[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-2]
PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BUDGET REDUCTIONS AND
EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVES
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JANUARY 26, 2011
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DUNCAN HUNTER, California LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado BILL OWENS, New York
TOM ROONEY, Florida JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia TIM RYAN, Ohio
CHRIS GIBSON, New York C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE HECK, Nevada KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Jack Schuler, Professional Staff Member
William Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Mary Kate Cunningham, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, January 26, 2011, Proposed Department of Defense
Budget Reductions and Efficiencies Initiatives................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, January 26, 2011...................................... 53
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26, 2011
PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET REDUCTIONS AND EFFICIENCIES
INITIATIVES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Lynn, Hon. William J., III, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of
Defense; GEN Peter W. Chiarelli, USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army; Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Assistant Commandant,
U.S. Marine Corps; ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, Vice Chief of
Naval Operations, U.S. Navy; and Gen. Philip M. Breedlove,
USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force...................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Lynn, Hon. William J., III................................... 60
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 57
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 59
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 75
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 79
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 85
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 83
Mr. Critz.................................................... 82
Dr. Heck..................................................... 86
Mr. Kline.................................................... 81
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 84
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 86
Mr. Ruppersberger............................................ 83
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 83
Mr. Turner................................................... 79
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 84
PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET REDUCTIONS AND EFFICIENCIES
INITIATIVES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 26, 2011.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you
for joining us for our first hearing of the 112th Congress.
I can't think of a more appropriate subject to begin our
oversight than a discussion of the Department of Defense's
topline budget expectations and the manner in which Secretary
Gates is bringing fiscal discipline to the Department and his
proposals for finding efficiencies to reinvest in much-needed
modernization and operations.
Before we get started, I would like to take the opportunity
to introduce our new leadership team. In adopting the committee
rules last week, the committee reorganized the jurisdictions of
the subcommittees to align with military missions rather than
individual military departments.
Our new subcommittees and leadership teams are: Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, Chairman Mac Thornberry, Ranking
Member, James Langevin; for Military Personnel, Chairman Joe
Wilson, Ranking Member, Susan Davis; for Oversight and
Investigations, Chairman Rob Wittman, Ranking Member, Jim
Cooper; for Readiness, Chairman Randy Forbes and Ranking
Member, Madeleine Bordallo; for Seapower and Projection Forces,
Chairman Todd Akin, Ranking Member, Mike McIntyre; for
Strategic Forces, Chairman Mike Turner and Ranking Member,
Loretta Sanchez; and last but not least, for Tactical Air and
Land Forces, Chairman Roscoe Bartlett and Ranking Member,
Silvestre Reyes.
I couldn't be more pleased about the selection of these
members for our leadership team for the 112th Congress and
appreciate the great depth and breadth of experience that they
each bring to the table. I am confident that we will have a
productive and purposeful year. And I look forward to working
with each of them.
As we get this new session started, there are a few
administrative issues that I would like to reiterate. First,
questioning will occur in regular order by seniority of those
present before the gavel and then by order in which members
arrive. That is how we will proceed today. There will be some
hearings where we will vary from that. We will explain it as we
go through.
Second, there will be strict enforcement of the five-minute
rule.
Finally, to minimize obstruction of the walkways, only
members and committee staff are permitted on the dais during
the hearing. Thank you for your cooperation and let's get
started.
In September, we held a preliminary hearing on the
Department's efficiencies initiative. At that time, I expressed
concern about the lack of information that we had been
provided. I remain dismayed, despite repeated assurances from
the Department about an interest to work together on these
issues, though we have seen little change in the Department's
willingness to share information.
Now, let me be clear on this. I agree with Secretary Gates
that we must scrutinize defense programs to ensure that we are
getting the most bang for our buck and concentrating our
limited resources on the highest priority programs. I support
initiatives focused on reducing waste, streamlining operations
and eliminating redundancies across all enterprises.
However, I will not support initiatives that will leave our
military less capable and less ready to fight. Make no mistake
about it; we stand at a critical juncture in the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
As we draw down in one AOR [Area of Responsibility] and
build up in another, the decisions that we make today will
directly impact the level of success of these efforts. I cannot
say it strongly enough. I will not support any measures that
stress our forces and jeopardize the safety of our men and
women in uniform. I will oppose also any plans that have the
potential to damage or endanger our national security.
Most concerning about the efficiencies initiative are the
plans to reduce the Army and Marine Corps end strength and to
implement even deeper cuts beyond the initial $100 billion
goal. The reduction of an additional $78 billion from the
Department's funding topline caught this committee by surprise.
And we intend to pursue the impact of this decision by the
Administration.
We have asked much of our men and women in uniform over the
years. They have bravely fought and sacrificed for all of us,
each and every one of us in this room. And I cannot in good
conscience ask them to do more with less.
Now I would like to turn to our ranking member, Adam Smith
from Washington, for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page ?.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again,
congratulations on being the chairman of the committee. This is
our first formal open hearing. And I have not had the chance to
publicly congratulate you on that. But you have already done a
terrific job of reaching out to me and to our side of the
aisle. I think we are going to have a great working
relationship. And I very much look forward to that. So thank
you, Buck, and congratulations again.
And I think this hearing is perfectly appropriate. It is
always the number one duty of this committee to make sure that
our national security is provided for, to make sure that our
troops and those who are fighting to protect us have the
resources they need to do the job that we on the civilian side
ask them to do.
Everybody on this committee has done an outstanding job of
making sure that that priority stays right at the top of our
list. And I think we have done an admirable job of that through
the years. And I am sure that we will continue to do so.
But as we go forward, we have to be mindful of the fact
that just spending money doesn't necessarily make us safer. And
I think anybody who spends, you know, just a few minutes
looking at the Pentagon budget, including the gentlemen before
us today who are going to testify, will readily agree that
there are savings and efficiencies to be found within the
Department of Defense budget. There is absolutely no question
about it.
We have wrestled over the years with a variety of different
programs that were funded that turned out not to do what we
wanted them to do. And we wound up wasting a lot of money,
quite frankly. I know this committee in particular in the last
couple of years has been very focused on acquisition reform.
Mr. Andrews has been a leader on that as well as others on both
sides of the aisle to try to figure out how to get more for
what we spend.
And I want to emphasize that point. Wasting money anywhere
in our budget, even in the Department of Defense, does not
makes safer, does not protect our troops and does not enhance
our national security. In fact, it does just the opposite. So
this committee and you gentlemen as well as everyone at the
Pentagon have an obligation, not just to spend the money, but
to make sure we are spending it efficiently and effectively.
And I really want to applaud Secretary Gates and the others
at the DOD for stepping up to that very difficult challenge to
looking at our budget and saying where can we save money.
Because there is no place where you are going to save money
where somebody isn't going to complain about it. As the quote
always goes, ``One person's waste is another person's income.''
It is not going to be easy, no matter how you do it.
But I believe you gentlemen and Secretary Gates have
stepped up and begun a very, very important process to find
those savings. I applaud that effort. We look forward to
learning more about the details.
And also, I would be remiss if I didn't put this into the
broader framework of our budget deficit and our budget. You
know, there is a growing consensus in this country that the
deficit is too high, the debt is too high, and we are out of
balance. Now, that consensus falls apart when you begin to talk
about where you are going to cut or how you are going to raise
the revenue to make up for that, understandably so, because
these are difficult decisions.
But the math here is unrelenting. And we shouldn't forget
about that.
2010 we took in $3--or, sorry. We spent $3.5 trillion and
took in about $2.3 trillion in revenue. That is a $1.2 trillion
difference. That is about 33 percent of everything we spend. So
if you started just from a logical standpoint, you would say to
get us back to balance, we need to cut 33 percent out of
everything that we spend.
If you want to take 20 percent of the budget, which defense
is, off the table, you are then down to about $2.8 trillion
that you have to cut $1 trillion out of. And that means that
you have to cut somewhere in the neighborhood of 45 percent out
of everything. And that is Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid,
homeland security, infrastructure, education, on down the line.
I say all that to make sure that we are mindful of the
difficult challenge that we face and also to remind everybody
that our national security is also dependent upon having a
strong economy. If we wind up, you know, putting our country in
a fiscal hole that we can't get out of, collapsing our economy,
making it difficult for U.S. industries to prosper and thrive,
they are not going to be in a position to provide the valuable
help that they do to our national security apparatus.
So we have a tough job ahead of us. But savings and
efficiencies are going to have to be found. And I, for my part,
am absolutely convinced that we continue to--can continue to
provide the best national security possible, give our support
to the troops that they deserve and still find savings within
the Pentagon budget. I think this hearing is the first start in
that process.
I know the gentlemen in front of us have worked very, very
hard on this problem. I look forward to hearing their
testimony. And I look forward to working with the Chairman and
with the Pentagon and all members of this committee to find
those savings and make sure that we continue to provide
national security in every sense of the word.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page ?.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Now I would like to introduce our witnesses this morning.
We have first the Honorable William J. Lynn III, the deputy
secretary of defense from the Defense Department; General Peter
W. Chiarelli, vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, Admiral
Jonathan W. Greenert, vice chief of naval operations, U.S.
Navy; General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., assistant commandant,
U.S. Marine Corps; General Philip M. Breedlove, vice chief of
staff, U.S. Air Force.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. LYNN III, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; GEN. PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF
OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC,
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS; ADM. JONATHAN W.
GREENERT, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY; AND
GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR
FORCE
Secretary Lynn. Thank you very much. And good morning, Mr.
Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you very much for
the opportunity to be with you today and discuss our efficiency
efforts at the Department of Defense.
Before I start, I would like to extend my thoughts and
support to one of the members of your committee who is not here
today, Representative Gabrielle Giffords as well as her
husband, Navy Captain Mark Kelly and the others affected by the
events in Tucson. Gabby and Mark are part of the military
family, and we are very much cheering Gabby on as she begins
her rehabilitation.
Today I am pleased to be joined by the vice chiefs of staff
of the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as the assistant
commandant of the Marine Corps. I will have a brief statement,
and then we will turn to your questions for the bulk of the
hearing.
The leadership of the Department is well-aware that the
nation is dealing with significant fiscal pressures. We owe it
to the taxpayers to make the most of every dollar entrusted to
us.
Indeed, we could all benefit from following the direction
of President Eisenhower, who believed we should spend whatever
is necessary for national defense, but not one penny more.
To that end of the Department sought in both the fiscal
year 2010 and the fiscal year 2011 budgets to curtail or
eliminate programs that were either too troubled to continue or
that provided capabilities that were too narrow to justify
their costs. We identified more than 20 programs in those
categories that would have cost more than $300 billion, if
pursued to their completion.
We have also initiated a comprehensive search for greater
efficiencies in our business operations, our personnel system
and our headquarters structure. Specifically, Secretary Gates
laid out three objectives that I will describe today.
The services first were directed to achieve $100 billion in
efficiencies over the 5-year Future Years Defense Plan. Second,
the services could retain and invest those efficiency savings
in enhancement of high-priority warfighting programs. And
third, the Department developed additional efficiencies and
other changes to accommodate a $78 billion reduction in our
topline that contributed to the Administration's deficit
reduction efforts.
Over the past 6 months, the military services have
undertaken a comprehensive examination of their overhead
accounts to achieve the $100 billion savings objective the
secretary issued them. The savings come from numerous sources.
A portion are generated by reorganizations that reassign
personnel and reduce layering in the Department.
For example, the Army will consolidate six installation
management command regions into four and close the evaluation
task force. The Navy will eliminate selected squadron staffs
and disestablish the 2nd Fleet in Norfolk. The Air Force will
consolidate four air operations centers and three numbered Air
Force staffs.
The services will also achieve savings through implementing
better business practices. For example, the Army will leverage
efforts of other organizations to reduce the number of data
centers, and the Navy will shift 6,000 billets from shore-based
installations to increase shipboard manning.
Finally, the Air Force will implement better business
practices in satellite procurement, establishing more stability
in the development process and utilizing block buys in
procurement.
In addition to these business practice efficiencies, this
service has garnered savings through reductions in programs
that either cost too much or provided too little capability.
The Army will terminate procurement of the SL-AMRAAM [Surface-
Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile] surface-to-
air missile and the non-line-of-sight launch system. The Marine
Corps will terminate the expeditionary fighting vehicle.
As directed by the secretary, all savings realized by a
military department will be retained and reinvested in that
department. Approximately 28 billion of the total savings would
be used over the next 5 years to deal with higher-than-expected
operating expenses. The remaining savings, some $70 billion,
would be used to enhance high-priority military capabilities.
The Air Force will begin development and acquisition of a
new long-range bomber and maintain maximum procurement levels
of Reaper UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vechicles]. The Army will
invest more heavily in modernization of the army's battle fleet
of Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and Stryker wheeled
vehicles. The Navy plans to use the savings to buy more ship--
to buy six more ships than were in last year's plan, including
an additional destroyer.
In sum, our efficiency initiatives will permit improvement
in warfighting capabilities in ways that would not have been
fiscally possible in the absence of the efficiency campaign.
However, Congressman Smith indicated the strength of our
national defense ultimately depends on a strong economy as
well, so as part of the Administration's broader effort to
address the deficit, the Department reduced its topline budget
for fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016.
This reduction, which totaled $78 billion compared with
last year's plan, will still result in a defense base budget
request of $553 billion in fiscal year 2012 and modest real
growth in the near years of the Future Years Defense Plan.
We accommodated this topline reductions through additional
efficiencies and other changes outside the warfighting
accounts. For instance, Secretary Gates has imposed a freeze on
civilian personnel levels in the Department through fiscal year
2013, allowing limited exceptions to accommodate growth in the
acquisition workforce and a few other essential areas.
The secretary also mandated a reduction of 10 percent per
year for 3 years in the number of contractors who augment
government staffs. We have sought to address the enormous
growth in our medical costs through management efficiencies
while continuing to improve high-quality military health care.
We believe, though, it is time to lift the 15-year freeze
on TRICARE enrollment fees for working-age retirees. We believe
it is time to phase out subsidies that DOD currently provides
to a small number of non-military hospitals, and we are making
adjustments and pharmacy co-pays that will both, we think,
improved the benefit as well as develop cost efficiencies.
Finally, we are taking steps to streamline our
organizational structure. The secretary announced last August
we are disestablishing the Joint Forces Command and the
Business Transformation Agency, and we are eliminating the
position of assistant secretary for networks and information
integration. In addition, we will pursue efficiencies in
intelligence operations and in our information technology
investments.
Mr. Chairman, the proposals we are describing today are the
result of a detailed, comprehensive budget and program review
led by Secretary Gates and involving the senior military and
civilian leadership of the Department. I know that some will
argue that our proposals cut defense too much. Others will
argue that we have not cut enough.
We believe this budget strikes the right balance for these
difficult times. In Secretary Gates' own words, ``This budget
proposal represents a reasonable, responsible and sustainable
level of defense spending for the next 5 years.''
I want to end my statement by thanking the Chairman and the
committee for your strong support of the Department and
particularly for your strong support of the men and women who
bear their burdens of our national defense. Thank you, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Lynn can be found in
the Appendix on page ?.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The 78 billion topline reduction was a surprise to us when
we went into the briefing with the Secretary. We thought we
were going to talking and getting more detail on the 100
billion. Then we also found out about the 78 billion.
What guidance was provided by the Administration to the
Department with regard to the topline budget reductions across
the Future Years Defense Program? And when was this guidance
received?
Secretary Lynn. Mr. Chairman, the topline this past year,
as it has--as it--as, I think, in every year with every
administration, was developed in a discussion between the White
House, led in particular by the Office of Management and
Budget, and the Defense Department. We had iterative discussion
that included the President.
We settled on the $78 billion number as the number that we
thought we could achieve through efficiencies that did not
undermine any of our warfighting capabilities. And as to the
timing, the final numbers were developed in December.
The Chairman. And have other departments received similar
instructions?
Secretary Lynn. Yes, they have, but I wouldn't be able to
give you the exact numbers of those other departments. But a
similar process was done with all of the departments.
The Chairman. Similar percentages of cuts?
Secretary Lynn. I am not in a position to release the whole
Administration's budget. My belief, though, is that the Defense
Department had less--fewer reductions than many other
departments.
The Chairman. And we will see those when the President's
budget is submitted?
Secretary Lynn. Yes, when the President's budget is
submitted, you will see all of them, of course, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. How will this 78 billion topline
reduction affect the execution of the fiscal year 2011 funding
priorities?
Secretary Lynn. At least off the top of my head, Mr.
Chairman, I don't think it would affect the fiscal year 2011.
The challenge with fiscal year 2011 is that we don't yet know
what the final number is going to be.
As you well know, we are operating under a continuing
resolution, and we are awaiting congressional action. So the
challenge in fiscal year 2011 is how to operate either under a
continuing resolution or ultimately a midyear appropriation.
That was the challenge in preparing the program. It is a
challenge in executing the budget. But I don't think the
development of the 2012 to 2016 program will affect execution
of fiscal 2011.
The Chairman. Okay. The secretary stated on January 6 that
this plan, and ``represents in my view the minimum level of
defense spending that is necessary, given the complex and
unpredictable array of security challenges the United States
faces around the globe.'' Then he went on to explain why
further cuts to force structure would be calamitous.
However, the secretary also indicated just last year that 2
to 3 percent real growth was necessary beyond 2015 to prevent
cuts to force structure. How will you maintain this level of
modernization that the secretary believes is necessary to
protect our national security in the face of zero percent real
growth in the coming years?
