[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-49]
TEN YEARS ON: THE EVOLUTION OF
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND
INFORMATION OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 12, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
JEFF MILLER, Florida JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
CHRIS GIBSON, New York TIM RYAN, Ohio
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
Kevin Gates, Professional Staff Member
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Jeff Cullen, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, July 12, 2011, Ten Years On: The Evolution of Strategic
Communication and Information Operations Since 9/11............ 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, July 12, 2011........................................... 27
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2011
TEN YEARS ON: THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION
OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 10
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.............. 1
WITNESSES
Brooks, Rosa, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center........ 2
Hamid, Dr. Tawfik, Senior Fellow and Chair for the Study of
Islamic Radicalism, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies....... 6
Paul, Dr. Christopher, Social Scientist, RAND Corporation........ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Brooks, Rosa................................................. 32
Hamid, Dr. Tawfik............................................ 73
Paul, Dr. Christopher........................................ 49
Thornberry, Hon. Mac......................................... 31
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
TEN YEARS ON: THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION
OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 12, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:05 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Mr. Thornberry. I call the hearing to order.
And again, I apologize to the witnesses for the delay. But
I appreciate you bearing with us during the time of votes.
I want to ask unanimous consent that my opening statement
will be made part of the record, and since nobody else is here
at the moment that seems to be without objection in the
interest of time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Thornberry. As you all know, this has been an important
issue for this subcommittee for some time. And there had been
meetings even in recent weeks I have attended where Members had
expressed various opinions on whether the area of strategic
communications particularly in terrorism is an area where it is
appropriate or productive for the United States government to
be involved.
And I think it is most appropriate for us to hear your
views about whether we should be involved, how we are doing,
and suggestions you have for the way forward.
So I understand Mr. Langevin and other Members are on their
way, but in the interest of time let me go ahead. And I am
going to turn to our witnesses to summarize their opening
statements.
Without objection, your complete written statement will be
made part of the record.
And I will turn to our witnesses--Ms. Rosa Brooks,
professor of Georgetown University Law Center; Dr. Christopher
Paul from the RAND Corporation; and Dr. Tawfik Hamid, senior
fellow and chair for the study of Islamic radicalism at the
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
So, Ms. Brooks, we will start with you. Again, thanks for
being here.
STATEMENT OF ROSA BROOKS, PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW
CENTER
Ms. Brooks. Thank you.
Thank you, Chris.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now I can be heard.
It is great to have an opportunity to be here. And let me
just start by saying, as you said, I am a professor at
Georgetown. Until a few weeks ago, I was an official at the
Defense Department, where I worked very extensively on
strategic communication and information operations [IO] issues.
But I should emphasize that although I am very happy to talk to
the extent that I can about those issues if there is interest
and questions, I am here today just in my individual capacity.
I believe Chris----
Mr. Thornberry. Would you pull the microphone just a little
closer to you? It may be me, but----
Ms. Brooks. Is this better?
I think Chris is going to talk a little bit about the
origin of the term ``strategic communication'' and the various
meanings it might have in some detail so I won't do much beyond
saying that it is a bit of a corporate import. And indeed,
people often use the term ``strategic communications'' with an
``s'' on it just to mean the plural of all the different kinds
of public relations, marketing, advertising.
We have really struggled to give it a meaning at the
Defense Department that adds some value that isn't the same,
because I don't think it is particularly useful in the
government context to have that term.
It is just redundant if it means the same thing as public
affairs, plus public diplomacy, plus what we used to call
psychological operations [PSYOP] and now call MISO--military
information support operations. So we have really struggled to
make it a somewhat more robust concept, one that emphasizes the
importance of engagement, listening, understanding the
perception of others and aligning all of our tools, our
actions, as well as our words in order to influence perceptions
in a way that is in our favor.
I think though that that corporate history of communication
often creates a lot of misleading and overly simplistic
impressions about what strategic communication can and can't do
in the government context.
One of those impressions is that it is simple. It is like
selling a soda. You want to be able to easily show success or
failure. You want to be easily able to quantify it.
But in the context of national security and foreign policy
objectives, it is not a soda. It is much more complex. People's
bundles of cultural assumptions are very, very different. The
timeframe for success is much, much longer. You are not talking
about increasing sales over year one or year two. It is much
harder to gauge. What you are doing is much more of an art than
a science.
I think that one phrase that you still very, very often
hear repeated is the famous one of Richard Holbrooke's, ``How
can the world's greatest communication society be out
communicated by a guy in a cave?''
And I think that imbeds some of those assumptions that the
skills of Madison Avenue and Hollywood in a subcultural vacuum
can nonetheless significantly change the perceptions, attitudes
and behaviors of many, many people around the globe.
Osama bin Laden, who, of course, was the man in the cave
who Holbrooke was referring to, had a lot of advantages early
on in a certain way when it came to strategic communication.
One of them was the home court advantage.
Compared to us, he knew the language, the culture, the
history, the narrative, certainly far more than we did. They
say all politics is local. Maybe all strategic communications
is fundamentally local, at least, to be successful.
He also had the underdog status, and I think we early on
made a mistake and really playing into his hands, in some way
giving him a prestige. The appearance of the whole U.S.
military was preoccupied with this one man.
We had a platform already. We unintentionally raised it a
little bit higher for him by seeming obsessed with one man, one
organization at the expense of other issues.
With that said, Osama bin Laden in the end, I think, didn't
out communicate anybody. By the time of his death, he had
really sunk into much greater irrelevance. I think he was
overtaken by the events of the Arab Spring, a multiplicity of
other voices.
In a way he forgot that actions speak louder than words and
that no amount of ringing appeals to Islamic unity or jihad
could make up for the number of dead Muslim bodies in the
streets and the squares in the Arab world and elsewhere. He was
overtaken by many other voices that in many ways were rejecting
extremism.
What does all these mean to the United States, very, very
briefly?
I think there are some things when it comes to strategic
communication that we need more of and some things that we need
less of.
One thing that we need more of still is we are still in the
process of reforming some of our internal structures in the
government to diminish confusion about just what it is we are
talking about when we say ``strategic communication'' or ``IO''
or these various other terms. We need to increase our
coordination, training, et cetera.
We need to decentralize more and stop fixating on control
of the message, which rarely works, and indeed, I think one of
the reasons that we have seen, you know, in the Arab Spring, a
multiplicity of voices, who aren't that interested in the
issues that we were interested in, in the end become much more
influential than our efforts to change the conversation
ourselves.
We need more funding for good, old-fashioned public
diplomacy, cultural exchanges, educational exchanges. They make
a difference. They help with that decentralization by
empowering those many other voices.
There is some risk in that. You sometimes empower people
you are not going to like very much, but I think it is one of
those tactical risks for strategic gain situations, and long
term it pays off.
And we need more funding for linguistic training, regional
area studies training.
What do we need less of? We need a little bit less of
seeing all strategic communication through a counterterrorism
lens. I think that that ends up doing us a disservice in our
counterterrorism aims, ironically. I am happy to talk a little
bit more about that.
I think we need little bit less of an obsession with
metrics and assessments. It is very hard, in fact, especially
in the short run, to evaluate the success of strategic
communication campaigns.
I think we need less of a zero defect mentality. No
question in my mind there are people in the name of U.S.
government strategic communications doing stupid things right
this minute. It is going to happen, but we can't throw the baby
out with the bathwater when it does happen.
And finally, just the last point, I think that we need a
little bit less obsession with who does what. One of the topics
that in some ways I get most frustrated by is why is the DOD
[Department of Defense] doing this when the State Department
should be doing this in a different world. It seems to me if
the phrase ``whole of government'' that we toss around a lot
means anything at all, it has got to mean that when something
is in the national interest, the government finds a way to do
it.
