[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-30]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS
FOR U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND,
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 30, 2011
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DUNCAN HUNTER, California LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado BILL OWENS, New York
TOM ROONEY, Florida JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia TIM RYAN, Ohio
CHRIS GIBSON, New York C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE HECK, Nevada KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 30, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense
Authorization Budget Requests for U.S. European Command, U.S.
Southern Command, and U.S. Northern Command.................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 30, 2011........................................ 39
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FOR
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Fraser, Gen. Douglas M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.. 5
Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command,
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe........................... 3
Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN, Commander, U.S. Northern
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command........... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Fraser, Gen. Douglas M....................................... 131
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 43
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 47
Stavridis, ADM James G....................................... 50
Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr.................................. 158
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 179
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 180
Mr. Franks................................................... 179
Mr. Larsen................................................... 177
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 177
Mr. Turner................................................... 179
Mr. West..................................................... 180
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 185
Ms. Giffords................................................. 184
Mr. Scott.................................................... 186
Mr. Turner................................................... 183
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FOR
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 30, 2011.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Good
morning.
I am pleased to welcome Admiral James Stavridis, commander
of U.S. European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Europe; General Douglas Fraser, commander of U.S. Southern
Command; and Admiral James Winnefeld, commander of U.S.
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and thank you for your
many years of devoted service for our country.
Before we move to the matters at hand, I want to briefly
address a big issue that is foremost in my mind and I am sure
in the minds of my colleagues--Libya. The President has an
obligation to clearly explain to Congress and the American
people what his administration's objectives and strategy are
for our operations in Libya. He fulfilled this obligation in
part on Monday night, but the full House will not have an
opportunity to be briefed until this afternoon--12 days after
the start of Operation Odyssey Dawn.
This committee will follow that up with a hearing tomorrow
focused on Libya with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen.
Admiral Stavridis, in his role as NATO's [the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's] Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is
intimately involved in the campaign against the Qaddafi regime,
particularly as command of the operation transitions to NATO.
Admiral, we are certainly interested in your views
particularly as NATO assumes command of the military mission
today, but I plan on reserving my questions on operations in
Libya--and there are many--for this afternoon's and tomorrow's
briefings.
Moving to the reason we are here today, Admiral Stavridis,
I am concerned that the administration will seek to remove one
or more Army brigade combat teams, or BCTs, from Europe for the
sake of efficiencies that neglect the operational importance of
their mission.
I also want to highlight my concerns regarding the European
phased adaptive approach. Missile defense is becoming a
critical component of our relationship to our European allies,
and we must ensure EUCOM [United States European Command] has
the resources and flexibility to implement a robust defense.
Moving to SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command],
General Fraser, in my mind the illicit trafficking threat is
the greatest challenge we face in your geographic area of
responsibility. It is also, I should add, one that requires
close collaboration and coordination with your colleague at the
table from NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command], as well
as your interagency partners.
General Fraser, your written statement highlights
opportunities and challenges resulting from the activities of
extra-regional actors in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility.
China, Russia and Iran have been very active in Latin America
through arms sales, personnel exchanges, investments and trade
deals. In addition, the activities of Hezbollah in the region
are very troubling. The committee would benefit from your
assessment of trends of the activities and influence of foreign
actors in the Western Hemisphere.
Regarding NORTHCOM, drug-related violence is one of the
foremost national security challenges directly impacting the
U.S. homeland, and we need to treat it as such. I laud the
heroic efforts of Mexican security service personnel and their
public officials, who--and make no mistake about this--are
risking their lives and the lives of their families in the war
against these brutal criminal enterprises.
We need to support these heroes in this fight while fully
respecting the sovereignty of Mexico. I look forward to hearing
your assessment, Admiral, on the progress that is being made by
the Mexican authorities and what NORTHCOM is doing to support
them and build their capacity and capabilities.
Finally, the fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution has
resulted in the Missile Defense Agency spending $324 million
less than is anticipated for this fiscal year. Next fiscal
year's request reduces the ground-based midcourse defense
program by another 185 million. These are sizable cuts. We must
understand how these cuts impact homeland missile defense
effectiveness, modernization, operations and development.
Gentlemen, again, thank you for appearing before us today.
Ranking Member Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in
welcoming Admiral Winnefeld, General Fraser and Admiral
Stavridis here.
Appreciate you gentlemen's service and your presence today.
My statement will be brief. I agree substantially with the
issues that the chairman has raised and the ones we wish to
hear in all three of your different commands. Obviously, in
Southern Command we are interested in the drug trafficking, how
things have progressed from Colombia and beyond other issues.
NORTHCOM, your work with Mexico on similar issues, getting
an update on that would be important. And Libya is the issue
that is in all of our minds, which I am sure you will hear a
great deal.
I was joking that General Fraser and Admiral Winnefeld, you
are very lucky gentleman, because most of the questions will be
focused on Admiral Stavridis and take a little pressure off
you, I suspect. But we will try to keep you involved as well.
And also with European Command, we do not want to forget
what is going on in Afghanistan, the role that NATO is playing
there. I would be very curious to hear the Admiral's views on
how that is progressing, how the support from our NATO allies
is going in Afghanistan and where he sees that situation going.
And lastly, one issue that has not been raised, and I think
it is particularly important in Europe, is the relationship
there with Russia and with Turkey, the role those two countries
play and how our relationship with each of them is going. So I
would be curious to hear about that a little bit.
With that, I have a statement for the record that is more
detailed, which I will submit, but I will yield back and look
forward to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
We will follow in the order I introduced--Admiral
Stavridis, General Fraser and Admiral Winnefeld.
STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND, NATO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
Admiral Stavridis. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you very
much to all the members of the committee for offering us an
opportunity to come and talk with you about all the important
issues that were raised, and I am sure many others.
I do have to point out if you get confused at any point in
the hearing who the two fighter pilots at the table are, they
are the two tall gentleman with full heads of hair. And, of
course, I look at them both as potential donors in that regard.
But it is a pleasure to be you here with two very distinguished
colleagues, who are also very good friends.
I would, if I may, make the observation that when I first
came before this committee 5 years ago, I started to get to
know Rep. Gabby Giffords. And I just wanted to comment that she
during my time at SOUTHCOM was a true friend, and certainly all
of us are thinking about her.
Today, as always, it is a pleasure to be with you, as I
mentioned. I do have a full statement for the record. If that
could be entered, sir, I would appreciate it.
What I would like to talk about, and very briefly, are
three key things that U.S. European Command is focused on in
sort of a general sense. One is military operations, one is
partnering with our friends and allies, and the third is
engaging with the interagency.
In terms of military operations, if I could, I will start
with just a word about Afghanistan. And I will do this from my
perspective as U.S. European Command Commander and make the
point that today in Afghanistan we have about 98,000 U.S.
troops. We have 45,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan fighting
alongside of us. The vast majority--well over 80 percent--are
from the European theater.
We also have from U.S. European Command 12,000 of our U.S.
soldiers, who are forward deployed from Europe into Afghanistan
and into Iraq as well. So from a military operational
perspective at U.S. European Command, we are very much in the
operational mode as we support those kinds of operations
forward.
In terms of how I see Afghanistan--both the chairman and
the ranking member mentioned this--I would say, much as you
heard from David Petraeus, I am cautiously optimistic today
about our progress. We have 49 troop contributing nations who
stand with us, the largest coalition in modern history, perhaps
in history. And today, I think, we see steady progress in the
security sector.
And I would particularly point to gains in the south. While
they are fragile, as General Petraeus has mentioned, I think
that they are indicative of the very real possibility of our
transition to Afghan-led security forces throughout Afghanistan
by 2014. So from a U.S. European Command perspective, we will
continue to support that effort. And again, I would say
cautious optimism is my watchword on Afghanistan.
In terms of partnership with friends and allies, there are
51 nations with whom we have mil-to-mil, military-to-military
relationships from U.S. European Command. And just as one
example, last year we conducted 33 exercises, 50,000 people
involved. And these exercises are the component that allows us
to bring these friends and allies forward into real operations
with us.
The interaction, the training, the coalition building that
occurs as part of these partnerships, I believe, is
fundamentally why we have 45,000 non-U.S. troops with us in
Afghanistan today. And I know my geographic colleagues here
would echo that building those kinds of relationships are part
of conducting successful coalition operations today.
And then thirdly, I mentioned the interagency. At U.S.
European Command, we try very hard to support the Department of
State as they do diplomacy, to support AID [the U.S. Agency for
International Development] as they do development. We want to
be a good interagency partner.
Two quick examples. One is disaster response. Last year we
were working to alleviate problems from wildfires both in
Russia and in Israel. And this is an example of working with
AID in that case.
Another partner is the Drug Enforcement Administration. We
have a counter trafficking center. It is a very reduced version
of what General Fraser operates out of JIATF [the Joint
Interagency Task Force] South in Key West, to try and get at
some of these trafficking challenges as they move through our
region and come back to threaten the United States.
So those three things are the key areas in which we are
engaged at the moment. As well, we are looking at ballistic
missile threat and what we can do to develop the phased
adaptive approach. We are looking at relations with Russia. We
are looking at Israel and Turkey, important countries in our
region. And we are also thinking about cyber and terrorism. So
it is a very full plate for us at U.S. European Command.
I will close, Chairman and Ranking Member, with just a word
about Libya. One is administrative, in a sense, to simply
clarify my role in terms of operations in Libya. From a U.S.
perspective, those are conducted by Africa Command, headed very
ably by General Carter Ham, who many of you know.
My job from a U.S. perspective is to support General Ham
and to move U.S. European Command forces forward for the
coalition operations that have been conducted for the last 5
weeks.
In my NATO hat as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, I am
essentially the operations officer for NATO. So in that hat we
are now taking on this mission in Libya as it is transitioning
today with flights over Libya, with the air tasking order
generated by NATO, and taking on the important missions that
were outlined under the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1973.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you for giving me an
opportunity to lay out a few thoughts initially. I look forward
to your questions. I would like to close by saying thank you to
the Congress and thank you to this committee for your support
to all of our men and women. We could not operate a single day
without the support of this committee, and I thank each one of
you personally, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found
in the Appendix on page 50.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And without objection, each of your full statements will be
introduced into the record.
General Fraser.
STATEMENT OF GEN. DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND
General Fraser. Chairman, thank you. Ranking Member Smith,
thank you also, and distinguished members of the committee.
It is my great pleasure and privilege to be here and have
the opportunity to discuss United States Southern Command and
our accomplishments over the past year, plus our future efforts
in Latin America and the Caribbean.
But first, before I continue, I would like to, as Admiral
Stavridis did, recognize the absence of Congresswoman Giffords
from this committee. As Admiral Stavridis said, she has been a
stalwart supporter of United States Southern Command, of Air
Forces Southern, and we wish her a speedy recovery.
I am also pleased to have my wife with me today. She is a
great partner. She is a steadfast advocate for our military
families, and she is a remarkable representative of United
States Southern Command and all our military spouses throughout
our armed forces.
[Applause.]
I am also pleased, as Admiral Stavridis mentioned also, to
share a table with my friends and my counterparts. Admiral
Stavridis, my predecessor, left a real legacy of interagency
integration. He talked about that just a minute ago in European
Command. That legacy remains in United States Southern Command
and is a vital part of our organization.
Admiral Winnefeld and I have been working diligently to
coordinate our respective activities in Mexico and the Central
American region, as well as across our combatant command
boundaries, to ensure that there is no disconnect and there is
no seam in U.S. military engagement within the hemisphere.
Over the past year, United States Southern Command worked
in close collaboration with other U.S. federal agencies and our
international partners to respond to natural disasters like the
earthquakes in Haiti and Chile and to address the ongoing
threats to regional security as well.
This year, with the continued support of Congress, we will
continue to promote United States' national and regional
security interests through enduring partnerships. Much as
Admiral Stavridis mentioned, partnerships and the building of
partnerships remain a vital part of our mission and a vital
role that we continue to pursue throughout the region.
But we are really focused on two direct issues, two direct
challenges. One is the ever present nature of natural disasters
within the region like those we witnessed last year and then,
Chairman, as you and the ranking member mentioned, the ongoing
threat posed by transnational criminal organizations and the
illicit activities they pursue.
While we remain prepared to conduct humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief operations whenever the need arises,
transnational criminal organizations represent the evolving
challenge to regional and hemispheric security.
These transnational criminal organizations engage in
illicit trafficking of drugs, arms, money and people across the
porous borders throughout the region, into the United States,
and also abroad into Africa and into Europe. They do not
respect national sovereignty, laws, governments or human life.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Central America, which
is besieged by gangs and transnational criminal organizations,
who conduct illicit trafficking with near impunity. But the
direct result of their activity is unprecedented levels of
violence and an erosion of citizen safety. The northern
triangle of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras is the
deadliest zone in the world outside of war zones.
The newly formed Central American Citizens Security
Partnership announced by President Obama last week builds upon
the existing interagency efforts and leverages the capacities
of partners such as Canada, Colombia and Mexico to help Central
America respond to the challenges of organized crime, drug
trafficking and violence. U.S. Southern Command will continue
to support this effort.
In closing, I would also like to thank the committee for
your support and funding the construction of our new
headquarters in Miami. My good friend, Admiral Stavridis, had a
large role to play in that, and we are the beneficiary of all
his hard work as well as yours.
This state-of-the-art building enhances our internal and
external collaboration. It improves our ability to conduct
interagency operations, and it raises the quality of life of
our personnel. So on behalf of the men and women of United
States Southern Command, thank you for your support.