Secretary Lynn. The secretary has indicated that to
maintain force structure and to absorb the growth that you see
in--due to technology and enhancements and personnel benefit
enhancements, that you do need a 2 to 3 percent real growth
with the constant force structure.
For that reason, when we are going to have a proposed flat
budget in fiscal 2015 and 2016, we believe that you do need
some force reductions, and we have put planning and therefore a
reduction of 27,000 in the Army end strength and 15,000 to
20,000 in the Marine Corps end strength.
Secretary Lynn. Now, that reduction will take place after
we think we will have drawn down substantially in both
Afghanistan and Iraq and so that our international commitments
should not be at today's levels.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, just as a starting point, can you keep the
numbers in, I think, proper perspective, if you will walk us
through a little bit how much the defense budget has increased
in the last, you know, 6 or 7 years.
You talk about those end-strength numbers. They have gone
up significantly, and understandably so with our commitments in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
But you have just a little bit of the numbers of how much
we have actually increased the budget in the last 7 or 8 years
in the Department of Defense. And try to include OCO [Overseas
Contingency Operations] in that as well, not just what the
baseline is.
Secretary Lynn. The--in the--I believe since 2001, the
budget--the base budget has come close to doubling.
Mr. Smith. Right.
Secretary Lynn. And, of course, the--and the end-strength
numbers are up, particularly in the Army and the Marine Corps,
and would still be higher even after the proposed reductions in
2015 and 2016 than they were when Secretary Gates took office.
And that was really the high point of the Iraqi conflict.
In terms of the OCO budget, that is about $160 billion this
year. Obviously in--going back to 2001, before the conflict,
before 9/11, before the conflict in Afghanistan, that
essentially would have been zero.
Mr. Smith. Right. But in NASB, if we added up over the 6 or
7 years that we have had supplementals, it is somewhere in the
neighborhood of a trillion dollars, in addition to that
doubling of the defense budget that has happened.
Secretary Lynn. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Smith. And these couple quick questions of specific
programs, the F-35, most expensive program we have got going,
has experienced some troubles.
Can you give us a little bit of an indication of our
efforts to try to get those costs under control and get us an
actual product for a reasonable price?
Secretary Lynn. Yes, Congressman. The F-35 is a--is
certainly a critical program for the Department. It is the
fifth generation fighter that we think that we need to have in
the decade following this.
The development program, frankly, has not gone as smoothly
as we had hoped. The costs have risen.
We have taken additional steps this year to, frankly,
present the committee with a more conservative program in three
fundamental ways.
One, the most difficult aspect of the program has been the
development of the STOVL [Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing]
version of the F-35, which is the most complicated version.
We have decoupled the development of that aircraft from the
carrier-based and the--and the Air Force versions, which are
proceeding a bit better, so that they will not be held back.
And we have put it on what the Secretary has called a 2-
year probation. We are going to continue the program. We are
going to try and work through the development issues.
And we are going to decide at the end of 2 years whether to
go forward with the program, in the strong hope that we will
have solved those problems at the end of that 2 years.
The second thing we are doing is we are slowing the ramp of
procurement. The procurement will be flat from fiscal 2011 to
2012. And the ramp will be slower by over a hundred aircraft in
the plan than we had--in the 5-year plan, than we had planned
last year.
This is reducing concurrency and getting further in
development before we invest more in production. It is a more
conservative approach.
And then, finally, third, to address any operational gaps
that we have by slowing that procurement, we have added about
40 F-18s to the line so that we are able to fill out the fleet
in the interim period.
Mr. Smith. Right, and then that, obviously, is a major
challenge, the tens of billions of dollars more than was
expected that are being spent on that critical piece of our
national security, presents some of the challenges for the
budget going forward.
Just one final question, General Chiarelli, can you walk us
through a little bit the early infantry brigade combat team
update, sort of, as I like to refer to it, Son of Future Combat
Systems, if you will, our effort to update those programs?
Information warfare in the battlefield space for our
brigade teams has not gone terribly smoothly as you know in
terms of the testing. I know you have been working hard to
update that, make sure we get the equipment we need, get rid of
what doesn't work and keep what does.
Can you just walk us through a little bit in light of the
most recent testing, where we are at on that and how you are
planning on going forward?
General Chiarelli. Well, we are very, very pleased with
where we are with the network right now. And we are very
pleased with the SUGV [Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle], which is
the little robot that goes around.
Some of the others have created some challenges for us. And
we will be looking before too long, once the R&D [Research and
Development] is complete, to make some decisions on some of the
other systems.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Whatever our topline is, we need to be as efficient as we
can in using the monies.
There are three areas that I know we all have concerns
about, and I just wanted to see where you are going with the--
trying to solve these problems.
I am a huge supporter of research and early R&D. You never
know, if you don't try, what will come of it.
So I don't want my concern here to be in any way--reflect
on--indicate that I am not a big supporter of research and R&D.
I think we need to do more of that, not less of that. I think
we spend too little money there.
But I am very much concerned that we have too many programs
that continue to the late R&D stage. There is no way we could
possibly procure all of them.
And so we have to find a mechanism for aborting these
things earlier rather than later, because there is just no way
that we could procure all of the--all of the end items that the
number of programs that we now have in late R&D. How are we
going to address that problem?
A second problem is when a program is not going well, it
has to really, really be moribund before we abort it. Two
recent programs are future combat systems and the expeditionary
fighting vehicle, you know. And after years and years and
billions of dollars, we finally decide, hey, that is not a good
idea.
I think there were a number of people along the way who
said, way earlier than that, that that was not a good idea,
that we shouldn't be doing that.
How do we address that problem so we don't come to the
point where we have these sunk costs of billions of dollars and
aborting a program where parts are made, partners are made in
many, many districts across the country so it gets wide
congressional support?
And the third problem is there is always some new
technology we can add. I have been here 18 years now. We never
have finished a program on time and on budget. And we are
partly responsible for that, because we keep saying, gee,
couldn't it be a little better? Let us add this new technology.
How do we determine it is good enough and we stop there? We
have an open architecture so that we can add these improvements
later, because many times we are going to have to live with
these things for the next 40 years.
So we want it to be as good as it can be. How are we
addressing these problems? There are huge potential savings in
these areas. How do we get there?
Secretary Lynn. Let me take your questions in order, Mr.
Bartlett. One, we agree with you on the basic R&D. And the
budget that we will send you next month will indeed have real
growth in the basic R&D, try to protect that seed corn that you
are rightly concerned about.
With regard to decisions on programs, I guess that is not a
criticism, I think, Secretary Gates has suffered from.
He has made, I think, some tough, tough decisions, whether
it is on the presidential helicopter or the F-22 earlier or the
future combat system that you mentioned, which he terminated,
then the expeditionary fighting vehicle this year.
I think the thrust of your question is right. The
Department needs to make hard decisions early. And we are
endeavoring to do that.
I think you are right. It is challenging, both in terms of
the support programs' buildup, as well as the--it is always
difficult to know when you have reached the point of do you
have enough knowledge to make the decision or is it going to
get better just around the next corner, which tends to be the
promise.
Your third question on how do we--I think it goes to what
the effort Mr. Andrews and others led on this committee.
It is the fundamental thrust of acquisition reform. It is
how do you have budget and schedule be equally important as
performance? You have to balance between all three.
I think we have often balanced in favor of performance, for
often good reasons, but budget and schedule suffers. We are
trying to, in our acquisition reform efforts, balance better.
And you will see, for example, in the program we are
presenting next month, that we have, as the secretary has
announced, we are going to pursue a new bomber program as part
of family of systems approach to long-range strike.
An important element of that new bomber program will be a
firm view of what the cost, of what the unit cost of that
bomber ought to be, and that we ought to develop the best
possible technology, but at that price.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome.
The first question is for General Chiarelli.
The committee was told by Under Secretary Westphal that the
Army was intending on reinvesting some of its savings in the
efficiency account in the Abrams, Bradleys and Stryker vehicle,
doing upgrades for those three.
Could you provide us with a little more detail on those
upgrades? And also, how much additional funding was the Army
able to allocate to modernize these particular vehicles?
And how will it provide better capability for the soldiers?
General Chiarelli. Well, those are three systems that we
currently have been able to put some money in from our
efficiencies, along with many others.
In Stryker, I think, you know, we are moving ahead with a
double V-hull. We have been completing some testing, and that
testing has come out very, very satisfactory.
We are very, very pleased with it and are moving ahead to
provide additional protection for the entire crew of the
Stryker, above what we have right now with the flat bottom
hull, with some of the add-on armor kits.
It is a great improvement. We will be making increases or
changes, improvements to both the Stryker and the Bradley. And
I will have to get you the exact dollars on that at a later
time, sir, and I will get those to you.
Mr. Reyes. Okay.
The other area I would like to ask is in the area of the
Patriot missile upgrades, and also the counter-rocket artillery
mortar systems. What is the Army intending to do with those
kinds of upgrades, and how will they play out into the
capabilities to the intent to procure, and obviously with the
end result of helping to protect our soldiers in the field?
General Chiarelli. Well, sir, those improvements grew out
of our portfolio reviews, where we took like-type systems and
looked at the entire portfolio and compared systems. That came
out of a portfolio we call air and missile defense.
And when we looked at that portfolio, we saw we had some
broken programs. One of the programs that we had concern with
was SL-AMRAAM. The cost of that missile for SL-AMRAAM had grown
from $300,000 to, I am told, over $1,000,000 a copy now. And in
POM [Program Objective Memorandum] 2010-2015 we were only
buying 100 of those missiles.
And quite frankly, we saw changes in the threat from the
time that that program had been conceived. We were able to take
the savings from that particular program and apply them against
Patriot and against counter-rocket and counter-mortar, because
quite frankly, counter-rocket and counter-mortar are the
threats that are affecting our troops downrange today.
So with over a billion dollars in SL-AMRAAM savings we were
able to reinvest that in counter-rocket and counter-mortar and
also in upgrading Patriot.
Mr. Reyes. Very good. Thank you, General.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you mentioned Joint Forces Command in your
opening statement. And as I am sure you remember from your
previous time, a primary reason that the command was created
was to have a major command that looks forward, a future
command. And to have joint experimentation come together, so
that you have a person at the table who is not just worried
about what is happening today, but looking ahead.
So if the command goes away, and there are lots of reasons
I understand to do that, who does that? Or is it your all's
view that you don't need that person who is future-oriented
with the joint experimentation capability?
Secretary Lynn. We agree with you, Congressman, that
certainly looking to the future and in particular the emphasis
on jointness through experimentation, through development of
doctrine, are critical roles. We did not think we, at the point
we are in the Department, that we needed a command to do that.
Now, we are retaining many of the sub-organizations--about
half is the rough estimate--that were doing that, including the
joint experimentation group. They will report--still the final
recommendations are still being developed. But the Joint Staff
and the chairman and the vice chairman will play a stronger
role in advocating for jointness, in advocating for development
of joint doctrine in this post-JFCOM [Joint Forces Command]
world.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes, I think the concern is you bury stuff
down in the bureaucracy, it is never going to percolate
through. And that is part of where we were before Joint Forces
Command.
General Dunford, I am not an expert in this area, but my
understanding was the Marine Corps has had a requirement that
the Navy is going to get the Marines so close, so many miles
from shore, then they got to be transferred into some
amphibious vehicles that will get them onto shore in a certain
amount of time so that they are in fighting condition. Have
those requirements changed? Have the miles changed? Have the
time changed?
General Dunford. Congressman, thank you.
First, we are and continue to be committed to the
capability that was represented by the EFV. That is to be able
to provide the nation with a short access. Historically, we
have planned over the past 2 decades for Marines to be
discharged at 25 nautical miles. In recent discussions with the
Navy, those figures have in fact changed. And we are in the
process now of refining the requirement.
And we think it is somewhere in excess of 12 nautical
miles, but something less than 25 nautical miles. So we are in
fact reviewing the requirement right now in the context of both
our capabilities and limitations, as well as the enemy's
capabilities and limitations, particularly some newly fielded
equipment inside of the Department of the Navy.
Mr. Thornberry. Admiral, is the Navy okay with getting
closer to shore and being more at risk of missiles from
reaching the ships?
Admiral Greenert. Congressman, we are. We have taken a very
close look at this, and with our integrated fire control
capabilities in the future, our ability to network with the
self-protection, the RAM [Rolling Airframe Missile], and some
of the other systems, the rolling airframe missile that we
have, our counter-swarm capability, we believe--and I am in
concurrence with General Dunford--somewhere around 12 miles,
maybe a little bit more, is acceptable.
We have modeled this closely; we have war-gamed it closely.
We are reasonably comfortable. There may be situations when, as
the maritime component commander, we may not have as much time
as we assume we will have. We will have to look at the risk
factor regarding that. That will be the individual operator's
judgment on that case. But overall, we are good with it.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I appreciate y'all's answers. I think
these are just two examples I picked of where we want to have
further discussions with you. There has been a sense, at least
from my part, that some edict comes down from on high saying
cut the budget, and you all do the best you can and try to put
a rosy face on it.
And I think the concern that some of us have is, okay, what
are the implications of eliminating this vehicle, eliminating
this command? Have we thought through who does it, what kind of
capability we lose if that happens?
And personally, I think there is concern about having that
thought through and analyzed, rather than going through
strictly a budget exercise, even though obviously all of us are
in favor of finding efficiencies wherever we can. So I
appreciate it. I think there is further discussion to be had.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for referencing what the members
of this committee did on procurement reform. Mr. Conaway
deserves at least equal credit for that, as do many members.
And we appreciate the fact you are already starting to
implement those reforms. Thank you.
I wanted to come back to the topline discussion, where
Secretary Gates on January 6th talked about $78 billion off the
topline through the efficiencies that have been outlined. Under
the 5-year plan that you are presently working under, defense
spending will still be considerably higher 5 years from today
than it is today. Isn't that right?
Secretary Lynn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. If I look at the math correctly, the
difference between the plan that you are presently operating on
and what Secretary Gates has now suggested is instead of the
defense budget being 17 percent higher than it is today, it
will be about 14.5 percent higher than it is today. Is that
essentially right?
Secretary Lynn. I don't have the math in front of me, but
it sounds right.
Mr. Andrews. Yes, the numbers to be were $567 billion in
the base budget in the first year, and $663 by the fifth year.
He would take that down by $78 billion over 5 years.
Given that, I want to commend you and the Secretary for the
real choices that you are putting before this committee and the
Congress. The easiest thing to do here--it has been for 2
decades or longer--is to say there can be operating
efficiencies and overhead savings and we can spend less if we
do that. In the 20 years since that has been said the budget
has probably tripled, not just doubled. So there really have to
be some real decisions.
And I think you have raised a very interesting one with the
EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle] recommendation. I note the
EFV had a Nunn-McCurdy breach in 2007. And our expert staff
tells us, a Nunn-McCurdy breach is triggered under the law when
a program exceeds its budgeted schedule by 25 percent or more.
Do you happen to recall the magnitude of the Nunn-McCurdy
breach for the EFV? How far over budget was it?
Secretary Lynn. Unless General Dunford can provide it, I
would have to provide it for the record.
General Dunford. Congressman, I can talk to the unit cost.
The unit cost was $5 million in 1995. At that time, we had
planned to buy 1,013 vehicles. The program now is 573 vehicles,
and it is $17 million for unit cost. So as you can see, it is
significantly more.
I think the Nunn-McCurdy threshold is about 25 percent. So
we exceeded the Nunn-McCurdy threshold for unit cost----
Mr. Andrews. So let me get this straight. When the Congress
made a decision to procure these vessels in 1995, we were
anticipating they would cost $5 million a copy? And that has
ballooned to $17 million?
General Dunford. That is correct.
Mr. Andrews. So it has more than tripled in cost? In lay-
person's language, why is that? Why did it more than triple in
cost?
General Dunford. One critical factor is that at the time in
1995, we planned on buying 1,013 vehicles. The current program
is 573 vehicles. So that accounts for some of the unit cost.
Quite frankly, Congressman, I can't tell you why the rest--
why it exceeded cost in other areas. I do know that the unit
cost was impacted by the total number of vehicles that we were
going to buy and other factors. Really, I think probably
General Dynamics can be better able to explain that than me.
Mr. Andrews. My understanding is that we have not yet
passed milestone B on this program, that we were approaching
it, but not yet past it?
General Dunford. Congressman, we are just about to be at
knowledge point two in February.
Mr. Andrews. Yes. And what planning has taken place in the
Department with respect to an alternative, if in fact we don't
procure these vessels that have been presently planned? How
would we get Marines from the ship to the shore?
General Dunford. Congressman, as I mentioned earlier, first
we are committed to continue to be able to do that and provide
a short access for the nation. So we are committed to be able
to get any vehicle that moves from ship to shore. We believe
that the knowledge that we learned in the EFV program, combined
with some new acquisition processes, will allow us to get a
vehicle that will allow us to meet the operational requirement
at significantly less cost.
Mr. Andrews. Is there going to be a gap between when we get
to that point and now? Is there any operating deficiency that
the Marines would be subjected to?
General Dunford. We can currently meet our requirements.
The use of the assault amphibious vehicle, which is a legacy
program, absolutely has an effect on our tactics, techniques,
and procedures. So we mitigate the risk of a legacy program by
our employment concepts. What we will do now is take a look at
service life extension program for the assault amphibious
vehicle to address some of the lethality shortfalls, some of
the mobility shortfalls.
