[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-48]
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE PROPOSED
DRAWDOWN OF U.S. FORCES
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 23, 2011
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DUNCAN HUNTER, California LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado BILL OWENS, New York
TOM ROONEY, Florida JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia TIM RYAN, Ohio
CHRIS GIBSON, New York C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE HECK, Nevada BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Ben Runkle, Professional Staff Member
Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, June 23, 2011, Recent Developments in Afghanistan and
the Proposed Drawdown of U.S. Forces........................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, June 23, 2011.......................................... 49
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2011
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE PROPOSED DRAWDOWN OF U.S.
FORCES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Flournoy, Hon. Michele, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense..................................... 6
Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Flournoy, Hon. Michele....................................... 61
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 53
Mullen, ADM Michael G........................................ 57
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 55
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 69
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 69
Mr. Scott.................................................... 69
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 73
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE PROPOSED DRAWDOWN OF U.S.
FORCES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, June 23, 2011.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Good
morning.
The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive
testimony on the President's decision to withdraw 10,000 U.S.
troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year and the
remaining 23,000 surge forces by next summer.
My position on the war effort has remained consistent:
Afghanistan's stability is vital to our national security. Any
removal of forces should be based on conditions on the ground
and consistent with the advice of our senior military leaders.
Based on the President's speech last night, it is not clear to
me that his decision was based on either.
At West Point, in 2009, the President committed to a
comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan by
surging 33,000 troops. Every witness before this committee has
testified that this strategy is beginning to bear fruit by
seizing the momentum from the Taliban.
Many Members have been to Afghanistan and seen this
progress for themselves. Districts that were once Taliban
strongholds are now being contested, and once-contentious
regions are being handed over to Afghan security forces. The
Afghan National Army and Police [ANA and ANP] are growing in
number and beginning to develop the capabilities to secure
their country. These gains are significant. We should guard
them jealously.
I am deeply concerned, therefore, about the aggressive
troop withdrawals proposed by President Obama. The President's
decision could jeopardize the hard-won gains our troops and
allies have made over the past 18 months and, potentially, the
safety of the remaining forces. This announcement also puts at
risk a negotiated settlement with reconcilable elements of the
Taliban, who will now believe they can wait out the departure
of U.S. forces and return to their strongholds.
Today, I hope to hear more about the details underpinning
the President's plan; that we have allowed enough time to
achieve success; that this drawdown is a military, not a
political, consideration; and that it does not put our
remaining forces at risk.
I am interested not only in the number of forces the
President plans to redeploy, but the location and composition
of those forces. I am concerned that we will withdraw combat
forces before they are able to cement recent gains and that
areas which have been economy-of-force missions thus far will
now never witness similar progress.
With the Taliban stumbling, we need a strategy designed to
knock the enemy to the mat, not give them a breather. I wish I
had heard the President forcefully renew his commitment to
winning in Afghanistan. We need our Commander in Chief to
remind the American people why this fight must be won and to
reassure our military service members and their families that
their sacrifices are not in vain.
Instead, I heard a campaign speech, short on details and
confusing multiple theaters of operation that have little to do
with a plan to succeed in Afghanistan. I look forward to
hearing more about how this plan will advance our shared
national security interests.
I would yield now to our ranking member, Mr. Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 53.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our witnesses for being here this morning to
further explain the President's policy in Afghanistan.
It is a very, very difficult set of choices that confront
our country. I think everyone agrees on two broad points: One,
we want our troops home as soon as possible. The cost and
finances but, more importantly, in terms of lives and those
injured is enormous. And we are weary of the war, without
question, and we want our troops to come home as soon as
possible.
But the second thing that we want is we want to make sure
that Afghanistan does not descend back into chaos, as it did in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. We understand the threat to our
national security that comes from an Afghanistan that is in
chaos, the safe havens that will become available to Al Qaeda
and Taliban and other allies that clearly threaten us.
The question, the challenge that our two witnesses before
us today and the President and others face is, how do you
balance those two things? And I think the President has struck
a very, very reasonable balance in this plan.
It is important to point out that, even with the drawdown
that is announced, we will have vastly more troops in
Afghanistan at the end of that drawdown late next year than we
had when President Obama took office. Nearly twice as many U.S.
troops will be there. It is a relatively modest drawdown over
the next year and a half.
And the other point that I hope folks will understand: Yes,
there is a risk in us leaving, but that will always be the
case. If we had 150,000 troops there and kept them for 10
years, 10 years from now when we decide to draw them down,
there would be a risk. This is not a historically stable part
of the world. That risk will always be there.
But what fails to be understood and what I applaud the
President for emphasizing is the risk involved in staying too
long, and not just in terms of the cost that we will bear as a
country and certainly the cost that our men and women serving
in uniform will bear, but to the very security of Afghanistan
itself.
On a daily basis, we hear complaints from the Afghan people
about our military presence, about civilian deaths, about the
simple fact of having 100,000 or, add the NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] folks in there, 150,000 U.S. troops in
your country. It is not a pleasant experience. It doesn't make
you want to support your government, to know that they are
reliant on 150,000 foreign troops and, in the case of a Muslim
country particularly, 150,000 western troops in your country.
That, too, has a risk attached to it.
So you have to strike a balance. If we were to say to the
Afghan people tomorrow, ``We are just going to stay here for as
long as we feel like it,'' that, too, would undermine our
national security interests. A balance must be struck. And I
think in the President's speech last night he struck that
balance. If I have a concern, it is that we may be staying
there too long into next year.
So I can certainly understand why our two witnesses and the
President and all those who put together this decision have a
difficult balance to strike. And I, too, look forward to
hearing from our witnesses about how that plan is going to play
out over the course of the next year and a half and beyond,
because there is no question that Afghanistan and Pakistan are
central to our national security interests. There is also no
question, I think we all wish they weren't. It is a very, very
difficult part of the world.
But we have to manage a plan there to try to protect our
national security interests. You know, I applaud the President
for taking steps in that direction. And I look forward to the
testimony from our witnesses that will further elaborate on
those plans.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I know
this is very short notice, but it is very timely, and I
appreciate you making the extraordinary effort to get
statements out and to be here today.
We are fortunate to have with us the Honorable Michele
Flournoy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and
Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff [JCS].
We were talking the other day, and he made the comment that
people kind of figure--have made comments to him that, ``Well,
you know, you are just going to coast through the next so many
months,'' and he says, ``Yes, like I have coasted through the
last 4 months.''
People, when they were preparing their New Year's
resolutions, probably weren't thinking about Egypt and Yemen
and Libya and all of the different things that are happening.
So, again, I want to thank you for your many years of service
and for making the extraordinary effort to be with us here
today.
And we will listen now to Ms. Flournoy. Or who----
Admiral Mullen. Yeah, I think we----
The Chairman. Excuse me. Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
Admiral Mullen. Good morning, sir.
Mr. Chairman and Representative Smith, distinguished
members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss with you the President's decisions regarding the
beginning of our drawdown in Afghanistan and our continued
transfer of responsibilities to Afghan National Security Forces
[ANSF].
Let me start by saying that I support the President's
decisions, as do Generals Mattis and Petraeus. We were given
voice in this process, we offered our views freely and without
hesitation, and they were heard. As has been the case
throughout the development and execution of the Afghanistan-
Pakistan strategy, the Commander in Chief presided over an
inclusive and comprehensive discussion about what to do next,
and I am grateful for that.
And I can tell you that foremost on everyone's mind
throughout the discussion was preserving the success our troops
and their civilian counterparts have achieved thus far. We
believed back when the strategy was established in December of
2009 that it would be about now, this summer, before we could
determine whether or not we had it right, whether the resources
were enough and the counterinsurgency focus was appropriate.
Well, now we know. We did have it right. The strategy is
working.
Al Qaeda is on their heels, and the Taliban's momentum in
the south has been checked. We have made extraordinary progress
against the mission we have been assigned and are, therefore,
now in a position to begin a responsible transition out of
Afghanistan.
We will, as the President has ordered, withdraw 10,000
American troops by the end of this year and complete the
withdrawal of the remaining 23,000 surge troops by the end of
next summer. General Petraeus and his successor will be given
the flexibility inside these deadlines to determine the pace of
this withdrawal and the rearrangement of remaining forces
inside the country.
There is no jumping ship here; quite the contrary. We will
have at our disposal the great bulk of the surge forces
throughout this and most of the next fighting season. And I am
comfortable that conditions on the ground will dominate, as
they have dominated, future decisions about our force posture
in Afghanistan.
Let me be candid, however. No commander ever wants to
sacrifice fighting power in the middle of a war, and no
decision to demand that sacrifice is ever without risk. This is
particularly true in a counterinsurgency, where success is
achieved not solely by technological prowess or conventional
superiority but by the wit and the wisdom of our people as they
pursue terrorists and engage the local populace on a daily
basis. In a counterinsurgency, firepower is manpower.
I do not intend to discuss the specifics of the private
advice I rendered with respect to these decisions. As I said, I
support them.
What I can tell you is the President's decisions are more
aggressive and incur more risk than I was originally prepared
to accept. More force for more time is, without doubt, the
safer course. But that does not necessarily make it the best
course. Only the President, in the end, can really determine
the acceptable level of risk we must take. I believe he has
done so.
The truth is, we would have run other kinds of risks by
keeping more forces in Afghanistan longer. We would have made
it easier for the Karzai administration to increase their
dependency on us. We would have denied the Afghan security
forces, who have grown in capability, opportunities to further
exercise that capability and to lead. We would have signaled to
the enemy and to our regional partners that the Taliban still
possess strength enough to warrant the full measure of our
presence; they do not. We would have also continued to limit
our own freedom of action there and in other places around the
world, globally. The President's decisions allow us to reset
our forces more quickly, as well as to reduce the not-
inconsiderable cost of deploying those forces.
In sum, we have earned this opportunity. Though not without
risk, it is also not without its rewards. And so we will take
that risk and we will reap those rewards. The war in
Afghanistan will enter a new phase, and we will continue to
fight it. And we will continue to need the assistance,
persistence, and expertise of our allies and partners.
The President said it well last night: Huge challenges
remain. This is the beginning, not the end, of our effort to
wind down this war. No one in uniform is under any illusion
that there will not be more violence, more casualties, more
struggles, or more challenges as we continue to accomplish the
mission there.
We know that the progress we have made, though
considerable, can still be reversed without our constant
leadership, the contributions of our partners and regional
nations, and a more concerted effort by the Afghan Government
to address corruption in their ranks and deliver basic goods
and services to their people.
But the strategy remains the right one. This transition and
the concurrent focus on developing the Afghan National Security
Forces was always a part of that strategy. In fact, if you
consider the continued growth of the ANSF, the Taliban could
well face more combined force, in terms of manpower, in 2012
than they did this year, and capable enough if the ANSF has
strong leadership and continued outside support.
Going forward, we also know we need to support an Afghan
political process that includes reconciliation with the Taliban
who break with Al Qaeda, renounce violence, and accept the
Afghan Constitution. And we know we need to continue building a
strategic partnership with Afghanistan, one based not on
military footprint but on mutual friendship.
Our true presence will diminish, as it should, but the
partnership between our two nations will and must endure. That
is ultimately the way we win in Afghanistan, not by how much we
do, but by how much they do for themselves and for their
country; not by how much our respective soldiers fight, but by
how much our statesmen lead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I stand ready to take your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen can be found in
the Appendix on page 57.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Flournoy.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Flournoy. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
us both here today to update you on Afghanistan.
As you all know, in his December 2009 speech at West Point,
President Obama announced a surge of 30,000 U.S. troops, with
the clear objectives of seizing the initiative from the Taliban
and reversing the momentum of the campaign on the ground. At
that time, the President also specified that the surge would
not be open-ended and that he would begin to reduce U.S. surge
forces beginning in July 2011.
Last night, true to his word, President Obama announced to
the American people that the United States is beginning a
deliberate, responsible drawdown of our surge forces in
Afghanistan. An initial drawdown of 10,000 troops will occur
over the course of this year, with a further drawdown of the
remainder of the surge by the end of summer 2012. Secretary
Gates believes that this decision provides our commanders with
the right mix of flexibility, resources, and time to continue
building on our significant progress on the ground.
Even after the recovery of the surge forces, totaling about
33,000 troops, we will still have 68,000 U.S. service members
in Afghanistan. That is more than twice the number as when
President Obama took office. Clearly, this is not a rush to the
exits that will jeopardize our security gains.
More importantly, at the end of summer 2012, when all of
the surge forces are out, there will actually be more Afghan
and coalition forces in the fight than there are today. That is
because, by the time we complete our drawdown, we anticipate
that the Afghan National Security Forces will have added
another 55,000-plus members, not including the Afghan local
police. The growth in the quantity and the quality of the ANSF,
which has fielded more than 100,000 additional forces over the
past 18 months, is one of the critical conditions that is
enabling the drawdown of the U.S. surge forces.
More broadly, as the admiral said, our strategy in
Afghanistan is working as designed. The momentum has shifted to
the coalition and Afghan forces, and, together, we have
degraded the Taliban's capability and achieved significant
security gains, especially in the Taliban's heartland in the
south.
These security gains are enabling key political initiatives
to make progress. We have begun a transition process that will
ultimately put Afghans in the lead for security nationwide by
2014. We are beginning to see reintegration and reconciliation
processes gain traction. And we are in discussions with the
Afghans about a strategic partnership that will signal our
enduring commitment to the Afghan people and to regional peace
and stability. Together, these initiatives promise a future
Afghanistan that is stable, peaceful, and secure.
So I want to emphasize that this announcement in no way
marks a change in American policy or strategy in Afghanistan.
It is wholly consistent with the goals that President Obama and
our allies agreed to at Lisbon, the NATO summit at Lisbon last
year. There, we committed to the gradual transfer of security
leadership to the Afghans by the end of 2014 and to an enduring
commitment to a security partnership with Afghanistan to ensure
that we never again repeat the mistake of simply abandoning
that nation to its fate and risking the re-establishment of Al
Qaeda safe havens there.
I want to emphasize that, although our progress in
Afghanistan has certainly been substantial and our strategy is
on track, there are significant challenges that remain. In the
months ahead, we will be confronted by an enemy that will try
to regain the momentum and the territory that it has lost to
Afghan and coalition forces.
However, that enemy will also face an Afghan population
that is increasingly experiencing the benefits of security and
self-governance. And those benefits will only become clearer as
we begin the transition to full Afghan security responsibility
in selected areas. Those communities will provide us with
useful lessons on security and governance, as well as a
potential model for other parts of the country.
Finally, let me emphasize how crucial it is for us to
maintain the continuing role of our coalition partners in
Afghanistan: 48 countries with some 47,000 troops along our
side. These partner nations have made significant contributions
and significant sacrifices. Even as we recognize the progress
that we and our partners have made toward our shared goal of
destroying terrorist safe havens, we must sustain this
partnership to ensure that we ultimately leave behind an
Afghanistan that will never again serve as a base for terrorist
attacks against the United States or our allies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, and distinguished
members of the committee. That concludes my remarks, and we
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy can be found
in the Appendix on page 61.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
You know, there is not a single Member of Congress who does
not want our troops to come home as soon as possible.