And I would also like to close by thanking Congress and the
members of this committee for your continued support of our men
and women in uniform. Much like Admiral Stavridis said, we
could not do our job without your constant support.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you for your continued
support.
[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in
the Appendix on page 131.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Winnefeld.
STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
Admiral Winnefeld. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee, thank
you again for the opportunity to appear before you this
morning.
I will echo my colleagues on at least two points. One is
that I am delighted to be alongside these two fine gentlemen
this morning, including my longtime friend, Admiral Jim
Stavridis, and my very good friend and close partner, Doug
Fraser, in the Western Hemisphere arena.
I also would like to echo their thoughts on the absence of
Representative Gabrielle Giffords, who has been such a strong
supporter of NORTHCOM and in particular NORAD [the North
American Aerospace Defense Command] and our air sovereignty
mission.
As the commander of U.S. NORTHCOM responsible for the
defense of the United States and in the case of NORAD for the
air defense of North America, it is my privilege to work with
the talented team of men and women executing a uniquely diverse
set of homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation
missions in Colorado Springs.
Our daily efforts include countering terrorism and
transnational criminal organizations, preparing to support our
federal and state partners in the wake of a natural or man-made
disaster, air defense against both external and internal
threats, maritime and ballistic missile defense, and, of
course, a growing focus on the Arctic.
I would like to highlight two of these areas in advance of
our discussion this morning. First, the tragic events in Japan
over the last several weeks highlight the importance of being
prepared to respond to disasters, including those providing
little or no notice, such as earthquakes, and those involving
accidental or intentional release of harmful substances, as in
Japan's case their release of radionuclides.
U.S. NORTHCOM plays a key role in our nation's response to
these disasters, principally in support of FEMA's [the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's] role as the lead federal agency
providing support to the affected states by bringing either
additional capacity or additional capabilities to bear that our
partners may lack.
Time is our enemy in these disasters, and we search every
day for ways to become more agile to meet the needs of our
partners.
We also stress our supporting role in these disasters, and
I am pleased to be able to report to you that we have made
considerable strides over the last year in achieving unity of
command and control over state and federal military forces that
might respond together in the wake of a disaster.
I can also report that NORTHCOM's relationship with the
National Guard, who is such a capable partner and on whom I
rely so much for my mission in several key areas, is superb.
The second area I would like to highlight is U.S.
NORTHCOM's support to the ongoing struggle to disrupt and
dismantle the transnational criminal organizations, otherwise
known as TCOs, that are having such corrosive effects within
our hemisphere. We work with law enforcement agencies within
the United States and in conjunction with U.S. SOUTHCOM in
support of the efforts of our partner nations in the
hemisphere.
President Obama and President Calderon of Mexico have
underscored our shared responsibilities as nations--on the U.S.
side of the border to reduce drug consumption and the illicit
flow of arms and money, and on the Mexican side to interdict
drugs going north and to strengthen the rule of law so that
criminals are put and kept in jail.
The Mexican government has displayed exemplary moral,
physical and political courage in undertaking this important
struggle, as you pointed out, Chairman McKeon, because they
know this is about the future of Mexico. And I take my hat off
to them for this.
The Mexican military has been asked by its civilian
leadership to join with Mexican law enforcement agencies to
support this struggle in the right way, respectful of Mexico's
democratic ideals and the nation's commitment to the rule of
law.
It has been a difficult struggle, as you pointed out. Since
December 2006, 35,000 Mexicans have lost their lives in TCO-
related violence. The criminality extends far beyond drugs to
extortion, robbery, kidnapping and trafficking in persons.
I salute Mexico's police and security forces for their
courage, skill and determination and for the progress they have
made in building institutions like the federal police and in
taking down over two dozen of the most wanted criminals in
their country, progress for which they do not always get the
credit they deserve.
Today the Mexican military is confronting concurrent
challenges--how to counter a sophisticated, unconventional
threat by integrating intelligence and operations, how to work
jointly with each other and with their interagency partners,
and how to fully inculcate respect for human rights into every
operation.
We know this is hard, because we have been down the same
road, and some days we are still on the same road. So I tell my
capable Mexican partners that we don't know it all, we have
made our own mistakes along the way, and we seek the kind of
engagement that helps them benefit from our experience.
But while I always want to do more to help, I want to state
publicly and very clearly that the first and most important
principle we observe in this struggle is respect for Mexican
sovereignty. We have much to offer, but Mexico is always,
always in the lead in Mexico.
The Mexican government has a strategy. They have defined
with us a substantive framework to guide our cooperation, and
they have invited us to work with them to support their
efforts. But, again, they are always in the lead in their
country.
If together we can maintain our resolve, if we can be
responsive to their requests, if we can work effectively
together to support their operational progress, and if we can
continue to make progress on our own side of the border, then
we have a good chance of carrying the day against the TCOs. And
if not, the corrosive effects of the TCOs will continue to pose
a danger to the citizens of both of our nations.
I want to thank you, as my colleagues did, both the
committee and a very capable staff for your steadfast support
for our men and women, both in uniform and in civilian clothes,
who work hard on these and many other difficult problems every
single day.
Once again, thanks for the opportunity to appear today, and
I look forward to our discussion.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Winnefeld can be found
in the Appendix on page 158.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Admiral Stavridis? ``Stavridis?'' Boy, oh, boy. At last
year's EUCOM posture hearing, you strongly advocated for
retaining four Army combat teams, or BCTs, in Europe. You said
that all four BCTs are required to enable both rotations in
support of overseas contingency operations and building
partnership capacity activities with our European allies.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review backed you up on this,
but that final decision would be made pending a review. What is
the status of the review? And when will the decision be
announced? And do you still strongly support retaining all
forward BCTs? And if not, what has changed? And what are the
impacts if one or more BCTs is relocated?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Chairman.
First of all, to focus on what these BCTs do, brigade
combat teams, I think they fulfill essentially four key
functions. They provide reassurance. They provide deterrence.
They are essential in our training process that we spoke of
with our partners and allies in Europe. And as we can see
today, they are very engaged in operations, again, 12,000 folks
forward even as we speak.
In terms of the review, it is still ongoing. I think it is
coming to a conclusion soon. And it is not simply focused, sir,
on the BCTs. It is really a larger look at the overall
structure in Europe, which as you know has decreased
dramatically since the Cold War, coming down from some 400,000
total troops to about 80,000 today, a 75 percent decrease.
So we will see, I think, the results of a final look, which
is being conducted at this point. All the inputs are in, and I
think final decisions will be announced, I would guess, soon.
But I don't have visibility as to when that final decision
would come.
Overall, I am satisfied that my input and my voice has been
heard through the process, and I am confident that I will be
supportive of the result that comes out when it is announced.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Fraser, China, Russia and Iran have been extremely
active in Latin America. Several left-leaning countries, such
as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, have forged ties with the
anti-U.S. leaders in Libya, North Korea, and elsewhere.
Alarmingly, Hezbollah and other radical groups appear to have a
growing presence in the region.
How significant is the influence of non-Western Hemisphere
actors in the region? And how would you assess our
relationships in comparison? What can SOUTHCOM and its
interagency partners do to maintain strong relationships in the
region and counter foreign interferences?
General Fraser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We see a growing
influence, but it varies country by country, if you look at
those external actors. But it is still primarily focused on
political, diplomatic, and commercial relationships within all
those countries. And that is a normal international process, if
you will, and that in many cases, especially as we look at
China, is a two-way street, where countries within the region
are also looking to engage with China on a more robust basis.
Russia's focus primarily continues to be commercial and
diplomatic, but there are also arms sales that they are
continuing to pursue within the region. In most cases, that is
providing opportunities for other countries as they look to
modernize their forces within the region.
My biggest concern within the arms supplies that Russia is
providing is the number of automatic weapons being provided to
Venezuela and the potential that those could be used in other
places, not that there is a connection to Venezuela, it is just
the fact that they could find their ways into other hands.
Regarding Iran, very similar, if you will, primarily
diplomatic and commercial, in many ways from our assessment,
looking to limit their isolation in the international community
and also support anti-U.S. and reduce U.S. influence not only
within the region, but also in other parts of the globe.
Hezbollah and Hamas do have organizations resident in the
region. I have not seen them growing in any capacity, and I see
primarily any support that they are giving is financial
support, principally back to parent organizations in the Middle
East. I have not seen connections that go beyond that to date.
What are we doing about that? We continue to engage very
robustly with our partner militaries throughout the region. We
have very good military-to-military relations with all those
partners within the region. The ones that we have minimal
relations with today are primarily Venezuela and Bolivia, and
that is more their choice than ours. We would like to continue
to engage with them. They are choosing not to engage with us.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. And we are happy to have
your wife here with you today.
You are more than welcome. Thank you.
Admiral Winnefeld, how are the Mexican security services
doing in their fight against these viciously violent
transnational communist--or criminal organizations? What is
NORTHCOM doing to support them and build their capacity and
capabilities, while maintaining an appropriate respect for our
sovereign neighbor? Is there something more that this committee
can do to help regarding either resources or statutory
flexibility?
Admiral Winnefeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
would say that it is important to understand, as we all do,
that the Mexican security services are up against a very
sophisticated, very ruthless, and very well financed threat, a
series of threats, actually, several different organizations.
I did a check recently, and I think most of the assessments
are that about $40 billion flows across our border each year
into Mexico to sustain these transnational criminal
organizations. And even though they are not military forces, if
you took that $40 billion and ranked it among the world's
militaries, it would come in in the top ten for the amount of
money that is potentially supplying these organizations. So it
is a well-financed threat, largely by our drug demand in the
United States.
So the Mexican security forces, the security police, the
military are up against a very, very sophisticated and a
ruthless threat. I give them a great deal of credit, though,
because they are undergoing some very difficult
transformations.
They have taken a force that was a very conventional force,
that candidly was mostly focused on support for natural
disasters, and they are gradually transforming this--and I
would say very successfully--into a force that is capable of
very regular operations against this sophisticated threat.
It is a long journey. We have been on the same journey
ourselves over the last 10 years. And it is difficult to
transform. And they are doing a good job.
I would say that they have had some serious successes in
the last 16 months or so. They have taken down 28 of the major
criminals, lead criminals, inside Mexico. Most recently, their
takedown of some of the people who were involved in the murder
of Agent Zapata down in Mexico was actually a very
sophisticated operation that was quite impressive by our
standards. So I think they are coming a long way.
As in any struggle like this, things are probably going to
get worse before they get better, and we are seeing that with
the violence in Mexico, not only TCO-on-TCO violence, but
violence that is basically an outgrowth of the fact that the
Calderon administration has taken such a courageous stand
against these organizations.
At NORTHCOM, we do everything we can to help our partners.
We have great respect for their sovereignty. And in that light,
I would leave it to the Mexican authorities to disclose any of
the particular details of the support that we provide.
But in general, it is sharing the lessons learned that we
have learned so hard over the last 10 years of similar
struggles elsewhere in the world from which our Mexican
partners can benefit. And I would include in that how you do
planning, how you do special operations, and also how you
carefully observe human rights.
We have a very good partnership with our friends in Mexico,
and I have great respect for their efforts, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ranking Member Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have two questions. The chairman actually covered a
number of the questions that I was interested in. The first one
is on actually behalf of Congresswoman Giffords. I am trying to
ask her questions, get her issues in as the ranking member here
until she is able to come back.
And I thank you, gentlemen, for your kind words on her
behalf. She is doing much, much better, and we are all looking
forward to her return.
And I was down in her district last week, down at Davis-
Monthan and Fort Huachuca. And she has one specific question,
as I think both the SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM people know, and that is
about the Air and Space Operations Center.
The 612th is at Davis-Monthan, which is responsible,
General Fraser, for the Southern Command. The 601st is in
Florida and is responsible for the Northern Command. And the
Air Force has made the decision and the military has made the
decision to combine the two.
And there are a number of questions about that. I had the
opportunity to spend some time down there and visit the center
they have at Davis-Monthan. And it is very impressive. It is
being updated as we speak and seems like a very capable center.
And, obviously, they are worried about losing that, in terms of
how that combination is going.
So a couple of questions about that. First of all,
Congressman Giffords' staff has requested from the Air Force
sort of an analysis of this issue. How is it going to work to
combine two operation centers in that way? And what are the
criteria that the Air Force and the two commands are going to
be weighing to determine which one wins, if you will? She has
not yet received that from the Air Force.
So if you could work with perhaps both of your commands
with the Air Force to get that analysis of that to her office
and to mine, that would be very helpful.
And then, second specific question on that--and it is for
both of you, actually--what are the factors that you are
weighing in terms of determining what the best place to do this
would be? And then, also, how do you think it is going to work
having two separate commands with the same operation center?
General Fraser. Ranking Member Smith, if I could start, it
is a discussion that is still within the Air Force, and it
really relies primarily within the Air Force, as they are
working their way through to answer many of the questions that
you are asking. The capability that is resident in Air Force
South is very significant.
But I am also comfortable, as the Air Force works its way
through this, that they understand our needs. And I have had
that discussion with the chief of staff of the Air Force, as
well as the commander of Air Combat Command, and they are
working to make sure that our needs, not only when it comes
time for crisis, but also as it supports our training and our
exercise requirements, that they are integrating those into
their matrix as they determine how best to support this
command.
The benefit, as I see also, though, is that Air Force
South's staff will remain a part of Southern Command. It is not
a combination completely of the two organizations. And as a
result, we have an Air Force component that is focused and
dedicated on continuing to build relationships with our partner
Air Forces within the region.
So I don't have the specific analysis either. The Air Force
is still working its way through that. I still understand that
it will be a little bit of time before they come to an answer
on that.
