[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
WHY TAIWAN MATTERS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 16, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-42
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Ms. June Teufel Dreyer, professor of political science at
University of Miami, senior fellow at Foreign Policy Research
Institute...................................................... 11
Mr. Randall G. Schriver, partner at Armitage International LLC.,
president & CEO of the Project 2049 Institute.................. 17
Mr. Rupert J. Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan
Business Council, Member of National Committee on United
States-China Relations......................................... 25
Ms. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, professor, School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University.......................................... 45
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Prepared statement.................................... 3
Ms. June Teufel Dreyer: Prepared statement....................... 13
Mr. Randall G. Schriver: Prepared statement...................... 19
Mr. Rupert J. Hammond-Chambers: Prepared statement............... 27
Ms. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker: Prepared statement.................... 47
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 70
Hearing minutes.................................................. 71
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 73
The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress
from American Samoa: Prepared statement........................ 75
Written responses from Ms. June Teufel Dreyer to questions
submitted for the record by the Honorable Jeff Duncan, a
Representative in Congress from the State of South Carolina.... 77
Written responses from Mr. Randall G. Schriver to questions
submitted for the record by the Honorable Jeff Duncan.......... 82
WHY TAIWAN MATTERS
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THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m.
in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr.
Berman, for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will
recognize the chairman and the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific for 3 minutes each for
their opening remarks.
We will then hear from our witnesses, and I would ask that
you summarize your prepared statements in 5 minutes each before
we move to questions and answers from the members under the 5-
minute rule.
Without objection, your prepared statements will be made
part of the record; and members may have 5 days to insert
statements and questions for the record subject to the length
limitation of the rules.
The chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes.
Today's hearing is entitled "Why Taiwan Matters." The
answer simply is that Taiwan matters because people matter. I
do not mean ``people'' in that false use as in the ``People's
Republic of China.'' I refer to people as in ``We, the
People.''
Taiwan has taken the ``We, the People'' principles of
democracy--human rights, freedom of religion, and a free market
economy--and transplanted them firmly into East Asian soil.
Taiwan has belied those critics who asserted that a Confucian-
based, hierarchical society is ill-suited for the tenets of
Jeffersonian democracy. Taiwan offers the audacity of hope--do
you like that phrase, Mr. Berman--to the survivors of the
Tiananmen Square massacre.
Taiwan inspires all victims of Beijing's totalitarian
oppression that they need not be faint of heart. It is for this
very reason, this shining example of liberty, that the cynical
old men who still rule in Beijing are so fearful of Taiwan. It
is for this very reason that they strive to eliminate this
beacon of democracy. And it is for this very reason that
Congress, through the Taiwan Relations Act, must strive to help
preserve a Taiwan that reflects the aspirations of its people.
This hearing is especially timely and necessary because it
has come to my attention that there is a new spirit of
appeasement in the air. Some in Washington policy circles are
suggesting that the time has come to recognize the reality of a
rising China and to cut our ties to Taiwan. This would be a
terrible mistake which would have far-reaching ramifications on
how the U.S. treats its democratic allies, its friends.
Turning to Taiwan's round of free elections early next
year, it should be perfectly clear: The people of Taiwan must
be able to choose their leaders and influence their future,
free from outside bullying or coercion. I have heard that some
Communist cronies in Beijing even recently urged the people of
Taiwan to ``choose the right person'' in the upcoming
elections--or else. This naysayer would seem to be subscribing
to Chairman Mao's old dictum that ``political power rose out of
the barrel of a gun.'' To the Communist leaders in Beijing I
say this: The ballot box is mightier than the gun's barrel.
I have news for the naysayers on Taiwan policy as well: The
United States is a Pacific power and plans to remain so for
this century and beyond. The commitments made in the Taiwan
Relations Act have remained unchanged for over 30 years and
still hold true today. The pledges in the six assurances given
by President Ronald Reagan to Taiwan, including the one not to
set a date for termination of arm sales to Taiwan, remain as
firm today as they were back in 1982.
With over 1,600 missiles pointed directly across the Taiwan
Strait, Taiwan needs the means to defend itself from threats
and intimidation. Taiwan needs the next generation of F-16
fighters now in order to protect its skies. With CIA Director--
and incoming Defense Secretary--Leon Panetta recently telling
our Senate colleagues that China is preparing for ``potential
contingencies'' that may involve Taiwan, there is a clear and
present danger of sending Beijing the wrong signal. To avoid
any misinterpretation about congressional commitment to Taiwan
security and its survival, I will soon introduce legislation to
enhance the Taiwan Relations Act.
I would like to add a final word of caution for our friends
regarding Taiwan. The American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei in
its annual white paper cautioned Taiwan against an overreliance
on trade with China and urged a diversification of Taiwan's
overseas markets. I, too, cautioned last year and repeat here
today that Beijing's pursuit of ever-deepening trade ties with
Taiwan could prove to be a Trojan horse. Beijing's game plan
seems to be that economic integration will lead inevitably to
political integration. The people of Taiwan must be vigilant in
remembering that all that glitters is not gold.
The challenges in the 32 years since the enactment of the
Taiwan Relations Act have been many, and they remain so today.
But we in Washington, as in Taiwan, give due diligence to the
challenges at hand. We can look forward to the continuation of
the vibrant democracy and the free market economy enjoyed by
the people of Taiwan.
Before recognizing the ranking member for his opening
remarks, I would like to note the presence in our audience
today of our former colleague, Congressman Lester Wolff of New
York. Lester, will you stand?
He was chairman of this committee's Asia and the Pacific
Subcommittee during the crucial period of the late 1970s.
Congressman Wolff played a leadership role in the framing and
legislative enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act.
I would like to note the presence also of the Formosa
Foundation Student Ambassadors with whom I will meet later on
today. If you could stand, young student leaders, thank you.
Thank you for being with us.
Now I am pleased to turn to my good friend, the ranking
member, Mr. Berman, for his opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Mr. Berman. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman; and
I am very glad you are having this hearing.
Seeing Lester Wolff, former Congressman Wolff, in the
audience is good in many respects, one of which is it makes me
feel like I just got here.
Taiwan is a flourishing multiparty democracy of 23 million
people with a vibrant free market economy. It is the ninth
biggest trading partner of the United States, ahead of much
bigger countries like Brazil and India, and has been a
consistent advocate for trade liberalization in the WTO and
APEC.
Over the past 60 years, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has
undergone dramatic changes, but Taiwan's development into a
robust and lively democracy, as the chair so eloquently pointed
out, underpins the strong U.S.-Taiwan friendship we enjoy
today.
Our relationship with Taiwan was initially defined by a
shared strategic purpose of containing the spread of communism
in Asia. With the end of the Cold War, Taiwan's political
evolution from authoritarianism to one of the strongest
democratic systems in Asia has transformed the U.S.-Taiwan
relationship from one based essentially on shared interest to
one based on shared values. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 is
the cornerstone of the relationship between our two nations. It
has been instrumental in maintaining peace and security across
the Taiwan Straits and in Asia.
One of the main obligations of the United States under that
legislation is to make available to Taiwan defensive arms so
that Taiwan is able to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability. Last year's Defense Department report to Congress
on the Chinese military stated that China's military buildup
opposite Taiwan is continuing and that the balance of cross-
strait military forces continues to shift in China's favor.
In addition, another DoD assessment of Taiwan's air defense
status concluded that, while Taiwan has nearly 400 combat
aircraft in service, ``far fewer of these are operationally
capable.''
Taiwan urgently needs new tactical fighters. I encourage
the administration to work closely with Congress in meeting our
obligations pursuant to the TRA and provide Taiwan with the
weapons it requires, including F-16 fighters.
While the cross-strait security situation remains tenuous,
it is encouraging to see that stronger economic and cultural
ties have developed between Taiwan and China in recent years.
There are now more than 350 direct flights between Taiwan and
the mainland, and last year over 1.6 million tourists from
China visited Taiwan. The two sides also signed a landmark
trade agreement last year that lowered and eliminated tariffs
on hundreds of commodities.
These examples are part of a positive trend that has
strengthened relations between Taiwan and China, and it would
benefit both Taiwan and Beijing to take additional steps to
build cross-strait trust and cooperation.
Three years ago when he took office, Taiwan's President
initiated a policy of rapprochement with the mainland,
declaring, ``no unification, no independence, and no use of
force.''
China could have responded in kind by forswearing the use
of military force to bring about reunification and reducing
their military threat against Taiwan. Instead, they increased
their missile deployment targeting in Taiwan. If China won't
take steps to reduce this military threat even after all of
Taiwan's efforts at rapprochement, can we expect that China
ever will renounce the use of force?
Taiwan's political, economic, and social transformation
over the past 60 years has demonstrated that a state can be
thoroughly Chinese, modern, and democratic. Taiwan's example is
an inspiration for other countries in Asia and throughout the
world that linger under the control of one person or one party.
And next year's election in Taiwan, its fifth direct
Presidential election, will be another sign of the political
maturity of the Taiwanese people and a signal to Beijing that a
change in relations between Taiwan and China cannot be imposed
by the mainland.
