[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
NORTH KOREA'S SEA OF FIRE:
BULLYING, BRINKMANSHIP AND BLACKMAIL
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 10, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-6
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Victor Cha, professor and director of Asian studies and D. S.
Song-Korea foundation chair in Asian studies and government,
Georgetown University.......................................... 9
Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow, Northeast Asia, Asian
Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation........................ 19
Mr. William Newcomb (former senior economist, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, and former
senior economic adviser, Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
U.S. Department of the Treasury)............................... 32
Mr. Robert Carlin, visiting scholar, Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.................. 45
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Victor Cha: Prepared statement............................... 12
Bruce Klingner: Prepared statement............................... 21
Mr. William Newcomb: Prepared statement.......................... 34
Mr. Robert Carlin: Prepared statement............................ 48
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 74
Hearing minutes.................................................. 75
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 77
The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California: Letter to the Honorable Barack Obama,
President of the United States, dated February 9, 2011......... 78
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey: Articles submitted for the record 85
NORTH KOREA'S SEA OF FIRE: BULLYING, BRINKMANSHIP AND BLACKMAIL
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THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order.
As we address the threats posed by the North Korean regime
to our nation's security interests, to our allies, and to its
own people, I would like to take a moment to remember another
brave people, the people of Tibet, as they commemorate the 52nd
anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising.
At the recent White House State Dinner for the visiting
Chinese leader, a Chinese pianist played a song from the long-
forgotten Korean War whose lyrics portray the brave American
soldiers who fought for freedom in the Korean peninsula as
``wolves and jackals.''
Those depicted at our Korean War Memorial are no jackals.
These are America's own boys. These are our beloved sons. ``Our
Nation,'' as the memorial inscription reads, ``honors our sons
and daughters who answered the call to defend a country they
never knew and a people they never met. Having risen from the
ashes of war, the Republic of Korea, a thriving democracy and
an economic powerhouse, is the proud legacy for those who
fought and died over 60 years ago.
By contrast, in North Korea, a modern Caligula pursues his
nuclear bread and circuses while he lets his own people starve.
He plays a risky game of brinkmanship, sinking a South Korean
naval vessel, defined as an act of war, and shelling South
Korean island villagers with a sense of impunity.
And why does he dare to do so? He is confident that his
Chinese patrons will protect him, both on the ground in Asia
and in the halls of the United Nations. And the leader in
Pyongyang threatens to turn Seoul, ``the miracle on the Han
River,'' into ``a sea of fire.''
He also directed his hackers to try to disrupt joint U.S./
South Korean military exercises held recently by jamming GPS,
Global Positioning System devices critical to South Korean
military communications.
But the evil deeds of this modern day Caligula do not end
in Korea. He has attempted to ship arms to the brutal regime in
Burma and the Tamil Tigers. News reports indicate that, with
Chinese complicity and in defiance of U.N. sanctions, he
shipped missile parts to Teheran via Beijing's airport.
North Korea has attempted to ship arms to Hamas and
Hezbollah, both proxies of the Iranian regime and both
designated by the U.S. Department of State as foreign terrorist
organizations. And it was North Korea that helped the Syrian
regime build the nuclear facility that Israel removed in
September 2007. The International Atomic Energy Agency is still
investigating and seeking answers on this North Korea/Syria
nuclear facility.
All this in the midst of one failed round after another of
the Six-Party Talks. These talks have proven to be little more
than kabuki theater demonstrating only Pyongyang's duplicity
and broken promises. Former Los Alamos National Laboratory
Director Siegfried Hecker reported that ``his jaw just
dropped'' when he saw a facility in North Korea last November
with ``hundreds of centrifuges.'' He added that the world
should take Pyongyang's apparent uranium enrichment program
seriously. This revelation indicates that Pyongyang has had a
covert second track to nuclear weaponry in defiance of the
Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks.
Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell is en route to
Seoul as we meet to discuss this critical Highly Enriched
Uranium issue with our South Korean allies. North Korea
promised to accept a transparent verification of its
denuclearization when it was removed from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism by the Bush administration in October
2008.
Pyongyang reneged on that promise and withdrew from the
Six-Party Talks after getting what it wanted. In January of
this year, a court in Seoul, South Korea sentenced a spy to 10
years in prison for planning to assassinate a leading North
Korean defector on direct orders from the regime in Pyongyang.
The U.S. criminal code defines such action as international
terrorism. Is it not high time for the State Department to re-
list North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism?
Meanwhile, Pyongyang has requested further U.S. food aid as
reports indicate renewed food shortages in North Korea. There
are some grave concerns about this proposal. There is the
question of the American food aid remaining in North Korean
warehouses when Pyongyang expelled American humanitarian NGOs
in the spring of 2009. Pyongyang distributed this food without
monitoring. There must be a full accounting of these 20,000
tons of food aid requested.
Lest we forget, in December 2008, U.S. shipment of food aid
to North Korea via the World Food Program was suspended due to
growing concerns about diversion by the North Korean military
and regime elite and the World Food Program's lack of effective
monitoring and safeguards.
Fast approaching is the 100th anniversary next year of the
birth of Kim Jong Il's father, and there is a danger that aid
provided would be diverted for this spectacle.
Much has occurred since the last full committee hearing on
North Korea that was held in early 2007. I look forward to
receiving the witnesses' insight on North Korean actions in the
last 4 years and their recommendations for U.S. policy moving
forward.
I now turn to the distinguished ranking member, my good
friend Mr. Berman, for his opening remarks.
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And thank
you for calling this hearing. And my kudos to the individual
who thought up the title of this hearing. I think there is a
literary career ahead for that person.
For over two decades, successive American administrations
have wrestled with the puzzle called North Korea. Every
President since Reagan has tried to put the puzzle pieces
together. And just when it seems like they are going to fit,
North Korea pulls the rug out from under us.
Today, a peaceful and permanent resolution of the North
Korean nuclear issue remains as elusive as ever. Pyongyang
desperately wants to be recognized as a nuclear power, and
refuses to fulfill its commitment to abandon its nuclear
weapons program under international inspections and safeguards.
At the same time, North Korea's reckless and provocative
actions have dramatically increased tensions on the Korean
Peninsula. In the past year alone, North Korea has sunk a South
Korean naval ship, shelled a South Korean island populated with
civilians, and revealed to the world what we already believed,
that it is pursuing a uranium enrichment program as well.
While North Korea poses a serious threat to the stability
and security of East Asia, it has also, as the chairman
mentioned, exported its destabilizing influence to other
regions of the world. Surpassed only by A.Q. Khan's network as
a source of illicit weapons technology, Pyongyang has supplied
ballistic missiles to Iran and built the now-destroyed nuclear
reactor in Syria. It could easily begin exporting uranium
enrichment equipment, nuclear weapon designs, and even nuclear
weapons material.
The perennial challenge is how to change the North's
behavior. Is there a new approach we should take in dealing
with Pyongyang? Is it even possible to reach an agreement with
North Korea that will lead to a verifiable end of its nuclear
program, especially now that the regime is undergoing a second
dynastic succession?
North Korea has now indicated that it wants to return to
the negotiating table, more than 2 years after the last round
of Six-Party Talks. But in light of the regime's previous
behavior, it is hard to view this as anything other than a
thinly-veiled effort, like so many previous cycles of
aggression and negotiation, to mitigate international
sanctions, regain economic aid, bolster ties with China, and
resume bilateral negotiations with Seoul and Washington, while
continuing to stall on the nuclear issue.
Nevertheless, while a healthy dose of skepticism is
certainly in order, it would be a mistake to completely write
off a policy of tough engagement. At the present time, there is
simply no other viable alternative to that approach.
Despite our differences with China on a whole range of
issues, we can't afford to ignore the role that Beijing plays
on the North Korea nuclear issue. As a result of its close
political and economic relationship with Pyongyang, China holds
considerable leverage over the regime. Regrettably, China has
been very reluctant to fully exercise that influence.
The Chinese leadership apparently believes that coddling
its neighbor will preserve stability in the region and perhaps
enhance Beijing's own prestige and influence with the West. But
this is a dangerous game Beijing is playing, one that it may
come to regret. Every day that Beijing fails to pressure
Pyongyang is a day that brings the North closer to having a
deliverable nuclear weapons capability, one that could directly
threaten China and cause other states in the region to consider
pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs. Continuing to
enable Kim Jong Il's truculence is the surest route to
instability in China's immediate neighborhood.
While the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea is a
critical issue that deserves our urgent attention, we must not
overlook the horrendous human rights situation in North Korea.
Millions of North Koreans live in desperate conditions, many of
them facing starvation. They live in constant fear of arbitrary
arrest and know they could be tortured or executed at any time.
We should make every effort to provide humanitarian
assistance and food aid to North Korean people but only if we
can get adequate monitoring to ensure that such aid is not
diverted or misused.
I look forward to the testimony of our panel of experts
today and to hearing their views on possible creative solutions
to the very serious North Korean problem.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
Unfortunately, the chairman of the Subcommittee on East
Asia and the Pacific, Mr. Manzullo, is ill today. Thus, I am
pleased to recognize the chairman of the functional
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Mr.
Royce, in his stead for a 3-minute opening statement and will
allow the members of our committee for a 1-minute opening
statement as well.
Mr. Royce is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. Royce. Madam Chair, thank you very much.
This is very serious. Last fall North Korea revealed its
highly enriched uranium facility. Experts estimate that these
centrifuges are four times as powerful as those spinning in
Natanz, Iran. Raising the stakes, exporting centrifuge
technology can be very easy to cloak. One witness predicts a
third nuclear test in the near future in North Korea.
Since I came to Congress in '93, our North Korea policy has
been a bipartisan failure in terms of both at the
administrations level, and what we have done.
Even the former chief proponent of the Six-Party Talks has
said those talks are of no use. Only a new government in North
Korea is going to get us closer to peace and security. And this
crisis comes as the administration is considering a request for
food aid.
Now, let me say this about the $800 million in food aid we
have already given. A top North Korean defector told the Wall
Street Journal last week, ``We must not give food aid to North
Korea. Doing so,'' he said, in his words, ``is the same as
providing funding for North Korea's nuclear program.''
And, according to this defector, who spent a decade in a
top position of power, if the regime cared about the people,
they would take money out of the nuclear program and spend it
on food. The opposite is happening. The money is going to fund
their build-up. So, looking at it through this defector's lens,
that is $800 million that we have given the North Korean
regime. And they have pilfered that, and they have not had to
spend it on feeding their military and their cronies.
