[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-40]
SUSTAINING THE FORCE: CHALLENGES TO READINESS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 7, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
JOE HECK, Nevada SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
CHRIS GIBSON, New York GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BILL OWENS, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey TIM RYAN, Ohio
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
Ryan Crumpler, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Christine Wagner, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, April 7, 2011, Sustaining the Force: Challenges to
Readiness...................................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, April 7, 2011.......................................... 33
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 2011
SUSTAINING THE FORCE: CHALLENGES TO READINESS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
WITNESSES
Collyar, BG Lynn A., USA, Director, Logistics Operations, Defense
Logistics Agency............................................... 8
Johnson, Maj. Gen. Michelle, USAF, Director, Strategy, Policy,
Programs and Logistics, J5/4, U.S. Transportation Command...... 6
Panter, Lt. Gen. Frank A., Jr., USMC, Deputy Commandant,
Installations and Logistics Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.... 5
Stevenson, LTG Mitchell H., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff,
Logistics, G4, U.S. Army....................................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Collyar, BG Lynn A........................................... 70
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 37
Johnson, Maj. Gen. Michelle.................................. 63
Panter, Lt. Gen. Frank A., Jr................................ 51
Stevenson, LTG Mitchell H.................................... 39
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 85
Mr. Forbes................................................... 85
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 89
SUSTAINING THE FORCE: CHALLENGES TO READINESS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 7, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m. in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Forbes. I want to welcome everyone to the
subcommittee's hearing on ``Sustaining the Force: Challenges to
Readiness.'' Today we have the opportunity to discuss not only
the current state of our logistical and maintenance readiness,
but to also look at how we are posturing the force to the
future.
Joining us today are four exceptional witnesses
representing the Army, Marine Corps, U.S. Transportation
Command and the Defense Logistics Agency. They are Lieutenant
General Mitch H. Stevenson, the Deputy Chief of Staff,
Logistics, U.S. Army; Lieutenant General Frank A. Panter, Jr.,
Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics, U.S. Marine
Corps; Major General Michelle D. Johnson, U.S. Air Force,
Director of Strategy, Policy, Programs and Logistics, U.S.
Transportation Command; and Brigadier General Lynn A. Collyar,
USA, Director of Logistics Operations, Defense Logistics
Agency.
These four distinguished officers are responsible for
transporting, sustaining and supporting our forces, both at
home and abroad. They are charged not only with ensuring our
men and women have what they need when they need it, but are
also responsible for ensuring we are postured to respond
effectively to future real-world contingencies like we have
seen recently in Haiti and Japan.
We are truly honored to have you join us today, and we are
extremely grateful for all you do to keep this Nation safe.
Thank you all for your service.
Our subcommittee's hearings over the last couple of months
have highlighted the many potential global threats and
challenges our military faces. There is no doubt that our
military is under significant strain, but they are performing
marvelously despite the many challenges they face.
However, the work of this subcommittee is to not only
ensure our force can continue to excel in Iraq and Afghanistan,
but that it also is postured to respond to a myriad of
potential challenges around the world, both in the near term
and in the long term.
Today the Department of Defense has more than 450,000
personnel abroad in support of our national interest. In
CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] alone, the U.S. has more than
150,000 brave men and women engaged in ongoing operations.
These complex operations are sure to present significant
logistical and maintenance challenges well beyond the
President's stated goal for redeployment of combat forces from
the region.
I hope that this hearing will allow members to learn more
about how we are meeting these current challenges, while at the
same time posturing ourselves for significant challenges we are
certain to face in the future.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
And now I would like to recognize the gentlelady from Guam
for any remarks she may have.
Ms. Bordallo.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. To all our
witnesses today, I look forward to your testimonies.
Today we are a Nation at war, confronting threats on every
continent with some 3.2 million soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines and civilian personnel deployed or stationed at 5,000
different locations worldwide.
Supporting this robust and geographically dispersed force
requires the significant logistics and maintenance capabilities
embodied in the organizations represented by our witnesses here
today.
As we continue to draw down forces in Iraq, support troops
on the ground in Afghanistan, support humanitarian missions in
Japan and support efforts to attain democracy in Libya, these
activities will test the ability of our military logistics
enterprise to get this done right and in a timely manner.
Given the austerity of today's national budget, we must
conduct these logistics operations in the most cost-effective
manner that is possible. All these requirements must be
fulfilled simultaneously with the best possible support of our
warfighters, but also with an eye on the value to the taxpayer.
I believe that we have the ability to accomplish these
daunting tasks, but it is going to take a tremendous
coordinated effort with military and civilian leaders thinking
outside the box to get this done right. I believe it is our
role in Congress to make sure that you have the tools you need
to accomplish all these requirements and fulfill your missions
successfully.
I also believe that our witnesses will have to look closely
at their own internal processes to make alterations that will
allow for successful completion of these missions. Internal
efficiencies are the quickest and sometimes the best way to
accomplish the multitude of tasks that are set before you.
In particular I look forward to hearing more from the
witnesses on the logistical challenges within Afghanistan and
Pakistan and options regarding use of the Northern Distribution
Network to move personnel and materiel in support of our troops
in Afghanistan.
Now some might say that Guam is isolated, but I have been
to Afghanistan a number of times, and its geography, I believe,
makes it a far more isolated location. I understand that there
are significant interagency and technical challenges associated
with supply chains into and out of Afghanistan.
I hope our witnesses can discuss how this system can be
strengthened before the inevitable drawdown of forces in
Afghanistan. Again, what can Congress do to facilitate this
process and give you all of the tools that you need to succeed?
Additionally, I hope that our witnesses from the Army and
Marine Corps can discuss their management of workflow at
military depots across the country as the OPTEMPO [Operations
Tempo] of the wars slows.
A recent congressionally directed report from LMI [the
Logistics Management Institute], the government consulting on
future depot maintenance requirements, highlights some
transformational changes that will need to occur to keep these
critical capabilities viable as more modern weapon systems are
integrated into the force.
I welcome comments from our witnesses on this report and
what steps are currently being taken to transform the depot
business model. If you believe that adjustments are needed in
the statutory framework underlying depot operations, we would
also be very interested in getting your input in that regard.
So again I thank you, Mr. Chair, for this opportunity, and
I look forward to the testimonies.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you for those remarks, Madeleine.
As we discussed prior to the hearing I ask unanimous
consent that we dispense with the 5-minute rule for this
hearing and depart from regular order so that members may ask
questions during the course of the discussion. I think this
will provide a round table-type forum and will enhance the
dialogue on this very important issue.
Without objection, so ordered.
We begin today once again thanking all of you for your
service to our country and for taking time to come here. We
have your written remarks. They are going to be made a part of
the record. And oftentimes in written remarks we use those to
kind of validate what we are doing, and that is what we should
be doing.
We want to give you each, though, about 5 minutes. You can
take less, or you can take a little bit more, but to tell us
from your own viewpoint what your biggest concerns are with
readiness. What do we need to be looking at?
All of us on here appreciate the logistical side of this.
We understand that in any fight, you know, part of the effort
that we have is how long we can sustain that fight, and that
comes down to something that is often not very sexy.
People don't like to really read reports about it and look
at it, but it is the logistics. It is how we maintain our
fleet, maintain our planes, maintain our equipment, get
supplies there. The logistical part of it determines whether we
win or lose. And you guys are on the forefront of that.
You don't hear it enough, so we want to make sure
corporately as a subcommittee we are telling you all thank you
for what you have done in your careers and what you continue to
do.
General Stevenson, if it is okay, we will start with you,
since you just happened to pick the slot on that side. And if
you would, I would like to recognize you for 5 minutes or how
long you feel appropriate.
STATEMENT OF LTG MITCHELL H. STEVENSON, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, LOGISTICS, G4, U.S. ARMY
General Stevenson. Thank you, Chairman Forbes and Ranking
Member Bordallo.
I won't take the full 5 minutes, but I did want to hit a
few high points from what is in my opening remarks. The reason
why we are here today is to answer the question, ``Are we
ready?''
And I think in just one sentence I would tell you that in
my view the Army is more ready and better prepared than we have
been in a long, long time, certainly in my 37 years in the
Army.
And we will get even better in the coming years for a
number of reasons, and I would be happy to get into that. We
are on track to complete our drawdown from Iraq by the end of
the year, and we are also, I think, doing reasonably well in
sustaining our forces in Afghanistan, despite the challenges
that Ms. Bordallo mentioned.
Here at home we are working very hard on improving
ammunition readiness. I would tell you our ammunition readiness
is probably the best shape it has been in since right after the
Cold War. We are reconstituting our Army prepositioned stocks,
probably two-thirds of the way through with that.
And we are, ma'am, as you pointed out that you had asked us
to be, we are working hard to be better stewards of our
taxpayer dollars. And a good example of that is the ongoing
property accountability campaign we have ongoing in the Army,
which will also, of course, contribute to readiness.
Just a couple of final thoughts. You have probably heard
testimony from various members of the Army and other Services
over this past several years that said that, you know, we are
going to need dollars, appropriations to reset for 2 to 3 years
after the end of combat operations, and that is still true
today.
And I can, if there is time and you are interested I could
walk you through why it does take that long. And it does go to
why we have a lesser requirement for reset dollars in fiscal
2012 than we had in perhaps in previous years.
And lastly, you asked about our challenges. The things that
probably are the biggest challenges on my scope right now are
supporting dispersed unit operations in Afghanistan. It seems
like every day we uncover a new challenge that we have got to
work with there. That is certainly a challenge for us.
Redistributing our Army property, you know, a lot of the
reasons why we don't look as ready as I believe we are is
because we have got maldistributed property and a lot of good
reasons for why that is, and we are on a path to get better.
And lastly, to do something about energy consumption, we
have got to improve and get better at that, although if you
were to compare the Services, Army energy consumption isn't as
high as others. We know that we still can do better, and we
want to do that.
Thank you for your support. And you have made us ready
through the terrific support we have gotten over the past
years. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Stevenson can be found
in the Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Forbes. Thanks, General.
General Panter.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. FRANK A. PANTER, JR., USMC, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT, INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS HEADQUARTERS, U.S.