For many years, I have been a staunch supporter of the
people of Taiwan; and I will continue to foster efforts here in
Congress to demonstrate our country's continued strong support
for Taiwan. I look forward to the testimony of our expert
witnesses this morning and in hearing their views on how to
further strengthen ties between the United States and Taiwan.
And, Madam Chairman, I yield back yield back the balance of
my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman.
Thank you for that opening statement.
Mr. Manzullo, the chairman of the appropriate subcommittee,
is recognized.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this
important hearing today regarding our relationship with Taiwan.
We have enjoyed a long and fruitful relationship with the
Taiwanese, and it goes without saying that Taiwan has always
mattered, now and into the future.
The U.S. and Taiwan share common goals that ensure an
economically vibrant and peaceful Asia based on respect for
intellectual property rights, human rights, domestic
principles, and adherence to the rule of law. Taiwan is a
success story in promoting universal freedoms and advancing
democracy and trade. The people of Taiwan have shown true
leadership in developing their country through their economy,
raising standards of living, and adhering to a democratic
system of governance.
Economics and trade have played a key role in delicately
balancing our relationship between the People's Republic of
China and Taiwan. Taiwan's success and economic prowess in the
1970s influenced the leadership of mainland China to consider
and ultimately implement economic reforms. Taiwan therefore
serves as a beacon of reform but, just as importantly, as a
beacon of democracy in a continent that has very few
democracies.
As a major innovator and producer of information
technology, Taiwan is a pioneer in high-tech goods and has
successfully moved up the value chain in manufacturing.
Taiwan is also America's ninth largest trading partner and
thirteenth largest export market for U.S. agricultural
products. Taiwan imports a wide variety of electronics,
optical, precision instruments, information and communications
products, transportation equipment, machinery, and electrical
products from the United States. Needless to say, this is an
important export market for American manufacturers.
Maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait must be the
priority for the U.S. and all countries in the broader Asia-
Pacific region. The Taiwan Relations Act governs America's
relationship with Taiwan, and as chairman of the Subcommittee
on Asia and the Pacific, I believe the TRA must continue to
play a central role in the future.
Providing Taiwan with the means to defend itself is a
cornerstone of a stable cross-strait policy. The economic
prosperity and livelihood of people in the region and in the
United States depend on a stable and peaceful cross-strait
relationship. Taiwan embraces our democratic values and world
view and has consistently remained a staunch supporter and
friend. The friendship between our two peoples has stood the
test of time, and it will into the future.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Manzullo.
Mr. Faleomavaega is recognized as the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Madam Chair and our ranking
member, for calling this hearing. I think it could not be more
appropriately stated: Why Taiwan Matters.
Madam Chair, since 1979, the U.S. policy regarding Taiwan
has remained unchanged. The Joint Communique, together with the
Taiwan Relations Act, are the foundation of our policy which
acknowledges that one China position on both sides of the
straits and implies, as Republican President Ronald Reagan once
said, and I quote, ``the Taiwan question is a matter for the
Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits to
resolve.''
Whether Democrat or Republican, every U.S. President since
1979 has stood by this assertion. In fact, the Taiwan Relations
Act states that it is the policy of the United States, and I
quote, ``to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly
commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of
the United States and the people of Taiwan, as well as the
people on the China mainland.''
For the sake of our U.S. troops, I also support this
policy; and I believe we should do everything we can to make
sure this policy works so that U.S. troops are not called upon
to resolve any unnecessary conflict between Taipei and Beijing.
And, as you noted earlier, also, Madam Chair, I do want to
also note the contribution, the tremendous contribution of the
former chairman of the Asia Pacific Subcommittee, my good
friend and colleague, Congressman Lester Wolff, for his
outstanding contributions and one of the critical forces who
brought about the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act. Very
much appreciate his presence here with us.
On a personal note, Madam Chair, I want to commend
President Ma for his leadership in reducing tensions in the
cross-straits. I also support President Ma's efforts to call
upon the United States to sell the Government of Taiwan all the
F-16 C/Ds it requires in accordance with the Taiwan Relations
Act which requires the United States, and I quote, ``to provide
Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, in order to maintain
the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force
or the forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security of
the social and economic system of the people of Taiwan.''
Given that Beijing has some 1,400 missiles aimed at Taiwan,
I add my voice to those calling upon the Obama administration
to authorize armed sales to Taiwan as a primary military
deterrence.
Having said this, Madam Chair, I also want to note that
since President Ma took office Taiwan has participated as an
observer at the World Health Assembly. There are now 307 direct
flights from the cities in Taiwan every week. There has been a
relaxation of China-bound investments, more visas, more
mainland tourists, and more exchange in many other areas.
Taiwan and China also inked the Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement last summer, and trade between China and Taiwan now
totals over $110 billion a year.
So I commend both Beijing and Taipei for their efforts in
trying to bring about a peaceful resolution to some of the
issues that they now are confronted with.
And with that, Madam Chair, I know my time is up; and I
yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
I would like to yield 1 minute to the members who would
like to speak.
Mr. Chabot, the subcommittee chair on the Middle East and
South Asia is recognized.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this
very important hearing. I want to commend you for doing so.
Taiwan is a long-time friend and loyal democratic ally of
the United States, and your convening a hearing entitled Why
Taiwan Matters couldn't be more appropriate.
As one of the founding co-chairs of the congressional
Taiwan Caucus and having visited that nation many times, I can
say with some authority that the freedom-loving Taiwanese
people know you to be a great friend and a true champion of
democracy.
I am sorry the administration did not find it convenient to
send a witness this morning. There always seems to be time for
an elaborate arrival ceremony or a State dinner for visiting
Communist leaders from Beijing, but when our democratic ally
Taiwan is being discussed, time on the schedule seems to get a
little tight.
We do, however, have a great panel of witnesses.
One final comment. The fact that former President Chen
Shui-bian, a strong ally of the United States, still occupies a
jail cell is of great concern. To me, there is the scent of the
criminalization of politics, and it smacks of third worldism.
Taiwan is much better than that; and, as a very strong ally of
Taiwan, I would like to see this addressed.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing.
You know, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan is a
multifaceted one and a very important one. Our policy with
regard to the defensive capabilities of Taiwan should not
surprise anybody. It is clearly outlined in the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979, which states it is the policy of the
United States Government to provide Taiwan with arms of a
defensive character.
Moreover, the three Joint Communiques between the U.S. and
the People's Republic of China and the six assurances to Taipei
offered by President Reagan add additional context to the U.S.-
Taiwan relationship. It is important that the United States
show strength and fortitude in this relationship as it pursues
other relationships that are also important in the region.
With that, I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton, the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia
chairman.
Mr. Burton. I won't add too much to what has already been
said. Taiwan is a great friend and always has been.
My colleague from Ohio mentioned that the Chinese Communist
leader got the red carpet treatment at the White House
treatment and said we ought to show some attention to Taiwan.
You know, one of the things that really bothers me is that they
can't even get off the plane. The President of Taiwan comes to
the United States, and I am down there in Florida to meet him,
and he can't get off the plane. That is a disgrace.
When we want to talk about diplomacy with Taiwan, one of
our great trading partners and great friends, we can't get
people in the administration or any administration to go over
there and talk to them. They can't come here to sit down and
talk to us, in many cases. That is just not right, and we need
to change that, and that is one of the questions I will be
asking our panel.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Higgins of New York.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I, too, look forward to the expert testimony of our panel
here. Taiwan is a very important nation of over 23 million
people, a dynamic economy which has experienced some slow
growth in the last several years. So I look forward to the
testimony and exploring ways and opportunities the United
States can benefit from a strategic partnership with Taiwan.
Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Royce is recognized, the chairman of the Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I think what really strikes us is it has just been a mere
few decades since Taiwan has gone from poverty to prosperity
and from autocracy to democracy. I think Taiwanese Americans
are rightfully proud about what has happened here. Taiwan is
truly a responsible stakeholder today. It is a long-time friend
to the United States.
It is a friend that faces some serious challenges. One is
that China's rapid militarization and continued belligerent
actions in the South China Sea are a serious cause for concern
to Taiwan, to all of Asia, and to us.
I think another observation is, since the 1990s, China has
warned Asian nations not to sign free trade agreements with
Taiwan. So you have numerous global FTAs out of the region
already in place. There are about 100 of them in East Asia. And
they are steadily undermining Taiwan's international
competitiveness through trade and investment discrimination.
So what can we do? Well, one of the issues that the
American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei called for were closer
trade relations between U.S. and Taiwan to strengthen that
bilateral relationship and we could move forward on our Trade
and Investment Framework Agreement agenda with Taiwan. It is
something we should look at today. I would hope our witnesses
would comment on it.
And I thank you very much, Madam Chairman, for holding this
hearing.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce.
And now the chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses.
First, I am happy to introduce a fellow south Floridian as
a panel member. I don't know how she got to be a panel member.
June Teufel Dreyer is a professor of political science at
the University of Miami. Go 'Canes. Professor Dreyer's
extensive research has focused on Chinese and cross-strait
politics, as well as on defense issues involving both Taiwan
and China. Among the many books she has authored is the
``Chinese Political System: Modernization and Tradition.''
Thank you for the inscription.
