[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-32]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 31, 2011
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-803 WASHINGTON : 2011
___________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer
Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or
866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Alejandra Villarreal, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, March 31, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for Missile Defense Programs...... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, March 31, 2011......................................... 33
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2011
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 3
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Ahern, David G., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Portfolio
Systems Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics...................... 9
Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense................. 11
O'Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency.. 6
Roberts, Dr. Bradley H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Office of the Secretary of
Defense........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Ahern, David G............................................... 72
Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael..................................... 85
O'Reilly, LTG Patrick J...................................... 57
Roberts, Dr. Bradley H....................................... 42
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................ 40
Turner, Hon. Michael......................................... 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Larsen................................................... 95
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brooks................................................... 110
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 109
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 101
Mr. Turner................................................... 99
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 31, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m. in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. I call to order the meeting of the
subcommittee.
And I would like to extend a warm welcome to our four
distinguished witnesses here today to discuss the fiscal year
2012 budget request for missile defense programs: Dr. Bradley
Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Missile Defense Policy; Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly,
Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and Dr. David Ahern,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Portfolio Systems
Acquisition; Dr. Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation.
Members have several issues that they want to address, and
we have votes that are actually pending, so I am hopeful that
we can get through my opening statement and the statement of
the witnesses before we actually depart for votes. And then
perhaps we can return for the questioning portion.
First, I am deeply concerned about the Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense system in Alaska and California, GMD. The
back-to-back flight test failures this past year raise doubts
about the reliability and effectiveness of this capability. I
had the opportunity to talk with General O'Reilly yesterday. I
appreciate his efforts to establish a rigorous failure review
and mitigation process. However, I question the
Administration's long-term commitment to getting it right.
While I understand there are some changes to the program
this year, I have also observed the funding for GMD plummet
over the past few years. In fiscal year 2010, the President's
budget request slashed it by $445 million. Last year we saw a
restoration of some funds, but then again this year the program
was cut by $185 million. Furthermore, the out-year spending
profile for GMD is $1 billion less than was projected a year
ago.
With these levels of cuts, it is clear that something will
be broke or something won't get done. I worry that these test
failures may be a harbinger of further setbacks if we don't
make GMD a priority and devote the resources necessary to make
it right. After all, what is at stake: GMD is currently the
only missile defense system that protects the United States
homeland from long-range ballistic attacks, and we have to get
it right.
General O'Reilly, I know you are committed to that.
Second, a year ago, I was highly critical of the
Administration for the lack of information it was providing to
Congress on the Phased Adaptive Approach for missile defense in
Europe. In the past several months, we have seen significant
improvement and engagement with our committee, and I want to
commend our witnesses for that.
Last month, while in Brussels, I had the opportunity to
meet with Admiral Stavridis and other NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] and European Command officials to discuss
progress in PAA [Phased Adaptive Approach] implementation. I
have also met with NATO parliamentarians and was pleased to see
how far the missile defense discussion in Europe had advanced
from just 3 years ago.
No doubt, there is significant work ahead that I would ask
our witnesses to discuss today.
On the policy front, a near-term decision must be made on
where to locate a forward-based X-band radar. Charting a path
forward with Russia while also protecting our interests will
continue to be challenging.
On the programmatic front, there is a substantial amount of
development and testing required to ensure new systems and
technologies planned for the PAA are proven. There are still
considerable technology risks, reduction activities that must
be accomplished in the--excuse me--technology risk-reduction
activities that must be accomplished in the Standard Missile
(SM)-3 Block IIA and the Block IIB programs, both of which are
key to protecting Europe and the United States.
Some of us also remain concerned about the Department's
hedging strategy for defense of the homeland in case the long-
range threat comes earlier or technical issues arise in the
development of a new SM-3 interceptor. I came away from our PAA
hearing last December believing that the Department's hedging
strategy was hollow. Since then, I understand the Department
has worked in earnest to develop the strategy, and I hope our
witnesses can discuss some of this.
Third, the budget request contains approximately $400
million in 2012 and another $400 million in 2013 for the Medium
Extended Area Defense System, MEADS, a joint U.S.-German-
Italian missile defense system that the Department does not
plan to continue beyond design and development due to cost and
schedule overruns. I understand the Government's contract
termination obligations, but spending $800 million in this
budget environment on a program that is not going forward into
production doesn't make a whole lot of sense. These resources
could be better spent on other missile defense priorities. And
is the Department looking at other options to lower this
liability?
Fourth, we need to continue to invest in innovative science
and technology. Last year, our committee expressed bipartisan
concern that the budget request for directed energy research
appeared insufficient to maintain the Airborne Laser Testbed
aircraft, conduct flight experiments, and fund technology
maturation of innovative directed energy concepts. This year,
the budget request is less than last year's, which only
heightens my concern that MDA [Missile Defense Agency] and the
scientists and engineers it leverages lack the resources to
make major advancements in this technology area.
On a final note, I would like to thank Dr. Roberts and
General O'Reilly for their participation in this committee's
``101'' briefings. These sessions have provided Members with a
greater understanding of the complex issues and programs that
are within our subject matter jurisdiction of this subcommittee
and, ultimately, they improve our ability to have effective
oversight.
I want to thank you again, each of our witnesses, for their
service and for being with us today. And I look forward to your
testimony.
With that, I will turn to my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez,
for any opening comments she might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Chairman Turner.
I would like to once again welcome everybody: Dr. Gilmore,
Mr. Ahern, Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly. Thanks for being
before us again today.
I am interested in hearing about how the budget request
supports plans to strengthen the hedge for homeland defense
beyond the deployed interceptors that we have in California and
Alaska, including plans at Fort Greely to mothball Missile
Field 1 and adding a hedge of eight available silos at Missile
Field 2, and also the upgrades to the Clear Radar, plans to
locate an interceptor communication system on the east coast,
and preparations toward Phase 4 of the Phased Adaptive
Approach.
I know that, General O'Reilly, we have spoken several times
this week, and I hope that the committee will get a good sense
of where you all are with respect to these things I just
mentioned.
I also look forward to hearing about the implementation of
the PAA this year and about preparations as we move beyond
Phase 1. I know you said we were on track, but maybe we can get
a little bit more information on that. And I would like to
specifically address three important issues.
First, the cost. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review
stated that, ``commitment to new capabilities must be
sustainable over the long term.'' And in the context of the
current budget environment, I would like to hear more about
savings and management improvements resulting from efficiencies
and, also, what the plans are for most efficiently closing out
the MEADS program without wasting what I believe is nearly
about a billion dollars of taxpayer money, if I read the report
correctly.
And, second, on testing, BMDR [Ballistic Missile Defense
Review] made the commitment that, before new capabilities are
deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment
under realistic conditions. So I would like to hear about how
the budget request supports effective testing to help us
achieve mature and reliable technologies, including plans in
the Integrated Master Test Plan for operational realistic
testing.
And, third, I would like to thank the Administration for
strengthening the international cooperation with our allies. I
know that Chairman Turner was out in Europe this past week. I
didn't have an opportunity to go, but I did hear good reports
back. And I heard that especially our NATO allies were all on
board and happy with the PAA and the process that we are going
through. And, beyond cooperation with NATO and Israel and Japan
and our other allies, I am pleased that we continue to keep
informed on plans as you work through with some of the issues
and try to engage Russia on missile defense.
So, preserving strategic stability is essential to U.S. and
international security as we develop a defense against the
threats from Iran and North Korea, in particular. And I am open
to hearing what you all have to say. And I am sure our
committee has many questions.
So thank you again for being before us.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the
Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Turner. We will now ask each of our witnesses to
summarize their written statement in about a 5-minute oral
statement.
Dr. Roberts, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. BRADLEY H. ROBERTS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Dr. Roberts. Thank you, Chairman Turner, Ranking Member
Sanchez, and additional members of the subcommittee.
Thank you also for the opportunity to participate in the
BMD [ballistic missile defense] 101 sessions. We also found
that helpful from our perspective in terms of reaching out to
you and creating a common foundation of information.
My written statement begins with a review of the scope,
findings, and conclusions of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review issued now a year ago. I won't repeat these here.
Clearly, over the last year, our focus has shifted from policy
development to policy implementation. And, in our dialogue with
you, four issues have emerged. And I would like to touch
briefly on each of those in turn.
The first issue relates to the commitment in the Missile
Defense Review to continue to closely monitor developments in
the threat, and to assess our priorities in the light of new
information. And although the unclassified nature of this
hearing constrains our discussion of this particular topic, it
is clear that we have had a lot of new information over the
last year that confirms the basic intelligence community
finding that the threat is continuing to develop, both
quantitatively and qualitatively. And it has reinforced our
principal conclusion that we need a balanced approach that
continues to improve the defense of the homeland while, at the
same time, accelerating regional protection.
The second main topic of continuing discussion between us
has been about defense of the homeland. The Ballistic Missile
Defense Review expressed two principal commitments: The first,
to continue to improve the GMD system in order to ensure that
we maintain our ``currently advantageous position'' vis-a-vis
the threats that might emerge from states like North Korea and
Iran to conduct limited strikes on the United States. And our
second commitment was to be well-hedged against the possibility
that those threats might emerge in a way and with a speed,
quantitatively and qualitatively, that requires some
significant shift in our posture.
All of us today have provided testimony with details about
the commitments that we are making in support of strengthening,
continuing to improve the GMD system. We have a lot of ongoing
activity in this area and some additional initiatives beginning
this year that we have proposed. And our conclusion is that the
cumulative effect of these commitments is to ensure that we
will maintain the advantageous position we have vis-a-vis
first-generation threats.
The hedge we have also made a commitment to, as you know,
not just as something we might do in the future but something
we are doing now. We committed to the additional silos, both
the completion of Missile Field 2 and the mothballing rather
than decommissioning of the residual capabilities in Missile
Field 1. And this puts us in a position to increase by 50
percent, if we were to choose to do so, the number of deployed
GBIs [ground-based interceptors] in light of additional threat
information.
We have also committed to assess in detail this basic hedge
posture and to bring additional information forward. I believe
you met with Dr. Jim Miller a month ago, and he expressed our
commitment to bring to you, as soon as we had been to the
Secretary, additional information in this area.
The third continuing topic of discussion between us has
been about implementation of the Phased Adaptive Approach. And
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, of course, expressed this
as a global approach, meaning an approach that would be pursued
in each region. We elaborated in detail in the review the
approach to Europe. And, as you know, the progress in the
interim year has been, we think, strong, with both a ramp-up in
the investments in the needed capabilities and working
politically with our partners, whether multilaterally in NATO
or bilaterally in the other regions, to strengthen our
postures.
The fourth issue I would like to touch briefly is the
commitment expressed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review to
strengthen international cooperation. And this is a global
intent and one that we are realizing through our collaborations
with our allies and partners in Europe, East Asia, and the
Middle East. But, of course, the sensitive and important
question today is about cooperation with Russia. We believe in
the potential benefits for our national security, for the
national security of our NATO allies, and also for Russia of
cooperation in this area.
We are mindful that there are many challenges associated
with this objective. We reject cooperation that would in any
way limit our defenses. And you have heard the President say
that NATO will defend NATO, Russia will defend Russia, and we
will try and reinforce each other's defenses cooperatively.
We will not compromise essential technologies. There is no
discussion of providing hit-to-kill technology as a part of our
cooperative activities with Russia. We have made clear that
cooperation will require a successful conclusion of a Defense
Technology Cooperation Agreement, as originally proposed and
pursued by the Bush administration. And, of course, we are
mindful of the fact that any classified information that might
be discussed with Russia or any other international partner is
subject to national disclosure policy.
As you know, we are pursuing two primary pathways of
cooperation with Russia, the first bilaterally and the second
in the NATO context. Bilaterally, our principal focus is on
joint analysis in order to better understand what capabilities
we might bring to the table at this time. And, clearly, from
Russia's perspective, what they bring to the table at this time
is only sensor information. And we are looking also bilaterally
at, then, what might be possible in the way of exchanging data
without compromising its integrity.
In the NATO context, we are working to explore the
possibility of a cooperative system for the common defense of
the European space. We have resumed our theater missile defense
cooperation with Russia that had been pursued under the Bush
administration. And we are also developing a joint analysis
process there to support the NATO process.
So that is a quick review of our four key areas, I think,
of continuing dialogue with the committee. And I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Roberts can be found in the
Appendix on page 42.]
Mr. Turner. General O'Reilly.
STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O'REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY
General O'Reilly. Good afternoon, Chairman Turner, Ranking
Member Sanchez, other distinguished members of the
subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before
you today on the Missile Defense Agency's $8.6 billion fiscal
year 2012 budget request.
We continue to enhance today's Ballistic Missile Defense
System, which is capable of protecting our homeland from
limited ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] attacks to
countering the growing proliferation of increasingly capable
ballistic missiles that threaten our deployed Armed Forces,
allies, and friends.
By the end of 2012, we plan to complete the initial
fielding of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, or GMD,
for homeland defense; deliver the first Theater High Altitude
Area Defense, or THAAD, units to the Army; and test the next
generation of Aegis missile for the Navy for regional defense.
Our objective is, by the end of this decade, to enhance our
current initial capabilities to achieve very robust missile
defense against all ranges of threat missiles.
Like the rest of the Department of Defense, our fiscal year
2012 budget request was based on the assumption of approval of
the fiscal year 2011 President's budget request. However, the
impact of operating under a continuing resolution at the fiscal
year 2010 budget level is significant for the Missile Defense
Agency since our fiscal year 2011 request was $486 million more
than our fiscal year 2010 budget, including a $324 million
increase for homeland defense.
We have had significant accomplishments over the last year,
including conducting 8 out of 8 planned flight tests, with 13
successful target flights; the first flight of a 2-stage
ground-based interceptor; the third successful missile
intercept by the Japanese Aegis program; a successful low-
altitude intercept by the THAAD system. We started production
of the THAAD Batteries 3 and 4. And we emplaced the thirtieth
GBI; upgraded 2 additional GBIs; completed the upgrade of the
early-warning radar in Thule, Greenland, to a missile defense
radar; converted 2 Aegis ships, thus increasing our fleet to 20
operationally configured ballistic missile defense ships.
We delivered 25 SM-3 IA interceptors and demonstrated the
ability for 2 space tracking and surveillance satellites to
provide high-fidelity missile tracks. And, with our Airborne
Laser Testbed, we destroyed two boosting missiles in flight. We
have demonstrated command and control interoperability with the
NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System on
multiple occasions. And we supported Israel's successful
intercept of a separating threat missile off the coast of
California earlier this month.
Today, MDA's top priority is to confirm the root cause of
the recent GBI flight test failure, verify the resolution of
the problem, and successfully repeat the previous flight test.
While the failure review board has only produced preliminary
results, it is clear more ground testing and additional non-
intercept flight tests of an upgraded GBI Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle, or EKV, will be required before the next intercept.
For fiscal year 2012, we are requesting funding for the
completion of the construction of the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense Missile Field 2; a second fire control node at Fort
Greely, Alaska; the construction of a missile communication
system on the east coast of the United States; placing Missile
Field 1 at Fort Greely in a storage mode for possible upgrade
for operational use in the future; procuring five new ground-
based interceptors; upgrading existing ground-based
interceptors; and upgrading the early-warning radar in Clear,
Alaska.
Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States
against a medium ICBM raid size launched from current regional
threats. We closely monitor intelligence assessments with the
intelligence community. And if this capability is deemed to be
insufficient, we are developing options to increase the
capacity of operational GBIs and accelerate the delivery of new
sensors and interceptor capabilities. The Department is
committed to brief Congress soon on our hedge strategy to
mitigate against uncertainties in threat estimates.
Our execution of the European Phased Adaptive Approach is
on track for meeting the timelines outlined by the President in
September 2009.
For Phase 1, our initial capability against short-, medium-
, and intermediate-range threats in Europe, our first Aegis
ballistic missile ship deployment, the USS Monterey, is on
station. The latest command and control system upgrades are
being installed in the European Command. And the AN/TPY-2
forward-based radar will be available in August for deployment
by the end of this year. Finally, a major test verifying the
readiness of the EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach] Phase
1 against an intermediate-range ballistic missile will be
conducted next month in the Pacific.
For Phase 2, our enhanced capability against medium-range
ballistic missiles by 2015, the first flight test of the next-
generation Aegis missile interceptor, the SM-3 IB, will occur
this summer. And the associated upgrade to the Aegis fire
control system is on track for certification by the Navy in
2012.
The design of the adaptation of the Aegis system for land
basing, called Aegis Ashore, began last summer, with
manufacturing beginning in fiscal year 2012. The Aegis Ashore
site will be installed in Hawaii in 2013 and flight tested in
2014. And installation of the second Aegis Ashore system in
Romania is also on track to occur in 2014, for full operation
by 2015.
For Phase 3 of our enhanced capability against
intermediate-range ballistic missiles by 2018, the SM-3 Block
IIA interceptor is completing its preliminary design this year
in support of flight testing in 2015 and deployment in 2018.
The airborne infrared sensor for early missile tracking will
begin flight testing of the next-generation sensor in 2012 and
is on track for deployment of a missile defense sensor pod that
could attach to any aircraft by 2016. Due to the fiscal year
2011 continuing resolution, the first flight of the Precision
Tracking Space System satellite has now been delayed to 2016,
and six more satellites, though, would then be on schedule for
placement on orbit by 2018.
For Phase 4, or medium- and intermediate-range and ICBM
early-intercept capability in Europe by 2020, we have completed
the Government system studies and will award interceptor
concept design contracts to three industry teams within the
next week. Even though the SM-3 IIB requirements are less
stringent than on other missile defense interceptors, we are
allocating more time to develop the SM-3 IIB than the average
time it has taken to develop other similar missile defense
interceptors in order to ensure low development risk. While not
necessary for the defense of the United States against limited
attacks by early-generation ICBMs, the SM-3 IIB will greatly
reduce the cost of homeland defense and will be effective
against larger raid sizes of more sophisticated ICBMs from
today's regional missile threats.
