[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-11]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 2, 2011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] CONGRESS.#13
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-111 WASHINGTON : 2011
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One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DUNCAN HUNTER, California LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado BILL OWENS, New York
TOM ROONEY, Florida JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia TIM RYAN, Ohio
CHRIS GIBSON, New York C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE HECK, Nevada KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Megan Howard, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 2, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Army... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 2, 2011......................................... 47
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2011
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 3
WITNESSES
Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army........ 9
McHugh, Hon. John, Secretary of the Army......................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McHugh, Hon. John, joint with GEN George W. Casey, Jr........ 55
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 51
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 53
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Smith.................................................... 117
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Akin..................................................... 124
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 122
Mr. Brooks................................................... 137
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 131
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 130
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 133
Mr. Loebsack................................................. 123
Mr. McKeon................................................... 121
Mr. Owens.................................................... 124
Mr. Rigell................................................... 133
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 137
Mr. Runyan................................................... 134
Mr. Ruppersberger............................................ 126
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 129
Mr. Smith.................................................... 122
Mr. Turner................................................... 127
Mr. West..................................................... 136
Mr. Wilson................................................... 125
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 2, 2011.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Committee come to order. Good morning. Thank
you for joining us as we consider the fiscal year 2012 budget
request for the Department of the Army. Secretary McHugh,
General Casey, thank you both for being here. As I have said
before, we are very fortunate to have both of you serving our
country.
Secretary McHugh, once again you find yourself in the hot
seat. Nine-term member of Congress and this committee's former
ranking member. I am sure glad you moved over there. General
Casey said, ``Me too.'' So that is----
Secretary McHugh. Mr. McKeon, not more than I.
The Chairman. I don't know--oh.
Secretary McHugh. I guess I should say I am glad as well.
So it is all worked out fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Without a doubt, whether a member of this
committee or as the 21st Secretary of the Army, you are a
staunch advocate for soldiers and their families. We on the
Armed Services Committee are very proud of you and of your
achievements and the things that you are doing there and we
thank you for your public service.
General Casey, you are also no stranger to this committee.
I want to take a moment to mention that this will be your last
Army posture hearing. Thirtieth vice chief of staff, commander
multinational force Iraq, 36th chief of staff, over 40 years of
selfless military service to this Nation. Pretty good for a guy
that wasn't going to go into the Service.
I know you still have much that you want to accomplish in
your time as Army chief of staff, but I thank you and your
wife, Sheila, for your service to our country, for the
leadership that you have provided for our Army and for all of
the soldiers that have served under you during those 40 years
and the ones that you served under. Great tradition. Thank you
very much.
General Casey. Thank you, Chairman.
The Chairman. I would like to mention that the ranking
member and I recently had the pleasure to visit with soldiers
at Fort Lewis in Mr. Smith's District and the National Training
Center in my district along with several members of our
committee. While at the NTC [National Training Center], we were
able to observe the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division as they
trained for their upcoming deployment to Afghanistan.
I want to mention that one of the things that I have been
very concerned about is IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] and
I thought we just weren't doing enough no matter what we are
doing, but I was very impressed both there and at Fort Lewis
where we observed the 3rd and 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
for the 2nd Infantry Division. Excellent training they were
getting to prepare them for IEDs and the things that are being
done to interdict the--get rid of the financier or get rid of
the builder or all the things that are being done by other--the
Marines, also.
We went to the Mountain Warfare Center in the Sierras and
saw them and it was a great visit, but the soldiers that we saw
training were getting excellent training and I am sure it will
save lives as they arrive in Afghanistan. It is on trips like
these and similar trips to Iraq and Afghanistan that we are
reminded why hearings such as this one are so important because
you just don't go to war with the Army you have. You go to war
with an Army who was resourced, hopefully properly, with
personnel and equipment provided by the United States Congress,
by the United States people.
As our former chairman, the great Ike Skelton used to say,
``The buck stops here,'' and I am sure he wasn't talking about
me. To that end, I remain concerned about the reduction of an
additional $78 billion from the Department's funding top line
including the $13 billion cut in 2012 ultimately leading to a
zero-percent real growth within 3 years. The Army's share of
the Department's efficiency savings is $29 billion including
$2.7 billion in the 2012 budget request.
We are told that the Army has been allowed to reinvest all
of the $2.7 billion. However, when you compare the Army's base
budget and the supplemental budget request from 2011 to 2012,
this budget request is almost $30 billion less.
I understand that the primary reason for the reduction is
based on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by this year
by the end of December. Clearly, there was a need to move
overseas contingency operations funding into the base budget,
but we need assurances that the Army was able to migrate
everything they needed from the supplemental into the base,
particularly as it relates to taking care of soldiers and the
reset of equipment.
Likewise, as Congress must learn more about the proposed
end strength reductions for the Army, the Army has borne the
brunt of two wars for the past decade and hasn't reached its
objectives for Active Component dwell time of one-to-three. In
fact, the proposed end strength reductions appear to force the
Army to settle for only a one-to-two dwell time. I would like
to know why.
In short, I cannot in good conscience ask the Army to do
more with less. Again, I thank both of you for your service to
our country and for being here today. Ranking Member Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to echo your
comments in support of--and thanks for--our two men testifying
today. Secretary McHugh, it is a great honor serving with you
on this committee for a long time. It is great to have you over
there. You certainly understand this committee and you
understand the Pentagon as well. You are in the perfect
position. You have been great to work with as Secretary of the
Army and as a member of the committee, and it is a real asset
for our country to have you there. It is great to see you back
here today.
And General Casey, congratulations on a great, great term
of service to your country. It has been great working with you.
I know you will miss these hearings more than anything, but we
appreciate your hard work on behalf of the Army and yes, I say
that facetiously, but appreciate the work you do in presenting
this. And it has been a great relationship, I believe, between
this committee and yourself. You have always done a great job
of reaching out to individual members, making sure that we are
informed and, you know, giving us a chance to understand the
issues that are so important.
So you will be missed and we appreciate your great service
to your country. And also as I said, your work with this
committee specifically has been outstanding and I have
appreciated it as I know other members have as well. And as we
go forward into this posture hearing, there are a lot of
transitions coming. As the chairman mentioned, there is talk
about what the future of force structure should be as drawdowns
continue in Iraq and hopefully at some point begin to happen in
Afghanistan.
What does that mean for the Army? But I want to assure you
and all those listening to this committee--focusing on the fact
that your Army is in the fight and protecting those who are in
the fight is our top priority. We still have, you know, 50,000
troops overall in Iraq and in Afghanistan we still have 100,000
and they are, in many cases, in the midst of a very, very
difficult fight and this committee's top priority is to make
sure that they are equipped and have the support that they need
to prosecute that fight to the best of their ability.
Now, the chairman mentioned what is, you know, our top
priority and that is IEDs. That still causes the most
casualties over there and I do want to also compliment both of
you for the work you have done, you know? Every Army base that
I have been to, you know, they take you to the IED training and
they are everyday learning directly from what is happening over
there taking it back, training the soldiers so that they will
be best prepared when they get over there to deal with that
threat. It is a constantly evolving threat, but you are
evolving with it in a way that has unquestionably saved lives
of our soldiers.
And we appreciate that work and this committee--well,
again, anything we can do to help in that area we want to do.
We know how important it is. And then the major challenge going
forward is the transition as we get back, as we begin to draw
down. What does that mean for the size of the force? I think
the chairman asks the appropriate questions. What is the
mission set that is going to be asked of our soldiers and is
the force the proper size to meet that? How do we get back into
a more regular training mission for all the threats that come
at us instead of just sort of responding as quickly as we have
to the immediate threats?
Now, what should that look like? It is not easy to tell.
How do we get the dwell times back up so we can deal with some
of the stress on the force that I know, General Casey, you have
talked about a great deal. Those are questions we need to
answer and we look forward to hearing from you today on how we
should go about meeting those threats.
In particular, we are also focused on PTSD [Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder] and traumatic brain injury, some of the things
that have more long-term impacts. How are we preparing to do
that? And I will say that when I was down at Fort Hood a few
weeks ago, I was very impressed with the overall preparation
for how you deal with the stresses and strains on the force. I
think you are making a great deal of progress on that and we
look forward to being as supportive as we possibly can.
And lastly is the modernization of the force. I know we had
some significant struggles with the future combat systems which
I believe we are pulling our way out of and I thank both of you
for your leadership on that. We do need to update, modernize
and better equip our infantry brigades. Now, the core of that
is the network.
How do we make sure that the soldiers get the information
when they need it? How can we give them total situational
awareness? You have to have the proper network to do that. I
think we have learned a lot of hard lessons in the acquisition
process about how to do that better, how to acquire equipment
in the future, hopefully in a more cost-effective manner that
gets there more quickly.
But I believe we are making progress on that. I thank both
of you. I also thank General Crowley, whom I have worked with
very closely on some of these issues, for making that progress.
I look forward to continuing to support that effort because
unquestionably, you know, information warfare places a great
deal more challenges on all of our services, but on the Army in
particular to make sure they have the best equipment when they
need it. You can't go through a 2-year--the normal acquisition
process in some cases to make sure you have that equipment
because by the time you get to the end of it, it is already 2
or 3 years out of date.
So we have learned some good lessons there. I think we are
making progress. And again, I look forward to working with you
and this committee as always stands ready to support you in any
way that we can. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 53.]
The Chairman. Thank you. The Honorable John McHugh,
Secretary of the Army, and General George W. Casey, Chief of
Staff of the U.S. Army. Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Secretary McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of--from a
somewhat prejudiced view what I believe is certainly the
leading committee in the United States House of
Representatives. It is great to be back here, although I
enjoyed the view sitting up there looking down here better. It
is terrific to see so many not old, but longstanding friends
and colleagues and to see so many new members here who have
stepped forward to serve on this great committee, and I commend
them for that action and look forward to working with them as
well.
I should note--on a sad comment. It pains all of us. I know
that Congresswoman Gabby Giffords is not with us here today. I
have to tell you from my experience working with her, she was
one of the most determined and capable legislators in the
House, but really a tireless champion for the men and women who
wore the uniform of this Nation.
And, in fact, she was one of the first members of Congress
to call me after I had been confirmed into this post and she
offered her congratulations, but she just happened to take the
opportunity to talk about the great men and women of Fort
Huachuca, which is in her district, of course.
And I remember thinking very clearly that that is Gabby,
always taking the opportunity to look out for soldiers and
their families and certainly everyone in the Army family joins
me in wishing her a speedy recovery and we look forward to
seeing her back in her rightful place on this distinguished
committee. And our thoughts and prayers go out as well to those
innocent victims of that tragic day, and may they quickly find
peace and comfort in the days ahead.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to join with you in
recognizing this great soldier on my left. As you mentioned,
this is the last time--at least he hopes it is the last time
that he will appear before this committee as the chief of staff
of our great Army. It is a career that has spanned four
distinguished decades and he has held numerous positions at
every level, but one thing has remained constant through all of
those positions. He has done the right thing for our soldiers
and their families and he has had a tireless determination to
serve our Nation.
And I can tell you that over the last nearly 18 months,
George and I have not only operated as partners, but I think we
have become close friends in spite of the fact that he is a
Boston Red Sox fan. So I do look forward to working with
another exceptional leader, the presidential nominee, General
Marty Dempsey, should the Senate so concur, but the Army, this
Nation, and I will truly miss George and Sheila. They are great
Americans.
I want to thank----
General Casey. I thought you were going to propose. I get
constructive credit for the hearing.
Secretary McHugh. No, I wasn't, but nice try. I want to
thank each of you for your steadfast support of our 1.1 million
soldiers, 279,000 civilians and their families. With the
leadership and great support of this Congress and particularly
this committee, America's Army continues to be at the forefront
of combat counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and security
assistance operations in nearly 80 countries around the world.
In Iraq, our soldiers and civilians began one of the
largest and most complex logistical operations in our Nation's
history. As we continue to draw down our forces to meet the
December 31, 2011, deadline, we have already closed or
transferred over 80 percent of the bases that we maintained to
the Iraqi authorities. We have reduced the number of U.S.
personnel by over 75,000 and we have redeployed some 26,000
vehicles back to other operations.
Having recently visited Iraq for my 16th time just last
January, I can validate firsthand the true enormity of the
retrograde operations and the exceptionally high morale of the
forces remaining as they continue to advise, assist, and train
Iraqis to support that still-burgeoning democracy.
Simultaneous with the drawdown operations, the Army has
surged an additional 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan to defeat
the Al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban insurgency. This
surge enabled our soldiers and our Afghan partners to seize
multiple sanctuaries in the traditional insurgent heartland of
Southern Afghanistan.
Additionally, during this past year, our forces have
trained some 109,000 Afghan National Army soldiers as well as
41,000 Afghan National Police, yet overseas contingency
operations are only one part of the Army's diverse
requirements. Our soldiers and civilians from all Army
Components remain committed to protecting our homeland not only
from the threat of enemies who would harm us, but also from the
ravages of natural and manmade disasters.
From National Guard soldiers assisting with drug
enforcement and border security to the Army Corps of Engineers
responding to the catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico,
America's Army has been there to support local, State and
Federal partners in saving, protecting and caring for our
citizens.
Clearly, over the last year America's Army has seen
extraordinary success in one of the most dynamic, dangerous and
complex operational environments in our Nation's history, and
yet our challenges have not been reserved solely for combat or
the protection of disaster relief.
For just as our soldiers and civilians conducted multiple
operations here and around the world, the Army simultaneously
continued its far-reaching efforts to modernize equipment,
transform units and complete the unprecedented consolidations
required under the round of base closure and realignment.
As the Army continues to fight global terrorists and
regional insurgents, we must be ever mindful of the future and
future enemies such as--threats and hostile state actors that
we may well face. It is vital, therefore, that we have a
modernization program, one that provides our soldiers with a
full array of equipment necessary to maintain a decisive
advantage over the enemies we are fighting today and to also
ensure that we can deter and defeat tomorrow's threats at a
price that we can afford.
Our fiscal year 2012 budget request is critical to
achieving this goal by supporting the extraordinary strides
being made in the Army state-of-the-art network tactical wheel
vehicle and combat vehicle modernization programs. Regarding
the network, we are requesting $974 million in procurement and
$298 million in research and development for the Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical, WIN-T, which will become the
cornerstone of our battlefield communication systems as the
distinguished ranking member had mentioned.
This budget request also contains $2.1 billion in
procurement for joint and combat communication systems
including the Joint Tactical Radio System better known as JTRS.
As we look to modernize our wheeled and combat vehicle fleets,
we are asking for $1.5 billion for Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
modernization and $1.04 billion in support of the Army's combat
vehicle modernization strategy including $884 million for the
Ground Combat Vehicle and $156 million for the modernization of
the Stryker, Bradley and Abrams programs.
Along with advances and equipment, the Army is seeking new
methods to use and secure our scarce energy resources. Clearly,
future operations will depend on our ability to reduce
dependency, increase efficiency and use more renewable or
alternative sources of energy. We have made great strides in
this area and we intend to do more.
The Army has established a senior energy council, appointed
a senior energy executive, created an energy security office
and adopted a comprehensive strategy for energy security. Based
on this strategy, we are developing more efficient generators
and power distribution platforms factoring in fuel cost as a
part of equipment modernizations in developing a net-zero
approach to holistically address our installation's energy,
water and waste needs.
In May 2010, the chief and I commissioned an unprecedented
blue ribbon panel review of the Army's acquisition systems from
cradle to grave. We are currently reviewing the panel's
insightful report and we will use it as a guide over the next 2
years to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army
acquisition process, but we didn't stop there.
To ensure that we purchased the right equipment to meet the
needs of our soldiers, we instituted a series of capability
portfolio reviews to examine all existing Army requirements and
terminate programs that we judged to be redundant, didn't work
or which are just too expensive.
These broad-based reviews have already helped us to
identify key gaps and unnecessary redundancies while promoting
good stewardship of our Nation's resources. We remain committed
to using every effort to obtain the right systems, supplies and
services at the right time and at the most cost-effective
streamlined manner. Our soldiers and the taxpayers deserve no
less. We look forward to working closely with this committee as
we continue to implement these sweeping challenges.
Throughout it all, at its heart, the Army is people.
Although our soldiers and civilians are better trained, led and
equipped and more capable than ever before, our forces are
clearly stretched and our personnel are strained from a decade
of war. This is evidenced by yet another year of discouraging
rates of suicide and high-risk behavior, not only among members
of the regular Army, but the Reserve Components as well.
In response and in the direct supervision of our Vice Chief
of Staff, General Pete Chiarelli, the Army completed an
unprecedented 15-month study to better understand suicide and
related actions amongst our soldiers. In July, we published the
first-ever health-promotion, risk-reduction, and suicide-
prevention report. Very, very candid assessment designed to
assist our leaders in recognizing and reducing high-risk
behavior as well as the stigma associated with behavioral
health care.
The lessons from this holistic review have been infused
into every level of command and incorporated throughout our
efforts to strengthen the resiliency of our soldiers' families
and civilians.
Moreover, our fiscal year 2012 budget requests $1.7 billion
to fund vital soldier and family programs to provide the full
range of essential services to include Army campaigns for
health promotion, risk reduction and suicide prevention, sexual
harassment and assault response and prevention, and
comprehensive soldier fitness.
In addition, this funding supports family services
including morale welfare and recreation programs, the youth
services and childcare. Survivor outreach services and
education and employment opportunities for family members are
funded in this manner as well. Caring for our personnel and
their families goes beyond mental, physical and emotional
health. We are also committed to protecting their safety both
at home and abroad from internal and external threats.
As part of our continuing efforts to learn and adopt and
adapt from the Fort Hood shooting, the Army has instituted a
number of key programs to enhance awareness reporting
prevention and response to such threats. Finally, I would be
remiss if I didn't mention the devastating impact of the
continuing resolution on each of the programs that I have
mentioned as well as dozens of others.
From modernization to MILCON [Military Construction] to
family services and base operation support, the lack of a
fiscal year 2011 budget is adversely affecting critical needs
and projects that support our soldiers and their families, not
to mention delaying long-term requirements of the Department
writ large.
Let me close by mentioning my deep appreciation and
admiration for all those who wear the Army uniform as well as
the great civilians who work day in and day out to support
them. Daily, I am reminded that these heroes make enormous
sacrifices in defense of the Nation, sacrifices that simply
can't be measured accurately. Moreover, I know that each of you
as members of this great committee play a key role in the
success of that Army. Your efforts and your support ensure that
our soldiers, civilians and Army families receive their
critical resources and authorities they need. We cannot do it
without you.
So from the bottom of my heart, thank you. I deeply
appreciate the opportunity to be with you here today and I look
forward to the rest of the hearing. With that, Mr. Chairman, I
yield back.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and
General Casey can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. General.
STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY
General Casey. Thank you, Chairman, Congressman Smith,
members of the committee. I am trying to keep a straight face,
but being here for the last time is not all it is cut out to
be. I will just tell you that. But it is a great opportunity
for me to talk to you about the progress that we have made in
the Army over the last decade.
I would echo the Secretary's comments on Congresswoman
Giffords and add my wishes for her speedy recovery and her
return to this chamber. And if you would indulge me, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to introduce some guests here today who
represent the men and women of this great Army. First of all,
if you just would stand up there, if you would, Ruth. Ruth
Stoneseifer. Ruth's son, Christopher, was killed in a
helicopter crash along the Afghan-Pakistan border in 2001 and
Ruth has committed herself since to helping other surviving
spouses.
She has recently completed a tour as the director of the
Gold Star Mother's Foundation for the last year. So thank you
very much, Ruth. Sitting next to her is First Sergeant Damien
Anderson. He is first sergeant from the old guard, but he has
recently completed a 10-day master resilience trainer course at
the University of Pennsylvania and master resilience trainers
are part of our key program to give our soldiers, civilians and
family members the skills they need to deal with the coming
challenges of the next decade. So thank you very much, First
Sergeant.
And lastly, Sergeant Joe Duasante. In 2007, Sergeant
Duasante was severely wounded and lost his right leg. He has
been working actually here in our legislative liaison office
while he has been completing the 2-year recovery. The good news
is he has completed that recovery and will leave this summer to
go to our airborne school as a member of the cadre down at Fort
Benning, Georgia. So thank you very much.
Now, if I may, Mr. Chairman, for the past 4 years, you have
heard me say that the Army was out of balance, that we were so
weighed down by our current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan
that we couldn't do the things that we knew we needed to do to
sustain this all-volunteer force for the long haul and to
prepare to do other things. Today, thanks in large measure to
the sustained support from this committee, I can tell you that
we have made great progress toward the goals that we set for
ourselves in 2007 and as an Army, we are starting to breathe
again.
We are emerging from a decade of war and transformation
with a well-equipped, combat-seasoned total force that, while
still stretched by the demands and lingering effects of a
decade at war, is able to begin preparing for the challenges of
the second decade of the 21st Century. And let me just quickly
update you on some of that progress. First, we have completed
both the permanent end strength increase that was directed by
President Bush in 2007 and the temporary end strength increase
of 22,000 authorized by Secretary Gates in 2009.
This allowed us to meet the plus-up in Afghanistan before
we departed Iraq without having to increase deployed time for
our soldiers. I know there is a concern about the condition-
based reductions planned for our end strengths that were
announced by Secretary Gates a few weeks ago, but I can tell
you that I believe that if the drawdowns in Iraq and
Afghanistan go as planned, that it is prudent to begin planning
to reduce the size of the Army in 2015 and we need to do that
to facilitate sustaining a balanced force, one that is both the
right size to meet our national security strategy at an
appropriate deployment tempo, but that is also well trained,
well equipped and well supported.
