[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-46]
EFFICACY OF THE DOD'S 30-YEAR
SHIPBUILDING AND AVIATION PLANS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 1, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MO BROOKS, Alabama ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
TODD YOUNG, Indiana LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
TOM ROONEY, Florida COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
Michele Pearce, Professional Staff Member
Paul Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Famid Sinha, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, June 1, 2011, Efficacy of the DOD's 30-Year
Shipbuilding and Aviation Plans................................ 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, June 1, 2011.......................................... 41
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1, 2011
EFFICACY OF THE DOD'S 30-YEAR SHIPBUILDING AND AVIATION PLANS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations........... 2
Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations................... 1
WITNESSES
Blake, VADM John T. ``Terry,'' USN, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)..... 3
Eaglen, Mackenzie, Research Fellow for National Security Studies,
The Heritage Foundation........................................ 26
Flynn, Lt. Gen. George, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration.................................... 3
Johnston, Maj. Gen. Richard C., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Strategic Plans and Programs, U.S. Air Force................... 5
Labs, Dr. Eric, National Security Division, Congressional Budget
Office......................................................... 24
O'Rourke, Ronald, Defense Policy and Arms Control Section,
Congressional Research Service................................. 22
Stanley, VADM P. Stephen, USN, Principal Deputy Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of
Defense........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Eaglen, Mackenzie............................................ 77
Labs, Dr. Eric............................................... 68
O'Rourke, Ronald............................................. 58
Stanley, VADM P. Stephen, joint with Maj. Gen. Richard C.
Johnston; VADM John T. ``Terry'' Blake; and Lt. Gen. George
Flynn...................................................... 47
Wittman, Hon. Rob............................................ 45
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 95
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Hanabusa................................................. 101
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 99
EFFICACY OF THE DOD'S 30-YEAR SHIPBUILDING AND AVIATION PLANS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 1, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m. in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rob Wittman
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Mr. Wittman. Good morning. I want to call to order the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed
Services Committee. I want to welcome you folks to the hearing
this morning. I appreciate your taking your time to join us. I
think today's efforts will be worth your time and worth all of
our attention.
I want to welcome everybody to the Oversight Investigations
Subcommittee's hearing on the efficacy of DOD's [the Department
of Defense's] shipbuilding and aviation plans. The main purpose
supporting the 30-year shipbuilding and aviation plans
requirement is to ensure effective congressional oversight of
DOD plans by giving Congress the information we need to make
decisions on issues that are not consistently available in the
5-year data of the Future Years Defense Plan better known as
the FYDP.
In my view, we tend to spend too much time arguing about
tactics when we are discussing these plans and not enough time
focused on long-term strategy. We are constantly reacting to
events rather than planning for them, resulting in a system
that is burdened with waste and inefficiency.
We cannot afford to do this any longer. The stakes are too
high, and we owe it to the American taxpayer to insist on well
thought-out, fiscally sound, long-term policy decisions that
shape our national defense strategy, and emphasize long-term
objectives.
It is critical for us to make sure we have that long-term
perspective to understand where we need to go and the best way
to get there. The central question put in simple terms is, are
we doing the best job we can when we develop and implement our
30-year plans to meet or Nation's current and future threats?
To illustrate this point, I want to highlight just a few
examples of what I am talking about. And these are general
examples: The decision not to build submarines in the 1990s,
which has created a shortfall in the attack submarine force
structure that we won't be able to fix in the foreseeable
future; decisions to cut or efforts to kill a number of
programs, including the F-22 fifth-generation fighter, the C-17
cargo aircraft and the Air Force's combat search-and-rescue
helicopter, all of which arguably place American air supremacy
at risk or at least at question; and ending purchases of the
next generation of DDG-1000 destroyers and killing the MPF-A
large-deck aviation ship, reducing our Navy to the smallest it
has been since 1916.
While arguments can be made to support the reasoning behind
these decisions, no on can argue about the number of growing
threats we face from both state and non-state actors, each with
ever expending capabilities, ready to challenge their own.
Between force reductions, a dramatic slowing of new starts
and closures of production lines, America's domestic industrial
strategy is slowly being whittled away, emphasizing the need
for smart long-term strategic planning.
I look forward to hearing your views on this important
subject and discussing how we can ensure that as we make
difficult policy decisions on long-term procurement, we don't
inadvertently place our national security at risk.
Before introducing our witnesses, I want to turn to our
ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for opening remarks.
Mr. Cooper.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your
calling this hearing.
I know that there are a lot of issues involved in the 30-
year shipbuilding plans. I hope that we can keep this hearing
away from personal and the parochial and focus on the strength
of America.
Some issues that I am interested in are industrial agility.
On a recent visit to China, we were able to visit a
shipbuilding yard there in which they said they can build any
super tanker in the world in 6 months, a feat that would be
apparently impossible in this country.
Also developments in technology, things such as
supercavitation, have changed the nature of surface warfare.
And that was a largely unanticipated development in the
science, that has changed things probably beyond ability of any
30-year plan to foresee. So thank you for calling this hearing.
I will look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
As we get started, I would like to ask unanimous consent
that nonsubcommittee members, if any, be allowed to participate
in today's hearing after all subcommittee members have had an
opportunity to ask questions. Is there any objection?
Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be
recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
And we will hear from two panels today, witnesses from our
first panel are Major General Richard Johnston, Deputy Chief of
Strategic Plans and Programs, U.S. Air Force; Vice Admiral P.
Stephen Stanley, Principal Deputy Director of Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense;
Vice Admiral John Terry Blake, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources; and
Lieutenant General George Flynn, Deputy Commandant of Combat
Development and Integration.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today, and we
will begin with General Flynn.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. GEORGE FLYNN, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
General Flynn. Chairman Wittman, Representative Cooper and
members of the subcommittee, it is good to be here with you
today. The Marine Corps' ability to serve as our Nation's
principal crisis response force is due in large part to your
continued strong support. Our Marines thank you very much for
that support.
I am here today to address your questions regarding the
Marine Corps' role in defining the operational needs and
identifying the required enabling capabilities necessary to
support the Nation's expeditionary force and readiness, a force
that must be able today to respond to today's crisis.
The Marine Corps is partnered with the United States Navy
in defining requirements and advocating for the necessary
resources to meet our operational needs. Our goals are to have
stability in amphibious maritime prepositioning and support
base capabilities vessel development, as well as associated
ship funding production and delivery schedules supported in the
program and budgeting process, so we can achieve the fleet
inventory necessary to support our forward presence engagement
and crisis response capability.
Clearly there are challenges in meeting operational
requirements in today's highly dynamic security environment.
Finite resources, ship supply, and maintenance requirements,
and the resulting ship operational availability for
predeployment operations and training can collectively impact
our ability to accomplish our assigned missions.
In partnership with the Navy, the Marine Corps looks
forward to working with you to address these issues so that we
are best postured to continue serving our Nation as its force
in readiness. Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here
and I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Flynn. Admiral Blake.
STATEMENT OF VADM JOHN T. ``TERRY'' BLAKE, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES
(N8)
Admiral Blake. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Cooper and
distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
address the efficacy of the Department of Defense's 30-year
shipbuilding and aviation plans.
The Department of the Navy is committed to building an
affordable ship and aircraft fleet that supports the National
Defense Strategy, the Maritime Strategy and the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review.
The development of the 30-year shipbuilding and aviation
plans enable this effort, providing valuable insight into
future investments and challenges. In addition, these long-
range plans promote stability in the defense industry and
support decisions, making for long-term capital investment and
workforce planning.
The Department of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan is
built around three basic precepts. First, the plan projects
what platforms the Navy will need to accomplish its assigned
missions over the three decades. Second, the plan balances
needs against expected resources and assesses the risk
associated with the Department's balancing efforts. Finally,
the plan aims to maintain the shipbuilding design and
industrial base necessary to build and maintain tomorrow's
Navy.
To accurately support these precepts, the general context
of the plan is spelled out in three distinct 10-year periods.
In the first 10-year period, cost estimates are judged to be
most accurate due to the known ship capability and quantity
requirements. In the second 10-year period, cost estimates for
the force structure are less accurate as the threat becomes
less clear, industrial base issues become more uncertain and
technologies continue to evolve and change requirements.
Finally, in the last 10-year period, cost estimates are the
most notional, since these estimates are largely based on the
recapitalization of today's legacy ships and ships procured at
the beginning of the near term of reporting.
The Navy also provides input to the Department of Defense's
30-year aviation plan. These shipbuilding and aviation plans
provide our best efforts to address a very difficult planning
challenge. The Navy supports the requirement for the submission
of the long-range shipbuilding aviation plans, as they provide
important for Congress, the Department of Defense, and industry
to make critical investment decisions.
Thank you all for all you do to support the United States
Navy and for all you do for the men and women in uniform
serving around the globe.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Admiral Blake. Admiral Stanley.
STATEMENT OF VADM P. STEPHEN STANLEY, USN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION, OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Admiral Stanley. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Cooper
and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you to discuss the Department's 30-year aviation
and shipbuilding plans.
While the Department has always done long-range planning,
we understand that the value of these plans lie more in what we
learn through the planning process than in the content of the
plans themselves. This is especially true for planning beyond 5
years.
The planning process provides a useful opportunity to
consider and confront out-year implications of our near-term
decisions. However, developing this plan requires speculation
about the future security environment, technology, development,
operational concept and fiscal constraints.
The speculative nature of projecting beyond the 5-year
window of the Future Years Defense Plan does not stem from any
process and organizational failures. It is caused by the
inherent uncertainty of the future.
The history of these submissions is relatively short. The
first submission of the shipbuilding plan was in 2000. And the
first aviation plan followed 10 years later in 2010.
The 2011 National Defense Authorization Act changed the
reporting requirement for the shipbuilding plan from an annual
report to a quadrennial report, while the aviation plan
remained an annual report. Plans were not submitted with the
President's fiscal year 2010 budget, due to uncertainty
regarding our defense strategy. During this period, in 2009, a
new national security strategy and associated defense budget
projection were being developed.
This year, the Department submitted the aviation plan on
the 12th of April, the plan was delayed because internal budget
decisions were concluded a month later than usual. Also, this
year there was more debate than last year on out-year aviation
plans. Resolving these issues and coordinating the results
delayed submission of the plan.
Both long-range aviation and shipbuilding plans follow a
similar development process. Individual Services maintain long-
range plans for these weapon systems as part of their Title X
responsibilities.
However, these plans are based on fiscal, operational and
technical assumptions. Once the current year planning and
budgeting process concludes, the Department has considerable
work to do. The Services have to develop and refine their
projections, reconcile these projections with the Selected
Acquisition Report, SAR, data and ensure the estimates adhere
to fiscal constraints.
For the aviation plan CAPE [the Director of Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation] develops the report based on the inputs
from the Services. Navy drafts shipbuilding plans based on the
shipbuilding stakeholders' inputs. CAPE and the Navy develop
tables and charts, refine themes, apply quality control to the
data, and combine inputs to form an integrated view. These
plans are the Department's best efforts to address the
challenge of the developing highly complex projections over a
30-year period.
The development of these plans involves a great deal of
collaborative analysis throughout the Department in order to
work through fiscal technical and operational assumptions.
These plans are not precise procurement blueprints; rather they
represent the Department's forecast of what tomorrow's forces
may look like given today's outlook.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Admiral Stanley. General
Johnston.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RICHARD C. JOHNSTON, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND PROGRAMS, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Johnston. Sure. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member
Cooper and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a
privilege to have this opportunity to discuss the Air Force
contribution to the Department of Defense's 30-year aircraft
procurement plan. The United States Air Force remains committed
to drafting of the aircraft procurement plan and to the
development of necessary aviation platforms that provide the
Joint Force with global vigilance, global reach and global
power. In support of the National Security Strategy, National
Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy and 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review.
The following statement is a brief summary of how the Air
Force's strategic planning process operates to serve the
interest of national defense and how it informs the 30-year
aircraft procurement plan.
The Air Force benefits from a disciplined strategic
planning approach to establish a long-term aviation investment
plan. Specifically, future force structure projections are
developed and refined after each programming milestone. These
force projections align with the aforementioned national
strategy documents. Major milestones include submission of the
Air Force program objective memorandum and the delivery of the
Presidential budget. Informing both planning and programming
efforts is the use of periodic systematic assessments of the
future operating environment.
The United States Air Force performs a strategic
environmental assessment biannually to anticipate potential
implications of critical trends to operations in air, space and
cyberspace domains 20 years into the future. The Future Force
Projection serves as a basis for the annual Service Secretary
approved 20-year planning and programming guidance, the intent
of this process is to shape the future force by linking
programmatic decisions to strategic planning. The sufficiency
of the plans for achieving and maintaining aircraft force-
structured goals are then reported within the annual 30-year
aircraft procurement plan.
The Air Force strategic planning process directs future
force programming through informed strategic planning. Within
the Air Force, the lead organization responsible for the plan
is the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans
and Programs. It is also reviewed by several offices to include
acquisitions, legislative liaisons; intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaisance; the operations plans and requirements; the
studies and analysis assessments and lessons learned; and of
course, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force.
The United States Air Force regularly and systematically
develops and refines its long-term aircraft investment plan.
The Air Force's deliberate process drives the Service to make
fiscally responsible choices that are grounded in strategy.
