[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-21]
LONG-TERM READINESS CHALLENGES
IN THE PACIFIC
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 15, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
JOE HECK, Nevada SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
CHRIS GIBSON, New York GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BILL OWENS, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey TIM RYAN, Ohio
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
Dave Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Christine Wagner, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011, Long-Term Readiness Challenges in the
Pacific........................................................ 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011.......................................... 31
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2011
LONG-TERM READINESS CHALLENGES IN THE PACIFIC
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Representative from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
WITNESSES
Alles, Maj. Gen. Randolph, USMC, Director, J-5, Strategic
Planning and Policy, U.S. Pacific Command...................... 9
Pfannenstiel, Hon. Jackalyne, Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Energy, Installations and Environment.......................... 11
Schiffer, R. Michael, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Asian & Pacific Security Affairs, East Asia.................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Alles, Maj. Gen. Randolph.................................... 50
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 35
Pfannenstiel, Hon. Jackalyne................................. 58
Schiffer, R. Michael......................................... 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 77
Mr. Forbes................................................... 77
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 84
Mr. Forbes................................................... 81
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 85
LONG-TERM READINESS CHALLENGES IN THE PACIFIC
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 15, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m. in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Forbes. Good afternoon and we are calling this meeting
of the Readiness Subcommittee to order. Several of my members
will be coming in in a few minutes, so just to let our
witnesses know they are in other meetings right now in
subcommittees that are overlapping, and also we expect to have
a vote probably about 2:30. So we may have to break briefly and
go to that vote.
We want to welcome our witnesses here. We think this is
going to be a crucial hearing for us on our readiness in the
Pacific region. We have three witnesses that bring a great deal
of experience and expertise to this issue, and we welcome them
here today.
First of all, we have Mr. Michael Schiffer, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs, East Asia. Michael, thank you for being here. We are
looking forward to your testimony with our members.
We also have Major General Randolph Alles. General, thank
you. The General is the Director of J-5 for Strategic Planning
and Policy in the U.S. Pacific Command. General, as always, we
appreciate your service to our country and we thank you for
your willingness to be here today and to lend your expertise to
the subcommittee.
And finally, we have the Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel,
and thank you for being here, Jackalyne. She is the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations and
Environment.
This subcommittee is unusual in that it is probably one of
the most bipartisan subcommittees in Congress. We are all
trying to look to make sure that we have answered the question,
``Are we ready?'' And that is the purpose of the hearing.
My partner in this endeavor and the ranking member from
Guam is Madeleine Bordallo, and I would like to defer at this
time to Madeleine for her opening remarks.
Ms. Bordallo.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
appreciate your willingness to hold this hearing on long-term
readiness challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, which is
certainly very important to me. As we have heard from witnesses
in our previous hearings and briefings, this area of the world
requires our focus and our attention.
Before I begin with my statement, I would like to recognize
the people of Japan and ask that we keep them in our thoughts
and prayers as they recover from the horrific tragedy of last
week's earthquake and tsunami. These unfortunate events,
however, underscore the importance of our alliance and our
strong relationship with the Japanese people. Our military
forces in Japan are helping with search and recovery efforts.
Further, other civilian agencies such as the USAID [United
States Agency for International Development] and FEMA [Federal
Emergency Management Agency] and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission are assisting Japan.
In the wake of this unfortunate tragedy, we must continue
to focus our military resources on this important region of the
world. Nearly 42 percent of all U.S. trade occurs with Asian-
Pacific nations, which make this area critical to our national
economic security.
And I applaud this Administration for its greatly increased
focus on the Asia-Pacific region. To highlight this point, one
of the first major actions of the Obama Administration was the
signing of the so-called Guam International Agreement by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then-Foreign Minister
Nakasone.
However, despite greater focus, we must continue to assess
the readiness of our forces to protect our economic, political
and other strategic interests in this vital region.
One of the most important strategic matters is continuing
to fulfill the United States' obligation under the Guam
International Agreement, which is based on the 2005 U.S.-Japan
Alliance Transformation and Realignment for the Future
Agreement. This agreement outlines the numerous realignments of
military personnel in Japan.
Of the greatest impact to Guam is the construction in
northern Okinawa of a replacement facility for Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma. This new facility will allow the transfer of
more than 8,000 marines and nearly 9,000 family members from
Okinawa, Japan, to Guam. This committee has been supportive of
this strategic realignment in the past, and I hope that we will
remain so in the future.
I ask our witnesses today to make clear to the committee
the significance of tangible progress by Japan toward the
Futenma Replacement Facility and what commitments the United
States must make in the meantime to achieve the goal of moving
the Marines to Guam.
While dealing with the challenges of the military buildup
on Guam, we must not overlook the strategic importance of
Guam's location and the value of the freedom of action from
bases on Guam. Just this past weekend, several Global Hawks
based at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, conducted sorties over
Japan to assist the region with mapping the destruction caused
by the massive tsunami. Our strategic location in the Pacific
can never be overstated.
The Governor of Guam, Eddie Calvo, recently signed a
Programmatic Agreement with the Department of Defense that
outlines a process for consultations to ensure the preservation
of certain historic sites and paves the way for spending
military construction funding authorized in previous fiscal
years. The Administration has budgeted for certain
infrastructure support that will help to improve our quality of
life on Guam and at the same time enhance the military mission.
Further, the U.S. Government has been successful in
obtaining financing for certain other improvement projects on
Guam that are needed for the buildup to be successful. However,
I remain concerned about the placement of a proposed firing
range on Guam and would ask today's witnesses to explain to the
committee the strategic necessity of the range site as
currently proposed.
Many have questioned whether alternatives to the Route 15
ranges were adequately vetted. There have also been questions
raised as to whether the Navy properly examined alternatives
that would keep the ranges within their existing footprint,
thus negating the need to pursue leasing Government of Guam
land adjacent to Route 15.
While I respect the ongoing process wherein the Department
of Defense will conduct discussions with the Governor over the
Route 15 range location, I would caution that it may be very
difficult for DOD [the Department of Defense] to reach a deal
that will be approved by the Guam Legislature, who ultimately
approves the leasing or the sale of Government of Guam lands. I
continue to urge DOD to consider alternatives such as more
robust training capability on Tinian, to include individual
skill qualifications.
Finally, it is important to reiterate, as I have in
previous hearings, that we must keep in mind the threats we
face in this region of the world. China's secretive military
buildup coupled with North Korea's continuing nuclear ambitions
are certainly at the forefront of our strategic posture in
Asia. However, we must not lose sight of other nontraditional
threats in this region, such as the southern Philippines or
southern Thailand.
I hope that the witnesses will discuss our strategic
posture in the Asia-Pacific region through both a military
asset framework as well as a soft power framework. This
Administration's focus on military-to-military engagements is
very important to establishing greater cultural understanding
and foster stability in our region.
In particular, the mil-to-mil [military-to-military]
efforts with China I believe can help us avoid
misunderstandings that will lead to far greater concerns in the
future.
So ladies and gentlemen, I look forward to the testimonies
from each of you as I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Madeleine, for those remarks.
And as we discussed prior to the hearing, I ask unanimous
consent that we dispense with the 5-minute rule for this
hearing and depart from regular order so that members may ask
questions during the course of the discussion. I think this
will provide a roundtable-type forum and will enhance the
dialogue of these very importance issues.
Without objection, that is so ordered.
And just so the witnesses know, we have explained it to all
three of you, we do things a little differently in here. We try
to really get at some issues, and rather than have 5 minutes of
staccato questions, if one of the members wants a follow-up
question, the chair will recognize them and we will try to do
that to keep the dialogue going.
The other thing I ask the members for is permission to
submit for the record a written statement that I prepared and
any of the members that have written statements feel free to
submit those for the record.
Without objection, all the statements will be entered in
the record.
Ladies and gentlemen, I am going to ask you to do now what
I am going to do myself, and that is take my written remarks
and put them aside. For these kinds of hearings normally what
we do is this. You submit to us written statements, which you
have done very admirably, we thank you for that. We read your
statements, and so we appreciate the time that you put in those
statements and the fact that you delivered them to us. Then
oftentimes what we have is our witnesses will take about 5
minutes each and they give us a regurgitation of what they have
put in the written statements, but we have already read the
written statements so we don't need to do that.
And so I want to change it a little bit today and I want
you to take the written remarks that you might have and just
put them aside for a moment. If you want to submit them for the
record, we will read them. But here is what I want to pose to
you, that you can start and we will give you each 5 minutes or
so to have a bite at this question.
The goal of this committee is to ask a very simple
question, ``Are we ready?'' And over and over again, our
witnesses come in and the response that they rightly give us
back is, ``Ready for what?'' We should be having a strategy
that we can use as a yardstick so that we can compare where we
are against that strategy. We try to do that in the Quadrennial
Defense Review and the National Defense Strategy. But as you
know, more and more, there is a consensus building that the
Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Strategy is
driven a lot by budget and bureaucratic desires simply to
reinforce what they are already doing. In fact, when the
independent panel was created to look at the QDR [Quadrennial
Defense Review] that was the exact conclusion that that
bipartisan group determined. And they used a word like ``train
wreck'' if we continue doing what we are doing. So we have to
kind of reach to get the strategy and build the yardsticks that
we are comparing our military to to make sure that, in fact, we
are ready.
Just last week we had our Deputy Chiefs sitting right where
you are sitting, and where Mr. Schiffer is sitting we had the
Deputy Chief for the Marine Corps; Jackalyne, where you are
sitting, we had the Deputy Chief for the Army. And the two of
them agreed on one thing. They said the greatest component that
they could have for readiness was time. They needed to be able
to react quickly and as quickly as they possibly could.
So ladies and gentlemen, the question I have for you is
this: If we look at the Pacific, and we recognize that we may
not as a committee have a strategy to use as a yardstick, one
of the things we know is that the most probable conflict we
would have may not be with China, but if we ever had a
conflict, probably the most devastating conflict we would have
with China. None of us want that conflict. We hope it doesn't
take place. But when we are looking for readiness, we want to
make sure that we are prepared. Because oftentimes, if we have
a lack of capability, that determines decisions that players
make in that area.
So the question I would like for you to start within your 5
minutes or so today is this. We know if we don't have a
strategy that we can get our hands around, we know that from
our readings China does. One of their strategies, we know, is
their Anti-Access/Area Denial strategy that they have been
trying to implement. A year ago, Secretary Gates directed the
Air Force and the Navy to develop an Air-Sea Battle concept to
address that Anti-Access/Denial problem.
The first question I would like for you to respond to is,
is that concept ready? Do we have it? And are we prepared in
our readiness to implement that strategy? If not, when is it
coming?
The second thing we know is my dear friend sitting to my
left not too far from her home she has been willing to take me
and she show me those huge fuel reserves that are sitting there
on Guam. We know that one of the strategies as part of the
denial strategy that China has would be able to do something to
those fuel reserves.
So the other question I have for you to be responding to is
if something happened to those fuel reserves, how long would it
take us to replace them and where would that replacement have
to come from?
And then the third thing is, if we look at China's
strategy, it is very clear from their writings that one of the
things they believe is that the United States can't endure a
long conflict, that we need to have short conflicts, and they
are prepared for a long one.
The question for you is, if we had a conflict and that
conflict had a high-intensity operations that lasted more than
a month, is our industrial base capable of supporting that kind
of long-term conflict and, if so, for how long?
I know that is a lot. But it kind of sets the parameters
that we need to be looking at for readiness in the Pacific.
And so with that, Mr. Schiffer, I am going to ask you if
you would start whatever response that you might have to that
and feel free to interject anything else that you would like to
in that.
STATEMENT OF R. MICHAEL SCHIFFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, ASIAN & PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, EAST ASIA
Mr. Schiffer. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
thank you, Ranking Member Bordallo, and the other distinguished
members of the committee, and thank you for the privilege of
allowing us to appear before you today.
Let me try to provide you in my opening comments with the
strategic context that underlies our approach to the Asia-
Pacific region and how we are preparing our presence and
pursuing our presence and our policy in the region, and I think
in so doing I will be able to shed some light on the questions
that you have raised.
Before I begin my comments, however, I want to join Ranking
Member Bordallo in reiterating that our thoughts and our
prayers today are with the people of Japan. I was in Japan last
week when the earthquake struck, and though I was not near the
area affected by the tsunami, the magnitude of the earthquake
in both real and psychological terms was palpable. We are still
learning the total extent of the devastation, and the United
States is working side-by-side with the people of Japan, the
Japanese Government, and the Self-Defense Forces to manage the
consequences of the earthquake and the tsunami.
In addition to the humanitarian assistance in helping to
address ongoing nuclear issues at the Fukushima Daiichi plant,
U.S. Forces are engaged in helicopter search and rescue
operations and support from U.S. Navy ships, including the
Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group, are providing services such
as water purification, medical teams and hospital beds.
Our forward presence in Japan and throughout the Asia-
Pacific region has allowed us to respond to Japan's urgent
needs quickly, and we will continue to facilitate rapid
engagement to provide whatever assistance our Japanese friends
require.
You have asked us to address the question ``Are we ready?''
and in your comments, Mr. Chairman, you elucidated some of the
issues that we need to dig into as we address that question. It
is an important question and one with many facets. And at the
risk of stating what other witnesses have stated before, I do
want to be clear from the outset that the Department of Defense
and our men and women in uniform wherever they may be
stationed, at home and abroad, are indeed ready to meet any of
the challenges that we may face in the region in the near-,
medium-, or in the long-term.