We are pursuing advanced technologies for applications
beyond PAA Phase 4, such as our partnership with Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory to develop new laser technologies
which offer great potential for high-efficiency compact and
lightweight high-energy lasers for a variety of missions of
interest to the Missile Defense Agency and the Department of
Defense.
Finally, Missile Defense Agency also continues to engage in
missile defense projects, studies, and analysis with over 40
countries.
In conclusion, our fiscal year 2012 budget funds the
deployment of the initial missile defense capability and the
creation of an international network of integrated ballistic
missile defense capabilities that are flexible, survivable,
affordable, and tolerant of uncertainties of intelligence
estimates of both nation-state extremist ballistic missile and
non-nation-state extremist ballistic missile threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering
the committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of General O'Reilly can be found in
the Appendix on page 57.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
I believe our witnesses are aware that votes have been
called. So, at this point, we will stand in recess, and we will
return after votes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Turner. I call the committee back together.
Mr. Ahern.
STATEMENT OF DAVID G. AHERN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, PORTFOLIO SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS
Mr. Ahern. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez, members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today.
I want to begin by addressing the Department's recent
decision regarding MEADS. Beginning in the 1990s, MEADS is a
ground-based air and terminal ballistic defense capability that
would replace existing Patriot systems in the U.S. and Germany
and the Nike Hercules system in Italy.
In 2004, the MEADS partner nations--Germany, Italy, and the
United States--signed a memorandum of understanding for a
cooperative design and development, or D&D, phase that
anticipated readiness for production beginning in 110 months,
or about 2014.
However, the NATO MEADS Management Agency program
restructure proposal presented to the board of directors in
November 2010 indicated that MEADS D&D would require 30
additional months beyond the original 110-month plan. Further,
it would require nearly a billion dollars more of U.S.
investment during fiscal year 2012 to 2017. And production
would not begin earlier than 2018, with the first U.S. fielding
around 2020.
As we built the fiscal 2012 budget, the Department was
fully cognizant of the MEADS updated estimates for cost and
schedule, and we were also informed by an independent cost
estimate of the D&D phase by the Department's Cost Assessment
and Performance Evaluation Office.
With those estimates in hand, the U.S. considered three
potential courses of action: Terminate immediately; continue
development within the funding limits set by the MOU
[memorandum of understanding] that entered into force; and
complete the planned D&D phase by adding additional funding and
allowing additional time. The Department has decided the best
course of action is to continue the D&D phase up to the
previously agreed MOU cost ceiling.
However, the U.S. will not pursue procurement and
production of MEADS. The Department believes the implementation
of a proof-of-concept program using the remaining D&D funds
contributed by the three nations is the best option for the
following reasons: Funding MEADS up to the existing MOU ceiling
enables all partners to harvest technology from the large
investment made to date. The U.S. cannot afford to purchase
MEADS and make required upgrades to Patriot concurrently over
the next two decades. The U.S. can achieve some of the
capabilities that MEADS provides using existing assets. Our air
and missile defense portfolio is based on integrating and
fielding a diverse set of elements to provide expanded coverage
against a wide range of threats. So, while we accept some risks
due to the MEADS decision, the U.S. is still able to achieve
some of the capabilities that MEADS was to provide.
The U.S. remains concerned with the overall track record of
the program. The proof-of-concept effort will use the remaining
D&D MOU funding in 2011 to 2013 to complete prototypes,
demonstrate and document the capabilities of major system
elements, and complete limited system integration. This work
would allow Germany and Italy to continue MEADS development and
production efforts after the current MOU funding is expended,
if they so desire. The same options would be available to the
United States should U.S. air defense plans change.
While the MEADS program of record performance might
ordinarily make it a candidate for cancellation, terminating
the program now, just after successful completion of the MEADS
critical design review, would force the nations to devote
significant funding to contractor termination costs instead of
using this funding to bring development to a viable level of
maturity.
Turning now to the Missile Defense Executive Board, I
testified before this subcommittee 2 years ago describing the
Board's structure, operation, and activities. The MDEB [Missile
Defense Executive Board] was established in 2007 to recommend
and oversee implementation of strategic policies and plans,
program priorities, and investment options to protect our
Nation and its allies from missile attack. The USD(AT&L) [Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics]
has maintained the MDEB structure and operation in essentially
the same form since its inception.
A notable MDEB achievement has been the creation of a Life
Cycle Management Process. It has had a significant impact on
the preparation and execution of MDA's plans and budgets. The
LCMP [Life Cycle Management Plan] provides for the
participation of the MDA, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command], other
combatant commanders, the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], and the
military departments in an annual process to identify
capability and support requirements, balance resources and
technical capabilities, and prepare a BMDS [Ballistic Missile
Defense System] program and budget. For the last 2 years, the
Department has executed the LCMP to derive comprehensive
Department involvement and influence on the MDA's plans and
budgets.
A key element which provides a foundation for the LCMP is
an input derived from the Strategic Command's Warfighter
Involvement Process. An output of this process is a Missile
Defense Prioritized Capability List that documents operator
capability requests and is reviewed and endorsed by the MDEB.
The MDA provides a formal response which, in turn, facilitates
MDEB assessment of MDA program plans against desired
capabilities.
Recent MDEB activities have included reviews of fiscal year
2012 MDA budget request, evaluation of operation and support
funding responsibilities, force structure recommendations such
as an addition of a TPY-2 radar to the BMDS acquisition
planning.
One oversight focus area is the Department's assessment of
BMDS elements' maturity for production and lead service
operation. The Department's current criteria for missile
defense element production include: An assessment of the depth
and breadth of preparation; performance validated by testing
results; funding to support the program plans; and an
executable plan for operation and support. MDA, in conjunction
with the designated lead military department, makes a
recommendation for a production decision. USD(AT&L) is
responsible for the review and decision.
The Department is ensuring proper management oversight of
this complex portfolio through its effective utilization of the
MDEB. We are taking prudent steps to transition individual
elements to lead military departments at the appropriate time
for operation and support. In that regard, the MDEB just agreed
to guidelines for MDA and the military departments regarding
funding responsibilities for BMDS element's development,
operation, and support. Continued operation between the MDA,
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], the military
departments, the Joint Staff, and COCOMs [combatant commands]
are critical to long-term success of the BMDS.
I am grateful to the members of this committee for your
support of the Defense Department's missile defense programs
and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ahern can be found in the
Appendix on page 72.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Gilmore.
STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL
TEST AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Dr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez, members
of the committee, I will very briefly summarize my written
statement.
In my view, General O'Reilly has brought outstanding rigor
to missile defense testing through his implementation of the
Integrated Master Test Plan, or IMTP. My office and I, myself,
are substantively involved throughout the 6-month development
and review process that the general is using to develop and
update the IMTP.
The IMTP remains focused on conducting the live testing
needed to demonstrate Ballistic Missile Defense System
performance under selected critical engagement conditions and
to collect the other empirical data required to rigorously
accredit the models and simulations that will be used to assess
the system's performance against the broad range of scenarios
that could be encountered in real-world operations. And so
another benefit here that the general has brought to his
approach to missile defense testing is to tie the testing very
rigorously and tightly to the development of the models and
simulations and to their rigorous accreditation.
The IMTP now includes operational testing of the Ballistic
Missile Defense System, and the first such test is now
scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012. And it
will demonstrate, among other capabilities, layered defenses,
shot coordination, and the negation of a small raid. Those are
all important capabilities to demonstrate.
General O'Reilly has summarized the testing that has
occurred over the past year and that is planned in the near
term. And, as he mentioned, there were two unsuccessful
intercepts conducted using the ground-based interceptors of the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system equipped with Capability
Enhancement II kill vehicles. Each of those tests failed--each
of those intercepts failed for different reasons. And the
reason for the failure of the second intercept remains under
investigation.
I think it is inevitable that the rigorous test regime
General O'Reilly is executing will inevitably result in such
failures. And those failures, although they may be perceived
negatively, also provide information that is absolutely
critical to assuring that the missile defense system will
actually work if it is ever needed. And the failures also
demonstrate why live-fire testing of the system, with all of
the complexity and expense that it entails, is absolutely
necessary.
The testing conducted during the past year has provided
valuable information, although, because of the unsuccessful
intercepts, not quite as much as we had hoped for. For example,
there were supposed to be intercepts conducted against target
complexes, including associated objects in the intercepts that
failed.
And, although we have gotten additional very useful
information, in my annual report I have not changed my
assessment this year relative to last year in terms of
demonstrated capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System. I use a six-point scale to do that, ranging from one,
where capabilities are estimated using engineering analysis and
laboratory testing, to six, where capabilities are verified
across the full range of scenarios and conditions possible in
real-world operations using a combination of rigorous flight
testing and rigorously accredited ground testing models and
simulations.
So, a one to six scale. On that scale, Patriot has
demonstrated level six against short-range ballistic missiles.
That is not to say that Patriot meets all of its requirements,
but it has been rigorously tested across a broad range of
conditions and scenarios.
Aegis, with the so-called build 3.6.1, I assess at level
five against short-range ballistic missiles and the lower end
of the range capable of medium-range ballistic missiles. I
assess Aegis 3.6.1 at level four against the upper end of the
range possible for medium-range ballistic missiles and the
lower end of intermediate-range ballistic missiles because it
has yet to actually be tested against such threats.
Although, as General O'Reilly pointed out, next month we
will conduct a test against an IRBM [intermediate-range
ballistic missile] at 3,700-kilometers range. That will
incorporate a queue from a forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar and,
possibly, launch on remote of the Aegis interceptor. And those
are all important capabilities to demonstrate to support
implementation of the Phased Adaptive Approach, Phase 1, to
defense of Europe.
I assess that at level four against short-range ballistic
missiles, and that is because it has been tested only against
simple short-range ballistic missiles. And the limitations on
testing in THAAD up to this point are, in part, due to the
target failures that occurred last year. Otherwise, we would
have tested against--if the target that failed to ignite upon
launch from the C-17, if that had not failed, we would have
been able to do a test against a more complex SRBM [short-range
ballistic missile]. But, so far, we have only tested against
simple short-range ballistic missiles and have not tested other
advanced capabilities of THAAD. And it is at level three
against medium-range ballistic missiles because it hasn't yet
been tested against those.
And then, finally, I assess the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense system at level three because it has been tested only
against IRBMs. The first ICBM test is now scheduled for the
fourth quarter of fiscal 2017 in simple threat presentations
with no silos, no simultaneous engagements, and many of the
models are not accredited.
Thank you. That concludes my remarks.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore can be found in the
Appendix on page 85.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Well, we have very good attendance at this meeting today,
and I know Members have a great deal of questions. So I am
going to start by trying to combine several questions that I
have. And then, General O'Reilly, I am going to start with a
series of them that relate to GMD.
There was acknowledgement, in both my comments and yours,
of the two GMD flight tests that failed to achieve intercept.
And it is our only missile-defense system that protects the
U.S. homeland from long-range ballistic missile attacks. And,
as you acknowledge and, certainly, we all believe, we have to
get this right.
Also, in looking at the issue of acquisition, MDA plans to
require a total of 52 GBIs to support the system's availability
and reliability until 2032. Of these 52 GBIs, 30 are
operational in Alaska and California, and 16 are designated for
flight tests from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2020.
This leaves only six GBIs available for spares and testing from
2020 to 2032. Already, two of these six spares may be consumed
to compensate for the failed flight test in 2010.
Then, also, the GMD program has, as I said in my opening
comments, seen sizeable budget cuts in the past 3 years. In
fiscal year 2010, it was reduced by $525 million. The fiscal
year 2011 request restored $300 million of this, but under the
current continuing resolution, MDA is spending $291 million
less than it anticipated in fiscal year 2011. The fiscal year
2012 budget request further reduces the GMD program by $185
million.
Also, a few changes to the GMD program are reflected in
this year's budget request. They include a decision to mothball
Missile Field 1 in Alaska instead of decommissioning it, and
beginning a preliminary design work to locate an interceptor
communications terminal at an east coast site by 2015.
So, combining those, would you please speak to the issue of
the failures and its impact on our GMD program; your
acquisition pace and issues that we might need to address there
for adequacy; the reductions in funding and their effect
overall on the program at the same time that it is having these
challenges from the failures; and if you would also address the
issues of the changes resulting in the status for Missile Field
1.
Thank you, General.
General O'Reilly. Thank you, sir.
First of all, for the failure of the GMD system, we have
two versions of the GMD missile. The first version is called
Capability Enhancement I, and it is the kill vehicle that has
performed five times on flight. It has done very well: Three
intercept attempts, and it has intercepted three times. Those
are flights out of--the target out of Kodiak, Alaska, and the
intercept out of Vandenberg. That roughly equates to the
geometry of a launch out of North Korea and an intercept coming
out of Fort Greely, Alaska.
For those type of scenarios and for that system, the CE-I
[Capability Enhancement I], we remain to have confidence in the
system based on the data we have seen.
However, we started a second version of the missile kill
vehicle in 2005 based on obsolescence reasons--parts,
manufacturers, and so forth not producing parts anymore in the
electronic systems that we needed. And, therefore, we
redesigned the system, upgraded it, and actually gave it
greater sensitivity and greater capability. However, it failed
on the first flight test due to a quality control problem we
identified in the plant. We corrected that quality control
problem, and, in the second flight, it didn't happen.
However, we did have a failure at the very end of the
second flight. And we have a failure review board that has been
formed. It is working diligently. It combines industry,
academia, the best of Government, FFRDCs [federally funded
research and development centers], national labs. They are
completing their analysis. Right now, it looks like we have a
very good idea of what the failure mode was. But that is not
enough. I need to have it verified and demonstrated, which they
will do through testing across the summer.
But that is not enough. We really need to have the industry
team, the GMD team, demonstrate to us they have corrected it.
So I have requested in this budget support for a flight test
which tests the missile very rigorously without an intercept,
but the purpose of it is to verify the resolution of these
issues. And then, as I said, we will have another flight test
next year.
What that effectively does is, it has delayed our flight
test program that Dr. Gilmore referred to for accrediting our
models and simulations by approximately a year. And we will
continue to update the committee as we go through this testing
and verify that we have, in fact, corrected the issue.
That is for Capability Enhancement II. Most of the missiles
which are deployed today are the earlier version which, again,
we haven't had those issues with.
As far as the number of 52 GBIs, which was our original
calculation, there are several assumptions we used which we now
deem no longer valid. First of all, we did not take into
account the last two flight tests have been failures. I just
mentioned another flight test that originally wasn't
envisioned. And we are going to repeat the last flight test. So
right there are--indicates four GBIs that we hadn't accounted
to before.
I propose that the best way to make this decision is, as we
do these tests over the next year, we determine what in fact is
the failure, make the corrections, as I said, and then go back
into production and make a decision based on that reliability
information--again, what is the acquisition objective for the
GBIs and whether it should be adjusted and what is that
adjustment.
I would propose that that would be appropriate for the
fiscal year 2013 budget so that the timelines of the decisions
I just said would be in effect. However, we have proposed five
new GBIs for this year. So the production lines will be up,
they will be operating. And it is clear to me that there will
be some increased number of GBIs that will be necessary.
As far as the budget cuts, most of the GMD system, over the
last several years, has been investing in infrastructure. And
we will complete Missile Field 2, the power plant power
distribution, other upgrades, over fiscal year 2012. And that
is one reason why you see a reduction in the budget after that,
because, from then on, the investments is not into the
infrastructure of the system; it is into testing and upgrades
to the GMD system or procuring, which will be in our follow-on
budget, additional GBIs.
However, I would point out that, inside that GMD budget,
the operations and support funding, it is an R&D [research and
development]-funded program, but the money to go to those type
of activities has increased, which is indicative of a program
which is fielded and operating.
The impact as a CRA [continuing resolution authority], as I
said, is significant to GMD because that particular program was
to receive $324 million more this year. It is exacerbated by
the timing of the CRA that we are under right now. Normally, at
this time of year, that is when we have the most significant
hiring of the construction crews in Alaska. If we don't hire
them over the next several weeks, they have opportunities
further north in the oil fields. And we have become very adept
at managing workloads, our contractor team has, in Alaska. And
if we don't fund the hiring of these folks over the next
several weeks, it will have a major impact in the summer
construction season, which is where we do 90 percent of our
annual construction.
So if this continuing resolution goes beyond the current
date of 8 April, we then will face some significant setbacks to
the construction schedule to complete that infrastructure. And
I would propose to come back and repropose that funding for the
following year so that we can, in fact, complete the
infrastructure that I was referring to.
Mr. Turner. General, the SM-3 Block IIB, an interceptor, is
planned for deployment by 2020 to improve protection of the
U.S. homeland against potential ICBM attack as part of Phase 3
of the Phased Adaptive Approach. The fiscal year 2012 budget
request provides an additional $1.7 billion to the SM-3 Block
IIB development program across the Future Years Defense
Program, the FYDP.
Will the SM-3 Block IIB design be optimized for ICBM
intercept capabilities?
General O'Reilly. It will be optimized to intercept
missiles early in flight. And, if I may, to better answer that
question more precisely, in early parts of flight, there is not
a significant amount of distinguishment between an
intermediate-range ballistic missile, or an ICBM. So the
original design of this and the original concept was against
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, 5,500 kilometers or
less. And when we look to have effective capability for that
range of missile, it became apparent that it would work. The
capability doesn't fall off when you increase the interceptor
velocity.
So, sir, its design space is to maximize its performance
from a medium-range ballistic missile to an ICBM, not to an
ICBM that is greater than on the order of 12,000 or more
kilometers. It would not be effective against the very largest
ICBMs, but it would be effective against ICBMs that are
traveling at velocities that we are concerned about and
distances we are concerned about for countries in the Middle
East and Northeast Asia.