Furthermore, the Air Force remains committed to the
collaborative approach with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Department of Navy in building a sound 30-year
aircraft procurement plan for the Department of Defense and
Congress that is both useful and timely.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Air Force
contribution to the Department of Defense long-range aviation
plan and your support to the men and women of all the Services.
I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Flynn, Admiral
Blake, Admiral Stanley, and General Johnston can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Johnston. And panel
members, thank you so much for joining us today and for your
thoughtful, insightful opening remarks. And we will proceed now
into questioning.
Admiral Stanley, I will begin with you. The observations
that you made about the process being important, I think is
spot-on. The process I think for developing good information
and for decisionmaking is absolutely critical. And we do know
that these plans are speculative in nature. I think you pointed
that out, and certainly there is some uncertainly with that.
Obviously, the longer we go out in the future, the less
certainty there is. But I think they play a very, very
important role in providing timely information to the House
Armed Services Committee and, in a larger sense, to Members of
the Congress in understanding the challenges that we face as
decisionmakers.
And some of the frustration I think that has been borne in
the House Armed Services Committee is getting that information
in the strategic plans in a timely manner in a way that we can
use it in our decisionmaking. As you know, that frustration has
been compounded over the last several years because of that
lack of coordination in getting information in time for us to
have it reflected in the decisions that we make. And you spoke
of some of the hiccups in this year's process.
Let me ask you, rather than retreading how the process took
place, which I think you did an admirable job of laying out.
Let me ask you this, how do you believe the process can be
changed, fixed to make sure the information that comes out of
the 30-year shipbuilding plan, the 30-year aviation plans,
makes it to the House Armed Services Committee members and the
committee staff itself in a timely way to make sure that we get
it so that those pieces of information, which I think are very
valuable, make their way into the planning process?
Admiral Stanley. It is a good question. How do you improve
it? We often struggle with the complexity of the plans, trying
to do something as complicated as this in projecting it as far
into the future as the current legislation requires. It is a
very complicated task. So I think the simple answer to your
question is let's try to focus on the things that you and we
value and need most. Okay?
Now what would that be? I think it is important--a piece of
this we need to work at together. I think we need to work to
answer--it is not clear to me exactly what you need, maybe,
right? So we have to meet that. We are not--we are--we want to
meet the needs of Congress. So how do we move forward?
My instinct is, again, the near-years provide the most
significant input; the longer your projections become less
important. Having a plan that is tied to the Administration's
current view of strategic risk that is reflected in the
Quadrennial Defense Report seems to make sense to me. Were I to
try to shape it, I would say that a reasonable balance is to
have a plan that is less, maybe less long in duration, maybe I
will suggest 20 years just to throw an idea out. Maybe it is
less duration. It is less frequent. Right? Maybe the QDR
[Quadrennial Defense Review] is enough. But in the annual
submission that is currently required with the shipbuilding
plan, or the 10-year data table, that is where we focus. So we
focus more on the things that you need, which is easier for us
to provide timely information on, than the complexity of things
that are maybe of less value.
So I would propose really three things. I believe the long
report tied to the Quadrennial Defense, and tying to the
Quadrennial Defense Review makes sense. I think limiting the
scope of the report, potentially to 20 years. I will say, it is
not clear to me that the last 10 years does neither you nor I
much good.
And then the last thing I would suggest is potentially that
we look at how do we time it? Think about when this
Administration last changed. The new Administration comes in.
It has to develop a National Security Strategy. It has to
develop its fiscal constraints, how it is going to view the
requirements of the Department. That takes time.
So over the last couple of administrations that changed,
then that budget and the associated Quadrennial Defense Review
has come in later. To try to then get a 30-year plan to reflect
that new direction of new administrations, master security
strategy in QDR, is very difficult. Potentially, the 30-year
plan should be delayed until the next budget. So I would
suggest maybe we work on those types of areas. Again, a
quadrennial, lesser scope and potentially a year delay after
the QDR.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Admiral Stanley. And
that leads me to the next question, when we talk about the
current process in terms of planning, is it normal, even under
the auspices of doing an evaluation leading up to the QDR with
a 30-year shipbuilding or 30-year aviation plan, is it normal
then for there to be an annual evaluation, or is there still an
annual update that leads up to the QDR with this long-range
planning process? And how rigorous is that outside the window
of the FYDP? And I think that alludes to some of the specifics
of what you had talked about regarding reforms.
Admiral Stanley. Yes. We update our proposals every year.
Normally that is focused on the near-years, the FYDP type of
proposals, but things change. You alluded to the idea of who
could have forecasted what is happening in the Middle East
today. Ten years ago, we couldn't have projected the demand for
the unmanned air vehicles that we require today on a day-to-day
basis and saving lives in the theater right now, so things
change. Our plans need to be flexible enough that we can
respond to the needs of the warfighter.
Certainly how you authorize and Congress appropriates also
is a change that we need to consider every year as we come up
with the next year's plan. So, yes, they change. Normally those
changes on a non-QDR year are more near-term than long-term.
Mr. Wittman. Thank, you Admiral Stanley. General Flynn, I
wanted to ask you a question, if you look now at the 30-year
procurement plans, the Marine Corps and the Army aren't
specifically required to go into those areas, but there have
been the questions that come up about where the Marine Corps'
needs might be, especially for both the Marine Corps and the
Army as it relates to rotary-winged aircraft. And I wanted to
get your thoughts and ideas about specifically, do you think
that should be part of this 30-year planning process? And if
so, what specifics do you think should be incorporated into the
aviation plan as it relates to potentially including rotary-
winged aircraft?
The reason I bring that up is more and more discussion is
taking place about the high ops tempo that we are experiencing
now. The high usage of rotary-winged aircraft, especially in
some pretty taxing environmental conditions and then, where do
we go down the road with planning for the replacement of that
fleet. And then how do we make sure we are addressing that in a
timely way, especially as we ramp down. We all know the
questions about reset. If there is nothing out there in the
plan, the question then becomes how do we integrate that in
with all the other needs that are being identified in both the
30-year shipbuilding and 30-year aviation plans?
General Flynn. First of all, in our Department of Aviation,
we have an aviation campaign plan that lays out our way ahead
for all our type model series aircraft to include both fixed-
wing and also rotary-wing. So General Robling, he develops that
plan. So there is a plan to, for example, how we are going to
replace our heavy lift helicopters in the future? As to whether
that needs to be part of a 30-year program, I think in general
it does make sense in some ways just because of the expensive
aircraft in the future. But I would like to give you a more
detailed response for the record if I could.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 95.]
Mr. Wittman. Absolutely, absolutely. And General Johnston,
I wanted to just touch base with you in looking at the
paralleling of the planning processes. As you know, in the 30-
year shipbuilding plan, the Navy projects both ship deliveries
and ship retirements, which keeps that at least within some
frame of number of ships. And I was going ask for your thoughts
about the aviation plan in looking not just at deliveries but
also looking at how retirements would occur. It doesn't seem in
the aviation plan that the retirement schedule is quite as
definitive as far as what we expect with our aircraft.
And I know that we continue to push the life of our
aircraft sometimes to the point of where it really creates
bigger issues for us down the road. It seems like to me maybe
in the planning process if we could look at further defining or
more clearly defining the retirement phase for aircraft and not
kind of pushing air frames to their max, we might be able to be
a little more robust in our decisionmaking. I just want to get
your reflections on the aviation plan and how it reflects
aircraft retirements.
General Johnston. Sir, I think you kind of hit on the
challenge, trying to anticipate when an aircraft will ``time
out'' if you will. Recently our Chief of Staff of the Air Force
approved the extended service life profile on trying to figure
out how long an aircraft will sustain and continue to be part
of our Department of Defense and part of our Air Force. And we
are using that obviously to project out, we are looking at
``SLEPing'' [implementing a Service Life Extension Program],
you know our Block 40, Block 52, F-16s [General Dynamics
Fighting Falcon fighter jets] based on that, but trying to
figure out exactly when those airplanes will time out, knowing
that we are trying to get the best value we can out of them for
the American taxpayer, extend them as far as we can based on
the mission requirements of that platform. And also tying them
into new procurements as they come on board, such as obviously
the F-35 [Lockheed Martin Lightning II fifth-generation fighter
jet]. So trying to bring that all together, we probably have--I
know we have a good handle on that, as far as within the 10-
year period, although those will change. So, year to year, if
you were to ask us to include retirement of platforms, you
would see changes, because as you fly the aircraft, it is based
on total number of hours when you decide to retire them.
I remember landing a 30,000-hour C-130 [Lockheed Hercules
transport aircraft] in Kandahar with NVG [night vision]
goggles, and that was about it, that airplane was going to
leave from there and go to the boneyard. So when do you
anticipate it? It all depends on the operational tempo, if that
airplane is involved in Southwest Asia--we are in the Middle
East. Are you flying it more often? Is it back home doing
steady state operations where it isn't flying as much? It is
very difficult to project that. But I can assure you that the
Air Force projects that, plans for that and anticipates that in
how we develop our aviation plans.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. Thank you, General Johnston.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is a common
phrase: The difficult we do immediately; the impossible takes a
little longer.
I am a little worried that we have asked you gentlemen to
do the impossible. Any 30-year crystal ball is going to be
cloudy. And Lord knows we ask plenty of reports from the
Pentagon already. There hasn't been a Secretary of Defense in
either party that hasn't complained loudly about the paperwork
requirements.
Now if it enables us to do our constitutional oversight
responsibilities, that is one in thing. On the other hand, in
context--and I appreciate Admiral Stanley putting it in context
for us--this is a relatively new and unproven method of
oversight.
Meanwhile, some other obvious features of the Pentagon are
not being tended to: The GAO [Government Accountability Office]
has complained for many years that the Pentagon is the least
auditable of all government agencies, and relatively little
headway has been made to find out where taxpayer dollars go
within the puzzle palace.
So to ask anyone to come up with a 30-year window in the
future is really a recipe for embarrassment, because no one can
anticipate the changes on the horizon. As one of the witnesses
pointed out, just in land warfare alone and the current
conflicts we are engaged in, requirements for MRAPs [Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles] and other things have
changed remarkably quickly.
So, as I said in my opening comments, I am a little more
interested in agility and the ability to respond to future
threats than in locking in programs that may or may not be
useful 10, 20, 30 years hence.
In the worst-case scenario, I am worried that a 30-year
oversight plan like this could just be a new type of pork
preservative as people seek to lock in constituent facilities
that may be popular back home but may not strengthen America.
So I think we have to guard against that danger. It is
always good to have plenty of cushion and reserve, but given
the uncertain nature of warfare and the constantly changing
nature of warfare, a 30-year time horizon, which is longer than
most careers in military itself, is going to be a difficult
task to achieve.
So I appreciate you gentlemen's patience in putting up with
requirements like this. I personally am doubtful of their
usefulness, but I appreciate the good humor in which you try to
comply with the request.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first of all, I
want to thank you and the ranking member for holding this
hearing and want to thank all the witnesses and tell you at the
outset that you are all good men. I know that you have served
your country well, that you love your country. And I am not
going ask you any tough questions today.
And the reason I am not going to ask you those tough
questions is because you can't answer me. And that is what
concerns me the most.
As the ranking member stated, it is sometimes difficult
when we look at 30-year plans because we know we won't hit
them, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't look at them. Because
the importance of the 30-year plan, if we don't graph it out,
we don't know whether our short-term actions are going to get
us down the road or not.
The second thing is it is not just agility that we need to
look at; it is honesty, because the Congress either needs to
play a role in this or we need to get out and just say we don't
have a part in it.
And I think that the thing that concerns us, Admiral
Stanley, you made a good comment when you said that it is not
so much the substance of the plan, but it is what you learn in
that planning process. And yet we, in doing oversight, we have
got to pass a National Defense Authorization bill at some point
in time that authorizes what you are doing. We never get access
to the most important part of the planning process, which is
what you learn during that process.
This is what bothers me, not from the four of you, but when
the Secretary of Defense can come out and he can say, as the
ranking member mentioned, he didn't want to give us all the
information because he is concerned that if he does, he may not
get what he wants. Whether it is parochial reasons or maybe it
is not parochial reasons at all. Maybe it is because some of us
just believe we have got to have a strong Navy to defend the
United States of America, and we want to ask some tough
questions about how to get there.
But when the Secretary of the Navy comes out and issues gag
orders and says the Pentagon can't even answer questions for
us, we question how in the world can we get those core
questions that you say were part of the process.
And the Secretary of the Navy just refuses to give us a
shipbuilding plan when the statute requires it. It may not be
easy. It may not be convenient. But the statute says how to do
it. We question how do we get at that process. When we hear
comments like anything outside of 5 years are just fantasy
worlds in terms of projections, that concerns us.
But then when we see numbers like what we see in the
reports, where we see the shipbuilding plan presented to us,
and let's don't take 30 years out, let's take the short-term,
and we see the projections that are in that shipbuilding plan
for the number of ships we are going to have and the cost of
that. And you have a $15.9 billion per year requirement. The
CBO [Congressional Budget Office] says it would take $19
billion a year to get what you say. That is a huge difference
for us. And how we cross that divide and get those answers, we
really don't know, especially given the fact that for the last
30 years we only had $15 billion put in shipbuilding, and we
know the Secretary said he is going to come up with $400
billion worth of cuts down the road.
So this is what I don't understand, and I don't expect you
to answer me today, maybe some time in the hall, you can answer
me, or maybe some time you can give us the information or maybe
the next panel can do it. But how do we get at a process where
we can get closer to the truth, because it is true that things
change in administration. Let me tell you what doesn't change,
our risks don't change. The number of ships the Chinese have
don't change. The number of ships we are building don't change.