We had a French NGO sit here and tell us that that money
goes into the hand of the military base because it is sold, the
food aid is sold, on the Pyongyang food exchange. The French
NGO traced it back. That is the report we get.
Believe me, they are not asking for food to help the
starving. I was told by the former minister of propaganda that
money never goes to the outlying areas. That never goes to
those areas. It goes to prop up the regime.
So it is really hard arguing that our aid doesn't support
this brutal regime and, secondly, doesn't support its nuclear
weapons drive. I think the administration is on the wrong
course in this request for food aid to North Korea.
As we are sitting here pointing out all of the failures of
the past policy. My question is, when are we going to learn? We
have been feeding North Korea for decades. The plight of the
average North Korean gets worse and worse. We should basically
be blocking their access to hard currency and helping to put
enough pressure on this regime from the officer corps, who
won't get paid if we do that. So we change the regime.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce.
And now I am pleased to recognize the ranking member on the
Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Mr. Faleomavaega,
for his 3-minute statement.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for calling
this important hearing.
For the 22 years that I have been serving as a member of
this committee, it seems that the more we hold hearings on the
crisis in the Korean Peninsula, the more I feel a real sense of
either hopelessness or sheer frustration, wondering if we are
ever going to resolve the critical issues that confront our
nation and our allies toward the people and he leaders of North
Korea.
At the same time, Madam Chairwoman, while it is very easy
for us to be throwing spears and daggers and even labeling
North Korea as an axis of evil, one cannot discuss the issues
of North Korea without including the concerns and also the
frustrations on the part of some 42 million South Koreans who
live in this current division, sheer frustrations on the part
of both North and South Korea, a most profound social and
political division that took place following World War II, not
of their choosing, Ms. Chairwoman, but even before there was a
North and South Korea.
The Korean people were caught in the middle of the
geopolitical rivalry between two superpowers that started the
Cold War. And, even though the Cold War may have been over, we
are still working on the remnants. And, as a child, I supposed
that the crisis in the Korean Peninsula was never part of the
solution.
History sometimes, Madam Chairman, can do nothing but
deliver misery to people. Let's not forget there for some 60
years before the World War II, Korea was a colony of the
imperial Japanese empire. The pain and suffering of the Korean
people during that period of time is still being felt by many
of the people in Korea.
I will never forget what the South Korean friend of mine
told me when we were in meetings in Seoul. He said, ``Eni, the
United States is our friend, but the North Korean people are
our brothers and sisters. Please don't forget that when you
discus the Korean issues.''
Let me just say, Madam Chairman, on the brighter side of
things, I would like to urge my colleagues let's move forward
in approving the proposed free trade agreement with South Korea
that has been carefully crafted to increase our export markets
to South Korea between $12-20 billion and will add some 70,000
jobs for the American people. Let's not play yo-yo politics
with this, Madam Chairwoman. And I say I am confident the
administration will also bring the Colombian and the Panama
free trade agreements for us to consider.
I look forward to hearing from our three distinguished
witnesses this morning, who know a lot more about Korea than
me. Is it me or I, Madam Chairman? I am still learning how to
speak English.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Than I.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Anyway, I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Pleased to yield 1 minute to our subcommittee chair on
Middle East and South Asia: Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will be brief.
I particularly like your comparison of North Korean
leadership to Caligula. I think that is exactly right.
And, as usual, China, I believe, is the problem behind the
scenes here. They essentially shield North Korea from any
ramifications from any consequences of their actions. So, you
know, North Korea sinks a South Korean ship, killing 46
sailors, nearly half the crew. They shell a South Korean
island, killing civilians and burning 70 percent of the corps
and the forests on that particular island, essentially with
impunity.
Our Stanford professor comes back and indicates how they
are moving forward. He is stunned with how they are moving
forward with their nuclear program. China is the real problem.
North Korea is their vessel. They are, in essence, the tool
that the Chinese use just to stir up mischief. That is the real
problem here.
I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot.
I am pleased to yield to Mr. Payne, the ranking member on
the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I couldn't agree more that China could certainly be more
helpful. I think that we have to convince China. You know, we
have bent over backwards for China. We took them from most
favored nation status to permanent trade relations.
And we are certainly increasing China's modernization. I
think the least we could do is ask them to--and it makes sense
for them to have a stable region. I do feel that we should
continue to give food aid. We do find that there are flaws
sometimes in our program, but I think many more people will be
helped with the food aid than those we feel should not be
participating in it.
And I believe that we have a humanitarian responsibility.
We shouldn't blame the people. They have double jeopardy from
their leaders and from our lack of support.
So I thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
Ms. Schmidt of Ohio?
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I want to voice some of my concerns with North Korea.
First, we have known since July 2006 when North Korea first
tested its nuclear device, that they are not just accumulating
separated plutonium, but they are also creating gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment, which will give them the means of producing
nuclear weapons.
In addition, North Korea is also developing a long-range
ballistic missile program capable at some point in the future,
possibly, of hitting the United States.
It doesn't end there. We know that they have been very,
very aggressive with their neighbors. On March 26th, 2010, a
North Korean submarine fired at a South Korean vessel, 46
fatalities. On November 23rd, 2010, the North Koreans, again
without provocation, lobbed dozens of artillery shells into a
South Korean island. And, again, South Korean civilians were
killed.
And, against this, we know that Kim Jong Il's health is
failing and his likely successor, his youngest son, Kim Jong-
un, is untested and may be more nervous to the West than his
father.
Our policy has been a little unsure in the United States
regarding this administration and North Korea. And I worry very
much about where we are going to go with the future talks.
I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Ms. Schmidt.
Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island?
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I just look forward to hearing from the four distinguished
panelists and thank the chair for convening this meeting on a
very important issue.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Pleased to yield to the Subcommittee on Africa, Global
Health, and Human Rights, the chairman, Chris Smith, for 1
minute.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I would hope that our distinguished witnesses would address
a number of news reports and as well as the Agency for Defense
Development briefing for members of Parliament in Seoul that
said that the North is believed to be nearing completion of an
electromagnetic pulse bomb that if exploded 25 miles above
ground, would cause irreversible damage to electrical and
electronic devices, such as mobile phones, computers, radio,
and radar, experts say. They also have said that this could be
used, obviously, in warfare. Kim Jong Il made it one of his
priorities, according to numerous reports, to pursue electronic
warfare. I hope you would speak to that.
Secondly, very briefly, the issue of religious freedom, and
human rights in general, remains a serious concern in North
Korea. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
has said that negotiations with North Korea will not succeed
unless rooted in a broader framework that includes agreements
on humanitarian and human rights concerns. I hope that you
would address that as well. They should not be decoupled,
notwithstanding our concerns about the nuclear issue.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, is recognized for a 5-
minute opening remarks.
Mr. Sherman. The U.S.-Korea free trade agreement will open
our markets to North Korean goods. Keeping this concealed until
Congress approves the agreement is critical to the strategy of
getting it passed.
Goods that are, say, 65 percent North Korean content and 35
percent South Korean content have the right to come into this
country duty-free under this agreement. If we block those
goods, as we may if we enforce our national security laws, then
South Korea gets to raise tariffs. And we lose all of the
advantages we negotiated for under the agreement.
Furthermore, the Kaesong slave labor camp will be eligible
for treatment as if it is part of South Korea. And all the
goods, 100 percent Kaesong-made goods will come into this
country with the workers being paid maybe $7 a month without
future congressional approval. The agreement is carefully vague
in appendix or annex number 22.
I have asked the USTR to clarify this. They have refused.
They have ignored my letter for the last month and longer. And
it is clear that there is enough vagueness there so that future
executive branches could act and let those slave labor goods
into the United States.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Johnson of Ohio is recognized.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I, too, applaud
setting up this hearing.
I am particularly interested today to hear our panel
members talk about the security implications. You have heard my
colleague talk about the trade agreement. I am interested in
hearing your opinion of the security implications were we to
not move forward with that trade agreement.
I would also be interested to hear your thoughts on China
and whether or not China is essentially benefitting from this
perceived standoff with North Korea and does it not, in fact,
give China significant leverage that these barriers persist. So
I would be interested to hear the panel members talk about
those kinds of issues.
And, with that, I yield back, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Thank you to all of our members for their opening
statements. The Chair is pleased to welcome now our panel of
witnesses. Victor D. Cha has been the Korean chair at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies since May 2009.
He is also a professor of government and director of Asian
studies at Georgetown University and has academic degrees from
Columbia and Oxford.
From 2004 to 2007, Mr. Cha served as the director for Asian
affairs at the National Security Council. At that time, he
worked closely with former Ambassador Chris Hill in the George
W. Bush administration on North Korean policy and served as
deputy head of the U.S. delegation to the Six-Party Talks.
Dr. Cha, thank you for attending.
Bruce Klingner is the senior research fellow for Northeast
Asia at The Heritage Foundation. He has a 20-year career at the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence
Agency, including serving as deputy division chief for Korea at
the CIA.
Mr. Klingner has written numerous articles on the Korean
Peninsula and received degrees from Middlebury College and the
National War College.
We welcome you as well, sir.
William J. Newcomb is a former U.S. Government economist.
From 2005 to 2008, Mr. Newcomb was the senior economic adviser
to the assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis in the
Treasury Department.
Prior to holding that position, Mr. Newcomb spent over 20
years as the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research senior economist for North Korea. During 2003 to 2005,
Mr. Newcomb served as the deputy coordinator of the State
Department's North Korea Working Group.
Mr. Newcomb is a graduate of Colorado College and has done
graduate work at St. Mary's and Texas A&M.
Glad to have you here, Mr. Newcomb.
And our final witness, Mr. Robert Carlin, is currently a
visiting fellow at Stanford University's Center for
International Security and Cooperation. He is also as veteran
of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
where he worked for 13 years on North Korea.
Mr. Carlin served as a senior policy adviser to the North
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization from 2003 to
2006, leading numerous delegations to North Korea.
Mr. Carlin holds a degree from Claremont Men's College and
Harvard University.
Welcome, Mr. Carlin. And thank you for this excellent set
of panelists. I kindly remind our witnesses to keep your oral
testimony to no more than 5 minutes. And, without objection,
the witnesses' written statements will be inserted into the
record.
So we will begin with you, Dr. Cha. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. VICTOR CHA, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF ASIAN
STUDIES AND D. S. SONG-KOREA FOUNDATION CHAIR IN ASIAN STUDIES
AND GOVERNMENT, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Cha. Thank you, Chairwoman, Congressman Berman, and
distinguished members of the committee. It truly is a pleasure
to be here with you today.
