[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-15]
ARMY MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 9, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
TOM ROONEY, Florida JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina BILL OWENS, New York
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Scott Bousum, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 9, 2011, Army Modernization Programs............ 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 9, 2011......................................... 41
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 2011
ARMY MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 3
WITNESSES
Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; LTG
Robert P. Lennox, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, U.S. Army;
and LTG William N. Phillips, USA, Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics and
Technology), U.S. Army......................................... 5
Gilmore, J. Michael, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of
the Secretary of Defense....................................... 22
Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office; and William
Graveline, Assistant Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office......... 24
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G...................................... 45
Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., joint with LTG Robert P. Lennox and
LTG William N. Phillips.................................... 54
Gilmore, J. Michael.......................................... 76
Sullivan, Michael J., joint with William Graveline........... 86
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre........................................ 48
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 111
Mr. Platts................................................... 111
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Akin..................................................... 119
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 115
Mr. LoBiondo................................................. 119
Mr. Rooney................................................... 119
Mr. Turner................................................... 120
ARMY MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 9, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:32 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G.
Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you for joining us as we consider the
fiscal year 2012 budget request for the Department of the Army
equipment modernization programs. Today we have two panels.
Panel 1 witnesses include General Pete Chiarelli, vice
chief of staff; Lieutenant General Robert Lennox, deputy chief
of staff of the Army for requirements; and Lieutenant General
William Phillips, military department--military deputy to the
assistant secretary of the Army, acquisition, logistics, and
technology.
Panel 2 witnesses include Dr. Michael Gilmore, director of
operational test and evaluation, Office of the Secretary of
Defense; and Mr. Michael Sullivan, Government Accountability
Office, director of acquisition and sourcing; and William
Graveline, Government Accountability Office.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here and thank you for your
service to our country. I just returned from having led a
delegation of members on a visit to Afghanistan, where we met
with personnel from all of our services at several different
locations. While I have always had misgivings about our
involvement of Afghanistan, I want to note how I was again so
highly impressed with the extraordinary courage, dedication,
and sacrifice, and ability demonstrated every hour, every day
by our service personnel. They are really quite remarkable.
We have always done our best to make sure our personnel
have what they need to execute their missions. I have been
reenergized by this most recent experience to make sure we do
all we can to support the absolutely outstanding men and women
serving our Nation.
In terms of this year's budget request, the Army's top two
modernization priorities are the tactical network and the
Ground Combat Vehicle Government programs. However, I would
like to maintain that the number one modernization priority
remains soldier equipment.
In saying that, I don't mean to imply that properly
equipped the soldier hasn't always--properly equipping the
soldier hasn't always been a priority, especially for the
witnesses in front of us today, but--whom I know share that
concern. There is no doubt that the equipment and body armor
that our soldiers have today is saving lives. However,
individual riflemen commonly carry in excess of 100 pounds of
gear on an all--on all dismounted missions; some more, some
less than that.
Equipment weight is a constant complaint we hear about when
we talk to our deployed soldiers. Not surprising, we also see
an alarming number of muscular-skeletal non-combat injuries in
our military hospitals.
While we certainly support enhancing the individual
soldier's capability and protection, the price we often pay is
more weight. I have often wondered if we would have taken just
5 percent of what we spend on the now terminated Future Combat
Systems program and applied it to lessening the weight of what
are soldiers carry, where would we be today?
I know Ranking Member Reyes shares my concern, which is why
we have scheduled a specific hearing on this issue next week.
Somehow we must figure out how to incentivize industry and
academia to lessen the weight for our soldiers without
lessening the protection that that weight provides them.
In terms of the tactical network, I have always felt that
one of the many mistakes that were made with the FCS [Future
Combat Systems] program was that the Army should have first and
foremost focused on getting the network right instead of trying
to do all of the vehicles and unmanned vehicle components of
the program simultaneously. We understand the importance of
what the Army is trying to do with the tactical network. If we
are going to send a soldier into harm's way he or she should
never have to open a communications device and have it say
``service not available'' or ``can you hear me now?''
The committee has been very critical of the lack of network
strategy over the last couple of years. It is my understanding
that the Army has made a lot of progress this last year in
laying out a nested network strategy.
However, I am reminded of the old adage that a vision
without resources is a hallucination. We need assurances that
the network is based on an open architecture, isn't dependent
on proprietary designs, and that it is pursued using full and
open competition.
Finally, the committee has and continues to support the
Army's goal of pursuing a modernized combat vehicle. However,
the committee needs to understand the rationale as to why the
ground combat vehicle should proceed as scheduled or if it
should move to the right in time.
How do we know that the GCV [Ground Combat Vehicle] is the
full spectrum vehicle the Army needs? Why did the Army not
complete an analysis of alternatives before it issued the
original requests for proposals, as this committee had
encouraged?
Can the Army afford to launch another program that could
cost up to $30 billion to procure a vehicle that carries a
squad of nine instead of the current six? Why not consider as
an alternative option continuing to upgrade Abrams, Bradleys,
and Strykers, focus on the network, and take part of the funds
and apply it to lightening the load of the soldier?
Ten years ago we were told that the Paladin howitzer
couldn't be upgraded and that Crusader and then Non-Line of
Sight-Cannon, N-LOS-C, was the only solution. And now that
those programs have been terminated we are pursuing an upgraded
Paladin howitzer, which we were told we couldn't do earlier on,
albeit with technologies from Crusader and network--and N-LOS-
C. They weren't a total loss.
To be clear, I am not saying that I don't support the GCV
program. And to be fair, I believe the Army requirements will
become clearer to the committee once the results of the
analysis of conservatives are submitted.
However, as was the case with the FCS program, it is this
committee's responsibility to ask the hard questions now so
that we don't learn in 5 years that the Army can't afford the
GCV or that it is based on exquisite requirements.
I now yield to my good friend and ranking member, Mr.
Reyes, for any remarks that he cares to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would also like to add my welcome. Thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today, and thank you for your
service.
Today's hearing on Army modernization again comes at a
critical time for our Army. The Army has been at war for almost
10 years--the longest continual period of combat for the U.S.
Army since the war in Vietnam and the longest war ever for an
all-volunteer Army.
Like all wars, these wars have changed the Army in profound
ways, and sometimes in ways that weren't predicted. The Army of
today features soldiers operating from widely dispersed fixed
locations and in relatively small elements, usually a company
or below, instead of the constantly moving large formations
that the Army practiced to fight for decades. The Army of today
integrates unmanned systems, intelligence networks, biometrics,
and communications networks in a very--in a way that was
unforeseen before September 11th of 2001, when the term IED
[Improvised Explosive Device] was not even in the Army's
lexicon.
At the same time, today's Army leadership faces the same
dilemma faced by their predecessors, namely answering two
critical questions: First, what kind of missions must the Army
prepare for to perform? And second, how to equip the Army of
today while preparing for the Army of tomorrow.
Today's hearing will center on finding that critical
balance and focus on the point for these two very important and
pivotal questions. The fiscal year 2012 Army budget requested
for modernization from my viewpoint is commendable in many
different ways.
For the first time in many years the Army has a single
modernization strategy that is integrated and resourced and
that covers the five key aspects of equipping the force. Our
chairman mentioned most of them, but they are: Soldier
equipment and weapons, and I certainly share the same concerns
that the chairman does in terms of the weight and finding ways
to address that challenge; second, communications,
intelligence, and network equipment; third, aviation and UAVs
[Unmanned Aerial Vehicles]; fourth, armored combat vehicles;
and fifth, wheeled combat vehicles.
A great deal of the credit for this clear and integrated
approach lies with the vice chief of staff, General Chiarelli,
who we are fortunate is here to testify at this hearing. While
he has not yet fixed every single problem in Army
modernization, his efforts and hard work have put the Army in a
much stronger position to justify and protect its modernization
efforts, both in the Pentagon and certainly here in Congress.
When Secretary Gates testified before our committee in
February he said that because the future is so uncertain
procurement funds must be focused on those areas that are
useful in many possible operations, not in any narrow range. In
my view, the Army's 2012 budget request does that in most
areas.
It invests heavily in modernizing and expanding the Army's
aviation capability and network communications. Both are areas
essential to today's fight in Afghanistan and that the Army
will be able to use in the future, no matter what kind of
operations it conducts.
Second, significant funds are also requested for upgrades,
so for soldier personal equipment that is intended to improve
lethality and protection while, again, reducing the critical
weight factor, another area where the Army will benefit
regardless of what the future holds and what future missions
develop. In this request, the Army also continues to
aggressively modernize its fleet of wheeled vehicles, from
MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles], to trucks, to
Humvees.
And finally, in terms of armored vehicles the request makes
what were probably the most difficult judgment calls. The
request clearly focuses on the future, with heavy investment in
the ground combat vehicle program. In order to achieve this
focus on the future, however, the request does show a
significant drop across the board in ongoing upgrades for
current vehicles.
In three major cases--the Abrams tanks, the Bradley
fighting vehicles, and Stryker vehicles--the Army has chosen to
accept the risk of production shutdowns in the 2013 to 2016
timeframe as the Army waits to produce upgraded versions of
these vehicles at the end of this decade. These shutdowns will
present significant challenges to the Army and the defense
industrial base, so I look forward to hearing more today about
how the Army will mitigate the risk involved with this plan.
However, despite this and other challenges, the Army
modernization budget request for 2012 represents a solid plan
for the future that seeks to balance the needs of today with
the potential needs of tomorrow. While the subcommittee will
carefully review this plan, I think the Army is starting from a
position of strength, in large part due to the hard work over
the past year from the three gentlemen that are sitting at our
witness table.
So today, Mr. Chairman, I look forward, as you do, to hear
more about the details that will significantly impact the Army
in 2012 and beyond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the
Appendix on page 48.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Reyes.
Without objection, all witness statements will be made a
part of the hearing record.
General Chiarelli, we do not normally have the benefit of
hearing from the vice chief of staff at our yearly subcommittee
modernization hearing, so we really appreciate you taking the
time to help us understand the Army's modernization priorities.
Clearly, among your many responsibilities Army equipment
modernization is an issue of great importance to you and the
Army or you wouldn't be here today, sir. Thank you very much.
I understand, General, that you have the oral testimony
representing all three of you. Is that correct?
General Chiarelli. I do, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay. Thank you. Please proceed with your
opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY
General Chiarelli. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the fiscal
year 2012 budget request as it pertains to Army acquisition and
modernization. I am joined by my colleagues, Lieutenant General
Bob Lennox, deputy chief of staff of the Army, G8; and
Lieutenant General Bill Phillips, principal military deputy to
the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics,
and technology. We look forward to answering your questions at
the conclusion of these opening remarks.
As you are all aware, our Nation's military continues to
face a broad array of complex challenges as we approach the
start of the second decade of a long-term struggle against a
global extremist network. Today's uncertain and dynamic
strategic and operational environments, coupled with current
political and fiscal realities and the rapid pace of
technological development have made our outdated, Cold War-era
strategies no longer supportable.
To be successful now and into the future we require a
strategy that takes a more focused and affordable approach to
equipping our force. Our evolved strategy, aligned with the
Army Force Generation model, ARFORGEN, will allow us to
incorporate lessons learned, improve or maintain core
capabilities, incrementally modernize to deliver new and
improved capabilities, and integrate portfolios to align our
equipment modernization communities, thereby enabling us to
develop and field a versatile and affordable mix of equipment,
ensuring our soldiers and units have the resources and
capabilities they need to be successful across the full range
of military operations today and into the future.
As part of the Army Modernization Plan 2012 we have
prioritized our material programs to focus on capabilities
which give our units and our soldiers a decisive edge in full-
spectrum operations. While considering program cost and size,
the emphasis is on capabilities critical to Army success and
our ability to network the force, deter hybrid threats, and
defeat hybrid threats, and protect and empower soldiers.
I have talked about the importance of the network with
members of the subcommittee on numerous occasions. I believe it
represents the centerpiece of the Army's modernization program,
and today I am pleased to report we are making significant
progress.
The Army is past talking concepts. We are making the
network happen, delivering needed capability downrange as we
speak. Certainly there is much more work to be done, but I am
confident we are headed in the right direction.
Much of what we are trying to accomplish in terms of
improving the pace of Army acquisition derived from what we
learned about the network and about the nature of rapidly
evolving technologies. However, the principles have application
across the entire modernization program.
I am prepared to discuss in greater detail the specifics of
the Army's critical fiscal year 2012 priority programs, as
outlined in my statement, for the record and during questions
and answers.
The advanced technologies added capabilities we are
pursuing are vital to the success of our force. That said, we
recognize that modernizing the force is not solely about buying
new or better equipment. It also has to do with spending money
wisely and finding efficiencies wherever possible.
I assure the members of this subcommittee, I and the Army's
other senior leaders remain diligent in our efforts to be good
stewards of scarce taxpayer dollars. Over the past year our
ongoing capability portfolio review process--we have identified
a number of areas we are able to make changes and eliminate
redundancies or outdated requirements.
In fact, as part of the Department of Defense's reform
agenda the Army has proposed $29 billion in savings over the
next 5 years, and we will not stop. We will continue to pursue
further efficiencies in the days ahead.
In the meantime, I respectfully request your support of the
Army's proposed research, development, and acquisition budget
of $31.8 billion for fiscal year 2012. We believe this request
allocates resources appropriately between fielding advanced
technologies in support of soldiers currently in the fight and
the development of technologies for the future.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you
again for your continued, generous support and demonstrated
commitment to the outstanding men and women of the United
States Army and their families. We--all three of us--look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Chiarelli, General
Phillips, and General Lennox can be found in the Appendix on
page 54.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. And thank you for your--
collectively--many years of service to our country.
As is my custom, I will ask my questions last hoping that
they will all have been asked so that I won't need to ask any,
and I now turn to my ranking member for his questions.
Mr. Reyes. Chances are, probably not, Mr. Chairman.