Personally, I believe the objective of transitioning to an
Afghan lead on security within 3 years is both a desirable and
an achievable objective.
The last visit I made, compared to the one before, I saw
significant progress. Areas that we weren't able to go into
before, we were able to go and walk down the streets in Marjah
without body armor. We opened a school while we were there. I
think we have made significant gains. This will enable, as we
transition, it will enable our forces to come home.
However, I am concerned that the drawdown plan announced by
the President last night will significantly undermine our
ability to responsibly enact this transition. I am concerned
with the gains we have made in the south. We have been holding,
as I understand, more of a holding pattern in the north and the
east. And the plan was, I thought, to move more of those
forces, as we solidified the gains in the south, to move them
to the north and the east. And I am concerned that this
drawdown may not let us do all that we could in that area.
Admiral Mullen, based on your best professional judgment
and that of your commanders, how many of the forces to be drawn
down will be combat forces?
And I will ask these, and you can answer them.
Is the President's plan to redeploy all 33,000 surge forces
by next summer aggressive? What regional commands will these
forces be drawn from? Does it put our recent security gains at
risk? And does it risk the security and safety of our remaining
forces?
Admiral Mullen. Let me talk about, broadly, the approach.
Clearly, as you have said, Chairman, we have made
significant gains over the course of the last 18 months and,
really, since the President made the decision to put the surge
forces in, and particularly in the south. And we are in the
hold phase now and, in fact, moving into a phase where the
Afghans have the lead.
So that was where we were, with respect to, literally, the
most recent discussions and meetings with respect to what to do
next, and we understand that. The south consciously has been
the main effort. And it is that focus that has allowed us to
achieve the gains we had.
Not insignificant when we debated this in 2009 was the very
small chance that everybody--an awful lot of people gave us in
terms of building the Afghan National Security Forces, because
of the illiteracy challenge, because we didn't have a training
infrastructure, because we didn't have noncommissioned officer
[NCO] leaders, et cetera. The extraordinary progress that has
been made with respect to setting up that infrastructure and
fielding forces--Ms. Flournoy said over 100,000. I think it is
about 120,000 forces that have been trained and fielded. Some
35,000 are in training literally this week. By the end of next
year, we will have Afghan units that are manned at the NCO
level to the 85 percent level across the board. So,
extraordinary changes with respect to that.
And when we talk about whether gains are reversible and
fragile, these gains can only be made irreversible by the
Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan people, in the
end. So that is where this is headed, and we have made great
progress with respect to that.
The secondary effort was the east. And I wouldn't describe
it over the course of the last year as a holding action at all.
And, in fact, what David Petraeus and others have done out
there is reconfigure forces to deal with the challenges of that
very rugged territory. And, in fact, it is not to take a lot
of--the plan is not to take a lot of our forces and put them in
the east. But it is, as Dave Petraeus says, it provides the jet
stream between the safe havens in Pakistan for the Haqqani
network, in particular, and getting to Kabul.
And Kabul, where roughly 20 percent of the Afghan
population has been secured, Afghans are in the lead. And,
obviously, you want to keep it that way, with respect to the
capital of that country.
So what General Petraeus has done over the course of the
last year is reconfigure those forces, look at an adjustment in
literally strategy on the ground, if you will, to layer the
forces in a way so that that jet stream is really cut off and
it is made much more difficult on the enemy.
And there are layered forces from the border right through
to Kabul which are now doing that. I am actually more confident
in what we have with respect to the east than we had a year ago
because I think we understand it. That doesn't mean it is not
hugely challenging. It clearly is. But there was never an
intent to do exactly in the east what we have done in the south
with respect to our forces. And I think that all lies within
this overall strategic approach.
All of us knew, going into this, that the surge forces were
going to come out next year at some point in time. So the
discussion about exactly when is obviously relevant but, in
terms of numbers of months and getting through the fighting
season, the end of September is almost all the way through the
fighting season. There will be those that argue October is a
pretty tough month. It is, but it is winding down in October.
So what we have is the vast majority of our forces for the
next two fighting seasons, not unlike what I said in 2009. We
put 10,000 Marines in Helmand in 2009. My position then was, if
we didn't have a good handle on what was going on in 18 to 24
months based on what we were doing from a strategy standpoint
as well as what has happened on the ground, then we would
probably have to change our strategy.
I believe these decisions and our strategy gives us time to
understand how good the Afghan security forces are going to be;
how well the government actually stands up; how does President
Karzai get at corruption; how well are we dealing with the
risks associated with safe havens; and is there political space
that this buys, where you can start reconciliation, move it
from where it is right now in its beginning stages, where you
can continue reintegration. And we have a couple thousand
former Afghan Taliban--or, former Taliban who are now being
reintegrated.
So, in essence, in ways, from my perspective, we are
talking about the margins here, after a lot of progress, a good
strategy, and continued focus in that direction. I think I
would be remiss if I said publicly where these forces are going
to come from, because I am not anxious to give up, you know,
anything to the enemy in that regard. I would be happy to, you
know, go through that with you.
But, most importantly, I think where the forces come from
next year will depend on what happens this year. And that will
be conditions-based, inside, obviously, the deadline set. And
that General Petraeus and General Rodriguez and, obviously,
their reliefs will make these determinations, given the mission
that they have been given to carry out and, obviously, the
direction from the President.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Would you term the redeployment for this summer
``aggressive''?
Admiral Mullen. Actually, not the words--as you know, we
all have to choose our words very carefully. You used
``significant'' earlier.
I think it is well within reason for us to be able to do
this. As I said in my opening statement, it was more aggressive
and it has more risk than, you know, I was originally prepared
to--than I recommended. That said, in totality, it is within
the ability to sustain the mission, focus on the objectives,
and execute.
The Chairman. I didn't mean, when I asked where the forces
would be withdrawn, to pinpoint locations.
I was referring to--and I am glad that you answered that
the way you did. But what I was talking about, will they be
coming from the fighting forces?
Admiral Mullen. You know, ``combat forces'' is a term that
has been broadened dramatically in these wars. I have been
asked as recently as a couple days ago about, will they be the
enablers? Enablers are every bit the combat force anybody else
is in the classic sense. And so, in ways, are our support
forces, because the threat is a 360-degree threat oftentimes.
So I can't actually tell you, Chairman, where they are
going to come from. I think, clearly, a commander on the ground
is going to keep as much fighting power, whatever that means,
given the situation, as he possibly can for as long as he can.
And I am sure that General Petraeus and, if confirmed, General
Allen will proceed in that direction. But I just don't have the
specifics yet.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You had mentioned in your opening remarks about the number
of Afghan security forces that have been trained over the
course of the last--I guess it is 18 months now since the surge
began. I have heard the statistic, 100,000 in the Afghan Army.
I know we also have made significant improvements in the police
force.
I think one of the logical things that occurs to us, if we
have that many more Afghan troops available, that much more
Afghan security, how does that figure in and help us with this
drawdown? How capable are they? How reliable are they? How can
we move them in to take over some of the responsibilities?
Because, I mean, if we are adding 100,000 Afghan troops--I
don't know what the figure is on the police force--and this
year, next 6 months, our plan is to draw down a total of 10,000
U.S. forces, it seems to me we are still in pretty good shape.
And one final little piece of that. The other NATO forces
are going to be keeping roughly the same amount for the rest of
this year, is my understanding. Can you confirm that and then
comment on how the Afghan forces add into the mix?
Admiral Mullen. Well, let me go to the second question
first.
I mean, we were in both consultation and contact with our
NATO allies over time. And they were obviously focused very
much on what the United States was going to do, and any
decisions that they were going to make were clearly going to be
informed by this decision that the President has made.
That said--and I think it is worthy of focusing on--part of
what the President focused on last night was the Lisbon summit,
the whole issue of transition, the number of heads of state and
countries that are committed to this transition in 2014, which
we think is about right--that is certainly the intent--and
everything coming into this, as far as I know, Mr. Smith, I
mean, the allies were very much with us.
They have specific decisions they have to make, and I don't
know what--I don't know what those are. Certainly, I think as
Secretary Flournoy pointed out, it is important for them to
stay in this. Not lost on me over the totality of this is, 48
countries have committed combat forces here over time, which is
a huge statement specifically in and of itself.
With respect to the ANSF, I think the number--and I can get
it if it is wrong--for the army and the police is about 128,000
between the two. And, in fact, you know, 2 years ago, it was
illiteracy, you know, it was essentially no training
infrastructure. There was nothing that was set up except you
recruited somebody on a Friday, and Monday they were on the
street in a unit that wasn't well-led, didn't have senior
leadership, senior or midgrade leadership, and hadn't had any
training.
We have now set up 12--what we call 12 branch schools that
have been set up. So this 35,000 that I mention--and the number
has been between 25,000 and 35,000 in training for months. So
it was a matter of setting up the infrastructure, many
countries contributing to trainers. And we are about where we
need to be with respect to trainers from all of these
countries.
So there is now a system of training, which has produced a
much more capable individual and what we see as a much more
capable fighting force in the field. They are leading, in some
cases, now. We are partnering with them throughout Afghanistan.
And, over the course of the next year, that will increase
exponentially.
I am not naive to think--you know, they have some
challenges. They haven't done this before. We don't expect it
to be magical. But in terms of the progress we have made over
the course of the last 18 months or so, it really has been
enormous. And we expect to continue on that pace and actually
have it pick up. They will get better and be more and more in
the lead.
Mr. Smith. Yeah, the improvement in training over the
course of the last 18 months I don't think can be overstated.
Because, as you said, it is one thing to say we are going to
pick someone up, turn them into a soldier, and send them out
the door. It is another thing to actually have a trained force.
And the surge wasn't just in our troops; it was in the totality
of the effort--improving the training and also improving the
governance.
The last time I was there, a few months back, you know, I
have never seen so much activity on the State Department,
Agriculture, Justice Department. We had USAID [U.S. Agency for
International Development]. We had a comprehensive effort to
improve the governance.
And I will just conclude by saying, you know, if we put
128,000 more Afghan security forces over the course of the last
18 months, I don't think it is fair to say that drawing down
10,000 U.S. troops this year and even another 23,000 next year
significantly reduces our effort. I think, clearly, we have
resourced this effort appropriately, and we are making
progress.
And I certainly appreciate your leadership on that. It was
a very tough fight, but the improvement that all of us have
seen over the course of the last 18 months is truly remarkable
and to be commended.
And, with that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Thank you for your service and your testimony.
Four and a half years ago, I led a CODEL [congressional
delegation] to China to talk about energy. I believe Mr. Larsen
was on that CODEL with me. We were stunned when the Chinese
began their discussion of energy by talking about post-oil. Oil
is finite; of course there will be a post-oil world.
With our focus of the next election, which is never more
than 2 years away, and the next quarterly report, which is
always less than 3 months away, I have heard none of our
leadership mention that there will be a post-oil world. This is
a dominant factor in the Chinese planning. So, clearly, people
in that part of the world have a different perspective of time
and agenda than we do.
I am the Afghan Taliban; I am not constrained in my
thinking about the next election, which is less than 2 years
away, or the next quarterly report. What may seem to those
Americans is a very long time, 3 years, to me in my planning it
is little more than the blink of an eye. In just 3 years, they
are going to be out of there. For the next 3 years, I am going
to continue the fight as a diversion, but what I am really
going to be doing is recruiting and reconstituting so that I am
going to be ready when they are gone. I know they are working
very hard to improve the security forces and the police. They
are trying to make the mayor of Kabul look like the President
of Afghanistan. But these gains are all very fragile and
reversible. And with the forces that I am going to hold in
reserve from this fight, they will be easily reversed when they
are gone.
Do you think that we have the ability--you know, what one
sees depends upon where one sits. Do you think that we have the
ability to see the world through the prism of the Taliban?
Admiral Mullen. We see that world a lot more clearly than
we used to, Mr. Bartlett, as I am sure you can appreciate,
because of the fights and because of the sacrifices.
We also see that world through the Afghan people's eyes,
because we are in so many villages, subdistricts, and districts
with them. And I just disagree that the gains are going to be
easily reversed. In fact, I see a stream of intelligence
routinely of the Taliban in significant disarray, at the
leadership level, many of whom live in Pakistan, as well as in
the field.
Mr. Bartlett. Sir, I was just repeating what I am told by
General Petraeus and others. And every testimony--read it in
the Congressional Record--they sit where you are sitting, and
they say, ``The gains are fragile and reversible.'' I was
simply repeating that.
Admiral Mullen. Right. I have said that, as well.
What you also said, that they are easily reversible, I just
disagree that that is the case. They only become irreversible
if we get the Afghan security forces in charge of their own
destiny. That is the goal over the course of the next 3 years.
Four years ago, they virtually had no Afghan security forces,
certainly no effective forces.
That is the challenge. That is the path home. We all know
that. And we see that through their eyes, as well as look at it
through the Taliban's eyes.
The Taliban had a really bad year last year. They are
having a really bad year this year. They are going to have
another really bad next year. It is for them to decide how long
they want to just sit on the side. And I certainly understand
that. That is less--as far as I am concerned, that is more than
just a blink in the eye, even in their eyes, and they have been
fighting this for many years. They are also tired, and I see
that routinely.
So I guess I come at it from a different position than how
you see it. I certainly understand what you are saying, but we
have just seen great progress. And there is an opportunity here
to succeed against the objectives we have, which have been
limited and get to a point where Afghanistan is in charge of
their own destiny and we have a long-term relationship with
that country that puts them in a position to be a lot more
peaceful and stable than they have been in the last three to
four decades.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here this morning.
I think, at least from my perspective--and this is after
having a conversation with former Ambassador Khalilzad about
the region in general and the challenges that we may face,
given the decision that the President made.
And we were there; I was part of the trip with the
chairman. And one of the anecdotes that stands out in my mind
speaks to just the comments that you are making about the
advances that we have made that some people categorize as
``fragile.'' But we were told about one of the soldiers that
had been trained, was intending on being deployed, but what was
significant about that was that his idea was, once he completed
his term, was to go back to his village and work on the next
generation in the context of literacy. We all know that is one
of the big challenges that we have faced, is the rate of
illiteracy in the general population.
So my question is, given the decision that has now been
made in terms of starting the drawdown, one of the expectations
that we have is that the civilian leadership will set the
direction and that the Afghani National Security Forces are
going to provide the security. So my question is for both of
you. Is the civilian leadership at a point to where they can
provide that direction, that oversight? And how are we--where
are we and how are we are ensuring that both evolve at the same
time?
Because we are also very troubled by the amount of
corruption that exists, the control or lack of control that is
exercised by the central government. So it seems to me that
those are still questions out there that we need to take into
account as we do the drawdown.
And then the last point is, we are being told that even
once this is accomplished, just for the ANSF, the security
forces, it is going to take somewhere between $6 billion and $8
billion a year to sustain them. The central government does not
have that kind of--at least at this point, we don't have the
expectation that they will have that kind of income. So where
is that money coming from? How much and how long are we on the
hook for? Either $6 billion or $8 billion or more if you take
into account the civilian government, as well?
Secretary Flournoy. Thank you, Congressman.
We are certainly investing in developing Afghan governance
and institutions as well as the ANSF.
