[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND
NEEDS AMIDST ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN
SOUTH ASIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 5, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-26
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York DENNIS CARDOZA, California
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Robert O. Blake, Assistant Secretary of State for
South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State...... 6
The Honorable Nisha Desai Biswal, Assistant Administrator for
Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development................ 16
Mr. Daniel Feldman, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State......................... 24
Mr. Donald Sampler, Deputy Director, Office of Afghanistan and
Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development.... 31
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Robert O. Blake: Prepared statement................ 8
The Honorable Nisha Desai Biswal: Prepared statement............. 19
Mr. Daniel Feldman: Prepared statement........................... 27
Mr. Donald Sampler: Prepared statement........................... 34
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 62
Hearing minutes.................................................. 63
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 64
ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND NEEDS AMIDST ECONOMIC
CHALLENGES IN SOUTH ASIA
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. Good afternoon. I welcome all my colleagues to
this hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South
Asia. We will make opening statements, myself and the ranking
member. Other members can make a 1-minute statement if they
choose to do so.
There was an unidentified package in the subway from the
Capitol building to this building, and that is why other
members aren't here yet, because they are making their way
various routes to this committee or they are going elsewhere
and won't come. One or the other, I am not sure. But I think
that is why there aren't more members here yet. Or they are
suspects, as the ranking member suggests.
Anyway, this hearing was called with the intention of
following up on Secretary of State Clinton's testimony at the
full committee that we heard last month, but with an exclusive
focus on South Asia. This will give members the opportunity to
ask more specific questions both about the Fiscal Year 2012
proposed budget as well as U.S. strategy throughout the region.
South Asia continues to be the source of many of the most
critical challenges to U.S. National security and will likely
continue to be in the future. The most immediate challenge is
the war in Afghanistan. At the NATO summit in Lisbon this past
November, NATO members presented their plan to cease all combat
operations in Afghanistan by 2014. The administration's
strategy to meet this deadline relies on a vast number of
complex variables, many of which are out of our control. At the
center of this effort lies the mission to build the capacity of
the Afghan National Security Forces.
Although we have seen significant gains within the Afghan
National Army, the capabilities of the Afghan National Police
lag behind. I would like to call the subcommittee's attention
to the tragic incident just yesterday in which two coalition
soldiers were shot and killed by a man wearing an Afghan border
policeman's uniform. While it is not yet clear whether this man
was indeed a policeman or an insurgent masquerading as a
policeman, incidents like this are, unfortunately, far too
common. They raise significant concerns about how successful
our efforts have been so far, how effective our screening
process is, and whether our 2014 deadline is realistic. The
most tragic outcome for this conflict would be to repeat the
mistakes of the past by leaving Afghanistan before we have had
the opportunity to solidify the gains that our troops have
fought so hard for over the past decade.
The administration's policy also emphasizes the importance
of reconciliation with the Taliban, which is an extremely
thorny issue. Setting aside the question of whether it is even
possible to achieve reconciliation, we are talking about
allowing to return to power the same extremist thugs who
terrorized women and ruled according to a radical
interpretation of Islam that disregards basic human rights.
I hope the witnesses here today will elaborate on the
administration's plans for the conduct of these negotiations as
well as what exactly is considered negotiable. I hope they will
also discuss how the administration is planning to balance the
concerns that India and Pakistan may have surrounding both the
negotiations process as well as how the Afghan Government that
may emerge would affect the strategic balance of the region.
Afghanistan, however, is not our only concern in South
Asia. Years of Pakistani mistrust of the U.S. has resulted in a
relationship in which cooperation on certain issues is often
accompanied by obstruction on others. The Enhanced Partnership
With Pakistan Act of 2009, also known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman
legislation, was intended to change this by authorizing up to
$1.5 billion in civilian aid per year through 2014. Among other
goals, the legislation is supposed to convey to Pakistan that
the U.S. interest is in a strategic partnership and not just a
transactional relationship.
Although we have seen improved cooperation with certain
elements of the Pakistani Government, the positive benefits of
Kerry-Lugar-Berman have not yet spilled over into other arenas,
such as security, in any meaningful way. The fact remains that
Pakistani and U.S. strategic interests diverge on certain
issues, especially those concerning Islamist terrorist groups
like Lashkar-e-Taiba, which the Pakistani
ISI continues to view as a strategic asset vis-a-vis India.
How, then, does the administration plan to address these
critical issues that continue to warp our entire policy in the
region? I would hope that as a strategic partner Pakistan would
not merely cooperate with us when it suits their immediate
interests.
Although I have focused almost exclusively on Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and to some degree India, I hope some of our
panelists will discuss our programs in the other countries of
the region. But after all, I only have 5 minutes, so I have to
keep mine relatively brief. You have all only get 5 minutes,
too, unfortunately. Several examples include our programs to
assist the Sri Lankans in their post-civil war reconciliation
and our efforts to help the Nepalese Government continue its
transition to democracy.
Without any further delay, I would like to recognize my
good friend from New York, the ranking member, Mr. Ackerman,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for assembling this panel of superstars.
Mr. Chairman, the heart of our security dilemma in South
Asia lies in a region that covers the northwest of Pakistan and
the southeast of Afghanistan. Whatever the lines on the map may
indicate, this cross-border area is where the focus of our
concerns should lie. Here is where al-Qaeda has sought cover;
here is where the Afghan Taliban is sustained; here is where
the Pakistani Taliban is strongest. Here is where the Afghan
warlords make their deals. Here is where the reach of the
Pakistani state is weakest. Here is where the combination of
cooperation and perfidy by the ISI is most stark. Here is where
both the convergence and divergence between U.S., Pakistani,
and Afghan interests are most clear.
This region is the chokepoint for much of the war matriel
going into Afghanistan, both ours and theirs. This is the
region where violence, radical Islamism, is most concentrated
and secure. This region is the chief operating area for our
drones because it is the area most saturated with high value
targets.
Even though this broad scenario has been the same for
years, we are always, always, always making progress, except we
never seem to get anywhere. The number of attacks against our
side continues to rise. The number of fighters on the other
side never seems to drop. President Karzai is alleged to be a
crook. President Zardari is alleged to be President Zardari.
Pakistan is about to go broke or collapse or broke.
Afghanistan's new government continues to plumb new depths in
the practice of corruption.
The border is open to us. The border is open to them. The
ISI is cooperating with us. The ISI is cooperating with them.
The Afghan National Security Forces are always being trained
and always melting away.
I know that our President in December 2010 announced, ``We
are seeing significant progress,'' he said, ``against the core
goal,'' and that al-Qaeda senior leadership are under more
pressure and that, ``we are clearing more areas from the
Taliban control and more Afghans are reclaiming their
communities,'' he said. I know that he questioned that, ``The
gains we have made are still fragile and reversible,'' said the
President. I know that he affirmed the goal agreed to at the
November 2010 Lisbon NATO summit to move toward what he said
was a transition to full Afghan lead for security that will
begin early next year--that is 2011--and will conclude in 2014,
said the President.
Mr. Chairman, I know all that, but I can't see anything
changing. The money keeps getting spent and the wounded and the
dead keep coming home. Maybe from Washington the progress can't
be discerned amid all of the conflicting data and narratives. I
hope, indeed, I pray, that things are going to be better than
they are from here. But after 10 years of hearing the same
sales pitch, I tend to doubt it.
I doubt that our money is buying anything that is deep or
durable. I doubt that these new trained security forces are
going to take the lead in weeks, much less years. I doubt the
leaders in the Afghan Government and the Pakistani Government
are going to do anything except pursue their own narrow, venal,
self-interest. I doubt the ISI will ever stop working with us
during the day and going to see their not-so-secret friends in
the Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed, and other terrorist
groups at night. Most of all, I doubt that we aren't being
taken for suckers and that the massive expenditures and the
terrible sacrifices of our troops will, in the end, be
vindicated by anything that resembles success.
A few words about India and other South Asian States. The
brightest light in South Asia's constellation and the strategic
center of gravity for the region is India, which has been on a
sustained path toward economic and political empowerment. As
the world's largest democracy, India is a natural partner for
the United States. And I am delighted by the way that our
relations have blossomed ever since the Clinton administration.
My complaint here, however, is much the same as it has been
for some time. Our relations with India are still too narrow
and still too shallow. Some of the responsibility is ours, some
is theirs. On the economic side, there is too much opportunity
being lost to outdated rules, regulations and laws limiting the
attractiveness of accessibility of India as a destination for
business and investment. On the defense and security side,
things are going well between our two defense establishments,
and I have hope high hopes that he will go much further still.
America makes the best defensive equipment in the world and
India's security requirements are very, very real.
And here, the United States has failed India in that we
have not used our diplomatic leadership and agenda for setting
capability to focus global attention to the threat to India
from Pakistan-based terrorists such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, that
continue to raise money from all over the world. If there is,
God forbid, another Mumbai-like strike, we will not be able to
say that we did our utmost to prevent it, because in truth we
haven't.
The ambitions of these terrorists have only grown and a
full-fledged global campaign to crush these thugs still awaits,
at our peril. The governments in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan,
Bangladesh are in varying degrees transitional, and all face
tough challenges in knitting together the social fabric of
their nations. Some have faced revolutions, others civil war or
conflict. Each faces the difficult task of providing a
government that serves all of its people, that is bound by the
law, and that is answerable ultimately to their publics.
American aid to these national efforts serves our national
interest and reflects the values that we hold most dear.
