[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-20]
NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 15, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
TOM ROONEY, Florida JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina BILL OWENS, New York
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
John Sullivan, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Scott Bousum, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force
Tactical Aviation Programs..................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011.......................................... 41
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TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2011
NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 5
WITNESSES
Shackelford, Lt. Gen. Mark D., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, U.S.
Air Force; and Lt. Gen. Herbert J. Carlisle, USAF, Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force 31
Skinner, VADM W. Mark, USN, Principal Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and
Acquisition), U.S. Navy; Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, USMC,
Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation, U.S. Marine
Corps; and RADM Kenneth E. Floyd, USN, Director of the Air
Warfare Division, U.S. Navy.................................... 30
Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 8
Van Buren, David M., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition, U.S. Air Force................................ 6
Venlet, VADM David J., Program Executive Officer for the F-35
Lightning II Program, U.S. Department of Defense............... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Shackelford, Lt. Gen. Mark D., joint with Lt. Gen. Herbert J.
Carlisle................................................... 123
Skinner, VADM W. Mark, joint with Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling
and RADM Kenneth E. Floyd.................................. 91
Sullivan, Michael J.......................................... 65
Van Buren, David M., joint with VADM David J. Venlet......... 45
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 149
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 149
Mr. Reyes.................................................... 149
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 153
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 161
Mr. Owens.................................................... 161
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 160
NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 15, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:32 a.m. in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G.
Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Bartlett. The hearing will come to order.
The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the
Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force budget request for combat
aircraft programs for fiscal year 2012.
We welcome our visitors for today.
The first panel is Mr. David Van Buren, Acting Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, also representing
the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Vice Admiral David
Venlet, Program Executive Officer for the F-35 aircraft
program; and Mr. Michael Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and
Sourcing.
The subcommittee invited Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to provide
testimony today, but he was unable to appear.
The second panel will be Vice Admiral Mark Skinner,
Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Lieutenant
General Robling, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for
Aviation; Rear Admiral Kenneth Floyd, Director of the Air
Warfare Division, the U.S. Navy; and Lieutenant General Mark
Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition; Lieutenant General Carlisle,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements,
U.S. Air Force.
Thank you all very much for accommodating us today and
coming to this hearing.
We have a number of issues to cover today, but my opening
remarks will focus primarily on the F-35 program.
The F-35 is a complex program. There is no question,
significant technology and manufacturing capabilities have been
demonstrated. The thousands of people working at the major
contractors, as well as the many suppliers and vendors, deserve
a great deal of credit for their achievements.
But with tens-of-billions of dollars having been invested
in F-35 development to date, the program has encountered a
series of major cost increases and schedule delays. Last year,
the F-35 program experienced a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach that
required a restructured program.
The new program executive officer conducted a Technical
Baseline Review this past year, which again has resulted in a
restructured program and additional projected cost increases
and program delays.
Concerns about the F-35 program expressed annually for
several years by the GAO [Government Accountability Office],
having gone unheeded by the Pentagon, have largely been right
on the mark.
Our first panel today includes Mr. Mike Sullivan from the
Government Accountability Office, who has provided the
committee independent reports on the F-35 program for many
years. In 2001, when the Department began the F-35 program, the
GAO noted that the critical technologies for key aircraft
performance elements were not mature, and recommended that DOD
[the Department of Defense] delay the start of system
development until critical technologies matured to acceptable
levels.
The DOD did not delay start of development and procurement
costs, and procurement costs have climbed from $233 billion to
over $382 billion since that time.
In 2006, the GAO noted that the DOD planned to enter
production with less than 1 percent of testing completed, and
recommended a delay in production until flight testing
demonstrated that the F-35 would perform as expected.
DOD did not delay the start of production, believing the
risk level was appropriate. Since that time, estimates for
average F-35 procurement costs have increased over 30 percent.
In 2008, the DOD implemented a Mid-Course Risk Reduction
Plan to replenish management reserves by reducing test
resources. The GAO testified that this plan would likely
actually increase risk, and recommended that DOD revise the
plan to address concerns about testing, use of management
reserves and manufacturing.
Since then, development costs have increased 22 percent,
and recent restructurings in the past year have added test
aircraft back into the program.
I might also add that in 2007, the GAO testified that
experience with the first alternate engine program suggests
that F135 and F136 engine competition could generate savings
and benefits of up to 20 percent, if contractors are
incentivized to invest their own money to remain competitive
and produce more reliable engines, resulting in lower
maintenance costs.
Unfortunately, the Pentagon has also rejected the GAO's
conclusions on the F-35 alternative engine program, and has
submitted a budget each year since fiscal year 2007 that would
eliminate competition for the $110 billion F-35 engine program.
This year we are told that an additional $4.6 billion and 2
years have been added to the development schedule. Another 124
aircraft have been removed from the planned buy for the next 5
years. We have yet to be provided an estimate of the current
total F-35 program procurement costs.
The fiscal year 2010-to-completion of development cost
estimate for the F-35 primary engine contract has increased
from $385 million to $2.1 billion--445 percent since February
2008. However, a portion of this increase is due solely to cost
increases associated with F-35B lift fan components and
schedule increases in the aircraft program, and not the F135
engine itself.
For those who might ask the question regarding F-35 program
costs, at what point does this program become unaffordable, I
would respond that, if you believe our Nation needs a fifth-
generation stealth fighter, you have no choice. There is no
viable competition for this aircraft.
And I would also point out that, if the Pentagon has its
way, that is exactly the position we will be in for the engine
for this aircraft by giving a decades-long, $110 billion, sole
source contract to the primary engine manufacturer for the F-
35.
Having no choice but to continue to pay for F-35
development and procurement cost increases is exactly why many
of us do not believe that it is wise to create the same
monopoly situation with the F-35 engine as we have done for the
F-35 aircraft, that could comprise ultimately up to 95 percent
of the U.S. fighter fleet.
Given the $2.6 billion investment already made in a
competitive engine program, the Pentagon's analysis indicates
that, over the life cycle of the F-35 aircraft program, that it
would cost no more for a two-engine program than a one-engine
F-35 program.
The Pentagon is concerned with the near-term investment
costs to maintain a competitive program--initial costs DOD
incurs to initiate any competitive military acquisition
program.
This year, the costs to maintain the competitive engine
program represent eight one-hundredths of one percent of the
Pentagon's budget request. The option is whether we believe
that it is wise for eight one-hundredths of one percent of the
defense budget to foreclose the option for competition on the
only element--an estimated $110 billion element--of the F-35
program that Congress agrees is required for our forces.
Discussion of the competitive engine issue has been made
more difficult by misstatements regarding the F-35 engine
program by former and current members of the Administration.
The former deputy secretary of defense for Secretary Gates when
he first became secretary of defense wrote an op-ed indicating
``The F-35 second engine was not included in the Defense
Department plan during or before my tenure as deputy
secretary.''
This statement is a total misrepresentation of fact. The F-
35 development program began in 2001. The July 2000 Joint
Strike Fighter program propulsion system acquisition strategy
includes the design, development and qualification and
production of a primary and an alternate propulsion system to
support the JSF [Joint Strike Fighter].
In November 2006, the same former deputy secretary signed a
memorandum of understanding with the eight partner nations for
the F-35 program agreeing ``the production work will include,
but will not be limited to, the following: production of the
JSF air vehicle, including propulsion systems, both 135 and
136.''
This from the same Administration official, very close to
the previous quote, which said that it had never been
anticipated.
It is a total mystery how the former number one adviser to
Secretary Gates could write that the F-35 engine was not
included in the Pentagon's plan during or before his tenure,
when the alternate engine was in the original F-35 acquisition
strategy, and he signed an agreement with eight other nations
to produce the alternate engine.
Some opponents of the competitive engine point out that the
competitive engine is 3-5 years behind the primary engine--
without also stating that is the case, because there is the
acquisition strategy for the F-35 engine.
The 136 engine development was started four years after the
135. The 135 engine is about 24 months behind schedule. The 136
is about 2 to 3 months behind schedule, which means, if the
engines had been started at the same time, the second engine
would be now nearly 2 years ahead of the first engine in
development.
Some opponents of the competitive engine say there already
was a competition for the F-35 engine program when, as
prescribed by the F-35 acquisition strategy, a sole source
engine development contract was signed with the primary engine
manufacturer in 2001, and a sole source contract was signed
with a competitive engine contract in 2005.
Some say that the primary engine has 20,000 flight test
hours when the primary engine has, in fact, accumulated less
than 1,000--only 950--flight test hours, and continues to have
modifications being made to achieve required capabilities. It
takes 200,000 flight hours to mature a fighter engine.
We have had tens-of-billions of dollars in overruns on the
F-35 development and procurement program, years of delay and
many misjudgments of risk remaining in the F135 program.
Secretary Gates, speaking in Fort Worth, Texas, in August
of 2009 said, ``My impression is that most of the high-risk
elements associated with this development program are already
behind us, and I felt a good deal of confidence on the part of
the leadership here that the manufacturing process, that the
supply chain, that the issues associated with all of these have
been addressed, or are being addressed.''
Since Secretary Gates made this statement, the F-35 program
cost has increased $50 billion, has had two major schedule
delays, and procurement of 246 F-35 aircraft has been deferred
to after 2016.
F-35 development competition has slipped from 2014 to 2018,
and increased by nearly $10 billion to $56.4 billion,
approximately 20 percent. The development test program has
added 3 years to its schedule, one-third more flights, and
Secretary Gates has put the Marine Corps short take-off and
vertical landing F-35B on a 2-year probation to evaluate and
engineer solutions to the F-35B.
Major misjudgments of risk in the F-35 program have been
made at the highest levels of the Pentagon over a number of
years. Is it possible that wrong judgments are being made on
the need for competition for the F-35 engine? What gives us
confidence that the engine decision is anything other than a
short-term decision?
Just like many of us have had to watch the cost of the F-35
program spiral upward, many of you could have to live with a
sole source F-35 engine decision for decades to come.
Before we begin, let me call on the ranking member of this
subcommittee, my good friend, Mr. Reyes, for his opening
remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I also want to welcome our panelists here this morning.
As today's hearing on combat aviation programs is a critical
part of this subcommittee's work for the year, we are very much
interested in listening to their testimony.
Other than large Navy ships, the DOD spends more procuring
aircraft of all types than any other kind of weapon system. In
fiscal year 2012, the total request for Air Force, Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft procurement is $33.9 billion. By
comparison, the Army's total procurement request for fiscal
year 2012 is only $24 billion.
That does not mean that the aircraft are not worth the
price, but it does mean that we must carefully review the DOD's
request and ensure that the funds are, as always, spent wisely.
Of the many topics today's hearing will cover, the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter is probably the most critical issue. When
the program's schedule was developed, the DOD intentionally
took some risk in ramping up large-scale production before a
significant amount of test flights had been completed. The DOD
is now living with both the benefits and the downsides of this
plan.
The good news is that we are building a lot of aircraft,
thus learning a lot about how to ramp up production while at
the same time gaining production efficiencies. The downside, on
the other hand, is that we are finding a lot of things in test
flights that will now have to be fixed during later production,
or through later modifications that could prove much more
expensive.
With regard to the alternate engine, while I do not support
continuing with the F136 alternate engine, I do--and I want to
emphasize this--share the Chairman's concerns about Congress
being given accurate information from DOD. Regardless of the
outcome, we have to deal with the facts at hand and not the
spin.
A final issue I hope to hear about in today's hearing is
the apparent disconnect in aircraft procurement strategies
between the Air Force and the Navy. The Air Force has been
adamant that it only wants to buy fifth-generation fighter
aircraft in the future, and thus has refused to consider
procuring F-16s or F-15s while the F-35 is under development.
On the other hand, the Navy is planning to continue to
procure fourth-generation F/A-18 Super Hornets for many years
while waiting on next versions of the F-35.
One benefit of the Navy's approach is that as the F-35 is
further delayed, they can more easily adjust fighter production
to ensure that there are enough planes to meet future
requirements, as they did this year by adding another 40 F/A-
18s to their budget request. The Air Force, on the other hand,
is essentially betting its entire future and force structure on
the F-35.
While we all hope that the F-35 proceeds as planned from
here on out, to me, this does seem like somewhat of a risky
approach. As a result, I look forward to hearing from our Air
Force witnesses what the back-up plan might be for additional
delays in the F-35 Strike Fighter program.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Without objection, all witnesses' prepared statements will
be included in the hearing record.
Mr. Van Buren, please proceed with your opening remarks.
Then you will be followed by Admiral Venlet and Mr. Sullivan.
Thank you for coming.
STATEMENT OF DAVID M. VAN BUREN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR FORCE
Mr. Van Buren. Thank you, Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member
Reyes and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for
the opportunity to address this committee regarding the Joint
Strike Fighter.
The Joint Strike Fighter is the Department of Defense's
largest acquisition program, and its importance to our national
security is immense. The JSF will form the backbone of U.S. air
combat superiority for generations to come.
For our international partners who are participating in the
program, the JSF will become a linchpin for future coalition
operations that will enhance the strength of our security
alliances.
Following the JSF Nunn-McCurdy criteria certification in
June 2010 by Dr. Carter, the F-35 program office under Admiral
Venlet conducted the most comprehensive review of the JSF
program ever accomplished. A Technical Baseline Review assessed
the cost, schedule and technical risk of the work required to
complete the F-35 system development and demonstration program.
The TBR [Technical Baseline Review] involved 120 technical
experts reviewing every detail of the program over a period of
months, supported by the full strength of the Air Force and
Navy's tactical aircraft experts.
As a result of the TBR, Secretary Gates directed several
changes to the program. He directed the program decouple
testing of the short take-off and vertical landing model from
the carrier, and conventional take-off and landing variants to
ensure that any problems with this STOVL [short take-off and
vertical landing] would not delay the other variants.
Additionally, the Secretary added resources to the system
design and development program through its completion in 2016.
Extra development funding will allow us to complete additional
testing found necessary by the TBR, and properly fund testing
cost estimates that were previously estimated at too low a
level.
The Department further decided to hold production levels to
32 aircraft in fiscal year 2012. This allows the final assembly
process at Fort Worth to mature, and reduces concurrency in the
program.
