[Senate Hearing 111-896]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-896
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION,
111TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
ELIZABETH A. McGRATH; MICHAEL J. McCORD; SHARON E. BURKE; SOLOMON B.
WATSON; KATHERINE G. HAMMACK; VADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; LTG
KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; LTG LLOYD J.
AUSTIN III, USA; GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS,
USMC; JONATHAN WOODSON, M.D.; NEILE L. MILLER; ANNE M. HARRINGTON; GEN.
JAMES F. AMOS, USMC; GEN. CLAUDE R. KEHLER, USAF; AND GEN CARTER F.
HAM, USA
----------
MARCH 23; APRIL 15; JUNE 24, 29; JULY 27; AUGUST 3; SEPTEMBER 21;
NOVEMBER 18, 2010
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 111-896
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION,
111TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
ELIZABETH A. McGRATH; MICHAEL J. McCORD; SHARON E. BURKE; SOLOMON B.
WATSON; KATHERINE G. HAMMACK; VADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; LTG
KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; LTG LLOYD J.
AUSTIN III, USA; GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS,
USMC; JONATHAN WOODSON, M.D.; NEILE L. MILLER; ANNE M. HARRINGTON; GEN.
JAMES F. AMOS, USMC; GEN. CLAUDE R. KEHLER, USAF; AND GEN CARTER F.
HAM, USA
__________
MARCH 23; APRIL 15; JUNE 24, 29; JULY 27; AUGUST 3; SEPTEMBER 21;
NOVEMBER 18, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
(Before July 22, 2010)
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
______
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
(After July 22, 2010)
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
CARTE P. GOODWIN, West Virginia
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Page
march 23, 2010
Nominations of Elizabeth A. McGrath to be Deputy Chief Management
Officer of the Department of Defense; Michael J. McCord to be
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller);
Sharon E. Burke to be Director of Operational Energy Plans and
Programs; Solomon B. Watson IV to be General Counsel of the
Department of the Army; and Katherine G. Hammack to be
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and
Environment.................................................... 1
Statements of:
Akaka, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from the State of Hawaii..... 2
Warner, Hon. John, Former U.S. Senator from the State of Virginia 21
McGrath, Elizabeth A., Nominee to be Deputy Chief Management
Officer of the Department of Defense........................... 23
McCord, Michael J., Nominee to be Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)............................. 24
Burke, Sharon E., Nominee to be Director of Operational Energy
Plans and Programs............................................. 26
Watson, Solomon B., IV, Nominee to be General Counsel of the
Department of the Army......................................... 27
Hammack, Katherine G., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Installations and Environment......................... 28
april 15, 2010
Nominations of VADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, to be Admiral
and Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American
Aerospace Defense Command; and LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA, to
be General and Director, National Security Agency/Chief,
Central Security Service/Commander, U.S. Cyber Command......... 145
Statements of:
Mikulski, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland.. 153
Winnefeld, VADM James A., Jr., USN, Nominee to be Admiral and
Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American
Aerospace Defense Command...................................... 155
Alexander, LTG Keith B., USA, Nominee to be General and Director,
National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service/
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command.................................. 156
june 24, 2010
Nominations of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command;
and LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, to be General and Commander,
U.S. Forces-Iraq............................................... 245
iii
Statements of:
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Nominee for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command...... 251
Austin, LTG Lloyd J., III, USA, Nominee to be General and
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq.................................... 252
june 29, 2010
Nomination of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General, and to be Commander, International
Security Assistance Force, and Commander, U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan.................................................... 329
Statement of:
Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Nominee for Reappointment to the
Grade of General, and to be Commander, International Security
Assistance Force, and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan....... 334
july 27, 2010
Nomination of Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Central Command. 405
Statement of:
Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Nominee for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Central Command..... 410
august 3, 2010
Nominations of Jonathan Woodson, M.D., to be Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Affairs; Neile L. Miller to be Principal
Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration;
and Anne M. Harrington to be Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 487
Statements of:
Woodson, Jonathan, M.D., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs..................................... 491
Miller, Neile L., Nominee to be Principal Deputy Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 493
Harrington, Anne M., Nominee to be Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 495
september 21, 2010
Nomination of Gen. James F. Amos, USMC, for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and to be Commandant of the Marine Corps...... 569
Statements of:
Hagan, Hon. Kay R., U.S. Senator from the State of North Carolina 572
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Nominee for Reappointment to the Grade
of General and to be Commandant of the Marine Corps............ 575
november 18, 2010
Nominations of Gen. Claude R. Kehler, USAF, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command; and GEN Carter F. Ham, USA, for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Africa Command...... 635
Statements of:
Kehler, Gen. Claude R., USAF, Nominee for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Strategic Command... 640
Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Nominee for Reappointment to the Grade
of General and to be Commander, U.S. Africa Command............ 641
APPENDIX......................................................... 719
NOMINATIONS OF ELIZABETH A. McGRATH TO BE DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT
OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MICHAEL J. McCORD TO BE PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); SHARON E. BURKE TO BE
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL ENERGY PLANS AND PROGRAMS; SOLOMON B. WATSON IV
TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; AND KATHERINE G.
HAMMACK TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR INSTALLATIONS AND
ENVIRONMENT
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman), presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Akaka, Udall,
Hagan, Begich, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, and Thune.
Former Senator present: Senator John Warner of Virginia.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Roy F.
Phillips, professional staff member; John H. Quirk V,
professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Brian F.
Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to
Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall;
Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Anthony J.
Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and
Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor
IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; and Chris Joyner, assistant
to Senator Burr.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
The committee meets today to consider the nominations of
Elizabeth McGrath to be Deputy Chief Management Officer of the
Department of Defense (DOD); Michael McCord to be Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Sharon Burke
to be Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs;
Solomon Watson IV to be General Counsel of the Department of
the Army; and Katherine Hammack to be Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Installations and Environment.
I'm going to interrupt my opening comments to call upon
Senator Akaka, who must leave, but he has an introduction that
he wants to make. We call upon Senator Akaka for that purpose.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. AKAKA, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF HAWAII
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee.
Since I will not be able to remain at this hearing, I want
to thank the chairman and the ranking member for permitting me
this time and honor to briefly introduce and congratulate two
nominees.
I ask, Mr. Chairman, that my full introductory statement be
included in the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
Senator Akaka. I want to add my welcome to our brother and
close friend, Senator Warner. Good to see you back here, as
well as our nominees who are at the table today.
I'm here, and I'm delighted to speak on the nomination of
Elizabeth McGrath to be DOD's first Deputy Chief Management
Officer. I'd like to introduce, also, her family, Beth
McGrath's son, James, and her daughter, Christine, and her mom
and dad, who are also here, and welcome them.
As you may know, I was a strong advocate for the creation
of a Chief Management Officer at DOD. I first encountered Beth
McGrath through my Oversight and Government Management
Subcommittee's work on DOD's Security Clearance Program, which
has been on the Government Accountability Office's high-risk
list since 2005. Beth now serves as the vice chair of a joint
reform team, led by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
reforming the clearance process. She has testified and worked
with my subcommittee extensively. That group has made
tremendous progress on modernizing the clearance process, in
large part due to Beth's hard work and expertise.
Ms. McGrath is an example of an individual who has
dedicated her professional career to civil service and has
advanced through the ranks. She has served as a logistics and
acquisition manager, a deputy director in the Defense Finance
Accounting Service, and Assistant Principal Deputy Under
Secretary, and now as Assistant and Deputy Chief Management
Officer.
I will not go further with her qualifications, except to
say that in my working with her, I have found her to be
professional and knowledgeable, and I think she will be
extremely valuable to the Department in this role.
Again, I congratulate you, Beth, on your nomination to this
position.
I also want to add my congratulations to Mike McCord, who
is the nominee to be the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller). I had the distinct pleasure to work with
him, when I was chairman of the Readiness and Management
Subcommittee. As a senior staff member of the subcommittee, his
expertise, dedication, and counsel were invaluable. Mike has an
unparalleled wealth of experience, a deep understanding of
defense issues and the budget process, and he will excel in his
position.
He is the best person, and the right person, for the job. I
want to wish him well.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for giving me this time to
speak on these nominees. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, aloha and good morning. I
am delighted to be at this hearing considering the nomination of
Elizabeth McGrath to be the Department of Defense's (DOD) first Deputy
Chief Management Officer (DCMO).
As you may know, I was a strong advocate for the creation of a
Chief Management Officer (CMO) at DOD. After the Deputy Secretary of
Defense was given responsibility to serve as the CMO, we created the
position of DCMO.
The DCMO will effectively serve as the full-time management
official for the Department, organizing business operations and
overseeing the Business Transformation Agency and the Performance
Improvement Officer.
Ms. McGrath is a long-time career civil servant who has served as
the Assistant Deputy Chief Management Officer since the DCMO office was
created. With no DCMO nominated during the last administration, she was
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the office.
I first encountered Beth McGrath through my Oversight of Government
Management Subcommittee's work on DOD's Security Clearance Program,
which has been on the Government Accountability Office's High Risk List
since 2005.
In 2007, Beth was named the lead staffer representing the
Department on the new Joint Reform Team and later the Performance
Accountability Council. She has testified and worked with my
subcommittee extensively since that time.
Over the last few years, the group has made tremendous progress on
modernizing the clearance process, in large part due to Beth's hard
work and expertise.
Due to her leadership on this issue, she was asked to serve as the
Vice-Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, and she has
agreed to continue serving in that role if confirmed.
Ms. McGrath is an example of an individual who has dedicated her
professional career to the civil service and has advanced through the
ranks. She started at the Department in 1988 in the Navy Logistics
Intern Program. I believe that professional internship programs in the
Federal Government are a powerful tool to attract talent.
She has since served as a logistics and acquisition manager, a
Deputy Director in the Finance Accounting Service, an Assistant
Principal Deputy Under Secretary in the Office of the Secretary, and
now as Assistant DCMO.
I will not go on with her qualifications, except to say that in my
working with her, I have found her to be professional, knowledgeable,
and confident. She has been a leader willing to look outside of the box
to improve performance. She has been a tremendous resource to me and my
staff, and I am confident that she will bring the same leadership to
addressing other critical business needs at the Department.
I have high hopes for this new office under Beth's leadership. The
Chief Management Officer concept has proven powerful in other agencies,
such as the Department of Homeland Security, in keeping a strict focus
on management and process improvement. I hope that we will see the same
from the DCMO position at DOD.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Again, I congratulate you, Beth McGrath, on
your nomination to this position.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka. I know
how important it is to our nominees that you are here to help
introduce them. I know they're grateful, and so are we, for
your comments.
We welcome our nominees and their families. We appreciate
the long hours and the other sacrifices that our nominees are
willing to make to serve our country. Their families also
deserve our thanks for the support that they provide. This is
essential support to the success of these officials.
All of our nominees are qualified for the positions to
which they have been nominated.
Ms. McGrath is a career civil servant who has worked in
management positions in DOD for the last 20 years. We heard
some details about her career from Senator Akaka, so I will not
repeat that. But, I do believe that Ms. McGrath's rise through
the ranks of DOD, and the basis of her qualifications and
achievements, sends an important message, to the entire
civilian workforce of the Department, that their dedication and
their hard work can be rewarded.
Mr. McCord has been a dedicated public servant for more
than 25 years, including more than 10 years on the staff of
this committee. We view Mike not only as a friend, but as a
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee family. We were
proud of his achievement when Mike was appointed Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), last January.
We were so proud of you, Mike, that we changed the law to
ensure that you could come back here today as the President's
nominee for the very same position.
I just can't imagine anybody who is better qualified for
this job than Mike McCord.
Ms. Burke is a dedicated public servant. She spent 3 years
at the Department of State, 7 years at DOD, 3 years at the old
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, before taking a
series of jobs at nonprofit thinktanks. She's currently vice
president for national security at the Center for New American
Security. She's going to be introduced, later on, by a dear
friend, who all of us on this committee--we have a couple of
new members, perhaps, who have not yet met Senator John Warner.
But, for those of us who worked with him, lived with him,
laughed with him, cried with him, believe in him, and his great
wife, Jeanne, it's always a treat to see you, John.
The fact that you have brought Senator Warner with you, Ms.
Burke, for this introduction, speaks volumes about you, but it
also gives us an opportunity just to give an old friend a
couple of hugs and a couple laughs.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Watson has had a 35-year legal career
at the New York Times, in the course of which he's been
awarded, among other honors, the Media Law Resource Center's
First Amendment Leadership Award, the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense and
Education Fund National Equal Justice Award, and the American
Corporate Counsel Associate Distinguished Service Award.
Ms. Hammack has spent more than 25 years of experience as
an energy and sustainability professional with private
industry. Currently, she is a senior manager at Ernst & Young,
where she has developed an expertise in the evaluation of
energy conservation projects, energy efficiency strategies,
demand-side management programs, and marketing electricity in
deregulated markets.
If confirmed, our nominees will all play critical roles in
helping to manage DOD at a time when we are fighting two wars,
when we face a wide array of difficult acquisition, management,
and financial challenges. We look forward to the testimony of
our nominees, to their speedy confirmation, hopefully.
I'll now call upon Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome all the nominees and their families who accompany
them today. Of course, a special welcome to our dear and
beloved friend Senator Warner, who is here today to introduce,
I believe, Ms. Burke. Is that correct? We won't hold that
against you, Ms. Burke. [Laughter.]
Of course, Elizabeth McGrath, as you mentioned, Mr.
Chairman, is to be Deputy Chief Management Officer of DOD;
Michael McCord, to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense; Solomon Watson, to be General Counsel of the
Department of the Army; and Katherine Hammack, to be Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment.
Solomon Watson IV has been nominated to be General Counsel
of the Department of the Army. Mr. Watson served from 1966 to
1968 as an Active Duty lieutenant in the U.S. Army Military
Police Corps. He performed distinguished military service in
Vietnam, and subsequently commenced his long career with the
New York Times Company, from which he retired in December 2006.
Mr. Watson served as senior vice president and general
counsel in New York Times Company from 1996 to 2005, and in
December 2005 he was named senior vice president and chief
legal officer. During his employment in these capacities, the
New York Times published two stories, which revealed highly
classified information, which I intend to discuss further in
connection with Mr. Watson's nomination.
The first, which was published on December 15, 2005,
revealed the existence of what became known as the Terrorist
Surveillance Program. This highly classified program was
authorized by President Bush shortly after the attacks of
September 11, 2001. It targeted communications where one party
was outside the United States and reasonable grounds existed to
believe that at least one party to the communication was a
member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
organization. Although the White House asked the New York Times
not to publish this article, arguing that it could jeopardize
continuing investigations and alert would-be terrorists that
they might be under scrutiny, the Times, after delaying
publication, chose to run the story.
As a result of the disclosure of the Terrorist Surveillance
Program, then-Central Intelligence Agency Director Porter Gass
testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee in February
2006, ``The damage has been very severe to our capabilities to
carry out our mission.'' I emphasize that he used the term
``very severe'' intentionally. He also testified that the story
had rendered intelligence sources, ``no longer viable or
usable, or less effective by a large degree.''
The second story, published on June 23, 2006, which also
appeared while Mr. Watson was chief legal officer, revealed a
secret government surveillance program about the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)
program. The New York Times article disclosed that, shortly
after September 11, 2001, SWIFT lawfully began providing the
U.S. Government with financial information about possible
terrorist-related transfers. Despite pleas to the New York
Times by National Intelligence Director John Negroponte,
Treasury Secretary John Snow, and by the cochairman of the 9/11
Commission, Thomas Keane and Lee Hamilton not to publish
information about the SWIFT surveillance program, the New York
Times chose to disregard those pleas and published the story.
Subsequently, even the Times' own public editor, Byron Calame
criticized the decision to publish the story.
After the committee received Mr. Watson's nomination, I
sent a number of questions to him by letter about his
involvement and evaluation of the publication of these stories,
and Mr. Watson responded by letter on January 7.
Mr. Chairman, I ask these letters be made a part of today's
record.
Chairman Levin. They will be.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator McCain. I will ask him some additional questions
today, in view of his nomination for this important DOD
position, about his views regarding the release of this
information and how he, as chief legal officer of the
Department in the Army, would respond to public disclosures
that endanger U.S. citizens, neutralize the effectiveness of
classified defense programs, and harm national security.
I acknowledge the government service and private-sector
accomplishments of Mr. McCord, Ms. McGrath, Ms. Burke, and Ms.
Hammack, and, again, thank them for their willingness to serve
in these important positions in DOD.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Warner, we're going to call on you first, for your
introduction so that you can be excused and go about your work.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. I'm required to take the oath of office.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. I think for us to administer an oath of
office to you, Senator Warner, would suggest----
Senator Warner. The law requires you to----[Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. If you could share what the oath is with
me, I'd be happy to----[Laughter.]
Senator Warner. The whole truth and nothing but the truth,
so help you God.
Chairman Levin. I do. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. I thank you, distinguished chairman. It's
an unusual framework of laws that will greet you when you
depart the U.S. Senate, but I've lived by them very carefully,
as each of you have.
Chairman Levin. As always, you abide by the law. Frankly, I
was not aware of that. Now we're going to have to look it up.
But, we're glad that you pointed it out to us, because it's
important that we abide by law. You're known for that, and we
admire you for that, and we thank you for doing what your duty
requires you to do this morning.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, needless to say, it's a very
moving experience for me to appear in this capacity before this
distinguished committee. I thank you and my dear friend for so
many years, Senator John McCain.
We go way back, Senator.
Senator Inhofe, I duly report again to you and remember
your distinguished Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Senator Chambliss, Senator Thune.
To our new members, you don't really appreciate, at this
juncture, how fortunate you are to be a member of this
committee. This committee has an extraordinary reputation, long
in the history of the Senate, for its ability to handle issues
of national security in the best interests of this country. I
commend each of you and wish you well in the future.
I shall be brief, and I'll ask unanimous consent that my
statement be included in the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be, of course.
Senator Warner. I'm privileged to introduce this very fine
professional to be the Director of Operational Energy Plans and
Programs. I commend these committees, the military committees,
for creating this new position, because if there's one issue
that's important to this Nation today, I know of no greater
than the subject of energy. DOD is the single largest user of
energy of any entity, not only in the United States, but the
entire world. To be a good shepherd of this responsibility in
the Department is important. This position was created for that
purpose.
What the public may not know--and I say this with a sense
of humility--is the extraordinary record of DOD and the
military departments, in the past several years, to be in the
very forefront of all issues related to energy. When a member
of this committee and the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee, I followed the leadership shown by the Department,
and have continued to keep myself informed in the ensuing
years.
I first met this very fine professional, when she, in the
capacity as the vice president of her distinguished
organization, held an extensive dinner meeting for about 25
individuals, from the National Guard to every department of the
military, to listen to them--what they're trying to do in the
area of energy and, indeed, some on climate security. You may
recall, Mr. Chairman, that I was privileged to join the
distinguished former Senator, now Secretary of State, Mrs.
Clinton, in sponsoring the legislation directing the Secretary
of Defense to, in the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR), make certain provisions for these subjects, and I
commend her for that foresight that Senator Clinton had at that
time. The Department has moved out. The announcement of the QDR
has a distinct provision in it on these subjects.
The Department's record is a great story of public service.
I would urge the committee this may be an opportunity to make
that public. But, there's much more to be done, and this fine
nominee, if confirmed, will give that leadership. She's ideally
and uniquely qualified, to the credit of the President that he
selected this candidate, where she's been working in the
private sector to promote many of the varied goals on energy
that DOD today is attaining and planning for the future. On a
number of occasions, I've had the privilege to be with her when
this candidate has publicly addressed a wide range of energy
issues and, most significantly, come up with some suggested
solutions.
She's widely respected by her peer group of nongovernmental
organizations, as well as being admired and trusted on her
views by government leaders. Her exceptional career had its
roots with membership on the staffs of two very distinguished
former Members of the U.S. Senate, Senator Paul Sarbanes and
Senator Chuck Hagel. As you stated, Mr. Chairman, she's
currently the vice president of the Center for New American
Security, where she directs the Center's work on the national
security implications of global energy security. She held
appointed positions in the U.S. Government as a member of the
policy planning staff at the Department of State and as a
country director in DOD's Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian affairs. She also served on the staff of a former member
of this committee, our esteemed friend, former Secretary of
Defense William Cohen.
Understandably, this exceptional professional, has been
awarded many recognitions by both public and private
institutions for her distinguished accomplishments, and I'm
sure that's part of the record.
If confirmed, she will become a national leader in the
field of energy and add another chapter to her distinguished
public service for the greater benefit of the American public.
I thank the chair, the ranking member, and members of the
committee.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Warner. Thanks
for coming here for that introduction. I know how important it
is to the nominee and to us, and it is always great seeing you.
Senator Warner. I thank you.
Chairman Levin. Now, we're going to ask all of you standard
questions, and you can answer them all together.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interests?
[All five nominees answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties, or undertaken
any actions, which would appear to presume the outcome of this
confirmation process?
[All five nominees answered in the negative.]
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
[All five nominees answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
[All five nominees answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
[All five nominees answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
[All five nominees answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner, when requested by a duly constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good faith delay, or denial, in providing such documents?
[All five nominees answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
As we call upon each of you, we'll call upon you in the
order that you're listed on the amended notice here, please
feel free to introduce members of your family or friends who
have accompanied you here today.
First we'll call upon Elizabeth McGrath, who has been
nominated to be Deputy Chief Management Officer of DOD.
Ms. McGrath.
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH A. McGRATH, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY CHIEF
MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. McGrath. Mr. Chairman, thank you and good morning.
Ranking Member McCain, distinguished members of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, I'm truly honored to be here today,
humbled to be nominated by the President as the Department's
first Deputy Chief Management Officer, and deeply appreciative
of both Secretary Gates' and Deputy Secretary Lynn's support
for my nomination.
I want to extend a special thanks to Senator Akaka for his
kind introduction. I've enjoyed our partnership on this
committee and on others, and I look forward to continuing to
pursue our shared goal of serving the needs of the American
people.
I also want to thank the members of this committee for all
you have done for the troops and their families, whose efforts
and sacrifice preserve the freedoms we enjoy today. If
confirmed, I will work in partnership with this committee to
ensure their mission is supported and enabled, the best it can
be.
I'm grateful to have my family here with me this morning,
supporting me today, as they have done throughout my life. I
would like to introduce to you my parents, Jim and Liz Bullock,
and my two children, James and Christine. My father is a 1960
graduate of the United States Naval Academy. His 20 years'
dedicated service as a surface warfare officer instilled in me
a deep respect for public service which inspires me to this
day. I'm also pleased for James and Christine to have this
chance to see our Federal Government in action. I'm certain
they are happy to be here too, and not only because it's a day
off of school.
The committee's emphatic work in establishing the positions
of both chief and deputy chief management officer highlights
the challenges the Department faces in managing the business of
defense. Current contingency operations and projections of
complex future operating environments require processes and
institutions that are more agile, innovative, and streamlined.
The Department faces a clear mandate to modernize its business
systems, and supporting processes, as part of an enterprise-
wide approach to business transformation. This is an enormous
undertaking.
To successfully modernize the business of defense, we must
energize not only those who work in the business areas, but
also other key leaders of the Department. In my 20-plus years
working various business disciplines across DOD, I have
observed that clear goals and sustained leadership commitment
are critical to success. If confirmed, I would ensure that our
business goals were well understood and that leadership
engagement was sustained.
The breadth and complexity of the Department's business
operations would challenge the most qualified executive. Yet,
despite their scope and scale, our business operations must
efficiently and effectively enable the larger national security
mission.
DOD has the responsibility to secure our Nation, enable our
warfighters, and steward the taxpayers' dollars. I'm keenly
aware that defense dollars spent on duplicative, inefficient
efforts is money not available to take care of our people, to
win the wars we're in, and improve our capabilities. If
confirmed, I would be honored to serve in the position of the
Deputy Chief Management Officer, doing everything in my
abilities to make the business of defense better.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I'd be pleased to
answer your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Mike McCord. Mike?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. McCORD, NOMINEE TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
Mr. McCord. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and
members of the committee. It's a pleasure to be back here with
the committee, where I served for so many years and had the
opportunity to learn from the outstanding public servants who
have led the full committee as chairman and ranking member
during my time here, such as Chairman Levin and Senator McCain
today, and former Chairman Sam Nunn and John Warner, as well as
those who served as my chairman and ranking member on the
Readiness Subcommittee, Senator Akaka, and former Senators John
Glenn and Chuck Robb.
I thank Senator Akaka for his kind words, which are so
characteristic of him.
I also want to recognize my friends and colleagues on the
staff, including those who continue today to uphold the
committee's high standards, such as Rick DeBobes and Chris
Cowart, as well as their predecessors over the years, including
especially people like David Lyles and John Hamre, who took the
time to mentor me when I was new here, quite awhile ago now.
Whether we serve in the executive or legislative branch, I
think we all feel that sense of shared responsibility for our
national security. During my career, I have often felt that the
two common images, of partisanship or ineffectiveness, that
serve as caricatures of Washington, bore little, if any,
resemblance to what I saw here inside the committee.
It's impossible for me to do justice today to all those
that I've worked with or for, or what this committee has
accomplished during all those years, but I would pick just one
thing, and that's the opportunity to work with former Senator
John Glenn, who was my first subcommittee ranking member when
Senator McCain was chairman of the Readiness and Management
Support Subcommittee in the 1990s. John Glenn is a hero to so
many Americans, but especially to those of us, like my mother
and I, who grew up in Ohio. To have had the opportunity to work
with such a dedicated public servant and wonderful human being
was a treat I never could have imagined when I graduated from
Ohio State University, years ago.
I would like to introduce my family. My mother, Anne, has
come from Ohio to be with me today, and I'm grateful for her
guidance and support. I'm especially pleased that both of my
wonderful daughters could be here with me today, Alejandra,
who's here from Boston, and Meredith, from Virginia. They grew
up during my career on the Senate Armed Services Committee, and
although that path was my choice, and not theirs, they shared
in the sacrifice that the long hours, required on the
committee, imposes on a family. I thank them for their
understanding.
I'm grateful to the President for appointing me, last year,
to the position I currently hold, and then for nominating me to
that same position after it changed to a confirmable one by
last year's authorization bill. I'm proud to be part of the
team serving under the President, Vice President Biden,
Secretary Gates, and Deputy Secretary Lynn.
It's also a great pleasure to serve under the Comptroller,
Bob Hale, who was confirmed by this committee last year. We in
the comptroller family are fortunate to have a boss of his
caliber.
There's a strong sense of mission in DOD that I've felt
since I've been there. You cannot help but feel it when you're
in the presence of Secretary Gates or when you're with our men
and women in uniform, especially those who are in harm's way,
and I think that sense flows from the troops to our Secretary
and back again.
The staff of the comptroller team that Bob and I are
privileged to lead are very capable and work extremely hard to
do their part to ensure the Department can accomplish its
missions; in particular, to respond to the ever-changing needs
of the military at war. We have no shortage of challenges.
Should I be confirmed, I will continue to do my best to
support our military, the comptroller organization that
supports them, our Secretary, our Commander in Chief, and our
Constitution.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. McCord.
Ms. Burke.
STATEMENT OF SHARON E. BURKE, NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONAL ENERGY PLANS AND PROGRAMS
Ms. Burke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members
of the committee. I very much appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today and that you will consider my
nomination to be the Director of Operational Energy Plans and
Programs at DOD.
I'm grateful for the confidence that President Obama has
shown in me by nominating me for this position, and I thank
Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary Lynn, and Under Secretary
Carter for their support for my nomination.
Of course, I owe special gratitude to Senator Warner. He
had a remarkable career here in the Senate, and it's even more
remarkable that he continues his service to the Nation as a
private citizen. I'm very grateful to him for all of his
support.
I also deeply appreciate the encouragement and enthusiasm
of my family, and especially, my husband Paul Fagiolo, and my
sons, Anthony and Thomas, who are here today; along with my
father-in-law, Romeo Fagiolo; he's here today, as well. His
service to the Nation in the Rainbow Division during World War
II continues to be a great inspiration to me, along with that
of my own late father, Tom Burke, who was a marine in the Cold
War. In fact, I hope that, if I am confirmed in this position,
that my service to the Nation will make them as proud of me as
I am of them.
This committee and Congress have shown an acute interest in
the issues of operational energy by creating this new position
for which you are considering me today. The President and the
Secretary of Defense have, likewise, placed a very high
priority on the energy security of the Nation, and specifically
to energy posture of DOD. I believe that my experience in
national security, energy security, and in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense have prepared me well to help advance
these priorities. If I am confirmed, I will be tremendously
honored to work with this committee, with Congress, as well as
partners across the defense enterprise and in the private
sector, to address and advance these important issues.
I thank you again for the opportunity to appear here today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Ms. Burke.
Mr. Watson.
STATEMENT OF SOLOMON B. WATSON IV, NOMINEE TO BE GENERAL
COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Mr. Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCain,
and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee. It's a great honor to have been nominated by
President Obama to be General Counsel of the Army, and to be
before this committee today.
I'm also very grateful for the confidence and support of
Secretary of the Army McHugh.
I want to thank my extended family for their support.
Brenda Watson, my wife of 25 years, is with me today, and I
want to introduce her and to note my appreciation for her. My
twin daughters are here, along with their husbands and
children. I note that my 4-year-old twin granddaughters are
learning to recite the Pledge of Allegiance in their pre-K
school. Two sisters, a brother, and a nephew round out the
family contingent. All together, they are a great and
supportive unit, and I owe them a debt of gratitude for the
patience that they've shown me over the years.
I have had an almost lifelong affinity for the Army,
starting out by seeing photos of our father, an Army veteran,
in uniform. Two of my brothers served the military honorably.
One of my brothers, a marine, paid the ultimate sacrifice,
resulting in our mother's being among the Gold Star Mothers.
My formal relationship with the Army began with advance
Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) at Howard University.
After graduating in 1966, I entered the Army as a 2nd
Lieutenant. I did a tour in Vietnam during 1967 and 1968. While
there, I met Captain Steve Swartz and Lieutenant Michael
Cahill. It was Swartz that persuaded me to go to law school. It
was Cahill who served with me in the 9th Division Military
Police (MP) Company, and I'm honored that my colleagues are
here with me today.
I've been a lawyer in the private sector for 35 years.
Anyone who has worked with me know that the Army and its
soldiers are not far from my heart or from my mind. Indeed, I
have always maintained that my military experience was very
important in my success as a lawyer and an executive.
Our Army, the world's greatest, is undergoing a substantial
transformation as it fights two contingency operations and
deals with the many changes and challenges of the 21st century.
Throughout my career, I have worked successfully in challenging
and changing legal, regulatory, and business environments. I'm
here today as a volunteer, because, if confirmed, I would like
to make a contribution, in any way I can, to support our Army's
efforts. If confirmed, I pledge to work with the outstanding
civilian and military lawyers in the Department to ensure the
provision of quality, candid legal advice. If confirmed, I will
put the interests of our country, our Army, and the rule of
law, above all others.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Watson.
Ms. Hammack.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE G. HAMMACK, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT
Ms. Hammack. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCain, and
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
it is an honor and a privilege to appear before you today. I am
humbled and deeply honored that President Obama had the
confidence and Secretary McHugh supported my nomination to be
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and the
Environment.
Before I go much further, I would like to recognize my
family and friends who have joined me here today. First of all,
my son, Alex, who is going to Arizona State University,
majoring in sustainability, and also skipping school today. My
mother, Mary Kate Dellett, also traveled here from Arizona, and
my brother, Steve Dellett, traveled here from Illinois. Three
friends have also joined me--Rebecca Truelove, Gopika Parikah,
and David Matthew. I'm very honored and grateful for their
encouragement and their support.
Coming to Washington, DC, will be a return to the place
where I was born. My father, who is now deceased, was a captain
in the Air Force, stationed at Fort Myer while my mother worked
in Washington, DC, at the State Department. I was born after my
father left the Air Force and was studying law at George
Washington University College of Law.
The Army is tackling many challenges today. First of all,
there's a need to complete the Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) process in a timely manner while still supporting our
troops' unit readiness in an era of persistent conflict.
Providing quality housing for soldiers, wounded warriors, and
their families is critical to restoring a sense of balance in
the Army. In addition, the 2010 QDR highlighted the importance
of crafting a strategic approach to climate and energy. The
White House, in addition, has identified a goal of a 28-percent
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, as called for in
Executive Order 13514, and an objective of zero net energy in
all new Federal facilities by 2030.
I have almost 30 years of experience in energy and the
environment in the private sector. In the varieties of
experience I've had over my career, I've obtained many lessons
learned and seen best practices. It is the application of those
best practices, leadership experience, and the knowledge
gained, that I look forward to bringing to the role of
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and the
Environment.
Over the weekend, I was able to take my son to Arlington
Cemetery to view the burial place for both of my grandparents.
While there, we visited the John F. Kennedy Memorial, where we
saw the quote ``Ask not what your country can do for you, but
what you can do for your country.'' I'm here today to ask for
the confirmation of my role to serve my country as Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Installations and the Environment.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Ms. Hammack.
We have a lot of nominees, but let's try 8 minutes of
questioning for our first round, and hopefully we'll have time
for a second round, should that be needed.
First, Ms. McGrath, let me ask you this question. Over the
decades, we have made many efforts to get DOD's business
systems to function efficiently and in a coordinated way. It
seems that almost every time we try to acquire a new business
system which could operate that way for the Department, it is
over budget, comes in behind schedule, doesn't meet user
expectations. The Defense Integrated Military Human Resources
System (DIMHRS) is just the latest example of that failure.
What, in your judgment, Ms. McGrath, are the most important
steps that the Department needs to take to get better results
out of business systems acquisitions?
Ms. McGrath. Sir, thank you for the question. DIMHRS, I
would agree, is an example proving our ability not to deliver
on-time, large-scale, information technology (IT)
implementations. A lot of the issues associated with the IT of
acquisitions stem from the lack of business process
reengineering. In the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010, specifically section 1072, now provides that
requirement for us in the Department to ensure that we conduct
appropriate level of business process reengineering. That will
be paramount to ensuring effective delivery.
Requirements creep, or appetites suppressant in terms of
requirements, is also an area that we have struggled with. Our
IT implementations tend to look 5 to 7, 10 years toward final
implementation. A different approach, focused on more near-
term, incremental improvements--18 months is what industry
typically fields--is absolutely necessary to ensure the user
gets what they want, that they stay closer to the budget, as
planned, and that we actually have an effective IT solution.
Chairman Levin. It's important that you keep in touch with
this committee. This is, frankly, been a long and very
frustrating road. We've appropriated a lot of money, authorized
a lot of money, in the case of this committee, to put together
some business processes which work, and we have, so far, really
not had much success. Would you, if confirmed, get back to this
committee with a report, within 60 days, as to progress that
you're making, what the challenges are, what your plans are,
and also tell us whether or not you have consulted with some of
the great IT geniuses that we have in this country? Obviously,
they can't be part of companies which would bid on anything, so
you'd have to be talking to people who would not have that kind
of a conflict of interest. But, we have such incredible
geniuses in America in this area, the idea that we've been
unable to get the job done inside DOD's business systems, to
me, is totally unacceptable. Will you get back to us within 60
days?
Ms. McGrath. Yes, sir, if confirmed, I'd be happy to do
that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. McCord, let me talk to you about a similar problem. In
last year's authorization bill, we required DOD to work towards
an auditable financial statement by the end of 2017--if my eyes
are not deceiving me, 2017. What is the Department going to
need to do to accomplish that objective, which seems awfully
minimal, nominal? What role are you going to play, when you're
confirmed, in this effort?
Mr. McCord. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, the date is 2017.
In my view, there's three things you need to achieve that. You
need correct data, you need the systems that produce that data,
and you need trained people. I think you can't do it with just
two, you need all three.
Mr. Hale, the Comptroller, has laid out his priorities for
how to get there. His focus is to concentrate on the
information that managers in the Department use most. That
information is particularly in what's called the Statement of
Budgetary Resources. That's his priority of how to start down
the path to get there. If confirmed, my role would be to
support Mr. Hale, who is the Chief Financial Officer, and our
Deputy Chief Financial Officer (DCFO) and his team. The DCFO is
part of our comptroller organization that plays the lead role
in that, and I would support them, as Mr. Hale directs.
Chairman Levin. Since September 11, DOD has paid for much
of the cost for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq through
supplemental appropriations. This is addressed to you, Mr.
McCord. The current administration has responded to
congressional concerns by submitting full-year funding requests
for 2010 and 2011. The budget for 2011 includes a 2010
supplemental request of $33 billion for an additional 30,000
troops in Afghanistan, bringing the total 2010 funding for
overseas contingency operations to $163 billion. Second, the
budget for 2011 includes a full-year war funding request of
$159 billion for fiscal year 2011. Third, a placeholder request
of $50 billion for overseas contingency operations for each
year after 2011--$50 billion in 2012, $50 billion in 2013, $50
billion in 2014, and $50 billion in 2015.
Number one, why is the Department including placeholder war
funding total for the out years? Second, why $50 billion? What
is the basis for that kind of a placeholder number? Why not
$100 billion or some other amount? I'll leave it at that.
Mr. McCord. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you said, it has
been the practice of the administration to try and budget as
accurately as we can for the budget year that we're in and that
is before Congress at any time. We've done that for fiscal year
2011, as we did last year. The supplemental to which you
referred, for fiscal year 2010, was solely because of the
surge, which was a later decision by the President.
The placeholder in the out years was a subject of great
debate internally last year. This year, we basically followed
the decision we reached last year, which was to not attempt to
forecast with great precision, precision that really was not
available to us, what would happen that many years in advance,
and to clearly communicate to the public, to Congress, and to
people in Afghanistan and Iraq, that we were not making a
particular projection, and to clearly state that it was a
placeholder that was not intended to make a policy judgment
about events of 2012 or 2013 or 2014, today. The number 50, I
think that was a decision by the Director of OMB, primarily. As
you state, it could have been some other number, but we felt
that it was important to have it not be zero, as in the past,
but to make it a hundred would have sent, maybe, a message that
was not intended. So, we decided to make it something that was
clearly a placeholder, and to so state in the budget documents
of the President.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. McCord.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. McGrath, how far off is the Department from being able
to produce a clean audit?
Ms. McGrath. I understand the Department's current
projection is 2017.
Senator McCain. You think they'll make that?
Ms. McGrath. I think that, each year, they'll make progress
against that goal. I think that the focus that Mr. Hale has put
on, in terms of their prioritization of the efforts and the
leadership attention and management controls within that
Department, gives them a higher probability than they had
previous to that.
Senator McCain. So, you think we'll make the goal.
Ms. McGrath. I think that they will make progress against
the goal. I think time will tell as to whether or not they're
able to hit the 2017 goal. I will also include that it is an
aggressive goal and it is tied to the successful implementation
of our IT systems, as the question that was previously asked of
me. Enterprise resource planning. The success of the Department
lies not only on the internal controls, but the ability of our
systems to deliver.
Senator McCain. I think most Americans would be astonished
to know that we have never been able to have an audit of the
largest expenditure of taxpayers' dollars, a half trillion
dollars. I hope you work on it. It's a lot more complicated
than we know, including the legacy systems that are not even
recording transactions. It's a very frustrating thing, and I
hope you'll give it a very high priority.
Mr. McCord, the appropriations bill from last year
contained a last-minute earmark that was air-dropped in, in the
final days of the conference, for $300 million to be spent by
DOD for ``medical transportation infrastructure.'' Are you
familiar with that earmark?
Mr. McCord. Yes, Senator.
Senator McCain. Yet, I understand the general counsel says
it doesn't allow the Department to expend those monies as
directed by the legislation. Is that true?
Mr. McCord. The Department believes it cannot execute the
money, as written currently, that is correct.
Senator McCain. You are aware of the situation. Are you
aware of anyone in DOD who is working with the Appropriations
Committee to find a way to spend these monies?
Mr. McCord. I believe the Deputy Secretary met with some
Members of Congress last week, including members of the
Appropriations Committee, to discuss the problem, that the
money could not be executed as spent.
Senator McCain. In other words, they're trying to spend the
money.
Mr. McCord. Congress enacted the funds, and, as with most
funds, I think Congress intended them to be spent as enacted.
Yes.
Senator McCain. Have you figured out what ``medical
transportation infrastructure'' means, except that it has to be
spent in Maryland and Virginia?
Mr. McCord. The statute does not speak to Maryland,
Virginia, or any other place. I think ``medical
infrastructure''--``transportation infrastructure'' is
generally taken to mean roads.
Senator McCain. I think you ought to double check. I think
that is earmarked for Maryland and Virginia, Mr. McCord. But,
do you know what it means, ``$300 million for medical
transportation infrastructure''?
Mr. McCord. Again, I think ``transportation
infrastructure'' is--generally, in the United States, roads,
which is the primary mean of transportation in this country.
But, it could be transportation encompasses buses and subways
and things, as well.
Senator McCain. So, we throw $300 million at ``medical
transportation infrastructure.'' No wonder Americans are
steamed.
Mr. Watson, in your response to my letter, you cited the
rationale for publication that was given by the executive
editor of the New York Times, whom you stated made the decision
to publish these stories, the Terrorist Surveillance Program
and the SWIFT program. I'd like to know your personal opinion,
today, with the benefit of hindsight, about whether publication
of these stories was justified.
Mr. Watson. Thank you, Senator. I think it's important for
me to state for this committee that, as a public citizen and a
former defender of this country, that I do not like to see
information based on classified information in the public
domain. That relates both to our national security and our
military intelligence processes.
Senator McCain. Again, I'd appreciate it if you'd answer
the question. Do you believe that the publication of these
stories was justified?
Mr. Watson. Senator, the publications of those stories were
consistent with the law as it stood at the time they were
published. There was not a violation of the law to publish
those stories.
Senator McCain. I'd ask one more time. Your personal
opinion, with the benefit of hindsight, do you believe that the
publication of these stories was justified?
Mr. Watson. Senator, that puts me in a sensitive position
of commenting on discussions related to a story that I'm
responsible for the lawyering on, and I have somewhat of a
tough legal line to tow on that. But, I wish I could emphasize
sufficiently my concern and to state that, were I fortunate
enough to be confirmed in this position, I would take an
aggressive action against anyone in the Department of the Army
who leaked classified information.
Senator McCain. Mr. Watson, when we have hearings here for
nominees to the administration, no matter what the
administration is, we ask for people's personal opinion on
issues. I don't see any reason why you couldn't respond to the
question, and I'll ask it for the fourth time. I'd like to
know, in your personal opinion, with the benefit of hindsight,
about whether publication of these stories was justified. I'm
simply asking for your personal opinion.
Mr. Watson. Senator, my opinion is that the decision to
publish them was justified. Were it my decision to make, I
would not have made that decision. I take that as to say that,
``No.''
Senator McCain. I thank you. Did you have any role or
responsibility for decisions made by the New York Times in the
role of general counsel, did you have any role or
responsibility for decisions, made by the New York Times, which
involved disclosure of classified national security
information?
Mr. Watson. The role of the general counsel is merely to
provide legal advice to the newsroom department which makes an
editorial decision. As the general counsel, I'd be responsible
for the legal advice that was given. In connection with
reviewing such a story, I'm sure that there would be a
discussion about the potential impacts of that story on
national security, sir.
Senator McCain. You had a role and responsibility for these
decisions?
Mr. Watson. Not for these specific decisions. I was not
involved in reviewing these particular stories. The person
responsible for reviewing these stories was the deputy general
counsel, who succeeded me as general counsel.
Senator McCain. I say with great respect, I would think
that a decision of this impact, two highly classified programs,
that perhaps the general counsel would have at least played an
advisory role. But, I thank you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to thank each of you for your willingness to
take these jobs and these nominations. I appreciate your time
here, and I appreciate all of your family members being here
with you today.
Ms. Burke, I wanted to also mention that one of my nephews
recently had you in a class, and said that you were an
excellent professor. I just thought I'd share that with you.
Secretary Mabus has committed the Navy and the Marine Corps
to a series of ambitious goals that are aimed at reducing the
energy footprint of our Nation's expeditionary forces. Senator
Warner, in his opening comments, made the comment about how
much energy that our military uses across the world.
Ms. Burke, as Director of Operational Energy Plans and
Programs, what contributions will you be able to make in
assisting the Navy and Marine Corps towards reaching these
objectives?
Ms. Burke. Thank you, Senator. I can say that your nephew
Tyler was also an excellent student.
The Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs, by
statute, has a role in coordinating, overseeing, and helping to
manage all of the Services in their energy postures, on the
operational side. If I were confirmed in this job, it would be
my job to oversee all of their planning in this area, and also
to be the lead agent for an operational energy strategy for
DOD. I would have oversight and would help them define better
what the mutual goals are. I think the challenge there is to
make sure that it works across the Services and also
differentiates for the different roles and missions.
Senator Hagan. Do you have any specifics, that you could
share with us today, that you would like to see beginning to be
implemented?
Ms. Burke. Yes, Senator. One of my top priorities, if I'm
confirmed, is to make sure that deployed forces have the
opportunity to be as effective as possible in their missions. I
believe that right now energy is a vulnerability and a
constraint on our deployed forces, and that we can do better in
that area.
Senator Hagan. Meaning the energy for the deployed forces--
can you give me an example of what you're talking about?
Ms. Burke. Sure. For example, forces who are deployed in
Afghanistan have a long fuel supply line. The convoys that are
taking out are either run by contractors or a required version
of combat forces for protection. It's a burden on the force,
and also it can compromise mission effectiveness if you're not
able to get the fuel you need. These are very fuel-intensive
operations.
I think our first mission in this job, if confirmed, is to
make sure that our deployed forces have better options
available to them.
We also need to look at the business processes of the
Department, make sure that they account for the full cost and
the full burden of energy.
Senator Hagan. One other question. There are currently a
number of offices within DOD, as well as the Department of
Energy and the national labs, that have an interest in
capturing the benefits associated with any innovation that we
have in energy research. If confirmed, do you envision your
office playing a leadership role within DOD in research,
development, and advancement of alternative energy
technologies? How do you expect to reconcile the efforts of
your office with those of the other stakeholders?
Ms. Burke. Senator, my office, by statute, would have a
lead role, if I'm confirmed, in that regard. I believe it will
be very important to work with Ms. Hammack, if she's confirmed,
and with all of her colleagues, to leverage the expertise and
the experience that we already have in the Department and
across the Government in these issues. There was a Defense
Science Board report in 2008 on this topic, and it identified
as one of the major missing elements in the Department's energy
posture is leadership. I believe that Congress was very smart
in creating this job so that it could catalyze the leadership
necessary, and that's what, if confirmed, I would look forward
to providing.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Ms. Hammack, I served for 10 years in the State Senate in
North Carolina, and during those years we were obviously
involved in the BRAC work. We were concerned about the
encroachment of development taking place around military bases.
We wanted to be sure to do whatever we could to protect those
areas, so that they weren't developed, so that our military
bases had room to conduct the training and exercises that
needed to be done at our bases. If confirmed, what measures do
you intend to pursue in order to address the pressures of
encroachment at our military installations?
Ms. Hammack. Thank you, Senator. I understand that there
are several measures that the Army is already taking on
encroachment. Some of them have to do with alternative uses, so
that the land around it is put to a usable purpose, yet is
defined as not available for development. I think some of those
are successful, and, if confirmed, I look forward to expanding
those programs and investigating other alternatives.
Senator Hagan. How about the funding stream?
Ms. Hammack. Some of the funding streams could be through
the enhanced-use lease or through other mechanisms already in
place. But, that certainly is a challenge that I will look
into, if confirmed. Thank you.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Watson, in your response to the
committee's advance policy questions regarding whether or not
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provides
appropriate jurisdiction over alleged criminal actions in areas
of combat operations, you noted that both the Department of
Justice and DOD play a role in determining appropriate
jurisdiction. With respect to contractor employees in areas of
combat operations, what do you believe to be the determining
factors for whether DOD or the Department of Justice should
exercise jurisdiction?
Mr. Watson. Thank you, Senator. I've not studied that area
in depth, but would do so, if confirmed. My view is that the
decision would have to be made on a case-by-case basis, perhaps
depending on the nature of the allegation, the jurisdiction
that the allegation took place in, and the kinds of issues that
it would raise, either consistent with those which had been
tried under the UCMJ or those which had been handled by the
Department of Justice.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Burke, in my office we talked a little bit about
alternative fuel sources, that we have to continue the research
in the cellulosic and algae landfill waste and other biofuel
options. I voiced my concern that we must, in the near term, in
the mid-term, develop and produce alternative fuels using
proven technologies. Now, I'm talking about your gas-to-liquid
and your coal-to-liquid. Unfortunately, section 526 creates a
cloud over some of the Federal agencies from entering into a
contract for an alternative or synthetic fuel of any mobility-
related use, other than for research. In other words, to
actually use in combat. When asked about potential impact on
national security in the near- and mid-term, if this country
did not start the development of the organic production
capabilities of alternative fuels--correct me if I'm wrong on
what you stated twice--that you didn't see that we're going to
have a supply problem. Is that correct? Or, that we do not have
a supply problem?
Ms. Burke. Senator, I would say that we have volatility
problems with our supply, and certainly tactical issues with
supplies, with deployed forces that are actually independent of
any alternative fuels. Our supply problems on the front have
nothing to do with any alternatives. As for whether or not we
have a supply problem, I believe what I said, if I recall
correctly, is that I believe our military forces will not have
a supply problem in the near- to mid-term, regardless of what
happens in the larger market. That does not mean that we
shouldn't be concerned about volatility and other issues with
supplies, but I don't believe our military forces will----
Senator Inhofe. All right. In the fiscal year 2010, of our
authorization bill, in our conference report, the conferees
acknowledged that section 526 was not intended to preclude DOD
from purchasing the fuel it needs, and that clarification is
required. Do you think clarification is required?
Ms. Burke. Senator, I would have to study that and also
would want to look at that, if confirmed, in the context of
what people at DOD think.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, do you believe, Ms. Burke, that
importing the majority of our oil supplies put this country at
risk? Our dependency on foreign oil?
Ms. Burke. Senator, I do. I think it's a security risk.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, and I agree. I agree with that.
Now, in October of this past year, 2009, a report from the
Congressional Research Service revealed that America's combined
recoverable natural gas, oil, and coal endowment is the largest
on Earth, larger than Saudi Arabia, China, and Canada,
combined. Now, I'd be in a position to make a statement, and
back it up, that if we did not restrict our own development of
our own resources, that between Canada and United States we
would not have to import oil from other countries. Right now,
in terms of natural gas at the rate of use, we have enough
natural gas to meet our demand for the next 90 years. We have
all of these opportunities. Right now in Canada, in 2008, they
had 1.3 million barrels a day; it should be up around 2 and a
half million barrels a day today. So, coming to that
conclusion, along with compressed natural gas and what we're
doing, I believe that we could be energy independent from
outside of the North American continent today. Do you agree
with that?
Ms. Burke. Senator, first of all, I would say that our
military forces will not be energy independent, because we do
procure our fuel where the forces are deployed, so my focus, if
I'm confirmed in this job, is our military forces.
Second, I know that you and I have a difference of opinion
on this, but I consider the security risks of added greenhouse
gases to be important, as well, and would not promote the use
of fuels that are carbon intensive.
Senator Inhofe. We have a job description. Part of your job
is to look after our national security, in terms of having an
adequate oil supply. I'm going to read what DOD stated just
recently, ``Finally, even a narrow interpretation of 526, in an
effort to reduce the uncertainty and the scope of section 526,
could still limit the Department's flexibility in making
emergency fuel purchases--overseas fuel purchases and purchases
at commercial stations and airports. Currently, there is no
method to determine whether fuel purchased at these locations
meet the requirements of section 526.''
The question I'd ask you is, how could they know? How could
they know that they would meet the requirements?
Ms. Burke. Senator, I think it's an excellent question that
I'm not able to answer at this time, and would certainly want
to look into, to find out whether or not section 526 restricts
military operations in that way.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Why don't you do that, because in the
event that it does restrict military operations, there's no way
that they can know, because we know that they have to purchase
fuel in places where they can't really determine in advance--
could be South Africa, it could be any place else. We know that
there are no means of making a determination as to whether or
not these fuels that they purchase are consistent with the
requirements of 526. The question I would have of you is,
assuming that's true, would you have any problem authorizing
the use of fuels, where you don't know for certain whether or
not they comply with 526?
Ms. Burke. Senator, I would have to look into that, to be
able to answer that question better. But, I will say that, if
I'm confirmed in this job, I see my top priority would be
mission effectiveness of our force. That would certainly be a
guiding principle. But, as to the specific question, I would
have to find out the answer to that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Combined effect on military operations dealing with the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, section 526, the
findings of an October 2009 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report
on American natural gas, oil, and coal resources, and sole-sourcing
domestic energy.
My understanding is that the Department of Defense (DOD) is looking
into concerns about section 526 of the 2007 Energy Independence and
Security Act; as this is a matter of internal deliberation, I do not
know the details. In my view, although DOD should of course comply with
the law, I do not believe it was the intent of this law to constrain
military operations in any way. If confirmed, I would seek to clarify
--and correct, if need be --this matter.
Concerning the October 2009 CRS report, I do not see an operational
energy connection between the report's findings and DOD's compliance
with Section 526, given the inability of DOD or the commercial sector
to differentiate among sources of fuels that go into the United States
and global distribution chain. The CRS report does do a good job of
highlighting the potential for domestically-produced fuels, as well as
the concerns and constraints. Generally, the report finds that while
the United States has significant technically recoverable fossil fuel
resources, the expense involved in recovering them also will be
significant, to be borne by industry and consumers or by the Federal
Government and taxpayers.
Nonetheless, the United States, including the U.S. military, is now
overwhelmingly dependent on fossil fuels and is likely to be for some
time. All fueling options need to be on the table and given due
consideration: DOD has to be able to procure whatever fuels the
military needs to conduct its operations, in a way that is as reliable
as possible while minimizing opportunity costs. In my view, in today's
military operations, there are energy alternatives, on the supply and
demand sides, that the Services should be adopting in order to lower
operational risks and improve effectiveness. In the longer term, the
military's dependence on petroleum products constitutes a stark
vulnerability and it is appropriate and even necessary that in addition
to pursuing demand management today, the Department research and
develop other energy alternatives.
Senator Inhofe. All right. In your written statement, you
said, ``One of my job priorities would be force protection in
these areas--and a global operation against terrorist
organizations.'' I would assume, then, that you believe that
national defense is one of your top priorities, in terms of the
availability of fuel to carry out the missions that we have to
carry out.
Ms. Burke. Yes, Senator, I believe that this job, as it's
defined in the statute, its role is to improve the mission
effectiveness of U.S. forces.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Ms. Burke. Both the future force and the current force.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Mr. Watson, I was trying to follow along here, and I'm
looking at your background. You were with the New York Times
for how many years?
Mr. Watson. Thirty-two, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thirty-two years, and you were general
counsel from 1989 to 2005. Is that correct?
Mr. Watson. Yes, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. It was during that timeframe that we had a
lot of problems that came up, that surfaced, where the New York
Times was notified, in terms of some of the things that they
were using, and what they were reporting, that this could be a
problem with our security, specifically talking about the
Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) and other classified
materials. You're aware that the New York Times, during that
period of time, was notified by DOD, or the Pentagon--I'm not
sure who actually did it--that the release of this information
could impair our national security. Is that correct?
Mr. Watson. Yes, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. You--with your job--are not stating, I
don't believe, that you could not have stopped this, as the
general counsel for the New York Times during that same
timeframe. You're not saying that, are you?
Mr. Watson. Senator, I think it would be helpful if I could
explain how the organization worked. It was the New York Times
newspaper, which is kind of a separate organization, with its
own culture and with its own protocol and its own chain of
command. There is the corporate side of the business, which I
worked on. The process, which has always been the case at the
New York Times, when an executive editor, a senior editor,
believes that there's a story that's going to run with a legal
issue, lawyers are brought in to give their legal advice on the
story, and the final decision, if running the story is not, on
its face, illegal, is made by, in this case, the publisher and/
or the executive editor.
Senator Inhofe. When you say ``lawyers are brought in,''
were you brought in at that point?
Mr. Watson. No, the way we were organized is that we have
experts in various subject-matter areas. I had, at that time,
three experts in the First Amendment area, including the deputy
general counsel. They were the lawyers who engaged in what we
call ``prepublication review.'' They had responsibility for
that from the publisher and from me. I'm responsible for the
legal advice that is given.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Mr. Watson. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. My time has expired. But, I am going to ask
that you put down in writing for us, for the record, just
exactly what your role was, and was not, during those specific
inquiries that were made by DOD.
Mr. Watson. I'll do that, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your willingness to serve.
I want to actually follow up on what Senator Inhofe was
bringing forward, Ms. Burke. First I want to remind everyone--I
appreciate he mentioned Canada, but don't forget Alaska and
that mix that we provide. We have one-third of the gas reserves
of this country, still untapped and full. I know we both have
talked about this, we recognize that it's an important asset
for this country.
But, Ms. Burke, your comment, which I thought was
interesting--I want to make sure we have a little followup--and
that is, you slipped in a comment that you're also concerned
about greenhouse gases. I recognize that. Alaska is ground
zero, when it comes to this issue, so we understand this. We're
also one of the largest producers of oil and gas, so we
understand the balance that's necessary. Gas is, in my view,
one of the best alternative fuels, in the sense of as we move
to alternative fuels, the transition fuel. Are you looking at,
or will you be looking at, within DOD, how to utilize gas in a
much more aggressive way as a part of the equation?
Ms. Burke. Senator, I think natural gas is a very important
bridge fuel, especially for this country and for the world. I
think that the responsibilities of this position I'm being
considered for is operational energy, and that natural gas, in
general, is probably not going to be very appropriate for those
purposes, for deployed forces and tactical uses. It is
certainly worth looking at, and I think we should explore all
options. I do believe that, on the facility side, that we have
been looking at opportunities there to bring in more natural
gas.
Senator Begich. If you can expand a little bit, when you
talk about operational energy plans that you'll be responsible
for in developing, how do you see DOD moving from where they
are now, which is the largest consumer of fuel, both in
structure as well as mobile operations--how do you see, and
what do you see--if you could measure 5 years from now or 10
years from now--where are we at?
Ms. Burke. Senator, I think that on the facilities side, as
Senator Warner indicated, we've had a lot of success in cutting
fuel use and in being more efficient. I'm sure we'll have a
great deal more if we're fortunate enough to have Ms. Hammack
confirmed. So, I think we have lessons we can learn there that
we can transfer over.
On the operational side, DOD has not been subject to
executive orders or directives or laws in cutting energy use
there. I think there are a number of opportunities in weapons
platforms, in tactical vehicles, in how we're deployed in using
alternative energy sources, renewable fuels. I think,
particularly for deployed forces, there are some very
interesting opportunities. I think, in the way that our
business processes run and the requirements process, in the
acquisition process, that we could be considering energy use as
a performance parameter and incorporating it into how we do
business, and cutting energy use without compromising
performance at all. I think there are a lot of opportunities
for doing that, and there are a number of people in the
Department who are willing to do so. What we need, at this
point, is just the momentum and a way to tie it all together.
I'm very optimistic that in 5 years, we'll see some
improvements.
Senator Begich. We talk about energy probably every other
committee meeting, in some form or another; someone has some
issues, or so forth. Do you think we should have an opportunity
for you, as well as mobile but stationary operations, to lay
out what you are planning to do and how that would impact?
Because, in reality, where DOD goes in this effort is a huge
market force. Just as we know, with the solar panel work that
the military is doing, the Air Force is doing, and others, that
where you go could drive the economy, one way or another, into
a new clean-energy economy. Is that a worthwhile discussion
that we should have, specifically around this area, to elevate
the importance of it within DOD?
Ms. Burke. Senator, I think, to be fair, you've already
done that by creating this position. We will have a discussion
about it, I hope. I believe that, if confirmed, I have 180 days
to produce a strategy with goals--near-, mid-, and long-term
goals--which will be a good point of discussion, as well as the
metrics for measuring success. We will have something to talk
about, if I'm confirmed.
I do think that the Department can provide important demand
pull and innovation pull, particularly when the Department is
solving its own problems. When we look at what we need, in
terms of our military forces, I believe we have tremendous
ability to affect research development and commercial
development, as well.
Senator Begich. Very good.
If I may, Ms. McGrath, I want to go back to you, in regards
to the payroll system and some of the business systems. To be
honest with you, I'm relatively new to the committee, a year-
plus. When I heard the discussion--I think Senator Burris
brought it up one day--the comment was, ``We killed off the
program because it wasn't working or didn't do what it needed
to do, after spending at least a half a billion dollars, maybe
more.'' I have a great many questions. For me, that's just
outrageous, to be very frank with you, and I'm trying to
rationalize, my mind, how we deal with this.
I know, in your written testimony, you talked about the
``core IT base of it,'' and I'm not sure exactly the right
phrase, but some of it might be utilized in the process of each
area doing their own payroll development or their own business
systems. How much of that work do you really believe will be
utilized? Do it on a percent scale.
Ms. McGrath. Each of the military departments--actually,
the Services are pursuing their integrated military pay and
personnel solution for their respective service. The Marine
Corps will continue to utilize their existing system, which is
the Marine Corps Total Force system. So, today, I don't expect
the Marine Corps to adopt any of----
Senator Begich. Any of that.
Ms. McGrath.--any of that. However, that said, I do know
that the Department of the Navy, which includes both Services,
is looking at how to best integrate pay and personnel for their
entire department, focusing first on the Navy, because they
don't have an integrated solution within the Navy.
Senator Begich. But give me a percentage, out of the 100
percent we spent, 10 percent of that might be used?
Ms. McGrath. I think that each are in a different stage, if
you will, of assessing what I refer to as the Core IT Solution,
which is the pay-related and entitlements that affect pay.
The Department of the Army has come on the wire to indicate
that they intend to utilize the Core IT investment; and,
according to their numbers, they are approximately 86 percent
fit, if you will, with the Core. What they're doing is, then,
doing the analysis surrounding the rest of their environment to
then determine if they could use more.
To be complete, the Air Force is doing an analysis of
alternatives using the Core IT investment as the basis of that.
Senator Begich. In one of your written responses, it says,
``Unfortunately, many of these communities and organizations
were reluctant to adopt the uniform processes and business
rules with the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) product,'' so
forth, so on. What do you think drove the communities or
organizations not to adopt those processes? What drove that
decision? Was it just that they were ingrained in a certain way
of doing business, or that change is not of interest to them?
Ms. McGrath. I really think that whenever you're trying to
adopt a COTS out of the box, it's a commercial product that
certainly would be foreign to DOD. But, recall, that particular
solution was trying to get every Military Service aligned
completely, and then utilize the COTS. Not only did you have
the enormous culture challenge--getting all four Services and
millions of people to adopt the same approach to military
personnel and pay--but then, you also had a new IT solution,
which required us to then do things more commercial-like. I
think it was a combination of the two.
Senator Begich. Let me end there. I have plenty more
questions, but I'll stop, and just leave you with one question.
Who was at fault for waiting so long? Half a billion
dollars, to me--I don't know, maybe to DOD, is not a lot of
money, but to me, it seems like a lot of money. Why wait that
long until the decision's made to say, ``Pull the plug''? Some
cases, up to a billion dollars. I'm not sure what the right
number is, but it's somewhere in there.
Ms. McGrath. I think each program is different, and there
are certainly decision points, in every acquisition program,
where a----
Senator Begich. Do you think DOD had a responsibility here
to pull the plug earlier?
Ms. McGrath. I think DOD made the decision to terminate the
program, again, the large-scale program, when the determination
was made that it was not going to go well.
Senator Begich. Okay.
Let me end there, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To each of you, we thank you for your willingness to serve
your country in this capacity. Some of you, obviously, have
been involved in public service. We thank you for that. But, to
all of you, going forward, we're appreciative of your
willingness to serve.
Ms. Hammack, you may or may not be aware of the fact that
at Fort Benning, GA, we're undergoing a significant expansion
as a result of the BRAC process. It's critical that our armor
training elements be able to make a smooth transition from Fort
Knox, KY, to Fort Benning so that we can prepare our second
lieutenants, basic trainees, and mid-career leaders for future
battles and maneuver warfare.
Recently, there's been one slight problem with this
transition, and it involves an Ecological Society of America
issue regarding the red cockaded woodpecker. Don't have those
in many places in the country, but we have them in South
Georgia. Although I am told that both the Sierra Club and the
Southern Environmental Law Center are satisfied with Fort
Benning's efforts to accommodate this rare and important bird
with the mitigation process that they have gone through and
will continue to go through, I'd simply like your assurance
that, if confirmed, you will do everything you can to ensure
our infantry and Army units have adequate space to conduct
critical training exercises on their tanks and Bradleys, and
also with their individual and crew-served weapons, and that
the integration of the armor and infantry schools at Fort
Benning is not delayed due to any environmental or habitat-
related issues.
Ms. Hammack. Yes.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
Ms. Burke, in your testimony to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee last year, on July 21, you stated that any
recovery in Afghanistan would depend on the restoration of
natural resources and that achieving U.S. goals in the region
may well depend on our ability to tie natural resources into
national security. In your opinion, how important is military
success in Afghanistan, in comparison to the restoration of
natural resources there? Do you think economic, civil, and
political restoration in the region should rank above that of
the concerns of climate change and biodiversity laws?
Ms. Burke. Senator, the goals that we have for Afghanistan
right now for stabilizing the country to the point where
terrorists organizations would no longer find a hospitable home
there, that will require some economic development in the
country. It is a very agricultural country. In order to restore
those lands, it is going to require some restoration of the
soils and some improvement in the conditions. Those are studies
that have been done by the United Nations and also here in the
United States. We know that's an important part of our effort
to help stabilize the country and keep us safe.
As for the question about whether those sorts of issues are
more important than climate change, I would say that they're
all linked together and that anything we do to strengthen our
hand, relative to future climate changes, should also
strengthen our hand, relative to water use, to our energy use,
to minerals--strategic minerals--all of those things. Those all
should be consistent. They should not be in opposition.
Senator Chambliss. Are you aware of any issues, relative to
climate change, that are being studied or undertaken by DOD
within Afghanistan?
Ms. Burke. I am not.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
If confirmed, what role, if any, would you suggest the
military play in confronting these global environmental
threats?
Ms. Burke. Senator, I think the 2010 QDR does a very good
job of laying out an appropriate role for military forces, and
I think that it ranges from things like partnerships with other
countries to develop capacities to develop military forces that
can do disaster relief in their own countries, to also being
prepared for effects that we may see on our own coastal
installations. I think the QDR does a very good job of laying
out a very credible and reasonable role for U.S. forces in that
arena.
Senator Chambliss. In this new position that's been created
and that you've been nominated for, what specific goals would
you set for the military, in terms of mitigating any potential
climate change factors?
Ms. Burke. That's not actually in the statute for this job,
Senator, so I would be doing the job that is statutorily
defined, which is improving the operational energy security of
military forces. I believe, if we do it right, that will be one
of the results, that we will be cutting greenhouse gas
emissions. But, that's not the role of this job.
Senator Chambliss. Do you have an opinion, relative to
whether or not DOD should be engaged in research and
development (R&D) on the use of alternative fuels?
Ms. Burke. Senator, yes. I believe DOD should be, and to my
knowledge, is involved in such R&D.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
As the largest user of energy, whether it's gasoline or
electricity for that matter, DOD is going to be key in our
ability to wean ourselves, in this country, off the importation
of foreign oil. What is your opinion, relative to any actions
that should be taken by the Department to move us in that
direction?
Ms. Burke. Senator, I believe that we have a number of
actions that we could be taking, including some that are
required in the law that created the position, such as
implementing the fully-burdened cost of fuel and the Energy
Efficiency Key Performance Parameter, which are mechanisms that
can help DOD appropriately value energy in its business
processes, from the requirements in war planning, to
acquisition and procurement. I believe that would go a long way
towards helping, and that we can improve the efficiency of our
platforms and our people and our operations, and we can also
look into alternatives that will improve our mission
effectiveness.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Watson, as a member of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, I think you can understand that I was very much
troubled by the New York Times article--both the one in 2005,
again the one in 2006--and the revelations of some very
sensitive programs that were disclosed. I concur with what
Admiral Mullen said, relative to those disclosures, that it not
only had the potential for American lives to be lost, but may
have, in fact, caused that.
You were the top lawyer at the New York Times Company, and
as a lawyer, I can appreciate the fact that you had other
lawyers working for you who were giving opinions, relative to
significant issues, whether they were First Amendment, or
whatever. But, Mr. Watson, at the end of the day, the buck
stopped with you, and you readily state that in your responses
to Senator McCain, in your letter dated January 7, 2010.
What troubles me about your responses in that letter, and
again today, are the fact that once this article was written in
the New York Times, it received worldwide attention. It was a
very explosive story; the one about the TSP program
particularly. As I understand what you've said, you did not
know anything about that story being published, until after the
fact, and that, basically, even after the fact, when you became
aware of that story and the information released in that story,
that, as a top lawyer at the New York Times Company, you were
not involved in any discussions relative to how you go forward,
which also meant that you were not involved in the decision of
whether or not to publish the SWIFT article in 2006. Am I
correct there? Can you explain your involvement, or your lack
of involvement, but yet, lawyers under you were making very
critical decisions to the national security of the United
States?
Mr. Watson. Thank you, Senator, I would like to try to
explain that the way we were organized was that the deputy
general counsel, who was my designated successor, was the
person in our chain of command, both on the corporate side and
on the newspaper side, with respect to the publisher, who was
empowered and authorized to make those decisions. At the time
of the TSP story, for example, he was the lead lawyer on
reviewing that; he's a nationally known expert. I became aware
of it after the fact. We had some discussion about it. I
presumed that there was discussion with the newsroom about how
to deal with these particular matters. But, at that time, the
state of the law was that if a newspaper had information which
was newsworthy, which was truthful and accurate, and the
newspaper itself had not violated the law in acquiring that
information, that it was not illegal to publish that
information. Once the decision was made that it was not
illegal, it would have been, in my experience, impossible for a
lawyer to stop the publication of that story, because to
publish or not is the decision which was made by the publisher
and the executive editor.
Senator Chambliss. I understand that's what you said in
response to Senator McCain, but I have to tell you, it really
does trouble me, particularly when the TSP article was delayed
for months. I don't remember the exact time period, but I do
remember that the previous administration went to the New York
Times and asked them not to publish that article, and there was
a period of time when they agreed that it was too sensitive to
be published. It bothers me, as a top lawyer in that firm, so
to speak, that you weren't engaged and weren't involved in the
decisionmaking process on that. Now you're going to be in a
position to be the top lawyer at the Army, and you're going to
be on the other side of the issue; you're going to be charged
with making sure that no secrets are released. I have grave
concerns about the fact that you weren't engaged with your
subordinates to the point to where you weren't involved. Are
you going to be engaged with your subordinates, your other
lawyers that are under you at the Department of the Army, to
make sure that this type of story does not get released in the
future? You can comment, or not.
Mr. Watson. No, Senator, I very much appreciate your
question, because it's one that seems to be circulating. I'm
here because I believe in the Army. I believe in national
security. I'm a patriot. I do not, as a professional, abide
people leaking classified information. I certainly wouldn't be
a leaker, if that's a question for me. As General Counsel of
the Army, I certainly wouldn't abide anyone within my
jurisdiction leaking classified information. My view is that
there are rules, regulations, and the laws against it, and that
those rules, regulations should be enforced. There should be no
question about that in the mind of anyone here. If I'm
confirmed, Senator, that would be my view.
I also want to state that in my career as a lieutenant, I
have had access to classified information. My first duty
station was on a classified mission. I will also state, for the
record, that when I was a Military Police lieutenant, in 1967,
I took a group of volunteers out on a highway in Vietnam to
retrieve classified information from some soldiers who had been
killed.
I can't emphasize enough how committed I would be, if
confirmed, to providing my personal duty and my professional
loyalty to the mission of the Army.
Thank you, Senator, for your question.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Watson, I had the unfortunate duty--
it seemed to me--to be on the Senate Judiciary Committee and
Senate Armed Services Committee, and to deal with leaks and
laws and matters for the last 4 years. I believe that aspects
of the media and aspects of Congress did not conduct themselves
with high standards in this process. You've repeated--what I
think you wrote Senator McCain--that the article in New York
Times revealing the existence of the highly important and
classified TSP was ``truthful and accurate, based on
information not illegally obtained by them, and was written and
published by individuals who were acting to fulfill the
newspaper's constitutional duty of informing the public about a
very newsworthy subject.''
How would you evaluate the Espionage Act, title 18, section
798 provides that, ``Whoever knowingly and willfully publishes,
in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the
United States, any classified information concerning the
communication of intelligence activities of the United States
shall be fined, imprisoned, or both''?
How is it that you would contend that this action wouldn't
violate that statute?
Mr. Watson. Thank you, Senator. That was my opinion. I read
the story. I read the statute. I don't have either one of them
in front of me, but my reading of the story and my reading of
the statute led me to believe that there was an arguable
position, a defensible position, that the statute was not
violated.
Senator Sessions. Okay.
Mr. Watson. If I may. I understand that there are
reasonable people who disagree. I understand that there are
reasonable lawyers who disagree. In the final analysis, in our
situation, whether there was a violation or not is a judgment
for a judge and/or a jury. I do understand that there were some
investigations with respect to who may have leaked or maybe
even whether there should be a prosecution after the
publication of the stories. But, there was no prosecution, to
my knowledge.
Senator Sessions. The statute says, ``If you knowingly
publish, in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of
the United States, classified information concerning the
communication, intelligence activities of the United States
shall be fined or imprisoned.'' But, you say, as long as it's
truthful and accurate, based on information not illegally
obtained, and written and published by individuals who are
fulfilling the newspaper's constitutional duty of informing the
public about a very newsworthy subject, that's the standard.
Which one is the standard, your statement, or the statute of
the United States?
Mr. Watson. The statute is the final determinant on that,
but the state of the law, as announced by the Supreme Court, is
what was stated in my letter. There's not, to my knowledge,
been a case prosecuting a newspaper under 798. There's clearly,
Senator, I agree with you, a tension between those two matters.
But, in our system of freedom of the press, and in our system
of classifying defense information, there is a tension there. I
want to make it clear, I'm on the side of protecting--as a
citizen and, if confirmed, as the general counsel of the Army--
I'm on the side of protecting classified information.
Senator Sessions. I believe that you were the chief counsel
of New York Times when all of this occurred, and they were not
on that side. Once it's leaked--it's hard for the Government to
do anything about it--whether they want to go back and try to
prosecute it or not, it's a very difficult thing to take on
folks who buy ink by the barrel. This was not a happy day in
our country, I have to tell you.
Having said this, do you believe that you can be an
effective advocate for defending the legitimate covert
activities of the Department of Army?
Mr. Watson. Oh, Senator, without question. Without
question.
Senator Sessions. Forgive me if I have concerns about it.
Did you ever express concerns to the New York Times about what
they were doing and the policies they were executing, and
advise against it?
Mr. Watson. I was not involved in these particular stories,
but my views, I think, are relatively well known throughout the
New York Times Company--that I'm a strong defender of the
military and national security.
Senator Sessions. But, were you ever part of a discussion--
any internal lawyer meetings in which questions were raised
about the wisdom of publishing these stories?
Mr. Watson. There were discussions within the legal
department, yes.
Senator Sessions. Were you in on some of those?
Mr. Watson. Yes, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Did you say, ``I vote to go ahead,'' or
did you say, ``I don't think we should publish this''?
Mr. Watson. The discussions I participated in were after
the fact, after the TSP story was published.
As I've said before, from my personal view, I don't like to
see that kind of information in the public domain, and that, if
I wouldn't have done it.
Senator Sessions. There's a saying, you have the fox
guarding the henhouse. You were the leading lawyer for the
institution that is a leading advocate of going the other way.
Now, that's a fact. Now you're seeking to be the top lawyer for
the Army, which I think should have a different view.
Thank you for your testimony.
Thank you, all of you, for your willingness to serve.
We have a great Defense Department. It has tremendous
challenges, is exceedingly large. It's difficult to manage it
well. I hope all of you will seek to manage it--get the best
value for the warfighter, and do it in a way that protects our
interests.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
Let me just ask a couple questions of you, Mr. Watson,
separate and apart from these two matters which have been
raised, those two particular publications.
As counsel to the New York Times, was it your duty--and,
again, I'm not asking about any particular article, including
these two--but, was it your duty to give advice to the New York
Times as to what was legal, to the best of your ability?
Mr. Watson. Yes, Senator, that was the responsibility of
the general counsel.
Chairman Levin. As I understand your testimony, it was not
your job as to advise the New York Times as to what should be
legal or what should be published.
Mr. Watson. That's correct. The decision on whether to
publish a story or not was not a legal decision. It's always
been a decision made by--in extreme cases or serious cases--the
executive editor and the publisher.
Chairman Levin. I just have a few more questions.
Ms. Burke, I have a longstanding interest and concern about
the Department's failure to fully develop renewable energy
resources on military installations. What is your understanding
as to who has the lead role on that issue at the DOD level?
Would it be you or would it be the Deputy Under Secretary for
Installations and Environment?
Ms. Burke. Senator, first of all, Under Secretary Carter
has responsibility for both offices. He would be the senior
official of record. But, for fixed installations, Dr. Robyn,
who is currently the Deputy Under Secretary for Installations
and Energy, would have the lead role.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Watson, the Defense Task Force on
Sexual Assault in the Military Services recently recommended
enactment of a comprehensive military justice privilege for
communications between victim advocates and victims of sexual
assault.
The Task Force found that some victims of sexual assault
were reluctant to use the services of a victim advocate,
because their communications with the victim advocate could be
available to the defense in criminal prosecutions.
Now, if you're confirmed, would you carefully consider the
value of a comprehensive military justice privilege for
communications between a victim advocate and a victim of sexual
assault?
Mr. Watson. Yes, if confirmed, Senator, I would.
Chairman Levin. Ms. Hammack, finally, the statutory
deadline for completing all work on BRAC recommendations is
September 15, 2011. That deadline is fast approaching, but only
28, I believe, of the 222 recommendations have been certified
as complete. Obviously there's many that are not yet complete;
they're in the process. But, nonetheless, that is worrisome to
me. What is your view as to the acceptability of missing the
deadline for BRAC recommendations?
Ms. Hammack. Senator, I don't believe it is acceptable to
miss the deadline. Certainly, completing BRAC in a timely
manner will be a priority.
Chairman Levin. We thank you all.
I'm going to turn this over to Senator Begich, for his
questions and then to close it out, if he is willing to do
that, because I must leave.
But, I just want to close with, again, thanks to all of you
for your service, your prior service, your future service.
We hope to get these nominations up to a vote before the
committee as soon as we can.
We, again, thank your families. We particularly thank the
younger kids and those middle-aged kids who have sat through
this fairly long hearing, trying to look very interested at all
times, but, in any event, being extremely patient. We always
like to see the kids here. I think it adds a great deal to the
hearings. I think it also will have an impact on their lives--
hopefully, a positive impact--when they see government at work
and they see their relatives or their friends testifying before
a democratically-elected Senate body.
For those parents who are here, for those parents who can't
be here because they're either gone or otherwise, we thank them
for their interest and their support of their children.
We now turn this over to Senator Begich.
Senator Begich [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to echo the chairman's comments. Thank you
all for your willingness to serve and being part of the Federal
Government in the process of helping us move this country
forward, especially in DOD.
Mr. Watson, I just want to follow up and I appreciate your
comments. Again, I'm new to this whole process. No disrespect
to lawyers. I'm not a lawyer. Don't intend to be one. I come
from a very commonsense approach of how I look at things. What
I hear you saying is that you've given advice. The publisher
makes the final call.
Mr. Watson. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Begich. It's no different than me, as when I was
mayor; managed 3,000 people for 5 years. That's why I also
encourage my colleagues--no disrespect to them--that they
should all be mayor just once in a lifetime, rather than just
legislators, because it gives you a good balance of managing
people, and how it works.
I think, in my case, for example, I had a municipal
attorney, who I appointed, but he was in charge of criminal and
civil division. Rarely did he get engaged--and I mean rarely--
in the criminal division section, even though he was the top
dog; he was in charge of it. He depended on his deputy to
handle that and make decisions on very high-profile legal cases
which ended up in the paper, sometimes to my chagrin of how
they were handling it, but that's the way it worked. Would that
be the same process you went through in the New York Times?
Mr. Watson. Very similar.
Senator Begich. Also, the comment that was made earlier
about ``the fox guarding the henhouse.'' Here's what I did when
I was mayor: I had a sergeant, who was the head of the police
union, complained a lot about how the police department
operated. What do you think I did? He became my deputy police
chief, and then later, the chief of police. We had a 28-year
low, in the history of our city, in crime. We had the most
police officers hired. Very little, if any, corruption of any
kind.
Sometimes you want to grab someone from the other side,
just like I did with the president of the NAACP--she always
complained to me when I was on the Assembly, so she ended up in
charge of the Office of Equal Opportunity, and incredible
scores that we got, nationally, because of that. I don't have
any problem with that. Sometimes you want to grab from the
other side as quickly as possible. I'm looking forward to your
work in the Army and DOD, and doing what's right as an
attorney. You have an oath that you follow, and your new client
would be the U.S. Government. Is that fair to say?
Mr. Watson. Yes, Senator. Thank you for your comments.
Senator Begich. You bet. I sit here a lot and listen
patiently to a lot of the politicking that goes on, and it does
bother me at times, because to be frank with you, you're
associated with the New York Times. Some people don't like
their opinions. My view is, they'll have their opinions. Some
days I like them, some days I don't. But, that is life. We
select this job we're in, and we get subjected to those
opinions as they come forward.
Again, thank you for your willingness to serve.
I actually have one question here, which I'm going to
submit to the record for you, because I don't want to burn any
more of your time. It's on a whole other issue, but it just
kind of bothered me, some of the questioning that was going on.
Ms. Hammack, I want to ask you, if I can, a separate
question. In the authorization bill last year, I proposed,
along with my colleagues, an evaluation of the housing stock
that exists in the military bases. Because also what goes on
here is, everyone tries to grab a piece of the pie for their
own district whether they may need it or not. But, I believe
housing stock in the military is substandard in some areas and
very high quality in others. I've asked for a report to be done
so we can manage this process a more rational way, rather than
just who has the muscle and who has the political clout.
As we move forward, I know, in our State, we have some very
high quality, but we also have, up in the north section, for
example, 200 relocatables for housing and offices, in an arctic
climate, which, I will tell you, is good for a short period,
not good for a long period.
Would you have any comment in regards to this issue of
housing stock and how we go about this in a very systematic way
to actually do it right, rather than just who can pull the
lever the hardest?
Ms. Hammack. At this point in time, Senator, it's my
understanding the two-thirds of the family housing has already
been improved and privatized, and there's an evaluation of the
balance. I have also been led to believe that there's an
evaluation going on, on the barracks and the other housing, and
that is something that is going to get my attention, if
confirmed.
Senator Begich. Very good. We had a timetable within the
authorization report. I forget when it actually expires. But, I
would like, if you do get confirmed, that you could give us
feedback on how you see that going and the timetable on that.
Because it goes to those issues you just brought up.
Let me end there. I'm not going to take up any more of your
time. You've been very patient.
Again, I appreciate all of you being here today.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Elizabeth A. McGrath by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. At this time, I do not believe changes are warranted. If
confirmed, I would consult with Congress on any modification I found
potentially useful.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. If confirmed, I would consult with Congress on any
modification I found potentially useful.
relationships
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) of the Department of Defense
(DOD) and each of the following?
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for all matters
within DOD. By law, the Secretary of Defense shall assign such duties
and authorities to the DCMO he deems necessary for the DCMO to assist
the Chief Management Officer (CMO) (the Deputy Secretary of Defense) to
effectively and efficiently organize the business operations of DOD. If
confirmed, I would faithfully carry out all duties assigned to me by
the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense assists the Secretary of
Defense in carrying out his responsibilities and duties and also
performs duties either assigned by the Secretary of Defense or by law.
By law, the Deputy Secretary of Defense also functions as CMO, and is
responsible for the daily operations of the Department on matters
including financial management, personnel policies, and acquisition
management. The Deputy Secretary of Defense delegates duties and
authorities to the DCMO to effectively and efficiently organize the
business operations of DOD. If confirmed, I would carry out all duties
assigned to me by the DOD CMO.
Question. The Defense Business Systems Management Committee
(DBSMC).
Answer. The DBSMC is a governance body designed to oversee
Department decisions on its business operations, including investments
in business systems, in order to maximize benefits to the warfighter.
The DBSMC is chaired by the CMO. The DCMO is the vice chair and
functions as executive secretary. If confirmed, I would be the vice-
chair of the DBSMC.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Financial Management
(Comptroller) (USD(C)).
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing work with USD(C)
on financial management improvement, development of the Department's
annual performance budget and report, and modernization of the
Department's financial systems.
Question. The Other Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The Office of the DCMO works with the Under Secretaries of
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, Personnel & Readiness,
Intelligence, and Policy in a number Department-wide management and
business modernization and improvement initiatives. If confirmed, I
look forward to continuing those efforts.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASDs).
Answer. The Office of the DCMO works with a variety of ASDs on
matters including acquisition decisions, process improvement,
performance management and transparency initiatives. The interaction
occurs in one-on-one meetings and governance council settings.
Question. The Director of the Business Transformation Agency (BTA).
Answer. BTA facilitates Department-wide transformational business
operations to support the warfighter and systematically improve
business processes, enterprise resource planning systems, and
investment management. If confirmed, the Director of BTA would directly
report to me.
Question. The Secretaries of the military departments.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretaries of
the military departments to help carry out the business management and
modernization objectives of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy
Secretary of Defense.
Question. The CMOs of the military departments.
Answer. The Under Secretaries of the military departments are the
CMOs of their respective organizations and, as such, have enterprise
responsibility for overseeing business operations within their
departments. The Office of the DCMO interacts routinely with these
officials on business transformation initiatives. The military
department CMOs also serve on the DBSMC. If confirmed, I look forward
to developing strong working relationships with each of the CMOs of the
military departments.
Question. The Investment Review Boards (IRBs).
Answer. The IRBs, along with the DBSMC, constitute a governance and
oversight framework for effective investment decisionmaking, enabling
the Department's senior leadership to guide investments to maximize
benefits to the warfighter. The Office of the DCMO provides direction
and guidance to the IRB chairs to ensure consistency and rigor in the
investment management process. If confirmed, I would continue to drive
robust investment management for defense business systems.
Question. The Comptrollers of the military departments.
Answer. If confirmed, I would engage with the Comptrollers of the
military departments in their capacities as the functional sponsors of
many of DOD's financial systems. If confirmed, as a member of the
Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Governance Board, and in
collaboration with the USD(C), I would work with the Comptrollers of
the military departments to further their efforts toward achieving
financial audit readiness.
Question. The Business Transformation Offices (BTOs) of the
military departments.
Answer. The Military Departments now have CMOs in place, who
oversee newly-established BTOs. The Office of the DCMO has an ongoing
relationship with the Service BTOs through the formulation of the
Strategic Management Plan (SMP) and various business system issues. If
confirmed, I would work to further interactions between the Office of
the DCMO, BTA, and the CMOs of the Military Departments.
Question. The Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG,
DOD).
Answer. The Office of the DCMO responds to inquiries by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the IG, DOD relating to
defense business operations. These inquiries pertain to the status of
recommendations regarding a variety of business issues. If confirmed, I
will continue to respond to these GAO and IG, DOD inquiries.
If confirmed, I will refer all appropriate matters to the Inspector
General.
Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek advice from the General Counsel
on all relevant subjects.
Question. The Directors of the Defense agencies.
Answer. The Office of the DCMO and its subordinate agency, BTA,
have effective relationships with many Defense agencies to further the
Department's strategic goals. Additionally, the Office of the DCMO and
BTA are also Department resources for broad business transformation
guidance. If confirmed, I would look for opportunities to improve the
Department's business operations both through and within the Defense
agencies.
duties of the deputy chief management officer
Question. Section 132 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Deputy
Secretary of Defense serves as the CMO of DOD. The Deputy Secretary is
to be assisted in this capacity by a DCMO.
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the CMO and DCMO of DOD?
Answer. The duties and responsibilities of the CMO and DCMO are
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense so that they may effectively and
efficiently organize the business operations of the Department. The
CMO's primary duties are to (a) ensure that the Department can carry
out its strategic plan, (b) ensure the core business missions of the
Department are optimally aligned to support the warfighting mission,
(c) establish performance goals and measures for improving and
evaluating overall economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and monitor
and measure the progress of the Department, and (d) develop and
maintain a Department-wide strategic plan for business reform. In
general, the duty of the DCMO is to assist the CMO in carrying out
those objectives and, if delegated, assume primary responsibility for
those functions.
Question. What specific duties and responsibilities do you expect
the Deputy Secretary to assign to you in your capacity as DCMO?
Answer. While the specific duties and responsibilities of the DCMO
remain at the discretion of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, if
confirmed, I would expect that the Deputy Secretary would empower me
to: (1) develop the Strategic Management Plan (SMP) as the primary
vehicle for strategic planning of the Department's business operations;
(2) drive the development and implementation of the Business Enterprise
Architecture (BEA); (3) implement a robust performance management and
improvement framework through the development and tracking of outcome-
focused measures and metrics; (4) synchronize, integrate and coordinate
the Department's cross-functional business stakeholders and operations;
and (5) oversee day-to-day operations of the DBSMC. Additionally, I
believe that, if confirmed, the Deputy Secretary of Defense may ask me
to oversee the defense business systems investment management process
and to serve as acquisition Milestone Decision Authority for certain
Major Automated Information Systems.
Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will bring over 20 years of DOD business
experience to the position. During my tenure as a civil servant with
the Department, I have served across a broad array of organizations and
business areas, which would provide a solid foundation for performing
the duties of the DCMO. During my career I have been part of a military
department, a Defense Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD)--and I have worked extensively in the interagency
environment. I have operational experience in supply chain management,
business financial management (to include Planning, Programming,
Budget, and Execution), and acquisition (to include contracting and
program management). These experiences have given me significant
insight into how the Department's business operations must work
together in a cross-functional manner - knowledge that would be
invaluable as the DCMO.
Additionally, I recently led the stand-up of the Office of the DCMO
within DOD and currently serve as the Assistant DCMO and the
Department's Performance Improvement Officer. In these roles, I lead,
on behalf of the CMO, the Department's effort to better synchronize,
integrate, and coordinate its business operations and I serve an
advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for matters
relating to the management and improvement of DOD business operations.
I led the Department's development of the 2008 and 2009 SMPs, have
established performance goals and measurements for the Department's
business operations, am responsible for implementing DOD's Continuous
Process Improvement/Lean Six Sigma efforts, work extensively with the
many business stakeholders in the Department to drive the adoption of
end-to-end business processes; and am frequently called upon to work
interagency initiatives.
Question. Do you believe that the CMO and DCMO have the resources
and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of DOD?
Answer. I believe the CMO and DCMO have the resources and authority
needed to carry out the business transformation of the Department. If
confirmed, I would consult with the CMO if I discovered that those
resources and authorities were insufficient.
Question. What role do you believe the CMO and DCMO of DOD should
play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific
business systems by the military departments?
Answer. I believe the CMO and DCMO of DOD should set policy, based
on sound best practices, regarding planning, development, and
implementation of business systems, including those in the military
departments, and verify those policies are being followed
appropriately. Importantly, this includes development of business
architectures. The CMO and DCMO, utilizing the DBSMC, IRBs, and BTA,
should work to ensure the Department manages its entire suite of
business systems, including those in the military departments, from an
enterprise portfolio perspective--eliminating redundant system
development, transferring lessons learned, and integrating the work of
all components to build enterprise capabilities. If confirmed, I would
work with the military department CMOs to help them institute rigorous
investment management and business process reengineering (BPR)
procedures for their organizations' business systems.
Question. Do you believe that the DCMO should have clearly defined
decision making authorities, or should the DCMO serve exclusively as an
advisor to the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO?
Answer. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act left it to the
Secretary of Defense to assign the DCMO specific duties and authorities
necessary to assist the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the execution of
his responsibilities as CMO. While a primary function of the DCMO is to
provide advice to the CMO, the Department, through the formal charter
of the DCMO position, signed October 2008, gave the DCMO specific
authority to set Departmental policy on issues within the position's
purview.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the
statutory provisions establishing the positions of CMO and DCMO?
Answer. At this time, I do not believe that any changes are
necessary, but if confirmed, I would consult with Congress if my
experience led me to believe that changes were warranted.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the DCMO?
Answer. In my view, the biggest challenge confronting the DCMO is
overcoming the size and complexity of the Department to affect enduring
transformation. Additionally, for business transformation to be
successful there needs to be a shift in the culture of DOD to move from
improving business operations within organizations to improving them
across organizations.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. While these challenges are profound, I believe they can be
overcome through the use of strong governance; active performance
management; utilization of standards; and improved processes. If
confirmed, I would continue to drive the use of these methods
throughout the Department.
priorities
Question. What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed,
with respect to issues which must be addressed by the DCMO?
Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the CMO on the five business
priorities established in the 2009 SMP: (1) support the All-Volunteer
Force; (2) support contingency business operations; (3) reform the DOD
acquisition and support processes; (4) enhance the civilian workforce;
and (5) strengthen DOD financial management.
Additionally, I would strengthen the governance of the Department's
business operations, work with stakeholders to establish a better
approach to the acquisition of information technology systems, ensure
that sufficient BPR has been conducted before investing in a system
modernization, further develop and implement the BEA, drive the use of
Continuous Process Improvement methodology, and seek opportunities to
achieve greater efficiencies throughout the Department.
management goals
Question. If confirmed, what key management performance goals would
you want to accomplish, and what standards or metrics would you use to
judge whether you have accomplished them?
Answer. If confirmed, my focus would be on ensuring the
Department's performance goals drive support to the Warfighter and that
this support is an effective and efficient use of the taxpayers' money.
The 2009 SMP and the Department's High Priority Performance Goals,
which were included as part of the fiscal year 2011 President's budget,
and their associated performance measures, reflect the Department's key
performance goals and measures. If confirmed, I would continue to drive
active performance management throughout the Department.
Question. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is
intended to provide managers with a disciplined approach--developing a
strategic plan, establishing annual goals, measuring performance, and
reporting on the results--for improving the performance and internal
management of an organization. The Government Accountability Office has
reported that DOD's initial SMP, issued in July 2008, fails to meet
statutory requirements to address performance goals and key initiatives
to meet such goals.
What is your understanding of the role of the DCMO in the
development and implementation of the Department's SMP?
Answer. With regard to the development of the SMP, the role of the
DCMO is to provide the vision for the document, enable the supporting
strategic planning process, and compose the document itself. This
includes analysis of, and alignment with, higher level strategic
documents and creation of a framework for development of the SMP that
will facilitate collaboration with the military department CMOs,
combatant commanders, Under Secretaries, and other leadership elements.
In terms of implementation, I believe, the role of the DCMO is to
facilitate the Department's performance management framework by
assisting the components and agencies to embed the SMP's goals and
outcomes into their own strategic plans and rigorously track results.
Question. What is your assessment of adequacy of the current
version of the Department's SMP?
Answer. The 2008 SMP served as a primer that described governance
structures and processes used to support the warfighter through the
improvement of the Department's business operations. It lacked
strategic business objectives and key supporting initiatives. However,
the 2009 SMP provided a key building block for institutionalizing
active performance within DOD. The document defined five strategic
priorities and supporting goals, outcomes, measures, and key
initiatives. It was a significant step forward toward providing
strategic business focus and direction. If confirmed, working with the
rest of the Department, I would seek to build upon this effort.
Question. What improvements, if any, would you like to see the
Department make in its SMP?
Answer. If confirmed, the next steps I would take to improve the
SMP would be to: (a) institutionalize a more formal strategic planning
process for the Department's business operations; (b) focus on the
alignment and synchronization of the SMP with other DOD planning and
budgeting processes (Policy, Planning, Budgeting and Execution system)
and strategic guidance documents such as the QDR; (c) work to enable
execution of cross-functional, end-to-end processes through the SMP and
in the Department's BEA; and (d) further develop performance outcome
measures.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Department meets statutory requirements for its SMP?
Answer. While I believe the 2009 SMP is compliant with statutory
requirements, if confirmed, I would seek to further strengthen the link
between the priorities and goals contained in the SMP and the
Department's established budgeting process to ensure we are properly
aligning resources with desired outcomes.
staffing and resources
Question. Do you believe the Office of the DCMO has the staffing
and resources needed to effectively carry out its mission?
Answer. I believe the Office of the DCMO, established in October
2008, has sufficient manpower authorizations and resources to carry out
its current responsibilities. If confirmed, I will work with the CMO to
ensure the office continues to have sufficient resources to effectively
carry out its mission.
Question. What types of expertise do you believe the office of the
DCMO needs to effectively carry out its mission?
Answer. The Office of the DCMO requires experts in business
processes and process improvement, strategic planning, change
management, performance management and measurement, enterprise
architecture, enterprise business systems implementation, and
governance and investment management. If confirmed, I would ensure the
Office of the DCMO has staff with the right skills to carry out its
mission.
Question. What mix of employees, contractors, and individuals
detailed from other organizations in DOD has the DCMO relied upon to
provide it with needed expertise?
Answer. While the Office of the DCMO is predominately staffed by
its own government employees, the office also leverages the expertise
of other DOD organizations, such as BTA, Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers, contractors, and inter-agency resources, as
appropriate. If confirmed, I would ensure the Office of the DCMO
maintains the right mix of employees, contractors, and detailees to
carry out its mission.
Question. To what extent do you believe that it is appropriate and
effective for the DCMO to rely upon contractors to provide it with
needed expertise?
Answer. Expertise in business operations resides in both industry
and government. I believe it is important to appropriately utilize both
resources. However, if confirmed, I will ensure that inherently
governmental functions are performed by government employees.
Question. To what extent do you believe that it is appropriate and
effective for the DCMO to rely upon other organizations within DOD to
provide it with needed expertise?
Answer. While it is important for the Office of the DCMO to
maintain a core staff with the expertise detailed above, I believe it
is appropriate and effective for the Office to leverage the vast
expertise that already exists within the Department to achieve our
collective business operations improvement goals. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with other organizations to achieve success.
business enterprise architecture and transition plan
Question. Section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C., requires that the
Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive BEA and transition plan to
guide the development of its business systems and processes.
What is your understanding of the role of the DCMO in the
development and implementation of the BEA and transition plan required
by section 2222?
Answer. The DCMO is directly responsible for the development and
implementation of the BEA and transition plan. The DCMO must establish
the strategic direction and priorities for the Department's business
operations which the BEA and transition plan must align to, and has
ultimate responsibility for their publication. If confirmed, further
development and implementation of the BEA and transition plan will be
one of my highest priorities.
Question. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated,
enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the
successful transformation of DOD's business systems?
Answer. In my view and experience, a single architecture for an
organization as large and complex as DOD is impractical, which is why I
support DOD's approach of architecture federation. However, the layer
of architecture OSD maintains through the BEA must include all
standards, policies, and processes needed at the enterprise-level.
Additionally, to be effective, it is critical OSD provides appropriate
technical guidance and policy to the Services, components, and agencies
on how to build and federate their architectures. If confirmed, this
would be a key focus area for me.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
DOD's enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements
of section 2222?
Answer. In order to meet the requirements of section 2222, the
established processes for the architecture and transition plan must
continue to be strengthened and enforced. If confirmed, I would work to
strengthen the alignment between the SMP and the BEA and use the IRBs
to ensure we are investing our business system modernization dollars on
the Department's most important cross-functional business management
challenges.
Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely
and accurate financial and business information in managing operations
and holding managers accountable?
Answer. Timely and accurate financial and business information is
essential in managing the Department's business operations. In order to
make informed decisions, the Department's senior leaders must have
authoritative information at the right time.
Question. How would you address a situation in which you found that
reliable, useful, and timely financial and business information was not
routinely available for these purposes?
Answer. If confirmed, and if I found reliable, useful, and timely
financial and business information was not routinely available, I would
work with the appropriate DOD leaders to rectify the situation.
Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in
managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial
and business information available to DOD managers?
Answer. If confirmed, improving the information available to the
Department's leaders regarding the performance of DOD's business
operations would be a key part of my responsibilities. With better
information the Department will be able to better target business
improvement opportunities and address deficiencies through the BEA and
transition plan and through the use of Continuous Process Improvement
methodology.
Question. The Department has chosen to implement the requirement
for an enterprise architecture and transition plan through a
``federated'' approach in which the BTA has developed the top level
architecture while leaving it to the military departments to fill in
most of the detail. The Comptroller General has testified that ``the
latest version of the [business enterprise architecture] continues to
represent the thin layer of DOD-wide corporate architectural policies,
capabilities, rules, and standards'' and ``well-defined architectures
[do] not yet exist for the military departments.''
If confirmed, would you continue the federated approach to BEA and
transition plan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the federated approach to
the BEA and transition plan.
Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the
military departments have completed their share of the federated
architecture and transition plan?
Answer. The military departments are each at different stages and
levels of maturity in developing their architectures and transition
plans and significant gaps remain. However, there are positive signs as
well. If confirmed, I would work with the military department CMOs on
initiatives to enhance federation.
Question. What is your assessment of the organization and staffing
of the military departments to address this issue?
Answer. The military department organizations that support their
CMOs are each at different stages of maturity in their ability to
develop architectures and transition plans. If confirmed, I would
monitor their ability to effectively deliver on their responsibilities
under section 2222.
Question. What steps do you believe the military departments need
to take to improve their BEAs and transition plans?
Answer. I believe it is important for the military departments to
leverage the experience of BTA gained while building the BEA. If
confirmed, I would work with the military department CMOs to ensure
this happens.
Question. What steps do you believe the military departments need
to take to improve their organization and staffing in this area?
Answer. I believe the military department CMOs are vitally
important to successful federation of the Department's architecture.
The Office of the DCMO, BTA, and the military department CMOs, working
together, can drive the necessary uniformity of approach to business
practices across each organization and development of the architecture
to ensure interoperability of business systems and services, and
effective sharing of business data, which is the ultimate goal of
section 2222.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Secretaries and
CMOs of the military departments to ensure that a federated
architecture meets the requirements of section 2222?
Answer. In addition to the actions outlined above, if confirmed, I
would work to ensure regular communication between the military
department CMOs and the IRB Chairs to ensure there is an integrated
approach to managing and constraining our defense business system
investments.
Question. Section 2222 requires that the DBSMC review and approve
all major defense business system modernization programs to ensure that
they are in compliance with the Department's BEA and transition plan.
What is your understanding of the extent to which the process for
DBSMC review and approval has ensured that business system
modernization programs are fully coordinated with the BEA and
transition plan, as intended?
Answer. The investment review process that supports the DBSMC
review and approval of business system modernization investments is
extensive. Every system that has come before the DBSMC has been
assessed by both the component Pre-Certification Authority and
appropriate IRB as being compliant to the BEA. If confirmed, I would
establish an audit capability within the Office of the DCMO to ensure
the review process is accomplishing the outcomes that are intended.
Question. How meaningful do you believe DBSMC review and approval
has been, in light of GAO's assessment that the Department's BEA and
transition plan has not yet been completed to the statutory standards?
Answer. Despite GAO's findings regarding the BEA and transition
plan, I believe the Department's investment review process is
meaningful. The BEA is a long way from being complete, but is
recognized as one of the more refined architectures in the Federal
Government, and won an award just last year from the 1105 Government
Information Group. As we continue to mature the target architecture,
the value of this review will become even more meaningful in leveraging
information technology for strategic outcomes. Also, the addition of
the requirement for the review process to assess systems' BPR efforts
will add further value to the review.
Question. Do you believe that the DBSMC has the expertise and
resources needed to conduct a meaningful, independent review of
proposed business system modernization programs, or is the DBSMC
reliant on the representations made by the military departments and
their program managers?
Answer. I believe the DBSMC, supported by the IRB process, has the
expertise and resources needed to conduct these reviews. If confirmed,
I would establish an audit capability within the Office of the DCMO to
ensure the review process is accomplishing the outcomes that are
intended.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving
the DBSMC review process?
Answer. If confirmed, I would establish an audit capability within
the Office of the DCMO to ensure the review process is accomplishing
the outcomes that are intended. If confirmed, I would also work with
the IRBs to further standardize their processes and procedures to
ensure each of them are providing a similarly rigorous review of a
system before it came to the DBSMC. Finally, if confirmed, I would
initiate a detailed analysis of the performance of the review process
over the past 5 years to better inform our decisionmaking and policy
setting in the future.
financial management
Question. What is your understanding of the efforts and progress
that have been made in DOD toward the goal of being able to produce a
clean audit?
Answer. Overall, I believe DOD is making progress toward a clean
audit, but significant improvements are still needed--including efforts
to address some of the most difficult challenges. The recent successful
audit of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and ongoing audit of the
Marine Corps Statement of Budgetary Resources are both important steps
forward. Another improvement the Department made recently is increasing
senior leadership attention to this effort. In my current role as
assistant DCMO, I participate as a member of the DOD Financial
Improvement and Audit Readiness Governance Board that Under Secretary
Hale chairs. Importantly, the military department CMOs are also members
of this board. If confirmed, I will work closely with Under Secretary
Hale to support his efforts to improve the financial management of the
Department.
Question. Do you believe that the Department can achieve a clean
audit opinion through better accounting and auditing, or is the
systematic improvement of the Department's business systems and
processes a perquisite?
Answer. I believe improved business systems are necessary to
achieve and sustain a clean audit opinion. This is because our legacy
systems are not capable of recording financial activity at the
transaction level. In order to achieve a clean audit opinion, we need
to both reengineer our underlying business processes and implement new
systems that provide transaction level detail. Each of the military
departments is in the process of installing a new Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) system that will move us significantly forward. The
Department will rely heavily on the military department CMOs to help
ensure proper governance is in place within each military department to
successfully field these systems.
Question. What is your assessment of the current version of the
Financial Improvement Audit Readiness (FIAR) plan prepared by DOD?
Answer. I agree with Under Secretary Hale and GAO that the last
FIAR plan and associated report prepared by the Department lacked
sufficient strategic objectives and priorities and systematic means of
achieving them. I believe the next FIAR plan should include better
strategic direction, utilize standard methodology, implement results-
oriented metrics, and identify accountable people and organizations.
Implementing these changes would be a step in the right direction.
Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to
improve the FIAR plan?
Answer. I believe the changes I detailed above would be significant
improvements to the FIAR Plan. Additionally, if confirmed, I will work
with Under Secretary Hale to better integrate the ERP implementations
and FIAR efforts.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
Department's efforts to achieve a clean audit?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with Under Secretary Hale and
the military department CMOs to ensure the Department's underlying
business processes and information technology investments support the
goal of achieving a clean audit opinion. I would also work to
synchronize the efforts of the cross-functional business community in
support of Under Secretary Hale's efforts.
Question. When do you believe the Department can achieve a clean
audit?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to assist Under Secretary Hale as
the Department seeks to achieve a clean audit by fiscal year 2017, as
required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010.
acquisition of business systems
Question. Most of the Department's business transformation programs
are substantially over budget and behind schedule. In fact, the
Department has run into unanticipated difficulties with virtually every
new business system it has tried to field in the last 10 years.
What is your assessment of the extent of the problems the
Department faces in its acquisition of new business systems?
Answer. I believe the Department's biggest problems in this area
are that we take a weapon systems approach to the acquisition of
information technology capabilities and our business system investments
are often aligned to a specific business area within the Department and
do not reflect how we truly perform our daily business. If confirmed, I
would work with key stakeholders in the Department to find better
approaches for the acquisition of business systems.
Question. What do you see as the root causes of these problems?
Answer. There are a number of root causes for these problems,
including:
Need for Cross-Functional Governance: Our business
systems must operate across traditionally stovepiped
communities with disparate interests making integrated
governance a challenge because there is not a single process
owner.
Lack of Business Process Re-Engineering: Too often the
Department pursues business systems investments without taking
a hard enough look at improving the underlying business
processes. Business system investments are therefore frequently
tied to legacy business processes.
Weak Performance Measures: Performance measures must
be tied to specific and measurable business outcomes and linked
to the Department's SMP. Proposed business system acquisitions
are indeed linked to Key Performance Parameters but these
measures are not usually tied to how the Department conducts
its day-to-day business
Rigid Funding Processes: Private industry is able to
deliver information technology capability in 12 to 18 month
cycles yet the planning, programming, and budgeting process
requires a program manager to forecast budget needs at least 2
years in advance of need.
Question. Do you believe that unique problems in the acquisition of
business systems require different acquisition strategies or
approaches?
Answer. Yes. While there are indeed overall improvements that could
be made to the Defense Acquisition System, I believe there are unique
characteristics associated with acquisition of business systems that
require focused attention.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the DCMO in the
management and oversight of specific business transformation programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe it would be my responsibility to
ensure that business process re-engineering is completed, that programs
are aligned with strategic business priorities, and that these programs
comply with the BEA.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to help address
the shortcomings in the Department's business transformation programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with key stakeholders in the
Department to find better approaches for acquisition of business
systems.
Question. Section 1072 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 requires DOD to undertake business process
reengineering efforts before initiating business system modernization
efforts. The Department is required to review ongoing business system
modernization programs to ensure that appropriate business process
reengineering efforts have been undertaken on these programs as well.
Do you believe that the Department has undertaken appropriate
business process reengineering efforts before initiating business
system modernization efforts in the past?
Answer. I believe section 1072 builds on what is currently mandated
in the Clinger-Cohen Act. Specifically, it recognizes BPR involves more
than just information technology and deliberately ties BPR to the
military department CMOs and the DCMO who are also responsible for
broader business dialogue. This will help to drive necessary functional
business involvement in a system's BPR efforts. If confirmed, I will
continue to enhance BPR implementation.
Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the
Department's efforts to comply with the requirements of section 1072?
Answer. The Office of the DCMO issued initial BPR guidance in
February 2010. The military department CMOs and the Office of the DCMO
are now moving deliberately to comply with this guidance.
Additionally, since section 1072 became law on October 28, 2009,
every system certified by the DBSMC has had a condition placed upon it
that once guidance was issued, the system would be required to comply
with it.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
Department's efforts to comply with the requirements of section 1072?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to drive implementation of
section 1072.
business transformation agency
Question. Five years ago, the Secretary of Defense established the
BTA to ensure an organizational focus for business transformation
efforts within the Department. The Director of the BTA reports to the
DCMO in his capacity as vice chairman of the Defense Business Systems
Management Committee.
What role do you believe the BTA should play in improving the
business operations and business systems of DOD?
Answer. I believe that BTA plays a crucial role in the
transformation of the Department's business operations--specifically in
five areas:
Managing the acquisition of a portfolio of enterprise
business systems that are utilized across the entire
Department.
Engaging with deployed warfighters and combatant
commands to assist them to improve processes and systems in
direct support of their missions.
Working with the principal staff assistants to
identify business requirements and policies that will generate
business benefit for the Department.
Providing expertise and assistance to the component
business system modernization efforts to drive best practices.
Developing and maintaining the BEA and Enterprise
Transition Plan.
BTA provides critical and complimentary support to the DCMO and
provides DOD a unique execution agency designed to look across the
enterprise and drive improvement. If confirmed, I would work to ensure
BTA is properly equipped with the resources it needs to continue to be
successful.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
supervision and management of the activities of the BTA?
Answer. If confirmed, the Director of BTA, consistent with section
192 of title 10 and the DCMO's chartering directive, would report
directly to me. As described above, BTA is the lynchpin of the
Department's business transformation efforts and, if confirmed, I would
work to ensure BTA's efforts are strategically aligned with our overall
business strategy and that the agency is attentive and responsive to
the requirements of its organizational customers, both internal and
external to DOD.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the BTA, or the
statutes authorizing the BTA? If so, what changes would you recommend?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure BTA is properly
equipped with the resources, to include senior personnel, and expertise
it needs to be successful.
cancellation of defense integrated military human resources system
Question. The Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System
(DIMHRS) was an enterprise program of the BTA's Defense Business
Systems Acquisition Executive. As the largest enterprise resource
planning program ever implemented for human resources, DIMHRS was to
subsume or replace over 90 legacy systems. After 10 years of
development and expenditure of approximately $850 million, DOD
cancelled the program. At the DOD posture hearing on February 2, 2010,
Admiral Mullen stated: ``This program has been a disaster.'' Secretary
Gates stated: ``Many of the programs that I have made decisions to cut
have been controversial within DOD. This one was not. I would say that
what we've gotten for a half billion dollars is an unpronounceable
acronym.''
What is your understanding of the DOD goals that DIMHRS was
intended to achieve?
Answer. The overall goal for DIMHRS was to provide a fully
integrated military personnel and pay capability for all components of
the Military Services of DOD.
Specifically DIMHRS was to address five major problem areas:
Timely and accurate data for combatant commanders
Standardization of Human Resources data
Issues surrounding mobilization of Reserve and
National Guard members
Tracking of personnel into and within a theater of
operations
Elimination of multiple redundant systems.
Question. What plan is in place within DOD to address the
requirements for a human resources management system, now that DIMHRS
is no longer considered a viable answer?
Answer. As part of the restructuring of the DIMHRS program, the
Department proceeded with completing a DIMHRS Core IT Investment, which
was defined as those common data and process elements, along with DOD
enterprise-level inbound and outbound interfaces required to achieve
timely and accurate military pay. Each Service will now deploy a
Service-level integrated personnel and pay system that uses the DIMHRS
Core IT Investment to the maximum extent practical.
The Service-level systems will provide the opportunity to include
Service specific requirements and will still address problem areas such
as standardization of Human Resources data, issues surrounding
mobilization of Reserve and National Guard members, tracking of
personnel into and within a theater of operations, and elimination of
multiple redundant systems.
Additionally, if confirmed, I would oversee deployment of an
Enterprise Information Warehouse which will meet the requirements for
enterprise-level information visibility.
Question. What is your understanding of why this system became a
``disaster,'' and what steps would you take, if confirmed, to prevent
it from happening again?
Answer. I believe the key problems with DIMHRS related to a lack of
strategic alignment, governance, requirements management, and the
overall size and scope of the effort. Successful implementation would
have required many traditionally separate communities and
organizations--personnel management and payroll services, each of the
Services, Active, Reserve, and Guard Forces--to adopt uniform business
practices to support the single, integrated personnel and pay system.
Unfortunately, many of these communities and organizations were
reluctant to adopt the uniform processes and business rules within the
commercial-off-the-shelf product.
Many of the Department's large scale business system modernization
efforts face similar challenges. If confirmed, I would take the
following actions to increase the probability of success with a DIMHRS-
like implementation: First, I would task the CMOs within the military
departments to take an active role in governance. Second, I would seek
alignment on the core business processes that truly can be operated in
an integrated manner. Third, I would seek a process owner to manage the
end-to-end business processes. Fourth, I would require in-depth BPR to
define the to-be process. I would create performance based metrics
aligned to the business process to ensure clear alignment around the
desired outcomes of the re-engineered process. I would also require the
redesigned processes to be fully documented and DOD policy to be
changed (if necessary) before pursuing an information technology
solution. Finally, I would document and enforce data standards to
ensure information can be effectively exchanged between information
consumers.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the DCMO?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
cost overruns
1. Senator Burris. Ms. McGrath, cost overruns for the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) and little or no oversight of billion dollar contracts to
support the war are examples of poor or mismanagement. What is your
philosophy on the role of the Secretariat within DOD to provide
management oversight over policy making and enforcement of standards?
Ms. McGrath. I believe the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
has a clear role to play in terms of management oversight, policy
making and enforcement of standards. In fact, I believe that it is
OSD's primary responsibility. This includes oversight of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), such as the JSF, and also the large
service contracts. While these specific examples fall within the
immediate realm of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology & Logistics (USD AT&L), it is true across the board. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the USD(ATL), and the rest of
the Department's senior management team, to improve the management
oversight and the enforcement of standards.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
financial management
2. Senator McCain. Ms. McGrath, although DOD continues to have the
largest budget in the Federal Government (with over a half trillion
dollars in fiscal year 2010), it has not been able to produce reliable,
auditable financial statements in the 20 years that it has been
required by law. Do you agree that a lack of effective financial
management processes and strong internal controls exposes the
Department to continued risk of fraud, waste, and abuse?
Ms. McGrath. I agree that strong internal controls embedded into
documented, repeatable processes, is important.
While the Department has not yet received a clean audit opinion,
stewardship of public funds has always been a priority. As the
Department makes investments in business systems, it is important to
ensure that thorough process reengineering has been accomplished that
enable entity-wide controls.
3. Senator McCain. Ms. McGrath, how do the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) and the fiscal year 2010 budget request address that
problem?
Ms. McGrath. While the QDR did not address specific financial
management improvement initiatives, the Department has subsequently
incorporated these items into several strategic planning efforts, is
devoting significant management attention to the issue, and is actively
working to execute against these plans. For example, the DOD Strategic
Management Plan includes the strategic priority, ``Strengthen DOD
Financial Management.''
The fiscal year 2010 budget does include funding to support
financial improvement initiatives to include system implementations
that are intended to support auditability. Also, it is my understanding
that the fiscal year 2011 budget request specifically identifies
dollars that that are aligned to the auditability milestones in the
Financial Improvement Audit Readiness (FIAR) plan.
4. Senator McCain. Ms. McGrath, how far off is the Department from
being able to produce a clean audit?
Ms. McGrath. If confirmed, I will work with Under Secretary Hale
and the military department Chief Management Officers (CMOs) as the
Department seeks to achieve a clean audit by fiscal year 2017, as
required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010. Additionally, we will continue to utilize the FIAR Governance
Board to manage the progress of the effort against the milestones
established in FIAR plan.
5. Senator McCain. Ms. McGrath, how much of a prerequisite to a
clean audit is the improvement of the Department's business systems to
its ability to achieve a clean audit opinion?
Ms. McGrath. I believe improved business processes and systems are
necessary to achieve and sustain a clean audit opinion. If confirmed, I
will work closely with the components to ensure that adequate business
process reengineering has been conducted prior to systems
implementation.
financial improvement audit readiness plan
6. Senator McCain. Ms. McGrath, the FIAR plan (which describes the
Department's progress in achieving clean auditable financial
statements) was not issued for the period ended September 2009. Why
not?
Ms. McGrath. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2010
required the FIAR Plan Status Report for the first time. The Act
requires reports from the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
(USD(C)) by November 15 and May 15 of each year. There was not
sufficient time between the signing of the act and November 15 to
produce a meaningful report. The Department was also in the process of
modifying the FIAR Plan to address the strategic priorities established
by the USD(C) and approved by the CMO.
7. Senator McCain. Ms. McGrath, when will the plan be issued?
Ms. McGrath. My understanding is that USD(C) will issued the FIAR
Plan Status Report on or before the required date of May 15, 2010.
8. Senator McCain. Ms. McGrath, until the plan is issued, how is
OSD holding the agencies and the Services accountable for progress?
Ms. McGrath. The USD(C) established a FIAR Governance Board of
which I am a member. This body meets regularly to monitor progress and
hold components accountable. Additionally, the OUSD(C) holds monthly
meetings of the components' Senior Executive Servicemembers responsible
for achieving audit readiness. These bodies use progress, schedule, and
outcome metrics to monitor progress. Also, status of financial
management progress is also presented to the Defense Business Systems
Management Committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary.
9. Senator McCain. Ms. McGrath, what progress has been made to
date?
Ms. McGrath. Overall, I believe DOD is making progress toward a
clean audit, but significant improvements are still needed--including
efforts to address some of the most difficult challenges. The recent
successful audit of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and ongoing audit
of the Marine Corps Statement of Budgetary Resources are both important
steps forward. Another improvement the Department made recently is
increasing senior leadership attention to this effort. In my current
role as assistant DCMO, I participate as a member of the DOD Financial
Improvement and Audit Readiness Governance Board that Under Secretary
Hale chairs. Importantly, the military department CMOs are also members
of this board. If confirmed, I will work closely with Under Secretary
Hale to support his efforts to improve the financial management of the
Department.
10. Senator McCain. Ms. McGrath, where do significant weaknesses
continue to exist?
Ms. McGrath. There is a substantial amount of work still to be
done, including efforts to address some of the most difficult
challenges. These challenges include successfully implementing
Enterprise Resource Planning systems with the internal controls needed
to support audits and maintaining supporting documentation sufficient
for audit of transactions.
If confirmed, I will pursue appropriate actions to ensure continued
progress toward meeting clean audit goals.
business enterprise architecture and transition planning
11. Senator McCain. Ms. McGrath, the Department is implementing the
legal requirement for an enterprise architecture and transition plan
through a federated approach--whereby the Business Transformation
Agency has developed a top-level architecture while leaving it to the
military departments to fill in most of the details. How far along is
each of the military departments in completing their part of the
federated architecture and transition plan?
Ms. McGrath. Although by definition, architecture and transition
plans are never complete, we continue to make progress. We learn from
each iteration of the architecture and make improvements in both the
process of building architecture and transition plans and in content.
In general, each of the Services has now federated each of its major
(Tier 1,2,3) business systems with the DOD Business Enterprise
Architecture (BEA) as part of the annual statutory certification
process and reflects the relationship between their systems and the BEA
in their Service Enterprise Architectures. This is a positive step.
With respect to the Enterprise Transition Plan, each of the
military departments is synchronizing their own transition plans with
the Enterprise Transition Plan and is a full partner in its
development, maintenance, and use.
12. Senator McCain. Ms. McGrath, which departments are being most
challenged and why do you think they are being challenged?
Ms. McGrath. In my opinion, the size and complexity of the military
department makes business transformation challenging. However, the
establishment and appointment of a CMO in each of the military
departments, has created an opportunity to enable progress across their
respective enterprises in the areas of governance, process
reengineering, and systems implementation. If confirmed, I will work
closely with military department CMOs to enable better business
outcomes.
______
[The nomination reference of Elizabeth A. McGrath follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
March 10, 2010.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Elizabeth A. McGrath of Virginia, to be Deputy Chief Management
Officer of the Department of Defense. (New position.)
______
[The biographical sketch of Elizabeth A. McGrath, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Resume of Career Service of Elizabeth A. McGrath
Education:
George Mason University (1988)
Bachelor of Science, Economics
Federal Executive Institute
Graduate
Program Management
Certified Acquisition Level III
Employment Record:
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of
Defense
Assistant Deputy Chief Management Officer
October 2008-Present
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of
Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Business Integration (served as Principal Deputy
during supervisor's absence)
May 2005-October 2008
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of
Defense Comptroller
Deputy Director, Business Modernization/
Systems Integration
January 2004-May 2005
Department of Defense, Defense Finance and Accounting
Service
Deputy Director, Systems Integration
June 1999-January 2004
Department of Defense, Department of the Navy
Business Financial Manager/Logistics
Management Specialist
July 1990-June 1999
Department of Defense, Department of the Navy
Naval Sea Systems Command, Logistics Intern
Program
July 1988-June 1990
Honors and Awards:
ODNI--Meritorious Unit Award (2009)
Presidential Rank Award, Meritorious Senior
Professional (2008)
Presidential Rank Award (2008)
DOD Civilian Service Award (2008)
Federal 100 Award (2007, 2008)
Navy Logistics Intern Program (1988-1990)
Superior Performance Awards (numerous)
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Elizabeth A.
McGrath in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Elizabeth Anne McGrath
Elizabeth Anne Bullock (maiden)
Nickname: Beth.
2. Position to which nominated:
Deputy Chief Management Officer, Department of Defense.
3. Date of nomination:
March 10, 2010.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
September 20, 1964; Long Beach, CA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Divorced.
7. Names and ages of children:
James McGrath, 14.
Christine McGrath, 12.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Secondary: Langley High School, High School Diploma; June 1982.
George Mason University, B.S., Economics, Dates Attended: Aug.
1985-Dec. 1987, Degree granted: January 1988.
Also attended Radford University, Aug. 1982-Dec. 1984.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Assistant Deputy Chief Management Officer; Department of Defense,
OSD; 9010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC; October 2008-Present.
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business
Integration (served as Principal Deputy during supervisor's absence);
Department of Defense, OSD Acquisition Technology and Logistics;
Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC; May 2005-October 2008 (Note: this
organization was subsumed into my current organization in accordance
with National Defense Authorization Act 2008--which established the
Deputy Chief Management Officer position).
Deputy Director, Business Modernization/Systems Integration;
Department of Defense, OSD Comptroller; 801 South Bell Street, 10th
floor, Arlington, VA; January 2004-May 2005.
Deputy Director, Systems Integration; Department of Defense,
Defense Finance and Accounting Service; 801 South Bell Street, 4th
Floor, Arlington, VA; June 1999-January 2004.
Business Financial Manager/Logistics Management Specialist;
Department of Defense/Department of the Navy; Crystal Park 3, Crystal
Drive, Arlington, VA; July 1990-June 1999.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
American Society of Military Comptrollers, member.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Presidential Rank Award.
DOD Civilian Service Award.
ODNI--Meritorius Unit Award.
Federal 100 Award, 2007.
Federal 100 Award, 2008.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
No formal speeches.
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Elizabeth A. McGrath.
This 17th day of March, 2010.
[The nomination of Elizabeth A. McGrath was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on May 5, 2010, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on June 22, 2010.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Michael J. McCord by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I believe the Goldwater-Nichols Act was and continues to be
an important and effective defense reform enacted by Congress. At this
time, I do not see any need for modifications. However, if confirmed, I
will keep an open mind regarding changes.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. I do not see any need for modifications at this time.
relationships
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and each
of the following?
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is the
principal assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense on fiscal and budgetary matters. If confirmed, I would
support the Secretary in any aspect of the responsibilities of the
Comptroller that the Secretary or the Comptroller may prescribe.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Deputy Secretary in any
matter within the purview of the Comptroller that the Deputy Secretary
or the Comptroller may prescribe.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Answer. The Principal Deputy supports the Under Secretary in all
aspects of his responsibilities. As Principal Deputy, I perform such
tasks as the Comptroller directs, and act for the Comptroller as
needed, and would continue to do so if confirmed.
Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Under
Secretaries, as directed by the Comptroller, the Secretary, or the
Deputy Secretary, to carry out the policies and guidance of the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Chairman,
the Vice Chairman, and the Joint Staff on resource and financial
management issues.
Question. The Secretaries of the military departments.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretaries of the
military departments on a wide range of resource allocation, execution,
and other financial management issues. Much of this work is carried out
through interactions with their Assistant Secretaries for Financial
Management, as described below.
Question. The heads of the defense agencies.
Answer. As the Department's Comptroller and Chief Financial
Officer, the Under Secretary works closely with the heads of the
defense agencies, and specifically, with our financial management
counterparts in those agencies. If confirmed, I will perform such
duties in support of these efforts as the Comptroller may direct.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the
military departments.
Answer. The Comptroller and I meet regularly with these Assistant
Secretaries to ensure that they are aware of the President's and the
Secretary of Defense's policies and priorities, to exchange
information, and to assist them in contributing to the successful
development and implementation of effective Department of Defense (DOD)
policies and programs.
Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
including the Comptroller and the Principal Deputy, work closely with
the Office of the General Counsel on a daily basis, in particular on
matters that require decisions by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of
Defense. I will, if confirmed, rely on the General Counsel, who is the
Chief Legal Officer of DOD, on all legal matters, and will consult and
coordinate with the General Counsel on all matters relating to
financial management that may have legal implications.
Question. The Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation.
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
including the Comptroller, the Principal Deputy, and our career staff,
work closely with the Director and the Office of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation throughout the program and budget review process.
Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO).
Answer. If confirmed, I would, as directed by the Comptroller,
establish an appropriate relationship with the DCMO, once an official
is confirmed to that position, and work to improve management of the
Department's complex operations and organization. I anticipate the
greatest interaction between our organizations would lie in the realm
of financial management, the systems that provide management
information, particularly financial management information, and the
development of appropriate metrics in those areas.
Question. The Director for Force Structure, Resources, and
Assessment on the Joint Staff.
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
including the Comptroller and the Principal Deputy, have and will
maintain a close working relationship with the office of the Director
for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment of the Joint Staff, in
particular with respect to matters relating to operating tempo, force
structure, and overseas contingency operations.
Question. The Director, Office of Management and Budget.
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
including the Comptroller and the Principal Deputy, have and will
maintain a close working relationship with the Office of Management and
Budget. That relationship is carried out primarily through near-daily
interaction with the National Security Division of OMB.
Question. The Comptroller General.
Answer. If confirmed, I would perform such duties with respect to
interactions with the Comptroller General and the Government
Accountability Office regarding DOD matters as the Comptroller may
prescribe for me.
duties of the principal deputy under secretary of defense (comptroller)
Question. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in the performance
of his or her duties and acts for him when the Under Secretary is
absent. The duties of the Comptroller of DOD are set forth in section
135 of title 10, U.S.C., and in DOD Directive 5118.3. Among the duties
prescribed in statute are advising and assisting the Secretary of
Defense in supervising and directing the preparation of budget
estimates of DOD, establishing and supervising Department of Defense
accounting policies, and supervising the expenditure of DOD funds.
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that
Secretary Gates and Under Secretary Hale will prescribe for you?
Answer.
To assist the Comptroller in providing high quality,
timely advice to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary
on issues related to the financial management of the
Department.
To assist the Comptroller in ensuring that the men and
women in the military services, especially those engaged in
overseas contingency operations, have the resources they need
to meet national security objectives.
To assist the Comptroller in ensuring that funds are
spent in accordance with laws and regulations and that the
American taxpayers get the best possible value for their tax
dollars.
To assist the Comptroller in accounting in an accurate
manner for the funds spent by the Department.
To serve as the Department's Senior Accountable
Official for implementation of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)?
Answer. I was appointed to the position for which I have been
nominated in January 2009, and have now served in that position for 14
months. I believe my experience performing the duties of the position
for which I have been nominated, and the manner in which I have
performed those duties, demonstrates my qualification for this
position.
I have more than 25 years of experience in the field of defense
budget and financial management analysis including:
Twenty-one years as a professional staff member of the
Senate Armed Services Committee overseeing the DOD budget,
including many of the same issues that I continue to work on,
from a different perspective, in DOD, including funding the
cost of overseas contingency operations, analysis of the fiscal
impact of legislation, reprogramming of funds to meet emerging
needs, questions of fiscal law and financial management, the
analysis of alternative courses of action with respect to
specific programs, and knowledge of the Federal budget process.
Two years at the Congressional Budget Office working
as an analyst performing tasks very similar to those performed
by the staff of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller).
Service on the staff of the House Budget Committee
working topline funding issues for both DOD and Veterans
Affairs, which enhanced my understanding of benefit issues and
the areas of interaction between the two Departments, as well
as the analysis of the cost of contingency operations and the
overall Federal budget process.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform these duties?
Answer. I believe I can continue to increase my expertise by
continuing to gain experience on current, specific DOD budget and
financial management issues.
chief financial officer
Question. DOD Directive 5118.3 designates the Comptroller as the
Chief Financial Officer of DOD.
Has Secretary Gates designated Under Secretary Hale as the Chief
Financial Officer of DOD?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, what role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
assisting Secretary Hale with these duties and acting for him when he
is absent?
Answer.
To assist the Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer in
overseeing all financial management activities relating to the
programs and operations of DOD;
To assist the Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer in
developing and maintaining integrated agency accounting and
financial management systems;
To assist the Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer in
managing and providing policy guidance and oversight of DOD's
financial management personnel, activities, and operations;
To assist the Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer in
preparing audited financial statements; and
To assist the Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer in
monitoring the financial execution of budgets.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief
Financial Officer?
Answer.
To prepare and manage defense budgets so that the
Department obtains the resources necessary to accomplish
national security objectives--especially the resources needed
to meet wartime requirements and for our military forces to
successfully conduct their operations.
Responding to the needs of our operational commanders
for additional resources or flexibility within the constraints
imposed by laws and regulations.
Improving the financial information most needed by DOD
managers.
Managing our workforce through the challenges of
converting out of the National Security Personnel System.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with other senior
officials in DOD and the Comptroller staff, military departments,
defense agencies, Office of Management and Budget, and Congress to
develop policies to meet these challenges.
I will also provide strong leadership and support for our staff in
meeting these priorities of the Comptroller.
authorization for national defense programs
Question. Do you believe that an authorization pursuant to section
114 of title 10, U.S.C., is necessary before funds for operation and
maintenance, procurement, research and development, and military
construction may be made available for obligation by DOD?
Answer. It has been the Department's practice to work with all the
oversight committees to resolve matters relating to the authorization
or appropriation of DOD activities. If confirmed, I will respect the
prerogatives of the Department's oversight committees and will work
closely with the committees to achieve a consensus necessary to meet
our defense needs.
supplemental funding for military operations
Question. Since September 11, 2001, DOD has paid for much of the
cost of ongoing military operations through supplemental
appropriations. The fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 budget
included full-year requests for overseas contingency operations.
What are your views regarding the use of supplemental
appropriations to fund the cost of ongoing military operations?
Answer. The Department and the administration are striving to
eliminate the use of planned supplemental funding and have worked hard
to put known requirements for ongoing operations into the overseas
contingency operations portion of the budget request and to limit the
use of supplementals to unanticipated needs.
The primary focus of this effort is to estimate the requirements
for the budget year as accurately possible. As a general rule, I do not
believe it is possible to achieve that same standard of accuracy for
the out-year projections.
program and budget review
Question. The Department has operated under a planning,
programming, and budget (PPBS) system for decades. The programming and
budgeting functions have sometimes been combined in a single reporting
chain and at other times, as is currently the case, been run by
distinct offices (Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Comptroller,
respectively) that report separately to the Secretary of Defense. The
program and budget review processes have also been revised in recent
years and have been made more concurrent than was previously the case.
Based on your experience working in the Comptroller's office for
the last year, what are your views on the proper relationship between
the program and budget processes and the offices responsible for those
functions?
Answer. I believe there must be regular and effective coordination
and communication between the Comptroller and Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation organizations. I believe both organizations have an
important role to play in the PPBS system.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
PPBS system and the program and budget review processes?
Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in any or all parts of the program
and budget review process as directed by the Comptroller.
Question. Do you anticipate changes in these relationships and
processes?
Answer. The Department is currently assessing potential changes to
the PPBS process. Those decisions will be made by the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary.
management of defense spending
Question. In November 2008, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) released its list of ``urgent issues'' for the next
administration and Congress. Among those issues was defense spending.
According to GAO, ``The department's current approach to planning and
budgeting is based on overly optimistic planning assumptions and lacks
a strategic, risk-based framework for determining priorities and making
investment decisions. As a result, it continues to experience a
mismatch between programs and budgets, and it does not fully consider
long-term resource implications and the opportunity cost of selecting
one alternative over another.'' Since GAO published that statement the
Defense Department has crafted two budgets and completed the 2009
Quadrennial Defense Review.
What are your views on the concerns raised by GAO?
Answer. The concerns raised by GAO are valid, and this
administration has taken action to establish a new approach to planning
and budgeting. Congress has also mandated reforms in this area in the
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 which I believe will,
when fully implemented, improve our future outcomes.
The Quadrennial Defense Review and related studies give us a
strategic, risk-based framework for determining priorities and making
investment decisions. Our program-budget process has incorporated those
priorities into our fiscal year 2011 budget request, and will continue
those efforts in future budgets.
DOD also is doing much more to consider long-term resource
implications and opportunity costs, e.g., by more rigorous analysis by
our Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office in partnership with
our Comptroller staff.
Question. Has the Office of Comptroller addressed these issues over
the last year?
Answer. Yes. Besides the general actions highlighted above, there
are several specifics:
To make better use of acquisition funding, the Department has taken
some bold action, beginning with the Secretary's decision last year to
discontinue several unneeded or underperforming programs, including the
F-22, and to focus on achieving a better balance between capabilities
needed to succeed in the wars we are in and capabilities needed to
prepare for potential future conflicts. This approach has continued in
the fiscal year 2011 budget request, which proposes to cancel the Joint
Strike Fighter alternate engine and end further production of the C-17
aircraft.
The Department has also invigorated the acquisition reform process
by taking steps to strengthen the acquisition workforce and improve
contract execution. The objective is to provide our warfighters with
the capabilities they need while also serving as good stewards of
taxpayer dollars.
Question. Are there additional efforts that need to be taken that
with respect to those aspects of the management of the Department that
are within the purview of the Comptroller that may be relevant to the
concerns raised by GAO?
Answer. Yes, we need to continue our efforts to scrutinize
requirements, costs, schedules, and program direction--in cooperation
with other DOD offices--to manage defense spending effectively.
earmarks
Question. On January 29, 2008, President Bush signed Executive
Order 13457, which stated that agency decisions to commit, obligate, or
expend funds may not be ``based on language in any report of a
committee of Congress, joint explanatory statement of a committee of
conference of Congress, statement of managers concerning a bill in
Congress, or any other non-statutory statement or indication of views
of Congress, or a House, committee, Member, officer, or staff
thereof.''
What is your understanding of the current status of Executive Order
13457 (has it been rescinded or modified)?
Answer. Executive Order 13457 has not been rescinded or modified by
the current administration. Until the President rescinds or modifies
the executive order, it is still in effect.
Question. What is your understanding of the current direction from
the White House on earmarks?
Answer. The President believes that transparency is crucial to
improving government. The President outlined his principles for earmark
reform on March 11, 2009. Two key principles of his approach are
maximizing the transparency of earmarks and the use of competition in
earmarks for for-profit entities. I believe Congress has taken
significant steps on earmark reform in the past few years, in
particular to increase such transparency. As a member of the staff of
the Armed Services Committee, I personally participated in implementing
some of the transparency reforms undertaken by Congress in recent years
such as the inclusion of the disclosure tables for member requests
beginning with the fiscal year 2008 authorization bill.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you expect to take to
ensure that DOD abides by congressional funding decisions and that
funds available to the Department are expended only for the purposes
for which they have been appropriated?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that DOD carries out
funding decisions in accordance with the law.
funding tables
Question. The 2010 National Defense Authorization Act included
funding tables in both report and bill language. Concern has been
expressed that incorporating funding tables into the bill could limit
the flexibility of DOD to transfer funds to meet emerging high-priority
needs.
What is your view on funding tables in the text of bills
authorizing and appropriating funds for DOD?
Answer. The Department does require flexibility. No matter how
carefully we prepare our budget, requirements change. The Department
should continue to work with Congress to seek the right balance of DOD
flexibility and congressional oversight.
chief management officer
Question. The positions of Chief Management Officer (CMO) of DOD
and DCMO of DOD were established by section 904 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. In accordance with section 904,
the purpose of these new positions is to improve the overall efficiency
and effectiveness of the business operations of DOD and to achieve an
integrated management system for business support areas within DOD.
Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide
architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful
transformation of DOD's business systems?
Answer. I think an effective architecture and transition plan to
guide the needed overhaul of DOD business systems should be our goal.
The more ambitious the goal, however, the more difficult it is likely
to be to achieve.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Comptroller
in implementing such a business enterprise architecture and transition
plan?
Answer.
To work with and support the CMO and DCMO in building
such an architecture and transition plan.
In implementing the architecture and plan, the
Comptroller would have a key role for the areas of its
responsibilities--notably, budgeting and financial management.
Question. Do you believe that the Department needs senior
leadership from a CMO and DCMO to cut across stovepipes and ensure the
implementation of a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide
architecture for its business systems?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Over the last year, how has the Comptroller's office
worked with the CMO and the DCMO to improve the business operations of
DOD?
Answer. The President has pledged to bring change to Washington,
and we at DOD are working to carry out his policies such as increasing
the transparency of government. A key first step in this effort has
been to promulgate this administration's management priorities, which
include the High Priority Performance Goals contained in the fiscal
year 2011 budget request and the Deputy Secretary's Strategic
Management Plan. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) has worked with the DCMO office on those goals and
management priorities that fall within our purview.
Question. Are there responsibilities performed by the Comptroller
that you believe should be reassigned to the CMO or the DCMO of DOD?
Answer. I believe that once an official is confirmed as the first
DCMO, it would be appropriate for our office to work with the DCMO
office to address any gaps or areas of overlap and to make such changes
in our respective charters as may be mutually agreed.
Question. Are there responsibilities performed by the CMO that you
believe should be performed by the Comptroller?
Answer. No, not that I have identified so far in my tenure here,
but my answer to the previous question applies here as well.
incremental funding versus full funding
Question. Do you believe DOD should continue to adhere to the
longstanding practice of fully funding the purchases of major capital
assets, including ships and aircraft, in the year the decision to
purchase the asset is made, or do you believe incremental funding of
such purchases is justified in some cases?
Answer. Yes, I agree with longstanding Office of Management and
Budget policy on full funding. However, I believe incremental funding
may be appropriate in limited circumstances--such as for aircraft
carrier procurement or for large, complex construction projects such as
hospitals that take several years to complete.
financial management
Question. What is your understanding of the efforts and progress
that have been made in DOD since 1999 toward the goal of being able to
produce a clean audit?
Answer. I believe DOD is making progress toward a clean audit. The
large trust funds for retiree benefits and several Defense Agencies
have received positive audit results. Recently the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers earned a clean audit opinion and the U.S. Marine Corps'
Statement of Budgetary Resources is currently under audit.
There is, however, a substantial amount of work still to do,
including efforts to address some of the most difficult problems. The
Department recently implemented a new strategy to achieve a clean audit
that focuses improvement efforts on the financial information most used
to manage. If confirmed, I will pursue appropriate actions to ensure
continued progress toward meeting clean audit goals.
Question. Do you believe the Department's Financial Improvement and
Audit Readiness (FIAR) plan will lead to achieving a clean audit
opinion for DOD, or are changes in that plan necessary in order to
achieve that goal?
Answer. The Department's progress toward achieving a clean audit
opinion has been slower than we would like. The Department needs to
agree on common goals and priorities in the audit readiness area.
Toward that end, last August the Comptroller issued his guidance to the
Department on his audit priorities. Our office is implementing this new
approach, which is focused on improving the quality, accuracy and
reliability of the financial and asset information that we use every
day to manage the Department. Specifically, we plan to focus initially
on two types of information--budgetary information and the existence
and completeness of assets. It is too early to assess whether further
changes will be needed to achieve this goal.
Question. What are the roles and responsibilities of the Office of
the Comptroller toward realizing a clean audit?
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C))
provides the vision, goals, and priorities of the FIAR Strategy. We
then work with the Military Services and Defense Agencies to make the
process and system improvements needed to achieve financial management
improvement and clean audits. The Comptroller organization supports the
components and is charged with the responsibility of managing
development and implementation of DOD-wide financial management systems
and overseeing financial management activities relating to the programs
and operations of the DOD.
The Office of the USD(C)'s oversight responsibilities relevant to a
clean audit include: (1) holding components accountable for meeting DOD
financial management improvement goals; (2) establishing financial
management policies for DOD including its Reporting Entity parts; (3)
ensuring compliance throughout DOD with applicable accounting policy,
standards and principles, as well as financial information and systems
functional standards; (4) establishing, reviewing, and enforcing
internal control policies, standards, and compliance guidelines
involving financial management; (5) providing oversight of financial
management activities and operations including preparation and revision
of the FIAR Plan Status Report.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
Department's efforts to achieve a clean audit?
Answer. If confirmed, I would perform such duties with respect to
these matters as the Comptroller may prescribe for me.
Question. When do you believe the Department can achieve a clean
audit?
Answer. While many significant challenges remain we now have
focused financial improvement and audit readiness efforts on
information we use to manage. We believe that this makes the business
case for improving financial information clear. The combination of this
business case and increased resources will lead to better results. We
are required to provide regular reports to Congress, and beginning with
our May 2010 report the Comptroller will provide more details on the
plan.
fully funding the defense health program
Question. For the fiscal years 2010 and 2011, Secretary Gates has
recognized the importance of fully funding medical care requirements
for military personnel, retirees, and their families.
If confirmed, would you ensure that budget requests presented to
Congress continue to fully fund all known medical requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I would do my utmost to ensure that DOD
budget requests fully fund all known healthcare requirements.
Question. Secretary Gates has also stated that he wishes to engage
with Congress on ways to sustain the military health care benefit in
the future, with the goal of achieving reasonable trade-offs between
the cost of premiums and the cost of the program.
What is your understanding of the major cost drivers in the defense
health program?
Answer.
Enrollment fees for the TRICARE Prime program have not
been modified since its inception in fiscal year 1995.
Increases in users--many beneficiaries are returning
to the Military Healthcare System (MHS), opting to use their
more generous TRICARE benefits versus using other health plans
(e.g. other health insurance either through employer's or a
spouse's plan);
Increases in utilization--the MHS continues to see
increases in the number of health care visits per user.
Greater benefits authorized by Congress (e.g., TRICARE
for Life and expanding TRICARE for reservists).
Question. If confirmed, what approach would you recommend to
achieve the Secretary's goal?
Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend continuing to work closely
with our Military Services and health care leaders to ensure that all
healthcare requirements are identified and analyzed during each year's
program and budget review. Changes in health care policies also require
a consensus with Congress.
mycaa program pause
Question. The Department initiated The Military Spouse Career
Advance Account Program (MyCAA) to help military spouses obtain
credentials and training needed to begin or advance their careers,
especially in high demand fields which are portable across communities.
DOD abruptly halted the program on February 16, 2010, citing the need
to conduct a review of ``software applications, financial assistance
documents and overall program.'' Subsequent explanations indicated that
the program had unexpectedly reached its budget threshold. It appears
that inadequate financial management of the program may have been a
root cause for the program's floundering.
What was the budget threshold for the MyCAA program in fiscal year
2010 and what were the factors that led to rapid halting of the
program?
Answer. The amount budgeted for MyCAA in fiscal year 2010 was $65
million. This was a new program which began in March 2009. There was no
accurate way to gauge interest or participation levels when the fiscal
year 2010 budget was built. After some months of lower participation,
it is my understanding that participation rates started increasing
substantially. The $65 million budgeted for the program in fiscal year
2010 proved to be inadequate to meet this higher demand. The
participation levels increased to the point where the program was on
the verge of exceeding the available funding.
Question. What is your understanding of the fiscal health of the
MyCAA program and the reasons that necessitated a pause in the
program's operation?
Answer. The fiscal health of the MyCAA program must be addressed
quickly. The current program funding levels are inadequate to meet the
demand.
The pause was initiated by the MyCAA program office in order to
limit the Department's potential funding liability and to evaluate the
program's near-term funding options.
We are currently preparing a reprogramming action to provide
adequate funding for those spouses already enrolled in the program. We
will need the assistance of Congress to fully fund our current
enrollees. We will monitor the program's demand, and will prepare
another reprogramming action this fiscal year if necessary to ensure
the fiscal health of the MyCAA Program.
Question. What measures, if any, has the DOD Comptroller instituted
to ensure the MyCAA program proceeds on a sound financial footing in
the future?
Answer. The DOD Comptroller and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness) are currently working with other stakeholders
on options to ensure the program is adequately funded in the future to
meet the needs of the military spouses. In my view, the key to this
effort is forecasting demand as accurately as possible.
A longer-term solution may entail changes to the program parameters
that allow for maximum participation within a more adequate fixed
budget level. As we gain more experience with the program participation
levels, further budget adjustments will be made to keep pace.
tracking and timeliness of dod reports
Question. The responsibility for tracking congressionally-required
reports largely is the responsibility of the USD(C).
Based on your experience in both the legislative and executive
branches, how do you evaluate DOD's current system for tracking,
evaluating the sufficiency of reports required by Congress, and
delivering required reports in a timely fashion?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs
is responsible for tracking reports due to Congress. I believe the
tracking system is basically sound. Some of the reports are difficult
to deliver within the stated deadlines given the scope of work required
and the limits of the resources available to respond.
The Department's response time could be improved. If confirmed, I
intend to look for ways to make such improvements.
Question. If confirmed, would you support efforts on behalf of the
Department to review current reporting requirements and, where
appropriate, recommend elimination of reporting requirements?
Answer. Yes. Both Congress and DOD would benefit from eliminating
unneeded reports.
Question. If so, how would you intend to implement such a plan in
order to achieve efficiencies?
Answer. I would recommend that Congress and DOD each identify
reporting requirements that seem unnecessary and seek agreement on
eliminating them.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such
documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
cost overruns
1. Senator Burris. Mr. McCord, during the March 11, 2010, hearing
on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the witnesses confirmed that the
unit cost has increased from $50 million in 2002 to a cost of $112
million in today's dollars. Additionally, the total cost to complete
the Pratt F135 engine is now estimated to be $7.28 billion, an overrun
of $2.5 billion. Programs such as JSF provide an example of how the
Department of Defense (DOD) is not being a good steward of the
taxpayers' money. How will you enforce fiscal responsibility?
Mr. McCord. To enforce better fiscal responsibility in programs
like the JSF, the Department has embarked on a comprehensive effort to
reform the acquisition process. That effort includes an overarching
strategy to expand and improve the capabilities of the DOD acquisition
workforce including our ability to conduct contract planning,
execution, and oversight. Consistent with that strategy, we are growing
our acquisition workforce by 20,000 positions over the fiscal years
2010-2015--including over 9,000 contracting, cost estimating, pricing,
and contract oversight personnel. Our intent is to improve our capacity
and technical ability to conduct component and independent cost
estimates.
2. Senator Burris. Mr. McCord, given the continued cost overruns
with the JSF program, how will you look at writing and enforcing future
contracts?
Mr. McCord. DOD plans to explore greater use of fixed-price
development contracts, when appropriate. To align profitability with
performance, we will align incentive fees to contractor performance.
Under an incentive fee contract, the contractor will maximize its fee
when it delivers a product that demonstrates the required capability,
on-time and within cost. Alternatively, the fee will be reduced when it
fails to deliver. Finally, contractors that have validated poor
performance will have that adverse information captured in the past
performance database and will negatively impact opportunities to be
successful in future competitions. These efforts, combined with other
acquisition process initiatives, are designed to ensure that our
programs are based on firm technical foundations, executable
requirements, rigorously estimated costs, and thoughtfully designed and
executed contracts.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
financial integrity and cost accounting in the defense health program
3. Senator McCain. Mr. McCord, a congressionally-mandated task
force chartered in 2007 to examine the future of military health care
found DOD's medical cost accounting system, in use since 1986, ``highly
inaccurate and inadequate''. Among the reasons cited for this finding
were: (1) it does not capture all DOD health care costs; (2) it is
inconsistent in how labor costs are allocated; and (3) it relies on
self-reporting on policies that are inconsistent across the Services.
Do you agree that the Department's $50 billion medical program care
warrants modernization and standardization of medical cost accounting
systems?
Mr. McCord. The cost of the healthcare provided by the Department
to servicemembers and their families is a key concern of the Secretary
of Defense since it makes up a significant and rising portion of the
DOD budget each year. Controlling these costs is important to the
Department's ability to meet its mission in a way that we can afford to
sustain over time. I agree that modernizing our medical cost accounting
processes and systems is one part of the larger effort the Department
and Congress need to make to control DOD health care costs.
4. Senator McCain. Mr. McCord, if confirmed, what will you do to
achieve the long overdue improvements?
Mr. McCord. I chair the Department's Senior Assessment Team, which
oversees financial reporting controls and addresses the Department's
material financial reporting weaknesses. Accounting for military health
care costs and related liabilities is one of the weaknesses we have
identified and are working to fix. The Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs has the primary responsibility
for these medical cost accounting systems. I intend to continue working
through this group to ensure this issue has the appropriate support and
attention within the financial management community.
______
[The nomination reference of Michael J. McCord follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
March 1, 2010.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Michael J. McCord of Virginia, to be Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). (New Position)
______
[The biographical sketch of Michael J. McCord, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Resume of Career Service of Michael J. McCord
Education:
The Ohio State University (September 1977-June 1981).
Bachelor of Arts in Economics with honors in the liberal arts,
June 1981
University of Pennsylvania, Master of Arts in Public
Policy Analysis, May 1984
Employment Record:
Department of Defense, Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), January 2009-present
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Professional
Staff Member, January 1987-January 2003 and March 2004-January
2009
Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of
Representatives, Budget Analyst, January 2003-February 2004
Congressional Budget Office, Assistant Analyst,
December 1984-January 1987
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Michael J.
McCord in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Michael John McCord.
2. Position to which nominated:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
3. Date of nomination:
March 1, 2010.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
January 23, 1959; Marion, OH.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Divorced.
7. Names and ages of children:
Alejandra E. McCord, age 24.
Meredith J. McCord, age 22.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
River Valley High School, Marion, Ohio, fall 1972-spring 1977, high
school degree received May 1977
The Ohio State University, September 1977-June 1981, Bachelor of
Art in Economics with honors in the liberal arts, June 1981
The University of Pennsylvania, September 1981-May1984, Master of
Arts in Public Policy, May 1984
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
January 2009-present, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), U.S. Department of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington DC
March 2004-January 2009, Professional Staff Member, Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington DC
January 2003-February 2004, Budget Analyst, Committee on the
Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington DC
January 1987-January 2003, Professional Staff Member, Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington DC
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
President-Elect's Transition Team, Department of Defense Agency
Review Team, The Pentagon, Washington DC, November-December 2008 (on
detail from the Senate Armed Services Committee staff)
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Unitarian Universalists for Social Justice, Silver Spring, MD.
Board member, Secretary, and member of the Executive Committee
Member, Accotink Unitarian Universalist Church, Burke VA
Member, Communities of Faith United for Housing, Fairfax County, VA
Member, American Society of Military Comptrollers, Alexandria, VA.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
No formal offices held.
Services:
Canvassing for Obama Presidential campaign, Columbus, OH, October
2008
Volunteer member of defense policy team, Obama campaign, 2007-2008
Canvassing for Marsden for Delegate campaign, Fairfax County, VA,
November 2005
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
My contributions that aggregate to $100 or more during the 5-year
period covering calendar years 2005-2009 are as follows:
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (2005-2009) $598
Obama for America (2007-2008) $560
Democratic National Committee (2005-2009) $495
Democratic Party of Virginia (2005, 2007-2009) $380
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (2006-2009)
$357.80
Mark Warner for Senate (2007/2008) $150
Webb for Senate (2006) $140
Deeds for Governor (2009) $120
Forward Together PAC (Mark Warner) (2006) $100
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
National Merit Scholarship, The Ohio State University, 1977-1981
Member, Phi Beta Kappa, The Ohio State University, 1981
Stennis Congressional Staff Fellow, 110th Congress, The Stennis
Center for Public Service Leadership, 2007-2008
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Remarks on Managing the Future of DOD Acquisition to the Defense
Acquisition University Business Managers' Conference, Fort Belvoir, VA,
May 19, 2009.
Remarks on DOD Budget and Financial Management Priorities to the
Association of Government Accountants/American Society of Military
Comptrollers Professional Development Institute Conference, Honolulu,
HI, October 14, 2009.
Copies to be provided separately.
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Michael J. McCord.
This 18th day of March, 2010.
[The nomination of Michael J. McCord was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on May 5, 2010, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on June 22, 2010.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Sharon E. Burke by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. Currently, I see no specific changes in the act that I
would recommend.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. See above.
duties
Question. Section 139b of title 10, U.S.C., establishes the duties
and functions of the Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs
(DOEPP).
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
DOEPP?
Answer. My understanding of the duties and functions of the DOEPP,
as established by the law, are as follows:
Provide leadership, facilitate communication, and
conduct oversight of operational energy plans and programs
within the Department of Defense and the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps;
Establish an operational energy strategy;
Coordinate and oversee planning and program activities
of the Department of Defense and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
the Marine Corps related to implementation of the operational
energy strategy; the consideration of operational energy
demands in defense planning, requirements, and acquisition
processes; research and development investments related to
operational energy demand and supply technologies; and monitor
and review all operational energy initiatives in the Department
of Defense;
Serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of
Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding
operational energy plans and programs and as the principal
policy official within the senior management of the Department
of Defense regarding operational energy plans and programs.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. With more than 20 years of relevant experience, I have
extensive background in energy security policy and Department of
Defense programs and priorities. I first worked in energy policy at the
Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress, where I
researched a range of energy and public works issues. In the 1990s,
after graduate education that focused on energy policy, I was selected
to join the Office of the Secretary of Defense as a Presidential
Management Intern. This program involved a 2-year period of postings
across the Defense Department, including the Office of the Under
Secretary for Acquisition and Technology. After joining the civil
service, I served as a Country Director for South Asia in the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where I was the lead in
coordinating U.S. defense policy toward the region with defense
agencies, the Joint Staff, the military departments, and the
interagency. Subsequently, I served as an aide to the Secretary of
Defense and then the Deputy Secretary of State, with direct exposure to
leadership challenges during military operations. Most recently, as an
executive at a small non-profit business, I directed a research program
on energy security and related issues, such as critical minerals, and
have conducted research on national energy security strategy, energy
security roles and missions in the Federal Government, Department of
Defense use of operational fuels, and how climate change may affect
strategic planning in the Department of Defense.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of DOEPP?
Answer. If confirmed, I will need to take actions common to many
new officials, such as deepening my knowledge of the portfolio and
developing partnerships with key stakeholders across the Department, in
other agencies, and in the private sector. In addition, if confirmed, I
will need to take actions that may be less common for incoming
officials in standing up a new office fully capable of executing a new
mission for the Department of Defense.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect that the Secretary of Defense will
prescribe duties and functions in accordance with the requirements in
the law. He may also expect me to play a supporting role in addressing
other Department of Defense energy challenges.
Question. What is your vision for how the DOEPP should interface
with the installations and environment community to tie together
installation and operational energy policy and goals?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to build a close partnership with
the installations and environment community. There are fairly clear
delineations in law and regulation on the responsibilities of these
communities within DOD, but there is a high degree of collaboration in
practice. First, given the way the term ``operational energy'' was
defined in law, there is operational energy used by both deployed
forces and at installations in the United States and around the world.
Second, the DOEPP will need to leverage the expertise and experience
the Department has amassed on the full range of defense energy
challenges within the installations and environment community, both in
the Pentagon and across the country. Indeed, the Department's energy
strategy must make common cause in improving the capabilities of our
forces and assuring their access to essential resources while reducing
our energy costs and demonstrating leadership on climate change. If
confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with Dr. Dorothy Robyn, the
DUSD(I&E), and the many other OSD, Service, and Defense agency
officials dedicated to these goals.
Question. How should DOEPP interface with the Services' existing
and new energy offices?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Services' energy
offices to integrate their respective efforts, including by developing
strategy, overseeing energy-related budgets, and promoting the improved
energy performance of our forces as directed in the law.
relationships
Question. In carrying out your duties, what would be your
relationship with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the Secretary's principal
advisor on operational energy matters. In keeping with statute, I would
communicate directly with the Secretary to convey timely advice
grounded in sound energy strategy.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the Deputy Secretary's
principal advisor on operational energy matters. In keeping with
statute, I would communicate directly with the Deputy Secretary to
convey timely advice grounded in sound energy strategy.
Question. The Service Secretaries.
Answer. If confirmed, I would engage with the Service Secretaries
and their senior operational energy officials to ensure that
operational energy concerns are addressed in their policy priorities
and inputs into joint planning.
Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. If confirmed, I would engage with the Service Chiefs, their
staffs, and their operational commanders to help incorporate
operational energy concerns into their statutory responsibilities to
recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain military forces.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. If confirmed, I would directly support the USD(AT&L) in
incorporating operational energy considerations throughout the
acquisition process, research and development priorities, and logistics
planning.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
Material Readiness.
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to collaborate with the
ASD(L&MR) to reduce the logistics burden that high energy consumption
can place on our forces.
Question. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment.
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to collaborate with the
DUSD(I&E) in a wide variety of ways, but primarily in setting a
comprehensive DOD energy strategy that helps advance the capabilities,
cost-effectiveness, and environmental stewardship of the Department of
Defense to the greatest degree possible.
Question. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and
Technology.
Answer. N/A (this position was absorbed into the Research Director
under DDR&E)
Question. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Director on
DOD's energy-related research and development portfolio, and to promote
investment in energy technologies and design innovations that may lead
to a more capable, more cost-effective and sustainable force. Further,
I would seek a partnership in the oversight of the energy-related
budget in DOD, consistent with the requirements of the DOEPP under law.
Question. The Director of Systems Engineering.
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Director's, the
Department's, and Congress' efforts to strengthen systems engineering
practice and oversight in DOD's acquisition process.
Question. The Director of Force Transformation.
Answer. N/A (this office was disbanded in the last administration
and its functions were split between NII and OSD Policy.)
Question. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the USD(AT&L)'s participation
on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), focusing on the
incorporation of operational energy concerns into the requirements
process. I would work with the key Joint Staff members who manage and
contribute to the JROC's work to also ensure that concepts of operation
and other doctrinal documents they review and approve are giving
adequate consideration of fuel demand in the force and the value of
efficiency and alternatives.
Question. The Combatant Commanders.
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek lessons learned from both the
regional and functional combatant commands in on-going and past
operations related to operational energy challenges and solutions. I
would also seek to work together to promote experimentation with new
energy capabilities.
Question. The Service Acquisition Executives of the military
departments.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Service
Acquisition Executives to promote the use of energy management tools,
such as the Energy Efficiency Key Performance Parameter and the Fully
Burdened Cost of Fuel, in the acquisition programs they oversee.
Question. The Director of the Defense Logistics Agency.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Director, DLA to ensure
compliance with DOD policies, executive orders, and current laws that
seek to reduce energy burdens on the force. Further, I would work with
the Director of the Defense Energy Support Center, a subordinate entity
within DLA, to ensure the implementation of the DOD operational energy
strategy.
Question. The program executive officers and program managers of
major defense acquisition programs.
Answer. If confirmed, I would offer support on the use of energy
planning and management tools, such as the Energy Efficiency Key
Performance Parameter and the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel. This would
include soliciting their ideas for how to ensure program executive
officers and program managers have greater incentives to drive towards
more energy efficient technology, alternative fuels, and other design
options to improve energy use.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront DOEPP?