Professor Dreyer is a former commissioner of the
congressionally established United States Economic and Security
Review Commission. She is also a member of the International
Institute of Strategic Studies in London and earned her
doctorate from Harvard University.
Welcome, Professor.
Next, I would like to welcome Randall Schriver. I did not
see you at the beginning or would have said hello. I apologize.
Randy is one of the five founding partners of Armitage
International. Mr. Schriver is also the CEO and president of
the Project 2049 Institute, a nonprofit research organization
dedicated to the study of security in Asia.
He previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, with the responsibility of
Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong during the first George W. Bush
administration. Prior to that, he worked for 4 years in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, where his responsibility
included the day-to-day management of U.S. relations with the
People's Liberation Army and the bilateral security and
military relationships with Taiwan.
Randy served his country as an active duty Navy
intelligence officer between 1989 and 1991. Mr. Schriver holds
a master's degree in public policy from Harvard University and
received a bachelor's in history from Williams College.
We are glad to have you with us, Mr. Schriver.
We now have one of the world's foremost experts on Taiwan's
economy here with us today, Mr. Hammond-Chambers, who was born
and raised in Scotland before coming to the United States in
1987.
In 1993, he joined The Center for Security Policy, a
defense and foreign policy think tank in Washington, DC, as the
associate for development. Mr. Hammond-Chambers was elected
president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council in November,
2000, after working for the Council since 1994.
He is also a member of both the National Committee on
United States-China Relations and the Council of Foreign
Relations. He holds a bachelor's degree in history and religion
from Denison University.
Welcome, Mr. Hammond-Chambers.
And now, rounding off the panel, we are so pleased to
welcome Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, a professor of history at
Georgetown University in its School of Foreign Service.
Professor Tucker is a highly regarded American diplomatic
historian who specializes in American-East Asian relations,
including relations with Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong. In 2007,
she received the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement for
her contributions as an Assistant Deputy Director of National
Intelligence in the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence. Previous U.S. Government service dating back to
the 1980s included working in both the Office of Chinese
Affairs in the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in
Beijing.
The professor's most recent book, published in 2009, is
entitled, ``Strait Talk: U.S.-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis
with China''--I am holding it right now--which examines the
Washington, Taipei, Beijing triangular relationship. Her
numerous academic essays have appeared in such journals as
Foreign Affairs, the Journal of American History, and Political
Science Quarterly. Professor Tucker holds a Ph.D. degree from
Columbia and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Good to have you here, Professor.
I kindly remind our witnesses to keep your oral testimony
to no more than 5 minutes.
Without objection, the witnesses' written statements will
be inserted into the record; and we hope to get through them
without any problem before the votes start at 11 o'clock.
So we will begin with you, Professor Dreyer.
STATEMENT OF MS. JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE AT UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, SENIOR FELLOW AT FOREIGN POLICY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Ms. Dreyer. Thank you very much for having me here.
I begin my remarks with reference to a recent article
entitled Taiwan's Narrowing Options, talking about the
inevitability of its absorption into China. My opinion is that
this is not in the best interest of the United States, for two
major reasons. The first is strategic and the second is that it
is a betrayal of the very principles that the United States was
founded on. It mocks us to the rest of the world as just
another hypocritical state making decisions that negatively
affect millions of people, purely on the basis of short-term
expediency.
To take the first first, as part of my research into
Chinese defense policies, I read Chinese defense journals.
These don't circulate in the United States. They are in
Chinese. And I find there that Taiwan is not discussed here as
terra irredenta, some sacred, long-lost part of China that has
to be recouped. No. It is regarded as a springboard for the
Chinese military to break out of the island chains around China
and into the open Pacific from which point China can gain
control of the sea lanes of communication. And, of course,
these are vital to commerce and the transport of energy. They
give whoever controls them a stranglehold on whoever does not
control them. At present, United States controls them. Are we
willing to cede this?
Second, the United States was founded on the principle that
human beings have the right to self-determination. It is so
stated in our Declaration of Independence; it was reiterated in
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points; and, most recently, it was
stated emphatically by President Obama when speaking about the
Middle East. Yet we explicitly have denied this right to the
people of Taiwan. This is a disgrace.
Now this occurs against a background of errors and
``misstatements'' by members of our administration. This is not
a Democratic/Republican thing. This has happened under several
administrations.
In 2003, the Department of Defense published a handbook
entitled ``Taiwan, Province of China.'' If I had a cell phone,
I would be typing OMG. After that, Colin Powell, as Secretary
of State, said, ``Taiwan is not independent. It is not a
sovereign state.'' Violation of six assurances in Taiwan
Relations Act--well, he misspoke.
Most recently, Secretary of Defense Gates said, ``We take
Chinese sensitivities into account when deciding to sell what
weapons Taiwan will get.''
This is surreal. We are allowing a country that has
insisted it has the right to conquer another country by force
to decide what weapons we sell to that country. Think about the
absurdity of that statement.
There have also been a couple of articles in a journal that
is widely regarded as reflecting official opinion to the effect
that the United States should abandon Taiwan. This journal has
printed no articles expressing any other point of view. If I am
a Taiwanese, what do I think? Taiwan is pretty responsive to
China for its economic ties. Yet it is responsible to the
United States for its strategic independence. And they realize,
if the United States means to abandon them, maybe it is better
to bandwagon with China, rather than wait to be conquered by
force.
I can see I am running out of time here. I will close with
my four recommendations: That is, to reiterate things,
representatives have said, sell the F-16 C/Ds to Taiwan;
second, reassess Taiwan's legitimate defense needs and what we
can do to satisfy them; three, remove the restrictions on high-
level visits between our officials and also on the locations
they can be held in; and, fourth, issue a strong affirmation of
the right of the people of Taiwan to determine their own
political future free from pressure by external forces.
Thank you for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dreyer follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Professor.
Mr. Schriver, the partner at Armitage International is
recognized.
STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, PARTNER AT ARMITAGE
INTERNATIONAL LLC., PRESIDENT & CEO OF THE PROJECT 2049
INSTITUTE
Mr. Schriver. Good morning. Thank you, Madam Chair, and
thank you for the opportunity to testify before the committee
today and for having a hearing on this very important topic.
In the interest of time, let me just make four very quick
points.
The first point is that, for all the reasons previously
articulated, Taiwan is extremely important and extremely
important to the United States. We do have a strong and stable
relationship with Taiwan. However, I feel as though this
administration--and, to be candid, like previous
administrations--does not hold high enough aspirations for
Taiwan or the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. It is too often seen as
merely a subset of U.S.-China relations. It is too often seen
as an issue to manage in the context of U.S.-China relations.
That not only relegates Taiwan to this sub-issue category,
but it brings opportunity costs. We are losing the
opportunities to partner with Taiwan that is a like-minded
country in so many ways, and we are losing the opportunity to
leverage what Taiwan can bring to bear on so many regional and
international challenges.
Second point, there is no doubt in my mind that we have
witnessed an improvement in the cross-strait relationship in
the last 3 years, and I think some credit is certainly due to
President Ma. Credit is also due to the DPP, of course. They
started a lot of the economic cross-strait activity on their
watch under President Chen Shui-bian. So all the people of
Taiwan deserve credit for the good work that has been done to
promote cross-strait relations.
The one thing that hasn't changed--and this has already
been pointed out, of course--is the dramatic nature of the
military buildup opposite Taiwan. I think we need to be very
clear on this point. We have a very senior ranking Chinese
general coming to the United States and saying there aren't
missiles pointed at Taiwan. We have some U.S. scholars and even
former officials saying that China has taken steps to reduce
the threat to Taiwan. And this is just false, and this is well-
documented in our DoD reports, well documented by objective
analysts, and it is an important point. Because, of course,
what our law says is that our decisions will be based solely
based on the needs of Taiwan. So it is an important point to
recognize that this buildup continues unabated.
The third point, I feel as though the response to this
buildup on the part of the United States has been insufficient.
And, again, I would be candid and say my own administration I
served in was not robust enough in response, and that has
continued and perhaps gotten worse in the current
administration.
There are several platforms and systems under
consideration--some have been mentioned here--F-16 C/Ds,
submarines, other systems. I would say not only does Taiwan
need these systems, not only does our law suggest that they
should be made available to Taiwan, I think if they are
withheld, not made available, I would seriously call into
question whether or not the law is being honored at this point,
given the state of the buildup.
And I do fear that there is a growing Chinese influence on
our own process and our own decision making. The comment
already made quoting Secretary Gates is of great concern when
we have six assurances that we still allege to honor and we
have a law that says our decisions will be solely based on
Taiwan's defense needs.
It looks as though to me that there is growing Chinese
influence. We are facing what I sometimes call the ``tyranny of
the calendar,'' all these different high-level U.S.-China
activities when we can't possibly do a congressional
notification for Taiwan in any proximity to those visits. This
is not the way that the original architects of the law--it is
just such a pleasure to have Congressman Wolff here and those
that are still the stewards and the overseers of the law. It is
not the way that people intended this to be carried out.
