[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION
IN AFRICA: THE FISCAL YEAR 2012 PROPOSED BUDGET
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 10, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-58
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State............ 8
Ms. Sharon Cromer, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau
for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development.......... 16
Mr. Patrick Fine, Vice President for Compact Implementation,
Department of Compact Operations, Millennium Challenge
Corporation.................................................... 24
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement................. 12
Ms. Sharon Cromer: Prepared statement............................ 18
Mr. Patrick Fine: Prepared statement............................. 26
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 56
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Missouri: Prepared statement...................... 58
The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Material submitted for the record.. 59
GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE
CORPORATION IN AFRICA: THE FISCAL YEAR 2012 PROPOSED BUDGET
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TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
and Human Rights
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. Good afternoon to everybody. Welcome. Thank you
for being here, especially to our very distinguished witnesses.
We are holding today's hearing for the purpose of examining
the administration's proposed level of funding for governance,
democracy, human rights, and the Millennium Challenge
Corporation programs in Africa for the upcoming fiscal year and
to determine our overall strategies for Africa programming as
we move forward.
A large percentage of U.S. assistance to Africa is for
global health programs. Due to the size of the global health
budget and the number of important issues specific to global
health, this subcommittee will hold a separate hearing at a
later date on the 2012 request for global health funding.
As we are all aware, our Nation is in severe economic
distress. Unemployment hovers around 9 percent, even as
gasoline and food prices continue to rise. Our Nation is
engaged in two wars. Meanwhile, our national deficit is
measured in the trillions of dollars, $14.3 trillion as of this
morning, and en route to $25.1 trillion by 2021, according to
the Congressional Budget Office. It is for this reason that
this House recently passed a plan to begin the process of
significantly reducing our deficit.
Recent surveys have shown that many Americans have the
widespread impression that U.S. Government funding for foreign
operations is much higher than it really is. In actuality, our
spending for foreign assistance is less than 1 percent of our
budget. It may seem like more because of the frequent,
unanticipated emergencies to which we respond out of our
national generosity of spirit.
The administration's proposed global bilateral budget for
2012 is $25.8 billion and the Africa allocation is $7.8
billion, representing 29 percent of the overall bilateral aid
request. This bilateral aid request includes funding allocated
for economic support funds, development assistance, and State
Department-administrated international security assistance.
However, it does not include aid administered by agencies other
than USAID and the State Department or multilateral aid. Africa
represents 40 percent of the Development Assistance account, 10
percent of the Economic Support Fund, and 4 percent of the
State Department administered International Security Assistance
budget.
Over the past decade, American bilateral aid to sub-Saharan
Africa grew from $1.1 billion in Fiscal Year 2002 to $8.8
billion in 2010. The largest increases were due to significant
growth in global health spending under the Bush administration
and lesser but additional growth in development aid and some
security programs.
There will have to be some efficiencies made and certainly
some genuine priorities in funding in our overall foreign
assistance program. In this subcommittee, our concern is that
African reductions in funding are not so significant that they
prevent us from conducting programs that have saved lives and
provided the most basic necessities for millions of African
citizens and supported our national security efforts in the
region as well.
It is not because of the generosity of spirit alone that we
conduct foreign assistance programs in Africa, although that
would, in and of itself, justify our abiding commitment. The
United States, however, has genuinely significant national
interests on the continent as well.
In the first quarter of this year, we watched unrest in
North Africa cause oil prices to rise steadily. We face the
prospect of $5 for a gallon of gasoline not only when oil
supplies are interrupted but also on the fear of potential
interruption. The U.S. gets nearly one-fifth of our oil from
West Africa; and with an increasing number of oil fields in
Uganda, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, and other
locations on the continent, Africa has become too important a
petroleum source to merely hope that supplies will not be
interrupted.
Energy security has long been a concern of the U.S.
Government because of the importance of oil to our and much of
the world's way of life. Failed states provide safe havens for
terrorists and now pirates, who threaten commerce and lives.
Somalia and Sudan have long been well known as sites for al-
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to train and harbor
their minions, as well as modern-day pirates operating on the
seas.
East Africa is home to Islamic fundamentalists, some of
whom perpetrated attacks on U.S. Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998 that claimed American lives and many more
African lives.
I would note parenthetically that I chaired the hearings in
this room in 1998. We heard from Admiral Crowe and Assistant
Secretary Carpenter from Diplomatic Security about how ill-
prepared we were and how many at our Embassies had thought they
could never strike here. Instead, they did; and thousands of
people were killed and many more were wounded.
I would also note parenthetically that, out of that, we
wrote what was known as the Embassy Security Act, the Meg
Donovan and Admiral Nance Foreign Relations Act of 2000--and I
was a sponsor of that--that provided authorization for about $6
billion to beef up our Embassies. But the lesson was learned in
Tanzania at Dar Salem and in Nairobi when our Embassies were so
brutally hit by the terrorists.
And as we watch government after government fall suddenly
or crumple under the pressure of popular uprisings, there is
concern that Islamic militants could seize power and create
enemy states where allies now exist. Failed states or even weak
states could become bases for international criminal cartels.
International drug traffickers are increasingly using African
countries as transshipment points. In fact, since 2003, West
Africa has been the source of 99 percent of all drugs seized in
Africa, and those seizures have increased by a factor of five
during that period.
The United Nations has dubbed Guinea-Bissau, one of the
world's poorest countries, as Africa's first narco state. Now
Mozambique, considered a rising economy on the continent, has
become a drug transshipment point as well. The war on drugs has
now shifted from Central and South America and Asia, and that
fact cannot be ignored.
The very air we breathe is partially created by the world's
rain forests. While the role of rain forests and oxygen
generation has been, at times, exaggerated, they are
realistically estimated to be responsible for the production of
some 20 percent of Earth's oxygen. Cutting down the rain forest
in Africa is not merely a local problem for African countries,
it is a global issue for us all. Certainly, we know storms in
West Africa contribute to hurricanes in our hemisphere, so
mitigating the negative impact of climate change in Africa is
our problem, too.
The rise of food prices in recent years is a global
problem. Scarcity of food produced in Africa means the
worldwide shortage also causes our food prices to rise. Even if
we produce enough for ourselves, the market for food is not
limited to one country alone. The demand for staples such as
rice, wheat, and corn affects everyone, and the lack of money
to buy such agricultural products in Africa means African
farmers have their market opportunities limited.
A point has been made that nearly 80 percent of the
strategic minerals that the United States needs originate in
Africa. An estimated 97 percent of the world's platinum is from
Africa, as well as 90 percent of the cobalt, 80 percent of the
chromium, 40 percent of the manganese, half of the world's gold
reserves, and as much as one-third of all uranium. In recent
years, the mineral coltan, largely coming from Africa, has
enabled the development of computers, cell phones, and other
electronic devices. Africans should enjoy more of the largesse
of those sales.
The world would be hard pressed to construct jet aircraft,
automobiles, catalytic converters, or computers, cell phones
and iPods without the minerals found in Africa and, in some
cases, almost nowhere else.
Modern life worldwide depends on a functional African
continent, and our foreign assistance program must be aimed
first and foremost at meeting basic humanitarian needs. We must
help the Africans to help themselves, but in so doing we also
help ourselves.
Our testimony this afternoon will be presented by three
witnesses: Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Johnnie Carson; Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for the
U.S. Agency for International Development's Africa Bureau,
Sharon Cromer; and the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Vice
President for Compact Implementation, Patrick Fine.
Before we hear from our distinguished witnesses, I would
like to yield to my good friend and colleague, Don Payne, for
any opening comments that he might have.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank you
for convening this hearing and for your continued interest and
attention to Africa.
Let me welcome the guests who will be testifying, all of
which have distinguished curriculum vitae.
The objective of today's hearing is to review the
President's budget request for Africa, including bilateral and
regional priorities for foreign assistance. I look forward to
learning about and reviewing the administration's program and
resource priorities in sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa as
well as the basis for projections for these requested funds.
The total bilateral foreign assistance request for Africa
for Fiscal Year 2012 is $7.8 billion, nearly three-quarters of
which is dedicated to global health, which, as the chairman
said, will be covered in a separate budget hearing later this
month. Today, we will cover major priorities, including Feed
the Future, humanitarian assistance, democracy and governance
programs, security assistance, and economic development
programs.
While we discuss the budget for Africa and are keenly aware
of the effects the economic downturn has had on our own
country--and we are all keenly aware of that as we proceed now
in the Congress--we know that this downturn also has affected
the rest of the world. The recent economic turmoil makes our
efforts to strengthen African economies, trade, access to
emerging markets, together with investment in good governance
and democracy, even more important.
We know that the world is deeply interconnected, and
instability in one country will affect the security and well-
being of those around the world. The recent revolutions in
North Africa and the Middle East remind us that food security
and good governance, for example, are not only humanitarian
issues but affect the stability of an entire region. This is a
lean budget for lean times, to use Secretary Clinton's word,
but we must make sure that security, democracy, and good
governance remains a priority.
According to U.N. population projections, Africa is
projected to undergo the greatest population increase of any
world region in the coming decade. People across the continent
are demanding governments that serve them and provide for
better access to world economies in order to provide growth and
opportunity. In this context, we must be prepared for the
destabilizing and complex interaction between population
changes, rising food costs, and climate change.
