[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-8]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 1, 2011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] CONGRESS.#13
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-108 WASHINGTON : 2011
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One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DUNCAN HUNTER, California LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado BILL OWENS, New York
TOM ROONEY, Florida JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia TIM RYAN, Ohio
CHRIS GIBSON, New York C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE HECK, Nevada KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Mary Kate Cunningham, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 1, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Navy... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 1, 2011........................................... 53
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 2011
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps........ 8
Mabus, Hon. Ray, Secretary of the Navy........................... 3
Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations............... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Amos, Gen. James F........................................... 123
Mabus, Hon. Ray.............................................. 57
Roughead, ADM Gary........................................... 97
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mrs. Davis................................................... 155
Mr. Langevin................................................. 156
Mr. Larsen................................................... 156
Mr. Smith.................................................... 155
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Akin..................................................... 166
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 171
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 191
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 187
Mr. Forbes................................................... 173
Mr. Franks................................................... 185
Ms. Giffords................................................. 174
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 195
Mr. Hunter................................................... 191
Mr. Kissell.................................................. 176
Mr. McKeon................................................... 159
Mr. Miller................................................... 175
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 196
Mr. Smith.................................................... 166
Ms. Sutton................................................... 179
Mr. Turner................................................... 180
Mr. West..................................................... 197
Mr. Wilson................................................... 178
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 189
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 1, 2011.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you
for joining us today as we consider the President's fiscal year
2012 budget request for the Department of the Navy. Secretary
Mabus, Admiral Roughead, good to have you here again. General
Amos, welcome for your first hearing here as Commandant. Glad
to have you.
We want to thank all of you men for the tremendous service
you have performed for our country and for those that wear the
uniform behind you, and behind you, elsewhere around the
country, around the world. As we review your budget requests
and reconcile it with the larger DOD [Department of Defense]
efficiencies initiative, we can see in many ways the Department
of Navy gained capabilities.
However, I remain concerned that this request does not
fully provide for the Navy and the Marine Corps. I support
efforts to identify savings and reinvest those dollars in the
critical force structure and modernization. But many of the
efficiencies identified by your department are cost avoidance
initiatives and not clear-cut savings. As such, we are
concerned that they in fact materialize.
Furthermore, over the 5-year period that this budget
request covers, your Department harvested over 42 billion in
so-called efficiencies yet had to sacrifice approximately $16
billion of that amount or 38 percent back to the Treasury. In
order to generate much of the savings, you have been compelled
to make significant force structure cuts. But your requirements
haven't changed.
For example, the amphibious assault mission remains valid
but you cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. Likewise,
the strike fighter inventory requirement to support the current
National Defense Strategy's 10 aircraft carrier air wings
containing 50 strike fighter aircraft each.
We do not currently meet this requirement but the budget
request puts the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter on a 2-year
probation and you have shuttered an aircraft carrier air wing.
Similarly, the budget request assumes savings as a result of a
decrease in the Marine Corps and end strength of 20,000
personnel before the Marine Corps could even complete its force
structure review. Now, the Marine Corps suggests they cannot
live with that number. It can only reduce end strength by
15,000.
Finally, you proposed to design the Ohio-class replacement
ballistic submarine with fewer missile tubes than envisioned by
the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty or
STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command]. Adding to my
concern is that the current battle force inventory is at least
25 ships below your stated 313-ship floor. Although we have not
seen the results of the force structure assessment you
indicated was underway last year, one can only imagine that the
requirements for ships will grow as missions such as anti-
piracy and sea-based missile defense expand.
Just in time replacements for legacy force structure such
as the Ford-class aircraft carrier program and the Joint Strike
Fighter program are currently behind schedule and over cost,
causing even more resources to be required to sustain legacy
platforms. Your department gives this nation the most flexible
and lethal projection of power of any country in the world. It
is imperative that we sustain and maintain a robust and
effective fighting force borne from the sea and that we provide
you with sufficient resources to do that, which includes
finishing the fiscal year 2011 Defense appropriations.
As you know that we are really working together to try to
see that happen, it is not going to happen this week. But
hopefully in the ongoing discussions we can bring that to a
good conclusion.
Ranking Member Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here this morning and
for your service to our country. And we are in a very, very
challenging budget environment. Short-term, we need to get
something done for fiscal year 2011. I know the pressure that
has put on you; it is always helpful to hear specifics about
that.
So during your testimony today, it would be good to hear
more about sort of what the C.R. [Continuing Resolution] means
in terms of limiting your ability to operate, hopefully to spur
us all to get that done so that we can have an actual
appropriations bill for the Department of Defense. We know that
impacts you in many ways. And then beyond that, even once we
get through the last 7 months of 2011, and going forward, we
face enormous budget challenges across the whole of government
and certainly that will have some impact on the Department of
Defense. So, we are anxious to hear how you plan to manage
those.
And the Navy and the Marine Corps are in a sort of a unique
position. You are the main upfront projection of our power. The
main point of the Navy and Marine Corps is to be ready to go
anywhere anytime, often with very little notice. So that
preparation requires, you know, a broader array of preparation
to make sure that we are ready for whatever comes at us.
You have all done that very, very well in the past. And in
the future, there will be many more challenges along those
lines. We continue to have the problems of piracy. The
disruption in the Middle East could give rise to any number of
different decisions that we have to make in terms of being able
to get in to that region in a supportive capacity. And, of
course, there continues to be major challenges in the CENTCOM
[United States Central Command] AOR [Area of Responsibility]
that require your services.
So that ability to project power is critical to our
national security. Navy and the Marine Corps are a critical
part of that. So I agree very much with the Chairman's comments
about, you know, some of the challenges going forward, some of
the decisions that have been made about which programs to
continue, which programs to cancel, how to make shifts.
I look forward to your testimony today, to further explain
some of those decisions and how exactly they will work out. And
pretty much along the lines as was what the Chairman said so I
will not repeat that.
And I guess the last thing I like to say, you know, we, for
quite some time in this committee have talked about the number
of ships that are necessary within the Navy, 313 seems to be
the magic number. I think it would be helpful for all of us to
sort of better understand why. You know, what are the
requirements that have led us to say that 313 is the magic
number.
And then the other piece of that, of course, is you have a
lot of different ships, that are not all created equal, we
could conceivably have 313 but still not meet your needs if we
don't have the right types of ship--no, I am sorry, ships. So a
better understanding of how you see that balance going forward
would be helpful for the committee.
And with that, I will yield back and I look forward to your
testimony.
And thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Well, we are happy to have the Honorable Ray Mabus,
Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Gary Roughead, the United States
Navy, Chief of Naval Operations; General James F. Amos, the
United States Marine Corps Commandant.
Mr. Secretary, you will start it out.
STATEMENT OF HON. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Secretary Mabus. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith,
members of the committee, I have the honor of appearing here
today on behalf of the sailors, Marines and civilians that make
up the Department of the Navy.
I want to mention the absence of Representative Gabby
Giffords, who were it not for the senseless act in January,
would be here with us today. She is a member of the Navy family
and been a true friend of the Navy and Marine Corps throughout
her entire career. And I want to extend the thoughts and the
prayers of everybody in the Department of the Navy to her and
to her family as she recovers.
Today, the Navy and Marine Corps are conducting missions
across the full range of military operations. They remain the
most formidable expeditionary fighting force the world has ever
known. And with your support, they will continue to meet the
multiplicity of missions entrusted to them by our nation.
Today as the Chairman and the Ranking Member pointed out,
we face an immediate crisis, the absence of a Defense
Appropriations Bill and the increasingly serious problems of
operating under a continuing resolution. The pressure of the
C.R. has already significantly impacted procurement and reduced
the resources available to maintain readiness.
If the C.R. continues for the entire year, we will be
forced to reduce aircraft flight hours and ship steaming days,
cancel up to 29 of 85 surface ship maintenance availabilities,
to defer maintenance on as many as 70 aircraft and 290 aircraft
engines, defer up to 140 maintenance and construction projects
across this country.
In addition, the lack of legislative action will prevent
the construction of one Virginia-class submarine, two Arleigh
Burke destroyers and one mobile landing platform, prevent
procurement of two nuclear reactor cores and delay increased
funding for the Ohio-class replacement.
Reduce Marine Corps procurement up to a third after
rebalancing the Marine Corps manpower counts, create a $4.6
billion shortfall in operation and maintenance accounts, and
create nearly a $600 million shortfall in combined Navy and
Marine Corps manpower accounts. These measures will not only
place additional stress on the force and our family, they will
weaken the industrial base and affect over 10,000 private
sector jobs.
The disruption to our fleet and to our shore maintenance
and modernization schedules may take years to recover from and
will come at a much greater cost. We strongly request
congressional action to address the implications of this
continuing resolution. This is particularly important when
considering submission of the fiscal year 2012 budget request
which was based on the fiscal year 2011 request.
The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request of $161
billion, an increase of only 0.5 percent over fiscal year 2011,
includes funds for 10 aircraft--for 10 ships and 223 aircraft.
It maintains our commitment to take care of our people, build a
strong R&D [Research and Development] and industrial based and
grow the fleet.
The $15 billion request for overseas contingency operations
which represents a drop of $3.5 billion from fiscal year 2011
includes funds to sustain operations, manpower, infrastructure
as well as procure equipment and support operations in
Afghanistan. During the development of this budget, we were
keenly aware of the fiscal position of the country and the
necessity to be responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars.
The resulting request is a strategy-driven document
informed by fiscal realities. It balances competing
requirements and tries to do what is best for the country, the
Navy, the Marine Corps and our sailors and Marines. We began
this budget cycle by examining every aspect of what we do and
how we do it.
Consequently, $42 billion in the Department of the Navy
efficiencies were identified over the 5 years. As a result, we
had been able to add one Aegis-class destroyer, three TAO(X)
fleet oilers, one T-AGOS ocean surveillance ship to our
shipbuilding plan. With our dual-block LCS [Littoral Combat
Ship] strategy, this increases the total number of ships over
the next 5 years from 50 to 56, including one Joint High Speed
Vessel to be built for the Army.
The savings also allows us to buy additional F/A-18s,
extend the service life of up to 150 legacy aircraft as a hedge
against delays and the deployment of the F-35B and allow us to
continue investing in unmanned systems which are becoming
increasingly important on the battlefield and unmatched in
their ability to covertly surveil hostile forces without
placing our own people at risk.
This upcoming year, we will see deployment of the Fire
Scout to Afghanistan and continued testing of the UCAS-D
[Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstrator], the forerunner of an
integrated carrier launch strike system. In 2010, one of the
most important efforts was the decision endorsed by Congress to
pursue the new Littoral Combat Ship through a dual-block buy
strategy.
At an average cost of less than $440 million per ship and
with the cost reductions we have seen on LCS-3 and 4, the new
strategy will save taxpayers $2.9 billion. This plan is one
that is good for the Navy, good for taxpayers, good for the
country and demonstrates what can accomplished when sound
acquisition principles are followed and enforced.
We heard the message from Congress very clearly. We need
more ships but they have to be affordable. The LCS strategy
supports the industrial base by keeping workers employed at two
shipyards and is indicative of the Department's push to ensure
acquisitions excellence.
The fixed price contracts used for LCS are our model. They
are the result of effective competition and give the government
full ownership of the technical data packages in construction
and afford greater Congressional oversight. With the new LCS
strategy, we get more ships more quickly, more affordably.
Significant additional savings were also achieved through
terminating the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. It is important
to emphasize that this decision in no way changes our nation's
commitment to amphibious warfare or on amphibious assault
capability.
We have to maintain an amphibious assault capability that
will put Marines ashore, ready for the fight. But the EFV
[Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle] is not the vehicle to do this.
Conceived in the 1980s, the EFV was a previous-generation
solution to a tactical problem that has since fundamentally
changed. And its cost per unit would have consumed half that
Corps' total procurement and 90 percent of its vehicle-related
operation and maintenance account. We simply cannot afford it.
In aviation programs, we are also closely monitoring the
Joint Strike Fighter, particularly the Marine Corps variant,
the B. After a 2-year period of focused scrutiny, we will make
an informal recommendation about resolving the technical and
cost issues. Ashore, we continue to confront rising health care
cost caused by an increasing number of beneficiaries, expanded
benefits and increased utilization.
To deal with these trends, we have to implement systematic
efficiencies and specific initiatives that improve the quality
of care and customer satisfaction but at the same time more
responsibly managed cost. We concur with the recommendations
made by the Secretary of Defense to ensure fiscal solvency and
benefit equity for our retirees.
Finally, we are continuing efforts to invest in and develop
alternative energy. The latest headlines from around the world
reinforce our basic point--energy is first and foremost an
issue of national security. We can't allow volatile regions of
the world to control the price and affect the supply of the
fuel that we use.
Last year--the Navy and Marine Corps took some huge steps
forward including flying the F/A-18 Hornet on biofuel,
conducting a large scale of expansion of solar power and
beginning expeditionary initiatives, efficiencies and
initiatives in Afghanistan.
What we are doing there is already saving lives as we
reduce our reliance on imported fuel. We will continue these
investments this year. And we will continue to move forward
toward our goal of at least 50 percent alternative energies by
2020.
In closing, it is a solemn privilege to lead the naval
services during an era of protracted war and of national
challenge. I have been honored by the trust the President and
Congress have placed in me and profoundly moved by the
sacrifice and devotion I have witnessed in the sailors and
Marines who defend us.
The Navy and Marine Corps are and will remain ready to do
any mission America gives them.
Thank you and Godspeed.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus can be found in
the Appendix on page 57.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Admiral Roughead. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McKeon, and Ranking Member Smith, and members of
the Committee, it is my honor to appear before you in my fourth
year as the Chief of Naval Operations, representing more than
600,000 sailors, Navy civilians and their families who operate
and live globally.
I appreciate your continued support for them and their
families as they continue to carry out our maritime strategy.
I, too, would like to echo the Secretary's comments and
thoughts with regard to Representative Giffords; all of us who
served wish her the very best and a speedy recovery.
Our Navy continues to meet operational commitments and
respond to crises as they emerge. We are engaged in Iraq and
Afghanistan with 14,000 sailors on the ground and another
14,000 at sea in the region. Thirty percent of the air support
over Afghanistan flies off the decks of our aircraft carriers.
But our presence in the Middle East also gives us the
flexibility to respond to the sweeping changes that we see
taking place there.
But our interests extend far beyond that and so do our
operations. Today, we have approximately 65,000 sailors
deployed at about 40 percent of our force structures.
We are globally present and we are persistently engaged. We
provide deterrence in Northeast Asia and a presence in the
Western Pacific. We conduct counter-piracy operations in the
Indian Ocean and we are building maritime partnerships in
Africa, South America and the Pacific.
The demand continues to grow for the offshore option our
Navy and Marine Corps team provides the nation. We assume the
lead for the first phase of the phased, adaptive approach for
ballistic missile defense in Europe and we are working with the
Missile Defense Agency on providing that same capability
ashore.
We have created the new information directorate on my staff
and that has enabled us to make better decisions and
investments in countering anti-access and area-denial threats.
We have recently established the 10th fleet, our cyber fleet,
and it's already demonstrated its expertise by conducting joint
and naval operations in the cyber network cryptology and space
arenas.
To deliver the above, we have been pushing the fleet hard.
We have 288 ships today, the smallest it has been since 1916
when our interests and responsibilities were nowhere near what
they are today. And that is why 313 ships remains the floor of
our future force. It also is why sustaining fleet capacity is
essential in reaching that floor.
Since I became CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], I focused
on ensuring the Navy is ready, that our quality of work and
quality of life for fulfilling to the men and women of our
Navy, and that we place underperforming programs back on track.
We have introduced stability, affordability and capacity into
our shipbuilding and aviation plans. And with the assistance of
Congress, we have advanced capabilities to meet the most likely
evolving threats.
We have secured as the Secretary mentioned the fixed-price
dual award for 20 Littoral Combat Ships. We have addressed our
strike fighter capacity with a multi-year F/A-18 procurement.
Pending resolution of the continuing resolution, we will build
two Virginia-class submarines per year, another guided missile
destroyer. We will start the mobile landing platform, construct
and refuel our aircraft carriers as planned, and continued the
design of our replacement strategic deterrence submarine.
I am pleased with our accomplishments and I thank the
Congress for their continued support of our acquisition
strategies. Our fiscal year 12 budget request is a balanced
approach to increasing fleet capacity, maintaining warfighting
readiness, and developing, and enhancing our Navy total force.
The budget goes beyond ships and aircraft. It enhances
electronic warfare, information dominance, integrated air and
missile defense, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities for
the evolving challenges.
It continues to develop a family of unmanned systems that
will work in concert with our manned systems to secure access
and establish maritime superiority when and where we choose. It
continues our effort over the last 2 years to reduce total
ownership costs and leverages the opportunity presented by the
Secretary of Defense's efficiency initiative to reduce excess
overhead, improve readiness, and reinvest in warfighting
capability and capacity that improves the long-term
sustainability of our force.
Importantly, it supports the Secretary of Defense's health
care initiatives included in the President's budget, which
continue our efforts in health care to improve internal
efficiency, incentivize behavior, and ensure all our
beneficiaries are treated equitably.
We are seeing high satisfaction with our medical home port
initiative. And I am comfortable with the changes to propose
fees and co-payments including indexing enrollment fees to a
medical inflation index, incentivizing beneficiaries to use the
most cost-effective prescription delivery methods and the
elimination of sole community hospital status.
These are gradual, fair, and equitable changes that enhance
our ability to deliver high-quality health care for years to
come. You can be exceptionally proud of our sailors and Navy
civilians, who they are, and what they do. Today, sailors are
the best with whom I have ever served.
I ask for your strong support of our fiscal year 2012
budget request. And I thank you for all you do to support the
men and women who make our Navy the enduring global force for
good. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead can be found in
the Appendix on page 97.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE
CORPS
General Amos. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and
members of the committee, it is my honor to appear before you
today for the first time as the commandant of the Marine Corps
to articulate the posture of your Corps. Today, the Corps
serves as America's Expeditionary Force-in-Readiness, a
balanced air-ground logistics team of 202,000 active, 39,600
reserve, and 35,000 civilian Marines.
Our ability to serve as our nation's principal crisis
response force is due in large part to this committee's and
Congress's strident continued strong support. I thank you for
that.
Today, there are roughly 32,000 Marines forward deployed
around the world. As we sit here, it is roughly 7:50 in the
morning, excuse me, in the evening, in Afghanistan. The rainy
season has hit. The evenings remain cold and damp. It is in
this nation where 20,000 of our young men and women are engaged
in full spectrum combat operations and counterinsurgency
operations.
I am encouraged by the significant progress that they have
made in the Helmand province. And you have my assurance that
this effort remains my top priority. Sergeant Major Kent and I
spent Christmas with our Marines and our sailors in
Afghanistan. I am happy to report that their morale is high and
belief in their mission remained strong.
Partnered with the United States Navy, we are forward-
deployed and forward-engaged. This past year alone, our afloat
forces conducted humanitarian assistance missions in Pakistan,
Haiti, and the Philippines.
We recaptured the pirated ship, Magellan Star, rescuing its
crew from Somali pirates, and partnered with allied forces in
engagement missions in the Pacific Rim, Latin America, Africa,
and throughout Eastern Europe.
Halfway around the world this morning, Marines are ready,
honing their skills on board our Navy's great capital ships,
prepared to do our nation's bidding. Such a role as America's
crisis response force necessitates that we maintain a high
state of readiness.
We are either ready to respond to today's crisis, with
today's force, today, and thus--or you risk being late and thus
being irrelevant. I am keenly aware of the fiscal realities
confronting our nation. During these times of constrained
resources, the Marine Corps remains committed to being the best
stewards of scarce public funds.
We maintain a longstanding tradition in Congress as the
Department of Defense's penny-pinchers. Our institutionalized
culture of frugality positions us as the best value for the
defense dollar. For approximately 8.5 percent of the annual
defense budget, the Marine Corps provides the nation 31 percent
of its ground operating forces, 12 percent of its fixed-wing
tactical aircraft, and 19 percent of its attack helicopters.
This year's budget submission was framed by my force
service level priorities. We will, number one, continue to
provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to
Afghanistan. Two, rebalance our Corps and posture it for the
future. Three, better educate and train our Marines to succeed
in increasingly complex environments. And four, finally, keep
faith with our Marines, our sailors, and our families. While
these priorities will guide our long-term plan for the Marine
Corps, there are nonetheless pressing issues facing our Corps
today that concern me, issues for which I ask Congress's
continued assistance in solving.
Our equipment abroad and at home stations has been heavily
taxed in the nearly 10 years of constant combat operations. The
price tag for reset is $10.6 billion of which $3.1 billion has
been requested in fiscal year 2011 and $2.5 billion is being
sought in fiscal year 2012. The remaining $5 billion bill will
be needed upon the completion of our mission in Afghanistan.
The F-35B STOVL [Short Take Off and Vertical Landing] Joint
Strike Fighter is vital to our ability to conduct expeditionary
operations. Continued funding and support from Congress for
this program is of utmost importance. During the next 2 years
of F-35B scrutiny, I will be personally involved with the
program and closely supervising it as the commandant of the
Marine Corps.
Both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy
have reaffirmed the necessity of the Marine Corps' amphibious
assault mission. We must develop an affordable and capable
amphibious combat vehicle to project Marines from sea, to land,
in permissive, uncertain and hostile environments. I ask for
your support to reach this goal.
To ensure that the Marine Corps remains a relevant force
with the capacity and capability to respond to the demands of
the future security environment, we recently conducted a
detailed and internally driven force structure review. The
results of this effort provide America a strategically mobile
middleweight force optimized for forward presence and rapid
crisis response.
As we look to the future of the Marine Corps, it is
committed to finding ways to be more energy efficient. Since
2009, we have aggressively pursued energy-efficient
capabilities that will make Marine units more energy self-
sufficient, increase our combat effectiveness, and protect our
lives.
Two weeks ago, I signed our new bases-to-battlefield energy
planning guidance, which sets goals and metrics in a plan to
implement just that. Finally, I would like to comment on the
impact the current continuing resolution has had on our
operations and programs.
As of today, $565 million in military construction
contracts have not been awarded. $2.4 billion of MILCON
[Military Construction] is at risk for the remainder of the
year for the Marine Corps. These projects impact the lives of
Marines, the local economies of the communities around our
bases and stations, and are projected to generate over 63,000
jobs from the Carolinas to Hawaii.
If the continuing resolution extends through the entire
fiscal year, 13 bachelor enlisted quarters, totaling 5,000
affected spaces, will not be built, thus stymieing our BEQ
[Bachelor Enlisted Quarters] modernization efforts. These 13
bachelor enlisted quarters will allow eight infantry battalions
to move out of 50-year-old Cold War barracks. Finally, a
continuing resolution could prove catastrophic to our
procurement accounts, resulting in a loss of almost a third of
our procurement budget.
Lastly, you have my promise that in these challenging times
ahead, the Marine Corps will only ask for what it needs, not
what it might want. We will make the hard decisions before
coming to Congress and we will redouble our efforts toward our
traditional culture of frugality. As has been the case for over
235 years, your Marine Corps stands ready to respond when the
nation calls whoever the President may direct.
Once again, I thank each of you for your continued support.
I ask that my written testimony be submitted for the record.
And I am prepared to answer your questions, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the
Appendix on page 123.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
Thank you to each of you. Just a couple of things on the
C.R. If that had been taken care of last year on regular order,
we wouldn't even be discussing it now, but it is what is. And I
know we're, all of the members on this committee in strong
support of getting this work finished up.
In the process of the C.R., the appropriators and the
leadership have separated out the defense and they are working
to bring that to a resolution and then all the other issues
will be dealt with in one large omnibus package. But the
defense, we are trying to finish up that appropriation bill.
And I know every week that goes by, it causes more problems.
So, hopefully we can get that wrapped up quickly.
General, I just returned. Mr. Reyes and Mr. Kline and
myself went to Afghanistan. I know other members of the
committee have just returned over the last break from
Afghanistan, and I was very impressed with the morale of the
Marines down at Marja and in the south down there with the job
that they have done.
And those young captains were so excited to show us what
they were doing and what they had accomplished, and I was
really impressed by their attitude, by their professionalism,
and by the way that they are carrying out their
responsibilities.
And it was just--it was a great experience for me. And I
saw a lot of progress from a year-and-a-half ago to now, when
the Marines had just gotten to Camp Leatherneck were just
starting to move out to where, now, they have freed up most of
that area and done an outstanding job.
The concern I have and I mentioned it in my opening
statement, the out-years Department of the Navy budget plans
for the Marine Corps end strength of 182,000 personnel.
However, the Marine Corps force structure assessment just
released states a requirement for an end strength 5,000
personnel over that amount. What is your out-year budgeting
strategy for adding back the additional $500 million required
to accommodate an additional 5,000 personnel?
General Amos. Congressman, that--as you recall that sits
out there in year 2015 and 2016, is when the budget was
adjusted and it was 10,000 a year, that was the drawdown. That
was proposed at the time. Now there is recognition within the
Department of Defense that it is not 20,000.
What I have asked our leadership to allow me to meter down
that manpower to avoid reductions in forces and keep faith--my
last priority, keep faith with my families and sailors and our
Marines. So, yet to be seen precisely how that drawdown will
take place.
The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy have
assured me that it will be conditions-based. In other words, it
is designed to be post-Afghanistan when the Marines are out of
Afghanistan. So, based on that, there will probably be some
adjustments as we move in to POM [Program Objective Memorandum]
2013 and POM 2014 as we work those budgets.
So, right now, we don't have as you note, we don't have the
solution to that 5,000 yet. But we will be working that as we
build the 2013 budget and as we build the 2014 budget, sir.
The Chairman. I understand it is very difficult for us to
look out a year, especially when we haven't even finished up
last year's work. So, it is difficult. But I have heard also
that that is conditions-based. And we will just take care of
this 1 year at a time as best we can.
On the SSBNX [Next-generation Ballistic Missile Submarine]
program, the Navy has determined that designing an Ohio-class
ballistic missile replacement submarine with 16 missile tubes
is more affordable than designing it for the current missile
requirement of 20 missile tubes per submarine.
You know, one of the things I am really concerned about is
we have just eliminated the EFV. We have eliminated most of
what we had planned for in the F-22s. When I first came here,
we had out the B2 from a 130 to 20 and there have been a lot of
programs started. And the excuse for eliminating the EFV is
because now we can't afford it.
Well, I don't know when we determine that, because we have
been working on it for 20 years. What my concern is now on this
submarine program, is that 20 years from now, are we--I mean,
if you look at it right now and realistically look at the
budget, we are not going to be able to afford it even at this
reduced number of 16 silos.
Are we? Or do you feel that that will be affordable with
all the other things that are needed for the Navy?
Secretary Mabus. Mr. Chairman, as we have looked forward,
as you know, the Ohio-class replacement, we have to start
building in 2019 to go on patrol in 2029, its first patrol. So
what we are doing today is trying to come up with the best R&D,
the best design that we can and to get the cost into a
manageable range.
We have taken a billion dollars per boat out within the
last year and we are looking for another half billion per boat.
And the reason for that is twofold--one is to give us the best
deterrent capability, because the Ohio class and its
replacement are the most survivable legs of the nuclear triad.
But it is also to keep from hollowing out our fleet, as we
start to build these replacement submarines, because they do
take such a large part of our shipbuilding budget, and to show
what that will do in our long-range plans.
We have--one of the things that I have committed to and I
think we stuck to is to be very realistic in terms of how much
something will cost. How much we can anticipate the--a range
that we can anticipate that Congress will provide for
shipbuilding and to work within those means.
But I do think that the Ohio-class replacement that we are
designing will be, well, it is absolutely necessary and we need
to make it affordable so that we can both have that deterrence
and also have the rest of the fleet that we are going to need
in the next 20, 30, 40 years.
The Chairman. I think we are in on an agreement on the
need. What my concern is that somewhere down the line, I mean,
one of the ways we got the billion dollar saving is just cut it
from 20 to 16 tubes. We cut the capability of the ship to save
money. And that makes me a little nervous about how we are
going to be able to really provide all of our needs. It is just
across the board I see our defense needs being driven by
budgetary concerns rather than to meet potential crises that
might confront us at some point down the line.
Secretary Mabus. The number of tubes designed in today for
the Ohio-class replacement meets every contingency that we know
of today. It meets every targeting design that we will be
tasked with.
We also--as technology changes we are able to reduce the
number of those submarines from 14 to 12 because now we are--we
will be building a life of a hull reactor so that there won't
be the need to pull two submarines at a time out for a
refueling. They would be able to stay on patrol for their
entire lifetimes without refueling. So, as the technology
changes, we will absolutely meet the needs, but try to do it
within the fiscal realities that we confront.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ranking Member Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appreciate
the difficulties of operating under a C.R. and the 2011 budget.
And to share the Chairman's concerns, I want to make sure we go
forward. It is worth pointing out that the House did in fact
pass a 2011 defense appropriations bill. Also worth pointing
out, actually, that the Senate, on more than one occasion, had
a defense and appropriations bills as well. But the filibuster
is a very powerful tool to stop things from happening.
One of the things that I am committed to, this whole
committee is committed to is working together across party
lines to get something done. But certainly the House fulfilled
its obligation and we are trying to get the appropriations bill
done still. We are going to work together to make that happen.
And also I want to say I was in Afghanistan at the end of
November and was very, very impressed with what the Marine
Corps has accomplished. We were taken down to Helmand Province,
walked to a village down there that you know a mere matter of
months before no one could have walked through safely and we
were able to do that, meet with the village leaders down there.
The Marine Corps has done a fabulous job you know taking back
territory and making a real difference and at a very high cost
as well, which we are all aware--so, we thank you for your
leadership and we thank all the Marines in Helmand for their
incredible service to our country and moving that forward.
On the budget question, I think I share the Chairman's
concerns you know broadly going forward how are we going to
meet the requirements that are out there? One thing that I hope
that you all would do, and everyone working on the Department
of Defense issues on this point forward, is go back and look at
the requirements very closely. I think that is really the key
to making a fit within the budget.
You know what are the requirements that have been there for
a long, long time and are just still sort of there because they
have always been there? And what are the real requirements in
the 21st century for what we are going to need to meet our
national security needs? I think that is going to be a big part
of the challenge, to make sure that we can fund what we need to
fund by making sure that we are not funding things that we
don't need to fund.
Those are some tough questions that I think the people--you
know you three are certainly the most qualified people out
there to answer those questions as are others in the DOD. I
think we are going to need to take a hard look at that on all
sides of this equation. So, I hope we will do that.
I want to thank you also for your kind words on behalf of
Congresswoman Giffords. We appreciate that. She is getting
better every day. And we are really looking forward to the day
on this committee when she comes back. She is a valuable member
of this committee, and she will be back soon, back working on
those issues. So, I appreciate that.
Also, I am going to ask you a couple of questions that her
staff has given me about issues that she is concerned about,
and then I have just one question of my own.
As you know, Congresswoman Giffords is a leader on
alternative energy and any energy efficient issues across all
of government but particularly within the DOD. And the Navy and
the Marine Corps have been just outstanding leaders on this
issue.
On a previous hearing, we discussed a little bit the Marine
Corps operating base and to figure out a way to better use
solar power so that they can reduce their fuel consumption. And
in reducing their fuel consumption, reduce the number of
shipments that had to be made. And every time, anyone has to
drive, they are at risk of IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices]
so reducing that doesn't just save energy and money, it
actually saves lives, and we appreciate that leadership.
And then, of course, we also have the Super Hornet that
flew with the 50-50 mix of biofuels. I had to call it the Green
Hornet. The name was just out there. It was very easy and very
clever. So, we really appreciate your leadership and those
issues.
A couple of specific questions, how scalable is all of
this? Because I think that is one of the blocks that stops
people from fully embracing alternative energy and energy
efficiency. It is like, yes, there is a good idea here, a good
idea there. But what does it really mean? How much does it
really save?
I am a true believer, as is Congresswoman Giffords, that if
we do this and do this aggressively it is very scalable. It can
save us an enormous amount of money. But can you give us some
idea of what--where you think this can go? How far can we go
using alternative fuels? And, Secretary Mabus, if you would
start off, it would be great.
Secretary Mabus. I think it is very scalable, Congressman.
I believe that we will reach our goal of at least 50 percent
alternative energy or non-fossil fuel energy, both afloat and
ashore, by 2020. You mentioned the Marines, you know General
Amos has signed out his plan to aggressively move these things
forward into the combat zone. We import fuel more than any
single thing into Afghanistan.
As you pointed out, we save money by producing energy on
site. We save lives, because Marines are not guarding fuel
convoys. And we free up Marines to do what they were sent there
to do, which is fight or engage or rebuild.
On the Navy side, we have looked at two things, one is
energy efficiencies; simply driving down the amount of energy
that we use. You know things like hull coatings and voyage
planning tools, things like that. We have also launched our
first hybrid ship and we are going to do more in terms of
hybrid drives, using electric drives for lower speeds.
And those--the Makin Island, our first hybrid ship, in its
maiden voyage from Mississippi around South America to
California saved almost $2 million in fuel cost. And so, we
believe that is very scalable.