The challenges that are posed by North Korea have only
become more complex from the past. In addition to the uranium
enrichment program and the possibility of a third nuclear test,
the sinking of the Cheonan and the brazen firing of 170
artillery shells on Yeonpyeong Island are very concerning. And
I think there are several theories that have been bantied about
as to why the North is provoking in such a deliberate and rapid
fashion having to do with the North Korean leaders' dislike of
the South Korean Government, longstanding disputes over
maritime boundaries, and the internal leadership transition.
But I would like to draw the committee's attention to one other
possible explanation.
North Koreans have said to me in the Six-Party Talks that
the United States attacked Iraq and it attacked Afghanistan
because they did not have nuclear weapons and that we would
never attack them or Iran because these countries have nuclear
capabilities. Kim may be engaging in more provocative
conventional attacks short of war because he believes his own
rhetoric that he is now a nuclear weapons state and, therefore,
feels invulnerable to potential retaliation by other parties.
Now, we know that this is wrong, but this does not mean
they may believe it mistakenly, particularly as they become
less confident in their deteriorating conventional deterrent,
including the degraded artillery that sits on the DMZ.
I cannot overemphasize to you how dangerous a situation
this is. The following scenario is not impossible. The North
could provoke again because they believe their nuclear
deterrent is sufficient to prevent retaliation. And Seoul
cannot stand another attack. They cannot sit passively. And
they respond with a military strike confident in their own
minds that they could control the escalation ladder. This is
the sort of miscalculation on both sides that could lead to
war.
So how do we deal with this? The Obama administration has
been operating essentially with the same toolbox as the Bush
administration: Sanctions, exercises, and counterproliferation
activities. And I give the administration credit for pursuing
trilateral coordination with Japan and South Korea and for the
up tempo of military exercises, including Key Resolve and Foal
Eagle, which finish up today.
But one cannot help but wonder where this is all leading. I
support sanctions, counterproliferation, and military
exercises. But even a hawk has to acknowledge that a long-term
policy of sanctions and military exercises in the end may lead
to war before they lead to a collapse of the North Korean
regime.
A study I directed at CSIS did a time-series analysis over
27 years back to March 1984 to chart on a weekly basis two
pieces of data. One was DPRK provocations, and the other were
periods of major negotiations involving the United States.
Never once in the entire 27-year period was there a period
in which the DPRK provoked in the midst of negotiations with
the United States. This does not mean the Obama administration
should dive right into negotiations today, but the cost of
strategic patience, the administration's policy, is likely to
be a third nuclear test and more North Korean provocations.
That will elicit a South Korean military response and potential
escalation.
No administration wants to be recorded in history as the
one that took the peninsula to war with a policy based for 4
years on sanctions and exercises. So they need to think hard
about their next steps.
As a baseline, the U.S. must continue to intensify the
sanctions and military exercising. They should also push
forward with new consultations with the ROK on extended
deterrence, both conventional and nuclear. The administration
should seek innovative ways to enhance trilateral coordination
with the allies, including a renewed effort at a collective
security statement. And the parties should also consider U.N.
authorization for U.S. and ROK use of force in self-defense in
response to future violations of the armistice.
While there is no movement on the nuclear negotiations,
this should not discourage those who seek to advance the human
rights agenda. And here the lowest hanging fruit is the food
assistance program. It is my own view that the United States
should consider providing food for North Korea if it is along
the lines of a 2008 agreement that the Bush administration
negotiated and if they can use that as an opportunity to try to
push North Korea to make an apology on the Cheonan or on the
Yeonpyeong Island shelling.
North Korea is truly the land of lousy options. There are
no good choices, and there are only bad choices and worse
choices. Rewarding bad behavior may elicit more bad behavior.
But the alternative is to do nothing on nuclear diplomacy or
human rights, and that will buy you a runaway nuclear program,
rampant proliferation, and now rumblings in South Korea about
nuclear weapons.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Klingner? Thank you so much for being here.
And if you could summarize your statement?
STATEMENT OF BRUCE KLINGNER, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, NORTHEAST
ASIA, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Klingner. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member
Berman, and distinguished members of the committee. It is
indeed an honor to appear before you on an issue of such
importance to the United States.
North Korea poses a multi-faceted military threat to peace
and stability in Asia as well as a global proliferation risk.
The disclosure last November of a previously unknown uranium
enrichment facility validates earlier U.S. assertions that
Pyongyang was pursuing a parallel uranium nuclear weapons
program. It not only augments North Korean capabilities to
increase its nuclear arsenal but also increases the risk of
nuclear proliferation.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently warned that
``North Korea is becoming a direct threat to the United
States'' since it will develop an ICBM within 5 years. And
Pyongyang has already deployed 1,000 missiles that can target
South Korea, Japan, and U.S. bases in Asia.
Pyongyang's two unprovoked acts of war last year were a
chilling reminder that its conventional forces remain a direct
military threat to South Korea.
For years, many sought to absolve North Korea for its
provocative acts and noncompliance by, instead, blaming U.S.
and South Korean policies. They also claimed that simply
returning to negotiations, offering concessions, and abandoning
sanctions would resolve the nuclear issue and prevent
provocations. Yet, dialogue did not prevent North Korean
provocative acts nor resolve the nuclear stalemate.
Last March, behind-the-scenes discussions were moving
toward resumption of the Six-Party Talks, but that did not
prevent Pyongyang's attack on the Cheonan. Nor did secret talks
between North and South Korea last November, including
discussions of humanitarian assistance, prevent the regime from
shelling Yeonpyeong Island.
During the last 4 years of the Bush administration, the
U.S. engaged not only in multilateral negotiations but also in
frequent direct bilateral diplomacy with Pyongyang, even
removing North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list.
But North Korean intransigence, noncompliance, and brinkmanship
continued.
In early 2009, there were euphoric expectations that the
transition from George Bush to Barack Obama would lead to
dramatic breakthroughs with North Korea. Instead, Pyongyang
quickly sent clear signals that it would not adopt a more
accommodating stance post-Bush. North Korea rejected several
attempts by the new administration to engage in dialogue and,
instead, engaged in a series of rapid-fire provocations.
U.S. policymaking toward North Korea has been hampered by a
binary debate over whether Washington should use pressure or
engagement. The reality, of course, is that pressure and
engagement, along with economic assistance, military
deterrence, alliances, and public diplomacy, are most effective
when integrated into a comprehensive strategy utilizing all the
instruments of national power. Sanctions are not an alternative
to diplomacy but are, rather, a component of a broader foreign
policy strategy.
I will quickly summarize some of the extensive policy
recommendations I included in my testimony. The U.S. should
continue the two-track policy of pressure and conditional
engagement. Overall, it is a good strategy but has been weakly
implemented to date. Stronger measures, both more pain and more
gain, should be put into effect.
Track one, increase punitive and coercive measures. We need
to fully implement existing U.N. resolution requirements,
including freezing and seizing the financial assets of any
violator. We need to target both ends of the proliferation
pipeline. To date, both the U.N. and U.S. have been reluctant
to target any non-North Korean violator. We should maintain
international punitive sanctions until North Korea complies
with international law and U.N. resolutions. We should not
negotiate them away for simply returning to the Six-Party
Talks.
Track two, simultaneously keep the door open for
negotiations. It is not a question of whether to engage North
Korea but of how to do so. Negotiations should be based on
principles of compliance, conditionality, reciprocity, and
verification. Create a strategic blueprint that clearly defines
the desired end-state, objectives, and requirements for all
parties, rather than continuing vaguely worded documents, and
insist on an effective verification mechanism.
Track three, strengthen defensive measures. Since
international diplomacy and U.N. resolutions did not prevent
North Korea from continuing its development and testing of
nuclear weapons and ICBM delivery capabilities, the U.S.
should: Continue to develop and deploy missile defense systems,
augment nonproliferation efforts, and strengthen its alliances
with South Korea and Japan.
And track four, adding lanes to the road of engagement. The
Six-Party Talks need not be the only focus of U.S. policy
toward North Korea. Other issues that could be addressed are
the missile threat, a peace treaty, the conventional forces
threat, humanitarian aid, economic development assistance,
human rights, and confidence-building measures. Yet, each of
these lanes has a number of issues that must be carefully
considered before going down them.
The current two-track policy of pressure and conditional
negotiations is an improvement over earlier approaches. Yet,
when weakly implemented, strategic patience is insufficient as
a long-term strategy. Simply trying to contain North Korea in a
box is problematic.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you.
And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Klingner follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. You guys are
wizards at being the under 5-minute guys. Thank you.
Mr. Newcomb?
STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM NEWCOMB (FORMER SENIOR ECONOMIST,
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
AND FORMER SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND
ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY)
Mr. Newcomb. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Berman, and
distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to be
invited to speak here today about North Korea's illicit
activities.
I don't have a law enforcement background. I learned about
these on the job. At the North Korean Working Group, I helped
to develop and implement the illicit activities initiative, a
multi-agency and multinational effort to restrict the DPRK's
ability to conduct and profit from illegal activities.
At Treasury, I worked on Banco Delta Asia affairs and
assisted the Department's efforts to identify and counter North
Korea's attempts to use the international financial system to
launder proceeds from proliferation and crime.
The statement I submitted to the committee briefly examines
the history and the extent of North Korea's illicit activity
and notes how it has compromised DPRK institutions and
officials.
North Korea continues to engage in manufacture and
distribution of counterfeit cigarettes and counterfeit U.S.
currency. It may have reduced its involvement in
narcotrafficking. Neither Japan nor Taiwan has reported any
major seizure of DPRK-sourced methamphetamines for 8 years.
Methamphetamines and other drugs are perhaps being
transshipped through China or sold in bulk there to criminal
groups. Multiple reports of active drug trade on the DPRK-China
border also suggest that China may have become North Korea's
preferred market.
Evidence is insufficient to gauge the size of this drug
trade, but a recent press report contends the Chinese Minister
of Public Security, Meng Jianzhu, probably expressed China's
concerns about this matter last month, when he visited
Pyongyang and met with Kim Jong Il.
Executive Order 13551 issued last August labels DPRK
counterfeiting, narcotics smuggling, and money laundering as
constituting an ``unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States.''
I would like to make four points about ongoing trends and
the possibility that North Korea in the near term could choose
to increase its involvement in illicit and proliferation
activities in an even more threatening way.
First, North Korea's economy is performing poorly, and food
shortages again appear severe. Preliminary partner-country
foreign trade statistics for 2009 show a falloff in DPRK
exports and a sharp drop in its imports. The trade deficit was
smaller than the average of recent years but exceeded $1
billion. The trade results for 2010 are scant. Except for
China, foreign trade last year with most partners likely was
down again.
