[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-25]
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 16, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri, Chairman
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas RICK LARSEN, Washington
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Mary Kate Cunningham, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 16, 2011, Amphibious Operations................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 16, 2011........................................ 25
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2011
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 2
WITNESSES
Blake, VADM Terry, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Integration of Capabilities and Resources...................... 7
Flynn, Lt. Gen. George, USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps
Combat Development Command..................................... 5
Stackley, Hon. Sean, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition.......................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Akin, Hon. W. Todd........................................... 29
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
Forces..................................................... 30
Stackley, Hon. Sean, joint with VADM Terry Blake and Lt. Gen.
George Flynn............................................... 32
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Smith.................................................... 47
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 16, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:07 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Todd Akin
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY
FORCES
Mr. Akin. The hearing will now come to order, and I have a
brief opening statement. And I don't know if we will have maybe
but one and just allow you gentlemen to proceed, I think,
unless the minority leaders here----
Unless--do you have a statement, too?
Okay, you do that. Okay, fine, thank you.
The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony
regarding the amphibious requirements and operational
development plans necessary to effectively meet the U.S.
combatant commanders' demands to engage forward, respond to
crisis, and project power.
Today's witnesses include the Honorable Sean Stackley,
Lieutenant General George Flynn, Vice Admiral John Blake.
And, gentlemen, thank you for being here. Thank you for
your longstanding service to our country and the great job that
I know that you all do.
First, I would appreciate at some point if Admiral Blake
and General Flynn could give us an update on how the 7th Fleet
is responding to the current crisis in Japan. That is kind of a
little parenthesis, but I think everybody is interested. Our
thoughts and prayers go out to all the victims, survivors and
family members, who are trying to get through this terrible
disaster.
Fortunately, we have the United States Navy and Marine
Corps that can provide humanitarian assistance in cases such as
this, and I know the subcommittee would appreciate a short
update on how they are doing. This is, of course, relevant to
today's hearing.
We know that Department of Navy officials agreed that a 38-
ship amphibious force would more fully meet the Marine Corps
2.0 Expeditionary Brigade assault echelon lift requirement. We
also know that a 33-ship amphibious force is the minimum
number. And, in fact, that minimum number currently isn't
planned to be reached until 2017. We need to fully understand
what risk is associated with maintaining an amphibious ship
inventory less than 38 ships.
Finally, it is no secret that I do not agree with the
decision to terminate the EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle].
I fear that although there is a lot of talk about support for a
new vehicle to replace EFV, history tells us that when all is
said and done, the Marine Corps will probably only get an
upgraded version of the current AAV [Amphibious Assault
Vehicle]. It is important for the members of this committee to
understand what the current status of the EFV contract is, how
the $3.3 billion dollars that has been spent on this program
won't be for naught.
And, again, thank you for being here, and I look forward to
your testimony. I would now yield to my friend, Mrs. Davis, for
an opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am pleased to
step in for Mr. McIntyre. I want to thank you and certainly
thank Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake, General Flynn for
being here and for testifying before this committee once again.
Today, we will hear testimony from both the Navy and the
Marine Corps on how they plan to execute amphibious operations
and how we as Congress can best support that mission. The need
for a forward-deployed amphibious force comprised of both Naval
and Marine assets cannot be seen more clearly than now.
The tragic events that we have witnessed in the aftermath
of the Japanese earthquake and subsequent tsunami only further
highlight the need for a quick response force that can
effectively move from the sea to shore in order to provide
assistance.
I look forward to hearing any updates our witnesses can
provide on how our forces are doing in support of the Japanese
relief. Our thoughts and our prayers are with all those who
have been affected.
The Marine Corps represents our Nation's 9/11 emergency
response force, and that enables us to quickly respond to
events anywhere in the world. There is no question that our
marines have been a crucial part of our forces in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, but it is essential that we transition the Marine
Corps away from being a second land force and back to one that
is an amphibious-based expeditionary force.
In doing so, it is essential that we carefully examine what
that force should look like, whether that be the appropriate
number of amphibious ships or the most capable platform for
moving marines ashore.
After the recent decision to terminate the Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle, the EFV, I am particularly interested to hear
our witnesses' views on what the current requirement is for an
amphibious vehicle. I would also like to hear what the
requirements will be for any new follow-on vehicle, such as
speed, distance and plane requirements.
I would like to hear from the Navy on what the minimum
ship-to-shore distance is for Navy amphibious ships to safely
deliver marines ashore in a new vehicle. And I believe that
these are important questions that should be carefully analyzed
as we transition our force.
Whether it is crisis response, disaster and humanitarian
relief or forward presence, our Navy and Marine Corps
amphibious capability is a vital asset for the United States
that we must maintain.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for being here
today, and we all look forward to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntyre can be found in the
Appendix on page 30.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
And Secretary Stackley, why don't you start off, and I will
let you determine your order, and then we have a bunch of
people with a lot of questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Chairman Akin, Representative
Davis, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
amphibious operations and, more importantly, for your steadfast
support for our sailors and marines around the world.
I propose to keep my opening remarks brief and submit a
formal statement for the record with your concurrence.
Mr. Akin. I concur.
Secretary Stackley. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, your Navy, Marine Corps team is the Nation's
force on the move--sea, air and land. About 90,000 sailors and
marines are today deployed around the world, conducting
missions that span the full spectrum of operations, from
humanitarian assistance, disaster response, to maritime
security, to combat operations.
Be it in response to the Nation's call in Iraq or
Afghanistan or in response to events unplanned and unimagined
in Libya or Japan, this team is first on the scene and remains
on scene, prepared to serve in whatever capacity the Nation
calls for.
It is our will to exercise our freedom of the seas in times
of peace, our mission to exercise command of the seas in times
of war, and our ability to project forces ashore in the most
austere environments, every ocean, every continent that ensures
our Nation's readiness to respond to crisis or conflict,
wherever our interests are challenged.
In considering our investments and capabilities required
for the force, our first priority is in addressing the fight we
are in and in taking care of our sailors and marines in the
fight. The Marine Corps, in particular, has been on point in
key developments in rapid fielding of capabilities critical to
this priority.
In addition to these priorities, the 2012 President's
budget request continues the recapitalization of the Marine
Corps' amphibious capabilities, an effort that has been
sustained for over the past decade plus. The ships, aircraft
and vehicles required to conduct amphibious operations are
uniquely capable of conducting ship-to-shore lift operations in
environments ranging from austere to hostile.
And it is the fleet's ability to aggregate at sea a mix of
type and number of ships, aircraft and landing craft that
provides our ability to respond to a crisis or conflict at a
scale appropriate to that crisis or conflict.
So, to this end, our amphibious force requirements have
been shaped over the past decade to provide two Marine
Expeditionary Brigade lift within an assault echelon of battle
force amphibious ships in addition to equipment prepositioned
within our Maritime Prepositioning Force to support an
additional brigade.
As discussed at last week's shipbuilding hearing, 38
amphibious ships are required to meet the full extent of this
requirement. In balancing the risk across our shipbuilding
program, the department's plan builds a balanced mix of 33
amphibious ships, providing aviation and well deck facilities
to support combined vertical and horizontal lift operations by
embarked aircraft, landing craft and assault vehicles. And to
this force, we are adding logistics lift capability with
procurement of the Mobile Landing Platform and Joint High Speed
Vessel.