Mr. Turner. Okay. Obviously, I would like to have an
additional conversation with you about that, because the intent
of 2020 and Phase 3 and then even 4 of the Phased Adaptive
Approach is protecting the homeland. So I would just like to
have an additional discussion about that subsequent to the
hearing.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Roberts, the Administration's decision in
2009 to adopt a Phased Adaptive Approach for missile defense in
Europe was based in part on an assessment that the longer-range
threat from Iran was slower to develop than previously
estimated.
We just had Secretary Gates in today to talk about Libya;
and in discussing Libya with him, we asked--I asked the
question of, and what do they--in their discussions on engaging
Libya, what were their concerns as to what the effect might be
on Iran and our efforts for nuclear nonproliferation? Is there
a prospect that it could make them go faster in their quest?
And he said, ``I don't think they could be going any faster.''
Which would lead me--that is certainly a statement of intent,
which certainly gives everyone the concern that the threat from
Iran could develop much faster than what the Phased Adaptive
Approach is designed to respond to.
What is your current thought of how the threat is emerging
and prospective gaps between the Phased Adaptive Approach and--
recognizing, of course, our ground-based system, but just
focusing on the issue of the Phased Adaptive Approach, trying
to respond to a threat from Iran, what are your thoughts on the
emergence of that threat and the potential gap?
Dr. Roberts. To be clear about your question, Phased
Adaptive is, of course, focused on the defense of the regions.
With, in the case of Europe, the addition of the Phase 4
capability that would offer some protection against
intercontinental threats, but also improve protection in the
early intercept mode against IRBMs. And the question we face in
anticipating Iranian threats is how they might mature in a way
that threatens both Europe more rapidly than PAA, and the
American homeland in a way that would overwhelm our current
posture. It is an interrelated question.
Without venturing into classified information, I think our
fundamental view is that the regional threat from Iranian
ballistic missiles is rapidly growing quantitatively and
quantitatively, and that the threat from the intercontinental
capability remains difficult to predict, precisely when and how
it might emerge.
And I think that is about all there is to say about the
threat at the unclassified level from Iran.
How does that measure up against the posture that we are
trying to put in place? In the case of the regional protection
posture, we are putting into the field as rapidly as we can the
capabilities that MDA has been developing. And there we are in
a race between their quantitative and qualitative improvements
and our quantitative and qualitative improvements, and our
phased approach is intended to take the advantage, as early as
possible, for our own proven capabilities for the defense of
Europe.
In terms of the protection of the American homeland, what
we are trying to hedge against is something quite specific and
not general. Let me begin with a quick summary of our baseline
of homeland defense capability, because it is not just the
interceptors in being today. It is the improvements that we
expect over the coming two decades with the additional
enhancements to the capabilities of the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense system and the addition in the out-years in the second
decade of the SM-3 IIB. It is a complementary set of tools that
will apply to the defense of the homeland over this time.
In addition, we have in place the hedge, such as it now
exists, to increase from 30 to 44 the number of deployed GBIs
in the case of a more rapid emergence of an Iranian threat
between where we are today and 2020 when, presumably, we will
have the SM-3 IIB to help supplement the defense of the
homeland.
The need is not to be hedged against an initial ICBM
capability from Iran or some other country. We are already
well-hedged against that position. We have 30 deployed
interceptors. Against--we have used the shorthand to
distinguish first-generation threats from second-generation
threats. First-generation threats being initial capabilities
from proliferators in the intercontinental range with
unsophisticated countermeasures. Second-generation threats
would be in quantity sufficient to overwhelm the GMD system or
advanced countermeasures or both. And our basic hedge concern
is to be well prepared for the possibility that there might be
a more rapid emergence of that second-generation threat than we
are ready to meet because SM-3 IIBs are not yet in place.
Now, that involves some discussions of how confident you
are in the intelligence that tells you that something is
coming--low, moderate, or high--and how much risk you are
willing to accept in the period--how much risk you are willing
to except about the possibility of an emergent second-
generation threat.
I'm sorry to dance around a subject that has a lot of
classified information in it, but I hope is that addresses the
thrust of your question.
Mr. Turner. You did a very good job of shepherding through
that, and I will take, since we are talking about missile
defense, your asking about the thrust of the question as a very
bad pun.
We will go to Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, again
gentlemen.
Let's see, Mr. Ahern, you said--you were talking about
MEADS, and you said something to the extent of stopping the
program, the costs versus completing it versus paying out the
closing costs on the contracts that you have. Can you get back
to us--we don't have to have it here unless you have it off the
top of your head--what that calculation is just for the record,
since you brought it up?
Mr. Ahern. Yes, ma'am. The phrase I used is that we would
be, if we went into that scenario--my notes are here--but
essentially that there has been an extensive amount of money--
that is about what I said--on termination costs if we went in
that direction.
The calculation that we have right now is that the
remaining funding in the MOU, and that liability that we are
into, and I want to be sure to explain that carefully. There
was an original commitment written into the MOU of about $4
billion U.S. equivalent dollars shared between the three
allies. Our share was $58 million, about $2.5 billion over that
period, 110 months, that I mentioned earlier.
The way that it is written, if you withdraw from the MOU,
then you are liable potentially to termination liability up to
the level of your commitment under the MOU.
Currently, we have put in--and the numbers are about
right--about $1.5 billion. So our remaining commitment to the
MOU, therefore, our maximum termination liability, is about
$800 million. $846 million, at some point, was the number that
we had used.
Now, the other side of the coin is what do we--we have
asked for $800 million in fiscal year 2012 and 2013 to continue
to fund the MOU. So the point I was trying to make is that in
balancing--to make a decision going forward, that the four
reasons that I said going forward, one of the ways that was
thought about is, if it is about the same amount of money--and
this is my Dave Ahern paraphrasing--if it is about the $800
million to go forward and be able to get into the
demonstration, show the prototyping, the capability of this
system, that is a better use of that funding than it would be
to unilaterally terminate, where you don't come away with
anything at all.
Does that answer your question? That is what I was trying
to do.
Ms. Sanchez. Yes, absolutely. I was trying to figure out
what the magnitude of that was. Okay.
And, Dr. Gilmore, you said at one point, you had a phrase
where you spoke about General O'Reilly's system testing or the
way he set up his tests; and you said something to the effect
of ``it would almost lead to failures because it was such
strict testing'' or----
Dr. Gilmore. I said that rigorous testing will probably
inevitably lead to some failures. They wouldn't be unexpected.
The same thing is true of missile defense systems that is
true of all defense systems, which is these are some of the
most complex systems that human beings try to build and get to
work. And so when you test these systems--and this is true not
just in missile defense interceptors and kill vehicles. It is
true of Joint Strike Fighters. It is true of advanced anti-
radiation guided missiles. It is true of virtually every
program that I have to write a test report about. When you test
them realistically under operational conditions where they are
first stressed to the max or much more than they have been in
developmental testing, inevitably you find problems and there
are failures.
Ms. Sanchez. So the more rigorous or calibrated you are
trying to get to, there are more.
Dr. Gilmore. Actually, the rigorous testing can be less
calibrated. It can be under conditions which are unexpected
and, therefore, more stressful. But, in any event, if you test
rigorously under operational conditions you will probably
encounter failures, and that is true of missile defense
interceptors as it is true of other defense systems.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you for that.
Because I am coming back to a question for you, General
O'Reilly. We had an earlier conversation when I spoke to you
about having spoken to somebody else, and one of the comments
that group made was that we might be a little bit less of a
risk-taker in this arena.
Can you speak a little to where you are calibrating how
much risk we should be taking? Because in some of the other
systems that I was talking to you about with this group, they
were having some quantum leaps, if you will, forward in theirs,
and ours is more doggedly coming along. What is your sense of
just how calibrated or how stringent you--or rigorous you are
making the tests?
General O'Reilly. Ma'am, the way we are setting up our
tests I do believe are representative. And I do work with Dr.
Gilmore and the services operational test community, but I do
believe they are representative of an actual scenario that the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, for example, could see.
So my philosophy to testing for the agency is we need to assure
it is going to work in combat; and, therefore, if there is a
problem, I would rather find out now and fix it than,
obviously, find out later. And I also have to report to the
combatant commanders why they should have confidence that in
battle these systems will work.
So we do stress it. We do ensure that we understand the
minimum performance. For example, these flight tests I have
done recently are very long in flight. And the reason we are
doing that is to replicate the longest flight we could possibly
have for defending the United States, for example, from Fort
Greely, Alaska. And, again, our philosophy is we want to assure
they work; and we also want to find out, if they don't work,
let's find out now. We have an opportunity to fix them. Which
is what we are doing in the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
program.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you for that.
Another really subjective sort of question I have with you
is how do you balance the need for ensuring an operationally
effective missile defense with the pressure to deploy the
missile defense systems quickly? And how does schedule and
employment pressures, you know, that are obviously aimed at
that--again, going back to this question of, you know, maybe we
are lagging behind because we are being so risk-averse or more
particular. And would the pressures that you see sometimes of
people pushing, would they lead you to do shortcuts? How do you
balance that? Because you are really our guy trying to figure
this out with respect to testing everything and working
everything and getting the schedule on.
General O'Reilly. Ma'am, I believe the key to handling
those situations where you are under a lot of pressure to
deploy something and there is a great need--and we recognize,
for example, against regional missile defense, we are outgunned
in about every region of the world today. I think the need to
balance that pressure versus verifying and making sure the
system works correctly is--the approach should be to determine
up front what is that criteria before you get in those high-
pressure situations.
And, again, I greatly appreciate the help of the
operational test community. We define in our Integrated Master
Test Plan up front what is our purpose of testing, what is the
success and failure criteria, and we do that early in the
process, even in some cases years before we actually conduct
the test. Therefore, once the test is done and we are looking
at the results, that is not really the time to determine what
is deemed a successful test or not.
Then, if we have a system that is not mature to the point
that we had originally set up criteria for, at that point we go
to the combatant commander and the operational test community
and STRATCOM, prepare a document of what capabilities have we
verified the system does have and what are the limitations that
it has. And then the combatant commander has to make a
determination. Does he want to accept those limitations or not
accept the capability until we mature it further?
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you.
Dr. Roberts, can you talk to us a little bit about how
consultations are proceeding with Russia? Or would you rather
do that off record?
Dr. Roberts. Well, the details should be done in a
different venue, because the state of discussions is sensitive.
In general, we see strong Russian leadership interest in
moving forward with missile defense cooperation with the United
States and NATO, reflected in presidential and prime
ministerial statements. We see supporting activities in the
various ministries aligned with the senior-level commitment. We
see some concerns on their side akin to the concerns we have.
We are concerned about sharing classified information; they are
concerned about sharing classified information. They are
concerned about some of their technology.
But I think the short answer would be we perceive that they
are approaching this cooperative effort in a constructive and
pragmatic way and with some realistic expectations about what
we might be able to accomplish.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
I will yield back.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. We appreciate what you
do. I have got two little 2-year-old twins, so I especially
appreciate what you do.
General O'Reilly, I hope the question has not already been
asked. We get divided in our attentions here.
But the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system in Alaska and
California is essentially all we have to defend the homeland
from long-range missile attacks. And it has been my estimate,
and I am going to ask you about it, the stockpile of these GBIs
is dangerously low. And so I guess I would ask you just to
refresh our memories on what the present stockpile is. And in
your personal opinion--I will put you in a bad spot here, if
you don't mind. In your personal opinion, not wearing your MDA
hat, is the number of available GBIs sufficient, or do we need
more? And coupled with that question, how will the $2.4 billion
reduction in the Future Years Defense Program affect our GMD
effectiveness?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we built the current acquisition
objective, we call it, the quantity of how many of an
acquisition item we believe we need to procure, including
testing and development. And for GBIs today the number is 52.
Thirty will be deployed. The others will be put into a pool
which--again, the way our approach is to reliability of the GBI
system is we continually learn about this system over time so
we want to have a pool of interceptors that we can rotate
through, which is not unusual to do with missiles. We do it
with PATRIOT and plan to do it with THAAD and we do it with
Aegis. You put them back into a depot, you test them, you take
components out, you fire them off, and you keep improving your
knowledge of how they are aging over time. So there is a
calculation of how many missiles are necessary for that.
We do not have a lot of data that you would normally have
before you field a system just due to the urgency, as you say,
the need, because the GMD system is our only homeland defense
system. So we put prototypes--they are more akin to prototypes
than production representative missiles in the field. We watch
them very carefully, and we have assessed that we needed 16 for
flight testing and ground testing. And, as has been said
before, that leaves you six for testing in 2020.
Well, there are some assumptions that we made at the time
that have since no longer been valid. And that is we didn't
anticipate the two flight test failures we have had. We also
didn't anticipate my request for another flight to verify it
works and then we are going to repeat the test. So right there
are four GBIs we hadn't anticipated.
I believe over the next year it would be prudent to
reassess the number of GBIs we ought to be buying. For our
fiscal year 2012 budget, we are requesting five new GBIs. So
the production lines will start, and that will commit the
contractors probably to their limit--close to their limit to
what they can do. That would be more GBIs than we have produced
at one time in the past in one lot.
And so we believe we are going to sufficiently start the
production line and, over the next year, I would recommend
between now and the fiscal year 2013 budget submit, the
Department reassess the total number we need to procure and
then include that in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, sir.
I will try to throw another question at you right quick.
Related to directed energy, I know that the Airborne Laser test
scheduled for last night had to be canceled, but, given what we
have learned from the Airborne Laser program, do you foresee
any near- or medium-term applications for directed energy
weapons in the ballistic missile defense architecture at this
point or anything new?
And, secondly, can you tell us a little bit about the DDR&E
[Director, Defense Research and Engineering] report on the
directed energy technologies?
General O'Reilly. We have supported the effort of that
study, DDR&E study, so I can talk from a point of view of us
providing information to them. But the bottom line is that
there are many applications of directed energy. Unfortunately,
for this venue right here, they are highly effective. Most of
them are classified.
I can tell you that last year twice, both against liquid-
fueled systems that are very hard to shoot down--the lethality
mechanisms was the theory they would be hard to shoot down--and
solid-rocket motors, we have shot both of them down with our
laser system at great ranges; and the destruction actually
occurred much faster than we theoretically thought it would
occur.
So there are some lethality effects that are greater than
our theory had indicated. The bottom line is, it is extremely
promising. We have effectively tracked and intercepted while a
missile is boosting, which is ultimately where you would want
to be in missile defense. Then you would never know how far the
missile--whether it was an IRBM or ICBM--because you killed it
while it was still boosting. Tremendous cost-effectiveness of
having that ability. And we have demonstrated for the first
time empirically over the last year our capabilities which
allow us to upgrade our theory and our models and simulations.
Mr. Franks. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General O'Reilly, a
couple of questions with regards to SM-3 Block IIA. It is a co-
development program between the U.S. and Japan. And in a letter
to the Japanese Ministry of Defense you noted the project is
rapidly approaching key milestones, that, absent a production
agreement with the Government of Japan, the U.S. will assume it
will produce the missiles in the United States. And I am
curious as to what decisions you believe--MDA believes you need
from the Japanese Ministry of Defense to move this from
development to production with the Japanese; and if that does
not happen, then what does happen to SM-3 Block IIA?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the SM-3 Block IIA, we have a
commitment to utilize that weapons system. It is Phase Three of
the Phased Adaptive Approach for the deployment of missile
defense in Europe. As the President has stated, the SM-3 IIA
will be part of that configuration. Therefore, it is my
responsibility to ensure it is brought to production and
produced.
Our current agreements with the Japanese Government are
more based on timelines; and so by 2015, the current agreement
is, that is when we would end our cooperative development of
the SM-3 IIA.
It is not that they have decided not to finish the
development with us, nor have they decided to participate in
production of it. They haven't announced that they have made
those decisions. My point in the letter was that in our budget
process it would be very helpful if we understood their
commitment, and we extended the cooperative development and
also made the agreements early on how we would produce it and
how we would conduct work share and so forth.
Short of that information, I must assume that I have to put
something in there to ensure--to submit to Congress the
resources needed to deliver the SM-3 IIA by 2018. And so what I
have done in the out-year budget, without having a commitment
from the Japanese Government, has assumed that the United
States will finish the development and production.
It was done only to have a comprehensive budget submission.
It was not meant that we do not desire it. In fact, we would;
and we have had great success with the Japanese. It is just
that it would be very helpful for our budgetary purposes to
understand what their intentions are for completing the
development and to going into production. I, frankly, would
imagine that after they----
Mr. Larsen. Do you anticipate, then, meeting a time?
Obviously, everything is down in Japan, and we are sensitive to
that. But on this issue do you anticipate sometime this year
meeting with them to try to find out what their intentions are?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we have several meetings planned
this year to discuss this, and the sooner the better for us.
But, obviously, we are very sensitive to the situation they are
in. But they have not delayed our upcoming meeting that will
occur in the next two months on this topic.
So that is where we stand on it, sir. And I may defer to
OSD Policy, too, because they work this from the policy side.
Mr. Larsen. Go ahead, Mr. Roberts. That is fine.
Dr. Roberts. Well, I would only add that we have every
reason to expect continued strong partnership from Japan on
this matter. Their commitment is clear, even if the terms of
the next agreement are not yet finalized; and we think they are
an excellent model of burden sharing with our allies in this
area.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Gilmore, in your testimony--in your written
testimony, you noted on the--back to the GMD and interceptors--
you said because the number of GMD interceptors available for
testing is limited and additional targets must be purchased to
support this repeat testing, the FTG-11 has been eliminated.
The point is that additional targets must be purchased, and we
have heard this from General O'Reilly as well.
Putting that together--this is actually a question for Mr.
Ahern, from MDEB's perspective, is this on your--is this yet on
your radar? Or it has to be worked for the 2013 and then comes
to you?
