[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-37]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUESTS FOR
U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 5, 2011
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DUNCAN HUNTER, California LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado BILL OWENS, New York
TOM ROONEY, Florida JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia TIM RYAN, Ohio
CHRIS GIBSON, New York C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE HECK, Nevada KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Ben Runkle, Professional Staff Member
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, April 5, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense
Authorization Budget Requests for U.S. Transportation Command
and U.S. Africa Command........................................ 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, April 5, 2011........................................... 35
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2011
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FOR
U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.......... 6
McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Ham, GEN Carter F............................................ 67
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 39
McNabb, Gen. Duncan J........................................ 43
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Hanabusa................................................. 103
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 108
Ms. Giffords................................................. 108
Mr. Turner................................................... 107
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FOR
U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 5, 2011.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:23 p.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
I apologize for our tardiness. We had a vote and then a
suspicious package, and I didn't think they were ever going to
let us back.
The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive
testimony from the commanders of the United States
Transportation Command and the United States Africa Command on
the posture of their respective commands. Although these are
two combatant areas that sometimes fly beneath the radar, this
hearing cannot be more relevant than it is today.
In AFRICOM's [the United States Africa Command's] area of
responsibility, U.S. forces have been conducting active
military operations against forces loyal to Libyan dictator
Muammar Qadhafi in an effort to prevent a massacre of the
civilian population of Libya. Although this humanitarian
intervention is motivated by a noble impulse, there is a strong
possibility of a strategic stalemate emerging in Libya. I fear
we may find ourselves committed to an open-ended obligation
through our participation in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation] operations, and that poses real opportunity
costs, given the volatility of other unstable, more
strategically important countries in the region.
Beyond Libya, this weekend, as many as 1,000 civilians were
massacred in the Ivory Coast, as that nation's political
standoff escalated violently. This brutality could be an
ominous foreshadowing of future events in the Sudan, as the
southern portion of that war-torn country becomes an
independent nation in July. Further east, Somalia continues to
be a source of instability, hosting both Al Qaeda and
affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist organization and the various
piracy networks that have intensified attacks in the Gulf of
Aden and beyond over the past several years, recently killing
four American citizens aboard a private yacht.
Just as it was virtually impossible to foresee the United
States becoming militarily involved in Libya, at least at last
year's posture hearings, this Congress may be called upon to
fund a number of possible contingency operations or
humanitarian missions in AFRICOM's AOR [area of
responsibility]. I think when we made New Year's resolutions
this year, we did not foresee Egypt, Libya, all of the other
things that are happening.
Wherever U.S. forces may operate over the next year,
TRANSCOM [the United States Transportation Command] will be
charged with getting them there, sustaining them throughout
their operations, and getting them home to their families. As
General Omar Bradley famously said, amateurs talk strategy and
professionals talk logistics. The events of the past 18 months
are an instructive example as to the relevance of that quote
today. Not only did TRANSCOM have to respond to the surge of
forces in Afghanistan while they simultaneously orchestrated
the drawdown of forces in Iraq, but they also had to respond to
the devastating earthquake in Haiti.
Things have not gotten any easier for the men and women of
TRANSCOM, as they are now supporting combat operations in
Libya, in addition to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
are working desperately to assist the people of Japan following
the horrific earthquakes of the past month.
What they do is not easy, and it oftentimes goes unnoticed,
but the capabilities of TRANSCOM are truly unique among
nations.
We are fortunate to be joined here today by two officers
with long and distinguished records of service to their Nation:
General Duncan McNabb, Commander of U.S. Transportation
Command, and General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Africa
Command.
Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us here today,
and thank you for your lifetime of service to our Nation. And
please convey our thanks to those who serve with you in your
combat areas. We look forward to hearing your testimony today.
Ranking Member Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, General McNabb, General Ham. Appreciate you being
here to testify this afternoon. Look forward to your comments
and your answers to our questions.
Two very important commands within the military.
Transportation Command, first, does an amazing job of what the
chairman referred to as ``logistics.'' You know, you can
imagine all the capabilities we have and where we would like
them, but General McNabb is the one who has to make sure that
those two things match up. And it is not an easy job, when you
consider our interests throughout the world and where we have
had to move our equipment in recent years. You do an
outstanding job, as do the men and women who serve in the
Transportation Command. We appreciate that. We have the C-17s
[Boeing Globemaster III military transport aircraft] out of
Joint Base Lewis-McChord and McChord Air Force Base who are a
big part of that, so we are very proud of what they do, as
well.
Going forward, I think, in this hearing, a number of issues
we are going to be interested in, but, in particular, as we
figure out how to downsize in Iraq, move equipment out of
there, how does that work in terms of getting it back to the
States or getting it back to where we want it based? How is
that process progressing? What contingencies do you have in
place if, for some reason, sometime in the next 7 to 8 months,
it turns out that we are going to be leaving more equipment
there than we expected? If the Iraqis make a request that we
are able to grant for a continued U.S. presence of some, you
know, very limited scope, I would anticipate, but, still, that
will complicate the transportation of that equipment.
And then, second, of course, the ongoing challenge of
providing for the warfighter in Afghanistan. And there are many
logistical challenges. We bring a lot of our equipment in
through Pakistan, not always a very stable place. Other
countries to the north of Afghanistan also have their
challenges, as we have heard. So I would be interested in your
feelings about how we are doing on that and what the major
challenges are going forward and how we can better make sure
that we get the equipment to Afghanistan that we need.
In AFRICOM, as the chairman mentioned, you have a fair
number of challenges in that region. I think the best way to
summarize them is ``instability.'' Certainly, there is a lot of
political unrest in a number of nations across the top of
Africa, to varying degrees, from Tunisia and Egypt and Libya
and Morocco. And then, also, further down in the Ivory Coast,
there are major challenges right now. The Democratic Republic
of the Congo has an ongoing challenge, particularly in the
eastern Congo, with maintaining stability.
And that instability can have a very real impact on our
national security interests. Al Qaeda is present both as, you
know, AQAP, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, over close to
Somalia, and then Al Qaeda in the land of the Islamic Maghreb,
AQIM, which is throughout the sort of Mali-Mauritania area. And
they feed on instability--vast, ungoverned spaces, where they
can operate without people being able to control them.
So AFRICOM has a strong interest not just, you know, in
Libya, where we are very aware of what is going on, but
throughout the continent in trying to figure out how we combat
political unrest, combat poverty, which drives instability, to
make sure that these unstable, ungoverned areas don't become a
threat to us and that we can help make sure that the continent
is a more peaceful and prosperous place for those who reside
there.
So I appreciate the opportunity to have this hearing today.
I look forward to your testimony, gentlemen.
With that, I will yield back to the chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General McNabb.
Your full testimonies, without objection, will be inserted
in the record, so you may tell us whatever you feel most
appropriate.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General McNabb. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, and
distinguished members of this committee, it is my distinct
privilege to be here today with you, representing more than
145,000 of the world's finest logistics professionals.
Throughout 2010 and continuing today, the U.S.
Transportation Command team of Active Duty, Guard, Reserves,
civilians, merchant mariners, and commercial partners
accomplish incredible feats in the face of historic challenges.
We have a saying at U.S. Transportation Command, ``We view
our success through the eyes of the warfighter.'' We have
always been about support to the six regional combatant
commands and their joint task force commanders. Working with
the Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint Staff, the Services,
and the combatant command staffs, our log-nation and trans-
nation teams have provided unparalleled logistics superiority
to the regional combatant commanders.
From the Services in the Joint Forces Command getting the
forces ready to go, to the TRANSCOM team delivering the force,
to the theater commanders receiving the force, this is the best
overall performance I have seen in almost 37 years of service.
Sitting next to me is one of our finest warfighters and my
good friend, General Carter Ham. I was proud to support him as
he commanded military operations over the skies of Libya in
Operation Odyssey Dawn. And I look forward to continuing to
support him as he takes AFRICOM to new and even higher levels.
It is he and the other commandant commanders that I am always
supporting, and we view our success through their eyes.
I feel blessed to be the custodian of one of the Nation's
greatest asymmetric advantages: our strategic ability to move.
Since taking command of U.S. Transportation Command in the fall
of 2008, I have been amazed to see some of the unique
capabilities inherent in this command.
First and foremost is the power of the total-force team.
Nobody matches up our Active Duty force with our Guard and
Reserve partners like the U.S. Transportation Command. When we
called for volunteers to help relieve some of the suffering in
Haiti last January, the men and women of the Guard and Reserves
stepped up in huge fashion. This included a Contingency
Response Group from the Kentucky Guard that was just coming up
to speed. During the surge of forces into Afghanistan, we
relied heavily on activated C-5 [Lockheed Galaxy military
transport aircraft] and C-17 crews, maintainers, and aerial
porters, and they were crucial to meeting President Obama's
deadline to complete the plus-up by 31 August of last year.
Most recently, we saw their patriotism in action in responding
rapidly to the air refueling requirements in support of the
Libyan operations.
I am also in awe of the power of the U.S.-flag fleet in the
air, on the seas, and over land. The U.S.-flag maritime fleet
and their outstanding merchant mariners stepped up during our
historic surge last year into Afghanistan and out of Iraq, and
we didn't have to activate one ship for either operation. And
they delivered. They continue to be key to supplying our forces
in Afghanistan, whether coming up through Pakistan or over the
Northern Distribution Network. In the air, our commercial
partners have continued to meet the demands of the surge in
Afghanistan and, most recently, responded brilliantly to
bringing Americans home from Japan following the recent
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear incident.
We know the combatant commanders around the world depend on
us to deliver the forces and their sustainment day-in and day-
out, from resupply of the South Pole, to air-dropping food,
water, and ammo to a forward operating base in Afghanistan, to
delivering fuel to our fighters and bombers enforcing the
Libyan no-fly zone, U.S. TRANSCOM delivers. If we do this
right, our warfighting commanders do not worry about their
logistics lifeline.
This is what the Secretary of Defense intended when he made
U.S. TRANSCOM the distribution process owner, or DPO, in 2003.
He gave the DPO influence over the entire supply chain, from
factory to foxhole. And we constantly look for more effective
solutions for the warfighter while also being good stewards of
the taxpayers' dollar. Since its inception, the DPO has
realized over $5.3 billion in savings, and we are still
counting. Last year alone, that savings was $1.7 billion.
A big part of the savings is taking advantage of lower-cost
surface transportation whenever possible. When we match surface
to air and commercial to military modes of transportation, we
are leveraging our enterprise to maximum advantage for both the
warfighter and the taxpayer. We recently saved over $110
million a month moving lifesaving Mine Resistant All-Terrain
vehicles to our forces in Afghanistan using a combination of
commercial surface and military air. We continue to look for
every opportunity to use multimodal operations throughout our
global enterprise.
My final callout is to the power of the interagency and the
joint team. President Obama, in ordering the plus-up of forces
in Afghanistan and drawdown in Iraq, set a very tight timeline
for our execution. We knew we would need some help increasing
capacity on our existing supply lines and help in establishing
new supply routes.
We took our recommendations to the interagency, and the
whole of government came through with excellent results. The
National Security Council, ambassadors around the world, the
State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Maritime Administration, the combatant commands, and the log-
nation and trans-nation teams came together to make logistics
magic.