The aviation component of amphibious forces is in the midst
of total recapitalization. The President's budget request
continues procurement of the MV-22 Osprey, remanufacture and
new build of the utility and attack versions of the H-1
helicopter, development and limited re-procurement of the short
takeoff vertical landing version of the Joint Strike Fighter,
and new development programs for the heavy-lift helicopter and
the Small Tactical Unmanned Air System.
These programs provide increased lift, air support and
aerial surveillance capabilities today in the case of MV-22 and
H-1 and within the future years' defense plan in the case of
the Joint Strike Fighter, heavy-lift helo and unmanned air
systems.
As well we are here today to address landing craft and
ground combat tactical vehicles required for amphibious
operations. In determining the force structure and capabilities
required to respond to the wide range of environments and
threats potentially confronting amphibious operations, the
amphibious force must balance lift, mobility on water and land,
range and speed, survivability, fire power, and command and
control.
The key elements of horizontal lift for amphibious
operations are the Landing Craft Utility, or LCU, which
provides low-speed, high-volume ship-to-shore transfer of
personnel and equipment; the Landing Craft Air Cushion Vehicle,
or LCAC, which provides high-speed ship-to-shore transfer of
equipment; and the Amphibious Assault Vehicle, or AAV, a
tracked amphibious vehicle which provides lift over water and
over land and limited protection and fire for a squadron of
marines.
I would like to highlight two programs in particular. The
LCAC fleet, whose service life has been extended through a SLEP
[Service Life Extension Program] program requires
recapitalization commencing later this decade. Accordingly,
this year, we will be opening competition for a new ship-to-
shore connector, a modern replacement for the LCAC to provide
high-speed ship-to-shore transfer of Marine Corps ground
vehicles.
The Amphibious Assault Vehicle was planned to be replaced
by the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, or EFV. As announced by
the Secretary of Defense in December, the Department has
concluded that the cost of recapitalizing the AAV fleet with
the EFV in terms of both procurement and sustainment costs is
not affordable.
The reality is that the 573 vehicles planned for this
program, which were projected to cost about $17 million each in
production, would alone consume the projected budget for Marine
Corps tactical vehicles for a decade, crippling other critical
recapitalization requirements within this portfolio.
The decision to terminate the EFV is accompanied with a
decision to pursue an integrated vehicle modernization effort
comprising investment in AAV upgrades to extend that vehicle's
mission effectiveness, the development of a new amphibious
combat vehicle to replace the AAV that will leverage investment
made in the EFV and be defined and designed from inception with
affordability as a key requirement, an acceleration of the
procurement of a Marine personnel carrier, a low-risk
capability that complements the assault vehicle program.
As we consider future development and recapitalization
efforts for our ground combat tactical vehicles, increased
emphasis on distributed command and control and vehicle
survivability, armor and protection systems have introduced
significant challenges to these vehicles' mobility and their
affordability. The decision to restart our assault and vehicle
program reflects the challenges posed to all of our future
programs and the need to address affordability head on, early
on.
In sum, the Department is committed to continuing its
efforts to recapitalize the force of ships, aircraft and
vehicles, which provide our Nation the forward-presence and the
unique ability to rapidly deploy forces from ship to shore
across a wide spectrum of environments and threats that
challenge our operations. Added to these operational
challenges, we have yet new affordability challenges which are
causing us to revisit past decisions and acquisition
strategies.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley,
General Flynn, and Admiral Blake can be found in the Appendix
on page 32.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And General Flynn, were you next? Or have you guys picked
an order?
Okay, why don't you go ahead, General Flynn?
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. GEORGE FLYNN, USMC, COMMANDING GENERAL,
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
General Flynn. Mr. Chairman Akin, Representative Davis, and
members of the committee, it is good to be here with you again
today--this time to discuss amphibious operations. I am happy
to join Secretary Stackley and Vice Admiral Blake. We have
submitted a joint written statement, so like Mr. Stackley, I
will be brief.
Today, your Marine Corps executes its role as America's
expeditionary force in readiness and is operationally relevant,
because it is enabled by the United States Navy and the ships
they crew and maintain. The product of this partnership is the
ability to conduct a variety of amphibious operations against
the full range of military operations that prevent conflict,
respond to crisis and, if necessary, prevail in conflict.
This operation flexibility is due in large part to this
committee's continued support. I thank you for that, and I
thank you for the support of all our marines and sailors.
During the Cold War, U.S. forces were largely based
overseas, with access maintained through an extensive network
of forward bases. In many ways, as the world and the operating
environment have changed, we have also changed our approach.
Today, U.S. forces are largely based within the United
States, and our ability to exert influence overseas is reliant
on expeditionary operations and capabilities, both forward-
postured and surged, that can overcome diplomatic, geographic
and/or military impediments to access.
Amphibious capabilities remain critical enablers for
overcoming access challenges and the key means to project power
and influence events ashore. The military challenges we will
face in the future will include state and, very possibly, non-
state actors in possession of modern anti-access and aerial-
denied weapons and technologies, meaning that amphibious
operations, even those conducted for benign purposes like
humanitarian assistance may be conducted in an uncertain or
even hostile environment.
Overcoming these challenges requires innovative tactics and
capabilities. This is why I believe Secretary Gates said in
August that the Marines' unique ability to project combat
forces from the sea under uncertain circumstances is the
capability that America has needed in this past decade and will
require in the future.
As current events have shown, this could not be more true.
While some still question both the necessity and feasibility of
amphibious operations, today, again, as recent events have
shown, they are needed. These modern-day operations bear little
resemblance to the operations and sacrifices made at places
like Tarawa, Peleliu and Iwo Jima.
As you look to the future, we are not looking to replicate
those battles or that level of self and courageous sacrifice.
This is why we continue to evolve the tactics and capabilities
to use the sea as maneuver space and as a base to conduct ship-
to-objective maneuver, which allows us to avoid heavily
defended areas where feasible and defeat likely adversaries.
In humanitarian operations, these same littoral maneuver
capabilities allow us to deliver disaster relief supplies
directly to the points needed ashore, rather than dropping them
off on the beach where they would be dependent upon the
devastated, austere or nonexistent infrastructure and
transportation system for distribution.
Partnered with the United States Navy, marines are forward
deployed today and responding today to crisis and still engaged
in combat operations in Afghanistan.
This past year alone, our sea-based forces conducted
humanitarian assistance missions in Japan, Pakistan, Haiti and
the Philippines; recaptured the pirated ship Magellan Star and
rescued its crew from Somali pirates; rapidly reinforced in
Afghanistan by committing the battalion landing team from the
forward-deployed 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and then
reinforcing the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the
Kearsarge and USS Ponce, with another 400 marines flown in from
United States in order to respond to crisis in North Africa.
History teaches us that preventing conflict is equally as
important as responding to crisis. Amphibious capabilities that
provide forward presence in a short access are a critical
enabler for both. This is validated by the continuous increase
in the geographic combatant commander demand signal for
amphibious forces.
Since 2007, the geographic combatant commanders' cumulative
requests for naval forces have grown 86 percent for amphibious-
ready groups and Marine expeditionary units, and 53 percent for
individually deployed amphibious ships. While our geographic
combatant commanders are unconstrained in their requests, our
job is to determine how best to meet their demand, given the
resources available.
For the foreseeable future, we will continue to maintain a
forward-based amphibious-ready group and Marine expeditionary
unit in the Western Pacific and maintain continuous presence in
the Arabian, Indian Ocean as well. As recent events in North
Africa and the Middle East demonstrate, it may also be
necessary to maintain presence in the Mediterranean and along
the coast of Africa.