There are some core principles that we ought to get at.
And I will just conclude with this: One of the things that
frightens me the most is whether, like the independent panel
looking at the QDR says, we have gotten a process where we are
just kind of validating what we are already doing, instead of
stepping back and looking at the risk that the Nation is facing
and saying, how are we going to create true plans that get us
there?
Because if we need more ships in our Navy, like the
independent panel said, like the Navy says that we have, we are
just confusing the American people and deceiving them when we
put out a plan that says that we are going have to ramp that up
in the next few years to get where our goals are, but we know
there is no way we are going to get at those dollars. And so,
at some point in time, I hope we can get at this process.
I hope we can get a process where, Admiral, we can get at
the things you learn during that analysis and then putting that
plan together. But also a situation where we can have some
forum with you guys where you are not in a career ender if you
come in here and tell us something that is not a part of that
plan, where we can sit down and say, what do we really need to
defend the United States of America? And I am afraid we are not
there yet, but I thank the chairman and ranking member for
holding hearings like this that maybe will help get us there
because our country is depending on it.
As the ranking member said, the Chinese can build those
tankers in 6 months, but Jim, as you know, it didn't start in
the last couple of years. They have been able to do that for
the last 5 years. They are the kinds of things we need to be
addressing.
And gentlemen, thanks for all you have done in your career,
and if you have any insight on that you can get back to us off
the record some time, we would love to hear it. Mr. Chairman,
thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you for
holding this hearing. Last April I was over in the U.K. with a
briefing with ministry of defense officials there. And although
I share a lot of the ranking member's questions about the value
of some of these reports, it was interesting getting their
perspective because when the new government, conservative
government, came into power, because they don't have any kind
of regular statutory-driven review process--it really is almost
at the whim of the government that happens to be there at the
day in question--they engaged in the context of, obviously, a
huge fiscal crisis of the equivalent of a defense review. And
what they found was that the projected acquisition programs
that they had along with sort of budget projections, there was
probably close to a 20-percent shortfall in terms of whether or
not the British government was going to be capable of funding
those needs. And that drove a lot of the budget design of the
first budget that was passed.
So, obviously, that has value in terms of just sort of
having at some point a planning process where you can sort of
see where you are flying here, as opposed to flying in the
dark. Of course, the irony of it was that one of the reductions
that they proposed was in fixed-wing aircraft and shipbuilding.
And within months, they were engaged in Libya requiring the use
of those very platforms that really were going to be subject to
some of the budget constraints, which shows, again, the ranking
member's point that trying to evaluate risk, even in the matter
of the short-term, let alone the long-term, is just really hard
to do.
I guess maybe coming from Connecticut, where we are the
land of actuaries, where people sit around and project 50-year
storms, 100-year storms, 500-year storms, to some degree, it is
an equivalent sort of challenge. I don't envy you in terms of
doing that.
One question I guess I would ask, Admiral Stanley, is just
in terms of evaluating risk, you know, as you said, it is very
complex, there are a lot of factors that you have to build into
it. One of them is whether or not we will have an industrial
base which will be capable of dealing with sudden change in
challenges that our country faces. Is that one of the
priorities in terms of, again, trying to structure out a plan
either short-term or long-term?
Admiral Stanley. The simple answer is, yes, we do consider
the industrial base. I like your parallel to what the British
review did. And I think a lot of those strategic issues about
what does the Nation need for defense, how do we look at the
risk against our Nation in the future, sorts out and we have
that discussion as part of putting together the National
Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy and
Quadrennial Defense Review.
So that is the place where I think that strategic debate
should be. And whatever shipbuilding or aviation plans that we
have that look forward--and it does look forward into a dimly
lit future--those plans as they come together reflect that risk
in that direction.
In these plans is not where we should be debating, do we
need 400-ship Navy or 300-ship Navy; what is the size of the F-
22 [Lockheed Martin/Boeing Raptor fifth-generation stealth
fighter aircraft] force that is required. That should come out
of the strategic reviews would be my input.
Considering the industrial base and the importance of the
industrial base is a part of these plans. I have established
some sort of strategy for the Nation. I am now implementing
that in the procurement profiles of the ships and aircraft that
the Nation needs. And as part of that, we make sure it is
executable by getting our people from acquisition technology
and logistics, industrial base, to come in and evaluate to make
sure that we can actually sustain that. So, yes, I think it
plays, but I think it plays there. And I think there is a
division between a strategic review and what the Nation needs
for the long-term and the number of platforms that is required
to execute.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
all for being here and thank you to for your service to our
country. I appreciate that. Some of my questions may have
already been asked and answered, so if it is duplicative, I
apologize.
In this time of high government spending and debt, many in
Congress are looking at ways to rein in our out-of-control
spending, and they are starting to look at big-ticket items
from the DOD budget.
Just last week, a colleague of mine introduced an amendment
aimed at cutting $150 million from the LHA-7 [large-deck
amphibious assault ship] program. Cuts like the one suggested
last week strengthen to me the possibility of further delays in
the ship's construction, which I feel like will also push back
other ship construction as well.
Given that so many shipbuilding programs are connected both
financially and in terms of planning, how do you think cuts or
delays in the current shipbuilding plan affect the overall
capabilities of the force in the future and our ability to meet
or force-level requirements?
Admiral Blake. I think you bring up an excellent point. I
think one of the key ingredients, if you will, that we have to
apply when we are going through this process is flexibility.
You bring up the case of delay in a shipbuilding contract.
I will tell you, when we have delays in deliveries of hulls, we
have to then go back in and evaluate, can we accept that risk
or not?
If we determine that we cannot accept that risk, then we
have to look at things to do extensions on the service lives of
other ships in order to be able to fill that COCOM [combatant
command] requirement. So I would tell you that basic approach
would be as you got these perturbations within the industrial
base. I think the Navy has to go back, look at what they have
done and then see if they have to modify their plans.
I will tell you, the Department is very supportive of the
planning process that goes on. We also recognize that this is
an open and collaborative process, and it must be flexible. And
so when an issue like that comes up, the first thing we would
do is, we would sit down and say, all right, what are the risks
involved, where do we need to go, and how do we get there?
Mr. Palazzo. So it does delay our shipbuilding plans for
our force for the future; it just keeps pushing things out to
the right.
Admiral Blake. Well, I think what you have to look at is
you have to look at the tradeoffs. For example, if a ship is
being delayed in its delivery, then you have to determine, all
right, then I am going to have to keep another asset around,
but if I keep that other asset around that was originally going
to go out of service, there is, if you will, a bill to be paid.
You have to keep those personnel available. You have to look at
what maintenance has to be done on that ship in order to extend
its service life. And then you have to factor all of those in,
in order to ascertain, where am I going to take the money from
in order to put it toward this particular issue?
So I would tell you, one of the examples I could give you
is we have a large-deck amphib which is currently going to be
about 16 months behind on schedule. We are going have to extend
one of other large-deck amphibs in order to meet that gap. So
we have to lay the decommissioning from a vessel from 1 year to
another. And the associated costs go with that, because we have
the personnel cost; we have the maintenance cost; we have the
operations cost. It is one of the ways we handle the risk.
Mr. Palazzo. With China's military build-up expected to
continue, particularly that of the Chinese navy, do you feel
that these delays and shortfalls in our own shipbuilding
programs put us at risk?
Admiral Blake. I think you have to look across the entire
portfolio. You can't just look at a single issue in isolation.
You must, if you will, look across the entire shipbuilding plan
and the aviation plan in order to determine where you can
afford to take risk, and then you have to apply it across the
entire portfolio. You can't take a single item, go to a single
data point and come up with a single solution.
If you go down that path, what you end up with is, in
isolation, any single issue is solvable, but when taken across
the entire portfolio, what you have to do then is you have to
balance your risk and recognize you have fiscal limitations.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Palazzo. Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Flynn,
Admiral Blake, and Admiral Stanley, in reading your resumes, I
notice you all graduated the same year from the Naval Academy.
So, given that, and I don't mean to embarrass you, it is
about--what is it--36 years ago, it sort of falls within this
30-year plan that we are talking about. So give me a very
practical approach, and my practical question to the three of
you--and I haven't forgotten you; you kind of don't fit--the
rest of you, we are talking about a 30-year plan. You have been
around 36 years. Would you be able to--of course, you wouldn't
have the positions you have, but given that, you can answer in
terms of what major changes you have seen that you would have
been able to predict and not predict in that 36-year period?
And given that, I am just trying to get a good feel for sort of
what Ranking Member Cooper was saying. How impossible is this?
Would you back then have been able to look forward and predict
where we are today? And what would you say about--we are
looking at shipbuilding, so would you be able to say in that
period of time that we are where we should be in terms of ships
today? And would you have had the magic wand and would you have
been able to do that?
I think it is just interesting that you all graduated the
same year, so there is nobody that can say, well, 10 years ago,
it wouldn't have been the same. So given all your experiences
and your common background, can you answer my question? I don't
care what order you do it.
General Flynn. As the one who had their first choice of
service selection--and for the record, I am the youngest of the
three.
Ms. Hanabusa. I am not asking what rank you graduated,
okay, just----
General Flynn. Ma'am, I think the first part is, I have
been listening today, and I do agree with Admiral Stanley. I
think the key part of this is you have to have a strategic
basis for what your plan is. And there was an Army general who
once said, we are never going to get the future 100-percent
right; but we can't afford to be 100-percent wrong.
So there is a value to doing a long-range plan, as to
whether that is 20 or 30 years, I tend to agree with Admiral
Stanley that 20 years is about right.
But then what you also have to be able to do is when you
build the execution plan to get there in 20 years, you are
searching for consistency and stability. And I think that means
on a yearly basis, then, you need to take a look at what
assumptions you have based your plan on and whether they are
going to play out.
For example, if you have a ship delay in construction, what
does that do to the rest of the plan? And you need to take a
look at that every year. If there is a maintenance issue, are
you right? I think that if you focus on the 5 years of the
program, when we do a defense program, that is really where the
focus is, but that should underpin, I think, a 20-year effort
that is based on some strategic context.
Admiral Blake. Ma'am, for the record, as the best-looking
of the three, as you go back and you look, I think you have
significant events that take place almost on a 10-year basis. I
will give you the best example, no one I think could have
predicted the Vietnam drawdown. We were all midshipmen at the
Naval Academy when that started. No one could have predicted
the Reagan buildup when it started in the 1980s. No one could
have predicted the peace dividend with the Cold War coming to
an end in the 1990s. No one, I think, would have predicted in
2000 that we were only a short time away from an event such as
9/11 and that we would be involved in two wars today.
So I think your point is absolutely accurate in that no one
of us can predict, if you will, what the future will hold. I do
however believe that planning is indispensable. And I think you
have to have a corroborative process that gets you there. You
have to have--and I look at the current shipbuilding plan. I
think if we hadn't had a look at the long range, whether it is
10 years or 20 years, we wouldn't necessarily have focused on
the fact that we have a significant challenge with the SSBN(X)
[next-generation ballistic missile submarine] program. We
wouldn't necessarily see that our surface force combatants, our
cruisers and destroyers, are going to go away in large numbers
in the 20s. We wouldn't necessarily have been able to project
the fact that our submarine numbers are going to go down and
that we have to address that.
You know, one of our goals, which we have accomplished in
recent times, is we are now able to build two submarines a
year, which is no small accomplishment given the fiscal
constraints we operate under. So I would say, as you look
across that, there is significant value in the planning
process. I would go to the point, as I mentioned in my opening
remarks, when you go out to 30 years, that last 10 years is
notional; it is a one-for-one replacement.
If you were to ask me what would I look at, I think we do
need to focus on that 20-year period, because we cannot project
those events like the peace dividend or Reagan buildup or
whatever event it happens to be, so it is important that we
have that. I guarantee you, in 2000, none of us were looking at
the use of the UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] that we
currently have in inventory back in 2000. No one, I don't
think, projected that by 2011, we would have the number of
assets available for the purposes they are now being used. I
definitely agree with you that you have to do that from that
perspective.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. Mr. Chair, can I ask that the
remaining admiral and general respond in writing?
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you so much. We appreciate that. Ms.
Pingree.
Ms. Pingree. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for
allowing me to sit in on your committee. It is an interesting
conversation, and I don't have a lot of questions to ask. I
really was looking forward to hearing a little bit of your
projections out into the future. And I think this is useful,
particularly a useful hearing in some of the challenges that
come up when you try to project 30 years out, which my
colleagues have been discussing. And you all have mentioned
that it is very hard to tell what technology will be available
to us, where we will be at risk. And I applaud you for
attempting to do that.
I will just add, from my perspective, and I do have a
similar parochial lens for this because I do have a shipyard in
my district, so we think a lot about our relationship with
building ships, with what our industrial capacity is, with our
inability sometimes to negotiate contracts. And from our
perspective, the lack of sufficient ships projected out into
the future. So if you want to make any comments on that. I see
from a very short-term lens that we are not meeting the need of
building sufficient ships to power our Navy.
And that I see every day the diminishment of the industrial
base, particularly of an aging workforce. We, of course,
believe that we build the best ships in the world in the State
of Maine. And we worry about what happens when we don't have
future generations that are trained to do that.