Answer. The primary challenge confronting DOEPP will be to change a
longstanding, underlying assumption across the defense enterprise that
energy will always be relatively cheap and available where it is
needed, when it is needed. Moreover, in addressing this challenge,
DOEPP will have to confront the reality that there is no one-size-fits-
all solution. A successful operational energy strategy for the
Department will have to place high priority on improving the energy
posture of deployed forces, both in forward operating positions and in
support bases, for example, at the same time that it incorporates
energy considerations into DOD's normal business processes, from
wargaming to requirements to budgeting. If confirmed, I expect to find
these challenges eased by the growing, pervasive awareness of the
importance of the Department's energy posture, given experiences in
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. If DOD incorporates
energy as both an enabler and as a liability in how it designs and
builds the force, we can make major improvements in our capability,
flexibility, effectiveness, affordability, and sustainability. In this
way, energy can be a strategic and tactical advantage for U.S. forces,
rather than a significant source of risk.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans, management
actions, and timelines do you have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Department's senior
leadership to improve the operational energy posture of current
deployments as well as incorporating operational energy considerations
into the Department's planning and strategy development, requirements,
acquisition, and budgeting processes on an ongoing and long-term basis.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the coordination of operational energy efforts across the Services?
Answer. At this time I do not have first-hand knowledge of what may
be the most serious problems in the coordination of operational energy
efforts across the Services, though I am certainly aware that each
Service has its own roles, missions, materiel, training, and cultures.
If confirmed, I would plan to work closely with Service energy
executives and other key stakeholders to ensure that the Department's
energy strategy allows for implementation that can promote coordination
and also accommodate differentiation.
organization and staffing
Question. Managing operational energy is vitally important but will
be challenging because of the cross-cutting nature of the problem which
permeates DOD and the Services. The authorizing language for this
position prescribes certain tools such as budgetary certification to
ensure that the Director has the access and ability to conduct
oversight needed to be successful.
Are there any additional tools you feel you might need to be
successful?
Answer. Not at this time but I will examine this question if I am
confirmed.
Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the
Department has made the changes necessary to establish the office of
DOEPP, in accordance with the statutory requirements?
Answer. Although I have limited knowledge of the arrangements
already made, I believe that the Department has taken steps to
establish the office of DOEPP and other energy policy infrastructure as
required in the law.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the structure,
organization, or reporting relationships of the office of DOEPP?
Answer. No, not at this time.
Question. What steps do you plan to take, if confirmed, to assess
the staffing needs of your office and ensure that you have sufficient
staff of appropriately qualified and trained personnel to carry out
your duties and responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully consider the best way to
fully establish this new office in order to meet the statutory
requirements. That will include determining the optimal office
organization, creating or fine-tuning position descriptions, adopting
success metrics, and recruiting qualified individuals.
Question. What is your view of the current staffing of operational
energy plans and programs of the military departments and defense
agencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the resources allocated to
operational energy plans and programs across the defense enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, what role if any do you expect to play in
ensuring that the operational energy planning and program functions of
the military departments and defense agencies have sufficient staff of
appropriately qualified and trained personnel to carry out their duties
and responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work with leadership to assess the
capability and capacity of the Department to execute the Department's
energy strategy. This assessment would include an appraisal of staff
qualifications.
Question. Do you think that the Department is currently doing an
adequate job of coordinating operational energy planning and
programming across the services?
Answer. No, not at this time. Military and civilian leadership in
the Department have done an admirable job of identifying concerns about
operational energy and beginning to put in place the policies and
staffing to deal with these concerns, but these efforts are still in
their early stages, particularly when it comes to implementation.
Coordination across the services, Combatant Commands, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff will be a high priority for me, if
confirmed.
training
Question. Section 332 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires consideration of fuel
logistics support requirements in planning, requirements development,
and acquisition processes.
What is your view of the steps that should be taken to ensure
wargames, planning processes, other training, and acquisitions
appropriately consider the operational impacts of systems that create
energy and fuel demand?
Answer. The key mission of the DOEPP office will be to make sure
planning processes, wargaming, and acquisitions consider the
operational impacts of energy consumption. If confirmed, I and my staff
will best accomplish this by deepening relationships and partnerships
with key stakeholders across the building, contributing to these
processes and activities, and providing useful expertise and
information, to include best practices and lessons learned. Also, key
leadership statements and strategy documents can be useful tools,
especially the 2008 Defense Science Board Task Force report on DOD
Energy Strategy and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which set
important baselines.
research and development
Question. What do you see as the role or need for research and
development to meet DOD's operational energy needs?
Answer. Research and development related to operational energy and
force capability is of great importance in meeting the Department's
operational energy needs. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, the Services, the
Department of Energy and the national labs, and the commercial sector
to drive and/or capture the benefits of innovation in energy research.
Question. What is your current understanding of the way that the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments
coordinate budgets for operational energy research and development?
Answer. My understanding is that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, supported by the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering, oversees the RDT&E investment
accounts and programs of the Services and Defense Agencies and
coordinates their budget requests with their sponsors.
Question. Do you believe that any of the military department's
research and development programs in this area are redundant or
overlapping?
Answer. I do not have sufficient information about the programs to
make an informed judgment at this time.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to coordinate the
research and development efforts of the military departments for
operational energy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Services,
Department leadership, and other stakeholders to ensure that energy
research needs are being performed where the best capability exists,
and to coordinate efforts to make the most progress as quickly as
possible.
Question. Do you believe that specific areas of responsibilities
should be assigned to each military department? If so, how would you go
about defining those areas of responsibility?
Answer. I believe the military departments should have a lead role
in determining the capabilities they need to meet military missions and
support military forces. If confirmed, I would support OSD and Joint
Staff efforts to facilitate collaboration and/or reduce overlap in
military R&D responsibilities.
Question. What role do you believe DARPA should play in research
and development to meet operational energy needs?
Answer. DARPA has a major role to play in pursuing leap-ahead,
often high risk, technological advancements to improve U.S. forces'
capabilities. This is true for energy-related technologies just as it
is for other areas.
Question. In your view, should DOD accelerate research and
technology development efforts related to renewable energy and
efficiency, procurement of equipment, and conservation efforts? If so,
what steps would you take, if confirmed, to accelerate such efforts?
Answer. I believe that DARPA, and DOD writ large, should accelerate
research and technology efforts in any area with strong promise for
improving our forces' capability, capacity, and efficiency,
particularly where DOD has a unique mission-critical need that cannot
be served by the commercial sector. Concerning energy, I am mindful of
the fact that DOD has been most successful in driving innovation when
DOD is focused on meeting military needs. If confirmed, I would work
with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, and the
relevant military department leadership to ensure we are investing in
energy innovations to advance our warfighter's capabilities.
Question. In your view, should DOD accelerate demonstration
programs with respect to renewable energy platforms to better aid
deployed forces in combat zones where energy and resources are derived
solely from power generators and convoy/airlift support? If so, what
steps would you take, if confirmed, to accelerate such programs?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to improve
the capabilities, force protection, effectiveness, and efficiency of
deployed forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and global operations against
terrorist organizations. I believe that energy innovations can further
that goal.
Question. What specific metrics would you use, if confirmed, to
assess funding targets and priorities for DOD's long term research
efforts and determine whether DOD is making adequate investments in its
basic research programs?
Answer. I do not have sufficient knowledge or perspective yet to
make such a judgment. However, if confirmed, I would plan to work with
key stakeholders to develop a prioritization scheme for energy-related
reforms and their implementation, complementing and informed by the
Quadrennial Defense Review and other relevant strategy and guidance.
This would provide the strongest context for making informed resource
allocation and funding target assessments.
department of energy
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Department of
Energy (DOE), including the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy,
on the development of new or advanced approaches for operational energy
requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I would look forward to working closely with
the Department of Energy, including the Advance Research Projects
Agency-Energy, to develop new or advanced approaches for meeting
operational energy requirements where opportunities for collaboration
exist.
Question. Are there any specific areas where you think DOD or the
Services are best suited to partner with DOE?
Answer. At this time, I do not have specific thoughts on
technologies or other areas that are best suited to a partnership.
Question. The Secretary of Energy recently outlined plans to invest
up to $366 million to establish and operate three new Energy Innovation
Hubs focused on accelerating research and development in three key
energy areas. Each Hub, to be funded at up to $122 million over 5
years, will bring together a multidisciplinary team of researchers in
an effort to speed research and shorten the path from scientific
discovery to technological development and commercial deployment of
highly promising energy-related technologies.
In your view, would similar plans and efforts within DOEPP
similarly benefit DOD?
Answer. If confirmed, this is a concept I would discuss with the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering and the appropriate Service
points of contact.
biofuels
Question. What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of
the use of biofuels by DOD?
Answer. Although I do not know the specifics of DOD's current or
planned biofuels use, I believe the advantages and disadvantages of the
Department of Defense biofuels programs likely mirror those of the
civilian economy. The chief advantages are: the ability to improve U.S.
energy security and cut operating and economic vulnerabilities by
decreasing reliance on foreign energy sources; the benefit to the U.S.
economy and provision of jobs that come with a domestic industry;
improvements in climate security through lower greenhouse gas
emissions; and the promotion of a long-term transition away from fossil
fuels. The disadvantages include: competition with other uses (such as
food) depending on the feedstock used; challenges with meeting
technical specifications and performance standards; high capital and/or
lifecycle costs; insufficient gains in cutting greenhouse gas
emissions; and opportunity costs for investment in other energy
innovations.
Question. What are the costs and benefits (including environmental
costs and benefits) associated with the use of biofuels?
Answer. The costs and benefits of biofuels are complex and depend
on the feedstock, water demands of the feedstock and fuel production,
byproducts, and total lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions. A thorough
and objective cost-benefit analysis of all these considerations will be
vital to capturing the benefits and minimizing the costs of biofuels.
Question. If confirmed, how will you help ensure that the use of
biofuels by the services do not result in prolonged increased energy
costs, detract from operational readiness, or unduly burden existing
logistics systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department's energy
strategy considers all of these factors and will work with the Defense
Energy Support Center to ensure any alternative fuels contracts DOD
enters into conform with EISA Section 526 and protect the taxpayer
against excessive costs. I will also ensure any alternative fuel
purchased for deployable systems are fully fungible with conventional
fuels and do not compromise performance or sustainment of our forces.
Question. In your view, does the Department need any additional
statutory or contract authorities to increase the production of
biofuels?
Answer. I do not yet have access to sufficient information to make
an informed judgment.
expeditionary energy
Question. In a deployed environment, forward operating bases rely
on ground-based and air logistical support and generators to function,
produce electricity, and accomplish their combat mission, often at the
risk of casualties and high costs. One alternative is the use of solar
and wind renewable energy resources in theater to provide energy to
units.
In your view, which of the concepts and technologies that are
currently available or under development provide the most promising
sources of energy for deployed units?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek more information on the technical
and demonstration data particular to combat missions in order to make
informed judgments on this issue. This would be a priority issue I
expect to discuss with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering
and the appropriate Service points of contact.
Question. Another alternative currently in use to conserve energy
and operational costs is the foaming of tents and structures. The
Marine Corps tends to favor insulating fabric layers rather than foam
to provide a more lightweight and maneuverable capability to shelters.
What is your understanding of the advantages and disadvantages to
using foam as insulation?
Answer. My understanding is that the foaming of tents and some more
permanent structures overseas is a great success story in terms of
reduced fuel demand. There have also proven to be some challenges
related to mobility, disposal, ventilation, and flammability. If
confirmed, I will review this program and work with the Services and
COCOMs to develop clear and consistent guidance.
Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which tents
and structures currently use foaming technology?
Answer. I am not aware of the total number or proportion of
operational structures that have been foamed, or that are planned to be
insulated in some way.
Question. What is your understanding of DOD's goals for use of
foaming in the future?
Answer. I am not aware of any goals or current contracts to further
foam any structures. If confirmed, I will collect this data from the
Services and COCOMs and discuss options with them to set clear guidance
for the future.
Question. In 2007, the Joints Chiefs of Staff rejected an urgent
request for renewable power stations in Iraq on the grounds that solar
and wind-powered technologies were ``not mature enough'' to deploy. As
a result such potentially beneficial technologies have generally been
limited to demonstration programs and deployed units are left without
renewable and independent energy sources that could ease the threat and
burden of logistical support convoys and airlifts.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to overcome such problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with senior civilian and
military leaders to ensure we are better supporting our warfighters in
the field. This means testing and fielding operational energy solutions
as quickly and as prudently as possible in order to enhance the ability
of deployed forces to achieve their missions. In assessing any urgent
operational needs, the Department must balance the quick and the
prudent; for urgent operational needs with energy as a factor, I would
expect the Director for Operational Energy to have a role in such
assessments.
Question. Do you consider energy conservation and the use of
renewable energy to be a combat multiplier or key performance
parameter?
Answer. Both. Improved energy efficiency and use of renewables can
be important combat multipliers, if they are implemented in ways that
improve the capability of systems and military units, or if they reduce
the total logistics footprint in the theater of operations. At the same
time, I believe the energy efficiency key performance parameter will be
a vital factor in requirements and acquisition decisions going forward.
Question. In your view, is there a need for a cultural change in
the mindset of our Armed Forces with respect to renewable energy,
efficiency, and conservation?
Answer. Yes. My impression is that a cultural change is underway
but is in the early stages of taking hold. A number of factors are
spurring this change. First, U.S. and partner forces have faced great
challenges in securing and maintaining supply lines in Iraq and
Afghanistan, along with high costs. This has underscored the need to
cut the consumption of fuel and develop energy alternatives. The
Quadrennial Defense Review explicitly and firmly identified energy
security as an important national security goal, which will provide a
baseline for new thinking. It is my understanding that some wargames
and other defense planning activities have also begun to incorporate
challenges to energy supplies.
fully burdened cost of fuel
Question. The fully burdened cost of fuel accounts for not only the
fuel price but all other costs associated with delivery, often to
forward operating locations. It can vary depending on the region and
operating platform, but moving fuel by convoy and airlift is often very
expensive depending on the analysis.
Do you believe that the fully burdened cost of fuel provides a
useful metric for the Department's operational energy programs?
Answer. I believe it can be a useful metric. Right now, the costs
of fuel consumption are not fully accounted for; developing a credible
metric for the fully burdened cost of fuel will help assign the
appropriate value to energy efficiency, conservation, and other
alternatives. It can be a vital tool for making smarter decisions on
both the performance and sustainment of our future force, but also on
the total ownership costs of the forces DOD is developing. If
confirmed, I look forward to working within OUSD(AT&L), with the
Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, and with the military
departments to find the best way to implement the fully burdened cost
of fuel in the DOD acquisition process.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that the fully burdened cost of fuel is accurate, incorporated into
funding requests, and becomes efficient as possible?
Answer. I understand that the development and implementation of the
fully burdened cost of fuel methodology is a core responsibility of the
Director's office. If confirmed, I would work closely with my
colleagues in OUSD(AT&L), the Office of the Director, Cost Analysis and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) and their equivalents in the military
departments to ensure their estimates are developed consistent with
acquisition policy, and that they are applied properly within the
established acquisition decision processes.
Question. If confirmed, what technologies, programs, and efforts
would you advocate to help reduce the fully burdened cost of fuel?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering, in particular, but also with the Service
acquisition and research and development commands, to pursue leads with
the most promise for improving U.S. forces' endurance, sustainment in
the field, and mission capability. I believe that by keeping the
improvement of our forces' mission capability as our central focus, we
will advance DOD's energy innovation to the greatest degree possible.
contingency plans
Question. Most military installations rely on energy provided by
the local civilian energy grid, which is owned and operated outside of
military jurisdiction. The risk of power outages in the civilian energy
grid may pose significant threats to their readiness and ability of
some installations to perform their mission.
Do you believe that the security and reliability of energy provided
to military installations is a significant source of concern?
Answer. Yes. I believe the overall security of the U.S. electric
grid is a significant source of concern--for the civilian economy as
well as for the Department of Defense. Although I have read reports
that there may be unappreciated risks to DOD critical missions from
electric grid vulnerabilities, I do not have sufficient exposure to
classified and technical data to make an informed judgment on the
matter. If confirmed, I expect to work with the assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, and the other DOD organizations with
equities concerning this issue to better understand current policies
and practices.
Question. What role if any do you see for DOEPP in initiatives to
improve the security and reliability of energy provided to military
installations both in the United States and abroad?
Answer. My understanding is that the responsibilities for ensuring
reliable energy supply to military installations cross-cuts numerous
policy, oversight, and operational organizations. Given that the
definition of ``operational energy'' includes energy consumed at
military bases in the United States in execution of mission critical
tasks supporting forward deployed forces and other operational
functions, it would be appropriate for DOEPP to be involved in policy
formulation and coordination in this area.
Question. In Afghanistan, fuel convoys must pass through unstable
regions and single points of entry through mountain passes.
What role if any do you see for DOEPP in the development of
contingency plans to ensure energy support to the warfighter in the
case of the disruption of lines of supply?
Answer. I am not aware of any authority or requirement in statute,
regulations, or policy for DOEPP to review and approve contingency
plans, which are the responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy and the relevant Combatant Commands. The same is true for
planning on current operations, although the USD(AT&L) has a role in
logistics oversight in current operations. If confirmed, I plan to
collaborate with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the Joint Staff J8, the Director, Cost Analysis and Program
Evaluation (CAPE), and the related offices in the military departments
to ensure energy support to warfighters.
renewable energy
Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which
military operational energy is currently derived from renewable energy
sources?
Answer. I have not seen an assessment of current operational use of
renewable energy. If confirmed, this is a question I will seek hard
data on.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any will you take to increase
the percentage of operational energy from renewable sources?
Answer. I believe it is in the Department's interest to assess
which renewable sources may reliably meet operational energy needs
before setting percentages or targets. An accurate assessment may well
demonstrate that there are circumstances in which renewable sources
will improve performance and/or reliability and/or lower costs,
especially once management tools such as the fully burdened cost of
fuel are implemented. I am not aware of whether an assessment has been
done to date, but if confirmed, I will examine how decisions are being
made about fielding renewable energy sources and technologies to
support operational activities.
Question. In your view, are renewable energy technology and other
alternatives to fossil fuels too expensive to compete with refined
petroleum sources of energy?
Answer. In my view, it would not be prudent to make any blanket
statements about the cost competitiveness of alternatives to fossil
fuels, especially since the full cost of these fuels is not reflected
in the price. Moreover, in the context of military operations,
performance is the most important metric, with reliability and cost
being important but not necessarily decisive considerations. I do think
it is important for the Department to factor into its decisions,
especially its procurement decisions, considerations such as ``total
ownership cost'' and the fully burdened cost of fuel, which can help
accurately incorporate full energy costs.
Question. If confirmed, what approach will you take to ensure that
any efforts to reduce energy demand or shift to renewable energy
alternatives will not degrade mission effectiveness?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my driving concerns will be to improve
mission effectiveness, especially for deployed forces. I will advocate
for energy policies that do so. I will not advocate for any energy
option that has a negative effect on mission effectiveness of U.S.
forces. If confirmed, I will work diligently to ensure that the way DOD
measures the capability, cost, and other implications of energy
alternatives is done consistently and rigorously, in line with the
other capability considerations.
Question. One common criticism of renewable energy platforms and
technologies relates to a lack of power storage or concerns with
battery capabilities.
If confirmed, what steps if any would you expect to take to address
such potential issues and concerns?
Answer. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering, as well as the military department research
and development and energy lead officials, to ensure our energy storage
and related technology investment and testing is keeping up with our
forces' operational needs.
Question. DOD has significant experience in partnering with
industry to develop renewable power resources--such as solar or
geothermal power--for military installations.
Do you see a role for similar partnerships with industry for the
development of renewable fuel approaches to operational energy
requirements?
Answer. Yes. Partnerships with industry are likely to be crucial to
meeting operational energy requirements.
energy goals
Question. How would you define operational energy security for DOD?
Answer. Section 331 of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act
defines operational energy as ``the energy required for training,
moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for
military operations. The term includes energy used by tactical power
systems and generators and weapons platforms.''
Question. If confirmed, what goals would you establish for DOEPP in
achieving operational energy security for DOD?
Answer. If confirmed, I will have a top goal to identify and
implement energy policies that can improve the mission effectiveness of
deployed forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the global fight against
terrorist organizations. Another top goal will be to better integrate
energy policy into the Department's business approaches in the research
and development, requirements, and procurement processes, to include
implementing tools required by law and regulation, such as the Energy
Efficiency Key Performance Parameter and the Fully Burdened Cost of
Fuel. If confirmed, I will also make assessing, assisting with, and
reporting on energy-related budgets across DOD a priority. Finally, an
important goal will be to integrate a full understanding of energy
security into the Department's strategic planning, force planning, and
logistics, raising awareness of energy challenges and opportunities
across the defense enterprise and identifying ways and means to improve
DOD's energy security in the near, mid, and long term.
Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities of
DOEPP for setting and implementing energy goals, including energy
conservation goals and goals for alternative and renewable types of
energy, within DOD?
Answer. My understanding is that, if confirmed, I would have a
leading role in drafting the Departmental operational energy strategy
and policy, in support of the Secretary. I would plan to work with all
DOD entities with operational energy in their own portfolios to devise
goals and specific changes that advance the capability, affordability,
and sustainability of U.S. forces, now and into the future. I would
also coordinate with the DUSD(I&E) on ensuring that the operational
energy strategy is compatible with the sustainability management plan
and other departmental energy management goals.
Question. In your view, are existing DOD energy goals, including
energy conservation goals and goals for alternative and renewable types
of energy, realistic and achievable?
Answer. From my experience in the private sector, I understand the
Department's current goals to be focused on installations and
compliance with current laws and the new Executive Order 13514
regarding greenhouse gas emissions from energy use. To my knowledge,
those issues will be overseen by the USD(AT&L) with the
DUSD(Installations & Environment) as his primary staff lead. I am not
aware of any systematic assessment that has been done on whether these
goals are sufficient for DOD's purposes but have read anecdotal success
stories.
Concerning operational energy, I believe there will be differences
in how the Department will measure operational energy benefits in
current operations from how it measures energy benefits in the design
of future capabilities. I am aware of no specific DOD energy goals in
either domain at this time, but if confirmed, I would anticipate having
a role in developing those within a DOD energy strategy.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to these goals?
Answer. I am not in a position to recommend proposed changes at
this time.
execution of executive order
Question. On October 8, 2009, the President signed Executive Order
13514, Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic
Performance, to establish the policy that Federal agencies shall
increase energy efficiency and measure, report, and reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions. The Secretary of Defense has designated the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
to serve as the Senior Sustainability Officer responsible for ensuring
compliance with the directives in this executive order.
Are you familiar with the Department of Defense's integrated
Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan required by the executive
order?
Answer. Yes, I am familiar with the requirement in the executive
order.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in working
with the Under Secretary of Defense to carry out the requirements of
the executive order?
Answer. I believe that, if confirmed, I would partner with the
DUSD(I&E) in supporting the USD(AT&L) to meet these requirements.
Question. What issues, if any, do you anticipate for the Department
of Defense in satisfying the goals in the executive order?
Answer. Beyond noting the recent announcement of greenhouse gas
emissions targets, I do not have sufficient insight into how the
Department is planning to implement the executive order to anticipate
such issues.
compliance with section 526 of the u.s. energy independence and
security act
Question. Section 526, which was signed into law in December 2007,
prohibits Federal agencies from entering into procurement contracts of
alternative or synthetic fuel for any mobility-related use, other than
for research or testing, unless the contract specifies that the
lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions are less than or equal to emissions
from the equivalent conventional fuel produced from conventional
petroleum sources.
What is your understanding of the Department of Defense's concerns
associated with the implementation of section 526?
Answer. I am not aware of any Department of Defense concerns about
this matter.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address these concerns?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe that my responsibilities would
include addressing concerns or legislative initiatives related to
section 526.
army energy policy
Question. In your view, what renewable technologies and fuel types
have the most potential for certification and use by tactical vehicles?
Answer. I do not have sufficient technical information at this time
to make an informed judgment on which technologies have the most
potential for tactical vehicle use. However, if confirmed, I will seek
information from the relevant acquisition and technology development
authorities in DOD, the R&D labs, and industry to gain a better
perspective. I strongly believe, though, that there is great promise in
developing, proving, and adopting more energy efficient designs and
technologies and renewables, if we can show that they improve the
capability of platforms, lower the total ownership cost of forces, and/
or reduce the scale of the logistic support required to sustain
missions.
Question. What is your view of the feasibility and advisability of
using alternative and renewable technologies for tactical vehicles?
Answer. I believe there is a bright future for incorporating
technologies and designs that improve efficiency and utilize
alternative power sources in tactical vehicles. My intent, if
confirmed, is to ensure DOD's planning processes incorporate
technologies and designs that maximize capability while minimizing the
limitations our systems have due to their demand for energy.
Question. In your view, what applications for hybrid-electric
drives, if any, could be applied to tactical vehicles?
Answer. I consider it very important to find ways to lighten the
logistics burden on deployed forces, including the fuel burden of
tactical vehicles. I believe there may be some applications for hybrid-
electric drives, but also that current technologies may not be suitable
for all tactical vehicles. Though I do not have detailed information on
this subject, I am aware that the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research,
Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) is currently evaluating
Hybrid-Electric (HE) technologies and look forward to learning more
about their findings.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's current
plan for certification of tactical vehicles for alternative fuel use?
Answer. The Air Force began a significant effort in 2007 to start
certifying its entire fleet of aircraft on blends of synthetic and
conventional fuels. From what I have read, most of their aircraft have
since been certified. Secretary of the Navy Mabus has issued a policy
regarding the Navy's certification of surface ships and aircraft for
use of synthetic fuels, but I am not sure of the status of this effort.
I understand the Army is currently evaluating synthetic and renewable
fuel blends for some systems. I am unaware of any Marine Corps plans to
certify their tactical vehicles for alternative fuel use. I am not
aware of a DOD-wide policy on alternative fuel certification.
Question. If confirmed, would you support such efforts and what
similar policies and initiatives would you support?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Installations and Environment and the military
departments' installation and energy officials to promote the use and
testing of initiatives that reduce costs, improve the resilience of
installations to perform critical missions, and to improve DOD's
greenhouse gas emissions.
air force energy policy
Question. In your view, what renewable technologies and fuel types
have the most potential for certification and use by aircraft?
Answer. I strongly support policies in place that address reducing
carbon emissions, reducing dependence on foreign oil, promoting
alternative energy sources, and increasing energy efficiency. I believe
renewable technologies and fuels can play a role in helping the
Department succeed in these areas. Therefore, if confirmed, I will
perform a comprehensive review of current Air Force and other Service
efforts regarding specific technologies and fuel types and recommend to
the Secretary of Defense those alternative fuel sources that I believe
are in the best interest of the Department.
Question. What is your view of the feasibility and advisability of
using alternative and renewable energy technologies for aircraft?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the Air Force and other
Services regarding the feasibility of specific alternative and
renewable energy technologies being considered for aviation use. I will
recommend to the Secretary of Defense those technologies which show the
most promise to enhance mission capability while meeting or exceeding
the Department's energy goals.
Question. What is your view of the cost effectiveness of
alternative and renewable fuels for use as aviation fuels?
Answer. Although there are promising scientific and technological
developments, the market for alternative and renewable aviation fuels
is not yet mature. It is still early to speculate on the cost
effectiveness of these fuels. It will be up to industry to produce
alternative and renewable fuels for the Department that can be obtained
cost-competitively.
Question. How much of a premium if any do you believe the
Department should be willing to pay for the use of alternative and
renewable fuels for aircraft?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult within the Department and the
Defense Logistics Agency to determine the feasibility of considering
premiums for the purchase of alternative and renewable fuels.
navy energy policy
Question. In October 2009, Secretary Mabus announced various energy
goals for the Navy including the creation of a ``Green Strike Group''
powered by biofuels by 2012 and deploying by 2016; by 2015, reducing
petroleum use in its 50,000 commercial vehicle fleet by 50 percent by
phasing in hybrid fuel and electric vehicles; producing at least half
the shore-based energy requirements from renewable sources, such as
solar, wind and ocean generated by the base; and by 2020, ensuring at
least 40 percent of the Navy's total energy consumption comes from
alternative sources.
What is your understanding of the ``Green Strike Group''?
Answer. I am pleased that Secretary Mabus has given operational
energy such a prominent place on his list of priorities, and if
confirmed, I would look forward to working closely with him on
improving the capability, sustainability, and cost-effectiveness of the
forces under his purview. My understanding of his ``Green Strike
Group'' concept is that he will meet the targets he has through a
combination of nuclear powered vessels, efficiency improvements, and
the use of alternative fuels.
Question. What is your understanding of the anticipated cost and
schedule for the implementation of the ``Green Strike Group'' and
associated energy goals?
Answer. I have not seen a cost estimate or specific schedule of its
implementation plan, besides those target dates mentioned above.
Question. What is your understanding of the role and responsibility
of DOEPP for establishing and implementing Navy energy policy within
the DOD?
Answer. My understanding of the role and responsibility of DOEPP in
this case is fourfold. While the Navy should establish and implement
its own energy policy, the DOEPP will provide leadership, facilitate
communication, and conduct oversight of operational energy plans and
programs within the Navy, as well as the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps,
and defense agencies. Second, DOEPP will establish an operational
energy strategy that will guide the Navy and other Services and defense
agencies in establishing their plans. Third, DOEPP is responsible for
coordinating and overseeing planning and program activities of the Navy
and across the defense enterprise in the implementation of the
operational energy strategy. Finally, DOEPP has other statutory
responsibilities to review and certify the energy portions of budget
submitted by the Navy, the other Services, and across the Department.
Question. In your view, what renewable technologies and fuel types
have the most potential for certification and use by ships?
Answer. To date, I have not seen a technical assessment that would
give me sufficient information on which to base such a judgment.
logistics
Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities with respect
to logistical and materiel support, supply chain management, and
sustainment efforts as they pertain to operational energy?
Answer. Responsibility in OSD for these issues rest with the
USD(AT&L), supported by the assistant Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness(ASD(L&MR)). If confirmed, I hope to
work closely with the ASD(L&MR) on ways to reduce energy demand in the
current and future force, and to promote energy solutions that will
improve the supportability, flexibility and mobility of U.S. forces.
Question. What is your view of the role DOEPP will play in
addressing logistical support challenges associated with the delivery
of energy to deployed units, particularly in harsh environments like
Afghanistan?
Answer. My view is that DOEPP should play a lead role in DOD in
advocating for aggressive testing, demonstration, and fielding of
energy solutions that can reduce the resupply burdens on U.S. forces
wherever they are operating. According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review, our forces face anti-access challenges from near-peer
competitors and others in the future as well, which could put fuel and
logistics resupply in the air and at sea at much greater risk.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as DOEPP?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
operational energy security and military culture
1. Senator Udall. Ms. Burke, in a deployed environment, forward
operating bases rely entirely upon ground-based and air logistical
support and electric generators to produce power, often at the risk of
casualties and high costs. Secure and renewable energy sources without
a risky logistical tail, vulnerabilities, or burden on combat
capability would greatly benefit our Armed Forces. Recently, the
Department has made some progress in setting renewable and sustainable
energy goals but we still have a long way to go. If confirmed, how do
you plan to transition from well-intentioned goals, small scale
demonstrations, and good ideas on paper, and make the leap to rapidly
test, evaluate, and field expeditionary energy platforms?
Ms. Burke. If confirmed, I would place high priority on improving
fuel demand management at deployed locations. As part of the strategy
development required by legislation, I would seek to assess the
technologies and practices that have already been fielded in current
deployments and in U.S.-based military installations, collecting
information on best practices and lessons learned that can be applied
to operational energy. This assessment would especially look for tested
strategies and technologies that can be scaled for wider use. My
understanding is that this may include but is not limited to: smarter
and more resilient power management systems and approaches, more
efficient or efficient use of generators, improved energy storage
(batteries), insulation of tents and generators, solar panels for
structures or individuals, small wind turbines, and a range of options
for mobility. In addition, if confirmed, I would cooperate with the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), other defense
components, the Military Services, the Department of Energy, and the
private sector to identify promising technologies and push the pace of
research, development, demonstration and deployment. The operational
energy strategy itself can provide an important roadmap to help
prioritize areas for investment, experimentation, field testing, and
further development.
2. Senator Udall. Ms. Burke, how can Congress assist you in that
endeavor?
Ms. Burke. Congress took important action in creating the office
for which I am being considered, but in my current position it would be
difficult to know if any further action is required. If I am confirmed
as the Director, I would consider an ongoing dialogue with Congress to
be crucial to the success of my office.
3. Senator Udall. Ms. Burke, how do you plan to reduce demand and
improve efficiencies through changing military culture while providing
them with renewable and sustainable battlefield solutions that reduce
vulnerability but also increase expeditionary capability?
Ms. Burke. If confirmed, my top priority would be to harness
military culture to improve the military's energy security. The
Military Services focus fiercely on mission effectiveness and have
strong leadership traditions, and I believe it is possible to
demonstrate to soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen--and their
leadership--that changing their energy use will improve their mission
effectiveness. At the same time, I would keep in mind that
organizational cultures change when the incentives and policies change,
with clear leadership support. If confirmed, I would seek to work with
the Department's leaders to change policies and incentives, including
by committing adequate resources to and rewards for demand management
and integrating operational energy concerns into the strategy,
planning, and procurement processes.
fully burdened cost of fuel
4. Senator Udall. Ms. Burke, the logistical efforts to deliver our
troops the fuel and other resources they need to fight are dangerous
and expensive. The Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) accounts for all
costs associated with delivery to forward operating locations, such as
combat outposts in Afghanistan. While some of the Services differ on
the exact price of FBCF, estimates range into the hundreds of dollars
per gallon, and logistical convoys often dedicate well over half of
their load to fuel and water. What is your understanding of FBCF today
in Afghanistan?
Ms. Burke. Military missions, from training to combat, tend to be
dangerous and expensive; the challenge is to eliminate unnecessarily
high risks and costs. Indeed, the Nation's leaders owe it to the men
and women in uniform to be aggressive about doing so. I believe the
patterns of operational energy use today in Afghanistan incorporate far
more risk than they need to and that there are alternatives and
approaches that will cut the risk and also potentially support broader
strategic goals in theater. To the best of my knowledge, the ``Fully
Burdened Cost of Fuel'' has not been explicitly used as a tool to help
cut these risks in Afghanistan. The Department's leaders are clearly
aware, however, that fuel costs and logistics vulnerabilities in
Afghanistan are too high. The variances in the estimates of FBCF that
you cite are due to calculations based on different methods of fuel
delivery.
5. Senator Udall. Ms. Burke, if confirmed, what steps would you
take to ensure that FBCF is accurate and incorporated into funding
requests and the acquisition process?
Ms. Burke. If confirmed, I would first look at all studies and
pilot programs that have been completed to date on how the Fully
Burdened Cost of Fuel might be calculated and then lead a collaborative
effort with the Joint Staff, relevant defense agencies, the military
services, and the private sector, if appropriate, to delineate a
reasonable process and implementation plan.
6. Senator Udall. Ms. Burke, do you believe that current Department
of Defense (DOD) requirements and acquisition processes adequately
consider the fully-burdened life-cycle costs of energy?
Ms. Burke. No.
7. Senator Udall. Ms. Burke, if confirmed, what technologies,
programs, and efforts would you advocate to help reduce FBCF?
Ms. Burke. Generally, I believe the Director of Operational Energy
Plans and Programs should focus on making the link between improved
energy security and improved mission effectiveness and force
capabilities. In that regard, if confirmed, I would look forward to
working with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, the
Service senior energy officials, industry, and interagency partners to
advocate for technologies, programs and efforts that minimize current
and future energy risks and costs to U.S. forces. At the same time, it
is my belief that the Director of Operational Energy Programs and Plans
should use tools that incentivize and identify rather than prescribe
the best mix of technologies and approaches for improved mission
effectiveness and force capabilities.
8. Senator Udall. Ms. Burke, what expeditionary renewable energy
platforms could help reduce the logistical burden of fuel and water for
deployed combat units?
Ms. Burke. The majority of fuel used in current military operations
is for tactical vehicles, aircraft, and generators (for space heating
and cooling, lighting, and communications on bases or in forward
operating positions). Renewable energy platforms that target these end
uses, either on the supply or demand side, may reduce the logistical
burdens on deployed forces. I believe the Department should be careful
not to focus, however, on a single or solely high-tech set of tools and
solutions; there has to be room for unexpected developments and
options. For example, the Government Accountability Office showcased in
a recent report a variety of ongoing initiatives, from the testing of a
``renewable energy tent city'' to one commander who achieved
significant energy savings just by rearranging the ``network'' of his
generators. Indeed, this study and others suggest that the practices of
energy consumers on defense installations and at forward positions can
affect energy usage as much as the design of equipment. If confirmed, I
would review all studies and ongoing pilot efforts on the use of
renewable technologies and collect information on promising
developments in this area for currently deployed forces.
alternative fuels
9. Senator Udall. Ms. Burke, DOD has begun to research and certify
renewable fuels such as algae and camelina to create alternatives to
petroleum products. These renewable alternatives could increase energy
security, reduce operational demand and dependence on petroleum
products, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which could result in a
plethora of benefits for DOD and by extension other Federal agencies
and academia. How do you define energy security and how does energy
security tie into the operational requirements of the military?
Ms. Burke. For the Nation, I define energy security as having
reliable, affordable, and sustainable energy supplies to support a
robust economy. For the Department specifically, I concur with the
definition of energy security in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR):
``energy security for the Department means having assured access to
reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver
sufficient energy to meet operational needs.'' Given the QDR wording,
it is fair to say that energy security ties into the military's
operational requirements geostrategically, strategically, and
tactically. These considerations can range from the way relations with
oil-producing nations may affect U.S. military commitments, to the role
of energy availability in campaign planning, to the opportunity cost of
volatile and high energy prices, to the vulnerability of fuel convoys
to attacks from Improvised Explosive Devices and ambush.
10. Senator Udall. Ms. Burke, how can the Department improve the
security and reliability of energy provided to our military abroad and
in the United States?
Ms. Burke. The Department can improve the security and reliability
of energy provided to the military by managing demand, especially by
improving energy efficiency and promoting conservation. The Department
also needs to promote diversity of fuel sources so that it relies on a
portfolio of energy sources and suppliers, lessening its vulnerability
to disruption, price volatility, and the unintended security
consequences of relying on problematic and insecure suppliers. In
addition, my understanding is that the Department is considering a full
range of risk management strategies for domestic U.S. bases, which rely
on the commercial electric grid.
11. Senator Udall. Ms. Burke, if confirmed, what specific metrics
would you establish to monitor DOD's progress with respect to
alternative fuels?
Ms. Burke. If confirmed, my first task would be to develop a
strategy that identifies goals against which to measure success and set
priorities--both for the Department and more specifically for the
Office of Operational Energy Plans and Programs. I think it is
important to do this before identifying specific metrics for
alternative fuels or overall operational energy security. Generally
speaking, though, I believe metrics should be developed in cooperation
with stakeholders, should measure inputs, outputs, outcome, and impact,
and they should be clear, limited in number, and flexible and iterative
enough to adjust for changing circumstances. Of course, the bottom line
in measuring DOD's energy progress will be how energy impacts military
effectiveness, and I anticipate implementing metrics along those lines,
as well as on cost and other issues.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
energy technology
12. Senator Burris. Ms. Burke, a recent Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report stated, ``DOD relies overwhelmingly on commercial
electrical power grids for secure, uninterrupted electrical power
supplies to support its critical assets and DOD is the single largest
consumer of energy in the United States.'' Additionally, Secretary
Gates and each of the Service Secretaries have stated in their fiscal
year 2011 testimony that energy and conservation overall is a priority
effort. What are the plans to use more clean energy technologies within
DOD?
Ms. Burke. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment has responsibility for energy policies related to fixed
installations, and environmental quality of the whole Department,
including for fleet vehicles. For installations, the Department is
preparing plans to meet the greenhouse gas (GHG) and other
``sustainability'' targets described in Executive Order 13514 of 2009,
which will require more aggressive use of clean energy sources. If
confirmed, I would expect to work closely with the DUSD(I&E) and the
Service senior energy leaders to promote experimentation and adoption
of renewable energy solutions and more efficient distribution systems
to help mitigate risks from prolonged outages, to reduce environmental
impact, and to help advance the state of the art for these technologies
in the civil sector.
13. Senator Burris. Ms. Burke, what are the plans to reduce
reliance on commercial electrical power?
Ms. Burke. I know the Department is looking at how to improve its
security relative to the commercial electric grid, but I do not know
the specifics of the Department's plans or whether reducing reliance on
commercial electrical power would meet DOD's energy security goals. DOD
must ensure it retains the ability to complete its critical missions
even in the event of failure by the commercial power grid. Although the
Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs has no explicit
responsibility for this issue by statute, I understand that if
confirmed, I would likely play a supporting role in improving the
Department's energy security at domestic installations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
dod energy
14. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Burke, in a July 2008 letter to my office,
DOD stated that section 526 ``is overly broad both in design and
application. . . . The provision opens the Department up to court or
administrative challenges to every fuel purchase it makes, with the
inherent potential for an adverse decision that would cover fuels the
military already relies on as well as potential reliable sources of
fuel that could be developed in the future.'' Do you believe section
526 has the potential to affect the availability of alternative and
conventional fuel sources which the military may procure? Why or why
not?
Ms. Burke. At this time, I do not have sufficient information to
answer this question. If confirmed, I would review the letter, the
findings that informed it, and confer with appropriate leadership in
order to fully answer this question. Generally, if confirmed, I would
see it as my job to help ensure that U.S. forces always have access to
the energy they need to conduct current and future military operations.
15. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Burke, do you believe DOD should have the
option of utilizing alternative fuels to include coal-to-liquid or gas-
to-liquid fuels?
Ms. Burke. Yes.
16. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Burke, in the hearing you said that you
``would not promote the use of fuels that are carbon intensive''. In
your opinion, are fuels derived from Canadian oil sands carbon
intensive?
Ms. Burke. In the hearing, I was referring to current research,
development, and demonstration of alternative fuels by the Department
of Defense and the need to balance operational capability gains with
environmental costs. While I am not privy to the latest research on
fuels derived from the Canadian oil sands, they are commonly understood
to have a higher carbon intensity than fuels already in use by DOD. I
believe U.S. forces should procure fuels that contribute to mission
success and am open to evaluating whether fuel from Canadian oil sands
would do this.
17. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Burke, what fuels do you consider carbon
intensive?
Ms. Burke. I consider fuels that generate relatively high carbon
dioxide emissions per unit of energy produced to be carbon intensive.
Fossil fuels (and, in some cases, biomass fuels) tend to be carbon
intensive, absent carbon capture and sequestration.
18. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Burke, to what degree could mission
effectiveness reasonably be sacrificed due to what you consider ``the
security risks of added greenhouse gases''?
Ms. Burke. Mission effectiveness should never be sacrificed; at the
same time, I do not believe that mission effectiveness is a zero sum
game. DOD needs to do everything possible to ensure mission success in
current deployments and also engage in the strategy development,
planning, and procurement that will prepare the military and the Nation
for future mission success.
19. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Burke, in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 conference report, the conferees
acknowledged that section 526 was not intended to preclude DOD from
purchasing the fuel it needs and that clarification is required. Do you
believe that simple report language is sufficient in this regard?
Ms. Burke. I do not know, but I believe it will be important to
clarify this matter with the leadership at the Department, if
confirmed. As the Senator notes, it was clearly not the intent of the
legislation to inhibit military operations in any way.
20. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Burke, if the security of our troops comes
into conflict with avoiding the use of carbon intensive fuels or
addressing climate change, which, in your view, should take priority?
Ms. Burke. DOD's energy decisions should always support the welfare
and mission success of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. If I
am confirmed, it would be my job to help make sure U.S. forces always
have the energy they need to achieve operational objectives. One way to
accomplish this goal is to reduce the amounts of fuel needed to support
current military operations, given that our supply lines are
vulnerable, difficult to protect, present unnecessarily high mission
risks, and are costly to operate and protect in dollars and in lives.
Therefore, in my view, the security of American troops will not come
into conflict with avoiding the use of carbon intensive fuels or
addressing climate change. In fact, I believe the security of our
troops will be enhanced by the prudent consideration of these factors,
as delineated in the 2010 QDR.
21. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Burke, in your answers to the advance
policy questions, you said one of your top priorities with respect to
renewable energy will be to improve the capabilities, force protection,
effectiveness, and efficiency of deployed forces in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and global operations against terrorist organizations. The question
specifically addressed energy and resources derived solely from power
generators and convoy/airlift support. Power to operate equipment 24/7
in all of our areas of responsibilities (AORs) is critical to mission
success. Please provide specific examples of alternative sources of
energy you would be looking at in Afghanistan.
Ms. Burke. I agree with what I believe to be the basic premise of
this question, which is that reliability is essential in deployed
energy supply. It is my belief, however, that current supply lines are
not as reliable as they could be or need to be. If confirmed, I would
plan to work with the Military Services to improve the energy security
of deployed forces, both by looking for alternative sources of energy,
but also by reducing the demand for energy. If confirmed, I would start
by assessing supply and demand options that have already been tested or
fielded. My understanding is that these options include, but are not
limited to: smarter and more resilient power management systems and
approaches, more efficient or efficient use of generators, improved
energy storage (batteries), insulation of tents and generators, solar
panels for structures or individuals, small wind turbines, and a range
of options for mobility. I believe there will be important lessons
learned, both about what works and what does not work, which can help
guide more systematic decisions and leadership support for energy
security in theater. I also believe that military bases in the United
States may have experience with energy innovations that can be applied
in theater and should be included in an assessment of the range of
possibilities.
22. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Burke, how do size of footprint on the
ground, logistics support, and threats from attack play into using and
accelerating such programs?
Ms. Burke. Today's U.S. forces and support operations are energy
intensive and require significant logistics support. In addition to the
2010 QDR, recent studies by the Government Accountability Office, the
Defense Science Board, Deloitte Consulting, Global Green USA, and
others have found that supply convoys have been heavily targeted in
current operations both in Iraq and in Afghanistan and that the
majority of these convoys are moving fuel. That vulnerability is
exacerbated, ironically, by our strength: it is my belief that U.S.
forces are likely to outclass any enemy for the foreseeable future, and
one result of that asymmetry is that our foes will continue to try to
attack and block our logistics ``tail'' and other relatively soft
targets, regardless of the size of our military ``footprint.''
Strategies, technologies, and approaches that can lessen the reliance
of U.S. forces on frequent resupply and lighten the logistics burden
will help make our operations more robust and resilient. In that sense,
operational energy use is as much an opportunity to improve mission
effectiveness as it is a vulnerability.
______
[The nomination reference of Sharon E. Burke follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
December 11, 2009.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Sharon E. Burke, of Maryland, to be Director of Operational Energy
Plans and Programs. (New Position)
______
[The biographical sketch of Sharon E. Burke, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Resume of Career Service of Sharon E. Burke
Education:
Williams College
September 1984-June 1988
Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded June 1988
Columbia University, School of International and
Public Affairs
September 1992-June 1994
Master of International Affairs Degree awarded
June 1994
Certificate of Middle Eastern Studies awarded
June 1994
Employment Record:
Center for a New American Security
Vice President for Natural Security
Senior Fellow
July 2007-present
Third Way
Director of the National Security Project
February 2006-July 2007
Corporation for National and Community Service
Speechwriter
September 2005-February 2006
Independent Consultant
Speechwriting consultant
January 2005-October 2006
U.S. Department of State
Member, Policy Planning Staff
Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of
State
July 2002-January 2005
Amnesty International USA
Advocacy Director for the Middle East and
North Africa
March 2001-July 2002
U.S. Department of Defense
Speechwriter to the Secretary of Defense
Country Director for South Asia, Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (OUSDP)
Presidential Management Intern
October 1994-January 2001
Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress
Research Analyst, Energy and Transportation
programs
September 1989-July 1992
Office of U.S. Senator Paul Sarbanes
Staff Assistant
October 1988 (approx)-September 1989
Honors and Awards:
Leadership Team, Next Generation Project, American
Assembly (2007)
Next Generation Fellow, American Assembly (2006)
Department of State Superior Honor Award (2004)
Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service Award
(2001)
Department of Defense Meritorious Service Group Award
(1995)
Presidential Management Intern, U.S. Department of
Defense (1994-1996)
Foreign Language and Areas Studies Fellow, Georgetown
University (1993)
International Fellow, Columbia University (1993)
Zuckerman Fellow, Columbia University (full tuition
and stipend, 1992-1994)
Dean's List, Williams College and St. Lawrence
University.
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Sharon E.
Burke in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Sharon Eileen Burke.
2. Position to which nominated:
Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs, U.S. Department
of Defense.
3. Date of nomination:
December 11, 2009.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
January 12, 1966; South Laguna, CA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Paul Anthony Fagiolo.
7. Names and ages of children:
Thomas Romeo Fagiolo, age 9.
Anthony Foster Fagiolo, age 5.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Palos Verdes High School, 1980-1984, high school diploma received
June 1984.
Williams College, 1984-1988, BA degree received June 1988.
Columbia University, 1992-1994, Master of International Affairs
degree received June 1994.
Certificate of Middle Eastern Studies received June 1994.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Center for a New American Security, Senior Fellow 2007-2008, Vice
President, 2008-present.
Director of the National Security Project, Third Way, Washington,
DC, February 2006-July 2007.
Speechwriter, Corporation for National and Community Service,
Washington, DC, September 2005-February 2006.
Independent Speechwriting Consultant, January 2005-present (note
that in this capacity, was on the Senate payroll working for U.S.
Senator Chuck Hagel from February 2005-September 2005). Note that
though technically I am still open to working on such contracts, but I
have not accepted any such work since October 2006.
Member, Policy Planning Staff and Special Assistant to the Deputy
Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, July 2002-January 2005,
Washington, DC.
Advocacy Director for the Middle East and North Africa Amnesty
International USA, March 2001-July 2002, Washington, DC.
Speechwriter to the Secretary of Defense, November 1998
(approximately)-January 2001, Washington, DC.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Naval Studies Board, National Security Implications of Climate
Change on U.S. Naval Forces, September 2009-present.
Member, Emergency Preparedness Committee, City of Takoma Park, MD,
2006-2008.
Consultant to Senator Chuck Hagel, February 2005-September 2005 (on
U.S. Senate payroll in that capacity).
Department of Defense, Country Director for South Asia and for
North Africa in OSD (Policy) 1996-1998; Presidential Management Intern
1994-1996.
Research Analyst, Office of Technology Assessment, September 1989-
July 1992.
Staff Assistant, Office of U.S. Senator Paul Sarbanes, September
1988 (approx)-September 1989.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Center for a New American Security, Senior Fellow 2007-2008, Vice
President, 2008-present.
Project 2049, Board of Directors, 2009-present.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Women in International Security, Member 1996 (approximately)-
present.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
$250 to Chap Petersen for Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, 2004
$500 to Forward Together PAC 2/23/2006
$500 to Obama Victory Fund 10/22/08
$200 to Jack Reed for Senate, September 2007
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Leadership Team, Next Generation Project, American Assembly (2007)
Next Generation Fellow, American Assembly (2006)
Department of State Superior Honor Award (2004)
Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service Award (2001)
Department of Defense Meritorious Service Group Award (1995)
Presidential Management Intern, U.S. Department of Defense (1994-
96)
Foreign Language and Areas Studies Fellow, Georgetown University
(1993)
International Fellow, Columbia University (1993)
Zuckerman Fellow, Columbia University (full tuition and stipend,
1992-1994)
Dean's List, Williams College and St. Lawrence University
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
``China is Calling for your Cell Phone,'' Defense News, October 12,
2009.
Occasional contributor to Natural Security Blog at www.cnas.org
since June 11, 2009.
Natural Security, Center for a New American Security, June 11,
2009.
Climate Change Wargame: Major Findings and Background, Center for a
New American Security, June 1, 2009.
Clout and Climate Change Wargame: Participant Briefing Book, Center
for a New American Security, May 29, 2009.
Clout and Climate Change Wargame: Materials Generated by the Game,
Center for a New American Security, May 29, 2009.
Uncharted Waters: the U.S. Navy and Climate Change, Center for a
New American Security, March 30, 2009.
Remodeling the U.S. Government for Energy Security: Initial
Findings from the Big Energy Map, Center for a New American Security,
December 4, 2008.
A Strategy for American Power: Energy, Climate, and National
Security, Center for a New American Security, June 11, 2008.
With Campbell et al., Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and
National Security Implications of Climate Change, Brookings Institution
Press, 5/22/2008.
With Kamarck and Galston, Security First: A Strategy for Defending
America, Third Way, 2007.
With Matt Bennett, Beyond Bush: A New Strategy of Constriction to
Defeat al Qaeda and its Allies, Third Way, 2007.
With Harlan Geer, The Neo Con: The Bush Defense Record by the
Numbers, Third Way, 2006.
With Matt Bennett, Addressing Iraq in a Charged Political
Environment, Third Way, 2006.
With Matt Bennett and Jim Kessler, Winning the National Security
Debate: Lessons from a New Poll, Third Way, 2006.
With Matt Benett, Tough and Smart: A Winning National Security
Strategy, Third Way, 2006 (A message memo series that includes focused
pieces on Latin America, China, the U.S. military, WMD, and homeland
security).
Occasional contributor to Third Way ``Dispatch,'' 2006-2007, at
www.thirdwav.org.
Research contributor to U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, Energy in Developing Countries, OTA-E-486, Washington, DC,
U.S. GPO, January 1991.
With Joy Dunkerley et al., U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, Fueling Development: Energy Technologies for Developing
Countries, OTA-E-516, Washington, DC, U.S. GPO, April 1992.
Contributor to U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Rebuilding the Foundations: A Special Report on State and Local Public
Works Financing and Management, OTA-SET-447, Washington, DC, U.S. GPO,
March 1990.
Contributor to U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Delivering the Goods: Public Works Technologies, Financing, and
Management, OTA-SET-477, Washington, DC, U.S. GPO, April 1991.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Please see attached.
October 29, 2009 Remarks to the Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense,
U.S. Pacific Command
October 22, 2009 Talking Points for Remarks to the Sandia National
Laboratory Leadership Conference
July 23, 2009 Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
June 11, 2009 CNAS Annual Meeting Remarks on Natural Security
June 11, 2008 CNAS Annual Meeting Remarks on Energy Security
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Sharon E. Burke.
This 18th day of March, 2010.
[The nomination of Sharon E. Burke was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on May 5, 2010, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on June 22, 2010.
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Solomon B. Watson IV by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. This milestone legislation is now more than 20 years old
and has served our Nation well. Although I believe that the framework
established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved inter-
Service and joint relationships and promoted the effective execution of
responsibilities, the Department, working with Congress, should
continually assess the law in light of improving capabilities, evolving
threats, and changing organizational dynamics. Although I am currently
unaware of any reason to amend Goldwater-Nichols, if confirmed, I hope
to have an opportunity to assess whether the challenges posed by
today's security environment require amendments to the legislation.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. As noted above, I have no specific proposals to modify
Goldwater-Nichols. As with any legislation of this magnitude, however,
I believe it may be appropriate to review past experience with the
legislation with a view to identifying any areas in which it can be
improved upon, and then to consider with Congress whether the act
should be revised.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the General Counsel of the Department of the Army?
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 3019 provides that the General
Counsel of the Army shall perform such functions as the Secretary of
the Army may prescribe. The Secretary has done so through general
orders, regulations, and memoranda. The General Counsel provides legal
advice to the Secretary of the Army, the Under Secretary, the Assistant
Secretaries, and other offices within the Army Secretariat. As the
chief legal officer of the Department of the Army, the General Counsel
determines the controlling legal positions of the Department of the
Army. The General Counsel's responsibilities extend to any matter of
law and to other matters as directed by the Secretary. I understand
that examples of specific responsibilities currently assigned to the
General Counsel include providing professional guidance to the Army's
legal community, overseeing matters in which the Army is involved in
litigation, serving as the Designated Agency Ethics Official,
exercising the Secretary's oversight of intelligence and other
sensitive activities and investigations, providing legal advice to the
Army Acquisition Executive, and taking final action on certain claims
filed against the Army.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. The duties and responsibilities of the General Counsel of
the Department of the Army are broad and far-reaching. Consequently,
the General Counsel must possess sound legal and analytical skills
along with absolute integrity and mature judgment. As the diversity and
complexity of the legal and policy issues confronting the Army are such
that no one lawyer can have in-depth experience in all of them, the
General Counsel must have strong interpersonal and leadership abilities
and a willingness to work collaboratively with experts in numerous
areas. I believe that, if confirmed, my background and diverse legal
and executive experiences have well prepared me to execute the duties
of General Counsel of the Department of the Army.
I received my undergraduate degree in 1966 from Howard University
where I was in Advanced Army ROTC and, after graduation, was
commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Military Police (MP) Corps. I
served with the 9th Infantry Division MP Company for almost 1 year in
Vietnam and received the Bronze Star and Army Commendation Medals for
my service. After completing my military service in 1968, I entered
Harvard Law School and received a JD degree in 1971. I have been a
practicing lawyer for more than 35 years.
I was an associate at a large Boston law firm for 3 years before
joining the legal department of The New York Times Company (a public
company) in 1974. I have held various legal and executive positions
during 32 years of service at the company, including 12 years as
Corporate Secretary and, more recently, 16 years as General Counsel. In
the latter role I was responsible for the legal affairs of The Times
Company and its operating units. I have practiced law in such areas as
antitrust, employee benefits, corporate acquisitions, and public
company reporting and disclosure, and have adapted to changing legal,
regulatory and economic environments throughout my career.
As General Counsel, I have regularly advised the board of directors
and the senior management of The Times Company on a broad range of
issues including compliance, legal and enterprise risk, governance,
conflicts of interest and human resources. Additionally, as a member of
the company's senior management team, I have participated in strategic
planning, management development, organizational design and
acquisitions/dispositions.
I believe that my military, legal and executive experiences have
helped prepare me for the extraordinary challenge of serving as General
Counsel of the Department of the Army and overseeing the delivery of
quality legal services. I recognize the legal and policy issues that
face the Department of the Army in this time of war and transformation.
If confirmed, I commit to diligently and effectively perform the duties
of General Counsel of the Department of the Army.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the General Counsel of
the Department of the Army?
Answer. I am confident that I have the requisite legal experience,
analytic abilities and leadership skills to serve as the General
Counsel of the Department of the Army. If confirmed, I will work to
broaden my expertise and further my understanding and knowledge of the
major legal challenges facing the Army, including its personnel and its
organizations. Additionally, if confirmed, I will undertake to
establish and maintain collaborative and productive professional
working relationships with the career civil servants in the Office of
the General Counsel as well as with the Judge Advocate General of the
Army and with other related offices dealing with matters of mutual
interest. If confirmed, I would expect to benefit from their knowledge
as we work collaboratively to provide the best possible legal services
to all members of the Department of the Army.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you?
Answer. Although the Secretary of the Army has not discussed with
me the duties and functions he will expect of me, I anticipate that he
will rely on me to provide accurate and timely legal advice to help
ensure that the Army complies with both the letter and spirit of the
law. I would expect the current enumeration of General Counsel
responsibilities set forth in the General Order prescribing the duties
of each principal official of Headquarters, Department of the Army,
generally to remain in effect. Apart from such formally prescribed
duties, I believe the Secretary of the Army would expect me to continue
a collegial and professional relationship with the General Counsels of
the Department of Defense, the other military departments, and the
Defense agencies and the legal staffs of other Federal agencies. I
anticipate that the Secretary of the Army will expect me to continue
the extraordinarily effective and professional working relationship
that exists between the Office of the General Counsel and The Judge
Advocate General and his staff. Finally, I anticipate that the
Secretary of the Army will expect me to manage the General Counsel's
office efficiently and effectively, and to ensure that the Army legal
community is adequately resourced to perform its important mission.
Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense?
Answer. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense is the
Chief Legal Officer and final legal authority for the Department of
Defense. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Mr. Jeh
Johnson, has made clear in his testimony before this Committee and in
his actions in the Department, that he intends to work closely with the
Service General Counsels. If confirmed, I anticipate having a close and
professional relationship with Mr. Johnson, characterized by continuing
consultation, communication, and cooperation on matters of mutual
interest, in furtherance of the best interests of the Department of
Defense.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the General Counsel of the Department of the Army?
Answer. In my opinion, one major challenge will be to consistently
provide responsive, accurate legal advice on the broad array of complex
issues likely to arise in connection with the Army's role in the
prosecution of contingency operations while simultaneously transforming
our business operations. Although the current environment makes it
difficult to anticipate specific legal questions, I expect to confront
issues relating to operational matters, acquisition reform,
privatization initiatives, military and civilian personnel policies,
compliance with environmental laws, and oversight of Department of the
Army intelligence activities. I am not aware of any problems in the
current delivery of legal services. However, if confirmed, I will work
hard to ensure that the Army legal community is adequately staffed and
resourced to provide the responsive, accurate, and timely legal advice
necessary to ensure success in all of the Army's endeavors.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize legal issues in the manner
that best serves the Department of the Army. I will also ensure that
the talented and dedicated lawyers comprising the Army legal community
continue to provide timely, value-added legal and policy advice of the
highest possible quality, executing the Department's recurring legal
responsibilities and anticipating and responding to the numerous issues
that the Army confronts every day. I will endeavor to keep Army lawyers
involved at all stages of the decisionmaking process, because I believe
that preventive law, practiced early in the formulation of departmental
policies, will undoubtedly facilitate the Department's adaptation to
the changing operational environment. Additionally, if confirmed I will
work diligently to resource adequately and staff expertly the Army
legal community, in order to guarantee decisionmakers at all levels
access to the best possible legal advice.
Question. What broad priorities will you establish in terms of
issues which must be addressed by the Office of the General Counsel of
the Department of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus foremost on the issues that
directly impact soldiers, their families, readiness, and the support of
military operations. I anticipate that the other legal issues of
highest priority will arise from the Army's operational readiness to
meet the challenges posed by today's dynamic security environment while
simultaneously transforming the business operations of the
institutional Army. I will ensure that expert advice is provided to
those engaged in the Army's efforts to improve the acquisition process
and to eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse. I will also ensure that the
Army legal community continues to provide timely legal advice of the
highest possible quality, executing the Department's recurring legal
responsibilities and anticipating and responding to the numerous issues
the Army confronts every day.
relationship with the judge advocate general
Question. In carrying out your duties if you are confirmed, how
will you work with the Judge Advocate General of the Army?
Answer. I believe that close, professional cooperation between the
civilian and uniformed members of the Army's legal community is
absolutely essential to the effective delivery of legal services to the
Department of the Army. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the
Office of the General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General and his
staff, as well as The Judge Advocate General and I, work closely
together to deliver the best possible legal services to the Department
of the Army.
Question. How are the legal responsibilities of the Department of
the Army allocated between the General Counsel and the Judge Advocate
General?
Answer. The Army General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the
Department of the Army. The Office of the Army General Counsel is a
component of the Army Secretariat, and provides legal advice to the
Secretary of the Army and other Secretariat officials on all legal
matters. The Judge Advocate General is the legal adviser of the Chief
of Staff of the Army, members of the Army Staff, and members of the
Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The
Judge Advocate General serves as military legal adviser to the
Secretary of the Army. The law expressly prohibits interference with
the ability of The Judge Advocate General to give independent legal
advice to the Secretary of the Army. Even in the absence of that
statutory requirement, I would always welcome the expression of
independent views about any legal matter under consideration. The Judge
Advocate General also directs the members of the Judge Advocate
General's Corps in the performance of their duties. By law, he is
primarily responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the administration of military
discipline. The Office of the Army General Counsel and the Office of
The Judge Advocate General have developed and maintain a close and
effective working relationship in performing their respective
responsibilities. If confirmed, I will work to continue this
synergistic partnership.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that legal opinions of
your office will be available to Army attorneys, including judge
advocates?
Answer. It is my understanding that the majority of legal opinions
provided to Army attorneys and judge advocates are issued by the Office
of The Judge Advocate General, and that many of these opinions are
coordinated with the Office of the Army General Counsel. The close,
professional cooperation between the civilian and uniformed members of
the Army's legal community is absolutely essential to ensure that legal
opinions issued by the Office of the Army General Counsel will be
available to all Army attorneys and Judge Advocates and vice versa. If
confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the Office of the General Counsel
appropriately makes available any legal opinions that it issues.
Question. In response to attempts within the Department of Defense
to subordinate legal functions and authorities of the Judge Advocates
General to the General Counsels of the Department of Defense and the
military services, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting any officer
or employee of the Department of Defense from interfering with the
ability of the Judge Advocates General of the military services and the
legal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide
independent legal advice to the Chairman, service secretaries, and
service chiefs.
What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocate General of the
Army to have the authority to provide independent legal advice to the
Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. The Judge Advocate General's statutory responsibility and
authority to provide independent legal advice, set forth in title 10,
U.S.C., section 3037, has repeatedly been recognized as essential to
the effective delivery of legal services. Uniformed attorneys bring
another perspective to the practice of law, providing insight and
advice shaped by years of service across the Army. In today's
environment, our senior leaders both demand and deserve independent
advice from their counsel.
Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Army judge
advocates to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?
Answer. I believe that Army Judge Advocates in the field are vested
with a critical responsibility: to provide quality, candid, legal
advice to military commanders. Army commanders need and deserve the
best legal advice and judgment available--that is in part made possible
when Judge Advocates operate independently, with appropriate advice and
guidance from supervising attorneys in their technical chain.
Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to the
current relationships between the Judge Advocate General of the Army
and the Army General Counsel?
Answer. Based upon my knowledge and understanding to date, I
believe that The Judge Advocate General and the Army General Counsel
have an excellent working relationship. If confirmed, I will continue
to foster this professional and collaborative relationship with The
Judge Advocate General and his staff to ensure the effective delivery
of legal services to the Department of the Army.
Question. Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice gives
primary jurisdiction over military justice to the Judge Advocates
General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
How do you view the responsibilities of the Army General Counsel in
the performance of military justice matters with regard to the Judge
Advocate General of the Army?
Answer. The Judge Advocate General's responsibilities to ensure the
proper administration of the military justice system require his direct
and independent advice to the Secretary of the Army on military justice
matters. I look forward to providing The Judge Advocate General with
whatever support and coordination I can in this respect. I will, if
confirmed, consult with The Judge Advocate General on matters of mutual
interest or concern relating to military justice, recognizing his
statutory duties and special expertise in this area. I will also work
with The Judge Advocate General in safeguarding the integrity of the
military justice system.
attorney recruiting and retention issues
Question. If confirmed, how do you assess your ability to hire and
retain top quality attorneys and provide sufficient opportunity for
advancement?
Answer. I understand that the Army continues to recruit and retain
top quality military and civilian attorneys and provide them
opportunities for advancement. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor
and assess recruitment, retention, and advancement programs for our
military and civilian attorneys.
Question. In your view, does the Department of the Army have a
sufficient number of civilian and military attorneys to perform its
missions
Answer. I understand that new and enhanced mission requirements in
recent years have fueled growth in the Army's legal community. If
confirmed, I will evaluate whether the number of attorneys in the
Department of the Army is sufficient to accomplish the Army's missions.
Question. In your view, what incentives to successful recruiting
and retention of attorneys, if any, need to be implemented or
established?
Answer. In my view, retention of top military and civilian
attorneys is essential to the current and future success Army legal
services. Although I am unfamiliar with the full scope of attorney
retention programs available in the Army, if confirmed, I intend to
review these programs carefully and support those incentives and
initiatives that affect the retention of the best attorneys to support
the Army mission.
detainee issues
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
addressing legal issues regarding detainees?
Answer. Properly addressing legal and policy issues associated with
detainees and detention operations is of vital importance to the
Department of Defense and the Nation as a whole. I understand that the
Office of the General Counsel and the Office of The Judge Advocate
General support the DOD General Counsel in executing elements of the
President's Executive Orders related to detainee operations.
Additionally, if confirmed, and in coordination with The Judge Advocate
General, I will provide advice to the Secretary of the Army in his role
as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for the administration of
detainee operations policy, with particular focus on our obligation to
treat all detainees humanely.
Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or
under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless
of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
In your view, is the foregoing prohibition in the best interest of
the United States? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, I firmly believe that this prohibition is in the best
interest of the United States. This prohibition is consistent with the
long-standing military tradition of applying the humanitarian
provisions of the Law of War to those individuals who, for whatever
reason, are no longer actively participating in hostilities and find
themselves in custody. Moreover, this prohibition is consistent with
international standards to which the United States is a party. As
President Obama recently noted, ``[a] democracy as resilient as ours
must reject the false choice between our security and our ideals.''
Prohibiting the cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment
of individuals in our custody or under our physical control upholds our
ideals and reinforces our moral authority around the world.
Question. Do you believe that the phrase ``cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment'' has been adequately and
appropriately defined for the purpose of this provision?
Answer. Although the phrase ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment'' is, on its face, susceptible to broad interpretation, the
proscriptions on such conduct contained in the Department's
implementing directives, as well as the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions that are embodied in those directives, make it clear to
soldiers what conduct is prohibited. If confirmed, I will ensure the
Army's implementation of this policy in doctrine, to include training
manuals, is clearly understood.
Question. What role do you believe the General Counsel of the Army
should play in the interpretation of this standard?
Answer. The appropriate role of the General Counsel is to provide
advice to the Secretary of the Army and his staff on detention and
interrogation policies that implement this standard. If confirmed, I
will ensure Army implementation is consistent with the law, the intent
of the administration, and the guidance issued by the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. What role do you believe the Judge Advocate General of
the Army should play in the interpretation of this standard?
Answer. The appropriate role of The Judge Advocate General is to
provide advice to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army staff on
detention and interrogation policies that implement this standard. The
Judge Advocate General should also continue to train and supervise the
Judge Advocates in the field, who are so instrumental in attaining and
maintaining this standard.
Question. If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all
relevant Army directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. I will. I believe the requirements of section 1403 and
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are essential to maintaining
a disciplined Army, whose actions are grounded in the rule of law.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. I do. These standards have been instrumental in restoring
the confidence of the American people in the Army and have been and
will continue to be important in guiding our soldiers' actions in
contingency operations.
Question. Section 2441 of title 18, U.S.C., as amended by the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and
inhuman treatment.
In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a manner that
provides appropriate protection from abusive treatment to U.S.
detainees in foreign custody and to foreign detainees in U.S. custody?
Answer. These sections of the War Crimes Act were necessary to
define the ``serious crimes,'' or ``grave breaches,'' of Common Article
3 to the Geneva Conventions. Defining these felony-level offenses in
our domestic law manifested our international law obligations to
define, with specificity, the grave breaches which must be prosecuted
under the law of war. In addition, I believe that we must continue to
enforce these standards through the promulgation of doctrine, training,
and oversight, and that we must hold soldiers accountable for
violations of these standards.
contractors on the battlefield
Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq have relied on
contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S. military
operations. The extensive involvement of contractor employees in a
broad array of activities--including security functions--has raised
questions about the legal accountability of contractor employees for
their actions.
Do you believe that current Department of Defense and Department of
the Army regulations appropriately define and limit the scope of
security functions that may be performed by contractors in an area of
combat operations?
Answer. It is my understanding that Department of Defense
Instructions 1100.22 and 3020.41 currently define the limit and scope
of security functions that may be performed by contractors in an area
of combat operations; however, I have been advised that these
instructions are presently under review. Accordingly, it would be
premature for me to offer an opinion at this time regarding whether
current Department of Defense and Department of the Army regulations on
this subject are adequate. If confirmed, however, I will support this
review, as appropriate. Additionally, Section 321 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 directed the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to review whether the definition of the
term ``inherently governmental'' is ``sufficiently focused to ensure
that only officers or employees of the Federal Government or members of
the Armed Forces perform inherently governmental functions or other
critical functions necessary for the mission of a Federal department or
agency.'' I understand that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is participating in this
review, which I too will support, if confirmed.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to such
regulations?
Answer. It would be premature for me to recommend any changes to
Department of Defense or Department of the Army regulations. If
confirmed, I will consider the findings and recommendations of the
reviews of this subject matter and make appropriate recommendations to
the Secretary of the Army.
Question. Do you believe that current Department of Defense and
Department of the Army regulations appropriately define and limit the
scope of contractor participation in the interrogation of detainees?
Answer. I understand that the current Department of Defense and
Department of the Army regulations define and, as properly implemented,
limit the scope of contractor participation in the interrogation of
detainees. However, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 significantly limits DOD's authority to use contractors in an
interrogation role. DOD and Army policies must be reviewed and amended
to comply with the new law. If confirmed, I will support this review
process.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to such
regulations?
Answer. Although I have no basis of knowledge on which to propose
changes at this time, I will, if confirmed, review applicable
Department of Defense and Department of the Army regulations to
determine what, if any, changes may be necessary and appropriate.
Question. OMB Circular A-76 defines ``inherently governmental
functions'' to include ``discretionary functions'' that could
``significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private
persons.''
In your view, is the performance of security functions that may
reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly
hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations an inherently
governmental function?
Answer. I understand that support services that require the
exercise of substantial discretion or prudent judgment are inherently
governmental. That said, there are many factors that must be considered
in assessing whether a particular mission or set of duties is
inherently governmental. If I am confirmed, I intend to examine this
issue in greater depth.
Question. In your view, is the interrogation of enemy prisoners of
war and other detainees during and in the aftermath of hostilities an
inherently governmental function?
Answer. Currently, DOD policy allows properly trained and cleared
contractors to conduct government-approved interrogations, provided
they are supervised and closely monitored throughout the process by
properly trained DOD military or civilian personnel. However, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 significantly
limits DOD's authority to use contractors in an interrogation role. DOD
and Army policies must be reviewed and amended to comply with the new
law. If confirmed, I will support this review process.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
addressing the issue of what functions may appropriately be performed
by contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. If confirmed, I will provide advice to the Secretary of the
Army and the Assistant Secretaries regarding the functions that
contractors may legally perform on the battlefield. I will assist them
in implementing policies regarding the use of contractors that are
consistent with applicable statutory and regulatory constraints.
Question. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was
enacted in 2000 to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. courts
to persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the
United States.
In your view, does MEJA provide appropriate jurisdiction for
alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and other areas of combat operations?
Answer. I understand that MEJA was intended to address a
jurisdictional gap in U.S. criminal law as applied to civilians
employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States,
members of the Armed Forces, and former members of the Armed Forces,
including their dependents. In my opinion, MEJA provides an effective
means of exercising extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over
contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of
operation, who engage in conduct that would constitute a felony-level
Federal crime in the United States.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to MEJA?
Answer. I understand that legislation has been proposed in the past
that would expand MEJA to cover individuals employed under a contract
(or subcontract at any tier) awarded by any department or agency of the
United States, where the work under such contract is carried out in an
area, or in close proximity to an area (as designated by the Department
of Defense), where the Armed Forces are conducting contingency
operations. If confirmed, I will assess whether this or any other
change to MEJA may be appropriate.
Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in
developing administration recommendations for changes to MEJA?
Answer. If confirmed, I would play an active role in the
development of any proposals to change MEJA. I would also coordinate
closely with The Judge Advocate General in the development of any such
proposals given the complementary and sometimes competing availability
of criminal jurisdiction under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Question. Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 extended criminal jurisdiction of military courts-
martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to persons
serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field during time of
declared war or a contingency operation, such as our current operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In your view, does the UCMJ provide appropriate jurisdiction over
alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and other areas of combat operations?
Answer. The UCMJ provides commanders the tools necessary to
maintain good order and discipline and the morale, welfare and safety
of all those under their jurisdiction during military operations.
Because misconduct by contractors may undermine good order and
discipline, Congress extended UCMJ jurisdiction to cover such
individuals. The Secretary of Defense, in turn, published guidance on
the prudent exercise of such jurisdiction. This guidance ensures that
the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense each play an
appropriate role in resolving whether, and under which system,
jurisdiction might be better exercised in each potential case.
Question. What is your view of the procedures agreed upon by the
Department of Defense and the Department of Justice to reconcile
jurisdictional responsibilities under MEJA and the UCMJ?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the procedures
agreed upon by the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice
to reconcile jurisdictional responsibilities under MEJA and the UCMJ.
If confirmed, in coordination with The Judge Advocate General, I will
monitor cases in which MEJA and the UCMJ are employed to assess the
effectiveness of the procedures and whether further refinements of
these procedures may be necessary.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the UCMJ to
ensure appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of
contractor employees?
Answer. At this time, I am not aware of any specific provisions in
the UCMJ that need change in this area.
Question. What are your views on the impact of Article 12 of the
Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Iraq on U.S.
jurisdiction over contractor personnel pursuant to either MEJA or the
UCMJ?
Answer. As I understand it, Article 12, paragraph 2 of the
``Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the
Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in
Iraq'' provides that Iraq shall have the primary right to exercises
jurisdiction over U.S. contractors and U.S. contractor employees. This
will not preclude the U.S. from exercising jurisdiction over such a
person pursuant to MEJA or the UCMJ in the event that Iraq agrees to
waive its primary right of jurisdiction in a particular case.
Question. How are jurisdictional matters arising out of Article 12
being addressed?
Answer. I have been informed that the United States will cooperate
with Iraq to address jurisdictional matters on a case-by-case basis
when such issues arise.
attacks at fort hood
Question. The recent attack that resulted in the deaths of 12
soldiers and one civilian employee and the wounding of many more at
Fort Hood was allegedly carried out by a Muslim Army medical officer.
Media reports indicate that warning signs of the Major's extremist
views were observed but not documented in official personnel records
that were shared with the FBI.
In your view, do current Army policies limit the ability to include
information in official records that may assist in the identification
of potential threats?
Answer. At this time, I am not sufficiently familiar with current
Army policies regarding the filing of information in official records
to permit me to express an opinion on this important question. I am
informed, however, that the issues associated with the identification
of potential threats are being addressed in the course of the reviews
currently underway within the Army and the Department of Defense. If
confirmed, I will look closely at this issue, in coordination with the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Personnel; the Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-1; and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2.
Question. Do current Army procedures hinder the ability to share
this type of information with other official agencies charged with
identifying and monitoring potential extremist or terrorist activities?
Answer. I am not aware of any problems in this area at the present
time. However, if confirmed, I will ensure that this matter is included
in the Army's review of its procedures for sharing potential threat and
other force protection-related information both internally (e.g., with
the Army Criminal Investigation Command), and with other Department of
Defense or Federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies, as
appropriate.
Question. What is your understanding of how the Army balances the
need to identify and respond to potentially harmful extremist views
held by soldiers against individual privacy and respect for the right
of soldiers to hold and express personal beliefs?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Army currently has a robust
policy that proscribes participation in extremist organizations and
activities. Commanders have been empowered to maintain good order and
discipline in their units, and enforcement of this policy is a function
of command; I further understand that the Army mandates reporting of
suspected or possible international or domestic terrorist activity,
espionage, compromises of security or classified information, and
similar activities. I have been informed that the Army regulation
addressing counterintelligence awareness and reporting is currently
under revision, and that in the interim, the Army has published
guidance to commanders that includes a list of indicators of potential
terrorist-associated threats that may arise inside the Army. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the proponents of force protection
policies to ensure that Army programs addressing potential threats
maintain the proper balance between the need for commanders to maintain
good order and discipline and protect the force, and soldiers' rights
to privacy and to hold and express personal beliefs.
Question. Do you see a need for a change in this balance?
Answer. At this time, I have no basis of knowledge on which to
formulate an opinion on this important issue. As noted above, however,
it is my understanding that the ongoing reviews within Army and
Department of Defense will attempt to determine whether existing policy
in this area may have contributed to the circumstances surrounding the
incident at Ft. Hood. If confirmed, I would examine the review panel's
report in detail, and participate in the Army's efforts to address the
report's findings and recommendations.
religious guidelines
Question. What is your understanding of current policies and
programs of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army
regarding religious practices in the military?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Army's policies support
religious tolerance and mutual respect. If confirmed, I would continue
the Army's firm commitment to upholding the Constitutional tenets of
the ``free exercise'' and ``establishment'' clauses and review policies
as necessary to assure continued compliance with the First Amendment.
Question. In your view, do these policies accommodate the free
exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who
have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. I have been informed that current Army policies require
chaplains to support all unit personnel, regardless of their beliefs.
It is my view that these Army policies do accommodate free exercise of
religion. If confirmed, I am willing to study this issue further to
determine if changes in policy are necessary and appropriate.
Question. In your opinion, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious belief?
Answer. I understand that during mandatory official functions,
chaplains are not compelled to offer prayers that are inconsistent with
their faith, but are expected to remain sensitive to the pluralistic
Army and society they serve. In my opinion, these policies strike an
appropriate balance, given the diversity of religious views in the
Army. If confirmed, I would be willing to study this issue further to
determine if changes in policy are necessary and appropriate.
role in the officer promotion and confirmation process
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General
Counsel of the Department of the Army in ensuring the integrity and
proper functioning of the officer promotion process?
Answer. I have been informed that under title 10, U.S.C., chapter
36, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the proper functioning
of the Department of the Army's promotion selection process. In
addition to the legal review of memoranda of instruction and selection
board reports to ensure they comport with statutory standards, the Army
General Counsel must also ensure the conduct of the board process
conforms to all legal requirements. The diligent execution of this
function requires advising the Secretary of the Army of any case in
which a selection board report or selection board process fails to
adhere to the statutory standards, either generally or with regard to a
particular officer being considered for promotion. In advising the
Secretary of the Army and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the General Counsel helps to
ensure that Army promotion policies properly implement applicable laws
and regulations and are fairly applied. In these matters, the Office of
the Army General Counsel coordinates closely with The Office of the
Judge Advocate General.
Question. Do you see a need for change in this role?
Answer. It is my understanding that the current process is working
well; however, if I am confirmed and determine that a change is
necessary, I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), The Judge Advocate General, and
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, to effect such change, while
maintaining both the integrity of the Army's promotion process and the
trust of the officer corps, Congress, and the American people.
general and flag officer nominations
Question. Under DOD Instruction 1320.4, adverse and alleged adverse
information pertaining to general and flag officers must be evaluated
by senior leaders in the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense prior to nomination for promotion and certain assignments.
If confirmed, what role, if any, would you play in the officer
promotion system, particularly in reviewing general officer
nominations?
Answer. I have been informed that for all officer promotions,
including general officer promotions, the Office of the Army General
Counsel, in coordination with the Office of The Judge Advocate General,
reviews the following:
a. Memoranda of Instruction that govern the conduct of promotion
selection boards and subsequent promotion selection board reports.
b. Adverse information that is not in an officer's official
military personnel file that may be presented to the promotion
selection board. I have been advised that this information is reviewed
to ensure it is accurate and comports with the requirements of Title 10
in that it is ``substantiated, relevant information that could
reasonably affect the deliberations of the selection board.''
c. Adverse information related to general officers. In general
officer cases, the standard for adverse information that must be
presented to a promotion selection board is ``any credible information
of an adverse nature.'' I have been advised that the Office of the Army
General Counsel participates in a detailed screening process in which a
panel of senior officials reviews all credible information related to
officers whose records will be reviewed by a promotion selection board
for promotion to a general officer grade. The panel ensures that all
adverse information is properly identified for presentation to the
promotion selection board.
d. Adverse information that becomes available after a promotion
selection board makes its recommendations. I have been advised that the
Office of the Army General Counsel and the Office of The Judge Advocate
General coordinate in providing legal advice to the Secretary of the
Army so that he may determine whether a promotion review board should
be convened to consider whether to continue to support the promotion of
the considered officer or take steps to remove the officer from the
promotion list.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General
Counsel of the Department of the Army in ensuring the legal sufficiency
of statutory selection board processes?
Answer. I understand that under title 10, the Secretary of the Army
is responsible for the proper functioning of the Department of the
Army's promotion selection process. Prior to approval by the Secretary
of the Army, all Memoranda of Instruction for officer promotion
selection boards are reviewed by the Office of the Army General
Counsel, in coordination with the Office of The Judge Advocate General,
to ensure the Secretary's instructions conform to statutes and
accurately reflect his guidance regarding attributes necessary for
service in the next grade. All reports of promotion selection boards
are processed through the Office of the Army General Counsel prior to
final action on the report by the Secretary. The Army General Counsel
must satisfy himself or herself that the Army has met applicable
statutory standards and that individual selection board reports conform
to the law. The Army General Counsel must advise the Secretary of the
Army of any case in which a selection board report fails to adhere to
the statutory standards, either generally or with regard to a
particular officer being considered for promotion. In advising the
Secretary of the Army and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the General Counsel helps to
ensure that Army promotion policies properly implement applicable laws
and regulations and are fairly applied.
Question. What is the role, if any, of the General Counsel of the
Department of the Army in reviewing and providing potentially adverse
information pertaining to a nomination to the Senate Armed Services
Committee
Answer. It is my understanding that under current Department of the
Army practice, the Office of the Army General Counsel reviews each
selection board report, as well as Departmental communications to the
Committee, the President, and the Secretary of Defense, to ensure that
the reports and communications comply in form and substance with law
and regulation. The Office of the Army General Counsel gives special
attention to cases of nominees with substantiated or potentially
adverse information and cases with reportable information in order to
ensure that such information is reported to the Senate Armed Services
Committee in a timely, accurate, and comprehensible manner.
military personnel policy and cases
Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the General
Counsel and civilian attorneys assigned to the Office of General
Counsel play in military personnel policy and individual cases,
including cases before the Board for Correction of Military Records?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army,
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and
other senior leaders to ensure that the Army properly develops and
fairly applies military personnel policies. Were I to become aware that
the Department did not fairly and lawfully apply military personnel
policies, I would take appropriate action to ensure that the Army
properly resolves the issue. If confirmed, I would coordinate with the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), who
provides oversight for the Army Review Boards Agency, regarding the
legal sufficiency of Army Board for the Correction of Military Records
recommendations to the Secretary of the Army. In addition, I am aware
of and fully respect the independent role that the Army Board for the
Correction of Military Records plays in the correction of military
records.
sexual assault prevention and response policy
Question. Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving soldiers
have been reported from Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan over the last
several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were
victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by
unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They asserted that the
military failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services,
including medical attention and criminal investigations of their
charges.
What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army
has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of serious sexual
assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. This is an extremely important issue for the Army and, if
confirmed, I will focus significant attention on it. Although I am not
fully aware of all Army initiatives or resources to help sexual assault
victims, I understand that the Army has taken significant steps to
improve the assistance to all victims of sexual assaults, with specific
attention to victims in a deployed environment. If confirmed, I will
study this matter in greater depth with a view to ensuring the Army
continues to take appropriate steps to provide medical, psychological,
and legal help to soldiers who are victims of sexual assault, both in
garrison and in deployed locations.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to
prevent sexual assaults on female soldiers at their home stations and
when they are deployed?
Answer. It is my view that the Army has taken several extremely
important steps in its campaign to prevent sexual assaults on female
soldiers at their home stations and when deployed. I am aware that the
Army launched a new comprehensive sexual assault prevention campaign in
2008. If confirmed, I will ensure that the legal community fully
supports this initiative.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. At this time I am not familiar with all of the Army's
training and resources to investigate and respond to allegations of
sexual assault. If confirmed, I will assess whether additional steps
should be taken to support victims and hold offenders accountable.
Question. Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault
policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting,
to be effective?
Answer. I have been advised that the Army has focused both on
eliminating sexual assault from its ranks and on victim support--both
key elements of an effective program to address sexual assault. I have
been advised that part of the focus on victim response was the
implementation of confidential reporting (also called ``restricted''
reporting), which I understand allows sexual assault victims to
disclose confidentially the details of their assault to specified
individuals and receive medical treatment and counseling, without
triggering the official investigative process. If confirmed, I will
work with knowledgeable professionals to assess and ensure the
continuation of effective Army programs.
Question. Specifically, do you think that Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators should be attended a confidentiality privilege in order to
help them perform their duties more effectively?
Answer. I am advised that the Army is currently considering whether
a confidentiality privilege should be extended to communications with
Sexual Assault Response Coordinators. If confirmed, I will work with
knowledgeable professionals to determine whether extending a
confidentiality privilege to Sexual Assault Response Coordinators would
allow them to perform their duties more effectively.
homosexual conduct policy
Question. The current Homosexual Conduct Policy, commonly referred
to as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' went into effect in February 1994
after months of congressional hearings and debate resulting in the
enactment of a Federal statute (10 U.S.C. section 654). Although there
have been some changes in how this policy has been implemented, the
basic policy has not changed. President Obama has made it clear that he
intends to work with the military and with Congress to repeal the
policy.
What is your view of the current policy, as stated in section 654?
Answer. I recognize the effort that went into the enactment of
title 10, U.S.C., section 654, and I respect the decisions of Congress
and the President on this issue. I have been informed that, as
implemented within the Department of Defense, the policy has met the
general intent of Congress.
Question. What is your view on the merits of repealing or changing
this policy?
Answer. I understand that a review of the policy has been initiated
by the President and, if I am confirmed, I would work closely with my
counterparts in the other Services, The Judge Advocate General, and the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense to assess the current
policy and to make recommendations for appropriate changes that are
consistent with law and promote good order and discipline in the Armed
Forces.
Question. In your view, would changing this policy have an adverse
impact on good order and discipline in the military?
Answer. It is my understanding that good order and discipline are
fundamental to the success of our Nation's military. Consequently, if I
am confirmed, and were changes to the policy to be approved, I would
work diligently to ensure that the implementation of any new law or
policy did not adversely impact the good order and discipline of the
Army.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in efforts to
repeal or change this policy?
Answer. As noted above, if confirmed, and as directed by the
President, I would work closely with my counterparts in the other
Services, The Judge Advocate General, and the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense to assess the current policy and to make
recommendations for appropriate changes.
Question. If the policy is changed by Congress, would you recommend
a phase-in period for implementation of the new policy?
Answer. If Congress and the President were to amend current policy,
the incremental implementation of the new policy should be carefully
considered. The potential impact on good order and discipline, military
necessity, and the intent of Congress are important factors to be
considered in the analysis of whether a phase-in of any new policy is
appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in implementing a
new policy?
Answer. If confirmed, and were a new policy approved, I would work
closely with The Judge Advocate General and our counterparts to ensure
that its implementation within the Army accorded with all applicable
laws, regulations, and directives.
whistleblower protection
Question. Section 1034 of title 10, U.S.C., prohibits taking
retaliatory personnel action against a member of the Armed Forces as
reprisal for making a protected communication. By definition, protected
communications include communications to certain individuals and
organizations outside of the chain of command.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that senior
military leaders understand the need to protect servicemembers who
report misconduct to appropriate authorities within or outside the
chain of command?
Answer. Whistleblower protections for military personnel affirm
that members of the Armed Forces must be free from reprisal for making
or preparing a protected communication to a Member of Congress; an
Inspector General; a member of a DOD audit, inspection, investigation,
or law enforcement organization; or any other person or organization
(within or outside the chain of command) designated under regulations
or established procedures to receive such communications. I believe
that these protections are essential. If confirmed, I will work with
The Judge Advocate General to ensure that senior military leaders are
fully and accurately advised of the whistleblower protections accorded
by law and regulation to all soldiers, and that they understand their
legal responsibilities in this important area. In addition, I will
ensure that any individual cases involving allegations of illegal
reprisal that may come to my attention are fully addressed in
accordance with the law.
support to army inspector general
Question. What role, if any, do you think the General Counsel of
the Army should have in reviewing the investigations and
recommendations of the Army Inspector General?
Answer. If confirmed as the chief legal officer of the Department
of the Army and counsel to the Secretary and other Secretariat
officials, I will establish and maintain a close, professional
relationship with The Inspector General, and will communicate with him
directly and candidly. I will provide independent and objective legal
advice to the Inspector General and the Secretary with regard to all
matters that relate to Inspector General programs, duties, functions,
and responsibilities. In coordination with The Judge Advocate General,
I will oversee the provision effective legal guidance to the Office of
the Inspector General in conducting investigations and making
recommendations. Further, as part of my responsibility to review legal
and policy issues arising from the Army's intelligence and
counterintelligence activities, I will advise The Inspector General
concerning proper reporting of the Army's intelligence oversight
activities.
women in combat
Question. Current DOD policies regarding the combat role of women
in uniform have been in effect since 1994.
What is your understanding of the conclusions and lessons that have
been learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom about the feasibility of current policies regarding women in
combat?
Answer. At this time, I do not have enough information to make an
informed assessment of the conclusions and lessons learned from OIF or
OEF in regard to women in combat. It is my understanding that the Army
is in compliance with the DOD policy relating to the assignment of
women.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's compliance with the
requirements of law relating to women in combat?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Army is in compliance with
the requirements of the DOD policy relating to women in combat. Women
have and will continue to be an integral part of the Army team,
performing exceptionally well in all specialties and positions open to
them.
Question. In your view, should the current policy regarding
assignment of women in combat be revised to reflect the realities of
the modern battlefield, effective counter-insurgency requirements, and
changing societal expectations regarding roles for female soldiers?
Answer. At this time, I do not have enough information to make an
informed judgment about whether the policy should be changed. If
confirmed, and if after careful study and deliberation, the Army
determines that a change to the policy is appropriate in the current
operating environment, I will provide the Secretary with cogent legal
advice on this matter and work closely with Department of Defense
officials to implement any approved changes.
civilian attorneys
Question. Judge advocates in the Armed Forces benefit from an
established career progression, substantial mentoring and training
opportunities, and exposure to a broad spectrum of legal areas and
leadership responsibilities. By contrast, civilian attorneys in the
military departments normally do not have established career programs
and may do the same work for many years, with promotion based solely
upon longevity and vacancies.
What is your understanding of the personnel management and career
development system for civilian attorneys?
Answer. It is my view that robust attorney career development
programs result in excellence in client service, the recruitment and
retention of high-performing professionals, and building the bench for
the future. If confirmed, I will be in a position to examine this issue
closely to ensure comprehensive and effective personnel management and
career development programs for civilian attorneys.
Question. In your view does that system need revision? If so, what
do you see as the major problems and what changes would you suggest?
Answer. I understand that there is a Working Group in the Army for
the purpose of assessing and recommending programs for the professional
development of civilian attorneys. If confirmed, I will assess the
current situation and the Working Group's recommendations.
client
Question. In your opinion, who is the client of the General Counsel
of the Department of the Army?
Answer. The client of the General Counsel of the Department of the
Army is the Department of the Army, acting thorough its authorized
officials.
acquisition issues
Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring
that Army procurement programs are executed in accordance with the law
and DOD acquisition policy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the
Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology), and other senior Department of the Army leaders to ensure
that the Department of the Army's acquisition and procurement programs
are executed in accordance with applicable provisions of the United
States Code, as well as controlling regulations and policies. Today's
acquisition professionals face the challenge of managing their
programs' cost, schedule, and performance while remaining in compliance
with a myriad of legal and policy requirements. I believe it is the
responsibility of Army lawyers to proactively assist their acquisition
clients in meeting that challenge. From the earliest stages of program
development, counsel should be involved in identifying potential issues
and, where appropriate, legally-compliant alternative courses of
action. In those rare situations where an issue cannot be
satisfactorily resolved, it is incumbent on counsel to promptly elevate
their concerns in order to protect the Department's overarching
interests.
Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring
that ethics provisions on conflict of interest are followed both by
Army personnel and by Army contractors?
Answer. Structuring Departmental business practices to avoid both
personal and organizational conflicts of interest should be one of the
Army's highest priorities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology) and other senior Departmental officials to promote an
organizational climate that is sensitive to the need to avoid conflicts
of interest and that reacts appropriately when specific issues arise. I
believe that Army lawyers can make a significant contribution to this
endeavor through the provision of acquisition ethics training and
through early and sustained involvement in the Department's acquisition
programs and procurement activities.
Question. Allegations of fraud and abuse during contingency
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan have been wide-spread.
What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army
personnel are properly trained in contingency contracting and are
supervised in the performance of their duties?
Answer. I understand that during his tenure as the Secretary of the
Army, Pete Geren created a commission, led by Dr. Jack Gansler, to
assess the current state of the Army's acquisition and contracting
system in support of expeditionary operations and to provide long-term
strategic-level recommendations for improvement. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), and other senior
Department of the Army personnel to ensure that the legal community
continues to fully support the initiatives recommended and currently
being implemented as a result of the Gansler Commission's assessment. I
would also work closely with the Army Judge Advocate General and the
other Army legal qualifying authorities to ensure that adequate legal
resources are available to support the contingency contracting mission.
detecting conflicts of interest
Question. Personal and organizational conflicts of interest have
become a major concern. DOD's expanded use of private contractors being
tasked to perform key functions that the services had formerly
performed in-house and the new requirement to fill thousands of DOD
civilian positions with experienced, qualified individuals present
challenges in preventing conflicts of interest and the appearance of
conflicts of interest.
What do you think the Army should do, and what should the General
Counsel's role be, in ensuring that the Army identifies personal and
organizational conflicts of interests and takes the appropriate steps
to avoid or mitigate them?
Answer. If confirmed, I would closely examine the Army's process
for reviewing and preventing both personal and organizational conflicts
of interest. I believe that ethics awareness and instruction for all
personnel is vitally important, and I would ensure that ethics training
is a priority at all echelons. Bringing functions back ``in-house''
must be closely monitored with respect to former contractor employees
and their relationships to their former employers. If confirmed, I
would place special emphasis on review of these employment actions to
prevent conflicts of interest at the inception.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps the Army takes to
identify and address potential conflicts of interest during the hiring
process?
Answer. I understand that financial disclosure reporting is a
primary source of information to identify and prevent conflicts of
interest. If confirmed, I would emphasize the importance of properly
identifying positions requiring financial disclosure reporting and
ensure that rigorous and timely review of the reports is accomplished
by both ethics counselors and supervisors. If confirmed, I will
emphasize education in conflicts of interest in the Army's ethics
training program.
Question. Recent reports have raised concerns about potential
personal conflicts of interest by contractor employees, including
retired general and flag officers (``senior mentors'') who advise
senior government officials.
What is your understanding of existing statutes and regulations
pertaining to personal conflicts of interest by contractor employees
who advise senior government officials?
Answer. I understand that concerns have been raised in media
reports about the Services' ``senior mentor'' programs. I have been
told that there are a variety of ways such mentors may be obtained
through contracts or Government employment arrangements. The laws and
regulations applicable to such arrangements are different for contracts
and Government employment. If confirmed, I would place a high priority
on examining the various ways that the Army might tap this wealth of
experience and expertise for the ultimate benefit of the war-fighter. I
would also emphasize the importance of finding acceptable employment or
contract arrangements that would minimize conflicts of interest or any
appearance thereof that could undermine the public's confidence in the
integrity of this program.
Question. Do you see any need for changes to these statutes and
regulations?
Answer. At the present time, I believe that the statutes and
regulations on personal and organizational conflicts of interest
adequately protect the public interest. If confirmed, I would monitor
this issue and, if I concluded that any changes were warranted, I would
proceed through the Department's procedures for proposing legislative
and regulatory changes.
Question. What role do you see for the General Counsel in
identifying and addressing potential conflicts of interest by employees
of Army contractors?
Answer. In my opinion, the General Counsel should work closely with
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology to ensure compliance with restrictions imposed by the
Federal Acquisition Regulation pertaining to organizational conflicts
of interest. I also would ensure that Army lawyers emphasize this area
as part of the Department's program for annual ethics training.
legal ethics
Question. What is your understanding of the action a Department of
the Army attorney or an Army judge advocate should take if the attorney
becomes aware of improper activities by a Department of the Army
official who has sought the attorney's legal advice and the official is
unwilling to follow the attorney's advice?
Answer. Army attorneys generally provide legal advice to Army
officials in their capacity as representatives of the Department of the
Army. The Department of the Army is the attorney's client, and no
attorney-client privilege is established between the attorney and the
Army official. When an Army attorney advises an Army official, the
official may use that advice to exercise official functions and duties.
If an Army attorney suspects that the individual Army official, either
in exercising such functions or in failing to do so, violates a law or
standard of conduct, I believe the attorney has an obligation to report
the potential violation. Potential violations of the conflict of
interest laws may be reported to Army criminal investigators; potential
violations of provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation may be
reported to the appropriate contracting officer; and potential
violations of ethics standards may be reported to an Army ethics
counselor, the head of the Army command or organization, the
individual's or attorney's supervisor, or the Army Inspector General,
as appropriate. At all times, Army personnel and attorneys may report
any allegation of misconduct to the Inspector General or to criminal
investigators, either in person or anonymously.
Question. Do you believe that the present limits on pro bono
activities of government attorneys are generally correct as a matter of
policy or does the policy need to be reviewed and revised?
Answer. I understand that government attorneys may participate in
pro bono activities so long as the representation is consistent with
general governmental ethical rules and with the rules of professional
responsibility applicable to attorneys. I understand that Army civilian
attorneys may, for instance, perform pro bono work with supervisory
approval so long as the representation does not occur on Government
time or at its expense, does not interfere with official duties, and
does not create a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict
of interest. I understand the Army also operates a legal assistance
program for soldiers and families, providing free services in areas
such as family law, wills and estate planning, tax law, landlord/tenant
matters, contract disputes, consumer law, and assistance during the
disability evaluation system. If confirmed, I would review the current
policies in coordination with The Judge Advocate General and recommend
revisions, if appropriate.
Question. In your view, do the laws, regulations, and guidelines
that establish the rules of professional responsibility for attorneys
in the Department of the Army provide adequate guidance?
Answer. The Army has comprehensive regulations, based upon the
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, that
govern the ethical conduct of Army lawyers, both military and civilian.
All Army attorneys must, at all times, be in good standing with the
licensing authority of at least one state, territory of the United
States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
This regulatory system would appear to provide adequate guidance;
however, if confirmed, I would review the current policy in
coordination with The Judge Advocate General and, as appropriate,
recommend revisions.
litigation involving the department of the army
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Department of the Army and the Department of Justice with respect
to litigation involving the Department of Defense?
Answer. The Department of Justice represents the Department of the
Army in civil litigation. In general, it is my understanding that
coordination between the Justice Department and the Army is timely and
consistent on every level. If confirmed, I will work with The Judge
Advocate General to ensure the continuation of a collaborative
relationship with the Department of Justice with respect to litigation
involving the Department of the Army.
Question. In your view, does the Department need more independence
and resources to conduct its own litigation or to improve upon its
current supporting role?
Answer. The Army's interests in civil litigation are effectively
protected and defended by the Department of Justice. If confirmed, I
will work with The Judge Advocate General to ensure that adequate
resources are available to ensure that the Army is able to provide the
appropriate level of support to the Department of Justice and to
protect the Army's interests and equities in civil litigation in which
the Army is involved.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the General Counsel of the
Department of the Army?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
don't ask, don't tell policy
1. Senator Burris. Mr. Watson, during the fiscal year 2011 budget
request hearing both Secretary Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Mullen voiced their support to conduct a study of how to
repeal the current Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) policy. In their fiscal
year 2011 budget request hearing, the Army leadership, Secretary McHugh
and General Casey, endorsed this approach as well. What role will you
play in the DADT study that the Secretary of Defense plans to direct
the Services to conduct?
Mr. Watson. If confirmed and appointed as General Counsel of the
Army, I will provide any necessary legal advice to the Secretary of the
Army with respect to this issue.
2. Senator Burris. Mr. Watson, what role will you play in the
enforcement of a moratorium for DADT, if directed by Congress?
Mr. Watson. Until such time as Congress changes the law, it would
be my obligation as General Counsel of the Army to ensure that the
current law was being faithfully executed.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
involvement in the new york times publication decisions
3. Senator McCain. Mr. Watson, you indicated in your response to my
letter that you were not aware of either the Terrorist Surveillance
Program or the SWIFT program prior to the publication of the articles
about them. This seems strange in view of your responsibilities as
General Counsel. Certainly, after the controversy that erupted after
the New York Times' publication of the Terrorist Surveillance Program
article in December 2005, I would think you would have insisted on
having a voice in subsequent decisions of this nature. Did you have any
role or responsibility for decisions made by the New York Times which
involved disclosure of classified national security information?
Mr. Watson. I was not involved in the decisions made by the New
York Times which involved disclosure of classified national security
information. As was the case with the TSP, the ultimate decision to
publish a given story in The Times--whether legal advice is provided or
not--is a journalistic decision made by the executive editor of The
Times, in some cases with the consent of the publisher. Similarly, it
is part of the editorial function to determine whether an article
should be reviewed by a Times Company lawyer prior to publication. The
role of the lawyer in such prepublication review relates to resolving
any identified legal issues.
As earlier stated, I was not aware of or involved in providing
legal advice in connection with these articles. In January 2006, I
became Chief Legal Officer and while I was familiar with all legal
areas relevant to the Company and its operations, including First
Amendment and litigation, I did not participate in prepublication
review. To the extent that the legal department was asked for pre-
publication review of these articles, the newly-appointed General
Counsel (formerly the Deputy) provided that advice. As an
organizational matter, the General Counsel was an experienced
practitioner in the First Amendment area and was authorized to make
decision therein, advising me when necessary.
4. Senator McCain. Mr. Watson, were you involved in or aware of the
negotiations with the White House and others with respect to the
newspaper's decisions to publish these articles?
Mr. Watson. No.
5. Senator McCain. Mr. Watson, were you consulted in any way about
the significance of the decision to publish these articles, including
the harm that would be done, by the New York Times?
Mr. Watson. No. Please refer to answer to QFR #3.
publication of leaked classified information
6. Senator McCain. Mr. Watson, you make it clear in your letter
dated January 7 that, if confirmed, you would ensure that all leaks are
fully investigated and where wrongdoing is found, the leakers
prosecuted. Do you think a newspaper has the prerogative under law to
publish any information that its reporters obtain through unauthorized
leaks of classified information?
Mr. Watson. Under applicable case law, publication of classified
information is legal where the article is truthful and accurate, based
on information not illegally obtained by the newspaper; and was written
and published by individuals who were acting to help fulfill the
newspaper's constitutional duty of informing the public about a very
newsworthy subject. In the final analysis, if a prosecution were ever
brought, the question of whether there has been a violation of law
would be determined by a judge and jury.
As stated during my testimony, I am very troubled anytime
classified information is published. There are aspects of our military
and intelligence operations that should not be in the public domain. It
is my personal belief that executive editors and publishers have a
substantial obligation to weigh the impact on national security when
considering the publication of articles based on classified
information.
7. Senator McCain. Mr. Watson, what factors do you think should be
applied by a newspaper in making the decision whether to publish
information that is classified?
Mr. Watson. Please refer to answer to QFR #6.
8. Senator McCain. Mr. Watson, if you are confirmed as General
Counsel of the Department of the Army and you were asked to participate
in negotiations with a newspaper aimed at preventing publication of
classified information, what factors would you consider most important
going into those negotiations?
Mr. Watson. If confirmed and appointed as General Counsel of the
Department of the Army, I would work aggressively and diligently to
prevent the leaking and the publication of classified information. With
our nation fighting two wars and combating global terrorism, the safety
of our troops and the American people must be our paramount objective.
The publication of classified information that would jeopardize either
is a matter of great concern.
Such a negotiation should start with discussion of any statute that
arguably might be violated by such publication. If, based on the
current state of the law or otherwise, that were not persuasive, the
discussion should include the following: the harm to national security
and the known bases on which certain newspapers, at the request of
government, have been known to omit some articles completely, or to
delay publication of articles, and/or to omit potentially harmful
information from articles that were published. I understand that such
cases have included both circumstances in which there was potential
immediate harm (such as troop movements) as well as potential harm to
longer term aspects of national security (such as elements of
intelligence and diplomacy).
Please note that as a signatory to the ethics pledge, I would be
prohibited from participating in any matters involving the New York
Times.
prosecution for publication of classified information
9. Senator McCain. Mr. Watson, in the information you included in
your letter regarding the rationale for publication of these stories,
it is clear that the Executive Editor of the New York Times believes
that he has the authority, if not the obligation, to publish classified
information which comes before him if it meets his criteria. Do you
think that there are any circumstances under which the editor or
publisher of a newspaper could be successfully prosecuted under
existing criminal laws for publishing classified information?
Mr. Watson. Under applicable case law, publication of classified
information is legal where the article: is truthful and accurate, based
on information not illegally obtained by the newspaper; and was written
and published by individuals who were acting to help fulfill the
newspaper's constitutional duty of informing the public about a very
newsworthy subject. I believe that there may be circumstances under
which an employee of a newspaper could be successfully prosecuted. For
instance, a newspaper employee could be found criminally liable if the
employee engaged in illegal activity to obtain the information.
leaking of classified information
10. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, while you were General Counsel and
Chief Legal Officer for the New York Times, the paper published 10
articles that revealed highly classified information about the
existence of the Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Terrorist
Finance Tracking Program. In response to a written letter from Senator
McCain, you said that even though you were ultimately responsible for
your department's legal judgments, in this case, you were ``not
involved in providing the legal advice in connection with this
particular article.'' In addition to articles about the Terrorist
Surveillance Program and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, the
New York Times published at least three more articles about classified
military information in 2006. On June 25, 2006, the Times published an
article about a classified briefing to reduce troop levels in Iraq. On
September 24, 2006, the Times published an article about the National
Intelligence Estimate. On November 1, 2006, it published an article
detailing a classified briefing about the level of violence in Iraq.
Please describe in detail the decisionmaking process for publishing all
the articles referenced above.
Mr. Watson. As was the case with the TSP and the SWIFT Program, the
ultimate decision to publish a given story in The Times--whether legal
advice is provided or not--is a journalistic decision made by the
executive editor of The Times, in some cases with the consent of the
publisher.
As stated above, I was not involved in providing legal advice in
connection with these articles. In January 2006, I became Chief Legal
Officer and while I was familiar with all legal areas relevant to the
Company and its operations, including First Amendment and litigation, I
did not participate in prepublication review. To the extent that the
legal department was asked for pre-publication review of these
articles, the newly-appointed General Counsel (formerly the Deputy)
provided that advice. As an organizational matter, the General Counsel
was an experienced practitioner in the First Amendment area and was
authorized to make decision therein, advising me when necessary.
11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, please describe in detail what role
you, as General Counsel and Chief Legal Officer, played regarding the
publishing of these articles as well as the role you played in
discussions after each of the articles were released?
Mr. Watson. I was not involved in the legal review of the articles
and became aware of each of the articles after it was published. The
ultimate decision to publish a given story in The Times--whether legal
advice is provided or not--is a journalistic decision made by the
executive editor of The Times, in some cases with the consent of the
publisher. Similarly, it is part of the editorial function to determine
whether an article should be reviewed by a Times Company lawyer prior
to publication. The role of the lawyer in such prepublication review
relates to resolving any identified legal issues.
After such a review, the executive editor, or his designee, makes
the final determination as to what, if any, changes will be made to the
story in response to any legal advice received, and whether and when
that story will be published. An issue such as the potential effect
that the publication of the article may have on national security is an
editorial matter to be determined solely by the executive editor and,
at times, the publisher.
Any legal opinion or communication I may have made to the New York
Times leadership, before or after the publication, is subject to the
Attorney-Client privilege and I am therefore not allowed to disclose
such information. As I stated during my testimony, I am very troubled
anytime classified information is published.
12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, please describe in detail what was
your legal and personal opinion of the decision to publish each of
these articles?
Mr. Watson. Any legal opinion or communication I may have made to
the New York Times leadership is subject to the Attorney-Client
privilege and I am therefore not allowed to disclose such information.
As I stated during my testimony, I am very troubled anytime classified
information is published.
13. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, did you make your opinions known to
the New York Times leadership? If yes, how did you make them known?
Mr. Watson. Please refer to answer to QFR #12.
14. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, what were their responses to your
opinions?
Mr. Watson. Please refer to answer to QFR #12.
15. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, did you issue any memoranda or
other general guidance regarding the publication of any of these
articles?
Mr. Watson. As stated above, I was not involved in providing legal
advice in connection with these articles. To the extent that the legal
department may have created written memoranda with respect to these
articles, I do not have access to these documents.
16. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, even if you knew nothing about the
Terrorist Surveillance Program before the first article was published,
why did you permit the paper to continue to run additional stories
after you learned the information was classified?
Mr. Watson. The ultimate decision to publish a given story in The
Times--whether legal advice is provided or not--is a journalistic
decision made by the executive editor of The Times, in some cases with
the consent of the publisher. Similarly, it is part of the editorial
function to determine whether an article should be reviewed by a Times
Company lawyer prior to publication. The role of the lawyer in such
prepublication review relates to resolving any identified legal issues.
After such a review, the executive editor, or his designee, makes
the final determination as to what, if any, changes will be made to the
story in response to any legal advice received, and whether and when
that story will be published. An issue such as the potential effect
that the publication of the article may have on national security is an
editorial matter to be determined solely by the executive editor and,
at times, the publisher.
17. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, do you still think the New York
Times' decision to publish the classified information related to the
Terrorist Surveillance Program was appropriate?
Mr. Watson. As I stated during my testimony, I am very troubled
anytime classified information is published.
18. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, do you still stand by your
assertion that ``the individuals who wrote the article and who were
responsible for its publication did not violate the Espionage Act''?
Mr. Watson. Yes.
19. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, is it your position that the New
York Times had a constitutional duty to publish the classified
information contained in its December 15, 2005, article?
Mr. Watson. A constitutional duty of a newspaper in such a
circumstance is to balance the newsworthiness of the subject and the
importance of informing the public against the potential harm to
national security in publishing the article. This is a journalistic
determination which in the case of the TSP was made by the executive
editor with the consent of the publisher.
20. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, under what circumstances, in your
opinion, should the public interest in a very newsworthy subject
outweigh national security interests?
Mr. Watson. Your question is hypothetical and requires a highly
fact specific analysis. As a citizen I support and defend the role that
public debate must by necessity play in our democracy and recognize
that there are aspects of our military and intelligence operations
which should not be in the public domain. Further, I am a proponent of
a strong national security, including a robust and effective
intelligence service.
21. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Watson, Jack Goldsmith, who led the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel from 2003 to 2004, has argued that
the Times' December 2005 article regarding the Terrorist Surveillance
Program, and a June 2006 article regarding the Terrorist Finance
Tracking Program, seriously damaged national security interests because
the articles ``helped terrorists to avoid forms of communication that
we were good at monitoring, and instead switched to channels of
communication in which we lack comparative advantage.'' Do you agree
that the New York Times' decision to publish classified information
damaged national security interests? Why or why not?
Mr. Watson. As a citizen I support and defend the role that public
debate must by necessity play in our democracy and recognize that there
are aspects of our military and intelligence operations which should
not be in the public domain. Further, I am a proponent of a strong
national security, including a robust and effective intelligence
service. That said, I do not have sufficient information to agree or
disagree with Mr. Goldsmith's comments.
______
Question Submitted by Senator David Vitter
legal responsibilities
22. Senator Vitter. Mr. Watson, in your letter responding to
Senator McCain's questions, you said you were not involved in providing
legal advice in connection to the New York Times article on the
Terrorist Surveillance Program, and the Deputy General Counsel provided
advice ``to the extent that the legal department was asked for advice
on this particular matter.'' However, the Executive Editor of the New
York Times wrote a memo stating that the newspaper worked on this story
for months and had considerable interaction with the Bush
administration arguing against its publication. So I am surprised that
a story that clearly received a significant amount of internal debate
and discussion, including the initial decision against running the
story, never came to your attention and was delegated down, and that
you were never consulted on this issue and story. If confirmed, will
you accept complete responsibility for all legal advice and
determinations made by the Army Office of the General Counsel?
Mr. Watson. Yes.
______
[The nomination reference of Solomon B. Watson IV follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
November 20, 2009.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Solomon B. Watson IV, of New York, to be General Counsel of the
Department of the Army, vice Benedict S. Cohen, resigned.
______
[The biographical sketch of Solomon B. Watson IV, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Resume of Career Service of Solomon B. Watson IV
Education:
Woodstown High School; 1958 to 1962
Howard University; 1962 to 1966; BA, 1966
Harvard Law School; 1968 to 1971; JD, 1971
Employment Record:
I have been retired since December 2006
The New York Times Company, New York; 1974 to 2006
Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer:
2005-2006
Senior Vice President & General Counsel: 1996-
2005
Vice President & General Counsel: 1990-1996
General Counsel: 1989
Corporate Secretary: 1979-1989 (and 2000-2002)
Corporate Counsel: 1974-1979
Associate, Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston; 1971 to 1974
Honors and Awards:
Army Commendation and Bronze Star medals for Service
in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN)
Media Law Resource Center's First Amendment Leadership
Award
NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund National Equal
Justice Award
Minority Corporate Counsel Association's Pioneers of
the Profession Award
American Corporate Counsel Association (Greater NY
Chapter) Distinguished Service Award
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Solomon B.
Watson IV in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Solomon B. Watson IV.
2. Position to which nominated:
General Counsel of the Department of the Army.
3. Date of nomination:
November 20, 2009.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
April 14, 1944; Salem, NJ
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to the former Brenda J. Hendricks.
7. Names and ages of children:
Katitti Watson Williams; age 40.
Kira Watson LeBlanc; age 40.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Woodstown High School; 1958 to 1962; Diploma, 1962
Howard University; 1962 to 1966; BA, 1966
Harvard Law School; 1968 to 1971; JD, 1971
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
I was employed by The New York Times Company in various legal
positions from 1974 to 2006 until my retirement in December 2006.
The New York Times Company, New York; 1974 to 2006
Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer: 2005-2006
Senior Vice President & General Counsel: 1996-2005
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Lieutenant, U.S. Army Military Police Corps; 1966 to 1968
Court-appointed Special Master in the Appellate Division of the New
York State Supreme Court from 2008 to date.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
The Howard University Institute on Entrepreneurship, Leadership &
Innovation: advisory board member
Whitney Realty Corp.: director, president of the board
Hudson River Foundation, New York, NY: director
ReServe Elder Service: director
Skadden Fellowship Foundation: trustee
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
In addition to those provided in response to 11:
Sigma Pi Phi Fraternity: member
The Executive Leadership Council: member
The American Bar Association: member
Association of the Bar of the City of New York: member
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Obama for America, 4/15/2008, $300.
Obama for America, 2/28/2008, $250.
Obama for America, 9/18/2007, $1,000.
Obama Victory Fund, 9/30/2008, $500.
Corey Booker for Mayor, 8/21/2009, $500.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Army Commendation and Bronze Star medals for Service in the
Republic of Vietnam (RVN)
Media Law Resource Center's First Amendment Leadership Award
NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund National Equal Justice Award
Minority Corporate Counsel Association's Pioneers of the Profession
Award
American Corporate Counsel Association (Greater New York Chapter)
Distinguished Service Award
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
None.
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Solomon B. Watson IV.
[The nomination of Solomon B. Watson IV was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on May 5, 2010, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. On December
22, 2010, this nomination was returned to the President under
the provisions of Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6, of the
Standing Rules of the Senate.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Katherine G. Hammack by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. This milestone legislation is now more than 20 years old
and has served our Nation well. Although I believe that the framework
established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved
interservice and joint relationships and promoted the effective
execution of responsibilities, the Department, working with Congress,
should continually assess the law in light of improving capabilities,
evolving threats, and changing organizational dynamics. Although I am
currently unaware of any reason to amend Goldwater-Nichols, if
confirmed, I hope to have an opportunity to assess whether the
challenges posed by today's security environment require amendments to
the legislation.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. As noted above, I have no specific proposals to modify
Goldwater-Nichols. As with any legislation of this magnitude, however,
I believe it may be appropriate to review past experience with the
legislation with a view to identifying any areas in which it can be
improved upon, and then to consider with Congress whether the act
should be revised.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment?
Answer. I have been informed that the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Installations & Environment has primary staff responsibility
for policy development, program oversight and coordination of a wide
variety of Army activities relating to installations, energy and
environmental matters, to include resource management and requirements
validation. These include (but are not limited to): design,
construction, operations, maintenance and management of Army
installations; base realignment and closure (BRAC) execution; energy
security and management; sustainability; privatization of Army family
housing, lodging, real estate, utilities and other infrastructure
programs; environmental compliance, clean-up and site disposal
programs; and management of the Army's safety and occupational health
programs. Inherent in those responsibilities is the requirement to
ensure the Army complies with law, policy and regulations within the
Assistant Secretary's area of responsibility, ensuring Reserve
component integration and providing guidance and oversight to the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have almost 30 years of experience in energy and the
environment in the private sector. While employed by Carrier Air
Conditioning, I was part of a small group that founded the U.S. Green
Building Council and the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(LEED) certification program, which is now a requirement for all new
Federal Buildings. This program sets sustainability guidance for
facilities design, construction, maintenance, utilities and operations.
For the last 4 years I have been involved in developing a new
energy and environmental building code. Currently, with Ernst & Young,
I lead projects to certify some of the largest green buildings in the
world to the LEED certification program which involves renewable
energy, energy efficiency, water efficiency, indoor environmental air
quality and building material selection. If confirmed, I will apply my
leadership to installation improvement, energy management and
privatization efforts in the Army.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Installations and Environment?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would seek to learn more about the
installations and facilities within my purview, as well as to
understand the installation and environment related issues, challenges
and initiatives relating to them. Using my significant private sector
experience with large building projects, I would expect to work with
the Secretary of the Army and my counterparts in the other military
departments to develop efficient and effective policies for the Army's
benefit. If confirmed, I would also plan to meet with key members of
agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of
Energy and General Services Administration to determine how we can work
together to leverage best practices, technologies and programs. I would
also seek the advice and counsel of the Army institutional and
operational commands to find ways to better serve the needs of soldiers
and families.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I would address the scope of my duties with
the Secretary of the Army at the earliest available opportunity. I
would expect the Secretary of the Army might ask me to use my
background in the energy and sustainability fields to support the
Army's Energy Security and Sustainability Programs, as well as policy
and program oversight of all areas of installation management, to
include BRAC execution. If confirmed, I would look forward to
implementing the Secretary of the Army's guidance on how best to meet
the needs of soldiers and families and to further Army and President's
goals and priorities.
relationships
Question. If confirmed, what would be your professional
relationship with:
The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. As the head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of
the Army is responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all
affairs of the Department. As the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Installations and Environment, if confirmed, I would strive to
establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the
Secretary of the Army, openly and candidly discussing with him all
issues that arise as I execute the responsibilities he has assigned to
me. I would expect the Secretary of the Army will discuss the roles and
responsibilities he wishes me to assume in furthering the goals and
priorities of the President.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.
Answer. The organizational relationship between the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment and the Under
Secretary of the Army is defined by the Secretary of the Army, and
published in Army General Orders. The Under Secretary is the Secretary
of the Army's principal civilian assistant and most senior civilian
advisor, and designated Chief Management Officer of the Army. If
confirmed, I would establish a strong, cooperative and open
relationship with the Under Secretary, keeping him informed of any and
all significant issues, and supporting his business transformation
efforts.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Chief of Staff
of the Army, the senior military leader of the Army, as well as the
Army Staff in areas of mutual interest and shared responsibility. I
expect that I would coordinate closely with the Army Staff regarding
the duties assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation
Management.
Question. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment.
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to establishing a cooperative
and professional relationship with the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment in all areas of mutual
interest. If confirmed, I would work collaboratively with the Deputy
Under Secretary in the development and implementation of Department of
Defense (DOD) policies relating to installations, environment, and
safety and occupational health.
Question. The Other Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, as part of the ``One Army'' team, I would
work closely, openly, and collaboratively with the other Assistant
Secretaries of the Army in executing the Army's missions, goals, and
objectives.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force for
Installations and Environment.
Answer. I look forward to establishing a cooperative and
professional relationship with the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy
and Air Force for Installations and Environment, pursuing opportunities
to enhance cooperation among the Military Services. If confirmed, I
would work collaboratively with the other Service Secretaries in the
development and implementation of DOD policies relating to
installations and environment, including joint-base operations.
Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Army
and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other Secretariat officials.
Were I to be confirmed, my relationship with the General Counsel of the
Army would involve close and regular consultation, given the legal
complexities of the programs assigned to the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Installations and Environment. If confirmed, I would actively
seek the General Counsel's guidance in order to ensure that the
policies and initiatives of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Installations and Environment are in strict accord with all laws and
regulations and the highest principles of ethical conduct.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with The Judge Advocate
General of the Army and in areas of shared responsibility and mutual
interest. I expect that I would coordinate closely with The Judge
Advocate General of the Army regarding the duties assigned to the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management.
Question. The Army Chief of Engineers.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Chief of
Engineers and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Districts and Divisions
in areas of shared responsibility. I expect that I would coordinate
closely with the Chief of Engineers regarding the military programs
executed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers including military
construction, BRAC, real property management and disposal, energy
security, and environmental matters.
Question. The Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Installation
Management.
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to establishing a close and
professional relationship with the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army
for Installation Management, one based on mutual trust and confidence.
If confirmed, I would work collaboratively with the Assistant Chief of
Staff of the Army for Installation Management and his staff to provide
oversight in developing and implementing Departmental policies relating
to management of the Army's real property assets, installations, and in
particular, the Army's military family housing and barracks.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that confront
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment?
Answer. It is my understanding that the next Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Installations and Environment will face a number of
challenges. The most significant challenges relating to soldiers and
families will include sustaining our installation facilities, services
and programs in support of an Army at war and returning from war;
achieving Energy Security and Environmental Sustainability; and
successful implementation of BRAC 2005--all in the most cost-effective
manner possible. As this committee is well aware, the soldiers and
families of the Army have answered their nation's call to duty and we
must ensure we deliver to them a quality of life that befits their
service and preserves the All-Volunteer Force.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with Congress, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Service counterparts, State and
local governments, and other partners to develop and implement
solutions to address our challenges and achieve administration
objectives.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant problems
in the performance of the functions of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Installations and Environment?
Answer. At this time, I have not been informed of any significant
issues or problems related to the performance of the functions of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary and
the Under Secretary of the Army to review and develop a strategic plan
and appropriate processes to address issues that may arise.
priorities
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Installations and Environment?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review Army programs immediately and
establish priorities consistent with those of the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. I would work
closely with my counterparts within DOD and the Army, as well as
members of Congress, to develop and maintain our facilities, services,
and programs in support of mission readiness, soldiers, and families.
Question. Do you have any specific plans to help improve the
quality of life for Army families who are under considerable strain as
a result of repeated deployments?
Answer. I am not in the position at this time to address specific
plans, but I am very aware of the impact of repeated deployments on our
soldiers and families. If confirmed, I would be completely committed to
supporting Army quality of life initiatives.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and
Environment has responsibility for, among other things, two largely
distinct programs--the military construction program and the
environmental program.
In the competition for resources inherent in the Defense Department
budget process, which of these two major programs do you believe should
have priority in terms of funding?
Answer. Although I have not been fully briefed on these programs,
my preliminary sense is that it may not be prudent to separate these
programs as they complement each other in many ways.
Question. Why?
Answer. Based on my current knowledge and understanding, all Army
construction is predicated on sound environmental planning. To be good
stewards of resources, I believe we must consider sustainability and
energy security, as well as support for operational readiness, as we
manage our facilities and installations. Construction and environmental
programs must work in harmony to achieve Army goals and objectives.
military construction
Question. DOD currently uses a range of facility assessment metrics
to determine adequate levels of annual funding for military
construction, modernization, and repair accounts. In recent budget
years, investment goals were established by determining annual rates of
capitalization of the physical plant to justify the levels of annual
investment required for facilities and infrastructure. While the goal
was annual funding for military construction and facility modernization
equal to a recapitalization rate of 67 years, the military services
consistently fell short of this rate of investment in their budget
submissions.
Do you believe that current metrics provide an accurate assessment
of the condition of facilities in order to allow military leaders to
assess the impact on military readiness of annual budget investment
decisions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would take time to gain a detailed
understanding of the metrics and goals currently being used by the Army
before taking any initiative to propose additions or modifications to
them.
Question. If confirmed, what other goals and metrics, if any, would
you consider establishing to assess the rate of facility
recapitalization?
Answer. If confirmed, I would take time to gain a detailed
understanding of the metrics and goals currently being used by the Army
before taking any initiative to propose additions or modifications to
them. I would ensure the Army is effectively measuring facilities
recapitalization in a manner that supports addressing the worst
facilities first.
base closure and realignments
Question. The Department of the Army is in the process of
implementing the decision of the 2005 Defense BRAC round. The DOD
installation closure process resulting from BRAC decisions has
historically included close cooperation with the affected local
community in order to allow these communities an active and decisive
role in the reuse of property.
What would your role be, if confirmed, in carrying out these
responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, and subject to the guidance of the Secretary
of the Army, I would work closely with the Office of Economic
Adjustment, Local Redevelopment Authorities, the Governors, and other
appropriate State and local officials to accelerate the property
disposal process whenever possible.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you set for the
process of disposal of any property at Army bases affected by BRAC
decisions?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority would be to support the
acceleration of the property disposal process as much as possible so
that affected communities can begin to redevelop the property. I
understand that the Army is committed to the economic principles of
redevelopment which dictate that capital investment is best achieved in
the marketplace.
Question. If confirmed, what goals would you establish to assist
affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-
use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to understand communities'
redevelopment plans and schedules. In my view, the Army needs to work
closely with the Office of Economic Adjustment to ensure that affected
communities have the resources necessary to accomplish their
comprehensive planning for the reuse of installation property. I will
evaluate the Army's BRAC Master Plan and environmental cleanup program
to ensure they are in line with community development planning.
Question. Although the Services have made solid progress in turning
over properties from prior rounds of BRAC to local communities, there
remain several properties that are both valuable and problematic.
Congress provided new authority in the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 aimed at expediting the process and at
removing legislative impediments that have caused friction between the
Department and local communities.
Do you believe that those new authorities will be sufficient to
jump start these long stalled negotiations?
Answer. Yes, I do. I understand that the changes made to the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2010 expand and broaden the Department's property
disposal authorities, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with
affected communities to expedite property disposal actions.
Question. What is your understanding of a reasonable period of time
to show substantial progress?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the status of all
conveyances, so I am unable to make such an assessment at this time. If
confirmed, I would study each conveyance, particularly those at
critical stages of negotiation, to set forth a reasonable period of
time in which to show substantial progress.
Question. The Department of the Army submitted to Congress a 2005
BRAC Implementation Plan that included specific decisions for military
construction requirements and mission realignment plans in order to
complete all moves by September 15, 2011.
If confirmed, would you ensure that Army BRAC actions are carried
out in accordance with the plans submitted to Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the Army has the proper
resources and policies in place to properly implement the BRAC 2005
decisions.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take
to update the 2005 BRAC Implementation Plan before spending amounts
authorized by Congress specifically for BRAC construction projects on
requirements that were not originally included in the Plan?
Answer. I understand that the Army submits a budget justification
book every year to Congress that lists its BRAC projects for the fiscal
year. I also understand that if changes become necessary the Army
submits notification in accordance with the procedures established by
Congress.
Question. In your opinion, can the Department of the Army implement
all BRAC decisions by the statutory deadline of September 15, 2011?
Answer. I understand that the Department of the Army has an
aggressive set of plans and milestones to implement BRAC 2005; it is my
understanding that the Department is on track to meet the 2011 BRAC
statutory deadline.
investment in defense industrial infrastructure
Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in the past have
testified that the military services underinvest in both the
sustainment and recapitalization of depots, arsenals, and ammunition
plants compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-
investment in our industrial facilities has led to substantial backlogs
of facility maintenance activities, created substandard working
conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies
that could increase productivity.
If confirmed, what recommendations would you have for restoring and
preserving the quality of our defense industrial infrastructure?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to study the quality of the
Army's industrial base. If confirmed, I would work closely with the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology and the Army Chief of Staff to develop a plan that ensures
the viability of our defense industrial infrastructure and facilities.
Question. This underinvestment in infrastructure is particularly
acute in Army arsenals and ammunition plants.
If confirmed, how would you plan on addressing this shortfall?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with my counterpart, the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology and with the Army Staff to ensure resources are available to
adequately invest in industrial facilities.
enhanced use leases
Question. Congress has provided the authority for each of the
Service Secretaries to lease underutilized non-excess property and to
use revenues generated by those leases to enhance infrastructure and
operating costs on those installations. This so-called ``enhanced use
lease'' (EUL) authority is being used in different ways and for
different purposes by each of the military departments.
What is your understanding of the EUL authority?
Answer. I understand that Congress provided EUL authority to the
military departments and that it applies to underutilized property that
has not been declared excess. I understand that the revenue from these
leases may be used, in part, to supplement installation maintenance and
repair expenses and can even be used for the construction of
facilities.
Question. What do you see as the future of the Army's EUL program?
Answer. I understand that the Army has completed several EUL
projects and has several more in various stages of completion. This
program is a significant asset management tool that creates needed
revenue for the Army.
Question. What EUL projects do you see as most viable in the near
term?
Answer. I am not in a position to know what EUL projects are
presently being considered by the Army. Nevertheless, if confirmed, I
intend to become fully informed about this program in order to make
such an assessment.
Question. What is your understanding of the main concentration of
the Army's EUL program?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to know the specifics of
the Army's EUL program. However, if confirmed, I would study the
program closely.
Question. Do you think the authority should be used to provide
support to energy initiatives?
Answer. Yes. Given what I know at this time, I believe that the EUL
authority can be an effective tool in putting energy initiatives in
place at Army installations. If confirmed, I would consider such
initiatives wherever it was in the best interests of the Army.
Question. If confirmed, would you continue the Army's focus on the
construction of facilities and in-kind reimbursement to base operating
costs?
Answer. The construction of facilities and the receipt of in-kind
reimbursement to installation operating costs are proven approaches to
lease consideration. Nevertheless, each EUL proposal is unique and, if
confirmed, I would focus on those proposals that are in the best
interest of the Army.
Question. The Congressional Budget Office has expressed concern
that EUL authority could be used to acquire expensive facilities
through long-term leases that commit DOD to make payments (rather than
receiving payments) over an extended period of time.
Do you believe that it would be appropriate to use EUL authority to
commit future years DOD funds for long-term projects to acquire
facilities that have not received approval through the normal budgeting
process?
Answer. No. My understanding of the EUL authority is that acquiring
facilities through long-term leasing that commits future-year funding
is not allowed.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address proposals to use EUL
authority in this manner?
Answer. If confirmed, and based upon my current understanding of
the EUL authority, I would not support such proposals.
facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization accounts
Question. The Army has historically budgeted for facility
sustainment accounts at 90 percent of the annual requirement. Much of
this funding is then used to address emerging facility repair and
modernization requirements during the year of execution.
How would you assess the level of funding actually carried out for
facility sustainment on an annual basis to maintain Army facilities and
infrastructure?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review facility
sustainment accounts in detail, so I cannot make specific assessment
about their use. My understanding is that facility sustainment,
restoration and modernization are crucial to the Army's mission given
the current initiatives to grow the Army. If confirmed, I would review
the current funding level, and if necessary, develop a strategy to
ensure that adequate funding is garnered for restoration and
modernization.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to address adequate
levels of facility sustainment, repair, and modernization?
Answer. I would continue the ongoing development of a Facility
Investment Strategy to ensure future infrastructure requirements are
properly identified.
base operating support
Question. What is your understanding of the processes used by the
Department of the Army to determine annual requirements for ``must
pays'' and discretionary base operating support?
Answer. It is my understanding the Department of the Army ``must
pays'' are those that the Army is legally obligated to pay and that if
unfunded would result in mission failure or loss of life or limb.
Although discretionary requirements support the mission, reducing the
level of support does not prevent the mission from being accomplished.
Question. In your view, do the Army's annual budgets adequately
fund base operating support to meet those requirements?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review base operating
funding in detail so I cannot make specific judgments or assessments
about the adequacy of funding for such a large complex set of
requirements. If confirmed, I would review the current and future
requirements for base operating support funding to ensure that the Army
can support its mission.
Question. In your view, how might the Department of the Army
distribute base operating funds to best ensure sound investment of
constrained resources?
Answer. I do not yet have an understanding of the options available
to distribute base operating funds. If confirmed, I am committed to
learning the methods and processes the Army has in place across the
Department to guide investment decisions and distribute resources.
family housing and privatization
Question. In recent years, DOD and Congress have taken significant
steps to improve family housing. The housing privatization program was
created as an alternative approach to speed the improvement of military
family housing and relieve base commanders of the burden of managing
family housing. If confirmed for the position of Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Installations and Environment you will have a key role in
decisions regarding military family housing.
What are your impressions of the overall quality and sufficiency of
Army family housing both in the United States and abroad?
Answer. I understand that the Department of the Army has taken huge
strides in just the past few years to improve the quality and amount of
housing inventory, and that quality family housing is very important to
retaining quality soldiers and their families. If confirmed, I would
visit military installations to assess the quality and sufficiency of
family housing and take steps to ensure the Army continues to make
progress in this important area.
Question. What are your views regarding the Army's success in
privatizing family housing?
Answer. I understand that family housing privatization has proven
to be a great success in that it has allowed the Department of the Army
to partner with private industry to leverage industry expertise and
market incentives for the benefit of America's soldiers and their
families.
Question. What is your view of the structure and general goals of
the Army's current housing privatization program?
Answer. Based on what I have learned to date, I believe the
structure and general goals of the Department's housing privatization
program are sound. The goals of the program have been to provide
soldiers and families with quality housing. This is absolutely critical
given our commitment to maintaining the All-Volunteer Force.
Question. The Department of the Army has historically relied on
consultants to assist with assessment of industry trends, analyses
financial statements, and the preparation of proposals. The Department
of the Army is currently in the process of soliciting requests for
proposals for a contractor to provide future consultation.
How would you assess the quality of this support to date?
Answer. I am not in a position to make a judgment about the quality
of this support at this time. If confirmed, however, I look forward to
evaluating the Army's use of consultants in this area.
Question. Do you believe the housing program should be modified in
any way?
Answer. I am not in a position to make such an assessment. If
confirmed, however, this is an area to which I would devote focused
study.
Question. If so, how?
If confirmed, would you expect to take part in the source selection
process to ensure a fair and objective review of proposals?
Answer. I believe that any Federal procurement should be conducted
in a manner that treats all offerors fairly and objectively. If
confirmed, however, I do not anticipate being involved in the source
selection process.
army barracks requirements
Question. The Army has established goals to ensure adequate housing
for unaccompanied personnel both in the condition of the quarters and
the privacy of the rooms.
In your opinion, is the Army investing at an adequate level in
various facility accounts to be able to meet their goals?
Answer. To answer this question appropriately will take a greater
measure of understanding, review and analysis on my part than I am able
to provide at this time. I look forward to learning as much as possible
about the Army's goals and accomplishments in this area, if confirmed.
Question. The Army has had to respond repeatedly in past years to
complaints about deficient conditions of living quarters for Army
personnel, including housing for wounded warriors, troops returning
from deployments, and transient personnel.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that Army
personnel are not required to live in deteriorated or substandard
conditions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would need to learn as much as possible
about the current living conditions of our soldiers and their families.
I understand that providing all soldiers, including wounded warriors,
troops returning from deployments, and transient personnel, with
quality housing is a critical element in maintaining the All-Volunteer
Force. It is simply the right thing to do for those who have sacrificed
so much for the safety and security of our Nation. If confirmed, I
would commit my efforts to improving the quality of life in this regard
for all soldiers.
privatization of unaccompanied personnel housing
Question. The Army has recently used authorities granted by
Congress to enter into public/private transactions for the
construction, maintenance, and operation of Army lodging and certain
unaccompanied personnel housing projects.
What do you view as the pros and cons of these transactions and
initiatives?
Answer. I have been advised that early reviews of the lodging
privatization program are positive. However, I do not have a deep
enough understanding of the program at this time to identify pros and
cons of these transactions and initiatives.
Question. In your opinion, how can privatization authorities be
used to address barracks requirements for junior enlisted personnel?
Answer. This is an issue that I would need to review at more
length. I understand that the idea of using privatization authorities
to address barracks requirements for junior enlisted personnel seems to
have great potential, but believe that such an initiative would need to
be evaluated based on benefits of the program in light of Army culture
issues and deployment considerations.
overseas installations
Question. The Army maintains a global basing infrastructure to
support a substantial number of forward deployed troops. Recent
decisions contained in the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review will result
in substantial changes in the Army's current plan for overseas bases.
If confirmed, what would your role be in the development and
implementation of facility investment programs for the normalization of
tours in the Republic of Korea?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the command and staff of U.S. Forces Korea, the
Army Chief of Staff and my counterpart in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Manpower and Reserve Affairs to plan and implement
Secretary of Defense directed tour normalization in the Republic of
Korea. If confirmed, one of my objectives would be to ensure that our
bases in Korea have the facilities investments needed to provide
soldiers and families with a quality of life that meets Army standards
and is consistent with that on Army installations worldwide.
Question. If confirmed, what would your role be in the
establishment of installation development master plans for
installations in U.S. European Command to support the stationing of
four Brigade Combat Teams?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with Army Chief of Staff
and the staff of European Command to execute facilities investment
planning to support the four Brigade scenario. In addition, I would
endeavor to ensure that the resultant Master Plan is appropriately
resourced to provide adequate facilities for the two Brigade Combat
Teams impacted by the recent Quadrennial Review should they remain
stationed in the European Theater.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure prudent investments in
facilities in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff to ensure the U.S.
Central Command area of responsibility receives an appropriate and
prudent level of facilities investments in direct support of its
current missions. As I understand it, planning and programming for
these investments would be accomplished and monitored through the U.S.
Army Central Command.
environmental challenges
Question. In your view, what are the most critical environmental
challenges facing the Army, and what is the best way for the Army to
address these challenges?
Answer. In my view, based on what I know today, one of the most
critical environmental challenges will be ensuring execution of the
2005 BRAC as mandated by Congress and Army Transformation actions. I
understand that these challenges include cleanup and disposal of closed
installations, adherence to applicable regulatory requirements for
environmental documentation under the National Environmental Policy
Act, and consideration of the mandates of the Endangered Species Act. I
have not yet had the opportunity to study the Army's approaches to
addressing these challenges, however, if confirmed I will work closely
with the Secretary of the Army to ensure the Army meets its regulatory
obligations. From my perspective, another important challenge will be
ensuring compliance with environmental sustainability and energy goals
in Federal mandates.
Question. If you are confirmed for this position, how would you
balance the need to maintain military readiness and the goal of
protecting the environment?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of
the Army to strike the right synergy and balance between maintaining a
well trained and well equipped force, while maintaining the Army's
longstanding commitment to environmental stewardship of its lands,
facilities, and operations.
Question. How is the Army prioritizing funding for environmental
compliance expenditures necessary to comply with requirements of law
and regulation?
Answer. I am not in a position at present to comment on the current
Army funding priorities. If confirmed, I would work with the
appropriate experts to ensure that the final funding decisions are in
the best interest of the Army, DOD, and our Nation.
environmental restoration
Question. What do you see as the main priorities for clean-up
within the Army's environmental restoration program?
Answer. My understanding is that the Army's top cleanup priority is
to address sites that represent the highest risk to human health and
the environment. I understand that the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of the Army have established cleanup goals
that reflect a cleanup strategy to address this ``worst first''
priority.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure that adequate
funding is requested and received so that clean-ups under the
Installation Restoration Program and under the Military Munitions
Remediation Program continue apace?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that I fully understand the
cleanup goals as established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and would work closely with the Secretary of the Army to ensure that
these two cleanup programs are adequately funded to achieve their
respective goals.
Question. What is your understanding of the Army's unexploded
ordnance problems, and what steps do you plan to take, if confirmed, to
address these problems?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Army is responsible for
addressing unexploded ordnance issues not only at its own
installations, but also on properties no longer controlled by DOD. If
confirmed, I would emphasize safety and work with regulators and
community stakeholders to ensure that these sites are addressed as
quickly as possible.
Question. In August 2009, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment signed a memorandum that sets forth the
benefits of green and sustainable remediation practices and encourages
the military departments to consider and implement such strategies
where appropriate.
What is your view of bioremediation technologies and other
sustainable remediation strategies, in general?
Answer. I believe that bioremediation is a promising strategy,
particularly as applied to certain chemical pollutants. I understand
that the Army Corps of Engineers has utilized bioremediation strategies
successfully in several applications. If confirmed, and as
bioremediation technologies and techniques continue to be developed and
improved, I look forward to employing these techniques in Army
facilities in an appropriate manner.
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure the Department
of the Army actively considers and implements green and sustainable
remediation strategies where appropriate?
Answer. The priority in any cleanup is protecting human health and
the environment. Where green and sustainable remediation strategies
have shown to be effective and lifecycle costs are competitive, I
would, if confirmed, encourage the Army to take full advantage of the
benefits of such strategies.
encroachment on military installations
Question. Encroachment by commercial and residential development on
military installations has negatively impacted operations at military
airfields and training ranges, and development of new facilities has
been problematic.
What do you see as the main constraints or encroachments on the
Army's ability to use its facilities, including training ranges?
Answer. I am not presently in a position to have developed an
informed opinion on the main constraints or encroachments affecting the
Army's ability to use its facilities and training ranges. I believe
that the Army should consider sensible workarounds to limit or avoid
adverse environmental impacts in its use of land and airspace, ever
mindful of the need to ensure that the quality of training and testing
of equipment is not compromised.
Question. If confirmed, what policies or steps would you take to
curtail the negative impacts on operations and training resulting from
encroachment?
Answer. I strongly believe the Army should work closely with the
local communities around installations to ensure that its requirements
are properly balanced with community needs. If confirmed, I would work
with the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a comprehensive
multi-faceted policy and program that provides Army installations with
the appropriate tools and strategies to engage current and future
encroachment challenges.
Question. In your view, how can the Army best address the issues of
encroachment around its bases in the United States, particularly with
respect to encroachment caused by residential development?
Answer. I believe that the ideal way to address encroachment issues
caused by residential development is to engage with the local community
to identify the community's requirements and concerns about the use of
the land surrounding our installations. If confirmed, I would ensure to
continue and endeavor to enhance positive Army working relationships
with local communities and participation in, local land use planning
and zoning efforts to ensure compatible land use.
energy policy
Question. If confirmed, what would your responsibilities be for
setting and implementing energy policy within the Department of the
Army?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Installations and Environment has oversight of Army
installation energy policies; the responsibility to promulgate policies
for energy security measures (including renewable and alternative
energy generation); building energy efficiency; standards for energy
efficiency; and performance of military construction and renovations. I
understand that the Assistant Secretary also co-chairs the Army's
Senior Energy Council with the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
Question. What do you see as the key elements of the Army's energy
strategy?
Answer. It is my understanding that energy security is the driving
concept for the Army's energy strategy. The Quadrennial Defense Review
provides DOD definition of energy security as--assured access to
reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver
sufficient energy to meet operational needs. I have been advised that
the Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy is consistent with
this definition and establishes the Army's five strategic energy
security goals:
Reduced energy consumption
Increased energy efficiency across platforms and facilities
Increased use of renewable/alternative energy
Assured access to sufficient energy supply
Reduced adverse impacts on the environment
Question. What is your understanding of the energy conservation
goals within DOD and the Department of the Army?
Answer. My understanding is that the Army's goals are tightly
linked to the Federal energy mandates set forth in legislation and
executive orders.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to promote energy
conservation within the Department of the Army?
Answer. Although I have not had an opportunity to assess and
appreciate the full progress made by the Army to achieve energy
conservation and incorporate specific energy conservation measures, if
confirmed, I would review and build on efforts to date and promote
energy conservation across the Army to its full potential.
Question. With respect to renewable energy, which strategies do you
believe provide the best prospects for meeting the energy needs at Army
installations and in the ground fleet?
Answer. I understand that the Army is pursuing many options to
incorporate renewable energy on installations and in its facilities and
that the Army's fundamental strategy relates to energy security,
providing sufficient power for its operational needs. In light of this,
if confirmed, I would endeavor to identify the best renewable energy
solutions for a given installation or facility.
Question. Renewable energy technologies such as solar currently
carry a high capital cost and so financing is a major obstacle. CBO
often cites direct scoring costs which can prevent the investment or
loan guarantees necessary for solar implementation.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to tackle this issue?
Answer. Although I am aware of the high capital cost of many
renewable energy technologies, current Federal and State incentives and
innovative alternatives (such as Enhanced Use Leases) can significantly
reduce costs. I have not had an opportunity to explore the details of
direct scoring of costs for renewable energy systems potentially useful
to the Army. If confirmed, I would review this issue and assess
renewable energy opportunities at my earliest opportunity.
Question. What renewable technologies and fuel types have the most
potential for certification and use by Army ground and air platforms?
Answer. It is my understanding that all bulk fuel is purchased for
DOD by the Defense Energy Support Center, which has the responsibility
to certify those fuels. I do not have enough information at this time
to know what technologies and fuel types have the most potential for
certification and use by Army ground and air platforms. If confirmed, I
would review this matter closely at my earliest opportunity. I would
also coordinate with the other Army Assistant Secretaries, the other
Services, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to address this
important issue.
Question. With respect to aviation fuel requirements, what examples
can you provide of policies or initiatives currently in practice that
both conserve fuel use and cost while balancing appropriate readiness
levels and pilot training requirements?
Answer. I understand that mission readiness is a top priority for
both fixed and rotary wing Army aviators. If confirmed, I would
coordinate with Army operational and training commands to explore what
approaches could be employed under the Army energy security program to
conserve fuel usage while balancing readiness and training
requirements.
Question. Do you believe energy audits are helpful in reducing
demand and increasing energy efficiency?
Answer. Yes. I believe that energy audits are an important tool for
helping to reduce energy demand and increase energy efficiency in
buildings, vehicles and energy-consuming operations. I expect that
energy audits will be helpful to the Army in prioritizing energy-
efficiency projects.
Question. When was the last energy audit conducted on Army
installations?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to have access to the
progress of the Army energy auditing program.
Question. The Department of the Navy recently signed a memorandum
of agreement with the Department of Agriculture to commit to
cooperation and coordination on energy matters.
Is there a similar plan for the Army or with other Federal
agencies, and would such an agreement be helpful for the Army?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to have access to Army
agreements. It is my understanding that other Federal agencies have
specific expertise and roles in technology development that can support
the Army energy security strategy. If confirmed, I would explore
possible avenues of cooperation and collaboration across the Federal
Government that could benefit the Army energy program.
Question. Much of your background has involved LEED advisory work
and ``greening'' of various buildings.
If confirmed, would you intend to focus on similar initiatives to
Army installations?
Answer. Yes. I believe that the programs and guidelines defined by
the LEED program provide excellent guidance. The Army dropped the
``SPiRiT'' program in 2006 and adopted the LEED program as a design and
construction requirement.
Question. If so, specifically how?
Answer. LEED is a menu of options for green buildings with a few
mandatory characteristics. Every building built to LEED program
standards will have different energy efficiency characteristics; some
could be barely above building code minimums. In January 2010 a
building code version of LEED was introduced. This standard (189.1)
provides more guidance and direction to facilities that want high
performance green buildings and energy efficiency. 189.1 was developed
in building code format and consists of mandatory characteristics with
a few optional compliance paths. I have spent the last 3.5 years
serving on the 189.1 committee to develop the standard and I believe
that compliance with 189.1, as part of the Army's LEED program, will
result in more sustainable, energy efficient buildings. A study
conducted by National Renewable Energy Laboratory identified a 30
percent improvement in energy efficiency on average in buildings
designed or remodeled to 189.1 criteria.
Question. The Department of the Army has stated it will lease
several thousand Neighborhood Electric Vehicles (NEVs) at installations
to reduce fuel costs and lower green house emissions. However, the
energy which powers NEVs is currently derived from the electric grid
which is largely powered by coal supplies.
Is there a plan to supply NEVs and Army installations at large with
truly renewable or ``green'' energy sources, other than coal and
petroleum products?
Answer. It is my understanding that the utilization of electric and
hybrid vehicles at Army installations addresses the primary mandates of
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 and Executive Order
13423 as they specifically relate to reducing Federal fleet fossil fuel
use by 20 percent by 2015. If confirmed, I would explore the
opportunities to expand renewable and alternative energy sources for
the Army vehicle fleet.
Question. Other countries such as Germany, Spain, and China are
aggressively investing in renewable energy sources such as wind and
solar power production capabilities.
Is there legislation or funding mechanisms that other countries
benefit from that the Army could possibly adopt that would enhance or
ease the transition to renewable energy platforms?
Answer. If confirmed, I would perform a thorough analysis of
possible legislative options and funding mechanisms that could enhance
the Army's energy program.
Question. DOD recently announced that it will reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from non-combat activities 34 percent by 2020. The target
includes more than 300,000 buildings and 160,000 fleet vehicles which
account for roughly one quarter of DOD's energy consumption but nearly
40 percent of its greenhouse gas emissions.
What is the Army's plan, milestones, and funding strategies to meet
these goals?
Answer. Executive Order 13514 mandated that DOD develop a
sustainability performance plan to support its greenhouse gas emissions
reduction goals. It is my understanding that this plan is due by June
2010 and has not been fully vetted through the Services and other DOD
agencies. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Army plan, milestones,
and funding strategies support the DOD plan, the Federal mandate, and
administration goals.
implications of climate change
Question. What do you see as the national security implications of
climate change for the United States?
Answer. My views align with those expressed in the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review regarding climate change. Climate change has the
potential to act as an accelerant to instability. Economic and
environmental conditions in already fragile areas of Asia, Africa, and
the Middle East may further erode if food production declines, diseases
increase, clean water becomes increasingly scarce, and populations
migrate in search of resources.
Question. What do you believe will be the impact of climate change
on the Army?
Answer. As indicated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the
military will need to adjust to the impacts of climate change on
facilities and operational capabilities. In terms of facilities,
drought conditions could affect water supply, and increased frequency
and intensity of storms may create flood risks for coastal and island
installations. Operational effects may include increasing demand to
respond to growing numbers of climate-induced disaster events and
peace-keeping operations to stabilize conditions before conflict
arises.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Installations and Environment?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such
documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
energy contracts at military installations
1. Senator Udall. Ms. Hammack, title 10 U.S.C. 2922a refers to
contracts for energy or fuel for military installations, and provides
the authority to a Secretary of a military department to enter into
contracts for periods of up to 30 years; however, the provision
requires approval by the Secretary of Defense and only affords this
authority for geothermal renewable energy platforms as further outlined
in title 10 U.S.C. 2917. In your opinion, does title 10 U.S.C. 2922a or
2917 need to be expanded to include other renewable energy platforms?
Ms. Hammack. I am not familiar with how these laws are implemented
within the Department and affect Army initiatives. However, if
confirmed, I will look into the issue and how they impact the Army.
2. Senator Udall. Ms. Hammack, to your knowledge, does the
requirement for the Secretary of Defense's approval discourage any of
the Services to pursue such contracts?
Ms. Hammack. I am unfamiliar with the process and policies within
the Department of Defense (DOD) to comply with the requirement to
obtain the Secretary of Defense's approval for these actions. If
confirmed, I will study this matter and work toward the most
expeditious means to pursue such contracts consistent with the
requirements of the law.
renewable energy
3. Senator Udall. Ms. Hammack, DOD currently holds approximately 28
million acres of land and almost 2 billion square feet of building
space on military installations, providing a vast opportunity for
renewable energy platforms. However, the sticking point is often
financing. The Department frequently does not budget or allocate
funding for renewable energy in a time of war, and to exacerbate
matters, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) typically score any creative
legislative language attempting to create new financing opportunities.
Currently, OMB requires long-term contracts to be paid in the full
amount in the year of execution, which makes renewable energy projects
difficult. Enabling the Department to budget and fund over the full
life cycle of a contract could expedite and enhance implementation of
renewable energy platforms. What opportunities exist in the area of
public/private ventures or partnerships with respect to renewable
energy?
Ms. Hammack. If confirmed, I will take actions to further the best
interests of the Army, including seeking to leverage the expertise of
private industry and public entities. Public-private-partnerships are
recognized as an innovative method of funding high quality renewable
energy infrastructure projects to reduce costs, accelerate delivery,
create jobs, and transfer risks to the private sector.
4. Senator Udall. Ms. Hammack, how will you help bridge this gap
with respect to renewable energy?
Ms. Hammack. If confirmed, I will continue developing public-
private-partnerships with industry for their energy expertise and
financial resources. This is a recognized effective approach and is
already used in certain circumstances by the Army. I believe it also
may be used to create a robust program of renewable energy projects at
installations.
5. Senator Udall. Ms. Hammack, if you are familiar with current OMB
and CBO scoring methods, do you believe they are outdated?
Ms. Hammack. I am not sufficiently familiar with all of the aspects
of these scoring methods at this time to offer an informed assessment.
If confirmed, I will certainly become proficient in these scoring
methods and address any perceived issues with the appropriate officials
within the Army and DOD.
6. Senator Udall. Ms. Hammack, if so, how might they be improved?
Ms. Hammack. Same answer as above.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
base operations
7. Senator Burris. Ms. Hammack, it has been reported that the
fiscal year 2011 Army budget had cuts as deep as 40 percent at some
bases. In February, the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of
Staff reported that $500 million would be added to the budget for base
operations. Even with the additional $500 million, many concerns remain
as to what services and facilities will suffer from the cuts. What is
your assessment of the state of base operations and services?
Ms. Hammack. Although I am aware there is concern on this subject,
I have not yet been afforded access to internal Army information and
data to review and analyze the Army's base operations support funding.
If confirmed, I will review the requirements associated with base
operations to ensure that the Army provides the necessary services and
programs to sustain its installations.
8. Senator Burris. Ms. Hammack, what is the top environmental
concern for the Army and how will it affect base operations and
services?
Ms. Hammack. In my view, one of the most critical environmental
challenges facing the Army will be ensuring execution of the 2005 Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) as mandated by Congress and Army
Transformation actions. These challenges include cleanup and disposal
of closed installations, regulatory requirements for environmental
documentation under the National Environmental Policy Act, and
consideration for the requirements of the Endangered Species Act. I
have not yet had the opportunity to study the Army's approaches to
address these challenges; however, if confirmed, I will work closely
with the Secretary of the Army to ensure the Army meets its legal and
regulatory obligations. Another important environmental challenge will
be ensuring compliance with sustainability and energy goals in Federal
mandates such as Executive Order (EO) 13514, EO13423, Energy
Independence and Security Act 2007, and Energy Policy Act 2005.
9. Senator Burris. Ms. Hammack, what is the projected number of
family and single soldier housing units the Army will build over the
next 24 months?
Ms. Hammack. I am unfamiliar with the Army's projected number of
family and single soldier housing units to be built over the next 24
months. It is my understanding that there is a need for additional
government-owned Army family housing units and barracks. If confirmed,
I will investigate and obtain this information for you.
10. Senator Burris. Ms. Hammack, will any child and/or youth
programs on bases need to be cut due to these budget reductions?
Ms. Hammack. I have not had an opportunity to review the Army's
base operations support funding in detail which includes funding for
these vital programs. If confirmed, it is my intention to fully support
the resourcing required to provide the quality of life that is
commensurate with the service of our soldiers' families and the
sacrifices they make in support of our Nation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
army base realignments and closures
11. Senator McCain. Ms. Hammack, in the answers to questions posed
by this committee in preparation for this hearing, you state that the
Army is on track to meet the 2011 BRAC statutory deadline. We've
received information recently that the Army may have concerns with
three pending Army realignments. Do you realize the importance of the
deadline to ensure the effects on impacted communities are minimized?
Ms. Hammack. Yes, I understand the importance of complying with the
statutory BRAC deadlines to ensure that the impacts to the affected
communities are minimized. If confirmed, I will make compliance with
the 2011 BRAC deadline one of my highest priorities.
12. Senator McCain. Ms. Hammack, if confirmed, will you inform this
committee promptly of any concerns within the Army in meeting the BRAC
deadline?
Ms. Hammack. Yes, if confirmed, I will keep the committee informed
of any Army concern or issue in meeting the statutory BRAC deadline.
housing privatization support
13. Senator McCain. Ms. Hammack, in carrying out housing
privatization efforts, the Department of the Army has historically
relied on consultants to assist with assessment of industry trends,
analyses, financial statements, and the preparation of proposals. The
Department of the Army is currently in the process of soliciting
requests for proposals for a contractor to provide future consultation.
If confirmed, will you report back to this committee with an assurance
that the source selection process for this solicitation includes a fair
and objective review of proposals?
Ms. Hammack. Yes, if confirmed, I will report back to this
committee with assurances from the Army that the source selection
process for this particular solicitation included a fair and objective
review of proposals.
______
[The nomination reference of Katherine G. Hammack follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 20, 2010.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Katherine Hammack, of Arizona, to be an Assistant Secretary of the
Army, vice Keith E. Eastin, resigned.
______
[The biographical sketch of Katherine G. Hammack, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Resume of Career Service of Katherine Grace Hammack
Education:
BS, Mechanical Engineering, Oregon State University,
Corvallis, OR: 1977-1981
MA, Business Administration, University of Hartford,
Hartford, CT: 1985-1990
Certifications:
Certified Energy Manager (CEM), 1997
Certified Indoor Air Quality Professional (CIAQP),
1998
Certified Indoor Air Quality Technician (CIAQT), 1999
Certified Indoor Air Quality Manager (CIAQM), 2000
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
Accreditation (LEED-AP), 2003
Employment Record:
2001-Present: Senior Manager, Ernst and Young
July 2004: Paid consultant to Veteran's Administration
regarding Performance Tracking measures for VA Cogeneration
Facilities
1998-2001: Senior Account Executive, Arizona Public
Service Company (Energy Services)
1995-1998: Senior Marketing Executive, Trade Ally
Segment, Arizona Public Service Company
1993-1995: Senior Product Manager, Air Handler
Products, United Technologies, Carrier Corporation
1993-94: Voluntary consultant to Clinton
administration regarding ``Greening of the White House''
1991-1993: Senior Product Manager, Global Indoor Air
Quality Products Group, United Technologies, Carrier
Corporation
1991: Senior Manager Analog Products, Bristol Babcock
1986-1991: Product and Sales Manager, The J.M. Ney
Company, Neytech Division
1984-1986: Senior Product Specialist, Honeywell,
Skinner Valve Division
1981-1984: Product Marketing and Application Engineer,
United Technologies, Carrier Corporation
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Katherine G.
Hammack in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Katherine Grace Hammack.
Katherine Grace Dellett (Maiden Name)
2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment.
3. Date of nomination:
January 20, 2010.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
November 23, 1959; Washington, DC.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Divorced - ex-husband is Timothy Hammack.
7. Names and ages of children:
Randolph Lawrence Hammack, age 23.