In an era of declining access and strategic uncertainty,
the operational value of amphibious forces for missions across
a range of military operations cannot be overstated. Amphibious
capabilities provide mobility, persistence and responsiveness
without which our Nation would be disadvantaged in its ability
to respond to crisis. If these capabilities are allowed to
decline, the alternatives would likely involve higher
operational risk and higher cost.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update
to the Congress. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Flynn, Secretary
Stackley, and Admiral Blake can be found in the Appendix on
page 32.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you, General.
And, Admiral.
STATEMENT OF VADM TERRY BLAKE, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES
Admiral Blake. Chairman Akin, Representative Davis, members
of the committee, it is my honor to appear before you with Mr.
Stackley and General Flynn to discuss amphibious operations.
Today, over 57,000 of our sailors are deployed with 26,000
on land or at sea in the Central Command area of operations.
Fifty percent of our fleet is under way and roughly 40 percent
of our ships are deployed.
Our sailors are on point throughout the world projecting
power in Afghanistan, providing deterrence against North Korea,
conducting counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean,
maintaining global nuclear deterrence, providing ballistic
missile defense in the Arabian Gulf, Western Pacific and
Eastern Mediterranean, and building partnerships in Africa,
South America and the Pacific.
Our sailors also answer the call to support humanitarian
relief and disaster assistance when needed, as we did last year
in Haiti and Pakistan. Even today, our sailors and marines are
responding to world crises, maintaining stations off the coast
of Libya and helping the people of Japan.
Our national security and economic prosperity depend upon a
strong Navy that can keep the sea lanes free, deter aggression,
safeguard our sources of energy, protect the interests of our
citizens, and reassure our friends and allies. To do this, our
Navy must maintain its global reach and persistent presence
while delivering warfighting capability wherever and whenever
it is needed.
In partnership with the Marine Corps, the Navy amphibious
forces support the core capabilities of our maritime strategy,
including power projection, deterrence, forward presence,
maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief.
With this budget, we will invest in our platforms that have
proven to be consistently and effectively accomplishing these
missions while expanding our capability to meet the most likely
evolving threats.
Investment in the mid-life upgrades of the LSD-41 class
dock landing ships and installation of the self-defense systems
on the LHD-1 amphibious assault ships are vital to retain the
Navy's capabilities for future conflicts and to keep our ships
on track to reach their full service lives.
We will also advance our capabilities with the LPD-17 class
of amphibious transport dock ships and the LHA-6 class, general
purpose amphibious assault ships, the Zumwalt Class, DDG-1000
class destroyers, the mobile landing platforms and the Littoral
Combat Ships with their mission packages.
Looking to the future, we are working to reintroduce a well
deck into LHA-8 to define the requirements for replacements and
to define requirements for the replacement of the dock landing
ship, the LSD(X), while continuing progress towards procurement
of a ship-to-shore connector replacement for our landing craft
air cushion vehicles.
As we build the Navy's future, I am very concerned about
the long-term impact of the current continuing resolution. In
addition to the delays in procuring the lead mobile landing
platform and cancellation of several important ship
availabilities, including the USS Peleliu, if the CR
[continuing resolution] continues to the end of March, the lack
of authorization for the fiscal year 2011 budget will very
likely lead to significant cost growth in many of our Navy's
programs.
I ask for your support for our 2012 budget request for our
programs and to address those programs and capabilities being
impacted by the continuing resolution.
Thank you for all your support to the United States Navy
and the Marine Corps and our ability to answer our Nation's
call when needed in conflict and disaster. I look forward to
your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Blake, Secretary
Stackley, and General Flynn can be found in the Appendix on
page 32.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Admiral.
As we were talking just briefly before the beginning of the
hearing, one of the concerns I have had all way along is the
fact that, particularly on the Marine expeditionary vehicle--
that was the thing that was my number one interest for our
hearing today--that I haven't just seen a simple ``here are the
different alternatives, here is how much each one costs, and
this is why we think this one is the best.''
And so that line of--and it doesn't have to be something
that is documented with 200 pages of notes after each one, but
just rough in some numbers on that and just say, ``Hey, what do
they look like?'' And I don't know that each of us taking 5
minutes in asking questions produces that product.
So as we discussed, just starting out, what I would like to
do is to schedule a hearing that specifically looks at EFV. And
I would like to look at whatever four or five good
alternatives, or at least logical alternatives to investigate
and say, ``What is the cost? What are the capabilities of each
package?'' And when you take a look at cost and performance,
what is probably the thing that we are going to need, which way
we are going to need to go.
And so that is going to require some homework to be done. I
think it might have been good to have the homework done before
we set anything in concrete, and I hope we haven't set anything
in concrete.
So that is just a request and a note to the other members
of the committee here that I think this structure, the way the
committee hearing is set up, isn't going to get to that
question probably.
And you weren't prepared to have that, am I correct,
Secretary? You don't have that data right now.
Secretary Stackley. Sir, what I would propose is a briefing
as opposed to a hearing.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
Secretary Stackley. We would go through the current state
of I call it the termination of the EFV and the process and the
analysis to date leading up to the amphibious combat vehicle,
which is the terminology being used for the replacement to the
AAV.
Mr. Akin. Did you answer my request to have, let us take a
look at different ways to do this thing? I mean, it sounded to
me like what you just said you have already assumed the EFV is
dead on arrival. Maybe that is your decision.
My concern is, did we look at half the number? Do you have
a hard number from the manufacturer how much each one would
cost? And have you run the numbers to say, what are these
different alternatives, what is the performance we get for each
one and the price performance? And has all of that been done?
If it has, we would really like to know that even right now.
It seemed to me that there are several assumptions built
into some of what I am hearing the Marine Corps say. The first
one is, is that we don't need a higher rate of speed for plane.
It might be nice but we don't have to have it.
The second one is the Navy is comfortable coming in to 12
instead of 24 miles. I understand that maybe there is some
technology that gives you some comfort to do that for the time
being, but is that assumption 20 years from now a good distance
to be 12 miles off the shore or not? That is a big assumption.
The assumption, it appears to me was, is that 500--what was
it--573 is too expensive. Does that mean 286 is also too
expensive, as we talked about?
Those are the kinds of things that--and I am okay if it is
a briefing. That is okay. But what I really want is I want some
great big old pieces of paper, and I want to have this is
alternative one, alternative two, alternative three. Here is
what you get for each one, here is how much it costs, and this
is why we think this one is the best alternative. And that is
what I am not seeing.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. And what I have seen is what I believe are some
pretty good size assumptions built into the direction you are
going. I am not sure those assumptions--you know, everything
depends on assumptions, and I am not sure those assumptions
are--first of all, the standoff distance from the Navy from the
shore, what is that like now, what it is going to be like 5
years, 10 years out, because as you guys say, the enemy has a
vote, too. And they are going to be developing cheaper weapons
that maybe can try to still hit our ships at closer distances.
A little more distance is a lot of safety.
And the smaller number. And then the other question is I
think the idea was eventually we are going to develop a new
replacement for the EFV which is--maybe go a little slower, we
have got maybe a V-shaped hull, and we are going to have to
develop that, and then build it and fund it. How long is that
going to take and how much does that development cost? Is it
going to be another $3.3 billion or not?