As some of my colleagues have mentioned, all you have to do
is take one look at China and think, what are we letting go of
in this country when we may easily find ourselves in the short
run and certainly in the long run facing a much more powerful
Navy without the capacity to deal with it?
So, to a certain extent, I look at it and say, it is good
we are thinking 30 years out, but I am really worried about the
next 10 years. It doesn't seem that we're on track to do what
we need to do in the short term. So if you want to make a
comment on that, that would be useful to me.
Admiral Blake. Ma'am, I will tell you, in our
deliberations, as we are building plans, one of the key
considerations is the fragility of the industrial base, the
fact that the industrial base over the past several years has
shrunk in size and the fact that we recognize that that
database is a national asset and that it is not easily
recoverable.
And so when we put plans together, one of the key factors
is the health of continuing to support the database, and that
is no small issue when we are doing that as we build the plan.
I can tell you when we look at, whether it is your yard up
in Bath or the yards down in the Gulf or it is the yards on the
West Coast or the ones in Virginia, we absolutely look at every
one of those. We also look at, not only the tier-1 yards but
the tier-2 yards, because we recognize that whatever decision
is made, it is going to have an affect on both of those, on the
work at those yards and how we are going to be able to maintain
that industrial base into the future.
Ms. Pingree. Thanks. I would just comment, it doesn't seem
from my perspective, and I know many of my colleagues have
high-performance yards in their district as well, but it
doesn't seem like at this rate we are keeping up with
maintaining the industrial base, training the individuals that
we need in the future, and we are certainly not building ships
fast enough to meet our capacity or our need.
Thanks.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Pingree. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. I will pass.
Mr. Wittman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for your testimony today and your service to our country. My
question, I appreciate the discussion here today about the
challenges we face in the shipbuilding budgets. I wanted to
focus, if I could, on the submarines, which I think I have
worked on for maybe 11 years now on the committee. Now the Navy
projects the attack boats and the shortfalls are going to
bottom out at about 39 boats in 2030 versus a requirement for
having a total of 48 submarines. That is a peak shortfall of
nine attack boats or 19 percent of the requirement.
More to the point, the Navy is going to be at least 10
percent short in attack submarines for an 8-year period of time
in 2027 and remain low through 2055 and to the end of the 30-
year period. Can you tell me, how is the Navy going to be able
to perform its mission adequately with that kind of a
shortfall, particularly the Naval modernization effort and
demands on our attack boats performing missions of various
other types?
Admiral Blake. Sir, let me begin by saying, first of all, I
think one of the key factors that occurred is that we were able
to get to building two boats a year. As you know, there have
been several years where we were only able to build one. So
that was the first start of the process we were able to get to
build a second SSN [attack submarine].
As to the long-term effect and how we are going to deal
with that, I think there are several approaches we need to look
at and consider, and those deliberations will be going on over
a period of time. As you know, we currently have 55 boats in
the inventory. You are absolutely correct. We are going to go
down to a low of 39 boats in the inventory. And I think we are
going to have to look at such things as looking at the current
inventory and seeing, if you will, what the best of breed is
and then seeing if we can do service life extensions on some of
those boats that are currently in the inventory.
Another way we can look at fulfilling COCOM demand is to
look at deployment extensions, if in fact that--and those are
just two options out there.
I think, as I mentioned earlier, I agree, when you look at
any single issue in isolation, I think--and I view it as--or we
are talking about the attack issue right here, I would agree
with you that we should be able to address that in some way.
But then when you have to look across the entire portfolio and
balance all the requirements that we have across the entire
portfolio, that is where it gets to be a real challenge,
because it is not just a submarine issue; there is an
amphibious issue. As I mentioned earlier, there is a surface
combatant issue. So as we look at each one of those, we can't
take each one of those in isolation. We have to delve into each
one of those across the entire portfolio.
Mr. Langevin. How does the shortfall--clearly, the
requirement says we need to have 48 boats, and I know that we
are only meeting about 60 percent of the request of the
combatant commanders right now with respect to the mission
submarines to fulfill. How does that compromise us? How do we
close that gap?
Admiral Blake. Well, that one is not in my lane, per se,
but I would tell you in general what you have is you have the
combatant commanders and the fleet commanders get together, and
if you will, they do a risk assessment to see what they have in
their inventories, and then they fill their global requirements
based on what they have in the inventory. And you can't address
the issue overnight. But I think for any deeper than that, sir,
I would have to take it for the record.
Mr. Langevin. Well, let me try a different but related
question.
Admiral, I understand that the Navy is trying to find a way
to put an additional attack boat into the shipbuilding plan for
fiscal year 2018 column to bring the fiscal year 2018 figure to
two boats, and that is fine. But it is only one additional
ship. You are still going to need to put another five to six
boats into the plan to avoid dropping below the 90 percent, 95
percent of your requirement. If the Navy isn't planning to
refuel older boats, attack boats, and it is not planning to put
an additional six or seven new attack boats into the
shipbuilding plan, then can you please tell me what the Navy
does plan to do to substantially mitigate the projected
shortfalls in attack submarines?
Admiral Blake. Thank you, sir. First, you are absolutely
correct. In the current mix, there is a single boat to be
delivered in 2018. That will be at the earliest a POM-14
[Program Objective Memorandum for Fiscal Year 2014] issue
because that would be at the end of the FYDP. And I am sure
there will be significant deliberations between now and then
just to address that single issue.
With respect to how we would address the overall shortfall
as you go to the out-years, I would go back to, I think we are
going to have to look at the viability of looking at service
life extensions if in fact that is viable whether, and then we
will have to determine if it is, or if we have to go to
deployment extensions.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Vice Admiral
Stanley, it seems like we've become fixated rightfully, so, on
the number of ships in the United States Navy. And so, I think
the current projection is we are trying to get to a 313-ship
Navy. But I think my concern is, in getting there, are we, and
focusing on the number, are we too focused on building the
least costly ships versus the more capital, the larger capital
ships. So we seem to be focused on the littoral combat ship and
the joint high-speed vessel in terms of getting those numbers.
But my concern is that there doesn't seem to be the focus on
the next-generation ballistic missile submarine. And I wonder
if you can comment on that from a long-term budget point of
view.
Admiral Stanley. So, first, on the SSBN(X), it is funded.
It is being developed in consonance with our British
counterparts. We are doing what we need to do to deliver that
capability now. It remains funded. I don't think that the
requirements at all are in jeopardy. But your larger question
is the number of ships. Is that an appropriate focus? Quantity
has a capability importance all its own. So it is important.
But to say that 313 is precisely the right number is, I think,
shortsighted. The number of ships varies.
In this plan, this 30-year plan, it varies significantly
from the 280 some that we are at today. I think it pegs out
around 225 or 325, something in that ball park, comes back
down. So you have got a bunch of sine curves in this plan that
all gets added up, and you know, we say that the requirement is
about 300, is what the Department said. You quoted the CNO
[Chief of Naval Operations], who says that 313, you know, is
his floor. It is important. I don't want to take away from
that. But I also recognize that it is not a single point. It is
not, a precise number is not always right, okay? So it is much
more important to get at what capability that force has. The
way Secretary Gates thinks about it is we have got to focus on
the flexibility of our force, make sure that we have a force
available that is adaptable to this future, which is hard to
foresee. We want to make sure that the ships that we are
buying--use LCS [littoral combat ship] as the example, quite
honestly, it is basically a new concept. That mission module
and the ability to change that mission module will allow the
Navy to send the right capability forward that they need. So
that is important. And having that in some quantities I think
makes some sense. How many of the more expensive types of ships
do we need? It gets at sort of what we are talking about over
here, where, what is China going to do? And what kind of
capabilities do we need to provide the right opposing force to
the Chinese capabilities?
And that is a discussion that we have. I think the plan
that we have right now is a good balance of capability and
capacity that the Nation needs.
Mr. Coffman. Anybody can answer this, probably certainly
General Flynn. The needs of the United States Marine Corps in
terms of the amphibious capability and shipping, I think it is
a minimum, I understand there are 33 ships in order to deploy
two marine expeditionary brigades, and I think the commandant
and the prior commandant have stated that that is a minimum,
that they need that as a--force projection capability is a
minimum. General Flynn, I wonder if you can comment on that and
where we are in this whole process of reaching. Are we at 28
right now and reaching the 33?
General Flynn. Sir, first of all, it is not just the two
brigade requirement. And it is not just focusing on the large
threat. It is how many ships do you need to do what we are
actually doing today around the world, and we believe that the
requirement was 38. Accept risk down to 33 because of fiscal
reality, and you can do both. You can do your two brigade
requirement and you can meet the demands that we are seeing
today. Right now, we have an inventory of about 30 amphibious
ships. We will go to 29 this year. So you have assumed
additional risk, not only in your larger requirement but also
in your day-to-day operations. And where you see that manifest
itself is not meeting the deployment because we always figure
out a way how to meet the deployment and the commitment.
Where you see it is in the ability to do maintenance and
the ability to train the force. This summer, we are likely to
deploy a marine expeditionary unit and amphibious ready group
that for the first time that all three ships will be together
is when they deploy. And that just shows you that that is when
you accept risk in the inventory. It is not just the large
enemy out there or potential enemy; it is also the day-to-day
demands on the thing where you see the stressing and
manifestation comes first in maintenance and in training at the
same time.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Coffman. Panel members, thank
you so much for joining us today. We appreciate your insights.
I would ask this.
Ms. Hanabusa had a request for some written responses. If
you will provide that to her.
And if you will do this as a formal request from the
committee, and that is, we would like to have your written
reflections on what we can do to improve the planning process.
And I know that you all had stated some of your thoughts today,
but we want to make sure that we give you the opportunity to
give us a more detailed list of things that you think can be
done to improve this particular planning process. And again,
with the focus of making sure that we get as highly robust
information as possible in a timely manner back to the House
Armed Services Committee. And we appreciate your reflections
and thoughts on that and thank you so much for joining us
today.
We are going to break for about 3 minutes and let the next
panel be seated, and then we will begin questioning them.
We will now begin with our next group of panelists, and
they include Mr. Ron O'Rourke, Defense Policy and Arms Control
Section, Congressional Research Service; Mr. Eric Labs, from
the National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office;
and Ms. Mackenzie Eaglen, Research Fellow for the National
Security Studies, the Heritage Foundation.
I want to thank you all so much for joining us today and
appreciate you taking the time to provide your insights on
this, what I believe is a critical planning process, in
understanding what we can do to push the issue forward. And I
want to welcome all of you and again, thank you for your
participation.
As we previously arranged, opening statements will be
limited to 5 minutes due to time constraints. I am going to
allow one exception, and that is Mr. O'Rourke. He has asked to
provide some additional comments, so we will allow that
particular time.
Additionally, written testimony, absent objection, will be
made part of the record, and we look forward to hearing from
all of you in discussing the oversight issues we have been
concerned about here in Congress. And I also remind my
colleagues that we will use our customary 5-minute rule today
for questioning, proceeding by seniority and arrival time.
So, with that, we will begin our testimony with Mr.
O'Rourke.
STATEMENT OF RONALD O'ROURKE, DEFENSE POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL
SECTION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. O'Rourke. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Cooper,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks for the
chance to speak today on the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
The main purpose of the 30-year plan is to support
effective congressional oversight of Navy shipbuilding by
giving Congress information that is important to performing
this oversight function but not available in the 5-year data of
the FYDP. The plan enables Congress to assess whether the Navy
intends to procure enough ships to achieve and maintain its
stated force level goals.
In particular, it makes visible to Congress projected ship
inventory shortfalls that are either not visible or not fully
visible in the 5-year data of the FYDP. Given the long
construction time of ships, as well as financial and
industrial-based limits on ship procurement rates, mitigating
shortfalls that appear to be far in the future can sometimes
involve making adjustments to ship procurement rates beginning
in the near term within the FYDP.
The Navy's addition of a second DDG-51 [Arleigh Burke-class
guided missile destroyer] to the fiscal year 2014 column can be
viewed as a possible case in point. By providing Congress
advance warning of projected inventory shortfalls, the 30-year
plan gives Congress an opportunity to consider whether to
address these shortfalls before it might become too late to do
much about them.
The value of the 30-year plan might be likened to the value
of headlights for a truck driver traveling on a country road at
night. The driver can't make abrupt changes in the truck's
speed and direction, and consequently gets a critical benefit
from the advanced warning the headlights provide of approaching
curves or obstructions in the road.
The 30-year plan can help Congress assess whether there is
a fundamental imbalance between Navy program goals and
resources, whether ship procurement plans are likely to be
affordable within future Defense budgets, whether Navy planning
is reasonable in terms of assumed service lines for existing
ships and estimated procurement costs for new ships, and what
the potential industrial and base implications of the Navy's
intentions for ship procurement might be, as well as whether
the Navy's planning is reasonable in terms of assumed service
lives for existing ships and, as I said, estimated procurement
costs for new ships.
Right now, the 30-year plan is helping inform Congress on
how addressing the projected shortfalls in cruisers and
destroyers and in attack submarines might need to take into
account the funding demands of the Ohio replacement program.
For example, Congress might decide that it would be easier to
put additional destroyers and attack submarines into the
shipbuilding plan before procurement of Ohio replacement boats
begins, meaning between now and fiscal year 2019.