The greatest progress we are seeing so far has really been
from the bottom up, starting at the local and district level,
moving to the provinces. I think I would say that something
like 75 percent now of the district and provincial officials
that are in place are now merit-based appointments. These are
capable people who are qualified to do the jobs they are doing.
And you are seeing a dramatic change at the local level, where
most Afghans have their most direct experience with their
government. So that is the good news.
I think, when you move to the national level, in terms of
ministries that can provide basic services, an accountable
justice system and dealing with corruption and so forth, we
still--this is a work in progress, and there are many
challenges that we still have to work through. But we are
working through--we have partnerships with each of the major
Afghan ministries, working with them to develop the capacity
and go after corruption.
On your question about ANSF sustainability, we share your
concern, the President shares your concern. We are currently
working with the Afghans to scrub our long-term model for the
ANSF to better understand, as the insurgency comes down, what
will the needs of that force really be, how can we bring down
the costs, do things in a way that gets us into a more
sustainable range in terms of what the Afghans, together with
the international community, can support over time.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, you said in your statement that the commanders
have flexibility inside the deadlines, which tells me there is
no flexibility to extend the deadlines. And you also said in
your statement that ``the President's decision was more
aggressive and incurs more risk than I was originally prepared
to accept.'' Interesting choice of words, ``prepared to
accept,'' to me. But what that tells me is, your best military
advice was something other than and less aggressive withdrawals
than what the President announced.
So I guess the first question that comes to my mind is, is
there a military reason to have a mandated withdrawal in
September rather than November or December?
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Thornberry, what I said in my
statement--and I will stick to that--is, I am not going to
review my private military advice. We presented a range of
options to the President. He has obviously chosen one based on
his judgment, and we intend to carry that out.
I honestly believe that within both the numbers of troops
and timelines, given that we will have the vast majority of our
forces through these two fighting seasons, that we are on the
margins here in terms of having an impact. And, as I said
earlier, there is not a commander on the ground, there is not a
military individual in the chain of command that wouldn't want
more, longer. That is normal. But it is not my decision; it is
for the President to decide.
And I would re-emphasize that inside that deadline--which
is not flexible, I understand that--the commander on the
ground--and the President has been very specific about this--
has all the flexibility so he can move the forces where and
when he wants to, as long as he meets those deadlines.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, as you referenced, there are other
people who are concerned about the military effects of this.
Now, as you know, there is speculation that politics plays a
role in this timetable. I am trying to focus on the military
aspects.
I am looking at today's New York Times, where Michael
O'Hanlon talks about that if the troops have to be out in
September, they are going to spend most of the summer on the
downsizing effort rather than, arguably, where they should be
spending most of their time, and that it is in the fighting
season.
And it also quotes General Barno, who was the ground
commander there in Afghanistan and is now affiliated with the
Center for a New American Security, saying that the 10,000 by
December is more than the military wanted but doable. But
putting a September 2012 expiration tag on the rest of the
surge raises real concerns. That is the middle of the fighting
season.
Admiral Mullen. Neither one of those guys are military
guys. And I know them both. Barno commanded it years ago. And
the focus from the perspective of the military leadership--
Rodriguez, Petraeus, others, Mattis, and myself--and how we
both recommended and integrated that--not integrated, but had
discussions about this decision--certainly, we were focused on
the military piece of this.
And, again, at the end, it increases the risk, but not
substantially from my point of view, and that, you know,
O'Hanlon's view that we are going to be focused on logistics is
not, from my perspective--in a fighting season, we have to meet
the deadline, but it is not going to divert the main effort.
Now, that is my view. He and I can differ on that. But I
assure you that is the view coming from the commanders, as
well.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, let me ask you one other thing. Some
of my colleagues and I have just recently been there, focused
on the village stability operations. It looks like one of the
great successes that is spreading, but the key determinate is
manpower. As you know, we are augmenting Special Forces with
conventional forces now. Plans to expand them to a bunch more
villages, but if the people aren't there, obviously that cannot
happen.
So does this decision put at risk what seems to be one of
the most promising things going on in Afghanistan to allow them
to stand up and provide for their own security?
Admiral Mullen. I agree with that. The Afghan local police
and the village stability operations, which have been
enormously successful, have stood up, I think as recently as
this week, to a level of about 6,400 Afghans who are in this
program. And, certainly, in discussions I have had with General
Petraeus and others, there is no intent to slow that down and
that this decision shouldn't do that.
Mr. Thornberry. I worry about that, but thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being before us.
I have a line of questioning from three different aspects
because I think all three of these are very important for us to
be able to leave Afghanistan and not have to return.
And, as you probably already know, I have been one of those
people who have been saying, let's get out of this, because I
can't seem to get--and you have been before us many times, and
so has Secretary Gates and others. I haven't seemed to really
get from any of you or from General Petraeus or the others what
is the real end game and what it really looks like, other than
stability and the Afghan people able to do this on their own.
So I think that is dependent on three things: education of
the population, because we know that it is very undereducated;
secondly, the leadership of that country; and, third, a strong
Afghan Army/police force, whatever you want to call it.
So my first question is, when did we start training the
Afghan--what year, I can't recall now, did we start training
the Afghan Army and police? Secondly, how many have gone
through our training or NATO's training or our allies' training
program at this point?
Admiral Mullen. I mean, I can speak to that, and certainly
Secretary Flournoy, as well.
The exact year would be hard for me to pin down, but there
has been a training effort almost as long as we have been
there. My own personal experience is, it was well under way,
although under-resourced, in 2006-2007. So it has been a number
of years.
Ms. Sanchez. And how many would you say we have trained,
who have gone through the training program that we have had or
our allies have had, in total, during this time?
Admiral Mullen. About 300,000----
Ms. Sanchez. 300,000.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. 302,000, 304,000.
Ms. Sanchez. So, currently, according to the information
you gave that we have in front of us, we have 305,000, total,
target end strength for this year of the ANSF.
Admiral Mullen. Correct.
Ms. Sanchez. So there has been--so we have trained 300,000
and we still have 300,000? So nobody has gone away like in
Iraq, where they walked away with arms, they walked away, they
didn't come to the fight, they went back to their villages? You
are saying we have 100 percent retention?
Admiral Mullen. No, no, no, no. I am saying that we--
certainly, we have had retention problems.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. But I asked you how many had we trained
during the total time.
Admiral Mullen. Oh, I couldn't--I would have to go----
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. I would like to get that number----
Admiral Mullen. Sure.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. When you get a chance.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 69.]
Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
My second question comes to the whole issue of a corrupt
government. And I start from the standpoint that the first time
I met President Karzai, I told him I thought he was--I was
reading a Newsweek article that had been written that day that
called him the mayor of Kabul, and that is about it.
In my last visit there, his own parliamentarians said a
type of election where he won a second term should never happen
again in that country. Some were of his own party. So they
don't even believe that was a good election.
So my question to you is, what are we doing about
leadership there? What have we done to try to cultivate
leadership? Who are we identifying? Or are we just leaving it
up to these corrupt people to take advantage of their own
country, as they currently are doing?
Secretary Flournoy. I would just say what I mentioned
before. We have worked bottom-up to systematically work with
the Afghans to ensure first at the district level where Afghans
experience government most directly, then at the provincial
level, and then at the national level that we replace corrupt
and incompetent leadership so that the Afghans replace them.
I think we are 75 percent of the way there at the district
and provincial level. I think you are starting to see President
Karzai, who is our partner in this effort----
Ms. Sanchez. Corrupt, I might add, but go on.
Secretary Flournoy [continuing]. Make the connection
between corruption--the need to fight corruption to be able to
gain and sustain legitimacy of government in the eyes of the
people.
And one of the things that he has begun to do, with our
support and encouragement, is start to make those
replacements--so, you know, for example, dismissing a number of
officers from the ANSF who he found to be corrupt. A lot of the
work we are doing on the police, again, historically one of the
most corrupt institutions in the country, the revetting,
retraining, refielding of those units with a totally different
philosophy about what their job is, in terms of serving the
communities that they protect.
Those are all concrete efforts toward dealing with the
corruption problem. That said, we certainly have a long way to
go. And we are pressing our Afghan partners every day on this
issue.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.
I just would like to add to the record, I think when all is
said and done about this effort of ours, we will find that a
corrupt government is what really brought our efforts to naught
there.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I would like to pick up on a line of questioning
that Mr. Thornberry began with your statement that you made,
both in writing and orally, where you said, ``What I can tell
you is the President's decisions are more aggressive and incur
more risk than I was originally prepared to accept.''
Risk to whom?
Admiral Mullen. Risk to the overall mission.
Mr. Forbes. But not risk to----
Admiral Mullen. Risk in the strategy.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Our troops?
Admiral Mullen. Certainly, it has increased--I think it has
increased risk across the board. But it is----
Mr. Forbes. The other thing----
Admiral Mullen. But, Mr. Forbes, it is manageable risk. And
we----
Mr. Forbes. I understand.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. Know where we stand.
Mr. Forbes. But, Admiral, I am taking your words that it is
more risk. And let me ask you this question. I notice from your
Web site that you state that you are the principal military
advisor to the President and, as such, that you present the
range of advice and opinions you have received, along with any
individual comments from other members of the Joint Staff.
What is your role when you come before us? Is it to do the
same thing, or is it to support the decisions of the
administration?
Admiral Mullen. It is--I think the Web site says ``Joint
Chiefs,'' not ``Joint Staff,'' although----
Mr. Forbes. Joint Chiefs.
Admiral Mullen. And it is certainly to provide my both
assessment and advice, if you will, views, based on the
questions that I get. It is typically----
Mr. Forbes. Is it the same role that you have to the
President, to give us the same type of advice?
Admiral Mullen. No, sir, it is not exactly----
Mr. Forbes. Okay. I looked through your testimony as you
have appeared before both the Senate and the House during the
administration's time. Can you tell us one time that you have,
in any of your testimony, not supported the decision that the
administration has made before any hearing?
Admiral Mullen. I have worked for two Presidents, and I
have supported those Presidents.
Mr. Forbes. So when we come here, we know that we are going
to basically have the support of what decision was made.
My question, then, comes back to this: In May of this year,
you said you think we will have a better picture of where to go
in Afghanistan toward the end of the year. You then said on May
30th, ``I think it is a very difficult fighting season right
now. This is going to be a tough year.'' Then in June, I think
you said, ``We shouldn't let up on the gas too much, at least
for the next months.''
And my question to you today is, what has changed between
that original acceptable risk that was risk to our troops as
well as our mission, that was not acceptable then, and today?
Have you reassessed your position, and were you wrong when you
thought it wasn't an acceptable risk? Or has there been
something that has changed on the ground, something that has
changed militarily, that makes that a more acceptable risk
today?
Admiral Mullen. What I have said for many months is, this
is going to be--I go back up to what I said earlier--a very
difficult year on the Taliban last year. It is going to be and
continues to be a very difficult year with respect to the
Taliban's goals this year.
And my recommendations and the risk that is out there is
very focused on achieving those objectives. And while there is
more risk, I don't consider it significant. And I don't
consider it in any way, shape, or form putting the military in
a position where it can't achieve its objectives.
Mr. Forbes. Were there any of the Joint Chiefs or any of
the commanders on the ground that recommended this particular
action that the President is taking?
Admiral Mullen. Again, I'm not going to talk about
individual recommendations.
Mr. Forbes. You know, Admiral, I will just close with this.
It just astounds me that when we had ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,''
you were willing to come before a committee, unsolicited, and
say, ``I am willing to state my personal opinion, and this is
what I think it should be,'' but yet, when we are talking about
potential risk to the troops that this committee has to make,
which is our number-one concern, that you are not willing to
say what those individual commanders were willing to say or
your personal recommendations.
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, it is an honor to be in the process with
someone whose integrity is as unimpeachable as yours, both in
the quality of your advice and the strength of your character.
And we thank you for it.
And, Madam Secretary, thank you, also, for your terrific
contributions here.
Madam Secretary, I think you have succinctly stated our
purpose in Afghanistan: that we ultimately leave behind an
Afghanistan that will never again serve as a base for terrorist
attacks on the United States and our allies.
I have always thought that Al Qaeda was the parasite and
the Taliban was the host in Afghanistan. And our military
mission, essentially, has been focused on destroying the
parasite and either weakening the host or making the host
unwilling to become the host for the parasite.
And I note that Admiral Mullen says, ``We need to support
an Afghan political process that includes reconciliation with
the Taliban who break with Al Qaeda,'' which I think is a wise
and understandable view.
So with that framework of what we are trying to accomplish,
it is my understanding that when the administration took
office, Madam Secretary, that we had about 34,000 troops in
Afghanistan. The surge built that up to 98,000. And when the
present withdrawal plan is completed, we will be at 68,000. Is
that correct?
Secretary Flournoy. That is correct.
Mr. Andrews. And, at present, there are 47,000 troops from
allied countries that are in-country. What do we know about the
plans of the allies to withdraw those 47,000? How many and
when?
Secretary Flournoy. Well, I think, in the discussions we
have had, I think they are--we have an in-together, out-
together principle; a very strong sense of resolve right now in
ISAF [International Security Assistance Force].
Mr. Andrews. Uh-huh.
Secretary Flournoy. And I think that, as we have talked
about bringing down our surge forces, some of the allies are
thinking about bringing down their surge contributions. But we
should remember----
Mr. Andrews. Now, in that context----
Secretary Flournoy [continuing]. Many----
Mr. Andrews [continuing]. In that context--I am sorry--of
security for Afghanistan, the target number of ANSF forces is
305,000, and, as of April, we were at 286,000. And the public
reports indicate that, by about a three to one ratio, those
units were deemed to be ``effective'' as opposed to
``dependent.''
Let me ask you a question that is not a rhetorical
question. Given the strengthening of the ANSF, the presence of
allied troops that we don't expect a precipitous drop in--we
expect it to be somewhat on par with ours--what will the
mission of the 68,000 remaining Americans be after September
30th of 2012? Why are they there?
Secretary Flournoy. I think they are there to continue the
implementation of the strategy on the road to successful
transition, which will be completed--you know, at the end of
2014, we expect that Afghans will be fully in the lead across
the country. We are on a glide slope toward that Lisbon goal.
And this drawdown is totally consistent with that, and the
strategy and the mission will keep aiming for that goal.
Mr. Andrews. Well, Admiral or Madam Secretary, either of
you can answer this. In terms that our constituents would
understand and that we would understand, what will these 68,000
troops be doing in the country after September 30th of 2012?
What will their mission be?
Admiral Mullen. First of all, it will be to sustain the
transition. But, specifically--and this is, from my
perspective, a rock-solid principle from Iraq--it is the
partnership piece. What we see in Iraq today and what we have
seen throughout the shift in Iraq of our mission to the assist
side is the enormity of the impact of partnership. And that is
where we are, even now, focused with the Afghan security
forces. And you talked about the ratio. And in 2 or 3 years
from now, it will be much better than it is right now.
So that will be, if you will, a significant part of the
main effort. But that doesn't mean we won't have forces still
involved in combat to continue the gains, if you will.
Mr. Andrews. Admiral, when the day hopefully comes when the
Afghan security forces are at their optimal point and can
control and defend their own country, what will the appropriate
U.S. troop level be then?