In a better world, I think the State Department would be
better funded, have greater capacity. We are not there yet. In
the meantime, I think, very clearly it is among other things a
military mission to use the tools it has to prevent conflicts
when possible.
I will stop there. I know I have only skated over the
surface, but I have used up my 5 minutes.
So, thank you very much. I am happy to talk more in the
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Brooks can be found in the
Appendix on page 32.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
We are a little liberal on the 5 minutes, because I do
realize this is a big topic and we are asking you to summarize
your statement. But I appreciate you doing so.
Dr. Paul.
STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER PAUL, SOCIAL SCIENTIST, RAND
CORPORATION
Dr. Paul. Thanks very much for inviting me here to testify
today.
It was, in fact, in 2001 that Vince Vitto coined the phrase
``strategic communication'' for use in the government as we are
talking about it today, while serving as the chairman of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information
Dissemination.
So here we are 10 years later still using his phrase, but
still struggling collectively to get our arms around the
concept, let alone to do it well. So there is no official
government-wide definition of ``strategic communication.'' And
in academia there is not an agreed definition, nor is there
complete consensus about the boundaries of the concepts for
agreements on priorities for moving it forward.
In my research I have observed at least three differences,
real, actual tensions in how people conceive strategic
communication. These are: first, attention between broadcast
and engagement; second, disagreements over the desired degree
of control of the message, attention between balancing taped
message automatons versus loose cannon in the ship of
communication; and, third, attention between inform and
influence.
And I think it is this latter tension that is the most
significant and pernicious, a tension between those who admit
that the goal of strategic communication is influence and those
who hold that the goal is just to inform without influencing.
And I think this is a false dichotomy. Informing without
influencing isn't possible. There is no such thing in my view
as value-free information. Every provision of information
depends on the attitudes and beliefs of the speaker and seeks
to serve some purpose.
Letting the facts speak for themselves presupposes first
two things: first, that the facts have something to say and,
second, that there is something that the speaker wants said.
Every provision of information is an act of persuasion.
Perhaps the more appropriate distinction to make would be
between influence and manipulation. In my view, strategic
communication should be unashamedly about virtuous persuasion,
but should be completely devoid of falsehood, partial truths
and spin.
A wide range of definitions could successfully cover the
concept, as long as they respect what I call the unassailable
core of strategic communication, which has four tenets. First,
informing, influencing and persuading is important. Second,
effectively informing, influencing and persuading requires
clear objectives. Third, coordination and deconfliction are
necessary to avoid information fratricide. And, fourth, actions
communicate.
Now, this last point is particularly important, as far too
often strategic communication efforts focus only on the
traditional communicators and the traditional messaging to the
exclusion of the messages and signals we send in other ways.
So, if a definition of strategic communication doesn't
embrace those four points then in my view it is actually a
definition of something else.
I have a vision of what successful U.S. government
strategic communication would look like. In this vision we have
clearly stated national objectives, which contain nested
subordinate objectives, which contain nested intermediate
objectives, nesting all the way down to the operational and the
tactical level.
These clear statements make it easy to see where there is a
way and a way for influence and persuasion to contribute and
where there isn't.
In this vision commanders and decisionmakers have a
communication mindedness. They consider the messages and
signals that will be sent by their actions, their utterances,
their plans, policies. Failing that--or as that is developing--
these same commanders or decisionmakers have access to and
respect for communication specialists, who advise them and sit
at their right hand and bring the communication implications of
their intentions to their attention.
In this vision everyone in government speaks not with one
voice like a robot or a parrot, but with their messages aligned
in the same direction, because everyone understands the nested
objectives and, most importantly, how their own efforts
contribute to those objectives and because they have or have
access to the requisite communication training and cultural
knowledge.
In this vision communication isn't exclusively one-way
broadcast but also includes two-way communication, engagement
and dialogue. In my vision this leads to policy shaped with our
own interests, as well as the interest and preferences of
others in mind. This is my vision.
To support my vision I have six recommendations. I will
give you the headline for each and refer you to my written
testimony for the details.
My recommendations:
First, specify information end states.
Second, build strategic communication following a crawl,
walk, run progression.
Third, build strategic communication from the bottom up as
well as from the top down. We do need further leadership and
guidance in this area from the highest levels, but better
training and better practices at intermediate and lower levels
can make important contributions that should not be overlooked.
Fifth, make a distinction and separate virtuous persuasion
from more pernicious deception and manipulation.
And sixth and finally, create and disseminate a government-
wide definition of strategic communication.
I am happy to elaborate on anything I have touched on
during questions and answers.
Thank you for your time today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Paul can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Dr. Hamid.
STATEMENT OF DR. TAWFIK HAMID, SENIOR FELLOW AND CHAIR FOR THE
STUDY OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM, POTOMAC INSTITUTE FOR POLICY
STUDIES
Dr. Hamid. Thanks a lot. It is a pleasure and honor to be
with you today.
I will address first an important issue with the strategic
communication, which is a need, and a vital need, for this
topic in the war on terror, because the war on terror should
not be seen as a war within a geographical border. We have seen
terrorism developing from Afghanistan, Pakistan to homegrown
terrorism in America here.
So I see that the war on terror should focus on what I call
``Brainistan,'' the impulse of hatred that is created in the
mind of some individuals and causes them to do terrorism. So,
if we ignore this part of the problem, then we will have major
difficulty, really, to defeat terrorism at the end.
The other point I would like to mention is that after
September 11 there were several setbacks in the relationship
between the U.S. and the Muslim world. And in response to this
the United States tried several ways to improve its image in
the Muslim world, what they call winning hearts and minds.
They used some phrases like ``Islam is a religion of
peace,'' for example, to satisfy the Muslim society. They
avoided using certain expressions like the word ``jihad'' in
official communications for the same reason.
And they also tried in some situation to show what I call
culture oversensitivity, not just sensitivity, by having some
U.S. diplomats wearing the hijab, for example, the Islamic
scarf, when they visit Muslim countries, or sometimes the
female military personnel will wear the hijab in Afghanistan to
satisfy the local community, thinking that this will improve
the image of the United States.
The outcome of many of these attempts were not really very
significant improvement in the image of the United States in
the Muslim world. I mentioned some reports in my statement to
show that the outcome was not really so very promising of all
these attempts.
Weaknesses in the U.S. approach, as I see them, include the
following: failure to achieve what I call a critical balance or
crucial balance between showing respect to the Muslim world and
not being perceived as weak. So the balance here is needed.
For example, doing certain acts like the U.S. President,
for example, bowing to the king of Saudi Arabia to show
respect, he could have given him a hug, because bowing here can
show sign of weakness that can impede the image of, the
improvement of the image of the United States. In general the
Muslim world prefers to have a strong friend rather than a weak
friend.
The other point is failure to remove obstacles that impede
the process of improving the U.S. image, like, for example,
failure to weaken the radical, or inability to weaken radical
Islamic ideology itself which is a main obstacle to improving
the image of the United States in the Muslim world.
The ideology itself here is crucial. Without weakening it,
the image of the United States will have always difficulty to
be improved. And also failure to disassociate the U.S.
government from the U.S. media in the minds of many in the
Muslim world.
In our parts of the world we don't see the government here
separate from the media, so the government can do great things
to improve its image, yet we see someone in the media
criticizing Islam, for example. This can ruin the whole image
of the government. I believe sufficient effort should be given
to disassociate the U.S. government from the media in the mind
of many in the Muslim world.
The recommendations in general--I give the outlines--we
should work at three levels: the level of improving the message
quality itself via the text. Sometimes use some Islamic text to
really improve the strategic communication. I give some example
here. There is a need to use certain cognitive psychology
tactics to improve the U.S. image to create positive links to
the U.S.