As you said, we have flown the F/A-18 and certified it on a
50-50 blend of biofuel. And we have also certified our
helicopters. We have certified our swift boats and we are in
the process of certifying our large service combatants on
biofuels.
We believe that as the market increases, particularly from
the Navy and Marine Corps, that prices are coming down. We are
seeing that happening already today. And, that infrastructure
will be built to support this. So, we think that it is
absolutely scalable and not only scalable but absolutely
necessary for our national security.
Mr. Smith. Great. Gentlemen, do you have anything you wish
to add?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I agree with the Secretary. Two
years ago, when we established Task Force Energy in the Navy,
we started looking at where we could go and that led to the
Green Hornet and to taking our inventory and putting it on
alternative fuels. I have been very pleased with what I have
seen. My recent updates indicate to me that it is scalable,
that costs are coming down.
I also believe that there is an expanding interest out in
the commercial sector which is going to be critical and I think
will be imperative, and that will contribute to bringing these
costs down.
We are continuing to press forward with the objectives that
the Secretary has laid out, and I am encouraged by what I see.
But I am also encouraged by the energy that our people are
putting into this. And I think the cultural change is equally
as important as some of the technical things that we see coming
along.
Mr. Smith. That is terrific.
General Amos. Congressman, the CNO talked about cultural
change and that is--I think that is really the hinge point
probably for all services certainly within mine. At the lowest
level--if you can get the young captains and the corporals
excited about not having to carry extra batteries up into the
mountains on patrol, such as in India Company 3rd Battalion 5th
Marines up in Sangin who have been on a pretty tough fight for
the last 4 months. They went for 90 days just recharging their
batteries that we would normally resupply on an almost daily
basis, just using their solar roll-up blankets that they had,
to the point where they built their combat outposts and strung
out all their stuff and then realized they liked it better than
having generators run and having to haul water and having to
haul fuel up there and then batteries resupply. So, it is a
culture change for us. It is catching on.
Two Fridays ago, I sat with a Marine colonel that had a
Black Engineer of the Year award and he was the award winner
from Albany. And he was bragging about this new methane gas
energy generation capability that they have at Albany. And they
are using the trash in the dump and using all the land fill and
then harvesting out the methane to run the generators. But we
have been doing that at Miramar now for several years, but he
has taken it to the next step.
He has captured the exhaust and the heat generated by this
generator that is run on methane gas to develop steam and
provide heat for the base. So, it is a culture change. I think
we are not there yet, but I am very, very encouraged. And my
sense is that probably all of our services are about ready to
kind of jump off the edge of this thing. So, I am very
encouraged by it.
Mr. Smith. Terrific. Thank you. One question, and you can
submit it for the record to my staff. You mentioned the other
services--that was the last question--was how the different
services are cooperating on this? Because everywhere I go--you
know Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force--everyone's got sort of
creative ideas. I wanted--I am curious what sort of synergy is
going on so that you are learning from each other as you go and
not duplicating. So if you could just have your staff submit
something, both to my office and Congresswoman Giffords'
office, that would be great.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 155.]
Mr. Smith. The only question that I had was on something
you have mentioned in your testimony about how we changed now
the aircraft carrier groups; you are reducing the air wings and
the associated staff. There are 11 aircraft carriers and they
are going down to 9 strike groups and air wings. And the staff
and I are not quite clear on exactly how that is going to work
or what impact that might have on your capability and how you
feel about how it is going to play out. We understand the
budget savings, want to make sure it can still work to fully
support those 11 aircraft carriers.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I think a lot of the questions
that have risen over taking out structure in the Navy really
gets to some of the headquarters elements that we are talking
about. As I have looked across the Navy and looked at how we
were overseeing the operational forces, quite frankly, in my
opinion, we had too much overhead structure. That structure
tends to be more senior and, therefore, more expensive.
But if you look at our ability to still field the 10
carrier air wings, that is there. What we have done is in the
submarine community, the destroyer community and the aviation
community, we have taken out overhead, headquarters, senior
people so that we could get more junior sailors back at sea in
positions that really make a difference.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. It has all the characteristics of
a perfect storm. There is general agreement that the world has
now reached that point that the United States reached 40 years
ago, that is the peak oil where you have reached the maximum
ability to produce oil.
This happens at just the time that the industrialized world
is struggling to recover from a recession and demanding more
oil. The developing world led by China and India are demanding
hugely increased amounts of oil. There is now escalating unrest
in the Arab world where most of the world's oil reserves are.
And a couple of weeks ago, WikiLeaks indicated that Saudi
Arabia has 40 percent less oil reserves than they were
claiming. That is probably true of most of the OPEC
[Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries
that we believe increased their projected reserves so that they
could pump more oil. And all of this is happening at the time
that the world has quite clearly reached its maximum ability to
produce oil. We are not going to produce more than about 84, 85
million barrels a day.
What is the world's response to this? The leadership in our
country seems largely unaware of these challenges. We have only
2 percent of the world's oil. We use 25 percent of the world's
oil and we are buying reserves nowhere in the world.
China is now very aggressively buying oil reserves all over
the world. Why would they do that? In today's market place,
there is no advantage to owning the reserves, because you can
go to the global oil auction and buy all the oil that you can
afford, whether or not you have reserves in your country. We
buy 25 percent of the world's oil. We have only 2 percent of
the world's reserves of oil.
There is only one reason that I could think of that you
would want to own oil reserves and that is that the time will
come when you are not going to be willing to share those
reserves with the rest of the world.
If that is China's goal, then they need to be able to
protect the sea lanes. Just a bit ago, they fielded a very
sophisticated anti-ship missile. We are struggling to develop
defenses against that.
Just quite recently we saw their J-20, very large fighter.
There is a suggestion that it really wasn't designed as a
fighter aircraft. It was designed to release wave-skimming,
supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. What do you make of this
confluence of events and what contingency plans are you
pursuing?
Secretary Mabus. Congressman, on the energy question, I
think you made the point about not relying on fossil fuels and
particularly imported fossil fuels more eloquently than I ever
could. What we are doing is trying to move as rapidly as
possible, the Navy and the Marine Corps, off dependence on
fossil fuels, move them to American-based alternative fuels,
both for expeditionary purposes or afloat purposes and for
basing purposes.
We have a goal and we are going to meet it of use--of
having at least half the Navy and Marine Corps total energy
coming from non-fossil fuel sources by the year 2020.
We absolutely think that it is a matter of national
security, of energy independence that we not be dependent on
this. It is also simple finances. Every time the cost of oil
goes up a dollar a barrel, it costs us $31 million. So, if oil
goes up $30 a barrel, you are talking about spending an
additional billion dollars just on fuel.
The Navy has always been a leader in terms of changing the
types of fuel that we use. We went from sail to coal in the
1850s, from coal to oil in the early part of the 20th century;
then, we pioneered nuclear in the 1950s, and we are going to do
that again. That is our plans, and it is because we need a
hedge against exactly what you were talking about to maintain
our warfighting capabilities.
I would like for the CNO to talk about the specific
operational things that we are doing about the other part of
the question.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. And, thank you for the
question. And I echo the Secretary's comments on--in what
really is behind our energy initiatives, it really is an
operational issue and less a technical issue for me. I mean, it
is really about how we operate and how unencumbered we can be
if we get off the foreign oil.
With regard to the capabilities that are being fielded, you
cited China; but quite frankly, many of those capabilities tend
to proliferate today more than they have in the past. So, as I
look at what we as a Navy must be able to do, it really has a
global view and not just about China, but in all areas.
As we look at capabilities that are being developed as we
have over the years, we look at what are the counters to those,
what are the strengths that we as a Navy have and we amplify on
those strengths and we address those areas that we know we want
to pursue counters to.
I think in the area of anti-submarine warfare, for example,
which is one that is--submarines are proliferating globally.
There is no better anti-submarine warfare weapon than the
Virginia-class submarine. And that is why we want to get to two
a year this year. If the C.R. is lifted, we can do that. But
that is hugely critical.
We have made significant investments in ballistic missile
defense, increasing the number of ships in our inventory up to
41 by the end of this defense plan.
We also have restructured ourselves within the Navy. We
have recreated the U.S. 10th Fleet to go after areas of
electronic warfare, electronic attack and cyber warfare.
And so, what we have done is we have re-imagined the
future. We have reinvented ourselves to be able to address
those challenges that are likely to be occurring in the years
ahead. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome and
thank you for service. I have two main areas that I would like
for you to address in the 5 minutes allotted to me. As we
talked the last couple of days about the possibility of a no-
fly zone over Libya and the ability to enforce that, and there
are a couple of options.
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] has been
mentioned. The United Nations authority is the other. When we
are talking about the constraints, the uptempo and all the
things that impact our Navy today, the Navy would be the only
option to be able to impose that no-fly zone over a place like
Libya. Am I correct?
Admiral Roughead. That would depend, Mr. Reyes, on basing
rights, over flight rights. But to your point, we in the Navy
don't have to worry about those, because we come from the sea.
We don't ask permission where we put our airfields. We put them
where they are needed. So, we are a very good option for that.
But there are other factors that I think leadership would have
to take into account.
Mr. Reyes. Well, my point being--and that--and it goes to
the question that the Ranking Member talked about in terms of
going to nine carrier wings versus the 10. When we have
unexpected emergencies or situations that come up, will--in
your mind, will we be able to handle those kinds of things
given the fact that we have these worldwide commitments and,
basically, the Navy would be the best option in terms of being
able to project that capability?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We are. Today, we have four
aircraft carriers deployed. Two more are underway. And what we
do with the fleet is we have it so that it is always forward
and that we can move those carriers very quickly from one
region to the other. And that is the beauty of how we have
designed our fleet response plan.
So, I feel very comfortable with that. I also believe that
what we have put in place with respect to our strike fighter
force, the service life extension on the airplanes, the
procurement of some additional E and F model Hornets and then
moving to the Joint Strike Fighter that the Air Force that we
have, particularly when we coupled with the Marine Corps and
their Hornet force and what will also be a Joint Strike Fighter
force that we will be well positioned for the future.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. Thank you, Admiral. General, I have one
question. And, again, I was as impressed with the change in
conditions in Southern Afghanistan particularly in the area
where the Marines where, we were wondering where they are going
to be able to take it back. But one of the--we heard a very
moving story about an IED attack on one of the--one of the
units and I guess it was the convoy commander that got hit the
hardest on there. But clearly, one of the big issues which also
affects the Army is the traumatic brain injury. Can you address
specifically in terms of the Marine Corps the kinds of programs
or what you are doing to address TBI [Traumatic Brain Injury]?
General Amos. Congressman, I would be happy to. This has
been evolutionary and I know that you are close to General
Croley when I was the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps.
We worked for--both General Croley and I worked for 2 years in
earnest trying to capitalize on all of the latest technology as
far as being able to determine what is traumatic brain injury,
what is it, what are the effects of that on that mass inside
that skull.
We have come a long way since 2003 when, quite honestly,
nobody was even talking about TBI. In a nutshell, today, we
recognize it, we understand some of it, we don't understand all
of it, but we have taken lessons learned from the National
Football League, worked very closely with University of
California, Los Angeles, the head of traumatic brain injury out
there, Dr. David Hovda and using that as--and bringing in great
minds across the country that understand this.
We built about 2 years ago--about a year-and-a-half ago
what we call a concussive protocol. And what that means is
recognition first of all that a concussive event of any kind
that either knocks a Marine down, perhaps, or throws him up
against the wall, or worse yet, he is standing 5 meters away
from his buddy that steps on a pressure plated IED that goes
off, all that has a great effect on the brain. Each brain is
different. It is affected different.
So what we have done now using this protocol is we have
brought every single Marine, and it has happened to every
single soldier now that this happens to in Afghanistan. You
enter this protocol. In other words, you have the event. It is
registered. You come back to your combat outpost, forward
operating base, wherever you are. You see the corpsman, medic
in the case of the Army. The next person is the doctor if there
is one available.
Depending on the extent of the injuries, we will fly our
Marines from our forward operating base or combat outpost in
the Leatherneck and they start this procedure where we do an
exam of the head. There is a physical examination and then
there is a cognitive test, a series of cognitive test over
days. And depending how you--whether you were knocked out,
depending on how feel, depending on how you look, with regards
to the examination, dictates what the next step is.
But in a nutshell, this is the--what we have discovered is
the brain needs to be rested after a concussive event. The very
best thing you can do is take the brain and put it at rest. In
that case, just keep it in the combat outpost, kept it at the
forward operation base or fly back to a resuscitative--not a
resuscitative, but a care unit which we have established at the
Leatherneck.
And then depending on how long you were knocked out or how
severe it is, it dictates how long it is before you go outside
the wire again. You could conceivably never leave what we call
the wire of the combat outpost again. In our case, we have what
is known as ``three strikes you are in,'' which means on the
third concussive event, you are not going anywhere. You are not
going on patrol anymore. You are not leaving the wire.
So, these are things we are doing. We have set up the
organization at Leatherneck which examines Marines and helps
them with rehabilitation. The final thing, Congressman, is that
we are in the process now of deploying an MRI [Magnetic
Resonance Imaging] into Camp Leatherneck. That should happen
this year and that will then give the local folks an
opportunity to examine the brain and then send that information
digitally back to the United States of America for analysis.
So, great recognition that is real. We are doing something
about it. I think a concussive protocol will probably save
mental lives down the road yet to be seen.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Reyes. Thanks.
The Chairman. Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, our
witnesses here this morning.
First of all, Admiral Roughead, the brief that you gave, I
believe, was 2 or 3 weeks ago in the SCIF [Secure Compartmented
Information Facility] was tremendously helpful. It was fast
paced, but you covered a lot of territory and maybe quieted a
lot of fears in certain people relative to naval capabilities
and some of the new threats. That was a very helpful briefing.
And also, General Amos, thank you for taking time to review
the EFV decision that you had worked through. I still have some
reservations as you know. We will probably have a committee
hearing about it just to try to look into that. But I
appreciate your availability and your candor in saying this is
what we are trying to do.
And as you know, Mr. Secretary, and General Amos, we are--
part of our job is to say, ``Wait a minute. We think you guys
are being too good of soldiers'' in terms of maybe being too
tough on the budget, and there may be sometimes where we need
to push back. We have tried to do that, members of this
committee making the case that the overall national budget
problem can't be fixed by cuts to defense and that that may be
very unwise.
Certainly, the number of 288 ships that we are the same
place we were in 1916 is not something that gives us a lot of
sense of peace here. And you have heard me complain before that
the more that you can include us in the process and help us to
go to bat for you, particularly, General Amos, in terms of your
reset necessity because of having had all this equipment
deployed for so long, we want to try to help you in that
regard.
Help us to help you in giving us as much heads up as you
are making different decisions and things are going along
instead of catching us. And you know, that has been my
continuous complaint, and I repeat it too much. But all three
of your availability, we are very appreciative.
We are supposed to know something about the political
situation of what is going on and we, as you know, the House
did pass an appropriations bill because we understand the
pressure that you are under. However, we are not the only
players in this game and so far, that hasn't gone anywhere.
My recommendation is that you prepare just as Secretary and
a number of you listed off--I forget who has made the list
today--but you listed off some of the things where you need
transfer authority. If we are continuing on this continued
resolution approach, I think it would be good to have the
second arrow and that would put together the most important
transfer authority requirements that you need so that we can go
to bat and if we have to include those in the--we can't do it
in this little short continued resolution, as I understand it,
because the bus has left the station.
But we may well be back at another one of these Band-Aid
type things. And if we do have the key transfer authority
things that you need, it may allow us to try to help you. You
might think that there are a couple of--particularly a certain
subcommittee chairman is a pain in the rear for complaining
about you making decisions and not telling us ahead of time,
but we are also, in the other hand, fighting in your behalf.
And we are trying to be a team player and a help, and we
may be able to get some of those key transfer things through
even if we don't have the appropriations piece fixed because we
are in a period of tremendous budget instability as you know.
The case that we have been making as a member of the Budget
Committee, if you take a look at the simple numbers, our
revenues are 2.2 trillion. Maybe you know this. Maybe you
don't.
Two point two trillion, that is how much money comes in,
and our entitlements plus debt service is 2.2 trillion. So we
can zero defense and it doesn't solve the problem. And so we
are making that case that we have to deal with this other
budget problem aside from trying to continuing to whack defense
and to run a Navy at the 1916 level. So help us to help you,
but do help us by giving us this--the most important transfer
authority pieces that you need. That was--so that was really
all I had, unless you want to respond, I have a few seconds
left here so----
Secretary Mabus. Thank you, Congressman. And just to
respond very quickly on a couple of issues. One is it is not
just transfer authority that we are lacking. It is new START
Authority. That is what is really going to hamper so much on
ship construction, for example, and you pointed out that we
are, as the CNO said, 288 ships the lowest since 1916. But if
we build our 5-year and then 10-year shipbuilding plan, we will
get to around 325 ships in the early 2020.
So we will pass the 313 floor, and we will go up to the
mid-320s in the early 2020s, but we won't be able to do that
absent the New START Authority to build the second Virginia-
class submarine, the two Aegis-class destroyers, the mobile
landing platform. So I would add that.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
The Chairman. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen, thank
you once again for being before our committee. Secretary Mabus,
February of last year, the Department of Defense took up what I
believe is a commendable step in reversing the ban that
prohibits women from being on Navy submarines. And as you
probably know, I have been a strong advocate to allow women to
fulfill all the positions currently available in our military,
and I hope more of that happens.
So, Secretary, can you provide our committee with an update
now, a year later, how that is going and if it is being
successful and what more do you need. Do you need anything from
us to ensure that that goes well?
Secretary Mabus. Well, thank you, and I share that that
women should be absolutely integrated into all parts of the
Navy in, particularly, the submarine community. We are moving
forward the first group of women, are in nuclear power school
and in submarine training, preparing to go on board our
ballistic missile submarines and our guided missile submarines
at the--late this year is the best estimate that we have.
The level of volunteers that when we made this announcement
from both the Naval Academy and ROTC programs around the
country was simply astounding. And the quality of the young
women that are going through these--this program heading for
our submarines is as high as can be imagined. Now we are also
moving laterally some Supply Corps officers to be department
heads on submarines and act as mentors for these new
submariners, and that is also coming along.
And finally, we notified Congress in December of our intent
to begin do design work on our attack submarines so that women
could also be integrated into those. But we think that at this
point, it is going very, very smoothly.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. That is great to hear. I wanted to give
the opportunity to one of our members who is sitting very close
to you--that would be Mrs. Hanabusa because she represents
Hawaii, which, you know, the Navy and Marines are very
important to. She sits on the, what we call, the bottom row,
which means she probably never gets to ask a question very
often. I don't know with the rest of my time if the gentlelady
from Hawaii would have some questions for you.
Mrs. Hanabusa. Mr. Chair, is that acceptable? Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen. I would like to understand something,
which is--and I hope I am not overstepping Congressman
Bordallo's question. But in the whole concept of the Guam
situation, I noticed that there is reference to the fact that
the budget request includes $33 million intended to move to
other agencies to mitigate the infrastructure and socioeconomic
impacts of Guam associated with the move of the Marines.
Can you explain to me exactly what the concern is that $33
million would have to be diverted for that specific purpose?
Secretary Mabus. One of the keys to the Guam strategy is
one Guam and one government here that we are a total all of
government solution and not just the Defense Department moving
toward that. That was the rationale for moving that because
other agencies would have a more direct interest and ability to
do some of things that will need to be done to make the Guam
move go forward.
Mrs. Hanabusa. So do you sense that there is going to be
some resistance or concern raised by the people of Guam of this
move and if that is why the almost a proactive action of taking
steps to ensure that it is--that you are addressing various
types of social issues before the move?
Secretary Mabus. We have been working very closely with the
government of Guam and with the people of Guam. We have had a
lot of public input before the environmental impacts. Statement
Record of Decision was signed last fall. The governor of Guam
is here now and has been meeting with the Department of Defense
and Department of Navy officials about this.
My Under Secretary, Bob Work, has recently returned from
his fifth or sixth trip to Guam and we are endeavoring to work
very closely to meet any cultural concerns, any concerns of the
people of Guam have as this move proceeds.
Mrs. Hanabusa. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Hanabusa. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Amos, I wish I had the words to adequately thank
you for what you have done for our Marine Corps and what our
Marine Corps does every day for our country, but suffice to
say, we appreciate it a great deal. And Admiral Roughead, I
have known you for years, and I know your heart for and service
to our Navy, and we thank you.
And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. One of
my big concerns is when you look at the recent review by the
Quadrennial Defense Review independent panel which as you know
is a bipartisan panel made up of some very talented individuals
that concerns you when you hear the word train wreck associated
where they think we are headed with the recent QDR [Quadrennial
Defense Review]. And they mentioned specifically the Navy and
the need for us to grow the Navy.
And then it concerns me when we see the Secretary of
Defense coming in as he did last year talking about the
shipbuilding plan and saying that the out-years of the
shipbuilding plan are simply a fantasy. As you know, our
shipbuilding plan, we are looking at how many ships we are
going to have both short-term and down the road. It is a pretty
simple calculus. It is the number of ships we plan to build
added to the number that is going to be in our fleet less what
we decommission.
OMB disagrees with the number of ships that as you know
that the Navy projects, they think we are headed towards 270
and not in the 300s. But suffice that--just put that aside for
a moment. I am concerned about the ships we have on our fleet
and, specifically, the estimated lives of those vessels because
as you know, two things have happened--one, we have used them a
lot more than we anticipated; but, secondly, we--we know that
we have had just in 2 fiscal years, fiscal year 2010 and--I
mean, 2010 and 2012, we have had $567 million of deferred
maintenance.
When will we receive a revised assessment showing not the
initial estimated lives of these vessels, but the current
estimated projections of the life expectancies of those
vessels? Is that in the works at any time for us to get?
Secretary Mabus. Congressman, if I could address one little
part of the earlier statements. In the QDR review that was
conducted as you said by some very distinguished Americans
looking at that, they came up with a number of ships for the
Navy that was higher than our plans get us in the early 2020s,
which is in the 325-ship range.
The major difference though is in the way they counted
ships. We do not count certain support ships that they did
count and if you count apples to apples in those two documents,
we are very close to where they think we need to be in the
early 2020s. In terms of maintenance, we are very concerned
because as the CNO says the Navy resets in stride. Maintenance
is our reset and we are concerned that all our ships reached
the total lifespan that we expect of them.
The CNO has established for each class of ship an
engineering-based maintenance plan so that they will reach the
end of their life span. We are moving sailors from shore
afloat, 2,200 sailors will go into the fleet for optimum
manning of our ships so that more maintenance--more
preventative maintenance will occur on a routine basis. Four
hundred sailors are moving to the pier for intermediate
maintenance so that as ships come in for their scheduled
maintenance calls, those maintenance calls are more valuable
and make more of a difference.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to interrupt you,
but I am losing my time.
Secretary Mabus. But because of--because of these things
that we are doing, we think that the ships are going to reach
the end of their schedule of life. And it was a long answer and
I apologize for that, but----
Mr. Forbes. I appreciate the answer. The other question I
have for you is, we know that we have had officials from the
Navy talking about doing a new force structure assessment to
look at if that number is correct or not correct, and I am
always concerned. We talked about getting strategy but limiting
based on fiscal realities. How can we be confident that when
that assessment is done we know the part of it, that strategy
versus the part of it that is being driven simply by budgetary
concerns?
Secretary Mabus. Well, Congressman, the force structure
review of the number of Navy ships which is under way in which
will be completed soon. We are basing it all on what we need,
on strategy. But we are also very mindful that we need to be
good stewards of the taxpayers' money, that we try to be--try
to make use of every single dollar that we get so that we can
get to the number of ships.
But this is a bottom-up strategic review that is not
budget-driven but nation-driven.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Thanks to all three of you for
your leadership. I have one question for each of you, so in my
time allotted, I will try to get each of these questions done.
Mr. Secretary, I appreciate the opportunity to be with you
and the Secretary of Agriculture. Last year when the biofuels
agreement was signed at the Pentagon and also to be at the
maiden flight of the Green Hornet last year on Earth Day, on
page 27 in your testimony, you mentioned your five energy goals
in wanting to generate at least 50 percent of all energy from
alternative sources.
With the F-35 coming online, is there an effort even now to
make sure that it can operate on biofuels rather than waiting
to have to convert it later?
Secretary Mabus. There--one of the requirements we have for
any biofuel that we use is that it is a drop-in fuel, but it
can be used in any engine that we have. So, the Green Hornet
was not modified in any way to fly on biofuels. Same will be
true for the F-35. The fuel will have to match that and so far,
they all have.
Mr. McIntyre. All right. Great. Thank you, Sir.
General Amos, on page 14 of your posture report, you
mentioned MARSOC [United States Marine Corps Special Operations
Command] which of course has its headquarters in North
Carolina. Has the Marine Corps resolved the issue of whether
MARSOC personnel will remain within MARSOC in the special
operations community for life or will they rotate back to
conventional forces? And is this affecting the number in terms
of your consideration for the growth of MARSOC?
General Amos. Congressman, we have--when MARSOC is fully
stood up after the--they get that latest tranche of 1,000
Marines, they will be about 3,600 strong. Of that 3,600, there
is roughly about 815 what we call critical skill operators. And
those are those Marines that have the ultimate in training.
They are the real special operators. They will have their own
military occupational specialty designation. They will remain
in MARSOC, that 815 for more--unless they want to come out.
But they are going to remain in MARSOC probably for the
length of their career. The other remaining 1,800 will rotate
out of MARSOC. Those are communicators, those are UAV [Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles] folks, those are CI HUMINT
[Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence] folks. They will
come out at 5-year marks, come back to the fleet Marine force
and as a rising tide raise all boats in the Marine Corps while
they spread their goodness that they learned in MARSOC.
So we have solved it and there is a portion that will
remain in MARSOC for the remainder of their time in the Marine
Corps.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Sir. And Admiral Roughead, thank
you for coming to Wilmington, North Carolina last fall for the
commissioning of the USS Gravely, the Navy's newest destroyer
named for the first African American admiral in the United
States Navy.
I know that on page 7 of your testimony, you mentioned
specifically reducing risk with regard to purchasing more F-18
Super Hornets. We understand in the next decade, there is an
assessment of a shortage of about 65 aircraft later in this
decade.
What risk do you see that can make the strike-fighter
shortfall rise even higher in the years ahead and that we may
have to complement this with the Super Hornet?
Admiral Roughead. Right now, sir, I think that we are in a
very good position with the new Super Hornets that are in this
budget. There are nine as, you know, pending on the hill. And
then the Service Life Extension Program that we have funded in
this budget. I am very comfortable with the 35C that is coming
along.
So, what we have been able to lay in and with the support
of Congress, I think we have a good way forward on our strike
fighter shortfall and, you know, we will continue to watch the
development of the F-35C but I feel very good about how we
position ourselves for that future.
Mr. McIntyre. All right. Thank you. Thank you, gentleman,
very much. We got it all done. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have questions that
I would like to submit for the record and because he is the
last one to ask a question, I would like to yield my time to
Mr. Palazzo.
The Chairman. The gentleman is recognized for 4 minutes and
50 seconds.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Kind of caught me off
guard there. But I appreciate it.
General Amos, there was recently an article in the
Washington Times that stated that American combat troops will
get sensitivity training directly on the battlefield about
``don't ask/don't tell'' instead of waiting until they returned
to their home base in the United States.
The article goes on to say that no units will be exempt. In
your professional military opinion, do you believe that
performance sensitivity training of this nature in anticipation
of the repeal of ``don't ask/don't tell'' while--is the best
use of military resources at this time?
General Amos. Congressman, we have about--we have done the
math now. We have many units on the ground of Afghanistan that
make the 20 thousand, we have turned several units over.
Those that are coming in have already--we have rushed to
make sure that they had to train before they left. We estimate
about 11 units of lieutenant colonel command battalions and
squadrons that will need to get the training, what we call
tier-three training while they are in Afghanistan.
Honestly, I am not concerned about that. I don't look at it
as sensitivity training by the way. I look at it as leadership
training. And my sense is that I have good lieutenant colonels,
good company commanders, and they will know precisely when the
optimum time is.
Not every Marine in combat is busy 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week as, you know, from your former life. So, there will be
opportunities where Marines will be able to sit down with their
company commander, the company first sergeant or squadron
commander and have that leadership training.
I don't think it will be onerous. I think it will be
focused purely on leadership principles. Those things that are
near and dear to the Marines. And I think actually it will be a
lot easier to do in combat than we thought--than we might think
otherwise.
Mr. Palazzo. All right. Thank you, General. I yield back my
time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
welcome. It is good to see you. And on page 17 and 18 of your
testimony, you make reference to the Littoral Combat Ship dual-
block procurement strategy which I agree I think has been very
beneficial for the department and for the country.
And you indicate that you are projecting savings of
approximately $1.9 billion over a 5-year period on the program
and across to $40 million per ship. To what would you attribute
those cost savings from the dual-block strategy? In other
words, what is the wisdom of the strategy that generates those
savings?
Secretary Mabus. A couple of things, one is competition. We
have two variants, they competed against each other and drove
the prices down significantly.
Secondly, is we have locked in those savings over the 5
years by signing firm fixed-price contracts for 10 of each
variant, so, 20 ships.
Mr. Andrews. Right.
Secretary Mabus. If we, by sticking to those two things,
competition and then doing firm fixed-price contracts, we know
we are going to--we are going to get these savings and one of
the things I think is important to point out is that while the
average is--cost of these ships is of about $433 million
apiece, the last ship--the last two ships will cost around $360
million apiece.
So, the cost of the ships as each ship is built is going
down--as you go forward, we should see those savings continue.
Mr. Andrews. I appreciate that. I know this is not a
decision at your pay grade but I think the Chairman would be
interested as well in exploring why that same logic doesn't
apply to the JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] engine program, if
there are benefits to having two competitors that create those
efficiencies over the long term, why doesn't that argument
apply to the second engine?
Secretary Mabus. Well, if I could take a crack at my pay
grade, we always planned to have two competitors for--you know,
for the Littoral Combat Ship. And we have paid for all the
engineering and R&D, the upfront calls that makes it different
from the alternate engine in that--the alternate engine are
the--engine was seen as one. And you would have to pay for all
the development cost for a second engine. That is a huge
difference.
Mr. Andrews. I do appreciate that although I would
respectfully say that it looks like the savings over time would
let you catch up and dwarf what it would cost to catch up
with--the R&D outlay but thank you.
Let me move on to General Amos, his comments about the
amphibious combat vehicle. And I guess, I see your comment that
you are going to begin development of an affordable and capable
ACV [Amphibious Combat Vehicle] to replace the EFV program.
When do you think that the alternative would be fieldable?
I mean under optimal circumstance, we go from where we are
sitting this afternoon to where we will be able to get those
vessels in the water, what is the optimal timetable to make
that happen?
General Amos. There are two answers to that. One is the
Commandant of the Marine Corps answer which is before I leave
office 4 years--3\1/2\ years from now, we have a program of
record, we will have steel, it will be a vehicle, and I will be
able to drive that. That is my answer.
Mr. Andrews. I like that answer.
General Amos. Okay. That is the answer. And I am trying to
pressurize industry. I am trying to pressurize the acquisition
professional folks, I want the word to get out. If I go by the
standard acquisition timeline which in some cases got us to
where we are today, it will be 2024.
So, you understand the exigency. And we will have a vehicle
by the time I give up this job.
Mr. Andrews. What would you say the two or three main
impediments are to you achieving that objective by the time you
relinquish your job?
General Amos. I think it is--first of all, I have, in this
case, I am on reasonably solid ground because I have the full
support of my Service Secretary, his acquisition professional,
Sean Stackley, I have the full support of the Secretary of
Defense and Dr. Ash Carter who is AT&L [Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics].
So, they are all behind it and they are going--what we
would really like to do is use the MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected] model. Understanding the MRAP model was probably too
aggressive and--but it saved lives. But so--something probably
that resembles the sense of urgency of the MRAP.
But probably a little bit more scheduled. And that is what
we are going to do. We're going to try to move everything to
the left.
Mr. Andrews. If I could just permit one moment of
advertising. You guys did a terrific job on the MRAP without
Chairman Hunter, former Chairman Skelton, former member Gene
Taylor and some others that would have never happened, and for
those who think Congress should not have a direct role in
spending decisions here, I would refer you to the MRAP
decision.
I yield back. I thank you for your answers.
The Chairman. Thank you, and I appreciate the gentleman's
question. You are right, I am also interested, and my
recollection is that the Department also planned for two
engines originally in the JSF acquisition strategy.
And if we were a couple of years down the road, we will
have already--we would have already paid for those acquisition
costs as we did with the LCS. And then we would have the
opportunity of realizing the competition going forward.
Thank you. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am a little taken
aback by the answer of what the timeframe is on the EFV, I
mean, I am very concerned about that--that whole decision
process and the answer because in your answer is a timeframe
that does not have anything to necessarily reflect on the
threat.
I mean the time that you are finished being commandant
doesn't really answer the question of when is it going to be
needed. Here is my concern on the whole question of the EFV: We
know that there is no funding in fiscal year 2012, both you and
the Secretary have re-affirmed the requirements to conduct
amphibious assault missions.