I understand there are uncertainties associated with
assembling the last 10 years of a 30-year plan. But the Navy
isn't exactly helpless in this regard. For one thing, the Navy
can project which ships are scheduled for retirement in those
years. And since the average life of a ship looking across the
fleet is about 35 years, those last 10 years will capture most
of the retirements that aren't projected for the first 10 or
20. Seeing the retirements projected for those final 10 years
can help Congress assess whether those retirement dates are
consistent with real world ship operating tempos and
maintenance practices.
Even though there will be ships in the strategic
environment between now and the final 10 years of the plan,
Navy planners can nevertheless project that the Navy will
likely need to have certain capabilities associated with the
broad and enduring roles of the Navy. Indeed, one of the
strengths of our multimission Naval forces is that, although
they are designed and built in a certain strategic environment
with certain specifics missions in mind, they usually wind up
being used many years later very successfully in different
strategic environments for different missions. The Navy's
aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers and attack
submarines are all cases in point.
Although there are uncertainties concerning the last 10
years of the 30-year plan, that doesn't mean those last 10
years aren't of value for Congress to see. They can help show,
for example, whether a projected shortfall is temporary in
nature or more open-ended and long-lasting. That is important
because mitigating a temporary shortfall might only require
SLEPing some existing ships, while mitigating a more open-ended
shortfall, like the cruiser destroyer shortfall, might need to
involve putting additional ships into the shipbuilding plan.
The last 10 years of the 30-year plan provide Congress with
a baseline against which to examine the possible implications
of potential longer-term changes in technology, budgets, or the
strategic environment. The final 10 years currently show that
the Navy has not yet identified a strategy for fully closing
the cruiser destroyer and attack submarine shortfalls, even
after procurement of the Ohio replacements boats is finished.
That is potentially important for Congress to see because
it can inform congressional consideration of options for
procuring additional destroyers and attack submarines between
now and then, or for funding research and development work on
new ship technologies or new shipbuilding methods that might
alter the shipbuilding affordability equation for those final
10 years.
In summary, the Navy is a long-run proposition because of
the timelines involved, building, maintaining, reshaping and
ultimately replacing a fleet isn't done over a period of 10 or
20 years but over a period of 30 years or more. The 30-year
shipbuilding plan responds to this fundamental aspect of the
responsibility for providing and maintaining a Navy.
As the CRS [Congressional Research Service] Specialist for
Naval Affairs, a key part of my job is to support congressional
oversight of DOD activities by identifying potential oversight
issues for Congress relating to the Navy, and except for the
annual DOD budget submission itself, no document is more useful
to me in performing this role for Congress than the 30-year
shipbuilding plan.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Thank you again
for the chance to speak on this issue, and I will be pleased to
respond to any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Rourke can be found in the
Appendix on page 58.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke.
Dr. Labs.
STATEMENT OF DR. ERIC LABS, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
Dr. Labs. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, members of
the subcommittee, I want to thank you for giving me the
opportunity to discuss with you the value of the Department of
Defense's annual 30-year shipbuilding and aviation plan for the
Congress' oversight responsibility.
Every year Congress is asked to approve the procurement of
a year's worth of expensive items, such as ships and aircraft.
Well-constructed 30-year acquisition plans for major weapons
system can provide information about the long-term implications
of those decisions.
The 30-year ship and aircraft plans benefit Congressional
oversight in at least three different ways: First, DOD's 30-
year shipbuilding and aviation plans enable the Congress to
assess the long-term effects of the incremental decisions that
are made each year in the annual authorization and
appropriation process. Ships and aircraft take decades to
develop and procure, and often remain in the inventory for
decades more. In the absence of a 30-year plan, the cumulative
effects of those annual decisions may not be well understood.
With the previous panel, you discussed the issue of the
submarines in the 1990s versus the effect of having a long-term
shortfall. That would be an example I would cite here as well.
Second, the 30-year plans may reveal whether an imbalance
exists between the inventory goals for ships or aircraft and
the resources the military Services are projected to receive.
If such an imbalance was indicated, the Congress might want to
more closely review the defense strategy that was the basis for
the DOD's inventory goals, the amount of money the Department
would receive, or how those resources would be spent. For
example, the Navy's 2011 shipbuilding plan revealed
definitively that the Service would face a substantial
budgetary challenge in the 2020s and the early 2030s when it
expects to purchase 12 replacements for the Ohio-class SSBNs
and still pay for other ship programs. That in turn over the
past year has led the Congress and the Navy to focus more early
attention on reducing the costs of those ships.
Indeed, the very process of the Navy's efforts to put out
its 30-year shipbuilding plans over the past 5 years showed
many year-to-year changes. Those individual changes were not so
important in themselves but as a whole, greatly illuminated for
Congress the Navy's challenge of developing a program that
meets inventory goals and is affordable.
I agree with Mr. O'Rourke. In fact, aside from the budget
and accompanying justification materials, the Navy's 30-year
ship procurement plan is the most important document I use in
the work I perform in support of the Congress.
Third, the 30-year plans also provide Congress with
information about the relationship between DOD's long-term
inventory objectives and its assumptions about service lives of
ships and aircraft. The 30-year plans make those assumptions
more transparent so that Congress has the opportunity to
examine the realism of those assumptions and to judge whether
it is investing enough resources to maintain the fleet.
For example, the Navy's plan assumes 40 years for new
destroyers, but the Navy has virtually no experience in keeping
surface combatants longer than 30 years. There is, of course,
as was mentioned earlier, considerable uncertainty in any 30-
year ship or aircraft procurement plan. The Navy's 2011 plan
highlighted some of the difficulties in both developing such a
plan and in estimating its costs, particularly for ships to be
purchased in the 2030s.
Although such uncertainties limit the utility of 30-year
plans as predictive tools, the documents can nevertheless help
inform the Congress of changes in plans and circumstances that
are likely to arise. For example, the Congress is frequently
faced with events and decisions about military aircraft
inventories and acquisition budgets that have long-term
implications. Recent events include the structural failure of
an F-15 Eagle that could have portended the need to retire
those fighters many years earlier than expected, delays in the
development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter that will probably
compel the Services to retain older aircraft longer than
planned, and the decision to begin developing a new long-range
bomber that will require substantial funding in the years well
beyond DOD's FYDP.
In much the same way, the CBO's budget baseline provides a
reference trajectory for Federal spending under current law, a
well documented 30-year aviation or shipbuilding plan can
provide a picture of how forces may evolve over time and what
investments will be needed if current plans and assumptions
remain unchanged. The value of that picture lies not in its
accuracy as a blueprint of the future, but serves as a basis
for Congress to evaluate the long-term implications of changes
to today's plans and circumstances.
The Congress' oversight of Navy shipbuilding programs could
be improved if the Navy included in its report the accompanying
tables, listing by class and types of ship that would be
procured, delivered, retired and serving in the fleet each year
over the 30-year period. Similarly, long-term aircraft
acquisition plans would be more informative if they displayed
respective inventories of each type of aircraft over the span
covered to include the schedule over which consisting aircraft
are phased in and phased out as well as the underlying
assumptions.
Although DOD has not produced 30-year plans for ground
combat vehicles, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft and trucks,
such plans would be useful for oversight of the Army's and
Marine Corps' acquisition plans, particularly if they provided
information about the size and age of current inventory,
inventory goals and plans to replace or modernize vehicle and
aircraft fleets, and the projected cost of doing so. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to answer any questions that
you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Labs can be found in the
Appendix on page 68.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Dr. Labs.
Mrs. Eaglen.
STATEMENT OF MACKENZIE EAGLEN, RESEARCH FELLOW FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Ms. Eaglen. Thank you, Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member
Cooper. It is a pleasure to be here. It is also good to see
Chairman Forbes as well earlier.
I agree with my colleagues that the purpose of the 30-year
plans is critical, not as a document to predict the future with
precision; it is really about forcing an examination on the
back-end to offer clarity on the front-end. And I know that the
DOD witnesses testified to the clarity within the FYDP, but it
is the 5- to the 20-year period that I think that really
matters. And I don't think you can get that 20-year clarity
unless you go even slightly beyond that into the 30-year.
Ron highlighted a point I would like to make. Identifying
broad trends and shortfalls is really where the pressure points
are in terms of fleet size and composition. Cost goals and
planning shortfalls is really where the utility of these plans
come in for Congress. So, for example, Admiral Blake referenced
the SSBN(X) as something, and Eric just did as well, as a
program and a pressure point in terms of budgetary resources
available and a potential plan resource mismatch, something
that Congress needs to begin to start working on right now with
the Department to help alleviate that strain, coming up with
creative solutions.
The two aviation plans that have been submitted so far to
Congress have highlighted the exact same thing for the U.S. Air
Force and this ``bow wave'' of spending that is going to be
required, beginning right in 2020 and throughout that decade,
as the Joint Strike Fighter enters full-rate production at 70
to 80 per year, as well as the tanker, which will be fully on
line, and then, of course, the bomber will be just entering or
hopefully near full-rate production. This is in addition to all
of the other things the Air Force will be doing during that
decade. And so that is the equivalent to me of the SSBN(X) and
the elephant in the room in terms of budgetary resources in
terms of aviation. And that being just roughly 7 fiscal years
from now; 2020 sounds far away, but the building is already
working on POM 13, and you can see how quickly this arrives.
Something my colleagues have referenced and I agree with is
that this, and the previous panel said, the process was
important. It may not necessarily be what is on the document,
but the learning curving of the process. Part of what I believe
this means is culling and highlighting the various assumptions.
In fact, the witnesses previously said, those may often change.
And they change annually, if not more so. And when assumptions
change, what we found is build rates and new procurement and
the service life extension and retirement plans of ships and
aircraft are not mutually exclusive. Tinkering with one, even
if it is a brand new program ripples through the entire fleet,
the legacy fleet and the new one coming on line.
So, for example, the previous panel said that retirement of
ships and aircraft changes vary, based on war-time usage rates,
base on op tempo and a variety of other things. That then
affects the service life extension needs of other programs, but
you can't look at service life extension needs without looking
at the new procurement and build schedules of what is coming on
line. But that is also linked to the maintenance plans or
delays of everything. So you see that we have a circular
argument here.
So I don't want to just talk about the value of the plans.
I actually want to offer some new ideas and solutions to you as
well, particularly as the DOD faces the deficit reduction
efforts. The Navy, for example, has correctly concluded the
U.S. needs a larger fleet, not just ships and aircraft but
network capability, longer-range and increased persistence. We
are losing our monopolies on guided weapons and the ability to
project power.
Precision munitions and battle networks are proliferating,
while advances in radar and electro-optical technology are
increasingly rendering stealth ineffective. I think Congress
should look at the possibility of a long-range technology road
map, which would include a science and technology plan and an
R&D, a research and development, plan for the Department of the
Navy and the Air Force. This would call for greater clarity to
the need for next-generation surface combatant for the Navy, a
new air superiority fighter jet for the Navy and the Air Force,
and what low observable capabilities beyond stealth may be
required.
This would also highlight some of the things Ms. Pingree
talked about as well in the need in the technology space for
more capable anti-ship, land attack and air-to-air missiles,
next-generation rotary-winged aircraft, satellite
recapitalization, directed energy and electromagnetic weapons,
nanotechnology, solid state and fiber lasers, and biotechnology
as well.
This road map would look at what our global allies and
partners are doing and the potential emergence of new players.
It would also consider capabilities and domains, including
undersea, cyber and space.
And lastly, I would conclude with something that I would
like Dr. Labs to weigh in on. Congress may want to consider
universal cost estimates among the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Department of the Navy, and the Congressional
Budget Office, to use a set of consistent costs and methods to
reduce the wide variances among new shipbuilding plans, the
defense budgets, the CBO estimates and external analyses. Thank
you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Eaglen can be found in the
Appendix on page 77.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mrs. Eaglen. We will now begin with
our round of questions. I understand we might have some votes
coming up, so we will try to integrate our questioning amongst
the vote schedules.
Mr. O'Rourke and Dr. Labs, I appreciate your insight into
the process, and you both indicated how valuable this document
is to you in decisionmaking and the efforts that you have to
put forward. Let me ask this: You had heard in the previous
testimony about some suggestions about the length of the entire
scope of the planning process, 20 years versus 30 years. I want
to get your perspective, a little more specificity on your
perspective on 20 versus 30 years and what that 10-year period
of time creates as far as value in the planning process.
And then give me a perspective, too, on the current regime,
which is, we are providing a 30-year aviation and shipbuilding
plan in relation to the QDR, which is on a 3-year cycle, versus
the proposal, which is to go to a 1-year cycle. Can you--I want
you to speak a little bit to the utility of doing an update on
an annual basis versus in concert with the QDR, and then 20
years versus 30 years as far as the scope of the plan. Mr.
O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. In terms of 20 versus 30, I think it is very
important to note that the two major shortfalls that I have
highlighted in my testimony, the one for cruisers, destroyers
and the one for attack submarines, the majority of the years of
those shortfalls are revealed in the final 10 years of the 30-
year plan. If you didn't see those final 10 years, you might
assume that those shortfalls might be closed up on their own
over time through natural build rates. It is only because we
saw the final 10 years in that 30-year plan that we see that in
fact those shortfalls are open-ended.
And as I mentioned in my opening statement, that can have a
big difference in terms of the kinds of options you might want
to entertain for how to address those shortfalls. If you
thought this was just going to be a dip that was going to close
up on its own accord over the long run, you might then simply
look at SLEPing some of your existing ships to fill in that
valley. But if you see that it is more of an open-ended
shortfall, then you might want to give more consideration to
actually putting extra ships into the shipbuilding budgets.