Partnership with these nations as well as our friends in the
Maldives serves our national interest for very little relative
cost and should be sustained even in these very difficult
economic times.
You have described an agenda wherein a lot of ground has to
be covered, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from
distinguished witnesses.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman. Are there
any other members of the committee who would like to make a 1-
minute opening statement? We will proceed with the
introductions of our distinguished panel here this morning.
First, we have Ambassador Robert Blake, who was appointed
Assistant Secretary of South and Central Asian Affairs in May
2009. He previously served as Ambassador to Sri Lanka and
Maldives, and as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. mission in
New Delhi. He has also held a number of positions at the State
Department in Washington, including Senior Desk Officer for
Turkey; Deputy Executive Secretary and Executive Assistant to
the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. We welcome you here,
Ambassador.
Next, we have Nisha Desai Biswal, who currently serves as
USAID's Assistant Administrator for Asia. Prior to her
appointment, she served as the majority clerk for the State
Department and Foreign Operations Subcommittee on the House
Committee on Appropriations. She also previously served on the
professional staff of the House International Relations
Committee, where she was responsible for South and Central Asia
policy as well as oversight of the State Department and USAID.
We welcome you here, Ms. Biswal.
Next, we have Dan Feldman, who is one of the three deputies
to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His
previous government experience includes serving as Director of
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security
Council in the Clinton administration, where he was responsible
for global human rights issues, and as counsel and
communications adviser to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee. Thank you for being here Mr.
Feldman.
Finally, last but not least is Larry Sampler, who is
currently the Principal Deputy Assistant to the Administrator
and Deputy Director of the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan
Affairs at USAID. Prior to this, he served as the Deputy
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the
Department of State and as the Chief of Staff for the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Mr. Sampler has also
served in the Special Operations community of the U.S. Army,
and we thank him for his service to our country. For 15 years I
believe, Mr. Sampler, is that correct?
Mr. Sampler. That is right.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you for your service, and thank you for
all your services here in the different capacities.
Gerry, would you want to make a 1-minute statement? You are
welcome to do so.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. I am
very interested in the testimony today. I do have a prepared
statement. Without objection, I would ask it be inserted in the
record.
Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Connolly. Let me just say, an issue, Mr. Chairman, that
I think we on a bipartisan basis need to follow, and that is
the whole CERP program, the Commanders' Emergency Response
Program. It has grown enormously. It falls through the cracks.
The intentions are all goods, but the amounts are not so big.
It would make it one of the largest bilateral aid programs in
the world, and we need to get our arms around it in terms of
making sure it is efficacious and making sure that we have full
auditing trails of such large amounts of money. So I am
interested in hearing our witnesses talk about that today, too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We will remind the panel,
as you probably know, we operate under the 5-minute rule, both
for members up here and the panelists. As I say, we have a very
distinguished panel here this afternoon. There should be a
lighting system which should be functioning there to let you
know how much of the 5 minutes are being used. A yellow light
will come on when you have 1 minute to wrap up. The red light
will come in, and you are supposed to stop then. If you didn't
cooperate too much, I have tap the little gavel. And at some
point I will bang it pretty loudly.
Your testimony in full, of course, will be taken for
record, and we will get into things in questions as well.
Mr. Ambassador, you are our first witness. So we appreciate
you being here. You have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT O. BLAKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Mr. Blake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ackerman,
members of the committee. I am very pleased to be here today to
speak with you about U.S. foreign policy priorities and needs
in South Asia. I have submitted testimony about the countries
under my purview, and I would just briefly summarize it now.
Mr. Chairman, South Asia holds more than 1.4 billion
people, nearly a quarter of the world's population, and yet
only 2.5 percent of the world's GDP. More than 50 percent of
South Asians are under 25 and nearly three-quarters of them
live on less than $2 a day. This burgeoning, multi-ethnic
region, anchored by the growing prosperity and global reach of
India, plays an instrumental role in world affairs,
international commerce, and global peace and security. Since
2008, democratically elected leaders govern all South Asian
countries, an indication that India's democracy has served as a
useful model in the region.
The United States and India enjoy a truly global strategic
partnership now, thanks to President Obama's recent visit in
November 2010. India's 8 percent growth rate makes it the world
second fastest growing major economy today. During the
President's visit he announced trade deals that exceeded $14.9
billion in total value, with $9.5 billion in U.S. export
content, supporting almost 54,000 jobs.
India is also among the fastest growing sources of
investment into the United States. In the last decade,
investment capital coming from India to the United States grew
at an annualized rate of 53 percent, reaching $4.4 billion in
2009.
The strategic partnership with India will remain among our
top foreign policy priorities. As the President told the Indian
Parliament last year, with India assuming its rightful place in
the world, we have an historic opportunity to make this
relationship between our countries a defining partnership for
the century ahead.
I would like to take note of the recent resumption of talks
between India and Pakistan and the demonstration of goodwill by
both sides. Both countries made important strides during Home
Secretary talks last week by agreeing to set up a hotline
between their two governments to share information about the
threats of terrorism and to share and facilitate the work of
commissions investigating terrorist attacks.
Turning to Bangladesh, it is a democratic and moderate
Muslim country of 160 million people with a rapidly growing
economy. It is a country with which the United States has a
strong interest in maintaining close relations. Since Prime
Minister Hasina was elected in December 2008, Bangladesh has
denied space to terrorist, captured several key leaders of
violent insurgent groups, and prioritized improving relations
with India.
When I went to Bangladesh 2 weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, I
pressed the government to protect the integrity of civil
society and the autonomy of Grameen Bank. I warned that a
failure to find a compromise that respects Dr. Yunus' global
stature and maintains the integrity and effectiveness necessary
of Grameen could affect our bilateral relations.
Off the coast of southern India lies Sri Lanka, still
recovering from its 26-year conflict with the LTTE. Positioned
directly on the shipping routes that carry petroleum products
and other trade from the Gulf to East Asia, Sri Lanka remains a
strategic interest to the United States. An important
contributor to the global peacekeeping operation, it is poised
to be a capable and willing partner to effectively combat
violent extremist, trafficking, and piracy. But the
government's worrying record on human rights, its weakening of
democratic institutions and practices, and the way in which it
conducted the final months of its conflict against the Tamil
Tigers, hamper our ability to fully engage. We continue to
stress the important of reconciliation and accountability for
the future stability and prosperity of that country.
Nepal is one of the poorest countries in Asia, but it
continues its dramatic transformation from a caste-bound
constitutional monarchy racked by a bloody Maoist insurgency to
a Federal republic that represents and includes all minorities
and ethnicities. Although numerous challenges remain, overall
trends are positive. When Nepal's leadership demonstrates its
readiness to move forward on the final elements of the peace
process, we stand ready to provide limited supports for some
aspects of that.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, South Asia is one of the most
vital regions of the world for the United States, and its
importance will only grow. The recent histories of Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives show they are joining
India in consolidating democracy and contributing to the peace
and security of the larger world. They may seem small, but they
understand the need to think big and the importance of working
with us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blake follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Your
timing was impeccable.
Ms. Biswal, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NISHA DESAI BISWAL, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Biswal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chabot,
Ranking Member Ackerman, and members of the committee, thank
you very much for the invitation to testify today on behalf of
President Obama's Fiscal Year 2012 budget for USAID programs in
South Asia. It is a particular honor for me to appear before
this committee after having served here as professional staff,
and I am also very pleased to be here with my colleagues, Bob
Blake, Dan Feldman, and Larry Sampler.
Mr. Chairman, USAID's development programs in Bangladesh,
India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are addressing critical development
challenges and advancing critical American interests. With
nearly one-fourth of the global population, a third of which
still lives in poverty, South Asia continues to experience
significant development challenges. At the same time it is a
region of strong economic growth and impressive progress. The
American people can take pride in the role that the United
States has played in this progress, whether it be the Green
Revolution of the sixties and seventies, which saved millions
of lives by increasing agricultural productivity, or the
strides that we are making today on reducing infant and
maternal deaths and improving other health outcomes.
Our investments in South Asia have also benefited the
American people. For example, in the last decade, U.S. Exports
to India have quadrupled and Indian investment in the United
States has grown significantly. In fact, globally U.S. exports
to developing countries overall has grown six times faster than
our exports to major economies.
USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah has talked about the need
for the United States to reach out to the 2-3 billion people
who are currently at the bottom of the economic pyramid who
have the potential to rise to the middle class. A large portion
of the bottom billion reside in South Asia. By establishing
links to them today with these future consumers, we can
effectively position American companies for marketing to them
in the future.
To improve our own efficiency, USAID is reforming the way
that we do business, streamlining our procurement processes,
broadening our partner base, employing the strategic use of
science and technology to create more innovative solutions and
strengthening our evaluation capability to better assess when
the programs are working and when they should be replicated.
USAID missions in South Asia are applying these lessons to
focus our resources in this very densely populated region of
profound poverty, chronic food insecurity, and environmental
vulnerability.
Across the region, USAID devotes about 50 percent of our
2012 request toward improving health outcomes. Nepal, India,
and Bangladesh are all USAID focus countries for the Global
Health Initiative. Our investments in the health sector in
South Asia have been highly effective, resulting in improved
maternal and child health, slowed rates of population growth,
and virtually eradicating polio and other childhood disease. In
the past two decades, India has reduced its infant mortality by
27 percent, Nepal by 39 percent, and Bangladesh by 37 percent.