And you intend to develop, as you were describing something
else, but the--as the Secretary was giving us the answer of his
cuts when you have announced that there was going to be a cut
with this vehicle. He says, ``the most plausible scenario of
power projections from the sea could be handled through a mix
of existing air and sea systems employed in new ways along with
new vehicles--scenarios that do not require the exquisite
features of the EFV.''
Can you describe the analytical work Secretary Gates is
referring to in his statement? And was there a report done? And
the EFV also to my understanding that there were, there was the
cessation of the testing phase. And I am a little worried about
our ability to mine or ascertain the innovations with respect
to the vehicle.
May I--if I can have your thoughts.
General Amos. So on your last point, the acquisition
decision memorandum was released about 2 or 3 weeks ago. Giving
60 days for the Secretary of the Navy to and the Department to
take a look at how to shut down the current EFV line.
The forecast is, is to take the best of what is left in the
testing for this fiscal year and continue on with that. Those
decisions are working through right now. So, what you will do
is you will capitalize between now and the end of this year--
the end of the contract on those things that are probably going
to be the most fruit-bearing as it relates to the EFV.
The whole concept is to take those technologies, those
lessons learned and then apply them to the amphibious combat
vehicle. So, the shutdown of the line is in work right now. But
it will be done from my words, it will be done focused on those
things that it ought to be focused on.
As it relates to the EFV and the elegance of the EFV, when
those requirements were developed 2\1/2\ decades ago, we look
at a threat and said it is 25 miles that is about the farthest
a naval vessel will have to go over the horizon to be able to
be out of harm's way.
Well, we know that that is not the case today. The enemy
has not gotten any easier, has only gotten more lethal. So, as
a superpower nation, we could either decide we are going to
abrogate all that space--the sea space. And get out a thousand
miles or we can take the technologies and capabilities we
have--that we know we have right now and integrate them in the
joint force and allow the naval vessels to come in to be able
to disembark the Marines in the new amphibious combat vehicle.
That is the difference between the requirements the way
they were viewed in the 1980s and the requirements as the way
they are being viewed in 2011.
Mr. Turner. As we have had a lot of discussions here today
about the reductions, ways to find savings and everyone
understanding that of course we have the cost pressures--we
would certainly also need to recognize that we are a nation at
war. And a lot of these cuts and reductions have an effect on
our capabilities and on our men and women who are serving.
We have also the end-strength reductions that are planned
and I am very concerned there. And I wanted to also give some
of my time to Mr. Runyan who is down in front. But when you
answer his question, could you also add any thoughts that you
might have on how those end-strength reductions might affect
dwell time. I think people are very concerned about the ratios
of dwell time. You have a goal of one to three. And now, we are
having difficulty I believe meeting--getting one to two.
And then I have a minute left but I would like to--I
concede that Mr. Runyan for him to add additional question.
The Chairman. The gentleman is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you the
gentleman from Ohio. Mr. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead,
according to recent reports the Aegis radar system is in the
worst shape ever. Aegis is considered the world's best seagoing
radar and combat system due to its power and adaptability.
But the training and maintenance are vital to maintain in
the system's readiness out in the field, could you please
discuss any--Aegis fleet readiness concerns that you have and
how we can help keep the Aegis radar available--a viable option
once fielded?
Admiral Roughead. Thank you very much, sir. And then, we
have--similar to how we looked at all of our ship maintenance
issues, we have looked at Aegis and also how that system and
the radar integrates into some other complex areas.
There are some things that we are working on in a technical
sense that gets to the interoperability in a much better and a
more reliable way than what I would like to see. But then we
have also taken a look at what training do we have to add into
the pipeline. We are also adding people to those ships because
as we went through an optimal manning initiative, we took
people off of the ships which ultimately gets to equipment
maintenance, equipment reliability.
So, those are just a couple of the things that we are
working on.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you. It is the Chair's intent to call
two more questioners and then a 5-minute recess. Mr. Conaway.
Excuse me, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, I
want to thank each of you, Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead
and General Amos for your testimony here today but most
especially for all that you do to protect our nation.
Let me just say that I want to talk briefly about one of
our nation's most vulnerable strategic--I am sorry--valuable
strategic assets, our nuclear submarine force.
We have talked about the Ohio replacement in particular a
bit this morning. Obviously, our submariners have maintained a
constant vigilance over the past decades to provide us and our
allies with strategic deterrence that remains unmatched by any
other nation on the planet.
Their work in the silent service, obviously deserves our
utmost respect and support. So, I believe it is absolutely
vital that we remain committed to projects such as the Ohio
Replacement Program.
I do, however, remain concerned that the large investments
required for this critical system would be threatened by the
needs of our surface fleet. Admiral Roughead, as I understand
you recently stated support for moving the SSBN-X funding out
of the Navy shipbuilding and conversion account.
Given our fiscal pressures, can you offer your vision of
how that could be accomplished? And what legislative authority
or permissions would be needed to change to be needed--to be
changed or added? And in addition, the Navy's--Navy officials
recently told committee staff that our programs--that the
program's schedule and cost present ``huge challenges and
tremendous risk,'' which we can all understand of course.
But what are your views of this program and your confidence
level that the Navy will meet its cost and schedule goals given
the critical importance of this program?
Admiral Roughead. Thank you very much, sir. And my comments
relative to the SSBN-X dealt with the fact that submarine is
being recapitalized in the decade of the 2020s and at that
time, there are several things that are going to happen.
Many of the submarines and surface combatants that we built
in the 1980s are going to be aging out and retiring from
service during that decade. That is when we are starting to lay
in the SSBN-X.
On top of that, we will be building the carriers on 5-year
centers, so there will be likely two carriers built during that
same time. We are also going to be refueling our aircraft
carriers which--that is not inexpensive. And at that time also,
we are going to be decommissioning some of the earlier Nimitz-
class aircraft carriers.
So, in the 2020s you have a fairly significant demand being
placed on the shipbuilding account and also on the shipbuilding
infrastructure. And so I do believe that that has to be
examined, the recapitalization of the service fleet,
recapitalization of the ballistic missile submarine, with
everything else going on, I believe requires some different
thinking.
With regard to legislative authorities, my sense is it is
really a question of how the budget is laid in for that. I am
not sure that there is a legislative piece but I would leave
that more to you to have a view of that.
I am very comfortable with where we are going with SSBN-X.
The decision and the recommendation that I made with regard to
the number of tubes--launch tubes are consistent with the new
START treaty. They are consistent with the missions that I see
that ship having to perform. And even though it may be
characterized as a cost-cutting measure, I believe it sizes the
ship for the missions it will perform.
We are not backing off on the stealth imperative that that
ship must have because the last one of that class will be on
patrol in 2080, and so we have to make sure that we have built
in the stealth.
I am very comfortable with our knowledge of how we have
been able to bring down the cost on Virginia to apply that to
the SSBN-X and I am very positive about where we are headed
with it.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral. Also on another topic
that has been important to me--cyber security. For Secretary
Mabus or Admiral Roughead, let me just talk about cyber
security threats to our critical infrastructure in particular.
Let me just say that I have been relatively disappointed by
the overall lack of response and commitment to this issue. And
I firmly believe America is still vulnerable to a cyber attack
against our electric grid which would obviously cause severe
damage not only our critical infrastructure but to our economy
and the welfare of our citizens.
We need to pay more attention to this issue, because of
this concern last Congress, I posed a question to heads of
Cyber Security for all of our military services, and the
question basically was if our civilian power systems are
vulnerable, what is being done to protect our numerous military
bases that rely on them to operate?
So, the answers though were disturbing but not surprising,
specifically Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, head of the Navy's
10th Fleet testified, ``These systems are very vulnerable to
attack.''
So, noting that much of the power and water systems for our
naval bases are served by single sources that have only very
limited backup capability, with an attack on our power station,
when an attack on a power station potentially requires weeks or
even months to recover from, our bases could face serious
problems maintaining operational status. What is Navy doing to
address these threats not only to its critical structure but
also its secured and unsecured networks?
The Chairman. Gentleman's time has expired. Could you
please give him those answers for the record please?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 156.]
The Chairman. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome.
Glad you are here. Just an aside, I want to associate myself
with Mr. Andrews' comments. I do believe competition works. It
works for LCS, and I think it works across most of our
platforms that--including the engine.
But I would like to turn my--our attention to something a
whole lot more--less exciting and more mundane than the cyber
attacks or anything else. It has to do with back office at the
Navy and your inability to provide the taxpayers in this
country with audited financial statements of the sums of money
that we--that we give that we provide through the appropriation
process.
I want to brag right upfront, the Marine Corps has taken
the lead as they typically do on most things and that rumor has
it that the September 30, 2011, financial statements will get
audited by the Marine Corps and will pass an audit, that same
issue needs to be spread across all branches, I have had this
conversation with the Secretary and others as well.
Nothing in your written statements that I was able to see
made reference to this issue at all. Without top-down
leadership this ain't going to happen. I have met with the next
layer below you guys, with Robert Hale and others, your
counterparts for the Navy, in the Marine Corps and the Army and
others, and they get it. And they are ready to go in and they
are making efforts to do that but without you two saying make
it happen, then this isn't going to happen.
I am also concerned, and I am going to appreciate your
comments in reference to all of the cost savings and cuttings
and redeployments and swaps around that is going on, I am
concerned that you will cannibalize the resources needed to
make this happen in efforts to redeploy those resources
somewhere else.
And my final comment as to why this is important. Over and
over and over this morning, you have talked to us about
greening the military and how much that is going to ``save
us.''
I have professional skepticism about that number. You
cannot tell us today what the differential between what we
would have spent had we ignored the greening effort versus all
we spent on this. You know, you can't tell me that delta and if
we are going to eliminate the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
because we ``can't afford it,'' then taxpayers need to know
what it is we are doing and why.
And so, give me some sense as to your commitments to making
this happen sooner than later in terms of getting the back
office in the shape that it can be audited.
Secretary Mabus. Congressman, as a former elected state
auditor of Mississippi----
Mr. Conaway. Good. Glad to hear that.
Secretary Mabus [continuing]. I understand very well the
importance of what you are talking about here. And I want to
echo what you said about the Marine Corps. The Marines are very
close to being able to do that. I want to also assure you that
the entire Department of the Navy is taking this very seriously
and working very hard on it.
We have two major issues. One is legacy systems just the
sheer number of legacy systems that we have out there and the
amount of effort that is taking to convert those. But we are
doing it and we are also presenting our financial statements to
you in GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles] form and
in meeting the FASB [Financial Accounting Standards Board]
regulations.
Secondly, one issue that we are working with GASB
[Governmental Accounting Standards Board] on is coming up with
an accurate cost for our assets. For example, USS Enterprise
was built more than 50 years ago, in the 1960s.
Going back and finding an accurate cost at that time is
just onerous. It is going to require a lot of time. It is going
to require a lot of effort and we won't get much for it in the
end. So, we are working to try to come up with a good cost-
figure structure so that we can move to the audited financial
statements.
If I could say one word on the energy initiatives, one is,
over the next 5 years we can show absolutely that we are going
to save $1.5 billion by----
Mr. Conaway. Yes, okay. I got you. But if we've got the
accounting sytems in place that allows us to rely on those
numbers, I would appreciate it. In the closing comments, I
agree with you figuring out what Ft. Hood costs or a 50- or 60-
year-old aircraft carrier. Don't let that be the reason why we
don't audit and put in place the things you use every day to
run your business.
And we are--I would be glad that I will be working with
GASB to try to figure out a different standard for the only
customer, the Federal government. I mean, the fixed asset side
is important, but just don't let that be the enemy of what we
need to get that done. And so I appreciate that.
I yield back. Thanks for your comments.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We will now take a 5-minute recess and reconvene at 1
minute to 12:00.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The meeting will come to order.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to thank the Navy for allowing me to have a
Navy fellow this year. John Krisciunas does an excellent job,
but he should not be blamed for whatever inadequacies are in
the following questions.
Three hundred and thirteen ships is a crude measure of
capability. Is there a better way to help explain to the public
platforms and missions so that they can know that our Navy is
strong enough to do the job?
Admiral.
Admiral Roughead. Well, I think you are right onto it, sir,
because too often we do look at the number. And as was
mentioned by one of your colleagues earlier, we could drive to
that number rather quickly, but it would be rather ineffective
force.
I think it is important that we continue to have a dialogue
with the American people about the types of capabilities that
we need, but I think it also is on full display every day.
The four aircraft carriers that we have deployed now are
there, flexible, and ready to respond particularly as we see
events sweeping through the Middle East. In the Western Pacific
and in the Arabian Gulf and in the Mediterranean are surface
combatants who are providing ballistic missile defense
capability.
Our submarines are forward-providing intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. And so the real key is
designing the type of force and the balance in the force that
allows us to go forward as a nation to protect our interest to
support and operate with our friends, allies, and partners. And
that discussion is something that I really believe is necessary
if we want to have a valid discussion about the Navy the nation
needs.
Mr. Cooper. Secretary Mabus, when will the new force
structure assessment be ready do you think?
Secretary Mabus. It would be ready very soon, and we will
certainly get it to you. But to the CNO's point, to your point,
new force structure assessment was built on capability needs
and mission needs and not to reach a certain arbitrary number.
We wanted to look at the mix of ships, the type of capabilities
and the missions that we have been asked to do in order to come
up with that force structure.
Mr. Cooper. It is about a lot more than hulls in the water.
Tell me, the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] may have
outdated numbers, but they were estimating the Navy's needs to
be about $19 billion a year in funding. And it is my
understanding you are going to have to make do with something
more like $15 billion a year. Is that doable?
Secretary Mabus. Well, if you look at our 5-year
shipbuilding plan and then on out to 10 and then 30 years, one
of the things we try to be very realistic about was how much
money we could expect, and the average is $15 billion a year.
For our shipbuilding needs, we think that that falls within the
historic average. And it will give us the ships we need if we
manage that money correctly and if we bring those ships in at
the budget that they need to be brought in at.
Mr. Cooper. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And I appreciate that question about the 313 versus the
platforms performing the missions. However, it was pointed out
I believe in the QDR that at some point numbers do count, too.
So, it has to be a combination of both.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral Roughead,
Secretary Mabus, and General Amos. Thank you all for your
service, long service to our country, distinguished service.
Secretary Mabus, I just want to clarify this. Under
Secretary of Defense Carter's memo of February 16th, 2011,
directs you within 60 days to provide a plan for the
cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle including
termination cost for the program and a plan to harvest
technology from the program for future efforts.
How do you plan on maximizing the return on taxpayer
dollars already invested in the EFV program in terms of
technology harvested and lessons learned?
Secretary Mabus. Well, as you pointed out, Congressman, the
directive tells us to harvest as much of those technologies as
is possible. We would much prefer to use the monies remaining
in the current contract to harvest that technology instead of
paying termination fees.
And so the plan that we are coming up with to the very
maximum extent possible gets those technologies so that we can
use those and use the lessons learned as we develop the next
amphibious assault vehicle, as General Amos has talked about
earlier today.
Mr. Coffman. Well, Mr. Secretary, let me ask you a follow-
up. How long do you anticipate it will be before you have a new
amphibious tractor, a new EFV or add initial operating
capability?
Secretary Mabus. I absolutely agree with my Commandant. I
want to add one thing here. We can build a new tracked
amphibious assault vehicle in a reasonable amount of time.
The EFV, had it been continued, would not have reached full
operating capability until the mid 2020s. And we were going to
have to do how to take mitigating steps in terms of upgrading
our AAVs [Amphibious Assault Vehicles], slipping our AAVs,
things like that, regardless of what amphibious assault
vehicles that we were doing.
And I think we ought to be able to build these things a lot
quicker than we have historically. And as I said, I absolutely
trust my Commandant in his estimate.
Mr. Coffman. General Amos, do you have any response?
General Amos. Sir, I think the benefit of--I mean, it is
regretful that we spent $3.2 billion over the last 2\1/2\
decades, and that pains me. I won't belabor why I came to a
decision that I want to recommend my Secretary. I won't do that
here.
But here is the good news out of this thing. We will take a
lot of that technology, a lot of the capabilities that have
been developed for the EFV to include the remainder of this
year.
And I have every expectation that we will be able to
translate some, if not the large percentage of that, over to
the amphibious combat vehicle. So it will not all be lost to
include the remainder of the money, sir, for this year, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Thanks, General Amos.
Admiral Roughead, one of the Navy's core requirements is
amphibious power projection. In a recent Navy Times article,
you spoke about increasing the manning levels of our Navy's
amphibious fleet to ensure these vessels are properly staffed
to carry out their vital missions.
Given the personnel challenges, the problematic first
deployment of the LPD-17 USS San Antonio and projection of 30
operational amphibious ships in fiscal year 2012, what other
steps are you taking in terms of shipbuilding, operational
readiness assessments, and service life extension to ensure
that the nation retains its ability to project power with our
amphibious fleet? How effective have efforts been to extend the
service life of the USS Nassau and USS Peleliu?
Admiral Roughead. Well, thank you, sir.
A range of things we have underway talk about manning. We
leaned out some of these headquarters so I could put more
sailors on ships so that the ships can be properly maintained.
Sailors have the time now to go off to school to be trained in
the skills they are going to need.
We have moved maintenance back onto the waterfront. Again,
that is also very helpful. We put in place a structured,
engineered life cycle plan to get the ships to the end of their
service life.
The other thing that we have done and what we have been
forced into by this continuing resolution is some of those
ships are getting ready to go into a midlife upgrade. And in
order to make sure that I can get to that, those are some of
the other--I am canceling other availabilities to try to hang
on to that midlife. Because if we don't get to midlife, then we
have a real issue. So, that is one aspect of it. So, there is a
whole collection of activities that we have in place to make
sure that our ships get to the end of their service life.
With regard to Nassau and Peleliu, I believe that we do
have enough life to get them to where we now have them going
out. But in any efforts to keep those ships for additional
time, we will run into maintenance issues and then also the
manpower piece because those sailors are destined to go on to
the new force structure. So we have to keep that in mind as
well.
I do believe that we are through the woods on the LPD-17
quality issues. We have worked that very hard. And I am pleased
with how those ships are now starting to perform. But it is
also a lesson to be learned that you don't take ships before
they are finished and that you really make sure that you are
leaning on the quality early on in the construction process.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Admiral Roughead.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the witnesses for your outstanding
testimony today.
This past weekend, there was kind of a lot of news reports
about the speech that was given by one of the senior senators
in New England area who talked about communities have to be
ready, ``when the 2015 base realignment and closure process
begins.''
You know, someone who is now in the middle of--I think this
is our third hearing on the cost efficiencies over the next 5
years. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, I mean, none of the
witnesses have ever uttered the word BRAC [Defense Base Closure
and Realignment]. And I am just wondering if you could speak to
whether the Navy or the Pentagon is preparing for new BRAC, has
requested one or plans to before the completion of the 2005
round.
Secretary Mabus. No.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
And again for folks maybe who are in the room here, I think
it is important to, again, reiterate that Congress authorizes
the BRAC process.
Again, if you extrapolate from the 2005 BRAC round, the
authorization occurred in 2002, so if we were really heading
down that path, I mean, this really is the year that we would
have to authorize it because it takes a while to get a
commission up and running. And is that--I am just wondering if
you could help sort of explain that process a bit.
Secretary Mabus. Congressman, first, I know of no effort to
plan for one in the Navy, or in larger DOD. You are right that
it is a long process. It takes a long time. In fact, we are
still dealing with a lot of the issues that previous BRAC round
surfaced and we continue to work those. And it is a long
process, it is a congressionally mandated process. And I don't
know of anything in the Navy or Marine Corps that we are
looking at to process such as that.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
I think that answer is going to be very helpful. And again,
just the budget which came over from the administration
actually has about another $300 million this year just to,
again, continue to implement the last round. So, we are far
from done with that last process.
Admiral, the New York Times editorial page about 2 weeks
ago had a piece about cost savings in the Pentagon. I think
someone has got it stuck in their word processor a phrase that
says that the Virginia-class program is a Cold War relic
because that is how they referred to it in that piece.
And you talked earlier about the proliferation of
submarines around the world, and I am just wondering if you
could just address, again, the question of whether or not this
really fits within the strategic needs of our country, the
Virginia-class program.
Admiral Roughead. Absolutely, Mr. Courtney.
The Virginia-class submarine is not looking back, it looks
forward. And it is the best submarine in the world today. Its
capabilities are absolutely extraordinary. It is a submarine
that is here. It is not something that we are thinking about.
We already have three of them homeported in Hawaii, out in
the Pacific. And we have deployed the submarine. We are very
pleased with the results. And it is, as I have said on many
occasions, the best anti-submarine weapon that we have in our
inventory and it is going to be relevant for a long time.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And I want to find that guy who
writes those things because it just--and sit down with them
because--and thank you for your answer.
You know, lastly, there has been some discussion about the
second engine battle. I think this Committee could tell it
looks like that beer commercial where one side yells ``tastes
great'' and the other side says ``less filling'' in terms of
the debate that is there.
But, you know, Admiral Roughead, you spoke very eloquently
about the fact that you can't just look at the production cost,
you also have to look at the life cycle cost in terms of, you
know, having systems to repair and maintain two separate engine
systems. And I was wondering if you could maybe reiterate that
point again because I think it really is a very powerful
argument about why we have to make a choice here.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I agree. I mean, if you
introduce, in my opinion, the second engine you are talking
about, dual logistics, dual training, dual maintenance, and
that all comes into play.
The other thing for the Navy that is important and why we
have long advocated the single engine is that when we go to sea
in our aircraft carriers and our amphibious ships, we are
rather space constrained.
And so, for the Navy, one variant where we have one
training track for people, one logistic system and one
maintenance system is the way that we must be because we can't
afford to have the redundancy in the space that would drive.
So, we have long advocated for the single engine. And for the
Navy, I think that that is really the most effective cost
approach that we can have.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And we have not had any discussions on the BRAC on our side
or Mr. Smith and I have not discussed it and we are not
contemplating it. So if that helps too.
Mr. Rigell.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Secretary Mabus, CNO Roughead, and Commandant Amos,
from one American to another thank you very much for your
distinguished service. I appreciate what you are doing to
protect our young men and women and give them the best
equipment and leadership when we put them in harm's way.
And I would like to direct our attention today to our East
Coast carriers home porting of those carriers, the threats that
may come against those carriers and mitigating those risks.
And can you tell us today are there times we have five in
ports on the East Coast, or are times when there are fewer than
five in port and as few as, say, two carriers in port at any
one time?
Admiral Roughead. Yes sir, the carrier numbers fluctuate
depending on how many are deployed, how many may be out for
local operations, so the number of carriers in port at any
given time varies.
Mr. Rigell. And it can down to--we have had times then
where we had as few as two and that even as few as one,
correct, in port, and--?
Admiral Roughead. I have been in Norfolk, I was assigned
there for a long time, and I have seen the piers empty at
times.
Mr. Rigell. That is correct, and so, there are times the
ship's log would indicate that there have been zero carriers in
port and for some period of time. So we know that the
Enterprise is being decommissioned and the math is pretty
simple. That is going to take us down to four.
Is it reasonable to assume then that as the number of
carriers decreases on the East Coast that the number of days
that--total days that our carriers are in port would also
decrease, correct? Do you follow me on that logic?
Admiral Roughead. I am following you very well. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rigell. Okay. So as the target for the terrorists, the
number of targets decrease, the threat also decreases against
that particular asset, would you agree with that Admiral?
Admiral Roughead. I think it is important to think not
simply in terms of the ships alone but the infrastructure that
is required to support them and to maintain them, to husband
them.
So even though if an aircraft carrier is at sea it still
has to come back in to perhaps have nuclear maintenance
performed on it and right now Norfolk, Virginia, or the Hampton
Roads area, an area of about 15-mile radius is the only place
on the East Coast where we can do that.
Mr. Rigell. Correct and that also is true, isn't it of our
SSBNs? We have--you know, the operations on the east at King's
Bay and also on the West Coast, just one, is that correct?
Admiral Roughead. That is not true when you get to the
infrastructure, sir, because we have King's Bay, we can bring a
nuclear ballistic submarine into Hampton Roads to do
maintenance there, either at Newport News or at the shipyard.
And then if we have to, we could also take it up to New London
to have work done at Electric Boat up there.
So I have three sites on the East Coast where I can take
care of our nuclear submarines. I have many sites on the East
Coast where I can take care of our conventional ships. I
currently have one place on the East Coast where I can maintain
a nuclear aircraft carrier.
Mr. Rigell. Because I read your testimony which I
appreciate you sharing with us that it indicated that one of
the risks is I guess the weather or environmental things like
that. Given that carriers by their nature are mobile, I frankly
don't place that much weight on that particular one, I am fully
concerned about a terrorist attack.
But given the fact that we are already in a decreasing risk
environment just by the sense that we are decreasing from five
to four on the East Coast and also in this context of
extraordinary times that we are in from a fiscal standpoint
that with my business background I can see--unfortunately it is
only going to increase and in a rather dramatic way.
The decisions that we make here, those who follow us 2, 4,
6, 8, 10 years down the road I think are going to continue to
be under enormous pressure. So it is disconcerting to me to see
that Mayport still is a path that is being considered by the
Navy for an East Coast home port for one of our nuclear
aircraft carriers.
Would you consider, if formally requested, an evaluation at
this time which would recognize that our fiscal situation is
very dynamic and would you reevaluate that decision just given
the fact that there is enormous fiscal pressure on us?
Admiral Roughead. I think the going in argument from me,
from the very beginning of the strategic dispersal was the fact
that having the flexibility and especially looking to the
South. We are going to see changes in shipping patterns when
the Panama Canal expands, so the southern regions, I think,
will become more dynamic and not less.
I believe as we look out into the future the approaches
from the South Atlantic and particularly as Africa really
becomes more central to international security affairs and
resources. I think having the strategic dispersal, having the
redundancy and being able to take care of these very capital
ships that we have will be more and more important to us.
Mr. Rigell. Admiral, I would say this, in a perfect
environment I would be fully supportive of more strategic
dispersal. I do, as I look at our SSBNs and see we really, in
many ways, have not dispersed those assets, it is difficult to
process why we are so committed in this extraordinary fiscal
environment of dispersing the carriers.
I think once it gets there if there is one that is moved
you are dealing with one carrier and then it goes to sea and
all these assets--you know, all the infrastructure's there are
for nothing in effect.
Admiral Roughead. I would say that infrastructure is
available to give us the redundancy that we need in the carrier
force but it is also maintenance capability that can be used on
other ships of the Navy as well.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you for your time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Pingree.
Ms. Pingree. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you to all of you for your perseverance today and
your testimony, and your hard work on behalf of our nation. I
appreciate it very much.
Secretary Mabus, thank you for our recent phone call and
your assistance and advice on the shipyard in my state, Bath
Iron Works. But I want to talk to you today a little bit about
the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard which is in Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, and Kittery, Maine.
I am pleased that the shipyard has continued to be a bright
beacon in this hard economic time both locally and for the Navy
with a delivery of the Virginia-class submarines, it is clear
that the yard has a solid workload for years to come.
And I know, Secretary Mabus, that you visited the shipyard
in 2009, thank you for that, and you saw firsthand the
extensive projects that are underway and the positive
advancements in efficiency in technology that the yard is
taking on. I am concerned though about the continued
modernizations at the yard that are necessary to ensure
efficient production.
As you know the shipyard has received strong support from
both state delegations for many years. The shipyard is an
economic engine for the region which I know everyone says that
about their local entity but even during this tough economic
times the shipyard has been to keep hiring and that was due in
large part because of the investments in efficiency that have
been made over the years.
I welcome, along with everyone else, the important efforts
to reduce spending, but all the upgrades at the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard have been a direct result of congressional
requests, or earmarks, as we used to call them.
These upgrades not only have improved the work there but
are also shared with other naval facilities for the betterment
of the armed forces as a whole. While the possibility is there
of including this funding in the Navy's base budget, so it
won't be as reliant on member support, this was not addressed
in the fiscal year 2012 budget.
Because of the current ban on placing such requests and the
reduction of spending in the President's budget, how do you
plan to address such important efficiency needs that are
directly related to ensuring our national security and
readiness?
Secretary Mabus. Congresswoman, first I want to agree with
you wholeheartedly on the value of not only Portsmouth but our
other public naval shipyards that we have. They perform an
amazingly valuable service for the country and for the Navy.
As we looked at the budget and add the maintenance
requirements that we had, we tried to balance it out in terms
of risk and in terms of absolute necessity for that
maintenance. One thing that I would point out that was specific
to shipyards was when the civilian hiring freeze was put into
effect.
Shipyards were exempt from that so that shipyards can
continue to hire the skilled workers that they need to hire to
meet these maintenance requirements. So I think we are
addressing the needs in a fiscally constrained environment for
not only Portsmouth but for the Navy.
Ms. Pingree. So I guess what I would say is we have
developed a habit over what I think is 30 or 40 years of the
shipyard, which is an old yard but does great work, requiring
upgrades and efficiency but receiving all their support through
the earmarking process. And while I understand we are in a
transition here of how we do our budgeting, and we are in need
of making tremendous cuts, and you had to be respectful of that
in your budgeting process.
I am concerned that the yard will not be able to do the
high-quality work that the Navy depends on if the efficiency
military construction doesn't continue.
So I know that is a hard thing for you to answer but, you
know, just one more time I want to say that this is very
important funding, it is not in the President's budget, and it
is not clear to me how we are going to continue that necessary
work.
Secretary Mabus. I do appreciate that and it is, as you
pointed out a transition period between, from one source of
funding to migrating to the Navy's base budget. That and a lot
of other things we will be taking close looks at because I know
that the CNO maintenance and the maintaining of the fleet is
among his very highest priorities as it is with mine.
Ms. Pingree. Great, well, I appreciate your answer, and I
know you will continue to hear from my delegation and that in
New Hampshire as well.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Admiral, and Mr. Secretary and General for
being with us today. I appreciate your service to our country
and for your stamina here today.
I want to follow up, Admiral Roughead, on your mentioning,
in a general way, the Navy's efforts to restructure how it
deals with Cyber. And I would if you could specifically speak
to the current status of the Tenth Fleet and its interface with
other entities within DOD or within the Department of the Navy
with respect to Cyber and whether those relationships are now
clarified.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, and I have been very pleased
with how Tenth Fleet has come on. It has only been in existence
now for a little over a year but the way that we aligned Tenth
Fleet as a direct reporting component to U.S. Cyber Command and
then the joint task forces under the Tenth Fleet, it has proven
to be very responsive and very nimble and has given us a global
view and a global response quite frankly that we did not have
in the past.
I think the command relationships are strong. I have
empowered the Tenth Fleet commander budgetarily in ways that I
have not done with other fleet commanders so they can move much
more quickly. He can respond much more quickly.
I believe that the dialog and the interaction, and the
coordination that takes place among the service components is
also going very well. So I think it is--I am very pleased with
what I see.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Admiral.
This line of conversation came up. I represent a district
in southeastern Indiana and there is a large naval base, Crane,
the naval service warfare center just outside the boundaries of
our district. There is a great electronic warfare component to
the services they offer there but they are also quite skilled
in some different cyber areas.
And we were discussing whether there are any training
programs, First Doctrine, has that been developed in a joint
way with respect to Cyber? And then training programs pursuant
to that doctrine? And could you perhaps speak to that, and I am
hopeful that Crane will find some role in assisting with that
training too.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. And I think that the other
thing that we have put a lot of emphasis on is the human
dimension to this. We created the information dominance core,
bringing together all the skills, about 45,000 people. And we
in the Navy have the center for information dominance,
essentially the school house for all of the services down in
the Pensacola area for the Navy.
The other thing that we have done and I think this is where
it ties in to Crane, Indiana, is that the Space and Warfare
Systems Command has now--it really couples in better to Tenth
Fleet and Cyber and the N26 organization the director for
information dominance on my staff in ways it has never been
able to do before, and I think it has the potential to bring
the centers, the labs, places like Crane into that environment
where we can be much more effective and where we can train and
where we can also use those assets more effectively.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Admiral.
One final follow-up here. If our Navy and I have seen naval
service and especially as a Marine myself, if our Navy and
Marine Corps were to have a Pearl Harbor-level cyber attack, so
to speak, would we be able to reconstitute our capabilities in
a short period of time or would--is there some methodology,
some apparatus out there for us to continue operations, even
after having absorbed such an attack?
Admiral Roughead. I think that was one of the reasons why
we have restructured ourselves, why we have created the Tenth
Fleet was to be able to respond and be much more nimble and
agile.
I think it would be--you know, there is probably not one
definition of a Pearl Harbor type Cyber attack. If it is
regional clearly we have the redundancies globally to be able
to respond to that. If it is at a particular system or network
I believe that we have redundancies to be able to accommodate
that.
Would there be effects? Absolutely. But that is why we put
in place the structures that we have, and as you know this is
really an evolving area, but I believe that how we posture
ourselves organizationally and with our talent today and the
young sailors that do this. They are absolutely eye-watering. I
believe we are well positioned to go into the future.
