[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
SHIFTING SANDS: POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PART 1
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 13, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-27
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York DENNIS CARDOZA, California
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Eliot Cohen, Ph.D., Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic
Studies, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies (SAIS), The Johns Hopkins University................... 6
Mr. J. Scott Carpenter, Keston Family Fellow, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy................................. 12
Mr. Michael Makovsky, Ph.D., Foreign Policy Director, Bipartisan
Policy Center.................................................. 20
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Eliot Cohen, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 9
Mr. J. Scott Carpenter: Prepared statement....................... 15
Mr. Michael Makovsky, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................. 23
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 58
Hearing minutes.................................................. 59
SHIFTING SANDS: POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PART 1
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. The committee will come to order. I want to
thank everyone for being here. We are going to have votes here
very shortly, so we are going to try to get at least our
opening statements in here.
I want to welcome all my colleagues to the third hearing of
the Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia. This hearing
was called to assess the current trajectory of the political
transitions in the Middle East, and to take stock of where the
U.S. stands today.
Nearly 4 months ago, Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor in
Ben Arous, Tunisia, touched off a tidal wave of unrest that
continues to share the Arab world to its very foundation. His
self-immolation became a symbol around which Tunisians united
to overthrow former President Ben Ali, whose oppressive regime
had at that point been ruling for over 20 years.
Arab citizens throughout the Middle East looked on, and
inspired by the revolution in Tunisia took to the streets in
unprecedented numbers. For us sitting here today, it is perhaps
the most striking that, unlike in the past, the citizens of the
region are not protesting against the U.S. or against Israel,
but against the failings of their own governments.
Hidden under a thin veneer of stability, Arab autocracies
for decades have allowed the social and political foundations
of their countries to fester, and in many cases rot. It was
only a matter of time until the citizens of the region stood up
and together said, ``Enough.''
Although each country has its own distinctive history and
its own set of unique circumstances, the current unrest is, at
its core, about rewriting the social contract throughout the
Arab world.
The citizens in the streets stand collectively and demand
the same fundamental human rights that are the birthright of
every individual on earth. They remind us that the rights to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness do not stop at the
water's edge.
Four months into this transition, it is appropriate to
pause and assess where the region is heading, and to examine
the effectiveness of the administration's policy to date. The
regional shifts happening throughout the Middle East place the
United States and our allies at a precipice in history.
The entire strategic framework upon which our foreign
policy in that region has been based is rapidly transforming.
U.S. policy must transform with it. It is, however, unclear
today whether the administration's foreign policy is, in
reality, adapting as it must.
Over the past months, the administration has dithered in
many cases, and vacillated. On several occasions, high-level
officials have even contradicted one another, suggesting that
not only is there no unified vision, but no clear policy
either.
This has left Members of Congress and citizens of the
region alike confused as to what the administration's objective
actually is, and with what means it seeks to achieve it.
Also missing is a clear strategic vision for the Middle
East as a whole. Rather than stepping back and determining
first what its desired end state is, the administration is
stuck in reaction mode.
The result is that foreign policy becomes slave to each
individual development on the ground, and consequently the
United States appears in many cases indecisive and non-
committal. Instead of leading the way to a more prosperous
future for the peoples of the Middle East, the administration
looks as if it is waiting to see who ends up on top before
picking a side.
Instead of viewing this as an unprecedented opportunity to
help spread democracy and freedom to parts of the world that do
not currently know it, the administration gives the impression
that the protests are more of an inconvenience in many cases,
that they are getting in the way of grand plans to extend
outreached hands in pursuit of unclenched fists.
Nearly 6 years ago, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
stood in front of an audience at the American University of
Cairo and declared that, ``For 60 years, the United States
pursued stability at the expense of democracy in the Middle
East, and we achieved neither. Now we are taking a different
course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all
people.''
Similarly, over 7 years ago, before an audience at the
National Endowment for Democracy, President Bush stated that,
``As changes come to the Middle Eastern region, those with
power should ask themselves: Will they be remembered for
resisting reform, or for leading it?''
These words are, perhaps, more fitting today than at any
other time in recent history. Although President Bush was
speaking about regional leaders, it is my firm belief that U.S.
policymakers should ask themselves the same question.
And I will now yield to the distinguished gentleman, the
ranking member of the committee from New York, Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Chairman, very much. 1947, 5th of
June. Standing in Harvard Yard, Secretary of State George
Marshall tried to explain why additional foreign aid was
critical to American security.
Since the end of World War II, America had already given or
loaned some $14 billion to Europe. To provide some sense of
scale, total Federal outlays in 1947 were $34.5 billion.
But the wave of Soviet-backed takeovers and ubiquitous
subversion, along with stark warnings of pending starvation and
economic collapse, convinced the Truman administration that
more needed to be done to help Europe recover.
America stood alone, at the time, as an economic colossus
in 1945, American GDP was greater than all other Allied and
Axis economies combined. While much of the world was ravaged
between 1940 and 1950, the United States economy, in
comparison, grew by 150 percent.
With clear victory in two theaters of war, sole possession
of nuclear arms, and a homeland untouched by the devastation of
war, American preeminence and self-confidence were justifiably
at all-time highs.
But Marshall's words were characteristically understated.
Coolly, he explained the downward spiral gripping Europe's
economy. Secretary Marshall warned that Europe's needs were, as
he said, ``So much greater than her present ability to pay that
she much have substantial additional help, or face economic,
social, and political deterioration of a very grave
character.''
Secretary Marshall then called for the United States to
provide assistance ``so far as it may be practical for us to do
so,'' and for full partnership with European recipients to make
that assistance effective.
He then departed from his written text. Clearly, he felt
something was awry, or missing, or needed to be said. He
apologized for having used Harvard's commencement for what he
said were rather technical discussions. ``But,'' he said, ``to
my mind it is of vast importance that our people reach some
general understanding of what the complications really are,
rather than react from a passion, or a prejudice, or an
emotional moment.''
He continued, ``As I said more formally a moment ago, we
are remote from the scene of the troubles. It is virtually
impossible at this distance, merely by reading, or listening,
or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp all the
real significance of the situation. And yet the whole world of
the future hangs upon a proper judgement. It hangs, I think,''
he said, ``to a large extent on the realization of the American
people of just what are the various dominant factors, what are
the reactions of the people, what are the justifications for
those reactions, what are the sufferings. What is needed, what
can be done, what must be done.''
These are the questions I think we ought to be asking
during this amazing wave of change and revolution going through
the Middle East. We are not the same nation that we were in
1947, and the world is different now than it was then.
But today, as then, there are still no substitutes for
American leadership. And by leadership, I don't just mean
rhetoric. Marshall's speech was not a plan. Marshall's plan was
nothing without the billions of dollars needed to actually make
a difference at the time.
The Middle East today doesn't need the old Marshall Plan,
and even if we had the resources to commit--which we don't--it
almost certainly wouldn't work. Post-war Europe and today's
Arab world are very different places, in very different times,
with very different economies, very different governments, and
very different needs.
But that doesn't mean there is nothing to be done to aid
both the people in need and to help stabilize the region that
is vital to our economic and national security interests. The
political transformations that began this year are not likely
to be over soon, and the consequences of what have already
transpired will unfold over years, not weeks or months.