Secretary Ahern. That is correct, sir. I have not seen that
come forward, the additional. But I understood what General
O'Reilly indicated, and I expect that we will see it coming
forward in 2013.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will take a second round later.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General O'Reilly, I want to the build on a question or two
that Representative Franks asked a moment ago. Is the funding
for directed energy what it should be, given what we continue
to learn about the greater and greater applications for
directed energy?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I am a strong supporter of
development of directed energy. I believe we have shown over
the last year that it does have lethal effects, as we have
desired. The Missile Defense Agency probably has the greatest
application of high-energy megawatt-plus class lasers, so we
are unique in that area. But at much lower energies, we have
significant applications in missile defense to assist our
interceptors if we have directed energy.
But for these--it is still in research and development in a
large part, especially the next generation. We would like to
see powerful lasers like we are working with Lawrence Livermore
National Labs that is about the size of this table, rather than
a 747, that would have tremendous lethality. And to achieve,
that I believe the best way is almost like the approach I
answered for test criteria. We establish technical milestones,
and we establish a steady funding level. And until they hit
that technical milestone, we keep a steady funding level that
adds stability to the research team and, once they achieve it,
then a decision is made to move to a higher funding level where
you can then start applying that technology.
Where they are in this program--and we are prepared to move
rapidly once they have achieved milestones. These are
significant milestones associated that they are working right
now with the efficiency of these lasers. Once they reach the
type of efficiencies they are trying to achieve, which is
greater we have ever seen before--and I do believe they are
achievable; it just has to be demonstrated--then I believe that
is the best strategy for justifying additional funding to apply
that capability.
Mr. Lamborn. Are we at least doing that initial stable R&D
type of funding in the proposed budget?
General O'Reilly. Yes, in the proposed budget, we are.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Secondly, I have heard that the Standard
Missile-3 Block IIB program described as a high schedule risk.
Do you see this as an important problem?
General O'Reilly. Sir, when we laid out the SM-3 IIB
program, we looked at interceptors that are much more complex
than this one.
If I may say, trying to intercept a missile in boost phase
has some big advantages and actually is a more simplistic
missile. The target you are trying to hit is very hot. You just
finished boosting, and the accelerations of it--it is very
clear to find it, to track it. And we have other classified
requirements that are not applicable at the front end of a
missile kill chain.
So the bottom line is, we don't believe the criteria are as
great on this missile as it is on the, say, PAC-3 [Patriot
Advanced Capability-3] or THAAD or Aegis. Yet we added time to
the average development time, and we went back and looked at
how long it takes to build missiles of this class. And so for
this missile, from the beginning of product development to
making a milestone decision for production, is 5\1/2\ years,
which is longer than what the average is for a typical missile.
So we do believe we have put margin, schedule margin, into the
development of this missile.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you very much.
And my last question for you is I was recently informed
that the defense efficiency initiatives will be cutting 1,000
positions from the Missile Defense Agency over the next 2
years. What parts of the agency are these cuts coming from? And
can your agency absorb such a huge cut without an impact to the
missile defense mission?
General O'Reilly. We were part of that process to determine
what the efficiency goals were. Our input was along that line,
and the majority of that is in the area of our contractor
support for Government functions, the supporting functions. And
it is a different way of contracting is what we have taken into
mind. Instead of taking a path like we have in the past where
we augment our staff, everybody inside the agency determines
how many more technical support contractors they need, and we
go out and procure for that number. We have turned it around,
and we have made it competitive, and we will announce what are
the tasks that need to be accomplished. And then we let the
contractors come back to us and propose--industry to tell us
how many people it would take, rather than we predetermining
how many people.
We are about 50 percent through this new contracting
process over the last year. The savings we have already
identified for this year alone, over $100 million, where the
actual proposals that we accepted was less than what the
Government estimate was under the previous contracting
approach.
So we believe the competition that has been added to this--
we also are awarding larger contracts in this area. So instead
of having a whole series of small contracts--we had over 400
for this agency--we are now pursuing 40 larger contracts which
then have their own efficiencies because the Government does
not have oversight over 400 contracts so there is the reduction
on the Government side.
But most of that goal for the reduction of effectively a
thousand full-time equivalent personnel is achieved through
this new contracting approach of letting industry tell us and
bid competitively on how much it would take in order to meet
the tasks that we have.
Mr. Lamborn. General, as a final follow-up, you have
explained the process very well, but do you think any of the
missions of MDA will be compromised?
General O'Reilly. No, we have determined up front what are
the tasks that need to be done in order to accomplish our
mission, and we are set out to contract to all of those tasks.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you, and thank you all for being
here.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General O'Reilly, you addressed--and I am discovering what
it is like to be a freshman, seems like all of my questions
have been asked in one shape, form, or fashion, so I am
modifying a little bit.
But you addressed the impact of a continuing resolution. As
you know, we in the House and the Senate are facing a logjam of
sorts with respect to CR [continuing resolution] versus a
budget for the remainder of this year. Which is the lesser of
the evils to you: Continuing throughout the remainder of the
year on a CR basis, sporadic 3 or 4 weeks at a time or, if push
comes to shove, having a partial Government shutdown of 2 or 3
weeks, something of that nature, which may be required to force
the parties to pass a budget for the remainder of this year?
Which is easier for you?
General O'Reilly. I am sure everybody is anticipating my
answer of what Congress should do.
Mr. Brooks. Not what Congress should do, but which is
easier for you to operate under? Which is the lesser of the
evils?
General O'Reilly. I think between shutting down the
Government and continuing contracting in a very inefficient
way, I would rather continue the contracting in a very
inefficient way. But, if I could, there are some impacts there
that I would just like to clarify and make sure that I have
represented correctly.
It is not only the Government operations but, obviously,
all of the contracts out there. Especially as we proposed the
Phased Adaptive Approach, there are a lot of new starts in this
budget that we are not allowed to turn on.
And there are particular issues such as the National
Defense Authorization Act in December authorized my agency to
procure Iron Dome, the system that the Israelis have developed
for short-range defense, $205 million. Even though the
President has committed and it is in the authorization act, it
is a new start for me, and so I can't even execute what the
authorization act has asked me to do.
So it is that and it is the impacts to the workforce;
trying to determine new contracts and things, whether or not
they are going to be hired or laid off. It is buying material.
We can't commit legally to buying material because we don't
have the follow-on funding. As I said, up in Alaska we are
missing at a critical time for hiring our construction
workforce. It is extremely difficult, and it is extremely
inefficient to operate this way, even though I said that would
be better for me than stopping and not movingly forward at all
with any of my--the work that the Government has asked me to
execute.
Mr. Brooks. So even if the Government shutdown was 2 to 3
weeks, something relatively short, sometime in April, you would
prefer to have a CR off and on for the remainder of the year
rather than risk a 2- to 3-week shutdown? That would be easier
for you to operate under?
General O'Reilly. That is the worst of two evils, but at
least we are accomplishing some work. If we completely shut
down, then there are a lot of also inefficiencies associated
with that, with having to terminate and start up activities.
Mr. Brooks. Do you have a judgment as to whether you would
qualify as an essential function and thereby MDA be exempt from
the shutdown?
General O'Reilly. Sir, there are functions that we do that
are in direct support of the combatant commanders; and it would
affect, for example, our homeland defense system. We need to
continue that operation and the oversight and the Government
participation of GMD. And it is an operational system, and
there are many others at the regional level that I would deem
are in direct support of combat operations or ongoing military
operations.
Mr. Brooks. The GMD program, as you know, has seen sizable
budget cuts in the past 3 years; and the fiscal year budget
request further reduces the GMD program by $185 million. How
are these reductions impacting GMD operations, sustainment, and
any modernization activities?
General O'Reilly. During this period of time, the
operations aspects are actually increasing over time in that
budget. What those budget reductions primarily reflect is the
completion of a lot of construction up at Fort Greely that was
originally intended, and now that work has come to an end.
However, we are starting new work. The upgrade of the Clear
radar, for example, that is about $200 million. That is for the
purpose of enhancing the homeland defense. So there are a lot
of other activities that are being initiated which, in fact,
support homeland defense but are not part of the GMD program.
But for O&S [Operations and Support], we are increasing
over time because we have a greater operation--as more assets
become operational, so does the need to maintain the system.
But, primarily, those reductions were associated with power
plants and other infrastructure, which we are now completing.
Mr. Brooks. Okay. I am just about out of time, but in view
of the most recent tests that were unsuccessful, does the
fiscal year 2012 budget request still reflect your funding
requirements for GMD?
General O'Reilly. Sir, they do. But some of that funding--
some of the activity we will have to defer and accomplish in
future budget requests.
Specifically, we have stopped the production of the
enhanced kill vehicles as this time so that--because we don't
know exactly what the solution is. We want to verify the
solution and the correction and then upgrade those kill
vehicles, make those corrections, and then continue the
production line. So we do have a stop of about--for seven kill
vehicles that are currently in production at this time. And
because we are not completing it, there is a reduction in our
need, our funding; and we are using that funding in order to
support these other activities to return to flight testing.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, General O'Reilly and the other
members of the panel; and, Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder
of my time.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General O'Reilly and Dr. Gilmore, what do you consider will
be the most demanding developments in terms of technology
improvements that are required for the PAA Phase 2 and 4--I'm
sorry--Phase 2 through 4?
Dr. Gilmore. To some extent the most demanding technologies
and the most demanding capabilities for Phase 2 through 4 are
common to all of missile defense. First of all, you have to
demonstrate that you can actually discriminate if the threat
comes with countermeasures. Because, if you can't, that is
obviously a problem; you won't be able to intercept what you
need to intercept.
That is a problem as you move towards trying to negate
longer-range threats in particular. And as we move into later
phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach, that could become a
greater problem as time goes by.
Another thing that has to be demonstrated is the capability
to do Engage-on-Remote. So you have forward-based sensors and
forward-based radars that are doing the tracking which then
provide that information over communications net and through
the Battle Management Command and Control system to the actual
platform that will launch an interceptor. And that intercept
will sometimes have to occur outside the field of view of the
radar that might be organic to the intercept platform. That is
another important capability that has to be demonstrated in
order to realize all of the protection that would be provided
by the Phased Adaptive Approach.
Those are just two things that come to mind, but, General
O'Reilly, if you care to say something else?
General O'Reilly. Ma'am, I believe the individual
development of the individual components--the sensors, the
command and control processors, the missiles--they are not
inherently more difficult to develop than ones we are
developing and have successfully developed today. I believe the
real challenge in 2, 3, and 4 is each time we move to a new
level of capability with missile defense they become more--
those capabilities become more interdependent on each other so
that we can--the Aegis ship, for example, in Phase 2 doesn't
need to see the missile before we go ahead and launch a missile
because we are relying on some other radar. So it is the
integration.
And just to give an idea, in the next two years the
operational tests, for example, that Dr. Gilmore has referred
to earlier, it is actually going to have two medium-range
missiles in the air simultaneously, an Aegis ship in a position
to shoot it down. But if it does not, THAAD has to be right
behind it to be ready to shoot it down, and we are going to
shoot another missile at THAAD simultaneously during that
period of time that it has to worry about. And just when it is
most difficult, we are going to launch a third missile so that
a PATRIOT system underneath it has to operate with all the
effects of the other intercepts.
So as we continue to become more and more complex, operate
live fire testing is important, but the accreditation of our
models and SIMS [simulations] so that we have confidence in
them is going to become more important. All of this is geared
toward the complexities.
Phase 3, we are now reaching out twice the range we were
before. So not only do you have more complex scenarios, but
they are spread out over a greater period of time.
But Phase 4 actually becomes easier. Because if you are
going to--it is just like our laser interceptions last year of
a boosting missile. The targets don't cost very much because
there is no target--there is no payload because we are trying
to destroy it early in the flight. Or, if it is, it is a
simplistic payload. And the range infrastructure, all of that
is much smaller because the entire flight from which we are
trying to destroy the missile occurs in 2 or 3 minutes, rather
than 30 minutes, over a much smaller piece of land.
So that capability of the SM-3 IIB will actually drive us
to more cost-effective missile defense and more cost-effective
testing and deployment. So I believe the challenge is for Phase
2 and 3 primarily to demonstrate all of the integration which
is necessary.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ahern, with regards to--is it ``ME-ADS'' or ``MEADS''?
How do we pronounce that?
Mr. Ahern. ``ME-ADS'' is the way I do it, sir.
Mr. Larsen. I'll use ``ME-ADS'' so we will be talking the
same language. At least we will start off talking on the same
page here.
From the staff memo, it says the penalty on the termination
is $846 million. Is that about right?
Mr. Ahern. That is what I was trying to describe earlier.
That is the subtraction between our original MOU commitment and
what we have already provided. And that is about the right
number today, yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. And then the 2012 and 2013 budgets anticipate
about $104 million----
Mr. Ahern. $804.
Mr. Larsen. $804 million. So a difference of about $42
million between terminating it today and what we plan on
spending over the next two budget cycles; is that about right?
Mr. Ahern. Yes, the maximum termination liability, $846
million, and that is just based on a snapshot in time.
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Mr. Ahern. And then the request for the budget is based on
our MOU commitment for 2012 and 2013. So, within that range,
yes, sir, those numbers are correct.
Mr. Larsen. When does the MOU commitment end and the threat
of a termination penalty end with it?
Mr. Ahern. I am not an attorney, but I am going to tell you
my understanding is, when the money has expired, then the MOU
is over. I think I have the MOU available. I will take the
question for the record, but I want--this is an opportunity to
do this.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 95.]
Mr. Ahern. We have no obligation to put more money into the
MEADS program after we have executed 2012 and 2013. So, from
the standpoint of are you worried that I will be back again
asking for money in 2014 or 2015 for MEADS, no, sir. It would
require an amendment to that MOU in order to be able to put
more money into it. We have no intention of amending that MOU.
Had we decided to go forward with what I described in my
opening statement as the third option of adding the additional
funding, that would have required an amendment.
So I think that my right answer to your question is, there
is no termination liability when the last dollar on the last
contract is expended.
Mr. Larsen. If you planned to come up here in 2014 and ask
for more money I would make sure that the chair, or whoever it
was, didn't invite you so you couldn't come up here and ask for
more money because--I am half joking, but it just seems that,
between the penalty and what we put in the budget, it is almost
the same. I am just trying to understand better the
decisionmaking process to get us to this point.
But I think you have also--just one issue, when does this
end? We haven't really delved into MEADS too much over the last
several years as much as we have done other parts of the
Missile Defense Agency budget, and it might be worth us maybe
doing a look back on MEADS a little bit on this side of the
microphone.
Mr. Ahern. Yes, sir. I am not sure--I think--I am not sure
where the question is, but I think that the effort going
forward, how the decision was made, as I described--tried to
describe, it was that going through the rationale of our
commitment to our allies, what we had accomplished, what we had
expected to accomplish, the affordability aspect of it. Because
were we to commit to continuing--there was that billion dollar
bill plus, really, implicit in Dave Ahern's mind, if you are
going to do that you really have to commit to production. And
we were not ready to do that. There was a recognition of the
risk.
So I think that is all wrapped up there. And it is a fact
our maximum termination liability is within reason, with small
estimating, whatever percentage that is, of what our obligation
to the contract is. But I don't think that was--it was not what
I was thinking of, anyway. And I am not the decisionmaker, but
I was certainly involved in it. It was those four reasons: You
are close; you have got the CDR [Critical Design Review]; you
have got allies; do what you can, but recognize that you are
not going to go any farther.
So I won't be up here in 2014, sir. And then also you are
taking some risk with the rest of the portfolio.
Mr. Larsen. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, what I understand
from the decision that MDEB has made with regard to MEADS,
though, is we go forward for the next 2 years on this and then
we end up with a prototype that provides a set of capabilities
that could be used for something else later. Is that what I
gathered from your written testimony at least?
Mr. Ahern. Sir, let me make one correction. The MDEB had
nothing to do with the decision on MEADS. That is a
straightforward Army, OSD, going forward to up the SECDEF
[Secretary of Defense] decision.
But at the end of the 2\1/2\ years we will have
demonstrated if the plan works as we expected. And that is part
of my job, is to ensure that we do. We will have the fire
control radar. We will have shot a couple of live shots with
the MSE [Missile Segment Enhancement] missiles. We will have
used the command and control system. We will have done, as Dr.
Gilmore mentioned in one of the other systems, an Engage-on-
Remote. So there are some realistic, focused achievements in
the ``system of systems'' kind of aspect for MEADS to
demonstrate that it is--that the concept is proven.
And then there will be technologies. Our technologies--this
is a big phased array--or not that big--but phased array
antennas, mobile, lightweight, in X band and in UHF band, and
they are modern electronic.
So it is both a system of systems and a technology that
will have been demonstrated available not only to the United
States but also to Germany and Italy.
Mr. Larsen. And one more question, Mr. Chairman.
This is for Dr. Roberts and has to do the Phased Adaptive
Approach, whether it is EPAA or APAA or the regional aspect of
this, and having to do with the numbers of destroyer platforms
that you anticipate will be available. Can you talk to us a
little bit about coordination of your policy shop with the U.S.
Navy and how you anticipate having the adequate number of Aegis
destroyer platforms to implement this? Plus knowing full well
we have a lot of other things our destroyers need to do?
Dr. Roberts. The missing voice today on this panel is the
Joint Staff. And Admiral Macy, I believe, is on foreign travel
and is not available today.
But, fundamentally, the answer to that question comes from
them, meaning the Joint Staff is responsible for adjudicating
competing requests from combatant commanders for scarce
resources. And our function has been to set some policy goals,
support the development of an acquisition strategy that grows
capability as rapidly as we can afford, and to provide what
policy context is needed for the Joint Staff to adjudicate
these competing demands.
And I think that is--it is fundamentally a responsibility
of the Joint Staff.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks. We will follow up with them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, gentlemen. I want to thank you for
your dedication and your expertise.