And then, we also at the same time, will take a look at,
you know, what the expeditionary fighting vehicle really
represents is a small part of our overall ground tactical
vehicle plan, and about two-thirds of what we need to come from
ship to shore in armored vehicles. So we will take a look also
now in addressing what we call the Marine Personnel Carrier,
which is the balance of our amphibious capability.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you very much, I appreciate it.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I didn't want to interrupt when you were
asking the questions. But I would like to have a little
understanding. When the secretary briefed us on this additional
$78 billion, what he said was, ``Next year's budget would have
a 1 percent increase, the following year, a half percent and
then 3 years of flat.'' Now, how does that grow those kind of
numbers?
Mr. Andrews. Will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Andrews. If I may, before the secretary does, my
understanding is that the numbers are in real dollar terms. So
that is how.
Secretary Lynn. That is part of the answer. Mr. Chairman,
the--we don't actually know what the fiscal 2011 to 2012 growth
rate is, again, because we don't know what the fiscal 2011
budget. But it will be somewhere between 1.5 and 3 percent real
growth. That is on top of inflation, which is in the 1.5 to 2
percent.
So you are looking at nominal growth of 4 or 5 percent
fiscal 2012. Then the real growth in fiscal 2013 and 2014 is 1
percent in 2013, a half a percent in 2014, then zero real in
2015 and 2016. In other words, the budget would still grow, but
only to keep pace with inflation so that when you net those
numbers up, I believe you end up with the line that Congressman
Andrews led with.
The Chairman. Okay.
Secretary Lynn. So, in current dollars, it wouldn't grow by
those numbers? It would be inflated dollars? In current
dollars, it would grow more because of the addition of
inflation----
The Chairman. Right. Thank you.
Secretary Lynn. When the secretary said to you 1 percent, a
half percent, zero, he was talking real. You have to add
inflation to that.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to start by making a distinction between two
things. And I have to say that I don't have so many questions
as answers. We still get 5 minutes for answers, so I am going
to just give you a little bit of where I am coming from sitting
in this committee.
The first thing is is what you have done. You started the
beginning of the year and decided we are going to cut defense
by $78 billion, make some big changes in various programs and a
whole series of decisions. The question is were those all good
decisions or not. That is one question.
The second point, though, is how you did it. The U.S.
Constitution requires the members of this committee to be
involved and be part of the decisions for national security.
The end of last year this committee was approached on the fact
that we had an opportunity to get two purchases for 10 Littoral
Combat Ships, which was different than what we had had planned.
At the last minute, we were said this would be a good idea
for the Navy. It is saving us some money, and it is a good
thing to do. We took a look at the numbers in a very compressed
timeframe, passed legislation and supported the Navy in that
decision, even though we had no idea that it was coming until a
week or so before, a couple weeks before when we actually made
the legislation and got it done.
We worked with you as co-partners. This month we received,
like a cc on a general press release to the public, that we
have made all of these unilateral decisions, and we had no idea
a bunch of them were even coming.
The expeditionary fighting vehicle strikes me as one where
the assumptions are very thin. It appears that we are almost
canceling a capability in order to make a $78 billion cut on
the surface. We will look into it. But my concern is that you
are trying to make, or you have inadvertently made, this
committee irrelevant because you are not keeping us in the loop
informing us of what you are looking at.
That has gotten progressively worse over 10 years to where
it is right now. And that is unacceptable, at least to me, as a
subcommittee chair. And I believe I may speak for a few other
members of this committee that we want to be part of the
decisionmaking process.
If you go back 200 years and look at the history of our
national defense, you find that it is a partnership between
military and civilians. And both sides play a role in that. And
at times, the civilian side, that is this committee, has made
recommendations in 20/20 hindsight that have turned out to be
very good military decisions such as, among other things,
arming predators.
And I don't like, and I don't think this committee will
tolerate, being left out of the process of decisionmaking. So
we will have our hearings. And we will look into those
decisions. And the decisions that we think are poor we will not
be shy about explaining why we think those are poor decisions.
But I just think it is clear in January when we are
starting off on a new foot that we understand each other. And I
am going to try to explain it so that you understood where we
are coming from because we don't like to be called at the last
minute and say--I talked to the secretary of the Navy 2 days
ago, and I said, ``I am very concerned about cutting the
defense budget.'' He said, there are not any cuts to the
defense budget that he knew of. We had the speech last night
that talked about it.
Now, to the overall concept, I think it is in your best
interest to use us as part of your team to help you do your
jobs. I think it is foolish to ignore us because here is what
is going on. You want to take a big look at where we are,
budget-wise, in this country.
You take your entitlements: Medicare, Medicaid, Social
Security. Add the other entitlements, and then add service on
the debt, which is like an entitlement because when we sell a
U.S. treasury or something, we have to keep paying the interest
like a little machine that spits out dollar bills. We can't not
pay that.
So you take all those entitlements together, add them up.
Right now those entitlements are equal to the revenue that we
take in as a nation. So you can cut defense to zero, cut
discretionary spending to zero, and we are still just even. You
cannot pay for entitlements by cutting defense. But you can
destroy our country by cutting defense.
Now, you want to take a look at some concerning numbers? If
you take a look at defense spending as a percent of total
budget authority, we are now, with these proposed cuts, to the
same place we were in 1998 when we hollowed out our forces.
That is the kind of thing that it is our job to be concerned
with and our job to go to bat and say to the Budget Committee,
``Wait a minute. We really can't take defense. We can't take
the Marines and deny them the capability to go from ship to
shore.''
And if you want to put new engines in some vehicles that
date back to the Korean era and they can go from four to six
knots, somehow or other, I am not seeing that as a very
workable solution, with all due respect to my good friends from
the Marine Corps. I know you are trying to do what you think
you have got to do, budget-wise. But some of these decisions
need to be run by this committee first. And I just wanted to
put a marker down.
Mr. Chairman, if I am a little too strong, correct me. But
that is--that is my strong sense. There needs to be
partnership. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you all for your distinguished
service. I want to turn to an issue that involves our people,
the men and women who serve. I know that the Department is
looking at a number of reforms in the area of military health
care. And clearly, in many ways, everything is on the table
here.
But I wonder if you could share with me what concerns the
services have raised as it reflects some of the proposals in
the--that you have in health care. Now, I know we are not
looking at specifics right now. But I am just wondering
somewhat about that process and about how the services are
weighing in, what their concerns are. What have they raised?
Secretary Lynn. Well, let me let the vice chiefs speak for
themselves. Let me just give an opening comment.
As you indicated, part of the development of this program
was an attempt to reign in health care costs, which have more
than doubled over the past 10 years. The--there is some
proposals with regard to fees, with regard to hospitals,
pharmacy benefit and overall efficiencies. Happy to go into
more detail at the appropriate time.
But the process by which those were developed was a full
Department-wide process led by the Secretary where he had a
series of meetings that included the entire leadership, the
chiefs, the service secretaries, the combatant commanders,
senior OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] leadership. I
know Chairman Mullen led at least one, I think more than one,
tank session. So this was a very fulsome process.
But let me turn to the vice chiefs for their reaction.
General Chiarelli. I would just echo what Secretary Lynn
said. We were part of that process and agreed with the
decisions that have been made.
I will tell you in my area, the area that I am most
concerned about is I don't have enough uniform health care
providers. But we made a decision in the Army a while ago to
cap the number of uniform military health care providers we had
at a certain number. And I need to find room inside my end
strength to add some more. It is just not enough.
We have been able to make up with that through contract
health care in certain areas. But when it comes to areas like
behavioral health care, I have got a real problem there, as the
nation has a real problem there because we just don't have
enough.
So I find myself competing with the nation to get that
really, really important asset that the United States Army
needs at this particular time. A great example I will give you
is second and third effects is I need alcohol and substance
abuse counselors. But many of them have the degrees necessary
to fleet up to become behavioral health specialists at an
increased salary.
So what I find myself doing--as hard as I try to hire
alcohol and drug abuse counselors, I bring in five to Fort
Campbell, Kentucky, and I lose five as they fleet-up to
behavioral health specialist positions that pay additional
funds. So that is an area for me that is of concern.
Admiral Greenert. Thank you, ma'am.
I echo General Chiarelli's comments regarding uniform
health care providers. Our concern was as we reviewed--and
there were more initiatives than what is in the budget. And
some were removed. Our concern was to ensure that our active
duty members and their families received proper care and world-
class care that they deserve.
And we are comfortable with that, make sure that
availability of care outside the service when needed to--
consults--that that was--that that capacity was still there.
And we are comfortable with that. And that pharmacy, any
changes to the pharmacy, that we could retain that service and
make it available. Again, we were comfortable. Ma'am, I would
say it was a collaborative process.
Mrs. Davis. Yes. So you are saying, particularly on the
pharmacy benefit, that you didn't see any drawbacks to that
that would affect the men and women?
Admiral Greenert. That is correct.
Mrs. Davis. All right.
General Dunford. Congresswoman, like the other vice chiefs,
our primary concern was ensuring that our Marines that are
forward-deployed have world-class medical care. We are also
concerned with making sure that our Marines, when they come
home, and their families, have world-class medical care. And we
are unaware of any initiatives in the proposals that would--
that would degrade that health care.
And so, we have very much been part of that process. And we
looked at the other initiatives that don't affect the active
duty force and have been, again, part of that process and feel
like we have an opportunity to shape that.
General Breedlove. Ma'am, I would echo the remarks of my
fellow vice chiefs. It was a collaborative process. We were
part of it, and we joined that process. In the Air Force and we
remain focused on the downrange care of our troops involved in
the conflict.
But we recently finished the year of the family in the Air
Force, and we focused on the after-care as our troops come home
and also taking care of those families when their troops or
downrange. And we continue to remain focused on that, and we
don't see any detriment to that in what we see in this
business.
Mrs. Davis. All right.
Well, I appreciate that, because I think there have been
some concerns that there hasn't been that kind of involvement
of the different services in that decision. So I want to be
sure that we are balancing the need to find some savings, but
at the same time clearly those benefits are expected, and
people deserve those benefits. And we want to be sure that we
are doing that in the proper way.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it is great to see you. And as you know, we
have got a limited amount of time, so I will be concise, and I
hope you will be as well.
In your statement you said we owe it to the taxpayers to
make the most of every dollar entrusted to us, and then you go
want to say one of the ways we are going to do that is the
services will achieve savings through implementing better
business practices.
I looked at many of our Fortune 500 companies to see some
of their business practices. And if you look at companies like
Wal-Mart, AT&T, Hewlett-Packard, Verizon, IBM, Procter &
Gamble, Kroger, Costco, Boeing, Home Depot, Target, they will
indicate to you that the core business practice that is
superior to all of the others is to make sure they know where
their money is going by having audited financial statements. In
fact, Congress feels so strongly about that we require them by
law to do the same.
Now in the Department of Defense, we are giving to you what
would essentially be the 22nd largest economy in the world, if
you were a country. It is over $700 billion last year. And as
you know, by law we require our agency heads to submit to us
audited financial statements each year so that we know where
the money is going.
Now, 21 different agencies have complied with that.
Clearly, the statute came back and said the Department of
Defense needed to do that. And in your statement you go on to
say proposals we are describing today are the result of a
detailed, comprehensive budget and program review led by
Secretary Gates and involving the entire senior military and
civilian leadership of the Department.
So, Mr. Secretary, my question for you, first one today, is
what percentage of the $700 billion budget of the Department of
Defense did Secretary Gates file the audited financial
statements required by law in 2007?
Secretary Lynn. Mr. Forbes, we are--the Department does not
have an auditable financial statement.
Mr. Forbes. So none were filed in 2007.
Secretary Lynn. I think one or two agencies, but it is a
very small part of the budget.
Mr. Forbes. First of all, you are the chief management
officer of the Department of Defense. Is it your testimony
today that you do not know how many were filed? Or are you
testifying that two agencies did file on the Department?
Secretary Lynn. I am going to have to provide the exact----
Mr. Forbes. I will tell you it was none. How about in 2008?
Secretary Lynn. Well, 2008 I wasn't at the Department, but
I----
Mr. Forbes. Do you know whether any financial statements
were filed?
Secretary Lynn [continuing]. I think it was--I doubt--I----
Mr. Forbes. There were none.
Secretary Lynn [continuing]. Don't think it would have been
any.
Mr. Forbes. How about 2009?
Secretary Lynn. I think the same answer.
Mr. Forbes. How about 2010?
Secretary Lynn. I believe the same answer.
Mr. Forbes. Do you know how many will be filed in 2011?
Secretary Lynn. The same.
Mr. Forbes. Do you know how--what percentage of the $700
billion budget in the Department of Defense will be in audit
ready posture for 2011--that is, that we could even be capable
of auditing?
Secretary Lynn. I don't think any, sir.
Mr. Forbes. The President last night told us that in making
decisions in our country, he said, ``It will be harder, because
we will argue about everything--the cost, the details, the
letter of every law. Of course, some countries don't have this
problem. If the central government wants a railroad, they build
a railroad, no matter how many homes get bulldozed. If they
don't want a bad story in the newspaper, it doesn't get
written. But we all believe in the rights enshrined in our
Constitution.''
Mr. Secretary, I believe that the Department of Defense has
developed the philosophy of bulldozing. When you make a
decision, you make that decision and, as Congressman Akin said,
you don't even include us. You don't even give us the
information. And then you bulldoze ahead without doing the
tough work of trying to work it through us.
You know, when we ask you to bring to us individuals who
can testify, give us your analysis, give us your documentation
of these cuts or anything else, you refuse to do it. So then we
ask you to do the reports so that we can get the information
and we can reach an analysis, and the secretary does press
conferences pooh-poohing reports to Congress and that is just
too tough. It is too hard. We are not going to do reports.
So then we put it in the law and we say you got to comply
with that, because this is the law of the land. But when we did
that for a shipbuilding plan, the Secretary just said, ``I am
not going to give it to you.'' When we put it in the aviation
plan, the Secretary said, ``We are just not going to give it to
you.'' And when require audited financial statements so we can
just know when our money is going, the secretary just says not
going to do it.
And the question we ought to be asking ourselves--is DOD
above the law? What--what do we have to do to get you to comply
with the law? And how can we even begin to talk about savings
and efficiencies when we cannot verify a single dollar of where
our defense budget is going?
And, Mr. Chairman, I will close by just saying this. Shame
on us if we continue to give the Department of Defense billions
of dollars without doing the most basic of all good business
practices by simply knowing where that money is going.
Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back.
Secretary Lynn. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond to a
couple of the remarks there, first, I agree with Congressman
Forbes. We do need to develop auditable financial statements.
We have developed a plan to do that. The plan is quite
aggressive. It is going to be difficult to achieve.
And we have focused on the budgetary resources for the
reasons that you gave, that that is the most important
responsibility that the Department be able to tell the Congress
and the taxpayers how each dollar is spent.
So the secretary very much agrees that we need to comply
with this. We have as a plan to do that.
With regard to the shipbuilding and the aviation plans, I
think that was a disagreement with the committees, as we did
provide those when we had them. When the committee was asking
for it, it was in the first couple of months, where the--that
the Administration had taken office, and they simply didn't
exist. As soon as they existed, we did provide them to the
Department.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take more of my
time, but just to respond to the secretary.
Mr. Secretary, it wasn't the committees that requested it.
It was the law that requested when you had to file it, and it
told you what to do if you didn't have a plan.
And secondly, if any of these Fortune 500 companies came up
and said, ``We just can't comply with the law, because it is
too hard,'' what would we do to them? And, you know, I think it
is a priority that we ought to make in the Department, and we
ought to insist on it in this committee.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the extra.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations on
your first hearing.
I would like to just say that I actually think that on the
merits, Congressman Forbes is absolutely right about what the
law says. And it was very frustrating over the last 2 years
that we didn't get that shipbuilding plan.
But as you said, we did get that last year.
And I would like to actually focus for a minute, Admiral
Greenert, on the testimony regarding the impact of these
changes to the Navy and ship acquisition. Again, the testimony
we received is that the savings will be directed towards,
again, reinvestment in the Navy and that six ships are going to
be added to the Navy's fleet as a result of this.
And we will--I guess the first question I have is is that
going to change the shipbuilding plan that was submitted last
year?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, it will, from the perspective
of there will be an additional six ships to that shipbuilding
plan. We have been able to move ahead in some of our required
shipbuilding--for example, oilers. We need to get double-hulled
oilers. We are operating on a waiver--that is, a U.S. waiver--
and around the world that we may not have those waivers, so
that helps us toward the longer view.
It brings us with another destroyer, Arleigh Burke
destroyer, which helps us--obviously, increases our warfighting
capability right there. And then, of course, the last one would
be the T-AGOS [Military Sealift Command Oceanographic Research
Ship], or the sonar trailing ship, if you will, which increases
our ASW [Anti-Submarine Warfare] capability.
Mr. Courtney. Well, to me, you know, that is a priority----
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney?
Mr. Courtney. Yes?
The Chairman. If could just interrupt just for a second----
Mr. Courtney. Sure.
The Chairman. We have been told with the new schedule this
year that we will be interrupted with votes. That will start
the week of the 14th. We have just been interrupted by a vote,
and the votes are going to be shorter than in the past. We
can't wait till it is almost over. So you will be the last
questioner.