Mr. Young. Thanks so much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all of you for your service and for being
here, and on a personal level for always being available for
questions. It has been a really strong relationship, and I
really am grateful for that.
I am not sure whether anyone has asked about this question
but I wanted to be sure I had a chance to check in with you on
it. I know that the Navy, like so many other services, has had
a challenge really of filling the number of medical personnel
that it deems necessary.
And I want to know what the current assessments are now for
the Navy reserve and active duty component. How do you plan to
meet a 100 percent of the need that you have by the end of the
year?
Secretary Mabus. In terms of doctors and nurses we are--we
think we will meet the 100 percent requirement, where we are
continuing to have some issues with psychological health
professionals.
And we are trying to cast as broad a net as possible, we
are also doing incentives to come in to naval service for
people like that and also incentives for remaining on active
duty. But as you pointed out, the medical corps whether
doctors, nurses, or on the battlefield, corpsmen constitutes
one of the strongest links that we have to have to take care of
our sailors and our Marines, and it is something that the CNO,
the Commandant and I focus on in a very strong way on an
enduring basis.
And one of the great strands in that link is Balboa and the
work that they are doing with our wounded warriors on things
like amputations and bringing our wounded warriors back into
either the service or the civilian community whole and ready to
move forward with their lives.
Mrs. Davis. It is an extraordinary job that is being done
for those who have been severely wounded. I would certainly
agree with that.
Our numbers would indicate that the reserve is coming close
to the 100 percent but that the Navy really is still falling
quite a bit below that, somewhere in the neighborhood of 55
percent. Are we just off in seeing that?
Admiral Roughead. I think we are challenged a bit on the
reserve side because as you know many of the reserve is filled
with people leaving active duty. We don't have as many people
leaving active duty as we used so there are some challenges
associated there.
But we really have stepped up the efforts in the active
side. As the Secretary mentioned in the mental health area we
are--right now we are about 139 short out of around 830 or so
professionals, but I would submit that that is a national issue
that we are dealing with as well in the area of mental health.
That there is a greater demand than there is a supply for that,
but we continue to work this very hard, and we will stay in
very close touch with you and with your subcommittee on this.
Mrs. Davis. Can I turn to the issue of tuition quickly
because perhaps you haven't had a chance to talk about that. I
understand that the Navy has begun to track the tuition
assistance programs to gain a better understanding of how
sailors are actually using this money.
And you have distinguished between the profit and the not-
for-profit schools. Could you go into a little bit of detail
regarding how these degrees are being used and if there is a
difference between the degrees obtained from these
institutions?
Admiral Roughead. Ma'am, I will take the question on the
differences in how we are using the degrees between profit and
nonprofit. And I would like to take that for the record if I
could, but we have given our tuition assistance programs a very
hard look as we look across all of the programs that are
available to our sailors, whether it is the GI Bill and the
Transferability Tuition Assistance and then MyCAA [Military
Spouse Career Advancement Account Program] is another program
to see how they all fit together.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 155.]
Admiral Roughead. We did put in place some guidelines, some
new guidelines on the tuition assistance. We want it to lead to
something so we have wanted sailors to have a plan. We also put
some restrictions on the first year of service because as a
sailor comes in and checks into a command they may take on some
educational obligations that then become a little difficult to
deliver on because of the pressures of their jobs.
So we have put some more structure and some more guidelines
in place.
Mrs. Davis. May I ask very quickly. General Amos, has the
Marine Corps stopped giving tuition assistance and relying only
on the GI plan now, understanding that the constraints that you
are under, but is that--am I representing that correctly?
General Amos. Ma'am, I am going to have to come back to you
on that for the record as well. What I know today is there has
been no change in the way that we have done business over the
last 5 or 6 years but let me double-check, and I will get you
an absolutely drop-dead accurate answer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 156.]
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Admiral, General, and Mr. Secretary, I have a question
that stems kind of from what is going on when it comes to
Libya, when it comes to Bahrain, when it comes to Egypt, when
it comes to all these places that we are in, and we are not
completely thrilled with their form of government but we know
that we have to be there anyway, and we are going to stay there
as long as we have to, I guess you would say. But we would like
to operate from a, you could say, a floating platform that
Admiral Roughead mentioned it earlier.
We have airfields on aircraft carriers obviously that
operate anywhere we want them to operate. And I think there is
going to be a point in time that I can see in the next decade
or so where we have to leave some of these places where we have
been operating simply because we cannot support their type of
government, whether it is a semi-tyrannical rule or a total
dictatorship but they let us use their air.
So my questioning goes to shipbuilding, and I have been
reading this, General Amos, the posture of the United States
Marine Corps, it is a motivating document and a lot of talking
there is about projecting force. So when it comes to the number
of amphibs [Amphibious Assault Ships] your number is 33, that
is the minimum. I believe you have 31 and you would like 38.
So as we are moving forward to this time or we might be
having to pull off of our land basis that we have established
at various places throughout the world which in my mind makes
amphibs that much more important. Why are we operating at the
bare minimum? That just doesn't seem to square with me, Mr.
Secretary, maybe, or General or everybody, if you don't mind
answering that. Thank you.
Secretary Mabus. Congressman, thank you, and I will give an
overview and then ask General Amos to talk to it as well.
Several years ago the Commandant and the CNO sat down and
looked at amphibious requirements and in an unconstrained
environment 38 is the number, 33 can get the job done that the
Marines need to get done in terms of getting two brigades
across a beach in a contested environment.
We are building toward that 33. We are also building toward
a little different mix of the 33, 11 big deck amphibs, LHAs
[Amphibious Assault Ships] or LHRs [Amphibious Assault Ship
Replacements], 11 of the LPDs [Amphibious Transport Docks], 11
of the LSDs [Dock Landing Ships] which will give us more
flexibility in terms of how we set up amphibious ready groups
and how we deploy a Marine expeditionary unit as you know so
well from your previous service.
So I think that we have the number right, and what we have
got to do is make sure that we get to those 33 and that we get
to the right mix. I would like to say that in fiscal year 2016,
the next LHA that we are going to build, we are going back to
putting a well deck in it to give the Marines more flexibility
in how they move on and off those ships.
Mr. Hunter. If I could be more pointed in my question,
these requirements were written in 2009. These requirements
were written before what has happened this year--happened
obviously and we can all say that in December the world will
look a lot different than it looked in January. I think we can
all agree on that.
And that a lot of these places where there is civil unrest
and that we might have to take action or not, or that we decide
it is not worth propping up a regime simply to be there
militarily, your requirement of 38 was done then.
So are we--I don't know, I am still not squaring it away,
when you say 38 is a good number and we are working towards it,
that was 2 years ago or a year-and-a-half ago, it could be 45
right now, and we could not have enough amphibs if we had to
operate in two different theaters and do something because I
know for a fact the operational number of amphibs that the
Commandant is able to deploy at any given time is much less
than that 33 number or the 31 number because of the rotation
cycle and the maintenance cycle.
So his numbers are extremely low in what he could actually
deploy in any given time. The numbers you are working on, sir,
are old. Those are old numbers that don't take into account, I
don't think what has happened just this year.
Could you respond to that please?
Secretary Mabus. Well, number one the way that the 33
number was arrived was in terms of operational, what is
operational at any given time given the maintenance
requirements and the other things that you talked about.
Number two though is coming up with this number. It was not
coming up with a number in a static environment. It was under
the terms of the last QDR in 2010 presented in early--presented
in early 2010 for the 2009 QDR. It was not only two major
combat operations at any given point but also other--the force
was tested against three different scenarios which included two
major combat operations at the same time, but also other things
that were unforeseen, that you could have a situation occur in
a specific area of the world, in addition to the major combat
operation which I believe is what you are getting at.
And this force of 33 amphibs was tested against that, and
we believe will meet those requirements.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service,
dedication and unwavering duty. We really appreciate it and so
does the nation. We are all lucky to have you. Thank you.
The Chairman. And just for the record, we were talking
about 33, like we have 33. My numbers are that we currently
have or will have by 2012, 30. We won't have 33 if everything
goes right until 2017.
Secretary Mabus. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mrs. Hanabusa.
Mrs. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here.
First of all I would like to thank Admiral Roughead, who I
remember from Hawaii in your years there. And my first question
is, is to the Admiral.
Admiral, you made an interesting comment in your testimony
and it has to do with building tomorrow's Navy. I am curious.
Other than the hardware, the 313 that we want to get to, and
you did mention the whole concept of the cyber terrorism and
battles with that. Do you have a view of what tomorrow's Navy
is going to look like? You have been Chief of Navy now for 4
years.
What is your view of tomorrow's Navy that you want to
build?
Admiral Roughead. Thank you for the question. And I would
say that tomorrow's Navy still has to have the flexibility, the
agility, and the ability to respond very quickly, the ability
to operate far from the homeland in areas that are of great
interest to us.
But I do believe that it also requires us to move into this
cyber world, which is something that we are all coming to grips
with, to be able to operate systems, particularly unmanned
systems, not just in the air, which is what most tend to think
of when we talk about unmanned systems. But I think there is a
huge potential for unmanned underwater systems. And I think how
those net together will be a shape of the force into the
future.
I also look at the proliferation that is taking place and
what are the systems that we will need there. There is no
question in my mind that ballistic missiles will continue to
proliferate, will continue to become more sophisticated and
will threaten at longer ranges, which is why we in the Navy
made the move to really make ballistic missile a core mission.
And the reason I mentioned that is because something that
is in Hawaii that is absolutely key to that is the Pacific
Missile Range Facility at Barking Sands. There is no other
place on the planet where that type of work is done, where the
developments of this future capability will have to continue to
evolve.
So, you know, those are some of the things. And at the
bottom of it all will be the young men and women that operate
this very sophisticated force, because even when we talk about
unmanned, it still requires a human being to direct it to make
critical decisions and to operate it. And so, looking and
attracting those young men and women who want to be part of
this future Navy is something that is probably the most
important thing that we will all be doing.
Mrs. Hanabusa. And thank you, Admiral. And I think one of
the understated facts that it takes someone to come here to
know is really the ability of the Navy to have stepped up in
Afghanistan and Iraq. And I know that a lot of the--what we
call--OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] is attributed to
all of you, and I think that we owe you a great deal of
gratitude for that.
I also would like to know from the Secretary, one of the
things that I have been intrigued by when we talk about the
nuclear capabilities and the Ohio class and going from 14 to 12
and 22 capabilities. How is that really--for lack of a better
description, how do you get that and the President's view of a
nuclear-free weapon type of situation? How do we get those two
things to work together? It just seems like we are talking
about nuclear weapons and we are talking--and our President is
saying we are going to work towards non-nuclear weapons.
So how do you do that?
Secretary Mabus. Well, for the current time being, we have
a triad of deterrence, and our Ohio-class submarines provide
one leg of that deterrence, and I think that it is a critical
national mission today.
We hope to work toward a reduction in that. But until that
day comes, I think, it is incumbent on us to not only have that
capability, but for it to be credible, for it to be up-to-date,
and for it to be very survivable.
Mrs. Hanabusa. One tube, what is that capable of doing? It
just seems like 24 to 20. They may not mean that much of a
difference. I mean, you are talking about nuclear weapons,
aren't you?
Secretary Mabus. Yes, you are. But you are also talking
about, in terms of, what the mission is and what the targets
would be under consideration. And in terms of coming up with
the number of tubes, we have looked particularly with the
uniform service of what the requirements are, what the mission
is for this submarine. And we feel confident that the number of
tubes that we are laying in for the Ohio-class replacement will
meet all the missions that we have.
Mrs. Hanabusa. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, I see you sitting there beside Admiral
Roughead and General Amos. What is your title?
Secretary Mabus. Secretary of the Navy, sir.
Mr. Jones. Secretary of the Navy. Okay.
In 1947, the National Security Act stated that we have four
equal services and, in fact, it says the Marine Corps, Army,
Navy, and Air Force as the four services given statutory
missions. So I would assume in my mind that means they are
equal.
You, many times--in the 16, 17 years I have been here, I
have heard many times that we are--the Navy and Marine Corps
are one fighting team. Would you agree with that statement--one
fighting team?
Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir, one fighting team and one
family.
Mr. Jones. Right, one family. Well, I am pleased to hear
that because I, again--and I won't fight the Chairman and the
previous Chairman who have been very supportive going back to--
I believe in--that the family should carry one name and that
name would obviously be Navy and Marine Corps.
I have another issue, and I would like to bring this up,
but our time goes so quickly. But I can assure you that when--I
hope you have been to see the Navy football team play since you
have been Secretary of the Navy.
Secretary Mabus. I have. So far, they haven't lost when I
have gone either.
Mr. Jones. Well, I am sure the Navy and Marine Corps loves
to hear that, and I mean that sincerely.
Well, a few years ago, we were here on the weekend and the
Navy was playing Notre Dame. And so for the first time, sitting
in my office, I happen to observe that on one sleeve, it has
the Navy anchor. On the other sleeve, it has the Marine emblem
of the globe and anchor. I guess, you have noticed that on the
jerseys.
Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jones. Okay. Well, again, we will fight this. We had
423 co-sponsors in the House last year, Pat Roberts had 80
senators and I made the statement, ``You couldn't get 80
senators last year to agree there is a Santa Claus.''
So we are going to take the same fight up this year. We
believe that it is the right thing to do to share that the
families are fully and clearly recognized as four separate
fighting teams. And even though the Navy and Marine Corps are a
family and we appreciate that, they should have--the coach of
the team or the leader of the team should carry the name of
both.
It is a tragedy when a Marine dies in this country. And I
have a copy of a letter that when a Marine dies, he receives a
letter from the Secretary of the Navy, Washington D.C., with
the Navy flag, nothing in the condolence letter about the
Marine Corps--nothing.
Yes, it does have in the first paragraph where it has the
name of the Marine who was killed, that he was a Marine, but in
the heading, the family's name in the heading does nothing
about Marine Corps. So thank you for your precise answers. I
appreciate that very much.
I want to go back to a point now. I have received letters
from you, Mr. Secretary, and the new Commandant and previous
Commandants about my concern about clearing the name of two
pilots who were killed in Arizona. Nineteen Marines were killed
when they were asked to do something they never should have
been asked to do because the plane was not ready.
In the 1 minute I have left, I have a copy of the
guidelines for the British Royal Air Force. If there is a plane
crash, these are the guidelines that they try to follow. And I
don't have the time, and you wouldn't have time enough to
answer--to ask you but one question. I want to go to the part
that deals with guide to the consideration of human failings.
We call them human factors. They say human failings.
This is the question. I would like to know if you agree
with this or not. I realize these are the British regulations
and not yours or not ours. Maybe I should say it that way.
``Only in cases where there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever
should deceased aircrew be found negligent.'' Do you agree with
that?
Secretary Mabus. Well, what I would agree with,
Congressman, is that we should follow very carefully our
regulations in terms of when we investigate an accident and the
reports that come out of that.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Secretary, that is fine. But I would tell
you that your rules and regulations, when dead men cannot speak
for themselves and dead men were put in a plane that should not
have been doing the procedure it was, then we need to follow
what the British say, and I will repeat it again, ``Only in
cases where there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should
deceased aircrew be found negligent.''
Thank you for your answer.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Roughead, I think I am expecting a letter from you
by Friday regarding the P-8 and so I--well, that is all I will
say about it. You can thank me later. But with regards to Aegis
and looking at some other issues on one of the other
subcommittees I have--Strategic Forces, and of course as well
as on the Seapower, can you discuss the Sea-based Missile
Defense requirements for our surface combatants. I know they
are still in review.
Has there been progress in determining what the
requirements are for the Navy to meet the requirements of the
Phased, Adaptive Approach and what kind of timeline are we
seeing--what investment do we see in this budget and what kind
of timeline do we see to meet those requirements?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Thank you.
We are moving forward on Phased, Adaptive Approach. And, in
fact, the first ship and the first phase will be sailing this
month to be part of the Phased, Adaptive Approach in Europe. We
also have been maintaining another ship in the Mediterranean
with ballistic missile defense capability.
I do believe that we have been able to settle on the number
of ships that are required. And that is what really drives the
request in this budget to ramp up the number of ships and then
the number of interceptors.
Those ships are still going to be very busy, there is no
question about that, through this 5-year plan that we have in
place. But we have closed in and your support to get us to have
the 41 BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense]-capable ships by the end
of this FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan] is going to be very
key to minimizing the stress on that BMD force.
Mr. Larsen. Just a question on that. Is the Navy's plan to
make these primarily BMD ships first or are these going to be
on-call for that? That is--obviously, they can do everything a
destroyer can do, but are we going to ask them to be BMD first?
Admiral Roughead. They will receive more extensive training
in BMD. They will be heavily focused on BMD. We will make sure
that they are exercised routinely in BMD. So that will be an
overriding case.
But as you mentioned, these are multi-mission ships. They
can do much more than that and, in fact, in this past week, the
USS Stout which is the BMD ship in the Mediterranean is the
ship that escorted the ferry that was carrying the Americans
from Libya to Malta.
So we can't simply say they are BMD. We expect them to do
more. They will do more. But they are going to be the BMD
horses of the Navy.
Mr. Larsen. Great. With regards to the Next Generation
Jammer, do we have a timing on the fielding of that? I know the
budget just starts putting money into it, but what is the
timing on fielding to replace--do you have anything on that?
Admiral Roughead. I will get back to you on the exact
timeline on that. But clearly, by the end of the decade, it is
where we want to be with that--capabilities.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 156.]
Mr. Larsen. And that will be able to ship to the 35, sorry
to the 18G.
Admiral Roughead. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Yes.
And, Commandant, is the Marine Corps anticipating that the
35B will have electronic attack capability or is that going to
be--I am not quite sure. Is that going to be all in the Navy
now or as you move away from your EA-6Bs?
General Amos. Congressman, we transitioned from the
Prowlers to the F-35B. We will have a significant electronic
warfare, electronic attack capability in that airplane resident
just the way it is coming off the line. So it is pretty
significant.
There is every expectation that they will take the Next
Generation Jamming Pod that is being developed--or is developed
now for the F-18G and more than likely--you know, or translate
that to the F-35B. So it will be an electronic attack-capable
airplane.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Okay. That is great. We have been
tracking that--has been tracking that--this progress for a
while.
Secretary Mabus, see you don't get off too easy, again, we
are going to be discussing these issues of satellites and
probably in Strategic Forces. But the Mobile User Objective
System programs experienced significant challenges, have
increased costs and schedule delays, and don't feel special.
You can apply that to a lot of our satellite programs,
something we have all been watching and trying to get on top
of.
But it now appears to be on track for the first launch in
2011 this year. Do you have concerns about any capability gaps
or have we looked at alternatives to fill those gaps until this
is up, as well as any gaps once the first one is up until we
get further buses launched?
Secretary Mabus. You are correct on all of these things.
And the thing we are looking at to fill any capability gaps is
commercial service on a commercial satellite to make sure that
we don't have the gaps because this is such a critical
component of everything that we do.
Mr. Larsen. That is right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Secretary, Admiral, and General, thank you
very much for your time here today and for your responsiveness.
I am sure we will continue to work together as we go through
the budget process.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 1, 2011
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 1, 2011
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 1, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH ON BEHALF OF MS. GIFFORDS
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead. To avoid duplication of
efforts, Navy is collaborating with the other Services to develop and
implement the use of energy efficient and alternative energy
technologies. Specifically, Navy is fostering synergies in the
following areas:
Fuels: Navy is an active participant in, and former chair of, the
Tri-Service Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants Users Group. This Group
brings together technical fuels experts from the research, test &
evaluation, and logistics communities to address operational issues at
the service user level. Navy and the other services are also involved
in the Interagency Working Group (IAWG), an information-sharing
organization chaired by the Defense Logistics Agency and the Department
of Energy that deals with alternative energy issues, including
biofuels.
Aviation: As a member of the Joint Propulsion Coordinating
Committee, Navy coordinates with propulsion leadership and technical
experts from the three Services to address propulsion technology
issues. In addition, Navy is working with representatives from Army,
Air Force, NASA, and private industry to advance the Variable
Affordable Advanced Turbine Engine Initiative, which focuses on the
development of aircraft propulsion and related systems technology.
Maritime: Military Sealift Command (which provides services to
Navy, U.S. Transportation Command, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps,
Missile Defense Agency, and other U.S. Government Agencies) and Naval
Sea Systems Command are collaborating on a number of initiatives such
as Hybrid Electric Drive, shore power metering, HVAC system efficiency
modifications, ship energy surveys, and development of energy
dashboards to provide users with real time ship energy consumption
information. These two organizations are also working together to
develop an energy portfolio manager position to prioritize and track
the progress of existing and future energy initiatives.
Expeditionary: Navy and Army have joined forces to test an
innovative hybrid hydraulic energy recovery system for use in military
heavy construction equipment. Once operational, this system should
result in significant energy savings for amphibious and expeditionary
forces around the world. In addition, Navy anticipates a partnership
with Army's Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering
Center (TARDEC) to test a hybrid bulldozer in the near future. [See
page 15.]
General Amos. The Marine Corps is supported by the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFAC ) and energy efficiency efforts across the
Department of Navy are implemented in both Military Construction, where
U.S. Green Building Council Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design (LEED) Silver is a standard for new construction, and
renovations and repairs. In addition, NAVFAC carries out a ``technical
Evaluation'' program that evaluates promising technologies for larger
scale use across the Services. Additionally, the Geothermal Program
Office assists in geothermal resource exploration with both technical
and geological expertise in the search for commercially viable
geothermal resources on Marine Corps installations.
The Marine Corps participates in Working Group efforts hosted by
the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Environment) (DUSD(I&E)). These groups ensure that ideas are shared
across the Services. DUSD(I&E) also develops policies that apply to all
Services. The annual GovEnergy Conference enables the Services to share
information with other Federal Agencies. Under this OSD oversight, the
Marine Corps executes projects using funds from the DoD Energy
Conservation Investment Program (ECIP). The ECIP program also funds
demonstrations of ``pre-commercial'' facility energy technologies for
demonstration through the Environmental Security Technology
Certification Program (ESTCP). The Marine Corps is currently
participating in a ``Smart Grid'' demonstration with General Electric
that will result in valuable information on smart grid implementation
as well as some of the practical aspects of implementing grid
monitoring and control for energy conservation, reliability and support
to critical infrastructure. [See page 15.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS
Admiral Roughead. Our Sailors use their education benefits for
professional and personal development. The Navy has partnered with
accredited public, non-profit and for-profit colleges to offer rating-
related associate's and bachelor's degrees for all of our enlisted
ratings. This approach enables our Sailors to improve knowledge and
skills relevant to their profession, while providing them a valuable
degree for transition to civilian life. For example, one of our newest
partners, Bismarck State College in North Dakota, provides an on-line
associate's degree in Energy Management for our Gas Turbine System (GS)
rating. We award advancement points to our junior enlisted Sailors for
satisfactory completion of an accredited associate's or bachelor's
degree. Degree completion may be considered during advancement
selection board deliberations for senior enlisted Sailors. Our Enlisted
Sailors may also use their degrees to apply for officer commissioning
programs.
We do not currently differentiate among the degrees obtained from
different schools provided the institutions are accredited by the
Department of Education. We are working with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) to establish a process to conduct third-
party quality assessments of all schools that receive Tuition
Assistance funding. This will help us identify schools, regardless of
the type, that may not be providing a quality education for our
Sailors. We have also supported OSD in establishing a formal complaint
tracking process that will help us identify problem schools and take
corrective action. [See page 44.]
General Amos. We continue to provide tuition assistance to our
Marines. For FY10, the Marine Corps paid $51M in tuition assistance.
FYTD11 (though 1 March 2011), we have paid $27M from an annual budget
of $48M.
We do not plan to eliminate the program. The Tuition Assistance
Program budget for FY12 has been reduced to $29.9M due to budget cuts
and to better align with the Post 9/11 education benefit. [See page
44.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead. Vulnerabilities to the Navy's
infrastructure and facilities are reviewed through threat assessment
analyses and incorporated into our force protections plans. Similarly,
we conduct cyber vulnerability assessments to protect the Navy's
utility distribution systems (electricity, steam, natural gas, fuel,
water) and facility control systems (heating, ventilating, air
conditioning).
These assessments have led the Navy to identify the need for
deployment of an Industrial Control System (ICS) sensors on a secure
framework, to provide monitoring and prevent unauthorized access. The
architecture of the secure framework is a closed network that carries
all alarms, sensors, controlled access points, intrusion prevention/
detection systems and security against malware and viruses. Secure ICS
integration is currently being piloted and will inform enterprise-wide
implementation. The envisioned enterprise-wide implementation will be a
phased plan to integrate all ICSs, including over 685 unique legacy and
new shore sensor systems. We are validating the security and robustness
of this system with Department of Homeland Security's cyber security
experts working at the Idaho National Laboratory.
Operationally, Fleet Cyber Command (FCC)/10th Fleet takes
additional measures to ensure network security and reduce overall risk
to the Navy's Command and Control infrastructure. FCC/10th Fleet
manages stand-alone emergency power and HVAC systems at over 50
discrete mission critical sites, which warrant added protection. [See
page 32.]
General Amos. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 32.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Admiral Roughead. Next Generation Jammer is on track to achieve
Block I Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2019 on the EA-18G. This first block will cover the
majority of the electromagnetic spectrum with which we are concerned.
We will IOC Blocks II and III in 2021 and 2024, respectively, again on
the EA-18G. [See page 50.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 1, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON
Mr. McKeon. The Navy estimates that its annual shipbuilding budget
requirement, on average, is $15.0 billion per year, to attain its
minimum floor of 313 battle-force ships. However, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the Navy will require, on average,
$19.0 billion per year to attain its minimum floor of 313 ships. Given
that there will be minimal to no real budget growth in the upcoming
years, are you concerned with the Navy's ability to reach its required
force structure?
Secretary Mabus. No. The requirement of 313 ships remains the floor
and the Navy is committed to building to that floor. The disparity of
funding requirements in Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) assessment
of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan results from
the difference in Navy and CBO estimating methods and assumptions about
the design and capabilities of future ships. In the near term, CBO's
and Navy's cost estimates are similar, however the differences become
more pronounced over time as CBO acknowledges they have made different
assumptions about both the size and capabilities of ships that led to
different cost estimates.
The Navy recognizes that building the required force structure will
largely depend on controlling shipbuilding costs (including combat
systems) within an affordable range. Navy is committed to maintaining
stability in requirements, funding, and profiles in an effort to
control costs. This will require the combined efforts of the Navy, the
shipbuilding industry and the combat systems industry. Working in
conjunction with Congress, the Navy will procure and sustain the force
structure necessary to deliver the naval capabilities needed to support
our national interests.
Mr. McKeon. Northrop-Grumman plans to spin-off its shipbuilding
portfolio at some point in the near future. Can you provide us your
view on how that will affect shipbuilding infrastructure and workforce,
and what challenges the Navy may confront as it relates to maintaining
cost, schedule and delivery times for ships currently under contract
with Northrop-Grumman?
Secretary Mabus. Having performed due diligence through extensive
analysis and protracted discussions, and following appropriate
adjustments, the Navy does not object to Northrop Grumman Corporation's
(NGC) spin-off of its shipbuilding business. The Navy recently awarded
Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (HII) the contract for LPD 26, and
we are in negotiations with HII for the DDG 113 contract. The Navy's
decision not to object to the spin-off is based on a critical review of
HII's proposed capital structure, current contract financials, required
capital investment and proprietary forward-looking projections.
Ultimately, the Navy has been able to resolve concerns about the risk
involved to this important segment of our shipbuilding industrial base
with appropriate adjustments made by NGC. These adjustments were a
result of the Navy's findings and captured within an agreement between
NGC and the Navy. The Navy's concern with HII's credit rating, driven
by its initial debt, has been offset by NGC's agreement to relieve HII
of first quarter 2011 debts, to provide a starting cash balance of $300
million, and to assign retentions, performance incentives, and economic
price adjustment (EPA) payments that the Navy might owe under current
shipbuilding contracts with NGSB to HII. The Navy regards HII as a
responsible contractor and is proceeding to finalize the negotiations
with the intent to award the contracts for construction of DDG 113 to
HII.
Mr. McKeon. Navy officials testified last year that the Department
would be conducting a ship Battle-Force, Force Structure Assessment
over the course of the past year to evaluate whether or not a force
inventory floor of 313 ships is adequate to meet the National Military
Strategy requirements applicable to the Navy. Can you provide us an
update as to when we can expect to be provided the new Force Structure
Assessment, and can you share with us any insight to its preliminary
conclusions and recommendations?
Secretary Mabus. The 2010 Force Structure Assessment has been
completed and is currently in staffing. We expect to be able to provide
the results to Congress within 30-60 days.
Mr. McKeon. Last year, the Navy testified that sea-based missile
defense requirements for surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers)
were still in the review. Has there been any progress in determining
sea-based missile defense requirements as it relates to Navy surface
combatant requirements, and if so, can you describe what the forward-
based requirements are for Navy surface combatants and what that means
to the battle-force inventory requirements regarding destroyers and
cruisers?
Secretary Mabus. Each Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC)
determines its own requirements for surface combatants in each mission
area. These requirements are adjudicated through the Department of
Defense's Global Force Management process, which allocates the
available Aegis ships. The Navy currently has sufficient capacity to
meet the most critical demands for multi-mission surface combatants;
however, Navy does not have the capacity to meet GCC demands for
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) surface combatants without breaking
established deployment length redlines. Based on threat analysis and
steady state presence indications from the GCCs, the Navy, working with
Missile Defense Agency, have concluded that the demand for BMD-capable
Aegis ships will outpace capacity through approximately 2018, assuming
standard six month deployment lengths.
Sea-based BMD requirements in the United States Central Command and
European Command are sourced through the rotation of Aegis ships home-
ported in the United States. The Pacific Command's sea-based BMD
requirements are sourced primarily from the Forward Deployed Naval
Force in Japan.
As the demand for these ships increase, either the inventory of
Aegis BMD-capable ships or deployment lengths must increase.
Accordingly, Navy, in conjunction with MDA, has established a plan to
increase the total number of Aegis BMD-capable ships across the FYDP
from 21 to 41, of which 27 will be deployable in FY16. This plan
includes the increase in capacity and capability of surface combatants
either through the installation of the Aegis BMD 3.6.1/4.0.1 suite or
Aegis Modernization program, as well as through new construction
(commencing with DDG 113). The addition of BMD capabilities to the
Aegis Fleet provides improved operational flexibility to GCC and Fleet
Commanders to fulfill their various missions.
Mr. McKeon. The Navy's budget documentation notes that, ``the
Department's budget increases by over $900 million across the FYDP to
address a significant increase in the cost of [the] solid rocket motor
(SRM) component of the Trident II D5 SLBM as a result of a shrinkage
and reorganization of the national SRM industrial base.'' Do you share
these concerns about the solid rocket motor industrial base, what are
their impacts, and how is the Navy mitigating these impacts?
Secretary Mabus. Yes, the Navy shares these concerns as there has
been an increase in the unit cost of Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) due to a
decline in customers (end of NASA's Space Shuttle Rocket Booster and
end of Air Force Minuteman III) for Solid Rocket Motors. Additional
Weapons Procurement, Navy funding is required in FY 2012 to fund an
increase in the unit cost of TRIDENT II D5 rocket motor production from
$10.7M to $19.2M. Also included in the $191.3M are increases for
production requalification, HMX procurement, and tooling. The Navy's
TRIDENT II D5 rocket motor production program is now responsible for a
significantly larger portion of the industrial base fixed costs. The
Navy's PB12 submit estimate is based on the assumption that NASA
continues RDT&E investment at $400M per year and the Air Force
maintains a warm line production investment of $40M per year for
Minuteman III to maintain critical skills. In an effort to mitigate
impacts, Navy Strategic Systems Programs is working closely with
Lockheed Martin Missile Space Corporation and Alliant Techsystems Inc.
Mr. McKeon. Can you provide the committee with more detail about
how the FY12 budget request increases research and development of
capabilities to increase satellite communications bandwidth and
survivability for off-ship connectivity?
Secretary Mabus. Navy SATCOM RDT&E budget supports three major
efforts to increase bandwidth and survivability for off-ship
connectivity, eXtended Data rate (XDR) testing with the Advanced
Extreme High Frequency (AEHF) satellite, development of AEHF Time
Division Multiple Access Internet Protocol (ATIP), and the Split
Internet Protocol (Split IP) capability.
In FY12, both the AEHF satellite and the XDR waveform become
available. Coupled with these capabilities, the Navy Multi-band
Terminal (NMT) system will provide a four-fold increase in the off-ship
survivable bandwidth. The RDT&E budget supports the formal testing of
the NMT terminal with the AEHF satellite and the resolution of
discrepancies discovered as a result of this testing.
ATIP is an ancillary NMT component that allows the bandwidth from a
single AEHF Satellite spot beam to be dynamically shared amongst
multiple Navy NMT users. The dynamic sharing increases off-ship
survivable bandwidth on one ship when needed, but reallocates the
bandwidth to other ships when not needed. With the ATIP enabled
bandwidth sharing, the Navy NMT users can fully leverage the DoD's
space investments to effectively increase survivable off-ship bandwidth
to all users.