But one challenge does seem to be the same, and that is to
convey to the American public and to the Congress, distant from
the troubles abroad and already fed up with the costs of war
and the burden of assisting others, why it is so critical not
to falter at this point.
It seems likely to me that we are witnessing a profound
change in world politics, as occurred following World War II or
the end of the Cold War. Lines of alignment are disappearing,
and the lines are being redrawn. Different ideologies and
models for government are competing in societies without deep
institutional safeguards to preserve order and provide
stability.
Salafists, Muslim Brothers, Islamist radicals, all see
opportunities in the emerging freedom and liberty which we so
rightfully celebrate. While brutally suppressing its own
people, Iran is racing ahead with its nuclear arms program,
bolstering its efforts in subversion of the Arab states,
exacerbating Sunni/Shia conflicts, and sending more and more
advanced weapons to anti-Israel terrorist groups.
The Middle East is poised at a moment of becoming. One of
the--one future offers a new Arab modernity, where culture and
space for Islamist radicalism is squeezed by the desire of
ordinary people to pursue their own dreams of peace and
prosperity.
The alternative future is one of greater tension, more
tyranny, deeper regression into ignorance and hatred and
violence. Amid all this chaos and change, I am certain of just
one thing. Now is not the time for America to go wobbly or
withdraw or turn inward. Now is not the time to try to be a
superpower on the cheap.
Now is the time for us to live up to the example left to us
by President Truman and Secretary Marshall of judicious
leadership, built upon a carefully constructed bipartisan
consensus at home, and a true partnership with our allies
abroad.
Today's problems are different, and the solutions must be
different as well. But we may still hope, as Secretary Marshall
said, that ``With foresight, and a willingness on the part of
our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history
has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties that I
have outlined can and will be overcome.''
To that, I would just add ``Amen.''
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman. The
committee will be in recess. We have four votes on the floor.
We will be back very shortly, and then we will continue.
[Whereupon, at 2:44 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to
reconvene at 3:22 p.m. the same day.]
Mr. Chabot. The committee will come back to order. The
chair and the ranking member have given our opening statements,
and we would invite any members of the committee, if they would
like to give a 1-minute opening statement. Mr. Higgins? Okay.
And we will go ahead and introduce our distinguished panel
here this afternoon. We will begin with Eliot Cohen, who is the
Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International studies, and is
founding director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic
Studies.
He received his B.A. degree from Harvard University in
1977, and his Ph.D. there in 1982. He has served on the policy
planning staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as a
member of the Defense Policy Board of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and most recently as Councillor of the
Department of State, serving as Secretary Condoleezza Rice's
Senior Advisor on Strategic Issues.
He has also served as an officer in the United States Army
Reserve. And on behalf of the subcommittee, I would like to
thank you for your service to our country.
Next we have J. Scott Carpenter, who is the Keston Family
Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and is
the director of Project Fikra, which focuses on empowering Arab
democrats in their struggle against extremism.
Mr. Carpenter previously served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and
also as the coordinator for the State Department's broader
Middle East and north Africa initiatives.
Prior to this, he served as director of the governance
group for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, and
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, where his responsibilities
included overseeing U.S. democracy promotion and human rights
policy in the Middle East and southeast Asia. And we thank you
for being here, Mr. Carpenter.
And last but not least, Michael Makovsky currently serves
as the foreign policy director for the Bipartisan Policy
Center. From 2002-2006, he served as Special Assistant for
Iraqi Energy Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
and Director of Essential Services in the Washington offices of
the Coalition Provisional Authority.
Prior to his work in the Pentagon, he worked over a decade
as a senior energy market analyst for various investment firms.
Makovsky has a Ph.D. in diplomatic history from Harvard
University, an M.B.A. in finance from Columbia Business School,
and a B.A. in history from the University of Chicago. And we
welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Makovsky.
And we appreciate, again, all three of our distinguished
panelists here this afternoon. And I see that another member
has entered here, and if Mr. Rohrabacher, the gentleman from
California, would like to make a 1-minute opening statement
relative to the Middle East and Egypt and the rest, we would
love to hear it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. One thing I know after 22 years here, and
7 years in the White House before that, is peace doesn't happen
on its own, and neither does freedom happen on its own. It is a
product of a lot of hard work, and the right ideas and the
right approach.
And if we are to have more freedom in this world, and more
peace in the Middle East, we have got to do things that work,
and I am very interested in hearing different people's
perspective on that.
One last note. I am very supportive of what was the Reagan
Doctrine. I was very involved in that in the White House. It
worked. It ended the Cold War. We helped people fight their own
fights.
People in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, wherever, we didn't send
our troops into those countries and risk confrontation directly
with the Soviets. We helped those other people fighting for
their freedom.
And that brought an end to the Cold War with the Soviet
Union in a peaceful way. There has to be some corollary to that
in the Middle East and throughout the world, where we would
help people like those in Libya who are fighting for their
freedom, without actually sending our troops on the ground and
thus risking being dragged into a quagmire.
I am very interested in the opinions of our guests today,
and I will be paying attention. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We will begin with Mr.
Cohen, and you will be recognized for 5 minutes, as each of the
witnesses will be.
We actually have a lighting system, and you should be able
to see the yellow light come on, which will tell you that you
have 1 minute to wrap up. When your red light comes on, if you
could conclude your testimony, we would appreciate it.
And we will restrict ourselves to that 5 minutes as well.
So Mr. Cohen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. ELIOT COHEN, PH.D., ROBERT E. OSGOOD PROFESSOR
OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (SAIS), THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Chairman Chabot and members of the
subcommittee. I have a longer statement, which I would like to
have entered into the record, if that would be possible.
Let me just summarize three points. The first, very much
along the lines of remarks that have already been made. And
that is, we are living in the middle of astounding events,
which I think disprove a lot of the truisms and cliches of
experts on the Middle East.
But I think we have to remind ourselves of the tremendous
uncertainty that surrounds these developments. If there are two
phrases I would like to see banned from the public discussion
of the Arab Spring, one would be the arc of history, and the
other would be being on the wrong side of history.
I don't think history has an arc, that is to say a curve
that we can calculate. And I certainly don't think that history
chooses sides. It is what people decide to do. And although I
think we have to be tremendously impressed at the courage of
Arab demonstrators, there iss nothing that guarantees that
these revolutions are going to have a happy outcome.
Ours did. The Velvet Revolutions did. The French Revolution
did not. The Russian Revolution did not. The Chinese Revolution
did not. The Iranian Revolution did not. So the first point is,
we simply cannot take for granted the triumph of liberal forces
in the Middle East.
My second broad point is that in the Middle East we are
going to face--we do face--that age-old clash between American
ideals and American self-interest. That, of course, is a
tension that goes back even before our independence from Great
Britain.
There are numerous cases, of course. One that comes to mind
is that of Bahrain, where our democratic instincts will tilt to
the Shia population, our geopolitical interests, to include our
alliance with Saudi Arabia, our concern about Iran, will tilt
in favor of the regime.
What should we do about that? I would say, first and
foremost, the United States should always be the friend of the
cause of liberty. And I have used the word liberty advisedly
and in preference to democracy.