Beginning in fiscal year 2013, the Department will increase
the production by a factor of 1.5 per year, as recommended by
the manufacturing review team.
Finally, the Secretary placed the STOVL on probation for 2
years, as was noted, pending further successful development.
The probation period limits the procurement of 6 F-35B aircraft
in both fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013.
This 2-year period will provide additional time to resolve
engineering and technical challenges. And at the end of the 2-
year probation, Department leadership will make an informed
decision on how or whether to proceed with STOVL.
The Department recognizes the concerns of Congress and the
taxpayers regarding the cost overruns of this program. The
Department estimates that the independent production unit cost
estimate to the JSF have nearly doubled since the program
began. This cost growth is simply unacceptable and must be
reversed.
The Department will be performing a rigorous LRIP [Low Rate
Initial Production] 5 ``should-cost'' effort. This process has
already shown some success, with cost reductions in LRIP 4, a
fixed-price incentive fee contract, with the target costs
substantially lower than the independent cost estimate.
The program's management over the past year has put in
place the right fundamentals and realistic plans using sound
systems engineering processes. And we are monitoring and
tracking performance on a continuous basis using detailed
metrics.
Overall, there is much work still ahead of us. But through
the multiple reviews and adjustments in the past year, Dr.
Carter and I believe we have put the program on sound footing
for the future. In our opinion, the TBR has given the
Department the best basis it has had to plan and manage the JSF
program.
Admiral Venlet and I have submitted this detailed written
statement for the committee. Admiral Venlet also has an opening
statement, but I do wish to thank you again for the opportunity
to discuss the program.
Admiral Venlet.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Van Buren and Admiral
Venlet can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]
STATEMENT OF VADM DAVID J. VENLET, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER
FOR THE F-35 LIGHTNING II PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Admiral Venlet. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you today.
By any measure of progress or performance, the F-35 program
has not delivered acceptable results. Previous reports and
investigations cite a history of program plans and re-plans to
which program performance does not measure up.
You may fairly ask why any new plan presented can be
depended upon to deliver to expectations or be bounded and
under control. The changes and decisions reflected in the
President's 2012 budget are a result of 120 technical experts
from the F-35 program office and the Services' systems commands
reviewing the remaining work from the bottom up.
This plan derives its higher confidence by embracing
fundamentals in every technical and business discipline. There
is grounding in realism about cost, schedule and performance.
Such a grasp on fundamentals and realism is the
distinguishing characteristic that makes this plan different
from all before it. This plan has resilience and prudent
reserve to absorb expected further learning and discovery.
This is a plan resourced with realism that will begin
building a record of dependable results.
I am honored to respond to your further questions.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Sullivan. Good morning, Chairman Bartlett, Ranking
Member Reyes and members of the subcommittee.
It is my pleasure to be here again to talk about the Joint
Strike Fighter program, DOD's largest acquisition ever and so
important to plans for recapitalizing our Air Force, Navy and
Marine Corps tactical aircraft. I will make some brief
comments, and then be happy to take your questions.
Mr. Chairman, over the last 13 months, Defense leadership
has taken positive action to restructure the Joint Strike
Fighter program, and we strongly support these actions, many of
which are overdue, that we and some other organizations have
previously recommended.
We have been concerned since program start about the risks
posed by the high degree of concurrency between testing and
production activities, and have consistently recommended
reducing annual procurement quantities until sufficient testing
is completed.
The Secretary's substantial reduction of 246 aircraft
through 2016 certainly helps lessen concurrency risk. Even with
that reduction, however, total development cost is now
estimated at $56.4 billion dollars, and will not be completed
until 2018--a 26 percent cost increase and a 5-year schedule
slip from the 2007 baseline.
We also note that, over the next 5 years, the annual
funding requirements for procurement more than double, and
annual quantities more than triple.
Looking forward, a focus is on affordability, which is
critical. With future budgets likely to be austere, the program
is planning an unprecedented amount of funding for a sustained
period, averaging more than $11 billion per year through 2034.
And this does not reflect all of the effects of the
Secretary's recent restructuring actions. We understand the
Department has not yet calculated the net effects financially
from differing aircraft quantities from the near term to future
budgets, and we expect future procurement funding requirements
to increase once this is done.
The program had mixed results during the year of 2010,
achieving 6 of 12 major goals that it set for itself, and
progressing in varying degrees on the rest.
There are some encouraging signs. The pace of flight
testing, for example, accelerated in 2010, accomplishing three
times as many flights as in the 3 years prior combined.
Also, there is much more work in process on the factory
floor. And we have taken annual tours of the factory floor, and
found it much busier this year than in the past.
These signs of improvements are counterbalanced with
continuing setbacks, however. For example, while the Air
Force's conventional variant and the Navy's carrier variant
performed well in limited flight tests, the short takeoff and
landing variant essential to the Marines' future aviation plans
had numerous technical problems. And as has been stated
earlier, DOD has directed a 2-year period to slow down
procurement to engineer solutions.
The final delivery of test and production aircraft is still
lagging. That is a big concern for us. And a majority of
improvements that the expert review teams did recommend have
not yet been implemented.
Improving factory through-put and the global supply chain
are now urgent priorities for the program.
Also, design changes continue at higher rates than
expected, and may increase further as flight testing continues.
This indicates the design is not fully stable, several years
after critical design review.
Finally, integration and testing of software essential for
achieving 80 percent of the JSF's functionality is
significantly behind schedule as it enters its most challenging
phase.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying that the program's
time to perform to cost and schedule targets has come.
The GAO pointed out several years ago that official
estimates were unrealistic, that they were based on optimistic
assumptions rather than robust systems engineering knowledge,
and that plans to cut test assets and reduce flight testing
during the Mid-Course Risk Reduction Plan were ill-advised. And
we have consistently pointed out risks to the program that the
Department has largely ignored until now.
We now support recent restructuring efforts and believe
that the added funding, extended time to complete systems
development and a more robust flight test program provide a
much more achievable program.
However, let me say loud and clear again that this program
still lags behind expectations and is not out of the woods yet.
Continued strong oversight will be critical.
Now is the time for much more disciplined decisionmaking
concerning critical aspects of the program such as: The STOVL
variants' inefficient schedule; overall cost controls on the
program; annual funding actions that the Department and the
Congress will have to make; and management of critical software
development efforts.
The program has been supported through many turbulent
years, and it does represent the fifth-generation fighter, and
it is a very important piece of our tactical air portfolio.
There have been a lot of smaller, perhaps lower-priority
programs that have taken on some of the cost-sharing for the
Joint Strike Fighter as it goes along.
After 10 years of product development and 4 years of
production, it is time for the program to make good on its
estimates and deliver aircraft in a predictable manner.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I await your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the
Appendix on page 65.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Thank all of you for your testimony.
As is usually my practice, I will delay my questions until
the end, hoping that my colleagues will have asked them all.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for your testimony.
I have two questions, one for Admiral Venlet dealing with
the testing results and production plans, and the other one for
Mr. Sullivan regarding the issue of the software and its
development.
For the Admiral, your testimony states that, due to a
series of problems discovered during testing, Secretary Gates
placed the F-35B short takeoff and landing variant JSF on
probation for 2 years.
He also directed major changes to the program that will add
hundreds of additional test flights. While test data to date
shows the other two F-35 variants somewhat ahead of schedule in
this testing, but the 35B continues to fall behind.
So my questions are, when exactly will the program, in your
opinion, have enough flight test data to allow us to get off
this probation designation?
And secondly, in the meantime, does it make sense to put
the 19 additional F-35B aircraft on contract for production,
which are being paid by fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011
funds?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 149.]
Mr. Reyes. And then, finally, why not build more of the
other variants that are not on probation instead of the 35B?
Admiral Venlet. Thank you, sir. Your reference to the STOVL
falling further behind, I would lead with the recent months'
progress has been quite remarkable for the STOVL aircraft.
It has flown quite a bit more. It has accomplished a lot
more vertical landings, really, since the turn of the year. We
have four of them return to flight test.
If I might just start with a current event issue, sir, you
mentioned discovery in flight test. Last week we had a dual
generator failure on an Air Force test aircraft at Edwards Air
Force Base. To take the time to understand what caused that,
what its impacts were, we grounded the entire test fleet and
their first two production aircraft.
Over the weekend, they were able to do an investigation and
tear the hardware apart. They understand what caused that
failure and the failure of the other generator.
And yesterday, they determined that there was a difference
in configuration of generators in the first test aircraft
built. This was a new configuration generator that was cut in.
And the differences gave confidence that we could return
the original, the older generator aircraft to flight. So
yesterday, AF1 flew at Edwards, and today, the four STOVL test
aircraft are on the schedule to fly today at Pax River.
So, I mentioned resilience in the schedule. This generator
is actually an early opportunity to test that resilience in our
schedule to see if we can absorb this and learn from it.
So, when will we have enough data to basically come off of
probation for the STOVL, sir?
The effect of probation was the suppression of the
procurement quantities. The test program has been planned and
is having detailed adjustments made to it this year, so it is
going full-speed ahead. And it was planned to do that even
before probation was pondered.
So, the actual focus in this probation period--and I am
meeting with the commandant every month. In fact, this week,
Friday, I meet with my shipmate behind me here and several
others to keep the commandant informed.
We are going to focus on several characteristics. The first
of all will be weight. We will watch how the weight is affected
by what we learn in flight test. We will watch how it performs
in its first sea trials, scheduled this fall.
Our progress in testing has improved our confidence of our
ability to meet what is our now-plan date of late October or
early November for its first sea trials. I know that was
originally planned to be late last year, slipped into the
spring. Our current planning and progress is giving us good
confidence that we will make this fall.
So, the weight, the ship operability, the discovery of
flight test that illuminates what we expect as key performance
parameters to be, and then, its progress towards achieving an
airworthiness determination by the technical assistance
command, and its ability to fly unmonitored in the fleet's
hands without test instrumentation and engineers following it.
Those are the characteristics that we will inform and we
will evaluate. And it will be a combination of those things,
not any one particular thing that will lead to the
determination of the confidence to go forward near the end of
2012.
You asked about the wisdom of continuing to buy. These are
certainly challenging decisions.
The complexity of the program and concurrency, the path
that we have set about to test and build and deliver to the
fleet, and operate at the same--this is our first year of
experiencing that. We are delivering our first production
aircraft this year, and we will be standing up testing for the
Air Force in Eglin Air Force Base.
Now, a comment. I have to wait and see what this generator
issue is going to do to that. There is nothing known on that.
We are evaluating that as we sit here.
But to break production would add additional cost. I think
the Secretary in this budget has moderated its spread
production out to reduce the impacts of concurrency and the
possibilities of modification due to learning and test.
I will stop there.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you. I will have some follow-up, but I
will wait until the next round.
Let me go to Mr. Sullivan on software. In your testimony,
you discuss the potential additional delays that could result
from the software development effort within the F-35 program.
And specifically, you note that each software block is likely
to be at least 2 years late, which obviously delays the overall
program.
The two questions I have: Are these delays primarily the
result of overoptimistic initial estimates, or are they
performance short-falls by the contractors? That is number one.
And number two, given the size and the complexity involved,
is the program doing well compared to the private sector, in
your opinion?
Mr. Sullivan. To answer your first question, I think your
point about underestimating the time and resources that would
be needed at the beginning of the program is probably the right
answer.
I think the program has found, number one, that the lines
of code that are needed to make up all of the performance and
functionality that software has to bring to this weapons system
has grown by about 40 percent since that time. And it is
already probably the most software-laden aircraft ever
developed. I know it is more than the F-22 or F/A-18E/F.
So, I think they underestimated the enormity of the
challenge for software development. They did not plan for
enough time.
And I think that they did not plan to keep software
engineering experts around long enough. That has been one, I
think, one of the cost drivers on the program, as well.
So, I think that, from our point of view, is the answer to
the first one. They were optimistic in their original
estimates.
With regard to your second question, I do not have a whole
lot of experience comparing defense programs with commercial,
but we have done some work in the commercial world to find best
practices in software, development in software engineering.
And I would say that the commercial world takes the idea of
spiral development a lot more seriously than what we see
typically on a weapon system acquisition.
What you have on the Joint Strike Fighter is that they want
to go all the way to--the program will not be complete, and
development is not complete, until they have all of the
software delivered Block 3 and beyond, which tends to go beyond
what you might think of as a 95-percent solution.
Whereas in the commercial world, I think they are much more
flexible with incrementally releasing software, getting better
software to the field, if you will, more quickly, although it
is not the ultimate. You know, they spin out. I think they are
much more flexible.
They reuse software a lot more. They do not rely as much on
unique software writing and proprietary software, and things
like that.
You know, that would be my observations on that.
Mr. Reyes. And I think it is interesting, because in last
week's hearing, we talked about just that issue, that sometimes
it does not make sense to--and unrealistic to expect--a 90, 95
percent level, when 75, 80 percent, and then evolving through
that process.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Reyes. So, that is something that I think the committee
certainly understands, and maybe we can influence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield my time
to Mr. Shuster.
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, Mr. Shuster.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the
gentleman from New Jersey for yielding me his time.
Mr. Van Buren, on the F-35, I have a couple of concerns,
first and foremost on the alternative engine.
We have seen a GAO report that has come out and says the
alternative engine is, over the long run, cost-neutral, one
engine or two engines. So, first, I wonder if you could address
that, along with--I read a report that General Heinz, the
former Joint Strike Fighter program manager, stated that he
believes that the Pentagon has not considered, under his
opinion, operational risk involved with doing away with the
alternative engine.
And looking at having an alternative engine, some of the
other benefits, the technological innovation, enhanced
contractor responsiveness and, I might add, keeping the costs
down, which was what I think we have seen over and over again
when you have competition and a more robust industrial base.
So, I wonder if you might address those concerns that I
have.
Mr. Van Buren. Well, the issue of the alternate engine is
clearly a case of constrained resources. And currently, in our
defense budget, we feel that we do not have the resources to
fund the alternate engine. The monies need to be put on higher
priority programs.
Secondarily, the issues of stability in the current engine,
the F135, it is performing very well. It is very mature. There
have been no major problems in the flight test program to-date.