But anybody else that wants to leave now to vote, there
will be two votes, and then we will return, and Mr. Wilson will
be first after Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, the--what you just described obviously addresses a
priority that this committee, and particularly the Seapower
Committee, has been struggling with for years, which is despite
the massive increase in the Pentagon, we have steadily seen the
fleet size fall below what the Navy has told us repeatedly is
necessary, at 313 ship Navy.
And to me, if we are for finding ways to, again, make the
Navy more efficient and reinvest it in what I think everybody
agrees is what we all want, then that is certainly not
weakening our defense. It is actually accelerating the past to
get to the goal that we all want.
These sort of story that I think--cautionary tale that I
think we--we in this committee have to keep aware of,
particularly in the context of shipbuilding, is what happened
with the Zumwalt, the DDG-1000, where again, you know, anything
goes in terms of the way that was put together. And it crashed
and collapsed of its own weight because of the high cost.
And last year the shipbuilding plan that was sent over
projected out a huge bulge that was going to be caused by the
SSBN price tag, 7 billion per copy. It is my understanding that
again the Pentagon has really worked hard to try and, you know,
bring that price down so that we don't find ourselves in a
Zumwalt-like situation five, 10 years from now.
And I was wondering if you could maybe talk about that cost
savings measure and any progress that the Navy has achieved.
Admiral Greenert. Thank you for the question, sir.
Yes, we had a--we have a very collaborative process, I
believe, on the Ohio replacement program. A little bit to Mr.
Bartlett's question or comment earlier, how is it that we can
interject, if you will, cost as a key performance parameter?
And so we have a cost threshold and objective on the Ohio
replacement program. Point here is as we develop this, as we
are into the early phases of design, we have to address cost
again and again and again as a function and balance it against
the capabilities.
Admiral Greenert. We haven't been very good at doing that
in the early phases.
It has been all about capability. And then we deal with the
bill later. So we are very focused on that, as you know, sir,
because of your background and in your area of shipbuilding.
This is a fairly well-defined capability that we are
building. And so this is a good program to get started in this
regard.
Mr. Courtney. And certainly, the shipbuilding plan, the
Nuclear Posture Review, the Quadrennial Defense Review, all
were unanimous in saying that, you know, this is something that
is essential to having a sea-based nuclear deterrent, is
something that we must move forward on.
But we can't allow costs to consume every other aspect of
the Navy's budget and frankly, put pressure on the rest of the
Pentagon.
Secretary Lynn, in your opening comments, you talked about
the end strength changes post-2015.
Again, when I first came to Congress in 2007, that was one
of Secretary Gates' first initiatives, was just to expand the
end strength for the Army and the Marines.
You alluded to the fact that we would still end up at a net
position stronger than we were in 2007. But you didn't really
sort of flesh out the numbers. I was wondering maybe if you
could describe that in a little more detail.
Obviously, we don't want to find ourselves in a situation
where the Guard and Reserves are really forced to do something
that they never were done--had to be done in the past and pick
up the slack.
Secretary Lynn. I am going to ask for help from the vices
on that. I think the Army, after the 27,000 reduction will be
about 30,000 above what Secretary Gates--is that right?
General Chiarelli. Well, sir, if you add in the increases
to the Guard and Reserves, which are not part of the decrease,
in reality, it would be 38 plus another 9, which is 47 higher
than we were when Secretary Gates became Secretary of Defense.
Secretary Lynn. And then the Marine Corps, General Dunford?
General Dunford. Congressman, we have been given a window
of 15,000 to 20,000. But we still have an opportunity to go
back to the Secretary of Defense and provide him with the
results of our recent four-structure review group.
So the commandant is taking a look at the comprehensive
capabilities and capacities that we will need.
And the--and he feels confident he will have a chance to
talk to the secretary about this specific end strength that the
Marine Corps will have in the future.
Mr. Courtney. All right. Thank you.
The Chairman. We will now take about a 15-minute break. We
will get back as quickly as we can. Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. Well, we were told it was two votes. It was
only one. So we--we got back, some of us, a little sooner.
Let us begin where we left off with Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your
leadership as the new chairman of our committee.
And, gentlemen, thank you for being here today. It has been
inspiring to me to know of your service and to be here with a
joint service hearing. I am from a joint service family with
immediate family members who are Army, Navy, Air Force.
And my late father-in-law, General Dunford, was a very
proud Marine, and my late brother-in-law. So I cover all of
you.
And as I am watching, though, the budget debate that we
have, I am very concerned. Representing Fort Jackson, the
extraordinary Army personnel and families there, the Marine
Corps Air Station at Buford Parris Island, the Buford Naval
Hospital, the proposed cuts in the Army of 27,000, another
22,000, cutting the Marine Corps 15,000 to 20,000--a question
that I have for General Chiarelli and General Dunford.
Have these proposals--are they done only in the context of
cutting the budget? Or has there been a military understanding
of the challenges of our country, an ongoing war, protracted
war with Al Qaeda, Islamic extremists that we have today,
potentially a conventional war in the future? And so, I would
like to know from both of you what has been the driving force
and what can be understood by the extraordinary people serving
our country.
General Dunford. Congressman, in the case of the Marine
Corps, Secretary Gates has given General Amos an opportunity to
do a force structure review group, which is going to take a
look holistically at all the capabilities and capacities we
need to deal with future challenges. So there are--there have
been no specific numbers identified for us to draw down at this
time. It is a window that the secretary has given.
On the 7th of February, General Amos will have an
opportunity to sit down with secretary of defense and walk
through what he believes the Marine Corps ought to be in the
future. And so, we feel comfortable that the outcome will be
based on the commandant's recommendations for capabilities and
capacities and not just a fiscal growth.
General Chiarelli. Congressman, as you know, the 22,000
that you talked about was a temporary end strength increase
that Secretary Gates provided the United States Army as we
moved off of stop-loss. It was absolutely critical, and we have
always planned that in 2013 we would, in fact, bring the force
back down to 547,400.
The Army supports the plan to reduce the size of its active
force by 27,000 in fiscal year 2015 and 2016. We support that
plan.
The chief personally talked to the secretary of defense
last summer and asked him to preserve our end strength at
547,400 through 2014. And he has with this plan.
And most importantly, the secretary has put on the table
three critical assumptions that must be met. First, that we are
out of Iraq, we see the drawdown and Afghanistan taking place,
and we do not see that commitment of land forces in any other
theater.
We feel this is important for our force that we have the
planning time to do this. This is reversible planning that
could be reversed, if conditions change. But it allows us to
take care of our force as we realize the need to balance the
force. I don't want to pay for a whole bunch of people and not
have any money for procurement accounts. It allows us to ensure
we have a balanced force in the future.
So we support this plan and are beginning the analysis
right now.
Mr. Wilson. Well, for both of you, what you are saying is
reassuring to me for persons serving in the military and
military families conditions-based.
In regard to dwell time, that goal has been three to one
for active components, five to one for Reserve components. Is
this going to be affected by the potential of a draw down?
General Chiarelli. I can't tell you that right now, because
I don't know what demand is going to be, but we feel that one
of the reasons we would go back to the secretary is if we
couldn't guarantee our force a minimum dwell time of one to two
when these drawdowns began.
Now, one to two is critical for us, one to four for the
Reserve components. Ideally, we would like to get to something
higher than that, but our redline is one to two.
General Dunford. Congressman, certainly, our assumption is
that no drawdown would take place until our commitments are
reduced. We are now approaching a one to two deployment to
dwell across the Marine Corps, and the expectation is that we
would not draw down again unless our requirements are adjusted
to be able to maintain at least that one to two deployment to
twelve.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would also like
to add in my congratulations to you, and looking forward to
working with you on this committee once again.
Mr. Secretary and all of our guests, thank you for being
here. Thank you for what you do.
Mr. Secretary, one of the things that was alluded to
earlier was the procurement savings legislation that we passed,
which I thought was a great bipartisan legislation with good
legislation.
How is the implementation of that legislation going? What
savings have--do we see yet perhaps? How will that play into
the savings we are looking for? And is any of this savings that
we estimated would come from that legislation included in what
we are talking about here?
Secretary Lynn. Thanks for the question, Mr. Kissell.
The thrust, I think, of the legislation and the thrust of
our acquisition reform efforts are, one, to establish stability
requirements, not to continually change the requirements, but
to establish a baseline and move forward on that, spiral in
additional capabilities later, if necessary; second, maintain
an adherence to cost and schedule, not have an unbalanced
approach where you are only looking for more performance; and
then, third, to use independent costing as a brake on the
system.
We are implementing all three of those. I think we are
quite far along on all three. In terms of savings, I think it
is too early to say, because what you--it takes a while to push
these all the way through all of the programs.
And where you will see savings is, hopefully, what you
would see is that instead of having cost overruns and schedule
delays, we would hit the program milestones as they were laid
out.
So you--in many ways it is less cost savings and more cost
avoidance. You wouldn't have the case that we have had in the
past, where you have on average 20 to 30 percent cost overruns
after milestone decisions.
Now, we haven't had very many milestone decisions since we
put in place the legislation that took place, so I think we are
going to have to measure that and come back to you in the--over
the course of the next couple of years.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, sir. And I think it is important
and that communication that we have been talking about and
several of my colleagues today have. I am not going to restate
that, but it is concern to a lot of us that we do communicate
in some of the decisions that are being made, as we perhaps
might need to revisit those because of a change in whatever.
You know, we need that communication in a way other than
just hearing about it from whatever source might be. We need to
hear from, you know, the way it is supposed to be.
General Breedlove, one specific situation that I read about
yesterday, and the name of the UAV platform escapes me right
now, but it seems like it is something-Stare that the Air Force
is wanting to implement a new platform.
And the article in the paper indicated there was a lot of
problems here. This seems like maybe a good example of the kind
of program that we could be talking about here, where something
may be running into trouble.
Just wondering, you know, what the thoughts are on that
program, how we are going forward with it, perhaps why we are
going forward with it, if it is having these issues.
General Breedlove. Congressman, thank you for that question
and the ability to clean up what I think may have been some
early and not exactly correct information.
That program is called Gorgon Stare. It is a program which
allows our ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance]
forces to look at a larger portion of the battlefield and to be
able to bring information to our soldiers and Marines on the
ground that they need about a much bigger piece of their battle
space.
Our current systems, as you know, we like to talk about
them as having a very narrow field of view, and it makes it
tougher to support the ground troops with some of those.
This particular wide-area surveillance system early in its
development, because it was a pretty good leap forward in
technology, was having some trouble with keeping the
coordinates and the positions that we wanted to watch. It was
having some troubles with those, and a leaked early report
talked about those troubles.
Three things were identified and the program that needed to
be fixed. All three of those are very close to fix or fixed
now, and the program is, quite frankly, performing better. And
we expect and hope to field it soon, early in the summer maybe,
into the theater in order to bring that capability to our
soldiers and Marines on the ground.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, sir, because it is so important to
keep that capacity there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your testimony.
There are many things I would like to cover in our very
limited time, but I know that the chairman is going to be
insistent on keeping us to 5 minutes.
I want to sort of identify myself with the comments of my
colleagues, Mr. Akin and Mr. Forbes, in the frustration in not
getting information, in not being consulted that not being part
of the process of shaping, arming, equipping, recruiting,
retaining the Armed Forces as we are charged should do by the
Constitution.
And I have grave concerns about some of the cuts. General
Dunford and I have had conversations about the expeditionary
fighting vehicle. I have great concerns that we have got a
program here where the requirement has been identified for
many, many, many years, going back to where I was much younger,
had hair, was brown, and I was in uniform, and we started
putting what we then called the triple-A [Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle] into the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program],
into the POM. And this was back in the 1980s.
And so now we have this cancellation, and I, like many of
my colleagues, and I expect you will hear from my Marine
colleagues here about their concern over that. But in my
remaining 3 minutes and 47 seconds, I want to talk about end
strength and the force structure that goes with it.
I believe, along with many experts, including the fine
folks who form the Quadrennial Defense Review independent
panel, Messrs. Hadley and Perry and their teams, that we should
not be looking at reducing the end strength of the Marine Corps
and the Army.
I have been a member of this panel now for going on 9
years, and I watched the debate and the struggle as we took the
size of the Army and the Marine Corps and year by year worked
to build that end strength as we were putting enormous
pressure--enormous pressure--on the Reserve component in ways
that had never been envisioned.
The Minnesota National Guard has been called up again and
again. The Red Bulls served the longest combat tour of any unit
in the Armed Forces continuously in Iraq. They are back again
and back again. And I am horrified at the prospect of drawing
down that end strength and assume the force structure that goes
with it.
And I am afraid that we are doing that as a cost-saving
measure. And I assume that the assumption is that if you have
fewer Marines and soldiers, you need fewer--less equipment and
therefore less cost. I think that is a poor strategy. I am
very, very concerned about that. But if you are going to draw
down, then by golly, we need to know in some detail what that
force structure is going to be and how you are going to equip
that force structure.
I would like to think that--I heard part of the answer to
my colleague Mr. Wilson's question about end strength that, you
know, conditions based, and we were going to look at that. This
process is a little bit unwieldy, as you know, in drawing down
and building up end strength, but particularly in building up.
If we accelerate a draw down--and I am not sure when
exactly that would start; I heard part of that question--then
we are going to be in a position where we have got an end
strength that is back--slightly above, but close to where we
started. I think we are looking at end strength for the Marines
in this proposal of around 180-some thousand. We were at about
175,000 when this started.
We are kind of back where we started--Army a little bit
bigger than when we started with fighting in Iraq, but
considerably smaller than where it is today. And you,
gentlemen, know how hard it is to build back--build that back
up and get the force structure that goes with it.
So I guess I am looking for some reassurance that somehow
you now in a way we haven't had maybe ever, but not in decades,
some sense of what the requirement is going to be for our
soldiers and Marines in places that we can think about now, but
where we are not deployed.
Mr. Kline. I am a little reluctant here to suggest some
areas and geography, but we know that there are tough things
going on in Yemen. There are tough things going on in sub-
Saharan Africa.
The Al Qaeda threat has not gone away. I assume you agree
with that, that we are still at war with Islamist extremists,
Jihadists.
How--in 30 seconds, anybody, how in the world can you tell
me you think we don't need this size of an active Army or
Marine Corps? Anybody?
General Dunford. Congressman, I can tell you, in the case
of the Marine Corps that we actually began our Force Structure
Review Group back in August. So it predated the efficiencies
exercise.
And in our case, we are taking a hard look at the actual
operational requirements. This was not a drill to draw down the
Marine Corps.
It was a drill to examine what we believe to be future
Marine Corps requirements and to ensure we had balanced
capability across the Marine-Air Ground Task Force.
So we want to make sure we had a balance between the
numbers of people that we had across the MAGTF [Marine Air-
Ground Task Force] as well as, you pointed out, as well as how
to properly equip them.
And I can assure you that the recommendations that General
Amos will make to the Secretary of Defense are made based on
the capabilities he believes the Marine Corps needs to have in
his best assessment of what the organizational constructs of
the Marine Corps of the future ought to be.
Mr. Kline. Okay, I am out of time. And so I am going to
yield back, except to say we will be looking at it very
closely, because I am fully ready to challenge that assumption.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple of
quick questions.
Secretary Lynn, I am looking through some of the savings
that have been identified. And it is--one of the things that
popped out, it says, many of the efficiency savings announced
are from consolidation of I.T. systems.
But in your testimony, you said that the assistant
secretary for network in information integration has been
eliminated. Now is that two separate jobs?
Or does this assistant secretary not have purview over the
I.T. [Information Technology]--consolidation of I.T. systems? I
am just trying to figure out how that works.
Secretary Lynn. Good question, Congressman. The assistant
secretary position has been eliminated. The chief information
officer, however, has not. And that individual used to be dual-
hatted.
And the problem we found with that is that it diffused
their responsibility--diffused their focus.
They were--in the old job, they were focused on buying
radios, command and control, a whole series of things.
We have moved those acquisition functions to where they
belong, we think, which is the Under Secretary for Acquisition.
We are asking the CIO now to focus on information
technology, focus on how do we interact in this cyberworld that
we find ourselves in.
And so Teri Takai, who is our Chief Information Officer,
will, in fact, be leading that effort in a strengthened CIO
office.
Mr. Critz. Okay. Well, I am going to hit on a subject that
has been talked about a little bit here. It is the EFV vehicle.
And we have been talking about, I guess, the minimum
distance it's being talked about from shore is going to be
about 12 nautical miles. And on a good day, the AAV [Amphibious
Assault Vehicle] goes, what, maybe eight knots?
So how long does that mean that, once the Marines drop in
the water, it is going to take them to get to shore? I don't
know how to do the math here.
General Dunford. Congressman, it would take a little over
an hour.
Mr. Critz. Now, is there a maximum time----
General Dunford [continuing]. That speed in 12 knots. In
other words, it would be about an hour and 30 minutes, if you,
if we are at 12 nautical miles and you are going eight knots.
Mr. Critz. It would be an hour and a half?
General Dunford. That is correct.
Mr. Critz. Now, do you have a target of how long you want
the Marines bouncing around in the water before you hit the
shore?
General Dunford. We do, Congressman. We think that much
more than an hour significantly degrades the Marines'
capability to fight.
Mr. Critz. So we still do have a need for the EFV. And we
have sunk about, what is it, $3.5 billion into research,
development, going into this.