Alexander Jennings Hammack, age 19.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Oregon State University, 1977-1981, Bachelors of Mechanical
Engineering, June 1981
University of Hartford, 1985-1990, Masters Business Administration,
May 1990
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
03/2001-Present; Senior Manager, Climate Change and Sustainability
Services, Tax Advisory; Ernst & Young, Phoenix, AZ
06/1998-03/2001; Senior Account Executive, Arizona Public Service
Company (Energy Services), Phoenix, AZ
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Voluntary consultant to Clinton administration as part of
``Greening of the White House'' project in 1993-4
Paid consultant (through Ernst & Young) to Veterans Administration
regarding Performance Tracking Measures for VA Cogeneration facilities
in July 2004
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
1993-present. Member, U.S. Green Building Council, National and
Arizona Chapter (past president Arizona chapter in 2003)
1993-present. Member, American Society of Heating Refrigeration and
Air Conditioning Engineers, National and Arizona Chapter (past
president Arizona chapter in 2000)
2006-present. Member, American Society of Heating Refrigeration and
Air Conditioning Engineers, Standard 189 Committee High performance
Green Buildings committee
1997-present. Member, Association of Energy Engineers, Arizona
Chapter
2000-present. Member, Desert Foothills Lutheran Church.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
None.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
For the last 2 years all published materials have been through
Ernst and Young on climate change, green buildings and incentives.
IRC Section 179D, Seven Answers to frequently asked questions,
EY SCORE No. ZZ0266, published 2009
Building Efficiency, EY SCORE No. DF0048, published 2008
Cleantech tax opportunities, EY 0805-0942458, published 2008
Cleantech Matters, Climate Change Opportunity and Risk, EY
SCORE No. BE0047, 2008
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Over the years I have given many presentations to organizations
such as the Global Energy Conference, conferences sponsored by the
American Institute of Architects, International Facility Management
Association (IFMA), Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA),
CoreNet, Association of Energy Engineers, U.S. Green Building Council,
and American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning
Engineers (ASHRAE), and other construction, real estate, engineering
and environmental organizations. All of my presentations are on energy,
efficiency, environmental sustainability, green tax incentives and
buildings. I do not have copies of these speeches because I speak
extemporaneously or from notes. While I don't have records of all such
presentations I have given, these are some of the more recent ones:
Dec 4, 2009, Green/Energy Efficient Buildings
Incentives, American Institute of CPA's Construction Conference
Nov 17/18, 2009, Climate Change and sustainability,
internal training for EY Employees
Nov 4, 2009, LEED tax incentives and credits for Green
Buildings, webinar for Lorman Education
Oct 22, 2009, Utilities Public Private Partnerships
Panel, Alliance for construction Excellence
Sept. 15, 2009, Carbon Markets 101, Arizona Chapter of
U.S. Green Building Council
July 2009, Section 179D Bootcamp, Internal training
for EY employees
April 2009, Energy Credits going green, Tax Executives
Institute
April 2009, What is ASHRAE/USGBC/IESNA Std 189.IP?,
Southwest Facilities Expo
I am attaching copies of two power point presentations that I gave
recently. [Copies are retained in the committee's executive files.]
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Katherine G. Hammack.
This 19th day of March, 2010.
[The nomination of Katherine G. Hammack was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on May 5, 2010, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on June 22, 2010.]
NOMINATIONS OF VADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, TO BE ADMIRAL AND
COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
DEFENSE COMMAND; AND LTG KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE/
COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Udall, Hagan, Burris, Kaufman, McCain, and Thune.
Other Senator present: Senator Barbara Mikulski.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Peter K.
Levine, general counsel; and Thomas K. McConnell, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Paul
C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw,
professional staff member; and David M. Morriss, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard and Kevin A.
Cronin.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator
Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Nathan
Davern, assistant to Senator Burris; Halie Soifer, assistant to
Senator Kaufman; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Jason Van
Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Kyle Ruckert, assistant
to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today to consider the nominations of two senior officers
to serve in important command positions. Vice Admiral James
Winnefeld, Jr., has been nominated for promotion to the rank of
admiral and to be Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
and Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD). Lieutenant General Keith Alexander has been nominated
for promotion to the rank of general and to be Director of the
National Security Agency (NSA), the Director of the Central
Security Service, and to be Commander of the new U.S. Cyber
Command (CYBERCOM).
We welcome both our nominees and we thank them, we thank
their families, for their long and distinguished service that
they've already provided to the Nation. We thank them both also
for their willingness to continue serving our Nation in these
senior military positions for which they are so well qualified.
Vice Admiral Winnefeld has had a long and distinguished
naval career, including a number of joint duty assignments. He
has commanded the U.S. Sixth Fleet, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Striking and Support Forces, and Carrier Strike
Group 2. He is currently serving as the Director of Strategic
Plans and Policy, J-5, on the Joint Staff.
NORTHCOM, which Admiral Winnefeld has been nominated to
lead, was created following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. It is charged with two primary missions, defense of
the United States and providing defense support to civil
authorities in circumstances where the Federal Government is
needed to respond to natural or manmade disasters in the
homeland. This latter mission requires a high level of
cooperation and coordination with other Federal agencies and
State agencies, especially the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
The Commander of NORTHCOM is also dual-hatted as the
Commander of NORAD, our binational command with Canada that
provides aerospace warning and control and since 2006 maritime
warning for North America. NORAD has been a key link between
our two nations for more than 50 years.
In addition to Canada, Mexico is also in the NORTHCOM area
of responsibility (AOR). Given the continuing high level of
drug-related violence in Mexico and the attendant risks to our
southern border region, the administration has been focusing
high-level attention on Mexico. This future close cooperation
between our countries in this and many other matters is
critically important to both our countries.
Finally, NORTHCOM is the combatant command responsible for
the operation of the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD)
system that has interceptors deployed in Alaska and California
to defend our Nation from limited long-range missile attack.
That system has been of considerable interest to this committee
for a number of reasons, including that we need it to be tested
in a way that will give us confidence in its operational
effectiveness.
General Alexander too has had a long and distinguished
career in military intelligence. He has served as the Director
for Intelligence, J-2, for U.S. Central Command; Commanding
General for the Army Intelligence and Security Command; and the
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Intelligence before
becoming Director of NSA in 2005.
With respect to the position to which General Alexander has
been nominated, the creation of a new combatant command, even
at the subunified level, is an extremely important matter. The
creation of CYBERCOM in particular warrants careful scrutiny on
the part of this committee for a variety of reasons. CYBERCOM
is to be formed solely around the mission involving the
relatively sudden dominance of the new computer and
communications technology of our age, technology that is
ubiquitous, rapidly evolving, and fraught with both great
promise and new perils for the country and the world.
As the committee's examination has confirmed, capabilities
to operate in cyber space have outpaced the development of
policy, law, and precedent to guide and control those
operations. This policy gap is especially concerning because
cyber weapons and cyber attacks potentially can be devastating,
approaching weapons of mass destruction in their effects,
depending on how they are designed and used.
Coupled with the fact that the U.S. economy and Government
are the most dependent in the world on the Internet and are
therefore the most vulnerable to attacks, the Nation must not
only invest in the effectiveness of its defense, but think
carefully about the precedents that it sets, hopefully acting
wisely in ways that we will accept if others act in the same or
similar ways.
Combatant commanders respond to attacks that affect our
forces and their ability to execute their missions. The
implications of their responses are usually limited and pertain
to the theater in which forces are operating. But responses and
initiatives in cyber space could have extremely broad and
damaging consequences and in the future may require rapid
decisionmaking. In this context, some have expressed concern
about an officer without strong career experience in commanding
combat forces serving as a subunified combatant commander.
Faced with that complex situation, the committee proceeded
methodically to gain an understanding of what Congress is being
asked to approve and what the key cyber space issues are that
need to be addressed. Committee staff have held numerous
meetings with senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials on a
host of policy and operational issues associated with CYBERCOM
and military and intelligence operations in cyber space.
Committee members held a classified meeting with the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cartwright, and
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr.
Jim Miller. The committee posed a lengthy set of policy
questions to be answered in writing by the nominee in advance
of today's hearing and followed that up with additional
meetings and discussions, including with General Alexander.
The committee has been assured that DOD's leadership and
the administration as a whole is committed to rapidly closing
the cyber space policy gap. The committee has also been assured
that DOD is proceeding with appropriate caution and care
regarding military operations in cyber space.
We look forward to hearing from our witnesses. There's a
possibility that a closed session will be required and if so
that session will be held in the Office of Senate Security in
the Visitors Center of the Capitol.
Before we turn to our wonderful colleague Senator Mikulski
to introduce General Alexander, let me call on Senator McCain
for his opening comments.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join
you in welcoming Lieutenant General Alexander and Vice Admiral
Winnefeld and their families.
General Alexander, CYBERCOM was established, as we all
know, by the Secretary of Defense last year. Since then I have
shared the concerns of Senator Levin and others about ensuring
that the role, mission, legal authorities, and rules of
engagement that CYBERCOM will employ are well thought out and
understood. I think we've made progress in achieving greater
clarity in this regard and that you are well qualified for this
new assignment.
The Department must have a centralized command to address
the challenges of cyber warfare, to provide the support to the
regional combatant commands, and to ensure that DOD, while
focused on its own military networks and information grid, also
is ready, if directed by the President, to assume a position of
leadership and support to civilian authorities in this regard.
Continuing intrusions and attacks by difficult to identify
and locate actors on our civilian and military networks and web
sites demand not only a robust defensive capability, but the
ability to respond offensively when the circumstances call for
it. One need only consider the examples of cyber warfare
conducted against the Republic of Georgia in 2008 and Estonia
in 2007 to appreciate the nature of this form of modern
warfare.
We look forward to your testimony about how CYBERCOM will
function in protecting our vital national assets and
infrastructure. I also noted in the media this morning that you
believe there are certain gaps in legislative form and also in
regulations that need to be improved in order to help you
complete your mission successfully and under the legal
framework that you feel is necessary. I look forward to hearing
from you on that aspect of your new responsibilities.
Admiral Winnefeld, I congratulate you on your nomination to
head NORTHCOM and NORAD. The vicious attacks of September 11
are never far from our thoughts. Ensuring effective support of
civilian authorities should be among our highest priorities.
The same is true, of course, for natural disasters, which
demand a capable, tested, intergovernmental response in which
NORTHCOM is a key player.
Admiral Winnefeld, I want to particularly emphasize the
continuing growing threat to our national security posed by the
violence along our border with Mexico. Your answers to the
committee's advance policy questions about the importance of
combatting drug trafficking and drug violence reflect my deep
concerns about the corrosive effect of this plague on both the
United States and Mexico. The drug-related violence in Mexico
is appalling. As you noted, there were over 6,500 drug-related
murders in Mexico last year. So far this year, there have been
nearly 2,000 deaths resulting from drug-related violence. Last
month, the murders in Juarez of Lesley Enriquez, an American
consulate worker, and her husband Arthur; of Jorge Salcido, the
husband of a U.S. consulate employee; and the murder of Robert
Krentz, a rancher in Douglas, AZ, underscored the cross-border
nature of this problem.
I've supported the assignment of federally-funded National
Guardsmen to our southern border in the past and I have
endorsed Arizona Governor Jan Brewer's recent request for 250
federally-funded National Guardsmen in Arizona to assist in
this effort to stop the flow of illegal immigrants and
narcotics.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to insert two letters into the
record: one I wrote to Secretary Napolitano on March 29; and
the other addressed to the mayor of Douglas, AZ, on March 31 in
this regard.
Chairman Levin. They will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator McCain. Unfortunately, the administration has
rejected Governor Brewer's request.
Admiral, I'm interested in your assessment of the security
situation along the border and what steps can be taken to
improve not only the ability of the United States to confront
this drug trafficking threat, but also the ability of our
allies in Mexico.
Admiral, I understand that yours is a military command and
your role is one to be carried out in combat. I can make an
argument that we are in combat with the drug cartels in Mexico.
I can make an argument that the war between the drug cartels
and the Government of Mexico directly threatens the very
existence of the Government of Mexico. I don't say these words
lightly, and I think that it's very clear that when you're
talking about a $65 billion a year business that is harming
American citizens and killing them because of the product, that
this struggle with the drug cartels is going to and already has
spilled over into the United States of America and has taken
the lives of American citizens.
I look forward to perhaps taking a visit with you to our
southern border. I look forward to working with you and
determining how we can best use some of the military equipment
we have, such as surveillance technologies, use of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), and better ways to enforce our border
and make sure that it is secure. I look forward to discussing
this and working with you, Admiral Winnefeld. This is a grave
threat and I am afraid that a lot of Americans are not aware
how serious the consequences would be of the Government of
Mexico failing and being overthrown by these drug cartels, or
at least marginalized so that the drug cartels can act freely,
and the consequences to American security.
I thank you and I will look forward to your testimony and
look forward to working with you as we carry out what I believe
is a national security requirement, and that is to secure our
southern border.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
General Alexander, you could have no more effective
advocate than Senator Mikulski. I want you to know that this
has been a long period of time for considerations because of
the newness of this position and the importance that it has for
the reasons which we've stated. But I don't think a week went
by during this long period that Barbara Mikulski did not ask
me: So when's the hearing? You're lucky to have her as a
Senator, but also as a wonderful advocate.
Senator Mikulski.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA MIKULSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF MARYLAND
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member McCain, and colleagues. I have the opportunity
today to introduce Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, who is
the current Director of NSA, located in Fort Meade, MD. I also
am very proud to sit here today with Admiral Winnefeld, and I
would like to re-echo Senator McCain's sense of urgency about
another war that we're fighting south of our own border.
I'm here today in my scope as the Senator from Maryland. My
State is the home to the mothership of signals intelligence in
the U.S. military, which is NSA. I would recommend in a
classified hearing that the scope, breadth, and talented
workforce, the nature of it really be further explored, because
I think it's often underestimated and it's undervalued because
it does come in under everybody's radar.
But today is an exciting day in introducing General
Alexander for his confirmation hearing to lead something called
CYBERCOM. He will elaborate on that command, but I'm going to
elaborate on General Alexander. President Obama nominated him
and I think it's a great choice. This job, to head up CYBERCOM,
is going to require expertise, leadership, and know-how. The
know-how is going to require technical competence in fields
that change in web years, not in fiscal years. It requires
someone who has incredible organizational skills that could
head up major dot-com companies in our own country and the
diplomatic skills to navigate not only with foreign leaders,
but the vagaries of our own governance structures.
I believe that General Alexander brings all of those
talents, skills, and even more. He brings a great deal of
expertise. His biography speaks for itself and the command
recognitions that he's received. He's been the head of NSA for
5 years. He was the Deputy Chief of Staff at the Army, General
of the U.S. Army in Intelligence Security Command, and the
Director of Intelligence for U.S. Central Command, and numerous
other positions.
That's kind of the resume stuff. But as you know, all of
you here, that it is one thing to talk about credentials and
bars on the shoulder and so on, but it's another thing to talk
about leadership. I believe that General Alexander has led the
transformation of NSA from an agency that was once focused on
Cold War threats to now a world of new world threats,
supporting both people who are literally in battle in Iraq and
Afghanistan, standing sentry over those others who have
predatory intent against us, and bringing that leadership.
Right now he is leading the fight against cyber spies who
want to steal our State secrets, cyber terrorists who want to
disrupt everything from our financial services to our power
grids, while supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
working with NORTHCOM and our forces at the border protecting
our borders.
Lieutenant General Alexander is a leader and a
professional. I believe he's an indispensable asset. He's had
to deal with everything from other generals and admirals to
deal with us and our often sluggish response to situations.
He's had to deal with Google as it's been threatened by China
and he's had to develop a workforce and develop technology and
he's had to do it with speed, diligence, while he's trying to
avoid attacks on the United States, he's been trying to avoid
fiscal boondoggles with his own agency.
The CYBERCOM leader needs to be respected by the military.
His service speaks for itself. He needs to be able to deal with
the private sector. They're already coming to him for advice
and how to work with us to protect dot-mil and other important
things. He's been a promoter of innovation.
I come to this because the committee must come to deal,
have a sense of urgency, not only on the confirmation, but on
cyber security. Those who have predatory intent against us are
dealing in web years. They're continually focusing on the
rapidity of change in a dynamic web environment. That's every 3
months. We deal in fiscal years, congressional sessions,
quadrennial reviews. That's pretty dated when it comes to cyber
security.
Our cyber shield is thinning. We need a unified response.
We need CYBERCOM and we need the leader who has the right stuff
to do it. I believe that's General Alexander and I hope you
confirm him with web year speed.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your kind attention.
[The prepared statement of Senator Mikulski follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Barbara Mikulski
Thank you Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain for the
opportunity to introduce Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, the current Director
of the National Security Agency (NSA), located in Fort Meade, MD.
As the Senator from and for Maryland, I am pleased and honored to
introduce Lieutenant General Alexander to the Senate Armed Services
Committee for his confirmation hearing to lead Cyber Command. In
October 2009, President Obama, with the support and backing of Defense
Secretary Gates and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Blair,
nominated Lieutenant General Alexander to lead Cyber Command.
I have known Lieutenant General Alexander since he started as
Director of the NSA in 2005. Lieutenant General Alexander's leadership
and expertise as Director of the NSA for the past 5 years, Deputy Chief
of Staff of the Army, General of the U.S. Army and Intelligence and
Security Command, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Central Command and
numerous other positions make him uniquely qualified to lead Cyber
Command.
Lieutenant General Alexander has led the transformation of the NSA
from an agency focused on counter-terrorism into an organization that
is leading the fight against cyber spies who want to steal our State
secrets, cyber terrorists who want to disrupt our power grid and cyber
criminals who want to make a quick buck, all while still supporting the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lieutenant General Alexander is a leader,
a professional and, most important for this job, he is an indispensable
asset to our Nation's cyber security.
As a member of both the Intelligence Committee and Defense
Subcommittee on Appropriations, which funds the NSA, I have seen the
tremendous things that the NSA is doing in cyber space both to protect
our national security systems and to keep us ahead of our cyber
adversaries.
The United States is being hacked and being attacked by cyber
adversaries and foes each and every day. Cyber spies want to steal our
State secrets, weapons systems, and restricted technology. Cyber
hackers who want to make off with our intellectual property and patents
and cyber criminals who want to make a quick $10,000.
Our cyber shield is thinning and a unified response is necessary.
The U.S. military needs a unified effort--a Cyber Command--to have the
ability to respond with speed, agility, and flexibility to increasingly
sophisticated cyber adversaries.
As DNI Mike McConnell--a former NSA Director himself--once told me,
Lieutenant General Alexander is an asset to our national security, and
I agree with him. Cyber hackers and warriors continue to hack and
attack us each day. Cyber hackers and warriors are operating with
increasing speed and sophistication.
This nomination is one that cannot wait. I strongly support his
nomination to lead Cyber Command and I urge his quick confirmation.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Mikulski. We
haven't acted yet with web year speed, but we surely from this
point on would hope to do so. The reasons we haven't are the
reasons that I tried to outline, though, in my introduction,
which intended to set out at least, some of the very
significant issues that this new command raises. But your
eloquence is very helpful in this regard and your comments are
very welcome.
Senator Mikulski. Good luck. I have your back.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, I think we're going to start with
you, so please proceed with your opening comments and please
introduce anybody that you'd like to introduce to us. We always
welcome family and friends should people be lucky enough to
have them with them.
STATEMENT OF VADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, NOMINEE TO BE
ADMIRAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH
AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator
McCain, and distinguished members of this committee, it's a
great honor to have been nominated by the President to become
the Commander of NORTHCOM and the Commander of NORAD. I thank
you all for the opportunity to appear before you this morning.
I'm joined this morning--and thank you, sir--by my family
and with your permission I'd like to introduce them: first my
wonderful wife and best friend, to whom I owe so much, from
Menomonie, WI, my wonderful wife Mary, who is a volunteer for
the Navy and Marine Corps Relief Society here in Washington and
who brings so much joy into my family's life. Sweetheart.
Here also are my two sons, of whom I'm so proud: my son LJ,
who tells me he'd like to follow his father's footsteps into
the Navy; and his brother Jonathan, who tells me he would
prefer to serve in the Marine Corps.
Chairman Levin. Both of them belong in school. How come
they're not there today? [Laughter.]
Admiral Winnefeld. I think they got a senatorial waiver,
sir.
Mr. Chairman, over the last 3 years my friend General Gene
Renuart has led the NORTHCOM and NORAD team with distinction
and he'll leave behind a tremendous legacy of continuous
improvement. If confirmed, I look forward to being able to
build upon his efforts.
In this light, I'd like to make two simple but important
points before receiving your questions. First, I can think of
no greater responsibility than protecting our people and our
way of life by leading our homeland's last military line of
defense and by providing support at the Federal, State, and
local level in times of great need. There are no points for
second place in either one of these missions and I view this as
a sacred trust.
Second, I have observed no other commands, no other
combatant command for sure, in which cooperation with and
support for partners is more important than with NORTHCOM and
with NORAD. I believe the significant part of my career and my
professional life spent in joint assignments has helped prepare
me for this task.
If confirmed, I will reinforce the critical importance of
close partnerships and teamwork with the other combatant
commanders and Service Chiefs, with DHS, and a host of other
interagency, State, local, and nongovernmental partners, with
our close friends and neighbors Canada and Mexico, and with the
National Guard and Reserve.
I view all of these relationships as vital, but I would
like to particularly emphasize the latter. Our Nation's Guard
and Reserve have never been better or more versatile and I look
forward, if confirmed, to forging a strong personal partnership
with them.
I also look forward to working closely with the members of
this committee to ensure we're correctly tackling the
critically important job of defending our homeland and
providing support to civil authorities.
Once again, I'm very grateful for the opportunity to appear
today and I'd like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
McCain, and the members and superb staff of this committee for
the ongoing support that you provide to our men and women in
uniform and to their families.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral. We welcome you.
We welcome your wife and your kids here today. We know how much
you treasure them and we are delighted to see them here.
General Alexander.
STATEMENT OF LTG KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA, NOMINEE TO BE GENERAL
AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY
SERVICE/COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND
General Alexander. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
distinguished members of the committee, it is a distinct honor
and privilege to appear before you today. I am honored that
President Obama and Secretary Gates have placed their trust and
confidence in me by nominating me for the position of Director,
NSA; Chief, Central Security Service; and for Commander,
CYBERCOM. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with
the committee to address the cyber security challenges facing
our Nation today and in the future.
Sir, I'd like to introduce my wife Debby, who is with me
today--right here, just so I can identify her. Debby has
overseen 20 moves, experienced the highs and lows of almost 35
years in service, brought 4 lovely daughters into the world,
and is grandmother to our 12 grandchildren. I am indebted to
her for her love, unflagging support, wise counsel, and
occasionally letting me win in Yahtzee.
We face a growing array of cyber threats, from foreign
intelligence services, terrorists, criminal groups, and
individual hackers, who are capable of stealing, manipulating,
or destroying information that could compromise our personal
and national security. DOD in particular requires a focused
approach to secure its own networks, given our military's
dependence on them for command and control, logistics, and
military operations.
In recognition of this, Secretary Gates directed the
creation of CYBERCOM to establish a framework under which a
single military commander can achieve unity of command and
operational integration across the full range of cyber space
operations.
If confirmed, my main focus will be on building the
capacity, the capability, and the critical partnerships
required to secure our military's operational networks. This
command is not about efforts to militarize cyber space. Rather,
it is about safeguarding the integrity of our military's
critical information systems. Working with U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) and Department leadership and with help from
this committee, my goal, if confirmed, will be to significantly
improve the way we defend ourselves in this domain.
If confirmed, I also intend to draw upon the extensive
lessons I have learned over the almost 5 years serving as both
Director of NSA and Commander of the Joint Functional Component
Command Net Warfare, to ensure that CYBERCOM can effectively
leverage NSA's global intelligence capabilities.
I would like to note, however, that while there will be, by
design, significant synergy between NSA and CYBERCOM, each
organization will have a separate and distinct mission with its
own identity, authorities, and oversight mechanisms. NSA's own
mission and authorities will not change as a result of the
creation of this command and, while cyber space is a dynamic,
rapidly evolving environment, what will never change will be an
unwavering dedication by both CYBERCOM and NSA to the
protection of civil liberties and privacy of American citizens.
Finally, if confirmed, we can stand up the command under
existing authorities, but there is undoubtedly much unchartered
territory in the world of cyber policy, law, and doctrine. If
confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy charged by Secretary Gates to develop a
comprehensive strategy for DOD's cyber space operations. I will
also rely heavily on the wisdom and guidance of this committee
to ensure that we get this critically important mission right
for our military and for our Nation.
In closing, I want to again express my sincere appreciation
to this committee for holding today's hearing. If confirmed, I
look forward to working closely with you. Your wisdom, support,
and sustained engagement are critical to ensuring the success
of this endeavor.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here with you
today. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General. We welcome
you. We welcome your wife. I'm a little bit jealous of the 2 of
you with 4 daughters--I only have 3--and 12 grandkids--I only
have 5. But it's wonderful to have you both here.
I want to explore with you, General Alexander, some of that
unexplored territory that you just mentioned, cyber policy,
cyber law, and cyber doctrine. You as the first Commander of
CYBERCOM are going to be in a critical position, not just in
commanding the command, but in really setting the precedents
for how that command is going to operate. There's a lot of
unchartered territory; you and I have talked about this.
What I'd like to do is share some hypothetical scenarios.
You and I talked about your doing this and I wanted to let you
know that's what I wanted to do because I wanted you to be able
to know in advance what these scenarios are and to give us your
thoughtful response to these. This is a new area, not just for
our country, but an area which is particularly challenging, I
must say, to me, being generationally challenged when it comes
to understanding some of these issues.
Let me give you the hypotheticals, starting with the
easiest one, I think, which is assume the following: U.S.
forces are engaged in a traditional military conflict with a
country, we'll call it Country C. Now, how would you conduct
cyber operations in that country in support of the combatant
commander? Under what authorities, processes, and orders would
you be operating in that particular scenario? Then I'll give
you two additional scenarios.
General Alexander. Yes, sir. We would be operating under
title 10 authorities, under an execute order, supporting
probably that regional combatant commander. The execute order
would have the authorities that we need to operate within that
country. We have standing rules of engagement of how to defend
our networks.
I think that's the straightforward case. There would be an
execute order that comes down to that regional combatant
commander, that includes the authorities for cyber parsed and
approved by the President.
Chairman Levin. All right, so that is kind of a traditional
role. You have an execute order. You have rules of engagement.
By the way, we'll have an 8-minute first round for
questioning.
Now the second hypothetical. I want to add a complicating
factor to the scenario. Assume that an adversary launches an
attack on our forces through computers that are located in a
neutral country. That's what you've determined. The attack is
coming from computers in a neutral country. How does that alter
the way that you would operate and the authorities that you
would operate under?
General Alexander. Sir, that does complicate it. It would
still be the regional combatant commander that we're supporting
under title 10 authorities. There would be an execute order. In
that execute order and the standing rules of engagement, it
talks about what we can do to defend our networks and where we
can go and how we can block.
The issue becomes more complicated when on the table are
facts such as we can't stop the attacks getting into our
computers, and if we don't have the authorities in accordance
with the standing rules of engagement we'd go back up to
STRATCOM, to the Secretary, and the President for additional
capabilities to stop that.
But right now the authorities would be to block it in
theater under the current standing rules of engagement, and it
would be under an execute order, and again under title 10 in
support of that regional combatant command.
Chairman Levin. Is that execute order likely to have the
authority to do more than defend the networks, or would you
have to, in all likelihood, go back for that authority if it
were more than defensive?
General Alexander. Sir, it would probably have the
authority to attack within the area of conflict against the
other military that you're fighting. There would be a rules of
engagement that articulate what you can do offensively and what
you can do defensively. Sir, in offense that's both in the
exploitation and in the attack role. Both of those would be
laid out in the execute order.
What you would not have the authority to do is to reach out
into a neutral country and do an attack, and therein lies the
complication from a neutral country: What do you do to take
that second step?
Chairman Levin. Neutral being a third country, presumably?
Is that synonymous or does the word ``neutral'' mean literally
neutral?
General Alexander. It could be either, sir. It could be a
third country or it could be one that we don't know. I should
have brought in attribution, because it may or may not be a
country that we could actually attribute to, and that further
complicates this. The neutral country could be used by yet a
different country, the adversary, and it's only an attack
through.
In physical space it's a little bit easier to see firing
from a neutral country, and I think the law of armed conflict
has some of that in it. It's much more difficult and this is
much more complex when a cyber attack could bounce through a
neutral country, and therein lies the complexity for this
problem.
Chairman Levin. That's the complexity that you've
addressed.
Now a third scenario, more complicated yet. Assume you're
in a peacetime setting. All of a sudden we're hit with a major
attack against the computers that manage the distribution of
electric power in the United States. The attacks appear to be
coming from computers outside the United States, but they're
being routed through computers that are owned by U.S. persons,
located in the United States. So the routers are in here, in
the United States.
How would CYBERCOM respond to that situation and under what
authorities?
General Alexander. Sir, that brings in the real complexity
of the problem that we face today, because there are many
issues out there on the table that we can extend, many of which
are not yet fully answered. Let me explain.
First, DHS would have the responsibility for the defense of
that working with critical infrastructure. DHS could, through
the defense support to civilian authorities, reach out to DOD
and ask for support. Sir, one of our requirements in the
unified command plan is to be prepared for that task. We would
have that responsibility.
If asked to do that, again we'd get an execute order and
we'd have the standing rules of engagement that we operate
under all the time. The issues now, though, are far more
complex, because you have U.S. persons. Civil liberties,
privacy all come into that equation, ensuring that privacy
while you try to on the same network potentially take care of
bad actors. A much more difficult problem.
As a consequence, you have a joint interagency task force,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who has a great joint
cyber investigative task force that would be brought in. All of
these come to bear.
This is the hardest problem because you have attribution
issues, you have the neutrality issues that we mentioned in the
second scenario, you have interagencies working together with
industry. I think that's one of the things that the
administration is trying to address with DHS and with DOD, how
do we actually do that with industry? That's probably the most
difficult and the one that we're going to spend the most time
trying to work our way through: How does DOD help DHS in a
crisis like that?
Chairman Levin. Is that policy that's now under way in
terms of debate and discussion, is that scheduled for
completion by the end of the year? Is it what the hope is, the
goal is, for that?
General Alexander. I think DOD portions that would support
that are, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, let me ask you about the missile
defense system that we have. If I have time, I'll ask about the
issue, the GMD system that we have in Alaska and California.
But as I may run out of time, let me focus first on Europe.
We have a ballistic missile defense system in Europe. Last
September the President announced a new missile defense plan
for Europe that was unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That plan includes a number of
elements that are intended to enhance the defense of the United
States against potential future long-range Iranian missiles,
particularly long-range Iranian missiles.
The forward-deployed radar in southeastern Europe would be
part of that. Development of an improved version of the
Standard Missile III Block 2 for deployment in Europe. This, of
course, would work to complement or in concert with the GMD
system that I referred to.
But first, do you agree that new missile defense plan will
improve our capability to defend the homeland against potential
future long-range missiles from Iran?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, in particular the radar that
would be placed presumably in southeastern Europe or in the
southeastern part of that AOR would provide much earlier
warning of a missile attack from Iran and therefore give much
earlier warning for the ground-based missile or ground-based
midcourse system in the United States to launch, and
potentially that will dramatically raise the ability of that
system to counter a threat coming from Iran. That's the most
important part. The SM III Block 2, obviously further down the
line with some potential intercontinental ballistic missile
capability is an adjunct to that.
Chairman Levin. If the Russian radars finally were able to
be joined to that system, would that add capability?
Admiral Winnefeld. If the Russian radars are able to feed
in into that system, then presumably, yes, sir, it would
augment that capability on top of the radar that we would have
in southeastern Europe.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Alexander, I think it would be helpful for this
committee, and also I note the presence of the chairman of the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, if
perhaps you could submit to us for the record some of the
changes that you think are needed both in law and in regulation
to allow you to perform your functions in a not only more
efficient fashion, but to make sure that you are protected
constitutionally. Do you see my point, General?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Do you think that would be helpful to the
committee and Congress, for us to get a laundry list of what
you think needs to be done in order for you to be able to carry
out your duties in a most efficient and effective fashion?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. We'll do that, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator McCain. I think it's obvious from General
Alexander's testimony that close coordination between DHS and
DOD is critical in taking effective measures in this new cyber
war that we are in.
Chairman Levin. If I could just support what your request
is on that, Senator McCain. It's a very useful point and the
answer that you give to us in response to Senator McCain will
go to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
as well. It's a very important point. Thank you.
Senator McCain. It may at some point argue for a joint
committee hearing, depending on how urgent the needs are. But
this is obviously a brand new field of combat and one that we
are going to have to make significant adjustments to.
Admiral Winnefeld, you are new in your responsibilities and
I congratulate you for your long years of service. Do you agree
with my opening statement concerning this real crisis we have
on our southern border and with our southern neighbor
concerning this struggle, the existential struggle of the
Government of Mexico with the drug cartels?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I certainly share your deep
concern over the levels of violence in Mexico and along our
border and certainly the corrosive effect that it ultimately
has inside our cities.
Senator McCain. Have you had time yet to assess whether the
Government of Mexico, whom we are helping out a great deal, I
think it's $1.5 billion in the Merida Plan. Have you any
assessment as to whether we are succeeding or failing or where
the drug cartels are as far as this struggle is concerned? Have
you an assessment of the situation yet?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I'm in the early stages of my
assessment, to be quite honest with you. In preparation for the
hearing, I have done my own reading. I was privileged to
accompany the large delegation that the Government sent down to
Mexico City in March to meet with their counterparts in Mexico,
and I'm watching this very closely. Of course, if I'm confirmed
I intend to really burrow into it once I get out and in
command.
Senator McCain. Would you agree that your initial
assessment is that the Government of Mexico is in an
existential struggle with the drug cartels?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that the drug cartels really
want to be left alone. They want to have space for them to
compete for market share. I don't believe at this point that
they are intent on overthrowing the Government of Mexico.
Senator McCain. I agree with that assessment. But if the
government does not have control of large parts of its
territory, then, if not an existential threat, certainly a
threat to its ability to govern.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Have you had an opportunity yet to visit
the border?
Admiral Winnefeld. I have not, and I was delighted that you
made the offer during your opening remarks, sir, because it's
one of my very first priorities, if confirmed. When I get out
there, I want to get down there and see for myself what's going
on. I would very much welcome the opportunity to accompany you
on a trip down there, sir.
Senator McCain. I would look forward to it, and soon,
Admiral.
One of the aspects of this struggle we're in--and I'm very
aware of our Constitution and the role of the military inside
the United States and all of that. But I also would argue that
when we have a level of violence that thousands of people are
being murdered on the other side of the border, American
citizens have been murdered, as I just described to you, that
at least we ought to scrutinize more carefully and utilize some
of the lessons we have learned in, say, Iraq. What I mean by
that is surveillance capability as well as physical barriers.
I do not mean to draw too close a comparison between the
war in Iraq and our struggle on the border. But I do believe
you could make a comparison between the use of UAVs,
surveillance capabilities, as well as barriers. We all know
that barriers only work if they are surveiled and maintained.
It seems to me that we could use some of the technology that
we've developed in Iraq and are using in Iraq and Afghanistan
to better surveil and enforce our borders, because I'm not sure
when this struggle between the Mexican Government and the drug
cartels is going to be over, but I do believe it's going to be
a while, and I do believe that therefore we have an obligation
to secure our borders to prevent further incidents such as the
murder of a rancher in Douglas, AZ, just a short time ago.
I look forward to visiting with you on the border. Every
area of the border has its challenges. I think factually that
the Tucson border area has the largest number of incursions. We
also have the Goldwater Ranges down near the border and some of
the illegal activity has affected our training capabilities
there. There are a number of implications associated with the
struggle on the border that argues I think for our highest
attention.
I hope that you would also, as we assess this situation,
help us assess the manpower requirements as well as the
technology requirements, since our Governors in the border
States have said that they need the National Guard there. That
request has not been met with a favorable response as of yet.
I would look forward to it and will go to work right away.
Frankly, I am more concerned than I have ever been about the
fact that many indicators are that the drug cartels are
certainly not losing, if they're not winning. If they're not
losing in any war, then they are winning. This is an irregular
warfare situation. It has many different complications. Where
are they getting the sophisticated weapons? The Mexican police
and army many times are outgunned. Also, this effect on the
United States of America of what is judged to be about a $65
billion a year business as well.
I thank you for your commitment to get down there and I
look forward to joining you as soon as possible. I know that my
colleagues that represent border States share the same concern
that I do about the size and implications of this issue.
I've been down there many times over the years and I've
visited Mexico City. I have the greatest respect and
admiration, as I know you do because you were in Mexico City,
for President Calderon. I think he is doing everything that
they can, but they are crippled by corruption and they're
crippled by a lack of training and capability of their police
and military.
I also believe that we have made some very wise investments
in helping them with technology and training that may be of
significant benefit to them in the long run.
Do you agree?
Admiral Winnefeld. Absolutely, sir, and I absolutely share
your view that the Calderon Government has exhibited extremely
good leadership and courage in this fight, because one thing--
if they wanted to immediately tamp down the violence, they
could back off the pressure on the drug cartels, and they have
had the courage to not do that. I think it's a tremendous sign
of our partner in Mexico, and I'm proud to have potentially the
opportunity to work with them, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Before I call on Senator Lieberman, let me ask you the
standard questions which we place before all of our nominees.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Winnefeld. No, sir.
General Alexander. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to Congressional requests?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Finally, do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Alexander, Admiral Winnefeld, thank you for your
service to our country. I must say, going over your biographies
in preparation for the hearing, your answers, listening to you
this morning, you're two extraordinarily capable people and our
Nation is fortunate indeed to have you in our service. I look
forward to supporting your nominations.
General Alexander, I want to pick up a bit on the line of
questioning that Senator McCain began. But first, just if you
would briefly lay on the record, as we stand up this new
CYBERCOM and you as its first leader, how serious is the cyber
threat to the United States today? To the extent that you're
able to say in open testimony, particularly about DOD web sites
and networks, how frequently are we today under attack?
General Alexander. Sir, I think one of the underlying
principles, beliefs, that the Secretary had for standing up
this command was just the amount of attacks that we're seeing
coming into DOD gateways every day.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Alexander. Hundreds of thousands of probes a day.
Senator Lieberman. Every day?
General Alexander. Every day.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Alexander. The issue that we saw was, how do you
fight against that? By putting the command together, I think
that was what he saw as the first big step that we need to make
to build the capacity and to take that on. We saw it as very
serious. We have been alarmed by the increase, especially this
year, both in the critical infrastructure within the Nation and
within DOD. So it's growing rapidly.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Hundreds of thousands of probes,
these are not attacks in the sense that we normally consider an
attack; is that correct?
General Alexander. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. They're an attempt to probe and to
exploit our system to gain information?
General Alexander. That's correct, Senator. They may scan
the network to see what type of operating system you have, to
then facilitate an exploit or an attack.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Is it fair to presume that, while
some degree of these are individual hackers, others are working
for nation states that are trying to determine what they can
about our defense structure?
General Alexander. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. That I think quickly but strongly
outlines the nature of the threat certainly to our national
security structure.
Let me get into some of the questions about the
relationship between DOD and DHS because, as Senator McCain
said, I'm privileged to be chair of the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. There's a lot of
overlap, not surprisingly, between the membership on these two
committees.
The existing system allocates responsibility between DOD
and DHS, DOD obviously having responsibility not only for
offensive cyber operations, but for the defense of DOD's
networks. DHS has responsibility for defending the civilian
networks of our Government and working with the private sector
to defend the civilian infrastructure, which probably itself
would be a target of attack, could be certainly at some point.
I welcome Senator McCain's suggestion that these two
committees work together and that we have your responses to how
we might clarify responsibilities in the future. But I think it
is important to get on the record the extent to which NSA,
which you head, is now cooperating with DHS in enabling its
work. The bottom line here is that the NSA is a treasure, a
national treasure. Its resources are extensive. No one I think
would want DHS to try to replicate those resources to carry out
its responsibility to protect Federal Government civilian
networks and outside civilian networks.
Therefore the cooperation is really critically important.
Can you explain both what that relationship is now and how you
envision CYBERCOM that you'll now head and NSA playing a
supporting role to DHS in protecting non-military networks?
General Alexander. Senator, I'm going to break that into
two parts, one that talks about what NSA is doing to support
DHS in executing their mission. As you stated, it's their
mission to defend the rest of the dot-gov and to work with the
civilian community for critical infrastructure. Our
responsibility is to provide technical support to DHS. We do
that under the comprehensive national cyber initiative to help
them build the technology that they need to defend those
networks.
In part of that, sir, we have a responsibility to provide
them the technical information for what the threat is trying to
do to them.
Senator Lieberman. Right, right.
General Alexander. Provide them early warning to that. But
they would operate and defend that system. So our
responsibility, we provide people and capabilities to help them
do that.
I think that partnership continues to grow. We've had a
number of meetings and I think we're trying to work through it.
That's part of the issue, as you can see. Then I think what
Secretary Napolitano and the country's going to have to look
at, how do we work with private industry, who owns and operates
many of these networks?
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Alexander. On the CYBERCOM side, if a crisis were
to occur, now CYBERCOM or DOD may be called in to help, defense
support to civilian authorities. What we would be asked to do
is dependent on the situation. It could go through NORTHCOM, it
could go to STRATCOM or to CYBERCOM to provide either technical
support or help prevent an attack, or in the case of a
sustained attack actually help defend our networks.
Those are the cases, and as you get into each one of those
you run into a series of issues that we have yet to work out
with the roles and responsibilities, especially with private
industry.
Senator Lieberman. Right. That was very helpful.
The second situation, the second area of overlap, would be
in what I would describe as a national security crisis, the
extent to which CYBERCOM would come in and work with DHS to
defend either Federal Government civilian networks or private
civilian networks; is that correct?
General Alexander. That is a mission that we would plan for
under the unified command plan and that we have to work out the
specifics of how to do that.
Senator Lieberman. Am I correct that you would say that the
current allocation of responsibility between DOD, CYBERCOM,
NSA, and DHS is a good one? Understanding that you have to work
out some of the questions you've talked about, but bottom line,
that DOD has responsibility for the defense networks in defense
and DHS has responsibility for the Federal Government civilian
networks and private civilian networks?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. I think it is absolutely
important to have DHS operate and defend those networks. I also
believe that there necessarily needs to be a linkage and
leverage of that capability for us to provide the technical
support, the early warning, and others. I think we're walking
down that road. I think it is written out right, but there's
more to understand as we go into that, what are the exact lanes
in the road for that and how can we help, and what happens in a
true crisis.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that answer very much.
One of the things I think was implicit in what Senator
McCain said, and I certainly share this hope, is that we can
work together to determine both with yourself and Secretary
Napolitano whether there are any legislative changes necessary
to enable DOD components to better assist DHS in its cyber
security mission.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman, and we will
work closely as committee chairmen, and our ranking members I
know will be joining us in this coordinated effort to
understand this new world and to oversee it properly.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I only wish I knew as much about this as Senator Lieberman
does and Senator McCain, because I'm kind of new to this and
when I saw your command, as I told you when you were in my
office, I'm on the surface, I started getting into it and
recognizing that there is a reason for it, and that there are
problems out there.
Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe, if I could interrupt just
for a moment. I'm going to have to leave for a short time and
I've asked Senator Udall, who will be next in line anyway to
ask questions, if he could then continue after that. He
indicated he could. After you're completed, Senator Inhofe,
it'll go then to Senator Udall, then back to somebody on your
side if there is someone here. But Senator Udall can take care
of that.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Over the last decade as the use and
connectivity has become more pervasive, most of the Information
Technology (IT) security spending has been invested in
perimeter defense of the distributed network. There has been a
reduction in appropriations or in spending in some of these
areas, and I am concerned about that.
I've been told that DOD has created and adhered to a strict
set of security configuration controls for their mainframe
systems, but there have been some reports of classified
government systems being breached. I'd like to have you just
take as much time and as much detail on this, the problems that
we have.
Second, I want to talk about some of the systems outside of
the military that I'll be asking you about, due to something
that appeared this morning in the media. Does DOD have any
issues with its mainframe security, both in its air-gapped or
non-wired systems and in the systems that are connected to the
Internet? What problems do you see that you haven't already
mentioned in the previous questions?
Again, I apologize for not being here for your opening
statement, you may have covered this. If so, that's fine.
General Alexander. Yes, sir. I think the key issue that you
bring up is some of the legacy defense capabilities would look
at a perimeter defense. As we begin to merge our offensive and
defensive capabilities onto one team, one of the things we did
was change the strategy from perimeter defense to defense I
depth.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Now, before that took place--and I'm
sorry I have to ask this question; I should know and I don't--
who was doing this then?
General Alexander. This was separated in responsibilities
between what the network defenders and operators would do
versus what you would do in the attack and exploit arena.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
General Alexander. In many of our war games, in many of our
exercises, we noted that the offense always had the upper hand.
When you look at that, the red teams and the blue teams that we
would bring out to test our networks we saw were largely
successful. As a consequence, one of the issues that we said is
can we bring some of that great talent that's on the offense to
help on the defense? When we started doing that, we made
changes to some of our doctrine, some of the operational
concepts, and some of the ways that we do it.
You bring out a key one, Senator, and that is defense in
depth. That's absolutely important because the adversary is
always going to try to penetrate our network. We have to remain
vigilant and try new capabilities, tests, and always be on
guard for those exploits or attacks into our network.
Senator Inhofe. That's good and I appreciate that.
This morning on Dark Reading--it's a business IT web site--
they talk about, even with minimal Internet access, malware and
breaches are increasingly occurring. We're talking about the
nonmilitary, nondefense field. While only 10 percent of the
industrial control systems are actually connected to the
Internet, these systems that run water, waste water, utility
power plants have suffered an increase in cyber security
incidents over the past 5 years.
Now, why don't we shift over into what is being done to
secure those networks and systems that are not government or
military, but are critical to us, such as those that are
mentioned in this article? What do you anticipate to do--you've
talked about the problems that are out there--in terms of
approaching those problems, finding solutions? Then getting
into the technology, do you really have the resources that you
need to do what you think, you anticipate, you're going to have
to do in these nonmilitary, nondefense areas?
General Alexander. Sir, the key issues that come on the
table as you lay that out is most of our infrastructure for our
Government is owned and operated by private industry. If we are
going to be successful in defending our networks, we have to
have a great partnership between DHS, who has the lead in this
area with civilian industry, with DOD and the Intelligence
Community to bring in those techniques and the early warning to
work with private industry. That's the hard issue that I see
facing us today.
Senator Inhofe. What I would ask you is, as this
progresses, I'm very interested in this. As I mentioned in my
office, if we could keep an ongoing conversation as to what
might be out there, what resources you might need, and so
forth, because I see this as just a huge area. You're the right
person for it. I'm glad that you're doing what you're doing. I
think that will probably take care of it.
Admiral Winnefeld, when you were in my office we talked
about one of the major concerns I had. I was very much involved
early on in the negotiations with both Poland and the Czech
Republic on the radar site and on the third site that we were
going to put in Poland. It was pretty risky on their part to do
something that Russia was opposed to, and they agreed to do it.
I was very much concerned when that was pulled out from under
them a year ago in the first budget of this administration.
Now, I had two concerns. One was can they really believe
what we're telling them? I've talked to them since that time
and I think that's probably all right. But the whole reason for
that is, we all know that we have ground-based interceptors in
Alaska and California and we know that we're in pretty good
shape on anything coming from that direction.
My concern is this. Our intelligence tells us--and it's not
even classified--that as early as 2015 they could have the
capability in Iran of sending one over to the eastern part of
the United States. Now, that may not be right. Maybe after
that. But nonetheless it says it could be that early.
My understanding on the third site, is that it would be
deployable by around 2012. I was very comfortable with that
time. I know the arguments, and I heard you respond to Senator
McCain's question. To me, if we're not going to use that third
site or a site someplace else--at one time we talked about
Florida--before the SM III 2-Bravo would be there--first of
all, do you have any date at all that that would come into
play, where that could be deployed?
Admiral Winnefeld. The SM III 2-Bravo is still under
development.
Senator Inhofe. I know that.
Admiral Winnefeld. About 2020, I believe is when it would--
--
Senator Inhofe. That's the date that I have heard. What
bothers me is what happens between 2015 and 2020? I heard your
response to that, but there has to be a percentage that's tied
to that, because when we look at it--I've had a lot of
briefings and I've seen the map of the coverage and the area of
how far can they reach with both radar and interception
capability from the west coast to the east coast. Frankly, I'm
just not comfortable with that.
I'd like to have all the assurance I can have that what
we're doing right now is not going to give us the vulnerability
that I think we're going to have in that period of time
somewhere between 2015 and 2020.
Do you want to elaborate on that?
Admiral Winnefeld. I would say that under the current
laydown, Alaska and Vandenberg, that there is a footprint that
covers the entire United States from both Iran and Korea. The
percentages go up as you get the radar into Europe, and
certainly if the SM III Block 2-Bravo pans out then they will
go up accordingly.
I understand your concern completely about the potential
risk in that little band before the SM III 2-Bravo would be on
line, and if confirmed that's certainly something that I would
want to understand better.
Senator Inhofe. My time has expired, but when you say the
percentages will go up, that's something you can't talk about
in an open meeting. Maybe some time we'll have a chance to
visit about that. Just keep me informed as this moves along
because I do have a great concern.
Admiral Winnefeld. I will, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Udall [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
I want to recognize Senator Reed for a minute. He has a
special acknowledgment he wants to make.
Senator Reed. Very briefly, I want to welcome General
Alexander. I think we met about 40 years ago and in the
intervening 40 years he has acquitted himself magnificently as
a soldier. I'm very confident that your leadership will improve
our national security.
Admiral, thank you for your service to the Navy, and to
your family, and to Keith's family, too. I'm sure we'll have a
chance in the days ahead to talk seriously about these very
critical issues. Thank you for your service.
Thank you very much.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Let me recognize myself for 7 minutes, and let's start with
Admiral Winnefeld. Welcome. General Alexander also, thank you
for taking the time to come by and see me in the last couple of
weeks.
General Renuart was here recently and he talked about the
synergy of his commands, Admiral, and what he believes is truly
an interdependent relationship between NORAD and NORTHCOM. Can
you tell us your thoughts about the relationship between NORAD
and NORTHCOM?
Admiral Winnefeld. Very close, clearly. The missions are
very symmetrical, aerospace warning, aerospace control, and
maritime warning for NORAD and, of course, homeland defense and
defense support to civil authorities to NORTHCOM. When you look
at the fact that NORAD might be providing some aerospace
warning of, for instance, the ballistic missile threat, that
then NORTHCOM would then assume the responsibility for
defending against, then there's clear synergy there.
I think it's important and a good move that General Renuart
has brought the staffs together. I know that the staffs enjoy
that, and my understanding is that Canada shares that view. I
think I look forward, if confirmed, to going out there and
exploring it further.
Senator Udall. We, of course, are looking forward to having
you based in Colorado, and I look forward to working with you,
as I have with General Renuart.
General Alexander, let me turn to you, if I might. We
talked about the benefits of dual hatting--speaking of dual
hatting in another setting, CYBERCOM and NSA. You talked about
your understanding of the importance that oversight
transparency will play in this new structure. Yet in the
advance policy questions you were only able to provide
classified answers to what seemed to be some of the fundamental
challenges facing CYBERCOM. Is there anything you can tell us
in this open session to get at some of those basic questions?
General Alexander. I think first transparency is important,
especially in the cyber arena, what we do on the NSA side to
support that and what we do on the CYBERCOM side. The reason I
say that, I believe that the Government combined, Congress and
the administration, to the American people, we have to help
explain that. We have to show what we're doing to ensure that
we comply with the laws. As you may know, Senator, we stood up
a Directorate of Compliance at NSA to ensure that we train our
folks significantly, we hold them accountable to complying with
that. It is important to us, and we'll carry that into CYBERCOM
as well to ensure that we have those same things.
It seems to me that's one of the fundamental issues, that
we all take an oath to the Constitution and that we support
that Constitution. Our folks take that very seriously.
Senator Udall. Let me follow on and turn the question to
the relationship with CYBERCOM and NORTHCOM. I'll ask you first
to give us your thoughts and then I'll turn to the Admiral to
provide his thoughts, if I might.
General Alexander. I think there's a great partnership. We
have already talked about this and our partnership would really
go through requests from DHS when they have an issue. From my
perspective, I could be supporting or supported depending on
the situation, and the Secretary would choose that. But it will
be a close working relationship, and I think one of the key
things that we'll look at in the future is asymmetric attacks
in cyber space on this country and how do we help DHS do their
mission.
Senator Udall. Admiral, would you care to comment?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I've forged a close friendship
with Keith Alexander over the last 18 months in our respective
roles and we get along very well. I would first tell you that I
look forward to being a satisfied customer if I'm confirmed in
terms of having networks protected and potentially, if it came
down to it, getting the types of information that I would need
in order to perform my job as the Commander of NORTHCOM or
NORAD.
I also believe that with the tremendous number of
interagency relationships that a command like NORTHCOM has to
have, that I'll have a tremendous source of information for
General Alexander on the kinds of support that those people
need, and of course with DHS in the lead. But he will be an
integral player in that process. I look forward to plugging
into that system and helping in any way I can.
Senator Udall. I understand when there's additional time
available we can discuss the respective merits of the football
teams at the two academies; is that accurate? Neither one of
you need to--well, you look like you want to comment.
Admiral Winnefeld. Being a graduate of the Georgia
Institute of Technology, but being a very loyal Navy football
fan, I think that we're in pretty good shape.
Senator Udall. Let me leave that there.
General Alexander, at a recent conference the White House
Cyber Security Adviser Howard Schmidt questioned whether an
event such as a cyber war can exist, and I'll quote what he had
to say. He said: ``A cyber war is just something that we can't
define. I don't even know how a cyber war would benefit
anybody. Everybody would lose. There's no win-lose in the cyber
realm today. It affects everybody. It affects businesses. It
affects government. So, number one, there's no value in having
one.''
That statement leaves me with a number of questions. Do you
think that a cyber war can exist? Can you define it? If there's
no value in having one, is there a need for the United States
to develop offensive cyber war capabilities?
General Alexander. Senator, in general terms I do think a
cyber war could exist. I believe it would not exist in and of
itself, but as part of a larger military campaign. I believe
that the tools and stuff for command and control that we have
today to affect those in cyber space are analogous to the tools
that we had 40 years ago for jamming communications. But now in
cyber space you can not only jam, but you can do a lot more to
information, and therein lies part of the problem.
We see that go on in civilian industry and governments
around the world, public knowledge. The issue is from a
military perspective, if these things are impacting our
networks today we have a responsibility to defend those and set
up cyber security.
I think the steps that we're taking with CYBERCOM is to do
just that: How do we secure these networks and how do we bring
those pieces of the team together under one single commander to
benefit each of the combatant commands in our Nation as a
whole?
Senator Udall. The old doctrine--and it's still in some
cases a very effective doctrine--of mutually assured
destruction or deterrence certainly could perhaps apply in a
cyber war or cyber context when you have nation states. But
when you have a lot of these individual actors under way, they
may not comport with existing both written and unwritten rules
as to how you conduct these kinds of operations. Is that a fair
characterization of the threat we face?
General Alexander. Senator, it is. Attribution will be very
difficult.
Senator Udall. We can certainly track, for example, if a
nuclear weapon is used the perpetrator of that particular
attack, from everything I know. There are signatures tied to
nuclear materials. But this is a much more difficult realm in
which to understand who may have attacked us or tried to
penetrate our systems; is that right?
General Alexander. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Udall. Let me move to this term ``geek-speak''
which I just became familiar with. You mentioned that in
developing policies for how far CYBERCOM can help protect
critical infrastructure that trying to translate that into an
understanding in the private sector is crucial. How are you
going to convey the seriousness of the threats that now are
framed in this geek-speak way, but the average individual or
even the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in some of these
civilian operations may not fully understand?
General Alexander. Senator, I think our CEOs of many of the
information technology companies are seeing the threats today
and that's becoming increasingly more public knowledge. The
banking community, your IT infrastructure, your antivirus
community, I think they see. They're on the leading edge.
They have great capability, they have great talent. Therein
lies part of the issue, the Government's going to have to
leverage part of that talent, because they own the
infrastructure that the Government operates on, and for
continuity of government DHS has a tough set of issues. In
crisis, that's where calling between DHS and DOD, that's where
the real issue is going to go.
I do think this is an education process, though. We're
going to have to teach people several things: What are the
rules and how are we operating? We have to be transparent in
how we do it. I think that's one of the key things, so that
they can see that what we're doing is just trying to protect
our networks, not invade their civil liberties and privacy.
That's a very difficult issue, because this area is so
complex it's hard for people to see it. We have to help them
understand that. I think the way to do that is by showing you
and other members of the committee and the Government and
critical infrastructure in DHS, a team, how we're doing it and
ensure that follows the right legal framework, that we're
complying with that, and you can see how we actually audit
ourselves and do that.
Senator Udall. My sense, as I close, is that in order of
focus and understanding, we're best prepared right now on the
dot-mil domain, dot-gov next. But then when you get into the
dot-com, dot-org, dot-edu, those are more vulnerable systems
and networks.
General Alexander. They have a wider spread, Senator, so
some of them really are where you say, and some of them may be
amongst the best. Your IT industry and antivirus are probably
up at the top and others like you said, yes, sir.
Senator Udall. Thank you. I look forward to working with
both of you when you're confirmed.
Let me recognize the Senator from North Carolina, Senator
Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Udall.
I, too, want to thank both of you for your service in the
past and certainly for your upcoming service in these new
positions. Admiral Winnefeld, I want to be sure that your boys
know that I think a Senate waiver in missing school today is
critical. I think it's very important for them to be here. The
rest of your families I think, family support, certainly allows
you to do a much better job. Thank you to all of the families.
I also wanted to say I thought Senator Mikulski's
introduction was right on. We always enjoy hearing Senator
Mikulski.
Admiral Winnefeld, many defense analysts have noted that
it's time for the Nation to look beyond Goldwater-Nichols and
institute reforms that will address the needs of a new
strategic era in a manner that more effectively leverages all
of the instruments of national power. As Commander of NORTHCOM,
do you feel that there are any changes in organizational design
or statutory authority that would enable you to more
effectively close the seams between DOD and DHS and other
governmental agencies with respect to creating a more
integrated approach to homeland defense?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I think that the relationship
between NORTHCOM and DHS is illustrative in this regard. My
understanding from what I've learned over the last couple of
months here is that they do have a very close relationship, a
very close working relationship, both at the planning, exercise
and training, and operational execution levels.
At the planning levels, a lot of collaboration is going on,
pre-scripted mission assignments that DHS has worked out with
NORTHCOM, and I can go on on the planning side. On the exercise
side, the national exercise programs are participated in by
both organizations. Then on the operational side, on a day-to-
day operations piece, both of the command centers are connected
together very well. There are liaison officers from DHS and
into NORTHCOM, and vice versa.
Then of course, in the event of a disaster or some sort of
event that would require NORTHCOM to support DHS, NORTHCOM very
clearly, I believe, understands its supporting role.
I think that relationship is very strong, but we are always
receptive to new and better ways of doing business, to include
all of the numerous partners that are involved in homeland
security and homeland defense.
Senator Hagan. From the standpoint of statutory authority,
you don't see a need for a change?
Admiral Winnefeld. I don't think right now, Senator, we
need any. But I will certainly keep an open mind on that, and
I'm always willing to explore it.
Senator Hagan. The U.S. Armed Forces responded to the
devastating earthquake that struck Haiti in a tremendous
fashion and we all want to give credit where credit is due. I
think our military did great. The servicemembers provided
support to the relief effort that included assistance with the
preservation of order, protection for vital supplies, and the
overhead imagery of the devastated areas. I was able several
weeks ago to shake 200 young men's hands as they were coming
back from Haiti and just thank them for their hard work.
Admiral Winnefeld, in the event that an equally devastating
earthquake or hurricane were to strike here in the United
States, do you believe that you would have statutory authority
to provide the same support to civil authorities which is
essential to restoring public order in the aftermath of a
natural disaster?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I believe that the events in
Haiti were very instructive for us, for one thing. It was a
very nearby reminder of the kinds of things that we're going to
have to do in a disaster like that, heaven forbid that it
happen inside our own country.
I do believe that most of the authorities that are required
are there. I think there are a couple of additional things, at
least one, that we need to pursue. As you're probably aware, we
are interested in having the authority for the Reserve
component to be activated in order to support the immediate
support to the disaster there. I think that we have a very good
understanding with the Governors and the National Guard on that
and I think we can come to closure on that.
Senator Hagan. Speaking of the National Guard, during
Tuesday's Airland Subcommittee hearing I voiced concerns over
the Air Force decision to transfer 12 C-130 aircraft from
various Air National Guard units to an Air Force Reserve unit
based in Arkansas without consulting the affected adjutant
generals or State Governors. Obviously, North Carolina is one
of the States where this is being discussed.
Within the total force structure, how do you intend to
satisfy your statutory responsibilities for providing homeland
defense and support to civil authorities at the Federal level
without disrupting the capacity of State governments to do the
same?
Admiral Winnefeld. I think we have to have a very close
partnership with the Governors and with their adjutant
generals, and if confirmed it's one of my very highest
priorities, to develop that relationship, my personal
relationship with the adjutant generals, to ensure that we have
a very clear understanding and that they know that I'm a
believer in playing the supporting role that NORTHCOM has been
identified statutorily with in a crisis.
It's one of the things, if I'm confirmed, that I look
forward the most to, is building that relationship.
Senator Hagan. I think a lot of the individuals within
those States are quite concerned about this request.
General Alexander, our growing reliance upon technologies,
such as robotics, unmanned sensors, computer-based
communications systems, has created a vulnerability within the
architecture of our Armed Forces and within our Government as a
whole. Protecting the platforms and the networks that our
Nation relies upon obviously must be treated as a priority,
which is why I truly support the concept of CYBERCOM. I think
we had a good discussion in my office this week about some of
the areas of expertise that you bring to the table, as well as
your concerns about many of the issues that I know that you'll
be facing.
But as Director of NSA, Chief of Central Security Service,
and Commander of CYBERCOM, how do you envision leveraging the
capabilities of each of these organizations in order to enhance
our national security posture?
General Alexander. Senator, perhaps one of the greatest
honors I've had is to lead NSA. They have great people,
tremendous people. Our Nation has put a lot into building NSA
up--over 700 Ph.D.s up there that have operated in this arena.
We built this over 60 years. Billions and billions of dollars
have gone into it.
Over the last 5 years we've had the privilege of having the
Joint Functional Component Command Net Warfare and NSA
together, so we could leverage that infrastructure and that
talent. What I think this does for CYBERCOM is it puts our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, the young folks that
are coming in, with this experienced group for training, and
when we deploy these folks forward to support regional
combatant commands we have folks that know the best in the
world that they can reach out--they operate at the tactical
operational level and can talk to the strategic level, because
in cyber space it's one network and we have to operate as one
team.
I think that absolutely one of the key principles is
leveraging that human capital that we have within NSA that is
absolutely superb, to help train, coach, and work with these in
peacetime, crisis, and war.
Senator Hagan. When you mentioned the 700 Ph.D.s that are
working there, I'm curious, and I know we talked about this,
too, the human capital. I just left an Education Subcommittee
meeting where we were talking about the reauthorization of No
Child Left Behind, and obviously we have to have an emphasis in
education to be sure that you have the talented work pool that
you need in order to conduct the requirements that are put
before you.
Can you discuss a little bit about the quality of the
workforce that you're seeing and where you're recruiting
individuals? If there is something from an education standpoint
that we need to do as a country, I'd be very curious as to your
thoughts on that?
General Alexander. Senator, I'm a huge advocate of science,
technology, engineering, mathematics (STEM). I think it's
absolutely crucial for our country that we continue to push our
younger folks that way. We'll work on Admiral Winnefeld's great
two sons here. It's the future for our country, having this.
We have tremendous, great programs out there. I have
personally seen what the Bill Gates Foundation is doing and how
that's going throughout the country. What that does for us is
build the capacity, the capability that we need, not just for
CYBERCOM and NSA, but for our country's leadership in this key
area. That's absolutely important.
We have partnerships from our information assurance part
with over 100 universities around the United States to help
come up with curriculums that meet a certain set of standards
that DHS and NSA jointly work. It is superb because it trains
people on how to secure networks, what are the key
fundamentals. They don't all come to NSA. Many of those will go
out to industry and that's good for our country. But we do get
an awful lot of good talent.
What I would say is we have great people, and one of the
key things is--I am a technologist. I love computers. I have a
new iPad. People are the key to this, and good quality trained
people is what our Nation needs in NSA and CYBERCOM.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, and I think that is critical. I
think that national security is certainly interdependent on our
education system, too. I think the STEM program is something as
a country we have to be focused on.
Thank you very much.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
I'm tempted to get a critical review of the iPad, but
perhaps we can----
General Alexander. Wonderful.
Senator Udall. Wonderful. We'll put that for the record.
General, I'd like to talk more specifically about an area
in our infrastructure world that could be vulnerable. There's
been a lot of excitement about smart grids. I know Senator
Hagan's been a leader in this area, and we see some real
potential to lessen our dependence on foreign oil, use our
energy that we have more effectively. But at the same time, I
understand there are some vulnerabilities that may arise
because of the deployment of the smart grid technologies. Would
you care to comment?
General Alexander. Senator, I'm a proponent for the smart
grid and using some of this, but we have to walk into this with
our eyes wide open. I think these information assurance
programs between industry, government, and understanding the
full spectrum of threats that we face from individual hackers
up to nation states in securing that are going to be key.
We all have a responsibility on the NSA side and on the
future CYBERCOM side to help identify flaws in those, share
those with industry and DHS. But this is going to be an area,
Senator, I think we're going to have to work in because it will
always evolve. Someone will figure out a new way in and we have
to be there to close that gap.
Senator Udall. I was listening to you earlier talk about
defensive capabilities that exist today and the challenge we
face with providing defensive tools and techniques. It seems to
me--and I'm thinking out loud, which can be dangerous--that if
you have a kinetic environment, say at a forward operating base
in Afghanistan, if that base were to be overrun by the enemy in
a tactical effort, it would not threaten the entire effort we
have under way in Afghanistan. On the other hand, if you have a
portal or an entry point that is the site of a tactical
incursion in cyber space and that point is overrun in a
tactical sense, it could have strategic ramifications that are
much greater than those we might face on the ground in a place
like Afghanistan.
Is that a fair characterization? Straighten me out,
elaborate on that?
General Alexander. Senator, that's absolutely right.
General McChrystal has reached out to work with the other
combatant commands, with us, with NSA, in building an Afghan
mission network and ensuring that network is secure, because it
will not only be for the United States but the other coalition
partners there.
There are a lot of issues in developing that we're working
through as a joint team. I think you've hit it right on the
head, because those communications bring in our intelligence,
our operations, our logistics, and his ability to command and
control all those forces across more than 40 countries. He has
to ensure that those communications are reliable and protected.
A huge issue and one of the key ones that we're working right
now.
Senator Udall. This could be specific to Afghanistan, but
if you penetrate, again, a network and a system anywhere in the
world, it could then have effects anywhere else in the world.
You alluded to this earlier, I think, when you talked about
what defines a country, what is ground that we have to defend.
That server that's being attacked could be in any number of
countries or the attacker could be based in any number of
countries. This raises some very thorny questions, does it not?
General Alexander. Senator, it does. Those are the issues,
the policies, that we have to, I think, address. It brings up
issues such as attribution. It brings up the neutrality. I
think our response we put in there, we are trained for
proportional and discriminate, but there are still a number of
issues that are out there. As you look at the complexity from
mobile devices--we mentioned the iPad--the tremendous
capability you will have from mobile devices only makes this a
more complex issue.
Senator Udall. One of the arguments that has been brought
forth about networks is that you get particular nodes cut off
and the network itself can continue to operate. That concept's
also being applied to kinetic activities on the ground in the
kind of warfare we're now fighting. Would you elaborate a
little bit more on that, that point as well?
General Alexander. Senator, I think one of the difficult
parts that we'll have is what are the actions of the adversary
on our network? Is it exploitation or attack? Who is it, and
attributing it and their intent, in time to come up with a
coherent response. The easiest and the most important probably
is the security aspects of it.
If a system is exploited or has an infection, closing that
off is one of the key things that we do early on, segregating
that so it can't infect other systems. The network can operate
with several nodes out. That's the intent of a network for the
future. But it also causes concern of what is the adversary's
intent, what's his game plan, does he have one. These are tough
issues, especially when attribution and neutrality are brought
in, and trying to figure out what's come in, was it a hacker,
was it an annoyance, or was this a real attack?
Senator Udall. The potential to generate an escalating
conflict is not insignificant, much like we saw during the Cold
War era with nuclear weapons. I take your cautions with real
seriousness.
Admiral, I haven't allowed you an opportunity to speak. Did
you have any comments? I'm going to bring this hearing to a
close here shortly, but I wanted to see if you had any
additional thoughts.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir. I was just reflecting on the
fact that some of the questions you asked were very insightful
in the sense of deterrence against a hard-to-deter nation in
the cyber world, an empowered individual in the cyber world the
same. We see the same thing with the sorts of terrorist attacks
with potential nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiation.
I would also echo your point on the education piece.
Educating citizens about the cyber world, the same thing
applies in the kinetic world as well. This phenomenon of a
super-empowered individual is something that we have to be very
watchful of.
Senator Udall. It's a great concern to all of us. That
super-empowered individual could have a goal of trying to
trigger a significant conflict between nation states or other
entities while he or she stands to the side chortling, with
their mission to create chaos, conflict, tragedy, and all the
rest that we've seen in the toolbox that terrorists bring. So
this is very important work you are doing.
One final question. General, I think you're going to be
charged with further integrating and understanding these title
10 and title 50 responsibilities, are you not? We haven't
answered all of those questions yet. You've certainly been at
the forefront at NSA in taking on some of those challenges.
You've at times received some criticism, I think we all have,
because these are somewhat different missions, but they're
certainly interlinked.
Would you care to comment?
General Alexander. Senator, one of the key things that
we're doing is we will have a unique set of authorities, a
unique staff for CYBERCOM operating under title 10, and the
NSA, Central Security Service under title 50. We do have some
title 10 responsibilities. We are a combat support agency. We
do forward deploy people to help the regional combatant
commanders. But there will be two distinct staffs, with
distinct authorities and responsibilities for how we operate
for intelligence, for information assurance on the NSA side,
and for CYBERCOM how we defend and secure our networks and
conduct cyber space operations if directed.
Senator Udall. I thank you for your focus on that. As
somebody who's a strong supporter of our civil liberties, who
believes that Ben Franklin had it right, to paraphrase him,
when he said: A society that would sacrifice essential
liberties for short-term security deserves neither. I think
you're on the forefront, and Admiral Winnefeld as well, of
protecting those civil liberties, but also surveiling and
developing intelligence that lets us protect those very
freedoms that we hold so dear.
Thank you both for being here. I'm going to bring the
hearing to a close. Admiral, I think we ought to send one of
your boys over to the U.S. House of Representatives to
demonstrate how to behave properly, and we'll keep one here in
the U.S. Senate. It's been wonderful to have your family here,
and General Alexander as well.
We will keep the record open for additional questions for a
period of time. But with that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank
you very much for being here.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to VADM James A. Winnefeld,
Jr., USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I have served in various joint capacities throughout my
naval career and witnessed firsthand the tremendous advancements this
landmark legislation has created, not only among our Nation's military
and civilian leadership, but as a whole within the joint services and
interagency environment. As such, I do not see an immediate need to
change the provisions of this legislation. However, if confirmed, I
will take a hard look at ways Northern Command (NORTHCOM) does business
to determine if changes in the legislation are warranted.
If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in
these modifications?
Answer. Not applicable.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, NORTHCOM?
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM is responsible for detecting,
deterring and preventing threats to the people and territory of the
United States; providing military support to Federal, State and local
authorities in response to natural or manmade disasters or for other
missions, as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense; and
executing theater security cooperation programs with Mexico, Canada and
the Bahamas.
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)?
Answer. The Commander of NORAD is responsible to both the President
of the United States and the Canadian Prime Minister for aerospace
warning, aerospace control and maritime warning of North America. The
Commander of NORAD provides tactical warning and attack assessment to
the Governments of the United States and Canada through an integrated
picture of any aerospace threat.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. It has been my honor to serve for over 30 years in a
diverse set of positions that I believe have prepared me to command
NORTHCOM and NORAD. Given my background as a naval aviator, I will
bring both an air and maritime perspective to the two commands. I have
experience on Joint Staff, Combatant Command, and Service staffs,
served as both a joint and combined commander, and have worked closely
with Congress on a variety of issues. In my current position as the
Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, I have
gained additional insight into the conduct of joint, combined and
international operations; the duties of a combatant commander; the
importance of interagency teamwork, particularly in response to natural
disasters; and the critical role of the National Guard and Federal
Reserve forces in defending our homeland and supporting civil
authorities in times of crisis.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
NORTHCOM and Commander, NORAD?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to capitalize on every opportunity
to further my understanding of NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil
support operations; specifically, how the National Guard and Federal
Reserve forces contribute to those missions and the whole-of-government
approach to responding to natural and manmade disasters. This includes
maintaining strong relationships with The Adjutants General, State
Governors, and the leadership of key Federal agencies.
I also intend to deepen my growing knowledge of the threat posed to
the United States and our neighbors by drug trafficking organizations,
as well as existing strategies to defeat them.
If confirmed in my role as Commander of NORAD, I will continue to
expand my knowledge of NORAD's aerospace warning, aerospace control,
and maritime warning operations and how the command integrates with its
partners to detect, intercept and, if necessary, engage any air-
breathing threat to North America. Additionally, I will receive the
same training provided to other NORAD senior leaders required to direct
the actual, formal process of engaging aerospace threats to our Nation.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander,
NORTHCOM, to the following officials:
Question. The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM has direct title 10
responsibility to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the
missions assigned to the command through the Unified Command Plan. If
confirmed, I will ensure NORTHCOM continues the close working
relationship it currently has with the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM provides the Deputy Secretary of
Defense information required to accomplish his duties and
responsibilities as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The Commander
of NORTHCOM also coordinates with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on
major homeland defense and civil support issues.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as the
principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national
security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD
policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. She is also a
key advocate for NORTHCOM's requirements. As such, the Commander of
NORTHCOM coordinates and exchanges homeland defense, support of civil
authorities, and security cooperation information with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy for use in formulating planning
guidance and policy.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)).
Answer. The USD(I) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence,
counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other
intelligence-related matters. The Commander of NORTHCOM works closely
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to ensure the
command has predictive and actionable threat estimates and timely
warning of worldwide threats to the homeland.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Americas' Security Affairs.
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM routinely works with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs on significant matters regarding homeland defense,
support of civil authorities, and security cooperation.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman serves as the principal military advisor to
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security
Council. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 permits
the President to place the Chairman in the communications chain, and
oversight of the activities of combatant commanders may be delegated by
the Secretary of Defense to the CJCS. In concert with this authority,
the Commander of NORTHCOM communicates closely with the Chairman to
enable him to perform his duties. As the current Director for Strategic
Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, I have been deeply involved in
interactions between the Chairman and combatant commanders, and
understand the process well.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible
for organizing, training, and equipping forces for assignment to the
Commander of NORTHCOM and other combatant commanders. The Commander of
NORTHCOM coordinates with the Secretaries to ensure homeland defense
and civil support requirements are met. This advocacy is particularly
important for ensuring the Reserve component is ready to answer the
call here at home, and for ensuring speed of response in times of
crisis.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM communicates with the Chiefs of
Staff of the Services to support their responsibility for organizing,
training and equipping forces to accomplish homeland defense and civil
support missions. In addition, the NORTHCOM Commander seeks the advice
and judgment of the Chiefs of Staff on matters of mutual interest, and
has a key relationship with the Chiefs on matters of force protection
within his area of responsibility. If confirmed, I intend to rely on
the Service Chiefs as valuable sources of advice.
Question. The other combatant commanders, particularly U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM maintains regular dialogue
concerning issues of mutual interest and frequently interacts with the
other combatant commanders to support and execute U.S. National
Military Strategy. If confirmed, I intend to further strengthen
NORTHCOM's established, vital relationships with the other combatant
commanders. Of note, NORTHCOM has an extremely close relationship with
SOUTHCOM and recently deployed more than 100 of its headquarters staff
to SOUTHCOM headquarters and Joint Task Force Haiti in support of the
catastrophic January earthquake. NORTHCOM also maintains particularly
close relationships with U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Transportation
Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM).
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. Strong teamwork between the National Guard Bureau and
NORTHCOM is critical to defending our homeland and supporting civil
authorities. In my current position as Director for Strategic Plans and
Policy for the Joint Staff, I have developed a strong belief in the
vitality of the National Guard, and enjoy an excellent relationship
with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, General Craig McKinley. If
confirmed, I look forward to further advancing this key relationship so
together we may best serve the American people.
Question. If confirmed, in carrying out your duties, how would you
work with the Department of Homeland Security, the Homeland Security
Council, and other Federal agencies, as well as State and local
authorities and representatives from the private sector?
Answer. From my vantage point on the Joint Staff, I have observed
NORTHCOM successfully operate within the most complex interagency
network of any combatant command. If confirmed, I will establish my own
relationships with--and ensure NORTHCOM continues to work issues
closely and as appropriate with--the National Security Council; the
Department of Homeland Security; the various other Federal departments
and agencies; State, tribal and local authorities; and the private
sector. I look forward to collaborating with every possible partner to
defend the homeland while ensuring that NORTHCOM is fully prepared to
assist civil authorities in support of the primary Federal agency in
accordance with the National Response Framework and as directed by the
President and the Secretary of Defense.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, NORTHCOM?
Answer. I believe one of our Nation's most serious security
challenges is protecting the United States from an attack by violent
extremists using weapons of mass destruction; accordingly, this is one
of NORTHCOM's enduring challenges. I am increasingly concerned by the
evolving nature of this extremist threat towards smaller scale, hard-
to-detect operations. This threat is determined and patient, will
attempt to use our freedoms against us, will search for any path to
produce violent events, and harbors no qualms about killing innocent
men, women, and children to achieve its objectives.
I am also concerned about the corrosive effect on our nation's
security of drug trafficking, including its associated violence both
inside Mexico and along our border. If confirmed, I will ensure
NORTHCOM continues to support a whole-of-government approach on both
sides of our border with Mexico and in strengthening Mexico's ability
to reduce and minimize this violence by dismantling and defeating
transnational drug trafficking organizations.
In the longer run, I am concerned about the potential acquisition
by rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran, of the combination of a
nuclear weapons capability and the capacity to deliver it to our
shores. Finally, the constant potential for a major natural disaster is
something for which the NORTHCOM Commander must always be prepared.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will do everything in my power to ensure
our Nation is prepared to handle the full spectrum of threats to our
homeland. I will be an advocate for the sense of urgency required to
maintain vigilance against these threats; nurture a culture that
continuously challenges and improves our capability, particularly in
the area of information sharing with our partners; and continue
improvements to NORTHCOM's rigorous exercise program. I will examine
the command's homeland defense and civil support plans to ensure they
address evolving threats and are tailored to need. I will continue to
strengthen NORTHCOM's relationships with its National Guard,
interagency, State, local, tribal, and international partners to ensure
the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
mission of northern command
Question. What is the mission of NORTHCOM?
Answer. NORTHCOM anticipates and conducts homeland defense and
civil support operations within its assigned area of responsibility in
order to defend and secure the United States and its interests. In
addition, the command is responsible for executing theater security
cooperation with Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas, with full respect for
their sovereignty.
Question. How does NORTHCOM's mission relate to the mission of the
Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for
guarding against terrorism; securing our borders; enforcing our
immigration laws; and improving our readiness for, response to, and
recovery from natural and man-made disasters. NORTHCOM is responsible
for detecting, deterring, and preventing external threats to the United
States, and when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense,
providing defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). NORTHCOM
cooperates closely with--and for DSCA missions will be in support of--
the Department of Homeland Security in the execution of its missions in
accordance with direction from the President or the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. Are there circumstances under which you would anticipate
NORTHCOM would have the lead Federal role in responding to a terrorist
incident?
Answer. Normally, the DOD (including NORTHCOM) will be in support
of agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Department
of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in preventing,
countering, and responding to terrorist incidents in the United States.
However, the President may determine that a terrorist incident rises to
the level of an armed attack against the United States and therefore
direct that DOD take the lead in the defense of the Homeland. The
Commander of NORTHCOM, as the Geographic Combatant Commander, would
likely be assigned as the supported DOD commander.
Question. Or do you believe NORTHCOM would operate only in support
of other Federal departments and agencies?
Answer. See previous answer.
Question. What responsibility, if any, does NORTHCOM have with
respect to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program?
Answer. In accordance with the Secretary of Defense's January 2010
directive on critical infrastructure, as a regional combatant command,
NORTHCOM is responsible for preventing or mitigating the loss or
degradation of DOD-owned critical assets within its area of
responsibility.
organization and authority
Question. NORTHCOM has been assigned responsibility for force
protection and antiterrorism within its area of responsibility.
What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate force
protection vulnerabilities, and what force protection challenges do you
anticipate you would face within NORTHCOM's area of responsibility?
Answer. If confirmed, I will employ an all-hazards approach to
force protection. I also understand that it is challenging to strike
the right balance between threat mitigation, responsible stewardship of
resources, and installation efficiency--areas that depend upon robust
DOD and interagency coordination to provide for mission assurance at
over 2,500 installations located in the NORTHCOM area of
responsibility. If confirmed, I will make a concerted effort to
determine where we stand on this key issue, and continue the command's
ongoing efforts to mitigate force protection vulnerabilities.
Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
efficiency in the use of funding for force protection and to prevent
unnecessary duplication of efforts between NORTHCOM, the Military
Services, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense?
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize coordination among NORTHCOM,
the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs on force protection
planning and resourcing to maximize efficiencies and preclude redundant
efforts. In addition, I will focus the command's ongoing efforts to
share force protection information to support critical analysis, as
well as employing force protection and biometric technologies that are
state-of-the-art and cost effective.
Question. What specific forces, if any, have been assigned to
NORTHCOM?
Answer. The forces assigned to NORTHCOM are those inherent within
the Headquarters staff, as well as the staffs of the subordinate/
component commands listed below:
U.S. Army North
Marine Forces North
Air Forces Northern
Joint Task Force Civil Support
Joint Task Force North
Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region
Question. How has the assignment of forces to NORTHCOM changed
since NORTHCOM was established on October 1, 2002?
Answer. On 1 October 2003, when Full Operational Capability was
achieved, the forces assigned to NORTHCOM consisted of the Service
component headquarters and two standing Joint Task Force headquarters.
In 2004, the command stood up a third Joint Task Force, Joint Force
Headquarters National Capital Region.
On 1 October 2008, NORTHCOM was assigned forces in support of the
standing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield
Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management Execute Order for a period of
12 months (October 2008 to September 2009). On 1 October 2009, the
status of the CBRNE Consequence Management forces was changed back to
allocated vice assigned, per the 2010 Global Force Management
Allocation Plan.
norad
Question. What is the mission of the NORAD?
Answer. NORAD is charged with the missions of aerospace warning,
aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America. Aerospace
warning includes the detection, validation, and warning of attack
against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles,
through mutual support arrangements with other commands. Aerospace
control includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defense of the
airspace of the United States and Canada. Maritime warning consists of
processing, assessing, and disseminating maritime intelligence and
information, and warning of maritime threats to or attacks against,
North America.
Question. How has NORAD's mission evolved since the creation of
NORTHCOM?
Answer. Since NORTHCOM stood up in 2002, NORAD's mission expanded
in two areas: maritime warning and ballistic missile warning. The April
2006 NORAD Agreement renewal added a maritime warning mission, which
entails a shared awareness and understanding of the activities
conducted in U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime areas and
inland waterways. NORAD also provides ballistic missile warning to
NORTHCOM in support of Ground-Based Midcourse Defense operations.
Additionally, NORAD has been instrumental in rapidly developing a close
operational relationship between NORTHCOM and Canada Command, the
Canadian equivalent to NORTHCOM, which was established in 2005.
Question. How does NORAD's mission relate to NORTHCOM's mission?
Answer. NORTHCOM and NORAD are separate commands; neither is
subordinate to the other. The commands have complementary missions,
operate within a common security environment, and share a largely
integrated headquarters staff. NORTHCOM is committed to the defense of
the United States and NORAD is committed to the air defense of and
maritime warning for both the United States and Canada.
Question. How does NORAD's mission relate to the mission of the
Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. NORAD, by performing its bi-national defense mission,
provides significant but indirect support to the Department of Homeland
Security by deterring threats in the air and maritime domains.
Question. Do you believe that NORAD should continue to have a
combined operations and planning staff, and a consolidated command
center, with NORTHCOM? Why or why not?
Answer. I understand that the NORAD and NORTHCOM staffs are fully
integrated, with the exception of separate operations directorates, and
that both commands believe this is effective. In my experience, where
organizations are integrated well, greater effectiveness and efficiency
can be the result. If confirmed, I will examine whether this
organizational structure maximizes the operational effectiveness of
both commands.
northcom joint task forces
Question. Since the establishment of NORTHCOM, several multi-
service task forces, e.g., Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS),
Joint Task Force-North (JTF-North), have been placed under its
authority.
What is the current status of the Joint Task Force organizations
under NORTHCOM in terms of organization, planning, personnel
allocation, and capability?
Answer. NORTHCOM currently has three Joint Task Forces:
Joint Task Force Civil Support: Aligned under U.S.
Army North; provides command and control of DOD incident
management forces that respond to catastrophic CBRNE events.
Joint Task Force North: Aligned under U.S. Army North;
supports counterdrug and border patrol support along the United
States-Canada and southwestern U.S. border, and other
operations against transnational threats.
Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region:
Provides land-based homeland defense, civil support, and
incident management in the National Capital Region.
Joint Task Forces under NORTHCOM's authority are well-manned multi-
service organizations that plan and execute Homeland Defense and
Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations, as directed by the
President or the Secretary of Defense. Joint Task Force operational
planning is synchronized through continuous development and
coordination of Joint Task Force plans that support NORTHCOM concept
plans. These Task Forces further develop and refine plans, and exercise
with HQ NORTHCOM, to enhance execution of existing and emergent
homeland defense and civil support missions.
counter-narcotics efforts
Question. Each year the Department of Defense (DOD) spends several
hundred million dollars to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the
United States, yet the availability of drugs on the street has not been
significantly reduced, and some countries continue to face internal
security challenges in responding to this threat. Some of these funds
are executed within the NORTHCOM AOR, and some have questioned the
effectiveness and focus of our counter-narcotics programs.
What role does NORTHCOM play in the DOD's overall counterdrug
mission and organization?
Answer. DOD supports the counterdrug mission in both domestic and
international environments, fully respecting jurisdictional and
sovereignty restrictions in each area. NORTHCOM plays an integral role
in these efforts, including cooperating closely with SOUTHCOM and PACOM
in sharing information and situational awareness of drug-related
threats to U.S. national security.
Question. NORTHCOM's Joint Task Force North provides DOD support of
civil authorities for U.S. law enforcement agencies in counternarcotics
operations, as well as working with Mexican military and civil
authorities along the border to enhance their capability. NORTHCOM is
working with Mexico as it continues to build their overall capability
and capacity to fight drug trafficking organizations as part of DOD's
support to the Merida Initiative. NORTHCOM also partners with Canada
and with the Bahamas on counterdrug matters.
Question. What is your assessment of the ongoing counternarcotics
operations within the NORTHCOM AOR and the geographic seam NORTHCOM
shares with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)?
Answer. Interdicting drug flow in the Western Hemisphere is a
complex, ever-evolving effort against a determined and resourceful
adversary. Substantial efforts by U.S. Federal civilian agencies and
State and local law enforcement agencies, supported by DOD, along with
efforts by military and police forces from other nations, have made
progress. However, demand for drugs remains a problem within our
country, and the United States needs to continue its whole-of-
government efforts to counter the flow of drugs coming north and the
flow of weapons and money to the south. I view this as a major
problem--where NORTHCOM can contribute to solving it, it should be an
important part of the command's mission. If confirmed, I will ensure
NORTHCOM continues to work with interagency and international partners
on all fronts to reduce the flow of narcotics into and within the
NORTHCOM area of responsibility.
The geographic seam between SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM is a key route
for drugs to enter Mexico on their way to the United States My
understanding is that the two commands work closely together on this
issue. Based on our collaboration in the aftermath of the Haiti
earthquake, I have developed a close working relationship with General
Doug Fraser, the Commander of SOUTHCOM. If confirmed, I fully expect to
continue our work together to ensure a seamless effort across the
border between the two areas of responsibility, to include further
strengthening the relationships among Joint Interagency Task Force-
South (JIATF-S), NORTHCOM's Intelligence Directorate, and JTF-North.
Question. How are counterdrug operations coordinated across
combatant command boundaries with PACOM?
Answer. Counterdrug operations, including those occurring on the
boundaries with PACOM, are coordinated through sharing of intelligence
information among combatant commands, interagency partners, the
National Interdiction Centers, and PACOM's Joint Interagency Task
Force-West. I believe that synchronization among combatant commands is
a critical ingredient of our Nation's unity of effort in counterdrug
operations. If confirmed, I will continue to nurture the relationship
among NORTHCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM regarding counter-drug information
sharing and operations.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the other
combatant commanders and interagency partners NORTHCOM supports to
identify and eliminate any operational seams to improve counterdrug
operations.
Question. How would you recommend that the success of the
Department's counter-narcotics programs be measured?
Answer. I believe that success in counternarcotics is not easy to
quantify. Traditional metrics, such as the price of drugs for sale on
the street, are the product of many different factors, and their
exclusive use could lead to false optimism or pessimism over our
efforts. If confirmed, I intend to further explore this topic to
determine whether there are useful input and output metrics that could
be applied to NORTHCOM's counternarcotics efforts.
Question. Do you believe that the current programs that the
Department is pursuing are the most effective for the region, or should
the Department's efforts focus elsewhere?
Answer. DOD's experience in countering insurgent and violent
extremist networks is useful in countering drug trafficking networks,
as all of these networks move people, material, money and information
using clandestine methods. Accordingly, DOD's contribution to
interagency counternarcotics efforts is expanding. DOD normally takes a
supporting role to the interagency in this arena. If confirmed, I look
forward to forming my own assessment, and assisting DOD in determining
which counternarcotics programs are most effective in the region to
improve operational mission support to law enforcement and theater
security cooperation efforts in combating these threats.
Question. Compared to other missions that you would be responsible
for as Commander, NORTHCOM, if confirmed, where would you rank counter-
narcotics in terms of its contribution to our national security and the
ability of DOD to make a meaningful contribution?
Answer. NORTHCOM conducts missions to defend and secure the United
States and its interests--these are no-fail missions. Drug trafficking
directly affects our national security in several ways, including its
corrosive effects within our society, violence along our border, and
violence that severely impacts our neighbor and friend, Mexico. As
such, I would rank contributing to counternarcotics efforts very high
among NORTHCOM's missions. If confirmed, and within appropriate
limitations of jurisdiction, sovereignty, and available resources, I
will continue NORTHCOM's efforts to support its domestic partner
agencies and partner nations to address illicit narcotics and
transnational threats to the Homeland.
Question. There has been a surge in drug-related violence in Mexico
over the past year, which has increased the risk of cross-border
violence into the United States. Much of the drug supply comes into
Mexico across its southern border. The vast majority of Latin America,
however, is in the SOUTHCOM AOR, so the security situation in Mexico is
an example of the need for a well-coordinated effort between NORTHCOM
and SOUTHCOM.
What is your vision of how SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM could work
together in a fully coordinated and seamless fashion with respect to
Mexico and other security challenges?
Answer. While I believe the geographic boundary between NORTHCOM
and SOUTHCOM is appropriately placed, it is absolutely critical that
these two commands work effectively together on common security
threats, including counternarcotics. This will require: a strong
partnership based on personal relationships; overall and theater
security cooperation strategies that mesh closely together; deep
information sharing enabled by quality liaison officers and modern
technology; and a willingness to allow the opposite command to relate
to partners in each other's area of responsibility. If confirmed, I
look forward to capitalizing on the excellent working relationship I
developed with General Doug Fraser, the SOUTHCOM Commander, during
operations in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake.
Question. The United States and Mexico announced in 2007, the start
of a multiyear, bilateral security agreement called the Merida
Initiative. This Initiative aims to combat drug trafficking and other
criminal activity along the U.S.-Mexican border, as well as in Central
America. The U.S.-Mexican border is viewed as especially important for
U.S. counternarcotics efforts because Mexico is currently the primary
point of entry for cocaine and other drug shipments smuggled into the
United States.
What is your understanding of the Merida Initiative as it relates
to NORTHCOM?
Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM plays a vital role in
coordinating acquisition, contracting, and delivery of items provided
through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) Programs within the auspices of the Merida Initiative. These
items improve the Mexican military's ability to deploy rapid-reaction
forces quickly in support of police operations against drug trafficking
organizations, and to conduct maritime surveillance in an effort to
deny the use of the eastern Pacific and western Caribbean to
transnational criminal organizations, including drug traffickers and
potential terrorists.
Additionally, NORTHCOM assists its Mexican military partners--while
respecting Mexican sovereignty--with focused training, equipment, and
related support intended to help reduce violence, weaken the drug
trafficking organizations, ensure rule of law and respect for human
rights, and set the conditions for the eventual operational takeover of
the drug war by Mexican law enforcement authorities.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of DOD in
countering transnational drug cartels and gangs?
Answer. Countering drug trafficking organizations is a
transnational, trans-border effort that must be approached in a
holistic, ``whole-of-governments'' manner. The DOD plays largely a
supporting role in countering drug trafficking organizations and gangs
by working closely with both domestic and international partners to
counter these transnational threats.
In accordance with Federal statutes, NORTHCOM provides military
support to Federal law enforcement agencies to assist in the
identification and interdiction of transnational threats within and
along the approaches to the United States. NORTHCOM also supports
Federal law enforcement agencies through information collection,
analysis, fusion, and sharing appropriate information.
Through its Theater Security Cooperation efforts, NORTHCOM is
focused on building partner capability and capacity with Mexico and The
Bahamas, and on enhancing coordination and interoperability with
Canada, in order to develop and strengthen mutually beneficial
partnerships to counter transnational drug trafficking organizations
and gangs. NORTHCOM also works closely with its partner combatant
commands through common strategies and information sharing in order to
mutually enhance each command's effectiveness in these efforts.
security relationships with canada and mexico
Question. The NORTHCOM area of responsibility includes the land
areas of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The binational NORAD
Command ensures close cooperation between the United States and Canada
on security matters. NORTHCOM has been working with the Mexican
military on security cooperation related to Mexico's efforts to counter
drug trafficking and violence.
What is your assessment of the current security relationship
between the United States and Canada?
Answer. I believe that our security relationship with Canada is
excellent at all levels and in every Department of the U.S. Government.
This relationship is characterized by extraordinary trust and
confidence, evidenced by the long standing cooperation our two nations
have enjoyed through the NORAD agreement. Canada has been an absolutely
vital partner in the International Security Assistance Force's role in
Afghanistan, conducting operations and making enormous sacrifices in
some of the most challenging areas of that country. My understanding is
that NORTHCOM also has a very strong relationship with its Canadian
counterpart, Canada Command. If confirmed, I look forward to
contributing to the success of this longstanding partnership.
Question. What is your assessment of the current security
relationship between the United States and Mexico?
Answer. In my opinion, the current security relationship on a
military-to-military level between the United States and Mexico is the
best it has ever been. This was recently exemplified by the 30 March
2010 Merida Initiative High-Level Consultative Group discussions held
in Mexico City at the highest levels of our governments, which included
the defense minister equivalents from both countries, as well as our
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is also reflected by
military-to-military discussions that continue to grow in substance and
importance, to include recently-held U.S.-Mexico Defense Bilateral
Working Group discussions in Washington, DC.
Mexico is a critical partner that has demonstrated its commitment
to combating drug trafficking organizations that affect the safety and
security of North America. President Calderon and the Mexican military
have been on the leading edge of a 3-year national effort to disrupt
the drug trafficking organizations and curtail narco-violence in
Mexico. NORTHCOM security cooperation activities continue to be a key
and successful element of fostering a new era of U.S. Government-
Government of Mexico collaboration.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your goals as Commander of
NORTHCOM for improving security relations with Mexico, and how would
you plan to achieve them?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the positive momentum
NORTHCOM has established in this relationship. This will include:
developing personal relationships with my counterparts informed by an
understanding of their concerns; extending this level of trust downward
through our respective chains of command; working to accelerate
delivery of equipment under the Merida initiative, as well as other
capabilities; and continuing to provide training and information
sharing requested by the Mexican authorities. I will capitalize on past
and ongoing successes and look for new and innovative ways to build
upon these achievements.
Question. What is your assessment of the security challenges to the
United States posed by drug-related violence in Mexico?
Answer. In addition to the corrosive effects of drugs within our
own cities, I believe the violence associated with drug trafficking in
Mexico is a significant security challenge to the United States through
its potential to spill over the border and by virtue of its severe
negative impact on the internal security of a neighbor and friend.
Mexican criminal organizations have been responsible for murders
(including U.S. personnel who work in Mexico), kidnappings, extortion,
human smuggling, arms and drug trafficking, and other violent
activities.
It is my understanding that narco-violence increased in 2009, with
some reports indicating 6,587 drug-related murders, up from 5,207 drug-
related murders in 2008. Despite the increase in violence, President
Calderon and the Mexican military are fighting back with notable
successes, including the attempted apprehension of Arturo Beltran Leyva
(Head of the Beltran Leyva Cartel, who was killed in the ensuing gun
battle), the capture of his brother Carlos Beltran Leyva, and the
arrest of Roberto Sanchez Arras, the one-time number three man in the
Juarez Cartel. It is my belief that the U.S. Government should continue
to provide security assistance to Mexico to build its capability and
capacity to counter the violence that poses such a threat to their
society.
northcom-state relations
Question. NORTHCOM has the primary military responsibility to
provide defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) when directed by
the President and the Secretary of Defense, including consequence
management operations. Such military assistance would support Federal
assistance to State and local emergency response units.
Do you believe it is important for NORTHCOM to have an
understanding of the emergency response capabilities and plans of the
various States before a crisis arises, in order to optimize NORTHCOM's
consequence management support to civil authorities?
Answer. Yes. I understand NORTHCOM already works collaboratively
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Guard
Bureau, and the States to anticipate DOD consequence management support
to civil authorities and to coordinate potential requirements for
effective consequence management. I have also observed that through
NORTHCOM's Component Command, U.S. Army North, and their assigned
Defense Coordinating Officers, that NORTHCOM works with the FEMA
regional offices and States to improve relationships, information
exchange, and mutual understanding. If confirmed, I look forward to
participating in the Council of Governors meetings to further
understand the States' capabilities and how DOD can best prepare to
assist States in an emergency.
Question. If so, how would you plan to ensure that NORTHCOM has
sufficient knowledge of State emergency response capabilities,
including capabilities of National Guard units, and a good working
relationship with State emergency response leaders?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure NORTHCOM continues its progress
with FEMA, the National Guard Bureau, and the States in planning and
integrating a whole-of-government approach to natural disaster
response. In addition, if confirmed, I will examine NORTHCOM's staff
substructure to determine if the command is organized optimally for
this important mission area.
force provision for northcom
Question. NORTHCOM has the mission of conducting military
operations for homeland defense and, when directed by the President or
Secretary of Defense, for providing military assistance to civil
authorities, including consequence management for natural disasters and
CBRNE incidents. Yet NORTHCOM has relatively few military forces
assigned to it on a permanent basis.
What is your understanding of how forces are planned to be
allocated to NORTHCOM for its full range of mission requirements, and
the role that U.S. Joint Forces Command plays in that process?
Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM's contingency plans
and orders contain force requirements that are allocated by joint force
providers. Forces are not normally identified and sourced until just
prior to a planned event or impending incident, or immediately after a
no-warning incident. The exceptions are the standing Execute Orders for
CBRNE Consequence Management response forces and the Homeland Defense
Quick Reaction Force/Rapid Response Force. Additionally, under the
Defense Support of Civil Authorities Operations Standing Execute Order,
the NORTHCOM Commander has the authority to place certain military
capabilities on a 24-hour prepare-to-deploy order in advance of or in
response to a contingency.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that NORTHCOM
will have sufficient forces available to it, properly trained and
equipped, to accomplish its assigned missions?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense allocates forces to Combatant
Commands based on global requirements. The Service Chiefs, in
accordance with their title 10 responsibilities, are responsible for
providing combatant commanders trained and ready forces for employment
within their respective areas of responsibility. If confirmed, I will
ensure the Joint Staff and the joint force providers are aware of my
force requirements, and that allocated forces are ready to perform
their various missions required in supporting civil authorities and
protecting the United States. I will maintain continuous liaison with
joint force providers and the Services and, in order to promote speed-
of-response, I will explore innovations that would enable pre-
identification of the units that would be sourced to NORTHCOM in a
contingency.
Question. If confirmed, how will you monitor the personnel,
equipment and training readiness of U.S. military forces (Active and
Reserve) for homeland defense mission-essential tasks in support of
NORTHCOM's contingency plans, and for its DSCA missions?
Answer. As I understand it, NORTHCOM has the ability to track the
readiness of title 10, title 32, and non-DOD capabilities of individual
States throughout its area of responsibility using the Defense
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). NORTHCOM directly interfaces with
the National Guard Bureau to obtain the readiness status of title 32
capabilities and is supporting the National Guard Bureau in
establishing DRRS in every State. Moreover, if confirmed, I intend to
work closely with my Service and National Guard counterparts to
personally observe, when possible and appropriate, the readiness of
units that will be assigned Homeland Defense or DSCA missions.
northcom-dhs relationship
Question. The Department of Homeland Security is still a relatively
new Federal agency, and is continuing to improve its ability to meet
its homeland security missions.
As the Department of Homeland Security improves and matures its
homeland security capabilities, do you expect that will reduce the
demands on NORTHCOM to provide DSCA?
Answer. This really depends on whether the combined capacity of
civil and military resources in a particular mission area (such as
counternarcotics or disaster response) is currently adequate. Where
this is true, it can be viewed as a zero-sum situation in which
additional Department of Homeland Security capability could reduce
demands on NORTHCOM. However, there may be areas where our current
capacity is inadequate, and increased Department of Homeland Security
capacity will merely make additional progress towards buying down risk
to a more acceptable level. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the
Department of Homeland Security to understand how the various
capacities mesh--both where savings may be realized and where
additional capacity may be required.
Question. What do you consider to be the appropriate role for DOD
and NORTHCOM's vis-a-vis DHS and State authorities in identifying and
validating the dual-use equipment and other requirements associated
with defense and homeland security missions?
Answer. In accordance with the Secretary of Defense's guidance, I
believe the role of NORTHCOM is to coordinate with the Secretaries of
the Military Departments, the Commander of SOCOM, the Commander of
PACOM, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to identify critical
dual-use equipment necessary for Active and Reserve component units and
personnel to assist civil authorities in responses to natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters as
identified in the national planning scenarios. In accordance with my
answer above, I believe it is also incumbent on NORTHCOM to coordinate
with the Department of Homeland Security and State authorities as
required to more fully understand equipment requirements in a resource-
constrained environment.
response to christmas day aircraft bomb plot
Question. There has been considerable confusion about the events
surrounding the attempted bombing of a commercial U.S. aircraft over
Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.
Do you believe that NORTHCOM or NORAD have any responsibility for
apprehending, detaining, or interrogating a terrorist suspect who tries
to destroy an aircraft in flight inside U.S. airspace? If so, what is
that role?
Answer. Apprehending, detaining, or interrogating an individual
alleged to have committed a criminal act within U.S. jurisdiction is a
law enforcement function. NORAD conducts air defense operations as part
of Operation Noble Eagle and would likely be involved operationally if
needed, and both NORAD and NORTHCOM would remain alert for potential
associated or follow-on attacks.
national guard
Question. There is still debate about the role the National Guard
should play in the Homeland. In an April 21, 2008 letter to the
committee concerning the recommendations of the Commission on the
National Guard and Reserves, Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, wrote that, ``I have some concerns about the
Commission's ideas on enhancing the Defense Department's role in the
Homeland. While Reserve component civil support requirements are
important, they should not be of equal importance to DOD combat
responsibilities.''
Do you agree with this view of Admiral Mullen?
Answer. Yes. Defending our country is the military's primary duty,
which is why all DOD forces, including the National Guard and Federal
Reserves, are organized, trained, and equipped to fight our Nation's
wars. This is not to minimize the absolutely vital role the National
Guard and Reserves play in civil support, and we must ensure these
agile forces are adequately resourced and prepared for this mission.
Question. Do you believe that defending the Homeland or civil
support should become the National Guard's primary missions?
Answer. As a component of the Total Force, the National Guard has
distinguished itself across full spectrum of DOD operations, both at
home and abroad. Never has this been more true than over the last 9
years of both conflict abroad and pressing missions at home. In my
view, the National Guard should remain a full member of the Total
Force. Their contribution to the success of DOD's mission is too
significant to be limited to just homeland defense and civil support.
Moreover, to create additional force structure to execute the Federal
missions currently being accomplished by the National Guard would be
cost-prohibitive. In short, the Guard is providing exceptional service
and flexibility to our Nation in its current status.
Question. What is the current status of the working relationship
between NORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and individual State
National Guard headquarters?
Answer. My sense is that the working relationship among NORTHCOM,
the National Guard Bureau, and individual States' Guard headquarters
has never been better and continues to improve. The robust National
Guard presence within the NORTHCOM headquarters bears witness to this
and fosters information sharing, collaborative planning, and Total
Force mission execution that are paying dividends every day. If
confirmed, I look forward to leveraging the excellent rapport I
maintain with General Craig McKinley and other Guard leaders whom I
have met in order to further advance this vital relationship.
Question. If confirmed, what type of liaison relationships for
planning and operational purposes would you advocate between NORTHCOM,
the Department of Homeland Security, Federal, State, and local first
responders, and National Guard units under State authority?
Answer. As a former Joint Task Force Commander, I understand the
value of strong liaison relationships and their contribution to an
organization's success. If confirmed, I intend to enhance the existing
liaison relationships that NORTHCOM currently already employs with
these organizations by ensuring that liaison officers are empowered,
motivated and prepared to take all actions necessary to build
relationships and understanding, conduct mutual planning, and remain
prepared to transition seamlessly to cooperative execution. Where
necessary, appropriate, and permitted by personnel resources, I will
build new liaison relationships with key partners.
cbrne response capabilities
Question. NORTHCOM has two primary missions: Homeland Defense and
DSCA, including preparation for and response to an incident or attack
involving CBRNE materials or weapons, in the NORTHCOM area of
responsibility.
If confirmed, how would you approach the challenge of ensuring
adequate military forces, capabilities, and plans to respond to such
incidents in support of civil authorities?
Answer. I believe the CBRNE Consequence Management (CM) mission in
our homeland is a no-fail mission, and that forces assigned to this
mission must be able to respond as required. NORTHCOM has developed
detailed plans to support CBRNE CM in support of civil authorities. I
understand the NORTHCOM CBRNE CM Response Forces are in transition and
evolving into what is designed to be a robust and responsive force to
provide faster life-saving capability and mitigate human suffering. If
confirmed, I will work closely within DOD and with the National Guard
and the States to ensure adequate forces are allocated to this mission
and that they are properly trained, resourced, and exercised to
maintain their readiness to respond when needed.
Question. There are currently a variety of organizations and units
intended for CBRNE response and consequence management, including Joint
Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), the CBRNE Consequence Management
Response Force (CCMRF), the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological
Incident Response Force (CBIRF), National Guard Weapons of Mass
Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs), and National Guard CBRNE
Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) units.
If confirmed, how would you plan to manage this mix of capabilities
to ensure the best possible response force to support civil authorities
in the event of a CBRNE incident, and to avoid unnecessary duplication?
Answer. The military organizations designed to respond to a CBRNE
CM incident are structured to provide a graduated response capable of
handling small incidents, as well as large-scale incidents, in support
of civil authorities. Some are Federal forces, while others are
National Guard forces normally controlled by the State Governors. Each
echeloned element is designed to respond under different timelines to
build upon and integrate with the others to provide capability to civil
authorities.
If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the National Guard
Bureau and the States to ensure all forces established to accomplish
this mission are properly manned, trained, equipped to execute it, and
that timelines and command and control relationships during execution
are clearly understood and effective.
Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the CBRNE
CCMRF, as currently constituted, to provide a significant capability to
support Federal civil authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident?
Answer. It is my understanding that the two existing CCMRFs provide
a responsive and flexible capability with federally-controlled forces
that are trained, equipped, exercised, evaluated, and employed by
NORTHCOM to respond to near-simultaneous incidents. I also understand
that incremental modifications have been made to the CBRNE CCMRF
concept--based on analysis and lessons learned from State- and
national-level exercises--in order to improve its ability to provide
comprehensive and self-sustaining support to first responders. I am
also aware that DOD has determined that further improvements in CBRNE
response capability are warranted to provide rapid response capability
that is aligned within FEMA regions and responsive to State Governors.
Question. How would you assess the relative capabilities of a
trained and equipped CCMRF to a trained and equipped National Guard
CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)?
Answer. It is my view that each of these forces present
complementary capabilities that enhance our overall CBRNE Consequence
Management response.
The CBRNE CCMRF is a relatively large force (4,000-4,500 personnel)
that contains the required centralized capabilities to integrate with
and support a Federal response under the National Response Framework.
These capabilities include search and extraction, decontamination, air
and ground casualty evacuation, mortuary affairs, information
dissemination, communications, logistics, and a command and control
structure to support integration of follow on forces.
CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs), under the control
of State Governors, represent a much smaller (90-180 personnel), more
agile and timely response force that is focused on regional support to
provide security, triage, mass casualty and patient decontamination and
stabilization.
When responding to a domestic event, both force elements provide a
balanced approach by integrating and synchronizing the advantages of
the National Guard CERFP and the robust Federal capability of the
CCMRF.
Question. Do you believe that U.S. military forces providing DSCA
in the event of CBRNE incidents should be under the command of the
Commander, NORTHCOM?
Answer. In most cases, the incident will be managed at the State
level with DOD in support. For all incidents, Federal forces would
``lean forward'', as permitted under the National Response Framework,
in order to monitor and assess CBRNE capabilities and provide
additional support if requested. If title 10 forces do respond, I
believe the Commander of NORTHCOM should maintain command and control
of these forces in a ``direct support'' relationship aligned closely
with the primary Federal agency and the affected State Governor(s)
under the principle of unity of effort. In certain rare circumstances,
the NORTHCOM Commander may be asked to assume overall command and
control due to the nature or scope of an incident. If confirmed, I will
ensure that Federal forces under my command are responsive under either
command and control framework.
wmd-csts and cerfps
Question. There is now at least one National Guard Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) in each of the 54 States and
territories, and there are 17 National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response
Force Package (CERFP) units.
Do you believe the WMD-CSTs and CERFPs are appropriately organized,
sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions?
Answer. Yes, in my view, WMD-CSTs are appropriately organized,
sized, trained and equipped to accomplish their assigned detection and
analysis mission. WMD-CSTs are standardized forces and their training
and readiness is overseen by NORTHCOM through its Army component, U.S.
Army North.
I understand that there may be a need to improve CERFP
organization, equipment standardization, and readiness. If confirmed, I
will work with the National Guard Bureau to assist in any way to ensure
that CERFPs are ready to accomplish their assigned mission in
accordance with the CBRNE Enterprise identified in the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR).
Question. If not, what changes do you believe are needed?
Answer. Today, I cannot say with certainty what changes are needed.
However, if confirmed, I will quickly focus on CBRNE consequence
management to do my part to ensure our nation has adequate response
capability across the spectrum.
cbrne consequence management response force units
Question. Several years ago, the Department decided to create three
CBRNE CCMRF units to provide DSCA in the case of major CBRNE incidents
in the United States requiring Federal consequence management. The
recently released 2010 QDR proposed a significant restructuring of the
CBRNE response force, from the 3 CCMRFs under DOD control, to 1 robust
CCMRF, 2 military command and control units, and 10 future Homeland
Response Forces (HRFs) within the National Guard and under the control
of Governors in the 10 FEMA regions.
Do you believe the CCMRF concept, organization, and capability
remain sound?
Answer. I believe the existing CCMRF concept was an important
milestone toward achieving increased capability for this vital mission.
The makeup of CBRNE response should inevitably represent a balance
among speed, capability, resources, and ownership. Clearly, a robust
Federal response to augment State and local responses is a vital
component of this response. It is my sense that the restructuring
directed by Secretary of Defense and outlined in the 2010 QDR
represents an effort to refine this concept, and that DOD is committed
to ensuring forces within the CBRNE CM Enterprise remain trained and
ready, regardless of how they are organized. I understand NORTHCOM is
actively working to fully outline this concept with DOD partners,
especially the National Guard Bureau, and Federal interagency partners
to ensure it is effectively employed.
Question. What is your assessment of the organization, capability,
and potential effectiveness of the proposed HRFs in responding to a
major CBRNE incident, as compared to the capability of the existing
CCMRFs?
As I understand it, the intent of this decision is to rebalance the
Nation's CBRNE CM forces to better reflect the shared roles of the
States and Federal government during a domestic event. As such, it
appears to me that the HRFs were designed to provide a faster life-
saving response than the existing CCMRFs, and to capitalize on the
advantages of alignment with the FEMA regions, deeper regional
knowledge, and State ownership.
That said, it remains important that a robust Federal response be
prepared to augment the HRFs. This will be provided by a revised CCMRF
that has 700 additional personnel and a more rapid response capability,
along with two command and control CCMRFs that can coordinate responses
to additional CBRNE events using general purpose forces.
It is my understanding that work is in progress at NORTHCOM, in
collaboration with the requisite partners, on detailed implementation
planning for this modified construct. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the National Guard Bureau and others to implement it
properly, while at the same time closely monitoring training and
readiness levels to ensure we provide the nation the strongest possible
response capability.
Question. In your position as Director for Strategic Plans and
Policy on the Joint Staff, were you involved in the debate and/or
formulation of the HRF plan as outlined in the QDR?
Answer. No. Within the Joint Staff, the Force Structure, Resources,
and Assessment Directorate partnered with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to lead the formulation of the HRF plan within the QDR
effort. I was informed of my pending nomination for the position of
Commander, NORTHCOM towards the end of the formulation and decision
process, at which time I requested an information brief and attended
two meetings as an observer.
Question. Do you believe it would be prudent to disestablish an
existing CCMRF unit and eliminate its capability prior to having an
equivalent alternative capability in place?
Answer. I do not believe it would be prudent to give up an existing
capability prior to an alternative capability being in place.
Question. In order to ensure adequate defense support of civil
authorities, do you believe the three CCMRFs, or any related units
created from the proposed restructuring outlined in the QDR, should be
Federal forces under the command of NORTHCOM?
Answer. In the new concept, Federal Restructured-CCMRF and the two
smaller command and control elements created under the proposed
restructuring outlined in the QDR should and will be under the command
and control of the NORTHCOM Commander. State assets, such as the HRFs,
CERFPs, and WMD-CSTs, will be under the command and control of the
Governors through their Adjutants General, but could be Federalized
under title 10 if needed. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with
the National Guard Bureau and the individual States to ensure command
and control arrangements are clear and are exercised.
western hemisphere institute for security cooperation
Question. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
(WHINSEC), which replaced the School of the Americas in 2001, has the
mission of contributing to theater cooperation activities through the
education and training of students in the Western Hemisphere from
Canada to Chile. If confirmed, you will be a member of the WHINSEC
Board of Visitors.
What is the relationship between NORTHCOM and WHINSEC?
Answer. I understand that the National Defense Authorization Act of
2008 added the Commander of NORTHCOM to the WHINSEC Board of Visitors.
The Board of Visitors reviews curricula to ensure compliance with U.S.
laws, regulations, and policy goals, with an emphasis on human rights.
Question. In your view, does WHINSEC promote the national security
interests of the United States in the Western Hemisphere?
Answer. It is my belief that WHINSEC is a strategic tool for
international engagement that supports principles set forth in the
Organization of American States Charter. WHINSEC's professional
education and training has a positive impact upon the 800-1,000 Latin
American students in attendance annually from military, law enforcement
and civilian institutions. I agree with the sense of Congress, as
expressed in section 1084 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010, that WHINSEC is building partner capacity that
enhances regional and global security.
Question. In your view, how should NORTHCOM participate in command
oversight and curriculum development?
Answer. As I understand it, NORTHCOM has an Academic Outreach and
Human Rights Officer who is responsible for the hands-on oversight of
WHINSEC from a NORTHCOM perspective and raises concerns to the
commander as appropriate. If confirmed, I will evaluate the
effectiveness of this arrangement to see if any changes are necessary,
and will exercise personal oversight to ensure this process is
effective.
Question. In your view, what more, if anything, does WHINSEC need
to do to emphasize human rights in its curriculum?
Answer. I believe that human rights are an absolutely essential
ingredient of the WHINSEC curriculum. If confirmed, I will examine this
issue closely and determine if more emphasis is needed.
Question. In your view, how can WHINSEC improve its outreach
efforts to individuals or groups interested in its activities,
particularly those who have accused the school of contributing to human
rights violations by former students?
Answer. After WHINSEC was activated, safeguards such as the Board
of Visitors were put in place to ensure compliance with U.S. laws,
regulations, and policy goals, with an emphasis on human rights. If
confirmed, I will examine outreach efforts in order to determine
whether they are effective, and to reassure these groups of NORTHCOM's
commitment to human rights within the WHINSEC curriculum.
Question. If confirmed, will you attend the WHINSEC Board of
Visitor's annual meeting?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to attending the Board of
Visitors annual meeting--I will ensure that only a higher priority
event requiring my presence would interfere with my attendance at the
annual meeting.
intelligence sharing/national counterterrorism center
Question. What is NORTHCOM's role and involvement in developing
intelligence assessments regarding terrorist threats?
Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM develops all-source
intelligence assessments of the transnational terrorist threat in order
to provide warning and situational awareness in support of the missions
of Homeland Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and Force
Protection. NORTHCOM collaborates with all members of the Intelligence
Community, other combatant commands, and the National Counterterrorism
Center to ensure the command is able to anticipate potential responses
to transnational terrorist threats as they develop.
Question. What intelligence agencies are involved in providing
input to NORTHCOM's staff for the development of intelligence
assessments?
Answer. I understand that NORTHCOM develops intelligence
assessments based on all-source intelligence derived from all 16
Intelligence Community members. This collaborative environment is
fostered by a networked approach that allows NORTHCOM analysts to
leverage relevant expertise throughout the Intelligence Community.
These collaborative relationships are created and maintained by a
robust liaison program. National Agency Representatives from the
Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Department
of Homeland Security, the Service intelligence agencies, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency are located within NORTHCOM.
Similarly, NORTHCOM liaison officers are located at the Department
of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) the Canadian National Defence
Headquarters in Ottawa.
Question. What is the current relationship between NORTHCOM and the
NCTC?
Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM has a strong
relationship with the National Counterterrorism Center in a
collaborative information-sharing environment. NORTHCOM routinely
relies on the Center's finished production and their collaborative
tools, all of which is facilitated by having two full-time NORTHCOM
personnel who are physically assigned to the Center as liaison
officers.
Question. Does NORTHCOM have representatives located at the NCTC on
a daily basis? If so, what are their functions and responsibilities? If
not, why not?
Answer. Yes. NORTHCOM currently has two full-time liaison officers
at the National Counterterrorism Center who facilitate the flow of
information between NORTHCOM and the Center.
One liaison officer is assigned to the Defense Intelligence Unit,
which is responsible for reviewing intelligence databases for
information related to DOD equities. The other liaison officer is
assigned to the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning at the
Center and ensures NORTHCOM is aware of and involved in community
operational and contingency planning.
Question. Do you believe NORTHCOM representatives at NCTC have the
access to intelligence needed to fully perform their functions?
Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM liaison officers
have access to all intelligence databases available to other Center
analysts and are fully capable of performing their functions in support
of the Center.
Question. How do posse comitatus, privacy restrictions, and other
laws and regulations concerning the collection of intelligence within
the United States, affect the way NORTHCOM receives and uses
intelligence?
Answer. NORTHCOM accomplishes its intelligence mission within the
framework of existing laws and policy; I understand NORTHCOM is
vigilant in ensuring all intelligence activities conducted in support
of its mission comply with intelligence oversight law and policy. If
confirmed, I will ensure all intelligence activities conducted in
support of NORTHCOM operations are reviewed by legal staff to ensure
they are conducted in accordance with law and policy.
ballistic missile defense
Question. One of NORTHCOM's missions is the defense of the United
States against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack. The
recently released Ballistic Missile Defense Review report stated as one
of its policy priorities: ``Before new capabilities are deployed, they
must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic
conditions.''
Do you agree that it is essential that our deployed ballistic
missile defense systems are operationally effective?
Answer. Yes. In light of the growing threat from North Korea and
Iran, both in numbers and sophistication, the capability to defend the
Nation with an effective ballistic missile defense system is becoming
increasingly important. The recently-announced Phased Adaptive
Approach, a four-phase global approach, will provide a layered defense
capability for the homeland, as well as for forward-deployed troops and
allies.
Question. Do you agree that it is important to conduct
operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate the operational
capability and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system?
Answer. Yes. Operationally realistic flight tests are one of the
most important, and visible, ways of demonstrating the operational
capability and reliability of the GMD system. I understand the NORTHCOM
staff has worked closely with U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile
Defense Agency in the formation of the Integrated Master Test Plan.
This robust test plan lays the foundation for increasingly realistic
operational flight tests over the next several years, and beyond.
cruise missile defense
Question. NORTHCOM and NORAD have responsibilities for warning and
defending the United States against airborne threats, including cruise
missiles.
Relative to cruise missile defense, what do you believe should be
the relationship between the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Organization (JIAMDO) of the Joint Staff, on the one hand, and NORTHCOM
and NORAD, on the other hand?
Answer. I understand the JIAMDO has maintained a working
partnership with NORAD since 1999 and NORTHCOM since its establishment
in 2002. The JIAMDO has expanded its theater focus to include homeland
air and cruise missile defense gaps, as well as ballistic missile
defense gaps, through operational concept, architecture, and roadmap
development efforts. The JIAMDO has a liaison office at NORAD and
NORTHCOM to ensure daily coordination and collaboration. If confirmed,
I look forward to building upon this relationship to enhance our
homeland capabilities against the potential threat of a cruise missile
attack.
Question. Relative to the full spectrum of threats to the United
States, how would you assess the cruise missile threat to the United
States and its territories?
Answer. I believe the overall cruise missile threat to the United
States and its territories is currently low. While technically
feasible, there are other means to use that are operationally easier
for those who would harm us.
Question. If confirmed, what capabilities would you prioritize to
address this threat?
Answer. While I believe the threat is currently low, continued
efforts in Wide Area Surveillance of North America are needed to
improve capabilities to address future capabilities. If confirmed, this
will be a key area I will address, as well as a review of the NORAD and
NORTHCOM Surveillance Gap Filler strategy. As I understand it, this
strategy outlines the NORTHCOM plan to address air and maritime
surveillance shortfalls through a family-of-systems approach to sensor
development and improved information sharing of interagency sensors.
Finally, through our intelligence resources, it is imperative that we
remain alert to any game-changing evolution in capability that would
raise the prominence of this threat.
continental air defense
Question. How has the continental air defense mission changed since
the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001?
Answer. Prior to 11 September 2001, NORAD's air defense posture was
aligned to counter external threats to North America. In response to
the attacks on 11 September 2001, the command's mission was expanded to
protect against domestic airborne threats originating within the United
States and Canada.
Operation Noble Eagle began immediately after the September 11
attacks and continues today to protect and defend the airspace of the
United States and Canada. NORAD implemented an improved air defense
system by integrating radar, air patrols, surface-launched missiles,
and control centers. This system also includes the capability to
protect the National Capital Region from air attacks.
Question. Do you believe that current U.S. continental air defense
capabilities are adequate to meet national security needs?
Answer. Yes. NORAD continues to adapt in an effort to counter the
terrorist threat posed to the United States and Canada by maintaining a
network of alert fighters, tankers, airborne early warning aircraft,
and ground-based air defense assets. This capability, combined with
improvements to surveillance and communications systems, as well as
better coordination and information sharing with the interagency
community, ensures NORAD provides air defense for the United States and
Canada.
Question. If confirmed, what capabilities and programs would you
prioritize to address any identified deficiencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will examine NORAD's air defense
capabilities with the goal of further improving the North American air
surveillance picture not only for DOD, but also for our interagency
partners--notably the National Capital Region Coordination Center and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. I understand that Homeland Air and
Cruise Missile Defense, wide-area air surveillance, and refining
intelligence sharing within the interagency community are critical to
this effort. I will also work closely with the Services to ensure
continuity of air sovereignty mission commensurate with postulated
threats.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, NORTHCOM, and
Commander, NORAD?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
border security
1. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what is your assessment
of the current security situation along our southern border?
Admiral Winnefeld. I view with concern the escalating violence
along the Southwest border that in many cases is attributable to drug
trafficking organizations. In addition to the corrosive effects of
drugs within our own cities, I believe the violence associated with
drug trafficking in Mexico is a significant security challenge to the
United States through its potential to spill over the border and by
virtue of its severe negative impact on the internal security of a
neighbor and friend. As I mentioned in my hearing, if confirmed I plan
to travel to the border region soon after taking command in order to
more closely assess the situation.
2. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what is your view about
the need for deployment of federally-funded national guardsmen along
the southern border to assist and support civilian law enforcement
agencies?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that the National Guard has a place in
support of civilian Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies
along the border. Indeed, over 300 title 32 forces from the 4 border
States, specially trained in counterdrug activities, are currently
deployed in support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which
is the lead Federal agency responsible for border security. I believe
such deployments should be subject to the following principles: First,
they should be undertaken only to the extent that the capacity of
civilian agencies is exceeded by the security requirement or where the
Guard can provide unique capability in support of civilian operations.
In some cases, it may be necessary for the Department of Defense (DOD)
forces to provide a bridge to increased DHS or local capacity. Second,
such deployments should account for the impact they would have on
support for U.S. troops that are engaged in combat overseas, as some of
the capabilities that may contribute to border security are in short
supply overseas. Third, I believe we need to be cautious about the
perception of militarizing the border, though we should not allow this
to prevent deployments required to guard against serious threats.
Finally, these deployments should be made in response to a request from
civilian agencies that is approved by the President or the Secretary of
Defense. If confirmed, I will contribute to interagency assessments
intended to assess the capacity and capabilities of civilian law
enforcement and the suitability and magnitude of DOD contributions.
3. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what additional steps
can U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) take, in coordination with DHS,
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and the Government of Mexico, to
bring the drug-trade violence we are seeing on both sides of our
southern border under control?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that NORTHCOM has separate but
complementary roles north and south of the border. It is my
understanding that NORTHCOM is well-engaged with interagency partners,
the Embassy Country Team, the Government of Mexico, and SOUTHCOM in
evaluating ways the command can effectively support U.S. Government
efforts to stem drug-trade related violence in our hemisphere. As one
example, the command recently hosted and facilitated the Ciudad Juarez-
El Paso Merida Planning Initiative from 22-26 February, 2010, with
these organizations. Those discussions, as well as coordination with
these organizations on a daily basis, point to several additional steps
that can be taken to stem the wave of violence that has gripped the
border region.
If confirmed, I look forward to broadening and deepening the
asymmetric warfare experience that we share with our domestic and
Mexican partners. I will further pressurize our efforts in intelligence
fusion and sharing, secure communications systems, biometrics
equipment, night vision equipment, and accelerating the delivery of the
helicopters and surveillance aircraft that are part of the Merida
Initiative. I will seek ways to more effectively support DHS, the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and other critical stakeholders in a
whole-of-government approach to enhancing security along the southwest
border. I will review current NORTHCOM initiatives, visit the Southwest
border, listen to our Mexican partners, and assess how best the command
can support U.S. Government efforts to assist Mexico and other
international partners in the region. Finally, I will work closely with
SOUTHCOM to explore what additional steps we might take to enable the
countries on Mexico's southern border to act more effectively to
interdict drug traffic in that region.
legislative gap in reserve activation authority
4. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, DOD currently lacks
statutory authority to order Reserve personnel to involuntary Active
Duty service for the purpose of providing civil support in response to
a natural disaster. While such authority exists for terrorist attacks,
proposals to give this legislative authority in response to a natural
disaster has been opposed by State Governors, apparently due to a
dispute about who will have operational control of Federal forces. What
is your understanding of this problem and why have the States opposed
ensuring that Federal Reserve Forces can be called up, if needed?
Admiral Winnefeld. Federal Reserve Forces have capabilities but
only limited authorities to make important and timely contributions in
support of local and State officials in response to domestic disasters.
First, they may only be used for immediate, life-and-limb support when
they are already on Active Duty status if/when a crisis occurs. Second,
if they volunteer, they may be used only if there is also a request for
assistance for title 10 support from another Federal agency. DOD is not
authorized in any scenario to involuntarily mobilize Reserve Forces in
response to a catastrophe or disaster.
State Governors, bound by their State constitutions to act as
Commanders in Chief of their State forces, have been reluctant to
support such authority until they better understand how such forces
would be employed. Accordingly, they have taken the initial position
that they must have command of all military forces (State and Federal)
operating within their States. However, it is my understanding that
constitutionally, the President of the United States, as Commander in
Chief, cannot relinquish command of Federal forces.
To resolve this issue, OSD has proposed a concept to the Council of
Governors addressing the command relationship as one of ``direct
support'' using the principle of ``unity of effort.'' Under this
arrangement, which I fully support, Federal forces would ``consult,
coordinate with, and respond to State authorities'' during a domestic
disaster while maintaining existing command relationships. In this
manner, Federal forces, including Federal Reserve Forces, would
technically remain under the command of Federal authorities while
responding directly to a Governor's needs. I have experienced this type
of unity of effort relationship several times during my career, and it
works. This concept is supported throughout the National Response
Framework, which also emphasizes unity of effort vice unity of command.
5. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe that
title 10 Federal forces should be placed under the operational or
tactical control of State Governors?
Admiral Winnefeld. No, I believe the Commander of NORTHCOM should
maintain command and control of title 10 forces in a ``direct support''
relationship, remaining closely aligned with the primary Federal agency
as well as coordinating closely with and remaining responsive to the
affected State Governor(s) under the principle of unity of effort. I
believe there is good balance in this construct. On the one hand, the
President should maintain operational command of Federal forces for a
variety of reasons. On the other hand, Federal forces should be very
responsive to a Governor's needs in a crisis and be tightly aligned
with the Adjutant General of the affected State. If confirmed, I intend
to make it very clear to my State partners that we will act in support
of a Governor's needs in time of crisis.
6. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what has been Secretary
Gates' position on this issue?
Admiral Winnefeld. Secretary Gates supports title 10 forces
remaining under the Federal chain of command in accordance with
subsection (b) of title 10, U.S.C. Sec. 162. Secretary Gates also
reiterated at the Council of Governors meeting in February 2010 that he
believes we can find a consensus approach that respects the
Constitutional authorities of both the Governors and the President of
the United States. I believe this is a sound approach and provides a
positive way forward.
7. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe NORTHCOM
currently has sufficient authority to access Reserve component
personnel and capabilities to fulfill your command's mission?
Admiral Winnefeld. In terms of NORTHCOM's primary mission of
homeland defense, I believe DOD does, in fact, have sufficient
authority to access Reserve component personnel and capabilities.
However, in terms of NORTHCOM's mission for Defense Support of Civil
Authorities, I do not believe there is sufficient access to the Reserve
component. In accordance with title 10, Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Federal reservists are only available for civil emergencies
while in voluntary Inactive Duty for Training status.
The National Governors Association supported Congress's rejection
of a DOD-proposed statutory change that would have allowed the
Secretary of Defense to order reservists to Active Duty to provide
assistance when the response capabilities of Federal, State, and local
civilian agencies are or could be exceeded. Under the knowledge
possessed by the Governors at the time, I understand and am sympathetic
to their rationale for not supporting this initiative. However, since
then, OSD has begun working closely with the Governors to outline DOD's
concept of ``direct support,'' briefly described above. I am very
hopeful that DOD can come to agreement with the Governors on this
construct so that they will support a statutory change. I understand
that the Council of Governors will discuss this issue further during
their next meeting in June 2010, and if confirmed, I plan to attend
that meeting to help forge a way ahead--and to make it clear to the
Governors that I will be responsive to their needs in a crisis
8. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, would you recommend that
we take action this legislative session to fix this problem?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that it is important to have the
support of the Governors on solutions to this problem. I understand it
was discussed extensively in the first Council of Governors meeting
with the Secretary of Defense in February 2010. It is also my
understanding that it will be further addressed at the next Council of
Governors meeting in June 2010, and if confirmed, I plan to attend that
meeting. With a better understanding of both DOD and the Governor's
concerns, appropriate actions for legislative session can be proposed--
and I am hopeful that this will occur this year.
9. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what is the potential
vulnerability if we do not take action?
Admiral Winnefeld. Certain DOD capabilities reside exclusively or
in significant numbers in the Federal Reserve Forces, such as aerial
spray, ``Hurricane Hunter'' weather reconnaissance, combat surgical
hospitals, search and rescue, aeromedical evacuation, mortuary affairs,
engineering and logistical support. Without this authority, these title
10 Federal Reserve Forces, which can be the most capable and closest
unit to a disaster, cannot be involuntarily called forward to support a
response, ultimately increasing costs and more importantly, risk to
American lives. This is why it is critical that we forge a consensus
solution as soon as possible and provide recommendations to Congress at
that time.
joint responses to attacks
10. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, how will NORTHCOM and
CYBERCOM work together to support civil authorities in the event of a
computer network attack on the Homeland?
Admiral Winnefeld. As I understand it, NORTHCOM has developed a
very strong relationship with U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Once
CYBERCOM stands up, I believe NORTHCOM will extend this relationship to
CYBERCOM as well. Similar to other combatant commands, NORTHCOM is a
routine consumer of the cyber security and information that STRATCOM
and CYBERCOM will provide. In the event of an attack, NORTHCOM will
work in a supported-supporting relationship as designated by the
Secretary of Defense to ensure the .mil domain is protected and that
all available support is provided, as appropriate, to the owners of
other domains.
11. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, do roles and
authorities exist to guide a joint response, if the Nation is attacked?
Admiral Winnefeld. The 2008 Unified Command Plan recognizes
cyberspace as a warfighting domain, and NORTHCOM's mission set crosses
all domains in order to defend, protect, and secure the United States
and its interests against all threats, including cyber.
There are myriad authorities supporting Homeland Defense and Civil
Support missions, as well as a joint response to cyber attack against
the Nation. These include NORTHCOM authorities identified in title 10,
as well as title 50, and the Unified Command Plan, Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan, Guidance for Employment of the Forces, and the
National Response Framework. Additionally, there are a number of DOD
policies and orders, contingency plans (to include NORTHCOM's Homeland
Defense CONPLAN 3400), and Joint Staff-directed orders that guide a
joint response. The authorities that are in place today for cyber
center primarily on self-defense. If we had to act today in response to
a cyber attack on critical national assets, the joint response would
also be guided by the National Cyber Incident Response Plan. That said,
I believe one of CYBERCOM's key roles will be to advise STRATCOM in
recommending any adjustments to existing authorities required to better
provide a joint response to an attack.
12. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, with respect to other
combatant commands, the Military Departments, and the many
organizations within DOD, how will CYBERCOM function to ensure cyber
operations are protected?
Admiral Winnefeld. As I understand it, CYBERCOM will have both
supported and supporting cyber roles. As the supported command for
defense of the Defense Information Networks, CYBERCOM will have the
technical capability to conduct effective ``defense in depth''
protection of cyber operations and infrastructure that is common to all
combatant commands. At the same time, as the supporting command,
CYBERCOM will have the technical capability to provide information and
awareness to enable its customers to effectively mitigate cyber threats
to operations within their own areas of responsibility.
threats to the homeland
13. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what do you consider to
be the biggest threats to the Homeland?
Admiral Winnefeld. There are many potential threats to our
Homeland, among which I would name five of particular concern. First,
extremists who are directed, supported, or inspired by al Qaeda
continue to plan terrorist attacks on our Homeland. Those attempting to
obtain weapons of mass destruction pose the most consequential threat,
while those pursuing smaller scale, hard-to-detect attacks using
improvised explosive devices or conventional weapons represent the most
likely threat. Second, I am concerned about the corrosive effect on our
Nation's security of drug trafficking, including its associated
violence, both inside Mexico and along our border. Third, the cyber
threat to our information infrastructure is increasing in parallel with
our growing reliance on the Internet. Fourth, North Korean and Iranian
pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them against our
Homeland using long-range ballistic missiles or other means is a
growing concern. Finally, the constant potential for a major natural
disaster, which can produce damage far greater than most terrorist
attacks, is something for which the NORTHCOM Commander must always be
prepared.
14. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, where do you assess the
greatest vulnerabilities in our ability to defend the Homeland?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe our greatest vulnerability remains
extremist threats, who are determined and patient, will search for any
path to produce violent events, and harbor no qualms about killing
innocents to achieve their objectives. Our vulnerabilities to this
threat derive from the immense array of potential targets within our
Nation, the relative ease of entering a large and diverse country, and
the extremists' intent to exploit the freedom of movement (and other
important freedoms) we enjoy within our country.
15. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, if confirmed, how will
you address these vulnerabilities?
Admiral Winnefeld. If confirmed, I will do everything in my power
to ensure our Nation is prepared to handle the full spectrum of threats
to our homeland. I will:
Advocate the sense of urgency required to maintain
vigilance against these threats;
Nurture a culture that continuously challenges and
improves our capability, particularly in the areas of
information sharing with our partners and speed-of-response;
Continue improvements to NORTHCOM's rigorous exercise
program;
Examine the NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil
support plans to ensure they address evolving threats and are
tailored to need;
Strengthen NORTHCOM's relationships with its National
Guard, interagency, State, local, tribal, and international
partners to ensure the whole is greater than the sum of the
parts;
Work closely with the other COCOMs and service chiefs
on issues of relevance to defending the Homeland;
Remain cognizant of the health of our ballistic
missile defense program; and
Support a whole-of-government approach on both sides
of our border with Mexico and strengthen Mexico's ability
efforts against drug trafficking organizations.
interoperability with state and local first responders
16. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, a tragic lesson learned
in the response to the attacks of September 11 was the inability of
first responders to communicate amongst one another. Given the role DOD
forces would assume in assisting State and local authorities in
responding to large-scale incidents, the importance of these varying
groups to communicate is vitally important if we are to avoid
unnecessary miscommunication and risk. If confirmed, what steps will
you take to ensure interoperability between title 10 forces and their
civilian counterparts?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is my belief that communications
interoperability among all mission partners is a cornerstone of the
Nation's response to disaster events. As I understand it, NORTHCOM has
taken several initiatives to reduce miscommunication and ensure
information sharing among our partners. NORTHCOM is a key participant
in the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and
Interoperability and the Federal Partnership for Interoperable
Communications and, in concert with DHS and the National Guard Bureau,
developed both the Strategic Operational Information Sharing Plan and
the Deployable Communications Standards Publication. These efforts are
critical in establishing interoperability protocols and standards for
both communications systems and information exchange processes and will
be used as the foundation for future procurement of DOD communications
systems. I also believe it is important that we test these systems to
ensure they function.
Further, NORTHCOM continues to partner with the National Guard
Bureau and the Federal Emergency Management Agency on use and
employment of our Deployable Cellular Systems and Incident Awareness
and Assessment/Full Motion Video suites. These systems are designed for
rapid employment to an incident to improve communications and shared
situational awareness through augmented cellular phone services and
video situational awareness to facilitate decisionmaking. In
particular, mobile cellular capability can be used to mitigate
commercial communications outages by providing cellular voice and data
devices for key civilian leadership and agencies while at the same time
providing radio communications interoperability among first responders
and title 32/title 10 DOD forces.
17. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, are you aware of any
interoperability gaps between State and local first responders and
title 10 forces?
Admiral Winnefeld. I am not aware of any specific interoperability
gaps forces among first responders and title 10 forces, but if
confirmed I will look closely at interoperability in communications. As
I understand it, NORTHCOM is dedicated to constantly improving
processes and procedures to mitigate potential and unidentified gaps.
For instance, since 2005 NORTHCOM has hosted an annual communications
exercise solely designed to refine interoperable communications among
National Guard, State, and local emergency management personnel and
first responders. Last year's exercise conducted in Texas, Arizona, and
South Carolina drew over 50 different participants from Federal, State,
and local agencies.
Additionally, NORTHCOM is participating in efforts conducted by the
Interagency Board and DHS's Office of Interoperability and
Compatibility to develop a Communications Unit Leader track under the
National Incident Management System. This track is designed to train
and certify communications personnel in typing incident scene
communications requirements, standardizing processes and protocols, and
providing a credentialing system to ensure equivalency among
communications personnel.
sharing of information and intelligence between agencies
18. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, if confirmed, how will
you seek to break down the barriers relating to intelligence collection
and evaluation between agencies to ensure NORTHCOM has an accurate
picture of potential threats?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that persistent engagement and
collaboration with our interagency partners is essential to ensure we
are aware of and prepared to deal with emerging threats. To the maximum
extent allowed by law and policy, we must strive for an ``information
push'' rather than an ``information pull'' culture, as well as seek new
ways of manipulating the information we do have in order to separate
key threat signals from the noise. Often, this information is sensitive
and closely held in law enforcement and/or intelligence channels. If
confirmed, I will consistently articulate mission needs, particularly
in the Force Protection and Defense Support of Civil Authorities
arenas, while assuring the lead Federal agencies that we will safeguard
their operational and investigative sensitivities. We must also pursue
these activities in full compliance with Intelligence Oversight
guidelines and ensure we maintain public trust in our ability to
protect civil liberties. I will also strive to develop and maintain a
solid and trusted set of relationships with the various intelligence
agencies that includes as many liaison officers as feasible.
restructuring of federal homeland response forces
19. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) calls for a significant restructuring of the force
packages NORTHCOM provides in support of civil authorities in the event
of a large-scale disaster or attack. The proposal calls for the
restructuring of one existing brigade-sized element, the elimination of
another, and the creation of 10 smaller Homeland Response Forces (HRFs)
to be spread throughout the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) regions of the country. What are your views about this new
approach?
Admiral Winnefeld. As I understand it, the intent of this decision
is to rebalance the Nation's Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and high-yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management (CM)
forces to better reflect the shared roles of the States and Federal
Government during a domestic event. It also appears to me that the HRFs
are designed to provide a faster life-saving response than the existing
CBRNE CM Forces (CCMRFs) and to capitalize on the advantages of
alignment with the FEMA regions, deeper regional knowledge, and State
ownership.
That said, it remains important that a robust Federal response be
prepared to augment the HRFs. This will be provided by a revised CCMRF
that has 700 additional personnel and a more rapid response capability,
along with two command and control CCMRFs that can coordinate responses
to additional CBRNE events using general purpose forces.
It is my understanding that work is in progress at NORTHCOM, in
collaboration with the requisite partners, on detailed implementation
planning for this modified construct. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the National Guard Bureau and others to implement it
properly, while at the same time closely monitoring training and
readiness levels to ensure we provide the Nation the strongest possible
response capability.
20. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, are there any concerns
about the apparent shift of authority of these forces from Federal
control to that of the States, particularly given the potential for
these forces to be moved and utilized across State lines?
Admiral Winnefeld. Although work is ongoing to develop this new
construct, I believe the various Federal and State response forces,
under the National Response Framework, will be able to achieve unity of
effort. My sense is that advance planning, gaming, exercising, and
effective employment of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
will be important elements of a successful program. If confirmed, I
intend to work closely with and through the National Guard Bureau to
the States to ensure all forces established to accomplish this mission
are properly manned, trained, and equipped to execute it, and that
timelines and command and control relationships during execution are
clearly understood and effective.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
guard and reserve in northern command
21. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, the integration of
Active, Reserve, Guard, and interagency elements into your headquarters
and the makeup of your subordinate units, makes NORTHCOM one of the
most diverse agencies this Government has. As we all know, without our
Guard and Reserve Forces, it would be impossible to conduct operations
abroad while ensuring that our Homeland is secure and safe. I have
legitimate concerns with respect to the impacts of Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom rotations on our National Guard, as
well as what I have been told to be the Air Force fighter reduction
plan of 250 aircraft for the Air National Guard and its impacts on the
18 Air Sovereignty Alert site requirement. As I have been informed,
this reduction in aircraft will reduce or cancel Operation Noble Eagle
and the associated Combat Air Patrols (CAP) that were instituted post-
September 11. What are your thoughts on the state of our National Guard
and Reserves and their ability to provide support in times of crisis?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe our National Guard and Reserves have
never been more capable than they are today; they are an amazingly
versatile and battle-hardened force. From my point of view, they are
critically important to NORTHCOM's mission, and their ability to
provide support in times of crisis is solid and growing. If confirmed,
I intend to develop a close relationship with the leadership of the
Guard and Reserve--indeed, I already enjoy a superb relationship with
the Chief, National Guard Bureau. While the Air Guard force structure
resulting from the Air Force recapitalization plan remains to be seen,
the professionals who employ this force will adapt with the
demonstrated skill necessary to safeguard the Homeland.
22. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe that
NORTHCOM has the right mix of Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard
present within your command?
Admiral Winnefeld. It seems to me that the NORTHCOM staff has a
healthy mix of Active Duty and Reserve component--although, if
confirmed, I will develop a more informed view. My understanding is
that NORTHCOM has a Reserve component presence in every staff
directorate HQs working alongside their Active Duty co-workers. In
addition, I understand that the National Guard has made a significant
investment in personnel assigned to NORTHCOM. In fact, NORTHCOM has the
largest concentration of title 10 National Guard officers in a joint
organization outside of the National Guard Bureau. I am aware that
there are over 50 full-time Reserve component authorizations in
NORTHCOM HQs, of which 45 are filled, which is about the same
percentage that applies to the active component.
23. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, can you confirm if
there will be an Air Force fighter reduction in the Air National Guard?
If so, what impact will it have on the 18 Air Sovereignty Alert sites
and CAP requirements?
Admiral Winnefeld. In my current position as Director of Strategic
Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, I am unable to confirm a
reduction of the number of fighters in the Air National Guard; the
balance between active and Guard force structure is a decision process
led by the Department of the Air Force. However, if a reduction occurs,
NORAD and NORTHCOM will work closely with the Air Force to ensure that
the resulting force structure will still meet the requirements of
Homeland Defense as directed under Operation Noble Eagle. I understand
that the Air Force submitted to Congress, in response to National
Defense Authorization Act language, a report that indicated that the 18
Air Sovereignty Alert sites would be unaffected by the fiscal year 2011
President's budget position. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Air Force to ensure the Air Sovereignty Alert site configuration
supports national guidance on Homeland Air Defense.
missile defense
24. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, I have spent a lot of
time and energy with regards to missile defense and I am convinced that
the current administration does not take the necessity of the program
seriously. I believe we are underfunding missile defense programs and
not driving the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and others to develop
a robust, layered, and integrated system of ground-, sea-, and
space-based radars and interceptors. I have specific concerns about the
Phased Adaptive Approach:
there is no map or plan showing the deployment of the
system and how it will be integrated;
while Aegis and our SM-3s are outstanding assets and
vital to our National security, we do not have enough Aegis
ships that are Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capable;
I have been told we are having problems with the
development of SM-3 1B which has taken expertise and focus away
from 2A and 2B development, potentially pushing back the
timeline;
I am concerned about our ability to integrate all the
radars we have into the existing BMD architecture which I have
been told is limited looking out to the east (Iranian threat)
as well as integrating Aegis with existing ground based radars;
I am concerned there is not enough testing for our
ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska and California nor
are there enough missiles to ensure we can continue to test as
well as maintain enough on status;
I am concerned we have not tested the new kill
vehicles that are being installed on our GBIs; and
I am concerned that we are not moving forward on
testing the two-stage GBI.
Every day there are open source reports of the efforts of North
Korea and Iran, known enemies of the United States, to develop more
advanced missiles and munitions with the intent to target the United
States and our military forces. China and Russia continue their
advancements as well, even as our President works to reduce our own
capabilities and restrain our efforts to adequately defend the Nation.
In short, our enemies are advancing their ability to reach out and hit
us in a devastating way. What are your thoughts on whether we are
assuming too much risk? If not, what can you tell me on how we are
mitigating the known risk from those threats I have mentioned?
Admiral Winnefeld. DOD spent considerable time during the recently
concluded Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) assessing both
evolving threats as well as our country's current and projected
capabilities over the next 10 years. I believe the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, as currently envisioned, will provide
adequate defense against the evolving threat from North Korea and Iran,
neither of which are currently capable of attacking the United States
but which certainly possess the ambition to develop this capability. At
the same time, DOD is placing additional emphasis on regional missile
defense under the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in order to pace the
threat and provide assurance to our allies and partners. As such, we
will be able to provide some measure of defense against medium and
intermediate range missiles launched from the Middle East against our
forces and our allies in Europe sooner than previously planned.
Moreover, Homeland ballistic missile defense will benefit from this
approach as soon as a surveillance radar becomes operational in
southeastern Europe, which will provide earlier warning of an Iranian
attack against the United States and increase the probability of
success of GMD interception. In the longer term, when future
interceptors such as the SM-3 Block IIB become operational, they could
provide an additional layer of defense for the Homeland.
If confirmed, I will participate along with the other combatant
commanders and service chiefs in the department's ongoing analysis to
ensure our future capability requirements and hedge strategies continue
to stay ahead of the threat. I will also work to ensure that our
systems are adequately tested and our operators properly trained to
execute this important mission.
25. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, have you looked at the
recommendations on the development of either the three-stage or two-
stage GBIs?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, though if confirmed I will reinforce my
knowledge of this program. My understanding is that the BMDR includes a
hedge strategy that includes the continued development and assessment
of a two-stage ground-based interceptor, including a test later this
year. If confirmed, I will work closely with the MDA to explore the
potential advantages of deploying a three-stage, two-stage mix of GBIs
within the Homeland.
26. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what are your thoughts
on a Third Site location on the east coast of the United States?
Admiral Winnefeld. As a follow-on to the BMDR, the Department is
examining how it will execute, operationally and programmatically, the
tenets laid out in the BMDR. I understand that as part of the ongoing
analysis, the capabilities and deployment strategy being studied by
NORTHCOM includes an east coast capability.
27. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, on February 11, the
Airborne Laser successfully intercepted a boosting ballistic missile--
the first time a directed-energy system has destroyed such a target in
any phase of flight. In a time of crisis, is there any plan to be able
to use this aircraft to protect our Homeland?
Admiral Winnefeld. The recent engagement test of the Airborne Laser
demonstrated a unique capability in the area of BMD and is a pathfinder
for future directed energy technologies. However, it is my
understanding that due to the operational challenges associated with
effectively employing this system against a real-world threat as
opposed to the high cost of maintaining it, the program has been
redesignated as a technology demonstration program and is therefore not
part of the baseline BMD architecture.
28. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, should we look into
that?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is my belief that during a time of crisis,
the Department will seek to provide the combatant commands with the
required capabilities to deter or, if necessary, defeat the threat.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator George S. LeMieux
border security
29. Senator LeMieux. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, one of your areas of
responsibility is the southwest border shared with Mexico. How secure
are our southern borders and what recommendations do you have to stem
the flow of humans and narcotics through them?
Admiral Winnefeld. Illicit trafficking of drugs, arms, and bulk
cash challenge the U.S. and Mexican Governments on both sides of the
border. As such, my sense is that NORTHCOM has separate but
complementary roles north and south of the border. Regarding the
former, the command plays a supporting role to DHS, DOJ, and other
critical stakeholders in a whole-of-government approach to enhancing
security along the southwest border. If confirmed, I will look for ways
to improve this support that are both effective and legal. Regarding
the latter, given the Mexican military's assigned role in the struggle
against drug trafficking organizations, NORTHCOM plays a vital role in
enhancing the Mexican military's capability and capacity, which I would
seek to enhance. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing current
NORTHCOM initiatives, visiting the Southwest border, listening to our
Mexican partners, and assessing how best the command can support U.S.
Government efforts to assist Mexico and other international partners in
the region.
ballistic missile defense
30. Senator LeMieux. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what is your
assessment of America's current ballistic missile defense capabilities
and in what areas would you like to see further development?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is my belief that the GMD system adequately
addresses the potential rogue threats we face today. The MDA's
evolutionary development of the GMD system continues to demonstrate
technology enhancements that will enable us to defeat the evolving
threats from long-range missiles under development by North Korea and
Iran.
Meanwhile, the newly-adopted Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in
Europe, intended to pace the threat by providing defense against medium
and intermediate ballistic missiles coming from the Middle East much
sooner, should also provide deployable, agile, and tailorable defensive
capabilities to enhance defense of the Homeland. For example, in the
near term, a PAA surveillance radar in southeastern Europe will provide
earlier warning of a ballistic missile attack from Iran, and thus
provide the GMD system with a higher probability of intercepting such a
threat. In the long term, when future interceptors such as the SM-3
Block IIB become operational, they will provide an additional layer of
defense.
As for areas requiring further development, I believe we must
continue developing our space-based sensor capabilities in order to
attain a birth-to-death tracking and engagement capability and we need
to continue moving into a net-centric integrated architecture to enable
service, agency, and potentially allied systems integration to
facilitate data sharing, situational awareness and coordinated
engagement capabilities.
eguardian system
31. Senator LeMieux. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, the eGuardian system
is an unclassified system, that once implemented, will help DOD and law
enforcement identify suspicious activity and hopefully preempt a
terrorist attack. How close are we to implementing this system?
Admiral Winnefeld. As I understand it, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy will establish a plan and issue policy and
procedures for the implementation of the eGuardian system no later than
June 30, 2010. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Americas' Security Affairs estimates that the fielding and
implementation of eGuardian will begin in September 2010.
Implementation in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility will be scheduled
in four phases, followed by a fifth phase for the other Geographical
Combatant Commands. Each implementation phase will involve all Service
components, Services, and agencies and each phase will require 60-to-90
days for completion.
cyber attacks
32. Senator LeMieux. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, in your opinion, how
should government-sanctioned Chinese cyber penetrations of American
companies be categorized? Is it an act of war, a violation of
international law, or something else?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is my belief that, depending on the
circumstances, a cyber intrusion into a privately owned network could
constitute one of the following: a violation of international law, a
violation of domestic law, espionage, a violation of a State's
sovereignty, or an act of trespass. In my opinion, such an intrusion
would only be an act of war if it were conducted by an identifiable
adversary and included demonstrated intent, planning, and execution,
leading to actual destruction of our infrastructure or our financial
system.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
homeland response
33. Senator Collins. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, in the recently
released QDR, the Pentagon announced plans to develop HRFs in each of
the 10 FEMA regions. These units would respond to domestic incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction, or other catastrophic disasters.
How do you envision the HRF's coordinating, planning, training, and
exercising with the FEMA regional offices?
Admiral Winnefeld. NORTHCOM is working closely with the National
Guard Bureau and other mission partners to develop integrated plans for
employment of the HRFs. The HRF concept aligns the HRFs with the 10
FEMA regions and tasks them with coordinating regionally focused
military planning, training, exercises, and other efforts to support
unity of effort across Federal, State, and local responses. As such, I
would expect a close coordinating relationship between the HRFs and the
FEMA regional offices, as well as with the NORTHCOM Defense
Coordinating Officer within each FEMA region. If confirmed, I look
forward to working together with the National Guard Bureau as the HRF
capability stands up.
34. Senator Collins. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, one of the most
effective ways to enhance our National preparedness is to develop
coordinated and detailed plans for preventing and responding to
disasters before they occur. DOD has unique planning capabilities that
can be brought to bear to assist in these efforts. How can the
Pentagon, and NORTHCOM specifically, more effectively leverage its
planning expertise to assist DHS and other Federal agencies in planning
for catastrophic natural disasters or terrorist attacks?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is my understanding that DOD (including
NORTHCOM) has for some time leveraged its planning expertise to assist
DHS and other Federal agencies under the Integrated Planning System
(set forth in the National Strategy for Homeland Security of 2007, and
Annex I (National Planning) to Homeland Security Presidential Directive
8 (HSPD-8) (National Preparedness). Specifically:
NORTHCOM planners participate, in coordination with
OSD and the Joint Staff, in all levels of planning with DHS and
FEMA, from mission analysis to approved and published Federal
plans.
NORTHCOM, when requested by DHS/FEMA, routinely sends
planners to assist in planning efforts.
NORTHCOM attends and hosts planning conferences with
its mission partners to coordinate and provide planning
assistance.
NORTHCOM shares its plans with critical mission
partners, including Federal agencies.
The National Security Staff is leading the development of a
National Preparedness Presidential Policy Directive that will supersede
HSPD-8 (including Annex I) and will implement a new planning system. If
confirmed, I will ensure NORTHCOM continues to provide planning
expertise on the development of Federal interagency plans, attend and
host planner-related events, and continue to share plans and
information to foster a closer working relationship with Federal
partners.
______
[The nomination reference of VADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr.,
USN, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 20, 2010.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Navy to the
grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be Admiral.
VADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., 5212.
______
[The biographical sketch of VADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr.,
USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Department of the Navy,
2000 Navy Pentagon,
Washington, DC, October 29, 2009.
Hon. Carl Levin, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The President, under the provisions of section
601, title 10, U.S.C., has submitted to the Senate the nomination of
Vice Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., U.S. Navy, for appointment to the
grade of admiral.
Vice Admiral Winnefeld is presently serving as Director, Strategic
Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff; Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to
the United Nations Military Staff Committee. He will be assigned as
Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
Command. He is 53 years of age.
This action will not result in the Navy exceeding the number of
authorized four-star positions.
For the information of the committee, I am enclosing a career
resume on Vice Admiral Winnefeld which includes a summary of his joint
duty assignments.
Most respectfully,
R.S. Erskine,
Director, Flag Officer
Management and Distribution.
cc:
Hon. John McCain, Ranking Member,
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
______
Transcript of Naval Service for VADM James Alexander Winnefeld, Jr.,
USN
24 April 1956............................. Born in Coronado, CA
07 June 1978.............................. Ensign
07 June 1980.............................. Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 July 1982.............................. Lieutenant
01 September 1988......................... Lieutenant Commander
01 September 1992......................... Commander
01 September 1997......................... Captain
01 October 2003........................... Rear Admiral (lower half)
06 May 2006............................... Designated Rear Admiral
while serving in billets
commensurate with that
grade
01 August 2006............................ Rear Admiral
14 September 2007......................... Vice Admiral, Service
continuous to date
Assignments and duties:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Station, Annapolis, MD (Division Officer). June 1978 Nov. 1978
Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL Nov. 1978 Apr. 1979
(DUINS)........................................
Training Squadron SIX (Student)................. Apr. 1979 June 1979
Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL June 1979 Dec. 1979
(DUINS)........................................
Training Squadron TWO THREE (Student)........... June 1979 Dec. 1979
Training Squadron TWO TWO (Student)............. Dec. 1979 May 1980
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Replacement Jun. 1980 Apr. 1981
Pilot).........................................
Fighter Squadron TWO FOUR (Power Plants Branch Apr. 1981 Nov. 1983
Officer).......................................
Naval Fighter Weapons School, San Diego, CA Nov. 1983 Jan. 1987
(Quality Assurance Officer)....................
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Replacement Naval Jan. 1987 Apr. 1987
Aviator).......................................
Fighter Squadron ONE (Operations Officer)....... Apr. 1987 Jan. 1990
Joint Staff (Action Officer, EUCOM/CENTCOM Feb. 1990 July 1991
Branch, J3)....................................
Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp to the Chaiiman July 1991 Aug. 1992
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)..................
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Student)......... Aug. 1992 Jan. 1993
XO, Fighter Squadron TWO ONE ONE................ Jan. 1993 Apr. 1994
CO, Fighter Squadron TWO ONE ONE................ Apr. 1994 Mar. 1995
Naval Nuclear Power Training Command, Orlando, Mar. 1995 Feb. 1996
FL (Student)...................................
Prospective Executive Officer, USS John C. Feb. 1996 Mar. 1996
Stennis (CVN 74)...............................
Naval Reactors, Department of Energy, Mar. 1996 Aug. 1996
Washington, DC (Student).......................
XO, USS John C Stennis (CVN 74)................. Aug. 1996 May 1998
CO, USS Cleveland (LPD 7)....................... May 1998 Feb. 2000
CO, USS Enterprise (CVN 65)..................... Feb. 2000 Mar. 2002
Office of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations Mar. 2002 July 2003
(Executive Assistant)..........................
Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Director, July 2003 Dec. 2004
Warfare Programs and Readiness) (N8)...........
Commander, Carrier Strike Group TWO............. Dec. 2004 June 2006
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (Director June 2006 Aug. 2007
of Joint Innovation and Experimentation, J9)...
Commander, SIXTH Fleet/Commander, Striking and Sep. 2007 Aug. 2008
Support Forces NATO/Deputy Commander, U.S.
Naval Forces Europe/Commander, Joint
Headquarters Lisbon............................
Joint Staff (Director, Strategic Plans and Aug. 2008 To date
Policy) (J5)/Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to
the United Nations Military Staff Committee....
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medals and awards:
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with two Gold Stars
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Air Medal with First Strike/Flight Award
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Navy Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star
Navy ``E'' Ribbon with ``E'' Device
National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two Bronze Stars
Southwest Asia Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star and one Bronze
Star
Expert Pistol Shot Medal
Special qualifications:
BS (Aerospace Engineering) Georgia Institute of Technology, 1978
Designated Naval Aviator, 1980
Capstone, 2004-3
Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009
Personal data:
Wife: Mary Alice Werner of Menomonie, WI
Children: James A. Winnefeld (Son) Born: 29 November 1995; and
Jonathan J. Winnefeld (Son) Born: 11 May 1998.
Summary of joint duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Staff (Action Officer, Feb. 90-July 91 LCDR
EUCOM/CENTCOM Branch, J3).......
Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp July 91-Aug. 92 CDR
to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff)................
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces June 06-Aug. 07 RADM
Command (Director of Joint
Innovation and Experimentation,
J9).............................
Commander, SIXTH Fleet/Commander, Sep. 07-Aug. 08 VADM
Striking and Support Forces NATO/
Deputy Commander, U.S. Naval
Forces Europe/Commander, Joint
Headquarters Lisbon.............
Joint Staff (Director, Strategic Aug. 08-To date VADM
Plans and Policy) (J5)/Senior
Member, U.S. Delegation to the
United Nations Military Staff
Committee.......................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by VADM James A.