I am heartened to see that the President's Fiscal Year 2012
budget provides for increased investment in both agriculture
and climate change; and I look forward to your accounts there
on the panel of how you intend to use the requested funds to
help strengthen the continent's resilience to climate disaster,
as well as the slower, equally pernicious challenges of soil
erosion and changing weather patterns.
I also look forward to hearing how the budget will be used
to strengthen Africa's agriculture production as well as
regional markets and infrastructure to ensure that sufficient
food reaches the local population.
While Africa faces great challenges on the continent, we
also find the greatest potential for growth. In countries like
Tanzania, only 22 percent of arable land is farmed because of
inefficiencies in the market. I am interested in hearing how
the Feed the Future initiative will address these issues.
In addition to these priorities, we must continue to work
to stabilize countries that have recently underwent serious
political and humanitarian crises and to prevent further
crises.
In this tough economic climate, we must remember that
investing in conflict prevention will serve us in the long
term. As we all know, a stitch in time saves nine, as my
grandmother used to say. By defraying humanitarian costs,
military costs and lost economic development will, of course,
increase.
It is estimated that every dollar invested in preventing
conflict from turning deadly saves us from spending $60 in
crisis response after violence erupts. We must remain vigilant
about recognizing the percolating signs of political unrest and
nipping them in the bud before a full-scale conflict erupts. We
must strengthen our investment in good governance, democracy,
and conflict prevention.
I look forward to hearing from you how this budget
increases our Government's ability to help prevent and mitigate
crises, specifically the important role of the Complex Crisis
Fund, or the CCF.
The recent uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, where
professional militaries were able to play a pacifying role,
reinforces the importance of security sector strengthening and
rule of law. I am pleased to see the request for a new account,
the Global Security Contingency Fund, to enhance foreign
militaries and provide justice sectors and stabilization
assistance, and I am curious to learn how that account will be
managed operationally.
Human rights activists have long raised concerns that some
African governments receiving U.S. security and
counterterrorism assistance are involved in human rights
abuses. I want to know what steps we are planning to take to
ensure that U.S. security assistance programs do not abet human
rights abuses on the continent.
On the same note, I am surprised to see that countries such
as Niger and Guinea, which are undergoing fragile transitions
from military to civilian rule governments, face steep aid
cuts. I am eager to hear how the administration's choice of 13
aid priority recipient countries match such priorities as
preventing, mitigating, and resolving armed conflict.
And, finally, we must continue to focus on encouraging good
governance, sustainable investments, and strong partnerships
with African countries. The Millennium Challenge Corporation,
the MCC, created through bipartisan consensus under President
Bush's leadership in an effort to introduce a new approach to
foreign economic assistance, works toward all of these goals.
It creates powerful incentives for countries to uphold
democratic and free market principles and to invest responsibly
in their citizens. By upholding standardized principles of
effectiveness, the MCC ensures that U.S. tax dollars are used
efficiently and that partner countries advance toward economic
growth.
The MCC's compact investments compel countries to make
sustainable and substantial reforms. For example, due to the
incentive of the compact agreement, Ghana passed landmark
legislation that will improve access to improved seed
varieties, certified fertilizers and pest-free plants, and
ensure that it is better equipped to provide long-term food
security for the country.
The MCC also encourages reform beyond partnership
countries. It is clear that eligible criteria and focus on
policy performance creates powerful incentives for reform.
Mozambique's government, due to its continued focus on MCC
eligibility, developed an action plan to expand access to
childhood vaccinations, increase primary school attendance for
girls, and strengthen natural resource management practices.
Mr. Fine, I look forward to hearing how the MCC plans to
expand on its good track record and how it will work to ensure
that GDP growth in Africa will mitigate poverty levels. I also
look forward to hearing how the MCC proposes to address
democracy, governance, and human rights concerns that emerge in
partner countries after the compacts are signed.
With economic pressure underlying our Fiscal Year 2012
budget debate, I remain a firm advocate for continued
investment in good governance, peace building, humanitarian
assistance, food security, and economic development in Africa.
I am deeply concerned that many of the calls for cuts in
international spending are based on a belief that the United
States, as the chairman mentioned, spends far more than it
actually does on foreign aid. A poll conducted by World Public
Opinion and managed by the University of Maryland shows that
Americans vastly overestimate the percentage of the Federal
budget allocated to foreign aid, as has been mentioned before,
with a median estimate of 25 percent of what the average
American feels we spend on foreign aid, according to the World
Public Opinion.
When asked how much they think we should appropriate,
percent-wise the median response is 10 percent, a response that
has remained unchanged for the past 15 years, straight line. In
reality, of course, as has already been mentioned by the
chairman, our foreign assistance account is less than 1 percent
of the Federal budget. The budget for Africa represents a mere
fraction of that investment, which yields great returns.
The President's Fiscal Year 2012 foreign affairs budget
request for Africa reflects tough choices and significant
savings in difficult economic times. In an interconnected world
characterized by grave turmoil and uncertainty, this budget
request represents the resources needed to protect Americans
and America's national security interests in Africa. A stable,
well-governed, and developed Africa will be a strong partner to
the United States in trade, in business, and in national
security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne.
Ms. Buerkle.
Ms. Buerkle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just thank you for holding this hearing today. Thank you
for the ranking member's comments. And I just look forward to
hearing the testimony of our three witnesses here today, and I
thank you for being here.
I yield back. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member
Payne. I also want to thank our witnesses for taking the time
out for your testimony today.
As a member of the Budget Committee, I do believe that
tough fiscal times call for tough fiscal decisions that stretch
us to critically examine our values. Having said that, I do
believe that our foreign assistance in Africa delivers
lifesaving humanitarian assistance, provides crucial health
interventions, and creates partnerships with Africans to
improve democracy, governance, and education outcomes.
The international affairs budget is critical to the U.S.
economic engagement with the world, especially at a time when
there is wide recognition of the need to boost U.S. exports to
create jobs. Nearly half of American exports now go to the
developing world, and the U.S. must continue to invest
overseas.
Investment in Africa is a mutual partnership. In the last
10 years, smart American investment in Africa has shown marked
returns. The United States has played an instrumental role in
ending conflicts as well as decreasing the instances of death
from malaria and other preventable diseases. This relationship
has created jobs for American firms and workers who have
benefited from marked growth in Africa. While Africa's future
must be driven by Africans, the United States should play a
major role by investing in our African partners to ensure
economic and democratic outcomes that lead to worldwide
stability and prosperity.
Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
We now have the privilege of welcoming our three very
distinguished witnesses to the subcommittee, beginning with
Ambassador Johnnie Carson, who was sworn in as Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of African Affairs on May 7,
2009. Prior to this, he was the National Intelligence Officer
for Africa at the National Intelligence Council after serving
as the Senior Vice President of the National Defense University
here in Washington from 2003 to 2006.
Ambassador Carson's 37-year Foreign Service career includes
ambassadorships to Kenya, 1999 to 2003; Zimbabwe from 1995 to
1997; and Uganda from 1991 to 1994; and Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs from 1997
to 1999. Earlier in his career, he served as staff director for
this committee, from 1979 to 1982.
Ambassador Carson is the recipient of several Superior
Honor Awards from the Department of State and a Meritorious
Service Award from the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright.
The Centers for Disease Control presented Ambassador Carson its
highest award, ``Champion of Prevention Award,'' for his
leadership in directing the U.S. Government's HIV/AIDS
prevention efforts in Kenya.
Sharon Cromer is currently the Senior Deputy Assistant
Administrator in the Africa Bureau at USAID, a position she has
held since May 2010. She is a senior USAID Foreign Service
officer, with more than 20 years of experience in the
international humanity and development assistance area. From
1986 to 1997, she was assigned to missions in Pakistan, Cote
d'Ivoire, and Senegal. Following these consecutive tours, she
assumed the role of Deputy Director of USAID's mission in
Indonesia. Ms. Cromer subsequently was USAID's Mission Director
in Ghana and later Mission Director in Nigeria.
Upon her return to Washington in 2009, Ms. Cromer served as
Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy Conflict
and Humanitarian Assistance on a temporary basis before
assuming the position of Deputy Assistant Administrator in the
Bureau of Management.
Patrick Fine is Vice President for Compact Implementation
for the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Previously, Mr. Fine
served as a senior vice president at the Academy for
Educational Development and director of the Global Education
Center, where he oversaw education development programs in
countries in Africa, Latin America, and in Asia.
Prior to working at AED, Mr. Fine served at USAID as the
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in the African Bureau and
a member of the Senior Foreign Service for the United States.
Mr. Fine served as USAID Mission Director in Afghanistan in
2004 to 2005, where he oversaw rapid expansion of U.S.
assistance for reconstruction and development. His areas of
expertise include international education, private sector and
livelihood development, development finance, donor
coordination, decentralization, community development, and
fostering public/private partnerships.
A very fine panel of extraordinary men and women; and I
would now like to turn the time to you, Ambassador Carson, for
such time as you would consume.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Carson. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, and other
members of the committee, I would like to thank all of you for
inviting me to testify today on the President's Fiscal Year
2012 budget request for sub-Saharan Africa.
As this is my first appearance before the subcommittee
since the 112th Congress began, I would like to express my very
deep and sincere appreciation to Chairman Smith and Congressman
Payne in particular for their past support of the African
Affairs Bureau and for their many years of dedicated service
and leadership of this subcommittee.