And I would say that the JPO [Joint Program Office] has
concluded a fixed-price type contract with Pratt and Whitney on
that engine, and that they appear to be working well to get the
cost price down.
Mr. Shuster. Then you would agree that, in the short term,
it is a $430 million--or a $430 billion savings is what we are
going after. But the long term, you do agree that there would
be--the cost would be bear out, it would be neutral, or it
would be the same cost by having the two engines, and reduce,
according to General Heinz, operational risks?
Mr. Van Buren. I do not agree with General Heinz on the
operational risk. What I will say in the near term is that it
is an expenditure of well over $2 billion, approaching $3
billion, funds that we currently do not have.
Mr. Shuster. And again, we are going to have--in 25 years
it appears we will have 95 percent of our fighter fleet will be
the F-35. That is correct?
Mr. Van Buren. A considerable portion of our fighter fleet
for the Air Force. I would let the Navy speak to the force
structure. But for the Air Force, certainly, the F-35 will
become the largest element of our force structure.
And I would say that the challenge that we have is to get
to the ``should-cost'' numbers, aggressively working at the
reduction in the per-unit costs, not only for the engine, but
also for the airframe.
Mr. Shuster. So, one engine you are willing to make the
bet--95 percent of the Air Force's fleet. Having that one
engine, you are confident that that is not going to cause an
increase in operational risk when you have that kind of--we are
going to rely on that single engine.
Mr. Van Buren. I am confident with this engine.
Mr. Shuster. And you talked about unit cost. Economies of
scale dictate that the more you produce, generally, it drives
cost down. But yet, we continue to decrease the numbers that we
are purchasing.
And you are certain, or you feel certain that that is not
going to drive up the cost per unit, if we reduce the quantity,
and we continue to reduce the quantity that we contract to
produce?
Mr. Van Buren. Well, I will say that that particular
factory in Middletown, Connecticut, is also responsible for
producing F119 and F117 engines for F-22 and C-17 fleet, and
also will be producing the engines for our KC-46A tanker.
So, we are confident with the situation up in Connecticut.
Mr. Shuster. But when you are switching over assembly
lines, they are not the same engine. Correct?
Mr. Van Buren. No. They go in parallel lines----
Mr. Shuster. Right.
Mr. Van Buren [continuing]. Coming through the factory.
Mr. Shuster. Well, again, most economics I have studied,
that when you reduce the units, you are going to drive up--or
when you reduce the number you order, you are going to drive up
the unit costs. And even if a plant is producing an engine, it
is a different engine. Every time you switch over, it seems to
me, there is going to be an increase in costs.
So, I have a great concern that we are going with one
engine. I know the House just recently voted to go with one
engine.
But again, with the reliance on the F-35 that we are going
to be placing on it with 95 percent of the Air Force fleet,
with our allies moving in that direction, again, I just think
it is--in the short term, I think we are making a mistake by
going with one engine. And I hope that as we move down the
road, we can change that policy, because again, I think there
are so many benefits to having a competitive program.
And this Administration has said about going out and being
competitive and transparent, yet we have seen time after time
they want to go to sole sourcing on many different items, not
just in the Defense Department, but across the government,
which I think is the wrong direction to take.
I see my time has expired. I thank the chairman and thank
the gentleman for yielding from New Jersey.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Van Buren, flight testing for the F-35 began in 2006.
Is that correct?
Mr. Van Buren. Yes, I think so.
Mr. McIntyre. All right. So, that means you have been
testing for over 4 years now, going on 5. Is that correct?
Mr. Van Buren. Very limited testing early on. I think this
past year was the preponderance of the testing, and we are
roughly doubling, as I remember, the number of flight test
sorties this year from last year.
Mr. McIntyre. Can the current aircraft fly throughout this
specified envelope?
Mr. Van Buren. Admiral.
Mr. McIntyre. Admiral Venlet, you are welcome to help
answer, if you need.
Admiral Venlet. Yes, sir. The envelopes are being expanded
as we speak.
Just for scale, we have roughly 550 flights under our belt
now, and we are approaching 900 total flight hours. The
Technical Baseline Review assessed that it would take up to
7,700 flights to complete developmental tests on all three
variants, including the mission systems, which we will take out
into 2016.
So, as a matter of scale of how much flight test is behind
us and how much is ahead of us, roughly 900 hours behind us,
reaching for--excuse me. I mixed hours and flights.
So, 550 flights behind us, 7,700 flights to attain.
Mr. McIntyre. What are the specific reasons that after 4
years of flight testing, that the F-35 is still not cleared to
fly throughout the specified envelope? Can you tell us--one,
two, three, four--what those specific reasons are?
Admiral Venlet. Developmental flight test incrementally
opens an envelope. It does not begin with a full envelope at
the beginning, sir. So, we know what envelope is required for
the commencement of training by fleet ops. And so, our testing
is focused on progressing to that size of envelope for all
three models--Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.
You are casting a view of the length of time we have been
in flight tests, sir, the first--there was only one test that
we called it AA-1, that was flying for the first couple of
years. So, it was one struggling airplane not accumulating very
much flight time, nor was it prepared or instrumented to expand
the envelope.
So, we really have only begun to expand the envelope in
this near the end of 2010. We will do so rapidly in 2011 and
2012.
I don't make excuses for that. I just say what it was.
Mr. McIntyre. Hasn't the F135 engine contributed to the
delays in the flight testing and the restrictions in the flight
envelope?
Admiral Venlet. Specifically, we had a characteristic
called screech in the afterburner that caused us to have to
avoid certain portions of the flight envelope, but that did not
slow us down from going to other points in the envelope to make
progress, sir. We are fixing--we are putting kits in so that
the aircraft can go back and catch that up, sir.
Mr. McIntyre. If you can tell me also, Mr. Van Buren, the
Air Force variant, you have said, has been performing very
well.
So, then, the question becomes, why slow down by cutting
production by 57 aircraft over the FYDP [Future Years Defense
Program], and potentially dramatically increasing the cost per
unit?
Mr. Van Buren. Well, the reduction in the recurring number
of jets to be built was caused by the need to more robustly
fund the development program. And so, resources on the order of
$4.5 billion were put into the budget between the 2011 budget
and the 2012 budget to fully fund that testing that needed to
be done, software development that the Admiral mentioned, and
to finish the program off in 2016.
Mr. McIntyre. How much per unit is it going to increase the
cost over the FYDP?
Mr. Van Buren. Our plan is to continuously reduce the per-
unit cost from LRIP 4 and beyond on a fixed-price type basis.
Mr. McIntyre. Right. But during the FYDP, how much will it
increase the cost per unit?
Mr. Van Buren. Well, we do not know that. I think that will
be a product of our ``should-cost'' activity. And we have not
received our proposal yet on LRIP 5. And that is our task, is
to robustly reduce the price for all of these variants.
Mr. McIntyre. I hope that can be achieved. I share with Mr.
Shuster the same concern, and with Mr. Bartlett, that
government studies have shown that the alternative engine would
bring down the cost over the life of the program for the F-35.
And I am very concerned that we be responsible with taxpayer
money, and that we also have an opportunity to increase job
opportunity, which the alternative engine will do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to follow up a bit on the one-versus-two engine
issue, as well.
I have no dog in the hunt, so it has nothing to do with my
district whatsoever. I am just interested in getting the best
results for the taxpayer.
And it is interesting. This is the only issue that I have
dealt with in the over 2 years I have been on the Hill in which
both sides claim the same ground, and that is savings.
The people who are for one engine say that we are going to
save money. The people who say we are for two engines say we
are going to save money. So, both sides are using the same
rationale.
The best I can understand about this is that we are really
looking at different budget windows, that one-engine proponents
say we are going to save money early on, because we are not
investing in that research and development. But then,
proponents of two engines say, in out-years, that is where the
savings are going to be, because we will have two sources and,
therefore, we will have competition.
So, is this really, by going with one engine, are we really
in essence saving money in the short term in order to actually
end up spending more money in the long term?
And I will open to anyone in the panel who would like to
answer that question.
Mr. Van Buren. Again, we are constrained on resources here.
In the near term we know that that would be some cost, and we
do not feel that that is in our taxpayers' interest.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. Anyone else like to tackle that
question?
Mr. Sullivan. I guess, from our point of view as an
uninterested observer, if you will. You know, when we looked at
this issue--it has been a few years ago--we made a number of
assumptions. So, we did really a rather theoretical look at the
impact of competition. And I think it does, more or less, boil
down to near term and long term, which, you know, can be
interpreted many different ways.
But I believe where the Department stands now, is that they
feel that they are in a short-term affordability crunch, and
they are not willing to invest what is now probably somewhere
between $2.5 and $3 billion in order to see if they can recoup
that and more down the road.
When we did our study, we found it reasonable to assume
that over the long haul, over a 40-year buy of engines, if you
competed them annually, you would achieve a return on
investment that would exceed the investment.
Dr. Fleming. And I appreciate your honesty in that
response.
Do you have--and I know this is an off-the-top-of-your-head
estimate--what the savings might be in the long term as
compared to the $2 billion or $3 billion in the short term?
Mr. Sullivan. We do not have a number for that. But what we
did was we looked at--we used as a model the Great Engine War.
I do not know if you are familiar with that, but it was the
result of the competition that was infused into the F-15, F-16
engine programs.
And it was done as a result of the--the prime engine maker
was not being responsive. Reliability was lacking. Cost was
going up on the engines. And it was a sole source buy.
So, the Air Force at that time brought in competition and
saw cost reductions--initially, a great deal of cost reductions
as the competition kicked in. And then, through the program,
was very happy, not only with the financial results of that,
but also with the--they got much more responsiveness from both
contractors, and reliability went up.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. I appreciate that answer.
Then, would it make sense that down the road another year
or two, we get our budgets in order, we are winding down our
conflicts, perhaps we are able to invest that money. Would it
make sense to open up a second-source engine at a later date?
Mr. Van Buren. It does not make any sense to us. And we are
comfortable with the efficiencies of having a single source. We
find the contractor responsive. We find the costs coming down
in a fixed-price environment. And there are no major technical
issues.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. Okay, well, that being said, I thank
you, gentlemen, and I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And as the chairman said earlier on, thank you, gentlemen,
for the work you do, that obviously, this program is very
important to our Nation. And obviously, we have had some issues
with this program.
And I am going to go through some numbers that have been
repeated. I know the chairman said these, and others have
referred to them. But I think it is important we not forget
this as we assess where we are in the development of the F-35.
In the 10th year of development, that we started out with
projected cost of $233 billion, is now up to $382 billion. By
rough math, that is a 65 percent increase. We have cut the
number of planes we are going to purchase by 400.
In 2007, Congress appropriated and authorized 90, I
believe, airplanes, none of which have been delivered. We were
looking for 32 this year.
We had less than 10 percent of the flight training
completed that we wanted to. Referencing back to what Secretary
Gates said in August 2009, that the rough spots are behind us,
that we are moving forward. But yet, it seems like we have
moved from 2014 to 2018, in terms of when we expect the
production to be completed.
From the authorization of 2007, we are now 15 months behind
schedule. And once again, we are talking about the first
production plane to be delivered next month.
And, Mr. Van Buren, I do find a lot of concern in my mind
with your saying, short term, this is the best option for us
with the single engine, when this program is anything but short
term in nature. We are talking about 95 percent of our fighter
fleet. We are talking about years of development leading to
years that this will be an operational plane.
There is nothing short-term about this.
Mr. Sullivan, we have heard the words, and we have talked
about that the F135 engine, I believe, that the manufacturers
reached that point to declare an ISR [Initial Services
Release]. They are ready to go into production.
But my understanding is that they also asked for $1 billion
more for development, changes, whatever. It sounds like we are
anywhere but ready to go into production when you ask for $1
billion more.
We have made words aplenty as to where we are. Where do
words stop and we can be able to say specifically, this is what
we have got to look for to be able to say we are on a
production schedule that is meaningful, and that the
projections we are making in terms of cost and delivery and
expectations are being met? What are the key things we should
be looking for other than just projections and words?
Mr. Sullivan. From our perspective, we believe the
restructure that they just went through was very comprehensive.
So, I think you are getting somewhere close to a point where
you are ready--you know, you are beginning to feel like you
could go to production.
However, until the flight test program, and for that
matter, until the models and simulation that they have are
accredited, and most of the development issues in testing are
further along, we believe that right now, that the aircraft is
too immature--and the engines are too immature--to go to
production. I do not know. Maybe the program has more insight
on that.
Mr. Kissell. Well, and Admiral--or Mr. Van Buren, you know,
we talk about going to production. But yet, we are not there.
And so, where are we in terms of going to production and
actually being able to have, you know, these airplanes rolling
out and meeting the needs that we have?
Mr. Van Buren. Congressman, I think one of the biggest
issues that affected the program was a high-level, a change
traffic that occurred, notably in the first part of 2009. And
it took the program some bit of time, delaying deliveries, to
absorb that change traffic.
If you look at the metrics on the production line with
regard to travel, work and span times, and the other, the new
changes that are occurring, it has come down significantly. So,
I can say that the production maturity is far better than it
was 2 years ago.
That is not to say, though, that there is a lot of work,
there is a lot of flight test ahead of us and discovery. And
that is why I think the changes that were made in the
restructure were very prudent to reduce that concurrency, and
produce the aircraft at a lower rate of production, which would
allow the Admiral and the team to make sure that we had a much
more mature product coming down that production line.
Mr. Kissell. Okay. Thank you, sir. Thank you, gentlemen,
once again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for testifying.
I did hear about the issue with the testing. What was that,
the end of last week, where you had to ground the fleet? You
say you are going to be up in the air today? Is that correct?
Admiral Venlet. We flew yesterday, sir, with AF1 at
Edwards.
Mr. Critz. And no recurring problem with----
Admiral Venlet. No, sir. The generator configuration is
different in the jets that are released for flight. And so,
that is why they are flying.
Mr. Critz. Okay, good.
Now, there have been advertisements in local newspapers,
and I have heard different figures. The Pratt Whitney engine is
how many billion dollars over budget right now?
There is an advertisement that says it has $3.9 billion
cost overruns. Can you put a number on what is the real number?