Winnefeld, Jr., USN, in connection with his nomination
follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
James A. Winnefeld, Jr. (nickname: Sandy)
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace
Defense Command.
3. Date of nomination:
20 January 2010.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
24 April 1956; Coronado, CA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to the former Mary Alice Werner.
7. Names and ages of children:
James A. Winnefeld III, age 13; Jonathan J. Winnefeld, age 11.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member (otherwise referred to as a Trustee) of U.S. Naval Academy
Foundation: Athletic and Scholarship Programs (a nonprofit
organization).
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Member of the Academy of Distinguished Engineering Alumni, Georgia
Institute of Technology.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
James A. Winnefeld, Jr.
This 29th day of October, 2009.
[The nomination of VADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on May 5, 2010, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 7, 2010.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Keith B. Alexander,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-
Nichols Act has been a remarkable achievement. Our military forces are
more interoperable today than they ever have been in our Nation's
history. I do not see a need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act at
this time.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. In accordance with Secretary of Defense guidance of June
23, 2009, the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command is responsible for
executing the specified cyberspace missions detailed in Section 18d(3)
of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) as delegated by the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command to secure our freedom of action in cyber space and
mitigate the risks to our national security that come from our
dependence on cyberspace and the associated threats and
vulnerabilities. Subject to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command,
delegation and in coordination with mission partners, specific missions
include: integrating cyberspace operations and synchronizing
warfighting effects across the global security environment; providing
support to civil authorities and international partners; directing
global information grid operations and defense; executing full-spectrum
military cyberspace operations; serving as the focal point for
deconfliction of the Department of Defense (DOD) offensive cyberspace
operations; providing improved shared situational awareness of
cyberspace operations, including indications and warning; and providing
military representation to U.S. national agencies, U.S. commercial
agencies, and international agencies for cyberspace matters.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I am deeply honored that the President nominated me to be
the first Commander of U.S. Cyber Command. Over the past 3 decades, I
have served in a wide variety of Joint and Army positions, including 15
years in command, that have prepared me well for the challenges ahead
if confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
First, I have 35 years in the profession of arms, serving in
various command, staff and intelligence positions in the military. I
have served as the Deputy Chief of Staff of Intelligence, Headquarters,
Department of the Army; Commanding General of the U.S. Army
Intelligence and Security Command; Director of Intelligence, U.S.
Central Command; and Deputy Director for Requirements, Capabilities,
Assessments, and Doctrine, J-2, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Second, my experiences and knowledge gained over the last 4\1/2\
years serving as Director, National Security Agency (NSA), Chief,
Central Security Service and Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command-Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) have been instrumental in preparing
me for the challenges of this new complex warfighting domain that is
cyberspace. NSA's cryptologic work in SIGINT/Computer Network
Exploitation, Information Assurance and Network Threat Operations is
second to none and foundational to our future success in the cyber
domain. I have personally championed NSA's work and learned a great
deal from the outstanding professionals at NSA/CSS. Over the last 4\1/
2\ years, I have also forged important partnerships with both our
allies and with industry to strengthen the defense of our collective
networks. Furthermore, my assignment as the Commander, JFCC-NW,
including operational control over Joint Task Force-Global Network
Operations (JTF-GNO) for the past 18 months, has provided me with the
experience, particularly in the realm of deliberate and crisis action
planning, to ensure the effective execution of cyberspace
responsibilities as directed by the Secretary of Defense through
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
Finally, I believe my academic background has intellectually
prepared me for the challenges of high-level command and complex
environments. I have Masters of Science degrees in Business
Administration, Systems Technology (Electronic Warfare) and Physics, as
well as National Security Strategy.
Question. If confirmed as the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command,
would you have command of or exercise operational control of the
Defense Information Systems Agency's (DISA) and Military Services'
communications networks?
Answer. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, I will be
responsible for directing the operation and defense of DOD's military
information networks as specified in the UCP and as delegated by
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. I will execute this mission through
each of the Service Network Operations and Security Centers. I will not
exercise command or operational control over the DISA communications
networks. DISA will continue to be responsible for acquiring,
engineering and provisioning enterprise infrastructure to assure the
availability of military information networks. As a Combat Support
Agency, DISA will maintain a close working relationship with U.S. Cyber
Command, providing expertise on the networks, communications and
computing infrastructure operated by DISA through both a DISA Field
Office and a DISA Support Element.
Question. As a career intelligence officer, what experience do you
have that qualifies you to command these networks and to command
military forces and military operations?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. I fundamentally believe that there is always something to
be learned to enhance my expertise in this very complex and dynamically
changing domain. If confirmed, I will engage with combatant commanders
to understand better how U.S. Cyber Command can best support and help
meet their operational missions. Additionally, I would engage with key
officials and personnel within the Executive and Legislative branches
of the U.S. Government, senior military leaders, and leaders throughout
the Intelligence Community in order to identify, assess, and mitigate
the cyber threats we face.
Question. Is there a precedent for a career intelligence officer to
serve as a combatant commander?
Answer. I know of no career intelligence officers who have
previously served as either a combatant or subunified commander.
However, two former Directors of NSA, General Lew Allen and Admiral
Noel Gayler, served with great distinction as the Chief of Staff, U.S.
Air Force and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, respectively.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship the Commander, U.S.
Cyber Command, will have to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Pursuant to title 10, U.S.C., section 164, subject to the
direction of the President, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command,
performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense and is directly responsible to the Secretary for
the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the
command. As a subunified command under the authority, direction, and
control of the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Cyber Command
will be directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command . If confirmed, I will work closely
with the Secretary in coordination with Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command, on matters of strategic importance.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. In accordance with title 10, U.S.C., section 132, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense will perform such duties and exercise
powers prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense will act for and exercise the powers of the Secretary of
Defense when the Secretary is disabled or the office is vacant. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary, in
coordination with Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, on matters of
strategic importance.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
Answer. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of
2004 established the Director of National Intelligence to act as the
head of the Intelligence Community, principal advisor to the President,
National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council on
intelligence matters pertaining to national security, and to oversee
and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.
Pursuant to title 50, U.S.C., section 403, subject to the authority,
direction, and control of the President, the Director of National
Intelligence is responsible to coordinate national intelligence
priorities and to facilitate information sharing among the Intelligence
Community. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command and through the Secretary of Defense to coordinate
and exchange information with the Director of National Intelligence as
needed to ensure unified effort and the leveraging of available
synergies within the Intelligence Community to support matters of
national security.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their
respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries
exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their
responsibilities, the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and
directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command, on all policy issues that affect U.S. Cyber Command
operations.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their
respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries
exercise policy and oversight functions and, in discharging their
responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and
directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, on matters in the area of U.S. Cyber Command's
assigned responsibilities.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their
respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries
exercise policy and oversight functions and, in discharging their
responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and
directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination
with Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, on matters in the area of U.S.
Cyber Command's assigned responsibilities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration .
Answer. Under the authority of DOD Directive 5144.1 and consistent
with titles 10, 40, and 44, U.S.C., the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) serves as the DOD
Chief Information Officer (CIO) and is the principal staff assistant
and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense
on networks and network-centric policies and concepts; command and
control (C2); communications; non-intelligence space matters;
enterprise-wide integration of DOD information matters; Information
Technology (IT), including National Security Systems (NSS); information
resource management (IRM); spectrum management; network operations;
information systems; information assurance; positioning, navigation,
and timing policy, including airspace and military-air-traffic control
activities; sensitive information integration; contingency support and
migration planning; and related matters. Pursuant to chapter 113,
subchapter III of 40 U.S.C., the ASD(NII)/DOD CIO has responsibilities
for integrating information and related activities and services across
DOD. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration through
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, on matters in the area of U.S. Cyber Command's
assigned responsibilities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
executes responsibilities including overall supervision of the homeland
defense activities of the DOD while serving under the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy. Any relationship the Commander, U.S. Cyber
Command requires with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Security would exist with and through the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense in concert with Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command, Commander, U.S. Northern Command, and
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command on related national security issues.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the
President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. title
10, U.S.C., section 163 allows communication between the President or
the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to flow through
the Chairman. By custom and tradition, and as instructed by the UCP, I
would normally communicate with the Chairman in coordination with the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 165, subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and
subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries
of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and
support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.
The authority exercised by a subunified combatant commander over
Service components is quite clear but requires close coordination with
each Secretary to ensure that there is no infringement upon those
lawful responsibilities which a Secretary alone may discharge. If
confirmed, I look forward to building a strong and productive
relationship with each of the Secretaries of the Military Departments
in partnership with Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Service Chiefs are charged to provide organized,
trained, and equipped forces to be employed by combatant commanders in
accomplishing their assigned missions. Additionally, these officers
serve as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as such have a lawful
obligation to provide military advice. Individually and collectively,
the Service Chiefs are a tremendous source of experience and judgment.
If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Service
Chiefs.
Question. The combatant commanders and specifically the Commanders
of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command.
Answer. U.S. Cyber Command is a subordinate unified command under
U.S. Strategic Command. The Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, will have
both supported and supporting relationships with other combatant
commanders, largely identified within the UCP, the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan, execute orders and operation orders. In general, the
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, will be the supported commander for
planning, leading, and conducting DOD defensive cyber and global
network operations and, in general, is a supporting commander for
offensive missions. Specific relationships with Commander, U.S.
Northern Command will be delineated by the Secretary of Defense or the
President in execute and/or operation orders. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the combatant commanders to broaden and enhance
the level and range of these relationships.
Question. The Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency.
Answer. DISA is a DOD combat support agency that provides command
and control capabilities and enterprise infrastructure to continuously
operate and assure a global net-centric enterprise in direct support to
join warfighters, national-level leaders, and other mission and
coalition partners across the full spectrum of operations. Commander,
U.S. Cyber Command must maintain a close relationship with the
Director, DISA to coordinate and represent requirements in this mission
area, in order to accomplish U.S. Strategic Command delegated UCP
missions. To this end, Lieutenant General Pollett, the current Director
of DISA, has committed to providing both a DISA Field Office as well as
a DISA support element unique to U.S. Cyber Command. If confirmed, I
will continue to work closely with the Director of DISA on matters of
shared interest and importance.
oversight
Question. The duties of the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command will
include conducting integrated intelligence collection and offensive and
defensive operations in cyberspace. However, the resourcing, planning,
programming and budgeting, and oversight of these three basic
activities is fragmented within DOD, the executive branch as a whole,
and within Congress. Multiple elements within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have responsibilities for one
or more of the missions of Cyber Command. The same is true for the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, as well
as the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees in Congress. The
single point of confluence would be the Commander of Cyber Command,
dual-hatted as the Director of NSA.
How do you anticipate that the Department will ensure the necessary
degree of coordination and timely decisionmaking across the Department
to guide the operations and resourcing of Cyber Command?
Answer. Through the Secretary of Defense's policy initiatives for
cyberspace operations and implementation guidance concerning national
security directives, the Department will ensure the necessary degree of
coordination and timely decisionmaking across the Department to guide
the operations and resourcing of U.S. Cyber Command. If confirmed, I
envision that the Department will retain its commitment to close
coordination both internally and externally to guide the operations and
resourcing of this command.
Question. What is the risk, in your view, that this fragmented
policy and oversight structure will result in a lack of coherent
oversight of cyberspace and U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. I believe we have a coherent policy and oversight structure
in place for cyberspace and that there is no risk that we will lack
coherent oversight. If confirmed, I can assure you that my actions will
be guided by the authorities vested in me by the Secretary of Defense
and Commander, U.S. Strategic Command and oversight of my actions will
be clearly auditable for overseers.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. I believe the major challenge that will confront the
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command will be improving the defense of our
military networks as they exist today. Additionally, in order to defend
those networks and make good decisions in exercising operational
control over them, U.S. Cyber Command will require much greater
situational awareness and real-time visibility of intrusions into our
networks. Finally, I believe the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command will
have to identify continuously policy and authority gaps to U.S.
Strategic Command and our civilian leadership as computer and
communication technologies evolve.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. What are your priorities for the U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
u.s. cyber command missions
Question. In an overarching sense, how do you define the U.S. Cyber
Command missions?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
offensive cyber warfare capabilities
Question. The attached solicitations and program descriptions show
that the military services are developing capabilities to stealthily
penetrate foreign computer networks, maintain a presence on those
networks, collect and extract information clandestinely, and undertake
offensive actions. The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace
Operations, published in 2006, also indicates that the U.S. military
places considerable importance on acquiring potent offensive cyber
warfare capabilities.
Does DOD possess significant capabilities to conduct military
operations in cyberspace at the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is there a substantial mismatch between the ability of
the United States to conduct operations in cyberspace and the level of
development of policies governing such operations?
Answer. President Obama's cybersecurity 60-day study highlighted
the mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations
and the governing laws and policies, and our civilian leadership is
working hard to resolve the mismatch. In the June 23, 2009 memorandum
outlining the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command, the Secretary of
Defense directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to lead a
review of policy and strategy to develop a comprehensive approach to
DOD cyberspace operations. This review is active and ongoing.
Question. Are you concerned that you are being assigned to command
an organization that may be directed to conduct activities whose
legality and rules have not been worked out?
Answer. Given current operations, there are sufficient law, policy,
and authorities to govern DOD cyberspace operations. If confirmed, I
will operate within applicable laws, policies, and authorities. I will
also identify any gaps in doctrine, policy and law that may prevent
national objectives from being fully realized or executed to the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. When does the administration intend to close existing
policy gaps?
Answer. The administration has provided a comprehensive set of
cyber security initiatives that will inform policy making (e.g.,
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) and the
President's Strategy to Secure Cyberspace). In support of the Secretary
of Defense, we will continue to work to identify gaps, inform the
development of meaningful and enduring national cyber policy, and be
prepared to adjust rapidly to changes.
support to the comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative
Question. Under the CNCI, NSA is providing support to the
Department of Homeland Security.
What is the nature and extent of that support?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is this support provided as a DOD activity or as an
intelligence activity through the Director of National Intelligence? If
the latter, what is the Secretary of Defense's role as the President's
executive agent for signals intelligence (SIGINT) under Executive Order
12333?
Answer. The support provided by NSA to DHS is provided as a DOD
activity, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence.
Specifically, with respect to the Foreign Intelligence support to
DHS, per Executive Order 12333, as amended, NSA is an element of both
the Intelligence Community, of which the Director of National
Intelligence serves as the head, and DOD, whose Secretary acts, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, as the
Executive Agent for the U.S. Government for SIGINT activities. In these
capacities, NSA conducts SIGINT activities for both national and
departmental requirements.
Further, with respect to Information Assurance support to DHS, for
such support that is given in connection with NSSs, National Security
Directive 42 provides that the Secretary of Defense shall serve as the
executive agent of the Government for National Security
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security. NSD 42 further
designates the Director NSA as the National Manager for National
Security Telecommunications and Information's Systems Security and is
responsible to the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for carrying
out those responsibilities. With respect to Information Assurance
support to DHS that is provided in connection with non-NSSs, NSA is
authorized by EO12333 to provide technical assistance to other U.S.
Government departments and agencies for either NSSs or non-NSSs.
support to civil authorities
Question. DOD officials have informed the committee that U.S. Cyber
Command will have a mission to support civil authorities, such as the
Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies, to help
defend government networks and critical infrastructure networks owned
and operated by the private sector.
Please describe in detail your understanding of the ways that U.S.
Cyber Command is most likely to assist civil authorities.
Answer. If I am confirmed as Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, I will
work closely with the Commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S.
Northern Command to answer any request for assistance from the
Department of Homeland Security. Our assistance could include technical
assistance and recommendations for immediate defensive actions, as well
as technical assistance and recommendations for more systemic
mitigation, such as improvements in network configurations and
improvements in information assurance measures or best practices.
Additionally, U.S. Cyber Command would continually assess the cyber
threat to DOD's information systems to ensure we are prepared to
provide cyber support to civil authorities in the event of a cyber
threat to the Nation's critical infrastructure.
Question. U.S. Northern Command was established to serve as the
focal point for DOD support to civil authorities.
Will cybersecurity support to civil authorities be provided through
U.S. Northern Command, as a supported command, or otherwise? If not,
why not?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
use of force in cyberspace
Question. Does DOD have a definition for what constitutes use of
force in cyberspace, and will that definition be the same for U.S.
activities in cyberspace and those of other nations?
Answer. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that states shall
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State. DOD operations are
conducted consistent with international law principles in regard to
what is a threat or use of force in terms of hostile intent and hostile
act, as reflected in the Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules
for the Use of Force (SROE/SRUF).
There is no international consensus on a precise definition of a
use of force, in or out of cyberspace. Consequently, individual nations
may assert different definitions, and may apply different thresholds
for what constitutes a use of force. Thus, whether in the cyber or any
other domain, there is always potential disagreement among nations
concerning what may amount to a threat or use of force.
Remainder of answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Has DOD or the administration as a whole determined what
constitutes use of force in cyberspace in relation to the War Powers
Act, the exercise of the right of self-defense under the U.N. Charter,
and the triggering of collective defense obligations? If not, when will
these fundamental policy issues be resolved?
Answer. The President of the United States determines what is a
threat or use of force/armed attack against the United States and
authorizes DOD through the SROE to exercise our national right of self-
defense recognized by the U.N. Charter. This determination involves an
objective and subjective analysis that considers the facts surrounding
a particular cyber attack, and is made within the bounds of U.S. and
international law. If the President determines a cyber event does meet
the threshold of a use of force/armed attack, he may determine that the
activity is of such scope, duration, or intensity that it warrants
exercising our right to self-defense and/or the initiation of
hostilities as an appropriate response. It is also within the
President's authority to determine, based upon the circumstances of any
event, including a cyber event, and the contemplated response, what
consultations and reports to Congress are necessary consistent with the
provisions of the War Powers Resolution. The U.N. Charter recognizes a
State's inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, and
the United States would evaluate its collective defense obligations
when another State is threatened or subject to a use of force in the
cyber domain just as it would in the other warfighting domains.
Question. Could U.S. Cyber Command lawfully employ offensive cyber
weapons against computers located abroad that have been determined to
be sources of an attack on the United States or U.S. deployed forces if
we do not know who is responsible for the attack (i.e., a foreign
government or non-state actors)?
Answer. The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command, in and of itself,
does not change the lawful employment of military force for self-
defense. In this case, if the ``attack'' met the criteria approved by
the President in our Standing Rules of Engagement, the military would
exercise its obligation of self-defense. Operationally, it is difficult
to develop an effective response when we do not know who is responsible
for an ``attack''; however, the circumstances may be such that at least
some level of mitigating action can be taken even when we are not
certain who is responsible. Regardless whether we know who is
responsible, international law requires that our use of force in self-
defense be proportional and discriminate. Neither proportionality nor
discrimination requires that we know who is responsible before we take
defensive action.
Question. Without confident ``attribution,'' under international
law, would DOD, in your judgment, be allowed to ``fire back'' without
first asking the host government to deal with the attack?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Traditionally, espionage has not been regarded as a use
of force or an act of war. Generally speaking, in cyberspace
operations, experts agree that gaining access to a target for
intelligence collection is tantamount to gaining the ability to attack
that target. If a penetration is detected, the victim cannot determine
whether the purpose of the activity is limited to espionage or also
constitutes preparation for an attack.
With the foregoing in mind, are there or should there be classes of
U.S. or allied targets that the U.S. Government would consider off-
limits from hostile penetration because of the danger that any such
breaches would present to national security?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Would or should such targets be immune to penetration by
the United States in peacetime even for intelligence collection?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
authorities of commander, u.s. cyber command
Question. Offensive cyber warfare weapons or operations could have
devastating effects, depending on the target of the attack and the
method used, which conceivably could be comparable to those caused by
weapons of mass destruction.
If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, would you have the
authority to use offensive cyber weapons against the following
representative classes of targets:
Military command and control networks;
Military air defense networks;
Military platforms and weapons;
Power grids;
Banks and other financial institutions and networks;
Transportation-related networks; and
National telecommunications networks?
Answer. The categories listed are all potential targets of military
attack, both kinetic and cyber, under the right circumstances. It is
difficult for me to conceive of an instance where it would be
appropriate to attack a bank or a financial institution, unless perhaps
it was being used solely to support enemy military operations.
Offensive cyber weapons would only be authorized under specific
lawful orders by the Secretary of Defense and the President and would
normally come with supplemental rules of engagement.
All military operations, to include actions taken in cyberspace,
must comply with international law that governs military operations.
Specifically, any U.S. military operation must comport with the
principles of military necessity, discrimination, and proportionality.
These legal principles are addressed during the planning and
operational phases of all military operations.
Question. Do you have this authority now as the Joint Functional
Component Commander for Network Warfare?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. At what level of command can decisions be made to pre-
deploy offensive cyber weapons against these same classes of targets?
Will this change after the standup of U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. This authority rests with the Secretary of Defense and the
President. It will not change after U.S. Cyber Command is established.
Question. Operations in cyberspace occur at nearly the speed of
light. Speed of response is widely considered to be necessary in some
circumstances when operating in cyberspace.
Is there currently or do you anticipate that there will be a
requirement to pre-authorize the use of force in cyberspace below the
level of the National Command Authority? If so, to what level and in
what circumstances?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is it your understanding that, as is the case with the
Commander of the subunified U.S. Forces Korea Command, the subunified
Commander of Cyber Command will have freedom of action to fight the
war?
Answer. The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command will have freedom of
action to conduct military operations in cyberspace based upon the
authorities provided by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. Because cyberspace is not
generally bounded by geography, the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command
will have to coordinate with U.S. agencies and combatant commanders
that would be affected by actions taken in cyberspace.
Question. What is the role of the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command, in directing or approving courses of action of the Commander,
U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, as the combatant
commander, has the responsibility to specify U.S. Cyber Command
missions and tasks and delegate appropriate authority to accomplish
those tasks. In accordance with joint doctrine, authority is normally
given to subordinate commanders to select the methodology for
accomplishing the mission, including selection and approval of courses
of action. However, this authority may be limited by directives or
other orders of the superior commander. Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command has indicated to the Secretary of Defense he will delegate
authority for all UCP cyber tasks, with the exception of advocacy for
cyberspace capabilities and integration of the Theater Security
Cooperation activities with Geographic Combatant Commanders.
laws of war
Question. Has DOD determined how the laws of armed conflict
(including the principles of military necessity in choosing targets,
proportionality with respect to collateral damage and unintended
consequences, and distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants)
apply to cyber warfare with respect to both nation-states and non-state
entities (e.g., terrorists, criminals), and both when the source of an
attack is known and unknown?
Answer. Per DOD guidance, all military operations must be in
compliance with the laws of armed conflict--this includes cyber
operations as well. The law of war principles of military necessity,
proportionality and distinction will apply when conducting cyber
operations.
Question. If not, when will the Department produce authoritative
positions on these issues?
Answer. See answer above.
balancing equities
Question. There have been many instances in history where military
and political leaders had to struggle with the choice of acting on
intelligence information to save lives or forestall an enemy success
but at the cost of the enemy learning that their communications,
information, or capabilities had been compromised. These choices are
referred to as ``balancing equities'' or ``gain-loss'' calculations.
U.S. Cyber Command is to be headed by the Director of the NSA, which,
like all intelligence agencies, could be naturally expected to seek to
protect sensitive sources and methods.
Who will be in charge of the equities/gain-loss process for
cyberspace within the military?
Answer. Within DOD, the equities/gain-loss process is built into
the deliberate and crisis action planning process and initiated by the
combatant commanders. In most cases, the gain-loss recommendation
within DOD is initially made by the supported combatant commander after
the risk of loss is well articulated by the Intelligence Community. If
there is disagreement I, as the commander of JFCC NW, serve as the
focal point for DOD offensive cyberspace operations in accordance with
the deconfliction process directed in NSPD-38. If the NSPD-38
deconfliction process does not resolve the interagency disagreement,
the issue goes to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of
Defense, the NSC Deputies, the NSC Principals, and then the President,
where the gain-loss determination continues to be considered. (In
counterterrorism issues, the National Counterterrorism Center is
brought in before the Deputies Committee considers the issue.) If
confirmed as Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, I will continue to have
responsibility for this process within the Department.
Question. If these decisions will rest with the Commander of Cyber
Command, how would you expect the process to work to ensure that the
combatant commands, the Military Services, and other defense agencies
have the opportunity to defend their interests and are not overruled by
NSA?
Answer. We would use the process outlined by the Joint Staff and
used by other combatant commands. Intelligence Gain-Loss is a
consideration of target vetting and is coordinated with the
Intelligence Community agencies and with supporting combatant commands
throughout the planning process. Those agencies and commands provide
comments on their equities and issues for the commander's review and
validation. The supported command then makes a determination based on
their mission and expected effects. If the targeting issues cannot be
resolved between the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command/Director, NSA and
the Federal Bureau of Investigations Cyber Division, the issue goes to
the NSC Deputies Committee, and if still unresolved, the NSC Principals
Committee.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that equities/gain-loss
decisions are made for the Nation as a whole? How will the interests of
the vulnerable private sector, critical infrastructure, and civil
agencies be weighed in the selection of targets for intelligence
collection and attack in wartime?
Answer. Our deconfliction process, documented in a Tri-lateral
Memorandum of Agreement among DOD, DoJ and the Intelligence Community,
includes appropriate representation of other agencies as directed in
NSPD-38. As with targeting issues within the Department, the reclama
process for issues spanning Federal agencies matriculate from the
Seniors to the Deputies Committee to the Principals Committee if they
remain unresolved.
deterrence and escalation control
Question. The U.S. Government currently does not appear to have a
cyber warfare deterrence strategy or doctrine. Promulgating such a
doctrine requires at least some broad statements of capabilities and
intentions regarding the use of offensive cyber capabilities, both to
influence potential adversaries and to reassure allies. Such statements
are not possible given the current degree of classification of all
aspects of U.S. cyber warfare capabilities.
Do you agree that it is necessary to declassify some information
about U.S. cyber warfare capabilities in order to support deterrence
and engagement with allies and potential adversaries?
Answer. I agree and fully support the President's executive order
regarding security classification. This is a complex subject, and we
will continue to implement directed policies and inform policymakers of
operational impacts.
Question. Is there a process and timetable in place to accomplish
this objective?
Answer. I am not aware of any plan or timetable to declassify
detailed information about U.S. offensive cyber capabilities.
Articulating new processes and timetables would flow from direction set
by the White House.
Question. Most experts believe that the attacker has a substantial
advantage over the defender in cyber warfare. It is also widely
believed that preemptively striking first against an adversary's
networks offers an advantage if the adversary's command and control
networks can be degraded, and because the attacker can take steps to
protect itself from a retaliatory attack. These considerations suggest
that cyber warfare is currently ``unstable'' from the perspective of
classic deterrence theory and escalation control.
Do you, or to your knowledge, experts in the Department, have a
different view of these dynamics?
Answer. I'd certainly agree that cyber warfare has unique and
important differences from classic deterrence theory and escalation
control. Experts, both inside and outside government, as well as within
DOD and Intelligence Communities, have widely differing views of these
dynamics, as should be expected. A consensus has yet to emerge, either
on how to characterize the strategic ``instability'' or on what to do
about it.
u.s. military strategy in cyberspace
Question. The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations
(NMS-CO), December 2006, states that ``The United States must have
cyberspace superiority to ensure our freedom of action and deny the
same to our adversaries through the integration of network defense,
exploitation, and attack. . . . The NMS-CO is the comprehensive
military strategy for the U.S. Armed Forces to ensure U.S. superiority
in cyberspace.''
Is this strategy statement consistent with current policy? If not,
is there a plan to issue a new or revised NMS-CO?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is this strategy realistic in light of the vulnerability
of U.S. Government and private networks to attack?
Answer. The military strategic goal of cyberspace superiority is
realistic, but not without difficulty in achieving its objectives in
the current national security environment. The 42 tasks in the NMS-CO
Implementation Plan continue to inform how DOD will move towards
achieving cyberspace superiority. Many of these tasks are defensive,
directed at addressing the vulnerabilities of the DOD networks, and
take into consideration the fact that the internet is a completely
connected environment where both DOD and private networks reside.
Question. In an interview on ``60 Minutes,'' former Director of
National Intelligence Michael McConnell said that ``If I were an
attacker and I wanted to do strategic damage to the United States . . .
I would sack electric power on the U.S. east coast, maybe the west
coast, and attempt to cause a cascading effect. All of those things are
in the art of the possible from a sophisticated attacker.'' He was then
asked whether he believes that adversaries have the ability to bring
down the power grid, and he replied ``I do.'' Crippling the U.S. power
grid would not only cause catastrophic economic problems; presumably it
would lead to significant loss of life, especially if the outage was
prolonged. Likewise, it could cripple DOD's ability to generate and
sustain forces.
In light of our current vulnerability to cyber attack, what is the
risk in your view that DOD and U.S. Cyber Command could be deterred
from undertaking coercive action against countries such as Iran or
North Korea because of the possibility that they could successfully
launch devastating attacks on critical U.S. infrastructure?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is this level of vulnerability consistent with the NMS-CO
assertion that the United States ensures ``superiority'' in cyberspace?
Answer. Yes, it is consistent that the United States seeks to
ensure superiority in cyberspace: Even with the clear understanding
that we could experience damage to our infrastructure, we must be
prepared to ``fight through'' in the worst case scenario. Based on
vulnerability, step one is to ensure that we can defend our networks.
In fact, the use of the term superiority, versus dominance or
supremacy, reflects the limits of our capabilities throughout the
domain. Having recognized the gap between the end states of the NMS-CO
and current capabilities, the Department developed an implementation
plan to close these gaps. The current state of our networks presents a
strategic vulnerability for the Department and the Nation. If
confirmed, I will focus U.S. Cyber Command on securing the Department's
networks and, as requested, assisting other Federal agencies to secure
the networks for which they are responsible.
Question. The NMS-CO states that ``U.S. law and national policy
assign DOD three main roles: defense of the Nation, national incident
response, and critical infrastructure protection. . . . Although
partner departments and agencies have responsibilities to secure
portions of cyberspace, only DOD conducts military operations to defend
cyberspace, the critical infrastructure, the homeland, or other vital
U.S. interests. If defense of a vital interest is implicated, DOD's
national defense mission takes primacy even if that would conflict
with, or subsume, the other support missions.''
Are these statements consistent with DOD's statements that U.S.
Cyber Command will not have the mission to defend the ``.gov'' and
``.com'' networks?
Answer. Yes, they are consistent. Although U.S. Cyber Command's
mission will not include defense of the .gov and .com domains, given
the integration of cyberspace into the operation of much of our
critical infrastructure and the conduct of commerce and governance, it
is the obligation of the Department to be prepared to provide military
options to the President and Secretary of Defense if our national
security is threatened. Any defensive action in support of a domain
other than .mil would require a proper request for assistance or a
directive from the President.
Question. Has ``critical infrastructure'' been formally defined or
otherwise identified for the purposes of cybersecurity?
Answer. Yes, specifically ``critical infrastructure'' has been
formally defined in HSPD-7 as those systems or assets, whether physical
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those matters.
Question. Do these statements reflect current policy?
Answer. Yes, they reflect current policy.
Question. Do these statements mean that DOD's mission to defend the
Nation ``takes primacy'' over the Department of Homeland Security's
role in some situations?
Answer. Yes, when war or any attack or other national security
crisis arises whereby the use of force is contemplated, DOD would take
the lead in defending the Nation. However, a Presidential order calling
on DOD to take the lead role in responding to a cyber attack on the
United States would be required before DOD assumes this lead role. I
believe that DOD and DHS are completely in synch on this point.
Question. The NMS-CO states that ``under the authorities of the
Secretary of Defense, DOD will use network exploitation to gather
intelligence and shape the cyberspace environment as necessary to
provide integrated offensive and defensive options.'' This statement
appears to mean that DOD will attempt to gain access to foreign
networks to create the ability to conduct offensive operations.
Under what conditions would DOD prepare foreign networks for
offensive operations when access is acquired for intelligence
gathering?
Answer. DOD conducts extensive planning for a wide range of
contingencies including planning for cyberspace operations. Effective
planning for offensive cyber operations requires extensive knowledge
and understanding of foreign networks and is accomplished by foreign
intelligence collection. Any preparation of foreign networks outside
that is beyond the realm of intelligence gathering can only be
conducted by lawful order (EXORD) from Secretary of Defense and the
President.
Question. Are such actions authorized and reported to Congress
under title 10 or title 50?
Answer. Preparation of foreign networks for offensive operations is
authorized only when part of a Secretary of Defense-approved military
operation under title 10 of the U.S.C.; such military operations are
subject to congressional armed services committee oversight. Foreign
intelligence collection activities are subjected to congressional
intelligence oversight.
Question. Does the Secretary of Defense have the unilateral
authority to direct intelligence-gathering operations in cyberspace?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as authorized by law and
executive order, can direct intelligence activities in cyberspace for
those intelligence activities, such as SIGINT, under his operational
control.
Question. If the Secretary of Defense is the President's executive
agent for SIGINT, what is the role of the Director of National
Intelligence in directing SIGINT collection in cyberspace?
Answer. The DNI provides the National Intelligence Strategy and the
National Intelligence Priority Framework, among others, to the entire
Intelligence Community. The DNI also plays a role with respect to
resource allocation via the National Intelligence Program.
Question. Under the Secretary's role as the executive agent for
SIGINT, what was the Secretary's responsibility for the policy
decisions regarding the NSA's Terrorist Surveillance Program, and the
assistance that NSA is providing to the Department of Homeland Security
through the Einstein 3 intrusion detection and prevention program?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. The NMS-CO states that ``Adversaries are deterred from
establishing or employing offensive capabilities against U.S. interests
in cyberspace. DOD will deter malicious adversary use of cyberspace,
while promoting freedom of action and trust and confidence in U.S.
cyberspace operations. Through deterrence, DOD seeks to influence the
adversary's decisionmaking processes by imposing political, economic,
or military costs; denying the benefits of their actions; and inducing
adversary restraint based on demonstrated U.S. capabilities.''
In your opinion, is it the case that ``adversaries are deterred''
from acting against U.S. interests in cyberspace?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Does the United States have a deterrence doctrine and a
deterrence strategy for cyber warfare?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Has the United States ever ``demonstrated capabilities''
in cyberspace in a way that would lead to deterrence of potential
adversaries?
Answer. Not in any significant way. We have conducted exercises and
war games, and responded to threats, intrusions, and even attacks
against us in cyberspace. Law Enforcement and the Counter-Intelligence
community have responded to intrusions and insider threats. Even
industry and academia have attempted to ``police'' the Internet. How
all of these have deterred criminal actions, terrorists, hostile
intelligence entities, and even nation states cannot be systematically
measured.
implications of u.s. dependence on cyber networks
Question. Many experts assert that the United States is the most
vulnerable country in the world to cyber attack because we are the most
networked nation and the one that has most fully-exploited computer
networks for business, government, and military functions. This
judgment implies that the United States has the most to lose in a
serious cyber conflict.
How could DOD best compensate for U.S. dependence on vulnerable
cyber networks in developing effective deterrent strategies?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Given U.S. vulnerabilities, is it in our interest to
engage in certain kinds of offensive cyber warfare, and possibly set
precedents by example that other nations might follow?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
covert action versus traditional military operations
Question. What is your understanding of whether clandestine
offensive actions in cyberspace conducted by DOD in connection with an
ongoing military conflict where the hand of the U.S. Government is
intended to be concealed ``covert action'' under the law, or are they
considered traditional military operations?
Answer. Covert action, as defined by law, includes ``an activity or
activities of the U.S. Government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
U.S. Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.'' The
law goes on specifically to except ``traditional . . . military
activities'' from being considered covert actions. (50 U.S.C.
413b(e)(2000)) Traditional military activities are often clandestine in
order to guarantee mission success and protect tactics, techniques, and
procedures--this is no different in cyberspace. DOD believes the
traditional military activities exception applies to the emerging field
of cyberspace operations.
Question. Does it matter whether such actions are conducted within
or outside of a theater of ongoing, traditional armed conflict?
Answer. This is a matter of ongoing debate. Proposed actions to
deliver effects to combatant commanders at the tactical and operational
level should be pursued as traditional military operations, under
existing authorizations, if possible. Any actions that we take must be
approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President through a lawful
order.
requirement for transit rights
Question. Under international law, nations enjoy sovereign rights
over the territorial extent of their countries and the airspace above
it, although not in space. Transiting that sovereign territory and
airspace for military purposes requires permission.
In a situation where a government intends to deliver a cyber weapon
or capability to a country not adjacent to its territory, through
terrestrial telecommunications networks, what is the legality of doing
so without the permission of the governments of the Nations through
which the weapon must pass?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
the challenge of attribution
Question. An essential feature of military, intelligence, and
criminal or malicious activities in cyberspace is the ease with which
the origin and the identity of those responsible for an attack can be
concealed. This ``attribution'' problem is severe. If it is impossible
to say with certainty who committed an attack, no one can be held
responsible, making deterrence and retaliation alike problematic. The
attribution capabilities that do exist appear to be time- and resource-
intensive, which can make appropriate, timely responses difficult or
even impossible.
How can deterrence be established in the absence of reliable
attribution?
Answer. I agree that attribution can be very difficult. We must
approach this problem in two ways. First and foremost, the most
effective way to deter adversaries is to increase the security of our
own networks. This will act as a deterrent to those adversaries who
target the United States simply because we are an easy mark. This is a
national problem and better security solutions must be encouraged for
all U.S. public and private networks.
Concurrently, we must partner closely with the Intelligence
Community to improve our ability to determine attribution. We must also
establish partnerships with nation-states that share common goals for
lawful behavior in cyberspace. Such agreements would establish
expectations of normative behavior for cyber activities and thresholds
for bad behaviors that would not be allowed to continue. Such
expectations will require standards of evidence that are mutually
acceptable and include highly automated procedures that allow attacks
to be alerted on and halted quickly.
Criminal law models depend on deterrence, as well. Legal scholars
have argued that crimes that often go unsolved (vandalism, for example)
should be punished more harshly to ensure an effective example is
offered in the few cases when it's available. Under this model, the
United States should take swift and effective action in every case in
which it can attribute an offensive action to a particular adversary.
Attribution has been a problem since the beginning of the terrorism
era. For example, in 1983 when the Marine barracks in Beirut was
bombed, the United States would likely have taken strong action against
the perpetrator--but the perpetrator was dead and the planners were
unknown. This problem continues today in kinetic operations as well as
in cyber.
The bottom line is, the only way to deter cyber attack is to work
to catch perpetrators and take strong and public action when we do.
Question. What authorities are required, or what procedures must be
invoked, to track back through layers of an attack involving computers
located in the United States and owned by U.S. persons?
Answer. Investigations of cyber attacks originating or appearing to
originate from the United States are typically law enforcement
investigations and a law enforcement warrant is used to attempt to
track back through layers involving computers located in the United
States or owned by U.S. persons. If there is reason to believe that the
attack is being conducted by a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power, though appearing to originate from the United States, the
investigation can be a counter intelligence investigation and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act order would be used to track back
through layers involving computers located in the United States or
owned by a U.S. person.
Question. What are the legalities, both in domestic and
international law, involved in ``shooting back'' immediately at the
sources of a large-scale attack, with and without a determination that
the sources are commandeered computers?
Answer. A commander's right to general self-defense is clearly
established in both U.S. and international law. Although this right has
not been specifically established by legal precedent to apply to
attacks in cyberspace, it is reasonable to assume that returning fire
in cyberspace, as long as it complied with law of war principles (e.g.,
proportionality), would be lawful.
Remainder of answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. The law regarding self-defense in the case of an attack
has never required a determination of identity before action can be
taken. For example, if someone is shooting at you, it isn't necessary
to establish what his name is before shooting back. If someone in a car
is trying to run down a police officer, the officer is not required to
determine whether the car is stolen before shooting out the tires in
self-defense. Similarly, the fact that computers may be commandeered is
irrelevant to the exercise of self-defense.
The United States has always hoped that the Internet would play a
``subversive'' role in countries with authoritarian governments.
If the U.S. Government takes vigorous diplomatic action, as some
experts recommend, to establish the norm that governments are
responsible for what happens in cyberspace within their sovereign
domains as a way to deal with the attribution problem, is there a
danger we could be providing a strong justification for governments
abroad to intensify surveillance and increase government controls on
the Internet?
Answer. Governments that have a tendency to curtail the freedoms of
their citizens will likely take such actions regardless of U.S.
policies regarding cyberspace. However, the United States has the
opportunity to model for other nations the process by which a nation-
state can allow freedom of expression, and even advanced concepts such
as Net Neutrality, and still insist on cyberspace behaviors that meet
the norms of international expectations in that they could not be
construed as constituting an attack in cyberspace. We can do this
without increased individual surveillance.
Question. Is it accurate that a large proportion of world-wide
unauthorized cyber intrusions and malicious cyber activity originates
or appears to originate within the United States?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is it reasonable to hold other governments responsible
for all such activity originating in their countries if the U.S.
Government cannot or will not stop it here?
Answer. Every government is responsible for actions originating in
its own country. We make every effort to address activity originating
in the United States, and we expect other countries will do the same.
title 10 versus title 50 reporting and oversight
Question. As the attached solicitations and program descriptions
indicate, and the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations
implies, gaining access to a cyberspace target for the purpose of
collecting intelligence also provides the basis for attacking that
target, and vice versa. Intelligence collection in cyberspace is
authorized and overseen under title 50 procedures, whereas operational
preparation of the environment for military action is authorized and
overseen under title 10 procedures.
Has the administration determined how it is going to authorize
these actions and report them to Congress?
Answer. Intelligence collection in cyberspace is conducted as part
of a foreign intelligence mission and is subject to congressional
intelligence oversight; e.g., the SIGINT Computer Network Exploitation
mission is conducted in accordance with SIGINT procedures and is
reported to the intelligence oversight committees. Military actions in
cyberspace done to prepare the environment for possible cyber attack
are authorized through Secretary of Defense Execute Orders and
reportable to the Armed Services Committees.
The attached solicitations and program descriptions indicate that
non-intelligence elements of DOD are developing capabilities to
penetrate foreign networks clandestinely, remain there undetected, and
exfiltrate data secretly.
Question. Are non-intelligence elements of DOD authorized to
collect intelligence in cyberspace through the clandestine penetration
of networks?
Answer. Non-intelligence elements of the DOD are not authorized to
collect intelligence or conduct preparation of the environment without
an appropriate execute order.
systems acquisition
Question. Combatant commands by design play a restricted role in
the acquisition process. However, the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, is
to be dual-hatted as the Director of NSA, which is a large enterprise
with substantial resources for developing, procuring, and supporting
new equipment, systems, and capabilities. In addition, the Commander
will exercise operational control of DISA networks, which also acquires
systems and capabilities.
Answer. Commander, U.S. Cyber Command will not exercise command or
operational control over the DISA communications networks. DISA will
continue to be responsible for acquiring, engineering and provisioning
enterprise infrastructure to assure the availability of military
information networks. As a Combat Support Agency, DISA will maintain a
close working relationship with U.S. Cyber Command, providing expertise
on the networks, communications and computing infrastructure operated
by DISA through both a DISA Field Office and a DISA Support Element.
Question. Is there a precedent for a combatant commander to
exercise this degree of direct control over acquisition organizations,
aside from Special Operations Command, which Congress expressly
provided with acquisition authority?
Answer. Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, would depend upon the
Military Departments and Agencies to deliver on U.S. Cyber Command-
documented requirements for capabilities. Each of the military
departments and agencies has oversight to ensure that this is done
properly. This is consistent with other combatant and subunified
commands, with the exception of U.S. Special Operations Command.
Question. What measures is the Department taking to guarantee that
Commanders of U.S. Cyber Command do not circumvent the requirements
process and the established acquisition process by directing
subordinates at NSA or DISA to directly address needs perceived by
Cyber Command?
Answer. U.S. Cyber Command will be a separate organization with a
separate and distinct acquisition authorities/process and staff from
the NSA and DISA. The separate oversight, accountability chains, and
the ability to audit actions taken by the two distinct organizations of
NSA and the future U.S. Cyber Command exist to ensure that the
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command follows the Cyber Command requirements
process and that the Director of NSA follows the established NSA
acquisition process. Specifically, NSA and U.S. Cyber Command will have
separate staffs with distinct authorities and oversight. U.S. Cyber
Command will operate under the same authorities and oversight as other
Combatant Commands and Subunified Commands.
NSA must operate under the authority and oversight of DOD and
Director, National Intelligence. Operating under distinct authorities
is not a new condition for the Director of NSA. I, like all the DIRNSAs
before me, am used to working under distinct authorities (title 10 and
title 50) and oversight (DOD and DNI), because of NSA's two separate
missions in Foreign Intelligence and Information Assurance.
Furthermore, as Director of NSA, I have delegated acquisition
authority to the Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE), who is not
assigned to or aligned with U.S. Cyber Command. The SAE position was
established in response to recommendations by Congress in 2000.
Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) and the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (ODNI) both have Milestone Decision Authority
(MDA) for some NSA Major System Acquisitions (MSA). While ODNI and
USD(AT&L) have delegated the NSA SAE Milestone Decision Authority for
certain major acquisition programs through the annual delegation
process, they retain joint acquisition oversight over all MSAs. Both
organizations conduct quarterly reviews of all MSA/Acquisition Category
I and Special Interest Programs, and USD(AT&L) conducts a tri-annual
review of NSA's contracting process in accordance with the Defense
Financial Acquisition Regulation Supplement.
The Director of DISA reports to ASD(NII) and will not be a
subordinate of Commander, U.S. Cyber Command. Additionally, Commander,
U.S. Cyber Command will have no subordinates in DISA.
extended deterrence in cyberspace
Question. With respect to close allies who depend upon the United
States for their security, will DOD provide a defense capability
against attacks on their critical military, government, and economic
infrastructure?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is DOD considering an ``extended deterrence'' model
similar to that which we have offered through the U.S. ``nuclear
umbrella''?
Answer. I am not aware of any efforts to develop an extended
deterrence model for cyber.
Question. The financial sector in the United States is tightly
integrated with and dependent upon the global financial network, such
that a massive attack on financial networks abroad would probably
inflict great harm on the United States.
To what extent does DOD consider that the defense of some U.S.
critical infrastructures must encompass network extensions abroad?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
authorities and procedures for investigating ``.mil'' intrusions
Question. One of the difficult issues confronting the Einstein 3
intrusion detection and prevention program is what to do when packets
are detected that contain malicious code. Attackers usually act
indirectly against their targets, routing attacks through a series of
innocent intermediaries to hide their identities and locations. A
malicious penetration or attack on a ``.gov'' computer or network may
be launched from a specific computer but without the knowledge of the
legitimate owner of that computer. However, government personnel
discovering such an attack have no way of knowing, without further
investigation, which computer owners in a chain may be complicit. The
Federal Government has not announced how it will specifically respond
in terms of investigating actual or apparent attacks, retaining and
analyzing associated data, when a warrant is required, and so forth,
for the defense of the civil ``.gov'' networks. However, DOD has
already fielded intrusion detection and prevention capabilities
developed by NSA at the gateways to the ``.mil'' networks.
Does this mean that the Department has developed and received
approval for protocols and procedures for investigating U.S. persons
whose computers may be implicated in attacks on ``.mil'' targets?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
explaining cybersecurity plans to the american people
Question. The majority of the funding for the multi-billion dollar
CNCI is contained in the classified National Intelligence Program
budget, which is reviewed and approved by the congressional
intelligence committees. Almost all important aspects of the CNCI
remain highly classified, including the implementation plan for the
Einstein 3 intrusion detection and prevention system. It is widely
perceived that the Department of Homeland Security is actually likely
to simply extend the cyber security system that the NSA developed for
DOD into the civilian and even the private sector for defense of
critical infrastructure. DOD is creating a subunified Cyber Command
with the Director of NSA as its Commander.
In your view, are we risking creating the perception, at home and
abroad, that the U.S. Government's dominant interests and objectives in
cyberspace are intelligence- and military-related, and if so, is this a
perception that we want to exist?
Answer. No, I don't believe we are risking creating this perception
as long as we communicate clearly to the American people--and the
world--regarding our interests and objectives.
Question. Based on your experience, are the American people likely
to accept deployment of classified methods of monitoring electronic
communications to defend the government and critical infrastructure
without explaining basic aspects of how this monitoring will be
conducted and how it may affect them?
Answer. I believe the government and the American people expect
both NSA and U.S. Cyber Command to support the cyber defense of our
Nation. Our support does not in any way suggest that we would be
monitoring Americans.
I don't believe we should ask the public to accept blindly some
unclear ``classified'' method. We need to be transparent and
communicate to the American people about our objectives to address the
national security threat to our Nation--the nature of the threat, our
overall approach, and the roles and responsibilities of each department
and agency involved--including NSA and DOD. I am personally committed
to this transparency, and I know that DOD, the Intelligence Community,
and rest of the administration are as well. What needs to remain
classified, and I believe that the American people will accept this as
reasonable, are the specific foreign threats that we are looking for
and how we identify them, and what actions we take when they are
identified. For these areas, the American people have you, their
elected representatives, to provide the appropriate oversight on their
behalf.
Remainder of answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. What are your views as to the necessity and desirability
of maintaining the current level of classification of the CNCI?
Answer. In recent months, we have seen an increasing amount of
information being shared by the administration and the departments and
agencies on the CNCI and cybersecurity in general, which I believe is
consistent with our commitment to transparency. I expect that trend to
continue, and personally believe and support this transparency as a
foundational element of the dialogue that we need to have with the
American people on cybersecurity.
military service roles in cyber command
Question. Each of the military services is planning to create new
organizations and structures, or expand existing ones, to support the
new U.S. Cyber Command. However, cyberspace is a virtual realm,
considerably removed from the physical world.
Has the Department undertaken any analyses of alternative means of
providing forces and capabilities to the new Command?
Answer. In accordance with the Secretary of Defense memorandum
directing the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command, each of the Services
conducted a thorough mission analysis on how best to provide
capabilities to U.S. Cyber Command, selected a course of action for the
near term, and briefed that selection to the Deputy Secretary.
Further, U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with the Services
and other combatant commanders, completed a study last year that gives
us an initial vector for required force size and composition for a
portion of the force. To that end, the Joint Requirements and Oversight
Committee approved that recommendation and directed a more in-depth
study. The study, the Cyber Analysis Campaign, is underway and should
give us a force sizing construct by the end of the summer.
Question. Can it be said that there is a logical basis for ground,
sea, and air components in cyberspace--apart from the fact that each of
the Services operate networks that must be defended?
Answer. There is a logical basis for the department to organize
both efficiently and consistently to achieve its assigned mission. In
much the same manner that--from a mission standpoint--Special
Operations or logistics crosses all warfighting dimensions, so does
cyberspace. There may come a time when this would merit further
consideration based upon lessons to be learned. Currently, the Military
Departments organize, man, train, and equip to generate and sustain
mission capacity on behalf of the Nation. Like other operational
commands, it will be U.S. Cyber Command's business to take this cyber
capacity--built to a common standard--and turn that into joint,
combined cyber capability to achieve the supported commander's assigned
mission as authorized by the Secretary of Defense.
Question. Is it optimal that each service have a separate
organization for supporting U.S. Cyber Command, especially in the areas
of intelligence and offensive cyber warfare?
Answer. Yes, I believe so. If cyberspace was homogenous and the
entirety of the work force did the same job, one could make the
argument that the Department doesn't need each Service to have its own
cyber component. But that would be a vast oversimplification of the
complexity of the domain. At the operational and tactical levels of
war, the Service components will be responsible for significant cyber
operations. They will depend upon the networks for command and control
of their forces and must be able to defend those networks. Over time
the Services will also bring resources to bear in the intelligence and
offensive cyber realm that will support their component missions at the
operational and tactical levels of war, with deconfliction by U.S.
Cyber Command. Each Service brings a unique perspective and some
specialized capability to the fight that would be neither efficient nor
effective to flatten into a singular whole. In cyberspace, as in all
the domains, each Service brings capability to be employed in the
combined arms philosophy that makes the whole greater than the sum of
the parts.
command of national defense in cyberspace
Question. A cornerstone of military doctrine is the importance of
unity of command, particularly in time-sensitive scenarios such as
those that are likely to arise in cyberspace. In the Federal
Government, the Department of Homeland Security is in charge of
defending the country against cyber attacks, but authorities and
responsibilities are fragmented and spread across the Intelligence
Community, DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice
Department, the Treasury Department, and the Department of Energy.
Also, each department and independent agency is responsible for
operating and equipping its own networks.
In your opinion, is there adequate unity of command and authorities
for the Nation's response to serious cyber attacks?
Answer. Unity of command within DOD is being improved with the
establishment of U.S. Cyber Command; however, unity of effort, vice
command, is equally important and achievable since effective cyber
security requires a whole-of-government approach.
As securing and defending our national cyber interests is an
evolving work in progress, coordination, cooperation, and information
sharing across the Federal Government is paramount. A rigorous
partnership with DHS--as they look to secure and protect the .gov
domain and critical infrastructure--is particularly crucial.
DOD continually reviews its existing authorities and directives to
determine what, if any, changes need to be requested to support ongoing
or contingency plans. Our unique challenge in this domain is to develop
a thorough understanding of the domain, posture to be prepared to
recognize as rapidly as possible those vulnerabilities or threat
unknowns and set effective ``post-crisis'' frameworks and conditions
for decisionmakers, policymakers, and legislators pre-crisis.
Question. If not, what is the process and schedule for defining and
establishing an effective construct?
Answer. Ultimately, the best processes and policies are those that
enable our national decisionmakers and operating forces to achieve the
best desired outcome. DOD continues to support and help protect our
national cyber interests as authorized and directed.
designing the internet for better security
Question. Cyber security experts emphasize that the Internet was
not designed for security.
How could the Internet be designed differently to provide much
greater inherent security?
Answer. The design of the Internet is--and will continue to
evolve--based on technological advancements. These new technologies
will enhance mobility and, if properly implemented, security. It is in
the best interest of both government and industry to consider security
more prominently in this evolving future internet architecture. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee, as well as
industry leaders, academia, the Services, and DOD agencies on these
important concerns.
Question. Is it practical to consider adopting those modifications?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. What would the impact be on privacy, both pro and con?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
intelligence collection goals versus military warfighting goals
1. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, there was a recent
Washington Post report of a supposed offensive cyber operation to take
down an internet site that, according to the report, was providing
valuable information to the Intelligence Community. Whether this
article is accurate or not, the article highlights the concern about
arbitrating between the potentially competing priorities of protecting
useful intelligence sources, versus taking offensive or defensive
action to achieve military objectives. What do you believe is the
appropriate mechanism for arbitrating between protecting a potentially
valuable source of intelligence and conducting cyber operations in
support of some military objective?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
2. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, do you agree that
it is appropriate that this committee be informed of all significant
U.S. offensive cyber operations in a timely manner?
General Alexander. Yes, I agree that in almost all circumstances
the Armed Services Committees should be informed in a timely manner of
significant offensive cyber operations conducted by Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM).
oversight for offensive cyber operations
3. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, one of the
committee's major concerns is that an action to penetrate a network in
order to collect intelligence in many situations is deemed by experts
to be virtually identical to the steps one would take to prepare that
target for offensive operations. In the advance policy questions, we
asked you under what authorities these activities would be conducted,
reported, and overseen by Congress.
You replied that that preparation of a target network for offensive
operations is ordered only by the Secretary of Defense in an Execute
Order and is reported to the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees, while penetration for intelligence collection is approved
under intelligence authorities and reported to the intelligence
committees.
Unfortunately, the reality is not that clear. There is no neat and
clear distinction between these two activities in cyberspace. In fact,
a distinction does not really exist, which is why we posed the question
in the first place to ensure that you, the Department of Defense (DOD),
and the administration address this problem.
Unfortunately, we also learned, after asking a specific question
following the appearance of a Washington Post article reporting on an
apparent offensive cyber operation, that DOD has undertaken a number of
offensive cyber operations in the last several years, none of which was
reported to the Armed Services Committees, notwithstanding your answer
to the question. Have the Armed Services Committees been informed of
all U.S. offensive cyber operations?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, do you agree that
it is appropriate that the Armed Services Committees be informed of all
U.S. offensive cyber operations?
General Alexander. Yes, I agree that in almost all circumstances
the Armed Services Committees should be informed in a timely manner of
significant offensive cyber operations conducted by CYBERCOM.
acquisition conflicts of interest
5. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, if confirmed, you
would lead the development of requirements for CYBERCOM. At the same
time, you would remain as the Director of the National Security Agency
(NSA), which has a sizeable acquisition budget. Why should we have
confidence that you will be able to arbitrate effectively between your
requirements definition role at CYBERCOM and your acquisition provider
role at NSA?
General Alexander. While the Commander, CYBERCOM, and the Director,
NSA, roles are slated to be dual-hatted under the same individual, each
organization will have separate and distinct staffs.
Acquisition Authority for the NSA has been delegated by the
Director, NSA, to the NSA Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE), who is
not assigned to nor aligned with CYBERCOM. The SAE position was
established in response to requests/recommendations by Congress in
2000. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Office of the Director
for National Intelligence both have Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)
for NSA Major Systems Acquisitions. These two safeguards will ensure
that acquisition processes and external oversight are properly
executed.
CYBERCOM, as a subunified command of STRATCOM, will not have
acquisition or procurement authority and will work through its
Executive Agent, the U.S. Air Force, to satisfy its requirements.
6. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, what thoughts do
you have for how we can build the appropriate firewalls between your
multiple roles, and how we can develop an acquisition process for
cyberspace that provides the high degree of agility required to keep
pace with the technology while preserving acquisition discipline and
oversight?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
decision on use of force
7. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, in our advance
policy questions, we asked you if you would have authority to fight the
war as does U.S. Forces Korea, the only other subunified command. You
said that you would have the authorities provided by the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM).
In answer to another question, you said that under joint doctrine
``authority is normally given to subordinate commanders to select the
methodology for accomplishing the mission,'' implying that you would
have the freedom to decide how to accomplish mission orders. You went
on to say that the Commander of STRATCOM has indicated already that he
would delegate to CYBERCOM ``authority for all UCP [Unified Command
Plan] cyber tasks.'' If you were to view these answers collectively,
CYBERCOM could have the discretion to use offensive weapons to achieve
any or all assigned cyber tasks.
If you are confirmed, will authority to employ such weapons be
delegated to you? If so, under what circumstances would you have
authority to act without having further direction from the President,
the Secretary of Defense, or the Commander of STRATCOM?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
authorities of the director of national intelligence
8. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, in the advance
policy questions, you were asked to characterize the role of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in signals intelligence
(SIGINT) in cyberspace in light of the emphasis DOD is placing on the
role of the Secretary of Defense as the President's Executive Agent for
Signals Intelligence under Executive Order 12333. You said that the
DNI's role is to issue the National Intelligence Priorities Framework
and to oversee resource allocation.
Your answer appears to overlook the fact that the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 explicitly provides the DNI
with the operational authority to task all national intelligence
collection and analysis. That includes SIGINT.
Could you elaborate on the respective roles and authorities of the
Secretary of Defense and the DNI with this in mind?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
Both the DNI and the Secretary of Defense have roles and
responsibilities for the direction and management of the Nation's
SIGINT activities. These roles and responsibilities were provided for
in the ``Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004''
(IRTPA), and implemented through amendment of Executive Order 12333
(EO12333), ``United States Intelligence Activities.''
Section 1018 of IRTPA said the President shall issue guidelines to
ensure the effective implementation and execution within the executive
branch of the authorities provided to the DNI without abrogating the
statutory responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense. The President
did so with EO12333, as amended by EO13470. For example, the DNI shall
determine requirements and priorities for, and manage and direct the
tasking, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of,
national intelligence by elements of the Intelligence Community. At the
same time, the Secretary of Defense is the U.S. Government's executive
agent for SIGINT but, as provided for in section 1.10(e) of EO12333,
exercises his executive agent responsibilities ``in coordination with''
the DNI. As a result, as the Director of NSA, I take direction from
both the Secretary of Defense and the DNI to ensure that I am
collecting and producing SIGINT that is responsive to national and DOD
requirements (to include support to military operations).
9. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, does the Secretary
of Defense have the authority to direct SIGINT collection and analysis
unilaterally, or only at the direction or approval of the DNI?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
role of commercial industry in cyber security
10. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, it is widely
believed and reported that the NSA has advised the last administration
and the current one that only the NSA has the technology and know-how
to provide effective defenses for the Government and the companies that
own and operate critical infrastructure--like banking, transportation,
power distribution, and telecommunications. However, the committee
understands that the major telecommunications companies, as well as
leading information technology companies, believe that their industries
possess major capabilities that in some respects exceed those of the
Government.
For example, the so-called tier 1 communications providers who own
and operate most of the world's telecommunications networks on which
the Internet operates have unparalleled insight into what is happening
in cyberspace on a global scale, and have tools to detect and stop
threats as they are materializing. Do you agree that the commercial
sector has untapped potential to help solve our cyber security
problems?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
11. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, do you support
pilot projects and demonstrations to test out some of these ideas?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, if the commercial
telecommunications providers have the legal authority and capability to
see cyber threats as they arise and traverse across the global network,
they would be in a position to quickly identify where attacks
originate, whereas the Government, as you have pointed out, must get
warrants to start backtracking to trace the route of an attack. Is
industry in principle in a better position to sense, characterize, and
respond rapidly to threats in cyberspace?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, which Government
agency should manage a relationship with industry in which commercial-
sector warning and threat information is provided to the Government?
Should it be the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
adequacy of nsa cyber security solution
14. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, Howard Schmidt,
the President's recently appointed cyber policy coordinator, just
released a description of the equipment--known as Einstein 3--which NSA
developed to help defend the military and Federal civilian networks
from cyber attacks. He characterized it as a signatures-based intrusion
detection and prevention system. Experts in cyber security, and leading
security officials in DOD, believe that such intrusion prevention
devices cannot by themselves defend against all threats, especially not
certain kinds of sophisticated or unknown threats. DOD's strategy is to
include the Einstein 3 technology as one part of a defense-in-depth. Do
you agree that Einstein 3 is but one element of a robust defensive
capability?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, do you think that
the investments made to date under the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative, for non-DOD .gov agencies and departments,
have reflected a proper balance between all the various aspects of a
strong defense-in-depth?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
response to attacks on dod networks
16. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, in the advance
policy questions, we asked you what the legal process is for
backtracking through the layers of computers or servers located in the
United States. Your reply was that law enforcement agencies have to do
that, and they have to have a warrant. Then, if there are grounds at
some point for believing that a foreign power is behind the attack that
is routed through U.S. computers, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) warrant may be necessary. These procedures appear
necessarily time-consuming--hardly matching the net speed that everyone
touts as necessary.
We also asked you about the legality of shooting back against an
attack that seems to come from U.S. sources, even if we cannot tell
whether the attacking computers are the source of the attack, or
whether they may have been commandeered for such as purpose.
Your answer is that the right to self defense allows commanders to
return fire. Are you really saying that it is lawful and appropriate
for U.S. military commanders to shoot back against computers located in
the United States under the doctrine of self-defense--especially in
light of the fact your answer to the first question was that a warrant
is required to start to unravel the origins of an attack?
General Alexander. Under normal circumstances, U.S. military forces
would not be authorized to engage targets in the United States.
However, the right and obligation of self-defense recognizes that under
exceptional circumstances such a course of action may be justified. For
example, if a military member comes under fire when guarding a military
installation, even in the United States, the member is authorized to
return fire in self-defense. There is no requirement for the member to
hold fire and try to determine whether the attacker is a U.S. national.
Similarly, in the cyber arena, when a military system comes under
attack, the commander charged with protecting the system is authorized
to act in self-defense. That right and obligation of self-defense may
include cyber actions, which would be based on the severity of the
attack, and could be characterized as ``firing back'' in order to stop
the threat. Obviously, as in all military operations, the principles of
necessity and proportionality would be applied. Military members would
take care to use the minimally effective solution to stop the attack.
17. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, how do you
reconcile these answers?
General Alexander. See answer to question #16.
18. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, how could we ever
get to a suitably rapid response to attacks that have been routed
through U.S.-based computers and infrastructure if a complicated legal
procedure is required?
General Alexander. The challenge for U.S. cyber leadership is to
balance the critical constitutional and legal protections we provide
U.S. persons with the necessity of defending our Nation from attack. We
must make use of every instrument of national power, drawing on the
resources and authorities of every agency of our Government to prevent
attacks on American interests. When prevention fails, we must have the
clear authority to act swiftly to end adversary attacks. Working within
the interagency process to determine how best to strike this balance is
one of DOD's top priorities.
real time regional gateway program
19. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, an NSA Inspector
General report on the Real Time Regional Gateway (RTRG) program found
that the NSA SAE recommended to you in 2006 that the RTRG program be
designated as a major acquisition, which would have subjected the
program to a significantly higher degree of internal and external
oversight. This recommendation was based on the fact that RTRG had
grown immensely in size and scope and plans were being made to extend
the fielding to multiple combatant commands. You rejected that
recommendation and did not brief the USD(AT&L), even though you briefed
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and other senior officials.
Why did you not brief the USD(AT&L), and reject your SAE's
recommendation, in spite of the fact that you briefed the program to
higher-level officials?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
interagency cooperation
20. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, one thing
that I commonly look for are stovepipes and whether the Services are
duplicating efforts or truly enhancing overall mission effectiveness.
Last year at the STRATCOM hearing, General Chilton highlighted the
importance of sharing information among agencies, including the DHS,
the Intelligence Community, and DOD, in addressing security risks in
cyberspace. I worry that in response to cyber security threats, without
strong coordination, agencies will create their own unique defenses. If
each agency builds their own protective walls, they ultimately stifle
collaboration and the ability to disseminate intelligence information
among agencies, which has been our Achilles heel--an inability to share
intelligence, connect the dots, and prevent future attacks. What do you
see as your role in interagency coordination of cyber security and
information exchange protocols?
General Alexander. I believe my role in interagency coordination of
cyber security and information exchange protocols centers on improving
mechanisms to foster this activity. Principal among these activities
will be the collaboration/coordination across the operational
cybersecurity centers such as NSA's NTOC, DHS's US-CERT, FBI's NCIJTF,
JTF-GNO's JOC and others. Additional coordination efforts include to
the Joint Interagency Task Force-Cyber (JIATF-Cyber) whose membership
includes the NSA/Central Security Service, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Justice, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Office of
the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, Joint Functional Component Command-Network Warfare (JFCC-NW),
Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), Joint Functional
Component Command for Global Strike, Joint Information Operations
Warfare Center (JIOWC), Departments of Treasury (DOT), State (DOS), and
Homeland Security, and the combatant commands. As CYBERCOM matures, we
will look to refine and improve our coordination processes with all our
Cyber partners.
I believe my role must be as a proponent for improving the
information exchange protocols among a variety of DOD and interagency
partners every day. We need to do this not only through changes within
our organizational structure and improvements to our procedures, but
also through a change in organizational culture that fosters
information sharing as essential to deterring our adversaries and
preventing future attacks.
21. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, how do you
see the relationship between the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) and U.S. CYBERCOM?
General Alexander. DISA is a DOD combat support agency that
provides command and control capabilities and enterprise infrastructure
to operate and assure a global net-centric enterprise in direct support
of joint warfighters, national-level leadership, and other mission and
coalition partners across the full spectrum of operations. A strong
relationship between DISA and CYBERCOM is essential to ensure we build,
lease, and/or operate networks so that they are defensible and so that
we are able visualize a Common Operating Environment (COE) in
cyberspace, which serves as a foundation for CYBERCOM's execution of
delegated missions assigned to STRATCOM in the Unified Command Plan.
In recognition of the crucial nature of this relationship, the
Director of DISA has committed to providing both a DISA Field Office to
support CYBERCOM and a DISA Support Element, unique to CYBERCOM which
will be integrated into the Joint Operations Center. CYBERCOM will
provide a liaison officer to DISA to facilitate the exchange of
information and coordination between the two commands.
22. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, do you have
or expect to have a formal process to provide requirements for DISA to
use as it acquires future network systems?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, how will you
ensure that DISA and the Service components' technical solutions to
cyber security issues do not end fielding proprietary solutions
resulting in information stovepipes that limit our cyberspace
operational effectiveness?
General Alexander. Technical capability development to support
CYBERCOM mission needs will be driven by a formal requirements process,
the definition and use of standards, and a force integration plan that
will include the Service cyber components assigned to the command as
well as DISA. Joint membership on a requirements review board will
ensure that all entities participate in the identification,
prioritization, and resource investment decisions for technical
solutions. Close collaboration and joint status reviews among the
respective development organizations will avoid duplication of effort,
and ensure activities remain complementary whether developed by the
Government or by industry. Supporting acquisition organizations must
ensure the careful crafting of acquisition contracts and associated
statements of work to ensure that the rare proprietary solution is not
a stovepiped solution, but rather is fully integrated with cyber
operations across the enterprise. If confirmed, we will work closely
with STRATCOM, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Military
Departments to ensure these solutions are properly aligned and
integrated.
cyber threats
24. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, in February,
Admiral Mullen stated before this committee that ``Threats in
cyberspace are increasing faster than our ability to adequately defend
against them.'' A key aspect of providing a strong cyber defense is
having enough talented people with the right skills to do the job. The
fiscal year 2010 budget increased the training capacity for cyber
experts to attempt to improve the DOD's ability to safeguard our
information and information systems. What progress are the Services
making in providing forces to address the cyber threat from a manning
perspective?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, is cyber
training capacity sufficient to get out in front of this rapidly
evolving threat? If not, what else is needed?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, are the
Services properly coordinating their cyber efforts such as training and
material solutions to ensure we are adequately protected against the
threat of a substantial cyber attack?
General Alexander. The Services are leveraging existing mechanisms
to coordinate training and material solutions to ensure our protection
against cyber attacks, and I will continue to work closely with them on
these efforts. The creation of CYBERCOM along with its Service cyber
components should significantly enhance the efforts of the Services to
train and equip cyber forces to a common standard.
Service initiatives to address cyber training shortfalls are well
developed and coordinated. STRATCOM and NSA/CSS along with the Services
have combined experience and expertise to confront the complicated
issues related to Computer Network Operations (CNO) workforce
development. Subject matter experts representing each of the CNO job
functions have defined each work role, and outlined the knowledge,
skills, abilities needed to perform those CNO tasks. Further enhancing
this initiative are the combined efforts of the Consolidated Staff
(JFCC-NW/JTF-GNO), under the auspices of STRATCOM and JFCOM, to develop
a Cyber Training Initiative to assess combatant commander and Service
joint cyber training efforts. Collectively, these efforts are ensuring
our cyber training is coordinated among the Services and poised to
address the threat of cyber attacks.
The Services' continued use of the Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System (JCIDS) remains an essential element of
coordinating material solutions to address our pressing cyber needs.
These efforts--including capability needs, capability gap and non-
materiel solutions--must continue. Concurrent with this, we will ensure
the technical capability development to support CYBERCOM mission needs
will be driven by a formal requirements process, and will include the
Service cyber components.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
cyber threats
27. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, I am convinced
that DOD's decision to stand up CYBERCOM is the right answer to a
drastically growing threat. As you well know, there is a significant
threat to our National security in the cyber world; a threat we are
dealing with daily - attacks against our civilian and military
infrastructure. Like threats to space assets, cyber threats fall into
that nebulous realm of what is a direct attack and what is something
just short of that. What are your thoughts on the seriousness of these
threats?
General Alexander. The adversaries our Nation faces today cover the
full spectrum, from individual hackers to terrorists and organized
criminal groups, as well as foreign militaries and intelligence
services. Indeed, the growing cyber threat has outpaced our defenses,
and we are experiencing increasingly sophisticated, coordinated, and
damaging cyberpenetration. We face a dangerous combination of known--
and unknown--vulnerabilities, strong adversary capabilities, and weak
situational awareness that could compromise our personal and national
security. Moreover, we have witnessed a dramatic rise over the past
several years in the number of intrusions against our military
networks; DOD networks are now scanned millions of times a day by
unauthorized users. In the most serious and significant cyber incident
to date on U.S. military computer networks, several thousand computers
were infected by malicious software attempting to exploit military
systems and compromise national security. These intrusions affected a
number of critical systems responsible for military command and
control. The seriousness of the threats our Nation faces in cyberspace
prompted the Secretary of Defense to stand up CYBERCOM and ensure our
military could maintain its ability to use cyberspace for critical
mission operations. The interconnected nature of these networks will
require CYBERCOM to actively coordinate its operations both within the
Department as well as in close partnership with the other agencies
authorized to address these threats.
28. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what do we need
to do to combat these threats?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, besides the
charter of CYBERCOM to address cyber-based threats, what else is within
the CYBERCOM's purview?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
network/internet security
30. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, over the last
decade, as internet use and connectivity have become pervasive, most
information technology (IT) security spending that has been invested in
``perimeter defense'' of the ``distributed network''. Breaches seem
frequent and sometimes seem easy, and therefore focusing on IT security
of the distributed network has been critical. While there has been
increasing focus and increasing spending on the IT security of the
distributed network over the past decade, I have been told that
spending on IT security for the mainframe has declined. This could
potentially lead to serious cyber security vulnerabilities in our
mainframe network. I have been told that DOD has created and adhered to
a strict set of security configuration controls for their mainframe
systems. However, there have been reports of classified Government
systems being breached. As I have been told in some detail, the
peripheral security of networks has been the primary focus with less
effort spent on the mainframes. Does DOD have any issues with its
mainframe security, both in its air-gapped systems and in the systems
that are connected to the internet?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what is being
done to secure those networks and systems that are not Government or
military but are critical to us, such as civilian agencies, State
governments, and private sector elements such as utility companies,
banks, pipelines, phone companies, et cetera?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
law and cyber command
32. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, I just read a
news release from Defense News on the legal issues associated with our
ability to conduct operations in cyber space. It basically said that
the NSA can monitor when we are under attack but right now DOD is
powerless to respond due to DHS ownership of responding to network
attacks. The article was not overly complimentary of the current
process. Experts indicated that we need to look at doing some serious
review of our statutory law. What are your thoughts on where we stand
with the legal aspects of responding to cyber attacks?
General Alexander. The process for DHS to request and receive DOD
support for any national event is known as Defense Support to Civil
Authorities (DSCA). If there is a national cyber emergency for which
DOD assistance is requested, the Secretary of Defense will provide
guidance, and we will comply with such guidance under all
circumstances. Any DOD cyber assistance will partner with the U.S.
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), the DHS lead organization,
under their National Cyber Security Division, for the day-to-day
defense of the Federal executive branch (.gov) networks.
Separate from the DSCA process, however, a new legal framework may
be needed to ensure the cyber security of our Nation at large.
President Obama's Cyberspace Policy Review specifically highlighted the
mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and
the governing laws and policies for the United States.
As stated in the Cyberspace Policy Review, law applicable to
cyberspace is a ``complex patchwork'' that ``shapes viable policy
options.'' This patchwork is the result of the convergence of once very
diverse industries and technologies--each governed by different laws
and policies--to create what we now call ``cyberspace.'' In response to
this convergence, ``law and policy should continue to seek an
integrated approach'' that leverages all the capabilities and expertise
of both the public and private sectors so that, together, we can
enhance the national security, economic competitiveness, public safety
and civil liberties and privacy of the American people. I completely
agree with this finding.
Until this integrated approach can be realized, policy gaps exist
that prevent us from doing all that can be done to increase the cyber
security of the Nation, especially our Nation's critical
infrastructure. Foremost amongst these gaps are the potential
impediments to the public-private cybersecurity information sharing
partnership, which I believe is critical to more effectively
attributing and countering this threat. These include two core issues.
First, the U.S. Government needs to be able to disseminate to the
owners of the critical infrastructure and other private sector entities
threat information that reflects real time exigencies, and to receive
such information from private entities, while balancing concerns
regarding anti-trust regulations and other unfair competition matters;
civil liberties and privacy; and due regard for the Constitution and
all applicable laws, policies, and procedures. The second issue
involves how private companies will protect sensitive Government
information and use it for the purpose of better cybersecurity without
incurring liability or unduly disrupting their network operations.
NSA/CSS, as a member of both DOD and the Intelligence Community and
in partnership with DHS and other departments and agencies, is working
closely with the President's Cybersecurity Coordinator, Mr. Howard A.
Schmidt, on these issues. We are exploring options within existing law,
policy, and doctrine to address these issues and we will inform
Congress if any legislation may be needed.
33. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what needs to be
done to ensure that the bureaucracy does not interfere with our
security necessities?
General Alexander. In my experience, we currently have an
unprecedented level of commitment across the public and private sectors
to improving the cybersecurity of our Nation. Evidence of the
commitment and cooperation is seen in the implementation of the
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) and the
President's Cyberspace Policy Review. The issues the Nation faces in
this domain are complex and challenging, necessarily taking time to
thoughtfully resolve even with the complete commitment of all
stakeholders. As stated in the Cyberspace Policy Review, integrating
the Nation's response to such challenging issues needs to be led ``from
the top,'' which is happening under the leadership of Mr. Howard A.
Schmidt, Special Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity
Coordinator. In support of the Secretary of Defense, and if confirmed,
I will continue to work to identify gaps, inform the development of
meaningful and enduring national cyber policy, and be prepared to
adjust rapidly to changes.
education in information technology
34. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, when we met in my
office yesterday, we discussed the need to attract extremely technical,
qualified, and diverse professionals. This begins with ensuring our
colleges and universities throughout the United States have programs in
place to educate and groom future generations of IT professionals. One
program we discussed was University of Tulsa's iSec, specializing in
educating students in cyber defense, deterrence, and warfare. Are we
doing enough in academic institutions to produce the IT professionals
this country needs in the future?
General Alexander. We have seen a lot of progress in academic
institutions responding to the high demand for IT professionals, but
more can be done to build this critical resource. The explosion of
cyber threats and increases in organized cyber crime activity has
driven the trend for information technology professionals upward. We
are starting to see more 4 year programs like the one at Tulsa and even
2 year programs at Community Colleges. For example, the Chronicle of
Higher Education reported that as early as 7 years ago, virtually no
Community Colleges offered cyber security programs. Now cyber security
education has spread across the 2 year college sector, spurred by
Federal grants and post-September 11 focus on infrastructure security.
Finally, President Obama is stressing the importance of such colleges
and a new White House cyber security push points to the need for
workforce training. All of this demand does lead to an increasing role
for 2 and 4 year colleges that can supply government agencies and
private companies with workers steeped in cyber security.
Through partnerships with Government, academia, and industry, NSA's
Information Assurance (IA) Mission advocates improvements in IA
education, training, and awareness. The National IA Education and
Training Program (NIETP) operates as the national manager for IA
education and training relating to national security systems. Its
programs assure the very finest preparation of professionals entrusted
with securing our critical information. The NIETP develops IA training
standards with the Committee on National Security Systems. It also
assesses current course IA offerings to identify gaps and determine how
to fill those gaps. The NIETP encourages and recognizes universities
through the National Centers of Academic Excellence in IA Education and
the National Centers of Academic Excellence in Research. The NIETP is
also one of the Government sponsors of the Colloquium for Information
Systems Security Education. There are over 106 National Centers of
Academic Excellence in the field of Information Assurance as recognized
by the NSA/Central Security Service. Including The University of
Tulsa's iSec program, these institutes of higher learning are located
in 37 different States, Washington, DC, and Puerto Rico. Prior to
submitting an application for the National Center of Excellence
Program, IA courseware must be certified under the IA Courseware
Evaluation Program as meeting the Committee on National Security
Systems (CNSS) Training Standards, and the certification must remain
current. There is a minimum number of points required in nine different
criteria to qualify as a National Center of Academic Excellence.
The partnership that we have with all of these institutions of
higher education will continue to evolve in order to meet the future
need of producing the very best IT professionals. Through NSA and other
government and industry efforts, we must remain engaged with academia
to ensure we foster the development of the right curriculum, based on
identifiable standards, to ensure the continued growth in the numbers
of IT professionals our country will need in the future.
35. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, is there a
research/development gap in cyber defense/deterrence/technology/
intelligence?
General Alexander. There are research and development gaps that do
exist in the areas of cyber operations and intelligence; principally
these involve a need for shared situational awareness, better
attribution technologies, and real-time visibility of intrusions into
our networks. These and other gaps are being identified and used to
influence DOD's research and development priorities. The technical
solutions associated with cyber defense will continue to evolve rapidly
as our adversaries become increasingly sophisticated. Given that
intrusions into DOD systems are virtually the same as those attacks
experienced by the commercial sector, DOD can both benefit from and
influence commercial development efforts, consistent with DOD
authorities, to address those vulnerabilities. Ultimately, we believe
automated solutions which adapt to rapidly increasing adversary
capability sophistication and to employ proactive measures to defeat
adversary attacks will be critical to ensuring the defense of our
military networks.
standing up cyber command
36. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, as I have seen
with the standup of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), putting together a
combatant or functional command organization is a tall order. It
requires herculean efforts on the parts of all entities and can easily
be subjected to inertia and bureaucracy. What is your understanding of
the infrastructure and capabilities requirements and status of
CYBERCOM?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
37. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what is needed to
ensure the command is fully functional?
General Alexander. Since CYBERCOM will initially be established
with the existing personnel from JFCC-NW and JTF-GNO along with
existing military Service component organizations, I believe that we
will be fully functional upon establishment of the command. That being
said, if confirmed and upon activation, we will be looking to
continually enhance and evolve our mission effectiveness. We need to
build capacity (trained personnel, facilities, communications, IT . . .
), enable effective collaboration (DOD, interagency, government,
industry, academia, foreign partners), and achieve collocation of a
critical set of core capabilities to provide agility in defeating
known, emerging, and unanticipated threats. In the short term, we are
standing up the headquarters within the Fort Meade area/NSA campus by
merging the JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW mission sets to better leverage the
capabilities of the global SIGINT enterprise while using existing
infrastructure. As necessary, we will pursue more contiguous space
solutions to house our authorized strength, host key Service cyber
component elements and liaison offices.
38. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what will be the
interagency support to the headquarters?
General Alexander. Currently, we have several representatives from
key interagency partners integrated into the Consolidated JFCC-NW/JTF-
GNO staff. My intent is to grow and strengthen these relationships by
increasing the level of integration of our key interagency partners. As
an example, we intend to further promote this enhanced coordination and
collaboration by seeking the integration of interagency personnel on
the CYBERCOM operations floor. We will also explore opportunities to
expand DOD/NSA liaison positions at other key departments and agencies.
In addition we will seek ways to improve the interagency coordination
process under the command's purview. One such process is the day-to-day
operational planning, deconfliction, and execution performed by JIATF-
Cyber that coordinates offensive cyberspace operations. Current member
organizations of JIATF-Cyber includes the NSA/Central Security Service,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Department of Justice (DOT), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint
Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, JFCC-NW, JTF-GNO, Joint
Functional Component Command for Global Strike, JIOWC, Departments of
Treasury (DOT), State (DOS), and Homeland Security and the combatant
commands. As CYBERCOM matures, we will look to improve this process and
expand our coordination to full-spectrum cyberspace operations.
39. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, how will your
responsibilities for the NSA impact or integrate with your
responsibilities for CYBERCOM?
General Alexander. Across my 4\1/2\ years as the Director of NSA/
Chief, CSS, and Commander of JFCC-NW (18 months of which I also served
as the operational commander of JTF-GNO), I have worked closely with
and been supported by excellent line commanders and leaders across the
STRATCOM, NSA, and CSS organizations who, in turn, have taken on
greater responsibility for executing their assigned tasks while
ensuring greater synchronization with all. I fully expect to be able to
draw upon the capabilities and talents of that broad leadership cadre
combined with the additional leaders that will join us upon activation
of CYBERCOM to effectively synchronize their work across NSA and
CYBERCOM.
While CYBERCOM's ability to leverage NSA's cryptologic capabilities
and its world class Information Assurance expertise will be critical to
its success in operating in the cyber domain, CYBERCOM and NSA will
remain separate and distinct organizations with their own identities,
authorities, missions, funding, and oversight mechanisms. I intend to
draw upon the extensive lessons I have learned over the past 4\1/2\
years to ensure that I am able to perform both missions effectively.
The addition of a three-star Deputy Commander for CYBERCOM, a fully
resourced joint staff and robust Service cyber components will be
critical enablers in this regard.
40. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, where would you
like to see CYBERCOM in the next 1, 5, and 10 years?
General Alexander. Over the next year, I see CYBERCOM focusing on
building the command and staff; implementing an effective operational
construct; and informing, and benefiting from, the development of DOD's
policy and strategy review to address cyberspace operations. Building
the command includes relocation of over 400 JTF-GNO personnel from
Arlington to Fort Meade, the establishment of a joint staff structure,
and the stand up of Service cyber components. Implementing an effective
operational construct is also key during the coming year and centers on
improving our ability to dynamically defend our military networks as
well as the development of a structured process to receive and respond
to combatant command cyber requirements. Underlying all of these goals
is the ongoing, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-led, review of
DOD cyberspace policy. This effort, as it comes to fruition, will
significantly shape and influence our actions in the cyber domain.
At year 5, I envision a significant improvement in defending of our
military cyber infrastructure. This improvement will be bolstered by
substantive growth and maturation of our Service cyber capacity and
capability as well as a considerable investment in physical and
information technology infrastructure to support shared cyber
situational awareness. Moreover, I envision a robust partnership with
the DHS and commercial sector to ensure the defense of the .mil, .gov,
and critical infrastructure, with roles, responsibilities and
authorities clearly defined and executed. At year 10, I envision
CYBERCOM, working closely with the Services, component commands, and
select agencies achieving a mature integrated operational construct
that allows for seamless interoperability, a capability to conduct net-
speed operations and a COE to conduct effective operations in
cyberspace.
41. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what level of
funding is necessary to achieve these goals?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator George S. LeMieux
cyber attacks
42. Senator LeMieux. Lieutenant General Alexander, what threshold
would constitute an act of war?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
43. Senator LeMieux. Lieutenant General Alexander, would we be
willing to commit kinetic forces in response to a cyber attack?
General Alexander. The President and the Secretary of Defense would
determine whether kinetic forces were to be committed. Important
considerations informing this decision would include the scale of the
attack and the ability to attribute it to a specific adversary as well
as the destructive effect. The use of kinetic force in response to a
cyber attack would also need to satisfy necessity and proportionality
requirements of the law of armed conflict.
44. Senator LeMieux. Lieutenant General Alexander, who are the
decisionmakers in reacting and responding to a cyber attack?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
45. Senator LeMieux. Lieutenant General Alexander, a March 23rd
article in Defense News claims that 120 countries have or are
developing offensive cyber attack capabilities. Is the United States
prepared to deal with this threat?
General Alexander. While the majority of these nations developing
offensive cyber attack capabilities are not our adversaries, the United
States does in fact face a serious threat from a spectrum of actors.
The growing cyber threat has, in fact and in my opinion, outpaced the
country's defenses and we are experiencing increasingly sophisticated,
coordinated, and damaging cyber penetration, for which I do not believe
we are adequately prepared.
The ever increasing intrusions into on our classified and
unclassified military networks, specifically, led to the Secretary of
Defense's decision to establish CYBERCOM in order to confront the
threats and reduce the vulnerability of our military cyber
infrastructure. As recognized in the President's Cyberspace Policy
Review, what is truly needed, however, is a comprehensive framework to
ensure coordinated response and recovery by the whole of government
working with the private sector. The interconnected nature of DOD
networks and the free flow of information across various domains
necessitate an active partnership between DOD and agencies across the
U.S. Government, along with the private sector, to ensure that the
security of these networks is synchronized. CYBERCOM will focus on
securing the Nation's military networks. Military operations and
command and control, however, no longer consistently fit neatly within
the boundaries of the .mil networks. Increasingly, key logistics and
other operational missions are performed by cleared defense contractors
and commercial vendors via routine network communications. Thus,
protecting the Nation's military networks and operations from
disruption will increasingly require close interaction with such
entities and new constructs to guarantee unimpeded operations.
As DOD works through the development of these new constructs, we
will do so in concert with the White House, the Justice Department,
DHS, and other agencies to ensure we develop a synchronized way ahead
within an overall national cyber policy framework. These collective
efforts will be foundational to our Nation's success in the cyber
domain.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
cyber attacks
46. Senator Vitter. Lieutenant General Alexander, first, I want to
thank you for our productive meeting and discussion last month about
NSA's continuing operations and future plans. How important do you view
an American offensive cyber capability?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
47. Senator Vitter. Lieutenant General Alexander, will you make
offensive capabilities a priority to counter or deter other nations'
cyber attacks?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
government/private sector collaboration
48. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, how critical is
collaboration between the private sector and the Government to reducing
our cyber vulnerabilities?
General Alexander. Collaboration is absolutely essential. I believe
building an effective partnership between the U.S. Government and the
Nation's private sector is integral to reducing the country's cyber
vulnerabilities.
Cyberspace is fundamentally owned and operated by the private
sector. Most of the government infrastructure is owned and operated by
private industry. For our mutual defense, the Government must share
information and expertise regarding threats and vulnerabilities with
the private sector--and the private sector should be able to do the
same. It must be a partnership.
49. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, can you discuss
how the NSA and CYBERCOM currently interact with the private sector and
your plans for that interaction to be stronger in the future?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
50. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, what specific
provisions in Federal law prevent information sharing between the
Government and the private sector, thus hampering our efforts to
protect cyberspace?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
51. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, if the private
sector shares information with the Government to help protect against
criminal and terrorist attacks, are there adequate protections in place
within the NSA and CYBERCOM to guard against the release of trade
secrets and other proprietary information?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
cyber coordination
52. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, NSA and CYBERCOM
play lead roles in protecting U.S. military networks. DHS is the lead
agency in terms of protecting the Federal Government's civilian
networks and the Nation's critical infrastructure. How do you plan to
coordinate the different responsibilities of NSA, CYBERCOM, and DHS in
this regard?
General Alexander. Each organization has specific missions and
authorities, and all will be required in order to increase the
cybersecurity of the Nation. Therefore, as you state, coordination is
essential for success. In my experience, the elements of effective
coordination are communication, collaboration, and respect. In response
to cyber threats and intrusions already encountered NSA, the Joint Task
Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) and DHS are continually
strengthening coordination in a manner that recognizes and respects
each others' authorities and capabilities, supports the exchange of
vital information, and results in collaboration on solutions that
mitigate the threat and reduce vulnerabilities. DHS, NSA, and the
Consolidated Staff (Joint Functional Component Command Network Warfare
and JTF-GNO) have also conducted a series of table top exercises to
improve coordination in cyberspace. Coordination, however, is necessary
beyond these three organizations. Coordination with other key
departments and agencies, to include the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice,
as well as State, local, and tribal government, industry and our allies
is imperative. In accordance with the White House Cyberspace Policy
Review, the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator is leading this
national effort.
Secretary Gates directed the creation of CYBERCOM to establish a
framework under which a single military command can achieve unity of
command and operational integration within DOD across the full-range of
cyberspace operations. CYBERCOM will increase the DOD's effectiveness
in this critical domain.
53. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, what is the
NSA's role in forming the technical standards, guidelines, or best
practices for protecting the evolving networks of the Government and
the private sector?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
cyber attacks
54. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, the former DNI,
Mike McConnell, recently pronounced that the United States ``is
fighting a cyber war today and it is losing.'' Various reports have
indicated that foreign powers have been at the root of serious and
malicious cyber attacks against U.S. Government networks and against
private interests. The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review
states that DOD's networks ``are infiltrated daily by myriad of
sources, ranging from small groups of individuals to some of the
largest countries in the world.'' In many cases, the attacks have been
conducted through private networks to cover their tracks. At what point
does an attack by a foreign power on our Government's systems or on a
U.S. private sector system become an act of war?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
55. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, authentication
of the source of a cyber attack is a critical component of any response
to the attack. However, authentication can often be a difficult
undertaking in the area of cyber security. It often requires the
cooperation of multiple Federal agencies as well as the assistance of
foreign governments. What steps is CYBERCOM taking to address this
challenge?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
56. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, what actions
should the U.S. Government take to improve authentication efforts,
including the need to pass any new laws?
General Alexander. We must approach this problem in several ways.
First, we must continue to encourage collaboration within the
Intelligence Community to improve our ability to determine
authentication. Second, we must invest in the right technologies to
promote rapid attribution of cyber intrusions as well as agile tipping
and cueing mechanisms to provide early warning and rapid response to
these threats. This must be done with careful attention to the
protection of privacy and civil liberties; if we are successful, these
measures and the resulting strengthening of cybersecurity will enhance
privacy through better protection of private information.
It is not clear at this time whether new laws are required to
improve U.S. Government authentication efforts, though some gaps do
exist today that prevent us from using technology to its fullest to
increase the cyber security of the nation, especially our Nation's
critical infrastructure. Foremost amongst these gaps are the potential
impediments to the public-private cybersecurity information sharing
partnership, which I believe is critical to more effectively
attributing and countering this threat. These include two core issues.
First, the U.S. Government needs to be able to disseminate to the
owners of the critical infrastructure and other private sector entities
threat information that reflects real time exigencies, and to receive
such information from private entities, while balancing concerns
regarding anti-trust regulations and other unfair competition matters;
civil liberties and privacy; and due regard for the Constitution and
all applicable laws, policies, and procedures. The second issue
involves how private companies will protect sensitive government
information and use it for the purpose of better cybersecurity without
incurring liability or unduly disrupting their network operations.
NSA/CSS, as a member of both DOD and the Intelligence Community and
in partnership with DHS and other departments and agencies, is working
closely with the President's Cyber Security Coordinator, Mr. Howard A.
Schmidt, on these issues. We are exploring options within existing law,
policy, and doctrine to address these issues and we will notify
Congress if any legislation maybe needed.
______
[The nomination reference of LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
October 20, 2009.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the
grade of indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General.
LTG Keith B. Alexander, 9763.
______
[The biographical sketch of LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Department of the Army,
Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison,
Washington, DC, October 15, 2009.
Hon. Carl Levin, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The President has forwarded to you under
separate cover the following nomination.
For appointment to the grade of General:
Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Director, National
Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, Fort Meade,
MD, as Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central
Security Service/Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, Fort Meade, MD.
For the information of the committee, I am enclosing a military
career resume for this officer showing his assignments and grades held.
Sincerely,
Bernard S. Champoux,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Legislative Liaison.
Enclosure
______
Transcript of Naval Service for LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.
Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
Boston University - MS - Business Administration
Naval Postgraduate School - MS - Electronic Warfare
Naval Postgraduate School - MS - Physics
National War College - MS - National Security Strategy
Military schools attended:
Armor Officer Basic Course
Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
National War College
Foreign language(s): None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date of
Promotions appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT................................................. 5 Jun 74
1LT................................................. 5 Jun 76
CPT................................................. 8 Aug 78
MAJ................................................. 1 Sep 85
LTC................................................. 1 Apr 91
COL................................................. 1 Sep 95
BG.................................................. 1 Jan 00
MG.................................................. 1 Jan 03
LTG................................................. 1 Aug 03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major permanent duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Feb. 75......................... Mar. 76........... Platoon Leader, B
Company, 2d
Battalion, 81st
Armor, 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Mar. 76......................... June 77........... Assistant S-4
(Logistics),
later S-4, 511th
Military
Intelligence
Battalion, 66th
Military
Intelligence
Group, U.S. Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
July 77......................... June 78........... Commander, Field
Office, 511th
Military
Intelligence
Battalion, 66th
Military
Intelligence
Group, U.S. Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
July 78......................... Feb. 79........... Student, Military
Intelligence
Officer Advanced
Course, U.S. Army
Military
Intelligence
Center and
School, Fort
Huachuca, AZ
Feb. 79......................... July 79........... Electronic Warfare
Staff Officer,
525th Military
Intelligence
Group, Fort
Bragg, NC
July 79......................... Jan. 81........... Commander, 336th
Army Security
Agency Company,
319th Military
Intelligence
Battalion (Corps
Electronic
Warfare
Intelligence),
525th Military
Intelligence
Group, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jan. 81......................... July 81........... Assistant S-3
(Operations),
525th Military
Intelligence
Group, Fort
Bragg, NC
Aug. 81......................... Sep. 83........... Student, Naval
Postgraduate
School, Monterey,
CA
Oct. 83......................... June 85........... Operations
Officer, later,
Chief,
Intelligence
Electronic
Warfare Systems
Task Force, later
Chief, Concepts
and Studies
Division, U.S.
Army Intelligence
Center and
School, Fort
Huachuca, AZ
June 85......................... June 86........... Student, U.S. Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
June 86......................... June 88........... Deputy Director,
Intelligence and
Electronic
Warfare Master
Plan Special Task
Force, later
Intelligence
Staff Officer,
Office of the
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Intelligence,
U.S. Army,
Washington, DC
June 88......................... Mar. 90........... S-3 (Operations),
later Executive
Officer, 522d
Military
Intelligence
Battalion, 2d
Armored Division,
Fort Hood, TX
Mar. 90......................... June 91........... Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2
(Intelligence),
1st Armored
Division, U.S.
Army, Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia
June 91......................... July 93........... Commander, 204th
Military
Intelligence
Battalion, U.S.
Army, Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Aug. 93......................... June 94........... Student, National
War College, Fort
McNair,
Washington, DC
June 94......................... May 95............ Chief, Army
Intelligence
Initiatives,
Office of the
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Intelligence,
U.S. Army,
Washington, DC
May 95.......................... June 97........... Commander, 525th
Military
Intelligence
Brigade, Fort
Bragg, NC
June 97......................... July 98........... Deputy Director
for Intelligence,
J-2, The Joint
Staff (Defense
Intelligence
Agency),
Washington, DC
July 98......................... Feb. 01........... Director for
Intelligence, J-
2, U.S. Central
Command, MacDill
Air Force Base,
FL
Feb. 01......................... July 03........... Commanding
General, U.S.
Army Intelligence
and Security
Command, Fort
Belvoir, VA
Aug. 03......................... July 05........... Deputy Chief of
Staff, G-2, U.S.
Army, Washington,
DC
Aug. 05......................... Present........... Director, National
Security Agency/
Chief, Central
Security Service,
Fort Meade, MD
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Mar. 90-June 91 Lieutenant Colonel
(Intelligence), 1st Armored
Division, U.S. Army Europe and
Seventh Army, Germany and
Operations Desert Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia (Partial Joint
Credit)........................
Deputy Director for June 97-July 98 Colonel
Intelligence, J-2, The Joint
Staff (Defense Intelligence
Agency), Washington, DC
(Cumulative Joint Credit
Awarded).......................
Director for Intelligence, J-2, July 98-Feb. 01 Brigadier General
U.S. Central Command, MacDill
Air Force Base, FL.............
Director, National Security Aug. 05-Present Lieutenant General
Agency/Chief, Central Security
Service, Fort Meade, MD........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of operations assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Mar. 90-June 91 Lieutenant Colonel
(Intelligence), 1st Armored
Division, U.S. Army Europe and
Seventh Army, Germany and
Operations Desert Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia...................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Distinguished Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Air Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Senior Parachutist Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Keith B.
Alexander, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Keith B. Alexander.
2. Position to which nominated:
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service/
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command.
3. Date of nomination:
October 20, 2009.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
December 2, 1951; Syracuse, NY.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Deborah Lynn Alexander (nee Douglas).
7. Names and ages of children:
Jennifer Lynn Leonard, age 33.
Julie Marie Bailey, age 31.
Diana Lauri Glaser, age 29.
Heather Michelle Burton, age 25.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association of U.S. Army.
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power.
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Keith B. Alexander.
This 1st day of July, 2009.
[The nomination of LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on May 5, 2010, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 7, 2010.]
NOMINATIONS OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND; AND LTG
LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Ben
Nelson, Webb, Hagan, Burris, Kaufman, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
Chambliss, Graham, Thune, LeMieux, Burr, and Vitter.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston,
research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff
member; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; John H.
Quirk V, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; John W. Heath, Jr. minority investigative
counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, and
Christine G. Lang.
Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka;
Christiana Gallagher and Ann Premer, assistants to Senator Ben
Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Roger Pena, assistant to
Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich;,
Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator Burris; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Andrew King, assistant to
Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune;
Brooks Tucker, assistant to Senator Burr; and Michael Wong,
assistant to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
The committee meets this morning to consider the
nominations of two extremely distinguished senior military
officers, General Raymond Odierno, nominated to be Commander,
U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and Lieutenant General Lloyd
Austin, nominated to be general and Commander, U.S. Forces-
Iraq. On behalf of the committee, let me thank you both for
your devotion, your commitment to the service of our country,
your willingness to be in positions of extreme responsibility.
We know that nominees are not alone in making these
sacrifices, and so in advance we thank your family members for
the support which they will need to continue to provide to you.
We have a longstanding tradition of asking our nominees to
introduce family members who are present, and let me do that at
this time.
General Odierno, if you have family members with you, we'd
be delighted for you to introduce them.
General Odierno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have my
wife, Linda, with me today.
Linda, if you could stand up, please?
My wife of 34 years has been with me my entire Army career,
supported our families and our soldiers and continues to do
that on a volunteer basis. As you all know, and we know, we
couldn't do it without their great support that they give us,
and I thank her for her support and sacrifices that she's given
these last several years.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Thank you so much for your great
service in support of not only your husband, but all that he
does for our Nation.
General Austin, do you have family members with you?
General Austin. I do, Mr. Chairman, and I'd ask my wife,
Charlene, to stand up, please?
Before I introduce Charlene, though, Mr. Chairman, I'd like
to applaud the efforts of all of the family members that
support our military day in and day out. They've made great
sacrifices to our Nation and they give a lot each and every
day.
Charlene's no exception. She's been my bride for 25 years.
She's a trained counselor by profession, and she's been in the
service of our soldiers and family members for the entire time
that we've been together. I'm very grateful for her sacrifices
and her continued support.
Thanks a lot, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to introduce
her.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, and thank her as well.
We, this committee, spend a lot of time supporting our men
and women in uniform and we also make it a point to focus on
their families and the kind of support that they deserve.
Each of our nominees has served this country in the
military for more than 30 years. They've shouldered the awesome
responsibilities of senior leadership of American troops in
combat.
General Odierno is no stranger to this committee, he's
commanded U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq nearly continuously
since December 2006. In fact, during that time, General Odierno
has had, I understand, only one small 7-month break in the last
47 months.
General, your service and sacrifice and that of your family
are well-known to all of us. They are deeply appreciated. We
have a tremendous respect and confidence in you. If you are
confirmed, you have the important responsibility of providing
mission-ready joint-capable forces to our combatant commanders
around the world. This command also supports the development
and integration of present and future joint interagency and
multi-national capabilities.
Our committee has a longstanding interest in this Command's
mission, responsibilities, authorities and activities with
respect to joint doctrine development, training,
experimentation, and acquisition.
The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to stress
the readiness and resources of our Armed Forces. JFCOM's
leadership as the joint force provider for present and future
operational needs of the Department of Defense (DOD) is
essential.
We're particularly interested in hearing General Odierno's
views on JFCOM's contribution to the development of
capabilities and the generation of forces to meet the
requirements of the combatant commanders, as well as his
assessment, based on his experience over the last few years of
the readiness of both deploying ground forces, and nondeploying
forces, and we'd be particularly interested, also, to hear
General Odierno's views on the future of JFCOM's contribution
to the joint acquisition, transformation, and readiness of our
military through what promises to be the very challenging years
ahead.
In addition, the committee is interested in the role that
joint experimentation, including JFCOM's modeling and
simulation activities plays in advancing our warfighting
capabilities. We have a significant interest in pressing the
Department on plans to reduce the number of contractors and to
transfer responsibility to DOD staff, as Secretary Gates has
said that he would do.
Lieutenant General Austin currently serves as Director of
the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, and that is an extraordinarily
important position. We've come to know of his great service in
that position. But he also has important recent experience
commanding U.S. and Coalition Forces in combat as Commanding
General of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and prior to that,
commanding the 10th Mountain Division in Afghanistan.
If confirmed, General Austin will assume command of
approximately 82,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, on the way down to
50,000 by the end of this coming August and leading to the
eventual withdrawal of all of our forces by December 2011.
The drawdown of U.S. forces is based on our security
agreement with the Government of Iraq. It is supported by the
increasing capability of the Iraqis Security Forces to shoulder
the responsibility of maintaining order in their country.
However, enough challenges remain, as the Iraqis still have
not established a government following the elections last
spring. They still need to wrestle with the political future of
their Northern Provinces, and come to an agreement on how to
distribute Iraq's abundant oil revenues.
Within that context, the drawdown of U.S. forces is a
complex military operation. When confirmed, General Austin will
continue to carefully manage the change of the U.S. force's
mission from counterinsurgency to advising and assisting the
Iraqi security forces, targeted counterterrorism operations and
force protection. All of which must occur while redeploying to
the United States tens of thousands of personnel, and shipping
millions of pieces of equipment out of Iraq.
A critical part of the drawdown of U.S. forces is the
interagency transition from DOD lead to the Department of State
lead with respect to U.S. long-term relations, and the host of
stability and reconstruction activities in Iraq. We'd be
interested in hearing General Austin's views on the importance
of that transition, and if confirmed, what actions he will
take--if any--to ensure that it is accomplished efficiently and
effectively.
We're also interested to hear General Austin's views on the
challenges of redeploying those large numbers of equipment and
the remaining 82,000 personnel from Iraq. Some of that
equipment needs to be sent to Afghanistan for our operations,
and where appropriate, by transferring some of that equipment
to the Afghan Security Forces to accelerate their taking
responsibility for their country's own security.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank our two very distinguished witnesses for
appearing before the committee this morning. General Ray
Odierno and General Lloyd Austin are two of America's finest
military leaders. They are also, for some of who are smaller in
stature, causing us to ask whether there is a height
requirement for command of our mission in Iraq.
I want to take this opportunity today to thank our
witnesses, and especially their families, for their many
decades of faithful service and sacrifice to our Nation. I'd
like to extend our gratitude to both of you for your tremendous
commitment to our Nation's fighting men and women of whom we
ask so much, and who never has let us down.
This hearing, obviously, is colored and dominated by the
issue of Iraq, its past, its present, and its future. When
General Odierno returned to Iraq in 2006, it was all but a
failed state. But over the next 2 years, as the operational
commander of the surge, a strategy which was opposed by many
members of this committee and dire predictions of failure were
made, and then for 2 more years as our top commander, General
Odierno was instrumental in the U.S. and Iraqi effort that
turned the situation around.
Perhaps the highest compliment I can pay to General Odierno
is that he has ably and impressively filled the very big shoes
of his predecessor, General David Petraeus. I'd go one step
further: much of the credit for the amazing turnaround in Iraq
has gone to General Petraeus, and that credit is richly
deserved. But not enough people understand the absolutely
indispensable role that General Odierno played, both in
conceiving of the surge strategy and then driving it day in and
day out, hour by hour, toward victory. There is no way that the
surge could have succeeded without him.
General Odierno's forward-looking and adaptive leadership
make him an ideal choice to head up our JFCOM where he will be
on the forefront of defining and shaping how our force will
tackle a complex and diverse array of challenges in the years
ahead, from raging insurgencies and rising powers, to
humanitarian relief and building partnership capacity.
General Austin has also been a vital part of our Iraq team.
Under his leadership of our day-to-day operations, U.S. forces
in Iraq carried out the critical work of consolidating the
success of the surge and beginning the transition to Iraqi
leadership. Perhaps the highest compliment I can pay to General
Austin is that he took over for General Odierno as our
operational commander in Iraq in 2008, and we never missed a
beat.
With the prospect of a second command transition from
General Odierno to General Austin, and with the final phase of
our redeployment out of Iraq soon to unfold, we can be
confident that our mission in Iraq is in the best of hands.
To be sure, the situation in Iraq is still fragile and
fraught with difficulty. The country is in the midst of a
pivotal and challenging process to form a new government, which
is taking longer than many of us had hoped. Still, it is more
important to get a good government in Iraq than a fast
government. At the same time, serious internal and external
threats to Iraq remain, as we have so tragically seen in recent
months. Yet, the Iraqi security forces continue to grow more
capable and professional, and they, not our troops, are now in
the lead in the most critical parts of the mission. It is
absolutely essential that the United States, including the
Congress, remain deeply engaged with Iraq during this critical
transition. Though the nature of our commitment to Iraq is
changing, that commitment is enduring.
We would welcome the views of both of our witnesses on some
of the most important issues now facing us in Iraq, on the
continued Iraqi efforts to form a new government, on the
transition from a military to a civilian-led U.S. mission, and
especially on this committee's decision to cut $1 billion from
the President's $2 billion request for the Iraq Security Forces
Fund, by the way, without consultation with the minority, and
replaced by earmarked pork-barrel projects. One of the really,
most unusual acts that I have seen in the years that I have
served on this committee.
The United States has sacrificed so much in Iraq. So many
lives have been given and so many resources have been
committed, and against all odds, success is within our grasp.
The one Iraqi institution that will do the most to determine
whether this success will be sustained is the Iraqi security
forces. Considering how high the stakes are in Iraq, it is
inconceivable why this committee would arbitrarily slash
funding for Iraq's security forces.
I look forward to discussing this and many other issues
pertaining to our mission in Iraq with our witnesses today. I
want to thank them again for their many years of service, and
for their desire to step forward once again to be considered
for these two important commands.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our two very distinguished
witnesses for appearing before the Committee this morning.
General Ray Odierno and General Lloyd Austin are two of America's
finest military leaders. They are also causing some of us to ask
whether there is a height requirement for command of our mission in
Iraq.
I want to take this opportunity today to thank our witnesses, and
especially their families, for their many decades of faithful service
and sacrifice to our Nation. I would also like to extend our gratitude
to both of you gentlemen for your tremendous commitment to our Nation's
fighting men and women--of whom we ask so much, and who never let us
down.
This hearing is colored by Iraq--its past, its present, and its
future.
When General Odierno returned to Iraq in 2006, it was all but a
failed state. But over the next 2 years, as the operational commander
of the surge, and then for 2 more years as our top commander, General
Odierno was instrumental in the U.S. and Iraqi effort that turned the
situation around.
Perhaps the highest compliment I can pay to General Odierno is that
he has ably and impressively filled the very big shoes of his
predecessor, General David Petraeus. I would go one step further: Much
of the credit for the amazing turnaround in Iraq has gone to General
Petraeus, and that credit is richly deserved. But not enough people
understand the absolutely indispensable role that General Odierno
played, both in conceiving of the surge strategy and then driving it
day in and day out, hour by hour, toward victory. There is no way that
the surge could have succeeded without him.
General Odierno's forward-looking and adaptive leadership make him
an ideal choice to head up our Joint Forces Command--where he will be
on the forefront of defining and shaping how our force will tackle a
complex and diverse array of challenges in the years ahead, from raging
insurgencies and rising powers, to humanitarian relief and building
partnership capacity.
General Austin has also been a vital part of our Iraq team. Under
his leadership of our day-to-day operations, U.S. forces in Iraq
carried out the critical work of consolidating the success of the surge
and beginning the transition to Iraqi leadership. Perhaps the highest
compliment I can pay to General Austin is that he took over for General
Odierno as our operational commander in Iraq in 2008, and we never
missed a beat. Now, with the prospect of a second command transition
from General Odierno to General Austin, and with the final phase of our
redeployment out of Iraq soon to unfold, we can be confident that our
mission in Iraq is in the best of hands.
To be sure, the situation in Iraq is still fragile and fraught with
difficulty. The country is in the midst of a pivotal and challenging
process to form a new government, which is taking longer than many of
us had hoped. Still, it is more important to get a good government in
Iraq than a fast government. At the same time, serious internal and
external threats to Iraq remain, as we have so tragically seen in
recent months. Yet, the Iraqi security forces continue to grow more
capable and professional, and they, not our troops, are now in the lead
in the most critical parts of the mission. It is absolutely essential
that the United States, including the Congress, remain deeply engaged
with Iraq during this critical transition. Though the nature of our
commitment to Iraq is changing, that commitment is enduring.
We would welcome the views of both of our witnesses on some of the
most important issues now facing us in Iraq--on the continued Iraqi
efforts to form a new government, on the transition from a military to
a civilian-led U.S. mission, and especially on this committee's
decision to cut $1 billion from the President's $2 billion request for
the Iraq Security Forces Fund. The United States has sacrificed so much
in Iraq. So many lives have been given and so many resources have been
committed, and against all odds, success is within our grasp. The one
Iraqi institution that will do the most to determine whether this
success will be sustained is the Iraqi security forces. Considering how
high the stakes are in Iraq, it is inconceivable why this committee
would arbitrarily slash funding for Iraq's security forces.
I look forward to discussing this and the many other issues
pertaining to our mission in Iraq with our witnesses today. I want to
thank them again for their many years of service, and for their desire
to step forward once again to be considered for these two important
commands.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Inhofe has asked for a very brief unanimous
consent.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.
Unfortunately, I won't be able to stay for this hearing,
but I want to make sure that I get on record.
I've been blessed to get to know both General Odierno and
General Austin in the place where it means the most: in the
field, and seen them in action. I want to thank them so much
for their service, and for the time that each one of you gave
me in my office yesterday. All of my questions have been
answered, and just for the record, I would like to say that
these guys today are not nominees, they're American heroes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me a chance to say
that.
Chairman Levin. All right, thank you, Senator Inhofe.
General Odierno.
STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, NOMINEE FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT
FORCES COMMAND
General Odierno. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
distinguished members of the committee, I'm deeply honored to
be here today, and humbled that I've been nominated by the
President and the Secretary of Defense to serve as the
Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before
the committee today. I promise you that, if confirmed, I will
dedicate myself to carrying out my duties to the best of my
ability and continue to work openly with Congress.
Should you confirm me, my first priority will be to support
all of our combatant commanders, and prepare our U.S. Joint
Interagency Team to meet the needs of this evolutionary and
complex environment in which we must continue to operate--but
not only operate, but succeed.
I will never forget my responsibilities to ensure our
soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, as well as our dedicated
families, are prepared and ready to take on all of the
challenges ahead.
If I could just take a few minutes, I would like to speak
just quickly about Iraq. Today we are at a pivotal time in
Iraq. Following successful elections in March, and the seating
of the parliament on June 14, the new legislative body has
begun the process of forming the next government.
We are working closely with Iraqis partners to enable a
process that yields an inclusive governing body, that is
representative of the diversity of the Nation and the results
of the elections. Although violence still persists in Iraq, we
continue to see a steady decline in overall incidents, in
overall civilian casualties and Iraqi security forces
casualties, and also a reduction in the number of high-profile
attacks inside of Iraq.
Since 30 June 2009, the Iraqi security forces have assumed
full responsibility for planning and executing security
operations inside of Iraq. Working closely with the Central
Command (CENTCOM) Commander, Secretary of Defense, and the
President of the United States, we have developed a roadmap for
the future of Iraq and our mission there. In accordance with
the Presidential guidance, our plan to responsibly drawdown our
force to 50,000 and end combat operations and transition to
stability operations by 1 September is on track.
Today, we have just under 82,000 U.S. troops on the ground,
down from a high of 165,000 in 2008. As we transition to a
civilian-led presence, we will continue to conduct partnered
counterterrorism operations and provide combat enablers to help
the Iraqi security forces maintain pressure on the extremist
networks.
But our primary mission will be to train, advise, and
assist the Iraqi security forces, to protect the population
against internal and external threats. Additionally, we will
support the U.S. Embassy, and specifically Provincial
Reconstruction Teams, the United Nations, and other
nongovernmental organizations dedicating to continuing the
build of Iraqis capacity. Guided by the Strategic Framework
Agreement between the United States and the Government of Iraq
and using a whole-of-government approach, we will continue to
set conditions for a secure, stable, self-reliant Iraq, and set
the foundation for an enduring strategic partnership between
the United States and the Government of Iraq. The stability of
the region and the interests of the United States depend on it.
During my time in Iraq, I've had the privilege to watch our
servicemembers perform superbly. Whether conducting full
spectrum combat, counterinsurgency, or stability operations, in
a complex and ever-changing operating environment, our
servicemembers have displayed unparalleled adaptability and
ingenuity to work through the toughest issues.
If confirmed, I'm committed to applying the lessons I've
learned in almost 5 years as a Division, Corps, and Force
Commander inside of Iraq, that I will dedicate myself to ensure
that in my duties as the Commander of JFCOM, I plan to use that
experience to develop our joint doctrine and capabilities,
evolve our professional military education, and support our
servicemembers currently deployed around the world.
I'm very thankful for the continuous support I've received
from Congress, and I'm deeply honored by the confidence placed
in me to continue to serve. It is the greatest privilege to
lead the men and women of our Armed Forces. I look forward to
your questions.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Odierno.
General Austin.
STATEMENT OF LTG LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, NOMINEE TO BE
GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ
General Austin. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and to all of
the distinguished Senators of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today and
thanks to all of the members of this committee for your
unwavering support to our service men and women and their
families.
As we enter our 9th year of sustained combat operations,
our young men and women, along with their families, continue to
answer the Nation's call, and carry the heavy burdens of the
current wars, and they are performing magnificently. As a
soldier, it has been my great privilege to serve the United
States of America for the last 35 years, and it is a tremendous
honor to be nominated to command U.S. Forces-Iraq. If
confirmed, I look forward to continuing our Nation's work in
Iraq. I understand that a stable environment in the Middle East
and Southwest Asia is essential to U.S. interests, and that the
future of Iraq is inseparable from the future of this critical
region.
A sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq will contribute
to the stability in the region, and will be a major ally in our
fight against al Qaeda and its extremist allies.
Conditions in Iraq have improved significantly over the
past 3 years. The government has demonstrated respect for the
rule of law, and is moving towards the peaceful transfer of
power through legitimate elections. Civil capacity and economic
conditions continue to improve, and al Qaeda in Iraq, and other
violent extremist groups have been severely degraded.
While we have achieved progress over the last few years, I
am keenly aware that the mission is not without risk, and our
work remains unfinished. Malign external influences continue to
infringe on Iraqi sovereignty, and al Qaeda and other violent
extremist groups still pose a threat to the government and to
the Iraqi people, and ethno-sectarian tensions continue to
impede a unified national vision for all Iraqis.
If confirmed, I would focus on a number of things. We would
continue to develop a long-term and mutually beneficial
relationship with the Iraqis. An enduring U.S.-Iraqis strategic
partnership and positive strategic relationships between the
Government of Iraq and its regional neighbors are essential to
security and prosperity in Iraq and across the region.
We would accomplish the U.S. military drawdown by
responsibly transferring missions and tasks to the Government
of Iraq, to the Department of State, and to other appropriate
international organizations. During this transition period, our
forces would continue to advise and train the Iraqi forces to
develop their security capabilities, and support their ability
to protect the Iraqi people.
In conjunction with our regional and global
counterterrorism strategy, we will continue to conduct
partnered counterterrorism operations to defeat al Qaeda and
other extremists in Iraq. We would assist the development of
effective ministries, and enable Iraq to meet the needs of the
people, and we would support efforts to advance enduring
solutions for Iraqi national unity. The foundational
requirement for all of this is security and stability, and that
can only happen through a capable and professional Iraqi
security forces.
We've achieved much in Iraq through the courage and
sacrifice of our U.S. service men and women, and the Iraqi
people and the Coalition Forces that fall alongside the Iraqis
in some of their most perilous times. I am committed to
achieving our national objectives and I am dedicated to all of
the brave people who've sacrificed to help build toward a
stable and secure Iraq.
I want to assure everyone that, if confirmed, I will work
tirelessly to achieve our national objectives in Iraq. I would
look forward to working with this committee and I would ensure
that the American values are adhered to by the U.S. forces in
Iraq.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Austin.
Let me ask, now, standard questions that are asked by this
committee of all of our nominees.
First, and you can answer together, have you adhered to
applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of
interest?
General Austin. I have.
General Odierno. I have.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Austin. No.
General Odierno. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications
including questions for the record at hearings.
General Austin. I will.
General Odierno. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Odierno. I will.
General Austin. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Odierno. Yes.
General Austin. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
General Odierno. Yes.
General Austin. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views,
when asked, before this committee to do so even if those views
differ from the administration in power?
General Odierno. Yes.
General Austin. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication in a
timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Odierno. Yes.
General Austin. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you both.
Let's try a 7-minute first round.
General Odierno, let me ask you first, the legislative
elections were held last March, they provided no clear winner
and the government has not yet been formed. Let me ask you, and
then General Austin, what is your assessment of the situation
in Iraq, particularly relative to the delay in the formation of
a new government and what is its impact on the security
situation in Iraq and on the planned drawdown of U.S. forces?
General Odierno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would just say the elections themselves were
historic in nature, and the outcomes were historic. We had
record numbers of Iraqis show up for the elections. In addition
they had a chance to vote freely.
In a poll that we took, 85 percent of the people felt that
they were not influenced at all in their votes, and I think
that shows why we had such a close outcome in the elections,
and I think that's extremely positive.
We then had a challenge to the election results, they did a
recount, and the recount, once again, validated that, in fact,
the elections were credible and legitimate. All of this
reinforcing the democratic processes that were put in place by
the Iraqi High Electoral Commission, supported by the United
Nations. I think all of these things added to the credibility
of the elections.
The long time period has made many of the people in Iraq a
bit nervous during this period where we have what we call a
caretaker government, but what's been encouraging to me has
been the actions of the Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi
security forces have remained professional and dedicated to
accomplishing the mission at hand: sustaining security levels,
and allowing the process to continue.
It's important that the Iraqis get the government right,
that they have a government that is a unity government that is
representative of all of the people, and it's important that
they be given time to do that. But they must realize they must
also move forward quickly, so that people don't take advantage
of that.
Chairman Levin. General Austin, do you wish to add anything
to that?
General Austin. Mr. Chairman, I share your concern with the
amount of time that it's taking to form the government. Having
said that, I am confident that the Iraqis will transfer power
peacefully.
I agree with General Odierno that it's absolutely
encouraging that despite the fact that it's taken them a little
longer than we'd like to see them take, the numbers of attacks
in Iraq have continued to go down and the Iraqi security force
is performing admirably.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask you both, do you continue to
support the drawing down to 50,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by
September 1?
General Austin. I do, Mr. Chairman.
General Odierno. Mr. Chairman, I've been clear about this,
I think it's the right time to do that. I think with 50,000
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on the ground it gives
us enough capability to continue to ensure that we continue to
make progress towards a self-reliant Iraq.
I think the Iraqi security forces have been in control of
the security situation, in charge of it for several months,
now. They've proven that they can do this with our support.
Over the next few months, we'll slowly reduce that support, and
I think we're in line to get to 50,000 by 1 September.
Chairman Levin. General Austin, when you take over, now,
you'll be facing the reduction by the end of next year to no
U.S. combat troops in Iraq. Do you support that?
General Austin. I absolutely do, Mr. Chairman, and I'm
confident that based upon plans that have currently been laid
out that we're on a good glide slope to get to where we need to
be.
Chairman Levin. General Odierno, the number of contractors
working under JFCOM currently outweighs the number of military
personnel assigned to JFCOM. Some of those contractors, the
ones that are hired as senior mentors can earn upwards of
$1,600 a day for their services, which is more than an Army
private running combat missions earns in an entire month.
Given the decision by Secretary Gates to convert the in-
source contractors to government employees, will you look at
this situation and see whether or not JFCOM is going to move in
that direction, as well?
General Odierno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have looked just peripherally, initially at the number of
contractors, civilians, and military in JFCOM. I'm going to
take a look at it when I get down there and understand what the
dynamic is.
As you've stated, there are more civilians and contractors
than military. We want to make sure that we have military
people doing military roles, governmental employees doing
inherently governmental roles, and that contractors are limited
to doing only those roles that they are authorized to do, and
we'll continue to look at that.
In regards to the senior mentor program, I understand that
JFCOM is working with the Department of the Navy, who is the
executive agent for JFCOM to be in line with Secretary Gates'
guidance in bringing that program online. I would just say that
the value of that program has been immense. I have personally
been trained with this program for 10 or 12 years, now, and the
impact it's had on preparing me to be ready to face complex
issues is extremely important.
It's important that we get this program right, and that we
continue to have a program that allows senior leaders to have
mentors and help them to learn through others what they have
experienced.
Chairman Levin. I hope you will not only look at those
matters, but look at the way in which the funding is provided
to those mentors and contractors which then apparently get a
cut of the money that goes to the mentors themselves. There's a
lot to be looked at in that area, and I'm glad to hear you'll
be doing it.
Are you familiar, General Odierno, with the request of the
Defense Minister in Iraq for the upcoming budget of $7.4
billion and the fact that, apparently, the Finance Minister of
Iraq reduced that request from $7.4 billion to $4.9 billion,
are you familiar with that?
General Odierno. I am, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Did you weigh in on that issue?
General Odierno. We did. I would just say that, as all
budgets are formed, I believe that the Defense Minister's
request was an unconstrained requirement. It was reviewed with
the rest of the requirements in Iraq, and decisions were made
in order to establish the budget.
I would say that the defense spending has gone up every
year since 2004. It went up again in 2010 from 2009. As we look
at the defense budget within Iraq, we look at both the Minister
of Interior and the Minister of Defense budgets, since they
both contribute significantly to the internal security. In
2010, that was $11 billion, approximately 17.5 percent of the
total budget. I think that's a significant amount, and they
continue to contribute immensely to building the Iraqi security
forces, police, and army.
Chairman Levin. Did you support the Minister's request of
$7.4 billion?
General Odierno. What we did is, we looked at what we
thought were mission-central capabilities and we thought that
$7.4 billion was what would be necessary to help them attain
that capability.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I mentioned in my opening statement and I'm sure you
heard this, the majority on the committee decided to take $1
billion out of the administration's request and substitute
items such as $1 million for foreign language correlation and
transition, $3 million for plant-based vaccine development, and
other very vital national security programs, i.e., the earmark
and pork barreling goes on despite the dissatisfaction of the
American people.
General Odierno and General Austin, if this committee's $1
billion cut to the Iraqi security forces is enacted, what
impact do you think that will have on the Iraqis military and
police capabilities and effectiveness, and on the security and
stability of Iraq as the U.S. troops withdraw?
General Odierno. Senator McCain, let me answer first.
I did submit the request through CENTCOM for $2 billion in
Iraqi security force funding for fiscal year 2011. That was
based on developing mission-essential capability for the Iraqi
security forces in preparation for our departure in the end of
2011. That request was based on getting them to a certain
capability, which we thought would mitigate and reduce the risk
of U.S. forces leaving Iraq by the end of 2011.
This money, we'd all be cost-sharing. That money would be
added to what the Iraqi security forces have available within
their budget. In order to continue to develop their strategic
logistics, intelligence collection integration, foundational
external security items, such as air sovereignty, and continued
improvements in the Navy in order to protect the oil
infrastructure, as well as other key enablers, such as
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and
others, that they are just beginning to develop. We think all
of those are important as we move forward, and get them to a
minimum capability. This does not, by any means, complete what
they absolutely will need in the long run. That will take
several more years. But we think it would give them initial
capability that would mitigate the risk in reduction of the
U.S. forces by the end of 2011.
Senator McCain. General Austin?
General Austin. Thank you, sir.
If confirmed, I would assess the impact of the loss of
these resources once I'm on the ground, but generally speaking,
as we try to conduct our responsible drawdown, and by the end
of calendar year 2011, what we're trying to do is stand up
capability with the Iraqi security forces as efficiently and
effectively as possible. Certainly, we're balancing risk as we
do that. If confirmed, as I go into theater, I would take a
hard look at what the loss of those resources would do to
either increase or not increase that risk.
Senator McCain. Maybe we could hear again, and I think you
partially answered this question from the chairman, as we took
this billion dollars and put it into earmark and pork barrel
projects--one of the arguments used by the majority was that
the Iraqi Government is not committing sufficient resources to
its own security and that it has surplus resources to direct to
its military and police.
How do you respond to that, General, again?
General Odierno. Senator, as I stated, I know that in 2010,
$11 billion has been dedicated to the security forces, which is
about 17.5 percent of the total budget.
In addition, the Iraqi budget for 2010 is $77 billion. We
believe revenue will be around $52 billion. They have $10
billion in excess cash which will be used to take care of part
of the $25 billion deficit, and then they are planning on
borrowing $2 to $3 more million from the International Monetary
Fund----
Senator McCain. Billion.
General Odierno.--billion--and that still would leave them
about $12 billion deficit in 2010.
For 2011, they have a $79 billion budget. They are
predicting a revenue of about $62 billion, which would be an
increase, obviously, over 2010, based on the fact that they
hope to increase oil exports in 2011. But it's unclear, yet,
whether they'll be able to do that or not, but it will still
leave them at a deficit in their spending.
Senator McCain. I thank you, and I just don't see, very
frankly, how our side of the aisle, could agree to an
authorization bill moving forward where we've substituted $1
billion of badly needed help to finish up our conflict in Iraq,
pursuing a successful strategy which was opposed by the same
individuals who want to spend $1.5 million for an acoustic
search glider and $1 million for a permafrost tunnel. I don't
think that I could support moving forward with an authorization
bill that would cut $1 billion from our ability to succeed in
our mission in Iraq. Too much American blood and treasure has
been expended to allow it to be undermined, because earmark and
pork-barrel spending seems to be the top priority.
I thank both of the witnesses, I look forward to confirming
them, and I thank them both for their service to our country.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to both of you. I was thinking as I looked around
the room that there's not a big crowd here, today, it's not the
size of the crowds that we used to get in hearings on Iraq, and
that's good news. Crowds tend not to turn out for good news,
and a lack of controversy. That's the result of a, really,
extraordinary effort by the American military, and the military
and people of Iraq, as well. Both of you have played a critical
leadership role in that. I think this has been one of the great
chapters in the proud history of the American military. The
results, as both of you testified to them today are--I'd use
the word miraculous. The Iraqi military really is in charge,
has been since last summer, in the major population centers.
The Iraqi people turned out in a democratic election, in great
numbers. While they're struggling with the parliamentary
process of putting the government together, that's a lot better
than what they experienced under Saddam Hussein for a long
time. The economy is improving, we're going over there next
week, but last time we were there in January, this is a country
really coming alive and moving forward.
It's really a remarkable accomplishment. I know we talk
about it, but we can't talk about it too much or thank you
enough for the role that the both of you have played, and
General Austin, you will continue to play.
General Odierno, as you depart Iraq, I wanted to ask you to
take us to a kind of bigger picture look at this because
clearly there's broader strategic implications of a stable and
secure democratic Iraq, pro-American, anti-terrorist in the
Middle East. I wanted to give you an opportunity to talk for a
moment or two about the significance--and, of course, we always
know we have to hold that, but if we continue along this path,
what's the significance to America's broader national security
interests in a region of the world where we have always felt
that we had a very important national security interest?
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. I believe we have an
opportunity that we might never have again with such an
important country in Iraq. We just look at where it is
geographically inside of the Middle East, and the important
position that it has where it's in the center of the many
different Middle Eastern religions, many of the different
Middle Eastern populations, and the impact that Iraq can have
on that.
The fact that Iraq is developing economically and moving a
little bit towards a capitalist system, the fact that Iraq has
now implemented a democracy and has had a successful election
run completely by the Government of Iraq is something that is
unique in the Middle East.
I think as they continue to build their security depth,
their economic depth and their political depth, I think what
that means is more stability in the Middle East. For a very
long time, Iraq contributed to stability, but in the wrong
way--it created more instability. Where it is, the importance
to the rest of the Middle Eastern nations allows us an
opportunity, here, to develop the Middle East economically,
diplomatically, and from a security standpoint.
The Iraqi people have rejected al Qaeda, they have rejected
the ideology of al Qaeda, they are fighting al Qaeda
themselves. That example is tremendous. The way ahead is, we
now have to get them working with other regional neighbors in
order to continue this fight against extremism, of all kinds,
that is all around the world, and that we can become long-term
partners with them, in my mind, could add significantly to the
security of the United States.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that.
Let me bring General Austin in on this. As you look around,
I know the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) moves us to,
essentially, zero troops at least at the end of 2011, although,
I think there's been a presumption that the democratically
elected Government of Iraq might ask us to maintain some
presence there in the future.
As you look around the Middle East, the truth is in just
about every country, we have some military presence--training,
prepositioning, our troops on the ground, our military
alliances. I wanted to ask you your thoughts, going forward as
you take command, particularly if the Iraqis do ask us to stay
in some way after 2011, are we prepared to continue to help
them?
General Austin. Senator, as you pointed out, this region is
important to the United States of America, and the country of
Iraq is important to the region.
I think that what we want and what we're working towards is
a healthy, long-term relationship with the country of Iraq, and
that relationship will be centered on a number of issues--
economic issues, political issues, and certainly if, in terms
of the way forward, I think it's incumbent upon the government
and the leadership of Iraq to engage the leadership of the
United States at the highest levels, and at the highest levels
whatever our future will be will be worked out at that level.
We, in the military, stand ready to support whatever the
decision is made.
But, whatever we do in the country of Iraq should be a
whole-of-government approach, and we should look to establish
great relationships with them along a number of dimensions,
here.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
General Odierno, let me ask you about Iran. It's true that
we understand that Iraq's in the neighborhood, it has to have
relations with its neighbors, but my impression is that Iran
continues to try not to just have good bilateral relations, but
in some sense, to exercise undue influence over political
activities in Iran. What's the status of that at this point, as
you depart?
General Odierno. I would say that Iran continues to be
extremely active in attempting to influence the outcome of the
formation of the government inside of Iraq. I think it's
important to know that they're doing that and just make sure
that we ensure that the Iraqis get to decide what their
government is and that we don't allow external influence to
decide what the next Iraqi Government will be.
I am confident that the Iraqis are nationalists, they want
Iraq to run Iraq. They do not want to be influenced by other
regional powers, they do not want Iran meddling inside of their
activities. I think, again, it's important for us to support
Iraq and the process that they have for Iraqis to choose the
next government. I think that's how we're trying to go about
our business today as we move forward.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, General Odierno.
My time is up, I just wish you well at JFCOM. I must say
that when General Mattis testified before the committee and we
talked to him about the role that command has in developing
doctrinal concepts that apply across the Military Services, he
indicated, I thought, that JFCOM has too often been a bystander
to the actual decisions made by the Services, and that his
greatest power was the power of persuasion. I think you come
with such credibility and stature, and I hope you use it all to
push, not yourself, but really, the JFCOM approach into the
center of the decisionmaking about what our military is going
to look like in the future.
I thank you very much for taking on this next assignment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
To both of you, once again, thanks to you, thanks to your
families for your continued service to our country. You are
certainly great leaders and you provide the kind of quality
leadership that is needed in a very difficult time for our
country, and a very complex time for the world.
Mr. Chairman, I have to qualify my support for General
Austin by saying that he and my wife are from the same
hometown, and his high school football coach was also my son's
coach. They were champions in both instances, and as a result,
I have several General Austin stories that I think I'll
probably save for another day, General. But needless to say,
we're all very proud of you down our way.
General Odierno, let me start with you. One of the great
success stories with Iraq under General Petraeus as well as
under you was the conversion of the Iraqi people and their
support for the American soldier and our effort and the mission
there. Where does that stand right now? What do you see from
the standpoint of the attitude of the Iraqi people towards the
American soldier?
General Odierno. I would say, Senator, this is always a
very difficult issue. I would just say, first, they understand
what the U.S. mission is, there, but Iraqis are tired of forces
outside Iraq inside of Iraq. Been there a long time, they
appreciate the progress that they're seeing, they want to move
forward and they want to take over their own country.
What we've done lately which I think has really been very
good is the fact that we are supporting Iraqi security forces
and allowing them to do more. They are starting to see that
future, and that's helping them to appreciate the role of the
U.S. soldiers even more, because they realize that they need
our support in order to get to where they want to be--an Iraq
that can be run by Iraqis, Iraq that can be secured by Iraqis.
Because of that, I'm starting to see this improvement in
relationships among Iraqi leaders and U.S. leaders as well as
our soldiers and their soldiers. There's links that will never
be broken, between Iraqi security forces and U.S. forces,
because we've stood by each other, now, through some extremely
difficult times, and shared some common sacrifices. It doesn't
matter where you come from, when you work together and share
those sacrifices, there will be a bond that will be always
linked between the two. I think we'll continue to see that as
we move forward, Senator.
Senator Chambliss. General Austin, you and I discussed
briefly, yesterday, the fact that General Cucolo and the 3rd
Infantry Division are leading the effort along Iraq's northern
border to bring some--or to mitigate some issues between the
Arabs and the Kurds. I know that U.S. assistance is a critical
component in this area. Could you give us your thoughts about
your confidence in the fact that we'll be able to solve this
issue. Is it going to continue to be necessary to devote
brigade combat team to that region?
General Austin. Senator, I think the Arab-Kurd tension
issue is an issue that the Iraqis must take on, and they must
solve for themselves.
I think that we can do a tremendous amount of work, and a
tremendous amount of good by advising, assisting, any way we
can, building confident measures to bring some of the parties
closer and closer together. We've already done that in the
north, the 3rd Infantry Division has been an instrumental part
of that, and we'll continue to work that as we, if confirmed,
if I go back into theater.
But, I think that this will take some time, it's a very
complex issue, and again, I think it's an issue that the Iraqi
Government must fully embrace and work hard at.
Senator Chambliss. General Austin, as we look to the
withdrawal of troops, as I told you yesterday, I think your
leadership may be coming at the most critical time, because of
the fact that it's going to be necessary to get an awful lot of
equipment moved around, as well as our troops out in a safe and
secure manner. I think your comment to me was that you're
prepared for them to take a swing at you as you come out. I'd
appreciate your comments relative to what your thoughts are
regarding safety and security of our troops as you transition
out.
General Austin. I have every reason to believe, Senator,
that as our footprint decreases, there will be extremist
elements that will try to place additional pressure on us.
We'll be prepared for that, we'll make sure that all of our
intelligence systems are working, we'll work with the Iraqi
security forces to make sure that we continue to approach these
issues as partners.
But the Iraqi security forces really have to play a big
part in providing for our security. The security of our forces
is foremost in my mind. If, as conditions change on the ground,
I need resources to accomplish a particular mission, I won't
hesitate to let my chain of command know that. But I'll assess
that every day as in theater, if I'm confirmed.
Senator Chambliss. Lastly, General Odierno, you mentioned
yesterday the number of incidents in Iraq, particularly in
Baghdad, it decreased in a significant way. But yet when
something does happen it's all over the news. I wish you'd
comment on that, because I think that's a point that the
American people need to understand, relative to casualties that
we're seeing there.
General Odierno. I would just say, as I said in my opening
statement, Senator, incidents are down significantly from the
height, they're down over 90 percent from what they were in
2006 and 2007. But, more importantly, they've continued to go
down since the Iraqi security forces have taken over
responsibility in the cities in June 2009.
What's interesting is as security has gotten better, we're
starting to see life come back to all of the cities in Iraq,
each event gets more publicity, every single individual event,
which is important, and good. But, I think sometimes we tend to
focus so much on these incidents, we really forget to put it in
perspective, to once where we were and where we are today. It's
really pretty significant.
As you fly over Baghdad today, compared to just a year ago,
it is a significantly different place. Traffic jams all over,
markets exploding, private investments coming in--that would
not be occurring if you did not have security. You see that in
other cities around Iraq, as well.
I don't want to give the impression that there is not
violence in Iraq--there is still violence, there is still work
that has to be done, but it is at a level where I believe the
Iraqi security forces are capable of handling that level of
violence. As we continue to develop the police and the army for
our departure at the end of 2011, I believe they will be ready
to protect the people of Iraq.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks to both of you, again, for your
service. I hope as you assume these new commands, that you will
take a moment to express to those men and women that serve
under you how much the American people appreciate their great
commitment, and their great service.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my appreciation for your service to our country
and your families for their support.
One thing that I've looked for from almost the beginning of
my time, here, is about stovepipes, and whether Services are
duplicating their efforts or truly enhancing overall mission
effectiveness. With regard to the unmanned platforms, both the
Army and the Air Force are making substantial investments in
relatively similar platforms--MQ-1 and MQ-9 unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). As the lead for joint capabilities
development, JFCOM, General Odierno, I know you're responsible
for trying to find a way to make sure that there's
interoperability and that we don't end up with stovepipes.
In your response to the committee's advance policy
questions, you state that you would like to continue efforts
that allow, ``Services to develop Service-specific,'' systems
and capabilities after joint review. How will you ensure that
the coordination is occurring as opposed to discoordinating,
going separate directions with respect to comparable equipment?
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. It's about
integration, it's about how these systems are integrated into
joint warfare and the joint fight, and it's how we get them in
the hands of all of our soldiers, sailors, and marines and they
understand the capabilities that are there and how they use
these different capabilities to integrate them together to get
the best results.
What we've learned over the last several years is one of
the key things that we have to be able to do better is manage
information. We now have systems available that collect an
enormous amount of information at the strategic, operational,
and tactical level. One of the things I want to focus on is how
do we best manage that information around the world with our
joint forces.
We still have issues, sometimes, of moving information from
one Service to another, or in some cases even within the
Service from one stovepipe to another, and I think that's the
key. I think I can focus that through doctrinal work, through
simulation experimentation work that we can do in working very
carefully with the combatant commanders in the Services and
integrating these capabilities. That what will help us in
fighting this unique threat that I foresee over the horizon of
regular warfare, that we have to continue to be adaptive and
show agility as we continue to improve our capacities.
Senator Ben Nelson. Another area where I am concerned about
stovepiping is how we process the information that's collected
by ISR. During the Air Force posture hearing, I asked General
Schwartz about the manning of the ISR mission, and he stated
that the current manning structure to support UAV operations
was ``unsustainable'' in light of projected growth. I wonder
what your view at JFCOM would be in ensuring that the Services
aren't necessarily duplicating investments in that area,
because we're obviously going to have limited capabilities?
General Odierno. I think, again, we have to separate the
strategic operational, tactical fight, we have to understand
what are the capabilities we have in each and are needed in
each, and how we integrate those together to ensure that want a
little bit of redundancy, but not too much redundancy.
What I think in JFCOM, what we can do is reach out to the
combatant commanders to understand what their needs are and
then react to those needs and then work the doctrinal piece as
well as the simulation experimentation piece, and really the
staff training piece, in order to understand what capabilities
we have and how we'll integrate those. If confirmed, I'll focus
myself on that.
Senator Ben Nelson. In regard to that, if we're struggling,
let's say, to have sufficient personnel and/or the cost of
sufficient personnel. If we don't do what you're talking about
doing, we'll have an avalanche of information and will be
unable to utilize any of it for our own benefit.
General Austin, according to the President's plan for
withdrawing troops, obviously the success of that depends on
our ability to train Iraqi security forces to secure Iraq. As
General Odierno has said, that security system seems to be
working much better with the reduction in the events that have
cost us so many of our own troops.
Secretary McHugh stated that, ``In terms of training, a
major lesson is that versatile and agile units that are
fundamentally competent can adapt to any threat from across the
spectrum of conflict.'' I'm interested in what your thoughts
are about the progress of Advisory and Assistance Brigades
(AABs) that we've trained, and that would now be mentoring
Iraqi units. Can you speak to the particular type of training
that we're giving to the AABs, versus traditional combat
brigade teams? Is there a difference?
General Austin. Senator, first of all, I'm pleased to see
that the AABs are doing so well. When I was last in Iraq, I
worked with General Odierno to help develop that concept. The
foundation for the AABs is a brigade combat team. What we've
done is added some additional capability to that brigade combat
team to help them be able to engage at the brigade and division
level and help train those staffs.
All of the indications that I've seen to date have been
very positive. That we, just taking a brigade combat team and
augmenting it with the right things, we've done the appropriate
thing, in this case.
In terms of the impact on the Iraqi security forces, I
think, as I look at where they are now, versus where they were
3 years ago, the change is remarkable. I think that change was
brought about, in large measure, because of the fact that we
partnered with the Iraqi security forces and really worked
side-by-side with them and developed them as quickly as we
possibly could to reach a certain level. Now we need to
continue to focus on those brigade and division staffs to
complete their training.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do we have enough AABs, or are we
planning to increase the number of AABs to be certain that the
conditions on the ground will support our direction in
departing?
General Austin. My assessment, and again, I'll continue to
refine this assessment, if confirmed, as I go in, is that we
absolutely have the right amount of AABs on the ground, and
certainly we're going down to 50,000 troops by 1 September.
From all that I've seen of the plans that U.S. Forces-Iraq and
General Odierno have put together, they have shaped this 50,000
force exactly right and that has all of the capability in terms
of training and force protection that it needs to be
successful.
Senator Ben Nelson. If conditions change, because
conditions are always fluctuating, will you be certain to let
us know if you need more AABs to facilitate that withdrawal?
General Austin. I will not hesitate to inform my
supervisors, Senator, in the event that things change and I
need to ask for additional capability.
Senator Ben Nelson. Again, thank you.
General Austin. You have my word on that. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. General?
General Odierno. Senator, if I could just add on the AABs,
I've been very pleased with the work of the AABs, we have six
on the ground today. The way they've been trained, we have
passed lessons learned back to the Army, the Army is the one
whose developed these, and they've changed how they operated
the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training
Center. They have prepared them to deal with the specific
environ that we've asked them to work in, and I've been very
pleased with the outcome. It shows the flexibility of the
Brigade Combat Team of the Army that they're able--with some
adjustments--to meet different mission requirements. I think
that's the important piece, and that gets to the flexibility
and adaptability that Secretary McHugh talked about, and I
think that's important to understand because as I go to my new
job in JFCOM, you want forces that are flexible and adaptable
and can meet the requirements of many different mission sets.
That's what we're going to need in order to have an efficient
armed services here, as we move forward, and continue to look
at doing things with maybe less resources in the future.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you both for your comments, and
good luck to both of you.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations to both of you on the job you have done and
the new jobs you're going to undertake, here.
General O--I always butcher your name, I'm just going to
call you General O--there must be a height requirement for
these jobs. [Laughter.]
We mentioned yesterday the World Cup is going on and it's
fun to watch, and I'm pulling for the U.S.A., but I have really
no idea what they're doing when they play soccer. So, we're
going to talk football. I think you indicated, we're probably
on the 10-yard line when it comes to Iraq?
General Odierno. I did, Senator. I do think we are on the
10-yard line. I think the next 18 months will determine whether
we get to the goal line, or really give the Iraqis an
opportunity to get the goal line beyond 2011.
Senator Graham. But, from our national perspective, we're
on the 10, and I think you said we probably have four downs?
It's first and 10 on the 10, we have a new quarterback coming
in.
General Odierno. That's right.
General Austin. I'll take the ball, Senator.
Senator Graham. I couldn't have found a better guy to be
the new quarterback.
Now, the Sons of Iraq, how is that going, General O, in
terms of getting those people integrated in the Iraqi security
forces?
General Odierno. We started out with about 103,000 Sons of
Iraq. About 40,000 have been transitioned into other Government
of Iraq jobs. They actually stopped the transition because they
were starting to realize the value in many areas of what they
were providing in terms of intelligence and other things, so
they've slowed that down, and they're now doing some
reevaluation of the Sons of Iraq program, and how they want to
transition that.
Senator Graham. Are they still getting paid?
General Odierno. They are.
Senator Graham. One thing that we need to watch for,
General Austin, is you have thousands of young Sunnis that are
receiving a government paycheck, I think it's like $90 a month,
is that right?
General Odierno. Three hundred.
Senator Graham. Three hundred? Okay, $300 a month. We have
to make sure that if that pay stops that we have a plan, do you
agree with that, General Austin?
General Austin. I absolutely agree with that, Senator. I
was there, again, in the early days we begin to transition the
Sons of Iraq to working for the government and work along with
the Prime Minister to outline a plan to effectively transition
them. I think they've done a pretty good job, and we need to
continue to do that in the future.
Senator Graham. Okay, who's paying? Is that coming from the
Iraqi budget?
General Austin. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Now, Article 140 boundary dispute issues, I think there are
a couple of trip wires left in Iraq and one of them that stands
out to me is how do you resolve the Arab-Kurdish conflict in
Kirkuk and the boundary dispute. If you could both give me,
maybe, a 30-second overview of where we're at and what could we
do in Congress to help you?
General Odierno. We have established a tripartite security
architecture in the disputed areas for about 6 months now, and
it's been very successful in reducing tensions. It's Pesh
Merga, Iraqi Army and U.S. forces manning checkpoints and joint
security areas where they do patrolling in these areas, and it
has calmed things down considerably. The United Nations (U.N.)
is now taking on the role of now mediating the long-term issues
of the border issues and the status of Kirkuk and other issues.
Senator Graham. Do you think that will get resolved for
this new government in a year?
General Odierno. It depends. My guess is, some of that will
be discussed during the governmental formation process. How
well that goes could determine how quickly it could happen. I
do believe though, to solve the whole problem, it will be
longer than a year.
Senator Graham. General Austin, do you agree that is one of
the big outstanding issues that the Iraqi people have to
resolve?
General Austin. Senator Graham, I absolutely do.
I think that, I would be delighted if it could be resolved
in a year but----
Senator Graham. Probably not.
General Austin. I really believe that it's going to take
awhile.
Senator Graham. Do you feel like we have enough resources
and focus to help them get it resolved?
General Austin. I think that we're doing the right things
in terms of working with the government to help them build
confidence--bring about confidence-building measures to bring
the two sides closer together. I think, again, it's encouraging
to see that the U.N. is continuing to try to help, we'll
require their help in the future.
Senator Graham. Okay.
General Austin. But this is going to take a lot of work.
Senator Graham. Okay.
The hydrocarbon law. Have you had to pass the hydrocarbon
law, is that right, General O?
General Odierno. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Graham. From my point of view, for what it's worth,
is that until the Iraqis have a statute that divides the oil up
between each group where everybody feels like they're getting
the resources of the country fairly shared, it's going to be a
tough go. Do you see a breakthrough in the hydrocarbon law any
time soon?
General Odierno. I think the hydrocarbon law, itself,
probably might not get passed. But, I think there are other
alternatives.
Senator Graham. They do it year-by-year, budgeting-wise,
don't they?
General Odierno. Yes, year-by-year, but also they get a
revenue-sharing agreement.
Senator Graham. Right.
General Odierno. I think it would be important. I think
that's something that people are looking at now, and I think
that would help significantly.
We've had some thawing, there was an argument about whether
the Kurdistan Region could develop their own oil, they have
solved that problem. They have now begun to develop that. The
Government of Iraq, the central government is helping them, so
that's a breakthrough. We're starting to see small
breakthroughs in the overall resolution of this. But again,
there's still work that has to be done in that area.
Senator Graham. The rules of engagement--as I understand
it, we're partnering with the Iraqi security forces, we have
right of self-defense, obviously, but when you make a raid,
now, at night, do you have to get a warrant?
General Odierno. Under the security agreement, all
operations must be warranted.
Senator Graham. Is that working okay?
General Odierno. It is working very well.
Senator Graham. Do you have good confidence in your
judicial system, there are no leaks?
General Odierno. It's not perfect.
Senator Graham. Not perfect.
General Odierno. No system is perfect. But our ability to
present evidence and get warrants, we absolutely have the
ability to do that. That's working well.
Senator Graham. That's very encouraging.
One last question to both of you. General O, we're talking
about the consequences to the United States of winning in Iraq,
and I think they're enormous. Probably a good time now, given
Afghanistan and where we are at in the world--if, for some
reason, we didn't make it into the end zone, what would be the
consequences of Iraq failing?
General Austin, if you could tell this committee, what are
the one or two things that keep you up at night when you think
about Iraq?
General Odierno. First, if we had a failed state in Iraq,
it would create uncertainty and significant instability,
probably, within the region. Because of the criticality of
Iraq, its relationship to Iran, its relationship to the other
Arab states in the region, if it became unstable, it could
create an environment that could continue to increase the
instability. If it becomes unstable and ungoverned, it opens
the area, potentially, for terrorists, in order to allow Iraq
to become a place where terrorism could be exported.
Now, I don't believe we're close to that. I believe we're
far away from that happening. I think we're definitely on the
right path. But those are the kinds of things that would happen
if we had a complete breakdown inside of Iraq.
General Austin. Senator Graham, we will be successful in
Iraq, we will get the ball into the end zone. I believe that
because of all of the great work that our young men and women
continue to do on a daily basis and the commitment of this
entire country to accomplishing that in the right way.
You mentioned the thing that keeps me awake at night, the
one thing that is foremost in my mind is that if their
leadership is unable to transfer power in a peaceful manner,
that would create conditions that would cause us to, perhaps,
revert to sectarian behavior and people to lose confidence in
their ability to be properly represented. That is one of the
major things.
But I am confident that, based upon what we've seen thus
far, this peaceful transition will occur. It will just take
some time for them to form a government.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I did want to tell our nominees today, not only are you
nominees, but you certainly are American heroes, and we thank
you for your commitment and your service.
I also want to thank Mrs. Odierno and Mrs. Austin, because
I too have been married around 30 years. We all chose great
partners, but I really appreciate your support of these two
excellent individuals before us today. Thank you for all that
you have done over the years for our troops and their families,
because I know how critically important that is.
General Odierno, I'm delighted that you've been nominated
to replace General Mattis as Commander of JFCOM and you are
extremely well-qualified to lead the joint integration effort.
You effectively established a coherent and integrated joint
force in Iraq, you know what it takes to fight jointly in an
irregular warfare environment, and you are also one of the
primary architects of the surge in Iraq and the Sunni-Anbar
Awakening. I appreciate the time you spent with me and several
of our other Senators this past March, and your team. I thank
you for that time.
General Austin, I'm also incredibly proud that you have
been nominated to replace General Odierno as the commander of
the U.S. forces in Iraq. You, too, are extremely well-qualified
to lead our forces in Iraq as we draw down our military
presence there and develop a long-term relationship with the
Government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces. I'm proud of
your outstanding work as the Commander of the 18th Airborne
Corps, and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq. You did a tremendous
job in planning and executing all of the military operations in
Iraq, and fighting alongside the Iraqi Army, and our coalition
partners.
General Odierno, among your expected duties as the
Commander of JFCOM will be to serve as the joint conventional
force provider and oversee joint military concept and doctrinal
development, joint training, and joint interoperability and
integration. How will you work with the Military Departments,
geographical combatant commanders, and intergovernmental
agencies to resolve gaps in joint warfighting capability, and
how do you plan to respond to overseas contingencies utilizing
the whole-of-government approach?
General Odierno. Thank you, ma'am, very much.
I would say a couple of things. The first thing I have to
be able to do is reach out to the combatant commanders
themselves, have a discussion with them of what their needs and
requirements are, whether it be U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), associated with our internal defense and work with
Department of Homeland Security and what we need there, or
whether it be CENTCOM and all of the things associated with
that. I have to be able to help us to understand how we can use
and integrate all of the capacities and capabilities we have
within the Services in order to meet those requirements, and I
have to understand what those requirements are.
Then I have to work with the Services, with the Service
providers within the Services, as well as the Service doctrinal
leaders in order to ensure that we are integrating all of the
efforts that are going on to meet the future needs, whether it
be irregular warfare or homeland defense requirements that we
have. We will continue to dedicate ourselves to that to include
a training program that allows us to continue to train with our
interagency partners. We continue to build relationships with
the interagency as we go after this whole-of-government
approach, which applies whether it be in NORTHCOM for internal
U.S. security, or whether it is in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility (AOR), or the PACOM AOR in Korea, as we have to
work with all of our interagency partners, and how we better
utilize that, and gain efficiencies in using this whole-of-
government approach, which is the way ahead for us.
Senator Hagan. Let me take that one step further, how will
you synchronize concepts for joint warfighting with the
President's national security strategy, the Secretary of
Defense's Force Employment guidance, and the combatant
commanders' theater security cooperation strategy?
General Odierno. Clearly what we have to do is we have to--
I have to personally go out and first talk with them,
understand those concepts, and then figure out how I--through
working with the Services--can help to develop the right
capacities and capabilities to meet those needs. What we have
to do is, in addition to that, through our simulation
experimentation, come up with new ideas, come up with better
ways to integrate these requirements and integrate the
solutions that are being developed by the Services to meet the
requirements of the national security strategy, of the guidance
I get from the Secretary of Defense, and the combatant
commanders' requirements.
This is a very complex process. But we have to figure out a
way to do it as efficiently as possible, and yet have the right
capabilities at the right place at the right time. That's what
I have to focus on, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. Okay.
General Austin, I know that the U.S. military drawdown in
Iraq should not be equated with disengagement from Iraq. We
have to define our relationship to reflect a strategic
partnership between both countries across economic, political,
security and developmental sectors, and assist the Iraqi
Government in transitioning to full management and funding of
its own security and governance programs.
The U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement does that,
laying out the contours for a long-term bilateral strategic
relationship. The challenge is to translate the Strategic
Framework Agreement into programs that will ensure Iraq's
security, stability and development, while respecting Iraqi
sovereignty and acknowledging that the Iraqis are in charge of
shaping their future. A long-term, strategic relationship with
Iraq is fundamental in achieving lasting security and stability
in the country and in the region.
As Commander of the U.S. forces in Iraq, how will you work
with the State Department to translate the Strategic Framework
Agreement into programs that will ensure Iraq's security and
stability?
General Austin. Thanks, Senator. I believe that the
relationship between Commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq and the
Ambassador is a very important relationship. Going into Iraq,
if I'm confirmed, I'll do everything within my power to, number
one, establish a great relationship and nurture that
relationship each and every day.
I think that the both of us, engaging the Iraqi leadership
routinely, and shaping the way ahead, along all lines of
operation--economic, political, cultural--I think we certainly
can build towards a very strong relationship and sustained
relationship.
This will take a whole-of-government approach. We often
focus solely on the military, but it's clear to me that as we
continue on, the Iraqis want to have a good relationship along
a number of dimensions with the U.S. Government, and not just
solely the military.
I think that relationship between myself and the Ambassador
and then between the both of us and the leadership of the
Government of Iraq is really important and we'll work hard at
that as we go in, Senator.
Senator Hagan. How do the current election results and the
timing and the leadership in Iraq affect this?
General Austin. Certainly, Senator, we'd like to see a
government formed as quickly as possible. Having said that, we
want it done right, and not necessarily quick, but the Iraqis
will form their government on their own time, and they will
make their own choices.
The longer it takes, of course, it creates space for other
events to occur, it also creates the space for people to feel
as if they won't be properly represented, they've been
disenfranchised. We are concerned about that. But, I think
whoever is the leadership when the government's formed, we'll
move out and engage that leadership and develop a strong
partnership with them, and shape the way ahead for a lasting
relationship.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to start by echoing the comments of my colleagues
and thank you, both of you, for your service and your wives for
their support of you. I know how difficult it is for families
of people in the military, and we are all supported by our
spouses, but especially those in the military, so a special
thank you for both of your wives.
I want to talk to you about the neighbors that surround
Iraq. In looking at a map, it occurs to me that Iraq's in a
pretty tough neighborhood.
Recently we've read reports about Iran conducting military
attacks again Kurdish villages inside Iraq. There's also been
incursions by Turkey, as I understand it, with the Kurdish
section of Iraq.
If you could give, General Odierno, an update to us about
the relationship between Iran and Iraq, and Turkey and Iraq,
and I want to talk to you, then, afterwards also about Syria,
and give us an overview and then I'll have some specific
questions for you.
General Odierno. On the northern areas and the border
issues that are going on, these are generated by the Kurdish
terrorist organizations that have been operating up in Northern
Iraq for a very long time who, in the spring, has conducted
offensive operations into both Iran and Turkey to kill Iranian
as well as Turkish military forces. This has caused a response
back, both from Iran and Turkey into the Northern mountains of
Iraq.
We have set up with Turkey a trilateral intelligence
collection organization, coordination element between the
Government of Iraq, Turkey, and with some support from the U.S.
Government, in order for Turkey to help and respond against
this threat.
Iran, although they have come close to the border, there's
no indication that Iran has actually conducted any ground-
crossed border operations into Kurdistan.
Overall, with the relationship with Iran to the Government
of Iraq--many people have many different opinions. Mine is that
Iran would like to see an Iraq that is weak, that does not have
strong relations with its other Arab nations, therefore would
leave a larger void for Iran to have more influence inside of
Iraq.
In addition, Iran does not want to see a long-term
strategic relationship with the United States. They want to
have that relationship. There's many reasons why they want
that. But, in my view, that's why it's so important for us to
execute the strategic framework agreement, and build strong
bilateral ties with the Government of Iraq for the future.
Turkey has huge investments inside of Iraq, in Northern
Iraq, Central Iraq. They have been working extremely hard to
help build the economies in both Kurdistan and Northern Iraq.
They have a lot of equities inside of Iraq, they're trying to
build a strong relationship, there's been quite a bit of
political engagement between the leaders of Turkey and the
leaders of Iraq, and I think that's something that we will,
hopefully, continue to see.
We've seen the strongest relationships we've seen in a very
long time between President Barzani and the Prime Minister in
Turkey in trying to work together to solve some of this Kurdish
terrorist issues that occur up in Northern Iraq. We've seen
some good meetings, agreements to assist each other with these
problems, and also agreements for the first time that the
Government of Turkey would recognize Kurdish rights inside of
Turkey. I think those are all positive developments. There's
still a lot more work that has to be done in that area, but it
is a positive development.
Senator LeMieux. Is Iran still trying to actively
destabilize Iraq?
General Odierno. Iran still funds smaller groups, they
still fund, train smaller groups inside of Iraq to
destabilize--for two reasons. One, to go after U.S. forces
inside of Iraq. Second, in order to, I believe, intimidate in
some cases, in order for political reasons inside of Iraq, with
the Government of Iraq.
Although the movement is smaller, the size of the elements
are smaller than they once were, they are still active.
Senator LeMieux. Are they providing weapons?
General Odierno. They provide training and weapons to these
groups.
Senator LeMieux. Can you speak for a moment about Syria,
and what the Syrians are doing? Are they providing weapons? I
was reading that there was a recent attack along the border
area between Syria and Iraq.
General Odierno. I do not believe that the Government of
Syria is providing weapons to groups to conduct attacks inside
of Iraq. However, we continue to see foreign fighter
facilitation occur through Syria, although it is lower than
it's been before, they are still able to move through Syria. We
would like to continue to see them take action against these
facilitation networks that originate in many other places--
Northern Africa and many others--in order to attempt to conduct
operations inside of Iraq.
In addition, there still is a large ex-Ba'ath Party element
inside Syria who continues to be very active and boisterous
against the Government of Iraq, which appears to be somewhat
destabilizing to the Government of Iraq, and we'd like to see
them take action against that, as well.
Senator LeMieux. Okay.