We should care about fundamental rights: Impartial courts,
freedom of conscience, security of life and property,
representation in any of a number of forms, and the opening of
opportunity, particularly for women. We should care more for
those things than we necessarily do for elections, per se.
I think we also have to accept the fact that in some cases
our interests and our values will not coincide, and there will
be times when we have to act in ways which will appear--and may
in fact be--inconsistent.
And I think there is a great need for America's leaders,
not only the White House but in Congress, to be up front
explaining why that is so, because it will be so.
And we need to consider not only these countries as
individual cases, but the region as a whole. And that leads me
to my third point, which is about Libya, even though I know
that that is not necessarily within the remit of this
subcommittee.
I believe it was the right course of action to intervene on
behalf of the Libyan rebels. I wish we had done so earlier.
Both our ideals and our self-interest are engaged there.
I can understand why people opposed the use of force in
Libya, but that debate is over. We are committed to getting rid
of Colonel Gaddafi. I have to say, though, I am dismayed by a
number of things.
I am particularly dismayed by the half-heartedness of our
effort in this war. And it is a war, because we are dropping
bombs on people. We are killing soldiers. We are destroying
equipment.
Having committed the United States to this conflict, we
really do need to see it through to the end. I think if Colonel
Gaddafi were to remain in power at the end of this, after
President Obama has said that he has to go, we will live to
regret it.
And I believe that unless he and his sons are really,
permanently put out of the way, there is a good chance that we
will have at least another Lockerbie, if not something worse.
And I think beyond that, we have to think about the
demonstration effects of Libya. What is at test right there is
whether regimes can use extreme ruthlessness toward their own
populations. That is what is being tested. And we really don't,
I think, have the ability simply to stay out of that.
And that is my last point, really, which has to do with
where we stand in the Middle East. Our country is not in the
mood for grand projects in that part of the world, and for
perfectly good reasons. Nor do I think we should embark on any.
But even so, to paraphrase that highly experienced
agitator, Leon Trotsky, we may not be interested in revolution,
but revolution--including the Arab revolution--is definitely
going to be interested in us.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
Mr. Carpenter, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. J. SCOTT CARPENTER, KESTON FAMILY FELLOW,
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. Having just returned
from a fact-finding mission to Tunisia and Egypt, I look
forward to sharing my observations, and request that my full
statement be included in the record.
Mr. Chairman, the revolutions currently sweeping the region
create new opportunities for the United States, but also
dangers. I recognize those dangers, but on the whole I would
say that there is more to celebrate here than to fear. There is
little doubt in my mind, for instance, that the Tunisians will
be the first in the Arab world to successfully transition to a
true representative democracy.
Egypt, however, is the bellwether. If Egypt succeeds in its
transition, it will transform the rest of the region. Its
population, strategic location, and traditional role
practically guarantee it.
There is new confidence in Egypt, and a democratic spirit I
found that pervades the country. And if it is institutionalized
in the new Egyptian state, a democratic Egypt that respects
human and political rights, including religious freedom, is an
Egypt that will make a better partner for the U.S. than the
declining Mubarak regime ever was. Such an Egypt may not see
eye to eye with the United States or Israel about various
aspects of policy, but no one I spoke with on my last trip
advocated or believed that Egypt would abrogate the peace
treaty with Israel or envisioned a war with Israel.
The if in that previous paragraph, Mr. Chairman, is a big
one. The transition there is bound to be rocky. Short-term
challenges include stabilizing the economy, restoring law and
order, and securing the Sinai region. Still, prominent
businesspeople and other political actives with whom I met were
remarkably bullish about Egypt's future, including the ability
to compete politically with Islamists.
To manage toward a positive outcome, I believe it is
critical that the U.S. do everything it can to help Egypt and
Tunisia consolidate their democratic transitions. Doing so will
require creativity, some resources, and the intestinal
fortitude to weather the ups and downs of the countries'
domestic politics.
The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, will play a role in
the respective elections that are quickly approaching. This
will require the U.S. to strike a wise balance between on the
one hand being alive to the dangers the Brotherhood and its
allies pose to critical U.S. interests and on the other hand
providing the Brotherhood with a political gift through
lightning-rod statements or actions that could motivate voters
otherwise indifferent to the Brotherhood's message to support
the movement.
It is important the administration send a clear message to
the political elites and voting publics in Egypt and Tunisia
that indicate the sorts of governments that we will support:
Those committed to universal freedoms, including religious
liberty and practice.
In the case of Egypt, we must clearly also state that we
support a government that fulfills its international
obligations, including upholding the peace treaty with Israel.
The administration must also act to create incentives
encouraging Egyptians and Tunisians to choose the sort of
leadership with whom we will build new and lasting relations.
In the case of Egypt, such incentives might include opening
negotiations for a free trade agreement or expanding the QIZ
programs. For both governments, I would recommend an early
loan, collateralized by seized assets of the ancien regime,
which could be a powerful incentive.
Mr. Chairman, even now the prospect of successful
democratic transition is posing challenges to reactionary
powers in the region, including Syria and Iran. Iran's primary
influence derives from its soft power and revolutionary
rhetoric. If democracy succeeds in marginalizing Islamist
political ideology, Iran's theocratic pretensions will be
similarly marginalized.
As we have already seen in Egypt and Tunisia, anti-
Americanism and a fixation on the Palestinian conflict, the
twin diets of Iranian rhetoric, have been subsumed completely
by a newfound preoccupation with domestic affairs and practical
concerns.
What is true for Iran, however, is also true for America's
ally, Saudi Arabia, another theocracy with pretensions to
leading the Islamic world. The U.S. and the Kingdom perceive
regional developments through different prisms.
For the U.S., the changes are natural consequences of poor
governance being expressed through unstoppable popular
protests. For the Saudis, who see Iranians under every bed,
there is an absolute paranoia about Shia ascendancy. At this
critical moment of cascading change, the Saudis are creating a
self-fulfilling prophecy which will be wholly negative for U.S.
interests, in my view.
The violence used against Bahrain Shia in recent weeks is
contributing to the radicalization of Shia across the region.
For this reason, it is critical that the U.S. find some way to
convince Riyadh that the focus should be on managing change,
rather than trying to stop it or roll it back.
At the same time, if the U.S. is to fundamentally leverage
the changes taking place in the region, the administration must
find a way to reinvigorate the Green Movement in Iran. In April
2009, the administration missed a golden opportunity to do so,
because it was convinced that it would risk efforts to broker a
nuclear deal with Iran. This was a strategic mistake, but it
has a second chance.
I strongly believe the Arab revolutions of 2011 pose an
insurmountable challenge to Iran's regime, but accelerating the
impact will require a comprehensive strategy. Forging such a
strategy and pursuing it aggressively, however, will do little
to calm Saudi Arabia, whose greatest nightmare is a democratic
Iran that becomes a strong U.S. ally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
Mr. Makovsky, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL MAKOVSKY, PH.D., FOREIGN POLICY
DIRECTOR, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER
Mr. Makovsky. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Ackerman, and members of the committee for giving me the
opportunity to speak to you this afternoon. I want to highlight
three key points I made in my written submission, my written
testimony: What are U.S. interests in the region, the impact of
political turbulence on Iran, and U.S. energy security.