Mr. Smith. It would be good to see that, because my
concern, as I was down there--and forgive me, I am forgetting
for the moment the general's name who runs the base--Lieutenant
General Spears, who showed me around--they have incredible
capability there.
I happened to be there when the President was down in the
SOUTHCOM region, so they were showing me all that was involved
in planning for that, all the technology and capability that
they have there. It also has some flexibility to be a center
for other, you know, contingencies, if those come up.
So I think it is an incredible capability that we would
hate to lose after having built it, and I would be very, very
interested in getting the criteria. You know, what is the Air
Force weighing in terms of what they need in a joint operations
center?
Because that is not clear at this point how they are going
to put this together, and I and my staff have some concerns
that criteria that might not be the most important from an
operational standpoint, but could be from a budgetary
standpoint, might be given higher priority than we would like,
so I would love to see what the criteria are.
Admiral Winnefeld, if you had anything to add on that?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir. We will work together to ask
the Air Force to provide those criteria. They have their own
criteria that they are using. And I don't have full visibility
on those at the moment.
I would say that both of those air operations centers are
very capable centers. The one at Tyndall Air Force Base, of
course, which is the NORAD region operations center, is very
capable and has excess capacity and that sort of thing as well.
The things that matter the most to me are that NORAD has a
daily vibrant mission in which literally many time-critical
decisions are made on a daily basis that affect the security of
this country from both external and internal threats. So in any
case, whichever way the decision falls, I would want to make
sure there was minimal disruption in our ability to execute
those daily decisions.
I would want to make--one of the things that is important
to me is that my commander, whose base is there in Tyndall, is
able to have rapid access to his air operations center in case
he needs to be the one making those split-second decisions.
And it is very useful for me to have the National Guard,
frankly, running that operations center, because they bring
such an extended timeframe of deep experience that is embedded
in that center over a course of years, rather than a constant
inflow and outflow of people.
Having said that, I would tell you that General Fraser and
I have discussed this. We are comfortable that either way this
decision goes, we will be able to manage it and that we will
work very closely together to bend over backwards to make sure
that the other guy is supported, you know, whoever absorbs the
other's center.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I appreciate it.
General Fraser. And, Congressman, if I might, I have had
this similar discussion with General Schwartz, as well as
General Fraser, the Commander of Air Force Combat Command. And
I am confident that they understand our requirements and are
working very diligently to meet those requirements as they look
at this design.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I appreciate that. I will actually
hold the other question that I had for the end. That took a
little longer than I expected, so I will yield back to the
chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your long
service to our country.
Our founding fathers were very well acquainted with the
exercise of the king's army. And so it would be expected that
they would want to preclude any such use of the army in the new
country that they were establishing. And so it is no surprise
what we find in the Constitution.
In Article I, Section 8, which describes the prerogatives
of Congress, it says Congress shall have power to declare war,
to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces, to provide for calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrection, and repel
invasions.
And then in Section 2 of the Constitution--Article II of
the Constitution, where they define the responsibilities of the
President, there is only one brief reference to the
relationship of the President to the military, and that is in
Section 2 of Article II.
And it says there the President shall be the Commander in
Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States and of the
militia of the several states when called into the actual
service of the United States. That calling into service is the
prerogative of Congress, you note, from Article I of the
Constitution.
In 1973, during the height of the Cold War, it was clear
that there had to be some interpretation of the intent of our
founding fathers, because Congress clearly would not have time
to be convened to declare war, if we were attacked by the
Soviet Union. And so our two houses drafted the War Powers
Resolution.
And in it, it said it is the purpose of this joint
resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the
Constitution of the United States. I see this as kind of a
recapitulation of the Constitution of the United States.
But to make the intent of our founding fathers consistent
with the reality of 1973, they said that the President could
call our armed forces into combat under three circumstances: a
declaration of war; specific statutory authorization; or,
three, a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territory or possessions, or its armed forces--this
third, of course, relevant to the Cold War and the threat of a
bolt out of the blue that everybody quite expected could happen
then.
Then, Section 3 of that says the President in every
possible instance shall consult with Congress before
introducing United States forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances.
Help me understand which of these three were invoked in
committing our troops to the military and why no time was
available to consult Congress when there was plenty of time to
consult with the United Nations and the Arab League.
Do we now, in fact--and this isn't the first President, by
the way, that--by the way, the War Powers Act was passed over
the veto of the President. That means that more than two-thirds
of the Senate and the House, supported by their constituents,
believed that this ought to become the law of the land.
This isn't the first President to use the military, I
think, in violation of the Constitution and of the War Powers
Act. What is your understanding of which of these three
circumstances, situations in the War Powers Act is relevant to
our involvement in Libya?
Admiral Stavridis. Congressman, I have not analyzed that
aspect of things. And I think, frankly, the question would be
best referred to the Department of Defense and potentially to
the White House. I mean, it sounds to me like it is an issue
under discussion between the executive and the legislative
branch.
My focus--if you are referring specifically to Libya--as a
U.S. Combatant Commander, my job was to provide forces for
General Carter Ham, who is the AFRICOM [United States Africa
Command] commander, who then employed those forces. From a NATO
perspective, I operate under a distinctly different chain of
command, and the authorities would be completely different.
Mr. Bartlett. Appreciate your response, and thank you very
much.
Yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, welcome, and thank you for your service and
for doing a great job in your respective positions, which at
this point are vital and critical to our national security.
I was on a trip with the chairman and Congressman Kline. We
visited Pakistan and Afghanistan and then stopped at NATO
headquarters. And for the members, I would strongly recommend
that, when you visit Afghanistan, you stop in NATO, because the
admiral and the ambassador can really add to the visit and give
you a good perspective on the critical role of NATO and the
things that are going on.
I don't know if you want to comment.
Admiral Stavridis. I would just very much echo that. And it
is a very logical stopping point coming in or out of
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan. We would love to have you and have
a chance to show you how the alliance is engaged in this. And I
thank you for mentioning that, sir.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
And for General Fraser and Admiral Winnefeld, I just was
part of a trip last week that went through--well, we went to
Colombia, Panama, Guatemala, and Mexico. And I would appreciate
if you would comment--and I know, General Fraser, I think it
was you that mentioned the triangle of concern, which includes
Guatemala--if you would comment on the challenges that we are
facing there.
Ambassador McFarland expressed his concern about the
situation in Guatemala and the kinds of challenges that that
government is facing as a result of the drug trafficking
organizations now using it as a staging area and a
transshipment area.
Panama as well is kind of the crossroads where those
organizations decide which way they are going to bring
narcotics into the U.S., whether the Caribbean through Mexico
or along the Pacific.
So if both of you would comment on that, I would appreciate
it. I think it would be very important to get your perspective.
General Fraser. Thank you, Congressman Reyes. Let me step
back, if I could, for just a minute and then explain the issue
as I see it. And it is a very nontraditional military
requirement and concern, because it is an irregular force in a
transnational criminal organization.
Our roles are very limited, but what we see from a cocaine
standpoint--and I will talk specifically cocaine--the majority
of cocaine is still produced in the northern part of South
America in the Andean Ridge.
It transits up along the east and west coast of Central
America and first makes its first stop somewhere along that
isthmus--Panama, Costa Rica, some in Nicaragua, primarily right
now in Honduras, about 40 percent of it, and then into
Guatemala.
Once it arrives on land, then it continues to transit up
through the isthmus of Central America into Mexico and then
into the United States across the southwest border. We estimate
that roughly about 60 to 65 percent of the cocaine that is
produced transits that route.
How that manifests itself within Central America, then, is
in increasing episodes of violence. And my best way to describe
that is if we use U.N.-based figures, in Iraq last year the
homicide rate or violent death rate was 14 per 100,000. In
Guatemala last year it was 48 per 100,000. If you go to some
specific cities, Guatemala City, it would approach 100. In
Honduras it was 77 per 100,000. In El Salvador it was 68 per
100,000.
We continue to work with Northern Command, with our partner
militaries and our interagency partners, because the real
solution for this is an interagency-the Department of State has
a Central American region security initiative working not only
to support our militaries, but law enforcement as well as
judiciary and bring up the capacities within those countries.
And it is us all working together on a regional basis that
we will address that problem. And those are the efforts that we
are taking on today.
Admiral Winnefeld. I would add, sir, that, you know, the
complexities of that region are enormous, particularly the
Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border region, and General Fraser and I
work very closely on that region to understand the complexities
and to look at the way ahead for addressing them.
I would say that my Mexican partners are very
sophisticated. They are very aware of what is happening down
there. They are approaching this strategically. They know that
they need to get at that problem.
They have a capacity issue, for one thing. They do not have
a huge military, and they have their hands full right now in
the northeast in places like Ciudad Juarez and Monterrey, and
they want to get that violence under control as best they can
before they really open another front. And I respect them for
that.
We are working to see if there is any way that we can help
them down there. And in fact, General Fraser and I, again, work
closely together on that very, very complex region.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Admirals, General, thank you for your service. I share
the concerns of Chairman McKeon and Congressman Bartlett over
the new war that America is in in Libya, but today it is budget
request. But we need to address the concerns of the American
people concerning Libya, I think, as soon as possible.
Admiral Stavridis, there are success stories, and I
appreciate you bringing up in Afghanistan that there are now
45,000 troops largely from NATO. And I have had the privilege
of meeting with troops from Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. It
is really encouraging to see this, and the American people need
to know how we do have a 49-nation coalition of real troops
involved from such remarkable places as Mongolia.
With that in mind, could you tell us what are the
contributions of the troops? The American people need to know
when there is success.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir. I would also throw out a
couple of other interesting countries that are in this--Tonga,
El Salvador, as well as all of our kind of traditional
partners, and we are also in discussion with other nations.
This really has become a global effort.
In addition to the 49 countries with troops there, there
are actually a total of well over 80 countries that are
contributing financially to develop Afghanistan.
In terms of what our partners are doing, the first thing I
would mention is that they are taking casualties. They are in
this fight. Tragically, we have lost about 1,400 of our fine
young men and women in Afghanistan.
We have 98,000 U.S., 45,000 Allied, so two-to-one, you
would expect the allies would have lost about 700 killed in
action. The allies have lost 900 killed in action, so they are
suffering casualties at a higher rate per capita than we are
here in the United States in many instances.
They are also bringing very specific skills across a range
of areas, and the one I would highlight for the committee today
is training. If you think about how we are going to succeed in
Afghanistan, I believe we will train our way to success.
We are beginning a transition this summer that will run
through 2014, and I believe that the ability to make that
transition is dependent on effective Afghan security forces.
Today there are 275,000 of them.
They are being trained very much by the U.S., but also by
our coalition partners, who bring discrete skill sets at
everything ranging from orienteering to aircraft maintenance.
And so this training effort, led by Lieutenant General Bill
Caldwell--many of you have met with General Caldwell--is an
area in which we are encouraging our allies to bring additional
forces.
And here I would highlight both the Canadians and the Dutch
have recently increased the numbers of troops that they are
going to commit to the training mission. So that would be the
one that I would particularly draw a line under, in addition to
the work around the nation in the patrolling.
Finally, in a command-and-control sense, although we all
know General Petraeus is our commander, his deputy is British,
his chief of staff is French. As you look around Afghanistan to
the leaders in each of the regional command areas, Kabul is
commanded by a Turk. In the far west we see an Italian in
command. In the north we see a German in command, in addition
to U.S. commanders in the south and the east.
So in command and control, in casualties, in many discrete
missions--I would highlight training in particular--I think the
contributions of the allies are noteworthy and part of, I
believe, my cautious optimism for success in Afghanistan.
Mr. Wilson. And for peace in the future, American forces
working together, the interoperability, people need to know how
positive this is going to be.
Another success I saw with Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo
was to visit the new bases of MK [Mihail Kogalniceanu] Airbase
in Romania, Novacella in Bulgaria, first time in the 1,225-year
history of Bulgaria that they have invited a foreign military
presence. What is the status of those bases?
Admiral Stavridis. Both of them are part of our training
programs and are very effective for us to move rotational
forces to engage with not only the troops of those nations, but
other troops from Eastern Europe, the Baltics and the Balkans,
so very much part of our training infrastructure in Europe in
nations that are very supportive of our missions in
Afghanistan, in Europe and in the alliance.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
Admiral Stavridis. Sir.
Mr. Wilson. And appreciate all of your service.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
And, gentlemen, thank you so much for being here. Thank you
for your service as well.
Admiral Stavridis, I wonder if you could talk a little bit
about the concerns that we all feel in terms of our economic
situation, but more particularly in terms of our European
allies. Clearly, they have been affected by the economy in
their countries, and so there are demands put on them.
And I am wondering if you are worried at all about NATO's
readiness due to any European cutbacks or of other allies.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Congresswoman. I would start,
actually, with some good news, and then I will move to the bad
news.
The good news is that our European allies, although they
are, like the United States, going through economic challenges,
they have great resources. The GDP [gross domestic product] of
Europe is about $14 trillion, very similar to that of the
United States, so if you put United States' GDP and Europe's
GDP together, about $28 trillion to $30 trillion, which is
roughly half of the global GDP.
So the point is we are lucky that our close allies in
Europe live in prosperous societies, who can contribute to
defense.
Now, the bad news is that many of our allies are not
meeting the NATO standard of spending at least 2 percent of
their GDP on defense. And so some are--the United Kingdom and
France and Turkey and Greece--and a handful are, but the
majority are not. So I am worried.
And I believe that we here in the United States, because we
pay a much higher percentage of our GDP for our defense, need
to be emphatic with our European allies that they should spend
at least the minimum NATO 2 percent.