MARINE CORPS
General Panter. Chairman Forbes, Representative Bordallo,
and other distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity
this morning to talk about the state of equipment and material
readiness in the United States Marine Corps.
On behalf of all the marines, families and our civilian
marines, thank you for the unwavering support you have provided
for the last 9 to 10 years as our troops have been engaged in
combat.
We have a high readiness rating forward in Afghanistan. I
think you know that. But that has come at a cost. Our equipment
aboard our home stations has been heavily taxed, and after this
almost a decade of combat operations our average readiness
ratings at home stations hover around 65 percent. We have
accepted that risk so we could properly support the forces
forward.
We continue to globally source equipment for Afghanistan
throughout the Marine Corps, and if there is additional
contingency that appears on the horizon, that is the approach
we take. We globally source it in the Marine Corps so we can
respond appropriately.
We do have some challenges I would like to share with you
this morning. One of them, much like General Stevenson
mentioned, we need your support when the time comes for reset
from Afghanistan. You may well know that we got out of Iraq
last year. We are about to conclude the reset actions for that
equipment we pulled out of Iraq.
We transferred or we swung over about 50 percent of the
table of equipment from Iraq to Afghanistan, so that equipment
set is in Afghanistan as we speak. And by that action, it
delayed our original reset plan, but we are adjusting to that.
We are consistently and constantly readjusting our reset plan.
Another issue, as I just mentioned, is the readiness rating
of our home station units hovers around 65 percent. We accepted
that risk early on.
Another area is the reconstitution effort beyond reset that
we would ask your help for. We have learned through Iraq and
Afghanistan that we--before we went into the war we were--we
now know we have legacy tables of equipment. The nature of
modern combat requires that we enhance these tables of
equipment.
For example, comm equipment, communication equipments, we
have learned that we require almost seven-fold of communication
equipment from what we have done in Iraq and Afghanistan as
compared to our old table of equipment.
Lastly, one of our strategic programs, our Maritime
Prepositioned Program, our MPSRON [Maritime Prepositioning Ship
Squadron] commandant has instructed us, instructed me, to
protect the readiness rating as much as we can with that.
Originally, we did use some of the equipment off of MPSRON
for Iraq. We have since replaced that. In general, our
attainment rates for MPSRON are greater than 90 percent. It is
in the 95 percent area.
There is equipment in our MPF program, Maritime Preposition
Force, that it does require to be modernized. And this is part
of that reconstitution effort. We do run the equipment through
our regular maintenance cycles to update as we can, as the
equipment is available, but we would ask for your continued
support to update that equipment.
In closing, and I mean this sincerely on behalf of all our
marines, their families, thank you for your support. Our
marines are doing--much like other service members--some great
things out there in defense of this Nation. We will ensure that
we are prepared to meet any additional assigned missions for
future contingencies, and with your help we can.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Panter can be found in
the Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Forbes. General, thank you.
General Johnson.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MICHELLE JOHNSON, USAF, DIRECTOR,
STRATEGY, POLICY, PROGRAMS AND LOGISTICS, J5/4, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Johnson. Chairman and Ranking Member Bordallo,
thank you so much for your time yesterday and for your time
today.
It is an honor to be able to address this committee and to
be able to represent the U.S. Transportation Command at the
side of the leaders of logistics in the Army and the Marine
Corps and at the side of our partner Defense Logistics Agency,
because Transportation Command looks globally. We link air,
sea, land transportation capabilities with the supply
capabilities that DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] provides, so
that we can provide a worldwide network to support our forces
in all the global areas.
As you mentioned, ma'am, earlier, we are in a far-flung
situation now. As the national military strategy says, more and
more we will be asked to act in a complex, far-flung
environment and to be able to operate indefinitely at the end
of very long lines of operation and supply.
Afghanistan represents probably the longest possible line
of supply you could achieve at a land-locked country with no
ports. Guam has ports. At least it has access that way. So,
again, that is remote there, but surrounded by the highest
mountains in the world and with no infrastructure.
And so to address, if I may, just briefly, a question you
actually put in your opening statement, how can we continue to
support such far-flung places and continue also to anticipate
other contingencies across the globe, meanwhile focusing on
Afghanistan?
And that is the stock and trade of TRANSCOM [U.S.
Transportation Command]. So we try to look for options every
day.
Pakistan presents challenges in its approaches to
Afghanistan, so we have found access through the north, through
countries that we didn't normally or used to have relationships
with in the past, through Central Asia. Russia has been a very
supportive partner. That route begins in the Baltics, who have
been partners with us for a long time.
We have approaches through Central Asia and are therefore
able to supply over 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. So distance
has a tyranny to it. The volume, the sheer volume to support
100,000 forces, is a burden on the forces who have to receive
that, to receive all that good and try to put it into place in
the forward operating bases.
So we work together with Central Command and with the
Services and, frankly, with European Command to support that
theater, but also to be ready to swing our forces to where they
are needed elsewhere--for instance, in Japan--to be able to
pivot forces over, whether they are commercial forces--and that
is who supported most immediately, our commercial air carriers,
to be able to help us with the departures of family members
from Japan--and to be ready in case we needed to do more than
evacuation. At the direction of the PACOM [U.S. Pacific
Command] commander, we could so do with surface resources
perhaps, whether commercial or organic.
Our Active Duty Forces have a certain amount of resource in
aircraft and ships, but if we need to mobilize the Reserves we
can also mobilize the Reserves. We have many options along
those lines, and we try to preserve those options, and then
when activity arises in North Africa, to build a swing as well
and to support European Command and AFRICOM [U.S. Africa
Command] in those ways.
And so it is a constant dynamic interplay between the joint
staff, TRANSCOM, DLA, the Services and the combatant commands
to understand the priorities of our Nation and to be able to
respond appropriately and as creatively as we possibly can.
And in so doing, we have really become an information
command, if you will, to be able to convey openly what we need
to do with commercial partners, interagency partners,
international partners. And in so doing we do those on
nonsecure networks most of the time. And so in many ways we are
very vulnerable on the cyber security front.
And so, if I would say, there are challenges, that we
face--challenges of distance, challenges of relationships
internationally--and we will appreciate Congress' understanding
of our new relationships with countries with whom we haven't
dealt as much before.
And also on the cyber front, I know this committee has been
very interested in defense industrial base. And one aspect of
that is the membership of defense industrial base and the cyber
activities of Department of Defense to be able to share
challenges and to understand that the weak point in any one of
our partners is therefore the weak part of the system. So if a
``mal-actor'' [malicious actor] wanted to get into the system
through a cleared defense contractor, it could affect the
entire program. So the more partnerships we have with the
commercial sector on all fronts, the better.
So again I look forward to the discussion. I value and
treasure the opportunity to speak to you today and the
opportunity to represent the over 150,000 members of the United
States Transportation Command from all the Services, as well as
commercial partners and the Merchant Marines.
Thank you for very kindly.
[The prepared statement of General Johnson can be found in
the Appendix on page 63.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
General Collyar.
STATEMENT OF BG LYNN A. COLLYAR, USA, DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS
OPERATIONS, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
General Collyar. Chairman Forbes, Ms. Bordallo, it is my
privilege also to speak to you today. I am representing the
27,000 men and women of the Defense Logistics Agency.
As the director of logistics operations, I would like to
tell you we are primarily a civilian organization. About 25,000
of those personnel are civilians, just over 500 Active Duty
military and about 750 Reserve military, and as such relatively
small compared to our service counterparts and again our
transportation, USTRANSCOM, partner.
We are a critical part of the supply chain, though, as we
are represented in both overseas areas and throughout CONUS
[continental United States], supporting the industrial base. We
have personnel in 48 of the 50 states and about 28 countries
overseas.
On a daily basis we supply about 55,000 requisitions in
support of the Services and execute over 10,000 different
contracts, many through automated means, but over 10,000
contracts per day.
And we do that to support approximately 1,900 weapon
systems whether it be aviation, land or maritime. And we supply
about 85 percent of those parts along with approximately almost
100 percent of the food, fuel and other commodities that the
Services need.
We are funded through the working capital fund, which means
that the Services pay for our support. And, therefore, it is
very, very important that we optimize both the effectiveness of
what we do, but balance that with efficiency. And I think we
have continually tried to execute that overseas.
We now operate 26 depots around the world. We have
increased that number over the last few years as we have added
depots in Kuwait supporting the Iraq campaign, in Kandahar,
Afghanistan, supporting there. That allows us to move things,
the slow, low-dollar items by surface and take them out of the
air supply chain.
In my written statement I provided a relatively
comprehensive look, but we provide primarily Class 1 and Class
3 food and fuel to the forces through prime vendors. Along with
our ability to stretch those, we have worldwide contracts with
an extensive vendor base in most all commodities that allows us
to support not only the present theater, but any of the
contingency operations that we are also supporting.
You have heard the challenges, and you have seen the
challenges in Afghanistan, the land-locked country,
infrastructure being one of the key things that we have had
overcome.
And, again, working with all of our partners, we have
really balanced it or tried to balance what we provide through
the PAK GLOC [Pakistani ground lines of communication] with the
NDN [Northern Distribution Network] and with other multi-modal
means of providing as much of the transportation by ship and
then flying in the last leg of that, minimizing that air
requirement as much as we can, along with setting up those
depots which have allowed us to support directly from the AOR
[Area of Responsibility] instead of having items come from the
United States.
I would like to just close by saying although we only have
27,000 people, we presently have a continued increase in
mission in Iraq specifically with disposition in our
disposition yards as the drawdown takes place.
With some of our dwell issues with the military personnel
and the limited military, we have had over 800 volunteers
throughout the agency to deploy to the AOR within just the last
3 weeks. So it speaks volumes for the morale and the desire to
support all of our personnel along with that of our Services.
And we have the capability to support not only a change of
forces in Iraq as we continue to draw down, but also we will
support the transition to the Department of State through
several commodities.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Collyar can be found in
the Appendix on page 70.]
Mr. Forbes. General, thank you.
I want to begin by focusing on a word that General Johnson
used, which is partnership. And one of the things that Ms.
Bordallo and I were just talking about is how much we
appreciate--we talked about your service, but also your
willingness to come in here and view this as a partnership.