Admiral Mullen. It is indeterminate right now. I mean,
dramatically reduced, clearly. The model is still Iraq. And
then that gets into what is being worked right now in this
strategic-partnership approach between Afghanistan and the
United States. And what does it mean, long term, in terms of
any kind of U.S. footprint, I just don't have the answer to
that.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you very much, again, for your testimony
and your integrity.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, Madam Secretary, thank you for being here today.
And, Admiral, I appreciate your testimony, bringing up the
extraordinary progress by the American military, their service
in Afghanistan. And I am just so grateful, too, for your
reference to winning in Afghanistan. The American people need
to know that progress is being made and we can win.
And, Madam Secretary, I appreciate you referencing how
important it is that we do win and that we are successful in
Afghanistan.
I wish the American people knew really the level of
achievement, such as the security forces. And you have provided
the information today, and I appreciate Congressman Andrews
referencing it, too. And that is, at the end of this year, in
the last 3 years, we will have doubled the number of Afghan
police and army personnel up to 305,000 personnel--trained
personnel. And General Bill Caldwell has certainly done
extraordinary work. I had the privilege of visiting my former
National Guard unit, the 218th Brigade, as they were training
Afghan security forces. And I don't think they get the credit,
our military or theirs, for the professionalism that is being
created in that country.
With that said, I am very concerned about conditions on the
ground. And for each of you, the President did not reference
any conditions on the ground that would justify withdrawing
10,000 troops by December and an additional 23,000 next summer.
Every witness before this committee has previously testified
that any withdrawal would be conditions-based.
The first question: What specific conditions on the ground
justify withdrawing 10,000 troops by December?
Admiral Mullen. We are literally starting transition in
seven districts next month, in this overall transition process
which is agreed to by everybody--you know, it was the Lisbon
agreement--certainly NATO and other countries who are
contributing. So this is the beginning of that, very
specifically. And the conditions on the ground in those
provinces support that transition. That is the approach.
The other transition provinces, if you will--and it will,
in great part, be tied to violence levels and tied to the
ability of the Afghan security forces. And we get a lot of
credit on the military side for the gains; there have been
considerable gains on the diplomatic side. I mean, we have
surged diplomatically over the course of the last 2 years
extraordinary civilians who have also made a big difference.
So the idea is, in the various provinces to--or districts,
if you will; sorry--to transition these as conditions allow.
And inside the numbers and the dates that you specifically
cited, Mr. Wilson, any movement, any changes that will be
associated with where the troops come from are going to be
conditions-based. There is just no question about that, that
the President has given us that flexibility.
Mr. Wilson. And, certainly, looking at level of violence,
the establishment of a civil society within those districts,
what are the future conditions that are anticipated to merit
the removal of 23,000 additional troops?
Admiral Mullen. The improvement in the security conditions.
I mean, the most representative example, clearly, is in the
south, in Helmand and Kandahar specifically. It is actually--
and we have enabled this, but we have allies fighting in the
north and in the west. And in the north it is actually turning.
It has not turned; I wouldn't say that. But it is turning. It
is better than it was. And a year ago, there were grave
predictions about losing the north because of what was going on
there.
And we talked earlier today about the challenges in the
east, and there are challenges there. But General Petraeus has
a strategy that I have seen and believe in, in terms of being
able to create the kind of conditions where we transition
there, as well.
So we are committed to not transitioning until it is ready,
and we are working our way through this with the Afghan
security forces, who have dramatically improved in size and in
quality. That doesn't mean we don't have retention problems and
attrition problems, although they are, particularly in the
police force, much better. And, in fact, on the attrition side
for the police force, we exceed our objective--meaning,
attrition is lower than it needs to be to sustain that force.
Mr. Wilson. As decisions are being made in terms of troop
withdrawal, is it being considered, the effect on the morale of
the Taliban and the extremists? Are we not giving false hope to
them that they may prevail, that we don't have resolve, Madam
Secretary?
Secretary Flournoy. I do not think that we are giving them
any comfort. If I were a member of the Taliban and I am looking
out, where will I be next year, 2 years more, 3 years more, I
am going to control less territory; I am going to have less
support from the population; I am going to face more forces in
the field, and more and more of them Afghans who will be there
for a very long time; I am going to have less access to
finances; I am going to have more internal dissension and
division and defection.
So, any way you slice it, things are getting worse for
them, not better.
Mr. Wilson. And we will not abandon our allies?
Secretary Flournoy. Absolutely not.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here.
And, Admiral Mullen, I know you will continue to give your
extraordinary attention to the issues in the next few months,
as you have in all of your tenure. And I appreciate your
leadership and your service.
We had a hearing yesterday, and I think the comment was
made that the numbers are probably less important than how our
troops are utilized or which troops, actually, would be leaving
and, certainly, which troops would be staying.
Can you break that down a little bit more, in terms of
support troops, in terms of combat troops, in terms of training
troops, and whether or not that decision has been made?
I think just a follow-up question to that really is, when
we think about the Afghan forces, how are they going to be
sustained financially into the future? And how do we envision
our help and support to them as we move forward?
Admiral Mullen. With respect to the Afghan security forces
and the bill that is associated with that, I think President
Karzai and his people recognize that--and, certainly, we do
from our side--that at the current level of $6 billion to $7
billion a year, you know, it is not sustainable.
And so there is a lot of work going on on both sides right
now to figure out what is sustainable, what will be needed, and
including a view that, do you need 352,000 in 2014 or 2015? And
I don't know the answer to that.
But everybody recognizes that the current level, from a
financial standpoint, it is not sustainable, and solutions have
to be taken with respect to a way forward there.
And what was the first part? I am sorry.
Mrs. Davis. The way that the remaining troops--and, of
course, there are large numbers; we are talking about 68,000--
but in terms of breaking down with support troops versus combat
troops, training?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I think the combat--in those three
categories, were I a commander on the ground, I would be
focused on the combat and training troops first, keeping them
as long as we possibly could.
But I just don't discount the need for the kind of support
troops, if you will. And I include in the first group the
enablers, and that General Petraeus and General Rodriguez and
their reliefs are going to have to determine the specifics.
And I think, on the 23,000, I think knowing exactly where
they will come from, it is far too soon to know that, because
that will be conditions-based, and the conditions are going to
change between now and when they really have to focus on
executing that.
I think in the near term, clearly, that General Petraeus
and General Rodriguez had some expectation, obviously, there
would be a withdrawal here over the course of this year and
specifically what that might entail. And they have done a lot
of that work. I have not seen it, although they will certainly
come in in the near future with how to do that.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you.
If I could, I want to follow up on the reintegration,
reconciliation issue. And we know, if we look around for
success, I think a lot of that is defined by the number of
young women that are in school, girls that are in schools. I
have had a chance to visit at those schools, as well as a
number of the trips that we have taken for Mother's Day to
visit with our troops but also to engage with women in villages
as well as in leadership. A number of those women were here in
the Capitol this last week.
What role are we really playing to make sure that it is not
just a lot of rhetoric about the fact that they are important
to the development of a civil society there? How are we moving
forward to be certain that their voices are a meaningful voice
in this process? And at what point would we consider that the
reconciliation is not even working or moving forward? And what
role would that play as we continue to look at troop
withdrawal?
Secretary Flournoy. I think that Secretary Clinton and many
other members of the administration have consistently raised
the issue of female participation in both the reintegration,
community-based processes, but also the larger reconciliation
process. And we have raised that issue with our Afghan
interlocutors, continue to press the point.
I think you see a gradual expansion of women involvement in
the High Peace Council, for example, involvement in more of the
community-based oversight efforts that are emerging.
So, you know, when we talk about the key criteria that
those who reconcile must meet and we talk about respecting the
Afghan Constitution, the key element of that is respect for
minority and women's rights. And that has been a key plank in
our policy from the get-go. It is something we continue to try
to translate into concrete improvements with our Afghan
interlocutors. It is very important.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you both.
And, Admiral Mullen, I want to go back to a topic that I
think goes to the heart, really, of what we see in the conflict
in Afghanistan, which is the issue of opium production and the
drugs that are fueling and funding the Taliban and other
insurgent activities.
Frequently, when we have these hearings, I hold up this
chart that is a Congressional Research Service bar chart that
shows the opium production that has occurred during our time
period and historically in Afghanistan. If you look at the
chart, you can see that, in the 4 years of 2006 through 2009,
opium production almost doubled. That is the time period when
we saw that we needed to go in with the surge. The period
beforehand, there was historical levels of opium production.
I have used this chart both with President Karzai and
General Petraeus to raise the issue of, you know, we need to do
more to lower the opium production and the narcotics trade.
General James Jones said that he believes that these funds go
directly to fund the Taliban, and he of course said that it
also goes to fund the issues of corruption.
Now, when General Petraeus was here last time and I held up
this chart, he kindly told me that there was new information as
to what successes we have had, and he has sent me a new bar
chart. And the new bar chart shows that, in 2010, there was a
48 percent decrease as a result of our counternarcotics
efforts; also, there was disease among the crops; but, also,
that there has been a 341 percent increase in our nationwide
drug seizures in Afghanistan, clearly showing that this was a
result of the activities of increased focus.
Admiral, with our reduction in troops, my concern is that
we are going to go back to a period where we take our eye off
the ball and that we may again see a surge in narcotics. What
assurances can you give us that, with the lower number of
troops, we will be able to maintain a counternarcotics strategy
to reduce opium production and the funding of the Taliban?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I think we will continue to certainly
press on this issue.
You have looked--just showing the charts, you look at the
levels over the years, and, in many ways, it is a way of life
that isn't going to go away quickly. There have been
considerable improvements, and we continue to keep pressure on
that.
I mean, one of the challenges--and this is going on--
obviously, it comes principally from Helmand--and the
landscape, the dynamics are changing in Helmand. By no means is
it gone. And the long term goal is obviously to produce a
better way to provide for one's family than what has happened
to date.
I think it actually happens over the long term based on the
security environment and having, you know, profitable crops
that are able to do that. But I don't think that is going to
mean we are going to dry it up overnight.
The focus--a critical focus here on the Taliban is where
they get their finances from, as it is for any terrorist
organization. And certainly this is--and, over the years, this
has varied. I have seen many estimates of how much money they
actually get from it, but it is substantial. And we need to
continue to focus on that, as well.
So, really, there is a near-term piece here, but there is a
long-term piece. And from an overall strategy standpoint, my
view would be that we would have the conditions in the south,
in Helmand in particular, in a place where they couldn't
sustain that kind of production over the long term.
Mr. Turner. Admiral, I would like to yield the rest of my
time to Joe Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
And, Admiral, a question--I want to conclude--in regard to
conditions-based. The success of the surge, the ultimate
reduction in violence, the development of a civil society, if
in fact violence increases, if we are unable to promote a civil
society, will the President change his course? Or is the
timeline of withdrawal more important than conditions?
Admiral Mullen. I think that is for the President to
decide. But what I said earlier, Mr. Wilson, is--and I go back
to mid-2009, we put 10,000 Marines in Helmand, and my view then
was, if this isn't working within 18 to 24 months, we really
need to reassess our strategy.
I think, from the standpoint of the next 18 to 24 months,
given the transition--and it doesn't just include the military
side here. Because the issues of corruption, the issues of
governance, the issues of Pakistan, those are all still
significant, inherent risks in this overall strategy.
So I think, you know, certainly from my point of view,
after a period of time, if it is not working, that a
reassessment is in order. But that is not for me to decide.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Admiral Mullen. I appreciate your
extraordinary service. It is not easy doing your job, and one
of your toughest parts may be the patience you have to
demonstrate in front of committees like this. So I appreciate
your forbearance.
One of the most important factors, as you well know better
than anyone, is the Pakistan reaction. And I assume that the
Pakistan situation was taken into account when this decision
was made?
Admiral Mullen. It was.
Mr. Cooper. Uh-huh. What is that reaction?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I--you mean the Pakistan reaction or
Pakistan itself?
Mr. Cooper. Pakistan's reaction to the decision to have a
slight troop drawdown?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I actually haven't gotten it yet. I
spoke with my Pakistani counterpart yesterday, as we made many
contacts. And so, we agreed to talk in the near future after he
is able to sort of absorb it.
I mean, from a standpoint of how Pakistan views the
future--and it is consistent across their government--they see
a stable, peaceful Afghanistan as a goal they, too, would like
to be a result of this overall strategy. They live there.
Seeing is believing. And, over time, exactly how they view this
will be determined on how this works, I think, personally.
I also think that they are clearly going through, you know,
a very difficult time right now. From a strategic standpoint, I
and many others believe, including the President, that we have
to sustain this relationship, as difficult as it is. This is a
country who has a significant terrorist problem. It is a
country whose economy is very weak. And it is a country with
nuclear weapons that is in a very dangerous and strategically
important part of the world.
I think, not just the United States, but the regional
countries need to continue to focus on this, so that stability
is something that is the output of all of what we do there, not
just--not continued instability. Because I think the continued
downward trend is dangerous for all of us, with respect to
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the region writ large.
Mr. Cooper. Well, I know it takes a great deal of patience
and expertise to deal with folks like that. I find that my
constituents don't usually realize that Pakistan has more
people than Russia, for example.
Admiral Mullen. Yeah. I mean, they are projected to have
over 200 million here in the next 20 or 30 years and be the
fourth- or fifth-largest nuclear power, if you consider
weapons, I think the fourth, in roughly the same time frame.
Mr. Cooper. Uh-huh.
Admiral Mullen. So it is not a country I--it is just a
country I think we have to continue to engage with and be frank
with.
And, at the same time, you know, I think we are paying the
price in Afghanistan and Pakistan for walking away in 1989. And
that is a model that just runs in my head 20 years from now,
whoever is sitting here or sitting in your seat, we are having
the same conversation, were we to walk away, except it is much
more dangerous than it is right now.
Mr. Cooper. Increasingly, Pakistan has, itself, been the
victim of terrorist attacks.
Admiral Mullen. Correct.
Mr. Cooper. In Karachi, most recently, and other instances.
So they have felt the wrath of the Taliban and the Haqqani
network and other groups.
Admiral Mullen. They have lost tens of thousands. They have
lost, specifically, over 3,000 of their military. They have had
tens of thousands wounded. They have sacrificed greatly for
their own country. Sometimes that sacrifice gets lost.
And they have some enormous, enormous challenges. They have
faced them. They will continue to face them. And I think we
need to help them, not hurt them.
Mr. Cooper. Uh-huh. As you say, they are a reality that we
are going to have to deal with regardless. And we might as well
face up to that, and not push the problem to the side or ignore
it.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooper. General Bing West wrote a book recently called
``The Wrong War,'' talking about the war in Afghanistan. And he
said that one of the chief problems is Hamid Karzai's
unwillingness to let us police the gaps in the mountains, the
valleys, and actually terminate flow of folks across those
treacherous border regions along the Durand Line.