Second, UNSCR 1874 is disrupting North Korea's arms trade
and its general trade. The report of the Panel of Experts on
Implementation of UNSCR 1874, issued last November, attributed
the sharp decline in overall trade to the imposition of
additional measures in June 2009.
The recently released U.N. Combined Appeal for 2011 also
linked the fall in total trade in part to ``stringent and
increasing sanctions'' from major economies as well as to
rising tensions with the ROK, the North's second largest trade
partner.
Third, North Korea is poor, financially isolated, and lacks
capacity to borrow to cover chronic current account deficits.
With trade down, risk rises that an increasingly cash-starved
DPRK will attempt to boost earnings from illicit activities and
ramp up exports of arms and proliferation-related items and
know-how.
Underscoring this danger are North Korea's past
proliferation to Libya and Syria; troubling signs of extensive,
although not well-understood, military trade and exchanges with
Burma; and recently expanded trade in weapons and weapons
development, including missiles, with its best customer, Iran,
where rising demand for enriched uranium matches up with North
Korea's apparent ability to supply it.
Fourth, North Korea is adept at making counter moves to
evade containment efforts, including deceptive techniques to
conceal the origin and content of shipping containers and use
of networks of overseas agents and front companies to manage
acquisitions, sales, and banking arrangements.
Most troubling, however, is the DPRK's potential ability to
exploit close contacts with transnational criminal groups, with
their own extensive networks and well-honed skills in smuggling
contraband, to assist in transporting proliferation-linked
items and acquiring restricted goods and weapons technology.
Thank you for this opportunity, and I welcome any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Newcomb follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Wonderful. Thank you so much.
Mr. Carlin?
STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT CARLIN, VISITING SCHOLAR, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Mr. Carlin. My thanks to the committee for letting me take
part in this important discussion on North Korea. We start with
bullying, brinkmanship and blackmail. I think we can add
bluster and baloney----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Oh, well. Here we go. Dennis, did
you hear that?
Mr. Carlin [continuing]. Because North Korea has indulged
in all of those things at one time or another.
As we start a discussion on North Korea, I think it is
useful at the outset to remind ourselves that North Korea is
not an expansionist power. That is, it doesn't have designs on
territory outside the Korean Peninsula. And in recent years,
that is even putting unification very low on its list of
priorities. However, it is engaged in a long-term violent
political struggle with South Korea. And that makes this a very
tough neighborhood.
Where does that leave the United States? I am afraid it
leaves us in the midst of a deteriorating situation that began
in late 2002, when we stepped out of an airplane without a
parachute. And we have been in policy free fall ever since.
What should be our first priority, which is protecting the
national security of the United States, has been diluted in a
soup of bromides.
Is the situation retrievable? It think that it is. I
wouldn't have spent 38 years of my life working on it if I
didn't think there was some hope. But there are several steps
we ought to take, and I just want to highlight a couple of them
in my remarks right now.
The first thing we need to do is recelebrate our
understanding of the problem. And the second thing we need to
do is engage the North Koreans directly.
For the past 20 years, Washington has looked at North Korea
primarily as a WMD problem. It is not just that. It is a
political problem with a WMD component. This is not
hairsplitting. If we don't get the problem right, if we keep
getting the problem wrong, we are going to keep wandering
around in the forest, the wrong forest, looking for solutions
to a problem that doesn't fit what actually is in front of us.
Engagement. I know ``engagement'' is a dirty word in many
quarters. But the goal of engagement is not to help the North
Koreans. It is to advance our own national security interests.
By itself and as Mr. Klingner pointed out, by itself, it is not
going to solve our problems, but without it, we are not going
to begin to solve any of our problems.
Past experience. And here I would disagree perhaps with
some of the statements made earlier. Past experience has shown
that if it is intelligently and coherently carried out,
engagement gives us influence on North Korean decision-making
and influence in the region as a whole.
For the past 10 years, however, there has been no serious
and no effective engagement with the North Koreans. I say that
because they have conducted two nuclear tests, developed their
uranium enrichment capability, and worked to perfect their
missile capability in those years.
Well, doesn't engagement legitimate the North Korean
regime? It does not. It doesn't compromise our interests. It
doesn't compromise our values.
Diplomacy has been and can be again with North Korea a
powerful tool for advancing and protecting our national
interests. And for us to let it rust unburnished is a mistake.
What about Six-Party Talks? I say let them go to the
elephant graveyard. They weren't anything more than a speed
bump to the North Korean nuclear program. They have this
industrial-scale centrifuge facility now. I know what it looks
like. I saw it in November along with Sig Hecker. And, with
that facility, they could in the worst case double their
existing nuclear arsenal sometime in the not-too-distant
future.
This is not a future problem. However, it is a problem of
the here and now. And we need to deal with it effectively.
Effectively, what does that mean? It means realistically
recognizing, realistically, what we can accomplish in the short
term. It means stabilizing the situation, not just talking
about it, stabilizing it to prevent it from becoming worse and
preparing the foundations for long-term progress.
This is going to be more difficult than it was 10 years
ago. It is going to be more difficult still the longer we wait
to get started.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carlin follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Excellent set
of panelists.
Hezbollah and Hamas. In a visit to Tokyo last May, Israeli
Foreign Minister Lieberman told Japanese authorities that he
had evidence that a shipment of North Korean weapons
intercepted at Bangkok Airport in late 2009 were headed for
Hezbollah and Hamas-designated terrorist organizations. Israeli
soldiers also reportedly found evidence of North Korean
tunneling techniques in southern Lebanon after the 2006 war.
Can you please comment on the extent, if any, if
Pyongyang's ties to Hezbollah and Hamas? And then do you
believe that North Korea has committed enough infractions to
merit relisting it as a state-sponsored terrorism? What would
the reaction in Pyongyang be to such a relisting? And how would
it impact the negotiating process?
Thank you. Anyone who would like to answer would be fine.
Mr. Klingner?
Mr. Klingner. I do believe North Korea should be returned
to the state sponsors of terrorism list now. I earlier resisted
such calls when it was based only on a reaction to the U.S.
negotiator having the wool pulled over his eyes in negotiations
in 2008 or for North Korea's unprovoked acts of war. Those did
not fit the legal requirements for listing a country on the
state sponsors list.
However, I do think a South Korean court's conviction of
two North Korean agents for attempting to assassinate Hwang
Jang-yop as well as the intercepted conventional arms that were
going to Hamas and Hezbollah as well as other indications that
North Korea has been providing aid and assistance to terrorist
groups do met the legal requirements for relisting them.
North Korea's reaction will be strong, but I don't think we
should hesitate from enforcing U.S. law due to the reaction of
the recipient nation.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Any others? Yes, Mr. Carlin?
Mr. Carlin. I would like to note--and probably very few
people remember it--that in October 2000, we signed a joint
statement with the North Koreans on international terrorism.
Nobody has paid any attention to this in the intervening years.
Nobody has taken advantage of it to discuss the problem with
the North Koreans. And so it is not a surprise to me in the
least that the North Koreans have gone back to what we would
consider their old tricks.
We don't want them to do that. We should do what we can to
stop it. But it seems to me that we shouldn't sign agreements
with them and then let them fly away when, in fact, they
provide tools for us to address the problem.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Newcomb? Dr. Cha?
Mr. Cha. Well, I would agree with Mr. Klingner's
statements. I think they do now meet the legal requirements. I
thought they met them before, but now they do really meet the
legal requirements, especially after the conviction of these
two individuals who tried to assassinate Hwang.
I would also agree that their reaction will be negative,
but at the same time I expect negative behavior from them this
year anyway.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. In the land of lousy options.
Mr. Newcomb?
Mr. Newcomb. About the seizure of the arms at Bangkok
Airport, that shows the success of UNSCR 1874. And so my
recommendation would be working closely with other member
countries because North Korea has alternative ways to ship
these weapons.
But good cooperation and effective enforcement of and
surveillance of these different shipping avenues I think would
continue to put a crimp in these kinds of military earnings.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, gentlemen.
Pleased to recognize Mr. Berman, the ranking member, for
his set of questions.
Mr. Berman. I am curious how you define this strategy of
strategic patience. Is it a mix of sanctions and engagement or
is it a sanctions with holding out the possibility of
engagement? I don't know if any of you could just--I mean, is
there a--what is your understanding of current U.S. policy?
Mr. Cha. Well, Congressmember, I think that essentially
strategic patience is an effort by the administration to
maintain the baseline of these counterproliferation measures
that Mr. Newcomb mentioned as well as other sanctions and hold
out the possibility for negotiation, but I think they were
seeking to wait for a period of time as economic pressures and
other political pressures build up on the regime to try to find
the right moment at which to negotiate.
Now, I would say, quite frankly, that every administration
has said that this has been their policy when they started on
North Korea. And this administration has carried it for 2\1/2\
years, in no small apart because they started with the missile
test and the nuclear test and, therefore, really did not have
an opportunity to engage.
So I think it is kind of a similar animal by a different
name that we have seen in past administrations.
Mr. Berman. Sort of a fundamental question the witnesses
all pose, what elicits North Korea's concessions and
cooperative behavior? We know several things happened. They
decommissioned their plutonium, their reactor. They destroyed
the cooling tower. They dismantled key portions of the
reprocessing facility. They allowed U.S. to participate. At the
same time, we heard inklings of it. And now you have seen it.
They were working on a uranium enrichment facility program.
Were those meaningful acts in retrospect? Do we get
something through that 2007-8 period in terms of negotiations
or is it right to say the wool was pulled over our eyes?
Mr. Klingner. In response to your first question, sir,
``strategic patience'' was not the administration's intended
policy. Instead, they were going to be very forward leaning on
engagement, even perhaps an unconditional summit with Kim Jong
Il.
They clearly in the campaign indicated they were going to
be very forward leaning and even initiated several attempts to
try to engage with North Korea, which were rejected by
Pyongyang.
After all of the provocations in the first 6 months of
2009, the nuclear tests, the missile tests, threats of war,
abrogation of the armistice, et cetera, the Obama
administration reversed itself virtually 180 degrees and now
adopted a much firmer policy. It is of much stronger sanctions
and punitive measures as well as offers of conditional
engagement.
So it is a response to the provocations that North Korea
did, despite the hopes that engagement----
Mr. Berman. Wait a minute. What about to this last question
in terms of the specifics we got? Did we really get something
here?
Mr. Klingner. The steps we received from North Korea in
2007 and '8 were good steps. The problem was that the joint
statements of the Six-Party Talks were so vaguely worded that
we could not push North Korea when it did not comply because
they could point to numerous loopholes.