At the military-to-military level, I carry that message
often, emphatically and very directly, frankly, not only to
military counterparts, but also to political actors in each of
the nations in the alliance.
Mrs. Davis. Is there a concern as well that the plate is
just getting too full as well for NATO?
Admiral Stavridis. I think that is a concern everywhere
today. And again, in my view a minimum spending goal of 2
percent is very reasonable, and one that, broadly speaking, the
allies should be able to support.
So I will continue to press that emphatically. Secretary
Gates pushes that very emphatically. Secretary Clinton pushes
that very emphatically. And we are all leaning forward to make
sure our allies do the right thing in this regard.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Could you turn for a second to the potential cooperation
between the U.S. and Russia and any changes that you are seeing
in terms of their military modernization efforts and how that
is affecting the EUCOM environment, the AOR [area of
responsibility]?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, ma'am, I can. In terms of where we
are cooperating with Russia, there is actually a wide spectrum
of activities, some of which you may not generally be aware of.
One is piracy. Russia is operating ships off the coast of
Africa that are working very closely with NATO and European
Union ships, along with those of other nations.
Another area is counterterrorism. Russia has been subject
to many terrible terrorist attacks, and we are cooperating with
them in that regard. Counternarcotics, Russia has a very
disturbing opium and heroin addiction problem, and we are in
constant dialogue with them to try and see how we can work
against the trafficking of heroin in particular, which comes
from Afghanistan.
We also, as we know, recently signed an arms control
agreement with Russia.
And then, finally, I would add----
Mrs. Davis. And I guess can you go on to the bad news?
Admiral Stavridis. Yeah, as always, there are going to be
areas where we don't agree with Russia. The situation in
Georgia is one of those, for example, where we stand for the
territorial integrity of Georgia.
But I think, on balance, overall, certainly compared to the
Cold War--and, I would argue, compared to 3 or 4 years ago--
these zones of cooperation are, in fact, in place and
expanding. The one we are looking to and exploring is missile
defense, and that is out in the future, but it is certainly
part of the dialogue today between the United States and
Russia.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much.
If I could just very quickly, Admiral Winnefeld, on the
Merida Initiative, which we know is now not--well, I guess the
initiative really ended in fiscal year 2010. And we now have
another security assistance program beyond Merida. How
important is that assistance?
Admiral Winnefeld. I think the Merida program is very, very
important. And there has been some criticism lately that we
haven't delivered fast enough. And part of that has to do with
simple physics, and that is, if you are going to buy a
helicopter, the helicopter is on an assembly line and it takes
a while to get that helicopter built.
And I would also add, though, that Secretary Gates has
accelerated, by the way, the program for some of these
helicopters to Mexico, which I think is a very helpful step.
But helping our Mexican partners with equipment is one of
many things that we would like to do with them, including
sharing our experience over the last few years, things that we
have learned. But the equipment is certainly important.
Particularly mobility, helicopters, night-vision goggles, that
sort of thing is really priceless to be able to help our
partners with that kind of support.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership and for your
service. I appreciate your being here before us today and
discussing these very important issues.
I wanted to echo what Mr. Wilson has said and our chairman
about concerns of the operation in Libya. It is a mission that
I am concerned as to whether or not its goals are clear. And
also, I am a little concerned and believe it is unclear as to
who we are supporting in this conflict.
But I know that is not, as Mr. Wilson had said, the subject
matter of this hearing, and we are going to continue to pursue
that issue later today. But I do think it does need to be
acknowledged as the concerns of this committee as we go
forward.
I would like to talk--Admiral Stavridis, you were talking
about the issue of the drug trade, the effects of the problems
in Russia. I appreciate that you and I last month had an
opportunity to meet during my trip to NATO and in Brussels. I
appreciate your discussions there about the drug trade.
So I would like to revisit that with you. General Petraeus
has indicated that, you know, one-third to perhaps, you know,
40 percent of the Taliban's funding comes from the drug trade.
So intuitively, we believe that if you can reduce the drug
trade, we can reduce the money that buys weapons and explosives
that fund the insurgency.
However, the to-do list of how we address this problem
extends well beyond the Department of Defense. With your prior
experience, I would like to know, you know, how do you believe
that we are in doing in going after this problem? And are we
hampered by Department of Defense or NATO limitations in
counternarcotics missions?
And also, General Fraser, you know, there are differing
viewpoints about whether the counter-drug strategy in the
region has been successful as touted. From your perspective,
what have been the successes, the challenges, and shortcomings
of the regional counternarcotics efforts?
Admiral.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir. And thank you for your
visit to NATO and for your work with the parliamentary
assembly, as well.
I would start by putting some numbers on this. Afghanistan
today produces about 80 percent to 90 percent of the world's
poppy, which is then turned into opium and then ultimately into
heroin, which is highly addictive.
In Russia alone last year, 30,000 young people between the
ages of 16 and 24 died of heroin overdoses. There is a
significant heroin problem throughout many other nations in
Europe, and it flows across to the United States. So there is a
human cost to this.
Secondly, as you alluded to, sir, Taliban financing comes
out of this, probably $100 million to $200 million. And so that
funding stream goes back and directly contributes to our losses
in Afghanistan.
And then, thirdly, all along that route, there is
corruption and there is crime, as the drugs move from
Afghanistan through Central Asia, through the Baltics--
correction, the Balkans--and into the user patterns both in
Russia, Europe, and ultimately in the United States.
It is very similar to what I learned of about cocaine in
the Americas. This, of course, is heroin.
What we are doing about it is to establish a counter-
trafficking effort that is multi-agency, if you will, and
really is there to support the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency],
as they take the lead on this.
But our ability to bring surveillance, to bring
connectivity, to develop analysis, all of that muscularity that
we have, similar to what Doug is doing at the Joint Interagency
Task Force South, we are trying to do in U.S. European Command
so that we can reduce these drug flows for all the reasons I
just described.
It is a significant challenge, but we are starting to see
some impact. And in fact, in Afghanistan, where we start this
supply chain and we see Afghans in the lead, but NATO
supporting, we have seen a reduction in the production of poppy
and, therefore, of opium and heroin by about 20 percent over
the last 2 years. So we are starting down the path.
In the end, in any problem like this, you have to attack
the demand side, as well as the supply side in the transit
zone. There is no silver bullet. You kind of have to go at all
three of those, and we are attacking all three in an
interagency way.
General Fraser. Congressman, my discussion is very similar,
as you look at Latin America and the effort that we have had
ongoing over a number of years to address the counter-drug
issue. We have kind of grown that into a counter-illicit-
activity issue, because we find they all are interrelated. It
is drugs; it is weapons; it is finance, bulk cash, all those
flowing back and forth.
We focused very significantly on Colombia, primarily
because there was a terrorist issue there, also, with the FARC
[Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia], and it has now become
a narcoterrorist issue, as they have now used narcoterrorism or
narco capability to finance their capacity.
But if you look at Colombia today, where Colombia was 10
years ago, largely on the shoulders of the Colombians, there
has been significant progress there. Homicides are down almost
50 percent. Kidnappings are down 90 percent. They are largely
controlling their entire country, where there were pockets
where they were not before. The aviation capacity that used to
emanate out of Colombia into the United States has been
removed. They have shifted to other places.
And if you look at the effort combined with JIATF South of
working in the transit zones, along with our law enforcement
partners who work with law enforcement throughout the region,
the impact in the United States over the last 10 years is the
price of cocaine has gone up 75 percent, the purity has gone
down 30 percent. There is still a big demand problem in the
United States, and it kills 38,000 people a year. It is an
issue we need to address.
What have we not done----
The Chairman. If you have more, would you please get it to
him on record?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 179.]
General Fraser. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. We are a little over time there.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, for Admiral Winnefeld, I am going to look north a
little bit here. Last year, the Olympics were held in
Vancouver, and NORTHCOM participated in Olympic coordination
center activities for security issues. And I was curious. What
operational lessons has NORTHCOM taken from that? And how are
you continuing to support these northern border enforcement
activities?
I note in your testimony it said 22 percent of available
resources out of Joint Task Force North are devoted to the
northern border. Can you talk about quickly--I have got a few
other questions--about those lessons? And then within the
restrictions of Title 10, how are you continuing to support
northern border enforcement?
Admiral Winnefeld. Your first question, as far as the
Olympics, I think we took a lot of good, solid lessons out of
that, and I would be happy to provide some of those for the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 177.]
Admiral Winnefeld. I think most importantly was just the
close cooperation that we have between U.S. Northern Command
and Canada Command. My partner, Walt Semianiw, up there and I
are very close. We have a Canadian-U.S. civil assistance plan,
where U.S. military is able to support Canadian military and
vice versa under the imprimatur of our two--State Department
and their Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
So that was a very good news story. And it has really
brought out lessons that we could potentially use in a future
disaster, either in support of Canada or the U.S., so very
positive.
In terms of the northern border, 4,000 miles of very
difficult territory. Since 2008, we have provided about two
events per year that are about 30 days per event. I think we
spent around $1.8 million or $1.4 million over the last few
years on that.
I would candidly tell you that, in that time, we have
managed to assist in the apprehension of 181 pounds of
marijuana, which is about the same amount that an ultra-light
drops at any given night coming across the southern border.
At the same time, JTF [Joint Task Force] North has done
exceptional work on the southern border. I think in a 2-month
period from November through January, they assisted in the
apprehension of around 17,000 pounds of marijuana and assisted
in the apprehension of the suspects that killed Agent Terry on
our side of the border.
So we have to consider this as an investment strategy. We
do continue to support our interagency partners on the northern
border with radar, ground sensors, and that sort of thing, and
we will continue to do so.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, and I understand the balance that you have
to meet, because clearly from the testimony and from questions
here the issues on the southern border are much more difficult.
But we live, you know, we live where we live and certainly want
to--to the extent that you can continue supporting that
cooperation, appreciate it.
But your testimony also covered the Arctic, and I was
curious what you would do differently than the U.S. Coast Guard
and what would you share with the U.S. Coast Guard. I also note
in your testimony your commander's estimate is done, it sounds
like, for the Arctic. Can you tell us where you are on that one
and when we can expect something?
Admiral Winnefeld. We are working very hard on a
commander's estimate, really good progress. I really benefit,
by the way, inside my command by having 125 Canadians there
with an integrated staff. It not only allows me to benefit from
their expertise in the Arctic, which is considerable, but it
also enables me to have true transparency with my Canadian
partners in that regard, so there is no suspicion going back
and forth.
So we are making great progress on that. We have pretty
much settled on the primary themes being defense, security and
safety with international cooperation to peacefully open the
Arctic, you know, to assist in that as best we can without
militarizing the Arctic. I also have a partner at the end of
the table in U.S. European Command, who has got a vested
interest in things in the Arctic going well as well.
One of the interesting things that we will be approaching
within our own process is the notion of working cooperatively
with Canada so that we can ensure that the capabilities that we
may invest in as the Arctic opens up are done in a
complementary fashion rather than a redundant fashion so that
we can both be more efficient. And I think that is a good news
story. If we can carry that ball down the field, it would be
very helpful.
And then in terms of our own internal U.S. military sorts
of things, we work closely with the Coast Guard, and we work
with the various services, in particular the Navy, who has had
a very good positive effort and progress to study what the
future needs are for the Navy in the Arctic.
And I think we have got some work ahead of us, frankly,
what kind of capabilities we are going to need, but I think we
have a good understanding of the gaps in capability that will
become apparent as the Arctic opens.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, and I think the reason I bring that up is
because, obviously, the Coast Guard does as well, has a good
understanding of the gaps. To the extent that we are not being
redundant among our own services, but rather investing
together, I think will be better for the taxpayers.
Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for being here.
Admiral Winnefeld, I am concerned about the effects of
budget constraints on the GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense]
program. First of all, the 2011 budget requests reduce GMD
funding by about $185 million from the fiscal year 2011 for a
total of about $1.16 billion, which is obviously designed to
sustain the 30 GBIs [Ground-Based Interceptors] that we have in
Alaska and California, as well as the other GMD programs.
And I guess the first part of the question is are 30 GBIs
enough, or is it time to reassess supply, given the potential
need to do some additional testing?
I also understand that current 2011 budgets left the GMD
program operating with a budget that is really $324 million
less than was anticipated for 2011. Part of that, I am sure, is
the CR [Continuing Resolution] and some of the other challenges
that you are dealing with, and I apologize for that on behalf
of Congress.
And I know that there are some recent flight intercept test
failures that are adding to the challenge. I guess I just want
to make sure that we know that you have enough funds to
successfully implement an effective GMD that will not fail when
the rubber hits the road.
Admiral Winnefeld. Thank you, sir, for that question. First
of all, the funds, of course, go to the Missile Defense Agency,
and I am the operator of that system, the trigger-puller, if
you will. But it goes without saying that I would pay very
close attention to the health and future of the ballistic
missile defense system that we have.
Regarding the budget, I would say that my very good
partner, General O'Reilly at the Missile Defense Agency--I
believe he would say that most of those funding reductions are
based on efficiencies and that it is just good work on the part
of his internal staff to try to squeeze as much out of that----
Mr. Franks. I just met with him, and so that is part of the
reason for the question.
Admiral Winnefeld. Right. I would say that the 2012 budget
is going to do some very important things for me. One, it is
going to procure some additional radars, the AN/TPY-2 [Army
Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance] radars that will give us
more situational awareness forward. It will provide an East
Coast communications node for us that will increase the
accuracy of our missiles, and it is going to keep the GBI line
open, which I think is very important to me, because it gives
us more options for the future as we study these.