General Austin, can you speak to how you envision the troop
drawdown going? I mean, that's obviously going to be a big
issue during your time of leadership and how will that process
work, and how will you be able to maintain the stability that
the U.S. forces, as well as the Iraqi Government have been able
to achieve in recent months, with less troops?
General Austin. First of all, Senator, I think that U.S.
Forces-Iraq and General Odierno have laid out a really good
plan to accomplish the drawdown and get us to where we need to
be by the end of calendar year 2011. As I go in, I'll assess
where we are with that plan, if I'm confirmed, and adjust, as
needed.
But, I think that the current plan takes us to where we
need to be, we're ahead of schedule in terms of the retrograde
of a rolling stock, our vehicles and a vast amount of other
equipment that we've moved out. There have been good control
mechanisms and oversight mechanisms that have been put in place
to manage and monitor the flow of equipment and people and so
we'll make sure that that remains on track.
The key to executing a responsible withdrawal is ensuring
that the Iraqi security forces have the capability to provide
for their own internal security as we transition. Certainly, it
will be this continual balancing act of making sure that they
have a level of proficiency and required equipment and the
resources to do what needs to be done to continue to secure the
people, the country as a whole, as we draw down.
I'm confident, right now, we're well on the way to
accomplishing that. Again, if there are any changes that need
to be made, certainly we'll evaluate and adjust on target.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Odierno, General Austin, I would like to begin by
thanking you for the clarity and the careful precision of your
answers today. A lot of issues here have a lot of nuance to
them, and I think it's been very helpful to listen to how
precise you have been answering some questions that could have
taken you one place or another.
I have read the Strategic Framework Agreement and the SOFA.
There are a lot of implications in those documents that are a
bit vague, and we've been hearing your answers today with
respect to what might happen if we leave too soon, and quite
frankly, what might happen if we stay too long. I think both of
those concerns need to be addressed.
I wanted to ask you a question about this withdrawal plan,
but before I do, I don't want to forget, or lose the time,
General Odierno, on the mentor program, to follow-on a comment
of the Chairman, I hope you'll take a really hard look at that.
I don't think that there's anyone up here who would deny the
value of mentor programs. There was a lot of mentoring that
went on in the United States military well before this specific
type of program came into place, and there are, I think,
legitimate concerns about, in some cases, the amount of
compensation that has been provided, and in others the lack of
transparency, quite frankly, with individuals who are retired,
receiving retirement pay, also working for defense industry and
not required, because of the form of these contracts, to
disclose potential conflicts of interest and these sorts of
things. There's a lot of concern up here on that.
Also, out in the retired community at large, I think
there's a lot of concern from people who are not involved in
the mentor program. I just hope you'll take a look at that.
With respect to the transition in Iraq, this is not a
classical military retrograde. This is not the shrinking
perimeter that you've seen in historical cases of a military
disengaging from a country. It's a very complicated set of
issues involving funding and involving transfers of missions,
involving the longevity of intermediate programs. Some of them
involve transfer of functions to the Iraqi Government, which
has been discussed. Some of them involve transfer of functions
to civilian contractors, as we discussed briefly yesterday.
Some of them involve transfer of responsibilities and functions
to the Department of State.
What I would like to hear from you, is in a form that is
now taking place, what is this going to look like at the end of
2011? What's the U.S. military going to be doing at the end of
2011 and where will these other overlaps have occurred?
General Odierno. Senator, thank you very much for the
question. It is a very important one. It is the key to what we
need to do here between now and the end of 2011. How we
transition and how we do this will have a long-term impact, I
think, on our relationship with the Government of Iraq, and
that's why this is such an important time.
I call it a thinning of the lines. I've called it that for
a while. As we slowly withdraw our forces, we don't leave any
areas, but we think our presence there and we give more and
more responsibility over to the Government of Iraq. But it's
more complex than that, that's from a security perspective.
Overall, our relationship with Iraq will be determined by how
we transition the many tasks that U.S. Forces-Iraq does now to
other entities. General Austin mentioned a couple of these, how
we transfer to the U.S. Embassy, what we transfer to the
Government of Iraq as a task. Then some will be transferred to
CENTCOM, because many of the things we do as we plan the future
of regional security architecture and a long-term engagement
with Iraq, will be run by CENTCOM. It's our responsibility to
build a plan, to determine which of these tasks gets
transitioned to which entity, and who is best qualified to do
that.
We have gone through and done this. We have looked at over
1,200 different tasks. Some will be terminated because they're
no longer necessary, some will be turned over to the embassy,
some will be turned over to CENTCOM, and some will be given to
the Government of Iraq. It's important which tasks go where,
who has the capacity to execute which tasks, and who will be
the ones who will be able to best engage with the Government of
Iraq on these tasks.
Although I won't get into any specifics, I want to assure
you that we're spending an awful lot of time on this. A part of
this is contractors. We have been working very hard to reduce
the size and number of contractors in Iraq to make sure we only
need those that are necessary. As we transition, we will
continue to do this analysis, because fundamentally, as you all
know, contractors are very expensive on the battlefield. We
will continue to look at this very carefully.
We're also working with the State Department to transition
what we have that can be reasonably transitioned to them, in
order to support their missions beyond 2011. We're looking at
this in a lot of detail, Senator.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much for that comment.
General Austin, we only had a brief period to meet
yesterday because of overlapping schedules, but I hope we can
count on having this Wartime Contracting Commission make
another visit soon into Iraq and come out with an idea on the
contracting side of how this is going to look like. They've
been very valuable to us.
General Austin. Senator, if confirmed, you have my guaranty
that we will embrace them as they come back into theater. You
also have my guaranty that I will work hand in hand as a
partner with the embassy to ensure that we don't just hand off
tasks, but we work to develop and shape the capability that's
required to accomplish those tasks. I know that's the road that
General Odierno has started down, and I'll pick up from where
he left off and continue to make sure that we have a great
relationship working with the embassy.
Senator Webb. Needless to say, it's a very tedious task
that you are going to take on and that, General Odierno, you
have done so well on. We don't often pay enough attention to it
up here. Once the casualty numbers went down in Iraq, we
haven't focused on this, but it's clearly the most vital thing
we have left to do in Iraq, is defining the nature of how all
these components fit together. I wish you all the best.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. If Senator Sessions is ready, it goes to
him.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Being ranking
member on the Senate Judiciary Committee is a full-time job. I
have conflicts around here a lot, but I want to express my
admiration for both of these individuals. I have great
confidence in you and would sincerely wish to express my
appreciation for your fabulous service. Anybody who's traveled
into Iraq or Afghanistan and seen the hours and the dedication
of our leaders and all of our personnel know how fabulous they
are, and we appreciate you and salute you.
One of the things, General Odierno, I don't want you to
repeat maybe what you've been asked before, but from my
conversation yesterday, you believe that we can meet our goals
of troop reductions in Iraq as of September. How would you
advise the American people as to what risks remain? Should we
be very confident or should we feel good about where we are,
but risks remain, or are there great risks? How would you
evaluate what you are leaving onto General Austin?
General Odierno. Senator, I would say we have continued to
make steady progress inside of Iraq. On the date of 1 September
or 31 August and the change of mission that is going to occur
and the reduction to 50,000 transition forces is quite
significant. But I think it is time for us to do that and it
shows another point of progress. The fact that the Iraqi
security forces have taken over responsibility, the fact that
the Government of Iraq is increasing its ability to function.
They still have a ways to go, but they are getting better in
their ability to function. That's allowing us to transition and
end combat operations and move to stability operations, where
we can assist them and helping them to sustain long-term
stability. I think it's another step.
The next step is, how do we establish that long-term
relationship? How do we implement the strategic framework
agreement that allows us to have a long-term relationship with
Iraq, in order to sustain stability not only inside of Iraq,
but add to the stability in the region? I think that's what we
have to gain. What do I worry about? I worry about not so much
security, but the impact of the political progress and economic
progress on security.
We've talked a long time about buying time and space.
They've done some work with that time and space, but we're now
at a critical juncture of time in Iraq, the formation of a new
government that will set the stage for Iraq for the next 4
years. The letting of 12 oil contracts in 2010, which will
start to come to fruition over the next several years. How well
that goes will say a lot and how economically Iraq starts to
move forward. I think all of those points is really what's
important, and how that goes will determine Iraq's future, in
my mind, Senator.
Senator Sessions. You and your predecessor, General
Petraeus, had fabulous relationships, as I understand it, with
the ambassador. You will have a new ambassador coming into Iraq
soon.
General Odierno. It has not been officially announced yet,
Senator. Ambassador Hill is currently the ambassador. I don't
know how much longer he'll be there. He's been a great
teammate.
Senator Sessions. General Austin, in September, what do you
understand how the relationships may change between you as
combatant commander or the general at least in Iraq, with the
State Department? Will they take on a greater leadership role
and has that been sorted out? Have you worked that out before
you get there or what's your thinking?
General Austin. It's being worked out as U.S. Forces-Iraq
gets smaller, the footprint decreases. I think, as General
Odierno said, there's a great working relationship right now
with Ambassador Hill. Certainly the ambassador is the senior
person in country and I look forward to working with whoever
the ambassador is.
But I think that partnership, Senator Sessions, is
absolutely critical. I think the example that we set flows down
to all the folks in the State Department and in the military
throughout the commands and directorates.
I was there when Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus
were there, and was there with General Odierno worked with
Ambassador Crocker as well. I was, and so I saw the great
working relationship that they had and I look to create the
same kinds of conditions for our troops and our State
Department officials as we go back into country, if I'm
confirmed.
Senator Sessions. I think that's true and it's my
understanding you've already discussed the importance of making
sure we adequately apply our resources to the top priorities in
Iraq, and that one of those is the Iraqi army and security
forces. I really feel strongly that at this point in history,
and I guess you both agree, that we shouldn't short change the
immediate need and make sure that the Iraqi army gets the
training and support to take on the higher level of
responsibility we expect of them. Would you comment on that or
have you already?
General Odierno. Senator, we've talked our way through that
already. I would just say that it is important that we set them
up for success in order to mitigate the risks that are ahead.
I've been very pleased with how the Iraqi army and police
continue to perform. They still have some key things that they
do not yet have that I think are necessary for them to be
prepared to take on full responsibility at the end of 2011 when
we leave, and that's what we're working towards now.
Senator Sessions. Thank you both, thank you for your
service.
General Austin, I'm glad you have your masters as an Auburn
War Eagle, that's another good thing in your training that's
going to help you, I'm sure.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing, and I just recall
when you and I and others were in Iraq at the worst possible
time, how discouraged and worried we were, but you should never
count out the U.S. military in the efforts that they executed
that turned that around, and now we're in such a better glide
path that a lot of people would not have thought it possible.
Our prayers are that we'll be able to do some of the same
things in Afghanistan. It's looking difficult now, but perhaps
we're seeing all the negatives now, and I think that we have to
believe that we can put that on the right glide path too.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service and thank you to your wives and
your family, and I feel totally inarticulate in trying to
express how much I do appreciate how much more, as I travel
around this country, how much the American people appreciate
what you're doing.
General Austin, you have literally big shoes to fill, and
I'm sure you're going to fill them, and I'm sure you're going
to do very well at it. The reason I came over here, because
most of the questions when they get to me have already been
asked, is I just couldn't pass up the opportunity to say,
General Odierno, how much I appreciate, not just your service,
not just the fact that you were there, but the quality of your
service. I mean, just sitting here listening today, and we've
embarked on a new counterinsurgency strategy, and requires a
lot of new skills for our military. It's amazing how they've
risen to it.
But when you look back at the history of Iraq, your grasp
on not just the military, but the economic and the political
issues and how they interact, just like you were talking about
a few minutes ago, about how the oil contracts are going to be
important. I don't think people thought that's the way you
fought a war 10, 15, 20 years ago. It's really key, and how the
coalition works, and how you work with the secretary. I think
Iraq is--when we look back in history--will be the place where
we finally figured out how to deal with the bad guys in a new
and creative way, and I think Iraq will be the thing, and I
think one of the key players will be you. I just wanted to
thank you for that.
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kaufman. One of the things I wanted to talk about a
minute, I've used this example of what a good job you do, is
what you did with the problems between the Kurds and the Iraq
army. When I was over there last year, I left Kirkuk pretty
well convinced that they were going to be shooting at each
other very shortly. I think your solution to go there and begin
these joint checkpoints and the joint groups going into the
cities and the rest of it worked real well. Is that continuing
to work well?
General Odierno. It is and, in fact, it's starting to
expand. We now have agreement from the Prime Minister and
President Barzani to now incorporate four brigades of the Pesh
Merga to the Iraqi army, and that's an incredible step forward
that we are now working.
Senator Kaufman. Yes.
General Odierno. We're now working at figuring how we can
help to train and equip them as they now are able to be
integrated into the Iraqi army.
Senator Kaufman. General Austin, do you think--I know
you're not going to know all the details of this--we're going
to be able to continue to have U.S. forces after September 1st
along that border to help keep bad things from happening?
General Austin. Certainly, Senator, and I do believe that
there will be a requirement to continue to work with the
elements up there for some time. Again, what we want to see is
the Iraqi Government, the leadership of the Iraqi Government
embracing this issue to a much greater degree in the future. As
time goes along, they have to establish a national vision so
that we can unify the country. That's going to take some time,
but I think it certainly can be done. We'll do everything we
can to work with the ambassador and work with the leadership of
both elements to ensure that they're making progress.
Senator Kaufman. General Odierno, in your new position, how
do you feel about Secretary Gate's effort to rebalance the
military, to get more emphasis put on these counterinsurgency
efforts as we move forward?
General Odierno. I think the concept of regular warfare
counterinsurgency are keys to the future. As I look back over
the last 7, 8, 9 years, it's the complexity of the environment
that we now have to operate in. There's so many different
things that impact on military operations and the success that
we have to have, is that we have to rethink how we do business
and how we operate in this environment.
People learn and watch what's gone in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and they will try to take those lessons, if they ever have to
come up against U.S. forces anywhere in the world, and we have
to be able to be prepared in order to feel how we would deal
with that and make ourselves more prepared than they ever will
be. That takes some intellectual capacity and it takes thought
and it takes experience and it takes thinking out of the box in
some cases.
But I think more importantly, that Secretary Gates has
pointed out, is that we have to be efficient in what we do. We
have to become more efficient, and I think that's the key. How
can we become more efficient and make our forces more
adaptable? That's what I think is important for me to focus on,
if I'm confirmed and assume my new position.
Senator Kaufman. This is my final question. One of the
things I've been interested in more and more is nonlethal
weapons; to give the warfighter an opportunity, if a bus is
coming up to the back of the convoy, to either let them come
and blow you up or having to shoot in there and kill women and
children, or if you're at a forward operating base and there's
a car coming at you at a high rate of speed or individuals. I
went down to Dahlgren and I was impressed with where we're
going. Can you just talk a little bit on your feeling about
nonlethal weapons in terms of here?
General Odierno. This kind of warfare is about precision
and it's about collateral damage, it's about eliminating
collateral damage, and it's actually killing innocent people
that's really what this is about. What we've learned is, if
we're not careful and we get careless, even though it's for our
own force protection, if we kill innocent people, the negatives
to the mission are significant. We have to continue to think of
ways of how we can stop this. Nonlethal weapons is one.
We've learned a lot about that and the importance of
nonlethal weapons and other ways for us to do other things
besides fire first. I think we've learned that over time, but
those are very difficult decisions these young soldiers,
sailors, or marines have to make on the ground. Sometimes you
don't have a lot of time to make it, so you want to be able to
provide them the capacity of something a little bit different
than having to maybe fire live rounds. Maybe there's something
else they can do to protect themselves and protect those
innocent people that are in a situation they don't quite
understand.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
Thank you both for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kaufman.
I have just a few additional questions. General Odierno,
the current readiness reporting systems in the process of being
implemented to a system called Defense Readiness Reporting
System (DRRS), which has been slow to come into operation,
since a decision was made now, I think 8 years ago or so to
switch from a previous system called Status of Resources and
Training. Now, do you know or do you have an opinion as to why
full implementation of this DRRS is taking so long?
General Odierno. Senator, I don't know why it has taken so
long. I think there's many nuances within the system that
people are trying to work out, but I will take a look at it,
Mr. Chairman, and find out more information.
Chairman Levin. All right, will you give us, after you're
confirmed, a chronology or timetable more accurately to
complete that transformation? Will you do that?
General Odierno. Absolutely, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
I am not familiar enough with the Defense Readiness Reporting
System (DRRS) to speak with confidence about this topic. However, if
confirmed, I will assess DRRS and Joint Forces Command's role in it,
and answer your question within 90 days of assuming command of Joint
Forces Command.
Chairman Levin. General, let me make sure I understand
something that you said about the Iraq budget. When it was
adopted, the budget that they're currently operating on had a
deficit, and since then, as I understand what you said, because
of an increase in oil prices and therefore in oil revenues, the
projected deficit in Iraq under this budget is $10 billion less
than when the budget was adopted.
General Odierno. What I said was, there was a budget of----
Chairman Levin. In other words, there's no surplus.
General Odierno. There's no surplus.
Chairman Levin. But the deficit that was projected has been
reduced because of the increase in oil prices.
General Odierno. Because of a $10 billion surplus, of cash
that they had.
Chairman Levin. Is that the result of the increase in oil
prices?
General Odierno. No, I don't know. I need to get you an
answer on that.
Chairman Levin. Okay, but it was something that they didn't
count on.
General Odierno. They had $10 billion in cash reserves from
last year. I think it had to do with their expenditures from
2009.
Chairman Levin. Were less than they expected.
General Odierno. Were less than they expected.
Chairman Levin. Okay, so they had $10 billion more in cash
than was projected in that deficit.
General Odierno. That's right.
Chairman Levin. Excuse me, in that budget.
General Odierno. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
General Austin, I have one additional question for you and
that has to do with the situation on the ground of religious
minorities in Iraq. It continues to be very fragile in some
places, and it's sometimes bleak. The U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom concluded in their May 2010
report that systemic ongoing and egregious religious freedom
violations continue in Iraq, and that the religious freedom
situation in Iraq remains grave, particularly for the country's
smallest, most vulnerable religious minorities. I've been very
much involved in trying to find ways to give greater protection
to those minorities, particularly the Iraqi Christian
community, and I'm wondering if you, when you are confirmed,
will you keep this committee apprised of the security situation
in the Ninevah area, particularly, but any other area where
there are religious minorities. Also, on the conditions of
those minorities in those regions, and will you take all
reasonable steps to increase the security for those people?
General Austin. I will, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We thank you both again. We thank your wives, your families
for their great support. We hope that we can get these
nominations confirmed in the next few days, hopefully by the
end of next week surely. We'll do everything we can to speed up
these confirmations both before these votes, both in this
committee, but also on the floor of the Senate.
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon at 11:34 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to GEN Raymond T. Odierno,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The Department has made great progress in the joint arena
since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols. The changes to the Joint
Officer Management process enacted by the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2007 have corrected some longstanding shortfalls.
I don't believe there is a need for any major modifications to the act;
however, as we learn more about ourselves given the current world
environment and the challenges we face, it is important that we
continue to refine and review joint and interagency operations and
requirements.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. We have learned the absolute necessity for strong civil-
military cooperation. Congress should consider means to increase
integration of all U.S. Government agencies in appropriate training and
force readiness environments in order to build the foundation for more
effective ``whole-of-government'' approaches to crisis prevention or
crisis resolution.
Continue Departmental efforts, such as Capability Portfolio
Management, to integrate acquisition and resource allocation processes
in meeting joint capability requirements. In other words, Services
develop `Service-Specific' systems and capabilities after joint review
and authorization to ensure joint/interoperability issues are
addressed.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command?
Answer. The Unified Command Plan focuses the command on two main
missions: (1) providing conventional forces trained to operate in a
joint, interagency, and multi-national environment, and (2)
transforming the U.S. military's forces to meet the security challenges
of the 21st century. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
serves as the chief advocate for jointness and interoperability,
championing the joint warfighting requirements of the other combatant
commanders. As such, he is responsible for five major areas:
Serves as the Primary Joint Force Provider for
conventional forces. In this role, JFCOM analyzes conventional
forces worldwide to identify the most appropriate and
responsive sourcing solutions that are then recommended to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet combatant commander
requirements. Commander, JFCOM provide those forces under its
combatant command authority as trained and ready joint capable
forces to the other combatant commanders when directed by the
Secretary of Defense. As the Department's Joint Deployment
Process Owner, it maintains the global capability for rapid and
decisive military force projection and redeployment.
Serves as the lead Joint Force Integrator, responsible
for recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training,
material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
to integrate Service, defense agency, interagency, and multi-
national capabilities. As the Joint Command and Control
Capability Portfolio Manager responsible for leading the
Department of Defense's (DOD) effort to improve
interoperability, minimize capability redundancies and gaps,
and maximize capability effectiveness.
Serves as the Executive Agent for Joint Concept
Development and Experimentation. In this role, JFCOM leads and
coordinates the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation
(JCDE) efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense
agencies. Additionally, the Commander of JFCOM integrates
multi-national and interagency warfighting transformation and
experimentation efforts to support joint interoperability and
future joint warfighting capabilities.
Serves as the lead agent for Joint Force Training.
This effort is focused at the operational level with an
emphasis on Joint Task Force (JTF) Commanders and their staffs
and the ability of U.S. forces to operate as part of a joint
and multi-national force. Additionally, JFCOM is responsible
for leading the development of a distributed joint training
architecture and developing joint training standards.
Provides operational joint enabling capability
packages that deploy on short notice to assist combatant
commanders to rapidly form, organize, and operate a joint force
headquarters. Additionally, assists combatant commanders in the
planning, forming, training, and operation of their designated
JTF-Capable headquarters.
background and experience
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I'm very fortunate to have had the opportunity to not only
serve for 34 years in uniform, but also to have commanded troops from
the platoon level up to my present assignment as Commander of U.S.
Forces-Iraq. Commanding in a joint, combined, interagency environment
for almost 6 years, mostly in combat, at the division, corps, and
force-level has provided me a unique perspective on joint interagency
operations. I have conducted full-spectrum operations,
counterinsurgency operations, and stability operations and have been on
the leading edge of ground-breaking Army and Marine Corps doctrine. In
every assignment I was fortunate to serve for, and lead, brave,
innovative, and hardworking people, both in uniform as well as senior
civilian leadership. Above all, I have tried to learn, mentor, and lead
at every chance. All of this has prepared me for this opportunity.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S.
Joint Forces Command, to the following:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command performs his
duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
Defense, and is directly responsible to him to carry out its assigned
missions.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in accordance with
established authorities, and except as expressly prohibited by law, has
the full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to
exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense upon any and all
matters concerning which the Secretary of Defense is authorized to act
pursuant to law. If confirmed, I will keep the Deputy Secretary of
Defense informed on appropriate matters.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense for:
Answer. The Under Secretaries of Defense, as the principal staff
assistants, provide advice, assistance, and support to the Secretary of
Defense in managing the Department and in carrying out such duties as
prescribed by the Secretary or by law. Within their areas, Under
Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. In carrying out
their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and
Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to
commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Under Secretaries in the areas of their
responsibilities.
Question. Policy.
Answer. The Under Secretary for Policy is the principal staff
assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense
policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and plans to
achieve national security objectives.
Question. Personnel and Readiness.
Answer. The Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness is the
principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense for Total Force management; National Guard and
Reserve affairs; health affairs; readiness and training; military and
civilian personnel; language; dependents' education; equal opportunity;
moral, welfare, recreation; and quality of life matters.
Question. Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. The Under Secretary for Policy is the principal staff
assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
for all matters relating to the DOD Acquisition System; research and
development; modeling and simulation; systems integration; logistics;
installation management; military construction; procurement;
environment, services; and nuclear, chemical, and biological programs.
Question. Intelligence.
Answer. The Under Secretary for Intelligence is the principal staff
assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
for all matters regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security,
sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is established by title 10 as the principal
military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The
Chairman serves as an advisor and is not, according to law, in the
operational chain of command, which runs from the President through the
Secretary to each combatant commander. The President directs
communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the
combatant commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This keeps the Chairman fully involved and allows the Chairman to
execute his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the
Chairman is to speak for the combatant commanders, especially on
operational requirements. If confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, I will keep
the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters
for which I am personally accountable.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs
duties as prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with
the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When necessary, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and shall perform the duties of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff until a successor is appointed or the absence
or disability ceases. If confirmed, I will keep the Vice Chairman
informed on matters as appropriate.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible
for the administration and support of the forces assigned to the
combatant commands. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command
coordinates closely with the secretaries to ensure the requirements to
organize, train, and equip forces assigned to JFCOM are met. Close
coordination with each Service Secretary is required to ensure that
there is no infringement upon the lawful responsibilities held by a
Service Secretary.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and
equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure
preparedness of his assigned forces without the full cooperation and
support of the Service Chiefs. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military
advice. The experience and judgment of the Service Chiefs provide an
invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed as
Commander, JFCOM, I will continue the close bond between the command,
the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard in order
to fully utilize their service capabilities, and to effectively employ
those capabilities as required to execute the missions of U.S. Joint
Forces Command.
Question. The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).
Answer. SACT is one of two co-equal Strategic Commanders within
NATO's command structure. SACT supports NATO in the education, training
and transformation of functional commands and staff elements that plan
for and conduct operations, with multi-national and joint forces, over
the full range of Alliance military missions authorized by the North
Atlantic Council/Defense Planning Committee. I believe the vision to
place NATO's North American Strategic Command in Norfolk alongside U.S.
Joint Forces Command was exactly correct. Our current enemy mandates
that we continue to build and support the symbiotic relationship
between Joint Forces Command and Allied Command Transformation.
Currently there is great synergy, collaboration, and support between
the two Commands, and it is very much a two-way street that benefits
both NATO and the United States.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. In general, JFCOM is a supporting command--its job is to
make the other combatant commands more successful. If confirmed, I will
continue the close relationships with other combatant commanders to
increase the effectiveness we've created, and continue to build mutual
support. The joint capabilities required by combatant commanders to
perform their missions--today and in the future--forms a large basis of
JFCOM's mission. Today's security environment dictates that JFCOM work
very closely with the other combatant commanders to execute our
national military strategy.
Question. The commanders of each of the Service's training and
doctrine commands.
Answer. JFCOM's relationship with each of the Service's training
and doctrine commands is marked by close cooperation and routine
collaboration. U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command are key partners in training and doctrine issues given
their close proximity to JFCOM in the Hampton Roads area. JFCOM
participates with all Service Doctrine Centers in Joint Doctrine
Community conferences and the JFCOM doctrine staff is in daily contact
with Service doctrine centers. DOD training programs that JFCOM manages
such as the Joint National Training Capability and Joint Knowledge
Online could not function without the direct support of the Services.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems
confronting the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command?
Answer. From my present view, the most significant challenge is
meeting the combatant commander's (COCOM) force sourcing requirements.
The task of providing trained and ready joint forces on a predictable
and stable schedule that is reactive to combatant commanders and
minimizes stress on families while providing adequate time for
training, will continue to be a challenge for anyone with the Global
Force Provider mission.
The second challenge is the continued implementation of Irregular
Warfare competencies in the General Purpose Force and maintaining the
appropriate level of balance between conventional and irregular
capabilities.
With my unique combat experience over the past 7 years, it will
provide an opportunity to review and institutionalize joint warfighting
and civil-military lessons learned and ensure the Joint Force is
proactive and adaptive to the complex environment we will face today
and in the future.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing them?
Answer. Certainly, if confirmed, I will continue to work with the
other combatant commanders, as well as the Services through JFCOM's
component commands, to shape JFCOM's ability to provide the most
logical and effective sourcing solutions for the Joint Warfighter. With
respect to Irregular Warfare, I will continue to follow the Secretary
of Defense's guidance and seek balance between our conventional,
irregular, and nuclear capabilities. Finally, I will develop a
mechanism to capture and implement joint and interagency operational
and strategic lessons learned.
joint force provider
Question. What is your understanding of the role of Joint Forces
Command as the joint force provider to meet combatant commander
requirements?
Answer. As the conventional Joint Force Provider (JFP), it is
JFCOM's goal to source all validated rotational and emergent force
requirements in support of the combatant commanders. To accomplish
this, JFCOM provides DOD leadership with recommended force sourcing
solutions to make proactive, risk-informed force management and
allocation decisions. JFCOM works to source these force requirements by
collaborating with JFCOM Service components, each of the Services (both
Active and Reserve) and combatant commands to meet combatant commands'
force requirements.
Question. From your experience as Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, what
are your observations and evaluation of the performance of Joint Forces
Command in meeting your command's force requirements?
Answer. Overall, JFCOM, along with the other stakeholders in the
Global Force Management process are doing a good job in supporting the
combatant commands' force requirements. But demand is currently
outpacing force supply in specific capability areas and the current
systems are not perfect. Problems remain: force stress, persistent
shortfalls, use of In-Lieu-Of (ILO) forces, etc. At times, the force
providing processes have not proven agile enough to keep up with the
pace of change and unplanned requirements. This is the source of some
frustration. To their credit, however, JFCOM and other stakeholders in
the Global Force Management Process are reviewing their processes:
determining how to streamline procedures and increase visibility in
order to increase responsiveness to combatant command force
requirements.
Question. In this regard, include your observations and evaluations
of the use of `in lieu of' forces to meet theater requirements.
Answer. In my judgment, ILO forces have provided effective
solutions to meet theater requirements. ILO solutions are, by
definition, substitutions of force when the standard force is
unavailable. As such, ILO solutions provide capability to meet theater
requirements that would otherwise go unfilled. I have been extremely
pleased with the ability of the Joint Force to adapt to the needs of
the theater commander. Of critical importance as ILO forces are
continued to be employed is ensuring that they have received the proper
training and equipment in order to enable their effectiveness. The
quality of preparedness has been outstanding.
Question. Based on your evaluation, what in your view are the most
urgent challenges requiring Joint Forces Command attention and how
would you propose to meet these challenges or improve the command's
efficiency or effectiveness as the joint force provider to our
combatant commands?
Answer. The most urgent challenge impacting Joint Forces Command's
effectiveness as Primary Joint Force Provider is access to high quality
force readiness and force availability data. JFCOM is teaming with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, Service
headquarters and technical organizations (DISA) in several initiatives
that will integrate policy, processes, authoritative databases and
technology that affect Joint Force sourcing and Global Force
Management.
joint force readiness
Question. Joint Forces Command's current mission statement
acknowledges its responsibility to provide ``trained and ready joint
forces'' to our combatant commanders. The readiness of our non-deployed
forces, especially our ground forces, for worldwide commitment has been
impacted by the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
What is your unclassified assessment of the readiness of our non-
deployed land, air, and sea forces in general, and specifically with
respect to homeland defense and counter-terrorism missions?
Answer. That portion of the armed services making up the ground
force is essentially either deployed forward supporting our Overseas
Contingency Operations or is in some stage of resetting for future
deployment. Those units that are in reset are challenged in their
readiness by equipment needs, rotation of manpower and time to train.
The Services have proven adaptive in preparing ground forces for their
next deployment--but in many cases, they achieve a deployment ready
state just in time for their next deployment rotation. The air and
maritime forces are more ready across the board, but specific skill
sets within those forces are also stressed due to deployments (e.g.,
Military Intelligence, EOD). As forces draw down in Iraq and the Army
begins to realize some relief from its current high operational tempo
(except in high demand skill sets), it is important we develop
mechanisms to increase readiness of our non-deployed ground forces and
develop ready force packages to meet worldwide needs.
Question. What policies, programs, or actions would you
specifically propose to strengthen the readiness of our non-deployed
air, land, and sea forces?
Answer. Continued support of current joint training and readiness
programs that prepare our forces and joint headquarters to be ready
when called upon by a combatant commander. Additionally, I will look to
support initiatives such as inserting joint enabler into the immersive
training environment, as well as continuing civil-military cooperation
in a training environment.
readiness reporting systems
Question. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)
measures unit readiness for combat missions at the high end of the
spectrum of war rather than counterinsurgency, stabilization or other
contingency missions. The Department has developed and begun fielding
the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to replace GSORTS.
Based on your years of command experience, both in garrison and
while deployed, what are your views of the importance of a
comprehensive, objective, accurate, reliable, adaptable, and timely
readiness reporting system?
Answer. A readiness reporting system as you have described is
obviously important. Such a system should incorporate both resource
assessments as well as mission assessments. This will provide the basis
for force analysis that underpins JFCOM's recommended sourcing
solutions to meet the geographic combatant commander's force needs.
Question. What in your view should be the requirements of a
readiness reporting system capable of meeting Joint Forces Command's
mission as joint force provider?
Answer. In general terms, the readiness system should reflect
objective readiness metrics and subjective assessments of a force's
ability to carry out specific mission tasks or a spectrum of military
missions.
Question. In this regard, is it more important for Joint Forces
Command to have a clear picture of available Service capabilities or
the readiness data on specific units and systems, or both?
Answer. JFCOM would require both to perform its Joint Force
Provider role. JFCOM currently works with its Service components and
each Service to generate the shared understanding of what Service
capabilities are available and why they are available--based on unit
readiness data. In its effort to improve Joint Force Provider
processes, JFCOM has defined needs for information including:
Force availability
Force capabilities
Force structure
Force readiness
Global Force Management (GFM) strategic guidance
(priorities)
Force location
Force apportionment
Common operating picture
Works in progress (pending changes in the force)
Question. What weight would you assign to each of the requirements
you identify?
Answer. High priority items include: force availability, force
capabilities identifier, force structure, force readiness. GFM
strategic guidance, force location and force apportionment are medium
priority. Common operating picture and works in progress are low
priority.
Question. What is your understanding of, or experience with, the
new DRRS?
Answer. I have very little experience with this system.
Theoretically, I believe this system will be an improvement over the
current Joint Readiness System, although I need to discuss DRRS with
the Service components to determine their confidence in the system
before declaring my own overall assessment.
Question. How would you evaluate this new system's ability to
assess the personnel, equipment, and training readiness of forces and
its utility in support of Joint Forces Command's joint force provider
process?
Answer. My brief understanding is that DRRS includes a subjective
readiness reporting system that focuses on evaluation of a force's
ability to execute mission essential tasks rather than just measuring
equipment, supply, manning and training levels as a means of assessing
readiness.
Question. One of the concerns about the GSORTS and DRRS is the use
or misuse of the commander's ``subjective upgrade.'' Commanders are
authorized to raise or lower their reported level of readiness in a
more subjective fashion than is otherwise required in a strict
application of objective standards as defined in the readiness
reporting regulation.
During your years of command, in general have you used this
authority to subjectively upgrade or downgrade your readiness reports?
If so, what philosophy has guided your use of subjective upgrade or
downgrade?
Answer. I have used subjective reporting in the past within the
parameters of the reporting system at the time. If the reporting system
directs an assessment of a units full spectrum combat mission, then the
full suite of equipment, manning and training is necessary to ready
that unit to the full spectrum level. If the unit is tasked with a less
demanding mission, for example, disaster relief--then a subjective
report of readiness against that lesser mission is helpful to reflect
that the unit is capable of success with the current state of manning,
equipment and training. It's important to keep in mind that readiness
reports are intended for senior headquarters consumption and their
information needs and intents are key variables in defining any
readiness system. I have never hesitated to apply my military judgment
in assessing the readiness of units I commanded. No one understands the
capabilities or shortfalls of a unit better than a commander and his
chain of command. Quantitative assessments alone cannot adequately
articulate a unit's readiness and I strongly endorse holistic
appraisals by commanders.
Question. How have you mentored your subordinate commanders in
their use of subjective upgrade in their readiness reporting to and
through you?
Answer. The Army trains leaders to be honest, forthright, critical
thinkers and they are selected to leadership positions based, in large
part, on their demonstration of good judgment. I have relied on the
good judgment of my subordinate commanders to reflect accurately their
unit's capabilities within the parameters of the readiness reporting
system. The readiness of their units has been a subject of frequent
discussion with my subordinate commanders. I expect them to apply their
judgment and report their honest assessment, even in open-ended
environments where current readiness reporting does not apply.
Question. What in your view are the benefits and dangers of the use
of subjective upgrades or downgrades?
Answer. The obvious danger is an overestimation of capabilities
that may be used as the basis for a decision to commit a unit to a
mission that it is not prepared to undertake. But commanders as well as
their chain of command have a firsthand understanding that allows
reflection of capabilities that are not measured in an objective based
system (e.g., a unit with a great deal of leadership experience, but
has not yet completed all training may be more capable than objective
assessment reveals).
Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the use of subjective
upgrades or downgrades in the readiness reporting system to ensure that
Joint Forces Command has the most accurate, reliable, and timely
information necessary to meet its responsibilities as joint forces
provider?
Answer. I will monitor reports of force readiness through my
Service component commanders who are in the best position to
continually assess the accuracy and reliability of readiness reports. I
will also travel and observe unit training and share Joint training
lessons learned.
joint force trainer
Question. Joint Forces Command also serves as a major joint force
trainer. In this role, the command certifies the training readiness of
Joint Task Force headquarters to plan, organize and manage the
execution of joint force operations at all levels of conflict. The
command supports combatant commander joint exercises and mission
rehearsal exercises prior to deployment of major headquarters. However,
Joint Forces Command does not certify the training readiness of
deploying forces at the unit or ``tactical'' level.
Based on your experience as Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, what is
your evaluation of the readiness of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
Corps units as they are arriving in Iraq?
Answer. Overall, the readiness of units arriving in Iraq has been
high. The strain on the force after 9 years of conflict is significant
but I believe the Services have done a good job in resetting units and
getting them ready to deploy.
There will always be issues with manning, equipment, and training,
but the Services have been adaptive and incorporated feedback from the
theater by making necessary adjustments in their force preparations.
There has been constant dialogue with JFCOM and the Service training
centers to provide immediate feedback in order to adjust training and
the training environment.
Question. Based on your observations and evaluations, should U.S.
Joint Forces Command be assigned a greater role in setting standards
and the certification of the training readiness of tactical units prior
to their deployment?
Answer. I believe the supported combatant commander should set the
requirements for what units need to be trained in, and in what
conditions, and to what standard, if a standard can be determined. If
there is something we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan it is that
this enemy is adaptive and does not follow doctrine. Trying to set a
standard for everything that a unit must do is challenging but it
should be done where possible.
I also believe that the Services understand their role in providing
trained and ready forces based on the supported commander requirements.
When a unit commander states to his boss that he has conducted the
required training then we must take that commander at his word.
What JFCOM can do is facilitate the articulation of the supported
commander's requirements to the Services. This can be done with the
annual Joint Training Plan which provides training guidance to the
Service components. JFCOM should also support the Service training
programs in replicating the environments of Iraq and Afghanistan in
their training.
contracting senior mentors
Question. The number of contractors working under U.S. Joint Forces
Command currently exceeds the number of uniformed military personnel
assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command. Those contractors who are hired
as Senior Mentors can earn upwards of $1,600 per day for their
services.
In your view, what value do contracted Senior Mentors provide to
U.S. Joint Forces Command and do you believe they are being overpaid?
Answer. Senior mentors bring years of experience and expertise and
they are vital to how we train, teach and mentor our commanders to lead
complex, joint and combined operations. I have personally experienced
the advantage of senior mentors as I prepared for combat operations as
a Division, Corps, and Force Commander. They provide unique perspective
and experience to manage large organizations and help solve complex
problems. Not everyone is qualified to provide these unique insights.
Our senior mentors are a key component of a training team that
includes mid-grade active duty officers who act as Observer-Trainers.
The senior mentor provides credibility for this training team due to
his many years of experience.
The impact of senior mentors on our exercise program and in senior
leader education programs such as Capstone, Keystone, and Pinnacle
cannot be overstated.
It is difficult to put a price on the value of our senior mentors
but the amount of time they spend mentoring a commander and staff
during an exercise can often be significant. Their duties sometimes
take them to locations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Djibouti where
they might log significant amounts of time in austere locations.
Question. In your view, is the Senior Mentor Program transparent
enough with respect to potential conflicts of interest?
Answer. I have not been involved in monitoring the program to
provide an absolute yes. In all the years I have benefitted from senior
mentors, did I ever experience or believe there was a conflict of
interest. I understand that as part of the transition from senior
mentor to a highly-qualified expert position, these flag and general
officers will undergo ethics and conflict of interest training/
counseling and be required to file an Office of Government Ethics Form
450.
Question. How can the current process be made more cost-efficient
and effective?
Answer. My understanding is that JFCOM has been working with
Department of the Navy, their Executive Agency, over the last 2 months
to develop a quality senior mentor program at JFCOM that is fully in
line with the Secretary of Defense's intent while ensuring they don't
risk ongoing or planned mission support. It will be important to
develop a risk mitigation plan phasing SM HQE transitions to ensure
continued mission support during this time period. We will work to
ensure every senior mentor has transitioned as soon as practicable and
have a management process that will be in place to manage and support
their mission activities.
Question. Given the decision by Secretary Gates to convert and in-
source contractors into government employees, could U.S. Joint Forces
Command also benefit from such a shift given the high percentage of
contractors currently residing in U.S. Joint Forces Command?
I believe JFCOM is currently striving to do this. JFCOM is
currently working on a plan to transition many of the Senior Mentors
used in the past, to government employees in the form of highly-
qualified experts. In addition, JFCOM will comply with the President's
directive to reduce the portion of work performed by contractors and to
hire government employees.
lessons learned
Question. One of Joint Forces Command's missions is to conduct
lessons learned studies that can result in changes to joint tactics and
doctrine. These efforts are informed by the command's wargaming
experimentation program, as well as a number of advisors, including
retired general officers, who have been sent to Iraq to review the
operational situation.
Based on your experience as Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, what are
your observations and evaluation of the Joint Forces Command's lessons
learned efforts?
Answer. JFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) embeds
collection teams with the supported combatant commands and Joint Task
Forces to conduct lessons learned collection during the course of
operations. This approach is a great leap forward over conducting
interviews to collect information after the fact as we've historically
done. It provides a level of timeliness, fidelity and impact that has
not been achieved in previous lessons learned programs. Service teams
also use this approach. From these collection efforts, JFCOM not only
improves tactics and doctrine, but improves Joint warfighting across
the full doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,
personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. This has permitted rapid
adaptation and sharing of ``best practices'' among our various services
and units. Lessons learned are a proven force multiplier in making us a
truly adaptive force.
Question. What are your observations and evaluation of how these
lessons learned impacted the conduct of operations in Iraq?
Answer. I observed two types of impacts: the first is the immediate
impact provided by forward collectors' observations to the operational
commanders, and the second is the result of subsequent analysis and
recommendations being shared with senior DOD, U.S. Government, and
coalition leadership. JCOA analysis identified lessons and derived
recommendations that were fed into multiple efforts. As a result of the
sharing of joint and Service lessons learned, training has been re-
oriented in real time, organizations have been modified, and doctrine
rewritten to strengthen our intellectual approach to this form of war.
We have also on several occasions asked JCOA to conduct specific
assessments of our ongoing programs such as Information Operations,
Civil-Military Operations, and Joint-Combined Staff Integration.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to improve the
command's lessons learned systems?
Answer. Key to the collection of needed data is trust in the
purpose and concept of JCOA's embedded missions. I intend to work with
my fellow combatant commanders to set positive conditions at the
highest level for JCOA's employment as a tool for analytical support.
We will continue to infuse a sense of urgency in disseminating best
practices uncovered by sharing lessons learned.
Additionally, the ability of U.S. forces to turn world-wide
collected lesson observations into knowledge has reached a new level
with the implementation of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System
(JLLIS). JLLIS is the DOD Program of Record for Lessons Learned managed
by the Joint Staff J-7. It allows for transparency among all the
service and combatant commands' lessons learned databases. The key for
JFCOM will be the development of business models to process this large
amount of information into knowledge, which we can then use to guide
improvements for the Joint Warfighter.
Finally, if confirmed, I intend to engage the Secretary of Defense
and Chairman on methods for ensuring resource allocations to the
recommendations that go forward.
national guard readiness for civil support missions
Question. An issue of concern to the Congress is the apparent low
levels of readiness of the National Guard for its domestic or civil
support missions. The reality is that we do not know with great
confidence the true ``readiness'' of the Guard for its domestic support
missions because there is no national readiness reporting system that
objectively captures the Guard's personnel, equipment, or training
requirements or their status relative to those requirements.
What is your assessment of the Guard's current readiness to respond
to the range of domestic contingencies that our states may face?
Answer. I believe the National Guard maintains a good level of
readiness to respond to the range of domestic contingencies normally
faced by a State in a given year. This year National Guard forces have
responded, or are expected to respond under state control, to floods,
fires, hurricanes, oil spills and tornadoes. Governors and their The
Adjutant Generals (TAGs) generally will not offer National Guard forces
for deployment if they believe that offering will negatively impact the
state's ability to respond to its citizens needs. The National Guard
forces that have returned from deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan
generally are at lower readiness levels and the Army is working
diligently to reset these forces.
Question. What in your view is the role or responsibility of Joint
Forces Command, as the joint force provider, in developing a readiness
reporting system that monitors the Guard's readiness for civil support
missions?
Answer. I believe once the DRRS is fully evolved and National Guard
units are reporting readiness via DRRS, the mission essential task
based readiness system could reflect Guard readiness for civil support
missions.
joint requirements oversight council
Question. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has the
responsibility to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements
to meet the national military strategy and alternatives to any
acquisition programs that have been identified.
How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the
Department's acquisition process?
Answer. As the Multi-National Forces-Iraq and now the U.S. Forces-
Iraq Commander, I am the end user of capability requirement and
development decisions the JROC makes. I believe the JROC is effective
at engaging the acquisition and programming communities early on by
validating COCOM, Service, and Agency requirements/capability gaps. The
JROC has approved a streamlined method for managing requirements
achieved through information technology. This requirements governance
process allows the operational user more flexibility in prioritizing
delivery of requirements as operational needs change and will
synchronize well with the proposed changes in the information
technology acquisition process. The JROC is very effective in assessing
and conveying the COCOMs' needs to the acquisition process through a
rigorous Capability Gap Analysis process.
Question. Do you see the need for any change in the organization or
structure of the JROC?
Answer. I think the Department is already pursuing necessary
changes to improve the process and I strongly support the VCJCS and
JROC efforts to include an ``upfront'' assessment of cost, schedule,
and performance as part of the requirements process; including the
evaluation of trade-off alternatives. The JROC provides independent
military advice to our senior leaders regarding which issues become
validated military requirements and which do not. I think the JROC is
organized and structured effectively to provide that independent
military voice. I also believe the combatant commanders need a voice
through the JROC to influence the resource and acquisition processes as
they relate to joint requirements. If confirmed, I look forward to
investigating options that include combatant commander representation
in the JROC.
Again, the JROC has already taken steps in this direction by
delegating Joint Capability Board (JCB) authority to several of the
functional combatant commands. This delegation included naming the
Deputy Commander of JFCOM as the Chairman of the Command and Control
(C2) JCB addressing all command and control requirements. This puts
JFCOM very much in the role of primary advisor to the JROC on command
and control issues. Similarly, the Deputy Commanders of U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
have been delegated JCB Chairmanship for their respective functional
areas.
Further, the SASC has proposed in the 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act to allow the Commander or Deputy Commander of any
combatant command to participate in a JROC which has topics that
significantly impact their operations and requirements. This will also
enhance the ability of the combatant commanders to influence the JROC
decisions.
Question. In your view, should the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces
Command, have a seat on the JROC?
Answer. I do not believe it is necessary for the JFCOM Commander to
have a seat on the JROC in order to be effective at influencing the
direction and types of joint force capabilities. In October 2008, the
JROC delegated the chairmanship of the command and control Joint
Capabilities Board to the JFCOM Deputy Commander. In that role, JFCOM
is the primary advisor to the JROC on command and control capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to interact with the
JROC in pursuing the development of improved joint force capabilities?
Answer. I would offer the JROC as it is chartered is sound, and I
am confident that General Cartwright will continue to lead us in the
right direction. I will continue in the path set forth by General
Mattis to bring significant issues to the attention of the JROC and
leverage the JFCOM Chairmanship of the Command and Control JCB to the
maximum extent possible to influence the development of joint force
capabilities.
Question. Do you feel that the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces
Command, should have a larger role in the activities of the JROC, given
the unique JFCOM mission to support joint warfighting?
Answer. In my view, we must continue to ``operationalize'' the JROC
and acquisition processes to respond with agility when Warfighter
Challenges are presented and validated. The Joint Capability
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is designed to impact mid-
to far-term capabilities and funding (3 years and beyond). The process
has less flexibility to quickly respond to emerging requirements within
the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process in the
near-term budget years (1-2 years). I strongly support initiatives such
as the Information Technology Oversight and Management process that
provides the required flexibility to take full advantage of evolving
commercial information technology and incorporate it throughout a
program's lifecycle. U.S. JFCOM's expanded role as the Chair of the C2
JCB provides a stronger voice in the JROC process.
The Joint Urgent Operational Needs process has been used
effectively over the last several years. However, there still exists a
gap in our ability to deliver joint warfighting capabilities that are
needed in the 1-3 year range due to issues with all three core
processes: requirements, acquisition and programming. I will be working
with the VCJCS to identify ways to bridge this gap, potentially through
changes in the JROC/JCIDS process that will then influence how we can
acquire these capabilities in a timelier manner.
joint requirements
Question. Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, is responsible for
advocating for the interests of combatant commanders in the overall
defense requirements and acquisition process.
From your perspective has the U.S. Joint Forces Command effectively
represented the requirements and needs of combatant commanders to the
JROC and the Military Services?
Answer. Yes, U.S. Joint Forces Command has well represented the
requirements and needs of the combatant commanders to the JROC.
Question. In your view, are combatant commanders capable of
identifying critical joint warfighting requirements and quickly
receiving needed capabilities?
Answer. Yes, as one of the component commanders for U.S. Central
Command it is my belief that the combatant commander, in working with
their component commanders is perfectly and uniquely suited to identify
those joint urgent needs for adjudication by the JROC. Enhanced
representation by the combatant commanders on the JROC will ensure that
these needs are given the appropriate priority for delivery.
Question. What suggestions, if any, do you have for improving the
requirements and acquisition process to ensure that combatant
commanders are able to quickly receive needed joint warfighting
capabilities?
Answer. The combatant commanders often face issues that require new
capabilities in the near-term that cannot be supported by the
traditional requirements, acquisition and programming processes. While
the Services have some flexibility to adapt to these needs, current
processes are often too bureaucratic and focused on the long-term to
meet these needs. I will work with the JROC to advocate improvements to
the existing requirements process that will accelerate our ability to
provide the required joint warfighting capabilities. Flexibility and
adaptability of our processes is essential as we continue to operate in
a dynamic and changing operations and strategic environment.
joint capability development
Question. In your view, how successful has U.S. Joint Forces
Command been in developing and delivering new joint capabilities to the
warfighter?
Answer. I think very successful. JFCOM continues to work with the
COCOMs to determine warfighter gaps and challenges and look for
solutions. JFCOM develops new capabilities, often partnering with the
Services, and leverages experimentation expertise, Joint Capability
Technology Demonstrations, and interim joint capability development
efforts to find solutions that can be operationally tested and fielded.
In response to a CENTCOM Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) JFCOM
partnered with the Services to develop and field test the Joint
Airborne Communication System (JACS). The JACS systems have evolved
under the JFCOM Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) from a
1,000 lb. package that required aircraft support to a 100 lb. package
that is currently undergoing final testing for ultimate integration on
existing Service unmanned aircraft system (UAS) platforms. The JACS
system more than triples the communication range capability of ground
forces operating at extended ranges from forward bases. The early
versions of JACS have been successfully tested in the Iraq AOR.
Question. What steps would you take to improve JFCOM's efforts in
this area?
Answer. The ability to expeditiously develop new capability hinges
not only on identifying the right technology, but also on having access
to the resources (manpower and funding) to effectively pursue solutions
that meet the warfighter's needs. In addition to Research and
Development (R&D) funding, interim solutions also require temporary
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) to ensure sustainability. If confirmed,
I will work with my staff to ensure that JFCOM in partnership with OSD
AT&L and others as appropriate, are adequately funded and provided the
authorities necessary to enable the development and fielding of interim
solutions, until a Service Program of record is available to meet COCOM
urgent needs.
budget and resources
Question. Since 2001, the U.S. Joint Forces Command budget
authority has risen considerably because of additional functional
mission responsibilities assigned to the command.
Have the increases kept pace with the JFCOM taskings and do you
foresee the need for future growth?
Answer. As any organization reacts to changes in organizational
priorities, customer demands (DOD and COCOMs), and other external
influences, that organization is forced to reassess the resources
available to it and the resource structure in place to meet the demand.
I understand building the resources to support JFCOM missions and
functions has been a departmental effort over 10 years, and the
informed allocation of those resources is intended to provide for that
mission in support of delivering the appropriate tools to the
warfighter. At this point in time, I can only assume that the resources
have kept pace with the growing mission responsibilities.
I do not believe the JFCOM headquarters has any excess capacity,
and a recent DOD COCOM Management Headquarters Analysis bears that out.
So, as Joint Warfighting capability gaps are identified, it will be
critical for the department to assess the risk as it relates to the
overall ability of the force to complete its mission, and then
determine the appropriate allocation/reallocation of resources as
required to mitigate or accept that risk. We must seek efficiencies and
constantly assess and adjust within the resources we have been given.
However, with the current economic condition of our country, and the
expected downward pressure on the overall budget, I view the near-term
opportunity for growth unlikely.
Question. In what specific areas do you see the need for future
growth?
Answer. Without having the opportunity to assess and evaluate
JFCOM, I am not able to provide an informed answer to that question.
Question. Do you believe that JFCOM has adequate staff to
efficiently manage this increase in budget authority and mission
responsibilities?
Answer. I believe the answer is yes, but once again, that is
something I will have to assess for myself. Anytime an organization
experiences rapid growth like JFCOM, there is always concern about
failure to address the management and oversight elements.
Question. Approximately two-thirds of JFCOM headquarters staff is
composed of government civilians or contractors.
In your view, what explains this large civilian and contractor
workforce?
Answer. From the recently completed COCOM Baseline Review, I
understand JFCOM's management headquarters staff is the leanest of any
COCOM. Like every COCOM HQ, the civilian and contractor components of
the workforce augment the military component. Taken together, I expect
the components operate as a team to execute the unique missions and
functions assigned by the Unified Command Plan and other directives.
JFCOM's government civilians generally perform duties that are
inherently governmental in nature, such as financial and program
management, while our military personnel provide the essential element
of recent and relevant operational experience and perspective. I expect
to find the contractor component of JFCOM's workforce to be lean and
well-managed by a trained cadre of government acquisition professionals
and held accountable to specific and rigorous performance standards.
Question. Do you believe that JFCOM has an appropriate mix of
military and civilian personnel?
Answer. I simply do not know at this time. This is something I will
have to review and access once I am there. I understand significant
workforce rebalancing is occurring in response to the legislative
enablers, and the Department's guidance, on acquisition reform and in-
sourcing. Hopefully, these initiatives will lead to a workforce that is
both more effective and less expensive.
joint forces command limited acquisition authority
Question. Congress has provided Commander, U.S. Joint Forces
Command, with the authority to develop and acquire equipment for battle
management command, control, communications, and intelligence and other
equipment determined to be necessary for facilitating the use of joint
forces in military operations and enhancing the interoperability of
equipment used by the various components of joint forces.
What is your assessment of the benefits of this authority?
Answer. Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA), which was delegated by
the Secretary of Defense to U.S. Joint Forces Command from 2004 through
2008, proved to be a useful and flexible tool for JFCOM to support
other combatant commands. LAA to JFCOM was discontinued at the end of
fiscal year 2008.
Question. Do you concur with the findings and recommendations of
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its April 2007 report
which were somewhat critical of JFCOM's use of limited acquisition
authority?
Answer. I am not familiar with the results of the GAO report.
Question. What internal changes, if any, would you recommend to
improve the execution of the authority?
Answer. If confirmed I would commit to studying this more
thoroughly.
Question. Do you believe that an increase in acquisition staff size
is necessary?
Answer. I am not in a position to speak for USD(AT&L) on makeup or
organization of the Defense Acquisition Work Force in DOD. I understand
that JFCOM has no acquisition staff and none is required at this time,
but we will study this more thoroughly.
Question. Do you believe this authority should be made permanent?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to studying this more
thoroughly.
Question. What additional acquisition authorities, if any, does
U.S. Joint Forces Command require to rapidly address such joint
warfighting challenges?
Answer. If confirmed I will review. My initial reaction is none at
this time.
Question. Do you believe similar acquisition authority should be
extended to other combatant commands, and, if so, which commands and
why?
Answer. SOCOM already has acquisition authority to meet specific
needs of their special operations mission. It is my understanding that
LAA was given to JFCOM to meet the unique interoperability and C2
missions assigned to the command under the Unified Command Plan (UCP)
and reinforced recently by the Joint C2 CPM mandate of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. For those missions, JFCOM should be the single
entity determining the joint solutions to interoperability and C2
problems faced by all the COCOMs.
Question. Will you recommend that the Department directly fund
JFCOM to support the authority--which has not occurred to date?
Answer. No. Again, if the LAA statue was extended, or made
permanent, and JFCOM was empowered by USD(AT&L) to execute all aspects
of acquisition authority, I would recommend funding by way of an
acquisition contingency fund (Program element) made up of RDT&E, O&M
and OP subheads available to USD(AT&L) to fund LAA approved projects.
Question. What role, if any, should oversight officials from the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology play in the utilization of JFCOM's acquisition
authority?
Answer. If the LAA statue was extended, and JFCOM was empowered by
USD(AT&L) to execute LAA, I strongly believe approval of LAA projects
should remain the decision of Commander, JFCOM. USD(AT&L) should have a
responsibility to arrange funding for the LAA projects and continue to
perform an oversight role in ensuring JFCOM doesn't violate acquisition
regulations in the execution of the LAA mission.
defense science and technology programs
Question. The Department's Science and Technology (S&T) programs
are designed to support defense transformation goals and objectives.
These programs are intended to ensure that warfighters--now and in the
future--have superior and affordable technology to support their
missions and to give them war-winning capabilities.
Do you believe there is an adequate investment in innovative
defense science and technology activities to develop the capabilities
the Department will need in the future?
Answer. The Department's current S&T investment level is probably
about right. If confirmed, I must continue JFCOM efforts to steer that
investment on solutions to debilitating capability gaps and on the
future warfighter enablers. That requires continuing to work closely
with OSD and Joint Staff, other COCOMS, and the Services to ensure we
are making the most effective and efficient use of the funding we
currently receive. I know JFCOM has developed partnering relationships
with the Services, Agencies, other Federal labs as well as with large
and small private sector companies which need to be embraced to help
speed capability development at reduced costs and promote that
necessary future capability development.
Question. Do you believe the Department's investment strategy for
S&T programs is correctly balanced between near-term and long-term
needs?
Answer. This is an area where I plan to review and analyze more
closely should I be confirmed. The challenge is ensuring that we have a
proper S&T portfolio that allows us to invest in the more risky,
revolutionary technologies; yet, sustain our investments in
technologies that are needed for the current fight and programs of
record in the POM. I intend to continue working closely with OSD, Joint
Staff, other COCOMs, and the Services to ensure we maintain the proper
balance to develop future capabilities while addressing the gaps
identified in the Science and Technology Integrated Priority Lists and
the identified Joint Warfighter Challenges.
Question. What is the role of JFCOM's modeling and simulation
program in the development of new warfighting capabilities for DOD?
Answer. I believe JFCOM modeling and simulation (M&S) should focus
on developing new warfighting capabilities, and facilitate a more
comprehensive understanding of the national and global security
environment of the 21st century. It needs to replicate the complexity
and terrain of the security environment without placing soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines in harm's way. In addition, JFCOM M&S
should enable complete integration of the other key players in national
security, such as multi-national and interagency partners, with little
attendant risk (politically and operationally). Distributed operations
allow participants greater access to joint venues through the network,
and from their home stations, thus driving down costs and encouraging
participation.
Modeling and simulation not only enables development of new
warfighting capabilities, but constitutes a new, emerging warfighting
capability in itself. For instance, an experimental modeling and
simulation capability that permitted the rapid assessment of enemy
transportation routes through mountainous areas during laboratory
experiments has been fielded and is in active use in Afghanistan. Other
M&S transformational capabilities developed through experimentation and
demonstration may be useful capabilities in planning, mission
rehearsal, mission execution, and assessment in direct support of
operators.
Question. How would you characterize JFCOM's relationship between
DARPA and the Services on S&T programs and how could those
relationships be improved?
Answer. My understanding is JFCOM has enjoyed a good relationship
with DARPA and the Services. JFCOM supports a DARPA intern program, and
also recently appointed the DARPA Director as a member of the JFCOM
Transformation Advisory Group. This provides the JFCOM senior
leadership with key strategic insight. I understand actions are ongoing
to more fully embrace DARPA's capability and strengthen collective
efforts. The Services' involvement with JFCOM appears healthy with a
program that has Service officers at JFCOM to understand Joint and
coalition needs, work on JFCOM's mission areas, and pull in Service
equities and capabilities. JFCOM, in coordination with OSD and Joint
Staff, leverages the Services S&T efforts to find opportunities for
tighter integration of S&T programs in Joint capability development
activities, such as Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD).
I will look to strengthen these relationships by keeping DARPA and the
Services continuously informed of Joint and coalition needs, thus
allowing them to address these needs within the Department's budget
cycle.
technology transition
Question. The Department's efforts to quickly transition
technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the
last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition
of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons
systems and platforms.
What are your views on the success of JFCOM programs in
transitioning new technologies into use to confront evolving threats
and to meet warfighter needs?
Answer. JFCOM has an established track record of identifying Joint
capability gaps and then developing solutions to meet the Joint
WarFighter need. I have seen the results of these efforts first hand in
Iraq. I do believe we need to work harder at fielding solutions faster
using off-the-shelf technology and leverage private sector best
practices. As the threat in the Irregular Warfare arena continually
evolves at a quickening pace, we must be proactive in meeting the
warfighters needs in a timely manner.
Question. Do you believe there are improvements that could be made
to transition critical technologies more quickly to warfighters?
Answer. I believe our process for identifying capability gaps and
joint warfighter requirements is solid--in the past I have made my fair
share of recommendations. However, the solution development process
under Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS) is overly
complex, burdensome and unable to respond quickly to urgent warfighter
needs. All critical Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) require
expediting within the existing Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC).
Increased resourcing and empowerment of the JRAC to address these needs
would ensure quicker solution delivery.
Question. What are your views on the current balance of activities
in the Joint Experimentation portfolio across battlespace awareness,
building partnerships, command and control, force application,
logistics, and protection?
Answer. A balanced joint experimentation portfolio is an important
element of the Departments comprehensive approach to address the
operational requirements of the warfighters. The UCP tasks JFCOM to
lead and coordinate JCD&E efforts across the Department. JFCOM does
this through an enterprise approach in order to balance the varied
experimental needs of the combatant commands and Services.
joint command and control (jc2) capability portfolio manager
Question. DOD recently assigned JFCOM the acquisition oversight
role of JC2 Capability Portfolio Manager. Note: DOD recently assigned
JFCOM as the military lead for the C2 Capability Portfolio.
As you understand it, what does this responsibility entail and do
you believe it is consistent with the overall JFCOM mission and funding
levels?
Answer. Given the UCP responsibilities assigned by the President to
U.S. Joint Forces Command, specifically in the area of joint
integration and interoperability, I think our assigned role as the
military lead for the Department's Command and Control (C2) capability
portfolio is consistent with our mission and appropriately resourced.
Command and Control is obviously a critical military capability, at
every echelon and across the Services. We fight and operate as a joint
force, which in turn requires that our C2 capabilities are integrated
and interoperable. Our ability to manage information and present it to
commanders in order to make decisions is imperative for success. The
information environment becomes more complex every day. How we manage
information to improve integrated Battle command must be a top
priority.
Question. What do you see as the major challenges towards the
development and deployment of joint, interoperable command, control,
and communications systems?
Answer. The major challenge is trying to integrate all the C2
capabilities developed and fielded by title 10 Service providers. This
may sound like a simple task, but C2 requirements vary across the
Services and Joint Force. There are also technical challenges
associated with trying to integrate complex systems of systems,
networks, data, C2 software interfaces and communications/delivery
(space, aerial and surface layers). My preference is obviously for the
Services to develop joint, interoperable C2 capabilities on the
``front-end'' rather than the Joint Force Commander having to integrate
these capabilities in theater. We are not there yet. We must work
together to develop joint warfighting concepts, doctrine, requirements,
training, and integrated joint architectures and standards.
joint experimentation
Question. How would you rate the success of the joint
experimentation activities of JFCOM, and the Department as a whole, in
supporting the development of new concepts of operations?
Answer. I understand that significant improvements in relevance and
impact have been achieved in joint experimentation over the past few
years. JCD&E results are delivering real change across DOTMLPF for the
joint warfighter in response to DOD's most pressing problems. JFCOM's
joint experimentation activities are an important element of the
Department's efforts to ensure we remain superior in the future threat
environment. JCD&E efforts generate solutions for the combatant
commands' and Services' most significant challenges and provide a
framework to understand the challenges of the future joint operating
environment and the ways in which the joint force will operate.
Warfighters are directly involved in developing and validating
concepts, and transitioning solutions across the full spectrum of
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel and facilities.
Question. What changes would you recommend to increase the
effectiveness of joint experimentation activities?
Answer. The joint experimentation community must continue to
improve the relevance and impact of concepts and capabilities for the
warfighter, while ensuring focus on the most pressing warfighter
challenges while ensuring visibility and transparency of concept
development and experimentation. Projects must focus on precisely
defined military problem statements and produce results in 12 months or
less. We must formalize partnerships between experiment sponsors,
subject matter area experts and transition agents to ensure the
accuracy and rapid transition of results to drive enduring change for
the joint warfighter.
Question. Based on your experience, do you believe that the overall
Department commitment and investment in joint experimentation is
adequate to ensure the effective integration and interoperability of
our future forces?
Answer. We are better, but we still have much work to do. The
integration and interoperability of joint forces is improving; however,
security challenges we face now and in the future mandate a
comprehensive approach to include interagency and multi-national
partners. My guess is that additional funding for joint experimentation
would be needed to facilitate this broadened body of work.
Question. What do you believe to be the appropriate role for JFCOM
in determining how the respective Services should invest their
experimentation dollars?
Answer. The UCP assigns JFCOM responsibility to lead joint concept
development and experimentation (CDE) and coordinate the CDE efforts of
the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies to support joint
interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities. The
Commander of JFCOM is also tasked with leading the development,
exploration, and integration of new joint warfighting concepts and
serving as the DOD Executive Agent for joint warfighting
experimentation. This does not require strict JFCOM control of how
Services invest their experimentation dollar, but does require a clear
communication of the planned activities of Service experimentation and
the ability to develop a common vision of the course of experimentation
with the CJCS and Joint Chiefs.
JFCOM must be the proponent that creates an awareness of
experimentation activities in the department and serves to synchronize
the efforts of the JCD&E Enterprise. Services can then exercise their
appropriate fiscal authorities under title 10, guided by that common
vision of the course of experimentation.
urban operations
Question. JFCOM's experimentation and lessons learned efforts have
had significant recent activity dedicated to understanding and
development of urban operations concepts.
What is your assessment of current DOD capabilities to conduct
urban operations?
Answer. We are much better today than we were 8 years ago because
our troops and their leaders are more experienced, truly adaptive and
superbly trained. But we must now develop realistic training
environments combined with simulations to continue to improve our
ability to operate in an urban environment. If the enemy adapts, we
must have the ability to think and constantly adapt. We must be able to
confront an adaptive enemy that simultaneously combines irregular and
conventional tactics, weapons and organizations.
Question. What major issues need to be addressed to improve those
capabilities?
Answer.
Increased capacity for human intelligence.
Greater urban operations reconnaissance and
surveillance to assist in the counter-IED fight. This includes
C-IED organization and doctrine.
Joint command and control systems that enable the
integration not only of military capability, but also of
interagency capability in a coalition environment that enables
true information sharing with our partners.
Precise and non-lethal weapons that minimize
collateral damage and civilian casualties.
Strategic communications capabilities that improve our
ability to help the population understand the truth about what
we are doing and gain their support. Additional investment in
language and cultural awareness for our troops who interact on
a daily basis with the population we hope to positively
influence is also essential.
The ability to better visualize the urban operating
environment, including the ability to sense through the massive
structures of the city.
Force tracking in the urban environment to ensure we
know exactly where all of our forces are located.
Abilities to Process, Exploit, and Disseminate the
tremendous ISR capabilities that we possess to the lowest
tactical levels.
Creation of processes and simulation that enable the
development of our small units to perform at increasingly
higher levels.
Question. Based on results from the JFCOM Urban Resolve 2015
experiment last year, efforts are being made to promote the concept and
fielding of airborne persistent surveillance assets such as Angel Fire.
What is your assessment of the value of the development of improved
sensors, aircraft, and downlink technology and the field testing and
integration of these assets with feeds from other battlefield sensors?
Answer. It is incredibly valuable. My experience in Iraq tells me
that one of the keys to success in counterinsurgency is a focus on the
environment that allows commanders to gain a view of the enemy that
enables timely decisionmaking. The increase in numbers of intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance platforms does not ensure that the
information derived from those sensors is properly fused. A critical
component in implementing this approach is the development/
implementation of capabilities to combine the information from these
ISR platforms in a form accessible by the commander at the lowest
operational level. If confirmed, I intend to continue to emphasize the
development of improved sensors and to ensure processes are jointly
synchronized and focused to enhance ISR integration with warfighting
capabilities. ISR is working in Iraq because tactical leaders are
maximizing the effectiveness of a limited resource. The optimal use of
ISR is enabled through decentralized control that provides the greatest
flexibility at the lowest levels within the command.
irregular warfare
Question. The Secretary of Defense has stated that irregular
warfare (IW) must become a Department core competency.
What, in your view, does it mean to make irregular warfare a core
competency and how will we know if that has been achieved?
Answer. In my opinion, this means enhancing our ability to conduct
a variety of missions such as: train, advise, and assist foreign
security forces; create a safe secure environment in fragile state;
provide essential government services and humanitarian relief as
necessary; and identify and defeat irregular threats from both state
and non-state actors. We will know that irregular warfare has been
achieved as a core competency when we have institutionalized many of
the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan into our joint training and
doctrine. We must define the role of conventional and unconventional
forces and broaden the spectrum of operations so that we can routinely
conduct operations in a variety of complex physical and mental
environments.
Question. What is your evaluation of the Department's efforts to
date to achieve this objective?
Answer. Significant lessons have been learned from recent
operations, and the Services have made progress adapting force
structure and fielding necessary capabilities to succeed in these
complex environments. Modular Brigades, Human Terrain Teams, expanded
Counter-IED capabilities, revised doctrine and concepts, enhanced pre-
deployment training are among many of the relevant, necessary
adaptations that have been made. Nevertheless, U.S. forces must
continue to adapt to stay ahead of determined adversaries intent on
exploiting our weaknesses.
Question. What, in your view, is the role of U.S. Joint Forces
Command in achieving this objective for the Department and with each of
the Services?
Answer. U.S. Joint Forces Command is uniquely positioned to assist
the Department in developing the right concepts and capabilities
required to ensure irregular warfare becomes a core competency of the
joint force. Specifically, JFCOM can assist the Department in
establishing joint standards for IW relevant training and readiness,
recommending mechanisms for increasing interoperability and integration
of SOF and GPF related activities. Furthermore, JFCOM can assist in
developing joint IW relevant doctrine and concepts, and regularly
assessing the readiness and proficiency of the joint force to conduct
Irregular Warfare related operations.
Question. What, in your view, are the most important challenges to
overcome in making irregular warfare a Department core competency?
Answer. The challenge as we forge ahead is to improve our ability
to be agile and responsive enough to stay ahead of an irregular enemy.
This requires balance and agility. Additionally, to obtain a balanced
force we must gain irregular warfare proficiency without forfeiting our
conventional and nuclear dominance and do this in a resource
constrained environment while engaged in two major contingencies. If
confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to increase our flexibility and adaptability for
fielding capabilities on the battlefield in the present warfight as
well as further institutionalize irregular warfare in military
doctrine, training, capability development and operational planning.
Question. What initiatives or improvements would you recommend, if
any, to overcome these challenges or accelerate the achievement of this
objective?
Answer. Adoption of institutional education for noncommissioned
officers and officers is absolutely critical to developing adaptive
leaders with the understanding and skills necessary to overcome our
future challenges. What quickly became clear to me from my deployments
to Iraq, is that in war, human beings matter more than any other
factor. We must equip our leaders with an education that gives them the
understanding of the political, strategic, historical and cultural
framework of a more complex world as well as a deep understanding of
the nature of war. In addition, we must include our interagency
partners in our training and education programs. Irregular warfare must
include all of our interagency partners and their unique skills.
``whole of government'' approach in joint operations
Question. The Secretary of Defense has emphasized a ``whole-of-
government approach'' to national security policies, programs, and
operations.
What, in your view, does a ``whole-of-government approach'' in
joint operations mean?
Answer. A ``whole-of-government approach'' to joint operations is
applying all potential resources available within the U.S. Government
to solve complex problems. It implies working with our civilian
interagency partners throughout the process of assessing the situation
on the ground, planning to address the challenges, executing
strategies, and developing assessment tools to monitor our progress. In
Iraq we have developed a comprehensive Joint Campaign Plan that
integrates the unique capabilities of our interagency partners, the
United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and other governmental
agencies.
Question. What is your evaluation of the Department's efforts to
bring a ``whole-of-government approach''?
Answer. At all levels, departmental, Service, COCOM and in the
field DOD is making an all out effort to improve our ability to
coordinate and collaborate with our civilian agency teammates. In the
field, civilian counterparts are imbedded with military units, like
Provincial Reconstruction Teams. At the Service level, we use civilian
consultation in the development of capabilities to address our security
force assistance responsibilities. COCOMs have aggressively sought to
improve civilian agency coordination and outreach functions and OSD and
Joint Staff have taken steps to include civilian agency input in the
development of our plans. But we must continue to break down
interagency barriers to more effectively deal with the complexity of
the modern security environment.
Question. What, in your view, is the role of U.S. Joint Forces
Command in developing and implementing a ``whole-of-government
approach'' to joint doctrine, training, planning, and operations?
Answer. JFCOM is in a supporting role for an overall DOD effort.
Its particular niche is ensuring that all Joint doctrine, training,
planning and approach to operations use a whole-of-government and
comprehensive approach. Additionally, JFCOM's UCP charter makes it
responsible for the conduct of interagency and multi-national
experimentation and concept development. Joint leadership training
programs from Capstone to Pinnacle must provide a forum for our senior
leaders to grow, adapt, and forge interagency relationships.
Question. What, in your view, are the important challenges to
overcome in making a ``whole-of-government approach'' a central part of
joint doctrine, training, planning, and operations?
Answer. JFCOM is and has been addressing this challenge for a
number of years, and I am told that the term ``whole-of-government''
approach was coined in a JFCOM experimentation effort. I think the most
important challenge in making a ``whole-of-government'' approach a
reality is to get buy-in from our interagency partners. This will build
their capacity so that we can consistently train together, encourage
them to participate in and consult with us on the development of
improved methods and capabilities for planning and operations thru
experimentation, and the revision of Joint doctrine.
Question. What initiatives or improvements would you recommend, if
any, to overcome these challenges or accelerate the achievement of this
objective?
Answer. I believe an assessment focused on the advantages and
disadvantages of increasing their capacity would be the key to
accelerating the achievement of this objective.
stability and support operations
Question. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the
importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and
support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and
support operations in DOD planning and guidance in order to achieve the
goal of full integration across all DOD activities.
What is your assessment of the Department's current emphasis on
planning for post-conflict scenarios?
Answer. The Department has made great progress in its emphasis on
military planning for post-conflict scenarios. These efforts have
helped to codify the best practices and procedures that the recent
experiences have taught us. Additionally, Department planning guidance
now emphasizes activities associated with both precluding contingency
plan execution as well as post-conflict requirements comparable to what
we have historically placed on preparations for major combat
operations.
However, these activities require a whole-of-government effort.
Typically during a crisis, those in military and civilian agencies have
come together with the best intentions and eventually respond in a
unified manner. The lack of integrated planning can make the initial
efforts awkward, uncoordinated, and inefficient. The Department is an
active participant in the executive branch's efforts to improve the
integration of U.S. Government efforts.
Question. How can the new directives on post-conflict planning and
the conduct of stability and support operations be better implemented?
Answer. The DOD Instruction on Stability Operations (16 Sep 2009)
provides comprehensive guidance to the Department to ensure the
development of both the capability and capacity to conduct stability
operations. One of the most important highlights is the need to
institutionalize and expand the Department's efforts towards
integrated, ``whole-of-government'' planning and execution. If
confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, I will keep the emphasis on matters for
which I am personally accountable such as:
Capturing the Joint lessons learned and improving our
ability to share them with our interagency partners
Developing Joint concepts in collaboration with
interagency partners
Supporting the continued expansion of Interagency
partner participation in both the planning and execution of
joint training and experimentation events
Integrating Interagency partners into Joint Command
and Control solutions.
Question. What lessons do you believe the Department has learned
from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. Most lessons learned from our experiences of planning and
training for post-conflict operations are related to the importance of
integrating our interagency, multi-national, and host nation partners.
The integration issues emphasize the need to invest in:
Defining the lead and supporting roles and
responsibilities in the planning process
Developing collaborative decisionmaking processes
Developing compatible information systems to include
interface controls, data sharing and disclosure processes
Continuing to expand opportunities to train with our interagency
and multi-national partners in order to improve planning, execution and
enhance mutual understanding.
responses to wmd threats and natural and manmade disasters in the
united states
Question. The responses of Federal, State, and local agencies to
Hurricane Katrina and, more recently, to the catastrophic oil spill in
the Gulf of Mexico, have generated debate about the appropriate role
for military forces in responding to national crises.
In your view, what is the appropriate role, if any, for U.S. Joint
Forces Command in supporting civil authorities responding to natural
and manmade disasters or WMD threats within the United States?
Answer. JFCOM's role is that of the Primary Joint Force Provider to
Commander, NORTHCOM, or any other designated Supported Commander,
following a WMD incident. JFCOM is tasked to develop sourcing solutions
to meet force requests of the Supported Commander in a timely manner.
JFCOM does not generally provide forces to Governors or TAGs who have
purview over their own State National Guard forces. However, if those
forces are Federalized by the President, they could be provided to the
supported commander by JFCOM. It is generally assumed that in case of a
WMD incident the President would choose to use forces under title 10,
but there is no guarantee of that eventuality. Should the response be
limited to title 32 forces, JFCOM would have a limited role in the
response.
Question. Hurricane Katrina has demonstrated the importance of
joint and interagency training in preparation for support disaster
operations.
In your view, how could U.S. Joint Forces Command influence joint
and interagency training to enable better coordination and response for
natural and manmade disasters operations?
Answer. There are probably two high-impact approaches JFCOM can use
to enable coordination and response during natural disaster operations:
experimentation and training. The first discovers best practices and
the second trains the entire interagency and nongovernmental partners
in those best practices.
weapons of mass destruction response units
Question. What role do you believe U.S. Joint Forces Command should
play in the training, assessment of readiness, and employment of units
with WMD response missions, such as the Weapons of Mass Destruction-
Civil Support Teams and the CBRNE Consequence Management Response
Force?
Answer. JFCOM, in its role as Primary Joint Force Provider, will
develop sourcing solutions for the Defense CBRN Response force and two
Command and Control CBRN Response Elements as defined in the QDR 2010
and the most recent Guidance for Development of the Force. JFCOM
ensures that Service training plans are aligned with NORTHCOM Joint
Mission Essential Tasks (JMET) for consequence management units, and
will also assess readiness against those JMETs and report that
assessment to DOD leadership monthly. JFCOM will not employ those
units, but will provide them in a timely manner to a supported
combatant commander following the Secretary of Defense allocation
decision.
joint qualified officers
Question. How do you assess the necessity for and effectiveness of
the current joint qualification system for military officers, including
requirements for promotion to general/flag officer rank and
professional military education?
Answer. The fundamentals of the Department's professional military
education programs that provide joint qualifications are sound, but
there are areas that need improvement. As the Secretary articulated in
his policy for the Department's Joint Qualified Officer program (DODI
1300.19), today's joint force requires the largest possible body of
fully qualified and inherently joint officers suitable for joint
command and staff responsibilities. Officer career management plans
that identify, develop, and track high-potential officers for joint
qualifications are crucial to ensure our best officers are prepared for
joint duty assignments and eventual promotion to general/flag officer
rank.
Question. In your opinion, does the existing framework for joint
qualification contribute sufficiently to producing military leaders who
possess the skills, intellect, and motivation to succeed in modern
warfare, including counterinsurgency and stability operations?
Answer. As confirmed by the recent House Armed Services Committee
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Report on in-residence
officer Professional Military Education, the Department's PME system is
still basically sound. However, there are areas of PME that need
improving. A significant challenge is that capacity limitations
preclude every officer from completing this Joint Qualified Officer
(JQO) requirement within traditional in-residence institutions. One way
in which the Department is addressing this challenge is by developing
paths for officers to earn joint qualification through alternative
joint education, training and experience. These alternatives include
online training and broader opportunities for officers to earn points
toward joint qualification through operational experience. Another
challenge that was confirmed by the HASC study is that curricula change
is too often reactive rather than anticipatory. This reactive nature of
PME curricula is particularly challenging in the dynamic mission areas
of modern warfare such as counterinsurgency and stability operations.
Question. What is your understanding of the role U.S. Joint Forces
Command currently plays in overseeing the professional development of
joint qualified officers, and do you think that role should change?
Answer. I understand that U.S. Joint Forces Command works closely
with the Joint Staff in overseeing the professional development of
joint qualified officers. U.S Joint Forces Command actively supports
the Chairman and the Joint Staff in development of both the Officer
Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) and Enlisted Joint
Professional Military Education Policy (EPMEP). U.S. Joint Forces
Command is actively engaged with the Joint Staff and Offices of the
Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a sustainable individual
joint education and training program with the capacity to meet the
Chairman's intent to ensure the largest possible body of fully
qualified and inherently joint officers suitable for joint command and
staff responsibilities.
allied command transformation
Question. Joint Forces Command is responsible for leading the
transformation of joint U.S. forces in the areas of providing joint
forces to combatant commanders, joint training, joint interoperability,
and joint innovation and experimentation. Until September 2009, the
Commander of Joint Forces Command was dual-hatted as Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation (SACT).
What role, if any, does Joint Forces Command currently have in
assisting SACT in accomplishing his mission of leading the
transformation of NATO's military structures, forces, capabilities and
doctrines to improve interoperability and military effectiveness of the
Alliance and its partner nations?
Answer. Similar mission sets and geographic co-location, provides
both JFCOM and ACT an excellent opportunity for U.S. and NATO
collaboration on joint and coalition warfighting issues. The work JFCOM
accomplishes in the areas of Joint Experimentation and Joint Training
directly complements similar efforts being undertaken by ACT. The
expansion of the NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan has increased the
frequency of cooperation between the two commands. Lesson learned in
Afghanistan by NATO can be applicable for U.S forces in Iraq and the
Horn of Africa.
Question. What actions would you anticipate taking, if confirmed,
to assist the SACT and his command in improving the capabilities of
NATO?
Answer. The co-location of NATO's Transformation Command with JFCOM
has already proven to be an invaluable resource to the militaries of
all NATO countries, including the United States. I believe SACT and
JFCOM enjoy a transparent and collaborative relationship. Within all
appropriate authorities, my intent is to build upon that positive
relationship. Additionally, where our missions are complimentary, I
intend to fully support SACT to improve our Alliance warfighting
capabilities.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. Joint
Forces Command?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
joint pacific alaska range complex
1. Senator Begich. General Odierno, the Joint Pacific Alaska Range
Complex (JPARC) is the largest instrumented air, ground, and electronic
combat training range in the world. Last year, the JPARC was accredited
and certified by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as a Joint National
Training Capability (JNTC) for command post exercises and field
training exercises. There are only 33 JNTC certified sites and JPARC.
If confirmed, please describe the importance of JPARC to training our
forces and how you see the JPARC utilized in the future.
General Odierno. I am not familiar enough with the JPARC to speak
with confidence about this topic. However, if confirmed, I will assess
the JPARC and answer your question within 90 days of assuming command
of JFCOM.
2. Senator Begich. General Odierno, the accreditation and
certification process also identifies improvements needed in range
capabilities and identifies measures to mitigate any shortfalls. If
confirmed, please describe how JFCOM will work with Alaska Command to
make improvements to the range to mitigate shortfalls identified in the
accreditation process.
General Odierno. I am not familiar enough with the JPARC and the
accreditation and certification process to speak with confidence about
this topic. However, if confirmed, I will assess the JPARC, and all
processes, and answer your question within 90 days of assuming command
of JFCOM.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
joint forces command mission
3. Senator Burris. General Odierno, the JFCOM mission is to provide
joint forces, training, experimentation, and capabilities for all of
the unified commanders and joint commands. The requirements for joint
capable forces will continue to grow as we work to meet our defense
priorities. What priority will you place on joint qualification and
education?
General Odierno. I believe that joint qualification and education
of our servicemembers is critical to our long-term development, growth,
and success as a fighting force.
JFCOM is actively engaged with the Joint Staff and Offices of the
Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a sustainable individual
joint education and training program with the capacity to meet the
Chairman's intent to ensure the largest possible body of fully
qualified and inherently joint officers suitable for joint command and
staff responsibilities. As Commander of JFCOM, I plan to assess all of
the education programs that fall under my area of responsibility to
ensure that these programs meet the intent of the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman.
Additionally, I will assess the effectiveness of the programs, with
regards to current and future threats and battlespaces to ensure that
we are spending our money and our time wisely. I'll make
recommendations for changes based on that assessment.
4. Senator Burris. General Odierno, do you see a major role for
Reserve component forces to assist you in accomplishing your mission?
General Odierno. In my time as Commanding General of all U.S.
forces in Iraq, I can speak to the importance of the reserve fighting
force to our continued success. Thousands of reservists came to the
fight with a multitude of skill sets that were vital to our ability to
solve the complex issues facing Iraq. While I still need to become
better acquainted with the mission of JFCOM, I can say that I do
believe in the importance of our Reserve component and am sure it will
help us accomplish out mission there.
______
[The nomination reference of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 24, 2010.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the
grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General.
GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, 8425.
______
[The biographical sketch of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.
Military schools attended:
Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
U.S. Naval Command and Staff College
U.S. Army War College
Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy - BS - Engineering
North Carolina State University - MS - Engineering, Nuclear Effects
U.S. Naval War College - MA - National Security and Strategy
Foreign language(s): None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 2 Jun 76
1LT....................................... 2 Jun 78
CPT....................................... 1 Aug 80
MAJ....................................... 1 Dec 86
LTC....................................... 1 Feb 92
COL....................................... 1 Sep 95
BG........................................ 1 Jul 99
MG........................................ 1 Nov 02
LTG....................................... 1 Jan 05
GEN....................................... 16 Sep 08
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oct 76.......................... Jan 78............ Support Platoon
Leader, later
Firing Platoon
Leader, C
Battery, 1st
Battalion, 41st
Field Artillery,
56th Field
Artillery
Brigade, U.S.
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jan 78.......................... Aug 78............ Survey Officer,
1st Battalion,
41st Field
Artillery, 56th
Field Artillery
Brigade, U.S.
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Aug 78.......................... Oct 79............ Aide-de-Camp to
the Commanding
General, 56th
Field Artillery
Brigade, U.S.
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Nov 79.......................... Jul 80............ Student, Field
Artillery
Advanced Course,
Fort Sill, OK
Aug 80.......................... Dec 80............ Liaison Officer,
1st Battalion,
73d Field
Artillery, XVIII
Airborne Corps,
Fort Bragg, NC
Dec 80.......................... Dec 82............ Commander, Service
Battery, later A
Battery, 1st
Battalion, 73d
Field Artillery,
XVIII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC
Dec 82.......................... May 83............ Assistant S-3
(Operations), 1st
Battalion, 73d
Field Artillery,
XVLII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jun 83.......................... May 84............ S-3 (Operations),
3d Battalion, 8th
Field Artillery,
XVIII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jun 84.......................... Aug 86............ Student, North
Carolina State
University,
Raleigh, NC
Sep 86.......................... Jun 89............ Nuclear Research
Officer, later
Chief,
Acquisition
Support Division,
Defense Nuclear
Agency,
Alexandria, VA,
later detailed as
Military Advisor
for Arms Control,
Office of the
Secretary of
Defense,
Washington, DC
Jun 89.......................... Jun 90............ Student, U.S.
Naval Command and
Staff Course,
Newport, RI
Jul 90.......................... Dec 90............ Executive Officer,
2d Battalion, 3d
Field Artillery,
3d Armored
Division, U.S.
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Dec 90.......................... Jun 91............ Executive Officer,
Division
Artillery, 3d
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia
Jun 91.......................... May 92............ Executive Officer,
42d Field
Artillery
Brigade, V Corps,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Jun 92.......................... Jun 94............ Commander, 2d
Battalion, 8th
Field Artillery,
7th Infantry
Division (Light),
Fort Ord, CA,
(relocated to
Fort Lewis, WA)
Jun 94.......................... Jun 95............ Student, U.S. Army
War College,
Carlisle
Barracks, PA
Jun 95.......................... Jun 97............ Commander,
Division
Artillery, 1st
Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, TX
Jun 97.......................... Aug 98............ Chief of Staff, V
Corps, U.S. Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Aug 98.......................... Jul 99............ Assistant Division
Commander
(Support), 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany to
include duty as
Deputy Commanding
General for
Ground
Operations, Task
Force Hawk,
Operation Allied
Force, Albania
Jul 99.......................... Jul 01............ Director, Force
Management,
Office of the
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Operations and
Plans, U.S. Army,
Washington, DC
Oct 01.......................... Aug 04............ Commanding
General, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Hood, TX,
and Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
Aug 04.......................... Oct 04............ Special Assistant
to Vice Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army,
Washington, DC
Oct 04.......................... May 06............ Assistant to the
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Office of
the Joint Chiefs
of Staff,
Washington, DC
May 06.......................... Feb 08............ Commanding
General, III
Corps/Commander,
Multi-National
Corps-Iraq,
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq
Feb 08.......................... Sep 08............ Commanding
General, III
Corps and Fort
Hood, Fort Hood,
TX
Sep 08.......................... Dec 09............ Commander, Multi-
National Force-
Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
Jan 10.......................... Present........... Commander, U.S.
Forces-Iraq,
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Research Officer, later Sep 86-Jun 89..... Captain/Major
Chief, Acquisition Support
Division, Defense Nuclear
Agency, Alexandria, VA, later
detailed as Military' Advisor
for Arms Control, Office of the
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC.
Assistant to the Chairman of the Oct 04-May 06..... Lieutenant General
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC.
Commander, Multi-National Corps- Dec 06-Feb 08..... Lieutenant General
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq/Commanding General, III
Corps.
Commander, Multi-National Corps- Sep 08-Dec 09..... General
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, Jan 10-Present.... General
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of operations assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Officer, Division Dec 90-May 91..... Major
Artillery, 3d Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe and Seventh
Army, Operations Desert Shield/
Storm, Saudi Arabia.
Deputy Commanding General for Apr 99-Jun 99..... Brigadier General
Ground Operations, Task Force
Hawk, Operation Allied Force,
Albania.
Commanding General, 4th Infantry Apr 03-Mar 04..... Major General
Division (Mechanized),
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
Commander, Multi-National Corps- Dec 06-Feb 08..... Lieutenant General
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq/Commanding General, III
Corps.
Commander, Multi-National Force- Sep 08-Dec 09..... General
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, Jan 10-Present.... General
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Combat Action Badge
Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Raymond T.
Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Raymond T. Odierno.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, Joint Forces Command.
3. Date of nomination:
May 24, 2010.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
September 8, 1954; Dover, NJ.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Linda Marie Odierno (Maiden Name: Burkarth).
7. Names and ages of children:
Anthony, 31; Kathrin, 29; Michael, 23.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
American Legion (Member), Association of the U.S. Army (Member),
4th Infantry Division Association (Member), 8th Field Artillery
Regimental Affiliation (Member), the 9th Infantry Regiment Association
(Member), and the 1st Cavalry Division Association (Member).
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes, I do.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes, I do.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Raymond T. Odierno, General, U.S. Army.
This 24th day of May, 2010.
[The nomination of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 29, 2010, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2010.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Lloyd J. Austin III,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. Not at this time. The integration of joint capabilities
under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been a success. The integration of
our military forces continues to improve and we are more interoperable
today than ever in our Nation's history. This achievement has been
remarkable. The next step is to ensure the ability of military and
civilian departments to work closely together to foster whole-of-
government approaches to address concerns of national interest.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Not at this time. However, I do believe that there are key
principles of teamwork, cohesion, and interoperability that could be
applied to enhance a whole-of-government approach to today's
challenges.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq?
Answer. U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) is the military component of the
U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationship, responsible for defense and security
cooperation. Its mission is to strengthen security and stability in
Iraq and to support Iraq's continued development as a sovereign,
stable, and self-reliant strategic partner and thereby contribute to
peace and stability in the region.
The Commanding General of USF-I commands the U.S. military forces
within Iraq and is responsible for all military activities in Iraq
conducted in support of the U.S. Ambassador and U.S. objectives. He
provides the political-military interface with the U.S. Embassy and
Government of Iraq and is responsible for strategic and operational
issues affecting security and stability in Iraq. USF-I is under the
Operational Control of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). USF-I conducts
operations in support of the Government of Iraq, U.S. Mission, and
other international organizations.
Question. What are the differences between the duties and functions
of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq and the Commander, Multi-National
Corps-Iraq (MNC-I)?
Answer. When I served as the Commander of MNC-I, an operational
headquarters, it fell under Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), a
strategic headquarters. Since that time MNF-I, MNC-I, and the Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq headquarters have been
combined to form the USF-I Headquarters. The USF-I Commander's
responsibilities are substantially broader than those of the Commander
of the former MNC-I and include national and regional strategic and
political-military issues. The USF-I Commander also has direct
responsibility for the missions previously performed by subordinate
headquarters under MNF-I. This includes operations, training and
assistance, and strategic engagement which now reside directly within
the USF-I headquarters.
Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform
these duties?
Answer. My professional military education, operational experience,
and assignment history over 35 years of service provides a broad
knowledge and experience base and thorough understanding of what is
needed to command USF-I in support of the strategic goals outlined by
the President for the mission in Iraq. Multiple tours of duty in Iraq
and Afghanistan coupled with service at U.S. CENTCOM and on the Joint
Staff, have provided invaluable experiences and insights on this
mission and enabled an appreciation for what is needed to accomplish
our Nation objectives in Iraq during this transitional time in our
bilateral relationship.
A summary of key joint and operational assignments includes:
Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq
Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division (Light)
with duty as Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-180,
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan
Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps/Commander,
Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
Director, Joint Staff
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander,
U.S. Forces-Iraq?
I believe I am fully qualified and positioned to assume this
important position. If confirmed, I would take steps to establish or
re-establish relationships across the U.S. and Iraqi Governments,
academia, and the business world to ensure full access to the most
current information and diversity of perspectives on the strategic
issues affecting Iraq and the region.
iraq
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing
the United States in Iraq?
Answer.
Overall:
Iraq is generally secure and a return to levels of violence seen in
the 2006/2007 timeframe is unlikely as long as all communities continue
to pursue their goals through the political process. The Iraqi
Government continues to improve its capability to provide security,
essential services, effective governance, and a functioning legal
system.
Security:
Security incidents are the lowest on record and continue to
decline. Although Iraqi and U.S. operations have eroded the strength
and capability of most insurgent and terrorist groups, extremist groups
still retain the will and a capability to conduct attacks. In
particular Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) remains capable of high-profile
attacks that damage public perceptions of stability in Iraq; however,
the group lacks sufficient popular support to achieve its strategic
goals of toppling the Iraqi Government and establishing a base for a
new caliphate. The Iraqi security forces are continuing to develop
their capability and capacity but remain reliant on U.S. enabling
capabilities such as logistics, intelligence, and advisory and training
assistance.
Governance:
Iraq conducted a successful national election in March 2010, but
political accommodation remains uneven. Mutual distrust among ethno-
sectarian groups limits progress in resolving major issues such as
control of hydrocarbon resources, revenue sharing, and the relationship
between Baghdad and the regions and provinces. An inclusive, popularly
accepted new government would be a key indicator of Iraq's ability to
eventually overcome these challenges, while prolonged government
formation would likely perpetuate policy paralysis.
Unresolved Arab-Kurdish issues, including the status of Kirkuk,
remain a primary concern. Ongoing dialogue among Arab and Kurdish
leaders, international mediation, the presence of U.S. forces in
disputed territories and the deferral of controversial issues are
important factors in helping prevent these disputes from escalating to
violence.
Development:
Economic conditions have stabilized but remain dependent on current
oil prices and levels of production. I am encouraged by recent
agreements with major international oil companies to expand the
development of some of Iraq's largest oil Reserves. Such contracts have
the potential to create jobs and stimulate growth. However, corruption,
inadequate infrastructure and essential services, and a poor business
environment remain obstacles to investment and hinder economic
diversification.
Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the
United States needs to take in Iraq?
Answer. We need to address the primary areas of risk to stability
in Iraq. A key to this effort will be support for the transition of the
national leadership resulting from the recent elections and the
establishment of effective relationships with the new Iraqi Government.
The results of this election and the potential for an inclusive
coalition government offer an opportunity to help Iraq move toward
national unification and a national vision. We need to assist in the
continued development of effective ministries to enable the Iraqi
Government to appropriately meet the needs of the people and maximize
their economic potential. We need to support efforts to develop
positive strategic relationships between the Iraqi Government, its
regional neighbors, and the United States. We need to support efforts
to implement enduring solutions to Arab-Kurd issues. Security and
stability are foundational requirements and necessary conditions for
progress in these areas. Capable, professional Iraqi security forces
are a prerequisite and our ability to effectively train, advise, and
equip them is key.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that confront
the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq?
Answer. The Commander USF-I will be faced with supporting the
establishment of a new government and establishing relationships with
new national leaders. The government formation process will span a
period of months and potentially create a significant lapse in
governing functions. This will undoubtedly create some degree of
degradation in services to the people and legislative actions.
The issues along the disputed internal boundary with the Kurdish
Regional Government remain unresolved and the associated Arab-Kurd
tensions remain a significant challenge. The underlying economic,
social, and security issues must be addressed to achieve an enduring
solution.
The establishment of constructive relationships between Iraq and
its regional neighbors is required for long term regional stability.
Diplomatic efforts to foster these relationships and counter malign
external influences will be key to U.S. interests in the region.
The major challenge is managing and communicating risk during the
responsible drawdown and transition to full Iraqi sovereignty thereby
ensuring that internal and external violent forces do not threaten the
security environment.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
and what actions would you initially take as Commander, U.S. Forces-
Iraq?
Answer. If confirmed, my priorities and initial actions would
center around the essential elements of the mission and the key areas
of risk. This would include sustaining the gains in security and
stability, mitigating Arab-Kurd tensions, continuing the development of
effective, professional Iraqi security forces, establishing positive
relationships with the Iraqi Government, maintaining a whole-of-
government approach and productive integration with U.S. Embassy-
Baghdad efforts, protecting U.S. forces and activities, and managing
the responsible drawdown of U.S. forces in accordance with the
President's guidance.
lessons learned
Question. What were the major lessons that you learned from your
experience as Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, that are most
applicable to the duties you would assume if confirmed?
Answer. A major lesson is that our counterinsurgency doctrine is
sound and that the true center of gravity is the Iraqi people. To hold
our gains we needed to stay among the people. To achieve long-term
success we needed to have Iraqi security forces capable of holding
those gains. This requires partnership based on mutual trust. That
partnership had to extend across the Iraqi security forces, into the
ministries, and throughout the Government of Iraq.
A second lesson is that there must be a whole-of-government
approach to operations in Iraq. A purely military approach is
inadequate. Unity of effort amongst the interagency must be a top
priority. Establishing effective relationships and partnerships are
critical to accomplishing our national objectives. It is through
military to military partnership that we maximize the development of
the Iraqi security forces' capabilities, maintain situational
awareness, and achieve common operational objectives.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the United States has made to date in Iraq?
Answer. We did not recognize and address the reasons for the rapid
growth in the level of political disenfranchisement of the Iraqi people
that led to the insurgency. This allowed extremist groups to establish
themselves and gain support of the population.
We failed early on to appreciate the requirements and adequately
resource our forces and civilian agencies in Iraq with the appropriate
capabilities that would enable them to work government formation and
reconstruction tasks.
We began to transition missions and responsibilities to the
Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces before they had adequate
capacity to effectively govern and secure the population resulting in
significant instability and ethno-sectarian violence that was exploited
by extremist groups.
Question. Which of these mistakes, if any, still impact U.S.
operations, and what corrective action, if any, will you take if
confirmed?
Answer. I believe the evolution of our resourcing, force posture,
doctrine, and operating procedures have effectively addressed these
issues over time.
u.s. force reductions in iraq
Question. By the end of August 2010, U.S. forces are expected to
number at or below 50,000 troops primarily involved in training and
equipping Iraqi security forces, force protection, and targeted counter
terrorism operations. All U.S. forces are scheduled to depart by the
end of December 2011.
Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or
must the solution be primarily a political one?
Answer. Iraq requires a U.S. whole-of-government effort in support
of our strategic relationship. The capabilities U.S. Government
civilian agencies and international organizations provide are essential
to progress in national unification, development of Iraq's Government,
and the establishment of normalized strategic relations within the
region and the rest of the international community.
Question. In your view, what conditions on the ground in Iraq would
allow for a recommendation to make further reductions in U.S. forces?
Answer. If confirmed I would continually assess the operational
environment and based on this assessment, I would shape the size of the
force. It is possible that the environment could change allowing a
recommendation for early troop reductions to occur. Examples of such
conditions are:
Regional diplomatic progress that helps Iraq secure
its borders and decreases malign external influence.
The beginnings of a resolution of Arab-Kurd issues
including disputed internal boundaries, status of Kirkuk, and
hydrocarbons revenue distribution.
A significant increase in the capability and capacity
of national, provincial and local Iraqi Governments that
results in a marked increase in stability and the provision of
essential services.
An increase in the capability of Iraqi security forces
ahead of programmed development.
Question. In your view, what is the risk, if any, associated with
the delay or inability of the Iraqi's to form a government after
certification of this year's election results?
Answer. I am encouraged by recent signs of progress in the seating
of the government and it appears that all sides are committed to a
political resolution of the stalemate. Prolonged government formation
is likely to delay movement on major policy issues and, over time,
diminish Baghdad's capacity to improve the delivery of services.
However, as long as all groups remain engaged in negotiations, Iraqis
will probably tolerate a protracted government formation period. An
inability to form a government, or marginalization of the Sunni Arabs
or Sadrists in the new government, could result in broad cynicism about
the political process and halt or reverse the generally positive
trajectory of political accommodation in Iraq.
Question. Do you believe that compromise among Iraqi political
leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. Yes. I think that an overwhelming majority of Iraq's
political leaders are committed to compromise and realize that in order
for the new government to be accepted it must be inclusive.
Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders
to make the compromises necessary for a political solution?
Answer. Political leaders appear dedicated to peaceful government
transition in accordance with their constitution. Diplomatic engagement
encouraging adherence to constitution procedures reinforces political
leaders obligations to the people and the Nation. Key leaders of all
Iraqi political blocs recognize, and have publicly called for,
inclusiveness in the next government. This recognition is the key for
Iraqi political leaders to make the compromises necessary for a
political solution.
Question. What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?
Answer. Our strategic relationship with the Iraqi Government and
the Iraqi people, and our continued commitment and support for their
development is a key lever. Iraqis perceive the U.S. to be an honest
broker among all the players in government formation and value our
role. The U.S. has and will continue to advocate for an inclusive and
representative government that works on behalf of all the Iraqi people.
In the longer term, our commitment to developing a broad strategic
relationship with Iraq through the U.S.-Iraqi Strategic Framework
Agreement sustains our credibility as a strategic partner in Iraq's
future.
Question. Earlier this year, current U.S. Forces--Iraq commander
General Raymond Odierno stated that, based on the reasonably high voter
turnout and low-level of violence during the Iraqi elections, U.S.
forces are still on track to end its combat mission and continue the
withdrawal of troops. According to General Odierno, ``Only a
catastrophic event would keep us from doing that now.''
Do you agree with General Odierno's assessment that the U.S. troop
drawdown plan remains on track for August and beyond?
Answer. Yes. I agree with General Odierno's assessment.
Question. What, in your view, are the greatest remaining risks to
the successful transition of the mission in Iraq and withdrawal of U.S.
forces as planned and required by the Security Agreement, and what
would you do, if anything, to mitigate these risks?
Answer. The greatest remaining risks to the successful transition
include continued communal rivalries across sectarian lines, the
insufficient capacity of the Iraqi Government to provide for its
people, violent extremist organizations, and malign influence from
external countries. These risks cannot be mitigated by USF-I alone.
They will require a whole of U.S. Government and Iraqi Government
approach. This would include adequate funding for the continued
development of the Iraqi security forces and the tasks associated with
the transition to a State Department lead in Iraq.
intercommunal conflict
Question. Over the last 2 years, civilian and military leaders in
Iraq have noted that the conflict there has evolved and that, although
there is still terrorism and insurgency, the greatest current threat is
the potential intercommunal conflict over power.
In your view, what have been the most important aspects of the
enduring and changing fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?
Answer. The absence of a shared national vision and development of
a new political culture compatible with democracy represent enduring
challenges to stability in Iraq. While there currently is not an
effective insurgency that immediately threatens the survival of the
Government in Iraq, a lingering Sunni Arab insurgency remains and will
rise or further recede based upon political successes of the next
government in integrating the Sunni Arabs into the system. Today, the
vast majority of Iraqi people want peace, and they want effective
governance and prosperity. The Iraqi people and their leaders
increasingly see political accommodation and inclusion as the approach
for peaceful unification. Some progress has been made in Northern Iraq,
but Arab-Kurd tensions over Kirkuk and other disputed internal
boundaries as well as hydrocarbons and revenue sharing remain key
problems that could trigger violent conflict in the next year.
Question. How would you recommend that military strategy adapt, if
any, to the evolving nature of the conflict?
Answer. I believe the current military approach is sound. As
always, the commander must continuously assess the situation on the
ground and adjust operational procedures accordingly. Based on current
conditions the force is postured to transition its focus from combat to
stability operations on 1 September 2010. We will partner with, enable,
advise, train and equip the Iraqis to ensure the continued development
of their capabilities. The development of effective government
institutions and the Iraqi security forces is critical for lasting
stability and security in Iraq. Confidence building measures like those
we are promoting to ensure peaceful resolution of the disputed internal
boundaries between the Iraqi Government and Kurdish Regional Government
are also a key component.
Question. What is the appropriate role of U.S. forces in response
to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among militant
groups vying for control, particularly in northern Iraq?
Answer. The appropriate role of U.S. forces is to partner with the
Iraqis to develop a non-sectarian army and police force capable of
maintaining internal security and preventing intercommunal violence and
a functioning legal system based on the rule of law. Additionally, USF-
I should continue to develop trust and interoperability between the
Iraqi security forces and those of the Kurdish Regional Government
through the combined security mechanisms established in northern Iraq.
Assistance to the Iraqi Government to enhance situational awareness of
conditions on the ground will reduce the probability of violent
encounters.
Question. Recent months have seen an increase in kidnappings and
murders of non-Muslim religious leaders.
In your opinion, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at
greater risk?
Answer. Non-Muslim minorities are vulnerable to the same sectarian
tensions that exist throughout Iraq. Insurgent and militant groups
continue to attempt to ignite ethno-sectarian violence though recent
attacks and have failed to this point. The Iraq Constitution affords
minorities the right of protection, and I believe that the Iraqi
Government has made efforts to ensure their protection and that many
Iraqis recognize minority rights.
Question. Are there any groups that are particularly vulnerable?
Answer. I believe non-Muslims, particularly Yazidis and Chaldean
Christians are more vulnerable in certain distinct areas of Iraq,
primarily in the central and northern portions of the country.
Christians remain a target for AQI and historically they have been
targeted in Mosul. The bombing of a bus with Christian students in 2010
highlights the persistent threat posed by AQI. AQI has also attacked
members of Iraq's Yazidi minority using suicide vests and vehicle borne
improvised explosive devices. It is important to note, however, that
every ethnic group in Iraq has been the victim of kidnappings and
murders.
Question. If so, what is the appropriate role, if any, for the U.S.
military in addressing their vulnerability?
Answer. This requires an Iraqi solution and commitment. We would
advise and assist the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi security forces to
provide equal protection and enforce minority rights of protection
under the rule of law. As the institutions of the Iraqi Government
strengthen and grow increasingly capable of providing security for all
of its citizens, the threats to non-Muslim religious minorities will
diminish.
confronting the militias
Question. Based on your understanding, is the Iraqi Government
taking the steps it must to confront and control the militias?
Answer. Through a combination of security operations and engagement
policies, the Iraqi Government is working to manage the challenges
presented by Sunni and Shia militia groups. Programs like the Sons of
Iraq aim to integrate former Sunni Arab insurgents into the government
or security forces or retrain them for other professions.
Reconciliation initiatives have also contributed to Muqtada al-Sadr's
decision to suspend his Jaysh al-Mahdi militia. However, some terrorist
groups, such as Kataib Hizballah, are more difficult for the Iraqi
Government to target because they operate covertly and are backed by
Iran.
Question. What role would you expect to play on this issue, if
confirmed?
Answer. I believe our role would be to support the Iraqi
Government's anti-militia policies, and improve the stability of Iraq
in order to negate the conditions which generate support for militia
groups. We would do this by continuing to develop the capabilities and
professionalism of the Iraqi security forces and by encouraging
inclusive political processes. Our intelligence capabilities also
contribute significantly to this effort as Iraq's capabilities continue
to grow. I would continue to monitor militia groups and provide
recommendations to the Iraqi Government to address this issue.
long-term security relationship
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to
ensure an effective and efficient transition from the current military
mission through December 2011 to a long-term security relationship with
Iraq?
Answer. Along with the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, we will continue to
work with the Iraqi Government, via the Strategic Framework Agreement,
to build a long term security relationship with Iraq. In the short-
term, I would continue the progress made in developing the Iraqi
security forces through our training and foreign military sales. As
leadership for the U.S. mission in Iraq transitions from USF-I to
Embassy Baghdad, I will continue to support planning for a robust
Office of Security Cooperation under Chief of Mission authority. The
Strategic Framework Agreement serves as the cornerstone of our
partnership with Iraq and I would continue efforts through the Joint
Coordinating Committees to solidify our long-term security relationship
with Iraq.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take
immediately or in the near-term to build a standard security
cooperation relationship with Iraq for long-term military sales and
support such as the United States has with many other nations in the
region and around the world?
Answer. After I have made an assessment I will work with the
Ambassador, CENTCOM, and our Iraqi partners to develop a security
relationship based on U.S. interests which contributes to regional
security and stability.
iraqi security forces
Question. In your view, what are the minimum essential capabilities
required by the Iraqi security forces in order to assume full and
independent responsibility for the internal security of their nation?
Answer. It is essential that the Iraqi people feel safe and believe
that their police, army, and border forces provide them with an
acceptable level of security. The Iraqi security ministries,
institutions, and forces must be able to work together to secure the
population and critical infrastructure; conduct basic manning,
training, and equipping functions; support and enforce the rule of law;
conduct operational level command and control; and sustain their
respective forces.
Question. What is your understanding of the level of agreement or
disagreement, if any, on the definition of these minimum essential
capabilities between the Government of Iraq, Ministry of Defense, and
U.S. Forces-Iraq?
Answer. I believe there is common understanding and agreement by
all parties of what the Iraqi security forces must be able to do in
order to assume full and independent responsibility for the internal
security of their nation.
Question. If there is disagreement between Iraq and the United
States on the minimum essential capabilities required for Iraqi
security forces, how would you propose to resolve this challenge if
confirmed?
Answer. We would routinely assess capabilities and maintain an
ongoing dialog with the Iraqi leadership on missions, threats,
readiness, and requirements. Through this partnered process, I would
convey my assessments and best military advice. Experience has shown
they have an appreciation for our capability assessment methodologies
and understand the process to be very mature, based in a regional
security context, and not a direct U.S. force comparison.
Question. What is your understanding of the state of training and
equipping of Iraqi security forces?
Answer. Due in large part to USF-I's tremendous efforts to date, I
believe the Iraqi security forces are now functioning well as an
internal security force, and all organizations are striving to reach
their minimum essential capability objectives. Within the MoD, the
Iraqi Army is functioning well as a counterinsurgency force. The Iraqi
Navy is providing point defense for both of the country's off-shore oil
terminals and is on track to achieve its objectives. The Iraqi Air
Force has shown significant improvements in accessions, training, and
ground support. Within the MoI, both the Federal Police and Oil Police
are assessed as operationally capable while the Provincial Police and
Border Police have shown progress in performing their security
functions.
Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces progress
toward assumption of full responsibility for internal security?
Answer. While we are witnessing Iraqi security forces that are
increasingly independent and capable of providing internal security
much work remains to be done. Continued U.S. efforts to train, advise
and equip the Iraqi security forces will be required to meet the
President's guidance and vision for a sovereign, stable, and self-
reliant Iraq. Without the continued support of the entire U.S.
Government, including Congress, we put the achievement of our Nation's
objectives for Iraq at risk
Question. In your view, what is the importance, relative priority,
and urgency, if any, of the Iraqi security forces developing the
capability to defend its borders and airspace from external threats?
Answer. In order to establish its legitimacy, both with its own
population as well as with its neighbors, a sovereign nation must be
able to defend and enforce its own borders and airspace from external
threats. Iraq is no exception to this, as such, I consider this issue
to be vital. Iraq is particularly vulnerable to border violations due
to the malign intentions of some of its neighbors. We also recognize
that there will be gaps in Iraq's ability to enforce its own airspace
for some time to come. Both of these issues will require our continued
attention and assistance to mitigate.
Question. What is the appropriate role of U.S. forces, if any, in
supporting the development of this capability with training, equipment,
or other resources?
Answer. Through training, advising, and assistance efforts, USF-I
has and will continue to play a critical role in the development of the
Iraqi security forces' capacity and capability. While we recognize that
some gaps will exist when we withdraw, particularly in their ability to
defend against external threats, we will make every effort to mitigate
the risks associated with those gaps.
Question. How would you characterize the performance of Iraqi
forces in the conduct of security operations during and since the
elections earlier this year?
Answer. We are seeing Iraqi security forces that are increasingly
capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations and providing
internal security for the population of Iraq--a fact that was
highlighted by their performance during the March elections. Their
actions since the elections have also been critical to maintaining the
relatively low level of violence that we have witnessed during the
critical period of government formation.
Question. As U.S. forces are withdrawn, are Iraqi Army units
assuming the areas and missions of these units?
Answer. Iraqi units have the lead for security throughout the
country. U.S. forces and Iraqi Army units work together to ensure that
as U.S. units move the Iraqi Army is prepared to assume responsibility.
Question. If so, are gains in reduced violence and increased
stability achieved by U.S. forces being effectively maintained in the
areas for which Iraqi Army forces have assumed responsibility?
Answer. Yes. Iraq's security environment remains stable at
historically low levels of violence. The Iraqi security forces continue
to lead the security efforts in Iraq and to disrupt the violent
extremists networks.
Question. What is your understanding of the ability and commitment
of Iraqi security forces to adequately maintain the readiness of the
equipment they have been given or purchased?
Answer. My understanding is that over the past year, the two
security ministries have made some progress in developing both
infrastructure and capacity, but logistics and sustainment remain areas
for continued focus. Supporting the maturation of the Iraqi supply and
maintenance system, training a cadre of Iraqis to sustain and maintain
their own equipment, and working to increase emphasis across the Iraqi
leadership will ultimately result in an effective force. I believe the
Iraqi security forces' leadership has an increasing appreciation for
their shortfalls and will want our continued assistance to improve
their strategic, operational, and tactical logistics systems.
Question. If confirmed, what action would you take, if any, to
expand the development of logistics capabilities and a commitment to a
culture of maintenance within the Iraqi security forces to ensure that
the equipment they have been provided is maintained and ready to meet
their security needs and protect the investment of billions of U.S. and
Iraqi dollars over the years?
Answer. I would continue with our detailed efforts, and fully
support the priority the Iraqis have placed on getting their logistics
capability to a higher level. The U.S. has the best military
logisticians in the world, and our example and mentorship for the Iraqi
security forces' leaders have been key to improving Iraqi capabilities
and leader competency. As commander of MNC-I, I took on the task of
emphasizing the importance of logistics competency with the senior
Iraqi security forces leadership during visits to Iraqi units, in
senior commander forums, and with the national leaders. I would
continue this effort if I return as the commander of USF-I.
advise and assist brigades and military/police transition teams
Question. In your view, does the size, structure, number, and
operating procedures for U.S. Advise and Assist Brigades and Military
and Police Transition Teams embedded with Iraqi security forces need to
be changed in any way? If so, what would you recommend?
Answer. As the MNC-I Commander I played a key role in the
development of the size, structure, number, and operating procedures
for U.S. Advise and Assist Brigades and am pleased to see that they are
performing well. These organizations as well as the embedded Transition
Teams provide the appropriate flexibility, partnership capacity,
mobility, and force protection for the evolving conditions in Iraq.
Adaptations will be addressed as conditions on the ground and feedback
from tactical leaders dictate. Part of my responsibility is to
recognize when change is needed and convey that to our Service
institutions so they can responsively adapt to meet USF-I requirements.
Question. What is your view of the potential transition of this
mission to contractors?
Answer. If confirmed, I would thoroughly assess the viability of
contractors doing these type missions but I think this could be a
viable option. I believe the best approach would be military led,
managed, and directed training teams in which contractors provide
instruction, subject matter expertise, and team/individual skills
training.
Contractors in a supporting versus lead role is appropriate in many
if not most cases for military/police training. Based upon our
department's recent experience, we utilize highly skilled, former and
retired U.S. military and U.S. law enforcement personnel as contractors
who are (often) Operation Iraqi Freedom experienced and have the
requisite military and police skills. We can leverage contracts and
contractors to accomplish this training mission by keeping a military
to military or military to police relationship as the organizing and
leadership principle that directs the training goals and objectives.
The key to success in this effort as in almost all contracted
support efforts is oversight. Oversight starts with adequate numbers of
well trained contracting officer representatives. If we were to pursue
this, ensuring we have the right oversight personnel and processes in
place to monitor contractor performance would be one of my biggest
priorities.
Question. What in your view is the appropriate distribution of
responsibility and resources for the security assistance, train,
advise, and equip mission between special operations forces and general
purpose forces in Iraq?
Answer. I think the distribution is based on the nature of the
security environment and the current capability of the Iraq special
operations and general purpose forces. USF-I's Deputy Commanding
General for Advise and Training has responsibility to assess both of
these Iraqi forces, and provide recommendations to the USF-I Commander
on any re-distribution. From my understanding, the current plan for
distribution of resources is effective and producing good results. I do
foresee the potential to adjust the ``distribution'' in the future, but
I am not in a position now to give specific recommendations.
Question. What is your understanding of how the Army is ensuring
that general purpose forces are properly trained for the advise and
assist or transition team mission, to include dissemination of
``lessons learned'' to incoming brigades and teams?
Answer. Our Army is doing a tremendous job in providing trained and
ready forces for Iraq. The Army adapted quickly to these requirements
and is meeting USF-I's requirements and continuously working to improve
their procedures based on deployed unit feedback and USF-I requirements
and recommendations. If confirmed, I would maintain the active ongoing
dialog with our Military Services to make sure we properly train our
servicemembers and their units for our remaining military tasks in
Iraq.
Question. If confirmed, what would you recommend in this regard?
Answer. I foresee a potential requirement to better integrate our
Transition Teams with the Advise and Assist Brigades. We started this
initiative when I was last in Iraq, and I suspect we can always improve
our integration efforts as we learn more lessons and reduce our
presence. I also believe we can do the same for the integration of U.S.
civilians into the construct. The civilian transition is a key
component of our strategy and we must work together by sharing our
military experiences and best practices with our civilian team members.
command and control
Question. What is your understanding of the lessons learned about
U.S.-Iraqi command and control of combined operations over the last
year and especially since the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraqi
urban areas?
Answer. Iraq is an extremely challenging environment in which to
command control, but over the last several years we have learned
valuable lessons and instituted many interoperable procedures. The most
significant of these, which we began in earnest during 2008 and 2009,
was working hand in hand with our Iraqi counterparts at their national
and provincial operations centers, as well as in combined joint
tactical operation centers and outposts throughout Iraq. As we reduce
our presence at the tactical operations centers we must ensure that we
maintain or increase our presence at the national and provincial
centers.
Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about command and
control relationships with Iraqi forces in combined operations, and if
confirmed, what actions would you take, if any, to mitigate challenges
or improve capabilities in this regard?
Answer. I do not have any major concerns over the command and
control relationship with Iraqi forces, but I do foresee the need to
routinely assess where we are and adjust accordingly as we draw down.
It is imperative to maintain situational awareness and an active
advisory capacity as force levels decline.
burden sharing
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role for the United
States, and particularly of U.S. Force-Iraq, in reconstruction
activities in Iraq going forward?
Answer. In my view the role of USF-I and the United States in
reconstruction activities needs to remain focused on Iraq's efforts and
expenditures to improve essential services and infrastructure. USF-I
plays a role in advising Iraqi counterparts on security implications,
critical infrastructure protection, and security and support for U.S.
Government and other international civil development efforts. I am
encouraged by reports that the Government of Iraq is currently spending
a significant portion of this year's budget on infrastructure and
essential services improvements. I think this indicates the
effectiveness of U.S. advice and that the Iraq Government recognizes
its importance.
Question. In your view, what capabilities or support should be the
highest priorities for U.S. financial assistance to the Iraqi security
forces?
Answer. I believe the highest priority for U.S. financial
assistance to the Iraqi Government should go towards those requirements
directly related to the establishment of the minimum essential
capabilities for the Iraqi security forces. Once that effort is
complete, we should focus our long term security assistance efforts on
building a credible capability to deter external threats.
Question. In your view, what capabilities and support for the Iraqi
security forces should be the sole financial responsibility of the
Government of Iraq?
Answer. I believe we should view this as a partnered effort that
involves a variety of cost-sharing options that eventually leads to a
long-term security relationship. The Iraqi Government funds the
preponderance of the Iraqi security forces' costs, but U.S. financial
assistance is still critical for ensuring that there is no degradation
of progress.
readiness of u.s. forces
Question. What is your assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces
that have been deployed and are deploying in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom? Have you observed any significant trends or gaps with respect
to personnel, equipment, or training readiness in units in theater?
Answer. All forces I observed, inspected, and fought with on
multiple tours to Iraq were well trained, led, and prepared for the
mission.
In my experience in Iraq, any significant gaps in readiness are
proactively addressed by the Service Chiefs to ensure trained,
equipped, and prepared forces. If confirmed, I will stay engaged with
the Service Chiefs to ensure no lapse during our responsible drawdown.
Question. What are your views on the growing debate over whether
the Army is putting too much emphasis on preparing for
counterinsurgency operations and/or too little emphasis on preparing
for high intensity force-on-force conflict?
Answer. I believe our current force is very capable of prevailing
in other conflicts and contingencies that may arise. I believe our
Nation has the intellectual capital, and institutional and industrial
capacity to maintain the force we have, and to adapt that force to meet
future defense and contingency requirements. I think we have adapted
our Department of Defense and whole-of-government approaches to win the
wars we are currently fighting with an eye on what the future may
portend, and with the type capabilities our Nation will require in
order to meet the security challenges of the future. At the tactical
level the counterinsurgency fight is equally a force on force,
controlled violence activity. We have the best trained and equipped
military in the world, and we have the best, most adaptive and seasoned
combat leaders in our Nation's military.
transition to lead u.s. agency
Question. As the mission of U.S. military forces in Iraq changes
and large numbers of troops begin to redeploy, responsibility for
leading the planning and management of U.S. assistance to the
Government of Iraq has begun to transition from the Department of
Defense (DOD) to the Department of State.
What is your understanding and assessment of the theater's plans
for this transition?
Answer. Considerable work has been done over the past year in both
Washington and Baghdad to ensure the smooth transition from military to
civilian lead in Iraq. I believe the transition plans, developed
through the interagency process, are executable. The key to the plan in
my mind is to synchronize the State Department's assumption of lead
responsibility with our military troop withdrawal, and for our
Government to resource the Department of State to accomplish the task.
A close civil military partnership with the Ambassador and the
interagency will be critical. If confirmed I would work closely with
U.S. Embassy Baghdad in the coming months as these plans are put in
motion.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the progress
being made toward the completion of this transition?
Answer. I believe this will be a tough but essential effort. I
understand that progress is being made, and Department of State and
other U.S. agency capacity shortfalls are being identified and
addressed by the administration and Congress. Substantial planning and
coordination for this transition is ongoing. As an example, more than
1,000 tasks currently being conducted in Iraq by members of USF-I have
been analyzed to determine whether they should transition to Embassy
Baghdad, transition to the Iraqi Government, or be terminated. It is
this level of detailed planning that will ensure our transition
success.
Question. In your view, what are the most significant challenges to
the efficient and effective transition of these agency roles?
Answer. Our strategy depends on the development of Iraqi security
forces that are capable of defending their population against internal
threats and a robust civilian effort that can sustain the positive
momentum gained over the last 2 to 3 years. Inadequate resourcing of
either could have profoundly negative impact on our partnership with
Iraq and their re-integration into the region. The challenge is
seamlessly transferring these tasks without degradation in mission
performance. This requires that the recipient of the transfers has
sufficient capacity to perform the task.
Question. If confirmed, what action would you recommend or take, if
any, to deal with these challenges and ensure an efficient, effective,
and timely transition?
Answer. I would maintain constant interaction by teaming with the
Ambassador and the embassy staff to ensure that all of our transition
objectives are met in an effective and timely manner. I would provide
my best military advice on how we can complete the transition
effectively and efficiently within the scope of U.S. goals for a
sovereign Iraq.
rule of law training
Question. How important do you consider continued U.S.-supported
training to Iraqi leaders in establishment of the ``rule of law''?
Answer. I believe that U.S. supported training to Iraqi leaders in
establishing the rule of law is critical to the success of the mission
in Iraq. Establishment of the rule of law is key to providing domestic
legitimacy to the Government of Iraq. The Iraqi Government must have
this continued U.S. support to succeed, and I believe this model is an
example for the entire region.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the impact
of previous rule of law training initiatives and the current
organization of U.S. Government-led efforts to foster commitment to the
rule of law in Iraq?
Answer. Achieving U.S. objectives in Iraq hinges on advancing gains
made over the last several years. As a result of previous initiatives,
the Iraqis have made progress in the development of the rule of law.
There is still much work to do to ensure that mature, professional
judicial and criminal justice institutions are in place to complement
an increasingly capable police force. It will be critical to our
success in Iraq that the U.S. Government allocates the necessary
resources to sustain further progress in this area.
Question. Do you believe that additional effort is needed by U.S.
military forces and through an interagency approach to develop doctrine
and resources for rule of law training?
Answer. I believe sustained effort by U.S. military forces through
an interagency approach to continue developing doctrine and resources
for rule of law training is important to our overall objectives and
that our interagency approach is effective. This type of U.S. sponsored
activity increases our democratic credentials in the world, and the
application of this program affords the United States the opportunity
to improve and refine our doctrine and resources for ``rule of law''
training efforts in Iraq, the region, and internationally.
sustainment of u.s. commitment
Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of
readiness, how long do you believe the Army can sustain U.S. troop
levels in Iraq of approximately 50,000 troops at their projected
operational tempo?
Answer. I have tremendous confidence in the Army leadership and the
American people to sustain the force requirements of the drawdown plan.
All indications to date project a continued withdrawal of our forces in
Iraq under the current timeline. This drawdown also supports our Army's
initiative to put the force more in balance and within desired dwell
rate ratios in order to improve readiness and Army Soldier and Family
support programs.
force protection
Question. What is your understanding of the status of U.S. forces'
distribution in partnership with Iraq forces and to small local bases
throughout the area of operations?
Answer. Force distribution and force disposition plans focus on
transferring responsibility to Iraqi Forces, and consolidating and
protecting U.S. forces at larger bases as we withdraw. The plan is
being executed under the guidelines that leaders ensure U.S.
servicemembers are adequately trained and resourced for the mission,
that they have the authorized rules of engagement that allow for their
right of self-defense and unit protection, and that leaders implement
thorough risk assessment and risk mitigation procedures. Also,
stringent safety procedures for U.S. forces are being practiced and
strictly enforced by leaders at all levels. Regardless, U.S. forces
must maintain the logistical capability to conduct independent resupply
operations throughout the theater.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the protection of
those forces and the forces which would have to resupply them on a
daily basis?
Answer. Protecting U.S. personnel would be one of my overarching
priorities. I have confidence in USF-I's base and route consolidation
plan because it was developed in large measure to provide for
protection of U.S. forces while we transition responsibility to Iraq,
and conduct our withdrawal. Equally, the plan focuses on providing
security to the U.S. civilians who will work in some of these
locations. The ``hub and spoke'' bases and routes will require
appropriate resourcing, and constant assessment, adaptation and
adjustment to maximize force protection of U.S. personnel and conduct
an effective transition and withdrawal.
intelligence support for ground forces
Question. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. Special
Operations Command and the national intelligence agencies have
developed effective equipment, tactics, and intelligence dissemination
practices to target al Qaeda personnel and personnel from other related
terrorist networks. The effectiveness of these tools and their utility
for regular ground forces in battling militias and improvised explosive
device networks are now more widely recognized. As a result, some of
these tools and capabilities are migrating to Army and Marine Corps
general purpose ground forces.
Do you believe that regular Army general purpose ground forces can
replicate the capabilities developed by special forces?
Answer. Yes. Our U.S. general purpose forces have adopted many of
the same technologies and procedures developed by Special Forces. For
example, our Special Operations Forces developed an intelligence
gathering, analysis, targeting, exploitation and dissemination process
that our general purpose forces follow. We also have a greater level of
integration and sharing at our combined fusion centers that provides
enhanced intelligence and geo-location capabilities for special and
general purpose forces.
Question. What is your understanding of how commanders within U.S.
Forces-Iraq are attempting to accomplish this?
Answer. The sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures is
active in Iraq, and reinforced by our Service institutions and agencies
through a variety of web-based information initiatives, and with
forward deployed support elements in theater. Experience within both
communities has increased dramatically in the last several years, and
our forces in the field are receiving the benefit of growing
institutional knowledge of threats and threat capabilities. An example
is the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Organization's and their
deployed Task Force Troy in Iraq. Commanders and leaders at all levels
are aggressively gathering information and collaborating with deployed
support agency elements to maintain a qualitative edge in the fight. As
Commander of MNC-I, we benefited enormously from these efforts, and we
were able to counter serious threats to our forces. We have also shared
a tremendous amount of this knowledge and capability with our Iraqi
partners so they can be more capable and independent. If confirmed, I
would want to make sure the focus and support is commensurate with our
withdrawal and the transition to the Department of State.
Question. In your view, has DOD provided the resources necessary to
acquire the equipment and intelligence dissemination support to enable
Army and Marine Corps general purpose ground forces to adopt or adapt
these tactics, techniques, and procedures?
Answer. Yes, DOD has been committed to acquiring and fielding these
resources to our general purpose ground forces. However, as U.S. Forces
in Iraq continue their drawdown I expect there will be challenges
meeting USF-I's intelligence needs. If confirmed, I would continually
assess those needs and the ability to meet them with the capabilities
available.
detainee treatment standards
Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the policy set forth in Deputy Secretary
of Defense England's memorandum of July 7, 2006.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes, I support the standards of detainee treatment
specified in the revised FM 2-22.3 and DOD Directive 2310.01E. I
believe those standards and procedures are correct guidelines and were
developed based on the hard lessons our forces learned early on in
Iraq. They are consistent with our American national values.
Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that
standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of
reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that
the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact
on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are
treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
Answer. I believe the rationale for prohibiting inhumane and
degrading treatment goes far deeper than reciprocity. It is an
important consideration and I agree it is an element that should guide
us in the standard of treatment for detainees.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes, I believe that it is consistent with effective
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the
requirements of Common Article 3. The joint doctrine for
counterinsurgency operations explains the benefits of complying with
the standards of the Geneva Conventions and risk associated with
failure to comply.
iraqi state-owned enterprises
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the status
of DOD efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to
increase employment in Iraq?
Answer. The Strategic Framework Agreement establishes the
foundation for building a prosperous, diversified, and growing economy
in Iraq. These principles are fundamental to achieving both short and
long-term stability and security. On the tactical level, the
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), and on the strategic
level, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) are
utilized toward this end.
The TFBSO is a great example, and one I am intimately familiar with
from my last assignment in Iraq. TFBSO was dedicated to revitalizing
Iraq's economy and creating jobs for Iraqis. TFBSO placed civilians
with expertise in industrial operations and factory management on the
ground in Iraq--skills previously absent from the American presence
there. TFBSO provided training for employees, upgraded equipment, and
prepared the factories for large-scale private investment, and provided
the example for greater private investment in Iraq. Other efforts like
Texas A&M University's in-country agricultural development teams
improved Iraqi agricultural diversity, capacity, and environmental
protection responsibilities.
Programs like these proved vital for commanders at all levels, and
were a key component in establishing the conditions for our withdrawal,
and can continue to be a contributor to Iraq's stability and
development during and after our transition. If confirmed, I will take
a personal interest in these programs to make sure they are effective.
iraqi refugees
Question. The United Nations estimates that over 2 million Iraqis
have been displaced, of which 1.8 million have fled to surrounding
countries while some 500,000 have left their homes to find safer areas
within Iraq.
What is your assessment of the refugee problem in Iraq? Are more
Iraqis returning home?
Answer. The refugee problem from the Iraq war is a regional
problem, drawing interest from Syria and Jordan among others. There are
over 200,000 Iraqi refugees registered with the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), and it is likely that there are a significant
number of unregistered refugees.
Approximately one million Iraqis remain displaced in Iraq from the
Saddam era. I do not believe the refugees who are returning home are
being supported by a mature Iraqi system that fully reintegrates them
back to their homes, and provides for their basic needs. Ultimately,
the solution to the problem of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced
persons is a stable, secure environment where these displaced people
can reintegrate into Iraqi society and obtain employment.
Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in
Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in
addressing this issue?
Answer. USF-I can directly help in this effort by encouraging the
Iraqi security forces to provide a safe and secure environment.
Continued U.S. and international effort under the United Nations is
needed to emphasize to the new Iraqi Government that the successful
return and reintegration of Iraqi refugees is the Iraqi Government's
responsibility, in their national interests, and a key component for
normalized relations with their neighbors.
Question. What should the role of the U.S. military be, in your
view, with respect to those Iraqis who are returning to find their
homes occupied by others?
Answer. USF-I, in conjunction with Embassy Baghdad, will continue
to assist the Government of Iraq in addressing the issue of displaced
persons. It is important to remember that with the implementation of
the Security Agreement in 2009, the Iraqis assumed sovereignty of their
country and people. We will continue to advise and assist them as they
handle these complex issues.
special inspector general
Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction
(SIGIR) conducts comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations
which are valuable to Congress.
If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to support the
audits, inspections, and investigations conducted by the SIGIR?
Answer. The reports of the SIGIR provides valuable insights to the
Force Commander, the Ambassador, officials in Washington, and to the
Government and people of Iraq. I fully supported the activities of the
SIGIR as the MNC-I Commander and, if confirmed, I would continue to
embrace this important Congressional body.
traumatic brain injury
Question. Recent press reports allege that there is a lack of
leadership and policy with respect to the evaluation of and treatment
for traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) in theater.
What is your understanding of the policy or policies in place that
address the needs of deployed servicemembers who have experienced an
event which could result in TBI or a concussion?
Answer. I acknowledge traumatic brain injury as a very real medical
condition, and one that is adversely affecting many of our
servicemembers who have served in Iraq. I know that our military
services and medical professionals in and out of the military are
aggressively pursuing strategies and treatments for this type injury. I
understand that we are developing clinical care instructions for all
levels of TBI severity to cover both the deployed, and the non-deployed
environment which includes mandatory concussion screening. I believe
the Department's protocol for diagnosing, evaluating, treating, and
following up on combat related concussion injuries is based on the best
scientific evidence available, which is being enhanced through ongoing
research efforts. Emerging DOD guidance on mandatory evaluations and
rest times after a defined event will help to better address these
incidents. If confirmed, I would maintain constant attention on this
issue, and the other issues that affect the health and well being of
our servicemembers.
Question. In your view, are these policies effective?
Answer. In my view, we need to improve compliance with our
protocols, encourage reporting of signs/symptoms, and stay ever
vigilant for further improvements in procedures. Clearly in the past,
we have missed servicemembers that sustained concussions or TBI whether
because they didn't want to leave their unit or because they or their
leadership did not understand the importance of being checked out and
treated early. New DOD guidance will help as it mandates evaluations
close to the injury and establishes policy, assigns responsibility and
provides procedures on the medical management of traumatic brain injury
in a deployed setting. Services and COCOMs have already begun to
implement this guidance. If confirmed I would be committed to ensuring
they are effective in Iraq.
mental health assessments in theater
Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made
six separate assessments over the past several years detailing the
immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S.
soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT VI, found that
``soldiers on their third and fourth deployment report lower morale and
more mental health problems,'' and that stigma continues to prevent
some soldiers from seeking mental health care. These types of reports
lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops are
returning from duty in Iraq with post traumatic stress, depression, and
other mental health problems.
What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous
MHAT assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings,
and the effect of such actions?
Answer. The MHAT is a great Army program. The results of MHAT VI
reported that psychological problems and combat exposure in maneuver
units are significantly lower than every year except 2004 in Iraq. It
was also reported that multiple deployments and dwell time are
correlated to mental health issues. There remain barriers to care and
stigma associated with seeking care although some improvement in stigma
was documented. The Army has augmented mental health staffing in both
theaters, particularly Afghanistan where the need was shown to be high.
In response to the observed need for resilience, in 2008, the Army
established the Directorate of Comprehensive Soldier Fitness to correct
the observed gaps in resilience capability. If confirmed, I would focus
on effective implementation of corrective actions and procedures to
address the underlining findings, and improve the mental health of our
servicemembers in Iraq.
Question. If confirmed, what measures would you support to ensure
ongoing mental health assessments of U.S. forces in Iraq?
Answer. I would support all DOD health assessment programs and
emphasize leaders' roles in creating resilient units through leadership
training and resiliency training. I would stress access of medical
assessment teams to all our servicemembers. I would specifically work
to decrease the perceived stigma of reporting one's own mental health
concerns to medical personnel.
Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental
health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?
Answer. I have great trust and confidence in our dedicated medical
professionals. I would stay abreast of these issues and
recommendations, and would work on how to best implement them in Iraq.
I would emphasize leaders' roles in providing for the mental health
needs of their servicemembers. I would work to ensure adequate
staffing, increase access to mental health services, stress the
importance of resiliency, and insist on positive, proactive leadership.
Question. Do you believe that mental health resources in theater
are adequate to handle the needs of our deployed servicemembers?
Answer. I currently have not had an opportunity to assess all the
resources available in theater. In previous tours in Iraq I found
resources to be adequate and effective, but with room for improvement.
My combat experience also showed me it wasn't necessarily about how
many medical resources we had, but whether they were at the right
locations, doing the right procedures. I would follow this approach but
would not be hesitant to request more mental health resources if
warranted.
sexual assault
Question. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, you will be
responsible for ensuring compliance with DOD policies on prevention of
and response to sexual assaults involving U.S. military and civilian
personnel in Iraq.
What lessons did you learn, if any, while implementing sexual
assault training, reporting protocols, and command awareness while
serving as Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps and Commander, Multi-
National Corps-Iraq that can help improve any of these policies or
their implementation in theater?
Answer. I believe that our policies are effective but this remains
a core leadership responsibility. Leaders at all level must ensure that
there is a culture and climate in place that allows victims to come
forward and that each allegation is taken seriously and investigated
thoroughly. The implementation of the ``I Am Strong'' campaign will
help to address the concerns victims have about coming forward.
Question. What are the unique issues, if any, that you believe need
to be addressed to ensure that policies on prevention, reporting,
medical treatment (including mental health care), and victim support
are available in the operational environment of Iraq?
Answer. There are several environmental issues in Iraq that have
bearing on this issue. Forces and bases will be in a fairly continuous
state of transition. The regular turnover of units and personnel could
affect the continuity of and quality of care for servicemembers in
theater. Maintaining the necessary capabilities to address sexual
assault as we reduce our force structure must be carefully planned for
to ensure our servicemembers' needs are being met.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of sexual assault
prevention and response resources currently available in the U.S.
CENTCOM area of responsibility?
Answer. I currently have not had an opportunity to assess all the
resources available, but during all my previous combat tours in
CENTCOM, I found it to be adequate and effective, but with room for
improvement. This is also being addressed in all Service programs like
the Army's ``I Am Strong'' campaign.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes. I welcome congressional oversight and I look forward
to a continued relationship.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes. I will always give my best military assessment to our
Nation's leadership.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
advise and assist in iraq
1. Senator Burris. Lieutenant General Austin, as you are aware our
U.S. Forces will complete the drawdown by December 2011 and transition
to an advise and assist role. It is critical that we accomplish this
with the utmost efficiency to minimize risks to our military personnel.
What do you feel is the biggest risk that must be mitigated to ensure
that the drawdown goes well?
General Austin. U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) continues partnered
operations as we conduct a responsible drawdown to no more than 50,000
forces by August 31, 2010. Assigned forces are currently conducting
stability operations and will continue to do so until the end of
mission and drawdown of all forces by December 2011. During that time
we will continue to train, advise, and equip Iraqi security forces
(ISF); provide force protection for U.S. military and civilian
personnel and facilities; assist the ISF in conducting counterterrorism
operations; and support civilian agencies and international
organizations in their capacity building efforts. By the end of 2011,
enduring functions will transfer to the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the
Government of Iraq (GoI), and other international organizations and
agencies.
Current risk is anything hindering the political and economic
development that is essential for Iraq to become a stable, sovereign,
self-reliant nation that contributes to the peace and security of the
region. Iraq must develop an inclusive government that represents the
Iraqi people, provides essential services and security, and
demonstrates the capacity to address national unity challenges such as
Arab-Kurd disagreements over disputed internal boundaries. At the same
time, the country needs to recapitalize its infrastructure while
developing a business climate that encourages economic development and
foreign investment, including the establishment of rule of law.
I am confident that our whole-of-government approach will mitigate
these risks as we transition to a civilian-led effort. I will work
closely with the U.S. Ambassador to encourage a smooth and effective
transition to ensure continued progress in meeting our national
objectives.
2. Senator Burris. Lieutenant General Austin, how will you measure
mission success for the advise and assist units?
General Austin. Our advise and assist brigades (AABs) directly
assist ISF as they become increasingly capable of providing for Iraq's
internal and external security.
A key measure of mission success for AABs includes their successful
partnership with the ISF to provide effective security and development
of the essential capabilities they will require before the end of 2011.
Another measure is the critical role AABs play in the U.S. interagency
process with their support of Department of State (DOS)-led provincial
reconstruction teams. Finally, they provide connectivity as they engage
with various echelons of Iraqi provincial and regional governments.
Their capability to maintain situational awareness, support stability
operations, operate in combined security areas, support
counterterrorism operations, and maintain training and readiness
improves as every day goes by. In addition, our AABs work with the ISF
to enable them to independently manage shortfalls in Iraqi sustainment
and logistics. We have seen great progress in the ISF's ability to
perform these functions and I am confident this progression will
continue.
3. Senator Burris. Lieutenant General Austin, do you envision a
larger or smaller role for Reserve component forces?
General Austin. The Reserve components are key players in U.S.
military operations in Iraq and around the world. In order to meet our
national objectives, the Defense Department considers all Services and
components when responding to Joint Staff and combatant commander
requests for forces. I envision the role of our reservists and
guardsmen remaining fairly consistent as we conduct our responsible
drawdown of forces in Iraq.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
state department request
4. Senator Vitter. Lieutenant General Austin, last week, the
Associated Press released an article outlining State Department plans
to form a security force for their continued operations in Iraq
following our military drawdown. This article cites documents which say
the State Department wants 24 of the Army's Black Hawk helicopters, 50
bomb-resistant vehicles, heavy cargo trucks, fuel trailers, and high-
tech surveillance systems. As I'm sure you are aware, this article
raises concerns about the full transition from military presence to
civilian presence in Iraq, and whether conditions are such that it can
be accomplished as planned in 2011. As the nominee for Commander of
U.S. Forces-Iraq, please describe your thoughts about this State
Department request.
General Austin. I believe we are on track to meet the President's
stated objective of a responsible drawdown of forces by December 2011,
with a successful transfer of responsibilities to the Government of
Iraq, the Department of State, and other international organizations. A
critical part of accomplishing these objectives is a strong partnership
between myself and the U.S. Ambassador, something to which I am wholly
committed.
We have already accomplished a considerable amount of work to
ensure the transfer of responsibilities will be a smooth one. We must
take a whole-of-government approach to transition not just
responsibilities, but the resources required to execute them. It is
imperative for the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad to be properly resourced for
the U.S. mission in Iraq to be successful.
5. Senator Vitter. Lieutenant General Austin, based on your
previous experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, do you feel that this
military/security capability is appropriate for State Department?
General Austin. DOS has a well established capability for providing
diplomatic security for U.S. missions around the world. That said, the
Department will face an unprecedented security challenge in Iraq after
the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
I believe unique capabilities required to successfully continue the
mission after departure of U.S. forces should be carefully considered
and fully resourced using a whole-of-government approach. Such
resourcing will allow our partners at DOS to pursue sustained political
engagement and regional diplomacy in support of a peaceful and
prosperous Iraq.
6. Senator Vitter. Lieutenant General Austin, will you concur with
the request?
General Austin. I believe the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad must be fully
resourced in order to successfully perform its mission as Iraq becomes
an increasingly stable, self-reliant sovereign nation. The Department
of Defense is carefully reviewing the request from DOS to transfer
military equipment, transportation, convoy support, base life support
and core logistics services. We will work closely with them to find a
feasible, whole-of-government approach to fulfilling these
requirements.
7. Senator Vitter. Lieutenant General Austin, should this committee
be concerned that this request represents a veiled assertion that U.S.
military forces are being withdrawn too quickly, and as such will be
leaving State Department personnel at risk?
General Austin. The responsible drawdown of forces currently taking
place is consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement
and gives us sufficient capability as we approach the transition to a
civilian-led mission in December 2011. I believe this drawdown is
taking place at an appropriate pace and will not leave U.S. Embassy
personnel with an inappropriate level of risk.
In addition, the security situation in Iraq has vastly improved;
security incidents are the lowest on record and continue to decline.
Since assuming full responsibility for planning and executing internal
security in June 2009, Iraqi security forces have continued to improve
their cability to maintain situational awareness, support stability
operations, operate in combined security areas, support
counterterrorism operations, and improve training and readiness of
their personnel.
use of contractors
8. Senator Vitter. Lieutenant General Austin, what are your views
on the use of contractors in roles customarily left to the military?
General Austin. I believe it is appropriate to use contractors in
roles complementing the Defense Department's effort to provide support
and services to the mission. Doing so allows commanders to allocate
more forces for combat and other inherently military operations. This
has been a critical component of our effort to achieve U.S. objectives
in Iraq. However, the key to success in this effort, as in almost all
contracted support efforts, is oversight. As conditions in theater
evolve I will continually monitor not only force levels but also the
role of contractors in support of the mission.
9. Senator Vitter. Lieutenant General Austin, is this a risk in
Iraq as the drawdown continues?
General Austin. I do not believe our use of contracted personnel
leads to an unacceptable level of risk as we conduct our responsible
drawdown of forces. As USF-I Commander, I will continually evaluate the
conditions on the ground to determine what composition of forces
(including contracted personnel) is appropriate for us to achieve our
national objectives.
______
[The nomination reference of LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 18, 2010.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the
grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General.
LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, 5848.
______
[The biographical sketch of LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.
Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
Auburn University - ME - Educational Administration
Webster University - MA - Management
Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
U.S. Army War College
Foreign language(s): None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 4 Jun 75
1LT....................................... 4 Jun 77
CPT....................................... 18 Nov 79
MAJ....................................... 1 Jun 86
LTC....................................... 1 Jul 92
COL....................................... 1 Aug 97
BG........................................ 1 Jan 02
MG........................................ 1 Jan 05
LTG....................................... 8 Dec 06
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 76.......................... Jan 78............ Rifle Platoon
Leader, A
Company, 1st
Battalion, 7th
Infantry, 3d
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Jan 78.......................... Feb 79............ Scout Platoon
Leader, Combat
Support Company,
1st Battalion,
7th Infantry, 3d
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Mar 79.......................... Sep 79............ Student, Infantry
Officer Advanced
Course, U.S. Army
Infantry School,
Fort Benning, GA
Oct 79.......................... Apr 81............ Commander, Combat
Support Company,
2d Battalion
(Airborne), 508th
Infantry, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Apr 81.......................... Oct 81............ Assistant S-3
(Operations), 1st
Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Oct 81.......................... Oct 82............ Operations
Officer, U.S.
Army Indianapolis
District
Recruiting
Command,
Indianapolis, IN
Oct 82.......................... Dec 84............ Company Commander,
U.S. Army
Recruiting
Battalion,
Indianapolis, IN
Jan 85.......................... Dec 85............ Student, Auburn
University,
Auburn, AL
Dec 85.......................... Jun 88............ Cadet Counselor,
later Company
Tactical Officer,
U.S. Military
Academy, West
Point, NY
Jul 88.......................... Jun 89............ Student, U.S. Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
Jun 89.......................... May 91............ S-3 (Operations),
later Executive
Officer, 2d
Battalion, 22d
Infantry, 10th
Mountain Division
(Light), Fort
Drum, NY
Jun 91.......................... Oct 92............ Executive Officer,
1st Infantry
Brigade, 10th
Mountain Division
(Light), Fort
Drum, NY
Oct 92.......................... Apr 93............ Director,
Directorate of
Plans, Training,
Mobilization, and
Security, U.S.
Army Garrison,
Fort Drum, NY
May 93.......................... Mar 95............ Commander, 2d
Battalion, 505th
Parachute
Infantry
Regiment, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC, and
Operation Safe
Haven, Panama
Mar 95.......................... Jun 96............ G-3 (Operations),
82d Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Aug 96.......................... Jun 97............ Student, U.S. Army
War College,
Carlisle
Barracks, PA
Jun 97.......................... Jun 99............ Commander, 3d
Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jun 99.......................... Jul 01............ Chief, Joint
Operations
Division, J-3,
The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Jul 01.......................... Jun 03............ Assistant Division
Commander
(Maneuver), 3d
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA,
and Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
Sep 03.......................... Aug 05............ Commanding
General, 10th
Mountain Division
(Light) and Fort
Drum, Fort Drum,
NY, to include
duty as
Commander,
Combined Joint
Task Force-180,
Operation
Enduring Freedom,
Afghanistan
Sep 05.......................... Dec 06............ Chief of Staff,
U.S. Central
Command, MacDill
Air Force Base,
FL
Dec 06.......................... Feb 08............ Commanding
General, XVIII
Airborne Corps
and Fort Bragg,
Fort Bragg, NC
Feb 08.......................... Apr 09............ Commanding
General, XVIII
Airborne Corps/
Commander, Multi-
National Corps-
Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
Apr 09.......................... Aug 09............ Commanding
General, XVIII
Airborne Corps
and Fort Bragg,
Fort Bragg, NC
Aug 09.......................... Present........... Director, The
Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chief, Joint Operations Jun 99-Jul 01..... Colonel
Division, J-3, The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Commanding General, 10th Sep 03-Apr 04..... Brigadier General/
Mountain Division (Light) with Major General
duty as Commander, Combined
Joint Task Force-180, Operation
Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan
(No Joint Credit).
Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Sep 05-Dec 06..... Major General
Command, MacDill Air Force
Base, FL.
Commanding General, XVIII Feb 08-Apr 09..... Lieutenant General
Airborne Corps/Commander, Multi-
National Corps-Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
Director, The Joint Staff, Aug 09-Present.... Lieutenant General
Washington, DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of operations assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander, 2d Battalion, 505th Nov 94-Feb 95..... Lieutenant Colonel
Parachute Infantry Regiment,
82d Airborne Division,
Operation Safe Haven, Panama.
Assistant Division Commander Mar 03-Apr 03..... Brigadier General
(Maneuver), 3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized),
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
Commanding General, 10th Sep 03-Apr 04..... Brigadier General/
Mountain Division (Light) with Major General
duty as Commander, Combined
Joint Task Force-180, Operation
Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan
(No Joint Credit).
Commanding General, XVIII Feb 08-Apr 09..... Lieutenant General
Airborne Corps/Commander, Multi-
National Corps-Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Silver Star
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with six Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Combat Action Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Lloyd J.
Austin III, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Lloyd J. Austin III.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq.
3. Date of nomination:
May 18, 2010.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
August 8, 1953; Mobile, AL.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Charlene Denise Banner Austin (Maiden name: Banner).
7. Names and ages of children:
Reginald Hill (stepson), 41.
Christopher Hill (stepson), 38.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed above.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association of the U.S. Army.
National Infantry Association.
Rocks Incorporated.
555 Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Patriot Award, October 2009, Awarded for exceptional service to
country, Patriot Foundation, Pinehurst, NC.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Lloyd J. Austin III.
This 18th day of May, 2010.
[The nomination of LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 29, 2010, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2010.]
NOMINATION OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL, AND TO BE COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
ASSISTANCE FORCE, AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Ben Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich,
Burris, Kaufman, McCain, Inhofe, Chambliss, Graham, Thune,
Wicker, LeMieux, Brown, Burr, Vitter, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Ilona R. Cohen, counsel;
Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael
J. Noblet, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer,
counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; John
W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; Michael V.
Kostiw, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority
counsel; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Dana
W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Brian F. Sebold and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Greta
Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to
Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Tressa Steffen Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer
Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to
Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich;
Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator Burris; Halie Soifer,
assistant to Senator Kaufman; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to
Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Andy Olson, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van
Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine W. Wells III,
assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator
LeMieux; Scott Clendaniel, assistant to Senator Brown; Brooks
Tucker, assistant to Senator Burr; and Ryan Kaldahl, assistant
to Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Before we begin today's hearing, I want to comment on the
loss that our committee, the Senate, and the Nation suffered
yesterday morning. Robert C. Byrd was a member of this
committee for nearly 3 decades. Just as he did in all of his
Senate work, he was a relentless advocate for the enduring
traditions of the Senate, including our respect for the
legislative authority that the Constitution places in our hands
to exercise and to defend. He was an eloquent spokesman for the
vital role that Congress plays in national security and foreign
affairs in our constitutional system. He was a treasured
colleague and a friend to the members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, to the entire Senate, and to the people of
this Nation. His life's work and his legacy will help guide us,
and will guide future Senates.
This morning, the committee considers the nomination of
General David H. Petraeus to be Commander of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.
General, you testified before this committee on Afghanistan
just 2 weeks ago, and certainly no one foresaw the events that
bring you to testify here again today. When confirmed, you will
bring highly experienced leadership and a profound
understanding of the President's strategy in Afghanistan, which
you helped shape as Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
I want to thank you for your willingness, at the
President's request, to leave that position to take charge of
the campaign in Afghanistan. We appreciate your sacrifice and
that of your family. Your wife, Holly, is with you this
morning. We all want to thank her personally for her commitment
and her sacrifices along the way.
I must tell you, General, that her understanding of your
doing your patriotic duty, as you are now doing again, taking
over the command in Afghanistan, her understanding and support
of that is truly inspiring. We thank her.
We profoundly thank you, Mrs. Petraeus.
I also want to express my gratitude to General McChrystal
for his great service to our Nation over 3 decades. Fate takes
strange bounces at times, and working through them with dignity
and honor, as has General McChrystal, is a hallmark of
leadership and of character.
The challenges in Afghanistan are in many ways as complex
or more complex than those that General Petraeus inherited when
he assumed command in Iraq. Recent news reports indicate that
progress in Afghanistan is spotty. Casualties among U.S., ISAF,
and Afghan security forces are higher. While some normal
activities have returned to Helmand, insurgent intimidation and
violence continues to threaten governance and development in
the south. The Karzai Government has yet to deliver services to
win allegiances locally. Recent reports suggest that
Afghanistan's Tajik and Uzbek minorities are concerned about
President Karzai's overtures to Taliban leaders through
Pakistani intermediaries.
At our hearing 2 weeks ago, General Petraeus emphasized
that ``a counterinsurgency operation is a roller coaster
experience,'' but he said that, in his view, the trajectory,
``has generally been upward, despite the tough losses.''
I have long believed that the number-one mission in
Afghanistan is building the capacity of the Afghan security
forces to be able to take increasing responsibility for their
country's security. General Petraeus said, 2 weeks ago, that
increasing the size and capacity of the Afghan security forces
is ``central to achieving progress in Afghanistan.''
U.S. and ISAF forces need to focus their resources and
energy on this effort. There is a significant shortfall, still,
of trainers to provide basic instruction to Afghan recruits,
and of mentors to embed with Afghan units in the field.
Building the capacity of the Afghan security forces to
provide security is not simply what we seek, it's what the
Afghan people seek. That's what we were told by a hundred or so
elders at a shura in southern Afghanistan last year. When we
asked them what they wanted the United States to do, they told
us that we should train and equip the Afghan army to provide
for their country's security, and then we should depart.
The 1,600 delegates to the Afghanistan Consultative Peace
Jirga at the beginning of this month adopted a resolution
calling on the international community to ``expedite'' the
training and equipping of the Afghan security forces so that
they can gain the capacity to provide security for their own
country and people.
I remain deeply concerned, however, by reports that there
are relatively few Afghan army troops in the lead in operations
in the south, where fighting is heaviest. The Afghan army now
numbers around 120,000 troops, including over 70,000 combat
troops. In the past, ISAF reported that over half of Afghan
battalions were capable of conducting operations either
independently or with coalition support. However, a recent
report, released just today by the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), finds that the
capability rating system used by the training mission
``overstated operational capabilities of the Afghan security
forces, and has not provided reliable or consistent
assessments.''
ISAF agreed with that report and recently has adopted a new
standard for measuring Afghan capability by which measure
around one-third of Afghan units are now determined to be
effective, with coalition support, in conducting operations.
However, even under that new measure, there are significantly
more Afghan army troops that could lead operations in Kandahar
than the 7,250 Afghan troops now in Kandahar. The level of
Afghan security forces in Kandahar, both army and police, is
scheduled to rise to only 8,500 personnel by the fall,
according to a chart provided by General McChrystal last month.
The influx of ISAF forces in and around Kandahar will outpace
the increase in Afghan forces by October, according to that
same chart.
The current slower pace of operations in Kandahar provides
the opportunity to get more Afghan combat-capable forces south,
to take the lead in operations there. Having the Afghan army in
the lead in operations in Kandahar is the insurgency's worst
nightmare. The Afghan army enjoys the support of the Afghan
people, and they are strong fighters.
Meanwhile, according to a recent New York Times survey,
only 40 percent of Afghans have a favorable view of the United
States. General Petraeus, I hope you will promptly review the
deployment of capable Afghan security forces to try to get more
Afghan troops down to the south and in the lead in operations
there before those operations are accelerated in the field in
the fall.
Finally, a few words about the July 2011 date set by the
President for the beginning of reductions in our combat
presence in Afghanistan. That decision also made clear that the
pace of those reductions would be dependent on circumstances at
that time, and that the United States would continue a strong
strategic commitment to Afghanistan.
That July 2011 date imparts a necessary sense of urgency to
Afghan leaders about the need to take on principal
responsibility for their country's security. We saw in Iraq the
importance of setting dates as a way of spurring action.
President Bush, in November 2008, decided to move all U.S.
forces out of Iraqi cities and towns by June 2009, and to
withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of December 2011.
That decision helped focus the Iraqi Government and military on
the need to take principal responsibility for the security of
their own country. The Afghan success and ours depends on that
happening in Afghanistan, as well.
We've already seen a positive effect of setting the July
2011 date to begin reduction of our troops. Lieutenant General
Caldwell, who commands our training efforts in Afghanistan,
told us that, when President Obama announced the date, the
Afghan leadership made a great effort to reach out to the local
leaders and elders, resulting in a surge in recruits for the
Afghan army. General Petraeus has said that he agrees with the
President's policy, setting that July 2011 date; and indeed, he
told me that, if he ceases to agree, that he would so advise
his Commander in Chief, which, of course, he has a
responsibility to do as a military commander.
It is my hope--and I believe that Senator McCain and other
members of this committee would surely join in this--that we
can vote on General Petraeus's nomination by the end, possibly,
even of today, so that the full Senate can act before the July
4th break.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank our distinguished witness for joining us here
today for a very unexpected and extraordinary hearing.
I want to echo the Chairman in welcoming General Petraeus's
wife, Holly. We all know that General Petraeus, like all of our
fighting men and women, could never do his job for our Nation
without the sacrifice and support of his family. On behalf of
our entire committee, Mrs. Petraeus, we sincerely thank you,
and we think you made a wise decision, more than 34 years ago,
to accept a blind date with a young cadet. [Laughter.]
As I said in our hearing 2 weeks ago, General Petraeus, I
believe you are one of our finest-ever military leaders. I hope
that does not provoke the same reaction as it did then.
[Laughter] But, seriously, we're all grateful for your
willingness to answer the call of service again in yet another
critical mission. You're an American hero, and I am confident
that you will be quickly and overwhelmingly confirmed.
Before I go further, let me say a word of praise for
another American hero, General Stanley McChrystal. He's a man
of unrivaled integrity. What is most impressive about his long
record of military excellence is how much of it remains cloaked
in silence. Few understand fully how General McChrystal
systematically dismantled al Qaeda in Iraq, or how he began to
turn around our failing war in Afghanistan. These achievements,
and others like them, are the true measure of Stanley
McChrystal, and they will earn him an honored place in our
history.