Also, the U.S. needs to work on weakening the ideology of
terrorism by properly calculated and adjusted psychological
warfare operations. This is much more effective than just
military confrontation. We need to balance this psychological
warfare that is fundamental to weaken the mind of the
terrorists.
And, finally, addressing the perception issue so whenever
certain acts or deeds or statements are released, they should
be carefully done or stated in a way to avoid being perceived
as weak on the other side. So you can still show respect as
you--great, it is great to show respect, however you should do
it in a way without being perceived as weak.
These are the frames of recommendations, and I mentioned
more details in my statement. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hamid can be found in the
Appendix on page 73.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Excuse me.
Let me just ask each of you to comment on something I want
to read, and then I will yield to Ranking Member Mr. Langevin.
This is a quote from an article entitled ``Ending Al
Qaeda'' which appeared in the July/August issue of the American
Interest. And it says, ``The center of gravity in our struggle
with Islamist terrorism concerns Al Qaeda's legitimacy in the
context of Muslim perceptions of the West. Counter-narratives
can enable Western and allied Middle Eastern governments to
convince potential Al Qaeda recruits that violent extremism is
both intellectually corrupt and politically counterproductive.
If we combine these messages with a concerted effort to contest
Al Qaeda's strategic communications mastery of the Internet, we
can end recruitment. We can thus destroy Al Qaeda as a self-
regenerating worldwide proselytizing organization. Alas, we are
not doing this very well. In some respects, we are not doing it
at all. We need to change our ways lest we come to regret an
opportunity missed.''
I would be very interested to know your reaction to those
statements.
Ms. Brooks.
Ms. Brooks. I think it is both true and untrue. I think we
are contesting the Internet, probably not as effectively as we
could and should be, but I think I won't go into detail, as you
are probably already familiar with some of the Defense
Department's efforts, as well as the efforts of other parts of
the U.S. government, but it is certainly an area that is
getting a tremendous amount of attention and we care about very
deeply.
But the only part I would squabble with, I think, a little
bit, we are not always the right ones to do it. And this goes
back to the issue of who has the home court advantage, who has
the right skill sets.
We often don't get it right, because we don't have the
linguistic skills. We don't have the historical knowledge. And
I think that there is a little bit of a Holy Grail fantasy that
if we can only come up with this mystical alternative
narrative, that somehow everyone will just say, ``Oh, goodness
me, extremism is a terrible idea.''
I think that is dangerously simplistic. There is no Holy
Grail alternative narrative that we will put out there and that
the minute potential extremist recruits see or read they will
go, ``Gosh, I see the error of my ways.''
It is so much more complicated than that and I think we
barely understand the relationship between ideas, ideology,
action, behavior, identity, group loyalties, family loyalties.
All sorts of things can trump ideas.
That said, I think that what we do need to do--this goes
back to a point, I think, that we have all made in various
ways--is empower other credible voices to make those arguments
in a multiplicity of different ways, some of which we won't
like, some of which we won't like, but which in sum total--they
will be contradictory; it will be messy--but in sum total is
often much more powerful in the Internet domain, as well as
every other domain, than a controlled message to find the
alternative narrative that we put out there.
And I think this is in some ways the positive and negative
lessons for us of the Arab Spring: that you poll protesters in
Tahrir Square and elsewhere in the Arab world, they are not
that interested in the United States. That is not what was
getting them out there in the public squares. That is not what
was motivating them.
They weren't that interested in extremism either. They were
there for economic reasons. They were there for political
reasons. They were there, because they wanted futures and jobs
and better educational opportunities. You name it.
And in some ways the best thing we could do is stand back,
enable them to speak and shut up, other than saying, ``We
support you.'' So I think getting over the notion that there is
some quick fix that we, the United States government, will find
is something that we need to do and put more energy into
empowering and enable others to speak, recognizing that
sometimes we won't like what they have to say.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Dr. Paul.
Dr. Paul. I think the quote you read represents a laudable
sentiment, but I think the devil is in the details.
So, first, I would like to reiterate that strategic
communication is good for things other than just countering
violent extremism. There is a whole host of foreign populations
with whom we need to sustain positive relationships. And then
it is a lot easier to prevent violent extremism before it
starts by having a positive relationship and having started a
dialogue long before something like that emerges.
Second, this is harder than it seems. As Rosa indicated,
there is no silver bullet. There is a lot of cultural context
and nuance. This is not a trivial undertaking that just
involves getting a few right messages on the Internet, finding
the right radical extremist boards and offering counter
arguments.
And third, even if we become better at that and we do more
in that domain, it is very likely that an organization such as
Al Qaeda will have a residual radical hard core that no amount
of persuasion is going to work on. And so there is going to
need to be the--we can't talk our way out of this problem.
Absolutely, the strategic communication piece is critical
both in terms of making progress, necking Al Qaeda down to the
radical hard core, who will need to be incarcerated or
eliminated, hopefully, in such a way that it doesn't engender
further recruits, that that is framed in such a way as to be
communicated as effectively as possible.
These are just the few things I wanted to observe.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Thank you.
Dr. Hamid.
Dr. Hamid. Absolutely.
I agree with the point that the counter narrative to Al
Qaeda ideology has not been developed yet. And the United
States may not be in a position or may not have the capability,
really, to develop it, because it depends on the culture, on
the religious jargon, like, for example, here in the article
mentioned, it is intellectually corrupt and terrorism and
politically incoherent. This doesn't make much sense in the
mind of the jihadists.
What makes sense in the mind of the Muslim world is if it
is un-Islamic or Islamic. They think differently. They think in
terms of religion. So, I believe a counter narrative has to be
created, but the U.S. may play a supportive role here, not
necessarily to get directly involved within the process of the
production itself.
The second part is the use of Internet. It is crucial in
winning the war on terror. First of all, it can help the
reformation efforts. I wrote recently an op-ed to show that how
the worst parts of the Muslim world when it comes to
terrorism--Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan, in general--are the
lowest in using the Internet, in Internet penetration.
And not only that. The Internet can be used as a tool to
launch a very powerful psychological warfare operation, as I
mentioned, to fight here the impulse of hatred in
``Brainistan,'' so psychological warfare by using the Internet.
The Internet is tremendous tool in our hands, but we need
to develop the content that can be really effective, because
what works in our mind does not necessarily mean it will work
in their mind. So what we see effective and crystal clear it
will work, may not work at all and may be actually doing the
opposite, may produce the opposite of what we are expecting.
So we need really to go forward with using the Internet
effectively to launch psychological warfare. However, we need
to be very careful on the message and the content of the
material to be effective on the other side. So I agree, really,
with the view of the article.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, without objection, I would like to read my
opening statement, then go into questions if I could?
Mr. Thornberry. Sure.
Mr. Langevin. Again, thanks to our witnesses for your
testimony. I found it fascinating so far.
And more than 2,500 years ago the great Chinese strategist,
Sun Tzu, wrote, and I quote--``To fight and conquer in all your
battles is not supreme excellence. Supreme excellence consists
in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.''
But his real words still hold true today. America's
interest abroad is not simply to rely on breaking enemy
resistance, but also in enabling people around the world to
share in the American ideals of protecting life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness.
Since the horrible attacks of 9/11, our country has been
forced to turn its focus on battles abroad to seek justice
against those who murdered nearly 3,000 people. And while we
have had recent victories against Al Qaeda and its supporters,
including the killing of Osama bin Laden and suppressing major
elements of the Taliban, much of our effort has been falsely
billed in the Muslim world as a quest for vengeance.