And those are the kinds of things, I think, probably some
of my colleagues are interested in. And we need to get in--if
that is a brief, that is okay. But, Secretary, I think we want
an analysis of a whole series of whatever more or less logical
alternative so we can see which one is the right path for us to
go. Is that what you meant?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. I would like to schedule a
briefing at your convenience, and we will go through those
details. There are several things that are mixed here. One is
the requirements. Another is when we talked about alternatives,
I think when you described alternatives, you are including a
mix of EFVs, plus some other vehicle.
Mr. Akin. It could be. I don't know.
Secretary Stackley. And then separately, there are
alternatives where the alternatives would be different
versions, like an AOA [Analysis of Alternatives], to come in
and meet the requirements that we defined on the front end for
this amphibious combat vehicle. And then we will walk through
the analysis that we have to date.
Mr. Akin. I think where I have been coming from, and this
is all the way along, but just to restate. I am unwilling and
un-negotiating. To me, it is nonnegotiable that we have to get
marines from the ocean to the shore. That is not--how you do it
and the most effective way to do it, that is both of our
business, and we all need to be comfortable with that decision.
And anything goes as far as I am concerned. Top speed and
performance at lowest cost, you know. What is the best deal we
can get? And I think anything should be on the table, and if
that means some smaller number of EFV fits in there, that is
okay. If it doesn't work, if they are way too expensive when
you get the order quantity smaller and the price goes through
the roof, okay, it doesn't work. But I want to look at
everything and, you know, keep everything on the table in order
to meet that requirement.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay. I have used up a lot of time, so I am going
to just go ahead and go to--let us see. The first question
would be for Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Thank you very much. And my thanks
to Mrs. Davis for sharing my opening statement, my being tied
up on another matter.
General Flynn and Admiral Blake, thank you for your
service. We heard last year that the Department was looking at
different weapons and projectiles and ways to mitigate gaps in
the naval surface fire support plan. With DDG-1000 line
truncated and the electromagnetic railguns still years away,
are there any weapons or projectiles or other capabilities
currently fielded or planned, which will serve to cover these
gaps?
And the question is also has that requirement changed? And
can you tell me if there are any plans for a 5-inch long-range
land attack projectile for the current destroyers and cruisers?
Mr. Admiral, yes.
Admiral Blake. Yes, sir. As you are aware, the triad of
fires, which supports the amphibious landing, is made up of
three distinct pieces--the naval surface fire support, organic
fires and tactical air. And it is these three, if you will,
intricate pieces which make up the entire requirement in order
to be met.
What we have done is with the DDG-1000, we have the 155-
millimeter gun onboard. That will be onboard that ship with a
long-range land attack projectile. That round will be in excess
of--the requirement is for an excess of 60 miles for that. In
addition, we also have the tactical Tomahawk, which is
available on both the DDGs and the CGs, as well as the 5-inch/
54 and the 5-inch/62 guns onboard the destroyers and the
cruisers.
At this time, we do not currently have in the program of
record a program for a long-range 5-inch round. However, that
said, we are open to all options and are looking at all
options. In particular, we are looking at the railgun, which
you mentioned, which with a 32-megajoule capability would be
able to reach out to ranges around 100 miles. So that is the
one of the leg triangle, which are, well, the triads of fires,
which we are also working on.
In addition, the Marines have the organic fires pieces,
which would be their artillery when they were able to get it
ashore. And then the third piece, which we have also invested
heavily in, is tactical air. We have invested in smart weapons
for all of our attack aircraft so that in combination with
these three systems or these three legs of the triad, we would
be able to shape the battlefield as we were going in.
Mr. McIntyre. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
One thing I forgot to add. What is a reasonable timeframe
that we could have that brief?
Secretary Stackley. Sir, we work around your convenience. I
think your schedule is----
Mr. Akin. I think we are gone next week. Would it be the
following week? Would that be----
Secretary Stackley. Week after next? We will arrange that.
Mr. Akin. Is that doable? Well, we are not asking for a
whole lot of super details, but just a rough analysis of each
category.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Is that too fast? Would 3 weeks be better?
Secretary Stackley. Well, 3 weeks would be 1 week smarter.
But we can--I would rather work around your schedule,
recognizing what you have pressing you all, and----
Mr. Akin. We have a slot on April 7th available to the
committee. Is that alright?
Secretary Stackley. We will work it, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay. We will talk.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. There is some markup going on afterwards, and we
are going to deal with that a little bit.
Okay.
Congressman Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to wait for the EFV hearing on April 7th, or
whenever we decide to do it. And Mr. Coffman has got a great
question about amphibs and construction, so I am going to yield
my time to Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Secretary Stackley, General Flynn, Admiral
Blake. Thank you so much for your service.
I did want to talk specifically about amphibs. As you know,
we are currently at 29 amphibs, and both yourself, the
commandant and the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] have said
that the requirement is at 38. The Navy says they can live with
33. That is an acceptable risk. We don't get to 33, though,
until 2016. A little bit of gap there, I think, that concerns
all of us.
And we see what is happening around the world. We see
humanitarian missions being performed in Haiti, the flooding in
Pakistan, now looking at a situation in Japan. We are
continuing to be spread further and further.
We see ourselves in a situation in the Mediterranean of
potentially deploying a MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] there.
So we see a scenario of a MEU being attached to the 5th Fleet,
the 6th Fleet, and then a continuing presence there in the
Pacific Command. So we are seeing a heightening of need across
a variety of different areas for our amphibs.
And if you look in the past years, as we placed emphasis on
our more advanced ships, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the
Virginia-class submarine, the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship], and I
like to go back to what General Amos said and that is, you
know, the Ford F-150s of the fleet are our amphibious ships,
and they are the ones that are out there each and every day and
where the most immediate need many times exists.
And I wanted to get your thoughts. If you look at where we
are with this shortfall and if you look at the scenario where
we see the older Whidbey Island-class LSDs [Landing Ship, Dock]
approaching 26 years of service, we see we are approaching some
challenges there.
Can you give me a timeline about when you see LSD(X) coming
online? And can you give us a little clarification on the
situation with the USS Peleliu LHA-5? It is pending
decommissioning. And also where we are with the delivery of USS
America LHA-6.
So either Secretary Stackley or General Flynn, whichever of
you there, or Admiral Blake, whichever of you would like to
answer those questions, I think having that clarity on the
overall vision about our amphibious fleet and then some
specifics about some of our aging portions of the fleet.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me propose to split the
response here. I will start with--let me just start with the
plan right now for shipbuilding in terms of amphibs.
You highlighted LHA-6, the America. She is under
construction right now at Ingalls. She is about a year--our
projected delivery date for the LHA-6 is about a year later
than what we had contracted for. And as a result of that, we
have decided to extend the service line for the Peleliu to
minimize the gap in terms of big deck amphibs. So she is about
30 percent complete, and 2015 timeframe she will be in service.
The follow-on ships to the America class, LHA-7, is in the
2011 budget request. And so that is one of the ships that is
caught up inside the continuing resolution, but we are
continuing to work with Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding in terms
of planning and advance procurement of materials to try to keep
that ship's schedule preserved as much as possible while we
work through the balance of the budget and the negotiations
associated with that ship.
Its next follow-on is the LHA-8, and that is when we return
to a well deck in our big decks. So today while we build the
LHA-6, negotiating, working around the budget associated with
the LHA-7, we are going through a mini analysis of alternatives
for the best method for restoring a well deck to our big decks
to support that 2016 ship, and then as well you see the advance
procurement preceding that in the 2012 FYDP [Future Years
Defense Program].
