. Forbes. And will it impact readiness if we do that,
Admiral?
Admiral Burke. So, sir, the answer to this question and the
answer to a previous question about cutting $9 billion or $8.9
billion, whatever the number was, out of the budget is I don't
know whether it will impact readiness per se. It will certainly
impact capability and capacity.
I look at readiness as what it takes to get the right
platforms out the door with the right training and the right
equipment. I suspect we will continue to do the best we can
there. The question is, if you cut too much you may not have as
many platforms.
Mr. Forbes. And, Admiral, I just want to finish my part up
with saying, I thank you for all the balancing act you did,
just like Mr. Courtney has said. But our job is not to do just
the balancing act.
Our job is to say, if those combatant commanders have a
mission that we have tasked them to do, we want to make sure
they have the resources so that they will not fail in that
mission. And that is what our committee is just trying to do,
and we are trying make sure they have those resources.
Ms. Bordallo, I recognize you for whatever time you may
need.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
There are a few miscellaneous questions for the admirals.
Admiral Burke, it is my understanding that the DOD rates
for fuel increased on June 1st from $126 a barrel to $165 a
barrel. Can you please explain the total cost and the impact to
the ship operations and flying hour program accounts?
And if the fuel rates remain high in fiscal year 2012, how
will you pay for that deficit?
Admiral Burke. Madam, you are absolutely right. It is
roughly $39 a barrel. In the last 4 months of 2011, if that
price holds, it will cost us an additional $140 million in the
ship operating account, an additional $204 million in the
flying hour account, for a total of $344 million through the
rest of the fiscal year.
The likely source of payment for that will be supplemental
funding.
Ms. Bordallo. Supplemental, okay.
The next one I have is--the Fleet Review Panel had much to
say about the inadequacy of the Aegis ship SPY radar readiness.
Since this radar is the backbone of the Navy's air and missile
defense capability, what steps has the Navy taken to address
this deficiency?
Admiral McCoy. Yes, madam. About 2 years ago, we undertook
a comprehensive look at the SPY radar. That look was finished
about a year ago this summer.
Following on that, we took an even more comprehensive look,
not only at the radar, but the entire Aegis weapon system, to
include what we call wholeness--manning, training, shore
infrastructure, spare parts, fit and fill, the adequacy of the
coding, the coding standards, interoperability, all of those.
We implemented in the near term, starting in fiscal year
2011, the results of the SPY task force, to include plused-up
manning, increased spares, rooms on ships, plus some coding
software fixes.
In addition, we have just come through with the two fleet
commanders and the resource sponsors and the Chief of Naval
Operations, a comprehensive plan for total Aegis wholeness, to
include those key elements. We are using some end-of-year
funding this year to start that, and we will plan on continuing
that through fiscal year 2012 and through the FYDP [Future
Years Defense Program].
So we have looked at it from a holistic standpoint. We were
not happy with where we were. And we have got a comprehensive
plan in place to address those issues.
Ms. Bordallo. And the funding has been requested?
Admiral McCoy. The funding has been requested, yes, madam.
Ms. Bordallo. Another question is, given the issues with
the current computer-based training raised by GAO [Government
Accountability Office], the Naval Inspector General and the
Balisle Report, how has the Navy improved off-ship training for
Navy personnel to ensure that sailors arrive at the ship with
the necessary skills?
Admiral Burke. Madam, we probably went a little too far on
computer-based training a few years ago. We have since shifted
the pendulum back some, so we have a mix of computer-based
training as well as instructor-based training. And we have a
very good instructor-to-student ratio in that instructor-based
training.
And we see benefits in both kinds of training, because
there are some people that learn better one way than the other
and there are some things that are better taught one way than
the other.
But the key point is it is much better to take apart a
valve and put it back together in something, you know, where
you actually put your hands on a physical valve or physical
work on something.
So like I said, we shifted too far. We have come back. And
we think we have got the mix about right now. But we have heard
from the sailors and heard from the Congress on this one, and
we have moved.
Ms. Bordallo. Good.
My last question, Mr. Chairman, is based on the findings of
the Balisle Report, the Navy plans to take a number of actions
in many interrelated areas such as training, maintenance,
command and control, manning, et cetera.
What is not clear, however, is who will be responsible for
making sure that the actions are coordinated and implemented to
avoid the problems of the past where the Navy wasn't looking at
things holistically to see whether the changes it was making
were compatible and did not have unintended consequences.
The Navy will need to take accountability clear and have
some kind of integration mechanism across the areas, whether it
be one senior-level official who is the focal point supported
by an interdisciplinary group or another approach.
So, how does the Navy intend to proceed from here in taking
corrective actions, including establishing leadership and
organizational accountability?