Is he mistaken? Is this something that we need to demand of
President Karzai?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I go back to what General Petraeus
and General Rodriguez have done over the course of the last
year, particularly in the east, and that is where he is talking
about it. And General Petraeus made the--along with General
Rodriguez and General Campbell, who basically ran the campaign
in the east for the last year, to refocus it, to layer it from
the border at Pakistan to Kabul, and, in fact, to pull forces
out of those very remote places, which none of us thought was
strategically significant. That doesn't mean we didn't have bad
guys out there; we do. But this layered approach to ensure that
we could protect the capital and deal with the Haqqani, make it
much more difficult on the Haqqani network, which is the one
that flows most of the fighters in there, was a better
strategy.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. My time has expired.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, you are here during an interesting time. And,
Secretary Flournoy, you have been back here month after month.
And I just want to say thanks for both of your service. We
don't always see eye to eye on stuff, but you are out there out
front, and you are doing what you believe is in the best
interest of the Nation.
I haven't heard anybody talk about a strategy. You know,
people ask what we think about the troop numbers. I have no
idea what the troop numbers are supposed to be. I am not a
military planner.
But I know what our troops are capable of, and I know that
higher numbers are better for a big counterinsurgency
operation. If we had 10 years and 300,000 troops, we could make
Afghanistan into San Diego. It would be a nice place to go fly
fishing and sheep hunting at. But we don't have 10 years; we
don't have 300,000 people on the ground.
I haven't heard any talk about change in strategy to
accompany the change in the troop numbers. How come? We are at
the low-ball end----
Admiral Mullen. Well, I mean, actually, the short answer
is, the strategy hasn't changed.
Mr. Hunter. We are at the low-ball end of the numbers that
McChrystal asked for. So I don't----
Secretary Flournoy. Well, I think----
Mr. Hunter [continuing]. Want to get wrapped up in the
numbers game.
Admiral Mullen. Yeah, but, I mean, McChrystal was talking
about troops, this is 2 to 3 years ago. And it has just--it has
changed, you know, it has changed dramatically on the ground
since then. So, clearly, it is something we look at all the
time.
You know, it is interesting in overall numbers, because,
you know, I mean, I spend a lot of time looking at who is there
and who is making a difference and who isn't. And, you know, we
have a culture of putting a lot of numbers in; historically, we
have, all of us.
We have learned a lot with respect to that. I was just in a
meeting with General Odierno as recently as yesterday. We were
talking about, you know, what we learned with respect to Iraq.
And we had excess forces in Iraq just because we were moving
them so fast.
So we literally take those lessons into account as we look
at how we do this. And despite the pressure on numbers, that
has also forced us to, not adjust our strategy, but look at how
we focus this, prioritize, and still achieve success.
You talked about the military. I mean, it is an
unbelievably innovative, creative, capable military that we
have. And, again, I talked about, you know, more risk and
quicker than I had originally anticipated. But it hasn't put me
anywhere close to out of the risk envelope, if you will, of
getting this done.
And, at some point in time, if it is not working, we are
going to have to adjust the strategy. The strategy still is----
Mr. Hunter. You don't think this----
Admiral Mullen. The strategy still is, you know, a
counterinsurgency focus, without any question, you know,
properly resourced. And, you know, we could probably get into a
debate about that. I think it is, given the mission and the
objectives that we have right now and the progress that we have
made.
If it is not working in a year or two, you know, my
recommendation would be it needs to be reassessed.
Mr. Hunter. We probably have different interpretations of
counterinsurgency. I mean, it can be an all-encompassing thing,
where you are building hospitals and schools, or it can be
where you have village security operations which are working
very, very well, little militias in each town. I mean, you
obviously know what VSOs [Village Stability Operations] are.
Admiral Mullen. Sure.
Mr. Hunter. Those are working. Some things aren't working.
But you don't think that there is any need--so you are
telling me there is no need for a relooking at the strategy as
we draw down in the tens of thousands for the ``clear, hold,
build''?
Admiral Mullen. It goes to--I will be very specific--it
goes to, well, how are we going to handle the east? And the
east is going to not be held by U.S. forces. It is going to be
both denied across the border as well as held by Afghan forces.
Mr. Hunter. But you are going to have to hold the south as
you go east, or you are going to lose all the gains you have
had in the south.
Admiral Mullen. But it is----
Mr. Hunter. So, a drawdown in troops and hold what we have,
which has taken so many troops, and move east at the same time
with fewer troops?
Admiral Mullen. The intent, certainly, over the course of
this transition is to hold and transition to Afghan security
forces. And that is going to be the challenge. I mean, I am not
here to say that is a done deal, because it isn't. But that is
the strategy.
And within the resources that we see right now, we see it
as executable. No one--not Petraeus, not Rodriguez, not
anybody--has said that is not the case. Is it going to be hard?
You bet it is going to be hard.
Mr. Hunter. Okay.
Madam Flournoy.
Secretary Flournoy. I was just going to add, if you go back
to the original six campaign objectives laid out in the West
Point speech--reverse the Taliban's momentum; deny them access
to population centers; disrupt them in areas outside of that;
degrade them to levels manageable by the ANSF; build the ANSF
capacity; and then build the capacity in selective areas of the
Afghan Government--as we do that, we always anticipated----
Mr. Hunter. We are successful now, kind of, on all of those
things.
Secretary Flournoy. Correct. But as we do that, that
success enables a shift of the effort more toward the Afghans
as they stand up. It allows us to thin out our----
Mr. Hunter. I was in Iraq. I understand how it works. Yeah,
I mean----
Secretary Flournoy. And so, we have always anticipated
that, with success, the strategy would require fewer resources
on the coalition side and more on the Afghan side. And that is
the path we are on.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral and Under Secretary, thank you very much for your
service. I know that you have worked long and hard on
extraordinarily difficult challenges, and it is much
appreciated.
I want to just confirm, I think I heard you say, Admiral
Mullen, a moment ago that the mission remains a
counterinsurgency mission. Is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. That is correct. The strategy is a
counterinsurgency strategy.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. And that involves all that was
just said just a moment ago, all of the ``clear and hold'' and
all that goes with it. In other words, nation-building is very
much a part of this.
Admiral Mullen. You know, it isn't--from my perspective, it
isn't very much a part of this. It is a counterinsurgency
strategy focused on, as the Secretary just laid out, limited
objectives, which is what it has been and is what the President
talked about in his speech in 2009.
Mr. Garamendi. The notion of counterterrorism--that is, to
focus on the terrorists, wherever they happen to be around the
world--seems to be secondary to this mission in Afghanistan.
Admiral Mullen. I think it is not secondary at all. It is
integral, very much. And it has been. I have spoken about that
before. That is also how it is being executed. And I just don't
separate the two. It is part of it.
Secretary Flournoy. If I could just add, if you look at the
region at large, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and you look at the
progress that we have made in terms of focusing pressure on Al
Qaeda senior leadership--the Osama bin Laden raid as the latest
example--but that pressure continues. It is looking at them
globally.
So there is, I would say, only an intensification of our
focus on counterterrorism alongside a complementary
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan.
Mr. Garamendi. Are all of the Taliban the same? That is,
the Taliban in Herat, the Taliban in Kandahar, and so forth.
Are they all the same? And do they have the same goal?
Secretary Flournoy. They are not all the same. This is a
diverse, symbiotic network of groups that assist one another,
that rely on one another, but do have overlapping but sometimes
distinct goals.
Mr. Garamendi. Some would describe Afghanistan as a five-
or six-sided civil war. Do you agree or disagree with that?
Secretary Flournoy. I would disagree with that. I think
what is happening right now in Afghanistan is really the
emergence of a nation from 30 years of war and the rejection of
the Taliban by the population and, with that, the reduction of
the threat to us, because as the population rejects that
movement and as they build their own national capacity,
Afghanistan is less and less likely to become a safe haven for
Al Qaeda and attacks against the United States and its allies.
Admiral Mullen. Can I just add one thing to this?
Mr. Garamendi. Yes.
Admiral Mullen. This border area that we have obviously
focused on--and Al Qaeda receives the focus. And Ms. Flourney
said ``symbiotic.'' I have watched terrorist organizations over
the last 3 or 4 years merge with each other, increase their
horizon in terms of objectives. So LET [Lakshar-e-Taiba], which
is a local outfit in eastern Pakistan focused on India, is now
in the west and now has transnational aspirations.
So terrorist organizations are also different, generally in
support of each other. And in this place, this is the epicenter
of terrorism in the world. And that is one of the reasons the
focus on both Afghanistan and Pakistan is so important.
Mr. Garamendi. What is the cost of the strategy that you
have described to us today--the cost in 2011, 2012, '13, '14?
Secretary Flournoy. If you look at the costs over time,
what we do see happening is those costs actually coming down.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, let's be very specific. Surely, you
have figured out what the cost of your strategy is.
Secretary Flournoy. Right. So, for 2011----
Mr. Garamendi. And could you please share that with us?
Secretary Flournoy [continuing]. The request for
Afghanistan was $43 billion----
Mr. Garamendi. I am sorry?
Secretary Flournoy [continuing]. In OCO [Overseas
Contingency Operations]. So the request for Afghanistan--I am
sorry?
Admiral Mullen. No, it is--I mean, we are running right now
at about $10 billion a month.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay.
Secretary Flournoy. I'm sorry, that's obligation.
Admiral Mullen. The 2011 request I think is for $117
billion. The bill of this, we look at it coming down about $30
billion or $40 billion a year based on the strategy that is
laid out.
Mr. Garamendi. And 2012 will be how much?
Secretary Flournoy. Less than $120 billion for 2012. It was
$160 billion in 2011. So it is about a $40 billion decline from
2011 to 2012.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Could you please give us those
numbers?
Secretary Flournoy. Yeah, we can give you that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 69.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
Secretary Flournoy. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, Secretary Flournoy, thanks again for your
service and dedication to this country.
Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, they are not
absolutes. It is really more of a continuum. And how would you
gauge the current strategy? Are we then shifting a little bit
more to add more counterterrorism elements as we draw down
forces? Or how would you state that, Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. Again, I think where we are a year from now
is going to be determined on how it goes this year. It is
heavily focused on both, as we speak. I mean, the CT
[counterterrorism] effort inside this counterinsurgency
strategy is significant. And General Petraeus asked for and got
more forces to do that.
So, will there be a different balance a year from now?
Probably. How much, I think it is hard to say. And I think,
again, what forces the commander on the ground recommends
taking out next year is going to be determined by what happens
this year. And we are not even halfway through this fighting
season, so it is really difficult to say exactly how it is
going to look a year from now.
Mr. Coffman. Admiral Mullen, I think you stated, quote,
``In a counterinsurgency, firepower is manpower,'' unquote. And
can you drill down just a little bit on what does that mean?
Admiral Mullen. Well, you have to have people out there
engaged. The whole idea in a counterinsurgency is to focus on
and protect the people--in this case, the Afghan people.
What is important in this--this goes back to the success of
the build of the Afghan security forces. The army, for sure;
the police, absolutely. And not unlike Iraq, the police lag the
development here, although, you know, it is going better and
better.
So, in the end, it is the protection of the people,
security for the people. And there is going to be, in numbers,
you know, a larger number of people focused on this in 2012
than focused in 2011, just because of the continued build of
the forces. So it is not just U.S. manpower or coalition
manpower; it is the totality of manpower.
And, in fact, to these VSOs that have gone so well--and
they are small in number right now, 6,400, as I indicate--that
is an enormously successful program, VSOs and Afghan local
police. And we will continue to build that.
Mr. Coffman. Admiral Mullen, in the Lisbon conference, I
believe the policy decision coming out of that was that we
would transfer operational control to Afghan security forces by
the end of 2014.
Can you just be more specific as to what that really will
look like? Does that mean we will still have some boots on the
ground then in support of Afghan security forces?
Admiral Mullen. The model that certainly is very much in
the front of our minds is Iraq. And we will, clearly, continue
to have forces there. And the Lisbon commitment is to have
Afghans in the lead, you know, throughout the country, every
single district, by the end of 2014. And that is where we are
headed. As much advise and assist and support as is necessary
at that point.
But, I mean, what we have watched in terms of the both
growth rate and learning rate, they are on a pretty good glide
slope right now, in terms of ascendance to be able to do this,
the Afghan security forces.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My questions flow along the lines of what Mr. Wilson
brought up earlier, and Ms. Davis, talking about the drawdown
being determined by conditions on the ground, the movement
toward the Afghan security forces, the Afghan National Police
being able to take over security.
My concern comes from the future of this operation at an
economic level. The Afghan security forces are taking over more
geography, but are we creating a situation where we have
created such a large Afghan Army that the Afghan economy just
will not be able to support that?
And I think we have to look at this, you know, if the
crystal ball says that we will be drawn down to a condition
sort of like what we have in Iraq right now by 2014, what is
the dollar amount that the Afghan Government, the Afghan
economy, is going to have to generate? And then how much of the
U.S. support is still going to be there in a financial sense?
Secretary Flournoy. That is something we are looking at in
great detail right now. One question is, once the insurgency is
degraded, the level of threat is degraded, how big an army and
police force do you really need? And it may well be smaller
than what we have currently planned. They may be experiencing
their own surge right now. Maybe they will settle at a lower
level.
Secondly, we are working very hard with the Afghan
Government on revenue generation, whether it is substantially
increasing their border revenues, growing their economy,
working with them on extractive industries to gain from their
strategic mineral and mining resources.
But, ultimately, we do have to get this on a more
sustainable footing, and it has to cost less than what is
currently anticipated. But I think we are working through that
now with lots of analysis and the Afghans.
And we do believe we can get there, but it is going to--but
let me be clear, this is going to be a substantial assistance
effort, not at the levels that are currently projected, but
this is going to be--Afghanistan is going to require
international development assistance for many, many years. It
will remain one of the poorest countries in the world for quite
some time.
Mr. Critz. Well, and, obviously, you have heard from this
committee. I mean, the support from this committee for what our
military personnel are doing is second to none. Because they
are doing--I mean, besides being warfighters, they are
educators, they are counselors, they are parents, and they are
doing more than probably any military has ever had to do. So
the support is very strong.
But, again, it just seems that we have developed a model
that is just not sustainable. And, of course, then you look
forward, and if you say a shrinking of the security forces,
well, you know, we know it in this country; we call them
``layoffs.'' That means there are people not working. And,
obviously, with an economy, the delta is so large.
You know, I am really very concerned about this, as are a
lot of people, that we are setting ourselves up for either many
decades of support just to maintain this or just something that
is just not functional, come down the road.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Madam Secretary and Admiral Mullen,
for being here today. I really appreciate your testimony.
You know, I want our troops to come home as soon as
possible. Everyone here does. But notwithstanding your
reassurances, Admiral Mullen, I am not yet comfortable that the
decisions related to this drawdown or future decisions related
to our force posture in Afghanistan are, in fact, going to be
primarily based upon conditions on the ground. So I hope to get
comfortable with that.
One of the conditions on the ground, as I see it, that is
very important as we consider our existing force posture and
future force posture is, of course, the conditions on the
ground in Pakistan, where there are elements, various extremist
elements, including elements of the Taliban, that reside over
there in a relatively safer haven than Afghanistan.
You acknowledged that yourself, Admiral, that the situation
in Pakistan is a significant, inherent risk to our overall
strategy. These elements, extremists laying in wait in
Pakistan, threaten to create the very conditions, destabilizing
conditions, that justify our presence in Afghanistan,
regardless of our progress toward the six components of our
overall strategy articulated in the President's West Point
speech.