My first question deals with the Army's number one priority
vehicle, which is the ground combat vehicle. So far, the Army
has justified the need for the GCV by pointing at the need for
better protection, more onboard power, and the ability to carry
additional soldiers. However, there are those that have argued
that an upgraded Bradley vehicle would be adequate to meet the
Army's needs.
So my questions are: What specific new threats, especially
in terms of IEDs and anti-tank missiles, is the Army worried
about in the 2020 timeframe, when the GCV would be available in
large numbers?
Second, what about an upgraded Bradley? Would that not be
adequate to meet these future threats?
And third, what about using lasers and other directed
energy weapons in the future? How does a GCV compare in
relation to upgrading Bradley vehicles in this very important
regard?
So, I will leave it open, General, for whoever wants to
tackle those.
General Chiarelli. I will just make a few comments, sir.
First of all, the Bradley is going to be around for a long
time. The GCV is a fighting vehicle and it is a full-spectrum
vehicle.
We believe we have revisited our first RFP [Request for
Proposal], put out a second RFP, where we carefully went over
every single one of the requirements, and we have worked very,
very hard to ensure that it is a full-spectrum vehicle. This is
a vehicle that can be used across the spectrum.
And one of the things it does is offers capability
packages. Those capability packages would give it an
opportunity to work in environments such as Afghanistan, and in
different parts of Afghanistan and Iraq where there are
different threats. And with the addition of those capability
packages, mostly in passive armor, the vehicle gets heavier or
lighter when you take them off.
In addition to that, we are going to finally get the entire
squad, although the Bradley, as pointed out, takes less than
the squad--finally in the GCV we will be able to put the entire
infantry fighting squad. In addition to that, we will be able
to provide an interpreter and a medic a place to be, which are
critical on today's battlefield.
We are working very, very hard to get it out in a 7-year
period because we believe we need the size, weight, and power
to power the network in an infantry fighting vehicle.
But I will let Bill and Bob make further comments, but I
just want to say the Bradley is going to be around for a long
time.
Gentlemen.
General Phillips. Sir, I would just only add one thing.
When you see the analysis of alternatives that will come
forward, part of the Bradley--the second question that you had,
the Bradley piece of that--will be considered as a part of the
GCV program, so you will see that coming forward.
The other piece that I would want to emphasize for GCV that
General Chiarelli sort of alluded to is, we took the original
RFP on the 25th of August of last year and we decided to pull
it back. When we went through and recharacterized all the
requirements--there were over 900--we determined that the big
four that General Chiarelli just described, we came up with
about 130 that were critical to make sure that we met the big
four capability inside the GCV, and the others were tradable in
some kind of way. That is going to allow us to get this vehicle
in 7 years at an affordable cost.
The other point that I would emphasize is the incremental
capability with the GCV itself. We will build a vehicle in 7
years and then we want to be able to upgrade that vehicle over
time.
General Chiarelli. If I could just add one other thing:
What is amazing if you look back at Army vehicle modernization
is the story of the M1 tank. Now, we are not building a tank,
but what we would like to do is have a program like the Abrams.
Think about it. The Abrams, 1978 technology that has been
upgraded from 105-mm gun to 120-mm gun, from a commander's
weapon station that--I remember we--not all of us had a rough
time operating--to one today that makes each Abrams tank worth
two Abrams tanks. That is because that vehicle was built with
size, weight, and power built into it to allow it, over time,
to have incremental builds.
That is what we want to do with GCV. We want a vehicle that
looks much different 10 years from now than 7 years from now,
when it first comes out, because we are able, through
incremental builds, to put new technologies on that vehicle as
they become proven and capable.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you very much for that additional
information, which brings me to a second concern, and that is
that the budget proposal for 2012 shows production breaks for
the Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, and Stryker
vehicles, starting in 2013, that could last--projected from 3
to 5 years. The 5-year plan then shows production of upgrades
starting back up in 2016 or later.
So the questions that I have are: How will defense industry
maintain these production lines during the period--the shutdown
years? How can the Army be sure that those production lines
will still be there after they have been mothballed for several
years?
And what is the economic impact going to be? What will the
Army do to keep the workers employed at those companies?
Because obviously a concern that I and other members have is
that the skilled workforce would just move elsewhere and would
not be available again when this--when these production lines
are called upon.
General Lennox. Congressman Reyes, great question and great
concern, and not one that we didn't consider this year. As
General Chiarelli led us through our portfolio review of the
entire combat vehicle fleet--we took a very holistic review
this year, and our fiscal year 2012 proposal calls for about
$2.5 billion. It tries to balance transforming our combat
vehicle fleet with investments in the ground combat vehicle,
improving the Bradley and the Abrams for the future, and
replacing the aging M113 [armored personnel carrier] fleet.
So we are trying to accomplish all three of those things in
a very, you know, fiscally informed approach in our strategy,
and we have undertaken to do that. So there are going to be
shutdowns. In the Abrams line, for example, we are going to
finish and buy our acquisition limit of those vehicles.
We are buying the very finest M1s right now, the SEP
[System Enhancement Program] version. We have got a very good
strategy that addresses both the Active and the Reserve
component. So we have taken a good, thoughtful approach to
that, but there is some risk.
In the area of the Bradley, we also have a two-vehicle type
fleet approach. We have looked at both the Active and the
Reserve component. They will both receive modernized, pure
fleet versions of the Bradley. And we have again bought our
limit of that vehicle.
The Stryker vehicle has proven itself in combat. With this
committee's help and Congress' help we have introduced a
double-V hull approach to the Stryker vehicle. We are going to
have one brigade that we are going to send to combat this
summer and we will assess it.
And in the fiscal year 2012 approach we have also invested
in modernization programs for all three of those vehicle types.
They will not prevent, however, the production break that you
talked about. We are cognizant of that.
And I think I will turn it over to General Phillips, who
can talk about some of our approach to that, if that is okay.
General Phillips. Sir, I would just say that we share the
concern with the industrial base. And the industrial base
across all the portfolios is incredibly important to us.
It is also important that we have worked very closely with
industry, and I will just give one example: the Humvee, and
with AM General and the Humvee production line. Most recently
we worked with Charlie Hall, the new president for AM General,
and with the team there, to work on the production capability--
number of vehicles per day. And most recently we were able to
downsize slightly, from 55 per day to 35 per day, which
sustains the industrial base over a longer period of time. And
with FMS [Foreign Military Sales] customers and others coming
in we are able to sustain that critical capability for that
production line for a period of time longer.
But we must do so in the most efficient, effective manner
as we consider all options, sir.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
As you heard, bells have gone off. I think we have time for
Mr. LoBiondo's questions. Then it will be about 5 minutes
before the end of the vote, and we will need to recess for
three votes, I think. We will be back as soon as we can get
here.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My question is regarding the modernization of the Abrams
tank, and in recent weeks we have heard from the Secretary of
Defense and I believe from you, General, the need to modernize
the tank into the future. Specifically, the Army's budget looks
like it has less than $10 million in the fiscal year 2012
budget, and I think the statement was the tank has virtually
reached its upper limits for space, weight, and power.
So it looks like it is about $100 million reduction from
previous budgets. In light of this, does the Army still support
the Abrams modernization?
General Lennox. Congressman LoBiondo, you are right. The
fiscal year 2012 submission does call for about $10 million in
RDT&E [Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation] for the
Abrams tank.
We have several--hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars
underexecuted from previous years, so now that we think we have
the strategy right and the requirements right, the combination
of previous years' unexecuted funds and this amount we think is
about the right amount that we can execute in fiscal year 2012,
and that was the rationale for our approach. In the out-years
we have programmed additional amounts for the Abrams.
General Chiarelli. And I might add, our modernization
activities are focused on increasing the SWAP [Size, Weight,
and Power] capability of that tank, particularly the power
portion of it. So that is exactly our focus with the Abrams.
Mr. LoBiondo. And as a follow-up question, the
modernization of the Abrams engine--I understand there is a
proposal that could increase fuel efficiency by up to as much
as 17 percent, which could translate to about 50 gallons a day
for one Abrams tank alone. And with the emphasis on energy
efficiency and who knows where oil is going to go to per
barrel, the fuel consumption could be dramatically improved.
In light of the Army's energy conservation goals does the
Army believe the Abrams modernization program should also
include fuel-efficient engines?
General Lennox. Congressman, it does, absolutely, and that
is one of the alternatives for Abrams modernization. We have
not yet defined what that will be but that will certainly be
one of the considerations.
Mr. LoBiondo. Would seem that, in light of the energy costs
and rising, skyrocketing, it might be something that could be
moved a little closer to the front burner.
Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Generals.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you so much.
We have 8 minutes remaining. We probably can take one more
question. And who is next in our----
Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
And thank you all for being here, and nice to see you
again.
I would like to sort of revisit the body armor question. I
know that we will be having a hearing in the future, but
nevertheless, you have heard the concerns expressed from
Chairman Bartlett, from Ranking Member Reyes, and so I would
just like to revisit it.
To sort of restate the concern we have--and you know it
well--currently soldiers deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan are
outfitted with armor that weighs as much as 40 pounds. And,
when combined with the gear that troops must carry in the
field, the total weight our soldiers carry can exceed 120
pounds, causing skeletal injury just through the mere fact of
carrying these materials.
But also it poses another challenge. At an Armed Services
Committee hearing just several years ago, when I was newly
arrived in Congress, I asked a sergeant who was testifying
about his experiences using body armor in Iraq if there was a
temptation to take off the armor, given its weight and
restrictions on mobility, and he replied that, ``Yes, ma'am.
There is a risk that all soldiers are willing to take. And I
think that in certain situations, mission dependent, that as
soldiers we would be happy to take off some of the body armor
to be more mission-capable, more mobile on the ground, more
flexible faster.''
The President signed into law language in the Fiscal Year
2011 National Defense Authorization Act to establish separate,
dedicated budget line items for body armor to improve research,
development, and procurement of body armor equipment. This was
a positive step in ensuring that the Department of Defense
focused on addressing weight and protection issues and that
Congress provides the necessary oversight.
So my question is for you, General Chiarelli. Why has the
department's fiscal year 2012 budget request failed to include
this procurement line item, created by this very committee last
year, providing armor research and development, and failed to
conform to the statutory requirement in fiscal year 2011?
General Chiarelli. Well, since I appeared before the
committee last time on lighten the load we have made
significant progress, and one area is in body armor. I think
you know that we went ahead and gave soldiers the option
between the old IOTV [Improved Outer Tactical Vest] carrier and
a new, lightweight plate carrier, which is 8 pounds lighter
than the IOTV. That is a significant improvement over the
weight we had before.
I was recently at a Yuma, where I saw a new 16-mm mortar
tripod and 16-mm mortar that is 8.7 pounds lighter, and a new
81-mm mortar that is 20 pounds lighter than its predecessor. At
the same time, cold and wet weather gear has been improved and
is not only better but is lighter and less bulky.
We continue to look at ways to further lighten body armor,
but I have not heard of any technologies now that will give us
the required protection as--and the capabilities continue to
increase at a lighter weight.
Bill, has--anything you have heard of?
General Phillips. No, sir. I would only add a couple
points, sir, on target.
Ma'am, our body armor is the most tested in the world, and
for the targets for which it is designed to defeat there has
never been a body armor that has been defeated by that kind of
weapon. We saw that last year--by that kind of a round.
We listened to your comments last year. We created a line
this year, or in fiscal year 2012, for RDT&E, and for that year
and some of the out-years as well we programmed about $5.8
million of RDT&E into the body armor line.
At the same time, we are currently looking at a requirement
for body armor holistically that is coming forward to the Army
staff and we expect to see that requirement through the Army
and approved probably in the fourth quarter of this year. And
we will continue to work body armor really hard.
Couple other things that I would share on lightening the
load is things as simple as shoes and boots. The boots that
have been worn previously in Afghanistan--we are using a new
Danner boot that reduces the weight per soldier of about 1.2
pounds.
So we are looking, in every way possible, for the ability
to lighten the load on soldiers.
Ms. Tsongas. Well, I think the point of a separate line
item was really--there is no quick answer, and obviously
without a focused investment in it we will never develop an
answer. And so these sound like positive steps forward but
there is still much work to be done. Eight pounds is obviously
a good thing, but the load is still altogether too heavy, and
it is going to take a very focused investment in research and
development, and I encourage you to engage in that.
Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
We need now to recess for the three votes----
[Recess.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you for your patience.
Okay, Mr. Kissell. Thank you.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would also like to thank you for your patience and
thank you for the job you all do.
I have three worries--not questions, but worries. And you
have addressed them and I just want to kind of address them
again.
Number one, I worry about the troop strength as we--I know
we are talking about 2014, but the concerns about--we get the
troops we need to keep the rotations we need to stay home 2
years for a year in combat, and I am concerned we drop off and
then 6 months later we need those troops.
I am concerned about the fragmentation of what we need for
today's combat in terms of equipment versus planning for the
future. Do we have enough of a plan that we don't end up with a
mismatch of a lot of different kind of things and kind of 3
years from now we say, ``Gee, how did we end up with this?''
And I worry about the training of the soldiers and types of
warfare other than what we are doing now, so that--I talked to
people from the 82nd and they--you know, ``When is the last
time you jumped out of an airplane?''
``It has been a while because that is not what we are doing
now.''
And I could throw in the National Guard and Reserve but I
said three. So, you know, I am just curious as to some of your
thoughts on these three areas.
General Chiarelli. Well, sir, that is why I think GCV is so
absolutely important. It is a full-spectrum vehicle. You know,
and we talk a lot about the light force, but every single unit
that we send into theater today comes out on the other end when
they get assigned their TPE, or theater provided equipment,
looking like a heavy force.
We end up putting five light infantrymen into a vehicle
that weighs over 20 tons. That squad is running around the
battlefield today going from point A to point B in 40 tons of
equipment.