Winston Churchill wrote during the Second World War,
``Everything for the war, whether controversial or not, and
nothing controversial that is not bona fide needed for the
war.'' He approached all world issues with such single-
mindedness. I believe we have to do the same during the fog of
events.
So what are our interests, first of all, in the region? I
would say our top interests in the region are three: A secure
flow of oil, a secure Israel, and reducing and defeating
Islamic radicalism and terror.
A single threat, more than any other, would undermine all
three of these interests: A nuclear Iran. Therefore, I believe
that preventing a nuclear Iran should remain our paramount goal
and guide our policies among the fog of events.
I support, like my colleagues here at the table, that
liberalization, if it took root in the region, would serve the
U.S. interest and would undermine Iran. However, there have
been some disturbing events that have gone on in the turmoil,
and I will just highlight how they have also affected Iran.
I think so far the turmoil has been rather beneficial for
Iran. It has weakened some of its allies. Mubarak is gone,
Lebanon is moving the Hezbollah camp. The one interesting
development that could go the other way is what is happening in
Syria. I think the anti-Iran coalition in the region has frayed
due to a lack of confidence in U.S. leadership and support,
which Secretary Gates and Tom Donilon have been trying to
address in their recent trips to the region.
Also, the international attention on Iran's nuclear
development has been diverted. Meanly, Iran has been only--
despite Stuxnet and international sanctions, which have really
been tough, Iran has been not only making its way, but actually
advancing in its nuclear program.
And I think going forward, we need to have a new phase of
our Iran policy. I think the administration needs to enforce
sanctions on the books. We should consider new sanctions, but
try to avoid sanctions that would be counterproductive, which
my initial sense is that--some talk about banning Iranian oil
exports, and that would actually come under the latter
category.
I think we should pursue a triple track policy: Diplomacy,
sanctions, and a visible and credible preparation for a
military option. These de rigeur comments by the administration
that all options are on the table, often followed by remarks
about how risky it would be, are actually not doing the trick.
The Iranis don't seem very afraid of a U.S. strike or a
U.S.-allied strike. And until we are, we don't have a chance of
a diplomatic solution to this problem. I think then, of course,
whatever we threaten we have to be prepared to do. Because as I
said, this is the primary strategic threat we have.
I would like to switch and move on to how this affects--
what has been going on in the region, how it affects our energy
security. I anticipate this upheaval will be extended, and I
think that it will lead to less oil supplies and higher prices,
undermining our energy security. And I will highlight four
reasons why, and what we can do about it.
First, we should expect that production disruptions are not
only going to occur in countries experiencing turmoil, like you
see in Libya, but then that there will be a prolonged
disruption even after there is some peace that comes to that
country.
History is littered with such examples: Iran, Iraq, Russia,
Venezuela, all experienced significant turmoil politically, and
their oil production has never returned to their previous
peaks, even as of today.
Transit will be more risky. We could talk about several of
the choke points, but I will just highlight the Bab el-Mandeb
choke point off of Yemen, which could become even more
dangerous if there is even more of a collapse of authority in
Yemen.
Third, oil demand is likely to rise and export will shrink
among the oil exporting countries that are experiencing
turmoil, because the regimes need to continue to subsidize fuel
to mollify their populaces. And I should add that the oil
exporting countries in the Middle East have actually been one
of the growth--they have had actually the biggest growth of
demand, actually, one of three, China and the United States are
the other two, in the last decade.
The fourth factor, oil exporting regimes need higher prices
and revenue to pay for higher social spending. Witness the
Saudi expenditure, or commitment to spent $130 billion. Thus, I
think gulf Arabs are unlikely to undercut Iran's economy by
supplying more oil and lowering prices.
Iran could only increase its revenue by higher prices,
because its oil production has declined 17 percent in the last
3 years. In the remaining seconds, I will just say Iraq
actually offers some hope in all this. Iraq could be--is
actually breaking out of its ban in oil production, and could
be an energy superpower. And this not only serves U.S.
interests in providing more oil to the market, but I would add
there are some challenges there. Because they have to expand
and diversify export routes, Turkey and the Persian Gulf, I
think they should go into Jordan. And I see my time is over.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Makovsky follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We may be able to get into
some of the things you were going to go into in our questions
here, and I will recognize myself first for 5 minutes.
And I will begin with you, if I can, Mr. Cohen. Since
taking office, the administration's policy toward Syria has
been focused almost exclusively on engagement with Damascus.
Two years and one ambassador later, I think it is fair to
conclude that the engagement path has not exactly borne fruit.
Despite what he may say, Assad has made clear through his
actions, both past and most recently, that he couldn't be
further from being a reformer. Along this line, I would like to
ask you about a recent statement Secretary of State Clinton
made in an interview with Bob Schieffer.
Most of the focus on this statement has been about
Secretary Clinton's suggestion that Bashar al-Assad, a ruthless
dictator, might in fact be a reformer. But I want to ask you
about a different portion of her statement, specifically what
she said before that particular gaffe. In response to Bob
Schieffer asking why, given the ruthless assault against
peaceful protestors, Secretary Clinton viewed the situation in
Syria as different from that in Libya and why we did not take
action in Syria and we are in Libya, she had this to say.
This is her quote: ``Well, if there were a coalition of the
international community, if there were the passage of a
Security Council resolution, if there were a call by the Arab
League, if there was a condemnation that was universal--but
that is not going to happen, because I don't think that it is
clear what will occur, what will unfold.''
So what would you have to say relative to Syria, and what
would your comments be about those comments?
Mr. Cohen. Let me break that in two. First, on Syria, I
quite agree. Look, this is a regime which throughout the Iraq
War, during part of which I was in government, was really
fostering the worst kind of attacks on American Servicemen and
Women serving in Iraq, and we really never called them to
account.
We never called them to account for their nuclear program,
and we have continued to allow ourselves to be, I think, gulled
by the Syrian regime. So I don't think Bashar al-Assad is
really a reformer. I don't think it is a regime that we should
be dealing with. I don't think we should have sent an
ambassador in return for nothing, which is what we did.
And I do think we have to realize that there is an
opportunity here. Not simply a humanitarian opportunity for the
people of Syria, but if that regime were changed by an uprising
of the Syrian people, that would break one of Iran's major
links to the Middle East.
Syria is Iran's most important Arab ally, and I think
strategically that is the way to think about it. The other
comment I would make would be about the tone of the remark, and
it does disturb me the extent to which the administration,
throughout all this, has referenced the U.N. Security Council,
the Arab League, world opinion. I mean, the issue is really
what American policy is, and to be perfectly frank with you, to
go back to Libya for a moment, I would have been happier if
congressional consent had been asked----
Mr. Chabot. Right.
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. And not just the consent of the
United Nations.
Mr. Chabot. Right, and that is one of my objections, is
really that I think like both President Bushes did, they should
have come here, I think, and gotten Congress' approval. And I
think they would have gotten it.
Let me ask you, Mr. Carpenter, next. You used the term
``half-heartedness'' when you referred to our actions in Libya
thus far. What do you think we should have done differently?