And what the secretary is telling this committee is that,
well, we are just going to move on. We are going to upgrade the
AAV to meet the current needs until we figure out what to do
next. Is that correct?
General Dunford. I think, Congressman, we are really going
to do two things. We are going to upgrade the current AAV with
a service life extension. But we are going to very quickly seek
to get a new amphibious vehicle.
And we believe we can significantly exceed the normal
procurement timelines associated with a new vehicle by
leveraging some of the acquisition processes that have been
used to support Marines that have been deployed in Iraq and
Afghanistan over the last several years, that the MRAP [Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected] is a good example from an
acquisition process perspective of something that was fielded
very quickly.
So we very much anticipate being able to get a new
amphibious vehicle in a much shorter timeline than a
traditional 8 to 10 years that it might take.
Mr. Critz. Okay. One of the things that I heard talk about
with the EFV was that it was a flat-bottom vehicle, and with
the rise in IEDs [Improvised Explosive Device] that we have
hit, that that didn't seem to make sense.
So I know that the contractor has come up with sort of a
pasty to put on the bottom, once they hit the shore, which I am
a little bit surprised if you can do that in a hostile
environment.
But the AAV also has a flat bottom. Is that correct?
General Dunford. That is correct.
Mr. Critz. Okay. To--I have 1 minute left, but I wanted to
go back to what Mr. Forbes was asking. And the Defense
Department has identified about $78 million in savings off the
topline.
Now, I am curious of how much of that savings is going to
be plugged back in so that the Defense Department can then
start providing this committee the audits that have been
required by law for the auditable reports.
So I am curious because that allows us to do our job. And
what Mr. Forbes was saying, what you have heard from this
committee is we are the ally. We are not the enemy. And we want
to be helpful.
But we need to know what we are looking to do and how we
can be helpful. So has any of that savings been targeted to
help provide this committee the information that we need?
Secretary Lynn. The overall efficiencies effort was
developed $178 billion in savings. Of that, $100 billion has
been reinvested, frankly, primarily in warfighting
requirements, as opposed to more the back office functions.
And $78 billion was provided for deficit reduction to
accomplish a broader Administration goal. We still are
committed to improving our audit readiness and ultimately
getting to auditable financial statements.
That is not because we are a commercial organization. And
it is necessary for things like shareholders. The importance
for us of audited financial statements is it improves our
management information systems.
It improves our ability to track budgetary resources, in
particular. And so our focus is on doing that. And we do have
an upgrade plan to develop that capability.
General Chiarelli. I would only add, Congressman, that the
Army--I think the other services too, are moving toward that.
We have--we publish a common operating environment to make
sure that our ERPs [Enterprise Resource Planning] can talk and
databases can talk and we can get to a point where we are an
auditable organization.
And we are moving out on that as quickly, I think, as we
can.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I always to thank those who wear the uniform
of this country for their commitment to stand between the
malevolent and the free people of the world. And I am grateful
to all of you.
Mr. Chairman, as it happens, there is one particular member
of this panel this morning that is a dear friend of mine that
was a commander of Luke Air Force Base in Arizona.
And seems like every time we hear about him, he has gained
another star or some other promotion.
In fact, the Air Force seems to be running out of stars
where Mr.--General Breedlove is concerned, and made him vice
chief of the Air Force. And I am--I guess I say that partly
because I am very grateful to the man.
He took me up in an F-16 some years ago. And we did an F--a
360-degree loop. And I have--was--have always been grateful
that he was at the controls and not me. But I appreciate all of
you for being here.
I guess, with that, my first question would be to the
general. After saying nice things, now we have got to put him
on the spot.
General, I am concerned that we have failed to modernize
our nuclear arsenal, or at least I think that has been a--sort
of a continuing failure. I don't want to put it on any one
administration.
But this Administration, in particular, seems focused on
maintaining our present military--our nuclear arsenal rather
than modernizing it. And there have been some savings spoken
of.
And I understand that the Air Force is planning to develop
a new long-range bomber as part of the family of long-range
strike platforms.
And I am just wondering if you think that that bomber will
be or could be used as a modernization platform for our nuclear
arsenal.
General Breedlove. Congressman, thank you for your kind
remarks and the opportunity to talk to both of these. I would
like to offer that we are upgrading all three of the bombers in
our current fleet.
The B-1 has done a magnificent job supporting our ground
forces in Afghanistan due to upgrades that we have made to that
fleet.
The B-52, we are currently in investing in upgrading
communications gear and other pieces that will make it even
more viable into the future.
And much the same with the B-2. We have an ongoing upgrade
program for the B-2. So I will be happy to have our folks come
by and give you more details on those upgrade programs for the
existing fleet.
For the new aircraft, yes, sir. In the long run, we intend
for it to start out conventional but grow into a nuclear
capability.
And it will have an upgrade effect and a capability into
many years beyond our existing programs, is the plan.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, sir.
I guess I--Deputy Secretary Lynn, I am--sort of pose the
question in a little different terms to you.
You know, Russia and North Korea and Iran seem focused on
modernizing their nuclear arsenals, to my great and grave
concern. The savings that you spoke of in your written
testimony, I think is about $70 billion.
Will any of that be dedicated to modernizing our nuclear
arsenal? What are--what is your perspective there?
Is it--are we to assume that the Administration will
continue to focus only on maintaining? Or can we look to see
some of the indications that they have made on modernizing our
nuclear forces to be kept and to be focused upon?
Secretary Lynn. We indeed do have plans to modernize all
pieces of the--of our nuclear force. The one where new
resources have been provided is the one you asked General
Breedlove about, which is the bomber.
We have--we did ship some of the savings that we developed
over the course of the past few months into increasing funding
for that bomber. It was as General Breedlove indicated.
Its initial focus would be on the conventional mission. But
we intend to build in the ability to do the nuclear mission so
that we can transition to that role, if that is the decision
made down the road.
The other piece I would add for you is outside of this
department, but is in the Department of Energy.
Secretary Lynn. It is one of the critical pieces of
modernization, is we need to modernize the nuclear
infrastructure in the Department of Energy. And part of the
debate over the START [Strategic Arms Reduction] treaty
included an Administration commitment to undertake that
modernization. And the President has moved resources. And we
have been working with the Department of Energy on that.
In many ways that is actually the near-term requirement.
And as I say, it is in the Department of Energy, but it is
fulfilling one of our requirements. So we are working very
closely with them on that.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you. That is very encouraging to
me, and I certainly recognize the President's commitment on
that. And I appreciate your following through.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Sutton.
Ms. Sutton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's
hearing. As a new member of the committee, it is my first
opportunity to participate. And I appreciate, gentlemen, your
testimony.
The topic today is integral to our committee's work, as is
clearly evident by the questions. The proposed budget
reductions and efficiency initiatives have the potential to
eliminate wasteful spending and allow us for the reinvestment
in those critical areas where we need our priorities to be.
And I do applaud the Secretary, Secretary Gates, and all
those who worked over the last few months to try to achieve a
start at this undertaking. And there is no question that
difficult decisions have and will need to be made, however, I
think my concerns and the concerns of those in Ohio who I have
the privilege to represent, are that appropriate decisions are
made.
So in discussing military spending, we have to assess how
each proposed change impacts our national security, our
military personnel, and our economy, including jobs in our
manufacturing base. And I am interested to hear from today's
witnesses a little bit more about how these proposals impact
these important priorities. You have certainly given us a good
start on those issues.
In the coming weeks and months, I am also interested in
working with DOD and the Office of Corrosion Policy and
Oversight. Secretary Lynn, you just mentioned the modern--to
modernize our nuclear infrastructure. Corrosion has an issue to
play, is an issue there.
Oversight to address corrosion and the impact that it has
on our military assets and our strengths, and the significant
cost savings that it offers us if we address it up front, as
demonstrated by the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight.
It is not a glamorous topic, but I think it is one that is
worth our time and attention, especially given the potential
savings if we address it in a smart and appropriate way.
So as we move forward, my hope is that we will take a
balanced and coordinated approach to evaluate cost reduction
and military spending levels without sacrificing our core
priorities. And if I could, Secretary Lynn, I would like to
just direct a couple of questions to you.
The proposed reductions and efficiencies include, as we
have heard here, a reduction in the permanent end-strength of
the active Army and Marine Corps. And one of the concerns I
have and one that I have worked on in the past and introduced
legislation to address is the issue of the stop-loss policy,
where the length of our servicemembers' tours of duties have
been involuntarily extended.
I just ask, you know, we have been able to make some gains
in making sure that our soldiers are getting fair compensation
for that extended time fighting our wars. But what is the
status of the use of stop-loss currently? And what assurances
can you give that these proposed reductions won't result in a
return to the utilization of stop-loss for our soldiers?
Secretary Lynn. Well, on the first part of the question, we
have been aggressively pursuing the members of the service and
former members of the service who would be subject to
additional compensation based on the legislation that granted
them some benefits for having been held up in the stop-loss
program.
On the second piece, as General Chiarelli indicated, the
Secretary was absolute in his direction to the Army to
eliminate the stop-loss program. The Army is equally resolute
in committing themselves to eliminate that. The immediate
impact was the increase of the 22,000 temporary increase in the
Army end-strength to allow the Army a transition period.
And we think we are going to--I'll ask General Chiarelli to
comment in a second--but we think we are going to be able to
eliminate it in that timeframe and then phase those 22,000 out.
But I don't think Secretary Gates or the Army leadership has
any intention to return to that policy.
General Chiarelli. I think, as you know, we have not stop-
lossed for the last year and our last soldier held up on stop-
loss, if my memory serves me correctly, will come off in March
of this year. We have no desire to go back to stop-loss, and
our Army force generation model has personnel aim points that
we are implementing and will continue to implement that will
allow us to be--allow us to ensure that we avoid getting
ourselves in a situation where we would have to use stop-loss
again.
It provides us some aim points throughout the year for both
bringing on soldiers and bringing them off duty that ensures we
maximize their time in the Army.
Ms. Sutton. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thank
you so much for joining us, and I want to thank you so much for
your service to our nation.
As you heard a little bit earlier, the concerns I think
among committee members go to a very basic level. And that is
we have to make decisions about budgeting and make decisions
about strategic needs of this nation. And the strategic
analysis in information needs to come to us first, so that we
can make those decisions.
The disappointment has been is that information has not
been forthcoming, and many times not in a timely fashion so
that this committee can make decisions. And as you know, we
have a constitutional responsibility to make those decisions.
We would rather it be done in partnership with a free flow of
information from the service branches, from the Secretary's
office.
When that doesn't happen, it creates a tremendous
difficulty for us to make those tough decisions. We need to
understand what the strategic needs are and then say, here is
the finite amount of resources we have to get that job done,
and then make those priority decisions.
So I would encourage you that when we request information,
that we are able to get that in a timely manner. It is
absolutely unacceptable to get a 30-year shipbuilding plan or a
30-year aviation plan after the point where this body makes
decisions.
So that absolutely has to happen. It is going to be tough
going forward to make those choices. And I know you all have
been thoughtful about putting your proposals out there on how
we achieve efficiencies.
All of us agree the efficiencies need to be there. The
concern too is this lack of detail about that $78 billion and
where that will go. We want to make sure again that we are
meeting the needs.
It is great to have $100 billion in savings and have those
roll back into the Department of Defense, but the question is,
if you are going to take $78 billion out, where exactly where
is it coming from and where is it going then? And I think that
is obviously a bit broader issue that we can address at the
higher levels here in Congress.
But I do want to get to some of the proposals that you put
forward as far as initiatives. And General Dunford, I want to
go first to you about the EFV. I have some very basic concerns.
As you know, the requirements there, we have a very aged AAV,
as you know, at the very edge of capability. We have seen some
problems with it. And I know you have spoken a little bit about
the plan, but the concern here is what is the plan going
forward?
We have spent $3 billion and have processed through 20
years of development on the EFV, and now we are saying, well,
let us change course. It is too expensive. We can't afford it.
We can't afford the operation and maintenance. And then the
question is, is the details. How is the AAV going to get us to
that next generation of amphibious vehicles, and how are you
going to manage the acquisition process? Are you going to
compress it? Is it going to be expeditious? The key is, is it
going to have a thorough test and evaluation period? What is
the timeliness?
And the bottom line is this. If you are going to use the
AAV as a bridge to that next generation vehicle, the question
is, is when is that next generation vehicle going to be in the
water carrying Marines to shore when they have to make an
amphibious landing?
So I will start there.
General Dunford. Congressman, thanks.
First, I would like to provide the context within which
General Amos made his recommendation to the Secretary. When we
looked at all of our reset costs coming out of the current war,
and we looked at all of our future requirements, and we looked
at the period of time 2018 to 2025, we found that the EFV alone
ate up 50 percent of our overall procurement dollars, and
exceeded 100 percent of how much money we typically spend on
the entirety of our ground tactical vehicle fleet.
And to put that in some perspective, the EFV program was
573 vehicles, and we have got 43,000 vehicles--43,000 or 45,000
vehicles in our fleet today. So it came down to--and on the
operation-maintenance side, similar figures. So it came down to
with regard to the EFV that it was simply unaffordable for us
to balance our requirements.
The EFV carries eight infantry battalions. We have got 36
battalions--27 in the active force and 9 in the reserve forces.
We have an overall requirement for 12 battalions to be lifted
by some type of armored vehicle in order to meet our war plans.
For those vehicles now, we are looking towards what we call
a Marine Personnel Carrier, which will be a new vehicle to
address that particular requirement. What we would like to do
is look at the totality of our requirement over the next couple
of years to look at a service life extension program for the
AAV, to look at moving the Marine Personnel Carrier earlier in
the pond so that we get that out there and to meet some of
those requirements that we have right now, today.
And to be able to leverage the EFV program, the knowledge
that we have gained from the EFV program, as well as the
knowledge that we have learned in the development of other
programs, to get the new amphibious vehicle there in a much
shorter period of time--I can't tell you this afternoon how
soon that will be. As I mentioned earlier, the normal
acquisition timelines are somewhere between eight and 10 years.
We are very confident, sitting down with our acquisition
experts, and also taking a look at what is available out there
in terms of what industry can produce. We are very confident
that we can exceed that normal 8- to 10-year acquisition
process. We have been working for 2 years on the details of a
service life extension program for the assault amphibious
vehicle unrelated to this decision, and so we will have an
opportunity to leverage the dialogue we have had with industry
about that particular program as well.
We are going to roll all this up into a portfolio approach,
the new amphibious vehicle, the service life extension program
for the AAV, and the Marine Personnel Carrier. The difference
that we will see as we move forward though, is we are going to
use cost as an independent variable as we get the new
amphibious vehicle. We know in the aggregate how much we can
spend on the totality of our ground tactical vehicle fleet, so
we will share that with industry.
General Dunford. And so, we need all these three programs
to, together in conjunction with the other requirements across
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, to be within what we project
to be the resources that we will have allocated in the future.
So that is the general approach that we are taking,
Congressman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you all for your service and your
testimony and the diligent work and hard work that you put into
this. I just have, kind of, a simple question I would like to
ask everybody. If you are talking about risk--and we have been
talking about canceling these programs, certain programs,
cutting down on other programs, leads us to--it is within what
Admiral Mullen called the risk envelope, the acceptable risk
envelope.
Tell me, do you think if you got rid--and I am just going
to throw some things out here. If we got rid of the F-22, we
stopped production of that, that was within the risk envelope.
We are going to stop--there has been talk about stopping the F-
35 STOVL. That is within the risk envelope. There has been talk
about cutting the B-22 Osprey. That is within the risk
envelope.
You have the EFV, obviously, which has been hit on by, I
think, every member here. That has been thought of to be in the
risk envelope. I would like to know what the basis for
calculating that acceptable risk is for situations that we are
unable to respond to because we lack a certain type of
equipment and why that is okay.
Does that question make sense? Why is it okay to have that
acceptable risk of not being able to respond to a certain
threat or do a certain thing? I am just wondering.
Probably, Mr. Secretary, you first, sir. How do you
calculate that risk?
Secretary Lynn. I think from the start of his tenure,
Secretary Gates has talked about balancing the force between
the near-term threats that we face and the conflicts we are
engaged in and the longer-term threats that we might face 5,
10, 15 years from now.
And I don't think it is too far to say he thought that the
program that he inherited was out of balance and was more
focused on longer-term threats developing what he called
exquisite capabilities for niche scenarios and not focused
enough, frankly, on the fights that we are in in--before Iraq
and right before us, Afghanistan.
So the overall thrust of our efforts has been to maintain
acceptable risk in those longer-term scenarios, but to,
frankly, reduce the risk in near-term, so to shift money to
MRAPs, to shift money to ISR----
Mr. Hunter. If I could, Mr. Secretary, let me----
Secretary Lynn [continuing]. Money to UAVs.
Mr. Hunter. Let me be more specific now. We--you approved,
obviously, the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship]. We have two
different versions of it now. We have two different LCSs that
operate in an area that is supposed to be the war of now, the
literal areas within 20 miles of any shoreline.
The Marine Corps--I think their amphibious move to shore
from ship was in Lebanon in 2006. It was more of an evacuation
peacetime move. I think General Mattis led an actual amphibious
assault in 2001, if I am not mistaken.
What I don't understand is how do you say the LCS works
within this area and we need it there because of the type of
threats that we face, yet we don't need another vehicle that
would do the same thing that is not a conventional warfare-type
vehicle.