And that is what GCV does for us. We see GCV as a vehicle
for the future and for today, quite frankly--a vehicle that
will add, through these capability packages, additional passive
armor and composite form when it needs it, if it gets into
direct firefight, with the ability to shed it when it is not
needed and it needs protection only from underneath from an IED
fight; a vehicle that can go into Sadr City, where we saw a lot
of explosive formed penetrators being used in Iraq with the
appropriate protection on it, to when you used it out in the
West where you never saw an EFP [Explosively Formed Penetrator]
not having to carry that extra weight.
So GCV is really our attempt here to try to do something
that takes into account all the lessons we have learned over
the last decade and ensure we have a combat vehicle that will
allow us to fight in a full-spectrum environment.
General Lennox. If I could, Congressman, over the last year
General Chiarelli took us through a series of portfolio
reviews, and you have heard the Secretary of Defense say we
don't do very well at predicting the future. As an output of
those portfolio reviews we try to develop strategies that
emphasize versatility and adaptability.
General Chiarelli just talked about one of them, the ground
combat vehicle--very critical and important to us. The network
is another one. We think if we can get the network right it
will work in--across the range of military operations and
empower soldiers in that regard.
Our aviation and our ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance &
Reconnaissance] portfolios kind of add versatility to the kinds
of missions we could be doing, be it along the border or in
Afghanistan today, or some other mission in the future. And
finally the soldier--I think Congressman Reyes went down the
list earlier of the different kinds of attributes that you want
to cover down in your portfolios, and empowering the soldier
for the future to give them the right mix of protection and
lethality are critical.
And I think we have done that over the course of the last
year. I am sure we haven't gotten it right--perfectly right--
but I think we have done a pretty good job at having that kind
of versatility and adaptability built in.
General Chiarelli. And what is going to be different this
time is we are not going to go another 10 years and not do
this. We are internalizing this into the Army process so that
we are reviewing this all the time.
I was just down and saw the Third Brigade of the 82nd
Airborne on Thursday using a rifleman radio with some of the
command and control software that we are providing, and I tell
you, it just made me feel so good to hear those soldiers talk
about a capability that we had put in their hands as part of
the JTRS [Joint Tactical Radio System] family, the rifleman
radio, and say, this fills a capability gap that they have had
for the longest period of time.
They were just ecstatic about this radio and how it works.
And it is really not a radio; it is all I.P. [Internet
Protocol]-based, but the ability to pass data and have voice
communication with all the members of that squad using a
nonproprietary waveform, SRW [Soldier Radio Waveform], that
works and passes that data, and to hear those soldiers was just
absolutely wonderful.
Mr. Kissell. Well, I think that is one of the keys, and I
know it is something we wrote into the last defense
authorization, is to get feedback on new systems from the guys
on the ground. And I think that is so important.
And one of the points that was made, we have just--we have
got to do this constantly. It has just got to be a measure in
where we are and just a constant, you know--keeping an eye on
it. And I know this is what we are going to do, but it is
just--once again, it is a worry and I appreciate your time.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, certainly my heartfelt thanks to all three of you
for your dedicated and courageous service to our Nation. On
Friday this past week and Monday of this week I had the somber
responsibility to be at West Point for the burial of a true
American hero, First Lieutenant Daren Hidalgo, and a young man
who I had the privilege to nominate to West Point and gave his
life February 20th in Afghanistan, and certainly a reminder of
the importance of the issues we are talking about here today
and the sacrifices that these courageous men and women in
uniform are making in harm's way on behalf of all of us. So I
sincerely appreciate what you and all in uniform are doing for
us, and your families.
I want to touch on, and I apologize coming in late from
another hearing, and I am running--I have the Secretary of
Education in my Ed Committee hearing I have got to run to
next--if I repeat anything that was asked earlier. And I want
to touch on mainly Bradleys and M88s [armored recovery
vehicles]. And it is my understanding that in the 2012 track
vehicle budget that there is about $250 million for upgrading
Bradleys, and that is something that you believe, as a service
branch, is critically important to--not just having Bradleys
out there but have them modernized to the best of our abilities
for the needs of the soldiers in the field. Is that an accurate
statement?
General Lennox. Yes, sir, it is. Two hundred fifty million
dollars allows us to pure fleet both the Active and the
Reserve, with certain types of Bradleys--most modern types of
Bradleys. And it caps off our Bradley investment.
Mr. Platts. A follow-up, then, specifically with Bradleys
in Guard--and we have our Pennsylvanian Guard, also Stryker
brigade, but interact with my Guard a fair amount here at home
and overseas: Is also accurate that in the 2010 funds that were
looking to upgrade the Army Guard's heavy brigade combat team
to the Desert Storm operation, is that accurate?
General Lennox. Congressman, I can't tell you which set of
funds--which year we are doing it. I know it is in the plan
that takes care of the brigade in Pennsylvania and the other
separate battalions that are in the National Guard. They will
all be upgraded to that version.
Mr. Platts. Is there--and you may not be able to answer
this today--is there a timeframe for when the Guard units will
start receiving the upgraded Bradleys?
General Lennox. I will have to take that one for the
record, Congressman. I know it is in our plan and it is in the
next several years, but I can't tell you specifically when they
will see them.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 111.]
Mr. Platts. Appreciate your following up with me and the
committee.
And then on the M88s, the A1 and the A2 versions, is there
plans at all to upgrade to the A2 version and--across the
fleet, or, you know, all of them or just a partial upgrade?
General Lennox. Congressman, it is really going to depend
for us on how the ground combat vehicle develops. It will
inform us whether or not we have an adequate mix of the A1
versions and the A2s, which we have today. We think we have a
pretty good balance, but as we see the ground combat vehicle
and improvements that may add weight to our combat vehicles in
the future we are going to have to make that decision in the
out-years.
Mr. Platts. Whether to maintain a mix or--okay.
A final--more of a comment, is associate myself with
colleagues before we broke who were addressing the issue of
personal body armor and the importance of doing right in this
category.
And this really, General Chiarelli, in my first time to
have the privilege of interacting with you was in Iraq, and I
will always remember you had a set of body armor there,
including the glasses with the piece of shrapnel in one of the
ballistic sunglasses, and that image, or that demonstration
that you gave us stayed with me, on the importance of making
sure we do right by our men and women in uniform in their own
personal protection in addition to equipment modernization of
the type we are talking about here today, and just associate
myself with the importance of us not letting up on that effort
as well.
So my thanks, again, to each of you for your service and
your testimony here today.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just two quick questions, and one I am going to show some
ignorance because it was an article I read and I am trying to
catch up, but I understand that the Army is going to--you are
slowly eliminating the Sherpa airplane from Army aviation, and
if I understand correctly--was it a C-27 [Alenia Spartan
military transport aircraft] that was going to replace it and
now the Army has decided that there is not going to be any more
Army aviators, that you are going to rely on the Air Force to
supply the C-27?
And I come from a state that has lots of National Guard, a
lot of aviators that wear the green of the Army, and it has
been a concern and I am just curious as to what the
justification or--is this a budgetary issue or is this
something that you see that there is not a need for it?
General Chiarelli. The C-27 is the replacement, and we--our
predecessors appeared before this committee and talked about
the need for an improvement for the Sherpa, a replacement for
the Sherpa, and the C-27 was always to be that replacement.
There will be aviators in the Army.
But we find it necessary, as we went through the portfolio
on aviation, to go with earlier plans, and that was as the C-27
comes onboard to, in fact, divest ourselves of the Sherpa over
the next 4 years. Because it is not pressurized; it is an older
aircraft. And we have got to look to the Air Force to provide
that mission set for us using the C-27, which is, of course, a
much more capable aircraft.
Mr. Critz. Right. Right.
So the C-27, though--there are still going to be Army
aviators flying C-27s, or that has been eliminated? The Sherpa
is eliminated along with the mission for the Army?
General Chiarelli. The mission remains, but it will be--we
will be supported by the United States Air Force and the C-27.
The specific pilots who are currently Sherpa pilots will be
given an opportunity, like pilots do many times, to transition
to other aircraft that remain in the Army inventory.
Mr. Critz. Okay. Thanks.
And one quick question, and, General Phillips, you actually
answered an inquiry I had on the APU [Auxiliary Power Unit] for
the Abrams, and I am going to follow up with that as well,
because it seems that during Operation Iraqi Freedom we had
long fuel lines, fuel tails to supply, and it was more of an
issue. And it seems like we do this--we do it in the private
sector as well so that when it is needed everyone is saying,
``Okay, let's study the APU,'' and then you get to a point
where now it is not such an issue and it tails off again.
And I believe we are at about 20 years now we have been
studying the APU, and I am just curious, are we ever going to
see one in an Abrams in my lifetime?
General Phillips. Congressman, great question. As we look
at the Abrams and really all of our systems it is important
that we take a holistic look on all the systems that are in
there surrounding space, weight, and power. And certainly the
APU that is inside the Abrams is a key part of that strategy.
And also fuel efficiency, as we look at fighting in places
like Afghanistan and potentially other places around the world.
How can we gain more fuel efficiency inside those platforms?
As we look at ground combat vehicle that has been discussed
at length, there is a fuel efficiency requirement that is in
that system as well. JLTV--joint light tactical vehicle--also
has a fuel efficiency requirement as well.
So we are very serious about the systems and subsystems
inside our platforms as we look at modernization for Stryker,
Abrams, Bradley in terms of efficiency, and greater capability
as well, sir.
Mr. Critz. So I am not sure if I heard--so where is the APU
inside the Abrams? Five years? Next year?
General Lennox. Well, what we have funded, Congressman, is
the start of the Abrams modernization program. So in fiscal
year 2012 we start with our requirement. As a result of our
holistic combat vehicle fleet we have decided that we do need
to upgrade the Abrams with all those concerns, and the APU will
be one of these areas.
Engine, APU, space, weight, and power issues inside the
Abrams will all be taken as part of that. And it will be over
the next 3 or 4 years before that will get finally settled out.
It is in our funding in our program but it is not in the
immediate future--not in the next year or so.
General Chiarelli. As a tanker I will tell you--I hate to
correct you, sir, but it has been longer than 20 years. We have
been looking for an APU that does everything we thought an APU
would do, but it has been a--one of the most difficult
engineering challenges I think we have had.
Mr. Critz. Well, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Ms. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Gentlemen. It is an honor to be here and to
hear from you.
I was impressed with reading all of the procurement items
that we have and glad to see that we have got some new Black
Hawks--47 new Black Hawks, 32 new Chinooks, and 19
remanufactured Apaches. Whiteman Air Force Base--of course we
have Apaches and we are very excited about that.
I did have a couple questions. Under--on page five--well,
you don't have that--but it says that under the family of
medium heavy tactical vehicles that the budget--2012 budget
requests $433 million for a total of 2,290 trucks and trailers.
I just wondered, does that mean total then or does that mean
how many more we are going to buy this year?
General Lennox. Ma'am, that does mean the additional amount
in fiscal year 2012, and our goal is to replace the aging 2.5-
ton, 5-ton 800 series and 900 series family of medium tactical
vehicles, so we will do this over time and that is the fiscal
year 2012--you have it exactly right--amount.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Very good. And that would be the same
for the heavy truck, the 7,928--that will be new--new trucks in
that category, right?
General Lennox. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. And there was some press articles a
couple of years ago, General, that--especially the ``Baltimore
Sun''--regarding the weight reduction initiatives for soldiers,
and saying that during that time there was over 20,000 soldiers
were in non-deployable status due to muscle or bone injuries
attributed to carrying the heavy rucksacks over rough terrain.
So I was wondering what improvements have been made to lighten
the load of our soldiers in 2009?
General Chiarelli. I appeared before this committee last
year to talk about our lighten-the-load efforts, and I am here
to say that we have made significant progress. I just saw the
other day at Yuma Proving Grounds a brand new 16-mm mortar that
has been reduced 8.7 pounds and a brand new 81-mm mortar that
has been reduced 20 pounds using composite.
We have provided a second type of body armor, what we call
a plate carrier, to our soldiers, which lowers the weight 8
pounds. We have fielded a brand new machine gun that is 8
pounds lighter--MK 48. It is an M240 light machine gun that has
gotten rave reviews from soldiers.
We are working with lighter boots, new cold weather and wet
weather equipment that not only protects better but is lighter.
We have a full court press on lightening the load of soldiers,
and we will continue to work that.
Mrs. Hartzler. I was at Fort Leonard Wood about a month ago
and the soldiers were raving about their new boots and the
shoes that they have and how they say they are just as good as
Nikes or anything; they would rather go running in those than
regular type of tennis shoes. And I am--as a former track coach
I thought that is smart. That makes sense to have them like
that.
So what is the, just, total weight that a soldier carries,
then, if you have the body armor on and the sack--what are we
looking at in their----
General Chiarelli. It depends on the mission. Not every
soldier will carry an 81-mm mortar, but for the one who does
get caught with the base plate of the mortar, to have a 20-
pound savings in the weight is a heck of a lot, which allows
that soldier to either carry something else--additional
ammunition--or to lighten that load.
But I think our studies show anywhere from about 50 pounds
to some, prior to us beginning this initiative, went up to 110
or 120 pounds, depending on exactly what it is they were
carrying.
Mrs. Hartzler. That is amazing. I am going to be going to
Afghanistan soon and I hope to be able to put on all of that
and see what it feels like. I am a farm girl, and we would pick
up a bale of hay and it would weigh about like that and that
would be hard to carry that around all day.
And so I appreciate your efforts to try to make it more
streamlined and lighter, but yet keep the safety factor. So I
applaud what you are doing. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I have a couple of quick questions and then I will ask one
for the record, and there may be others submitted for the
record as well.
General Chiarelli, with regard to force structure and in
terms of equipping the force, what I would like to understand
is the relationship between the current requirement for 45
Active Duty brigade combat teams and the--cut the end strength
of 27,000 between 2015 and 2016. General Casey testified last
week that it took 10 years to get where we are today in terms
of dwell time and equipment.