So that is one of the reasons why in any subsequent
agreements that we have we must have more definitively worded
agreements, such as the arms control treaties the U.S. had in
order to assure that all parties know their responsibilities.
Mr. Berman. I guess to the ``Yes'' or ``No,'' do all of you
agree with the Six-Party Talks should be put in--what was your
phrase, the elephants?
Mr. Carlin. Elephant graveyard.
Mr. Berman. Burial ground?
Mr. Newcomb. No, I do not agree that they should be buried.
I think Six-Party Talks have utility in their own right.
Certainly five-party talks do, and so do three-party talks to
strategize in the neighborhood about how to handle the North
Korean problem.
Mr. Cha. I would say that both the 2007 agreements as well
as the 1994 agreements aimed to do two things. That was to
freeze the North programs and to disable and dismantle pieces
of it. And I would say that both agreements were able to do
some of that.
The '94 agreement was able to disable essentially the 50
and the 200-megawatt reactors that were under construction.
Those have been mothballed. They have not been restarted. And
the 2007 agreement did result in the collapsing of the cooler
tower at Yongbyon.
So they have made incremental progress, but at the same
time, as you say, the North has been doing things while these
agreements were reached behind our backs. And that is the
frustration of negotiating. You are negotiating pieces of this
program but never certain in the end that you will get all of
it.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman.
The chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade, Mr. Royce of California?
Mr. Royce. Yes. I wanted to ask Mr. Newcomb a question. I
remember the evidence we were presented in this committee back
in 2002 in terms of North Korea becoming the world's best
counterfeiter of $100 bills using the same type of equipment
and presses that we use on our currency. And they presented us
also--the U.S. had evidence that the distribution to criminal
groups typically occurred through senior officers at the
Embassies and through state trading companies was routine and
went all the way up to the top of the regime.
And so, as it was called, this supernote conspiracy led to
the concept of prosecuting some of these state officials with
the idea that we could freeze the funds, freeze the funds under
section 311 of the PATRIOT Act. And that, in fact, was done.
In August of '05, arrests were made. The Justice Department
was instructed by the NSC, however, to, in effect, bury the
evidence and keep it out of court, mask the role of the North
Korean Government. Why? We didn't want to embarrass it. We
didn't want to embarrass it. We wanted to negotiate with North
Korea.
I just have a problem with the fact that the State
Department took steps to eliminate the Working Group, the North
Korean Working Group, and the North Korea Illicit Activities
Group that developed this strategy because the strategy cut off
hard currency into North Korea, right?
The Ambassador at the time was convinced the pressure would
get in the way of dialogue. We don't want to get in the way of
a dialogue. But, frankly, it is the only thing that I have seen
that has been effective.
And then last June, traveling to South Korea, the Secretary
of State began to articulate what she called new measures to
target North Korea's illicit activity. I thought this was a
good idea. They were going to go after cigarettes, drugs, and
counterfeit currency.
And, Mr. Newcomb, you were deputy in the group in the last
administration that tackled this. And in a new report, David
Asher, your partner on this, details a very robust approach to
confronting North Korea on its illegal gains. It was State and
Treasury but also the FBI and ATF on the cigarettes and the
Secret Service on counterfeiting. Something like a dozen
government agencies were involved. It had high-level support
until again it was undercut by the diplomats.
In your view, what is going on here? Is the administration
even close to reconsidering this? I am not beating up on this
administration. It has been every administration that has held
back on the approach of freezing these funds, of doing what we
temporarily were able to do with Banco Delta Asia and cut off
the hard currency. And the people that I know that were close
to this say that that brought a tremendous amount of pressure
on this regime, but it was amazing how much pressure came the
other direction to list those sanctions.
Could you give me your views?
Mr. Newcomb. Yes, sir. I think the circumstances and the
developments are much as you described at the time. The August
'05 arrests were a result of the well-publicized Smoking Dragon
and Royal Charm sting operations that were run by the FBI with
a lot of help from Secret Service and others.
They had something like 89 indictments. And when it came
time to publish the indictments, they dropped the original
language and substituted ``country 1'' and ``country 2,'' which
were China and North Korea it was later revealed. There were
other developments as well.
U.S. sought to arrest Sean Garland, an IRA terrorist, for
his involvement in distributing supernote. So there was a very
aggressive law enforcement program underway.
We had achieved notable success cooperating on this with a
number of foreign governments. They were starting to take steps
on export controls that they had earlier resisted. We had great
cooperation internationally among police agencies. And to get
that, you have to have high-level political support, the
diplomatic support that encourages police officers that are not
accustomed necessarily to working with one another to go that
extra mile and establish relationships.
And, to be quite frank, the evidence that we use to
convince folks about the seriousness of our alarm mostly came
out of police reporting because of the suspicion a lot of
intelligence reporting was held in at the time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Newcomb. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Payne, the ranking member on the
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. And let me thank the
witnesses for your excellent testimony.
In your opinion--and anyone could take a stab at it--what
do you attribute the sort of aggressiveness of the North
Koreans at this time, the sinking of the ship, the shelling of
the island, you know, saber rattling? In your opinion, what has
created or caused this?
Mr. Klingner. All of us I am sure have theories, but one
can also just jump over thinking of the motivations for this
and, instead, look at the acts themselves. They have committed
acts of terror, acts of war. We can figure our own reasons for
those objectives, but I think we really have to focus on the
acts themselves.
That said, I think there are multiple reasons. And they are
not contradictory for North Korea to engage in this behavior.
It is a demonstration of military prowess to show that they are
not weak, they will not be cowed, to ensure regime survival,
reestablish relevance on the international stage.
They don't want to be ignored. They feel that when they are
not ignored, it gives them increased negotiating leverage and
they create a dispute and escalate tensions in order to
demonstrate a need for a peace treaty, which they feel they
would be able to gain additional foreign policy objectives and
economic benefits as well as to divert attention from the
previous North Korean bad act.
Some would say the Yeonpyeong-do attack may have been a way
of diverting attention from its revelation of uranium
enrichment facility, which is yet another violation of the U.N.
resolution. So there are many reasons I think, sir.
Mr. Berman. The only thing I would add to that is that, as
I said earlier, I am concerned that they really do believe they
are a nuclear weapon state now. And, therefore, they can act
with impunity short of war, and they don't think the U.S. or
other South Koreans or anybody else in the region will respond.
And that, again, to me is a very dangerous thing because that
is, of course, not the case.
The South Koreans may respond or we may respond the next
time. But if they go around believing they are a nuclear weapon
state, they may start doing more provocations. And, you know,
historically it is this sort of miscalculation that always
leads to escalation and potentially war.
Mr. Carlin. I think we should look at the West Sea as a
particular problem. It has become a powder keg. And the
tensions there are going to continue to rise. There is a
dynamic that has been put in place in the West Sea of action,
counteraction, mostly below the radar of international
reporting, but it is what builds the tensions up until they pop
over the top into something like an incident that we had.
Those tensions have not been resolved. And I am afraid that
the West Sea is going to continue to be a locus of clashes
unless somehow someone can address the problems.
Mr. Newcomb. I personally have concerns that succession
politics also plays a role in how they decided to respond
recently.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. Interesting answers.
The strength of their military--I am not talking about the
nuclear potential, but they have a very large Army. But so did
Saddam Hussein have a very large Army. I found out that a lot
of them were old persons. They showed up in large numbers. But
when it came to it, it was basically the Republican Guard that
was about the only fit fighting unit.
What about the in your opinion strength of their infantry,
their land, soldiers that you see on display in so large
numbers?
Republican Guard
Mr. Klingner. North Korea has approximately a million-man
Army. And 60 or 70 percent of it is forward deployed near the
DMZ. There are mechanized corps, armored corps, artillery
corps, all very close to the demilitarized zone. They have
thousands of tubes of artillery that can hit Seoul without
further movement. They forward deployed a number of POL and
other logistical issues, which reduces the U.S. intelligence
community's ability to warn of even a short-notice attack.
That said, there are credible reports that the capability
has been declining. They have not deployed new modern weapons
as well as the infantry themselves are suffering from the poor
food conditions.
That said, any U.S. war game and simulation still posits
horrendous casualties, trillions of dollars of damage and that,
even after the initial week of hostilities in these
simulations, the situation is still very dire. We feel----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chabot, the chair of the Subcommittee on Middle East
and South Asia, is recognized.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Given that virtually all of North Korea's imported energy
and the large majority of its food comes through China--one
report indicated that Beijing provides North Korea with 70
percent of its food imports and 90 percent of its oil imports--
how can Chinese leaders credibly maintain that it has no
leverage over North Korea, especially since its direct support
and increasing investments over North Korea are crucial to
keeping the North Korean economy functioning?
Is there any evidence that Chinese has used its enormous
influence to directly pressure Pyongyang to halt and dismantle
its nuclear weapons program or, instead, limit its influence to
occasionally and mildly advising Pyongyang to temporarily tone
down its aggressive policies?
And I would invite any of the panel. Maybe start with you,
Dr. Cha.
Mr. Cha. Thank you for the question. I think that you are
absolutely right in terms of the metrics that you mentioned.
China does have incredible material leverage on North Korea.
And I think in the past, they have done things to help calm the
situation down and push North Korea toward some of the
agreements that we have reached in the past.
I think the problem right now is that China has basically
chosen its side. And the side it has chosen is the side of not
allowing this regime to collapse because for them, that is a
strategic buffer. Therefore, they are giving all of this fluid
and energy. They are supporting the internal regime transition
because as unstable as the situation is, a collapse of North
Korea is more unstable to them.
And, therefore, they are doing all of these things to help
the regime because they think--I mean, this is China, their own
parochial interest--it puts them in a better place when they
come out of this transition tunnel that the leadership is going
through in North Korea.
So in the past, when we were doing Six-Party Talks, we
relied on China a lot. We hoped that China could do a lot in
terms of this leverage. These days, watching this from the
outside, I don't think China is very helpful at all. And I
don't think we can rely on them to help us solve this problem
now.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Klingner or any of the other witnesses?
Mr. Klingner. I agree with Mr. Cha. I think China has shown
itself to be part of the problem, rather than part of the
solution. Despite the figure you mentioned, I think China has
less influence over North Korea than many presume and has also
shown itself to be less willing to use what influence it does.
I had been somewhat encouraged when China did take some actions
in the U.N. Security Council in response to the nuclear missile
test.