That is the signal you get from seeing the final 10 years of
the 30-year plan. You wouldn't get that signal if the final 10
years weren't there.
And because the middle years of that 30-year plan have the
Ohio replacement program in it, that might give rise to
consideration for putting any extra ships in the shipbuilding
plan into the first 10 years of the 30-year plan, the period we
are looking at right now. That is how the significance of the
final 10 years can actually reverberate into the present time.
Moreover, as I mentioned in my opening statement, those
final 10 years show you the projected retirement dates of the
ships whose projected retirement dates do not show in the first
10 or 20 years, and because the average life of a Navy ship,
when you look across all the classes on a weighted basis, is
about 35 years, it completes your understanding of the
assumptions that the Navy is making about expected service
lives for its ships because the vast majority of those expected
retirements will now be within that 30-year period. They would
not be in there on an only 20-year basis.
In terms of once every 4 years versus once a year, if you
do it once every 4 years, but then the FYDP comes up every year
and puts differences into that, you then have to start running
two sets of books on the issue. And, in fact, I was in that
situation earlier this year before the Navy submitted their new
30-year shipbuilding plan, which they did in late May. Prior to
that, I had to try and reconcile the FYDP data from this year's
budget with the 30-year plan from a year ago, and there were
differences between the two, and I had to start running two
sets of tables to present every situation, which were loaded
with a lot of footnotes to explain the discrepancies. And my
sense was that this made the situation a lot harder for Members
and staff to understand.
And so, when you get a situation where you submit a 30-year
plan once every 4 years, but the FYDPs nevertheless change
every year, you run into this complication that I think makes
it harder for people to understand what they are looking at,
and that can hinder effective oversight.
Dr. Labs. Mr. Chairman, I can't really improve upon what
Mr. O'Rourke just said, and I would echo each of his points
identically. I would add just a couple of things to that.
One is that you see, his first point about sort of the
importance of it, you see the shortfalls are unveiled in the
last 10 years of the plan. If you could actually compare the
shipbuilding plans, as I sort of do on a routine basis as a
part of the oversight work that I do, the original 313-ship
plan that the Navy put out back in the fiscal year 2007 plan,
around the 2006 time period, showed at that time at the end of
the planning period a 15-ship shortfall in large surface
combatants. You might think that that might have been all it
was. But as the planning period got extended even under that
plan, that shortfall was going to grow to 20-plus ships as
well, and we are still seeing the same thing today. So the
value of that long-term perspective, whether the Congress
chooses to take that information and act upon it or not seems
to me is highly valuable.
I would also add in terms of there was some discussion in
the previous panel about sort of the difficulties and
complexities of projecting out that last 10-year period. And I
guess I would disagree that I don't think it actually is all
that difficult or all that complex to do, depending on what the
Department is trying to achieve with that 10-year window. If
you are trying to simply give a picture of that 10-year window
as to what are the numbers of ships that might be required
based on current requirements and assumptions, then it is
really not hard to put the ships you need into the plan and
come up with a notional cost based on historical cost
relationships and give that information, give that information
to the Congress. And if, as the some members of the previous
panel stated, that not much changes in that 10-year window,
then it is really not that difficult then to produce a bill on
an annual basis.
If, on the other hand, as was also indicated in discussion
of the service lives issue, if op tempo is changing the service
lives of ships or aircraft on a year-to-year basis because we
are using them a lot and therefore maybe they don't serve in
the fleet as long as we would have expected, we very much would
want to see on a year-to-year basis how those changes, how that
op tempo is affecting the long-term projections of the fleet.
Mr. O'Rourke. Just one additional point to add to that on
the 4-year versus the 1-year issue. If you run into--if you run
a process where you submit the 30-year plan once every 4 years
and that 30-year plan reveals shortfalls or other issues that
someone might find inconvenient in the executive branch, then
that would give them the opportunity when that 30-year plan
becomes 1 year old or 2 years old or 3 years old to begin to
discount the importance of those oversight issues for Congress
on the grounds that they are based on a plan that might no
longer be accurate. And I don't know if Eric wants to add
anything to that.
Dr. Labs. We have actually had that experience in various
meetings and briefings over the last 5 years, where certain
plans would be out of date of certain types, and they would
say, well, that is old, and things have changed since then. But
they were not then willing to offer up well what exactly has
changed that we would have to wait until whenever the next
budget submission would be.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Mrs. Eaglen, I want to the pursue a line
of questioning with a comment that you made concerning a peak
in Air Force resource needs, especially when we have a tanker
program coming to maturation, the F-35 program coming to
maturation at the same time we have the strategic bomber
program that reaches its height, and the costs that are
reflected in that. Do you believe that under the current
planning process, that that difficulty is accurately reflected?
And again, I want to look at, are we really able to properly
project that to make sure that at that time, we are now aware
of the stresses that that will put on resources in a fairly
challenging time of resources? I want you to comment on that.
And then I think you also brought up an interesting
perspective on one element of this strategic planning process
that does seem to be lacking, and that is, on the Army side of
things, with rotary-winged aircraft and other assets there that
should be part of a planning process that we put in place that
is similar for ships and other aircraft, that element of the
planning process does seem to be lacking, so I want to get your
perspective on the scope of what we may want to consider as far
as the Army's involvement in the process, what they ought to
possibly bring to the table as far as planning to make sure
that we have a proper representation in evaluation of what the
needs are from top to bottom within DOD.
Ms. Eaglen. Absolutely. Thank you. Regarding, you know, do
we have a good sense of this bow wave, this pressure,
particularly on Air Force aviation plans in the early 2020s, I
would argue, no. And the plan lacks the detail that Dr. Labs
just identified that is required. But at least it gives you an
avenue to ask these questions. You would not be able to ask
them without this.
So, for example, the fiscal year 2011 aviation plan and
then you compare it with the 2012, the year-over-year
assumptions changed pretty dramatically in terms of available
resources to the Department of Defense. Basically, the 2011
plan called for a 3-percent real growth in aviation funding as
if there was an aviation pot of money, but similar to the SCN
[Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy] account. And the 2012 plan
just 1 year later suggests zero real growth after 2017 and
didn't even address the years between now and then. Not sure
where specifically that came from, if this was just a
prediction by the Secretary made 1 year or not or President
Obama's deficit reduction goals. But these are important
because what the plan said year over year, it reduced plan
spending from $268 billion to $259 billion in just this 1-year
change. And it is unclear where that was effected in the plan.
But if you look at the total fleet size of the aviation force,
while the number stayed relatively healthy, even though the
costs had decreased--available--the assumption of the costs of
the resources available, it was at the high-end where we are
seeing those shortfalls that manifest themselves, so the
unmanned systems, for example, stayed very healthy in terms of
numbers available under the new cost assessment, but the
fighter attack fleet, the strategic lift and bomber aircraft
all fell year over year. And I believe that is a direct result
of reduced money available to the Department, but they don't
make that connection. This is something that Members are
certainly interested in.
I do believe that, in going to Mr. Cooper's point earlier,
I don't think that these plans need to have every single piece
of data in them. And we could certainly get into trainer
aircraft, for example, and other types of unmanned systems that
are already alone pretty significant. But I think rotary-winged
in particular is important because of a couple of reasons. We
know that the multiple Services need to develop a next-
generation rotary-winged aircraft or whatever it is, an attack
helicopter or something else. And those plans are actually, if
the Department had been serious about this, should have begun
about 5 years ago. So that the R&D would be coming online just
about now. Heavy lift aircraft and rotary-winged are something
the last panel brought up as well, and I believe that is true
in particular for the Navy. Their MH-53E Dragon helicopters are
the only heavy lift planes that they have in the fleet, and
they are not going to last forever. And there is no discussion
or at least clarity in terms of the R&D planning that is
required today. If we want to put this in the fleet by 2019, we
are looking at basically 2013, next year's budget, or 2014 at
the latest to do that.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Ms. Eaglen. Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All the witnesses on
this panel seem to like the requirement that the Pentagon do
the 30-year shipbuilding report. In fact, for some of you, it
is your favorite report it seems like. Two of you work for a
government agency. Does either the Library of Congress or CBO
have a 30-year plan?
Mr. O'Rourke. I am not aware that the Library of Congress
has a 30-year plan, no.
Dr. Labs. No, Mr. Cooper, I am not aware that CBO has a 30-
year plan.
Mr. Cooper. Have either of you advocated for a 30-year plan
for your agency?
Mr. O'Rourke. It is not my role to advocate policy for the
Library of Congress one way or the other.
Mr. Cooper. Well, just informally, speaking as a citizen,
do you think it would be a good idea for the Library of
Congress or the CBO to have such a plan?
Mr. O'Rourke. As a general management practice, if an
entity is involved in the construction of capital assets that
have very long lifetimes, it might then make sense for that
entity to have a planning process in place that encapsulates
the lifespan of those assets.
Mr. Cooper. But bottom line is, neither one of your
agencies has such a plan and for various reasons, one hasn't
been advocated apparently.
Mr. O'Rourke. I can't say that our agency doesn't have that
plan, but I am not aware of one.
Mr. Cooper. You seem to be a very informed person. I think
you would be aware of one if they had one. Another line of
questioning is this: It seems to me that core competency for
military service is preserving warfighting capability, not just
during their tenure as officers but in their hand-off. It also
seems to me that we had quite a capable military before this
30-year requirement was put into place; 10 years ago or 1 year
ago, depending on whether you are talking ships or aircraft.
But now we have layered on this new requirement that almost
assumes that our general officers are incompetent or
untrustworthy because otherwise, they can't be trusted to
deliver capability in the future that will sustain our great
Nation.
Mr. O'Rourke. I think it is a question, as you put it,
about whether the requirement implies incompetence on the part
of the military. Even before the 30-year plans were submitted,
the DOD was in the regular practice of looking at these years
out beyond the end of the FYDP anyway in something they called
the extended planning annex. They still do that today. And so
what this does is not imply, in my view, incompetence on the
part of the military officers. What it does instead is give
visibility to Congress of this long-range planning data, which
can be helpful in congressional oversight but which Congress
previously did not have visibility into.
Mr. Cooper. Well, we are very good at pretending to be
armchair generals and admirals. The question is whether we have
a stronger nation as a result. And as you know, defense bills
used to be quite short. Now they are incredibly long. They are
full of red tape, and sometimes we can't even get out of our
own red tape. And this, I am worried, is another one of those
red-tape requirements that ensures future generations of
armchair generals and is very satisfying for oversight but not
necessarily helpful to warfighters.
Mr. O'Rourke. I agree that the burden of preparing a report
for Congress should be weighed against its value, and I stated
that in my prepared statement for this hearing. In my view,
this is a valuable report for assisting congressional oversight
into issues relating to the Navy. Ships are central to the
Navy. You can't have a Navy without them. It is the thing that
they spend the largest ticket items on, and so, in my view,
there are grounds for people to come to that conclusion if they
should so wish, that the report, in fact, is worth the amount
of time needed to put it together.
And as Eric indicated in one of his earlier responses, if
the plan doesn't change very much from year to year, then the
burden of preparing a new one each year is not necessarily that
great. But if the plan does change a lot from year to year,
then that in fact becomes a reason why Congress might in fact
need to get it every year so that it can have that changed data
on a timely basis and not work off of outdated information.
Mr. Cooper. If I could reclaim my time. I am limited by the
chairman.
I would suggest when you say in oral testimony that the
Navy is like driving a truck in the dark down a road without
headlights unless we have such a report, that that is close to
an allegation of incompetence.
Mr. O'Rourke. I didn't say that. I said that the value of
it for Congress is in providing that advance warning because if
Congress doesn't have this report, it is very difficult for
Congress to see that far ahead, except by making a lot of
assumptions which may or may not match actual DOD planning
assumptions.
Mr. Cooper. Then you are accusing them of untrustworthiness
and not revealing to Congress what their true intentions are.
Mr. O'Rourke. No, not at all. I am simply saying that
Congress has visibility into this data when they have a 30-year
report, and I am not aware of another mechanism by which
Congress can regularly become acquainted with this data in a
structured manner.
Mr. Cooper. Remember, we succeeded quite well for many
decades without it, and driving in the dark without headlights
is not a pretty picture under any circumstances.
Another line of questioning. If we do care about the
future, and I think we should, remember that the Federal
Government is the only large entity left in America that
refuses to use real accrual accounting, which takes into
account future obligations. None of you have advocated for
that.
And as I mentioned earlier, the Pentagon is one of the
least auditable of all government agencies, even using the
limited cash accounting standard. So if we do want to focus on
the future, as I believe we should, we need to do this in
useful, rigorous ways that do not tie us down in red tape, that
allow us to focus on some of the harder issues, which are a
capable industrial base, an agile industrial base, so that we
can respond to threats.
Otherwise, I am worried that we are advocating osteoporosis
or something like that that just will harden an outlook so that
we meet the plan. And the glory of America has been flexibility
and ingenuity and genius, not 5-year plans or 30-year plans
like the former Soviet Union and just wanting to stick with
that new blueprint. So it is very important that we balance
objectives here. And this panel at least seems to have all
folks who love the idea of 30-year plans, and that worries me.
Dr. Labs. Mr. Cooper, I would say that CBO routinely looks
long-term over a lot of things. In fact, we have a 75-year look
at such things like Social Security and Medicare because you
don't get sort of the long-term effects of what it is going to
mean for the Federal deficit, for the Federal budget situation.