This was at a time when we were asked to expand quickly and
redirect flow due at an earthquake in the Caribbean that
devastated Haiti, which the chairman alluded to; a volcanic
eruption that shut down European airspace for 3 weeks; a coup
in the country where we have our main passenger trans-load
operation; the Deep Horizon oil spill in the gulf; and the
worst floods in Pakistan history during the last month of the
plus-up. And we still closed everything by 31 August that the
President had asked us to do.
And our operations continue today at record-breaking pace.
We continue to support our forces in Afghanistan and the
drawdown in Iraq. We pivoted the transportation enterprise
rapidly to support General Ham in the implementation of the no-
fly zone over Libya. And we moved out urgently to help with
disaster relief in Japan and provide immediate responses to the
nuclear incident with special equipment and nuclear specialists
from the United States.
I could not be more proud of the men and women of the
United States Transportation Command. I have flown with our
aircrews and loaded and moved containers with our stevedores. I
have walked through the pallet holding areas with our aerial
porters in Afghanistan and explored the cargo holds of our
Ready Reserve Fleet with our merchant mariners. Daily, I am
amazed and humbled by what our people accomplish.
Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, and all members of this
committee, thank you for your continued superb support of U.S.
TRANSCOM and our men and women in uniform. It is my distinct
honor and privilege to appear before you today to represent the
men and women who are the U.S. Transportation Command and to
tell you their story.
Again, thank you for taking my written statement for the
record, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General McNabb can be found in
the Appendix on page 43.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Ham.
STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA
COMMAND
General Ham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith,
and members of the committee. And thanks for the opportunity to
discuss with you today the accomplishments of the men and women
of United States Africa Command.
I would like to introduce to the committee Command Chief
Master Sergeant Jack Johnson, the command's senior enlisted
leader. He and I have only just begun our service together at
Africa Command, but I see already that he is exactly the right
person to lead several important initiatives and to ensure our
service members and their families are well-trained and well-
supported.
And I am indeed honored to appear alongside General McNabb,
a highly distinguished airman and joint force leader.
This is a historic time for United States Africa Command.
We have completed a complex, short-notice operational mission
in Libya and have now transferred control of that mission to
NATO. The situation in Libya in the conduct of Operation
Odyssey Dawn highlights some important matters about Africa.
First, this event illustrates the dynamics of the African
political-military environment, one that has seen the growing
threat of transnational extremists in Somalia, election crises,
coups, the Southern Sudanese referendum, the scourge of the
Lord's Resistance Army, to name just a few of the challenges to
security on the continent.
In order for Africa Command to reduce threats to our
citizens and interests both abroad and at home, we need to
contribute to operations, programs, and activities that help
African states provide for their own security in a manner that
is consistent with the rule of law and international norms. And
we must continue our efforts to enhance regional stability
through partnership, not only with African states, but also
sustained, reliable support to African regional organizations.
Africa Command's programs are designed to help prevent
conflict while simultaneously ensuring that the command is
prepared to respond decisively to any crisis when the President
so directs, as demonstrated in our conduct of Operation Odyssey
Dawn.
Secondly, building the coalition to address the situation
in Libya was greatly facilitated through the benefits of
longstanding relationships and interoperability, this time
within NATO. This is the kind of regional approach to security
that U.S. Africa Command seeks to foster on the continent.
U.S. Africa Command's priority efforts remain building the
security capacity of our African partners. We incorporate
regional cooperation in pursuit of interoperability in all our
programs, activities, and exercises so that our African
partners are postured to readily form coalitions to address
African security challenges as they arise.
Everything U.S. Africa Command has accomplished is the
result of the professionalism and dedication of the uniformed
and civilian women and men of the command and our many
teammates from across the U.S. Government. Their dedicated
efforts are a testament to the American spirit and
determination and reflects our commitment to contributing to
the wellbeing and security of the people of Africa.
Our guiding principles are, first, that a safe, secure, and
stable Africa is clearly in the best interest of the United
States and, secondly, that we seek to help Africans find
solutions to African challenges.
I am cognizant that the command is only able to accomplish
its missions with the enduring support of this committee. And I
thank you for that and invite you to come visit us at our
headquarters or, better yet, come see us at work in Africa.
Mr. Chairman, I would welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Ham can be found in the
Appendix on page 67.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General McNabb, the ongoing combat operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the response to the earthquake in Japan,
and the President's decision to engage combat forces in Libya
are undoubtedly straining the mobility force.
Have you reached or are you approaching any redlines in
mobility capabilities? What areas of operations concern you the
most? And are there any additional resources or assets that
could alleviate the stress on the forces and reduce your
operational risk?
General McNabb. Sir, right now, I think one of the things
that hits me is our ability to pivot the transportation
enterprise and expand it and contract it using our U.S.-flag
carriers and our total force. At this point, we have gotten
tremendous support from our Guard and Reserve. A lot of them
have volunteered to help wherever they can.
What I would do next, if we ended up--if that is not enough
to handle what we are being asked to do worldwide, is then I
would have to mobilize some folks. And, at this time, we do not
think we have to do that, at the present level.
What we have been able to do is, as we have looked at kind
of the urgent requirements that we had for Libya and the urgent
requirements we had for Japan, we basically stayed in very
good, close contact with CENTCOM [United States Central
Command], and we looked for ways or things that we could slow
down that they could take a little risk in, primarily
sustainment.
A decision was made by General Petraeus and General Mattis
to increase the sustainment stocks in Afghanistan, and that
gave us a little bit of room to be able to say, ``Can we slow
this down a little bit until we take care of these emergencies?
And then we will get right back to you.'' That is the same way
we handled Haiti.
And so, the ability to mix and match is one of the things
that I think we bring to the table.
At this time, I will say that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
has stepped up to anything that we have asked. I would say
that, this last couple of weeks, I didn't quite understand how
much spring break affects excess capacity, but I will say that
that one hit us pretty hard. Next to Christmas and
Thanksgiving, spring break is the busiest time for our carriers
who are out there. So as we brought--on the order of departure,
the voluntary departure coming out of Japan, in support of
Admiral Willard, getting them back to the States and getting
seats back to their homes was something that was worked very
closely with NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] and with
TRANSCOM as we worked through that.
Right now, I think that, as the Libyan operation unfolds,
we are watching that carefully. Obviously, if that expands in
any way, that would be one where we would be looking to say, do
we have enough? Right now, we don't see that.
Obviously, there are some other places where there is
turmoil. I will bring the Ivory Coast, you can bring Yemen. All
of those operations, we work with CENTCOM or with AFRICOM to
sit down and say, ``Okay, how are we going to do this
together,'' doing lot of what-ifs.
At this point, I am looking forward to Afghanistan and
Iraq, making sure that we can meet the timelines coming out of
Iraq. As Congressman Smith asked me about how do we do that, I
would say that, coming down from 130,000 to 50,000, that that
work with General Austin and his people in Iraq, the Army
Materiel Command under General Dunwoody, really that team has
worked superbly, bringing out the extra equipment through
Kuwait and through Jordan, getting it washed up, and then
putting it on commercial vessels. That is what I was
mentioning, that we didn't have to activate any ships to do
that.
I am confident that that system is working well. And, in
fact, making sure which stuff we will leave there, which stuff
that we will bring home, which stuff will we send to
Afghanistan was what we went through last year. But I will tell
you, the team, I think, did a superb job. And my portion was
just moving it, which was not the hardest part of all of that.
When I think about Afghanistan, I would say that we have
found the power of intermodal operations that I had mentioned,
being able to take it by surface to ports much closer to
Afghanistan, and then just jumping the last part using airlift.
We are looking for that same capability to be able to bring
stuff out of Afghanistan. In other words, same way: bring it
out by air to a port nearby, and then bring it by surface mode
from there.
We would like to get dual--be able to go both directions on
the Northern Distribution Network. Right now, we can only take
stuff in. Some countries have not given us permission to bring
stuff out of Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution
Network. So the interagency and the whole team is working that.
I continue to look to say, I would like to make sure that I
have lots of options--the Northern Distribution Network, the
Pakistan LOC [line of communication]. Working with General
Kayani and the Pak [Pakistan] military, we are trying to make
sure we do everything we can to make the Pak LOC as smooth as
possible.
But our ultimate ace in the hole is air. And we are trying
to make sure we have taken full advantage of that, working very
closely with General Petraeus and his team there.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General McNabb. So, sir, I think that kind of puts it in a
nutshell, but I think we are getting there.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Ham, despite the numerous briefings we have
received from the administration regarding our military
operations in Libya, I think many areas of uncertainty still
remain. One question I have is where AFRICOM fits into the
command and control structure of NATO enforcement of the no-fly
zone and attacks on regime ground targets.
General, does AFRICOM have a clear role in the chain of
command or targeting boards of Operation Odyssey Dawn, or are
you liaising with NATO's Joint Task Force Unified Protector, at
this point?
And what has the reaction of Libya's African neighbors been
to our intervention there? Will this operation affect our
partnership efforts in the region--in particular, Operation
Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara and our efforts against Al Qaeda
in the Maghreb?
General Ham. Chairman, first of all, on the command and
control side, at present, with the transition of the operation
from U.S. AFRICOM to NATO, NATO now has the full operational
control of the forces that are actually conducting missions
over Libya. So U.S. AFRICOM is presently in a supporting role
to Admiral Stavridis, Admiral Locklear, General Bouchard in
their efforts. So I don't, at present, have an operational
responsibility.
There is always the potential for some U.S. unilateral
military missions. One could think of, for example, a personnel
recovery of a downed pilot or something like that. And if that
were to occur, then that would fall to U.S. Africa Command to
execute those responsibilities.
Sir, with regard to the regional reaction, it is--frankly,
it is mixed, as we see that particularly play out in the
African Union. Many members, many states in Africa have voiced
their support for the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1973, the imposition and the execution of those
responsibilities. But, frankly, there are other states who did
not agree with that U.N. [United Nations] Security Council
resolution.
I think, frankly, as we proceed, I am going to have the
responsibility, as I engage with our African partners, of just
having a very frank discussion about what U.S. Africa Command's
role was, why we did what we did, and just be as truthful and
forthright as I can, just to try to maintain the great
relationships that we have with most African states as we move
forward.
But your point is valid. There is an impact and there will
be an impact within the region.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ranking Member Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My first question on the Transportation Command, if you
could play out a little bit, General McNabb, how things are
going in terms of the logistical challenges in Afghanistan that
I asked about earlier, working through Pakistan and some of the
other areas. Are we able to get what we need in? I know there
are major movements now of equipment for the Afghan National
Security Force. How is that working, and what are the
challenges going forward?
General McNabb. Sir, we presently take in about 35 percent,
and everything that is high-value we take in by air. Sometimes
that is just that short hop that I was mentioning before from a
port that is close in, sometimes that is all the way from the
States, depending on the nature of the stuff going in.
It is about--on the surface side, it ends up being about 45
percent coming through the Pakistan LOC and about 55 percent of
the surface move coming through the Northern Distribution
Network. So we have actually adjusted more of the flow to the
north, but we don't have--we are not able to bring military
equipment through the NDN [Northern Distribution Network]; we
can only bring that through the Pakistan LOC, which gets to
your question about FMS [foreign military sales] for the ANA
[Afghan National Army].
We have been working with the Pakistan military to make
sure that we--I have stressed to them how important it is to
maintain the velocity going through the Pakistan LOC. I
continue to work with them to say--we can identify if there is
any pilferage or attacks and show them where that is taking
place and work with them to respond quickly. We still are at
less than about 1 percent pilfered rate on the Pak LOC. And so
I would say that--of course, if it is your stuff, the 1 percent
is way too much.