The President's 2012 request for Africa reflects our core
U.S. priorities and interests in the continent. I would like to
highlight those priorities and some of the major policy
challenges and opportunities that we face in Africa today.
We remain committed to five overarching policy priorities:
Strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law;
encouraging long-term development and growth, including food
security; enhancing access to quality health care and
education; assisting in the prevention, mitigation, and
resolution of conflicts; and working with African nations and
leaders to address transnational challenges, including
terrorism, maritime security, climate change, narcotrafficking,
and trafficking in persons.
The Fiscal Year 2012 request of $7.8 billion represents a
10 percent overall increase from the Fiscal Year 2010 enacted
total of $7 billion. This increase is due in large measure to
increases requested for each of the President's special
initiatives. The request for global climate change has
increased by 141 percent, Feed the Future by 20 percent, and
global health by 12.6 percent. Our requests for discretionary
funds to support non-initiative programs is $1.8 billion. They
include programs focused on enhancing democracy and governance,
economic growth, conflict resolution, and transnational issues.
The United States has many challenges and commitments
around the globe, but it is important for us not to lose sight
of our growing national interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-
Saharan Africa is a region where the United States has
benefited from longstanding partnerships and friendships and
enjoys some of the highest approval ratings in the world. The
ties between Americans and Africans are deep and historic. With
few exceptions, Africa is not a place where we see anti-
American demonstrations and rhetoric. That is indicative of the
prevailing appreciation for our country's longstanding
commitment to democracy and human rights and for our steadfast
support in addressing Africa's many challenges and problems.
The spread of democracy in Africa over the past two decades
and the vibrancy of pro-democracy activism across the continent
is further evidence that most Africans share our fundamental
political values. In the international arena, we might not see
eye to eye with Africans on every issue, but, overall, most
governments there have been cooperative as we deal with a
variety of global challenges.
Our economic interests in Africa are clear and compelling.
Approximately 14 percent of U.S. oil imports come from that
region, making it a strategic part of our energy security
portfolio. Imports from Nigeria alone are about 9 percent of
our total oil imports and almost the same volume as those from
Saudi Arabia.
With promising exploration and development in a number of
countries, sub-Saharan Africa's significance for global oil and
gas will only increase in the coming years. Africa's enormous
share of the world's mineral reserves and a rapidly growing
population--which is expected to increase by 20 percent over
the next two decades--will make the countries of sub-Saharan
Africa a major market for American businesses.
Helping African countries, no matter how small and poor,
realize their full potential and succeed as economically viable
democracies is in our national interest. If fledgling
democracies are allowed to fail and undemocratic regimes are
allowed to endure unchallenged, then people will lose
confidence in democracy and free market economic principles,
and we will find ourselves on the defensive in the global
competition for influence, ideas, and friends.
Many sub-Saharan African countries face enormous challenges
to their survival as functioning states, and we must continue
to help them meet those challenges so that they can better help
us as we deal with a wide range of global issues such as
narcotrafficking, piracy, illegal immigration, climate change,
and the spread of infectious diseases.
With our limited resources and personnel, we are managing a
long list of near- and long-term problems that have a direct
impact on U.S. security, political, economic, and humanitarian
interests. Over the last year, we have been actively engaged in
Sudan, Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, the eastern Congo,
Uganda, and Guinea-Conakry. Working with our African partners
and members of the international community, we have made
progress, but political and security challenges remain ahead in
all of those countries as well as others in the continent.
Beyond these fast-moving issues which dominate the
headlines, our Government is trying to address a number of
slower moving but nonetheless high-impact challenges. The
greatest of these is the continued prevalence of HIV/AIDS and
other infectious diseases which have tragic consequences for
economic livelihoods and the social welfare of Africans across
the continent. It is estimated that some 22.5 million Africans
are living with HIV/AIDS, about two-thirds of the world's
total. Millions more suffer and die regularly from malaria,
tuberculosis, and other debilitating but preventable endemic
diseases. Women and children suffer disproportionately. I
realize you will discuss this and other health aspects of the
Fiscal Year 2012 budget request in a separate future hearing,
but it is important to underscore the problems and challenges
of public health in sub-Saharan Africa.
Although a handful of African countries have demonstrated
improved rates of macroeconomic performance and growth compared
to previous decades, the overall poverty and social indicators
for much of the continent are sobering. Ethiopia's per capita
GPD, for example, is only $344 a year. Life expectancy in
Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, is only 48 years.
Basic infrastructure is lacking in many countries struggling to
keep up with their growing populations. As of last year,
southern Sudan, which is expected to become independent on July
9 of this year, had only 50 kilometers of paved road. And food
security remains an ongoing concern across much of the
continent.
I have already alluded to some of the many security
challenges in Africa. There are others, such as the presence of
terrorist groups and drug traffickers in the Sahara and the
ascendence of drug trafficking in such countries as Guinea-
Bissau and Mozambique. Our preferred approach to all of these
challenges is to work through African security and judicial
institutions and develop their capacity, rather than rely on
direct and potentially costly U.S. intervention and
involvement. This approach may be slow and imperfect, but we
believe it is the only truly sustainable one for the African
context, and it is the most cost-effective approach for the
United States.
When Africans take ownership of their own security
responsibilities, we are more likely to have the requisite
trust and political buy-in of key players than if quick-fix
solutions are imposed from the outside; and this buy-in is what
can lead to more durable and sustainable outcomes. To put it
differently, the more proactive we are in encouraging and
supporting African-led security initiatives and solutions, the
less likely we will need to intervene directly ourselves down
the road.
Africa's complex challenges demand considerable time,
attention, and resources, but we must also be attentive to the
significant gains and progress that have occurred in many
African countries over the past decade and which are
continuing. Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, require our
engagement and support to help sustain their largely successful
post-conflict transitions. Helping Africa's most democratic
countries--such as Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Botswana, Cape
Verde, Mauritius, Tanzania, and South Africa--continue with
their political and economic reforms is vital for demonstrating
the sincerity of our commitment to democracy and good
governance, as well as encouraging other countries to follow
their model.
In recent years, regional organizations such as the African
Union and the Economic Community of West Africa and the East
African Community have demonstrated a growing commitment in
censuring unconstitutional changes of power, promoting economic
integration, and addressing regional security problems. It is
in our interest to see that these organizations continue to
build capacity and become more assertive across the continent.
I have worked on Africa for most of my professional career,
and whenever I review the budget numbers I am still amazed at
how our Government manages to do so much with so little.
Roughly speaking, one can easily fit the land masses of the
United States, China, and Western Europe into sub-Saharan
Africa. After southern Sudan becomes independent on July 9,
sub-Saharan Africa will have 49 states.
We have 44 Embassies, five consulates, and several regional
platforms used by U.S. Government agencies spread across sub-
Saharan Africa. Those of you who have been out to the region
know most of these missions are thinly staffed with an
ambassador and only a handful of reporting officers and
supporting personnel.
In closing, I would like to state simply that every dollar
that we invest in helping Africans to address their problems
and better capitalize on their opportunities may not satisfy
our high expectations for rapid and quick economic growth,
development, health, security, and political stability, but
they sure can go a long way in preventing situations from
getting worse and costing us even more money in the future.
And as my colleagues from USAID and the Millennium
Challenge Corporation will detail in their testimonies, many of
our efforts do in fact have a very positive and significant
impact on improving the lives of Africans. It is through these
programs and our vigorous diplomacy that the United States will
remain a critical and key player in Africa and protect and
advance our long-term interests on the continent.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and other distinguished
members, thank you. I will be happy to address specific
questions at the conclusion of the others' testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Ambassador Carson, thank you very much.
Ms. Cromer.
STATEMENT OF MS. SHARON CROMER, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Cromer. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
Payne, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
inviting me to speak today. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Payne, it is
always an honor for the Agency to have an opportunity to share
our work with such great supporters of Africa.
This year, USAID celebrates 50 years of the generosity of
the American people who believe that we can make the world a
better place if we use our wealth and expertise to invest
smartly.
Where can we make a difference? That question drives
everything we do. We are becoming more selective in how we
choose the countries and sectors where we will invest our
resources. Under USAID Forward, we are moving toward practices
that are most effective at achieving development results that
are measurable and real and that create conditions where our
assistance is no longer needed.
In all of our areas of work we are seeking to put in place
more effective, more modern, and more efficient strategies to
get better results and better outcomes. At the same time, we
are constantly in search of science and technology innovations
that will accelerate economic growth and improve health.
Promising innovations in vaccines, clean energy, and
information technologies can produce especially dramatic
results in Africa, where even small-scale or low-cost
technologies can leapfrog traditional development hurdles and
yield exponential development gains.
Today, I will discuss our priorities in Africa, the major
Presidential initiatives that focus on food security, global
health, and climate change.
Over the last decade, dozens of African countries embraced
democracy; and, today, nine of Africa's 48 states are regarded
by Freedom House as full democracies. This is a significant
achievement, and the United States' sustained efforts to
support democracy through diplomacy and development have played
a key role.
The number of conflicts in Africa has also been sharply
reduced. USAID will continue our work until that number is
zero, employing a range of conflict mitigation, peace, and
reconciliation and early warning and prevention mechanisms in
Africa, especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan.