The LSD class, as Admiral Blake referred, we are conducting
a midlife upgrade, and that is high priority inside of our
budget to ensure that we are able to not just sustain them to
their service life, but ensure that they are both mission-
effective and affordable in terms of upkeep and maintenance
through the balance of their service life.
And the LSD(X), which is the planned replacement for the
LSD-41 class, today sits in 2017. So we are in fact looking at
the total force lift requirements in terms of lift capabilities
by platform. And as we complete the LHA-8, where we restore the
well deck, and we look at the capability assessment that the
Marine Corps is completing for future force requirements, when
we look at the balance of force, that then defines what lift
capability LSD(X) has to have.
So the sequence of events is, complete the LHA-8 in terms
of its upfront mini analysis of alternatives, get the balance
of the lift capability required by the LSD(X), conduct that
analysis of alternatives, and then get in to the--we call it
the TD [Technology Development] phase for LSD(X). But we are
firm in the 2017 requirement for a start of procurement for
LSD(X).
Mr. Akin. We have got now Mrs. Davis with a question, I
believe.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, all of you, for your service to the country.
I wanted to ask about our operations in Japan right now and
the disaster relief there and to have a better understanding of
how our amphibious assets are being used there and what you see
as the importance of those assets in these kinds of activities.
I know strategic shaping, looking at environments and how
we can better position ourselves for noncombatant evacuations,
other activities. What role is that playing now and how
critical really is that?
Admiral Blake. Mrs. Davis, right now, the forces, it is a
combination of forces over there. It is not only the
amphibious--it is not only the ESG [Expeditionary Strike
Group], the Essex ESG in particular, because as you are aware,
they are part of our permanently forward-deployed forces that
are over there. They are in the process of supporting events in
Japan.
In addition, the Ronald Reagan Strike Group was redirected
and is now in position off the northern part of the island
where the bulk of the events are taking place, and they are in
support of events on the ground. In fact, they are using their
helo support in order to move both food and supplies ashore.
Additionally, you have ships from the George Washington
Battle Group, which is home ported in Yokosuka, supporting
events, and they are being tasked as needed to go out, as well
as the flagship for the 7th Fleet, the USS Blue Ridge.
So the 7th Fleet commander at this time has the Essex ARG
[Amphibious Ready Group], ships from the GW Battle Group, as
well as the Ronald Reagan underway supporting that. And what
our primary is to get the helo decks over there in order to be
able to move stuff from the ship-to-shore in order to support
the people on the ground, which is one of our primary functions
in any humanitarian assistance, disaster relief event.
Mrs. Davis. So looking at that area, at least, of response
is not a critical issue in terms of losing any of the
amphibious-related platforms. That is not the issue----
Admiral Blake. No, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis [continuing]. That we would be facing. Can you
talk a little bit more about how that effort is organized
generally? I think I have been asked are the commanders in the
field at that time in control? I mean, who is in charge? And is
there confusion sometimes about who should be in control, who
should be in charge?
Admiral Blake. No, ma'am. Basically, you have got the PACOM
[U.S. Pacific Command], the Pacific commander, the combatant
commander in that theater. Underneath the Pacific commander,
you have got the fleet commander. Both of them are at Pearl
Harbor.
Then, when you walk it down, you come to the 7th Fleet
commander who has his flagship in Yokosuka. And then you also
have the commander of naval forces Japan, a two-star who is on,
if you will, the shore side. And so they all work in
conjunction, and then they all work for the PACOM commander.
Mrs. Davis. Is that same level of expertise really
available in all the commands across the globe?
Admiral Blake. Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am. And I can only speak
for the Navy, but that is the way we are organized in order to
be able to operate.
In addition, we have also got the Marine Corps elements,
which are participating, because as you are aware, the Essex
ARG has marines assigned to them, as well as you have also got
the third MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] down at Okinawa,
which is available to support. And they can, of course, shift
forces and they will all be following under Pacific command
there.
Mrs. Davis. And everybody is trained in those efforts. I
think we are obviously doing a substantial job, and I
appreciate that. I think that it is very important.
Admiral Blake. Yes, ma'am. In fact, one of our greatest
skills is we are an expeditionary force, and then we are able
to go forward and perform a full spectrum of operations, as I
mentioned in the opening remarks. We can do everything from
power projection to deterrence to what we are currently doing,
which is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Mrs. Davis. Where is the need in that arena that we are not
able to meet right now?
Admiral Blake. I am not sure I understand your question,
ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. In all the operations that are being done now,
the use of the carrier groups, et cetera, is there, I mean, is
there anything that we are lacking in the ability to help and
support in that region?
Admiral Blake. No, ma'am. The way the Pacific commander,
the combatant commander in theater would be requesting forces
and they would be working through Pacific, the fleet commander,
and then it would go right on down.
And if you needed assets to be shifted from the continental
United States, then they would go back to the 3rd Fleet
commander, pull those forces. They would then ``chop'' to 7th
Fleet, if you will. ``Chop'' is a term we use when you go from
one commander to another.
And that is exactly what we do. It is how we always
operate. And they would also, if necessary, be able to pull
forces from Pearl Harbor or from any of the West Coast ports.
You could even go to the East Coast ports, if you needed to.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Akin. Congressman Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Mr. Secretary, I thank you so much for your
service.
Admiral, General, your service to this country as well.
I do have one question on EFV, and then I want to talk
about some of our shipping requirements.
But that is that, Mr. Secretary, my concern is that, to
meet our requirements--ship-to-shore requirement, we are just
going to use a service life extension program for the AAV. Do
you plan on simply modernizing the AAV and say it meets the
requirements? Or is a new vehicle needed? And what is really
your position on this?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. I am going to share this
response with General Flynn. In terms of the AAV and meeting
requirements, when we move from EFV to this amphibious combat
vehicle, we are in the stage of actually defining what is the
limit of capability that we can bring to this vehicle and still
have it be an effective fighting vehicle for the Marine Corps.
And the capabilities that we are looking at that that were
cost drivers on the EFV that we are trying to scale back into
the range of affordability, speed is a major driver. So we are
looking at the speed, distance, time equation, which comes back
to the issue that Chairman Akin raised, which is how far from
shore do you plan to deploy the force. And speed is the
critical element there.
So speed was a major cost driver on EFV. Speed is, frankly,
a--I call it deficiency on AAV today. We have to do better in
terms of the speed that the AAV brings to the force. So we have
got to increase our capability that the AAV has today in speed
or mobility.
Another area that we had already planned on upgrading the
AAV for is survivability. So it is an old vehicle. The
survivability requirements have increased, driven a lot by
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. And so we had planned on
increasing the survivability of the AAV. We are going to
continue with that, and any future vehicle that replaces the
AAV will likewise have an emphasis on increased survivability.
Mr. Coffman. Sure.
General Flynn.
General Flynn. Sir, I think one of the key things when we
take a look at affordability, it is not just the affordability
of the EFV. It is the affordability of what we have to do
across all our ground vehicles. The reality is largely driven
by protection requirements and also the need to increase our
network mobility.
The cost of ground procurement has not only increased. It
has increased exponentially. So, first of all, when we looked
at affordability of the program, we looked at affordability in
the context of the overall requirements for the Marine Corps.
A key part of that is, we were always thinking, you know,
even in October, when we released the request from industry to
take a look at a survivability upgrade for the AAV, we had to
upgrade that anyway, because the IOC [Initial Operating
Capability] for the EFV was not going to occur until 2016, and
it would take us 10 years to get to. Because we tried to spread
out the program so much to make it affordable, it would have
taken us 10 years to get to full operating capability.