Mr. Smith. Right.
General McNabb. So we continue to work that hard with Task
Force Guardian, which General Petraeus and General Mattis put
together.
General Thurman made sure--he is the Army Forces Command--
he made sure the discipline of what goes on the ground is
maintained. From my standpoint, I say, if it is really
important to you, we put that on the air.
Mr. Smith. And has the security situation in terms of the
Pakistan route gotten better or worse? I know there were
concerns about attacks against our supply line coming through
Pakistan. What is the update on that?
General McNabb. Sir, it has gone--it has kind of gone--
there are periods where it goes a little higher. I will say, in
December of '08 was the time when all of us very much worried
that we did not have the Northern Distribution Network at that
time. It was 11 percent, was the pilferage and attack rate on
it.
Since then, it has come down below 1 percent, pretty much,
for calendar years. But to give you a sense, in July of last
year, when the floods were all happening and things started to
get stacked up, that is when--you slow down the velocity, that
is when you become more vulnerable. We went up to about 2
percent during that month. But, overall, for the last year, it
was less than 1 percent.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
General McNabb. But, again, we keep working at that and
making sure that we are looking for every possible way that we
can smooth that. A lot of it is just maintaining the velocity
on there so it doesn't slow down and become vulnerable.
Mr. Smith. Right, and create a bigger target. Thank you.
General Ham, just a quick question about Africa. I
mentioned that stability is a main challenge there, and in
making sure that we do what we can to help create a more stable
atmosphere, there is a strong interagency approach that is
necessary--State Department, USAID [U.S. Agency for
International Development], in particular, and elsewhere. I
have done a trip across Africa to a variety of different
countries a couple years ago, and I know that that is critical
to being able to be successful, is to leverage your assets in
cooperation with the State Department.
Can you talk to us a little bit about how that interagency
process works country to country in Africa and how you see that
as part of your mission there?
General McNabb. Yes, sir, absolutely. With the design of
United States Africa Command, there was a recognition, I think,
early on that the problem set that you just identified was key,
that it is about instability, and it does require a whole-of-
government approach to advance U.S. interests on the continent.
And, with that in mind, the command headquarters was designed
as--or, with a considerable amount of interagency support.
So we look at our headquarters in Stuttgart, which is, not
surprisingly, overwhelmingly Department of Defense, but we have
12 other Government agencies who are represented at some pretty
senior levels, to include a deputy to the commander, who is a
very experienced and senior foreign service officer, former
ambassador. We have senior representatives from USAID, from
Treasury, from Commerce and many other organizations to help us
look at the challenges, the security challenges, in Africa
through more than just a military lens.
And that helps us, first of all, better define the problem
so that we can then, in concert with our interagency partners,
bring to bear, you know, ideally, the whole of government, the
various assets that different branches bring, to help African
states build the secure environment that they need to build.
Our aspect of that is, again, very largely weighted toward the
military, but the other aspects of government are key.
The second point, Congressman, that I would say is we work
very, very closely with the chiefs of mission in the countries.
And, of course, they are the senior Americans in each of those
countries. We make sure that all of our efforts are nested with
the Ambassador and with the country team, which are inherently
interagency. And we think that that works to our best effect.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you both very much for your testimony,
your long service, and your stellar performance.
I have a lot of questions about our Libyan involvement,
which I believe is both unconstitutional and illegal. But these
are policy questions, and I know yours is not to reason why,
yours is but to do and die. So I will avoid the temptation to
ask you questions which you cannot answer by yielding my time
to our most junior member here at gavel fall, which was Mr.
West.
Mr. West. Well, thank you, Mr. Bartlett.
And, also, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member.
And, Generals, it is good to see you.
And, General Ham, always great to see you.
First of all, General McNabb, strategic maneuverability has
always been the great thing about our force and our country.
But what I would like to do is look out ahead maybe about 5
years. And when you look at the fact that we are moving more so
from a forward-deployed type of military force more so to a
power-projection or a forceable-entry type of force, what do
you see are the challenges, you know, 5 years and beyond, for
the Transportation Command? Because I know one of the things I
am very concerned about is our C-17 fleet.
General McNabb. Well, Congressman, thanks for that. I
couldn't agree more with the value of the strategic mobility
capability. And I would say that we are being pushed,
especially as you think about global operations and we think
about how we are headed as a department.
I will tell you first and foremost, that new tanker was my
number-one acquisition priority. And the fact that the tanker
allows us to put global-on-global mobility reach in power is
what that is all about. And that new tanker will allow us to
make sure that we can extend out and we can really change the
way we do our concept of operations and be much more efficient
in that. So that is huge. And the faster we can get the tanker
on board, the better, from my standpoint.
Right now, we do some things by brute force. For instance,
do trans-load using C-17s, moving pallets and people, and that
is not what C-17s do best. They do air assault or airdrop. And
that has been--that has grown a lot as we have gotten into
Afghanistan. We have gone from 2 million pounds of airdrop in
2005 to 60 million pounds last year, and we are headed toward
100 million pounds of airdrop. And what that allows us to do is
to get out there to the forward operating bases and make sure
they get what they need without having to put convoys at
unnecessary risk.
I think that we are pushing very hard to be able to have
some of these intermodal/multimodal locations, places like
Rota, places like Souda, places like--or Souda Bay, places like
Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. As I look to the Pacific, the same
thing--Guam, Singapore, Diego Garcia. And if I have those
places where I can get large stuff into and then have theater
response, whether that is the joint high-speed vessel, whether
that is C-17s or 130s [Lockheed C-130 Hercules military
transport aircraft] doing airdrop, or whether that is even as
we look at hybrid airships, if we can get to the point where we
can get that stuff to these major ports by surface and then
have options for the theater commanders out there depending on
the nature, we really will have gone a long way.
That is the part that I am looking at now, because that is
big dollar savings and it is also very, very fast. That
includes not only our float prepositioning but what do we
preposition on the land. So you can imagine giving those
options to the theater commanders out there, and I think that
will be very useful to them.
So those are the things that I am looking at and really
asking all the theater commanders, is, where do you want me to
look at those intermodal locations, and let's work those now.
The investments in places like Diego Garcia, like in Rota, like
in Souda Bay, have already paid big dividends for us. And we
are finding that the power of that has actually increased the
velocity into the warfighter, because, oftentimes, in those
small places, it is not the number of airplanes, it is what we
can get in the throughput into those small bases. And that is
where the C-17, as you mentioned, has really, really played
well.
I get to fly the C-17, and I will tell you, it is an
awesome airplane. When I go fly with those young guys at Altus
and those young instructors--and, you know, I have 5,600
hours--they will come over and put their arm around me and say,
``Come over here, son. Let me show you how we fly this
airplane.'' And so they really have taken this and taken it to
a whole different level.
So, lots of great opportunities. The C-5M is performing
very well; that is the re-engined C-5s. And as we get the C-
130Js on board and the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program on
the C-130H models, you know, you have really set us up with
modern airplanes that we can really throw in there very quickly
and really can make a difference.
Mr. West. Well, thank you, sir.
And if I could ask one other question.
General Ham, you know, as we sit back, as Ranking Member
Smith talked about the unrest and the political instability in
Africa, do you see an encroachment of any Al Qaeda type of
elements? And, also, I would like to get your assessment of
China's interventions into the African continent, as well.
General Ham. Thanks, Congressman.
If I could take the second piece first, the Chinese are
very active across the continent, but primarily in an economic
way. And I am learning more about that as I get further into
the command. And I would note that tomorrow would be 4 weeks,
so I have a lot yet to learn about this. But I see the Chinese
influence primarily in an economic vein, with construction,
with oil, and the like.
Your first point about Al Qaeda and, more broadly, violent
extremist organizations in Africa is, indeed, the number one
security challenge that we face in Africa, and I would say most
notably in East Africa, where we see the efforts of al-Shabaab
in Somalia attempting to expand their reach more regionally,
with linkages with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen
and, potentially, linkages with Al Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb.
All of those, I think, pose a very, very real strategic
concern to the United States, our people, and our interests,
both abroad and at home. So I take that as our number one
mission and our number one area of emphasis.
Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your distinguished service.
I wanted to follow up a little on the interagency question,
because I think, over the years, we have acknowledged that the
military operations and interface probably will always
overshadow, to a certain extent, in many of the areas in which
we are engaged, we are involved.
Are there some metrics, are there some areas that you are
really looking at to see whether, in fact, that has changed
dramatically, and what has really contributed to that change?
Are we, in fact, seeing that military operations or the
activities per se are really not getting in the way of some of
the diplomatic efforts that we have had ongoing?
General Ham. Yes, ma'am, I think for us in Africa Command,
the operations in Libya were certainly a different nature, a
different type of the operation, in that those were certainly
an overwhelmingly military aspect of the U.S. application of
power. More commonly throughout Africa, U.S. Africa Command is
operating in a supporting role, in most cases supporting chief-
of-mission initiatives or Department of State-led initiatives.
It is principally through Department of State authorities that
building partner capacity--security institution building is
done through State authorities; though DOD [the Department of
Defense], through U.S. Africa Command, has a supporting role in
that regard. A good example is the development of forces from
Uganda, Burundi, who operate in the African mission in Somalia
under a State Department program that U.S. Africa Command
supports.
So I think we have the balance about right, in terms of who
is in charge. The Department of Defense, and, again, through
U.S. Africa Command, we bring a lot of capacity and a lot of
ability to enable those programs, but, by and large, we are
doing so in support of others. And that seems to me to be about
right for most of the programs in Africa.
Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. Are you checking in, I guess, fairly
frequently to be sure that everybody agrees, I think, that that
balance, where it is appropriate--obviously, there are areas
that you pointed out, of course, where the balance is not
appropriate. But I think one of the--I think it was the trips
that I took, actually, with our ranking chairman, where,
despite the fact that we talked about how important it was, in
fact, the people who were engaged in this effort didn't feel
that they had the same seat at the table.
General McNabb. I think that is a very real concern, and it
is something that I would tell you that I will take a look at,
as I get my feet under me in this new command.
I will, as I have told Assistant Secretary Carson of the
Africa Bureau of State Department, that most of the time when I
come back to D.C., I will make an effort to see him, as he has
pledged to come see me on the continent or in Germany. I think
it is very, very important that we have that very strong
linkage to make sure that all of the assets of the Government
get a voice, and an important voice, as we move forward.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, sir.
May I just--you noted, I think, two areas in which you are
reaching out to military families, particularly in Stuttgart, I
think, where they have had some questions and some problems.
How else are you able to make certain that our military
families feel that they have the support that they need in that
command?
And some of those are accompanied, I believe. And the
majority, I suspect, are probably not accompanied, certainly in
Djibouti, where we have some forces there.
General Ham. Yes, ma'am, the quality of life for our
service members who are at the headquarters in Stuttgart and in
our service component commands who are largely based in Europe,
with one here in the U.S., those families have excellent
support.
I do worry more so about the small contingents that are
either in our embassies, kind of separated away, that the
military service members and families have the programs that
they need. But, generally, that is pretty good.
And at places like Camp Lemonier, which is a pretty large
deployment of unaccompanied service members, again, thanks to
this committee, they actually have a very good quality of life.
It is never as good as being separated, but it is quite good.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Generals, thank you for being here today.
And, General Ham, I am very familiar that the Southern
Command is located in Miami. And we know that the people of my
birthplace, Charleston, South Carolina, have a keen interest in
the potential of AFRICOM being located in Charleston. And we
would, if my colleagues, Congressman Tim Scott, Congressman Jim
Clyburn, were here, they would want to make a few points to
you.