In a time of war, we just can't afford anything less.
Second, our growth plus the drawdown in Iraq enabled us to
significantly improve dwell, and by dwell I mean the time at
home between deployments. This is a critical component of
sustaining an all-volunteer force in a protracted conflict. For
the better part of 5 years, we were returning soldiers to
combat after only 1 year at home and we knew that wasn't
sustainable and had been working to bring dwell to 2 years at
home as quickly as possible.
I will tell you that beginning the 1st of October this
year, given what we know about the projected demands, our
Active units who deploy after the 1st of October will deploy
with an expectation of having 2 years at home when they return.
Our Guard and Reserve units will deploy with an expectation of
having 4 years at home when they return. We have worked very
hard to get to this point and it is a significant
accomplishment because all of our studies tell us that it takes
24 to 36 months to recover from a 1-year combat deployment. It
just does. We are human beings.
And turning faster than that accelerates the cumulative
effects. I would tell you that we will continue to work toward
our long-term goal of 3 years at home between combat
deployments. Third, this year we will also complete the largest
organizational transformation of the Army since World War II.
We will finish the modular conversion of all but a handful of
our 300 brigades and finish rebalancing soldiers out of Cold
War skills into skills that are more relevant and more
necessary today. That is to the tune of about 150,000 to
160,000 soldiers.
Taken together, it is a fundamentally different Army than
it was on September 11, 2001, and we had a great Army then, but
today, we are a much more versatile and experienced force.
Fourth, to enhance this versatility, we have developed a
fundamentally different way of building readiness in providing
trained and ready forces to combatant commanders, and I think
you have heard about it, but we call it the Army Force
Generation Model.
It is an output readiness model that fully integrates the
Guard and Reserve, that brings the kind of predictability we
need to sustain our all-volunteer force, and that allows us to
build the readiness we need to both meet current demands and to
hedge against unexpected contingencies. ARFORGEN [Army Force
Generation] is also a more effective and more efficient way of
building the readiness we need when we need it.
So if you add all of these things up, accelerated growth,
increased dwell, transformation and the ARFORGEN readiness
model, together they begin to allow us to restore some
strategic flexibility, the capability to provide trained and
ready forces to all combatant commanders for operations across
the spectrum of conflict.
So after a decade of very hard work, we have a force that
is the right size, that is organized in versatile modular
formations on a predictable rotational cycle, and that has
sufficient time at home to begin training for the full range of
missions and to recover from a decade at war. This would not
have been possible without your support and the support of the
American people. So thank you.
Now, this fiscal year 2012 budget marks a transition point
in which we can begin shifting our focus from restoring balance
to sustaining the balance that we together have so
painstakingly restored to this force. Sustaining that balance
is critically important because this war is not over by any
stretch of the imagination. The fiscal year 2012 budget that we
are presenting today enables us to maintain our combat edge, to
reset and reconstitute our force, to continue to deal with the
impacts of a decade at war, and to build the resilience into
this force for the second decade.
I would like to say a few words about each of those, but in
short, this budget enables us to sustain the balance that we
have restored to this great Army. First, maintaining our combat
edge. It is important that we maintain the edge that we have
honed over a decade at war and we will do that through
continuous adaptation, affordable modernization, tough,
demanding training for the full range of missions, and by
sustaining the gains that we have made in our Reserve
Components.
Last week, Secretary Gates said that, ``We were an
institution transformed by war.'' He is absolutely right and I
talked about that transformation a few minutes ago, but I
believe that we are in a period of continuous and fundamental
change driven by rapid technological advances and adaptive
enemies. Critical to our ability to maintain our edge will be
an affordable modernization strategy that provides the
equipment that gives our soldiers a decisive advantage over any
enemy that they face.
This budget lays out such a plan and I would like just to
highlight two key areas and reinforce what the Secretary said.
No matter where our soldiers are operating, they need to know
where they are, they need to know where their buddies are, they
need to know where the enemy is and when they shoot at the
enemy, they need to strike them with precision. They will also
need protected mobility.
This budget contains funding that will begin the fielding
of some key elements of the network that will enable our
soldiers in any--enable our soldiers in any environment and
these include the Joint Tactical Radio System and the
Warfighter Information Network. It also includes funding for a
new ground combat vehicle that provides protection against
IEDs, that has the capacity to carry a nine-man squad and is
capable of operating across the spectrum of operations, and we
also hope that it can be developed in 7 years.
Maintaining our combat edge also requires training for the
full spectrum of operations. This training is conducted both at
home stations and at our combat training centers, and it will
be critical to ensuring that we sustain our combat experience
and restore the ability to rapidly deploy for the full range of
missions. It will require moving operations and maintenance
dollars from OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] to the base
over the next several years.
It will also be important to consolidate the gains that we
made in our Reserve Components. Think about it. Half of our
guardsmen and reservists are combat veterans. Half of the
general officers in the Guard and Reserve are combat veterans.
I have never seen a relationship between the Active and Reserve
Component forces better than it is now, and we are working
together to establish an effective paradigm that allows us to
leverage our substantial investments and the substantial
experience of the Reserve Components.
Second point, reconstituting the force. I see two elements
to this. One is the continuous reset of forces returning from
Afghanistan and Iraq. We have got over 110,000 soldiers there
today and they and their replacements and their equipment will
need to be reset over time. Reset isn't a one-time shot. It is
a process that is necessary for every returning unit, and it
will require sustained funding for 2 to 3 years after we are
out of Iraq and Afghanistan to ensure that we reconstitute the
force fully and restore readiness into our next to deploy
forces. We haven't had that ability in 5 or 6 years, and so it
is important that we restore that readiness.
The third critical element for us is building resilience
into the force for the long haul. We have been at war for
almost a decade. The cumulative effects are still with us and
they are going to be with us for a while. Think about it.
More than 4,000 soldiers killed, leaving more than 20,000
family members.
Over 29,000 soldiers wounded, 8,000 of them significantly
enough to require long-term care.
Over 100,000 soldiers diagnosed with traumatic brain
injury. Fortunately, greater than 90 percent are moderate or
mild.
Forty thousand soldiers diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress, and over 30,000 soldiers processed through our warrior
transition units.
This budget contains funding for programs like the
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, health promotion, risk
reduction, suicide prevention, the Army Family Covenant,
survivor outreach services and sexual assault prevention that
will allow us to continue to build resilience into this force
for the second decade. We remain, as I know you do, committed
to the well-being of our soldiers, families and civilians.
So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to leave the
committee with two thoughts as I complete over 40 years of
service to this great country. First, we are at a key
transition point here as we move from a decade of war and
transformation to a decade of sustaining a force at war in a
period of declining resources. Together, we have built a great
Army, but it is an Army still stretched and recovering from the
last decade of war and it continues to prosecute a war in two
theaters.
It took us a decade to get where we are today and we
recognize that the country is in a difficult fiscal position,
and we have and will continue to work hard to use the resources
that you provide us as effectively and as efficiently as
possible, but we are at war and this war is not over. So we
need to proceed with caution because the last thing any of us
want to do is to create a hollow Army while we are fighting a
war.
And second, Mr. Chairman, is to thank the members of this
committee for your enduring support of our Army. You have
visited our troops and their families at home and at war, you
have helped us bury our dead and you have seen firsthand
through all this change, hardship and demands of war. What has
remained constant is the courage, the selfless service and the
sacrifice of our soldiers, our families and Army civilians.
I couldn't be more proud to have worn this uniform for the
past 40 years and to have served alongside the men and women of
this great Army. I am humbled and particularly proud to have
led them in this last decade. It has been the greatest honor of
my career. So thank you very much and I look forward to taking
your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Casey and
Secretary McHugh can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much. General Casey, just a
couple of things about the end strength. I would like to
understand the relationship between the current requirement for
BCTs [Brigade Combat Teams] and the cut to the end strength of
27,000 soldiers. Did the Army propose the cut or was it imposed
on the Army? If it was the result of an in-depth Army analysis,
I would like to hear when that analysis took place and what the
results were. If the analysis has not yet taken place, does the
Army have assurances that the Department of Defense will
restore the funding required that the analysis suggests a
lesser reduction is appropriate?
General Casey. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. First of all, we did
not propose the cuts. They were given to us by--from the
Department of Defense. We were informed of them before they
were announced, but we did not participate in the development.
But last July, I went to the Secretary of Defense and I laid
out for him what I thought the Army needed to do in the next 5
years and the majority of that was in the next 3 years to get
this force back and to reset it and reconstitute it.
And I told them that to do that, I needed to hold the end
strength of the Army and the access of the Guard and Reserve
constant through fiscal year 2014. And he basically supported
me in that with this decision. Now, as I said in my testimony,
I see this end strength reduction as conditions-based and the
Secretary established those conditions. If the assumptions
don't hold, then I am sure the Secretary and my successor will
feel very comfortable coming back to the Secretary and saying,
``This won't work.''
But I think it is important as we look at this to remember
that we need a balanced Army coming out the other end and if we
hold the end strength too high, we run the risk of having a big
hollow force like the Army I came into. So it is going to take
some good analysis and some good interaction between the
committee and us as we go forward so that we come out of this
with the right size Army that can meet demands at an
appropriate tempo and is also well equipped, well trained and
well maintained. John, you want----
Secretary McHugh. If I may, Mr. Chairman, first of all, I
associate myself with the comments of the chief. While we
didn't participate, certainly from my perspective, we were
given ample opportunity to come in and to talk to both the
programmers and the Secretary as to the way ahead and from my
perspective, as I look at the direction we are on a path to
take, both with respect to a total drawdown in Iraq at the end
of this calendar year and the way forward that the President
has laid down in his responsibilities as the Commander in
Chief. Beginning to withdraw out of Afghanistan in numbers yet
to be determined beginning in 2014, this is a supportable
position and the budget that underpins it is appropriately
arrayed, particularly as the chief said with respect to
ensuring that we have an end strike number that is supported
robustly by the kinds of training equipment and support
programs that are necessary to keep it from being hollow,
something that some of the older amongst us in this room had
gone through before in our oversight role and something we very
much want to resist, and both the Secretary of Defense and the
President are ever mindful of that.
The old adage, ``Man plans, God laughs'' is always true. I
remember in my role early on, in listening to four
administrations come to this committee and lay out their 5-year
programs, I told them I just pray to God that someday before I
die I am allowed to live in an out-year. I mean, as the
President has said and as the Secretary endorsed in his
comments at West Point just last week, we are perfect in our
record of prediction. We have always been wrong.
So the Secretary, the Administration and I assure you, Mr.
Chairman, I recognize that we have to be ever vigilant as to
the changing realities and demand on the force, but as we look
ahead to 2015 and 2016, this is very supportable and I think a
very justifiable position.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. I know we are all
concerned that--and as you both stated, no one can see really
over the horizon. We have to put our best guesses and as you
said, unfortunately, many times we are wrong, but the--our job,
I think, all of us working together is to make sure that we are
not wrong at the detriment to the Nation.
And I know I have been around long enough to remember how
we cut back after World War II and after Korea and after
Vietnam and I just want to make sure that we don't put
ourselves in a position that we--as Reagan said, we don't--he
never saw us get into war that we were--because we were
overprepared and that is a fine line, I think, between a
hollowed-out Army and one that is lean and mean and ready to go
and sufficient in size to handle all of those eventualities
that may hit us.
You mentioned, both of you, the CR [Continuing Resolution],
and I know we all have strong concerns there and I think all of
the committee here is unanimous in understanding and supporting
the prospect of getting an appropriation bill finished up. And
I have talked to the appropriators and they have assured me
that they are ready to go. They have got the bill done. I don't
know how much of it has been coordinated yet at this point with
the Senate. I know they have been working on it.
I was hopeful that we would be able to tie it in to this CR
that is being voted on this week, but apparently there wasn't
time to get it all done, but maybe, hopefully, it could be done
at the end of this 2-week extension that we are voting on this
week because everybody--you have all expressed to all the
services, the Secretary has expressed it, industry, everybody
understands that if we don't get this done, stupid things are
going to happen and it is going to end up costing us more
money.
So we are unanimous in desire. It is just whether we are
going to be able to pull it together and make it happen and I
feel fairly confident that we will. The rest of the spending
will probably just roll into one big omnibus bill to carry
through September 30th, but defense will be, hopefully,
separated out and should be able to move us forward. Ranking
Member Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I share the
chairman's concerns about the CR and the hope that we get
there. I am a little less optimistic about the ultimate outcome
and I think the members of this committee in particular should
bear close scrutiny on that process and be as supportive as
possible of getting us a defense appropriations bill once we
get through this whole process. There are still a lot of
differences between the House and the Senate to resolve to get
there.
And if we don't get there, one of the consequences is the
impact that it has on--certainly on the Army, on the entire DOD
[Department of Defense]. So getting a defense appropriations
bill, you know, getting a process that gets us to September
30th is critically important to what everybody on this
committee does and I hope we all work hard in the next couple
of weeks to try and make sure that we get that done.
I thank you gentlemen both for your kind words about
Congresswoman Giffords. One of the things that her staff has
been doing, if you are interested to know, she and her staff
continue to be incredibly strong advocates for Fort Huachuca in
particular and the military in particular and they work closely
with my staff to make sure that while she is recovering, her
questions and concerns about the military and about her
district in particular get addressed.
So I have a couple of questions from her staff that have
been sent to me and then a couple of my own. Fort Huachuca is a
critical part of the Army. I have been down there to visit
myself. Going back at the end of this month, as a matter of
fact. It is where the Intelligence Center of Excellence is
which provides, you know, great support for all the Intel
operations and the training for our Intel officers. It is also
where the Army's Network Enterprise Technology Command, or
NETCOM is, and that is the focus of my first question.
How are you and the Army doing a better job of protecting
our networks? Obviously, in the light of the whole WikiLeaks
thing, there have been heightened concerns, but even before
that we were aware of the challenges of protecting the Army's
network and also protecting the entire DOD network because they
all come in together. And one of the things I have discovered
is I visit military bases and there are a lot of Army bases
that have a piece of that responsibility and it's never been
clear to me who is ultimately responsible for network security.
It is a multilayered thing, but having ultimate responsibility
is a good place to start.
How are you pulling that together? What is your overall
plan for the Army's network security?
Secretary McHugh. I would just start and anything the chief
wants to add, obviously, you mentioned WikiLeaks, Mr. Smith.
You are absolutely right. That was a real lesson learned from--
for us and, in fact, for DOD writ large. We have really had a
parallel effort at OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and
DOD level. Their intelligence folks have taken a hard look at
the processes and the procedures as to network protection. They
have ordered a host of reforms and new measures including the
tighter restrictions on readable media, et cetera, et cetera,
that have already been implemented.
And while I can't put a quantified number to it, I think we
have already come a long way in ensuring that our network
security systems particularly for the kinds of things that
happen with respect to WikiLeaks does not happen again. Beyond
that, at the Army level, we are coordinating, of course, with
OSD, but are--we have stood up our cyber which in concert with
Cyber Command. General Keith Alexander will be the combatant--
is the combatant commander working together to ensure that we
are installing the kinds of network protections across the
Army, across the services in general are taken up.
The Secretary also directed me, asked me to go in and to
take a hard look at what happened in WikiLeaks, not just what
happened at that particular SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility], but the processes by which we train, the
processes by which we maintain security both at home, but, of
course, in theater as well.
Mr. Smith. Just a basic question, if I could on that, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary McHugh. Certainly.
Mr. Smith. You know, one of the big concerns that was
raised was the fact that this material was able to be
downloaded and there were no alarm bells that went off. This
was clearly protected. Maybe just--could you--why? Why was
there not a situation where this was downloaded and it didn't,
you know, raise an alarm?
Secretary McHugh. Well, the study is still ongoing, but I
think there were a couple of reasons. One, the controls on the
SCIF were not up to standards.
Mr. Smith. So it was the Army's policy that that should
have happened? It just didn't? It wasn't a----
Secretary McHugh [continuing]. We don't have room for
improvement because I----
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Secretary McHugh [continuing]. I think it is going to come
back that we do and, in fact, I am going to meet with General
Caslan, and he is the officer who is the commander of our
schoolhouse out at Fort Leavenworth, to pull together a team to
look at that. I think we probably have a situation where we
need to tighten up both our training and our standards, but it
seems likely to me that where procedures did exist, where they
were perhaps not as sufficient as we would like, they probably
were not upheld as well as they should have been.
Mr. Smith. And just one other specific question on that.
You mentioned the Cyber Command. I think that is a great step.
I am a big fan of General Alexander's. Could not have a better
person in that position. So you are confident now that in terms
of who is ultimately responsible for network security, that
even in the Army that will filter up directly through the Cyber
Command, the Army has a representative there and that
representative is going to be the person who every day wakes up
going, ``It is my responsibility to make sure the network is
protected''?
Secretary McHugh. That is the purpose of those two commands
and I share your great admiration for General Alexander. His
experience at NSA [National Security Agency] and now carried
into Cyber Command, I think, will give us the kind of one-
source authority that is necessary to make sure all the
Services are pulling the oar in the same direction.
Mr. Smith. Okay. If I could move on to one other, the other
areas--as you know, Congresswoman Giffords is very interested
in energy security alternatives and efficiencies dealing with
the energy challenges. There is a great quote in your written
testimony, ``The Army's logistical tail of the operational
energy pipeline is a handicap that must be overcome through
technological advances.'' A fancy way of saying getting energy
to the troops is always a major challenge.
There have been examples. The Marine Corps has a forward-
operating base that has used solar to dramatically reduce the
amount of fuel that they have to use, which has dramatically
reduced the number of convoys that need to run that fuel in and
out, always at risk when you are running a convoy. So it has
definitely been saving lives and definitely saving energy.
Two questions about that. I also know that you have set up
a sort of a tech center at Bagram--which has a long complicated
name that I won't get into, but basically it is, you know, the
problem solver. If you have a technological problem anywhere,
you know, across the Army, the tech center is the place to go.
Energy obviously is going to be one of those technological
challenges.
How is the Army meeting those operational challenges in
trying to reduce its dependency on energy and more deal with
the challenges that were laid out there?
General Casey. Well, we just call it--I just call it--the
technology village of Bagram--it is--than the longer term, but
as you have stated very correctly, Congressman, that is the
place where we bring in and fuse together the various elements
of energy efficiency and energy consumption reduction that we
think is so very important. It is a big cost saver. There is no
question about it. But frankly, at least from my perspective,
we look at this as a matter of soldier safety.
Convoying in fuel supplies is a very dangerous job and we
would like to see that reduced as greatly as possible. We have
already deployed some of the lessons learned in places like
Fort Huachuca and places like Fort Irwin, the national training
center, with respect to fuel cells, with respect to water
purification systems. We are putting into the field higher
efficiency generators. I would add as well that we have put a
mark on the wall that we expect in the years ahead will reduce
our energy consumption at FOBs [forward operating bases]
through high-efficiency batteries, et cetera, et cetera, by 30
to 60 percent.
So the Marines and us and the Army are working hard to
reduce that as a cost saver, but as I said, it is a saver of
lives and we are very devoted and dedicated to that objective.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I won't ask for a comment on this. I
just want to make a statement for the record. One of the big
problems we have within the Department of Defense is the
contractor issue which you remember from when you were here
the, you know, excessive reliance on the amount of costs. We
have contractor supervisors and contractors in some instances
which, you know, drives up costs as well.
That is something this committee is going to be taking a
close look at as we try to find efficiencies. I would be
curious to get, for the record, an answer of sorts if you
will--both of your take, not right now, but if you could submit
something on how are we addressing that problem. How can we
save money in the contractor world because, you know, that is
something that many members of this committee are interested
in.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 117.]
Mr. Smith. So you can do that for the record if you had a
quick comment. I had one other question I wanted to ask you.
Secretary McHugh. I do. I have a quick comment and----
Mr. Smith. Right.
Secretary McHugh [continuing]. And I am glad you brought it
up because this is, in our opinion, a place where we can save a
lot of taxpayer dollars through common sense and a tighter
rein. As I mentioned in my opening comments, we commissioned a
blue ribbon panel. They have come back with, I think, some very
exciting recommendations as to how we can tighten that up. I
have asked both the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army and the
acquisition executive to look at that, to come back to the
chief and I with recommendations.
The other thing, just in closing, one of the bigger
problems we have had in theater is we didn't have enough CORs,
contracting officer's representatives. In fact, in 2007, we
just had 200. Now, I am proud to say we have grown that COR
body to 3,558 and that gives us an on-the-ground eyeball on the
kinds of contract situations where we have not been as
efficient as we should and we would not run as tight of a ship
as we could and we are getting better, but clearly, we look
forward to working with you and doing an even better job, sir.
Mr. Smith. Yes, we will certainly take a closer look at
that report and I look forward to work with you on that. The
final question I have builds off of Secretary Gates' speech at
West Point. He called into question the size of the Army's
heavy mechanized forces given the threats he foresees in the
future. It is the most quotable line from the speech being, you
know, you have to be insane to go into a war like we went into
Iraq and Afghanistan anytime again in the future.
Now, some people have misunderstood that as a criticism of
the existing fights that we are in, but I think it is looking
forward to say, what are our needs? And I think your initial
requests in the budget this year, you know, focus on
helicopters, network communications, lighter, faster dealing
with the asymmetric threats, but at the same time, you know,
there is the beginning of the R&D [Research and Development]
process for a new ground combat vehicle which is ultimately, if
we are lucky, going to cost $40 billion and that is a very high
mechanized thing.