How do you plan program and budget for equipment with a
pending end strength cut of 27,000 soldiers when it is
condition-based? Are there plans to reduce the current
requirement of 45 Active Duty BCTs [Brigade Combat Teams] and/
or to change the current mix of heavy infantry or Stryker
brigades?
General Chiarelli. Well, as General Casey testified, this
is conditions-based. It is based on that we are out of Iraq. In
most numbers it is based on the drawdown in Afghanistan
progressing from this summer through 2014. And it is based on
no other requirement for a large number of land forces in any
other contingency.
I would add a fourth condition, and that is access to the
Reserve component. We have got to have access to the Reserve
components.
We don't know whether that is going to be brigade combat
strength that is going to come out. We are going through the
mission analysis right now to look at the 27,000.
But understanding the modernization program that we have
brought onboard and how we have done that with our capability
portfolio reviews, we are looking at 2-year packages. And with
a third of the force always in reset we really believe we can
do this. And it is absolutely essential we do this, given the
top-line cut that we had, so that we can ensure that we do not
rob our equipment accounts to get underneath the cut that we
received in the top line.
So we feel that by having the time to plan for this across
the board, both in equipment and exactly where we take those
cuts, and given those four conditions, that it makes a lot of
sense for us to be looking at this now. But General Casey also
does call it reversible planning, that based on the situation
we could, in fact, reverse and feel we would get the support of
the Secretary of Defense if conditions changed.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
And the second question, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, the Army continues to review its network strategy to
ensure that the Army's acquisition strategy supports the needs
of the warfighters and the fielding of the brigade combat team
tactical network. Would you please detail the essence of your
evolving acquisition strategy, the timelines, and how you are
proposing to align these with the Army's needs in Afghanistan
and the BCT modernization schedule?
In particular, please explain how your network strategy
will impact the Joint Tactical Radio System program. And you
might, if you wish, submit additional details for the record
after your response to this question. Thank you.
General Lennox. Congressman Bartlett, great question. For
us it is really two key programs in fiscal year 2012 get us
along the big first step of building capacity in our network,
and that is the WIN-T [Warfighter Information Network-Tactical]
program, where we have about $1.3 billion requested, and that
is the big pipes that get us from satellites down to corps,
division, brigade, and battalion, and even to the company level
that start providing the big pipes and capacity down to
soldiers.
The next is the Joint Tactical Radio System, and we have
requested about $800 million for a variety of radios that take
the communications then from the brigade and battalion level
down through the company and platoon to the individual
soldiers. You heard General Chiarelli talk about the rifleman's
radio. That is part of our Joint Tactical Radio System.
We think the program has made enormous progress and we
think it is on the verge of really providing the capacity that
we need for soldiers in the future.
General Chiarelli. Key to our strategy is what we are doing
out of Fort Bliss, Texas. The establishment of a full brigade
combat team--we call it the AETF [Army Evaluation Task Force]--
that has all the equipment in the Army, from that which the
light soldier has to that which the heavy soldier has, and
putting them on a 4-month test schedule. We are going to solve
a lot of problems out here.
I know everybody looks at JUONS [Joint Urgent Operational
Needs Statement] and ONS [Operational Needs Statement] and
getting support to the warfighter because he needs it, but many
times because we don't have anybody dedicated to being able to
do this like we have now that equipment is sent downrange
without giving soldiers the opportunity to get through the
integration issues, and those integration issues have to be
done downrange.
By putting this brigade into a 4-month test cycle they are
going to be testing every single 4 months. We are going to be
able to rapidly take even the requests from the fields in ONS
and JUONS--joint operational needs statements and operational
needs statements--we are going to be able to take that, test
it, integrate it, and make it so much better for the soldier
downrange and rapidly get equipment to the soldier.
I will tell you, we have had an amazing thing with the
Stryker double-V hull. Thanks to the next panel you are going
to hear about--and Dr. Gilmore's team. You know, it is from
January 10 until about 18 months, it will be--we are going to
be putting in the hands of soldiers a brand new Stryker double-
V hull that provides increased protection to them.
And that was tested in accordance to ensure that we really
were putting a good piece of equipment in there. And we have
done it in a year-and-a-half thanks to the great help that we
got from the next panel you are going to hear from.
So I really hold a lot of--I am excited about what is going
to happen at Fort Bliss and to be able to take this equipment
and test it every single 4 months and get it through those
integration challenges and into the hands of our soldiers. I
think it is going to be big for our network and it is going to
be big for other equipment we want to get in the hands of the
warfighter as quickly as possible.
Mr. Bartlett. Sir, how will the acquisition strategy change
in light of this and how will competition be applied in
production?
General Phillips. Sir, one of the biggest challenges that
we have in acquisition--Dr. O'Neill, the Army acquisition
executive and myself--is the alignment of programs--program
executive offices and program managers--in execution of the
network strategy. It is the most important program that we will
execute.
So what we are doing today is aligning programs that were
just mentioned, like Joint Tactical Radio System and WIN-T, to
align them with the strategy, doing the testing out at Fort
Bliss, White Sands to make sure that the programs and the
acquisition strategy is aligned with the needs of the Army in
terms of our Army Force Generation, our ARFORGEN. And that
piece of it we are going to work really hard.
Joint Tactical Radio System--I will talk a little bit about
that. We are aligning the acquisition strategies; we are
seeking to accelerate for the rifleman radio that was mentioned
in the demonstration we just did down at Fort Bragg last week.
We are driving toward a Milestone C decision in July for
airborne, maritime-fixed station JTRS. We are looking for a
Milestone C in early fiscal year 2012; ground mobile radio for
a Milestone C this year.
So we are driving the key components of the--or, I am
sorry, the network strategy toward acquisition decisions on a
short timeline and we are delivering. And I agree with my
partner, Bob Lennox, that we have made great strides over the
last year in JTRS as well as WIN-T. Critically important.
General Chiarelli. And you said in your opening statement,
Mr. Chairman, the key here is non-proprietary software. We call
these things radios. They are not radios; they are small
computers. That is what they are. Different sizes of computers,
I.P.-based.
And because we have non-proprietary waveforms in the
soldier radio waveform--in all the waveforms--we don't care who
builds the box as long as it carries our waveform. And that is
the JTRS business model and that is going to spur competition.
And we are not going to necessarily go out and buy one for
everyone to start with. We will let the competition make those
boxes better and cheaper. That is the model--the business model
that we have adopted with JTRS, and we are excited about it.
And not everybody is, but we sure are.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I have now one question, this for the record. Supplying our
troops in Afghanistan has focused increased attention on a
number of things, and one of them is the line haul tractor. I
have been told the Army has not held a competition for the M915
line haul tractor in nearly 11 years.
Why would there not be a business case to pursue a full and
open competition? Is the M915A5 basically a commercial vehicle
or has it changed significantly in the last 10 to 15 years?
How does the Army know it is getting the best truck
available for the best possible price? Is it possible that
industry could provide a safer, more fuel-efficient truck at
less cost than the Army is currently paying for the M915A5?
Does the Army plan to pursue a competitive procurement of
line haul trucks in fiscal year 2018 in support of a new line
haul capabilities production document requirement? You may
answer this multifaceted question for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 111.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much for your testimony.
Thank you for your service.
And we will recess this panel and empanel the next
witnesses. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Gentlemen, for taking your time to join us. I
have been to the floor a number of times to do a special order
after the close of business. As they pan the floor you may note
that there is nobody in the chamber but there are somewhere
between 1.5 million and 2.5 million people watching in addition
to staff and members in a lot of their offices.
I just returned from Afghanistan and I was surprised that
soldiers there told me that they watched our hearings here. So
although there are few of us here at the hearing be assured
that there are many people watching this, so be careful what
you say, and that this will be a part of the permanent record
that people will pore over for quite a while to come.
Thank you very much for joining us.
Dr. Gilmore, please proceed, and you will be followed by
Mr. Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF J. MICHAEL GILMORE, OPERATIONAL TEST AND
EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Gilmore. Chairman Bartlett, Congressman Reyes, members
of the committee, I am happy to be here no matter how many of
you are actually in the chamber. I consider it an honor to be
here.
I will just very briefly summarize my written testimony,
beginning with the results of testing of the Early or Enhanced
Infantry Brigade Combat Team systems, then moving on to testing
of Stryker double-V hull, which General Chiarelli referred to,
and then closing with an assessment--a quick assessment--of the
plans to continue testing our Army network systems over the
next several years.
Unfortunately, with regard to the testing of the E-IBCT
[Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team] systems that was conducted
last year, my assessment remains the same, actually, as it was
based on the results of the testing that was conducted a year
prior to that, which is that with the exception of the small
unmanned ground vehicle the systems under test really
demonstrated very little, if any, military utility.
The unattended ground sensors provided the test units
little useful tactical intelligence. The images that they
provided were frequently blank or contained little, if any,
useful information.
The sensors were difficult to conceal and easily identified
by the opposing force, which precluded their utility.
Connecting them to the network was complex, and in fact, the
majority of the time during a test the soldiers did not succeed
in connecting the sensors to the network.
And also, since the information that was collected that was
useful was useful primarily locally to the units that were
actually in charge of the sensors there really wasn't much
point in trying to connect the sensors to the network, although
some of them can only be controlled if they are actually
connected to the network.
The primary purpose of the network integration kit and its
key component, the Joint Tactical Radio System ground mobile
radio, which I will refer to as the GMR, is to provide the
mobile adaptive Internet, enabling information from the sensors
to be shared among all echelons of command during combat.
Because the sensors provided essentially no useful information
the key function that the NIK, the network integration kit, has
was not demonstrated during the test.
Now, the NIK and the GMR, while providing the mobile
adaptive Internet, actually have many more purposes than just
that, and in fact, the GMR is planned to replace a number of
the existing radios, including radios that provide secure voice
communications for the soldiers. This was the first time that
the secure voice communications capability of the GMR was
tested under operationally realistic conditions, and 70 percent
of the time it didn't work, which meant that the test units had
to rely on the existing legacy radios that they had, or if they
didn't have them they had to use runners, which is something
that hasn't been done regularly since World War II.
The NIK startup and reboot times were very long, in excess
of the 25-minute requirement. The NIK was complex to operate
and the soldiers expressed little confidence in it, frequently
turning it off or putting it in standby when they went on
offensive missions.
Also, there were critical information assurance
vulnerabilities that were found in the NIK. Now, the Army
reports that it has fixed the last three problems that I
mentioned and we will have an opportunity to test those fixes
during the upcoming tests this spring and this summer, that
General Chiarelli mentioned and I will touch on briefly at the
end of my remarks.
The Class 1 Block 0 Unmanned Aerial System was not useful
in offensive operations due to its weight and bulkiness. It was
not useful in situations requiring surprise because it is very
loud.
It was most useful when used from a static defensive
position, and it was meant to be used in much more--in many
more situations than those. It was also unreliable and crashed.
The unit showed a preference for the existing Raven
Unmanned Aerial System over the Class 1 UAS because the Raven
is quieter, was easier to deploy, and had longer endurance.
The small unmanned ground vehicle, as I mentioned, did
provide useful military capability. It can be used for remote
investigation of potential threats, such as improvised
explosive devices.
It is also used to support a range of other tactical
missions, including clearing buildings or caves and traffic
control points, but its utility is limited by the fact that--
for example, in a building if it goes around a couple of a
corners and the building has, you know, rather thick walls the
operator loses radio communications with the unmanned ground
vehicle and has to go retrieve it. And in a number of instances
during the tests that exposed the operator and the operator was
scored as being killed.
So there can be improvements made to the small unmanned
ground vehicle but it does provide useful military capability.
There were several lessons learned, that I mentioned in my
written testimony, from this experience with the E-IBCT
systems. I think the most important one for me is that rigorous
testing of these systems beginning as early as possible is
really mandatory.
These systems originated in the Future Combat Systems
program, which started back in 2000. After 9 years we did
operationally realistic tests of these systems. We found that
the majority of them didn't provide military utility.
I can say, I think without challenge, that that should have
been discovered much sooner and could have been discovered much
sooner if more rigorous developmental testing had been done
than was.
With regard to the Stryker double-V-shaped hull, we have
been doing a robust test program, both live fire and
operational, of that vehicle to support deployment in June
2011. That is just one of many examples I can cite of doing
rapid, robust testing to support rapid fielding of such a
system.
The preliminary results of that live fire testing are very
positive. It indicates that the Stryker double-V hull provides
substantially increased protection to crew relative to the
existing flat-bottom Strykers, as they are called, that are
deployed in the theater.
But that testing also indicates--and it was the first time
comprehensive testing was done of the existing flat-bottom
Strykers--that they provide better-than-expected protection of
the crew, and in fact, in a number of instances meet the
threshold protection requirements that are levied upon the all-
terrain version of the mine resistant ambush protected
vehicles. However, there is testing that remains to be done of
the Stryker double-V hull in order to assure that all of its
variants provide needed protection.
Nonetheless, I support fielding the system as soon as
possible based on these test events.
As far as Army network testing is concerned, this summer's
integrated network baseline event is going to be the Army's
first major test within its fiscal year 2011-2012 integrated
evaluation schedule, and General Chiarelli talked about his
plan to do this continuous testing in order to support rapid
fielding, and I certainly support that strongly. In this
particular case this summer the Army intends to conduct six so-
called limited user tests under operationally realistic
conditions to support production or fielding decisions for
systems, including the Joint Tactical Radio System ground
mobile radio.
I am focused in that test, as far as the GMR is concerned,
on demonstrating that, notwithstanding the somewhat
disappointing results of the tests last year, that the radio
can be used in a 20- to 30-node network to rapidly provide
useful information to soldiers in combat on the battlefield.
I am concerned about the testing that is planned, primarily
because in order to make this testing worthwhile the requisite
planning has to be done and that is behind schedule. The
individual systems that will compose the network, how they will
interact with one another, where they will be deployed, at what
echelons, is yet to be determined, even though we are supposed
to start testing in June.