Admiral Burke. Last summer, last July, I think it was, in
front of this committee, Admiral McCoy and I were here--in
between us was Admiral Harvey.
And Admiral Harvey was and is the Commander at Fleet Forces
down in Norfolk. Admiral Harvey said he was the responsible
person to do exactly what you talked about.
Now, he can't do that without Admiral McCoy and Admiral
Architzel and me doing our jobs to support him. So in military
parlance, we see him as the supported commander and we are the
supporting commanders. And as long as we do our jobs to give
him the resources to do it, he will deliver.
Ms. Bordallo. So, he is the focal point.
Admiral Burke. Yes, madam.
Admiral McCoy. And if I could chime in, I am on a regular
every 60- to 90-day drumbeat with Admiral Harvey. I also report
to Admiral Walsh, the Pacific Fleet Commander.
I am responsible to deliver the engineering and maintenance
associated with the actions in the Balisle Report.
I can also tell you that the two surface type commanders
are also held accountable by the fleet, Admiral Harvey and
Admiral Walsh, for their pieces of manning, training and
standards and things like that that were in the Balisle Report.
So, we are on a regular drumbeat. And so, I think that is
often moving and being well cared for.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. And I thank you both for
service to our country.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Madeleine.
Mr. Courtney is recognized for a question.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Actually, I wanted to ask two
questions, if that is okay.
One is, you know, we talk about spending in the top line of
the defense budget, which, again, I share a lot of Mr. Forbes'
concern. Obviously, that doesn't mean there is a blanket
approval for any kind of spending. I mean, the fact of the
matter is, any system can always be more efficient.
And, you know, the SSBN reconfiguration that brought the
price tag down by almost $2 billion a copy that was worked
through over the last year or so, you know, is an example of
where, you know, I think that is a healthy thing, to make sure
that we are really spending the money as efficiently and
smartly as possible.
Another question that came up over the last year was the
JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] alternate engine, you know, never-
ending, perpetual debate in this building.
But one of the arguments that Secretary Gates and Admiral
Roughead talked about was the impact, not just on production
costs, which was about $3 billion in additional spending for
the alternate engine, but also the repair and maintenance
impact of having two separate engine systems, particularly in
places like aircraft carriers, where, I mean, you are really
creating--Admiral Roughead argued pretty passionately was a
pretty inefficient arrangement that was going to cost money.
So, I guess, you know, again, I share many of Mr. Forbes'
concerns, but on the other hand I think that, you know, I
think--let me ask you. Do you agree that it still behooves us
to look at spending issues, you know, thinking through, again,
the way these sort of play out over the life cycle in terms of
impact of cost down the road, because we don't want to waste
money under almost any scenario over the next few years or so.
Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. I fully agree with you.
And I spend much of my time and my team spends much of its
time scrubbing those things that come to us from Admiral McCoy,
Admiral Architzel and others as requirements. So, we dig into
them to try to figure out if there is a different way to skin
the cat.
Once it goes past me, the same thing happens with some of
our budgeteers who have much experience in particular accounts
and look for ways to either save money that might be spent in a
duplicative fashion or to look at efficiencies like you are
talking about, Congressman.
Mr. Courtney. Because I think, you know, we want, you know,
testimony that is very upfront about whether we are
unnecessarily cutting spending, but we also, I think, would
encourage input about ways that we could do things better and
maybe save money as well.
Admiral McCoy. Can I chime in there for a second?
Mr. Forbes. Yes.
Admiral McCoy. We see it as our obligation, particularly
given all that we deal with maintaining this and procuring this
fleet, to cut what we call total ownership costs. And it is
everything to do from using composites on ships to single-coat
paints instead of three-coat paints.
Sounds like a small, small thing, but it is huge when you
multiply it over 288 ships.
For example, we recently saved $600 million by one study of
whether we could take a class of ships from 4-year maintenance
intervals to 6-year maintenance intervals. And that was $600
million over the FYDP.
And on any given day across NAVSEA, we have 200 to 300 of
those efforts ongoing. Some of them don't pan out. Some of them
are almost a no-brainer, because the return on investment is so
big. And we are constantly feeding those out.
Matter of fact for the first time starting in the fiscal
year 2012 budget, we actually across the Navy went and invested
heavily to put seed money to a number of initiatives that will
actually reduce spending in the long run.
Mr. Courtney. Good, last point, Admiral McCoy.
You testified earlier again that you have this monthly
meeting process. I hope that will continue. Again, a few
notices go out this week, and as you know, my office will be
calling in just to check in with you.
And again, I want to thank you for your great efforts to
try and make sure that talented people get used and not wasted.
And I hope that will continue.
Admiral McCoy. Yes, sir. And we are heavily relying on the
excess labor, if you will, at Electric Boat for the next 6 to
12 months to help us with the public shipyards.