I want to personally thank Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly
for your work with the committee, both in the 101 sessions and
in the private briefings that we have had and the classified
briefings. I can tell you that, you know, this is substantial
progress that has been made from our hearings a couple of years
ago. I think certainly our European allies were all very
impressed with what has occurred and what has been achieved
there and their support for the Phased Adaptive Approach.
I appreciate you working cooperatively with the committee,
and I think what this has allowed us to do is to hone in on
what the remaining items are, what the to-do list is, those
items where we might need to exchange additional information.
But I do greatly appreciate the way and the manner in which you
are working with the committee and the members, and I think it
really helps. By the time we get to this committee hearing, a
lot of the questions that we have, a whole lot of background
has been exchanged between us, and that really helps. So thank
you very much.
With that, we will be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 31, 2011
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 31, 2011
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 31, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Ahern. Per the MEADS Design and Development (D&D) MOU
(Memorandum of Understanding), Section 19.9, and absent a unanimous
decision by the Partner nations to terminate the D&D effort early, the
MOU will remain in effect until the successful completion of the D&D
project or September 2016, whichever comes first.
The termination liability is tied to our overall MOU funding
commitment. Section V of the MOU states that the total program phase
cost ceiling is $4 Billion equivalent U.S. dollars (EUSD) (in 2004
dollars) and that each Participant will contribute its equitable share
of the full costs of the MEADS project. The U.S. cost share of the MOU
cooperative program is 58%, for a ceiling of $2.324B EUSD (2004
dollars). In February 2011 (the time of the President's FY12 budget
announcement), the remaining MOU funding commitment for the U.S. was
$846 million. Since February, the U.S. provided the remaining FY11
funding for the program per our MOU commitment. The U.S. obligation
toward cooperative MOU program costs for NATO MEADS Management Agency
in FY 12 and FY 13 are $350M and $338M, respectively, totaling $688M.
The remainder of the U.S. FY 12 and FY 13 budget amount, which is
approximately $116M, is required for U.S.-specific MEADS work--
including Government Furnished Property (GFP) obligations under the
MOU--implemented through the US Army National Program Office.
In the event of a unilateral MOU withdrawal by a Partner nation,
the remaining partners would have 6 months to determine whether to
terminate or to restructure the contract and proceed. Should the
remaining nations proceed, the withdrawing nation would be responsible
for restructure costs up to their MOU obligation limits (up to $804M
for the United States, as noted above). Should the remaining Partners
choose to terminate NATO MEADS Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) contracts,
contract termination costs would be based on a termination proposal
from the prime contractor as well as any related U.S. GFP termination
costs. Because our MEADS Partner nations have made it clear that they
have no interest in pursuing termination, NAMEADSMA has not requested
detailed contract termination proposals. Contract termination costs
(and related government termination costs) in a contract termination
scenario would be driven by existing obligations like long-lead item
procurements and orders, targets, test and integration infrastructure,
and other contract costs (leases, support contractors, etc). In a
unilateral withdrawal, the withdrawing nation would be liable for
termination or restructure costs up to the MOU commitment ceiling. [See
page 29.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 31, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. On March 10, 2011, Under Secretary of State Ellen
Tauscher was in Moscow to propose the establishment of a ``Missile
Defense Data Processing Center'' that would synthesize U.S./NATO and
Russian sensor data. Can you describe this concept in more detail and
describe what data and technology would be shared and how they would be
shared?
Dr. Roberts. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation with
Russia is an Administration priority. To this end, we are pursuing BMD
cooperation in the following three separate, but related, bilateral
tracks:
Defense Relations Working Group: Defense Secretary Gates and
Defense Minister Serduykov established this working group to further
practical cooperation in a number of areas, including missile defense.
International Security and Arms Control: Under Secretary Tauscher
and Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov are engaged in a dialogue that
includes such topics as strategic stability.
Military Cooperation Working Group: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Mullen and Chief of the General Staff Makarov meet periodically
to discuss a range of cooperative efforts including missile defense.
We are also pursuing multilateral BMD cooperation with Russia
through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The effort in the NRC is
synchronized with our bilateral efforts.
I am prepared to provide more details in a classified setting on
the specific proposals we have made to Russia and the outlook for
progress in these areas.
Mr. Turner. The November 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration expressed
NATO's desire to work with Russia on missile defense: ``We are actively
pursuing cooperation with Russia on missile defence, including through
the resumption of theatre missile defence exercises.'' Describe the
scope of any missile defense exercises that are being considered, and
what systems or capabilities Russia would have to provide to make these
exercises equitable and beneficial for both parties?
Dr. Roberts. NATO and Russia agreed to resume theater missile
defense cooperation that is likely to include exercises. The NATO-
Russia Council (NRC) Missile Defense Working Group is establishing a
program of work that will include a joint analysis and exercise
proposals.
The scope of missile defense exercises will be determined within
the NRC Missile Defense Working Group, but our view is that the
exercises should have a greater scope and scale than previous
exercises, which focused on tactical missile defense cooperation.
Mr. Turner. A few changes to the GMD program are reflected in this
year's budget request. These include a decision to ``mothball'' Missile
Field 1 in Alaska instead of decommissioning it, and beginning
preliminary design work to locate an interceptor communications
terminal at an East Coast site by 2015. Why did MDA make these
changes--is there a specific development which motivated MDA to adopt
these changes? Is MDA considering other changes to the GMD system to
improve its reliability and operational effectiveness, or to enhance
its ability to protect the U.S. homeland against evolving threats?
General O'Reilly. In coordination with OSD Policy, MDA decided to
place Missile Field 1 in a non-operational state (``mothball'') instead
of permanently decommissioning the missile field. While in a mothball
status, the 6 silos in missile field 1 can be hardened and reactivated
in two years at a cost of approximately $200M as a hedge against any
future change in threat to the Homeland. There are no current threats
dictating the need, nor plans to reactivate MF-1 in the future;
however, we determined preserving the asset in a non-operational status
was prudent over destruction based in uncertainties inherent in threat
estimates.
MDA is adding an East Coast interceptor communication terminal
(IDT) to provide additional and redundant communication with GBIs
launched from Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg AFB, CA. These additional
communication opportunities allow additional GBI updates from sensors
to improve performance against threats to the eastern United States
from the Middle East. MDA originally planned to install an East Coast
IDT in 2004, but delayed it while focusing on a 3rd GMD site in Europe.
We concur with the previously identified need and are proceeding with
its installation.
The GMD's reliability and operational effectiveness continue to
improve through upgrades to existing GBI components and system
software. Our ongoing GBI upgrade program replaces older items with new
higher-reliability components to enhance mission readiness. Our ongoing
stockpile reliability program evaluates system components throughout
their service life to identify any negative trends needing correction.
Also, we are improving the GMD's ability to utilize additional sensor
data and better discriminate threat objects during flight. Finally, we
continue to develop the 2-stage GBI. After last year's successful
initial flight test, we plan to conduct an intercept with a two-stage
GBI as a potential hedge to allow for a longer intercept window of time
if ICBMs were launch against the United States from Northeast Asia or
the Middle East.
Mr. Turner. The SM-3 Block IIB interceptor is planned for
deployment by 2020 to improve protection of the U.S. homeland against
potential ICBM attack as part of Phase 3 of the EPAA. The FY12 budget
request provides an additional $1.7 billion to the SM-3 Block IIB
development program across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Can
you describe the key technology risk areas associated with the SM-3
Block IIB and MDA's plans for retiring that risk?
General O'Reilly. The SM-3 Block IIB will counter short, medium,
intermediate, and long range threats, including ICBMs, earlier in their
trajectories than is currently possible. We are focusing SM-3 Block IIB
design on enhancements over existing SM-3 variants including increasing
interceptor velocity, improving the ability of the kill vehicle to
maneuver, and increasing the range at which the kill vehicle seeker can
discern the threat. The SM-3 Block IIB will leverage existing and
planned Aegis Weapon System and Mk41 Vertical Launching System
interfaces. Today, we are executing a two-pronged strategy to achieve
capability goals and plan for the product development phase. In early
April, MDA awarded three Concept Definition and Program Planning
contracts (Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon). Each contractor will
conduct missile trade studies to define SM-3 Block IIB concepts,
challenges, and associated program plans. Concept definition products
will include detailed performance characterizations, technology
maturity assessments, and demonstration of key technologies. In
addition, we are executing technology risk reduction efforts to mature
key interceptor components that increase performance and potentially
reduce cost. Specifically, we are investing now with multiple vendors
in kill vehicle divert and attitude control systems, upper stage
propulsion, advanced seekers, and lighter weight structures and
materials to reduce inert mass.
Mr. Turner. The SM-3 Block IIA interceptor also requires the
maturation of key technologies. An additional $19 million was provided
in the FY12 budget to do this, but no additional funds were added to
the FYDP. Are you confident that the funds in the FYDP are sufficient
to complete development and start testing and production of the SM-3
Block IIA interceptor? Please provide any fact-of life revisions to the
FYDP funding profile and schedule, including changes in any milestones,
since the release of the FY12 budget request.
General O'Reilly. The funds requested in the FYDP for the SM-3
Block IIA missile are sufficient to complete development and start
testing and production. The SM-3 Block IIA development plan is
currently under review to determine the lowest risk development
approach to achieve a 2018 deployment. While the overall development
timeline remains the same, the sequencing and timelines associated with
flight testing in 2015-2017 may be adjusted based on results of ground
and early testing in 2014 and 2015. Production plans remain as
requested in PB12.
Mr. Turner. Former MDA Executive Director, Mr. David Altwegg, said
there is a ``big-time quality problem'' and ``a lack of attention to
detail'' across the board for systems delivered to MDA. Recent examples
include the air-launched target intended for a THAAD intercept test and
the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) on the ground-based interceptor
(GBI). Is MDA considering changes to its contracts to create stronger
defect or quality control clauses and increase contractor liability for
poor performance?
General O'Reilly. MDA is currently developing a defect clause to
increase contractor liability for poor performance. MDA is looking at
the fee and the profit that we are providing our contractors and
evaluating our ability to go beyond the scope that we currently have
defined in our award fees for quality control and extending it to a
much greater pool of award fee money, to include even past awarded
money. This will enable the government to be compensated for egregious
errors in quality control.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. Do you think the ICBM threat from Iran and North Korea
is developing more quickly than anticipated and do you think the
current hedging policy is adequate to respond to the threat to our
homeland and the threat to our deployed troops and allies, and why?
Dr. Roberts. Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran continue
to develop long-range missiles that could threaten the United States.
Although there is some uncertainty about when and how this type of ICBM
threat to the U.S. homeland will mature, the United States already
possesses a capacity to counter the projected ICBM threats from these
States.
In order to maintain this advantageous position, the Administration
is taking several steps to maintain and improve the protection of the
homeland from the potential ICBM threat posed by Iran and North Korea.
These steps include the continued procurement of ground-based
interceptors (GBIs); the procurement and deployment of additional
sensors; and upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications (C2BMC) system.
In addition to these improvements, the United States must also be
well hedged against the possibility of rapid threat developments or
delays in U.S. technological advances. The Administration has already
taken the following decisions to strengthen the U.S. hedge posture:
The construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely,
Alaska, including a 14-silo configuration to accommodate a contingency
deployment of eight additional GBIs, if needed;
Six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely are being
mothballed instead of decommissioned, allowing their return to service
within two years, if necessary; and
The development and assessment of a two-stage GBI, which
will continue to preserve future deployment options.
The Administration is considering additional steps to strengthen
the U.S. hedge posture. We are studying threat developments, future
capabilities, and deployment options for a range of scenarios. In
addition, we are evaluating the deployment timelines associated with
fielding additional capabilities, with an eye to enabling rapid
responses to triggering events. Our objective is to enable aggregate
improvements that increase probability of kill, raid capacity, and
battle space. This work involves a significant amount of classified
information from both the Intelligence Community and the system
developers. We have committed to brief the Committee on the results of
this work in a classified setting once it is complete.
Ms. Sanchez. Preserving strategic stability with Russia and China
is important as we defend ourselves against the threats posed by the
nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea. Are there any plans to engage
China? What are the risks of not engaging Russia and China?
Dr. Roberts. It is important to engage Russia and China on
strategic issues, including missile defense, to further our
understanding, develop trust, and avoid misunderstandings that can lead
to dangerous miscalculations.
The Administration is committed to substantive and sustained
dialogue with China, with the goals of enhancing confidence, improving
transparency, and reducing mistrust on strategic security issues.
We are pursuing a broad agenda with Russia focused on shared early
warning of missile launches, technical cooperation, and even
operational cooperation. Cooperation with Russia could offer some
important tangible benefits for the United States--and also Russia.
Cooperation is also the best means for Russia to gain an understanding
of our ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans and programs in order to
build confidence that our European missile defenses neither target
Russia, nor pose a threat to Russia's strategic forces.
As we pursue missile defense discussions with Russia and China, the
Administration will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on
U.S. ballistic missile defenses.
Ms. Sanchez. Could you outline what savings were derived from
efficiencies? Have these reductions increased the risk for any program
or impacted your ability to respond to requirements?
Dr. Roberts. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) did not have any
program adjustments; these were efficiencies to purchase same program
scope with fewer dollars. The efficiencies were generated from changes
with respect to manufacturing process efficiencies, savings through
competition of major contracts and consolidation of tests to achieve
objectives with fewer events.
MDA implemented a more efficient approach to the Airborne Infrared
program to focus on development and integration of the sensor package
and software that would enable the capability.
Additionally, with a more efficient acquisition strategy, MDA was
able to revise the cost of the AN/TPY-2 radars. MDA also reduced the
Aegis 5.1 Aegis Weapons System cost by aligning the schedule to the
Navy's Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 16 effort.
Ms. Sanchez. The March 2011 GAO report on missile defense notes
that after 14 years of development and $5 billion, the Airborne Laser
achieved its first successful short-range intercept in February 2010,
though a second intercept during that test did not occur due to the
laser shutting down prematurely. Could you outline the challenges
stemming from the second part of this February 2010 test and the
subsequent failed tests in September and October 2010, and explain what
has delayed the March 2010 test? Should we remain optimistic about this
program?
Dr. Roberts. In February 2010, the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB)
successfully shot down a threat-representative short-range ballistic
missile; however, the second intercept during this same flight did not
end in destruction of the missile. The ALTB successfully engaged the
missile, a Terrier Black Brant, but the safety abort system functioned
as designed and shut down the laser early upon detecting stray light in
its internal sensors. Chemical contamination within the laser caused
this stray light. Although destruction of the second target did not
occur, numerous other test objectives were accomplished for this
mission: engaging multiple targets in the same mission; delivering a
high-energy laser (HEL) beam to the boosted target; and demonstrating
acquisition, track, and pointing of high- and low-power lasers.
During testing in September/October 2010, the ALTB experienced two
additional technical problems that resulted in unsuccessful
engagements. In the first mission, a software issue in the beam-control
system steered the high-energy laser slightly off center. The ALTB
safety abort system worked as designed, detected this shift, and shut
down the laser. The second technical problem was a micro-switch failure
in a laser subsystem, which prevented a successful mission test. The
laser incorrectly reported it was not ready, and a safety-default
aborted the engagement. The failure investigation determined the cause
to be a single micro-switch on an iodine valve that incorrectly
reported a closed-valve condition. Both technical problems have been
corrected.
As a prototype, non-operational test bed, the ALTB incorporates
cutting-edge technology and systems that can be challenging to maintain
and operate. The program upholds stringent
Go/No-Go criteria that ensure air and ground crew safety and
minimize failed launch attempts. Meeting these criteria, coupled with
range availability and weather, delayed the March 2011 test.
The ALTB employs and incorporates highly advanced technologies and
is credited with numerous groundbreaking directed energy capability
demonstrations. These activities are carried out according to the
highest safety standards to ensure that a catastrophic mishap does not
occur. As such, some delays are to be expected. However, the ALTB
continues to collect Science and Technology data in accordance with a
plan developed by the Department of Defense to support the development
of future airborne ballistic missile defense systems. The Department
annually evaluates the contribution of ALTB to the development of
directed-energy technologies as part of the annual budget development
process.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you think the ICBM threat from Iran and North Korea
is developing more quickly than anticipated and do you think the
current hedging policy is adequate to respond to the threat to our
homeland and the threat to our deployed troops and allies, and why?
General O'Reilly. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files].
Ms. Sanchez. After two GMD flight test failures in a row, why
should we have confidence that the GMD system can defend the United
States?
General O'Reilly. There are two versions of the GMD interceptor.
The two most recent flight test failures involved a new version of the
GMD EKV, called the Capability Enhancement II (CEII) EKV.
Today there are 20 operational Capability Enhancement I (CEI) EKVs
in the emplaced fleet. In its last three flight tests, the CEI has
intercepted three times in a row. These CEI flight tests were conducted
against appropriate threat scenarios.
Based on current intelligence, the CEI fleet of interceptors are
sufficient while MDA addresses and corrects the deficiencies associated
with the CEII EKVs.
Ms. Sanchez. How do you balance the need for ensuring an
operationally effective missile defense with the pressure to deploy
missile defense systems quickly? Will scheduling and deployment
pressures lead to short-cuts in testing?
General O'Reilly. The Missile Defense Agency follows a
comprehensive, systems engineering approach in developing and testing
ballistic missile defense capabilities.
The Agency remains committed to the testing processes and program
decisions based on rigorous engineering analysis of test data, as
described in the Integrated Master Test Plan jointly developed by MDA,
Operational Test Agency and DOT&E. The specific data required for
comprehensive testing of the BMDS has been identified and is updated in
our Integrated Master Test Plan every six months to ensure that
scheduling and deployment pressures will not lead to shortcuts in
testing.
Ms. Sanchez. How many successful operationally realistic GMD tests
have we had? (How many included countermeasures and have we designed a
test scenario that envisioned more than one incoming ICBM?)