Our ability to respond rapidly and effectively to provide
assistance to our Japanese friends is one facet of the question
``Are we ready?'' and especially the related question of
``Ready for what?'' It will come as no surprise to members of
this committee, and as the ranking member pointed out, that the
Asia-Pacific region is the most dynamic region in the world
today. It holds over half the world's population, more than $1
trillion in annual U.S. trade, 15 of the world's largest ports,
and is home to six of the world's largest armies, China, India,
North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, and of course our own.
Over the past six decades, the region has experienced
extraordinary growth, in large part because of the peace,
stability, and prosperity that our security presence, our
robust U.S. military presence, made possible for all states in
the region. That military presence remains critical to our
long-term readiness and to ensuring that peace and prosperity
continue to prevail in the Asia-Pacific region. The United
States and the Department of Defense remain committed to our
enduring presence in the Asia-Pacific, and to the investments
in forces and capabilities necessary for protecting our
national interests and those of our allies and partners in the
region, as well as for meeting the full range of potential
traditional and nontraditional 21st-century security
challenges.
I would like to focus for a little bit in getting at some
of the questions that the chairman raised, focus my attention
on three particular issues: The rise of China, North Korea, and
our evolving regional posture. I will keep my comments brief in
the remaining time that I have, and my written testimony
provides a more detailed assessment.
As you know, over the past 30 years, China has transformed
itself from an impoverished country to the world's second
largest economy. As its economy has grown, so has its
capabilities across a range of measures, including its military
capabilities. President Obama and Secretary Gates have stated
that the United States welcomes and encourages a strong and
prosperous China that makes positive contributions to the
stability, resilience, and growth of the international system.
We continue to see positive examples of cooperation and
partnership from China on certain regional challenges. There
are, however, other areas, such as its military modernization
efforts, its opaquely defined long-term strategic intentions,
and questions about the development of its Anti-Access/Area
Denial capabilities that are causing concern in the United
States and around the region.
In this respect, long-term readiness means that the United
States must continue to work with our allies and partners and
with China to positively shape China's rise both within the
Asia-Pacific region and globally. U.S. strategy must be
flexible enough to anticipate and balance multiple possible
outcomes and must be able to capitalize on the cooperative
potential of the U.S.-China relationship while also managing
the risks inherent in China's rise and that includes the
investments that the Department is undertaking precisely to
make sure that we can counter Anti-Access/Area Denial
capabilities.
If I can ask the indulgence of the committee to continue
for a little bit.
Mr. Forbes. You go ahead, Mr. Schiffer.
Mr. Schiffer. As China continues to rise and its military
capabilities continue to increase, both the United States and
China benefit from having a healthy, stable, and reliable
military-to-military relationship.
During the recent state visit by President Hu Jintao, both
sides agreed on the need for enhanced and substantive dialogue
and communication at all levels. While we will continue to
engage in dialogue with the Chinese, we will also continue to
strengthen our posture, presence, and capabilities in the
region and to strengthen our alliance partnerships to ensure a
common view of how the United States can best continue to work
in and with the region for peace and stability.
The second issue that I would like to highlight briefly is
the continuing challenge of North Korean provocations. As
members of the committee are well aware, North Korea continues
to be a complicated security threat. In face of North Korean
provocations, including the sinking of the Cheonan and the
shelling of Yeonpyeong, the United States and our ally, the
Republic of Korea, are enhancing our deterrent capabilities and
so ensuring that we are fully prepared to meet any threat from
North Korea.
The United States has drawn ever closer in our bilateral
relationship with our allies in South Korea and Japan and have
also seen positive progress in the past year in trilateral
relations as well.
Critical to ensuring our long-term readiness to meet a
North Korean threat is maintaining a forward-deployed military
posture on the Peninsula. It is our forward presence, 28,500
strong, that effectively communicates our resolve to defend the
Republic of Korea and preserve our vital interests in Asia, and
our regular exercises like Key Resolve and Full Eagle serve to
enhance U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea] alliance's ability to
defend the ROK and to protect the region.
Lastly, let me address the efforts we are taking to
implement the Realignment Roadmap and our broader posture moves
in the region. As you know, the Department of Defense is
evaluating U.S. global posture on an ongoing basis to better
position us and our forces to meet the demands of the myriad
emerging threats and provocations in the region. This subject
will be addressed in greater detail in an upcoming global
posture review.
However, the important point to note for this hearing is
that the U.S. defense posture in Asia, where Secretary Gates
has stated that our goal is to maintain or posture in Northeast
Asia while enhancing it in Southeast Asia, is shifting it one
that is more geographically distributed, operationally
resilient, and politically sustainable.
While the focus on the implementation of the relocation of
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has been intense, the United
States and Japan are working closely together on FRF [Futenma
Replacement Facility] and on Guam. It is important to note that
the Government of Japan has publicly affirmed the importance of
the U.S. alliance, of the U.S. Marine Corps' having forward-
deployed forces on Okinawa and of moving forward with the
Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab, Henoko.
Indeed, events in the region have conspired to remind us of
all of the importance and the necessity of marine forces in
Okinawa and the vital role in both deterring potential conflict
and responding to crisis played by U.S. Forces in Japan,
including the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Forces in Okinawa.
This capacity to respond quickly to regional challenges,
both traditional and nontraditional challenges, rests in no
small part on the maintenance of rapidly deployable ground
forces in the region, and we look forward to continuing to work
with the Government of Japan to move forward with the full
implementation of the Realignment Roadmap.
The Asia-Pacific region is one where America has deep roots
and enduring interests. As the United States looks to the
challenges, threats and opportunities of the future, the
Department of Defense remains focused on protecting American
interests and allies against the range of threats and
challenges we will face together in the 21st century.
Thank you for your time. Thank you for your indulgence. I
look forward to engaging more deeply on some of the questions
that you raised, and let me turn to my colleagues for their
comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schiffer can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Schiffer, and again we
appreciate your expertise and coming here.
Now Mr. Schiffer did exactly the opposite, though, of what
I am asking you guys to do. I know it is comfortable to hang on
to those prepared remarks. But we have read those. What we want
you to do is try to address the readiness issue. And General,
maybe you are the perfect person to do that.
So General Alles, if you would please see if you could
address those remarks and throw those written remarks away
because we just want to hear your expertise. We can put those
in the record. But the time we have got, how are we prepared
and are we ready to meet those challenges?
General, thank you for being here.
General Alles. All right, sir. I will keep my remarks brief
here. I would ask that the written remarks that I have
submitted be included in the record.
Mr. Forbes. And we are including all of your written
remarks. We appreciate your time in preparing them.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RANDOLPH ALLES, USMC, DIRECTOR, J-5,
STRATEGIC PLANNING AND POLICY, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
General Alles. Chairman Forbes and Ms. Bordallo and members
of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear
today and discuss the readiness challenges here in the Pacific.
I do want to acknowledge before I continue with my
responses here my condolences to our very close ally in Asia,
Japan, as Mr. Schiffer has already mentioned during their
ongoing trial here, this great earthquake and tsunami. I just
want you to rest assured the U.S. Pacific Command is doing
everything in our power to assist the Japanese people during
this hour of need.
I also would like to extend my best wishes to
Representative Giffords and her husband Mark. We hope to see
her back soon fulfilling her responsibilities as a member of
the committee.
I wanted to build on one comment that Mr. Schiffer had made
as he talked about China and the rise of China, as we consider
the rise of China. And I wanted to emphasize I had a
conversation previously with Ms. Bordallo about the importance
of dialogue between the Chinese and the U.S. sides. Both myself
and Mr. Schiffer get to occasionally participate in dialogues
with the Chinese, usually with the PLA [People's Liberation
Army] is who we talk with, and I think those dialogues are
beneficial. Yes, I mean they are scripted in a certain degree,
there is a degree that we tend to hear the same points coming
back from the Chinese, but the fact that we are able to meet
and actually have a dialogue together I think is important.
One of my responsibilities is to function on the MMCA, the
Military Maritime Consultive Agreement, which is our meeting
that we have with the Chinese to discuss operational safety in
the international air space and off the coast of China and in
the international waters.
And I think I would comment that I have seen effect out of
that dialogue. It has done much to ensure that tensions when
U.S. and Chinese forces interact remain low, and I think there
is great benefit in the overall dialogue between the two sides.
Even if sometimes it may just appear to be an exchange of
talking points, I think nevertheless it is an important
interchange that we have.
Turning to the topic of the question on the Air-Sea Battle,
I would like to just point out a few things about that. It is,
as you noted, Mr. Chairman, an attempt to address Anti-Access/
Area Denial. I would point out that it is a concept that is
broader in thinking than just looking at the Chinese situation.
We are looking at this more broadly across the globe on how
countries are attempting to deny access to U.S. forces and how
this might address it.
I do think there are significant and effective work going
on currently in near-term initiatives. I would just note we
have met on several occasions recently with the Under Secretary
for Defense for AT&L [Acquisition, Technology & Logistics], Mr.
Carter, and he has made substantial progress in addressing some
of these Anti-Access/Area Denial issues in the current defense
program.
Just as a list of a few items here, there is modernization
efforts underway to the tune of $4\1/2\ billion in the FYDP
[Future Years Defense Program] on the F-22 to leverage radar
and electronic protection technologies coming out of the JSF
[Joint Strike Fighter]. We have $1.6 billion over the FYDP
going into the F-15 radars to address electronic attack and
warfare issues that they would have in this A2AD environment.
There are also efforts underway with the E-18 Growler, our
AMRAAM [Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile] weapons
systems, our Aegis-equipped ships, and improving antisubmarine
capabilities that will address Anti-Access/Area Denial
challenges.
So I think there has been great progress made in the
Department here. They are moving forward rapidly, and I am
encouraged by what I have seen. Even today we talked with the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development,
addressing this particular issue of Anti-Access/Area Denial
across the globe, and I think they are making good progress in
their long-range strike family of systems that are addressing
the issues we are going to have with Anti-Access/Area Denial
holistically across the spectrum of military capabilities and
capacities that we would need.
I do think it is a concept that is going to take a number
of years to implement. It is not something that is going to
occur in 1 or 2 years. I think it is a long-term question that
the Department is addressing, so clearly funding the
initiatives that the Department puts forward to address Anti-
Access/Area Denial will be very important to us, but I think we
have a good handle on how we are approaching this particular
issue and the things that we are going to need to do in the
future to ensure access for U.S. forces and to be that
stabilizing influence that the U.S. has been in Asia really for
over 60 years.
Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
[The prepared statement of General Alles can be found in
the Appendix on page 50.]
Mr. Forbes. Madam Secretary.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. JACKALYNE PFANNENSTIEL, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Congresswoman Bordallo, distinguished members of this
committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today. I will focus my comments on the realignment in Guam,
specifically to the question of ``Are we ready?'' And that will
begin with the recognition of the strategic importance of Guam.
The Marine Corps relocation, along with the other Defense
Department alignments to Guam, represents a unique opportunity
to strategically realign the future posture in the Pacific for
the next 50 years. We need to get this right.
And this time last year we were still working on the
Environmental Impact Statement for the realignment. We had some
10,000 comments that we were working on. Since then, we have
moved forward. We have issued the final Environmental Impact
Statement, we have issued the Record of Decision, we have made
decisions in certain areas for moving the facilities to Guam.
We have deferred decision on the aircraft carrier berth and on
the ranges, as the Congresswoman pointed out earlier.
We have made some progress. Just this week we signed the
Programmatic Agreement, which allows us to move forward,
completing the Section 106 for the National Historic
Preservation Act process. With that, we are now able to start
letting contracts and beginning some military construction
associated with the realignment.
I should point out that a long-term, positive relationship
with the people of Guam is essential to the success of the
Marine Corps mission in the Pacific. With this in mind, we have
laid out what we are calling the four pillars of working with
the community in Guam. And they are that we will work towards
OneGuam; in other words, that outside of the base and on the
base will be of the same community, that we will pursue a green
Guam, an environmentally preferred base, and help Guam with
their renewable resources, and we will make sure that access to
the cultural sites, specifically the Pagat site, would be
protected.
In addition, in recognizing the amount of land the
Department of Defense already consumes on Guam, we will commit
to making sure that we do not expand and in fact that we reduce
the footprint on Guam.
We believe that our commitment to these four pillars will
allow us to work well with the Government, with the people of
Guam. We have worked with Governor Calvo in trying to gain
access to the land that we will need for the training, for the
Marines' training.
And that is a really critical element of the ``Are we
ready?'' We need to be ready to train the Marines when they
come to Guam. And so we are spending, we are focusing our
attention on getting the land that we are going to need for the
training resources.
This is an important year for the Guam realignment. The
start of construction is imminent, and additional contracts
will be awarded in the next weeks and months.
Building on the projects from the fiscal year 2010 and
fiscal year 2011, we are seeking additional funding for fiscal
year 2012 to begin vertical construction and to allow off-
island workers.
Also this year, we will continue the discussions with the
Government and the legislature and the private landowners to
begin an agreement in principle for the land that we need for
the ranges.
The Guam realignment is a multi-faceted, dynamic endeavor
with many component parts. Successful execution will be the key
to the Department's success in the Pacific. We will continue to
work with our partners in Guam and Japan and the Commonwealth
of the Northern Marianas to develop solutions to the challenges
we are facing.