Each of you did what we asked you to do. You gave us a
written statement, but then you didn't come in here with
prepared, with canned remarks. You talked to us. And that is
what we want this to be today is a dialogue to get that
information out. We were talking, as you were talking, about
how encouraging that is that we can have that dialogue and have
that partnership.
But also this is, as I have told each of you privately,
probably one of the most bipartisan committees or
subcommittees, I think, in Congress. We like each other, work
very well together, so got kind of two partnerships going here,
Republicans and Democrats, and we have the Department of
Defense and we have Congress. And I think if we do that, there
is no end to what we can really accomplish. So we thank you for
that.
And the other thing I want to tell you just logistically,
as we talked about earlier, we do something a little bit
different. So if one of our members are asking a question and
another member has kind of a follow-up on that, we will let
them go ahead and ask that follow-up. And the ranking member
has given me some discretion in doing that. We won't allow it
to run on, but we just allow that so we can have a fruitful
discussion.
I am going to hold my questions until the end, so we can
get all of our members' questions in. And I would like to now
recognize our ranking member, the gentlelady from Guam, for any
questions she may have.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much.
And I want to echo the remarks of the chairman. I felt when
you speak to us just from your heart and not from a written
statement, I think it is much more meaningful.
I think you covered some of this, but I would like to ask
the question for any of our witnesses. During the March 2010
hearing before the House Appropriations Committee Defense
Subcommittee, GAO [Government Accountability Office] identified
several challenges, and I think you mentioned these, in
distributing supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in
Afghanistan.
Now, these challenges included difficulties with
transporting cargo through neighboring countries, limited
airfield infrastructure within Afghanistan, lack of full
visibility over supply and equipment movements into and around
Afghanistan, lack of coordination, as well as competing
logistics priorities in a coalition environment, uncertain
requirements and low transportation priority for contractors.
Now, given all these challenges, what does it look like
today? And is there any one of these that stand out?
What steps have been taken to mitigate some of these
challenges? And what metrics are being used to gauge the
effectiveness of the supply chain and the distribution
processes in delivering required material to deployed forces in
Afghanistan?
I guess whichever want to be would like to answer that?
Admiral.
General Stevenson. There are quite a few challenges, ma'am,
in your statement there. Let me just hit a few high points and
then I would ask the others, particularly General Johnson, who
is, in large measure, the one helping us overcome these
challenges.
We know that it is difficult to get into and out of
Afghanistan. So one of the things that we have done in the Army
is we have told units, when you get in there and it is time for
you to be replaced leave your equipment there. The new unit
will fall in on top of it. You go home to the United States,
and we will get you replacement equipment.
Sounds real easy, rolls right off the tongue. It is a
little tough to do. But it does keep equipment off the roads,
and therefore not subject to pilferage and not subject to the
limited road networks and air networks that we have there. So
that is one thing we have done to mitigate.
Another is to just limit the amount of things that units
take over there with them. You know, when you deploy to a place
like that and you are going to fight, the tendency is to take
everything you could possibly think you might need in the next
year. And it ends up being hundreds of containers.
And we have had to step in with units and say, ``Look, you
know, have some confidence in the supply chain. When you
develop a need there, we will get it to you, but don't try to
deploy with, you know, a thousand containers in a brigade, for
example.''
And so our forces commanders put out some very deliberate
guidance about that, and that is helping mitigate, because if
you reduce the amount of stuff that has got to flow through the
soda straw, then it flows easier.
We have added in-transit visibility. Starting this summer,
we are going to add satellite tagging to that equipment which
must transit on the ground. We don't put anything on the ground
that we care about. No ammunition goes on the ground. No
sensitive material goes on the ground. That all flies in.
But that which has to go on the ground, we are going to put
satellite tags on it so that we can have real-time visibility
as to where this cargo is. If it stops at a place it shouldn't
stop, we will know immediately, or nearly immediately, and then
can take appropriate action.
And I could keep going but I would rather let General
Johnson talk a little bit about what TRANSCOM is doing.
Ms. Bordallo. And what you mentioned then has been quite
successful?
General Stevenson. I would say reasonably successful. I
don't want to overstate how successful we are. We have been
challenged. We have had pilferage.
Ms. Bordallo. That is right.
General Stevenson. But reasonably successful, I think.
Ms. Bordallo. Anyone else like to comment?
General Johnson. Yes, ma'am, if I could. I appreciate
General Stevenson's noting the actions the Army has taken
itself to provide discipline in the process.
One of the things that we can benefit from being a very
wealthy country is to have a logistical tail, but sometimes it
can a burden in the sheer volume, and so I really respect the
way the Army is managing their massive force. It is a lot of
need for 100,000 people in-theater.
So as he pointed out, we fly in sensitive lethal equipment
as we can, and so, that is able to keep things off the road and
keep it safe. We also airdrop in an increasingly amount. Last
year we dropped over 60 million tons of equipment via airdrop,
often to very remote forward operating bases.
And we are trying to be creative so that we don't have to
have very expensive equipment that we need to recover later. In
fact, we take low-cost, low-altitude chutes, parachutes that
are maybe reused from some other purpose and drop it in a
really low level at very low speed so that troops don't have to
subject themselves to harm in a hazardous environment of a
forward operating base, and they can still get the equipment
that they need or the medicine or the food or the water that
they need.
This year we anticipate 100 million tons of equipment
airdropped. Again, it is more secure, it is more accurate, it
is more safe for all concerned. So we have taken that effort.
The pilferage General Stevenson alludes to exists, you
know, and probably, in all fairness, any of us could look at
our own home states or any place with human beings involved.
There might be some, but obviously we don't want to lose
anything on our lines of communication to theater.
One percent is what we are showing. We think that is a
fairly accurate figure but 1 percent of 8,000 to 9,000
containers at any given day is dozens, and if it is yours you
don't want to lose it. And by containers we mean the back of a
semi-trailer truck size of container that we are talking.
On the Northern Distribution Net, we have put more and more
of our volume as we can to try to reduce the risk in Pakistan.
So we have upwards of 10,000 to 12,000 containers en route from
the Northern Distribution Net at any given day, and it has been
a very secure route. There have been really nil pilferage
issues, and the attacks have been nonexistent as well.
And, well, we watch that with great concern. And our
intelligence community actually has turned their eyes to these
routes as well, because logistics do matter. Logistics are a
great asymmetric advantage for our country, and we know that.
So, intermodally, I really appreciate my colleague, General
Collyar, mentioned intermodal options. What does that mean?
For instance, MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicle], all-terrain vehicles--you may be familiar with M-ATVs
[MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles]--we needed to deliver upwards of
7,000 to 8,000 of them in a short amount of time over the last
year.
And to fly them in from the United States after Oshkosh
builds them and delivers them to Charleston, South Carolina,
and to fly them four or five at a time on an airplane is
prohibitively expensive.
But actually to load maybe 300 of them on a ship--and some
of these large ships can hold 200 to 400 C-17 [Boeing
Globemaster III tactical airlifter] loads--and then send them
to a port, maybe in the vicinity, perhaps Bahrain or Oman, and
then shuttle the airplanes in a shorter distance--less fuel is
required, they can carry more vehicles--we are saving $110
million per thousand M-ATVs delivered.
So, again, we are trying to use good business practices, be
good stewards of tax dollars and support the warfighter
foremost. And so we are nearly finished. We are nearly complete
this month. We will have delivered over 7,000 of those
vehicles. And there are other vehicles in the works and heavy
trailers that we are delivering that way.
We have used this method elsewhere. And Rota, Spain, is an
important place. And it illustrates how important one COCOM
[Combatant Command] can be to another, that bases in Europe are
actually very important for Central Command from the
transportation point of view.
If we send shiploads of helicopters to Rota, Spain, and
then shuttle on heavy aircraft into Afghanistan, it is
efficient, it is effective. Most importantly, it supports the
warfighter, but also saves tax dollars as we go.
So those are the kinds of creative ways we are trying to
work around the challenges that we have.
And I will finish up with the in-transit visibility work.
You know, in business, obviously, there is, you know, tagging.
Some of our foremost companies take advantage of these
operations. But it is just not the physical device that goes on
the container that senses the location of the device. There is
a process that is required for this volume of material coming.
And so to the credit of the forces on the ground in Central
Command and my counterparts in the logistics community in the
Central Command, they have taken into account how best to track
the inputs from all those data. There is no shortage of data,
but how to manage that, make it useful and have the soldiers
and the marines and the airmen and the sailors on the ground in
Afghanistan be able to track the things they are bringing in.
And they have also started maintaining cargo yards, so that
trucks aren't lined up on the roads and vulnerable to attack.
And our commercial partners have helped orchestrate that as
well. And DLA is helping us work in those lines, too.
So this is very much a team effort to know what we have, to
track what we have and to have only what the folks on the
ground really need.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General.
I have a quick follow up to General Stevenson. What about
the second order effect of theater-provided equipment not being
returned to the United States for training or equipment that
may have been pulled out of the Reserve units? How is the Army
meeting this challenge?
General Stevenson. Yes, ma'am, that is a very good point.
And that is sort of what I alluded to in my opening remarks
about maldistributed equipment.
Equipment that we told to stay there in Afghanistan becomes
what we refer to as theater-provided equipment. It is not part
of any unit table of organization and equipment, like General
Panter referred to. And so somebody else is doing without
because that equipment is sitting there. So that is an impact.
Another impact is because we have decided to leave that
material there and let units rotate on top of it, it has
interrupted what we had planned to do in our depots. And so
there has been a workload impact.
And then, lastly, if you leave unit in country for multiple
rotations, there is a point at which if you have got to take it
down and apply some heavy-duty maintenance to it--you know,
when you have got a unit going in, they only stay a year, they
come out, it is generally not a problem. We will get it reset
and ready for the next operation.
But when that equipment stays for multiple rotations, there
is a point at which you have just got to say time out. We got
to put that equipment into some sort of maintenance facility.
And we are building one in Kandahar now to help us do that.
Ms. Bordallo. General, do you ever sell equipment to the
Afghan military, I mean, you know, where they are training them
and so forth? I mean, is there something like that?
General Stevenson. We do. There are a number of ways by
which we transfer equipment to the Afghans. One is what is
called sale from stock. There isn't much of that going on.