Now, some in the U.S. have fanned these flames with similar
rhetoric, only sparking greater violence and outrage. It is a
vital lesson for those seeking to maintain America's influence
or leadership in the world community that words matter not only
for the respect and image of our nation abroad but also our
national security.
Now, strategic communication must be a whole of government
effort that employs American values of justice and liberty to
strengthen ties with our friends and allies and influence or
disrupt our competitors and foes.
These goals are becoming increasingly difficult in a world
of instantaneous global communication, where messages designed
for one audience can easily spill over and be confused by
another.
Furthermore, these audiences are not simply empty vessels.
No communication takes place in a vacuum, and certainly any
American engagement overseas can and will be spun and used
against us.
We must also be aware that we are targets of other
strategic communication efforts and must order our own
impressions and views. Take, for example, the recent quote from
the People's Liberation Army Chief General Chen Bingde, who
during Admiral Mullen's recent visit to China, noted that
America should reduce its spending on defense.
Should the statement be taken as a legitimate expression of
Chinese concerns with a strong and well-funded military, or
rather is it intended as ammunition for another audience in the
U.S., who would seek to stop any defense efficiencies, despite
a massive deficit owed largely to China and declining force
responsibilities in Iraq and Afghanistan? This is just one of
the main challenges facing our strategic communications abroad.
So with that, I just want to thank our witnesses, again,
for your time today. Again, I have appreciated your testimony
and look forward to continue to review the printed material
that you have provided to us and I appreciate, you know, the
challenges that we do face. The United States, obviously, has a
good story to tell. It is a story of strength through pluralism
and diversity and justice through fairness and compassion.
We must not lose the opportunities to tell the story when
we are able, so that our actions abroad may be rightly
interpreted as supporting the ideals upon which our
Constitution was based and which we wish for men and women
around the world.
With that, I would like to just turn to a question. Last
Congress I introduced a bill to establish a quadrennial
national security review that would basically take a whole of
government look at our national security challenges and
resources to meet these threats.
My question is, how should strategic communications be
synchronized with direct and indirect efforts, such as
humanitarian assistance operations? And will we benefit from a
high-level look at these priorities and resources across the
board?
Ms. Brooks. Yes, we would.
I think that your idea of a quadrennial national security
review is a very good one. I personally would also love to see
us move towards a more unified national security budget,
because I think that the increasingly archaic distinctions that
we draw between what the State Department does, what the
Defense Department does, which made sense in an era of rather
different, more state-oriented threats, don't make much sense
any longer.
And yet our committee processes here on the Hill, the way
our executive branch is structured and certainly the way we
present our budgets just sort of calcifies arbitrary lines that
really are doing us a disservice.
And I think that any effort--I think we are still obviously
very far away from that--but any efforts to force the executive
branch as well as invite people here on the Hill and in the
media to think of this as a unified set of problems, not as a,
over here you have got State, over here you have got AID
[Agency for International Development], over here you have got
the Defense Department, would be very valuable.
I think that one of the tough institutional challenges that
we face at the Defense Department and then I think is faced at
every other executive branch agency has been sort of wresting
strategic communication away from the communications experts,
which is not to say that that is not extremely important.
But your point about how do we better synchronize it with
humanitarian assistance and other issues really goes to a point
that I made and that Chris also emphasized, that strategic
communication, to be effective, is about aligning all of the
tools at our disposal, our actions, as well as our words. And
humanitarian assistance among other things can be a vital
strategic communication tool. If we stick it off in a closet
with public affairs, we don't tend to realize those synergies
at all.
So I think that that is partly just a bureaucratic and
structural challenge for us and some of the internal reforms
that while I was at the Defense Department we worked on. We are
very much geared at how do you integrate strategic
communication thinking across the departments so that it is not
deemed as it is on the sort of theory of every marine as a
rifleman, everyone should be a strategic communicator and be
thinking about those issues, but it is very hard to do.
Dr. Paul. So a really excellent question, because it
attacks two critical issues in this area--resources and this
issue of synchronization of actions. So the question is very
much mindful of the fact that actions communicate.
I will echo Rosa. Yes, more resources are necessary for
this. When USIA [United States Information Agency] was
disestablished, we lost as a nation a lot of capability in this
area. Some of it was rolled into State. Some of it was just
lost.
We have been building some capabilities in these areas, and
I understand this is a time of fiscal austerity. And if public
diplomacy and strategic communication are national priorities,
and they should be, they need to be resourced like they are.
Now, turning to the coordination and synchronization issue,
that is a real challenge. Something inside individual
departments that can help is the development of communication
mindedness. If the people who are doing humanitarian aid, who
are doing other kinds of policy have become conditioned to ask
the question, what are the communication implications of what I
am about to do and who else might I need to coordinate with,
that will go a long way.
But at the end of the day, if there are different
departments that have different portfolios, it is easy to say
the phrase ``whole of government.'' It is very difficult to
actually do whole of government integration.
Part of the challenge there is within the executive
departments. It is almost impossible for one executive
department to have anything approaching authority over another
executive department. The way it is structured just doesn't
allow that.
So you definitely hit on the challenge. There are some
possible solutions that can be achieved collaboratively and
through training and through constant reminders of
decisionmakers and reminders to decisionmakers and commanders
that actions communicate and that these things need to be
coordinated and integrated. But that is a real challenge and
remains a challenge.
Dr. Hamid. Okay. Thank you.
Thanks for the question. I see two parts. My answer will be
in two parts. The first is, when we have limited resources, I
believe it is the time when we should focus on how to improve
the efficacy and efficiency of using these resources. So it is
not just the amount of resources. I believe what is more
important is how to improve the same resources, even less
resources, to be more efficient.
Regarding the synchronization of the strategic
communications and the humanitarian effort, this is absolutely
needed. In cognitive psychology models in memory, in human
memory, there is a concept called or a theory called the
spreading activation model that means that when you remember
something like the word ``red'' you remember apple or red car
or blood, some related information. All information are like a
network of related data.
So when you remember in the Muslim world, for example, the
word you say, it can be either linked to positive or negative
things. Now it is more linked to negative things. That is why
the image is not that good. The aim of using humanitarian aid
can play a significant role in changing these links to make it
positive.
I will give you an example that happened in our country,
Egypt, my country, my original country, Egypt, that in the
1980s after Yom Kippur war, after long period of hatred to
America during Nasser's time, the United States AID, USAID,
used to send some chickens directly to the hands of people. And
the color of the cover of the bag was--or the color of the bag
there was something like the U.S. flag. It was not the flag,
but with same colors. It represented America. We called it the
American chickens.
And what happened when Egyptians used to eat these
chickens--believe me, this was happening--we used to pray, say,
``God bless America.'' The taste was so good, and it linked, it
created a link in the human brain between the word ``USA'' and
the good taste. So it was a positive link toward USA.
And during that time, the image of U.S. was marvelous. So
synchronizing the humanitarian aid with strategic
communication, they should work together, because you can use
the humanitarian aid more effectively when you, for example,
add the image of the flag, and you can put the two flags of the
two countries so that it is not misunderstood in a negative
way. So it creates a link toward the flag of the USA, the USA
via using humanitarian aid more effectively. So I fully agree
with this point.
I call this chicken diplomacy, by the way.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you all for your answers.
I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. West.
Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member.
And thanks to the panel for being here.
And Dr. Hamid, I absolutely applaud you for your stance----
Dr. Hamid. Thank you.
Mr. West [continuing]. And your efforts.
I spent 22 years in the military. And as an artillery
officer, one of the things that we saw develop was the
understanding that you have lethal fires, but then you also
have this thing called nonlethal fires. And when you do your
strategic studies, they will teach you that there are four
elements of a nation's power, and that is the DIME theory--
diplomatic, informational, military and economic.