The fourth point is there have been some people calling for
reducing or eliminating arms sales, changing the TRA, perhaps
abandoning Taiwan. I think this is a very bad idea; and, in
fact, I would go in the opposite direction. I applaud your
efforts to strengthen the Taiwan Relations Act, but those that
are saying we should abandon Taiwan I think are operating on a
number of false assumptions, somehow we are going to get better
U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea and Iran. Whereas I think
China's policies there are driven by her own interests, which
are very important strategic interests for China, not a fit of
pique over our Taiwan policy.
Some people think that somehow this will help improve the
cross-strait relationship, when, in fact, the historical data
actually shows our arm sales support cross-strait negotiations.
The 150 F-16s sold in 1992 preceded by a mere few months the
so-called 1992 Consensus, the agreement reached in Hong Kong.
Even the $6.4 billion package that the Obama administration
did in early 2010 preceded by just a few months the ECFA
agreement, the economic agreement between the two sides.
So why would we change course now and alter the negotiating
environment? I think this is a policy that is successful, and
we should continue it.
And I look forward to your questions, Madam Chair, and
other committee members.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]
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----------
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Next, we will hear from Mr. Hammond-Chambers, the president
of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. And I would note that in
your official biography you have a very cool Robert De Niro
goatee. Maybe the Mrs. behind you nixed that one, huh?
STATEMENT OF MR. RUPERT J. HAMMOND-CHAMBERS, PRESIDENT OF THE
U.S.-TAIWAN BUSINESS COUNCIL, MEMBER OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON
UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS
Mr. Hammond-Chambers. Very perceptive of you, Madam
Chairwoman, yes. She said, ``Enough.''
Madam Chairman, esteemed committee members, as an immigrant
to the United States I want to say what an honor it is to
testify in front of this committee. As my good friend Randy
likes to point, I am Scottish by birth, but I am American by
choice, and I take that with great pride.
I believe that the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan
is suffering significantly from a lack of ambition and a lack
of leadership. We have throughout the different areas of policy
a lack of leadership on the part of the administration to move
forward in areas that would benefit our country.
As you, Madam Chairman, pointed out, Taiwan is a dynamic
democracy. We have seen a peaceful transition of power. We have
dynamic legislative and executive branches vested with real
power. We have an active dual party democracy, respect for
human rights, and media. And Taiwan also a serious player on
the defense security region when it can get access to
equipment, of course.
For many, many reasons--for those reasons and many reasons
more, Taiwan stands as a beacon for U.S. Policy in the region
and around the world and is deserving of American support.
There are three specific areas in which we are coming up
short: Econ, military, and communication.
In the economic area, as mentioned by one of your committee
members, the TIFA process is again frozen. We are in the 7th
year out of 11 years in which the principal process for
negotiating with Taiwan on economic matters is frozen, this
time over beef.
In the early part of this year, the administration was
preparing to send Demetrios Marantis, the deputy, out to
Taiwan. There was another beef issue of ractopamine. That issue
undermined efforts to get Mr. Marantis to Taiwan, and again we
were thrown back into crisis.
There appears to be no likelihood that this issue will be
resolved anytime soon, indeed through at least until the middle
of 2012. Beef represents less than 1 percent of bilateral trade
relationship, and yet it continues to dominate and to undermine
the best intentions and hurt U.S. economic interests.
From an FTA standpoint, Free Trade Agreement, I think it is
simple enough to point out that, in the absence of a TIFA, it
is difficult to talk about FTA in the absence of fast track and
an FTA policy on the part of the administration. It is
difficult to see how Taiwan fits there. However, at such time
as the President has FTA as part of his policy objectives, we
would hope to see Taiwan as a priority.
On the arm sales issue, we have an almost complete
breakdown in process as well as consideration of movement
forward on capabilities and new capabilities. We have had no
new significant programs in the system. We have no new
significant programs in the system other than the F-16 A/Bs.
They are sitting at State. They have been there since
September, 2010. The pricing and availability data is ready to
be sent to Taiwan; and the Department of State has offered no
reason as to why, in the middle of the bureaucratic process in
which a sale is considered, they have sat on the F-16 A/B
upgrade for so many months.
The submarine program, too, is at State. The congressional
notification could be sent to Capitol Hill after due process at
any time and yet we see no movement on that. That issue is of
significant interest and importance to Taiwan.
Of course, the issue of the LOR for F-16 C/Ds, Taiwan has
been attempting to submit a lateral request for 66 F-16 C/Ds
since 2007, and successive administrations have refused to even
accept the LOR, bearing in mind, of course, as you and your
committee members know, that accepting an LOR isn't an
agreement to sell; it is simply an agreement to consider. And
yet we find ourselves in a position where even the follow-on
sale of additional equipment that Taiwan already has in its
inventory is not under consideration.
In process, you, Madam Chairman, have pointed out, issues
over the Javits report, Senator Lugar has pointed out issues
over due process, prenotification for congressional
notification and other areas.
At what point do we challenge the administration's
rhetorical claim that they are abiding by the Taiwan Relations
Act, following the proper FMS process for arm sales, and
involving Congress in Taiwan-related security matters? I
believe that time has come.
The recommendations I would make are relaunching TIFA
immediately, finish the extradition and visa waiver agreements
in 2011, accept an LOR for F-16 C/Ds, notify to Congress at
earliest possible opportunity the phase 1 submarine design,
notify to Congress as early as possible the F-16 A/B upgrade
program, and to restart the sending of Cabinet officers off to
Taiwan.
I hope very many, Madam Chairman, that your chair and your
committee will look to fill the role of leadership where the
administration at present is not. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hammond-Chambers follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir.
Professor Tucker, thank you.
STATEMENT OF MS. NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER, PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF
FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Ms. Tucker. Thank you.
U.S. relations with Taiwan rarely merit special attention
from the U.S. Government, the Congress, or the American people.
In fact, for many years, the level of knowledge about and
awareness of developments in Taiwan has been regrettably low.
The House Foreign Affairs committee is making an important
contribution by holding these hearings; and I want to thank the
chairman, the ranking minority member, and the committee for
the opportunity to be here.
I am told if I knew more about sports I would understand
the value of being the cleanup player here, and I will try to
do that.
We have already heard why Taiwan matters to the U.S.--its
democracy, its highly developed economy, and its security
profile.
I want to underscore three points about security.
First, the Taiwan Straits is the only place in the world
where two nuclear armed great powers could go to war, if not by
intent then by miscalculation, misunderstanding, or accident.
Secondly, Taiwan's geostrategic position astride the sea
lanes of supply and communication are critical to Japan and for
the U.S. Navy's freedom of navigation.
Third, Taiwan is a test of China's intentions and behavior.
It can alert us to continued patience or mounting
aggressiveness. It is also a test of U.S. reliability and
credibility.
However frightening or seductive China is, appeasing it by
sacrificing Taiwan would not be good policy. But I believe the
U.S. will not abandon Taiwan, despite Chinese threats and the
potential benefits involved.
The administration continues to build on policy inherited
from George Bush, Bill Clinton, and their predecessors when it
makes arm sales, shares intelligence, trains the military,
observes military exercises, and conducts wide-ranging
bilateral consultations with military and civilian officials;
when it rebuffs Chinese efforts to destabilize U.S.-Taiwan
relations with demands for a fourth communique on Taiwan and
false claims that Beijing has no missiles threatening Taiwan,
that Congress is eager to revise the Taiwan Relations Act, and
that Secretary of State Clinton accepted that Taiwan is a part
of China.
The administration strongly supports peaceful resolution of
the cross-strait stalemate but only with the assent of the
people of Taiwan. It encourages Taiwan's democratic system,
which, I think, is particularly important since reports suggest
that China is already interfering with the January elections.
And, finally, as a visible symbol of U.S. friendship for
Taiwan, it is completing construction of a new American
Institute in Taiwan headquarters on land that we have leased
for 99 years.
But I believe government can and should do more.
First, it should, as others have said, sell the F-16 C/D
and upgrade F-16 A/Bs despite China's likely retaliation. They
are vital for defense, for the confidence to negotiate, and
admittedly as a tangible indicator of U.S. support.
The government should resume Cabinet-level visits that are
important symbolically but also improve communication and
because I know from my own government service that they educate
officials who have to prepare for the trips. It should grant
better access to the U.S. Government for higher-level Taiwan
officials and approve visa waiver and extradition policies.
I also want to say something specifically about Congress,
and I join the chairman in this with the audacity of hope to
recommend to the Congress that it should restore active
oversight of Taiwan affairs. That was notable after passage of
the TRA but has been minimal more recently.
Secondly, I believe it should intervene to neutralize
political debate and facilitate settlement of the beef
controversy so that we can get TIFA talks going.
Thirdly, it should assist development of Taiwan's
legislature and its other democratic institutions.
And, fourthly, it should educate the U.S. public and its
own Members of Congress about why Taiwan matters.
In conclusion, sustaining U.S.-Taiwan ties will not be
easy, but it is essential. There is nothing inevitable about
the course of Taiwan-China relations. Options remain open. It
would be a serious mistake to appease China and abandon Taiwan.
The challenge is benefiting from, while also controlling,
improved relations with Beijing. Only Taiwan can defend itself,
but it needs the United States as a counterweight to China's
growing power and influence.