The Congress authorized us to provide equipment that was
excess to our needs to them, I think it was in fiscal year 2010
in the authorization bill. And so as a result of that, we have
been transferring some equipment to them.
And then, lastly, there is foreign military sales. This
actually ends up being grant money provided by the United
States, appropriated by the Congress, that we have people--Army
and other service people in-country--helping to build their
military and decide what they need. You know, as you know, we
are building the Afghan army up into several hundred thousand
Afghan soldiers.
Ms. Bordallo. That is right.
General Stevenson. They all need rifles. They all need
radios. And they all need transport. And all that stuff is
being bought as part of that foreign military sales effort.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, on my last trip to Afghanistan
with a CODEL [Congressional Delegation], we all received desert
boots as a gift, made in Afghanistan. So I understand they are
now making their own uniforms. Is that a true comment?
General Stevenson. Ma'am, it wouldn't surprise me, and it
would be a good thing if they are.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The next question will come from our gentleman
from New Jersey. But before he does, the gentleman from New
York had a quick follow-up question to Ms. Bordallo's
questions.
Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. I thank the chairman and the ranking member.
And I thank the panelists.
With regard to movement of logistics in-theater, my
question has to do with are we confident we have learned from
the lessons from Iraq as far as rearward movement? The
President has laid down the marker to begin the drawdown this
year and to complete combat operations by 2014.
And please give me some assurances that--because it was
Herculean work that was done to move that--how are we applying
those lessons and how that might impact reset operations at the
completion.
General Panter. If I may, since we are out of Iraq, and we
had some pretty good lessons learned coming out of Iraq and we
thought we had a fairly successful drawdown plan, some of this
is basic leadership.
For example, the commander we had on the ground at the time
told his subordinate commanders they can't go home until they
account for all of their equipment. That got everybody's
attention to the degree that we had a 110 percent turn-in as we
were getting out of Iraq.
[Laughter.]
Now, that says something about our legacy accounting
systems, which is a different issue that we are working in
trying to solve, and one of those solutions will be MCCS
[Marine Corps Community Services] Marine Corps, our future
logistical information backbone.
So the commander told everyone of the equipment
accountability.
The second thing was early decisions. Now, we took some
risk early on, but they proved to be right. Without knowing the
political dimensions or the decisions that might be made
related to a timeline for a drawdown, the commanders made the
decision to pull 10 percent of the equipment off your forward
operating bases to try and get ahead of the game. And that
proved to be successful in that we had a sense that we had
maybe too much equipment forward.
So, again, the leadership came in play there. I have to
admit though that we were lucky in that we were not having to
compete with our Army friends as we were coming out of Iraq.
Thus, the competition for the LOCs [Lines of Communication] and
the strategic airflow diminished. The transportation that
TRANSCOM provided to get us out of country was tremendous.
Those lessons learned like that we immediately captured
after our withdrawal from Iraq. And we have already started
planning for when the time comes for Afghanistan not to repeat
any bad practices, but to use some of the good practices that
we learned from that.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Runyan, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
General Stevenson. Sir, I just want to do a quick follow-
up.
Mr. Forbes. Sorry, General, go ahead. I apologize.
General Stevenson. You heard General Johnson refer to the
Northern Distribution Network. It is going to be key that that
Northern Distribution Network allows movement of what is
referred to as lethal cargo.
You know, today, we can only move non-lethal cargo on that
network. Fully 60 percent of our materiel flows in through the
Northern Distribution Network today, but it is only non-lethal
stuff. It is food. It is fuel. It is water. It is construction
materials.
In order to do a withdrawal, an orderly withdrawal out of
Afghanistan, we are going to need to--and TRANSCOM is working
on it; perhaps General Johnson can talk about it--we are going
to need to be able to go out through the north as well from the
south.
General Johnson. Sir, if I may?
Mr. Forbes. Yes.
General Johnson. Absolutely to the point, one of the points
of fragility in the Northern Distribution Network is that each
of our transit agreements is bilateral. It is individual per
country in this chain and series of each country. And it is one
way right now.
And for many reasons, these countries have long memories of
what happened in Afghanistan, you know, a couple of decades ago
and are very nervous about the security on their southern
borders. So we do not currently have permission from all the
countries to be able to come out, whether just to rotate forces
or to eventually move out.
And even for--we are working with our NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] partners as well because some of their
units are obviously based on Europe. They would like to be able
to rotate that way.
So these are the kinds of agreements that the State
Department is helping us with in each country team to try to
find a way for us not just to rotate units but eventually to
build a plan to move in and out with unlimited equipment. But
right now, it is very restricted.
Mr. Gibson. Well, it is encouraging that you at least have
identified the challenges and you are working to in a joint way
incorporate the lessons. I think that is going to make us
stronger, as we look towards the reset. Thanks.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Runyan.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank all of you for your testimony and your service
to our country.
General Stevenson, you mentioned it in your opening
statement that, you know, as we move to a reset, which you said
typically takes 2 to 3 years, you have a lesser ask in your
fiscal year 2012 budget. I just wanted you to elaborate on that
a little bit.
General Stevenson. Yes, sir, the amount next year, I
believe, is somewhere around $4.5 billion for a reset for the
Army. And that is considerably less than it has been in
previous years.
Two big reasons for that. One is timing, that is, when the
stuff that is in Iraq is going to be put into maintenance. And
the other is the type of stuff that is coming out of Iraq.
We have virtually no combat vehicles left, no tanks, no
Bradley Fighting Vehicles, no M113 personnel carriers, no self-
propelled howitzers. There are some, but not very large
numbers. And those are the big dollar drivers for a reset for
the Army. But mostly what we have in Iraq today is MRAPs. And
they are not nearly as expensive to reset as a tank or a
Bradley.
But back to the timing issue, if you just consider when we
are going to be coming out, and if you look--and you perhaps
haven't had a chance to see the plan yet, because it is still
coming together--but the plan has the 50,000 forces that are
there are coming out mostly in the fall of this year, which
means they will end up in Kuwait somewhere around the turn of
the year.
And by the time we get them on a ship and back to the
continental United States and then off to a source of repair,
it will be the third quarter when they finally land there. And
then they have got to be inducted into a maintenance program.
Our depots typically plan their work a year in advance, so most
of them probably won't induct until fiscal 2013.
And that is why it is a timing thing. You will see our 2013
request will account for all of that.
Mr. Runyan. Well, thank you.
And as we are talking budgets, General Johnson, you know,
moving all this equipment, and I think we all feel it in our
lives every day, the price of fuel around the world is
drastically affecting your ability and your budget constraints.
Can you comment on that?
General Johnson. Yes, sir. In the short run, obviously, we
probably are the greatest consumer of fuel in the Department of
Defense with our Air Mobility Command component. So Air
Mobility Command has undertaken some fuel efficiency efforts
before this current change in the fuel price, because we know
we need a smaller carbon footprint and to be good stewards of
money.
And so what they have done is invested in some fuel
planning types of software programs and in a way of conducting
flights that the commercial industry has taken on in the past
and has achieved already 5 to 10 percent of savings in the fuel
use. And, as well, we are trying to find ways to avoid using
air when we can. That is why the surface alternative is a
better one.
And when you factor in all costs, including fuel, if, for
instance, it costs, say, 30 cents a pound to send something via
ship and land, it costs 10 times that. It costs $3 a pound to
do it by fixed wing air. Rotary air is 20 times.
And so if we can find some way to get that cost closer to
what it would be on a ship or a truck, the way business does to
reduce their costs as well, that is what we are trying to do.
There are obviously some efforts with alternative fuels
that we have explored. The Air Force has explored using
various--whether it is from coal or other alternative fuels in
engines to see if that might work, there needs to be a larger,
obviously, market for that for us to be part of it as we go.
And then we have a very small R&D [Research & Development]
budget at TRANSCOM. We try to come up with ways, whether it is
low-cost, low-altitude parachutes or look at other crafts to
see if there is another way to deliver logistics cheaper, maybe
from unmanned vehicles.
We are actually looking at a new generation of air ships,
sort of blimps, if you will, to be, you know, sort of faster
ships. They are not slow airplanes. They are really faster
ships.
And there may be a business case for that in austere
environments, especially for humanitarian assistance, to be
able to use large amounts of equipment for a very little bit of
fuel and without having, you know, port facilities or an
elaborate airfield, to able to do it simply and have some
benefit from what is old is new and look at those ways and try
to be more creative in how we deliver.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
General Collyar. Can I add something to that statement
please?
Mr. Forbes. Please, General.
General Collyar. At Defense Logistics Agency, we provide
all of the fuel for the Services. And today that is about 70
million gallons a month. So the quantity is very, very
significant and we are looking at all possible mitigation
strategies.
The key to the keeping the fuel cost down, though is we do
have long-term contracts. There is an extensive vendor base
throughout the world. We provide fuel to a specific location on
the ground at a specified price delivered, FOB [Forward
Operating Base] destination, which is right now just over $3 a
gallon.
We adjust that price to the Services about every 6 months
based on actual cost so that we can, again, try to mitigate the
continuous fluctuations of day-to-day pricing. But our long-
term contracts and the significant buying power we have across
the world lets us buy at a relatively low cost. That final
delivery that Michelle talked about is very, very significant
in that, though.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Ryan has a quick follow-up question before we go to the
gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Ryan. Yes. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General, I guess either of you can answer this. Last year I
was on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and we were
talking a lot about how much it actually costs to get a gallon
of fuel from wherever it originates to somewhere in Iraq or
Afghanistan, if you can just enlighten us on that?
General Collyar. There is a lot of myth and legend about
the fully burdened cost of fuel. The Defense Logistics Agency
today, the cost of fuel anywhere in the world is $3.03. That is
with our delivery to a FOB. And in Afghanistan, we are
delivering to about 14 different locations. And that is the
cost to deliver to there.
Now, there is a challenge that I can't answer how much it
costs for a Service to take it from there to another FOB out of
the 200-plus locations that they may have to deliver to, but
the cost of basic delivery to the large locations that we
support in supply is $3 a gallon.
Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady from Hawaii had a quick follow
up to that.