I would also add there is a good, robust intellectual
effort going on within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy that is
bringing all the players together to look at what the future
holds in case the threat starts to accelerate a little bit. And
we are aware of the potential for that happening.
And I am pleased with what I have seen in that effort. I
believe it is soon going to be briefed to the Secretary of
Defense and that subsequent to that Congress would be briefed
as well. But I am comfortable in my ability to defend the
country from the current limited ballistic missile threats that
I am charged with defending against.
I would echo your comments on the CR. That has some
definite potential for slowing things down for General O'Reilly
to include delays in component testing, delays in Navy
ballistic missile defense ship modernization.
It delays some of the testing that we would like to do. It
will delay the construction of Missile Field 2 in Fort Greely,
and so on down the line. So if we can get beyond the CRs, I
would be with you in that regard.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, sir.
Well, let me----
General Fraser, forgive me. I am going to skip over here
and talk to Admiral Stavridis, if I could.
Recent evidence, Admiral, has emerged that the Iranian
regime has released a video that suggests that they may
escalate hostilities in an effort to fulfill this prophecy of
Mahdi. And that includes, of course, destroying Israel and
conquering Jerusalem.
And I understand that the X-Band Missile Defense Radar
System there in Israel now is obviously interconnected with our
U.S. theater missile defenses and that we have fire control.
But I am concerned that the budget constraints will prevent
these systems from effectively mitigating on Iranian threats to
the region.
So I guess the question here is how confident are you that
our current missile defense network in that region can
effectively mitigate an Iranian threat that seems to be
increasing or even escalating? And what do you believe needs to
be done additionally to ensure that we can protect key U.S.
interests, including the State of Israel, from such a threat?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I do believe that as we look at the
emerging ballistic missile threat from Iran and from other
actors both in that region and elsewhere around the world, it
is a threat for which we must be very mindful.
The cooperation we have with Israel in that regard is
strong, and I believe it will continue. I had a chance to go
see a missile defense exercise a year ago. I am going to
another one this summer. It is a capability we work very
closely on.
The good news is we are now bringing online, as you know,
the European phased adaptive approach, and I will send you some
material for the record that will cover that part of my answer.
Thank you, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 179.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I would like to begin with Admiral Winnefeld. In reading
your testimony, I was taken by the reference to the National
Guard. In our Readiness Subcommittee, we had talked about the
National Guard sort of enhancing the forces when we get to the
end strength issues.
You specifically mentioned that you have 40 as part of U.S.
NORTHCOM. And I am also curious, given the fact that we have
the issues of, of course, Article 10 and Title 32, how is it
that you are able to do that? Because they are being utilized,
or appear to be utilized, for issues regarding, really, our own
defense, and there is, of course, as you know, through the
Constitution and various other laws, that there are
restrictions on what the military can do.
So if you can explain to me, because this is something that
I have been very curious about, as we talked about it in
Readiness, as to how do we get the National Guard working with
the military.
And it is also interesting, because, you know, you are Navy
and, of course, you don't really have any of that, and they are
under the control of the governors and not Congress or the
military. So if you could educate me on that, I would
appreciate it.
Admiral Winnefeld. Sure. First of all, I want to stress
that I am just very, very pleased with the relationship that I
have with the National Guard, both personally with my
counterpart, General Craig McKinley, and the adjutants general
of the 54 states and territories and Washington, D.C. They are
good friends. We are very close partners, and I think it is a
very good news story.
I am also very pleased and proud with the dependence that I
have on the National Guard for things that may surprise you. My
missile defense trigger-pullers are all National Guardsmen from
Colorado or Alaska, tremendous capability in the air
sovereignty alert piece with the Air Guard. And it goes on and
on.
So it is important that I have National Guard
representation in my headquarters, both culturally,
technically, so we properly understand our relationship with
the Guard and don't stray outside the lines while we use them.
And the Guardsmen that are in my headquarters tend to be on
Title 10 ADOS [Active Duty for Operational Support], that sort
of thing.
And so we, obviously, have a raft of lawyers that make sure
we are doing this properly and legally and that sort of thing
and that they are associated in general with National Guard-
related issues, which is where the legality comes in.
And I not only have, I think, it is 45 of them in my
headquarters, but on any given day temporarily coming to the
headquarters to do work and that sort of thing, I might have
upwards of 100. And I am very proud of that fact.
It has really helped our headquarters in our understanding
of our missions, many missions we have, and in particular the
way that we would support the states in the wake of a disaster,
working through FEMA. So I think it is a very good news story.
Ms. Hanabusa. Well, as an attorney, I have never heard of
attorneys playing a critical role to keep people on.
Admiral Winnefeld. We have 10,000 of them in the Department
of Defense.
Ms. Hanabusa. Along the same lines, Admiral, you also
mentioned the concept of transnational criminal organizations
as a major focus. And I guess that has also triggered the
interest in the National Guard component as well, because, you
know, we don't usually traditionally view the military as
somebody engaging transnational criminal, or TCOs, as you say.
Can you also explain to me how that is interfacing with the
National Guard, if it does at all, because that seems to be
more of a local state issue than a military one?
Admiral Winnefeld. Sure, that is a very good question. And
in general, first, I would say that anything that we do
regarding transnational criminal organizations, whether it be
domestically or in support of our Mexican partners, is always
in support of civilian agencies, in particular law enforcement.
We don't take on any of those roles ourselves.
On the U.S. side of the border, we give considerable
support on the active duty side using JTF North to our law
enforcement partners, in particular Customs and Border
Protection and ICE [U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement]
and those sorts of things.
When it comes to the National Guard and the recent
deployment of National Guard to the border, that is completely
outside of my responsibility, in the sense that they are
brought under Title 32 active status. They work for the state
governors in that status.
And by virtue of the fact that they are in Title 32,
technically they can do law enforcement operations, although I
don't believe they are. They are typically doing entry
identification team support to the Border Patrol and that sort
of thing.
So I have no command-and-control authority whatsoever over
the National Guardsmen who have been sent to the border. I
watch it, of course. I keep in touch with my Guard partners on
how it is going.
Ms. Hanabusa. But they are an integral part of your TCO
operations?
Admiral Winnefeld. The National Guardsmen who are deployed
to the borders are not part of my counter TCO operations. They
really work for the state governors and in turn work closely
with the Customs and Border Protection team.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all three of you for your service to our country.
Admiral Stavridis, if I am saying it right, the Government
Accountability Office has criticized EUCOM--European Command--
and U.S. Army-Europe for its cost assessments regarding options
for retaining four brigade combat teams in Europe, saying the
analyses were, quote-unquote--``poorly documented, limited in
scope and based on questionable assumptions.''
What have you done to correct this problem? Do you agree
with the GAO [Government Accountability Office]? Will retention
of three or four brigade combat teams in Europe add significant
infrastructure sustainment costs? And what are the cost
implications?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, this is an area in which there has
been a great deal of analysis going both ways. And I would say
that, first of all, I will provide you--because it is detailed
and technical, and I would like to come back to you on the
record and provide that in some measured way to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 180.]
Admiral Stavridis. As a general proposition, I think over
the last year we have become much closer in the way we viewed
this as between Department of Army, EUCOM, GAO and OSD [the
Office of the Secretary of Defense], because OSD has really
stepped up and led the study that the chairman asked me about
earlier. So as a result of that study coming out, I think you
will have an opportunity to see that we have brought this
analysis together in a way that is sensible.
The root of the question is always, do you save money or do
you spend more money when you forward deploy troops from CONUS
[the Continental United States] or from a forward European
Command platform, if you will? And so there has been some back
and forth between the entities you mentioned, Congressman, in
regard to everything from cost of shipping to moving, we would
say, from fort to port and port to fort forward.
So I would say over the last year we have brought that
analysis together, and it is reflected in the report that will
come out shortly, and I will get you more of the technical
detail and provide it to you.
Mr. Coffman. Let me ask a quick follow-up question in
regard to that. If forces based in Europe are not committed to
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in your opinion, how
many brigade combat teams should be forward-based in Europe?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, I think that it is difficult to
answer that question. And I would point here to the Libya
operation, in the sense of we never know what is going to pop
up. And, obviously, we are not sending ground troops to Libya.
That is very clear. However, it is indicative of the potential
for emergence of new tasking.
So the analysis that we have provided to the Department of
Defense reflects the potential for change in the world. And the
change can be good as we transition in Afghanistan and reduce
it, and the change can potentially be bad, if we see an
emergent mission somewhere.
Mr. Coffman. And do you believe that the operation right
now in Libya has the appropriate force mix between U.S. and
coalition forces?
Admiral Stavridis. I do. And I would say that we today in
NATO took over the mission, and we are reducing the U.S.
component of it measurably. And I think you will see our allies
increasingly engaged, and that is appropriate.
And the mix of forces is sea and air forces, since we are
not going to use ground troops there. And certainly that is
good, in the sense that it is different than the forces that we
need in Afghanistan, a landlocked country. So I believe we are
adequately resourced at the moment at NATO, and I believe that
the balance between U.S. and coalition is appropriate.
Mr. Coffman. Let me just say one word for the record that
the President said in his speech, I think, on Monday night that
it took 8 years to do regime change in Iraq. Actually, it took
3 weeks to do regime change in Iraq. It took 8 years in the
aftermath of that regime change, given the fact that there was
then a humanitarian catastrophe and sectarian warfare that
dragged the U.S. into it for 8 years.
General Fraser, could you speak a little bit about China
and its growing influence in Latin America?
General Fraser. Thank you, Congressman.
Today I see it primarily in the diplomatic and the
commercial realm, really, and a two-way street, if you will.
Many of the countries and nations within Latin America and the
Caribbean are reaching out to China as they see that as an
economic opportunity for them as well as China coming in and
working within Latin America.
Outside of Asia, Latin America is the second destination
for Chinese investment.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have a question for Admiral Winnefeld. Actually, I would
like to make a statement, and I want to thank my colleague from
Hawaii for bringing up the National Guard. We are, indeed, very
proud of our National Guard in Guam. And I think if my
statistics are right that, per capita, we have the largest
number of National Guardsmen in the United States.
Is that correct?
Admiral Winnefeld. That is a very good question. Because
Guam lies outside of my area of responsibility, I have not paid
attention. But I will certainly look into that for you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 179.]
Ms. Bordallo. Well, Congressman Wilson was with me when we
heard those statistics.
Also, having just returned from a CODEL [Congressional
Delegation] with Congressman Wilson and other members of the
Armed Services Committee, we were shocked during a country
briefing to hear that over 1 million people are addicted to
drugs in Afghanistan. Is that a figure you have heard?
Admiral Stavridis. I can take that question.
Ms. Bordallo. Yes?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, ma'am, that is accurate. I will
give you another one. In Russia today there are 1.5 million
people addicted to heroin.
So this is part of this supply chain of poppy to opium to
heroin that is moving largely from Afghanistan through the
region and contributing to deleterious effects in corruption,
in human cost, as you allude to, a very great challenge.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, we were truly shocked at some of the
numbers that we heard.
Also, Admiral, I would like to ask you, you have often
discussed the most effective method to national security is a
whole-of-government approach.
You mentioned your efforts in great detail in your posture
statement. Would you please describe to us what you have
learned from this approach and if you still believe that this
is the best path forward?
Admiral Stavridis. I do believe in this very turbulent 21st
century that we need to bring all elements of national
capability together to solve security challenges, because so
many of them are transnational, nontraditional problems that
direct military activity will not solve.
We have to have Department of State, AID and Defense, the
so-called three Ds, working together--defense, diplomacy and
development. And I believe it is actually much larger than
those three agencies.
We have talked a lot today about many other government
agencies, from the Drug Enforcement Administration to the FAA
[Federal Aviation Administration] to the Department of Justice,
Department of Transportation, Department of Homeland Security,
obviously.
We have to bring all of these elements of capability
together to bear against the challenges that we have all talked
about today, because they go across borders, they are
nontraditional. And I believe that is a very important aspect
of our security going forward.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, I think my colleagues would agree with
me, during our recent CODEL, we did find that, working
together, all of these agencies were very important to our
success.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much.
And I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. West.
Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.
And, gentlemen, it really is an honor to have you all here
today.
And, to Admiral Stavridis, I understand that we have
transitioned the combat theater of operations to NATO control
right now. My question is this. And having been on some NATO
missions, I know that lots of times that CJMD, the combined
joint manning document, lots of times has to be picked up ad
hoc to be filled. So my question is, what percentage of the
CJMD are we finding that the United States is going to have to
fill with the NATO C-2 [Command and Control]?
Admiral Stavridis. A couple of answers to that, and, first,
Congressman, thank you for your service, as well.
Mr. West. Not a problem.
Admiral Stavridis. And obviously spent some time in NATO.
I would say that let us start with the command structure
itself. Today the command elements are an Italian CAOC
[Combined Air and Space Operations Center] and their operation
center in Poggio Renatico, commanded by an Italian one-star.
There is a three-star Italian admiral who is in charge of the
arms embargo at Maritime Component Command-Naples; in Izmir,
Turkey, the Air Component Command Center, headed by a three-
star American with a three-star French deputy. And that flows
up to the three-star Canadian general, who is heading up the
joint task force embedded in Joint Forces Command-Naples.
Of that command structure, to pick one number, for
example--but it is an important one--would be flag and general
officers. In all of those entities, there are about 40 admirals
and generals. Only five will be from the United States. The
rest will be alliance officers.
Throughout the operation, I think the balance will be
somewhere around 50-50 as we move forward. Over the last week
or so, taking strike sorties as an example, they have been
balanced about 50-50 between the alliance and the United
States.