The U.S. wants Taiwan stable, peaceful, and democratic for
the people of Taiwan, as a model to others in East Asia, and as
an assurance of U.S. credibility and dependability. Congress
can and should serve the U.S. national interest by more
actively promoting positive development of U.S.-Taiwan
relations.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Tucker follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Excellent
testimony from all of our witnesses.
As we all know, Taiwan is a full member of the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation, APEC, and this forum is a very important
one internationally. The United States will host the next APEC
summit in Honolulu this November, and I strongly encourage the
Obama administration to invite Taiwan's President to the
Honolulu APEC summit along with the leaders of the other APEC
countries, and we hope that that happens.
I wanted to ask our panelists about arm sales. There has
been an unwillingness since January, 2010, by the
administration to notify Congress regarding any foreign
military sales to Taiwan. This has resulted in an ongoing
neglect of Taiwan and a growing disregard for U.S. obligations
under the TRA, the Taiwan Relations Act.
Has China established any so-called ``red lines'' with
respect to potential U.S. defense transfers to Taiwan? And, if
so, what are they? And at present what do you think are the
most pressing needs of Taiwan's military that can and should be
met by the United States through the foreign military sales
process? Is it the F-16s, the diesel submarines, et cetera?
We will begin down the line. Thank you.
Ms. Dreyer. Yes, I think the F-16s would be a very
important symbolic gesture. It is just that the F-16, even in
its C/D version, is not going to be any match for new fourth-
generation, fifth-generation Chinese planes coming on line. I
would therefore very seriously suggest that we get busy with
the submarine sales as well.
I am sorry. There was another question you had there.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. It was if China has established any
red lines with respect to----
Ms. Dreyer. Thank you.
The problem is that China lets us know it has these red
lines, but does not tell us what the red lines are. This fits
in with a very clever propaganda that it uses on its own people
that U.S. scholar Perry Link has referred to as ``the anaconda
in the chandelier.'' In other words, there is something up
there looking at you in the light fixture, and every so often
it moves and you wince in terror, but it never lets you know
what it is. And this induces on the part of the United States
something that you might call a preemptive cringe and----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Ms. Dreyer [continuing]. It works every time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Schriver.
Mr. Schriver. I agree with everything Professor Dreyer just
said.
I have from time to time heard the Chinese describe the F-
16 C/D sale as a red line, but--Professor Dreyer is absolutely
correct--they don't describe exactly what that means, what they
might do in response. Threats they have made in the past about
arm sales have not been realized. There were threats of
sanctions against U.S. companies. The last time, there was a
$6.4 billion package notified. None of those companies that had
commercial sales ongoing in Beijing were affected whatsoever.
And we shouldn't put these things in China's face to challenge
them: Will you really do something this time?
But I think it speaks to the point we should not hold these
notifications so long, sit on them so that pressure grows and
grows and China starts to believe that, hey, we can influence
their decision making, and we can threaten them with so-called
red lines. And it has really warped our process. We should do
these as a matter of routine course, based on objectives,
analysis of the military balance, and just explain it that way.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Professor Tucker.
Ms. Tucker. I think I would underline what Randy just said.
There have been Chinese red lines. There are Chinese red lines.
There are rumors today that China could perhaps tolerate the
upgrades if we divide that into small packages, but the C/Ds
are unacceptable.
I also think that there will always be red lines, but we
have crossed them before. Who would have thought that they
could sit back and tolerate a DPP President of Taiwan? So there
have been a number of things that have happened, and China has
had to deal with it, and I think that this is not that big an
issue that we are likely to be severely punished for it.
As far as which sales, my own sense is that the aircraft
are the most important. Unless we have made a decision that
Taiwan does not need an air force, they have to have those
planes. Their F-5s are falling out of the sky. F-16s are in
serious trouble. They are about to retire the Mirage because
they are too expensive to keep up. So I think aircraft should
be the first priority.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Hammond-Chambers.
Mr. Hammond-Chambers. Yes, ma'am.
On the red lines again, as you point out, it is China's
position that it is a red line. It is not our position that it
is a red line, of course. I think that is essential.
We have an FMS process here in the United States that works
for our foreign military partners. We should use it in respect
to Taiwan and regularize and normalize the armed sales process,
which is not regularized and normalized at the moment.
We have allowed China to start influencing the process, and
I think the nonacceptance of the LOR for the F-16s is an
example of that. It is the F-16s today, and then it is whatever
comes tomorrow. It will be less than the F-16s. The Chinese
will attempt to incrementally walk down our commitment to a
point where it is negligible and then they have free run.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely. Thank you so much for
those answers.
I am pleased to yield to the ranking member, my friend Mr.
Berman, for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Berman. I thank you very much.
Fundamentally, I agree with what both my colleagues have
said, and what the witnesses have said on this issue. But let's
for a second try to put ourselves out there--the chairman
referred to it, in some policy circles, there is a notion that
our relationship and our position with Taiwan undercuts our
interests, oh, because we want China to do more on currency
revaluation, because we want them to be more assertive with
North Korea, because we don't want them to backfill on Iran--
because, because, because, because and that somehow all of
these important concerns aren't being addressed by the Chinese
because of Taiwan Relations Act and policies. And that is why
people are hesitant to do the sales and all that.
Some of you have touched on that, but I would like to hear
you talk, a few of you at least, talk a little more on it.
And I am curious about the extent to which the other
panelists agree with Ms. Tucker's point that basically she
doesn't doubt, even though it is not always so clearly stated
and there is a little bit of ambiguity, that the United States
is committed to Taiwan's security; and implicit in that is the
Chinese know that the United States is committed. Ms. Tucker
didn't say that, but if I am right that that was implied, do
you agree with that conclusion?
Why don't you just take the next 3 minutes, any of you who
want, to dwell on that?
Ms. Dreyer. If I could go first, it seems to me that the
United States needs to assert in some meaningful way that it
does still mean to protect Taiwan's security. It has to do that
by making a gesture, like selling the F-16s.
Mr. Berman. Why, because you don't think that we intend to?
Or because you don't think China thinks we intend to?
Ms. Dreyer. I think some of both. Those are not mutually
exclusive.
Mr. Berman. So you disagree with Ms. Tucker's----
Ms. Dreyer. I am not sure I do disagree with Ms. Tucker.
But in any case, I do think the sale must take place in order
to show----
Mr. Berman. Well, so does she and so do we.
Ms. Dreyer. Yes, in order to show our sincerity, because
there are two ways that the Taiwan Relations Act could
deteriorate.
What China would like us to do, of course, is repudiate it,
which is not going to happen. But things often happen by
inaction. What seems to be happening now is that the Taiwan
Relations Act is eroding through inaction on the part of the
United States to live up to its commitments.
Mr. Berman. Anybody else?
Mr. Schriver. Congressman Berman, if I could address the
first part of your question about what we could expect from
China if we changed our policies on Taiwan because I did
address this in my statement. I think it is absurd to think
that somehow China is currently taking suboptimal positions on
North Korea, Iran, currency to show their annoyance about our
Taiwan policy or that they would take suboptimal positions in
the future as an expression of gratitude if we changed
something. These are very important strategic interests for
China. And we could go at length about----
Mr. Berman. They take their positions----
Mr. Schriver. They are interest-based, and they would not
be altered if we changed our positions on Taiwan. The
atmosphere might be better. There might be, you know, nicer
greetings.
Mr. Berman. Apparently the military could meet more
frequently.
Mr. Schriver. Well, you know, I ran that program for a long
time. It always struck me that if China has ambitions to become
a greater military and more powerful, capable military, and
they are choosing not to interact with the world's greatest
military, who gains and who loses in that equation?
Mr. Berman. Some of our military leaders act like we are
losing.
Mr. Schriver. I have never understood why we would the
ardent suitor in a military relationship with China.
Ms. Tucker. As a historian, I would have to remind you that
talk of abandoning Taiwan is not new. It has happened many
times in the past, and there is no doubt that at least for the
moment, the U.S.----
Mr. Berman. There was a lot of that in the 1950s; wasn't
there?
Ms. Tucker. Absolutely. There was even one Member of
Congress who hoped that Taiwan would sink into the sea so we
could stop worrying about it.
Mr. Berman. Usually, they ask that California to do that,
so I am glad----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The ranking member's time is up. So
I am going to cut you off if I could, just because we have so
many votes coming up. Save that answer for another question.
Mr. Chabot, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Middle East
and South Asia, is recognized.
Mr. Chabot. Once again, Madam Chair, let me thank you for
holding this very important hearing on Taiwan. This is truly a
very distinguished panel this morning.
First let me address the issue of restrictions on
diplomatic visits by high-ranking Taiwanese officials,
something I have always felt was both insulting and
counterproductive.
I can remember joining a number of my colleagues, there
were 25 Members, approximately, some years ago, and we flew up
to New York City one evening after votes to meet with then-
President Chen Shui-bian, a great friend of America. We
traveled to New York--and I think you were there, Dan, if I am
not mistaken--because President Chen could not come to
Washington, DC. I can remember the veiled threats from
Communist China when former President Lee Teng-Hui, another
great friend of the United States, known as the father of
Taiwanese democracy, wanted to visit his alma mater, Cornell,
Cornell University.