So we were looking at a survivability upgrade anyway. I
think the key thing as we move forward, now that we have the
request for industry out there, is to take a look what industry
is going to come back with. We are going to have an industry
day towards the end of March, and by the end of April, we will
have a better idea of what is going to be capable.
And one of the key things we are going to have to trade off
between what we do to the AAV is what opportunity cost do you
invest in the AAV at the expense of creating a new vehicle and
the minimum capabilities that we need to be able to execute the
amphibious mission.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
Admiral Blake, due to the continuing resolution, the
amphibious ship, the USS Peleliu's maintenance availability was
recently cancelled. Furthermore, the Navy plans to extend the
Peleliu's decommissioning date by 1 year in 2014. What impact
will this missed maintenance availability have on keeping her
operationally available to meet amphibious lift requirements?
What options are being planned to mitigate missed yard times
across the fleet?
Admiral Blake. Sir, first of all, Peleliu is only one of
five ships that are--as the result of the continuing resolution
as of 30 March, we will be required to cancel five avails. That
would be the Peleliu, which you mentioned. We have also got to
cancel a LSD-41 class availability. We are also going to have
to look at canceling two DDG-51 class availabilities and one
FFG-7 class availability.
So that is just the extent, so it is not just the Peleliu.
It is five ships total, and that is as of the 30th of March. As
the continuing resolution continues to move on, we will, of
course, have to look at additional availabilities in order to
cancel, which we will be required to cancel.
That is one of the challenges we are having right now,
because as was mentioned earlier by Representative Wittman, the
Peleliu, we have decided that because of the delay in the
delivery of America, we are going to now delay the
decommissioning of Peleliu from 2013 to 2014. So with the fleet
commander, we are required to do now is to look at his options
in order to determine how to be able to support the global
requirements and at the same time get the Peleliu into an
avail.
There is a double-edged sword to that when you extend a
ship like the Peleliu, because there are unexpected manpower
costs, there are unexpected operational costs, and then as you
extend that, we are probably going to have to look at doing an
additional maintenance period for that ship in order to get it
to go to that.
So those are all the factors, if you will, that the fleet
commander will have to look at as he is meeting the global
commitments based on what the combatant commanders come in
with.
Mr. Akin. Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Although we are going to have a briefing on EFV, I have
some issues that I wanted to ask about, because I am a little
confused about how we got to where we are still. Because I am
reading through the Nunn-McCurdy certification, and the
analysis--and this is only less than 4 years ago. And the
analysis came up. It said the lowest program acquisition unit
cost, PAUC, was associated with upgrading the AAV alternative.
Okay, that is lowest cost.
Next lowest was estimated for the fix, the EFV alternative,
and the new start alternative had the highest cost. So we are
ending the EFV as we know it, and we are really going to a new
start, which, according to the Nunn-McCurdy, was the highest
cost alternative. And I am just curious as to what has changed
that either makes this a false statement or makes what we are
doing actually going to cost more?
And I am not trying to beat a dead horse here, but what I
am trying to figure out is that there is a level of confidence
that we have to have in the information that we are getting,
and this was the best information we had at the time, which
predates me, of course, but I am trying to figure out where are
we going.
Now I know that the RFI [Request for Information] just went
out. What was that, about a month ago? And the request was
asking for a new start, an upgraded AAV, and I am going to go
to the AAV, which does, what, on a good day about 8 knots?
General Flynn. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Critz. Okay. So--and now the drop-in distance is
changed. So we have got an issue, because initially it was 25
nautical miles. Now it is 12, is that correct?
General Flynn. Sir, the launch distance, what we have put
out in the RFI, is at a minimum launch distance of 12 nautical
miles, minimum launch distance of 12 nautical miles. And when
the Nunn-McCurdy was done, sir, the launch distance was--that
was part of Nunn-McCurdy--was 10 to 20 miles.
Mr. Critz. Oh, so we are still within that range.
General Flynn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Critz. Okay. Now, as I understand it, we tried to make
the EFV do 25 knots, too, so that it could plane and travel up
to 25 nautical miles, is that correct?
General Flynn. Sir, what drove it to plane was the ability
to get up to be able to do, I guess, around the 25-knot
requirement, because it all goes back to this speed, distance,
habitability requirement on the vehicle to get ashore. That is
where the trade would be.
If you say what changed, what changed a little bit is how
we are looking--what changed is how we are looking at the
requirement. So how long can you--what distance do you have to
traverse, what is the speed that you are going to traverse, and
what is the habitability in the vehicle. And if you can be
comfortable in the vehicle, we can do some trades there, and
that is where the trade is.
And then what also changed since the Nunn-McCurdy breach is
all the other things that are affecting the affordability of
this program, and not just this program, but the other things
that we need to do around it. That is what changed, sir.
Mr. Critz. Okay. Now, it is my understanding that you don't
want your marines in the vehicle on the sea more than maybe 40
minutes, or they are going to get beat up so badly that they
are not going to be as effective when they hit the shore.
General Flynn. It depends on the vehicle, sir. And I would
say that is true for the AAV. Again, it is the quality of the
ride. Is it cool? Are you sucking in diesel fumes? Are you
bobbing up and down? That is what you do in the AAV.
On the EFV, when it was up on plane, it was a relatively
smooth ride. The climate was pretty good. So as we look at a
future design, the key part that we are going to be is what is
the habitability, if you will, or the quality of life in the
back of the vehicle. And that is a key thing we are going to
have to look at in the new alternative.
Mr. Critz. And one of the cost drivers was it having to
plane, which was what drove the cost up so much because it was,
I don't know, if it was new technology, it was pretty forward-
thinking technology, is that correct?
General Flynn. Yes, sir. The size of the engine to move it,
to bring it up on plane and also the complexity of the
technology to configure the vehicle to plane.
Mr. Critz. So we are probably going to--if we are still
looking at 12 nautical miles, you are still going to have to
plane.
General Flynn. Sir, we are not saying right now that we
think we are going to have to plane. There may be an option to
get that far that would not require planing.
Mr. Critz. Okay. Well, I just figure, 12 nautical miles,
you got to be going 18 knots to do 40 minutes. So that is
pretty fast.
Okay. And one thing I was unclear with, as my time runs
out, is that when the Nunn-McCurdy hit, the 1993 dollars for
the EFV was 13.3 million. Is it now 17.3 or something like
that? Is that in 1993 dollars or is that current problem?
General Flynn. In fiscal year 2007 dollars, it was about
$17 million, sir, in fiscal year 2007 dollars.
Mr. Critz. Okay. All right, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Mr. Rigell.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Secretary Stackley, General Flynn, and Admiral Blake,
thank you very much for your testimony today.
And I just want to pick up a bit on this discussion of
speed and hull design. I know from, frankly, a lifetime of
adult boating and reading all the magazines, there is just some
profound physics taking place between a planing hull and a non-
planing hull, when moving at displacement speeds.
So, General, would you just comment, please, on--you
mentioned, I believe, that the speed which you want the new
vehicle to be able to approach the shore has not yet been
determined. Is that correct?
General Flynn. That is correct, sir, until we have a better
idea of what the alternatives are.
Mr. Rigell. Okay. Well, we are going to be--you know, as we
look at this balance between speed and a V-shaped hull design,
let me ask you this. Is part of what we are trying to
accomplish as well the ability of this vehicle once on land to
withstand an IED [Improvised Explosive Device]?