And I thought last year with the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong-do
attacks that were so blatantly against the norms of
international behavior, that China, of course, must not be able
to ignore the evidence, let alone the need for action. And,
yet, they did.
So it was very discouraging that China was refusing to
accept the clear, compelling evidence and was unwilling to
agree to additional U.N. Security Council resolutions or even
to fully implement the agreements that are in place.
Mr. Chabot. Let me just ask my second question here because
I am running out of time. Christopher Hill, former Chief, North
Korea negotiator in the Bush administrator, wrote on February
22nd, and I quote,
``More recently the North Korean regime proudly
unveiled a modern high-tech uranium enrichment
facility. The North Koreans lied in writing, not only
to the United States, which they have done repeatedly
in the past, but also to China, Russia, Japan, and
South Korea.''
If even Chris Hill now thinks that the North Koreans lied,
how can anyone else really trust them in further negotiations?
And maybe I will go to Mr. Newcomb and Mr. Carlin at this
point.
Mr. Newcomb. I think trust is a hard commodity to come by
in negotiations with North Korea. And I think China is just
refusing to recognize what Mr. Carlin and others saw there so
it doesn't have to deal with that particular matter.
Mr. Chabot. Mr. Carlin?
Mr. Carlin. We don't negotiate with the North Koreans on
the basis of trust. We don't reach agreements with them on the
basis of trust. If we can't verify an agreement with them, we
shouldn't reach it. If we can verify, then we should, you know,
place a lot of emphasis on that and make sure that they do
follow through.
We do have examples where they follow through with
agreements. And we should try to reproduce that environment to
make sure that we can get there again I think.
Mr. Chabot. Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot.
And now the ranking member on the Subcommittee on East Asia
and the Pacific, Mr. Faleomavaega, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
As I have said earlier in my statement, I am still learning
how to speak the English language. And in the process, I have
come up with some words that maybe our experts here can help me
with: Deterrence, detente, multilateralism, unilateralism,
preemption. Now it is hedge politics.
And I must say I was very impressed with all of you
gentlemen's statements and what we have here. What I have
pointed out is that not one of you ever mentioned about whether
or not South Korea is an important element of what we are
talking about when we talk about North Korea, nothing. And I
think it is critical because if there is a war, it is the
Korean people that are going to end up dead, not as much as
Japan or Russia or the United States or even China. It is the
Korean people that are going to end up in the pot potentially
if we are going to have a nuclear war.
And I was just wondering, am I missing something here, the
fact that we don't even talk about South Korea as an integral
part of the whole issue that we are discussing here. Mr. Cha?
Mr. Cha. Well, you point up correctly an omission in all of
our statements. I think South Korea is a very important part of
any policy puzzle with North Korea. The current
administration----
Mr. Faleomavaega. See, this is the problem. We only say it
in passing.
Mr. Cha. Yes, yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. So oh, yes. By the way, there is a South
Korea.
Mr. Cha. Yes. No. Point well-taken. The Obama
administration actually in many ways has put the initiative for
any future policies with North Korea in the hands of Seoul
currently in the sense that the administration wants to see
rectification of inter-Korean relations before they are willing
to move forward on other tracks.
The current government, as you know, is more conservative.
It has more of a conditional reciprocity engagement policy. And
the North Koreans don't like that. They got very used to 10
years of sunshine policy under Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun,
which was unconditional in many ways.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Well, the preconditions that I want to
say that I agree with Mr. Carlin's statements that for the past
10 years, they really have not had any real effective
engagement process in dealing with North Korea. And what I mean
by this is that--and, again, I have a different take from my
colleagues about this whole thing--in this history, when Kim
Dae Jung after 60 years of this political separation that was
not of their doing was able to go up to Pyongyang and shook the
hands with Kim Jong Il, to me that was a very important thing
because why did this occur?
The Koreans themselves are trying to solve the issues or
the problems between North Korea and South Korea. What did we
do? We criticized. We condemned Kim Dae Jung's initiative by
saying, if anything else, can we at least let the Koreans
encourage them in some way or somehow that they can solve these
problems if we give them the tools that are the necessary
support process because all we are talking about here, of
course, we all know that our first priority is our national
security interest in this region of the world, but the poor
Koreans are caught in the middle of this geopolitical situation
between China and the United States. And I am a little puzzled
by this because I don't get a sense that we are really serious
about including South Korea in this whole dialogue.
Mr. Carlin?
Mr. Carlin. I guess I would make two quick points. First,
from where I sat anyway in the State Department, we were
perfectly happy with Kim Dae Jung's trip to Pyongyang and
supported it because it reinforced our own policies.
Second point is we have got a range of problems in dealing
with the interests of the South Koreans. Of course, they should
take priority to a certain extent. It is their country. It is
their people. It is their risk.
On the other hand, as you know, we have got much broader
concerns in the region. And those have to be balanced. When we
are working truly with the South Koreans, I think everybody's
interests get looked at. When the South Koreans are pulling in
a slightly different direction, then it gets more difficult to
make the policies work.
Mr. Newcomb. I think I, too, agreed with the trip of Kim
Dae Jung up to Pyongyang. I am not certain, though, that the
North Koreans saw it in the same light. If you recall, North
Korea required an advance $500 million payment before they
agreed to----
Mr. Faleomavaega. I'm sorry. I know my time is up, but let
me just say this. The sunshine policy I adore and really with
the utmost respect what Kim Dae Jung was able to accomplish for
one simple reason, that the Koreans themselves are trying to
solve a serious problem just to say hello. Give them the
credits.
Oh, shoot. I am sorry, Madam Chair. Time is up.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Faleomavaega.
Mr. Smith, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human
Rights chairman, is recognized.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Dr. Cha and Mr. Klingner, you both made strong reference to
the need for food aid. And I would echo that call to the
administration.
The World Food Program has said that there is a severe
problem with lactating women, pregnant women, and small
children. Thirty-three percent of the kids are stunted. Twenty-
five percent of the pregnant women are malnourished. And TB,
especially drug-resistant TB, which has a problem associated
with malnutrition, is bad and getting worse.
So I would hope, as you both said, as long as there is very
good monitoring to ensure that those highly at risk get the
food, this ought to be done yesterday. And I would add my voice
to yours asking that there be movement on that by the
administration. You might want to speak to that.
Secondly, Mr. Klingner, you made a very good call as well
on the human rights issue. There is no reason why we should in
any way silence, both through the international work that we do
at the U.N. as well as on our own, our voice on the egregious
human rights abuses, whether it be religious freedom, a woman
was executed simply for distributing Bibles last year or the
ongoing incarcerations in the hideous gulags of North Korea for
Christians especially needs to be confronted. When it comes to
refugees, many women who make it out of North Korea are
trafficked.
I held three hearings several years ago on the human rights
plight of those women. And we had women who were actually the
lucky ones who got to South Korea through a very long,
circuitous route. That, plus the fact that China, completely
contrary to the refugee convention, sends people right back.
And they go right to the gulag, where they are tortured and
even executed. So you might want to speak to that.
Finally, in my opening comment, I mentioned Defense
Minister Kim and others who have been raising the alarm about
the electromagnetic bomb that they seem to be working on. Any
thoughts that you might have about that?
As a matter of fact, it was pointed out in the Korea Herald
yesterday that the jamming equipment, talking about electronic
warfare, could pose serious problems to the South in case
another armed conflict with their neighbor, with their northern
neighbor. The North can use it not only to jam GPS signals, but
also to disseminate misleading, fake signals so as to confuse
its enemy's forces; in other words, South Korea and us.
The equipment would also preclude the South from using GPS-
guided weapons to bomb its long-range artillery pieces that put
the Seoul metropolitan area within striking range.
The North is also thought to be seeking to develop
electromagnetic post bombs and effectively paralyze computers.
And you know that issue. So if you could speak to that as well?
Thank you.
Mr. Cha. Well, let me just address quickly your comments on
food and human rights. And I will let others address EMP. On
food, you know, the North Koreans have asked for basically the
remaining 330,000 tons left from the 2008 agreement.
And, as I said, my own view is that if they will agree to
the same terms they did in 2008, the letter of protocol, that
was a good agreement. It was the only time that we had access
to every province except two, nutritional surveys as well as
Korean speakers, as part of the A team. And that is much better
than simply dumping the food at the port and then letting them
divert 30 percent of it to the military. So I think if they can
get those terms, it certainly is a good thing.
And, as you know, sir, all of these bags go into the
country with the American flag on it. And in Korean, it says,
``Gift of the American people.'' So that is not a bad thing for
us in North Korea.
On human rights, I guess the one thing I would say is that,
you know, the United States now has a refugee resettlement
program for North Koreans. They have a special envoy for human
rights. I would like to see this administration be a little bit
more active on the human rights agenda.
As you know, the previous administration did things like
statement on this question of Chinese sending North Korean
refugees back as well as having North Korean defectors in the
Oval Office. And that really brought a high-profile nature to
the issue around the world for others to see.
Mr. Klingner. I would comment on food aid. Clearly there is
a need. And, as a father, one can't help but be compelled by
the reports and the pictures, particularly of children and
babies that are starving and emaciated. So if we were to
provide aid, at a minimum, we must have an effective
verification and monitoring regime to ensure that it actually
gets to the people who require it.
Humanitarian aid is supposed to be divorced from politics,
but we can't help overlook some other factors. North Korea's
actions. It is hard to advocate having the UNDP and the World
Food Program, which is part of the U.N., providing aid and
assistance when North Korea is in violation of U.N.
resolutions.
And, even setting aside that, there are donor dynamics. In
the 20 years we have been providing aid, there have been more
recent horrendous natural disasters suffered by other
countries. So one wonders with a limited pool of donor
assistance whether it should instead be going to countries that
are willing to make economic reforms and have suffered
calamities more recently.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on
the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, is
recognized.
Mr. Sherman. Yes. I am torn between the vision of hungry
North Koreans overthrowing their government and the fact that I
don't want to see people hungry.
I want to focus my attention on this South Korea free trade
agreement because that is something Congress will actually
focus on. Right now we have got 40,000 workers there. Would the
North Koreans have any difficulty providing 400,000 workers to
Kaesong and similar export-oriented labor facilities? Is there
any shortage of labor in North Korea? Mr. Carlin or Mr.
Newcomb?
Mr. Newcomb. In North Korea right now there is a shortage
of jobs. But I don't know that they could supply the number
that you indicated to replications of Kaesong scattered about
the country. Personally I have never been a big fan of Kaesong
because Kaesong requires South Korea to pay North Korea in U.S.
dollars. I keep asking them, ``Why don't they use South Korean
won?'' They don't have a good answer for that. And I also think
it's sort of a----
Mr. Sherman. No, it is not. Those U.S. dollars, I am told
that the amount the worker actually gets--and worker, I mean,
arguably, the word is ``slave'' because when you are forced to
do work and your owner rebuts, you know, the national
government is the one that receives the payment. It is by no
means clear that that is a work relationship.