And then, finally, to take a third example, I think that we
will see over the next couple of weeks as we move into this, we
will see the strike part of this and the aviation combat air
patrol will be filled largely by the allies, and the United
States will shift to enablers--things like intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance, refueling, CSAR, combat search
and rescue.
So I think the balance feels about right in terms of
alliance, and I am confident that we will be able to fill the
CJMD, CJSOR [Combined Joint Statement of Requirements]
appropriately as we go forward.
Mr. West. Have you found yourself having to switch hats
back and forth to task yourself as the EUCOM commander to----
Admiral Stavridis. It is actually no, because the big
change over the last 5 years was the stand-up of U.S. Africa
Command. As you very well recall, Africa and Europe used to be
part of one enormous combatant command, and I think the
department very wisely, with the support of Congress, stood up
Africa Command. So it really has been a transition from a U.S.
commander, Carter Ham, General Carter Ham, over to me as the
NATO commander, and that is in progress today.
Mr. West. Very well.
To General Fraser and Admiral Winnefeld, first of all,
thanks, and it is great to see both of you again.
General Fraser, it was great that your staff hosted me down
there at your headquarters--a very beautiful, pristine
headquarters and a very functional headquarters.
One of the concerns I have is--we have discussed before--
with the TCOs. But we also do have a radical Islamic threat
that we are starting to see--Central America, South America,
and even creeping into Mexico.
We discussed while we were at your headquarters these new
mini-submersibles that we are starting to see. Of course, today
those mini-submersibles could be used by the TCOs for drugs,
but what could they possibly be used for in the future?
When I go to the Border Patrol Web site, I see this
category called ``OTMs,'' which stands for ``Other Than
Mexicans.'' And I am sure every one of us know who fits into
that category. So my big concern is, are we starting to see the
age-old maxim of ``the enemy of my enemy is my friend''?
Is there an alliance that is somewhat growing in your two
respective AORs between these TCOs and some of these radical
Islamic non-state, non-uniformed belligerents? And how are we
tracking it?
General Fraser. Congressman, thank you for that question.
There is a lot of complexity to the relations of the TCOs
within the region. And even though extremist organizations are
involved in illicit activity, I have not seen a connection
between those two groups as they conduct their own illicit
activities.
The one connection that we see growing is the area we term
``special interest aliens,'' and those are individuals coming
from other parts outside of Latin America, who have and use the
illicit trafficking routes within Latin America for entry into
the United States. We are just seeing connections there. That
is not necessarily connected to extremist organizations, but we
are continuing to watch.
Mr. West. Thank you.
The Chairman. If you could give it to him for the record,
that would be appreciated.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 180.]
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to follow up on a couple of
things that you have touched on. The chairman began by asking
about force structure in Europe and the study that is going on.
But I think a lot of us here at home question about why we have
so many military folks still in Europe.
And you touched briefly on the cost aspect of this. But can
you discuss a little bit the operational advantages to having
forces deployed in Europe should they be needed in a Libya-like
situation or elsewhere in the Middle East or North Africa? How
big a deal is that, to have those forces that far in advance?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think it is a very important
advantage having our forces forward in Europe. As I mentioned,
we have come down a long way since the Cold War, appropriately,
from 400,000 down to about 80,000 today. Those 80,000 I think
contribute in at least three very distinct and obvious ways.
You touched on the first, which is geography. I think that
as we look forward into this turbulent 21st century, I think
the possibility of continuing U.S. engagement forward in the
region in which we are involved today is fairly high. And as a
result, having forces that are forward gives us geographic
immediacy in terms of response.
And with Libya, for example, the U.S. Air Force, which is
still very strong in Europe, had jets, helicopters, refuelers
all based there that could immediately be chopped to Africa
Command and be on-station. So I think that first advantage of
geography is very crucial.
A second one is that interaction of our troops with all of
the European partners, where we learn from each other. And I
think that is an advantage that we tend to overlook at times.
But being able to operate so frequently together in so many
different places in and around Europe, including our crown
jewel training range, Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr in Germany, as
well as the new bases in the east, is a second real advantage--
that kind of continuous engagement.
And then thirdly, the presence of the United States there
is what encourages our allies to come forward and operate with
us. Because we operate with them, we live with them, it creates
an environment in which we can generate 45,000 non-U.S. troops
for Afghanistan. We can generate today--for example, off of
Libya, there are 40 ships operating, only about 12 from the
United States, the rest from our European allies. Why is that?
Because we are embedded with them and operate with them.
So I would say geography, mutual training and the benefits
of that, and finally the ability to leverage these forces
forward are three very strong advantages.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me ask you about one other thing. You
mentioned today NATO takes over the Libyan operation. Are the
rules of engagement clear? I think we all assume that if an
airplane gets up in the sky, a Libyan airplane, it will be shot
down. If a tank moves, it seems like the tank is taken out. But
it is not clear to me, if there are a group of Libyan
government soldiers massing together, what our reaction is to
that.
And so I guess my question is, are the rules of engagement
clear? What can you tell us about them? And in a NATO context,
are they determined by the least common denominator? Or who
sets them?
Admiral Stavridis. Terrific question. I think we should
probably not discuss specifics of rules of engagement because
of classification. I will provide you the actual rules of
engagement.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 177.]
Admiral Stavridis. And I think you will be struck as you
see how similar they are to U.S. normal unilateral rules of
engagement in format, in style, and in fact in intent and use
of terminology, anywhere from ``hostile act'' to ``hostile
intent'' to ``penetration of technical area,'' et cetera, et
cetera, et cetera.
And this goes back to your previous question of an
advantage. We have worked together so long with these allies
that we are fairly close in our tactics, techniques, procedures
and, yes, our rules of engagement.
In terms of how they are generated, they come up from the
operators. The first set of rules of engagement were generated
from the operational commander, who is heading this operation
down in Naples. They come into my headquarters. They are very
carefully vetted by my operational international NATO team. And
then they go up to the North Atlantic Council, and they are
approved there. All that flowed very smoothly in this process.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank the distinguished panelists for being here and
also for your leadership for our servicemen and women.
I guess first a comment, and it is conveyed with the
deepest and most profound respect for my colleagues and the
panelists. But, you know, on the issue of the forward presence
and some of the virtues that have been put forward today, I
guess it would be precisely my point that I am concerned about
us being forever or aggressively being involved in operations
overseas.
I have opposed the actions in Libya. I think we have so
much on the plate right now that we need to do to bring closure
with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan. We are certainly involved
in a global challenge from extremist networks that are designed
to protect our cherished way of life.
And as we bring those operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to
a closure and look to perfect and to neutralize, perfect our
counterterrorism operations and neutralize the extremist
threats and learn from the past, I don't want to see us get
involved, as much as I am empathetic with those who want to
live free.
So I guess I would respectfully disagree that we get added
benefit from forward presence. And when asked that we consider
the fact that while these are worthy goals--reassurance,
deterrence, training and engaging in operations--I am not
convinced that that must be so with forward presence. I think
you can also do these things using joint exercises going
forward. I just wanted to make that comment.
The question I have is actually for Admiral Winnefeld, and
I must say right up front that I am critical of some of the
expansions in our federal government over the last decade as it
relates to protecting our way of life. I just wanted to say
that up front because I m going to ask you the question with
regard to the whole-of-government, Department of Defense,
Northern Command and Department of Homeland Security.
Can you perhaps provide some clarity on unity of effort?
Who is in charge with regard to border security,
counterterrorism operations here, cyber defense and response to
natural disaster? Who is in charge?
Admiral Winnefeld. Thank you for your question, sir.
First, I would say that we have a very good whole-of-
government synergistic relationship with our various partners
inside the federal government, to include the Department of
Homeland Security and also inside DOD [the Department of
Defense]. In general, I find myself, unless I am pulling the
trigger for a ballistic missile defense or some sort of air-
breathing threat to North America, that most of what I do is in
support of my partners.
So in the event of a disaster, for example, there are
capabilities that the Department of Defense can bring to bear
that we would use other places as well, potentially overseas in
a contingency or something like that, that are either very
specific capabilities that are in short supply among our
partners inside government, or they are capacities--just sheer
numbers of people that can respond to a disaster, who are well
trained, disciplined, you know, as your experience in the
military would probably inform you, where we can assist our
partners.
And we have very carefully drawn rules and limitations and
processes and procedures by which we provide that support. So
my very good partner in the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Craig Fugate, is in the lead in the federal response to
a disaster in support of the various states. If he needs my
support, he will--there is a process in place--the Stafford
Act, Economy Act, where he can provide a mission assignment to
me, and we will respond according to the Secretary of Defense's
willingness to do that. So that is just one small example.
Regarding the cyber piece, I would, of course, defer to
Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command in that regard, but
they have struck a very good relationship with Department of
Homeland Security in terms of what the way ahead is for
supporting this country in the event of a cyber attack that
could be fairly debilitating.
So I would want to assure you that we do have minimal
redundancies, that we have appropriate procedures and rules in
place where we can work closely together as a whole-of-
government.
Mr. Gibson. I appreciate the comments and know that every
day you are giving everything you have to protect us, and we
are just incredibly proud. I would just say that I think that
there were other ways that we could have aligned our
organizations that I think would have been more effective, but
for now I will just yield back. Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you.
General Fraser, you mentioned earlier with respect to Mr.
Coffman's comments relevant to China's activities in Venezuela,
and clearly the numbers show that it is commercial, but in your
statement you talk about military arms sales to Venezuela,
Russian. They had portable weapons, automatic weapons, the AK-
47 deal they made with Chavez and also, I guess, sales to
Bolivia.
Can you talk to us somewhat about our visibility as to what
Chavez is doing with respect to those relationships? Fold into
that the Iranian work and Russian work with Chavez in terms of
at least talking about a nuclear power program within Venezuela
and how that might morph into something else that is more
threatening to us than just his bluster.
Interesting comment made the other day about wanting, I
guess, Venezuelans to eat less every day to reduce their
caloric intake. I didn't realize that was such a strategic
threat to Venezuela, but maybe it is, to talk about how he is--
give me some thoughts about the military aspects of what China
and Russia are doing in Venezuela and South America in general.
General Fraser. Thank you very much for that question,
Congressman. If I look broadly across the region and look at
China, it is very much focused on commercial and diplomatic
efforts. They do have military programs not just with
Venezuela, but with many of the countries in the region, where
they are inviting individuals to come attend courses within
China.
They are also looking to establish closer military-to-
military relationships with partners in the region. And they
are beginning to sell more weapons, the K-8. It is a light
attack aircraft and a trainer that they are selling to
Venezuela and that Bolivia is also looking at right now. I
still see it very much in a commercial and diplomatic and in a
business aspect.
Russia, I still see again very much focused in arms and
also working to address both commercial and diplomatic efforts.
Do we have a lot of visibility? I don't have a lot of
visibility into what all those agreements are. I see a number
of agreements made. Those agreements tend to take a long time
to come to fruition.
Specifically to your question on Iran and the issue with
nuclear power, there was an agreement that Venezuela and Iran
signed, but subsequent to the concerns in Japan over the
Fukushima reactor site, at least the statements from President
Chavez are that he has put a hold on any future development of
nuclear power.
Mr. Conaway. We have had a change in the presidency in
Colombia. You mentioned the great work the Colombians did led
by their courageous President Uribe. Now with Santos do you see
any changes in their focus on what successes Colombia has had
with Plan Colombia and our involvement with the new Santos-led
government?
General Fraser. I see President Santos continuing the great
work that President Uribe did, and expanding it. He has
reestablished diplomatic relations with Venezuela as well as
Ecuador, and there are growing military as well as commercial
and other relationships there. Across all his borders, he is
working to expand that.
If you look within Colombia itself beyond Plan Colombia, it
is now a consolidation plan, and he is even looking to put in
place a broader plan, a $240 billion effort over 4 years to
expand the Colombian government's presence throughout the
region.
In addition to that, he is reaching out beyond Colombia. He
is helping support the Mexican military with training some
helicopter pilots. He is involved in Central America. He is
looking to see where they can provide their lessons to other
partners and share their experiences.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
General Fraser. So it is a very positive effort.
Mr. Conaway. The requirements--on page 22 of your
statement, you talk about the needs that you have. Specific
needs include manned and unmanned aerial vehicles, light
detection and ranging technology, a variety of things. Does the
2012 budget request support acquisition of these capabilities
for Southern Command?
General Fraser. These are capabilities that are existing
broadly across the Department of Defense, so they are
continuing to progress and provide those capabilities. And then
we will work on a year-to-year basis on where the concerns and
where their priorities are within the department to----
Mr. Conaway. So your 2012 budget request gives you access--
I mean, these aren't new, but they give you the proper access
to deploy these things in your AOR adequately.
General Fraser. As we look across the globe and you look at
all the concerns that we have around the globe, within their
priorities and within the concerns that we have, I have
adequate access to those types of capability.
Is there opportunity for more? Yes, sir. But if we put it
in context, I am comfortable with where we are.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Thanks, Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Admiral Stavridis, General Fraser, Admiral Winnefeld, thank
you, each of you, for the job you are doing. Please convey our
thanks. As a member of the Armed Services Committee, all of us,
I am sure, would ask you to convey our thanks to those that you
command for the great job that they are doing. And thank you
for your time here today.
This committee will now be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 30, 2011
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 30, 2011
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 30, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Admiral Stavridis. On April 4, 2011 EUCOM representatives provided
a copy of the then current NATO rules of engagement for Libya
operations to Representative Thornberry's office. [See page 33.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Admiral Winnefeld. Lessons from our support to the Vancouver 2010
Olympics (Operation PODIUM) pertain to Command and Control;
Relationships and Interaction; Information Management; and Guiding
Documents, Concept Plans (CONPLANs), and Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs).