So my first question, laying that groundwork, is: Admiral
Mullen, are you prepared to say that the conditions on the
ground in Pakistan have improved to such an extent that the
threat to the government in Afghanistan and to the people of
Afghanistan by these extremists in Pakistan has diminished to a
significant degree?
Admiral Mullen. I think it is really important to remember
that the, you know, core goal of the President's strategy was
to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda. And Al Qaeda is
very much on the ropes right now. I don't say that thinking it
is over, because they still would like to kill as many of us as
they possibly could, and they have aspirational goals to do
that.
Secondly is to make sure that Afghanistan can't turn into
fertile ground for Al Qaeda or another organization which would
threaten us long term. And that is really what the Afghanistan
piece of this is.
Mr. Young. I am going to very rudely interject, which is a
euphemism for ``interrupt'' here on the Hill.
But, all right, so we are trying to create conditions, of
course, where Afghanistan can't become a safe haven. But it
seems that Pakistan is a relatively safer haven already.
Admiral Mullen. And that is where, first of all, targeting
significant leaders in those other organizations, the Afghan
Taliban, the Haqqani network, et cetera, with, in many cases,
our Pakistani partners, which is problematic, is a part of
this. And what the strategy is intended to do is buy space so
that there can be political reconciliation across the board.
That is not an insignificant----
Mr. Young. All right, Admiral. So it seems that we are
approaching Pakistan with a very limited sort of
counterterrorist strategy, when we are implementing a
counterinsurgency strategy over in Afghanistan. We have our
UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], much reported, that are going
after----
Admiral Mullen. I think our----
Mr. Young. Yes?
Admiral Mullen. I think our approach with Pakistan has been
to engage them, to try to partner with them, support them in
training, so that they can deal with the threats which are both
internal to them as well as external.
Now, that is a very, very difficult strategy and execution,
just because of both the history, the lack of trust--we left
them before--and, obviously, recent events.
Mr. Young. Right. Okay.
So, Admiral, in your estimation, we can never send in
enough American troops to Afghanistan to create conditions
where the extremists across the border in Pakistan would not
present a threat to the Afghans, conceivably a threat to the
United States----
Admiral Mullen. No, it has to change in Pakistan.
Mr. Young. Right. So all of this depends upon the
Pakistanis playing ball, if you will, to put it colloquially.
Admiral Mullen. There is great risk in the strategy tied to
Pakistan. There has been from the beginning.
Mr. Young. Okay.
Now, finally, is our remaining presence on the ground in
Afghanistan in part a hedge against, or a deterrent to, future
efforts by these militants in Pakistan to use regions of that
country as an unfettered training ground for their activities,
or even a worse case scenario, to get control of Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal, perhaps through violent means?
Admiral Mullen. I think, through Pakistani eyes, what you
say, you know, they are very concerned about an unstable
Afghanistan that could threaten them with a much larger force.
That is why getting to some level of stability and peaceful
outcome here is so important. And I believe, if we can,
Pakistan will come to that.
Mr. Young. So, as I assess whether we should keep troops
there or not, we should in no way factor in the fact that our
troops are playing a productive role in perhaps deterring those
extremists----
Mr. Scott [presiding]. The gentleman's----
Mr. Young [continuing]. Taking control of the nuclear
arsenal.
Admiral Mullen. Am I allowed to answer that?
Mr. Young. Can he answer?
Mr. Scott. Admiral, if we could get that question on the
record and get the answer for the committee, we would
appreciate it.
Admiral Mullen. Sure.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, thank you for being here; Secretary
Flournoy. Appreciate your service to our country and all that
you are doing to keep America safe.
Admiral, let me just say that, you know, I am concerned
that we are reaching a point of diminishing returns in
Afghanistan. Clearly, the war has cost us billions of dollars
and thousands of lives lost or wounded. I was mindful of that
just this past Tuesday when I went out to Walter Reed to visit
some of our wounded soldiers there.
At our Emerging Threats hearing yesterday on evolving
terrorist threats, Dr. Sebastian Gorka of National Defense
University noted that Al Qaeda no longer exists in Afghanistan
in any reasonable number. Ultimately, clearly, we deployed to
Afghanistan to eliminate Al Qaeda and deny the region as a
source of terrorist activity there. Our troops clearly have
performed the mission incredibly well; Al Qaeda effectively is
gone from Afghanistan. But, obviously, new terrorist threats
are being cultivated in other trouble spots like Pakistan,
Yemen, and North Africa.
Now, the President, in his strategy that he released last
night, is going to bring home 33,000 troops by next summer.
My question is--and I know that you have talked about that
the reason to leave that number there and not bring them home
sooner is to ensure that we have enough troops to support
another wave of heightened violence that accompanies the summer
months in Afghanistan so that our claimed victories there won't
be lost.
I have to say that I really remain unconvinced. As both a
member of the Armed Services Committee and the House
Intelligence Committee, I have transparency into both worlds.
And I question, where are the gains that really have been made
that would justify us keeping the additional 23,000 troops in
there until next summer?
Can you further convince me? What is the real rationale for
not bringing the 33,000 troops home by the end of this year? I
know that my constituents are looking for that answer, and I
need to have it, as well.
Admiral Mullen. From a military standpoint, it is the focus
on keeping the firepower, if you will, the manpower, there
through the fighting season, and certainly by the end of
September, it does that next year, and then, obviously, putting
the commander in a position to make decisions about where he
may or may not take troops from, first of all. Secondly, I get
the Al Qaeda--no Al Qaeda or a very small number of Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan. That is not the case in Pakistan.
And I just never looked at this as a single-country
approach. You can't, from my perspective, you can't do that. It
is the region and part--you know, the other core objective, if
you will, of this strategy is to make sure Afghanistan is
stable enough so it can't return to where it was when Al Qaeda
grew up there and struck us in the first place or some other
outfit that would seek to do the same thing. There are growing
numbers of those. So--and that is not--that is not where we are
in Pakistan. That is where we are in Afghanistan.
Admittedly, Al Qaeda is not there in any kind of
significant numbers. Al Qaeda, however, is very tightly wound
with the Haqqani network, who continues to try to destabilize
Afghanistan and take over that government. The Taliban's
strategic goal is to still run the country. And I am hard-
pressed to think that if the Taliban are still running the
country or get back to that position, that they won't be the
host, if you will, for organizations like Al Qaeda in the past.
So the focus, again, I think, is to have as much combat
power there through this fighting season. We have talked about
that and the importance of getting through--vastly through next
fighting season as well and then move the troop--and that to me
is the time to bring the surge troops out.
Mr. Langevin. Let me try this from then another
perspective. I had hoped, quite frankly, to hear that the
President was going to be withdrawing more troops than what he
has planned over the next--even the next year. Why are we not
cutting our forces in half by next summer? What is the margin
of utility of having the extra 17,000 troops there between the
30,000 that the President wants to bring home by next summer
and the number of--would achieve 50 percent, that extra 17,000
troops by the summer?
Admiral Mullen. I think if we did what you just described,
we undo all the gains that have occurred since he put the surge
in simply. The strategy has absolutely no chance of succeeding
were we to do that.
Mr. Langevin. I know that my time has expired. I thank you
both for your service. We, obviously, have still tough
questions and tough roads ahead. But I appreciate the work that
you are doing. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Admiral, I had a couple of questions when I was
down front.
I will be very brief so that we can move on to the other
members. If you would, just my concern after being there a
couple of weeks ago and talking to the soldiers, the generals,
our intelligence community, you hit on this when Congressman
Cooper was talking about Pakistan and that if we walked away
now, we would be right back here in 20 years. I recognize that
we weren't talking about--that we were talking about Pakistan
at the time, if I am not mistaken. Is that----
Admiral Mullen. I think, again, it goes to the regional
approach. I wouldn't be so specific. I mean, we walked not just
from Pakistan in 1990; we walked from Afghanistan in 1989.
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir. I think my concern--and if you would
speak to this is, as you sit there as somebody that we rely on
to help us make the decisions, and your statement was Al Qaeda
is on their heels, and the Taliban is in check. And does that
accurately reflect your statement, that Al Qaeda----
Admiral Mullen. The Taliban is in check in the south. They
are not in check in the east.
Mr. Scott. And so our concern and my concern is I hear that
we have them on their heels with one group and in check, at
least in certain regions, in others; why would we draw down
until we had them in checkmate?
Admiral Mullen. I think in the judgement that we can accept
the risk associated with that drawdown, while still able to
succeed in the overall strategy, based on the gains of the
surge over the course of the last--since the President
announced it 18 months ago.
Mr. Scott. My understanding is that Germany, France and
Britain have all announced troop withdrawals somewhat
simultaneous with ours, along a similar schedule as ours. Is
that correct? That is what is reported in the news?
Secretary Flournoy. They are very, very modest, and they
are not uniform at all. I would say they are more modest in
general than what we have proposed. For the most part, our
allies, the Australians, others, are saying we are in it. We
are committed. We are signed up to the Lisbon plan, and that is
what we are sticking with. And I haven't heard anybody walk
away from what we all agreed at Lisbon.
Mr. Scott. Is it public what the total NATO force will be,
U.S. and coalition forces? Or is that classified information
and when those drawdowns are anticipated?
Secretary Flournoy. I don't think we have the particulars
yet to be able to calculate where that will be a year from now.
But we certainly release the numbers of where we are today. I
don't think we have heard enough detail from our partners to
know exactly where we will be at the end of the next summer.
From what we have heard so far, there will not be dramatic
increases or people departing the coalition. There is a lot of
commitment to the strategy and making it succeed.
Mr. Scott. As we have that information, I would appreciate
it if you would update me and the committee, because I do think
it is important what the total force is as well as the U.S.
force. I am going to yield the remainder of my time.
Secretary Flournoy. I would be happy to do that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 69.]
Mr. Scott. And we have got Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Under Secretary and Admiral, for being here. My
question, whichever one of you can answer it, is that I think
the public is a bit confused about what 2014 represents. I
think when people think of 2014, given the announcement of the
numbers that we are withdrawing, that people are construing
that as the date that, by the end of 2014, we would have
withdrawn our troops.
But in reading both of your testimonies, 2014 is clearly
being identified as the day that--or the time that Afghan--or
Afghanistan takes over basically the whole military effort. So
given that, what are the numbers that are anticipated?
And I think, Under Secretary, you made a statement that if
peace is achieved, then the numbers that are currently planned
may then be reduced. So I assume there is some understanding of
where we are going to be in 2014. And what is that number in
terms of our troops?
Secretary Flournoy. I think by the end of 2014, we expect
Afghans will be in the lead for security. We will be able to
shift our mission focus more toward advise, assist, training,
supporting them, continuing to partner with them on
counterterrorism, intelligence and so forth. This is a lot of
what we are flushing out in our discussions about an enduring
strategic partnership.
The expectation is that the numbers will be substantially
lower, but I don't think until we know what the state of the
Taliban is, what the state of the threat, the state of the
ANSF, it will be hard to predict exactly what those numbers
will be.
But we can tell you they are going to be smaller; the
mission set will become increasingly more focused on supporting
and enabling the Afghans in the lead across the country.
Ms. Hanabusa. I saw an interesting chart on the news. For
example, the number, what the troop strength was in 2008, and
then after President Obama came into office. And it looked like
almost a doubling of those numbers, if I remember it correctly.
So we were like at 30-something thousand, if I am correct, and
then we went up to 60-something thousand, and we are now up to
100-something thousand. So we are going to draw down 33,000 by
the end of next year. And then the question becomes from that
70,000 that we have left to what you are considering to be not
as large or whatever it is, what does it look like in terms of
where we are in relationship to those numbers?
Secretary Flournoy. Again, I think that we will continue on
the curve toward 2014.
The thing that President Obama has said from the beginning
of this strategy is that this administration will commit to
periodically reviewing where we are; is the strategy working?
Is it not? How do we adjust the alignment of resources to that
strategy, and I would anticipate that regular process of review
that we have demonstrated over the last 2 years will continue
through this administration, certainly, and I would hope on
through to 2014 and beyond.
Ms. Hanabusa. Under Secretary, if somebody who doesn't
understand all of this wants to know in plain English, are we
going to have troops in Afghanistan or are we not going to have
troops in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, the answer is we are
going to have troops in Afghanistan; we just don't know how
many there are going to be?
Secretary Flournoy. I believe we will have troops with a
different mission focus and at much reduced numbers supporting
the Afghans who are going to be able to be leading their own
security at that time.
Ms. Hanabusa. But Ms. Under Secretary, the bottom line is
we are going to have troops with guns who are going to be in
some way in harm's way, and I think that is what the people are
really concerned about. So the bottom line, irrespective of
what their mission or their objective may be, we are going to
have men and women in uniform who are going to be potentially
in jeopardy after 2014?
Secretary Flournoy. Again, I don't want to--that is not--
the President has not decided on the character or numbers of
our presence beyond 2014. I think it would be unwise for
someone to try to do that at this point in time, given that a
lot is going to happen between now and then.
I am just giving you my personal best judgment that there
will still be a mission for the United States that will be in
our interest to support continued counterterrorism operations,
intelligence and supporting the Afghans as they take the lead
for security in their own country.
Ms. Hanabusa. I understand all of that. The bottom-line
question is very simple. If they are going to be in uniform and
if they are going to be--they may be in potential of harm's
way, unless they are somehow protected, which I don't see that
happening, those who are in Afghanistan would still be men and
women in uniform, and they still will have potential of being
injured and potentially killed. Would that be a fair statement?
Secretary Flournoy. You know, again, I think that we
anticipate a residual force, but I don't want to put words in
the President's mouth, that he has not made decisions on the
nature or composition or character of anything beyond what we
have announced and beyond 2014.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. My time is up.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, Madam Secretary, we are certainly grateful
for both of you and your dedicated service and great leadership
on a whole host of issues and especially our strategy in
Afghanistan and appreciate your patience here today. I will try
to be quick. I know it has been a long morning of questions.
I first associate myself with Mr. Cooper and his concerns
and about the impact of what we are doing on Pakistan. I have
had the privilege to visit our troops in Afghanistan eight
times and will be back later this time for my ninth, as well as
visits to Pakistan and the importance of them partnering with
us and that we don't send the wrong message that they focus on
the insurgents that they think are a threat to them versus a
threat more to Afghanistan and to us, that they continue to
partner with us.
So I think he raised those issues pretty well, and I
appreciate your answers on his questions. Probably my overall
main concern is, I have always said in Iraq and Afghanistan,
facts on the ground guiding us, it was an important part of
what the President said in December of 2009 when he laid out
his plans for the surge, which I commended him for doing, and
his hope to begin withdrawing this summer, but an important
caveat was facts on the ground.
And so I understand where today the ability to say we are
going to begin drawing up to 10,000 this year, based on the
facts on the ground today. I am a little concerned that we will
get ahead of ourselves and say, we already know what the facts
on the ground are going to be next year so we can draw down
another 23,000 rather than waiting to see what the facts
actually are next year and not be premature. So that is
certainly a concern I have.