When you look out in the future in terms of how you meet
the challenges with all the budget constraints that we have and
how we have to choose between risks, I guess my one difference
from some on the committee is I don't think it is the job of
this committee or your job to eliminate all risk. We can't do
that. We have to sort of manage the threats. We have to do
triage, try to contain the threats and be most logical about
what is coming. I think Secretary Gates is spot-on in what he
said at West Point. So, you know, how does that blend in with
continuing to build a heavier mechanized force with things like
the ground combat vehicle, General?
General Casey. Yes, I am glad you asked that because I
don't see the ground combat vehicle as a heavy mechanized
vehicle. It may wind up being heavy because it requires a
certain weight to protect soldiers from the blast, but we are
purposely designing it as a full-spectrum vehicle, one that can
be used in any environment that we go into and it is not
specifically designed to fight mobile armored warfare which is
what the tanks and Bradleys are very well designed to do.
This is the first vehicle that has been designed from the
ground up to operate in an IED environment and we believe that
IEDs are going to be part of any future environment that we are
going to have to operate in. So I don't see it as a heavy
combat vehicle.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
General Casey. I see it as a full-spectrum vehicle that
will protect our soldiers and connect them to the network.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, gentlemen, both very much. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much both of you for your
service. Secretary McHugh, I continue to be concerned that we
spend billions of dollars on weapon systems only to change the
underlying requirement and terminate the program. While
termination may be appropriate in certain instances, we must
examine how these requirements get validated in the first
place.
The Secretary of Defense coined a new phrase when he
referred to programs as having exquisite requirements, yet
these requirements were approved at the individual service
level and validated by the joint community. I read with
interest a recent article which stated that you had
commissioned an acquisition reform study last May. According to
the article, the study group concluded that cancelled Army
programs had eaten up between $3 billion and $4 billion a year
since 2004 and that, ``The Army lacks a credible quantitative
model and process for determining realistic achievable
requirements for modernization and recapitalization given
reduced budgets.''
I understand that a copy of this study was recently
delivered to our committee. Can you share any of your
observations from this study or follow-on actions? Do all of
the weapons programs that are funded in this budget have valid
requirements, or in 3 to 4 years will they be labeled
exquisite?
Secretary McHugh. Well, I think the Secretary has been very
clear in his perspective as to what he is looking for out of
the services and fielding a new platform. And as you mentioned,
Congressman Bartlett, he feels, and I couldn't agree more, that
the objective of single service exquisite is 100 percent,
meaning the requirements can no longer be the standard by which
we feel platforms and that we have to be more realistic.
And I would certainly tip my hat to the chief. One of the
first things he started talking to me about when I walked into
the Pentagon as the new service secretary was the fact that our
requirements process simply does not reflect reality, that it
just ends up being an add-on every little bell and whistle that
you can think of and the result, as you mentioned was found in
the acquisition study, has lost billions of dollars and through
cancelled programs, a vast majority of which since 2004, of
course, we are through the future combat system cancellation.
I would like to think we have learned that lesson. I
wouldn't come here today and tell you we can't do better
because we can, but to use for an example the ground combat
vehicle, when that RFP [Request for Proposal] was first put out
on the street, it had over 900 exquisite requirements embedded
in it. We had at least the good sense to pull back from that to
cancel that RFP, to revalidate the requirements and they were
reduced to less than 200 and the RFP was refielded.
I think that beyond common sense though, we have to have
systems changes, and the report by Lou Wagner and Gil Decker
that you had mentioned is going to be, at least in large
measure, our blueprint. I don't want to prejudice our
acquisition executive or our Deputy Under Secretary because I
just tasked them last week to look at that and to analyze it,
but I have reviewed this report very carefully.
I think it lays out in large measure a very common sense
approach on both requirements and how we can be better
acquirers of future platforms, and I look forward to working
with the other executives in the Army to make sure that that
happens. But I would like to hear the chief's comments if that
meets with your approval.
General Casey. Now, Congressman, as I said in my opening
statement, you know, we are committed to using the resources
you give us as effectively and as efficiently as possible. And
as we look at what is happening with the budgets, there is no
way that we can operate an acquisition system that doesn't very
efficiently acquire the systems that give us the most value and
we are absolutely committed to doing that.
Our track record, as you know better than I, has not been
good at this. And what the report found--one of the things the
report found was that our requirements and acquisition core
competencies have atrophied over the last couple of decades and
we have got to build those back. And it is going to take us a
little time, but we are absolutely committed to doing it.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. I think all of us want the very
best equipment for our people and I think the challenge is to
be able to develop a more open architecture so that the system
can continue to be improved as it is in use. To have everything
on the front end just makes it prohibitively expensive and too
long of a development time. Thank you very much and I yield
back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both. Good to
see you here this morning. And General Casey, I want to
congratulate you and thank you for your 40 years of service
including your wonderful wife, Sheila. Thank you both for
serving our Nation.
I would like to follow up on the ranking member's question
regarding Secretary Gates' speech at West Point. In that
speech, he was questioning the Army's heavy mechanized forces,
while at the same time saying that he--that the Army should not
be a constabulary peacekeeping force that can only do
counterinsurgency, which I found curious because I think
historically there has never been a closer working relationship
between our military and our intelligence forces as we have
taken on the challenge of Iraq and Afghanistan.
And as we prepare to face the future challenges of not so
much nations, although they will always be on our radar scope,
but these groups--these radicalized groups that work everywhere
from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa and other places, to
me the Secretary's comments send a very mixed message and I was
curious to know--what is your view of the Army's role in future
combats?
How does the Army strike the right balance between the
different types of warfare that it may face including in
partnership with the intelligence community? And as you and I
have talked about before, you know, the answer isn't that we
have to be prepared to do everything because that makes it, you
know--if everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority.
So do you feel like you have had enough guidance from the
civilian DOD leaders to make the kinds of choices the Army
needs to make in the structure of the forces? And if not, your
successor is going to have to work with this. How do you think
that will take place? What will that look like and what kind of
specific guidance will your successor need to be able to carry
out what I think is a kind of conflicting priority?
General Casey. Thank you, Congressman. You know, lots of
different reporting on the Secretary's speech and what I found
is if you sat down and read the speech, you had a different
view than you usually got from the press reports of the speech.
But what I saw the Secretary doing was telling us to start
thinking about the future beyond Iraq and Afghanistan and I
think that is the right thing to do and we had been doing that
already.
You have heard me talk about we are at war. It is a long-
term ideological struggle and that the trends out there in the
global environment are more likely to exacerbate that struggle
than they are to ameliorate it. And when I put all that
together, I see us as a country in an error of what I call
persistent conflict, protracted confrontation and not
necessarily at the level we have been at in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but at some levels and I would say for a decade or
so.
And we don't have a choice. You know, I fought these folks
in Iraq. They have a 100-year view and they are out to attack
our way of life and establish their own. So, you know, we have
to be very careful with that. As we looked at this, the two
elements of this--the future strategic environment--that are
most pronounced to us are uncertainty and complexity, and
Secretary Gates hit it exactly right. Our record is perfect. He
never accurately predicted the future.
So it seems to us that we--versatility needs to be the
primary operating principle for our Army. That is the--we need
a versatile Army for the future that can do a range of things
because we just don't know which end of the spectrum we are
going to be operating at. And as we look at that, we say then,
okay. Well, we need a versatile mix of forces: Heavy, light,
special operating, Stryker, aviation brigades and all of the
supporting--all the supporting forces.
And we had been working for the last 6 months going back
and look at--looking at every type of force and the design of
every unit to take the lessons that we have learned in the last
decade at war and say have we got this right. And, you know,
even though since 2003, we have stood down 40 percent of our
heavy brigade combat teams. We have stood down almost 70
percent of artillery units and we have stood down about 60
percent of the heavy sustainment units that supported those
forces.
I mean, that is pretty significant, but we are also asking
ourselves the question, was it enough? And so we are wrapping
up the study here in the next few weeks and I think my
successor will be well postured to take a look and figure out
what this Army needs to look like 2015 and beyond and I think
that is important. And I think that is where Secretary Gates is
trying to push us.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you very much. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Chairman. Gentlemen, thanks for
being here. I want to talk about a different part of the
Secretary's speech last week. It caught my attention primarily
because this is something I have been interested in and
concerned about for some time. He said that the third and
greatest challenge facing the Army, and frankly, my main worry
is how can the Army break up the institutional concrete, its
bureaucratic rigidity in its assignment and promotion process?
And I am sure you both know that he went on to talk about a
more merit-based, more individualized approach to officer
evaluations, citing General Chiarelli's proposal that
evaluations include input from peers as well as subordinates
rather than just superiors. He talked about maybe instead of
moving people around every 2 or 3 years, we ought to have
people apply for job openings like in the competitive system
that a number of big organizations use, and essentially quoted
Nagl and Yingling about how the Army will become more adaptive
only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion.
And so I think that really gets at the heart of not just
budgets, but the culture of the Army and my question is, number
one, do you think he is right? That is the number one concern
that we ought to have for the Army. And if you do think he is
right, what are we doing about it?
Secretary McHugh. Well, I would never say the Secretary of
Defense is necessarily wrong and I would not hear either of--
not just because he is the Secretary of Defense, but more to
the point because I think he is right. When you are at war, it
is tough to say what is the number one challenge, but the
Secretary's comments were directed, I believe, over time. This
is a critical aspect of how the Army is structured and how it
maintains itself that we have to address.
One of the first things I did when I walked in the building
was to begin to look at and rewrite the memorandum of
instructions. These are the qualities that are listed in the
paper's instructions to the promotion boards what we are
looking for, the kinds of things that the Secretary mentioned,
creativity, trying to get our promotion boards not to think
about lifting up officers simply because they checked the boxes
that they had checked on their OERs [Officer Evaluation
Reports] when they were promoted.
And that is a cultural change that is a challenge, but I
think we can begin to see it. I would argue that the selection
of the next chief of staff, Marty Dempsey, should the Senate
confirm him, is a great example of promoting someone who thinks
outside the box and it will serve as a great example not just
because it will help us to create the means by which we can
achieve those kinds of new paradigms, but also because it sends
the right message as to what kinds of officers ultimately
succeed.
At the end of the day, we have to look at this very
carefully and I think the Secretary has set the stage in an
exciting way that will allow us to think in new ways about what
we value in an officer. I think one of the equally big
challenges we face, and the Secretary mentioned this in his
speech, is that as we take today's field grade officers, these
majors and others who are given so much autonomy, so much
authority in theater and bring them back into--and put them
into what often times is a--garrison environment, how do we
keep them from losing interest?
And there is a variety of things we have to work very hard
to ensure that this Army forged through 10 years of war so well
equipped with creativity and intelligence and flexibility is
not lost in a garrison environment. And we are looking at that
everyday in the schoolhouses and I won't tell you we have the
answers yet, but I think the Secretary has posed a critical
issue for us to take up and to hopefully deal with effectively
or we are going to lose the greatest Army, I think, the world
has ever seen.
General Casey. If I could just speak back on that, I agree
that we need to make some significant advances in our personnel
system. They have been up to their eyeballs just trying to man
these units and get them into the fight properly manned, but we
have some significant changes we need to make in our promotion
and assignments policy. No question.
I don't think that is a number one concern. It is certainly
not my number one concern. What the Secretary just mentioned
about retaining this generation of young combat season leaders
who understand the environment that we are operating in, that
is my number one concern and combating this, slipping back into
a garrison mindset that a lot of the old folks can't wait to
get back to, you know, the good old days and we have been
talking about this since last summer when I had all the two-
and three-star commanders and their sergeants majors in for a
training and leader development conference.
And I warned them about this because I saw it myself as a
division commander in Europe. We brought units back from
Kosovo. We would have a sergeant that we would let lead a
patrol into the downtown Gnjilane in the middle of the night
and we wouldn't let him turn in a deadline report when he got
back. And that is our bias and that is my number one concern
and we can't let that happen.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
again, for being before us today. There are so many questions
that I would really like to have with you. I was speaking
earlier to our former colleague about how we protect the
industrial base or how we get back to making things in America
and how we use the military for that transformation, how we
really get out of Iraq and Afghanistan. So many questions, but
unfortunately, I really need to come back to an issue that, Mr.
Secretary, you and I worked on, on this committee because it is
still bothering me and it is still out there and we just had
a--last week a lawsuit filed with respect to sexual assault in
the military.
And because really nobody else brings it up, I am going to
do that. You know, one of the things that I remember you said,
Mr. Secretary, so firmly when we were working on trying to
change and we did the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice]
with respect to sexual assault was a comment you made when you
were the chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee and you said,
``It has been 15 years and we have had 18 reports given to
Congress from the Pentagon about sexual assault.''
And we are sort of--a lot of things haven't changed. I know
that they have changed in the way that you are trying to
implement, but the fact of the matter is I get calls every
single day about are military women being assaulted by our
military men. And they get drummed out and the guys get to stay
in. I mean, this is their main complaint.
So the task force in the 2009 December report for sexual
assault in the military recommended that the secretaries of the
military departments ensure that all commanders and senior
enlisted leaders be actively involved in sexual assault
prevention and response training and awareness programs.
I would like to ask you, Secretary McHugh, what steps have
you taken to engage General Casey right next to you on the
subject of sexual assault in the service?
Secretary McHugh. I want to make sure I understand your
questions, Ms. Sanchez. What actions have I taken in respect to
the issue or working with the chief?
Ms. Sanchez. Working with the chief. What is it from the
top? How can you help us change this? I mean, I really don't
want to get another report that says the same thing again. So I
would like to know how actively--how do you think we can change
that? Now, you are on the other side, you know, having to deal
with this.
Secretary McHugh. Right. Fair point.
Ms. Sanchez. How do we do this?
Secretary McHugh. I view this problem very seriously and I
really view it from two different perspectives. The first is a
cultural one that I can't imagine anything more contrary to the
basic core values of being a member of the United States Army
than sexually assaulting, abusing a fellow soldier be it male
or female under any circumstances.
And what we have tried to do through the formation of the
SHRP, Sexual Harassment Response Program, is to put into place
the mechanism by which we can begin to change the perspective
and the understanding particularly of our younger soldiers, but
all through the cadre as to how volatile this is to Army core
values. The main component of that SHRP effort is an initiative
called, ``I am strong; intervene, act and motivate'' where we
have placed in the schoolhouses at all levels of military
education, the fact that this is unacceptable, what the
responsibility of every soldier is and looking out for,
protecting, reporting and participating and getting this better
under control.
Obviously, as we saw last week, we have quite a long way to
go. I mentioned it to you in our discussions earlier. One of
the more recent initiatives was to produce two training films
that I brought here to this House and previewed for a number of
members who were able to drop by and take a look at it. My
impression was they felt it was very effective. We give this
now to--as part of our training aid. So all of our NCOs [Non-
Commissioned Officers], those soldiers that are with our
troops, our younger troops particularly that learn and look up
to those soldiers, and we are going to continue that effort.
The other is to ensure that we have the resources and the
personnel available to get out there and to make a difference.
When this program began, it was funded at about $10 million. It
has been a 500-percent increase and with those monies, we have
hired 10 experts to go out and to train our trainers. They are
experts in everything from sexual assaults to investigations to
counseling to forensics to laboratory work. We have hired 15
investigators in addition to our base cadre to go out and to
ensure that when a sexual assault occurs, we have the expertise
to fully investigate.
We have hired prosecutors. We have hired 35 additional lab
technicians. The Army is the central lab for investigating all
cases of sexual assault and most importantly, we have placed
into the Judge Advocate General Schools a specialist in sexual
assault and we have 38 different programs through the JAG
[Judge Advocate General] schools to ensure that every JAG
officer coming out and ultimately going to every post, camp and
station that we have Army forces on understands the nuances of
investigating and prosecuting sexual assault.
So we are trying to take a holistic approach. Obviously one
case is too many. I do think we are making good progress. I
meet quarterly with the SHRP representatives and the chief and
we take a full briefing and try to ensure that we understand
exactly the outcome of those programs, but this is something
that troubles us very deeply.
And as I started out, I will close with something that is
totally contrary to our core values. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. I know my time is up. I will have some
questions for the record to ask the general on that also. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Jones.
General Casey. If I could just add just briefly to that
because that, I think, is important, Congresswoman. It is a
leadership issue. Prevention of sexual assault is a leadership
issue and it is something that we from the top down have to
force all the way down through our ranks.
Secretary Gerin and I started a program in 2008 designed to
change the culture of the Army because as we assessed the
programs we put in place in 2004, they were all focused on
response and not prevention and we recognized that until we
changed the culture, we weren't going to be successful in the
program and that is what this program that the Secretary
mentioned is designed to do.
At the end of this month, we have our annual conference and
the Secretary and I are going to put the goal at zero sexual
assaults.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and Secretary
McHugh, it is good to see you as always and General Casey. I
join my colleagues here in thanking you for your years of
service to our Nation.
I want to go back. Last week we had Secretary Gates
testifying and I might have misunderstood, but it seemed that
he was saying that, you know, before a significant drawdown,
much must happen in Afghanistan and probably we are looking
more at 2016 before there is a substantial--excuse me--
drawdown. After I read his comments that he made in West Point,
General Casey, I have a very dear friend--I gave him my word I
wouldn't use his name in a hearing on the floor--that you would
know very well. And I hate playing that game, but you would.
But I gave him my word.
I emailed him about Secretary Gates' comments about the
large number of troops in the Middle East, Africa, wherever it
might be and this will lead to my question. I am going to read
you just a sentence that he emailed me back. He said, ``I have
mixed feelings about the comments made by Secretary Gates. I
think he is spot-on regarding the commitment of a large number
of forces to conflicts in either Asia or the Middle East, but
must qualify this statement with the thought that if the
conflict is in a vital, national interest, we must never be
afraid to take action to protect those interests.''
This general who is retired agrees with me and the American
people that Afghanistan is really not in our national interest.
It might have been 10 years ago, but it is 10 years later. My
comment to you based on what I thought I heard from Secretary
Gates--can you share with this committee what do you view as a
realistic timeline for withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan?
Before I--you answer, would you please--we had been hearing
for 10 years from different leaders of our military that it is
going to be critical to be able to train the Afghans to do the
police work. It is going to be critical to train the
Afghanistan people to be the soldiers. And, you know, not you,
sir, not Secretary McHugh, but I have been hearing that for 10
years and I think 10 years later they ought to be trained. And
here we go again with the Secretary of Defense indicating that
the significant drawdown might not happen until 2014 and yet,
the President of the United States, I know he meant what he
said at the time, was saying a significant drawdown could
happen beginning in July of 2011.
The American people want to know what is the end point of
this strategy? What can they see that would say to the American
people we have victory? So if you would share with me, if no
one else cares, what you see as the timeline that we can
significantly start bringing down our troops in Afghanistan.
General Casey. Okay. Congressman, you are asking the wrong
guy to make comments on policy.
Mr. Jones. Well, I am just asking your opinion because soon
you will be a retired hero of this country. So if you can in
the short period of time----
General Casey. Then I can make all the--then I can make all
the comments on policy that I want.
Mr. Jones [continuing]. Call you back then, I don't know,
but we don't ever get a straight answer. And I am not talking
about you here, but we don't ever seem to get the straight
answer about what we are trying to accomplish in Afghanistan.
What can we say to the American people that are spending
billions of dollars breaking our soldiers' backs and legs and
killing them? What can we say to them that looks like we can
declare victory?
General Casey. Okay. If I might just go back to your
friend's comments there about not putting forces on the ground,
I mean, one of the things that I have learned in 40 years is
never say never.
Mr. Jones. I understand.
General Casey. And especially in an environment as
unpredictable as we are operating in. And so I would just take
you back to the comments I made. We have to have a versatile
mix of forces that can do a range of things and we ought not
seal off or put off any options. I can tell you your--now to
your question about when. I can tell you from my experience in
Iraq and I was--I am sure I have come to this committee and sat
before this committee and said we can't credibly hand off
security in these countries until the local security forces can
maintain domestic order and keep the terrorists out.
Otherwise, our long-term mission wouldn't be successful. We
would just have to do it again. And one of the things I worry
about as I look at the environment is safe havens. Countries or
parts of countries where the local government can't or won't
deny their country to terrorists. And this global extremist
network has tried to attack us on our soil three times in the
last year and they are not going to stop and they are not going
to quit.
So for us to have the ability to go in and stop that, or
better yet have the local security forces at a level that can
prevent that, I think is the only way we are going to protect
ourselves over the long haul.
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you
and your family for the sacrifices you made for our country and
the honor for which you serve. And Mr. Secretary, we are so
proud of you and the dignity and quality of your work at the
Department of the Army. Thank you for what you are doing as
well.
I looked at the budget request for fiscal year 2012 as
compared to the request for fiscal year 2011. I wish I could
say it compared to the budget for fiscal year 2011. We are
trying. And I see that there is about a $29.5 billion reduction
for fiscal year 2012 compared to the request for fiscal year
2011. I also see that $23 billion of that $29 billion
approximately is from the O&M [Operations and Maintenance] and
procurement account.
To what extent is that drawdown, that reduction
attributable to the drawdown in Iraq? Either of you.
Secretary McHugh. The theater operation differences between
2011 and 2012 are in large measure the cause of those
drawdowns. There are a number of subfactors. For example, a
rather noticeable cut in Warrior Transition Units that comes
from OPA, Other Procurement Army, where we had a number of
military construction projects under way to serve in the WTU
[Warrior Transition Units] inventory. The IT [Information
Technology] purchases have been made and we no longer need that
level of expenditure.