So I think one of the things we have not really been able
to do a good job of is really understand how do we leverage the
nonlethal fires, the information operations, as part of our
national power. And I think that when you look at the fact that
we continue to talk about a war on terror, and I think you will
agree that terror is a tactic, so our nation cannot really
fight against a tactic. That is something down the tactical
level.
So I think we have missed the boat as far as our strategic
communications, and until we can clearly understand and
identify who the enemy is and their goals and objectives, that
we are not going to be successful in bringing together a
targeted, strategic type of communications message which, as
you just said, should not be in the realm of communicators. It
should be in the realm of operators. And I think that is an
important thing.
So my question to you all is this. Do you think in
developing a strategic communications plan--and we have been at
this for 10 years now--that we have truly failed to understand
the impetus behind which our enemy combats against us?
And also, I would ask a second question. Do you think we
are narrowly defining our enemy because if Al Qaeda was to
change their name tomorrow, does that mean that we have won?
Ms. Brooks. That is a good question.
I think that, as you said yourself in your comments,
terrorism is a tactic. It is not an entity called ``terror.''
It is a method. It is an asymmetrical method of warfare, and
those with less power will at times turn to it and that there
is importance in being very precise about who we are talking
about when we talk about the war on terror.
So to the question of, do we understand the impetus behind
our enemy, is I think it depends which one. The Taliban is
different from Al Qaeda. Al-Shabaab is different from main Al
Qaeda. Hamas and Hezbollah are very, very different from Al
Qaeda.
And I do think that we do ourselves a tremendous disservice
when we lump them all together. They have elements in common,
may draw on similar modes of support, may have similar
ideological elements, but they are not the same. The
grievances, the issues that motivate their adherents are
fundamentally different.
And I think that one of the, again, efforts that we have
really certainly worked on, I know, during my time with the
Defense Department, and I think that the U.S. in general has
made some significant progress is in disaggregating and saying,
``You know, you can't fight if you don't understand who you are
fighting against.'' I mean, you know, again, we do ourselves a
real disservice if we don't disaggregate.
Actually, if you will indulge me, one other metaphor I
really wish we could put to rest is the war of ideas metaphor
which, again, I think, as with the war on terror, tends to
confuse us more than it actually enlightens us.
As we have said earlier, you know, there is no one meta-
narrative that magically ends extremism or ends terrorism. We
don't really understand the relationship between ideas and
action.
There are lots of people who are exposed to and may be
adherents of violent extremist ideas, but who don't become
terrorists or don't fight against us. You know, to paraphrase
the NRA [National Rifle Association] bumper sticker, you know,
``Ideas Don't Kill People. People Do.''
And we need to understand that I think at times the
fixation on extremist ideology can really blind us to that sort
of down and dirty work of really disaggregating and saying,
``What is going on in this country in this province with this
demographic group that is motivating them to take action
against us,'' so that we can tailor our responses accordingly.
Dr. Paul. I think the way you framed your question provides
a really important frame, the separation between fires--lethal
fires and nonlethal fires. In the military we really understand
how to do lethal fires. There is a protocol, there are targets,
there is a desired effect, there is a variety of different
ammunitions that might deliver that effect. We know and we
understand that.
Not so much in the nonlethal fire side, on the information
operation side. It is harder to define the targets. It is hard
to know what the desired effect really is. It is harder to
articulate that, and it is harder to measure that.
So, bringing that up to strategic communication--you asked
about strategic communication strategies and strategic
communication plans--I think on some level it would be best if
we didn't have a strategic communication plan, but just had a
plan that included strategic communication.
One of the recommendations I make--and if you will indulge
me for a moment, I will elaborate--is that we should elaborate
information end states. This is a piece of advice that comes
from Professor Dennis Murphy at the U.S. Army War College. It
is one of the best pieces of strategic communication advice I
have heard, so I try to repeat it whenever I have the chance.
Dennis Murphy says, ``Hey, we should change the guidance
for the commander's intent such that commander's intent be
required to include an information end state.''
So if the traditional commander's intent, to give a simple
example, is remove--or the desired end state is remove the
insurgent presence from village X, if an information end state
is required, the commander might also make clear ``remove the
insurgent presence from village X whilst retaining the attitude
of noncombatants as neutral or better towards the friendly
force.''
With that caveat, with that extra information end state,
now subordinates have a lot more clear guidance to execute on.
And if they don't feel comfortable with the different
approaches necessary to do that, then they know they need to
reach outside their own stovepipe and go find someone who has
that expertise.
Thank you.
Mr. West. Thank you.
Dr. Hamid. Thanks for the question.
Regarding the first question, have we failed in our
strategic communications with information warfare, my answer
is, yes, we certainly have failed. Until today terrorists are
generated in higher rates. We have homegrown terrorism here in
the United States in the last couple of years that exceeded
previous 8 years since September 11. So certainly, the evidence
is showing that we are not very successful on this front.
The other question, have we failed in defining, you know,
the enemy, my answer is, certainly, yes. We failed basically to
define the word ``radical.'' We are fighting like radical Islam
sometimes, and we say we support moderates.
But when you ask people how would you define ``radical''
and how would you define ``moderate,'' what are the parameters.
It is like a doctor going to do surgery for cancer without
defining the criteria for cancer.
We failed to understand that relationship between the
ideology and the actions. So we simply focus on like, the
doctor focusing on the abscess and ignoring the diabetes that
caused the abscess.
You treat the abscess, you have another abscess. You treat
it again, you have another abscess. Until you recognize the
underlying cause and the mechanism of diabetes, obesity,
aggravating it, you see the holistic picture, then you cannot
cure the condition.
And I see we ignore the common factor in all the groups
whatever you call them, whatever their names are, they share
one thing, a common ideology that tells them to kill the other
or not to be tolerant to the other or to hate the other. And as
long as we do not confront this ideology effectively and weaken
it via education, via psychological warfare operations, via
other means, we will not be able, really, to really control
this problem.
Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all of you for being here.
I appreciate you talking about the whole of government
approach because, you know, for years that was very
frustrating, because one, you know, you could really see why we
needed to do that, and yet it was clear that we weren't quite
there.
But, I wonder if you could--is there an example, a positive
example of where that whole of government across entities and
with proper communication occurred and could be looked at as--
and actually we would have even the results of what that might
have changed in terms of--so can we look to any of that? What
do we learn from that or what do we learn from the fact that we
can't find an example like that?
Dr. Paul. I have one. Unfortunately it isn't a U.S. one.
But the Australian Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands,
RAMSI, they went in there. It is a peace enforcement and
governance restoration mission, I think, in the 2005/2006
timeframe. And they had amazing whole of government
integration.
How did they do it? They had the three commanders on the
ground, the representative of their foreign ministry, their
state department, the police representative they sent and the
military representative.
The three of them went around joined at the hip. If ever
they spoke in public, one was at the podium, the other two sat
behind him or her. If a question came up that required an
answer that they hadn't already reached a consensus on, they
would turn around and put their heads together and get the
Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands answer. And so they
always had integration.
That may not always be practical, but there is one example
of success.
Mrs. Davis. Were they approaching that from the--were they
understanding that within the context of strategic
communication? Or they were doing that, perhaps they would say
because it was the right thing to do, but because they needed
to try and carry out a mission that required--I am thinking of,
you know, the Africa Command, but maybe ``command'' is using
the wrong word, you know, AFRICOM, but where we tried to put
people forward who don't only represent the military, the
Pentagon, and----
Dr. Paul. They didn't use the phrase ``strategic
communication.'' They did it in the name of unity of command,
which is an important strategic communication principle, and
they were very mindful of the message their force and their
actions were sending within the separate command stovepipes,
within the military stovepipe, within their civilian police
forces.