What is the real number of the cost overrun on the engine?
Admiral Venlet. The contract for the F135 has a scope that
includes the integration into the aircraft that is not on the
F136. So, the size of the scope of work for the two contracts
is so different.
There was a reference to adding more money to that
contract. We have talked about the Technical Baseline Review,
that looked at the work to go, sir, and the additional flights
from 5,500 in the old plan, the 7,700 in the new plan--5,800
to--it is an 1,800-flight increase.
There was a need to buy more spares to support that
extension. So, it was not related to a deficiency in the F135
as much a preponderance of that money is to support the
extension in the flight test. We were going to fly 12 aircraft
in test. We are now going to fly 18.
There was $470 or $480 million that the Technical Baseline
Review assessed that was needed to address the integration of
the STOVL issues that are not unique to the F135, sir. There is
the lift-fan, drive shaft, clutch, roll-post heating.
Addressing those technical issues, there are material solutions
in hand.
So, the original F135 contract--I would go through my notes
here, but I--it is currently projected with these cost
additions to be about 8.2.
So, I haven't got the beginning portion in my head to give
you a good delta in that growth, sir.
Mr. Critz. So, cost additions are $8.2 billion?
Admiral Venlet. No, that is the total of the entire
contract----
Mr. Critz. The entire, right, right.
Admiral Venlet [continuing]. From the beginning of 2002 to
the----
Mr. Critz. And to separate out if the engine--now, you said
you went from 5,500--5,800 to 7,700. What drove that additional
flight?
Admiral Venlet. It was not engine-related, uniquely, sir.
It was the entire scope of the program.
There were four characteristics of the growth in the test.
The planned work was judged to be underestimated in cost and
schedule. There was work that was not in the test program that
was necessary to address risks that we saw.
There was the schedule extension that needed to just pay
for the more time of flight test and the people involved. And
then, there was no reserve.
So, those are the four characteristics that go in. And that
is across the entire scope of work, aircraft and engine, sir.
Mr. Critz. Mr. Sullivan, you wanted to say something?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir. I think the original contract, the
development contract, began at $4.8 billion. And it is now $8.2
billion, so it is a $3.4 billion increase.
Mr. Critz. But that is systemwide. That is not just the
engine.
Mr. Sullivan. That is the engine.
Mr. Critz. That is the engine.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Critz. Oh, so there is a $3.4 billion--oh.
Well, the reason I bring it up is that, you know, we had a
presidential helicopter that got cancelled, because it was
around $3 billion spent, and nothing to show for it. Then we
just had an EFV program that was cancelled, that was around $3
billion.
And, you know, we are at this magic number here, $3.4
billion creep. You know, obviously, that seems to be a magic
number on your side of the equation as to when we have got
problems.
Of course, we have issues with it, too, when it grows
exponentially like that, especially when we are told there is
not enough money in the budget to fund an alternate engine, but
we have got a $3.4 billion increase in the engine that we are
buying.
One other question, and I do not have much time left. But I
saw where there was about $1 billion cost increase in
development, and $600 million was for extra flight test
engines. I am trying to figure this out.
There were 15 test planes. And then I imagine you buy a
couple extra engines, just in case. And I am curious why you
have to buy more.
Admiral Venlet. The test program did not have spare engines
in it. It did not have enough spare components and support to
carry it through. That was one of the areas that was judged
underestimated and underresourced. So, it was putting the
realism back in the work to go, sir.
Mr. Critz. All right. Thank you, and I yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster was previously yielded Mr. LoBiondo's time. And
now he is in the queue for his own time. After that, we move to
those who arrived at the committee after gavel fall.
Mr. Shuster.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I just, for the record, want to know, as Dr. Fleming
stated, I have no manufacturing facilities for this aircraft in
my district. What I care about is that we are doing what is
right for this Nation.
And the other thing Dr. Fleming said is, the argument is
not one engine versus two engines saves money. It is two
engines we believe is going to be neutral.
But it is going to give us, I think as Mr. Sullivan said,
as we learned from the F-16 and F-15, financially, it will
improve the response--the response of the supplier to the
Department of Defense is increased, and the reliability, the
quality got better.
So, that is what I care about, making sure we are doing--
making the right choice. Because, Mr. Van Buren, you and I, 25
years from now, are probably going to be long gone from public
service. And the Nation is going to have to live with what we
do with this F-35, being that it is 95 percent of our--it will
be 95 percent of the fighter fleet.
So, I hope we get it right. And I hope, if I am up here
today talking about this, I hope I am wrong, and I hope you are
right if we go with one engine, because the Nation will be at
risk.
But just as we go through this, we talk about cost overruns
and the schedule slipping. As Mr. Critz pointed out, $3
billion, and it seems to be the magic number. It is in
baseball, too. Three strikes and you are out.
So, you know, this is too important. And I know that when
we develop new systems, that that often happens, unfortunately.
But we need to make sure we do what is right for this Nation.
And Mr. Sullivan, a question to you is, has the program
been receptive to your advice in the past? When you have come
to them and laid it out to them what you think, have they been
receptive to it? Have they stiff-armed you? What has been their
reaction?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, we, you know, we maintain an auditor,
or a program relationship, which I think is good. But we make
recommendations. We typically make recommendations, make them
available to the program and the Department. And they weigh
those and either concur with our recommendations or non-concur.
And I would say, on this program, it has mostly been non-
concur.
Mr. Shuster. Right. That is unfortunate to hear.
And again, if you would, just so I make sure I am
completely straight on the record, the F-15 and the F-16, your
testimony today was that it was--that it was financially
positive, that the supplier was much more responsive to the
military?
Mr. Sullivan. The studies that we looked at--and they were
mostly Air Force and industry studies--showed that there was
much more--responsiveness went way up. Reliability went up.
Quality went up.
And the financial aspects of that, we looked at the first 4
years of competition to get the percentage savings that we saw.
So, we did not have the entire lifecycle of the engines. But it
was dramatic.
Mr. Shuster. And your general experience in these
situations, when you have competition, do you typically see
financially the cost has not necessarily stayed down, but it
does not grow as quickly, you get the responsiveness and you
get the reliability? Is that typically your response when--or
typically what you have seen when----
Mr. Sullivan. I think that is what competition is all
about. And in fact, the Department recently has tried to make
it more of a policy to infuse more competition into these
programs.
Mr. Shuster. Right. And what would you say going forward?
What would you recommend to the Department of Defense on the
Joint Strike Fighter program to see that past mistakes have not
been made? What recommendations would you put forward to them?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, right now, what we believe needs to be
done is that we think the restructure was a really good,
comprehensive restructure. But they need to continue to
maintain very close oversight. We think that software
management is something that they need to pay very close
attention.
We think that they should consider, with the problems that
the STOVL aircraft is having, I think the Department would be
good to try to manage that. You know, we have thought about
perhaps separating that out from the program, so that the other
two variants can get busy and get testing done.
Mr. Shuster. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. And, you know, the funding on this program is
going to be critical for the Department and for the Congress;
$11 billion on average over the next 20 years. We believe that
that should be very closely monitored and limited.
Mr. Shuster. Right. All right.
Well, thank you all. Thank you all for your testimony.
And again, I just would say in closing that I hope we are
making the right decision. I think it is a short-term decision
for a long-term system, that we desperately need to make sure
it is right.
So, again, thank you very much.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I noticed that a lot of the discussion on the new strike
fighter, but also a lot of testimony on the existing equipment
that we are using. And the structural integrity of the A-10, F-
15, F-16 and F-22 has been in question and, apparently, to be
dealt with.
As I was reading that, I was reminded of an incident
several decades ago in which a piece of equipment on my
family's ranch needed to be repaired. And an old blacksmith was
working on it, and he was beating the heck out of that piece of
steel with a ball-peen hammer.
About a few decades, several decades later, I ran into a
laser peening operation in coming out of Lawrence Livermore
Laboratories and now out in the public, which is apparently
beating the heck out of a piece of F-22 equipment, and
strengthening it.
That is what the blacksmith said. He said, why are you
doing that? And he said, because it makes it stronger.
And apparently, laser peening does the same thing, and has
been proven to be successful on the F-22. And the aircraft
structural integrity program has found it so.
So, my question to all of the generals behind you, as well
as those of you at the table is: Are you considering using the
laser peening process when you go about the repair or the
maintenance or the strengthening of certain structural
materials on the various jets that you are operating? For
example, Admiral, tailhooks, where I understand it is able to
increase the viability of a tailhook by two-and-a-half times.
General.
Or Admiral, and Mr. Van Buren.
Mr. Van Buren. Congressman, I would like to take that for
the record. I am unfamiliar with that. Perhaps some of the
generals in the second panel might be, but we will take that
for the record on the first panel.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 149.]
Mr. Garamendi. Well, now you know why I asked you, because
I figured you did not know about it.
Admiral.
Admiral Venlet. I would say that I do have confidence,
though, that the most modern methods of repair and improvement
are certainly going to be taken advantage of. But I am also not
familiar with laser peening specifically.
Mr. Garamendi. And I suspect most of the men and women
behind you are also not familiar.
Admiral Venlet. But that does not mean--the industry team
that we have and the technical experts in our government
systems commands might very well know about it, sir. I just
might not, so I could get back to you.
Mr. Garamendi. Now you know why I raised the question.
My next question goes to Mr. Sullivan. Could you tell me
the three most important things that can be done to hold down
the cost of the equipment that is being purchased by the
military? One, two, three.
Mr. Sullivan. Define requirements a lot better at the
beginning of the program. Take enough time early in the program
to ensure that you have a stable design for the full-up weapon
system through prototyping and good systems engineering
knowledge.
And limit the development time to a reasonable kind of a
horizon that people can actually think about where you are
getting added value capability to the field, but you are not
putting yourself in a position where you are trying to invent
and do trial-and-error on the fly--incremental, knowledge-based
acquisition.
Mr. Garamendi. Are we doing those three things?
Mr. Sullivan. You know, the Department and, in fact, the
Congress a couple of years ago passed a bunch of acquisition
reform. The Department has embraced it in its policies. I think
there are people within the government--I think this program is
beginning to think along those lines, but there is a long way
to go.
I do not know that I could name more than two or three
programs that I have seen that seem to be doing things in that
reasonable fashion. It really does all begin with setting
requirements properly.
Mr. Garamendi. What does it take to force the Department of
Defense to do those three things? Another law? Apparently, that
did not work.
Mr. Sullivan. That is a very good question, sir. You know,
I have been doing this for 25 years, and there are an awful lot
of stakeholders involved in the building of weapon systems. And
it can be a very complex proposition.
But I do not know that laws necessarily--we pass laws, we
pass legislation. I think at some point, it is a matter of
getting serious with the taxpayers' dollars.
Mr. Garamendi. Which is our responsibility.
Mr. Sullivan. That is all of our responsibilities--mine,
the rest of the people on the panel----
Mr. Garamendi. I was specifically referring to this
committee.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. When we say that it is not, I suppose we
should pull the plug.
Mr. Sullivan. It does not happen very often, and it might--
and decisions, tough decisions like that might make a
difference in changing the culture, yes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson, and then Mr. Turner.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you
for being here today.
And I am particularly interested in the F-35s, the F-35Bs.
I am very grateful that I know how important they are and to
our national security. And I represent communities that are
very supportive of their being placed; for example, the
Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station, and also, McEntire Joint Air
Base near Columbia.
And in fact, I just met with the mayor of Columbia, a new
mayor, Steve Benjamin, and long-time city councilwoman, Tameika
Isaac Devine. And we were talking about that we have got the
right climate.
It is a meteorological climate, so that people can train
almost 365 days of the year. And then, it is a climate where
there are warm, supportive people. So, keep that in mind as you
think of Beaufort and Columbia.
I am concerned, Mr. Van Buren. On January the 6th, the
Secretary of Defense stated he was placing the F-35Bs on a 2-
year probation. It is my understanding that, over this entire
year, the last 70 days, that the training, the test flights
have been really very, very positive.
The Commandant has stated, if this continues, he would like
to see the probation status lifted and the normal procurement
numbers restored as soon as possible.
And so, my first question is: What criteria was established
to measure its progress, and what is expected during the
probation period?
Mr. Van Buren. Well, I will let the Admiral get into a
little bit more detail. But at a top level, Congressman, I
would say that it is stability of the design that is not
impacted by further discovery, and flight test sortie
generations, flight test rates, is usually reliability, both in
the vehicle overall, as well as the propulsion system.
Mr. Wilson. And Admiral? Yes.
Admiral Venlet. Yes, the test program is structured to go
at full pace either with or without probation. It did not
affect the test program; it affected the procurement profiles.
But to inform the Department, the focus on STOVL unique
characteristics, sir.
So, we are sharing with the Commandant and Department
leadership that each of the technical issues in view right now,
which are preponderantly integration-related to the STOVL
characteristics of the airplane to land vertically and short
take-off. We believe we have engineering solutions to
everything in view today.
We are focusing on its weight, its key performance
parameter of its vertical lift bring-back. Every pound of
weight is, you know, needs to be offset by thrust. They all
line up in the same axis, so weight is very critical, and we
are focusing on weight.
We are focusing how it will perform around the ship--we
expect to get there this fall--both how it operates around the
ship and how it appears it will be able to be supported around
the ship, as well.
And then, its ability to work through these issues, and
then be judged by the systems command to be worthy of an
airworthiness flight clearance, to be flown by the fleet in an
unmonitored sense.
Those will be the characteristics in progress we will be
closely helping the Commandant keep track of.
Mr. Wilson. And I cannot wait for the American people to
see the STOVL capability and what that means in projecting our
military's ability to save lives and make a difference.
Mr. Van Buren, who will make the decision to remove the F-
35Bs from the probation, or take other actions?
Mr. Van Buren. I think it will be recommendations coming
from Admiral Venlet, through me to Dr. Carter, the Under
Secretary, and ultimately the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Wilson. And again, I just want to thank all of you for
your service.
But we are really looking forward. And the communities I
represent, they love the sound of freedom. And I cannot imagine
anything more meaningful to the people I represent than F-35Bs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I want to return to the issue of the alternate
engine. I know there has been some discussion. I know many
times people raise the issue of having an alternate engine as
being one of budgetary concerns.