And I vividly remember meeting a Taiwanese legislator, Mark
Chen, here in the United States Capitol where he was allowed to
visit. And only a few weeks later, we had to travel all of the
way up to Baltimore to meet with him because he had become the
equivalent of Secretary of State, the foreign minister. And
because of his new position, he was no longer welcomed in
Washington, DC.
Now, the policy that I just talked about is U.S. policy.
That is American policy. That is our Government's policy that
says that they can't come here. This is outrageous. This is
plain nonsense and ought to be changed.
So I will ask the panel, what are your thoughts on that
policy?
Perhaps, Mr. Schriver, you might want to comment as a
former State Department official how these restrictions might
affect our diplomatic exchanges with the Government of Taiwan
if they can't even come here, the President and Vice President,
Secretary of State, et cetera, and before I turn it over to the
panel, let me also ask a question about arms sales. We already
talked a little about that.
I remember when I first came to Congress after the 1994
election, back in 1995, and I was the co-chair of the
Congressional Taiwan Caucus for about 10 years, one of the
founding members of it, there were a few hundred missiles aimed
at Taiwan, and then it increased more. It went to six, seven,
eight, nine. My understanding is that the latest number is
about 1,600 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles aimed at
Taiwan, our friend and our ally.
If you can comment on that and perhaps if you have time,
also China's campaign to isolate Taiwan, whether it is the
World Health Organization, where they objected to them being
there on observer status, or participation at the U.N., or
their campaign to try to get those who still recognize Taiwan
to rescind that and basically bribing these nations to do so.
So any of these things that I mentioned, I would ask any of
the panel members.
Professor, I don't know if you would like to start.
Ms. Dreyer. Thank you. I share your concern about the
absurdity of not allowing official interaction and visits. We
argue under any circumstance that dialogue is good. We dialogue
with terrorist leaders. We insist that meeting with the Chinese
military is good because we need to understand each other. And
yet we deny this to a country we have an alliance with.
As for the World Health Organization, this is one of these
things that has been blown out, way out, of proportion as a
victory for the current Taiwan administration. The way that
Taiwan has been allowed into the WTO is as an observer, which
is on the same status as Hong Kong, which is considered part of
China. And also, it is worse than Hong Kong because it allows
China to agree or disagree to allow Taiwan on an annual basis,
which is, of course, a mechanism for behavior compliance.
Thank you.
Ms. Tucker. If I might, I would say that it has been a
principle of American foreign policy that meeting with heads of
state from other countries is a vital practice. Summitry was
very important during the Cold War. We emphasized it with
China. There should be an opportunity for Presidents to talk to
each other, get to know each other. George Bush looked into
Putin's eyes, and it made all of the difference in the world. I
think that Obama meeting Ma Ying-jeou would be a very good
thing.
But I also want to go back and underline something about
the question of abandonment, and that is that we have talked
about but we haven't emphasized the importance of democracy as
a bond between the United States and Taiwan. If you were to ask
me why the United States will not abandon Taiwan, it is because
of the shared democracy that we helped to nurture, that we
celebrate. I don't believe that Congress or the administration
would abandon a democracy.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. I hate to cut you
off yet again.
Mr. Faleomavaega, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to commend and thank the distinguished members of
the panel for not only their expertise but certainly
understanding of the situation in Taiwan.
Taiwan is in a predicament not by choice. I think we all
understand historically how this whole thing evolved from the
civil war that China was under between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang
Kai-shek. And there was a dream that Chaing Kai-shek had to
someday want to go back to mainland China and take over from
Mao Tse-tung. That is history. Correct me if I am wrong in this
respect.
China and its terms as one of the most critical factors of
the whole Nixon policy and its efforts, which in my opinion
literally changed the course of history, when Henry Kissinger
and his efforts that made, that caused the relations between
China and the United States very understandable, and Taiwan was
one of those issues that to still to this day is still in a
form of ambiguity and not really saying for what it is and what
it stands for.
Now call it what you may; it looks like a duck, acts like a
duck and quacks like a duck. The fact that Taiwan has
diplomatic relations with 23 countries, 6 of those countries
are South Pacific Island countries.
There has also been a consideration to say that Taiwan and
China were conducting checkbook diplomacy to gain the favors
and understanding and appreciation of those countries that they
recognize for whatever given interest that they have between
those two countries and what we have here.
I don't think that this administration is any different
from what President Clinton did when he sent two battle groups,
naval battle groups, to prove to our friends in China that we
mean every bit of the substance of the Taiwan Relations Act,
that we will defend Taiwan at all costs.
Now, I don't know, I am not a genius in military strategic
matters in terms of the fact that there are 1,400 missiles in
mainland China pointing at Taiwan. I really don't know if
selling 66 F-16s is going to provide some sense of safety for
the lives of some 23 million people living in Taiwan. Well, you
say it is for symbolic reasons. But in reality, are we serious
about the fact that selling these arms equipment to Taiwan is
going to give them the capability of defending itself against
China?
I would love a response from our distinguished panel.
Ms. Dreyer. I would say that the F-16 is a capable plane
without being solely, by itself, able to redress the military
balance across the strait. So it will not solve the problem
completely, but it will be a step in the correct direction.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And I believe China also currently has
about 100 nuclear-capable submarines all over the world, and I
suspect in the Pacific--Asia-Pacific region. And the Chinese
are not stupid. Why build an aircraft carrier when you can
build a nuclear submarine that is more lethal and more
dangerous in its capabilities in terms of really when you talk
about serious strategic and military advantage. This is, as it
is to any country, is to defend itself.
Ms. Dreyer. Sir, it is not an either/or. They are doing
both.
Mr. Hammond-Chambers. Congressman, again, I would like to
echo professor Dreyer's point. It is important to not consider
the F-16s simply as the only solution we are proposing. There
are two issues I think at play here. The first is getting the
process moving again, getting things considered.
At the moment, we are not even considering stuff, and stuff
that is supposed to be being considered is frozen in the
system. So it is getting the system moving again so that F-16s
can be considered. If the decision is no, then the decision is
no. But we should at least consider the sale, which we are not
doing at the moment. Submarines, an asymmetric capability, can
confuse--can make it tougher for the Chinese to calculate on
whether or not they should go over to the Taiwan Strait. There
are things that we can do in total and ongoing that can improve
Taiwan's security.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Sure, I know my time is running, but
there is one thing I want to emphasize again. The One-China
policy has not changed from all of the previous
administrations, including President Reagan, all of the way
down even to this President. The fact that this is one of the
ambiguities dealing with the people of Taiwan, and I feel for
the 23 million people living in Taiwan and not wanting to know
the fact that they are not really being treated as a full
sovereign country as a state, but in terms of--I don't know,
international laws or whatever it is, and giving this undue
recognition, as my friend, Mr. Chabot, was saying, it is how we
treat these officials coming from Taiwan. To me it is unfair.
But that is the reality that we are dealing with.
I am sorry, Madam Chair, my time is up. I want to thank the
panel for their excellent testimony.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Faleomavaega.
The chairman of the Europe and Eurasia Subcommittee is
recognized, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want you to know I
really appreciate you holding this hearing. Taiwan has been a
great friend to the United States forever. We need to live up
to our commitments.
I would just like to answer one of the questions that Mr.
Faleomavaega just raised, and that is: Are the F-16s going to
be a deterrent if China decides to launch its 1,600 missiles
and come across the strait and blow up Taiwan.
No, but what it does do is it shows that we are committed
to the Taiwan Relations Act, which also includes defending
Taiwan in the event of an attack. Now, if we don't sell them
the things that we said we would sell them to protect
themselves under the Taiwan Relations Act, it looks like a move
toward appeasement. It looks like we are not going to live up
to our agreements, so China may say, oh, will if they won't do
this, even sell them the weapons to defend themselves, maybe
they won't come in and bring the Fifth Fleet in to defend
Taiwan if it is necessary. I think it is the Fifth Fleet.
But in any event, I think it is important that we live up
to every item in the Taiwan Relations Act, and I think that
sends a very strong signal to China.
I really abhor watching the head of China come to the White
House, get the red carpet treatment, the handshakes, the
dinners and all of the accolades when there are 10 million
people in communist gulags and human rights violations are
horrible, and forced abortions are--abortions are forced upon
people.
I mean, this is not our good buddies. They are our
adversaries, and we need to continue to look at them that way.
They are in the world. We have to deal with them. I understand
all that. But we need to live up to our commitments, and our
commitment to Taiwan is very clearly stated in the Taiwan
Relations Act. I wish it was more than that, if I had my way.
Now, Madam Chairman, Chairwoman, Chairperson--I still have
trouble knowing how to address people--one thing I would really
urge the chairman to do and that is to make a copy of all of
the statements today, because I thought they were all great,
and send them to Secretary Clinton and to the White House and
ask them to read those remarks. I am serious because I think
that they need to take a hard look at what was said here today
and let them know that the Congress of the United States
supports the statements that were made.
The last thing that I would like to say is that I am so
disappointed that this administration didn't come here today to
testify. It shows an absence of concern that is remarkable. We
have dealt with Taiwan, not only in foreign policy but in trade
and so many ways. We don't treat them the way that they should
be treated, and at the very least, the State Department should
have had somebody here to testify and to answer questions
today. I think they were afraid to because I don't think they
have the answers.