About 20 percent of the request is for improving food
security and agriculture in South Asia. Despite the advances of
the Green Revolution, the region has once again become food
insecure. So in Bangladesh our programs focus on improving
production outputs of rice, maize, and fisheries, and
supporting research for saline-resistant rice that can grow in
the country's flood plains, which are becoming increasingly
more saline.
In Nepal, the program targets the southern Terai, the
breadbasket region of Nepal, which has stalled agricultural
productivity because of the violent conflict of recent years.
In India, the U.S. has embarked on a strategic partnership
with the Government of India to harness the capabilities of
both the United States and India in addressing poverty and
hunger in India, as well as tackling these challenges globally.
President Obama and Prime Minister Singh announced the
Partnership for an Evergreen Revolution in November during that
historic visit.
Mr. Chairman, South Asia also faces strong and unique
environmental vulnerabilities that challenge its growth.
Changing water supply caused by shifting glaciers and monsoon
patterns threaten economic growth, health, and security. So we
are working with scientific communities, other U.S. Government
agencies, and private sector, to help communities manage these
dwindling resources and to address the consequences on health
and social issues.
We are also focusing on disaster risk reduction. Because
the region is so prone to cyclones, monsoon floods, and
earthquakes, as we saw this week the minor earthquake in
northern India, we are launching an effort to mainstream
disaster risk reduction into our development programs, working
with other donors, including the World Bank, so that we can
minimize the impact of disasters in this region.
Finally, because we know that strengthening weak governance
and improving transparency and accountability is critical to
everything that we do, we are building these good governance
programs into every sector of work that we do in South Asia,
including expanding the democratic space in post-conflict
transitions in Sri Lanka and Nepal, strengthening weak
institutions in Bangladesh, and tackling corruption throughout
the region.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to
testify. I look forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Biswal follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
testimony.
Mr. Feldman, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL FELDMAN, DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Feldman. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman,
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today
to discuss U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I have
submitted my written remarks for the record and will briefly
highlight some key points.
The President's Fiscal Year 2012 budget outlines the
resources required to build on hard-won security and civilian
gains that we have achieved through the sacrifice of our
military and civilian personnel serving in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Today, I want to briefly frame the way forward and
explain how we intend to utilize the resources the President
requested to reinforce the progress of the military and
civilian surges while also launching a political process aimed
at splitting the Taliban from al-Qaeda. This diplomatic surge,
as Secretary Clinton outlined in her recent speech, would bring
the Afghan conflict to an end, further our core goal of
disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda, and help to
stabilize the region.
First, Afghanistan, where alongside our military more than
1,100 civilians are working to bolster the Afghan Government
and lay a foundation for sustainable economic growth that will
undercut the insurgency. Assisting us is a broad international
coalition--46 nations, one-third of them Muslim majority, form
the international contact group which met recently in Jedda,
Saudi Arabia, hosted by the Organization of the Islamic
Conference.
We are at the high water mark of the military effort, and
as President Karzai announced on March 22, we are preparing to
transition provinces and districts to an Afghan lead that
encompass roughly 25 percent of Afghanistan's population. This
will advance the transition plan agreed to at the Lisbon summit
in November and which President Obama reaffirmed in his
December policy review. We look forward to combat troop
reductions starting in July, and continuing, based on
conditions on the ground, with transition to Afghanistan
security being completed by 2014. As we have long said, the
Afghans must take responsibility for their own future.
With our allies and partners, the United States will
realign our civilian and military resources in these provinces
to support the Afghan Government's increasing responsibility
for security and the delivery of other essential services to
its citizens. Our civilians will continue to support the
stabilization mission, but will also focus increasingly on
developing the capacity of critical Afghan Government
institutions.
As General Petraeus testified, retreating from our surge in
Afghanistan with our troops still in the field and the handoff
to Afghanistan security will be just getting underway would be
a grave mistake. During transition, State, USAID, and our
civilians from eight other agencies will shoulder increased
responsibilities. Without a fully resourced State and USAID
role in Afghanistan, hard-earned progress by our troops and
civilians will be put at risk.
Equally important is our civilian assistance to Pakistan, a
nuclear-armed nation with deep ties and strong interests in
Afghanistan. We are broadening our partnership and focusing on
shared threats as well as addressing Pakistan's political and
economic challenges. Since 2009, we have worked with the
Pakistani Government and the Pakistani people, including
through our enhanced strategic dialogue process, which met last
year three times at the ministerial level. This has helped
better focus assistance on Pakistan's urgent energy and
economic needs and coordinate our efforts against violent
extremist organizations.
Even as we have had serious challenges to our relationship,
some of which have made headlines, we have continued civilian
and military efforts throughout the country and even expanded
our cooperation. Challenges must still be overcome in our
relationship with Pakistan as distrust lingers on both sides.
And as recent events underscore, we need to work together
carefully to prevent misunderstandings and disagreements from
derailing progress. But it is critical that we remain engaged
in Pakistan and help its democratically elected leaders as they
work to address the myriad of domestic challenges they face,
whether on religious freedoms or economic policy.
We believe that the gains of the past 2 years on both sides
of the border have created space for an Afghan-led
reconciliation effort settlement aimed at achieving a political
settlement of the conflict that will isolate al-Qaeda and
enhance regional stability. The U.S. supports this Afghan
effort. Over the last 2 years we have laid out our unambiguous
redlines for reconciliation with the insurgents. They must
renounce violence, they must abandon their alliance with al-
Qaeda, and they must abide by the Constitution of Afghanistan,
including its protections for the rights of women and
minorities. Those are necessary outcomes of any negotiation.
Insurgents now face a clear choice--disown al-Qaeda and enter
into a political process under Afghanistan's Constitution, or
continue to face military pressure.
All of Afghanistan's neighbors, including Pakistan, have
legitimate concerns that should be understood and addressed by
the Afghan Government in any reconciliation process with steps
that provide transparency and reassurance. They also have
responsibilities, including respecting Afghan sovereignty,
which means agreeing not to play out their rivalries within its
borders and working with Kabul to improve regional stability.
We are encouraged by a resumption of dialogue between
Pakistan and India and the positive steps taken by Prime
Ministers Singh and Gilani last week as a part of cricket
diplomacy. We look to them and all of Afghanistan's neighbors
to help ensure that al-Qaeda and the syndicate of terrorism is
denied safe haven everywhere.
Let me conclude by reiterating that the President's Fiscal
Year 2012 budget request for Afghanistan and Pakistan is
critical to the success of our military efforts. The success of
counterinsurgency is based largely on the ability of civilian
institutions and law enforcement governance and development to
replace military forces as soon as security is restored. While
tackling corruption is a challenge, we are working with our
Afghan and Pakistani partners to ensure that U.S. tax dollars
are utilized effectively and efficiently.
Enduring partnerships with Afghanistan and Pakistan are
vital to U.S. national interests and stability in South and
Central Asia. There have been points in our history when we
have disengaged from Pakistan and Afghanistan, with disastrous
results. We cannot afford to make that mistake again.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to answering
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feldman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Mr. Sampler, you are recognized for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. DONALD SAMPLER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Sampler. It is a pleasure to be here today to talk
about the Afghanistan and Pakistan portion of the Fiscal Year
2012 budget request and how it contributes to U.S. national
security interests in the whole of South Asia. My full written
statement has been entered into the hearing record, and for
purposes of opening remarks I would like to just highlight a
few key points from that statement.
With respect to national security, U.S. foreign assistance
is an inseparable part of U.S. And global security. As
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and General Petraeus have all
emphasized to the Congress, we need a fully engaged and fully
funded national security presence, to include the core
components of our Nation's civilian power, the State Department
and USAID.
In the most dangerous areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan
today, USAID works side by side with our military and civilian
colleagues, participating in the shape, clear, hold, build, and
transfer efforts, administering development projects, playing a
critical role in stabilizing districts, building responsive
local governance, improving the lives of ordinary citizens, and
ultimately helping to prepare the way for American troops to
return home.
With respect to oversight and accountability, we must be
good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars. We understand this.
Central to all of our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan is an
understanding of the critical importance of oversight and
accountability. These are areas on which USAID's leadership has
focused intensely as they represent key parts of our agency's
reform agenda and our team's approach in both countries. I will
be happy to discuss this if asked.
With respect to sustainability, one element of the value
that USAID adds to the whole-of-government approach is our
expertise at integrating the urgent and immediate needs of
stabilization work with the important and lasting benefits of
more traditional assistance. In Afghanistan, guided by the
Afghanistan-Pakistan Review conducted last December, USAID'S
2012 budget request supports two priorities of national
security in Afghanistan--attaining stabilization goals and
establishing the basic conditions that make investments
sustainable. Towards the first, our focus will be to focus and
establish the conditions that will support stability through
programs that generate employment, resolve disputes, involve
the population and their local governance, and provide services
in key population centers.
Toward the second priority, our focus will be on
foundational investments that help maintain stability while
enabling growth and sustaining legitimate governance.
Highlights of these investments include the strategic
reprioritization of resources in the energy sector; continued
support in the areas of gender, education, and health; and
increasing the capacity of public and private institutions to
generate revenues, generate economic growth, and sustained
development efforts.
In Pakistan, U.S. civilian assistance is critical to
maintaining and deepening a long-term strategic partnership
that the United States is forging with the people and the
Government of Pakistan. Our budget request for fiscal 2012
reflects a sustained commitment to cooperation based on mutual
goals and values, which include building a more secure,
prosperous, and democratic Pakistan. In support of this
commitment we will focus U.S. efforts and resources on the
following four priority sectors: Energy; economic growth,
focusing on agriculture; stabilization; and the social sector,
specifically education and health.