Mr. Forbes. And let me finish up by saying that what Mr.
Courtney said is really apples and oranges. There is no one who
says that we shouldn't look at the most efficient means
possible.
Here is what I will stand on, and I think it is very
difficult to argue with this. We hear the Secretary come in and
talk about efficiencies. It is not an efficiency when you cut
your maintenance down to doing only 80 percent of the
maintenance that you need. That is just kicking the can down
the road. And as you have admitted, it is going to be greater
cost and shorter life expectancies when we do it.
This committee needs to be on top of that. That is not good
to go.
It is not cutting costs when we say that we are going to
cut the cost on aircraft maintenance, and we see that we have
the problems that we have with only 45 percent of our naval
aircraft in a mission-capable ready to fly. That is not a cost
efficiency.
It is not a cost efficiency when we look at our
cannibalization rates, which have been above the maximum
accepted level for the fourth consecutive quarter. That means
we are taking parts off of one ship to put on another ship so
we can meet the inspections.
The other thing that I am really concerned about, and I
don't think it is a cost efficiency--I want to put this last
chart up so we can get it in the record and let you comment on
this--but our casualty reports, which indicate--if it is a C-3
or C-4, indicates a primary mission degradation with mission-
essential systems or equipment have failed.
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
84.]
Mr. Forbes. We have had on the average 40 percent of the
time that our ships have been deployed, they have had at least
one major equipment or systems failure. That is not a cost-
cutting measure.
And I know yesterday when we were talking, you said,
``Well, that is not necessarily a failure for that particular
mission that they are doing.'' But that would be like saying,
``I am going down the road, and the windshield wipers on my car
aren't working, but it is not raining right now.''
The reason we put that equipment on is so they are ready
for those missions when they come up.
And that is the kind of thing, Mr. Courtney, I think this
committee needs to be on top of, because when we come in here
and say we are good to go for readiness, we are not good to go
for readiness. We have got some big shortfalls that we need to
fill, if we are going to make sure that our combatant
commanders have the resources they need to meet the missions
that they need.
And the final question I want to do is just one follow-up.
Ms. Bordallo raised a very good question on the fuel, and you
talked about the supplemental. But what are you going to do to
address the fiscal year 2012 costs that you are going to be
having?
How are we going to pay for those shortfalls due to the
increased prices that you know you have already got?
I am sorry, Larry--okay.
The supplemental won't come for that, but.
Admiral Burke. Is that a question?
Mr. Forbes. Yes, sir, please.
Admiral Burke. I don't know yet how we will pay for it. I
suspect we will--because much of that fuel use will be in the
CENTCOM [Central Command] area supporting operations in
Afghanistan and in the Gulf, that we will pay for that with OCO
[Overseas Contingency Operations] funding.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Kissell, one final question, and then we
are done.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a couple of follow-ups and the information we talked
about on our aircraft and kind of like the convergence, you
know, where does the eventual demise of the legacy aircraft and
the lack of the F-35, you know, where are we going with that?
But especially in terms of safety for our airmen and, you
know, how far are we going to be pushing that envelope in terms
of safety. I would like to have, you know, consideration for
that.
And the last thought is when you look at these readiness
numbers and recognizing that we are operating in what I would
call a harsh environment, but we are not operating in a hostile
environment, you know. And I hope we don't.
I hope we don't have active warfare involving our ships,
other than what we are doing in terms of launching attacks.
But it does concern me. If we did get into a hostile
situation, and we have these maintenance situations, you know,
without being fired upon, then, you know, where might we go?
And the idea that switching from computer-based training to
more realistic training--I applaud that. And I remember when
Admiral Harvey said that last year, that it falls on him, and
we do need these numbers getting better.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Kissell.
I thank all the members of the committee.
And I want to also, before we adjourn, once again thank our
witnesses again for their service to the country and also for
appearing before the subcommittee today.
I want to also take a moment to highlight for our
membership an opportunity to continue this dialogue by joining
me in a visit to some of our key shipyards that we are going to
be trying to arrange in the near future. And I think this will
facilitate a first-hand assessment of our capabilities. And I
welcome your participation.
Thank the Navy in advance for organizing those visits for
us.
And with that, if there is nothing else, we are adjourned.
Thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 12, 2011
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 12, 2011
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 12, 2011
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 12, 2011
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Admiral Burke and Admiral McCoy. Of the $8.9B reduction in the
House version of the DoD Appropriation Act for 2012 (H.R.2219), Navy's
budget request is decreased by a total of $1,982M. These reductions
would impact future readiness, with $1,795M taken against Navy
procurement accounts (APN, OPN, WPN, SCN, and PANMC), and smaller
reductions taken against R&D ($157M), National Defense Sealift Forces
($26M), and personnel ($25M). Current readiness accounts (OMN and OMNR)
actually increase by a net total of $21M.