Thank you for the opportunity to address you today. I look
forward to continue to work with you, and I am available for
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Pfannenstiel can be
found in the Appendix on page 58.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I thank all of our
witnesses for their comments. Normally I defer my questions to
the end, but I am going to start because I am going to come
back with the three questions that I asked at the beginning to
see if anyone is willing to address them. And let me fill in
the context for you.
There was a sunny summer day that took place when, before I
was born, when Oahu was just beginning to wake up in the
morning, most of the people who had been out doing what they
would do on a Saturday night were still sleeping in, there were
a handful of people that were policing the area. A fleet was
making its way up to the northern portion of Oahu. It was
sailing inside some rain squalls that were taking place,
staying out of the commercial lanes so that shipping couldn't
pick them up, the planes couldn't pick them up. As it got to
the northern portion of Oahu, they launched three types of
planes--fighters, bombers and torpedo planes. Just as they came
into Oahu, the sun came up, they were able to see their
targets, our battleships were all lined up in Battleship Alley.
They did all the things they were supposed to do. By the time
our fighters could scramble and get up, they had already gone.
They landed back on the airfield. The next thing that happened
as soon as they landed another wave came in, and that was
successful.
As you would hear that, you would think that would be Pearl
Harbor. As many of you know, that was not Pearl Harbor. That
was a war game we did in 1932, 10 years before with Admiral
Yarnell, and the Department of Defense threw it out because
they basically said it was unfair to attack on Sunday, and
nobody would attack on Sunday. If we had seen that 10 years ago
before, we would have been better prepared 10 years later.
Now I say that because I come back to looking at the
scenarios when we are asking if we are ready we are not just
asking what our goals are or what our philosophies are. We are
trying to ask, ``Are we ready when those conflicts come?'' We
know that there is a strategy by the Chinese, we hope that that
doesn't happen, all of us want to have the dialogue, but it is
the Anti-Access/Area Denial problem. They have told me that,
they have told many of the members here, they write about it
all the time. If we deny the strategy, let us know, but if
there is a strategy there, we had the Secretary saying a year
ago we were going to create this concept.
My question for any of you today is do we have the concept?
Not are we making good progress, but do we have that concept
today and if we don't have the concept today, when can we
expect to have that? Anybody want to tackle the question?
Mr. Schiffer. I will try to take a first cut at that
question, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is fair to say that as we talk about Air-Sea
that it is an evolving operational concept. But the important
point, and I think this is something that General Alles got at,
is that the Air-Sea concept needs to be put inside the larger
framework of the activities that we are undertaking to counter
Anti-Access/Area Denial challenges, not just as it might relate
to China, but as the General said, globally, wherever those
challenges may occur.
We take as a predicate the necessity for the United States
to maintain its ability to project power across the globe and
to maintain the integrity of U.S. alliances and partnerships
and to achieve that objective and to make sure that Anti-
Access/Area Denial threats and capabilities will not in fact
slow the deployment of forces into a theater or prevent U.S.
forces from operating in a particular theater.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Schiffer, I don't want to cut you off but
other people----
Mr. Schiffer. I am going to be getting to the enumeration.
There are a number of things that we are currently engaged in.
There are procurement activities that include the new
penetrating bomber and pressing forward with the mass
production of the F-35, that we are expanding procurement of
proven cruise missile systems. We are looking to procure robust
an air defense network that will prevail against ballistic and
cruise missile attacks. We are upgrading the B-2 bomber. We are
modernizing our fourth-generation fighters with new sensors,
electronic protection and modernized missiles. We are ensuring
resiliency by hardening key logistics infrastructures, building
dispersed operating locations, and creating redundant and
resilient command and control networks with increased
bandwidth.
We are also pursuing in addition to these investments new
concepts of operations, including new horizons and power
projection by integrating the presence of the Navy with the
global reach of the Air Force, which is the essence of what the
Air-Sea Battle concept of operations is all about.
And we are pursuing new technologies and new technologies
that will allow us to counter competitors' Anti-Access/Area
Denial investments, specifically their investments in ballistic
missiles, counter-space, and cyber capabilities, and we are
examining such technologies as prompt global strike
capabilities to be able to precisely strike time-sensitive,
high-value targets.
So when you put that together as a package I think it
provides a fairly robust response to the threats and challenges
that you outline.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you. General, do we have the concept?
General Alles. The concept is in development, which is what
we are currently doing and what the Navy and the Air Force are
currently in the process of doing. And they have started that
work over the past year or so, I think extending beyond a year,
it is still something that is in development and there are many
enabling pieces of that once we have that finally developed. So
I think as Mr. Schiffer is saying, it is evolving in its
development, it is at the point, it is not at the point where
obviously I am going to deliver you a pamphlet on the Air-Sea
Battle concept. It is something that we are still developing.
Mr. Forbes. Do you have any idea when we might expect it,
General?
General Alles. Candidly, I would have to ask the services
and come back to you on that. I think I would be speaking out
of turn to say we have an actual timeline for that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Mr. Forbes. Madam Secretary, question on Guam, if we lost
that fuel capacity, how long would it take us to replace it and
where would we have to get that energy from?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Mr. Chairman, I will have to get
back to you on the date. I do know that there are other fuel
sources in the Pacific and that we would be perhaps--in fact
perhaps the General can be more specific on where that would
come from.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Mr. Forbes. General, maybe you can.
General Alles. I would say that I can address the
specifics. The specifics are classified in nature.
Mr. Forbes. That is okay. Don't tell us anything
classified.
General Alles. There are alternative fuel sources in the
Pacific that we would leverage. There is a concern about the
vulnerability of above-ground facilities there. There is a
resiliency effort going on by the Air Force. Currently they
have $300 million put against that, I am not sure over the
exact time period, but to address some of the vulnerability
issues that we are going to have in this Anti-Access/Area
Denial environment.
So I think we are looking at that and looking at the
actions we need to take to make those facilities better
protected.
But I think also, as described earlier, we talked about
this briefly in your office this morning, is it is more than
just a single piece, a single system. It is more than
hardening. It is really as Air-Sea Battle is attempting to
address it needs to address the end-to-end chain of operations.
So it is complex and it is broad in nature.
Mr. Forbes. Before we go to Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Kissell has a
quick follow-up question.
Mr. Kissell. Just a quick question here. We talk about the
fuel capacities on Guam and other set places, a specific
location. But one of our colleagues in the last Congress said
what about getting the fuel to the ships themselves because you
wouldn't want the ships to have to come back to a set location,
what about the refueling capacity at sea in the midst of
battle? Do we have the ships that can do that?
General Alles. Candidly, I am not aware of any shortages
that we have in refueling the fleet. That one is the best I can
address. So we would need to address it with the Navy.
Mr. Forbes. My last question, very quickly, if we had a
protracted battle with high-intensity operations do we have the
industrial base here to sustain that, and if so, for what
period of time do you think?
General Alles. Candidly, I am not qualified to answer that.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Schiffer, any idea?
Mr. Schiffer. I would have to also plead that when it comes
to speaking to the industrial base in the United States I am
not qualified to answer that but will be happy to make sure
that----
Mr. Forbes. If you can give us that information. And now my
colleague and friend from Guam, Ms. Bordallo.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask my first question to Secretary
Schiffer, and that is regarding the concept of tangible
progress with regards to the construction of the new Futenma
facility and what that means for the realignment on Guam. What
exactly is tangible progress and when tangible progress occurs
what will that allow the United States to accomplish?
And further, what must the United States be doing
concurrently as the Government of Guam--the Government of Japan
works through its processes to reach tangible progress in
Okinawa?
Mr. Schiffer. Thank you. As we look at tangible progress on
the Futenma Replacement Facility, we see it as not a single
specific event but rather a series of steps roughly in parallel
between Japan and the United States as spelled out in the
Realignment Roadmap, the Guam International Agreement, and
other bilateral agreements.
It will allow us to move forward with the Government of
Japan as progress is made on the FRF to in turn take associated
steps that we have to take on Guam. There are a number of
different indicators that we are looking at, starting with the
decision on the runway configuration for FRF that we expect at
the upcoming ``Two-plus-Two'' meeting with Japan and then other
issues that we expect to come down, down the line, including
issuance of the landfill permit, construction of the seawall,
and progress on the landfill itself.
The other critical point for the committee, which I know
that you understand, is that preparation on Guam needs to begin
well in advance of actual construction on the ground for the
replacement facility at Camp Schwab and that relocation of the
Marines from Okinawa will be phased with completion of suitable
infrastructure on Guam sequenced in such a way as to maintain
unit cohesion and operational readiness. And that is why this
entire process has to move in lockstep and why we need to look
at all of the different indicators as we go along, including
for one other item to offer, Japanese financing for
infrastructure improvements on Guam as part of this continuum
that comprises tangible progress and that will enable us to
relocate from Futenma Air Station to the Futenma Replacement
Facility and to relocate the Marines from Okinawa to Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I have one quick question, Mr. Chairman. This is for
Secretary Pfannenstiel. As you know, last year's defense
authorization bill contained a provision that gave the
Department of Defense the permissive authority to integrate the
water and the wastewater lines on Guam. I have long believed
that the Navy, indeed all services, should be out of the
business of being a utility provider. And that said, I continue
to believe that the integration of power in Guam provides us
the right model for utility integration.
In that case, Madam Secretary, Guam took over control of
the Navy's power system but did so after agreeing to reach
certain performance milestones.
Additionally, there was a third-party expert that helped to
oversee the integration process and ensure that the agreed-upon
milestones were met. However, this was all done at no cost to
the ratepayers on Guam.
Would you agree that this is a model that should be used
for the consolidation of the water and wastewater system on
Guam? And would you also agree that consolidation of the
utilities should occur without burdening the ratepayers on
Guam?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo.
We are, in fact, working with the Guam Water Authority to
interconnect with their lines, and some of the money that will
come from the Japanese financing for infrastructure will be
used to improve the infrastructure for the water facilities,
the water on base, and those will be interconnected.
Now, as I understand, the agreement in the NDAA [National
Defense Authorization Act] about the integration set some
conditions for meeting performance standards before there could
be such thing as an integration, and that is what happened with
power. And so my suggestion with water is that we continue to
work towards meeting the standards that will work for the needs
of the Department of Defense as well as the Guam water agency.
Ms. Bordallo. Madam Secretary, I noticed in the agreement
there that they are saying that the Navy should have a voting
member on our utility board.
Can you indicate where else in the United States that the
Navy is a voting member on a utility board or any other local
governing body? Isn't this a cumbersome requirement for the
Navy or any service and intrusive to the Federal, State, and
local relationship?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. I don't know of any place where it
would be, but I believe that the requirement there was based on
this need to make sure that certain operational standards were
met, and I believe that was one way that that could be done.
Ms. Bordallo. So your answer is then nowhere else in the
United States?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. None that I know of, Congresswoman.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Now the chair recognizes Mr. Runyan from New
Jersey for 5 minutes.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all three
of you witnesses for coming out.
General Alles, talking about readiness in a current light,
how is Pacific Command engaging with our international partners
over there to really address terrorism? I mean, you have
elements of the Philippines, Indonesia, Southeast Asia that are
obvious threats. How are our partners coming together and do we
need more resources and/or funding to accomplish this and be
ready for that?
General Alles. Thank you, sir. That is being addressed at
multiple levels. Let me talk about kind of current events. As
you are probably aware, we have a Joint Special Operations Task
Force operating in the southern Philippines of around 600 U.S.
personnel. That has been there for a number of years and
continues to be effective in addressing terrorist issues that
were occurring in that part of the Philippines, I think very
effectively. So that is one specific instance.
So we are also concerned, as we look at the South Asia
region, with the LET, or the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group,
which emanates out of Pakistan but has a presence in India and
Nepal and Bangladesh, and we are concerned how that--let me
backtrack for a second. As you are aware, the LET was
responsible for the Mumbai attacks, where so many people lost
their lives. So we are very concerned about that interaction
that LET is having on India and the effect, that compression
effect that you had between two nuclear powers when there is an
attack into India from LET.
So we are concerned about that very much in the South Asia
area. We are attempting to address that by focusing not only in
India but also in Bangladesh and Nepal to ensure that we work
on facilitation networks, and, more importantly, how we address
building the capacity of our partners to, in fact, address
those internal issues so that they can secure their borders, so
that they have developed networks for intelligence, they can
develop intelligence on things that might be occurring inside
of their country, and then also how they might--you know, law
enforcement and actual counterterrorism operations.
So that is another line of our operation there, and we
facilitate that mainly through your Theater Security
Cooperation Plan, which addresses each of the countries in the
Pacific AOR [Area of Responsibility] and the ones that are
specific concerns for terrorist activities, clearly a big part
of that, TCP [Theater Security Cooperation Plan] is addressing
that building partner capacity to address either endemic or
military issues that are causing those situations to occur.
Mr. Runyan. A kind of problem in the same realm to kind of
defuse the tensions also with the South China Sea, the Taiwan
Strait, is that kind of the same angle you are taking with that
or is that a totally different game?
General Alles. The real, the building partner capacity part
of this I think is in a different sense, you know. Of course
when we interact with the Chinese, it is a different
interaction than we have with our allies and our partners, if
that is what you are asking, sir.
Mr. Runyan. I was just curious about, we know there is a
lot of tension there, specifically in the Strait and that type
of thing and how we are dealing with that moving forward.
General Alles. I think, again, and Mr. Schiffer may want to
comment also, I think the importance of the interaction
military-to-military between ourselves and the Chinese is of
prime importance, and we do remain concerned that the nature of
that interaction tends to be episodic at best.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Runyan.