Ms. Hanabusa. Hello, General. Somehow it doesn't seem to
logically follow that it would be $3.03 cents to wherever we
want to send it. I mean, isn't there some logistical advantages
to be in a particular location, or, more importantly, shouldn't
there be an advantage, if you are going to a shorter distance
that you wouldn't be paying $3.03 cents, whether you are going
to Afghanistan or, say, Hawaii.
I mean, you know, there should be some--it just logically
seems there should be some kind of advantage to that.
General Collyar. There are advantages. Again, the average
cost, which is what we charge per gallon to the Services, is
averaged across all of that worldwide fuel requirement. And
that is it is cheaper to certain locations, but they pay an
average price.
But in Afghanistan today our contract, again, we get fuel
based on a worldwide vendor network from that area. So I know
there are no refineries in Afghanistan itself, but we get fuel
from Pakistan and certain types that they provide, JP-8 [Jet
Propellant 8 jet fuel]. And then we provide also through India
and through the Northern Distribution Network.
Mr. Forbes. General, I think what the gentlelady from
Hawaii is asking--maybe you can get back to us on the record on
this--is we understand that you may average it all out and
charge a single price. But I think her question is, do we ever
get a breakout and see how much it is actually costing to have
different areas geographically, because there is a
differentiation in cost.
And I understand you don't have those figures today, but if
you could get back to us with those.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 85.]
Mr. Forbes. I think Mr. Runyan, you hit a nerve because the
gentlelady from Missouri also has a question on that, if we can
briefly.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Just a real quick question, and I
think you may have partially answered it. I was wondering where
the fuel is originating that we are using in Afghanistan. So
you said part of it is from Pakistan. I just wondered how much
are we buying and depending on Russia for a lot of that fuel.
General Collyar. Ma'am, we get a portion from Pakistan.
There is a portion of it that is provided through Russia. We
get it through multiple different routes. The NDN provides
about five or six different countries through the Caucasus and
across that we provide fuel from.
Again, our goal is to have it from as many locations as
possible to ensure your vendor base is solid.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes. I am a little nervous about depending
too much on any one of those people you have mentioned at this
point. I think that makes sense.
Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. I have a quick follow up also. Did you get
your--what is the length of the contracts? You said
``lengthy.'' Somebody mentioned lengthy contracts. I just hope
we are not tied into contracts for too long a period.
General Collyar. Ma'am, the average contract right now is
based on either a 12-month or it could be an 18-month contract
with options available to us.
Ms. Bordallo. Oh, well, that is not so bad. I was thinking
years.
Mr. Forbes. And if you will bear with us, we have three
votes. We are going to try to get one more question in. But if
you will just be patient, we will run over and vote and then
come back.
The gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for the great work that you are doing and
for your service.
My question deals with--and I know contractors have been
mentioned here several times, but my question deals with our
reliance on contractors worldwide and in particular in areas
like the Middle East and in combat situations.
According to our figures, last year we spent more than $200
billion on contractor support. Many of these contractors, I
know, fulfill vital logistics roles, and, as has been noted,
fuel is only one of them, but also maintenance and dining
facilities contracts.
And the concern that I have is that we may be losing our
ability to have our own in-house system of being able to take
care of these kinds of issues. I know that in an asymmetrical
low-intensity conflict, the use of contractors has been an
option--some would argue not a good option, but an option
nonetheless.
But my concern is that with this reliance, is the military
relying too much on contractors? And can we still have the
capability to do these kinds of tasks, you know, I guess
organically for lack of a better way to describe it?
So in the event of a high-intensity conflict, do our
military capabilities, will they be able to fulfill these kinds
of requirements? Because we all know that not only do we have
the finest military in the world, in the history of the world,
but what differentiates us many times from others is the
logistical capabilities that we bring to the fight.
So can anybody address that?
General Stevenson. Yes, sir. I would take a first shot at
it. This is something I spend a lot of my time thinking about,
concerned about and examining as we structure the Army.
You know, we go through a very deliberate process to
structure the Army. We run that cycle every 2 years and are
about to start running it every year. The short answer of your
question is I am not concerned. I think we are okay.
In the specific case of food service that you mentioned, we
designed the Army to be able to do what we call field feeding,
MREs [Meals, Ready-To-Eat], and something called a heat-and-
serve ration. We don't have enough cooks to do the kind of food
service operations that you might see in a garrison dining
facility, because we just don't think we need that for wartime.
When we get into a position, like we are today, where we
are in a sort of a benign environment where you can use
contractors and you can set up a dining facility and provide a
soldier what we call an A-ration meal, great. And we will do
that with contractors.
But when we get into an area where we are fighting or we
are in major combat operations, or at these combat outposts
that you see in Afghanistan, that is all soldiers. That is not
contractors.
General Panter. If I may, just to jump on with General
Stevenson's comment, the expeditionary nature of the Marine
Corps, early on in any conflict, we do maintain and we have
this capability, the organic capability you speak of, sir. That
is there. We have our appropriate logistics unit to do this
organic piece that you speak of.
As General Stevenson says, as the theater matures and it
gets more stable, I think that is where you see the larger
influx of contractors, getting to the issue you speak about.
General Johnson. Sir, at the other end of the spectrum of
the contracting, TRANSCOM obviously works in partnership with
U.S. flag fleets and the commercial reserve air fleet and also
the sealift fleet.
And those carriers are worldwide carriers. They are very
reputable, and they have networks to help us have economic and
transit access in different countries. And also they provide
this surge capability for us that day in and day out would be
prohibitively expensive for the taxpayer to support, but our
organic fleet can do it.
But having that surge capability and knowing if we really
needed it, it would be there, that relationship is tremendously
important. And then, obviously, there is a concurrent benefit
to the flag fleet, the prosperity of the merchant mariners and
the ports that support them and that whole dynamic that goes
along with the U.S. flag fleet.
So that is TRANSCOM's end. And we appreciate the
partnership. But we can handle it with the organic fleet as
well.
Mr. Forbes. And if you have any other comments, we will
finish these when we come back. But we need to adjourn now, or
recess now for an opportunity to vote.
We will be back after three votes. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you for your patience, and we hope some
of our members will make it back. We know that today is an
interesting day. As you all know, we are talking about budgets,
and they all impact all of you significantly as well. So we
don't know what our scheduling is going to be in terms of our
members.
But I want to pick up where Mr. Reyes left off when we
asked about the concern with contractors. And I think all of
you indicated that our contractors are an essential part of
what you do. And would you not agree that without our
contractors, we simply couldn't do that jobs that we need to
do?
I think, General Stevenson, your comment was that you
thought we had it under control, and it was right. And is that
pretty much consistently what the panel feels in terms of our
contractor mix with what we are doing?
Anybody disagree with that, to do it?
The other question I wanted to ask while we are waiting for
some of our other members to come back is the prepositioned
stocks. I know some of you have talked about some of our
reductions in that. And that is a concern that we have heard
voiced in our subcommittee in past hearings.
Can you tell us what the impacts of some of those
reductions might be on you? And are we kind of at the right
place there? Or is that something we need to look at to change?
General.
General Stevenson. Sir, there aren't any reductions been
decided upon yet. There is discussion about whether or not the
size of the afloat prepositioned stocks, both Army and Marine
Corps, is too big. But we are probably at least, I would say, 6
to 9 months away from recommendations and decisions about that.
But beyond that, there is no plan to reduce. In fact, we
are actively working to rebuild our prepositioned stocks in
accordance with something we call APS, Army prepositioned
stocks 2015. And we are well on our way. I would say we are
probably two-thirds of the way there toward rebuilding. But any
reductions we are not even close to a decision on it.
Mr. Forbes. General Panter, I know one of the things we
have seen is the Navy's budget has included an initiative that
projects about $4.2 billion in savings by, among other things,
restructuring its prepositioned ship squadrons.
In your opinion, what are the impacts of readiness of
moving this capability to a reduced status?
General Panter. Sir, that reduced status issue, the Marine
Corps does have a concern over it. That particular squadron
supports EUCOM [U.S. European Command] and AFRICOM, and we
routinely use that in theater engagement and for training
exercises. I would suspect the two COCOMs involved also have a
concern over that as well.
And getting back to General Stevenson's comment, we think
what we have right now is aligned properly with the
requirements of the COCOM commanders.
Now, the issue I earlier brought up, that equipment, while
we have some critical shortfalls, in general the readiness
ratings are pretty high. We do need to refresh it from the
lessons learned in combat.
Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. General Johnson, I know that TRANSCOM
structures its force and how prepositioned stocks are factored
in. How would reductions in prepositioned stocks affect your
ability to meet your requirements?
General Johnson. Sir, we are actually in the midst right
now of studying the as-is state of prepositioned materials to
see if, in partnership with DLA, if TRANSCOM and DLA could
possibly be even more effective in delivering what is there.
We don't have a vote in what the content is. Because the
Services are having the opportunity now to reset and to
reconstitute their ``pre-po'' [prepositioned materials], the
Department saw this as an opportune time to take a look at how
it is arrayed, to see if we have learned anything about
distribution in the last 10 years or so, to see where they are
and in what medium, whether they are afloat or ashore, if they
can be presented even better than they are.
Because now, it has been deemed, as the general said,
effective that they can respond to the plans that they are
aligned for. We just want to see if we can do better. But that
study is literally just completing the very first phase to
assess what we have.
And those are things that we are trying to take account of,
of being good stewards of how much it costs to move things and
store them, but most importantly to build a support to the
warfighters in their efforts.
Mr. Forbes. General----
General Stevenson. [Off mike.]
Mr. Forbes. I am sorry. Yes.
General Stevenson. Chairman, if I could follow up?
Mr. Forbes. Sure.
General Stevenson. Something that we have done, and this
was done internal to the Army, given what DLA has done in the
last 10 years in terms of forward-positioned depots--and
General Collyar alluded to that--we used to have in our afloat
set two large container ships, which we spent probably $40
million, $50 million per year each to maintain afloat
sustainment stocks.
Because of the nature of DLA's distribution of their depots
around the world, we believe now that we can position our
materiel in those depots on land and have them in the right
places to meet all of the potential contingencies and won't
need those sustainment ships, those two container ships that we
would contract for as part of the afloat stock.
So there is an example of how we are working with the
Defense Logistics Agency to come up with a cheaper way to
achieve the same end.
Mr. Forbes. And General Panter, I know that you may have a
little disagreement with how the Marine Corps views that, as
opposed to the Army. What is your thought there?