Congress' support for our current operational forces and the $365M
increase for ship maintenance funding are greatly appreciated. However,
the Navy remains concerned about two readiness items that were marked
in H.R. 2219:
1. Public Shipyards were marked $215M for excessive overhead
funding. As Navy ship construction workload is increasing across the
FYDP, this OMN reduction detrimentally impacts the execution of all
Navy shipbuilding contracts, by forcing reductions in manpower
oversight that will degrade mission execution for onsite management of
these critical programs at all major shipbuilding private yards. This
loss of funding will reverse gains made by the Supervisors of
Shipbuilding (SUPSHIPS) over the last five years, and will result in
the loss of critical skills. The SUPSHIPs provide contract
administration and government oversight to ALL Navy shipbuilding
programs and private sector nuclear repair. In FY12, this includes
oversight of construction and/or design of SSN 774 Class, CVN 78 & 79,
DDG 1000 Class, LCS Variants, DDG 51 Class, LPD 17 Class, LHA 6 Class,
JHSV Class, MLP, T-AGM, T-AGS and T-AKE, as well as nuclear repair of
submarines and Refueling Complex Overhauls for CVNs. These programs are
critical to the Navy's ability to deliver quality ships, control cost,
meet schedules, and successfully recapitalize to 313 ships.
2. Deployed steaming days were marked $25M. Deployed ship underway
steaming days directly support Combatant Commander missions, including
Joint exercises with allied nations, maritime interdiction operations,
and anti-piracy operations. Reduced funding for deployed steaming days
will increase costs in other accounts, given deployed ships that are
not underway typically must moor/anchor, run generators, and incur
additional shore support expenses, nearly equal to the costs of
remaining underway. The net effect of this mark would be a 4% reduction
in the number of underway days available for Combatant Commander
missions (from 45 per ship/quarter to 43 per ship/quarter). [See page
27.]
Admiral McCoy. Fiscal Year 2013 budget discussions on the
shipbuilding plan are ongoing. As always, these discussions focus on
balancing the overall shipbuilding plan, considering warfighting needs
and industrial base considerations. Deliberations of Navy's force
structure alignment are subject to a complete review by the Secretary
of the Navy and OSD; results are pre-decisional until submitted in the
President's Fiscal Year 2013 budget request. It would be inappropriate
to discuss internal budget deliberations until officially released in
President's Budget 2013. [See page 27.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Admiral Burke and Admiral McCoy. The Navy is taking a three phased
approach to address Interoperability issues within its Carrier Strike
Groups. Phase I is a ``Near Term'' solution providing immediate
corrections to Aegis platforms and Cooperative Engagement Capability
(CEC only). This effort is already fielding and will first deploy with
the John C Stennis Carrier Strike Group.
Phase II is a ``Mid Term'' solution to correct ``root cause''
Interoperability issues across the majority of Navy ships, to include
Aegis, Ships Self Defense System (SSDS), and E-2 aircraft. The main
goal of this Mid Term effort is to improve the integration of our CEC
sensor netting capability with the Link 16 track data management
process to deliver a consistent common operational picture. The Navy
plans to demonstrate these interoperability improvements in FY 12
during a Fleet exercise titled Trident Warrior. This fleet exercise is
representative of a real world joint operational environment and
involves a wide range of Navy and Joint operational platforms (ships
and aircraft). Based on successful testing and completion of Trident
Warrior 12, the Navy will commence fielding of this improved common
operational picture capability starting in FY 13.
Phase III (Far Term) will be a follow on effort to address
Interoperability in future Navy platforms that will include
implementing design changes learned from the Mid Term development and
integrating those changes into future system and platform baselines.
[See page 15.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL
Admiral Burke. The Department of the Navy (DoN) is challenged with
a strike-fighter shortfall due to F/A-18A-D aircraft reaching the end
of their service life before the replacement aircraft (the F-35B/C) can
be delivered into service.
In December 2010, the Secretary of Defense made changes to the
Programs of Record for both the F-35B/C and F/A-18E/F programs. The
DoN's procurement of F-35B/C aircraft was decreased by 60 in the FYDP,
creating a requirement for 50 additional F/A-18 E/F to negate the
resulting increase in the projected strike fighter shortfall. To
address this shortfall, 150 F/A-18A-D service life extensions (SLEP)
and 41 additional F/A-18E/F aircraft were added to the Fiscal Year 2012
Navy budget request, and Congress added nine F/A-18E/F aircraft to the
program of record of 556 aircraft in the Department of Defense and
Full-Year Continuing Resolution Appropriations Act 2011. These nine
aircraft, combined with the 41 additional aircraft, satisfied the
requirement for 50 that resulted from the changes to the F-35B/C
Program of Record. With the new F/A-18E/F procurement total of 565
aircraft, the predicted peak shortfall was reduced to 52 aircraft in
2018.