And now our submarine expert from Connecticut, Mr.
Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually to follow
up on Mr. Runyan's question, a test of that military-to-
military relationship was the sinking of the Cheonan, which
again there was exhaustive forensic investigation that it was
inescapable that it was a completely unprovoked attack by a
North Korean mini sub, and yet we were unable to get China's
acknowledgment of, again, something that was just totally black
and white that North Korea was responsible for this.
And in terms of just the prospects of a productive
military-to-military relationship, even government-to-
government relationship, to not be able to even succeed in
terms of getting a basic baseline of what actually happened
there and in terms of just what impact that is going to have in
terms of transit of traffic, both commercial and military, in
that part of the world, I guess I would ask you to comment on
that Mr. Schiffer, in terms of it seems like using that as a
test, the relationship really is not doing that well and maybe
it is just episodic, is the right way to describe it.
The second question in terms of readiness is the press
reports show that there was clearly a gap there in terms of
sonar technology, in terms of being able to detect that mini
sub and when you gave your list of investments and help that we
are giving to our allies in that region, that was one of the
items that, I didn't hear it, and I am just wondering if maybe
you could address that because clearly 46 sailors lost their
lives because they didn't see that submarine coming or that
attack.
Mr. Schiffer. Let me address part of the question, and then
turn the floor over to General Alles.
I guess I would note first that when the Cheonan incident
occurred, our military-to-military relationship with the
People's Republic of China was in one of its periodic and, from
our perspective, very unfortunate periods of suspension because
the Chinese had suspended the relationship in January of last
year following our announcement of an arms sale package to
Taiwan. So we were actually unable at that point in time to
have any discussions with the Chinese in the military channels
about the Cheonan.
I am not sure that would have made much of a difference,
frankly. And much like you, we continue to be somewhat
mystified by how the Chinese have approached what seems to us
to be very, very clear evidence about culpability in the
Cheonan incident.
We hope now that we have resumed the military-to-military
relationship with China, that we are going to be able to put it
on stable and reliable footing and that in so doing, we will be
able to reduce misunderstanding, miscommunication, and
misapprehension, and perhaps have some real discussions with
them about some of the larger strategic issues in the region,
including how we each view and approach North Korea. That is
certainly something that when Secretary Gates was in China this
past January he engaged on.
Insofar as the readiness issue that you identified before,
turning things over to General Alles, I will just note that the
list that I offered was, by necessity, given the open nature of
this hearing, not complete, and obviously we will be happy to
brief any member of the committee that is interested in a
closed session more fully on the fuller list of the
capabilities that we are seeking to develop.
But I certainly can say in this open setting that, as you
are no doubt aware, we have undertaken a series of very robust
exercises with our ROK ally since the sinking of the Cheonan,
including a number of exercises at sea off both coasts of
Korea. And those exercises have been intended in no small part
to increase ROK capabilities and increase alliance capabilities
precisely so we are bettered postured to be able to respond to
these sorts of provocations in the future.
General Alles. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Schiffer.
I would make a couple of comments about Cheonan. One is the
nature of the attack was unexpected. It was unprovoked and
unexpected, so from that standpoint it was a surprise attack
and a surprise to the Koreans.
As indicated, a lot of our focus here in the near term has
been on increasing the capacity of the South Koreans in terms
of ASW [Anti-Submarine Warfare]. We have conducted a number of
ASW exercises with them to increase their capabilities in those
areas.
I think the Chinese remain concerned about the stability of
North Korea in general, and I think that is a large part, that
is a large calculus in how they respond to these situations
here. We, as all would expect, are mystified, given the
evidence we saw for Cheonan, that that was not attributed to
the North Koreans.
Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you. Just to let everybody know, we have
three votes that have just been called. Our witnesses have
graciously agreed to wait as we run over and do those and come
back. I want to try to get in one more set of questions. So I
would like to turn now to the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Alles, I understand that the Department is
reevaluating its prepositioned stocks as a part of Secretary
Gates' efficiency drills, and we are already beginning to see
reductions in funding for prepo in the 2012 budget that the
Secretary just submitted to us. Was PACOM [U.S. Pacific
Command] a part of this evaluation of the prepo strategy?
General Alles. Yes, sir, we were a part of that evaluation.
I would note that we have calculated the effects of that as it
is booked against our operations plans to ensure those plans
remain viable in execution, and they are from our standpoint.
So I can't address the whole worldwide posture of that.
That is beyond my scope at PACOM. But from our standpoint of
sourcing our plans and addressing the very difficult time-
distance equation we have in the Pacific theater, we are
currently satisfied.
Mr. Rogers. And you feel like that is going to be adequate
in the near future?
See, given what is happening with the recent national
disaster in Japan and what is going to be required of resources
and the volatility in North Korea, it seems to me that bringing
those prepositioned stocks down is risky, and you are saying
you don't think that is true?
General Alles. That was one of the concerns we addressed to
the Department, was to ensure that we were looking beyond just
the near term, really at the 5-year and beyond horizon, because
of course, the dynamic, the security posture in Asia is
changing as we consider the rise in powers in Asia itself. So
that was part of our calculation there and part of our response
back to the Department to ensure that we had adequate stocks
for our operations plans.
Mr. Rogers. I understand that we need to get use out of
every dollar, but I also want to make sure we are ready, and I
have very real concerns about these reductions.
We know that the readiness posture of PACOM is negatively
affected by the ongoing military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and now by humanitarian assistance in Japan.
How significant is the shortage of forces and equipment
required to effectively deal with the broad range of security
concerns in PACOM's Area of Operation?
General Alles. I would comment there, sir, that for our
day-to-day theater security operations, I think we are adequate
resourced, and I have had this conversation with Admiral
Willard, my boss. There is a significant presence of U.S.
forces from PACOM in Afghanistan and Iraq. Obviously, there is
an effect of those forces. There is a long-term effect, I
believe, about the strategic expression we are making by having
those forces out of theater year after year after year, that we
do have to address our operations. And I think as a long-term
equation, we need to continue to look at that.
It is having, though, probably a different effect you may
not be aware of. As the ground forces are gone obviously to
Afghanistan and Iraq, we are relying more on our air and our
Navy forces, so that requires more basic steaming days or air
operations days out of those forces, which is more wear and
tear on those aircrafts and those ships. It affects maintenance
schedules and also the long-term viability of those. In other
words, we are using those assets up because we are relying on
them more with our deployment of ground forces out of theater.
Mr. Rogers. What would you like to see this committee or
this Congress do to help you with that wear and tear and that
problem that you just described?
General Alles. Well, I think in one sense, as we continue
on the continuing resolution, that is going to affect
maintenance schedules for our ships and our aircraft because of
funding levels that they don't have. That is one aspect of it.
I think, also, we have to look at the long-term equation of
what our shipbuilding program looks like.
Mr. Rogers. Just as a last point, I want to go back to this
prepositioned stocks. When I asked you if PACOM had been
involved in the evaluation, did you feel any pressure from the
Secretary's Office or the Administration to tell them what they
wanted to hear on that issue?
General Alles. No, sir. I think we had a robust dialogue
with them and clearly expressed what our positions were.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. Thank you, General.
That is all that I have, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. We will stand in recess until we return from
the votes. Thank you for your patience. It will probably be
about 30 minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Forbes. I will call the hearing back to order.
I thank our witnesses for their patience and apologize for
us having to leave during the votes.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Kissell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
witnesses for being here.
Mr. Chairman, being a past world history teacher, I
couldn't help but to enjoy your story this morning about Pearl
Harbor. When I was teaching, I would start out every semester
by reading a preamble to a book, and I believe it was
``Flyboys,'' but don't quote me on that. And it talked about
the Japanese surprised the fleet, caught them in the harbor in
December, and the end result of the battle was they sunk all of
the fleet. I would tell my students, if you can tell me where
that happened, I will give you an A for the semester and you
don't have to come to class; you can do whatever you want. All
of them would raise their hands, and of course they thought it
was Pearl Harbor. I would say: Well, the next line in the book
says that President Roosevelt wrote a letter to the Japanese
and congratulated them to their great victory. That stumped
them a bit. It was 1905, it was the Russians.
We have great capacity to think we have all of the answers,
and we have to keep looking for the things that may surprise
us.
The reason I asked the question, General, earlier about the
supply ships, Gene Taylor was one of our former colleagues who
was very knowledgeable of these things. I remember one session
he was very concerned about how do we resupply the oil when we
are on the seas, in the battle, do we have enough oilers. He
had concerns whether we did or not. I will follow up with this
with a question, and you can take it off the record.
My question being this: If we are in a prolonged engagement
in the Western Pacific, do we have the resources, and the
chairman asked do we have the industrial resources, well, not
answering that, but do we have the resources, the capacity,
whether it be ships, airplanes, whatever, to get what we need
on a continuing basis to where the engagement may be.
I encourage you to be brief because I have a couple of
other questions.
General Alles. We can't get obviously into classified
discussions, obviously. I would need to answer specifics off
the record.
But generally, I would say yes, we do have the capacities
we need in terms of resupply for the plans that I have booked
right now, sir.
Mr. Kissell. Good. One country we haven't specifically
mentioned, even though we have said in the general area, is
Vietnam. Where do we see Vietnam emerging? Or do we see them
emerging in terms of the military, but where do we see them
emerging politically, especially as it relates to our
relationship with China?
Once again, whoever wants to jump at this one.
Mr. Schiffer. I think as a general statement we have been
extraordinarily pleased by the progress that we have made in
our relationship with Vietnam over the past number of years
since normalization. And we certainly look to deepen and
strengthen the relationship that we have between the United
States and Vietnam in the years ahead.
Mr. Kissell. Does China view that as a threat, because
historically those two countries have been at odds?
Mr. Schiffer. I wouldn't speak and couldn't speak about
Beijing's threat perception; but certainly, as you know, China
and Vietnam have had a rocky history of their own. I am certain
there are those in Beijing that probably do view our burgeoning
relationship with Vietnam in a less-than-favorable light.
From our perspective, our deepening and strengthening
relationship with Vietnam, and our desire to enter into a
genuine partnership with Vietnam, is a relationship that we
pursue in and of itself. It is not about China; it is about the
United States and Vietnam.
But I should also note that we don't have any illusions,
given our own history with Vietnam, about the future of that
relationship either. There are issues that we have to continue
to work out. There are human rights questions that we still
have in terms of how Vietnam treats some of its own religious
minorities that we still need to be able to cycle through as
well.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, and thank you once again for your
patience. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Kissell.
Now, someone who the Pacific is near and dear to her heart,
the gentlelady from Hawaii.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't believe we can discuss readiness out of the context
of what has happened and what the implications are of what
happened, the devastation and the catastrophe in Japan. Having
said that, I would like to know, Japan is considered like our
anchor partner in terms of our security defenses in the
Pacific. What impact is the tsunami and the earthquake having
on whatever strategic locations we have in Japan? Mr.
Secretary, if you can answer that.
Mr. Schiffer. Certainly. To begin with, I would say it
would be speculative at best at this point to comment on any of
the longer-term implications of the earthquake and the tsunami.
But I would note that certainly I think the assistance that we
have been able to offer, the engagement of the U.S. military
and the U.S. Government across the board in response to this
crisis has helped to strengthen the bonds that we have between
our two countries and helped make a case, I think, for the
logic of why we have a forward-deployed presence in the Asian-
Pacific region, including the base and footprint that we have
in Japan.
Ms. Hanabusa. I understand that part, Mr. Secretary. I
guess my question is more in line of what role does Japan play,
if any, in our readiness posture in the Pacific, and how is it
now going to be affected by what has happened?
Mr. Schiffer. Japan is the cornerstone of our approach to
security issues in the Asian-Pacific region, and there is a
reason why we term it that way and it is not just rhetoric.
Japan is an incredibly important ally. The contributions that
they bring to the alliance, including our base and footprint in
Japan is absolutely critical to our enduring presence in the
Asian-Pacific region.
I have absolutely no reason to believe that anything that
has transpired in the past few days following the earthquake
and the tsunami will undermine the commitment, the depth, the
strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As I noted I think just to
the contrary, that we will emerge from this and Japan will
emerge from this with a closer, better, and deeper
relationship.
Ms. Hanabusa. One of the issues that we are aware of is the
fact that the Japanese Government structure has changed. We
have gone from, since I think 1955 when the Liberal Democratic
Party actually had control of their Parliament, and now we have
the Democratic Party of Japan; and I don't believe necessarily
the Democratic Party of Japan felt as strong about our military
presence as the Liberal Democratic Party. Do you feel that
somehow that structure is now going to be affected as well?
Mr. Schiffer. I would offer that we have been
extraordinarily happy to be working with the DPJ [Democratic
Party of Japan] Government over the past years. As I noted in
my opening statement, the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister,
the Foreign Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, all of the
senior members of the DPJ Government have made very, very
strong and forward-leaning statements about the value of the
alliance, the value of the U.S. military presence in Japan, and
about their commitment to move forward with the Realignment
Roadmap and FRF. So we view them as a good and strong partner.
Ms. Hanabusa. I understand what you are saying, but isn't
it true that the reality of it is as to the Futenma transfer
that Japan has yet to come up with approximately their $6
billion of the $10 billion price tag for Futenma. Given the
disaster, given the catastrophe, what are the probabilities
that they are going to pay for the move of part of the Marines
from Futenma to Guam?