The Split IP effort develops the software to allow tactical units
to transmit Internet Protocol traffic over one type of satellite link
and receive the traffic over a different type of satellite link.
Separating the transmit and receive paths efficiently uses the full
array of DoD satellite systems for maximum off-ship bandwidth while
increasing the survivability of these communications.
Both ATIP and Split IP initiatives mitigate the limitations in
bandwidth posed in a hostile satellite communications environment.
Mr. McKeon. The Navy estimates that its annual shipbuilding budget
requirement, on average, is $15.0 billion per year, to attain its
minimum floor of 313 battle-force ships. However, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the Navy will require, on average,
$19.0 billion per year to attain its minimum floor of 313 ships. Given
that there will be minimal to no real budget growth in the upcoming
years, are you concerned with the Navy's ability to reach its required
force structure?
Admiral Roughead. No. The requirement of 313 ships remains the
floor and the Navy is committed to building to that floor. The
disparity of funding requirements in Congressional Budget Office's
(CBO) assessment of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Long-Range Shipbuilding
Plan results from the difference in Navy and CBO estimating methods and
assumptions about the design and capabilities of future ships. In the
near term, CBO's and Navy's cost estimates are similar, however the
differences become more pronounced over time as CBO acknowledges they
have made different assumptions about both the size and capabilities of
ships that led to different cost estimates.
The Navy recognizes that building the required force structure will
largely depend on controlling shipbuilding costs (including combat
systems). Navy is committed to maintaining stability in requirements,
funding, and profiles in an effort to control costs. This will require
the combined efforts of the Navy, the shipbuilding industry and the
combat systems industry. Working in conjunction with Congress, the Navy
will procure and sustain the force structure necessary to deliver the
naval capabilities needed to support our national interests.
Mr. McKeon. The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Schwartz,
testified last week to this committee that an ``Air-Sea Battle Plan''
is being jointly developed, between the Air Force and Navy, for future
operations. Can you provide us your perspective of the plan, why you
feel it is necessary to implement, and an estimate of when we can
expect to receive the plan's details?
Admiral Roughead. Air-Sea Battle is a limited operational concept
that focuses the development of integrated air and naval forces on
addressing the evolving anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment.
ASB encompasses three key elements:
Institutional cooperation will be enhanced by
establishing an enduring organizational construct that will continue
formal collaboration to address the A2/AD environment as it evolves
over time.
Conceptual alignment will be perpetuated through the
operational design that describes how capabilities and forces are
integrated to accomplish operational objectives in an A2/AD
environment.
Materiel solutions and innovations will be
collaboratively vetted to ensure they are complementary where
appropriate; redundant when mandated by capacity requirements; fully
interoperable; and fielded with integrated acquisition strategies
seeking efficiencies where they can be achieved.
Air-Sea Battle is necessary because various states and their
surrogates are developing capabilities specifically designed to deny
access and challenge freedom of action. Failure to effectively address
this threat could increase risk to our forces or compel them to operate
at extended distances from an area of conflict. Either circumstance
threatens the ability of joint and allied forces to accomplish assigned
operational objectives. ASB identifies and characterizes specific A2/AD
challenges presented to the joint force, and provides solutions to
those challenges. We expect to be able to brief key stakeholders on the
ASB Concept in the coming months.
Mr. McKeon. The LPD-17 San Antonio-class of amphibs has been
plagued by quality workmanship and reliability issues. Can you provide
us an update on how the Navy is progressing on addressing these
deficiencies and to what extent these issues have been addressed with
the shipyard to preclude future issues?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy has completed thorough reviews and
assessments of the LPD 17 Class that revealed issues in the areas of
construction oversight, manning, and training. Corrective actions are
being implemented and lessons learned from earlier ships in the class
have been incorporated into later new-construction ships.
Specifically, quality assurance (QA) and production oversight
during ship construction were not sufficient by the Navy Supervisor of
Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) and the shipbuilder,
which impacted Main Propulsion Diesel Engines, lube oil systems, piping
welds, and foundation bolts and power train alignment. The shipbuilder
has since developed new procedures and training for its personnel and
added additional QA checkpoints to the shipbuilding inspection process.
We have added additional staffing to the SUPSHIP staff with a focus on
compliance, and we have instituted comprehensive quality audits of both
SUPSHIP and the shipbuilder.
The Navy is strengthening LPD 17 Class crew training by
establishing more traditional schoolhouse training that will result in
a blended approach of classroom, shipboard and computer based training,
rather than relying on the previous model of extensive computer-based
shipboard training.
Initial system reliability issues with the engine controls, ship
controls and interior communications systems have been addressed
through major software upgrades to each system as well as the
replacement of critical obsolete parts with rugged current technology
hardware. We are replacing the ships' 1990s-era technology asynchronous
transfer mode (ATM) shipboard wide area network (SWAN) with a current
Gigabit Ethernet technology network hardware and software.
An LPD 17 Class Wholeness Task Force was formed by the Fleet to
undertake a comprehensive assessment of the overall state of readiness
for the entire LPD 17 Class. The task force is addressing shipboard
manning, adequacy of shore-based infrastructure support, performance of
critical mission and propulsion systems, spare parts support, and
adequacy of maintenance resources.
The actions taken are resulting in better reliability and
operational availability of the commissioned ships of the class, while
improving the projected operational availability of the ships currently
under construction. Recent examples are USS NEW YORK (LPD 21)
completing, in February 2011, a highly successful Board of Inspection
and Survey (INSURV) Final Contract Trials and USS MESA VERDE (LPD 19),
in March 2011, departing early for its second overseas deployment in
response to world events.
Mr. McKeon. Last year, the Navy testified that sea-based missile
defense requirements for surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers)
were still in the review. Has there been any progress in determining
sea-based missile defense requirements as it relates to Navy surface
combatant requirements, and if so, can you describe what the forward-
based requirements are for Navy surface combatants and what that means
to the battle-force inventory requirements regarding destroyers and
cruisers?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy currently has sufficient capacity to
meet the most critical demands for multi-mission surface combatants;
however, Navy does not have the capacity to meet expected future GCC
demands for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) surface combatants without
breaking established deployment length redlines. Based on threat
analysis and steady state presence indications from the GCCs, the Navy,
working with Missile Defense Agency, has concluded that the demand for
BMD-capable Aegis ships will outpace capacity through approximately
2018, assuming standard six month deployment lengths.
Sea-based BMD requirements in the United States Central Command and
European Command are sourced through the rotation of Aegis ships home-
ported in the United States. The Pacific Command's sea-based BMD
requirements are sourced primarily from the Forward Deployed Naval
Force in Japan.
With the President's decision to pursue a phased adaptive approach
(PAA) for the missile defense of Europe, the Navy has been working
within the Department of Defense to identify the most efficient method
to provide the required afloat BMD capability. The establishment of a
forward deployed force in Europe is one of the options being assessed,
however, no final decision has been made.
As the demand for these ships increase, either the inventory of
Aegis BMD-capable ships or deployment lengths must increase.
Accordingly, Navy, in conjunction with MDA, has established a plan to
increase the total number of Aegis BMD-capable ships across the FYDP
from 21 to 41, of which 27 will be deployable in FY16. This plan
includes the increase in capacity and capability of surface combatants
either through the installation of the Aegis BMD 3.6.1/4.0.1 suite or
Aegis Modernization program, as well as through new construction
(commencing with DDG 113). The addition of BMD capabilities to the
Aegis Fleet provides improved operational flexibility to GCC and Fleet
Commanders to fulfill their various missions.
Mr. McKeon. Can you discuss how the missile defense mission and the
multi-mission capability of Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) ships
are affecting the overall force structure requirements for the Aegis
fleet? How is the Navy managing the limited number of Aegis BMD ships
when demand is greater than supply?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy currently has sufficient capacity to
meet the most critical demands for its multi-mission Aegis ships;
however, we do not have the capacity to meet all Geographic Combatant
Commander (GCC) demands for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) without
exceeding established Personnel Tempo program limits for deployment
lengths, dwell tempo, or homeport tempo. Based on threat analysis and
current indications from GCCs, and assuming standard six month
deployment lengths, the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
concluded that GCC demand for surface combatants with Aegis BMD
capability will outpace capacity through approximately 2018.
To meet the increasing demand for these ships and reduce the risk
to our long term force structure caused by the increased operational
tempo from longer deployment lengths, the Navy, working in conjunction
with MDA, has established a plan (see Figure 1 on page 165) to increase
the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships from 23 in FY2011 to 41 in
FY2016. This plan balances the need for meeting current operational
requirements against the need to upgrade existing BMD-capable Aegis
ships to pace the future threat. Included in this plan are increases in
the Navy's capacity and the capabilities of Aegis ships through the
installation of an Aegis BMD 3.6.1/4.0.1 suite, the Aegis Modernization
program, or new construction (commencing with DDG-113).
To mitigate the impact of the BMD mission, Navy has implemented an
operating concept for AEGIS ship's conducting BMD missions that
features a graduated readiness posture that allows BMD-capable surface
combatants to be on an operational tether and available for other
tasking when not directly involved in active BMD operations. Surface
combatants operating in support of a BMD mission do not lose the
capability to conduct other missions; however, specific mission
effectiveness may be affected by ships' position and/or application of
ship resources to those missions.
Navy analysis of evolving BMD and other mission area requirements
indicates that the current Navy BMD upgrade plan will support BMD
Global Force Management requirements while simultaneously fulfilling
Navy's requirements in other mission areas.
Mr. McKeon. Aegis ships support multiple Navy missions such as
maritime security, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, etc. It has
also been noted in previous committee hearings that when an Aegis ship
is in missile defense mode, it has less capability for ship self-
defense and therefore requires support from a second Aegis ship. \1\
Please discuss some of these mission optimization challenges and
tradeoffs, and how the Navy is addressing them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, ``New Plan for
Missile Defenses in Europe and Implications for International
Security,'' October 1, 2009, p. 25 from the hearing transcript.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Admiral Roughead. All Aegis BMD capable ships have the ability to
defend themselves against both traditional and advanced air and cruise
missile threats while also executing the BMD mission. Simultaneous BMD
and Anti-Air Warfare engagements were demonstrated by USS LAKE ERIE on
June 22, 2006 and this capability is the current BMD Fleet standard. It
is proven and remains ready today. Navy continues to work with the MDA
to ensure that future BMD upgrades will further improve the multi-
mission capabilities of our BMD ships.
Mr. McKeon. Admiral Roughead, according to a Defense News article
in June 2010, ``U.S. Aegis Radars' Readiness Plunges,'' the Aegis radar
systems are ``in their worst shape ever, raising questions about the
surface fleet's ability to take on its high-profile new mission next
year defending Europe from ballistic missiles.'' Discuss any Aegis
readiness concerns you may have and how it might impact the Navy's
ability to meet missile defense mission requirements.
Admiral Roughead. I am confident in Navy's ability to meet our
missile defense requirements, and I am pleased to report that the USS
MONTEREY (CG 61) is currently deployed in the Mediterranean Sea as the
first ship on station in support of the first phase of the President's
European Phased Adaptive Approach to Ballistic Missile Defense.
While several reports and studies, completed last year as part of
Navy's ongoing self-assessment and continuous improvement efforts,
indicated the beginning of some declining trends in various elements of
Aegis readiness, the overall readiness of our Aegis Fleet remains high.
A product of their ongoing success, these assessments reflected the
elevated standards we are employing in measuring Aegis readiness, which
may have led to the misperception that these ships are having
difficulty meeting their assigned missions; nothing could be further
from the truth.
To ensure continued readiness in the future, we have initiated a
study that will integrate previous assessment findings and provide a
holistic assessment of Aegis readiness in terms of interoperability,
maintainability, test & evaluation, manpower, training, and current
development efforts. We will use the results to inform our continued
improvement of Aegis readiness in a targeted, affordable manner to
ensure that Aegis warships remain ready for tasking.
Mr. McKeon. The Navy's budget documentation notes that, ``the
Department's budget increases by over $900 million across the FYDP to
address a significant increase in the cost of [the] solid rocket motor
(SRM) component of the Trident II D5 SLBM as a result of a shrinkage
and reorganization of the national SRM industrial base.'' Do you share
these concerns about the solid rocket motor industrial base, what are
their impacts, and how is the Navy mitigating these impacts?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, the Navy shares these concerns as there has
been an increase in the unit cost of Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) due to a
decline in customers (end of NASA's Space Shuttle Rocket Booster and
end of Air Force Minuteman III) for Solid Rocket Motors. Additional
Weapons Procurement, Navy funding is required in FY 2012 to fund an
increase in the unit cost of TRIDENT II D5 rocket motor production from
$10.7M to $19.2M. Also included in the $191.3M request are increases
for production requalification, HMX procurement, and tooling. The
Navy's TRIDENT II D5 rocket motor production program is now responsible
for a significantly larger portion of the industrial base fixed costs.
The Navy's PB12 budget submission is based on the assumption that NASA
continues RDT&E investment at $400M per year and the Air Force
maintains a warm line production investment of $40M per year for
Minuteman III to maintain critical skills. In an effort to mitigate
deleterious fiscal impacts, Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) is working
closely with Lockheed Martin Missile Space Corporation and Alliant
Techsystems Inc toward cooperative solutions that support the
industrial base and the nation's strategic needs.
Mr. McKeon. Can you provide the committee with more detail about
how the FY12 budget request increases research and development of
capabilities to increase satellite communications bandwidth and
survivability for off-ship connectivity?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy SATCOM RDT&E budget supports three major
efforts to increase bandwidth and survivability for off-ship
connectivity: eXtended Data rate (XDR) testing with the Advanced
Extreme High Frequency (AEHF) satellite, development of AEHF Time
Division Multiple Access Internet Protocol (ATIP), and the Split
Internet Protocol (Split IP) capability.
In FY12, both the AEHF satellite and the XDR waveform become
available. Coupled with these capabilities, the Navy Multi-band
Terminal (NMT) system will provide a four-fold increase in the off-ship
survivable bandwidth. The RDT&E budget supports the formal testing of
the NMT terminal with the AEHF satellite and the resolution of
discrepancies discovered as a result of this testing.
ATIP is an NMT component that allows the bandwidth from a single
AEHF Satellite spot beam to be dynamically shared amongst multiple Navy
NMT users. The dynamic sharing increases off-ship survivable bandwidth
on one ship when needed, but reallocates the bandwidth to other ships
when not needed. With ATIP enabled bandwidth sharing, the Navy NMT
users can fully leverage DoD's space investments to effectively
increase survivable off-ship bandwidth to all users.
The Split IP effort develops the software to allow tactical units
to transmit Internet Protocol traffic over one type of satellite link
and receive the traffic over a different type of satellite link.
Separating the transmit and receive paths efficiently uses the full
array of DoD satellite systems for maximum off-ship bandwidth while
increasing the survivability of these communications.
Both ATIP and Split IP initiatives mitigate the limitations in
bandwidth posed in a hostile satellite communications environment.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5108.101
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. The USMC LAV Program Manager met with HASC staff in
January 2010 and reported significant benefits associated with Side and
Wheel-well Armor added to the USMC fleet of LAV's. These kits were
developed by Armatec and installed at the Barstow and Albany USMC
Depots.
The HASC understands that several allied countries are
incorporating, into their LAV fleets, additional technologies developed
by this company such as Mine Blast floor and Underbelly Protection
Kits, Roof Mounted Blast Attenuating Seats, and Armored Self-sealing
Fuel Tanks. Given this, along with the success of the past LAV Side and
Wheel-well Armor Kit upgrades, the Committee believes these additional
technologies should be evaluated as part of the LAV Survivability II
Upgrade Program.
Has the USMC LAV Program evaluated these additional
vehicle and occupant survivability technologies? If so, report to the
HASC all findings and follow-on actions. If an evaluation has not taken
place, the Committee recommends that the LAV Program evaluate these
technologies and requests a report of the findings be submitted to the
Committee.
When does the USMC LAV program expect to release RFP's
for the Survivability II Upgrade program?
Will these RFP's allow for full and open competition?
General Amos. The Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle Program
Manager's Office (PM LAV) has an open dialogue with Armatec, as well as
with other companies offering survivability capabilities, to evaluate
follow-on vehicle and occupant survivability technologies for the LAV
program.
The PM LAV Office has evaluated incorporating Mine Blast Floor and
Underbelly Protection Kits, Roof Mounted Blast Attenuating Seats and
Armored Self-sealing Fuel Tanks as a part of the LAV Survivability II
Upgrade Program. The Marine Corps Survivability II Upgrade Program will
be contracting for Blast Attenuating Seats and structural reinforcement
in the vehicle chassis. A Request for Proposal (RFP) is anticipated to
be announced for the second quarter of FY12 under full and open
competition. As an interim solution, the Armatec driver's seat has been
procured for LAV use, in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), to improve
driver survivability. Additionally, a contract for Self-sealing Fuel
Tanks was awarded in September 2010. The RFP was issued as full and
open competition with no restrictions on who could submit a proposal.
The contract was awarded from a competitive source selection.
Regarding Mine Blast Floor and Underbelly Protection Kits, the USMC
LAV currently uses an underbody protection kit designed by the PM LAV
engineering staff that has proven to be effective in the field. Our
Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in OEF currently uses this kit.
At their request, our Australian allies also are now procuring the PM
LAV underbody solution on their vehicles in OEF.
PM LAV's survivability upgrade evaluation efforts are fluid and
ongoing. We will continue to evaluate increasing occupant survivability
technologies through (1) market research across industry; (2)
participating in a bi-annual LAV User Nation's Group meeting with the
U.S. Army, Canadian Forces, New Zealand Army and Australian Army to
collaborate on LAV survivability technologies that include the Armatec
product line; and (3) participating in annual survivability technology
review meetings with the Office of Naval Research and the Army Research
Laboratories at which time we provide research direction to the science
and technology community so that they can better tailor their efforts
to meet our projected needs.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN
Mr. Akin. For the last ten years we have been operating our
aircraft carriers and battle group in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean
regions leaving a power vacuum in the Mediterranean. With the recent
uprising in Tunisia, Egypt and now Libya do you see a need for our
carrier navy to reassert itself in the Mediterranean Ocean and what
affect will that have on our Fleet Readiness Plan and carrier Cycles?
Secretary Mabus. Carrier Strike Groups are deployed in the
Mediterranean several times per year. There are several factors
involved in the timing and duration of those deployments, all of which
require the approval of our senior civilian leadership. At this time,
bolstered by the deployments of our coalition partners, there is no
requirement for continuous Carrier Strike Group deployment in the
Mediterranean. If additional Carrier presence is required in the
Mediterranean Sea, carriers would have to shift from other areas of the
world or curtail time for training and maintenance.
Mr. Akin. The QDR independent panel recommended a fleet size of
roughly 340 ships. What kind of budget would you need to get to a 340
ship fleet?
Secretary Mabus. The 2010 QDR Independent Panel recommended an
Alternate Force Structure of 346 ships, the number found in the 1993
Bottom-Up Review (BUR). However, the BUR occurred as the US Navy and
the other three Services were trying to establish the force structure
floor for the post-Cold War drawdown. The 346 ships called for in the
BUR represented a simple projection of the size of the Navy in Fiscal
Year 1999 (FY99), not a statement of long-term steady-state
requirements. For example:
The FY99 fleet projection was for 52 SSNs, but the BUR's
long-term goal for SSNs was 45 boats.
Similarly, the FY99 fleet projection included over 40
amphibious ships, against a long-term goal of 36 ships, and over 40
combat logistics force ships, against a long-term goal of 30-35 ships.
Indeed, less than six months after the BUR was published, the Navy
dropped the FY99 fleet target by 16 ships--primarily tenders and
obsolete amphibious ships. In testimony, Navy leaders assured Congress
that ``This difference will not affect our warfighting and forward
presence capabilities.'' Moreover, the BUR fleet included ships not
normally included in official battle force counts. For example, the BUR
fleet included 27 mine warfare vessels. However, 11 of these ships were
to be maintained in Mobilization Category B status, which do not count
in official fleet numbers.
If one focuses on the BUR's long-range steady-state fleet
requirements rather than the FY99 projection, and only those ships that
contribute to official battle force counts, the BUR essentially called
for a fleet of some 300-305 ships. The differences between the BUR
fleet and the Navy's current 313-ship plan are thus minor.
The nucleus of the BUR fleet included 11 active and one
reserve aircraft carrier; 45-55 SSNs, with a long-term goal of 45 SSNs;
110-116 active surface combatants, 8-10 reserve frigates, and 27 mine
warfare vessels (some in reserve), for a total of 145-153 surface
warships; and 36 amphibious ships to carry 2.5 MEBs.
The steady-state 313-ship fleet includes 11 CVNs; 48
SSNs; 88 large surface combatants and 55 Littoral combat ships, for a
total of 143 surface warships; and 33 amphibious ships to carry 2.0
MEBs.
The biggest difference between the BUR and 2010 QDR
fleets is found in combat logistics, mobile logistics, and support
ships. The 1993 BUR Combat Logistics Force (CLF) included single-
purpose ships like the Ammunition Ships (AEs) and Combat Stores Ships
(AFS) that have been replaced by multi-purpose/multi-product ships in
the fleet today. Moreover, although today's fleet includes fewer ships
in these categories, most are now more efficiently manned and operated
by Military Sealift Command, and meet all fleet requirements.
Navy is confident that 313 ship force structure requirements in the
long-range shipbuilding plan reflect the latest approved Naval Force
Structure Assessment and should be considered the baseline vice those
articulated in the 1993 BUR.
The Chief of Naval Operations has stated that the Navy requires a
minimum of 313 ships to meet operational requirements globally, and, as
detailed in the Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
FY 2011, the Department of the Navy remains committed to reaching this
ship number by 2020. While this minimum number remains the current
target for force planning, the Department continues to examine this
requirement to address the increased operational demands and expanding
requirements for ballistic missile defense, intra-theater lift, and
forces capable of confronting irregular challenges.
Mr. Akin. The Navy has seen a steady decline in their manning
numbers through such force shaping tools such as Perform-To-Serve
(PTS). This has been occurring at the same time as their OPTEMPO has
been steadily increasing through the War on Terror, our other Deployed
Assets and Humanitarian response. At what point do you believe the Navy
will reach their breaking point with regards to dwell time?
Secretary Mabus. The various metrics that may be used to assess how
we are doing, suggest that we are operating within acceptable
parameters, and that we are not approaching a breaking point, nor do we
see that occurring on the horizon. While we are currently experiencing
high tempo thresholds, particularly in certain units or missions areas,
Navy expects to remain above Dwell limits based on current and
projected operational requirements.
Mr. Akin. What are the costs associated with the purchase and later
SLAP of an F-18E/F over a current SLEP of a current F-18C? Is it not
more cost effective long term to purchase a more capable platform that
can last for 9000 hours then to extend a legacy system for 1400
additional hours?
Secretary Mabus. The weapon systems procurement cost of an F/A-18E/
F is an average of $84.4 million (CY11$), based on the current
multiyear procurement (FY10-13). The current planned service life of
the F/A-18E/F is 6,000 hours ($14,000 per planned flight hour). At this
time, the cost for a future SLEP of F/A-18E/F aircraft from 6,000 to
9,000 hours is yet to be determined. A Service Life Assessment Program
(SLAP) is underway and will identifying the critical areas required to
be addressed, which will inform future costs of E/F SLEP. The estimated
average cost to extend the service life (SLEP) of 150 F/A-18A-D Legacy
Hornets from 8,600 to 10,000 hours is an average of $14.1 million
(CY11$) per aircraft ($10,000 per planned flight hour).
The Department of the Navy conducted a cost benefit analysis to
compare alternatives to mitigate the Strike Fighter Shortfall
considering cost, technical risk and operational requirements. The
result of the analysis shows that the shortfall cannot be mitigated to
a manageable level without Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) of
some legacy F/A-18s to meet operational requirements; procuring
additional F/A-18E/F alone will not mitigate the shortfall to a
manageable level. Moreover, over-buying F/A-18E/Fs now is not
consistent with the DoN strategy to procure one squadron of F-35C Joint
Strike Fighters for each active Carrier Air Wing (CVW). SLEPing legacy
aircraft as a bridge to the JSF is a much better transition strategy.
Consistent with this thinking, and as presented in the Fiscal Year
2012 President's Budget request, the DoN planned to procure a total of
556 F/A-8E/Fs and extend the service life (SLEP) of 150 F/A-18A-D
aircraft. The plan balances the strike fighter inventory requirement
within the Department's limited financial resources within the Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP), mitigates the shortfall to a manageable
level with acceptable risk. The addition of nine aircraft by Congress
in the Fiscal Year 2011 Appropriations Act will increase the number of
F/A-18E/Fs to 565, which will further reduce the risk associated with
the inventory shortfall.
Mr. Akin. Assuming that we cannot fill the strike fighter shortfall
what is your aircraft allocation plan for squadrons and airwings in the
future?
Secretary Mabus. The Department of the Navy (DON) has an existing
inventory of 628 Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18A-D aircraft that will
comprise over half of Naval Aviation's TACAIR force structure until
2013. They are scheduled to remain in the inventory through 2023. The
Navy has also received 418 F/A-18E/Fs to date.
In December 2010, the Secretary of Defense made changes to the
Programs of Record (POR) for both the F-35B/C and F/A-18E/F programs.
Compared to Fiscal Year 2011 President's Budget, the DON's procurement
of F-35B/C aircraft was decreased by 60 and the F/A-18E/F procurement
was increased by 41. This action also extended the last year of
procurement for the Super Hornets from Fiscal Year 2013 to Fiscal Year
2014. By adding 41 Super Hornets and extending the life of 150 F/A-18
A-D aircraft to 10,000 flight hours, the strike fighter shortfall
estimate has been reduced from about 100 aircraft to a peak of 65
aircraft, occurring in 2018. The Department has testified that this
level of aircraft shortfall is manageable.
DON's procurement objectives are presented in the FY-12 President's
Budget. The budget reflects the optimum balance of procuring new
aircraft for a total of 556 F/A-18E/Fs, extending the service life of
150 existing legacy Hornets, and procuring F-35B/Cs. This balanced
approach will address the Department's need for Tactical Aircraft to
meet requirements.
Mr. Akin. Have we included the savings in fuel costs of a Super
Hornet over a legacy Hornet in the long term cost analysis/benefit of
SLEPing a legacy Hornet versus a new Super Hornet purchase?
Secretary Mabus. The fuel consumption of a Super Hornet is
approximately 100 gals per hour more than a Legacy Hornet; this is
driven by engine design and aircraft weight. Hence, there are no fuel
savings. Fuel consumption for both Super Hornets and legacy Hornets has
been included in the Operations & Support cost estimates for each
respective aircraft in the Cost Benefit Analysis in support of the FY
2011 National Defense Authorization Act.
Mr. Akin. How many planes will the Department of the Navy be short
of its requirement of 1240 strike fighters at the peak of the strike
fighter shortfall?
Secretary Mabus. The Department of the Navy (DoN) is challenged
with a Strike Fighter Shortfall due to the current F/A-18A-D aircraft
reaching the end of their service life before the replacement aircraft
(the F-35B/C) can be delivered into service. To address this shortfall,
41 additional F/A-18E/F aircraft and 150 F/A-18A-D service life
extensions (SLEP) were added to the Fiscal Year 2012 President's Budget
request. These actions, in conjunctions with the Joint Strike Fighter
post-Technical Baseline Review procurement rate, reduces the inventory
shortfall to 65 aircraft in 2018. Congress' addition of 9 F/A-18E/F in
the FY11 appropriations process further reduces the predicted shortfall
peak to 52 aircraft in 2018. The DoN has determined that this shortfall
is a manageable level.
Mr. Akin. With ISR requirements increasing across the whole of the
DOD and the Navy specifically, the Air Force appears to be maxed out in
their ability to provide 24 hours coverage across the globe. What is
the Navy's need and capability to provide ISR for the short and long
term future?
Secretary Mabus. The Global Commons, which comprises the littoral
regions and the contiguous brown water and inshore areas, contains over
three-quarters of the world's population, over eighty percent of all
capital cities, and nearly all the marketplaces of international trade.
The United States ability to operate in the Global Commons is of
critical importance for all nations of the world who wish to be part of
the global economy and who wish to have free access to the markets of
the world. The United States Navy's ability to operate on the high seas
in the conduct of future operations requires an increasingly robust
maritime domain awareness of these waters and is the key driver for
future Navy ISR requirements. The United State's ability to influence
those regions and to win Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), as well
as future conflicts, requires not only control of the littorals, but
rest upon a clear understanding of what is happening on those waters.
The ability of existing and projected U.S. forces to gain access and
conduct sustained operations in this near-land battlespace can be
limited by the demanding natural environment (including restrictive
features such as choke points, high shipping densities, and shallow
waters) and a considerable adversary area-denial competency. All of
which necessitates a robust Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capability.
Another essential requirement exists to sustain and improve
maritime ISR capabilities for U.S. Naval forces in traditional, Joint
and combined roles to counter changing and emerging threats. Maritime
and littoral ISR demands already outstrip the capacities of available
naval ISR assets. The importance of establishing the capability of
launching ISR assets from a Sea Base cannot be understated. Sea Basing
offers an alternative to basing forces ashore in host nations that is
less vulnerable to attack from the opposition. Sea Basing also offers
the ability to quickly establish an ISR capability anywhere in the
world at a moment's notice.
The Navy's ISR ``Family of Systems'' integrates land-based and sea-
based, manned and unmanned air systems to increase capability across a
full spectrum of maritime and littoral missions while adhering to
fiscal restraints in a challenging budgetary environment. The legacy
platform, EP-3, will be sustained until the system is fully
recapitalized in accordance with the FY11 National Defense
Authorization Act and the 2008/2009 Consolidated Intelligence Guidance.
All aircraft will be sustained through the Special Structural
Inspections and Special Structural Inspection Kits. The Joint Airborne
SIGINT Common Configuration (JCC) includes the Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT) spiral upgrades. The latest upgrade, JCC Spiral 3, will meet
current threat and supportability challenges with advances in
technology, and will be the baseline for any EP-3 follow-on capability.
Currently, the Navy is focused on five land- and ship-based UAS
platforms:
1) Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS: An ACAT 1D program
with an FY16 IOC, the land-based BAMS will provide persistent (24
hours/day, 7 days/week), multi-sensor (radar, EO/IR, ESM) maritime
surveillance capability with worldwide access, enhancing situational
awareness of the battlespace and shortening the sensor-to-shooter kill
chain. BAMS UAS mission operations, which are adjunct to P-8A, will
share facilities and personnel between the manned and unmanned assets.
Additionally, Navy and Air Force are working together to exploit
synergies between the BAMS UAS and Global Hawk UAS programs. The FY12
President's Budget (PB 12) requests $ $548.5M in research, development,
testing, and evaluation (RDTEN).
2) Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike
(UCLASS): The UCLASS program will build upon technologies and lessons
learned from the Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D).
Utilizing the Northrop Grumman X-47B demonstrator air vehicles, UCAS-D
will perform catapult launches, arrested landings, flight operations in
the vicinity of a carrier, and automated air refueling by the end of
2013. The program of record, UCLASS, will enhance the Navy's
Information Dominance mission and will shorten the timeline to find,
fix, track, target, engage, and assess time sensitive targets. With an
initial capability in FY18 timeframe, the UCLASS system will integrate
with the carrier air wings to increase the flexibility, versatility,
and capability of the carrier force. PB12 provides $121.2M in RDTEN
funding for UCLASS and $198.3M in RDTEN funding for the UCAS-D.
3) MQ-8 Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff UAV (VTUAV): The MQ-8 system is
designed to operate as an integral component of the Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS) Mission Modules and from hangar-equipped, air-capable ships
with an FY12 Initial Operational Capability (IOC). OSD directed Navy to
support interim Special Operations Force (SOF) maritime sea-based
urgent needs through FY18 using MQ-8 until a new Medium Endurance
Maritime UAS is fielded. Support includes increasing aircraft and ship
control station procurement, integration onto twelve additional ships,
and implementing an Engineering Change that increases MQ-8 endurance
(the larger airframe VTUAV+) and integrates mission specific payloads.
Also, Navy is using the Rapid Deployment Capability process to
integrate a weaponization capability. The PB12 funding request includes
$108.2M in RDTEN and $192.0M in APN.
4) Medium Range Maritime UAS (MRMUAS): MRMUAS is a planned FY11/12
new start program to develop a multi-intelligence ISR and targeting
platform capable of operations from any hangar-equipped, air-capable
ship in support of MDA and Irregular Warfare mission sets, including
maritime ISR in support of SOF. The PB12 funding request includes
$15.0M in RDTEN.
5) Small Tactical UAS (STUAS): STUAS is an organic ISR asset for
Navy Special Warfare (NSW) and LSD-41 class ships with an FY13 IOC. It
provides the deployed unit the capability to control its own ISR
capability for use at the tactical level. The Navy plans to buy four
systems. USMC still plans to buy 32 systems and shares RDTEN costs with
the Navy. PB12 funding includes $12.8M in APN and $22.7M in RDTEN.