They were very cognizant of how their behaviors, how their
dress, what kind of messages those sent to the civilian
population. It was very important to them to not--to be
internally consistent and not be contradictory.
So while they might not have used the phrase ``strategic
communication,'' I would argue that what they were doing was
very much in that vein and with that intention, a whole of
government continuity and coherence.
Ms. Brooks. I think it partly depends on the scale. I think
it is easier to find good examples on a very small scale than
on a very large scale just because, you know, the nature of
this is a big government, it is a big country, it is a big
world, the bigger the issue.
Mrs. Davis. Right.
Ms. Brooks. You can say, ``Here are areas where we did
better or worse,'' but it is very tough to say, ``Here is a,
you know, unequivocal, wholehearted success.''
I can think of a couple of examples of things that I think
that we got better or got right. I can think of more, but I
will just mention a couple.
One which was something, a very difficult issue where I
think we certainly got better, was in the context of civilian
casualties in Afghanistan, where there was a very conscious
shift, which was very much a whole of government shift, from
saying our first reaction to press reports or other reports of
civilian casualties caused by coalition forces is going to be
to say, ``We don't know what you are talking about. We are
going to do investigation. They were all bad guys anyway. What
do you mean,'' to shift to saying straight off the bat,
everybody saying, ``If our actions caused civilian casualties,
we will do everything we can to correct it. We are so sorry if
there has been any loss of innocent life. Nothing we can say
can change the fact that people have lost loved ones. We know
that.''
I think that shift in itself was actually quite significant
and took a real conscious effort to sound less defensive, to
say, you know, loss of life is loss of life. It doesn't matter
if it was justified. The grieving parents or relatives are
still grieving. I think that was getting it better and in
reaction to learning the hard way that we were getting it
wrong.
Another more recent example of one, I think, all things
considered, the government did a pretty good job with the death
of Osama bin Laden. I think that we fumbled a little bit on the
details of what happened in terms of how the story came out,
but I think it was actually handled in precisely the right way
across the government, which was supposed to say, ``This is
something we have been trying to do for a long time, we said we
are going to do. We did it. This guy is a bad guy. He is not
here anymore. Good thing.''
But, also, without turning it into a moment of exulting in
vengefulness or exulting in death, or lionizing him more than--
inadvertently raising again the prestige and the profile of Al
Qaeda, that it was the right degree of ``bad guy, he is dead,
we got him, we can do these things,'' but also sort of saying,
``And, you know what, he is not that important anymore. Move
on.''
Mrs. Davis. Yes.
Dr. Hamid. I actually, I was going to give the bin Laden
example also as a matter of cooperation, but I don't really
have several other examples, really, in my mind about this sort
of cooperation. I see from the other side that actions of the
U.S. government seem to be disassociated from one another.
One part of the government is doing something. Another part
is doing something else. Sometimes this is beneficial, because
if someone did a mistake, the other one can try to correct it.
But in general, things must be synchronized more effectively
together, I believe.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, may I just ask one quick question, because I
know we don't have too many of us here.
You know, I was really interested in your comments, Dr.
Hamid, about weakness--respect and weakness.
Dr. Hamid. Yes.
Mrs. Davis. And particularly related to the hijab, the U.S.
women going in----
Dr. Hamid. Yes.
Mrs. Davis [continuing]. And wearing----
Dr. Hamid. The hijab.
Mrs. Davis [continuing]. The hijab. And also thinking about
how those of us who--women who go in also cover our heads. We
don't really----
Dr. Hamid. Yes.
Mrs. Davis [continuing]. Wear the full, but we are told to
do that, and we do that out of respect.
Dr. Hamid. Yes.
Mrs. Davis. Where is--how----
Dr. Hamid. Ah, how is it seen as weakness?
Mrs. Davis. Where does one go for that information?
Dr. Hamid. Yes. The other side simply sees it as you are
subjugated to Islam. The word ``Islam'' means submission. It
was supposed to be submission to God, but it is used
politically in different ways to submit others to their values
of their religion.
You see, the radicals everywhere are trying to submit other
people to their will. In Somalia, from Afghanistan, the
Taliban, even in the Salafis in Egypt recently were trying to
submit others. So they see you have submitted to their value
system. So you see, they are bowing to us. This is how they
will interpret it. We are winning. We are victorious.
So whatever you do on one hand to really show victory and
bring the psychology of defeat in the mind of the enemy, the
enemy will always go and say, ``Look, they are defeated. They
are bowing to us. They are following our values.''
So this is how it is seen as weakness. This is why what I
am saying is to show respect, yes, absolutely, but be very
careful of doing this without showing signs of weakness. So you
can still achieve the positive value of showing respect to
others and without the negative effect of showing weakness, and
weakness from their side, from their point of view, not from
your point of view. From your point of view you can't see it,
but this is how it is seen on the other side.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And after this question I unfortunately have to depart for
a meeting that I have in my office, but it is important to
stay. And, you know, I am fascinated by the discussion here
today, and I understand how important these things are and how
they matter.
Obviously, the conflict in terms of where we are today has
been years in the making, and particularly the conflict with
violent jihad.
Dr. Hamid. Yes.
Mr. Langevin. How do we really turn this around? And one of
the things that really that I struggle with and I think we are
all challenged by is the fact that if you look at, for example,
throughout the Quran there are numerous examples where it
actually calls for followers to commit violent jihad, that it
calls for acts of violence----
Dr. Hamid. Yes.
Mr. Langevin [continuing]. To subjugate. And it is almost a
duty----
Dr. Hamid. Yes.
Mr. Langevin [continuing]. To do that.
It is not like in some cases in the Bible, as I understand
it, there are certain cases where there might be call for acts
of violence, but they are almost subject to interpretation. It
might be more vague than it is in the Quran, which seems to be
very direct----
Dr. Hamid. Yes.
Mr. Langevin [continuing]. In calling for acts of violence.
So, if that is the case, how do we turn this around? How do
we win, you know, in the sense of--and achieve a peaceful
outcome?
Dr. Hamid. Thank you for this question, this vital
question. And I noticed, for example, I read the Bible when I
was young, and in Deuteronomy you will find, for example, fight
against Amalek, for example, specific groups. So it is not a
general fight for everyone else.
But I will give you a personal story of mine. One day I was
praying in Egypt when I was young, beginning my real story in
religions and in thinking. And I read a verse in the Quran that
says [Arabic]--``Kill the infidels wherever you find them.''
And my conscience couldn't accept it, so I asked a Salafi
friend of mine. His name was Ali. He was radical. And he said
to me, ``Yes, we have to fight the infidels, and it is
obligation on us.''
I went to a Sufi scholar, which is a mystical form of
Islam. He said to me, ``Just love every human being and be good
with every human being.'' And this was not satisfactory. I said
to him, ``It is written. It is mentioned in the Quran. It is
written here.'' He said to me, ``[Arabic],'' which means ``in
the day of judgment you will understand the meaning.''
So, for me I was not so patient to wait for the day of
judgment. I just followed the one who is giving me the literal
meaning.
Later on in the reformation efforts I am doing, I realized
that all the verses in the Quran that talk about jihad or
violence use the expression ``the'' before the expression
``infidels''--al-kafioun, al-moshaka. ``Al'' means ``the'' in
Arabic. It is like telling you I am going tomorrow to a white
house or I am going tomorrow to the White House. It is
completely different.
Just emphasizing the value of ``the'' or ``al-a'' before
the word ``infidel'' in the Quran can simply solve this
problem, because once you say ``the,'' you define the meaning,
the violent text to this specific group in the early stages of
Islam. You can't generalize it to everyone else.