The DoN has determined that a 52 aircraft shortfall in 2018 is
manageable with the mitigations in place. Along with other mitigation
efforts, if the JSF delivery profile remains unchanged, and the service
life of 150 F/A-18A-D is extended to 10,000 flight hours, DoN will
continue to assess the most recent shortfall projection as manageable.
However, any further delay in the JSF delivery profile will have a
negative effect on the projected strike fighter shortfall in both
magnitude and duration, depending on the magnitude, duration, and
timing of the delay. [See page 22.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. HECK
Admiral Burke. In recent years, to enhance operational readiness at
sea, we shifted from a supply-driven system, focused on getting the
right number of Sailors aboard ships, to a demand-driven system,
focused on getting the right number of Sailors in the correct pay
grades and with the requisite formal schoolhouse training aboard ships.
Establishing new schoolhouse courses of instruction for certain Navy
Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes, the timing of which are properly
aligned with distribution and assignment practices that deliver a fully
trained Sailor to the Fleet on time, are essential to getting us to the
overall goal of 85% Fit. The Chief of Naval Personnel has established a
Business Improvement Team, which is using proven business models to
properly align our supply chain and eliminate inefficiencies in
processes for delivering fully trained personnel to the Fleet on time.
We are initially focusing on improving Fit in our most critical NEC
requirements (i.e., those in which the mission cannot be performed
unless the NEC is properly manned), and have increased Critical NEC Fit
from 70% to 75% in fiscal year 2011, ensuring that assigned combat
missions are properly manned. [See page 19.]
Admiral Burke. The issue is less about sufficient numbers of school
slots than it is about timing of available school slots with the
rotation of Sailors. Fit is not currently where it should be as a
result of friction in Navy's distributable inventory at pay grades E5-
E9, in part due to assignment policies and sea/shore flow imbalance. We
are working diligently to optimize use of available resources to
improve all Fit measures, and minimize the amount of time Sailors must
wait for seat availability. Navy Personnel Command's Quarterly Demand
Planning Working Group has been working to synchronize rotation of
Sailors with available school quotas to time the arrival of trained
Sailors as they are required in the Fleet. In the past year, through
numerous distribution and administrative enhancements, we have improved
Fit, from just above 60%, to approximately 70%. [See page 20.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO
Admiral McCoy. The Naval Sea Systems Command continues efforts in
coordination with industry to identify additional uses of composites in
shipboard applications. Additional composite applications currently
include gratings, louvers, screens, stanchions, masts, bow domes, cover
plates, electrical boxes, shaft covers, and boat deck enclosures. The
President's budget directly supports the further development and
integration of composite technology in a number of ship acquisition
programs. For example, the Navy is currently pursuing several composite
applications through the OHIO Replacement program. Evaluation of these
applications is based on a business case assessment that includes
projected life cycle cost savings. The OHIO Replacement program is also
planning to invest in development of new manufacturing techniques for
the bow dome and bow dome boot. These manufacturing techniques have the
potential to be leveraged for future applications. [See page 16.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 12, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. There are many aspects to material readiness; training
and manning are only two of them. What are the others?
Admiral Burke and Admiral McCoy. Navy reports Fleet readiness in
five pillars. In addition to Training and Personnel (manning), the
remaining pillars are Equipment, Supply, and Ordnance. From a material
readiness perspective, depot, intermediate, and unit-level maintenance
programs are all important factors under the Equipment pillar. A key
element in the Supply pillar is the availability of spare parts.
Ordnance readiness is a product of both acquisition of new weapons and
maintenance of existing stockpiles. An additional element, not directly
addressed by the Navy readiness pillars, is ``time.'' To get material
readiness right, we must allow sufficient time for:
Individual sailors' training and professional growth
Unit level training
Execution of maintenance availabilities and unit-level
maintenance
When time is compressed, each of these may suffer. The pace of
operations over the last ten years is in excess of what Navy can
ultimately support within our existing force structure. This has
compressed the time available for readiness activities and is reflected
in negative readiness trends in several areas, as reported in the
Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress.
Mr. Forbes. For the last two years you have discussed the degraded
military readiness of the surface ships and the steps you are taking to
achieve expected service life on your ships. Given the $367 million
shortfall in ship depot maintenance that defers 44 availabilities in
fiscal year 2012, how do you plan on maintaining a ready surface fleet
that meets its estimated service life? What is the threshold for risk
on surface ship maintenance?