In conclusion, we recognize fully the challenges we face in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Problems of limited capacity,
corruption, narco activities and their corrosive effect on
government all exist. For our part, there are issues related to
limited resources, the pending military drawdown, contracting
oversight, and the placement and protection of our civilian
staff in the field. But these are calls to exercise care and
due diligence and to explore ways to do better with fewer
resources. These are not reasons to abandon our vital national
security interest nor the hard work and sacrifices made thus
far.
Finally, in closing, I know that some of the committee are
military veterans, and I thank you also for your service. But I
also would like to recognize and thank the hundreds of
civilians who are serving or have served in frontline countries
on the other side of the world as part of our whole-of-
government approach to national security. Many of them lived
and worked side by side with fellow Americans in the military,
sharing the same hardships, the same separations from loved
ones, and the same risks. These young men and women, all of
them, whether they are in uniform or not, deserve the best that
our Government and our agency can do to support them as they do
their job, which is to represent the very best of America to
the rest of the world.
I am truly honored to be here today, and look forward to
answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sampler follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Sampler. We want to
thank all the witnesses who have testified here this afternoon.
Now the members here have 5 minutes to ask questions. I will
begin with myself.
Mr. Feldman and Mr. Sampler, the latest quarterly report
for the three inspector general offices charged with monitoring
U.S. nonmilitary aid programs in Pakistan set off a flurry of
media coverage, all focusing on the stark assessment of the
progress of the Pakistan program: ``One year after the launch
of the civilian assistance strategy in Pakistan, USAID has not
been able to demonstrate measurable progress.''
While many of us appreciate the challenges of implementing
a substantial assistance package in the Pakistani environment,
it remains unclear what the $6 billion in civilian development
and humanitarian aid over the last decade has done to overcome
anti-American sentiment there. Additionally, the Kerry-Lugar-
Berman legislation was to achieve this very objective. It was
supposed to demonstrate to Islamabad that the U.S. wished to
move beyond the transactional relationship that had fomented so
much distrust.
As you state in your testimony, Mr. Feldman, $1.5 billion
has already been distributed. We are now discussing the budget
for year 3 of this 5-year program and we have seen little, if
any, progress on some of the most significant security issues.
A couple of questions relative to that. What is your assessment
of the success or lack thereof of our civilian and security
assistance to date?
Secondly, more broadly, what are the trends in the
relationship? Do you see evidence of any increasingly shared
strategic outlook or, absent that, at least an improved ability
to manage our strategic differences in Afghanistan and
elsewhere.
Thirdly, alternatively, does the Davis case and other
controversies point to growing bilateral tensions and
increasing strategic divergence? Our efforts to date have
focused overwhelmingly on highly visible projects like
infrastructure assistance at the expense of democracy and
governance programs. Why have these so-called high visible
programs not led to warmer relations or improved public opinion
concerning the U.S.?
Finally, why did legislative strengthening programs like
the Provincial Assembly Program in Peshawar not get extended,
and what specifically is SRAP doing to help facilitate the
growth of political parties in Pakistan?
I know that is a lot to answer, but I have only got 5
minutes and if I ask them individually, I won't get to the
third or fourth tier questions. So I will shut up and start
listening.
Mr. Feldman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The relationship, as
I tried to be very honest about in the opening statement, is a
complex one. And I don't mean to sugarcoat it. Obviously, we
have gone through a difficult time recently. But it is against
the backdrop of real strides, very significant strides, in the
overall bilateral relationship over the course of the last 2
years.
U.S. security assistance builds Pakistani capability and
increases its willingness to engage in difficult fights. Last
year, for the first time, Pakistan conducted major combat
operations in five of the seven tribal areas, tribal agencies,
at significant cost and sacrifice, as well as since 2009, in
Malakand, which includes Swat Valley. We rely on the Pakistan
security institutions to prioritize counterinsurgency, to move
to eliminate save havens, to cooperate with us in deleting al-
Qaeda and the Taliban.
I would say as the broadest frame a difficult partnership
with Pakistan is far better than a hostile Pakistan and is
vital to U.S. national security interests. If we were to have
economic or political collapse in Pakistan, it would threaten
our most critical national security interests.
In terms of our civilian assistance programs, I will defer
in part to my colleague from USAID. But we have made great
strides since Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation was passed just 18
months ago or so. As I noted, $1.5 billion has been spent since
then. The GAO reports focus on the amount from Fiscal Year 2010
funding, the first year of Kerry-Lugar-Berman, so it looks like
a smaller amount than has actually be spent altogether. And
$500 million of that $1.5 million was for flood relief and
recovery efforts, and we are now moving into more flood
reconstruction.
Many of those projects are given--the lead time to start
many of these projects are just now getting underway. I think
we will see much more significant expenditures in the months
ahead. As Larry laid out, we have sought to focus and
prioritize those projects in those four key sectors that are of
most core national security interest not only to the Pakistanis
but also to us. That is helping to ensure that there is energy
and electricity, to help create jobs, there is a counter to
extremism, and helping to promote education and health
opportunities.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. My time has expired. So, Mr.
Sampler, I will however let you respond however you would like
to in a second round or maybe I can get the answers in writing
or some point. The question is basically we spend all this
money and they still hate us. What should we do about that. But
I will let you get to it later.
I think, Mr. Ackerman, you are next for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since 2001, the
amount of assistance, military and otherwise, that we have
provided to Pakistan is pushing close, I think, to $20 billion.
That is a bunch of money. By anybody's reading of how popular
the United States is in Pakistan, the numbers hardly measure on
any type of meter. Our popularity could not be too much worse.
For a country that is completely victimized by terrorists, with
us being just about the sole--not quite the sole, but
numerically pretty much there--protector of the people against
the terrorists, at least in our efforts to do that, and the
astonishing contrast to how we are regarded there gives one
pause to say: What are we doing, how effective are we in
getting our message across.
Of course, we do this in large measure for our own reasons,
our own security reasons, besides the humanitarian reasons. But
why hasn't all of this help and assistance demonstrated in a
measurable way to the people of Pakistan that we are not the
enemy?
Any volunteers? So if we gave another $20 billion, I guess,
would they like us in the morning as we loved them $20 billion
another night?
Mr. Sampler. Ranking Member, thank you for the question.
Mr. Ackerman. You don't mean that.
Mr. Sampler. With respect to the amounts of money and the
return on investment in terms of popularity, it is at the
moment in time not possible to make a direct correlation
between amounts given and popularity.
Mr. Ackerman. I know you can't buy love, but a little like.
Mr. Sampler. I draw attention to surveys done after the
earthquake and the flood relief. Those were opportunities where
popular opinion in Pakistan were dramatically affected and
pretty directly affected by the immediacy of the results and
the immediacy of the relief that was provided. The continued
assistance is in support of the strategic campaign we have with
Pakistan to develop this partnership over time. I believe
Secretary Clinton mentioned in her remarks at one point that
there is now a communication strategy for how we take better
advantage of the money that we are spending. Ambassador Munter
is adamant that we brand the work we do in Pakistan as from the
American people.
So there are steps being taken to make sure that we do get
value for the investment where we can, but it would be
inaccurate to state that the primary reason for the investment
is for a momentary blip in popularity. We are in Pakistan and
we are in a partnership with Pakistan for the long haul, and
our investment is evidence of that.
Mr. Ackerman. Let me ask a different question, different
subject. Help me play chess, which means we are going to do
three moves at least instead of the usual what move is next.
India suffered a huge catastrophe in Bhopal, a chemical spill.
If you take a look at what is happening in Japan, it is
absolutely frightening. We have helped in India with our 123
nuclear agreement to provide for nuclear energy. One of the
thoughts in doing that was so that they are less reliant on the
possibility of doing business with Iran and buying crude from
Iran. If India decides to be as cautious as most countries are
and slows down their nuclear and civilian energy projects, how
likely is it that Iran will be higher on their radar for
supplying the energy that they so voraciously need to consume?
Ambassador Blake, people are pointing to you.
Mr. Blake. Mr. Ranking Member, first of all, on the
Japanese situation, I think it is really too early to say what
effect Japan is going to have on India's nuclear program. I
think India does remain very much committed to carrying out its
nuclear program because it has such huge energy needs that are
going to be needed for its growing economy and its growing
population. So we continue to work very closely with our Indian
friends to carry out the civil nuclear deal. I think they
remain committed to it. We haven't received any indications of
that.
In terms of India's continued reliance on Iran for oil and
gas, India presently imports about 15 percent of its oil from
Iran, and I think that actually our sanctions and the
international sanctions have had some impact because Indian
companies, big companies like Reliance, increasingly are
reading the tea leaves and understand that they have to make a
choice, they have to make a strategic choice between trading
with Iran and trading with the United States and the broader
world. Increasingly, they are moving toward us. I think that is
a very, very positive signs. It also puts pressure on the
Iranians. So I actually think that the trends are good in this
respect.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. Kind of the
same question I think the ranking member and I are asking
relative to Pakistan. I remember seeing a political cartoon
some years ago, it has probably been 10 now, in which there was
a Middle Eastern man who was looking, smiling at a bag that had
been provided to them for an aid of some sort and had a flag on
there, and it said, Food. The caption under there was: Those
Americans are so thoughtful, food and a flag to burn.