Obviously not being able to go back and redo what we didn't do,
or undo what we did do, how should we move things differently?
Because it looks like we may well be on our way to a divided
country, at least at this point. And I don't think that is in
anybody's best interest.
Mr. Carpenter. As you suggest, Mr. Chairman, there is no
use crying over spilled milk. But I would say that the United
States had an opportunity to lead earlier, that a no-fly zone
could have been imposed earlier and more robustly, well before
Benghazi came under direct threat and sparked the global
concern that led to the Security Council resolution.
In terms of what I think needs to happen now, again I
understand that the administration has been loath to want to
lead from the front, but only to encourage from behind.
But clearly the situation is deteriorating there, and I
think for the importance of American power and because I think
that Gaddafi returning to power in any way in Libya would be
extremely destabilizing for both Tunisia and Egypt in the
medium-term, it is critical that we devote additional air
assets to the struggle, including those that could be used
against ground forces, for instance AC-130 gunships.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you very much. Unfortunately, my
time has expired. If we do a second round, I will get to you,
Mr. Makovsky.
The ranking member, the gentleman from New York, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. I thank the chairman. I am trying to find a
sense of direction here that everybody is encouraging us to do,
and trying to understand the position of the administration,
which I think has not been as articulate as I would like to see
it.
The chairman has very appropriately called this hearing
Shifting Sands, and if you have ever been on shifting sands I
guess you know it is kind of difficult to get your footing. It
is also difficult for the critics to get their footing, as
well, so let me just observe that I am not sure that Secretary
Clinton--and she can certainly speak for herself, or misspeak
for herself if that is your view--actually said that Colonel
Gaddafi was a reformer--Assad, I am sorry.
But what she said was Members of Congress, I believe that
includes Senators, have told her that. I am not sure that that
is her view, or that she was just observing what she was told.
But nonetheless, my dad served in World War II. I was a
little baby when he came home. But I remember two expressions
he came home with that I can repeat here. One was, ``He who
hesitates is lost.'' And the other was, ``Look before you
leap.''
Whenever I would do something, he would impose one of those
two if I screwed up my guess. And I asked him, ``How do you
know when to look before you leap and how do you know that you
are going to be lost if you hesitate?''
And he says, ``Experience. You make a lot of mistakes
first.'' I am not sure what we are supposed to be here
listening to advice, not just from our panel but from others as
well. If you were to pick any three countries in the region
that are in a state of transition, on a scale of one to 10,
with one being just saying, ``Hey guys, we wish you a lot of
luck'' and 10 being full-fledged support, which includes U.S.
military support, troops, and a blank check commitment, name
the country and give me 1 to 10 what you would do if you were
the administration.
Mr. Chabot. Is there one particular----
Mr. Ackerman. Let us start with Mr. Cohen. Just the order
you went in.
Mr. Cohen. That is a difficult question. I think in the
case of Libya, once having committed ourselves to the use of
force and having committed ourselves to the overthrow of
Colonel Gaddafi, which is really where we are----
Mr. Ackerman. Did we commit ourselves to the use of force
in Libya?
Mr. Cohen. Well, we have done it. And the President has
indicated that we are in this to back up our European allies,
but for sure we have used it. And for sure he has said that----
Mr. Ackerman. Sometimes that means ``I will hold your
coat.''
Mr. Cohen. But the first week was very far from holding the
coat, and we are doing a lot more than holding the coat. And as
I think we are already----
Mr. Ackerman. How far do we go, is the question.
Mr. Cohen. I would be willing to go, I think, where Mr.
Carpenter would go, that is to say----
Mr. Ackerman. What is the number?
Mr. Cohen. I don't think there is a need for troops on the
ground beyond trainers and advisers to the rebels. I think we
probably need a lot more in the way of lethal air power.
Mr. Ackerman. Is that a 3 or a 7?
Mr. Cohen. I am not quite sure. I find it hard to think
about it in that way. I mean, I can think concretely what I
would be in favor of doing in Libya, which is AC-130s, A-10s,
Special Operations Forces to train the rebels. I would be
against putting in the 82nd, but I don't think we need that.
Mr. Ackerman. You have a number of troops or a dollar
amount?
Mr. Cohen. What?
Mr. Ackerman. You have a number of troops, or a dollar
amount?
Mr. Cohen. At this point, given what we have chosen to do,
I really don't think that is what I would be thinking about.
Because I really do think that the stakes are very high. If we
fail, if the President having said Gaddafi has to go, Gaddafi
stays, if he ends up having stood up against NATO and a large
coalition----
Mr. Ackerman. So it is like President Bush saying, ``That
is unacceptable,'' referring to behavior from any number of----
Mr. Cohen. I think that is unacceptable. Do I think this is
$100 billion commitment? No, I don't.
Mr. Ackerman. Okay.
Mr. Cohen. But can I tell you whether it is 40,000,000 or
150,000,000? I can't.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Carpenter?
Mr. Carpenter. I would just say very quickly I would invest
very heavily--no need for troops, but I would invest very
heavily--in helping Egypt succeed. Frankly, I think Yemen is a
basket case no matter what happens, and I would not invest a
ton of money there, although I understand the rationales for
doing so. It is in the Saudis' backyard, and I think we can
coordinate with them and help.
In terms of Libya, I would say it is probably a 6, because
it doesn't warrant ground troops but it is very, very
important. But I think there are different categories here. I
think, as Mr. Cohen suggested, that the United States, whether
we think we have committed ourselves or not, we have committed
ourselves, and people around the region and the world believe
we have. So success is important.
Mr. Ackerman. With the chairman's indulgence, if Dr.
Makovsky can----
Mr. Chabot. Yes.
Mr. Makovsky. Thank you. I concur with what Eliot and Scott
said about Libya. Once we have committed, then we have got to
do our best, short of ground troops, to get Gaddafi out. The
only other country I think we should consider doing any heavy
military investment in is Iran.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of the Oversight
and Investigations Subcommittee, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. Let me remind Dr. Cohen and the other two witnesses,
yes, the stakes are very high, you said, but so is our level of
deficit spending. We no longer can do what we did 10 years ago,
and 20 years ago, and 30 years ago. The United States--we are
not just broke, we are on the edge of an economic catastrophe.
We have $4.5 trillion more in debt after 2 years of this
administration than we were before. What is the interest rate
on that? If we keep going the way it is, and especially when
the interest rate starts going up, it will crowd out all
spending, and there will be a collapse, and none of the things
that you are talking about will be affordable, because the
money will have gone into inflation. Everyone's savings will be
gone.
We are on the edge of a catastrophe in a number of ways,
but we still face these major challenges that we are talking
about today. But it has to be within the context of what we can
afford to do now. And we no longer--certainly, we can no longer
afford to send our troops all over the world and garrison the
world, and try to use American troops as the shock troops that
will play the deciding factor in every war that is going on,
that concerns us.
Thus we have got to have another strategy. As I stated in
the beginning, I think we can possibly afford a strategy that
does not put American troops on the ground. And I am going to
add one more factor here, and that is--and I agree with you,
maybe AC-130 gunships would be good--if we have already
committed ourselves, if you are going to help them out--you
know what Teddy Roosevelt said was the worst sin? Does anyone
know there?