Mr. Schiffer. Again, I think that would be highly
speculative. I guess I would note that Japan has offered $415.5
million in funding for Guam infrastructure improvements in the
Japan fiscal year 2011 budget. That has already been approved
by their lower house. We expect it to be fully approved, and
that we are not aware of any effort, have not heard any voices
in the past few days that would suggest that that funding is
not going to go forward.
Ms. Hanabusa. Have you heard an affirmation that even if
they have got this critical situation where they are going to
be rebuilding a huge part of their nation that they are still
going to continue with their commitments to the United States?
Mr. Schiffer. The discussions that we have been having with
the Government of Japan in the past few days have been how to
respond to the immediate humanitarian crisis and the situation
at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Once we have
managed to deal with the management of the immediate
consequences, the thousands of people that have died, the
hundreds of thousands that are internally displaced, and the
ongoing situation with the nuclear power plant, I am sure we
will have those discussions. And I am fully confident that the
Government of Japan will continue to be positively engaged.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you for your questions.
To follow up on what the gentlelady from Hawaii was asking,
Mr. Schiffer, you and General Alles have both talked about the
importance of our allies working in a partnership fashion for
us to be able to do the type of defense that we need in the
Pacific. Have there been any thoughts about perhaps selling
some export version of the F-22 to Japan or any of our other
allies given the fact that we are concerned perhaps that the
Russians may be selling their PAK FA [fifth-generation jet
fighter] to other players across the world? And if we did that,
and I am not suggesting we do, I am just asking for your
thoughts, but there is arguments that it would help bring the
cost of the F-22 down in doing that. Have there ever been any
discussions about doing that?
Mr. Schiffer. I think Secretary Gates is very, very clear
on where he is on the F-22 program. As I did not bring along a
copy of my letter of resignation in my backpack, that will be
the entirety of my remarks on the issue.
Mr. Forbes. Well placed.
General Alles. I will leave the F-22 to Mr. Schiffer.
But I would just comment, we have had discussions with the
Japanese about what their needs are in terms of aviation
requirements. We think the F-35 makes a very logical fit for
them. I think it is what they are exploring currently. So that
makes eminent sense to us in many ways. I think it more
adequately addresses the defense of Japan needs.
I think another aspect of this, back to our allies and
partners in the region, in the Northeast Asia region we are
seeing increased levels of cooperation between the Government
of South Korea and Japan. Even this recent tragedy shows a
degree of cooperation between them in terms of assistance. So
we are encouraged by that and by the trilateral cooperation
that we are having between the three sides.
Mr. Forbes. Madam Secretary, I am going to let you slide on
that question, and we are going to go to Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, if you would bear with me. I
have a number of questions to ask. I really just want to get
answers for the record, so if the witnesses could make it very
brief.
First, Secretary Pfannenstiel, now that the Programmatic
Agreement has been signed, when can you expect task orders to
be issued to contract awardees? And when will some initial
construction efforts get underway on Guam?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Congresswoman Bordallo, we will be
issuing contracts and notices to proceed on several of these
contracts very soon. We have some contracts have already been
awarded, and we will be able to issue notices to proceed on
those. On a number of others we have specific dates that we are
ready to go on them.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good.
Regarding the training ranges, I hope that General Alles
can help to answer this. The QDR addresses training in the
Pacific. General, can you describe the current challenges to
training in this region? And also, are there any efforts by
PACOM to lead a comprehensive approach to develop a truly
effective solution to training issues in the future?
General Alles. Thank you, ma'am. There is an effort on the
part of PACOM to start an EIS [environmental impact statement],
which actually I think the funding is in the current year's
budget, that would address holistically the issues for PACOM as
far as joint training is concerned across the Pacific region.
So I think that addresses partially the issues on Guam.
We have discussed earlier the sighting of ranges on Guam
itself and the need for individual training of the Marines in
terms of small arms and those issues and where the broader
degrees of training can be conducted throughout the theater.
One of our prime considerations, though, as we have
discussed, is that we maintain ready forces throughout our
region. We think that is critical as a deterrence aspect. It is
so very important to us at the combatant commander's levels
that we are able to train our marines, soldiers, sailors, and
airmen across their range of required skills.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Secretary Pfannenstiel, I hope that you can help me better
understand the rationale for a firing range on Guam. I have
long expressed my concern about the preferred alternative
location for the firing range on Guam. The Marine requirements
seem to have shifted since the beginning of the EIS process in
2006; and as such, why are these individual qualifications
needed to be met on Guam? Has a cost-benefit analysis, and I
think we talked about this earlier, been conducted to determine
why the Island of Tinian may or may not be feasible?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. We have looked at the Island of
Tinian, and in fact we will be doing some group training there.
But the individual qualifying training needs to be on site
close to where the Marines will be. We have looked at the
ability to move the Marines as would be required, to move them
to Tinian often, to support them there, to move them back. You
end up not with just a lot of additional expense, you reduce
the time they have to train. You reduce the throughput of
training for them.
Given all of that, we have concluded that the training
needs to be on the Island of Guam. And we have sought for,
since we have been doing the process, to find a place on the
island of Guam that meets the needs; that is, sufficient size,
that has the least impact on the community, that does not
interfere with business or recreation, that is operationally
safe, which is why we ended up with a preferred alternative
that we are now looking at.
Ms. Bordallo. Another question for you, Secretary. Many
institutions of higher learning have cooperative agreements
with DOD to support the mission and provide technical studies
and analysis. Are you open to developing a cooperative
agreement with the University of Guam, and what steps are you
taking to get an agreement on a cooperative agreement?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. We have the highest respect--I
personally have the highest respect for the University of Guam
and Dr. Underwood. I have met with him every time I have gone
to Guam. I believe that the university is a true asset for the
island. I am not sure what the cooperative agreement is that
you would be proposing, but I am certainly open to talking
about it.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
And another one for you, Secretary. As you know, included
in the Record of Decision was a commitment to Adaptive Program
Management throughout the duration of the military buildup.
However, there is still a lack of common understanding of APM's
[the Adaptive Program Management's] specific meaning for the
buildup. What role do you see APM and CMCC [Civilian Military
Coordinating Council] playing as the relocation moves forward?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. The Adaptive Program Management was
developed as a way of slowing, if necessary, the activity of
the buildup to keep from overwhelming the infrastructure of the
island, whether it is water or wastewater or power or roads or
any other aspect of the infrastructure. So the idea is that as
the buildup happens, as construction happens, we will look
continually at the logistics that are needed and slow down or
change the schedule. And the CMCC, the Civilian Military
Coordinating Council, would be the oversight body that would
meet and decide whether the buildup was in fact moving too
fast, whether it needed to be slowed down in some aspects.
Right now we are in the process of working with the other
parties who would be involved in this to develop the operating
charter for the CMCC.
Ms. Bordallo. A follow-up on this, if a project related to
the buildup is causing significant environmental impacts, how
will DOD adequately adapt given the short timeframe for the
buildup?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. I believe that depends on what the
impacts of the project would be. We are working with the
Environmental Protection Agency and many other resources
agencies to mitigate where we can, to slow down if that is what
would be required.
Ms. Bordallo. All right, and I have a further question for
you, Secretary. Throughout the course of this series of
hearings on ``Are we ready?'', we have discussed the element of
risk in the operations and maintenance. Now, I would like to
bring an element of serious risk in the acquisition strategy
for the military buildup on Guam.
The current acquisition strategy requires that each
contractor provides a certain level of medical care at each
work site as well as health insurance coverage. The plan also
calls for the prescreening of any guest workers at their
origin. The fragmented strategy could result in seven different
plans for how to care for workers. Given the state of the
health care system on Guam, I think this part of the plan
assumes way too much risk for our overall health
infrastructure.
So can you detail for the committee why this strategy was
settled on and what steps are being taken to ensure that the
predeployment screening of guest workers is done to a certain
standard?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Congresswoman, the concern here was
to specifically avoid overwhelming the medical facilities
available on Guam. So it became part of the contract award
process that the contractors would have to provide medical care
for their workers. That is an important part of what determined
whether they would be selected.
Our expectation is that these workers will be able to be
treated by their employers. If they need to go to the hospital
for stabilization, they would do that, then they would be
airlifted off. They would be able to put the least possible
impact on the island's existing medical facilities.
In terms of screening before they came, we would have to
ensure that that would happen and that it would be effective.
Ms. Bordallo. Can I get your word on working with my office
further on this detail?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Oh, absolutely. I would be glad to
do that.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
One last question for you. The Micronesian Bio-Security
Plan was developed by various Federal agencies, to include the
DOD and DOI [the Department of the Interior], to determine how
to address the risks of terrestrial and marine invasive species
to the Micronesian region resulting from the buildup. Can you
tell me how the DOD will implement the MBP [Micronesian Bio-
Security Plan] and what proactive actions the DOD will take to
prevent new invasive species from being introduced?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. We have a fairly elaborate plan of
how it would work, and I would be glad to get more information
on that to your office. I think that would probably be more
productive than trying to walk through the various pieces of it
here.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 78.]
Ms. Bordallo. Very good, because we do have enough brown
tree snakes now forever.
General Alles, the lease for the Guam shipyard is up next
year. General, can you address what level of readiness our
forward-deployed ship repair capability provides PACOM?
General Alles. Ma'am, I will have to take that for the
record. I am not in a position to address that one. But I can
definitely get you the answer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, that concludes. I wanted the
answers to those questions for the record.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you. Feel free to supplement any of those
answers that you have for the record.
General, Admiral Willard when he was here last year, gave
some testimony about the number of ships in the Chinese Navy.
Do you have any idea how many ships the Chinese have in their
Navy today?
General Alles. I can comment on their modernization. The
specific numbers, I would need to get.
Mr. Forbes. If you can get those numbers for us and supply
them to us.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Schiffer, today is March 15, 2011. Ten
years from now, do you have any idea, if we continue on the
same building plan we are on right now, how will the number of
submarines that we have in our Navy compare with the number the
submarines the Chinese will have based on our projections of
what they are building?
Mr. Schiffer. I will have to get back to you on the record
in terms of the exact number.
Mr. Forbes. I understand. If you could get that number back
to us so we can see it.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Mr. Forbes. General, you and I talked the other day, one of
the interesting things right now, most of our strategies are
dependent upon our forces being able to attack and then move
back to sanctuaries where they have basically safe harbors at
that particular point in time. But if we had a major conflict
in the Pacific, more likely than not these safe harbors or
sanctuaries wouldn't be available. So my question is: Do U.S.
forces typically operate under degraded battle network
conditions when training for operations in the Western Pacific?
And if so, what are the key lessons we have learned from such
training? And if not, why are we not training in this manner,
especially since the Chinese military writings cite our battle
networks as our Achilles heel?
General Alles. I think one of the areas that we have
identified that we will continue to work on is the need to be
able to operate in missions-controlled environments, and that
is something certainly that we have done in a robust nature in
the past. It is an area that we need to address now and into
the future. It is an area that is not being ignored. It is not
an area that we don't ever practice to, but I think, like other
issues as we look at a potential country that would be a near-
peer, we are going to have to look at the kinds of training we
are doing and how we prepare for that kind of a situation.
Mr. Forbes. If you could keep our subcommittee posted on
your progress on that, we would appreciate it.
Our Navy and Air forces, are they trained and ready to
operated under sustained loss degradation based on space
capabilities and capacities because we know that we see the
Chinese perhaps looking at taking away some of those
capabilities? Are we training to deal with that degradation if
it were to take place?
General Alles. Again, we are looking at that during our
exercises. I think there is more improvement that we can gain
in those areas, both in the type of technology we are using
that provides a more robust space network as far as jam
resistance, those kinds of things, and also from the standpoint
of practicing those types of operations in degraded
environments. There are certainly improvements that can be done
there. I don't want to imply there that is not practiced at all
now. That would be an incorrect statement, too.
Mr. Forbes. My last question, maybe all three of you could
take a bite at this at how we can do better. I want to go back
to the very first question that I raised, and it is the fact
that the Secretary did direct the Air Force and the Navy to
develop an Air-Sea Battle concept to address the growing Anti-
Access/Area Denial problem, which many people feel is the most
acute in the Western Pacific.
We know from writings that this challenge has been emerging
really for the better part of the last decade, and yet we had
the instruction come out last year to develop the concept, and
all of your testimonies today were that it was evolving. What
takes us so long to create a concept to respond to a threat
that we have? Any suggestions on how we can cut that timeline
down?
Mr. Schiffer. I think that is an excellent question, Mr.
Chairman, and one that I would very much like to be able to
take back and consult with some of my colleagues on so we can
provide you with a better answer on how we might be able to be
more nimble in our own thinking.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Mr. Forbes. I would appreciate it, and we are not pointing
the finger at you. We are pointing the finger at us, too, and
we want to work in a partnership so that we can respond faster.
We would love to have that dialogue and any input you can give
us to how we can make that work better.
General, you have lived with this most of your career. Any
suggestions?
General Alles. I don't have the answer for what takes so
long. I do think that this has come into a much better focus
over the past few years on the direction that China has done
with this Anti-Access/Area Denial strategy of theirs. And as it
has come into focus, I think that is moving us toward action in
this one area of Air-Sea Battles, and numerous other areas.