General Flynn. Sir, that is one of the things that has
changed since the initial development of the EFV is we have
learned a lot more about protection. We have learned a lot more
about underbelly blast protection than we knew in the past. You
know, we in some cases went even beyond V-shaped hulls. We may
be inserting chimneys in vehicles now to mitigate blast.
So we have learned a lot about blast, and that is one of
the things if we start this anew, that we are going to be able
to take a fresh look at it. How do you get the better blast
protection that we would like to see in this vehicle?
Mr. Rigell. So. but wouldn't you say that you would
probably start out with a bias in favor of a V-shaped hull?
General Flynn. Sir, I wouldn't be biased towards a V-shaped
hull, because what I am seeing now is there are some things
that maybe even better than a V-shaped hull just because of
everything that we are learning about blast effects.
Mr. Rigell. Okay. Very good. And I know the whole committee
would be looking forward to seeing exactly what your
requirements are going to be of the new vehicle.
Looking over the cost that was spent on the EFV, 3.7
billion, and I know for all of us, for all of us, that is just
painful, given our fiscal crisis. And with the chairman's
indulgence, I would like to ask for a moment, if we could talk
just a moment about the Marine personnel carrier.
I know it is not amphibious, of course, but could you
describe, General, what the unique mission requirements for the
Marine Corps might be that would cause us to need to develop a
new vehicle? Because that's the information I am--my
understanding is we are also going to pursue development of a
Marine personnel carrier.
General Flynn. Sir, when the expeditionary fighting vehicle
went through the Nunn-McCurdy effort in 2007, one of the ways
that we attempted to deal with affordability back there was we
had a requirement for 12 battalions worth of armored or mobile
lift. To make it affordable, what we then went down the road
for is eight battalions worth of EFV lift and four battalions
of Marine personnel carrier lift.
So that was when we first started looking at the Marine
personnel carrier. It was a part of the effort. That is when we
reduced the quantity of the EFV requirement from a little over
1,000 vehicles down to about 571.
So that is where the origin of the MPC [Marine Personnel
Carrier] program was. It was, if you will, the partner program
to the expeditionary fighting vehicle program.
Mr. Rigell. Sure.
General Flynn. So the approach on the MPC is going to be a
little bit different than the other vehicles. There are, we
believe, right now, six potential off-the-shelf or commercial
alternatives available right now.
In addition, we have already built one technology
demonstrator. So we have a pretty good idea what this vehicle
would look like. And again, the requirement is not new. The
requirement goes back to 2007, and it was part then of the
effort to make the EFV more affordable and to provide the 12
total battalions worth of armored lift that we were looking for
on the battlefield.
Mr. Rigell. Well, I am encouraged and I applaud your effort
at really looking at off-the-shelf. I know each one of us wants
to squeeze every dollar of efficiency that we can. To the
extent that we use something that is presently out there, we
are going to leverage our money that much more.
In the few seconds that are remaining, General, could you
just for my benefit help me to understand how the Stryker
vehicle may or may not play into this. I know it is a
sophisticated family of vehicles with tremendous amount of
capability.
General Flynn. Sir, one of the key requirements that we
will be looking for in a Marine personnel carrier is the
ability to swim across rivers.
Mr. Rigell. Okay, that is it right there.
General Flynn. So that is one of the key things. And plus,
I think, you know, it has to--what underbelly armoring is the
best? And that is the second part of what we are really going
to be looking at in the future, sir.
Mr. Rigell. Very good. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Akin. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Thank you very much.
I want to continue with the line of comments and the
questions that our chairman asked. And my first question has to
do with the process.
You obviously go through a very rigorous process in
deciding what new platform what you want to develop. We are not
privy of that process at all. And so you come to us with an
already-made decision as to what that ought to be. And we are
then placed in kind of an adversarial role, because you have
pride of authorship, and you are in kind of a defensive role
defending what you are proposing, and we are kind of in an
adversarial role with you.
This is not a productive way to proceed. I would like, and
I am sure a number of our members would like, to be involved in
the process that you go through to make these decisions.
You seek the advice of a lot of experts. You do war gaming.
You look at the limits of technology. You look at the rate at
which technologies are developing and could be developed,
because many of these platforms are going to be with us for 30,
40, 50 years. So we need to be looking down the road, which I
know it was one of the concerns of our chairman. And he is
talking about standoff is what we do today, relative to
standoff appropriate for what we need to be doing 10 or 20
years from now.
Can we be involved in that process?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. I would describe--and this
goes a little bit back to your discussion about briefing in a
couple of weeks in terms of where we are today. I am, frankly,
not aware of anything right now in our process that would be--
let us put it this way. I believe that the process we are
executing right now, we have the ability to be fully
transparent with you all to share with you the analysis that we
are doing, the trades that we are considering----
Mr. Bartlett. This is after the fact. I would like to be
involved before the fact so that we are involved in the--yes, I
am sure you go through a very rigorous program before you
decide what new platform you want to bring out. There is no
fundamental reason we couldn't be involved with that, is there?
Secretary Stackley. Fundamentally, I think the decision to
terminate the EFV program that was announced by the Secretary
was not a traditional program new start process. This was a
case of in the course of, frankly, the budget process and
taking a look at the challenges in POM 12 associated with
continuation of that program and that budget process, that is
where the affordability issue----
Mr. Bartlett. But there was some internal discussion. I
think our chairman would have been very much more comfortable
if he had had the opportunity of potentially being involved in
there.
Let me go to a specific question about this process.
Technologies mature at various rates, and there are some
physical limits to the asymptote for many technology
advancements.
In looking to the future for a mechanism of getting our
Marines to the shore, with the access denial capabilities that
our enemies are developing or could develop, I am not
comfortable that we have done an adequate analysis of
alternatives and have adequately competed the missions to
decide that this amphib ship-to-shore is exactly the right
thing to do.
I do not know the rate at which these technologies will
develop, but it is conceivable to me that access denial in the
future will be so robust that we are not going to be able to
get anywhere near 12 miles to the coast, in which case, don't
you think we need another alternative for getting our marines
ashore?
What we have got now, sir, is more than we need for most of
our activities. Going aboard to Haiti or to Libya or any of
these places, you know, they don't have much access denial. But
one day we will be in a war with a peer that will have a lot of
access denial.
I am not comfortable that 12-mile standoff will be the
right standoff 20 years from now. Are you?
Secretary Stackley. So I am going to turn the requirements
officer to talk about the derivation of the requirement that
establishes the----
Mr. Bartlett. We have only 18 seconds. We can't do that.
What I would like to do, sir, is to be involved in the process
of how you got there. Our chairman is an engineer. I am a
scientist. We have very good professional staff that could
benefit by----
Secretary Stackley. Let me, in the time remaining, just
describe the approach that was taken. The requirement to deploy
marines from 20-odd miles from shore was driven principally by
anti-ship cruise missiles. And at the time that requirement was
established, we really had limited defense against anti-ship
cruise missiles, particularly if they are coming from over the
horizon.
So when we go after that threat through Navy Integrated
Fire Control-Counter Air capability in the past couple of
years, in fact, particularly this past year, we have been able
to successfully demonstrate that capability coming forward on
the maturity of technology timeline that enables the Navy to
determine that they in fact can go closer to shore in the face
of that threat.