But clearly as we draw out of Iraq, as the expenses
associated with personnel while deployed, 42 cents of every
dollar we spend is personnel-related on the infrastructure that
had been supported. We are down to 73 bases or posts in Iraq,
more than 400 have been turned back to the Iraqis or just
closed up, we no longer have to support. So a large measure of
that is theater-driven.
Mr. Andrews. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what the size
of the force assumptions are for the fiscal year 2012 number?
Size of the force in Iraq assumptions? In other words, what are
they based on?
Secretary McHugh. The assumption is as we are now at
500,000 and the planning assumption in our operational
assumption is we will be out of Iraq in entirety by the end of
this calendar year.
Mr. Andrews. So am I correct that the present size of the
force is a little bit in excess of 40,000 Army; is that
correct?
Secretary McHugh. Fifty thousand roughly. We have six
advise----
Mr. Andrews. Fifty----
Secretary McHugh [continuing]. And assist brigades and an
advise and assist task force.
Mr. Andrews. And the assumption is at the end of fiscal
year 2012 or the end of calendar 2011?
Secretary McHugh. Calendar 2011.
Mr. Andrews. At the end of calendar 2011, it is down to
zero?
Secretary McHugh. Yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. Okay. I also wanted to ask about the reports
in today's newspaper about a step-up of fitness standards. What
was--I applaud that. It sounds like it makes an awful a lot of
sense. If either of you could tell us, what was the cause of
that decision?
General Casey. It is just--it is something that we have
been working for a long time and the last test was 30 years old
and we have been working at this for a while.
Mr. Andrews. Right.
General Casey. And it--finally, we got to the point where
we had some concrete ideas and put it in their package and now,
we are going to pilot it at several installations. But it is
designed to test this--the things that we see ourselves using.
Mr. Andrews. I don't expect you to have a specific number,
but do you know an intelligent estimate of what percentage of
those who attempt to enlist are obese or significantly
overweight?
Secretary McHugh. Seventy-five percent of the age
knowledgeable population of this country are either--through
weight, social background, criminal background or intelligence
levels--unavailable for being accessed in the United States
Army. And of that 75 percent, a very substantial number is
because of obesity problems.
Mr. Andrews. So I assume if we could do a better job in the
civilian world with diet, nutrition and exercise that the
number of men and women eligible to serve would expand pretty
significantly?
Secretary McHugh. I think that is a fair assumption, sir.
Mr. Andrews. And I see that you did a great job at 100
percent of your recruiting goals for this year which is
extraordinary given the circumstances. How much easier would it
be to hit those recruiting goals if we had more people who were
physically eligible to serve?
Secretary McHugh. I think our recruiting command and its
cadre would be delighted, but they, do a great job and it is
not just numbers. The quality of our recruits is outstanding.
Over 98 percent are high school grads that----
Mr. Andrews. Sure is.
Secretary McHugh [continuing]. Far in excess of the
population averages in this country and their intelligence
levels are really unequaled in our Army's history----
Mr. Andrews. We agree and please thank them all and we
thank you. I yield back. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you. Next will be Mr. Forbes and at the
conclusion of his questions, we will take a 5-minute break for
the committee. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Secretary and
General, you know the enormous respect you have at this
committee. Mr. Secretary, you have sat on this side. So you
know our needs. And General, I don't know of any individual in
the military who spends more time to talk with members and find
out their concerns than you do.
So I have two questions for you. One is that it seems like
over and over when we have people coming in to testify to us
today we are hearing them say we are trying to give you a
defense strategy that is driven by physical realities. When we
hear that, it seems like we are saying there is this tension
between what our defense needs are and what our budgetary wants
are.
The first question I would have is do you have any
recommendations for us as members of this committee about how
we can be assured that we are getting the true defensive needs
of the country that are not distorted by budgetary wants? That
is one. And the second one, it seems like we are needing to use
modeling and simulation a lot today for training, also for our
testing and for jointness.
How important do you see modeling and simulation in the
Army and what kind of future do you see for modeling and
simulation?
Secretary McHugh. I think many of us have been through the
times, as I mentioned earlier, where we had a very significant
mismatch between what the National Defense Policy was and what
the services were fielding.
And from my experience, I think we all intuitively knew it,
but didn't press it. I sat through my first drawing up from the
DOD side of the Quadrennial Defense Review and as I understand
it, this was a landmark QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and
that it really did for the first time make an effort to
purposely match available resources against the formulation of
that defense policy.
And I wish I were a better attuned to the QDR both as a
process and a document when I was a member of this committee
and I think every member would find that helpful because it
exposes the validity of what the National Defense Policy is and
ultimately the resourcing of the individual services or the
gaps that exist that you can discern from those.
So my humble suggestion was, you know, read the QDR, be
familiar with the process and you can learn from it. I would
say with respect to the 2012 budget, because I am mindful of
the very circumstances that you spoke about, Congressman
Forbes, that I look at this budget as really driven by policy,
driven by what we expect the threat to be particularly in the
out years.
I mentioned we can never get it right, but as we look at
the drawdown in Iraq that we have already drawn down to just
under 50,000 troops, as we look at what the President has said
with respect to the drawdown as anticipated in Afghanistan,
particularly beginning in 2015 and as the Secretary of Defense
and the chief worked out in their conversations, this budget
fields an Army.
Again, critically important that it isn't just sufficient
numbers, but it is robust in the equipment that is available to
the training and program support initiatives for their families
that we all know is so important in this volunteer force, but
at all times, this committee plays a critical role to make sure
that the services are getting it right and we don't just look
to you, we need you to keep a close watch and vigilance and
that is why, in my opinion, this is such a great committee.
Simulation is absolutely essential.
We do a great job in trying to give soldiers real role
experiences. If you go out to the chairman's district of the
National Training Center, a little place called Medina Wasl,
the replication of IEDs in a firefight in a simulated village
either Iraq or Afghanistan is chilling, but clearly simulations
are computer driven and are some of the best ways we can ensure
that our soldiers are acclimated to what they are going to see
and what they are going to experience once they get into
theater.
And I see it, as robotics and such get better and better, I
see it as an increasingly important part of our training lay-
down.
General Casey. Congressman, I would just say that we are at
war and I can't imagine that you would ever have anyone wearing
this uniform sitting in this position not coming to you and
telling you what the men and women of the United States Army
needed to successfully prosecute that war and recover from it.
And that really was the theme of my opening testimony that we
have to be very, very careful here as fiscal pressures cause us
to make decisions about the size, the structure, the equipment,
the training for your future Army.
We have been at war for a decade. It took us a decade to
get where we are today and we can unhinge that in a couple of
years.
The Chairman. The committee will now stand in recess for 5
minutes and reconvene at 10 minutes to 12:00. Thank you.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The committee will be in order. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to General Casey,
I think that we are all grateful for your service to the
country as our troops are and their families and I want to
thank you very much for always being available as well. And,
Mr. Secretary, good to see you as well. I wanted to follow up
just very briefly on the issue that my colleague, Congresswoman
Sanchez, raised because we do meet with victims quite
frequently actually and I think the one message that I would
relay from them is that until the perpetrators are held
accountable and not promoted, nothing is going to change.
All the education in the world is not going to make a
difference. So it is the law enforcement piece that is really
critical here and I think we need to continue to work on that.
And I know you have been working on it. Thank you.
The other issue that I wanted to raise that a number of
colleagues have mentioned is really the contracting issue and I
don't know whether you happened to see the C.Q. [Congressional
Quarterly] article in the middle of this month and we are very
aware of these issues ongoing, but it feels as if, in addition
to the Army Acquisition Review that is going on, the fact that
we have hired a number more corps men to deal with the
procurement that there is also a real cultural issue there in
the way that contracts are led.
And I wanted to ask you, General, because the Secretary
spoke to this. I mean, you see a lot of this. I can't imagine
that this is not so frustrating from time to time because this
is all about the troops. It is about their equipment. It is
about the way that we train and a lot of the contracts that we
know go on forever and don't have the kind of oversight that
they should. How is this going to be different? How do we
change business as usual?
General Casey. Congresswoman, I come at this from two
perspectives. One is the actual skills required to develop and
monitor contracting, and you may recall back in 2007 the Army
chartered what we called the Gansler Commission. Jack Gansler
went out and we told him the same thing that we basically told
Lou Wagner and Gil Decker about the acquisition, go out and
give us a soup-to-nuts look at how we are doing contracting and
tell us what we need to do to fix it.
He came back and gave us a blueprint and when we looked at
it, it is getting the right leadership, you know? We have
promoted 15 acquisition and contracting colonels to generals in
the time that I have been here and that is putting people in
the right rank in leadership positions that have the knowledge
to deal with these things.
We also have set up a contracting command and seven
expeditionary contacting brigades to provide the oversight. You
might remember the charts where we started off with a couple of
hundred million dollars worth of contracts in Kuwait and it
went to $5 billion and didn't increase the people monitoring
the contract.
Mrs. Davis. I think partly what I am asking though are
sole-source contracts. Now, maybe it is hard to generalize
that. Is that a good idea? Is it a bad idea of data rights? Do
you think those issues are going to be changed and what would
you change?
General Casey. Some of those--yes. Well, some of those
issues are really a case-by-case basis and there is not a
cookie cutter way to say yes or no on any one of those. The
other thing on contracting is how we actually develop the
requirements--to go out and buy something for the troops and
that is what the second study looked at.
And it comes down to you have got to have the right people
with the right skills and that takes time to build them. And so
I think we are going in the right direction. I think it is
going to take us some time to get where we want to be.
Secretary McHugh. May I say just a couple of things about
sole source? As the chief said, there are circumstances where
you have no choice and in those circumstances are obviously an
operational necessity, but they are few and far between or they
should be. And I think your point is well taken that you don't
have to look in the far past--the too distant past to see where
sole-source contracts may have been let as a matter of
convenience, not as a matter of responsibility.
Probably the most prevalent example of areas where the Army
and others have been criticized is--are in the LOGCAP'd
[Logistics Civil Augmentation Program] contracts, those service
support contracts and principally in Iraq that over time in the
past were sole-sourced. We have changed that. They are now--
let. We have three, in fact, LOGCAP at the operators in LOGCAP
IV. We had the issue recently of so-called ANC, Alaska Native
Corporation, contracts where under the federal guidelines an
Alaska Native Corporation duly constituted is eligible for a
sole-source contract. That was the topic of some discussion in
recent newspaper articles.
We have put out directives that if we indeed use those
kinds of contracts, they have to be absolutely justifiable. We
don't want to diminish our support of the small business and
minority objectives----
Mrs. Davis. Exactly.
Secretary McHugh [continuing]. And this Administration is
very supportive of those, but I think we have got to be wise
taxpayer stewards, and sole-sourcing is something that we can
do a better job of.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis. I will submit questions for the record. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Casey,
Secretary McHugh, thank you very much for your visits to Fort
Jackson which I am very grateful to represent in South
Carolina. To me, it is a classic case of where new recruits are
trained, military opportunity is provided and our military
service where young people can achieve to their highest
potential. And so I appreciate your service.
In my perspective, my dad served in the 14th Army Air
Corps, Fighting Tigers, World War II. I was grateful, General,
to serve actually beginning with you at Indiantown Gap Military
Reservation, Pennsylvania, several years ago. Like, 1943. And
so I served 31 years in Guard and Reserve, but most grateful I
have got three sons currently in your command serving with the
Army National Guard, one son served for you in Iraq, another
has served in Egypt and the third guy will be commissioned May
12th.
With that background, I want to thank you. This committee
has been bipartisan and I sent a letter with Congresswoman
Davis and, General, you responded and I appreciate this. Our
concern was dwell time, one that the goal is still one to three
and I am still hopeful too that boots on the ground that we can
work for 1 year to 9 months.
But my concern is about the drawdown and the impact of a
27,000 drawdown. I am concerned obviously for the morale of the
troops, for the families, their concerns and expectations of a
career that could be in jeopardy. I am also concerned that we
may have an unintended message to our enemy that we are not
understanding the threat to our country.
And so as to the impact, General, what do you see as to
what study and what will be considered for a drawdown?
General Casey. Thank you, Congressman. As I have--we have
worked our way through this. I mean, there was a reason I
picked the end of 2014 to hold our end strength in excess to
the Guard and Reserve and that the reason was that got us
through one full cycle at 1 year out, 2 years back and I felt
that that was important to get that for the troops.
As we talked about earlier, you know, we have not yet begun
to figure out how this drawdown will occur. I mentioned that we
have had some ongoing work for about 6 months here looking at
our force structure, figuring out what we need more of, what we
need less of, those kinds of things and that work will come
together, I would think, over the next 90 days to 180 days.
And so I think we are in a much better position to talk
about that a little bit later. But I would assure you and the
committee that we will work very closely with the committee and
we want to make sure because we are at war. We have an
appropriate end strength that both meets the demand and does it
at a sustainable tempo. I can't imagine knowingly bringing to
this committee an end strength that wouldn't give us at least
one-to-two and we want to get to one-to-three and be able to
surge to one-to-two. That has got to be the new benchmark. We
can't go back to one-to-one after a decade at war.
Mr. Wilson. And that would just be what we would--I know I
would support. So I thank you for your commitment.
Additionally, General, all the joint chiefs signed a letter
supporting changes in the military health care plan and these
changes affect the military, but they also go beyond that and
affect our local hospitals such as Fort Drum, New York; Fort
Huachuca in Arizona.
How will these hospitals be affected? I am going to ask the
Secretary that.
Secretary McHugh. If I may, in my old district, you
mentioned one of the hospitals. When that special program was
set up, the original intention, as I recall, was to ensure that
these hospitals had the opportunity to adapt to the needs of
the military community and the assistance dollars were intended
to provide that bridging opportunity.
If I could use the hospital outside of Fort Drum, New York
and Carthage, New York, as an example, at the time their OB/GYN
operations were probably not at a level that would allow them
to take advantage and participate particularly in live birth
deliveries for the--population and we would hope the monies
provided gave them that chance to upgrade their infrastructure.
From my perspective, it was never intended to be an
unending program and, in fact, it has been maintained now for a
sufficient amount of time that the Department of Defense made
the judgment that indeed we could withdraw that support and
that the bridging should have been completed by now. I can't
speak to the condition of each and every hospital, but I think
from a programmatic level, it was a reasonable planning and
budgetary assumption.
I just want to point out when we are talking about the very
modest increases to the TRICARE payments, they do not affect
Active military. No Active military member nor their families
would be affected by the very modest increases in the TRICARE
enrollment increases which are $2.50 a month for an individual
and $5 for a family.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank
you for being here. Good to see you again. And General Casey,
we also wish you the best and if you could, pass on to your
wife also our thanks for her service. I know you and I were at
a meeting last spring. We were both there in service of our
spouses who were in service of our military families and
especially our military children in the light of education.
Our concern here, my concern is for the whole of the
military, the whole of the Army and the Reserve Component. I am
going to zero in a little bit towards Fort Bragg, the center of
the universe, and General Mulholland and Special Forces. I am
sure there is one or two people here that might be familiar
with Robin Sage and the exercise that our special forces go
through and they have trained to go into the field and they
tell us it is the best training they get to actually be working
and encounter insurgency and I have had the privilege because
Robin Sage is mostly my district.
I have had the privilege of being a character actor there
three times. I have met the Pine Lynn government official who
will work with the insurgency and has been a great opportunity.
But if you could, tell us a little bit about the Special
Forces. I know Admiral Olson was talking about the special ops,
they are starting to feel a little bit of the strain. What are
our Special Forces doing, where are we heading, and what are
our plans for Special Forces?
General Casey. We have been adding a Special Forces
battalion a year here for the last several years and I think we
finish up next year and it will be a total of five more Special
Forces battalions that we have added to the force.
And I talked to General Mulholland frequently and he has
done a wonderful job of putting us in a position to better
support them. I know you have heard a lot about--talk about
enablers for Special Forces. We have worked out a system where
they can request enablers from us through the normal force
generation process that I described earlier and that is helping
them out quite a bit.
I think one of the other things that we are looking at
here, and I have discussed this with both General Mulholland
and Admiral Olson is that--we are looking because of our
experience of--with conventional forces working with other
militaries that we have gained in the last 5 or 6 years. We are
actually going to be in a position here next year to start
taking some of the training requirements to ease the burden on
the Special Forces.
And so that active conventional mix can go--active special
mix can go the other way and actually we can wind up supporting
them. And I am--the other thing that we are doing is for
Special Forces aviation, building them some additional CH-47
[Boeing Chinook helicopter] battalions so that they increase
their aviation capabilities.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, sir. And I would just like to
quickly reiterate what my colleague, Mrs. Davis, said about the
concerns about some of the--and that you all have talked about
and working on that some of the procurement--down to some of
the smaller levels of contracts. I am not talking about the big
systems and the big monies, but just some of the things that
people have that are better ideas, better cost. It just seems
like the bureaucracy that there is such a comfort level of the
people within the programs that they don't want to be bothered
with having to consider something else.
And we get a lot of folks that we feel that have good ideas
that just get frustrated with the process. We appreciate you
all working on this and I will actually be sending a couple of
questions in for the record. And thank you for your service and
thank you for your time and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you for
being here. Mr. Secretary, good to see you again. I appreciate
you being here and I for one do miss you on the committee. So
for all those who are happy that you are in that position, we
certainly appreciate all the accomplishments that you had while
you served on this committee.
General, you had made the point, you know, that we are a
country at war and this is a Congress that is burdened by the
issues of how we address this mounting debt and the deficits
that our country is facing, but I think, you know, we know
being a country at war that our greatest concern is, how do we
ensure that the Department of Defense receives what it needs at
the same time that we look for efficiencies?
And one of the concerns that I have as we look to this
year's of reductions or cost-cutting in the Department of
Defense is the issue of end strength reductions, both those
that I looked at, at the Marine Corps and the Army. And in your
opening statement, you made reference to the issues of dwell
time ratios. We know that the Marine Corps and the Army neither
have met the goal of one-to-three dwell time ratios.
According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' testimony to
the committee on February 16th, the Army will not even achieve
a one-to-two dwell ratio until sometime in 2012. You made
similar statements of the goals of achieving it, but they are
still just goals and we have grave concerns as we look to what
reductions and resources you might have as to whether or not
that is accomplishable.
And then so if you would comment on that, I would greatly
appreciate it. And then, Mr. Secretary and General Casey, I am
also interested in your thoughts on the issues of the HMMWV
[High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle] reprogramming. I
think people are really concerned as to what extent there has
been true and accurate analysis of both the ability to field
the type of vehicles that are needed and to look at what the
effects are going to be of the account reprogramming and we
would appreciate it if you would comment on that, and I
probably have a follow-up question to the HMMWV comments.
Secretary McHugh. If I may, I will start with HMMWVs and
then if the chief would take over on end strength. The issue of
how carefully did considered this is a well studied one, and I
can assure you this is based on sound analysis. I directed
early on in my tenure as the Secretary that the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army, General Pete Chiarelli, and the Under
Secretary of the Army, Joe Westphal, began what we are calling
capability portfolio reviews. Everything the Army does is
compressed into a portfolio whether it be our wheeled vehicles,
our combat fighting fleet, et cetera, et cetera.
And when that panel took a look at HMMWVs, they discovered
something very, very interesting. Not only have we met our
requirement, we in fact had exceeded it and we had come to the
point where we always knew someday it would be that our
acquisition objective had been achieved.
There are a couple of reasons that snuck up on us, I think,
in large measure because the HMMWVs were not being used to the
extent we thought they would be in theater. They were lasting
longer and we weren't having to transition out through wear as
many as, I think, in the first instance were programmed. The
other thing is the commanders were concerned about their
survivability in an IED environment. So that too added to the
fact that we had more on-hand much, much sooner than we had
originally planned.
So that analysis led us to the conclusion that the monies
that were scheduled in 2010 to procure more HMMWVs could be
better spent in other ways. And we worked with the Secretary of
Defense and Comptroller Hale to ensure that the proposed
reprogramming we put forward would utilize the monies should
Congress approve that reprogramming to meet the immediate
threat that our soldiers are facing in theater, counter IEDs,
ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], things
that are necessary to save lives.
So it is a very careful calculation. We feel it is well
founded in the data and obviously a change of this nature
causes concern amongst some quarters. We understand that and we
are willing to do whatever we can----
Mr. Turner. Before, if I could----
General Casey. Sure.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. Before my time completely runs
out, but I appreciate your answer, and your explanation, you
know, the two concerns obviously in that switch you are taking
a capital expenditure and shifting it to what is an operational
expense. The other issue is the concern that the JLTV [Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle] program may be delayed and what--a
result if that program is delayed? Will you be able to meet all
of your requirements?
Secretary McHugh. The question--your second question is we
will. We have a recap program for the existing HMMWV that is
being damaged right now frankly by the continuing C.R. We have
had to lay off 200--on that recap program, but we feel we can
buy a zero-miles-based, zero-hour-based recapped HMMWV for
$100,000 versus $165,000 for an equal new. So we feel confident
and we are going to require platforms with our reprogramming,
as I said, counter IED and such, in the same fashion we are
going to require HMMWV platforms.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman--my
colleagues who liked you, thanks, General Casey, for his 40-
plus years of service and to say that I have read a lot about
you and I think we are losing someone with amazing foresight as
to what we need to do.
Having said that, my questions are for the Secretary. Mr.