Mr. Forbes. General, one thing I would just throw out, we
are not just limiting it to the Anti-Access/Area Denial
problem, it is generally when we are trying to deal with these
concepts, sometimes it just takes us so long to get our arms
around it. I know in many hearings that we had we were talking
about this very problem, and we have the Department of Defense
telling us it is no problem, it is no problem, it is no
problem. And then it seems like everybody went to bed one night
and woke up the next morning and said: Oh, my gosh, it is a
problem. And so we would appreciate any insight you have from
your years of experience on how we can make that better.
Madam Secretary, I know, not particularly on this issue,
but on a lot of the other issues across agencies, you have
lived with this a long time, too. What are your suggestions on
how we cope with it a little faster?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I
have any wisdom beyond what my colleagues here have offered. I
am, as you note, relatively new to the Pentagon and the
processes. I see dedication, I see very knowledgeable people
who are answering questions as well as they can, and I believe
that the interaction with Congress is strong and is positive.
Clearly if I have any ideas on this I would be glad to share
them with you.
Mr. Forbes. We are about out of time. I just want to give
our witnesses a couple of minutes to say anything that you left
out or that you think is important or you got short-changed on
that you didn't get to get in the record.
Mr. Schiffer.
Mr. Schiffer. No, Mr. Chairman, I think we have had ample
opportunity, and thank you very much for this opportunity to
come up and engage in this important dialogue with you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Schiffer.
General.
General Alles. I would just mention what we discussed in
your office, and that is we look at this issue of Anti-Access/
Area Denial. We are in kind of a formative period here, and the
support of Congress in working on these particular programs I
think will be essential to addressing the issue.
Mr. Forbes. Madam Secretary.
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to thank you and Congresswoman Bordallo for the
opportunity to come and talk about what I see as a very
important part of our Pacific posture, and I know Guam is one
piece of it, but I think for many of us it is a key strategic
piece.
Mr. Forbes. Our doors remain open to all three of you if
there is anything we can do to help.
I would like to leave with Ms. Bordallo, any closing
comments.
Ms. Bordallo. Just a few seconds, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you very much for focusing on this very important move
for the military, probably one of the biggest in the history, I
understand. It is going to cost our Government and the
Government of Japan about $16 billion when all is concluded,
and I just want to thank you very much for focusing on the
Asia-Pacific area and its importance.
Mr. Forbes. With that, we are adjourned. Thank you all very
much.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 15, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Schiffer. The United States defense industrial base is
sufficient to meet general current and projected DOD requirements.
However, the Department has faced capacity concerns centered on
difficulties associated with rapidly increasing production of
``critical'' (based on unique evolving operational scenarios) items;
for example, those items associated with body armor, up-armoring
vehicles, and precision-guided munitions. As the Department continues
to improve its requirements generation process, particularly for
contingency operations, it will provide better and timelier guidance to
its industry partners, who will then be better able to plan and build
their capacity accordingly. However, in circumstances where capacity
for certain items becomes problematic for unforeseeable reasons, the
Department has a variety of tools at its disposal to address these
situations, such as prioritizing industry deliveries to meet the most
critical war fighting needs first. [See page 15.]
Mr. Schiffer. Ten years from now, China and the United States are
likely to have roughly the same number of submarines, although with
very different capabilities. Currently, China possesses approximately
55 submarines, most of which are diesel-electric, and its submarine
force is likely to grow by approximately 15 submarines in the next 10-
15 years, primarily due to the introduction of new diesel and air
independent power (AIP) submarines. Over the next decade, the U.S.
submarine force is projected to decline from 71 to 67 submarines.
The U.S. Navy operates three types of submarines--nuclear-powered
attack submarines (53 in service), nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (14 in service), and nuclear-powered cruise missile and
special operations forces (SOF) submarines (four in service).
The Navy's proposed FY2012 budget requests $3,232.2 million in
procurement funding to cover the procurement cost of two additional
attack submarines. Based on U.S. Navy projections, the total number of
U.S. attack submarines will peak in 2013-2014 and will then decline to
a total of 49 submarines by 2021. [See page 28.]
Mr. Schiffer. The Air-Sea Battle concept is a ``next-step''
evolution in U.S. joint warfare. It builds on the extensive experience
of the Department of the Air Force and the Department of the Navy in
conducting joint operations together over the last twenty years. The
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasized the importance of preparing
for the broadest possible range of conflicts, requiring continuous
operational innovation and rebalancing. This is consistent with our
aims as we continue to develop the Air-Sea Battle concept as an
effective approach to serve U.S. security interests most effectively.
In the future, the Air-Sea Battle concept will be a driver of new
and innovative programs. The military capabilities envisioned in the
initial Air-Sea Battle concept either exist at present or are currently
funded programs. [See page 29.]
General Alles. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 14.]
General Alles. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 27.]
Secretary Pfannenstiel. There are alternative fuel sources in the
Pacific that could be leveraged and there exists a concern about the
vulnerability of above-ground facilities as stated by General Alles
during the hearing. More specific information on subject matter is
classified in nature.
Additional information on specific time required to replace or
replenish fuel capacity in Guam can most appropriately be answered by
the Department of Defense's lead activity for this project, Defense
Logistics Agency. [See page 14.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
General Alles. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 27.]
Secretary Pfannenstiel. The Department of the Navy has put in place
strict contractual requirements for workforce health care to be
enforced through an aggressive and coordinated oversight program
cooperatively managed by DON and regulatory agencies including the Guam
Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of Labor. All contractors
are required to have plans to cover health care needs associated with
the introduction of an off-island workforce, including detailed medical
screening and surveillance, primary care and emergency care needs. This
efficient and cost effective approach has been coordinated with the
Center for Disease Control (Pacific Region), the Government of Guam
Public Health and Social Services, Navy Medicine West and Navy Bureau
of Medicine and Surgery (Occupational and Environmental Medicine
Policy). During a recent visit to Guam (April 2011) by the Navy
Medicine's Occupational and Environmental Policy Expert and Special
Assistant for Asia-Pacific Affairs, Navy Medicine West, DON's current
plan for addressing medical care requirements for H-2B workers was
endorsed and supported by the private medical sector, the medical
insurance industry, representatives of the regional CDC and the
Government of Guam Department of Public Health.
The Department of the Navy is committed to working with Guam health
providers, CDC, you and your staff regarding workforce medical care on
Guam. We will continue to review and provide feedback on amendment
language regarding this subject, as we did prior to the committee's
mark-up on the FY-2011 National Defense Authorization Act. [See page
27.]
Secretary Pfannenstiel. The Department of Navy (DON) has contracted
with the National Invasive Species Council, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, the US Geological Survey, and the Smithsonian Institute to
develop and coordinate risk assessments and prepare a Micronesian
BioSecurity Plan (MBP) in cooperation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, Guam Division of Aquatic and Wildlife Resources, Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands Division of Fish and Wildlife, and
other interested parties. The approach will integrate techniques
involving exclusion, detection, rapid response, and control of non-
native and invasive organisms that can be readily implemented into
standard operating procedures, training instructions, and construction
projects. Experts in various fields are collaborating to provide the
best scientific decision support to develop the MBP. The MBP is still
under development, and the final plan is anticipated in December of
2011. After the MBP is finalized, DON will develop an implementation
plan that will identify feasible mitigation and management actions
associated with DOD activities. DON will implement biosecurity measures
identified in the MBP that will reduce the risk of introduction and
spread of invasive species via DON activities. Implementation of
identified mitigation/management actions will be dependent on forecasts
of the tempo and sequencing of the realignment construction effort,
compliance with regulatory requirements, and compatibility with
military training. [See page 27.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 15, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. The 2006 International Agreement between the United
States and Government of Japan requires that the Government of Japan
make ``tangible progress'' on the construction of a Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma replacement facility in northern Okinawa before
implementing the Guam realignment. How does the U.S. define ``tangible
progress''? If the Government of Japan has not made ``tangible
progress'' in Okinawa, should Congress continue funding for the Guam
realignment?
Mr. Schiffer. We see tangible progress on the Futenma Replacement
Facility (FRF), not as a single specific event, but rather as a series
of steps taken roughly in parallel between Japan and the United States,
as spelled out in our bilateral understandings on realignment. As the
Government of Japan makes progress on the FRF, the United States will
take associated steps to move forward on Guam. There are a number of
different indicators of this progress, starting with the decision on
the runway configuration that we expect at the upcoming two-plus-two
meeting with Japan, the issuance of the landfill permit, the
construction of the sea wall, and progress on the landfill itself.
An essential point of our realignment understanding with Japan is
that preparations for facilities on Guam need to begin well in advance
of the actual construction of the replacement facility at Camp Schwab.
It is necessary to ensure that when we are satisfied with the progress
Japan has made on the FRF, suitable facilities will be available on
Guam to allow the phased relocation of Marines from Okinawa, such that
any relocation can be sequenced to maintain unit cohesion and
operational readiness.
Mr. Forbes. The Japanese Prime Minister has indicated that he
intends to ``start from scratch'' in reviewing options to relocate the
U.S. Marines on Okinawa and has proposed a May 2010 deadline to provide
a new basing proposal. What information can the Department of Defense
provide regarding the status of negotiations in providing for a Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma Replacement Facility?
Mr. Schiffer. On May 28, 2010, the Security Consultative Committee
(2+2) issued a Joint Statement reconfirming both governments'
commitment to the Realignment Roadmap, and in particular, to the
establishment of a Futenma Replacement Facility in the Camp Schwab/
Henoko location identified in the Roadmap.
Mr. Forbes. A) The relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea has
been postponed for several years beyond 2008. Why?
B) Is it correct that the Yongsan portion of the relocation plan is
now set for 2015? Are there also new dates for other elements of the
relocation plan? How likely is it that there will be further delays
beyond these dates?
C) What defense capabilities will be gained or reduced from the
relocation, and how will it improve or potentially hinder our ability
to respond to a North Korean attack against the South?
Mr. Schiffer. A) Both the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and the
Land Partnership Plan (LPP) have been delayed due to challenges with
the procurement of land in the Republic of Korea, slow construction of
facilities, and Korean bureaucratic challenges that have delayed
funding of projects.
B) Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP)- and Land Partnership Plan (LPP)-
related construction projects are scheduled for completion in 2015,
with relocation of forces scheduled to be complete in 2016. YRP
relocates a majority of U.S. forces and HQ United Nations Command
activities in and around the capital city of Seoul to U.S. Army
Garrison Humphreys. LPP relocates and consolidates U.S. forces north of
Seoul into areas in the south and expands infrastructure at Osan Air
Base and Camp Mujuk. The YRP/LPP initiatives were incorporated into the
Strategic Alliance 2015 (SA 2015) plan signed by both the U.S.
Secretary of Defense and the Republic of Korea Minister of Defense in
October 2010. The progress of these initiatives, as well as others
included in the SA 2015 plan, are tracked regularly through a series of
governing committees to ensure milestones are effectively met. Any
deviations are addressed by the next higher committee, and ultimately
by the Secretary and Minister for adjudication if necessary.
C) The U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) governments reached an
understanding to consolidate and relocate American forces stationed in
the ROK onto installations south of the capital city, Seoul. Prior to
the year 2005, the United States had 107 installations in Korea. Once
relocation is complete, the United States will utilize 49 sites,
concentrated for the most part around two enduring hubs: a southwest
hub and a southeast hub. The southwest hub is centered on Osan Air Base
and U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys. It will be the future centerpiece of
U.S. military force structure in Korea. The southeast hub will include
installations located in the cities of Daegu, Chinhae, and Busan. This
hub will serve as the logistics distribution center and storage
location for wartime and contingency prepositioned stocks.
The consolidation of forces onto two enduring hubs improves
warfighting capabilities in a number of ways. First, the 2nd Infantry
Division and future Korea Command will be collocated at U.S. Army
Garrison Humphreys, improving coordination and planning between staffs
of the two organizations. Similarly, relocating 2nd Infantry Division
to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys consolidates the division's subordinate
units at a single location, increasing direct face-to-face contact
among unit personnel while reducing the physical span of control and
infrastructure needed to support the division. The unit is better
postured to train and fight.
Consolidation at two enduring hubs also enhances command and
control and coordination. In addition to strengthening relationships
between operational staffs of the 2nd Infantry Division and a future
Korea Command, 2nd Infantry Division is better positioned to effect
initial liaison and coordination during reception, staging, and onward
movement of deploying maneuver and sustainment brigades. Early liaison
and coordination sets the conditions to more reliable and effective
command and control during later phases/stages of conflict. Positioning
of the 2nd Infantry Division at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys also
improves tactical flexibility by posturing the division in a better
tactical location for rapid commitment in support of either of the
forward stationed ROK armies and corps. This position also shortens
logistical lines during the initial phases of conflict that better
postures the division for successful employment later.
Consolidation also enhances the execution of noncombatant
evacuation operations (NEO). By reducing the dispersion of
transportation assets, movement times are cut. By separating U.S.
forces from initial wartime threats such as North Korea's long-range
artillery and its ground forces threatening Seoul, the vulnerability of
these forces is reduced and their survivability enhanced. A 2nd
Infantry Division located at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys will be
better able to integrate follow-on maneuver and sustainment brigades
while not under the fire of North Korean long-range artillery. This
factor supports the division's preparation for combat activities.
Finally, force consolidation enhances warfighting capabilities by
improving soldier quality of life, realization of stationing
efficiencies, optimizes use of land in Korea, and enhances force
protection and survivability.
Mr. Forbes. The readiness posture of PACOM is negatively affected
by the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. How
significant is the shortage of forces and equipment required to
effectively deal with the broad range of security concerns in PACOM's
AOR? What does PACOM need to meet existing requirements?