General Panter. We approach it a little differently, sir. I
think you realize when we load our ships out, these are
capability ships. And the expectations are that the equipment
that we put on these ships can support the war fight in the
initial stages of the war fight.
As we run these things through our maintenance cycle, we
pay particular attention on how we would load these ships so
they can achieve that mission. So, for us, it is not considered
a floating warehouse. It is capability--warfighting
capability--that we can project for.
Mr. Forbes. And that is something we have just got to keep
our eyes on that ball and not miss that.
General Collyar, in our supply chains now, if you had to
point out, do we have any key single points of failure? And
maybe the flip side of that, are there places where we have too
much redundancy?
General Collyar. Sir, many of the commodities, the big
commodities of food and fuel, we are such a small portion--and
in medical also--a small portion of the overall worldwide
supply chain that we don't have issues with those.
Probably the greatest individual chain that we have issues
with is clothing and textiles and the American base there. With
the continuing adjustments to uniforms and all to support the
theaters, we are challenged to have a supply base here in the
United States for--really, the textile industry is probably our
most important.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for----
I am sorry. I am sorry. Ms. Bordallo has a follow-up on
that.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, not exactly a follow-up, but I do have
a question. During a recent posture hearing with General McNabb
from TRANSCOM, we discussed ship repairs in U.S. shipyards.
And to continue and to dig a little deeper into this issue,
I understand that the Guam shipyard has had some difficulty
with its dry dock. However, I find that it is up. But it is
undergoing some repairs now.
But the trend of sending ships overseas has occurred
consistently, even before this event. In other words, they are
sending MSC ships to Singapore and other foreign ports. What
steps can be taken to address this matter further? And I am
very concerned that we are degrading our domestic industrial
capabilities.
I think, General Johnson, you probably will be able to
answer that. Could you discuss what sort of planning models are
taken into consideration when repairing naval or MSC [Military
Sealift Command] ships. You know, where is ``Buy America''?
General Johnson. Ma'am, I will probably take the larger
portion of this question for the record so I can get you the
detail. But in general, the vessels that are staged overseas
from a certain period of time is something like over 2 years.
You know, the big Navy can determine to have those repairs done
overseas.
Those tend not to be the kinds of vessels that attend to
TRANSCOM work to do the cargo vessels. As you have had a chance
to talk with the commander of Military Sealift Command, you
have had a sense to know that we, you know, the $40 million
worth of work that we do in Guam. And we do hope that the Big
Blue dry dock can be back up.
Ms. Bordallo. Yes, it is up now.
General Johnson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. I understand.
General Johnson. And so I will have to take for the record
the details of that process for you and for your staff to
better understand that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 85.]
Ms. Bordallo. Very good.
And one quick question for General Johnson also,
referencing the Defense Personal Property System, DPS, I
understand that a new system is in place now for the movement
of personal goods during a PCS [Permanent Change of Station]
move.
However, I do understand that some in the community of
users have raised concerns about the new system. And I also
understand that there is a concern this system was developed
without adequate input from the shipping community that
provides the services.
So can you discuss what is being done to improve this and
to what extent contractors are involved in the improvements of
this new technology?
General Johnson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for that question.
The movement of household goods is an enormous undertaking for
the Department of Defense, obviously, with all the movement of
our forces.
And the last 2 years have been particularly challenging,
because with the economy in decline, the trucking industry has
laid up several of their vehicles, so their capacity was much
reduced.
Unfortunately, at the same time, some of the BRAC [Base
Closure and Realignment] moves have actually accelerated
household goods moves in the Department of Defense, which put
more pressure on the industry to just create more of a perfect
storm then. At the same time, we have been developing this new
Web-based program to actually help with the quality of life for
military members in their moves.
And we have had 11 different occasions to meet with
industry in major forums over the last 2 years, and then the
discussions went on before that, to try to refine the process.
We have over 70 percent of members of the Services, I
think, using the DPS now. We have received 30 percent customer
surveys. So of those 30 percent who have submitted customer
surveys, we can have a sense of how that is working for the
military members. There is also a feedback loop with the
carriers as well.
Some of the complaints initially was that the Web site was
cumbersome, and it was. And we are trying to do better with
that. It wasn't as elegant as some of the--I think the easiest,
you know, whether expedia.com or Amazon or that sort of thing.
It is meant to be. And so it has improved with the feedback.
And as we approach this peak season, this peak move season
coming up, our teammates have worked with the trucking industry
to come up with alternatives.
Even though the normal enclosed moving truck that we are
used to seeing is in shorter supply this year, we have come up
with agreements with them to use crating and on flatbed trucks
that will provide a secure move for the members, but also gives
an alternative to industry for them to have business as their
business picks up.
And we have also, with this program, been able to black
out, in a sense, to block out times of peak, so that people
don't oversubscribe to a period of time when they can't be
supported, which is a burden on the industry as well as on the
members, and to then phase out the move to make it more smooth.
So we think the improvements we have made will benefit both
the members and the industry. And, actually, a side benefit of
this is we have saved over $200 million along the way.
Ms. Bordallo. Absolutely.
General Johnson. So that has really been a benefit to the
Department of Defense and makes it a competitive environment
for industry. But it has been quite a value for the Department
of Defense.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Thank you, General, and I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you, all of you, for being here to testify. You
are really probably the unsung heroes, because you make things
actually work.
So, having said that, my first question is to Lieutenant
General Stevenson. In your statement, you used this word or
this phrase ``organic industrial base.'' What is an organic
industrial base?
General Stevenson. Yes, ma'am. What I was referring to are
depots, maintenance depots that are operated by the Army--we
have five; arsenals, which are operated by the Army--we have
three, manufacturing arsenals; and then a number of ammunition
plants and also ammunition depots, and there are a total of 14
of those. That makes up the organic industrial base.
And the notion there is that we have a capability internal
to the Army to support ourselves in time of war and so that we
are not reliant, necessarily, on the commercial outside the
Army base.
Ms. Hanabusa. And how much of our needs are the organic
industrial bases or depots capable of meeting?
General Stevenson. I think, geez, that is an interesting
question. I have not really looked at it in that way.
Let me say this. By law, we were required to do no more
than 50 percent of our depot maintenance outside the base. In
other words, the law says, ``Do at least 50 percent of the
depot level work in the depot,'' the organic depots. And we are
complying with that. We are actually about 60 percent in the
organic base.
Could we do 100 percent? Pretty close. We probably could.
Ms. Hanabusa. And particular ammunitions, for example.
General Stevenson. Ammunition is much closer. The law
doesn't talk about how much of our ammunition must be produced
organically. It only refers to the maintenance depots. It
doesn't even refer to the manufacturing arsenals, which is
something we would like to--we plan to propose some thoughts
about what we ought to have in the way of law for that in the
future.
But in ammunition, there are no requirements. There are
things, though, that we know that commercial industry won't do.
Just South of here in Radford, Virginia, we make what is called
nitrocellulose. It is the T in TNT.
Ms. Hanabusa. Can you also tell me, then, if this is what
is ongoing, what is the savings, if we are able to go to 100
percent?
And, let me just share with you, I happen to believe that
if the military can insource, basically, all of its needs in
terms of what we are outsourcing, not to say anything about the
private sector, but if we could insource especially these
critical aspects of our needs, that we probably, you know,
could do it efficiently and, in addition to that, at a great
cost savings.
And I just wondered if there was a cost-benefit analysis
done.
General Stevenson. There is. And that is exactly what
drives us to not use the organic bases. It is a maintenance
action that has to occur every once in a blue moon. It doesn't
really make sense to keep that capability to gear up the
organic base just to do that small task and then gear back
down. It is inefficient.
We have another law besides the 50-50 law that says 50
percent must be done organically. Another law says we must
maintain a core, C-O-R-E, organic capability in our organic
industrial base that is the amount of capability to meet our
needs in wartime. And we are very careful about ensuring that
we meet that core capability. We can do 100 percent of our core
requirement in our base.
To be completely frank with you, today we have some
shortcomings there, where there are things that we should have
the capability to do in the base that we can't. And there are
long reasons for how that occurred. We are working to fix that
and ensure that we have complete compliance with the law and
can do every bit of our wartime requirement organically, should
we have the need to.
Ms. Hanabusa. And I am running out of time, but I believe
that maybe you can answer this in writing. You know, Secretary
Gates has this whole idea of how to save monies through
efficiencies. Now, is, by any chance, any of the operations
regarding the organic base part of it? And if not, what exactly
or how does his efficiency measures that are going to cut cost
affect you?
General Stevenson. Everything is subject to being
considered in this look at the efficiency of the Department of
Defense. And we shouldn't be exempt from that. We should be
looking internally to see if we are doing business as
efficiently as possible.
And the fact is, we can. I mean, there are still cases
where there are redundancies that don't need to be, perhaps
between the Services. And there has been a lot of work to
correct that over the years--centers of technical excellence in
one Service that the other Service can depend upon, and that
goes both ways.
And then just the way we operate in the base. An example
for you, our arsenals are probably--of our organic industrial
base, they are probably the least workloaded. And we have
capacity there, untapped capacity. But having untapped capacity
in the business--and this organic base is a business--is not
efficient. It means you are paying overhead that you don't need
to be paying.
And so we have got to do a better job ourselves of getting
business for our manufacturing arsenals. We are doing some work
with that. General Collyar can tell you that we are
manufacturing small arms parts, weapons parts, for the DLA,
because they have had some difficulties with some of their
suppliers. That is perfect work for an arsenal. In fact, it is
being done at the Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois.
We need to do more of that. I sent a note last night to my
counterpart in the Air Force asking about bomb casings that
they are using a contractor to make for them. We could make
those bomb casings at Watervliet arsenal. And my approach to
him was, let us do that for you.
The more of that kind of work we can do, we can make our
arsenals more efficient.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
As I mentioned at the beginning, I deferred my questions. I
just have about three questions for you.
Now, one of them is about counterfeit parts. All of us know
that they have the potential to seriously disrupt the DOD
[Department of Defense] supply chain, to delay missions, to
infect the integrity of our weapon systems.