Any idea how much they receive?
Mr. Newcomb. It is possible that the figure is correct. I
haven't looked at this in a couple of years. On the other hand,
they line up for these jobs.
Mr. Sherman. Look, the fact that it is better than other
things available to North Koreans does not mean that even the
word ``slavery'' is too strong. So certainly it provides
foreign currency, U.S. dollars to the North Korean Government.
Now, the agreement provides, the free trade agreement
provides that we have to accept and do our country anything
that is--in various categories, including auto parts, anything
that is 35 percent made in South Korea, which means 65 percent
of the work could be done in North Korea.
Do any of you have any focus on the trade agreement that
would contradict that?
Mr. Klingner. Well, I would say, sir, the agreement I think
has provisions that preclude the use of Kaesong goods as part
of----
Mr. Sherman. You haven't read the annex 22, which first
says that there is nothing in the agreement that says that
goods that are 65 percent North Korean, whether it be Kaesong
or otherwise, and 35 percent South Korean are not given access
to the U.S. market.
Now, it is true that we have laws that might prohibit such
import, which we would be violating the agreement and subject
to sanctions by the South Koreans just as soon as we signed it
unless the executive branch removed those restrictions.
But if you also look at annex 22, you will see that the
agreement envisions future discussions, in which Kaesong would
be considered for purposes of the agreement part of South Korea
so you could have 100 percent Kaesong-produced goods, rather
than just 65 percent Kaesong-produced goods coming into the
United States duty-free.
And the agreement is cleverly drawn so you can't tell
whether any such future decision to count Kaesong as part of
``South Korea'' would require future congressional approval or
not. And that is why in hearings from our subcommittee we asked
that question in 2007, still haven't gotten an answer. I asked
that question by letter on February 9th of this year to the
current USTR, still haven't gotten an answer.
And this is why the current Ambassador to the United States
from South Korea is on record as saying at Kaesong when he was
Prime Minister that this agreement will pave the way for
Kaesong-produced products to come into the United States duty-
free.
I just don't know which is worse: The national security
aspect of huge dollars flowing to the Government of North Korea
or the economic impact of telling American workers that they
have to compete against products made at the labor rates that
we find in Kaesong.
My time has expired.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
Ms. Ellmers of North Carolina.
Ms. Ellmers. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you to
our distinguished panelists today.
My question is also on South Korean free trade agreements.
I am generally a free trade person, but there is great pause
that I have on the national security issue. And I believe, of
course, as many of us do, that national security trumps any
possibility of trade with South Korea, especially in
conjunction with the flooding of the South Korean market, with
Chinese and North Korean goods. And that is particularly of
concern to my North Carolinian textile industry.
I would like to know, Mr. Newcomb and Mr. Carlin, how do
you feel about the South Korean free trade agreement in
relation to the national security issue. I will start with you,
Mr. Newcomb.
Mr. Newcomb. I am an economist. I love free trade
agreements. I also think Kaesong poses a danger, that goods
could be let in that are not produced up to acceptable labor
standards.
Ms. Ellmers. What can we do? What can the United States do
to prevent that? What could we put in place in relation to the
South Korean free trade agreement that might actually help us
in this situation?
Mr. Newcomb. Well, I mean, that is a question you have to
ask of USTR because they are the ones that deal with this. They
are the ones that have to strike the agreement.
Ms. Ellmers. So, in your opinion, is it something that we
should grapple with now or is it something that we should take
pause and maybe hold off for a while until we get some of the
answers that we need?
Mr. Newcomb. Well, Kaesong does have advantages as well.
South Korea invested in Kaesong partly because they thought
they could gain some economic leverage over the North. I think,
actually, it gives the North economic leverage over South Korea
to a degree.
But there is also a demonstration effect. You have well-
educated, well-dressed, highly trained South Koreans operating
these factories. You have South Korean technology. You have
South Korean goods there. They are exposing a large number of
North Korean workers to what is otherwise denied information.
So it is a two-way street here. And I don't want to dismiss
the long-term corrosion of North Korea that association with
people at Kaesong might bring.
Ms. Ellmers. Okay. Mr. Carlin?
Mr. Carlin. Under present circumstances, with the
government that is in power in South Korea now, we don't really
have a big problem about Kaesong because they are going slow.
But I can imagine circumstances in which another election
brings a government with different priorities, which, in fact,
may reinvigorate Kaesong and maybe expand it.
And then where are we going to be? We are going to be
cross-wise with our South Korean allies on what they will
consider to be a very important part of their policy toward
North Korea. At that point we are going to have to weigh these
things about U.S. economic interests, interests of our workers,
and broader security problems.
I am not an economist. I don't focus on these things. I
just think I can see clouds on the horizon on this one.
Ms. Ellmers. So you would say at this point that we really
need to proceed very cautiously?
Mr. Carlin. Yes, I think that is right.
Ms. Ellmers. I do have about 1\1/2\ minutes. And I was just
going to say to Mr. Cha and Mr. Klingner, if you would like to
make a comment, that would be wonderful.
Mr. Klingner. Begging the committee's indulgence for an
advertisement, on April 1st in this building, The Heritage
Foundation and Brookings Institution are having a joint
conference that points out the geostrategic and economic
benefits of all three free trades. So the two organizations are
in agreement.
On Kaesong, the U.S. negotiator in 2007, when the agreement
was first signed, made very clear that the Kaesong goods before
they were allowed into the United States would have to be
discussed through a bilateral committee and that clearly the
U.S. would not be in favor of that. And now we have a new
conservative government in South Korea that I think also would
be less willing to push for Kaesong goods, particularly after
North Korea's actions in the last several years.
Ms. Ellmers. Okay. Mr. Cha?
Mr. Cha. Yes. I mean, the only thing that I would--I mean,
in 2007, that is the way I recall it in 2007 in the
administration that there were checks against sort of just the
free flow of Kaesong goods into the United States.
The other thing that I would add is that the goods we are
talking about that come out of Kaesong--and they could change,
admittedly, in the future--we are largely talking about things
like chopstick sets, cheap watches, things of this nature, so
not things that necessarily pose a national security risk.
Ms. Ellmers. Thank you very much. I appreciate all of your
input. And I yield back the rest of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Sherman. Madam Chair?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized.
Mr. Sherman. Madam Chair?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Yes?
Mr. Sherman. If I could just have unanimous consent to
insert here in the record my letter of February 9th to the
President of USTR----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection.
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. That deals with the very issues
these gentlemen were discussing.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Gerry?
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And welcome to the
panel.
Perhaps starting with you, Professor Cha, in situations
like this, often historically the military has played multiple
roles, one of which is maintaining cohesion and order and long-
term stability for a regime. Given the transitional period we
are apparently looking at in North Korea, how would you
characterize the role of the military in this transition? And
how should we assign responsibility when we look at very
provocative actions, obviously the shelling of the island, the
sinking of the ship of South Korea to the military versus
civilian leadership if one can even paraphrase it that way?
Mr. Cha. Thank you for the question.
I don't think acts of that magnitude, the sinking of the
Cheonan or the shelling of Yeonpyong--they are not random acts
by, you know, a so-called mad colonel. These are remediated
actions taken by the military as a group and I would imagine in
conjunction with the party and political leadership going up to
the top.
So I don't see these things as a rogue military but as in
many ways a unitary actor, the state acting together.
What role would the military play in any possible
transition? They will clearly play an important role. Since
1995, Kim Jong Il has really raised the role of the military in
North Korean decision-making. And as he tries to promote his
third son, he is really now trying to balance that with an
increasing role of the party in the management of the country.
So I think we will see. We will have to watch very
carefully the extent to which this creates competition between
two units within the government or whether they are able to
manage this in a way that allows for a smooth transition.
Probably the most important variable in that sense will be
the longevity of the current leader: Kim Jong Il. If he were to
die suddenly tomorrow, next week, I would be much less certain
that they could carry this off.
Mr. Connolly. Is there evidence that there is unease or
difficulty of acceptance of the passing on of the baton in
terms of leadership in North Korea?
Mr. Cha. We read about some of it in the newspaper, that
there appears to be some unease. It is not just the passing to
the son, but it is also the promotion of a group or younger
generation of military leaders, generals that many may not see
as being qualified.
The young son himself, Kim Jong Il's sister were both
promoted to the rank of four-star general last September. And
they never served a day in the military. So I think that that
also can create some tensions.
Mr. Connolly. Anyone on the panel, but we were talking
earlier about food shortages. Is it necessarily true that
severe food shortages, in fact, can be destabilizing to a
regime? And is there evidence it is destabilizing in North
Korea?
Mr. Cha. The assessment that the U.S. NGO group brought
back this month said that there is clearly a need. There is
clearly a confirmed need. But these are not conditions like the
mid 1990s, that if we were not to provide food, it will not
lead to a famine-like situation.
This has led to periodic reported riots at food
distribution centers, but the question as to whether it could
create a larger revolution I think remains unanswered. It is
very clear that the North Koreans are very sensitive to what
was happening in Egypt and in Libya and in Tunisia and worked
at their best to try to clamp down on any news with regard to
them getting into their country.
Mr. Connolly. Madam Chairman, I see I have 50 seconds left.
There was a group of American experts that observed last
November the construction of a light water reactor and new
uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon. Any evidence that the
North Koreans have proceeded or included that construction and
what it means in 30 seconds? Mr. Carlin?
Mr. Carlin. They are a long way off from finishing the
light water reactor. That is going to take them several more
years. The centrifuge facility had, as far as we could tell,
2,000 centrifuges. We could not tell whether they were
operating standing there. And so I can't tell you at this
moment whether they are actually producing enriched uranium or
not. And until we get somebody in there, I don't think we are
going to be able to answer that question.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
And we are so pleased to recognize Ambassador Han of our
ally, the Republic of Korea, who is in our audience today. We
welcome you, sir.
And I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I am sorry
for my tardiness, but I had another committee hearing going on.
I just wanted to ask you, particularly The Heritage
Foundation but all of you, in your opinion, what would the
security implications be in Northeast Asia of a failure by the
U.S. Congress to expeditiously approve the free trade agreement
with South Korea?
Mr. Klingner. As strong advocates of free trade as well as
a very strong relationship between the U.S. and our critical
and indispensable ally South Korea, The Heritage Foundation
sees the many benefits, economic and geostrategic, for approval
of the KORUS FTA.