Thank you for having this hearing.
Thank you very much, panelists. I thought you were great.
Usually I disagree with two or three panelists, and I jump all
over them. But today, I love you all.
I sure hope that you will send these remarks to Hillary.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Gosh, I don't know what to say to a panel that is loved,
beloved by Dan Burton. Uh-oh. But thank you for your testimony.
Professor Tucker, you were talking a little bit earlier
about, you know, abandonment, and Mr. Berman mentioned in the
1950s, certainly there were Members of Congress who said to
abandon. But I mean, today, in serious public policy
discussions, are you aware of prominent folks in the foreign
policy field, in the Congress and in the administration, for
example, who have given voice to that worry?
Ms. Tucker. Unfortunately, yes.
Ambassador Joseph Prueher, our former Ambassador to China,
led a study group that included Jim Shinn, a former Pentagon
official, and others, who all said it was time to rethink our
Taiwan policy. Even Members of Congress----
Mr. Connolly. No, no, my question was the word
``abandonment.''
Ms. Tucker. Oh, using that word in particular?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
Ms. Tucker. I am not sure.
Mr. Connolly. No. So rethinking policy is one thing;
abandonment is quite another. I just wanted to get that on
record because no one is talking about that.
With respect to--I mean, the title of this hearing is,
``Why Taiwan Matters.'' Why does Taiwan matter to the United
States? Why is it of any critical interest to the United States
in the year 2011?
How about you start, Professor Tucker? All wisdom we know
in Washington flows from the Georgetown Foreign Service School.
Ms. Tucker. Absolutely.
I would underline because of its democracy, because it
shares our values in a region of the world where we would like
to see democracy spread. It is a potential model for China in
the future. Also, it is a strategic asset and potentially a
strategic problem for us if Taiwan was not there, and we
couldn't cooperate with it.
Mr. Connolly. You might also want to say, Professor Tucker,
that there is a statutory framework for the relationship that
is spelled out in law.
Ms. Tucker. Yes. And I think China should be reminded that
we do take our laws seriously.
Mr. Connolly. And that law, also, does it not, addresses
the defense relationship?
Ms. Tucker. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Schriver, you made reference to the F-
16s. I think you may have mentioned, or maybe it was Ms.
Dreyer, that the F-16s are not--even if the sale went through
tomorrow, unfortunately, they are not going to be--their
deterrent--their ability to deter an actual attack, given the
capability on the mainland, is limited. Could you expand on
that just a little bit?
Mr. Schriver. I would make a couple of comments. Again,
nobody talks about the F-16s in complete isolation. There are
many things that Taiwan needs to do to enhance its capabilities
and its deterrence position, and there are many things the
United States can do to support that beyond F-16s, but I would
say that the F-16s are part of it.
Number two, a lot of people who say that the F-16s won't
help, won't do enough because the posture of China is so
overwhelming, they only talk about one scenario, which is the
all-out attack scenario. The F-16s are actually quite useful as
a multi-role aircraft in a number of contingencies, like the
counter blockade, like if there was a battle over one of the
offshore islands and as a ground attack capability.
So there are a number of things that the F-16s can do
beyond defending that all-out attack. Although it is a piece of
the answer for that as well.
Mr. Connolly. That is a very good point you make, that we
cannot look at just one scenario and that in other scenarios,
the F-16s clearly have value. But what about the current
capacity, air fleet capacity of Taiwan? Where are they in their
current fleet?
Mr. Schriver. It is an aging fleet. They are still flying
F-16s, I believe. Dr. Tucker said they are falling out of the
sky. That is literally true. They have Mirage aircraft that
they can't support adequately because spare parts and logistics
are unavailable. Frankly, the F-16 is getting on itself. It is
still very capable aircraft for Taiwan's needs. But if this
decision is not made and the F-16 closes, the F-16 line closes,
we are either going to have Taiwan with no air force, or we are
going to have to consider a more advanced aircraft, like the F-
35, which I would be prepared to do, but I suspect that an
administration that is already reluctant to sell F-16s is not
going to like the idea of an F-35.
Mr. Connolly. I think that is a really good point we can
end on: 70 percent of the current air fleet has to be retired.
We cannot have Taiwan without some air defense capability, and
that means the F-16 decision can't be somehow put off forever.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Rivera of Florida is recognized.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank the
witnesses for their testimony.
I want to start off by letting you all know that I have
visited Taiwan on several occasions, and I am familiar with the
important issues facing Taiwan and facing our bilateral
relations, and also our relations with China. I am particularly
familiar with how important Taiwan is to our Nation as an ally.
China's large military expansion throughout the past decade, I
believe, poses a clear and present danger to Taiwan and the
entire region, a threat that may have implications for the
United States as well, as has been discussed here today.
This administration, I believe as well, has clearly been
pressured by the Chinese to control Taiwan and Taiwan policy in
every way possible. I still find it unconscionable how our
Government refuses to allow any senior leaders of Taiwan's
Government into the United States and into Washington, DC.
China should never, I repeat, never be allowed to dictate
our Nation's foreign policy. And our lack of action when it
relates to arms sales to Taiwan is a clear sign that the
Chinese are pressuring us in order to further China's interests
with respect to defense and foreign policy.
As I have previously stated in this committee, it is
important for the United States to stand with our allies, and I
believe specifically in this case with respect to this hearing
that it is important to note that we must deliver those F-16s
and the diesel submarines to Taiwan. Because the Chinese
military poses a clear threat to the region, it is time that we
commit to helping a great friend like Taiwan and act with them
in providing them these defense systems that is are critical to
their national self-defense.
So let me ask the panel, and I will begin with Professor
Tucker, can you just spell it out for us in plain and simple
terms, what is the thinking in the West Wing, the National
Security Council, what is their thinking? Why won't they help
Taiwan and deliver these weapons systems?
Ms. Tucker. I can't speak for the administration.
Mr. Rivera. What do you think their thinking is?
Ms. Tucker. I do believe that the pressure from China is a
significant factor, and it shouldn't be, as several people have
mentioned. I think there has been over time a sense that Taiwan
is not important in comparison to what China can contribute in
world affairs. I think that is a problem.
Mr. Rivera. So they are basically throwing Taiwan under the
bus because of the larger interests with China?
Ms. Tucker. I wouldn't go quite that far. I do think, for
instance, that the government spokesmen who intended or perhaps
should have been here today, Kurt Campbell and Derek Mitchell,
are actually good friends of Taiwan and have promoted policies
to help Taiwan in the past. So I wouldn't say that we are
throwing them under the bus; but I do think that on a value
scale, there is a lot of concern about China's actions in the
world.
Mr. Rivera. Mr. Schriver, you have been in the belly of the
beast. You know the process over there in the National Security
Council and the State Department at the highest levels. In
plain and simple terms, what are they thinking? Why won't they
support Taiwan and these weapons system deliveries?
Mr. Schriver. I agree with what Dr. Tucker said. I think
there is a growing influence on the part on China on our
decision making. But I use this term ``the tyranny of the
calendar.'' Our administration seems to always look for the
right time to have an arms sales announcement. If you look at
our calendar of activities, we have got the strategic and
economic dialogue in May. We have got Vice President Biden
visiting in July. We have Hu Jintao coming in September for the
U.N. General Assembly. We have got--so guess what, there is no
right time. And then they have to take into account the
congressional schedule, because there are certain days that are
required for a notification. And these things get backed up and
backed up, and then the problem gets harder, not easier,
because then the Chinese are looking at a much larger package
because everything is backed.
So I think they have gotten themselves bollixed up. I think
they need to just--I am sorry, there is not a better way to say
it. They need to be bolder and more courageous and deal with
the Chinese fallout because I think the historical data
suggests we can absorb the fallout.
Mr. Rivera. Well, it seems pretty clear from just the
panelists I have heard that this administration is kowtowing to
pressure for a variety of reasons from the Chinese; and
hopefully they will reconsider those positions and stand by our
ally, Taiwan.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. And batting cleanup for our team,
Congressman Wilson of South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for your
leadership on this issue. I am very appreciative of all of our
witnesses, the recognition of Taiwan as such a significant
friend of the United States. And it is particularly important
to me, my father served with the Flying Tigers in China in
World War II. He was in Kunming and Xiangcheng, too, and he
developed a great affection for the people of China.
I have had the privilege and opportunity of visiting
Taiwan. What an extraordinary country. What a model of
development and opportunity for people in the Far East.
Additionally, I have had the opportunity to visit Beijing-
Shanghai, and I had the opportunity to visit with President
Jiang Zemin at the Presidential compound. He was somewhat
interested to meet me as a Member of Congress. But when it was
announced that I was the son of a Flying Tiger, he stopped the
meeting and announced something very surprising to the American
people, that the American military is revered in China.
And I did go back several years later for the 60th
anniversary of VJ Day where monuments were erected to the
Flying Tigers, to the American service members who saved
millions of Chinese lives.