General O'Reilly. We have conducted three successful operationally
realistic GMD intercept tests against first generation ICBMs, Flight
Test Ground-based Interceptor (FTG)-02, FTG-03a, FTG-05. On FTG-02 and
FTG-03a, there were no countermeasures, and on FTG-05, the planned
countermeasures did not deploy. All future GMD intercept tests include
countermeasures of increasing complexity. FTG-06b in FY13 is the next
planned intercept with countermeasures.
The Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) currently plans for 2
operational tests, Flight Test Operational (FTO)-02 and -03. FTO-03
will demonstrate a multiple simultaneous engagement (MSE) of one ICBM
threat with countermeasures and one IRBM threat with countermeasures.
Ms. Sanchez. What are you doing to ensure that if poor performance
by the contractor results in test failures, cost liability is
shouldered by the contractor, not MDA? Are you ensuring that this
clause is improved and rectified in future contracts?
General O'Reilly. MDA is currently developing a defect clause to
increase contractor liability for poor performance. MDA is looking at
the fee and the profit that we are providing our contractors and
evaluating our ability to go beyond the scope that we currently have
defined in our award fees for quality control and extending it to a
much greater pool of award fee money, to include even past awarded
money. This will enable the government to be compensated for egregious
errors in quality control.
Ms. Sanchez. Can you describe how the Integrated Master Test Plan
(IMTP) will ensure that we mature technologies based on operational
testing? What is the value of operational effectiveness for deployment?
General O'Reilly. The IMTP contains both developmental and
operational tests. Through the collaborative efforts of test designs,
test objectives (described as Critical Engagement Conditions (CEC) and
Empirical Measurement Events (EME)), tests are constructed and data is
gathered to determine a technology's maturity, system design
achievement, and to validate models. The data acquired through ground
and flight tests allows MDA, DOT&E, the OTAs, and Combatant Commanders
(COCOMs) to assess the system performance, effectiveness, and
suitability of the capabilities prior to making procurement or
deployment decisions. The current IMTP, v11.1 has a total of 73 CECs
and 61 EMEs that shape the design of flight and ground testing
programs; and inform system assessments and the maturity of
technologies. This IMTP also includes a series of element (ie: Aegis,
THAAD, etc) operational tests and BMDS system level operational tests
(ie: FTO-01) that the Operational Test Agencies use to formulate their
assessment of system maturity. The Operational Test Agencies are fully
engaged in the development, and execution of the IMTP and they, with
the Director, MDA, approve each version of the IMTP.
Operational effectiveness is defined as the overall degree of
mission accomplishment of a system when used by representative
personnel in the environment planned or expected for operational
employment of the system considering organization, doctrine, tactics,
survivability, vulnerability, and threat. The Operational Test Agencies
(OTA) use data collected from flight and ground testing to make a
statement of operational effectiveness after MDA determines that the
deploying system is functioning within its technical design
specifications. MDA bases its technical declaration upon a series of
hardware-in-the-loop ground tests (integrated and distributed),
operational flight tests, and a final system integration and check-out
event (SICO) upon deployment. The Services or Combatant Commanders use
both the technical declaration and operational effectiveness
assessments in their determinations to accept and deploy weapon
systems.
Ms. Sanchez. What is the cost of a GMD intercept test?
General O'Reilly. Each flight test is unique. The results and
findings from previous flight tests are reviewed and adjustments to
testing scenarios adopted as required. Overall, MDA builds on the
successes of each flight test, and future tests are designed to be more
complex. Following is a breakdown of MDA's most recent GM tests.
Ms. Sanchez. The current acquisition plans envision an inventory of
52 GBIs. This includes 30 deployed GBIs, 16 for tests, and 6 for
spares. Should you need additional GBIs for additional tests or other
requirements, when would this decision have to be made? How long will
the GBI production line remain warm? Would the costs necessarily
increase if we wait, and by how much?
General O'Reilly. The Department has the option of purchasing
additional GBIs on the upcoming GMD Development and Sustainment
Contract (DSC) to meet testing or operational requirements through 2016
without incurring a production break of our unique component suppliers.
The GBI supplier base will remain warm through 2016. First and second-
Tier suppliers will remain warm beyond that time through a combination
of new manufacturing and GBI upgrades. MDA does not anticipate a cost
increase beyond the current GM program plan for purchasing additional
GBIs if the decision is made prior to 2016.
Ms. Sanchez. Given the impacts of the continuing resolution, is the
FY12 budget request adequate?
General O'Reilly. The MDA budget for 2011 through 2015 is based on
the missile defense priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review (BMDR. MDA is in a position to execute planned PB11
activities.
Ms. Sanchez. Could you outline what savings were derived from
efficiencies? Have these reductions increased the risk for any program
or impacted your ability to respond to requirements?
General O'Reilly. MDA did not have any program adjustments; these
were efficiencies to purchase same program scope with fewer dollars.
The efficiencies were generated from changes with respect to
manufacturing process efficiencies, savings through competition of
major contracts and consolidation of tests to achieve objectives with
fewer events.
MDA implemented a more efficient approach to the Airborne Infrared
program to focus on development and integration of the sensor package
and software that would enable the capability. Additionally, with a
more efficient acquisition strategy, MDA was able to revise the cost of
the AN/TPY-2 radars. MDA also reduced the Aegis 5.1 Aegis Weapons
System cost by aligning the schedule to the Navy's Advanced Capability
Build (ACB) 16 effort.
Ms. Sanchez. What risk is there of a production gap between the end
of production of SM3-IA missiles and SM3-IB missiles?
General O'Reilly. FY11 Congressional funding actions have reduced
the risk of a production gap between the loss of the SM-3 Block IA
unique vendors and the start of the SM-3 Block IB production line. The
Missile Defense Agency intends to procure up to 30 additional SM-3
Block IA missiles in FY11 for delivery in FY13. An updated PB12 SM-3
Buy/Delivery Plan is attached. [See page 105.]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Sanchez. Are you confident that we will get assurances from the
Japanese that they can provide the capabilities and meet the production
timelines for manufacturing the SM3-IIA missile?
General O'Reilly. The U.S. and Japanese governments are engaged in
a series of discussions on SM-3 Blk-IIA production requirements. The
U.S. has made it clear we expect each side to meet the other's
production requirements; that position is understood by Japan. We
intend to continue these bilateral discussions with the expectation of
reaching agreement on a set of production principles later this year
that would form the basis of future formal government to government
production agreements.
Japanese industry is planning to meet future production demand. For
example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries made capital investment to
increase its capability to produce nosecones in its Komaki Plant.
Additional machinery can be easily procured to meet production
obligations. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Aerospace Takasago
Plant has excess floor space to build second and third stage rocket
motors that can be used to meet production requirements.
We are confident that these measures by the joint U.S.-Japan
government-industry teams will result in the ability to meet future
production timelines.
Ms. Sanchez. The March 2011 GAO report on missile defense notes
that after 14 years of development and $5 billion, the Airborne Laser
achieved its first successful short-range intercept in February 2010,
though a second intercept during that test did not occur due to the
laser shutting down prematurely. Could you outline the challenges
stemming from the second part of this February 2010 test and the
subsequent failed tests in September and October 2010, and explain what
has delayed the March 2010 test? Should we remain optimistic about this
program?
General O'Reilly. On February 3, 2010, the Airborne Laser Test Bed
(ALTB) successfully shot down a solid propellant Terrier Black Brant
(TBB). On February 11, 2010, the ALTB successfully shot down a threat-
representative liquid propellant ballistic missile. The ALTB
subsequently engaged an additional TBB on February 11, 2010, but the
safety abort system functioned as designed and shutdown the laser early
upon detecting stray light in its internal sensors. Chemical
contamination within the laser caused this stray light.
In September 2010, ALTB experienced two other technical issues that
resulted in unsuccessful engagements. In the first mission, a software
issue in the beam control system steered the high energy laser slightly
off center. The ALTB safety abort system worked as designed, detected
this shift and shut down the laser. A micro-switch failure in a laser
subsystem prevented a successful mission in October 2010. The laser
incorrectly reported it was not ready and a safety-default aborted the
engagement. The failure investigation determined the cause to be a
single micro-switch on an iodine valve that incorrectly reported a
closed-valve condition. Both issues have been corrected.
As a prototype, non-operational test bed, the ALTB incorporates
cutting-edge technology and systems that can be challenging to maintain
and operate. The program upholds stringent Go/No Go criteria that
ensure air and ground crew safety and minimize failed launch attempts.
Meeting these criteria, coupled with range availability and weather
delayed the March 2011 test.
The ALTB employs and incorporates highly advanced technologies and
is credited with numerous groundbreaking directed energy capability
demonstrations. For example, in the past 9 months, ALTB has had 14
successful non-intercept flight tests where unprecedented high energy
laser atmospheric propagation data has been collected to greatly
enhance our confidence in previously theoretical models and
simulations. One test verified that ALTB can deposit lethal energy of
more than twice the range previously demonstrated in the February 2010
shoot downs. These activities are carried out with the highest safety
standards to ensure that a catastrophic mishap does not occur. As such,
some delays are to be expected. However, ALTB continues to collect
Science and Technology data in accordance with a plan developed by the
Department of Defense to support the development of future airborne
ballistic missile defense systems. The Department annually evaluates
the contribution of ALTB to the development of directed energy
technologies as part of our annual budget development process.
Ms. Sanchez. The current acquisition plans envision an inventory of
52 GBIs. This includes 30 deployed GBIs, 16 for tests, and 6 for
spares. Should you need additional GBIs for additional tests or other
requirements, when would this decision have to be made? How long will
the GBI production line remain warm? Would the costs necessarily
increase if we wait, and by how much?
Mr. Ahern. The Department has the option of purchasing additional
GBIs on the upcoming GMD Development and Sustainment Contract (DSC),
expected to be awarded in November 2011, to meet testing or operational
requirements through 2016 without incurring a production break of our
unique component suppliers.
The GBI supplier base will remain warm through 2016. First and
second-Tier suppliers will remain warm beyond that time through a
combination of new manufacturing and GBI upgrades.
We do not anticipate a cost increase beyond the current GM program
plan for purchasing additional GBIs if the decision is made prior to
2016.
Ms. Sanchez. Could you outline what savings were derived from
efficiencies? Have these reductions increased the risk for any program
or impacted your ability to respond to requirements?
Mr. Ahern. The efficiencies savings ($332.3 million in Fiscal Year
2012) were generated as a result of a variety of actions aimed at
improving performance, such as freezing civilian manpower, changes with
respect to manufacturing processes, savings through competition of
major contracts, and consolidation of testing events to achieve
multiple objectives with fewer events. The MDA did not have any program
adjustments that would impact risk levels; these were efficiencies that
will allow the purchase of the same program scope with fewer dollars.
Ms. Sanchez. How do you balance the need for ensuring an
operationally effective missile defense with the pressure to deploy
missile defense systems quickly? Will scheduling and deployment
pressures lead to short-cuts in testing?
Dr. Gilmore. Balancing adequate testing with the pressures of
operational need is continually a challenge. This is especially true
with the highly complex Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and its
key interceptor elements: Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD), Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD), and Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD). The decision either to field early or to first perform
adequate testing involves evaluation of many competing and complex
risks. GMD was fielded early, Aegis BMD initial capability was fielded
after a substantial number of flight tests, including an operational
evaluation by the Navy, and THAAD will undergo an initial operational
test and evaluation later this year to support a full-rate production
decision. Dedicated testing of follow-on Aegis BMD capability
supporting the President's Phased Adaptive Approach for the Defense of
Europe is defined in the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) that
General O'Reilly and I approved recently. The first such test was
conducted last month and was successful. The IMTP includes dedicated
operational testing. If successfully executed, the IMTP will provide
information sufficient to support rigorous quantitative estimates of
BMDS performance.
My office will continue to work closely with the MDA, the Combatant
Commands, and the BMDS Operational Test Team. The default fielding
strategy is to assure that system capabilities are adequately
demonstrated by realistic testing prior to transitioning those systems
to the acquiring services. The Department's leadership continually
evaluates the information available from testing of BMDS performance as
it decides how to respond to the evolving threat.
Ms. Sanchez. Dr. Gilmore, you stated in your written testimony that
the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) is, for the most part, ``success
oriented'' and ``does not incorporate explicitly repeat, or backup,
tests that could be used to compensate for unsuccessful tests.''
The GMD test track record counts 7 failures out of 15 tests since
1999. This is difficult technology. Do you think there is enough
flexibility in the plan to account for potential future failures? Does
it adequately minimize cost and schedule delays that would result from
potential future failed or canceled tests?
Dr. Gilmore. In the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), each test
is designed to collect data for verification, validation and
accreditation of models and simulations. These data elements are
defined as either Critical Engagement Conditions (CECs) or Empirical
Measurement Events (EMEs). The IMTP is revised every six months. When a
test failure occurs, preventing collection of planned CECs/EMEs, the
IMTP revision process, in which my office participates, reviews the
current test program for opportunities to collect the CECs/EMEs using
other tests or to add new tests, as necessary. This was the case with
the recent failure during FTG-06. FTG-06a was planned and incorporated
in a revised IMTP. When FTG-06a failed, the GMD flight test program was
revised again in the IMTP General O'Reilly and I recently approved.
No test plan as complex as the IMTP has ever been executed exactly
as planned. There are always unforeseen system responses and failures
that occur and require adjustments to the test plan. If such problems
do not arise, it likely means that the testing being conducted is not
robust. The delays in collecting data caused by test failures could
vary from several months to more than one year depending upon many
details including the BMDS element involved in the test and the targets
used in the test. Costs and schedule delays are accommodated in part by
the six-month revision process currently used to update the IMTP.
Ms. Sanchez. How many successful operationally realistic GMD tests
have we had? (How many included countermeasures and have we designed a
test scenario that envisioned more than one incoming ICBM?)
Dr. Gilmore. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and my office jointly
published operational realism flight test criteria in 2005 as required
by the Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act. There are
nine criteria: Operationally-Representative Interceptor; Threat-
Representative Target; Complex Countermeasures; Operational Sensor(s);
Operational Fire Control Software; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(TTPs); Warfighter Participation; Unannounced Target Launch; and End-
to-End Test.
Every Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) flight test since then
has demonstrated at least some of the nine operational realism
criteria. No test has yet demonstrated all nine criteria. FTG-05,
conducted in December 2008, was the most operationally realistic test
of GMD conducted to date, demonstrating at least partial operational
realism for eight of the nine criteria. Although simple countermeasures
were planned for FTG-05, a malfunction prevented deployment. The
targets for both FTG-06 and FTG-06a successfully deployed simple
countermeasures but the GMD kill vehicles malfunctioned before they
could complete their intercepts in the countermeasures environments.
No GMD tests against a true intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) have yet been conducted. A multiple simultaneous engagement of
two ICBM targets by two GMD interceptors launched from Vandenberg AFB,
California, is currently under consideration for inclusion in the third
operational flight test, FTO-03, included in the Integrated Master Test
Plan that General O'Reilly and I recently approved.
Ms. Sanchez. Can you describe how the Integrated Master Test Plan
(IMTP) will ensure that we mature technologies based on operational
testing? What is the value of operational effectiveness for deployment?
Dr. Gilmore. Operational test and evaluation will provide the
Combatant Commanders with definitive understanding of the warfighting
capabilities the BMDS provides, as well as the capabilities it does not
provide. The test program defined in the IMTP was constructed so as to
collect Verification, Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A) data for the
models and simulations that may be used to support evaluations of the
BMDS, while also demonstrating progressive capability of the BMDS and
its associated elements through increasingly complex testing. Nearly
every flight test has both developmental and operational test
objectives. There are also three designated operational flight tests of
the BMDS and an initial operational test and evaluation of the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The IMTP is a rigorous plan
for obtaining the test information needed to assess element and BMDS
performance quantitatively. If the Missile Defense Agency can execute
the IMTP, the data needed to validate models and perform rigorous
quantitative assessments will become available.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans for and my office assesses
each test against the operational realism criteria developed and
submitted to Congress in 2005. I will ensure appropriate operational
testing is accomplished in compliance with Title 10 USC. This testing
is scheduled for THAAD later this year and was accomplished by the Navy
for the initial Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense capability. Ultimately,
the number of purely operational tests conducted will depend upon a
number of considerations including: capability demonstrated in the
developmental test programs; estimated or demonstrated performance and
reliability of the various missile components; experience with other
similar missile systems; and availability of operational assets for
testing or for replacement on operational status if missiles are
expended during reliability testing. In the case of the BMDS, the
entire test program--developmental testing, combined developmental/
operational testing, and operational testing--will be required and used
to determine operational effectiveness, suitability and survivability.
Ms. Sanchez. The March 2011 GAO report on missile defense notes
that after 14 years of development and $5 billion, the Airborne Laser
achieved its first successful short-range intercept in February 2010,
though a second intercept during that test did not occur due to the
laser shutting down prematurely. Could you outline the challenges
stemming from the second part of this February 2010 test and the
subsequent failed tests in September and October 2010, and explain what
has delayed the March 2010 test? Should we remain optimistic about this
program?
Dr. Gilmore. The problems incurred during Airborne Laser Test Bed
(ALTB) flight tests subsequent to the February 2010 lethality
demonstration demonstrate the challenge of developing and fielding a
reliable system as complex as the ALTB. Not only must the ALTB
demonstrate lethality under realistic conditions and threat scenarios,
it must also demonstrate that it can be depended upon to operate
successfully when required. I discuss many of these issues in my
Assessment of Operational Effectiveness, Suitability, and Survivability
of the Airborne Laser which I submitted to Congress in January 2010.
Currently, the ALTB is not an operational system and a substantial
amount of additional work and funding would be required to make it an
operational system.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Space is an integral part of the Missile Defense
Agency, we have read much in the press and media over the past several
months regarding the performance and success being demonstrated by the
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites. Can you
discuss the specifics of what these two satellites have accomplished to
date?