So, there is a way within some linguistic analysis and
interpretation really to limit the meaning of the violent jihad
to some specific group only in the early stages of Islam.
So, it is certainly possible to, through different ways of
interpretations, through language, to really limit. And you
take it literally from me, all the violent text of jihad can be
limited to the early stages of Islam without being currently
applicable in our modern times.
So there are ways to do this. It is not impossible. It is
certainly possible.
Ms. Brooks. If I can add a thought on that, I think I defer
to Dr. Hamid about all of this, and I am sure it is right that
there is a segment of the population for whom that sort of
textual analysis can make an enormous difference. At the same
time, I think there is a real danger of placing too much
emphasis on ideology.
Islam has been around for 1,500 years, more or less, and
the rise of extremist Islamic terrorism is a pretty new
phenomenon. And even today the vast majority of Muslims in the
world have nothing to do with it.
So, I think, assuming that our problem is this pernicious
ideology that comes out of the Quran can be very misleading,
and this goes back to the earlier discussion of what is the
relationship between ideas and behavior.
You know, for the average recruit to extremist action, it
may have far more to do with what their brother suggested that
they do or economic need or fear or anger about a very specific
policy, whether it is of the United States somewhere.
They may be wrong. They may be misunderstanding it, but a
perception about Palestine or Israel for instance. And I think
that we would be wise to not overemphasize the role that
ideology--religious or otherwise--plays in what are violent
social movements that often have many complicated causes, some
of which are nationalistic, some of which are economic.
You know, again, not to suggest that there isn't a very
important role for a segment of people in doing that, but I
sometimes think that we get so obsessed with that we have got
to counter this ideology that we give too little attention to
the other causes that motivate people to become a recruit.
I know that I am not an expert on radicalization, but I
have colleagues who spent a great deal of time looking very
concretely at case studies of how does person A end up being
radicalized, and it is pretty rare that ideology has much to do
with it, you know, except as kind of a blanket justification
that becomes convenient when someone asks. It usually has much
more to do with who their friends are, who is paying them, et
cetera, et cetera.
Dr. Hamid. Yes. Would you mind?
I am not denying the role of other factors. There are other
facts that can play a role. However, we should ask ourselves a
basic question. Why the socioeconomic and political factors
that some people say it makes someone a terrorist? Why they do
not affect, for example the Christians in the Middle East, who
live under the same socioeconomic and political circumstances.
Like we haven't seen the Christians in Iraq, for example, being
suicide bombing or beheading other people.
So it is obviously the problem is coming from specific
group here. So, if the factor, the external factor was the true
cause of the problem, it shouldn't distinguish between a Muslim
or Christian or a Jew. It should affect all the population.
So you see terrorism development in any poor area, like
from Brazil to India for example, but that is not the
situation. That is what makes the ideology playing the pivotal
role, but yet I am not saying it is the only role. There are
other contributing factors.
Dr. Paul. It is complicated. And I won't pretend to have
the answer. I will make two observations.
First, given that this conflict was years in the making and
did take a long time to brew, we should accept that it may well
be years in the unmaking.
And second, that the kinds of things that will help are
kinds of things we are talking about--promoting engagements,
encouraging shared understanding, trying to identify and
emphasize shared values, share information, and better
understanding of radicalization processes and connecting
engagements and promotion of shared understanding in programs
to try to diminish radicalization processes.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
Thank you all for your testimony today. It has been
valuable.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Ms. Brooks, you all were really talking about this, and I
acknowledge that there is no one factor that makes one go blow
yourself up. But certainly during the cold war, we fought an
ideological struggle as well as had troops in Europe and
nuclear weapons. You know, there was a multi-front sort of
effort to combat the evil, I will say, that was coming out of
the Soviet Union.
So isn't there an ideological aspect to the fight against
those who want to come kill innocent people in the name of
religion also?
Ms. Brooks. Absolutely, and I don't mean to suggest that
there is no ideological aspect. I think I would just emphasize
what you just said. It has got to be a multi-front battle.
And I think that we err, I think, when we get a little
overly simplistic and start thinking it is a magic bullet. If
we could only refute the ideology, if we could only come up
with the alternative narrative, that is when we start getting
ourselves into trouble.
It is a component. The nature of the component is probably
different with different groups of people. At risk of repeating
myself, it is sort of disaggregate, disaggregate, disaggregate.
Mr. Thornberry. No, and I think that is a fair point. But I
guess what we are trying to evaluate, as somebody said, 10
years on into this, is to what extent the ideological part of
this is appropriate for the U.S. government and how well the
U.S. government is doing it.
And I think at least both of you have said, it is not just
a counterterrorism issue. There is a strategic communications
element to a whole variety of engagement with the world.
Ms. Brooks. Absolutely.
Mr. Thornberry. And I acknowledge that.
But I guess we are kind of taking the terrorism as a case
study here today mostly. But as that passage I read indicates,
at least there are some who believe that if we can be more
effective, we can decrease Al Qaeda's recruitment and, to
borrow a phrase, have it wither on the vine.
Ms. Brooks. Yes. I think it is a question of balance, as
ever. I mean, can we be more effective at exactly that? Should
we be? Yes, absolutely. And I think that there are actually
some very interesting projects, some of which you are probably
aware of, for instance the center at West Point that I can't
remember the name, Center for the Study of Terrorism, something
like that----
Mr. Thornberry. Center for Combating Terrorism. Yes.
Ms. Brooks [continuing]. That does these extremely
interesting studies, close readings of documents released by
leading Al Qaeda figures. It points out contradictions, et
cetera, et cetera. It puts them up on the Web. That one tiny
little project, which is not very expensive, actually there is
some clear evidence that that makes a difference, and it gets
them very upset that for the segment of people for whom
ideology is important, that that matters.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes.
Ms. Brooks. And so, I don't at all mean to suggest that we
shouldn't do it and that we shouldn't do it better. We
absolutely can and should. I think it is just that when we
overvalue the ideological component and forget to think about
everything from that war via chickens, humanitarian assistance
piece to----
Mr. Thornberry. Yes.
Ms. Brooks [continuing]. To another piece of your question,
thinking about what is it that we don't do that well but that
other people can do much better, and this goes back to
empowering other voices, empowering both the U.S. private
sector, because there are just things that the U.S. government
shouldn't do and----
Mr. Thornberry. Yes. I want to get to that whole subject in
a second.
Ms. Brooks. Yes.
Mr. Thornberry. But I take your point.
Dr. Hamid, we had witnesses at our last hearing----
Dr. Hamid. Yes.
Mr. Thornberry [continuing]. Who suggested that one of the
most effective messages, whether it is from us or from others,
is the idea that these terrorist acts kill innocent Muslims.
Dr. Hamid. Yes.
Mr. Thornberry. And so, the fact that you have innocent
members of the same religion, who are being slaughtered----
Dr. Hamid. Yes.
Mr. Thornberry [continuing]. With these acts, do you think
that is effective to use?
Dr. Hamid. Absolutely. Using this fact that the majority of
the victims of terror are Muslims can be used effectively in
strategic communications to show that the whole war against the
terrorists is actually a war that protects the lives of many
Muslim people.
And, ideally, if there is some moderate Muslims coming this
whole image to support what the U.S. is doing against the
terrorists, it's not just selfish action that only cares for
the personal interest, but it is much broader than this. It is
far more than just the security of America. It is security for
the whole world, including many Muslim innocents.
In fact, one of the best ways to achieve this is to show
the Muslim world the impact of terrorism on the Muslim society.
One of the very sensitive areas is the impact on women. Many of
the terrorist acts in Pakistan and Afghanistan ended in orphans
or widows. Some of them, for example, had to do some immoral
things because of the poverty and the need.