Secretary, in looking at the budget, it is very evident that
the base budget for the 2012 request is about $144 plus, almost
$145 billion, and there is this interesting category--of
course, the overseas contingency operations, the OCO, which
then amounts to almost 50 percent of the $144 billion. For your
total addition together, you would have about $216 billion.
I was really interested in the OCO category because my
understanding from the power briefings is that that category is
really one that is sort of tied to Iraq and Afghanistan and as
we begin to draw down, I assume that that budget was also being
looked upon as being drawn down. Now, how would that then
impact what you need to do with your sustainability efforts for
the Army in the future?
Secretary McHugh. Well, indeed the OCO budgets that used to
be called supplemental budgets are designed to support theater
operations. That is how historically Congress has funded wars,
and it provides us an opportunity to fund, as you noted, a base
budget this year just over $140 billion to sustain those things
that we would buy whether we were at war or not, and at the
same time to ensure we are doing the right things by the
warfighters.
Indeed, as you noted, Congresswoman, OCO budgets do come
down when theater operations and demands decrease. The $71
billion in this year's Army OCO request is down from about $120
billion in years past and we expect that that will continue as
operations diminish.
We will need in terms of our long-term sustainment, as the
chief had mentioned earlier, 2 to 3 years of reset monies,
those dollars that in large measure, in fact, totally contained
in OCO right now to bring back the major pieces of equipment to
put them through the recap program to bring them back to
standards for 2 to 3 years after we are no longer engaged in a
name contingency.
So we need those reset monies as they are contained in OCO
right now to transition with Congress' support into the base so
we can do over the next 2 or 3 years after cessation of
hostilities the reset program that we need.
Ms. Hanabusa. I noticed that also part of the OCO budget is
an increase of $9 billion for research and development and
about $2.1 billion for procurement. I happen to be a great
advocate of research and development and I was wondering, why
is it in the OCO budget? Was there something unique about this
research and development and the procurement that puts it in
the OCO budget versus something that can be facilitated in the
base budget?
Secretary McHugh. I don't recall that exact line, but
clearly if you look for example historically at joint IED
defeat programs, the RTD&E [Research, Development, Test &
Evaluation] had been in the OCO. I would note that we are
purposely--and I think at the behest in urging of the Congress
and this committee--moving those funds for IED defeat and
providing a line in the base budget for that, but a generic
response to your question be any time we are developing
something such as an MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicle] or something that is field-unique, it would not be
unusual to have at least a portion of the research development
monies in the OCO itself because that is a primarily war-driven
process and cost.
Ms. Hanabusa. Let me ask you about one of the--probably the
most disturbing parts of the testimony regarding General
Chiarelli's report on the suicide. Now, how much of the reset
or how much of this dwell time should--is going to cost--it is
going to have a cost--and how much of that should we really
have in the base budget if it isn't already in the base budget?
It seems to be something that is so result of the OCO
operations.
So what do we want to ensure into the future that we have
those kinds of costs written into your base?
Secretary McHugh. Well, we pay a soldier whether that
soldier is back and reset and going through--in his or her home
base or if they are forward-deployed. When they are forward-
deployed, there are certain wartime pays and bonuses that are
available, but the cost when you are in CONUS [the continental
United States] and garrison are calculated as part of our
personnel expenses, as I mentioned earlier, about 42 cents of
every dollar we spend are personnel-driven and it is something
that we will have to build into our budget development process
and we do that routinely.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
General Casey. If I could, we are already putting some of
those costs in the base. I mean, we have about $280 million in
the base for psychiatric care and services and another $85
million for research in post-traumatic stress and mild
traumatic brain injury. That is already in the base.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General
Casey, may I just add my name to the list of all those who have
lauded your noble service to humanity and just to the cause of
human freedom. I know that there is no way to express the kind
of service that you have done. I mean, a lot of us talk about
freedom up here and people like yourselves carry it on your
back everywhere you go and I appreciate it so much.
And Mr. Secretary, obviously it is wonderful to see you
back again. You know, I don't know if it is harder on that side
of the lectern or not. It sounds like it might be. So my
question is to both of you. DOD has recently decided to stop
funding for the Medium Extended Air Defense System, or the
MEADS system, and yet they have decided to complete the design
and development phase of the program which requires an
additional $804 million across fiscal 2012 and 2013.
And as you know, the MEADS program is intended to replace
the aging Patriot and Hawk missile system that has been
developed in cooporation with, of course, Italy and Germany.
Admiral Mullen testified in a hearing before the Senate in 2007
that, ``In view of the threats we face today and will face in
the future, I believe the United States should deploy
components of the ballistic missile defense system as soon as
they become available, even as we improve their operational
effectiveness.''
Now, significant amounts of time and research and
development and testing have already gone into the MEADS system
and at a time when the need for layered ballistic defense
system is drastically increasing, I guess my question is kind
of three-fold. First, does it make sense to end the program
that will meet this need so near to its completion? And,
secondly, if the program is terminated what course of action is
the Army taking to replace the intended mission of the MEAD
system and what kind of timeframe are we working on?
And finally, do we have a cost comparison between seeing
the MEAD system go through the--to production and
implementation and the alternative to replacing the Patriot and
Hawk missile systems? That is a long set of questions, but it
is----
Secretary McHugh. I will do my best to try to get through
at least most of those. This was not an easy decision and it
wasn't a hasty decision. As I am sure you are aware,
Congressman, the MEADS program has been under way for a decade.
The Army has invested over $2 billion and that is only the
partial cost of the program. Frankly, it was underperforming.
You mentioned it was close to completion. We are not so sure
that is true.
The decision to stick with the D&D [Design and Development]
through the end of, I believe, 2014--the technology was one to
provide our German and Italian partners an equal opportunity to
harvest technology out of that. If there is any available
information and gain out of this program, it is the technology
package. We intend to put that on the shelf and to utilize it
in trying to develop a program that can deliver the capability
the MEADS was designed to deliver and do it in a more timely
and affordable way.
In the interim, it is our intent to do upgrades to the pack
three that you mentioned to--and other layered defenses that
OSD has validated to us are available to meet the near-term
needs. We just felt it was more good money after bad, but we
remain committed to a system that is--that provides that kind
of protection against the threat that is just not going to go
away.
Mr. Franks. General, I might ask you to elaborate, too. I
mean, as far as the cost comparison to any replacement that may
occur, you are saying to me, it sounds like, that you think
that the PAC-3 [Patriot Advanced Capability-3] and some of the
other systems can be upgraded to be able to meet that need; is
that--was that what I was hearing?
Secretary McHugh. I said there is a bridge.
Mr. Franks. Okay. Where would the bridge go?
Secretary McHugh. Well, the bridge goes to the next system.
We are not abandoning the project that--and one of the reasons
for harvesting the technology is as the threat becomes more
prevalent, we can take the technology off the shelf and develop
a system that meets the threat when it appears. Right now, it
is prospective.
Mr. Franks. Well, I guess I am--you know, I am hearing a
little conflict here that the threat or the need is increasing,
but you are--if I heard you right, Mr. Secretary, you are
saying that the need right now is more prospective? Now, maybe
I misunderstood.
Secretary McHugh. Well, what I am suggesting--and I defer
to your expertise on missile defense, Mr. Franks. I have
followed your lead on voting many times and I appreciate the
insight and the understanding you bring to that.
Mr. Franks. You should keep that a secret, if you can.
Secretary McHugh. No, there are not many of us here.
Perhaps they will hold it----
Mr. Franks. Nobody will know. You are safe.
Secretary McHugh. Yes. Yes.
But we felt there was a--use of money particularly with
this program that was non-performing and we really did not see
light at the end of the tunnel to invest the funds more wisely
in an immediate threat that we know is out there that we feel
and has as, again, I mentioned, validated by OSD and DOD that
can be met by our PAC-3 upgrade programs, Aegis System and
other available technologies.
Clearly, we need to ensure in the future as this threat
that MEADS was intended to confront matures to have a response
to it and that is why we are harvesting the technology to begin
to develop a new program that will meet what we feel is a
maturing threat somewhere down the road, it is not a threat
right now that we believe we are indefensible against.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and
General, thank you. Let me beat this horse from a different
side. It is going to cost about $800 million to finish MEADS to
proof of concept. That is 800-and-something-million dollars.
The request to bring it this next fiscal year 2012 is around
$400 million, roughly half.
If you are not doing it for any particular purpose that
meets a standing threat, then why put the money there at all?
My question is actually for General Casey. Do you have any
other thing you would like to put to almost half a billion
dollars into in fiscal year 2012 or----
General Casey. As you both know, I mean, this is a very
complex program. It is a development program with other
countries that have interest in it. There are cancellation fees
and things that had to be taken into consideration. And the
Department has worked all of those issues and come to the
conclusion that this is the best way to proceed with the
program.
Mr. Hunter. By spending almost a billion dollars on
something we are not going to produce?
General Casey. But that will allow us to meet our
obligations to these other countries.
Mr. Hunter. So we are doing it for these other nations'
interest?
Secretary McHugh. If I may, the $800 million proof of
concept that you mentioned we are not convinced is viable. The
history of this program has been one as it has been related to
me were milestones that were set out and determined were rarely
reached in the timeframe in which they were defined and proof
of concept may well be yet another one of those. The investment
of the $400 million was the--as the chief said, a decision as
to how do we most wisely terminate this program.
If we withdrew this year, there are substantial withdrawal
fees that the United States would have to bear and pay into the
program that would not make it a wise decision.
Mr. Hunter. Would you call it a bad deal then from the very
beginning kind of? I mean, to----
Secretary McHugh. Well, I think the--I wasn't there at the
time, Congressman Hunter. Obviously anytime you--anytime you
spend over $2 billion and dedicated a decade and you have
little to show for it beyond the technology package was why the
Department decided to spend the $400 million. It is probably
not what you would want to design your procurement programs to
be, but I think in the beginning you had three key allies--the
Germans, the Italians, the Americans--working together to try
to cooperatively do something that maybe they wouldn't have
taken up jointly and for a variety of reasons that I don't
pretend to totally understand. It has been a non-performing
program.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Next question, something totally
different having to do with Reserves, National Guard, Army
drawdowns as we exit Iraq and hopefully victoriously leave
Afghanistan in the next decade or so. How are we going to make
sure this time that we don't let our National Guard and
Reserves fall into disrepair especially National Guard which
are your shooters?
General Casey. Yes.
Mr. Hunter. I mean, it is just a huge burden--I wouldn't
call it a burden. I would call it a privilege that they have
had to serve as main frontline soldiers especially in
Afghanistan and Iraq. How are we going to make sure that they
don't fall into the same slump that they sink to every time we
exit a war?
General Casey. That is a great question because they have
been full participants in this war. I mean, the Guard itself
has over 600 killed, 5,000 wounded and I just talked to all of
the tags a couple of days ago and we talked about exactly this.
We all believe that we do not want the Guard and Reserve to
go back to being just a Strategic Reserve. We have invested $28
billion just in Guard equipment in the last 5 years. We have to
figure out how to leverage that investment and we commissioned
a study, the Secretary and I, oh, about a year ago now where we
asked a former Chief of Staff of the Army, a former Chief of
the Army Guard and former Chief of the Army Reserve to go back
and tell us what should be the role of the Guard and Reserve in
an area of persistent conflict when repeated deployments are
the norm.
And they came back and gave us some great insights and one
of the most important insights that they gave us was that we
are going to have some forces that are going to deploy and
those forces will be resourced and to do what they need to do
and be well trained and equipped so they meet the needs of that
deployment. And we have designed the Army since the early 1970s
not to be able to go to war without the Guard and Reserve.
And I think you know our force structure is very heavily
weighted with Guard and Reserve filling the combat supported
combat service for functions. And so there is one level. They
are going to get funded. They are going to go.
Now, the question then becomes, okay, how much readiness do
you build in the next decade to deploy forces and we need a
model that allows us to sustain their combat edge that they
have built over the last decade, but then also only to build
the readiness we need when we need it and we are actively
working on that model with the Guard and Reserve, but we are
absolutely committed that we don't want the Guard and Reserve
to go back to being just a Strategic Reserve.
Mr. Hunter. Great. And please let me know how we can help.
Mr. Walls and myself are the co-chairs of the National Guard
Reserve Caucus now and any way that we can help you with that
or work with you on that, we would be happy to. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary McHugh.
And especially General Casey, seeing that you are going to
retire soon, thank you so much for your 4 decades of service to
the United States Army.
First of all, Secretary McHugh, I share with you the
condolences to the families that were killed in the Fort Hood
shooting that happened last year--I am sorry, on November 5,
2009--and the report of Major Hasan is--I believe it is still
restricted and it is merely an analysis of his personnel record
with no references to the incident itself. And if it is still
restricted, I would ask you to make that available to the
American people. I think they have a right to know and I don't
see anything relevant to national security nor relevant to the
case that is in this report.
It is, in fact, embarrassing to the United States Army to
have missed so many, I think, cues as to the radicalization of
Major Hasan and I believe that corrective action is being taken
in that regard. I certainly hope that it is. Secretary.
Secretary McHugh. The release of information is really
controlled by the interpretation placed on it by the legal
authorities as to the possible effect it might have at this
time with respect to public release with the prosecution for
the crimes allegedly committed by Nidal Hasan. That was a
decision made by the Office of General Counsel, DOD and others,
and at such time that I would assume that those circumstances
no longer exist, release of appropriate redacted information I
feel comfortable will occur. I just can't tell you when the
lawyers----
Mr. Coffman. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I just want to say
that that is an abuse of the authority of the chief legal
counsel of the Department of Defense to have made that
decision, which I believe is a political decision, and really
has nothing to do with the case.
Let me go to a question concerning our--I believe we have
four brigade combat teams still in Europe and General Casey, I
think I was--you were second lieutenant when I was a private in
the United States Army. And during the Cold War, you and I know
it is pretty damn cold being on that border of Czechoslovakia--
rotating on that border during that period of time in the early
1970s, but we still have four brigade combat teams and the Cold
War has long since been over with.
And I know in the Quadrennial Defense Review, they
supported keeping those troops there, but in a recent GAO
[Government Accountability Office] study, it said that GAO
concludes keeping two brigades in Germany costs $390 million
more per year than basing them in the United States. And so I
would really ask you to take a look at whether or not we ought
to redeploy some of those forces back to the United States. Do
you have a response to that?
General Casey. I think you--you know, Congressman, this is
something the Department of Defense has been working on for a
while and I think they are getting relatively close to making a
decision on what, if any, of those forces would return.
Mr. Coffman. Very well. Thank you. You know, my final
question, for Secretary McHugh or General Casey, the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle program has been subject to cost
overruns, milestone delays, ambiguous capability requirements,
you know? I think that right now the projected base unit cost
of the JLTV is $300 to $4,000--$300,000 to $400,000 per copy.
And you know and I know historically these costs will rise over
time. What is the future of this program and how will the army
manage cost increases? What is the long-term ground vehicle
strategy for the Army regarding HMMWVs, MRAPs and JLTVs?
Secretary McHugh. A good question there. The Army is still
committed and we are still working with the Marine Corps on the
development of the JLTV. Your observations about cost overruns
is accurate and it in large measure goes back to what we had
discussed earlier in this hearing with respect to unrealistic
requirements. I think they have reconfigured that.
We do expect a lot of the JLTV. It shares several hundred
requirements with the MATVs, with the--MRAPs that we think are
performing so magnificently, but it has its own unique aspects
as well. We are trying our best to control that and we look
forward to its fielding. It will be ultimately the replacement
for the HMMWV with far more survivability with off-road
capability that the HMMWV does not have and we see it as part
of our future fleet.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
witnesses being here today. I have learned a great deal and I
want to thank you for your leadership. I also want to express
my support and admiration for those you lead. I think it was
particularly noteworthy that you brought these fine non-
commissioned officers here to remind us to keep it real as we
are going through this here today. Thank you for your service.
And we remember the families too and I thought it was very
touching that you brought one of our Gold Star family leaders
here today. We will always remember.
You know, I also want to appreciate the work that went into
preparing the budget. This is really a different time over the
last decade. We are doing more with less and we are all
committed. I think everybody on this committee and beyond is
committed to protecting our cherished way of life, but we also
know that the deficit is a threat to our way of life.
So towards that end, the judgment that you showed to deal
with the declining President's budget numbers is appreciated.
You know, my question has to do with the future of the Armed
Forces and here today the Army and looking forward to 2014,
2015 and beyond at a time when we have accomplished our
objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan and we think about the force
that we are going to need.
I affiliate to some degree with the--he would--any future
Secretary of Defense would be crazy if he gave a recommendation
that we send a land army or send our Army to the land forces in
Asia or to Africa, you know, I think to the degree that we
avoid a decade-long counterinsurgency effort is something we
ought to be trying to do.
I think there are better ways to neutralize the Al Qaeda
threat, but having said that, so much of the international
order is really based on deterrence and to have demonstrated
capability to put together a con-op where the Nation has the
ability from joint forcible entry to campaigning to sustaining
and post-hostilities, I think, will go a long way to keeping
peace, particularly when you think about the instability in the
world and the potential interests of nations that may want to
take advantage of certain circumstances.
So looking out in 2014 and 2015 and beyond, General, how do
you assess our ability to conduct these kind of operations?
Where do you think the risk is not only inside your formations
and your institutions, but along the joint force for the
country to be able to do this, and are you convinced that in
the fight that we have, war gaming, exercises and other means
to come to understanding in situational awareness on where our
weakness and vulnerabilities are? Thanks.
General Casey. Well, this kind of goes back to the
discussion we were having earlier about what are we going to
need and what kind of Army we are going to need in 2015, 2016.
And as I mentioned, the two dominant characteristics of the
future environment are uncertainty and complexity. And frankly,
I believe that the Army we will have at the beginning of 2015
will be an Army that is versatile, that is combat-seasoned,
that is well-equipped and ready to deal with a wide range of
challenges.
The issue will be should we draw it down and if we draw it
down, can we do that without damaging our capability to operate
across the spectrum of conflict, to put together the types of
operations that you mentioned? Because I think that is what we
are going to need. We don't know what we are going to be doing
in 3 to 5 years from now.
I mean, Secretary Gates says our track record is perfect
and I firmly believe that we will be doing something in 3 to 5
years that none of us are thinking about today. I don't know
what that is.
Mr. Gibson. Are you convinced that in the FYDP [Future
Years Defense Program] you have got the war gaming, the
modeling, the simulation, the exercises to show that we have
this capability? And, for example, to put a finer point on a
couple of these things, are you convinced we have got enough C-
17s [Boeing Globemaster military transport aircraft], vessels
that we have got the command and control in the like that we
are going to be able to put this together?
General Casey. No, I appreciate what you are saying there
and there are studies and models that do the kinds of things
you are saying, but what I found in my 4 years here is they are
still largely weighted toward a conventional military operation
and we have been working with others over time to build models
that actually reflect the kinds of operations that we are going
to be doing--we think are hybrid-type operations. They are
not--there will be a mix of conventional irregular criminal
terrorists, all arrayed against us asymmetrically, but we don't
have good models for those to your point.
Mr. Gibson. Well, thank you very much for that testimony,
and I think to the degree that we demonstrate competency on
that, I think it will reinforce what our diplomats are doing
for us and we will be a strong Nation. And I think we can
protect our cherished way of life in a manner that is
consistent for a republic and not an empire. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. I see no further members
of the committee to ask questions. I thank you for your time
here today. Thank you again for your service. I look forward to
working with you as we move through the budget process and this
committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 2, 2011
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March 2, 2011
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?
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 2, 2011
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army has initiated several
efforts to improve contracting practices and save taxpayer resources.
In April 2009, we formally established solicitation and contract review
boards and oversight thresholds to improve visibility and performance
of our contracts across the entire Army. We have also strengthened the
Headquarters, Department of the Army Procurement Management Review
program to ensure the Army is effectively managing its resources. In
addition, the Army continues to implement strategic sourcing
initiatives to achieve the benefit of cost efficiencies by
consolidating procurements where it makes good business sense. In
November 2010, we appointed a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Services) to place greater emphasis on the requirements generation,
oversight, and management of service contracts, which account for a
large share of DOD spending. As part of the DOD effort to achieve
savings of $100 billion over the next five years, the Army has been a
full partner in identifying cost savings of approximately $29 billion.
Through comprehensive capability portfolio reviews, the Army has
proposed savings by terminating or reducing weapons systems with
declining relevance or unnecessary redundancy. Lastly, the Army is
utilizing Section 852 funding to hire new Acquisition personnel, with
the majority being contracting interns. The Army has hired over 1300
Acquisition personnel under Section 852 authority. [See page 18.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 2, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON
Mr. McKeon. With regard to end strength, what I would like to
understand is the relationship between the current requirement for 45
Active Brigade Combat Teams and the cut to end strength of 27,000
between 2015 and 2016.
a. If this end strength reduction happens, what will be the impact
on the total number of BCTs and what kind of mix of BCTs can we expect
(Heavy, Light, and Stryker)?
b. From a force structure perspective, how do you budget in 2012,
2013 and 2014, for an anticipated end strength reduction in 2015/2016?
c. You have previously stated that it took ten years to grow and
equip the force to current levels, have equipping funds already been
reduced in the 2012-2014 timeframe that assumes that this reduction
will take place?
d. From a total force structure perspective, how do you plan and
program funds in the 2012-2014 timeframe if the plan assumes that this
troop reduction will take place in 2015/2016?
e. What is the ``knee in the curve'' for making a decision to
reverse this reduction and still not have a negative impact on the
ability to train and equip?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. a. No decisions have been made
as to what types of units or what installations will be impacted by the
Secretary of Defense's announcement. There are currently 73 Brigade
Combat Teams (BCTs) in the Army, 45 in the Active Component (AC) and 28
in the Army National Guard (ARNG). There are 24 Heavy Brigade Combat
Teams (17 AC/7ARNG), 40 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (20 AC/20 ARNG),
and 9 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (8 AC/1 ARNG).
b. Specific direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) is to reduce end strength by 27,000, including about 5,000
officers and about 22,000 enlisted personnel. Reductions are expected
to be phased in with approximately half of the 27,000 reduction
occurring in FY15 and the other half no later than the second quarter
of FY16. The Army is considering reducing accessions and implementing a
myriad of voluntary and involuntary separation authorities to achieve
the Secretary of Defense's direction.
c/d. We are conducting deliberate analyses now to determine which
capabilities should be reduced and how the drawdown plan will proceed.