And the Army Test and Evaluation Command has not yet
developed a plan for conducting the tests, collecting data, and
evaluating the data. We are late to need for all that
information and we are working with the Army to develop it as
quickly as possible, but if we are not able to get that
information in line here very quickly then we run a risk that
this first major event will not produce all the information we
need.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilmore can be found in the
Appendix on page 76.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Sullivan. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes,
members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to
discuss Army modernization. My oral statement will focus on
efforts to initiate the ground combat vehicle acquisition
program, developments in the initial brigade combat team
program, and emerging plans for the future tactical network. I
have a written statement I would like to submit for the record.
I will begin with the ground combat vehicle program. After
several false starts the Army now appears to have reduced the
GCV's expected capabilities in favor of a strong focus on
mature technologies to control cost.
However, we believe there are critical questions that must
be addressed as the Army begins technology development on that
system. These include questions about the urgency of the need
for the vehicle, the depth of the analysis supporting the
preferred concept, the feasibility of a 7-year delivery
schedule, and whether the program will be able to deliver key
capabilities using only mature technologies.
It is imperative, in our opinion, that the Army demonstrate
the match between those requirements it needs and the available
resources before it proceeds past a Milestone B decision by the
spring of 2013.
With regard to the first and second increments of the
Initial Brigade and Combat Team Systems, the director of
operational tests has indicated that most demonstrated little
or no military utility in recent user tests. In response, the
Army decided not to pursue the second increment and terminated
all but two of the first increment's systems, the small
unmanned ground vehicle and the network integration kit.
However, the Army still assesses the maturity of two
technologies critical to the kit's performance: the wideband
networking waveform and the soldier radio waveform. It has very
low maturity at this point and still risky. We believe this
raises legitimate questions about whether procurement of up to
181 units is appropriate at this time.
The results of these tests have prompted the Army to review
its requirement-setting process to determine how validated
requirements that have come through TRADOC [Training and
Doctrine Command] can translate into little or no military
utility. One explanation may be that these systems were spun
out of the Future Combat System concept and the Army
restructured the acquisitions without an adequate analysis of
the new post-FCS operational environment.
Finally, the Army Tactical Network has recently been
established as a special interest portfolio. I think the last
panel talked a little bit about that. The Army is now
developing an integrated network architecture and a
comprehensive acquisition strategy for it and plans to deliver
that strategy, we have been told, sometime this month, in
March. The Army's first step is to establish an understanding
of the network requirements and develop strategies to manage a
number of communications command and control acquisitions in a
coordinated fashion.
These recent developments in Army acquisition present new
questions for the Army that it really must address. It is not
helpful to promise early capabilities, as we have seen here, if
they are not technically mature or reliable.
Last year we cautioned that moving too fast with immature
designs could cause additional delays as contractors
concurrently address technology, design, and production issues.
The Army must now incorporate that lesson as it examines its
current acquisition strategies.
After a rough start the Army has shown a willingness to
rethink its original ground combat vehicle acquisition
approach, for example. However, the acquisition strategy is
still very ambitious, allowing just 4 years of product
development before delivering its first vehicle.
During the next 2 years in technology development the Army
must determine whether this proposed timeframe is sufficient.
If not, it must be prepared to add time and resources to the
development of the ground combat vehicle and it must retain the
flexibility and the resolve, frankly, to ensure that the right
work gets done now. And that means good systems engineering,
good technology development, and good requirements definition.
The GCV acquisition, if done right, could be a breakthrough
for Army acquisitions. However, if the risks are not
appropriately accounted for right now it could end up in the
same failed position that the Army found itself in with the FCS
and other programs.
More importantly, decisions on whether and how the ground
combat vehicle program enters the acquisition process will
define how recent acquisition reform legislation will actually
be implemented. These decisions will be symbolic, from that
standpoint.
The Congress and the department have enacted acquisition
reforms in both legislation and policy, and now is the time to
enforce those reforms by making the tough decisions at the
service, the department, and at the congressional levels. If
this program does not measure up to the standards in law and in
policy, yet is approved and wins funding, it will be a setback
to acquisition reform.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I will
be happy to answer any questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan and Mr.
Graveline can be found in the Appendix on page 86.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Graveline, for joining us. I understand you
will be available for questions.
Mr. Graveline. Yes, sir. Happy to be here.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Let me turn now to my good friend and ranking member, Mr.
Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Gilmore, in your testimony you raised some concerns
about how the Army will conduct a major network testing event
at Fort Bliss this summer, as you made mention. Can you be a
little more specific about your concerns, aside from the
comments that you made in--I guess putting it in context in
terms of the requirement to be able to function in an
integrated manner?
Mr. Gilmore. My concern is that we don't know how many GMRs
are going to be in the test. We don't know what units will have
them at what levels. We don't know what kind of information the
test units will try to transmit over the mobile Internet.
Absent that kind of information, it is very difficult to
plan for the test. We also don't know the same thing for WIN-T
and some of the other systems that are going to be tested.
We don't know what the Army's plan is for collecting data.
We don't know that the Army is going to have sufficient
capacity to collect the digital information needed to do a full
assessment of the performance of the systems.
These are things that we would expect, at this point, to
already know. Hopefully we will know them by the middle of this
month, around the 18th of March. That is the current schedule
on which this information should be provided. However,
originally it was supposed to have been provided a month ago.
And if we are going to start testing in June and we don't
know how many radios are going to be on the--you know, on the--
in the test, who is going to be using them, what they are going
to be trying to use them to do, how the information is going to
be collected, that is a concern.
Mr. Reyes. If you were us, what would be your
recommendations as to the--first of all, the ability to conduct
the test; secondly, the ability to track the data that you are
concerned about; and third, how the results would be utilized?
What would be your recommendations?
Mr. Gilmore. First of all, we can conduct the tests but we
have to plan appropriately and we have to have enough time to
do that planning. In fact, that was a lesson learned from the
operational testing of the E-IBCT systems in 2009, where we had
a good plan but we couldn't execute it and so we didn't get as
much information as we needed in 2009.
We can conduct the tests. We need sufficient time to plan
them and we need to make sure that the Army Test and Evaluation
Command is staffed and has the infrastructure necessary to
collect the data and analyze it.
So at this point my recommendation would be--and this may
be not greeted with joy by some senior leaders in the Army--my
recommendation would be that we wait until the end of the
window for testing this summer in order to do the test. There
is a window over which it could be conducted.
Currently, it is planned to begin at the beginning of that
window, at the earliest possible time. I would recommend, at
this point, that we look hard at giving ourselves a little more
time to plan the test--not delaying it, you know, a
significantly long amount of time, but maybe delaying it about
6 weeks so that we have sufficient time to plan the test so
that it can be executed in such a way that it gives us the
information that we really need to support General Chiarelli's
desire--and I fully support it--to get this equipment out into
the field as quickly as we can.
Mr. Reyes. So based on your work, your concerns are
predicated on either the lack of information, or lack of access
to the information, or--what is the basis for your----
Mr. Gilmore. It is not the lack of access to information.
We are working well with the Army. They are sharing information
as they have it, so there is no problem with access to
information. It is just they have not yet been able to figure
this out.
And that is not a criticism of, you know, of the Army. I
don't mean this as a harsh criticism at all. This is going to
be one of the most complex tests the Army has ever conducted of
its communication systems, and it will be a comprehensive test.
And I support it. We need to do comprehensive tests of these
networks.
But, because it is comprehensive and it is so complex--and
this is the first time we are attempting it, so we are just
beginning to learn how to do this--we need to make sure that we
have enough time to make this test a success. And then as we
move forward we will learn and we will be able to support the
Army's desire and General Chiarelli's vision to do these tests
every few months, every year, and have them yield the
information we need to get this equipment out into the field
quickly.
But this is the first one. It is very complex, and so I
would recommend that we take a little more time to make sure
that it is a success.
Mr. Reyes. I guess the obvious question is, have you made
those recommendations and what have--what has the Army----
Mr. Gilmore. I have discussed this with General Dellarocco,
who is the commander of the Army Test and Evaluation Command,
and we are working on it. He shares a number of my concerns. Of
course, he and the Army leadership are reluctant, until they
absolutely have to, to admit that a delay may be in order.
And they may come up with this information in the next
couple of weeks and it may be sufficiently comprehensive that I
would then evaluate that a delay is not needed. I don't mean to
completely prejudge this. I am just expressing a concern
because this information is already late to need.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. Thank you.
Just one more question for Mr. Sullivan.
In your testimony you raised concerns about the 7-year
schedule to the ground combat vehicle.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reyes. However, the Army is still evaluating, as we
understand it, the three bids it received from the defense
industry. So I guess what I am wondering is how can you assess
that the schedule is ``high risk'' if you haven't seen what the
different companies will propose?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, I think, I guess to clarify that a
little bit, it is not necessarily that we see it at high risk
at this point. We haven't seen enough, I guess. But just
judging from past history and how these programs have gone
before, 7 years is a very ambitious schedule. So what we have
is a lot of questions.
I think that is probably--you know, right now there are a
lot of questions and it may take a year or so to sort these
out. But what we are really concerned about is if, when they do
get to a Milestone A and a Milestone B we want to make sure
that the decisionmakers make decisions based on really good
knowledge.
So, you know, what we look for is the maturity of the
technologies they are using and to make sure that their
required capabilities they are going for are really doable.
Right now we are waiting to see. I guess that is the best way
to put it.
Mr. Reyes. Fair enough. And since the Army has stated that
they are taking an incremental approach to the development is
it possible that the, you know, that the first phase, the first
increment will not achieve all the requirements based on the
benchmarks and that it is designed that way, to----
Mr. Sullivan. Yes. In fact, we would----
Mr. Reyes [continuing]. Develop it slowly--slower and more
methodically?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir. In fact, that is what we have
advocated. And, you know, we have done a lot of work looking at
best practices on how to develop products and we have always
said that the--if you can do it in a knowledge-based way, you
know, where you really, truly understand your requirements and
you do it incrementally, not in such a revolutionary fashion,
you know, like a lot of the weapon systems where they begin
inventing things, that is the best way to do it because you--as
long as you are delivering needed value to the warfighter and
improved value over what they have and you are getting that to
the warfighter a lot quicker, we see that as a win-win.
So the first increment, you know, not being real sexy and a
big bang or anything, we--you know, as long as it meets the
warfighter's needs that is a good thing.
Mr. Reyes. And based on General Chiarelli's testimony
earlier, the manner in which the Abrams tank--you know, he
mentioned it has been upgraded numerous times and that is
basically, at least the way I understood it, that is basically
the approach they are using for the GCV. Is that, in your mind,
a good approach? Is that----
Mr. Sullivan. That is the approach we would actually like
to see. We will believe it when we see it, I guess, is one way
to put it.
Mr. Reyes. All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Dr. Gilmore, one of the striking outcomes of the 2010
limited tester using of the Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team
equipment was that a majority of performance requirements were
demonstrated, but in spite of that the equipment provided
little or no military utility for the force. How could this
have happened, sir?
Mr. Gilmore. I can't give you a completely definitive
answer. I can give you my impressions.
The requirements that existed tended to be, for the most
part, what I would characterize as technical performance
specifications that engineers could relatively easily measure.
So there were requirements for the resolution of the cameras
used in the unattended ground sensors, for example.
What the requirements didn't specify was that the sensors
should be capable of being easily concealed. This was a problem
for both sets of sensors--the urban unattended ground sensors,
which are, you know, similar in appearance to the kinds of
sensors that the alarm company I use in my home sticks up on my
wall, as well as the tactical unattended ground sensors, which
are larger sensor sets that are placed outside.
One of the problems with those--well, there were several
problems with them, but one of the problems with those is that
in order to connect to the network there is a large antenna
that sticks up where the sensor field is, basically saying,
``In case, enemy, you were wondering where the sensors are,
they are right over here where this antenna is.''
So the primary problems seem to be--and this is not unique
to Army programs--is that the requirements were stated mostly
in terms of technical specifications that were easily
measured--and they must--and those technical specifications
certainly have to be satisfied in order for the systems to be
useful. In other words, the camera did have to have sufficient
resolution for you to be able to recognize a face, for example,
or recognize a human versus someone else--something else. But
they aren't sufficient to guarantee military utility.
To fix this problem--and in fact, I think the Decker-Wagner
panel, in its recommendations, addressed some of these problems
with requirements, and I agree with a number of their findings,
but we need to get the operators involved much sooner in the
development of requirements. It shouldn't be a bureaucratic
process. The operators need to get involved early on.
And I would suggest that the testers should get involved
early on, particularly people from my office. The law last year
made my office an official advisor to the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, and I view that as a good thing. We are
participating in JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council]
deliberations.
But that is not sufficient. We have to get involved earlier
in the--when the services themselves, before they bring the
requirements to the JROC, when they are actually developing
them, to give them our perspectives and our lessons learned on
what we have found useful when we have done testing and what we
haven't. And we also monitor what goes on in the field.
And then also, we can advise them on whether requirements
are technically realistic or not, based on our experience. And
then when they are technically realistic, if they are, we can
advise them on what the implications are for testing of those
requirements.
So getting more people involved earlier, particularly the
real operators and the testers who have a lot of experience,
would be very useful. And I think that that is consistent with
some of the recommendations made by the Decker-Wagner panel.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
We understand that the results of the 2009 limited tester--
user testing were obscured by poor reliability of the equipment
being tested. Are you more confident with the results of the
2010 limited user testing?
Mr. Gilmore. Yes, I am. The reliability of many of the
systems was, as you note, very poor in the 2009 testing, but
with regard to operational effectiveness we saw many of the
same things in 2010, albeit with substantially improved
reliability, with the exception of systems like the unmanned
aerial system--we saw, essentially, the same kinds of things.
In the 2009 limited user test we saw that the majority of
the images taken by both sets of sensors were blank or blurry
and didn't provide useful information. We saw that the UAS was
noisy and difficult to pack around and had limited utility.
So unfortunately the answer is yes, I am--you know, I am
confident that the assessment that we generated is correct.