General Alles. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a Taepo-Dong-2
(TD-2) missile over Japan and on May 25, 2009, it conducted a second
nuclear test. The regime has also kicked out inspectors and re-started
its nuclear facilities. How do existing basing arrangements in South
Korea, Japan and Guam contribute to the defense of South Korea?
General Alles. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. The Chinese have an extensive conventional missile
capacity and range to strike many of our existing bases. How does the
Department assess the adequacy of the U.S. military's capacity to
withstand a Chinese air and missile assault on regional bases? How do
our existing basing arrangements in South Korea, Japan and Guam serve
to impede the growing Chinese extra-territorial ambitions? What steps
are being pursued to further strengthen regional bases' capacity to
survive such an assault and continue or resume operation?
General Alles. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. How does PACOM assess the adequacy of resources
available to Department of Defense programs that seek to defend
forward-deployed U.S. bases to include theater missile defense and
early warning systems, hardened structures and hangers, air defense
systems, and runway repair kits?
General Alles. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. The U.S. agreed to draw down its troops on the Korean
peninsula from 37,000 to 25,000, but in June 2008, DOD announced that
the drawdown would halt at 28,500 and that level would be maintained
indefinitely. What changed? If eventually there is a peaceful
reunification of the Korean peninsula, how will this affect U.S. troop
requirements on the peninsula? Is there a long-term rationale for U.S.
troop presence there?
General Alles. U.S. Pacific Command exercises operational control
over U.S. military forces assigned and allocated to it by the Secretary
of Defense. In accordance with the Presidential decision of April 2008,
the Department of Defense maintains an authorized end-strength of
28,500 U.S. Service members in the Republic of Korea. I respectfully
refer the Congressman to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy/Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific
Security Affairs for further information regarding the policy
background of this matter.
U.S. force posture in the Republic of Korea is tailored to meet
current U.S. security and alliance commitments. A peaceful
reunification of the Korean peninsula would, presumably, necessitate
changing U.S. force posture; however, specific force requirements would
depend on the actual security situation and on the particular missions
assigned to U.S. Pacific Command.
U.S. military forces on the Korean Peninsula support the U.S.-ROK
Alliance, whose mission is to defend the Republic of Korea through a
robust and combined defense posture. The Alliance is vital to the
interests of both nations in securing peace and stability on the Korean
Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
Mr. Forbes. The United States and Japan concluded an international
agreement to move 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. The Guam
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) uses the 2014 date as a benchmark
to complete the overall realignment. However, there are indications
that completing the move by 2014 is unachievable, and Navy's MILCON
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) supports completing the move beyond
2015. What is the target date to conclude the Marine Corps realignment
to Guam and what are the principal impediments to completion?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. The Record of Decision for the Guam and
CNMI Military Realignment EIS indicated the Department was implementing
Adaptive Program Management (APM) as a mitigation measure to ensure
that Guam's utility infrastructure is not overstressed and significant
environmental impacts do not occur. Through the use of APM, the pace
and sequencing of construction projects will be adjusted. As such, the
construction timeline and force flow of Marine Corps units into Guam
from Okinawa will ultimately depend upon improvements to Guam's
infrastructure capacity and proper management of environmental impacts.
Investments are being made to increase infrastructure capacity by
addressing improvements to utilities systems, the Port of Guam, and
roadways, all of which will allow the construction program to ramp-up.
We have developed an updated cost estimate and notional timeline
for the Guam realignment and we are prepared to brief the Chairman or
committee staff regarding these issues at their convenience.
Mr. Forbes. What is the overall cost of the Marine Corps relocation
from Okinawa to Guam? Does this include the expanded training
capabilities that the Marine Corps is pursuing?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. The Department understands Congress's
concerns regarding the total cost of the Guam realignment and is
committed to providing an accurate picture of current costs. We have
developed an updated estimate and notional timeline and have offered to
brief committee staff regarding these issues.
Mr. Forbes. How can the Department of Defense move forward with the
Guam realignment without having resolved Guam land acquisition issues
that are integral to the overall Marine Corps capability? If Congress
provided land acquisition appropriations to support training and family
housing requirements, would the Navy pursue eminent domain to acquire
land?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. The projects appropriated in FY-10 and FY-
11 and those requested in FY-12 are necessary to enable subsequent
construction. Waiting to begin military construction projects until
after training range land acquisition issues are resolved would create
a significant bottleneck in Guam's limited construction capacity, which
could ultimately result in a delay the Marines' ability to relocate
from Okinawa in fulfillment of our international agreement with Japan.
Discussions between the Department and Guam's leaders have enabled
the DOD to better appreciate concerns regarding issues such as access
to cultural sites and the expansion of DOD's footprint. Senior DOD
officials and Guam's leaders are committed to work together to resolve
such issues. The Department has committed to four principles for
reaching a negotiated settlement for acquiring land necessary for the
proposed training range complex:
One Guam: Address infrastructure improvements outside the
fence that are directly related to the buildup, and work with other
federal agencies to identify solutions for addressing Guam's needs
indirectly or unrelated to the military realignment.
Green Guam: Develop the most energy efficient base
possible and support Guam's efforts to develop sustainable and
renewable energy projects.
Unfettered Access to Pagat Village and Cave: Conduct
training activities in a manner which will allow access to the Pagat
Village and Pagat Cave historical sites 24 hours per day, seven days
per week, as it is today.
Net Negative: Following the completion of the
realignment, DOD will have a smaller footprint than it has today. This
commitment will directly address concerns regarding an expanding DOD
footprint on Guam. This concept is currently in the early stage of
development. Studies will be conducted to determine if missions can be
relocated and assess any potentially underutilized properties.
As a result of these discussions with Guam's leaders, the Governor
of Guam has stated publicly his willingness to discuss land use issues
with the Department and we believe that we will be able to reach a
negotiated agreement. We will continue to have discussions with the
Governor and Guam Legislature with a goal of being ready to commence
formal land negotiations once appropriate Congressional approval for
land acquisition has been received. The Department will continue to
update the Congress on land use matters and the status of informal
discussions with the Government of Guam. The Navy position is and
remains, that we seek agreement with landowners on the fair market
value for the land, using existing authorities and processes, and thus
the use of eminent domain will not be necessary.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. The Civil-Military Coordination Council was
established to implement Adaptive Program Management (APM) on Guam;
however there is still a lack of common understanding of APM's specific
meaning for the build-up. What role do you see APM and the CMCC playing
as the Relocation moves forward? From my understanding, the build-up is
not the first time APM has been used however; its short timeline
differs from previous federal projects. If a project related to the
buildup is causing significant environmental impacts, how will the DOD
adequately adapt given the short timeframe for the build-up?
``Adaptive'' means you will be using data to adjust, can you tell
me how the DOD will be monitoring and collecting new data as projects
move forward? If you are not collecting new data, how can you prevent
any unforeseen environmental impacts? Can you detail what efforts are
being taken to develop specific metrics that will help decision makers
in the CMCC ensure the build-up does not overly burden the local Guam
community? To what extent is the Government of Guam integrated into the
development of these metrics?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Adaptive Program Management (APM) is a
mitigation measure designed to keep the military construction effort
within the infrastructure capabilities on Guam. With implementation of
APM, DOD would evaluate infrastructure capacity/limitations and adjust
the tempo and sequencing of construction activities accordingly. This
would result in adjustments to the growth in the workforce population
so as to not overwhelm Guam's utilities, port, roadways and other
systems, and ultimately can result in a stretched out timeline for
implementing the buildup. The Record of Decision for the Guam/CNMI
Military Realignment included an initial operating charter for a Civil
Military Coordination Council (CMCC). The CMCC, comprised of military,
federal agency, and Government of Guam representatives, will assist in
implementing APM. The focus of the Council will be to coordinate
military, public, and private construction activity conducted during
the military realignment effort. It will develop recommendations on how
to integrate future DOD construction activity and other actions
undertaken by Guam or federal agencies associated with the military
realignment to avoid or reduce the potential adverse impacts on Guam's
environment, infrastructure, public agencies, and the public at large.
Efforts continue to finalize the CMCC charter.
Two possible actions could result from a finding that significant
impacts may occur in the future: 1) change the pace of construction
(i.e. contract awards or construction start dates, and/or 2) modify the
sequence of construction projects. Decisions regarding the pace and
sequencing of construction remain with each participating organization
as dictated by existing roles and authorities.
The CMCC is comprised of multiple working groups responsible for
developing metrics, thresholds, and trigger points that can inform
decision-making regarding the implementation of APM. The working groups
will exhaust all available sources for relevant data including reports,
surveys, ongoing projects and similar sources generated by local,
federal and other organizations.
The Government of Guam is an integral participant in the CMCC with
the Guam Buildup Office serving as the primary point of contact. As
many as ten executive agencies, the University of Guam and
representatives from several legislative offices continue to
participate in workshops, organizational and planning meetings. As the
need arises, DOD anticipates a dynamic environment in which other
working groups and Guam agencies may join the effort.
Ms. Bordallo. The Secretary of Defense laid out a framework of
pillars for the development on Guam to accommodate the movement of
Marines from Okinawa. The ``Net Negative'' pillar implies that the
Department of Defense will have less land overall on the island of Guam
after the buildup is complete than when it began. My question is
whether or not that footprint would include leased lands under that
plan? In other words, does DOD consider leased lands towards their
overall footprint? Will leased land be factored in to the overall ``Net
Negative'' sum?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. As stated by Under Secretary Work, the
Department understands the Guam community's concerns regarding the
amount of land controlled by DOD. In response, we have committed to the
Net Negative concept, which means that at the completion of the
military buildup DOD will have a smaller footprint that it currently
has today. If property is reserved for military use, and therefore
unavailable for the public, we would consider that property to be part
of our inventory regardless of the method of acquisition.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO
Mr. Palazzo. I represent South Mississippi, a heavy military
district where all branches of service are represented. My district has
also seen its share of devastation due to natural disasters, most
memorably Hurricane Katrina. Last week we saw another example of the
destructive power of Mother Nature as Japan was hit by a major
earthquake followed by a devastating tsunami.
1. Almost exactly one year ago, in his testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Admiral Willard mentioned that ``In the Asia-
Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60 days.''
Following the recent devastation in Japan, could you comment on our
military's readiness to respond to natural disasters in the Pacific at
this point?
Mr. Schiffer. 1. The United States Armed Forces are ready. We
maintain the capabilities necessary to respond to the full range of
contingencies that may occur in the region whether they are natural or
man-made. In addition to being well-trained and highly capable, when it
comes to military readiness, there is no substitute to being forward
deployed. Our highly capable forces have a history of rapid response
and have been present on the scene after some of the most devastating
natural disasters to hit the Asia-Pacific region. After the 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami, the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Burma, the 2009 Typhoon that
hit the Philippines, the 2010 Typhoon Fanapi that struck Taiwan, and
most recently the earthquake, Tsunami, and nuclear crisis in Japan, our
forces have shown an ability--unmatched in the region or elsewhere--to
respond to these crises and help to save lives.
Following the 11 March earthquake and tsunami in Japan, we launched
Operation TOMODACHI, which enabled us to provide support to the
Japanese Government and people. We provided continuous airlift,
delivering goods and services to remote, hard to reach, devastated
areas in the northern part of Japan most affected by the quake. To
respond to challenges posed by the nuclear crisis, we deployed an
Incident Response Force (IRF), comprised of personnel specifically
trained to operate in contaminated environments. The IRF provided a
rapid response capability as well as capabilities for monitoring
support for agent detection and identification; casualty search,
rescue, and personnel decontamination; and emergency medical care and
stabilization of contaminated personnel.
Our experience in Operation TOMODACHI underscores the importance of
being forward deployed in the region and the value of partner capacity
building as an integral part of our theater security cooperation
activities with all of our regional allies and partners. This serves
not only to enhance the preparedness of partner forces, but also the
readiness of our own.
Mr. Palazzo. 2. Do you feel that this high rate of humanitarian
missions, particularly in the Pacific, is hurting our readiness to
respond or plan for other, more traditional threats in the region?
Mr. Schiffer. 2. The high operations tempo of our humanitarian
response missions has not diminished our readiness. Quite the contrary,
through these operations, we are able to conduct critical training of
our forces in real-world scenarios that allow us to exercise command
and control and interoperability. The Department of Defense maintains a
high-level of readiness to respond to an array of 21st century threats
and challenges. As the first decade of the 21st century taught us, the
United States Armed Forces must remain prepared to address threats that
range from the impacts of climate change on the environment to the
dangers posed by global terrorism and piracy. And wherever traditional
threats may linger, such as in the case of North Korea, we must remain
forward deployed and maintain our capabilities, while bolstering those
of our allies and partners.
Mr. Palazzo. 3. Who pays for these humanitarian responses?
Mr. Schiffer. 3. The U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) is the lead federal agency for foreign disaster assistance and
is appropriated funding to support these efforts. The Department of
Defense may be asked to support USAID in providing foreign disaster
relief, which is funded through the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster,
and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation. Through OHDACA, DOD was able to
respond to Japan's earthquake and resulting tsunami; U.S. forces
supported U.S. operations to assist Japan with airlift support, at-sea
search and rescue, and the provision of relief commodities.
Mr. Palazzo. 4. What Asia-Pacific countries concern you most at
this point and where are we lacking to respond (equipment, technology,
manpower, money) to realistic threats from potential hot spots in the
region?