Mr. Akin. For the last ten years we have been operating our
aircraft carriers and battle group in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean
regions leaving a power vacuum in the Mediterranean. With the recent
uprising in Tunisia, Egypt and now Libya do you see a need for our
carrier navy to reassert itself in the Mediterranean Ocean and what
affect will that have on our Fleet Readiness Plan and carrier Cycles?
Admiral Roughead. Carrier Strike Group's are deployed in the
Mediterranean several times per year. There are several factors
involved in the timing and duration of those deployments. At this time,
bolstered by the deployments of our coalition partners, there is no
requirement for continuous Carrier Strike Group deployments in the
Mediterranean. If additional carrier presence is required in the
Mediterranean Sea, carriers could be shifted from other areas of the
world or we could adjust training and maintenance schedules.
Mr. Akin. The QDR independent panel recommended a fleet size of
roughly 340 ships. What kind of budget would you need to get to a 340
ship fleet?
Admiral Roughead. The cost of a 340-ship Navy depends upon the
capabilities and mix of ships desired in the Fleet; the associated
effects and costs related to the shipbuilding industrial base,
including second and third tier suppliers; and the manpower and
operations and maintenance funding necessary to operate a 340-ship
Navy. These factors must be determined before addressing the resources
required to get to a 340-ship Navy.
Mr. Akin. The Navy has seen a steady decline in their manning
numbers through such force shaping tools such as Perform-To-Serve
(PTS). This has been occurring at the same time as their OPTEMPO has
been steadily increasing through the War on Terror, our other Deployed
Assets and Humanitarian response. At what point do you believe the Navy
will reach their breaking point with regards to dwell time?
Admiral Roughead. The metrics we use to assess impact to the force
on high operating tempo and lower dwell time, indicate we are operating
within acceptable parameters, and that we are not approaching a
breaking point for our sailors. While we are currently experiencing
high tempo with particular units or within certain mission areas, Navy
expects to remain above established Dwell limits based on current and
projected operational requirements.
Mr. Akin. What are the costs associated with the purchase and later
SLAP of an F-18E/F over a current SLEP of a current F-18C? Is it not
more cost effective long term to purchase a more capable platform that
can last for 9000 hours then to extend a legacy system for 1400
additional hours?
Admiral Roughead. During the five-year timeframe in which our
strike fighter shortfall will peak, there is not a significant yearly
cost difference between performing SLEP on our F/A-18A-D aircraft and
procuring new F/A-18E/F aircraft when the costs are amortized over 5
and 20 years respectively. Costs associated with extending the F/A-18A-
D aircraft and operating them for an additional five years is estimated
at $10.2 million a year, per aircraft. Procuring additional F/A-18E/F
aircraft and operating them for five years is estimated to be $10.8
million per year. The Navy's decision to SLEP 150 F/A-18A-D aircraft
and procure 41 additional F/A-18E/F aircraft and the Joint Strike
Fighter is the most viable and cost effective strategy to mitigate the
impact of the projected strike fighter shortfall. (Costs provided in
CY11$.)
The Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) for F/A-18E/F is
underway; however there is no cost estimate on extending F/A-18E/Fs to
9,000 flight hours. F/A-18E/F SLAP effort has not produced data yet to
support a cost estimate for SLEP of E/F, therefore those costs are not
included in the comparison.
Mr. Akin. Assuming that we cannot fill the strike fighter shortfall
what is your aircraft allocation plan for squadrons and airwings in the
future?
Admiral Roughead. Navy's peak strike fighter shortfall of 65
aircraft in 2018 is manageable. With the fidelity and understanding we
possess today, we do not plan to develop an alternative allocation plan
for dealing with our anticipated strike fighter shortfall. Should Navy
experience a greater strike fighter shortfall than expected, we will
investigate a variety of options for dealing with the projected
shortfall.
Mr. Akin. Have we included the savings in fuel costs of a Super
Hornet over a legacy Hornet in the long term cost analysis/benefit of
SLEPing a legacy Hornet versus a new Super Hornet purchase?
Admiral Roughead. Fuel consumption for both Super Hornets and
Legacy Hornets has been included in the Operations & Support cost
estimates in the SLEP Cost Benefit Analysis conducted in support of the
FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act. Because the fuel
consumption of a Super Hornet is approximately 100 gals per hour more
than a legacy Hornet, we do not anticipate any fuel-related cost
savings.
Mr. Akin. How many planes will the Department of the Navy be short
of its requirement of 1240 strike fighters at the peak of the strike
fighter shortfall?
Admiral Roughead. Based on the 2012 President's Budget, the
Department of the Navy projects it will experience a peak inventory
shortfall of 65 aircraft in 2018, should the following conditions
exist: accelerated transition of ten F/A-18 legacy Hornet squadrons
into Super Hornets; the service life extension of approximately 150
legacy Hornets; and procurement of a total of 556 F/A-18E/F Super
Hornets. As I testified, this aircraft shortfall is manageable.
Mr. Akin. With ISR requirements increasing across the whole of the
DOD and the Navy specifically, the Air Force appears to be maxed out in
their ability to provide 24 hours coverage across the globe. What is
the Navy's need and capability to provide ISR for the short and long
term future?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy's need to conduct current and future
operations in service, Joint and combined roles requires robust
maritime domain awareness and is the primary driver for Navy
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements.
Current demand for maritime and littoral ISR exceeds existing Navy
ISR capacity. We are investing in an ISR ``Family of Systems'' that
integrates land-based and sea-based, manned and unmanned, air systems
to increase ISR capability and capacity for the full spectrum of
maritime and littoral missions. Programs essential to improving our ISR
capability and capacity include: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
(BAMS) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne
Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system, MQ-8 Fire Scout Vertical
Takeoff UAV (VTUAV), Medium Range Maritime UAS (MRMUAS), and Small
Tactical UAS (STUAS). Our Presidential Budget FY12 submission funds
development and/or procurement of each of these systems. We will
continue to sustain and modernize our EP-3 aircraft, including spiral
upgrades of SIGINT capability, until a replacement capability can be
fielded.
Mr. Akin. What is your goal for the cost of the replacement for the
EFV?
General Amos. We will assess affordability of future vehicles based
on assumptions of a declining budgetary environment. Historically,
ground combat and tactical vehicle procurement has accounted for 33% of
our overall Service level procurement account. The addition of the EFV
alone at a projected $17M cost per vehicle in a continuously forecasted
declining budgetary environment would have consumed the preponderance
of our procurement account and 100% of our operations and maintenance
account through 2025. Procuring a modern amphibious vehicle at a unit
cost of $8M (calculated in FY11 dollars) is affordable based on
procurement budget projections. Operations and maintenance allocations
are expected at 7% annually of the vehicle price, or $560K/year per
vehicle. A vehicle of $12M also is affordable if funding continues at
the projected FY16 level. Therefore, we judge that a range of $8-12M
per vehicle is affordable
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. Secretary Mabus, there seems to be some confusion
here on the Hill about the Administration's position on the realignment
of Marines from Okinawa, Japan to Guam. Can you detail the rationale
behind the current budget of $155 million for military construction on
Guam directly related to the military build-up? This direct U.S.
funding for the realignment is significantly smaller than the
Government of Japan contributions. Why is there a discrepancy and does
this mean there is any shift in position by the Obama Administration
for the realignment of Marines? In my opinion, the current funding
level seems consistent with concerns that were raised by this Committee
last year and are concurrent with the Adaptive Program Management
mitigation measure outlined in the Record of Decision but we would
appreciate your insights on this matter.
Secretary Mabus. In determining the request for FY-12, the
Department considered the concerns noted by Congress in the FY-11
National Defense Authorization Act Joint Explanatory Statement. The
Department is committed to executing the realignment in a deliberate
manner and funding decisions were made to take the time to work towards
resolution of these issues. Additionally, as discussed in the Record of
Decision for the Guam and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
Military Buildup, the Department will use Adaptive Program Management
to adjust the pace and sequencing of construction projects so that the
buildup does not exceed Guam's infrastructure capacities. Efforts are
underway to increase the capacity of Guam's commercial port, using; $50
million in Department of Defense (DOD) funding and $54 million in
United States Department of Agriculture financing; improve roadways
using Defense Access Road funding ($49M authorized in FY10 and $67M
authorized in FY11); and address critical improvements to Guam's
utilities systems by applying financing from the Government of Japan.
As these upgrades come online, the pace of construction can be adjusted
accordingly. Projects requested in FY-12 are those that are necessary
at this time to support future vertical construction and also to
support the introduction of off-island workers necessary to ramp-up
construction over the next few years.
At $167 million, the Government of Japan's direct cash contribution
for Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 2011 is comparable to DOD's $156 million
request. The Japanese Diet is currently considering $415 million in
utilities financing in JFY-11 in addition to the direct cash
contribution. $273 million of this utilities financing will be applied
to critical upgrades to wastewater systems off-base, which will support
the relocating Marines and Guam's population growth in the long-term
and in time to support the requirements of the off-island construction
workforce. The balance of the JFY-11 utilities financing will be used
for improvements to the Navy's water system on base and will eventually
be married up with the P-2048 Finegayan Water Utilities FY12 MILCON
project request. Coupled with the efforts noted above, these
improvements will allow for the construction program to ramp-up.
Ms. Bordallo. My top legislative priority is the passage of H.R. 44
the Guam World War II Loyalty Recognition Act. We advanced the bill
forward with the Senate by agreeing to some compromises but that was
due in large part to the Department of Defense's support. As you know,
the people of Guam are expected to concede additional land for a firing
range for the Marines and I would be remiss if I didn't point out that
the resolution of Guam war claims is important to getting the build-up
done right. To that end, Secretary Mabus and General Amos can we count
on both of you to support H.R. 44? Is there recognition of the
importance of this bill's passage to getting the build-up done right?
Secretary Mabus. The Department understands the importance of
resolving war reparations to the people of Guam. In December 2010,
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn sent a letter to Senate Armed
Services Committee chairman Senator Carl Levin in support of the Guam
Loyalty Recognition Act. The Department remains in support of the Guam
Loyalty Recognition Act as stated in the letter.
Ms. Bordallo. Under Secretary Work outlined 4 key pillars for the
military build-up and one of those was 24/7, unimpeded access to the
Pagat cave and nearby historical and cultural sites. Can you tell me
what is being done to reconfigure to the potential firing range to meet
this pillar? I remain skeptical that the Department of Defense will be
able to obtain the land necessary for this firing range and so, again,
I urge the Marines and the Department of the Navy to seriously consider
using Tinian for the firing range to meet the full spectrum of
individual and unit-sized training that is necessary. Are the Marines
continuing to look into Tinian to meet the full spectrum of training
requirements?
General Amos. The Department of the Navy has not yet issued the
Training Record of Decision finalizing the location of the firing
ranges at Route 15. When that decision is made and a follow-on survey
of the Route 15 area occurs, the Marine Corps will be able to finalize
a range design that allows 24/7 unimpeded access to the Pagat
historical site. The ranges planned in the Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) for Guam are critical to meeting Marine Corps
individual training requirements. The Tinian ranges outlined in the
FEIS complement, rather than replace, the Guam ranges and provide
limited small unit common skills training utilizing up to 5.56mm
ammunition only.
Ms. Bordallo. My top legislative priority is the passage of H.R. 44
the Guam World War II Loyalty Recognition Act. We advanced the bill
forward with the Senate by agreeing to some compromises but that was
due in large part to the Department of Defense's support. As you know,
the people of Guam are expected to concede additional land for a firing
range for the Marines and I would be remiss if I didn't point out that
the resolution of Guam war claims is important to getting the build-up
done right. To that end, Secretary Mabus and General Amos can we count
on both of you to support H.R. 44? Is there recognition of the
importance of this bill's passage to getting the build-up done right?
General Amos. The Marine Corps fully supports the Department of
Defense position in support of the Guam World War II Loyalty
Recognition Act as stated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his
December 8, 2010 letter to Chairman Levin. The Marine Corps lauds the
courage and fidelity displayed by the people of Guam during this dark
chapter in their history and acknowledges this legislation as a
significant step forward in providing closure for the People of Guam
who endured unimaginable hardship, but who never lost faith in the
United States.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. 1. Given predicted FY12 shortfall of $367 million and
deferral of 44 maintenance availabilities, how do you plan to maintain
a ready surface fleet that meets estimated service life and reduces
INSURV failure rate?
Secretary Mabus. Although it would be desirable not to defer
maintenance, most of the work being deferred are the small, non-
docking, pier-side surface ship maintenance periods that we know by
experience can be temporarily delayed without substantial risk to
achieving expected service life. The Surface Maintenance Engineering
Planning Program (SURFMEPP) enables the Navy to mitigate risk by using
available funding to schedule and complete the most critical
maintenance in FY12. SURFMEPP also formally tracks deferred work and
reschedules it for future maintenance periods, allowing future budget
requirements to accurately reflect the full surface ship maintenance
requirement. The FY12 President's Budget represents the best balance of
risk and available resources across the Navy Enterprise portfolio.
Mr. Forbes. 2. With regards to your ongoing Force Structure
Assessment:
a. What assurances will you provide Congress that your conclusions
on required force structure are based on the totality of threats and
the strategy to handle those threats rather than driven by budgetary
constraints?
b. In light of numerous recent INSURV failures and clear evidence
that the expected service lives of our ships are being reduced due to
deferred and unperformed maintenance, can we expect the Force Structure
Assessment to consider shorter service lives of our current fleet in
assessing the future requirements?
c. On Feb 3, 2010, the Secretary of Defense testified that the
``outyears toward the end of the 2030's'' of the 30-year shipbuilding
plan ``is mainly fantasy.'' Given this assessment, should we be
prepared to see a lowering of the current ``floor'' of 313 ships,
driven by budgetary pressures, when the Force Structure Assessment is
released?
Secretary Mabus. a. In addition to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower and the Naval Operations Concept 2010, the Quadrennial
Defense Review, Nuclear Posture Review and Ballistic Missile Defense
Review provided strategic guidance, threat assessments and analysis
that validated Navy's force structure requirements. This guidance
supports a global posture of distributed, mission-tailored ships,
aircraft, and units capable of regionally concentrated combat
operations and peacetime theater security cooperation.
The Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels projects the
affordable procurement and available inventory of ships over the next
30 years. This shipbuilding plan is where the Navy balances the demands
for naval forces with expected future resources.
b. The Navy force structure requirements provide sufficient
rotation base to sustain global posture indefinitely without
jeopardizing service lives of platforms. Additionally, the Navy will
carefully manage and closely monitor the material condition of these
legacy ships during the various maintenance and modernization periods
as they progress through their service lives. The Navy intends to
utilize spiral upgrades to the maximum extent possible to help
modernize existing ships and prevent block obsolescence causing
unacceptable gaps in capability and capacity.
c. 313 remains the floor. Since the release of the Maritime
Strategy, the Chief of Naval Operations has stated that the Navy
requires a minimum of 313 ships to meet operational requirements
globally. This minimum remains valid. The Navy will continue to examine
this requirement in conjunction with the increased operational demands
and expanding requirements for ballistic missile defense, intra-theater
lift, and irregular challenges.
Mr. Forbes. Regarding the Department of the Navy proposal to base a
carrier in Mayport, FL beginning in 2019:
a. In testimony before the House Armed Service Committee on January
26th, 2011, VADM Greenert stated that the move to Mayport was
considered when the Department of the Navy evaluated it's efficiency
initiatives and that the strategic necessity of the move outweighed the
cost. In a conversation with Under Secretary of the Navy Work on
January 6th, I was informed that the Mayport proposal was not
considered in the efficiency decision. Which of these statements is
accurate?
b. If the Navy evaluated this proposal as part of its efficiency
determination, please provide this analysis.
c. How does the strategic priority of basing a carrier at Mayport
compare with the priority of fully funding the maintenance of our
existing fleet to ensure that our current inventory of ships achieve
their intended service life? Please provide details.
d. Given that the FY12 budget proposal includes $15 million for
road improvements at Naval Station Mayport in anticipation of future
carrier basing, along with an additional $549 million in other related
MILCON over the next 3 years, why is the Navy willing to accept a $367
million shortfall in its ship repair account and the deferral of 44
maintenance availabilities?
Secretary Mabus. a. Admiral Greenert testified that the costs
associated with moving a nuclear carrier to Mayport were considered as
part of the Navy's ``budget preparation'', vice as an efficiency. This
is not contradictory with Under Secretary Work's statement that the
costs associated with moving a nuclear carrier to Mayport were not
considered in the efficiency initiatives.
b. This proposal was not evaluated as part of the efficiency
initiatives.
c. Both are strategic priorities. The Navy's budget submission
represents the best balance of funding amongst all priorities.
d. The Navy's FY12 budget submission, which includes $15M for road
improvements at Naval Station Mayport, and an additional $398M in other
related MILCON across the FYDP for completing the remaining projects
necessary to homeport a carrier there, represents the best balance of
funding amongst all the Navy's priorities. Although we will defer $367M
of maintenance, primarily in the Surface Force, the work accomplished
by the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP)
enables us to mitigate risk by scheduling and completing the most
critical maintenance in FY12.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS
Ms. Giffords. In relation to the Navy's ``Green Hornet'' Program,
where a Navy F/A-18 successfully completed test flights using a 50/50
bio-fuel blend and the Marines Corps' 3rd Battalion 5th Marines
employment of the Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) in
Afghanistan can you answer the following questions:
How do these types of programs fit within the context of
the Navy's overall Operational Energy Strategy?
What is the inter-service process for sharing these
operational energy lessons learned?
Can you describe the strategic impact of access to a
scaleable bio-fuel on the Department of the Navy's global roles and
responsibilities?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead. The Navy's Biofuels Program
and the Marine Corps' Experimental Forward Operating Base Program are
on the leading edge of our Operational Energy initiatives. In order to
achieve the SECNAV goal of having 50% of Department of the Navy's
energy come from alternative sources by 2020, we need to be bold and
innovative. Our operational energy strategy relies on programs like
these to continually push the envelope.
Within our biofuels program, we are sharing data and information on
our testing and certification process on our hydrotreated renewable jet
fuels. We are going to work together on the CV-22/MV-22 airframe since
Navy and Air Force both fly it. With the lessons learned in our
Experimental Forward Operating Base, we are sharing the technologies
and information with the Navy Expeditionary Warfare Group and the Army.
The Department of the Navy's switch to biofuels, in and of itself,
will not reduce the nation's total energy consumption by a significant
margin. To achieve this and extend our tactical reach, the Department
of the Navy is pursuing energy efficiency initiatives, which together
with the use of alternative fuels will achieve significant cost
savings, guarantee energy supply, and reduce operational risk.
Benefits of our approach include:
Cost savings. Increasing our use of alternative energy
sources helps us achieve a level of protection from energy price
volatility. For every $10 increase in the cost of a barrel of oil, the
Navy spends an additional $300 million dollars a year. Operating more
efficiently saves money by reducing the amount we spend for fuel.
Savings can be reinvested to strengthen combat capability. The cheapest
barrel of fuel afloat or kilowatt-hour ashore is the one we will never
use.
Guaranteed Supply. Our reliance on energy can be
exploited by potential adversaries. Efficiency and alternatives may be
our best countermeasure. Energy efficiency increases our mission
effectiveness by expanding our range and endurance, and reducing our
need for logistics support. Efficiency improvements minimize
operational risks of that logistics tether, saving time, money, and
lives. Alternative fuels provide the Navy an `off-ramp from petroleum,'
mitigating the risk to a volatile and ever more expensive petroleum
market.
Early Adopter of Technologies. The military has often led
in the development of new technologies where there was a compelling
military use, even if the civilian use was ultimately greater (ex. GPS,
the Internet). The operational use of alternative fuels by the
Department of the Navy will be hastened by collaborating with federal
agencies and private industry at every step of the research,
development, and certification process. The alternative fuel program
establishes the Department of the Navy as an early adopter for
investors in a nascent industry that could significantly enhance energy
security, and thereby national security, in the mid- to long-term.
Fossil Fuel Independence. The Navy recognizes that our
dependence on fossil fuels and foreign sources of oil makes us more
susceptible to price shocks, supply shocks, natural and man-made
disasters, and political unrest in countries far from our shores.
Combat Capability. Making our ships and aircraft more
efficient improves their fuel economy. We can increase the days between
refueling for our ships, improving their security and combat
capability. We can also extend the range of our aircraft strike
missions, allowing us to launch our aircraft farther away from combat
areas. Increasing our efficiency and the diversity in our sources of
fuel improves our combat capability strategically and tactically.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER
Mr. Miller. Secretary Mabus, according to recent media reports, the
Secretary of the Army has halted the insourcing of contractor positions
within his department because the expected cost savings were not
realized. Do you plan to implement a similar freeze within the
Department of the Navy?
Secretary Mabus. The DON is not abandoning all in-sourcing, but re-
evaluating priorities and all workforce balancing efforts to meet FY
2012 budget expectations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL
Mr. Kissell. 1. When will the Navy achieve a 50% bio-fuel usage
level?
Admiral Roughead. DoN does not have a specific bio-fuel usage goal.
The Secretary of the Navy's goal is for DoN tactical energy use to
consume at least 50% alternative energy, to include nuclear, by 2020.
Mr. Kissell. 2. What percent of Navy fuel is nuclear? What
percentage will be nuclear once we achieve 50% bio-fuel usage level?
Admiral Roughead. Tactical fuel usage is defined as all fuel usage
to maintain operations of our ships (including logistics ships),
submarines, aircraft, and expeditionary ground vehicles/equipment. The
Navy currently utilizes nuclear propulsion only for its aircraft
carriers and submarines. As the below graph indicates, the Navy's
tactical energy usage today is 72% petroleum and 28% nuclear power.
Nuclear power's contribution is not projected to change appreciably as
the Navy goes about achieving the Secretary of the Navy's energy goal
of 50% alternatives by 2020. As is graphically depicted, Navy's Energy
Vision is multi-faceted: enhancing our combat capability through
operational efficiencies, an ethos towards energy that saves us 5M
barrels of oil per year by 2020, and supplanting 8M barrels of
petroleum with `drop-in' biofuels to give us an `off-ramp', in terms of
price and availability, from petroleum. Much of this fuel, particularly
for our local training needs, could be domestically produced. Together
with nuclear, these new fuels will reduce our risk to petroleum
volatility.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5108.103
Mr. Kissell. 3. What type of bio-fuel is being utilized?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy is currently testing and evaluating
hydrotreated renewable fuels. These fuels are derived from algae and
camelina.
Mr. Kissell. 4. What is the Navy's/DOD's primary source of bio-
fuel?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy is currently testing and evaluating
hydrotreated renewable fuels derived from algae and camelina. Defense
Logistics Agency--Energy (DLA Energy) procures all fuels for the Navy
through competitive procurement.
Mr. Kissell. 5. What is the daily percentage of bio-fuel
consumption in all Department of the Navy operations?
Admiral Roughead. Bio-fuel usage for tactical systems is limited to
test and evaluation only. It is not yet approved for operational use
and therefore not currently incorporated into the DON fuel supply.
Mr. Kissell. 6. What percentage of total naval fuel consumption is
this (bio-fuel usage)?
Admiral Roughead. Currently 0% of total naval tactical fuel
consumption is from biofuel. In FY09 and FY10, 285,000 gallons of bio-
fuel were procured for test and evaluation purposes only.
Mr. Kissell. 7. What is the Navy's current capability to produce
bio-fuels? If the Navy is not the lead on production then what efforts
are the Navy and the Department of Defense taking to establish a
production capacity that will facilitate a 50% bio-fuel usage by 2020?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy is only testing and evaluating biofuel
to support the Secretary of the Navy's goal for 50% alternative energy
use (including nuclear) by 2020. The Navy is not producing and does not
plan to produce bio-fuel. The Navy and the Department of Defense are
partnering with commercial entities that use biofuels to establish a
demand signal that demonstrates industry viability. Additionally, the
Navy and Department of Defense are partnering with the Department of
Energy and the US Department of Agriculture to spur biofuel
development.
Mr. Kissell. 8. What generation bio-fuel is being utilized?
Admiral Roughead. The classification system used to categorize the
generation of bio-fuels has not been standardized; however, the Navy is
testing a range of bio-fuels, which include those considered to be
second or third generation fuels.
Mr. Kissell. 9. What efforts/initiatives is the Navy implementing
to address the Chinese anti-ship missile?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy has made significant investment in
kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to counter the threat of anti-ship
ballistic missiles and advanced cruise missiles, including increased
investment in Aegis modernization, which will upgrade our existing
Aegis technology to continually improve our Integrated Air and Missile
Defense capability. I would be pleased to provide a classified briefing
for you to address our efforts in more detail.
Mr. Kissell. What is the impact to the 3-1 dwell time effort by the
Marine Corps, once the Marine Corps achieves their target reduction of
at least 15,000 Marines?
General Amos. Our overall objective is a 1:3 deployment-to-dwell
ratio for the Marine Corps Active Component and a 1:5 deployment-to-
dwell ratio for the Reserve Component in a post-Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM (OEF) environment. Currently, my stated goal, in concert with
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is for deployment-to-dwell
ratios in support of combat operations in Afghanistan to be 1:2 for the
Marine Corps Active Component and 1:4 for the Reserve Component.
Based on our current force level in support of OEF and other global
force requirements, the Marine Corps could achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-
dwell ratio across the Service within 18-24 months following the
scheduled OEF draw-down. The Marine Corps' deployment-to-dwell ratio
will continue to improve in a post-OEF environment and reach the stated
goals of 1:3/1:5 as we balance requirements in support of the
Geographic Combatant Commanders and the President's draw-down plan for
Afghanistan.
Establishing a sustainable deployment-to-dwell ratio is based upon
forces available and the need to meet our global operational demands.
We will closely monitor the pace of reduction in our end strength to
best support Geographical Combatant Commander requirements while also
fostering the best health and resiliency of our Total Force.
Mr. Kissell. If the Marines are going to maintain their amphibious,
assault capability following the cancellation of the EFV (Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle). What efforts are currently ongoing by the Marine
Corps to maintain this capability? How quickly will the Marines
introduce a proposal to take the EFV's place or refurbish their current
fleet of amphibious assault vehicles? What is the expected
refurbishment and maintenance cost to ensure an operational capability
with an older fleet and what is the timeline for refurbishment?
General Amos. Instead of procuring the EFV, the Marine Corps will
pursue an integrated new vehicle program crafted from the beginning for
affordability and taking advantage of the investment made in the EFV.
As we move forward, the Marine Corps intends to mitigate risks
associated with a new vehicle program and to maximize value by the use
of an integrated acquisition portfolio approach. This approach will
have three efforts: 1) an acceleration of the planned procurement of
Marine Personnel Carriers (MPC); 2) investment in a service life
extension program (SLEP) and upgrades for a portion of the existing
amphibious assault vehicles (AAV); and 3) the development of a new
amphibious combat vehicle (ACV). We will manage the overall
requirements and acquisition of these from a portfolio perspective.
From an investment perspective, and understanding the imperative for a
modern amphibious vehicle capability, the Amphibious Combat Vehicle
emerges as a priority effort.
From the perspective of current operations and near term relevance,
the AAV SLEP is a near-term operational priority. We must upgrade a
portion of the current inventory of AAVs now in order to provide a more
survivable capability until the ACV is fielded. The complementary
capability to achieve greater protection for our forces is the Marine
Personnel Carrier.
The Amphibious Combat Vehicle and the Marine Personnel Carrier
represent the modern and enduring capability solution. The ACV will
provide the surface amphibious assault capability and will be the heavy
armored combat vehicle during sustained operations ashore. The MPC will
provide armored mobility for the reinforcing element of the amphibious
assault and will also provide armor protected mobility during sustained
operations ashore. As the MPC is a wheeled vehicle, we envision it as a
versatile platform capable of employment across the Range of Military
Operations and in urban settings, and it will incorporate the high
levels of underbody protection needed in an irregular warfare
environment. Together, the ACV and MPC will satisfy the Marine Corps'
lift requirement for 12 infantry battalions- 8 Battalions supported by
ACV and 4 Battalions supported by MPC.
Prior to EFV cancellation, we funded a basic AAV Survivability
Improvement Program which would add armor and blast protective seats,
and also would move the fuel tank. Early analysis in support of that
effort has begun and will proceed to research and development in FY12.
We are now developing an additional upgrade for the AAV. This new
initiative is intended to improve the AAV's mobility, lethality,
communications, environmental and habitability capabilities and provide
a bridge in capability until the Amphibious Combat Vehicle enters
service. The timing of the decision for a comprehensive SLEP is
dependent on how rapidly we can acquire a replacement amphibious
vehicle.
The Marine Corps released a series of ``Requests for Information''
(RFI) to industry in February covering the three vehicles that comprise
the Amphibious Vehicle portfolio. Responses to the RFI, received in
May, will provide a better understanding of available technology and
associated costs.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. General Amos, the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed off on a
letter conveying their ``strong support for the military health care
program changes that are included in the President's proposed fiscal
year 2012 budget.''
a. Please explain in your own words why you support the proposed
changes.
b. These changes will go beyond the beneficiaries and will impact
the people who support the Department of Defense health system. Are you
concerned about the implications these changes will have on hospital
employees, pharmacists, vendors, just to name a few? In your opinion,
will these effects harm the quality and access to care for our service
members, military retirees, and their families?
c. For example, there are hospitals located very close to Camp
Lejeune, New River Air Station, Beaufort Air Station, Parris Island and
Yuma Air Station that will be significantly affected by the plan to
reduce the rate that TRICARE pays them to care for our beneficiaries.
Does that concern you?
General Amos. I support the proposed changes because I believe they
will allow the Department of Defense to continue providing the finest
health care benefits in the country for our active and retired service
members and their families while also ensuring that the Department
remains a responsible financial steward of the taxpayers' investment in
our military. The Marine Corps, along with the other Services, will
actively monitor any negative trends on access to or quality of care,
but I do not anticipate any unfavorable impacts in these parameters as
a result of the military health care program proposals outlined in the
President's FY12 budget.
The proposed changes will facilitate the application of current
Medicare criteria to determine which hospitals that provide access to
service members should receive special designations to ensure that they
are appropriately compensated. These criteria are applied to all
hospitals in the United States that request a special status from
Medicare. TRICARE has similarly adopted these criteria to appropriately
compensate hospitals that regularly support service member care.
Some hospitals that regularly receive TRICARE funding, including
some that serve Marines, have received a special designation in the
past for which they may no longer qualify due to changes peculiar to
their local conditions. In these cases, a level playing field would
dictate that they be re-classified.
Mr. Wilson. General Amos, in light of the results of the F-35's
technical baseline review and the previous initial operating capability
date of 2012, when does the Marine Corps now plan to achieve F-35B
initial operating capability?
General Amos. Our plan is to maintain our operational requirements,
field the aircraft, train to the capabilities as they are cleared for
operational use and achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) when the
program office and contractor delivers the aircraft without
limitations. IOC will depend on the results of the Joint Program Office
technical and sustainment reviews. It also will depend on when we have
a more clear understanding on flight test plans, software development
improvements, and aircraft delivery schedules.
Delivery of aircraft to the first training squadron will occur
later this year. Delivery of our first operational aircraft is
anticipated in 2012.
Mr. Wilson. General Amos, what risks do you see of the F-35B not
meeting its cost, schedule, and performance objectives in the two-year
probationary period?
General Amos. The current two-year probationary period brings with
it a reduced rate of production. In turn, this slows down our rate of
transition from legacy tactical fighter aircraft--F/A-18 and AV-8B--all
of which are nearing the end of their service lives. While we are
pursuing Service Life Extension Programs of these older 4th generation
planes to mitigate risk and be a bridging capability until we fully
field the F-35B, extended delays in this transition process will place
greater burdens on our already operationally stressed legacy platforms.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SUTTON
Ms. Sutton. A key component of modernizing our infrastructure,
preserving our military assets, and saving money in the process is
adopting a robust corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy. It is
not a glamorous topic, but it's one that is worth our time and
attention, especially given the potential savings if we address it in a
smart and appropriate way.
The San Diego Business Journal reported on Monday, February 28
about the struggles the Navy faces with respect to rust and corrosion.
The article quotes retired Navy captain Pat Garrett, who spoke of the
early decommissioning of ships in the Spruance class partly due to
decay of the vessels.
If you could, I'd like to hear--with respect to the Navy and Marine
Corps--what potential issues you may face with corrosion.
Are there any specific programs or assets currently experiencing
these problems due to corrosion? How can this committee best support
DoD prevention and mitigation efforts to tackle corrosion and do you
believe sufficient funding and resources have been devoted to address
this issue?
Secretary Mabus and General Amos. Due to the location of many of
our bases near significant bodies of water and the amphibious nature of
our operations, Marine Corps maintenance efforts against corrosion are
critical to extending the life-cycle and preserving the readiness of
the fleet. Our assets stationed in Japan and Hawaii are most
susceptible to corrosion due to the humid environment. One of the
assets most damaged by corrosion is the quad container, often requiring
extensive repair or disposal and procurement of new assets.
Over the past several years, the Marine Corps has developed a
robust Corrosion Prevention and Control Program (CPAC) focused on the
identification of corrosion levels on our ground tactical equipment;
followed by correction of the corrosion damage identified; and finally
by the prevention and management of corrosion levels on ground tactical
equipment. Our CPAC protocol is currently tracking and maintaining
corrosion levels on more than 71,000 assets. We globally employ eight
Mobile Corrosion Service Teams that update corrosion assessment data
and apply Corrosion Prevention Compounds to preserve and protect Marine
Corps equipment from harsh operating environments.