I fall on the side of being concerned of not having an
alternate engine, that if we go to a single source, we could
have both problems with price escalation. If there are problems
that develop with the engine, you could have, certainly,
devastating consequences to a fleet that has a single source.
And when you look at the analyses that have occurred that
indicate that, you know, the Joint Strike Fighter will
ultimately comprise 95 percent of our fighter attack force
structure, I think you can become concerned about our
vulnerability.
But one of the concerns that I have is the manner in which
we discuss this issue. Since it is a financial issue, we talk
about it in terms of comparison. And when we talk about the 135
engine, the Pratt Whitney engine, people cast that discussion
in terms of cost efficiencies in production.
Admiral Mullen said you get savings by production levels.
He says, I think with the kind of production levels we will
talk about, that we are talking about, that they will come
down--meaning the cost amounts will come down.
Mr. Van Buren, I understand that you had stated in this
hearing that you are confident that the prices would not be
increased.
One of the concerns that I have when we have this
discussion is the difference between what is opinion, what is
judgment and what is fact upon which we can rely. When we talk
about the people who come before us, and even the people who
sit in our seats, these are decisions that will long last us as
we look to what the effects are.
So, I raise my inquiry to the issues of, to what extent is
it legally binding that these cost reductions will occur? Are
they projections that people are saying of savings and
production levels?
When we go to one and we talk about confidence levels that
prices will not be raised, is there currently--currently--any
legally binding way in which it can be enforced that we get
those cost savings? Or is this something that we are figuring
and projecting? Because I think it does figure into our overall
discussion.
Mr. Van Buren, would you like to start?
Mr. Van Buren. Surely. What we know in the way of fact is a
fixed-price contract that we have with Pratt for LRIP 4. What
we know is that there is substantial cost that will be required
to continue the F136 development.
So, our plan is to continue that cost reduction on the F135
on a fixed-price type basis----
Mr. Turner. But excuse me. You said--but your fixed-price
contract, does it currently have a price reduction provision?
I mean, does it say, if you do not have 136, that your
costs are a different amount?
Mr. Van Buren. No. It is simply a contract with the
manufacturer on a fixed-price incentive fee type basis for the
quantity that we are procuring in LRIP 4.
Mr. Turner. And so, it already figures in what Admiral
Mullen is saying that he believes they are going to be
production savings and what you say are going to be confident
of no cost increases, and that these cost reductions will be
delivered.
Mr. Van Buren. There is a ceiling or a cap on the price
that the government would pay for those engines.
Mr. Turner. Does that contract currently require the cost
savings that we have heard as a result of the increased
production that is expected? Or will it have to be
continually--will it have to be renegotiated?
I mean, my understanding, my expectation is that there is
going to have to be additional negotiation and documents that
occur, that your current primary, underlying document does not
take into consideration the full timeline of production or the
increases in production, and deliver the cost savings that are
projected, or that you are expecting.
Is that correct? Or does your current document deliver
those cost savings?
Mr. Van Buren. This contract is simply for the production
quantity for the fiscal year 2010 procurement of engines.
Mr. Turner. That is what I thought. So, when we talk about
what the cost comparison is going to be, and the budget effects
for future years, we are talking about projections and
expectations, not things that are absolute as we go forward
with these cost comparisons. Am I accurate in characterizing it
that way?
Mr. Van Buren. Well, what is absolute would be the
nonrecurring investment to fund a second engine. That is a
known fact.
Mr. Turner. The cost per engine, though, is not known.
Correct? I mean, you cannot tell me for every year what it is
going to be. It is an expectation.
Mr. Van Buren. Well, as I mentioned in my----
Mr. Turner. The cost, it is a projection. Is that correct?
Mr. Van Buren. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the
challenge for us, our responsibility, our commitment to the
taxpayer and to all of you, is to have to work very diligently
on the cost reduction for this program--not just with the
engine, but also with the airframe.
Mr. Turner. But which is yet to be done. My other portion
of the point on this is for the issue of the cost for the 136.
There are, of course, a significant number who have an opinion
that, in the long run, those will actually be cost savings.
But I appreciate your distinctions here and your
explanation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
In the interest of full disclosure, I would like to note
that, to the best of my knowledge, the only interest in my
district relative to the engine is the 135, the prime engine. I
think that they will do a better job if there is a 136.
Some of my questions have been asked, not all of them. But
I will submit most of them for the record. I would just like to
ask two questions now.
Mr. Van Buren, wearing your OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] hat, Secretary Carter indicated last September that
dual-source procurement for the littoral combat ship would not
be ``real competition.''
By December of 2010, Secretary Carter reversed his
position, because of the lower-than-expected ship price--this
is what competition does, gentlemen--bid and endorsed dual-
source procurement for the LCS [littoral combat ship].
In justifying this reversal and stating dual-source
procurement of LCS is different than dual-source procurement of
the F-35 engines, the Pentagon has indicated LCS is different,
because all of the development costs of the LCS have been
expended.
But this year's budget request for development costs for
LCS is $1.9 billion--$785 million higher than last year.
Can you explain this contradiction to the Pentagon's
statement and explain why the LCS acquisition model does not
apply to F-35 engines?
Mr. Van Buren. Mr. Chairman, I am not equipped to discuss
the LCS. That is not in an area of the Air Force's portfolio.
So, I would like to take that for the record and have the
Department get back to you on that issue.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 149.]
Mr. Bartlett. Admiral.
Admiral Venlet. Sir, LCS strategy is beyond the vein of my
awareness or ability to speak to. I am sorry.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Sullivan. I think I am in the same boat, your honor. I
would not be able to speak intelligently to compare those two
different acquisitions.
Mr. Bartlett. To whom should we address this question, so
that we can get an answer? If we ask this question for the
record, will somebody answer the question for us?
Mr. Van Buren. Well, Secretary Stackley, the acquisition
executive of the Navy, reporting up through Dr. Carter, are the
most knowledgeable of this topic.
Mr. Bartlett. Are any of you in that chain of command?
Mr. Van Buren. No.
Mr. Bartlett. No? Is anybody in the second panel in that
chain of command?
Mr. Van Buren. I will have to----
Mr. Bartlett. I see a hand raised behind you. Okay, we will
ask that question again in the second panel. And if you cannot
answer it, sir, we hope you will go up the chain of command and
get us an answer for the record.
Okay, my second question. In your statement--this is
Admiral Venlet--in your statement, you indicated a fixed-price
contract has been signed with the contractor for $3.9 billion
for 32 aircraft for fiscal year 2010. The amount appropriated
for this--2010 was over $11 billion.
Given the yet-to-be-determined contract amount for the F-35
engine, because the fiscal year 2010 contract has yet to be
signed, how much of the total fiscal year 2010 appropriation is
still subject to cost-plus determination?
Admiral Venlet. Yes, sir. We contract on each year's
procurement fixed-price incentive for the aircraft, and we
contract for the sustainment portion where we buy simulators,
support equipment and sustainment activity at cost-plus, since
we are still early in.
So, the math--the difference between--you cited a budget
number and an aircraft fixed-price engine contract number in
the different--in the space between those two, there is a
portion for cost-plus sustainment activity on the contract. But
there are other costs in there, as well. So, I do not have that
split out, sir.
But there is a sustainment that is cost-plus, and it will
be on the next couple of years' contract.
Mr. Bartlett. We have eight or so foreign countries that
are interested in buying this plane. I know that some of them--
I do not know how many of them--are distressed that there may
be only one engine.
To your knowledge, are any of these sales at risk, if we do
not have a second engine?
Because if they are, then that simply drives up the cost of
our planes, because we have got to spread the development costs
across the universe of planes that are sold. If fewer are sold,
ours cost more.
Wouldn't just some minimal drop in foreign sales way offset
any potential savings that you hope to achieve by this short-
term not supporting the second engine?
Mr. Van Buren. Mr. Chairman, I talk to many of the partner
nations regularly. I know of no risk based on the engine issue.
Mr. Bartlett. I talked to one of them, and they were
considerably concerned--I don't know if concerned to the point
that they are not going to buy. And as the price goes up, we
risk that some of them will not buy.
And if they are concerned about a second engine, it would
not take very many planes not sold to increase our cost, to
wipe out any miniscule savings that you could achieve by not
funding the second engine currently.
I have one other question. We have a vote on, so we will
recess very shortly, and then we will come back and seat the
second panel.
Ultimately, 95 percent of all of our fighter aircraft in
all of our Services, we hope to be this airplane.
What percent of the fighter aircraft of our allies will be
this plane? Do you have any knowledge of that?
I do not know whether it will be big or small. But whatever
number it is, I think it indicates a real risk.
Should there be problems with the engine--there are
occasionally problems with engines, and we have to ground the
fleet that uses that engine. So far, that has not been a
problem, because we have not had 95 percent of our fleet the
same airplane. So, if one plane is down because of engine
troubles, we have several other airplanes. That will not be the
case in the future.
Not only will a second engine provide competition and drive
the cost down and the quality up, but shouldn't we also have
the second engine in some of our planes, so that we will not be
at risk of having only 5 percent of our planes available in an
emergency, should there be an engine problem?
Mr. Van Buren. Mr. Chairman, you asked about the partner
nations. I would like to take that for the record.
I think it widely varies from country to country. For some
countries, JSF is a very high percentage of their future force
structure; for others, not as much.
So, I would like to take that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 149.]
Mr. Bartlett. So, it is not only us who would have 95
percent of our planes grounded, but a significant percentage of
the fighter aircraft, and our allies would also be grounded.
Correct?
That does not give you some pause that we might be in a
situation where we desperately need fighter aircraft, and
neither we nor our allies have very many?
Mr. Van Buren. Mr. Chairman, I think it is an issue of
risk. And I think the opinion of the Department right now is
that the engine is performing very well. It is in a very mature
state, and the risk is very low.
Mr. Bartlett. Those are very qualitative terms, sir. The
slippage in the increased cost would indicate that some would
not concur with those terms.
Well, I am just having trouble understanding how it is in
our long-term best interest to save a few dollars now, and put
ourselves at risk for the future of having increased cost and a
lesser quality of engine.
Competition always makes things better and cheaper. And
having only one engine, so that if that is grounded,
essentially our whole fleet is grounded for all of our
Services--and a major part of the fleet for all of our allies.
I would hope that would give you considerable pause as we
look to the future. And I think that this short-term expediency
of saving a few billion dollars now, that we will pay dearly
for that in the future.
Thank you all very much for your testimony. We will recess
now for votes, and we will return so quickly as we can.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Bartlett. Admiral Skinner, please proceed with your
opening remarks, followed by General Robling, Admiral Floyd,
General Shackelford and General Carlisle.
STATEMENT OF VADM W. MARK SKINNER, USN, PRINCIPAL MILITARY
DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION), U.S. NAVY; LT. GEN. TERRY G.
ROBLING, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR
AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND RADM KENNETH E. FLOYD, USN,
DIRECTOR OF THE AIR WARFARE DIVISION, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Skinner. Chairman Bartlett and Ranking Member
Reyes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is our
honor to appear before you today to discuss the Department of
the Navy's aviation procurement programs.
Testifying alongside me today are Lieutenant General Terry
Robling, Deputy Commandant for Marine Corps Aviation; and Rear
Admiral Kenneth Floyd, the Navy's Director of Air Warfare.
We note the absence of Representative Gabby Giffords, and
send her and our shipmate, Mark, our best.
With the permission of the committee, I propose to keep our
oral remarks brief and submit our combined statement for the
record. That includes the specific questions requested by the
subcommittee.
Mr. Bartlett. Without objection.
Admiral Skinner. The Department of the Navy's fiscal year
2012 aviation budget request provides Navy and Marine Corps
aviation forces capable of meeting the wide spectrum of threats
to our Nation, both today and in the future.
This year, the Department of the Navy will procure 137
fixed wing aircraft, 66 rotary wing aircraft and 20 unmanned
air vehicles, for a total of 223 aircraft.
In the past year, we deployed the EA-18G in an
expeditionary role to Iraq; the E-2D successfully completed an
operational assessment; our MV-22 fleet reached 100,000 flight
hours; the AH-1 Zulu successfully completed operational test
and entered full-rate production; and the CH-53K completed its
critical design review.
And with the leadership of Congress, we signed a multiyear
procurement contract for the F/A-18 and EA-18G, which saved the
taxpayers $605 million, and we are moving forward on the next
MH-60 multiyear procurement.
The Department of the Navy has emerged more confident that
the essential F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program has been
positioned for success.
Taking into account the restructuring of the program
approved by Secretary Gates last December, we reviewed our
tactical aircraft inventory projections and initiated strong
steps to mitigate the strike fighter shortfall to the
operational commanders by increasing F/A-18E/F procurement
quantity by 41 aircraft, and including funds to extend the life
of 150 legacy Hornets.
By doing this, we anticipate a manageable shortfall of
approximately 65 aircraft that peaks in fiscal year 2018.
We are integrating Dr. Carter's Better Buying Power
initiatives, and are implementing ``should cost'' parameters
into our programs early, where it can make the most difference,
such as with the E-2D.
We are changing our approach to contract types and
structures, to ensure that we get the most product for the
warfighter. We are targeting affordability, both in procurement
and sustainment.
It is our privilege to testify before you today, and we
look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Skinner, General
Robling, and Admiral Floyd can be found in the Appendix on page
91.]
Mr. Bartlett. Do I understand that you have made a combined
statement for all of the group?
Admiral Skinner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Reyes.
Oh, is there another to testify? It was not clear to me for
how many you were speaking, sir.
Who wishes to testify?
Admiral Skinner. General Robling and----
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, thank you. Okay, go ahead, sir.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARK D. SHACKELFORD, USAF, MILITARY
DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR
ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR FORCE; AND LT. GEN. HERBERT J. CARLISLE,
USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND
REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Shackelford. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member
Reyes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
calling this hearing and for the opportunity to provide you
with an update on the Air Force's tactical aviation programs.
I am joined this afternoon by Lieutenant General ``Hawk''
Carlisle, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and
Requirements.