Adjustments to the Army's program will be captured in our Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) 14-18 submission.
e. Three assumptions must be achieved if the Army is to draw down
its end strength as directed by OSD. The Army assumes that the drawdown
in Iraq will continue and that it will be completed by 31 December
2011. The Army also assumes that forces in Afghanistan will be drawn
down in accordance with current administration policy. Finally, while
we cannot predict when and where crises may occur, we do expect that in
an era of persistent conflict Army forces could be required for a
variety of missions but at nothing approaching the levels seen in
recent years. If these assumptions hold true, we believe the Army is
capable of supporting Combatant Command requirements within an end
strength of 520,400.
Mr. McKeon. The Secretary of Defense said at our hearing that the
force structure reductions he announced in January will be ``conditions
based.'' a. Please give us your definition of what ``conditions based''
means? Is it AFG specifically? b. What assumptions must we make about
our force presence after 2014 in AFG to implement the cut? How does
this relate to your recent comments that you believe the Army will
continue to have over 50K deployed after Iraq/AFG? c. Is the end
strength decision reversible? d. If the decision is indeed conditions
based, how will the Army ensure we have the force structure to support
a higher end strength in case conditions do not allow for such
reductions?
General Casey. The term ``conditions based'' refers to global
demand for land forces and does not refer to any one region
specifically. The Army makes assumptions about future demand in order
to inform its planning efforts, and while we cannot predict demand with
absolute certainty, we are confident that it will not reach the levels
seen in recent years. We assume that the drawdown in Iraq will continue
and that it will be completed by 31 December, 2011 and we assume that
forces in
Afghanistan will be drawn down in accordance with the current
Administration's policy. The Army is conducting deliberate analysis,
and will develop a phased plan with opportunities to reverse course if
assumptions prove incorrect. We will continue to ensure that force
requirements are sourced with trained and ready units through a
disciplined Global Force Management process.
Mr. McKeon. Secretary Gates recently spoke at West Point and said
that he envisages a future ground force that will be smaller, pack less
heavy firepower and will not engage in large-scale counter-insurgency
wars like those in Iraq or Afghanistan. a. Do you believe that in the
next ten years the Army will increasingly be asked to focus more on
short-duration counterterrorism strikes and disaster relief? b. What
size force do you believe will be required? c. In past, we have
downsized after the war was over. But this budget puts us in
unchartered waters. Does this concern you?
General Casey. Due to the complexity and dynamic nature of the
strategic environment, it is impossible to predict with certainty
exactly the types of conflicts in which the United States may become
involved. The Army must maintain the capability to operate effectively
across the full spectrum of conflict, with a continued emphasis on
partner building and engagement activities to prevent conflicts from
occurring or escalating. The Army is conducting deliberate analysis to
determine the optimal force mix within authorized end strength, and
will take into account the current fiscally constrained environment.
The Army will continue to ensure the accomplishment of its assigned
missions, improve operational readiness to meet future demands, and
care for the well-being of its Soldiers and their Families.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. The Committee understands that the USMC LAV program has
experienced significant benefits associated with Side and Wheel-well
Armor Kits added to the USMC fleet of LAV's. These kits were developed
by Armatec and installed at the Barstow and Albany USMC Depots.
Further, the Committee understands that several allied countries are
incorporating, into their LAV fleets, additional technologies developed
by this company such as Mine Blast floor and Underbelly Protection
Kits, Roof Mounted Blast Attenuating Seats, Armored Self-sealing Fuel
Tanks and RPG Protection Kits. The Committee believes that these
technologies could improve Stryker vehicle and occupant survivability
while not compromising mobility.
a. Could these kits be adapted for use on the Stryker vehicle? Has
the Army worked with the USMC or ally countries to determine if these
LAV armor solutions provide better protection than current Stryker
armor solutions? If not, why not?
b. If the Army has worked in coordination with the USMC LAV program
and or ally countries to evaluate if any of these technologies could be
incorporated into the Stryker vehicles during reset, provide the HASC
with a summary of your findings.
c. If the USMC and allied countries have armor solutions that
provide better protection for their war fighters shouldn't the Army
develop a prototype to test these technologies?
Secretary McHugh. a. Yes, the kits could be adapted for use on
Stryker. However, while vehicles may appear largely common, specific
kits may not be easily applied to the other vehicles without
significant redesign. Since the Stryker vehicles have a greater base
vehicle protection against small arms than the USMC LAVs and the
Canadian LAV IIIs, the armor technologies optimized for their vehicle
systems may not be optimized or as weight efficient on the Strykers.
b/c. Since 2002, the Army has participated and conducted technical
exchanges with the USMC, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia under the
Light Armor Vehicle User Nation Group that included meetings conducted
annually in London and Ontario. In addition, the Army has conducted bi-
lateral exchanges with the Canadian Project Manager Organization-Light
Armored Vehicle III Office under a Data Exchange Agreement on the Light
Armor Ground Combat Vehicles. Exchanges have included technical
approaches to enhance the force protection and survivability of our
respective ground vehicle systems. It should be noted that vehicle
weight, configuration, and capacity play a significant role in the
applicability of specific kits to other vehicle systems. We will
coordinate with the HASC staff to provide a summary of our findings.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Bartlett. We understand that the U.S. Army has developed a
three-phase strategy to upgrade M4 carbines with incremental
improvements--ambidextrous fire control, bolt and bolt carrier, forward
rail assemblies, and an upgraded operating system--over the next few
years. Given the importance of these weapons on the battlefield, this
improvement process is essential to ensuring our Soldiers' operational
readiness and military capability in places like Afghanistan and
elsewhere. But as we've witnessed with Secretary Gates' Efficiency
Initiatives and the on-going debate about trimming programs and getting
our spending under control, this upgrade process needs to occur in a
cost-effective manner. Procurement decisions must emphasize efficiency
and effectiveness. And they need to recognize that competition is an
essential component in achieving the best value--as highlighted so
often by Under Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. It is in that context
that I ask you gentlemen about the Army's strategy for upgrading the
M4. It appears that by choosing to approve only incremental upgrades
that rely on one company's product, you have foreclosed the possibility
of a smarter way to do business. So my questions are threefold:
1. How aware are you of commercial off-the-shelf options in the M4
carbine upgrade area? Have you considered that there may be readily-
available COTS solutions?
2. We understand that the Army is fielding incremental weapon
improvements to the M4 in Phase I and Phase II of the upgrade strategy,
but why is there no definitive budget or timeline for Phase III when
COTS solutions will finally be evaluated? If there is a plan for Phase
III, can you tell us how much is budgeted and when the Army will test
those COTS solutions?
3. The Army recently released a draft RFP for a new individual
carbine. That competition will take at least two years to down select
to three potential vendors, for a competition that could ultimately
cost $1B. At the end of that competition, the Chief of Staff of Army
will decide between a new carbine and an upgrade. Does it make sense to
spend 10's of millions to run an individual carbine competition only to
turn around and potentially decide only an upgrade is required? Why
won't the Army take the more cost effective option today and test
commercially available kits (and individual carbines) to start by
determining the best, most cost effective weapon, then developing a
strategy to procure it?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. 1. The Army has conducted
several market surveys and is aware of the Commercial Off the Shelf
(COTS) components and weapons that could offer a substitute to the
upgraded M4A1 carbine. We are pursuing a Small Arms dual approach to
upgrade our current weapons while we simultaneously challenge industry
through a Full and Open Competition for the next generation Individual
Carbine (IC). The current M4A1 will be in the Army's inventory for a
number of years, even if a new weapon is selected through the IC
Competition. We owe our Soldiers the best weapons we can provide and
this dual approach will accomplish that.
2. There is currently no definitive Phase III within the M4 Product
Improvement Program. Incorporation of a COTS solution for specific
weapon components is planned for Phase II.
3. The Army selects its systems through an extensive requirements
based test and evaluation process. The pending IC competition and
testing is estimated to cost $21.8M. The Army developed a dual path
strategy that would maximize the ability to upgrade the M4 by assessing
available industry capability, while simultaneously developing a new
requirement and conducting a full and open COTS competition for a new
IC. The planned Business Case Analysis at the conclusion of the COTS
competition will support the Army's decision to determine the most
prudent path forward for the Carbine program.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
Mr. Loebsack. How much funding for psychological health and suicide
prevention in the 2012 budget will be specifically targeted to the
National Guard and Reserve?
Secretary McHugh. The Army Reserve's FY12 budget for psychological
health is $529K and Suicide Prevention is $3.8M.
Mr. Loebsack. Does the Army have a detailed plan to address the
mental health needs of the Reserve Components? Will that plan
specifically address the unique needs and circumstances of the Guard
and Reserve?
Secretary McHugh. The Army has embarked on a holistic approach in
addressing the mental health needs of the Total Force through the
Comprehensive Behavioral Health System of Care (CBHSOC). However,
challenges remain in providing care for Reserve Component Soldiers as
they matriculate in and out of ``beneficiary'' status based on
mobilization activities. Planning efforts to improve the CBHSOC include
identifying those challenges that are unique to the Reserve Component.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN
Mr. Akin. In recent weeks, we have heard the Secretary of Defense
and you General speak to the need to modernize the tank into the
future. Specifically, in the Army's budget material provided to this
committee, the Army notes that the Abrams tank has ``virtually reached
its upper limits for space, weight and power.'' However, there is less
than $10 million in the FY 2012 budget request for research and
development for Abrams Tank Modernization. This represents close to a
$100 million reduction from previous budgets. In light of this
significant research funding reduction, does the Army still support
Abrams modernization?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Yes. The Army is committed to
the modernization of the Abrams. The $9.7M of Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation (RDTE) funds requested in the FY12 President's
Budget is sufficient for Abrams modernization because the Army
anticipates that the majority of the $107.5M in FY11 RDTE funds will
carry over to FY12, thereby providing sufficient funding to execute all
anticipated FY12 RDTE efforts.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS
Mr. Owens. MCEB-Joint Staff memo calls for ``accelerating
commercial JTRS solutions to the field'' and setting standards to
create a competitive environment. What actions is the Army taking to
create a competitive environment for tactical radio market?
Secretary McHugh. The Army is taking the following actions to
create a competitive environment for the tactical radio market:
The Army is working to incentivize industry to invest and also
direct internal corporate efforts toward developing products that can
be made available off-the-shelf to meet Service capability needs.
The JTRS Enterprise Business Model enables companies outside the
Programs of Record to invest/develop tactical radios according to
technical standards determined by JTRS, and then compete to sell those
radios to the Services.
Each JTRS Program Office, Airborne Maritime/Fixed, Ground Mobile
Radio, and Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit is intended to have a Full
and Open Competition for Full Rate Production.
The Army remains committed to ensuring that all capable radio
vendors are given a fair and open opportunity to compete for the
Department of Defense's tactical radio communication needs.
Mr. Owens. The President's budget request for family programs is
$200 million more than FY11, $8.3 billion in all. You yourself have
been a particularly strong champion for Army family programs. Last year
before our Committee you noted that if we wish to maintain our vibrant,
all-volunteer force, ``soldiers and their families must be our top
priority.'' Does this funding increase give your Department the
latitude it needs to meet the commitments laid out by the President
earlier this year, especially as they pertain to rural or underserved
areas?
Secretary McHugh. The Army is committed to providing the best
possible Family Programs and services for Soldiers and Families. We
have resourced FY12 Family Programs to provide Soldiers and Families
with a quality of life commensurate with their level of service and
sacrifice to the Nation. Army Family Programs serve Active and Reserve
Component Soldiers and Families whether they reside on or near an
installation, or are geographically dispersed. Because of their
incredible sacrifices, the Army has committed to provide a full range
of services to support readiness and retention and enhance resiliency.
Soldiers and Families appreciate the wide variety of available
programs and services. To better serve them, the Army recently
conducted a Holistic Review of Army Family Covenant programs and
identified opportunities to rebalance resources to improve customer
access to available programs and services. Our efforts will ensure a
balanced portfolio of services that are fiscally sustainable to
strengthen Soldier and Family programs for the long term.
Mr. Owens. It is my understanding that the Army is providing our
sniper teams with the XM2010, which is the upgraded M24 sniper rifle,
with increased range and lethality. The success of this program has
been well covered in the press. I note that the President's Budget
proposes $2M for the XM2010 in FY2012 and $2M in each of the following
three years. It would seem to make sense to buy the XM2010 now, when
the need by our sniper teams is the greatest, rather than spreading the
procurement over four years. Is the $2M amount sufficient to meet the
immediate needs of the Army? If not, should we accelerate the purchase
of the rifles to meet the need?
Secretary McHugh. The President's Budget requested $2M per year for
sniper modifications beginning in FY12. This funding was not intended
for conversion of any M24s to XM2010. Rather, it enables a number of
improvements to the other weapons in the Army Sniper Rifle Portfolio:
the M107 (.50 Caliber) and the M110 (7.62) Sniper Rifles. Planned
improvements include: Lightening the M110 and procuring Sniper Weapon
Tripods, Sniper Weapon Quick Fire Sights, Sniper Weapon Collimators and
Sniper Mirage Mitigating Devices. The Army has sufficient funding
programmed to meet the current requirement for the XM2010, and is
considering additional procurements.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. I am interested in the Army's effort to compete
Contractor Logistics Sustainment and Support (CLSS) contract for Route
Clearance Vehicles (RCV) and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
family of vehicles which has been carried out by a single provider
since 2003. It is concerning to learn the MRAP CLSS acquisition
schedule is currently in its fourth delay with a new proposed date of
April 8, 2011, for the release of a draft Request for Proposal (RFP).
Can you tell me whether the Army is on schedule to release a draft RFP
on April 8 and a final RFP on June 7? What do you intend to do to
ensure the current schedule is not delayed for a fifth time?
Secretary McHugh. Yes, the Army is on track to release the draft
RFP in April 2011. The final RFP is still planned for release in June
2011. There are many aspects of conducting a competitive acquisition,
including documentation and peer reviews to ensure the RFP is fair to
all competitors. It is imperative that the solicitation is properly
scoped and the evaluation factors accurately reflect the criterion for
best value during the initial planning stages of a source selection.
The MRAP team continues to work towards a competitive procurement while
maintaining key support to deployed forces. I have asked the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) to
continue to monitor this competitive source selection.
Mr. Wilson. We appreciate your commitment to providing our soldiers
with improved small arms at both close combat range and long distance
shots in the mountains of Afghanistan.
a. I understand that the Army is conducting a competition that
could determine the successor to the M-4. Please describe the
competition and how the Army will determine whether to retain the M-4
or begin replacing it with the new carbine?
b. What do you see as the future for the M-4 in the next year or
two?
General Casey. a. The Individual Carbine (IC) program is being
conducted as a full and open competition to ensure that the Soldier
receives the best overall weapon at the best value to the Government.
Full and open competition will permit the Army to exploit commercially
available advances in small arms capabilities. On 31 January 2011 the
Army released the initial draft ``Request for Proposal'' (RFP) to
solicit input from industry. Industry was afforded approximately 60
days to review the initial draft and submit questions to Program
Manager Soldier Weapons (PMSW).
PMSW will host an IC Industry Day on 30 March 2011 in which 35
weapons manufacturers are expected to attend. A panel of acquisitions
experts and program managers addressed questions previously submitted
by industry as well as questions submitted that day.
The Army expects to release the final RFP at the end of May/
beginning of June 2011 and will give industry 90 (ninety) days to
submit their single weapon design that best meets the Army requirement.
The IC Competition is a formal source selection and is expected to
last two years, although the time frames will vary based upon the
number of entrants received and qualified for each phase of the
competition. The M4A1 will be tested alongside each of the competing
designs in order to establish a baseline data set for performance
comparison.
The Individual Carbine competition has three distinct phases:
Phase I consists of weapons inspections, non firing
characteristics, facility capability, and cost/price. The most highly
qualified candidate system will proceed to the next phase.
Phase II: IC candidates will be evaluated against a number of
factors, including accuracy, reliability/durability, fielding, facility
capability, and operational and supportability impacts, management,
price, government purpose rights, and past performance. Three candidate
systems will enter the final ``down select'' phase.
Down select Phase: The vendors of the three most highly rated
candidate systems will be awarded contracts to produce limited number
of test articles. The down select phase will include ``user in the
loop'' testing where Soldiers will put the weapons through their paces
in a Limited User Evaluation.
At the end of the competition a formal business case analysis (BCA)
will be conducted to consider the performance, life-cycle cost, and
terms and conditions (government purpose rights) of the selected system
as compared to the current carbine. Based on the BCA, we will determine
if it is in the best interest of the Army to procure the winning
carbine, and if so, what the ultimate fielding plan would be.
b. The future of the M4 is to continue with our Product Improvement
Program (PIP) as part of the Army's ``Dual Path Strategy.'' The M4 PIP
includes upgrading M4s to M4A1s by adding heavy barrels, full automatic
trigger mechanisms and ambidextrous controls. Additionally, the Army
plans to solicit industry for upgrades to specific components to
further improve overall system performance. The combat-proven M4/M4A1
Carbine will remain in service for years to come. A competitive M4/M4A1
carbine solicitation will be published later this FY to complete the
Army's requirements for new M4A1 Carbines and to procure M4/M4A1
Carbines for other services and foreign military sales.
Mr. Wilson. Did the Army conduct an Analysis of Alternatives prior
to initiating the new carbine competition? If so, will you provide the
Committee a copy of the analysis?
General Casey. The Army waived an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA).
We determined that an AOA would not produce relevant information in
support of the program since the Key Performance Parameters and Key
Systems Attributes were baselined on the current M4 Carbine capability
as directed by the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC). Instead
the Army will conduct a Business Case Analysis using actual data
collected during the test and evaluation of the Individual Carbine
candidate at the conclusion of the Commercial-off-the-Shelf competition
to determine the most prudent path forward.
Mr. Wilson. How will the Army guarantee it does not simply award
the contract to the lowest bidder, but focuses rather on a combination
of quality, cost (life-cycle included), and manufacturing capability?
General Casey. The Secretary of the Army has directed that all
actions be taken that allow the Army to conduct a best value, full and
open competition for an Individual Carbine. We will evaluate a number
of source selection factors, including, price, technical performance,
past performance, and manufacturing capability. The evaluation criteria
and the relative weighting of the criteria will be contained in the
final Request for Proposals. When the technical evaluation is complete,
the procurement team will conduct price evaluations against the
Independent Government Cost Estimate and past performance evaluations.
Mr. Wilson. Is the infantry carbine competition fully funded in the
proposed FY12 budget?
a. Is the M-4 Product Improvement Program (PIP) fully funded in the
proposed FY12 budget?
b. Is the Continuing Resolution for FY2011 having any effect on the
PIP or carbine competition?
General Casey. a. Yes, the Individual Carbine (IC) competition is
fully funded in FY12. The M4 PIP is not fully funded in the proposed
FY12 Budget.
b. The Continuing Resolution (CR) has not yet begun to affect the
M4 PIP or the IC Competition at this time but an extended CR could
delay both programs three to six months.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER
Mr. Ruppersberger. As you are aware the Air National Guard wing in
my District is transitioning from C-130s to the new C-27J Spartan,
specifically to address the Army's Direct Support Mission. The Army is
spending significant operations and maintenance funding on resupply
missions using CH-47s. Once deployed, the C-27J will relieve the strain
on the Army CH-47 fleet and reduce the amount of contracted airlift
missions required in-theater. Can these missions be better performed
using more C-27s rather than CH-47s and contractor supported lift?
Secretary McHugh. We are anticipating that the C-27J will ease the
burden on Army CH-47 helicopters and contracted airlift missions. We
are working closely with the U.S. Air Force so that the operational
commanders' requirements for delivery of equipment, supplies, and
personnel are met. Until the C-27J assumes this mission, and until the
supported commanders gain sufficient experience with this aircraft, the
Air Force will support with C-130 Hercules aircraft, and the Army will
continue to augment with CH-47 and contracted airlift missions.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Regarding the strategy for upgrading the M4.
What is your strategy to use commercial off-the-shelf options in the M4
carbine upgrade area? Are there readily-available COTS solutions? Could
you outline the budget plan and timeline for each phase of the upgrade
strategy?
Secretary McHugh. Upgrading the M4 consists of two phases. Phase I
is underway and does not involve a Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS)/Non-
Developmental Item solution. Phase I converts M4 Carbines to M4A1
carbines through new production and modification work orders. Delivery
of the M4A1's from the current production contract begins in mid-FY11
and is currently funded. The Army Acquisition Objective quantities will
be met through an acquisition competition and new production contract
award to the existing Technical Data Package. The competition and
funding required to support the Army's conversion of all fielded M4
Series carbines to the M4A1 is currently programmed for FY13-17.