Africa's economies have made measurable strides, embracing
reforms and adopting pro-business policies. Prior to the onset
of the global financial crisis in 2008, Africa enjoyed nearly a
decade of economic growth, averaging 5.3 percent a year. This
kind of growth is essential to reducing poverty. USAID
envisions a world where market-led development replaces foreign
assistance, so our priority is to foster broad-based growth
that will accelerate gains and leverage private sector
investment.
Feed the Future affirms this commitment to advance
prosperity by improving the most basic human condition, the
need for a reliable source of food and the means to purchase
it. Agricultural growth is highly effective in reducing
poverty, especially in Africa, where the majority of rural poor
depend on agriculture for their livelihoods.
The United States' bipartisan commitment to help is a
signature of American leadership. Yet this year more than
350,000 women worldwide will die in pregnancy or childbirth,
and 8 million children will die of preventable diseases. Half
of these deaths will occur in Africa.
Our global work in HIV/AIDS has provided care to 9.4
million people and prevented a quarter million newborns from
contracting the disease.
As part of our women's health programs, we have supported
25 fistula centers in Africa and funded training, treatment,
and counseling. The Global Health Initiative will accelerate
progress toward even more ambitious goals that will improve
millions of lives.
Africa is a continent most vulnerable to climate change,
and we are committed to forging a truly global solution to this
emerging challenge. The Global Climate Change Initiative is
helping countries adapt to this challenge while addressing the
sectors where the effects of climate change will be most
pronounced--food security, health, and stability.
For USAID to accomplish its goals, we must get the most out
of every taxpayer dollar. USAID partners with other donors for
greater impact, as we did with the British in Nigeria to ensure
that elections were free and credible. We are proud of our
efforts with the State Department to support the successful
referendum on independence in southern Sudan. We are also
engaging with regional organizations like the African Union to
support democracy and trade.
Our efforts reap dividends for both Africa and the United
States. Disease and conflict know no borders, and undeveloped
markets limit the potential of global economic growth.
At the same time, we cannot turn our backs on the great
need we see in Africa. The American people have demonstrated
their commitment to responding to the needs of others through
outpourings of donations to families in Japan and Haiti.
Assistance is an American value.
As USAID looks ahead to the next 50 years, we are very much
looking forward to a continued conversation with our partners
in Congress on challenges and opportunities in Africa.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, and members
of the subcommittee. I will be happy to respond to any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cromer follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Ms. Cromer, we thank you very much.
Now we go to Mr. Fine.
STATEMENT OF MR. PATRICK FINE, VICE PRESIDENT FOR COMPACT
IMPLEMENTATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMPACT OPERATIONS, MILLENNIUM
CHALLENGE CORPORATION
Mr. Fine. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, and Ms.
Bass, I would like to begin by thanking you for the leadership
that you are providing to advance American interests in Africa.
Like my colleagues, I have spent much of my adult life living
in Africa, and I know firsthand that America matters to Africa
and that Africa matters to us.
It is great to be with USAID and with the Department of
State to discuss U.S. assistance to Africa and the unique role
that the Millennium Challenge Corporation plays in advancing
American interests by reducing poverty and promoting good
governance in Africa.
If there are no objections, I will summarize my remarks and
submit a full statement for the record.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Fine. Africa is home to more impoverished nations than
any other region of the world. Appropriately, most of MCC's
partner countries are in Africa, where two-thirds of our funds
are dedicated. Although countries in conflict like Cote
d'Ivoire grab the headlines, I have witnessed the remarkable
progress in over 30 years that I have been living in and
working in Africa, and I have seen the vital role that U.S.
assistance has played in increasing access to education,
combating disease, promoting human rights, and strengthening
market economies.
President Obama laid out a clear vision for development
that articulates the strategic, economic, and moral imperatives
that explain why development assistance is vital to U.S.
national security. The President's global development policy
recognizes that protecting our interests and advancing our
ideals requires economic and diplomatic tools, such as the MCC,
USAID, and the State Department.
MCC is a specialized instrument that works with poor but
well-governed countries. Our programs build capacity, including
trade capacity, and strengthen relationships with important
emerging economies.
As you know, MCC only works with countries selected using
publicly available third-party indicators that measure the
extent to which a country is ruling justly, investing in its
people, and providing economic freedom. Making selectivity a
core feature of our business model creates an amazingly
powerful set of incentives for good policy performance. This is
often called the ``MCC effect,'' and we have seen governments
undertake reforms to become eligible for MCC assistance. More
importantly, countries make these reforms before we put any
money on the table. They make them to retain the assistance
programs already being implemented and now, as the first
generation of compacts complete, to become eligible for a
second compact.
Within the context of the U.S. Government's overall
diplomatic relationship with a country and working especially
closely with the Department of State and USAID, we continually
work with our partner countries on policies and practices
needed to ensure the sustainability of our investments. At a
macro level, this means engaging civil society, respecting the
rule of law, confronting corruption, and valuing human rights.
At the investment level, we condition assistance on sector-
level reforms, making it clear that, if commitments are not
met, we reserve the right to suspend or cancel a compact. In
fact, we have a record of doing just that.
Secretary of State Clinton has described development
resting on a three-legged stool made up of government, the
private sector, and civil society. Each leg must be strong, and
they all must be balanced to support the difficult work and
political will that goes into bringing about the kind of change
that expands opportunities and reduces poverty.
The MCC selection process creates direct incentives for
governments to adopt policies that promote economic growth, and
our emphasis on country ownership and placing responsibility
for program implementation on our partner countries strengthens
the other legs of the stool.
We actively encourage participation from civil society
groups in our programs. They must be consulted during compact
development, and they must be represented on the local
governing boards our partner countries establish to oversee the
programs. We also make concerted efforts to promote private-
sector participation. The reason is simple. MCC programs reduce
constraints to economic growth, but it is the private sector--
whether we are talking about small-scale commercial farmers or
the truckers who are transporting goods on improved roads or
large-scale follow-on investments in manufacturing or retail--
that create jobs and income that reduce poverty and put a
country on the path away from aid dependency.
In return for scarce U.S. taxpayer dollars, we advance U.S.
economic and security interests. The emerging economies of sub-
Saharan Africa are the growth markets of the 21st century.
Between 2000 and 2008, GDP per capita income in sub-Saharan
Africa grew by 54 percent when adjusted for purchasing power
parity, which is a lot faster than we thought it was going to
grow when I was living in Uganda back in the early '90s.
Our competitors see these opportunities, and they are
investing heavily. The World Bank expects international capital
flows to the region to be higher than anywhere else in the
world. America's development assistance helps unlock the
potential in these markets, it fosters the personal and
business relationships that grow into mature trade
relationships, and it promotes our security interests.
President Obama has requested $1.125 billion for MCC for
Fiscal Year 2012. We are currently developing programs with
Zambia, Cape Verde, and Ghana. By supporting funding for MCC,
Congress will reaffirm America's commitment to investing in
countries that are committed to their own development.
Look at our track record in terms of the results that
benefit the poor and in terms of the incentives for good policy
performance that create the business environment to allow
countries to increasingly finance their own development, and
you will see this taxpayer money is well spent.
With that, Chairman Smith, I would like again to state my
appreciation for your continued support of results-based
foreign assistance. And we look forward to continuing our
strong working relationship with you, Congressman Payne, and
other members of the subcommittee.
I would be happy to answer any questions that you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Mr. Fine, thank you very much.
And for all of our witnesses, any additional comments,
written testimony that you would want included in the record,
it will be so ordered.
Let me just begin with a basic question to help the
subcommittee gain a better understanding of some of the huge
shifts in funding at both the country level as well as at the
functional level.
I note that some countries will receive overall funding
increases in excess of 20 percent, including Cameroon, DRC,
Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
Meanwhile, other countries will have existing developmental
assistance programs cut by more than half, including Burundi
and Guinea. And Sierra Leone's development assistance funding
will be cut by some 27 percent, and Angola's will be cut by 13
percent. Development assistance programs would be eliminated in
eight countries: Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Madagascar, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Niger, and Togo. I mean, these are, the way I look
at it, rather significant changes in how the money is
allocated.
And on the functional level, just very briefly, looking at
peace and security, counterterrorism is cut by 49 percent, but
conflict mitigation and reconciliation is enhanced by 60
percent. You know, perhaps you could speak to, was the
counterterrorism money not being efficacious or was it better
utilized somewhere else, how were those decisions made?
And then, when we look at education, education is cut by 10
percent, basic education by 3, but higher education by 80
percent. Water supply and sanitation is cut by 27 percent. This
is from 2010 to 2012 numbers.
And, you know, both Mr. Payne and I, since we have been in
Congress, particularly on the water side, have believed, and I
think very passionately, that waterborne microbes and disease
attributable to contaminated water remains one of the leading
killers of children, through diarrheal disease and other
diseases. And I am just, you know, wondering out loud and
asking you a very specific question, how that is justified.
And on the higher education piece, from $25 million to $5
million, it seems rather draconian, but perhaps there is--and I
am sure there is a real method to how you are doing this.
So if you could speak to those functional accounts and how
some of the money has been moved away from some countries in a
total fashion, zero funding, others are getting significant and
beefed-up allocations.
Mr. Carson. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me, first of
all, not try to answer your question by going through and
discussing point by point with respect to each country and each
account. But we can, in fact, provide you with the rationale
for what we have done. But let me try to provide a strategic
overview of what we have done.