We acknowledge Congresswoman Giffords' absence this
afternoon, and wish her a speedy recovery.
Today, the Air Force is fully engaged in operations across
the globe, engaged in overseas contingency operations and
providing support to the combatant commanders to enable them to
successfully execute their missions.
In the coming year, we will assess how the fiscal year 2012
budget aligns with our standing operational requirements, along
with the upcoming needs of the entire Air Force.
We understand your focus today is on the Air Force
investment plans to ensure that conventional strike, air
superiority and rotary wing capabilities are adequate for
executing the national military strategy with an acceptable
level of risk.
Our rapidly aging aircraft fleet drives our urgent need to
balance between acquiring new inventory with sustaining our
current fleet.
We look forward to discussing how we can match the
requirements with available resources in order to execute the
national military strategy.
Lieutenant General Carlisle and I thank the subcommittee
for allowing us to appear before you today, and for your
continued support of the Air Force. I will request our combined
written statement be submitted for the record. We look forward
to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Shackelford and
General Carlisle can be found in the Appendix on page 123.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Without objection, all of the written statements will be in
the record in full.
Thank you very much for your testimony.
Now, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for being here with us and for
your service, and most of all for your gracious comments about
Congresswoman Giffords. We really appreciate that. And I know
it really makes a difference to her staff and family members,
as well. So, thank you. Thank you very much for that.
I have a question for General Carlisle, General Robling and
Admiral Floyd. The committee has been told many times that the
F-35 is a must-have weapon system for the future.
I guess the most basic question is: Why is that the case?
What about the F--what about the F-35, I guess, do we have in
order to succeed in the future? What is it about the F-35?
What specific threats are we most concerned about? And how
does the F-35 counter those threats?
And the third one is: How does the F-35, which is a
relatively short-range fighter, fit into DOD's overall need for
the longer range systems to operate in regions such as the
Pacific?
In whatever order you wish to take that.
General Carlisle. Thank you, Congressman Reyes. I will
start, if that is okay.
Clearly, the Air Force believes that the move to a fifth-
generation capability is paramount as we move into the future.
And that is to be able to operate aircraft and have freedom of
action across the range of operations, military operations that
would be required of us.
We know that our adversaries, or potential adversaries out
there, are continuing to develop and field anti-access/area
denial capability, and that fifth-generation ability to
penetrate those areas and still maintain freedom of maneuver
and, if required, to hold targets at risk in an anti--or an
area denial type environment. So, that is really the reason
that we see it.
And we see that those systems are proliferating throughout
the world, and they are continuing--as very recently, the J-20
roll-outs.
You look at the short-range and medium-range ballistic
missiles, surface-to-air capability and an integrated air and
missile defense capability from our adversaries, we have to
have that fifth generation to be able to maintain freedom of
action in those environments.
With respect to the legs, obviously, very much refueling
aircraft and the ability to get it close and then refuel in and
out. Also, certainly in the case of the Air Force.
The announcement by the Secretary of Defense of the new
long-range strike family of systems, which is a family of
systems which includes communications, electronic attack, long-
range weapons, as well as a long-range penetrating bomber--all
aid our ability to penetrate airspace and to go deep, if
required, sir.
Mr. Reyes. And the specific threats and how the F-35 is
unique in that respect to counter them?
General Carlisle. Sir, I think that unique--would probably
be the adversary's advanced integrated air defense systems, SA-
20s and SAN-20s, HQ-9s, in particular, as well as the denial
capabilities, with respect to anti-satellite capabilities to
deny access, as well as trying to keep surface combatants away
from using anti-ship missiles, would be the three that would be
the most prominent, sir.
Mr. Reyes. Anybody else?
General Robling. Sir, I will just add, one of the things
you asked in addition was, what makes the F-35 a must-have?
I would say, over legacy aircraft right now, even at Block
2B and eventually Block 3, but even starting at Block B, what
you get out of the F-35 that you do not get out of legacy
aircraft is this very powerful, integrated sensor suite that is
really designed to--you know, centered around the digital
aperture system.
You get fused information displays. You get better joint
operability for data transmission and communications. You get
increased capability with your precision weapons, particularly
JDAM [Joint Direct Attack Munition] and AMRAAM [advanced medium
range air-to-air missile]-type missiles.
And all of that combined gives you an aircraft, really,
that is much more survivable, much more lethal and less
dependent on support aircraft, tanker aircraft and electronic
attack aircraft.
Mr. Reyes. I will yield back.
I do have some additional questions, Mr. Chairman, but I
will submit those for the record.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our panelists for being here today and for
your service to our Nation.
I have got two questions I would like to ask. First, we
have read a lot about the future of the Air Force's fighter
fleet. But I want to focus on a very specific portion of it
right now.
Due to the current Air Force recapitalization crisis, the
fiscal year 2012 budget request adds only about $15 million to
the design and development of structural and capability
modifications for the F-16 Block 40, 42, 50 and 52 fleet.
However, I believe a majority of the F-16s in the Air Guard
fleet are flying Block 30s, which also includes the 177th
Fighter Wing, which I represent. These aircraft are not in your
current plan for service life extension program.
My question is: How do you plan to maintain the air
sovereignty alert mission if these planes cannot fly, if you do
not provide the same modifications to the aircraft at our
National Guard wings? I think this is confusing and sends a
very bad message.
And the second question I have is that I have been
surprised by the reports that the Air Force is considering a
sole-source approach to buying helicopters to replace its fleet
of Hueys for the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform program.
I anticipate a competition would be a fair one; it would
not favor any one particular company or solution. And it is
puzzling to me why a decision has not been made to have this
competitively bid.
Given that the mission is U.S.-only, non-combat, non-
deployable, can we be assured that the Air Force is going to
give consideration to affordable solutions in this time of
budget crisis that are commercial, off-the-shelf, not in the
current inventory?
I think it would be a shame to waste what could be up to
billions-of-dollars buying something that is overkill, just for
the convenience that it is already in the Pentagon inventory.
Whoever would choose to----
General Carlisle. Thank you, Congressman. I will answer
your first question, and my friend, Shack, will answer your
second question, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay.
General Carlisle. The first one referenced the F-16s and
the ASA [air sovereignty alert] alert. The Air Force fully
funded the program for ASA alert, and clearly, that is our
primary mission is homeland defense, and we are committed to
that mission.
With respect to the service life extension and how we are
going to maintain that fleet, the Block 30, the pre-blocks as
we call them, Block 25, 30 and 32s, using structural
sustainment using O&M [Operations and Maintenance] funding,
those airplanes, our intent would be to fly those to the 8,000-
hour limit of those airplanes, which brings those airplanes out
into late in this decade and early in the 2020s.
We are going to do a service life extension program to
include structure and capability modifications for Block 40s
and 50s, the newest, most capable F-16s. And as F-35s start
coming off the line, we will move those Block 40s and 50s,
backfill in Block 25, 30 and 32 units.
So, the cascade of iron will be, as F-35s come in to both
the Guard and the Active Duty, then we will take the newest F-
16s that do have the SLEP [service life extension program]
modernization and both the end capability improvements, and
move those into the units that have the older aircraft, the
Block 25s, 30s and 32s, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Just a brief comment, if I could, that it
just seems that without the modifications, if the F-35
continues to slip, these F-16 Block 30s are made more
irrelevant and incapable of doing the mission. I would hope
somebody would consider that.
And for the second part of the question, General?
General Shackelford. Yes, sir. If I might just elaborate on
that for a second. The SLEP for the Block 40s or 52s leads to a
production kit buyout in the--just beyond this current FYDP.
That is prior to the time when the Block 30s--25, 30 and
32--are expected to time-out with their service life, which is
between 2018 and 2021.
So, we still have time in the future, if we need to go back
to those pre-blocks, to further modify them to pick that up. It
is too early to be putting that into the budget right now.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay.
General Shackelford. Now, regarding your question about
Common Vertical Lift Support Platform, clearly, there are a
number of vendors. We believe three or four different companies
are able to produce the type of helicopter that we are looking
for there. So, we have a wide range of options to choose from
as we finalize the acquisition strategy.
I expect that to be a competitive acquisition strategy, so
that we can take advantage of competition, and so that we can
get the best arrangement that we can for the Air Force and the
taxpayer.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay.
Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Shuster.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
My question, General Shackelford, on the Common Vertical
Lift Support Platform, the CVLSP, my understanding is that the
Air Force is considering--well, I guess in March, you are going
to come out with requirements on acquisition, the strategy. And
my understanding is that you are going to put out there a sole
source for the Huey helicopter replacement.
Can you confirm or deny it, that that is going to happen,
the sole-source contract?
General Shackelford. If you mean by a sole-source contract
selecting an existing helicopter in a sole-source situation,
that is not correct as a strategy.
Mr. Shuster. Okay.
General Shackelford. Per my just previous comment, there
are three or four different vendors that are able to produce a
helicopter to our requirement for Common Vertical Lift Support
Platform. We have a range of options.
At one extreme end is going to a sole-source vendor for an
existing capability, such as the H-60. That is not the
direction we are leaning towards. I expect we will go towards a
competitive strategy, which will give all of those vendors an
opportunity to compete.
Mr. Shuster. I am sorry. You said, for one of the platforms
you will go to an existing----
General Shackelford. No, sir.
Mr. Shuster. Okay.
General Shackelford. No, sir----
Mr. Shuster. There's going to be competition?
General Shackelford. It will be a competitive strategy, as
I understand it.
Mr. Shuster. And you view there are at least four vendors
out there that can meet the requirements.
General Shackelford. There are three to four that can meet
the requirement for CVLSP.
Mr. Shuster. Okay. That was my only question, so I yield
back.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Admiral Skinner, let me ask the question of you that I
asked of the previous panel. Can you explain the contradiction
to the Pentagon statement and explain why the LCS acquisition
model does not apply to the F-35 engine? If competition and two
LCS ships--those are pretty small classes, sir, compared to the
number of engines that we would be buying for these planes.
Can you explain why that is not a good model for F-35
engine procurement?
Admiral Skinner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
Secretary Mabus has stated that the littoral combat ship
procurement, we funded the research and development for both
variants of the littoral combat ship. And we also obtained the
data packages for both of those variants.
We have funded the research and development for one variant
of the F-35 engine, the F135. And the vast majority of the
research and development for the other variant of the F-35
engine, the F136, is in front of us.
I have seen the business case analysis. And it seems to be
compelling in that regard.
But those are the major differences between the procurement
of the littoral combat ship and the current procurement of the
F-35 fighter engine.
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, but there is still a meaningful amount
of development money to be expended yet in LCS, is there not?
Admiral Skinner. Well, we have both LCS-1 and LCS-2 are
currently afloat. LCS-1 has already made one appointment to
Southern Command.
So, to my knowledge, we have committed to fully funding the
research and development for both of those variants. And that
was all part of our acquisition strategy, and the purchase of
the design packages for both of those variants.
Mr. Bartlett. Why do we still have more money in this
year's budget for a development of the LCS than there was in
last year's budget? Is this for the ship itself? Or is it for
the mission packages?
Admiral Skinner. We have money in the budget for
procurement of the vessels themselves, and we are still
developing the mission packages.
But Mr. Chairman, I can get you more information on that
question, and take that question for the record and get back to
you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 149.]
Mr. Bartlett. Your budget request RDT&E [Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation] continues through 2011, 2012,
2013 and 2014 in decreasing amounts, from $226 million, $183
million, $110 million, $82 million, and up a little to $87
million in fiscal year 2015.
I was very supportive of buying both of the LCS ships.
The competition did what they were supposed to do. Each of
them believed that they had to be the low bidder, or they were
not going to be in the game anymore. So, they really sharpened
their pencils, and we got bids that were like $100 million less
than we expected, unexpectedly low numbers.
I did not think we had enough sea trials with these ships
to know which of those would be better for the multiple
missions that we are buying these ships for. And so, I was very
supportive of this dual buy.
And I am still wondering why this is not a good model for
procurement of the F-35 engine.
Admiral Skinner, the Department has increased its emphasis
on acquiring longer-range strike capabilities to address ever-
increasing anti-access/area denial threat environments. These
are obviously threat environments for the ships.
This was evident by the Navy's desire to field an Unmanned
Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike system by
2018, and the Air Force's plans to acquire a new long-range
penetrating bomber by mid-2020s.
I have a couple of questions and concerns relative to this.
First of all, this recent emphasis on the need for longer-range
strike systems changed the Department's thinking about its
requirements--that is, the quantity, the mix, the fielding
timeframes--for shorter-range fighter attack aircraft, such as
the Joint Strike Fighter.
Admiral Skinner. Mr. Chairman, the systems that you refer
to as the unmanned are the UCLASS [Unmanned Carrier-Launched
Airborne Surveillance and Strike] system, a surveillance and
strike system that we are going to put on our aircraft carriers
in the 2018 timeframe.
We have a two-part process in order to do that. We have a
current demonstration, the Navy Unmanned Combat Aerial System
demonstration, that we are performing to-date.
That system will operate off an aircraft carrier in the
2013 timeframe. What is unique about that is we will stop our
carrier operations to get that unmanned air vehicle on and off
our ships, and we will learn how to operate it from an arrested
landing and a catapult launch and airspace means.
All the knowledge that we gain from operating that unmanned
combat air system will be put into the UCLASS system, the
surveillance and strike system that you mentioned. And that
system will fly in an integrated fashion with our carrier air
wings in the 2018 timeframe.
With regards to the requirements part of your question, I
defer that part of the answer to Admiral Floyd.
Admiral Floyd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Regarding the requirements and whether there is anything
specific ongoing right now in the manned aircraft realm,
outside of our normal requirements review process every year,
the answer to that would be no.
We are focused on the carrier air wing and the mix of Joint
Strike Fighter and F/A-18 out into the future for our strike
requirements.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand that we are relooking at the mix
of short-range and long-range attack platforms, because of some
anti-access platforms that potential enemies have, such as the
Chinese anti-ship missile, which means that we need to stand
off a considerable distance that that weapon is available to
them.
I have a question relative to the future. You are
projecting the use of unmanned. That means you have not put a
man at risk, if you are going into a hostile environment. And I
think we need to move more in that direction.