I was particularly struck when I was in South Korea shortly
after the Senkaku incident between China and Japan. I met with
senior officials, including Presidential advisers, who said
that they were very concerned about China's behavior, as
exhibited there, because South Korea felt even more susceptible
to Chinese pressure than Japan, particularly the export of rare
earth materials. And they said, because South Korea has become
more reliant on the Chinese economy, they are nervous of that
pressure and that they advocated a free trade agreement with
the United States because it would help the U.S. regain market
share or at least the ability to compete better against EU and
Chinese competitors. So they saw it as a way of reducing
Chinese ability to influence an ally of the United States.
Mr. Burton. So you think the free trade agreement is
extremely important not only because of economic issues but as
well because of other issues in that area?
Mr. Klingner. Very much so, sir.
Mr. Burton. Anybody else have a comment on that?
Mr. Cha. Congressman, I would agree entirely with what Mr.
Klingner said. I mean, historically the U.S. position in Asia,
its leadership position, has rested on two legs. That is the
security umbrella it provides and its support of free trade.
And, quite frankly, until very recently, there were lots of
concerns in the region about where the United States was on
trade. And many saw it as the first indicator of a receding
U.S. presence in Asia.
So the free trade agreement, the biggest bilateral free
trade agreement the United States has ever negotiated, has very
broad strategic implications for the United States and how
others in the region see the U.S. as a leader.
Mr. Burton. Well, if you don't have any other comments
about that, I appreciate your response. My colleague Mr. Smith
of New Jersey had a question he would like to ask. So I am
going to yield my time to him.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Chairman Burton.
It was the other question about the electromagnetic bomb if
any of you would like to talk about that as well as electronic
warfare. What threat is that to South Korea and to our troops
that are deployed there? So I yield to the witnesses.
Mr. Klingner. The information on an EMP weapon is very
sketchy. It has just come out this week. And, in fact, the day
before reports of a North Korea EMP weapon, there were reports
about a South Korea EMP weapon. So I wonder if perhaps there is
some media confusion.
And also the jamming of the GPS signals during the joint
U.S.-South Korean exercise doesn't necessarily have to have
been done by an EMP weapon. It could simply be by massive radio
jamming. So I think we are very unclear, sir, at this point the
extent of North Korean EMP capabilities, but we also know they
do have cyber terrorism capabilities and units and that they
very well may have been behind the cyber attacks, both this
year and a year or 2 ago, in South Korea.
Mr. Smith. Anybody else want to comment?
Mr. Carlin. Mr. Smith, may I return real briefly to human
rights and what you said. I can recall 30 years ago when there
were members of this committee who were speaking out on human
rights in Korea and nipping at the heels of the administration.
And it was South Korea that they were talking about. And they
were right to talk about it then. It was important to focus on.
And we ended up with a better situation.
I think it is equally important that this committee also
continue to speak out on the question of human rights in North
Korea but also continue to put it in perspective so that it
enhances the policy and doesn't, in fact, turn out to be an
anchor on it.
Mr. Smith. If I could--thank you for yielding, Chairman
Burton--I would ask unanimous consent that an ABC News piece,
``North Korea Nears Completion of Electromagnetic Pulse Bomb''
as well as a Korea Herald article, ``South Korea behind North
in Electronic Warfare''----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. Be made a part of the record?
And if any of our distinguished witnesses, because
obviously a lot of this is breaking this week, have any
additional thoughts that they could provide to the record, it
would be most helpful.
And I thank my friend for yielding.
Mr. Burton. Madam Chairperson, I think this is a question
that we ought to send to the State Department, the Defense
Department to see if our intelligence----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. We shall do so.
Mr. Burton [continuing]. Has any answers on these.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely, very important. Thank
you, Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Marino of Pennsylvania?
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Gentlemen, if you would each respond to this if you have a
response, starting with Mr. Cha? Given the wave of revolution
in the Middle East today, what is the reality? What is the
reality of an uprising in North Korea? And would South Korea
facilitate that?
Mr. Cha. Well, I would say that the chances of an uprising
as we have seen of the magnitude in Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt is
not very likely in the North Korea. The conditions are very
different.
I think in the case of North Korea, you have a population
that literally is starving. And moms, dads, uncles,
grandfathers are really just looking to see how to make it
through the next day or the next week. And that is not the
condition for revolution.
Revolutions occur when people have access to outside
information and their own situation starts getting better and
they feel it is not getting better fast enough. That is what
Montesquieu once referred to as the spiral of expectations.
Those conditions don't exist in North Korea.
Having said that, the North Koreans are incredibly,
incredibly concerned about what they're seeing and, therefore,
doing everything possible to block information. In many ways,
this regime, though it blames the outside world for its nuclear
weapons, is afraid of its own shadow.
And in that sense, the people still offer a potential for
the future, but I don't think at this point----
Mr. Marino. Quickly, gentlemen, because I have a follow-up.
Mr. Klingner. I would agree with Dr. Cha. At this point we
don't see the likelihood of a mass uprising or revolution in
North Korea to that extent, but that is I think another reason
why North Korea is unlikely to open its country to outside
influence, such as engagement.
Mr. Marino. No. Please go ahead. Go ahead. I will come back
with that question.
Mr. Newcomb. North Korea has a lot of workers in the Middle
East. They have nurses and construction workers in Libya. They
have workers in the UAE. When they go back to North Korea, they
will probably go to reeducation camps, but what they saw, what
they learned, what they heard will be communicated over time.
So while it may not prompt anything immediately, I think there
is going to be a slow corrosion of society because of it.
Mr. Marino. Mr. Carlin?
Mr. Carlin. We usually find the precursors to revolutions
and uprisings after they take place. So I am pretty cautious
about predictions.
Mr. Marino. And briefly what could the relationship be
potentially between the United States and North Korea when its
present dictator dies or steps aside, regardless if it is his
son or another military leader? Mr. Cha?
Mr. Cha. I mean, I think the United States over the past 25
years has been pretty clear about what sort of relationship it
would have. I mean, it would be willing to have one with fully
normalized relations and exchange of ambassadors if the North
nuclear question was addressed.
I don't think the new leadership, the coming leadership is
any different from the current one in terms of their nuclear
ambitions, unfortunately. So I am not very confident.
Mr. Marino. And I apologize for mispronouncing your name
just now. I am very sorry.
Mr. Klingner. I would agree. Some have hoped that because
the third son was educated in Switzerland that perhaps he has
more Western ideals of reform and governance, but I don't think
there is any evidence for that. He is a product of the system.
His legitimacy is not only from his bloodline but also
continuing the policies of his father and his grandfather. So I
don't see the likelihood of change in the North Korean policy
after the transition.
Mr. Marino. Thank you.
Mr. Newcomb, do you concur?
Mr. Newcomb. Yes, I concur.
Mr. Marino. Mr. Carlin?
Mr. Carlin. There was a time when the North Koreans were
looking to us to protect them from the Chinese and the Chinese
influence. And they thought that they might be a piece on the
chess, on the U.S. chess board against the Chinese. I don't
know if that is still in their thinking and if, in fact, in the
strategic sense, the North Koreans would actually be helpful to
us in sort of enhancing our influence in the region.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Madam Chair. I
yield my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Excellent questions. Thank you, Mr.
Marino.
And our batter-up, clean up, David Rivera of Florida. Thank
you.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman.
The Cuban and North Korean regimes, spearheaded by the
armed forces of each country, of Cuba and North Korea, have a
well-documented history of cooperation and exchange.
Most recently Cuban and North Korean authorities have
reportedly signed a protocol in December 2010 to develop
economic and scientific, technical partnerships, projects in
2011. Given these regimes' open hostility toward the United
States and Cuba's demonstrated pursuit of biotechnology
capacities, what implications do you believe this type of
cooperation may hold for U.S. national security?
Now, I will begin with perhaps Mr. Carlin.
Mr. Carlin. Since I really don't know the details of that,
all I know is that the Chief of Staff visited in December, it
is very difficult to try to predict what the influence will be,
if it is just economic and scientific, even though it was
signed by the military. I don't know how, what sorts of things
they are going into.
You know, it is worth looking at, I agree with you. It is
very important. But I just don't have at the tip of my fingers
the details.
Mr. Rivera. Any other comments? Yes?
Mr. Newcomb. Yes. I truly don't have any details on the
agreement. I would like to note that they have been dealing
with each other for 35-40 years. And from time to time, the
Cubans have been very critical of the North Korean system and
some of the measures it has taken.
So the relationship can be a bit prickly. So how it plays
out may well depend upon whether or not they can find a
coincidence of economic interests. In the past, it has been a
little tough. North Korea doesn't pay for anything.
Mr. Rivera. Do you have anything to add?
Mr. Klingner. I have not seen a lot of information about
direct North Korean, Cuban military assistance, certainly not
to the degree of, say, North Korea and Iran, where we know
Iranian officials are present during missile tests and nuclear
tests. And I think there is a much closer relationship between
North Korea, Iran, Burma, Syria than we see sort of direct
military ties with Cuba.
Mr. Cha. I would agree that the countries that they have
relationships with that pose the most security risk to us are
countries like Iran, as Bruce said, and Burma at this point.
The relationship with Cuba historically has gone back quite
a bit of time. Kim Il-sung and Castro were quite close.
But the relationship is prickly today. But I would add
North Korea's relationship with every country in the world
today is prickly, even China. I mean, even though the Chinese
are very close to the North Koreans and protect them like a big
brother, the two hate each other. I mean, they just despise
each other. The mistrust and distrust is really quite palpable.
Mr. Rivera. Well, since several of you have mentioned Iran
and considering its increasing engagement in places in Latin
America, like Venezuela and Cuba, perhaps that is also
something that we should monitor in terms of some sort of a
North Korea, Iran, Cuba or North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela
axis developing.
Also, is there any information from any of you that the
Cuban dictatorship perhaps shares the results of their
espionage efforts against the United States with North Korea?
Maybe, Mr. Carlin, in your experience have you seen any
espionage activity that may be shared between Cuba and North
Korea, particularly anti-U.S. espionage activity?
Mr. Carlin. That is a good question. And I am afraid I
don't really recall anything, but that doesn't mean the answer
is no.
Mr. Rivera. Anyone else?
[No response.]
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. And I think this
is probably due to the repressive police states it is so hard
to get information from either one of those two countries.
Thank you for such excellent testimony. And thank you to
the members for wonderful questions as well. And we will
consider editing that to include ``baloney and bluster.''
So the committee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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