And that is that Charleston is the transportation hub for
the United States Transportation Command, as well as the
primary seaport for container traffic between the United States
and the South Atlantic. The Charleston Air Force Base provides
all the strategic airlift support for Africa for our
Government, to include embassy support. SPAWAR-Charleston
[Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command--Charleston] is the
leading provider for command, control, and communications for
EUCOM's [United States European Command's] role in Africa.
The relationships for the Charleston medical community,
which would be so helpful in the event of an emergency in
Africa; the Medical University of South Carolina is located in
Charleston, a world-class facility. We know that most of the
rapid deployment forces that would be used in an African
operation include special operations that are in the
southeastern part of the United States. Charleston is the hub
for all military transportation, airlift, sealift, and
prepositioning to Africa.
And then there is an extraordinary cultural linkage. I had
the privilege of visiting in Monrovia, Liberia, and the great
cultural association of West Africa to Charleston is very
clear. It is a shared culture. In fact, we have the same
accents, and I felt right at home when I was visiting with the
people in Monrovia. And then I found out, to my pleasant
surprise, that the diocese of the African American Methodist
Church for South Carolina is actually South Carolina and
Liberia, and it sponsors the AME [African Methodist Episcopal]
university there in Monrovia.
And so, with that in mind, the decision, Secretary Gates
has indicated, to be made for moving Africa Command or
retaining it won't be considered until next year. But when the
decision is made, what are the considerations that will be made
as to quality of life or dependents' access to schools, jobs,
medical care? What do you see?
General Ham. Well, Congressman, first, I would say I have
only had the opportunity to visit Charleston once, but it was
just a few years ago, and it was indeed a very enjoyable visit
to a great city.
As you mentioned, the Secretary of Defense has asked me to
take a look at and provide a recommendation back to him as to
where the stationing of the Africa Command headquarters should
be. And he has essentially asked me to start from a clean sheet
of paper and look at the factors that you have identified:
Security, suitability, quality of life, the transportation
nodes, accessibility to the area of responsibility, a whole
host of requirements that we would like to station our
headquarters.
And so that process has begun, and we will look at, first
of all, to make sure we have the methodology right, and then we
will look at a wide variety of locations to see which we think
would make the--be most suitable for the command to accomplish
its missions.
But it will take us a little bit of time to do that study.
Mr. Wilson. Well, you indicated you have visited Charleston
once. You are welcome back, obviously. And you will see such a
symbiotic relationship with West Africa to the low country of
South Carolina. And the people there are very proud of the
shared culture, but then, obviously, all the other features
that I told you. And I know that if Congressman Scott were
here, or Congressman Clyburn, they would want to make that
point.
And, General McNabb, as my final question, with regard to
refitting railcars, what is the status of refitting old
railcars as opposed to buying new?
General McNabb. Yes, sir, our Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command has been looking at that and have
basically decided that refurbishing old probably makes the most
sense from a business case.
Right now, we have been asked by OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] to take a look and say, okay, given
everything going on, what should that number be, 4,000, 5,000,
you know, where should that be in there? And, right now, they
are doing that study with OSD.
Mr. Wilson. And to conclude, there is a bit of history
there, too. Where retrofitting occurs in South Carolina is in
the community of Hamburg, South Carolina. It was the site of
the first scheduled railroad in the world, between Charleston
and Hamburg in 1832.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And to Mr. Wilson, I would comment that when I have been to
South Carolina, Charleston, I have enjoyed myself in that area.
But I would also point everyone out--or point everyone to
the fact that I live in the Atlanta, Georgia, area, which is
the transportation hub of the Southeast. We have the world's
busiest airport; it is high-capacity. We have approximately--
quite a few military aviation facilities. We have one of the
country's largest diaspora communities from Africa; superb
infrastructure to support the military's communication needs;
world-class educational institutions--Georgia Tech, Emory, the
Atlanta University Center. High quality of life for personnel
who were assigned--or who would be assigned to that area.
And I think that it would be a great thing. I know that
Ambassador Andrew Young is very much interested in AFRICOM
choosing to locate its headquarters in Atlanta, and I certainly
join in that desire. If not Atlanta, then someplace in Georgia
would be great.
But I want to also congratulate you, General Ham, for your
new assignment. Four weeks in, I know that you are still trying
to get adjusted. And it seems like you came in at a time of
great action going on in Africa, with the Libyan situation, we
have the situation in the Ivory Coast.
Now, I understand that President Gbagbo has resigned and is
asking for U.N. assistance, or U.N. protection actually. And
that is good, that he will be moving on.
I would like to ask you, are U.S. personnel or equipment
taking part in the U.N. operations in the Ivory Coast?
General Ham. Congressman, we are not. We are in very close
dialogue with the U.S. Embassy and also with the French, who
have a large presence in Cote d'Ivoire. As we typically do in
the U.S. military, we plan for possible contingencies. And as
the chairman mentioned, you know, the security situation in
Cote d'Ivoire had been deteriorating for some period of time,
so we looked at a whole range of possible military actions that
might be necessary.
But we have--the people at the Embassy are present. The
Ambassador has asked for a small coordinating team just to
maintain communications, and we have got that available to him,
as well.
Your information is probably a little more current than
mine, but, as I was departing the Pentagon to come over here,
we were at the situation where Mr. Gbagbo had indicated his
apparent willingness to turn himself over, but that had not yet
been accomplished by the time I left. But, hopefully, that will
be accomplished and a calm returned to Abidjan and to the
country. It is sorely needed.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir.
And would you also update us on the progress toward
increasing the professionalism and accountability of the forces
in the Democratic Republic of Congo?
General Ham. Yes, sir. It is an ongoing effort. We have
trained one battalion. We think that one battalion will perform
pretty well. But we think there is more that we can and should
be doing to help Congo become a more professional military
force, subordinate to civil control and responding under
international norms.
But initial indications are pretty good, I think, but there
is still, certainly, some work to be done.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
General McNabb, I had questions, but Congressman Wilson
kind of threw me off track there, so I will get back to you at
some point in the future.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to the Nation.
Mr. Forbes. [Presiding.] Thank you.
The chair recognizes Mr. Kline for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And with all apologies to my colleagues from South Carolina
and Georgia, most everybody knows that Minneapolis-St. Paul is
roughly the transportation center of the entire world.
General McNabb, I have a copy of the letter that you sent
to Mr. Babbitt, the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration]
administrator, where you were expressing some concerns about a
proposed rule that will affect crew rest for our commercial
partners.
Could you briefly outline what your concerns are and what
impact this rule might have on our ability to move troops and
personnel?
General McNabb. Sure. Yes, Congressman, actually, Mr.
Babbitt did come out--Administrator Babbitt did come out and
visit with me at TRANSCOM, also visited with the Air Mobility
Command. And we chatted about what this impact would have on
our Civil Reserve Air Fleet, especially the nonscheduled
carriers--so, the legacy carriers, kind of a separate issue--
but the nonscheduled carriers that primarily do the charter
work not only for us but for others.
As I mentioned to him, I said, safety is paramount. There
is no question that that----
Mr. Kline. Yes, sir, but what would the impact be? What is
your concern here?
General McNabb. Sir, the biggest concern has to do with, as
you get modern airplanes, when you think about--basically, one
size doesn't fit all. When you talk about regional carriers,
they are doing a number of landings, versus long international
legs, they have different levels of fatigue, and they require
different approaches.
When you talk about the nonsecurity carriers, they are
taking stuff directly from the United States and, ideally, with
modern airplanes, going all the way to Afghanistan, not
stopping on the way; it is taking advantage of that.
Ideally, I have been pushing hard for the modern airplanes
that have the longer range. That increases velocity. It also
means we don't have to worry about stopping in some of those
locations. It allows this thing to go very rapidly.
So I asked them to, you know, take a look at that, take a
look at better crew rest facilities, better operational risk-
management-type things that say, let's look at this kind of
unique part of this mission, and make sure that we enhance
safety but look at all the ways that we can do that.
Mr. Kline. So if I may interrupt again just for a minute,
this proposed rule would take away that flexibility. And what I
am trying to get at, the impact would be, we would move fewer
troops, it would take more time, we could move less equipment.
What would the impact of this rule be?
General McNabb. Well, certainly, it is time, and,
certainly, it is dollars. And what I am probably the most--what
I want to make sure is our U.S.-flag fleet stays competitive.
And if we don't take full advantage of modern airplanes,
especially on the international market, we will find ourselves
not in that market. And I am very worried about that, because I
depend on those.
Mr. Kline. I am, too, General. Thank you very much. If
there is anything this committee can do, I trust you will
communicate that to us.
General Ham, I want to go back to the command structure for
Operation Unified Protector. And I have a little thing here
from Admiral Stavridis, I think, NATO, sort of a command
structure outline. And it says that we have, apparently,
Lieutenant General Jodice, American; Vice Admiral Rinaldo
Veri--in fact, I should put my glasses on, I am sorry--an
Italian; and we have a Canadian lieutenant general, and they
are reporting to Admiral Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander
Europe.
You should have lobbied for a title like that.
The question is, do you see your relationship as the
commander of AFRICOM as the same as General Mattis' is to
General Petraeus and Admiral Stavridis? We are trying to fit--
the chairman asked you about that relationship, and you said
that there might be a uniquely American operation where,
presumably, you insert yourself into this chain of command and
take U.S. forces and use them for, in your example, it was a
pickup of a downed pilot or something else.
I am just--help me understand what your relationship is to
this--I know you don't have this--but to this command structure
that I just described, which is a NATO command structure.
General Ham. Sir, it is quite analogous to what you
described in Afghanistan, where in Afghanistan Admiral
Stavridis, in his NATO role, overseeing General Petraeus, a
NATO commander, supported by General Mattis, a United States
geographic combatant commander. And so that relationship is
very similar to what we have here.
I do not have a day-to-day operational role, but Libya is
in the area of responsibility of U.S. Africa Command, so we
have, obviously, an enduring interest. And when Operation
Unified Protector is complete, when the alliance decides that
its missions have been accomplished, then Libya is still in
Africa Command's area of responsibility. So I remain very
closely connected with Admiral Stavridis, Admiral Locklear,
and, indeed, the Canadian, General Bouchard, who is a very
competent commander.
Mr. Kline. Okay. Thanks very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
The chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs.
Castor, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Generals.
General McNabb, I think many of the personnel in U.S.
Transportation Command are something of unsung heroes. I mean,
they do it all, from the intricate and complex delivery of
supplies across the globe, to air refueling, to deployment and
redeployments, and then you have the disaster response and all
of the aeromedical assignments that you have. I don't think you
get enough kudos, so my hat is off to all of the personnel in
U.S. Transportation Command.
General McNabb. Thank you, ma'am.
Mrs. Castor. I know that one of the primary issues for
TRANSCOM has been the ongoing saga of the KC-X air refueling
tanker. And we have finally reached a point now where we can
all move ahead and they can focus on actually engineering and
building those aircraft.
How do you keep the KC-X on time and on budget?
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am. Well, first of all, obviously,
the Air Force will--you know, I depend on the Air Force, in
their organize, train, and equip role, to be able to be
overseeing that and making sure that it stays on time and on
budget.
Mrs. Castor. But can you bring some added attention to
General Schwartz and the Air Force? And I want to hear whether
or not you have the ability to do that.