Now, that doesn't cover all threats. And the bottom line is
that that becomes a limiting factor in terms of whether it is
an anti-ship cruise missile. In your defense against that or
other threats, you are going to consider that threat in
determining how you deploy your forces.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Look forward to working with you in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Mr. Young, did you have a question or an inquiry
at this point?
Mr. Young. Thank you so much for being with us, gentlemen.
I think I will pivot off of my esteemed colleague from
Maryland's line of questioning there and just follow up a bit
on the EFV.
It is my understanding that this ship-to-shore capability
power projection that has really defined the Marine Corps, at
least in the 20th century, we are seeking to continue it here.
And I would just like to step away and ask kind of a larger
question as a marine myself here.
It has been some time since we have had a contested
amphibious landing, and this question may have already been
asked, but with the prospect of access denial weapons out there
being developed by so many countries, would it make more sense
perhaps to invest our resources in capabilities from the air,
redefining the Marine Corps' amphibious capabilities perhaps.
Or, instead, is the justification behind the EFV and other
similarly equipped vehicles that we need to have redundancy, if
for some reason we were encounter an enemy that could defeat us
from ground-to-air as we insert our marines into a given area?
Is that the reason why we need our amphibious vehicles?
I am not sure I have seen this tested out in any robust
way, at least in the literature I have read in recent months,
so perhaps one of you gentlemen or more could address that.
General Flynn. I think at the heart of your question is
when and where do you need the capability. And I think the
question on that is you are needed across the full range of
military operations.
At the high end, if you say that we are going to do a two-
brigade forcible entry operation, we are going to have in
conjunction with marshalling the forces to do that probably
anywhere from 45 to 60 days of shaping operations to do it. So
that is one end of the spectrum that will influence, you know,
the threat that you would have to launch in there is how much
time you would have to shape your environment.
Then the other part is--and some would say at the high end
is the least likely chance that you would have. But as you said
there, there has to be redundancy.
And when was the last forcible entry operation? Well, the
one that I come to mind when we talk about an air-only option
is the amphibious withdrawal from Somalia. I would not have
wanted been the last person getting on the last helicopter in a
collapsing perimeter. I like the fact that I had that ability
to be able to withdraw back to the sea base and fight as you
withdraw. So that is one part.
So at the lower end of the range of military operations,
you may not have the shaping time. You may have to respond
today just like forces responded the same day the crisis was in
Japan. We responded that day. So what capability do you need?
And I think you do have to have the balance.
And then the key question is, you know, under that threat
environment, how closer are we going to be able to get. And we
do believe that we are not going to get any closer than 12
nautical miles, but we are not going to plan ourselves at 12
nautical miles. That could be the launch point for the vehicle
to go. And then the launching platform then pulls away from the
12 nautical miles. It is very similar now to how we do high-
speed launches even closer right now.
So I do think you need to balance capability of having both
an air and a surface option, because on the surface is the only
way you can rapidly build combat power up and get off the beach
quickly. So that is how I--when I looked at the requirement
that's as I see it, but I don't just focus on the high end. I
also look at all the variables that would take us down to a
lower threat level or a more likely area of employment.
Mr. Young. By way of follow-up in our remaining 50 seconds
here, your point that only on the ground is where you could
build up a fairly robust combat power, is that to say that--
maybe you could tease that out. Explain exactly what you mean
by that, why that cannot be done by inserting your marines from
air and--?
General Flynn. I think it is just to be able to get the
volume of combat power that you need to be decisive. In the
future environment, we are going to spread out over the
battlefield, but still the reality of pushing things across,
the volume really comes from the surface. And initially, you
have to establish the beachhead, and then you have to push off
the beach, and then that is where the robust supplies come in.
Mr. Young. You mean the volume of personnel, the volume of
marines, or are you referring to our ability to place
equipment?
General Flynn. I think all of the above, sir. I think it is
not only to get the combat forces in, but to get the
sustainment in as well.
Mr. Young. All right. Thanks, General.
Mr. Akin. We have a vote before too long here. I thank you
all for coming in. I think just from the questions, it says
that in a couple of weeks we will be able to have a probably
interesting briefing. And we will look forward to that. And
thank you so much for your time.
[Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 16, 2011
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March 16, 2011
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 16, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. The USMC LAV Program Manager met with HASC staff in
January 2010 and reported significant benefits associated with side and
wheel-well armor kits added to the USMC fleet of LAV's. These kits were
developed by Armatec and installed at the Barstow and Albany USMC
Depots. The Committee was informed that these kits added needed
survivability to the LAV's, while also extending LAV service life. The
HASC also understands that several allied countries are incorporating,
into their vehicle fleets, additional technologies developed by this
company such as Mine Blast Floor and Underbelly Protection Kits, Roof
Mounted Blast Attenuating Seats, and Armored Fuel Tanks. Are there
plans to evaluate the technologies from recent LAV survivability
upgrades for possible use in upgrade programs for the AAV or HUMMWV
fleets?
General Flynn. Yes. CD&I manages the capabilities included in the
Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy as a portfolio. AAV will
benefit from the lessons learned from LAV and all other USMC vehicles
in the portfolio, plus some Army vehicles such as the Bradley with its
Urban Survival Kit and Stryker with its new Double Vee Hull. CD&I is
actively connected to relevant intelligence from the National Ground
Intelligence Center and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, and it
communicates with protection experts from Army Research Labs and TARDEC
to stay current on best practices with respect to Force Protection and
Survivability.
The AAV upgrade initiative is planned to improve protection against
roadside and underbelly IEDs by upgrading protective armor and
modifying the interior of the vehicle to mitigate blast and
fragmentation effects while maintaining current water and land mobility
capabilities.
Analyses are ongoing to underpin AAV protection requirements, and
to ensure these requirements are balanced against others such as swim
capability, land mobility, etc. For instance, CD&I, PM AAVS, and MCOTEA
are assessing the feasibility of protecting the occupants of the AAV
during underbelly attacks through a deliberate study performed by Army
Research Labs. In this study, ARL is estimating the potential benefit
afforded by all-external applique, all-internal applique, and some
combination of the two, using 3D modeling and simulation. Given that
AAV has stricter swim mobility requirements than LAV, more attention is
being paid to the second order effects of adding heavy protection to
the belly of the AAV. CD&I anticipates leveraging Government (Naval
Surface Warfare Center) and academia (Stevens Institute of Technology)
to assess the effects of heavy upgrades on swim performance, and Nevada
Automotive Test Center to assess the effects on land mobility,
reliability, and ride quality.
Likewise, future HMMWV upgrade initiatives will benefit from the
lessons learned from past initiatives, to include recent LAV upgrades,
experimentation on the SCTVC (also known as ``Capsule''), ongoing
experimentation on DARPA's Blast Mitigation System (also known as
Structural Blast Channel or Chimney), plus the ongoing technical
development of the new-start Joint Light Tactical Vehicle systems. The
USMC is actively pursuing better protection for a portion of the HMMWV
fleet, and anticipates a recapitalization initiative that will likely
replace older cabs with more protected ones, while improving off-road
mobility in order to expand maneuver space, within established cost and
transportability constraints. Knowing that protected mobility for the
light fleet is an extremely difficult task within the USMC's unique
transportability requirements, it will continue to leverage the
experience of Science and Technology activities such as the Office of
Naval Research and DARPA, from Industry through our Materiel Developers
at Marine Corps Systems Command, and from Research and Development
Activities such as TARDEC and ARL, to ensure a balanced and effective
set of capabilities is fielded.
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