During Phase II the Army will review potential COTS solutions to
improve specific weapon components. Phase II production incorporating
these improvements is subject to approval prior to proceeding. An
engineering study to support the Army's decision for Phase II is funded
and currently underway with testing scheduled to begin towards the end
of FY11.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Because of the 2005 BRAC, as well as standing up
of CYBERCOM there is significant growth at Fort George G. Meade. Could
you please provide me a status update and timeline on the replacement
of displaced BRAC facilities as well as the impact to the MWR Fund at
Meade if these facilities are not replaced?
Secretary McHugh. I have asked my staff to develop a legislative
solution for the authorization and appropriation of limited funding to
enable the replacement of a portion of displaced Soldier assets in FY
13. If the assets are not replaced (in addition to negative impact on
community services) the MWR Fund will lose an important source of non-
appropriated income, estimated at $200K per year, which is used to
support other MWR programs on Fort Meade.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Regarding the modernization of the US Army's
ground vehicle fleet, please explain the obstacles to further reducing
the Army's (and U.S. Marine Corps) ground vehicle program budget
expenditures by re-using the relevant portions of the mission systems
software and architecture from current investments in the AH-64 Apache
helicopter program.
Secretary McHugh. The Army continuously seeks to improve its ground
vehicle fleet by cross-leveling relevant technology to include system
software and architecture from other programs whenever possible.
Typically, obstacles preventing cross-leveling of technology between
programs include the lack of data rights, commonality between
architectures, and the willingness of defense contractors for different
platforms to collaborate. There are specific obstacles to re-using AH-
64 software systems. For one, the systems used in aviation tend to be
more complex and costly. Additionally, the cost of incorporating
aviation systems into a truck fleet that currently exceeds 250,000 (and
for which there is no system software requirement) would be cost
prohibitive.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. In today's austere budget environment, can the Army
afford to procure the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) at a base
unit cost of $300-400,000 and a total unit cost of $700-800,000? I
understand the Army plans to procure about 50,000 JLTVs.
a. Will the additional capability provided by the JLTV over the
HMMWV merit the significant difference in cost?
b. When were JLTVs originally supposed to go into production?
c. When are they expected to go into production now?
d. Does the Army still plan to procure 50,000 JLTVs?
e. How long is it anticipated that the Army and Marine Corps will
use recapitalized vehicles before replacing them with JLTVs?
f. How much will the recapitalized unarmored HMMWVs cost per unit,
per year, until the JLTV goes into production?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. a. Yes, the Army can afford the
JLTV. The total unit cost of $700K-$800K for JLTV is not accurate. The
Army has established a cost target of $350K per-vehicle and budgeted an
additional $60K for vehicle armor kits for a total program target cost
of $410K per vehicle. At this target cost, the Army can afford its
strategy to replace roughly one-third of the Light Tactical Vehicle
(LTV) fleet with JLTVs.
The JLTV is the next generation LTV and is being designed to
provide the necessary leap in protection, performance, and payload to
fill the capability gap between High Multi-Purpose Mobility Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Family
of Vehicles. In addition to providing greater mobility than the current
Up Armored HMMWV (UAH) and MRAPs, the JLTV will provide the following:
(1) increased payload with armor installed (3,500 to 5,100 pounds), (2)
greater underbody protection than UAH (equal to the MRAP-All Terrain
Vehicle threshold), (3) on-board/exportable power, (4) the advanced
``Victory'' architecture for its Command, Control, Communications and
Computers and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems,
(5) increased reliability, and (6) increased fuel efficiency.
b. As of the Army's Program Objective Memorandum 12-16, the
production of JLTV was scheduled to begin in FY14.
c. As a result of the requirement changes captured from lessons
learned in the JLTV Technology Demonstration (TD) phase and operational
lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development phase has been extended, moving the start of
production to FY16.
d. The Army continues to refine the quantity requirement for JLTV.
However, based on operational requirements and the Total Obligation
Authority for the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) fleet, the Army's
strategy is to replace roughly one-third of the LTV fleet with JLTVs
over a 20 year period. The total number of HMWMVs to be replaced is
projected to be approximately 40-46K after completion of the 15 percent
reduction of the TWV fleet directed in the Army TWV Strategy.
e. The Army will not replace all of its recapitalized HMMWVs with
JLTVs. The Army will first replace legacy vehicles that have not been
recapitalized, and then will begin to replace recapitalized vehicles
approximately eight years into JLTV production. At that point the Army
will replace unarmored HMMWVs that will have accrued roughly 20 years
of service life since their recapitalization.
f. The Army is still developing its HMMWV recapitalization strategy
and has not made decisions about the recapitalization mix between
unarmored and armored HMMWVs in the period FY13-15 before JLTV enters
production.
Mr. Turner. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for
Patriot in the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are
required by the Army, and when, to operate and sustain the legacy
Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of these funded in the FY12
request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade Patriot's
capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or
upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and
production?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army is taking numerous
actions and making multiple investments to operate and sustain Patriot
in light of the decision not to continue the Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS). These actions include upgrades to the Patriot
system to meet the evolving threat, improving both system performance
and mean time between failures, extending the recapitalization program
and accelerating Patriot integration into the Army Integrated Air and
Missile Defense System of Systems architecture.
In the President's Budget 2012, the Army requested funding in
support of this effort primarily for the Patriot improvement and
sustainment efforts. Additionally, the Army will integrate the Missile
Segment Enhancement (MSE) missile with the Patriot system to continue
the capability evolution of Patriot's interceptor and expand the size
of Patriot's engagement envelope. Additionally, the Army will procure
Electronic Launcher Enhanced System (``ELES'' launcher upgrades) to
provide Combatant Commanders with additional Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 and MSE hit-to-kill launch capability. In total, these
efforts will keep Patriot relevant and ready well into the future.
The Army conducted a comprehensive analysis of cost to complete
development, complete production, and operate and sustain MEADS
compared to the cost to upgrade and sustain Patriot. The assessment
concluded that, between FY12 and FY30, proceeding with Patriot is
approximately one-third the cost of continuing MEADS. This difference
is in large part attributable to the high cost of producing a full new
force of MEADS equipment, versus upgrading and sustaining existing
equipment to meet emerging threats.
Mr. Turner. During your testimony you were confident that the Army
would meet the 1 to 2 dwell time ratio. When will the Army meet that
ratio? Will the Army continue to meet that ratio given the proposed end
strength reductions? Will the Army be able to meet the 1 to 3 dwell
time ratio before the proposed Afghanistan reductions in 2014? What
concerns do you have about the Army's ability to meet and maintain the
1 to 2 dwell time ratio? The 1 to 3 dwell time ratio?
General Casey. Based on the Joint Staff projections of demand for
forces, which includes reductions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we
believe we will reach our goal of 1-to-2 in late 2012. The strength
reductions in FY15 and FY16 also assume that the demand for forces will
decrease enough to allow us to maintain at least the 1-to-2 ratio with
the smaller force. However, it is unlikely that we will be able to
achieve a 1-to-3 ratio under proposed Afghanistan reductions in FY14.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is a
NATO-managed, cooperative development program that was conceived in the
mid-1990's to develop a ground-based air and terminal ballistic missile
defense capability that would replace existing Patriot systems. On
February 11, the Secretary of Defense made a decision not to proceed to
procurement of the MEADS system. Instead, the Department plans to
continue development though 2013 within the funding limits set forth
under a 2005 Memorandum of Understanding (a $4B cap on total design and
development costs). According to DOD, this would allow them to
implement a ``proof of concept'' effort and avoid termination costs.
However, under this scenario, the Department is still required to spend
$804M. This raises the question of whether it is feasible in the
current fiscal and threat environment to continue investing in MEADS.
The Patriot system is currently fielded by the U.S. and 11 partner
nations. It has been continuously upgraded and modernized over the
years, much of it financed through FMS, resulting in a ``Configuration
3+'' system that already meets most of the envisioned requirements for
MEADS. The OSD Memo clearly lists Department's inability to afford to
procure MEADS and make required Patriot upgrades as rationale for
terminating the procurement of MEADS. Patriot modernization should be
accelerated in light of the Department's MEADS decision. I applaud you
for your decision not to proceed to procurement of the MEADS missile
defense system. As noted in the DOD memo, the program is substantially
over budget and behind schedule. The Department made a decision to
complete the design and development phase of the program, which will
require an additional $804 million across FY12 and FY13. $406.6 million
of this is included in the FY12 budget request.
a. If the MEADS program ends at the design and development phase
and there are no plans to continue into production and fielding, why
are we even continuing to fund design and development?
b. Why should the committee authorize the FY12 budget request of
$406.6 million for MEADS? What is the pay-off?
c. Will DOD go back to the drawing board and try to find a way to
ring out some additional savings out of this $800M for MEADS?
d. The DOD memo indicates that it will be necessary to allocate
funds for Patriot upgrades. At a minimum, will DOD work to reallocate
funds for Design and Development for upgrades to the Patriot system?
Secretary McHugh. a. The continued funding of the Proof of Concept
is intended to complete prototypes of radar, battle manager, and
launcher end items; demonstrate integration of the Missile Segment
Enhancement interceptor; and complete ground testing and conduct two
intercept flight tests. Information gained from the Proof of Concept
will be used to inform future program decisions, and some MEADS
technology developed in the Proof of Concept approach may be applicable
to future U.S. systems. The MEADS partners will also take delivery of
equipment and other hardware residuals from this contracted effort, as
well as all information (including deliverable technical data) that the
contractor is obligated to provide under the contract. Germany and
Italy stated in discussions with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) that they would like to
proceed to completion of the Proof of Concept. Completing the Proof of
Concept will enable our MEADS partners to field coalition missile
defense capability. Our MEADS partner's burden-sharing investment in
MEADS will reduce future demands for U.S. investment to protect
coalition forces in this ``high-demand, low-density'' force protection
area. Additionally, the continuation and completion of the Design and
Development will avoid the more costly termination cost required under
the agreements in the Memorandum of Agreement.
b. The $406.6M in FY12 funds the Proof of Concept effort to reduce
risk and invest in Technology Development rather than absorb the
termination costs. The Proof of Concept will mature MEADS Major End
Items and complete some system-level integration and testing within the
existing Design and Development (D&D) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
cost constraints. This will be executed using remaining funds that
would otherwise pay termination costs with no further benefit to the
three MEADS partners. Collective work under the Proof of Concept offers
pay-off benefits for all three MEADS partners, builds partner capacity
in Air and Missile Defense, and positions Italy and Germany for
possible future development, production, and fielding. We envision that
the Proof of Concept development efforts will focus on completion of as
many D&D tasks as possible within the funding limitations of the
current D&D MOU, concluding with two flight tests of the MEADS system
in late 2012 and mid 2013, and completion of all D&D MOU efforts by
mid-2014.
c. Potential Proof of Concept revisions to the D&D prime contract
are currently in negotiations with the Partners. The NATO MEADS
Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) will develop and negotiate a contract
amendment consistent with the Proof of Concept scope envisioned by the
MEADS partners.
d. The Army is taking numerous actions and making multiple
investments to operate, sustain and upgrade Patriot, in light of the
decision to pursue the Proof of Concept approach and the decreased
future funding requirement for MEADS. It should be noted, however, that
the $804M for the MEADS Proof of Concept funding remains separate and
does not directly sustain or upgrade Patriot.
Mr. Shuster. The Memo accompanying your recent decision not to
proceed to procurement of MEADS, you specifically highlighted the
Army's inability to afford to procure MEADS and make required Patriot
upgrades as rationale for the decision. I agree wholeheartedly with
that assessment and commend you on your decision. It is vital that we
continue to upgrade the Patriot system, which can provide added
capability much sooner and at a fraction of the cost. With MEADS no
longer planned as the replacement for Patriot in the 2017 timeframe,
what actions and investments are required by the Army, and when, to
operate and sustain the legacy Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of
these funded in the FY12 request? Does the Army see a need to improve
or upgrade Patriot's capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of
such improvements or upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS
development and production?
Secretary McHugh. The Army is taking numerous actions and making
multiple investments to operate and sustain Patriot in light of the
decision not to continue the Medium Extended Air Defense System
(MEADS). These actions include upgrades to the Patriot system to meet
the evolving threat, improving both system performance and mean time
between failures, extending the recapitalization program and
accelerating Patriot integration into the Army Integrated Air and
Missile Defense System of Systems architecture.
In the President's Budget 2012, we requested funding in support of
this effort primarily for Patriot improvement and sustainment efforts.
Additionally, the Army will integrate the Missile Segment Enhancement
(MSE) missile with the Patriot system to continue the capability
evolution of Patriot's interceptor and expand the size of Patriot's
engagement envelope. We will also procure the Electronic Launcher
Enhanced System (``ELES'' launcher upgrades) to provide Combatant
Commanders with additional Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and MSE hit-
to-kill launch capability. In total, these efforts will keep Patriot
relevant and ready well into the future.
The Army conducted a comprehensive analysis of cost to complete
development, complete production, and operate and sustain MEADS
compared to the cost to upgrade and sustain Patriot. The assessment
concluded that, between FY12 and FY30, proceeding with Patriot is
approximately one-third the cost of continuing MEADS. This difference
is in large part attributable to the high cost of producing a full new
force of MEADS equipment, versus upgrading and sustaining existing
equipment to meet emerging threats.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. I am pleased to read from your statement your thoughts
on the importance of fiscal stewardship in the U.S. Army. Like you, I
strongly support training leaders and managers to make better resource-
informed decisions. I am happy to learn that in addition to better
training and professional development, the Army has fielded the General
Fund Enterprise Business System to more than 11,000 users at 14
installations. Along with the better training, this system is vital to
ensuring Army is able to reach full auditability of its financial
statements sooner rather than later. Investment from the Army
leadership is important in accomplishing the full audit readiness goal.
Like I have said in every budget posture hearing during this Congress
and many previous Congresses, I cannot stress enough to you that making
audit readiness a priority for the U.S. Army is a necessity. Would you
please provide for the Committee your thoughts on the Army's audit
program to date and how you see it moving forward?
Secretary McHugh. The Army has a solid, achievable, and resourced
plan to be fully auditable by 2017. The Army's plan is synchronized
with the overall DOD Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR)
Plan and provides detailed milestones and organizations responsible for
ensuring the milestones are met.
Our plan provides necessary training to Army personnel to ensure
these personnel understand how to manage the Army's financial resources
in a manner that is transparent and auditable. The plan stresses the
importance of establishing and maintaining a compliant control
environment that will meet or exceed audit standards. To meet the
objective of establishing an effective internal control environment, we
are implementing the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS),
evaluating existing internal controls, and implementing corrective
actions where controls do not meet standards. Moreover, we are training
personnel to maintain and operate within the required, disciplined
control environment.
Additionally, our audit readiness plan includes a series of four
successive financial statement audits, conducted by an independent
public accounting firm (IPA) in FY11 through FY14. The IPA audits will
validate the efficacy of our control environment, training and GFEBS
implementation. The audits will disclose underperforming areas and
recommend corrective actions. The cumulative effect of training,
controls, GFEBS fielding and independent audit testing will enable an
audit ready environment by FY17.
In executing this audit readiness plan, the Army has achieved
several significant accomplishments. First, as of 30 Sep 2010, the Army
asserted the audit readiness of the Appropriations Received line on the
General Fund Statement of Budgetary Resources, which totaled $231.9
billion in FY10. OUSD(C) has validated this assertion package and on 27
Apr 2011 an independent public accounting firm began an audit of this
line item. In addition, the Army asserted, as of 31 Mar 2011, the
existence and completeness of eight aviation programs, which includes
more than 2,400 mission critical assets. OUSD(C) and DOD IG are
currently validating this assertion package and DOD IG will begin an
audit of this assertion in in the fourth quarter of FY11. Finally, the
Army is in the process of beginning the first of several interim audit
readiness examinations of the funds distribution and budget execution
processes at sites where GFEBS was first implemented, known as GFEBS
Wave 1 installations. OUSD(C) and DOD IG are currently validating
this assertion package and OUSD(C) is progressing through the
procurement process to contract an IPA to begin this examination in
June 2011.
By achieving these important milestones, the Army has demonstrated
that its audit readiness plan will result in the appropriate outcomes,
as defined by Congress and USD(C). These milestones are critical first
steps in confirming the effectiveness of the Army's plan and gaining
the necessary momentum to enable future audit readiness success across
the Army.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. General, various ground vehicle programs are currently
being developed by the U.S. Army. Additionally, modernization efforts
are also underway for some ground vehicle platforms, including the
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Abrams Main Battle Tank, and the Stryker.
How will the Army ultimately reconcile the existing ground vehicles,
updated/modernized ground vehicles, and ground vehicles currently being
developed into a comprehensive and cohesive ground vehicle strategy?
Please specifically address the future of Abrams Main Battle Tank,
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Ground Combat Vehicle, MRAP/MATV, Stryker,
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the HMMWV.
General Casey. The Army's Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy
represents a holistic approach to the development of the Ground Combat
Vehicle, replacement of the M113 Family of Vehicles and the incremental
modernization of the Bradley, Abrams, Paladin, and Stryker.
Modernization imperatives across the fleet include improved protection,
mobility and sustainment, mitigation of existing Size, Weight and Power
(SWaP) shortfalls and Network integration. In addition, the Army has
developed and published a comprehensive Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
Strategy aimed at providing an affordable plan to achieve and sustain
the capabilities that the Army will need through FY25.
The Ground Combat Vehicle will replace the Bradley Infantry
Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and will be the cornerstone of modernization for
the Combat Vehicle fleet. The four imperatives of the Ground Combat
Vehicle are: 1) MRAP like protection, 2) a nine man squad carrying
capacity, 3) full spectrum operations capability, and 4) development in
seven years. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be built with capacity to
grow in weight and power requirements through modernization as future
technologies mature.
The Army is considering options for the modernization of the
M1A2SEP v2 tank and is currently evaluating technology alternatives.
The application of new technologies will be synchronized with the next
recapitalization opportunity for the oldest tanks in the fleet.
Bradley modernization will address buy-back of SWaP for Non-IFV
Bradley variants (Cavalry, Fire Support and Engineer) to improve
protection, mobility and integrate the emerging network.
M113 replacement will initially focus on Heavy Brigade Combat Teams
(HBCT) using a material solution that provides necessary protection,
mobility, and interoperability to operate in the Ground Combat Vehicle-
equipped formation.
Stryker Modernization includes buy-back of SWaP and will leverage
the development effort of the Double V Hull. Additionally, the Army
will consider engine and drive train upgrades to improve mobility and
enable network integration.
The Army plans to retain and use most of its MRAP/M-ATV fleet for
the next 15 years and potentially beyond. A small number of MRAPs that
are uneconomical to maintain and/or upgrade will be divested once they
are no longer required for wartime service. The majority will be
maintained by the Army, some as organic unit equipment and some in
augmentation sets to be used when required. As requirements in Iraq and
Afghanistan decline, MRAPs will be reset to eliminate maintenance
deficiencies; when feasible and affordable, safety and automotive
upgrades will also be applied.
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is the Army's next
generation Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) and is being designed to
provide the necessary capability in protection, performance and payload
to fill the capability gap remaining between the HMMWV and MRAPs. The
JLTV program is scheduled to enter the Engineering and Manufacturing
Design phase of development in FY12 and begin Low Rate Production in
FY16. The Army plans to replace approximately one-third of the HMMWVs
in its LTV fleet over a period of 20 years.
The HMMWV is the Army's current LTV and will continue to serve in
the force for the foreseeable future. The Army TWV Strategy calls for
an approximately 15% reduction in its Tactical Wheeled Vehicle fleet,
which will result in an LTV fleet size of roughly 120,000 vehicles.
HMMWVs will continue to make-up two-thirds of this fleet after the
Army's planned procurement of JLTV. HMMWVs will continue to be used for
operational deployments as the mission and threat situation allows and
will serve prominently in the Homeland Defense and Disaster Relief
mission roles. The Army will continue to recapitalize its HMWMV fleet
to extend its service life and is conducting research for a Competitive
HMWMV Recap program to potentially increase HMMWV protection to near-
MRAP levels.
Mr. Coffman. General, how important are initiatives such as the
Yellow Ribbon program at the state level in reintegrating National
Guard soldiers when they return from combat operations?
General Casey. At the state level, the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration
Program has proven to be an invaluable resource and tool for our
Warriors and Families. Programs like the Yellow Ribbon program are an
integral part of our efforts to build resilient Families and Army
Strong Soldiers who can endure the mobilizations, separations, and
sacrifices we ask of them as part of their selfless service. We
continue to work to provide Soldiers and Families, their employers and
local communities some stability and predictability. This allows them
to pursue both their military and civilian careers. Participating in
Yellow Ribbon events provide attendees with information and services,
opportunities for referral and proactive outreach from our commands and
our communities. Our events rely on the support and involvement of
command staffs, employers, community partners and a host of volunteers.