As you also know, a congressionally requested GAO study on
counterfeit parts completed in March 2010 found that DOD is
limited in its ability to determine the extent to which
counterfeit parts exist in our supply chain, because it does
not have a DOD-wide definition of the term ``counterfeit'' and
does not have a policy or specific process for detecting and
preventing counterfeit parts.
General Collyar, what are we doing about that, and how can
we address that problem better?
General Collyar. Sir, first of all, we recognize that there
is a problem. We don't truly know the depth of the problem and
the scope of the problem. But we know it, and it hurts us and
it hurts industry.
So we have actually formed an organizational effectiveness
team led by two Senior Executive Service personnel. We have got
contracting personnel, we have got legal personnel, engineers,
all working together to develop and, again, work with industry
to find certified traceability of parts, certify both the
manufacturers and the parts. And we have different ways of
doing that.
Again, we are very susceptible when with those 10,000
automated contracts every day, you have a hard time vetting all
of those people that are truly providing those parts. So we are
looking, using automation models to determine if things are out
of line with either pricing or quality of the parts.
And then we are also looking at ways to even DNA-stamp
parts to ensure that the chain of reliability or certification
of the parts is there, because a lot of times, it is not the
OEM [Original Equipment Manufacturer] that is providing it. It
is one of the sub-manufacturers way down the line, as complex
as many of these things are.
And so we have a testing facility. We are working heavily
with them out in Columbus, Ohio, to test for counterfeit. It is
one of the priorities that we have on line right now.
Mr. Forbes. If you see something else you think we can do
to help, please let us know.
The other thing the gentlelady from Hawaii mentioned were
the efficiencies and, for a better term, we call them just
cuts, that are taking place. And I think, General Stevenson,
you mentioned everything should be on the table. We don't
question that.
Here is the concern we have as a committee, I think,
though, and perhaps congressionally, that oftentimes these
efficiencies or cuts, however you want to deem them, are not
being done based on business models that have milestones that
you can really measure to make sure that in the long run they
are cost savings, as opposed to things that we are just kicking
down the road.
Do we need to have more business models when we make these
decisions, do you think? And how do we go about bridging that
gap, I guess, of credibility, because it seems like more and
more we are getting it where somebody is coming and just
telling us well, we had some meetings, and we decided, but we
never see that analysis.
General Stevenson. Sir, two thoughts. First thought is, at
least in the logistics area, we are getting a vote. It is a
bottom-up offering, not a top-down ``cut 10 percent, and you
guys figure out how to make that work.''
Mr. Forbes. But is your vote based on a business model, or
is it based on the fact we have got to cut something, and this
what we think is the thing that would be the least painful?
General Stevenson. I am not sure I would call it a business
model, but it is certainly an examination of what we think the
possibilities are. And then it is, you know, on us as managers
to ensure that we deliver the goods and what we said we could
do. And shame on us if we can't pull it off. Then we were silly
and shortsighted in what we proposed.
Mr. Forbes. But you guys oftentimes have a great mentality,
and we salute you for this. But it is that whenever somebody
asks you to do something, you salute and say, ``We can do it.''
And I have never heard you say, ``No, we can't do it,'' which
is admirable, but we don't want to put you in that position.
General Stevenson. Yes, sir. We do say we can't do things.
We just don't do it publicly.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Forbes. And that is what we are trying to get you to
do, I guess.
Anybody else weigh in on a business model aspect of what--
General?
General Panter. Mr. Chairman, if I may, and I will be a
little bit more blunt with it, I guess. We are concerned about
some of the efficiencies as they are being discussed and the
business case analysis that might be behind them.
In all honesty, my Service, and fair to say, Department of
Navy has the position that some of these efficiencies we have
concerns, not that we can't accept them, not that they are not
good ideas, we are just asking for the proper analysis to be
done so there are not secondary effects that we will regret.
Mr. Forbes. And just so you know, this committee is going
to help you guys. We are going to try to give you some of that
business model analysis so that you don't have to ask for it,
but that it is in there so that we know. And I hope that we
will have some stuff to help along that line.
Just two other questions that I have got. One of them we
kind of hinted at, and it is in the industrial base. I know
this is not totally your areas.
But one of the things that worries me, and I have talked
to, I think, all of you privately about this, you know, when we
go back to World War II, when we had to gear up for World War
II, we will never be in a situation where our military is
capable of fighting long-term battles by itself. I mean, they
have got to have private sector and all involved.
We shifted manufacturers of arcade games into making
munitions and other kinds of things. We are losing that
industrial base here, as you have to depend more and more on
foreign sources to even get the supplies that you need.
Does that concern you? And at any time, do any of you take
a look at not just how I am getting the items I need today, be
it maintenance or be it items that I have to put in the supply
chain, but who is manufacturing them?
And if we had to have that intense long-going conflict, do
we have the industrial base, not just for ships--that is
important--but for everything that you have to supply to our
military?
General Stevenson. Yes. The short answer is yes. And
probably the best example I can give you is in the ammunition
business. We have a very deliberate, detailed industrial base
assessment process we use for every munition that we produce.
As you know, the Army is the single manager for
conventional ammunition for all the Services. And I could show
you for every munition we produce a complete breakout of where
every part comes from, where the single points of failure are,
and what mitigation steps that we are taking to ensure that in
time of war we have the ability to get that subcomponent so
that we can produce the munition.
We work very hard at that, and we know that we are
susceptible to offshore sources, and we have got to have
mitigating strategy. In some cases, we buy to keep a vendor in
business even though we don't have a need because it is so
critical----
Mr. Forbes. Create capability.
General Stevenson [continuing]. For our future. Yes, sir.
General Panter. Mr. Chairman, if I may--if I could use
another example in this area that I am pretty comfortable with,
ground tactical equipment. If you look at what we do with the
MRAP, since 2007, they were there. Industry was there when we
needed them. We expended over $30 billion. We delivered in a
partnership an item that actually saved lives.
When it comes to ground equipment, I think there are many
skills sets out there that are transferable and they are well
today. And I think in a time of great crisis, we could pretty
well rely on them.
When it comes to aviation, shipbuilding, I am certainly not
an expert in that area, but my experience with the ground side
of the house, I think we are in pretty good situation.
Mr. Forbes. You know, one of the things we may just need to
be looking at, too. I know if you look at plants, for example,
that geared up to help do the Kevlar that we needed for some of
our vests and all, at times they feel like we pulled the rug
out from under them. You know, we asked them to shift. It cost
them a lot of money to do it. But then we kind of pulled that
rug out from under them.
And the question I always have, if we do that, what are
they going to do next time, you know, when we need them? So it
is something I know you guys are concerned about. We just need
to have that conversation about how we support them.
General Johnson, what are your thoughts?
General Johnson. Well, sir, you have alluded to sealift and
airlift, and obviously that is one of our greatest interests,
even with these air ships that we talked about. There are
companies trying to figure out if they have a business case for
that type of different vehicle. Some of the testing we do out
in the ranges for our unmanned logistics vehicles and that sort
of thing, it shows a dynamic interest out there.
If you are talking about producing in great numbers,
though, that is obviously the business of this committee more
than for us in transport. But we have found great support. When
we try to look for new ideas, we have found great support from
the U.S. flag industry and then home-based industry.
Mr. Forbes. General Collyar, any thoughts?
General Collyar. Sir, no. You know, overall, most of the
commodities that we support, we have a relatively good
industrial base. I said textiles and some of the Nomex [flame
resistant fiber] and different types of things. You actually
said one of them that is very key with the armor protecting
materials. And it is a challenge because of our long-term
commitment to those types of organizations and what they
produce.
I think one of the things that the Army has done well is
try to look at those and see which of the items that is the
item du jour today that we are really going to keep in the
system long-term and make sure we do continue to support those
versus what we are using in today's conflict and may decide we
don't need to keep that long-term within our capability.
The other challenge that we have in DLA is to support all
the legacy systems along with those new systems coming out, and
we lose manufacturers off of those systems routinely also.
Mr. Forbes. Last question I have got for you. All of us, we
appreciate so much, as we said at the beginning, your
expertise, the experience you bring here, your service to our
country. It all comes with a unique skill set that you bring to
the table.
All of us, though, go through our days sometime, and we
have good days, but there is one thing that just kind of
worries us and nags at us. And sometime you wake up at night
and that hits you. And we oftentimes say, ``What keeps us up at
night?'' You have heard those kinds of comments.
What is the thing that concerns you most in what you have
seen in terms of our readiness posture that you would say would
be the thing that would concern you the most, not just for
today, but 5 years down the road or 6 years down the road, if
you had to peg that as the thing that would worry you most at
night, if you had to pick one thing?
General Stevenson. I was about to answer a today answer,
but you took----
Mr. Forbes. Today is okay if you want to do that. Or give
me both.
General Stevenson. The obvious thing, sir, is the CR
[Continuing Resolution] and potentially the shutting down of
the government.
Mr. Forbes. That is a little out of our pay grade. So let
us go to one that we can deal with.
General Stevenson. But one that sort of Haiti brought to
mind. You know, we have been very, very good at deploying and
operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. And it has gotten in--it is
a cyclic thing, and we know how to do it and it happens almost
so smoothly and so by rote.
But we have got to be able to do that on short notice to
other places in the world. And we got soldiers--when we did
Haiti, there are some skills that we didn't have because we had
gotten rusty at them.
And so 5 years from now, you know, we are out of Iraq, we
are out of Afghanistan. You know, how are we going to keep
those skills? You know, it just almost makes you cry how
competent Army, Marine Corps, other Service logisticians are.
They have gotten really, really good at this.
It is something we haven't done, you know. I mean before
the Cold War, end of the Cold War, I mean, we talked a lot, we
practiced a lot, but we didn't do. We have been doing for 10
years. And to keep those skills is what--how you keep them. How
do you keep the soldiers motivated after what they have been
through? That is what keeps me up at night.
Mr. Forbes. So we found that with NASA [National
Aeronautics and Space Administration] when we lost our ability
to put somebody on the moon, you know.
General.
General Panter. I am sorry. If I was going to pick one
thing, I think it is this reset issue. I use an analogy, and my
folks hate it when I use it, but this ``pig in a snake''
[bottleneck] is coming.