I mean, if Russia invaded tomorrow and parachuted in and
was like the movie, ``Red Dawn,'' you wouldn't have the EFV
running around. Right? But you would use the EFV if you had to
hit a shoreline and you had to help some people out or you had
some terrorist threat that you had to hit quickly.
How do you marry those two? I am not understanding what--I
understand your point. But the logic seems to elude me on how
those two things can be separated, something like the LCS and
the EFV to both operate that kind of have the same type of
mission and that would operate in the same waters, yet one is
cut, and one is not. In fact, one is doubled.
Secretary Lynn. We didn't actually double the LCS. But we
accelerated the buy. That is fair enough.
The--let me be clear. The secretary and the Marine Corps
remain committed to the amphibious assault mission. We are not
eliminating the amphibious assault mission. What we are
changing is the investment approach to that mission.
As General Dunford indicated, the--using the EFV developed
a relatively small number of vehicles at a very high cost that
consumed the Marine Corps tactical--the vehicle budget for
longer than a decade and absorbed more than half of its overall
procurement costs. So----
Mr. Hunter. If you don't mind, I would--I have got 20
seconds left.
Secretary Lynn [continuing]. What we are proposing is a
different approach that involves a new, cheaper vehicle and
upgrading the older vehicles.
Mr. Hunter. So it is----
Secretary Lynn. But it is still commitment to----
Mr. Hunter. General Dunford, it is acceptable risk to not
have an answer to that core capability that--or that core
requirement. It is acceptable risk because it is too expensive?
Is that--is it too expensive to have the ability to hit a shore
with an EFV-type vehicle? And I am out of time.
General Dunford. Congressman, I don't think it is too
expensive to have that capability. And we are committed to that
capability.
In our case, we had finite resources. And I think the
expectation is that the Marine Corps be relevant across the
range of military operations. And so, what we were confronted
with is the need to balance our investment portfolio across the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force for operations across the Marines,
the military operations, most specifically focused as a crisis
response force and readiness.
So we view ourselves as taking a different approach to
meeting that capability requirement. The vehicle that we are
talking about, the EFV, simply took too much money away, and,
frankly, incurred a significant amount of risk in the rest of
our portfolio. And so, we were out of balance as the Marine
Air-Ground Task Force. That is from a Marine Corps perspective,
the situation we are in.
And that is what drilled the decision to walk away from the
EFV and then go back after a new amphibious vehicle that meets
the capability that I absolutely share your concern with. And I
think the nation should not incur the risk of not having the
ability to assure access to the joint force from ship to shore.
We remain committed to that. We just believe we can meet that
requirement at less cost than the EFV program.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Secretary Lynn, I applaud the Defense Department for
courageously proposing a reduction of $78 billion from the
defense budget growth through 2016 and challenging the services
to make better use of their money. This committee and the
Congress must, however, play our constitutional role in
defining the scope and specifics of these cuts. But it is an
admirable initiative. And I do want to commend you for it.
As we complete our withdrawal from Iraq and begin to draw
down in Afghanistan, the Pentagon will have to share the burden
of getting our fiscal house in order, no doubt. And it is
refreshing to see Defense Department leadership coming to grips
with this new reality and proposing steps, if only baby steps,
to adopt to this new reality.
Secretary Lynn, defense funding accounted for about 15
percent of federal budget authority during the mid to 1990s,
the mid to late 1990s. Since the invasions of Afghanistan and
Iraq, it has climbed to about 20 percent. Do you believe that
as we end these two wars that we will be able to meaningfully
reduce defense spending while maintaining our capacity to
respond to threats, project power and ensure the security of
the United States?
Secretary Lynn. Congressman, I think that the proposal that
we are bringing to the committee formally next month as part of
the budget process, which involves real growth in the initial
few years of the plan, while we still expect to be engaged in
conflicts, particularly in Afghanistan and then flattens out in
the outer years, when we hopefully have a substantially reduced
commitment in Afghanistan as well as Iraq is a responsible
balance between the need to reduce federal spending to bring
the deficit down and the need to maintain absolutely the
highest defense capabilities to protect the national security
interests of the nation.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir.
General Dunford, the Marine Corps and the Department of
Defense are insistent that sea-based forcible entry is an
essential capability even as you move to shut down the EFV
program. The Department has no specific proposal to replace the
EFV. And we have spent, what, $3 billion thus far in research
and development? And we are at the point now where we can start
production of these vessels at a cost that exceeds that which
was anticipated many years ago.
And the vehicle at this point, I think, has been described
by Secretary Gates as being superb, I believe, or exquisite or
excellent in its performance. So we would essentially be
throwing $3 billion away and starting out with a Korean War-era
vehicles that have been upgraded, if you will, with plans to
produce another 21st-century fighting vehicle.
It just seems that we go this far and then we make a
decision to yank a program, despite the cost to the taxpayer
and perhaps the efficiency of the Marine Corps in carrying out
its obligations.
That is something that is almost nonsensical. I know it is
costing money, but we need these vessels for you to complete
your job. Can you tell how much money the Department of Defense
would save by canceling the EFV and developing an alternative?
And also, when do you plan to present a detailed proposal for
an alternative program? And when can we get the information
that backs up your decision to stop this project?
The Chairman. General, maybe you could get that information
to him on the record, please.
General Dunford. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Absolutely, we will get the information in terms of how
much there is a cost avoidance aspect of the EFV, and we will
share the details of that information. That money is again what
we hope to reinvest to address our other requirements.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 75.]
General Dunford. But I would just respond to the
Congressman and say we do absolutely share that commitment to a
sea-based forcible entry capability. We share the commitment to
get a new amphibious vehicle as quickly as possible in the
manner that I described earlier. And we will come back over,
and we will share with you the details of that.
We have just gone out now to begin to discuss with industry
what is in the area of the possible, again using cost as an
independent variable. We will take that request for proposal
and continue to work with industry to meet our requirement.
Mr. Johnson. And we, frankly, don't have any idea whether
or not a newly developed vehicle would cost in excess of what
we would pay for these----
The Chairman. Thank the----
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. That are ready to come on line at
this point.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rigell.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And good afternoon, gentlemen.
As a gentleman who has spent a summer becoming a Marine at
Parris Island, as did my son and my dad, who served at Iwo
Jima, it is really a great honor to serve on this committee.
Admiral Greenert, given the operational tempo of our Navy
and really, I think, the collision of how we are running our
troops and our--and hours shifts with these budgetary concerns
that are coming in, the idea of spending what could be $1
billion to move the carrier to Mayport seems to me to be a
severely misplaced priority.
And given the other demands, other things that are lacking,
it certainly seems to me that it would be critical and much
wiser to invest or reinvest that money in more pressing
matters, particularly those that affect readiness.
So could you concisely give us, the committee, an update on
exactly where we are with the prospect of moving a carrier from
Norfolk to Mayport?
Admiral Greenert. Thank you very much for the question. We
considered that proposal, as we considered everything in this
budget preparation, and we are convinced that the value, the
strategic value of having our carriers dispersed exceeds any
risk, if you will, associated to the budget.
We are--we stand by the numbers. It is about $580 million
cost. We are very comfortable with that number, the cost to
move to Mayport. Some of the dredging, some of the early
projects--well, really, the dredging has gotten started. So we
looked again, as I said before, and we stand by that.
The risk, when you talk about what are we concerned about
in readiness, frankly, more near-term we are concerned about a
continuing resolution because of the risk that that places on
our readiness ships--$4.5 billion alone to our readiness
accounts this year.
Mr. Rigell. Admiral, what steps did you--did the Navy take,
if any, to examine what could be done in Norfolk to mitigate
those risks? I am convinced, as are some other retired flag
officers who I seek counsel from and others, that practical
steps could be taken to mitigate that risk and keep the carrier
in Norfolk, allowing us to use those funds to--for more
pressing matters.
Admiral Greenert. The issue is not necessarily--well, it
isn't the risk in Norfolk. It is the consequences is what we
are talking about to have--the consequences of having all of--
not having an alternate port in the East Coast, as we have on
the West Coast, as we have for East and West Coast for all of
our other ship types. The consequences is what-- is the main
issue here, not the risk, if you will, of an event.
Mr. Rigell. My time is short.
Mr. Secretary, would you address for us what--are there any
other cuts that you are contemplating with respect to JFCOM?
Secretary Lynn. Congressman, we are in the final stages of
developing the implementation plan. The--we expect that the
overall cut will be, as the secretary said, in the 50 percent
range. I don't think it is going to vary from that. And we will
provide the detailed to you we have completed that evaluation.
Mr. Rigell. The--that chairman, I think, rightly pointed
out the pattern of lack of transparency. And I would certainly
appreciate and, I think, reasonably expect, as would other
committee members, that there would be a proactive effort on
the Department to communicate with leadership within the
communities. And I would certainly appreciate that going
forward.
Now, finally, with respect to TRICARE and the prospect of
increasing those deductibles, you know, it is widely understood
when you enlist in the armed services that you are going to get
lifetime health benefits. And I think to raise those premiums
or to raise the deductible I think is a breach of trust with
those who have served our country.
And if we want to change it going forward, that is an
entirely other--that is a different subject. And I think we
should do better disclosure to those who are considering a
military career to fully explain to them going forward that
your benefits might be changed.
But I know every person who has enlisted in the military,
they did so, and they served, believing they would get lifetime
care. And I would ask the Department to re-examine that and to
set that aside as a possible option to address our fiscal
problems.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Lynn. Mr. Chairman, if I could just address that
last point briefly, please, we are not, Congressman, moving
away from that commitment to lifetime care for retirees. The
TRICARE proposal simply would lift the freeze, which I don't
think was part of the promise that they would have fees frozen
at the 1995 level.
We think the fees should essentially rise with inflation so
that you should maintain a constant benefit, but that you
shouldn't--if you don't rise with inflation, essentially the
benefit improves every year. That--we don't think that was part
of the commitment, so we are trying to put in place some kind
of reasonable inflation measure on those fees, and just--that
is just for working-age retirees. It would not affect the
active-duty force at all.
Mr. Rigell. Full disclosure from the recruiters, please.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Thank you, Chairman.
And I want to thank the distinguished panelists here today
for their service, for their leadership, and for appearing
before this committee. I would like to express my support and
admiration for all our service men and women and for their
families. Serving us so courageously and selflessly forward in
a time of war, multiple deployments, is recognized.
I make my pledge for solemn commitment to protect this
cherished way of life. Having said that, I want to appreciate
what has been said today, the testimony, you know, the candor,
the effort to find savings. This deficit that we have threatens
our very way of life, and everything needs to be on the table
as we go forward.
You know, I am interested to learning more about the
intellectual underpinnings for some of the rationale for the
cuts, particularly in relation to vision for our country's
strategy, a fully developed strategy of ends, ways and means,
and how that impacts policy decisions, programming and
budgeting.
And in particular, my question today is for Mr. Lynn and
has to do with Joint Forces Command. I am interested in
understanding in relation to the strategy and, in fact, purpose
for the original charter for the Joint Forces Command, what has
changed over time and the rationale for why the
disestablishment. Thank you.
Secretary Lynn. Congressman, this goes back to the
Goldwater-Nichols legislation, which I am sure you are familiar
with, which shifted the balance of the military and put more
emphasis on joint warfighting capabilities by strengthening the
combatant commanders, by putting in place an emphasis on joint
doctrine and joint training, by strengthening the role of the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and having the joint
staff report to him rather than the chiefs as the body.
All of those measures were intended to strengthen joint
news. One of those measures--it was after the Goldwater-Nichols
era, but a decade later the Department set up the Joint Forces
Command to help implement those purposes.
We think the combination of the Goldwater-Nichols efforts,
as well as the work of the Joint Forces Command, has
accomplished a lot. And we think that the combatant commands
are in a much stronger place than they were 2 decades ago, and
we think the services have a much more joint focus than they
did 15 years ago.
And in that context, we think that we can pursue jointness
without the billion-dollar expense of a four-star command. We
are going to retain a portion of that. As I responded to
Congressman Rigell, we think about half of those functions will
be retained there.
But the overhead of a four-star command, all of the
supporting elements--we think we can save those, and we think
that leadership can be done by the chairman and the vice
chairman and the joint staff. And we still think we will
continue down that path of jointness.
Mr. Gibson. I thank the gentleman. I just want to affiliate
myself with the remarks that we can restructure our command and
control headquarters. We can achieve consolidation.
I think this is really the time to think big, to take a
look at the way we lay down forces, to take a look at the way
we structure our command and control. I think there may be some
other alternatives that we can look at.
And as we go forward, Mr. Chairman, I would tell you that I
am willing to be part of that effort, if the committee was
interested in looking at ways for the 21st century, how we can
have these--just take a look at full spectrum command and
control across all the regional combatant commands and taking a
look at the Joint Forces Command and figuring them out. What is
the best way that we can protect this cherished way of life in
a manner that is consistent with the Republic?
I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you. And you will be given
that opportunity.
Mr. West.
Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Secretary Lynn and distinguished members of the panel,
I just want to say it is an absolute honor to be here serving
on this committee.
It truly is the culmination of an American dream when I
consider the fact that my father was a soldier in World War II,
that my mother served 25 years civilian service with the 6th
Marine Corps District Headquarters in Atlanta, an older brother
who served as a Marine in Vietnam, the 22 years that I had on
active duty service, and now my young nephew, who is serving as
an assignments officer with field artillery branch at HRC
[Human Resources Command].
So as I bring that experience to bear, I want to echo some
of the comments that we have talked about, the military
personnel side and those reductions, because I recall a time
when the Soviet Union collapsed--and I was still there in
active duty and I ended up being a brigade operations officer--
and having to go out and not being able to qualify some of our
soldiers except for the Weaponeer, that simulation system, or
not having the repair parts to be able to keep our Howitzer
systems up and operational.
So as we look--go forward, I want to make sure that, as we
talk about this military personnel, that we don't go back and
do what we did at that time when the Soviet Union collapsed,
where we saw the military as a bill-payer for some of the other
budgetary programs that we wanted to do, because I think one of
the most important things we have to realize that the world
right now is a lot more Machiavellian than it is a peaceful
world.
And we must be able to provide the national security to our
people here. The thing that I look at is what are the second
and third order effects?
We talk about the effects on the National Guard. We talked
about the effects on the Reserve forces. You know, we look and
see that now we are starting to see a lot of stress on our men
and women in uniform with the countless amounts of deployments
they are doing, four and five deployments.
I want to make sure that, as we go forward and we talk
about the end strength of our fighting forces, that we are
really sitting down and looking at the emerging threats and
doing a threat-based assessment and an analysis so that we
don't find ourselves as we did going into Iraq in 2003, where
we didn't have the right type of equipment, where we didn't
have a force that was ready for those long, continued
operations.
And so I would ask, Secretary, as we look at these
personnel reductions that we have the time to bring in some of
the combatant commanders to really look at what are the
emerging threats in some of these theaters of operation.
We see what has happened in North Korea. We understand what
is going on in Somalia and Yemen. Things are not as well as
they could be in Afghanistan. We have a threat there in
Pakistan.
If you look south of our border, in Mexico, it is starting
to look a lot like Iraq and Afghanistan with beheadings and
mass graves and things of that nature, and roadside bombs.
So, you know, the world is still a dangerous place.
So what manner did we use as an assessment or an analysis
to come up with these reductions to the Army and to the Marine
Corps, because we do need those fighting forces to be viable,
as they are a land combat and maritime combat force.
Secretary Lynn. Congressman, I have 8 years of experience
in the Department building programs and budgets prior to my 2
years here.
In those 10 years, the involvement of the combatant
commanders and the building of a budget is unique in, I think,
the way Secretary Gates has led this.
I--he had repeated meetings through the course of the
summer and the fall to evaluate all of the proposals with all
of the leadership.
And the--all--the Pentagon leadership is the normal
practice. Usually the chiefs and the service secretaries----
Mr. West. Understand.
Secretary Lynn [continuing]. OSD representatives around the
table. The combatant commanders are, frankly, usually brought
in for just a meeting and told what the budget is. And they go
back out and do their jobs.
In this case, they were brought in for repeated meetings,
repeated discussions. They were a part of the process. So I
think the secretary's understanding of the risks is fully
informed by their recommendations.
With regard to the force structure changes, I would take
you back to, I think, the phrase that General Chiarelli used,
that the proposals we have are conditions-based.
They are at, frankly, at the back end of the planning
period and that was intentional, both to allow time for
planning, but also to allow time for the expected reductions in
Afghanistan and Iraq to take place.
Assuming those do, we think that this is acceptable risk,
but as I said, conditions-based. If the conditions are
different than that, we will have to reevaluate, and for just
the reasons that you said. We do not want to have inadequate
force to meet the threats that we might face.
Mr. West. Okay. So, in other words, we have built-in
flexibility?
Secretary Lynn. Absolutely.
Mr. West. Very well. I yield back to you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Secretary Lynn, as you know, I represent Hawaii. And each
one of you have your services represented in Hawaii. And we all
believe that Hawaii is very critical, especially in the Far
East arena.
Now having said that, an integral part of our success in
Hawaii has been our civilian workforce. And in reading
Secretary Gates' statement as well as some of yours, there are
mentions of cutting in personnel.
And I assume part of it is meant to be military personnel
and part of it is meant to be civilian personnel.
I would like to know how you are making the distinction
between when you say cuts or freezes and you talk about it in
terms of savings in TRICARE, for example.