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am. And I think that, you know,
right now, they have made that--that was their number-one
acquisition priority, just like it was mine.
I really do appreciate the tremendous support on both sides
of the Hill on getting us that new tanker. And I am absolutely
excited about what it will bring.
I think that the fact that it is, you know, primarily off
the shelf, in general, taking advantage of what is already
commercial market, making sure that we are not asking for
things that are beyond the reach in technology--I mean, a lot
of the things that usually will drive something to increase
cost or a delay in time, most of that stuff has been worked
out. So I am pretty excited about that.
And it seems to me, as long as we keep a stable program,
that we will be able to deliver that on time. And, you know,
hopefully, we will be cranking those out at 15-plus a year, and
then we can begin to replace those old 135s [Boeing C-135
Stratolifter military transport aircraft] that have done such a
great job.
Mrs. Castor. Yeah, the mechanics that have worked on--that
continue to work on some of the Eisenhower-era tankers are
magicians, I think, sometimes.
What role has TRANSCOM played in support of the
humanitarian relief to the earthquake victims in Japan? Could
you give us a quick summary on that and whether or not it has
placed stress on our mobility system?
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am. We have had 512 sorties, moved
about 306 packs into there to help. Primarily, those were those
radiological teams and other teams that went in. Moved----
Mrs. Castor. Are these teams and assets, are they in that
area? Could you distinguish, how far are you having to travel?
Do you have the ability to respond with assets that are close-
in?
General McNabb. Well, certainly, Admiral Willard is using
his own forces that are already in-theater. And you have seen
them. You have seen the amphibious groups. You have seen the
Marines come up from Kadena. You have seen the Seventh Fleet,
the naval assets come in. Obviously, we have a number of airmen
that are over there at different bases, like Yokota and Misawa,
and he is taking full advantage of all of that.
Where he has asked us to help is the stuff coming from the
Continental United States or for emergency movement in-theater
that they can't handle themselves. We have moved, for instance,
crash rescue teams, the Fairfax rescue team from here, the L.A.
crash rescue team. And this is not only to go into the rubble
but also dog teams that deployed with them. We moved emergency
generators, a planeload, 65 emergency generators, as the
generators were taken out by the tsunami, for the nuclear
plant. We also moved a planeload of boron to neutralize the
radioisotopes.
So we have been doing things like that, kind of the
emergency, ``This is stuff that we need from the States.'' A
lot of radiological teams, whether they were survey teams or
chemical, biological, radiological teams, we brought those on.
And, basically, what Northern Command, Admiral Winnefeld,
did when this came up, said, ``Here are the teams that they
might need.'' We leave that to Admiral Willard. I make sure
that I have airplanes that are on standby alert and air
refueling assets to take it as soon as it is identified. And,
once it is identified, we go pick them up and take them.
We also did the--aided in the voluntary departure of all of
the U.S. people----
Mrs. Castor. Has it provided any kinks in your ability to
complete missions anywhere else?
General McNabb. Ma'am, the only thing that we had a bit of
discussion on is how quickly they needed to move the voluntary
departure. We decided that we would do that all commercial. We
went to our U.S.-flag carriers, like you were mentioning.
Spring break did have a play, because there wasn't excess
capacity. And they basically responded very quickly. That
allowed us to keep the T-tail supporting General Ham in
AFRICOM, General Petraeus and General Mattis in CENTCOM, at the
same time of having those T-tails available to take any of that
emergency nuclear response stuff immediately in there.
So, again, our commercial partners really stepped up
magnificently and, by the time it was over, brought out about
5,000 passengers, over 400 pets. And then we also got
commercial tickets on the scheduled missions that were coming
out of Japan to get the folks home. And then we worked with
NORTHCOM to get them to their final destination.
Mrs. Castor. Thank you very much.
General McNabb. You are very welcome, ma'am.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, General McNabb, thanks for the job that you
are doing as the commanding general for U.S. Transportation
Command.
A question about Afghanistan, and that is--you mentioned
that you want to get the C-17 more in its primary mission, as
you define it, to do the airborne drops for logistical support.
But I understand that there have been some problems with
accuracy, getting that inside the drop zone. Could you respond
to that?
General McNabb. Sir, I think you are probably talking about
the Precision Airdrop System, where we drop it at 10,000 or
15,000 feet, and it has a GPS [Global Positioning System]
receiver and a square chute, and it comes in. And the biggest
issue with that was the terrain and the winds. And, obviously,
it has got to be able to keep up with those kinds of things. So
we have worked with industry to make sure that we continue to
drive in the accuracy that they need on the ground.
Because of the conditions, primarily we have been able to
do Visual Flight Rule-type drops, low-altitude, low-cost, using
disposable-type chutes. That has been the primary amount that
we have done. And normal container delivery system, that is the
primary way that we have been doing that.
I actually got to fly an airdrop, 40 bundles, where we
dropped from a C-17 that we dropped up in the mountains at
night. They use the night-vision goggles. They have worked out
very well with the folks on the ground. And when you are coming
in at 1,000 to 2,000 feet, the accuracy rule is within the
standards that they need.
So we have been, you know, the 93 to 94 percent accuracy on
putting the stuff on target. We are even looking at doing low-
altitude, high-speed airdrop, much like the special operators
do. The C-17 and the 130J are stressed to be able to do that,
and that is where you would come in at 250 knots at 300 feet.
But we have to make sure we design--and we are really looking
for, you know, an ability to size this and keep the cost down.
But it obviously has to do with the parachute and the opening
shock.
Those are the kind of things that we continue to work to
say, can we do it as cheap as possible, depending on the
threat, all the way to putting a precision airdrop that,
ideally, we would like to recover and reuse.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
And, General Ham, thanks for your service to our country.
And congratulations on your recent command for--taking over
U.S. Africa Command.
First of all, can you just share with me what the rationale
was for putting it at Stuttgart, Germany, when Central Command
was your predecessor? And it deals with an area geographically
further away than Africa, and yet, they are in Florida.
General Ham. Yes, sir. Africa had been divided between
European Command, which had the bulk of Africa; Central
Command, which had the Horn of Egypt and the Horn of Africa;
and Pacific Command, which had the island nations and
Madagascar. So there actually were three geographic combatant
commands, previously, that divided the continent.
But the majority was in European Command. And so, when the
decision was made to stand up Africa Command as a separate
geographic command, the bulk of the resources were already in
Stuttgart, the facilities were already in Stuttgart. So, for
purposes of getting the command off to an expeditious start,
that seemed to make a lot of sense.
Mr. Coffman. I understand.
Now, in the situation in Ivory Coast right now, where you
have a constitutionally elected government that is not being
permitted to assume the government and you have a president-
elect there that has not been allowed to assume his position in
the government, that there has not been a peaceful transfer of
power, were there any communications between that president-
elect and you and your command in reference to any assistance?
General Ham. No, sir. Only through the U.S. Embassy. But it
was specifically focused on U.S. missions, for example,
planning for a noncombatant evacuation.
Mr. Coffman. I see. So there was virtually no communication
whatsoever from that constitutionally elected government that
was not able to assume power to provide any assistance
whatsoever?
General Ham. Sir, not with Africa Command, to the very best
of my knowledge.
Mr. Coffman. Well, you know, how would you define your
mission in Africa? Because if you cannot influence that
situation in any way, you know, tell me how you define your
mission.
General Ham. Sir, in Cote d'Ivoire, there was already a
very large United Nations presence, and focused on this
clearly. There were efforts under way, through a variety of
international and regional organizations, to try to seek a
solution to this other than through the application of military
force. My sense is that proceeded. Over the past couple of
days, as violence escalated, we saw the United Nations take a
more forceful role. And I think that is what perhaps compelled
Mr. Gbagbo to decide that it was time to change.
I think the best role that Africa Command plays in these
situations is to try to prevent them, to try to work with the
militaries and security forces of African states so that they
are loyal to their duly elected and constituted government,
which is not something we saw play out in this situation, where
we had forces loyal to both the duly elected president and to
the man who would not relinquish power.
So I think we can be more preventive, rather than the
application of military power, to displace--the application of
U.S. military power to displace someone in an African state.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Generals, for being here.
General McNabb, I was wondering, because of others who have
testified before us, there always seems to be this interesting
relationship between the National Guard and Reserves as making
up your force. Do you also have that combination?
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Hanabusa. And do you know what your numbers are, in
terms of how many are Active and how many of the Reserves or
National Guard supplement you?
General McNabb. It is about 60 percent in the Guard and
Reserve and about 40 percent in the Active would be a, you
know, rough, depending on what weapons system and--of course,
you have a great team out there in Hawaii.
General Wong and his team have been superb in figuring out
new ways that we can take full advantage of the total force,
sharing airplanes and figuring out the best way to use the
Guard and Active Duty. That has really been very positive.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. Thank you for saying that.
I am really curious about whether you have had any problems
with, I think it is Article 10--or, I mean Title 10 and Title
32. Because, as you know, the Guard really is a State function,
reports and appointed by the adjutant general, as appointed by
the Governor. And how do you work out the chain of command, I
guess, for lack of a better description?
General McNabb. Certainly, when they are flying a Federal
mission, obviously they get paid for that. And when they do
that, they come on to our orders, and then they use our normal
chain of command.
They do some Guard missions in which they stay under the
Governors' command and control. I would say that, for
especially on the mobility side, I am very, very happy with how
that all works. But it is fairly simple, given the fact that we
give them a mission, they fly it, and they get paid for that.
It works out well overall, and it is a little easier for us,
especially on the airlift side.
Tanker, the same way. For the most part, any time that we
have had a national emergency, I have never once had a governor
say, well, I am holding the tankers back, or the 130s, or the
C-17s--not once. They always know that this is part of this.
Where we really get into--you really see the value is for a
domestic disaster like Katrina. And, at that point, you know,
how do we make sure that we are using not only the Guard bureau
but our support to NORTHCOM, and making sure that that all
comes together. And I would say that that has gone very well.
We saw that in Haiti, really some very, very good work in
making sure that General McKinley, as the National Guard Bureau
chief, and us working through that. It really has not been a
problem.
Ms. Hanabusa. You testified earlier about Japan and the
amount of support that you have had to coordinate. Does any of
that support correlate to the respective Guard units and/or
Reserve units?
General McNabb. We definitely had some of the people flying
the missions. But they are flying there, they are flying back,
and it is a specific mission in which they are doing that.
The rest of them, I am not sure how much of the Guard would
be on those chemical, biological, and radiological teams that
NORTHCOM, you know, has that we move. I would have to get that
for the record for you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 103.]
Ms. Hanabusa. Have you also had occasion to call into
service, like, commercial planes or commercial ships or
anything like that? And what is the process that you would go
through to do that?
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am. In fact, we have a very robust
process. And, in fact, if we can go first to our commercial
industry, our U.S.-flag fleet, that is what I will do, if that
can handle it, because they can do it cheaper than we can do
for the military side.
So I try to focus the military on places where the threat
or the conditions require military-type lift. And if commercial
can do it, I will turn to them first. They have really helped
us tremendously on the surge into Afghanistan, bringing the
equipment out of Iraq. All of that has been done commercial,
which is good for----
Ms. Hanabusa. How are they cheaper? I am curious.
General McNabb. Pardon me?
Ms. Hanabusa. How are they cheaper?
General McNabb. Well, if you look at fully burdened cost
and you say, okay, here is how much it costs me to take a
pallet of stuff on a C-17 versus a 747-400 freighter, you know,
you look at the efficiencies that they have in the commercial
world, it ends up being, you know, a cheaper way to do that.