Teddy Roosevelt said the worst sin is hitting someone
softly, because you just make them mad. So if we are going to
do it, let us do it. But that doesn't mean sending troops in.
I have had discussions with people representing the Libyan
Council there in Benghazi, and they have insisted to me that
they are willing to, and will be making public statements to
the point that they are willing to pay all the expenses of the
United States in what we are doing to help them win their
freedom.
Would you say that is a major factor, or would be a major
factor in our consideration?
Mr. Cohen. It sounds like a great idea. I mean, we managed
to fight the first Gulf War with other people's money. If I
could, Congressman, could I just say, I don't think any of us
are in favor of massive financial aid programs. And I am not in
favor of military intervention in Syria. I do think Libya is a
very distinct case, and for better or for worse we are
committed.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. Cohen. And part of the price--I don't know how we price
out a Lockerbie.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, let us note this, that the cost of
sending troops to another country and doing warfare there is
far more expensive than aid programs, although I generally am
not in favor of nation-building aid programs either.
But it is $1 million a head per troop in Afghanistan, and
so we are spending about $100 billion a year over there, and
guess what? The Gross National Product of that country is only
about $12- or $14 billion. Something is wrong there, somewhere.
So I would hope that we are able to think creatively enough
to utilize our resources and our financial resources to the
maximum. For example, in Afghanistan, I think we could buy off
every leader in that country, all the way down to the village
level, for $2- or $3 billion, not $100 billion a year.
Mr. Chairman, that is a deal. Three billion dollars to get
us out of a $100 billion liability. So I think that--and I
agree with the panel, let me just say. I agree with what each
of you had to say. We need to do what is right in Libya, and it
will be a message to everybody else in the Gulf if we do. But
we need to do it with letting them do their fighting, but us
backing them us, and them paying for it. Thank you very much,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. I think the ranking
member and I have both agreed that if we can get out of
Afghanistan for $3 billion and you can make it happen, we are
with you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I can guarantee it right now.
Mr. Chabot. All right. We need to talk further. The
distinguished gentleman from the great State of Massachusetts,
Mr. Higgins, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Higgins. New York.
Mr. Chabot. Oh, I am sorry. New York, I am sorry.
Mr. Higgins. It is an even greater state.
Mr. Chabot. An even greater state.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was, I suppose,
more confident about the changes that we saw occurring in the
Middle East and north Africa a month ago than I am today.
Mr. Carpenter, you had said that there is a feel in Egypt,
a democratic spirit and a confidence. Yet we see that the army
that is overseeing the democratization process just arrested a
blogger for insulting the military.
A month ago, I believed that there were the two most
powerful forces in the world, that being youth and technology,
youth and technology that was empowered to not only organize,
but the inspiration, if you will, for what was going on in
these revolutions, at the basis.
In other words, they would see what was going on in the
rest of the world, and find that under their repressive
regimes, these countries, and in particular the youth, had been
held down. And what they wanted to be were citizens, not
subjects.
So when you look for a coherent center to all this
instability, with uncertain outcomes, you can't find it,
because there isn't one. And while I would agree, a month ago,
that Egypt perhaps is the place that can set the model for a
democratic, more or less, Middle East and north Africa, I am
less certain of that today.
So I would be interested in each of your assessments as to
where this is likely to go, who potentially is the emerging
leader, and what kind of democratic government can we see in
that part of the world that can serve not only as an
inspiration but as a model for other countries, including
Turkey.
I traveled the region last month and was particularly
impressed with what I saw in Turkey. If you go to the airport
in Istanbul and you look at the departure board, they are going
to places that I can't even pronounce, which is a good sign. It
shows that it is a functioning economy that is seeking to build
economic relationships with other people. So I would be
interested in your assessment, each of you, relative to those
issues.
Mr. Carpenter. I will try to be very short. I am not saying
that this has--that there is any inevitability in the direction
that this is headed. What I will say, that your concerns about
the arrest and sentencing of a blogger in Egypt by the military
is not only our concern, but it is an Egyptian concern.
And I can guarantee you that the people will be out on the
streets on Friday, and this will be an additional command. Last
week, it was that the military do more to hold President
Mubarak and his sons accountable, and guess what? Today it was
announced that they are proceeding with the detention of the
President and his two sons.
The military wants, desperately wants, to get out of the
business of governing the country. Every petition--if you can
imagine, every petition, from everyone in the country, whether
it is the Muslim Brotherhood or a demonstrator in the street,
or a professor at a university--are all being directed at the
Supreme Military Council. They are in a position to have to
meet all of those demands. They need to get out of that
business. They want to move quickly to elections.
And there is a hunger for those elections. People argue
about whether it should happen sooner, faster. But everyone
also believes that to have the military stay in charge is not a
positive thing, and will lead to a military dictatorship,
because they won't be able to sustain this level of
interaction.
So it is not inevitable. We cannot sit on our hands,
because I think if we do, it could create a self-fulfilling
prophecy. We have to get in the game, much as we did with
Indonesia, much as we did with the transitions in Latin America
and Eastern Europe.
Mr. Cohen. As you know, my view is that we have entered a
very unpredictable time. And I suspect some of these
revolutions will turn out well, and some of them will turn out
poorly.
I think where our investments should be to help shape this
is in doing things which are really not expensive at all, to
help develop civil societies.
So some of this is the kind of thing that the Republican
and Democratic Institutes do to teach people how to set up
political parties. Some of it could be the kinds of things that
we did after the end of the Cold War with Eastern European
militaries, for example, getting them used to the idea of being
subordinate to civilian authority, and so on. It is really
about helping to shape and educate a generation, and I think
that is where we will have our greatest payoff, which is not a
particularly expensive investment.
Mr. Makovsky. I share your concern about how this will play
out. Eliot cited a few examples of revolutions that didn't go
the way we thought. As we all know, the French Revolution had a
counter-revolution, things played out--the Russian Revolution,
and so on.
I expect that a lot of these upheavals in these countries
are going to take a long time to play out. They might settle
down for a bit, but it is going to take a while. And it is
understandable that it should take a while, given the histories
of a lot of these countries.
I share the idea about doing anything we can on civil
society. Perhaps we should also revisit what we could do in
terms of our public diplomacy tools, and try to convey our
values and our interests with these countries, and perhaps we
could influence things.
Again, I think that a lot of these protests are organic,
they are local. And the United States was not a part of that,
so we don't want to be too much out in front of these. I don't
think that would be too constructive. We want to be supportive.
To answer your question about which of the countries you
think you have the most faith in, obviously, given that this
will play out for a while, it is hard to know. But I would say,
of all the countries, I think Iran is actually possible. I am
not 100 percent convinced of the leaders of the Green group as
actually that they are the ones that we want to be supporting
fully. We don't know who exactly would take charge, but the
Persians--Iran is a coherent country, and the people seem very
hungry there, if ever we could get past this awful regime.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. The gentleman's time has
expired. We are going to go into a second round, and I will
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
I will get to you this time, Mr. Makovsky, because I didn't
get to you last time. You had touched on energy in your talk,
which essentially in that part of the world means oil,
obviously. And it is my understanding that Libya puts out,
ballpark I think it is 1.2 or 1.3 million barrels a day, versus
Saudi Arabia which I think is 8.3 million a day.