Mr. Bartlett. In regard to weapon systems taking too long
to get into production, some believe that we might shorten that
time by reducing the quantity of testing. Can you--in this
regard what should the individual services be doing that they
currently aren't now doing to work more effectively and
efficiently with your organization?
Mr. Gilmore. Let me comment first on this proposition that
we should be, you know, cutting back on testing. My office
doesn't want to do gold-plated testing. We don't want to do any
more testing than is required.
But we do want to do testing that is sufficiently robust so
that decisionmakers here in the Congress and in the executive
branch have the information they need as quickly as they can
get it to make decisions on these systems, which frequently
cost many billions if not tens-of-billions of dollars, and that
is an important mission my office has under the law. But even
more importantly, we want the information to be available to
the commanders in the field and the soldiers in the field so
that they understand what they are getting and, just as
importantly, what they are not getting.
And my office has demonstrated, in the case of double-V
hull, in the case of testing of the mine resistant ambush
protected vehicles--both the original versions of the vehicles
and then the all-terrain versions of the vehicles--and the
ongoing testing of the Gray Eagle ER/MP [Extended-Range/Multi-
Purpose] UAV, in which my office took the initiative to combine
testing and training at the National Training Center so that we
could not only get test data but also train the units, because
we saw that they weren't being trained sufficiently when they
were being deployed as part of the quick reaction packages that
are now being deployed to Afghanistan.
We want to do testing as quickly as possible to get
equipment that works into the field so that the soldiers in
combat can use it. But what I mentioned as a lesson learned
here I think is a clear lesson learned, and that is, to do
that--to get equipment into the field quickly--you need to do
robust, rigorous testing early and often.
And so one of the things that I have been pushing, even
though I am in charge of operational testing--the law says I
can advise on developmental testing. I have been pushing for
earlier, more rigorous developmental testing, and I see that,
unfortunately, in many instances, including the E-IBCT systems,
that hasn't been done. We need to do that.
Then I will not be giving you these pessimistic operational
test reports, which I do not enjoy giving you. It is much
better if we can detect these problems early when they can be
fixed more cheaply or we can make an informed decision that,
you know, fixing these problems really isn't going to be cost
effective. It isn't really going to be feasible. We need to
stop and pursue a different approach.
So I think it is key to do rigorous, robust testing--not
gold-plated testing. If we do it and if we plan for it, that
will enable us to get these systems into the field more
quickly. Not as quickly as we often plan for, because
unfortunately the Department of Defense still is the department
of wishful thinking in many ways, but more quickly than will
otherwise happen if we have to redo tests, redesign equipment,
restructure programs, with all the efficiency and increased
costs that that yields. So I hope that answers your question,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
In your testimony you mentioned that developmental testing
is a key to successful operational testing. How can we improve
the relationship between developmental testing and operational
testing?
Mr. Gilmore. Oh, and this gets to the one question that you
asked me previously that I actually didn't answer, and so I
will try to do that now: You need to get the testers involved
early. Just as I said we need to be involved early in the
development of requirements, we need to be involved early in
the programs, once the program's offices are set up and once
the program managers are installed.
And we are willing to do that; we are doing that. For
example, we have done it in Stryker double-V hull. We are doing
it in Gray Eagle. I can go down the list.
If you get the testers involved early--and I can cite you
many examples in all of the services where that is happening; I
can also cite you some examples where it is not happening. For
example, it didn't occur in the Joint Strike Fighter program
until within the last year-and-a-half, and particularly with
the advent of Admiral Venlet taking charge of that program.
The restructuring that occurred in JSF [Joint Strike
Fighter] under Secretary Carter and Admiral Venlet--it dealt
with problems that are mentioned in detail in several of the
DOT&E [Director, Operational Test & Evaluation] annual reports
preceding my assumption of this office but continuing in the
report that I issued last year--in the reports I issued last
year and this year.
So getting us involved, having a dialogue with us,
listening to our concerns, let us understand what the concerns
of the program managers are because they are always under the
gun for time and schedule and we understand that and we want to
help them out in both regards--but getting us involved early
and getting the developmental testers involved earlier, and
doing more robust governmental testing as well as contractor
testing--on a number of these contractors that have been led
over the last decade we have been relying on the contractors to
do the testing and the record is not very good, so I think we
need to reinvigorate government developmental testing. All
those things will clearly help.
Mr. Bartlett. Sir, across the department we have trouble
during operational testing. How much of that do you think is
due to a lack of quality developmental testing along with
trying to test immature technologies?
Mr. Gilmore. The short answer is, much of it. I think it
was true in the case of E-IBCT. It has been true, for--another
example is the advanced anti-radiation guided missile.
Early last year I was presented a test plan for operational
testing of that missile. I reviewed the developmental testing
that had been done, which was just a few shots. My response
was, to the Navy acquisition leadership, ``I am not going to
prevent you from going to operational testing because I know
you will learn a lot from it, but I think you are also going to
be disappointed by the results.''
So they took the missiles, they put them on the aircraft,
and the missiles started to fail for a variety of different
reasons. A variety of different failure modes manifested
themselves.
The planes would take off, the operational test squadron;
they would have to turn back because the missiles failed and
couldn't be fired. This happened so often that the
operational--the commander of the operational test squadron
said, ``'We are going to stop testing. We can't fire the
missiles. We can't test. And there are so many different
failures occurring we don't know what is happening.''
So they stopped the operational test, which was
unfortunately what I had thought would probably happen, based
on my review of what the developmental testing had been--was.
Now they have been working on the missiles to try and fix the
problems. I got a report just last week that they have,
unfortunately, still been exhibiting a lot of failures, many of
which are not yet completely understood.
These are problems that should not surface for the first
time during operational testing. They should be worked out
during developmental testing, and unfortunately they are not.
So again, the short answer to your question is yes, that is
clearly a problem and I hope that we can work to fix it. Now,
it is hard. It is hard even when budgets are fat, and the
budgets are not fat now.
And it is very hard for a program manager who is under the
gun for budget and schedule to take additional time and spend
additional money for testing. Then it comes to operational
tests and I have to report very straightforwardly, both to the
Secretary of Defense and to you, what the results are.
And those results, when they are stark and they are
publicized in that manner, then force them to go back and
restructure the program and relook. And that is a good thing--
better late than never--but it would be much, much better if
that happened sooner.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sullivan, as the Army proceeds to implement its network
investment strategy what advice would you offer the Army on how
to proceed? What are the major areas of risk for the Army to
focus its management attention?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, I think most importantly is the idea
that they do it incrementally, you know, which I think they are
trying to do now anyway. And the director here has been talking
an awful lot about developmental testing and immature
technologies and things like that. I think they have to work
with technologies in advance in order to make sure they are
mature.
As we know, the network integration kits, for example have
immature technologies. They were ready to go to procurement
with this. In fact, they procured 81 kits already and they
still have immature technologies on that.
So in a way I think they are doing a lot of the things that
we probably would recommend, and maybe Mr. Graveline could
weigh in on this. But they are taking an incremental approach.
They are kind of decentralizing this.
This is not the Future Combat Systems system of systems
operation anymore, and they are not relying as much on the
information and--you know, the ground combat vehicle, for
example, is going to be a big, heavy vehicle again so that, you
know, it can have a lot of power and carry a lot of subsystems.
They have reduced the emphasis on information cutting through
the fog of war.
I don't know, Bill, if you have anything to add.
Mr. Graveline. I would just echo some of the things that
Mike said, was about the incremental approach, and building on
the current foundation of the network that they already have,
because there are already a lot of the pieces are in place in
the current forces now. And then secondly, their approach for
demonstrating on a regular basis at Fort Bliss, building up the
network over time there, having the operational forces working
with it on a regular basis, working out the bugs, learning the
best ways how to use it, that is just--it is a very good
approach.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
As the Army approaches the launch of the technology
development phase of the ground combat vehicle what do you see
as the major areas of risk for this program to meet its
performance expectations within 7 years?
Mr. Sullivan. I think, as I was talking with Congressman
Reyes about that, it is hard to tell right now really what the
risks are. We do know that they had an extreme amount of risk,
I think, with their first RFP in the areas of armor. You know,
I think they had a lot of very, very immature technologies they
were looking for for armor protection, and then a lot of the
sensors on there, a lot of the 360-degree protection that they
were looking for was calling for technologies that were pretty
high-risk and pretty immature.
Now, they pulled back the RFP. They looked at it again and
we have been told that they reduced the need for a lot of those
technologies. They have reduced the capability in order to be
able to control time and cost a little bit more.
The question--so there is a risk there--are they going to
get enough bang for their buck? And, you know, that is kind of
the balance, I think, that you have to play when you try to go
for an incremental approach like that.
So the risk on ground combat vehicle now is, number one, we
probably would like to take a better look at what the RFP
really calls for, what technologies they are trying to
integrate into a system, and then in that short period of time
whether or not they can do, you know, kind of a clean sheet of
paper design. There is a lot of integration risk, I guess,
too--not just technology, but system integration risk. They
need a lot of systems engineering done early on that program.
Mr. Bartlett. You questioned in your written statement
whether the Army's final assessment of the reduced GCV
requirements during its analysis of alternatives was
sufficiently robust. Can you expand a bit on this?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes. I think when we looked at the first RFP
that went out--first of all, they initiated the beginnings of
the program before the analysis of alternatives was complete,
so they kind of had an RFP out there for some exotic
technologies needed to meet the capabilities before they had
the analysis done. When the analysis--the original analysis of
alternatives came in for the first set of requirements it came
in and said that this was a very risky--basically there was no
way that they could accomplish this in 7 years; there was too
much technology risk, too much integration risk, you know, the
industrial base probably wasn't fully prepared for this.
But that is when the Army take it--and they said, I think
they put an estimate on the eventual unit cost of the ground
combat vehicle somewhere between $18 million and $23 million,
which busted the Army's budget. The Army is looking for a
target of somewhere around $10 million.
To the Army's credit, that is when they pulled that RFP
back. When they sent the new one out with the new set of
requirements that were lower the analysis team looked at that
again but we don't believe that they did a full analysis. In
fact, we would recommend--one thing that we would recommend at
this point in the ground combat vehicle is that they do a
robust, very quantitative analysis of this new RFP before they
get too much further down the road.
They did a kind of a qualitative assessment. I don't want
to--the team looked at it. They didn't do the modeling and
simulation they had done before, they just kind of looked at
the changes they made and looked at the delta and said, ``Yes,
this looks less risky,'' more or less.
Mr. Bartlett. I have a couple questions about lessons we
learned with the procurement of MRAPs. How long was it from
``we need it'' to ``we had it''?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, I will be a little bit fuzzy on this
but I think it was within a couple of years when they--you
know, once an urgent need statement went in to the time they
delivered the first systems I think was within 2 years. Is that
right?
Mr. Graveline. Yes, I believe so. There seemed to be some
lag from the--there was some tracing back of the original needs
from the warfighters, and that seemed to take some time to get
up to the right levels and get the needs statements----
Mr. Sullivan. But suffice it to say it was an efficient
process.
Mr. Graveline. Yes.
Mr. Bartlett. It certainly was. And is the ground combat
vehicle so enormously more complex? Does it have so many more
required capabilities?
My understanding is that MRAPs have done pretty much what
we wanted it to do and we kind of bypassed all of our very
meticulous checkpoints to get it there as quickly as we could
and we really did. We got it there in a couple of years.
You are looking at a program here that is 7 years--three-
and-a-half times longer--and you are questioning whether it is
doable or not? What kind of lessons have we learned from the
procurement of MRAPs that might help us here? Do we really need
to go through--this really was revolutionary, wasn't it?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, the MRAP--it was--it certainly was an
incredible development and acquisition program to meet an
extremely urgent need. It met the need.
I don't know that it was a revolutionary--I mean, basically
what they did----
Mr. Bartlett. I didn't mean, sir, that the platform was
revolutionary----
Mr. Sullivan. Right.
Mr. Bartlett [continuing]. I meant the procurement was
revolutionary.
Mr. Sullivan. The speed of time it took for them to get
that fielded was incredible.
Mr. Bartlett. It was incredible.
Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, could I----
Mr. Bartlett. Yes.
Mr. Gilmore [continuing]. Offer something here?
We were already building--MRAPs were already being built.
It is a very heavy armored truck. It was not a great leap
forward in technology.
Mr. Bartlett. But it met our needs, did it not?
Mr. Gilmore. And it met our needs----
Mr. Bartlett [continuing]. The question, do we really need
all of these technologies to meet our needs since the MRAPs
obviously did?
Mr. Gilmore. It depends upon what those needs are. The
needs in the case of MRAP were clear and relatively simple:
Protect crew from underbody blasts----
Mr. Bartlett. Right.
Mr. Gilmore [continuing]. Which was actually something the
Army hadn't really thought about a lot prior to the experience
in Iraq because it hadn't had that experience. The South
Africans had and so they had already designed the predecessors
of the MRAPs that we have and were already building them, as
were others.
So if you are not going to take a revolutionary leap
forward you can design and test in parallel, and produce in
parallel with testing, and get the equipment into the field
very quickly.
And, you know, is it possible, in my view, to do a ground
combat vehicle in 7 years or even less than 7 years? Yes. But
it depends upon what kind of requirements you are trying to
impose.
If you are trying to impose a great leap forward in sensor
technology or active protection system technology then you may
need 7 years or you may need more. If you are trying to build
an upgraded version of a Bradley you can do that relatively
quickly.
So, you know, the requirements and the schedule go
together. And by the way, the budgets are coupled in there,
too; the costs are coupled in there, too.
Now, I have heard--and, you know, it is expressed by senior
leaders in the Army, ``Well, only once every 20 years or so do
we get an opportunity to build a new ground combat vehicle so
we want to get the best that we possibly can,'' and I
understand that view. But if we want to get the best that we
possibly can and that turns into a revolutionary leap forward
then it will take time to get it. If we are willing to settle
for somewhat less then we can do it more quickly.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Sullivan. One thing I would say about the ground combat
vehicle now is that if you think about it, really they are
doing, you know--what we are talking about really, the period
of time where you are investing very, very large sums of money
in product development, that really isn't going to begin on
that program until 2013. So what they are talking about is that
product development period of really only 4 years.