How is it that you are making the distinction as to which
part of this workforce shall be cut? And in addition to that,
somebody is going to have to do that work. So I assume that
part of this is also looking at outsourcing of that work.
And I would like to know how that decision is being made as
to how much of it will be kept in terms of a civilian personnel
within the military, and how much of it you would be
outsourcing.
Secretary Lynn. With regard to outsourcing, we actually
think we have oversteered in that regard and that there are
certainly valid purposes and valid roles in outsourcing.
But we think, in some cases, we have gone too far. We think
in the acquisition workforce we frankly outsourced too much of
our expertise. And we need to bring more of it back in house.
And we are endeavoring to do that, even though, as you
indicated, there--we are--we have a--I guess I would call it a
soft freeze. We have made an exception for those acquisition
increases.
We also think in terms of staff support, headquarters and
other office functions, we have relied too heavily on
outsourcing. And that is the reason for the secretary's
directive that those staff augmentees be reduced by 10 percent
per year over the next 3 years.
So we are still conscious--we could not, frankly, do the
nation's business without contractors. So this is not at all an
attack on contractors. But we think, as I said, we have
oversteered, and we are now trying to correct the rudder a bit.
Ms. Hanabusa. So if you can tell me very simply, what are
the areas--you are saying in acquisition areas, you are
assuming that we would probably bring them back in-house versus
outsourcing it.
But what--when you speak, for example, to staff
augmentation, what exactly are those functions and are they
intended to be frozen, never filled, cut? How do you look at
that?
Secretary Lynn. They are intended to be cut.
And what I mean by those, those are people, for example,
who work for private contractors but come to work every day in
the Pentagon, would be an example of the kind of augmentee we
are trying to reduce.
We are just trying to reduce the size of the overall
headquarters as an efficiency measure.
And in particular, we think that the growth over the last
decade of private contract support, in that particular role,
has been too great. And we are cutting that back.
Ms. Hanabusa. How does it impact each state, like, for
example, my state?
How would you--when you start to cut or augment, whichever
way you are going to do it, in terms of acquisition or
whatever, how are you going to face that decision in each
state? Is there going to be some kind of a uniform policy?
Secretary Lynn. Well, we are not really doing it state by
state. We are doing it organization by organization.
So the heaviest--you would feel the impact where you have
headquarters. So, I mean, in Hawaii, there are several
headquarters.
Ms. Hanabusa. Right.
Secretary Lynn. They will see some private contractor
reductions here. Of course, I mentioned the Pentagon, see some
reductions here as well.
Ms. Hanabusa. Are we ever going to see--is there any plan
to augment the workforces, like in headquarters, like in
Hawaii?
Secretary Lynn. Admiral Greenert.
Admiral Greenert. Yes.
Congresswoman, as you know, the Navy has got a pretty big
footprint in Hawaii. So, if I may, I will speak a little bit to
it.
First, in the military footprint, we found that our ships
weren't properly manned due to some initiatives we put out
earlier. And so we have a lot of destroyers and cruisers.
We will be increasing manning in our destroyers and
cruisers. When you take the net effect to the fleet in Hawaii,
there is a net increase of about 300 military personnel.
Looking at civilian personnel, civilian workers, if you
will, government civilian workers--our harbor naval shipyard is
important to us. And we have increased manning there and as--
and joint basing as well.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Lynn, the $70 billion in reductions, $14 billion
or approximately 20 percent is listed as economic assumptions
and other. What are those economic assumptions, and what is the
breakdown of the other?
Secretary Lynn. The economic assumptions are changes in
inflation rates, changes in pay rates that, in other words,
what it essentially means is that, when you make those
changes--and in this case they are reductions--you can buy the
same program for fewer dollars.
Mr. Scott. Those are the economic assumptions?
Secretary Lynn. Yes, that is right.
Mr. Scott. What is the other?
Secretary Lynn. The other is just the--all the proposals
that are too small to list. We will provide those when we
provide the budget.
Mr. Scott. So we can get a detailed breakdown of all of
those and the economic----
Secretary Lynn. Absolutely.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a further question?
General Breedlove, we--and Mr. Franks talked about this a
little bit. I would also like the information on the B-1, the
B-52 and the B-2 on those upgrades, if you would.
And as we talk about this new bomber, what capabilities
will that bomber have that the upgraded B-1, B-52, B-2 don't
have?
General Breedlove. Sir, thank you for the question. We will
get on your calendar and bring by the discussion of the three
existing bomber aircraft.
The new aircraft, we envision to bring up the capabilities
to today's standards in many ways. One of the cost savings
approaches we have for this bomber is to not lean forward into
technology that is not proven, but bring our aircraft up to the
current day's standards.
For instance, our existing bomber fleet, the stealth
capability and technology is 15 to 18 years old. We have done a
lot of work in the F-22 and the JSF that tells us we can do
that better.
So the new bomber will have better stealth capability but
not making leaps forward that we can't count on. And I could
walk through the systems of the airplane, the avionics, the ISR
capabilities. It is all the same story.
General Breedlove. We have had years of improvement in
those capabilities since we built the F-22, the JSF, the B-52,
et cetera. And we will bring this new bomber up to today's
standards of capabilities.
Mr. Scott. General, if I may follow up with that. If we are
going to spend the money to upgrade, again, the B-1s, why
wouldn't we put that technology in--into the upgrades of the
current fleet? And, you know, that----
General Breedlove. Sir, in some cases, that is exactly what
we are going to do. But an aircraft like the B-52 was never
built to be stealthy.
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir.
General Breedlove. You cannot bring that to that aircraft.
So the--to the degree that we can bring today's technologies to
these existing platforms, we are doing that. And that is part
of what we will bring to your office, sir, and to Congressman
Franks' office and discuss with him.
Mr. Scott. One further question on that. What is the
anticipated cost of the new bomber?
General Breedlove. That, sir, is not fleshed out totally
yet. We are trying to drive to a number that will allow us to
buy a fleet that can address the numbers and types of threats
around the world that we face, as you know, sir, the fleet size
of the B-2 has challenged a very dedicated group of aviators
and maintainers. And our distinct goal in this aircraft is to
control the costs so that we can buy a fleet that makes us
operationally relevant around the world and around the target
set.
Mr. Scott. One final question, if I may, General. I
represent Warner Robins, Robins Air Force Base. And there were
$3 billion approximately in savings and changes to the
logistics of the operations of the depots. Could you go through
a breakdown of that?
General Breedlove. I can give you an overall read, and then
I will try to hit a few of the specific examples. We are not
taking those savings in people. They are in processes. What we
are trying to do is adopt more processes like our civil
competitors, bring leaner--what I would call leaner stocking
and supply practices so that we do not have money tied up in
excess stock and supply. And those are examples. And again, I
would be happy to come by and talk about a list of those, if
you would like.
Mr. Scott. Thank you so much.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to acknowledge some of the comments that have
been made prior to me about the Department of Defense not being
responsive to the Congress of the United States in terms of
inquiries. And I want to really second that. And I hope you all
can do a better job this year and going forward with working
with members of Congress in terms of providing inquiry--
information to inquiries.
First of all, I would love it if somebody could get back to
me and to the committee. I am sure you looked at everything in
terms of making reductions. And I think we still have four
brigade combat teams in Europe and forward-deployed. And so, is
there a potential reduction in short-term, long-term and
redeploying those forces back home?
Having served with the First Armored Division in the United
States Army during the Cold War, I certainly saw the need for
those forces there then. And, of course, we had a lot more
then. And I question the need for them now. We can certainly
demonstrate our support for NATO by doing joint military
exercises on a periodic basis. And so, I question having
permanent U.S. bases there.
In South Korea right now, I think we are moving from an
unaccompanied tour, our 28,500 personnel that are there, to an
accompanied tour, 1-year assignments and 3-year assignments and
building all the infrastructure associated with that for
dependents. Given the tensions on the peninsula right now, I
question the need for that. And I question the cost for that.
And I would like to know if we suspended that personnel change
and we didn't have to build all the schools, the housing and
everything associated with dependents, what is the cost savings
associated with that.
Then I want to--I certainly want to commend you, Mr.
Secretary, on some of the savings that you have done in terms
of the Department of Defense being so top-heavy, combining
commands, doing away with Joint Forces Command. Having served
in the first Gulf War with the United States Marine Corps--I
transferred over from the Army to the Marine Corps--and then
gone back in 2005 to serve in Iraq, I can tell you the culture
of the military has changed from when we started Joint Forces
Command in terms of accomplishing that critical mission of
being able to work together.
And we are there now. We certainly need to stay on top of
that. But it is time to dismantle that bureaucracy. And I want
to commend you. I think the Defense Department is unlike any
other agency of government, that it is easy to establish new
commands, establish new bureaucracies. And it is hard to
dismantle anything. And so, again, I want to commend you for
that and certainly support those cost-saving efforts.
On the EFV, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, I am very
concerned, having read the secretary of defense's comments on
the Nunn-McCurdy breach about affirming the requirement of the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and listening to the testimony
today where it seems like we are trying to massage a savings
where I am not sure that there ought to be one.
I am going--Admiral, I would like to--if you could give us
a report in writing. You talked about how we went from 25
nautical miles to 50 nautical miles out--and how we are able to
achieve that without exposing our forces to a higher risk.
General Dunford, you mentioned that we were going to do a
service life extension program to the EFV and that you had a
lower cost alternative also to the EFV. But it seems like we
have a gap in terms of our capabilities as to meeting the
requirement, even if we went out--even if 12 nautical miles was
acceptable. We don't have that capability now with the AAV.
I am not sure even with the service life extension program
we are going to have that capability there. And I think that a
lot of the technology, a lot of the costs associated with the
development of the EFV anyway is going--is probably going to be
transferred to this supposedly low-cost--lower-cost vehicle
where we didn't have all the startup costs in terms of research
and development. So I think that there is a lot of--I think at
the end of the day with the EFV question, what we will have is
a gap in the requirement.
And, look, if a gap in the requirement is acceptable as a
cost savings measure, then tell us that because really, that
is, at the end of the day, what I am hearing, that we will take
a risk in not meeting the requirement in order to save money
because, I think, the Department of Defense feels that--feels
that the--having force entry requirements is not all that
significant.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.
Thank you for being here today, for giving as many as
members of the committee who stayed an opportunity to ask their
questions. Just one final closing comment. I think you probably
sensed the frustration of many of the members on the committee
for their feeling of lack of communication. I know we have the
hearings. I know you present things to us from time to time
like you only had the update on that $78 billion that we hadn't
planned on.
It just seems to me that if--if we work closer--we do not
want to be confrontational. We want to be supportive. Every
member of this committee strongly supportive of the armed
services. But we get the feeling that sometimes decisions are
handed to us as a fait accompli. And we are irrelevant. And,
you know, we all have big egos up here, or we wouldn't be here.
That is now what I really mean. But it is important to give
us the opportunity to do our job. And we want to work together
to make that happen. So if you can carry that message back, you
are going to hear a lot of it until we feel like we are being
brought into the process.
Thank you very much.
Secretary Lynn. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond to
your last----
The Chairman. Sure.
Secretary Lynn. Very much appreciate what you said. I did
get the flavor of the comments and the breadth of them. I will
say I think the Department recognizes that not all wisdom is
South of the Potomac River and that Congress has a very
important role to play and very much value added. And I have
heard the examples of the F-117 and UAVs. And Congress has
often been right in these debates.
So I take your comment seriously. And we will endeavor to
work with the committee. And we very much appreciate the
committee's support.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. This hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
January 26, 2011
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.] [See page 41.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
January 26, 2011
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. 1. The Department's plan includes a reduction in 360
contractors from MDA. Across the FDYP, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
will add $1.7 billion for research and development of the Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIB interceptor and $360 million for additional
forward-based Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2)
radars. To offset these increases, MDA has identified roughly $2.4
billion in efficiencies and reductions; however, the specific
distribution of these reductions is unknown.
i. Considering these reductions in personnel and funding, is it
likely that the administration will meet the strategic goals and
timeline laid out in the Phased Adaptive Approach?
ii. What programs will be adjusted to support these lower
funding levels?
iii. With the move of MDA to Redstone Arsenal as a result of
BRAC, MDA is currently facing a personnel issue in meeting the
personnel needs as a result of the BRAC move and they have to meet the
insourcing requirements with contractors. What process was used to come
up with the personnel reductions?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Turner. 2. Secretary Gates recently announced his intent to
eliminate 100 general officer positions.
i. How will the process to reduce general officer positions
work?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Turner. What kind of analysis does the SecDef refer to when he
said that ``analysis'' by the Navy and Marine Corps ``suggests that the
most plausible scenarios requiring power projection from the sea could
be handled through a mix of existing air and sea systems employed in
new ways along with new vehicles--scenarios that do not require the
exquisite features of the EFV''?
Admiral Greenert. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Turner. What kind of analysis does the SecDef refer to when he
said that ``analysis'' by the Navy and Marine Corps ``suggests that the
most plausible scenarios requiring power projection from the sea could
be handled through a mix of existing air and sea systems employed in
new ways along with new vehicles--scenarios that do not require the
exquisite features of the EFV''?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. 1. For Fiscal Years 2001 through 2010, what was the
cost, including pay and benefits, and strength of the Department of
Defense's civilian workforce? For the same years, what was the cost,
including all object classes in 2500, and size of the Department's
contractor workforce?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 2. Given that the A-76 process to evaluate whether
work done by federal employees should be contracted out or remain in-
house crosses personnel and acquisition functionalities within the
Department, what is the Department doing to ensure that the appropriate
management and leadership are engaged at all stages in the process,
from preliminary planning through execution of a competition?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 3. How will the Department comply with the statutory
requirement that inherently governmental functions be performed by
civilian employees? For example, the Army's services contract inventory
has revealed that 2,357 contractors have performed inherently
governmental functions, less than half of which have been insourced.
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 4. What are the savings generated from the imposition
of a three-year cap on the civilian workforce and all other
efficiencies derived from the civilian workforce, pursuant to the
Secretary's January 6th announcement? What are the savings generated
from the planned reductions in spending on service contractors?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 5. What workforce planning did the Department
undertake before imposing a cap on civilian employees? How is this cap
consistent with Title 10 United States Code, Section 129?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 6. The Secretary insists that there can be only
``very limited exceptions'' to the cap. How are those exceptions made?
What is the process by which exceptions are granted? What criteria are
used? Are the criteria consistent with various sourcing laws? What
functions are likely to qualify? Which functions are not likely? Will
the authority to authorize exceptions be reserved to a very high level?
If so, why?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 7. How will the Department comply with Title 10
United States Code, Section 129a and Title 10 United States Code,
Section 2463 if it cannot add new staff to take on functions that can
be performed more efficiently in-house or should never have been
outsourced because they are inherently governmental?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 8. Does the in-house freeze not mean that,
effectively, all new work as well as additions to existing work will be
contracted without regard to cost or risk?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 9. Will the Department's ability to undertake new
contracts be subject to the same constraints? If not, why? Why should
there be a hard cap on the civilian workforce and no cap on contractor
costs? Will new contracts as well as additions to existing contracts
also require very high-level authorization?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 10. How will the Department comply with the statutory
requirement (Section 807, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008, Public Law 110-181) that unauthorized personal services
contracts be ``entered into, and . . . performed, in accordance with
applicable statutory and regulatory requirements,'' and, if necessary,
be corrected, including through insourcing?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 11. How will the Department comply with the statutory
requirement that DOD give ``special consideration'' to insourcing
contracts that are poorly performed or undertaken without competition?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 12. How will the Department comply with Section 1111
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public
Law 111-84) and ensure that ``funds authorized to be appropriated for
the Department of Defense that are available for the purchase of
contract services to meet a requirement that is anticipated to continue
for five years or more shall be available to provide compensation for
civilian employees of the Department to meet the same requirement''?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 13. Why did the Department limit its focus to support
service contracts? What percentage of the Department's service
contracting costs do support service contracts constitute? How does
this limited focus accommodate the Department's concern, as expressed
last August, with the extraordinary growth in contract costs for object
classes 25.1 and 25.2?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 14. What other options did the Department consider
with respect to reducing contractor costs? What was the dollar value of
those other options? Why did the Department not consider freezing or
cutting contract costs for all object classes?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 15. The Department's focus on the narrow category of
support service contracts for cuts excludes the vast majority of
service contract dollars. How will growth in non-support service
contracts be constrained? How will the cuts in support service
contracts be enforced in the absence of a contractor inventory that is
integrated into the budget process?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Ms. Bordallo. 16. For advisory and assistance services, for Fiscal
Years 2007 through 2010, what were the estimated and actual costs for:
management and professional services FFRDC;
management and professional services non-FFRDC;
studies, analyses and evaluation FFRDC;
studies, analyses and evaluations non-FFRDC;
engineering and technical services FFRDC; and
engineering and technical services non-FFRDC.
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE
Mr. Kline. 1. It seems like we are already planning a decrease in
manpower because we expect to be done in Afghanistan in 2014. How
flexible are today's decisions to decrease force levels if we find that
we are not ready to leave by 2014--or, worse, the contingency we are
not expecting emerges in the meantime? How comfortable are you with end
strength levels now and in the future to meet our warfighting
requirements. With your men and women being asked to do more, not less,
every day, how can you justify future planned reductions?
General Chiarelli. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Kline. 2. The conventional and asymmetric threats have changed
significantly since 2001, and so has our National Security Strategy.