Admiral Burke and Admiral McCoy. The cumulative amount of surface
ship maintenance that can be deferred, without impacting operations or
the expected service life of our platforms, varies from year to year
based upon the individual age and materiel condition of our ships,
current operations, and the next available opportunity to complete the
maintenance. With the recent establishment of the Surface Maintenance
Engineering Planning Program, Navy has an improved ability to assess
the risk of individual ship maintenance deferrals, track deferred work
to completion, and optimize deferral decisions in a budget constrained
environment, allowing us to more effectively mitigate shortfalls that
do occur.
The Navy remains committed to sustaining the force structure
required to implement the Maritime Strategy and to funding the full
surface ship maintenance requirement, as evidenced by the increase in
the baseline maintenance budget request from $4.3B in FY 2010 to $5.0B
in FY 2012. The Navy's total FY 2012 budget submission reflects the
best balance of risk and available resources across the Navy portfolio.
Mr. Forbes. How will the stand-up of SURFMEPP help improve the
maintenance tracking and planning for surface ships? What are the
Navy's plans for re-establishing further intermediate maintenance
activities?
Admiral Burke and Admiral McCoy. In 2009, NAVSEA established the
Surface Ship Life Cycle Maintenance (SSLCM) Activity, which in 2010
evolved into the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program
(SURFMEPP)--a shore command to centrally manage surface ship
maintenance assessments and planning.
SURFMEPP will improve maintenance tracking and planning for surface
ships by:
- Providing centralized surface ship life cycle management, and
discipline of maintenance and modernization requirements.
- Creating individual ship life cycle maintenance plans that are
based on the Class Maintenance Plan (CMP) and actual ship condition.
- Using the CMP and individual ship life cycle maintenance plans
to build a Baseline Availability Work Package (BAWP) for each scheduled
availability that will include a list of non-deviational life cycle
work that must be accomplished.
- Tracking the completion of all required maintenance actions to
meet ship expected service life.
- Ensuring adjudication of all BAWP deferral requests by the
appropriate Technical Warrant Holder (TWH), and if approved,
automatically scheduling the deferred work for the follow-on
availability or window of opportunity, as directed by the TWH.
- Integrating, tracking, and monitoring organizational level
maintenance requirements as part of the surface ship maintenance end-
to-end process.
To increase intermediate maintenance capacity, the Navy is adding
manning to the Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs), whose dual mission
is to train returning Fleet Sailors in shipboard repairs, and perform
intermediate level maintenance and repairs. This training will prepare
them to return to sea with enhanced maintenance and repair skills
resulting in improved ship readiness.
Increased civilian and military manning allowed the re-opening of
selected repair shops at the Southeast RMC in Mayport, Florida in June,
2011. The requested FY12 budget provides a manning increase of 200
military and 385 civilians across all RMCs. Additional civilian and
military personnel increases are being considered as part of POM-13.
Mr. Forbes. How will the projected backlog of airframe and engine
maintenance events impact aviation readiness and training?
Admiral Burke and Admiral McCoy. The projected backlog of airframe
and engine maintenance in FY12 is not of sufficient size to cause an
impact to the readiness of deployed Naval aviation units.
Mr. Forbes. How are the LPD 17 and other ship construction lessons
learned being formally captured and incorporated into the institutional
memory and training for all new program managers and key Supervisor of
Shipbuilding personnel?
Admiral Burke and Admiral McCoy. Government oversight by the Navy's
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Gulf Coast (SSGC) has been revamped with an
increase in overall SSGC manning by 21 percent from 2005 through the
end of 2010, including an intensive focus on critical waterfront
Quality Assurance (QA) billets. All Government QA weld inspectors were
required to undergo re-training and re-certification in critical
process areas, and QA oversight was increased across all phases of
production. Within the last 18 months, the QA organization has been
restructured to include more surveillance of in process work and
compliance with formal ship construction procedures. A revamped
training program has been implemented, providing an ``apprentice to
subject matter expert'' career roadmap for QA specialists. SSGC has
implemented a process of ``critical process pulse audits'' to ensure
HII maintains production quality across the critical shipbuilding areas
of structure, pipe, electrical, and coatings. Navy critical process
metrics have been aligned with the shipbuilder to better assess
performance trends leading to earlier identification of issues when
they arise.
In addition, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) sent
teams of QA experts to assess SSGC ability to provide QA oversight and
HII's production quality in Spring 2009, July 2010 and January 2011.
The NAVSEA audits confirmed initial improvement by both SSGC and HII.
The focus going forward, and a key element of the critical process
pulse audits, is ensuring sustainment of that performance.
The LPD 17 Strike Team and INSURV Trial Card databases are two
tools that are monitored on a consistent basis and have been made
readily available to the other NAVSEA shipbuilding programs. Lessons
learned from these two databases are being leveraged across all ship
construction efforts to increase focus on pre-outfitting and completion
levels at launch, facilitate more efficient production cycles, and
further enhance quality assurance processes resulting in improved
operational effectiveness, reliability, and sustainability.