And that strategic overview is to essentially provide
assistance sufficient to fund the President's key initiatives
in global health, in Feed the Future, in climate change, and to
ensure that there was adequate funding for those programs.
In addition to that, we have tried to provide assistance to
Africa under the five major strategic categories that I
outlined earlier: Support for democracy and governance and
strengthening of democratic institutions in Africa--there have
been a number of elections that are forecast for Africa going
forward. We want to make sure that we have resources to be able
to commit to help in the democratic process.
Secondly, we have tried to provide assistance sufficient to
help continue to support economic reform and economic
development across the continent.
And, thirdly, we have tried to, as I say, put money into
health care, which is a major initiative of the President.
We have also put money into the prevention and mitigation
of conflict. And we have moved some money that was previously
provided to countries on a bilateral basis under the security
accounts into a regional account, which would give us more
flexibility in using that money to address crises.
And then, finally, we have effectively focused on the need
to work with Africa to deal with transnational and global
challenges.
But we can give you, if it is insufficient now, a more
detailed response as to why we did what we did in each of the
countries that you have outlined, and you have outlined at
least nine countries where you saw major changes.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate that. And we will make it a part of
the record, Mr. Ambassador. And I would agree that, like, in
the DR Congo, for example, I note that you have increased the
amount of money to some $86 million. And that is certainly
needed; if this is going to be a free and fair election, we
certainly have to do our part, along with other European and
other African countries that will be assisting. So it isn't a
matter of trying to find where best to put those moneys.
And I just want to raise and underscore the concern about
the water and the importance of clean water, as well as the
education piece that I mentioned earlier.
Let me ask you, with regard, any of you who would like to
respond, on the trafficking issue, I have read the interim
report that was put out April 5th by the Trafficking in Persons
Office. And it shows some positive progress among numerous
African countries, although some have not made any progress at
all and have actually gone in the wrong direction.
And I am just wondering if you could speak to how well you
work and interface with the TIP Office, whether or not you see
overall progress in combating modern-day slavery, both sex
slavery as well as labor trafficking. And, in your view, is it
getting worse, has it ebbed, or is it getting better, in terms
of our efforts, global efforts as well as indigenous African
efforts, to stop it? And any country that you might want to
highlight that might, you know, jump off the page in terms of,
you know, a job well done that needs to be affirmed and
reinforced.
Mr. Carson. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that the issues of
trafficking in persons is a major priority of the Department of
State, it is a major priority of the African Affairs Bureau. We
work very, very closely with Ambassador Luis CdeBaca, who runs
the G/TIP office at the State Department, and we work very
closely with Under Secretary Maria Otero, whose office oversees
the TIP program.
We believe that our interventions have, first of all,
increased the awareness of African governments about the
problems that they confront in trafficking in persons and that
the criteria that we have put in place, including the tier
rating system, has energized many African countries to take
steps which we believe are important in addressing the
challenges and problems that African countries face.
We believe that we have raised awareness. We have
encouraged governments to pass legislation focusing on
trafficking in persons, to appoint special representatives, to
increase the number of investigations, and also to increase the
number of prosecutions that have taken place.
South Africa is, in fact, a good example. We believed that,
last year, as South Africa was preparing to host the soccer
World Cup, that there would be a dramatic upsurge in
trafficking in persons and in sex slavery. The South Africans
indicated a willingness to put in place a law. That law is
before their national assembly. But they did, in fact,
undertake a number of activities that were designed to prevent
trafficking in persons from becoming a problem, including the
appointment of special law enforcement officers to deal with
it, the creation of special child protection sites in and
around soccer locations, and stepping up the prosecution of
individuals who were responsible for trafficking.
This is a major concern of ours across the continent, and
we take it seriously. And we continue to push African
governments to acknowledge the problem, work against it, pass
laws to ensure that people can be punished, and then to
investigate, prosecute, convict, and jail those who were
responsible. We think progress is being made, not nearly as
rapidly as we would like, but it is being made.
Ms. Cromer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
From 2001 to 2009, we programmed about $145 million in 70
countries to address both sex and labor trafficking. We focused
our efforts on prevention and protection.
In Africa, we are working in about four countries--the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Mauritania, and
Senegal--as the Ambassador said, to raise awareness, to better
understand the issue, to enact domestic anti-trafficking
legislation, and to address the needs of the victims. Today, we
have two countries that are fully compliant Tier I countries--
Nigeria and Mauritius--and 18 African countries that are in
Tier II, making significant progress.
Mr. Fine. The U.S. has done more than anybody else to
combat trafficking. And if you look at G/TIP and the scale, the
grades, the score card that comes out now, that is a game-
changer in Africa. I mean, people pay attention to it. It
influences policy.
MCC works very closely with the State Department and with
G/TIP. We coordinate with them almost on a daily basis. It is
something we give a lot of attention to. And the MCC is a very
valuable asset for the U.S. Government to create incentives for
good policy performance, and it shows up in trafficking.
An example is Lesotho. Earlier this year, Lesotho passed an
anti-trafficking law. And part of what motivated that behavior
was the whole diplomacy that went around the MCC investment
there.
Another example where MCC had a direct impact on government
actions to do something about trafficking is in Senegal, where
the government passed a law against child begging to do
something about the thousands of these young boys, the talibs,
who were out begging, and that had become a corrupted, abusive
practice. And they put seven of these corrupt, sort of false
marabouts in prison.
Now, passing that law--or, it was a decree--making that
decree and taking action against corrupt marabouts or imams
would have been unthinkable 15 years ago. I mean, there was a
lot of talk about it 10, 12 years ago, but nobody would have
thought that the government could take that kind of courageous
action in the face of an established and respected cultural
practice that had been, over the years, corrupted. And, again,
that action was, in part, a direct result of influence brought
to bear by the State Department and MCC acting together, using
the MCC as an asset to advance that dialogue.
So there are other countries where I see policy changes,
where countries pay more attention to it than they would
otherwise because of MCC. Mozambique is an example. And,
Chairman, Mali is an example where not as much progress has
been made as needs to be made but where we certainly have the
government's attention.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
I would just note, in the interim report, the countries,
especially Senegal, that you mentioned, as of April--and we
will get the full report in June--have said that they have made
significant progress in combating trafficking since the 2010
TIP report. So the interim report reads mostly in a very, very
positive way about progress being made.
And I think leveraging the work that the Millennium
Challenge Corporation does is just another way of getting good
people within governments to realize the duty they have to
combat this horrific scourge of modern-day slavery.
Let me just also ask--maybe, Ambassador Carson, to you--the
African Union has complained that it is not being consulted on
international operations on the continent. And that was
primarily focused on Libya. Jean Ping made some very, you know,
strong comments.
And I am wondering how our Government, particularly our
Ambassador, interfaces at the AU with regards to these kinds of
issues. If you could just speak to that.
Mr. Carson. Yes, let me just say that we have tried to work
closely with the African Union to enhance its ability to
participate in peacekeeping and security activities on the
continent. And the AU is now engaged very significantly in
Somalia, where it has some 12,000 AMISOM peacekeepers, and are
working without the support of the United Nations. They are
also a part of the United Nation's Mission in the Sudan.
We, too, have noted Chairman Ping's statements about the
desire of the AU to be consulted more closely on issues related
to Libya. But we believe that the AU is just as committed as
the United States and those in the international community to
bringing about fundamental reforms in Libya that will lead to a
democratic transition. I think that their methods and means may
be different, but their objective of seeing a democratic
transition in which we would see elections and full
participation by all Libyans is probably exactly the same as
ours.
We think that the AU has become a much more positive and
constructive regional organization over the last decade. They
are doing more to speak out and uphold the principles of
democracy and human rights and to encourage economic reform.
And we want to generally continue to encourage them in that
direction.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask three final questions and then yield
for whatever time they would like to consume to my
distinguished colleagues.
First, on AFRICOM, could you perhaps, Ambassador Carson,
speak to its progress? I, frankly, would love to see it located
on the African continent. But, short of that, we are hoping
that, as it looks for a base home, that places like the joint
base in New Jersey would be adequately looked at. And then, of
course, that is something that I will pursue at a different
venue. But let me just--how well is it working? Because,
obviously, there is a great deal of cooperation among USAID and
the humanitarian component of our foreign policy.
And if you could just briefly speak to the transnational
crime issue. That is straight-lined from 2010 to 2012. Do you
see a burgeoning problem of drugs, illicit drugs, as I
mentioned in my opening comments? And is that sufficient to
combat it?
And, finally, I do want to note and congratulate you on the
Feed the Future and the nutrition component. The expectation
here is that it would go up 186 percent, from $34.5 million to
$99 million. I was at the Millennium Development kickoff last
September at a First Ladies of Africa luncheon. And Lady Odinga
and other first ladies spoke very eloquently about the need for
the first 1,000 days--and I know the administration is working
along those lines, as well--that if you care for and provide
proper nutrition from the moment of conception during those
first 1,000 days, the next 25,000 days of that child's life,
then adult's life, will be significantly enhanced.
And we see the polar opposite of that in places where there
is severe malnutrition. And nothing could be more stark than
what happens in North and South Korea, where nutrition has been
denied and, you know, young people are anywhere from three to
five inches shorter in North Korea because of that stunted
consequence of not having adequate nutrition.