Mr. Schiffer. 4. Within Northeast Asia, the United States has
concerns about North Korea. In the last 12 months, North Korea has
attacked and sunk a ROK naval vessel, killing 46 sailors; publicly
revealed a uranium enrichment program in contravention of multiple UN
Security Council Resolutions; and launched an artillery attack that
killed both Republic of Korea (ROK) Marines and civilians. These are
examples of the type of destabilizing actions of concern to the United
States and reasons why we need a forward-deployed presence in the Asia-
Pacific area.
The United States also continues to have concerns about China's
military modernization program. As China's economy has grown, it has
understandably invested in its military. However, the United States
continues to have concerns about the lack of transparency from China
regarding its capabilities and its intentions. This is something we
discuss with the PRC regularly, and on which we hope to see continuing
progress over time.
There are a range of non-traditional security threats in Asia that
also concern the United States. These include proliferation prevention,
countering the impacts of climate change, and, as we have seen most
recently in Japan, responding to disasters.
As we plan and prepare for a range of possible uses of the U.S.
Armed Forces, we have worked--and will continue to work--with our
regional Allies and partners to maintain peace and ensure stability
throughout Asia. For example, we intend to enhance our forward presence
in the Pacific as it is a critical region to long-term U.S. economic
security. We are investing in base resiliency to protect critical
infrastructure and also developing new concepts of operation for how we
will project power when challenged by emerging capabilities in the
future.
We will continue working with Japan to implement the bilateral
Realignment Roadmap and relocate 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam in
order to offer strategic flexibility, enhance contingency response
capabilities, and improve peacetime engagement.
We will enhance the readiness of our forces in Korea with Tour
Normalization. This initiative will further our long-term commitment to
provide greater stability for forward-stationed service members and
their families. We will also continue transition of wartime operational
control to South Korea in December 2015. The ROK and the United States
will establish separate, complementary national commands consistent
with the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and focused on the defense of
the ROK.
Mr. Palazzo. 5. If we were to face a threat from China, would it be
more beneficial for our marines to be in Japan or Guam?
Mr. Schiffer. 5. Our bases across Asia, including in Japan and in
Guam as well as our rotational forces and ship deployments, contribute
to a U.S. defense posture in Asia that is becoming more geographically
distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. In
addition to being well-trained and highly capable, when it comes to
military readiness there is no substitute to being forward deployed.
There should be no mistaking the importance of U.S. military power as
one of the essential elements of our strategy for protecting our
national interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
Our realignment agreement with Japan is intended to ensure a stable
basing arrangement for our U.S. Forces in Japan, while at the same time
addressing longstanding local concerns about a substantial presence in
the relatively small island of Okinawa. Relocating a portion of the
Marines to Guam helps ensure that we meet objectives while retaining
capable and sustainable posture.
Guam is becoming a strategic hub for our presence in Asia, helping
to ensure the resiliency and geographical distribution that we seek.
Our Marine Forces will be configured in the most operationally
effective manner consistent with our commitments to our partners and
allies in the region.
The Department of Defense evaluates our global posture on an
ongoing basis to position our forces most effectively to maintain
deterrence and contingency response capabilities, and to shape the
security environment in ways that best strengthen stability, peace, and
prosperity for the region.
Mr. Palazzo. 6. Do you believe that Japan wants us to demobilize
our Marines?
Mr. Schiffer. 6. I believe the Government of Japan recognizes the
importance of the US-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty to the security of
Japan, and the critical contribution of the forward-stationed US Marine
Corps forces to fulfilling that commitment. Senior Japanese leaders,
including Prime Minister Kan, have in the last six months made several
public statements regarding the central importance of the U.S. force
presence in Japan to regional stability and the defense of our nation.
They recognize that the Marines provide an essential element of that
presence. The capabilities and responsiveness of the Marines forward-
deployed to Japan was highlighted to the Japanese public by their high-
profile in the response effort following the 11 March earthquake and
tsunami.
Even after the movement of some Marines to Guam, the realignment
agreement with Japan will keep approximately 10,000 Marines on Okinawa,
and another 3,500 Marines on mainland Japan.
A true sign of the value Government of Japan places on the Marine
Corps is their willingness to fund nearly $3 billion towards the
construction of some of the facilities on U.S. territory, in Guam, for
the exclusive use of the Marines. As then Defense Minister Ono
explained at the time of the agreement, doing so helps to ``maintain
the deterrence, while reducing the burden.''
The Government of Japan has also committed to providing an
additional $3 billion in financing for utility improvements on Guam and
family housing for Marines.
Mr. Palazzo. 7. In 2009 the U.S. imported over 220 bilion dollars
in goods from China, over double the imports of any other western
nation. Do you believe that this U.S. consumer behavior is actually
fueling China's military buildup?
Mr. Schiffer. 7. China's leaders can draw from a diverse range of
sources to support PLA modernization, including: domestic defense
investments, indigenous defense industrial development, a growing
research and development and science and technology base, dual-use
technologies, and foreign technology acquisition. Although the United
States currently imports more in goods from China than China imports
from the United States, China has committed to expanding its domestic
consumption and imports in order to promote a more balanced trade
relationship with the United States.
Mr. Palazzo. I represent South Mississippi, a heavy military
district where all branches of service are represented. My district has
also seen its share of devastation due to natural disasters, most
memorably Hurricane Katrina. Last week we saw another example of the
destructive power of Mother Nature as Japan was hit by a major
earthquake followed by a devastating tsunami.
1. Almost exactly one year ago, in his testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Admiral Willard mentioned that ``In the Asia-
Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60 days.''
Following the recent devastation in Japan, could you comment on our
military's readiness to respond to natural disasters in the Pacific at
this point?
General Alles. USPACOM is able to respond to natural disasters
through detailed understanding of the region and potential requests
through the following: 1) Understanding the regional perspective, 2)
Joint response, 3) Force availability, and finally understanding of
funding to support Host Nation requests, military response, and return
to Host Nation, Non Governmental Organizations, and other efforts upon
our exit.
1. Regional Perspective: USPACOM is divided into 4 regions:
Northeast Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. Northeast
Asia: North Korea and potential need for FHA/HADR may arise from
natural or manmade disasters. Disaster in this affected state would
cause great concern because of ability to interact, visibility, and
other concerns that naturally arise. Central Asia: China. Although
disasters in China have occurred since 2009, access is limited and
typical requests are in the form of funding or spare parts for military
hardware. Southeast Asia: We have seen significant improvement within
the Philippines and their ability to respond to FHA. Additional support
is still required for Indonesia, but access is not always guaranteed,
granted, or requested. As seen in 2007, Burma and associated relief is
problematic. Lastly, South Asia: Concern and planning has been focused
on the Government of Nepal (GON) due to its geographical isolation and
recent predicative earthquake models that suggest potential earthquake
on the scale of Haiti 2010. Just recently, USPACOM has concluded
strategic and operational level planning to address these concerns.
Refinements are being made through tactical planning to best
support GON and help mitigate potential disaster through leveraging
regional neighbors, international and non-governmental organizations,
and United Nations support. In summary, countries that have adversarial
relationships with USG are the most problematic to support and provide
FHA and HA/DR.
2. Joint Response: USPACOM forces are capable through joint effort
and unity of command to execute Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)/
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) from the strategic to
tactical level. Natural disasters that occur in our Area of
Responsibility (AOR) are frequent, but PACOM readiness is not adversely
affected. Although FHA/HADR is not a trained military skill set, it is
inherent to all the services. To mitigate strain on force readiness,
USPACOM employs a variety of forces ``tailored'' for response related
to the scope of the disaster.
Common to all disaster response from USPACOM are the following:
Command and Control, tailored forces, legal authorities, funding, and
ability to effectively/efficiently transfer response to appropriate
Host Nation, International Organizations, or Non Government
Organizations.
Operations such as TOMODACHI are unique. The Japan Disaster of
March 2011 incorporated an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster
and increased the aperture for response and need to best support our
alliance with Japan. Operation TOMODACHI incorporated FHA, Foreign
Consequence Management (FCM), and Department of State (DOS) Voluntary
Authorized Departure (VAD). In each case USPACOM forces were prepared,
able to quickly respond and adapt to the natural and manmade disaster,
while bolstering and strengthening our alliance with Japan.
3. Force Availability: FHA and HA/DR are inherent to USPACOM
forces. As stated, although FHA and HA/DR skills are not a skill set
specifically trained by the services, our subordinate units understand
the importance and strategic implications to respond with accuracy,
effectiveness, and compassion to the Host Nation (RN) affected.
Additionally, our response within our AOR signifies to our Allies and
Partners our commitment to the region. Conversely, our response in the
AOR leverages our potential adversaries and provides strong strategic
communication throughout the region. In short, we do not just respond
with ``monetary'' assistance, if requested, we provided a tailorable
and scalable joint force to support the affected host nation, thus
improving our position and alliances within the AOR.
4. Funding: With respect to monetary assistance, Humanitarian
Responses are paid for through USAID/OFDA. The Host Nation (RN) must
request DOD support through the Ambassador or American Embassy. Upon
approval and request of DOD forces from DOS, funding for HA/DR or FHA
commences. Caveat: DOD forces may initiate crisis response and HA/DR or
FHA with a 72 hour Vocal Command, IOT safeguard lives, alleviate human
suffering, and mitigate great property damage.
Simultaneously, as funding is being approved and adjudicated, the
Disaster Response Team (DART) from DOS or military equivalent may be
vectored to the HN IOT to provide initial assessment, scope of the
disaster, and potential cost. As first responders work under the first
72 hours, additional authorities and funding must be approved by USAID/
OFDA and OSD. The funding approved outlines the military support that
will be provided by the USPACOM to the Host Nation. Typically, funding
will support helicopter lift, food, water, shelter, and other
consumable items. Modification of funding may be requested if the
disaster warrants. As funding dissipates, USPACOM anticipates departure
of tailored forces and enables transfer back to the Host Nation or Non
Governmental Organizations or other efforts IOT for our forces to reset
the force posture and prepare for other potential crisis or
contingencies.
Mr. Palazzo. 2. Do you feel that this high rate of humanitarian
missions, particularly in the Pacific, is hurting our readiness to
respond or plan for other, more traditional threats in the region?
General Alles. The recovery effort in Japan was a first-class
effort which underscored the United States' commitment to Japan, one of
our most important regional allies. United States Pacific Command
(USPACOM), with help from the United States Interagency, was able to
provide humanitarian assistance to Japan without impacting our
capability to support other potential operations or contingencies. The
Japan Self Defense Force's (JSDF) ability to quickly respond to the
disaster and integrate U.S. Force support into its efforts was
impressive. U.S. assistance and assets were vital to the rapid and
successful implementation of disaster response measures, the voluntary
departure of American Citizens and the timely and effective execution
of nuclear response and cleanup procedures. This disaster, and the
effective coordination of relief efforts between USPACOM, the United
States Government and the Government of Japan, provided a valuable
platform for us to exercise our rapid response capability for
emergencies and disasters and to improve bilateral processes with a key
ally, Japan. Throughout Operation TOMODACHI, USPACOM had the ability to
quickly redirect forces, if required, to other areas in the Pacific.
Absent a large on-going crisis in the Pacific Area of Operations,
USPACOM is positioned to accomplish a variety of humanitarian
operations without having an immediate, adverse effect on its readiness
to respond to or plan for traditional threats in the region.
Mr. Palazzo. 3. Who pays for these humanitarian responses?
General Alles. USD (P) is the primary stakeholder in DOD for
humanitarian response with USG HA/DR issues primarily managed by USAID.
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding as
approved by USD (P) is utilized to support incremental costs associated
with military humanitarian assistance operations.
Mr. Palazzo. 4. What Asia-Pacific countries concern you most at
this point and where are we lacking to respond (equipment, technology,
manpower, money) to realistic threats from potential hot spots in the
region?
General Alles. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Palazzo. 5. If we were to face a threat from China, would it be
more beneficial for our marines to be in Japan or Guam?
General Alles. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Palazzo. 6. Do you believe that Japan wants us to demobilize
our Marines?
General Alles. The Marines that participated in the rescue and
relief efforts following the earthquake and the resulting tsunami and
nuclear incident have returned to their normal duties. Their ability to
react swiftly following these events was a direct result of being
forward based in Japan. Local reaction to the efforts of the Marines,
and all the participating members of our other services in Operation
TOMODACHI, was overwhelmingly positive. While there will always be
opponents to the forward basing of our forces, this event provided a
tangible domestic example of the value of our forward military presence
in Japan and highlighted the strength of our alliance. The Government
of Japan strongly supports the presence of U.S. military forces in
Japan and their commitment to the defense of their homeland and our
fulfillment of obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security.
Mr. Palazzo. 7. In 2009 the U.S. imported over 220 bilion dollars
in goods from China, over double the imports of any other western
nation. Do you believe that this U.S. consumer behavior is actually
fueling China's military buildup?
General Alles. This is not PACOM's area of expertise. I would defer
to the U.S. Treasury or Department of Commerce for response.
Mr. Palazzo. 1. Do you believe that Japan wants us to demobilize
our Marines?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. United States Pacific Command (US PACOM) is
the appropriate organization to respond to questions about military
strategy in the Asian-Pacific region.
Mr. Palazzo. 2. If we were to face a threat from China, would it be
more beneficial for our marines to be in Japan or Guam?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. United States Pacific Command (US PACOM) is
the appropriate organization to respond to questions about strategic
military capabilities in the Asian-Pacific region.
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