The specific area of questions I want to address is the
importance of training up the Afghan National Security Forces.
And I visited with General Caldwell and think he and his team
are doing an outstanding job and really have transformed that
training mission in the last year, including the literacy
aspect, which especially for the police, a key aspect of what
they are doing.
Madam Secretary, you talked about the importance of them
being trained up as part of the calculation in this drawdown
that we are going to see. I guess, first, I assume you
calculated that my understanding that we are still seeing about
a 30 percent attrition level, desertions, that that was
factored into the numbers, not just that we have this many
being trained, but we are probably going to lose 30 percent of
them. Is that an accurate assessment or assumption?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes. I think our expectations about
both growth and quality are based on what we have experienced
to date but also the progress that we are making on bringing
some of the attrition down, bringing the retention up,
improving the quality, but importantly, on performance in the
field, particularly as more and more units are--almost all of
the units in the south, southwest and so forth are partnered
with ours, and we are able to get a very good sense of how
these units are performing in the field.
Mr. Platts. And that relates to a follow-on question. And I
guess a concern I have is that we are training them up through
basics and then, because of the need, we are putting them right
out there without the additional opportunity to kind of hone
their skills, and I think that leads to that 30 percent
desertion or attrition rate. To counter that, we have to
better--or continue to partner. The fact that there is going to
be 33,000 fewer U.S. forces there to partner with, isn't that
going to create somewhat of a challenge? How do we do that
partnering with that many less U.S. forces for them to be
partnered with?
Secretary Flournoy. I think the details of how this affects
partnering will be worked through, but I don't anticipate a
significant shortfall in that regard. Part of what we are
getting as we grow the force is more time to pull units out for
retraining, more time to send leaders to further development.
Admiral Mullen mentioned the specialty schools, that we are now
developing the Afghan National Forces own enablers and
specialists and so forth. So I think this is all of a piece,
but I don't think anyone has assessed the drawdown to
fundamentally put that effort at risk in any way.
Mr. Platts. I certainly hope not because probably the best
training we give them is when they are out there in the field
with the most professional, best qualified, best trained, most
capable force in the world, that being the American soldier and
marine, all of our personnel. And that is when we look at the
numbers and not equate a newly trained Afghan National Security
Force individual to our military because, obviously, there is a
huge difference.
I come back to, as I run out of time, just that my hope is
the administration, as we get to next year, with that 23,000
number, that if the facts on the ground are not what we hope
they will be today come next year, that we don't go forward
then with that drawdown if the facts don't justify it.
And a final comment, Mr. Chairman, is, Admiral Mullen,
again, just what a record of service to this Nation. We as--I
personally and my family, we are indebted to you and your
family for your heroic service and wish you great success in
all you do and thanks for what you have done for all of us.
I yield back.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The President just can't win on this one. It is going to
have one side saying that you are withdrawing too many troops
at a time when we need to have them stay the course, and then,
on the other side, you are going to have folks saying, well,
look, we are tired of war. Bring the troops home. Osama bin
Laden has been neutralized. That ends it. Let's close the door
over there, bring the troops home, and put all of the money
into reducing our debt. So the President just cannot win.
There is another way, though. And first of all, Admiral
Mullen and Secretary Flournoy, I appreciate you all being here
today. I want everyone to remember that the President was clear
in his 2008 campaign. He said that he would draw down U.S.
forces from Iraq, and he pledged to refocus on the neglected
war in Afghanistan. He has made good on both of those
commitments. In the spring of 2009, we had 138,000 troops on
the ground in Iraq. We now have 61,000 on the ground, with more
leaving every day. And by the end of this year, we will have
less than 130 Department of Defense boots on the ground in
Iraq, unless there is some change in the security agreement.
With the addition of 30,000 troops and renewed focus on
Afghanistan, we have been successful by all accounts. We have
degraded insurgent groups. We have denied them territory, while
neutralizing and disrupting transnational terrorists, who
continue to threaten us and our allies.
The President has also made perfectly clear when he pledged
additional forces to Afghanistan, the 30,000-person surge,
30,000-troop surge, that he would begin to return those troops
home in July of this year. Last night, true to form, the
President made good on that commitment; 10,000 troops by the
end of this year, and over the next year, approximately 30,000
troops to return from Afghanistan.
Now, what would it look like if we left right now, if we
just decided to close the book on this painful era in our
history and just--let's close the book on it and let's get
everybody out of there like we are doing in Iraq and just
leave? What would the area look like, and what would the future
look like for Americans? Could we be snug as a bug in the rug
and think that we don't have to worry about what is being
fermented in these ungoverned areas? What about Pakistan, a
nuclear country right next door to India, a nuclear country,
India having been the victim in the Mumbai attacks of a
terrorist plot hatched in Afghan--in Pakistan, you know? What
would we do if we left that area just totally destabilized by
withdrawing our troops from Afghanistan?
I submit that it would not look pretty in the long term. We
would end up having to recommit troops, probably a larger
number and at a greater expense at a time when we would least
be able to afford it. And so I regret that we are put into that
kind of a situation, that that is the situation that we are in.
I regret that, but that is where we are. And so what do we do
from here? I think that the President has made the right
decision. And I would want to bring every soldier home if I
could right now today but it just would not be the responsible
thing to do. And so I want to encourage the people to support
the President. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, Secretary Flournoy, thank you so much for
joining us today.
Admiral Mullen, thank you for your service to our Nation
and especially to that of your family. I know the sacrifice it
takes to have a loved one serve this Nation, and we deeply
appreciate that service and that sacrifice to our Nation. So we
appreciate that.
I want to ask this. We have heard a lot about numbers. We
have heard a lot about timelines. We have heard a lot about the
generalities of what we have talked about, the COIN strategy
and continuing along those same lines of effort while we are
drawing down troops. It seems to me, though, that there is
another element there that should be as concerning as the
operations in Afghanistan and that is what is currently
occurring in Pakistan. And my concern is that we can mount the
greatest effort in Afghanistan, but if we don't have an equal
effort in Pakistan, then we are going to not be successful I
think in where we all want to be in the long run.
I know that not long ago, General Rodriguez said that even
if the Pakistanis do nothing more than what they are doing
today, that we would be okay in Afghanistan. Let me ask this.
In light of the current conditions in Pakistan with the
relationship between Pakistan and the United States and with
the current projection of force drawdown in Afghanistan, do you
believe that we will still be in, as General Rodriguez says, in
good shape with our operations in Afghanistan in our efforts to
defeat the Taliban and ultimately displace Al Qaeda with the
current situation in Pakistan ending with the proposed
drawdown?
Admiral Mullen. I think Pakistan's calculus will depend on
how things go in Afghanistan. Not completely, but
significantly. And while, at the same time, they are going
through an incredibly difficult time right now, not just in the
relationship with the United States, but also internally,
particularly their military because of what they have been
through. And I said before and I would just repeat, the entire
chain of command of the United States through the President
thinks it is important that we sustain this relationship, even
through its most difficult times.
And I am actually heartened by the fact that we are going
through a very difficult time, and in fact, the relationship is
still there. I am just chastened by the past when we said, no,
when the relationship was broken. So I think we all just have
to be moderate, frank, careful about how we proceed in this
relationship, particularly as they go through this
introspection, if you will, about what has happened to them.
In the long run, I think it is the region; it is both
countries. And I think the Pakistan piece of this is a very
risky part of the overall strategy, which is why we have been
engaged so long. But it is not just Afghanistan/Pakistan,
because there is an India piece to this, nuclear armed
countries, all of that, which gets to the point that should we
walk away now, I just worry like--I worry a lot that we will be
back, and it will be much more challenging than it even is now
and much more dangerous.
Mr. Wittman. Secretary Flournoy.
Secretary Flournoy. I would agree wholeheartedly, that we
really have to look at this region in a very integrated manner,
and we have to re-invest in the relationship with Pakistan to
secure the cooperation we need from them on counterterrorism
but also in helping to reach the goals of stability in
Afghanistan.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask this then. Are either of you or
both of you confident that we can get to the point where the
relationship between Pakistan and the United States in relation
to what we are dealing with in Afghanistan will get us to the
point where their efforts will be on the level of where we
believe they need to be. I know, having just travelled there,
there were many concerns about their current level of effort,
especially on many of the networks that we are dealing with,
whether it is the Haqqani network, the Quetta Shura, whatever
it may be, the concern is, we do our part on one side in
Afghanistan, and there is safe harbor on the other side in
Pakistan. Do you see--even in light of the difficult
relationship that we have right now, do you see us being able
to get to a point to have an active Pakistan government and
army combatting the Taliban in their country in a way that
helps us overall strategically in the region?
Secretary Flournoy. Yeah, I think Pakistan--as we succeed
in Afghanistan, I think Pakistan will face some real strategic
choices in terms of where do they want to end up when this
comes to a successful conclusion. And I think the real question
for them is what role will they play politically in helping to
get to a political endgame in Afghanistan and with
reconciliation and so forth. I think that is really where their
key decisions will lie and that will ultimately have a huge
impact, not only on their relationship with Afghanistan and
what is on their border, but also in their relationship with us
long term.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks for sticking around and helping us out to understand
the President's announcement last night.
Admiral Mullen, in your statement you said we are going to
continue to build a strategic partnership with Afghanistan, one
based not on a military footprint, but on mutual friendship.
And I think that we are--if there is something that was lacking
in the President's speech last night was further defining what
that relationship is going to look like.
I wrote a letter to you, Secretary Flournoy, a couple of
weeks back on this very question about what this transition
from, as I put it, from troops to trade as a shorthand does in
fact look like? Because I think we need to maintain a
substantial commitment to Afghanistan. But I think it is going
to change and ought to change in nature. And I think most
Americans want a change in nature. It is not just a matter of
doing a drawdown. It is a matter of, what does it look like in
the future?
And I would be very interested in hearing from you,
Secretary, and then you, Admiral, about what that relationship
does in fact look like, what does that strategic partnership
with Afghanistan look like to send the message to Afghanistan
that we are not leaving like we did in the 1980s and to the
American people that we are not staying any longer militarily
than we need to be?
Secretary Flournoy. I think that the strategic partnership
between the United States and Afghanistan will have many, many
dimensions. One is going to be a very sustained political and
diplomatic engagement. I think there will be economic
investment opportunities. The early days of that is already
being seen in some sectors like the mining sector, the IT
[information technology] sector, the telecommunications,
agriculture and so forth.
I think there will be a security cooperation component that
will be very important to continuing to press our shared
counterterrorism interests and to continue to support the
development of the Afghan National Security Forces over time.
So I think it will be multidimensional. I think there will be
people-to-people elements, educational elements and so forth.
But the key message here is that even as we achieve our
military goals and the military drawdown is made possible and
Afghans do take--stand up and take more responsibility for
their security, we are not going away in a relationship sense.
We recognize we have vital interests in this region. We have--
the objective of disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda
is one that is not going anywhere, and we are going to stick
with this, and that means that we are going to stay with the
partnership in Afghanistan, even as the nature of the means by
which we do this will change naturally over time.
Mr. Larsen. Admiral, do you have anything to add?
Admiral Mullen. Well, it is tied up into this whole idea of
transition and focused, as the Secretary has pointed out,
multisector. There are ongoing negotiations right now about the
aegis of what this strategic agreement would look like from my
perspective, and I am not involved in those. From my
perspective, it is talking about the right things, the
President of the United States and the president of Afghanistan
are both committed to this. So that will be the framework for
how this looks. And it is based on the assumption, obviously,
that we get to a point in 2014 where we have a successful
transition; they are in charge of their own security; obviously
our footprint is dramatically reduced; and there is a
commitment to sort of the long-term relationship. I sum that up
in friendship, but a long-term relationship that sustains a
level of stability in that part of the world so that it can
grow, so that its economy can improve, so that people do have
comfort in investing in it, and it has an impact, not just in
Afghanistan but next door in Pakistan.
Mr. Larsen. I think--honestly, I think the responsible and
deliberate drawdown can be more deliberate and more
responsible, meaning I think it can happen faster with more
folks. But I just don't want us to think that--and I know you
do not think this. But in talking to folks at home who say,
well, get out of Afghanistan, the question I always try to push
back on is, well, if we do that, what do we have left? Have you
thought about that? Their answer is, well, no, we don't think
about that.
Well, we need to be thinking about that; what does that
look like in the future? I just want to be sure that you are
all talking about what this looks like in the future, what
model, you know, of which relationship we have with the current
country is the Afghanistan-U.S. relationship going to look
like?
Secretary Flournoy. We are actively discussing that with
the Afghans, and as that matures, I am sure we will be coming
back here to talk with you about that in more detail.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, thank you.
Mr. Scott. We had a hard stop at 12:30. We have two more
members with questions. I understand our witnesses have agreed
to stay. I would ask the members to keep it brief, if possible,
and thank you for agreeing to continue with us another 10
minutes.
Mr. Griffin.
Mr. Griffin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary and Admiral, thank you all for your service
and thank you for being here. I know you have been here a
while.
Just quickly, I want to ask you, looking at Afghanistan and
the history of Afghanistan and its difficulty in establishing
central control, a central--a strong central government, what
changes have you seen over the past few years, if any, in terms
of the people of Afghanistan willing to accept a strong central
government and be a part of a one-nation state, if you will?
Can you comment on that at all? Because I believe that the
answer to that will--is directly related to our chances of
success long term in Afghanistan.
Secretary Flournoy. I do think that Afghans increasingly do
have a sense of common nationhood. But I think that the
government that--the level of government that matters to them
most and where we see them investing greatly, participating
greatly, holding people accountable is at the local district
and then, by extension, provincial level. A lot of Afghans
don't worry too much about what is happening in Kabul. They
focus on, is my district governor listening to our priorities
in my community, meeting my basic needs? Are the mechanisms or
the instruments of government not preying upon me, not being
predatory, not corrupt, et cetera?
So I think the first place we have to help them get it
right is at that local district, provincial level. I think
working on the national government, we are making progress in
terms of capacity, countering corruption and so forth. But that
is a project that is going to take quite some time. But in the
meantime, the real stability is coming at the local level.
Mr. Griffin. I would mention that I was in Afghanistan
about 3 weeks ago and was able to visit not only some of the
larger areas but some of the larger cities--but was able to go
and observe firsthand some of the village stabilization
operations with the Special Forces and was struck by the
success that they have had at the local level and particularly
the progress that has been made in the last, I guess, 18
months, couple of years.
So I was able to see that firsthand and I was able to
actually be flown around in a C-130 from my district. And Mac
Thornberry, who had scheduled the trip, assured me that he did
not plant that Little Rock-based C-130 there for me, but we
enjoyed it nonetheless. But thank you all for your time today.
I appreciate it.
Mr. Scott. Does the gentleman yield back?
Mr. Griffin. Yes.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks for staying a few extra minutes. You know, I was
struck listening to your testimony today.
Yesterday we actually had a hearing on an update on Iraq
and the drawdown in Iraq. And again, it was actually amazing to
hear the story of how we are going to be at about 157 military
by the end of this year. And having sat through a number of
those hearings going back to 2007, and Admiral Mullen, you
know, has just done stellar service in terms of helping guide
our country through that challenge.