That frees the C-17 to go do airdrop.
So when I sit there and I think about that, that has been
one of the real powers that I have seen in TRANSCOM, is the use
of both the air and the maritime industry wherever possible.
And what has allowed us to handle a lot of these surges that
you all have asked about, is the fact that we have brought the
U.S.-flag fleet to bear. We basically contract with them.
Ms. Hanabusa. And it is U.S.-flagged.
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
General McNabb, General Ham, I represent Robbins Air Force
Base. And just to the south of me, I have Moody, and just to
the West, I have Fort Benning; just to the east, I have
Stewart. Both of your--the Air Force and the Army are extremely
important to us. And as you look for additional commands, I
think Georgia will be--you will find open and welcome arms
there.
I want to ask a question. The joint future theater lifter,
is that going to be a vertical lift craft?
General McNabb. Congressman, we are looking at all parts.
Vertical lift is one of them. One is fixed-wing, which Air
Mobility Command had brought in kind of a, you know, a much
more modern C-17, -130-type aircraft.
We also are looking at airships under that, to say, you
know, how does that fit in to the overall enterprise that we
have. And what we are trying do is sort that out. And I will
say, we are going to look at, you know, what does it cost per
pound delivered, and then how does that fit in to the rest of
the fleets that we have. And I will use surface, I will use
rail, we will use trucks, I will look at airships, you know,
and we will just see how that will fit in to the rest of those.
Vertical lift is one of those ways. Vertical lift, in the
past, has been probably the most expensive way. So when we
think about ways that we can help General Petraeus and General
Mattis, one of the things is, if I can free up his vertical
lift assets to go do the operational-type missions that only
they can do, by doing whether it is airdrop or air land, that
is what I try to do. Because, historically, that is just a much
more expensive way.
When I look for the future, that may change, those
dynamics, as technology takes over. And I think that is what we
are looking for.
Mr. Scott. Okay.
Just looking at the history of things, it never made sense
to me why we canceled the F-22 [Lockheed Martin/Boeing Raptor
fifth-generation fighter aircraft] before the F-35 [Lockheed
Martin Lightning II fifth-generation fighter aircraft] is
ready. And the tanker, it takes us a decade to get through
that. And now we have the C-17 and stopping the purchase of the
C-17.
And, of all the decisions that I have seen--and, again, I
don't pretend to think that I know as much as you do, General.
But, of all the decisions I have seen made, the one that I
question the most, as far as our abilities going forward, is
cancelling the C-17.
And it is not manufactured in my district. I mean, it is
not. But this is my question: If we cancel the C-17 buying
altogether, knowing the history of the procurements and that it
may be 20 years before there is an alternative to the C-17 that
actually works--we have already paid for the technology costs
of the plane--you know, what alternatives do you see for future
airlift production if our last remaining wide-body military
production program shuts its doors and closes?
And how would we replace those aircraft if we end up in a
situation where they do come under fire and we do actually
start to lose some of them?
General McNabb. Yes, sir. Sir, I will tell you the C-17 has
performed magnificently, and it really has changed the way we
did airlift. Because it can swing between strategic and theater
roles, and, as you mentioned, it has been tremendous.
Right now, we are set to have 222 C-17s. I would say that,
when we did the MCRS [Mobility Capabilities and Requirements
Study], we figured we need about 300--it was 304--large
strategic airlifters. And, right now, that was made up of C-
17s, C-5Ms, which were re-engined, and C-5As that had the
Avionics Modernization Program on there. And what I basically--
from TRANSCOM's standpoint, we need about 32.7 million ton-
miles. And as the Air Force looks at what is the best mix of
those airplanes, that is where the C-17/C-5 mix came up.
From my standpoint, one of the things that I am very
excited about is, as we get the new tanker--and, right now, I
use C-17s in ways that I would rather be using the new multi-
role tanker in--and that will free up C-17s to do some of the
other work. I think that is going to be a positive all by
itself. And it is one of those things that folks don't realize
the impact that we have on having to use C-17s to trans-load
from our Civil Reserve Air Fleet both cargo and packs, because
I can't take them all the way forward.
When I think about the future--and, you know, you make a
very good point. One, I think they are planning to make sure
that they keep the tooling. I mean, I think that gives you a
hedge. The other portion I would say is, we look at these new--
as you mentioned, as we look at the new study, what are the
other things that we need to do, and then, again, how will that
mix and match?
When I first was working as a major on the C-17 and talking
about when we needed it, at that point we were going to buy 210
C-17s to replace the C-141 [Lockheed Starlifter strategic
airlifter] fleet. We are at 222 now. I would say, we have the
numbers. Most of the places that we go now, I would just say
that we are not impacted by the numbers of airplanes; it is,
how many airplanes can I get in there? And so that tends to be
where I look at the C-17 fleet. It is versatile, and it has
been superb.
The other portion where I think we are doing better than
ever is using our Civil Reserve Air Fleet--again, modern
airplanes--and making sure that we are using those to max
advantage so, again, we free up the fleet to make sure that
they do that.
But I do understand your concern. And, I mean, I would say
that I have the same concern, to make sure that we have hedged
those bets and we have options to be able to bring that back if
we need to.
Mr. Scott. Well, my concern is that we start finding stress
fractures and other things, that it takes us longer to repair
them, and, at the same time, we can't bring new equipment in.
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, sir. Thank both of you.
Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady from Guam is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I would also like to welcome General McNabb and General
Ham. Thank you for your testimonies.
Well, earlier, you heard my colleagues speak about the
great attributes of their States. Well, I represent the
beautiful island of Guam. And if I were to tell you about all
the advantages of living on a tropical island, it would take
all day, so we will put it off for another time. But Guam is
the home of Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base.
I have two questions for you, General McNabb. The first is
for you, in reference to ship repairs in U.S. shipyards. In a
May 2004 report to Congress, MSC [Military Sealift Command]
assured Congress that it was firmly committed to conducting the
maximum amount of repair work practicable in domestic shipyards
and ensuring that MSC ships are repaired in foreign shipyards
only when directed by operational necessity and allowed by law.
How does TRANSCOM ensure that operational necessity exists
before authorizing repairs in foreign shipyards?
An annual report to Congress indicates that there are still
a tremendous amount of ships being repaired in Hong Kong or
Singapore. So what more can be done to comply with
congressional intent? Could you answer that for me?
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am. One of the things that Military
Sealift Command does, not only do they take care of our surge
ships, they also take care of the Navy fleet. And the ships
that they have forward, for instance, in the Pacific, are
primarily under the Chief of Naval Operations' hats. In other
words, it is support of the Navy.
The ships that they take care of for me are the large,
medium-speed RO/RO [roll-on/roll-off] ships that we would
activate if we can't, you know, get the commercial lift to be
able to do that. And right now, we haven't had to be
activating, you know, these large ships because the commercial
capability has been there.
I know that they are committed to using Guam. I know
Admiral Buzby, the MSC commander, has, I believe, talked with
you and gone through this with you, and it had to do with the
drydock, I think, there in Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. That is correct.
General McNabb. And so, whatever we can do to get that
drydock up, because right now that is the constraint, you know,
as I understand it, the big constraint in '11. We do $40
million. Guam is probably the place that we do--he does most of
the work. But not under my--you know, not under my umbrella. It
is really under the CNO's [Chief of Naval Operations']
umbrella.
Ms. Bordallo. I see. Well, I am very concerned, because we
have, well, about 350 workers, employees there. It is a private
shipyard. And, you know, it was one of the things that I fought
for a few years ago, ``Buy America.''
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. So I want to be sure that that is being
carried out.
Now, my final question is also for you, General McNabb, and
it is in regards to rotating aircraft support on Guam. A
rotating aircraft, which in the past has been called the
Patriot Express, helps to enhance morale and welfare for
service members in Guam by offering them flights to, say, Japan
or Hawaii.
What steps is TRANSCOM taking with either the Navy or the
Air Force to bring back this capability to Guam? And can you
explain to me what is necessary to revisit this issue and
validate the requirements for this important capability?
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am. On the Patriot Express, what we
have done with that--and that primarily was to move the U.S.
military members around, and their families, when they are
moving back and forth. It also has the other benefit that, if
you have it, then there are space-available opportunities for
dependents and families, which I think is one of the real
advantages to that.
We have actually increased the number of Patriot Express
missions, adding back Korea, adding back Misawa, adding back
Iwakuni. And the promise that I have had with the commanders in
those areas is that you have to make sure you fill those
airplanes, because we have to break even at the end of all of
this.
Guam is slated to be--and I will have to get you whether it
is next year--it may even be--it is probably '12, but it might
even be '11. But we said, especially as the Marines would come
down there and we got an additional number of military folks on
Guam, then it will make sense to have Patriot Express come in
there, rather than the normal commercial traffic.
So right now I have told them that is what we want to do as
soon as we have enough military presence on Guam, and then we
will get the Patriot Express coming in.
Ms. Bordallo. So what you are saying, then, is that, by
2011, possibly, or '12, this capability will be returned.
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am. And I will get you the exact
date, because it had to do with the movement of the Marines
coming down.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am sitting here listening to some of my colleagues, and I
feel like I have gone through a time warp, back when earmarks
were okay, the monster earmark requests going on for General
Ham to move his command. So I will refrain from doing that.
General McNabb, the requirement under the QDR [Quadrennial
Defense Review] for some 330-plus planes includes 111 C-5s, of
some configuration. The list I have is 36 C-5As that either
have or will go through the AMP [Avionics Modernization
Program] program and 52 Bs and Cs that have gone through both
engines and the AMP program.
Where are the other 23--or what are the other 23?
General McNabb. Sir, right now, we are asking for--the
MCRS-2016 [Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016]
said we needed 32.7 million ton-miles, which equates to about
301 total big airplanes. That is 222 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms, and 27 C-
5As.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. So you would be supportive of--I
suspect, of that 23 that are missing off that list, they are
parked someplace and may never get off the ground again. And we
are maintaining airplanes that, in a commercial venue, you
would never do, for a variety of reasons.
General McNabb. Sir, what we were hoping for is the ability
to, as we bring on the additional C-17s, that we can put them
at places like McChord and Charleston, take our older C-17s and
replace some of those old C-5As at some of the different bases.
That will get them new airplanes, it will extend the service
life on our C-17s----
Mr. Conaway. Speaking of the service life, the operational
tempo that you are currently experiencing, I don't
necessarily--none of us hope it is over the next 5 or 6 years,
but----
General McNabb. Right.
Mr. Conaway [continuing]. Given that each plane has a set
useful life of some period of time, what impact does this
current operational tempo have on that fleet? Will it last
until 2025, 2030, whenever it is we will decide to replace the
C-17?
General McNabb. Yes, sir, we bought the C-17s for 30,000
hours, and we plan to do 1,000 hours a year. So, basically, 30
years is what we were trying to get out of that asset.
I would say that we were overflying that, especially early
on in OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] and OEF [Operation Enduring
Freedom]. In fact, this committee and the Congress helped us
with that. We said we need about 7 to 10 airplanes to make up
that--you know, to get the flying hours back down.
Mr. Conaway. All right. In your analysis, you have
addressed that operational tempo issue with respect to the life
of that fleet.
General McNabb. But if we keep--you know, we may have to
address it again if we just keep--you know, we stay at this
tempo. But, as I mentioned before, we are using a lot of
commercial----
Mr. Conaway. Right. I understand that. But, at some point
in time, if you come back to us and say, ``We need C-17s,'' it
is going to be a whole lot more expensive, at that point in
time, depending on what the circumstances are.