But there are three capabilities that one needs to
consider. One is our ability to be stealthy--and we are pretty
good. But radars are getting better, and the air--or the
ground-to-air defenses are getting better.
With whom do you counsel to determine which of these
technologies will run faster? Will we be able to remain
invisible to them with our stealth? Or will their radars run
faster than stealth improvements, so that they can see us?
And what about these ground-to-air capabilities?
With whom do you counsel to determine which of these
capabilities will run the faster? And, therefore, what kind of
assets should we be developing for the future?
General Carlisle. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will start with an
answer on that.
I think that we look to all the agencies--obviously, DARPA
[the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], NASIC [the
National Air and Space Intelligence Center] with respect to
adversary capabilities and how well they are--how fast they are
developing their new systems--AFRL [the Air Force Research
Laboratory], the research laboratory.
We look at the T.R. [Technology Readiness] level of
different technologies, technology readiness levels of
different technologies. And we look at where we are at, and
what it has taken to get us to the position we are at with
respect to our capabilities and our potential adversaries and
where they are at, and what we assess to be their timeframe to
get there.
But I think, at the core of this, Mr. Chairman, is our
ability to integrate and operate jointly in a cross-domain
capability. Whether it is space, cyber or subsurface, surface
combatant, air combatants, it is our ability to operate in an
integrated--beyond joint--an integrated fashion and use
capabilities to exploit the adversary's weakness wherever that
is, to deny him use of those systems that he has developed and
put forth, so that we can achieve freedom of maneuver and gain
access to hold targets at risk when we want to and when we need
to.
Mr. Bartlett. I asked that question of the new director of
DARPA--you mentioned DARPA--Regina Dugan. I asked if they had
the capability to advise us on the projected improvement in
technology, so that we would know whether we were developing an
airplane that was just going to be cannon fodder for the
future, or would we be able to penetrate their defenses.
She said, yes, they did that kind of thing. And as an
example, she had with her an analysis they did of cyber, and
the malware and the defense-ware that we are developing.
It was a startling picture. The lines of code for malware
have not increased significantly over the years. But there has
been an exponential increase in the lines of code that we find
necessary to protect our computer systems.
If we cannot bend that curve, by-and-by, our computers will
be consumed with protecting themselves, and they will not be
able to do anything for us. And it is that kind of an analysis
that I hope we are able to make for these technologies.
Clearly, radar will get better. Clearly, we will be able to
do better with stealth. And clearly, there will be improvements
in ground-to-air defensive capabilities.
And again, I want to make sure that we are getting the best
counsel we have. And these are very long-range programs, you
know. It is going to be a decade or more before anything is in
the field when you start a program.
And when we get it in the field, is it already going to be
obsolete, because the defenses against it have run faster than
those developments? And you indicated that you counsel with
DARPA for this kind of thing?
General Carlisle. Yes, sir, we do. We take advantage of
what they are looking at. And again, NASIC and the entire I.C.,
intelligence community, as well as the research labs--
Livermore, Lawrence Livermore, AFRL--all the labs.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. We have a number of
questions that we need answers to for the record.
Let me turn to my colleague and ask him if he has
additional questions?
Mr. Reyes. Just for the record.
Mr. Bartlett. Just for the record. He has questions for the
record.
I have a number of questions. But rather than take your
time here, we will just submit those questions for the record.
I want to thank you very much for your testimony.
I want to note that I have been to the floor 50 times, I
think, exactly, to speak for an hour on energy. And if you
watch C-SPAN, you will notice that they pan the floor. There is
nobody out there.
But I need to know when I am at that microphone that there
are somewhere between a million-and-a-half and two-and-a-half
million people out there that are watching that. So, you are
talking kind of to an invisible audience.
We are doing quite the same thing today. There are a lot of
people out there watching. And this becomes a part of the
permanent record, and a lot of people will be poring over it in
the future.
So, thank you very much for your testimony. Thank you for
the service to your country.
And we will adjourn this hearing.
[Whereupon, at 2:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 15, 2011
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 15, 2011
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 15, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Van Buren. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 28.]
Mr. Van Buren. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 29.]
Mr. Van Buren. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 37.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES
Admiral Venlet. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 10.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Van Buren, Admiral Venlet, and Mr. Sullivan. [The information
was not available at the time of printing.] [See page 23.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 15, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Bartlett. Air Force witnesses before the subcommittee indicated
the Air Force intends to conduct a fair and open competition for CVLSP.
Can I assume that the Air Force will establish CVLSP requirements that
do not exceed the requirements, to avoid having to pay for more
capability than required for the CVLSP mission?
Mr. Van Buren. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. I understand the Air Force has two helicopter
modernization requirements, CSAR and CVLSP. The CSAR mission is a
demanding combat operation for which the Air Force originally intended
to buy the HH-47 heavy-lift Chinook helicopter. The CVLSP mission is a
non-deployable, non-combat mission performed today by UH-1 aircraft. Is
it correct to assume that these are two very different missions that
require a high-low mix of aircraft to ensure that the warfighter gets
what is truly required, as affordably as possible?
Mr. Van Buren. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. Can the Air Force assure the subcommittee that it
will run separate fair and open competitions for its Huey and its
Pavehawk replacement programs, given that they are such different
requirements?
Mr. Van Buren. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. On several occasions during your testimony on the
F135 engine you characterized the F135 engine as a ``mature'' engine.
Previously, the Department of Defense has informed the committee that
200,000 flight hours are required to achieve engine maturity. The F135
has accumulated approximately 1,000 flight hours. How can you
characterize the F135 as a ``mature'' engine?
Mr. Van Buren. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. In your March 15, testimony before the subcommittee
you indicated that the ``JPO has concluded a fixed price type contract
for the F135 engine.''
When was the contract signed?
What type of contract was signed?
What was the total value of the contract?
What percentage of the contract value was subject to cost plus
reimbursement?
What is the target value of the contract?
What is the ceiling price of the contract?
What is the cost share?
Mr. Van Buren. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 1a. Mr. Sullivan, as you know, the JSF program has
had a host of problems over the past years resulting in significant
cost growth, schedule slips, and, most importantly, delays in fielding
capabilities to the warfighter.
From your observations, what have been the primary causes to the
JSF's development problems and challenges to date?
Mr. Sullivan. JSF development problems and challenges can largely
be traced to its extremely risky acquisition strategy, poor decisions
at key junctures, and a management environment that was slow to
acknowledge and address problems. At development start, JSF officials
adopted a ``single step'' acquisition strategy to develop and acquire
full combat capabilities on a very aggressive, risky schedule with
substantial concurrency among development, testing, and production
activities. Little systems engineering analysis was done to understand
what resources would be needed to achieve the required capabilities. In
implementation, the program started development before requisite
technologies were ready, started manufacturing test aircraft before
designs were stable, and moved to production before flight testing
adequately demonstrated that the aircraft design meets performance and
operational suitability requirements. None of the 8 critical
technologies were mature at system start and now, almost 10 years
later, only five are mature and three are approaching maturity.\1\
Also, all three variants fell significantly short of meeting best
practice standards regarding release of drawings at the critical design
reviews. The late release of drawings--and continuing high rate of
changes--resulted in a cascading of problems in establishing suppliers
and manufacturing processes, which led to late parts deliveries,
delayed the program schedule, and forced inefficient manufacturing
processes to workaround problems. These issues are lessening now but
the impacts are still felt in higher costs, late deliveries of test and
production aircraft, and a much-delayed development test schedule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Applying best commercial practices, we define maturity as
achieving technology readiness level 7-system prototype demonstration
in a realistic operational environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of its June 2010 Nunn-McCurdy certification to the
Congress, DOD provided a root cause analysis for cost and schedule
growth that identifies similar factors. Specifically, the analysis
cites a very aggressive and concurrent development schedule,
unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, flawed and overoptimistic
assumptions, and management's reluctance to accept unfavorable
information, slowing down the ability of the contractor and government
to recognize and respond to problems.
Mr. Bartlett. 1b. Has the program been receptive to your past
advice and recommendations for establishing a knowledge-based
acquisition process?
Mr. Sullivan. Until recently, the Department has not been very
receptive to our findings and recommendations. Since 2001, defense
officials have often non-concurred with our recommendations and, even
when somewhat agreeable, did not usually fully implement them. For
example, while officials generally acknowledged the merits of
knowledge-based acquisitions and agreed that the JSF strategy was very
risky, they chose to continue moving forward with the intent to manage
the risks. They did not delay development start even though
technologies were not ready and did not delay or reduce procurement
when designs were not stable nor manufacturing processes mature.
Appendix II of our recently issued report \2\ summarizes our reports
since 2001 and DOD's general recalcitrance in adopting our
recommendations. (Included in this document as appendix 1.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on
Firmer Footing, but Progress Still Lags. GAO-11-325 (Washington, D.C.:
April 7, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the past year and a half, defense management appears to be
somewhat more responsive to our findings and recommendations. Defense
officials lately recognized numerous technical, financial, and
management shortcomings and continue to significantly restructure the
program, making changes we support and, in quite a few cases, had
earlier recommended. Our work with DOD officials and the JSF program is
now somewhat more collaborative than in the past and is open to, at
minimum, an ``agree to disagree'' relationship.
Mr. Bartlett. 1c. What future steps can the Department take to
ensure the JSF program does not repeat its mistakes from the past to
achieve a more predictable and successful outcome?
Mr. Sullivan. A new and sustained focus on affordability, effective
implementation of restructuring actions, successful mitigation of cost
and manufacturing risks identified by independent panels, and more
active and involved oversight by OSD and military service headquarters
should lead to more predictable and achievable outcomes. Regaining and
aggressively pursuing affordability--both in terms of the investment
costs to acquire the JSF and the continuing costs to operate and
maintain it over the life-cycle--will be very challenging, but is
paramount to future success. Restructuring actions include the adoption
of more realistic cost and schedule estimates, a more robust flight
test program, and directed implementation of critical improvements
needed in the aircraft and engine manufacturing and supplier management
processes. Still needed (and in the works) is a new, knowledge-based
procurement cost estimate through completion of the program. Marine
Corps leadership is directly involved in efforts to resolve technical
deficiencies in the short take off and landing variant.
Mr. Bartlett. 1d. What steps can be taken to place bounds on the
program and to help improve management and oversight of the program?
Mr. Sullivan. Our April 7 report \3\ recommends the Secretary of
Defense take the following actions to reinforce and strengthen program
cost controls and oversight:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO-11-325.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) The JSF program should maintain total annual funding levels for
development and procurement at the current budgeted amounts in the
fiscal year 2012-2016 future years defense plan (modified, if
warranted, by the new acquisition program baseline expected this year).
It should facilitate trades among cost, schedule, requirements, and
quantities to control cost growth. Having gone through the Technical
Baseline Review and budget approval process, it is reasonable to expect
the program to execute against the future years defense plan going
forward. Only in instances of major and unforeseen circumstances,
should the Department consider spending more money on the program. Even
then, we would expect changes to be few and adopted only after close
scrutiny by defense leadership. Approved changes should be well
supported, adequately documented, and reported to the congressional
defense committees.
(2) Establish criteria for the STOVL probation period and take
additional steps to sustain individual attention on STOVL-specific
issues, including independent F-35B/STOVL Progress Reviews with Senior
Leadership to ensure cost and schedule milestones are achieved to
deliver required warfighter capabilities. The intent is to allow each
JSF variant to proceed and demonstrate success at its own pace and
could result in separate full-rate production decisions.
(3) Conduct an independent review of the contractor's software
development, integration, and test processes--similar to its review of
manufacturing operations--and look for opportunities to streamline
software efforts. This review should include an evaluation of the
ground lab and simulation model accreditation process to ensure it is
properly structured and robustly resourced to support software test and
verification requirements.
Mr. Bartlett. 2a. DOD has been engaged in a comprehensive
restructuring of the program since last year. In testimony last year
before this Subcommittee, you said that GAO supports these actions.
Do you still support the restructuring efforts, including the most
recent ones added by the Secretary in January 2011? Have you seen
concrete examples of improvements from these actions?
Mr. Sullivan. We do still support JSF restructuring actions and
note some tangible improvements already:
The technical baseline review was very comprehensive and
applied solid systems engineering methods to thoroughly scrub the
program and highlight key problem areas.
While cost analysts are still working toward a new
program baseline that recalculates procurement costs to completion, the
current cost and schedule estimates provided to the Congress in the
Nunn-McCurdy certification package and the FY 2012 budget are more
realistic and achievable.
The new development flight test schedule is also more
realistic and better resourced, using more conservative assumptions
about fly rates and test point achievements and providing for more
flights and more test assets.
The ``probation period'' and high level of oversight
ordered for the STOVL is appropriately focused on evaluating and
resolving its problems to better inform future decisions on this
variant, so critically important to the Marine Corps' future aviation
plans.
The substantial reduction in near-term procurement
lessens, but does not eliminate, risks from concurrency.
Finally, the aircraft and engine manufacturers are making
good faith efforts to implement the findings and recommendations of the
Independent Manufacturing Review Team and Joint Assessment Team and
some production and supply performance measures are improving.
Mr. Bartlett. 2b. Several actions seem the same or similar to GAO's
recommendations from years ago. What are some of these and why did the
Department not previously implement your recommendations?
Mr. Sullivan. Several actions are quite similar.
Our March 2008 report criticized DOD's so-called Mid-
course Risk Reduction Plan, particularly the cuts made in flight test
assets and the number of flight tests. We recommended that DOD revisit
and, if necessary, revise the plan to address concerns about testing,
use of management reserves, and manufacturing deficiencies. Instead,
DOD wanted to replenish management reserves from within the program
baseline and did not revise its plan, nor fix the problems. In short
order, management reserves were again depleted. Recent restructuring
actions added more test resources, increased the number of flight
tests, and extended the schedule, effectively reversing the mid-course
plan. In addition, the IMRT team recommended improvements in
manufacturing and supply chain management.