If these stories are emphasized to the Muslim world, they
will really start to hate terrorism, and it can help a lot in
preventing the process of radicalization. So, certainly, this
is one of the most fundamental areas that could be used.
Mr. Thornberry. Dr. Paul, in your comments you said
something about we need to make sure that what we do is more
effective. Ms. Brooks says there is too much emphasis on
metrics when we talk about strategic communications. My
question is, how do you know what is effective if you don't
have some way to measure the results?
Dr. Paul. Another really good question.
Yes, it is very difficult to do effective measurement in
this area. When we look at industry, they are engaging in
similar kinds of challenges, sharing ideas and engagement
pathways. But at the end of the day, they have a sales metric.
Either their product is being bought or it isn't.
It is much harder to capture measures globally. It is an
area we can get better at. There is something to learn from
industry. There is something to learn from social science. When
I speak to junior officers about things that they can do in
smaller areas of responsibly, I talk about field expedient
measurements.
There is something to the old aphorism that the plural of
``anecdote'' is ``data,'' that if you collect impressions,
patrol impressions, crowd impressions over time, and plot those
kinds of events against exogenous factors, significant events
and other areas of responsibility--elections, things like
that--and if you can plot a trend over time, then you can see
and compare that to the kinds of things you have been doing.
And this is at a very small scale. There is some traction
there. At the bigger scale, there is polling. It is not that we
are completely ignorant of how to do measurement in this arena.
There is room to get better and, of course, measurement isn't
free.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes. Yes.
Ms. Brooks, let me go back to the private sector for just a
second. One of the things that struck my attention years ago on
this was someone I knew in the political consulting world went
to run a campaign in a Muslim country successfully for
president and then wanted to come here and offer his services
to the United States government for free. I mean, he made all
the money he needed to make, you know, but there is no way for
him to plug in.
And in spite of knowing a lot of folks at the State
Department at that time and around the administration, it was
simply impossible. And so that is one of the reasons that
somebody referred, I think, to the Defense Science Board study
that I thought their suggestion of having a FFRDC [federally
funded research and development center] that is separate from
the government, where private industry could plug in, and some
of those skills from Madison Avenue or international political
consulting could be useful.
When you did your review for the administration, did that
figure in at all or is that all a pipe dream, that government
is government, private sector is private sector, and if you
want to come work for government you have got to come be a
civil servant or something.
Ms. Brooks. I think on the level of principle, everybody
agrees with that, that we ought to do more with the private
sector, we ought to enable the private sector more effectively.
I think where it breaks down is implementation, and I think it
is quite shocking.
I think we literally just have astonishingly few vehicles
to enable private sector action even when, as in your example,
we have people literally coming to us, you know, from very
large corporations, universities, non-government saying, ``How
can we help?''
We don't know what to do with them. We don't know what to
tell them. We say, ``Thanks, we will get back to you,'' and we
never do, because we have no vehicles for using them.
That is for a lot of different reasons. Some of them are
reasons of bureaucratic rigidity and the usual stupidity. It is
not in any--you know, it doesn't help anyone to do it, so they
don't. It is not their job.
Some of it has to do with legal and ethical restrictions
that have been put there for very good reasons. It is if you
are in the executive branch, it is actually quite astonishing
when you make the mistake of asking a lawyer something like,
``Well, could we ask Google to help us with,'' or whatever the
question may be.
The answer is usually, ``Don't even think about it. Don't
you dare,'' often because of legislative restrictions that are
in place to prevent conflicts of interest, et cetera, et
cetera.
How we untangle that I don't know. But I actually think it
would be--a fabulous project for folks here to undertake would
be to really do an evaluation of both the sort of the
bureaucratic reasons and the statutory reasons. But that is so
hard, because I absolutely agree our greatest strength of the
country is not our amazingly streamlined executive branch,
sadly.
Our greatest strength as a country is our people and our
organizations, and finding better and more effective ways to
let them do what they are good at is something that strikes me
as extremely urgent, and we are shockingly bad at it.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes.
Yes, Dr. Paul.
Dr. Paul. If I may, in my written testimony there is a
brief reference to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation or Institute
for International Scholars, SAGE Initiative, Strengthening
America's Global Engagement, that has taken about a dozen
reports recommending reforms in public diplomacy and strategic
communication, all of which advocate some kind of--like the
Defense Science Board, some kind of semi-independent or
independent entity.
They have been working since September of last year with a
large consortium of think tanks, individuals from industry,
from governments, from advertising, from academia, to
synthesize some of the best ideas in a no kidding business plan
for such an entity and hope later this year in a bipartisan way
to advance such a thing.
If such an entity came into being, that would the perfect
opportunity for a dollar-a-year man who wanted to come in and
share expertise or provide skills to plug into that
organization, making that expertise available to the
government, leveraging the private sector, and getting public-
private partnership benefits.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes, well, I look forward to seeing what
they come up with.
Now to pass something through the Congress, we have the
same jurisdictional issues that you referenced earlier, but I
think there are a number of us at least who are interested in
exploring that.
We haven't talked about Smith-Mundt, Dr. Paul. How big an
impediment is that just being effective in our communication?
Dr. Paul. It makes a difference. Just for background, the
Smith-Mundt Act is actually the Information Exchange Act of
1948 amended a couple of times. The principal complaint about
it isn't that it established the foundation for public
diplomacy, which it did, but some of the later amendments
prohibit dissemination of information intended for foreign
audiences to the domestic U.S. public.
I was at a hearing for the U.S. Advisory Commission on
Public Diplomacy earlier today. Sat next to me was Jeff
Trimble, the executive director for the Broadcasting Board of
Governors [BBG], the folks who do Voice of America and all the
different Voice programs.
And he reported some sad instances where domestic
populations, domestic radio stations and broadcasting
communities within the United States, wanted to have access to
BBG Somali language broadcasts or BBG Urdu language broadcasts
for domestic populations and when they made a formal request to
the BBG for those broadcast, the BBG, because of the statutory
constraints, had to say no.
And he also related the sad story of just recently being
abroad, being in Russia and talking to Russian administrators
to try to encourage them to relax their policies regarding BBG
products being disseminated in Russia. And the Russians pointed
out, ``Well, gee, you have the Smith-Mundt Act, so you can't
show these broadcasts to your people. Why should we let you
show them to our people?'' To which he had no answer. So, there
is a concrete example.
When you talk to folks from the Department of State, they
don't see it as much of a constraint. They are more inclined
to--in my experience to laugh it off as kind of historical
oddity that doesn't get in their way very much. It gets in the
way of BBG, and I have heard far too often of accounts of it
getting in the way of the Department of Defense as well.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes. Yes. So have I. And it seems to me it
is a great example of an outdated law that has not kept up with
change in technology. When you think about the Internet and how
Smith-Mundt can possibly apply to that situation, it makes no
sense to me. And, you know, I continue to hope and think that
common sense will prevail at some point.
Again, we are not interested in the government providing
propaganda, as it is called, to try to influence decisions
within the United States, but at the same time when you can't
even communicate basic information because of this, it makes no
sense at all to me either.
We may have a couple more questions that we will submit to
you all in writing after we go through some of what we talked
about. Again, let me thank each of you for being here and for
your expertise and opinions that you have shared with us. This
is a--as you can tell--as I think several of you said, it is
harder than it seems. Recognize that.
On the other hand, that doesn't mean we should walk away
from making the attempt, because I am of the view that it is an
important component not only against the terrorists, but in a
variety of aspects of U.S. foreign policy and national
influence around the world. And we have got to get better at
that.
So thank you again for being here.
And with that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 12, 2011
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 12, 2011
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