Mr. Cooper. I am quite well aware of that.
Dr. Labs. Yes, sir. I am certain that you are. So, in that
sense, certainly the organization has looked at long-term
perspectives in a variety of subject areas. I don't look at
sort of the requirement of a presentation of a 30-year
shipbuilding or aircraft plan as a question challenging the
Administration's or the Services' competence.
What it does is it provides information and visibility to
sort of what the planning process for future military forces
should be. And I don't see a disadvantage where more
information is--I don't see a situation where more information
in that respect would be a bad thing.
Mr. Cooper. I think if you look at personnel trend costs in
the Pentagon, that they are liable in the out-years to crowd
out all weapons systems.
Dr. Labs. Yes, sir. The CBO actually puts out publications
that show that.
Mr. Cooper. I am aware of that. It is a little bit
different context when you are talking about new weapons
platforms to meet as yet unheralded threats. I mentioned
supercavitation earlier. No one anticipated, as one of the
witnesses mentioned, unmanned aircraft, drones, things like
that. We have to be flexible. And I trust, at least, our
admirals and generals to do their jobs and not blindside
Congress, not to give them a blank check, but to have a capable
handoff to the next generation of general officers. And that
seems to be somewhat a question here.
Dr. Labs. I don't think the presentation of a 30-year plan
is in any way limiting the flexibility of the Services in
developing responses to new weapons, new capabilities, new
security environments. In fact, if anything it would help
illuminate sort of what is going on and what factors into the
decisionmaking as they look into the future.
Mr. Cooper. But it creates an entitlement mentality in
certain seaports, ship ports, you know, building yards for a
certain amount of jobs going forward whether the Nation needs
them or not. It creates that environment of promise, and I
think it reduces agility.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One question on the
30-year plan, and given, I think, on our capital ships, I think
30 years is the average life of those ships. Is it important up
front to make--because don't we use the service life extension
program for most of our major weapons systems, like ships? Is
it feasible to incorporate that in the planning process
directly, that there is going to be a SLEP of these systems?
Anybody.
Mr. O'Rourke. We are tending to run our systems longer and
longer over time. We are running ships over longer lives now
than we did in previous decades. And that is true for aircraft
as well. If DOD or the Navy has a program for extending the
official service life of a platform, it can incorporate that in
a 30-year plan. What the 30-year plan can also tell you is
whether there is possibly a need for doing more of that on
classes of ships or aircraft for which SLEPs have not yet been
approved. SLEPs are also sometimes not technically feasible or
cost effective for every kind of ship or aircraft. They could
be, for example, very difficult to accomplish on attack
submarines, due to limits on pressure hull life.
Dr. Labs. I would agree with what Mr. O'Rourke said. And
the other thing that is sort of at work here is that we have
done service life extension programs on certain types of ships
in the past, which has been actually an SCN, usually has been
an SCN-funded activity. Where the Navy seems to be moving in
the future as they recognize that certain ships are going to be
in the fleet longer or longer than anticipated, they try to put
a lot of that maintenance activity actually in the maintenance
accounts on a more incremental basis. In other words, the
Navy's planning going forward has been to do less of sort of
take a ship out of service for a year and do a major overhaul,
but rather try to maintain it a little bit better over the
course of its service life so they can still maintain a higher
state of readiness and a higher state of utility for that ship
as possible. But it is certainly something that can be featured
into the planning process and has occurred so in the past.
Ms. Eaglen. I would just add that to put service life
extension in context, the answer to your question is yes. But
it also can help you take it one step even further into detail
and highlight the cost-benefit analysis of a service life
extension versus of the purchase of a brand new system. So the
C-130 is a good example here. The C-130 center wing box design
has an inherent weakness, which means all of them will need to
be replaced. This is in addition to the modernization of all of
the H models. There may come a tipping point where Congress may
say, forget it. We want just additional new aircraft. But also
SLEPs aren't fail-safe. We have seen this with the A-10Cs
[Fairchild Republic Thunderbolt II close air support jets], for
example. Those aircraft were recently rewinged, and they had
their avionics upgraded, and now they are showing fuselage
cracks, which was not the point of the SLEP in the first place,
so we may have to go back and reSLEP for example. And again,
what is the cost-benefit analysis of doing this and the impact
on the ripple effect on the rest of the fleet?
Mr. Coffman. How realistic is the objective of a 313-ship
Navy? Are we chasing a metric versus looking at capability?
Numerical metric in terms of focusing on capability?
Dr. Labs. Well, if you think about it in terms of the 313
is not a numerical metric but actually represents the sets of
capabilities that the Department of the Navy says it needs to
meet its warfighting planning scenarios, then whether it is a
realistic--it is certainly realistic that the Navy could build
the ships it needs to achieve that metric and particularly the
components of the Navy, the different components of ships that
would present the capabilities that you are referring to. But
in terms of the realism, is it realism to achieve that under
current funding requirements, under current funding levels?
Under current funding levels of about $15 billion to $16
billion a year, the Navy is looking at the prospect of about a
250-ship Navy over a 30-year time period, under CBO estimates,
without an increase in funding. And so, in that sense, it
depends very much on what you think your future projected
funding levels for shipbuilding will be.
Ms. Eaglen. I would just add the Navy would tell you that
the number of ships actually includes an analysis of their
unmanned aerial system capability in the BAMS [Broad Area
Maritime Surveillance], for example, their maritime mobility
aircraft, the P8 [Boeing Poseidon anti-submarine warfare
aircraft] in particular, other unmanned systems, the battle
network, the sensor grids, that all of this is part of the 313-
ship fleet. So it is, I would agree with the Navy in this case
that it actually is a capability assessment, although it sounds
simplistic that it is just a number, but it is more than that.
Mr. O'Rourke. Part of what the 30-year shipbuilding plan
does in my view right now is illuminate the possible need for
re-examining the allocation of DOD resources between, frankly,
between the Navy and other parts of DOD if people in fact do
want to achieve a fleet of that size and capability.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Mrs. Eaglen, I am most intrigued by your long-
range technology plan, integrating that into our overall
planning process here. And so I wanted to briefly dig into that
with you a moment. It seems like right now, we first have the
National Security Strategy, coming from the White House and the
President's advisers, driving the QDR, and then you propose
adding an additional step after the QDR step, before we come up
with our inventory goals for our ships and our aircraft
production. Is that correct? Did I put it in the right spot
there in terms of the sequencing?
Ms. Eaglen. I am open to the timing. I am open to the
sequencing. It could be off year every two, so your R&D, S&T
[science and technology] could be after the QDR.
Mr. Young. But the developers of the technology road map,
as you have styled it, would look to the QDR for strategic
guidance presumably, right?
Ms. Eaglen. Presumably, if the QDR takes a 20-year review,
which this last one did not.
Mr. Young. Okay. Which leads me to my next set of questions
here. You have I think correctly indicated that any such
document should prioritize our needs for additional investment
and different capabilities based on those perceived threats and
estimated threats out there.
Right now, under the most recent QDR, it seems like the
prioritization should begin there, maybe should begin with the
President and the National Security Strategy. Do we have that
prioritization under the current strategic thinking occurring
in the Administration? Do we have enough direction to be able
to develop or prioritize long-range technology or R&D plan?
Ms. Eaglen. Unfortunately no, so it does raise a difficulty
in terms of doing it, but it doesn't mean it shouldn't be done.
Because, for example, the last QDR was issued in the absence of
a National Security Strategy, and it was largely based on a
National Defense Strategy issued under the previous
administration. And I would think Congress would have some
problems with the Department not meeting its statutory
obligations.
It also largely renders the document ineffective or at
least not tied to the current administration's foreign policy
of which defense policy is a derivative. In this case, we had
the cart before the horse.
The Secretary in his recent speech at the American
Enterprise Institute basically alluded to shockingly some
shortfalls in the QDR planning process, which I think should
inform the NDAA debate this year, in fact, saying that there
isn't a good link to force structure, and certainly I am
paraphrasing here of course, and some other challenges therein.
The last QDR served to simply justify the 2010 defense
budget. I didn't see it as much more, not to be overly
simplistic. So it does pose a challenge for a long-term R&D and
S&T plan, but it doesn't make that need irrelevant, because
neither of those are really being talked about now.
For example, in the aviation plan, we heard the Navy talk
about the need for a next-generation air dominant fighter some
time after 2019. The Air Force says they need a new cargo jet,
but we are getting ready to shutting down our only wide-bodied
air production line right now. So, I mean, these are, like I
said, it is all about the back end clarifying the front end
investment choices.
Mr. Young. Right. So to break this down to the sort of
real-world decisions that those of us in Congress and even
people in the Pentagon are asked to make, career military
people, I think prioritizing whether we invest in satellite
recapitalization or next-generation rotary-winged aircraft and
setting those priorities and determining what level we are
going to fund each respective technology becomes impossible,
frankly, to do in an informed fashion unless, first the
Administration and then the Pentagon with their robust QDR,
unless they do their homework. Am I correct in that analysis?
Ms. Eaglen. Yes, you are.
Mr. Young. Okay. Where in your estimation in this model
from QDR to the technology road map and setting the inventory
goals, at what point do we consider resource constraints,
especially since our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and many
other observers have noted that our national debt constitutes
our Nation's greatest national security threat. When do we
consider those resource constraints, is it way back in the QDR
process or the National Security Strategy, or is it after we
have developed inventory goals for our Navy?
Ms. Eaglen. Well, DOD currently does it as part of the QDR
and the 2010 QDR said, vaguely referenced here, that it took
resource constraints into account, you know. It didn't project
I think a cost growth zero percent or 3 percent, but something
about an inflation-adjusted flat defense budget, roughly
speaking, was what it predicted. So that is one way of taking
into account.
Now that doesn't take into the roles and missions review
that is ongoing now that is going to need to inform the next
QDR because it is going to be significantly different with up
to $400 billion in cuts.
Mr. Young. But looking to previous years or previous
decades investment in say shipbuilding is probably not the best
way to benchmark future investments.
Ms. Eaglen. I think that is fair.
Mr. Wittman. Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. If we have time, I have one question.
Mr. Wittman. Just a minute, please, go ahead.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Eaglen, in April,
your organization put out a report on defense spending entitled
``A Strong National Defense: The Armed Forces America Needs and
What They Will Cost.'' It recommends, among other things, an
attack submarine force, with 55 boats compared to the Navy's
current requirement of 48. The report also calls for a force of
37 amphibious ships compared to the Navy's fiscally constrained
goal of 33. Can you tell me how you came up with those figures?
Ms. Eaglen. Sure, this was not meant to be an alternate QDR
document by any means. It was really linear and it was at the
request of several members of your committee.
A quick holistic look around the world at the threats today
as they are, not necessarily what they are going to be in 20
years, but certainly taking that into account, saying these are
the capabilities required for major contingencies or even some
minor ones, and this is what it costs.
On the attack submarine front, I think the last panel
basically agreed with our assessment that the current fleet is
the minimum required. In fact, Admiral Blake said that they are
looking to add an additional attack submarine in fiscal year
2018 and saying that decision would be made next year by the
Department, because that is how much in advance they need to
plan for that.
Our ``bath tub'' or our shortfall in attack submarines
exists not just in the future in terms of numbers but, as
another member referenced, it is actually today in terms of
meeting combatant commander requirements, on any given day, it
can be less than half up to maybe 60, 65 percent of meeting the
worldwide requirements. And so we either need to reduce our
appetite for these needs, or if we are not changing the
missions, then we need to fund at the appropriate level.
On the amphibious side, the Navy has previously said that
they need 38 of these ships, but they can live with 33 because
simply it is unaffordable. So they certainly took resource
constraints into account. What I am concerned about primarily
is that the mission set has not changed, and I suppose the
current roles and missions review may help alleviate this
mismatch we are seeing across systems, as you have heard here
this morning, the high-end requirement is 38, so basically a
two-contingency scenario. So the Two Marine Expeditionary
Brigade fulfillment at 33 is adequate, as General Flynn said,
but it doesn't include all their support equipment. So we came
out at 37--there is more detail to it, which I could certainly
speak to--but to help find the right balance between what is
fiscally affordable and what the Navy said is its low and high
end requirement.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Palazzo. Folks, we are going to
head on to a vote right now. I thank you so much for your
testimony today. What I ask, as I did with the last group of
panelists, if you would let us know again in writing your
thoughts about what we could do to make the planning process as
useful as possible, making it as streamlined as possible. I can
assure you that this planning process is not an attempt to
question the integrity of any of our military leaders, but it
is incumbent upon us as Members of Congress to assert our
Constitutional duties in oversight. And that is getting
information from the executive branch in order to make sure
that we are performing those proper duties. The way we do that
is to get good, accurate and timely information from the
Department of Defense, and I do think that is necessary for
planning.
And I would agree that short of that, how do we make proper
decisions? So I would say that we are trying to find the best
balance with the planning process and the timeliness of it.
So if you could give us, again, your thoughts, and many of
those you gave us here today, that would be helpful, because we
do plan on pursuing how to make sure we make that planning
process as functional and as useful as possible.
So thank you, again, for your testimony today. I will
adjourn the committee.