Additionally, the program office has recently initiated preliminary
discussions with the Defense Acquisition University to ascertain the
possibility and value of adding the recent LPD 17 class issues and
lessons learned as a case study for inclusion in the program managers'
curriculum.
Mr. Forbes. In light of the most recent issues with the LPD 17
maintenance contract, what is being done to ensure that the correct
repairs were performed on the ship? What steps are being taken at
Norfolk Ship Support Activity to ensure that future availabilities do
not face the same setbacks as LPD 17?
Admiral Burke and Admiral McCoy. A Navy engineering team from
NAVSEA and Norfolk Ship Support Activity certified that all work had
been performed correctly by completing a review of all work and
objective quality evidence.
More stringent oversight has been put into place to oversee quality
of work. For example, all Main Propulsion Diesel Engine work for LPD 17
Class and LSD 41/49 Class ships is now being conducted under controlled
work packages for increased oversight.
Mr. Forbes. As we know, in the recent past, the Navy severely
reduced its Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMAs) by closing some
locations and reducing personnel in others resulting in a loss of
critical capability and trained personnel. The Navy is currently
reversing that trend. How many IMAs does the Navy intend to reestablish
and what is the overall manpower increase anticipated?
Admiral Burke and Admiral McCoy. The Navy is reconstituting some
intermediate maintenance capabilities at existing Regional Maintenance
Centers (RMCs). All RMCs are scheduled to receive additional manning to
increase intermediate maintenance capacity as well as provide Fleet
Sailors the opportunity for training in engineering ratings so they
return to sea duty with journeyman-level capabilities.
The FY12 RMC manning increase totals 200 military and 385
civilians. Additional civilian and military personnel increases are
being considered as part of POM-13.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL
Mr. Kissell. What is the Navy's projection reflected annually for
the next 10 years of potential increased operational maintenance costs
on current air platforms that the F-35 is expected to replace?
Admiral Burke. Navy has reliable projections of maintenance costs
across the FYDP. Requirements in the Navy FY12 budget submission are
based on assumed aircraft utilization rates and inventory, and they
include funding for the Service Life Extension of 150 legacy F/A-18
aircraft. This funding is adequate for maintenance and sustainment of
the projected Navy strike-fighter inventory at the time of submission.
The costs are also consistent with those reported in the Secretary of
Navy SLEP report to Congress, Appendix 3, as required by Public Law
111-383 of May 13, 2011. Maintenance for the nine additional F/A-18E/F
aircraft, provided by Congress in the Department of Defense and Full-
Year Continuing Resolution Appropriations Act of 2011, will be included
in the FY13 Navy budget submission.
Mr. Kissell. How will this projected maintenance cost be impacted
as current air platforms are utilized well past their normal amount of
flight hours?
Admiral Burke. Maintenance costs increase with additional flight
hours above planned service life, due to required inspections and
modifications. Projected maintenance and sustainment requirements for
all strike-fighter aircraft currently in inventory are included in the
Navy FY12 budget submission. In addition to all regularly scheduled
maintenance for these aircraft, the budget submission requirements
include the F/A-18 Service Life Extension Program to extend 150 legacy
F/A-18 aircraft to 10,000 hours, with all remaining legacy F/A-18
aircraft extended through high flight hour inspections to 8,600 flight
hours.
Mr. Kissell. At what date does the Navy identify emerging readiness
shortfalls due to operational or maintenance requirements as well as
critical readiness shortfalls for air platforms that are being utilized
for an extensive amount of time beyond their projected use? Please
provide a response for aircraft expected to be replaced by the F-35.
Admiral Burke. The process to identify emerging aircraft readiness
shortfalls, as well as critical readiness shortfalls, is continuous
across all Naval aviation platforms. Service life, operational
utilization, and cost are continuously monitored by Type/Model/Series.
As issues are identified, they are prioritized in conjunction with the
annual POM process. The FY12 Navy budget supports the operational and
maintenance requirements through the FYDP for all aircraft in the Navy
inventory. The Navy is challenged with a strike-fighter shortfall, due
primarily to F/A-18A-D aircraft reaching the end of their planned
service life before the replacement aircraft (F-35B/C) can be delivered
into service. Based on a Program of Record to procure 556 F/A-18E/F
aircraft and the FY12 President's Budget Request, the current projected
peak strike fighter shortfall is 52 aircraft in 2018. The DoN assesses
that the shortfall, as currently forecasted, is manageable with
acceptable risk for a limited duration. An increase above the current
projected shortfall will have a negative impact on operational
readiness.
Mr. Kissell. Specifically, if the F-35 does not reach fully mission
capable status as planned, when does the Navy reach a crisis point in
short and long term readiness as well as day to day operations as we
push our current air platforms well beyond their planned service time
line?