It sort of, unfortunately, went to what many of us feel
about our aid, how frustrating it is that the American taxpayer
puts out so much money and unfortunately we are still despised
in many places around the world, despite what the United States
does and the American taxpayer.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I guess
it comes down to fundamental approaches, and frankly, we have
to admit and should admit that the fundamental approach that we
have been taking to establishing stability and friendships in
these parts of the worlds has failed. Failed. It is a failure.
We are now in a situation where there is more turmoil and more
anti-American hatred than before. Perhaps one of the
fundamentals we are talking about is the idea that we can in
some way build other people's nations for them.
I would agree with Mr. Sampler that when he just mentioned
emergency and crisis assistance brings us good will. When
people are most desperate and most vulnerable and we help with
a helping hand and we help people with medicines and food and
water at a time when their families are being threatened, we
can win their friendship. And that should be, Mr. Chairman, the
focus of America's efforts. The money that we are spending for
nation building has been a waste. It has not built the ties
that we thought it would build.
So as we go to cut our budgets and try to find the most
effective way of spending our limited dollars overseas, Mr.
Chairman, I would suggest that, from what I am hearing today
and what I have been looking at over the last few years, that
we need to change the fundamental of going from nation building
uber alles to perhaps crisis and emergency assistance and being
there when they need us.
I don't believe that any amount of nation building can
change the fundamentals of another society unless of course we
want to occupy that society for decades and decades and
decades, which I don't believe Americans want to do that
anywhere, especially Afghanistan.
I appreciate Mr. Feldman's optimism. His testimony has been
very optimistic about Afghanistan. Let me just suggest that it
runs contrary to everything the rest of us are seeing in
Afghanistan. It is not becoming more stable. We have a
situation now where the disruption of radical Islam now that we
had driven out after 9/11, after the Northern Alliance drove
the Taliban out of their country, with our help, the situation
is actually a lot worse in terms of American security today.
I would suggest that perhaps this amount of spending--well,
let me ask you this just straight out, Mr. Feldman. Can
assistance basically succeed? Can our spending and our
development projects succeed if the government structure that
we have foisted upon the Afghanistan people is contrary to
their basic culture? This is a culture of the most diversified
and I would say the most bottoms-up culture in the world. This
is a village culture. Eighty percent of the people live in
villages. They believe in the tribal chief and the tribal
alignments. Can we change that? Can we force them to accept the
central government?
The structure we have tried to force upon them and are
currently trying to force upon them is the most centralized
system that I have identified in the world. You have Karzai,
who is elected, and then he appoints the provincial leaders. Is
that correct, Mr. Feldman? The provincial leaders are not
elected. What kind of corruption would we have in this country
if the President of the United States--oh, boy, he's elected,
thus we have democracy--but he would appoint all the Governors
and then the Governors would appoint the police chiefs and the
heads of the education and everything all the way down the line
would be, when it got to the people level, was associated with
somebody in the capital city, who all they know has a brother
who is engaged in the drug trafficking. Do you think we can
succeed with that type of reality?
Go ahead, Mr. Feldman. Tell me I am wrong. Give me some
reason for optimism. I am ready for it.
Mr. Feldman. Thank you. In terms of looking for a reason
for optimism, I would first point to the Washington Post op ed
from last week that says: Afghanistan's Reasons for Optimism,
by Jim Dobbins and Craig Charney.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I never get optimistic when I read the
Washington Post.
Mr. Feldman. Again, I am not seeking to be Pollyannish in
this, and we certainly recognize the vast difficulties here.
But I think if you look back at the testimony by General
Petraeus, by Secretary Gates, by Chairman Mullen in terms of
significant military successes recently and how we are using
that to leverage what we hope, and which we have always said
that this cannot be resolved just on the battlefield and
therefore this is the reason why we are seeking to move forward
with this third----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Are we asking for any structural changes?
I was in Bonn when this whole system was created, we threatened
Zahir Shah, the former king, to accept this and to accept
Karzai, I might add. He wasn't Zahir Shah's pick. Is there any
indication that we are willing to accept a change in what we
forced on these people, this centralized structure? Because
they are not going to accept it. These village chiefs, these
village leaders are not going to accept mandates from a central
government, especially when the guy up there is from a
different tribe or whatever.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. If the
gentleman would like to answer briefly the question or
statement or like to make the gentleman optimistic up here.
Mr. Feldman. In citing some of this polling data released
last week--and, again, I am not using it as the only framework
to view this through. I am also dubious about some polling.
According to these polling numbers, 63 percent of Afghans said
that they are better off than they were 5 years ago. Fifty-nine
percent of Afghans think their country is moving in the right
direction. Karzai's approval ratings were 62 percent. That is
not a case for optimism, but it is a case of looking at what--I
don't think you can accurately say we are foisting this upon
them, by any means. This is the system, the legitimate,
credible system of government that is in place now, and this is
what we are working with.
But I think that per my opening statement the two key
pieces here are, first of all, the transition announcement and
the fact that we have now embarked on the real transition,
including this announcement of seven provinces and districts
encompassing 25 percent of the country's population, which was
announced by President Karzai just a week or so ago, and the
fact that the transition frame as announced in Lisbon, which
will be completed by the end of 2014, has now started.
But second of all, trying to bring all the assets that we
have to bear; not only the continuation of a very robust
military and civilian surge, but also this diplomatic and
political surge, which we are seeking to bring this to
conclusion. But the military and civilian campaigns have to go
hand in hand, and the Afghan Government, as you rightly note,
has to build credibility with its own people. And that is what
our assistance has gone to do, to try to ensure that there are
alternatives presented to the Afghan people to the insurgency.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The ranking
member, Mr. Ackerman, had to go to the floor to offer an
amendment on a bill that is being taken up on the floor so he
is being now ably represented as the acting ranking member by
the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, who is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the
panel.
I mentioned in my brief opening remarks my concern about
CERP, the Commanders' Emergency Response Program. Since 2004,
nearly $2.64 billion has been appropriated for this program. I
am concerned that there is little transparency and little
accountability. And the amounts are now quite large.
Originally, maybe the intention of CERP was to augment the
ability of a military commander to provide something other than
guns and uniforms in a village or in a region so that he or she
could respond quickly without a lot of bureaucracy in fixing a
bridge or rebuilding a school or whatever it might be. This is
now a very serious, large aid program. There was, for example,
a special inspector general report in January that raised the
question of whether all of programs we have invested in through
this program might be at risk of waste because, oops, we forgot
to build in a maintenance component.
So I would like to hear your view about CERP and whether
there is sufficient accountability and transparency in what we
are doing moving forward.
Mr. Feldman.
Mr. Feldman. I will defer to my colleague.
Mr. Sampler. Thank you. I am familiar with CERP actually
from my time in the military service as well, and it is a
valuable tool because what we find is that there are times when
the military is present in advance of USAID's ability to be
present and do the work. So I appreciate your recognition that
CERP had a place and has a time.
The discussion about how we use it now is a valid one. I
will note that recently, to encourage the interaction between
USAID and our military colleagues with respect to CERP, there
is a manual that has been developed, a civilian guide to how
CERP is being used. It allows and encourages and in fact in
some cases strongly encourages the USAID development experts
working at the PRT and even further down at the DST, where
these military commanders are employing CERP, to engaged on how
it should be done, how it is integrated into longer-term
development projects.
What the nuances of the use of CERP are, the military
perspective may be shaped by the winds through which they view
the particular project and the context politically in the
village. The USAID perspective will be different. One is not
right and one wrong. What we have to do is learn to integrate
them. So we are working quite closely at PRT and DST levels on
coordinating and making sure that CERP is applied appropriately
and an integration and smoothly harmonized with the development
work that USAID is doing.
Mr. Connolly. I would say to you, Mr. Sampler, when you get
to $1 billion a year, that is real money. And the military are
not development experts. They are wonderful at all kinds of
things, but that is not their mission. And that is what they
are doing right now; they are running a development program
through CERP. That is not their main expertise. And that is my
concern; that with the best of intentions, you have to ask
yourself what could go wrong with amounts that large. And are
there mechanics in place to account for it in a transparent
way. That continues to be a concern to me.
Let me ask you in the time I have left, Mr. Rohrabacher and
the chairman really raised questions about the success of our
efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan. One measure of whether we
are successful or not I guess is do they like us. Another might
be more concrete metrics in terms of what got built or repaired
or invested. I would be interested in hearing what are your
metrics for success or failure and how do you think we are
doing? What constitutes success in Pakistan, for example?
Mr. Feldman. Well, are you asking both Afghanistan and
Pakistan?
Mr. Connolly. Yes. I thought I would start with Pakistan.
But you can pick either.
Mr. Feldman. If I have less than a minute, I will try to
put them together, and that is I would go back to the
President's December review and what he has laid out as the
touchstone here, which is a region that is free from al-Qaeda;
a stable, independent Afghanistan rid of insurgency and proxy
conflicts fought by neighboring states. So it is political
resolution to the conflict.
I think you can look at a variety of different metrics,
depending on what you are seeking for success. As I noted in
the Pakistan answer, in particular, and at least three or four
members have now asked about the kind of popularity piece.