And obviously we have seen--that is my first question,
really. How much do you think the instability in the region,
and Libya most particularly, how much impact has that had on
what we are seeing in the U.S. now versus, perhaps, the
moratorium on oil rigs after the spill in the Gulf, and the
natural tendency of oil to go up as the summer driving season
is approach, and those other things which are obviously
factors? How much do you think it is related to the
instability?
Mr. Makovsky. Thank you. A few parts on that. I agree with
you, what you last said. Production anywhere is supply
everywhere, so whether we produce it in North Dakota or we
produce it in Libya, it is oil in the market, and that is
important.
You were right, Libya was producing about one and a half,
1.6 million barrels a day. And the Saudis are estimated to have
produced around 9 million barrels a day. The lower number that
you cited is closer to their OPEC quota.
I think that the issue with Libya is twofold. One is that
it is a particularly desirable crude oil and there is no spare
capacity for that sort of crude oil in the world, so the Saudis
aren't fully able to fill that void. It is what they call
sweeter, and it is lighter, to use the terminology in the
industry.
So that is one problem. Price usually balances that. When
you have supply issues, prices will go up. The second issue is
I think it made folks in the market worry that other countries
will follow. Libya, as you point out, is generally a small
player, but it just raises concerns. It is the first of the oil
producing countries to really experience deep turmoil, so it
made the market worried.
I personally feel that the market has underestimated,
frankly, the risks in the region.
Mr. Chabot. Really?
Mr. Makovsky. Yes.
Mr. Chabot. But you do think it has had a substantial
impact? From what you are saying now, it really should have
been or could have been even higher than it has been.
Mr. Makovsky. It could. Again, there are two parts of it,
as you kind of alluded to. One is the actual supply that is
missing from the market, and then there is what people call the
risk premium, or a political risk premium that other countries
could follow. And so those are the two pieces.
Mr. Chabot. My follow up question is, if Libya has had such
an impact, and the rest of the region, with the instability,
were Saudi Arabia to become unstable, what would the possible
impact of that be? And how stable is Saudi Arabia right now?
Mr. Makovsky. I----
Mr. Chabot. The other gentlemen, I would welcome your input
on that as well, if you would like to----
Mr. Makovsky. If I could punt the ladder to my other
colleagues on the stability--if Saudi Arabia would be
destabilized significantly, it would have a huge impact on the
oil market. If I could add something to this?
Mr. Chabot. Yes.
Mr. Makovsky. I want to finish up. I think Iraq here could
actually be very helpful. They are now producing more oil than
they have for many years, since before the war. There is a lot
of money pouring in, billions of dollars from a lot of
companies.
And it is not just oil. Natural gas is also very important,
and they could supply a lot both to Asia and to Europe, and
reduce the European dependency on Russian supplies.
So I think anything we could do to help Iraqi oil--and I
think there are too many things. I would say one, when we talk
about what forces hopefully could stay in Iraq after 2011, the
5th Fleet should continue to protect the export terminals in
the south. And anything that we could support having to do with
diversifying and securing their export capacity.
Mr. Chabot. And I would remind folks that one of the
criticisms of the United States was that we were going into
Iraq to take their oil. We obviously didn't take their oil.
Mr. Makovsky. No. And I would argue, if anything, I think
we were a little spooked by that idea so we didn't actually do
enough. The idea was--we didn't go in for oil, and we were
getting plenty of Iraqi oil before the war. In fact we were one
of the biggest buyers of Iraqi oil before the war.
That said, it is in our interests that Iraq develops its
energy sector. It also hurts Iran. It improves the oil market.
It improves our economy.
Mr. Chabot. Well, it was one of the Democratic amendments
that I agreed with and voted for years ago that we should have
used, I think it was half of the rebuilding of Iraq should have
been paid for by their oil, as opposed to the U.S. taxpayer.
But we failed on that amendment.
Because, my recollection is, the Bush administration was
concerned that it would send the wrong message to Iraq, and
might be consistent with those criticisms of the United States
that we were just going in to take their oil, which was absurd
from the start.
But if you took a poll in the Middle East, I am guessing it
would be pretty high that people would agree that that is why
we went in there, and what we did. Which we clearly didn't.
Stability in Saudi Arabia, if either one of the other
gentlemen might like to take that very quickly, because then I
will turn it over to Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Carpenter. I think that, on the face of it, all of the
aspects for instability do exist in Saudi Arabia. The Al-Saud
family, we are talking about 2,000-plus princes and members, a
very large population, the average age probably being around
20, 22, which means that the leadership is about 60 years
older. You have a succession crisis coming up.
But on the whole, they do have resources, and they are
using them to deploy against this, as Mike mentioned, in a
massive way. So I think they are going to buy themselves some
time. The question is, what do you do with it?
Mr. Cohen. You know, 6 months ago we would have told you
Egypt is massively stable, so I wouldn't count on Saudi Arabia.
That is point one. I mean, I agree with everything Mr.
Carpenter just said. I also think because of the succession
problem that they have, you are going to have a geriatric
leadership as far as the eye can see, and that is not a good
thing.
And the third thing is, the Iranians clearly have an
interest in messing around with them, and particularly with the
Shia population, which is of course in some of the oil
producing regions. So I would not rule out some sort of major
shock. And if that were to happen, then the world really is
going to look like a very different kind of place.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Very good answer. The
gentleman from New York, and not Massachusetts, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. The world indeed is
going to look like a different place no matter how some of
these situations turn out, it would appear. I didn't mean to
trivialize before by asking the assignment of a number, but I
was trying to get a perspective in scale of which countries
were worth investing more in than others, and how much we are
willing to invest in those countries.
I know it is very fuzzy, and the answer really is, ``It
depends,'' but what I did get from the general remarks was
basically that Egypt is too big to fail, that Yemen is too
crazy to get involved with, and that Libya is okay because we
said it was okay and therefore we have to do it. Do what, I am
still not entirely positive.
But take Egypt. The question is, I see a danger in the high
expectations that exist among the Egyptian people, that we are
not as involved as we are committed, that the Muslim
Brotherhood and even others are planning at a rapid rate of how
to take advantage of the situation as quickly as they can.
The military is probably figuring out how to get out of
this business while remaining in business business. And both
the military and those who are more mischievous are probably
looking at the possibility of being in business together to
satisfy their mutual interest. At the same time, the people are
going to become frustrated because those high expectations
cannot be possibly met in an expedient amount of time.
Question two is if we ignore basket cases, do we do so at
our peril? What happens when that happens? A lot of people will
tell you we are in Afghanistan because we can't put Pakistan at
risk, whatever all that means. What happens in Saudi Arabia if
nobody intervenes in Yemen and the bad guys take over in full
force?
And I will leave it at those two questions, and we will
start with Dr. Makovsky.
Mr. Makovsky. Your second question was what do we do in
basket case countries?
Mr. Ackerman. Yes.
Mr. Makovsky. Well, the best we have----
Mr. Ackerman. My colleague from California made very
strongly, as he often does, that the cost of getting involved
is too high.
Mr. Makovsky. That is right.