This 2-year period they are going to do now is kind of, you
know, playing around with technologies and risk and kind of
playing in the sandbox stuff with--I mean, I know it is a lot
of money but it is a lot less money than when they finally say,
``Okay, we are going to start integrating these products and
doing all the full-scale testing on them.'' So I think we are
probably talking about 4 years, which is a little less.
And then I would say that probably, because it is kind of a
clean sheet of paper, it is going to have more capability and
probably be at more risk than an MRAP. It is going to be a
combat vehicle. It probably will be a little--it will take a
little more time.
But I get what you are saying.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Reyes has a comment, observation,
question.
Mr. Reyes. Well, you know, and mine is predicated on the
issue of immature technologies. For instance, sensors--we were
dropping long-range reconnaissance patrols on the Ho Chi Minh
Trail north of the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] in 1967, 1968, and
they were--they had these PSIDs, the portable seismic intrusion
devices, they were called, that they would just lay on the
trails because there there were no friendlies. All they needed
to know was that there was an alert, that there was somebody
coming at them on these various trails so they would put those
out there to be able to respond and they would put clamores and
all these other kinds of protective devices in place.
But my point of that is in 1972, when I was then in the
border patrol, we were using these PSIDs, you know, surplus
from Vietnam in the border patrol in 1972. So sensors have been
around for 40-plus years now that I personally worked with, and
I saw--Fort Bliss is in my district, so I saw a lot of the
soldiers that came back from--mostly veterans from Iraq--that
got a chance to evaluate the sensors, the robots. You have the
``flying keg'' [Honeywell gas-powered Micro Air Vehicle], you
know, if the wind was too high it wouldn't maneuver right and
all of these other things, but I can tell you, those soldiers
were very much impressed and said, ``We wish we could have had
these first,'' and some were veterans of Fallujah, and they
wished that they could have used robots to go down those alleys
rather than soldiers, their buddies that got killed because
they went down those alleys.
So when we talk about immature technologies we are not
talking--I hope we are not talking about sensors and we are not
talking about robots, because they have been around a long
time. We have seen them evolve very quickly, as the chairman
has said.
You know, in wartime we have the capacity and the
capability to accelerate these things because lives are on the
line. I was with Chairman Hunter, and as the chairman here was,
when we went to Quantico to test some of the armor repulsive
capability to do the V-hull and the MRAPs and stuff like that.
So I, like the chairman, think--I am all for testing and I am
all for making sure that we follow the carpenter's rule,
measure twice and cut once, but we just have to streamline this
process because we have seen it done better.
And that is why I wanted to comment on the immature
technologies, because they--sensors have been around, you know,
in my lifetime since I was a soldier going into North Vietnam
to drop these LRRPs [Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols] in
there. And I was--frankly, I was amazed that we were, still in
the combat evaluation brigade, that we were still evaluating
these things.
And I guess when I asked the questions they said it is
because they have to be part of the network. And it is not just
the squad that is using these things, like the LRRPs, that are
going to have to maneuver and respond to them; they want to
have it at the--I guess at the company level, at the battalion
level, so that they can see a fuller picture of what the
battlefield looks like. That was the reason that they gave me
why they needed to be a little more complex.
But they were--border patrol today is using those. They
bury the battery and there is nothing that sticks out except a
little reed-like antenna. So the capability to hide them was
not an issue.
Mr. Sullivan. Well, yes, I think that is an instance where
you are certainly not gold-plating the requirements, right?
They are using pretty much what they need.
Mr. Reyes. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. And, you know, I would say there are a lot of
programs--acquisition--if you look at the F-16, for example,
there is a pretty high-tech instrument, and that was a--really
when you look at it it was an incremental. The sensors on the
F-16--you know, all those sensors weren't on there on the first
one that came out in the 1970s, right? But they were able to--
they worked the tech base.
And I think sensors and subsystems do this a lot better.
When you have a platform like a ground combat vehicle, which
will eventually grow into all of these sensors as they develop,
that is something different. You know, that is where you are--
you have got to get the technologies right on that.
But, you know, you do see a lot--F-16, F-15 were examples
of pretty good acquisitions where they did that incrementally,
and you can take advantage of--you know, you grow the sensors
and grow their capabilities in the tech base. You know, you
invent and do trial and error with the S&T [Science &
Technology] money, and when they are ready they should be able
to snap into a ground combat vehicle.
That is another thing about this is open systems
architecture is critical for all of that.
Mr. Bartlett. That was going to be my final question: When
will we know enough about spiral development and open
architecture so that we can start with a platform like the
MRAPs and then have it current with technology for the next 30,
40 years of its life?
Couldn't we shorten these programs? Now we try to build
into the original platform all the bells and whistles that are
conceivable. Wouldn't it be better to start simple and put them
in when we know that we are really mature?
How far are we away from our ability to do a spiral
development with open architecture so that we can do this?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, I would hope that the Army, with the
ground combat--that is one of the things that, for example, we
would be looking for if we were asked to go in at Milestone B,
where they make the business case. You know, we have looked at
the capabilities, we have system engineered them, we have
looked at the technologies needed, we know they are mature. So
if you have a business case that has a lot of knowledge about
what you are going to build, it is not too big, it has open
systems architecture, for example, and it is going to be the
first increment but we are going to put space, power, and
cooling in there and pay attention to open systems so as new
technologies come available we can snap them in, you know plug
and play--we would expect that--that is something that we would
be looking for on the ground combat vehicle.
Mr. Gilmore. I would just say, I think we can do it now. It
is just a matter of deciding to do it.
Mr. Bartlett. So why don't----
Mr. Gilmore. I would also say we have done it before,
perhaps not with as much forethought as you are engaging in.
But the B-52 has been around for a very, very long time. It has
seen many different uses.
At the time it was built people decided to build a long-
range aircraft that could carry a lot of payload and they did
the best job of it that they could. They probably didn't try to
engage in some big analysis of what would happen even 10 years
in the future because they couldn't foresee it, but they built
a good truck of an aircraft at the time--the best one that they
could build--and it has had a lot of use since then.
So I think it is more than just thinking about the
technologies that are available. It is shifting your view of
what it is you want to do and changing the culture of it.
Mr. Bartlett. I have one last, last question. Sometimes you
can get 95 percent of the way there for half the cost of
getting 100 percent of the way there. Who is making those kind
of judgments as we move along?
Mr. Gilmore. Well, I would say that Secretary Gates has
been making them. And not everyone agrees with all of the
decisions----
Mr. Bartlett. But there are thousands of these little
things along the way in development and, you know, you ask for
something and if you only needed 95 percent of that you might
get it 2 years quicker and at half the cost. Who is out there
looking at these things saying, ``Hey, guys, do you really need
100 percent? Won't 95 percent do okay because it will cost half
as much and you will get it in half the time''? Who is doing
that kind of thing and looking at these----
Mr. Gilmore. I would say that Secretary Carter is doing
that.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay.
Mr. Gilmore. He has done it on ground combat vehicle.
I would say that General Chiarelli is doing that, and
Secretary McHugh are doing that----
Mr. Bartlett. That is kind of a 30,000-foot evaluation and
I would like to see it down at the----
Mr. Gilmore. I understand. But Under Secretary Westphal is
also getting into it. Under Secretary Westphal and General
Chiarelli are participating in these acquisition portfolio
reviews and they are bringing in their subordinates to do this,
and I would say in some sense they are training their
subordinates to do that, who will eventually replace them.
I would agree with you that there is a way to go in terms
of getting those kinds of ideas and that way of thinking down
lower into the service requirements organizations and so forth,
but clearly General Chiarelli and the Army leadership are
trying to do that. Secretary Gates is trying to do that. For
example, you know, his push to get Intelligence, Surveillance &
Reconnaissance capabilities into the theater as quickly as
possible, and I think he engaged in some teachable moments with
the Air Force leadership in that regard.
And I agree with you if your point is that is shouldn't
have to happen at the level of Secretary Gates. That is
absolutely true. But it has to start somewhere and sometimes it
has to start at the top and percolate down.
Also, constrained budgets are going to play a big role
here. There will be no choice but to try to go for the 50- and
75-percent solutions because the 90- or 95-percent solutions
simply won't be affordable.
Mr. Bartlett. Sir, by the time the Secretary gets involved
we are several billions down the road and several years late. I
would just like to see it start at the very beginning. Do you
really need that? Because if you only have to get 95 percent of
that can you live with that? That would only cost you half as
much.
People need to be asking those questions all along the
line, and my perception is those questions don't get asked. You
just take it as a requirement and try to fulfill it, never
telling them, ``Gee, do you really need that requirement or
would 95 percent of that be okay and that would really cost you
a whole lot less?''
Mr. Sullivan. The director made a good point a while back,
and I think that, you know, the culture has an awful lot to do
with this. The Army says we get to do this ground combat
vehicle; this is our only chance in 20 years. They are going to
gold-plate those requirements. They are going to make sure that
this is the best thing since sliced bread.
And that culture probably has to change a little bit, but--
--
Mr. Bartlett. If you will excuse us for just a moment to
welcome an old and dear friend.
Mr. Gilmore. Certainly, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. You will recognize him from his picture on
the wall.
Mr. Sullivan. That is Morgan Freeman, right?
Mr. Bartlett. When he sat here I sat down there at that
first chair 18 years ago.
Mr. Sullivan. The only point I guess I would make, there
are pockets of what you are talking about out there. Every once
in a while they try it. You know, I would reach back to, like,
JDAM [Joint Direct Attack Munition], the precision kit that was
a simple, kind of, you know, a very unsexy thing that did a lot
for precision strike, right? That was an 80-percent solution.
And I think there are some systems now. I think of P-8A
[Boeing Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft],
for example, which I think has made some pretty good trades--
you know, not gold-plated, just trying to get the job done. And
the reason is is because they need it because the system that
it is replacing is getting really old. So, you know, when
forced to good decisions can get made.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
You have been a great panel. Thank you very, very much for
your testimony and your service.
[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 9, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.] [See page 21.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. PLATTS
General Lennox. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 14.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 9, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Bartlett. I am pleased to see the Improved Turbine Engine
Program (ITEP) supported as an Army priority. This program greatly
reduces fuel consumption and increases power for the Black Hawk and
Apache fleets and provides the engine for the next generation
helicopter. I am concerned that all too often we make premature
selections that result in schedule and cost escalation and cancelled
programs. It is important that this program embraces competition
through flight demonstration in order to reduce risk and validate
operational capability. Please keep congress informed on the
acquisition strategy and status of this key program. Please explain
what measures the Army is taking in the acquisition strategy to ensure
there is competition beyond the Science & Technology phase and into
Flight Demonstration.
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 1. In a recent ``Inside the Army'' article there was
a quote that said the Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team is a ``great
example of how technology changes so rapidly, based on requirements
that were written a long time ago.'' Might not the same logic apply to
the various pieces of ``the network,'' Nett Warrior, and other future
Army systems still in the acquisition pipeline? What is the Army doing
now to ensure that the requirements for these systems have also not
grown stale?
General Chiarelli, General Phillips, and General Lennox. [The
information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 2. The committee noted that the Early-Infantry
Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) test results in 2010 were not very
different from the results of the 2009 E-IBCT operational tests, with
the exception of improved reliability of several systems. Our concern
is that DOD and the Army spends millions of dollars and a great deal of
institutional energy on these tests. Do you believe that the Army is
capturing and applying the lessons learned from these operational
tests?
General Chiarelli, General Phillips, and General Lennox. [The
information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 3. The committee noted that the 2010 Early-Infantry
Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) operational test not only revealed
weaknesses in several E-IBCT systems, but also noted the lack of
military utility of the network itself. The Army now has another
important network operational test planned for this summer. What is the
Army's plan should this test also reveal that soldiers and their
leaders don't see utility in these new and expensive communications
systems?
General Chiarelli, General Phillips, and General Lennox. [The
information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 4. With regards to Ground Combat Vehicle, the
committee notes that the Army plans to use mature technologies rather
than concurrently chase some future as-yet-invented ones. We agree with
that approach. However, since whatever replaces the Bradley Fighting
Vehicle will have many of the same capabilities as our latest model
Bradley fleet, has the Army considered other, non-new-materiel and
perhaps far cheaper solutions such as changes to doctrine, training,
manning, organization, etc.? For example, adding a fifth Bradley
Fighting Vehicle to mechanized infantry platoon formations?
General Chiarelli, General Phillips, and General Lennox. [The
information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 5. The Army has stated that its number one
modernization priority is the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) which may
enter production in 2017 and replace the Bradley Infantry Fighting
Vehicle. The Abrams tank will remain in the inventory for the
foreseeable future. As you know, this committee has long been concerned
over the lack of balance between investment in the Army's current and
future force. There are concerns that it may be too early to put all
our eggs in the one basket of GCV. We probably won't have a better
understanding in regards to what is doable in terms of GCV for a few
more years. In the mean time, what is the Army doing to upgrade the
current fleet including the Abrams tank in terms of RDTE and
production?
General Chiarelli, General Phillips, and General Lennox. [The
information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 6. What was the impact of terminating the Future
Combat Systems Program and what has the Army learned from recent
Limited Users Testing at Fort Bliss, TX?
General Chiarelli, General Phillips, and General Lennox. [The
information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 7. What is the extent of the Army's R&D effort to
reduce the weight of body armor systems? What are your thoughts in
establishing a task force similar to the MRAP Task Force and ISR Task
Force to accelerate these efforts?
General Chiarelli, General Phillips, and General Lennox. [The
information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 8. There is no funding in fiscal year 2012 for new
production high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV or
`humvee'). Could you please elaborate on the Army's acquisition
strategy for Humvees?