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Multiple Supported Commanders. During the Olympics, there
were two supported commanders: Commander, Canada Command (Canada COM)
and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). Although there were no fundamental
doctrinal issues with multiple supported commanders and there were no
issues with defining tasks during the actual operation, there were
minor issues with planning, theater activation, theater deactivation
and personnel administration that were complicated by the dual nature
of the supported commanders.
Way Ahead. In conjunction with the Secretary, Joint
Staff (SJS), develop the standing Canadian Special Security
Event framework, recommend modifications to the Chief of
Defence Staff (CDS) Command and Control Directive, and provide
input for new CDS Initiating Directives to clearly identify
roles, responsibilities, and missions for the supported
commanders.
Tactical Control (TACON) of Forces. There were concerns
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) regarding TACON
of U.S forces to the Canadian Forces (CF). Although the Canada-United
States Civil Assistance Plan (CAP) clearly states that the host nation
will have TACON over visiting forces, there were concerns stated during
Operation PODIUM that were only resolved after long discussions.
Way Ahead. One possible resolution of this issue is
to have the signing authority for the CAP at the SecDef and CDS
level, rather than, Commander, USNORTHCOM and Commander, Canada
COM level. This could also be an issue to be resolved by
Permanent Joint Board on Defense.
Common Operating Picture (COP)--Tracking of Forces. There
appears to be different expectations within USNORTHCOM and Canada COM
as to the COP. Forces within Canada are not equipped with a Situational
Awareness System (Blue Force Tracker). Therefore, the level of fidelity
available to and requested by Commander, Canada COM may be less than
what is available to Commander, USNORTHCOM.
Way Ahead. A clear understanding of what a COP means
to each of the nations is required for the CAP. Although this
will often be commander dependent, it will still establish a
baseline of understanding from which planning and information
management requirements can be developed.
RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERACTION
Medical Overall. There are a significant number of
hurdles that need to be overcome for medical personnel, pharmaceuticals
and counter-measures to be employed cross-border. These issues should
continue to be addressed through both governments' medical services so
that the employment of medical personnel, pharmaceuticals and counter-
measures can be expedited through a clearly defined process.
Way Ahead.
Patient Regulation. To achieve maximum
benefit should patient regulation be required within
Canada, a more robust patient regulation system should
be developed. Canada could either modify the existing
U.S. National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) or develop
a de novo Canadian system. Either system should be
compatible with the U.S. system to facilitate moving
patients across the border should that be required.
Reciprocal Licensing. Refine three courses of
action and determine best course: continue current
practice of emergency waiving of licensure at the state
and provincial level; seek pre-approval for military
and NDMS personnel based on credentialing processes
currently used for these personnel; or, build on
existing provincial/state cross border public health
agreements to ease reciprocity of licensure.
Cross Border. Overall, the preparation for U.S. forces to
come across the border into Canada was well coordinated. However, there
may be a difference between deliberate planning of crossing operations
and crisis planning. Several issues still need to be further
investigated with regards to border crossing.
Way Ahead.
The Visiting Forces Act (VFA) and Status of
Forces Act (SOFA) should be validated for contingency
operations (not just exercises and training).
The issue of servicemembers with criminal
records needs to be examined and if the requirement to
pre-screen these members exists, this should be
captured in the CAP.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Canadian Communications Systems Network (CSNI)
Effectiveness of Access for the United States. CSNI was chosen for
Operation PODIUM because it is the main Canadian secure system and the
system is widely available within NORAD and USNORTHCOM. Other terminals
were added as required (Washington State and Joint Task Force Civil
Support) to ensure even greater connectivity. However, there are
significant challenges to using CSNI in the United States.
Way Ahead.
We should continue to pursue the initiative
to allow interoperability between CSNI and the Secret
Internet Protocol Router Network, particularly in terms
of email between the commands.
When Law Enforcement Agencies are involved,
more planning and greater effort will be required to
develop an Information Management (IM) plan that
recognizes law enforcement sensitivities, but doesn't
create a military ``firewall'' for information.
Sharing of Lessons Learned. Canada and the United
States have different software systems for capturing lessons
learned and these systems do not talk to each other. In
addition, there is no formalized process for the three commands
to sharing lessons learned.
Way Ahead. A formalized ``knowledge sharing''
process for sharing lessons learned should be developed
for the commands.
GUIDING DOCUMENTS, CONPLANs, AND MOUs
Guiding Documents, CONPLANs and MOUs. In general, the
guiding documents that are in place worked for Operation PODIUM.
However, several of these documents should be modified or re-examined
in light of some of the lessons learned during the operation.
CAP. The CAP should
Include a detailed IM plan to provide a
baseline for future security events.
Document processes that are in place so that
medical requirements can be expedited.
Contain a legal annex that identifies key
differences between operating in the United States and
in Canada, and highlights key legal authority documents
like the SOFA and VFA.
Include a financial annex to provide a
framework for fiscal reimbursement and dispensation.
SOFA and VFA. Both of these documents were used
extensively by military and interagency organizations to
support the deployment of U.S. forces across the border.
Applicability of the VFA and SOFA needs to be confirmed prior
to the commencement of any particular operation.
CF CDS C2 Directive and CDS Initiating Directives.
The CF CDS C2 Directive should be revisited with the SJS to
clarify some of the relationships between NORAD and Canada COM,
especially during special security events. Since dual supported
commanders for operations will likely not disappear, a more
detailed understanding of the linkages during planning, theater
activation/deactivation and personnel administration is
required. [See page 23.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
General Fraser. What we have not done yet, and what we are working
to do, is to ensure a regional, integrated counterdrug strategy--
connecting our efforts in Colombia, the Andean ridge, Central America,
Mexico, the Caribbean, and the U.S. The problems Mexico is facing are
implicitly connected to the cocaine production in the Andean region;
that cocaine is trafficked through the Central American corridor,
through Mexico, and into the U.S. or abroad to the rest of the world.
As an example, USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM are actively working together
to ensure there is no seam between our commands, focusing in particular
on strengthening border security along Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize.
To be truly impactful, our counter-narcotics strategy needs to be
coordinated in concert with our partner nations, taking into account
their capabilities, resources, and particular concerns as well as with
our interagency partners, such as Department of Justice and Department
of Homeland Security, under the lead of the Department of State, to
ensure an integrated and comprehensive strategy.
In spite of continued regional successes, many challenges continue
to exist. We are actively working to promote information sharing among
countries in the region to better coordinate our counter drug strategy.
Regional security initiatives like the Central American Regional
Security Initiative (CARSI) and Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
(CBSI) are designed to build partner nation capability, which
USSOUTHCOM actively supports through our engagement and security
cooperation activities in the region. We envision a region that is
capable and willing to help address security threats that affect all
nations in this hemisphere.
Recent world economic challenges, as well as other security
challenges, have resulted in limitations on available resources. This
has resulted in a void of assets which otherwise would have the
potential to disrupt roughly 66% of the actionable intelligence driven
cases. In contrast, transnational criminal organizations adapt quickly
to effective counter measures and have significant financial resources.
The recent confirmation that these organizations use submarines, called
Self-Propelled Fully Submersibles, underscores the technology and
resources available to these organizations.
There is no silver bullet. Through the engagement efforts of U.S.
Southern Command, regional cooperation will continue to evolve and
strengthen. [See page 22.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Admiral Winnefeld. Ma'am, you are correct. Guam has the highest per
capita National Guard membership in the nation with 1500+ Guardsmen for
180,800 persons. [See page 30.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Admiral Stavridis. Implementation of the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA) occupies a great deal of our attention in the U.S.
European Command (EUCOM) theater, and EUCOM is working with our
partners in the State Department, Missile Defense Agency, Services, and
Components to ensure we implement and operationalize EPAA to defend
U.S. forces and interests in Europe.
For Phase 1, the USS MONTEREY, a Ticonderoga-class guided missile
cruiser, is already in theater, laying the foundation for Phase 1 and
the transition to operational capability. This ship represents the
first asset deployed under the EPAA as well as the intercept capability
planned for Phase 1. To enhance this capability, EUCOM is supporting
the State Department's basing negotiations for the AN/TPY-2 radar and
working closely with the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and U.S. Army Europe to ensure deployment as soon as possible
once negotiations are complete.
For Phase 2, EUCOM is fully supporting negotiations led by the
State Department to establish basing and agreements necessary for the
Aegis Ashore site in Romania. We will work closely with the U.S. Navy
and the Missile Defense Agency as the Aegis Ashore development program
continues.
For Phase 3, EUCOM is working with a key ally, Poland, to lay the
groundwork and define the terms and conditions necessary for the
eventual construction of an Aegis Ashore facility in that country.
Finally, EUCOM and our Component staffs continue to work with our
NATO counterparts to develop the procedures and define the systems we
will use to achieve the missile defense language outlined in the goals
of the Lisbon Summit. [See page 26.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Admiral Stavridis. I agree with the Department of Defense (DoD)
response to the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report, which
concurred with the report's two recommendations, and has taken remedial
action on both fronts. I also support DoD's response to the report's
conclusion, which reads: ``Although the Department concurs with the
specific report recommendations, the Department nonetheless takes issue
with a report conclusion that `Keeping more Army forces in Europe than
originally planned would result in significant additional
costs...'(page 3). This report does not consider the full cost of the
CONUS basing alternative, including the cost to build new
infrastructure in CONUS, or the cost to rotate units from CONUS to
Europe on temporary deployments to maintain a forward presence. Because
it ignores these costs, the conclusion of the report is unfounded.''
At U.S. European Command (EUCOM), we understand the importance of
developing a defined process and establishing a clear methodology for
evaluating force posture alternatives. To that end, my team--working in
concert with the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff,
U.S. Army, and U.S. government interagency representatives--has taken
definitive steps to institute and ensure proper, balanced, and
transparent analysis. Those steps include: 1) the codification of OSD
guidance, specific cost/benefit criteria (political/military,
operational, force structure/force management, and costs), and defined
posture processes in an updated EUCOM posture planning instruction; 2)
a clear definition and delineation of the roles and responsibilities of
EUCOM Headquarters' two posture planning bodies, the EUCOM Posture
Executive Council (EPEC) and the EUCOM Posture Implementation Team
(EPIT), into EUCOM's latest Theater Posture Plan; 3) the wider
inclusion of interagency representatives into EUCOM's theater posture
planning efforts; and 4) continued coordination with OSD, the Joint
Staff, and the supporting Services to include known installation
operations and maintenance (O&M) costs into force posture
considerations. I am confident that these steps will help address and
remediate the issues raised in the GAO report.
Post-hearing Note: Finally, I support the Department's decision,
announced on April 8, 2011, to retain three Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)
in Europe, as well as DoD's conclusion that this decision ``will
enhance and rebalance the U.S. force posture in Europe to make it more
capable, more effective, and better aligned with current and future
security challenges.'' On specific questions of cost with respect to
the BCT decision, I would respectfully refer you to the Director of OSD
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and the Department of the
Army, who remain the governmental agencies responsible for final cost
analysis and evaluation. [See page 28.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WEST
General Fraser. There are no confirmed links between Latin American
Trans National Criminal Organizations and Islamic Radical Groups.
However, there are several familial clans of Lebanese descent involved
in illegal activity, to include drug trafficking and the laundering of
drug proceeds throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. These clans
have publically been associated with Hizballah. They typically operate
within the Free Trade Zones in the region and use the permissive
environment to facilitate their activities. In addition, supporters and
sympathizers of Lebanese Hizballah in Latin America reportedly move
multi-hundred kilogram quantities of cocaine to Europe and the Middle
East each year. We assess that Hizballah receives tens of millions of
dollars annually from supporters in Latin America involved in drug
trafficking. [See page 32.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 30, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. Last month we discussed the NATO Deterrence Review. I
get the sense that this review may jump right to ``how'' we deter and
not examine ``who'' or ``what'' we're trying to deter.
a) How do you conduct a deterrence review without first identifying
``who'' or ``what'' we're deterring?
b) Also, Russia has thousands of tactical nuclear weapons; the U.S.
has a few hundred. Is it in our national security interest to
unilaterally reduce or withdraw our U.S. nuclear forces in Europe?
c) What role do nuclear weapons play in the NATO Alliance?
d) What role do U.S. nuclear forces in Europe play?
Admiral Stavridis.
a) I am assured that it will be a thorough and complete review--
taking into account all the evolving changes and factors in the current
and foreseeable security environment. It will help determine the
appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces
that NATO will need to deter and defend against threats to the Alliance
and its member states.
b) The United States Government has repeatedly stated we will
consult with our NATO Allies on reduction or withdrawal of nuclear
forces and will not take unilateral action. I strongly support that
policy.
c) The NATO Strategic Concept preface states ``as long as there are
nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.'' It
further points out that deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of
nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of NATO's
overall strategy. To reiterate Secretary Clinton, nuclear weapons play
a role in the NATO Alliance by providing a ``safe, secure, and
effective deterrent.''
d) U.S. nuclear forces provide the resources necessary to maintain
NATO's nuclear deterrent. Additionally, NATO views the strategic
nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those provided by the
United States, as the supreme guarantee of the allies' security.
Mr. Turner. Your [written] testimony points to the extraordinary
``leverage'' Russia holds over oil and gas supplies for Europe--and
that Russia has occasionally shut off the gas. What is your assessment
of the impacts on NATO and the stability of Europe resulting from this
energy dependence relationship?