Admiral Burke. The Department of the Navy (DoN) does not currently
assess there to be a forseeable ``crisis point'', in either short or
long term readiness. The DoN has traditionally managed its entire
aircraft inventory in a purposeful and responsible manner, balancing
operational requirements with ``best practices'' for maximum
utilization of aircraft service life. The established process of
ensuring required preparedness levels are maintained is iterative, and
constantly under review as new data and assumptions are evaluated.
Mr. Kissell. How soon will we see the consequences of overextending
our current air platforms? At what date will the Navy reach the point
where we do not have the necessary aircraft to fulfill mission
requirements?
Admiral Burke. The DoN continues to meticulously manage the flight
hours and fatigue life of our tactical aircraft. Since 2004, we have
provided Fleet users guidance and actions to optimize aircraft
utilization rates, while maximizing training and operational
opportunities. The F/A-18A-D Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
initial request is included in PB-12. The program is designed to extend
the airframe life of approximately 150 aircraft from 8,600 to 10,000
flight hours, with all remaining legacy F/A-18 aircraft extended
through high flight hour inspections to 8,600 flight hours. Through
extensive engineering analysis, the DoN continues to refine its SLEP
plan to ensure that those aircraft, whose service lives are extended,
satisfy all safety of flight and operational requirements. If the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) delivery profile remains unchanged, and the
service life of 150 F/A-18A-D is extended to 10,000 flight hours (along
with success in other mitigation efforts), DoN will continue to assess
the most recent shortfall projection of 52 as manageable, allowing the
DoN to meet all mission requirements. However, any further delay in the
JSF delivery profile will have a negative effect on existing
strategies, and the projected strike fighter shortfall in both
magnitude and duration.
Mr. Kissell. Is there or what is the projection for taking current
air platforms off line as the F-35 begins to integrate into service? If
so, how is that projection adapting to continued delays in the
procurement of the F-35?
Admiral Burke. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps develop separate
F-35 transition plans that account for each Service's assumptions.
These transition plans go through periodic reviews that will address
any changes, including any delays in F-35 procurement. The Naval
Aviation Master Aircraft Plan (MAP) document, and its associated
processes, identifies the transition schedule to F-35. The current
document, MAP 11-01, reflects all of the Navy's Type/Model/Series
aircraft transitions. This document is reviewed and updated twice a
year to account for any changes, including any delay in F-35
procurement.
As current strike-fighter platforms reach the end of their service
life, the Department of the Navy (DoN) plans to replace them with the
F-35. Planned delivery rates for the F-35 will not keep up with current
projected retirements, resulting in the shortfall in the overall number
of strike-fighters within DoN. The latest Fiscal Year 2012 President's
Budget DoN inventory shortfall is 52 aircraft, projected to occur
toward the end of the decade. The DoN has testified that this shortfall
is manageable.
Mr. Kissell. Is the Navy sustaining its training capability of new
pilots on many of these legacy aircraft? If the Navy is transitioning
its future needs toward the F-35 how are we mitigating the potential
need for a much larger pool of pilots capable of flying our legacy
aircraft as the need for continued service of older aircraft remains?
Admiral Burke. Yes, Navy is sustaining training capability for new
pilots on its legacy strike-fighter aircraft. It is not expected that
legacy pilot training capacity will be reduced until F-35 transitions
have stabilized. Since aircraft are being replaced on a one to one
basis in most cases, the number of pilots necessary does not vary much
between the present and the future. Our Master Aviation Plan process
allows us to forecast the demand for aircrew to support new and legacy
platforms. This results in adjustments to Pilot Training Rates at the
appropriate Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) as a matter of normal
execution.
Mr. Kissell. How is the Navy adapting its training, if at all, to
these older aircraft to better ensure the safety of our pilots? What is
the risk associated with utilizing our aircraft for thousands of hours
beyond what they were originally intended?
Admiral Burke. The Navy adapts its training for older aircraft as
necessary to ensure the safety of our pilots. Safety and mission
readiness are not compromised in the service life management of the
Fleet's F/A-18 aircraft. In fact, coincident with the Navy and Marine
Corp's service life management program, aircrew training readiness has
been enhanced with improved tactical standardization, a refined
training syllabus, and improvements to measurable training objectives
on each training sortie flown. There is a recognized and appreciated
correlation between aircrew flight hours, flight safety, and combat
effectiveness. There has been no decrease in aircrew flight hour
requirements or lowering of training standards simply to preserve
aircraft life.
Any extension of service life beyond the initial design life is the
result of rigorous engineering analysis by NAVAIR, in concert with the
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). Any extension that results will
include the necessary inspections and modifications to ensure the full
operating envelope of the aircraft remains available in support of its
mission.
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