I do believe strongly in the politics and the policies of
inclusion. So I could commend you for ensuring that the child
in utero, the child before birth gets that food, that
nutrition, so that he or she, once born and as they go through
their lives, have a greater quality of life because of that
attention that was given to them as they were unborn. So thank
you for that great initiative.
But if you could speak to AFRICOM, if you would, Mr.
Ambassador.
Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, you raise three issues of
significance.
First of all, AFRICOM is 3 years old. It has gotten off to
an excellent start. It continues to work closely with the
Department of State and other agencies overseas. In most
instances, it is in a supporting role. The military in Africa
is an important and critical and valuable institution, but we
recognize that it can do its best work if it is under civilian,
democratically elected, and constitutional control.
Our AFRICOM elements on the continent are helping to
professionalize Africa's military, making them responsive to
democratic control and making them the defenders of the nation
rather than the predators of the nation. We think that AFRICOM
is doing well.
I will not speak to the issue of headquarters location. I
think, when it was established 3 years ago, there was much
discussion about whether it should be on the continent. I think
that was an issue that distracted it from doing the kind of job
that we all want it to do.
I only note that the United States Government only has one
of its combatant commands outside of the United States
territorial geography, and that is the European Command. I
think AFRICOM is in a good location. I leave it to DOD to
determine whether it should be a different location.
With respect to transnational crime, we are very, very
concerned about transnational crime. If we had been sitting in
this room 20 years ago, we would not have been talking about
the movement of narcotics through West Africa into Western
Europe, we would not have been talking about narcotrafficking
states. But yet, today, some 50 percent or more of the drugs
that are landed in Western Europe transits through West Africa.
Most of this is cocaine coming out of Central America,
going across the Atlantic, and taking advantage of porous
borders, weak security institutions, and corruption to get into
West Africa and then move on to Western Europe and, in some
cases, even from Western Europe back into the United States.
One the reasons why we continue to focus on the need for
strong democratic institutions and good governance is to be
able to deal with issues related to crime and narcotrafficking.
It is not just, however, a West African problem; it is also a
problem in East Africa, as well, in a different kind of way,
where the airports of Addis Ababa and Nairobi and the port of
Mombassa are used as transshipment points for heroin coming out
of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Because of the strong airline
links and good airport facilities, we see heroin moving through
those areas. And in southern Africa, we see particularly the
emergence of a culture of synthetic drug manufacturing, again,
moving out from there into the Middle East and Western Europe.
It is important that we work with African states to
increase their level of awareness about the threat that
transiting causes, about the threat that illegal money coming
out of drugs causes, and undermining governments, and the need
to improve their customs, police, and anti-drug authorities. We
have worked very hard with African countries on this and will
continue to do so.
You also raised a question about Feed the Future. Feed the
Future is only in its second year, which means that it is still
very, very much a new program and a new initiative. But the
administration is determined to do everything that it possibly
can to help Africa increase its agricultural production.
Both the President and the Secretary of State have spoken
eloquently about the need to help Africa create the green
agricultural revolution that helped to transform agriculture in
Asia and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. That
agricultural revolution has largely eluded Africa, and because
of that, Africa remains one of the food-dependent and deficit
continents in the world.
And so there is a genuine need to help at the lower end to
end hunger at the household and village level, and at the upper
end to help Africa use agriculture as a basis for sustained
economic development through major agricultural exports and the
creation of agro-industry, not so much to compete against
American markets but to go into places like the Middle East and
South Asia, where there are burgeoning populations, little
arable and agricultural resources, that, in fact, could benefit
from larger agricultural exports from Africa.
Ms. Cromer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was just going to add, with regard to Feed the Future,
that one of the criteria for selecting countries under Feed the
Future is their own commitment to substantial proportions of
their own resources going into agriculture and economic and
social development.
In Africa, it was truly a country-owned, country-led
effort, with countries developing the Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Programme, CAADP, which set forth their
plans for agricultural development. And so this is not simply a
U.S. initiative, this is a true partnership. And I think it is
unique in that sense.
Mr. Fine. Feed the Future is a USAID initiative, but it is
one where MCC works very closely with USAID to advance the
objectives of food-secure nations. In fact, over 40 percent of
our investments are in the agricultural area. And there are
great examples of real tight coordination, meaningful
coordination, and whole-of-government approach between USAID
and MCC to ensure that investments in agriculture get the full
synergy of U.S. engagement.
A good example is in Mali, where MCC is investing in an
irrigation program and has converted thousands of hectares of
bush, of unproductive bush land, into now thriving rice fields.
And it is phenomenal to see the difference and to see hundreds
of people who had no real livelihood before now become
successful rice farmers, generating thousands of tons of rice.
Now, that infrastructure investment and some of the
training of farmers has been done by MCC. We have an agreement
with USAID where USAID's program is going to come in and work
in the same area to do follow-on training with farmers and to
work to make sure that the agricultural inputs, that the market
linkages are all in place so that that investment is
sustainable over a long term. So it is a good example of our
organizations working together.
Mr. Smith. Ranking Member Payne?
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
It is really very interesting to hear your responses to the
questions.
And, as you have indicated, I think, Ambassador Carson,
that it would be very difficult. I had a number of specific
questions regarding why things are done in one country. First
of all, we realize that there is a budget crunch; therefore,
decisions have to be made. However it is--and I certainly will
not ask you to try to go into the rationale for these. However,
at some time in the future, could you give us a general view of
how determinations are made?
For example, you take Chad and Mauritania, both are
impoverished countries with a history of authoritarian and
military intervention in politics. They were also among the 10
countries participating in the U.S.-led Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership, the TSCTP.
Now, I just wonder, are you concerned by, one, there is
proposed cutting to bilateral economic and democracy-promotion
assistance to these countries, but we are continuing or
increasing the military assistance, and would the enemies of
the U.S. make the U.S. seem to be more vulnerable to
accusations of militarizing foreign aid in the Sahel, for
example?
So, you know, there are a number of questions that some of
the countries, like Niger, you know, there are 13 priority
countries for the U.S. assistance in Africa as well as 5
foreign assistance priorities. In some cases, there are
incongruencies, in my opinion. For example--I am not being
critical. I know it just, like I said, a very difficult thing
to try to figure out.
For example, you state that it is a U.S. foreign assistance
priority to strengthen democratic institutions and prevent
armed conflict. However, the State Department, not you, but the
administrators, propose cutting the Governing Justly and
Democratically program in Niger and Guinea. And these are in
the middle of fragile transitions from military to civilian
rule. Both of them are very, very, as you know, fragile. Niger
has, as you know, a continued drought in one part of the
country, water in another part. One part has had no rain for
maybe a decade. But they are in the middle of this transition
from military to civilian rule. As well as Sierra Leone, which,
as you know, the horrible situation they had. They are in the
post-conflict era.
So, you know, I just wonder how the administration proposal
to cut aid in Fiscal Year 2012 to several African countries
affects those U.S. policy priorities? And what is the expected
impact of our bilateral relations with affected countries? Do,
like, proposals in Fiscal Year 2012 aid cuts to transitional
countries risk jeopardizing the fragile democratic gains?
So, you know, I could go all over the continent and pick
out three or four more. But I just wondered, some basic kind of
rationale, a simple one. You did say that you could deal with
it later, and I don't want to spend a lot of time on--it
doesn't seem like nitpicking. I mean, they are countries. But,
you know, how the determination is made, other than I guess the
big fact is that there is a scarcity of funds to do really what
you want to do. And I certainly recognize that.
Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, let me respond by not trying to
go down in detail as to the rationale of all of these, but it
is important to say several things.
One is, we are not trying to militarize our policies in
Africa. That would be contrary to our desire to strengthen
democratic institutions and promote democracy and good
governance.
In all of the countries that you have mentioned--
Mauritania, Niger, and Chad--over the last 2 years, we have
worked enormously hard to promote better democratic
institutions and governance in each one of those.
Two years ago, I personally was very much engaged with our
partners in Senegal and in ECOWAS to help Mauritania move back
away from a coup which had brought in a military leader to a
government which is now recognized as one which is far better
and which is oriented democratically. The same thing is true of
Niger, where we first had a civilian usurpation of power, then
a military coup d'etat, and then finally, just months ago, an
election that returned that country to democratic rule.
We, in both the instance of Mauritania and in the instance
of Niger, cut substantially our assistance programs because
these governments had been taken over by military authorities.
Both of them are now back under the control of civilian
leaders.
We want to do as much as we can to continue the political
and democratic progress that is under way in both of those
countries, and don't look forward to reducing our assistance,
but look forward to maintaining it and doing things that we
previously were doing that had to be cut off. This is
particularly true of Niger.
But at the same time that I say this, both of those
countries border the Sahelian region, where there are issues of
terrorism and politically inspired kidnapping. And we believe
that it is important not only to work with these governments to
strengthen their democracies and improve their economic
performance, but also to assist them in dealing with the spread
of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which has, in fact, become
a problem to states in the region.