So my view is that you can be a friend of Taiwan; you can
be a friend of the People's Republic. And I am just hoping that
each can develop in such a way, particularly as democracy,
hopefully, spreads and is developed on the mainland.
With that in mind and that background, since 2006--and this
is for any one of you who would like to answer, and I am
regretful that there is not a representative from the
administration here--since 2006, Taiwan has been trying to
submit a formal letter of request to procure new F-16 C/DD
fighters to replace aging fighters, as you have discussed.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates submitted to Congress in
February 2010 an unclassified assessment of Taiwan's air
defenses, including its F-16s fighters, which stated that
Taiwan faced a diminished ability to deny the PRC air
superiority. Why has the Obama administration not acted in
regard to Taiwan's need for the new F-16 fighters? When does
the President need to make a decision in order to sustain the
F-16 production line?
Mr. Hammond-Chambers. Thank you, Congressman Wilson.
Just quickly, on the industrial base issue--the U.S.-Taiwan
Business Council works closely on this--the line will start to
wind down at the end of this year. Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth
facility will deliver the last F-16 at the end of 2013, but it
requires 2 to 2\1/2\ years of lead order time to ensure that
the supply chain provides the necessary parts. So for there to
be smooth production for any order from Taiwan, the letter of
request really needs to be brought into the U.S. Government by
the end of 2011 for that to take place.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. That is very clear. I appreciate
that.
For each of you, there has been no comprehensive review of
U.S. Policy toward Taiwan since 1994. Many experts believe that
a comprehensive U.S. Strategy and policy review is needed to
adjust to the new realities of the Taiwan Strait and to sustain
U.S. security, political and economic interests in regard to
Taiwan and China. Do you think it is now time for a
comprehensive policy review?
Ms. Dreyer. Sir, that was one of the four recommendations I
made. I do hope that it will be more successful than the 1994
policy review, which in my opinion worsened Taiwan's situation
rather than helped it because it was that 1994 policy review
that restricted the visits. And so a review, you mentioned in
light of new realities across the Taiwan Strait, that scares
me. So I hope this review would be conducted with Taiwan's best
interest in mind rather than the ``new realities across the
strait.'' Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. That relates directly to my next
question, and that is: To what extent does uncertainty about
U.S. security commitment to Taiwan lead to a broader
uncertainty as to America as a security guarantor in East Asia,
particularly we think of DPRK?
Ms. Tucker. I think that is one of the critical issues that
we don't hear a lot from other countries in Asia about what we
should do, certainly not publicly. But privately, it is my
understanding that many of them have said, stand by your
promises. We need to rely on you. And if we don't follow
through on our promises to Taiwan, I think it will have a very
negative effect on a number of friends and allies in the
region.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Payne is recognized. He is the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair,
first, for calling this very important hearing.
The upcoming elections, I am wondering if anyone wants to
try to answer, the Koumintang regime, under the leadership of
President Ma Ying-Jeou, has recently charged 17 former
opposition officials belonging to the Democratic Progressive
Party as violating laws, including the National Archives Act,
alleging that they failed to return about 36,000 documents
during the DPP administration.
Critics in Canada, Europe, Australia, and the U.S. are
concerned about the timing of these announcements, noting that
if there were any documents withheld or missing, an alarm
should have been gone off during the transition period between
the DPP administration and the current government in 2008, not
3 years after the fact and during the current primary season
for next year's Presidential elections. Can anyone here
address, in your opinion, the criticism that the judiciary
process is being used as a political weapon?
Ms. Dreyer. If I can start off with that, yes. That is one
excellent example. Not only the, ``suddenly missing'' 36,000
documents that have been missing for quite some time, but there
have also been wholesale indictments of officials of the
previous administration. The judiciary has been used in ways
that were so irregular that it prompted a series of--I think--
five different letters by human rights advocates and others.
The signatories included President Ma's former mentor at
Harvard Law School, who also expressed his concern. This is
something I didn't have time to address in my oral statement,
but you will find in the written one. In ways that are very
worrisome, the United States' seeming withdraw from support of
Taiwan is having very deleterious effects on Taiwan's democracy
and its civil liberties.
Mr. Schriver. If I could just add very briefly to that, I
think that what is really needed is full transparency and that
there is aggressive oversight on the part of the press,
aggressive response from the international community when they
see things. It is hard to know ground truth. I mean, it
certainly looks like there is something that is not consistent
with rule of law and that the judiciary has not been used
appropriately in certain instances. But I do think that if
there is transparency and this is brought out into the
daylight, the people of Taiwan will respond the right way,
which is to punish that kind of activity. I do have confidence
in Taiwan's democracy and that the people will exercise their
vote, taking these things into account.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
Taiwan, and we all know in comparison to many of the
countries in Asia, Taiwan for the most part currently has a
pretty decent human rights standard, as I said in comparison.
The current President, Ma Ying-Jeou, has contended that he has
valued democracy, freedom, and human rights.
Critics of President Ma and the KMT party, however, have
criticized the current Taiwanese administration as not doing
enough to promote the democratic values and the PRC, and that
the judicial reforms in Taiwan have really not been addressed.
President Tsai Ing-wen, chairwoman of the opposition Democratic
Progressive Party, called for adding human rights in the cross-
strait talks and agreements, and for Taiwan to be more vocal of
the suppression of democracy within China.
Can any of you provide insight into what democratic factors
should be discussed in cross-strait exchanges in negotiations
between Taiwan and China?
Ms. Dreyer. It seems very difficult for the President of
Taiwan, who is constantly being urged to better relations
across the strait, to be chiding the People's Republic of China
on that. I notice that even when our own Secretary of State,
who is in a far more powerful position does that, and
innocently--I think she was innocently suggesting that the
disputes in the South China Sea be settled in a democratic
manner, and incurred the invective of the Chinese Government.
So they don't take well to that.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. I apologize, but
our voting series has started.
Thank you, Mr. Payne. Your time is up.
Mr. Royce, I would like to recognize you, so that you can
ask your questions.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
The question I asked the panelists originally, if we can go
back to that. We have free trade agreements in Asia, about 100
of them. But China has really leaned on its neighbors not to
allow Taiwan to engage in any of those. And as a result, that
sort of steadily erodes the ability to compete and the ability
to be engaged in trade and investment there from the
competitiveness standpoint.
What can we do to move forward on our Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement? That is an agenda that we have with
Taiwan, and how can we use this dialogue to increase the
prospect of securing a U.S. free trade agreement with Taiwan in
the near future?
Mr. Hammond-Chambers. Thank you, Congressman Royce.
On the TIFA, I believe with the present situation with
USTR, the USTR really is looking to Mr. Baucus and those who
are friendly to the beef community to drive this issue.
But there is no counter in Congress. There is no pressure
from other parts of Congress to try and counter the pressure on
beef. And as a consequence, the USTR is acting really with the
sole guidance of one particular constituency on the Hill.
So I think congressional leadership, pressuring USTR to put
beef aside, not to give up on it, but to put it aside and allow
the broader relationship to move forward. Of course, the
benefit would be senior level USTR officials traveling to
Taiwan and the improvement in communication.
And then, of course, the possibility that we could start
putting into place some building block agreements that would
move us close toward a free trade agreement at such time as the
U.S. is ready to start signing FTAs with other trading
partners.
Mr. Royce. Other ideas? Any commentary?
Ms. Tucker. I would just add that it is not an entirely
bleak picture about Taiwan and its isolation in the region.
Since the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement was signed
with China, China has stepped out of the way, and Taiwan is now
negotiating with Singapore for a free trade agreement, and
there is talk about one, perhaps, with India.
I think the one that Taiwan wants most is with us. As I
understand it, that is in your court. I think Congress needs to
deal with free trade agreements from a lot of places and move
forward because Taiwan is not going to get it if Korea doesn't
get it or Panama doesn't get it.
Mr. Royce. That is what we are trying to elicit here. Go
ahead.
Mr. Schriver. I can't quite resist this question to talk a
little broader than Taiwan. Because the hearing is ``Why Taiwan
Matters,'' if we don't have a more aggressive trade policy,
people are going to start wondering will the United States
continue to matter because trade and commerce is the lifeblood
of Asia, and we are in the game right now.
Mr. Royce. Yes. Over 100 agreements, and we are party to
two of them.
Mr. Schriver. Yes. We should do Taiwan, and we should get
KORUS done. And we should be much more aggressive. We should be
a player rather than a very reluctant observer.
Mr. Royce. Thank you. Any other commentary?
If not, Madam Chair, I will yield back so we can go to the
vote.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, very much, Mr. Royce,
because Taiwan matters, but so do our voting percentages. So
thank you very much.
With that, the meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record Notice
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Written Responses from Ms. June Teufel Dreyer, professor of political
science at University of Miami, senior fellow at Foreign Policy
Research Institute, to Questions Submitted for the Record by the
Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the State of
South Carolina
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Written Responses from Mr. Randall G. Schriver, partner at Armitage
International LLC., president & CEO of the Project 2049 Institute, to
Questions Submitted for the Record by the Honorable Jeff Duncan, a
Representative in Congress from the State of South Carolina
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[Note: Responses were not received from Mr. Rupert J. Hammond-Chambers
or Ms. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker to the previous questions prior to
printing.]
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