The events that led to this hearing are unexpected and
unfortunate, but they don't mean we are failing in Afghanistan.
I agree with the President, that success in Afghanistan is ``a
vital national interest,'' and I support his decision to adopt
a counterinsurgency strategy backed by more troops and civilian
resources. This is the only viable path to true success, which
I would define as an Afghanistan that is increasingly capable
of governing itself, securing its people, sustaining its own
development, and never again serving as a base for attacks
against America and our allies. In short, the same results we
are slowly seeing emerge today in Iraq.
Before heading out to Iraq 3 years ago, General Petraeus,
you told this committee that the mission was ``hard, but not
hopeless.'' I would characterize our mission in Afghanistan the
same way. Nevertheless, many of the same people who were
defeatist about Iraq are now saying similar things about
Afghanistan. But, Afghanistan is not a lost cause. Afghans do
not want the Taliban back. They're good fighters, and they want
a government that works for them, and works well.
For those who think the Karzai Government is not an
adequate partner, I would remind them that, in 2007, the Maliki
Government in Iraq was not only corrupt, it was collapsed and
complicit in sectarian violence. A weak and compromised local
partner is to be expected in counterinsurgency. That's why
there's an insurgency. The challenge is to support and push our
partners to perform better. That's what we're doing in Iraq,
and that's what we can do in Afghanistan if we make it clear
that, as long as success is possible, we will stay in
Afghanistan to achieve it, as we did with Iraq, not that we
will start to withdraw, no matter what, in July 2011.
I appreciate the President's statement, last week, that
July 2011 is simply a date to ``begin a transition phase to
greater Afghan responsibility.'' For those who doubt the
President's desire and commitment to succeed in Afghanistan,
his nomination of General Petraeus to run this war should cause
them to think twice.
Still, what we need to hear from the President, what our
friends and enemies in Afghanistan and the region need to hear,
is that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan will be
determined solely by conditions on the ground.
Let me explain why I believe the July 2011 date is so
harmful. What we're trying to do in Afghanistan, as in any
counterinsurgency, is to win the loyalty of the population, to
convince people, who may dislike the insurgency, but who may
also distrust their government, that they should line up with
us against the Taliban and al Qaeda. We're asking them to take
a huge risk, and they will be far less willing to run it if
they think we will begin leaving in a year. One U.S. marine put
it this way about the Afghan/Shi'a encounters, ``That's why
they won't work with us,'' she said, ``They say, `You'll leave
in 2011,' and the Taliban will chop their heads off.''
The same goes for the Afghan Government. We're told that
setting a date to begin withdrawing would be an incentive for
the Karzai administration to make better decisions, and to make
them more quickly. I would argue it's having the opposite
effect; it's causing Afghan leaders to hedge their bets on us.
This is not only making the war harder, it's making the war
longer. If the President would say that success in Afghanistan
is our only withdrawal plan, whether we reach it before July
2011 or afterwards, he would make the war more winnable and
hasten the day when our troops can come home with honor, which
is what we all want.
In addition to being harmful, the July 2011 withdrawal date
increasingly looks unrealistic. That date was based on
assumptions made back in December about how much progress we
could achieve in Afghanistan, and how quickly we could achieve
it. But, war never works out the way we assume, as today's
hearing reminds us all too well. Secretary Gates said last
week, ``I believe we are making some progress, but it is slower
and harder than we anticipated.'' I agree. Marjah is largely
``cleared'' of the Taliban, but the ``holding and building'' is
not going as well as planned. Our operation in Kandahar is
getting off to a slower and more difficult start than expected.
The Dutch and Canadian Governments plan to withdraw, soon. It
looks increasingly unlikely that NATO will make its pledge of
10,000 troops. Meanwhile, I think it's safe to say that the
performance of the Afghan Government over the past 7 months is
not as even or as rapid as we had hoped.
None of this is to say that we are failing, or that we will
fail, in Afghanistan; it just means that we need to give our
strategy the necessary time to succeed. We cannot afford to
have a stay-the-course approach to starting our withdrawal in
July 2011, when the facts on the ground are suggesting that we
need more time.
This is all the more essential now, with General Petraeus
assuming command, pending his confirmation. He is proof that we
can win wars, and we need to give him every opportunity, and
remove every obstacle, to win in Afghanistan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
General Petraeus.
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, NOMINEE FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL, AND TO BE COMMANDER,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, AND COMMANDER, U.S.
FORCES AFGHANISTAN
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today, and thank you for the rapid scheduling of this
hearing.
I am, needless to say, humbled and honored to have been
nominated by the President to command the NATO International
Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, and
to have the opportunity, if confirmed, to continue to serve our
Nation, the NATO alliance, our non-NATO coalition partners, and
Afghanistan, in these new capacities.
At the outset, I want to echo your salute to the
extraordinary service of Senator Robert Byrd. With his death,
America clearly has lost a great patriot.
I'd like to begin this morning by also saying a few words
about General Stan McChrystal, someone I've known and admired
for nearly 30 years. General McChrystal has devoted his entire
professional life to the defense of this Nation, and he and his
family have made enormous personal sacrifices during his
lengthy deployments over the past 9 years, in particular. His
contributions during that time were very significant.
I can attest, for example, that the success of the surge in
Iraq would not have been possible without General McChrystal's
exceptional leadership of our Special Mission Unit forces
there. Similarly, the development of the Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC) during his unprecedented tenure
commanding JSOC was extraordinary, as well.
Most importantly, of course, he has made enormous
contributions in leading the coalition endeavor in Afghanistan
over the past year. During that time, he brought impressive
vision, energy, and expertise to the effort there. He made a
huge contribution to the reorientation of our strategy, and was
a central figure in our efforts to get the inputs right in
Afghanistan, to build the organizations needed to carry out a
comprehensive civil/military counterinsurgency campaign, to get
the right leaders in charge of those organizations, to develop
appropriate plans and concepts, and to deploy the resources
necessary to enable the implementation of those plans and
concepts.
We now see some areas of progress amidst the tough fight
ongoing in Afghanistan. Considerable credit for that must go to
Stan McChrystal.
As we take stock of the situation in Afghanistan, it is
important to remember why we are there. We should never forget
that the September 11 attacks were planned in southern
Afghanistan, and that the initial training of the attackers was
carried out in camps in Afghanistan before the attackers moved
on to Germany and then on to U.S. flight schools.
It was, of course, in response to those attacks that a
U.S.-led coalition entered Afghanistan, in late 2001, and
defeated al Qaeda and the Taliban elements that allowed al
Qaeda to establish its headquarters and training camps in
Afghanistan.
In the subsequent years, however, the extremists were able
to regroup, with al Qaeda establishing new sanctuaries in the
tribal areas of Pakistan, and the Taliban and its affiliates
reentering Afghanistan, in an effort to reestablish the control
they once had in much of the country.
In light of those developments, our task in Afghanistan is
clear. Indeed, President Obama has explained America's vital
national interests there, ``We will not,'' he has stated,
``tolerate a safe haven for terrorists who want to destroy
Afghan security from within and launch attacks against innocent
men, women, and children in our country and around the world.''
In short, we cannot allow al Qaeda or other transnational
extremist elements to once again establish sanctuaries from
which they can launch attacks on our homeland or on our allies.
Achieving that objective, however, requires that we not
only counter the resurgent Taliban elements who allowed such
sanctuaries in the past, we must also help our Afghan partners
develop their security forces and governance capacity so that
they can, over time, take on the tasks of securing their
country and seeing to the needs of their people.
The United States is not alone in seeing the task in
Afghanistan as a vital national interest. Indeed, 46 countries,
including our own, are providing forces to the ISAF coalition,
and others, like Japan, provide vital economic assistance.
Earlier this year, our NATO allies and other coalition
partners committed well over 9,000 additional troopers to the
effort; approximately 60 percent of those additional forces are
currently in place, and, when the rest are deployed, they'll
bring the number of non-U.S. forces in Afghanistan to over
50,000. That expansion takes place as we are in the final
months of deploying the 30,000 additional U.S. troopers, a
deployment that is slightly ahead of schedule, and that will
bring the total number of U.S. servicemembers in Afghanistan to
nearly 100,000 by the end of August. Notably, this number will
be more than three times the number of U.S. forces on the
ground in early 2009.
Complementing the military buildup has been the tripling of
the U.S. civilian structure in Afghanistan with substantial
additional numbers still deploying. This is essential for, as
the President has made clear, the campaign in Afghanistan must
be a fully integrated civil/military effort, one that includes
an unshakable commitment to teamwork among all elements of the
U.S. Government, as well as unshakable commitment to teamwork
with members of other NATO and coalition governments and the
United Nations (U.N.) assistance mission in Afghanistan, as
well as, of course, members of the Afghan Government itself. I
will seek to contribute to such teamwork and to unity of effort
among all participants.
We know, in fact, that we can achieve such unity of effort,
because we've done it before. During my more than 19 months in
command of the Multinational Force-Iraq, I worked very closely
with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, members of the U.S. Embassy, the
U.N. Special Representative, and representatives of the
embassies of key coalition partners, and we all worked closely
together with our Iraqi partners.
I look forward to working just as closely with Ambassador
Karl Eikenberry and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul; Ambassador Mark
Sedwill, the NATO senior civilian representative; Staffan de
Mistura, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary
General, the same position he held in Baghdad; Ambassador
Vygaudas Usackas, the European Union (EU) Special
Representative; and, most importantly, of course, with
President Karzai and members of the Afghan Government. Indeed,
I've talked, in recent days, with all of these members of the
team, including President Karzai, as well as with Ambassador
Holbrooke, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan. We are all firmly united in seeking to forge unity of
effort.
As I noted in my testimony before this committee 2 weeks
ago, I was part of the process that helped formulate the
President's strategy for Afghanistan, and I support and agree
with his new policy. During its development, I offered my
forthright military advice, and I have assured the President
that I will do the same as we conduct assessments over the
course of the months ahead. He, in turn, assured me that he
expects and wants me to provide that character of advice.
As I also explained to this committee 2 weeks ago, I
specifically agreed with the messages of greater commitment and
greater urgency that the President expressed in his address at
West Point in December, when he announced the new policy. As
you'll recall, the greater commitment was explained in terms of
the additional 30,000 U.S. forces, the tripling of the number
of U.S. civilians, and the funding for an additional 100,000
Afghan security force members. The greater urgency was
highlighted by the President announcing the intent to begin a
process, in July 2011, of transitioning tasks to Afghan forces
and officials, and of beginning what the President termed ``a
responsible drawdown of the U.S. surge forces,'' with the pace
of both the transition of tasks and the drawdown of forces to
be based on conditions on the ground.
It is important to note the President's reminder, in recent
days, that July 2011 will mark the beginning of a process, not
the date when the U.S. heads for the exits and turns out the
lights. As he explained, this past Sunday, in fact, we'll need
to provide assistance to Afghanistan for a long time to come.
Moreover, as President Karzai has recognized, and as a
number of allied leaders noted at the recent G-20 summit, it is
going to be a number of years before Afghan forces can truly
handle the security tasks in Afghanistan on their own. The
commitment to Afghanistan is necessarily, therefore, an
enduring one, and neither the Taliban nor Afghan and Pakistani
partners should doubt that.
Our efforts in Afghanistan have, appropriately, focused on
protecting the population. This is, needless to say, of
considerable importance, for, in counterinsurgency operations,
the human terrain is the decisive terrain. The results in
recent months have been notable. Indeed, over the last 12
weeks, the number of innocent civilians killed in the course of
military operations has been substantially lower than it was
during the same period last year. I will continue the emphasis
on reducing the loss of innocent civilian life to an absolute
minimum in the course of military operations.
Focusing on securing the people does not, however, mean
that we don't go after the enemy. In fact, protecting the
population inevitably requires killing, capturing, or turning
the insurgents. Our forces have been doing that, and we will
continue to do that. In fact, our troopers and our Afghan
partners have been very much taking the fight to the enemy in
recent months. Since the beginning of April alone, more than
130 middle- and upper-level Taliban and other extremist-element
leaders have been killed or captured, and thousands of their
rank-and-file members have been taken off the battlefield.
Together with our Afghan partners, we will continue to pursue,
relentlessly, the enemies of the new Afghanistan in the months
and years ahead.
On a related note, I want to assure the mothers and fathers
of those fighting in Afghanistan that I see it as a moral
imperative to bring all assets to bear to protect our men and
women in uniform and the Afghan security forces with whom ISAF
troopers are fighting, shoulder to shoulder. Those on the
ground must have all the support they need when they are in a
tough situation. This is so important that I have discussed it
with President Karzai, Afghan Defense Minister Wardak, and
Afghan Interior Minister, Bismullah Kahn, newly approved
yesterday, since my nomination to be Commander, ISAF, and they
are in full agreement with me on this.
I mention this because I am keenly aware of concerns by
some of our troopers on the ground about the application of our
rules of engagement and the tactical directive. They should
know that I will look very hard at this issue.
Along with you and other members of this committee, Mr.
Chairman, I recognize that enduring success in Afghanistan will
require the development of Afghan national security forces in
sufficient numbers and sufficient quality. This is, of course,
hugely important and hugely challenging. Indeed, helping to
train and equip host-nation forces in the midst of an
insurgency is akin to building an advanced aircraft while it is
in flight, while it is being designed, and while it is being
shot at. There is nothing easy about it. But, our efforts in
this important area have been overhauled in the past year, and
those efforts are now broadly on track, for the first time, to
achieve overall approved growth goals and to improve Afghan
security force quality, as well.
Indeed, Afghan security force development has been advanced
considerably by partnering efforts that were expanded under
General McChrystal's command by the establishment of the NATO
Training Mission Afghanistan and by the appointment of
Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell to command that organization.
Despite the progress in recent months in Afghan security
force development, there is considerable work, nonetheless, to
be done to reduce attrition further and to develop effective
leaders, especially with respect to the Afghan National Police.
Further progress will take even greater partnering, additional
training improvements, fuller manning of the training and
mentoring missions, and expanded professional education
opportunities. Initiatives are being pursued in each of these
areas.
Recent salary and benefits initiatives are helping to
improve recruiting and retention of Afghan security forces.
Training capacity has been increased significantly, and the
density of trainers to trainees has been increased from 1
trainer per 79 trainees to 1 trainer for 30 trainees. The
unprecedented intensity of our teamwork with the Afghan forces
is also beginning to show results.
Today, Afghan military headquarters typically are colocated
with ISAF unit headquarters, sometimes even sharing the same
operating centers. Nearly 85 percent of the Afghan National
Army (ANA) is now fully partnered with ISAF forces for
operations in the field. In short, ISAF and Afghan forces train
together, plan operations together, and fight together.
Furthermore, I should note that Afghan forces are now in
the lead in Kabul and in a number of other areas. In such
cases, Afghan units are now the supported forces, operating
with significant assistance from ISAF, to be sure, but already
shouldering the responsibilities of leadership.
An excellent example of this was the recovery operation for
the Pamir Airways crash north of Kabul last month. Afghan
border police found the site. Recovery operations were planned,
coordinated, and executed jointly by the Afghan Ministry of
Defense and Ministry of Interior at the Afghan National
Military Coordination Center. The recovery operation, at an
elevation of more than 12,500 feet, was executed by Afghan
helicopter crews and Afghan commandos. Even the media, in
information issues, were handled by Afghan personnel. That case
is, to be sure, not the norm throughout Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, the Afghan security forces are very much in the
fight and sacrificing for their country, and nothing reflects
this more than the fact that their losses are typically several
times ours.
There is no question that levels of violence in Afghanistan
have increased significantly over the last several years.
Moreover, the Taliban and its affiliates had, until this year,
steadily been expanding the areas they control and influence.
This year, however, ISAF has achieved progress in several
locations. The initial main effort has been in the central
Helmand River Valley, and Afghan, U.S., and United Kingdom
(U.K.) forces have expanded security there, though,
predictably, the enemy has fought back as we have taken away
his sanctuaries in the districts of Marjah, Nad-i-Ali, Nawa,
Lashkar, and elsewhere. Nothing has been easy in those
operations, but, 6 months ago, we could not have walked through
the market in Marjah, as I was able to do with the district
governor there, 2 months ago.
We are now increasing our focus on Kandahar Province, an
area of considerable importance to the Taliban. We're working
hard to ensure that our operations there are based on a strong,
integrated civil-military, and Afghan-international approach to
security, governance, and development. So-called ``shaping
operations,'' including a high tempo of targeted Special Forces
operations, have been ongoing for some months. President Karzai
and his ministers have also conducted shura councils and a
number of other political initiatives focused on increasing the
sense of inclusivity and transparency in the province, elements
of the way ahead that are essential, and have been stressed by
President Karzai.
In the months ahead, we'll see an additional U.S. brigade,
from the great 101st Airborne Division, deploy into the
districts around Kandahar City, where it will operate together
with an additional Afghan army brigade. We'll see the
introduction of additional Afghan police and U.S. military
police to secure the city itself, along with other U.S. forces
and civilians who will work together with the impressive
Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team that has been
operating in the city.
The combination of all these initiatives is intended to
slowly but surely establish the foundation of security that can
allow the development of viable local political structures,
enable the improvement of basic services, and help Afghan
leaders and local governance achieve legitimacy and greater
support by the Kandaharis.
While relentless pursuit of the Taliban will be critical in
Kandahar and elsewhere, we know, from Iraq and other
counterinsurgency experiences, that we cannot kill or capture
our way out of an industrial-strength insurgency like that in
Afghanistan. Clearly, as many insurgents and citizens as
possible need to be convinced to become part of the solution
rather than a continuing part of the problem.
The National Consultative Peace Jirga, conducted in Kabul
several weeks ago, was an important initiative in this arena.
The reintegration policy that President Karzai signed today--
and I talked to him about it on the way here this morning--will
be critical to the effort to convince reconcilable elements of
the insurgency to lay down their weapons and support the new
Afghanistan. We look forward to working with our Afghan and
diplomatic partners in implementing this newly signed policy.
Recent months in Afghanistan have, as you noted, Mr.
Chairman, seen tough fighting and tough casualties. This was
expected. Indeed, as I noted in testimony last year and again
earlier this year, the going inevitably gets tougher before it
gets easier when a counterinsurgency operation tries to reverse
insurgent momentum.
My sense is that the tough fighting will continue; indeed,
it may get more intense in the next few months. As we take away
the enemy's safe havens and reduce the enemy's freedom of
action, the insurgents will fight back.
In the face of the tough fighting, however, we must
remember that progress is possible in Afghanistan, because we
have already seen a fair amount of it, in a variety of
different forms, beyond the recent security gains. For example,
nearly 7 million Afghan children are now in school, as opposed
to less than 1 million, a decade ago, under Taliban control.
Immunization rates for children have gone up substantially and
are now in the 70- to 90-percent range nationwide. Cell phones
are ubiquitous in a country that had virtually none during the
Taliban days, though the Taliban does try to shut down some of
those towers at night; and does it, as well.
Kabul is a bustling, busy city, as are Herat, Mazar-e-
Sharif, and Jalalabad. Roads and bridges and other
infrastructure have been repaired or built. Commerce is
returning to those parts of Helmand where ISAF and Afghan
forces are present.
Even in places where governance remains weak, innovative
efforts, like the Afghan Government's National Solidarity
Program, supported by American and international civilians, as
well as by our troopers, have helped enable local shura
councils to choose their own development priorities, and
receive modest cash grants to pursue them.
Enabling further such progress, though, and successfully
implementing the President's policy, will require that our work
in Afghanistan is fully resourced. It is essential for the
conduct of this mission, for example, that the supplemental
funding measure now before Congress be passed. This committee
and the Senate have passed it, and it was heartening to hear
Speaker Pelosi's call, last week, for the House to do the same,
expeditiously.
Beyond that, as always, I also ask for your continued
support for the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP).
CERP-funded projects are often the most responsive and
effective means to address a local community's needs; indeed,
CERP is often the only tool to address pressing requirements in
areas where security is challenged. Our commanders value CERP
enormously, and they appreciate your appropriating funds for
CERP each year.
As I close, I'd like to once again note the extraordinary
work being done by our troopers on the ground in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and elsewhere around the world. Our young men and women
truly deserve the recognition they have earned as America's new
greatest generation. There is no question that they comprise
the finest, most combat-hardened military in our Nation's
history.
There is also no question that they and their families have
made enormous sacrifices since September 11, in particular.
Many of them have deployed on multiple tours to perform
difficult missions under challenging circumstances against
tough, even barbaric, enemies. We cannot, in my view, ever
thank our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
coastguardsmen enough, but what Americans have done to support
those in uniform and our deployed civilians has been truly
wonderful. Indeed, nothing has meant more to our troopers and
their families than the appreciation of those here at home.
As you noted, Mr. Chairman, my wife, Holly, is here with me
today. She is a symbol of the strength and dedication of
families around the globe who wait at home for their loved ones
while they're engaged in critical work in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and elsewhere. She has hung tough while I've been deployed for
over 5\1/2\ years since September 11. So have untold other
spouses, children, and loved ones, as their troopers have
deployed and continued to raise their right hands, time and
time again. Clearly, our families are the unsung heroes of the
long campaigns on which we have been embarked over the past
decade.
One of America's greatest Presidents, Teddy Roosevelt, once
observed that, ``Far and away the best prize that life has to
offer is the chance to work hard at work worth doing.'' There
are currently nearly 140,000 coalition troopers and over
235,000 Afghan security force members engaged in hard work very
much worth doing in Afghanistan. If I am confirmed by the
Senate, it will be a great privilege to soldier with them in
that hard work that is so worth doing in that country.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Petraeus.
Let me, since we now have a quorum, take care of some
important committee business. I would ask the committee now to
consider a list of 3,839 pending military nominations, included
in this list are the nominations of General Raymond Odierno to
be Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and Lieutenant General
Lloyd Austin to be Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq. These
nominations have been before the committee the required length
of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report those nominations?
Senator Lieberman. So moved.
Chairman Levin. A second?
Senator McCain. Second.
Chairman Levin. All those in favor, say aye. [Chorus of
ayes.]
Opposed, nay. [No response.]
The motions carry.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on June 29, 2010.
1. In the Air Force, there are 2,990 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Jeremy C. Aamold) (Reference No. 1519).
2. Capt. Margaret A. Rykowski, USNR, to be rear admiral (lower
half) (Reference No. 1527).
3. Capt. Gregory C. Horn, USNR, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1528).
4. Capt. Paula C. Brown, USNR, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1529).
5. BG Rex C. McMillian, USMCR, to be major general (Reference No.
1569).
6. RADM(lh) Alton L. Stocks, USN, to be rear admiral (Reference No.
1596).
7. RADM(lh) William A. Brown, USN, to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1598).
8. Capt. Elaine C. Wagner, USN, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1601).
9. Capt. Colin G. Chinn, USN, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1602).
10. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Willie L. Metts) (Reference No.
1625).
11. Capt. Thomas H. Bond, Jr., USN, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1627).
12. In the Air Force, there are 125 appointments to be major (list
begins with Mark J. Aguiar) (Reference No. 1661).
13. In the Air Force, there are 47 appointments to be lieutenant
colonel (list begins with Verona Boucher) (Reference No. 1664).
14. In the Navy Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
captain (Lynn A. Oschmann) (Reference No. 1688).
15. In the Navy Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
captain (Diane C. Boettcher) (Reference No. 1689).
16. In the Navy Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade
of captain (list begins with Stephen J. Lepp) (Reference No. 1690).
17. In the Navy Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
captain (Caroline M. Gaghan) (Reference No. 1691).
18. In the Navy Reserve, there are five appointments to the grade
of captain (list begins with David W. Howard) (Reference No. 1692).
19. In the Navy Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Kevin A. Askin) (Reference No. 1693).
20. In the Navy Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
of captain (list begins with John B. Holt) (Reference No. 1694).
21. In the Navy Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
captain (Jeffrey S. Tandy) (Reference No. 1695).
22. In the Navy Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
of captain (list begins with Russell L. Coons) (Reference No. 1696).
23. In the Navy Reserve, there are 12 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Kevin P. Bennett) (Reference No. 1697).
24. In the Navy Reserve, there are 15 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Richard A. Balzano) (Reference No. 1698).
25. In the Navy Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade
of captain (list begins with John T. Archer) (Reference No. 1699).
26. In the Navy Reserve, there are 18 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Steven T. Beldy) (Reference No. 1700).
27. In the Navy Reserve, there are 72 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with James D. Beardsley) (Reference No. 1701).
28. RADM(lh) Samuel J. Cox, USN, to be rear admiral (Reference No.
1718).
29. RADM(lh) Michael S. Rogers, USN, to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1719).
30. RADM(lh) David G. Simpson, USN, to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1720).
31. RADM(lh) David A. Dunaway, USN, to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1721).
32. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Terry J. Benedict) (Reference No. 1722).
33. In the Navy, there are three appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Lloyd P. Brown, Jr.) (Reference No. 1737).
34. In the Navy, there are 19 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Danny K. Busch) (Reference No. 1738).
35. In the Navy, there are 14 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with William S. Dillon) (Reference No. 1739).
36. In the Navy, there are five appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Nora A. Burghardt) (Reference No. 1740).
37. In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Bruce J. Black) (Reference No. 1741).
38. In the Navy, there are 12 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Chad F. Acey) (Reference No. 1742).
39. In the Navy, there are 21 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with James S. Biggs) (Reference No. 1743).
40. In the Navy, there are five appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Richard W. Haupt) (Reference No. 1744).
41. In the Navy, there are five appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Edward A. Bradfield) (Reference No. 1745).
42. In the Navy, there are four appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Brian D. Connon) (Reference No. 1746).
43. In the Navy, there are four appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Conrado K. Alejo) (Reference No. 1747).
44. In the Navy, there are nine appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Eric D. Cheney) (Reference No. 1748).
45. In the Navy, there are 169 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with James A. Aiken) (Reference No. 1749).
46. Capt. James H. Rodman, Jr., USNR, to be rear admiral (lower
half) (Reference No. 1751).
47. Capt. Victor M. Beck, USNR, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1752).
48. Capt. Gerald W. Clusen, USNR, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1753).
49. Capt. Bryan P. Cutchen, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1754).
50. In the Navy Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade
of rear admiral (lower half) (list begins with Kelvin N. Dixon)
(Reference No. 1755).
51. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain
(James R. Peltier) (Reference No. 1787).
52. In the Navy, there are 76 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Joseph C. Aquilina) (Reference No. 1788).
53. In the Navy, there are 13 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Stephen G. Alfano) (Reference No. 1789).
54. In the Navy, there are 27 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Christopher A. Blow) (Reference No. 1790).
55. In the Navy, there are 11 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Jeffrey A. Fischer) (Reference No. 1791).
56. In the Navy, there are 25 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Catherine A. Bayne) (Reference No. 1792).
57. In the Navy, there are 23 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with John D. Brughelli) (Reference No. 1793).
58. In the Navy, there are 13 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Billy M. Appleton) (Reference No. 1794).
59. In the Navy, there are 12 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Eric M. Aaby) (Reference No. 1795).
60. LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, to be general and Commander, U.S.
Forces-Iraq (Reference No. 1800).
61. GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, to be general and Commander, U.S.
Joint Forces Command (Reference No. 1818).
62. RADM(lh) Scott A. Weikert, USNR, to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1819).
63. RADM(lh) Patricia E. Wolfe, USNR, to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1820).
64. RADM(lh) Donald R. Gintzig, USNR, to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1821).
65. RADM(lh) Steven M. Talson, USNR, to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1822).
66. RADM(lh) Lothrop S. Little, USNR, to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1823).
67. In the Navy Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
of rear admiral (list begins with Garry J. Bonelli) (Reference No.
1824).
68. LTG Francis H. Kearney III, USA, to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Director for Strategic Operational Planning Directorate,
National Counter Terrorism Center (Reference No. 1827).
69. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Axel L. Steiner) (Reference No. 1841).
70. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander
(Clifford R. Shearer) (Reference No. 1842).
71. In the Marine Corps, there are five appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Adam M. King) (Reference No. 1843).
Total: 3,839.
Chairman Levin. Now, General, we ask standard questions of
all nominees that come before us. The standard questions are as
follows:
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Petraeus. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
General Petraeus. I do.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Petraeus. I have not.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Petraeus. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to the congressional requests?
General Petraeus. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Petraeus. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
General Petraeus. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Finally, do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Petraeus. I do.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Let us try a 7-minute first round for questioning.
General, you've commented on these questions in your
testimony, and I want to ask them again, to get very clear,
direct answers to them.
Two fundamental elements of the Afghanistan strategy that
the President announced in December 2009 are, first, a surge of
30,000 additional U.S. troops by the end of the summer, to help
regain the initiative; and, second, the setting of a July 2011
date for the beginning of reduction in our combat presence in
Afghanistan, with the pace of a reasonable drawdown to be
determined by the circumstances at that time.
Do you agree with the President's policy?
General Petraeus. I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that the setting of that July
2011 date to begin reductions signals urgency to Afghan leaders
that they must more and more take responsibility for their
country's security which is important for success of the
mission in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. I do.
Chairman Levin. In a report released this morning, the
SIGAR concluded that the way ISAF has been measuring the
capability of the Afghan security forces was flawed. The ISAF
command basically agreed and has revised its approach for
measuring the capability of Afghan forces. With the revised
approach, ISAF figures, now, that 30 percent of Afghan forces
are assessed to be effective, with coalition support.
At the end of May, there were some 120,000 Afghan army
troops, including at least 70,000 combat troops. Taking just
this lower combat troop level, that would mean that around
25,000 Afghan troops can operate effectively, with coalition
support. Yet, according to figures provided in your answers to
advance policy questions, General, the Afghan army has only
around 7,250 Afghan army soldiers present for duty in Kandahar
Province, which is so central to success in Afghanistan. Now,
that's less than one-third of the effective Afghan forces that
are available.
Would you agree, first of all, that the Afghan army has
broad popular support, and that the Afghan people want the
Afghan army to be taking the lead, where possible, to provide
security?
General Petraeus. I would.
Chairman Levin. Would you also agree the Afghan army are
excellent fighters?
General Petraeus. By and large. Again, you'd need to walk
your way around the country and discuss them a little bit more
granularly, but that's generally correct.
Chairman Levin. As a general statement.
General Petraeus. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that it is in our interest,
and it's in the interest of a successful outcome in
Afghanistan, to increase the number of Afghan units who can
lead, to take the lead in operations?
General Petraeus. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Why is that?
General Petraeus. We want them doing the fighting, rather
than us, obviously.
Chairman Levin. What about the reaction of the Afghan
people to the----
General Petraeus. That's another piece of it. Again, we
want Afghan ownership of Afghan problems, whether it's security
problems, political problems, economic problems, you name it.
That's part and parcel of that, obviously.
Chairman Levin. General, will you review the--and I'm not
going to keep asking you ``if confirmed,'' because I'm going to
assume that, with all these questions--so, I'm going to say,
``when confirmed,'' will you review the--you're not allowed to
assume confirmation, by the way, but I am allowed to assume
confirmation----[Laughter.]
So, when confirmed, will you review the deployments of
forces in Afghanistan, to see how more Afghan army and police
forces can be brought in to increase the number of Afghan
security forces in Kandahar, to take the lead in that campaign?
General Petraeus. If confirmed, I will do that, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Petraeus. If not, I'll do it as the CENTCOM
Commander. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. One way or another, we're going to count on
you to do that. [Laughter.]
Earlier this month, General McChrystal announced that he
was slowing the operations of Afghan and ISAF forces in and
around Kandahar to allow more time for discussions with local
leaders, and to try to get more of their buy-in, as well, try
to get better governance, as well. ISAF taking additional time
in Kandahar should mean that we will have more Afghan-led
operations in a few months. I'm just wondering whether or not
you would agree that, since we have slowed, somewhat, the pace
of operations of Afghan and ISAF forces in and around Kandahar,
that will present an opportunity, at least, to bring in more
Afghan forces capable of leading in the Kandahar campaign
during this period.
General Petraeus. In fact, Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in
my opening statement, there is a plan to deploy an additional
Afghan army brigade to partner with the additional U.S.
brigade, and also additional Afghan police battalions and
individual police, as well.
Chairman Levin. If there are possibilities to increase the
numbers of Afghan troops that can lead, above that plan, will
you also take a look at that?
General Petraeus. I will.
Chairman Levin. Do you know off-hand how many Afghan troops
there will be in Kandahar by September?
General Petraeus. I think that it will be in the range of
7,500 to 8,000 at that time.
Chairman Levin. What about in Helmand?
General Petraeus. Let me answer that for the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. All right.
[The information referred to follows:]
We currently estimate that there will be 6,835 Afghan National
Security Forces troops in Helmand Province in September 2010.
Chairman Levin. Let me mention to you--and that's fine--the
figures that your office provided to my staff last evening were
somewhat surprising in that regard, and I want you just to
doublecheck those figures for us.
General Petraeus. I will do that.
Chairman Levin. They showed that there is a total of 40,000
Afghan and coalition security forces in Helmand, while there's
only a total of about 11,000 in Kandahar. If you could
doublecheck those figures and explain why there's so many fewer
combined forces in Kandahar than in Helmand, since Kandahar is
really going to be the central effort--if you could take a look
at those numbers and explain that, for the record, I'd
appreciate it.
General Petraeus. Happy to do that.
[The information referred to follows:]
As of July 2010, there are approximately 4,700 International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and 7,550 Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) troops in Kandahar City in support of Operation Hamkari
for a total of approximately 12,250. In September 2010, we estimate
that there will be 7,000 ISAF and 9,470 ANSF troops for approximately
16,470 total security forces.
Chairman Levin. The press reported, last week, that
Pakistani officials have approached the Karzai Government with
a proposal that includes delivering the Haqqani network, which
runs a major part of the insurgency in Afghanistan and is an
ally of al Qaeda, into a power-sharing arrangement.
Now, President Obama and Central Intelligence Agency
Director Panetta have expressed skepticism about the likelihood
that Taliban leaders would accept such a proposal, but the
President also noted that attempts to draw Afghanistan and
Pakistan interests closer together is a useful step.
I'm wondering whether you share Director Panetta's
skepticism about the potential for Pakistan to broker a
reconciliation deal between the Taliban leadership and the
Afghan Government at this time.
General Petraeus. Let me just say, first of all, just an
interesting item. In talking to President Karzai in the vehicle
on the way over here, he assured me that he has not met with a
Haqqani group leader, by the way, in recent days or I think, at
any time.
Now, with respect to Pakistani involvement in some form of
reconciliation agreement, I think that is essential. Now,
whether that is possible, such an agreement, I think is going
to depend on a number of factors that will play out over the
course of the summer, including creating a sense, among the
Taliban, that they are going to get hammered in the field, and
perhaps should look at some options.
Now, we have already seen cases where lower- and mid-level
Taliban leaders have, indeed, sought to reintegrate, and there
have been more in recent days. Small numbers, here and there.
The reintegration decree, that was approved by President Karzai
today, will help codify the process for this. That should help.
Again, as you'll recall in Iraq, we did a substantial amount of
reconciliation. But, whether or not very senior leaders can
meet the very clear conditions that the Afghan Government has
laid down for reconciliation, I think, is somewhat in question.
In that regard, I agree with Director Panetta.
But, clearly we want to forge a partnership or further the
partnership that has been developing between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Those countries are always going to be neighbors, and
helping them develop a constructive relationship would be an
important contribution.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, General. Just to follow up,
obviously the key to success in reconciling with the Taliban is
to first convince the Taliban that they cannot succeed,
militarily, in prevailing. It's also true that the majority of
the people of Afghanistan are in opposition to a Taliban return
to power. Is that correct?
General Petraeus. It is.
Senator McCain. There's no doubt about that.
General Petraeus. There's no love lost for the Taliban.
They remember the barbaric activities, the oppressive social
practices, and the extremist ideology practiced by the Taliban,
and there's no love for them.
Senator McCain. So, you could interpret that, in some ways,
as an advantage over the situation you found in Iraq at the
beginning of the surge?
General Petraeus. That's correct, Senator, although over
time we were able to hang around the neck of al Qaeda in Iraq
the same kinds of labels--extremist ideology, oppressive
practices, and so forth. Indeed, those weighed them down every
time they carried out another act of indiscriminate violence,
as the Taliban have done. We obviously will work with our
Afghan partners to ensure that the Afghan people know who has
been killing the vast majority of the civilians in that
country.
Senator McCain. Is Marjah going as well now as we hoped
last December?
General Petraeus. Probably not as well as the optimistic
assessments. Now, again, I think I'm very clearly on the
record--last year, this year, and so forth--in stating that
this is going to be hard, and it was going to be hard all the
time.
Senator McCain. Right.
General Petraeus. The truth is, I'm not surprised by these
kinds of challenges.
Senator McCain. I'm not either. In Kandahar, we're not
where we had wanted to be 7 months ago, and the Afghan
Government isn't performing as well as we had expected. Would
you agree with Secretary Gates' comment, ``We are making some
progress, but it is slower and harder than we anticipated''?
General Petraeus. I would.
Senator McCain. Do you agree with that statement?
General Petraeus. I would, Senator.
Senator McCain. That argues, then, for a reassessment of
the July 2011 commitment to begin a withdrawal.
Let me tell you why Americans are confused, and why our
allies are discouraged and our enemies are encouraged. As short
a time ago as Sunday before last, the President's chief
advisor, Rahm Emanuel, said, ``Everybody knows there's a firm
date. What will be determined that date, or going into that
date, will be the scale and scope of that reduction, but there
will be no doubt that's going to happen. July 2011 is not
changing. Everybody agreed on that date.''
David Axelrod, June 13, ``He is committed to begin that
process of withdrawal in July of next year, and that continues
to be the plan, and we're going to pursue that on that
schedule.''
Mr. Alter, in his book, said, ``This would not be a 5- to
7-year nation-building commitment, much less an open-ended one.
The timeframe the military was offering for both getting in and
getting out must shrink dramatically, he''--Obama--``said.
There would be no nationwide counterinsurgency strategy. The
Pentagon was to present a targeted plan for protecting
population centers, training Afghan security forces, and
beginning a real, not a token, withdrawal within 18 months of
the escalation.''
That's why people are confused, I would say, General. I
know you're put in the position where you have to say that it's
based on conditions.
Last January, a few of us were in Arghandab Province. We
met an old tribal leader, who entertained us with stories, how
they beat the Russians. He turned to me, and he said, ``Are you
Americans staying, or are you leaving, like you did last
time?''
I quote from an article in today's New York Times--``A
senior American intelligence official said the Taliban had
effectively used their deadline to their advantage. He added
that the deadline had encouraged Pakistani security services to
`hedge their bets and continue supporting groups like the
Haqqani network. They've been burned before, and they've seen
this movie before,' the official said.''
That's the problem here, in whether we are going to prevail
and convince the people of Afghanistan to come over to our side
and to stand up against the Taliban, rather than, as the
military person said, ``They say you'll leave in 2011. The
Taliban will chop their heads off.'' It's frustrating.
General, at any time during the deliberations that the
military shared with the President when he went through the
decisionmaking process, was there a recommendation from you or
anyone in the military that we set a date of July 2011?
General Petraeus. There was not.
Senator McCain. There was not. By any military person that
you know of.
General Petraeus. Not that I'm aware of.
Senator McCain. I thank you.
Do you think that it's of concern, the situation with
Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), continuing
to work with the Taliban?
General Petraeus. Again, what we have to always figure out,
with Pakistan, Senator, is, are they working with the Taliban
to support the Taliban or to recruit sources in the Taliban?
That's the difficulty, frankly, in trying to assess what the
ISI is doing in some of their activities in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, in contacts with the Haqqani network
or the Afghan Taliban.
There are no questions about the longstanding links. Let's
remember that we funded the ISI to build these organizations,
when they were the Mujahideen and helping to expel the Soviets
from Afghanistan. Certainly residual links would not be a
surprise. The question is what the character of those links is,
and what the activities are behind them.
Senator McCain. Obviously, one of the biggest problems
we're facing is corruption. There's a Wall Street Journal
article of June 28, 2010, ``Corruption Suspected in Airlift of
Billions in Cash from Kabul.'' Do you have anything to tell us
about that, what is one of the more disturbing news reports
that I have seen?
General Petraeus. There have been actions taken--this
spring, in fact--by the Afghan Government, the establishment of
new anticorruption bodies, the prosecution of certain cases,
and also, on our side, for example, the establishment of a Task
Force 2010, headed by a two-star naval contracting officer, she
commanded the Joint Contracting Command that supported us in
Iraq, which is going to examine where the contract money is
going--not only who are the subcontractors, but who are the
subs to the subcontractors, and so forth.
President Karzai has committed to supporting this effort.
I've discussed it with him in the past, and we will obviously
focus on it intently, if confirmed.
Senator McCain. I'm sure you may have seen that this
committee, the majority decided that we would cut a billion
dollars from aid to Iraq military and put in earmarked
porkbarrel projects. Is that of concern to you, that they would
cut half of the necessary aid to the Iraqi military?
General Petraeus. It is of concern, Senator. We obviously
contributed to the development of that particular request. We
think that money is needed at a critical time in the transition
in Iraq, where we are transitioning from Defense lead on a
number of these different programs to State Department lead. To
do that, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense
forces have to be at certain levels so that that transition can
be successful. Indeed, therefore, there is concern about that.
I know that General Odierno and the Secretary have expressed
that, as well.
Senator McCain. I thank you, General. Again, we're deeply
appreciative of your willingness to serve, and your entire
family.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you, General, not only for your testimony
today, but your service to the Army and to the Nation.
In the course of your colloquy with Senator McCain, you
indicated that you did not make a recommendation with respect
to a deadline. But, your statements indicate you support that
approach. Is that correct?
General Petraeus. That's correct.
Senator Reed. You're fully supportive of the President's
policy, including beginning a transition, based upon the
condition on the ground, in July 2011.
General Petraeus. Let me be very clear, if I could,
Senator. Not only did I say that I supported it, I said that I
agreed with it. This is, again, an agreement that was made
back, of course, in the fall of last year, based on projections
about conditions that we hoped would obtain, that we were going
to strive to achieve in Afghanistan, a full year from now. That
was an 18-month-or-more projection at that time.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, I saw this, most
importantly, as the message of urgency to complement the
message of enormous additional commitment.
Let's remember that it wasn't just this 30,000 additional
forces. The President--and, actually, the previous President
had started some deployment of additional forces before he left
office. But, we started with some 30,000-31,000 U.S. forces in
Afghanistan in 2009, and we will now be approaching 100,000 by
the deployment of the final 30,000. This is a substantial
additional commitment complemented, again, by a message of
urgency.
Senator Reed. In looking forward to next year, when there
is a conditions-based redeployment of forces, we are starting
at a much, much higher base than we've ever had in that
country, in the 8 or 9 years that we engaged. Is that correct?
General Petraeus. It's not just our forces. There will
actually be more NATO forces, and, more importantly, there will
be substantially more Afghan forces. But, again, all based on
projections right now.
Senator Reed. Right.
One of the other aspects of the timeline is--particularly
if the Taliban thought that this was sort of just playing out
our hand and leaving--it raises a question of, why would they
be so active on the ground, militarily?
General Petraeus. They're active on the----
Senator Reed. Their behavior suggests that they believe now
that we're staying, but we're winning or at least we can win.
General Petraeus. It's actually a great point. The reason
they're active on the ground, militarily there's probably a
couple of reasons. One is, they're fighting to retain safe
havens and sanctuaries that they've been able to establish in
recent years. Again, when we take them away, they must retake
them. Marjah was the nexus of the Taliban. It had improvised
explosive device (IED)-producing ``factories,'' if you will,
supplies, headquarters, medical facilities, and the illegal
narcotics industry, all tied into one. They lost a great deal
when they lost Marjah, and it's not surprising that they fight
back.
Now, the other reason, though, is, they're also fighting to
break our will. This is a contest of wills. They can sense
concern in various capitals around the world. Of course, they
want to increase that concern.
Senator Reed. I'll ask the question, given our very
aggressive operations, if we succeed in the next several
months, their ability to be influential within Afghanistan is
severely diminished. Is that correct?
General Petraeus. It is correct. We have insights,
intelligence, into when they're feeling pressure, and they are
feeling pressure right now, there's no question about it--more
in certain areas than others, to be sure, and not to say
they're still not trying to expand, in certain areas, also. As
I mentioned, 2 weeks ago, it is a roller coaster existence.
There are setbacks for every small success. But, what you're
trying to do is determine if the trajectory is generally
upward. That's, indeed, how we see it.
Senator Reed. Going back to Marjah, civilians have returned
after the initial fighting, is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct.
Senator Reed. That they're conducting agricultural
activities and permissible activities.
General Petraeus. They are. As I mentioned, I walked
through Marjah, about 2 months ago, with the district governor.
The market was reopened. We sat there, ate bread that was
produced right there--it was great bread--and chatted with the
locals. Had a lot of security around, of course, but also had
dozens, if not hundreds, of locals around.
Senator Reed. Let me turn to an issue that you alluded to
in your opening statement, General, and that is the rules of
engagement.
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Reed. Could you elaborate? Because this is a very
sensitive balance between providing effective fire support for
troops in contact, and also minimizing, hopefully eliminating,
collateral casualties. Could you comment on it?
General Petraeus. Okay. We must remain committed to
reducing the loss of innocent civilian life to an absolute
minimum in the course of military operations. Tragically,
inevitably, there will be civilian casualties in the course of
operations. Indeed, the Taliban will try to create situations
in which that is the result. It's essential. Again, and
President Karzai knows that I remain committed, continue the
commitment that General McChrystal made in this area.
Now, we have rules of engagement. Those are fairly
standard. We also have a tactical directive that is designed to
guide the employment, in particular, of large casualty-
producing devices--bombs, close air support, attack
helicopters, and so forth. That's an area we have to look very
closely at, because, of course, if you drop a bomb on a house,
if you're not sure who's in it, you can kill a lot of innocent
civilians in a hurry.
Having said that, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
we have to be absolutely certain that the implementation of the
tactical directive and the rules of engagement is even
throughout the force, that there are not leaders at certain
levels that are perhaps making this more bureaucratic or more
restrictive than necessary when our troopers and our Afghan
partners are in a tough spot. When they are in a tough spot,
it's a moral imperative that we use everything we have to
ensure that they get out of it.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
One of the persistent issues here is the lack of
governmental capacity on the part of the Afghanis. In Marjah,
the criticism is, we cleared it, civilians have come back, but
the Afghan Government hasn't come back or established itself. I
know this gets into that gray area between civ-mil and your mil
and there are civilians there. But, one of the structural
defects within the Afghani Government is highly centralized
government, and all the action is in the provinces, which needs
much more effective provincial support, more independent
governance. Is that an issue that you and Ambassador Eikenberry
are going to take to President Karzai, along with our national
security team, to talk about how they can empower local
officials more than have a national ineffectual government?
General Petraeus. Certainly. Again, a key to this is to
helping the reestablishment of viable local social organizing
structures, if you will. As you noted, this is a very
centralized form of government. President Karzai is sensitive
to the challenges that presents at lower levels. He has
empowered governors in certain areas. Actually, interestingly,
Helmand has one of the most active governors in all of
Afghanistan. The challenge there is not one of desire, it's
literally a lack of human capital, and, in particular, human
capital that is willing to go into a really tough spot, like
that in Marjah, when there are many requirements and demands
and folks hiring human capital elsewhere, in locations that are
safer. That's the challenge. But, it is certainly something
that we have to address. It's critical. You must complement the
activities, you must build on the security foundation that our
troopers and Afghan troopers fight so hard to provide.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. My time's expired.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the problem, General, all the discussion we're
having right now, on the withdrawal and the timetable and all
of that, is the mixed message. Frankly, I was relieved, a
little bit, when the President spoke at West Point and he said
it would be conditions on the ground. I think the conditions or
the perception out there is whatever you want it to be. My
perception is that we're not going to be pulling out until the
conditions on the ground would justify it. But, I think the
Taliban probably has the perception of ``cut and run,'' and
that's what they're talking about.
I just would say that I think it's important, as when
you're communicating on the conditions there, that you talk
about, ``Yes, we are in it to win, and conditions on the
ground,'' and certainly there's enough that has been said that
would fortify that position.
General Petraeus. I tried to make that clear in my
statement today when I mentioned that neither the Taliban nor
our Afghan and Pakistani partners should have doubts about our
continuing the fight.
Senator Inhofe. You did. That's good. In your opening
statement, you also talked about the merits of the CERP. I do
appreciate that, because I've seen that in action, I see how it
works. We actually cut that by $300 million, from $1.1 to $0.8
million. Was that a mistake?
General Petraeus. We asked for $1.1 billion because we
believe we need $1.1 billion. We're also aware, though, that we
have not used some of those funds in the past, and we've
returned them. The truth is, though, that all we do is return
them to the Service operation and maintenance account so that
those funds are still used for very valid reasons. But, we
believe that we will need that. That's why we asked for it. We
would hope to get it.
Senator Inhofe. I agree with that.
I was real pleased to hear you mentioned, several times,
your conversations you have had with Karzai. Frankly, I wasn't
aware of that.
General Petraeus. As the CENTCOM Commander, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that.
General Petraeus. In recent days.
Senator Inhofe. I have to say this, though, in the years
that I've been on this committee, and, previous to this, the
House Armed Services Committee, when we go through
confirmations, this is the first time that I've heard the
chairman say ``when confirmed,'' not ``if confirmed.'' So,
let's just keep that in mind.
General Petraeus. We've had, actually, three conversations,
Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir.
General Petraeus. Once right after the nomination and then
two more in recent days, including, as I mentioned, one coming
over today. By the way, he asked that I give my best to
Chairman Levin and Senator McCain. But we were talking, in
fact, about the reintegration decree that he just approved this
morning, which is really quite a positive development, and now
the focus shifting to the Afghan People Protection Program
effort that his national security team is working on.
Senator Inhofe. I think that communications--that's
important, because a lot of people don't realize you have that
relationship. That is very important.
There are a lot of things that have been done in Iraq that
perhaps should be done. I am very comfortable that you're going
to go in and take advantage of that. One of them was this Task
Force Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize that its
objective was to take back the roads. General Petraeus, under
your leadership in Iraq, our forces were using that ``take back
the road'' strategy, combined man and unmanned surveillance
aircraft, and quick reaction teams. The results were great, at
least what I have read, that they have been credited with
killing 3,000 IED emplacers, and capturing 150 high-value
targets. I assume that program has not been taking place in
Afghanistan. Am I correct? Is that something that will work
there? Or is there some condition there that is different than
Iraq?
General Petraeus. There are small components of it. But,
again, we just have to realize that, when you only have 30,000
troops there which is what we had, up until 18 months or so
ago, now this has become the main effort, appropriately, and we
are now seeing that kind of commitment. As the CENTCOM
Commander, and then also with the support of the Secretary and
the President, we provided substantial additional intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Those are among
some of those that you talked about, but many others. This is a
very comprehensive effort when you're trying to get the IED
emplacers.
Senator Inhofe. Is there anything you can think of that you
could share with us that has met some success in Iraq that
would also apply to Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. Many, many things, Senator. We have
shifted substantial numbers of them over there, and others are
still being established.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
General Petraeus. We've done a substantial amount of
infrastructure development. Of course, that's what's necessary,
because you have to have platforms for all of this.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Petraeus. Indeed, we will take the same kind of
approach there that we took in Iraq.
Senator Inhofe. That's good. I think, for the record, it
would be good if you could send us some of these things that
have worked there that perhaps might be worthwhile in
Afghanistan.
General Petraeus. I'd be happy to do that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The biggest lesson learned from the counter improvised explosive
device (IED) fight in Iraq is that it takes a comprehensive approach to
address the problem, and that no one solution or technology alone will
be sufficient. As in Iraq, reducing the IED threat in Afghanistan will
result from a combination of efforts by International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and our Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
partners. The first critical component is that we are increasing the
number of ISAF and ANSF security forces in Regional Commands South and
Southwest. This has already allowed us to secure Marjah, which
previously functioned as an insurgent sanctuary. In fact, there was
significant IED manufacturing infrastructure in Marjah that the Taliban
no longer enjoys access to. As we increase the ring of security around
Kandahar City in Operation Hamkari, we will secure areas to the west
and north of Kandahar that have also served the enemy as critical
sanctuaries. There is no substitute for the persistent presence of ISAF
and Afghan security forces on the ground, living among the population.
The second requirement is to attack the enemy's network. This includes
the leadership, logistics, and transportation components. To this end
we are aggressively targeting and attacking these nodes. Finally, all
of these efforts are enabled by intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and the fusing of this data with
information from other sources. Secretary Gates has placed significant
emphasis on increasing ISR capability in Afghanistan, and the level of
support we have there has more than doubled in the last 12 months. We
are also in the process of fielding a significant number of persistent
surveillance systems.
Senator Inhofe. Quickly, an unnamed military official
stated, recently, ``We're on an Afghan timetable, and the
Afghan timetable is not the American timetable, and that is the
crux of the problem.'' Then, after that, General Mills made the
statement, that I'm sure you recall, talking about, ``I think
we can move faster. We need to impart to our Afghan partners a
sense of urgency. They have to understand there's a timeline.''
The timeline they refer to here, how do you interpret his
statement?
General Petraeus. I've seen this movie before, as well. We
used to talk about the different watches or different clocks
that were out there when I was in Iraq, and you'd hit the
Baghdad clock to see why it was going backwards, or to get it
going forward, and, in the meantime, you were aware that there
were other clocks, including perhaps one up here, that was
moving a bit more rapidly.
This, again, is common to counterinsurgency efforts.
They're tough. There's nothing easy about them, and they aren't
quick.
Senator Inhofe. In 2004, our Oklahoma 45th was over there.
They had the responsibility of training the ANA to train
themselves. I went over there at, you could call it graduation
time. I don't think they call it that.
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Inhofe. But, we watched them in the field. I'm not
sure whether you were there, but you certainly had people
there.
When I looked at the looks on the faces of these guys, they
were very proud that they were taking over. That sense of pride
was obvious. I was there for quite a while, because that 45th
had been training them for a period of time. I received nothing
but glowing reports.
Then we get reports, like the one that has been referred to
here, that was written up yesterday in the New York Times,
where they talk about that the United States used the past 5
years to rate the readiness and so forth, that it wasn't
working. General Caldwell had said that--he was in charge of
the training over there--the report was inaccurate. General
Rodriguez said it was more accurate. I'm sure it's somewhere in
between.
But, in terms of these guys and the expressions on their
faces and the pride that they had, do you think they've lost
some of that, or do you still think that they have the
capability of being great warriors and taking this thing over?
General Petraeus. They are great warriors. But they're in a
tougher fight.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Petraeus. It's easy to stand tall when the enemy
isn't all that significant. Again, we went through this in
Iraq, as well, where the Iraqi security forces not only
relatively went down, they went down absolutely, because they
were so threatened by the deteriorating security conditions.
That's what we have to ensure does not happen in Afghanistan.
If I could, just briefly, about the report by the SIGAR,
the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan--General Arnold
Fields--by the way, with whom I had a very good relationship in
Iraq, when he was in a capacity there--worked very hard to
support in Afghanistan. I think very highly of him, and I will
commit that to him, if confirmed, there, as well.
The capability milestone rating, I think, truthfully, more
has been made of this--all it does is tell you what the levels
of manning, training, and equipping are. It didn't have the
kind of subjective evaluation of fighting, which is really what
you need. It sort of tries to project that, well, they could be
independent, or they can't.
What General Rodriguez, rightly, is referring to is a new
evaluation system that's been brought online as he has gotten
his operational headquarters online, because he's the one who
oversees the fighting. General Caldwell does the training, the
equipping, and the infrastructure, and then provides those
forces, or the Afghans provide the forces, to partner outside
the wire, along with our forces, who are under the command of
General Rodriguez. I think, rightly, he has taken this on, and
you'll get a more--this is a subjective evaluation of, Can they
fight? Can they do it on their own? How much assistance do they
need?--and so forth. I think that's where the debate is,
really. I think General Caldwell trying to point out, rightly,
that, over the course of the last 7 months or so, there's been
substantial progress with the establishment of the NATO
Training Mission Afghanistan and the overhaul of a whole bunch
of processes.
The fact is that what we were doing was recruiting police
and then putting them in the fight. It was basically a recruit-
assign-and-then train-when-you-get-to-it model. That just can't
be. You have to recruit, train, and then assign. The Afghan
Government is fully supportive of that.
There have been quite a few significant changes made with
the advent of the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan and General
Caldwell taking command of it.
Senator Inhofe. That's a very valuable clarification. We
appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to add my welcome to General Petraeus and your wife,
Holly to this hearing.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Senator Akaka. I would like to congratulate you on your
nomination to this very critical position, and also to thank
the men and women that you lead. Their commitment and
dedication is appreciated and honored.
General Petraeus, I understand Secretary Gates to have said
that you will have the flexibility to reconsider the campaign
plan and the approach in Afghanistan. I'm sure that you will
consider many issues as you assess operations in Afghanistan.
General, what are some of the key elements you will look at
in the assessment? Is there anything you plan on changing
immediately?
General Petraeus. Senator, I think the campaign plan is
sound. First of all, I obviously contributed to the President's
policy. At CENTCOM, we supported General McChrystal and
Ambassador Eikenberry as they developed the civil-military
campaign plan to operationalize the President's policy. We
think it is sound. I've been one of those, of course, who
oversees that process.
Again, I will look hard at it, as any new commander does
when he comes in, if confirmed, and see if there are tweaks
needed in various places.
As I did mention in my opening statement, I do think we
have to look at the implementation of the tactical directive
and the rules of engagement. That is something that clearly our
troopers, in some cases, some units, have some concerns about;
and therefore, they are my concerns.
But, by and large, I think that this is more about
executing, now, than it is about redesign. That's why it was
important to hear that President Karzai, as I said, approved
the reintegration policy. This is of enormous significance.
This has been under development for months. It capitalizes on
the National Consultative Peace Jirga that was held, of nearly
2,000--between 1,500-2,000 participants in Kabul, several weeks
ago. It presents a real opportunity, I think. It codifies all
of the processes that we have been waiting for to integrate
those elements of the insurgency who are reconcilable, an
important element of any counterinsurgency effort.
But, by the same token, we will continue to relentlessly
pursue those who are irreconcilable. We will seek to empower
and to secure villages and valleys with local security
initiatives. This is something else that President Karzai and I
discussed, literally on the way over here again this morning.
It's the next big focus that he told me about, that he and his
national security advisor, in fact, discussed yesterday, so
that you have a comprehensive approach. That's what this
takes--everything from the very hard-edged, targeted Special
Mission Unit operations, to the reintegration of reconcilables,
to conventional forces expanding their security zones, in some
cases actually clearing, so that you can then hold and build.
Then also local security initiatives, some of them working
around our great Special Forces A Teams, who are out there,
very courageously, in villages, and helping to empower and to
support local elements that want to resist the Taliban, as
well.
All of that, of course, complemented by the whole host of
political, economic, even diplomatic initiatives that can help
produce progress, overall, and, over time, make it enduring, as
that was the approach that we took in Iraq, and it's the
approach you have to take in any counterinsurgency effort.
Senator Akaka. General, last week the Army announced that
it had exonerated the three officers who were issued letters of
reprimand related to their actions prior to the Battle of
Wanat. The independent investigating officer, a Marine
lieutenant general, had recommended that two officers should
receive reprimands. After your review, you added a third, and
concurred with the results.
General, first, I'm interested in your reaction to the
Army's decision to withdraw the letters of reprimand to the
three officers. Second, would your recommendation concerning
the letters of reprimand change, based on any information
presented to you by General Campbell, who was the Army official
charged with reviewing and taking action on the independent
investigation report?
General Petraeus. In this case, Senator, what we did at
CENTCOM--first, I directed Lieutenant General Natonski,
supported by a very able U.S. Army two-star division commander,
Major General Perkins, who, by the way, did the Thunder Run in
Baghdad--but, they did a reinvestigation of the circumstances
in this case. Your characterization of our findings is correct.
We did not recommend any action. What we did is provide the
results of our investigation, and then provided that to the
authority that has jurisdiction, if you will--command
authority, in this case, which is the U.S. Army.
General ``Hondo'' Campbell, a very distinguished, great
soldier, in fact, who is just about to retire, took that on,
reviewed the investigation exhaustively, and did a further
review of his own.
This is like any process, where there was an original
finding, then we reinvestigated another finding, then, again, a
final review. We discussed that. I respect his view in this
particular case. I support the process. But, I did not change
the finding that I affirmed after the investigating officers
provided it to me. Again, I support this particular process.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses,
General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Again, General Petraeus, thanks to you, thanks to your
family, for the great commitment that you continue to make to
provide protection to America, as well as literally the whole
world.
I can't help but note the number of combat stripes you have
on your sleeve there, which is certainly an indication not only
of your commitment, but of the fact that you've been gone from
your family for an awful long time over the last several years.
I note, also, that those number of combat stripes are
comparable to those on the sleeve of General Stan McChrystal. I
was very pleased to hear you mention him the number of times
that you did in your opening statement, because he certainly
has laid the groundwork, in Afghanistan, for a successful
military operation.
General McChrystal has been a great military leader, he's a
great man and a military officer that I had the privilege of
visiting in theater several different times when he was under
your command. I know the great work that he did there. I know
how recognized it is by you. I also know the respect that he
had of the men and women that served under him. Wherever life
takes him now, obviously we all wish him the best and thank him
for his service.
General, I want to make sure that you appreciate the
seriousness that this issue of the deadline, as well as the
issue of the rules of engagement, are. I'm not going to really
get into that, because I think you've had the opportunity, and
you have adequately addressed those two issues. But, if we're
going to have military success in Afghanistan--and there is no
other option, I know, on our minds, as well as in your mind--
it's imperative that you have the tools with which you need to
work. As you review the situation on the ground leading up to
July 1, 2011, I know we'll be hearing more from you on that
issue.
I want to ask you about another side to the Afghan
situation, and something that you and I have had a little bit
of conversation about, but, your success in Iraq, particularly
in the Ramadi area, when we saw a turn in the conflict there,
was in large part due to the fact that the Iraqi people got
engaged and decided they wanted to see a peaceful resolution of
the conflict in Iraq, and joined forces with your army, as well
as our colleagues and our partners in Iraq. Thus, we saw a
complete change in the direction of that war.
We haven't seen that situation in Afghanistan; and unless
there's confidence on the part of the Afghan people that we're
going to be there, I don't think it's going to happen. That's
an issue that you'll address with respect to this deadline.
But, there's another part to it. In Iraq, there was an
economy which could be built upon. It was founded on oil. It
has been rebuilt on oil. It appears to be moving in the right
direction; the Iraqi people have a good feeling about it.
In Afghanistan, I don't see that, number one, foundation to
be built upon; but, second, until there is security within
Afghanistan, it's going to be very difficult for that
confidence to be achieved. Two areas of their economic
situation that I know are available or are potentials:
Number one, the agricultural economy of Afghanistan does
have a lot of potential. You and I have talked about the fact
that I had the opportunity to observe what's going on in
Lashkar Gah with respect to what the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and other partners are doing
to build up that aspect of the economy.
Also, with the recent finding of minerals and metals in
Afghanistan, there is additional potential for providing the
Afghans with some sort of quality of life.
But, unless you have security in the country, neither one
of those avenues for building that economy is going to be
possible.
I would simply like you to comment, number one, on your
idea about partnering with the Afghan people and with the
Afghan Government to start this economy, or move it in a
positive direction, and second, how that interrelates with the
ability to incorporate the mindset of the Afghan people to
understand why it's important that we have peace and security
there.
General Petraeus. First of all, I think there is a good
partnership between the military side of the campaign and,
again, the Embassy--USAID Director Rajiv Shah--and also proper
emphasis, enormous emphasis that Ambassador Holbrooke has put
on the agriculture effort, along with Secretary Tom Vilsack. I
think that has all been very positive.
Clearly, what we have to do is expand the security bubble
in key areas, when it comes to agriculture, provide alternative
crops to those who are growing the poppy, and so forth, to make
that more viable.
There are a lot of initiatives, everything from rebuilding
the canal structures or cleaning or what have you--refurbishing
the canal structures that USAID, by the way, put into
Afghanistan decades ago. The reason central Helmand Valley is
so fertile is because it was an USAID project that was hugely
successful. By the way, they remember the Americans for that.
All of that founded on security, to be sure.
Now, beyond that, I think it is worth recalling, because
there were some news stories on it recently, that Afghanistan
is not without natural blessings in a whole host of ways,
including extraordinary mineral resources. It has extensive--
some of the largest resources of all, when it comes to lithium,
iron ore. It has coal. It has tin. It has lumber. It has
precious gems, and so forth.
But, of course, you have to extract it. You have to have
extractive industries. You have to have the lines of
communication. Again, you have to have security. You also have
to have the governance structures in which that can function.
There has to be a legal framework that provides sufficient
incentives. But, it's my hope, in fact, in all seriousness,
that we could see some of what are called ``adventure venture
capitalists'' enter Afghanistan who can help the Afghan
Government and people capitalize on, take advantage of, these
extraordinary mineral blessings that they have.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks very much, General. Again, thanks
for your commitment.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Ben Nelson, and then Senator Graham will follow
Senator Nelson. Then we're going to take a 10-minute break.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you and your wife and your family for your
continuing service to our country. We appreciate it. I know the
country is in your debt for taking on this assignment.
I'd like to follow up on a couple of questions that I had 2
weeks ago about the Afghan population and whether or not they
believe that the country is going in the right direction with
the NATO and U.S. forces there directing it. Secretary Flournoy
said, I think, that 59 percent of the Afghan people were of
that opinion.
Now, much has been made about the July 11 withdrawal. Is
there a way that we can--and particularly with your
leadership--assure the Afghan people that this is not a cut-
and-run deadline or a drop-dead date for decisions? Because I
think that may impact what further acceptance there is, as
you've indicated, of the effort on their behalf.
General Petraeus. We absolutely can, Senator. In fact, I
have sought to do that with my encounters, with the Afghan
Government as the CENTCOM Commander, also with our Pakistani
partners, with whom we've worked very hard to forge a good
partnership, and who have done such impressive
counterinsurgency operations, at high cost to themselves,
against the Pakistani Taliban on their side of the Durand Line.
As you note, Secretary Flournoy did point out the results
of these polls that almost paradoxically seem to show that,
although levels of violence have gone up, they have actually
have greater hope for the future, and greater optimism. That's
obviously something that we want to play on, and to show them
that their hopes are well-founded by our actions, together with
our Afghan partners.
Senator Ben Nelson. There is some concern that many will,
maybe, withhold their support because they're concerned about
the Taliban coming back in and, as you've indicated, chop their
heads off if they collaborate with us. You believe that we can,
by showing our commitment, overcome some of that resistance,
which is natural for people to be concerned?
General Petraeus. I do. I think it would be a mistake for
them to hedge their bets forever. Clearly that's what we want
to demonstrate by our operations on the ground, by our
development of the Afghan National Security Forces who can take
over the tasks and show that, again, that is not just possible,
but will happen. Also, to demonstrate to the Taliban that they
should not continue what it is that they are doing, either.
There are not only incentives for reintegration, there are
enormous penalties for not reintegrating.
Senator Ben Nelson. Will potential withdrawal of some of
the NATO forces be a bump in the road, in terms of that
perception, or will that be something that could simply
embolden the Taliban?
General Petraeus. I wouldn't say that it will embolden
them. It will perhaps give them a little cause for optimism.
What we have to do, obviously, is compensate. Whenever there is
a shift, whenever there is an addition, a reduction, what have
you, obviously, you have to redo your battlefield geometry, as
it's said. We have done that already, to compensate for the
expected departure of one nation's forces. We'll do that as we
have to.
On the other hand, we're also accommodating the additional
forces, for example, that are coming from Jordan or, from
Georgia, and also from some of the countries in the CENTCOM
region, and then also some others around the world.
Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, as you satisfy the
government that we are there to stay, and work toward building
the confidence of the Afghan people, will the rules of
engagement, by clearly stating them, as you have, also tell the
Taliban that it's going to be ``game, set, match'' one of these
days, in terms of their future?
General Petraeus. I think what impresses the Taliban is not
in the rules of engagement. It's the precise, targeted
operations that are designed to give them no rest. The idea is,
if you can get your teeth into the jugular of the enemy, you
don't let go. This word ``relentless'' is an important word to
describe the campaign against the Taliban, just as other
efforts also have to be relentless in our commitment to try to
help the Afghan Government provide a better future for their
people.
Senator Ben Nelson. We talked, a few weeks ago, about the
benchmarks and metric measurement of our success. In that
regard, what should we expect between now and December just as
a date and point of time?
General Petraeus. Certainly what we'll be looking at will
be the security situation in districts, and, in some cases,
even subdistricts, because you really do have to have a fairly
granular look at this. You can look at levels of violence
within districts, for example, because that's what matters.
If you have been able, for example, to move the violence
out of Marjah, and it's on the periphery, as it generally is
right now--touch wood--again, that is important, because that
is protecting the population. It allows commerce to resume,
schools to reopen, health clinics to be rebuilt, much of which
was damaged by the Taliban during its control of that
particular area. So, that's important.
Then, of course, as the Chairman has focused on, rightly,
How are the Afghan security forces doing in these different
efforts, different locations? Not just numbers, but level of
contribution, capability, quality, and so forth, as well. Then
you get into the areas of the provision and the establishment
of local governance, of local services, and of that whole
process of pointing to a brighter future for the people of that
particular area.
But, again, I think you have to do it in a fairly granular
fashion to try to understand what's going on, and also to
confirm that the approach does produce the kind of progress
that we're seeking to achieve.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is it fair to say that strengthening
the local governments will have a positive impact on the
central government of President Karzai's?
General Petraeus. It is, certainly, as long as that local
governance is, of course, distinguished by two very important
qualities. Those are: inclusivity--in other words, everyone in
that area feels as if they have a seat at the table and are
involved and represented; and then, transparency, so that
everyone has a sense of what's going on, and, in particular,
where the money is going, because that's very important,
needless to say, as well.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is that why you said, ``It's hard, and
it's hard all the time''?
General Petraeus. That, and many other reasons, Senator.
Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, and good luck. We're all
depending on you.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, I can't tell you how much it means to all
of us that you're willing to do this. It is very unfortunate
that General McChrystal is resigning from the Army. In case
he's listening, I think about everyone here who's met him has
nothing but great respect for his service, and the incident
which led to his resignation is very unfortunate, should not be
the end of his evaluation, in terms of being an Army officer.
He was a terrific Army officer, and I want to let everyone know
that most everybody who met him believes that.
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Graham. Now, I don't know how this translates in
Pashtun, but it's not translating well for me in English, in
terms of where we're at and where we're going. I would not use
the word ``relentless,'' General, in terms of the policy that
we're embarking on, regarding the enemy. That's just my two
cents' worth.
From what I can take, here's the summary of your testimony,
from my point of view, and I may be wrong. It doesn't appear
there are going to be any civilian changes, in terms of the
team in Afghanistan. Is that correct?
General Petraeus. That's beyond my purview, Senator.
Senator Graham. Okay. From what I can tell, it doesn't seem
to be contemplated.
From your testimony, I think you've created an expectation
by the American people, in July 2011 we will begin to withdraw
from Afghanistan. Is that a correct assumption I've made, or
not?
General Petraeus. What I have done is restate the policy as
it currently exists, Senator. The policy, again, that, as I
stated, I supported and agreed to, back last fall, to begin a
process, in July 2011, under which tasks are transferred to
Afghan security forces and government officials, and a
``responsible drawdown'' of the surge forces begins, pace to be
determined by conditions.
Senator Graham. The Vice President has been quoted as
saying, about this particular topic, ``Come July, we're going
to begin to leave in large numbers. You can bet on it.'' Is his
view of the policy correct?
General Petraeus. Well, first of all, I've heard----
Senator Graham. If that's----
General Petraeus.--Secretary Gates----
Senator Graham.--an accurate statement----
General Petraeus. I've heard----
Senator Graham. If that is an----
General Petraeus.--Secretary Gates----
Senator Graham. Excuse me.
General Petraeus.--state that he----
Senator Graham. Excuse me, sir. Let me ask my question.
Is his statement, if accurate, does that make sense, in
terms of what you think the policy to be?
The Vice President of the United States has been quoted, in
a book widely published in the United States, which I am sure
the enemy can have access to, that, ``Come July 2011, we're
going to be leaving in large numbers, you can bet on it.'' Is
he right?
General Petraeus. First, let me just state something that
he said that I could share with you and others.
Senator Graham. Okay.
General Petraeus. In the National Security Council meeting
that followed the meeting that I had with the President in the
Oval Office, at which the President laid out what the future
was going to be and described his expectations, the Vice
President grabbed me and said, ``You should know that I am 100
percent supportive of this policy.'' I said that, ``I'm
reassured to hear that. Is it okay to share that with others?''
Beyond that, I might add that I'm hosting the Vice
President for dinner tonight at our quarters in Tampa. Again,
we have another opportunity to continue that conversation.
The third and final point is, Secretary Gates has said, I
believe in testimony, that he never heard Vice President Biden
say that remark, either. For what it's worth.
Senator Graham. It's worth a lot, because he's saying one
thing to one person, allegedly, and he's saying another thing
to you, and they don't reconcile themselves. That is exactly my
point. It depends on who you seem to be talking to, because a
lot of liberal people in this country are being told, directly
and indirectly, ``We're getting out, beginning July 2011. How
fast, I don't know, but we're beginning to leave.'' Somebody
needs to get it straight, without doubt, what the hell we're
going to do, come July, because I think it determines whether
or not someone in Afghanistan is going to stay in the fight.
Now, this is not all your problem to fix. This is a
political problem. Because I'm assuming the July deadline did
not come from you. You said it didn't. You agreed to it, but
somebody other than you came up with this whole July-get-out-
of-Afghanistan deadline, and I think it's all politics. But,
that's just me.
In the House, Friday, the Speaker of the House said, ``I
don't know how many votes there are in the caucus, even
conditions-based for the war hands down, I just don't. We'll
see what the shape of it is the day of the vote.''
A letter was sent to the President by Barbara Lee, a
Democratic member of the caucus from the House Foreign
Relations Committee. It said, ``Mr. President, we believe that
it is imperative for you to provide Congress and the American
people with a clear commitment and plan to withdraw U.S. forces
from Afghanistan. This should include not only a date certain
for the initiation of this withdrawal, but a date for the
completion and a strategy to achieve it.''
You're advising Congress now. We fund the war. What would
you say to her recommendation that war funding have a condition
placed upon it that no funds can be expended until you deliver
to us, Congress, a withdrawal strategy?
General Petraeus. What I have stated here this morning is,
again, first of all, the importance of, of course----
Senator Graham. Would it be wise of us to put that in
legislation----
Chairman Levin. I wonder if he could just finish the
answer.
Senator Graham. I think my question is pretty simple. Would
it be wise for Congress to put such a condition on war funding?
Would it undermine the mission?
General Petraeus. Let's think about it from the enemy's
perspective and from the perspective of our friends. As I
sought to do in my opening statement this morning, they should
be assured that, with respect to, one, we are going to pursue
them relentlessly. With respect, Senator, earlier, we are
pursuing the enemy relentlessly. Make no mistake about it. When
you're back out there as ``Colonel Graham,'' you'll see it once
again.
Senator Graham. Yes, sir.
General Petraeus. We look forward to having you as part of
the ISAF Command, if confirmed.
Senator Graham. I'll look forward, but my time's up. You
have a chance to advise Congress. Should we put a condition on
war funding that would say, ``You have to submit a plan for
withdrawal by the beginning of next year''? Does that undercut
our mission, or not?
General Petraeus. It would be contrary to the whole policy,
which has talked about conditions-based.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
General Petraeus. I hope that's enough of an answer.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
We're going to take a 10-minute break. [Recess.]
We'll be back in order.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you very much, General.
I want to express my appreciation for our phone call the
other day. I really did appreciate your courtesy. It's great to
see you here. Again, thank you for your continued service to
our country, and your family's willingness to support you in
that service.
I just have three questions. It seems, predictably, that
most of the dialogue here this morning is focused upon the July
date for next year. There are some who have argued that a
deadline is important, to create a sense of urgency on the part
of the Afghans and our allies, and also to ensure that we don't
enable dysfunctional behavior on their part. There are others
of you, you have heard here, who think that the presence of a
deadline shows a lack of resolve on our part, and undermines
their willingness to do some of the tough things, over the long
haul, that need to be done.
It seems to me that you're attempting to strike a
commonsense middle ground here, to get the benefits of creating
a sense of urgency, while still reassuring our allies that the
deadline is flexible and will take into account changes on the
ground.
If you could just elaborate a little bit upon the
importance of trying to strike that balance, not choosing one
or the other, but also the difficulties of getting it right. It
seems to me, therein lies that major challenge we confront.
General Petraeus. Therein does lie the challenge, I think.
On the one hand, productivity experts say that there's no
greater productivity tool than a deadline. Indeed, as I
mentioned, the message of urgency that the deadline conveyed,
keeping in mind that this 18 months or more, when it was
announced, out in the future, I'm convinced it was not just for
domestic political purposes. It was for audiences in Kabul,
who, again, needed to be reminded that we won't be there
forever. But, we will be there, and presumably for quite some
time, as I mentioned in my opening statement--various
quotations from various G-20 leaders, President Obama, and
others.
Senator Bayh. Can I interject just for a moment, General?
It seems to me the message there to the Afghans is, ``Look,
we're here, and you can rely on us, but you have to do your
part, too. You cannot exclusively rely upon us.''
General Petraeus. I think that's it. I think there is a
sense, again, that, on the one hand, ``Don't take us for
granted, but do expect us to be there. But, we want to be there
with you.'' I think it did actually galvanize some degree of
action. There may have been some message for some of us in
uniform that we needed to get on with it.
The truth is that early on in the process we were looking
at a more deliberate campaign. We compressed that. Getting the
troops on the ground much more rapidly than was originally even
thought possible, frankly, much less desirable.
I think, in that sense, again, all helpful. On the other
hand, again, you have to make sure that the enemy does not
interpret that as that moment where, as we've said, the United
States is heading for the exits, looking for the light switch,
to turn it off, because we're out of here. Because that is not
accurate, at least not in my perception.
Again, I was part of the process, actually went with the
President to West Point to hear the speech. I sat there, heard
it. What I took from it were two messages. Again, an enormous
commitment, when you think about it, that it requires
substantial additional resources, as we have discussed--and the
funding for that is very important, but also the message of
urgency. That's what this July 2011 conveyed. That's how I took
that.
Senator Bayh. It's always tempting to choose an all-or-
nothing approach, but on something this complex, sometimes the
truth lies somewhere in the middle, and it seems to me that's
exactly the approach you and the President have taken. I think
it's the right one.
My second question, there are some who question our mission
there entirely by saying, ``Look, we were attacked from
Afghanistan by al Qaeda, but al Qaeda is not really there
anymore. They've moved over into the tribal areas in
Pakistan.'' You touched upon this in your opening statement.
Can you give us your assessment about the likelihood--if we
were to withdraw from Afghanistan prematurely, and the Afghans
did not have the capability of securing their territory--the
likelihood that al Qaeda would reestablish itself in that
place?
General Petraeus. I think there's a high likelihood of it,
especially if the pressure continues on them in the tribal
areas. They have sustained significant losses, as is well
known. In the tribal areas, their freedom of action has been
reduced by operations by the Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps
in the former Northwest Frontier Province, Khyber Pakhtunkha,
and in several of the agencies of the tribal areas, certainly
not all of them, and certainly there are still, without
question, extremist elements there that have sanctuary there
and are carrying out operations inside Afghanistan; and others
that are transnational, as is the case of al Qaeda and some
other elements in Pakistan, as well.
But, the Pakistanis have carried out impressive operations
over the course of the last year. Their means are not
unlimited, however, and they have a lot of short sticks in
hornets' nests right now, and they have to consolidate some of
their gains. They have to do the hold and build and transition
phases, as well as they did the clearance phases in places like
Swat Valley.
Senator Bayh. That is a good segue to my final question,
General. As we were discussing yesterday, I'm confident that,
with your leadership and the civilian leadership, we're going
to do our part here. Certainly there are some differences of
opinion--that's been well documented--but, we have a pretty
good team, and particularly our men and women who wear the
uniform are going to perform heroically and do their jobs well.
But, ultimately, this is not up to us. Ultimately, it's up
to the Afghans, primarily, and then some of the neighbors,
principally the Paks, to do their job, as well.
My final question to you would be first about the Afghans
and then about the Paks. Are the Afghans willing to reconcile
themselves to being, not a nation-state, perhaps, as we would
ideally describe it, but at least to resolve enough of the
ethnic tribal tensions to view themselves first as
Afghanistanis, and second as members of ethnic and tribal
groups, sufficiently to establish a strong enough state? That's
number one. Do they have it within them to do their job?
Second, the Paks: Are they in the process of reassessing
their own strategic interests, which heretofore have led them
to believe that a weak Afghanistan, subject to their influence,
was in their national security interest? Do they now understand
that an Afghan Government with sufficient strength to secure
their own territory is, in fact, in the strategic interests of
Pakistan?
General Petraeus. I think the answer to both of those is
yes. I think it is within the capacity of the Afghan people to
see themselves as Afghans, perhaps first, even before their
tribal or ethnic or sectarian identity. Certainly the country
has existed as a country--arguably, it's existed as a country
longer than ours has. It has had extended periods of time when
it has been ruled by a leader out of Kabul.
But, as with any society like that, what it will require is
this inclusivity and transparency in the activities of
governance. President Karzai has discussed that with me and
Ambassador Holbrooke, on several occasions. That is something
that we look forward to supporting him in striving to achieve.
With respect to the Pakistanis, I think there is some
reassessment that has gone on with respect to Afghanistan. I
think as important has been the reassessment of the situation
within their own borders.
What took place about 12 to 18 months or so ago, when the
Pakistani people, the leadership, and the clerics all came to
recognize that the most pressing existential threat to their
country was that posed by internal extremists who had
threatened the writ of governance in Swat Valley and the rest
of what is now called Khyber Paktunkwa, and then in a number of
areas of the tribal areas.
The fact is, I think they came to recognize that the
concept that was in practice, and still may be in some areas--
that concept, that you can allow poisonous snakes to have a
nest in your backyard, as long as they only bite the neighbors'
kids, inevitably turns around and ends up biting you in the
backside. I think they have come to see the challenges of this.
Now, to be fair to them, let's remember that many of these
groups were formed, in the beginning, with our money, through
the ISI, when we were trying to help get rid of the Soviets out
of Afghanistan, and the Mujahideen were our heroes at that
time. Those very groups put down roots and, in some cases,
turned into transnational extremist elements and other
extremist elements that have threatened the idea of Pakistan
being able to move forward, and actually want to turn the clock
back several centuries. I think that they have come to
recognize the threat that these groups pose to their country,
but have also realized that they cannot deal with all of them
simultaneously, and that their means, particularly when it
comes to the holding, building, and transition phases, is
somewhat limited.
That's why the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill was so important.
That's why a sustained, substantial commitment--again, we
talked about the idea of a sustained commitment--that's why
that is so important, with respect to Pakistan, as well.
Senator Bayh. General, thank you, again, for your service
and for your leadership.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for once again answering the call to
duty. As you can tell, members on this committee, I think
Members of Congress, irrespective of their political
affiliation, have tremendous confidence in you, as do the
American people. Our hopes and prayers are with you and our
troops that this can be a successful mission and undertaking.
Thank you, to your wife, Holly, too, for being willing to take
on the responsibilities and the sacrifice that goes with having
you away all these months.
I was pleased to hear you say, I think in response to an
earlier question today, I raised the question a week ago, when
you were here, about the issue of rules of engagement,
particularly with regard to close air support, and to hear you
say that you are going to evaluate those. I think it does get
at this whole issue of not only protecting our men and women in
uniform, but also the perception that we are in this to win. I
appreciate you doing that.
Could you speak to the importance, with regard to close air
support, of the B-1 in the current fight in Afghanistan, both
in terms of providing close air support, as well as providing
ISR to our troops on the ground?
General Petraeus. First of all, if I could, just to be
precise, it's really about the implementation of the rules of
engagement and the tactical directive, both of which I think
are fundamentally sound. I don't see any reason to change them
in significant ways.
Rather, what we do need to do is make sure that the intent
behind those, the intent being to reduce the loss of innocent
civilian life in the course of military operations to an
absolute minimum, that's an imperative for any
counterinsurgent. We must achieve that. I have pledged to
continue to do that, to continue the great work that General
McChrystal did in that regard.
But, at the same time, we have to find that balance between
ensuring that we also bring everything to bear, if our troopers
get in a tough spot, and make sure that process is very rapid
in responding, when it is absolutely necessary to do that.
Now, the B-1 does play a very big role in that regard. It
is a great platform in at least two respects, maybe more. One,
it carries a heck of a lot of bombs, substantial ordnance.
Second, it has very good ISR capabilities. It can loiter for a
good time, when it's not being used to drop bombs, which is,
frankly, what it does most of the time, because we're not
dropping bombs constantly. It is up there waiting, in a Combat
Air Patrol. Then what we do is, we use whatever optics that
particular bomber has on it, the sniper pod or what have you.
It is almost like having another unmanned aerial vehicle, in
terms of full motion video and so forth, not quite the same
resolutions and differences in the capabilities, but it is very
helpful in that regard, as well.
It's not just a case of a very capable bomber just boring
holes in the sky, waiting to open the bomb-bay doors. It is
also a case of a platform that's very capable, even as it is
just doing that, flying around in circles.
Senator Thune. Let me ask you, I don't want to beat this to
death; I think you answered it at great length, but this was in
written response to the advance policy questions for the
committee. You state that you agree with the President's
decision to begin reductions of U.S. forces in July 2011.
You also assess, in your responses to the committee's
advance policy questions, ``An increasing percentage of
insurgents are motivated by the perception that the Taliban
will eventually emerge as the dominant Pashtun political entity
in Afghanistan.''
You also write in your response to the advance policy
questions, ``The Taliban believe that they can outlast the
coalition's will to fight, and believe the strategy will be
effective, despite short-term losses.''
Do you believe that the July 2011 date to begin reductions
of U.S. forces contributes to the perception among the
insurgents that Taliban will eventually emerge as the dominant
Pashtun political entity in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. Only if it is interpreted what I think is
incorrectly. Again, that really comes back to Senator Bayh's
question, earlier, I think, of being very careful in how we
explain what that represents. Of course, that's what I sought
to do in my opening statement today, as well.
This is a test of wills, though. The enemy has to know that
we have the will to prevail.
Senator Thune. I appreciate your efforts to try and clarify
that. I think it is critical that the enemy knows that, that
our friends, as you mentioned earlier, know that we are
committed. We can't do this halfway. There has to be an
understanding that we are in this to win.
You know that the Senate passed its version of the war
supplemental before the Memorial Day break, consistent with the
Department's request. The House has yet to mark it up or to
take up the legislation. I certainly, as I think my colleagues
here all do, support funding for the troops. I was compelled,
as many of my colleagues here were, to vote against the
emergency supplemental when it left the Senate, because the
majority had included a lot of additional domestic spending
that many of us disagreed with. We are now seeing that the
Democrat majority, some of our colleagues in the House, are
seeking to add some domestic spending items to the bill, as
well.
My question is, Could you comment on the urgency of the
funding, in the first place, and perhaps elaborate a little bit
on what the consequences of delaying that funding would be,
when it comes to our military operations, particularly those in
Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. As the old saying goes, ``You can never
go wrong by quoting your boss.'' In this case, I'd like to
recall what I believe Secretary Gates said--perhaps you might
confirm it--but, I believe that he said something along the
lines that, ``If the supplemental wasn't passed by the 4th of
July, then what happens is, the Services have to start going
into various drills,'' because the consequences won't be felt
in Afghanistan. The Services will find the money to fund our
operations in Afghanistan. I'm convinced of that. The Secretary
and the President will ensure that is the case.
What will happen, though, is, there will have to be a whole
host of other activities, that are either reduced or shut down
or stopped, to find the funding for that. I think that would be
in other areas that the various Military Departments have
operations, maintenance, training, recruiting, and other
readiness activities.
Senator Thune. I assume that you would like to see a clean
supplemental appropriation, though. It was talked about
earlier. I think Senator Graham alluded to some discussion in
the House right now about perhaps attaching some conditions on
Afghanistan to a supplemental appropriation bill.
General Petraeus. Senator, I'll leave that up to Congress.
All we want is the resources to enable us to continue the
fight.
Senator Thune. I suspect we have a better opportunity of
getting you those resources if, in fact, it is a clean bill.
There was a report that the Taliban had attacked a wedding
party in Arghandab district, a few weeks ago, killing at least
39 people. There are also reports the Taliban executed a 7-
year-old child in Helmand Province for cooperating with the
Afghan Government. I'm curious to know, with regard to the
village where the wedding party was attacked, what we've done
to provide assistance to the survivors. Since this village was
clearly allied with us against the Taliban, why were we not
able to protect it? I know, as a counterinsurgency strategy,
that's one of the main objectives, is to protect the
population. Could you perhaps provide a little bit of insight
about how that is going and that element of our strategy?
General Petraeus. I don't know the circumstances of what
security precautions were taken for this particular wedding.
Again, no question but that the Taliban bombed and killed
dozens of innocent civilians in attacking what should have been
a celebration, and turned it into a tragedy.
With respect to the assistance to the survivors, that one
I'd like to take for the record and see what it is that the
unit there has done.
[The information referred to follows:]
We believe that the Arghandab wedding was specifically targeted due
the large number of Afghan National Police (ANP) who were present. This
particularly brutal attack was perpetrated by an insurgent who employed
a suicide vehicle born improvised explosive device, or in plain
language a car bomb. By our numbers, he killed 38 Afghans, 14 of whom
were Afghan Police. Eighty-four others were wounded in the attack.
Our intelligence analysis determined that this was not a revenge
killing, and the Taliban appear to have specifically targeted the ANP
officers attending the wedding. This terrible act illustrates the
desperation of the Taliban. While increased violence at the hands of
the Taliban is deplorable, it must be viewed in context. Heightened
violence throughout the summer was anticipated by International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as a result of our increased
operational tempo and efforts to separate the population from the
insurgency.
ISAF forces conducted key leader engagements with the ANP following
this tragedy and extended its greatest condolences to the families of
those who were wounded or killed. However, as ISAF was not involved in
the incident itself, the Afghan Government is responsible for providing
assistance to the survivors who were members of the Afghan National
Security Forces.
General Petraeus. I suspect, by the way, that this is what
CERP is so useful for, is this kind of activity in immediate
need in security circumstances that are challenging.
But, what you have highlighted is something that I think we
all need to highlight much more, and something that we will
strive to do in our strategic communications, and it is just
merely truthfully to report the extremist activities, the
indiscriminate violence, and the oppressive practices that have
always been associated with the Taliban.
Despite their supposed change in strategy this year--they
also have committed, they said, to not killing innocent
civilians--despite all of that, they have continued to carry
out actions, just like you have said. In fact, their IEDs kill
innocent civilians in Afghanistan on a daily basis. We must get
the word out on that more effectively.
Senator Thune. Thank you, General. Thank you, again, for
your service.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I would like to reiterate what I said to you in my
office, and that's how much I respect your stepping forward
here, in what is really an unusual historical circumstance, in
that, at least on paper, you are accepting a demotion in order
to undertake these responsibilities. As you alluded to a little
earlier, you're kind of your own boss right now. There was a
country song, when I was a kid, by a group called ``Flatt and
Scruggs,'' called ``I'm My Own Grandpa.''
General Petraeus. There's been an amazing alacrity of
approving ISAF-submitted requests in the CENTCOM headquarters
in the past several years.
Senator Webb. Yes. Then the question becomes, ``If you
don't like what you're doing, can you fire yourself?''
[Laughter.]
I would also like to express my appreciation for the
comments you're making about rules of engagement here, and the
need to review them. I struggled with this as a rifle platoon
and company commander in a very difficult war. I worry about
it, as a father, in this war, with a son who is a lance
corporal in Anbar Province. Actually, I wrote a movie called,
appropriately enough, ``Rules of Engagement.'' It's a very
delicate question in these politically-driven operations. But,
as clearly as I can say this, there are no circumstances--
none--in which we should put our people unreasonably at risk,
where they cannot take actions in order to protect themselves.
There's a perception out there, among a lot of military people,
that that has occurred. You can go a long way--I think you
already have gone a long way, in terms of clarifying that to
the people who are out there serving.
Last year, a little more than a year ago, when you were
testifying, I raised some of my concerns about this Afghanistan
venture. They were basically based on uncontrollable unknowns,
particularly when it comes to the use of the military itself,
unknowns that are beyond the scope of military operations, as,
for instance, Can the Afghanis really put together a viable
national government? Can they really grow to 400,000?--which I
assume is still the goal, when you combine the National Police
Force with the National Army, which is probably five times as
high as what any viable ANA before, on a national level, has
ever reached.
Also the question on the strategy of clear, hold, and
build. I recall having a discussion with you a year ago on
that. We kind of know who's going to clear, and they've done a
pretty good job, in terms of clearing. It was not really clear,
no pun intended, who was going to hold and who was going to
build.
I would like to share with you an excerpt from a letter
that I received yesterday, and get your thoughts on the phase 2
and phase 3 of this strategy. This letter was written by an
individual who was a great mentor to me, as I became a Marine
Corps general, and very thoughtful individual who's had family
members--like so many of us have, he's had family members in
Afghanistan for more than 5 years at this point. He said this,
``The national strategy, as currently implemented, is seriously
flawed,'' talking about clear, hold, and build. He went on to
point out that the clear phase is a military responsibility. He
has great faith in it, although he did have some discussion
about the difference between living among the population and
operating out of forward operating bases, and those sorts of
things. He says, ``The hold phase is where the strategy's
serious problems start. The Afghan National Police are the
logical force to hold a cleared area. The bulk of the
population, with ample reason, considers the ANP to be a
corrupt, untrustworthy, and illegitimate organization. This
problem is compounded by the fact that the bulk of the
population also holds the same view of the Karzai Government.
They consider the central government to be a corrupt,
irrelevant entity. The build phase is now largely a figment of
the imagination,'' according to this general. ``In the final
analysis, the three-pronged strategy has two broken prongs. It
is a charade summing to the point that the problem and its
cures are essentially in the political, vice the military,
realm. We have a solid military base in Afghanistan,'' writes
the general, ``however, it is meaningless, unless the civilian
leadership attacks the political problems.''
I would imagine that, in concept, you would probably at
least agree with his bottom line here. The question is, in your
capacity, what do you believe can be done in order to attack
these political problems and make this policy a success?
General Petraeus. The truth is that, in counterinsurgency
operations, military leaders end up getting involved in civil-
military activities; you've lived it, you know it. That is not
just inevitable, it is essential. You must capitalize on every
capability that is out there--host nation, U.S., international,
whatever it may be. But, at times, you have to make up for what
might not be there, same three categories.
But, to reach an enduring situation, such as we were able
to reach, I think--touch wood--and not just in Anbar, but in
Iraq, writ large, although the final chapter is certainly not
written, and there's plenty of political drama going on there
now--but, over time, we were, obviously, able not only to clear
areas and to turn bad guys into at least no longer bad, no
longer opposing, in many cases supporting the new Iraq. Then
citizens stepped forward, they were given a stake in the
success of the new Iraq, they felt included, and there was a
certain degree of self-policing among the community that is so
important as it works forward, and then as you establish the
formal security forces, and so on.
There's no question that the police, in an insurgent
situation, facing an insurgency, are the most vulnerable. They
are very susceptible to intimidation, to assassination, and, in
some cases, sadly, corrupt activities, as well, or even illegal
activities. There has to be improvement in that very important
element of the security forces.
With respect, I think the build phases actually are coming
along reasonably well. But, again, that's something that we are
largely doing with our CERP, and then with our USAID comrades,
and others--U.K. Department for International Development, and
so on. But, again, the question there is to get to something
that is sustainable, that's enduring, that's self-sustaining
over the long term.
Then there's really a fourth phase to the clear, hold, and
build. There's a transition phase. That's the phase when we
begin to thin out, we begin to hand off tasks.
Of course, you don't merely need to do this so that,
ultimately, we can reduce our forces in theater. You need to do
it so that you can send your forces elsewhere, so that, as we
solidify a situation, say, in Nawa, you can focus a bit more in
Marjah or Nadi Ali, or push out a bit farther, to increase the
security bubble for the people. You don't have to go
everywhere. This is not a nationwide effort, in that regard.
But, you do have to be able to protect the population and the
key lines of communication.
Now, I've talked, in recent days, with Ambassador
Eikenberry, with Ambassador Sedwill, the NATO senior civilian
representative, with Ambassador Holbrooke, General Lute, the EU
rep, and various Afghan Government officials, NATO Secretary
General, and a whole host of others, about these kinds of
issues. There's no question that we have to do everything that
we can to enable our Afghan partners to address the kinds of
challenges that you have talked about right here.
This all begins with a foundation of security, though,
because you cannot expect local police to survive in a fierce
insurgent situation. You can't expect local commerce to
develop. You can't rebuild schools, and so forth. So, that's
obvious. But, we have to get the foundation and the security. I
think that is doable, as the writer of that letter mentioned.
We clearly have to address the kinds of challenges that have
made the hold and build phases so challenging, and then enable
the transition phases, as well.
Senator Webb. I thank you for that, and I wish you the
best. I still have a great number of concerns about the
stability of the political environment in that country. But, as
I said to you in my office, I will do everything I can to
support your effort here.
You have my upmost respect for having accepted this call,
because that's basically what it is, for someone who has
already done what you've done. This is a call to service, and I
respect that very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus. A privilege to do it, Senator. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, General.
The compliments and best wishes, on both sides of the aisle
from this committee, are heartfelt and genuine. I hope you hear
them, and I hope you understand them. I do admire you,
unqualifiedly, and appreciate what you're doing.
Let me, first of all, echo what Senator Webb said about the
rules of engagement. We should never have rules that put our
troops in danger, in the hope that we're winning hearts and
minds. We ought to win hearts and minds among the Afghans, but
we need to make sure that our rules of engagement protect our
troops.
You said you are going to look very hard at this issue. I'm
not asking a question here, but I would assume that means we're
going to look very hard at, maybe, altering or amending those
rules of engagement, and applying them uniformly across the
board.
General Petraeus. It's the latter piece of it, Senator.
Again, rules of engagement are pretty straightforward. They
don't vary enormously from place to place. Our troopers have
been exercising similar rules of engagement in these various
campaigns in recent years.
What we need to do is ensure that the application of them,
and, as importantly, the tactical directive, which talks about
the use of close air support, and other, again, enablers, that
is uniform, and again, there are not leaders at certain levels
that are imposing additional checks and balances at times when
lives are on the line. That's the real key.
If I could also touch on one other topic, though. It is not
mutually exclusive that you can ensure the security of the
population, minimize the loss of innocent civilian life, and
also ensure that you bring whatever is necessary to bear when
your troopers are in a tough spot. Do we take a risk in
military operations? Of course we do. I mean, in any operation.
The minute you go outside the gate, if you don't want to take
risk, then you shouldn't be there in the first place. That's
what we do. But, we have a solemn obligation, really, a moral
imperative, to ensure that when our troopers and our Afghan
partners are in a tough spot, that we do what is necessary to
support them in those tough spots.
It's also important that they understand, again, the
context in which they're operating. There are examples such as
a house, and you're taking fire from the house. Now, our
impulse is to take the fight to the enemy. We close with and
destroy the enemy in the infantry. That's our motto, this kind
of thing. This is not conventional combat, and if there are
civilians in the house--if you don't know who's in the house,
you really do need to think twice before you take out the
house, if that fire on you is not pinning you down. Maybe you
want to break contact, keep the house under observation for a
while.
Our soldiers are magnificent; as I mentioned, they're the
most combat-experienced force and the finest force our Nation
has ever fielded--they can understand the intent, on the one
hand, to minimize loss of innocent civilian life, and, on the
other hand, to make sure that we do whatever is necessary if
they get in a tight spot.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, General. That was not going to
be my question, but it's such an important topic that I felt it
was important to go ahead and let you enlarge on that.
General Petraeus. It is an important topic. Thank you.
Senator Wicker. Let me say, also, I take your testimony,
about the timeliness, at face value. You said, 2 weeks ago,
that, in an ideal world, timelines aren't the best, are not
your favorite.
General Petraeus. I said, ``I think you have to think hard
about them,'' or something like that. It wasn't quite what you
said, but something like that.
Senator Wicker. You've talked about a responsible
drawdown--2011 will begin a process--but, that our relationship
and our partnership in Afghanistan is going to be an enduring
one, and the Taliban know their enemy should not doubt our
resolve. I take that at face value. I want to read some
excerpts from the Wall Street Journal today, by Bret Stephens,
and he speaks pretty plain. Free speech is great in the United
States. He says, ``With a wink of its left eye, the Obama
administration tells its liberal base that a year from now the
United States will be heading for a quick Afghan exit.
`Everyone knows there's a firm date,' insists White House Chief
Rahm Emanuel. With a wink of its right eye, the administration
tells Afghanistan, Pakistan, NATO allies, and its own military
leadership that the July 2011 date is effectively meaningless.
`The notion that a major drawdown will begin next year,
absolutely has not been decided,' says Defense Secretary Robert
Gates.''
The problem with this is it appears, from what we're
learning from the Speaker of the House today, that a wink to
the left may not be sufficient, and that there is a move afoot
in the other body to use the power of the purse to impose
timelines that the administration has not agreed to, that you
would feel uncomfortable with. I don't think it's your role, as
general, to call for vetoes of legislation, but it is the role
of the Secretary of Defense and the President. I would hope
that they make it clear that such restrictions on a war-funding
bill by the House of Representatives would be unacceptable, and
should be, and would be, vetoed, should they reach the
President's desk.
The article goes on to say, ``General Petraeus won in Iraq
because George W. Bush had his back, and the people in Iraq,
friend and foe, knew it. By contrast, the fact that we've been
unable to secure the small city of Marjah, much less take on
the larger job of Kandahar, is because nobody, right down to
the village folk, believes that Barack Obama believes in his
own war.''
Let me say this. There's no better fighting force in the
history of the planet than the American fighting force in
Afghanistan today. We are fighting an enemy that has 10 percent
support among the Afghan people. There's no way on Earth that
our fighting force can lose this war. The only way that our
effort can be unsuccessful is that if we have a government in
Washington, DC, that is unworthy of that fighting force. I want
to be part of a bipartisan team that gives you the resources
and the time to accomplish the mission.
Since the General took a moment to talk about rules of
engagement, let me just ask you this. Could you comment--
compare and contrast--the relationship you had in Iraq, between
you, as the general, and Ambassador Crocker, and the approach
that has been used in Afghanistan between General McChrystal
and Ambassador Eikenberry? What lessons can we learn from your
experience with Ambassador Crocker in Iraq? What do you hope
the civilian-military relationship will look like, now that
you're headed back to Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. Let me just reiterate, if I could, what I
said in my opening statement about being committed to forging a
civil-military partnership, to achieving unity of effort
between the civilian and military elements, and not just
between U.S. military and civilian, but between the ISAF
military and the international civilian efforts, and then, of
course, between those efforts and those of our Afghan partners.
I think I may have mentioned that, in the past several days,
without presuming confirmation, I have had conversations with--
in fact, we did four-way conversations--we had Ambassador
Eikenberry, Ambassador Holbrooke, General Lute, and myself on
the phone. These have been quite productive. This is, I think,
the way to go about it, so that everyone is all on there.
Ambassador Eikenberry is going--if confirmed, depending on how
rapidly--we have various timelines--the intent is to stop in
Brussels, on the way, to meet with the Secretary General of
NATO, the Chairman of the Military Committee, the permanent
representatives of the North Atlantic Council, the military
representatives, and so forth. Having talked to the Secretary
General, the chairman, and then the NATO chain of command, the
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the Commander of Joint
Forces Command, Brunssum, General Ramms, who's the ISAF boss on
the NATO chain. Ambassador Eikenberry will join me in Brussels.
We'll huddle there, after the activities with NATO and then fly
into Kabul together. Ambassador Mark Sedwill, the NATO senior
civilian representative for ISAF, will do the same.
I think that there is every intent, and everyone has
committed to forging this civil-military partnership that can
help us achieve unity of effort on the U.S. and international
side, and then, as I said, unity of effort with our Afghan
partners, as well.
Senator Wicker. Will you be applying lessons learned
between you and Ambassador Crocker in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Of course.
Lessons learned from that, from the study of history, of
watching other circumstances, watching it in Iraq, in previous
assignments there, and so forth, as well, without question--and
in Bosnia and Haiti and Kuwait and a variety of other places,
too; Central America, for that matter.
Senator Wicker. I wish you the very best, and want to be
helpful in any way.
Thank you for your service.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Good afternoon, General. Thank you for being
here today.
I want to share the same sentiments that Senator Webb did
with you about taking a demotion and once again responding to
the call.
I want to also add my comments to the expectation, that I
think we all have on the committee, that leadership, as you've
demonstrated, and as Tom Ricks mentioned in a recent column, is
about getting everybody on the same page. You don't need to
respond, but I hold the President responsible, on down through
the chain of command, that we'll get the kind of unified team
in Afghanistan to make this strategy a successful one.
I'm reminded, moving to the second point I'd like to make,
that Lincoln, I think, famously said, ``The best generals
always seem to work for the newspapers.'' I think that's what
he said. There have been a whole slew of comments in columns,
over the last few weeks, from people that I respect--Ignatius,
Douthat, McCaffrey, Ricks, Viscovich, Cordesman--there's a long
list of smart people who've laid out a lot of different
approaches to the challenge we face in Afghanistan. I wanted to
mention a couple of them in the following comments.
For those who think the smart thing to do is just to leave
Afghanistan, I think Douthat put it pretty well, when he said,
``The best exit strategy is probably success strategy. For
those who think that a counterterrorism approach or a
containment strategy would be easy, think about the long term
responsibilities that those would involve.''
At the other end of the scale, you have those who say we
ought to have an open-ended approach in Afghanistan, that there
shouldn't be any real urgency. I disagree with that approach,
as well. President Bush showed that timelines in Iraq could
work. You made the point earlier that we've combined a sense of
urgency with an enormously larger commitment of troops and
support in Afghanistan.
Again, you don't have to comment, but I hold those comments
out as reflecting my point of view for the citizens of Colorado
and members of this committee.
Let me just move to a question you've been asked, and
answered some different ways here this morning. A lot of people
think we've had success in Iraq. We can just replicate it in
Afghanistan. What's different, in Afghanistan, when it comes to
our counterinsurgency strategy?
General Petraeus. They are two very different countries,
obviously. It might be worth recalling that, back in September
2005, after I completed a second tour in Iraq, when we stood up
the train-and-equip mission, and so forth, I was asked to come
home through Afghanistan--by the Secretary of Defense--and to
do an assessment of the situation over there, and particularly
the train-and-equip program. I did that. In the course of doing
that, when I reported out to him, of course with the aid of
PowerPoint, which is one of the First Amendment rights of every
four-star general in expressing his freedom of expression--but,
anyway, we laid out a PowerPoint slide, and the title of the
slide was ``Afghanistan''--and it had the does-not-equal sign--
``Afghanistan Does Not Equal Iraq,'' and then laid out the
factors that were different: the very different level of human
capital in Afghanistan, a country that's been wracked by well
over 3 decades of conflict, and started out, prior to that
time, as one of the fifth poorest countries in the world, the
lack of infrastructure, the lack, at that time, to my awareness
at that time, of the kinds of natural resource blessings,
energy blessings that Iraq has; the lack of the very strong
central government that Iraq had, arguably a bit too strong,
under Saddam. But, again, you can just keep going on down the
list: 70 percent illiteracy in Afghanistan, probably 80-some-
odd percent literacy in Iraq. So, we laid that out.
All of this means that you have to adapt very
substantially. You certainly can't take lessons learned in Iraq
and just apply them in a rote manner in Afghanistan. They have
to be applied with a keen understanding of the situation on the
ground, village by village, valley by valley. All
counterinsurgency is local, as they say. I think we have to be
very measured, again, in trying to transfer anything from Iraq.
Having said that, there are certainly principles of
counterinsurgency, there are certainly experiences that we had
there, and certainly there are capabilities and capacities that
we developed there that are very much of value, when it comes
to our abilities to fuse intelligence, the breakthroughs in
each of the disciplines of intelligence imagery, human
intelligence, signals intelligence, and so forth, and on and
on. I think that has helped us.
For example, we know that there are certain organizations
that you need. When I talked about getting the inputs right in
Afghanistan, what I meant was, trying to replicate, certainly,
the organizations that we had in Iraq, in Afghanistan. We
didn't have the inputs right. When I took over as CENTCOM
Commander, having focused almost exclusively, for the previous
5 or 6 years, on Iraq, and opened the aperture further, to
really look hard at Afghanistan, I was struck by how many
actions we needed to take to get the inputs right, in terms of
the organizations, the people, the concepts, and above all, the
resources.
As I mentioned, on General McChrystal's watch--and on
General McKiernan's, prior to that--there has been a
substantial effort to get those inputs right. We're almost at
the point where we have the additional forces on the ground
that will enable the full implementation of the approach. That
approach will have to be carried out with a keen and as precise
an awareness of local circumstances on the ground in
Afghanistan, and without some thought of, ``Well, it worked
this way in Baghdad. Why won't it work this way in Kabul?''
Senator Udall. Let me mention that Ambassador Crocker used
to say, I believe, that ``Just because you walked out of a
movie, it doesn't mean it's over.'' In that context, I've read
some accounts that there's not much tangible planning being put
in place for after July 2011, particularly on the civil-
military front. Could you speak to what kind of planning is
being done, and what's in place for that timeframe after July
2011?
General Petraeus. The focus, I think, understandably, of
really the last year and a half has been, first, to help the
President contribute to getting the policy right, then to
develop the implementation plans to operationalize that policy,
in terms of a civil-military campaign plan, and then to expand
it with our Afghan partners, and then to make, in some cases,
some substantial tweaks along the way, particularly with the
Afghan National Security Force effort. That has been the focus.
Now we're into the implementation of those plans.
At some point, obviously we'll start looking harder at
this. But, I think right now, our effort, rightly, needs to
look at what it is that we need to do between now and the end
of this fighting season. There will be an assessment at the end
of this year, after which, undoubtedly, we'll make certain
tweaks, refinements, perhaps some significant changes to get us
to that point at which we obviously want to begin these
processes that we've talked about beginning in July 2011.
Senator Udall. Thanks, General. I see my time's expired.
I support the way forward, and I'm going to very carefully
study the assessments at the end of this year and as we move
forward.
Thank you for being here.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here. Again, thank you, to you
and to your wife, Holly, for again answering the call of duty.
We are going to miss you at MacDill in Tampa, but we know we'll
get you back to Florida eventually, like we get most folks to
Florida.
I also want to thank your senior team for also making the
sacrifice and the commitment to go with you. I know that is a
sacrifice. I am just very appreciative of all that you, your
wife, your family, and your team has done for this country.
General Petraeus. If I could, I'd just thank them, as well.
CENTCOM hasn't exactly been sitting on the beach at Florida,
much as we'd like to. A number of them have raised their right
hands and volunteered to go back into the fray here, and to
deploy to Afghanistan. I do appreciate that very much.
Senator LeMieux. General, you said, a moment ago, in
answering a question from Senator McCain, that you were not
consulted on the development of the drawdown date.
General Petraeus. I was consulted. Let's be very precise,
if I could--did we propose it or it was something like that. I
mean, we--there's no question that, in the final session, that
this was discussed and we support it and agree to it.
Senator LeMieux. But, it was not something that you
proposed?
General Petraeus. That is correct.
Senator LeMieux. Not something, as far as you're aware,
that was proposed by any of the other leadership of the
military?
General Petraeus. Not that I'm aware of.
Senator LeMieux. You're a student of military history in
this country, and you're well expert in it. Do you find that
the adoption of something like that, coming from the civilian
side, the elected leadership of the country, without being
offered by the military--do you find that to be normal, based
upon the history of this country?
General Petraeus. I'm not a student of every deliberation
that's ever taken place about this kind of stuff. I have
watched enough of them, though, as the Executive Officer to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and then, of course, in various
capacities as a general officer, to know that a whole lot of
things intrude that are--and appropriately intrude--because
there are many other interests out there than the strictly
military interests and strictly military advice.
In fact, I've had good conversations with individuals, in
recent days, about the role of a commander in a situation such
as that of being Commander, ISAF. In my view, it is to
understand the mission very clearly, to have dialogue with
one's chain of command, and ultimately the Commander in Chief,
to ensure that everyone understands it the same way--and, for
what it's worth, this is a process I went through with
President Bush at the beginning of the surge--to then develop
and recommend what is believed to be the right approach to
accomplish that mission; to assess the resources necessary to
enable implementation of that approach that military strategy,
and in this case, a civil-military strategy, frankly; to
identify the levels of risk associated with different levels of
resourcing; and then to have dialogue about all of that, as it
goes forward, recognizing that, when Commander, ISAF made a
recommendation to me, for example, as CENTCOM Commander, I had
a broader purview. It wasn't only about Afghanistan in CENTCOM,
we also certainly still had Iraq. There's Yemen, there's Iran,
there's Lebanon. There's a whole host of other challenges. It
goes to the Pentagon and, of course, now it's the whole world.
You also now start to have, probably, resource implications
and the opportunity costs of doing something in one place and
not in another. Obviously and appropriately, when it goes
across the river to the White House, the President has to be
interested in fiscal considerations, political considerations,
diplomatic considerations. All of that is appropriate.
Senator LeMieux. I understand.
General Petraeus. I won't find it unusual to have, again,
something be inserted that was not from the bottom up.
Senator LeMieux. I'm just trying to think of a precedent in
American history where we were fighting a war, and, before
we've won that war, we've decided that there would be a day
that we would start withdrawing our troops. Are you aware of
such a precedent?
General Petraeus. You might just go back and look, with
respect, at the 2005-2006 timeframe in Iraq; look at the
efforts at transitioning of tasks to Iraqi security forces
prior to the beginning of the surge, and so forth. I think I'd
be careful, if I could, with respect, Senator.
Senator LeMieux. The amount of troops that General
McChrystal had recommended was 40,000. The President agreed to
send 30,000 troops, with the understanding that 10,000 troops
would be drawn down upon from our international partners.
What's the status of those 10,000 troops?
General Petraeus. I think that right now you are always
recalculating numbers--but, the latest number that I was given
is that 9,700 have been pledged. Of that, I think about 60
percent of those are actually on the ground. Beyond that,
Secretary Gates has been given--and he has explained this
publicly--a ``flex factor,'' if you will, of some 10 percent on
top of the 30 percent, so that he doesn't need to go back to
the President if----
Chairman Levin. The 10 percent on top of the 30,000?
General Petraeus. I'm sorry--30,000, right--so that, if
required for emerging force protection needs and so forth, that
he can very quickly make determinations and enable the
deployment of those forces to protect our forces, or to deploy
something that is urgently needed without having to, again, get
into a deliberation.
Senator LeMieux. Are those international troops there
without caveats? Are they able to fight, just as our U.S.
troops are able to fight?
General Petraeus. It varies from country to country,
clearly. Certainly there are countries with caveats. For what
it's worth, when I was the commander in Iraq, many of the
international contributions had caveats, some of them official
and, by the way, some of them non-official, or unofficial.
Certainly, the coalition commander should ask for everything,
there's never been a coalition commander that wouldn't like
fewer caveats, more troops, more money, and now, by the way,
more bandwidth, as well, because bandwidth is another key need.
But, when you get all that, after having done that, your
job is to stop whining and to get on with it and put it all
together; understand the strengths and weaknesses, the
capabilities and limitations of each element in the force, and
try to make the best use of those elements that are provided.
Senator LeMieux. When you get on the ground in
Afghanistan--this will have to be my final question, because my
time is up--I assume you're going to make an evaluation of the
troops that have deployed, as well as our international
partners that have troops. Is it possible that, in the next
coming months, as you're on the ground making those decisions,
that you could request additional troops, beyond those that
have been pledged?
General Petraeus. Not only is it possible, I will, if
confirmed, do that at NATO when I am there. We're going to stop
at NATO, en route to Kabul, and there is a requirement for
forces that has not been met by NATO. This is a NATO standing
requirement for additional trainers. Chairman Levin talked at
considerable length about this, 2 weeks ago, as we worked our
way through the numbers of what the requirement is, what has
been already put on the ground, what is pledged, and then what
is still out there as a requirement. I will state to our NATO
partners the importance of filling, in particular, those
trainer and mentor billets, because that's all about the
development of the Afghan National Security Forces.
Senator LeMieux. My question wasn't clear enough. Is it
possible that you may ask the President for additional troops,
as well?
General Petraeus. Senator, as I said 2 weeks ago, as I said
this morning, I will offer my best professional military
advice, and if that's part of it, then that's what I'll
provide.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you again, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus. Thank you. Thanks for the tremendous
support that Florida provides to those at MacDill, and all of
our Armed Forces.
Senator LeMieux. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, I am glad that the President has chosen
you to be the Commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and
NATO's ISAF. There's nobody better equipped to do this job than
you. You wrote the counterinsurgency field manual when you were
the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center,
and you implemented it as the commander in Iraq during the
surge in troops and the change in the Iraqi strategy. You were
also fundamental in helping to shape President Obama's strategy
in Afghanistan. I want to say to you, thank you, and to Mrs.
Petraeus, for your continued sacrifice and service.
Mrs. Petraeus, I want to personally tell you how much we
all appreciate your support and personal sacrifice. Your
patriotism is most obvious. On behalf of the citizens and the
soldiers and the families in North Carolina, I just want to
tell you, once again, thank you very much.
General Petraeus, earlier today you mentioned that
President Karzai is sensitive to empowering provincial and
district governors in Afghanistan. It seems that President
Karzai tends to favor a more centralized government in Kabul.
As you mentioned, it's important that there is inclusivity and
transparency for all in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban
shadow governments continue to pose significant problems
throughout Afghanistan. How will you work with President Karzai
to continue to develop local Afghan Government capacity? How
will you ensure that President Karzai understands that it's in
his best interest to build the local governance capacity?
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, thanks, to all
those in the Tarheel State who do so much for our country. I'm
hard-pressed to think of three greater platforms than what you
have there with the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and what
a privilege it's been to serve at the center of the military
universe--that being, of course, Fort Bragg, NC.
With respect to the point about centralized government, of
course, the constitution is what mandates the centralization of
that government in Afghanistan, and President Karzai is, of
course, carrying out the law of that constitution. But, without
question, I will work very hard with Ambassador Eikenberry,
with Ambassador Mark Sedwill, with Ambassador Staffan de
Mistura, the special representative of the Secretary General of
the U.N., who, by the way, again, had that same position in
Iraq, to help President Karzai really operationalize these
qualities that he has identified as being essential to
successful local governance. Those are inclusivity and
transparency.
We've had long conversations about this. Ambassador
Holbrooke and I, after we did the review-of-concept drill, a
civil-military review-of-concept drill, a few months ago in
Kabul, which involved not just the U.S. and ISAF and coalition,
but also Afghan civilian, as well as military officials, sat
for over 2 hours with President Karzai, and talked about this
very subject. Because, again, we were giving him an outbrief
from the conduct of this drill, where we identified certain
areas that needed greater emphasis. Rule of law, by the way,
was one of them--the judicial sector of that, in particular--
and which he very much agrees with.
But, again, this discussion about, How do you ensure that
all elements of a local community, subdistrict, district,
province feel that they are represented adequately and fairly?
That's critical.
Arguably, one of the challenges in Kandahar is that that
situation does not obtain. That's why he went down there twice
in recent months alone to hold large shura councils. Folks will
say, ``Well, he stacked them with all his own players.'' You
could have fooled me, because some of them stood up, on camera,
with the microphone, and criticized the government, criticized
President Karzai. He did some self-criticism.
That's the kind of process that needs to be carried out so
that the people do feel that what the ``new Afghanistan,'' if
you will, offers--what the Government of Afghanistan offers--
is, indeed, a better future, a fairer one, and has brighter
prospects than the future that the Taliban might be able to
hold out.
The Taliban, in the past, has been able to play on
grievances, some of them quite legitimate. When there has been
predatory activity by local police or other security officials,
or government officials, that obviously plays into the
Taliban's hand. Clearly, the whole issue of corruption does, as
well. We've had conversations with President Karzai about that,
as well. He recognizes the seriousness of it. We have to help
him there. Indeed, there are structures and activities on both
the Afghan and the international side that have been
established in recent months that should be able to help with
that, including our task force, to look very hard at contracts.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
As CENTCOM Commander, you have been able to effectively
develop a good working relationship with the Pakistani military
leadership. How do you plan to utilize those relationships, as
Commander of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. That relationship is crucially important.
We worked it very hard, as did Admiral Mullen, and as did, by
the way, General McChrystal, who made a number of visits to
Islamabad to meet with General Kayani and with other Pakistani
officials. But, the relationship between the Afghan Government
and the Pakistani Government, between the militaries, and so
forth, is critical. As I mentioned earlier, they are always
going to be neighbors. They have had, at various times,
differing objectives in the future. What we need to do is to
help them realize that there are mutual objectives that could
help each country more, if they seek them, rather than by
seeking objectives that are in conflict.
Senator Hagan. Reportedly, Pakistan wants to have a role in
the Afghan reconciliation initiatives, with senior members of
the Afghan Taliban. It's also been reported that Pakistan wants
to be a channel to the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, and wants to
utilize reconciliation as a mechanism to influence Afghanistan
and avert Indian regional encirclement. How will you work with
the Afghan Government and military to manage Pakistan's
strategic interests?
General Petraeus. We can certainly facilitate that
dialogue; participate in the dialogue; be perhaps, an honest
broker in that dialogue. We are friends to both. We are
enormously enabling both in a tough fight. One of its fights,
by the way, is to keep our lines of communication open. You
enable us to provide substantial amounts of coalition support
funding to them, well over a billion dollars, for the course of
their past fiscal and calendar year. Well up into the hundreds
of billion--or, hundreds of millions in foreign military
financing and other mechanisms, plus the $1.5 billion of Kerry-
Lugar-Berman for each of the next 5 years. That's very
important. That's a symbol, again, of our sustained,
substantial commitment. It shows that we do not want to do to
them what we did after Charlie Wilson's war, which was, having
achieved the outcome that we wanted, washed our hands of it and
left. I think it's very important. They've seen that movie
before, as well. I think it's very important that they realize
that we are in this with them, with both of them--and, by the
way, with India, as well. India has legitimate interests in
this region, without question, as do others, if you want to
extend it further.
I think we can facilitate that. This would be--again, a
civil-military effort, very much. But, we'll use those
relationships that we have developed to that end.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. I see that my time is up. I know
you've had a long morning. We all look forward to your
confirmation.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
General, as you've reiterated, setting a July 2011 date to
begin reduction of our forces is a message of urgency to the
Afghan Government to take principal responsibility for their
own security by increasing the capacity of their security
forces, particularly their army.
Now, that message to the Afghan Government reflects the
urgency that I think we all feel. It's also an urgency for the
Afghan units that are capable of leading operations, to take
that leadership, particularly in Kandahar.
Now, there's another target of this message of urgency,
which is aimed at increasing the size and the capability of the
Afghan forces, and the hope and belief that they need to take
the lead in operations, particularly in Kandahar. That other
target, beside the Afghan Government, of this message, is the
Taliban itself.
The size and capability of the Afghan army, and having
Afghan forces leading operations more and more, is bad news for
the Taliban. Now, I've described that as the Taliban's worst
nightmare, because their propaganda, that they are fighting
against foreign forces who want to control Afghanistan, will
ring more and more hollow with the Afghan population as the
Afghan army, which has support of the Afghan people, is leading
the effort to defeat the insurgents. Is that something that you
would generally agree with?
General Petraeus. I would.
Chairman Levin. Now, finally, General, you were asked,
earlier, about the funding for the Iraq security forces.
According to a Defense Department report, the Iraq Minister of
Defense requested $7.4 billion as part of the 2010 budget, but
the Iraq Minister of Finance cut the request to $4.9 billion.
That's a $2\1/2\ billion cut in Iraqi support for their own
military, from the request that was made by the Minister of
Defense. Were you familiar with the Government of Iraq's cut to
the Ministry of Defense request?
General Petraeus. With respect, I missed that Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. That's all right.
General Petraeus. However, having heard it, I want to
assure you that I will communicate with my friend, Minister of
Finance, Bayan Jabbar, and express my concern about that, my
hope that they would increase that amount, and, if they can't
do it in the formal budget, to do it in a supplemental, such as
they have done in the past, because, it's very important that
they get full funding for their forces, just as, obviously, it
is for ours.
Chairman Levin. The Minister of Finance recently announced
that Iraq now has a windfall of an additional $10 billion in
oil revenue, above what it had budgeted for in 2010. Are you
familiar with that additional unexpected $10 billion in oil
revenues for Iraq?
General Petraeus. That sounds a bit high. It may be on
projections, frankly. I think that's going to fluctuate with
the price of oil, obviously. But, the fact is that they were
ahead of their projected revenues. That is something that we
typically watch. Once a month or so, we see that. That would
enable them, indeed, to fund it more fully, clearly, than he
did. I'll express that to him.
Chairman Levin. General, we thank you. We admire you
greatly. We wish you a successful mission, with all of your
troops. We add our thanks, to all of the people who work with
you, for, as you put it, raising their right hand, as well, and
those that are able to go back to Afghanistan to do so.
We will stand adjourned with, again, our gratitude to you
and to Mrs. Petraeus.
[Whereupon, at 12:49 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to GEN David H. Petraeus,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
afghanistan-pakistan strategy and major challenges
Question. What role, if any, did you play in the formulation of the
President's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Answer. In my position as Commander, U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), I was part of a group that included the President and his
national security team that engaged in an extensive review of our
options, mission, and objectives in Afghanistan. The review process
involved multiple sessions with the President, in which we discussed
and challenged the assumptions underlying the strategy in Afghanistan.
Additionally, the process included a review of the situation in
Pakistan, which is closely related to the situation in Afghanistan.
While participating in each of these sessions, I offered to the
President my best professional military advice.
Question. In his speech at West Point in December 2009, the
President formulated his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Do you agree with that strategy?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree with the President's decision to begin
reductions of U.S. forces in July 2011?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Why or why not?
Answer. I support the policy of the President. As the President has
stated, July 2011 is the point at which we will begin a transition
phase in which the Afghan Government will take more and more
responsibility for its own security. As the President has also
indicated, July 2011 is not a date when we will be rapidly withdrawing
our forces and ``switching off the lights and closing the door behind
us.''
The President's speech at West Point was intended to convey two
messages, one of enormous additional commitment and one of urgency. I
believe there was value in sending a message of urgency--July 2011--as
well as the message the President was sending of commitment--the
additional, substantial numbers of forces. But it is important that
July 2011 be seen for what it is: the date when a process begins, in
which the reduction of U.S. forces must be based on the conditions at
the time, and not a date when the U.S. heads for the exits, as the
President reiterated on 24 June.
Question. Do you agree with the President's decision that the pace
of reductions beginning in July 2011 will be conditions based?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Why or why not?
Answer. The pace of the drawdown of our forces in Afghanistan
should, as the President has stated, be a responsible one, based on
conditions on the ground beginning in July 2011, in order to ensure
that Afghanistan can build the capacity to take full responsibility for
its own security.
security situation in afghanistan
Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in
Afghanistan and the nature, size, and scope of the insurgency?
Answer. The security situation in Afghanistan remains tenuous, with
instability fueled by a resilient and still-confident insurgency,
tribal tensions, political challenges, and competition for influence in
the future. A deeply rooted criminal element, fueled by illicit
economic activity and the narcotics industry, further threatens
stability and continues to serve as an impediment to creating good
governance and effective security forces. The formal governance system
in Afghanistan appears weak, but is reinforced by strong power broker
networks. The nexus between weak formal structures and strong informal
ones is a key driver of support for the opposition and the insurgency,
and also fundamentally undermines insurgents' interest in
reconciliation and reintegration.
While the Taliban are the dominant Afghan insurgent group, the
insurgency is by no means monolithic. Moreover, primary motivations for
joining the insurgency have evolved over the past 5 years from
ideological affinity with Mullah Omar's beliefs to disenfranchisement
with local and national conditions. While the key goals and values of
insurgent leaders remain largely constant, an increasing percentage of
insurgents are motivated by intra-Pashtun rivalries, political
disenfranchisement, and the perception that the Taliban will eventually
emerge as the dominant Pashtun political entity in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, the strategic objectives of the Taliban-dominated
insurgency remain expelling foreign forces from Afghanistan, preventing
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) from
developing into an effective government, and reinstating the Islamist
Government headed by Mullah Omar. Insurgent leaders view their tactical
and operational losses in 2010 as inevitable and acceptable. The
Taliban believe they can outlast the Coalition's will to fight and
believe this strategy will be effective despite short-term losses. The
Taliban also believe they can sustain momentum and maintain operational
capacity. We assess that the Taliban strategy is largely designed to
establish influence over the Afghan population, by whatever means
necessary. In some cases this will mean exercising brutal, coercive
intimidation, and in other cases providing services for the population,
such as the application of Sha'ria law to fill the societal need for
speedy justice. Nevertheless, polling consistently shows that Afghan
public opinion is largely opposed to the Taliban, though public
sentiment also reflects dissatisfaction with the GIRoA in some areas.
It is difficult to arrive at quantitative estimates of Taliban
manpower. Even though the increase in International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) strength in 2010 caused some concern for insurgent
leaders, they continue to show an ability to adapt and respond to ISAF
changes, and the size and intensity of the insurgency has increased in
proportion to ISAF's expansion. The Taliban's increasing ability to
project its influence in Regional Command-South, Regional Command-
Southwest and Regional Command-East and to create instability in
Regional Command-West and Regional Command-North indicate the Taliban
suffer no shortage of manpower. They likely believe they will be able
to maintain their current strength and possibly grow.
Central to Taliban themes and messages is their depiction of ISAF
forces as occupiers supporting an apostate and corrupt regime. Senior
Taliban leaders understand the ISAF strategy and have made adjustments
to enhance their own population-centric insurgency in competition with
the ISAF counterinsurgency approach. They recognize the need to keep
the local population distanced from the GIRoA and ISAF, as exemplified
by the recent increase in assassinations, murder, and intimidation
tactics focused on Afghans who work with the GIRoA and ISAF. These are
traditional insurgent tactics, which the Taliban likely deem sufficient
to achieve their goals for the 2010 fighting season. They are unlikely
to significantly alter their strategy, except to adapt to local
conditions.
Afghans remain optimistic, however, about the direction of their
country, despite the many shortcomings of the GIRoA and the tumultuous
security environment. Afghans overwhelmingly prefer the GIRoA to the
Taliban. Additionally, many Afghans continue to support potential
negotiations with the Taliban to end the years-long conflict.
civilian-military cooperation in afghanistan
Question. What is your assessment of the current level of
cooperation and coordination between the military and civilian efforts
in Afghanistan to implement the counterinsurgency strategy, both within
the U.S. Government and between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) ISAF and international civilian entities?
Answer. My judgment is that the current level of civil-military
cooperation and coordination is good and has been strengthened during
the past year. Clearly, civil-military partnership is the key to
establishing unity of effort in all our activities. It is my intention
to take further steps to enhance civil-military planning and
coordination as we move ahead in our campaign in Afghanistan.
Much progress has been made in the past year. The Afghanistan-
Pakistan Strategic Implementation Plan of July 2009 called for greater
civil-military cooperation and directed the development of U.S.
Government integrated civil-military campaign plans for both
Afghanistan and Pakistan. These plans were cooperatively developed by
U.S. Embassy Kabul and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)/ISAF in
conjunction with CENTCOM and the office of the Special Representative
for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed, we are currently in the process
of reviewing the Afghanistan civil-military campaign plan to take into
account the adoption of development clusters by the Afghan Government
and the transition process which is being jointly developed by ISAF and
the Afghan Government.
Civil-military cooperation has also been strengthened with the
ongoing ``civilian surge'' of approximately 1,000 additional civilian
officials to help build governance and development capacity in
Afghanistan. The civilian surge has enabled ISAF and the ISAF Joint
Command Headquarters, along with each of the regional headquarters
staffs, to evolve into fully integrated civil-military teams. The
civilian surge has also increased civilian support at the provincial
level, where Provincial Reconstruction Teams and District Delivery
Teams are the tactical manifestation of our civil-military cooperative
efforts. They prioritize our collective efforts and help to enhance
unity of effort at the local level.
The appointment of a NATO Senior Civilian Representative, currently
Ambassador Mark Sedwill, as a NATO counterpart to Commander, ISAF has
greatly improved cooperation between ISAF and international civilian
agencies. Likewise, the appointment of Senior Civilian Representatives
to each of the regional headquarters has served to improve our overall
civil-military cooperation and coordination.
We have also undertaken to synchronize our civil-military
activities through periodic civil-military Rehearsal of Concept (ROC)
Drills, which have helped identify areas where we can improve our
partnership while giving us a shared understanding of future key events
and operations. The most recent ROC Drill, which I co-hosted in April
in Kabul with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, brought together the senior
leaders of practically every major Afghan, U.S., NATO, and
international agency operating in Afghanistan. The conference yielded
invaluable insights about how to better coordinate our collective
efforts, and it is our intent to conduct a follow-up ROC Drill in the
second half of this year.
building the afghan national security forces
Question. The current strategy for training and equipping the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) calls for growing the Afghan
National Army (ANA) to a level of 171,000 and the Afghan National
Police (ANP) to a level of 134,000 by October 2011.
In your view, will the currently-planned end strength levels for
the ANA and ANP be sufficient to provide security and stability in
Afghanistan, or should these end strength levels be increased? If
increased, what levels would you recommend for the ANA and the ANP?
Answer. I am aware of ongoing analysis by the NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) on the need for growth beyond currently
approved goals. While the exact numbers needed are still being
determined, I am not willing to say that the currently approved
strength of 305,600 will prove sufficient. If I am confirmed, within
90-120 days of assuming command, I will make my own assessment of the
need for any increase, provide that recommendation to the U.S. and NATO
chains of command, and continually assess the appropriate size and
structure of the ANSF to ensure that we do all possible to enable
transition of security tasks to Afghan forces as soon as is possible.
Question. What in your view are the greatest challenges to building
the capacity of the ANSF to assume responsibility for Afghanistan's
security?
Answer. The development of leaders remains our top priority and is
essential for building a professional ANSF. Leadership deficiencies
within the ANSF--including insufficient numbers of junior officers and
noncommissioned officers, gaps in the midgrade ranks, and the presence
of corruption in some ranks--pose the greatest threat to our Afghan
allies. Significant efforts have been made to improve leader
development programs, to include adding new and overhauling existing
ANA and ANP leader courses.
Attrition in some elements of the ANSF, particularly Afghan
National Civil Order Police and the southern ANA Corps, also remains a
problem. As we have executed our accelerated growth plans, it has
become apparent that a complex interaction exists amongst recruiting,
retention, and attrition. This interaction affects our efforts to meet
quantitative goals while maintaining adequate quality. In order to meet
both quantitative and qualitative objectives, training and instructor
shortfalls must be filled.
An additional challenge includes balancing current operational
requirements with the demands of long-term programs that are focused on
growth, quality, and supporting institutions. There is an inherent
tension between running long training and education programs, and
striving to keep a large percentage of the existing ANSF in near-
continuous operations. Our challenge is to find the appropriate balance
between the two demands.
NTM-A/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
manning remains a challenge. Though these organizations have received a
significant influx of U.S. personnel since November 2009, there remain
unfilled requirements. The Joint Staff, the Services, and SHAPE are
working to bring in personnel with the appropriate skill sets to meet
ANSF quantitative goals in a timely manner, while simultaneously
improving ANSF quality. If NTM-A/CSTC-A receives all confirmed NATO
pledges, it will have approximately 724 additional personnel, bringing
us to 91 percent of our required NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel.
Finally, internal security depends on the three pillars of
judiciary, corrections, and policing. While NTM-A/CSTC-A is directly
responsible for supporting policing, other organizations are
responsible for the development of corrections and the judiciary. The
lagging progress of the judiciary is a serious concern, and if
corrective measures are not taken soon to accelerate the development of
the justice system, the professionalization of the Afghan police will
be put at risk. It is for this reason that we have supported the
development of a civil-military rule of law task force.
Question. There remains a shortfall in the number of training
personnel required for the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A).
At a recent hearing, the committee heard testimony that NTM-A lacks 450
``institutional'' trainers. In addition 574 trainers have been pledged
by NATO members but have yet to arrive in theater, and another 235
trainers are ``pending'' confirmation from NATO member capitals.
Separately, the training effort is short some 14 Operational Mentoring
and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) for training the ANA and 140 Police OMLTs for
building the capabilities of the ANP.
What is your assessment of the ANA?
Answer. The ANA remains the most respected element of the ANSF.
ANA, and police forces are now jointly leading security efforts in
Kabul. They have recently conducted joint air mobile operations in the
north, where Afghan Air Force helicopters transported army forces to
support local police. Moreover, ANA commanders are now partnering with
coalition forces during joint operational planning.
In IJC's most recent assessment of ANSF operational effectiveness,
5 of 19 assessed ANA brigades are capable of planning, executing, and
sustaining regional security operations with limited, yet still
essential, support from partnered ISAF units. The remaining 14 brigades
are assessed as requiring partnered assistance to conduct the majority
of their functions. Of the major ANA headquarters assessed, two (205th
Corps and 111th Capital Division) are assessed as capable of performing
their missions with limited support, while the remaining five major
headquarters require comprehensive ISAF support.
The ANA still lacks the combat power to adequately secure terrain,
but new ANA growth is helping to ameliorate this shortcoming. The ANA's
logistics efforts need greater emphasis, but the planned fielding of
greater logistics assets should improve the Afghans' ability to
adequately sustain themselves.
Question. What in your view should be done to encourage NATO allies
to provide more institutional trainers?
Answer. Nations are generally resistant to additional contributions
for two reasons: money and force caps. With regard to money, we can
encourage our NATO allies by allowing the use of Afghanistan Security
Forces Funds (ASFF) or Lift and Sustain money, when appropriate, to
fund the deployment and life support of trainers. In some cases,
especially regarding police trainers, allied organizations that are
potential contributors to NTM-A do not have sufficient funding to
support the deployment of their trainers. Under current U.S. policy, we
cannot provide funding if nations do not qualify for L&S support or if
the organization in question is outside the Ministry of Defense (MoD)
structure.
In the case of non-MoD forces, exceptions to policy may be made for
nations already approved for L&S funding. However, L&S funds only cover
MoD forces, and not police forces that work with the Ministry of the
Interior. To meet this critical gap, NTM-A has sought approval to use
ASFF funding for police trainers during the next 2 fiscal years to ease
the issue of funding and provide resources for vital trainers during
this critical period of ANSF growth.
In addition, we should continue to coordinate and facilitate
countries willing to donate funding for other countries that are
willing to deploy but lack the necessary funds. The United Arab
Emirates, for example, recently made a generous offer to help fund
deployments to assist in overcoming the shortage of required trainers.
NATO members are also constrained by force cap issues. Several
member nations have limitations on the number of forces they can have
in theater. Germany, Spain, France, U.K., and Italy are all examples of
nations that could provide more trainers but are unable to do so
because of domestic political reluctance to increase troop numbers. To
overcome some of these force cap issues, we should ask our NATO allies
to send instructors to teach in ANSF schools on a rotational, temporary
duty basis. This would provide the specialized trainers required, while
building capacity for the Afghan forces and enhancing the expertise of
coalition partners.
Question. What should be done to encourage NATO allies to provide
additional OMLTs and Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams
(POMLTs)?
Answer. In addition to the proposals I have already mentioned, the
United States can encourage our allies to provide more OMLTs and POMLTs
by offering to provide NATO interoperable equipment that would give the
OMLTs/POMLTs greater capability to move and communicate. Many nations
are unable to equip their forces to meet NATO standards. The United
States supports many such nations now, although we are constrained by
our own resource requirements and the overall shortage of critical
assets such as mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) (though the MRAP
shortage will be eliminated late this fall).
Additionally, many Central and East European nations require U.S.
augmentation, often through the State Partnership Program, to fill
critical billets within the OMLT/POMLTs. We can continue to provide
this augmentation, within the limits of our own force limitations.
partnering with afghan security forces
Question. The committee received a briefing on plans for the
campaign in Kandahar, which called for the deployment of Afghan and
ISAF security forces partnered together to provide a ``rising tide'' of
security in and around Kandahar over a period of months.
How many Afghan troops are there now in Kandahar?
Answer. As of 27 June, the ANA's 205th Corps has 7,261 soldiers
present for duty in Kandahar province. New expansions to the ANA have
allowed the 205th Corps to focus its efforts on Kandahar, effectively
doubling the number of Afghan troops there, and additional new forces
are expected to reach the 205th Corps in the remainder of 2010 and in
2011.
Question. How many Afghan troops are there now in Helmand?
Answer. As of 27 June, the ANA's newly formed 215th Corps has 6,794
soldiers present for duty in Helmand province. Over the remainder of
2010, the 215th Corps will continue to be fielded towards its
authorized strength of 11,000.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you recommend to
increase the number of operations in which Afghan security forces are
in the lead, particularly in RC-South?
Answer. The tested concept of embedded partnering remains our most
critical tool to increase the effectiveness of ANSF. As we complete the
Coalition force flow and concentrate our combined efforts in both
Helmand and Kandahar, embedded partnerships will enable us to
accelerate the development of the fielded Afghan force and foster
stronger leadership. The Afghans' local knowledge, cultural
understanding, and intuitive feel for the operating environment,
coupled with our technology, air assets, and logistics support are
proving time and time again to be a powerful combination.
Over time, this partnership will result in Afghan units that
increasingly operate as the supported force in even more operations,
and to a greater degree than they do today. Although coalition forces
are already serving in a supporting role in many areas, we still
provide many of the required enabling capabilities, such as access to
fires, air assets, and logistics support. Even in a supporting
capacity, our role will still be very significant. Embedded partnering
will allow us to reduce the scope of our supporting role over time as
Afghan forces continue to develop these capabilities for themselves.
Afghan soldiers, police, and National Directorate of Security
representatives recognize the great value of embedded partnering,
appreciate sharing the risk, and want to lead.
contract oversight and private security contractors
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you recommend to
ensure adequate oversight is in place for U.S. and ISAF contracts in
Afghanistan?
Answer. We will continue to work closely with the Commission on
Wartime Contracting to implement their recommendations, while
leveraging the newly established Joint Theater Support Contracting
Command. This will eliminate duplicative contracts and ensure
appropriate clauses are included in contracts. We will also strive to
ensure sufficient manning of contracting officer representatives for
all critical contracts.
As we continue to refine inputs for Afghanistan, we have determined
the need to redesignate Task Force Spotlight under one-star leadership
and to stand up Task Force 2010 to manage contracts below prime
contractor level. This will enable us to adequately enforce provisions
requiring prime contractors and private security contractors (PSCs) to
report detailed census data, 100 percent synchronized pre-deployment
and operational tracker and biometric registration, 100 percent
individual arming authorization, and serious incident reporting.
Accurate and detailed information of this nature is paramount for
effective oversight to prevent contracts below the prime contractor
level from falling into the hands of malign actors.
Question. The committee's review of Department of Defense (DOD)
private security contracts found that private security companies
actively recruit from the Afghan security forces and frequently pay
more than the Afghan security forces. DOD reported in October 2009 that
``private security contractors are, on average, paid more'' than the
Afghan security forces.
If so, what steps would you envision taking to correct that
problem, if confirmed?
Answer. Task Force Spotlight is currently examining the issue to
ensure Afghan security forces' wages are competitive with those of
PSCs. One solution may be to build comparative salary caps into our
contracts to ensure PSCs and ANSF are paid more equitably. However, we
must do so without degrading the quality of PSCs recruited, and without
subverting the ability of companies to pay the fair market value for
services. We are also taking steps to share biometric data collected by
the Government of Afghanistan on ANSF personnel to ensure companies do
not hire ANSF personnel who are absent without leave.
Question. There is evidence that DOD security contractors are
relying on local warlords and strongmen to provide men to staff their
guard forces.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that:
a. providers of manpower for security contractors are properly
vetted; and
b. that individuals we rely on for security are not detracting from
the counterinsurgency mission?
Answer. To ensure proper vetting of PSCs, we must demand their
immediate adherence to existing contractual requirements. We have not
adequately enforced current provisions requiring prime contractors and
PSCs to report detailed census data, register their employees properly,
report serious incidents. Biometric data has been collected on only
about 4,500 PSC and employees.
To reduce the influence of malign actors and power brokers, we must
leverage our intelligence communities and investigative agencies to
bring actionable information into the contracting process. We may need
legislative flexibility to terminate contracts for bad actors or to
award contracts to those who adhere to requirements and are committed
to partnering in the counterinsurgency campaign. Task Forces Spotlight
and Task Force 2010 have been charged to examine these issues within
USFOR-A.
To ensure that PSCs are not detracting from the counterinsurgency
mission, we must require that they adhere to rules for the use of
force, guidelines for escalation of force, and the principles of the
Law of Armed Conflict. They must use only appropriate and measured
force for defensive purposes. To this end, we will work with the
Government of Afghanistan to ensure PSC personnel are properly trained,
regulated, inspected, and investigated when required.
Our counterinsurgency mission depends heavily on perceptions, and
therefore requires a clear distinction between licensed, trained, and
restrained PSCs that help us accomplish our mission, and illegally
armed groups that must be disbanded and held accountable for their
actions. As the security environment in Afghanistan improves, our need
for PSCs will diminish, but in the meantime, we will use legal,
licensed, and controlled PSCs to accomplish appropriate missions.
reintegration and reconciliation
Question. In your assessment, what percentage of low- to mid-level
Taliban fighters may be willing to reintegrate with Afghan society and
switch to supporting the Afghan Government if provided the right
incentives, such as protection from reprisal and employment?
Answer. It is difficult to make a reliable estimate of low- to mid-
level Taliban fighters willing to reintegrate, given the uncertainty
regarding incentives and guarantees of protection and employment.
Theoretically, it is possible to reintegrate many insurgent fighters--
indeed, all those that are not the ideologically driven, irreconcilable
insurgents. Practically, the primary challenge to the reintegration
process is that the Afghan Government must identify the right
incentives and provide the necessary resources to ensure the effective
and sustained reintegration of these fighters--all with coalition
support and partnership, to be sure. The government must also develop
the reconcilable fighters' confidence that it can deliver on
reintegration promises, and must overcome the issue of corruption by
some government and ANSF representatives that erodes trust in local
governance. The program must also overcome the potentially corrosive
effects of local power brokers who may inhibit its impartial
implementation. In addition, overcoming the traditional Pashtunwali
concept of revenge and reprisal may take a significant amount of time,
as may overcoming the belief of other ethnic groups that the program
would unfairly benefit and empower Pashtuns.
Additionally, not every insurgent fighter will need to be
reintegrated through a government program. Under the right
circumstances, many will simply desire to stop fighting and return
home, though we do not have a reliable estimate of this number. We
assess that there are fighters who would not need government assistance
to transition out of the insurgency, but we would encourage reconciled
insurgents identify themselves in case they later decided to take
advantage of government assistance in reintegration.
Question. What is your assessment of the reintegration plan that
has been developed by the Government of Afghanistan with ISAF
assistance?
Answer. The Afghan Government's reintegration plan will be of
central importance in our efforts to improve Afghanistan's security and
long-term stability. This GIRoA program, currently under final review
by President Karzai, offers the potential to reduce violence and
provide realistic avenues to assimilate Pashtun insurgents back into
Afghanistan society.
Afghan officials are still working to provide implementation
details in a few key areas of the plan. First, the deliberate process
for identification, tracking, execution, and oversight of the
reintegration process from start to finish still has to be refined.
These formal program processes are critical to ensure accurate
reporting, identification of key insurgent candidates for
reintegration, adequate protection of citizens and former insurgents,
and impartial administration. Additionally, an oversight process will
be needed to ensure compliance with standards and provide mechanisms
for redress of systemic Afghan societal problems that have helped fuel
the insurgency. The success of this program will require substantial
support and resources from ISAF at national and local levels, which we
will be prepared to provide.
It will be important to ensure that reintegration processes are put
into place and made functional speedily, so that GIRoA's invitation for
insurgents to formally reintegrate can yield rapid results. Previous
reintegration initiatives have failed, in part, because program
implementation moved more slowly than policy discussion. Another
failure of this sort could well harden insurgents to reject further
reintegration overtures, and could risk dramatically eroding public and
international trust and confidence in the Afghan Government. Finally,
reintegration success will depend in part on enduring improvements in
security and local governance, and on the perception that malign
powerbrokers and corrupt government activities are being addressed and
significantly reduced.
civilian casualties and rules of engagement
Question. A critical objective of the counterinsurgency strategy is
to provide protection to the Afghan people, including minimizing the
risk of civilian casualties. ISAF has issued revised procedures aimed
at reducing the risk to civilians from military operations.
In your view, do the current rules of engagement (ROEs) in
Afghanistan, for both NATO and U.S. forces, provide the necessary
flexibility to allow forces to engage the enemy, protect themselves,
and minimize the risk of civilian casualties?
Answer. There is an inherent tension in counterinsurgency
operations between engaging the enemy and protecting the population. In
fact, in the past few days, I have had a good discussion with President
Karzai on this topic, noting that, if confirmed, I would continue the
emphasis on reducing loss of civilian life in the course of operations
to an absolute minimum, while also ensuring that we provide whatever
assets are necessary to ensure the safety of ISAF and Afghan forces
when they are in a tough spot. As we have done in numerous after action
reports and through other feedback mechanisms in recent months, we will
need to continue to educate our leaders on the implementation of the
ROE moving forward.
Question. If confirmed, what general changes, if any, would you
make to the current ROEs?
Answer. One of my highest priorities, should I be confirmed as
Commander of USFOR-A, will be to assess the effect of our ROE on the
safety of our forces and the successful conduct of our mission.
health of the forces
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of health and
mental health capabilities supporting our expanding force structure in
Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe that our forces in Afghanistan are properly
postured with health professionals and required medical assets. A
comprehensive Health Service Support assessment was completed as part
of the force expansion planning, and we have worked closely with JFCOM
and the Services to completely source all new requirements in medical
force structure.
In mental health support, we continue to refine our capabilities
and assess this complex concern. We recently responded to
recommendations made by Mental Health Advisory Team-6 and we are
increasing behavioral health personnel to meet and maintain the
recommended 1:700 ratio, while also appointing a theater behavioral
health consultant that will proactively manage the provision of
behavioral health services throughout Afghanistan.
Question. How do you intend to implement the new DOD Policy on
management of mild traumatic brain injury throughout Afghanistan
including working with NATO forces?
Answer. The DOD policy for mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI)
(concussion) gives specific direction to line leaders and medical
personnel in their response to mTBI. It also addresses exposures to
blast events that are potentially related to mTBI. I will continue to
ensure appropriate command emphasis is placed on this crucial effort to
identify, evaluate, and manage all personnel exposed to potential
concussive events, as defined in the policy. In addition, CENTCOM
continues to develop a joint solution to track all such exposures by
utilizing the operational Combined Information Data Network Exchange
system already in use in theater. This will provide us a mechanism to
ensure proper evaluation, post-event rest period, and future evaluation
based on exposure to multiple events. While this DOD policy will not
apply to other NATO forces, we will work to ensure the impact of its
requirements on our coalition partners is minimized.
Question. Will you, if confirmed, assess the adequacy of sexual
assault and suicide prevention programs and if necessary request
additional resources to support these essential programs?
Answer. Yes.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this
committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the ISAF Commander/Commander,
USFOR-A?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
wanat, afghanistan
1. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, last week the Army reversed
a decision to reprimand commanders who had responsibility for the nine
troops who were killed at Wanat. The decision to issue reprimands was
based on an inquiry that you ordered to be conducted. In March 2010,
letters of reprimand were issued to three officers for ``failing to
properly prepare defenses'' at Wanat. This decision provided some
vindication for the families, who maintained that their sons were left
vulnerable by the chain of command. General Charles Campbell, USA,
Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command, who conducted the review of your
inquiry, revoked the reprimand, citing that it would have a ``chilling
effect'' on ground operations. The Army said that the second look at
the incident proved that the officers were ``neither negligent nor
derelict'' and that ``their actions were reasonable under the
circumstances.''
One of those nine dead young men was Corporal Gunnar Zwilling, a
Missouri native. His father, Kurt Zwilling, has been fighting a long
time to get answers about what happened to his son and the reversal by
the Army was really hard for him to take. It took away some measure of
closure or explanation for the tragedy at Wanat. As we move into the
next critical phase in the fight in Afghanistan, it is critical that
our military leaders learn from the tragic lessons of Wanat and
continue to work in every manner possible to protect our brave men and
women in harm's way. Further, where there is a question about command
decisions in instances where we lose soldiers in battle, the Army must
better be able to review the questions and arrive at a single,
responsible and definitive response. An ever-wavering process only
provides for uncertainty and pain and erodes confidence in Army's
leadership. As you modify and implement the current counterinsurgency
strategy, do you anticipate continuing to use small outposts like the
one at Wanat?
General Petraeus. Beginning in 2009, senior U.S. commanders, in
conjunction with International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the
ISAF Joint Command, have been reviewing some of our more remote
outposts, weighing the value that they provide to the campaign against
the risk that they pose to our troopers on the ground. Through this
process, we have in fact closed some outposts when it was determined
that the outpost provided little or no tactical value but presented
significant risk to the small element based there. It is, however,
important to differentiate between remote outposts like Wanat and the
combat outposts that we routinely employ around population centers like
Kandahar. In order to separate the Taliban and other insurgent groups
from the population, it is critical that we and our Afghan National
Security Force partners live among the people we are protecting.
Additionally, Special Forces units will continue to have small elements
operating in remote locations as part of our efforts to build local
protection forces and deny access support to our enemies in these
remote areas.
2. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, are these outposts an
effective use of resources and manpower in the context of fighting the
broader war?
General Petraeus. Combat outposts that protect the population and
deny insurgents access to that population are an essential component of
our counterinsurgency campaign and an effective use of resources.
Additionally, we often find it necessary to station forces in remote
locations in order to achieve some tactical or operational advantage
over the insurgency. When we do so, however, it is the result of a
deliberate decisionmaking process that weighs the cost and benefits of
putting our troopers in that outpost.
3. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, how will you balance force
protection with getting out to the Afghan people?
General Petraeus. One of the key paradoxes in counterinsurgency is
that when you focus too much on force protection, you inherently make
yourself less safe. Finding the balance between force protection and
operational effectiveness requires partnering our extremely capable
ISAF troopers with Afghan soldiers and police who are more culturally
aware. Beyond this, our commanders have to make difficult but
deliberate choices about where and why we establish combat outposts.
When we choose to position forces in remote outposts, our obligation is
to ensure those forces are sufficiently resourced and have the ability
to defend themselves. Commanders at every level have to make these
decisions, and we have to give them the flexibility to use their best
tactical judgment.
4. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, do you feel that there was
real accountability for this incident with all of these investigations?
General Petraeus. I stand by the findings of fact, opinions, and
recommendations I endorsed as Commander, U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM). This was a thorough investigation, undertaken with
painstaking attention to detail over a 3-month period. Efforts included
reviewing over 4,000 pages of documentation, reams of information, and
interviews of all personnel involved in the incident. I remain
committed to the thoroughness and accuracy of the report as well as my
recommendations. I also support the administrative process by which it
was adjudicated.
5. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, how will you treat the fact
that the Army has produced what are essentially conflicting results on
this case?
General Petraeus. CENTCOM was responsible for the investigation
that primarily focused on the facts and circumstances that preceded the
combat action at Wanat, Afghanistan on 13 July 2008. The Army did not
dispute the findings of fact and opinions in my report. Those details
were critical to our understanding of what occurred and how we can
hopefully avoid incidents like this in the future. They have been used
to develop lessons learned which are being shared throughout our
various service programs and in pre-deployment training. This process I
see as vital. The Army, having administrative control for the officers
involved, was responsible for any actions against those officers. Any
questions regarding ``reconciling'' the CENTCOM investigation with the
Army review and actions in this case should be directed to the
Department of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
lashkar-e-taiba
6. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, there are indications that
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has a growing role in Afghanistan. As you are
aware, LeT is the Pakistani-based militant group identified with
attacks on Indian targets (most notably the 2008 Mumbai terrorist
attack), and there are fears that it has expanded its operations in
Afghanistan, reportedly inflicting casualties on Afghans and Indians
alike, setting up training camps, and adding new volatility to
relations between India and Pakistan. The New York Times wrote recently
that LeT is believed to have planned or executed three major attacks
against Indian Government employees and private workers in Afghanistan
in recent months, according to Afghan and international intelligence
officers and diplomats in Afghanistan. Some fear that Afghanistan could
become a proxy location for clashes between India and Pakistan.
In addition, some believe that former and current Pakistani Inter-
Services Intelligence officers could be encouraging LeT's activities in
Afghanistan. Many analysts say that it is likely that LeT has had help
from other terrorist groups to get into Afghanistan and perhaps was
assisted by the Haqqani network. In March, during CENTCOM's posture
hearing with the Senate Armed Services Committee, I flagged concerns
for you that LeT's role may be expanding in the region, and even around
the world. Are you concerned about LeT potentially causing greater
trouble along the border with Pakistan and in Afghanistan itself?
General Petraeus. Senator McCaskill, there is no doubt LeT is a
capable and dangerous terrorist organization with the intent to bring
harm to anyone with a vested interest in a stable Afghanistan. LeT has
maintained a presence in Afghanistan since its inception in the late
1980s; however, that presence has been relatively small vis-a-vis the
Afghan Taliban. We will continue to monitor and make efforts to counter
the influence of LeT in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
7. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, is it possible that LeT has
had support from other terrorist groups, such as the Haqqani network?
General Petraeus. Because LeT shares similar goals with other
terrorist and insurgent groups in the region, it is possible that LeT
has had support from other groups. LeT and the Haqqani network may
mutually support each other in Afghanistan, however on a limited basis.
8. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, how seriously do you take
assertions about the potential for Afghanistan to become a proxy area
for clashes between India and Pakistan?
General Petraeus. I take this issue very seriously and remain
committed to ensuring that Afghanistan does not become a proxy area for
clashes between India and Pakistan. I plan to work closely with Admiral
Mullen, CENTCOM, Ambassador Eikenberry, Ambassador Holbrooke, and
Ambassador Patterson to facilitate a cooperative and productive
relationship between the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In
order to succeed in Afghanistan, ISAF must continue to work closely
with Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to promote
regional security, stability, and cooperation between Afghanistan and
all of its neighbors and regional partners.
9. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, is there the potential that
LeT could be planning to attack U.S. targets in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. One of LeT's strategic goals is to eliminate U.S.
and western influence in Afghanistan. With the increase of coalition
forces in Afghanistan, the potential exists for increased targeting of
U.S. personnel and assets. As with all threats to our U.S. and
coalition forces, we continue to closely track all indications of
planned attacks and take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety
of our troopers.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
assessment of afghanistan
10. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, the mission in Afghanistan is
now in its 8th year and is currently at a very critical stage. The
spring/summer offensive has started and casualties are increasing along
with public disapproval. What do you envision as a show-stopper in
meeting the President's projected date to begin a drawdown in forces in
June 2011?
General Petraeus. I support the President's decision to begin a
process of responsible transition in July 2011. The thinning out of our
forces will be a conditions-based process based on our commanders'
assessments of what is occurring on the ground.
11. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, what will be your first
priority after you complete your initial assessment of the mission?
General Petraeus. My assumption of command represents a change in
personnel, not a change in the President's policy. As President Obama
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General
Rasmussen have noted, our military objectives remain the same. To that
end, we must first secure and serve the people of Afghanistan in
cooperation with our Afghan partners, thereby providing time and space
for enduring governance and development initiatives to take root. To
accomplish this priority objective, we must help Afghan leaders develop
their security forces and governance capacity so that they can, over
time, take on the tasks of securing their country and see to the needs
of their people.
12. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, what do you see as
impediments to fully implementing a whole-of-government approach in
Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. While striking the appropriate balance between a
counterinsurgency campaign and laying the foundation for sustainable
long-term stability is never easy, U.S. forces in Afghanistan are
wholly committed to supporting the President's strategy and achieving
the closest possible partnership between civilian and military
personnel. Our teams strive daily to ensure our efforts work in tandem
to implement a whole-of-government approach. Success in Afghanistan,
however, is contingent upon more than simply U.S. synchronization. We
must achieve unity within NATO, the broader international community,
and the Government of Afghanistan if we are to succeed in our efforts
to protect the Afghan people. Possible impediments to implementing a
whole-of-government approach could include the withdrawal of key
coalition civilian or military capabilities. To ensure these
impediments do not arise, we continue to coordinate and update
requirements closely with our NATO and coalition partners.
13. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, do you envision a scenario
where you would want a significant amount of the personnel and
equipment being drawn down from Iraq being diverted to Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. In my role as the Commander of U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan, I would command only those forces in theater once they are
provided by the Services. Given the current situation and the uplift of
U.S. and NATO forces, I do not currently foresee a requirement for
additional forces. However, if circumstances arise that require the
commitment of additional forces, I will not hesitate to request those
troops or capabilities required.
As the CENTCOM Commander, I worked closely with the Services to
deploy refurbished MRAP vehicles from Operation Iraqi Freedom and
anticipate this process will continue for this critical force
protection system. Further questions regarding force generation and
equipping could be better addressed by the Joint Staff and the
Services.
14. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, do you envision a bigger role
for Reserve component forces to take advantage of their civilian-
acquired skill sets?
General Petraeus. The Reserve component forces play a critical role
in Afghanistan. They bring with them a high level of maturity and
civilian-skill sets that we are able to leverage in theater. However,
the sourcing of forces, whether Active, Reserve, or National Guard, is
determined by the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command and approved by
the Secretary of Defense. As Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, my
role is to determine the requirements for forces and capabilities, and
then command those forces in theater once sourcing decisions are made
and the forces deployed by their respective Services. Therefore, I
cannot speak directly to the future commitment of Reserve component
forces in theater. The Joint Staff and the Services could best answer
this question.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
protecting the afghan population
15. Senator Thune. General Petraeus, the Taliban reportedly
attacked a wedding celebration in Arghandab District a few weeks ago,
killing at least 40 people. There are also reports that the Taliban
executed a 7-year-old child in Helmand province for cooperating with
the Afghan Government. With regard to the village where the wedding
party was attacked, what have we done to provide assistance to the
survivors, and since this village was clearly allied with us against
the Taliban, why weren't we able to protect it?