Meeting the short-term wartime requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
the Horn of Africa was not the only reason we funded an increase in
military end strength. On the contrary, the troop increases were done
as a result of lessons learned from these conflicts--to realign our
troop levels with the changing conventional and asymmetric threats for
today and the future. How do these cuts in military personnel take into
account the changes in National Security Strategy and our current
security treaty obligations with other countries in the world?
General Chiarelli. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Kline. 3. The Services have been trying to achieve adequate
dwell-to-deployment ratios in order to reduce the stress on the active,
reserve, and National Guard forces. What is the status of your progress
to meet your dwell-to-deployment ratio goals for active duty, reserve,
and National Guard forces, and how will a planned reduction in end
strength affect your ability to achieve the adequate dwell time?
General Chiarelli. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Kline. 4. According to the CBO in 2007, the estimated cost of
increasing end strength from 2007 to 2013 was $108 billion for the Army
and the Marine Corps. Now we are talking about decreasing end strength
before the initiative to grow the force is complete. How much do the
see-saw decisions to ramp up and then ramp down military personnel end
strength cost the government--in infrastructure, MILCON, equipment, and
training?
General Chiarelli. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Kline. 1. It seems like we are already planning a decrease in
manpower because we expect to be done in Afghanistan in 2014. How
flexible are today's decisions to decrease force levels if we find that
we are not ready to leave by 2014--or, worse, the contingency we are
not expecting emerges in the meantime? How comfortable are you with end
strength levels now and in the future to meet our warfighting
requirements. With your men and women being asked to do more, not less,
every day, how can you justify future planned reductions?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Kline. 2. The conventional and asymmetric threats have changed
significantly since 2001, and so has our National Security Strategy.
Meeting the short-term wartime requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
the Horn of Africa was not the only reason we funded an increase in
military end strength. On the contrary, the troop increases were done
as a result of lessons learned from these conflicts--to realign our
troop levels with the changing conventional and asymmetric threats for
today and the future. How do these cuts in military personnel take into
account the changes in National Security Strategy and our current
security treaty obligations with other countries in the world?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Kline. 3. The Services have been trying to achieve adequate
dwell-to-deployment ratios in order to reduce the stress on the active,
reserve, and National Guard forces. What is the status of your progress
to meet your dwell-to-deployment ratio goals for active duty, reserve,
and National Guard forces, and how will a planned reduction in end
strength affect your ability to achieve the adequate dwell time?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Kline. 4. According to the CBO in 2007, the estimated cost of
increasing end strength from 2007 to 2013 was $108 billion for the Army
and the Marine Corps. Now we are talking about decreasing end strength
before the initiative to grow the force is complete. How much do the
see-saw decisions to ramp up and then ramp down military personnel end
strength cost the government--in infrastructure, MILCON, equipment, and
training?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ
Mr. Critz. 1) Mr. Lynn, Robert Hale, the current DOD comptroller,
warned in a 2002 paper that ``Because efficiencies are hard to achieve,
defense managers should avoid counting on projected savings to make up
budget shortfalls.'' He suggested that ``Save `em before you spend
`em'' should be the motto of defense management. How does the
Department reconcile this advice with the its current plan to spend
projected savings on higher priority capabilities and programs before
the savings have actually been realized?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. 2) Mr. Lynn, what are the projected savings over the
FYDP from the proposed increase in premiums and copays for working age
military retirees using TRICARE? How much does it raise the annual
premiums working-age retirees pay? How much of the projected savings
are from retirees being incentivized to move out of the military
healthcare system onto their employer's healthcare plans? What measure
of inflation will the premiums be linked to for future increases (e.g.
consumer price index, etc.)?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. 3) Mr. Lynn, does the healthcare proposal attempt to
raise premiums for military retirees over the age of 65 (i.e. non-
working age retirees) for the TRICARE for Life benefit?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. 4) Mr. Lynn, many of the efficiency savings announced
are from consolidation of IT systems. What are the up-front costs of
consolidating these systems, what is the timeframe for implementation,
and what is the breakeven point in terms of how long the savings must
be realized in order to recoup the up-front cost of implementation?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. 5) Mr. Lynn, the FY11 budget request showed a projected
decrease in RDT&E funding each year from FY11 to FY15. Will some part
of the savings from the efficiency initiative be used to keep RDT&E
from declining as was previously planned?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. 1)Admiral Greenert, there are (3) basic landing elements
during an amphibious operation. Launch distance from Ship to Shore,
Speed of Landing Craft, and Travel time to the beach. Are there
doctrinal requirements for any of these elements? If so, what are they?
If not, why not?
Also, will there be a detailed joint Navy/Marine Corps requirements
process that examines all requirements to include the proximity of
amphibious naval ships to the shoreline; especially in hostile/anti-
access scenarios?
Admiral Greenert. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. 1) General Dunford, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
recommended cancelling the EFV program as part of the Secretary of
Defense Efficiency initiatives. However, the Marine Corps and the
Department still proclaim the requirement still remains. Has there been
or are there plans for a comprehensive study to analyze the cost of EFV
termination, AAV modernization, and new AAV program initiation; against
continuing with the current EFV program? If so, when will this study be
available? If not, why not?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. General Dunford, what is the minimum requirement for
assault amphibian platforms of any type to ensure the Marine Corps
maintains a dominant forcible entry capability? This includes deployed,
home stations, training and schools, as well as maintenance spares.
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. 3) General Dunford, the taxpayers have already spent $3B
and 15 years of effort on this program. Would it not be more prudent to
complete the System Design/Development phase; saving the cancellation
costs and then evaluate the program health before termination?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. 4) General Dunford, there are (3) basic landing elements
during an amphibious operation. Launch distance from Ship to Shore,
Speed of Landing Craft, and Travel time to the beach. Are there
doctrinal requirements for any of these elements? If so, what are they?
If not, why not?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. 5) Also, will there be a detailed joint Navy/Marine
Corps requirements process that examines all requirements to include
the proximity of amphibious naval ships to the shoreline; especially in
hostile/anti-access scenarios?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. 1) General Breedlove, the FY11 budget request projected
total spending of $1.7 billion over the FYDP for long-range precision
strike (e.g. the next generation bomber). How much does the FY12 budget
request increase the funding for this program above what was already
planned? What is the timeline for this program, specifically: when does
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) begin, when is Initial
Operating Capability (IOC) planned, and how many total bombers are
planned?
General Breedlove. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Critz. 2) General Breedlove, why is the Air Force proposing an
optionally manned design for the bomber? Is this an example of the type
of ``exquisite requirements'' that have plagued other programs? What
studies have been performed to estimate the additional cost of making
the bomber optionally manned instead of just manned or unmanned? Who
performed these studies (industry or DOD) and what is the confidence
level of the results?
General Breedlove. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. 1. The MEADS program is structured as a tri-national
cooperative development program involving the U.S., with Germany and
Italy participating in a jointly managed development program. Initiated
in 1996 and based on international program cost-sharing, MEADS was
intended to field a new system quickly and at less cost to the United
States while increasing trans-Atlantic cooperation and commonality
(replace Patriot.)
To date, the MEADS development program has not delivered on
promised timely and cost-effective fielding of new air and missile
defense capabilities. Since the program's initiation, the time to field
the First Unit Equipped (FUE) has repeatedly been revised resulting in
increased costs and delays to fielding warfighter capability as
follows:
In 1996, the expected RDTE cost was $2B to $3B, with a
planned FUE in 2008.
In 2002, the expected RDTE cost was $7B to $9B, with a
planned FUE in 2012.
In 2008, the expected RDTE cost was $10B, with a planned
FUE in 2015.
As you know, Congress passed some strong language (FY11 NDAA)
restricting the funds for the MEADS missile defense program, due to
concerns that the program is over budget and behind schedule. It is
currently still in System Design and Development which I understand
requires additional funding to complete before a production decision:
one study estimated the need for an additional $1 B to $1.5B just for
the design and development phase.
a. Regarding the MDA, the Department stated that approximately
$2.4 billion in efficiencies and reductions were identified. Has MEADS
been reviewed as a programs to support these lower funding levels?
b. Are there more efficient and affordable options out there and
are OSD and the Army seriously looking at more cost-effective
alternative capabilities, derived from Patriot and other AMD defense
systems, as required by the NDAA bill language?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER
Mr. Ruppersberger. 1. Two Defense Science Board reports and the
Army's own reviews highlight that there is an outstanding need for
adding an Auxiliary Power Unit to the Abrams Tank. The Abrams voracious
fuel consumption is a significant platform shortfall that has caused
the Tank to remain on conditional release for over twenty years
awaiting an Auxiliary Power Unit. What is preventing funding for, and
implementation of, APU technology developed and tested by the army over
the past several years and reaping these cost and capabilities
advantages?
General Chiarelli. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. 1. You have directed the disestablishment of the
Business Transformation Agency (BTA) as an efficiency. Is this an
indication DOD has determined BTA's function was unnecessary? If not,
what is the Department planning to do with the BTA functions deemed
necessary by DOD? If these functions are being transferred to or
recreated in other organizations, how is DOD obtaining an efficiency?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Conaway. 2. Deputy Secretary Lynn indicated in his testimony
that the Services were directed to achieve $100 billion in efficiencies
over the FY 2012 to 2016 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) and the
Services succeeded. He also indicated the Services could retain and
reinvest these efficiency savings in enhancements of high priority
warfighting programs. What is DOD's plan to track how this $100 billion
is reinvested and monitor over the coming years how this money is being
used?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Conaway. 1. Secretary Gates' proposal includes a $6 billion
funding decrease within fiscal years 2015-2016 for the reduced
permanent end strength of the Active Army and Marine Corps.
Specifically, the Army's permanent end strength would be reduced by
27,000 and the Marine Corps would be reduced between 15,000 and 20,000.
First, how will these reductions apply specifically to those who deploy
most? Secondly, what analysis was done, and by whom, in connection with
this decision, especially with regard to the ability of both services
to meet commander war fighting requirements on overall military
readiness? Are these end strengths locked or would Secretary Gates
consider changing them based on further analyses by the Army and Marine
Corps?
General Chiarelli. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Conaway. 1. Secretary Gates' proposal includes a $6 billion
funding decrease within fiscal years 2015-2016 for the reduced
permanent end strength of the Active Army and Marine Corps.
Specifically, the Army's permanent end strength would be reduced by
27,000 and the Marine Corps would be reduced between 15,000 and 20,000.
First, how will these reductions apply specifically to those who deploy
most? Secondly, what analysis was done, and by whom, in connection with
this decision, especially with regard to the ability of both services
to meet commander war fighting requirements on overall military
readiness? Are these end strengths locked or would Secretary Gates
consider changing them based on further analyses by the Army and Marine
Corps?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Conaway. 1. As an Air Force Captain and pilot I question the
necessity to develop a new flight suit for the forces. Would you
consider delaying the development of a new flight suit currently under
development? Furthermore, how do you plan to reduce unnecessary
acquisition and procurement spending?
General Breedlove. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. 1. For Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Department
stated that approximately $2.4 billion in efficiencies and reductions
were identified. What programs were adjusted to support these lower
funding levels?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Lamborn. 2. Identified in the $78 billion cut is the reduction
of 360 MDA contractors. From what areas are these being cut and what
impact will these have on meeting initial capability of the Phased
Adaptive Approach in 2011?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Lamborn. 3. With the failure of the last two Ground-Based
Midcourse interceptor tests, how will these efficiencies affect the
Department's short- and long-term strategies in ensuring we have a
reliable system for homeland defense? Will these cuts also put a strain
on testing and integration?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. 1. Secretary Lynn, with regard to TRICARE and the
unaffordable healthcare costs, particularly the working age retirees
that were mentioned by Secretary Gates and the proposed reforms to
TRICARE in FY12 to better manage medical coast growth, what is the
plan? Will this reform be retro-active or will it be a new policy for
all men and women joining the military after 2012? No one denies the
fact that TRICARE should be reformed, but drastic changes should not
affect those currently serving or retired from our military.
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Wittman. 2. Secretary Lynn, how does the DOD plan to compensate
for the reduction of the contractor force by 10%. Defense contractors
have played a critical role in the technical and tactical advances we
have made in weapons systems, shipbuilding, system engineering, C4I and
ISR, procurements, test and evaluation, and program management. How to
we plan on mitigating this void in the workforce while balancing an
obvious increase in workload?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Wittman. 1. General Dunford, did you examine any ``80 percent''
alternatives to the current EFV design before deciding to abandon that
investment? Is there no alternative that would allow the U.S.
Government to capture the value of the 3 billion invested to date?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Wittman. 2. General Dunford, the Marines want a new assault
vehicle, and as the Commandant stated on January 13, 2011, at the
Surface Navy Association Symposium, ``the cancellation of the EFV is by
no means a rejection of the Marine Corps amphibious assault mission. I
remain committed to develop and field an effective, survivable and
affordable new amphibious vehicle . . . sooner rather than later!''
When is ``sooner''? We need a plan to move our Marines ashore in the
21st century with a 21st-century vehicle that they need and deserve for
amphibious assault missions.
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Wittman. 3. General Dunford, did the Marine Corps consider
alternatives to the EFV program leading up to the decision to recommend
termination of the program? For example, the manufacturer has brought
to our attention a high-low mix alternative that appears to be
affordable at least based on the Marine Corps budget. Did you consider
a high-low mix of EFVs and AAVs? Why not?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Wittman. 4. General Dunford, you and the Commandant have
repeatedly stated the EFV is unaffordable and that the program has
become too onerous. What is exactly is ``affordable'' for the USMC when
it comes to the EFV? Could your annual procurement budget accommodate
$500 million per year? Is it $400 million or perhaps $300 million? What
is the goal price per vehicle and what are the target life-cycle
management costs of the vehicle?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Wittman. 5. General Dunford, the following is taken from CRS:
The Marines originally planned to procure 1,025 EFVs at a total cost of
$8.5 billion. According to GAO, as of March 2010, the EFV program will
require $866.7 million in research and development and $10.226 billion
in procurement funding for a total of $11.163 billion to complete the
program and field 573 EFVs. Each EFV was expected to cost about $24
million apiece. There were concerns that the high cost of the EFV could
consume up to 90% of the Marines' ground equipment budget. The former
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Conway, reportedly was
concerned that with potential future cuts to the defense budget, 573
EFVs might not be affordable. The Marines have stated that it will cost
approximately $185 million to terminate the EFV program.
Budget aside, and only talking USMC requirements and mission
capability, how many future generation amphibious assault vehicles (if
not the EFV) does the Marine Corps need in order to conduct their ship-
to-shore operations effectively throughout the 21st Century?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. 1. Currently the military is transitioning between
tours to certain areas that may be either accompanied or unaccompanied
by family members. In South Korea and Europe, what are the savings of
mandating unaccompanied tours in lieu of accompanied tours? For
accompanied tours, what risk assessments have been conducted in light
of the tensions on the Korean Peninsula? For South Korea, Europe, and
Japan, to what extent do the host nations contribute financially to
accompanied tours in building new housing, schools, and exchanges?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Coffman. 1. What is the impact of the current Continuing
Resolution on shipbuilding operations, specifically in meeting the
requirement of a 33 ship amphibious fleet?
Admiral Greenert. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Coffman. 1. What is the reason for the change in requirement
for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle? The certified requirement has
been for a tracked amphibious vehicle capable of deploying from
amphibious shipping at least 25 Nautical Miles from shore. That
requirement recently changed to between 12 and 20 Nautical Miles. What
is the reason for this change? Are there significant changes in our
ability to defend our fleet from enemy shore defenses or are we simply
assuming a higher risk threshold in changing the requirement?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Coffman. 2. If we cannot afford to purchase the Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle currently, how can we expect to afford to purchase a
vehicle with similar capabilities in the future?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Coffman. 3. Last year in a Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing, the topic of early decommissioning of the amphibious ships
Nassau and Peleliu was discussed. Lieutenant General Flynn, USMC,
testified that the Marine Corps would like to see a joint Navy and
Marine Corps operational assessment of the impact of any planned
amphibious ship decommissionings before those decommissioning plans are
made final. Does the Marine Corps maintain that position?
General Dunford. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. HECK
Dr. Heck. 1. The Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Authorization Bill
required that the Department of Defense submit a report on the A-76
process that included recommendations and improvements. Would you
please tell us what recommendations on the A-76 process will be
included in that report to more effectively use this tool for right-
sizing the contractor and government workforce?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Dr. Heck. 2. In your comments you referenced the Secretary of
Defense's mandate to reduce the number of contractors who augment
government staffs. In that regard, absent a robust inventory of
contracts for services, and with the current moratorium on using the A-
76 process, what confidence do you have that you can achieve the
savings projected if you are not using all tools available to evaluate
contractor and government performance?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Dr. Heck. 3. Lastly, what impact does the A-76 process have on
civilian government employees compared to members of our armed
services?
Secretary Lynn. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. 1. I represent Central and Southeast Alabama and I am
very interested in knowing specifically how the efficiencies planned
will impact the missions of both Fort Rucker and Maxwell AFB (including
the Gunter Annex)?
General Chiarelli. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
Mrs. Roby. 1. I represent Central and Southeast Alabama and I am
very interested in knowing specifically how the efficiencies planned
will impact the missions of both Fort Rucker and Maxwell AFB (including
the Gunter Annex)?
General Breedlove. [The response was not received at the time of
publication.]
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