Again, I don't put that much stock in polling numbers. I would
note that they are not all, again, against us. In polling that
was through December of last year, so pre the most recent
situation in Pakistan, we had gradually crept up kind of mid-
teens to over 40 percent in terms of approval ratings by
Pakistanis of the U.S. And I think that that goes to the fact
that we were really addressing for the first time in many years
this trust deficit which we had talked about quite a bit. We
are seeking to move from a far more transactional relationship
in Pakistan to a much broader and deeper one. That was
crystallized by the strategic dialogue process that we have had
hosted three times by the Secretary at a ministerial level year
but, most importantly, which had 13 different substantive
working groups, everything from security to water to energy and
infrastructure, helping the Pakistani Government meet the needs
of the Pakistani people, which is in our own national security
interest as well as that of the Pakistanis.
So that is how I would look at success in Pakistan.
Mr. Chabot. Than you. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentleman from Illinois, who is the chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Mr. Manzullo, is
recognized. I should have also indicated Mr. Rohrabacher is the
chairman of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee in
Foreign Affairs as well.
Mr. Manzullo, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement
for Ms. Biswal. I was wondering where I had seen you before.
Then I remembered you had been part of Mr. Obey's staff.
Ms. Biswal. Yes, sir, as well as on this committee prior to
that.
Mr. Manzullo. That is correct. That is correct. In your
testimony you stated in the third paragraph, the last sentence:
``I hope to get a better sense of the committee's priorities in
the region what USAID can do answer questions and address
concerns.'' Then, on the second page, the fourth paragraph, you
say: ``Under the leadership of Dr. Shah, USAID has reformed the
way we do business. We are broadening our partner base to make
it easier for small businesses, organizations, to partner with
us. We are employing strategic use of science and technology
and seeking out innovations that can have a game-changing
impact.''
Are you familiar with the development innovations ventures?
Ms. Biswal. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Manzullo. Were you here last week when I questioned Dr.
Shah on the wisdom of that program?
Ms. Biswal. I was not present, but I do understand the
nature of your question.
Mr. Manzullo. Well, this gives $30 million in grants. It
employs 10 new full-time employees of the State Department. A
brand new program. It duplicates what other agencies are doing
in the area of science and technology. It makes foreign
companies as well as U.S. companies and individuals available
for $30 million for new innovations, we and are in the process
of ending that program through various techniques.
I just find it extraordinarily difficult to believe that
USAID would begin to expand its role into strategic use of
science and technology. One in particular is spending money on
fuel cell research and there is already millions being spent in
the private sector.
Can you tell me how you can justify expanding USAID's
mission at a time when there is hardly enough money to take
care of the original mission?
Ms. Biswal. Mr. Chairman, I think it is a fair question.
Let me explain to you my view of why I think this is an
important area for us to expand into. USAID has funded a lot of
very important work in improving health outcomes and in
improving development outcomes. But we have not had the focus
on innovation or the partnership with the private sector that I
think can look at nontraditional ways of finding solutions that
perhaps are not in our quiver of arrows right now but perhaps
could have a much greater transformative impact. And so the
idea here is to seek out what we don't know, what others are
doing in the private sector, in academia that might have a game
changing impact and invest in a very small amount initially to
see if that----
Mr. Manzullo. I understand. A $30 million--hiring 10 brand
new bureaucrats is not a small amount. And how would that help
feed the most needy now?
Ms. Biswal. For example, one program that we are looking at
in India is for $173,000 to look at mobile technology as a way
of improving health care delivery in rural areas in India where
you can through mobile technology----
Mr. Manzullo. What is that? What is mobile technology?
Ms. Biswal. From cell phones and smart phones. Because of
the high prevalence of mobiles in the area----
Mr. Manzullo. The problem with that is DIV, you don't check
what our agencies are doing. You don't check with what NIST is
doing, what the SBIR program is doing. You are adding arrows to
your quiver when most agencies are taking arrows out of the
quiver, to use your metaphor.
I am just suggesting to you that Americans are not in the
mood for USAID or any other agency to expand, to increase its
activities. You have got your hands full feeding the needy. And
what I would like you to do is to furnish me within 10 days--
and, Chairman, if you could make this in order--I want copies
of all of the awards that were made, including the one on fuel
cell technology. I don't want to have to get a subpoena. Can
you give me your assurance at this hearing that you will
furnish copies of the awards that were made under this program?
Ms. Biswal. I will give you my assurance that we will
comply with that request.
Mr. Manzullo. That is good enough, and so I will leave you
alone. Thank you. It is good to see you back.
Mr. Chabot. Hot and cold. Thank you very much. We
appreciate that very much. And we will go now to the gentleman
from Florida if he has any questions, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
it very much. For the panel I am alarmed by the killings and
beheadings that took place this past weekend in Afghanistan as
a result of the Koran burning that happened in my State of
Florida. Though certainly it was within the pastor's
constitutional rights to burn the Koran, I don't believe it was
the right thing to do.
What is more alarming, however, is that it appears that
more than just Taliban ties participated in this violent
protest. The media has reported that students at Kabul
University have been especially enthusiastic in calling for
death to America. It makes me wonder if any of the tens of
billions of dollars we are sending in development aid has
really done anything to develop Afghanistan either civilly,
politically, educationally, or economically.
Are we wasting our time over there? Are we wasting our time
and money over there? I know the question has been asked
several times. I would like to have an answer.
Mr. Feldman. I would just start with the fact that we
obviously abhor the burning of a holy text, but nothing
justifies the kind of violence that we saw in Mazar several
days ago. I would note on the positive side that Afghan
leaders, including Ulema leaders and President Karzai, are
urging calm, that the situation seems to be getting calmer and
more stable. The report that I saw today about protests the
Kabul University were fairly small, a few hundred students and
certainly not violent. And so hopefully the arc of this has
wound down.
But I would certainly note that I think that the statement
by the President, his second statement over the weekend,
addressed this issue most specifically, I think, and eloquently
when he said the desecration of any holy text, including the
Koran, is an act of extreme intolerance and bigotry. But to
attack and kill innocent people in response to that is
outrageous and an affront to human decency and dignity.
I don't know if there is anything else my colleagues what
to add.
Mr. Sampler. I will just add, and partly also in response
to a previous question about nation building or state building,
the investment is not going to prevent college students from
protesting but it will build the capacity of the government to
respond to protests and address them in ways that are more
recognizable and acceptable to the rest of the world.
The focus in terms of the state assistance that we give to
the Government of Afghanistan is focused on that. When these
things happen, as they may, how will the state be able and
capable to response. In Mazar the response was inadequate. I
would argue that in Kandahar the response was different,
inadequate in different ways. What we need to be able to
measure and to continue to apply resources and metrics to is
the ability of the state to respond when things like this
occur.
Mr. Bilirakis. I have one other question, Mr. Chairman.
What is the capability for the Afghan state to harness its own
resources to become as self-sufficient as possible and are
there proper oversight and accountability requirements
currently? What international bodies would be responsible for
oversight and accountability as international forces transition
and draw down? For the entire panel.
Mr. Feldman. Obviously the sustainability aspect here is
one that we have been very, very focused on. Ambassador
Holbrooke used to say frequently that agriculture was our chief
nonsecurity priority in Afghanistan. Rebuilding the economic
infrastructure has been at the core of what we have been
seeking to do.
There is obviously much that we are continuing to look at
to help Afghans find the resources to make it a more
sustainable state. And USAID can perhaps speak about some of
the extractive initiatives and others that are currently being
looked at.
In terms was oversight this is something that we have tried
to factor into every aspect of our relationship in both
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we have particularly focused
resources on looking at our own contracting processes,
subcontracting processes, and having many more civilians in the
field to help to oversee that has aided that effort quite a
bit.
Mr. Sampler. In the waning seconds, there is the now the
High Office of Oversight that the Government of Afghanistan has
created and we are working to build their indigenous capability
with their own High Office of Oversight. In the meantime and in
addition to that we have an initiative called A3, accountable
assistance for Afghanistan, and the notion there is that we
will assess ministries and provide technical assistance as
required to bring them up to international standards, and we
will provide continuing oversight. And we have a number of what
we call host country contracts with specific ministries that
have been quite successful at delivering the goods and services
of governance through these mechanisms that were mentioned.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
hearing. I am sorry I am late so I don't have the benefit of
your earlier perspectives. So if this is a bit redundant, I
apologize. But let's talk a little bit about what is happening
across the Arab world and the potential there in terms of the
Arab spring and a reaching for more democratic ideals as well
as in South Asia, the ongoing interest in expanding democratic
capability, capacity.
If you think about it, the concept of democracy really
rests upon two pillars. The first is respect for the inherent
dignity and therefore rights of all persons of a society and
then, secondly, a responsibility for the rule of law. And in
that regard, we have some things that are in dire conflict.
If you look at, for instance, the situation in Pakistan
where the gentleman, the highest ranking Christian in the
government, Mr. Shahbaz Bhatti, was assassinated about a month
ago on the heels of others who had spoken out against the
blasphemy laws. This is a very, very powerful setback for the
notion of expanding democratic ideals and democratic capacity.
Throughout the Middle East as well there is a diaspora
going on where its Christian populations are fleeing Iraq, they
are under pressure in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon. And so I would
like to hear some of your perspectives on how to heighten
awareness of this as a U.S. Government and how societies who
are striving to again achieve more democratic ideals have to
reconcile themselves with the concept that all persons have
dignity and therefore rights, and particularly if you lose the
Christian communities throughout the Middle East you are losing
a true leavening influence that has a rightful place to be
there alongside other historic communities, a historic right as
well as a right based upon the natural rights of man. You will
lose the leavening influence and the buffering capacity that
those communities have historically had between differing
factions.