I didn't say anything about Chad. Chad has just had
elections, as well. And we think that the Chadians have,
themselves, done some very good things over the last 2 years in
helping to defuse the tension along the Chadian-Sudan-Darfur
border. But more needs to be done to help that country improve
its civilian democratic institutions, as well as to live up to
some of the economic potential that it has but has not yet
realized.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
I agree with you on Chad. Just the manner in which they
welcomed Darfurians into an area that was challenged for water
in the first place, and having the influx of hundreds of
thousands of people. I went out to some of those camps when
they first arrived there, and do have to give the Chadians
credit for accepting them in and trying to help provide for
them. We know that, like I said, President Deby has a little
work to do, but I think, overall, in my opinion, that they tend
in the right direction.
The question of elections--we have seen this trend in
Zimbabwe where the strong man loses and then they want to have
a coalition government. Now, you have always pushed that there
should be--you know, this shouldn't be winner take all, and
there should be some recognition for other political parties.
But I was starting to get a little concerned when I started to
hear not our administration but others in Cote d'Ivoire talking
about, well, maybe there needs to be a shared government
between Ouattara and Gbagbo, which would have certainly sent
another bad trend. Even Kenya's shared government, to me, is
not--the President tends, in my opinion, to have much more
power than the Prime Minister, Odinga. And so I don't think
that--and I am glad that the Ivoirian situation was resolved
without the way of this--well, this Rodney King-type thing, you
know, we can all get along, because the one who is really in
charge tends to exert most of the power.
Having said that, we have just seen a Nigerian election,
which I think was better than the one 4 years ago but left a
lot to be desired. I think the fact that Gbagbo had to be
removed--because if that was going to be the trend with the 16
elections in 2011 and the number of important elections coming
up in 2012--Liberia, Congo, DRC, Kenya, Senegal, Sudan--I don't
know about Sudan, but those five--we really need to ensure that
the whole democracy question moves forward.
Now, I know that the funds are not available--I think in
the first election in the DRC, we, I think, had about a $30
million budget, something like that, I mean, an enormous
budget. Now I hear we have maybe $2 million or $3 million or $4
million. So the outcomes are certainly--as you know, the DRC
had to get South Africa to fly helicopters in to leave ballots
in places that you couldn't get to. So I kind of wonder how
these elections will turn out.
So I just wonder, how can the U.S. best work to ensure that
the elections held in countries that benefit from less
international attention go smoothly? Are we working with our
partners in the EU or other donor and potential donor
countries, Japanese or the Koreans, or other people to see how
we can have them perhaps assist in the cost--you know, as we
all know, democracy is very expensive. You know, you save a lot
of money when you don't have to have elections, but that is not
the right thing to do.
And so, is there any approach to try to encourage other
countries to have the concern that we have and have had--great
job being done by the NED all over the world.
Anyone could try to answer that.
Mr. Carson. Congressman Payne, thank you very much for your
question.
We have focused a great deal on strengthening democracy,
and I think, over the last 2 years, our track record in support
of that has been pretty good. Let me give you four quick
examples and then talk a little bit about the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
Deputy USAID Assistant Administrator for Africa Sharon
Cromer mentioned Nigeria. And Nigeria is important; it is most
populous state in the continent. In 2007, it held deeply,
deeply flawed elections where maybe 10 or 15 percent of the
population actually cast a vote for the presidency. The
elections in 2007 represented a continuing decline in electoral
participation and credibility. In 1999, that country was
returned to the civilian rule. Those elections were so-so;
2003, again, a decline; 2007, we are there.
We were determined to do as much as we possibly could,
working with the Nigerian Electoral Commission, to ensure that
the elections that took place in 2011 were a substantial and
significant improvement over 2007 and 2003 and 1999. Working
jointly with DFID, the British aid agency, we came up with some
$35 million. Our assistance helped to fund local observation
groups, to put in place a parallel vote tabulation system, to
provide technical assistance of a global nature to the newly
appointed electoral commissioner, Professor Jega, and to ensure
that we were able to do things that would help ensure that
election.
I went out to Nigeria myself during the first round of
elections and traveled in three states to see for myself what
had happened. And I am very pleased that Nigerians responded in
very large numbers to an opportunity to vote in that country
for the very first time in many years. It was not without
technical hitches and problems, and it was not without violence
after the second round, which was the Presidential round. But I
can say that it was indeed a substantial and significant and
clear improvement over what had gone on in 2007.
We pushed very hard, along with Nigerians in civil society
and those in government, to help make this happen. Having done
that, we cannot turn our backs on Nigeria. We have to make sure
that we continue to work.
But Nigeria is not the only example. Niger, which has held
successful elections this year as well, saw a return to
civilian rule after approximately 15 months of military
takeover. The former President, Tandja, the last civilian
President there, overthrew the decision of the Supreme Court,
overthrew the decision of his legislature, and overthrew the
decision of many around him when his term had ended and he
decided to stay on. There was a military coup, and, as a
result, we were one of the very first to step in, pulling out
our Peace Corps program, stopping our MCC program, and
suspending our aid.
Our Ambassador took a very tough, early line and said this
would not be acceptable. We also said that we would not, in
fact, go back in unless there was a civilian government. Again,
we stepped in, we played a useful role, working with Nigeriens
who were committed to democracy in that country, working with
some military officers who were determined, themselves, to move
back into a civilian situation. And we also, I might add, cut
off our assistance to the Nigerien military and to their
participation in the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Program.
They responded. Again, working with ECOWAS as well in this
process, with General Abubakar, President Abubakar, who had led
the transition to democracy in 1999 in Nigeria, worked very
closely with him. Again, we were a part of that successful
effort, again, working behind African initiatives.
The same thing can be said in Guinea-Conakry, where, for 50
years, under several different leaders, that country had not
had a free and fair election. After the death of President
Conte, a military junta came to power. But we worked very
closely with ECOWAS, with President Blaise Compaore from
Burkina Faso, with the Moroccans, and also with the French to
ensure that there was a transition in that government, as well.
I, myself, went out and met the head of the military junta and
worked with Blaise Compaore, with the French and the Moroccans,
and with ECOWAS to ensure the kind of transition that occurred
there, again, driven largely by our concern about a military
that was carrying out gross violations of human rights.
And let me say on the Ivory Coast, we have been
extraordinarily engaged on this issue, as well. From the very,
very beginning, we have said that we would not accept an
arrangement in which the victor of the election, now-President
Alassane Ouattara, would have to share power with the person
who stole the election--never been our position.
It is not very well known, but both President Obama and
Secretary Clinton were both very clear from the very beginning.
President Obama attempted to talk on two occasions with
President Gbagbo early on in this crisis, in December and
January, to encourage him to step aside. The effort was also
made by Secretary of State Clinton, as well. We offered, among
others, an opportunity for Gbagbo to leave and to step aside
and even to come into the United States. We also sought friends
of Mr. Gbagbo here in the United States to reach out to him.
And, of course, he did not accept any of those offers.
But never, never on the table was a compromise in which we
would subject him to having to do what Morgan Tsvangirai has
done in Zimbabwe and, I might even add, what Prime Minister
Raila Odinga has done in Kenya. It was clear that Alassane
Ouattara won that election, and we stood beside and behind
ECOWAS and the decision by ECOWAS that Alassane Ouattara had
won that election, again, working very closely with ECOWAS and
the leaderships in West Africa on this. But we were very strong
behind Choi and ECOWAS and the U.N. on this issue of the Ivory
Coast.
There are some 16 Presidential contests for Africa slated
for this year across the continent. Many of them, like Nigeria
and Niger, have already taken place, but there are other big
ones coming up over the next 6 months. We expect Cameroon to be
one; we expect Liberia to be another. But the next really big
one will be in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
We will focus as much political attention on trying to
ensure that the elections in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo are a step forward, not a step backward, in democracy,
and that they, too, will provide not fewer but more Congolese
to be able to participate in the process, have confidence in
the elected leaders who come out of it, and can build on this
set of elections coming this year to make greater progress in
democracy but also open the door for development.
We are not stepping back from these. There is a strong
commitment on our part to do as much as we can. It is important
that democratic institutions be strengthened across the
continent. They empower people economically and they empower
them to unleash their ability to lean forward and to contribute
to the growth of their societies.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. I think my time has
expired.
I won't ask a question for an answer, but in concern about
Abyei and a solution to Sudan--like I said, we don't have time
for an answer--but I don't think that we should take the
pressure off the Government of Khartoum until Abyei and all of
those issues are resolved, because we can have something like
we had in India and Pakistan going on for 60 years in the
future.
Secondly, hopefully, we can keep an eye on Somalia. As you
know, I have a lot of investment in Somalia. We have to
maintain that whole peninsula for a democratic-elected person
or we are going to have more chaos than we can ever dream of.
If you think piracy is something now, let the TFG go out of
power and al-Shabaab take over with the support of al-Qaeda.
And finally, the issue of--I mentioned Sudan and Somalia.
Just finally--and I am a pacifist, but I think that there ought
to be some attention--Kony should not, after 22 years, still be
able to roam around Africa. I think there ought to be a little
SEALs project--we might want to get him alive, but that man
should not be allowed for 20-something-plus years, to
terrorize, to maim, to kill, to brutalize, and he still goes
on. To me, he is the number one terrorist in the world.
So, like I said, I have already abused my time, so I won't
ask for a question, but I just wanted to get that on the
record.
Thank you.
Mr. Carson. Let me respond very, very quickly, if I could,
on Sudan.