General Chiarelli, General Phillips, and General Lennox. [The
information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 9. In today's austere budget environment, can the
Army afford to procure the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) at a
base unit cost of $300-400,000 and a total unit cost of $700-800,000? I
understand the Army plans to procure about 50,000 JLTVs. How much
better than the Humvee is JLTV projected to be?
General Chiarelli, General Phillips, and General Lennox. [The
information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 10. As it currently stands, the Abrams tank program
is set to have a production break (of upgraded vehicles) in 2013 and a
full blown Abrams modernization effort isn't scheduled to begin until
2016. Some might say that it is too expensive to continue to upgrade
battle tanks just to keep the industrial base employed. However, this
issue is much larger than that. Would we let our only tactical fighter
producer close down production 5 years before its replacement was
scheduled to be procured? And while Foreign Military Sales (FMS) may
have been a possible risk mitigation in the past, the current FMS
market is uncertain. Is the Army currently looking at any alternatives
to minimize the impact of this production break? For example, is it
possible to upgraded older National Guard tanks to bring them in line
with the most modern version that the Active Duty forces have?
General Chiarelli, General Phillips, and General Lennox. [The
information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. It is my understanding that a contract to manufacture
M915 line haul tractors was competitively awarded to Freightliner, now
Daimler Trucks North American, on September 8, 2000. I also understand
it was a 7-year requirements contract, that has since been extended for
3 years on a sole source basis. Now the Army is proposing to buy
another 222 vehicles sole source using anticipated FY 11, 12 and 13
funds. It is also my understanding that the justification for the sole
source award is that competition would result in unacceptable delays
and duplicative costs.
1. Is it correct to say that the M915A5 line haul tractor the Army
is buying sole source is just an upgraded version of a vehicle designed
almost two decades ago?
General Phillips. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 2. What are the major differences in the original
configuration and the configuration of current vehicles?
General Phillips. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 3. Since it has not held a competition in nearly 11
years, how does the Army know it is getting the best truck available
for the best possible price? Is it possible that industry could provide
a safer more fuel efficient truck at less cost than the Army is paying
for the M915A5?
General Phillips. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 4. The J&A provided this committee stated that it
would take 39 months to begin full rate of production of a new line
haul tractor. That seems like a very long time to buy what is
essentially, a commercial vehicle. But assuming that is an accurate
projection, why is it unacceptable, since none of the funds requested
for FY 11 were identified for Overseas Contingency Operations?
General Phillips. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 5. The Army procured MRAP and Stryker vehicles
competitively during a time of war, why can't it buy a truck?
General Phillips. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 6. The other justification for making a sole source
award is that a competition would result in duplicative costs of $20.8
million that could not be recovered through competition. These included
buying test vehicles, operational tests, logistics costs and Armor
kits. One, how does the Army know it could not recover those costs
since it hasn't held a competition in nearly 11 years? Second, aren't
similar costs incurred as part of any acquisition? If the Army's logic
who extrapolated to every vehicle or weapon it buys, wouldn't it be
forced to continue buying the same product from the same vendor in
perpetuity?
General Phillips. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. Also, the J&A stated that Daimler would pay some of
the costs for the proposed sole source procurement. Please provide for
the record, the legal basis for this arrangement (i.e. the governing
statute, FAR provision, comptroller general decision and case law).
Please provide for the record:
a. The schedule for delivering each of the 222 vehicles the Army
plans to procure sole source to units and identify when those units are
expected to deploy to Afghanistan or Iraq.
General Phillips. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. b. The procurement history for the MRAP and Stryker
vehicles to include: the date the RFP was issued; the length of time
for safety/operational testing and date that full rate of production
began.
General Phillips. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 1. One of the striking outcomes of the 2010 limited
user testing of the Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team equipment was
that a majority of performance requirements were demonstrated but that
the equipment provided little or no military utility for the force.
From your perspective, could you offer an explanation on how this
outcome could have possibly occurred? We understand that the results of
the 2009 limited user testing were obscured by the poor reliability of
the equipment being tested. Are you more confident with the results of
the 2010 limited user testing?
Mr. Gilmore. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 2. One of the two Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team
items of equipment that is moving forward is the Network Integration
Kit (NIK). However, its performance during the 2010 limited user
testing was marginal at best. Do you think that the testing was robust
enough to either demonstrate its potential or its true limitations?
Some of the test findings were that the NIK was cumbersome to operate
and its contribution to the operating unit was quite small. Are these
correctable issues, in your view, or is there still hope for more
positive results on the NIK?
Mr. Gilmore. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 3. At the heart of the Network Integration Kit's
(NIK) problems seem to be the Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) and
its complex waveforms. Although some technical experts have expressed
grave concerns about the viability of these radios and waveforms, the
Army seems intent on going forward with them in some fashion. From a
test perspective, do we know enough yet to make an informed decision on
the future of these technologies?
Mr. Gilmore. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. 4. The Army plans on establishing the Fort Bliss
complex with a full composite brigade to, among other things, conduct
regular demonstrations of the current tactical network as well as
possible upgrades. Given the significant investments involved in this
objective, do you support the Army's network demonstration plans? Do
the DOD and Army test communities have the necessary resources to
monitor and evaluate the Army plans for network demonstrations?
Mr. Gilmore. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bartlett. One of the striking outcomes of the 2010 limited user
testing of the EIBCT equipment was that a majority of performance
requirements were demonstrated but that the equipment provided little
or no military utility for the force. From your perspective, could you
offer an explanation of how this outcome could have possibly occurred?
We understand that the results of the 2009 LUT were obscured by the
poor reliability of the equipment being tested. Are you more confident
with the results of the 2010 LUT?
Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Graveline. First of all, the requirements were
probably not thoroughly refined and vetted with the ultimate users of
the equipment. For example, the Network Integration Kit has proven to
be troublesome for the operators and its startup process is complicated
and time consuming. These are things that the operators or users may
have readily pointed out much earlier. Second, there was too much focus
on what the equipment was expected to do and not enough focus on what
burdens it may impose on the users. The Tactical Unmanned Ground Sensor
did fairly well in detecting approaching threats but it was much
heavier than expected and was time consuming to put in place and to
support. The Class I unmanned aerial system was expected to ``hover and
stare'' and send back video on enemy locations. However, it turned out
to be very noisy and that eliminated any possibility of stealthy
operations. Third, as we predicted earlier, the equipment was not
technically mature and was not ready for production or fielding, no
matter the perceived urgency in doing so. Fourth, the E-IBCT Increment
1 systems were a continuation of previous Future Combat System (FCS)-
related efforts to spin out emerging capabilities and technologies to
current forces. FCS was to be a synergistic system-of-systems. The Army
conducted a single analysis of alternatives for the program and
concluded that an FCS-equipped brigade would be more effective than
other Army combat brigades. When the FCS program was terminated, the
Army restructured the program into the E-IBCT Modernization, which
aimed to field subsets of former FCS systems to the current force.
However, this decision was not informed by analyses of alternatives for
the individual systems. Such analyses would have informed decision
makers about the systems' individual ability to satisfy a mission need
outside of the earlier FCS fighting construct, which may have provided
insights into their potential military utility. Finally, the poor
reliability of the equipment did seem to prevent an earlier
understanding of their poor military utility. Moreover, given the fact
that the evaluations of the 2010 Limited User Tests from both the Army
Test and Evaluation Command and the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation reached the same conclusions, we are confident in the
results of testing.
Mr. Bartlett. One of the two EIBCT items of equipment that is
moving forward is the NIK. However, its performance during the 2010 LUT
was marginal at best. Do you think that the testing was robust enough
to either demonstrate its potential or its true limitations? Some of
the test findings were that the NIK was cumbersome to operate and its
contribution to the operating unit was quite small. Are these
correctable issues, in your view, or is there still hope for more
positive results in the NIK?
Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Graveline. We would leave it up to the test
and evaluation experts to determine whether the 2010 limited user
testing was sufficiently robust. However, the NIK's performance in that
testing was marginal at best and it did not contribute very much to the
unit's effectiveness. This indicates that the testing was at least
robust enough to expose operational inadequacies in the NIK systems.
The Under Secretary approved additional NIK production but directed the
Army to correct a number of deficiencies and continue testing before
fielding the NIK to operating units. We believe that this is vitally
important. Only systems that are proven to be reliable and capable
should be fielded to our warfighters. Hopefully, the Army can identify
solutions to the NIK deficiencies in the coming months but those
solutions will need to be thoroughly demonstrated in testing. Moreover,
it is important to keep in mind that the Army has clearly stated that
they do not consider the NIK to be a viable, affordable, long-term
solution. We agree and do not see the need to procure any more NIKs
than those needed for testing.
Mr. Bartlett. At the heart of the NIK's problems seems to be the
JTRS and its complex waveforms. Although some technical experts have
expressed grave concerns about the viability of these radios and
waveforms, the Army seems intent on going forward with them in some
fashion. From a test perspective, do we know enough yet to make an
informed decision on the future of these technologies?
Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Graveline. The Army has been developing JTRS
radios and associated waveforms for about 13 years. Maturity levels for
the associated technologies have not improved much during that time.
While the Army has demonstrated some improved reliability at the 2010
Limited User Test and reported some success in more recent testing, the
systems have not yet proven to be militarily useful. Additional testing
is to be conducted shortly. Thirteen years of knowledge exists about
the performance of the JTRS program and associated waveforms, and it is
up to the Army, DOD, and the Congress to make the necessary and prudent
decisions based on that knowledge. We would defer to DOT&E to provide
the test perspective on the viability and future of these technologies.
Mr. Bartlett. The Army plans on establishing the Fort Bliss complex
with a full composite brigade to, among other things, conduct regular
demonstrations of the current tactical network as well as possible
upgrades. Given the significant investments involved in this objective,
do you support the Army's network demonstration plans? Do the DOD and
Army test communities have the necessary resources to monitor and
evaluate the Army plans for network demonstrations?
Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Graveline. In our acquisition best practices
work, we have advocated an incremental development approach as well as
thorough testing of systems before production and fielding. In the case
of the evolving networking systems, the Army Evaluation Task Force will
periodically receive equipment that it will test and train with so that
soldiers can provide feedback to developers for system improvements. It
will also provide Army and DOD officials with information that will
help them make production decisions and better plan fielding of the
network systems. In the past, we have commented on the task force's
potential advantages, like having a near brigade-sized unit testing
prototypes and incorporating soldier feedback into the design process.
While there may be some advantages with the Army's new process, it will
have a substantial cost. For example, the projected spending for
brigade combat team network integration, modeling, simulation, test and
evaluation for fiscal year 2011 is $169 million. Finally, we would
prefer that the test community comment on the adequacy of the resources
available to monitor and evaluate network development and
demonstration.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
Mr. LoBiondo. The Army's Fiscal Year 2012 Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation budget shows a decrease in funding for Abrams Tank
Improvement program from $107.5 million in Fiscal Year 2011 to $9.7
million in Fiscal Year 2012--close to a 90% reduction in funding.
However, in the accompanying budget material provided to the Committee,
the Army notes the Abrams tank has ``virtually reached its upper limits
for space, weight and power.'' And, the Abrams tank is expected to be
in service through 2045. Moreover, it appears the Army doesn't plan to
address engine improvements until the second increment of the Abrams
Modernization Program--which we understand could be as early as Fiscal
Year 2018.
1. How does current Abrams Modernization Program account for engine
technology insertion in the Fiscal Year 2012 budget and associated
Program Objective Memorandum?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. LoBiondo. 2. It is anticipated the engine improvements will
yield approximately 50 gallons of fuel savings per mission day; how
does the Army account for return on investment in the decision making
process for Abrams Modernization?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. LoBiondo. 3. Assuming the Army had the available resources for
power train improvements in Fiscal Year 2012, what power train
technology insertion programs could the Army implement for the Abrams
Modernization Program? Please include costs, benefits and program
element numbers for each power train technology insertion program.
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROONEY
Mr. Rooney. The Committee understands that the Army plans to extend
the Abrams service life through 2045. Based on budget information
provided to this Committee, the Army does not intend on modernizing the
engine of the Abrams tank until past 2018. The power train accounts for
60% of the annual maintenance costs for the Abrams tank. The facts
would seem to lend themselves to a far greater urgency for an engine
upgrade. The Army has not truly upgraded the Abrams engine in 20 years.
Shouldn't any decision on Abrams modernization also include
prioritizing the engine upgrade?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN
Mr. Akin. 1. The Committee understands that the Army plans to
extend the Abrams service life through 2045. Based on budget
information provided to this Committee, the Army does not intend on
modernizing the engine of the Abrams tank until past 2018. The
powertrain accounts for 60% of the annual maintenance costs for the
Abrams tank. The facts would seem to lend themselves to a far greater
urgency for an engine upgrade. The Army has not truly upgraded the
Abrams engine in 20 years. In light of this significant delay in
upgrading the engine, does the Army still support Abrams modernization?
General Phillips. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Akin. 2. Are you aware of an initiative to modernize the
current Abrams engine in such a way that would significantly increase
fuel efficiency, reducing fuel consumption by up to 17%? This
improvement equates to 50 gallon per day reduction of fuel for one
Abrams tank. With the emphasis on energy efficiency it would seem to me
we would want to reduce Abrams fuel consumption as fast as possible. In
light of the Army's energy conservation goals, does the Army believe
the Abrams Modernization program should also include fuel efficient
engines?
General Phillips. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. 1. In today's austere budget environment, can the Army
afford to procure the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) at a base
unit cost of $300-400,000 and a total unit cost of $700-800,000?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Turner. 2. I understand the Army plans to procure about 50,000
JLTVs. How much better than the Humvee is JLTV projected to be? Will
the JLTV be worth the additional cost?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Turner. 3. Originally, when were JLTVs supposed to go into
production? When are they expected to go into production now?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Turner. 4. How long are Army and Marine Corps supposed to use
these recapitalized vehicles before receiving JLTVs?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
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