Also in 2008, we determined that the program cost
estimate was not reliable and that a new comprehensive independent cost
estimate and schedule risk assessment are needed. We reiterated these
concerns in subsequent reports, including the need to make a better
projection of life-cycle operating and support costs. DOD's joint
estimating team did provide better cost estimates in the interim, but
it was not until the recent restructuring (and after a Nunn-McCurdy
cost breach) that comprehensive independent cost estimates for the
program to completion were directed. DOD is also preparing a more
informed forecast of life cycle costs. Restructuring also directed the
program to finally do the schedule risk assessment, more than two after
our recommendation.
Since 2006, we have consistently warned against procuring
quantities of aircraft much ahead of testing and the ability of the
manufacturing process to produce at high rates. In 2009, for example,
we reported on the risks posed by DOD plans to further accelerate
procurement and to do so on cost reimbursement contracts. DOD responded
to us that planned procurement rates were efficient and feasible. We
were gratified when Defense leadership substantially reduced near term
procurement and decreased the annual ramp rate (the percentage increase
in production from one year to the next) and awarded the first fixed
price production contract.
We are not sure why the Department did not implement these
recommendations earlier. We can only surmise that it did not because it
did not have to. Funding for the JSF was plentiful and it was a top
priority, meaning the Department could borrow from lower priorities to
pay for its cost growth. While acknowledging the risks, program and
contractor officials typically kept driving forward rather than admit
and resolve problems.
Mr. Bartlett. 2c. Going forward, what critical challenges remain
for the program from a cost and schedule standpoint?
Mr. Sullivan. Although encouraged by DOD's ongoing restructuring
actions, we remain concerned about the JSF program's ability to
successfully execute to testing and manufacturing schedules. The JSF
program is still very early in demonstrating aircraft design and
testing to verify it works as intended. Development testing continues
to be hampered by late delivery of test aircraft, slips in delivering
software to testing, and delays in accrediting and verifying ground
test labs and simulation models. These issues must be addressed in
order to implement the more rigorous test schedule going forward.
Furthermore, development and operational testing will inevitably
identify design and employment changes as a result of discovery and
rework. Future changes may require alterations to the manufacturing
process, changes to the supply base, and costly retrofitting of
aircraft already produced and fielded.
The program has still not adequately demonstrated stable designs
and mature manufacturing processes as it enters the fifth year of
production. We remain concerned about constraints in factory throughput
and the increasing backlog of production jets on order but not
delivered. Even after the Secretary reduced near-term procurement
quantities, the program still plans to steeply ramp up annual
production rates and make substantial investments, planning to purchase
more than 300 aircraft for about $50 billion before development flight
testing is completed in 2016. We will monitor contractors'
responsiveness in implementing the IMRT and JAT recommendations,
especially efforts to improve global supply chain management.
Additional program cost increases and schedule delays are likely as
restructuring continues. The Secretary of Defense has not yet granted
new milestone B approval nor approved a new acquisition program
baseline. Originally planned for November 2010, program officials now
expect the new acquisition program baseline in summer 2011. Cost
analysts are still revising procurement funding requirements for the
period fiscal year 2017 through completion of procurement in 2035.
Accordingly, the net effect of reducing near-term procurement
quantities and deferring these aircraft to future years is uncertain
and depends upon the assumptions made about future unit prices, annual
quantities, and inflation. We expect total procurement costs will be
somewhat higher than the estimate submitted in the Nunn-McCurdy
certification. A major unknown factor that could have major
consequences is the potential costs and schedule changes resulting from
the evaluation of STOVL deficiencies.
Maintaining affordability--both in terms of the investment costs to
acquire the JSF and the continuing costs to operate and maintain it
over the life-cycle--will be very challenging. A key tenet of the JSF
program from its inception has been to deliver an affordable, highly
common fifth-generation aircraft that could be acquired by the
warfighters in large numbers. Rising aircraft prices erode buying power
and may make it difficult for the U.S. and its allies to buy as many
aircraft as planned. The international partners are being counted on to
buy about 730 aircraft; DOD's unit cost estimates assume this level of
participation. Quantity reductions could drive additional price
increases for future aircraft. Further, while the Department is still
refining cost projections for operating and supporting future JSF
fleets, cost forecasts have increased as the program matures and more
data becomes available. Current JSF life-cycle cost estimates are
considerably higher than the legacy aircraft it will replace; this has
major implications for future demands on military operating support
budgets and plans for recapitalizing fighter forces.
Mr. Bartlett. 2d. In your current draft report at DOD for comment,
what are some specific actions you would like them to take?
Mr. Sullivan. We issued the report on April 7. DOD concurred with
all three recommendations. These are discussed above in the answer to
the fourth question under part 1.
Mr. Bartlett. 3a. Mr. Sullivan, you issued a recent report on the
Air Force's tactical fighter shortfalls and inventory plans. One key
point was the JSF's sheer size and priority within the Department and
how that impacts other programs in the acquisition portfolio.
How has the JSF size and priority affected other programs in the
portfolio? Considering the JSF's central role in DOD's future tactical
aircraft recapitalization plans, what are the potential consequences to
the program and other programs if the JSF cannot deliver on time with
the numbers needed to replace legacy fighters and at a price the
Department can afford?
Mr. Sullivan. Our July 2010 report on DOD's tactical aircraft
requirements \4\ stated that the JSF is the linchpin in DOD's tactical
aircraft recapitalization plans because of its magnitude and the
hundreds of legacy aircraft it is slated to replace. As a result, JSF
program setbacks in costs, deliveries, and performance directly affect
modernization plans and retirement schedules of the legacy aircraft.
Uncertainty about JSF's costs and deliveries makes it challenging for
the Services to plan and implement modernization efforts and retire
older aircraft that are becoming more expensive to operate. As a
result, Service officials have been forced to react to changing JSF
schedules and to put forward unfunded contingency plans to modernize
and extend the life of some legacy aircraft. In addition to JSF's
problems, DOD's investments in legacy systems have generally been
assigned lower priority in the budgeting process, and many critical
upgrade and modernization efforts face funding shortfalls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, Tactical Aircraft: DOD's Ability to Meet Future
Requirements Is Uncertain, with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming
Investment Decisions. GAO-10-789 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Going forward, the JSF is a top priority for the Department and
will require large annual funding commitments from the Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps. As such, continued program cost increases have
significant affordability implications for the Services, other programs
in the acquisition portfolio, and the Nation as a whole. In this period
of more austere budget conditions, continued cost increases may result
in reduced quantity purchases by the Department or international
partners. If this were to occur, we would expect unit prices to
increase, further straining program affordability. At minimum, other
lower priority programs will have to compete with the JSF for a
shrinking discretionary pool of money. Looking forward, long-term JSF
operating and sustainment costs will significantly affect future
budgets; while the costs to develop and produce a weapon system are
significant, these usually represent less than a third of total
ownership costs. Current forecasts of JSF operating and sustainment
costs project them to exceed those of legacy aircraft.
Mr. Bartlett. 3b. What are the Air Force and Navy doing with legacy
fighter programs to help mitigate cost increases and schedule delays
for the JSF?
Mr. Sullivan. The Air Force plans to extend the service life and
enhance capabilities on 300 newer legacy F-16s. Initial funding for
this is in the Air Force's 2012 budget request, but the full cost is
not yet known. Along with some structural work on older legacy F-16s,
and assuming JSF at peak procurement of 80 aircraft per year, officials
believe this will mitigate a projected shortfall in the tactical
fighter force through 2030. Our February 2011 report on Air Force
fighter force structure reports \5\ noted the-Air Force is not
expecting any major changes to its fighter recapitalization plan.
However, better information on the JSF restructured program and on the
F-16 fleet is expected to become available in 2011. This could enable a
more informed analysis, comparing and contrasting various alternatives
for mitigating the projected aircraft shortfalls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Fighter Reports Generally
Addressed Congressional Mandates, but Reflected Dated Plans and
Guidance, and Limited Analyses. GAO-11-323R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24,
2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, the Navy is evaluating a service life extension program
for approximately 280 F/A-18 aircraft in order to address its projected
tactical aircraft shortfall in the near term. The new budget also
directs the Navy to purchase an additional 41 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets
in the near-term to help cover the gap caused by JSF delays.
Appendix 1: GAO Reports and DOD Responses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Est. dev. costs DOD response and
GAO report dev. length APUC(a) Key program event Primary GAO message actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 GAO-02-39 $34.4 Billion 10 Start of system Critical technologies DOD did not delay start
years $69 Million development and needed for key of system development
demonstration aircraft performance and demonstration
approved. elements are not stating technologies
mature. Program should were at acceptable
delay start of system maturity levels and
development until will manage risks in
critical technologies development.
are mature to
acceptable levels.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 GAO-05-271 $44.8 Billion 12 The program undergoes We recommend that the DOD partially concurred
years $82 Million re-plan to address program reduce risks but does not adjust
higher than expected and establish strategy, believing
design weight, which executable business that their approach is
added $7 billion and case that is knowledge- balanced between cost,
18 months to based with an schedule and technical
development schedule. evolutionary risk.
acquisition strategy.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 GAO-06-356 $45.7 Billion 12 Program sets in motion The program plans to DOD partially concurred
years $86 Million plan to enter enter production with but did not delay
production in 2007 less than 1 percent of start of production
shortly after first testing complete. We because they believe
flight of the non- recommend program the risk level was
production delay investing in appropriate.
representative production until
aircraft. flight testing shows
that JSF performs as
expected.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 GAO-07-360 $44.5 Billion 12 Congress reduced Progress is being made DOD non-concurred and
years $104 funding for first two but concerns remain felt that the program
Million low-rate production about undue overlap in had an acceptable
buys thereby slowing testing and level of concurrency
the ramp up of production. We and an appropriate
production. recommend limits to acquisition strategy.
annual production
quantities to 24 a
year until flying
quantities are
demonstrated.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 GAO-08-388 $44.2 Billion 12 DOD implemented a Mid- We believe new plan DOD did not revise risk
years $104 Course Risk Reduction actually increases plan nor restore
Million Plan to replenish risks and that DOD testing resources,
management reserves should revise the plan stating that they will
from about $400 to address concerns monitor the new plan
million to about $1 about testing, use of and adjust it if
billion by reducing management reserves, necessary. Consistent
test resources. and manufacturing. We with a report
determine that the recommendation, a new
cost estimate is not cost estimate was
reliable and that a eventually prepared,
new cost estimate and but DOD refused to do
schedule risk a risk and uncertainty
assessment is needed. analysis that we felt
was important to
provide a range
estimate of potential
outcomes.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 GAO-09-303 $44.4 Billion 13 The program increased Because of development DOD agreed to report
years $104 the cost estimate and problems, we stated its contracting
Million adds a year to that moving forward strategy and plans to
development but with an accelerated Congress. In response
accelerated the procurement plan and to our report
production ramp up. use of cost recommendation, DOD
Independent DOD cost reimbursement subsequently agreed to
estimate (JET I) contracts is very do a schedule risk
projects even higher risky. We recommended analysis, but still
costs and further the program report on had not done so as of
delays. the risks and February 2011. In
mitigation strategy February 2010, the
for this approach. Department announced a
major restructuring of
the JSF program,
including reduced
procurement and a
planned move to fixed-
price contracts.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 GAO-10-382 $49.3 Billion 15 The program was Because of additional DOD continued
years $112 restructured to costs and schedule restructuring actions
Million reflect findings of delays, the program's and announced plans to
recent independent ability to meet increase test
cost team (JET II) and warfighter resources and lower
independent requirements on time the production rate.
manufacturing review is at risk. We Independent review
team. As a result, recommend the program teams evaluated
development funds complete a full aircraft and engine
increased, test comprehensive cost manufacturing
aircraft were added, estimate and assess processes. As we
the schedule was warfighter and IOC projected in this
extended, and the requirements. We report, cost increases
early production rate suggest that Congress later resulted in a
decreased. require DOD to prepare Nunn-McCurdy breach.
a ``system maturity Military Services are
matrix''-a tool for currently reviewing
tying annual capability
procurement requests requirements as we
to demonstrated recommended. The
progress. Department and
Congress are working
on a ``system maturity
matrix'' tool, which
we suggested to
Congress for
consideration, to
improve oversight and
inform budget
deliberations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: DOD data and GAO analysis.
(a) Average procurement unit cost.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. Gen Carlisle, what is the process you plan to use to
ensure procurement of an affordable, right-sized helicopter for the
mission? What assurances will there be that the American taxpayer is
not paying too much for an aircraft that is overkill for this domestic,
non-combat requirement?
General Carlisle. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mrs. Roby. I am sure you are familiar with all of the fighter wings
in the Air National Guard, and there is one I would like to highlight,
in light of F-35 fielding. This is the 187th Fighter Wing which flies
F-16s. Early on, Air Combat Command leadership led our Commanding
General of the Alabama National Guard to believe that this unit would
be on the first list of units to be fielded the F-35. Well, the list
came out and the 187th FW was not on the list. My question is not if
the 187th FW will be fielded the F-35, but when?
General Carlisle. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS
Mr. Owens. Given our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and even
previous air campaigns like Operations Desert Storm and Operation
Allied Force how much of an operational and logistical advantage will
it be in future conflicts, if three of our Services and our allies are
all flying the F-35?
General Carlisle. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. On-going deployment of laser peening for life
extension of the F-22 structure is going very well and represents an
excellent example of addressing issues before they become serious and
costly problems. It is also another example of US development of world
leading aerospace technology that spins out creating US jobs in the
commercial sector. We applaud this F-22 effort and the forward looking
steps the Air Force and its OEMs took in this deployment. Do you see
this and other new technologies being deployed to solve problems for
new systems such as the F-35? What is the mechanism to ensure these
advances move forward?
Mr. Van Buren and Admiral Venlet. [The information was not
available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Garamendi. Laboratory test results funded by the Office of
Naval Research and overseen by NAVAIR have indicated that up to 250%
lifetime improvements can be obtained on arrestment hook shanks for
carrier based aircraft with a simple advanced process adding processing
cost of only about 1%. We applaud this work and highly recommend that
it be followed through to deployment. We understand that if implemented
cost savings will be in the many millions of dollars for the fleet as
well as adding enhanced safety. Are efforts underway to field and
identify other applications? Are programs such as the Navy's BOSS III
the appropriate vehicle to enable implementation and thus begin to
realize cost savings?
Admiral Skinner. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
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