General Petraeus. We believe that the Arghandab wedding was
specifically targeted due the large number of Afghan National Police
(ANP) who were present. This particularly brutal attack was perpetrated
by an insurgent who employed a Suicide Vehicle Born Improvised
Explosive Device, or in plain language a car bomb. By our numbers, he
killed 38 Afghans, 14 of whom were Afghan Police. Eighty-four others
were wounded in the attack.
Our intelligence analysis determined that this was not a revenge
killing, and the Taliban appear to have specifically targeted the ANP
officers attending the wedding. This terrible act illustrates the
desperation of the Taliban. While increased violence at the hands of
the Taliban is deplorable, it must be viewed in context. Heightened
violence throughout the summer was anticipated by ISAF as a result of
our increased operational tempo and efforts to separate the population
from the insurgency.
ISAF forces conducted key leader engagements with the ANP following
this tragedy and extended its greatest condolences to the families of
those who were wounded or killed. However, as ISAF was not involved in
the incident itself, the Afghan Government is responsible for providing
assistance to the survivors who were members of the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF).
16. Senator Thune. General Petraeus, isn't it one of our strategic
goals to protect the population?
General Petraeus. Protecting the population is the priority of
effort and it is ISAF's first line of operation. Our counterinsurgency
doctrine places particular emphasis on the population's importance.
Security, however, is not a blanket that can be pulled out of a closet
and thrown over Afghanistan. It must be woven into the population with
their own people providing that security. As we continue to deploy more
ISAF and ANSF forces into former insurgent safe havens to create what
we have characterized as a ``rising tide of security,'' we can expect
that the Taliban will resort to high profile attacks such as these. As
we continue to build the size and capabilities of the ANSF, we will
also reach a point where our Afghan partners are capable of taking more
of this responsibility with ISAF forces assuming more of a support
role.
17. Senator Thune. General Petraeus, what will happen to this
village when we start to pull troops out of Afghanistan in July 2011?
General Petraeus. The President's strategy calls for beginning to
withdraw troops from Afghanistan in July 2011. The President has also
made very clear that the pace of the withdrawal will be conditions
based. A withdrawal of force will occur according to the security
conditions on the ground and in a responsible manner. Our strategic
main effort is the Afghan Security Forces. We currently plan to build
the Army up to 134,000 and the Police up to 109,000 by October 2010;
these numbers increase to 171,600 soldiers and 134,000 police by
October 2011. Additionally, President Karzai has recently approved the
creation of the MOI Afghan Local Police, which will not count against
ANSF numbers, but will enhance community security and link communities
to the Afghan Government. ISAF will not transition responsibility for a
particular district or province until the commanders on the ground
believe that the Afghan National Security Forces are capable of
addressing the internal and external threats and protecting the
population.
army/air force duplicative unmanned vehicles
18. Senator Thune. General Petraeus, the Army's fiscal year 2011
budget proposal requested over $578 million toward the acquisition of
MQ-1 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as their payload and
weaponization. With that money, the Army would buy 26 more aircraft
next year in addition to the 24 purchased this year with 158 total
aircraft in the Army inventory by the end of 2015. By comparison, the
Air Force has 144 MQ-1 remotely piloted aircraft today. The rationale
for these duplicative purchases is that there is an urgent need for
more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms in
the field. Specifically, the Air Force has been tasked to provide 65
combat air patrols (CAPs) on a daily basis using these types of
aircraft. What is your view of the use of the Army's MQ-1 aircraft in
Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. There is in fact a need for additional ISR
platforms to support our operations in Afghanistan and the Army UAVs
work very effectively--as do various Air Force platforms. We are
working closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Services to
ensure that we have all of the capabilities that our troopers need,
including unmanned aerial systems.
19. Senator Thune. General Petraeus, shouldn't we be using these
aircraft to augment the Air Force's capabilities in order to achieve
the requested goal of 65 CAPs?
General Petraeus. It is important to get the UAVs into theater
where they support our requirements. There remains more demand than we
have resources available and we need additional capability, regardless
of whether it is provided by the Army or the Air Force.
20. Senator Thune. General Petraeus, with the drawdown of all
combat troops in Iraq this August, and I assume this includes UAVs,
what kind of immediate increase in capacity do you expect will be
available to you in Afghanistan in terms of UAVs?
General Petraeus. I currently do not anticipate an immediate
increase in UAV capacity in Afghanistan due to the drawdown in Iraq.
Fewer forces on the ground do not translate into an immediate reduction
of intelligence requirements. It is even possible that the requirements
will go up for a time. CENTCOM carefully balances capabilities across
its area of operations and I am confident our requirements will remain
under consideration during the drawdown process. Secretary Gates has
placed considerable emphasis on increasing ISR capability for our
deployed forces, but there is still much work to do in this regard.
21. Senator Thune. General Petraeus, how will this immediate
increase in capacity aid with the counterinsurgency strategy of
securing the Afghan population?
General Petraeus. I currently do not anticipate an immediate
increase in UAV capacity in Afghanistan due to the drawdown in Iraq.
Fewer forces on the ground do not translate into an immediate reduction
of intelligence requirements. It is even possible that the requirements
will go up for a time. CENTCOM carefully balances capabilities across
its area of operations and I am confident our requirements will remain
under consideration during the drawdown process. Secretary Gates has
placed considerable emphasis on increasing ISR capability for our
deployed forces, but there is still much work to do in this regard.
22. Senator Thune. General Petraeus, Secretary Gates has directed
each Service to find savings of $2 billion in next year's budget. What
synergies do you envision could be made between the Army and the Air
Force with regard to unmanned capabilities and where do you think they
can save money and reduce duplication?
General Petraeus. The role as Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
is to command the forces provided by the Services within the theater of
operations. With regards to redundancies or efficiencies, I believe
that the Defense Department and the Services could provide a more
useful perspective.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
success in afghanistan
23. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, what is your definition of
victory or success in Afghanistan? Is that definition the same as the
President's definition?
General Petraeus. As the President stated in his December 1 West
Point address, our core goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle,
and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent it from
threatening America and our allies in the future. To meet that goal we
must deny al Qaeda a safe haven, reverse the Taliban's momentum and
deny it the ability to overthrow the government, and strengthen the
capacity of Afghanistan's Security Forces and government so that they
can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future. Success in
Afghanistan will be defined by durable, measurable progress towards
these objectives. We are working to ensure that the insurgency is
defeated within Afghan capacity; that the ANSF has self-sufficient
capacity for the provision of security; that legitimate connections
between the national government and local communities (local,
traditional structures that are sufficiently inclusive) are more than
`Afghan good enough;' and that a degree of stability is achieved that
allows for the provision of basic services, economic development, and
the establishment of governance. To attain these goals, we must
continuously assess the security situation in districts and sub-
districts. In order to sufficiently protect the population, our focus
will also assess the ANSF in different efforts and locations-not just
with regard to quantity, but also to their level of contribution,
capability, and quality. We will also look for the establishment of
local governance, services, and processes in a given area. We will need
to conduct a granular assessment along the way to ensure that we
understand if our approach is enabling the outcome we want to achieve.
afghan mineral deposits
24. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, do you believe that the
discovery of minerals will have any impact on the campaign?
General Petraeus. Properly developing Afghanistan's mineral
potential may be an engine of job creation, economic growth, and
revenue generation. However, much work remains to be done before this
potential can be fully realized, particularly in security,
infrastructure, capacity building, and regulatory, tax and license
reforms.
While long term economic development is essential to Afghan self-
sufficiency, I do not anticipate an immediate impact on the campaign as
it will take several years to build the required infrastructure.
25. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, how do you plan on working to
ensure that Afghanistan can potentially utilize the mineral deposits to
develop a more stable economy and government?
General Petraeus. While much of this is outside of ISAF's direct
authority, we are working diligently to set the conditions necessary to
help Afghanistan realize its full economic potential. U.S. and
coalition forces are executing a deliberate counterinsurgency campaign
to improve the security environment necessary to support the
infrastructure development and encourage private sector investment in
Afghanistan's extractive industries.
ISAF is working with the Minister of Mines on a broad range of
infrastructure and economic development issues impacting long-term
economic growth and creation. Specifically, ISAF is supporting donor
efforts to assist the Ministry of Mines in developing its capacity to
plan and manage the mining sector. The challenge ahead is coordinating
multiple donor programs with Ministry needs.
Donor strategies, now underway, to engage with the Ministry of
Mines include:
Technical assistance in mining policy, regulation
management, and licensing reform.
Creating oversight institutions to assure transparency
of mining operations consistent with international standards
and programs to enable the Ministry of Mines to support
responsible private sector investment
Capacity building to strengthen the technical
capabilities of the Ministry of Mines to assess and regulate
the mining sector.
Support for Ministry incentives for private sector
investment to reduce trade barriers and improve the enabling
business environment.
civilian-military levels
26. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, do you believe the current
civilian-military levels are balanced out or will be balanced out after
the 1,000 civilian surge is complete or do you believe more are needed
in order to accomplish your definition of success?
General Petraeus. In the current phase of the campaign, the 1,000
person civilian surge is sufficient. However, as the ISAF expands into
more of the Key Terrain Districts, the number of governance and
development activities will grow. This means that the need for civilian
expertise will most likely continue to grow.
______
[The nomination reference of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 24, 2010.
Ordered, that the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the
grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General.
GEN David H. Petraeus, 1960.
______
[The biographical sketch of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Resume of Service Career of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.
Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy--BS--No Major.
Princeton University--MPA--International Relations.
Princeton University--PHD--International Relations.
Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses,
Armor Officer Advanced Course,
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
Senior Service College Fellowship--Georgetown University.
Foreign language(s): None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 5 Jun 74
1LT....................................... 5 Jun 76
CPT....................................... 8 Aug 78
MAJ....................................... 1 Aug 85
LTC....................................... 1 Apr 91
COL....................................... 1 Sep 95
BG........................................ 1 Jan 00
MG........................................ 1 Jan 03
LTG....................................... 18 May 04
GEN....................................... 10 Feb 07
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 75.......................... Jan 79............ Platoon Leader, C
Company, later S-
4 (Logistics),
later S-1
(Personnel),
509th Airborne
Battalion Combat
Team, Vicenza,
Italy.
Jan 79.......................... Jul 79 Assistant S-3
(Operations), 2d
Brigade, 24th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
Jul 79 May 81............ Commander, A
Company, later S-
3 (Operations),
2d Battalion,
19th Infantry,
24th Infantry
Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
May 81.......................... May 82............ Aide-de-Camp to
the Division
Commander, 24th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
May 82.......................... Jun 83............ Student, Command
and General Staff
Officer Course,
Fort Leavenworth,
KS.
Jun 83.......................... Jun 85............ Student, Princeton
University,
Princeton, NJ.
Jul 85 Jun 87............ Instructor, later
Assistant
Professor,
Department of
Social Sciences,
U.S. Military
Academy, West
Point, NY.
Jun 87.......................... Jun 88............ Military Assistant
to the Supreme
Allied Commander
Europe, Supreme
Headquarters,
Allied Powers
Europe, Belgium.
Jun 88.......................... Aug 89............ S-3 (Operations),
2d Battalion,
30th Infantry,
later 1st
Brigade, 3d
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
U.S. Army Europe,
Germany.
Aug 89.......................... Aug 91............ Aide/Assistant
Executive Officer
to the Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army,
Washington, DC.
Aug 91.......................... Jul 93 Commander, 3d
Battalion, 187th
Infantry, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault),
Fort Campbell,
KY.
Jul 93 Jul 94 G-3 (Operations)/
Director of
Plans, Training,
and Mobilization,
101st Airborne
Division (Air
Assault), Fort
Campbell, KY.
Aug 94.......................... Jan 95............ Senior Service
College Fellow,
Georgetown
University,
Washington, DC.
Jan 95.......................... Jun 95............ Chief Operations
Officer, U.N.
Mission in Haiti,
Operation Uphold
Democracy, Haiti.
Jun 95.......................... Jun 97............ Commander, 1st
Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Jun 97.......................... Sep 97............ Executive
Assistant to the
Director of the
Joint Staff, The
Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Oct 97.......................... Aug 99............ Executive
Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
Office of the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
Washington, DC.
Aug 99.......................... Jul 00 Assistant Division
Commander
(Operations), 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC, and
Commanding
General, Combined
Joint Task Force-
Kuwait, Operation
Desert Spring,
Kuwait.
Jul 00 Aug 00............ Acting Commanding
General, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Aug 00.......................... Jun 01............ Chief of Staff,
XVIII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Jun 01.......................... Jun 02............ Assistant Chief of
Staff for
Operations, SFOR
and Deputy
Commander, U.S.
Joint Interagency
Counterterrorism
Task Force,
Operation Joint
Forge, Sarajevo,
Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Jul 02 May 04............ Commanding
General, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault) and
Fort Campbell,
Fort Campbell,
KY, and Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
May 04.......................... Sep 05............ Commander,
Multinational
Security
Transition
Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO
Training Mission-
Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
Oct 05.......................... Feb 07............ Commanding
General, U.S.
Army Combined
Arms Center and
Fort Leavenworth,
Fort Leavenworth,
KS.
Feb 07.......................... Sep 08............ Commander,
Multinational
Force-Iraq,
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq.
Oct 08.......................... Present........... Commander, U.S.
Central Command,
MacDill Air Force
Base, FL.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Assistant to the Supreme Jun 87-Jun 88 Major
Allied Commander Europe, Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Powers
Europe, Belgium (Cumulative
Joint Credit).
Chief Operations Officer, U.N. Jan 95-Jun 95 Lieutenant Colonel
Mission in Haiti, Operation
Uphold Democracy, Haiti (No
Joint Credit).
Executive Assistant to the Jun 97-Aug 99 Colonel
Director, The Joint Staff, later
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC.
Commanding General, Combined Aug 99-Sep 99 Colonel
Joint Task Force-Kuwait,
Operation Desert Spring, Kuwait
(No Joint Credit).
Assistant Chief of Staff for Jun 01-Jun 02 Brigadier General
Operations, SFOR and Deputy
Commander, U.S. Joint
Interagency Counter-Terrorism
Task Force, Operation Joint
Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina (No joint credit).
Commander, Multinational Security May 04-Sep 05 Lieutenant General
Transition Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO Training Mission-
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
Commander, Multinational Force- Feb 07-Sep 08 General
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
Commander, U.S. Central Command, Oct 08-Present General
MacDill Air Force Base, FL.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of operations assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chief Operations Officer, U.N. Jan 95-Jun 95 Lieutenant Colonel
Mission in Haiti, Operation
Uphold Democracy, Haiti (No
Joint Credit).
Commanding General, Combined Aug 99-Sep 99 Brigadier General
Joint Task Force-Kuwait,
Operation Desert Spring, Kuwait
(No Joint Credit).
Assistant Chief of Staff for Jun 01-Jun 02 Brigadier General
Operations, SFOR and Deputy
Commander, U.S. Joint
Interagency Counterterrorism
Task Force, Operation Joint
Forge. Sarajevo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina (No Joint Credit).
Commanding General. 101st Mar 03-Feb 04 Major General
Airborne Division (Air Assault),
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
Commander, Multinational Security May 04-Sep 05 Lieutenant General
Transition Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO Training Mission-
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
Commander, Multinational Force- Feb 07-Oct 08 General
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal with ``V'' Device
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Combat Action Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Air Assault Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN David H.
Petraeus, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
David H. Petraeus.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, U.S.
Forces-Afghanistan.
3. Date of nomination:
24 June 2010.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
7 November 1952; Cornwall on Hudson, NY.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Hollister Knowlton Petraeus.
7. Names and ages of children:
Anne, 27; Stephen, 23.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Council on Foreign Relations
Association of the U.S. Army
Association of Graduates, U.S. Military Academy
82d Airborne Division Assosciation
101st Airborne Division Association
504th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association
Static Line Association
555th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association
187th Infantry Regiment Association
SHAPE Alumni Association
7th Armored Division Association
Princeton Alumni Association
U.S. Parachute Association
Command and General Staff Foundation
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the
service record extract provided to the committee by the executive
branch.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
David H. Petraeus.
This 23rd day of June, 2010.
[The nomination of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 29, 2010, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2010.]
NOMINATION OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 27, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:33 p.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Webb, Hagan, Burris, Goodwin, McCain, Inhofe,
Chambliss, Graham, Thune, LeMieux, and Brown.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston,
research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff
member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; Christian D. Brose, professional
staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; and Richard
F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn A. Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator
Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett,
assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator
Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Anthony
J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Andrew King, assistant to
Senator Graham; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator
Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; Scott
Clendaniel, assistant to Senator Brown; and Brooks Tucker,
assistant to Senator Burr.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. Sorry for the
delay. A Senate vote, as I think you all know, takes
precedence.
The committee meets today to consider the nomination of
General James Mattis for reappointment to the grade of general
and to be Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
General Mattis is no stranger to this committee. He's
served for more than 30 years in the military, with tours in
both Afghanistan and Iraq. In the last few years, General
Mattis has served as the Commander of U.S. Joint Forces
Command, where many have considered his work to be pioneering.
General Petraeus told me, last week, that he and General
Mattis have worked closely and well together. Indeed, General
Mattis collaborated closely with General Petraeus in writing
the book on counterinsurgency doctrine during General Mattis's
tenure as Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat
Development Command. General Mattis will have an opportunity,
as the CENTCOM Commander to see the fruits of his most recent
labors.
The coming months, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, are
critical. In Afghanistan, a top priority for the next CENTCOM
Commander will be ensuring that General Petraeus, the Commander
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and U.S.
forces--has what he needs to succeed.
While there's been a change in leadership of the effort in
Afghanistan, it does not represent a change in policy. Our goal
there remains to prevent Afghanistan from being dominated by a
Taliban-led insurgency that would once again provide a safe
haven for al Qaeda to plan attacks against us and our allies,
and, indeed, the world.
Achieving this goal requires helping the Afghan Government
and security forces to take principal responsibility for
Afghanistan's security and affairs.
The last 6 months have seen the Afghans make some progress
in building the capacity of the Afghan security forces to
assume principal security responsibility. These include a surge
in the recruiting and growth of the Afghan army, resulting in
the army meeting its current target strength of 134,000, and
meeting that, months early. The partnering of Afghan security
forces with coalition forces is improving, with combined forces
in the field starting to be predominantly Afghan.
In the coming days, a major joint Afghan Army ISAF
operation will be conducted west of Kandahar City in the
traditional Taliban heartland of the Arghandab Valley. This
operation will involve approximately 10,000 troops, more than
half of which will be Afghan forces. It has been jointly
planned and, of critical importance, will be carried out with
Afghan security forces in the lead. The significance of this
will not be lost on the Afghan people, nor on the Taliban,
because it will undermine the Taliban propaganda that the
United States and its allies are looking to dominate
Afghanistan.
There are signs of progress, even if significant challenges
remain. These challenges include the threat emanating from
Pakistan, where insurgent groups, such as the Haqqani network,
the Afghan Taliban, and Quetta Shura continue to find
sanctuary. Other challenges include the failure of the Afghan
Government to effectively deliver services and forcefully take
on corruption, and the maligned influence of powerbrokers,
warlords, and private security contractors who engage in
bribery, blatant racketeering, and rip-offs in Afghanistan.
In Iraq, we're on the threshold of another milestone for
the President's strategy. By September 1, the U.S. combat
mission in Iraq will end, and U.S. forces will transition to
the role of advising and assisting the Iraqi security forces,
as well as targeted counterterrorism missions. According to
General Ray Odierno, the Commander of U.S. Forces Iraq,
security continues to improve in Iraq, generally, despite
recent high-profile attacks and the drawdown of U.S. forces
from 70,000 currently, to 50,000 by the end of August, remains
on track.
Given this improvement, General Odierno recently
acknowledged that Iraq's problems are principally political and
economic. The new Iraqi Government still has not addressed
longstanding issues, including the political future of its
northern provinces and how to distribute Iraq's abundant oil
revenues. A critical part of the drawdown of U.S. forces is the
interagency transition from Department of Defense lead to
Department of State lead, with respect to U.S.-Iraqi long-term
relations and responsibility for stability and reconstruction
activities in Iraq. We're interested to hear General Mattis's
views on the importance of this transition. If confirmed, what
actions he would take, if any, to ensure that it is
accomplished efficiently and effectively.
The attempted Christmas Day airline bombing near Detroit
reminded Americans that al Qaeda is a global organization that
continues to threaten harm to those who do not share its
radical views. That nearly catastrophic incident also focused
attention on Yemen, a country with an uneven record on
counterterrorism, and large ungoverned spaces that serve as
attractive sanctuaries for al Qaeda and its recruits. General
Mattis will undoubtedly be confronted with challenges emerging
from Yemen during his tenure at CENTCOM.
Any counterterrorism successes in Yemen, and across the
CENTCOM region, will probably lead to al Qaeda and its
supporters moving to other countries in the region. General
Mattis will have to reassess, constantly, his efforts, and
change the application of resources to respond to changing
threats. This committee stands ready to support General Mattis
in these efforts.
As General Mattis articulated in response to advance policy
questions from this committee, also key among the challenges he
will confront is helping to check any aggressive actions by
Iran. Iran's pursuit of a nuclear program undermines stability
and stokes fear across the region. The brutal tactics and human
rights abuses of the Government of Iran in its efforts to
silence the voices of the people of Iran are also of deep
concern.
As the new bilateral and multilateral sanctions regimes are
implemented, it will be critical to continue to work with other
countries in the region on robust sanctions enforcement. We
expect General Mattis to keep us informed, on a regular basis,
of events occurring relative to Iran.
General Mattis, we appreciate the sacrifices that you have
already made in the service of our country. We thank you in
advance for your willingness to bear the burden of continued
service.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also,
Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely hearing. Hopefully we can
move General Mattis' nomination as quickly as possible so he
can get to work.
We're pleased to hear testimony from General Mattis as we
consider his nomination to be Commander of CENTCOM. General
Mattis is one of America's most accomplished warrior-thinkers,
a warrior who has led men in combat with success and valor in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the wider war against violent Islamic
extremism, and a thinker who has advanced our Nation's conduct
of warfare in the 21st century through his work on the
Counterinsurgency Field Manual and in his recent tour as
Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.
General Mattis is also known for engaging, at times, in a
little straight talk, something that this Senator particularly
appreciates.
The CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) is the front line
for U.S. forces today in this theater. Our men and women in
uniform are fighting two wars and facing countless other
challenges on behalf of our Nation. Now and in the coming
years, we will look to CENTCOM's leadership on a host of
critical priorities: to redeploy our forces from Iraq, under
conditions of success, while consolidating our long-term
strategic partnership with that essential country; to continue
building a balance of power in the Middle East that curbs the
Iranian Government's pursuit of regional hegemony and a nuclear
weapons capability; to support the independence of democratic
partners like Lebanon and longstanding friends in the Levant
and the Gulf, all of whom are beset by violent enemies; and
finally, to stand up for the human rights and democratic
aspirations of citizens across the region, especially in a
country like Egypt, which is entering a critical period of
transition.
But, perhaps the most important near-term priority in the
CENTCOM AOR is winning the war in Afghanistan. Since the
President's speech at West Point last December, our campaign in
Afghanistan has been slower and harder than we had imagined.
There have been setbacks and changes that we did not foresee.
All of our surge forces will finally be in place by the end of
next month.
While many of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
forces we were promised are not materializing, this is leading
some to doubt whether the war is winnable, whether it's worth
the sacrifice, and whether we should begin to withdraw our
forces.
Some are seizing on the recent leak of 92,000 highly-
classified documents about Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawn from
2004 to 2009, as somehow proof that the war is lost. In
actuality, the emerging picture from these documents appear to
be little more than what we knew already, that the war in
Afghanistan was deteriorating over the past several years, and
that we were not winning. In this sense, the WikiLeaks
disclosure is simply an extended footnote to a well-known
reading of recent history.
That's why a concerted effort has been made since 2009,
both in the administration and in Congress, to make wide-
ranging changes to our strategy in Afghanistan, to increase our
commitment of troops and resources, and to bring new and better
leadership to the mission. As a result, we are beginning to
address many of the problems highlighted within these leaked
documents.
It's only been 23 days since General Petraeus assumed
command in Kabul, and we need to give him the time he needs to
review and, if necessary, make changes to our campaign plan to
achieve success. But, no matter how many good adjustments we
make to our strategy on the ground, our ability to succeed will
continue to be severely limited if Afghans and actors in the
region, friends and enemies alike, all think we will begin
leaving in a year.
I just visited Afghanistan with Senators Lieberman and
Graham, and we heard this concern everywhere we went. Our
Afghan friends are worried that we will leave and the Taliban
will cut their heads off. As long as they believe that, they
will hedge their bets on this mission; and that goes for
Pakistan, as well. The WikiLeaks controversy has reopened
charges that elements of the Pakistani military and
intelligence services are playing both sides of the fight in
Afghanistan. But, this should not be surprising, especially
when we are sounding an uncertain trumpet about our own
commitment.
General Petraeus has said about Afghanistan that, ``We're
in this to win.'' I imagine you feel the same way, General
Mattis. I appreciate that conviction, and I share it. But, we
need to hear it, clearly and consistently, from the highest
levels of the administration. We need to hear that, when
winning a war is a, ``vital national security interest,'' as
the President has rightly described the fight in Afghanistan,
you don't surge for 1 year and then begin leaving, regardless
of whether you've achieved your objectives, or not.
We're asking our Afghan partners to take an enormous chance
on us; a wager, in many cases, that could cost them their
lives. We should not expect to summon that kind of total
commitment and faith in us if we're not prepared to extend the
same to them. I know that our military leaders and our troops
on the ground are giving every ounce of devotion they have to
this mission and to their Afghan partners, on whom success
ultimately depends. It is the solemn obligation of political
leaders, here in Washington, to be equal to that commitment and
the sacrifice it entails. That's the only way we will be
successful in this war.
I thank you, General Mattis, for your willing to serve our
Nation, once again, when we need you most.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
General Mattis, before I turn to you for your opening
statement, we have a set of standard questions which we pose to
all nominees.
First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Mattis. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with the deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record, in hearings?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Finally, do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner, when requested by a duly constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good faith delay of denial in providing such documents?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General. Now, we'll
turn to you for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, NOMINEE FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND
General Mattis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today.
I am honored to have been nominated by the President to
serve as the Commander of U.S. Central Command, and I request
my written statement be accepted for the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
General Mattis. I wish to acknowledge General Petraeus and
the Acting Commander of CENTCOM, Lieutenant General John Allen,
and to express my appreciation for their selfless service.
If I am confirmed as CENTCOM Commander, our troops, our
regional partners, and our adversaries, alike, should know that
CENTCOM's leadership has changed, but our strategy, our
mission, and our activities have not. Despite any recent papers
leaked to the media, we are remaining in the region. We are not
leaving.
There will also be harmony in our relationships. The wars
we are fighting require highly integrated civilian-military
efforts, from the highest to the lowest levels. If confirmed, I
will make every effort to work closely with the civilian and
military leaders charged with leading our operations, and to
ensure they are fully resourced in a coherent and comprehensive
manner.
Consistency in our approach and harmony in our
relationships are fundamental to achieving unity of effort in a
region vital to our national interests and those of the
international community. In the midst of the harsh realities we
face, there are also opportunities to work with responsible
moderate elements, and I will be eager to do so.
I have no illusions that the CENTCOM region also includes
elements that are irreconcilable, part of a movement that is
intent on carrying out attacks on innocent civilians worldwide,
and which must be confronted by the strongest possible
coalitions. Our enemy's barbaric and medieval actions offer us
opportunities to counter their extremist ideology. Those who
deliberately kill innocents know their politically bankrupt
message cannot win at the ballot box, and thus, repeatedly
resort to violent intimidation. That violence alienates the
larger population, whose support they seek to gain.
We and our coalition and regional partners, by contrast,
are involved in the noble cause of helping to realize a
brighter future in the region and internationally. We are the
``good guys.'' Yet, we're not perfect. Regrettably, we make
mistakes, about which we are candid and constantly strive to
correct. But, we are the ones working to protect the
population, to reopen schools, to immunize children, to provide
electricity, and to offer new hope, balancing chivalry to the
innocent with unflinching military prowess against the
irreconcilable elements who choose violence.
This stands in sharp contrast to those we confront who
target the innocent, from Kandahar to Islamabad, from London to
New York, from Mumbai to Madrid, Moscow to Amman, and the list
goes on.
If confirmed, my immediate priority will be the campaign in
Afghanistan. The stakes there are high. The military component
of our strategy in Afghanistan is sound, and it requires firm
execution. I support it fully. I believe that, by steadfastly
executing our strategy, we will win in Afghanistan. Nothing
about the mission will be easy, however. We recognize that
achieving our goals in Afghanistan requires, also, the enduring
commitment of the international community.
Inextricably linked to our campaign in Afghanistan is our
strategic partnership with Pakistan. Proximity to an area with
affiliated terror groups has dealt the people of Pakistan a
tough hand, geographically. Pakistan continues to endure great
sacrifices in their effort to counter extremism, and I am
heartened by their efforts.
There are other significant challenges that will be among
my highest priorities if I am confirmed. Among these is the
responsible drawdown in Iraq, continuing from 128,500 troops, a
year ago, to the September target. As with our current
commander, the very able General Odierno, I have unbridled
confidence in General Austin's leadership, and I will work to
set the broader conditions for his success when he takes the
reins.
Iran offers the greatest long-term challenge in the region,
as it continues to threaten regional and global stability by
pursuing a nuclear weapons program and by funding, arming, and
training militant proxies throughout the region. The task of
CENTCOM will be to counter the Iranian regime's destabilizing
activities, to deter the regime from aggression, and to work in
concert with our partners in the region to advance our shared
security interests.
Further, al Qaeda and associated extremist groups pose a
threat that spans the CENTCOM region and beyond, has threatened
Yemen, and requires an integrated response that applies
constant pressure to all elements of the enemy network.
If confirmed, I will leverage my experiences in the region
over the last 30 years to ethically carry out CENTCOM's
missions in concert with our allies. I have keen respect for
the peoples in the region and for their cultures, and I'm eager
to work with them once again.
Having been nominated for this position, I am mindful of
the extraordinary privilege it has been to serve for over 38
years alongside America's finest young men and women. I will
hold our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines foremost in my
thoughts if you confirm me.
I will also provide my best professional military
assessment to this committee and to our national security
leadership.
I want to thank Congress, and the members of this
committee, in particular, for your support over many years.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Mattis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored to have
been nominated by the President to serve as the Commander of U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM). If confirmed, I will apply my experience and
pledge my best efforts and my candid assessments in this position.
continuity of leadership
I wish to acknowledge General Petraeus and to express my
appreciation for the selfless service that he exemplifies. He, his wife
Holly, and his family have made endless sacrifices in our country's
service.
General Petraeus and I share a similar view of the region. We have
served together repeatedly: in the Pentagon; fighting together in Iraq;
jointly developing the counterinsurgency manual when he was at Fort
Leavenworth and I was at Quantico; and as fellow combatant commanders.
I would also like to acknowledge that there has been no loss of
momentum since General Petraeus left CENTCOM as Lt. Gen. John Allen
continues to do superb work as the Acting Commander of CENTCOM. John
has been a steady hand during this period of transition, resolutely
continuing our regional strategy and reassuring our partners that there
will be no change in our relationships with them.
consistency in our approach
If I am confirmed as CENTCOM Commander, I will carry out a strategy
that is consistent with the strategy currently in place. Our troops,
our regional partners, and our adversaries alike should know that
CENTCOM's leadership has changed, but our mission and activities have
not. The CENTCOM team has generated a great deal of momentum, and if
confirmed, I intend to sustain and strengthen what the team has set in
motion.
harmony in our relationships
The wars we are fighting require highly integrated civilian-
military efforts from the highest to the lowest levels. I will work in
tandem with General Petraeus, General Odierno, General Austin, and the
other military and civilian members of the President's National
Security Team, as well as our many international partners in the region
and around the world. If confirmed, my duty will be to pursue harmony
in our civil-military relationships, to represent the needs of our
commanders, and to ensure our military and civilian leaders are fully
resourced in a coherent and comprehensive manner.
view of the region: clear-eyed/no illusions
Consistency in our approach and harmony in our relationships are
vital because we face immense challenges in a region vital to our
national interests and those of our partners. I will listen, learn, and
understand the region's people and its leaders, finding opportunities
in league with their interests to achieve broader objectives for
stability, economic progress, and a better future. In the midst of the
harsh realities in this vital region, there are also opportunities to
work with responsible, moderate elements, and I will be eager to do so.
The CENTCOM region also includes elements that are irreconcilable,
part of a movement that is intent on carrying out attacks on innocent
civilians worldwide, including the September 11 attack on American soil
that killed 3,000 from over 90 countries; the 10/12/02 bombing in Bali,
Indonesia that killed 202 and injured 209; the 3/11/04 train bombing in
Madrid, Spain that killed 191 and injured 1,800; the 7/7/05 subway
bombing in London, England that killed 52 and injured 700; the 11/26/08
coordinated hotel attacks in Mumbai, India that killed 166 and injured
308, among many other failed and successful attacks worldwide. In the
CENTCOM region, the enemy has carried out attacks that have killed
thousands, the vast majority of them Muslims.
Our enemies' practices of targeting civilians offer us
opportunities to counter their extremist ideology. Those who adopt
terror as a way of war repeatedly make the mistake of revealing their
disregard for human life and alienating the population whose support
they need to operate. We and our coalition and regional partners, by
contrast, are involved in the noble cause of helping to realize a
brighter future in the region. We are the good guys. We're not perfect;
regrettably, we make mistakes about which we are candid and constantly
strive to correct, but we are the ones working to reopen schools, to
build roads, to provide electricity, and to offer new hope. As the
President stated during his inaugural address, ``We will not apologize
for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense. For those who
seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering
innocents, we say to you, now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be
broken--you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you.''
most pressing mission: support to afghanistan and pakistan
If confirmed, my immediate priority will be the campaign in
Afghanistan. The border zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan is home
to a syndicate of extremists that includes al Qaeda, whose leaders
conducted the initial planning for the September 11 attacks from
Kandahar before going on to U.S. flight schools. Afghanistan and
Pakistan are two countries of critical interest to our national
security, to that of the region, and to all nations. These active
theaters comprise a regional whole, for while they require differing
operational approaches (with the character of our assistance adapted to
the situation in each country), the extremists who traverse that border
are threats to the people on both sides.
afghanistan
The issues we currently face in Afghanistan are familiar to me. I
fought there in November 2001, less than 3 months after the September
11 attacks. From 2006 to 2007, I was Commander of Marine Corps Forces
CENTCOM under General Abizaid and Admiral Fallon. From 2007 to 2009, I
wore U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) hats, leading
U.S. Joint Forces Command and NATO's Allied Command Transformation,
requiring me to directly support operations in Afghanistan and to work
closely with NATO allies and coalition partners.
In Afghanistan today, the insurgency has proven to be resilient,
while Afghan state institutions, decimated by decades of war, are
struggling to develop, provide security, and deliver services to the
Afghan people. These institutions are developing in the face of a
murderous enemy who knows its empty message cannot win at the ballot
box and thus must resort to violently intimidating the populace. Since
2008, the enemy's indiscriminate use of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) alone has killed 1992 Afghan civilians and injured 4,110 others.
Moreover, over a large period since 2004 IEDs have killed 2,267 U.S.,
coalition, and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and wounded
7,825. These numbers reflect the enormous sacrifices our Nation, our
partners in Afghanistan, and the Afghans themselves are making for this
effort and I am deeply aware of these costs.
defining the mission
We have a clear mission in Afghanistan, as articulated by our
President, who said, ``We will not tolerate a safe haven for terrorists
who want to destroy Afghan security from within and launch attacks
against innocent men, women, and children in our country and around the
world.'' Specifically, the President said, ``to meet that goal, we will
pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al
Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it
the ability to overthrow the government. We must strengthen the
capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they
can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future.'' The mission is
consistent with the hopes of the overwhelming majority of the Afghan
people who have faced cruel times for too long. Implementing the
military component of our strategy there--by assiduously protecting the
Afghan people; of helping to pragmatically build Afghanistan; and of
relentlessly pursuing those who seek to kill and destroy--is sound and
it requires firm execution. I support it fully.
defining winning
I believe that by steadfastly executing our strategy we will
succeed in enabling Afghanistan. Success in Afghanistan means that we
are making progress in enabling the Afghan Government to take the lead
in preventing its people from being abused by extremists and Afghan
territory from again being used for destabilizing the region and
exporting terror to the world. The key line of effort for us is
building ANSF that are capable of standing against internal and
external threats with only modest international support--so that al
Qaeda and other transnational extremists cannot once again establish
sanctuaries from which they can launch attacks on our homeland or on
our allies. This vision must be achieved in parallel with efforts to
help Afghans make progress toward their longer-term aspirations to
build their economy, infrastructure, and capacity to govern.
We all know achieving our goals in Afghanistan requires the
enduring commitment of the international community. As outlined in the
2010 National Security Strategy of the United States, the challenges
such as those found in Afghanistan cannot be solved by any one nation
alone--it requires the sustained cooperation and contributions of many
nations. Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen have also articulated the same message. We are united in our
enduring commitment to the mission in Afghanistan.
the meaning of july 2011
It is equally important to recognize that Afghans want to have the
lead in protecting themselves, and that we have no interest in being
occupiers. President Karzai told the Kabul Conference last week that
his objective is for Afghanistan to be responsible for all security
responsibilities in 2014. In this context, I understand the July 2011
date that the President announced at West Point last December as the
beginning of a transition of security tasks to the Afghans, based on
conditions on the ground at that time, which will allow U.S. troops to
begin returning home. Secretary Gates reaffirmed this last month when
he said ``the pace . . . with which we draw down and how many we draw
down is going to be conditions-based.'' The transition process will be
more of a ``thinning out'' of coalition forces as ANSF move into the
lead. Forces may shift missions and be ``reinvested'' in other elements
of the effort before they return home, and this transition will occur
on the district level and in functional areas as well.
the way ahead
Moving forward, we are working alongside the Afghans to reverse the
momentum of the Taliban insurgency and to build the capabilities of the
Afghan security forces, while investing in a civil-military campaign
plan to improve the Afghan Government's capacity to respond to the
needs of its people. We are doing this with an uplift of 30,000
additional U.S. Forces--nearly 85 percent of which have arrived--and
9,700 additional forces from NATO and coalition partners--about 71
percent of which have arrived. Once fully deployed, there will be more
than 44,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan, reinforcing the 243,000
soldiers and police in growing Afghan security forces, carrying out a
variety of combat, training, logistics, and intelligence missions
needed for success.
progress in afghanistan
We have already seen that progress is being made in assisting the
Afghan people. Under the Taliban, fewer than 900,000 boys--and no
girls--were enrolled in Afghanistan's schools. As of January 2010,
nearly 7 million children are enrolled in over 11,000 schools nation-
wide; around 37 percent or 2.5 million are girls. There has also been
an over eight-fold increase in the number of teachers to 170,000--30
percent of them are women. As Chairman Levin recounted after a recent
trip to Afghanistan, there is maturation in the Afghan National Army
meeting its goals, with the Afghans increasingly shouldering a heavier
burden in the fight, and partnered operations becoming the norm. The
most visible evidence of this is in RC-Capitol, where ANSF forces are
in the lead patrolling in the streets of Kabul and establishing
security rings within the city for the recent Consultative Peace Jirga
and the successful Kabul Conference, the biggest high-level gathering
ever in the capital. In RC-South, the first fully Afghan-led operation
occurred during Operation Malajat. This effort involved more than 550
Afghan and coalition personnel tasked to search and secure
approximately 10 square kilometers around Malajat, a community in
Kandahar City.
Violence will remain amidst this progress, as the enemy chooses to
fight intentionally among innocent people in a war ``among the
people.'' The enemy is alarmed that they are losing momentum and is
fighting back, as expected. Working in partnership with Afghan forces,
ISAF will apply unrelenting pressure to further roll back the enemy and
protect the people. A lot has been accomplished, and much remains to be
done.
Nothing about this will be easy. I have witnessed the difficulties,
the burdens, and the hopes carried by our troops, our coalition
partners, and notably the Afghan people themselves. We will have some
bad days ahead, but so long as we hold fast and adapt faster than the
enemy, the enemy's situation will continue to worsen; it will become
more desperate, continue to make mistakes, and turn the population
against it. While reconcilable elements fold back into society,
irreconcilable elements will be removed from it.
pakistan
Inextricably linked to our campaign in Afghanistan is our strategic
partnership with Pakistan. I am heartened by the Pakistanis' efforts in
countering extremism in their country, and I am reminded that the
initial amphibious operation that I led into Afghanistan in November
2001 would not have been possible without their support. Today, the
Pakistani people and their political parties have thrown tremendous
weight behind military efforts to root out and destroy the Pakistani
Taliban and other violent extremists, having increased the size of
their forces committed to the fight in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas and Kyber-Pawktoon-Kwah to approximately 147,000, and
retaking control over large sections of their territory that had been
safe havens for our common enemies. Pakistan's Army and Frontier Corps
have carried out increasingly effective and extensive operations in
those parts of their country that have suffered under the Taliban and
other violent extremist influence for many years, at the significant
cost of more than 4,000 casualties since 2009. Clearly the Pakistan
Government, military, and people deserve our support, and I thank
Congress for its continuing support as we restore trust with our
Pakistani counterparts, help them sustain their campaign against
extremism, and deepen our partnership with this vital ally.
iraq
I have served in Iraq and seen first-hand the valor, adaptability,
and ethical performance of our troops as they have fought to earn the
trust of an initially skeptical Iraqi people. Among my highest
priorities if confirmed as CENTCOM Commander will be to enable the
critical continuation of our responsible drawdown in Iraq. The drawdown
of our forces to 50,000 by September 1st is on track, as are the
withdrawal of our equipment and base closures. The shift from our
combat mission to stability operations will go forward thanks to the
combined efforts of our military, the Iraqi security forces (ISF), and
the Iraqi people themselves, while our Department of State takes on a
more long-term role in our relationship with Iraq. Our forces will soon
be led in this effort by General Lloyd Austin, who was recently
confirmed as our next commander in Iraq and is a trusted comrade, as we
have served together several times since 2002 and fought alongside each
other in Iraq. As with General Odierno, I have unbridled confidence in
General Austin's leadership and I will work to set the broader
conditions for his success.
Difficulties and challenges remain for Iraq. Although great
progress has been made in Iraq, it is not yet enduring, primarily
because many underlying sources of political instability have yet to be
resolved. Nevertheless, the fact that security trends have remained
positive over the past year in the context of a significant drawdown of
U.S. forces is testament to the growing capabilities and
professionalism of the ISF, who now lead in protecting the Iraqi
population throughout the country. Their performance is particularly
evident in this extended period of Iraqi Government formation, with
enemy effectiveness continuing to decline, and the ISF serving as a
protective windbreak between the Iraqi people and a merciless and
increasingly desperate enemy. This combination of circumstances permits
us to continue to responsibly draw down, thinning our lines over the
coming year, and transitioning to a civilian-led, long-term, and
mutually beneficial relationship between our two nations. I support
robust resourcing of the ISF Fund, even as the Iraqis themselves commit
17 percent of their national budget to their own security and, as a
result, cover the lion's share of total security costs. The Iraqis
still need our help as they continue to build their capabilities in
order to protect against malign external influences seeking to foment
ethno-sectarian violence and distrust.
other significant challenges
Beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, there are several other
significant challenges to our interests and the interests of our
partners in the CENTCOM area.
iran
Iran presents the greatest long-term challenge in the region as it
continues to threaten regional and global stability. Despite the
promise of its rich cultural heritage and educated populace, the
Iranian regime continues to ignore the true aspirations of its people
and appears less interested in hiding its ambitions to pursue a
nuclear-weapons capability, heightening global concerns over a nuclear
arms race that would destabilize the region.
The Iranian regime also continues to challenge the authority of
Iran's neighboring governments by funding, arming, and training
militant proxies in the region, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As General Odierno recently stated, these Iranian proxies continue to
take advantage of our drawdown in Iraq by conducting attacks against
our forces there, with the additional intent to intimidate and
manipulate political outcomes inside Iraq. The Iranian regime has
carried out these activities while violently suppressing the rights of
its own citizens. The task of CENTCOM will be to counter the Iranian
regime's destabilizing activities, to deter the regime from aggression,
to forthrightly and prudently posture our forces, and to work in
concert with our partners in the region to advance our shared
interests. Our efforts need to back-stop the diplomatic and economic
initiatives exercised by the United Nations and the international
community, keeping a close eye on Iran's efforts to threaten and
destabilize countries in the region.
al qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Al Qaeda and the other extremist groups associated with it pose a
threat that spans the CENTCOM region and requires a theater-wide
response that applies constant pressure to all elements of the
extremist network. Al Qaeda and its affiliates' growing challenge to
stability in Yemen has made that country an area of emphasis for
CENTCOM. Indeed, from locations in Yemen, al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) has shown it has the intent to conduct attacks that
threaten not just Yemen, but surrounding countries and the U.S.
homeland. Yemen is also an example of what rapidly-applied assistance
through joint civil-military efforts can do for a nation in need. When
al Qaeda began exerting its influence in Yemen, our Ambassador and the
CENTCOM team worked closely with President Saleh to come up with a plan
to provide a range of assistance to the Yemenis. We must continue to
forge closely supportive relations with the Yemenis and regional
partners to ensure a sustained whole-of-governments approach against
AQAP.
regional approach
As we endeavor to address these crosscutting and subregional
challenges, I will carry forward an overall approach of assisting our
partners in the region based on our shared interests. CENTCOM has made
a great deal of progress in this respect and I will reinforce those
efforts.
In the Gulf region, for example, our partners are involved in a
variety of activities that are contributing to the region's security.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a powerful influence in the region.
Moreover, the Kingdom's commitment to defeating al Qaeda and its
effective program for reintegration of dissidents serve as valuable
models for other states in the region. The Kingdom, with our
assistance, is also undertaking an effort to protect its critical
infrastructure. We also have a strong security relationship with the
United Arab Emirates, and we have expanded our partnerships with
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. Kuwait is a pivotal partner that has
been instrumental in supporting our efforts in Iraq. Bahrain, as well,
has been a gracious host of the U.S. fleet for decades, while at the
same time Qatar has been host to one of our largest bases in the region
and our forward headquarters. Oman has continued to be a valuable
partner in preserving stability in the region. CENTCOM's Regional
Security Architecture bolsters and connects these relationships,
strengthening partner capabilities to address existing and emerging
threats. Understanding the region's unique geo-political realities and
recognizing that our Gulf partners have much to offer, if confirmed I
will work with them individually and collectively to sustain regional
stability.
Similarly, in Central Asia, we have opened new and encouraging
opportunities for engagement with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Kazakhstan by cooperating to establish the Northern Distribution
Network as a supply route to Afghanistan, which will also serve to
further future economic integration and stability. Strengthening our
relationships greatly aids our cooperation on other issues, such as
counterterrorism and counternarcotics. In similar fashion, we are
reaching out to Turkmenistan, advancing our partnerships in Central
Asia, and doing so transparently to avoid any misunderstanding of our
motives.
Elsewhere in the region, we must continue to strengthen our
partnerships, building trust and national capabilities against
terrorism through training, equipping, personnel exchanges, and
exercises. In Lebanon, we are working to build the critical
capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, especially in
counterterrorism. We have collaborated with the Kingdom of Jordan,
having established a world-class irregular warfare training center
where many nations train. Egypt continues to play a leadership role in
the region by hosting the important multilateral Bright Star Exercise
and conducting counterterrorism and counter-smuggling activities,
besides remaining an intellectual center of gravity in the region.
external influences
To complement these regional partnerships, CENTCOM also must
recognize that none of its sub-regional challenges exists in a vacuum.
Confronting each of them requires us to recognize that significant
forces at work in the CENTCOM region originate from outside it. It is
imperative to strengthen our understanding of these external elements
and what they represent in terms of potential stabilizing influences.
Turkey, Russia, and, increasingly, China and India exert major
influences within the CENTCOM region. Similarly, the Middle East Peace
Process, though it involves parties that are outside the CENTCOM
region, has a significant impact upon the countries of the region and
upon CENTCOM's ability to further our interests throughout the area. In
addition, though on a smaller scale, we have seen an increasing impact
in the region from the migration of extremists from Africa--whether
from the al Qaeda-affiliated Somali group Al Shabaab or out of Muslim
Nigeria--into Yemen and AQAP training camps. Al Shabaab has shown
recently the intent to carry out terrorist attacks beyond the Horn of
Africa. Finally, the pirates who prey on shipping in the waters off of
the coast of Africa are based in ports that lie beyond CENTCOM's
boundaries. Addressing these dynamics will require CENTCOM to maintain
a close working relationship with U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S.
European Command (EUCOM), and U.S. Africa Command, as well as other
commands and agencies, and I pledge to do so.
personal experience in the region
If confirmed by the Senate, I will leverage my experiences in the
region over the last 30 years to advance the missions of CENTCOM. I
have had the privilege of serving in the Central Command area of
responsibility many times, starting as a young officer in 1979 on a
naval deployment to the North Arabian Sea. I have respect for the
peoples in the region and for their cultures. I have been fortunate to
develop personal relationships with several leaders in the region--
military and civilian, plus U.S. and partner nations--for more than a
decade, and I will expand those relationships to enhance the unity of
effort and integrated harmony essential to success.
closing
Having been nominated for this position, I am mindful of the
extraordinary privilege it has been to serve for over 38 years
alongside some of America's finest young men and women. These soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians represent all
that is great about our experiment in democracy that we call America.
They sacrifice daily in difficult environments to defend our freedoms
when they are threatened, and I would like to express my appreciation
and respect for their incredible dedication and skill. I will hold them
foremost in my thoughts if you confirm me and I will also provide my
best professional military assessment to this committee and to my
leadership with their interests in mind.
I would also like to thank Congress, and the members of this
committee, in particular, for your support. I remain mindful of the
inherited freedoms we share here today, thanks to the blood, sweat and
tears of our predecessors. Today, if confirmed, I pledge to give all
that I have to build the strongest coalitions, the most agile forces
and the most ethical defenders of our Nation. We, too, have the same
obligation as past generations of Americans to pass along these
freedoms to our children.
In closing, I will reemphasize that I place a high priority on
trust, unity of effort and harmony in protection of innocents from
those who would attack them.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
We will have an 8-minute first round of questions. I think
there might be time for a second round, if needed.
General, in his speech at West Point in December of last
year, President Obama announced a surge of 30,000 additional
U.S. troops by the end of this summer. He set the date of July
2011 for the beginning of reduction in our combat presence in
Afghanistan, but with the pace of those reductions to be
determined by the circumstances at the time.
Is that your understanding of the President's policy, and
do you agree with it?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. That is my understanding, and I
do agree with it.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that one of the advantages of
that is that it signals urgency to Afghan leaders and to the
Afghan army that they must, more and more, take responsibility
for their country's security, which, in turn, is important to
the success of our mission?
General Mattis. Sir, it brings a sense of urgency, I think,
because it starts a process that is conditions-based. We can
also moderate the enemy's message that says we're there to
occupy Afghanistan. But, the idea is for a bottom-up, not a
top-down, thinning out of our forces as we reach the conditions
that permits a responsible turnover. Again, it's a date when a
process begins; it's not a handoff of a hot potato.
Chairman Levin. General, for some time I have pressed that
more units of the Afghan army that are considered the most
effective move to Kandahar, where the challenge is perhaps the
greatest, and to also get them into the lead in operations down
there. When Senator Jack Reed and I were there earlier this
month, we made the very same point with President Karzai, with
Minister of Defense Wardak, with the chief of their general
staff, during our visit to Afghanistan. Defense Minister Wardak
wrote to me, saying that he agreed with that, and he has
ordered additional two infantry battalions and two commando
battalions to support operations in Kandahar, because that is
in the heart of Taliban country, the area of their greatest
strength. So, the Afghan army will have more than 8,000
soldiers in Kandahar by September 2010.
We've been told frequently that the Afghan army has broad
popular support and that the Afghan people want their army to
be taking the lead in providing their security.
First of all, do you agree that the Afghan people generally
have confidence in the Afghan army and want them to provide
their security, where possible?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. I've seen the same thing on my
trips over there, and I believe it is probably the most admired
and respected part of the Afghan Government right now.
Chairman Levin. Will it help achieve the success of the
mission that Afghan army units can take the lead in joint
operations, wherever possible?
General Mattis. Sir, I think I can quote you. This is the
worst nightmare for the Taliban, that the Afghan army is
increasingly effective, partnered with our forces and moving
against an enemy that they know better than anyone. I think
this is very heartening.
Chairman Levin. There's going to be a major effort in the
Arghandab Valley in the next--actually, it's already begun,
perhaps--but, at the end of this month and the beginning of
next month. It's going to be a joint Afghan Army-ISAF
operation. There's going to be approximately 10,000 combined
troops, or more--the majority, again, from the Afghan Army's
205th Corps. The effort is to clear the area of insurgent
domination. The Commander of the Afghan 205th Corps announced,
publicly, a few weeks ago--his name is General Zazai--that he
and his staff had participated jointly in planning the
campaign, that he'd signed the orders, and that his forces
would be in the lead in the Arghandab campaign.
I'm wondering whether or not you will be focusing some
major attention, as soon as you're confirmed, on that specific
campaign. Do you agree with what you know of its design?
General Mattis. Sir, until I'm confirmed, I'm not as
familiar as I, perhaps, would be as the CENTCOM Commander.
However, the partnering effort that's underway--the joint
planning and the joint execution--and, as you're aware, there's
already over 7,000 Afghan soldiers in Kandahar, so they are
rapidly approaching the strength they need--I think it all sets
the conditions for a very successful campaign, whenever they
determine the conditions are right to kick it off.
Chairman Levin. At the recently concluded Kabul conference,
the participants endorsed the Afghan Government's plan,
developed with NATO participation, for the phased transition to
full Afghan responsibility for security. Now, that will be a
transition which will take many years. But, the Government of
Afghanistan and ISAF will assess, jointly, which provinces can
be transitioned. They'll begin to do that, they expect, by the
end of 2010. Are you aware of that Kabul conference
announcement? Can you give us your reaction to the Kabul
conference, generally, as to whether or not the fact that that
conference was able to be held with relative calm demonstrates
some progress?
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that the Haqqani
network had decided that conference would not be held. They
threatened to attack. As we all know, Kabul has already
transitioned to the Afghan security forces. So, they had the
lead. They had the planning and the execution of providing
protection for what was, I think, a very impressive showing of
57 nations and 11 international organizations coming to Kabul.
To pull off a conference like that in the midst of the kind of
war this enemy is fighting, where they attack innocent people,
and they actually attack the very people who are trying to come
in and help, is very emblematic of the kind of enemy we're up
against, but also the international support. I think it was
very healthy for President Karzai to hear from all of them
about the challenge of corruption. I think it was very healthy
for them to see President Karzai as a man who could deal
maturely with the international organization.
I thought it was a very heartening conference, and I
thought it was a real blow to the enemy's boasts that they were
going to stop this. The Haqqani network was unable to defeat
the Afghan security forces.
Chairman Levin. Relative to the Haqqani network, which is
based in North Waziristan, neither they nor the Afghan Taliban,
Quetta Shura, which is based in Quetta, Pakistan, is on the
State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations.
These groups and their senior leaders are involved deeply in
supporting the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan. There's
little question that they engage in terrorist activities, to
the detriment of the United States' national security interest
and to the coalition. Designating those groups as foreign
terrorist organizations, or, at a minimum, designating their
senior leaders as terrorist-affiliated individuals, would make
certain tools available for limiting the financial and
logistical support that they receive, and also, perhaps even
more importantly, would send a very important signal regarding
the United States serious concern with their ongoing
activities, including a signal to Pakistan.
General, in your view, has the Haqqani network and the
Afghan Taliban, Quetta Shura, engaged in terrorist activities
that threaten our security interest? Do you believe that those
groups, or at least their leaders, should be designated as
foreign terrorist organizations?
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, both those groups have
engaged in terrorism, and I believe the leaders of both groups
should be placed on the State Department list.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you, again, for your service.
On the issue du jour of the WikiLeaks, what effect does the
fact that these messages and information that were passed up
the chain of command from the field, as to the assessment of
the situation--what effect does this publication of these
secret communications--what effect does that have on the degree
of candor that military officers and senior noncommissioned
officers in the field who are doing their best to report, the
best of their ability--what effect does this have on them?
General Mattis. Sir, I would speculate, but, due to the
urgency of the operations in a combat zone, it probably won't
have much, because, at the moment they're actually reporting,
they're probably more eager to get the truth up the chain of
command. That said, I just thought it was an appallingly
irresponsible act to release this information. It didn't tell
us anything, that I've seen so far, that we weren't already
aware of. I've seen no big revelations. One of the newspaper
headlines was that the war is a ``tense and dangerous thing.''
If that is news, I don't know who it's news to that's on this
planet. It would probably not help candor, but I think I'd be
more concerned about allies being more circumspect than our own
troops, sir.
Senator McCain. These leaks are certainly not helpful in
you doing your job, particularly in coordination with our
allies.
General Mattis. That's correct. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. How many Pakistani military have been
killed in operations against Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan,
roughly?
General Mattis. Senator, I'll have to take that question
for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Since April 2009, the Pakistanis have sustained approximately 900
service men killed and over 3,000 wounded. If counting their military
casualties since 2002, the number killed is approximately 2,500 with
over 7,000 wounded. This data is current as of June 2010.
General Mattis. However, I will tell you that my Pakistani
friends assure me they've lost more of their troops in the
fight than NATO has lost on their side of the border.
Senator McCain. I think it's in hundreds. Is that roughly
correct?
General Mattis. At least, sir.
Senator McCain. We have been, at least to a significant
degree, getting cooperation and assistance from the Pakistani
military.
General Mattis. Sir, I think we have a stronger strategic
relationship and more support today from the Pakistani military
than we've enjoyed in 10 years. It's trending in the right
direction. They have sustained a 15-month counteroffensive,
despite the casualties, in militarily, some of the worst
terrain I've ever operated in, up along the border area. I
think our counterterrorism cooperation is also at an all-time
high.
Senator McCain. But, there is also reports that certain
elements of Inter-Services Intelligence are at least
cooperating, to some extent, with the Taliban. Is that correct?
General Mattis. That's correct. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Could that be because they're hedging their
bets as to whether the United States is going to remain, or
not?
General Mattis. Sir, I need to get more current. However,
history didn't start at 2001, and some of those same groups, we
had a relationship with, back when we were fighting the
Soviets. It's no surprise to me that there may be some
continued relationship there. But, whether or not it's because
they're working with them, they're trying to infiltrate them--
there's any number of motives, and I'm just not current enough
to say why. I think, though, that it's hard to wipe the slate
clean and just start over at any one point. Clearly, the
offensive against many of the people they allegedly used to
work with is showing they're no longer friends with most of
them.
Senator McCain. Let me just be clear, again. You said that
you were appalled at the publication of these documents--the
WikiLeaks that just happened.
General Mattis. Yes, sir. I thought it was grossly
irresponsible.
Senator McCain. I won't ask you to comment on the
publications--or, the newspapers that chose to publish them.
Are you concerned, as I have seen with my own eyes, the
concern that exists in Afghanistan and in the region about a
date for withdrawal for the middle of next year?
General Mattis. Sir, I think that it is a misinterpretation
that we would, and we have to be very clear that we're not
leaving, that it starts a process of transition to the Afghan
forces. It is not that we are pulling out of the region.
Senator McCain. Wouldn't that be more impactful, your
statement, if the President of the United States just said,
``We're not turning out the lights and closing the door in the
middle of next year?'' Wouldn't it be helpful if the President
of the United States made clear what you have just said, and
what the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have
said? I don't expect you to answer that.
Are you satisfied with the withdrawal from Iraq, as it is
on schedule?
General Mattis. I am, sir. We're less than half the troops
there today than where we were at a year ago. We're on track.
Senator McCain. But, you're satisfied that the environment
is such we can continue----
General Mattis. Yes, sir. I'm actually very impressed by
the Iraqi security forces, and how they're keeping the enemy
off balance, even during this transition of the government
that's taken longer than we expected.
Senator McCain. What is your view--or maybe you could
inform us--on Iranian involvement in Iraq, over time. What
about reports of increasing Iranian involvement in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. As best I understand it right
now, sir, I think they're playing both sides against the
middle. I think that they are supporting President Karzai, in
some ways. I think they're also hedging their bets and up to
their usual kind of spreading of terrorism.
Senator McCain. What about equipment and training?
General Mattis. I need to get specific with you to answer
that question, sir. But, we are very sure that they have done
some things counter to our interests, supporting people we are
fighting.
Senator McCain. The last time we left a place, at the
urging of many on the left, not the last time, but one of the
times--was Cambodia; and horrible things happened. What do you
think the consequences will be for the general population,
specifically women, if we leave and allow the Taliban to return
to power? Do you believe that al Qaeda will work with them and
reestablish a base for attacks on the United States?
General Mattis. Sir, I have no reason for optimism that, if
the Taliban were left in control, that al Qaeda would not move
back in. They did it before. I don't see any reason I would
expect them not to do it again.
As far as human rights abuses, Senator McCain, this Taliban
approach to running a country is well known. They've
demonstrated it for 5 years before we went in, in 2001. We have
seen the human rights abuses. We're keenly aware that no girls
went to school--to speak specifically to your question about
the female population--no girls went to school for the 5 years
they were in control, until we came in. It was against their
law. I have no doubt that, again, the human rights abuses will
be a challenge if we were to pull out. By that, I mean that
they'll return to their same ways.
Senator McCain. There's no doubt that al Qaeda would work
again with the Taliban?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. They are not monolithic. I
realize that. There are ways that we can split off some of the
reconcilables from the irreconcilables. But, the leadership of
Taliban, I am very confident, would work again with al Qaeda.
Senator McCain. I thank you, General, and thanks again for
your service and your straight talk.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, for
the record here, I'd like to point out that each Military
Service has its own personalities, but there's no clearer
measure of a marine than to be trusted with the responsibility
of command. If you look at General Mattis's biographical
statement, I count, I think, at least 12 different levels of
command in his career, which is really an extraordinary career.
He's commanded a platoon, company, battalion--these are
operational commands--regiment, division, and marine
expeditionary force. I know we have someone, here, who knows
how to lead, who knows how to make decisions, and who knows how
to accept responsibility for the consequences of his decisions.
I think this is a good fit for our country, and I wish the
General well.
What I would like to do today, General, in the brief time
that I have, rather than focusing on Afghanistan--I know you
have a strong operational partner there, and someone who is
already on the ground running--I'd like to ask your thoughts,
first of all, about the diplomatic side of your job, for lack
of a better term. You have a military hat, and you also have a
responsibility to deal with a lot of civilian foreign leaders.
What are your thoughts on how to conduct that?
General Mattis. Thank you, Senator Webb. There is probably
no problem in that region that can be addressed by a single
country, or working just with a single country. It has to be a
regional approach. It also has to be a political-military
component in a holistic campaign. There is probably nothing
over there that a purely military answer will provide the long-
term outcome that we need. The diplomatic aspects have to be
ones that find common cause with those nations of like-minded
principles, or with security issues that can find common cause
with us, and find a way, bilaterally and, ultimately, in a
regional manner, to ensure that we really solve problems; we're
simply solving one to create another.
The diplomatic aspects will be, I think, foremost, as we
ensure that, by CENTCOM being military-ready, sends a message
that we are staying in the theater, we are engaged, and we have
the will to do so.
Senator Webb. How do you see your role in that area?
General Mattis. Specifically, meeting with the military
leadership throughout the region of the 20-odd countries, and
ensuring that we can build trust and confidence between us.
Senator Webb. I'd like to go to your written testimony. On
page 9, you have a paragraph that's titled ``External
Influences,'' and you make, I think, a very interesting
statement, and I'd like to hear your thoughts on this. I'll
read it to you. ``Turkey, Russia, and, increasingly, China and
India, exert major influences within the CENTCOM region.
Somewhere, the Middle East peace process, though it involves
parties that are outside the CENTCOM region, has a significant
impact on the countries of the region and upon CENTCOM's
ability to further our interests throughout the area.''
Would you comment on your views on Turkey, Russia, China,
India, and then the Middle East peace process?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. Turkey has been an ally of ours
since the Korean war, when they fought alongside us during that
difficult period. They stood by us through the Cold War. They
stood by us through sanctions against Saddam, at a time when it
cost them, economically, severe consequences to their country.
They are the only NATO country that is fighting an active
insurgency in the southeast corner. I believe there is a lot of
room for us to continue to work together on common interests.
It is part of U.S. European Command, and I will work with
Admiral Stavridis.
In regards to Russia, I believe, in the short term, we will
continue to have our engagement policy with Russia. I think
Russia is also threatened by some of the same things that
disturb us--for example, terrorism in the southern belt, in the
Afghanistan area, and the drug trade. There is room for common
interest to work with the Russians.
China, I noticed, just recently actually bought more oil
from Saudi Arabia than we did. It shows that they have a deep
economic interest in the area. They also are trying to assure
themselves of certain raw materials that they need. There are
going to be continuing economic interests. But, also, between
piracy and the challenge for them to remain fully capable of
getting oil out of the Middle East, I think there are going to
be opportunities for us to work together regionally, so if they
stand by us in the United Nations, with United Nations Security
Council resolutions sanctioning Iran, they are not, in effect,
cutting off their own oil.
Finally, India: Anything we do in the Pakistan and
Afghanistan arena has to be considered in terms of its effect
on India.
Lastly, on the Middle East peace process, there is a
political cost to the stagnation. I think it allows radicals to
seize the issue between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and
basically trap the moderates in the region. I very strongly
endorse what our State Department is doing, pursuing the two-
state solution with both sides.
Senator Webb. Final question, as a follow-on to that.
We have serious logistical challenges in Afghanistan,
because of the logistical routes through Pakistan, and also
through the other ``stans.'' Do you see Russia as now assisting
us, in cooperation, in ameliorating that situation? Or do you
see an obstacle there?
General Mattis. I see Russia helping us, right now, sir,
with the northern distribution network.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to say, General Mattis, that you did
such a great job in Joint Forces Command. You'll be missed
there. But, this is probably even more challenging than your
duties there. Particularly, 9 months, or so, ago, we had a
chance to look over the programs, some of our joint successes.
We'll continue to do that.
I know that you said in your opening statement that your
main focus is going to be on the war in Afghanistan. When I
look at all the countries in CENTCOM and the AOR, I think that
it's a pretty overwhelming thing that you are facing. A couple
of interests that we have: I just got back, a month ago, from
Iraq, and I met with Prime Minister Maliki, Ambassador Hill,
General Cone, General Hunzeker, and the person I've always
thought had the greatest leadership there is Barham Salih. We
went up in the northern part of Iraq, had a chance to visit
with him. They, at that time, were optimistic they were going
to be able to get together some kind of a coalition government,
but you have the Shia and Sunnis, and then you have the Kurds,
up north. Have you had a chance, in anticipating getting into
this job and looking to see what I think is going to be one of
the great challenges in that whole AOR is some kind of a
successful coalition government. What do you think the
prospects are there?
General Mattis. Senator Inhofe, in preparation for this
hearing, I met with Ambassador Jeffrey, our Ambassador
Designate, if he's confirmed by the Senate, to Baghdad. I've
talked with General Austin, and at length with General Odierno.
I think that it's taking longer than we or the Iraqi people
wanted to see this take, but it's more important they get an
inclusive government, I think, than they get a fast government
right now. The three issues I think they must address: One is
the political future of those northern provinces; one is the
oil distribution, and the distribution of the oil funds that
come out. Both of those touch right to the heart of your
question.
I think, right now, that we're on the right track, and I
think, in some ways, the slow pace may give us more confidence,
when we finally see it report out and we have a government,
that it's going to be able to take on the political futures in
a responsible way.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. You talk about coordinating with the
north. You've thought about it, and you've looked at the
leadership qualities of different people--do you see a role for
Salih to play in a new coalition government that might help, in
that respect, in terms of up north?
General Mattis. Right, sir. I think he is very impressive
in his qualifications, but I, of course, would defer to the----
Senator Inhofe. Sure. I understand that.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. This committee cut $1 billion from the
President's request, $2 billion for the Iraqi Security Forces
Fund. Even you mentioned, briefly, the fact that there is going
to be a potential of oil revenues coming in.
However, I've been told that Iraq will have about a $4-
billion budget deficit in 2010, and it will take Iraq 4 to 5
years until it can fund itself; oil production at one-quarter
the capacity, due to pipeline problems. What impact would the
$1-billion cut have? Or have you had a chance to look at that
and develop any ideas?
General Mattis. Senator, I need to look at it more closely,
if confirmed. The most important thing is that we have an Iraqi
security force that can pick up and carry forward as we
continue to draw down. They will run a budget deficit this
year. They are spending, right now, I believe it's around 15
percent of their national budget on security. It's not that
they're just dropping this to us and expecting us to pick it
up. However we keep the Iraqi security forces at the top of
their game so, as we move out, a stable, successful Iraq is
left in our wake, I think is critical.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate your saying that, because we
hear a lot about, ``They have all these revenues. They're able
to do this.'' It's as if they are not trying to do it on their
own. It's been my experience, going over and talking to the
leadership, that they are. I see progress there, in terms of
these forces, whether it's the tribal forces against each other
coming back together.
I thought, when Senator McCain mentioned Iran, he was going
to ask the question that I had in mind, but he went in a
different direction. I've been concerned, for quite some time,
of course, Iran is in CENTCOM and our unclassified intel has
said that Iran, most likely, will have an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) capability, the weapon and the
delivery system, by as early, they said, as 2015. Then, just
the other day, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director
Panetta said on ABC News--he was talking about when they would
have the material. Then, moving it forward, it came to--some
thing--closer to about 2013.
We know they have the capability. We know that you have an
AOR that would be affected by that. My concern, that I voiced
from this table several times, has been addressing it, relative
to pulling out the ground-based interceptor capability in
Poland. But, with it is right now as this date moves forward--
and we're looking at maybe 2015, or maybe a little bit
earlier--what's your assessment of Iran and its impact on the
AOR of CENTCOM?
General Mattis. If they continue in their current
direction, sir, they can only have a negative impact. We are
looking at a country that's undiminished in its efforts to
enrich uranium, to oppress their own people, and to support
murderous proxy units all over the region.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Mattis. This is becoming emblematic of them, and it
is unhelpful, in the extreme, to stability there in the region.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Now, in your previous job, you
didn't address my concerns but, you will have to address them--
and I'm talking about programs that I've talked about before,
such as the train-and-equip program, the 1206, 1208--the
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) that has been cut
a little bit. Every time I talk to commanders in the field,
they talk about how valuable that program is. Have you looked
at these programs, what your feelings are now, in terms of how
significant they are? I'm talking about the Combatant Commander
Initiative Fund, the CERP, the International Military Education
and Training Program, the train-and-equip program, and those.
General Mattis. These programs are absolutely critical,
sir, because we cannot afford to be the world's policemen and
carry it all ourselves.
Senator Inhofe. Exactly.
General Mattis. These programs are what actually provides
the seed corn, in many cases, to allow others to do their
share; and they want to do it. In some cases, just access to
our technology; in others, it's training and equipping them so
they can do their own thing. The CERP, for urgent humanitarian
reasons, allows us to go in and make an immediate impact. These
are great, adaptive programs that allow us to checkmate our
enemies.
Senator Inhofe. The amount of money the CERP you pay, at
that time, it could be worth four times the normal process of
going all the way through the steps and getting it done later.
I know you'll be looking at these programs, and you're
certainly the right man for the job, and we look forward to
working with you over there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
General Mattis, let me first state the obvious. You're one
of the most remarkable combat leaders we have in our Military
Services, and also one of the most thoughtful students of
strategy in the profession of arms. I have every confidence
that you're going to be a remarkable commander in CENTCOM. Let
me proceed from that standpoint.
Our initial engagement in this region was prompted by the
need to protect the United States from terrorist groups that
were operating there, but with a worldwide reach, regrettably,
even into the United States. In your view, does that still
remain our number-one strategic priority?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, it does. The enemy is not
monolithic, and we have to adapt to how the enemy has adapted,
but, yes, sir.
Senator Reed. In the carrying out of that responsibility to
meet that strategic objective, the question that I posed to
General Petraeus, and I'll pose to you, is it your view that
our presence in Afghanistan is necessary to effectuate that
strategic objective?
General Mattis. There's no doubt in my mind it is, sir.
Senator Reed. Even though what we know is that some of
these groups have migrated into Pakistan, and elsewhere in the
region, and indeed, our initial opponents, al Qaeda, have now
sort of morphed into copycat groups and to a much more
disparate sort of terrorist network. Is that a fair assessment?
General Mattis. I think that's exactly on target, sir.
Senator Reed. Now, there's a lot of discussion about what
we want to achieve in Afghanistan. Could you give me a general
idea of what your view of a successful end-state would be in
Afghanistan, General?
General Mattis. I think the President put it very well when
he said, with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and our 46 international
partners, we are basically going to break the Taliban's
momentum, we're going to relentlessly attack al Qaeda, and
we're going to build the Afghan and Pakistani capability to
carry on once we pull out of there. I think if you look at
those three points that the President outlined, sir, that
outlines the overarching strategy.
Obviously, we have both a military and a political
component to our strategy. The military piece is well-
integrated, and increasingly well-integrated, with the civilian
component, something that I probably could not have said quite
so strongly a year ago, but we've made a lot of progress, sir.
Senator Reed. With respect to this end-state, again, one of
the things that strikes me as the most critical is building
Afghan capacity; and the most immediate capacity they have to
build is security forces, both Afghan National Army and Afghan
Police. Is that your view, also?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Reed. Do you have an assessment, initially, about
how well we're doing? I must confess, over the last 8 years,
the record of building Afghan security forces has been not even
mixed; it's been hit and miss, start and stop. Do you believe
that we're on the right trajectory, and more importantly, will
be able, in a reasonable amount of time, to field adequate
forces so that they can relieve our presence, or at least
substitute for our presence?
General Mattis. Senator Reed, we are on the right track
now. I think we have the organizational construct right, and
that has the four-star strategic commander there in theater,
General Petraeus. We have a three-star core commander who's
fighting the battle. We have a three-star, Lieutenant General
Caldwell, who's responsible for this training, advising,
equipping effort. As the chairman pointed out, we are 3 months
ahead on the recruiting target here. We're already at the
October goal, right now, of 134,000. This is for the Army.
We're making progress today, I think, in a way that we have
been unable to make in the past because it just wasn't
resourced enough. We did a lot of things right in the past. It
just wasn't resourced enough.
The Afghan police, we started later, frankly, with our
responsibility there. I think it's on the right track now, but
no longer do we recruit, assign, and then try to train them on
the job. Today, we recruit them, we train them, and then assign
them. The sense of urgency in the past competed with the
longer-term effort, and I think we learned a lesson there. But,
we're on the right track now, sir, and they will be able to
take over from us. In Kabul, they already have transitioned to
Afghan control, Afghan leadership. They were able to pull off
that very complicated conference, last week, where our
Secretary of State represented us, along with 57 other nations.
The Haqqani network said that would not happen, and they lost
to the Afghan security forces. I thought that was very telling.
Senator Reed. As you pointed out, previously, there will be
a transition point next summer. That transition point is not a
withdrawal, but it is a transition to a different mission. One
way at least I think about it is, moving from a emphasis on
counterinsurgency to an increasingly important emphasis, and
indefinite emphasis, on counterterrorism. Is that your
approach, too? Or could you amplify on that?
General Mattis. I think that is the approach, Senator.
Because we're going to have to work this from the bottom up,
some districts and provinces will transition much faster than
others. That's the norm in this kind of war. But, that is the
right approach. Of course, as the President's pointed out, the
conditions on the ground will determine the pace of transition.
Senator Reed. Right. As you've pointed out, too, that this
is not a strictly, indeed, perhaps even most importantly, a
military operation; it's a combined military-civilian
operation. It struck me, in my visits, along with Senator Levin
and others, that we have invested, appropriately, a lot of
effort in the ministries in Kabul. But, do you think we should
be devoting more time to a more decentralized approach that
will engage tribal leaders, that will recognize that, even if
we can develop effective ministerial capacity, there's a huge
gap between Kabul and everyplace else that we're fighting?
General Mattis. Senator Reed, violence and progress coexist
in Afghanistan, and sometimes the violence blinds us to the
progress, because it's so heartbreaking to see innocent people
murdered for no reason by an enemy that intentionally fights
from among innocent people. But, that said, I think the recent
decision, even since General Petraeus arrived in Kabul,
continuing General McChrystal's efforts, the continuity of the
strategy, with Ambassador Sedwill of the United Kingdom being
the NATO senior civilian representative, and it was President
Karzai's decision to decentralize and having local security
forces stood up, now--very heartening, very consistent with the
line of thinking that you're proposing, sir.
Senator Reed. One of the realities that certainly caught me
by surprise, 7 or 8 years ago, when I first went into the
theater, was the presence, both real and imagined, of the
Indians in Afghanistan, particularly from the Pakistani
perspective, which leads me to this sort of functional
question. Your responsibilities embrace Afghanistan and
Pakistan. But, India is a key factor in what happens in
Pakistan, certainly, and to a surprising degree, to me, at
least initially, in Afghanistan. Is this CENTCOM/Pacific
Command (PACOM) structure--how do you bridge that, I would
argue, in some cases, artificial gap between your
responsibilities and the Pacific Commander's responsibilities?
General Mattis. I think one of the key functions of a
combatant commander is to ensure there are no gaps. I spoke
with Admiral Willard yesterday, Senator, in preparation for
this hearing, and, if you confirm me, we agreed to work very
closely together. We cannot do something on one side of a
combatant commander's boundary that complicates the other.
We're committed to working together. It will be the closest
collaboration between PACOM and CENTCOM, if you confirm me.
What we don't want to do is ignore the reality that it's a
regional problem that Pakistan has had a very difficult history
with India. India has shown great forbearance, under some
enormous pressure--a terrorist attack in Mumbai. At the same
time, Afghanistan and Pakistan have to be able to work
together. It is complicated, but it's the normal state of
things in the world, and we can overcome any little boundary
issues between PACOM and CENTCOM.
Senator Reed. Let me conclude with a final very quick
hypothetical. Should the Government of Pakistan, together with
the United States--NATO, actually--effectively control their
border, suppress the Haqqani network and the Quetta Shura, the
operational tactical situation in Afghanistan would be
remarkably improved, or marginally improved, or not affected?
General Mattis. Senator Reed, the Pakistanis have moved
against many of our common enemies, and I think that there is a
growing awareness and a remarkable political consensus in
Islamabad that what can be conveyed as ``poisonous snakes in
the garden'' don't only bite other people's kids; they go after
everyone. I think, in the longer run, as they are able to amass
what they need, in terms of political will and military
capability, that we will work against the common enemies.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General.
General Mattis. You're welcome.
Senator Reed. Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Senator Reed.
General, first of all, congratulations. I'm certainly
looking forward to casting my vote for you. I'm hopeful that
the chairman will take this up as quickly as we took up General
Petraeus's confirmation. I think it's very important for the
security of the region, the security of our troops, and the
security of our country.
I did note with interest the recent article, ``Warrior
Monk,'' that you were looking forward to growing onions in your
spare time when you retired. I don't think that's going to be
happening anytime soon. Thank you for stepping up and stepping
to the plate again.
Just a couple of questions, because I want to give my
colleagues time also. When I was in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
obviously I was very aware of the conflict in Afghanistan, but
I also sensed--especially over water rights between India and
Pakistan--that water is the lifeblood of Pakistan and India.
There's a dam being built that, potentially, will divert water.
What do you see the military's role in trying to kind of calm
down that brewing conflict, or potential conflict, between
those two countries over water rights? Do you see any
involvement or anything that you could be doing?
General Mattis. Senator, they've fought several wars over a
number of issues. There's the Kashmir issue, there's any number
of terrorist attacks. But, I think the most important thing we
can do, in support of the diplomatic efforts, which will
fundamentally be how we change something like this, is to help
bring the officer corps of both militaries together and create
trust between them; allow them to perhaps attend our school
together, as they do, they get to know each other there; and
even do some of the things we've done elsewhere in the world
where we bring different sides, during frozen conflicts,
together, for example, at the Army School at Leavenworth, or up
at Carlisle Barracks, and let them study our civil war
together. After a few days, they start warming up. I think
there are ways for us to build trust between officer corps that
will help stabilize these issues. But, it's fundamentally a
political problem, not a military one, of course.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
With regards to a lot of the folks that have released, we
had about 28,000, if my numbers are accurate, people who were
detained and have been reintegrated. I know you haven't
necessarily been dealing with it, but have you noticed what the
recidivism rate is with a lot of these folks? Are they getting
back into the battle at all? Anything you can comment on that?
You're not there yet.
General Mattis. I'm not current on the issue, right now,
Senator, and I can take the question for the record and get
back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The rate of persons captured and released, who later rejoin the
insurgency, is unknown. The recidivism metrics only reflect individuals
who re-enter the long-term Detention Facility in Parwan for a second or
third time. Current facility records do not reflect those persons who
return to the insurgency and avoid capture or are killed.
The Detention Facility in Parwan recidivism numbers reflect only a
small percentage of individuals who re-engage in active hostilities or
support roles. Until late 2009, International Security Assistance
Forces did not conduct long-term detention or maintain records or
metrics. The U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Detention Operations metrics for
measuring recidivism are narrow in scope and not linked to biometrics
other than at the Detention Facility in Parwan. This means the database
for measuring recidivism pertains only to those held at Detention
Facility in Parwan and certain special facilities; does not include
most insurgents captured and released due to Rules of Engagement; and
does not include detainees taken and held by the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. There is no consistent means for
monitoring released persons in Afghanistan. Most insurgents released
after being captured adjust their pattern of life to avoid recapture,
and thus do not again appear in operational or intelligence reporting.
Many who re-engage in the insurgency do not use their true names after
incarceration which also complicates and confuses reporting.
General Mattis. There has been some recidivism over the
years that I've served there, but it's also gotten better as
conditions in the society got better. You've seen the
plummeting nature of the attack profile, where the attacks have
dropped off significantly. Obviously the reintegration is going
somewhat well. I would never say there's no recidivism at all.
I think that would be unrealistic.
Senator Brown. I know, when I was there, the sense I got
from the coalition forces, the troops, the tribal leaders, the
police, the army, is that the plan instituted by General
McChrystal, where everyone was training, patrolling, being
housed, eating, doing everything together was creating a sense
that we weren't there as occupiers, we genuinely want them to
do well so we can let them take over. I love the fact that they
want to do everything and be everything and be the head of
everything. But, with all due respect, until they can show us
and the coalition forces and their citizens that they can do
that we have to be there. Are you continuing to push that plan?
Is it being tweaked by General Petraeus? What's your thought on
that plan, and whether it's the way to move forward, and
ultimately get us out of the region?
General Mattis. Sir, partnering is absolutely the right way
to go. It has worked well everywhere we've done it. Sometimes,
it's better that they do something imperfectly than we try to
come in and do it perfectly, because they know the people and,
in the long run, they're actually probably doing it better. I
was looking at the reports of casualties and incidents the
other day, and I was impressed by the fact that 80 percent of
the contacts with the enemy--80 percent--were out of partnered
units. That's just a snapshot. I don't want to say that's a
take-that-to-the-bank indicator of how we're doing things over
there every day. But, when you look at how the enemy is
fighting right now, they're running into more and more units
that are partnered together and gaining that very maturity
you're talking about, which will eventually ensure that we can
back out into an advise-and-assist role while they carry the
load.
Senator Brown. Is it an accurate statement that the
Taliban, al Qaeda, or the enemy, however its constituted in
that region, are using civilians as shields, and so, some of
the casualties that we're being part of are a result of that
use of civilians in the battlefield?
General Mattis. Sir, this enemy has no regard for the
innocent on the battlefield. During the period from 1 June to
10 July, 89 percent of the people killed and wounded over there
in the midst of this fighting were killed or wounded by the
enemy. They have no regard for innocent people. They do not
fight by any conventions. They have opened, apocalyptically,
who they think they can attack, whether it be on September 11,
when thousands of innocent die, or on 7/7, in London, or in
Mumbai. It's the same theme that you see, time after time, of
them declaring that, basically, they don't care about the
innocent. They fight intentionally from among innocent people,
at times, I think, to draw fire on them if we fire back.
Senator Brown. How do you get that message out, then, and
win that kind of media battle, where you have to let people
know and understand that a lot of the casualties that are
happening--when you hear about civilian deaths in Afghanistan,
you say, ``Oh, man, the military again, they're messing up''--
but, in reality, I'm aware of it, being in the military, that
they're using them as shields. How do you, with your team, get
that message out to the rest of the world, that we're actually
being very judicious. The rules of engagement are very clear to
the troops; they're very concerned about when to fire, when not
to fire. At times, I feel that they're putting themselves in a
little bit of jeopardy. How do we get that message out and win
that battle of confidence, to let them know that we're doing
the right thing, and we're there to do the right thing?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. I think we have to display the
data more. We have to talk about it more. Frankly, I think we
need more political leadership to display it, as well, since
there are times when you are speaking in venues that,
generally, you don't find military people in. I think it has to
be a full-court press, as we get this information distributed.
But, also, in our military role, we have to make certain we're
discussing this in international forums.
The bottom line is, we have the most ethically-grounded
military, I think, in the history of warfare. Yet, somehow we
are not getting the message out that we are the good guys.
We're not the perfect guys, but we are the good guys. We're
fighting people who have much less concern for the innocent.
Senator Brown. There is a perfect guy, and, in talking to
him, he's the perfect guy for the job, so I wish you well,
General. Thank you.
General Mattis. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General.
I've been a long-time advocate for the use of benchmarks to
measure progress, first in Iraq, and now in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. In the role of the CENTCOM Commander, I'd like your
assurances that you will ensure the benchmark reports continue
to be delivered to Congress in a timely and honest assessment
of our progress there.
With regard to our operations in Afghanistan, what are the
key metrics that you'll focus on to ensure that we're on the
right track, that our strategy is sound, and that our progress,
though it may be slow, can lead us to a successful end game in
Afghanistan? Because, after all, that is what our purpose for
being there consists of.
Perhaps, as well, what are the biggest challenges in
promoting regional stability? I know you've answered that to
some degree already.
General Mattis. Sir, on the benchmarks report, I will
ensure that they get to you. I'll personally check on it to
make sure that we're timely on that.
The real challenge, Senator Nelson, is that what often
counts most in war is the most difficult to quantify. We
sensed, for example, in western Iraq--al Anbar Province--that
we were going to turn the province against the enemy. But, it
took months before it showed up in statistics. You don't want
to be behind the statistics out there. You want to be dealing
with people in the current fight and their current perceptions.
What we're going to have to do is quantify, to the point we
can, What is the size of the army? How many engagements? How
many patrols are they running? How much of this is really
transitioning in reality, not just a check-the-block that the
unit exists? This sort of thing, and make certain that, at some
point, we apply our military judgment so we're giving you a
mature assessment, not a pure numerical assessment or something
that really turns into nonsense.
As far as the broader issues, obviously we have al Qaeda
pinned down. They have not been able to do as many big
operations. It's not because they've fallen in love with us,
it's because they're trying to survive. That's their focus
right now.
At the same time, we're going to have to press against the
Taliban in their heartland, both politically and militarily.
We're going to have to break them for irreconcilable from
reconcilable. If they're irreconcilable, we will neutralize
them. If they're reconcilable, if they'll put down their
weapons, if they'll work with the government and work within
the constitution, then there's going to be a home for them. All
wars come to an end, and we have to make sure we give them a
way to end early.
The larger issues, I think, that I'm concerned with in the
region have to do with Iran. It is representative of that
leadership that they treat their own people with the same level
of oppression that they do externally, where they fund terror
groups. I think it shows they're one and the same, internal and
external.
Of course, their enrichment activities with uranium has now
drawn sufficient censure from the U.N. Security Council, where
you see nations as different as China, Russia, France, the
United States voting together. Just yesterday, the European
Union voted to sanction them even further--restrict, further,
their trade and their visas. Iran is, I think, the bigger long-
term state threat, and it is becoming increasingly isolated by
its approach.
Senator Ben Nelson. I'm encouraged by your discussion about
the use of benchmarks to identify progress of a certain type.
In that regard, I think it's helpful, because you have people
who say we're winning and you have people who say we're losing,
looking at the same set of circumstances. It's hard for them
both to be right at the same time. But, we can begin to debate
whether we're 60 percent toward the reduction in the number of
missions taken by the enemy, where we realize that they're held
down and they're not able to continue at the level they were
before. That kind of information is helpful to anybody looking
and trying to measure where we are, as well as where we're
going.
In addition, in your response to the committee's advance
policy questions, you said that Pakistan is the highest
priority in countering al Qaeda, citing that the tribal areas
provide them a safe haven, and the Pakistanis have begun to
take significant steps in addressing extremists within their
borders.
Is it possible to describe the effectiveness of our
military cooperation with Pakistan over the last 6 months?
Obviously, the information that was released, unfortunately,
would lead us to believe that things, previously, were not as
effective with cooperation between our forces and their forces
because of what might have been double-dealing. But, do we
think that our military cooperation with Pakistan and our
relationship with them has improved over the last 6 months?
General Mattis. Significantly, Senator, both in
counterterror and in the counterinsurgency effort. I think we
have growing trust and relationships, also, between the Afghans
and the Pakistani military, so that we're getting more of a
joint approach to that border area.
Senator Ben Nelson. As we continue to work with them, I
would imagine that the goal is to absolutely be certain that
they can take over more of the responsibility directly.
General Mattis. Yes, sir. Exactly.
Senator Ben Nelson. It appears that they have been doing
that over the last several months, as well.
General Mattis. Sir, they have sustained a military
offensive in some of the worst terrain I've ever seen, and
against record snowfalls. They've sustained very high
casualties amongst their junior officers, and that's usually a
very strong indication that they're the aggressive ones who are
going after the enemy. It's really, I think, quite impressive,
what they've pulled off right now.
Senator Ben Nelson. With respect to NATO, a third of the
ISAF is composed of the international partner forces, and our
NATO allies have made critical commitments to providing forces.
On a whole, what is your view of the strength of the commitment
of this international coalition?
What will be your priorities in helping develop the
regional support that's necessary for success in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. Sir, with 40-odd nations there with forces
committed, and that includes some 40,000 non-U.S. troops, from
NATO, primarily, and organized from the NATO flag--that also
includes non-NATO troop-contributing nations; for example,
Australia--we're seeing, I think, very effective operations.
Now, it's often said, the only thing more difficult than
fighting a war with allies, is fighting one without them, so
it's not that there's not any friction. But, when you look at,
for example, the very mature German operations up in the
northern sector, as we make certain that the enemy can't find a
new home there, under increasing pressure in the eastern and
southern areas--when you look at those kind of performances--
and those are the Romanians, the Estonians--these are countries
that are fighting alongside us, thousands of kilometers from
Europe, where we initially set NATO up to fight. I think it's
going well.
We also have 71 percent of their 9,700 reinforcements
already on the ground. Frankly, that's ahead of where I thought
it would be right now. Besides our 85 percent of our 30,000
there, we're seeing this coalition reinforcement coming in, and
also the civilians, so we're getting the civilian piece of it
right. At the same time, on the Pakistani side of the border,
we see the Pakistani Army in active operations in a number of
regions against the enemy. This is coming together, sir, in a
regional way with numbers of countries, international effort,
working together. Just as we can all recall, when the Soviet
Union went into Afghanistan, there was one country there.
Today, there's 40-odd, and we just saw the U.N. and the
European Union give an even more diplomatic strike to us. I
think we're on the right track.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General. Good luck.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for avoiding retirement. I know you were
probably looking forward to going into retirement, but we
really appreciate your taking on this responsibility. All those
years of deployment, training, and engagement on your behalf
will serve the country well. I think it will all come to bear.
Do you have any idea how 90,000 documents could get
missing, or taken from the Pentagon and given to the press?
General Mattis. Sir, I could only speculate, and I hate to
do that in front of this committee.
Senator Graham. Yes. I just hope we find out what happened,
because that's not a very comforting feeling, knowing that
90,000 classified documents could somehow leave the Pentagon,
or wherever they were supposed to be.
As we move forward, I think it's important for the American
people to understand what lies ahead, don't you, General, in
Afghanistan?
General Mattis. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Graham. It's going to be a tough road.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. The outcome is uncertain. We want to win.
We should win. But, you have to do the things to win. Winning
won't come by just talking about it, will it?
General Mattis. No, sir, it will not.
Senator Graham. Can the American people expect more of
their sons and daughters, in terms of increased casualties? The
death rate's going to go up, the casualty rate, in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. I believe it will be a difficult
summer, right into the fall.
Senator Graham. As a matter of fact, the American people
need to brace themselves for increased casualties in
Afghanistan.
In terms of the cost of the war, we're about to pass the
supplemental of $30, $40, $50 billion; after a while, it gets
all blurry. We're going to have to spend a lot of money in
Afghanistan in the near and long term, is that correct?
General Mattis. We will, sir, and hopefully reinforced by
the international community.
Senator Graham. Secretary Gates said NATO's been pretty
awful, when it comes to the Afghan security forces. There's a
fund that was created, where NATO nations and other countries
would contribute to paying for the cost of training the Afghan
army and police force. Secretary Gates said that fund has
accumulated 200 million Euros, which I think is pretty pitiful.
Can you take this on, in your new assignment, to try to urge
our colleagues to contribute more? If you can't send troops, if
you're going to leave, at least help us financially, because
the American people need to understand that, right now, we're
paying for the Afghan army and police force in great measure,
is that correct?
General Mattis. We are, sir. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. The entire budget for Afghanistan is about
$1 billion a year, maybe a little bit over, is that correct--
the actual budget for the country?
General Mattis. I'd have to take that for the record, sir.
I believe it's correct.
[The information referred to follows:]
According to the Department of Defense April 2010 Congressional
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, the
Government of Afghanistan estimates approximately $1.3 billion in
revenue and approximately $3.2 billion in expenditures during solar
year 1389 which covers March 2010 to March 2011.
Senator Graham. All right. Do you know what it costs, a
year, to train the Afghan police and army, and to equip them?
General Mattis. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Graham. I think it's somewhere in the $6- to $10-
billion range. I hope the American people understand, not only
are we going to have more casualties, we're going to be paying
for their army, their police force, and ours. My question to
you: Is it worth it, from a national security perspective?
General Mattis. Sir, I believe it was worth it when I first
went in to Afghanistan, in November 2001, right after September
11. Although the years have gone by since we lost those people
in New York and Washington, I believe it's still just as worth
it today.
Senator Graham. All right. Let's dig into this a little
bit, about where we're at, as a Nation, vis-a-vis Afghanistan.
How many tanks do the Taliban have?
General Mattis. Sir, after about December 2001, zero.
Senator Graham. How many airplanes do they have?
General Mattis. None, sir.
Senator Graham. How in the world are they able to come
back? Here we are in 2010, and some people say they're stronger
than they've ever been. How in the world did that happen, if
they don't have an air force, navy, or armored divisions? How
could they do this?
General Mattis. Sir, they've chosen to fight a different
kind of war. It's not a conventional war. It's not a
traditional war, with icon weapons systems. They've chosen to
hide among innocent people. They have an ideology that they
stand on. There were times when we were not sufficiently
resourced, in terms of counterinsurgency, to throw them off
their game.
Senator Graham. When I was in Afghanistan, not very long
ago, we met with some leaders in the Kandahar region. These
were different community leaders--they were all men, but they
did speak pretty bluntly, and they told us that enemy consists
of two groups--the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan,
from their point of view. They thought that the problem was 30
percent the Taliban, and 70 percent the Afghan Government.
What's your view of that?
General Mattis. Sir, Kandahar, of course, was the spiritual
home of the Taliban, and it still has the residue, very strong
residue, as the primary location for them. I was first there,
again, in December 2001, found many of the same ideas. However,
it is interesting that, even there, once we go into an area and
we stay there, they prefer us. This is from going in and out of
areas, and having the wrong people in charge, has cost us
credibility. But, also, if you go, for example, to Marjah, only
150 kilometers further, I think it is, to the west, an area
held by the Taliban for years, they changed their view once we
came in and stayed.
Senator Graham. You made a good comment, I think, about
``had the wrong people in charge.'' We all make mistakes. But,
do you believe it's possible to win in southern Afghanistan
without some major shake-ups, in terms of the Afghan
governance, without people being fired--local officials,
governors, police chiefs? Is it remotely possible for us to win
unless somebody new comes into the southern part of Afghanistan
on the Afghan side?
General Mattis. Sir, I'm not current enough, because I've
been out of the country now for quite a few months. That said,
you have to have competent and credible people representing the
government.
That's why the enemy is using assassination right now.
Senator Graham. Right.
General Mattis. Because where they find them, they have to
take them out, as they try to maintain a less effective Afghan
Government, sir.
Senator Graham. What I learned in my visit to Kandahar is,
there are four families pretty much running the place down
there. You promised to be candid, and I know you will, so the
next time you come before the committee, be prepared to answer
the question, Is Wali Karzai the problem or the solution? Is
there a commitment on the Afghan Government's part to clean
house where they need to clean house? If you could remember
that question, and come back, after a reasonable period of
time, and give me the answer, I think it would help the
committee and the American people, because, I'll tell you one
thing, General, we can ``clear'' anywhere. We're not going to
``hold'' unless the Afghan Government has the same desire to
change their country as we do. I look forward to hearing your
thoughts on how they're progressing.
General Mattis. Yes, sir. I will get back to you, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Per your guidance, we will prepare to answer this question at the
next hearing.
General Mattis. I don't think the Taliban is as loved down
there as some people portray them to be, because they've also
lived under Taliban rule, and I was not rejected, when I walked
the streets there, right after we threw them out.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Goodwin.
Senator Goodwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here today.
As the newest member of this committee, and of the Senate,
I also want to thank my colleagues for giving me a brief moment
to say a few words and pose a question to you, General.
During my admittedly brief tenure in the Senate, one thing
I hope to contribute is giving voice to our brave men and women
in uniform, particularly those from my home State of West
Virginia. As you may be aware, General, West Virginia is among
the top States in military volunteers per capita, and there
have been over 10,000 deployments from West Virginia Guard
members since September 11. West Virginians are no strangers to
hard work and sacrifice, and if there's a job to do to protect
this country, West Virginians are often a part of it.
Yet, West Virginians are also acutely aware that we're
engaged in two ground wars, and a global war on terror. As the
challenges grow, General, so do the stakes. I think the people
of West Virginia want to make sure that our strategies are
working, we're moving in the right directions, and we're
delivering the best possible results for our national security.
In my short week in this esteemed body, I've obviously
undertaken a wide range of pretty important responsibilities,
perhaps none of which, however, is more important than our
function here today, and ongoing conversation regarding our
role in the CENTCOM region, especially Afghanistan. I think, as
the recent news events have suggested, and as Senator Graham
alluded to in his questions to you, there has been somewhat of
a reignition of the conversation regarding our role in
Afghanistan, and what our objectives should be.
My question to you, General, would be, how would you
suggest that I properly weigh our objectives that we're seeking
to achieve in Afghanistan against the loss of American life and
the substantial resources we are devoting there?
General Mattis. Yes. Every loss that we've taken is a
tragedy, and I deeply sympathize with the families that have
paid this cost. I think that when you say, ``Why''--``Is it
worth it?'' we have to look at what the enemy intends to do.
They've been very candid. They've demonstrated, in their
actions, what they intend. They've demonstrated it from New
York City to London, from Washington, DC, to Mumbai. This is an
enemy that we are going to have to confront. I think that's a
harsh reality. The strategy that we have is a regional
strategy. It is a civilian-military strategy, it has both
political and it has security aspects to it--they are
integrated.
In Afghanistan, I believe I can say, with much more
assurance today than I could have a year ago, they are
integrated, with Ambassador Mark Sedwill of the U.K. being the
leader, the General Petraeus counterpart, the senior NATO
civilian representative there, integrating the civilian piece.
Even as we're buying time and getting the Afghan Army stood up,
and we're moving against the enemy, we are still doing those
things that will allow us to see true progress, and eventually
bringing our troops home and leaving more of an advise-and-
assist capability there in our wake.
Senator Goodwin. Thank you, General.
General Mattis. You're welcome.
Senator Goodwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Goodwin.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for your service to this country. Thank
you for again coming to the plate to serve your country in a
very important role. On behalf of Florida--I know, upon your
confirmation--welcome to CENTCOM, in Florida. We're excited to
have you.
I was just talking to the Tampa Chamber of Commerce, and
they're ready to welcome you to Hillsborough County. It's
important to us, in Florida, to have the relationship we have
with the military, as I think you know, from the world's
largest Air Force base, to, I guess, 22 or 23 military
installations, including 3 commands, 1 of which, you will
preside over. The military means a lot to Florida, and
Floridians love the military. I just wanted to say, on behalf
of my home State, we look forward to having you, upon your
confirmation.
I want to talk about a wide variety of different topics. I
want to start, first, with Afghanistan and follow up with you
on a point that General Petraeus and I have talked about
before, and that is information operations. This goes back to
the point that Senator Brown was making about trying to get the
word out to Afghanis that when the Taliban comes in and says we
killed all these children, or we've done something horrible
that we haven't done, that we're getting the word out, as
quickly and effectively as possible, that, ``That's not true,
and here's the real truth of the case.''
When I went to Afghanistan last fall, I met with a Colonel
Craft, who I believe now is back from Afghanistan, but he was
working with the Afghan commandos, and he was working with
local territorial governors, and they were putting up radio
stations, they were passing out leaflets, they were meeting
with local commanders and village leaders to make sure that
they had a network of people to get the word out, so that when
the Taliban tried to lie about what we were doing, we could
respond quickly and effectively. I would just want to encourage
you that that information operations effort is extremely
important, to stay focused on that, that there was a lot of
room for improvement in that. I know General Petraeus was
focused on it and had done a great job with it in Iraq. I
wanted to just highlight that issue for you.
This is outside of your AOR, but I wanted to--because this
is the first time I've had a chance to talk to you in this
setting--put this on your radar screen. I've talked to General
Fraser about this, on several times, and it's in the U.S.
Southern Command AOR, but there is a link with yours, and that
is the growing threat that I think Venezuela poses to this
country. The reason why I mention it to you is that there is a
connection between Venezuela and Iran. There are direct flights
between Tehran and Caracas, where we don't know who gets on the
flight, we don't know who gets off it. They land at a separate
part of the airport in Caracas. We know, by public information,
that there are Iranian shock troops in Venezuela. We know that
Hezbollah and Hamas have set up shop in Latin America. I'm very
concerned that Hugo Chavez is going to play by the same
playbook as Ahmadinejad.
Again, not in your AOR, but I take the opportunity with
everyone that I can to raise this topic, especially because it
links up with Iran, which is in your area of responsibility.
Let me ask you some questions now. I want to switch gears a
little and talk about the Horn of Africa, and also about Yemen,
because, as we've been successful against al Qaeda in
Afghanistan, we know that they have taken up root in Pakistan,
and we also know that al Qaeda is in Yemen, as well as in the
Horn of Africa. I wanted to ask you about what your focus will
be on those areas, what more we can do, what's the current
state of affairs in our efforts in both Yemen and in Somalia,
and also other parts of the Horn of Africa?
General Mattis. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. I agree 100
percent on information operations. It does us no good to win
the tactical battle and lose it at the strategic communications
level. We are committed to that, lock, stock, and barrel.
On Iran/Venezuela, I register your concern, and I have no
argument with you. It has my attention.
Regarding Yemen, sir, first, we are working a civilian-
military, a pol-mil plan, with Yemen. It's a very poor country.
It has severe water problems. It has an internal rebellion. Of
course, it has al Qaeda, the terrorists. They're a threat not
just to Yemen, but they're, also, to next door, Saudi Arabia.
We are working it, I think, in as cohesive a way, a civilian,
diplomatic, military role, as we can, considering the capacity
of the country to take on support. I think it's going the right
direction right now. It is going to be a problem. We are going
to have to address it. We can do so, I think, in league with
some of our friends in the region that can also assist.
As far as the Horn of Africa, it's under U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM), but due to the nature of it, and when you
look at al Qaeda's links, or possible links with al Shabaab, we
are going to have to get to a point of collaboration with
AFRICOM that the enemy doesn't find a seam between CENTCOM and
AFRICOM. I'm committed to doing that.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you. That's the point that I wanted
to raise with you, is that they're so close, they're
trafficking between the two places. I think there was newspaper
reports this weekend about al Shabaab committing a terrorist
attack in Uganda, which is the first time that, I think, that's
been reported. I look forward to traveling to the region, later
this year, and learning more about what our efforts are.
But, the use of our predator aircraft and other unmanned
vehicles--and everything that we can do, I think, needs to be
done, because as we saw with the Christmas Day bomber, the new
terrorists are going to come from regions that are outside of
Afghanistan, and we have to be ready for the next war. You know
the expression better than I do, that you don't just fight the
last war, but we have to be ready for the next war. I'm glad
that you're focused on that, as well.
If I can switch gears again, I'm sorry to go all over the
place, but I only have so much time to ask you questions. I was
looking at your testimony earlier this year, and it was a
program you were watching closely, called Imminent Fury. The
Navy submitted a reprogramming request for the second phase of
this program, which was denied, for a bunch of different
reasons. You were supportive of the program at the time. I
don't know if that's still your opinion. I wanted to check in
with you and see if you still think that's a program that is
worthwhile pursuing.
General Mattis. Yes, sir, I thought it was, at the time,
and I still do. It's a test program to see if we can use
turboprop planes to replace much more expensive planes, but,
more importantly, more effectively in the counterinsurgency
environment. But, there's an awful lot of data we would have to
collect. That's why I wanted to do the test, which is what
Imminent Fury would have done. But, yes, sir, I'm still
supportive of it, but I think I need to build some support for
it.
Senator LeMieux. Okay. Thank you, General. Again, welcome
to Florida. If we can be of any service to you, please let us
know. I had a great relationship with General Petraeus, and
want to have one equally as good with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
I have a few questions, and then others may, or not. We
will then end our confirmation hearing. I have just a few, and
here they are.
First, on private security contractors in Afghanistan.
They're creating huge problems for us. They threaten our
security in very real ways. In response to our advance policy
questions, you wrote that you believe the transition from
private security contractors to the Afghan security forces will
occur gradually and at the direction and encouragement of the
Afghan Government.
Just to share with you a couple conversations which Senator
Reed and I had when we were there a couple weeks ago, first
with General Carter, who's the commander of the ISAF forces in
the region, in Regional Command South, and with General
Rodriguez, who's our commander of the ISAF Joint Command. Both
those generals expressed real determination to go after the
contractors because of the harm that they're causing to us.
They are threatening the security of our own troops in a whole
host of ways. They solicit bribes, they extract fees for
convoys that are traveling through territory, instead of
actually protecting our own convoys, as they're supposed to be
doing. They're part of, in many cases--I don't want to overly
generalize--but, they are often part of schemes that are worked
with the warlord bosses to actually make us less secure and,
therefore, have to hire them to provide security. It's a
vicious circle. Both General Carter and General Rodriguez are
determined to break it.
General Carter, as a matter of fact, showed us a road--I
think it was north of Kandahar--that he said is going to be
free of these kind of warlord dominations. General Rodreguez
flat-out said, ``We're going to end it.''
I just want to let you know that there's real determination
there, on the ground, with our commanders, to go after these
security contractors who threaten our own well-being.
I think I mentioned to you, the Senate Armed Services
Committee has an ongoing investigation, which is close to
conclusion, about the operations of so many of these security
contractors and the way in which our own taxpayers' money, in
effect, end up making our own troops less secure, endangering
them, costing taxpayers' money in the process.
That's just for your information. I don't have a question
on that, other than I hope you'll really give some support to
that effort.
Second, while we are becoming less involved in Iraq, we are
going to continue to have involvement there for the next year
or so, and probably beyond that. I want to just highlight to
you the situation of the religious minorities in Iraq, as I
mentioned to you in the office. The U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom concluded, last May, that,
``systemic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations
continue in Iraq,'' and that ``the religious freedom situation
in Iraq remains grave, particularly for the country's smallest,
most vulnerable religious minorities.'' Now, what we're
referring to, and they're referring to here, is the Christian
community in Iraq. They are in a very fragile situation. They
need whatever kind of support in various ways we can provide to
them. I just want to make sure that's on your radar, as well,
when you are confirmed. You are, I think, familiar, somewhat,
with that situation, as we talked, and if you have any comment
on that, we'd welcome it.
General Mattis. Sir, two comments. One, I think the pace of
putting the government together may actually be indicating that
they're trying to put an inclusive government together. I think
that's fundamental to protecting minorities' rights.
The second point is the advise-and-assist mission that the
U.S. military will continue to carry forward in September on
out, will permit us to really, I think, make clear that the
ethical use of force and the protection of all Iraqis is the
job of the Iraqi security forces. I think there's nothing
better than demonstrating that, as we go forward, to try and
make an impression that that's their job, that the rule of law
and protection of everyone is a testimonial to their own
professionalism. I think that's the best we can do on this--
support the government that's inclusive and make certain you
have a military and police force that tries to protect people
in these communities.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Your active involvement in
reinforcing that position is very important. Even though our
presence will be reduced, it's not going to be ending.
Finally, Senator Graham made reference to the importance of
governance down in Kandahar and throughout Afghanistan, and I
couldn't agree with him more. In that regard, what Senator Jack
Reed and I found when we got there was something which--at
least it surprised me, and I'll let him speak for himself--that
is that in Kandahar, when we met with the Governor of Kandahar
and the mayor of Kandahar, both impressed us with their
independence, their outspokenness against corruption. They've
made no bones about it publicly. It's not just in a private
meeting with us. Their lives are on the line whenever they do
that. A neighboring governor in a province next door was
assassinated. But, from what we could tell, it was kind of
reassuring, because right in the province where you have
evidence of significant corruption, you have, at least the
impression we received--and I think our military folks said our
impression is a correct one--that you have a courageous
governor down there who's very much opposed to corruption, and
you have a mayor in the city that is outspoken, as well,
against it.
There are some glimmers of hope, in terms of independence
and a willingness to go after the corruption, which the Afghan
people are so sick of, and which really jeopardizes the
success--their success--it's not just our mission, it's their
mission, which we're helping them to succeed with. We
sometimes, in our rhetoric, talk as though this is our country,
and it clearly is a country we care about which has had a big
impact on our lives. But, it is a country whose sovereignty
belongs to others. Our role there is to make sure that
sovereignty is not destroyed by a extreme group, the Taliban,
which, again, would give safe haven--and I agree with you--to
al Qaeda, if the Taliban ever came back into power.
But, there is, in other words, not only the right focus, in
terms of the importance of governance, but it's also some
evidence that, in a very difficult area, which is down in
Kandahar, there is, apparently, if our impression is correct,
some people who are willing to put their lives on the line to
take on the corruption which has been so endemic.
General, let me ask Senator Goodwin if he might have more
questions.
Senator Goodwin. No, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Okay. In that case, we again thank you for
your service.
We will try to see if we can't get you on the job here just
as quickly as possible, hopefully in a matter of days. But, I
know there's very broad support and very strong support for
your nomination. We'll try to take this to the Senate floor as
quickly as we can get a quorum together here, either in--
somehow, in a committee meeting or off the floor, so we can get
the full Senate to approve you.
We again thank you for your service.
General Mattis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:24 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. James N. Mattis,
USMC, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The Department has made great progress in the joint arena
since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols. There is no room for
complacency but I believe we're on the right track. I don't believe
there is a need for any major modifications to the act.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Congress may consider means to
increase integration of non-military agencies in appropriate training
and force readiness environments in order to build the foundation for
more effective ``whole-of-government'' approaches to crisis prevention
or crisis resolution.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other
sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM), to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Subject to direction from the President, the Commander,
CENTCOM, performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of
the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commander, CENTCOM, is
responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of the
command to carry out its missions.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM, coordinates and exchanges information
with the Under Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet CENTCOM
priorities and requirements for support.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM, coordinates and exchanges information
with the assistant Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet
CENTCOM priorities and requirements for support.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the
President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Section
163 of title 10, U.S.C., allows communication between the President or
the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to flow through
the Chairman. As is custom and traditional practice, and as instructed
by the Unified Command Plan, I would communicate with the Secretary
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I anticipate a close
dialogue with the Chairman on all significant matters.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. I would communicate and coordinate with the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as required and in the absence of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.
Answer. I would also communicate and coordinate with the Director
as necessary and expect the Deputy Commander, CENTCOM, or Chief of
Staff, CENTCOM, would communicate regularly with the Director of the
Joint Staff.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible
for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant
commands. Commander, CENTCOM, coordinates closely with the Secretaries
to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip forces for
CENTCOM are met.
Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM communicates and exchanges information
with the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for organizing,
training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of the CENTCOM
mission responsibilities requires close coordination with the Service
Chiefs. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Service Chiefs
to understand the capabilities of their Services to clearly communicate
to them the CENTCOM theater's requirements and to ensure effective
employment of the Services' capabilities in the joint and coalition
execution of the CENTCOM mission.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM, maintains close relationships with the
other combatant commanders. These relationships are critical to the
execution of our National Military Strategy, and are characterized by
mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of
information on key issues. This is especially true of European Command,
Pacific Command (PACOM), and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.
Answer. I would necessarily have a relationship with the U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq, in close coordination with the Commander, U.S.
Forces-Iraq, in order to ensure unity of effort between U.S. military
and all other U.S. Government activities in Iraq and in the CENTCOM
region.
Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
Answer. I would necessarily have a close working relationship with
the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in close coordination with the U.S.
commander there, in order to ensure unity of effort between U.S.
military and all other U.S. Government activities in Afghanistan and in
the CENTCOM region.
Question. The U.S. Ambassadors to other countries within the
CENTCOM area of operations.
Answer. I would necessarily have a close working relationship with
U.S. Ambassadors to other countries in the CENTCOM region, in close
coordination with defense representatives or defense attaches in each
country, in order to ensure unity of effort between U.S. military and
other U.S. Government activities in the CENTCOM region.
Question. Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM requires close cooperation with the
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) [as MNF-I has been formally
redesignated] to support and resource the effort in Iraq to meet
national policy goals. It is critical that the relationship between the
Commander, CENTCOM and the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq be close,
candid, and productive to meet this end.
Question. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM requires close cooperation with
Commander, NATO-ISAF to support and resource the effort to achieve the
goals of the NATO mandate in Afghanistan. Commander, NATO-ISAF is dual-
hatted as the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, who formally reports
to Commander, CENTCOM, and a strong spirit of collaboration will
characterize our interactions.
qualifications
Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important
position at a critical time for CENTCOM.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. My experience in the CENTCOM region spans 30 years,
extending back to my first deployment to the Middle East in 1979 as a
Marine infantry company commander. Since then, I have commanded in the
CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) at the battalion, brigade, and
division levels, first in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and in the
post-September 11 period during the initial invasions in Afghanistan
and in Iraq. Additionally, I commanded I Marine Division in al Anbar
Province during the Sunni Awakening, and following that, I commanded I
Marine Expeditionary Force and Marine Forces CENTCOM. Finally, I have
served as the Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, working with
our NATO Allies in support of our efforts in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
I have been fortunate to develop personal relationships with
several leaders in the CENTCOM region--military and civilian, plus U.S.
and partner nations--for more than a decade, and if confirmed I will
seek to expand those relationships to enhance the unity of effort and
integrated harmony essential to success.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Commander, CENTCOM? If confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. Key among the challenges will be helping to check any
aggressive actions by Iran and setting the regional conditions for
success in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, there are significant
challenges in several of CENTCOM's sub-regions that require sustained
and significant attention. The region has been torn by interstate and
ethno-sectarian conflicts that have only intensified in the past three
decades with the emergence of al Qaeda, the specter of nuclear weapons,
and the enormous wealth derived from petroleum and criminal enterprise.
Today the area's stability is most seriously threatened by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, violent extremism, and
the conflation of the two. These are the harsh realities of the CENTCOM
region.
Beyond these sub-regional challenges, a number of transnational
challenges exist.
Amid pockets of affluence, many of the half-billion people in the
CENTCOM region suffer from the absence of sustainable economic
development, which in large part is brought on by weak government and
civil institutions, insufficient human capital, and endemic corruption.
These contrasts, when combined with the proliferation of global
communications and interaction, have left many of the states in the AOR
struggling to manage change at a pace that reinforces stability rather
than erodes it. These states often lack the capacity to deal with the
continuing challenges posed by a range of criminal activities, to
include piracy, smuggling, trafficking, and narcotics. The area's many
ethnic, tribal, and religious differences have exacerbated this
problem, as has the pressure of a rapidly expanding, youthful
population that faces a future of underemployment and limited
opportunity--all of which are factors that have led some groups to
undermine traditional authority and seek radical change through
militant means.
Though it is premature to have specific plans to address these
challenges, if I am confirmed I will carry forward an overall approach
of assisting our partners in the region based on our shared interests.
CENTCOM has made a great deal of progress in this respect and I will
reinforce those efforts.
Question. What management actions and time lines would you
establish to address these challenges?
Answer. Since I am not confirmed yet, I need to gain better
understanding of each of CENTCOM's lines of operation and get advice
from our regional partners to give a complete answer. I can say that if
I am confirmed, I will periodically review and assess our strategy,
activities, and programs to address the challenges in the CENTCOM
region.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
and what actions would you initially take as Commander, CENTCOM?
Answer. Should I be confirmed, the mission in Afghanistan will be
my immediate priority. Other significant priorities include helping
Pakistan in its struggle against extremism, continuing the responsible
drawdown in Iraq, deterring Iranian destabilizing activities,
addressing the presence of al Qaeda and affiliated extremist groups in
Yemen and throughout the region, and countering the scourge of piracy
on the high seas.
While it would be premature for me to have detailed plans to
address these priority areas, my approach will be guided by several
concepts if I am confirmed: I will require highly integrated civil-
military efforts from the highest to the lowest levels. To that end, I
will seek to ensure harmony in the relationships of military and
civilian leaders at all levels, emphasizing a strong spirit of
collaboration with all concerned. I will strengthen and sustain our
multilateral and bilateral partnerships in the region based on shared
interests. Each of these elements will contribute to an overall
approach that is comprehensive and capitalizes on comparative
advantages of components within the whole of our own government and
that of our partners.
Question. What were the major lessons that you learned from your
previous experience in Iraq and most recently as Commander, U.S. Joint
Forces Command, that are most applicable to the duties you would assume
if confirmed?
Answer. One of the most important lessons I have learned throughout
my 38-year career in commanding troops from the platoon level to the
combatant command level is to appreciate and recognize the skill and
sacrifice of those serving our country in the military or as civilians.
Beyond that, and specifically related to the CENTCOM region, I have
learned to appreciate the region's rich social and cultural history
from my experiences leading marines in Iraq and in Afghanistan and from
my many contacts in the region. I have obtained further insight as the
Commander of the I Marine Expeditionary Force and Marine Forces
CENTCOM, and in my present assignment. I have sharpened my
understanding of counterinsurgency strategy in leading the Marine
Corps' Combat Development Command, where I was able to help shape much
of the current doctrine and training that the Marine Corps has since
incorporated. It was also there that I was able to co-author, with
General Petraeus, the new Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency
manual. In my current position, I have learned a great deal about the
current operating environment in the CENTCOM region, and the needs of
the forces that are operating there.
readiness of forces
Question. What is your assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces
that have been deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)?
Answer. I am riveted to this issue on a daily basis in my current
position as U.S. Joint Forces Commander, and our forces are extremely
well trained, and increasingly combat hardened--they are ready for the
fight, technically and tactically. Those deployed to Afghanistan as
part of OEF receive the best training and equipment possible, and they
possess an unparalleled level of combat experience, which has been
thoroughly integrated into the training process from the recruit to
unit level. Pre-deployment training at the various Joint Training
Centers provides tailored counterinsurgency scenarios and incorporates
up-to-the-minute lessons learned from troops on the ground in
Afghanistan. Fielding of critical protective equipment, such as the
Mine Resistant Ambush Protective (MRAP) family of vehicles is on
schedule. I have worked hard in my current position to ensure that all
levels of command are appropriately focused on ensuring the readiness
of U.S. OEF forces.
That said, there is always room for improvement. Gaps in our
counter-insurgency doctrine and training have been addressed as we
adapted to the enemy situation.
Question. What is your assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces
that have been deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Answer. My answer to this question mirrors the above response. Our
forces in Iraq are highly-trained, well-led, and fully-prepared for the
mission. Many of the senior leaders who will execute Operation New Dawn
have been closely involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom over several
years--LTG Austin, for one. We have a good understanding of the
requirements for completing the military mission in Iraq and I am
confident we are well postured to facilitate the transition to
Department of State (DOS) led operations.
Question. Have you observed any significant trends in or apparent
gaps with respect to personnel, equipment, or training readiness in
units upon arrival in either theater?
Answer. No. Overall, the readiness of units arriving in the AOR has
been high and the Services have done well preparing units to deploy.
Where issues have arisen, the Services have been adaptive and
incorporated feedback from the theater by making necessary adjustments
in force preparations. There has been constant dialogue with U.S. Joint
Forces Command and the Service training centers to provide immediate
feedback in order to adjust training and the training environment.
Where adjustment has been necessary, supplemental funding has been
essential to meeting the requirements especially for counterinsurgency
training during the pre-deployment phase and roll out of coalition
command and control networks. Continued, expanded language training
will remain a training focus for these sorts of wars.
Question. What are your views on the growing debate over whether
U.S. forces are putting too much emphasis on preparing for
counterinsurgency and irregular warfare operations or too little
emphasis on preparing for high intensity force-on-force conflict and
full spectrum operations?
Answer. War is war and I think the debate is overblown. Irregular
warfare is important and conventional capability is important as well,
and many skill sets are applicable to both types of fighting. As
Secretary Gates has emphasized, irregular warfare must become a core
competency of the U.S. military. That does not mean that every Service
is ``50-50'' in a split of conventional versus irregular warfare
capabilities. It means that they have to train and fight across the
full range of military operations. We need to gain a competency at the
national level right down to the tactical level without surrendering
our nuclear deterrence or conventional superiority, behind which the
international community gains great benefit. We do not have the freedom
at this point in history to say that we are going to surrender one part
of the spectrum--if we embrace a single, preclusive form of
warfighting, we do so at our peril. The enemy will always move against
perceived weakness, which means that we have to be strong across the
full spectrum. This requires agile forces, educated leaders, and
lengthened dwell times between deployments especially for the Army and
Marine Corps.
afghanistan-pakistan strategy and major challenges
Question. In his speech at West Point in December 2009, the
President formulated his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
What role, if any, did you play in the formulation of the
President's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Answer. None.
Question. Do you agree with that strategy?
Answer. I fully support the policy of the President and I believe
the strategy is sound.
Question. Do you agree with the President's decision to begin
reductions of U.S. forces in July 2011?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Please explain why or why not.
Answer. I support the policy of the President. I understand the
July 2011 date to begin reduction of U.S. Forces that the President
announced at West Point last December as the beginning of a transition
of security tasks to the Afghans, based on our assessment of conditions
on the ground at that time. The drawdown of U.S. Forces will be based
on conditions on the ground at that time, as Secretary Gates reaffirmed
this last month when he said ``the pace . . . with which we draw down
and how many we draw down is going to be conditions-based.'' Consistent
with our counter-insurgency lessons learned and our doctrine, the
transition will involve a ``thinning out'' of forces rather than simply
dropping them to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Some forces
may shift missions and be ``reinvested'' in other elements of the
effort before they return home, and this transition will occur on the
district level and in functional areas as well, as we checkmate the
enemy's designs.
Question. Do you agree with the President's decision that the pace
of reductions beginning in July 2011 will be conditions based?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Please explain why or why not.
Answer. The responsible drawdown of forces beginning in July 2011
must be conditions based so that we ensure that ANSF can stand up
against internal and external threats with only modest international
support, thus leaving Afghanistan in a position to deny enemy use of
its territory.
Question. What are the major challenges and problems you foresee,
if confirmed as the next Commander, CENTCOM, in the implementation of
the President's strategy?
Answer. The most urgent challenges will be to establish security
and to protect the Afghan population, while increasing the numbers and
capabilities of the ANSF. This will require the strong partnering
between our forces and the Afghan Army, which synergistically improves
coalition and ANA combat performance in checkmating the enemy. Other
important challenges include strengthening trust among key regional
actors, the process of reintegration and reconciliation, improving
governance, and combating corruption.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges and problems?
Answer. Having confidence in the ability of General Petraeus to
execute the President's strategy in Afghanistan and for he and I to
work in the closest possible partnership, I will seek to ensure that
the effort there is fully resourced in a coherent and comprehensive
manner. I will also work to set broader regional conditions for the
success of the mission.
security situation in afghanistan
Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in
Afghanistan and the nature, size, and scope of the anti-government
insurgency?
Answer. The insurgency in Afghanistan has proven to be resilient,
and the security situation remains violent. The Taliban-dominated
insurgency has shown an ability to adapt, and remains a threat in many
populated areas. The insurgents fight among the people to deny the
Afghan Government from developing and representing the will of the
Afghan people. But I believe the enemy is losing its strategic
initiative. In the roller-coaster effect we always see in counter-
insurgency, progress and violence coexist. While progress is spotty,
overall the directions are trending toward the positive for us.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the nature and extent of
their cooperation?
Answer. Their relationship isn't as close as it once was. They
still share similar ideologies and they both want the expulsion of all
foreign forces from Afghanistan, but for different reasons. The Taliban
want to re-establish their medieval government; al Qaeda wants to re-
establish its sanctuary and to spread its Salifist ideology, primarily
through violent attacks on innocents.
coalition capabilities
Question. Do you believe that the current level of ISAF troops and
other U.S. troops and equipment in Afghanistan are sufficient to carry
out the mission?
Answer. I have reviewed the troop-to-task assessments and I believe
that there are sufficient troops for combat operations, but there
remains the need to adequately resource forces to partner, mentor, and
help train the ANSF. Working to build the ANSF so that it can protect
the population with minimal international support is the preeminent
task for ISAF as it builds Afghan ability to protect its own people and
territory.
Question. If not, what are the current shortfalls in troops and/or
equipment required for that mission?
Answer. The shortage of trainers and partner-mentor personnel is
approximately 1,000 personnel.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you have for
meeting any current shortfalls in troops or equipment required for the
mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with ADM Stavridis, our partner
nations and other stakeholders to gain the needed personnel, equipment
and forces.
Question. Do you believe our NATO allies should be doing more to
eliminate any shortfall in resourcing the NATO ISAF mission
requirements?
Answer. While I appreciate the increased commitments from Allies
and partners that are adding about 10,000 troops in Afghanistan, I do
feel there can be more contributions from other countries both from
NATO and other Allies and partners, especially providing personnel for
institutional trainers and Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams and
Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs).
command structures in afghanistan
Question. There have been a number of changes to the command
structures in Afghanistan over the past year, including the standing up
of the ISAF Joint Command under a three-star commander, U.S. Lieutenant
General David Rodriguez, and the establishment of the NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan under a three-star commander, U.S. Lieutenant
General William Caldwell.
What is your assessment of the current command structures for ISAF
and for U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)?
Answer. Monitoring these developments from my current position, I
believe tremendous progress has been made over the past year. In
addition to the ISAF Joint Command and NATO Training Mission
Afghanistan, a Joint Task Force (JTF) has been established under VADM
Robert Harward to address detainee and rule of law issues, and other
arrangements have been put in place to address issues such as
contracting and corruption. On the U.S. side, we have consolidated the
majority of U.S. forces under the operational control of Commander
USFOR-A, enhancing unity of effort considerably. These changes now
provide the organizational structure necessary for successful execution
of the mission.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to those
command structures?
Answer. I am satisfied with the current command relationships.
civilian-military cooperation in afghanistan
Question. What is your assessment of the current level of
cooperation and coordination between the military and civilian efforts
in Afghanistan to implement the counterinsurgency strategy, both within
the U.S. Government and between NATO ISAF and international civilian
entities?
Answer. From my current position, I assess the level of cooperation
as improving on a steady upward trajectory. I will closely monitor the
level of cooperation to provide the best possible harmony to maintain
our unity of effort.
The integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to
Afghanistan was developed by the U.S. Embassy and USFOR-A in close
coordination with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan and the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). I understand that this
document integrates and synchronizes actions and activities across the
civilian, military and international community to achieve common
objectives in Afghanistan. This plan reflects significant ongoing
collaboration and is the model for future planning.
Civil-military cooperation has also been strengthened with the
ongoing ``civilian surge'' of approximately 1,000 additional civilian
officials to help build governance and development capacity in
Afghanistan. The civilian surge has enabled ISAF and the ISAF Joint
Command (IJC) Headquarters, along with each of the regional
headquarters staffs, to evolve into fully integrated civil-military
teams. The civilian surge has also increased the numbers of experts at
the provincial level, under Provincial Reconstruction Teams and
District Delivery Teams.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
for improving the cooperation and coordination between the military and
civilian efforts in Afghanistan?
Answer. Unity of effort and civ-mil harmony in relationships are
critical to the accomplishment of the mission in Afghanistan. If I am
confirmed, I will work closely with the Special Representative to
Afghanistan and Pakistan--the natural counterpart to the Commander,
CENTCOM--as well as the civil-military team on the ground in Kabul,
along with the NATO and other leaders to ensure that all of our work--
civilian and military--is mutually supportive in pursuit of our goals
in Afghanistan.
building the afghan national security forces
Question. The current strategy for training and equipping the ANSF
calls for growing the Afghan National Army (ANA) to a level of 171,000
and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to a level of 134,000 by October
2011.
What is your assessment of the ANA?
Answer. It would be premature for me to formally assess the ANA in
my current position. In broad terms, I recognize that the ANA are often
cited as one of the most respected institutions in the Afghan
Government. ANA and police forces are now jointly leading security
efforts in Kabul and elsewhere in a more limited fashion. I am also
aware that ANA commanders are now partnering with coalition forces
during joint operational planning, and on any given day, much of the
combat against our enemy is conducted by ISAF-ANA partnered units. All
of these factors lead me to believe that ANA is developing, while
significant challenges remain, including the fielding of sufficient
combat power to adequately secure terrain and the growth of logistics
capabilities.
Question. What is your assessment of the ANP?
Answer. It would be premature for me to formally assess the ANP in
my current position. In broad terms, I am familiar with the many
challenges that confront the ANP, which can be attributed to the
shortfall of POMLTs. Many ANP units have experienced poor retention and
high attrition. The ANP also suffers from poor leadership and a
scarcity of trained officers and NCOs, despite other, more positive
signs of development. The decision to no longer deploy untrained police
in an effort to more rapidly fill the ranks is the right one; they must
be trained and this decision, shifting from recruit-deploy-train to
recruit-train-deploy will improve ANP capability and standing. Recent
increases in recruitment and the beginning of ISAF partnering with the
ANP are positive gains.
Question. In your view, will the currently-planned end strength
levels for the ANA and ANP be sufficient to provide security and
stability in Afghanistan, or should these target end strength levels be
increased?
Answer. This is a critical question that I will work with the
Commander, ISAF (COMISAF), to explore further upon taking command, if
confirmed. I am aware of ongoing analysis by NATO Training Mission-
Aghanistan (NTM-A) on the possible need for growth beyond currently
approved goals. While this process is ongoing, I am not in a position
to say that the currently approved strength of 305,600 will prove
sufficient. COMISAF has expressed his commitment to closely evaluating
end strength requirements--and I will interface with him on this issue
at length, if confirmed.
Question. What in your assessment are the greatest challenges to
building the capacity of the ANSF to assume responsibility for
Afghanistan's security?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the efforts that are currently
underway in building the capacity of ANSF and provide my own
assessment, as required. At that time, I'll be cognizant of those
challenges that have already been identified, such as leader
development, attrition, recruitment, retention, balancing current
operational needs with long-term demands, and unfilled training
requirements, among others.
Question. If confirmed, how would you recommend addressing these
challenges?
Answer. I would work closely with COMISAF to ensure that NTM-A/
CSTC-A have the appropriate level of resources that are necessary to
meet the identified mission objectives.
Question. There remains a shortfall in the number of training
personnel required for the NTM-A, both in terms of institutional
trainers at training centers and training teams embedded with Afghan
Army units and Afghan police units.
What in your view should be done to encourage NATO allies to
provide more institutional trainers?
Answer. We can encourage our Allies and partners to provide more
trainers by addressing their concerns on the issues of money and force
caps. There are productive ways to coordinate and facilitate countries
willing to donate funding for other countries that are willing to
deploy but lack the necessary funds. The United Arab Emirates (UAE),
for example, recently made a generous offer to help fund deployments to
assist in overcoming the shortage of required trainers.
To overcome some of these force cap issues, we should ask our
Allies and partners to send instructors to teach in ANSF schools on a
rotational, temporary duty basis. The recent decision by Malaysia to
send police trainers to Afghanistan is a positive step. This would
provide the specialized trainers required, while building capacity for
the Afghan forces and enhancing the expertise of coalition partners. On
all these matters, I will work closely with NATO's Civilian Senior
Representative in Afghanistan Mark Sedwill and Admiral Stavridis.
Question. What should be done to encourage NATO allies to provide
additional trainers to embed with the Afghan Army and police?
Answer. In addition to the proposals I have already mentioned, the
United States can encourage our Allies to provide more embedded
trainers by offering to provide NATO interoperable equipment that would
give them greater capability to move and communicate. Many nations are
unable to equip their forces to meet NATO standards. The United States
supports many such nations now, although we are constrained by our own
resource requirements and the overall shortage of critical assets such
as MRAPs (though the MRAP shortage will be eliminated late this fall).
Oversight responsibility for the contract to train the ANP is in
the process of transitioning from the DOS to the Department of Defense
(DOD). However, it will be several months before the DOD contract for
ANP training is awarded while a full and open competition is conducted.
In the interim, DOS is extending the existing DOS-managed ANP training
contract and seeking appropriate modifications to address oversight
deficiencies and align contract requirements with the NTM-A mission.
Question. What is your view of the advisability of using
contractors to perform this function?
Answer. Contractors fill critical shortfalls in government manpower
capacity. The demand for critical skills in low density areas is often
filled with contractors to enable mission success. Without a larger
force of military or government law enforcement, contractors must be
used to fill this critical gap.
Question. What level of performance do you believe we can
reasonably expect from private security contractors engaged to provide
training to the ANP?
Answer. In the large majority of cases, the performance should be
fully sufficient to accomplish the mission. With clear performance
requirements stipulated in the contract, we should be able to achieve
the desired levels of performance from ANP trainers. We will also
ensure that proper levels of quality assurance processes are used to
ensure required levels of performance are met. When the DOS contract
was extended, desired performance requirements were clarified with the
contractor. This issue will demand keen oversight to ensure the
contractor training is sufficient.
Question. If confirmed, what is your assessment of DOD's resources
and capacity to conduct appropriate oversight of the ANP training
contract for building the capabilities of the Afghan police forces?
Answer. I feel DOD has the resources and capacity in place to
conduct the necessary oversight. In response to the DOD Inspector
General and DOS Inspector General concerns in their joint report
entitled, ``DOD Obligations and Expenditures of Funds Provided to the
DOS for the Training and Mentoring of the ANP,'' issued February 9,
2010, DOD has made oversight of the new contract a priority. DOD is
currently competing the new ANP contract and is in the process of
planning an extensive oversight program that will include full-time
contract oversight and management as well as increased contract officer
representatives in the field, quality assurance personnel, and property
managers.
In December 2009, the Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) identified 26 additional high-priority positions
to strengthen oversight of the ASFF program, including acquisition
officers, internal auditors, foreign military sales specialists, and
finance specialists. These experts are providing CSTC-A with the depth
of knowledge needed to oversee the budget and acquisition processes, as
well as enhance contract oversight.
CSTC-A also has: put new policies and procedures in place to
implement adequate contract oversight; implemented a system to ensure
quality assurance for all contracts; established a six-person Contract
Management Team to monitor contracts, validate contract oversight, and
share best practices across the command; and established a process to
conduct a weekly contract performance review.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure proper
DOD oversight of the ANP training contract?
Answer. I would work with CSTC-A and NTM-A to continue the progress
that has been made in recent months and will look closely for
additional ways to improve oversight.
partnering with afghan security forces
Question. The committee received a briefing on plans for the
campaign in Kandahar, which called for the deployment of Afghan and
ISAF security forces partnered together to provide a ``rising tide'' of
security in and around Kandahar over a period of months.
What is your assessment of current efforts to partner Afghan
security forces with ISAF forces in operations, particularly in
Regional Command South (RC-South)?
Answer. As U.S., NATO, and coalition partners concentrate efforts
in Helmand and Kandahar, embedded partnerships will enable ISAF to
accelerate the development of the fielded Afghan force and foster
stronger leadership. The Afghans' local knowledge, cultural
understanding, and intuitive feel for the operating environment,
coupled with our troops, technology, air assets, and logistics support
are proving time and time again to be a powerful combination, one that
is increasingly effective against the enemy.
Question. Do you support moving as quickly as possible to
partnering ISAF forces and Afghan security forces together on at least
a 1-to-1 basis--one ISAF partnered with one or more Afghan--in order to
accelerate the transition of responsibility for Afghanistan's security
to Afghan security forces?
Answer. I do support moving as quickly as possible to partnering
ISAF and Afghanistan Security Forces. Partnering for ANA and ANP units
is now fully implemented in RC East, South, and Southwest. Partnering
is more difficult to implement fully in RCs North and West because of
limited allied numbers and differences in the way allied forces are
organized.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you recommend to
increase the number of operations in which Afghan security forces are
in the lead, including in RC-South?
Answer. I agree that Afghanistan forces need to take the lead in
operations, but this should be done on a deliberate basis, following
appropriate training, partnering and mentorship. Over time partnership
will result in Afghan units that increasingly operate in the lead as
the supported force. Although coalition forces are already serving in a
supporting role in many areas, U.S. and coalition forces still provide
many of the required enabling capabilities, such as access to fires,
air assets, and logistics support. Even in a supporting capacity, the
role of the U.S. and the international community will remain
significant for some time to come, though embedded partnering will
allow us to reduce the scope of our supporting role over time as Afghan
forces continue to develop these capabilities for themselves. Afghan
soldiers, police, and National Directorate of Security representatives
recognize the value of embedded partnering, appreciate sharing the
risk, and want to lead.
counternarcotics efforts in afghanistan
Question. According to the United Nations (U.N.) Office on Drugs
and Crime, Afghanistan alone provides 85 percent of the estimated
global heroin and morphine supply, a near monopoly. Of the estimated
380 metric tons of heroin produced in Afghanistan, approximately 5
metric tons stay in the country for local consumption or is seized by
local law enforcement.
What is your assessment of the current U.S. and NATO strategies for
combating the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics in
Afghanistan?
Answer. I am generally supportive of the current counternarcotics
(CN) strategies in Afghanistan which address not only narcotics
production and trafficking but also focus on licit alternatives to
poppy, agricultural development, demand reduction and treatment
programs. This strategy is about dismantling the links between drugs,
corruption, criminality and insurgency that plague the Afghan people.
The CN team in Afghanistan is also heavily vested in the development of
self reliant and effective CN law enforcement agencies such as the
Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, which help break the
narcotics-insurgency-corruption nexus and help connect the people of
Afghanistan to their government. If confirmed, I will closely examine
the regional strategy to ensure it supports ISAF's efforts in
Afghanistan and addresses the public health menace this crop produces.
Question. What changes, if any, would you make to those strategies
if you are confirmed?
Answer. I support efforts to work closely with our coalition
partners and NATO allies to reduce, when appropriate, the number of
national caveats inhibit associated with CN. I believe it is also
important to begin to address the narcotics problem as a regional
threat. When we are successful in our Afghan CN efforts, those involved
in the trade will move their operations elsewhere, and we need to deny
these traffickers safe haven across both Central and South Asia.
Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
Community (IC) have called for investing significantly more resources
in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with the
illegal narcotics trade. The objective would be to identify key
individuals within Afghanistan, as well as individuals enabling the
flow of money outside of Afghanistan. Comparable efforts have been
undertaken by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
against the flow of money and components for improvised explosive
devices.
What are your views on efforts to invest additional resources into
identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with the illegal
narcotics trade, both inside and outside Afghanistan?
Answer. Cutting off access to this vital component of insurgent
funding is an important part of a comprehensive counterinsurgency
campaign. From my current position, it would be premature for me to
evaluate the appropriate distribution of resources to this part of the
mission, which is implemented in large part by USFOR-A with CENTCOM in
an oversight role.
I am aware that recent international community studies indicate
narcotics account for more than half of insurgent financing. While the
specific percentages/amounts are debatable, there is consensus that
narcotics are a pillar of insurgent financial resources. This is
especially true in the Eastern and Southern Provinces of Afghanistan.
Finding the various financial sources and tracking money flows into the
insurgency is absolutely critical to defeating it.
Part of my role, if confirmed, will be to ensure appropriate
oversight of the funding flows. This will require a highly integrated
interagency effort at all levels. Tracking financial data and flow is
not a traditional military skill set, but our operations-intelligence
personnel can provide value-added to interagency organizations devoted
to maintaining the picture on financial resources of the insurgency.
Examples include the Drug Enforcement Administration-led Afghan Threat
Finance Cell (ATFC) and the proposed law-enforcement support centric
Trans-National Crime Support Center, which will contain the DOD
Counternarcotics Support Center. Investing in these types of
organizations will be the key to maintaining unity of effort and
maximizing resources.
reintegration and reconciliation
Question. Do you support offering incentives--such as employment
and protection from reprisal--to low- to mid-level Taliban fighters who
are willing to reintegrate with Afghan society and switch to supporting
the Afghan Government?
Answer. Yes. I believe that reintegration is an important element
of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. As such, I support
incentives that promote the confidence necessary for former fighters
and their host communities to feel secure. The Afghan Peace and
Reintegration Program utilizes a community-based approach that should
result in job creation for all members of a community, to include
former fighters. These incentives provide alternatives to fighting, as
well as promote the reintegration of former fighters into local
communities.
Question. What is your assessment of the reintegration plan that
has been developed by the Government of Afghanistan with ISAF
assistance?
Answer. I believe that the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration
Program provides the necessary framework to support success by
empowering Provincial and District governments with national-level
support. Further guidance is expected from the Afghan Government that
will provide the detailed guidance necessary for implementation, which,
if confirmed, I will look forward to reviewing.
Question. In your view, what should be the redlines for any
negotiations with the leadership of the Taliban on reconciliation?
Answer. I would support a reconciliation process as long as it is
Afghan-led. Those that reconcile must respect the Afghan constitution,
renounce violence, and have no material ties or support for al Qaeda or
its associates.
local defense initiative
Question. President Karzai has approved a program called the
Village Stabilization program that is designed to empower local
communities to provide for their own security. President Karzai has
previously expressed concern, however, that the program risks
strengthening local warlords.
What is your assessment of the Village Stabilization program?
Answer. Having monitored the situation closely, this has been one
of COMISAF's highest priorities as he has engaged President Karzai and
others on a number of occasions in recent weeks on this issue. This
program, now called Afghan Local Police (ALP) will enable the local
population to take a more active role in, and significantly improve,
local security. It is specifically designed to link the local
population with district governance, enabling this through community
outreach and shuras, as well as vetting and training a local defense
force. It is critical that we link these efforts to central government,
and importantly, to the local and regional-based ANSF capabilities to
maximize effect and develop enduring support. By doing so, the local
population is empowered while the Afghan central government's
legitimacy is simultaneously strengthened. I am heartened by the recent
progress, the result of Afghan Government leadership, discussion, and
decision.
Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about the program? If
confirmed, how would you seek to address those concerns?
Answer. I am aware of concerns others have expressed that these
programs may create a dependency on the enabling coalition special
forces (SF) rather than the government, as well as concerns that
without proper training and oversight, these programs may create local
militias that abuse military training and threaten local populations or
even result in a greater militia that competes with uniformed ANSF.
I expect that such problems can be avoided by executing this plan
well: understanding the programs' potential strengths and weaknesses,
focusing intelligence, and taking prudent mitigation measures, such as:
(1) ensuring program sites and participants are properly chosen,
vetted, and trained; (2) ensuring the program is well balanced--the
district governance and local/traditional leadership must be empowered
in the decisionmaking process; and (3) the enabling element must be
stabilized on-site to provide continuity for the force in training, and
focus on developing partnered relationships with ANSF units and key
leaders. However, ISAF elements should only act as enablers and ensure
the community does not become dependent upon them.
reconstruction efforts in afghanistan
Question. In your view, what should be the respective roles of the
military and the U.S. civilian agencies in reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan?
Answer. The civil-military partnership is the key to establishing
unity of effort in all our activities--respective roles should not be
stove-piped, but integrated within this framework. Civil-military
cooperation has been strengthened with the ongoing ``civilian surge''
of approximately 1,000 additional civilian officials to help build
governance and development. The role of the civil-military team should
be as trainers, advisors, and mentors, positioning the Afghans to take
the lead in making Afghanistan more self-reliant. The civil-military
team must continue to conduct mutually supporting stability and
reconstruction operations. As an example, the Afghanistan strategy for
roads and electrification is the result of a concerted effort between
GIRoA, DOD, USAID, and other donors.
Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe need to be made
in the coordination of military and civilian efforts to provide
reconstruction relief and development and to enhance the governance
capacity of the Afghan Government?
Answer. In my current position, I understand that CENTCOM continues
to leverage the strengthening of civil-military cooperation and
capacity, which has been increased through the civilian surge in
Afghanistan. To improve coordination, equal emphasis must be placed on
improving our interagency partners' capacity and resources to ensure
their expert knowledge is leveraged. Also, departments and agencies
must reassess mechanisms for funding large-scale infrastructure
projects in Afghanistan by identifying the proper authorities for
execution between key interagency partners such as DOD and USAID, as
well as by working with Congress to define appropriate authorities.
contract oversight and private security contractors
Question. The committee's review of DOD private security contracts
found that private security companies recruit from and frequently pay
more than Afghan security forces. DOD reported in October 2009 that
``private security contractors (PSCs) are, on average, paid more'' than
the Afghan security forces. The challenges associated with recruiting
and retaining ANSF personnel has been attributed, in part, to this pay
differential.
Do you agree that U.S.-funded contractors for private security
should not be paid more than Afghan security forces?
Answer. The discrepancy in payments to PSC vis-a-vis ANSF can be a
disruptive influence to organizing and maintaining effective and
professional security forces. We need to find ways to stop the
unintended competition between the PSC and ANSF and I will support
General Petraeus and the Afghan Government leadership in this effort.
Question. If so, what steps would you envision taking to correct
that problem, if confirmed?
Answer. A possible solution is building comparative salary caps
into our contracts to ensure the PSC and ANSF have salaries more
closely aligned with each other. However, the effort must be cautious
so as not to degrade the quality of those recruited.
Task Force Spotlight and Task Force 2010 have missions to
facilitate the capability for greater oversight, regulation,
operational transparency, and visibility of the flow of contracting
funds and goods below the prime contractor level. I believe these
efforts will eventually minimize malign actor influence, improve PSC
accountability, and ensure an improved distribution of funds to the
Afghan people. Their conclusions may illuminate additional ways to
mitigate the consequences of pay disparity.
Question. In his November 2009 inaugural statement, President
Karzai stated that within the next 2 years, he wanted ``operations by
all private, national, and international security firms to be ended and
their duties delegated to Afghan security entities.''
Do you believe that we should be working toward the integration of
Afghan private security contractor personnel, who are currently
performing security for facilities and supply convoys, into the ANSF?
Answer. Yes, but until the Afghan Government has this capacity, we
will need to use legal, licensed, and controlled PSCs to accomplish
appropriate missions. Like the ANSF, the PSCs also require high-quality
employees who are not supportive of malign activities we will look for
ways to support the Afghan Government's intentions to transition PSCs.
We do not want to force integration at the expense of PSCs involved in
security activities, but phase it in, over time, as security improves.
I believe the transition from private security contractors to ANSF will
occur gradually and at the direction and encouragement of the Afghan
Government.
Question. If so, what steps would you envision taking to bring
about that result, if confirmed?
Answer. ISAF and the Afghan Government are working together to
develop courses of action to reduce reliance on PSCs. I would insist
that security personnel being considered for integration into the ANSF
flow through the same vetting process as current ANSF personnel. We
must better leverage and integrate our intelligence community and
investigative agency assets to provide our partners with actionable
information. If confirmed, I will assess the cooperation between ISAF
and the Afghan Government as they develop a phased program to work
toward this transition, and I will continue efforts which support the
build-up of the ANSF.
Question. There is evidence that DOD security contractors are
relying on local warlords and strongmen to provide men to staff their
guard forces.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that:
a. providers of manpower for security contractors are properly
vetted; and
b. individuals we rely on as providers of manpower for security do
not detract from the counterinsurgency mission?
Answer. If confirmed, it will be one of my highest priorities to
further investigate all aspects of this issue, but I have a broad
appreciation for the basic principles at stake. To ensure proper
vetting of PSCs, we must demand contractors immediately adhere to
existing, specified contractual requirements. We have not, to date,
adequately enforced current provisions requiring prime contractors and
PSCs to report detailed census data, register their employees properly,
or report serious incidents in an efficient manner. In fact, biometric
data has been collected on only about 4,500 PSC employees, inhibiting
proper vetting; this must be corrected quickly.
Reducing the influence of malign actors and power brokers demands
that we leverage our entire national intelligence and investigative
apparatus to identify, include, and action discovered derogatory
information that might influence or undermine the contracting process.
We may need to request legislative flexibility in allowing us to
terminate contracts for bad actors, or to expedite awarding contracts
to those who demonstrate adherence to requirements and are committed to
full partnering in our counterinsurgency campaign.
To ensure that PSCs are not detracting from, or acting
contradictory to the USFOR-A counterinsurgency mission directives, we
will need to work closely with Afghan Government authorities to require
all contractors to adhere to mutually accepted rules regarding the use
of force, to enforce guidelines for escalation of force, and to abide
by the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. As our values and
ethics require from our own security forces, contractors must
understand and be held accountable for measured response, using force
for only appropriate defensive purposes. To this end, we will need to
work with the Afghan Government and support USFOR-A efforts to ensure
PSC personnel are properly trained, regulated, inspected, and
investigated when required.
civilian casualties and rules of engagement
Question. A critical objective of the counterinsurgency strategy is
to provide protection to the Afghan people, including minimizing the
risk of civilian casualties. ISAF has issued revised procedures aimed
at reducing the risk to civilians from military operations.
In your view, do the current rules of engagement (ROEs) in
Afghanistan, for both NATO and U.S. forces, provide the necessary
flexibility to allow forces to engage the enemy, protect themselves,
and minimize the risk of civilian casualties?
Answer. We must balance two moral imperatives--that of doing
everything humanly possible to protect the innocent, the Afghan people
caught up in a war where our enemy intentionally endangers the
noncombatants. The second imperative is that we never impede on our
troops' right to self-defense; once in a fight they must be able to use
all necessary force, constantly balancing this requirement with our
commitment to protecting the innocent. From my own review, the ROE are
sound. At the same time, I endorse General Petraeus' ongoing review of
the tactical directive, both its tone and its execution, to ensure we
are giving the right intent to our troops in the field.
Question. If confirmed, what general changes, if any, would you
make to the current ROEs?
If confirmed, I will add my assessment to any changes that are made
or proposed in this important area by General Petraeus in his capacity
as COMISAF and Commander, USFOR-A.
special operation forces airlift in afghanistan
Question. A number of published reports indicate that Special
Operations Forces (SOF) in Afghanistan face severe shortfalls in the
availability of rotary wing airlift support for both direct and
indirect missions.
What is your understanding of the current rotary wing airlift
support available to SOF?
Answer. I understand that rotary wing lift is in high demand across
the CENTCOM AOR, but particularly in Afghanistan where the roads are
poor, the terrain is mountainous, and the use of Improvised Explosive
Devices has increased the risk to our forces, markedly. SOF have their
own organic rotary wing lift, and are supplemented by lift from general
purpose forces in accordance with Commander USFOR-A's priorities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you prioritize requests from SOF
for rotary wing airlift support from general purpose forces?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will continue to delegate authority to
Commander of USFOR-A to prioritize available rotary wing assets in
support of the mission in Afghanistan. This responsibility includes
meeting the requirements of SOF, should their organic assets be
insufficient for a specific mission. My expectation will be that the
Commander USFOR-A will continue to allocate these finite assets to the
most prioritized SOF and conventional missions in accordance with his
mission priorities.
pakistan
Question. What is your assessment of the threat to U.S. and
coalition forces in Afghanistan posed by the Afghan Taliban, the
Haqqani network, al Qaeda and other militant extremists finding
sanctuary in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Answer. The strategic intent of these extremist groups remains
imposing their will over the people through the removal of foreign
forces from Afghanistan, preventing GIRoA from developing into an
effective and legitimate government, and reinstating the Islamic
Government headed by Mullah Omar. Weak or ungoverned areas along the
Afghanistan and Pakistan border region provide an unequalled haven for
these violent extremist organizations. These physical havens, under
increasing pressure on both sides of the border, provide sanctuary for
leadership, nodes for command and control, training, media operations,
external operational planning and other functions essential to the
syndicate of extremist groups that include al Qaeda, the Afghan
Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and others. Each of these groups
continues to pose a threat to U.S. and coalition forces, but also to
Afghan and Pakistani stability.
Question. What is your assessment of the current status of U.S.-
Pakistan military cooperation on confronting this threat?
Answer. I understand that CENTCOM has made great strides over the
past 18 months in building an enduring strategic partnership with the
Pakistan military. Cooperation is particularly strong between U.S.
military counterparts and the Frontier Scouts. As well, important
relationships have been forged across other services as we support
their efforts for a sustained counterinsurgency campaign. The Office of
Defense Representative Pakistan has been an integral part of this
effort and continues to work closely with the U.S. Ambassador, her
country team, and Pakistan General Headquarters to confront our shared
threats in the region. This maturation has been challenged by past
mistrust and requires continued efforts to enhance teamwork.
india
Question. How does the fact that India is in the PACOM AOR while
Pakistan is in the CENTCOM AOR affect the U.S.'s ability to treat the
region's challenges holistically?
Answer. Close coordination between CENTCOM and PACOM is a
recognized condition for the regions' challenges to be addressed.
Though some advantages could be realized with India and Pakistan in one
AOR, PACOM and CENTCOM, with adequate coordination mechanisms to
address U.S. interests in the region, can work symbiotically on long-
term security measures.
Question. In your view, how do our military cooperation and
engagement with India affect our efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan?
Answer. Pakistan, naturally, has concerns about any military
cooperation between the United States and India, which affects both our
relationship with Pakistan and, indirectly, or efforts in Afghanistan.
However, we make clear to Pakistan that our military cooperation and
engagement is not a threat to Pakistan and that this is not a zero-sum
game. We have important relationships and strategic partnerships with
both countries that are not at the expense of either.
iraq
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing
the United States in Iraq?
Answer. The security situation in Iraq has greatly improved since
the height of sectarian violence there in 2007, but a number of
significant challenges remain. Although great progress has been made in
Iraq, it is not yet enduring , primarily because many underlying
sources of political instability have yet to be resolved. Nevertheless,
the fact that security trends have remained positive over the past year
in the context of a significant drawdown of U.S. forces is testament to
the growing capabilities and professionalism of the Iraqi security
forces, who now lead in protecting the Iraqi population throughout the
country. Their performance is particularly evident in this extended
period of Iraqi Government formation, with enemy effectiveness
continuing to decline, and the ISF serving as a protective windbreak
between the Iraqi people and a merciless and increasingly desperate
enemy.
Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the
United States needs to take in Iraq?
Answer. The combination of circumstances described above permits us
to responsibly draw down, thinning our lines over the coming year, and
transitioning to a civilian-led, long term, and mutually beneficial
relationship between our two nations. The Iraqis still need our help as
they continue to build their capabilities in order to protect against
malign external influences seeking to foment ethno-sectarian violence
and distrust.
The responsible drawdown of our forces to 50,000 by September 1st
is on track, as is the withdrawal of our equipment. The shift from our
combat mission to stability operations will go forward thanks to the
combined efforts of our military, the Iraqi security forces, and the
Iraqi people themselves, while our DOS takes on a more long-term role
in our relationship.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that confront
the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq?
Answer. Both Generals Odierno and Austin, in whom I have great
confidence, will be faced with supporting the establishment of a new
government and establishing or strengthening relationships with Iraq's
national leaders. The government formation process will span a period
of months, which carries with it a measure of uncertainty and requires
further vigilance in the security arena. The issues along the disputed
internal boundary with the Kurdistan Regional Government remain
unresolved and the associated Arab-Kurd tensions remain a significant
challenge. The underlying economic, social, and security issues must be
addressed to achieve an enduring solution. The establishment of
constructive relationships between Iraq and its regional neighbors is
required for long term regional stability. Diplomatic efforts to foster
these relationships and counter destabilizing external influences will
also be critical to U.S. interests in the region. The major challenge
is managing and communicating risk during the responsible drawdown and
transition to a civilian led mission thereby ensuring that internal and
external violent forces do not threaten the security environment. The
ongoing performance of the care-taker government in terms of providing
security, oil infrastructure improvements and basic services (e.g.
electricity, etc.) is heartening.
u.s. force reductions in iraq
Question. Earlier this year, current U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I)
Commander, General Raymond Odierno, stated that, based on the
reasonably high voter turnout and low-level of violence during the
Iraqi elections, U.S. forces are still on track to end its combat
mission and continue the withdrawal of troops. According to General
Odierno, ``Only a catastrophic event would keep us from doing that
now.''
Do you agree with General Odierno's assessment that the U.S. troop
drawdown plan remains on track for August and beyond?
Answer. Yes. I agree with General Odierno's assessment.
Question. What, in your view, are the greatest remaining risks to
the successful transition of the mission in Iraq and withdrawal of U.S.
forces as planned and required by the Security Agreement, and what
would you do, if anything, to mitigate these risks?
Answer. The greatest remaining risks to the successful transition
include continued communal rivalries across sectarian lines, the
insufficient capacity of the Iraqi Government to provide for its
people, violent extremist organizations, and destabilizing influence
from external countries. These risks cannot be mitigated by USF-I
alone. They will require a whole of U.S. Government and Iraqi
Government approach. This would include adequate funding for the
continued development of the Iraqi security forces and the tasks
associated with the transition to a State Department lead in Iraq.
Question. What actions, if any, do you think should be taken by
U.S. forces to protect, or limit reprisals against, Iraqi nationals who
supported U.S. forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Answer. To my knowledge, there is no pervasive hostility today in
the general populace of Iraq toward the large number of Iraqis who
supported the liberation of Iraq from Saddam's regime. Of course, al
Qaeda in Iraq and other violent extremists have ordered reprisals
against those they felt threatened them or their cause. To the extent
that we can, we should help the Iraqi Government protect its people in
the line with the governing documents of our relationship moving
forward.
consideration of united nations peacekeepers replacing u.s. forces in
northern iraq
Question. Unresolved political disputes in northern Iraq over
security, boundaries, and distribution of oil revenues continue to pose
a risk to continued progress toward a stable and self-sufficient
nation. In this regard, current U.S. Forces-Iraq Commander General
Raymond Odierno stated that United Nations peacekeeping forces may need
to replace U.S. forces in northern Iraq to manage this risk.
What is your assessment of the risk in northern Iraq and the
concept of replacing U.S. forces there with U.N. peacekeepers?
Answer. Currently, the Combined Security Mechanisms are in place in
northern Iraq as a temporary measure to help provide stability. Joint
forces composed of U.S., Iraqi, and Kurdish troops protect the
population from insurgent attacks, and U.S. forces are often called on
to mediate tensions between Kurds and Arabs. Moving forward, I would
need to review the concept of replacing U.S. forces with U.N.
peacekeepers, in consultation with the Commander, USF-I (COMUSF-I), as
well as appropriate interagency counterparts, if confirmed.
u.s.-iraq long-term security relationship
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to
ensure an effective and efficient transition from the current military
mission through December 2011 to a long-term security relationship with
Iraq?
Answer. In the short- and mid-term, I will work with the
interagency to continue to support the President's guidance and the
objectives, support COMUSF-I's efforts for U.S. Embassy Baghdad's Joint
Campaign Plan, and fulfill the commitments of our Security Agreement
with the Government of Iraq. As U.S. military forces draw down in Iraq,
I will work to support the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad's Mission Strategic
Resource Plan as discussed in last week's Iraq Transition Conference.
In the longer term, I will work to support U.S. commitments for Iraq's
security and stability as expressed in the Strategic Framework
Agreement. Using traditional security cooperation tools, we will
fulfill our Foreign Military Sales commitments to the Government of
Iraq and conduct other security cooperation engagements, while
supporting Iraq's integration with its moderate Arab regional
neighbors, in support of U.S. regional security objectives.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take
immediately or in the near-term to build a standard security
cooperation relationship with Iraq?
Answer. If confirmed, in the short and mid-term, I will work with
the rest of the U.S. interagency to continue to support the President's
guidance and the objectives of the USF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad's Joint
Campaign Plan, and fulfill the commitments of our Security Agreement
with the Government of Iraq. As U.S. military forces draw down in Iraq,
I will work to support the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad's Mission Strategic
Resource Plan as discussed in last month's Iraq Transition Conference.
In the longer term, I will work to support U.S. commitments to Iraq's
security and stability as expressed in the Strategic Framework
Agreement. Using traditional security cooperation tools, we will
fulfill our Foreign Military Sales commitments to the Government of
Iraq and conduct other security cooperation engagements that support
Iraq's security and stability, while supporting Iraq's integration with
its moderate regional neighbors, in support of U.S. regional security
objectives.
transition to lead u.s. agency in iraq
Question. As the mission of U.S. military forces in Iraq changes
and large numbers of troops begin to redeploy, responsibility for
leading the planning and management of U.S. assistance to the
Government of Iraq has begun to transition from the DOD to the DOS. The
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan recently
reported that ongoing planning for this transition ``has not been
sufficiently detailed.''
What is your understanding and assessment of the plans for this
transition?