The Marine Corps also maintains a field-level repair capability
that repairs corrosion related damage when identified through the
corrosion assessments completed by the Marine Corps CPAC Program
Office. The field-level Corrosion Repair Facilities provide the
operational commander with the capability to repair equipment.
The Marine Corps has also developed a robust on-the-lot
Dehumidification Program which provides the unit commander with
dehumidified space for staging equipment when not in-use. Previous
reports identify an investment return at a minimum of 9:1, with the use
of dehumidification in protecting equipment.
The Marine Corps CPAC Program Office maintains an aggressive
research and development program to locate, identify, evaluate and/or
develop best corrosion prevention materials and procedures. These
efforts support both the acquisition community and the field user.
Our investment in corrosion prevention and control over the past
several years will continue to pay dividends by decreasing total
ownership costs and improving equipment readiness. However, as budgets
become increasingly constrained, a major challenge will be maintaining
sufficient operations and maintenance funding in the baseline budgets
for corrosion control.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. Secretary Mabus, can you discuss how the missile
defense mission and the multi-mission capability of Aegis ballistic
missile defense (BMD) ships are affecting the overall force structure
requirements for the Aegis fleet? How is the Navy managing the limited
number of Aegis BMD ships when demand is greater than supply?
Secretary Mabus. Navy force structure accounts for the employment
of Aegis ships in multi-mission roles rather than for exclusive
missions, such as BMD, on an enduring basis. Single mission use, as for
BMD, may result in shortages in other mission areas and a loss of
operational flexibility for the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC).
The preferred Navy operating concept for maritime BMD features a
graduated readiness posture that would allow BMD-capable surface
combatants to be on an operational tether and available for other
tasking when not directly involved in active BMD operations. Surface
combatants operating in support of a BMD mission do not lose the
capability to conduct other missions; however, specific mission
effectiveness may be affected by ships' position and/or application of
ship resources to those missions.
Navy analysis of evolving BMD and other mission area requirements
indicates that the current Navy BMD upgrade plan will support BMD
Global Force Management requirements while simultaneously fulfilling
Navy's requirements in other mission areas.
Mr. Turner. Secretary Mabus, according to a Defense News article in
June 2010, ``U.S. Aegis Radars' Readiness Plunges,'' the Aegis radar
systems are ``in their worst shape ever, raising questions about the
surface fleet's ability to take on its high-profile new mission next
year defending Europe from ballistic missiles.'' Discuss any Aegis
readiness concerns you may have and how it might impact the Navy's
ability to meet missile defense mission requirements.
Secretary Mabus. I am confident in Navy's ability to meet our
missile defense requirements. While several reports and studies
completed last year, as part of Navy's ongoing self-assessment and
continuous improvement initiative, did indicate the beginning of some
declining trends in various elements of Aegis readiness, the overall
readiness of the Aegis Fleet remains high. A product of their ongoing
success, the elevated standards employed in measuring Aegis readiness
can lead to the misperception that these ships are having difficulty
meeting their assigned missions--nothing could be further from the
truth. However, in light of Aegis' role in ballistic missile defense, a
study was initiated to integrate previous study efforts and provide a
holistic assessment of Aegis readiness in terms of interoperability,
maintainability, test & evaluation, manpower, training, and current
development efforts. As has always been the case, Navy will continue
improving Aegis readiness in a targeted, affordable manner to ensure
that Aegis warships remain ready for tasking. I remain confident in the
ability of Aegis ships' to meet warfighter requirements today and in
the future.
Mr. Turner. Secretary Mabus, what specific changes in nuclear
deterrence requirements or change in nuclear strategy have allowed the
Navy to further reduce SSBN missile tubes from 20, as specified in May
2010 by the Secretary of Defense, to 16 missile tubes?
Secretary Mabus. There have been no changes in nuclear deterrence
requirements or nuclear strategy following the submission of the New
START Treaty implementation plan (NDAA FY10 Section 1251 Report) in May
2010. While the Department of Defense's implementation plan reduced the
number of operational missile tubes from 24 to 20 on the current OHIO
Class SSBNs, the OHIO Replacement SSBN will be operational in the 2030
to 2080 timeframe beyond the period of treaty governance (2011-2021
with an option for a single extension to 2026).
Coincident with the submission of the New START implementation
plan, the Navy conducted an in-depth, extensive review of the
capability requirements for the OHIO Replacement SSBN in parallel with
development of the Service Cost Position required at Milestone A. This
analysis concluded that even if the number of operationally deployed
warheads assigned to the sea-based leg of the Triad remains constant
after the New START treaty expires (an assumption that does not reflect
a policy supporting downward reliance on nuclear weapons outlined in
the Nuclear Posture Review), a force of 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs with
16 missile tubes can carry all the sea-based warheads and maintain
excess capacity in the event of a fundamental deterioration of the
security environment or as a hedge against technical challenges within
one or more of the other legs of the triad.
It is the Navy's judgment that the Nation's sea-based strategic
requirements can be met with a force of 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs with
16 tubes and that a 20 tube variant would inappropriately sacrifice
other conventional shipbuilding requirements for unneeded excess
capacity. OSD, Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command have since
concurred with the Navy's position on this military requirement.
Mr. Turner. Secretary Mabus, the SSBN(X) is expected to have a
service life of over 60 years. The threat and strategic environment can
change significantly over the course of 60 years. What planning
assumptions--both nuclear and nonnuclear--are being made? How do they
affect the number of missile tubes per hull and what sensitivity
analysis has been done?
Secretary Mabus. The OHIO Replacement SSBN is being developed as a
replacement for the current OHIO Class SSBN. The OHIO Replacement SSBN
force is planned to consist of 12 SSBNs which will replace the current
14 OHIO SSBNs. The concept of operations for the OHIO Replacement SSBN
is similar to the current OHIO Class SSBN, employing in-port and at-sea
rotational patrols using a two-crew concept designed to meet U.S.
Strategic Command at-sea presence and generation requirements. A force
of 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs will maintain the same presence level as
14 OHIO SSBNs due to elimination of nuclear refueling and maintenance
items during the mid-life maintenance period.
The survivability of individual SSBNs as well as the SSBN force is
a key attribute to meet the requirement for a survivable assured
response. The current OHIO class with the TRIDENT II D5 Life Extension
(LE) missile is the nation's most survivable leg of the US nuclear
deterrent force and will serve in strategic service from 1982 to 2040.
To ensure the SSBN force remains survivable, the SSBN Security Program
in collaboration with the Office of Naval Intelligence and Johns
Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory has, over the past 40 years,
anticipated potential threats and developed appropriate countermeasures
to enhance survivability and protect SSBNs. Consistent with direction
in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and FY12-16 Defense Planning
and Programmatic Guidance, the SSBN Security Program is an integral
part of the development of the key survivability characteristics for
the OHIO Replacement SSBN. This process included an extensive review of
current and future threats as well as potential submarine
vulnerabilities. The resultant acoustic and non acoustic performance of
the OHIO Replacement SSBN will deter an adversary from attempting to
hold a platform or the SSBN force at risk on patrol.
The Navy conducted an in-depth, extensive review of the capability
requirements for the OHIO Replacement SSBN in parallel with development
of the Service Cost Position required at Milestone A. This analysis
concluded that even if the number of operationally deployed warheads
assigned to the sea-based leg of the Triad remains constant after the
New START treaty expires (an assumption that does not reflect the 2010
NPR recommendation for decreasing reliance on nuclear weapons), a force
of 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs with 16 missile tubes can carry all the
sea-based warheads and maintain excess capacity in the event of a
fundamental deterioration of the security environment or as a hedge
against technical challenges within one or more of the other legs of
the triad.
Mr. Turner. Secretary Mabus, the committee understands the Navy has
completed an updated cost estimate for SSBN(X). What is the new cost
estimate for the average follow-on unit end cost, what is the margin of
error in this cost estimate, and what is the estimate for the cost
savings attributable to the reduction from 20 to 16 missile tubes?
Secretary Mabus. The Department has assigned an affordability
target for the average procurement for hulls 2-12 of $4.9 billion (CY
10$, using Navy inflation/deflation indices, excluding outfitting and
post delivery).
Mr. Turner. Secretary Mabus, what would be the costs to construct
additional SSBN(X)-class submarines if it is determined in the future
that the U.S. has insufficient capacity to meet its nuclear strategy
and mission requirements? For example, what would the cost of one
additional submarine be in the 2035 timeframe?
Secretary Mabus. The Department has assigned an affordability
target for the average procurement for hulls 2-12 of $4.9 billion (CY
10$, using Navy inflation/deflation indices, excluding outfitting and
post delivery).
Mr. Turner. Admiral Roughead, can you discuss how the missile
defense mission and the multi-mission capability of Aegis ballistic
missile defense (BMD) ships are affecting the overall force structure
requirements for the Aegis fleet? How is the Navy managing the limited
number of Aegis BMD ships when demand is greater than supply?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy currently has sufficient capacity to
meet the most critical demands for its multi-mission Aegis ships;
however, we do not have the capacity to meet all Geographic Combatant
Commander (GCC) demands for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) without
exceeding established Personnel Tempo program limits for deployment
lengths, dwell tempo, or homeport tempo. Based on threat analysis and
current indications from GCCs, and assuming standard six month
deployment lengths, the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
concluded that GCC demand for surface combatants with Aegis BMD
capability will outpace capacity through approximately 2018.
To meet the increasing demand for these ships and reduce the risk
to our long term force structure caused by the increased operational
tempo from longer deployment lengths, the Navy, working in conjunction
with MDA, has established a plan (see Figure 1 on page 165) to increase
the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships from 23 in FY2011 to 41 in
FY2016. This plan balances the need for meeting current operational
requirements against the need to upgrade existing BMD-capable Aegis
ships to pace the future threat. Included in this plan are increases in
the Navy's capacity and the capabilities of Aegis ships through the
installation of an Aegis BMD 3.6.1/4.0.1 suite, the Aegis Modernization
program, or new construction (commencing with DDG-113).
To mitigate the impact of the BMD mission, Navy has implemented an
operating concept for AEGIS ship's conducting BMD missions that
features a graduated readiness posture that allows BMD-capable surface
combatants to be on an operational tether and available for other
tasking when not directly involved in active BMD operations. Surface
combatants operating in support of a BMD mission do not lose the
capability to conduct other missions; however, specific mission
effectiveness may be affected by ships' position and/or application of
ship resources to those missions.
Navy analysis of evolving BMD and other mission area requirements
indicates that the current Navy BMD upgrade plan will support BMD
Global Force Management requirements while simultaneously fulfilling
Navy's requirements in other mission areas.
Mr. Turner. Admiral Roughead, according to a Defense News article
in June 2010, ``U.S. Aegis Radars' Readiness Plunges,'' the Aegis radar
systems are ``in their worst shape ever, raising questions about the
surface fleet's ability to take on its high-profile new mission next
year defending Europe from ballistic missiles.'' Discuss any Aegis
readiness concerns you may have and how it might impact the Navy's
ability to meet missile defense mission requirements.
Admiral Roughead. I am confident in Navy's ability to meet our
missile defense requirements. While several reports and studies
completed last year, as part of Navy's ongoing self-assessment and
continuous improvement initiative, did indicate the beginning of some
declining trends in various elements of Aegis readiness, the overall
readiness of the Aegis Fleet remains high. A product of their ongoing
success, the elevated standards employed in measuring Aegis readiness
can lead to the misperception that these ships are having difficulty
meeting their assigned missions--nothing could be further from the
truth. In light of Aegis' role in ballistic missile defense, a study
was initiated to integrate previous study efforts and provide a
holistic assessment of Aegis readiness in terms of interoperability,
maintainability, test & evaluation, manpower, training, and current
development efforts. As has always been the case, Navy will continue
improving Aegis readiness in a targeted, affordable manner to ensure
that Aegis warships remain ready for tasking. I remain confident in the
ability of Aegis ships' to meet warfighter requirements today and in
the future.
Mr. Turner. Admiral Roughead, in his January 6th efficiencies
announcement Secretary Gates stated that ``analysis by the Navy and
Marine Corps'' suggests that the most plausible scenarios requiring
power projection from the sea could be handled through a mix of
existing air and sea systems employed in new ways along with new
vehicles--scenarios that do not require the exquisite features of the
EFV.'' Can you describe the analytical work Secretary Gates is
referring to in his statement?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy and Marine Corps have conducted campaign
analysis and war gaming examining scenarios requiring power projection
from the sea using the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) as well as
the legacy Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) and our current and
projected suite of air assault connectors. The analysis used official
threat assessments and modeled battlespace preparation in order to
define threats to landings.
Using fielded and planned capabilities to conduct pre-assault
battlespace preparation, the Navy assessed that U.S. weapons and
sensors will allow amphibious ships to operate at 12 nm from the coast
with acceptable risk against any residual threats. This analysis
suggests a 25 nm assault range of the EFV may not be required.
Mr. Turner. Admiral Roughead, what specific changes in nuclear
deterrence requirements or change in nuclear strategy have allowed the
Navy to further reduce SSBN missile tubes from 20, as specified in May
2010 by the Secretary of Defense, to 16 missile tubes?
Admiral Roughead. There have been no changes in nuclear deterrence
requirements or nuclear strategy following the submission of the New
START Treaty implementation plan (NDAA FY10 Section 1251 Report) in May
2010. Coincident with the submission of the New START implementation
plan, the Navy conducted an in-depth, extensive review of the
capability requirements for the OHIO Replacement SSBN in parallel with
development of the Service Cost Position required at Milestone A. This
analysis concluded that a force of 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs with 16
missile tubes can carry all the sea-based warheads and maintain
sufficient excess capacity for the future. It is the Navy's judgment
that the nation's sea-based strategic requirements can be met with a
force of 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs with 16 tubes and that a 20 tube
variant would inappropriately sacrifice other conventional shipbuilding
requirements for unneeded excess capacity. OSD, Joint Staff and U.S.
Strategic Command concur with the Navy's position on this military
requirement.
Mr. Turner. Admiral Roughead, the SSBN(X) is expected to have a
service life of over 60 years. The threat and strategic environment can
change significantly over the course of 60 years. What planning
assumptions--both nuclear and nonnuclear--are being made? How do they
affect the number of missile tubes per hull and what sensitivity
analysis has been done?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy plans to build 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs
to replace the 14 OHIO SSBNs currently in the Fleet. The concept of
operations for the OHIO Replacement SSBN is similar to the current OHIO
Class SSBN in that it will employ in-port and at-sea rotational
patrols, using a two-crew concept, to meet U.S. Strategic Command at-
sea presence and force generation requirements. A force of 12 OHIO
Replacement SSBNs will maintain the same presence level as 14 OHIO
SSBNs due to elimination of nuclear refueling and maintenance items
during the mid-life maintenance period.
The survivability of individual SSBNs and the SSBN force as a whole
is a key attribute to meeting the requirement for a survivable assured
response. The current OHIO class with the TRIDENT II D5 Life Extension
(LE) missile is the nation's most survivable leg of the US nuclear
deterrent force and will serve in strategic service from 1982 to 2040.
To ensure the SSBN force remains survivable, the SSBN Security Program
in collaboration with the Office of Naval Intelligence and Johns
Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory has, over the past 40 years,
anticipated potential threats and developed appropriate countermeasures
to enhance survivability and protect SSBNs. Consistent with direction
in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and FY12-16 Defense Planning
and Programmatic Guidance, the SSBN Security Program is an integral
part of the development of the key survivability characteristics for
the OHIO Replacement SSBN. This process included an extensive review of
current and future threats as well as potential submarine
vulnerabilities. The resultant acoustic and non acoustic performance of
the OHIO Replacement SSBN will deter an adversary from attempting to
hold a platform or the SSBN force at risk on patrol.
The Navy conducted an in-depth, extensive review of the capability
requirements for the OHIO Replacement SSBN in parallel with development
of the Service Cost Position required at Milestone A. This analysis
concluded that even if the number of operationally deployed warheads
assigned to the sea-based leg of the Triad remains constant after the
New START treaty expires (an assumption that does not reflect the 2010
NPR recommendation for decreasing reliance on nuclear weapons), a force
of 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs with 16 missile tubes can carry all the
sea-based warheads and maintain excess capacity in the event of a
fundamental deterioration of the security environment or as a hedge
against technical challenges within one or more of the other legs of
the triad.
Mr. Turner. Admiral Roughead, the committee understands the Navy
has completed an updated cost estimate for SSBN(X). What is the new
cost estimate for the average follow-on unit end cost, what is the
margin of error in this cost estimate, and what is the estimate for the
cost savings attributable to the reduction from 20 to 16 missile tubes?
Admiral Roughead. The OHIO Replacement Milestone (MS) A Service
Cost Position for the average follow-ship end cost (hulls 2-12) in
CY10$ is $5.6B (using Navy inflation/deflation indices, excluding
outfitting and post delivery). Additionally, the MS A Acquisition
Decision Memorandum assigned an affordability target for the average
follow-ship end cost (hulls 2-12, using Navy inflation/deflation
indices, excluding outfitting and post delivery) of $4.9B in CY10$.
The cost savings associated with a 16-tube vs. a 20-tube OHIO
Replacement SSBN design is expected to be approximately $0.2B per ship
(CY10$; average follow-ship hulls 2-12), which when combined with a
reduction of approximately $0.5B of non-recurring engineering costs for
the first ship plus lead ship construction, result in a total class
acquisition cost savings of approximately $3B (CY10$). These cost
savings are in addition to those associated with decreased missile
inventory requirements for the 16 tube variant.
Mr. Turner. Admiral Roughead, what would be the costs to construct
additional SSBN(X)-class submarines if it is determined in the future
that the U.S. has insufficient capacity to meet its nuclear strategy
and mission requirements? For example, what would the cost of one
additional submarine be in the 2035 timeframe?
Admiral Roughead. The OHIO Replacement Program has a Milestone (MS)
A Service Cost Position of $5.6B CY10 and an affordability target of
$4.9B CY10 for average follow-ship end cost (hulls 2-12, including Navy
inflation/deflation indices, excluding outfitting and post delivery).
Assuming the cost target is achieved, an additional hull awarded at the
end of the current planned production line would be expected to cost
less than $4.9B (CY10$). A force of 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs meets U.
S. Strategic Command's at-sea presence requirements.
Mr. Turner. General Amos, what effect will a reduction of 15,300
Marines have on individual dwell time ratios? Do you expect to meet the
1 to 3 dwell time goal?
General Amos. Our overall objective is a 1:3 deployment-to-dwell
ratio for the Marine Corps Active Component and a 1:5 deployment-to-
dwell ratio for the Reserve Component in a post-Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM (OEF) environment. Currently, my stated goal, in concert with
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is for deployment-to-dwell
ratios in support of combat operations in Afghanistan to be 1:2 for the
Marine Corps Active Component and 1:4 for the Reserve Component.
Based on the current USMC force level in support of OEF and other
global force requirements, the Marine Corps could achieve a 1:2
deployment-to-dwell ratio across the Service within 18-24 months
following the scheduled OEF draw-down. The Marine Corps deployment-to-
dwell ratio will continue to improve in a post-OEF environment and
reach the stated goals of 1:3/1:5 as we balance requirements in support
of the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the President's draw-down
plan for Afghanistan.
Establishing a sustainable deployment-to-dwell ratio is based upon
forces available and the need to meet our global operational demands.
We will closely monitor the pace of reduction in our end strength to
best support Geographical Combatant Commander requirements while also
fostering the best health and resiliency of our Total Force.
Mr. Turner. General Amos, in his January 6th efficiencies
announcement Secretary Gates stated that ``analysis by the Navy and
Marine Corps'' suggests that the most plausible scenarios requiring
power projection from the sea could be handled through a mix of
existing air and sea systems employed in new ways along with new
vehicles--scenarios that do not require the exquisite features of the
EFV.'' Can you describe the analytical work Secretary Gates is
referring to in his statement?
General Amos. The Navy and Marine Corps conducted campaign analysis
\1\ and a war game examining scenarios \2\ requiring power projection
from the sea using the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) as well as
the legacy Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) and our current and
projected suite of rotary and tilt wing aircraft. The analysis used
official threat assessments and modeled battle-space preparation in
order to define threats to amphibious landings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 2008--Naval Campaign Analysis (2024) sponsored by OPNAV N816
and Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC) defines battlespace
preparation completed by the initial landing and residual threat. The
Naval Campaign is based on the 19 Sep 2007 MCO 1 Swiftly Defeat the
Efforts 2014 Multi-Service Force Deployment.
\2\ 2009--The Simulation Analysis Center of OSD's Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation Directorate led the MCO-1 Swiftly Defeat the
Efforts 2014 Analytic Baseline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The analysis assessed concurrent and separate landings from 25 nm
off a coastline with one force using EFV and another force using AAVs
delivered by Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC). The analysis did not
specifically compare EFV and AAV in that the forces landed used
different tactics, in different sites and facing different opposition.
While both missions were accomplished, suggesting that the EFV may not
be required, higher risk was incurred employing the LCAC/AAV as a
result of a slower build-up of combat power ashore. In addition, the
LCAC/AAVs required using vertical assaults to secure landing zones,
losing the flexibility to maneuver deep inland.
In February 2006, a systems threat assessment was conducted by
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity and the Defense Intelligence Agency
which supported a minimum distance of 10.8 nm from shore if the right
capabilities were in place. Since that time, the Navy has assessed that
employing planned U.S. capabilities in pre-assault operations will
allow amphibious ships to operate at 12 nm from the coast with
acceptable risk against any residual threats. This analysis suggests
the 25 nm assault range of the EFV may no longer be required in light
of the current capabilities.
In March 2010, the Office of Program Appraisal ``Assuring
Operational Access'' Wargame conducted three separate and distinct
excursions using the former EFV program of record, the current
capability set (i.e. AAV) and alternative capabilities (i.e. a notional
Marine Expeditionary Maneuver Vehicle, and an experimental Ultra Heavy-
lift Amphibious Connector).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. 1) Secretary Mabus, it is documented that the Aegis
system has experienced setbacks, including failed tests and alleged
``false positives''. Furthermore, the radar system has also been
criticized as being subpar and unable to meet operational expectations.
The Aegis missile defense system is a vital part of our missile
defense. What concerns do you have regarding Aegis operational
readiness in light of its crucial role in our missile defense, and what
is being done to address those concerns? Furthermore, can we rely on
the Aegis system today if an attack were to occur during this hearing?
Secretary Mabus. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system
is the most operationally ready, flexible, and effective regional
missile defense system in the world and is in great demand by Combatant
Commanders. Navy and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) have achieved an
unprecedented level of success with the Aegis BMD system and the SM-3
Block IA missile, accomplishing successful intercepts of ballistic
targets in 18 of 21 exo-atmospheric tests. The system successfully
intercepted and destroyed a de-orbiting satellite in February 2008. The
system has also successfully intercepted 3 of 3 endo-atmospheric Short
Range Ballistic targets in the terminal phase of flight using the SM-2
Block IV missile. In October 2008, Navy's Operational Test and
Evaluation Force declared, ``The Block 4 Aegis, employing the Aegis 3.6
Combat System is operationally effective in the negation of Medium
Range Ballistic Missiles and Short Range Ballistic Missiles and
provides effective tracking of Long Range Ballistic Missiles for cueing
of other Aegis, Aegis BMD, and DoD systems.''
Navy is committed to maintaining the highest level of readiness for
all Aegis BMD ships. Each ship undergoes extensive system evaluations
prior to deployment knowing they may be tasked with BMD missions. Due
to the high reliability required of the SPY radar while performing the
BMD mission, selected critical spare parts have been augmented for
these ships to ensure an even higher level of operational readiness.
All ships currently employed on BMD missions are fully capable of
providing the designed level of protection against ballistic missile
threats.
Mr. Franks. 2. Secretary Mabus, Aegis ships play large and various
roles for Navy missions. One vulnerability that results from this
multi-role is that the Aegis ship cannot fully defend itself during
missile defense mode. Therefore, another Aegis ship is required to
defend the Aegis ship in missile defense mode. Given the limited supply
of Aegis ships, is this the best practice, or is there a better
strategy to protect the Aegis ship in missile defense mode. How is the
Navy addressing this situation of the limited Aegis fleet, and how can
Congress help to make sure that our limited supply of Aegis ships are
used in the best way possible?
Secretary Mabus. From its inception, Aegis BMD was designed with
three main objectives in mind. The ship would be 1) effective in
conducting its assigned BMD mission; 2) able to survive air, surface,
and subsurface attacks and; 3) be cost effective. All Aegis BMD capable
ships have the ability to defend themselves against both traditional
and advanced air and cruise missile threats while also executing the
BMD mission. This capability was initiated by Navy in 2003 and
developed by Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Simultaneous BMD and Anti-
Air Warfare engagements were demonstrated by USS LAKE ERIE on June 22,
2006 and this capability is the current BMD fleet standard. It is
proven; it remains ready.
An additional six Aegis BMD upgrades and installations were
included in the President's Budget 2012 for a total of 41 Aegis BMD
ships by 2016. The Navy continues to work with MDA to ensure that
further BMD upgrades will improve the multi-mission capabilities of our
BMD ships. Finally, the Navy utilizes the Global Force Management
process and coordinates closely with the Combatant Commanders to ensure
the best possible use of our Aegis multi-mission ships.
Mr. Franks. 3) Last year, the Navy testified that sea-based missile
defense requirements for surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers)
were still in the review. Has there been any progress in determining
sea-based missile defense requirements as it relates to Navy surface
combatant requirements, and if so, can you describe what the forward-
based requirements are for Navy surface combatants and what that means
to the battle-force inventory requirements?
Secretary Mabus. Each Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC)
determines its own requirements for surface combatants in each mission
area. These requirements are adjudicated through the Department of
Defense's Global Force Management process, which allocates the
available Aegis ships. The Navy currently has sufficient capacity to
meet the most critical demands for multi-mission surface combatants;
however, Navy does not have the capacity to meet GCC demands for
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) surface combatants without breaking
established deployment length redlines. Based on threat analysis and
steady state presence indications from the GCCs, the Navy, working with
Missile Defense Agency, have concluded that the demand for BMD-capable
Aegis ships will outpace capacity through approximately 2018, assuming
standard six month deployment lengths.
Sea-based BMD requirements in the United States Central Command and
European Command are sourced through the rotation of Aegis ships home-
ported in the United States. The Pacific Command's sea-based BMD
requirements are sourced primarily from the Forward Deployed Naval
Force in Japan.
As the demand for these ships increase, either the inventory of
Aegis BMD-capable ships or deployment lengths must increase.
Accordingly, Navy, in conjunction with MDA, has established a plan to
increase the total number of Aegis BMD-capable ships across the FYDP
from 21 to 41, of which 27 will be deployable in FY16. This plan
includes the increase in capacity and capability of surface combatants
either through the installation of the Aegis BMD 3.6.1/4.0.1 suite or
Aegis Modernization program, as well as through new construction
(commencing with DDG 113). The addition of BMD capabilities to the
Aegis Fleet provides improved operational flexibility to GCC and Fleet
Commanders to fulfill their various missions.
Mr. Franks. 1) Admiral Roughead, it is documented that the Aegis
system has experienced setbacks, including failed tests and alleged
``false positives''. Furthermore, the radar system has also been
criticized as being subpar and unable to meet operational expectations.
The Aegis missile defense system is a vital part of our missile
defense. What concerns do you have regarding Aegis operational
readiness in light of its crucial role in our missile defense, and what
is being done to address those concerns? Furthermore, can we rely on
the Aegis system today if an attack were to occur during this hearing?
Admiral Roughead. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system
is the most proven, operationally ready, flexible, and effective
regional missile defense system in the world. Navy is committed to
maintaining the highest level of readiness for all Aegis BMD ships and
we put each ship through extensive system evaluations prior to
deployment, knowing they may be tasked with BMD missions. All ships
currently employed on BMD missions are fully capable of providing the
designed level of protection against ballistic missile threats. I am
confident in relying on this system today to defend our Fleet, our
Allies and partners, and our national interests against the threat of
ballistic missiles.
Mr. Franks. 2) Admiral Roughead, Aegis ships play large and various
roles for Navy missions. One vulnerability that results from this
multi-role is that the Aegis ship cannot fully defend itself during
missile defense mode. Therefore, another Aegis ship is required to
defend the Aegis ship in missile defense mode. Given the limited supply
of Aegis ships, is this the best practice, or is there a better
strategy to protect the Aegis ship in missile defense mode. How is the
Navy addressing this situation of the limited Aegis fleet, and how can
Congress help to make sure that our limited supply of Aegis ships are
used in the best way possible?
Admiral Roughead. All Aegis BMD capable ships have the ability to
defend themselves against both traditional and advanced air and cruise
missile threats while also executing the BMD mission. Simultaneous BMD
and Anti-Air Warfare engagements were demonstrated by USS LAKE ERIE on
June 22, 2006, and this capability is the current BMD Fleet standard.
It is proven and remains ready today.
The Navy utilizes the Global Force Management process and
coordinates closely with Combatant Commanders to ensure the best
possible use of our Aegis multi-mission ships. To meet increasing
demand for these ships, Navy is growing its Aegis Fleet through
modernization of our existing Fleet and the restart of DDG-51
procurement. To meet increasing demand for our Aegis ships, our PB 2012
budget requests funding for one DDG-51 restart ship (DDG 116) in FY
2012 and an additional six Aegis BMD upgrades and installations to
increase the Navy's Aegis BMD ships from 21 to 41 ships by 2016. The
Navy continues to work with MDA to ensure that future BMD upgrades will
further improve the multi-mission capabilities of our BMD ships.
Mr. Franks. 3) Last year, the Navy testified that sea-based missile
defense requirements for surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers)
were still in the review. Has there been any progress in determining
sea-based missile defense requirements as it relates to Navy surface
combatant requirements, and if so, can you describe what the forward-
based requirements are for Navy surface combatants and what that means
to the battle-force inventory requirements?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy currently has sufficient capacity to
meet the most critical demands for multi-mission surface combatants;
however, Navy does not have the capacity to meet expected future GCC
demands for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) surface combatants without
breaking established deployment length redlines. Based on threat
analysis and steady state presence indications from the Geographic
Combatant Commander the Navy, working with Missile Defense Agency, has
concluded that the demand for BMD-capable Aegis ships will outpace
capacity through approximately 2018, assuming standard six month
deployment lengths.
Sea-based BMD requirements in the United States Central Command and
European Command are sourced through the rotation of Aegis ships home-
ported in the United States. The Pacific Command's sea-based BMD
requirements are sourced primarily from the Forward Deployed Naval
Force in Japan.
With the President's decision to pursue a phased adaptive approach
(PAA) for the missile defense of Europe, the Navy has been working
within the Department of Defense to identify the most efficient method
to provide the required afloat BMD capability. The establishment of a
forward deployed force in Europe is one of the options being assessed,
however, no final decision has been made.
As the demand for these ships increase, either the inventory of
Aegis BMD-capable ships or deployment lengths must increase.
Accordingly, Navy, in conjunction with MDA, has established a plan to
increase the total number of Aegis BMD-capable ships across the FYDP
from 21 to 41, of which 27 will be deployable in FY16. This plan
includes the increase in capacity and capability of surface combatants
either through the installation of the Aegis BMD 3.6.1/4.0.1 suite or
Aegis Modernization program, as well as through new construction
(commencing with DDG 113). The addition of BMD capabilities to the
Aegis Fleet provides improved operational flexibility to GCC and Fleet
Commanders to fulfill their various missions.
Mr. Franks. 4) Admiral Roughead, with fewer different fighter/
attack aircraft today, and even fewer in the future, do you believe
that the Navy is taking significant risks by not including a program to
develop and procure a competitive, alternate engine for the F-35?
Admiral Roughead. No. The Navy does not have a requirement for an
alternate engine; indeed, we would only take one model to sea. The
additional costs of an alternate engine threaten our ability to fund
currently planned aircraft procurement quantities, which would
exacerbate our anticipated decrease in strike fighter capacity
throughout the remainder of this decade.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. From your perspective as the Secretary of the Navy,
can you describe to the committee the strategic importance of the F-35
program to the future of Naval and Marine Corps fighter aviation?
Secretary Mabus. The F-35B Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing
(STOVL) and F-35C Carrier Variant (CV) of the Joint Strike Fighter are
essential to our long-term national security as the future backbone of
U.S. Navy and Marine Aviation combat air-superiority. I believe there
is no program, or combination of programs, that will more affordably
provide the Combatant Commanders these warfighting capabilities they
will need to protect the Global interests of the Nation. The
integration of F-35 aircraft will provide the dominant, multi-role,
fifth-generation capabilities needed across the full spectrum of combat
operations to deter potential adversaries and enable future Naval and
Marine Aviation power projection.
Mr. Conaway. 1. In the Secretary of Defense's recent restructuring
of the F-35 program, the F-35B was put on a two year probation due to
development problems.