We absolutely agree with you, Congressman Payne, that it is
absolutely critical to resolve the remaining issues of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Abyei must be resolved. A
political solution has to be found. If it is not resolved, it
could become a festering sore that could lead to a new
conflict. We don't want to see that happen.
The other issues that must be resolved are related to oil
and wealth sharing, to citizenship and naturalization, also, to
borders and the resolution of five border issues, and, finally,
the issue of debt.
The clock is ticking very, very rapidly. Southern Sudan is
slated to receive its independence on July 9. We are working as
hard as we can under the leadership of Ambassador Princeton
Lyman, who is the Secretary and the President's Special Envoy
on Sudan, to resolve these issues. We are working with
President Thabo Mbeki and the high-level panel, as well as with
the U.N. and its Special Representative, Haile Menkerios. But
we believe that it is absolutely critical that we do as much as
we can to resolve all of these issues before July 9 so that
they do not become festering problems that could in fact lead
to new conflicts and disagreements and ongoing tension in the
future.
On Somalia, we recognize the enormous problems that Somalia
has caused. We see Somalia not only as an imploded state which
has caused enormous problems for the Somali population, but we
see Somalia as a cancer, in a sense, that has metastasized
regionally, generating hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees
traveling across the border into Kenya, across the Red Sea into
Yemen. The number of Somalis leaving that country probably is
in excess of 6,000 a month. It is also generating not only
refugees but illegal trading, illegal arms movements.
But Somalia has become more than just a regional problem.
That regional cancer has metastasized into a global one. And we
see that manifested in multiple ways, but in the way that we
see it most clearly is in the piracy on the high seas. Piracy
is not a result of issues that are happening in the waters of
Somalia, but because there is no government, there is no
security force, there are no judges and no laws to punish
pirates, but, more importantly, no economy to prevent or to
have some other alternative.
But we see it also in terrorism, and the fact that there
continue to be in Somalia remnants of the al-Qaeda East Africa
cell that was responsible for the destruction of the American
Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Salem in August 1998.
So Somalia is a domestic problem, a regional problem, and a
global problem; and we need to continue to work on that. We
have a dual-track strategy that we are focused on in which we
are continuing to help AMISOM and help the TFG stand up. But we
also are working with those local entities in south central
Somalia that are not affiliated with TFG but are anti-al-
Shabaab. We are looking for opportunities to work with them.
And we are also stepping up our engagement in working with the
regional authorities in Puntland and in Hargeisa and
Somaliland. So we have not taken our eye off the ball in
Somalia. It is a complex issue, but we are very much focused on
trying to deal with it.
With respect to Uganda and Joseph Kony, we know that he has
been around for a long time and over that period of time has
caused a great deal of hardship not only in northern Uganda
from where he comes but also in the northeastern part of the
Congo, the Central African Republic, and even parts of southern
Sudan from time to time.
Under legislation that was passed by the Congress last
year, we have, in effect, stepped up our own engagement in
activities and assistance to the Ugandan authorities to help
them track Kony in the Congo and the Central African Republic.
In the process, we have tried to help to strengthen not only
the Ugandans but also the regional capacity in the Congo and
also in the Central African Republic.
There are a lot of things--I won't go into them in detail--
that we are doing to assist the Ugandans, and we will continue
to work as effectively as we can with them and with others in
the region to strengthen their capacity to go after this man
and to deal with him. It is an enormous area, it is the size of
Texas, and when you only have 2- or 3,000 people trying to do
it, it is a difficult job. I think that over the last 2 years
we have dispersed his forces and degraded his threat capacity,
even though he continues to be a problem. We have to support
the Ugandans as they continue to pursue him.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
I wanted to ask one of the panelists to comment a little
bit more about the transnational crime in Africa.
Reference was made to the cocaine trafficking from South
America to West Africa, and I think you also mentioned
Afghanistan and heroin traffic. I am assuming, but I don't
know, that these South American cartels are responsible for the
cocaine, and I was wondering who is it that is involved in the
trafficking in Africa of the heroin from Afghanistan.
Mr. Carson. The traffickers coming out of Central America
are some of the same traffickers who have tried to penetrate
the U.S. for many years. As our defenses have become stronger
and tighter, those networks have moved across the Atlantic into
West Africa and have begun to penetrate Europe and, as I say,
in very small quantities even come transatlantic from Europe
into the United States.
We can have someone come up and give you a thorough
briefing on it, but some of these are the same networks. The
reason why we know this to be a fact is because we have worked
with a number of African countries who have successfully made
arrests of narcotraffickers from Central America----
Ms. Bass. Central or South? Central America?
Mr. Carson. Central and South. And they have been turned
over to Federal law enforcement officials, brought back to the
United States where they have faced prosecution.
We have gotten excellent cooperation from the Liberians,
from the Ghanaians, from the Sierra Leoneans; and there have
been reported published cases of individuals as they have been
busted for trying to suborn and to illegally influence or
corrupt officials in West Africa. They have made arrests, and
they have turned these individuals over to the United States.
In East Africa, the problem is very different. Again, there
it is traffickers trying to take advantage of air links and
networks into probably the two best airline hubs in the East
African Community that have links with the Asian subcontinent
and also with Europe.
And so it is just transiting and trafficking of a different
sort, mainly through the airports and through the ports; and it
is in fact again heroin and not cocaine.
Ms. Bass. In which countries in East Africa?
Mr. Carson. The two that are used are, of course, the two
that have the best airlines and the best airports and the best
connections, and that is Ethiopia and Kenya. Because you have
daily flights in and out of both of those airports into the
Middle East, and they have excellent connections into Western
Europe and on. So they are simply transit points for
transshipment there. It is on a different level than what is
happening in West Africa, which, obviously, West Africa is far
more troubling and concerning.
Ms. Bass. So the administration has requested an increase
in funding for transnational crime, and I wanted to know what
type of programs does the new funding envision?
Mr. Carson. Yes. The increase is quite substantial. There
is a 352 percent increase. It jumps from, Fiscal Year 2010,
funding of $2.2 million to over $10 million in the Fiscal Year
2012 request.
Ms. Bass. So I wanted to know what type of programs that
funds. I see the increase but wanted to know what programs are
envisioned for that funding and where?
Mr. Carson. Well, let me say that it is training, it is
investigation, it is forensics, it is enabling the capacity to
increase border security, customs investigations, and
techniques for detection both at airports and at seaports. Some
of this is also used to create what are called ``vetted''
narcotics units, locally staffed and trained but with
individuals who are highly skilled and who are able to operate
against international syndicates that operate these rings.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Just one final question, if I could, Mr.
Ambassador.
Ethiopia, if I am not mistaken, if I am looking at this
number right, is slated to get $608 million in the 2012 budget,
pretty much current levels. And I am wondering, how does
Ethiopia's 2009 law that empowered the Meles government with
new authorities over NGOs if those authorities received at
least 10 percent of their funding from overseas, and that would
include the Diaspora, how does that affect our funding for NGOs
that promote human rights and democracy?
Mr. Carson. This is a piece of legislation--I think it is
the NGO Act--that we have talked with the Ethiopian Government
about on a number of occasions. I myself have talked to
officials at the highest level about this legislation; and we
have said that we believe, in our own estimation, that it
constrains the ability of NGOs to carry out the full range of
activities that they would like to do and that it is a
constraint. We hope that at some point this legislation will be
reviewed.
But the Ethiopian Government does have it on the books, and
they say that their desire is to create indigenously funded
organizations and not organizations that are dependent on funds
from the outside. Our belief is is that there should in fact be
more latitude and that if organizations can secure outside
funding for what are responsible civil society organizations
that are not in contravention of any laws that are undermining
the state that these things should be considered. But we talk
about this issue with the Ethiopian Government.
Mr. Smith. But I think it is clear that constraint is the
design. That is why the law was enacted in the first place. How
does that affect those organizations, particularly the human
rights organizations, civil society organizations that want to
promote true pluralism and really want to hold the government
to account? Does that restrain our ability to fund those
organizations?
Mr. Carson. It certainly doesn't restrain our ability to
talk with them, to engage with them, and that is important.
There is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has
come.
Mr. Smith. Victor Hugo.
Mr. Carson. But let me just say that those organizations
continue to operate in Ethiopia. They have not been barred. I
suspect that many of them would like to have greater outside
funding and assistance, but they continue to exist; they are
not prohibited or barred. And, as I say, we have talked to the
government about it and encouraged that there be more
liberalization in this area.
Mr. Smith. Can you assure us that our funding for NGOs that
promote human rights, that that money is not being diverted to
those organizations, NGOs that are compliant with the
government and certainly maybe working in tandem with the
government? We always know there are front groups that purport
to be human rights organizations that fall far short of an
internationally recognized----
Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, I don't think our funding is
being diverted at all. I think that which is given is in fact
going to legitimate civil society groups who are doing a range
of things. These are not just civil society groups promoting
human rights but civil society groups that are doing other
things, including microfinance and microcredit, and working in
various other activities. But I am confident that our funding
is being appropriately used and not being diverted.
Mr. Smith. And just the last question, are there any other
countries in sub-Saharan Africa that have a law similar to the
NGO law in Ethiopia?
Mr. Carson. I don't know, but I will find out.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate that. Thank you.
The hearing is adjourned. Thank you very much to our
distinguished witnesses.
[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Johnnie Carson,
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S.
Department of State
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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