This is also very important in the Israeli-Palestinian
question. We like to talk about trying to resolve those
differences between Jews and Muslims, but there are three legs
to this stool. It is Jews, Christians, and Muslims. We are
struggling as a government to figure out how to communicate
that effectively and to raise it to the level that it needs to
be raised, both in our bilateral relationships but also in our
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations.
So I would like to hear your commentary on that, please.
Mr. Blake. Mr. Fortenberry, let me start and I will ask Dan
to chime in. I would like to say that I think there is a very
broad and encouraging trend in South Asia, which is that for
the first time now in the history of that region there are
democratically elected governments in every single South Asian
country. The most recent entrants to that club were Bhutan,
which was a monarchy and now has become an elected Parliament,
and then the Maldives, which had for 30 years an autocrat and
they had a very good, fair election in 2008. Bangladesh also in
2008 had its freest and fairest elections ever.
So the broad trends in South Asia are actually very
positive, and I would submit that the United States has played
a very important role through our assistance in helping many of
those democratic transitions.
So let me just ask Dan to also chime in on the Afghanistan/
Pakistan part.
Mr. Feldman. Sure. The assassinations of Governor Tazir and
Mr. Bhatti were truly tragic. They were obviously very
committed to tolerance and to education of Pakistan's future
generations. We felt it very deeply. I went to the memorial
service held here by the Embassy for Minister Bhatti. He had
been in to see Secretary Clinton just a few weeks before his
death.
It is an issue that our ambassadors, Ambassador Munter and
Ambassador Eikenberry, raise frequently in terms of their
ongoing concerns about discrimination.
Mr. Fortenberry. It is important to note that Shahbaz
Bhatti, while being the highest ranking Christian in the
Pakistani Government was also highly interested and effective
in protecting other minority rights because he was a man
compelled by this fundamental ideal of justice for all people.
Mr. Feldman. Yes, absolutely, and it is an issue that we
raise frequently in our dialogues with the governments and in
this case in particular with the Pakistani Government and have
really put it as one centerpiece of those discussions. I know
that in addition to Secretary Clinton's own meeting with
Minister Bhatti, our Under Secretary for Global Affairs, our
Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Human Rights and Labor
all have been to Pakistan recently and raised this prominently
in their issues, and it is something that we continue to be
very, very committed to.
I would say on the rule of law front this is a cornerstone
of some of our civilian assistance programs in Afghanistan, and
Mr. Sampler can speak a little bit in more detail about some of
those. But this is a hallmark of civil society, and it is in
many ways why we again tried within our strategic dialogue to
really enhance and promote the role of civilian government and
everything that a civilian government can and should stand for
and its responsiveness and protection for his people.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. We will go
into a second round here. We don't have to necessarily take up
our full 5 minutes, but if the gentleman would like to do that,
I will start off myself. I will not take 5 complete minutes.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, brought up
something I also intended to bring up and that was the incident
where this knucklehead burns a Koran and then a far in excess
reaction occurs over in Afghanistan where literally people's
lives are lost. And I was just wondering first of all with
respect to the four Nepalese soldiers in particular, who were
some of the victims here, do we know if--the different
countries that are over there have different rules of
engagement. Some are armed, some my understanding is may or may
not have ammunition and different things. Do we know what the
Nepalese were operating under at the time?
Mr. Feldman. For the rules of engagement, I think that
would be per the UNAMAs mandate but I am not sure.
Mr. Sampler. I can't speak with authority to the UNAMAs
mandate now, but when I was chief of staff the guards actually
had a fairly liberal rule of engagement policy. They would not
necessarily have to have been or to have allowed themselves to
have been disarmed.
Mr. Chabot. Some of the countries themselves have different
restrictions on their own troops, don't they?
Mr. Sampler. Mr. Chairman, you may be speaking about the
troop-contributing nations to ISAF in particular and you are
certainly right, but that is way beyond my purview.
Mr. Chabot. I would be interested to find out what they
were operating under, first of all. And then second of all, do
we have any insight or any intelligence or any feedback that we
have gotten as to what the reaction has been in Nepal about
such a horrific thing happening to their soldiers? Because they
have been a pretty key part in different exercises around the
world and have good troops as far as I understand. Have we
heard anything about that?
Mr. Blake. Mr. Chairman, I actually called the Nepalese
Ambassador when I heard about this and expressed my
condolences. He actually wasn't aware of it at the time, but I
think, as you say, the Nepalese have soldiers serving around
the world. They have suffered casualties like this in the past.
They are known for their bravery and their service, the Gurkhas
in particular.
Mr. Chabot. Do we know if they were Gurkhas or not?
Mr. Blake. I don't know about these particular ones.
Mr. Chabot. That was the first thing that came to mind.
Mr. Blake. I don't think this is going to in any way impede
their continued service in peacekeeping operations around the
world. This is something that the Nepalese take great pride in.
I think that will continue. I see no indication that that has
changed.
Mr. Chabot. If we could have some follow-up on the
questions that I raised. And then secondly, relative to India,
one of the things that I find particularly annoying as a Member
of Congress and a representative of the taxpayers who send
dollars to India--and let me preface by saying that I consider
India to be an important ally to the United States and
important trading partner and even more so in the years to come
hopefully--is that in the U.N. they have a history of not being
particularly in sync with where the United States is.
I asked to have the most recent year available, which I
think is 2009, the numbers how they were with the U.S., and I
was informed that they were not particularly big, overall
voting. They were with us 30 percent of the time, not counting
a consensus vote. And on important votes they were with us 11
percent of the time. And one would hope that a strategic ally,
a friend of the United States, would be with us a bit more than
11 percent.
Mr. Ambassador, did you want to comment on that? I met with
the Ambassador from India on the same topic and expressed my
concern about that. What would you have to say?
Mr. Blake. Mr. Chairman, this is something that we have had
a long dialogue with our friends in India about. I would say
that things are changing. India is now on a 2-year rotation,
just started in January and will be on for the next 2 years. We
have made it a point on very important votes to talk to them.
And I would point to things like some of the recent IAEA votes
over the last several years on Iran where India has similar
interests to ours in terms of ensuring that there is not going
to be another nuclear weapons state in the region and they have
taken some very important votes with the United States and with
the majority on the IAEA.
Mr. Chabot. Not to interrupt, but what you said is when it
is in their interest. So when our interests align, they are
with us. Thanks a lot.
Mr. Blake. But I would say even on some of these things
like human rights, where traditionally the Indians have not
been willing to support country-specific resolutions, I think
there has been an evolution and will continue to be an
evolution. One of the most important trends in India over the
last 10 years is they want to be a responsible global power.
They want to help to manage the international system. So I
think that we are going to see an evolution in their voting
patterns, and I think we have already seen some evolution in
their voting patterns and I expect that to continue.
Mr. Chabot. I appreciate it, but again 11 percent is not
very good on the important votes. And I would hope that they
would be in line naturally more often and not only if it is
just in their best interests.
Thank you very much, and my time has just expired. Gerry,
we are going into a second round if you wanted to ask any
questions.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask you
about the issue of corruption. Some economists have argued in
the past that corruption can be an economic efficiency in being
able to sort of hot wire around normal bureaucracy and get
things done. But all of the stories one hears about the levels
of corruption in this region, from Afghanistan to India, is
that we have crossed a very different threshold and we are
talking about huge impediments actually to economic development
and the ability for some kind of regular business code and
protocol.
I am wondering what your views are and how do we reconcile
our foreign assistance and economic assistance programs in
light of the obvious fact that massive corruption is occurring
in some of these governments? What protections do we take for
U.S. tax dollars?
Mr. Blake. We all have answers to that, but let me start on
that with respect to India because I think it is important.
First of all, as you rightly point out, Mr. Connolly,
corruption is a huge issue right now in virtually every one of
these states. In India the corruption issue has brought
Parliament to a standstill for the last 6 months because they
have been focused on particularly telecoms corruption. And I
think it has also had a deterrent effect on investment, and
most Indians would say that as well. So there are real costs to
the problem of corruption.
But I also think that the government is committed to trying
to deal with this. They have obviously a very open civil
society and independent judiciary, a very free Parliament, all
of whom are looking to address this.
The other thing that India has, which is really important
is a right-to-information law, that they passed in 2005 where
any Indian citizen can apply to find out how his or her tax
money is being spent at any level of the government, and they
have done so, so much so in fact people who have exercised this
right have been threatened because they have been effective in
asserting their rights.
So this is something where the United States has now
started an open government initiative with India to try to
promote open government, not just in India but in other parts
of the world. And I think it is another sign of how, again,
India wants to take a greater responsibility in the world and
wants to promote some of the values that we both cherish.
So I think they certainly have problems, but they have
their own institutions to deal with those problems and, most
importantly, they are now ready to work with us to try to
promote open government elsewhere in the world through things
like rights to information.
Let me ask my colleagues in they want to----
Ms. Biswal. Thank you very much. I wanted to add to that,
maybe answer your question in three ways. One, what we are
doing to protect taxpayer resources; two, what we are doing to
build capacity in these countries to tackle corruption; and,
three, where we are working with governments what steps we take
to ensure that those resources are safeguarded.
And the vast majority of U.S. assistance does not go
through government-to-government mechanisms but goes through
nongovernmental organizations, and we take great care in
ensuring proper oversight of that assistance, including through
monitoring, through periodic audits. Whenever we do find an
instance of wrongdoing, we try to take steps immediately to
correct and curtail when any problems have occurred.