If the F-35B variant does not show significant progress
by FY13 and is cancelled, what are the USMC's alternatives to fulfill
the requirements expected to be filled by the F-35B?
Admiral Roughead. We are confident that the F-35B program is on
track and that the restructuring effort will be successful. However, in
the event that the F-35B does not show significant progress and is
cancelled, then the question of potential alternatives for USMC
aviation requirements would more appropriately be addressed by the
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Mr. Conaway. 2. In January, Secretary Gates announced a reduction
of 124 F-35s over the FYDP. He further stated that the savings from
this reduction would be used to fund $4.6 billion to extend the
development period and add additional flight tests; as well as using $4
billion for additional purposes, such as purchasing more F/A-18s for
the Navy.
How does this decision impact you?
How does this change in the fighter mix effect the Navy?
Admiral Roughead. The Secretary of Defense's changes to the
Programs of Record (POR) for the F-35B/C and F/A-18E/F in December 2010
impacted the Navy in the following ways:
Compared to PB 2011, the DoN's procurement of F-35B/C
aircraft was decreased by 60 in the FYDP, and the F/A-18E/F procurement
was increased by 41.
Procurement of 41 additional F/A-18E/F extended the last
year of procurement for the Super Hornets from FY 2013 to FY 2014.
By adding 41 Super Hornets and extending the life of 150
F/A-18 A-D aircraft to 10,000 flight hours, our strike fighter
shortfall was reduced from about 100 aircraft to a peak of 65 aircraft,
projected in 2018. As I testified, this aircraft shortfall is
manageable.
Navy's PB 2012 budget submission, with the change in strike fighter
mix, reflects the optimum balance of procuring new F/A-18E/F aircraft,
extending the service life of 150 existing legacy Hornets, and
procuring F-35B/Cs. This balanced approach will address the
Department's need for tactical aircraft to meet requirements.
Mr. Conaway. Are you confident that the development challenges
currently faced by the STOVL variant can be solved successfully?
General Amos. The current Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing
(STOVL) technical challenges are typical of major acquisition programs
during this stage of development. We do not regard any of these
challenges as insurmountable. We already have incorporated corrective
actions into production aircraft and identified the modifications
needed in the aircraft nearing delivery; and we are proactively
finalizing changes for future incorporation.
I am personally engaged with the Joint Strike Fighter Joint Program
Office and prime contractors on a monthly basis. We collaborate in
resolving these challenges by identifying the most efficient and cost
effective processes through which we will implement long term
engineering solutions. Our overarching intent is to meet our collective
requirements and to deliver higher quality aircraft in a responsible
timeframe. Ultimately, this will equip the warfighter with more
sustainable and more capable platforms.
On a related note, STOVL flight tests began to turn around this
past January, and are experiencing unprecedented success this calendar
year. Test point collection and sortie rates achieved from January to
March this year have made up for the deficits of 2010 and continue to
perform well ahead of plan to date. We are on track for ship trials
this fall and commencement of training early next year. I am confident
the F-35B will surpass expectations during this period of focused
scrutiny.
Mr. Conaway. How important is the F-35B to the future of Marine
Corps fighter aviation?
General Amos. The F-35B is the future of Marine Corps fighter
aviation. We intend to replace three aging platforms--the AV-8B, the
EA-6B and the FA-18--with a single 5th generation platform--the F-35
Lightning II. Our F-35B Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL)
variant will become our utility tactical aviation (TACAIR) platform
well into the middle of this century. The F-35C carrier variant will
serve as our TACAIR Integration aircraft for service with the Navy on
their carriers.
The F-35B is the tactical aircraft our Marine Air Ground Task Force
requires to remain relevant in today's world with tomorrow's threats.
This STOVL variant Joint Strike Fighter meets the expeditionary
expectation that our Commander-in-Chief, our Combatant Commanders and
the American people demand of the Marine Corps. STOVL aviation
capabilities have deep roots in the Marine Corps. Current operations in
Afghanistan and Libya and our experience in Iraq reinforce the critical
role of amphibious-based and expeditionary STOVL aircraft.
Our requirement is not complex. We require 5th generation stealth,
sensors, interoperability and connectivity supporting our forward-
deployed Marines. The F-35B will source the MAGTF with an agile, cross-
functional tactical aircraft that will provide forward based flexible,
scalable and responsive capabilities to our ground forces. F-35Bs
transition from ship-to-shore, operating seamlessly from 850ft decks of
amphibious ships to short-field, expeditionary operating bases. This
proximity provides our ground forces immediate and integrated access to
tactical aviation--a core tenet of Marine air operations. F-35B
postures Marine TACAIR with the basing flexibility that MAGTF
commanders require to execute expeditionary operations. Recent Joint
and Coalition operations highlight the flexibility that embarked Marine
TACAIR provides the nation and, in the future, the Joint Force will
leverage the expeditionary, responsive and game-changing capabilities
that the Marine STOVL F-35B brings to the fight.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. 1. Are we investing enough in our equipment to sustain
our position as the greatest Naval Force throughout the 21st Century?
As you all know our Navy and Marine Corps have conducted cyclic combat
operations now for 10 years at a pace that we have not seen in the
history of our fleet. Ships and aircraft are constantly deploying and
critical life cycle maintenance is being affected due to the high
operational tempo. Knowing there is deferred maintenance and a backlog
of lifecycle management for our fleet, how is the past 10 years going
to affect the service life of our ships, submarines, and aircraft?
Admiral Roughead. Keeping our ships, submarines and aircraft in
satisfactory material condition is essential both to supporting current
operations and ensuring that we are able to get the projected service
life from these valuable national assets. It has been central to the
United States Navy's mission to perform sufficient levels of
maintenance in each of these areas to ensure our fleet is maintained
and ready when called upon. Certainly the last decade of high tempo
operations have been a challenge and there have been areas where we
were not able to do all of the maintenance we desired. Based on the
rapidly improving surface ship engineered maintenance requirement and
the established aircraft, submarine, and aircraft carrier engineered
maintenance requirements, the FY12 budget accurately reflects the
maintenance necessary to ensure ships, submarines, and aircraft will
reach their expected service life.
Mr. Wittman. 2. What is the affect going to be on the service life
of an F/A-18 Super Hornet that is above its planned airframe and engine
flight hours, or the DDG that has deployed so many times to support
overseas contingency operations, that critical hull, mechanical,
electrical, and weapons systems maintenance is neglected and pushed to
the right? What do you believe the long term affect is to our overall
material readiness? Furthermore, do you feel that we are allocating the
appropriate amount of money to focus on maintenance, modernization, and
modification?
Admiral Roughead. Keeping our ships, submarines and aircraft in
satisfactory material condition is essential to supporting current
operations and ensuring that we are able to get the projected service
life from these valuable national assets. It has been central to the
United States Navy's mission to perform sufficient levels of
maintenance in each of these areas to ensure our fleet is maintained
and ready when called upon. Certainly the last decade of high tempo
operations have been a challenge and there have been areas where we
were not able to do all of the maintenance we desired. Based on the
rapidly improving surface ship engineered maintenance requirement and
the established aircraft, submarine, and aircraft carrier engineered
maintenance requirements, the FY12 budget accurately reflects the
resources necessary to maintain, modernize and modify our ships,
submarines, and aircraft to reach their expected service life.
Mr. Wittman. 3. Do you feel that that $15.9 billion is enough to
sustain a 30 year shipbuilding plan with a goal of maintaining 313
battle force ships? We have an aging Oliver Hazard Perry Class that
accounts for 29 frigates and over 40 submarines that are either past
their halfway point of commissioned service (6 that are at or over 30
years of service) in the Los Angeles Class Submarine. Is the plan for
313 battle force ships a realistic number and do we have the ability to
reach this number when taking in to account the planned budget to reach
that goal?
Admiral Roughead. Yes. The requirement of 313 ships remains the
floor and the Navy is committed to building to that floor. The funding
in place supports the Navy plan of reaching that level in the next ten
years.
Mr. Wittman. Can you please talk about the 2 year probationary
period that has been placed on the F-35B and how that is going to
affect the Marine Corps Strike Fighter shortfall? If the F-35B
struggles through test and evaluation, is there a backup plan to
mitigate the risk of the F-35B being delayed in delivery to the USMC
(will the USMC SLEP the AV-8 Harrier to sustain a STOVL capability or
possibly invest in the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet)?
General Amos. The Secretary of Defense's decision to increase
oversight and decrease early production of the F-35B was prudent. The
primary contractor did not achieve fundamental program milestones on
time, and the program lacked credible and tangible measurements for
progress. I believe that the Secretary's move further serves to
emphasize the need to procure a fully capable aircraft that judiciously
maximizes value to taxpayer dollars.
I believe the F-35B aircraft will succeed, but I also share the
Department's concerns. That is why I am personally involved in tracking
progress of this aircraft. The data that I evaluate on a daily basis
suggests that our Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) test and
evaluation is on track and exceeding expectations. In the first three
months of this year, our test point collection overcame last year's
shortfall. The test aircraft are flying more frequently, are collecting
more test points per flight and are surpassing planning measures in a
sustainable way. Two of our aircraft are currently preparing for the
first ship trial period later this year. That will be an important
milestone in demonstrating that our 5th generation tactical aircraft is
capable of integrating into our Marine Air Ground Task Force aboard the
amphibious ships of the Navy's Amphibious Ready Group.
We agree that reduced F-35 production rates will slow transition.
However, we also believe we can continue to successfully manage our
inventory of legacy aircraft to meet operational commitments. We have a
variety of service life management initiatives for legacy F/A-18
aircraft. Our AV-8Bs do not require service life extensions, but we
plan to reallocate aircraft to manage attrition. Our recent TACAIR
Integration agreement with the Navy requires the Marine Corps to
procure 80 F-35C variants which will afford us maneuvering room
following the F-35B reductions in the near term. Of these 80 aircraft,
we will procure 35 across the current Future Years Defense Program and
stand up three Marine F-35C squadrons by FY18. These measures allow us
to actively manage our TACAIR inventory until we gain the efficiencies
of an all F-35 force--340 F-35B and 80 F-35C.
The Marine Corps has no intention to procure the F/A-18 E/F Super
Hornet. The Super Hornet lacks a 5th generation capability that our
MAGTF requires across the Range of Military Operations now and in
future decades. With its expected service life and necessary
survivability upgrades, this platform does not meet our vision for
TACAIR recapitalization.
Mr. Wittman. Has significant testing been done with regard to the
F-35B STOVL taking off and landing from the deck of an amphibious ship
yet? If not, when do you predict that testing will take place? Do we
know if the thrust and heat produced from the engine of the F-35B will
have a negative effect on the steel flight deck and I-beam support of
the deck . . . will the deck buckle or become unstable over time?
General Amos. The F-35B test program has made substantial progress
this year and is on track for the first Developmental Test Ship Trials
scheduled in October through November 2011. During this trial, we will
fully assess the environmental effects of the engine. After three years
of focused analysis and preliminary tests in preparation for this
event, we expect no significant damage or degradation will occur. The
USS WASP will serve as the amphibious ship for this test and is being
instrumented to assess the flight deck, substructure, and ancillary
deck systems. The Marine Corps along with NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and the Joint
Strike Fighter Joint Program Office has collaborated extensively to
ensure F-35B operations aboard L Class amphibious ships are fully
tested and representative of required standards.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. The events in the Middle East and Northern Africa
continue to jeopardize our ability to operate freely on land and from
those locations in the region where U.S. forces are based. Given this
uncertainty in the region, it seems more important that our amphibious
assault force is fully operational to address any threat throughout the
world. However, the amphibious ship requirement of 33 is less than the
38 requested by the Marine Corps. In fact, we are currently operating
below the 33 ship requirement and won't reach that level until 2017.
Given what is currently taking place in the Middle East and Africa,
why do we find it acceptable to operate at the bare minimum and below
with our amphibious forces? What actions are the Marine Corps taking
with the Navy to improve the operational effectiveness of our
amphibious forces?
General Amos. The Marine Corps assesses that the future security
environment will require a minimum of three forward deployed Amphibious
Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEU). To meet this
operational requirement, we have planned for an ARG/MEU presence in the
PACOM, CENTCOM, and EUCOM/AFRICOM Areas of Operations. This necessity
requires 38 amphibious ships to meet the Geographic Combatant Commander
day-to-day partnering and engagement requirements as well as to be able
to support the assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades for
a theater joint forcible entry operation. However, we have accepted
risk at a minimum of 33 amphibious ships in our inventory. Due to
decommissioning/commission and maintenance cycles, there are currently
29 ships operationally available in the amphibious fleet. Based on
projected fabrication cycles, we anticipate the amphibious ship
inventory will rise again to 33 vessels in FY17.
We are utilizing our Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan as a
roadmap to strengthen and maintain our core competencies and to ensure
we remain America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness. Our amphibious
core competency figures prominently in our Service Campaign Plan, and
as a result we have undertaken an array of exercise planning in this
critical skill area. We will soon be conducting a Marine Air Ground
Task Force Large Scale Exercise that will refine our capability to
amphibious power projection and sustained operations ashore in a joint
and interagency environment. In late 2010, we conducted Exercise Bold
Alligator 2011, the first large-scale amphibious training exercise with
the Navy on the East Coast in almost 10 years. This synthetic training
event practiced planning for forcible entry operations against
conventional and asymmetric threats and a large-scale non-combatant
evacuation. We will take lessons learned from this exercise and build
upon them for the next iteration of this important exercise with the
U.S. Navy scheduled in the coming year.
We are presently implementing a Naval Board that will provide a
regular forum for senior-leader exploration of strategy, policy, naval
concepts and doctrine, concepts of operation, technology, and resource
issues to develop unified naval guidance for requirements. The Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) will
approve recommendations from the Naval Board. The Naval Board will
consider issues selected by the CNO or CMC as well as issues raised by
the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands, Navy and Marine Corps
component commanders and their respective Fleet and Marine
expeditionary force commanders, and through other venues as
appropriate. Although the Board will initially focus on improving
coordination of capability development processes, its considerations
may include a range of other issues with Navy-Marine Corps implications
such as integration of strategic planning and Service campaign
planning; prioritizing research and development efforts; development of
naval concepts; training and education programs; wargame design; and
resource investment recommendations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. 1.) Secretary Mabus, based on the National Security
Strategy's demand for theater security cooperation and engagement, I am
interested in our nation's ability to meet the requirement for Marine
Expeditionary Units/Amphibious Readiness Groups (MEUs/ARGs). What was
the Combatant Commander's demand for Marine Expeditionary Units/
Amphibious Readiness Groups (MEUs/ARGs) during the last five years? How
much of this demand was satisfied?
Secretary Mabus. Demand by Combatant Commanders for naval forces
has remained high during the last five years. The inherent flexibility
and capabilities of Amphibious/Expeditionary forces makes them
particularly desirable by COCOMs.
Navy's current force structure can provide about five MEU/ARG
deployments annually. While not able to meet the cumulative annual
global COCOM MEU/ARG demand, Navy is meeting all adjudicated demands
through the Global Force Management process, based on prioritizes
requirements defined by the Guidance for the Employment of the Force.
Mr. Coffman. 2.) Secretary Mabus, I applaud the efforts you have
taken to identify efficiencies in the Department. I believe the
reductions you have made to redundant staffs and large headquarters
elements are a good step. Are there additional efficiencies to be had
in other headquarters and staff organizations within the Department?
Secretary Mabus. The Department's efficiencies focused on three
overarching efforts: Buy Smarter, Streamline Organizations and
Operations, and Reduce Fossil Energy Consumption. More specifically, by
Streamlining Our Organizations and Operations (-$15.4B), we looked hard
at ways to save money by eliminating duplicative staffs, streamlining
all staffs, reducing contractor support, and looking at our personnel
policies and practices. We focused on building a more efficient
operation by reducing infrastructure overhead, and consolidating
headquarters activities.
Examples include:
Reduce ashore manpower, reassign personnel to operational
ships and air units; adjust special pays/advancements; and eliminate
duplicative functions (-$4.7B).
Disestablish Second Fleet headquarters; disestablish/
reorganize staffs for submarine, patrol aircraft, reserve aircraft,
carrier staffs, and destroyer squadrons; and eliminate one carrier
strike group staff ($-1.2B).
Efficient utilization of personnel (force shaping) and
examination of personnel policies/practices; develop housing/BAH
efficiencies; and rebaseline advertising (-$1.4B).
Reduce contractor support (-$1.7B).
Streamline air/ship/equipment maintenance; revalidate
flying hour program model; modify fleet training concepts; and
restructure maritime prepositioning force squadrons ($-4.2B).
Implement flexible and tailored responses to
infrastructure sustainment ($-2.2B).
While we do not foresee additional efficiencies to be garnered in
other headquarters and staff organizations within the Department of the
Navy at this time, we will continue the momentum to pursue streamlining
efforts.
Mr. Coffman. 3.) Secretary Mabus, the number of operational
Aircraft Carriers and Submarines that the Navy is required to maintain
are mandated by law. Are you in favor of mandating the requirement to
maintain the Navy and Marine Corps' published need for a minimum of 33
operational amphibious ships?
Secretary Mabus. I do not believe mandating the number of
operational amphibious ships the Navy is required to maintain is
necessary or desirable as it would affect the flexibility and force
structure decision-making going forward that the Navy and Marine Corps
share in providing a capable, adaptable, amphibious force. The Navy and
Marine Corps continuously evaluate amphibious lift capabilities to meet
current and projected requirements. Specifically:
In the January 2009 Report to Congress on Naval Amphibious Force
Structure, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps reaffirmed that 38 amphibious ships are required to lift
the Assault Echelon (AE) of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).
They agreed to sustain, resources permitting, an amphibious force of
about 33 total amphibious ships in the AE, evenly balanced at 11
aviation-capable ships, 11 LPD 17 class ships, and 11 LSD 41 class
ships. The 33 ship force accepts risk in the arrival of combat support
and combat service support elements of the MEB but has been judged to
be adequate in meeting the needs of all parties within the limits of
today's fiscal realities. The 33 ships represent the limit of
acceptable risk in meeting lift requirements for the Assault Echelon in
a two MEB forcible entry operation, the capacity to sustain a day-to-
day forward posture of Amphibious Ready Groups with the full deployment
capacity of Marine Expeditionary Units. In addition, a force of this
size will provide sufficient capacity for single-ship deployments for
theater security cooperation activities.
The recently completed Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force
Structure Review of March 14, 2011 concluded that: ``The dual demands
of sustained forward presence and sufficient lift for the assault
echelons of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) result in a
requirement of 38 amphibious ships. Given fiscal constraints, however,
the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to accept the risk with 33 ships,
increasing the imperative to design a lean and effective force
structure. We will also explore options for employing Marines from a
wider variety of Navy ships, seeking innovative naval solutions to GCC
requirements.''
In addition to the Department of the Navy's internal reviews, the
Quadrennial Defense Review Report of February 2010 determined that the
main elements of the Navy force structure should include 29--31
amphibious warfare ships for the duration of the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) (Fiscal Year (FY) 2011--FY 2015).
Mr. Coffman. 4.) The Department of the Navy (DON) has led the DOD
in establishing secure, enterprise-wide networking through the Navy
Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) and is to be commended for its leadership.
However, the planned NGEN procurement contemplates a segmentation
approach that proposes to split a unified network into at least four
pieces, creating multiple, overlapping points of accountability across
the network, leading to more complexity and likely higher overhead
cost, slower problem resolution and most importantly, increased risk of
security breaches. How much does the DON plan to spend on the NGEN
procurement and why does the DON believe the proposed segmented plan is
an improvement to the current IT NMCI/COSC program?
Secretary Mabus. NGEN Increment 1 is the follow-on to the Navy
Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). NGEN will provide secure, net-centric
data and information technology (IT) services and support to the United
States Navy (USN) and United States Marine Corps (USMC) within the
Continental United States (CONUS) and Outside the Continental United
States (OCONUS). NGEN will position the DON for transition to the Naval
Networking Environment (NNE) vision, and will be interoperable with and
leverage other DoD provided Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES).
NGEN is the foundation for the future Naval Networking Environment
(NNE). It is the continuous evolution of the DON enterprise networks
acquisition life-cycle, and the transition from the congressionally
mandated end of the NMCI contract.
The primary objectives of NGEN Increment 1 are to establish
Government operational control of the networks and to provide service-
specific network operation. The objectives will be accomplished via the
acquisition of necessary NMCI infrastructure and Government Purpose
Rights (GPR) of the NMCI Intellectual Property (NMCI IP). Government
operational control of the network will be implemented using a phased
transition approach and will be complete when the Network Operations
(NetOps), Command and Control, Design Authority (DA), and Technical
Authority (TA) of the network have transitioned to the DON. In
addition, increased competition, to include the ability to periodically
recompete this network capability were a critical objective supported
by Congress, DoD and DON. The DON's segmented approach, along with
ownership of the infrastructure, and license to the IP accomplishes
this goal.
The current DON budget profile (PB12) reflects the Navy's position
regarding funding the NGEN procurement as follows (FY10 and prior years
were budgeted under NMCI. The cost of NMCI is not included): (See page
194.)
A new Program Manager for Naval Enterprise Networks (PMW-205)
recently reported and is currently in the midst of conducting an
initial program review to include the appropriateness and cost of
current acquisition processes as applied to the transition of an
existing capability to a new delivery model (i.e., segmented,
government ownership and operations). The NGEN program is currently in
the process of developing its Service Cost Position (SCP). With the
assistance of the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) a solid ``will
cost'' position will be developed with appropriate sensitivity analysis
and identification of program cost drivers. Once the NGEN ``will cost''
position is developed, the program manager will work toward a program
``should cost'' total.
Mr. Coffman. 1.) Are you comfortable with the level of risk of
operating amphibious ships within 12-15 Nautical Miles of enemy
coastlines instead of the former 25 Nautical Mile planning guidance?
Admiral Roughead. Yes. Over the last two decades, threats in the
littorals and US capabilities to counter those threats have evolved.
Improvements in US area-defense and self-defense capabilities (fielded
and in development) mitigate potential threats to an acceptable level
of risk that I am comfortable with our naval forces launching
amphibious vehicles from a 12 nautical mile standoff distance.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5108.102
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Mrs. Hartzler. 1) With the proposed repeal of the DADT policy, what
changes to facilities are you contemplating to address the privacy and
concerns of service members?
Admiral Roughead. There is no requirement to make any facility
changes.
Mrs. Hartzler. 2) What costs do you anticipate it costing to make
these changes?
Admiral Roughead. There are no identified costs because there is no
requirement to make any facility changes.
Mrs. Hartzler. 3) What policies are being put in place to ensure
all service members' concerns will be considered without fear of
reprisal?
Admiral Roughead. Current policies ensure all service members have
multiple avenues through which they can address their concerns. Service
members who believe they have suffered discrimination or reprisal for
communicating their concerns may petition for redress through their
chain of command or legal office via existing grievance procedures
under UCMJ Article 138 or Navy Regulations Article 1150. Similarly,
service members with individual concerns or questions about the repeal
of DADT may seek guidance through their chain of command. The Navy's
approach is founded on professionalism, treating everyone with dignity
and respect, and Standards of Conduct that apply without regard to
sexual orientation.
Mrs. Hartzler. 4) Given what is known about the normal human desire
for privacy in sexual matters, why would policies requiring the
constant cohabitation of mixed sexual orientation groups not undermine
morale, disciple, and readiness, recruiting, and retention?
Admiral Roughead. In the Navy, we live and work in close quarters
in many of our operating environments with individuals from diverse
backgrounds. We expect all Sailors to treat their fellow shipmates with
dignity and respect, and maintain high standards of behavior. This will
not change following repeal of DADT. As in all situations, commanders
may make reasonable accommodations in the interest of maintaining
morale, good order, and discipline, consistent with the performance of
the mission and the environments in which we live.
Mrs. Hartzler. 5) How would these changes improve the All-Volunteer
Force?
Admiral Roughead. Although I cannot quantify the extent to which
repeal of DADT would improve the all-volunteer force, I believe repeal,
in the long-term, will make our Navy better. Gay and lesbian Sailors
already serve in our Navy. Repeal will end the unnecessary loss of
these talented and dedicated men and women from the Service and improve
our ability to provide an environment in which all Sailors will be able
to serve with honesty and integrity. I am confident that the
professional men and women of the United States Navy will ensure we
remain the world's most ready, capable, and professional Navy in which
all shipmates continue to be treated with mutual dignity and respect.
Mrs. Hartzler. With the proposed repeal of the DADT policy, what
changes to facilities are you contemplating to address the privacy and
concerns of service members?
General Amos. The Secretary of Defense has been clear that the
Services will not prescribe berthing or billeting assignments based on
sexual orientation.
Mrs. Hartzler. What costs do you anticipate it costing to make
these changes?
General Amos. The Marine Corps does not anticipate any costs as
separate facilities will not be established based on sexual
orientation.
Mrs. Hartzler. How essential do you think it is for service member
to be able to focus on their mission without distraction?
General Amos. The Marine Corps is a disciplined, professional force
trained to accomplish its mission regardless of environment. I have
tendered my best judgment to the Secretary of Defense that the United
States Marine Corps is prepared for the implementation of DADT repeal.
The Marine Corps has conducted extensive training within the force on
DADT repeal and has the applicable policies and regulations necessary
for implementation that are consistent with standards of military
readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and
retention. I assess the impact of implementation to be low to moderate.
We intend to resolve any issues that may arise through engaged
leadership and discipline.
Mrs. Hartzler. Do you support the idea of, or do you think it is
wise policy, for men and women service members to sleep in the same
barracks and shower together?
General Amos. Sexual orientation is not synonymous with gender. The
Marine Corps' and other Services' gender-based barracks have deep roots
in longstanding societal and cultural norms. While males and females
reside in the same barracks buildings, they have separate room
assignments and individual shower facilities within their rooms. We
maintain gender separate room assignments now and currently see no
reason to change the current assignment policy.
Mrs. Hartzler. Given what is known about the normal human desire
for privacy in sexual matters, why would policies requiring the
constant cohabitation of mixed sexual orientation groups not undermine
morale, disciple, and readiness, recruiting, and retention?
General Amos. The Marine Corps is a disciplined, professional force
trained to accomplish its mission regardless of environment. I have
tendered my best judgment to the Secretary of Defense that the United
States Marine Corps is prepared for the implementation of DADT repeal.
The Marine Corps has conducted extensive training within the force on
DADT repeal and has the applicable policies and regulations necessary
for implementation that are consistent with standards of military
readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and
retention. I assess the impact of implementation to be low to moderate.
We intend to resolve any issues that may arise through engaged
leadership and discipline.
Mrs. Hartzler. How would these changes improve the All-Volunteer
Force?
General Amos. Upon implementation of DADT repeal, the Marine Corps
will continue making concerted efforts to attract, mentor and retain
the most talented men and women who bring a diversity of background,
culture and skill in service to our Nation. As always, we will raise
our total capability by leveraging the strengths and talents of each
and every Marine.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO
Mr. Palazzo. 1. Admiral Roughead, you were quoted recently in the
San Diego Business Journal expressing the needs of the Navy as it
relates to the continuing resolution that we are currently operating
under. I think it is extremely important that the Department of Defense
is funded appropriately, through the regular appropriations process.
According to the same article the Navy has had to delay or cancel 29
trips to shipyards, could you give us an overview of the long term
effects of this delayed funding and the consequences it holds for our
Navy, our military as a whole and the Defense Industry?
Admiral Roughead. Regrettably, the series of continuing resolutions
(CR) for FY 2011 prevented us from applying the increased FY 2011 O&M
funding to improve our readiness, and it negatively impacted our
ability to procure our future Navy and support our Sailors, Navy
civilians, and their families. It forced us to take mitigation measures
that included: reducing operations, limiting numerous contracts for
base operating support, slowing civilian hiring, reducing Permanent
Change of Station notifications for our Sailors from about six months
lead time to less than two months, not initiating the Small Business
Innovative Research program, and delaying procurement contracts for new
capabilities and existing production lines. Starting in March, we
cancelled or scaled back several ship maintenance availabilities in
Norfolk, Mayport, and San Diego and MILCON projects in many states. The
impact of these actions will jeopardize the efforts we made in recent
years to restore Fleet readiness.
With the passage of a full year funding bill we will make every
effort to reverse these actions, but their initial impact will have
negative downstream effects in our maintenance and MILCON portfolios
for many y ears.
Mr. Palazzo. 2. The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes a $15
million military construction project for road improvements at Naval
Station Mayport. The request is the first of several military
construction projects that the Navy anticipates will cost $564 million
to provide the supporting infrastructure for a nuclear aircraft
carrier. The Navy cites the strategic risk of locating all nuclear
aircraft carriers on the East Coast at a single location as the
principal reason to relocate an aircraft carrier to Mayport. If
strategic dispersal is central to the Navy's decision, why did the Navy
abandon strategic dispersal in the Gulf of Mexico in BRAC 2005 through
the closure of Naval Station Ingleside and especially Naval Station
Pascagoula?
Admiral Roughead. Strategic dispersal remains a key aspect of Navy
planning for, and mitigation of, manmade or natural disasters along our
coasts. As the Navy grew its Fleet size to almost 600 ships in the
1980s, it constructed four naval bases, including Naval Station
Ingleside and Naval Station Pascagoula, to support and disperse those
additional ships. As the size of our Fleet has decreased over the last
thirty years to 287 ships today, the Navy has methodically closed or
consolidated its presence in many ports, including at Ingleside and
Pascagoula as part of BRAC 2005.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WEST
Mr. West. 1) Do you believe that the Navy--as currently funded--has
the ability to execute proper force projection in order to protect the
sea lanes of commerce throughout the world, specifically off the coast
of Somalia?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead. The Navy provides maritime
forces to Combatant Commanders (CCDR) to accomplish their assigned
missions, which include force projection and sea control. Our readiness
and operational support programs will meet the anticipated CCDR demand
for Navy forces within force structure constraints and provide surge
forces in support of operational plans, with an acceptable level of
risk. Although total CCDR demand exceeds Navy's capability to source,
the world's sea lanes remain protected.
Navy's forward stationed and rotationally deployed forces cooperate
with allies and partners to promote collective security, enhance global
stability and confront irregular challenges. We join with navies and
coast guards around the world to support the stability and security of
the global maritime commons; a prime example of our maritime strategy
in action. As articulated in that strategy, enhanced global stability
and secure freedom of the seas benefits all nations.
Mr. West. 2) Considering the recent developments in the Middle
East--specifically in Bahrain--what is the current risk to the long-
term viability of the 5th Fleet stationed in Bahrain?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead. There has been no change in
the status of the relationship between COMUSNAVCENT/C5F and the
Government of Bahrain. The Government of Bahrain continues to fully
support hosting Naval Support Activity-Bahrain (NSA-Bahrain) and its
tenant commands. The King and Crown Prince have stated their continuing
support to the U.S. Navy presence in the Kingdom of Bahrain. We do not
expect a change in the Bahraini government's attitude toward hosting
NSA-Bahrain. To date, there are no known credible threats to U.S./
Coalition forces or bases. There have been incidents of direct anti-
Western/anti-U.S. (but not specifically against U.S. Navy) sentiment.
We view the Government of Bahrain's allegations that Iran could support
specific measures in an effort to influence the opposition movement in
Bahrain with concern.
Mr. West. 3) Myself and a number of my colleagues are concerned
about so-called invisible wounds, such as Traumatic Brain Injury. What
can you tell me about the Department of the Navy's efforts with
Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy (HBOT) and Cognitive Stimulation?
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead. We are committed to providing
all scientifically proven and FDA-approved therapies to our Sailors,
Marines and their family members. As soon as there is evidence to
ensure safety and efficacy of any new therapy such as HBOT, including
documentation from well-designed, adequately controlled medical
research studies, we move forward to make it available to our injured
service members. In this regard, the Department of Defense has three
trials in progress to assess the safety and efficacy of HBOT on the
symptoms of mild and moderate traumatic brain injury. The Air Force
study at Wilford Hall Medical Center recently completed enrollment and
follow-up visits; and the DARPA/VA funded study is ongoing at the Navy
operational hyperbaric oxygen chambers in Panama City, Florida. In
addition, a large DoD multi-site study will utilize the hyperbaric
oxygen chambers at Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune and Naval Hospital Camp
Pendleton. Navy Medicine is working with their Army and Air Force
counterparts to see these three studies completed safely and
efficiently.
With respect to Cognitive Rehabilitation Therapy, Navy Medicine has
recently initiated formal pilot programs at four sites that serve large
Marine populations including: Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune; Naval
Hospital Camp Pendleton; Naval Medical Center San Diego; and Naval
Medical Center Portsmouth. All four pilot sites have interdisciplinary
treatment teams that meet to discuss patients and their general
progress, as well as cognitive rehabilitation. Cognitive rehabilitation
interventions offered at the sites address the domains of attention,
memory, processing speed, executive functioning, emotional regulation,
and social pragmatics through individual and group therapy and training
sessions. Outcome measures are collected using standardized
psychological, cognitive, and neuropsychological assessments before and
after treatment to document progress. Many other Navy medical treatment
facilities offer forms of cognitive rehabilitation to their patients,
frequently through the neuropsychology, behavioral health, and/or
speech language therapy clinics.
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