When we get out of Afghanistan, we are going to have this
tremendous requirement to reset our corps, our Marine Corps. I
just hope that the American public and Congress will be there
when we need them.
And, as Mitch has said before, we are going to need 2 or 3
years to get this right, and that is coming. And I just hope
the will is there to help us when we do start coming out of
Afghanistan. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
General Johnson.
General Johnson. Sir, as we look at our responsibilities in
the future environment that we are going to face, the idea of
going to remote places with austere environments is more and
more a reality.
Our alignment in the world has been fairly East-West. We
find that our presence north and south and those, whether in
Africa, South America or even southern parts of the Pacific,
perhaps aren't as robust.
And so one of the interests we have taken is to come up
with an infrastructure look, an annual look, with the other
combatant commands to see if what if we could fix a road here
or a port there, so that in the future, we would be able to go
in to do--in a benign way to go do humanitarian assistance, not
necessarily, you know, to do bellicose acts, although we could
do that as well.
But to fix a road in Souda Bay, Greece, may be a small
investment, but it would give us the opportunity to support
perhaps even better the activities in North Africa right now.
The kind of work we are doing in Guam right now represents that
sort of work, to make these intermodal nodes as we go.
But as we build relationships with other countries, whether
Vietnam or others that might give us this presence, so that we
don't have a giant expensive footprint, but we have a way to
respond in the way that General Stevenson alluded to, in ways
that we can anticipate in place, that we can anticipate the
kinds of things that might happen in the increasingly remote
areas.
Mr. Forbes. General Collyar.
General Collyar. Sir, my thought is more along the lines of
wearing my service uniform versus a DLA uniform.
But it really does go back to more of what General Panter
said. We have been given the greatest equipment today, and we
continue to get full support for any new piece of equipment to
support our troops deployed around the world.
And I worry about our ability to continue to get that
money, for the public to stomach us getting that money to reset
and recap our equipment so we are prepared it in the future.
And along the other thing that General Stevenson, I think,
said, we have noncommissioned officers today that have no peer
anywhere in the world, and it is because of what we allow them
to do in the theater. And yet our regulations when we bring
them back here require officers to do many of those same
functions.
And how do we keep junior, mid-grade NCOs [Non-Commissioned
Officers] engaged when we take those responsibilities away from
them that we fully handed them, including soldiers' lives? How
do we keep them engaged and wanting to stay in and do what we
need them to do in the future?
Mr. Forbes. Good. Good comments. I promised all of you
before that if you needed any other time to correct anything
that you said or something we left out, to give you that
opportunity.
Anybody need anything else or feel that we have left out
something that you think we need to put in the record or that
you need to go back and reevaluate?
Well, if not, we want to, again, thank you so much. This
committee appreciates not just you being here today, but your
service to our country. And by telling you that, we also
hopefully are telling all the men and women that serve under
you, and thank you.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
April 7, 2011
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 7, 2011
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness
Hearing on
Sustaining the Force: Challenges to Readiness
April 7, 2011
I want to welcome everyone to the subcommittee's hearing on
``Sustaining the Force: Challenges to Readiness.'' Today we
have the opportunity to discuss not only the current state of
our logistical and maintenance readiness, but to also look at
how we are posturing the force for the future. Joining us today
are four exceptional witnesses representing the Army, Marine
Corps, U.S. Transportation Command, and the Defense Logistics
Agency.
They are:
LLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson,
USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, G4, U.S. Army;
LLieutenant General Frank A. Panter, Jr.,
USMC, Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps;
LMajor General Michelle D. Johnson, USAF,
Director of Strategy, Policy, Programs and Logisitics,
J5/4, U.S. Transportation Command; and
LBrigadier General Lynn A. Collyar, USA,
Director of Logistics Operations, Defense Logistics
Agency.
These four distinguished officers are responsible for
transporting, sustaining and supporting our forces with both at
home and abroad. They are charged not only with ensuring our
men and women in have what they need when they need it, but are
also responsible for ensuring we are postured to respond
effectively to future real world contingencies like we have
seen recently in Haiti and Japan.
We are truly honored to have you join us today and we are
extremely grateful for all you do to keep this nation safe.
Thank you for your service.
Our subcommittee's hearings over the last couple of months
have highlighted the many potential global threats and
challenges our military faces. There is no doubt that our
military is under significant strain, but they are performing
marvelously despite the many challenges they face. However, the
work of this subcommittee is to not only ensure our force can
continue to excel in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is also postured
to respond to a myriad of potential challenges around the
world, both in the near term and in the long term.
Today, the Department of Defense has more than 450,000
personnel abroad in support of our national interests. In
CENTCOM [United States Central Command] alone, the U.S. has
more than 150,000 brave men and women engaged in ongoing
operations. These complex operations are sure to present
significant logistical and maintenance challenges well beyond
the President's stated goal for redeployment of combat forces
from the region.
I hope that this hearing will allow members to learn more
about how we are meeting these current challenges while, at the
same time, posturing ourselves for significant challenges we
are certain to face in the future.
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 7, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
General Collyar. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 18.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
General Johnson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 23.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 7, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. The budget contains a proposal to streamline logistics
sustainment processes and optimize the Army's distribution, disposal,
and transportation network in order to reduce your budget requirement
by $600 million. Please discuss this optimization process and the
implications should these savings not be fully realized.
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. How can we improve the core determination process?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Among the Section 322 report's findings was that the
Congress has poor visibility of the depot maintenance budget. How can
we improve the reporting process to ensure Congress has the necessary
information to provide oversight?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Is there a formal process in place to nominate non-
standard equipment for inclusion in Modified Tables of Equipment and
subsequently Prepositioned Stocks? If not, are we bringing home
equipment that does not meet an enduring need?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Are there items that need to be removed from
prepositioned stocks because they no longer meet mission needs?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What are your plans to better manage limited-life
medical prepositioned stocks to avoid expiration and waste?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Please discuss your requirements for DLA. How are
things working? Where do you see gaps, if any?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Can you discuss your requirements for TRANSCOM? How are
things working? Where do you see gaps, if any?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Please discuss how we are using forward depot
maintenance and theatre provided equipment (TPE). What are the
challenges associated with this approach?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What can be done to enhance the Northern Distribution
Network?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What impact would a delayed redeployment of the
remaining U.S. forces in Iraq have on our logistics and maintenance
enterprise? Are we poised or such a contingency?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. In April of last year, the GAO identified several
challenges facing the Department with retrograde of equipment from Iraq
to include: unclear guidance on what non-standard equipment will be
transferred to the Government of Iraq; the inability to fully identify
its need for contracted services; and visibility over its inventory of
equipment and shipping containers. What steps have you taken to improve
the retrograde process? What steps have you taken to improve the
process of transferring excess non-standard equipment to U.S. state and
local governments?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What steps are being taken to posture the depots for a
post-reset environment? Are there adjustments to the statutory
framework that need to be made?
General Stevenson. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. How can we improve the core determination process?
General Panter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Among the Section 322 report's findings was that the
Congress has poor visibility of the depot maintenance budget. How can
we improve the reporting process to ensure Congress has the necessary
information to provide oversight?
General Panter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Are there items that need to be removed from
prepositioned stocks because they no longer meet mission needs?
General Panter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What are your plans to better manage limited-life
medical prepositioned stocks to avoid expiration and waste?
General Panter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Please discuss your requirements for DLA. How are
things working? Where do you see gaps, if any?
General Panter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Can you discuss your requirements for TRANSCOM? How are
things working? Where do you see gaps, if any?
General Panter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Please discuss how we are using forward depot
maintenance and theatre provided equipment (TPE). What are the
challenges associated with this approach?
General Panter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What can be done to enhance the Northern Distribution
Network?
General Panter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What impact would a delayed redeployment of the
remaining U.S. forces in Iraq have on our logistics and maintenance
enterprise? Are we poised or such a contingency?
General Panter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. In April of last year, the GAO identified several
challenges facing the Department with retrograde of equipment from Iraq
to include: unclear guidance on what non-standard equipment will be
transferred to the Government of Iraq; the inability to fully identify
its need for contracted services; and visibility over its inventory of
equipment and shipping containers. What steps have you taken to improve
the retrograde process? What steps have you taken to improve the
process of transferring excess non-standard equipment to U.S. state and
local governments?
General Panter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What steps are being taken to posture the depots for a
post-reset environment? Are there adjustments to the statutory
framework that need to be made?
General Panter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Are there items that need to be removed from
prepositioned stocks because they no longer meet mission needs?
General Johnson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What can be done to enhance the Northern Distribution
Network?
General Johnson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What impact would a delayed redeployment of the
remaining U.S. forces in Iraq have on our logistics and maintenance
enterprise? Are we poised or such a contingency?
General Johnson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. In April of last year, the GAO identified several
challenges facing the Department with retrograde of equipment from Iraq
to include: unclear guidance on what non-standard equipment will be
transferred to the Government of Iraq; the inability to fully identify
its need for contracted services; and visibility over its inventory of
equipment and shipping containers. What steps have you taken to improve
the retrograde process? What steps have you taken to improve the
process of transferring excess non-standard equipment to U.S. state and
local governments?
General Johnson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What steps are being taken to posture the depots for a
post-reset environment? Are there adjustments to the statutory
framework that need to be made?
General Johnson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. How is DLA supporting the Services and are you properly
equipped to meet their logistical needs? If not, where are some of the
shortfalls?
General Collyar. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What are the top challenges associated with our supply
chain? What is DLA doing to address these challenges?
General Collyar. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What can be done to enhance the Northern Distribution
Network?
General Collyar. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What impact would a delayed redeployment of the
remaining U.S. forces in Iraq have on our logistics and maintenance
enterprise? Are we poised or such a contingency?
General Collyar. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. In April of last year, the GAO identified several
challenges facing the Department with retrograde of equipment from Iraq
to include: unclear guidance on what non-standard equipment will be
transferred to the Government of Iraq; the inability to fully identify
its need for contracted services; and visibility over its inventory of
equipment and shipping containers. What steps have you taken to improve
the retrograde process? What steps have you taken to improve the
process of transferring excess non-standard equipment to U.S. state and
local governments?
General Collyar. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What steps are being taken to posture the depots for a
post-reset environment? Are there adjustments to the statutory
framework that need to be made?
General Collyar. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
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