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway. General Ham, congratulations on the new
command.
Just a quick inference. When Gates was here last week, he
said that one of the core missions of NATO that he would
support would be the search and rescue. And maybe I
misunderstood you to say that was an ad hoc thing that may
occur, but it seemed to me that we were going to provide the
search and rescue for the Libyan work. Did I misunderstand
that?
General Ham. No, sir. You understood it correctly. It falls
under the category of what we call ``unique U.S. military
capabilities.''
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
General Ham. And we thought we were the best suited to do
that.
Mr. Conaway. Are those your assets?
General Ham. For the most part, they are, yes, sir----
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
General Ham [continuing]. With our Special Operations
Command Africa.
Mr. Conaway. All right.
Your budget request for 2012 is $289 million. How much out
of hide is this Libyan operation going to cost you, assuming it
goes past September or October 1st?
General Ham. Congressman, financially, it won't affect the
headquarters very much. But where the cost is borne is with our
service components, in this case particularly the Air Force and
Navy service component commands for AFRICOM, who have sortied
ships, aircraft, and personnel at a rate higher than they were
anticipating to do.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. So they will have to figure out some way
to pay for that. That is not necessarily your responsibility.
General Ham. That is correct, sir. That burden will,
through the service component commands, fall back to the
Services.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
One of the advantages that we were told about AFRICOM was
that you would, in effect, create long-term relationships
between the mil-to-mil kind of things that would go on in these
developing countries.
Given it is a relatively young command still, at this point
in time, are you experiencing the kind of opportunity or
availability to send the folks back to the same countries on
enough of a basis so that we are building relationships there
that can be used in a crisis if we need them?
General Ham. I am just learning about this, but in my first
two trips to the continent, which were, admittedly, far too
short, but to Djibouti and to Kenya, I, in fact, found exactly
that circumstance, where U.S. service personnel had been back
for repetitive assignments. And in those two cases, the
Djiboutians and the Kenyans were very welcoming of that,
because it is people they know and understand.
I think there is probably more that we can do in the
future, and I will look to do just that.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Thanks, gentlemen.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Generals.
We are down now--it is two to two, and you have a much
deeper bench than we do. So I am going to be very quick on just
a couple of follow-up questions.
General McNabb, if I could follow up on a question that Mr.
Kline asked. If the FAA goes forward with the rule on crew rest
requirements, will it affect TRANSCOM's ability to execute the
mission?
General McNabb. Sir, as Mr. Babbitt went through it, he
said that he would consider what I was worried about, which is
that one size doesn't fit all, and our nonscheduled carriers
are a bit unique, and to make sure that we have built in the
proper safety program for them.
If they do the one-size-fits-all, it will impact us in how
quickly we can do it, velocity, and it will also drive up the
cost for our U.S. carriers fairly dramatically, to the point
where I, again, start worrying about the competitiveness they
will have in making sure that they can take advantage of modern
airplanes.
That is probably my biggest concern. And I do think,
between ORM [Operational Risk Management] and crew rest
facilities and making sure that we look at what their mission
is like, it is a little different than the legacy carriers. And
I just hope that they will consider that there is a difference
there.
Mr. Forbes. Can I just drill down on that question just a
little bit more? I am aware of the Air Force Institute of
Technology study that found that up to 70 percent of the
missions flown for you by the civilian carriers may be
impacted, depending on how the rule is implemented. That seems
substantial to us, given how much you rely on them.
Can you just put that in context for us so the committee
has a good feel of where that falls?
General McNabb. Sure. When we set up our concept of ops and
how we are going to base airplanes, especially when you talk to
a far-off place like Afghanistan, and if you have to drive in
some additional crew rest and changing crews, it drives in some
perplexity into the system, that becomes a little bit tougher
to manage.
Right now, we have that--you know, we have been driving
very hard to get those modern airplanes. And, like I said, if
70 percent are affected, it means that they would have to have
additional stops, they would have to lay in additional crews.
The circadian rhythm, you know, the issue with making sure that
if they are--you know, as you are traveling around the world,
Afghanistan is 12 hours out from here. So if you have--you
know, when you think about the domestic here in the U.S., they
don't have to deal with a 12-hour change in circadian rhythm
every day.
So what we have to do is make sure that we think through
all of those parts to the puzzle and make sure that one size
doesn't necessarily fit all. Fatigue will affect everybody, but
you need to come up with programs that adjust to that reality.
I have flown lots of missions and, you know, have 5,600
hours. I will say that there is a big difference from flying
four to six sorties in the U.S., very quick stops, dealing with
air traffic, all of the problems that you have on the ground,
versus flying a one-hop on the same crew duty day and going all
the way, for instance, to Incirlik and stopping for the night.
I would just say the fatigue level is different and it takes
different approaches, is my recommendation.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
General Ham, just a couple questions for you. Just a few
weeks ago, I had the privilege of being over at your command.
And I had just gotten back from visiting several of the
countries in Africa. And one of the things on every briefing
that you would find is that there would be a host of arrows
that would be drawn from all of the different operations that
are going on, some of them by State Department, some of them by
DOD.
And the question that always puzzles me is, who is managing
all the arrows? Who is the one authority that is making sure
that we are not overlapping and that those missions are all
coordinating in the right fashion? Can you shed a little bit of
light on that for me, as we see that overlap between State and
DOD and all the various operations that we have going on in
Africa? Who is ultimately managing that to make sure the
jointness is done right?
General Ham. Yes, sir. While there isn't, you know, an
overarching command that is in fact directing that, this is our
interagency process at work. And each of us who participates in
that has a responsibility.
So me, at Africa Command, certainly Assistant Secretary
Carson at State, the folks at the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and USAID and other agencies, what I think we have to
do is make sure we have a forum through which the most senior
folks can collaborate and make sure that we have, in fact,
synchronized our efforts to the highest degree possible.
My sense is probably a bit the same as yours, at least my
initial blush at this, is that at least within the military
side I am not sure that that is quite as tightly wound as it
perhaps ought to be. And it is something that I would like to
take a look at, as I begin my tenure.
Mr. Forbes. And if you do take a look at that, if you would
give us that information back as you examine it.
Just two other quick questions. One of the other concerns I
had was, in talking to the various players over there, one of
the things we consistently heard from the State Department was,
``Defense doesn't do anything unless we okay it.'' That gave
some of us just a little bit of concern as to the role that the
State Department had and the role that the Department of
Defense had.
Can you tell us and explain a little bit about those two
functions and how they are collaborating?
General Ham. Yes, sir, certainly. We would all agree that
it is far better when State and Defense agree on a way ahead in
a particular--in any particular matter.
Mr. Forbes. That is given. I----
General Ham. But sometimes that is just not the case.
Mr. Forbes. Right.
General Ham. But we have a mechanism, again, through our
interagency process, through the national security staff, for
the various departments to bring forward matters where there
is, perhaps, some disagreement on the way ahead.
I am confident that, again, as I am able to get started in
this command and build the relationships with Secretary Carson
and with others in the interagency, that those times will be
few and far between where we will have very strong
disagreement.
But where we do, I don't feel any reservation whatsoever
about saying, ``I am sorry; I just can't get to agreement on
this. We need to take it into the interagency deliberative
process to have disagreements adjudicated.'' We know how to do
that; we do it all the time in our Government. And I am very
comfortable inside that process.
Mr. Forbes. Last question: What are the authorities granted
to the U.S. chiefs of mission regarding combatant command
activities in the countries to which they are posted? And do
you believe that these authorities are sufficient?
General Ham. Sir, in general, they are. I mean, clearly,
the chief of mission is the senior American representative, the
representative of the President in those countries. And so our
efforts are nested with the chief of mission.
There may be some very unique circumstances where there
would be a military effort that might require an authority
other than the chief of mission. Those are probably addressed
in a--not in an open session.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Well, I think we have had all of our questions. Thank you
so much for your service to our country and for your patience
today and for sharing your experience and expertise with us.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
April 5, 2011
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 5, 2011
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization
Budget Requests for U.S. Transportation Command
and U.S. Africa Command
April 5, 2011
Good afternoon. The House Armed Services Committee meets
today to receive testimony from the commanders of the United
States Transportation Command and the United States Africa
Command on the posture of their respective commands.
Although these are two combatant commands that sometimes
fly beneath the radar, this hearing could not be more relevant
than it is today. In AFRICOM's area of responsibility (AOR),
U.S. forces have been conducting active military operations
against forces loyal to Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi in an
effort to prevent a massacre of the civilian population of
Libya. Although this humanitarian intervention is motivated by
a noble impulse, there is a strong possibility of a strategic
stalemate emerging in Libya. I fear we may find ourselves
committed to an open-ended obligation through our participation
in NATO operations--and that poses real opportunity costs,
given the volatility of other unstable, more strategically
important countries in the region.
Beyond Libya, this weekend as many as one thousand
civilians were massacred in the Ivory Coast as that nation's
political standoff escalated violently. This brutality could be
an ominous foreshadowing of future events in the Sudan, as the
southern portion of that war-torn country becomes an
independent nation in July. Further east, Somalia continues to
be a source of instability, hosting both the Al Qaeda-
affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist organization, and the various
piracy networks that have intensified attacks in the Gulf of
Aden and beyond over the past several years, recently killing
four American citizens aboard a private yacht.
Just as it was virtually impossible to foresee the United
States becoming militarily involved in Libya at last year's
posture hearings, this Congress may be called upon to fund a
number of possible contingency operations or humanitarian
missions in AFRICOM's AOR.
Wherever U.S. forces may operate over the next year,
TRANSCOM will be charged with getting them there, sustaining
them throughout their operations, and getting them home to
their families. As General Omar Bradley famously said,
``Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics.'' The
events of the past 18 months are an instructive example as to
the relevance of that quote today. Not only did TRANSCOM have
to respond to the surge of forces in Afghanistan while they
simultaneously orchestrated the drawdown of forces in Iraq, but
they also had to respond to the devastating earthquake in
Haiti.
Things have not gotten any easier for the men and women of
TRANSCOM, as they are now supporting combat operations in Libya
in addition to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are
working desperately to assist the people of Japan following the
horrific earthquakes of the past month. What they do is not
easy and it oftentimes goes unnoticed, but the capabilities of
TRANSCOM are truly unique among nations.
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization
Budget Requests for U.S. Transportation Command
and U.S. Africa Command
April 5, 2011
General McNabb, General Ham, welcome. We have two separate
subjects before us: The posture of U.S. Transportation Command
and the posture of U.S. Africa Command. Welcome to you both. I
look forward to your testimony.
Let me start with TRANSCOM. With the challenges on materiel
distribution routes inside Pakistan growing because of
insurgent attacks, border delays, weather, road conditions,
labor issues, theft and pilferage, what options is TRANSCOM
considering regarding the Northern Distribution Network? In
light of increased requirements for transport into Afghanistan,
I'd also like to hear how TRANSCOM is ensuring a steady flow of
equipment retrograding out of Iraq and Kuwait at the same time.
Previously, the Air Force had stated that the minimum
number of strategic airlift assets required was 316. Recently,
the Air Force has reassessed that number and has concluded they
now have an excess to need in regard to strategic airlift. I am
interested in hearing what TRANSCOM's position is on what the
appropriate number of strategic airlift assets are and what
level of risk that assumes.