The goal is to build skills in each Family member and Soldier to assure
they are prepared and able to cope with the difficulties of extended
separation and deployment. We help Families network together, connect
with each other and keep the Families connected with their unit/command
and Family Programs' Office/staff during the deployment of their
Soldiers. We concentrate on assisting Families and Soldiers to help
with reuniting, reconnecting and reintegrating them into a ``new
normal.'' Lastly, we attend to both the Family members' and Soldiers'
physical, behavioral and mental health needs. We utilize trained
professional speakers and briefers from federal agencies and local,
state, and national agencies, to come to units or regional venues to
educate and assist attendees with knowledge, skills and practical,
hands-on participation to meet the goals stated above.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RIGELL
Mr. Rigell. I would like to commend the Army on their quick and
appropriate response to addressing the increased threat of Improvised
Explosive Devices (IED) and other heat hazards facing our soldiers in
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Notably, policies put in place to
ensure that flame resistance is integrated into a soldier's uniform
have helped to greatly mitigate the number of soldiers suffering life
altering or ending burn injuries.
a. To this end, it is my understanding that currently, only
aviators and combat vehicle crewmen receive the Fire Resistant
Environmental Ensemble (FREE) that protects soldiers from heat and burn
threats, and provides critical warmth and mission readiness
capabilities. Could you please clarify if this is correct?
b. Please also comment if the Army has a plan to provide this or a
similar flame resistant cold weather clothing systems to all soldiers
deployed in OEF.
General Casey. a. Only aviators and combat vehicle crewmen are
issued the FREE System, however, all Soldiers deploying in support of
OEF are issued Flame Resistant (FR) Uniforms to include gloves, light-
weight performance hood, FR boots, and FR Army combat shirts. Depending
on the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and mission, all deploying
Soldiers are fielded either the Flame Resistant Army Combat Uniform (FR
ACU), the Army Aircrew Combat Uniform (A2CU), or the Improved Combat
Vehicle Crewman (ICVC) uniform). All Soldiers are protected in their
operating environments.
b. Yes, the Army has a plan to provide similar flame resistant cold
weather clothing system to all Soldiers deployed in OEF. The Army is
currently pursuing efforts to integrate FR capabilities into the outer
layers of the Extended Cold Weather Clothing System (ECWCS) seven-layer
system. The improvement is currently in research and development (R&D)
and, when available, will be issued to all deploying Soldiers.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Mrs. Hartzler. With the proposed repeal of the DADT policy, what
changes to facilities are you contemplating to address the privacy and
concerns of service members?
General Casey. We are not contemplating any changes to facilities.
This is supported by the Comprehensive Review Working Group (CRWG)
recommendation that no ``new construction or modifications to
facilities beyond low-cost, unit-funded adaptations'' to improve
privacy was required to address the concerns of Soldiers. Although not
related to the implementation of the repeal of DADT, the DOD Unified
Facilities Criteria requires all new, unaccompanied, permanent housing
be designed to afford Soldiers private bedrooms and a bathroom shared
by not more than one person, which will provide greater privacy.
Mrs. Hartzler. Will chaplains of all faiths be required to conduct
diversity training programs that promote homosexual conduct as
equivalent to heterosexual conduct, or will there be a right to refuse
such responsibilities in educational programs?
General Casey. Chaplains will continue to have freedom to practice
their religion according to the tenets of their faith. In the context
of their religious ministry, chaplains are not required to take actions
that are inconsistent with their religious beliefs (e.g., altering the
content of sermons or religious counseling, sharing a pulpit with other
chaplains or modifying forms of prayer or worship).
Chaplains of all faiths care for all Soldiers and facilitate the
free exercise of religion for all personnel, regardless of religious
affiliation of either the chaplain or the individual.
Chaplains minister to Soldiers and provide advice to commanders on
matters of religion, morals, ethics and morale in accordance with (and
without compromising) the tenets or requirements of their faith.
Chaplains faced with an issue contrary to their individual faith may
refer the Soldier to other appropriate counsel.
Mrs. Hartzler. If chaplains do have a right to refuse such
responsibilities, will they suffer career penalties for exercising it?
General Casey. Implementation of the repeal of DADT will require no
change in chaplains' responsibilities or flexibility in serving
Soldiers. Chaplains of all faiths care for all Soldiers and facilitate
the free exercise of religion for all, regardless of religious
affiliation of either the chaplain or the individual; hence, chaplains
will incur no career penalties for practicing the tenets of their faith
Mrs. Hartzler. What costs do you anticipate it costing to make
these changes?
General Casey. No funds will be separately requested for
construction of facilities as a result of the Don't Ask Don't Tell
Repeal Act.
Mrs. Hartzler. What is the estimated number of man-hours that will
be needed to implement each phase of the three-tier training program?
General Casey. Current analysis indicates that Tier 1 education
sessions are taking an average of 1.5 hours to complete; Tier 2
education sessions require an average of 2.5 hours, and Tier 3
education sessions are taking about an hour. Using the most recent
reporting numbers from the force: 66,093 Soldiers completed Tier 1
training; 44,894 completed Tier 2; and 1,019,013 completed Tier 3. We
estimate Tier 1 man-hours at 99,140; Tier 2 man-hours at 112,235; Tier
3 man-hours at 1,019,013 with a grand total of 1,230,388 man hours to
date.
Mrs. Hartzler. What is the estimated number of military commanders
likely to suffer career-ending consequences for disagreement with the
repeal of the DADT law and policies?
General Casey. The Army has no such estimate and has no way of
knowing. Commanders are expected to emphasize Soldiers' fundamental
professional obligations and the oath to support and defend the
Constitution that is at the core of their military service.
Mrs. Hartzler. Given what is known about the normal human desire
for privacy in sexual matters, why would policies requiring the
constant cohabitation of mixed sexual orientation groups not undermine
morale, disciple, and readiness, recruiting, and retention?
General Casey. Service in the military makes it necessary at times
for Soldiers to accept living and working conditions characterized by
little or no privacy. The Army will not establish facilities, quarters,
berthing or practices based on sexual orientation. Commanders retain
the authority to address individual cohabitation concerns on a case-by-
case basis regardless of the sexual orientation of the affected
Soldiers.
The Army Guiding Principles for Implementation of the Repeal of
DADT include: standards of conduct will apply to every Soldier; all
Soldiers must treat each other with dignity and respect; our role as
professional Soldiers is emphasized; and good order and discipline will
be maintained at all times. The clear message is that respecting each
other's rights within a closed space is critical to maintaining good
order and discipline. Standards of conduct apply equally to all
Soldiers and inappropriate conduct should be corrected appropriately.
If a Soldier has a concern with a billeting or work arrangement for any
reason, he or she should address those concerns appropriately within
the chain of command. Commanders may use discretion in personnel
assignments to berthing, housing and other facilities to maintain
morale, good order and discipline based on Army policies and space
available.
Mrs. Hartzler. How would these changes improve the All-Volunteer
Force?
General Casey. It is currently too early to determine its effects
as the policy has not gone into effect. We have a training strategy/
plan that should allow the transition to the new policy with minimal
disruption. The policy as currently crafted, which is limited in scope
(in that gays/lesbians are not a special class), should have a neutral
impact during the training/transition period.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN
Mr. Runyan. Could you please give your assessments of the impact of
proposed DOD and Army efficiencies on Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. It is too early in the process
for an assessment regarding DOD and Army efficiencies at the Joint Base
McGuire Dix Lakehurst (JBMDL). JBMDL reached Final Operational
Capability (FOC) on 1 Oct 2009 with the Air Force as the lead.
Projected efficiencies associated with Joint Basing will not be
realized until two to five years after achieving FOC.
Mr. Runyan. As BRAC 2005 winds down, what is your assessment on
whether Joint Basing is producing the operational benefits and cost
efficiencies that were expected more than five years ago? Is the Army
transferring funds to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to pay for
valid Army Military Construction requirements at Joint Bases? How about
the reverse--has the Army received any MILCON fund transfers from other
Services?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Although we do not have enough
data to conclude that Joint Bases are achieving the expected benefits
and efficiencies, early indications show that some operational benefits
are being realized. Joint Base Commanders are using ingenuity to
optimize the delivery of installation support. The Army has transferred
funds to the Service lead for valid Army Military Construction
requirements.
Mr. Runyan. Are you confident that the budget cuts contained in the
FY12 request will not force the Reserve Components to go back to the
pre-September 11th days of a hollow, ``Strategic Reserve'' force? What
metrics or leading indicators will you be monitoring to ensure that the
Reserve Components remain a viable, operational force that is fully
part of the Total Army?''
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The steady, consistent, and
recurring demand for Reserve capabilities during almost a decade of war
required us to integrate our Reserve forces into our operational
expeditionary Army. Congressional support for Overseas Contingency
Operations resources enabled us to address incremental funding
challenges. Most of the incremental costs were a result of needing
additional man days (above the statutory 39 per year) to achieve higher
readiness levels. During POM 12-16, the Army validated Operational
Reserve training requirements in the base program for the first time.
The majority of our Reserve Component units are still funded at the
``Strategic Reserve'' level in the FY12 Base Budget but have achieved
higher levels of readiness using OCO funding. As part of the POM 13-17
build, the Army tasked the Reserve Chiefs to assess how much of the
Operational Reserve requirements they can fund within existing
resources. We have not yet determined which Army programs will be
decreased or eliminated to fund the Reserve Components above the
current ``Strategic Reserve'' levels, but we expect to make those
decisions as part of the FY13 budget submission. We are working closely
with OSD to determine what the future requirements will be for our
Reserve Component and how to best achieve affordable access for the
full range of assignments.
Mr. Runyan. How does the Army plan to integrate the Russian Mi-17
into the Army operational and logistical system? Have you established a
separate program office?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. There are no plans to integrate
the Mi-17 into the Army Operational and Logistical System. The Army was
designated as the lead Service for the Mi-17 and other Non-Standard
Rotary-Wing Aircraft in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) dated
19 January 2010. The lead Service responsibilities outlined in the ADM
include procurement, training, and sustaining of Non-Standard Rotary
Wing Aircraft for partner nations in support of Department of Defense's
(DOD's) enduring Security Force Assistance (SFA) requirements. In order
to facilitate lead Service responsibilities, the Army established a
Project Management Office to support DOD's global Non-Standard Rotary
Wing SFA programs. As identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review,
building partner nation vertical lift capabilities through SFA programs
will likely continue into the future. Building a partner Nation's
sustainment is a key capability and the primary method of building a
Non-Standard Rotary Wing sustainment capability is through Contractor
Logistics Support (CLS). The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics,
G-4, has identified CLS as the most cost effective and dependable means
to sustain low density, high demand, critical components and repair
parts that require airworthiness certification.
Mr. Runyan. Will the logistical support for the Mi-17 aircraft be
integrated into the normal Army aviation logistics system?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Logistics support for the Mi-17
will not be integrated into the normal Army aviation logistics system.
The logistics and sustainment support for each partner nation or
customer will be accomplished through a Contractor Logistics Support
(CLS) Contract executed through the Non-Standard Rotary Wing Program
Manager's Office with approved sources of supply. Each partner Nation/
customer will determine the level of CLS required to support their
Nation's sustainment strategy. The Department of Defense's assigned
Security Force Assistance Team helps them develop their logistics and
sustainment strategy through detailed capability and requirements
analysis.
Mr. Runyan. Why was the Mi-17 program changed from NAVAIR to the
Army?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Mi-17 program was not
changed from NAVAIR to the Army. The NAVAIR was directed to procure 21
Mi-17 helicopters for Afghanistan in 2009, but was not assigned as a
project office nor as the lead Service. This procurement was prior to
the establishment of the Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aviation Program
Management Office (NSRWA PMO) and a decision was made not to move the
NAVAIR procurement to the Army after the NSRWA PMO was created. The
Department of Defense did not want to impact the Mi-17 procurement. The
NAVAIR procurement strategy was to procure commercial Mi-17 helicopters
and modify them for military use. However, based on diplomatic
communications between the U.S. Ambassador to Russia and the Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2010, it was determined that the NAVAIR
procurement approach would not be feasible. Russian Federation Law
requires that all military end use helicopters be procured through
Rosoboronexport, a state owned organization responsible for the export
of all military end use items from the Russian Federation. Based on
this information, the Defense Acquisition Executive signed an
Acquisition Decision Memorandum directing NAVAIR to cancel its
procurement and directing the Army to begin a new procurement for
military Mi-17 helicopters for the Afghan Ministry of Defense in
accordance with Russian Federation law.
Mr. Runyan. Is the Mi-17 program a government to government program
with the Russian government?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The current Mi-17 procurement
effort for 21 helicopters and airworthiness assurances are being
conducted between the U.S. Army's Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aviation
Program Management Office (NSWRA PMO) and the Russian Federation's
Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation. In addition,
the NSWRA PMO is negotiating a contract with Rosoboronexport for the
procurement of 21 military use Mi-17s for Afghanistan. This contract
will include the procurement of 21 Mi-17's, with an option for 12
additional Mi-17's, critical Mi-17 spare parts and engineering
services.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WEST
Mr. West. The recent developments across North Africa, the Middle
East, the Korean Peninsula, and in the SOUTHCOM AOR have one common
geographical aspect--the littorals. Is the Army looking ahead and
considering how they can be deployed into the littorals using force
projection and forcible entry from the seas? I specifically would like
to know about training, equipment modernization, and joint coordination
exercises.
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Typically, the Army plays a
limited role during forcible entry operations from the seas into the
littorals. The Army maintains capabilities in general purpose forces to
conduct forcible entry by air borne and air assault operations and
these forces could support forcible entry operations in littorals.
Seldom would airborne operations need to originate from ships. By
exception, air assault operations could be executed from ships, but
this capability is not expected of general purpose forces and requires
qualification of pilots and compatible helicopters and ammunition. Army
aviation units do not routinely train for over-water/shipboard
operations until assigned that mission. For aviation units with
assigned over-water/ship-board requirements (like some supporting Korea
and U.S. Southern Command), the Army provides qualification training
and equipment. Army aviation simulators include littoral training
scenarios.
The Army has organized, equipped, and trained units to support
force projection from the seas, to include specific units that
supported port opening, water purification/storage/distribution, and
logistics-over-the-shore operations. Critical capabilities for
logistics-over-the-shore operations include command and control; cargo
documentation; Soldier ``stevedores'' to operate onboard cranes and to
discharge equipment from strategic ships; waterborne transportation of
personnel, cargo, and equipment to include the operation of small tugs,
large tugs, vessels, floating cranes, ``water taxi'' service, floating
platforms and causeways. Army training ensures these units are
technically and tactically ready for employment when needed by
combatant commanders. U.S. Transportation Command joint logistics-over-
the-shore exercises provide an important training venue where these
Army units can operate doctrinally in littorals as part of an
interdependent joint team. There is a joint logistics-over-the-shore
exercise in Morocco with U.S. Africa Command during the April-May
timeframe and a joint logistics-over-the-shore exercise in Korea with
U.S. Pacific Command in the Mar-Jun timeframe. The Army is also
exploring with U.S. Transportation Command opportunities to integrate
air borne forcible entry capabilities into a theater entry exercise.
Mr. West. Myself and a number of my colleagues are concerned about
so-called invisible wounds, such as Traumatic Brain Injury. What can
you tell me about the Department of the Army's efforts with Hyperbaric
Oxygen Therapy (HBOT) and Cognitive Stimulation?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army is evaluating the use
of hyperbaric oxygen for the treatment of persistent mild TBI symptoms.
There is a multi-center study underway that will evaluate Active Duty
military men and non-pregnant Active Duty military women who are
residing in the United States. The military personnel in the study have
been deployed one or more times and have been diagnosed with at least
one mild brain injury with persistent symptoms. The study is being
conducted at Fort Gordon, Fort Carson, Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton
with research staff assistance from the Denver VA Medical Center and
Salt Lake City LDS Hospital. It is important to note, however, that the
use of hyperbaric oxygen to treat traumatic brain injury (TBI) is
currently not approved by the Food and Drug Administration. Some
civilian medical practitioners are using it as treatment for patients
with brain damage from stroke, sports injury and trauma including
chronic symptoms from mild traumatic brain injury.
The Army is providing Cognitive Rehabilitation Therapy (CRT) to a
large number of Soldiers with TBI and the Department of Defense (DOD)
is actively studying its effectiveness. CRT interventions for Service
members are available at DOD Military Treatment Facilities, through the
Supplemental Health Care Program, and through VA programs. CRT is a not
a single therapy as the name suggests, but a collection of individual
treatment strategies, such as cognitive stimulation, that are designed
to improve problems with memory, attention, perception, learning,
planning and judgment brought about by a traumatic injury to the brain.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. During the testimony, it was stated ``As we continue to
build dwell and increase the time Soldiers have at home, more units
will conduct full spectrum training rotations at the Combat Training
Centers.'' To be fair to Soldiers and Families, can the dwell time
ratio be modified to reflect time not spent at home station so that it
better represents the amount of time that the Soldier is able to be at
their home station?
Secretary McHugh. The current dwell time ratio was designed to
account for significant, high-stress events that could have physical
and psychological impacts on individual Soldiers. While time away from
home station and family for any event can be stressful, routine
training events are not likely to have the same impact on individuals
as combat deployments.
Mrs. Roby. In light of the Army budget allowing for $1.5 billion in
adding 71 UH-60M/HH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, $1.4 billion to procure
32 new and 15 remanufactured CH-47F Chinook helicopters, and $1.04
billion to modernize the AH-64 Apache helicopter: What are the fielding
plans for another UH-60M simulator and another Transportable Black Hawk
Operations Simulator (TBOS) system for Fort Rucker, AL? Additionally,
what impact will modernization of the UH-60 (Black Hawk), CH-47
(Chinook), and AH-64 (Apache) helicopters have on the USAACE's ability
to meet their mission goals in regards to training, maintenance, and
facilities?
General Casey. The United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence
(USAACE) is slated to receive its third Transportable Black Hawk
Operations Simulator (TBOS) by the end of FY11. The third TBOS will be
operational no later than 1 OCT 11 in order to support the FY12
training requirement. USAACE will receive three UH-60M simulators by
midyear 2013. To date, USAACE has received 10 CH-47Fs and will receive
4 additional CH-47Fs in 3rd and 4th quarter FY11. Every time we receive
a CH-47F, we are required to turn in a legacy CH-47D to the
remanufacture line. Currently, USAACE has 28 UH-60Ms on hand and is
scheduled to receive 6 additional this year with an end state of 34 on
hand for FY11. Due to the large training demand for the UH-60A/L,
USAACE has not been required to turn in any legacy UH-60s to the
remanufacture line. The first arrival of AH-64D Block III helicopters
is tentatively scheduled for FY14. USAACE will be required to turn in
legacy AH-64Ds on a one for one basis with the Block III's. The
fielding of modernized aircraft will not impact USAACE's mission goals
in regards to training, maintenance, and facilities. Coordination has
been conducted with Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command and all
USAACE elements to insure timely integration of new aircraft to
mitigate any training issues.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. During the March 2, 2011, hearing you discussed the
MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System) program with Rep. Franks and
Rep. Hunter.
a. You mentioned that MEADS was ``underperforming''. Can you
explain in what ways the systems is underperforming?
b. You also mentioned that MEADS was not close to completion. What
was the original schedule for completion? How far behind is the
program?
c. Is the additional $804 million over the next two years intended
to wind down the program or complete the program?
d. How will ending the program affect our German and Italian
partners in their development of MEADS? What inputs have you had from
Germany and Italy on MEADS?
Secretary McHugh. a. The MEADS' underperformance has been in the
areas of cost and schedule, with additional concerns on oversight,
program management, and systems engineering. The Proof of Concept was
designed to markedly reduce the risk of the remaining Design and
Development work. It should be noted that since the MEADS independent
review in 2008, there have been improvements in oversight, program
management, and systems engineering in the MEADS program, although cost
and schedule growth continue. By choosing to not pursue development of
the full MEADS system, and to refocus the program as a Proof of
Concept, the higher-risk integration and testing efforts included in
the full scope program have been removed, resulting in substantially
lower cost and schedule risk.
b. The original Design and Development program schedule was
established as a 110 month effort, which is approximately 71 percent
complete. The effort was originally to be completed in October 2013.
However, in 2010, the Partners and the NATO MEADS Management Agency
(NAMEADSMA) determined that an additional 30 month effort was required
to recover from delays in the program and to add Partner desired
capabilities. These changes would have extended the total program
effort to 140 months, with completion in March 2016.
c. The $804M will wind down the program.
d. Completing the Proof of Concept will enable our MEADS partners
to field coalition missile defense capability. We believe that our
collective work under the Proof of Concept offers significant benefits
for all three MEADS partners, builds partner capacity in Air and
Missile Defense, and will position Italy and Germany to continue future
development, production, and fielding. Our MEADS partners have informed
us that they intend to field MEADS capability in some form.
Mr. Brooks. If we are to end MEADS and harvest technology from the
program in the future for other missile defense systems: Which
technologies are you expecting harvest? What other systems do you
expect to use the harvested technology? Are you expecting to use the
MEADS 360 degree radar in the Patriot system? What are the expected
costs of the integration of MEADS technology into legacy and future
missile defense systems?
Secretary McHugh. The technology benefits are likely to be at the
subsystem level, which makes it unfeasible to estimate the costs at
this time. Some of the more attractive technologies from the U.S.
perspective are contained in radar developments for the 360 degree
surveillance radar. As part of the Proof of Concept approach, the U.S.
expects to receive technical data packages providing detailed
technology information. The U.S. will evaluate the potential
incorporation of the MEADS technology in existing or future systems
over the next several years as that data becomes available.
Mr. Brooks. Can you provide the committee with the cost comparison
between fully completing the MEADS program and harvesting the
technology for legacy and future systems?
Secretary McHugh. The cost comparison for completing the U.S. share
of the MEADS design and development is approximately $2.8B in FY12-17,
while the Proof of Concept will cost approximately $804M in FY12
through FY13, and may lead to harvesting technology. This does not
include procurement costs for a full force of MEADS major end items,
which would require additional funds beginning in FY13 and extending
through FY30.
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