[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
June 1, 2011
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 1, 2011
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Rob Wittman
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Hearing on
Efficacy of the DOD's 30-Year
Shipbuilding and Aviation Plans
April 13, 2011
The main purpose supporting the 30-year shipbuilding and
aviation plans requirements is to ensure effective
congressional oversight of DOD plans by giving Congress the
information we need to make decisions on issues that are not
consistently available in the five-year data of the Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
In my view, we tend to spend too much time arguing about
tactics when we're discussing these plans, and not enough time
focused on long-term strategy. We are constantly reacting to
events rather than planning for them, resulting in a system
that is burdened with waste and inefficiency.
We cannot afford to do this any longer. The stakes are too
high and we owe it to the American taxpayer to insist on well
thought-out, fiscally sound, long-term policy decisions that
shape our national defense strategy.
The central question, put in simple terms, is: Are we doing
the best job we can when we develop and implement our 30-year
plans to meet our Nation's current and future threats?
To illustrate this point, I want to highlight just a few
examples of what I'm talking about:
LThe decision to not build submarines in the
1990s which has created a shortfall in the attack
submarine force structure that we won't be able to fix
in the foreseeable future;
LDecisions to cut or efforts to kill a number
of programs including the F-22 fifth-generation
fighter, the C-17 cargo aircraft, and the Air Force's
combat search and rescue helicopter--all of which
arguably place American air supremacy at risk; and
LEnding purchases of the next-generation DDG-
1000 destroyers and killing the MPF-A large-deck
aviation ship--reducing our Navy to the smallest it's
been since 1916.
While arguments can be made to support the reasoning behind
these decisions, no one can argue about the number of growing
threats we face from both state and non-state actors, each with
ever-expanding capabilities ready to challenge our own.
Between force reductions, a dramatic slowing of new starts,
and closures of production lines, America's domestic industrial
strategy is slowly being whittled away, emphasizing the need
for smart long-term strategic planning.
We will hear from two panels. Witnesses from our first
panel are:
LMajor General Richard C. Johnston, USAF,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs,
U.S. Air Force;
LVice Admiral P. Stephen Stanley, USN,
Principal Deputy Director of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense;
LVice Admiral John T. Blake, USN, Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and
Resources (N8); and
LLieutenant General George Flynn, USMC, Deputy
Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.
For our second panel, we will receive testimony from:
LMr. Ronald O'Rourke, Defense Policy and Arms
Control Section, Congressional Research Service
LMr. Eric Labs, National Security Division,
Congressional Budget Office; and
LMs. Mackenzie Eaglen, Research Fellow for
National Security Studies, The Heritage Foundation
I look forward to hearing our witnesses' views on this
important subject and discussing how we can ensure that as we
make difficult policy decisions on long-term procurement issues
we don't inadvertently place our national security at risk.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
June 1, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
General Flynn. Before submitting the Department of the Navy (DON)
30-Year Aircraft Investment Plan to OSD, the Navy and Marine Corps
assess affordability of the entire Naval Aviation portfolio to include
fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft systems. For that
reason, rotary-wing aircraft should be included in the 30-Year Aircraft
Investment Plan. [See page 9.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 1, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. What are your thoughts for ways to improve the 30-year
shipbuilding and aviation planning process?
General Flynn. 1. The shipbuilding plan serves to provide Congress
with a resource strategy for Naval force employment--a strategy that is
developed through a shared Naval vision. Today that strategy exists in
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, a shared vision between
the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in support of the President's
National Security Strategy. This strategy is placed into operational
terms by the Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10) which describes
when, where, and how U.S. Naval forces contribute to enhancing national
security, preventing conflict, and prevailing in war. The shipbuilding
plan is the end result of matching the necessary resources to support
both the cooperative strategy and the operations concept.
2. The shipbuilding plan development must be an integrated process,
combining naval strategy, its operational concepts, and resource
allocation. The process would be enhanced by including a Naval risk
assessment that defines the shortfalls between operational needs and
resources across the full range of military operations.
3. The following comments apply to the 30-Year Aircraft Investment
Plan.
A. Include rotary-wing aircraft in the 30-Year Aircraft
Investment Plan (AIP). Before submitting the Department of the
Navy (DON) 30-Year AIP to OSD, the Navy and Marine Corps assess
affordability of the entire Naval Aviation portfolio to include
fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft systems.
B. Adjust scope of the 30-Year AIP to 20 years instead of 30
years to reflect well-defined requirements and reasonable cost
estimates.
C. Adjust the report timeline to allow Selected Acquisition
Reports (SARs) to advise the AIP; SARs are submitted in April.
D. Consider tying the AIP requirement to the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR). There are minor changes to the AIP from
year to year that primarily reflect changes to service budget
priorities. By tying the AIP to the QDR, Congress will be
better able to track programmatic adjustments related to
changes to defense strategy and threat posture.
Mr. Wittman. What are your thoughts for ways to improve the 30-year
shipbuilding and aviation planning process?
Admiral Blake. The Department of the Navy supports the requirement
for the submission of the Long Range Shipbuilding and Aviation Plans as
they provide important information for Congress, the Department of
Defense, and industry to make critical investment decisions. These
plans support the Department's ability to build a force structure in
accordance with requirements addressed in the National Defense
Strategy, the Maritime Strategy and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review; however, some modification to the timing for submission and the
time period required for investment projection will likely increase the
accuracy and value of these reports.
The shipbuilding report would be improved if its scope was limited
to a period of twenty years, with the submission of funding tables for
only the first ten years. The first ten years of the report are the
most definitive aspect of the report, both in terms of requirements and
cost data, and would provide the data necessary for meaningful analysis
by outside entities such as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and
Congressional Research Service (CRS). The second ten years relies on
analysis of trends and projections, and the cost data is not as
accurate. However, the data tables provide valuable information
concerning future acquisition intentions for various ship platforms
necessary to meet the perceived and anticipated threats.
The Department of the Navy fully supports the amendment to the 2011
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act, changing the
requirement of the shipbuilding report from an annual requirement to
one that requires the plan be submitted only in QDR years. However,
submission of the report in the year following the QDR vice in the year
of the QDR would improve the efficacy of the report. This would permit
better synchronization within the Department of Defense since
sufficient time would have elapsed after QDR delivery to interpret the
broad strategy and guidance against the practical requirements and
resources backdrop. Such a process would allow the Department of the
Navy to align its plans with the QDR submission. Finally, the existing
requirement to submit a shipbuilding report when the number of ships
drops from previous submissions should also be reconsidered. A single
ship deletion or move from one year to the next is not an indicator of
success or failure of the shipbuilding plan, and typically does not
provide a change of sufficient substance to warrant a new submission.
The aviation report can be improved by inclusion of all aircraft in
the report. Fixed wing, rotary wing, unmanned aerial systems, and
trainer aircraft are all part of the Navy and Marine Corps aviation
planning and programming process. Each platform has capabilities that
are delivered through sufficient capacity that must be balanced in an
affordable, integrated warfighting plan. Congress could then view the
aviation plan in its full context. As with the shipbuilding plan, Navy
recommends that subsequent aviation reports be limited to a twenty year
timeframe due to the highly speculative nature of future threats and
technology. Also in line with the shipbuilding plan, the aviation
report should be submitted every four years in the year following each
QDR.
Mr. Wittman. What are your thoughts for ways to improve the 30-year
shipbuilding and aviation planning process?
Admiral Stanley. Because of our inability to precisely predict the
future, 30-year plans should not be viewed as precise roadmaps for
execution. Instead, the planning process used to assemble the reports
provides a useful opportunity to consider and confront outyear
implications of near-term decisions. By finding problems early, the
Department can work to plan a program that will meet needs, but spread
the costs and industrial workload more reasonably.
Both plans should be submitted every four years. Current
legislation requires the 30-year shipbuilding plan to be submitted
every four years while the 30-year aviation plan is submitted annually.
Given that the first five years of the plans contain the same
information that is included in the President's Budget FYDP and that
the period beyond the FYDP is less subject to change, submission of
both plans every four years would reduce the burden of producing the
reports while allowing Congressional oversight.
Submission of both plans in the year following the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) would be an improvement. Current law requires the
shipbuilding plan to be submitted in the same years as the QDR;
however, this may provide insufficient time to incorporate QDR results.
Delaying submission until the year following the QDR would ensure that
the plan reflects the new strategy. Additionally, three Congressional
reports require integration: The President's budget, the Selected
Acquisition Reports and the 30-year plans. In order to allow this
integration, submission of the 30-year plans should be required 60 days
after submission of the President's budget request.
Reducing the time-frame covered by the plans to 20 years would also
be an improvement. Future projections are always speculative however,
those beyond 20 years are even less credible. While there is value in
looking ahead, especially to the near future, we should recognize that
the accuracy and value of the plans diminishes the further we get
beyond the FYDP.
We understand your important oversight role and want to provide
information that empowers Congress to fulfill its responsibilities. I
believe that implementing these improvements will result in a more
balanced approach to our shipbuilding and aviation planning.
Mr. Wittman. What are your thoughts for ways to improve the 30-year
shipbuilding and aviation planning process?
General Johnston. The United States Air Force takes very seriously
its Strategic Planning process in order to better understand the
impacts of the decisions made today, and to identify issues we will
face in the out-years. We believe our planning greatly informs and
improves the way we budget in order to provide the most capable Air
Force at the best value for the nation's defense. Over the past two
years, the 30-Year Aircraft Procurement Plan has been incorporated into
the Air Force's Strategic Planning System. This past year's process for
the second plan built for Congress was well executed, allowing the Air
Force the opportunity to provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) its input to the report. We are cognizant of the need for the DoD
to provide the committee this report in a timely manner, and will
continue to improve our processes to meet the needs of the Congress.
Two changes can help improve the planning process and the utility
of the report. First, the requirement to submit an annual report should
be modified to require the plan every two years or upon specific
request by the Congress in response to a strategically significant
budgetary change. The plan is rooted in national strategic documents
that are modified either biennially or quadrennially; therefore the
basis for the planning changes little each year. As such, the
requirement to submit the report annually provides only marginal
benefit. Second, a modification from a 30-year to a 20-year Aircraft
Procurement Plan would prove just as useful in matching strategy to
long-range planning because predicting the security environment and
technological needs of national defense beyond 20 years into the future
is highly speculative and adds little value to the national defense.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA
Ms. Hanabusa. Reflecting back on your graduation from the Naval
Academy 36 years ago, do you think you would have been able to predict
where we are today with regards to shipbuilding needs and current
status of United States shipbuilding efforts? How impossible of a task
is it to accurately predict needs thirty years in the future?
Admiral Blake. In the last thirty years, no one could have
predicted the Vietnam drawdown, the end of the Cold War in the 1990s,
the tragic events of September 11th, or the fact that we would be
involved in two wars today. None of us can predict with 100% accuracy
what the future will hold. I do, however, believe that planning is
indispensable and that the Navy's planning process provides valuable
insight into projected future shortfalls and needs from the
shipbuilding industrial base. For example, if we did not do long range
planning then we would not be able to identify the significant funding
challenge with the OHIO Replacement Program or that our inventory of
surface force combatants and submarines declines in large numbers in
the 2020s. With this insight, we can make decisions and plan changes
earlier to address concerns such as these projected shortfalls.
Ms. Hanabusa. Reflecting back on your graduation from the Naval
Academy 36 years ago, do you think you would have been able to predict
where we are today with regards to shipbuilding needs and current
status of United States shipbuilding efforts? How impossible of a task
is it to accurately predict needs thirty years in the future?
Admiral Stanley. Simple answer is no. There have been many profound
events that have occurred since my graduation from the Naval Academy.
Many of these affect our Defense Strategy and how we view our
requirement for ships and aircraft. Precise predictions of these events
or their effects are not possible.
It is the uncertainty inherent in trying to predict the future that
diminishes the value of the later years in the 30-Year plans. Outyear
predictions necessarily involve considerable speculation about such
things as the future security environment, technology development,
operational concepts, and fiscal constraints. Long range projections
unravel in the face of unforeseen developments or advances. An example
is the recent explosive growth in unmanned aerial systems, which would
have been impossible to predict 30 years ago. It is because of this
fundamental problem with long-term prediction that I recommend reducing
the time-frame covered by the shipbuilding and aviation plans to 20
years.
Ms. Hanabusa. Reflecting back on your graduation from the Naval
Academy 36 years ago, do you think you would have been able to predict
where we are today with regards to shipbuilding needs and current
status of United States shipbuilding efforts? How impossible of a task
is it to accurately predict needs thirty years in the future?
General Johnston. The 30-Year Aircraft Procurement Plan provides a
view of how the USAF intends to recapitalize and modernize its
aircraft. Within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) it mirrors the
President's budget. Beyond the FYDP, the recapitalization and
modernization predictive profile is less precise further out in the
future. Nonetheless, the USAF values the time spent developing the 30-
Year Aircraft Procurement Plan for two main reasons. First, it's a tool
that helps us understand the impact of decisions made today. For
example, decisions regarding large scale acquisition programs like the
F-35 and KC-46 will have significant influence on the shape of the Air
Force ten to twenty years from now. The impact of decisions to delay or
accelerate procurement profiles can be readily viewed within the plan.
The second advantage of long-range planning is a greater understanding
of issues that will need to be addressed in the years outside of the
FYDP. For example, we recognize the need to invest in the Long Range
Strike Bomber (LRS-B) and Next Generation Trainer (T-X) during these
out-years. The plan helps the USAF de-conflict the timing of these
programs and, in turn, mitigate the risk of unaffordable spikes in
spending. That said, predicting in the out-years is difficult because
the future strategic environment will change for a variety of reasons--
to include the capabilities of our allies and future threats.
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