General O'Reilly. The two Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS) Demonstrator satellites were launched in September 2009. From
September 2009 to January 2011, the satellites accomplished their Early
on Orbit Test (EOT) period, involving system functionality testing and
payload/subsystem initialization and calibration activities.
During the EOT period, the satellites also supported seven BMDS
flight tests demonstrating the ability to track missiles with both the
acquisition and track sensors, conduct an acquisition sensor to track
sensor handover of a missile in flight, track aircraft in afterburner,
and track resident space objects (satellites). The calibration and
system functionality test results showed the satellites are performing
at or better than system specifications.
Since the completion of EOT, STSS activity has focused on expanding
the performance envelope of the BMDS system and reducing risk for the
follow-on operational capability, the Precision Tracking Space System
(PTSS). In March 2011 during FTM-16, STSS demonstrated for the first
time, space based sensor tracking of a missile flight from start to
finish. STSS observed the target missile from launch through reentry
and collected valuable data for Aegis BMD, PTSS and the Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3), Block IIB programs. One week later, in FTX-16, STSS
demonstrated stereo tracking from birth to death, again collecting
valuable data. These tests serve to reduce risk for the Aegis Launch on
Remote and Aegis Engage on Remote campaigns. These campaigns will
demonstrate the functionality of the BMDS space layer integrated with
the Aegis weapons system and extend Aegis coverage beyond the ship
based radar envelope.
In April 2011, STSS participated in a flight test (FTM-15). This
associated test demonstrated the functions required of an operational
BMDS space layer system. At the time of the target launch, both STSS
satellites (SV1 and SV2) were out of view over the horizon. The STSS
ground system received a cue from the Enterprise Sensors Lab formed
from a TPY-2 radar track of the outbound target via C2BMC X-Lab. This
emulates PTSS receiving a cue from SBIRS GEO. This cue was passed via
the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) to STSS space vehicle 2
(SV2) which processed the cue and acquired and tracked the target. When
SV1 was able to view the target, the cue was passed through SV2 to SV1
across the STSS communication crosslink and SV1 acquired and tracked
the target. SV1 remained out of AFSCN ground contact for the entire
duration of the test, and SV1 track information was passed back through
SV2 to the ground mission data processor which formed a stereo track of
the target. This stereo track was used to cue a simulated interceptor
launch from an Aegis system simulator prior to the target missile
entering the Aegis radar system coverage (Launch on Remote). At the
time of the actual intercept, SV2 was out of view, and SV1 observed the
successful intercept.
Mr. Lamborn. The FY12 budget request includes funds for a program
called Precision Tracking Space System or PTSS. It appears that the MDA
is moving forward with yet another clean sheet design for the Space
Layer within the Ballistic Missile Defense System and doing so without
fully completing the STSS tests and Knowledge Points. Can you explain
the rational for this approach, and why the need to have such a system
initiated via government labs and not within industry?
General O'Reilly. The Space Tracking and Surveillance System--
Demonstration (STSS-D) completed all the tests necessary to demonstrate
System Stereo Track Fully Calibrated Performance Knowledge Point (KP)
and satisfy design requirements for PTSS.
The STSS-D design uses a Space-Based Infrared System, Low Earth
Orbit (SBIRS-Low) heritage gimbaled sensor design. The PTSS
incorporates a Northern Hemisphere staring sensor which is far less
complex, takes advantage of other Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS) functionality, and is expected to be more cost effective than
the STSS-D gimbaled sensor.
STSS-D demonstrated the first ever cradle-to-grave tracking from
space in a series of flight tests (FTX-16, FTM-15 and FTM-16). These
tests exercised the entire BMDS kill chain for the first time. The
STSS-D also demonstrated launch-on and engage-on track accuracy in
flight tests FTX-16 and FTM-15. STSS-D is a pathfinder for how PTSS
will close the fire control loop with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
from space. PTSS will take advantage of technical and design lessons
learned from the STSS-D.
PTSS is to be developed as an integrated part of the BMDS. This
will require extensive participation of all elements as the preliminary
design is developed. PTSS development phase will have involvement of
Federally Funded Research Laboratories (Johns Hopkins Applied Physics
Laboratory, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Naval Research Laboratory, Space
Dynamics Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory); dedicated Service
Cells of the Air Force and Navy; and an industry-partnered Integrated
System Engineering Team (Ball Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin,
Northrop Grumman, Orbital Sciences and Raytheon). These PTSS
stakeholders will develop a non-proprietary, government-owned design
and intellectual property to enable full and open competition for
industry to produce the PTSS.
Mr. Lamborn. The FY12 budget request includes funds for a program
called Precision Tracking Space System or PTSS. It appears that the MDA
is moving forward with yet another clean sheet design for the Space
Layer within the Ballistic Missile Defense System and doing so without
fully completing the STSS tests and Knowledge Points. Can you explain
the rational for this approach, and why the need to have such a system
initiated via government labs and not within industry?
Mr. Ahern. The Space Tracking and Surveillance System--
Demonstration (STSS-D) completed all the tests necessary to demonstrate
System Stereo Track Fully Calibrated Performance Knowledge Point (KP)
and satisfy design requirements for PTSS.
The STSS-D design uses a Space-Based Infrared System, Low Earth
Orbit (SBIRS-Low) heritage gimbaled sensor design. The PTSS
incorporates a Northern Hemisphere staring sensor which is far less
complex, takes advantage of other Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS) functionality, and is expected to be more cost effective than
the STSS-D gimbaled sensor.
STSS-D demonstrated the first ever cradle-to-grave tracking from
space in a series of flight tests (FTX-16, FTM-15 and FTM-16). These
tests exercised the entire BMDS kill chain for the first time. The
STSS-D also demonstrated launch-on and engage-on track accuracy in
flight tests FTX-16 and FTM-15. STSS-D is a pathfinder for how PTSS
will close the fire control loop with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
from space. PTSS will take advantage of technical and design lessons
learned from the STSS-D.
PTSS is to be developed as an integrated part of the BMDS. This
will require extensive participation of all elements as the preliminary
design is developed. PTSS development phase will have involvement of
Federally Funded Research Laboratories (Johns Hopkins Applied Physics
Laboratory, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Naval Research Laboratory, Space
Dynamics Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory); dedicated Service
Cells of the Air Force and Navy; and an industry-partnered Integrated
System Engineering Team (Ball Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin,
Northrop Grumman, Orbital Sciences and Raytheon). These PTSS
stakeholders will develop a non-proprietary, government-owned design
and intellectual property to enable full and open competition for
industry to produce the PTSS.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. Last month, Director of National Intelligence Clapper
testified that Iran's long range ballistic missile program was more
advanced than previously estimated--with Iran perhaps having a missile
capable of reaching the USA in the 2015 to 2020 timeframe. The
Administration's decision in 2009 to adopt a Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA) for missile defense in Europe was based, in part, on an
assessment that Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles were
developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the longer-
range missile threat had been slower to develop than previously
estimated.
What trends in Iranian ballistic missile developments have you seen
over the last two years that might change this assessment? Has the
threat changed and to what degree?
Dr. Roberts. The Intelligence Community continues to assess and
evaluate Iranian progress toward achieving ICBM and nuclear
capabilities that could threaten the U.S. homeland.
A key factor in the decision to adopt the European Phased Adaptive
Approach was that although Iran and other regional actors have not yet
acquired or deployed ICBMs, the threat from shorter-range missiles has
developed very quickly. For example, Iran already has hundreds of
ballistic missiles that threaten its neighbors and U.S. forces, and it
is actively developing and testing ballistic missiles that can reach
beyond its neighbors and further into Europe. This capability poses a
clear and present danger to U.S. deployed forces, Allies, and partners.
Over the past two years, we have seen this trend continue.
It is important to remember that our current ballistic missile
defense posture already protects us from the potential emergence of an
Iranian ICBM threat. The initial long-range threat from Iran would
likely be ICBMs that are few in number. In order to maintain this
advantageous position, the Administration is taking several steps to
improve the protection of the homeland from the potential ICBM threat
posed by Iran and North Korea. These steps include the continued
procurement of ground-based interceptors (GBIs); the deployment of
additional sensors; and upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle
Management, and Communications system.
Improvements to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system
will better protect us against future ICBM threats, whether from Iran,
North Korea, or other regional actors.
Mr. Brooks. As discussed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a
hedging strategy would provide a robust defense of the U.S. homeland in
case the Iranian long-range threat comes earlier or the later models of
the SM-3 interceptor experience technical development problems. When
Dr. Miller testified before the subcommittee last month, he discussed
ongoing work within the Department to complete its hedging strategy. At
what point do you believe a decision would be necessary if a hedge is
to be employed and what criteria would be used to make such a decision?
Does the FY12 budget request fund continued development and test of the
two-stage ground-based interceptor (GBI)? Are other hedging options
beyond the two-stage GBI being considered? Can you describe those
options and the timeframes in which they may be available?
Dr. Roberts. The current ballistic missile defense posture for the
United States protects against ICBMs that might be deployed by States
like North Korea or Iran. Improvements to the existing sensors and
software, in addition to the procurement of additional ground-based
interceptors (GBIs) and radars, will continue this protection against
future ICBM threats from States like North Korea and Iran.
In addition to these improvements, the United States must also be
well hedged against the possibility of rapid threat developments or
delays in U.S. technological advances. The Administration has already
taken the following decisions to strengthen the U.S. hedge posture:
The construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely,
Alaska, including a 14-silo configuration to accommodate a contingency
deployment of eight additional GBIs, if needed;
Six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely are being
mothballed instead of decommissioned, allowing their return to service
within two years, if necessary; and
The development and assessment of a two-stage GBI, which
will continue to preserve future deployment options.
The Administration is considering additional steps to strengthen
the U.S. hedge posture. We are studying threat developments, future
capabilities, and deployment options for a range of scenarios. In
addition, we are evaluating the deployment timelines associated with
fielding additional capabilities, with an eye to enabling rapid
responses to triggering events. Our objective is to enable aggregate
improvements that increase probability of kill, raid capacity, and
battle space. This work involves a significant amount of classified
information from both the Intelligence Community and the system
developers. We have committed to brief the Committee on the results of
this work in a classified setting once it is complete.
Mr. Brooks. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for
Patriot in the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are
required by the Army, and when, to operate and sustain the legacy
Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of these funded in the FY12
request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade Patriot's
capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or
upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and
production?
Dr. Roberts. The U.S. Army can achieve some of the capabilities
that MEADS would provide using existing assets. Because air and missile
defense (AMD) systems are relatively few in number and high in demand,
the U.S. AMD portfolio is based on the concept of integrating and
fielding a diverse set of elements to provide expanded coverage against
a wide range of threats. Our first priority in AMD is the Phased
Adapted Approach (PAA) in Europe, which includes systems like THAAD,
TPY-2, and AEGIS to counter the ballistic missile threat. The portfolio
must also address threats in Southwest Asia and the Pacific with these
ballistic missile defense systems, as well as other air defense systems
such as Patriot and Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated
Netted Sensor (JLENS).
The United States is willing to accept some risk in our air defense
portfolio in the near term in order to increase investments in new
capabilities that our soldiers can use today to counter threats in
Forward Operating Bases in Afghanistan, such as capabilities to counter
rockets, artillery, and mortars (C-RAM). By fielding a diverse set of
systems, and integrating them, the United States is able to achieve
some of the capabilities using existing assets, such as 360- degree
coverage and extended range air defense, that MEADS is designed to
provide.
The U.S. Army has budgeted for fact-of-life upgrades to Patriot
units necessary to keep these systems viable and up-to-date. The U.S.
Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense will conduct a thorough
review of the air and missile defense portfolio as we do each year in
light of budgets, capability needs, and the program changes made in the
FY 2012 budget to ensure our programs are delivering what the
warfighter needs. In addition, we will evaluate the results of the
MEADS Proof of Concept to determine if MEADS elements could contribute
to the U.S. air and missile defense architectures.
Mr. Brooks. This committee has heard testimony that MEADS
technology will be ``harvested'' and ``put on the shelf'' for
integration into a future system or systems. What technologies can be
``harvested'' from MEADS for a future system(s)?
How much will it cost to integrate these harvested technologies
into a future system? Has a cost-benefit analysis been performed to
show that it save money and increase capability to harvest technology
for integration into Patriot or other systems versus completing and
fielding MEADS? If so, can you provide that analysis to the Committee?
If not, why not? And what did you base your decision to not procure
MEADS upon?
Dr. Roberts. The U.S. Army is developing plans to integrate sensor
and interceptor components from U.S. Army air and missile defense
systems like Patriot, JLENS, and Sentinel into the U.S. Army Integrated
Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) network. This effort, when complete and
fielded with the U.S. Army Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS),
will mitigate some risks to meeting the validated Patriot/MEADS
Combined Program requirements, and will allow the United States to
employ more flexible and effective air and missile defense task force
configurations. Given the decision to not procure MEADS, the U.S. Army
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will investigate
whether additional upgrades to enhance Patriot against evolving threats
are needed. In addition, the U.S. Army and OSD will evaluate
technologies demonstrated during the MEADS Proof of Concept effort to
determine if key elements like the lightweight launcher or the 360-
degree radars could be included in the evolving IAMD network to
mitigate shortfalls in the Patriot/MEADS requirement. Details on the
full scope of the Proof of Concept effort are being worked, but already
we can say the Proof of Concept will mature technologies related to the
delivery of: two lightweight launchers; two, 360-degree X-band fire
control radars; three tactical operations centers; one prototype 360-
degree UHF-band surveillance radar; ground testing; and two intercept
flight tests. Complete system design and performance documentation will
also be delivered to the participating nations. Beyond the demonstrated
hardware and design documentation, a number of advanced technologies
will be matured for harvesting under the Proof of Concept, including:
360-degree Patriot Missile Segment Enhancement engagement solution
logic and algorithms; X-band exciter design and performance data;
improved launcher electronics and near-vertical launch design/
performance data; power and cooling technologies for rotating phased-
array radars; techniques and algorithms for track fusion from multi-
spectral (UHF and X-band) sensors; advanced prognostic and diagnostics
logistics; and design for reduced personnel requirements.
Because the U.S. Army has chosen to integrate all U.S. Army air and
missile defense components via the Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Battle Command System (IBCS), the MEADS command and control element,
the Battle Management, Command, Control Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence (BMC4I), in development for the MEADS program, is now a
redundant capability for the United States. Although the United States
no longer needs to field a MEADS-unique command and control element,
the MEADS partner nations, Germany and Italy, still desire the BMC4I.
The U.S. Army and OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
assessed whether the MEADS BMC4I could meet the U.S. Army IAMD
requirements in August 2007 and found: ``Use of the MEADS Tactical
Operating Center (TOC) as an interim solution for IAMD would . . .
require significant investment in `U.S. only' software and hardware
that could not be carried over to the final IAMD configuration.''
Subsequent independent reviews of MEADS in 2008 and 2009 supported the
position that the MEADS BMC4I should not be procured and that the
United States should continue the move to integration of the range of
disparate sensor and shooter elements within the Army IAMD/IBCS
architecture.
The total U.S. cost commitment for the Design and Development (D &
D) program is $2.3B, of which the United States has funded $1.5B to
date; the remaining U.S. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) commitment,
which will enable the Proof of Concept, is $804M. It is important to
recognize the costs that the United States will avoid by its decision
not to produce MEADS and to agree with its partners to limit the
development to the Proof of Concept. The OSD CAPE estimates that an
additional $1.16B of U.S. funding would be required to complete the D&D
effort as originally contemplated. By restructuring to a Proof of
Concept, the United States avoids this additional cost, which is on top
of the U.S. MOU funding commitment of $804M already programmed for
MEADS. Moreover, an additional $800M would be required to complete
U.S.-unique national certification, operational testing requirements,
and integration into U.S. air and missile defense architectures.
Finally, roughly $1.2B that was programmed in the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) for MEADS procurement is no longer required.
Given the high costs, the United States cannot afford to purchase
MEADS and make required upgrades to Patriot concurrently over the next
two decades. The costs of completing MEADS development and procuring
MEADS to replace Patriot eventually would also require a significant
concurrent investment in Patriot sustainment and modernization over the
next two decades. Together, these costs are unaffordable in the current
DoD budget environment.
Mr. Brooks. In a recent Washington Times article, it was reported
that the Russian government is interested in acquiring our ``hit-to-
kill'' technology. In your opinion, what would be the impact of Russia
acquiring ``hit-to-kill'' technology?
In the event of such a technology transfer, are you confidant that
measures could be taken to ensure the technology is not proliferated to
foreign powers who may use it to defeat our current and future missile
defense systems?
Dr. Roberts. There has been no discussion of sharing hit-to-kill
technology with Russia, and there is no intention to do so.
We are keenly aware of the risks of sharing sensitive U.S.
technology and information. To safeguard this information, we are
working to conclude a Defense Technology Cooperation (DTC) Agreement
with Russia. This agreement would provide the legal framework for
undertaking cooperative efforts, and would contain annexes that address
the sharing of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) as well as
Classified Information. But this on its own would not constitute
authorization to provide Classified Information to Russia. Any exchange
of Classified Information with Russia would still be subject to an
extensive review process under U.S. National Disclosure Policy, as is
the case with other partners.
Mr. Brooks. Last month, Director of National Intelligence Clapper
testified that Iran's long range ballistic missile program was more
advanced than previously estimated--with Iran perhaps having a missile
capable of reaching the USA in the 2015 to 2020 timeframe. The
Administration's decision in 2009 to adopt a Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA) for missile defense in Europe was based, in part, on an
assessment that Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles were
developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the longer-
range missile threat had been slower to develop than previously
estimated.
What trends in Iranian ballistic missile developments have you seen
over the last two years that might change this assessment? Has the
threat changed and to what degree?
General O'Reilly. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files].