Admiral Stavridis. Russia has a minimal ability to directly impact
NATO missions through its oil leverage, with the notable exception of
the fuel received for NATO operations at Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan,
which is purchased directly from a Russian company. Our engagement
strategy, implemented largely through the NATO-Russia Council, has
begun building a relationship that will encompass refined petroleum
interoperability and help define opportunities for participating in
joint exercises and, possibly, other military operations. Additionally,
NATO recently stood up an Energy Security Challenges Division whose
purpose is to study and prepare to deal with energy security threats to
the Alliance.
The world oil markets are flexible and would respond to counter any
imbalances caused by Russian shut-offs. By cutting oil shipments to
Europe, some price increases would occur, but refineries would continue
to purchase oil from other sources.
The NATO Alliance has a very limited reliance on natural gas for
its operations and facility maintenance. During recent shut-offs, most
of the reduction was made up from other sources and available reserves.
However, these same shutoffs caused considerable hardship in eastern
European countries, to include some NATO members, who depend on Russia
for natural gas. Effects included the loss of residential heating and
the closures of factories and businesses. However, as long as these
shut-offs remain temporary, and are not carried out during the coldest
part of the year, they are not likely to lead to regional instability.
These cut-offs also served as a wake-up call to countries, most of whom
are now taking steps to diversify their energy supplies with liquid
natural gas (LNG), build more infrastructure, and liberalize their
markets in order to reduce their dependence on Russian gas.
Finally, with over 50% of the Russian government's revenue coming
from oil and gas sales, the Kremlin cannot afford to cut off gas or oil
supplies for an extended period of time.
Mr. Turner. Senior military officials have said that in the event
of a ballistic missile attack, countries like Iran would probably
launch multiple missiles in an effort to overwhelm our defenses. Is it
true that the more ground based interceptors Northern Command has at
its disposal, the higher the probability of intercepting a missile
headed for the U.S. homeland?
Admiral Winnefeld. I'm comfortable in USNORTHCOM's ability to
defend the country from the current set of limited ballistic missile
threats. Our current shot doctrine--the number of Ground Based
Interceptors (GBIs) we fire per threat--is based on our best
understanding of the capabilities of the Ground Based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) Missile System. The GMD system was fielded using a spiral
development concept and as such we have repeatedly evaluated the right
number of GBIs to shoot. As we develop more robust capabilities and
field them following the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review report, we will again reevaluate the
right number and types of interceptors we need to defeat incoming
threats. Our understanding of the number of threats that rogue nations
like North Korea or Iran may be able to simultaneously launch indicates
we currently have sufficient GBIs to handle those threats. The ongoing
efforts to develop the Hedge Strategy for the PAA will give us more
insight to verify the right number and mix of interceptors. As such,
more GBIs could be part of an enhanced solution countering additional
numbers of threat ballistic missiles.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS
Ms. Giffords. As part of the recent DoD efficiencies initiative the
Air Force proposed consolidating Air Force Southern Command's 612 Air
and Space Operations Center with the 601st AOC based in Florida. The
612th as mentioned is aligned with Gen Fraser's Southern Command and
the 601st is aligned with ADM Winnefeld's Northern Command. Please
answer the following questions that reference this proposed
consolidation:
1. What inputs have your respective commands had on the
consolidation recommendation?
2. Discuss the importance of a dedicated Air Component to your
Combatant Command's capability to execute daily operations.
2a. What is the impact to your Command of a disruption to Air and
Space Operation Center's mission capacity?
General Fraser.
1. The consolidated AOC basing criteria and concept of operations
(CONOPs) analysis are currently being developed by the Air Force. I
have discussed USSOUTHCOM's requirements for Air Force support directly
with the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Commander of Air Combat
Command. I am confident the Air Force will execute the consolidation in
a way that will support SOUTHCOM requirements.
2. As a Combatant Commander, the Air Component provides me with the
command and control and situational awareness to conduct flexible air
operations in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.
2a. With respect to the Air Operations Center, the disruption/
impact of consolidation should be minimal to daily operations.
Ultimately, mandated tasks will be completed and operations will
continue. The operational and tactical details will have to be worked
out by AFSOUTH and AFNORTH once the Air Force makes the decision on
where to consolidate.
Ms. Giffords. The Congresswoman's staff requested the Air Force
provide a detailed concept of operations that describes how 1 AOC would
support two distinct Air Component Commanders. Thus far this report has
not been forthcoming.
Is it possible for 2 Combatant Commands to execute Air, Space and
Cyber operations from the same operations center?
If so please describe how this would work.
Would it require two distinct Air Component Commanders and staffs?
General Fraser. The consolidated AOC basing criteria and concept of
operations (CONOPs) analysis are currently being developed by the Air
Force. I have discussed USSOUTHCOM's requirements for Air Force support
directly with the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Commander of Air
Combat Command. I am confident the Air Force will execute the
consolidation in a way that will support SOUTHCOM requirements.
As a Combatant Commander, the Air Component provides me with the
command and control and situational awareness to conduct flexible air
operations in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. With respect to the
Air Operations Center, the disruption/impact of consolidation should be
minimal to daily operations. Ultimately, mandated tasks will be
completed and operations will continue. The operational and tactical
details will have to be worked out by AFSOUTH and AFNORTH once the Air
Force makes the decision on where to consolidate.
Ms. Giffords. As part of the recent DoD efficiencies initiative the
Air Force proposed consolidating Air Force Southern Command's 612 Air
and Space Operations Center with the 601st AOC based in Florida. The
612th as mentioned is aligned with Gen Fraser's Southern Command and
the 601st is aligned with ADM Winnefeld's Northern Command.
Admiral Winnefeld. USNORTHCOM and NORAD have provided informal
input on critical aspects of the consolidation to Air Combat Command
(ACC) as they work on a draft ``Component Numbered Air Force Multi-
Theater Air and Space Operations Center'' Concept of Operations
(CONOPS). Specifically, the USNORTHCOM and NORAD staffs have
highlighted areas that need to be addressed in order for a consolidated
Air Operations Center (AOC) to support all USNORTHCOM and NORAD
missions. In addition, we ensured that ACC clearly understands that any
changes to Canadian mission sets, personnel, and location that are
identified in the NORAD Agreement will need to be coordinated with and
approved by the Government of Canada due to Canadian Forces being
assigned to NORAD.
USNORTHCOM has one Air Component (Air Forces Northern) that
executes missions such as support for federal and state authorities in
the wake of a disaster. NORAD shares the same AOC for its Continental
United States NORAD Region (CONR) (other AOCs support the Alaska and
Canada NORAD Regions). Given the importance of homeland defense, a
dedicated Air Component Commander and forces have been vested with the
appropriate authorities and they have been provided the required
training to best protect our homeland. It is important to me, given the
dynamic nature of NORAD operations in particular, that my CONR
Commander be co-located with the AOC that supports him.
The impact of a disruption on the AOC would largely depend on the
length of time and the reasons for a disruption. Alternate Command
Center locations and procedures currently in place could mitigate
potential temporary degradation to our missions. Inevitably there will
be some disruption during any amalgamation of an AOC capability.
However, I'm confident that my staff and the AOC staffs will be able to
work through these issues to ensure that any disruption is minimized or
averted.
Ms. Giffords. The Congresswoman's staff requested the Air Force
provide a detailed concept of operations that describes how 1 AOC would
support two distinct Air Component Commanders. Thus far this report has
not been forthcoming. Is it possible for 2 Combatant Commands to
execute Air, Space and Cyber operations from the same operations
center?
Admiral Winnefeld. Even though I am dual-hated as the Commander for
both commands, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have distinct mission sets. The
601st AOC at Tyndall Air Force Base is a ``tailored'' AOC that is
manned by both U.S. DOD personnel and Canadian Forces. It is also
configured to support the missions of both commands. Thus, Air, Space
and Cyber operations for both USNORTHCOM and NORAD are already being
conducted from the same operations center. Folding USSOUTHCOM's air
component missions into this AOC would eventually constitute support
for a third command.
I believe it is possible for two Combatant Commands and NORAD to
execute Air, Space, and Cyber operations from the same operations
center. Indeed, for contingencies that occur near the boundary between
the USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM Areas of Responsibility (as occurred in
Haiti), there are useful synergies to be derived from such an
arrangement. Air Combat Command (ACC) is developing a Concept of
Operations to outline their vision of how this would work. USNORTHCOM,
USSOUTHCOM, and NORAD will review ACC's proposed consolidated AOC
construct to determine any impact to operations.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. Are you providing military training, intelligence
training, etc. to the Mexican military?
Admiral Winnefeld. At the request of the Mexican military, we share
lessons learned and conduct subject matter expert exchanges on a wide
range of topics to assist them in their efforts to disrupt
Transnational Criminal Organizations. These topics include planning,
intelligence fusion, tactical operations and human rights. Over the
next year, we have planned approximately 250 individual subject matter
expert information exchange events with our Mexican military partners.
As an example, our Asymmetrical Conflict Executive Seminars provide
insights into operational planning to counter an irregular warfare
threat, while also reinforcing the adherence to human rights
principles.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within EUCOM's
area of responsibility?
Admiral Stavridis. The USCG is an active and critical interagency
partner for U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and I benefit tremendously
from the presence of a USCG liaison officer on my staff to facilitate
communications with USCG Headquarters and coordinate theater-wide Coast
Guard-type security assistance.
Major USCG operations in the region are somewhat limited based on
the high level of professional development among the peer maritime
services of most western European countries. Many of our European
allies already conduct development efforts with less capable central
and eastern European coast guard-like organizations.
As the USCG is resource-constrained with respect to out-of-
hemisphere (OOH) assets, the last USCG deployment to EUCOM was USCGC
DALLAS (WHEC 716), which provided humanitarian assistance in the
aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.
The USCG also maintains a permanent 28-man Marine Safety unit in
The Netherlands to execute U.S. flagged vessel administration, port
state control, international port security program, international
outreach/engagement, and environmental stewardship. Other permanent or
semi-permanent USCG presence includes maritime advisors in Albania and
Georgia, an exchange helicopter pilot in the United Kingdom, two
liaison officers with U.S. Naval Forces Europe (in Italy), and an
attache at the U.S. Embassy in Malta.
The USCG maintains a robust International Training Division in
Virginia that deploys small, highly effective training teams throughout
the world, covering everything from maritime law enforcement to
outboard engine maintenance. At any given time, there are two to four
teams conducting such training within the EUCOM theater. The USCG also
hosts approximately 20 European naval personnel per year for resident
training at U.S. training facilities. These efforts are funded through
the International Military Education and Training program.
I foresee a growing role for the USCG within EUCOM, particularly in
the Arctic over the next 10 to 40 years. I am working closely with U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and our Arctic partners to ensure the USCG
and EUCOM are well-positioned to manage the maritime development of
that region.
Finally, the USCG's Seventeenth District in Alaska maintains an
important and very positive relationship with the Russian Federation's
Border Guard Service in the Pacific. While this effort falls mostly
within NORTHCOM's purview, I maintain visibility of those activities.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of ``Smart Power'' at EUCOM?
Admiral Stavridis. Smart power describes how U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) combines elements of our core military mission and operations
with other collaborative engagement activities and initiatives to
maximize our resources, potential, and positive effects in the
protection of U.S. interests at minimal cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
EUCOM uses smart power to bring all elements of national power to bear
on the interconnected, complex, and dynamic problem sets we face in the
21st century. By blending multiple aspects of national influence, we
seek to improve our relationships and effectiveness with partners,
allies, even potential adversaries.
At EUCOM, we strive to leverage our military capability with in-
stride diplomacy at every opportunity. This is one of the reasons why I
appointed a Civilian Deputy Commander at EUCOM Headquarters who, as a
U.S. Ambassador, brings extensive and unique diplomatic expertise,
insight, and skills to all we do at EUCOM. Her contributions add an
invaluable lens through which we view, plan, and execute our many
initiatives, engagements, and operations. In addition, given the
increasing complexity of the modern security environment, I am
convinced of the need for, and have taken active measures to
incorporate, a whole-of-government approach to many of the challenges
we face at EUCOM. Upon assuming command, I directed the creation of a
separate and distinct Interagency Partnering Directorate at EUCOM
Headquarters--on par with our Intelligence, Operations, and Strategy &
Plans Directorates--which includes representatives from seven non-DoD
departments and agencies. These fully integrated EUCOM team members are
empowered to engage, coordinate, and collaborate across the EUCOM
enterprise, bringing a unique perspective to our Combatant Command's
operations and responsibilities and ensuring unity-of-effort across the
full spectrum of national security issues. In addition, we maintain
Offices of Defense Cooperation in thirty-eight countries across the
theater.
One recent example of smart power was EUCOM's coordination and
execution of military airlift to bring over thirty tons of desperately
needed fire-fighting equipment to Russia during the wildfires that
raged across that country last summer. We provided similar assistance
to Israel as it faced its wildfires last year as well.
Finally, smart power also requires that we understand the breadth
of the challenges we face every day. For that reason, I have instituted
several programs designed to broaden our collective perspective for, as
I tell my team often, ``no one of us is as smart as all of us working
together.'' Those programs include a European Partnership Outreach
Program, reaching out to influential Europeans in their capital cities;
a EUCOM Public-Private Outreach division, engaging and leveraging the
private sector to find innovative solutions to theater challenges; a
Next Generation Advisory Panel, which serves as a forum to share ideas
with young, professional, up-and-coming Europeans; a ``Distinguished
Authors'' series at EUCOM Headquarters, which exposes my staff to
distinguished thinkers in the national security and international
relations arenas; a foreign language training program; and multiple
social networking initiatives to take advantage of the unique and
rapidly expanding connectivity available through cyberspace.
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