Again, I guess first of all, I should tip my hat to you
about the fact that what we heard yesterday was a real amazing
accomplishment under your leadership, but also struck by the
fact that when we had hearings on the SOFA agreement [Status of
Forces Agreement], which really set the glide path down,
frankly, there was angst in this committee about whether or not
military advice was sort of being set aside and whether or not
it was, you know, again, getting too far into a higher margin
of risk, which you talked about.
And I guess, you know, this probably is going to be one of
your final appearances before this committee, and I just wonder
maybe if you want to share a little perspective about that
experience. Obviously, you know, these are totally different,
you know, parts of the world and conflicts. But certainly there
should be some confidence that we can draw about your success
in that drawdown and what we are sort of contemplating here
today.
Admiral Mullen. What we have a tendency to forget is how
bad it was in 2006-2007. We were in free fall, from the
standpoint of our strategy, until the surge in Iraq, and there
was certainly uncertainty whether even at the time that would
work. It clearly did turn. A lot of that was external pressure
from the standpoint of outside forces, but also a lot of it was
internal.
It is a different country in so many ways, and we certainly
understand that. But the overall model, certainly how we
assisted them and how they developed their forces, et cetera,
is one that we are trying to follow now. Different forces. This
is from scratch in Afghanistan; it is a different country. I
actually believe that, you know, there are--there will be
limited--we focused in Afghanistan in a limited way on some of
these ministries, finance, minister of interior, minister of
defense, not across the whole government, central government of
Afghanistan, if you will, and I think, the long run, this is a
decentralized country. How do you make it flow and work? But
that model is a very powerful model, from my perspective, of
where we are.
And I guess the question earlier was, how many are going to
be left? We don't know. Right now, it is 157. How many are
going to be left in Afghanistan? It is 157 in Iraq, unless we
reach some agreement to the contrary, based on what the
leadership in both countries want to do. We want a strong
partnership with Iraq for the future, for lots of reasons, and
I think they are a little more evident now than even they were
in 2006 and 2007, given the turmoil that is going on in that
region. We seek the same kind of relationship, strong
relationship with Afghanistan long term. So, in that regard, it
is very instructive.
There are huge differences, and we have got to--we have got
to take into consideration both the similarities and the
differences and also acknowledge that in 2006-2007, we were in
our fourth and fifth year of war, and now it is 5 years later.
We are in our 10th, and that has got to be integrated into this
overall decision as well, and I think the President has done
that.
Mr. Courtney. And I guess, you know, the deadlines, you
know, are always, (A), subject to some change, but they also
help focus, not just our own government but other governments
as well. And I hope that, you know, would also be one of the,
you know, just general similarities that will help us get
through this.
Admiral Mullen. I think that is true. One of the things
that happened with the President's speech in 2009, when he
admit--when said he was going to start bringing troops out this
July, which he has since made the decision on doing that and
met that commitment, is it really did energize the Afghans. It
sent a very strong message that this is not open-ended; you are
going to have to get up and take care of yourself, which is
what everybody believed anyway.
So there is--I have talked about the risks associated with
this in one way, but there is another side of this that there
is a potential upside where they know how serious we are. They
have made a lot of progress. They are going to have to continue
to improve, from the president down to the local villages that
we have talked about. And they have made a lot of improvements.
Mr. Scott. Madam Secretary, Admiral, if you have any
closing comments, we will be happy to hear them now. I want to
thank you again for staying past your stop time.
Secretary Flournoy. I would just like to say thank you for
hosting us today. I think this dialogue is incredibly important
to continue this throughout the mission.
I also want to thank this committee and the members here
for supporting the members of our Armed Forces and their
incredibly courageous work but also supporting this mission,
which I believe is in the vital interest of the United States
for us to succeed.
Thank you.
Admiral Mullen. The committee has been incredible for years
and years and years supporting our men and women and families,
and words don't capture what you have done and the impact of
it. And certainly as someone in my position, I just--I can't
tell you how much we appreciate all that you do. And we will
need that continued support in the future.
Mr. Scott. Admiral, we appreciate all of those warfighters
and their families and all of those who support them,
especially you right now. Thank you. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 23, 2011
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
June 23, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Admiral Mullen. The United States started training the Afghan
National Army in May 2002. The United States Department of State
contracted with DynCorp International in May 2003 to conduct police
training. At the time, Germany still had lead responsibility for Afghan
National Police development. In July 2005, the United States assumed
responsibility for training and equipping the Afghan National Police.
The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was
created in May 2006. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was
created on 21 November 2009. Though two separate organizations with a
common goal and combined staffs of U.S. and Coalition partners, the
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is
also the Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.
Since the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established
on 21 November 2009; 190,184 members of the Afghan National Security
Force (ANSF) have graduated from training courses (as of 20 July 2011).
As of June 2011, there were 301,672 members of the Afghan National
Security Force (171,050 members of the Afghan National Army (this
figure includes the Afghan Air Force), and 130,622 members of the
Afghan National Police). [See page 17.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Secretary Flournoy. In response to your question about the total
NATO force, including both U.S. and non-U.S. Coalition personnel,
serving in Afghanistan, as of May 16, 2011, 132,305 Coalition military
personnel were serving under NATO command. If you subtract the number
of U.S. military personnel serving under NATO command, the total non-
U.S. Coalition contribution was 42,305, or an increase of nearly 10,000
non-U.S. Coalition forces since President Obama announced the U.S.
surge at West Point in December 2009.
ISAF routinely publishes a ``placemat'' on its website with the
total number countries and military personnel participating in the
Coalition in Afghanistan. That website can be found at http://
www.isaf.nato.int/isaf-placemat-archives.html, and the placemats are
updated monthly. Attached is the May 16, 2011 placemat referenced
above. [See page 38.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Secretary Flournoy. The following table provides Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) amounts for the Department of Defense for FY 2011 and FY
2012. The amounts for OEF mostly support activities in Afghanistan.
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
(Dollars in Billions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2011 Enacted FY 2012 PB Request FY 2013 FY 2014
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OEF 110.0................ 107.0................ TBD.................. --
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The President's recent announcement of troop drawdown from
Afghanistan will change the Department's FY 2012 Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) budget requirements for OEF (Operation New Dawn for
Iraq remains the same), but the exact change will depend on the
Commanders' determination of the pace of the drawdown and/or adjustment
of the forces mix.
The Department is in the process of reformulating its OCO
requirements for OEF for FY 2012, and developing its OCO funding
requirements for FY 2013.
The DoD OCO budget is a bottom-up budget preparation each year, and
it is configured to support current military strategy, to include troop
redeployments, and Commander needs on the ground. At this time, the
Department does not have the information necessary to predict its FY
2014 OCO requirements, but it is reasonable to expect that the
President's announcement of troop withdrawals from Afghanistan will
result in a decrease in OCO requirements for OEF over time. [See page
31.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 23, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. You referred to the region where we are fighting as
the ``epicenter of terrorism in the world,'' noting that this is why
``the focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan is so important.'' Do you
believe the terrorist threat is greater in Afghanistan or in Yemen? To
your understanding, are there more Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan or
in Yemen?
Admiral Mullen. We judge Al Qaeda does not have the capability to
conduct a transnational attack from Afghanistan but continues to
support the insurgency by sending mid-level leaders and operatives into
Afghanistan. Al Qaeda's leadership and transnational capability is
based in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
Pakistan. However, the group is likely attempting to further develop
permissive operating areas in Afghanistan into future safehavens from
which a small Al Qaeda presence could establish limited transnational
attack capabilities. We judge the sustained counterterrorism pressure
in Pakistan against Al Qaeda makes it more difficult for the group to
operate than their counterparts in Yemen. The Pakistan-based Al Qaeda
leadership continues to lead the larger Al Qaeda movement as well as
maintain the capability to conducted less-sophisticated transnational
attacks from the group's safehaven in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas. Counterterrorism pressure in Pakistan has significantly degraded
Al Qaeda's ability to operate--including planning and executing
transnational plots--whereas Al Qaeda's regional affiliate in Yemen, Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), poses a growing transnational
threat. AQAP members, operating under significantly less
counterterrorism pressure in Yemen, are likely more capable of planning
and executing spectacular but smaller scale transnational attacks than
their counterparts based in Pakistan, as demonstrated by AQAP's
directed 2009 Christmas Day bomber and 2010 parcel bomb plot. AQAP has
a larger presence in Yemen than the total number of core Al Qaeda
members in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, a smaller proportion of
AQAP members are focused on supporting transnational attacks;
conversely Al Qaeda senior leaders maintain the intent to orchestrate
transnational attacks from the Afghanistan and Pakistan region.
We expect the conflict in Afghanistan to continue to draw foreign
fighters from around the world, some of whom, through their contact
with terrorist networks in the region, likely will be redirected or
inspired to conduct transnational terrorist attacks. The majority of
these foreign fighters will travel to the FATA to join a larger
interconnected network of terrorists, including members of groups such
as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB), and Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) before
traveling into Afghanistan. We assess these groups are under
significantly less counterterrorism pressure than Al Qaeda. Foreign
fighters with Afghan battlefield experience and exposure to these
groups are likely to participate in transnational terrorist attacks. As
the Western presence in Afghanistan decreases, however, the appeal of
the jihad in Yemen to foreign extremists will likely increase. We are
following a trend of operatives increasingly choosing to join Al
Qaeda's presence in Yemen and we assess western recruits or others can
be diverted to AQAP's transnational operations program.
Mr. Garamendi. Counterterrorism experts suggest that the most
likely terrorist threat may be ``homegrown,'' as we see an increase in
Al Qaeda followers in the United States. Do you think our presence in
Afghanistan decreases the homegrown terrorist threat? Might it
exacerbate that threat?
Admiral Mullen. [The information is for official use only and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Garamendi. Do you believe that maintaining anywhere from
100,000 to 68,000 troops in Afghanistan over the next three years is
the most efficient and/or effective way to address the threat of
international terrorism? If so, why? Are there other strategies that
might be more efficient or effective?
Admiral Mullen. Yes. We have seen significant improvement in
Afghanistan since the President authorized the deployment of surge
forces. These forces have successfully denied Al Qaeda's ability to use
Afghanistan as a base to plan terrorist attacks against the United
States and its allies. Our continued presence in Afghanistan is
critical to maintaining the improvements of the last few years as we
transition to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014. We must maintain
forces at a level that ensures Afghanistan will never again become a
safe haven for international terrorist organizations. As we draw down
our forces, our commitment to the development of the Afghanistan
National Security Forces must be an enduring one. A strong Afghanistan
will be a key element to the ultimate defeat of Al Qaeda and will
foster greater regional stability.
Mr. Garamendi. How much will the Department of Defense spend on the
war in Afghanistan each year between now and 2014 when we withdraw our
troops? (Please provide figures for each year.) Based on best
estimates, how much will this spending contribute to anticipated budget
deficits each year? Do you see the rising deficit as a problem for our
national security?
Admiral Mullen. The President's recent announcement of troop
drawdown from Afghanistan will change the Department's FY 2012 budget
requirements for OEF (OND remains the same), but the exact change will
depend on the Commanders' determination of the pace of the drawdown
and/or adjustment of the forces mix. The Department is in the process
of reformulating its OCO requirements for OEF for FY 2012, and
developing its OCO funding requirements for FY 2013. The DoD OCO budget
is a bottom-up budget preparation each year and it is configured to
support current military strategy and Commander needs. At this time,
the Department does not have the information necessary, e.g., military
operational plans, to estimate its FY 2014 OCO requirements. Given that
the Forces in both OEF and OND are being reduced over time, a reduction
in the OCO request logically follows, and will have a positive impact
on deficit reduction each successive year. I have stated in numerous
forums that I believe the debt is a significant issue to our national
security.
Mr. Garamendi. When I asked about the cost of the projected
strategy, you stated that we are ``looking at coming down 30 or 40
billion a year based on the strategy laid out.'' Based on an unofficial
Congressional Research Service estimate, drawing down to 25,000 troops
by the end of 2012 (as I proposed in the attached amendment I
introduced to the National Defense Authorization Act) would save $35
billion next year. How do you reconcile the difference between your
statement that we would save $30-40 billion a year by drawing down to
68,000 troops in the summer of 2012 and the estimate that we would save
$35 billion a year by drawing down to 25,000 troops by the end of 2012?
Admiral Mullen. The $30-40 billion figure was in reference to the
actual reduction in the OCO request from FY11 to FY12. We reduced the
total OCO budget by $41B from FY11 to FY12. We have not reviewed the
CRS estimate you mentioned and we do not have specific savings
identified for FY12 given that the ISAF Commander is still formulating
the final withdrawal plan for FY12 and the final details will not be
available for several months.
Mr. Garamendi. How many Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)
members do you expect will be sufficient to ensure a stable Afghan
state after U.S. forces withdraw in 2014? To ensure long-term
stability, what average ANSF force levels will need to be maintained
over a 5-year period (from 2014 to 2019)? Over a ten-year period (from
2014 to 2024)?
Admiral Mullen. Long-term planning for the composition of the ANSF
is currently in its initial stages. We are working with our coalition
partners and GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]
to determine the force structure required to ensure that Afghanistan
remains secure and stable. Once complete, the ANSF plan of record will
establish final projected troop levels. The final composition of the
ANSF will be based on security conditions on the ground.
Mr. Garamendi. How much will it cost to maintain these ANSF force
levels over these periods? How will these costs compare to levels of
revenue that the Afghan government is expected to be able to collect
over these same time periods? Who will pay for the remaining costs?
Admiral Mullen. One of the most critical preconditions for Afghans
to maintain stability and security will be capable, professional Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF). The creation of this force allows for
the gradual withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces. It is true that support
for the ANSF will continue to require international assistance for some
years, however as progress is made, the Afghan Government may be able
to reduce the size, and therefore cost, of the ANSF to address a
diminished threat.
FY12 is the largest Afghan Security Force Fund submission to date,
and will complete the majority of initial procurement and
infrastructure development for the ANSF. As this initial stand-up cost
is paid, the future requests should be less. Specific planning has
guided the investment and procurement aimed at systems that can be
maintained and supported by the ANSF and specifically steered away from
high cost, highly complex systems. This will facilitate a lower long
term cost. The level of reduction is currently being developed as part
of the FY13 OCO request. Subsequent assessments will be required each
year to identify the overall future requirements.
Mr. Garamendi. Under Secretary Flournoy noted that ANSF troop
levels will likely be reduced after 2014 because the insurgency will be
degraded. How many ANSF members do you expect will be discharged? Are
there concerns that having this many unemployed trained fighters could
destabilize Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. We do expect to see a reduction in the number of
personnel in the ANSF after we have completed the transition process in
2014. The number of personnel that could be discharged from the ANSF
has not been determined. The long-term plan for the ANSF is currently
being developed. Once completed, the long-term ANSF plan of record will
support the conditions on the ground. Our intent is to insure that
Afghanistan remains secure and stable long after our drawdown is
complete.
There are always concerns about unemployed fighters becoming a
destabilizing factor in Afghanistan. It is important to remember that
we are currently focusing on professionalization programs for the ANSF.
Personnel leaving the ANSF after 2014 will most likely be literate and
possess the required skill sets to become productive members of Afghan
society.
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