Mr. Ackerman. I tried to make the case earlier that the
cost of staying out of it may not be acceptable in the world
either, because there is a high price for that, too.
Mr. Makovsky. That is right. And if you stay out of it,
often the cost only rises. So I would argue that with what are
called often fragile states, like a Yemen or a Pakistan,
sometimes putting some money down--and I recognize the
budgetary constraints that the country is facing, which are
very significant--but some money to help on governance issues
and on security forces could help, because it is seen as some
money down could save a lot of money later if things collapse,
and we have seen that in some of the countries that you
mentioned, so that would be one issue.
And I agree with you about Yemen being a country that is
very scary. One of the dangers with Yemen is that if things
collapse, that if President Saleh leaves, the country is an
artificial construct. So some of the consequences could be al-
Qaeda getting even more room for maneuverability, more piracy
off the shores, which will raise oil prices, and also
instability in the Arabian Peninsula. I thought my time was up.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Carpenter?
Mr. Carpenter. Just about Yemen, Yemen has been a nearly
failed state for a very long time. I think we have been trying
to keep it on life support the best we can, but there has been
no political will by the Saleh regime to address very basic
issues, whether it is basic education or water allocation, or
anything.
I think that ultimately Michael could be right about al-
Qaeda in Yemen, but the problems in Yemen go much beyond al-
Qaeda in Yemen. And that in fact, if the country were to split,
the south might be a better partner, in fact, for issues
related to piracy or any other issue.
But these are real problems, and I don't see really how the
United States intervenes. But minimal investments in the
security aspects, to safeguard what are our real, true
interests in Yemen, which is going after al-Qaeda, I think, is
critically important.
In terms of Egypt and raising expectations, look. I think
you are right that people have very high expectations, but I
also think that having the opportunity to express themselves
and be able to organize is going to go a long way to being able
to vent some of those frustrations.
And people are very, very poor. And because they are very,
very poor, even a modest increase in their living standards
will be, I think, greatly appreciated. There are businesspeople
in Egypt, and they are not fleeing with their capital.
They want to invest in the country. They want to invest in
its future. They believe in its future. So I think, yes, this
is going to be a rocky time. The Muslim Brotherhood is
organizing. In my view, based on my conversations with people
there, I think they are way overconfident. I think there is a
vast silent majority of people that do not want to see
Islamists come to power in Egypt, and I think that they have a
fighting chance of creating a bulwark against them.
Mr. Chabot. Mr. Cohen, did you want to respond?
Mr. Cohen. Just real quickly. Actually, I do think I have
to note that I am from Massachusetts, so I appreciate the
compliments to Massachusetts.
Mr. Chabot. I was reminded, by the way, it is not a great
state. It is a great commonwealth.
Mr. Cohen. Yes. In answer to the question, I think really
quickly, pretty clearly Egypt is the most important country in
the Arab world for all the obvious reasons, and it would seem
to me that that is where most of our efforts should focus.
The second point I should offer is that although it is
important to think about each of these countries individually,
there is also regional dynamics, and to some extent I think we
have to think about this as almost as much of a regional issue.
Because a country like Tunisia might not be intrinsically
important, but it is Tunisia that set off this whole wave of
events. Which leads to the last point, which is the weights of
these countries may change depending on events.
We may think Yemen is just such a basket case that there is
not much good you can do there, leave it alone. And tomorrow
developments may occur which are just going to force us to
think about it differently, the way we thought about
Afghanistan on September 10th, 2001.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired,
and we will conclude this afternoon with questions by the
gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is a good
point that this is--to look at this from a regional context, I
think, is very important. And when you look at countries like
Syria and Libya and Yemen and Bahrain, countries that are
fractured by tribal, ethnic, and religious divisions--you look
at Saudi Arabia, and it is 90 percent Sunni, 10 percent Shiite.
Bahrain, a Sunni minority rules over a Shiite majority.
How significant in this regional context is the Shiite/
Sunni divide, and how will that play out moving forward?
Mr. Carpenter. We all have many aspects of our identity,
and if you touch on any one part of that identity in a negative
way, all of a sudden that becomes the preeminent element of
your identity. I think that is why in my testimony I said that
Saudi Arabia right now is, unfortunately in my view, creating a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
Because the Shia in Bahrain were Bahraini first, and now
are Shia to the core. And I think it is true, it is happening
in Kuwait now where it wasn't the case before. So I think that
this issue is going to become a very real one, the sectarian
issue.
You see it forcing Prime Minister Maliki to makes
statements which I don't think he would have made before. It
gives opening to Nasrallah, Mukhtar al-Sadr all of a sudden
appears on the scene to defend the rights of the Shia in
Bahrain.
This is not healthy, and it is not good for American vital
interests in the region. Because I think if the sectarian fire
gets going, it is going to be very hard to stop, and it is
going to be destabilizing.
Just one other very quick point. I would say that when we
talk about regional, we need to change the way we think. I
think we really do need to have a north African strategy. You
have Egypt, you have Tunisia, you have Libya, Algeria, and
Morocco.
If somehow that area gets its act together, that is where
all of the population in this region is, and that would be a
huge win for all of us. And so the Gulf is another challenge,
and we need to begin to separate the two, in my opinion.
Mr. Cohen. I guess just two thoughts. Again, I agree with
everything that was just said. I think this is why, for
example, in the case of Bahrain, although our geopolitical
interests really require that we support that government to
some extent, it means that we should not let go of sort of
quietly pushing for reform that will ease that tension. And
that is not just on humanitarian grounds. It is on long-term
enlightened self-interest grounds.
I also think this really shouldn't color our overall policy
toward Iraq. I think it is unfortunate that so much of the
administration's approach to Iraq has been, ``How do we
liquidate with dignity this commitment that we never wanted and
that we opposed?''
And whether one was in favor of the Iraq War or not, the
fact is we have an Iraq that is a Shia-dominated country that
is aligned with the United States. That is an asset, and we
should begin treating it as an asset rather than as a liability
to be liquidated.
Mr. Makovsky. I agree with that. That is why, because of
Iraq, we can't see things exactly only on sectarian grounds
between Shia and Sunni. Clearly, it is an issue. Clearly, it is
an opening for the Iranians. And certainly Bahrain is a perfect
example which the Iranians feel belongs to them, and they have
had a lot of historical involvement.
So clearly with some countries it is an issue. I don't
think it is a decisive issue. It is certainly an important
issue, and it obviously matters in Lebanon. But in Iraq I would
also agree with what Eliot Cohen just said, that it doesn't
break down exactly that way. There are a lot of Shia Iraqis
that are not in favor of more Persian influence in Iraq.
Also, there are Shia that are, of course, but just because
they are Shia does not mean they want more Iranian influence in
southern Iraq. And I agree with what Eliot just said, that we
should really do whatever we can to help make Iraq a success.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, gentlemen. Your testimony has been
very helpful and insightful. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. And I would like to echo the
gentleman from New York, that I think the panel this afternoon
has been particularly helpful, and your testimony, I think, has
really been excellent. So we appreciate it very much.
And I would remind members that they have 5 legislative
days to insert any statements or questions in the record. And
if there is no further business to come before the committee,
we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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