We do work on economic governance in a lot of countries
specifically to address this issue of corruption to improve the
rule of law, to enhance that country and society's ability to
tackle corruption. And we are looking increasingly at what can
we do to be building these host country systems, the
procurement systems in governments, the budgetary systems in
governments. Most governments don't have the standards and meet
the standards that we have for USAID in terms of entrusting
funds into those governments. And so we conduct assessment of
that government, independent audits of that government's
financial system, where there might be weaknesses, and then
recommend the steps that need to be put in place to strengthen
that system before we put any resources through government
mechanisms.
So it is an issue throughout the region. It is an issue
that we are tackling both individually and in partnership with
the countries in which we work.
Mr. Feldman. I will say just very quickly, obviously
corruption is an enormous problem in Afghanistan; in
particular, fighting fraud and waste is certainly one of our
highest priorities. One of the major aspects of our civilian
surge, tripling the number of civilians that we have in the
field over the course of the last 2 years, has been expanding
the presence in the field, allowing experts to get out and have
more hands on oversight over development projects. And we have
also had a very active collaboration with our military in terms
of putting stronger controls on our contractors.
So within our Embassy, one of the resident ambassadors has
been overseeing this with the military in terms of the various
task forces, 2010, Shafafiyat and others, that look at the
transparency and contracting process.
And lastly, as Mr. Sampler can say a little bit more about
if he has time, on our government-to-government assistance in
both Afghanistan and Pakistan, this is an area that we have
particularly scrutinized in terms of pre-certification
requirements, the vetting processes, and how we ensure that any
money that goes government-to-government has a variety of
mechanisms of oversight governing it.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, the Foreign Affairs Committee
chairman on the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Mr.
Rohrabacher is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I don't want to sound too pessimistic
here, but I kind of get the idea that you folks are very
optimistic about an area that I don't think we should be very
optimistic about. Quite frankly, the one shining light in
American foreign policy and perhaps in progress, diplomatic
progress, that we have to show is India, and quite frankly, I
think that reflects an evolution that has taken place in
American policy since the end of the Cold War and also an
evolution in India that also has taken place since the end of
the Cold War. After the end of that stupid conflict that we
were in for 4 to 5 decades, we now are hopefully readjusting to
what would be the natural friendships in different countries,
in Asia in particular.
I don't think that we have--the evolution in Russia should
have been a lot further along, I believe, but we can talk about
that in some other hearing. But even that, if you compare what
we were 30 years ago with Russia, we were at each other's
throats and now at least we can work together, and I would hope
that 10 years from now we could have evolved into a real solid
friendship with the Russian people.
Well, that is the same with India. India during the Cold
War was allied with the Russians. I don't believe necessarily
that our policy toward India was what has caused this. This is
a natural thing, and I would hope that we have the intelligence
to work and to make sure that India is our best friend in that
part of the world because they are demonstrating a commitment
to democracy.
Pakistan, which is a hangover again from the Cold War, why
were we so close to Pakistan? In order to balance off the
Soviet Union. Pakistan isn't committed to democracy. I am
sorry, Pakistan is committed--the people who run that society
are committed to Islamic government. And the people who get in
their way are being murdered. And it is an unfortunate thing
there. And to the point that we have been able to take a look
at what is going on in Pakistan, our aid programs and all of
these things we are trying to do for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
we haven't as much stabilized Afghanistan as we have
destabilized Pakistan. And if they want to have their country
and they want it to be a radical Muslim country, let them do
it. And the fact is that Pakistan is committed to Islam. And
they are dedicated people. They have every right to be
dedicated to it.
I think India is dedicated to prosperity for their people.
And that certainly leaves a lot more openness toward how who we
can work with and who we can't in the future. And so I guess
my--let's get back to government structure and to what we can
do.
Should we have an India-based foreign policy in Asia and
South Asia or should we be hanging on to this old tie with
Pakistan that was established during the Cold War?
Mr. Blake. Mr. Rohrabacher, let me just start and just talk
about our relationship with India, which is, as you know, the
President made a very important trip to Asia last year because
we really see Asia as fundamental to or security and economic
goals.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, I have one question that I
would like to ask that is yes or no, because I am going to miss
out on my time here.
Is the Pakistan Government still providing--is it still the
major source of supplies and weapons for the Taliban and the
radical elements that the American troops are fighting in
Afghanistan? If not, where are those supplies coming from?
Mr. Feldman. That is a much longer than a yes-or-no
question. But no, the Pakistan Government is not providing it.
We have a very good and growing and strong relationship with
the civilian and the military government.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You include the ISI as within the Pakistan
government or are you putting that as a separate entity?
Mr. Feldman. Writ large, we have tried to improve, and very
successfully, our strategic relationship with all elements of
the Pakistani Government. And as I noted from the very outset
from my opening testimony, a difficult partnership with
Pakistan is far better than having a hostile Pakistan. This is
a country that is vital to our national security interests. We
have to do this. We cannot make----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I have been hearing that for 50 years, and
I will tell you, a realistic relationship, rather than basing a
relationship on wishful thinking, is what will bring about
peace in that part of the world. And what we have had is
wishful thinking and what I call irrational optimism.
There are ways of getting tough without getting belligerent
with weapons, but we need to get tough and make sure that we
are not looked at as patsies, and those people in Pakistan now
look a lot us, as do several other groups of people, like we
are patsies. They respect strength and they respect courage
enough to stand up for one's own interest as we should respect
their rights.
So anyway, I am sorry I have used up our time on this.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry, is recognized.
Mr. Fortenberry. I want to return to my previous line of
thoughts and questioning. When we engage other countries we
tend to do so with concepts that are measurable--security
capacity, economic capacity, civil service capacities--in order
to create stabilization and then potential opportunities. But
if you have got an eroding philosophical underpinning that
doesn't protect certain segments of society, how can the
advances that we can do measure actually hold over time? The
question becomes then--and this is not the United States'
responsibility alone. It is an international community
responsibility--how do you continue to heighten and elevate the
need, the urgency to protect vulnerable minority communities,
particularly in areas that are proclaiming a desire for the
pursuit of democratic ideals?
Mr. Feldman, you appropriately went to the Embassy and
expressed condolences for Shahbaz Bhatti's death, and that is a
respectable thing to do and we will do things like that on a
case-by-case basis as the horror of this kind of persecution
presents itself in a most dramatic fashion.
But what about other ways is which we can collectively
unify ourselves along with other countries and elevate these
concepts of the principles of justice, the principles of
democracy? And this has implications for places like Iran,
where are the people of Iran, a certain segment anyway, are
desiring a more just and moderate form of governance. If we
focus intensely on these types of questions, I think it leads
to outcomes that help in the long term develop real capacities
and real vibrant democracies rather than just to focus on
things that can collapse fairly rapidly.
I would like your thoughts on that. Not rather than; in
addition to. Let me put it that way. In addition to focusing on
that which we can measure.
Mr. Feldman. I believe Secretary Clinton when she testified
perhaps to this committee also noted that this was not just an
attack on a single man but on the values and tolerance and
respect for people of all faiths and backgrounds. And she noted
that had been championed, I would say in particular, as a
rebuttal to Congressman Rohrabacher, that had been championed
by Muhammad Ali Jenna, the founder of Pakistan. And this is
very important. This is a civilian government that we strongly
support. We work with them on a range of initiatives. And
certainly a respect for tolerance and a broad-based growth of
civil society is one of the core precepts that we engage with
them on across the board. And this is a part of all of our
conversations at every level, from the working level to the
most senior level, when we do have discussions like these.
On the civil society piece or----
Ms. Biswal. Well, I would like to just maybe--because I
think you ask a very thoughtful question that goes broader than
this specific incident and it really does go to the core of our
values on human rights, on human dignity and elevating those
values.
Mr. Fortenberry. The incident is generalizable to the
principle. It is a shocking incident that forces us to perhaps
rethink some approaches here.
Ms. Biswal. Absolutely, and it is not an easy answer, and
it is not a yes-or-no or a 5-minutes. But it goes to the core
of what we as a government stand for and the work that we do in
trying to build democratic societies and strengthen civil
society organizations in countries, because we know that these
countries when they are true democracies and deep democracies
and when they have strong and vibrant civil societies that
there is a greater recognition of that value of human dignity,
and when there is a transgression against that human dignity
that there is greater accountability for it.
And so it is not an easy answer, but I think it is
fundamental to why we are doing what we are doing around the
world.
Mr. Blake. If I could just add that American diplomats
around the world make it their business to promote religious
freedom and the protection of religious minorities. I can tell
you even in a democracy like India there are problems at the
state level at places like Karnataka and Orissa and our consuls
general and our ambassadors are quick to respond to those and
make public statements and express our concerns and hopefully
take steps to work with those governments to address the
underlying problems.
And that is true--I can tell you for Central Asia, I am
also responsible for Central Asia, I spend a lot of my time
talking about religious freedom. It is an important part of the
overall human rights equation and a really important part of
developing responsive and responsible government that Secretary
Clinton has talked over and over about. We spend a lot of our
time, and I want to reassure you about that, this is a very
high priority for all of us.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. I would like
to thank all the witnesses for their testimony here this
afternoon. I would like to remind members that they will have 5
legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks
and to include statements for the record.
If there is no further business to come before the
committee, we are adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Connolly statement
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