Mr. Brooks. As discussed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a
hedging strategy would provide a robust defense of the U.S. homeland in
case the Iranian long-range threat comes earlier or the later models of
the SM-3 interceptor experience technical development problems. When
Dr. Miller testified before the subcommittee last month, he discussed
ongoing work within the Department to complete its hedging strategy.
At what point do you believe a decision would be necessary if a
hedge is to be employed and what criteria would be used to make such a
decision? Does the FY12 budget request fund continued development and
test of the two-stage ground-based interceptor (GBI)? Are other hedging
options beyond the two-stage GBI being considered? Can you describe
those options and the timeframes in which they may be available?
General O'Reilly. Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United
States against a medium ICBM raid size launched from current regional
threats. The FY12 budget funds continued development and test of the
two-stage GBI as we prepare for an intercept mission in 2014.
Completing GMD missile field 2 with 8 spare silos and placing missile
field 1 in a mode where its 6 additional silos can be hardened and made
operational within two years are two examples of developing greater
homeland defense capability if a credible ICBM threat emerges from Iran
before 2020.
As Dr. Roberts stated in his testimony, the Defense Department is
reviewing what more needs to be done to ensure the hedge posture is
sufficient to deal with the possible threat developments in the time
frame before 2020 and what are the intelligence data required to employ
a hedge. And the Department is committed to bringing that work forward
as soon as the Secretary is satisfied that it is complete.
Mr. Brooks. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for
Patriot in the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are
required by the Army, and when, to operate and sustain the legacy
Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of these funded in the FY12
request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade Patriot's
capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or
upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and
production?
General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to Army's
senior leadership on questions pertaining to costs associated with this
program.
Mr. Brooks. This committee has heard testimony that MEADS
technology will be ``harvested'' and ``put on the shelf'' for
integration into a future system or systems. What technologies can be
``harvested'' from MEADS for a future system(s)?
How much will it cost to integrate these harvested technologies
into a future system? Has a cost-benefit analysis been performed to
show that it save money and increase capability to harvest technology
for integration into Patriot or other systems versus completing and
fielding MEADS? If so, can you provide that analysis to the Committee?
If not, why not? And what did you base your decision to not procure
MEADS upon?
General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to Army's
senior leadership on questions pertaining to cost associated with this
program.
Mr. Brooks. In a recent Washington Times article, it was reported
that the Russian government is interested in acquiring our ``hit-to-
kill'' technology. In your opinion, what would be the impact of Russia
acquiring ``hit-to-kill'' technology?
In the event of such a technology transfer, are you confidant that
measures could be taken to ensure the technology is not proliferated to
foreign powers who may use it to defeat our current and future missile
defense systems?
General O'Reilly. The US government has not offered to share `hit-
to-kill' technology with the Russian Federation. More broadly, in
accordance with U.S. National Disclosure Policy, decisions to disclose
U.S. classified military information to a foreign government or
international organization are based on a determination that the
recipient has both the capability and intent to protect the information
equivalent to that of the U.S. Government.
Mr. Brooks. Last month, Director of National Intelligence Clapper
testified that Iran's long range ballistic missile program was more
advanced than previously estimated--with Iran perhaps having a missile
capable of reaching the USA in the 2015 to 2020 timeframe. The
Administration's decision in 2009 to adopt a Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA) for missile defense in Europe was based, in part, on an
assessment that Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles were
developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the longer-
range missile threat had been slower to develop than previously
estimated.
What trends in Iranian ballistic missile developments have you seen
over the last two years that might change this assessment? Has the
threat changed and to what degree?
Mr. Ahern. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files].
Mr. Brooks. As discussed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a
hedging strategy would provide a robust defense of the U.S. homeland in
case the Iranian long-range threat comes earlier or the later models of
the SM-3 interceptor experience technical development problems. When
Dr. Miller testified before the subcommittee last month, he discussed
ongoing work within the Department to complete its hedging strategy.
At what point do you believe a decision would be necessary if a
hedge is to be employed and what criteria would be used to make such a
decision? Does the FY12 budget request fund continued development and
test of the two-stage ground-based interceptor (GBI)? Are other hedging
options beyond the two-stage GBI being considered? Can you describe
those options and the timeframes in which they may be available?
Mr. Ahern. The current ballistic missile defense posture for the
United States protects against intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) that might be deployed by States like North Korea or Iran.
Improvements to the existing sensors and software, in addition to the
procurement of additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and radars,
will continue this protection against future ICBM threats from States
like North Korea and Iran. The timing and criteria for decisions on
hedge strategy changes will depend on development of the threat. Should
a significant departure from the current hedge strategy be required,
the details and timing would be briefed to Congress in a classified
setting.
Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a
medium ICBM raid size launched from current regional threats. The FY12
budget funds will continue development and test of the two-stage GBI as
we prepare for an intercept mission in 2014. Completing GMD missile
field 2 with 8 spare silos and placing missile field 1 in a mode where
its 6 additional silos can be hardened and made operational within two
years are two examples of developing greater homeland defense
capability should a credible ICBM threat emerges from Iran before 2020.
The Administration is considering additional steps to strengthen
the U.S. hedge posture. We are studying threat developments, future
capabilities, and deployment options for a range of scenarios. In
addition, we are evaluating the deployment timelines associated with
fielding additional capabilities, in order to enable rapid responses to
triggering events. Our objective is to enable aggregate improvements
that increase probability of kill, raid capacity, and battle space.
This work involves a significant amount of classified information from
both the Intelligence Community and the system developers. We have
committed to brief the Committee on the results of this work in a
classified setting once it is complete.
Mr. Brooks. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for
Patriot in the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are
required by the Army, and when, to operate and sustain the legacy
Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of these funded in the FY12
request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade Patriot's
capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or
upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and
production?
Mr. Ahern. The U.S. Army can achieve some of the capabilities that
MEADS would provide using existing assets. Because air and missile
defense (AMD) systems are relatively few in number and high in demand,
the U.S. AMD portfolio is based on the concept of integrating and
fielding a diverse set of elements to provide expanded coverage against
a wide range of threats.
The Army FY12 budget includes funding for fact-of-life upgrades to
Patriot units necessary to keep these systems viable and up-to-date.
The Army is preparing for their 2011 Capability Portfolio Review (CPR)
on Air and Missile Defense which will be conducted over the summer. The
Army CPR and subsequent Office of the Secretary of Defense-level
Program Issue team reviews will update and validate 2010 assessments on
Ballistic Missile Defense, Counter-Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars, and
Air Defense that led to program budget decisions, including the
decision to restructure development and not procure MEADS. The summer
reviews will also evaluate the impacts of the FY12 budget decisions and
investigate ways to mitigate any risks or long-term capability gaps
created by the MEADS decision, to include evaluation of MEADS sensor
and launcher elements. In addition, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in
conjunction with the Army is performing a military utility assessment
of MEADS elements (as well as other combinations of Army missile
defense capabilities) to evaluate the contribution of MEADS elements to
the nation's missile defense capabilities. Finally, the reviews will
assess other (non-Army or MDA) sensor development efforts within the
Department where potential for leveraging the MEADS radars exists. One
outcome will be a DoD-level business case evaluation to determine if
harvested elements from MEADS provide cost-effective capability
enhancements in air surveillance and/or air and missile defense when
integrated into existing architectures. This business case evaluation
will include an assessment of the benefits of a competitive environment
for mobile, ground-based air and missile capability.
Mr. Brooks. This committee has heard testimony that MEADS
technology will be ``harvested'' and ``put on the shelf'' for
integration into a future system or systems. What technologies can be
``harvested'' from MEADS for a future system(s)?
How much will it cost to integrate these harvested technologies
into a future system? Has a cost-benefit analysis been performed to
show that it save money and increase capability to harvest technology
for integration into Patriot or other systems versus completing and
fielding MEADS? If so, can you provide that analysis to the Committee?
If not, why not? And what did you base your decision to not procure
MEADS upon?
Mr. Ahern. By pursuing the MEADS Proof of Concept, the U.S. gets
the opportunity to harvest technologies for future, and potentially
near-term integration into air and missile defense systems. Our
Partners have told us that they intend to continue with the program. By
honoring our MEADS commitment, we will be supporting our Partners in
building their air and missile defense capacity, which will allow NATO
to contribute more air and missile defense capabilities when needed,
easing the strain on our forces and freeing resources for other
priorities. Conversely, limiting the remaining funding for MEADS would
have serious negative effects on U.S. and Partner air and missile
defense capability.
Details on the full scope of the Proof of Concept effort are being
worked, but already we can say the Proof of Concept will mature
advanced air and missile defense technologies related to the delivery
of: 2 lightweight, near-vertical launchers, 2 rotating, 360-degree X-
band fire control radars, 3 mobile tactical operations centers, 1
prototype 360-degree UHF-band surveillance radar, verification ground
testing, and 2 intercept flight tests with the next-generation PAC-3
Missile Segment Enhancement missile. Complete system design and
performance documentation will also be delivered to the Nations. Beyond
the demonstrated hardware and design documentation, a number of
advanced technologies will be matured for harvesting under the Proof of
Concept. These include: 360-degree PATRIOT Missile Segment Enhancement
engagement solution logic and algorithms; X-band exciter design and
performance data; improved launcher electronics and near-vertical
launch design/performance data; power and cooling technologies for
rotating phased-array radars; techniques and algorithms for track
fusion from multi-spectral (UHF and X-band) sensors; advanced
prognostic and diagnostics logistics; and design for reduced personnel
requirements.
The Army is preparing for their 2011 Capability Portfolio Review
(CPR) on Air and Missile Defense which will be conducted over the
summer. The Army CPR and subsequent OSD-level Program Issue team
reviews will update and validate 2010 assessments on Ballistic Missile
Defense, Counter-Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars, and Air Defense that
led to program budget decisions, including the decision to restructure
development and not procure MEADS. The summer reviews will also
evaluate the impacts of the FY12 budget decisions and investigate ways
to mitigate any risks or long-term capability gaps created by the MEADS
decision, to include evaluation of MEADS sensor and launcher elements.
In addition, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in conjunction with the
Army is performing a military utility assessment of MEADS elements (as
well as other combinations of Army missile defense capabilities) to
evaluate the contribution of MEADS elements to the nation's missile
defense capabilities. Finally, the reviews will assess other (non-Army
or MDA) sensor development efforts within the Department where
potential for leveraging the MEADS radars exists. One outcome will be a
DoD-level business case evaluation to determine if harvested elements
from MEADS provide cost-effective capability enhancements in air
surveillance and/or air and missile defense when integrated into
existing architectures. This business case evaluation will include an
assessment of the benefits of a competitive environment for mobile,
ground-based air and missile capability.
The successful August 2010 MEADS Critical Design Review that the
MEADS rotating sensor elements are highly capable and that the mature
designs represent a significant advance in current capabilities. Based
on the maturity of MEADS system development efforts and completion of
the envisioned Proof of Concept efforts, the Department is confident
MEADS components will provide attractive options with respect to
fielding future DoD air and missile defense capabilities if
demonstration and testing is completed in the Proof of Concept. Those
MEADS elements of most interest to the U.S., the Fire Control and
Surveillance Radars, and the lightweight launcher, are very near the
end of the non-recurring engineering and development phase and ready
for demonstration (Proof of Concept) that would easily lead to low rate
initial production, additional testing, and fielding if a requirement
is generated from assessments described above.
MEADS is designed to provide continuous, medium-range 360-degree
air and missile defense coverage. This capability, a Joint Staff
validated requirement, is nonexistent in the U.S.'s land-based air
defense portfolio. The Department will seek innovative ways to leverage
the components developed under the MEADS program to meet this
requirement, without having to pay to replace the proven Patriot system
battalion-for-battalion. Such replacement would be cost prohibitive and
given advances in the Army's Integrated Battle Command System, with its
ability to integrate disparate components like radars, launchers, and
interceptors from a variety of vendors, it is no longer necessary. We
can now plan to modernize and augment our capabilities with next-
generation elements as needed. The MEADS high-performance X-band fire
control and UHF-band long-range surveillance and lightweight launcher
with Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3
MSE) missiles could provide that added capability at a significantly
reduced cost, adding continuous 360-degree coverage and longer-range
intercepts, while requiring reduced strategic lift, less personnel, and
more robust logistics.
In summary, there are four reasons why the U.S. believes refocusing
the MEADS program to a proof of concept and forgoing full production
was the right choice for all the MEADS partners: 1) As described above,
funding MEADS up to the agreed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) cost
ceiling enables partners to harvest technology from large investment to
date; 2) the U.S cannot afford to purchase MEADS and make required
upgrades to Patriot concurrently over the next two decades. The costs
of completing MEADS development and procuring MEADS to eventually
replace Patriot would also require a significant concurrent investment
in Patriot sustainment and modernization over the next two decades.
Together, these costs are unaffordable; 3) as described above, the U.S.
can achieve some of the capabilities that MEADS provides using existing
assets; 4) the U.S. remains concerned with the overall track record of
the program and the risks of moving to full scale production of a MEADS
system.
Mr. Brooks. In a recent Washington Times article, it was reported
that the Russian government is interested in acquiring our ``hit-to-
kill'' technology. In your opinion, what would be the impact of Russia
acquiring ``hit-to-kill'' technology?
In the event of such a technology transfer, are you confident that
measures could be taken to ensure the technology is not proliferated to
foreign powers who may use it to defeat our current and future missile
defense systems?
Mr. Ahern. The US government has not offered to share `hit-to-kill'
technology with the Russian Federation. More broadly, in accordance
with U.S. National Disclosure Policy, decisions to disclose U.S.
classified military information to a foreign government or
international organization are based on a determination that the
recipient has both the capability and intent to protect the information
equivalent to that of the U.S. Government.
Mr. Brooks. Last month, Director of National Intelligence Clapper
testified that Iran's long range ballistic missile program was more
advanced than previously estimated--with Iran perhaps having a missile
capable of reaching the USA in the 2015 to 2020 timeframe. The
Administration's decision in 2009 to adopt a Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA) for missile defense in Europe was based, in part, on an
assessment that Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles were
developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the longer-
range missile threat had been slower to develop than previously
estimated.
What trends in Iranian ballistic missile developments have you seen
over the last two years that might change this assessment? Has the
threat changed and to what degree?
Dr. Gilmore. My knowledge of recent trends in Iranian ballistic
missile developments is consistent with Director Clapper's assessment.
However, threat estimates and trends are best addressed by the
intelligence communities.
Mr. Brooks. As discussed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a
hedging strategy would provide a robust defense of the U.S. homeland in
case the Iranian long-range threat comes earlier or the later models of
the SM-3 interceptor experience technical development problems. When
Dr. Miller testified before the subcommittee last month, he discussed
ongoing work within the Department to complete its hedging strategy.
At what point do you believe a decision would be necessary if a
hedge is to be employed and what criteria would be used to make such a
decision? Does the FY12 budget request fund continued development and
test of the two-stage ground-based interceptor (GBI)? Are other hedging
options beyond the two-stage GBI being considered? Can you describe
those options and the timeframes in which they may be available?
Dr. Gilmore. The Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) that General
O'Reilly and I recently approved includes two intercept flight tests
using the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI), the first against
an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) target and the second
against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) target.
Each flight test will demonstrate the ability of the two-stage GBI
to boost the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) to a position from
which it can successfully complete an intercept of the IRBM or ICBM.
Once the EKV is separated from the two-stage GBI, final intercept and
kill performance is independent of the GBI used (two-stage or three-
stage) and is demonstrated on every Ground-based Midcourse Defense
flight test. Each time a three-stage GBI is tested, essentially all of
the hardware used in the two-stage GBI is also tested; only the
software to support the two-stage fly out performance is different.
Including operational testing, the IMTP contains 9 more tests of three-
stage GBIs through Fiscal Year 2021.
Hedging options to be pursued and associated decision criteria are
determined by the Secretary of Defense and by offices other than DOT&E.
Mr. Brooks. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for
Patriot in the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are
required by the Army, and when, to operate and sustain the legacy
Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of these funded in the FY12
request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade Patriot's
capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or
upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and
production?
Dr. Gilmore. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are conducting a Joint
Capabilities Mix Study to determine future requirements for air and
missile defense systems, including the Patriot system. Based upon the
study's recommendations and other considerations, the Department's
senior leadership will determine how best to proceed. Questions
regarding program costs are best directed to the USD(AT&L) and the
Director, CAPE.
Mr. Brooks. This committee has heard testimony that MEADS
technology will be ``harvested'' and ``put on the shelf'' for
integration into a future system or systems. What technologies can be
``harvested'' from MEADS for a future system(s)?
How much will it cost to integrate these harvested technologies
into a future system? Has a cost-benefit analysis been performed to
show that it save money and increase capability to harvest technology
for integration into Patriot or other systems versus completing and
fielding MEADS? If so, can you provide that analysis to the Committee?
If not, why not? And what did you base your decision to not procure
MEADS upon?
Dr. Gilmore. Please refer to my answer above. Once the required
capabilities are determined, it should be possible to develop a cost
estimate for developing and/or integrating them. Questions regarding
program costs and whether or not a cost-benefit analysis has been
conducted are best directed to the USD(AT&L). DOT&E has played no role
in decisions made regarding MEADS.
Mr. Brooks. In a recent Washington Times article, it was reported
that the Russian government is interested in acquiring our ``hit-to-
kill'' technology. In your opinion, what would be the impact of Russia
acquiring ``hit-to-kill'' technology?
In the event of such a technology transfer, are you confidant that
measures could be taken to ensure the technology is not proliferated to
foreign powers who may use it to defeat our current and future missile
defense systems?
Dr. Gilmore. Our ``hit-to-kill'' technologies are being developed
by the United States only as a defensive capability to counter
offensive ballistic missiles. Russian interest in this technology would
be of concern if that interest was rooted in acquiring a counter-
countermeasure capability to defeat our kill vehicles in flight.
Issues of non-proliferation are best addressed by the OUSD(Policy).
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