Turning to AFRICOM next, events of recent weeks have
certainly put Africa at the forefront of our minds. The ongoing
NATO operation in Libya, and before that, the uprisings in
Tunisia and Egypt (although technically not in AFRICOM's area
of responsibility) are just the most recent reminders that
turbulence on the continent can have international
implications. General Ham, I want to commend you and the
command on your performance in the Libya operation before you
passed responsibility over to NATO.
Looking beyond Libya, AFRICOM's challenge is how to develop
the military-unique portions of the larger inter-agency process
that translates broad U.S. national interests on the continent
into a policy appropriate across a widely diverse geo-political
landscape, and then execute it with austere resources. It is
clear that we have an interest in the wellbeing and stability
of the continent. Global poverty, which affects hundreds of
millions in Africa, is a major destabilizing force.
Developing countries are more likely to become mired in
destabilizing conflicts, or worse, become havens or recruiting
grounds for terrorists. Violent extremists have footholds
stretching from the Maghreb to Somalia and points both north
and south. International crime, including narcotics
trafficking, human trafficking, trade in illegal weapons, and
piracy destabilize countries and regions. Unchecked pandemics
could spread across borders and oceans and threaten entire
populations and local conflicts can ignite wider conflagrations
and destabilize entire regions.
There are any numbers of examples of war, or poverty, or
human suffering in Africa. The ongoing conflict in Cote
d'Ivorie and the fragile state of affairs in Eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo that is held together by a huge
peacekeeping operation are but two illustrations. But we do not
possess unlimited capability or an unlimited mandate.
Therefore, AFRICOM's approach, to largely work in concert
with our African partners to identify mutual areas for security
cooperation, is a proactive way to address national security
concerns and prevent future conflicts in Africa. With American
assistance, our African partners can professionalize their
militaries, become more accountable to the people they protect,
and strengthen the civilian governance structures that control
them. In that way, they become more able to deal with the
security challenges we share.
Without a robust inter-agency process in Africa, AFRICOM's
efforts will never reap their true potential return so I hope
you'll take the time today to discuss how you are building the
security capacity of our partners within the framework of the
inter-agency process.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 5, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA
General McNabb. Congresswoman Hanabusa, the chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) teams deployed to Japan by USNORTHCOM
were all active duty teams. None of those particular teams were
comprised of National Guard or Reserve personnel. [See page 24.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 5, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. Following a briefing and demonstration last
year on nuclear weapon transportation, I became concerned over
some potential vulnerabilities.
a. How does TRANSCOM, NNSA and DoD share, synthesize, and
evaluate potential threat information for transportation
operations?
b. What evaluations have been conducted into air
transportation of nuclear weapons and materials?
c. What is the process for identifying and examining
options for incorporating new technologies or equipment in
improving the safety or security of nuclear weapons and
materials while in transit? At what interval are these analyses
conducted?
General McNabb. USTRANSCOM's primary forum to evaluate
threats to air transport of nuclear weapons is the Headquarters
Air Mobility Command (AMC) Threat Working Group (TWG). The TWG
provides integrated risk assessments in support of Prime
Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) missions and makes mission
execution recommendations to senior leadership that mitigate
threat and security vulnerabilities. Membership includes AMC
Directorates, 18th Air Force, Air Force Office of Special
Investigation, U.S. Transportation Command, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National
Security Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
It is mandatory for this group to meet for every PNAF mission.
Additionally, the TWG members work very closely with
Headquarters Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear
Integration Directorate in supporting multiple agencies'
nuclear forums. Specifically, AMC has supported the 2009 Air
Transportation Study, conducted in accordance with the Duncan
Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 09 and
sponsored by National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) and
Secretary of the Air Force. AMC has also provided assistance to
the Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff (NSS)
during their recent assessment of movement operations,
including the PNAF. AMC Nuclear Operations Division is an
active participant with the NNSA in the semi-annual Nuclear
Transportation Working Group. Additionally, AMC was actively
engaged in the October 2010 Nuclear Weapons System Steering
Group's Operational Safety Review of the PNAF program. This
review is sponsored by the Air Force Safety Center and
conducted once every five years under the provisions of DoD
Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual, and Air Force
Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety
Reviews, and Safety Rules.
Air Mobility Command maintains a robust inspection program
through the Inspector General. AMC conducts a Nuclear Surety
Inspection (NSI) on AMC's sole PNAF-certified unit on an 18-
month inspection cycle in accordance with Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSI) Nuclear Weapons Technical
Inspections. To obtain certification, an Initial Nuclear Surety
Inspection (INSI) is conducted prior to the unit performing its
nuclear mission. In addition to the CJCSI 18-month requirement,
units receive a Limited NSI (LNSI) during the period between
the 18-month inspection intervals. This results in a unit
receiving an NSI or LNSI approximately every nine months at the
very least, half of which are required to be no- or minimal-
notice.
AMC's 62D Airlift Wing (AW) at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
is the sole PNAF-certified unit in the Air Force to conduct
logistical air transport of nuclear weapons and related
material. Since certification, the 62 AW has successfully
passed every NSI or LNSI. Additionally, AMC Safety conducts
Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits on an 18-month cycle as
required by Air Force Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit
(NSSAV) Program. This program allows functional experts from
across the AMC staff to examine the processes in place at the
62 AW with respect to its nuclear mission. Furthermore, AMC has
also implemented a Functional Expert Visit (FEV) program for
the interim period between formal inspections. AMC Nuclear
Operations Division leads the FEV programs and is able to
provide subject matter expert review/focus on areas specified
or requested by the 62 AW. These quarterly FEVs are conducted
with a small footprint of two-to-four staff personnel and serve
to continually maintain the highest state of proficiency
required of this critical nuclear mission.
Through each of the agencies, assessments, inspections and
evaluations, options for new technologies are discovered and
examined. Specifically, the 2009 Air Transportation Study, the
Nuclear Transportation Working Group, and the Nuclear Weapons
System Steering Group's Operational Safety Review all examine
the use of new technologies to improve the efficiency, safety
and security of nuclear weapons transportation. In addition,
the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
Matters (DASD/NM) sponsors the Security Policy Verification
Committee Technology Working Group, which gathers quarterly to
address technology which would enhance the safety and security
of weapons transport. Also, the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, as directed by DASD/NM, conducts red team exercises to
address current tactics and policy as well as new technologies.
Mr. Turner. Have operations in support of Operation Odyssey
Dawn impacted your ability to support operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq?
General McNabb. USTRANSCOM was challenged providing
concurrent emerging support to Japan relief, Operation ODYSSEY
DAWN and Presidential support--all while maintaining normal
passenger and cargo operations to Afghanistan and Iraq.
Over 95% of all personnel move into and out of theater on
commercial carriers, and our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
partners performed without any interruption of support.
Passenger rotations continued, ensuring that all Relief in
Place/Transfers of Authority (RIP/TOA) remained on schedule to
meet US Forces-Afghanistan requirements.
Specifically addressing cargo support to Afghanistan and
Iraq, the USTRANSCOM team partnered with USCENTCOM to
prioritize all cargo and manage warfighter expectations during
this period of heavy lift. As we synchronized and prioritized
cargo movements with USCENTCOM to ensure that no RIP/TOA was
delayed, we experienced some backlog of sustainment cargo as a
result of concurrent operational requirements. USCENTCOM
mitigates the risk of sustainment cargo delay by maintaining
sufficient days of supply in Afghanistan and Iraq.
------
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. With regard to ship repairs facilities on
Guam, I understand the dry dock at our shipyard is only
capable, right now, to do limited repairs. However, even before
the incident with the dry dock a significant number of pre-
positioned ships were being sent to Singapore or Hong Kong for
repairs. What more can be done to comply with the law requiring
ships to be repaired in American shipyards? What is the
operational necessity for some of the repairs in foreign
shipyards? The annual report is not clear on this point.
General McNabb. Overseas shipyard repair of naval vessels,
including Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels, is a matter
under the cognizance of the Department of the Navy.
Prior to the incident that placed the Guam Shipyard drydock
out of service earlier this year, MSC had repair work done in
Singapore on two T-AKE Class (dry cargo and ammunition)
vessels. These were not prepositioning vessels. The repair work
was emergency repairs requiring the vessels to be drydocked. At
the time that these vessels were repaired in Singapore, the
Guam Shipyard drydock was not certified to lift the T-AKE class
ships. The drydock has now been refloated, but it has not yet
been certified to resume repair work. Nearly all shipyard work,
with the exception of voyage repairs, performed on government-
owned prepositioning ships is done within the Continental
United States during periodic overhaul periods after their
cargo is discharged at U.S. military installations.
------
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS
Ms. Giffords. TRANSCOM's mission requires a massive energy
footprint. To their credit each of the Services pro-actively
developed strategic processes to make energy informed
decisions. Recently, as part of the DoD efficiencies the Air
Force stated it would annually save $750 million dollars due to
Air Mobility Command's due to reduced energy consumption
generated via the Air Force Energy Plan. The Navy's ``Green
Hornet'' Program successfully completed test flights using a
50/50 bio-fuel blend, is a perfect example of developing
sustainable alternatives to current energy sources. Finally the
Marines Corp's 3rd Battalion 5th Marines employment of the
Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) in Afghanistan has
been instrumental in demonstrating the utility of renewable in
the battlefield.
1. Does TRANSCOM have a published Operational Energy
strategy?
2. What is TRANSCOM's approach to energy efficiency,
renewable and alternative fuel technologies?
3. Can you describe the strategic impact of access to a
scalable bio-fuel on TRANSCOM's global roles and
responsibilities?
General McNabb. Our service components, with their
statutory role of organizing, training, and equipping forces,
retain the primary responsibility for improving efficiency and
reducing energy consumption. USTRANSCOM does not have a
separate Operational Energy strategy document but incorporates
Operational Energy considerations in our 2011 Strategic Plan.
One illustration of our encouragement of the service
components' efforts was our recent investment of $172 million
into Air Mobility Command's aviation fuel efficiency
initiatives, which are projected to yield $237 million in
savings and cost avoidance through the FYDP. Additionally, Air
Mobility Command has certified a number of mobility aircraft on
alternative fuels and continues to aggressively explore
possibilities in this area. USTRANSCOM's 2011 Strategic Plan
directs that ``wherever possible, the Joint Deployment and
Distribution Enterprise must recognize and rapidly apply
technological advances that reduce fuel consumption and enhance
joint operations.'' Regarding process improvement in this area,
USTRANSCOM is committed to identify ecologically-aware
deployment and distribution concepts that improve performance
while reducing energy consumption and costs. We are currently
in the concept development phase of identifying ways to
inventory USTRANSCOM's global supply chain carbon footprint and
thereby find ways to reduce it in the future. A highly-
successful example is our detailed planning and execution of
multi-modal contingency operations--efficiently combining
sealift, ground movement, and airlift of equipment--at Rota,
Spain and elsewhere. These multi-modal operations not only
reduce fuel consumption, they are considerably more cost-
effective than reliance upon a single mode of movement (such as
airlift) alone.
At this time, no bio-fuels are available in sufficient
production quantities that would provide a truly viable
alternative to the fossil fuels currently in use, nor does
USTRANSCOM own or manage bulk petroleum assets. However, if a
scalable bio-fuel was developed that met stringent jet and
maritime fuel use specifications and could be mass-produced, at
competitive cost, in quantities needed to support sustained
combat operations as well as worldwide petroleum war reserve
stockage requirements, USTRANSCOM would use such energy sources
to accomplish our global mobility mission.
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