Answer. From my current position, I understand that DOD and DOS
have completed substantial work over the past year in support of
transition efforts from military to civilian lead in Iraq. As recently
as Friday, 23 July, CENTCOM hosted a conference held here in
Washington, DC, to further develop transition planning. My assessment
is that the interagency transition planning process is on track. I have
also met with the prospective U.S. ambassador to Baghdad. If we are
both confirmed by the Senate, we are committed to working together with
General Austin and the Iraqi Government for the smoothest possible
transition.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the progress
being made toward the completion of this transition?
Answer. From my current position, I understand that significant
progress is being made as DOD, DOS, and other agencies work in unison
to implement a seamless transition. The Iraq Transition Senior Leader
Conference held last week was a significant milestone in ensuring that
all agencies work together.
Question. In your view, what are the most significant challenges to
the efficient and effective transition of these agency roles?
Answer. Efficient and effective transition is predicated on the
following two efforts: the development of Iraqi security forces that
are capable of defending their population against internal threats and
a strong civilian effort capable of sustaining the positive momentum
gained over the last couple of years.
These two efforts require adequate resourcing, as well as a
coordinated transfer of the tasks necessary to support these efforts.
It is particularly important that the DOS is resourced to assume lead
responsibility.
Question. If confirmed, what action would you recommend or take, if
any, to deal with these challenges and ensure an efficient, effective,
and timely transition?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Commander of
USF-I, the U.S. Ambassador, the interagency, and where necessary, the
Government of Iraq to ensure that all of our transition objectives and
tasks are executed in an effective and timely manner.
iraqi security forces
Question. What is your understanding of the state of training and
equipping of Iraqi security forces?
Answer. Having monitored this issue closely from my current
position, I believe the Iraqi security forces are functioning well as
an internal security force and are progressing towards their minimum
essential capability objectives. Within the Ministry of Defense, the
Iraqi Army is functioning well as a counterinsurgency force and the
Iraqi Navy is providing defense for both of the country's off-shore oil
terminals. The Iraqi Air Force has shown significant improvements in
accessions, training, and ground support. Within the Ministry of
Interior, both the Federal Police and Oil Police have been deemed
operationally capable, while the Provincial Police and Border Police
have shown progress in performing their security functions. As we
observe the Iraqi security forces performance, we can also see
declining enemy coherence, an indicator of ISF effectiveness which is a
direct outgrowth of their training.
Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces progress
toward assumption of full responsibility for internal security?
Answer. Monitoring the situation from my current position, I
understand that the Iraqi security forces are steadily improving and
increasingly capable of providing internal security, which has been
especially evident during the extended period of Iraqi Government
formation. Difficulties and challenges remain for Iraq. The Iraqis
still need our help, however, as they continue to build their
capabilities in order to protect against destabilizing external
influences seeking to foment ethno-sectarian violence and distrust.
Question. In your view, what is the importance, relative priority,
and urgency, if any, of the Iraqi security forces developing the
capability to defend its borders and airspace from external threats?
Answer. Among my highest priorities if confirmed as CENTCOM
Commander will be to enable the critical continuation of our
responsible drawdown in Iraq, while recognizing the importance of an
Iraq Security Force capable of defending its borders against external
threats who would harm Iraq. CENTCOM will balance security assistance
programs to ensure Iraq can continue to sustain its gains in
counterinsurgency, while simultaneously building capabilities to defend
its sovereign territory.
Question. What is the appropriate role of U.S. forces, if any, in
supporting the development of this capability with training, equipment,
or other resources?
Answer. U.S. and Iraqi forces have fought together for several
years and have shared best practices throughout that time. Iraqis have
proven the ability to lead operations effectively. The appropriate role
for the United States at this time is to shift our assistance to one of
advising and assisting the Iraqi forces and transition tasks to the
U.S. Embassy, to CENTCOM, and to the Iraqi Government.
Question. How would you characterize the performance of Iraqi
forces in the conduct of security operations during and since the
elections earlier this year?
Answer. The Iraqi security forces give clear evidence of strength
and competence, leading the protection effort nation-wide. Their
performance is particularly evident in this extended period of Iraqi
Government formation, with enemy effectiveness continuing to decline,
and the ISF serving as a protective windbreak between the Iraqi people
and a merciless and increasingly desperate enemy.
Question. If confirmed, what action would you take, if any, to
expand the development of logistics capabilities and a commitment to
efficient management within the Iraqi security forces to ensure that
the equipment they have been provided is maintained and ready to meet
their security needs and protect the investment of billions of U.S. and
Iraqi dollars over the years?
Answer. I fully support the priority the Iraqis have placed on
raising their logistics capability to a higher level. Our exceptional
U.S. military logisticians provide the example and mentorship which is
key to Iraqi security force leaders improving logistics capabilities.
advise and assist brigades and military/police transition teams
Question. In your view, does the size, structure, number, and
operating procedures for U.S. Advise and Assist Brigades and Military
and Police Transition Teams embedded with Iraqi security forces need to
be changed in any way? If so, what would you recommend?
Answer. While I cannot address this question in detail from my
current position, I find the overall concept of the Advise and Assist
Brigades and Military/Police Transition Teams that are in place provide
us appropriate flexibility, partner capacity, and force protection for
the evolving operational environment in Iraq. I have no concerns at
this time, but will consult with General Odierno on this issue if I am
confirmed.
Question. What is your view of the potential transition of this
mission to contractors?
Answer. Beyond this potential transition, there is a broad
imperative to periodically assess the performance of contractors
supporting security operations of all types. Contractors continue to
perform admirably in a variety of supporting roles in theater. They are
often highly-skilled government retirees with experience in theater,
and many of them possess considerable military and police skills. My
task, if confirmed, would be to oversee the evaluation and
implementation of oversight and management processes led by military
leaders in the region.
Question. What in your view is the appropriate distribution of
responsibility and resources for the security assistance, train,
advise, and equip mission between SOF and general purpose forces in
Iraq?
Answer. I would need to evaluate this issue, if confirmed, in
consultation with the Commander, USF-I, as well as appropriate
interagency counterparts, to make a judgment about the appropriate
distribution of resources.
Question. What is your assessment of how the Army is ensuring that
general purpose forces are properly trained for the advise and assist
or transition team mission, to include dissemination of ``lessons
learned'' to incoming brigades and teams?
Answer. Our Army is doing a tremendous job in providing trained and
ready forces for Iraq.
The Army adapted quickly to this change of mission and is meeting
USF-I's requirements, and continues to improve based on unit feedback
and USF-I recommendations. If confirmed, I would maintain the active
ongoing dialog with our Military Services to ensure we properly train
our servicemembers and their units for our remaining military tasks in
Iraq.
iraq burden sharing
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role for the United
States, and particularly of U.S. Forces-Iraq, in reconstruction
activities in Iraq going forward?
Answer. The U.S. and Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) lays
out a solid foundation for a long-term bilateral relationship, which
guides U.S. and Iraqi actions based on mutual interests. With the SFA
serving as a roadmap, the U.S. strategy for reconstruction activities
integrates the efforts of the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, USF-I, and other
U.S. and international partners. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
promote the development of reconstruction activities and enhance
provincial and local governments in becoming self-sufficient,
responsive, transparent, accountable, and capable of meeting the needs
of the Iraqi citizens. Drawdown planning for all PRTs is underway as
USF-I prepares to facilitate a seamless DOS assumption of
reconstruction and development activities.
The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) remains a key
counterinsurgency tool for commanders to hold security gains and
undermine insurgent influence in Iraq. As we drawdown, CERP will remain
essential to support limited civil-military operations, such as
humanitarian assistance, battle damage repair, and repair of minor
municipal infrastructure, where it supports the counterinsurgency
mission.
Question. In your view, what capabilities or support should be the
highest priorities for U.S. assistance to the Iraqi security forces?
Answer. From my current position, I understand that the Iraqi
Ministry of Defense (MoD), with the exception of logistics and
sustainment, is on track to develop key capabilities prior to the
redeployment of U.S. Forces in December 2011. In addition to logistics
and sustainment, there may be MoD challenges in the areas of planning
and budgeting, procurement, and information technology. The
capabilities of police, border security, and naval forces are
improving; however, still require assistance to conduct effective
internal, border, and maritime security. Iraqi command and control
capabilities and logistical support nodes require further development
to sustain these operational efforts, as well. The Iraqi Air Force,
because of its more extensive training requirements and equipment
shortfalls, requires a longer-term commitment. If confirmed, CENTCOM
will continue to work to provide the best support and sustainment of
property purchased for the Iraqi security forces, consistent with U.S.
Embassy Baghdad guidance.
Question. In your view, what capabilities and support for the Iraqi
security forces should be the sole financial responsibility of the
Government of Iraq?
Answer. Future Foreign Military Sales (FMS) that introduce new
capabilities to the Iraqi security forces (such as F-16s) need to be
funded by the Government of Iraq. The Iraqis have demonstrated a
serious commitment to funding their security needs through major M1A1
and C-130 programs, as well as the purchase of naval ships and air
force training aircraft. Recognizing the fiscal realities in the United
States and Iraq, and the common enemies we face, I will continue to
advise our Iraqi partners to acquire equipment designed to meet their
specific requirements. Overall, FMS to the Iraqi security forces should
focus on building security for the Iraqi people, improving and
protecting its critical infrastructure, and securing Iraqi borders
against malign influence.
internally displaced persons
Question. The U.N. estimates that some 500,000 have left their
homes to find safer areas within Iraq.
What is your assessment of the internally displaced persons (IDP)
situation in Iraq and what impact, if any, does it have on the U.S.
military objective in Iraq?
Answer. The IDP situation in Iraq is a significant challenge for
the Iraqi Government. The Government of Iraq has taken steps to support
the return of Iraqis, and the IDP situation is improving. Due in large
part to security gains, an increasing number of refugee families are
returning. Recent efforts in line with the government's increased
emphasis on national unity have been positive. The United States
supports the Government of Iraq as it reaches out to its displaced
citizens and provides a transparent presentation of services and
benefits. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting our commander in
Iraq in the full implementation of measures to help the Government of
Iraq further increase its assistance to its refugees and IDPs.
Question. Beyond working with the Iraqi security forces to improve
the security environment in Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military
should play a role in addressing the internally displaced person
situation?
Answer. The DOS is responsible as the U.S. Government lead on this
issue, and this includes our efforts to support internally displaced
persons and refugees. As the U.S. military moves to establish a
traditional security cooperation relationship with Iraq, our force
posture and our resources will change. Until the end of 2011, U.S.
Forces-Iraq will support the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad when requested in
accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement and within the
limitations of the military means and capabilities available when any
request is made.
religious minority communities in iraq
Question. Public reports of targeted kidnappings and murders of
non-Muslim religious leaders continue in certain parts of Iraq, most
notably in the Ninewah region.
In your view, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at
significant risk of being the victims of violence as a result of their
religious status? Are there any of these groups that are particularly
vulnerable?
Answer. The Iraq Constitution affords protection to minorities, and
the Iraqi Government has made measured progress in ensuring their
protection. Nonetheless, non-Muslim religious minorities throughout
Iraq remain at risk of violence. Extremists and insurgent militant
groups continue efforts to ignite ethno-sectarian violence through
attacks on vulnerable populations, to include non-Muslim religious
minorities, but have failed to reignite the cycle of sectarian violence
that plagued the country in 2006 and 2007 due to increasingly capable
Iraq Security Forces.
Question. If so, what is the appropriate role for the U.S. military
in addressing their vulnerability?
Answer. The U.S. military's mission to advise and assist the Iraqi
Government and ISF must continue as planned and we must remain
committed to the terms of the Security Agreement and the Strategic
Framework Agreement, specifically focusing on the rule of law. Of note,
ISF has demonstrated most recently that they are increasingly becoming
a more professional and competent force that is capable of handling
Iraq's internal threats.
u.s.-iraqi security forces command and control relations
Question. What is your understanding of the lessons learned about
U.S.-Iraqi command and control of combined operations over the last
year and especially since the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraqi
urban areas?
Answer. As I am not confirmed as the Commander, CENTCOM, I do not
have the full picture to adequately address this question. I do fully
support highly integrated efforts with our Iraqi partners, while noting
that command and control in a combined environment brings with it
considerable challenges. To address these challenges, it will be
necessary to integrate efforts at national and provincial operations
centers as well as combined joint tactical operations centers. I think
the proof of how well this is working today is found in the strong
performance of the Iraqi security forces in this transition period when
a new government is not yet formed. Frankly, I have been impressed with
their stoic, capable performance, a key indicator of effective command
and control.
Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about command and
control relationships with Iraqi forces in combined operations, and if
confirmed, what actions would you take, if any, to mitigate challenges
or improve capabilities in this regard?
Answer. I am not in a position to address this question at this
time. Should I be confirmed, I will continue to assess the
effectiveness of relationships and procedures in place and adjust if
necessary.
u.s. forces in afghanistan and iraq command and control relationships
Question. Policies directing and guiding command and control
relationships for U.S. unified commands and their assigned and attached
forces are found in statute, regulation, and in joint doctrine. In
March 2010, changes were made to command relationships in Afghanistan
to address operational challenges attributed to insufficient command
and control authority for U.S. Forces-Afghanistan over forces attached
to or operating in its AOR.
What is your assessment of the current command relationship
structure for U.S. forces attached to or operating in the U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan and U.S. Forces-Iraq AORs?
Answer. I believe the current command relationships, as modified
over this last year, align our structure for successful prosecution of
the campaign.
Question. In your view, do the Commanders of U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan and U.S. Forces-Iraq have appropriate and sufficient
command and control authority over all U.S. forces operating in
Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure unity of command and unity of effort?
Answer. Yes, I believe the proper command and control authorities
have been established for both USFOR-A and USF-I commanders.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you request
with respect to command and control relationships for U.S. forces
operating in Afghanistan or Iraq?
Answer. I am currently satisfied with the command and control
relationships in Afghanistan and Iraq. If confirmed, I would not make
any immediate changes.
Question. In your view, what are the critical criteria that should
be used to determine whether forces allocated to U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan or U.S. Forces-Iraq are provided under ``operational
control'' versus ``tactical control''?
Answer. The critical criteria to determine the appropriate command
and control relationship for U.S. forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq
is mission accomplishment; ensuring the relationship give the commander
the authority he needs to accomplish the mission. A wide range of
others criteria also have bearing in any individual case. I am
satisfied that in both Afghanistan and Iraq the current arrangements
are adequate to ensure Generals Petraeus and Odierno have the authority
they require.
impact of iraq drawdown on special operations forces
Question. As conventional forces continue to draw down in Iraq, the
requirement for SOF is projected to remain the same for the foreseeable
future. However, SOF rely heavily on their conventional counterparts
for many support and enabling functions including airlift, medical
evacuation, resupply, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance.
What is being done to make sure SOF are adequately supported in
Iraq as the drawdown progresses?
Answer. CENTCOM has begun the responsible drawdown of forces from
Iraq, working to sustain the hard-won security gains achieved since the
summer of 2007 and placing on track to have 50,000 troops in Iraq after
this August. If confirmed, a key priority will be to work closely with
COMUSF-I to protect and facilitate SOF in Iraq. The disposition and
composition of our conventional forces are specifically designed to
sustain security and logistical requirements. Our Advisory and
Assistance Brigades also possess the combat power to enable SOF
operations across the battle-space, and logistical hubs are distributed
to ensure responsive medical evacuation and other logistical needs for
these forces.
Question. Are we assuming additional risk in Iraq by moving some of
these enablers to Afghanistan? If so, in what areas?
Answer. No. I understand that we are assuming no additional risk to
SOF in Iraq with respect to repositioning some enablers to Afghanistan.
confronting the militias
Question. Do you believe that the Iraqi Government is taking the
steps it must to confront and control the militias?
Answer. Yes. The Iraqi Government has worked to manage the
challenges presented by Sunni and Shia militia groups through a
combination of security operations and engagement policies such as
integrating the Sons of Iraq, and reconciliation initiatives with
Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi militia. However, some terrorist
groups are more difficult for the Iraqi Government to target because of
their covert nature and backing by Iran.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect U.S. forces to
play on this issue?
Answer. The Commander, CENTCOM, plays an important role in setting
broad conditions to prevent militia groups from being supported by
regional actors. Additionally, if I am confirmed, I will work with the
DOS and USF-I to foster inclusive political processes, to support the
Iraqi Government's anti-militia policies--using U.S. intelligence
capabilities, for example--and to continue to train, advise, and assist
Iraqi security forces.
counterinsurgency doctrine
Question. According to Field Manual 3-24, the new counterinsurgency
manual, ``20 [soldiers or police forces] per 1,000 residents is often
considered the minimum troop density required for effective
counterinsurgency operations.'' Baghdad alone, according to doctrine,
requires a force of 120,000-130,000 personnel to meet the minimum
requirement. However, the increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces for Baghdad
only provided for about 80,000 security forces.
Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops has been and
remains sufficient and if so, why?
Answer. This is an issue that I will address in detail with the
Commander, USF-I, if I am confirmed. The counterinsurgency threat in
Iraq has considerably reduced since its peak levels in mid-2007.
Additionally the Iraqi security forces are functioning well as an
internal security force. Based on their current performance and our
assessment of the security situation, the Iraqi security forces are
well placed to assume the security role across all of Iraq, including
Baghdad, within their current force structure in conjunction with
continued USF-I advice and assistance.
Question. What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of
the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation
from doctrine?
Answer. The USF-I force remaining to provide an advise and assist
function provides appropriate risk mitigation. I am confident that the
improved security situation, combined with the capabilities of the
Iraqi security forces and the presence of remaining USF-I forces
mitigates risk to an acceptable level, but I will remain alert to any
indications to the contrary.
iran
Question. What, in your assessment, are Iran's goals with respect
to Iraq's stability and security?
Answer. Iran's motives are not entirely clear due to the nature of
its government, though it appears that Iran seeks through its actions
to influence the formation of the Iraq Government, to distance Iraq
from its Arab neighbors, and to weaken the relationship between Iraq
and the United States.
Question. What, in your assessment, are Iran's goals with respect
to Afghanistan's stability and security?
Answer. Iran seeks the removal of coalition forces, particularly
U.S. forces, along its eastern border, expanded influence among Afghan
Government officials and its populace, and maintenance of a benign,
friendly Afghanistan, increasingly reliant on Iran for trade,
economics, reconstruction and cultural issues.
Question. What options are available to the United States and its
allies for influencing Iran's activities towards Iraq and how could
CENTCOM play a role in that effort?
Answer. The United States, its allies, and regional partners can
counter Iranian influence in Iraq by establishing strong diplomatic,
political, economic, and security relationships with Iraq and
integrating Iraq into the international community. These efforts will
allow Iraq to achieve national goals without support from Iran. The
relationships also provide partner nations visibility on Iran's
influence activities and provide an engagement platform with the Iraqis
to diminish Iran's influence. Bilaterally, the U.S.-Iraq Strategic
Framework Agreement serves as the foundation for a long-term
cooperative relationship between our two nations and gives us access to
deter Iran's influence. Additionally, Turkey's diplomatic and economic
links are heartening and portend well for Iraq determining its own
future, unhindered by Iran's designs.
Question. What, in your view, are Iran's military goals in the
region?
Answer. Iran's foremost military goal is to ensure the survival of
the regime. Another military goal is to maintain a power projection
capability to influence other nations in the region, which may include
the development of nuclear-weapons capability, but certainly includes
proxy terror organizations.
Question. What options do you believe are available to the United
States to counter Iran's growing military and economic influence in the
region and how could CENTCOM play a role in countering this influence?
Answer. Options to counter Iran's growing influence in the region
include: enhancing international diplomatic cooperation; influencing
Iran to adopt policies favorable to stability; undermining internal,
regional, and global support for malign Iranian policies and
activities; and controlling regional escalation.
I am aware that CENTCOM has established a Regional Security
Architecture (RSA) with Gulf partners to advance shared interests and
to build our partners defensive capabilities so they can resist Iranian
intimidation.
Question. Could a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq
strengthen Iran's influence in the region?
Answer. No. Iran's influence will not be strengthened with an
extended U.S. presence in Iraq if regional governments and their
respective populaces recognize the presence of U.S. troops is to
improve the security and stability of Iraq.
Question. Iran is clearly going to remain a significant factor in
the CENTCOM AOR. One of the critical objectives for the United States
in this region is to determine how to achieve a more stable situation
with respect to Iran for the future.
How do you believe CENTCOM could best participate in achieving a
stable relationship with Iran in the future?
Answer. CENTCOM can participate as part of whole-of-governments
efforts in partnership with U.S. Allies and partners in the region. The
presence of CENTCOM forces in the region is a visible reminder of U.S.
power, which is one element of the dual track approach to bring Iran
back into the responsible community of nations.
united arab emirates
Question. The United States has been working in recent years to
strengthen security cooperation with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and
other nations participating in the Gulf Security Dialogue.
What do you believe are the potential benefits of our security
cooperation with the UAE?
Answer. The U.S.-UAE cooperative partnership is the model for the
region and is getting stronger every day. Our enduring relationship is
key to regional security and stability because, by working together, we
disrupt violent extremist organizations, deter potential adversaries,
and defeat those who use proxies or malign influences against the U.S.
or other partners in the region.
With the U.S.-UAE enduring partnership evolving, UAE continues to
take a leadership role, with the United States, in supporting other
partners. UAE support has enabled other regional partners to become the
theater focal point to train the trainers which is critical to building
the Afghan security and police forces. The UAE also assists its
neighbors in developing the capability to conduct counterterrorism
operations that will eliminate safe havens from which terrorists train
and operate.
By engaging with UAE and like-minded nations, we send a reassuring
message to our friends in the region and a cautionary message to those
who practice aggressive, destabilizing activities.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for CENTCOM
in advancing U.S. security interests and cooperation with the UAE?
Answer. CENTCOM must continue to partner with the UAE. The
continued willingness of the UAE to support the presence of U.S. forces
at key UAE locations, such as Al Dhafra Air Base, Fujariah and Jebel
Ali Navy Bases, and Minhad Air Base, provides critical access and
support for CENTCOM's operations across the region. We train and
exercise together, which builds trust and confidence, so we can operate
together as one team at the tactical and operational levels.
CENTCOM should also continue to support the UAE's efforts to
enhance regional security. The UAE's Air Warfare Center is already the
acknowledged model of a regional center of excellence. The UAE's
willingness to host the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center of
Excellence is another initiative in which CENTCOM and the UAE will
cooperate. The Center of Excellence will be the regional hub for air
and missile defense doctrine discussions, simulated exercises, and
improved partnership capacity, while promoting regional security and
stability against air and ballistic missile threats. The UAE Air Force
has also performed well at the USAF Red Flag exercise, demonstrating a
commendable level of capability and strengthening deterrence in the
Gulf.
yemen
Question. Prior to the attempted Christmas Day bombing of a U.S.
bound airliner by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the U.S.
Government had a robust security assistance program with Yemen. Some
observers, while supportive of U.S. security assistance to Yemen, have
suggested that the problems being confronted by the Government of Yemen
cannot simply be addressed with the provision of additional security
assistance.
What is your assessment of the situation in Yemen?
Answer. Yemen is struggling to address a number of challenges to
its governance in four areas--Houthi rebels, southern oppositionists,
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and economic deterioration.
Six years of intermittent conflict in northwest Yemen between the
Yemeni Government and Houthi rebels threatens stability. Although
currently under a fragile ceasefire, there has been a recent increase
in violence between the Houthi and pro-Government tribes. In the south,
an opposition movement threatens Yemen's unity, although this movement
currently lacks cohesive leadership and a central message. ``Al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula'' has a haven in Yemen, taking advantage of
weak central government control in Yemen's remote, tribal regions, and
the Yemeni Government's preoccupation with other existential regime
threats (Houthi, southern opposition). Yemen's economy is failing,
marked by high unemployment and exacerbated by poor security, dwindling
oil reserves, and depleted aquifers. This challenges Yemen's ability to
provide necessary services to its people without significant regional
and international donor support.
While President Salih is able to manage these threats sequentially,
a combination of spikes in the challenges listed above could stretch
Sanaa's resources and military/security services to the breaking point.
To date, Salih has managed these crises through negotiation and by co-
opting his opponents, but there are signs his ability to exert control
is waning. A newly-inked National Dialogue agreement between the ruling
General People's Congress party and the opposition Joint Meeting
Parties holds a glimmer of hope for political reconciliation. While
this is a positive step in reanimating the Yemeni political system, it
remains too early to assess its ultimate outcome, given years of
mistrust between the Yemeni Government and a segment of its
constituents.
Question. Do you believe U.S. objectives in Yemen should be
strictly focused on counterterrorism military and intelligence support
to the Government of Yemen or is it necessary to broaden the focus to
include humanitarian and other development activities?
Answer. No. While U.S. objectives in Yemen primarily address the
growing regional and homeland terrorism threats presented by AQAP, this
cannot be our sole focus. Yemen is looking for a long-term partner and
if I am confirmed, I will work to solidify such a relationship. We must
work with Yemen to not only build military and intelligence capacity,
but we must also encourage, and where possible, provide development,
humanitarian and technical assistance. This should be done through
existing organizations such as the U.N., the Friends of Yemen process,
World Bank, IMF and the international and regional donor community. The
assignment of political, economic and social reform metrics is
essential to proper distribution and application of assistance. A long-
term whole-of-government commitment to Yemen and its people, especially
activities that assist Yemen in providing good governance and services
to its people, will be most effective in bolstering government
capacity, increasing stability and denying havens to extremists.
al qaeda and associated groups
Question. Within the CENTCOM AOR, where do you consider the
greatest terrorist threats from al Qaeda and al Qaeda-affiliated groups
to be located?
Answer. The greatest al Qaeda and al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist
threats emanate from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen.
Question. Which of these threats do you believe constitute the
highest priority for efforts to counter al Qaeda's influence and
eliminate safe havens for al Qaeda and affiliated groups?
Answer. Pakistan's tribal areas remain the greatest danger as these
areas are strategic footholds for al Qaeda and its Senior Leaders,
including Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. From Islamabad to New
York, from east Africa to Europe, this area has hatched al Qaeda's
murderous designs. Although al Qaeda Senior Leaders are under
considerably more pressure in Pakistan than in previous years, the
tribal areas of Pakistan remain key to extremist efforts to rally
Muslim resistance worldwide. The tribal areas are home to al Qaeda
training and media hubs, which al Qaeda uses to maintain relevance in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and globally as well. Additionally, the
tribal areas provide a haven to formulate attack plans and disseminate
propaganda. However, al Qaeda tactical support to insurgents and
extremists in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen from the tribal areas is
minimal, with most of the actual fighting done by groups such as the
Afghanistan Taliban, Tehrik-e Taliban, Haqqani, ``al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula,'' and more recently, al Shabaab.
former soviet union states
Question. Several former Soviet states have played roles in
supporting the U.S. and coalition forces.
What is your assessment of current U.S. military relationships with
these nations, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan?
Answer. My assessment is that in Central Asia, CENTCOM has opened
new and encouraging opportunities for engagement with Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan by cooperating to establish the
Northern Distribution Network as a supply route to Afghanistan, which
will also serve to further future economic integration and stability.
Strengthening our relationships greatly aids our cooperation on other
issues, such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics. In similar
fashion, CENTCOM is reaching out to Turkmenistan, advancing our
partnerships in Central Asia, doing so transparently to avoid any
misunderstanding of our motives.
Question. What security challenges do you see in this portion of
the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Narcotics, arms trafficking, and smuggling are
transnational threats in the region. These threaten legitimate commerce
and the flow of strategic resources, damage societies, and often
benefit terrorist networks. The proliferation of material for weapons
of mass destruction, associated delivery systems and the spread of
technical expertise is another concern in the region.
Following through on U.S. commitments to sustaining and securing
prosperous and capable governments in this region will contribute
immensely to the security of the Central Asian countries, especially
those immediately bordering Afghanistan. Al Qaeda and its associated
violent extremist organizations are, of course, the highest-priority
terrorist threats to the states in the region, as well as to the United
States and many of our allies around the world. There is considerable
concern about the lack of sustainable economic development, which
translates into a serious security concern, for without economic
opportunity, poor and disenfranchised communities can serve as hotbeds
for the spread of violent extremism. The countries of Central Asia
offer abundant opportunities for building security and economic
partnerships and for pursuing common interests.
somalia
Question. While CENTCOM has the lead for counter piracy operations
off the coast of Somalia, U.S. Africa Command has the lead for any
military operations in Somalia.
If confirmed, how do you envision managing this critical seam
between the two geographic combatant commands (COCOMs)?
Answer. A range of mechanisms are already in place to mitigate this
critical seam, not just for counter piracy operations, but for littoral
security, illicit trafficking, combating militancy, and developing
partner capacity. Several standing Memoranda of Understanding between
the two COCOMs regulate shared operational concerns; the respective
staffs maintain close working relationships; and embedded personnel are
exchanged regularly. If confirmed, I would assess whether these
mechanisms are in fact sufficient or need to be enhanced. Further, I
will ensure all diplomatic, U.S. Africa Command and CENTCOM efforts are
characterized by a strong spirit of collaboration on my part.
Question. What impact, if any, does Somalia have on the CENTCOM
AOR?
Answer. Somalia is a haven which has allowed a number of al Qaeda
individuals, and the al Qaeda associated insurgent group al-Shabaab, to
operate a continuously active training camp program which constitutes a
threat to the Transitional Federal Government and to the region in
general. Lack of governance allows piracy to thrive, with attendant
demand on CENTCOM maritime assets. Additionally, Somali refugees in
Yemen complicate Yemeni Government efforts to achieve stability and
good governance.
counter piracy operations off the coast of somalia
Question. In the past 2 years, there have been a disturbing number
of pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia--some ending in death and
others ending in the payment of ransom. The shipping lanes off the
coast of Somalia are some of the most economically and strategically
important in the world. CENTCOM is now well into its second year of the
counter piracy mission off the coast of Somalia.
What is your assessment of the mission thus far?
Answer. The effort of the international community is yielding
positive results in the Gulf of Aden (GOA), where attacks have
decreased since their spike in 2008. Concerned governments, agencies,
militaries and the international maritime community meet regularly to
address the evolving challenges of piracy. The increase in
international presence and continued encouragement of the merchant
community to adopt best practices has helped to stem the tide of
piracy. Pirates, however, continue to adapt to the pressures of the
international community by modifying their operating areas and tactics.
If I am confirmed, I will continue to work with international partners
to ensure our practices adapt faster than those of pirates and
recommend, where needed, modifications to current international laws
that may hinder our efforts.
Question. In your opinion, how long should we continue the current
mission as constituted and at what point should we consider a change to
the strategy?
Answer. The mission should continue as long as it supports U.S. and
international objectives for countering piracy. If I am confirmed,
CENTCOM will continually assess our whole-of-governments strategy and
make recommendations to our partners where needed to checkmate this
dangerous, disruptive activity.
Question. In your opinion, what is the most appropriate maritime
strategy in this region of the world, given the threats of weapons
trafficking, human trafficking, and piracy?
Answer. Our most appropriate maritime strategy is to build
international collaboration. U.S. Maritime presence in international
waters is an enduring influence and can, in league with other concerned
nations, deter the ambitions of regional aggressors, prevent illicit
activity, foster and sustain cooperative relationships, and prevent or
mitigate disruptions and threats. We need to encourage regional states
to have their own capacity to govern their territorial waters and exert
that governance into the international waters beyond their territories.
israel
Question. While Israel is not part of the CENTCOM AOR, it does play
a role in the Command's AOR.
In your assessment, what are the most significant threats facing
Israel in the Middle East?
Answer. Although Israel is not in the CENTCOM region, progress in
the Middle East Peace Process has an effect on advancing U.S. interests
in the region. With respect to the threats Israel faces, the gravest is
the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. Iran's nuclear weapons program,
it should be noted, confronts many nations in CENTCOM's AOR with the
same threat. Despite significant pressure from the international
community, the Iranian regime continues to take steps that are seen by
many to be associated with the development of a nuclear-weapons
program. Because the Iranian nuclear-weapons program would not only
present a threat to Israel but would also present a threat to our
partners in the region and to the interests of the United States, we
must work closely with many nations to check the Iranian efforts to
threaten and destabilize the region. Other significant threats include
a combination of Iranian and Syrian proxy elements, Lebanese Hezbollah,
and Palestinian rejectionists such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ).
Question. The Iraq Study Group report suggested that one of the
most significant hurdles to broader stability in the Middle East was a
final status agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian Governments.
Do you agree with this conclusion of the Iraq Study Group? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. Clearly this conflict has an enormous effect on the region
and sets the strategic context within which CENTCOM operates.
Specifically, the conflict enables state sponsored terrorism and
instability in our region by providing a common enemy for extremist
ideological propaganda. Additionally, regional stability would be
significantly enhanced if we could garner greater cooperation within
the region between Arab and Israeli Governments on mutual security
concerns like the Iranian nuclear program. However, moderate
governments in our region are not likely to step out and begin
cooperative engagement with Israel until this issue is resolved.
egypt
Question. Despite being on the African continent, Egypt remains
within the CENTCOM AOR. Egypt has been criticized for its perceived
failure to act along the Egypt-Gaza border to counter the smuggling
threat posed by cross-border tunnels. Egypt has also played an
important role, however, in ensuring peace on the southern border of
Israel.
What is your assessment of the role Egypt plays with respect to
regional stability?
Answer. Egypt continues efforts to maintain and enhance stability
in the Middle East though Cairo's leadership role has changed since the
days of Camp David. In the past two decades, the Gulf States have
gained prominence politically and militarily largely through oil
revenue. Egypt has looked inward in some respects in recent years,
while remaining focued on Israel, the Nile Basin, and Africa writ
large. Egypt has been less engaged, by comparison, with the rest of the
Middle East. Today, Egypt rarely deploys its forces to any of its
Middle Eastern neighbors for bilateral and multilateral exercises,
though its moral weight and leadership role can still be felt
throughout the region.
Egypt's role on the African continent continues to ascend.
Including the Nile Basin, Egypt regularly deploys hard and soft power
across Africa. Recent examples include peacekeepers in Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Egyptian diplomats are actively engaged
in the conflict between North and South Sudan, the ongoing disputes
over Western Sahara, and in the Horn of Africa between Ethiopia,
Somalia and the separatist movements within Somaliland.
Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Egyptian military-to-
military relationship?
Answer. Egypt receives the second largest allocation of Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) at $1.3 billion. Egypt remains sensitive over
U.S. conditions on FMF spending, and concerned over a perceived
imbalance between Egypt and Israel.
Egypt has capitalized on international military education training
for three decades, including the professional development of many of
Egypt's next generation of senior leaders. Egypt's biennial
multilateral BRIGHT STAR exercise now involves modern threat scenarios
linking together all participants. I view these positive trends as an
opportunity for Egypt to continue to strengthen its traditional role as
a key player in regional affairs and stability.
united nations peacekeeping missions
Question. Within the CENTCOM AOR there are three U.N. peacekeeping
operations. The United States contributes financially to all of these
missions and on a limited case-by-case basis provides U.S. military
personnel in the form of military observers or staff officers. Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, in response to
advanced policy questions to the Committee indicated that ``[United
Nations] peacekeepers help promote stability and help reduce the risks
that major U.S. military interventions may be required to restore
stability in a country or region. Therefore, the success of these
operations is very much in our national interest.'' Further, as stated
in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review, ``America's power and
influence are enhanced by . . . maintaining interactions with important
international institutions such as the United Nations.'' In testimony
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
on July 29, 2009, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. stated that the
United States ``is willing to consider directly contributing more
military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other
civilian personnel--including more women I should note--to U.N.
peacekeeping operations.''
In your view, would an increase in the number of U.S. military
personnel assigned to U.N. peacekeeping missions in the CENTCOM AOR
help you advance the theater campaign plan?
Answer. While this is not an issue that I am ready to fully assess
as I am not the Commander, CENTCOM, there are many important factors to
balance in making such an assessment, including the ongoing U.S.
military commitments and engagements in the area and perceptions in the
AOR that would result from an increase in U.S. Peacekeepers. I would
need to study the issue further to ensure we did not address one issue
but inadvertently create additional issues.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your intentions regarding
support to peacekeeping missions in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. I would continue the current levels of support to the
international forces operating in the CENTCOM region, closely
coordinating all efforts through the Joint Staff and policy experts to
maintain stability and impartiality in this part of the world. U.S.
activities in the area support U.N. objectives, especially in promoting
peace and stability in the region. An example of that is the CENTCOM
support provided to the Lebanese Armed Forces, increasing their
capabilities and capacities. I would also welcome reviews that examine
where efficiencies may be realized in those peacekeeping missions.
lebanon
Question. Over the past 5 years, the United States has provided
over $500 million in security assistance to the Government of Lebanon.
In your view, what is the appropriate role for CENTCOM in Lebanon?
Answer. The component of CENTCOM partner with the Lebanese Armed
Forces at the operational level and below to develop capabilities that
build forces to maintain internal stability and protect borders. I
support and, if confimed, will continue to drive CENTCOM partnership
with the Lebanese Armed Forces in developing the following seven
capabilities: border defense and security, close air support and
precision delivery, special operations, establishment of a national
defense secure-communications architecture, enhanced protected
mobility, improved military training system and facilities, and
development of a military logistics support architecture. This will not
be a quick process, but CENTCOM and Lebanon have a mutually-agreed upon
framework by which we can program our investment, exercises,
activities, and engagements.
Question. What are the U.S. national security interests in Lebanon?
Answer. In my view, our interests in Lebanon are twofold. First, we
must help Lebanon maintain a democratic government with fair
representation from each of Lebanon's eighteen confessionals. Our
second interest is Lebanon's sovereignty, which is challenged by the
destabilizing activities of Hezbollah.
Question. The current coalition government in Lebanon includes
Hezbollah, a designated foreign terrorist organization under U.S. law.
Given the involvement of Hezbollah in the Lebanese Government, what
do you believe to be the appropriate level of engagement with the
Lebanese Armed Forces?
Answer. CENTCOM's engagements should be primarily focused at the
operational level and below with the Lebanese Armed Forces, consistent
with established U.S. policy. Our current focus on mutually developing
the Lebanon's capabilities (described above) is the means to accomplish
this end.
Question. Do you believe the focus of U.S. security assistance
should be on building the counterterrorism capabilities of the Lebanese
Armed Forces or more broadly focused on building the institution of the
Lebanese Armed Forces writ large?
Answer. The Lebanese Armed Forces remains a functionally apolitical
institution. I believe it would be productive to focus broadly on
building capabilities in the Lebanese Armed Forces to provide an even-
handed counterweight to the influences of Syria and Hezbollah.
Appropriately, counterterrorism is one of the Lebanese Armed Forces'
four stated missions, along with defending and securing its borders,
providing internal security and stability, and supporting social
development. If confirmed, I intend to continue the CENTCOM focus on
developing capabilities within and across each mission to include the
use of Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and
Training, section 1206 funding, and other security assistance
investments.
A strong and effective Lebanese Armed Forces provides a pillar of
stability for the Government of Lebanon and its citizens to lean upon,
as demonstrated in the 2007 Nahr al-Bared conflict. Due in part to
CENTCOM's security assistance being distributed broadly across the
Lebanese Armed Forces, these forces had the resources and expertise to
conduct this operation which effectively integrated elements across
each of its four missions.
saudi arabia
Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Saudi military-to-
military relationship? What are the pluses and minuses of this
relationship?
Answer. It is my assessment that the U.S.-Saudi Arabia military
relationship is strong. Since 2008, the United States has expanded
cooperation with the Saudi Arabian security establishment, adding to an
already robust security cooperation program. CENTCOM established an
Office of Program Management to train, equip, and advise the Saudi
security forces that protect Saudi Arabia's critical energy
infrastructure. It is important to our national interests that we
continue to engage broadly with the Saudi military and to strengthen
our cooperation in such vital areas as air and missile defense,
ballistic missile early warning, critical infrastructure protection,
and our efforts to degrade and disrupt extremist elements in the
region.
The scale of Saudi Arabian capacity provides significant
opportunity for large-scale combined exercises like Red Flag and the
Friendship series as well as large numbers of other bilateral
engagements. The Saudis have expended great effort in expanding
participation in regional military exercises and programs such as the
annual Eagle Resolve and Bright Star exercises.
Moreover, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a powerful influence in
the region that is committed to defeating al Qaeda and its effective
program for reintegration of dissidents serve as valuable models for
other states in the region. An increasingly shared appreciation of the
enemy threats to regional stability gives me confidence that we have a
solid basis for even stronger military-to-military cooperation in the
future.
Question. In your assessment what threat does a more regionally
assertive Iran, including the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, pose
to Saudi Arabia?
Answer. Having not served as Commander of CENTCOM, I am not
intimately familiar with Saudi security concerns, though I recognize
the Kingdom's concerns about Iranian malign activities in the region.
While King Abdullah has played a positive role through the inter-faith
dialogue, Arab Peace Initiative, and warming of relations with Syria,
there continues to be negative Iranian interference in Iraq, Lebanon,
and the Palestinian territories. Saudi leadership has made it clear
that a nuclear-armed Iran is incompatible with regional stability and a
grave threat to Saudi strategic interests. Saudi Arabia is committed to
open and transparent use of civilian nuclear technology; however a
nuclear-armed Iran will cause a Saudi reassessment of this policy.
communications capabilities
Question. The CENTCOM AOR is heavily dependent on timely and
reliable communications capabilities including satellite based
communications to support troops directly as well as a variety of ISR
and related capabilities.
In your view are there any gaps or deficiencies in communications
capabilities that should or could be improved?
Answer. I have a great appreciation for the role that communication
capabilities play in today's operating environment. If confirmed, I
will carry forward broad priorities to address any assessed gaps or
deficiencies in this area, and I will work to increasing network
capacity by tier (terrestrial, air, space); become more effective and
efficient with existing capacity; increase information sharing--
enabling the ``need to share'' approach; and in Afghanistan moving the
fight to the coalition network (Afghanistan Mission Network).
Question. The Afghanistan Ministry of Telecommunications is
attempting to complete a fiber-optic cable backbone both around Kabul
and the Ring Road, with international extensions to Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran. If this network were fully
operational, DOD could shift a lot of traffic from expensive satellite
communications to fiber, which would save money, provide more
bandwidth, and inject funds into Afghanistan. However, the fiber-optic
backbone installation is mired down in precisely the areas where it is
most needed--from Kabul to Pakistan, and from Kabul through the Pashtun
belt in the South to Kandahar and beyond towards Herat. Moreover, the
contracts for this backbone have been let to Chinese and Iranian firms.
Elements of the U.S. Government now believe that, with a concerted U.S.
effort and assistance, this network could soon be completed and
executed in partnership with the United States, Afghan, and other
companies.
What is your understanding of this situation?
Answer. Having not been confirmed as Commander, CENTCOM, I am not
in a position to comment extensively on this highly important, yet
technical topic. If confirmed, I will consult with COMISAF and the
communications directorate to determine the best way forward.
Question. Are there other opportunities to improve communications
networks in Afghanistan that would serve our counterinsurgency
strategy, provide better communications services to our forces
operating there, and contribute to Afghanistan's governance?
Answer. I have thought about these issues at length as part of the
development of the Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual, and
I believe there are opportunities to enhance to the Company and platoon
level, with extension to the mobile trooper. We can also enable greater
flexibility and versatility in coalition task organization. This
requires a change to the existing coalition network norm and forces the
fight to move to the recently fielded coalition network.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
Question. General McChrystal often stated that in his opinion there
could never be enough ISR capability.
What are your views regarding the level of ISR support deployed
thus far to Afghanistan?
Answer. Due to the nature of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
operations, ISR demand will always exceed ISR capacity. As I understand
from my current position, there is a substantial amount of ISR support
in Afghanistan today, heavily reinforced by Secretary Gates in response
to theater requirements. I will be acutely aware of and responsive to
any shortfalls that are identified in Afghanistan, if I am confirmed,
and I will work to resource my commanders in the field appropriately.
Question. What are the specific capabilities that you think we are
short of and that may need attention?
Answer. Assessments consistently demonstrate that Full Motion Video
(FMV), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Ground Moving Target Indicator
(GMTI) collection capacity, communications, and Processing,
Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) capacity remain the greatest
shortfalls.
I understand that the ISR Task Force has been extremely effective
at focusing efforts and funding toward the CENTCOM's highest urgent
operational needs. Continued funding is essential to maximizing ISR
effectiveness through better collection management tools, increased PED
capability and capacity, and expanded architecture capacity. Real time,
Wide Area Surveillance is also being pursued on an urgent timeline.
Question. Major General Flynn, the NATO ISAF J2, late last year
published a sharp critique on the Intelligence Community's (IC)
response to the shift to a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
He stated that the IC was too focused on identifying enemy forces and
supporting kinetic operations against them and was not providing
critical information on the people that the counterinsurgency strategy
needed to protect and win over.
Do you think that General Flynn's complaint remains valid, or have
the national and military Intelligence Community adequately adjusted
its priorities and improved its support for the counterinsurgency
strategy? Where are we still deficient?
Answer. Counterinsurgency is predicated on intelligence and
information collection, which requires an accelerated and adaptive
approach. The intelligence community has taken key steps to better
understand the conflict and react to emerging opportunities to
influence its trajectory. If confirmed, I will work closely with
COMISAF to ensure we close any existing gaps in our joint interagency
intelligence capabilities, and work collaboratively with the Service
chiefs to ensure they understand the theater demands on the forces that
they are organizing, training and equipping.
regional ballistic missile threats and response
Question. Iran has hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S.
forces, allies, and other friendly nations in the CENTCOM AOR. Syria
also has an inventory of ballistic missiles that pose a threat to the
region. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report of February 2010
stated that the United States intends to pursue a Phased Adaptive
Approach to ballistic missile defense against such missile threats in
various regions, including the Middle East.
Do you agree that such a phased adaptive approach will provide
CENTCOM with the missile defense capabilities needed to defend our
forward deployed forces and our allies and partners in the region?
Answer. Yes. The Phased Adaptive Approach framework can be applied
in CENTCOM and supports building strong cooperative relationships,
appropriate country burden sharing, and missile defenses tailored to
the threats in the CENTCOM Region.
Question. What role do you see for the Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense system with Standard Missile-3 interceptors in U.S. missile
defense capabilities in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. The Aegis BMD system is one of the critical components in
the U.S. integrated layered missile defense architecture, which is
designed to check regional threats, including Iran's Shahab 3 and
Ashura missiles. When outfitted with the SM-3 interceptor missile the
Aegis weapons system offers an upper-tier layer to our missile defense
capability.
Question. In addition to U.S. missile defense capabilities in the
CENTCOM AOR, what role do you see for other nations in the AOR to
contribute to regional missile defense capabilities, such as UAE
interest in purchasing the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
system?
Answer. I am aware that CENTCOM partner nations have shared their
perception that Iran is posing a threat to them with its ballistic
missile capabilities. CENTCOM is seeking to strengthen deterrence
against this challenge by working agreements with partner nations to
bring their BMD assets into a regional architecture. The primary
purpose is for individual sovereign defense with a secondary purpose of
integrating into a common defense. The purchase of U.S. BMD systems, to
include THAAD, enables not only integration but interoperability into a
regional BMD architecture.
centcom and dod global posture review
Question. According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
DOD will conduct a global posture review that assesses U.S. strategic
relationships and interests to identify where and at what levels the
forward stationing of military forces supports those relationships and
interests.
What is your assessment of the current and future strategic
requirement for U.S. military basing and prepositioning in the Persian
Gulf region?
Answer. In my current position as Commander, Joint Forces Command,
I recognize the essential requirements to develop the forces, bases,
and agreements necessary to ensure capabilities and access are
available to meet current and future operational requirements. We need
to ensure that our investments in infrastructure and capabilities are
consistent with our long-term objectives for the region. To meet these
challenges, we must continue to work with regional partners to maintain
access, freedom of action, and capabilities at existing and new
locations across the region. Doing so will improve our strategic depth,
allow for rapid increases in operational surge requirements, and
support our partners in the region, many of which have stood by us for
decades.
In addition, prepositioned equipment and material will enable the
rapid deployment of selected forces to respond to a variety of
requirements, from humanitarian assistance to combat operations.
Prepositioning also signals U.S. commitment to regional partners. This
requires restoring pre-positioned equipment stocks to full capacity. If
confirmed, CENTCOM will partner with the Services to address any
capability gaps to meet theater and global contingency requirements
within a resource constrained environment.
Question. In your view, what capabilities and facilities will be
most critical to the CENTCOM mission after the withdrawal from Iraq is
completed?
Answer. The posture of U.S. forces, currently tailored towards
ongoing operations, must transition over time to balance requirements
for contingency operations and crisis response. If confirmed, I will
ensure that CENTCOM continues to develop a defense posture and regional
security architecture focused on strengthening our partners' national
and regional defense capabilities and advancing regional stability and
security. I understand that CENTCOM has identified several theater
enduring support locations to meet these requirements, including 1 main
operating base, 6 forward operating sites, and 17 cooperative security
locations.
In addition to theater locations, CENTCOM must continue to work
with regional partners to secure adequate en route infrastructure,
intermodal capacity, and global mobility for enhanced redundancy. This
will require extensive cooperation between combatant commanders to
further develop en route mobility from Europe, Africa, and the Caucasus
into the Gulf region and Central and South Asia.
Question. What is your view of arguments that an over-the-horizon
presence would reduce tensions in the region?
Answer. U.S. military posture in the CENTCOM region must support
ongoing operations, prevent and deter conflict, and provide options to
respond to a wide range of contingencies. Our deterrent ability is
founded on the presence of land, air, and naval forces in the region
capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts where anti-access
weaponry and tactics are used by state and non-state actors. If I am
confirmed, CENTCOM will continue efforts to respond to a wide variety
of contingency scenarios, including defeating aggression by adversary
states, supporting and stabilizing fragile states facing serious
internal threats, and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief.
I understand that CENTCOM employs two enduring principles: (1)
minimize steady state force presence by relying on rotational forces,
reach back capabilities, and prepositioning to meet requirements; and
(2) maximize the use of maritime assets to provide operational
flexibility, increase freedom of action, and minimize land based
footprint. While enduring force presence at regional locations may not
always be available or preferred, the need for access, freedom of
action, and in place capacity and facilities will be required to enable
the rapid flow of forces to those locations.
treatment of detainees
Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or
under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of
nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.
If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant DOD
directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable
to U.S. forces in Afghanistan fully comply with the requirements of
section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD
Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes. We have a legal and moral obligation to treat persons
under our control humanely, to comply fully with Common Article 3 as
construed and applied by U.S. Law and policy. It is not only the right
thing to do; it is also an important component of successful counter-
insurgency operations.
Question. How would you ensure a climate that not only discourages
the abuse of detainees, but that encourages the reporting of abuse?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will continue to set forth clear
standards and expectations and demonstrate to the troops that we are
committed to those standards. We will provide clear guidance at every
level of command, proper training, and prompt and effective action when
we don't meet our standards. Additionally, we will continue conducting
thorough inspections of all detention facilities and programs
throughout the theater of operations, and we will continue to cooperate
with the International Committee of the Red Cross. This is consistent
with U.S. military policy on treatment of detainees since General
George Washington commanded our troops and I am committed to no abuse
of detainees.
Question. JTF 435 in Afghanistan is working with the U.S. Embassy
to address detention operations and rule of law issues. Concerns have
been raised over the capacity and willingness of the Government of
Afghanistan to detain and prosecute individuals detained in operations,
particularly in the south.
What is your assessment of detention operations in Afghanistan and
how do these operations contribute to the overall counterinsurgency
strategy?
Answer. Though I am not confirmed as Commander, CENTCOM, I have
been able to track this issue closely, and I am pleased with the
progress that USFOR-A has made in regard to detention operations in
Afghanistan. The opening of the new detention facility in Parwan,
coupled with the formation of JTF 435, has ensured oversight over
detainee operations and detainees in U.S. custody. With the new
facility comes ample room and opportunity to provide several programs
to help detainees reintegrate into Afghan society upon their release.
These new programs include basic education classes that teach reading,
writing and math skills as well as vocational programs such as bakery
and carpentry to teach detainees a skill. The programs offered by JTF
435 also provide for the de-radicalization of certain detainees by
providing moderate religious classes and discussions with local Imams.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you recommend for
addressing detention operations and rule of law issues in Afghanistan?
Answer. I am generally supportive of steps toward establishing the
Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 (CJIATF-435) that will
centralize all USFOR-A detention, interrogation, and Rule of Law
functions in Afghanistan. CJIATF 435 will help build capacity in the
Afghan Government, including establishing a command element capable of
coordinating coalition efforts with the Afghanistan Government.
This will ultimately help the Afghan Government build the capacity
to conduct safe, secure, lawful and humane detention operations
including appropriate facilities and a fully trained Afghan guard
force. There is also a need to ensure effective programs are in place
for reintegrating detainees who are suitable candidates for release and
ensure effective processes for investigating and prosecuting detainees
for violations of Afghan criminal law. This effort is well underway
and, if confirmed, I would follow implementation closely, and work with
Commander, USFOR-A, and Commander, CJIATF 435, to make adjustments
where appropriate.
traumatic brain injury
Question. On June 21, 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued
a new DOD-wide policy on the management of mild traumatic brain injury
in deployed settings.
If confirmed, how will you ensure that the policy is implemented
consistently throughout the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. IEDs and the associated injuries are signature aspects of
this war. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure appropriate command
emphasis is placed on this crucial effort to identify, evaluate and
manage all servicemembers exposed to potential concussive events.
Defense Department policy provides specific direction to line leaders
and medical personnel in their response to defined events--such as
blasts--in the deployed environment which could result in mild
traumatic brain injury/concussion, and CENTCOM has supplemented this
policy with its own implementation order, which I will review and
maintain if confirmed. In addition, CENTCOM has developed a single,
joint solution to the tracking requirement for such exposures. This
will provide a mechanism to ensure execution of proper evaluation,
post-event rest period, and future evaluation, especially for those
exposed to multiple events.
mental health assessments and treatment in theater
Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made
six separate assessments over the past several years detailing the
immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S.
soldiers and marines deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. The most recent
study, MHAT VI, found that ``soldiers on their third and fourth
deployment report lower morale and more mental health problems,'' and
that stigma continues to prevent some soldiers from seeking mental
health care. These types of reports lend support to the fact that
increasing numbers of troops are returning from duty in Iraq and
Afghanistan with posttraumatic stress, depression, and other mental
health problems.
What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous
MHAT assessments, actions taken by the services to address key
findings, and the effect of such actions?
Answer. In my current position, I am charged with training and
preparing joint forces to serve downrange, and I consider it among my
highest responsibilities to monitor and take care of the mental health
of these men and women. I find the MHAT results encouraging in some
respects, but there is still room for significant improvement.
During the third quarter of fiscal year 2009, MHAT IV reported that
21 percent of maneuver soldiers and marines met screening criteria for
depression, anxiety, or acute stress. Historically these numbers are
similar to 2007, yet higher than 2005. Unit morale was reported as
lower than in previous MHATs. Marital problems among junior enlisted
and support/sustainment Soldiers and Marines were higher, as well as
mental health and marital problems among NCOs on three or more
deployment. The MHAT team recommended adding behavioral health (BH)
personnel to meet the recommended ratio for 1 BH per 700
servicemembers, maintaining the ratio through the surge in forces, and
appointing a senior theater-wide BH consultant.
These recommendations have been implemented in theater since the
last MHAT. The impact of these actions has been positive thus far, and
will continue to be evaluated by the joint team under MHAT-7. I also
want to take advantage of the U.S. Army's advances, under the guidance
of Brigadier General Rhonda Cornum, in strengthening the resilience of
all troops deploying to the CENTCOM combat zones.
Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental
health needs of our troops in theater, in terms of both prevention and
treatment?
Answer. Addressing mental health, as in addressing physical health,
cannot begin in theater--it must begin at home. This is accomplished by
the Services through their various mental health support functions,
resiliency training and provision of mental health services. In the
pre-deployment period, individuals are screened for potential mental
health problems, conditions or concerns. Individuals, who have specific
behavioral health conditions that require specific treatments, and have
not demonstrated adequate resolution of their behavioral health
condition or symptoms, are not permitted to deploy.
If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of mental
health prevention and treatment for our servicemembers. This will
require adequate provisions and access to behavioral health, the proper
command emphasis, de-stigmatization, and positive officer leadership
throughout the life-cycle of a deployment (pre, during, and post) in
order to maintain combat resilient units. Brigadier General Cornum and
the Army's efforts in this regard provide pragmatic steps to improve
resilience for our young troops going into harm's way.
Question. Do you believe that mental health resources in theater
are adequate to handle the needs of our deployed servicemembers?
Answer. Yes. Based on my experience at U.S. Joint Forces Command, I
believe that current mental health resources are adequate to handle the
needs of our deployed servicemembers. The MHAT-7 Team, which has just
deployed to Afghanistan, will independently evaluate this. If
confirmed, I will continue to work with the Services and our deployed
behavioral health resources to identify and eliminate any barriers to
care, especially among maneuver units where stigma has been found to be
higher. While there is no room for complacency on our efforts to fully
resource mental health support, we have made unmistakable progress.
Question. If confirmed, would you request additional behavioral
health resources from the services, if needed, to meet the needs of
current and future units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. If additional behavioral health resources were deemed
necessary, either by our own assessment or that of the MHAT-7, I would
not hesitate to request such resources from the Services to fill any
identified gaps. CENTCOM, its components, and the Services are all
dedicated to ensuring the adequate provision of behavioral health
resources to support our deployed warfighters.
suicide prevention
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services continue
to increase. A number of these military suicides are committed in
theater.
If confirmed, what resources would you use to help prevent suicides
in theater and to prepare redeploying servicemembers for transition to
life back at home?
Answer. Prevention of suicide in theater and at home is a vital
priority--the safety of all deploying, deployed, and returning
servicemembers is always foremost among my priorities.
Confronting the difficult reality of suicide in the force requires
regularly exercising a broad complement of health resources within
fully supportive command culture. This process begins with recognizing
the importance of taking care of people, which will always remain the
most important asset in our military. There are many elements and
separate suicide prevention initiatives that comprise a comprehensive
approach to suicide prevention, including embedded and organic
behavioral health care assets ``in country,'' programs run by the
Services, pre- and post-deployment ``eye-to-eye'' screening, alliance
partnerships, and a host of other prevention, treatment, and care
facilities. It is imperative that we implement these programs
throughout the life cycle of the training and deployment so that
servicemembers can receive appropriate counseling, assistance, respite,
and support.
sexual assault
Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for ensuring
compliance with DOD policies on prevention of and response to sexual
assaults against military personnel and civilians throughout the
CENTCOM AOR.
What lessons have military leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan learned
regarding sexual assault prevention, response, and reporting protocols
that can be applied across the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Commanders have learned that they have the responsibility
to establish a command climate where safety is promoted, servicemembers
are educated on sexual assault risk reduction techniques, and
servicemembers feel free to report incidents without stigma or
recrimination. They have also learned that sexual assault is a safety
risk and a crime, it is incompatible with our military values, and that
it negatively impacts unit cohesion and mission accomplishment.
Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be
addressed to ensure that policies on prevention, reporting, medical
treatment (including mental health care), and victim support are
available for military personnel and civilians in the operational
environments of Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. The unique issues that need to be addressed are a positive
and supportive command climate, unit leadership that demonstrates
intent to follow established policies, provision of caring assistance
to victims of sexual assault, and firm disciplinary actions taken
against offenders. In addressing each of these unique issues,
commanders demonstrate that they are committed to preventing and
reducing instances of sexual assault.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the adequacy of such
resources in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Continued command emphasis and involvement will insure the
adequacy of resources. One best practice from Iraq involves the regular
meeting of a multidisciplinary team with representation from across the
command, chaired by a General Officer. This provides the appropriate
forum for sharing concerns, identifying issues, and taking immediate
corrective action.
deployed civilians in the centcom aor
Question. The President has called on all agencies of the executive
branch to encourage the assignment of highly qualified Federal civilian
employees in support of CENTCOM operations, and DOD provides the
majority of those employees.
If confirmed, what would be your objectives for improving and
sustaining the support of Federal civilians in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. If I am confirmed, CENTCOM will continue to maintain the
relationship we have developed with the Office of the Deputy Secretary
of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy (CPP) as it continues its
implementation of the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) program.
During the past year, CPP has permanently transferred a Senior Human
Resource CEW Program Manager to provide advisory services on
compensation, benefits, medical care and entitlements, and more
importantly, to be involved in the planning for mobilization of highly
qualified civilian talent. I understand that the assignment of this
billet to CENTCOM has already brought dividends, producing a 166
percent increase in the number of DOD civilians augmenting our military
forces across Iraq and Afghanistan since March 2009.
CENTCOM has found that leveraging the expertise and the skill sets
of highly-qualified DOD civilians improves operational effectiveness
and helps reduce demand on the uniformed force. As such, I would
endorse the Department's efforts to provide deployed civilians with
uniform, fair and transparent incentives, and benefits that will enable
us to further increase the use of a ready and able source of quality
manpower.
intelligence support for indirect activities
Question. Some observers contend that the national intelligence
agencies focus their assistance to the Defense Department in
Afghanistan and Iraq on special operators engaged in direct action
operations. As a consequence, it is alleged, general purpose forces and
SOF engaged in indirect activities, including foreign internal defense
and population protection, receive less intelligence support.
If confirmed, how would you ensure SOF engaged in indirect
activities receive adequate intelligence support?
Answer. Our SOF require precise targeting data to be effective.
Intelligence, especially ISR support, is allocated based upon theater
requirements (to include requirements to support general purpose forces
and SOF engaged in indirect activities) that are balanced against
existing capabilities and capacity. If confirmed, I will work to expand
intelligence and information sharing across the entire enterprise--
especially technology that will help to ensure the effectiveness of our
special operators. At the same time, integrated special operations with
general purpose force operations are key to success in this sort of
war. A mission-oriented balance is my vision.
special operations forces in support of country teams
Question. SOCOM deploys personnel to work with country teams in a
number of priority countries where the United States is not engaged in
direct action operations, but rather trying to stop the spread of
violent extremism. Their mission is to support the priorities of the
Ambassador and the geographic combatant commander's theater campaign
plan against terrorist networks.
Please describe the potential value of these special operations
personnel to CENTCOM and the country teams they are supporting.
Answer. The limited visibility profiles, professional maturity and
self-sufficiency of SOF provide unique capabilities to work within U.S.
Embassy country teams. They provide the Ambassador and Commander,
CENTCOM, the flexibility required to execute security assistance
programs in fluid and culturally diverse environments. Also, their
expertise in understanding the complex issues of interagency and
international cooperation provides additional leverage that may not
otherwise be realized.
Question. If confirmed, what do you intend to do to make sure the
goals of special operations personnel deployed to these countries are
closely aligned with those of the Ambassadors they are working with?
Answer. It is paramount that CENTCOM's military effort acts in
unity and coordination with the Chief of Mission as the U.S. Government
lead. If confirmed, I would work to establish close working
relationships with every U.S. Ambassador in the region, and ensure that
all CENTCOM efforts--not just those of special operations personnel--
align with their objectives.
military information support operations
Question. Al Qaeda and affiliated violent extremist groups work
hard to appeal to local populations. In several cases throughout the
CENTCOM AOR, most recently in Yemen, these efforts have allowed violent
extremists to establish a safe haven, conduct operations, and expand
their recruiting base. The composition and size of these groups in
comparison to the U.S. Government permits it to make policy decisions
very quickly.
Do you believe CENTCOM and other agencies within the U.S.
Government are appropriately organized to respond effectively to the
messaging and influence efforts of al Qaeda and other affiliated
terrorist groups?
Answer. Not yet, but we are getting there. There are several key
elements critical to our achieving success in this aspect of
operations: Alignment and synchronization of our activities;
authorities to engage in countering violent extremist messaging;
capacity, and funding. Communication integration is equally important
in regards to the interagency--there must be a robust, aligned
interagency communication effort, since the battle of the narrative is
a whole-of-government problem.
CENTCOM continues to refine our processes to ensure alignment and
synchronization of all of communication activities, not only within the
CENTCOM Headquarters, but among all the components, the two Joint
Operational Areas, and across the interagency. This includes public
affairs, military information operations and key leader engagement. We
are focused on improvements and, if confirmed, I anticipate I will be
bringing more attention to this arena.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you explore or
take to counter and delegitimize violent extremist ideologies?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I would continue to use Military
Information Operations in coordination with our partners in the
interagency to degrade the violent rhetoric of our enemy, particularly
on the Internet. In addition, our public affairs operations should be
fully engaged in the emerging media environments within the AOR,
including the use of all available tools to engage in blogs and social
media to be first with the truth and correct the record when our
adversaries attack us with disinformation and propaganda. Finally, DOD
and the Combatant Commands have a critical role in the interagency
effort to counter violent extremists, and I will work to ensure our
commanders retain the authorities they need to execute their missions.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, CENTCOM?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
afghanistan
1. Senator Burris. General Mattis, we now have a new commander in
charge of the mission in Afghanistan that is now in its 9th year.
Casualties are increasing along with public disapproval. What do you
envision as the primary thing you can do to support General Petraeus
and the overall political military situation in the region?
General Mattis. The primary thing I can do to support General
Petraeus is to work in the closest possible partnership with him to
help him execute the President's strategy in Afghanistan. That will
mean working to ensure that the effort is fully resourced in a coherent
and comprehensive manner and to set broader regional conditions for the
success of the mission.
2. Senator Burris. General Mattis, what interagency efforts need to
be abandoned or reinforced?
General Mattis. We are undergoing a comprehensive review of all our
key interagency efforts to ensure robust support of General Petraeus's
work in Afghanistan. These efforts include our actions to expose
corruption and disrupt enemy threat finance streams; neutralize the
enemies improvised explosive device capability; degrade violent
extremist ability to recruit and propagate violent ideology; expand
training for Afghan security forces and border security; enhance Afghan
governance, rule of law, and tribal engagement initiatives; and
expedite economic and agriculture transition and advancement.
While strengthening these efforts, and while acknowledging the good
work currently being done, we will carefully seek means and methods to
streamline established programs to reduce duplication and redundancy
and better optimize our effectiveness and efficiency. You have my
assurance that we will assess interagency efforts and work together
with our interagency partners in order to achieve maximum
synchronization, unity of purpose, and effort.
One area of interagency effort that we must continue to reinforce
is the whole-of-government approach in cyberspace and other information
operations. Our adversaries continue to demonstrate an ability to
rapidly adapt to and exploit an information domain without geographic
boundaries. We must continue our interagency collaboration and
coordination, thereby leveraging each agency's capabilities and
authorities. To date, we have partnered with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of State, and other agencies to successfully
counter violent extremism in several key areas of the information
domain. It is my intention to continue to expand our partnerships to
more effectively engage violent extremists across the entire
information domain.
To that end, we respectfully request your full support to our
partner agencies as they seek enhancements of their capabilities and
support for this important collaboration. In the long-term, we will
continue to work to refine our interagency team with a clear eye toward
transitioning to less Department of Defense (DOD)-led efforts and,
ultimately, to Afghan self-reliance and self-governance.
3. Senator Burris. General Mattis, what efforts will you take to
strengthen partnerships and commitments from the international
community?
General Mattis. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) will continue to
pursue cooperative, multi-lateral solutions to the challenges in the
region. Our efforts to strengthen international partnerships focus on
the interests we share with other nations, and we will continue to
pursue those interests by helping our partners bolster their
capabilities and capacities. Cooperative efforts that build partner
capacity both encourage participation in joint endeavors and increase
the coalition's overall effectiveness in ongoing multi-lateral
operations. Our initiatives have already led to partner nation
contributions, funding, and forces for operations in Afghanistan and we
will continue to develop these mutually beneficial partnerships to
enhance stability and economic opportunity throughout the region.
leaked information
4. Senator Burris. General Mattis, the unauthorized public release
of confidential and classified information by WikiLeaks.org reveals
some disturbing information about the Afghan/Pakistan cooperation. What
is your assessment of the diplomatic and military effort between
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the International Security Assistance Force?
General Mattis. While the disclosure by WikiLeaks is irresponsible
and unwelcome, the diplomatic and military effort between Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and the International Security Assistance Force continues to
move in a positive direction.
5. Senator Burris. General Mattis, what impact do you think this
irresponsibility will have on our partnerships with Afghanistan and
Pakistan?
General Mattis. The people who released this information into the
public domain have been grossly irresponsible and have caused harm to
the efforts of the United States and our partners. Our relationships
with Afghanistan and Pakistan will endure however, despite this
unfortunate incident. We are doing all we can with our partners in
order to minimize the damage caused.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
strategic communication/taliban targeting of civilians
6. Senator Thune. General Mattis, when General Petraeus was here
before the committee a few weeks ago, he discussed the importance of
strategic communication, and in particular the importance of merely
truthfully reporting the extremist activities, the indiscriminate
violence and the oppressive practices that have always been associated
with the Taliban. For example, I understand that we recently
intercepted a message from Mullah Omar ordering his fighters to target
civilian Afghans. In June, they bombed a wedding in an Afghan village
that killed 39 people who were simply celebrating a joyous occasion.
Overall, insurgent actions have caused 1,074 civilian deaths in
Afghanistan since January of this year. Do you view our strategic
communication efforts in Afghanistan as effective?
General Mattis. We have built a strategic communication effort that
is beginning to yield positive results, yet we are challenged by an
enemy that uses lies and propaganda without discretion and as a means
of first resort. Our goal is to be ``first with the truth'' and to
ensure our strategic communication effort is fully integrated into the
interagency effort. I will continue to seek the authorities and
resources to assist CENTCOM in general and General Petraeus in
particular conduct full-spectrum communication programs to counter our
enemies in Afghanistan and throughout the region.
7. Senator Thune. General Mattis, as CENTCOM Commander, how would
you approach this issue of amplifying the truth about the atrocities of
the enemy?
General Mattis. Our CENTCOM team uses military information
operations, public affairs, key leader engagements, and a
``traditional'' or tribal communication effort in coordination with our
partners in the region to demonstrate the enemy's violent, extremist
behavior against the Afghan people. These important activities are
conducted in the theater and amplified at CENTCOM HQ through blogs,
press releases, and other means. Additionally, CENTCOM will continue to
coordinate with DOD and the Interagency to counter disinformation and
propaganda using all available tools, including blogs and social media.
Moreover, I will continue to work with our commanders ensuring they
have the authorities necessary to execute the mission and I will work
closely with friendly moderate countries in the CENTCOM region to
amplify the brutal character of the enemy. I fully support not only the
full resourcing of requirements for military information operations and
public affairs, but also the programs of other Departments, such as
State's public diplomacy, whose efforts are mutually supporting in this
regard.
rules of engagement
8. Senator Thune. General Mattis, General Petraeus told us he would
be closely scrutinizing our rules of engagement in Afghanistan,
particularly with regard to close air support (CAS), to see if there
are any problems with implementation of these rules of engagement. What
are your views of the rules of engagement in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. I am satisfied that the Rules of Engagement in
Afghanistan provide an appropriate balance between assuring our troops
the right to self-defense and the requirement to apply force only when
necessary and in a proportional way. I will, however, review them from
time to time in consultation with the Commander in Afghanistan to
ensure that they remain appropriate to the situation on the ground.
9. Senator Thune. General Mattis, do you believe the CAS
restrictions should be modified?
General Mattis. I am satisfied that the rules for the employment of
CAS provide a balance between the right to self-defense and the
requirement to ensure appropriate application of force. I will review
them from time to time in consultation with the Commander in
Afghanistan to ensure that they remain appropriate to the situation on
the ground.
army unmanned aerial vehicles duplicating air force unmanned aerial
vehicles
10. Senator Thune. General Mattis, the Army's 2011 budget proposal
requested over $578 million toward the acquisition of MQ-1 unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as their payload and weaponization.
With that money, the Army would buy 26 more aircraft next year in
addition to the 24 purchased this year with 158 total aircraft in the
Army inventory by the end of 2015. By comparison, the Air Force has 144
MQ-1s today. The rationale for these duplicative purchases is that
there is an urgent need for more intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) platforms in the field. Specifically, the Air
Force has been tasked to provide 65 combat air patrols (CAPs) on a
daily basis using these types of aircraft. What is your view of the use
of the Army's MQ-1 aircraft in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. CENTCOM identifies its requirements for ISR through
the Global Force Management process, Joint Urgent Operational Needs
Statements, and Integrated Priority Lists. DOD and the Services
determine how best to meet those requirements. The Air Force and the
Army MQ-1 type aircraft offer complementary and additive capabilities
that help to fulfill stated needs and both are crucial to the effort in
Afghanistan.
11. Senator Thune. General Mattis, shouldn't we be using these
aircraft to augment the Air Force's capabilities in order to achieve
the requested goal of 65 CAPs?
General Mattis. As the Commander of CENTCOM, I am not in the best
position to determine funding priorities or acquisition strategies for
each Service. CENTCOM has substantial unmet ISR requirements and gladly
accepts sourcing by both the Air Force and the Army. While 65 CAPs may
be a goal of a single Service, if that were the end state for DOD ISR
capacity, significant ISR capacity shortfalls within CENTCOM would
remain.
12. Senator Thune. General Mattis, with the drawdown of all combat
troops in Iraq this August, and I assume this includes UAVs, what kind
of immediate increase in capacity do you expect will be available to
you in Afghanistan in terms of UAVs?
General Mattis. There have never been enough UAVs to fully support
requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously, which has resulted
in CENTCOM shifting UAVs from Iraq to Afghanistan over the last 18
months as the priority of effort for operations has shifted. There will
be no immediate UAV dividend when force levels reach 50,000 and Iraq
will continue to have UAV requirements for as long as we have troops
there. Even after we withdraw the last of the troops from Iraq and we
reapportion UAVs, we will still not meet the complete requirement for
the theater.
13. Senator Thune. General Mattis, do you believe 65 CAPs will
still be required?
General Mattis. Yes, the 65 CAP acquisition strategy is one aspect
of a total Air Force global ISR capability. The ISR capacity provided
by 65 Air Force CAPs only partially fulfills CENTCOM's ISR
requirements. As such, the 65 Air Force CAPs plus the remainder of DOD
ISR capacity are required for the foreseeable future.
14. Senator Thune. General Mattis, how will this immediate increase
in capacity aid with the counterinsurgency strategy of securing the
Afghan population?
General Mattis. There are not enough UAVs to support operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, which has resulted in CENTCOM shifting UAVs from
Iraq to Afghanistan for more than 12 months as the priority of effort
for operations shifted. There will be no immediate increase in ISR
capacity in Afghanistan as a result of the drawdown in Iraq.
15. Senator Thune. General Mattis, Secretary Gates has directed
each Service to find savings of $2 billion in next year's budget. What
synergies do you envision could be made between the Army and the Air
Force with regard to unmanned capabilities and where do you think they
can save money and reduce duplication?
General Mattis. As a combatant commander, my interest is in the
capability provided by the UAV and not the Service that provides that
capability. All the Services use UAVs and even similar systems may have
different sensors that support unique mission tasks. I view the Air
Force and Army UAV programs as complementary rather than as
competitive. We have and will continue to work with the Services to
avoid duplication of capability and work together for cost savings when
cooperative development is justified.
reintegration and reconciliation
16. Senator Thune. General Mattis, several weeks ago, President
Karzai convened the National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and
Reintegration. Do you agree with his approach and how does this
proposal contemplate dealing with Taliban leadership figures like
Mullah Omar?
General Mattis. Reintegration and reconciliation are Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan programs. While I agree with and
welcome President Karzai's approach, I recognize that more
implementation details need to be developed by the Afghan Government,
particularly at the sub-national level, to include the issuance of a
Government of Afghanistan Joint Order. While the specific methods and
outcomes for dealing with Taliban leadership figures have not yet been
articulated by the Government of Afghanistan, I would support proposals
that ensure that individuals renounce violence against the Government
of Afghanistan, live in accordance with the Afghan Constitution and
law, and have no material ties to al Qaeda.
brief timeframe of the surge
17. Senator Thune. General Mattis, a report in the London Times
last month quotes Brigadier General Frederick Hodges, U.S. Director of
Operations in Southern Afghanistan, as saying ``Our mission is to show
irreversible momentum by the end of 2010--that's the clock I'm using .
. . We'll never have more capacity than we have by late summer 2010.
We'll never have it any better.'' Do you concur with General Hodges'
assessment that we will either succeed or fail within the next 5 months
in this area?
General Mattis. I do not sense that declaring success or failure in
the next 5 months was the point this officer was trying to make, but
rather his mission is focused on using the additional resources being
brought into Afghanistan to make observable progress. I do agree that
by the end of 2010 our additional 30,000 troops will be in place and
many of the additional troops offered by our partners will be in place
by then, too. The next 5 months will be important and we will work to
continue to achieve progress, but it will not be possible to declare
success or failure in that timeframe.
18. Senator Thune. General Mattis, if we will never have as many
troops as we have right now, then is he right by saying that we have to
win now?
General Mattis. Coalition troops are only one part of the equation.
I believe our strength will continue to grow as Afghan National
Security Forces grow and develop. Over time, a range of other
initiatives will mature--including advances in the Rule of Law,
reintegration and reconciliation, the fight against corruption, and
economic development--cumulatively adding weight to our effort. There
are also important whole-of-government initiatives underway that will
reinforce improvement in Afghan governance at all levels. We need to
allow the time for these developments to occur.
19. Senator Thune. General Mattis, with the recent death of al-
Yazid, the third highest ranking leader in al Qaeda, after Osama bin
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, do you believe we have that momentum now?
What will it take to keep that momentum?
General Mattis. While the May 2010 death of al Qaeda #3 al-Yazid
(Shaykh Said al-Masri) is a notable loss for the al Qaeda organization,
his death is not a momentum changing event by itself. Al Qaeda has
suffered serious leadership losses since late 2007 due to
counterterrorism (CT) operations. The death of al-Yazid will most
impact al Qaeda in the areas of training, financing, and the perception
that Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas may no longer
provide a viable safe haven. Al Qaeda, however, still has the ability
to plan and conduct operations globally, as witnessed during the
Christmas Day bombing attempt by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. To
maintain momentum, we must continue to execute regional CT operations
and to train, equip, build capacity/capability of, and where feasible,
conduct joint operations with our regional partners.
20. Senator Thune. General Mattis, if the next 5 months are so
critical, what do you need from us on this committee in order to
succeed?
General Mattis. Your continued support of our efforts in the
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) remains vital for the next 5
months and the long-term. The 4 most critical areas are building the
ANSF, providing the Afghan's with basic infrastructure, ensuring we can
counter enemy messaging, and supporting the Afghanistan Reintegration
program.
First, we need full funding to train and equip the Afghanistan
National Security Forces (ANSF) through the Afghanistan Security Forces
Fund. A competent and capable ANSF is an essential requirement for
transition.
Second, we need flexibility and funding in the National Defense
Authorization Act to enable us to address the basic needs for the
average Afghan citizen. This flexibility should team us up with U.S.
Agency for International Development to work on strategic
infrastructure projects that will positively influence our
counterinsurgency mission. We would welcome a transfer authority from
the Commander's Emergency Response Program that would identify a
specific amount for funding such infrastructure.
Third, we need to be able to execute Information Operations
programs against insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as violent
extremists across the CENTCOM AOR. The information battle space in
which this war is fought has become increasingly complex, with violent
extremist groups displaying the necessary acumen to use emerging
Internet conduits to recruit forces, solicit funding, share tradecraft,
and spread their ideology. They use the information environment as a
key line of effort for their campaigns, and they use kinetic attacks to
enable their Information Operations and to kill and injure our forces,
those of our partners, and innocent civilians. In Iraq, we have seen
the value of U.S. and coalition Information Operations, specifically in
terms of contributions to host-nation stability, the increase in
support for democratic processes and the rule of law, and the reduction
of the levels of violence. However, these successes are not
irreversible. Indeed, our adversaries are continuing to exploit the
information domain to try to reverse our gains.
Fourth, we need flexibility to support Afghanistan's Reintegration
Program similar to how we are able to in fiscal year 2010, without the
authority limitations in the House Armed Services Committee bill. The
Current house bill restricts DOD from executing the program until the
Department of State certifies they cannot execute the mission due to
security reasons.
unity of effort/unity of command
21. Senator Thune. General Mattis, one of the issues I'm concerned
about in light of events of the past week is unity of command and unity
of effort. Going forward, one of the obvious issues in terms of unity
of command that arises from your nomination to this post is that while
you are the head of CENTCOM, your technical subordinate in Afghanistan,
General Petraeus, is the previous head of CENTCOM. Do you foresee a
problem in terms of unity of command in light of the fact that General
Petraeus would be technically a subordinate to you in your position as
head of CENTCOM? What assurances can you give us that this will not be
an issue?
General Mattis. General Petraeus and I share a similar view of the
region. We have served together repeatedly: in the Pentagon; fighting
together in Iraq; jointly developing the counterinsurgency manual when
he was at Fort Leavenworth and I was at Quantico; and as fellow
combatant commanders. He is a great soldier and joint warfighter who is
fully attuned to both my and his responsibilities, especially having
served in my position previously. I am confident through our close
collaboration we will be able to successfully support and resource the
effort to achieve our goals in Afghanistan and there will be no problem
with unity of command in CENTCOM.
______
[The nomination reference of Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 21, 2010.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment to the grade of general
in the United States Marine Corps while assigned to a position of
importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General
Gen. James N. Mattis, 7981.
______
[The biographical sketch of Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Resume of Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC
Assigned: 9 Nov 07.
Projected Rotation: 9 Nov 10.
Education/Qualifications:
Central Washington State University, BS, 1971
National War College, MS, 1994
The Basic School, 1972
Amphibious Warfare School, 1978
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1985
National War College, 1994
Capstone, 2001
JFLCC, 2004
Pinnacle, 2006
Infantry Officer
Joint Qualified Officer
Date of rank: 9 Nov 07.
Date of birth: 8 Sep 50.
Date commissioned: 9 Feb 72.
MRD: 1 July 12.
Languages: None.
Commands:
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force; and Commander,
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command (Lt. Gen.: Aug. 06-Oct. 07).
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (Lt.
Gen.: Oct. 04-Aug. 06).
Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Maj. Gen.: Aug. 02-Aug.
04).
Deputy Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (BGen.:
July 01-July 02)
Commanding Officer, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Col.: June
94-June 96).
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Lt. Col.: Feb. 90-
May 92).
Commanding Officer, Recruiting Station Portland, OR (Maj: Jun. 85-
Aug. 88)
Joint assignments:
Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (BGen:
Mar. 00-June 01).
Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Col: June
96-June 98).
Service staff assignments:
Director, Manpower Plans and Policies Division (BGen: Aug. 98-Feb.
00).
Head, Enlisted Assignments, Personnel Management Division (Lt.
Col.: Apr. 92-Aug. 93).
Executive Officer, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Lt. Col.: Aug.
89-Feb. 90).
Operations Officer, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Lt. Col.:
June 89-July 89).
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. James N.
Mattis, USMC, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
James N. Mattis.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, U.S. Central Command.
3. Date of nomination:
July 21, 2010.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
September 8, 1950; Pullman, WA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Single.
7. Names and ages of children:
None.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member of U.S. Naval Institute.
Member of Marine Corps Association.
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
After approval from my Agency Ethics officials, I accepted the
Center for National Policy's 2009 Edmund S. Muskie Distinguished Public
Service Award and the Atlantic Council's 2010 Distinguished Military
Leadership Award.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC.
This 17th day of July, 2010.
[The nomination of Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 4, 2010, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on August 5, 2010.]
NOMINATIONS OF JONATHAN WOODSON, M.D., TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS; NEILE L. MILLER TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; AND ANNE M.
HARRINGTON TO BE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
----------
TUESDAY, AUGUST 3, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, McCain, Thune,
Wicker, and Brown.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Gerald
J. Leeling, counsel; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member;
Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Daniel Trope,
assistant to Senator Bayh; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator
Hagan; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Jason
Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Erskine Wells III,
assistant to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. The committee
meets today to consider the nominations of Jonathan Woodson to
be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Neile
Miller to be the Principal Deputy Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and Anne Harrington to
be Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation of
the NNSA.
We welcome our nominees and their families to today's
hearing. We appreciate the long hours and the other sacrifices
that our nominees are willing to make to serve our country, and
their families also deserve our thanks for the support that
they provide that is so essential to the success of these
officials. When we call on you for your opening statements, we
will give you an opportunity to introduce your family members
if they are with you today.
Jonathan Woodson has been nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, and if confirmed, he
will be principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on
healthcare policies, programs, and activities and will be
responsible for administering the $50 billion military health
system. Dr. Woodson is well qualified for this position as a
result of his extensive experience as an Associate Professor of
Surgery and Associate Dean at the Boston University School of
Medicine, Adjunct Professor of Surgery at the Uniformed
Services University of the Health Sciences, and Fellow and
Governor of the American College of Surgeons.
Perhaps most important, Dr. Woodson is a brigadier general
in the Army Reserve, has seen military medical care firsthand
during deployments to Kosovo, to Central America, to Saudi
Arabia for Operation Desert Storm, and to Iraq and Afghanistan
for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
Our other two nominees have been nominated for positions at
the NNSA. Neile Miller has been nominated to be the Principal
Deputy Administrator of the NNSA, and if confirmed, Ms. Miller
will be the chief operating officer of the NNSA at a time when
the NNSA faces the challenging task of constructing two major
technically complex multi-billion dollar facilities.
The two new facilities, one at the NNSA Oakridge Y-12 plant
and the other at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, will be a
significant challenge, but they are essential to the long-term
ability of the NNSA to maintain the nuclear stockpile. Ensuring
that the requirements are well defined and that the design is
sufficiently mature to support a fully independent cost
estimate will be just the beginning of the challenges that Ms.
Miller would face if she is confirmed.
Her background at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and the experience she has gained in her current position as
the Director of the Office of the Budget at the Department of
Energy (DOE) should help her in this effort.
Anne Harrington has been nominated to be the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and if she
is confirmed, Ms. Harrington will have the challenge of
managing the substantial growth plan for the nonproliferation
programs at the NNSA. She will also have a large, technically
complex project to complete--the mixed oxide fuel facility
complex at the Savannah River site.
Ms. Harrington is well qualified for these tasks by virtue
of her extensive background managing nonproliferation programs.
In the very early days of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction program, she was instrumental in getting the program
off to a successful start. Since that time, she has worked to
coordinate the activities of the Departments of State, Energy,
and Defense in ongoing nonproliferation efforts.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in welcoming our nominees and their families,
and I thank them for their willingness to serve in these key
leadership positions.
As you mentioned, Dr. Woodson has been nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. He is an
accomplished physician, administrator, educator, and soldier.
Having served in the Army Reserve as a medical officer for
over 20 years, he has a distinguished record of Active Duty
service, having deployed to the Middle East during Operation
Desert Storm, to Kosovo with Task Force Falcon, and again to
the Central Command area of responsibility in support of
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He has staffed
and commanded combat support hospitals, forward surgical teams,
and medical brigades. Dr. Woodson is currently assigned as
Assistant Surgeon General for Reserve Affairs, et cetera.
The challenges facing the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the Defense Health Program in providing care to over 9.5
million eligible beneficiaries and sustaining the All-Volunteer
Force are well documented. Ensuring continued world-class
healthcare, including mental health support, in theater and at
home to our wounded warriors and their families is essential.
Improving the seamless transition of healthcare between DOD
and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has to be one of
your top priorities, as well as working to make military
service and careers in military healthcare professions
attractive to students and practitioners alike. I look forward
to your testimony about these issues, and I am grateful for
your career of service.
Ms. Neile Miller has been nominated to be the Principal
Deputy Administrator for the NNSA. Ms. Miller currently is the
Director of the Office of Budget at DOE and, if confirmed, will
bring over 20 years of experience in the fields of nuclear
energy, defense policy, and budget analysis at OMB and in the
DOE, to NNSA.
NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the
Nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval
reactor programs. If confirmed as Principal Deputy
Administrator, Ms. Miller will perform an essential role in
continuing management reform, recapitalizing infrastructure,
and ensuring that each dollar spent assists our friends and
partners in reducing the global nuclear threat and guarantees
the quality and reliability of our own nuclear deterrent.
Ms. Anne Harrington is the nominee to be Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. Currently
she is the Director of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences
Committee on International Security and Arms Control. She
served in the Department of State from 1990 through 2005, where
she worked on nonproliferation cooperative threat reduction
programs aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and missile expertise from Russia and
Eurasia.
Ms. Harrington was instrumental in shaping our arms control
policies in the aftermath of the Cold War and clearly
understands the need for a transparent common roadmap to reduce
the threat of proliferation.
One of the greatest threats we face is the possibility that
terrorists or rogue states will acquire nuclear weapons or
other WMD. NNSA, through its Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, works closely with a wide range of
international partners, key U.S. Federal agencies, U.S.
national laboratories, and the private sector to detect,
secure, and dispose of nuclear and radiological material and
related WMD technology and expertise. I believe that Ms.
Harrington is well qualified for this key national security
role.
I look forward to the testimony of the nominees today, and
I thank them and their families for their service to our
Nation.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Thank you, Senator Levin.
I join you in welcoming our nominees and their families, and I
thank them for their willingness to serve in these key leadership
positions.
Dr. Woodson has been nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Health Affairs. He is an accomplished physician, administrator,
educator, and soldier, having served in the Army Reserve as a medical
officer for over 20 years. Dr. Woodson has a distinguished record of
Active-Duty service having deployed to the Middle East during Operation
Desert Storm, to Kosovo with Task Force Falcon, and again to the
Central Command area of responsibility in support of Operations
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He has staffed and commanded combat
support hospitals, forward surgical teams, and medical brigades. Dr.
Woodson is currently assigned as Assistant Surgeon General for Reserve
Affairs, Force Structure, and Mobilization in the Office of the Army
Surgeon General and is dual hatted as Deputy Commander, Army Reserve
Medical Command.
The challenges facing the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Defense Health Program in providing care to over 9.5 million eligible
beneficiaries and sustaining the All-Volunteer Force are well
documented. Ensuring continued world class health care, including
mental health support, in theater and at home to our wounded warriors
and their families is essential. Improving the seamless transition of
health care between DOD and the Veterans' Administration has to be one
of your top priorities, as well as working to make military service and
careers in military health care professions attractive to students and
practitioners alike. I look forward to your testimony about these
issues, and am grateful for your career of service.
Ms. Neile Miller has been nominated to be the Principal Deputy
Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
Ms. Miller currently is the Director of the Office of Budget at the
U.S. Department of Energy, and, if confirmed, will bring over 20 years
of experience in the fields of nuclear energy, defense policy, and
budget analysis at the Office of Management and Budget and in the
Department of Energy to NNSA.
The NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the
Nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor
programs. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, Ms. Miller
will perform an essential role in continuing management reform,
recapitalizing infrastructure, and ensuring that each dollar spent not
only assists our friends and partners in reducing the global nuclear
threat and guaranteeing the quality and reliability of our own nuclear
deterrent.
Ms. Anne Harrington is the nominee to be Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. She is currently the Director of the
U.S. National Academy of Sciences' Committee on International Security
and Arms Control. She served in the Department of State from 1990
through 2005 where she worked on nonproliferation and cooperative
threat reduction programs aimed at preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile expertise from Russia and
Eurasia. Ms. Harrington was instrumental in shaping our arms control
policies in the aftermath of the Cold War, and clearly understands the
need for a transparent, common roadmap to reduce the threat of
proliferation.
One of the greatest threats we face is the possibility that
terrorists or rogue States will acquire nuclear weapons or other WMD.
The NNSA through its Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, works
closely with a wide range of international partners, key U.S. Federal
agencies, the U.S. national laboratories and the private sector to
detect, secure and dispose of nuclear and radiological material and
related WMD technology and expertise. You are very well qualified for
this key national security role.
I look forward to the testimony of the nominees today, and I again
thank them and their families for their service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Now let me ask you all the standard questions that we ask
of all nominees before this committee. You can answer together.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
[All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation progress?
[All witnesses answered in the negative.]
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
[All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
[All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
[All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
[All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
[All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Dr. Woodson, I think we are going to start with you for
your statement and your introductions, if you have any.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN WOODSON, M.D., NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS
Dr. Woodson. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the
committee, thank you very much for this opportunity to appear
before you today.
I am honored to have been nominated by the President to
serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs,
and I thank Secretary Gates for his support.
If confirmed, I pledge to apply my experience and my best
efforts to work with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, the Service Surgeons General, and
Congress to promote and safeguard the health of military
personnel and their families and deliver the best medical care
to the wounded warriors and all DOD beneficiaries. You will
always receive my candid assessment.
With me today are my wife, Sherril, and my daughter, Sarah.
My son, Jonathan, could not be here today. My family has always
supported and served alongside of me throughout my career.
Families are important, and those of us who have served in the
military understand that when we raise our right hand and swear
to protect and defend this great Nation, we not only commit
ourselves to this mission, but our loved ones as well. Without
our families, we could not have the greatest military in the
world.
If confirmed, I will collaboratively work with leaders from
other DOD components, intradepartmental Government agencies,
and civilian organizations to tackle the challenges that
confront the military health system to create new opportunities
and solutions to advance military health, its mission, and its
benefits to its beneficiaries.
I understand that the portfolio for the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Affairs is broad and includes policy and
programmatic issues related to force health protection,
readiness, wounded warrior care, deployment health, medical
education and training, medical research, humanitarian disaster
response, in addition to TRICARE benefits, and other global
health issues.
I will draw upon my career experiences as a military
medical officer and leader, healthcare administrator, teacher,
researcher, and physician to engage others, set the vision, and
motivate and inspire others to work toward common goals.
I have always been personally inspired by the commitment
and dedication of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
coast guardsmen. The highlight of my career as a surgeon has
been caring for the wounded warriors on the battlefield. These
talented young men and women, who have been asked to shoulder
the responsibilities for defending this Nation and have
suffered the consequences of nearly a decade of war, deserve
the best medical care both at home and abroad.
Specifically, I will work with Congress and sister agencies
on finding the most effective strategies for preventing
suicide, preventing and treating post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and traumatic brain injury, and enhancing medical
readiness of our military forces.
I look forward to working with Secretary Shinseki on
improving the medical evaluation board and disability
evaluation system and processes to produce a servicemember-
centered, streamlined process that produces efficient handoffs
from Active service to veteran status. I understand that we
must do this while keeping in mind that we have to be good
stewards of public resources as we enter a resource-constrained
time in our Nation's history.
Over the past few years, Congress has been a great partner
in supporting the military members, raising concerns, asking
hard questions, and demanding answers when appropriate. If
confirmed, I look forward to your continuing engagement and
support.
I cannot complete these opening remarks without expressing
my admiration for the men and women who are the heart and soul
of the military health system. These true professionals have
soldiered alongside their combat arms colleagues and acted as a
force multiplier. They deserve not only accolades, but real
assistance in helping them to perform their jobs better and
more efficiently.
If confirmed, I pledge to pursue diligently and
expeditiously the implementation of a new electronic health
record, which will not only serve all servicemembers well, but
give the healthcare providers decision support tools to enhance
their ability to deliver quality care, which we can simply
define as the right care at the right time, in the right
amount, at the right cost, that is safe and patient centered.
I believe the military health system has the ability to
establish new models in the delivery of medical care, evidence-
based treatment algorithms, and medical education that the
civilian sector will want to emulate.
I thank the committee and you, Mr. Chairman, for the
privilege and opportunity to make these opening remarks, and I
stand ready to answer questions that you have for me.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Woodson.
Ms. Miller?
STATEMENT OF NEILE L. MILLER, NOMINEE TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Miller. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the
committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear
before you today.
I am honored to be nominated by the President to serve as
the Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration.
I am also very grateful for the confidence placed in me by
Secretary Chu and Administrator D'Agostino in recommending me
for this position, and I am excited about the opportunity to
serve as a member of the NNSA leadership team.
Only part of my family is here with me today. My husband,
Dr. Werner Lutze, and our sons, Max Lutze and Daniel Lutze, are
waiting for me to rejoin them in Italy as we continue our
vacation. I thank them for their endless enthusiastic support
and understanding, without which nothing I do would be
possible.
However, I am delighted that my mother, Belle Miller, and
my sisters, Lisa Miller and Abbey Kreinik, are here with me
today. I consider myself truly blessed to have always been able
to count on their love and support, as well as that of my late
father, Arthur Miller.
I would like to thank the members of this committee for
your strong support for the NNSA mission. If confirmed, I look
forward to working closely with you and your respective staffs
in carrying out to the best of my abilities the duties and
responsibilities of the Principal Deputy Administrator.
The NNSA has been charged by the President and Congress
with the principal responsibility for carrying out the Nation's
nuclear security agenda. Even as the Senate prepares to
deliberate further reductions in the Nation's arsenal of
strategic nuclear weapons, the challenges facing the NNSA are
increasing. This committee is very aware of the challenges
facing the NNSA, and I am greatly appreciative of their support
in the annual NNSA authorization process.
Based on my prior experience as a senior analyst at OMB
and, most recently, as the senior career executive at the DOE's
Office of Budget, I have gained a unique set of qualifications
and experiences to serve as the Principal Deputy Administrator.
Over the past 10 years, I have developed a detailed
knowledge of the programs, the budgets, and the personnel of
the NNSA, from both the OMB as well as the secretarial
perspectives. I am well aware of the significant challenges
facing the NNSA in implementing the national security policies
established by the President and Congress.
If confirmed by the Senate for this position, I plan to
work closely with the Administrator in making the difficult
decisions needed to ensure that the Nation's nuclear security
enterprise operates in the most effective and efficient manner
possible. It is my intention to focus my efforts in three
areas.
First, I will strive for excellence in the execution of the
major new projects assigned to the NNSA for implementation.
These investments are needed to ensure the safe and efficient
operation of the nuclear weapons complex. These projects must
meet our national security objectives with an increased
attention to the Federal budget. Plus, it is important that the
NNSA be agile as well as efficient in project execution.
Second, I plan to work to maintain and strengthen the
scientific and technological basis for NNSA activities so that
we will be adequately prepared to meet the demanding challenges
of the future. History has repeatedly shown that a robust
science and technology capability is the best way to prepare
for future uncertainties.
Third, I will lead efforts to improve the professional
capabilities of the NNSA staff. My Federal career experience at
OMB and DOE has taught me the key role of the professional
staff in ensuring effective program execution. If confirmed for
this position, I intend to work constructively with the NNSA
career managers and staff to develop the institutional
capabilities to ensure continuous improvement in NNSA program
execution and performance.
In closing, I commit to communicating with you and your
staffs in a timely and highly effective manner to further the
overall goals and objectives of the NNSA. With your approval,
it would be my great privilege to serve as the Principal Deputy
Administrator of the NNSA.
I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Neile Miller
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee: I am
honored to be nominated by the President to serve as the Principal
Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). I am also very grateful for the confidence placed in me by
Secretary Chu and Administrator D'Agostino in recommending me for this
position. I am very excited about this opportunity to serve as a member
of the NNSA senior leadership team.
Only part of my family is here with me today. My husband, Dr.
Werner Lutze, and our sons, Max and Daniel Lutze, are waiting for me to
rejoin them in Italy as we continue our vacation. I thank them for
their endless, enthusiastic support and understanding, without which
nothing I do would be possible. However, I am delighted that my mother,
Belle Miller, and my sisters, Lisa Miller and Abbey Kreinik, are here
with me today. I consider myself truly blessed to have always been able
to count on their love and support, as well as that of my late father,
Arthur Miller.
I would like to thank the members of this committee for your strong
support of the NNSA mission. If confirmed, I look forward to working
closely with you and your respective staffs in carrying out to the best
of my abilities the duties and responsibilities of the Principal Deputy
Administrator.
The NNSA has been charged by the President and Congress with the
principal responsibility for carrying out the Nation's nuclear security
agenda. Even as the Senate prepares to deliberate further reductions in
the Nation's arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, the challenges
facing the NNSA continue. I am greatly appreciative of the support
provided by the committee in the annual NNSA authorization process to
help us meet these challenges and our nuclear security mission.
Based on my prior experience as a senior analyst at the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and most recently, as the senior career
executive at the Department of Energy's Office of Budget, I have gained
a unique set of qualifications and experiences to serve as the
Principal Deputy Administrator. Over the past 10 years, I have
developed a detailed knowledge of the technical programs, budgets, and
personnel of the NNSA, from both the OMB as well as the Secretarial
perspectives. I am well aware of the significant responsibilities
facing the NNSA in implementing national security policies established
by the President and Congress.
If confirmed by the Senate for this position, I plan to work
closely with the Administrator in making the difficult decisions needed
to ensure that the Nation's Nuclear Security Enterprise operates in the
most effective and efficient manner possible. It is my intention to
focus my efforts in three areas:
First, I will strive for excellence in the execution of the major
new projects assigned to the NNSA for implementation. These investments
are needed to ensure the safe and efficient operation of the nuclear
weapons complex. These projects must meet our national security
objectives with an increased attention to the Federal budget. Thus, it
is important that NNSA be agile as well as efficient in project
execution.
Second, I plan to work to maintain and strengthen the scientific
and technological basis for NNSA activities, so that we will be
adequately prepared to meet the demanding challenges of the future.
History has repeatedly shown that a robust science and technology
capability is the best way to be prepared for future uncertainties.
Third, I will lead efforts to improve the professional capabilities
of the NNSA staff personnel. My Federal career experience at OMB and
DOE has taught me the key role of the professional staff in ensuring
effective program execution. If confirmed for this position, I intend
to work constructively with NNSA career managers and staff to develop
the institutional capabilities to ensure continuous improvement in NNSA
program execution and performance.
In closing, I commit to communicating with you, and your staffs, in
a timely and highly effective manner to further the overall goals and
objectives of the NNSA.
With your approval, it would be my great privilege to serve as the
Principal Deputy Administrator of the NNSA. I sincerely appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your
questions, and I thank you for your consideration.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Ms. Miller.
Ms. Harrington.
STATEMENT OF ANNE M. HARRINGTON, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Harrington. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members
of the committee, I am honored to appear before you as the
nominee for Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation at the Department of Energy's National Nuclear
Security Administration.
I am grateful to President Obama for nominating me for this
position and for the confidence expressed by Secretary Chu and
Administrator D'Agostino in his selection.
I am very fortunate to have the support of a wonderful
family, most of which could not be here today. My mother,
Margaret LaRocque, lives in northern New York. My daughter,
Meredith Lynch, is finishing her dissertation at the University
of St. Andrews in Scotland. My sister, Eileen Wetmiller, and my
brother, George Harrington, also were not able to be here.
I am delighted that my son, Owen Lynch, a student at
Virginia Tech majoring in physics and philosophy, is here.
Finally, I would like to thank my friends and colleagues who
are here to support me today.
I have devoted the last 20 years of my career to preventing
the proliferation of WMD, first in the Department of State and
for the last 5 years at the National Academy of Sciences. Those
experiences have demonstrated the enormous challenges facing us
every day and also demonstrate the incredible value that rests
in developing partnerships, both without our Government and
with others, to accomplish the tasks that we must confront.
Mr. Chairman, I am truly humbled by the opportunity
President Obama has given me. If confirmed, I pledge to work
closely with you and with this committee to strengthen the
Nation's security against nuclear threats.
I thank you for your consideration and welcome any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Harrington follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anne M. Harrington
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, I am
honored to appear before you as the nominee for Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the Department of Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration. I am grateful to President
Obama for nominating me for this important position and for the
confidence expressed by Secretary Chu and Administrator D'Agostino in
his selection.
I am very fortunate to have the support of a wonderful family, most
of which could not be here today. My mother, Margaret LaRocque, lives
in northern New York, and my daughter, Meredith Lynch, is finishing her
dissertation at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. I am
delighted that my son, Owen Lynch, a student at Virginia Tech majoring
in physics and philosophy, is here. Finally, I would like to thank my
friends and colleagues who are here today to support me.
I have devoted the last 20 years of my career to preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, first in the Department
of State and for the last 5 years at the National Academy of Sciences.
Mr. Chairman, I am truly humbled by the opportunity President Obama
has given me, and if confirmed, I pledge to work closely with you and
this committee to strengthen the Nation's security against nuclear
threats at the NNSA. I thank you for your consideration and welcome any
questions you may have.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Ms. Harrington.
Let us try a 7-minute round for questioning. First, Dr.
Woodson, the Defense Health Program budget request, including
retiree healthcare costs, has tripled from $16.6 billion in
2001 to $51.7 billion in 2011. That is a huge increase, way
above inflation in 10 years.
Secretary Gates made the statement last year that,
``Healthcare is eating the Department alive.'' In February of
this year, he said that he ``would like to work with Congress
in figuring out a way to try and bring some modest control to
this program.''
If you are confirmed, what would you do to try to address
the rising costs of providing healthcare to our almost 10
million eligible beneficiaries?
Dr. Woodson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.
Obviously, the cost of healthcare is a concern not only in
the military, but in the civilian population as well. I think,
going forward, what we would need to do is work with a number
of constituents and try and stem the rise of that cost.
One opportunity is to look at more cost efficient care and
do appropriate research in terms of therapies that are really
effective. There is a lot of potential waste in the way we
deliver care because of the culture of medicine, and there is
opportunity to decrease the variability in care that might
result in cost savings.
We need to look at the issue of inter-Service coordination
within the military health system and see where we can
streamline measures there as well to increase the efficiency of
the administrative process.
There are a lot of other ideas and issues that need to be
looked at, researched and developed, but those are two off the
top of my head.
Chairman Levin. One of the areas where there is a great
deal of waste in the medical world has to do with the lack of
use to date of electronic health records. We have taken some
steps in a number of bills to try to promote this.
But it is also important in terms of providing good care to
our beneficiaries that there be a seamless transition between
DOD and the VA healthcare systems so that we can share medical
records of servicemembers who are moving from one system into
another, and so we can share those records.
In addition, there is still a lack of adequate
interoperability between the DOD and the VA electronic record
systems and the outside civilian contractors. I am wondering--
and you made reference to this in your opening comments, Dr.
Woodson--can you give us your assessment of the strengths and
the weaknesses of the DOD's electronic health record system
called AHLTA [Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology
Application]. How would you compare that system, that
information technology system to the system which is used in
civilian medicine today?
Dr. Woodson. Again, thank you for that question.
First, I would make a comment that I don't think you can
find a common system within the civilian sector. Electronic
health records are not that ubiquitous, number one, in
healthcare systems. But number two, they utilize a number of
off-the-shelf and homegrown technology to create the electronic
health records. As a result, many don't talk to each other at
all.
It has been my experience, working both within the military
health system and outside, that, actually, the AHLTA system is
a little bit ahead of the curve. The problem with the AHLTA
system is that it was developed mainly to capture a lot of
administrative data. So, from the health provider user end, it
is not an efficient tool to take care of patients.
It is a little bit cumbersome. The various databases don't
talk to each other, and it doesn't provide the decisionmaking
tools to lead to efficient provider care that might actually
reduce the cost of care.
For example, decisionmaking tools on the right antibiotic
at the right time, the issue that might lead to a safer use of
drugs. For example, if you are going to use an antibiotic that
might affect the kidneys, what the proper dosage should be.
The issue is that it has a lot of administrative features
to it that don't help the provider, and so, that would need to
be reformed.
Chairman Levin. Is this system, the AHLTA system, used
between DOD and the VA, and between the two of them and the
outside contractors?
Dr. Woodson. Once again, I think the VA has a different
system. The military health system has another electronic
medical record. Then when you go out in the civilian world,
there are a lot of varieties and flavors of electronic health
records, and that is part of the problem.
Looking ahead to 2015, of course, in some of the
legislation that has been passed, the whole idea is to create
some common properties of electronic health records so that
they can talk to each other and information can be shared.
Chairman Levin. So the VA and DOD are not now talking to
each other through the AHLTA system?
Dr. Woodson. Currently, there are a lot of efforts underway
to be able to share the information. I don't think it is there
yet.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now we, as a Congress, are extremely
concerned about the increase in suicides in each of the
Services over the last several years. Can you give us some of
your thoughts on what role you might play in addressing that
tragic problem?
Dr. Woodson. Thanks again for that question. Of course, it
has been of significant concern to both Members of Congress and
a number of officials within the military health system, as
well as providers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
General Chiarelli came out with this report last week of a
Department of the Army study, and I thank General Chiarelli for
undertaking that effort. What he has done, I think, is painted
a holistic picture of the many complex issues that come into
the issue of suicide. He has made some 250 recommendations,
some of which fall in the lane of health affairs and others
within the institutional Army.
The issue really is, I think, we have a better profile of
who is at risk. Clearly, perhaps on the front end, we need to
do a better job of screening candidates that might come into
the military and see if they are fit to remain in the military.
It appears that first year and that first tour and that first
enlistment is a vulnerable period.
We need to build resiliency training into the basic
introduction of recruits into the military. Then, of course, we
have to do better longitudinal assessments of their behavioral
health needs. We are beginning to understand what the markers
are for soldiers at risk--those with failed relationship,
financial difficulty, drug and alcohol abuse.
There is a piece of this that can be, I think, fixed with
better monitoring and adherence to discipline. I think General
Chiarelli has come up with a number of very good
recommendations that we will have to examine further and help
implement.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Doctor.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Doctor, do you agree with Secretary Gates's
statement, ``Healthcare costs are eating the department
alive?''
Dr. Woodson. I agree with that statement, and there has
been----
Senator McCain. Can you give me a couple of specific
examples of steps that you think could be taken right away?
Dr. Woodson. Sir, once again, I think Senator----
Senator McCain. Specific examples.
Dr. Woodson. Right. I think we have to look at the inter-
Service coordination to decrease some of the administrative
costs of administering the healthcare system--the training
costs, the cost of running military health facilities. These
are things that we can look at.
Senator McCain. Again, I would like to hear a specific
example. Is that by putting health records online? In other
words, it is nice to say we could do a better job, but I would
like a couple of specific examples.
Dr. Woodson. I think we can decrease the administrative
costs. So I think each----
Senator McCain. How do you do that?
Dr. Woodson.--each of the Services----
Senator McCain. How do you decrease the administrative
costs?
Dr. Woodson. Each of the Services has a structure that
supports their delivery of care. As a result, if you have
better coordination, you can reduce that structure.
We also have to look at the delivery of healthcare within
each military health facility. I think the electronic health
record also, because it will be more efficient and have
decisionmaking tools, will reduce the variability in care so
that the individual practitioner will not be ordering extra
tests, if you will, that add to the cost of delivering care.
Senator McCain. You have a very tough job, Doctor, and the
fact is that healthcare is really an incredibly increasing cost
burden. I hope that as you get into your job more heavily, you
will be able to give this committee some very specific ideas. I
understand your answer, but we have to come up with some
specific ideas and proposals, and I thank you for your
willingness to serve.
Ms. Miller, we have had the directors of the laboratories,
as well as the former directors here before the committee. I
hope you will consult with both former as well as present
directors of the laboratories. I think there is a lot of
knowledge and wisdom from past experience, as well as present
experience.
Ms. Miller. I absolutely will be doing that, and I can add
that from a long career of working in and around DOE's
laboratories, both the Defense laboratories as well as the
others, I have had the opportunity to develop relationships
over the years with many who were directors when I first met
them and are now former directors, as well as the current
directors. Even in my capacity at OMB, these have been ongoing
relationships that I have had and certainly will continue to do
so.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Ms. Harrington, what is your assessment of the ability of
Pakistan to secure their nuclear material and prevent
proliferation?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you for your question.
That is a complicated issue, and I think if you give me the
opportunity to be fully briefed on that subject, I would like
to come back to talk to you and the rest of the committee,
probably in a classified environment.
Senator McCain. Would you rather we do that before or after
your confirmation? [Laughter.]
Ms. Harrington. Since I still have a day job at the
National Academy of Sciences, it probably would be more
appropriate afterwards.
Senator McCain. But you do not have previous experience
with the issue of the Pakistani nuclear stockpile?
Ms. Harrington. I have had some contact with Pakistan in my
current position. I visited there several years ago where we
were hosted by General Kidwai and others involved in the
Pakistani military. But specific questions on the security and
safety of their stockpile were beyond the range of those
discussions.
Senator McCain. Do you believe that the A.Q. Khan network
is still functioning? In other words, are they still providing
expertise and equipment to other nations on nuclear weapons?
Ms. Harrington. In my current position, I do not have full
access to the intelligence that would allow me to give a
comprehensive answer to that, but I think we must always be
vigilant, and we must always assume that there are those who
would sell expertise or sell technology for their own
personal----
Senator McCain. I was speaking specifically of the A.Q.
Khan network.
Ms. Harrington. Again, I would have to say I don't have the
full benefit of intelligence to be able to answer your
question, but I am happy to do that when I am fully briefed.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Again, Dr. Woodson, you have a very tough job. On the issue
of suicides, it is a very serious question, and the thing that
I don't quite understand is it does not seem to be related with
deployment. It seems to be related to other issues which are
hard for us to really grasp, but it is obvious that it is a
serious issue.
We have made great progress in the transition from Active
Duty military care to VA care, but there still emerges quite
often glitches, problems, delays, paperwork, or computer work,
and I hope you will continue to look at that aspect of your
responsibilities.
I know every member of this committee spends a great deal
of time with our constituents who come to us and are veterans
who have not received either timely or, in their view,
appropriate addressing of the issues that arose as part of
their military service. I hope you will pay close attention to
that.
I know you will. But your major challenge is to get this
cost under control, and frankly, I don't know if you can do it,
isolate military healthcare from the overall rising cost of
healthcare in America. Maybe next January, when we repeal and
replace Obamacare, we will have a better shot at it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
I appreciate all three witnesses coming, and I appreciate
their families joining them.
I do want to talk to Dr. Woodson a little more. You do have
a tough job. There is no question about it. There is also no
question that you bring some unique qualifications to this job,
should you be confirmed.
Not only are you a very experienced vascular surgeon, but
you served in the Army Reserve as Assistant Surgeon General for
Reserve Affairs, Force Structure and Mobilization. I believe it
is also correct that you are Deputy Commander of the Army
Reserve Medical Command. Is that correct?
Also, you have been there. You have served us in Saudi
Arabia with Operation Desert Storm, also in Kosovo, Operation
Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and also you
responded in New York City to the September 11 attack. Is that
all correct?
Dr. Woodson. Yes, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much for your service there.
I do think that will bring a great deal of experience to this
very tough job you have.
We are saving a lot more of our troops that are injured.
While we grieve the fatalities that we have and we regret the
injuries we have, we do have to celebrate the fact that we are
bringing a lot more people back to treat their injuries, rather
than losing their lives on the field of battle.
This affects our doctors and our medical personnel, no
question about it. The length of deployments is decreasing for
doctors and medics, but the rate of deployment among these
personnel is increasing.
Do you agree, Doctor, with the recent Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report stating that military
medical physicians are in high demand, and the Services have
been consistently unable to meet their authorization levels?
Dr. Woodson. I believe that is true. We have seen,
particularly in the Army Reserve, that we are now at about 89
percent of fill rate for some of these professionals.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Would you characterize the shortages
among medical professionals, including physicians, dentists,
nurses, and the like as--would you characterize those shortages
as severe at this time?
Dr. Woodson. I would not characterize them as severe, but
we need to implement some new strategies to ensure that we have
the members in the ranks that we need for the future.
Senator Wicker. All right. You may find yourself at odds
with a majority of the members of this committee and with the
leadership of this committee. One of the questions submitted to
you by the joint leadership of this committee states flatly
under the term ``Medical Health Professional Recruiting and
Retention,'' and I quote, ``The DOD is facing severe shortages
of military medical professionals, including physicians,
dentists, nurses, and needed for its peacetime and wartime
missions.''
As a matter of fact, you answered several questions based
on that premise. I want to ask you as this confirmation process
continues, for you to rethink that, and it may very well be
that we need someone in your position who understands the
severe shortage of medical military professionals, as the
chairman and the ranking member apparently do in submitting
that question.
You stated in your answers, ``Having fewer than the optimum
number of uniformed healthcare professionals could result in
increased private sector care costs and lower medical force
morale.'' That might have been, perhaps, an answer to the
request for specifics that Senator McCain propounded to you.
You further say it is important to properly manage
recruiting, pay, and retention programs to ensure appropriate
balance. But then when asked, based on your service, which is
extensive, ``Do you have any recommendations about the
effectiveness of incentives?'' your answer is specifically
``not at this time,'' that we need to do constant review and
updating.
You were further asked, Doctor, ``What other steps can be
taken to eliminate shortages of medical personnel, including
nurses and mental health providers?''
Your response there is, ``I do not have any specific
recommendations at this point. But if confirmed, I will work to
understand what factors contribute to these shortages and take
action to resolve these matters.''
I just want to say I don't know how controversial this
nomination is going to be, Doctor. But you have been asked by
the first three questioners about this issue, and I would
submit, with all due respect for your qualifications, for your
educational level, your experience and your service to this
country, that a lot more thought, sir, needs to be put into
this issue as we go forward because I do think it is, indeed,
severe.
Let me tell you, I talked to a servicemember the other day.
Now he is stationed in the continental United States. His wife
has to routinely wait more than 3 weeks for an appointment for
their infant because there are not enough doctors at their
military medical clinic. This is not in a remote location,
Doctor.
There was a one-half hour slot available during an entire
month. There clearly are not enough doctors because the clinic
is forced to deploy doctors to meet the demand overseas. It
seems to me that many State-side clinics are stretched too
thin.
Do you encounter this? Would you say this is an exception
to the rule or that this is a frequent problem that we might
have?
Dr. Woodson. Senator, thank you very much for your comments
and your question.
I cannot speak specifically to the situation that you have
just illustrated. I have spoken with Admiral Hunter, and she
tells me that this situation is improving across the spectrum
and cites that care is being delivered. But, again, I cannot
speak to the specific example that you have given.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Thank you very much.
I think the chair has indicated we may have time for a
second round. If so, Mr. Chairman, I will be here for that
second round.
Chairman Levin. There will be a second round if members
desire. Absolutely.
Senator Brown is next.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you.
Dr. Woodson, I am always approached, being in the military
and, obviously, with the healthcare reform that was passed, a
lot of military folks are concerned about TRICARE and their
coverages with TRICARE and how they match up with the new
Federal plan. I have heard that there is going to be no change.
Is that your understanding as well?
Dr. Woodson. Yes, Senator, that is correct. That is my
understanding.
Senator Brown. We are going to have a national healthcare
law that is supposedly going to reform the way that healthcare
is delivered, yet we have a system in the military, and these
folks--your understanding, they are going to be completely
excluded from that? They will still get the TRICARE coverages
that they have had for quite a while?
Dr. Woodson. That is my understanding, Senator.
Senator Brown. Okay. I echo what the folks have said here,
what the Senators have said here. My biggest concern is it is
about the money. What efforts can we do and make to save money
so we can have more available for the soldiers individually?
I just thought right off the top, how do you save money? I
would say, we can consolidate the way we communicate between
the different Services. We can update and modernize the billing
procedure, the scheduling, the records keeping.
We could also look if there is any duplication of services
between the agencies. Can we share? Is there a base down the
road that does that specialty better than shipping it outside
our bases?
Because when we talk about pushing things out the door and
the civilians will cover it, my impression--and I know you
obviously have Massachusetts roots--is that they don't have any
ability to care for the soldiers either. What are they forced
to do? They are forced to go to the emergency room.
Then we are in a vicious cycle again of one of the reasons
we in Massachusetts passed the healthcare reform that we did is
because the folks were going into the emergency rooms and just
using that care and not trying to go through the appropriate
channels.
Those are a couple of things I am concerned with. Here it
is. I just reeled off a few things. I would really focus and
provide answers, if possible, as to what specifically you plan
to do, because it seems like that is what you are going to be
tasked to do, to save the Government money, which, in turn, can
be used, I am hopeful, to provide better and quicker service,
hire more doctors, nurses.
What do you need? What are the tools and resources you are
going to need to do it better? That is kind of a statement. But
a question would be, what is your philosophy with regard to
what I just said? Am I going down the right path here with your
philosophy, or is it different somehow?
Dr. Woodson. Thank you very much, Senator, for those
comments. In fact, you have hit upon a number of very key
issues.
If you look at the issues of TRICARE, a lot of the costs
are in the retiree population that actually uses services on
the economy. Both you and Senator McCain have hit the nail on
the head that we have to be able to communicate with the
civilian sector and be able to control those costs as they
become consumers on the economy.
This gets into the issue of information sharing and making
sure that we put out good algorithms of care, that we reduce
the variability, that we understand what sorts of treatment
that they are receiving. Because, in fact, the way doctors
practice contributes a lot to the cost of care. We are going to
have to look at all of those issues comprehensively.
Senator Brown. I would encourage you to do so because the
fact that when I had my children and they were younger, the
thought of waiting 3 weeks to have an ear infection taken care
of or something like that, or some type of sore throat--it
would be torture, not only at home with the constant yelling
and crying and the like.
If there is a way to certainly address the line issue, that
would be greatly appreciated.
For Ms. Miller and Ms. Harrington, how critical do you both
feel the uranium processing facility and the chemistry and
metallurgy research replacement facilities are to our future
stockpile? Could the delays in construction lead to a need to
either conduct an underground nuclear test or to withdraw from
the New START Treaty?
Ms. Miller. Thank you, Senator. I am going to answer that
question on behalf of both of us.
Both of those facilities are absolutely critical to the
continued health of the nuclear weapons stockpile and certainly
to the long-term commitment to nuclear security in this
country. At this time, we do not anticipate any type of
catastrophic delay in either of these facilities, although they
are not meant to come online for a good number of years yet,
that any sort of delay that would lead us to go down a
different path than we are currently on with regard to the
treaty or with regard to resuming testing right now. I have
every reason to believe we are going to stay successful on the
path we have established for both of those facilities.
Senator Brown. Once again, it comes down to the money, Mr.
Chairman. You know we are struggling to pay the bills. What do
you see your role will be as to streamline, consolidate,
update, and upgrade?
Do you think there is any cost savings in what you are
doing or plan to do in the future, in addition to obviously
getting funds to do upgrade, update? What do you think you
could do to help save the bottom line?
Ms. Miller. I think, in my experience, there are several
directions that you have to look at. One is how things are done
now and whether there are ways to do them in a more efficient
or a more cost-effective way, and that is certainly true of all
the operations in the NNSA and certainly something that I will
be looking at strongly.
At the same time, I think what we would want to look at
and, if confirmed, what I would be looking at personally is, as
these projects develop, both in design and, as they go toward
construction, to be sure that cost growth does not get ahead of
good analysis. In other words, I think it is absolutely vital
to be cognizant of the design and the construction plans as
they proceed so that cost growth can be contained early and you
do not wind up on a path of uncontrollable costs and
unsustainable growth.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
I would also just suggest that some of these contracts that
are awarded, you have to keep an eye on them and make sure they
are timely, and they are not going over budget, and they are
not doing some of these crazy reward packages for not hitting
deadlines. I have never seen anything like it. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Let us try our second round, maybe the same length. But
there could be a third round, too, Senator Wicker, should you
want one.
Ms. Miller, for you, the NNSA has two major new first-of-a-
kind, technically complex, multi-billion dollar facilities that
it needs to build over the course of the next decade or so--one
at Oak Ridge, one at Los Alamos. You are going to be playing a
major role in the oversight of these projects, if you are
confirmed.
By the way, DOE is on the GAO list as a high-risk agency
for project management. So the DOE is not doing well from the
GAO perspective in terms of managing projects. These are huge
projects. Now the question will be what do you think that the
NNSA can do to get off the GAO list?
Ms. Miller. With regard to the list, of course, the list
includes NNSA projects, as well as projects from the rest of
DOE, and there are problems in many different directions that
have caused these projects to be on that list.
Specifically, with the NNSA and with regard to the two
projects that you referred to, I think that certainly the
Administrator has testified to the increased efforts to be made
in project management, both within the current DOE guidelines
for construction management, the Order 413, as well as beyond
that, the restrictions or the directions of that order. That
includes, for example, strong, independent cost analysis at the
outset.
The Administrator is committed to, and I, if I am
confirmed, would be certainly helping to lead the effort to
have an independent cost analysis performed for those projects
early on so that we have a better sense of what we are looking
at in terms of costs.
Right now, we have organized with DOD's cost analysis
group, as well as the DOE's Office of Cost Analysis, an
independent review that we expect to be carried out and
completed in September in time to be able to inform the OMB
Fiscal Year 2012 process. These cost analyses need to be done
at the beginning, and it needs to be done later, as the design
develops and the project develops. I think really good project
management starts with good cost analysis.
I think regular reviews with the contractor, as well as
review of all of the program requirements, is also going to be
essential in all of these cases. Has this gone on in the past?
Of course it has, but probably not to the depth and length that
it needed to and the frequency.
Chairman Levin. The NNSA utilizes contractors to operate
its major facilities and laboratories. Now that is an
organizational structure unique in the Federal Government. I
believe you just made reference to those contractors. Within
that structure, there are some who think there is too little
oversight. That is folks like GAO. There are folks that think
there is too much oversight, and that is probably the
contractor.
The Strategic Posture Commission raised this as one of the
issues that has led to inefficiencies in the execution of NNSA
projects. Is it your view that there is too little or too much
oversight of the contractor?
Ms. Miller. It is my experience that it is very much
dependent on the given situation. I can recall projects when I
was at OMB that I was informed about after the fact. The
project had gone very far afield from the original cost
estimates, and the analysis at the end was that there was
insufficient Federal oversight. This is not a new problem with
any of these projects at DOE.
I think it has been a problem that has very much gotten the
attention of the current administration, and I think there are
strong efforts, and again, this goes beyond the NNSA, but
certainly within the NNSA, to be cognizant of how much Federal
oversight is going to be necessary in particular with these
large, expensive, complicated nuclear projects that we have to
build.
At the same time, I know it has been the view of many of
the people of the science laboratories that oversight can, at
the same time, become so micro that it prevents them from doing
the science the way they think that science needs to be done. I
think this really depends on the given situation, but I do
believe that hard questions need to be asked and answered.
Chairman Levin. The Deputy Secretary of Energy is engaged
in a review now of the various DOE regulations and orders that
govern the operations that you just talked about of the DOE
contractors, including the NNSA contractors. Do you know what
your role is going to be if you are confirmed in this review
process?
Ms. Miller. I do not, Senator, except to say that depending
on at what point my confirmation might occur and at what stage
of his review that would happen, I would be confident that I
would be playing a role in it. But I can't speak to it
specifically right now.
Chairman Levin. The management of the protective forces at
NNSA facilities is an issue which has been of concern to the
committee, and a report on the way ahead for the management of
these protective forces was supposed to be here by the end of
April. Do you know the status of that report?
Ms. Miller. My understanding is that the report is soon to
be submitted to the committee. But beyond that, I am not sure.
Chairman Levin. Okay. If you are confirmed, will you give
us an update?
Ms. Miller. I definitely will, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Ms. Harrington, let me ask you about the
mixed oxide fuel program, the MOX program. That is the U.S.
portion of the U.S.-Russia joint commitment to transform and
reuse 34 metric tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium to power
commercial nuclear reactors.
A facility to convert the plutonium into commercial power
reactor fuel is underway, but apparently way beyond schedule--
way late and over budget. The approach to the companion
facility to take apart the plutonium parts of a nuclear weapon
has changed over time. So a decision needs to be made and
implemented quickly, as there is already a risk that enough
plutonium will not be ready in time to keep the new MOX
facility running for more than a year or so.
Have you had an opportunity to examine the options for the
pit disassembly? What are your thoughts on how to approach the
critical issue of timing to support the MOX facility, if you
are familiar with it?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you for your question, Senator.
I have not been briefed in depth yet on this issue, but my
understanding is the following. That the option is being
considered at the moment to integrate both the MOX facility and
the pit disassembly and conversion facility at the Savannah
River site. That there is an awareness that there needs to be
feedstock flowing into the MOX facility when it is completed
and that the pit disassembly and conversion plant may not be
prepared to provide that feedstock at that point. There have
been I believe it is 10 metric tons of plutonium identified
that can be the initial feedstock into the plant while the
other facility is being completed.
As I said, I haven't had a full briefing on this yet. I
would be happy to come back and talk to the committee further
on this after I have had an opportunity to learn more.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Ms. Harrington.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Woodson, let me just get back to the shortages we have.
Do you have any reason to quarrel with the assertion of the
Navy leadership that the Navy falls short in these areas of
personnel--aerospace medicine, preventive medicine, radiology,
general surgery, cardiothoracic surgery, orthopedic surgery,
and nursing? Would you say that is a fair and accurate
statement that has been made by Navy personnel?
Dr. Woodson. If Navy personnel have made those statements,
I have no reason to quarrel with it.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Likewise, if the Air Force leadership
say they lack comprehensive dentists, oral surgeons, specialty
nurses, independent duty medical technicians, and orthopedic
technicians, you would have no reason to disagree with that
assertion either?
Dr. Woodson. Correct, Senator.
Senator Wicker. It is correct that these types of
personnel, both physicians and related medical personnel, are
needed for our wounded when they return home. They are needed
for our families, whether the service personnel themselves are
stationed overseas or at home. Is that correct?
Dr. Woodson. That would be correct, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Do you have enough information at this
point, based on your experience, to tell us whether, likewise,
we have a problem with facilities? Or is it simply personnel
where there is a shortage?
Dr. Woodson. Senator, thank you very much for the question
and the comments. I have not received a detailed briefing from
all of the Services on their personnel and health facilities
issues. I can't speak to the details of that.
I would make one comment to bring context to this is that
we do know that we have issues with certain what we call areas
of concentration or specialties. General surgery, for example,
is one of those specialties that has been difficult to recruit.
I would just make one other comment to bring context to
this, that the way medicine is now practiced in the civilian
community, where we draw a lot of the practitioners from, and
the way they train has produced particular issues and
restrictions in terms of accessing these individuals into the
military.
Very early in careers now, doctors narrow the scope of
their practice and practice in very narrow specialties, and
oftentimes, we need them to come into the Service and practice
more broadly. The numbers of individuals that are out there in
civilian practice that could be accessed into the military has
changed because of the way training is conducted and the way
physicians practice in the civilian sector. So, we are going to
have to look at this as well.
Senator Wicker. A further problem that enhances the
shortages. I would note at this point that this committee, if
it persists in the Burris amendment, is about to make the
situation worse. The Burris amendment would allow abortions to
be performed in military health facilities, provided the
patient pay for the abortion herself or through a different
insurance program.
Now, when we went to this procedure back in 1979, in that
fiscal year, there were approximately 1,300 abortions performed
during that fiscal year. Should the Burris amendment prevail on
the Senate floor, where I will be moving to strike it, or
should it prevail in the House of Representatives, where there
is no such provision, there is no telling how many abortions
our already taxed personnel and already strained facilities
would have to accommodate, even though, theoretically, the
abortion would be paid for by private sources or private
insurance.
Next year, if we perform 1,300 abortions in military
facilities, Doctor, that is going to take personnel away from
treating our wounded servicemen or treating their families.
Isn't that correct?
Dr. Woodson. Senator, I appreciate your concern, but I
can't speak to that directly because I would have to do some
analysis of personnel and where they are at. Also, we would
have to consider the specialty that is involved in that
procedure and see the numbers that are available. I am sorry I
can't give you an answer at this time.
Senator Wicker. Okay. If a women's facility or if a women's
ward in a military hospital has to take up space to accommodate
abortion, use of that facility that is not available for other
uses, it stands to reason, doesn't it?
Dr. Woodson. Again, I appreciate your concern. Generally,
those are ambulatory procedures and use a different specialty.
But I am sorry, Senator, I can't answer your question directly
because I would have to do the personnel analysis and the
facility utilization analysis in order to see how much of an
impact that would have.
Senator Wicker. Clearly, it would take a medical doctor to
perform that abortion, would it not?
Dr. Woodson. Correct, of a certain specialty.
Senator Wicker. Exactly. It would require a facility to be
taken up for a certain amount of time. Is that correct?
Dr. Woodson. Again, most of those are ambulatory
procedures.
Senator Wicker. That ambulatory facility would be taken up,
at that point, for that abortion. Isn't that correct?
Dr. Woodson. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. It stands to reason.
I would just say this. Mr. Chairman, I will not take
another round. But if we continue with the Burris amendment, it
is going to weigh down this legislation to the extent where I
do not know if we can have a bipartisan consensus to go forward
with an essential DOD authorization bill during calendar year
2010.
Abortions not only would create demand in the hospital,
they would create demand for facilities and among
practitioners. They also are going to create demand for mental
health professionals. You don't have to take my word for it as
a layman. A 2008 study in the Journal of Psychiatric Research
showed that abortion is a risk factor for PTSD, major
depression, and more than a dozen different psychiatric
disorders. That is the Journal of Psychiatric Research.
The Medical Science Monitor found that of the women
studied, 65 percent who had undergone abortions reported
symptoms of PTSD. That is 65 percent, and 14 percent reported
all of the symptoms necessary for a clinical diagnosis of PTSD.
So, in addition to the drain on practitioners, the drain on
facilities, we are going to have additional conditions and
disorders to take care of. I would cite also to the committee
members the Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry from New
Zealand that found conclusively that abortion in young women is
associated with increased risks of some of the things we have
had questions about today--major depression, anxiety disorders,
suicidal behaviors, and substance abuse.
I appreciate the challenges that Dr. Woodson is going to
have. I think this committee can lessen the burden that he is
going to have if we will retreat from this Burris amendment. In
the middle of two wars, constant deployments, and undermanned
medical facilities, we should not add to the pressure on our
military personnel. Instead, we should be looking for ways to
lessen that pressure.
Thank you very much, Dr. Woodson, for your indulgence.
I thank the chairman for the time.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. That
decision, of course, as to whether to strike that amendment
would be left up to the Senate.
I would point out that the language leaves it up to a
voluntary decision on the part of a doctor, and it is paid for,
as you pointed out, Senator Wicker, by nongovernment funds, if
a doctor volunteers to do it.
I think, as a practical matter, it is aimed at the overseas
facilities, which then if they are not available, if it is
prohibited, then require a woman who has a right to an
abortion, assuming it is legal, would have to then come home
for that procedure.
But I think that debate is best left for the Senate,
assuming the bill will come to the floor, which I am hoping
will happen soon after we return in September. Then, Senator,
you know this debate is a debate which is an honest debate, and
it would occur properly before the whole Senate on a motion to
strike. I think that is the appropriate way to handle that
debate.
Senator Wicker. Do I understand and I will not belabor this
at length, Mr. Chairman. But do I understand, though, that
under the Burris language, if physicians at a facility
conscientiously object, it would be the obligation of the
Service to spend the money or the time and bring a private
physician onto the post to perform that which the military
personnel would conscientiously object to doing?
Chairman Levin. I am looking at my staff. I don't have the
language in front of me. I don't believe that is the case, but
that is based on my memory.
Senator Wicker. Well----
Chairman Levin. I don't have that language in front of me.
I just don't think that is correct.
Senator Wicker. It is my understanding that under the
previous language, that was very much like the Burris
amendment, when that was the law of the land, many doctors
objected as a matter of conscience--and I commend them for
that--to performing an abortion. And so, a civilian physician
had to be brought on post to perform that abortion.
I would simply return to my major point, and that is, this
if enacted, will be a burden on military personnel, on
administrative personnel at the facility, and on the scarce
space in the facility itself. I do agree it is a debate that we
will have, and we will have a lot more opportunity to discuss
that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
There are no other questions, and we will attempt to bring
these nominations before the full committee for a vote, if
possible, this week. If all things go well, which happens once
in a while around here, we would be able to vote on these
nominations before the end of the week.
We thank you again. We thank your families. We will stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:49 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Jonathan Woodson, M.D., by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. Not at this time.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. N/A.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (ASD) for Health Affairs (HA) assists the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD/P&R) and the Secretary of
Defense in promoting and safeguarding the health of military personnel
and their families, retirees and others eligible for the Department of
Defense (DOD) health benefits. The role is primarily one of setting
health policies, in consultation with other Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) components, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and Services' Surgeons
General. These health policies include deployment health, both physical
and mental. The ASD also has an important, though less direct, role in
health education and research. Health Affairs is directly responsible
for managing TRICARE and the Uniform Services University.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect
that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. In May 2007, Secretary Gates said, `` . . . Our Nation is
truly blessed that so many talented and patriotic young people have
stepped forward to serve. They deserve the very best facilities and
care to recuperate from their injuries and ample assistance to navigate
the next step in their lives, and that is what we intend to give them.
Apart from the war itself, this Department and I have no higher
priority.'' I know that the ASD(HA) has been actively engaged with and
leading efforts in DOD, in collaboration with partners in the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), to address this priority--caring
for our Nation's wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers, and their
families. If confirmed, it would be my highest privilege to serve these
great Americans and support this monumental DOD priority.
I understand that the ASD(HA) portfolio includes the breadth of
policy and programmatic issues related to force health protection and
readiness, deployment health, clinical activities, health budget/fiscal
management, medical education and training, medical research, and
TRICARE/healthcare benefits. I believe the Secretary of Defense may
call on the ASD(HA) for advice on disaster relief and humanitarian
operations, civil/military operations, and global health issues. DOD
has played an increasingly frequent and important role in disaster
preparedness and response, both in the United States and abroad.
Medical care is a critical part of this effort--both in the provision
of health care, as well as in capacity-building (education and
facilities) and pandemic prevention and surveillance.
Finally, I realize that healthcare costs have garnered increasing
attention in recent months. The Secretary may call upon the ASD(HA) to
continue the efforts to work within and outside DOD to examine this
important issue.
Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the
following:
A. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
B. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
C. The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of
the Services.
D. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
E. The Surgeons General of each of the Services.
F. The Joint Staff.
G. The TRICARE Regional Offices.
H. Commander, Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical.
I. The TRICARE Support Contractors.
J. The U.S. Family Health Plan Designated Providers.
K. Beneficiary Groups.
L. Department of Veterans Affairs.
M. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
Answer. If confirmed as ASD(HA), I will work collaboratively with
leaders from other DOD components, interdepartmental government
agencies, and civilian organizations in order to tackle challenges and
create new opportunities. Like most leaders, I have learned that most
problems arise from poor communication, and success relies on building
partnerships through regular, frank meetings in order to gain consensus
on near-term and long-term goals. If confirmed, I would commit to
performing my duties with a spirit of simple, fair and transparent
processes, and personal and organizational accountability.
goals and priorities
Question. If confirmed, what are the major goals that you would
seek to accomplish as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs?
Answer. First, I would focus on efforts to improve care and support
for our Nation's wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers, and their
families.
I also understand the power of an electronic health record (EHR),
and would, if confirmed, work within the Department and with other
Federal agencies and the private sector to advance EHR initiatives and
interoperability.
If confirmed, I also promise to work with Congress and the
Department to find ways to address the rising cost of healthcare while
ensuring benefit levels worthy of attracting and retaining the highest
quality All-Volunteer Force, as well as recognizing the service of our
retired beneficiaries.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish for
achieving those goals?
Answer. I would re-assess and enhance the effectiveness of the
Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) and Wounded Warrior Regiments (WWRs) to
serve the needs of wounded warriors and their families and to bring
greater focus on the efficiency of the Medical Evaluation Board (MEB)/
Disability Evaluation System (DES) process. In doing so, I would work
diligently with VA officials to validate demonstration pilot projects.
With regard to the EHR, I would work closely with USD(AT&L) to
complete the analysis of alternatives (operational effectiveness,
suitability and life-cycle cost). In addition, I would work quickly to
have the appointment of a program manager and the establishment of a
formal program office completed.
If confirmed, I would move diligently and rapidly to reform
processes and algorithms for care to reduce costs, waste and
inefficiency in the MHS. In concert with the EHR efforts, I look
forward to developing decision tools to allow health providers to work
smarter and deliver a higher quality of care that is evidence-based.
Question. How would you work with Health Affairs staff and the
TRICARE Management Activity workforce to achieve these goals?
Answer. I understand that the chartering documents for these
organizations state that the Health Affairs staff develops policies
that reflect legislative, executive and Department priorities, to
include health budget and financial plans, while the TRICARE Management
Activity implements programs and policies to manage the health plan. If
confirmed, I would look forward to working not only internally, with
Health Affairs and the TRICARE Management Activity, but also with the
military departments and Services' Surgeons General to achieve our
common goals for the Military Health System.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems
that confront the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs?
Answer. Delivering care to 9.6 million beneficiaries is a great
challenge, and one worthy of our most ardent efforts. Ensuring quality
health care and, particularly, mental health support will be paramount.
DOD must deliver world-class support to families and to wounded, ill,
and injured servicemembers. For our Wounded Warriors, ensuring
comprehensive care from point of injury to point of definitive care--
whether in DOD or in the VA--and caring for their families and
caregivers, are sacred obligations.
Question. If confirmed, what plans would you put in place to
address these challenges?
Answer. I do not have specific recommendations at this time.
However, if confirmed, I would review the plans that are currently in
place to address these challenges, and determine whether they need to
be modified or amplified. I would collaborate with my colleagues in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, and the
Joint Staff in charting the right course for the Department.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines are
needed in order to address these problems?
Answer. I would have to evaluate this further to determine the most
appropriate actions, milestones and timelines.
background
Question. You currently hold the rank of brigadier general in the
U.S. Army Reserve and are assigned as the Assistant Surgeon General for
Reserve Affairs, Force Structure and Mobilization, and as Deputy
Commander, Army Reserve Medical Command.
Please describe your military experiences, particularly your
service in Operations Iraq Freedom and Enduring Freedom. What do you
consider to be your most significant accomplishments as an Army medical
officer?
Answer. It has been an honor and privilege to serve in the Army
Reserves for nearly a quarter of a century. For me, any day I can wear
the uniform is a good day because it ties me to the great men and women
who currently serve and those who served before me and protected the
freedoms we enjoy today. I am especially humbled to have served in
support of those men and women who are asked to put themselves in harms
way and sacrifice everything for this great Nation. I have served as a
health care provider (physician/surgeon), teacher and leader/commander.
As a surgeon, I have been there at those life-altering moments in a
wounded warrior's life when they are told their limbs must be
amputated, and I will never forget the courage of these resilient men
and women who in these moments of pain and anguish will think not of
themselves but will express concern for their fellow soldiers or a
sense of having let their sister and brother soldiers down. Repeatedly
I have heard from the wounded warriors their desire to return to the
ranks to complete the mission. Throughout my entire career, I have been
dedicated to helping sick and injured military men and women achieve
the best possible health outcomes and to developing strategies to
improve the military health system.
I have participated in military medical missions in Central
America, Europe, Balkans, Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Iraqi
Freedom, and Enduring Freedom. I have staffed and commanded combat
support hospitals, forward surgical teams and medical brigades.
I consider my contribution significant every time I add to the team
effort of saving a life or limb. However, I am most proud of the times
when I have deployed as a leader, commander, and surgeon. Functioning
in these roles, I have been challenged not only with optimizing
outcomes one injured soldier at a time, but with improving the
performance of the organization I led, inspiring the men and women who
followed, and solving problems which contributed to mission success.
Developing and articulating a clear vision, in the volatile, uncertain,
complex and ambiguous (or VUCA) environments as they are known and
motivating people to work to achieve that vision has matured and
exhilarated me.
Question. What is the nature of your current duties?
Answer. I currently serve in the dual-hatted position of Assistant
Surgeon General for Reserve Affairs, Force Structure and Mobilization
and Deputy Commander Army Reserve Medical Command (AR-MEDCOM).
In the role of Assistant Surgeon General, I provide consultative
services to the Active component, USAR, and Army National Guard on
issues relating to the medical readiness (individual and unit) of the
USAR and provide consultative services on strategic planning for all
health care of USAR personnel, recruitment of medical personnel, and
operational training issues relating to the USAR.
In the role of DCG, AR-MEDCOM, I assume the duties of the
Commanding General in his absence and provide oversight and guidance to
the staff, particularly on operations and training issues, monitor
readiness of subordinate units and guide training strategy.
Question. If confirmed, what are your intentions regarding
continued service in the Army Reserve?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue as a Reserve officer and
will take appropriate action to de-conflict any roles. I consider my
participation in the Reserves to be important in maintaining
credibility with those I seek to serve in my role as ASD(HA), should I
be confirmed. Military men and women should always know that I will be
subject to the policies and procedures I promote, and that if
necessary, I stand ready to deploy to any theater of operation.
Question. What is your assessment of the readiness of the Army
Reserve Medical Command?
Answer. The Army Reserve Medical Command currently has more
soldiers mobilized than any other Reserve medical command and has met
every requirement for mobilization. We contribute to continental United
States (CONUS)-based Temporary Duty Assignment mobilizations as well as
units deploying to theaters of operation. In addition, we have assumed
some responsibilities for homeland defense medical support. AR-MEDCOM
has experienced and is experiencing the expected turbulence associated
with the past years of transformation, reshaping, and right sizing the
force.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I believe I have had many experiences that qualify me to
perform the duties of ASD(HA). I have been a military and civilian
health care provider, health care administrator, teacher, researcher
and leader. My interests and career have provided me with experience in
leading, strategic goal setting, health insurance issues, health care
costs issues, quality improvement, research methods, ethical issues and
medical error reduction. I have cared for military men and women (and
dependents) at all echelons of the military health care system from
forward surgical teams and medical detachments to combat support
hospitals and medical centers such as Landstuhl, Tripler Army Medical
Center (AMC) and Walter Reed AMC. I have, as part of my military
duties, trained with the Air Force (CCAT--first army officer to do so)
and served in joint exercises, as well as cared for sick and injured
military personnel in medical treatment facilities (both deployed and
otherwise) staffed by the three Services. At the U.S. Army War College,
we studied and gained experience in the interagency, Program Objective
Memorandum (POM), and legislative processes. I have had an adjunct
faculty appointment at the Uniformed Services University of the Health
Sciences. I have taught medical students, nurses, medics, and health
executives. I have extensive experience with trauma care. As an
administrator, military commander and staff officer, I have experience
in directing and managing staffs. Most of all, I am fiercely dedicated
to providing the best care to wounded and sick soldiers and DOD
beneficiaries to ensure the best health outcomes.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Affairs?
Answer. Not at this time.
managing the cost of health care
Question. According to DOD, and using 2010 constant dollars, the
Defense Health Program base budget, including retiree health care
costs, has increased from $16.6 billion in 2001 to $51.7 billion in
2011, an increase of over 151 percent. Secretary Gates made the
statement last year that ``health care is eating the Department
alive.'' In February of this year he said he ``would like to work with
Congress in figuring out a way to try and bring some modest control to
this program.''
If confirmed, how would you address the rising cost of providing
health care to 9.5 million eligible beneficiaries?
Answer. If confirmed, I promise to work with Congress and the
Department to find ways to address the rising cost of healthcare, while
ensuring benefit levels worthy of attracting and retaining the highest
quality All-Volunteer Force, as well as recognizing the service of our
retired beneficiaries.
Question. If confirmed, do you plan to engage with Congress on this
issue?
Answer. Yes.
commitment to military retirees
Question. By law, DOD and the Military Departments must provide
health care through the Military Health Care System to those who have
retired from the uniformed services and their eligible family members
until they are eligible for Medicare. According to the report of the
Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care, as of 2007, 56
percent of TRICARE beneficiaries were retirees or their dependents.
What is your view of the importance of delivering health care
services to military retirees and their family members?
Answer. Ensuring competitive compensation and benefits for today's
All-Volunteer Force is paramount in attracting and retaining the
highest quality servicemembers. Also, ensuring we ``keep faith'' with
those who served before is also of great importance. I understand the
significant commitment to delivering the highest quality care to all
9.6 million DOD healthcare beneficiaries.
The retired servicemembers and their families, who comprise the
vast majority of those for whom DOD cares, are an integral part of
clinical experience base that providers and staff require in DOD
Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) and in Graduate Medical Education
programs to develop, maintain and advance their clinical skills.
Military facility health care is a finite resource. Healthcare
services under TRICARE, now available to retirees over 65 as well as
under 65, provide assurance of comprehensive coverage for our retirees
even when military providers are not available.
Question. What is the current percentage of the TRICARE beneficiary
population that consists of retirees or their dependents?
Answer. It is my understanding that retirees and their family
members constitute about 53 percent of the eligible beneficiaries.
Question. What percentage of the current DOD budget goes towards
paying for retirees' health care?
Answer. It is my understanding that for fiscal year 2009, retiree
health care was 57 percent of the health care budget or 3.0 percent of
the total DOD budget.
tricare
Question. If confirmed, what would be your short-term and long-term
goals for TRICARE?
Answer. From my review, I believe TRICARE offers robust coverage to
the Department's beneficiaries. If confirmed, I would look for
opportunities to make the link stronger between the direct care system
and the vast purchased care network in order to make the benefit
better, more seamless, of higher quality, and more affordable. I
understand that one of TRICARE's strengths is that it is very
inexpensive for the beneficiary, compared to commercial or other
government health plans. I believe we need to look for ways to leverage
the best public and private sector ideas to make the TRICARE system an
example that beneficiaries and our Nations' taxpayers can be proud of.
Question. If confirmed, how would you strengthen the partnership
between the MTFs of the Services and the TRICARE support contractors
that is necessary for the successful delivery of health care within the
TRICARE Program?
Answer. If confirmed, I would wholeheartedly commit to the
strengthening of these relationships. I understand that in the past few
years, key performance measures for TRICARE have improved
dramatically--for example, claims processing and customer satisfaction.
I am also told that enrollment, especially for the retiree population,
has also increased. A key feature of my commitment would be to seek
further improvements in the program, building on its many past
successes. There may be even more opportunities to learn from
commercial health plan experiences by building even stronger bonds with
the Department's contract partners, to coordinate TRICARE with other
Federal health care programs, and to better capitalize on the unique
capabilities of military medicine.
Question. Do you have any views on how health care support
contracts could be restructured to incentivize effective disease
management programs and cost-efficient delivery of health care
services?
Answer. I understand that this issue is a focus of the third
generation of TRICARE contracts, and I believe it is a good example of
how lessons learned from the private sector can be leveraged. I would
look forward to working within the Department on this key health plan
feature.
Question. There continues to be concern expressed by TRICARE
beneficiaries about the adequacy and availability of health care
providers in some areas of the country. In a Personnel Subcommittee
hearing last year, military spouses who testified said that access to
health care was among military families' top issues. While health care
support contracts have access standards and timeliness requirements to
ensure beneficiaries have access to appropriate providers within a
reasonable period of time, this does not always happen. In addition,
many beneficiaries who choose the TRICARE Standard option report a lack
of availability of health care providers willing to accept new TRICARE
patients.
Answer. I understand that the TRICARE contracts are working well
and the contractors have developed robust networks. However, I
understand that all health care is local. If confirmed and if a local
problem exists, I will work to understand what contributes to the
problem and then work with the appropriate Service Surgeon General and
TRICARE contractor to take steps to ensure access is improved.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving
the number and adequacy of providers under the TRICARE program?
Answer. I do not have specific recommendations at this time. If
confirmed, I would work with the TRICARE contractors to ensure
appropriate access for the Department's healthcare beneficiaries.
quality of dod medical care
Question. Please describe your knowledge of quality improvement
programs in the civilian sector, and comment on how they compare to
military health care quality programs.
Answer. For approximately 10 years I was the medical director and
associate chief medical officer for quality improvement at Boston
Medical Center. I have formal training in Health Services Research and
completed the nationally recognized Institute for Healthcare
Improvement Patient Safety Officer Executive Development Program. I am
very familiar with the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organization's processes and standards and helped BMC
through several successful accreditation reviews. At this time, I do
not have details of where each of the military MTFs stands with regard
to quality improvement programs, but in general, my experience is that
they are good. In both the civilian and military setting, there is an
ongoing question as to whether the right things are being looked at to
optimize quality outcomes. This will be an important focus of mine, if
confirmed.
Question. If confirmed, what would your goals be in the area of
improving quality and patient safety throughout the military health
care system?
Answer. Improving quality and patient safety have been high
priorities for the health systems with which I have worked, and finding
solutions to the problems we confront requires a multifaceted, team
approach. Quality care begins with well-trained and qualified
professionals who work together as a team. These professionals must be
provided appropriate ancillary support services and facilities to
create a safe ``environment of care'' focused upon the needs of
patients and their families. We must have automated systems for
documentation of care, surveillance, supply support, and to meet the
information needs of the health care team. Finally, Senior Leaders must
be committed to supporting health care quality and safety by
establishing strategic objectives and providing the resources necessary
to achieve them.
I am aware that the Military Health System has been engaged in
addressing quality and safety along with its civilian counterparts.
Military professionals, graduate medical education programs, and
facilities, also meet the same standards as those established for
civilian sector professionals and organizations. If confirmed, I can
assure you that providing high quality, safe health care for the men
and women who serve, their families, and all other beneficiaries of the
Military Health System would be one of my highest priorities.
wounded warriors
Question. Despite the revelations in 2007 about outpatient care at
Walter Reed and significant systemic improvements, some wounded
warriors and their families still perceive that care, management, and
transition to the VA are inadequate.
What is your assessment of the factors that led to the inadequate
wounded warrior outpatient conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical
Center in 2007?
Answer. It has been said that the first Commander in Chief of our
country, George Washington, once said that the extent to which future
generations of Americans will be willing to serve will be directly
proportional to how they view current veterans are treated. He was and
is right. Care and respect for veterans, particularly those wounded and
ill, needs to be the highest priority. The factors, as I understand
them as documented in the Washington Post's articles in February 2007,
which led to the situation at Walter Reed, and particularly Building
18, were many. Most factors reflected problems with a bureaucratic
system ill-prepared for the current influx of wounded warriors and
included: poor housing facilities; lack of case management; complex
documentation systems; communication issues; a slow complex,
inefficient, unevenly applied DES; and failure of leaders at many
levels to recognize emerging and existing soldier issues and to
advocate for appropriate funds and changes on behalf of soldiers and
their families.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army Warrior Transition
Unit (WTU) and Marine Corps WWR concept?
Answer. It is my understanding that both the WTUs and the Marine
Corp WWRs have several goals and features in common. Both have as a
central mission to provide soldier (WTU) and marine/sailor (WWR)
centered programs to provide seamless (predominately) non-medical care,
assistance and coordination during the transition of the soldier/
marine/sailor in the recovery phase of injury. The intent is to provide
support to military personnel and families to ensure the best and most
efficient possible outcome, which may include return to active service
or transition to veteran status with disability determination and the
highest functional/rehabilitation/employment status in civilian life.
These administrative activities are carried out while soldiers,
sailors, and marines receive coordinated, high quality follow-on
medical care and rehabilitation services.
Question. In your view, is it beneficial to assign wounded, ill,
and injured servicemembers to these units?
Answer. I believe this issue needs further study. I suspect one
size does not fit all. Follow-on care and coordination for some
minimally-injured service personnel might be more effectively done
close to home with the supportive care of family members and the
community. In other cases, where more complex resources are needed or
families are not able to assist, more centralized service units are
necessary.
Question. If confirmed, and if casualties increase in Afghanistan
as anticipated as a result of the troop increase ordered by the
President, what will you do to ensure that care for wounded and
seriously ill servicemembers and their families is of the highest
quality?
Answer. If confirmed, I will bring unrelenting leadership focus to
this issue. Understanding that the potential exists for breakdown in
care at many points in the system, leaders at all levels must be held
accountable for the highest quality of care. We must constantly look
forward to anticipate problems and improve the system, and not wait for
problems to arise and find ourselves scrambling for answers. We need to
understand that we need to constantly seek improvement, not only in
specific medical treatments and technology, but in how we organize and
deliver care (including administrative procedures) and how we
communicate and show compassion to sick and injured servicemembers and
their families--and we must do this while remaining good stewards of
public resources.
walter reed national military medical center
Question. The Base Realignment and Closure Commission Act of 2005
realigned medical operations from the current Walter Reed Army Medical
Center to the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC),
Bethesda, and the Fort Belvoir Community Hospital. The National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2008 required that the new medical
facilities be constructed as ``world class'' medical facilities,
incorporating the best practices of premier private health care
facilities throughout the country. When the new facilities open in
2011, DOD will have achieved the most significant realignment of
military medical resources in history, through both ``world class''
facilities and an integrated health care delivery system serving
wounded and ill servicemembers and their families in the National
Capitol Region.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that WRNMMC achieves these
goals?
Answer. I understand that there has been much public discussion
regarding the ``world class'' nature of construction of and integration
at WRNMMC and other BRAC healthcare facilities in the National Capital
Region. If confirmed, I will quickly familiarize myself with the
history of these discussions and decisions in order to guide the
efforts to effectively bring to fruition the goals for healthcare in
the National Capital Region.
Question. Are you committed to ensuring that any additional
construction requirements based on the facilities masterplan for the
NCR are completed as quickly as possible?
Answer. Yes.
dental benefits
Question. The committee has increasingly heard complaints that DOD
dental benefits are less attractive than those offered by other
employers. Also, DOD beneficiaries, especially members of the Reserve
Components, have shown a reluctance to use their dental benefits.
If confirmed, what action would you take to evaluate the
effectiveness of dental programs for the active duty, reservists,
retirees, and their dependents?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect my staff to evaluate the
benefit on an ongoing basis, including analysis of enrollment and
utilization, and surveys of members to determine their satisfaction.
Additionally, if confirmed, I would work with Congress to make any
necessary changes to the program.
effect of private sector care on medical readiness
Question. Currently more than 60 percent of military medical care
is provided by civilian provider networks outside of MTFs.
In your view, has this shift from MTF-based care to the TRICARE
network affected military medical training programs in any way?
Answer. If confirmed, I will study this issue and develop
appropriate courses of action to ensure the military medical training
programs remain of the highest quality.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that if we continue to
see an increase in the use of private sector care, military medical
training programs will remain viable?
Answer. If confirmed, I will study this issue and develop
appropriate courses of action to insure the military medical training
programs remain of the highest quality. There are several potential
ways to ensure viability of military medical training programs, which
include, but are not limited to; simulation training, changing rotation
sites for trainees, and more effective use of work hours. A big issue
we have in medical training now is the growth of information and
turning it into useable knowledge. In some ways, the Military Health
System is better positioned to deal with needed changes in medical
training than our civilian counterparts. All the elements of the
training system are within our influence, including a medical school
and advanced nursing programs, an insurance plan, medical training
facilities, outpatient practices, simulation training platforms and
research opportunities. We can shape the continuum of the training
spectrum to produce the best educational outcomes while providing the
best care and experiences for our beneficiaries.
military health professional recruiting and retention
Question. DOD is facing severe shortages of military medical
professionals, including physicians, dentists, and nurses, needed for
its peacetime and wartime missions. The Department relies on a
combination of bonuses and incentives to recruit and retain military
health care professionals to provide care to military members and their
families.
What are your views on the adequacy of existing bonus and pay
incentive programs for both active and Reserve components?
Answer. DOD, like any other major employer, must be able to use
effective, competitive, and fair financial tools to be able to attract
and retain highly-qualified professionals in both the Active and
Reserve components. Having fewer than the optimum number of uniformed
health care professionals could result in increased private sector care
costs and lower medical force morale. It is important to properly
manage recruiting, pay, and retention programs to ensure appropriate
balance for Department missions and beneficiary needs. If confirmed, I
would fully commit to working within the Department and with Congress
to address this issue.
Question. Based on your service as the Assistant Surgeon General
for Reserve Affairs, Force Structure, and Mobilization and as Deputy
Commander of the Army Reserve Medical Command, do you have any
recommendations about the effectiveness of incentives for medical
personnel to serve in the Reserve Forces?
Answer. Not at this time. As medical specialties change and
requirements for manpower shift, this issue will need constant review
and updating.
Question. What other steps can be taken to eliminate shortages of
medical personnel, including nurses and mental health providers?
Answer. I do not have any specific recommendations at this point,
but if confirmed, I will work to understand what factors contribute to
these shortages and take action to resolve these issues.
disability evaluation system pilot program and seamless transition
Question. DOD and VA are conducting a Disability Evaluation System
Pilot in which the VA conducts a single medical examination for both VA
and DOD purposes. This pilot was recently expanded.
What is your assessment of the effectiveness of this pilot program?
Answer. I have not been briefed on the effectiveness of current
programs, but I understand that there is still room to improve. If
confirmed, I will work with colleagues at the VA and the USD(P&R) to
optimize programs, policies and procedures to produce the most
efficient DES that serves the needs of servicemembers and future
veterans.
Question. What are the critical elements necessary for a seamless
transition of health services from one agency's responsibility to
another?
Answer. Based on my past experience, I believe the critical
elements for a seamless transition of health services from one agency
to another are: a full understanding of medical care capabilities
within both agencies by all medical providers involved; clear
communications of the transition plan between providers in each agency
and with the patient and patient's family; timely transfer of all
pertinent medical records before or at the time of transfer of the
patient; and, ongoing communication after the transfer of the patient
between the medical providers in each agency and with the patient and
patient's family.
Question. How can the transition for disabled servicemembers
between DOD and the VA be improved, especially in the area of health
care?
Answer. Improvements in the transition of health care between DOD
and VA can be achieved by early and concise communications to
servicemembers and their families about the DOD and VA benefits and
programs they are entitled to based on their military status and
service. Based on my experiences, I believe that two principal efforts
would facilitate the early and concise communication we desire. The
first would be to establish a program that assigns a specific DOD-VA
team comprised of medical staff to support each patient and his/her
family during the transition process. The second initiative would be to
establish a single, user friendly disability evaluation system that is
evidence-based, medically-endorsed, and most importantly, consistent
with the civilian disability system. If confirmed, I would give this
issue my fullest attention.
Question. Even with accelerated processing in the Disability
Evaluation System Pilot, required times for medical evaluation boards
can be well over a year.
Do you have any views about improvements that can be made quickly
to the medical evaluation board process in order to reduce case
processing times?
Answer. I am aware that there are ongoing high-level efforts
between DOD and VA to improve the Disability Evaluation System. Based
on my experience, I understand that DOD's Physical Disability
Evaluation System was designed to evaluate an individual's loss of
capability to function once the medical condition has reached maximum
benefit from continued medical care. The period of time necessary to
make that assessment varies widely from person to person, and is
dependent on individual rates of healing and response to restorative
therapies. The medical evaluation board process requires that maximum
benefits of medical care be completed. A change that would streamline
the process would require care providers to make an early, initial
medical prediction of capability after maximum benefits of medical care
are complete, and, once the patient's medical condition is stable, then
proceed with the disability benefits determination based on that
assessment. This would require frequent re-evaluation of medical
capability as the healing process is continuing, and possible
redetermination of benefits. If confirmed, I would give this issue my
fullest attention.
traumatic brain injury
Question. In Iraq and Afghanistan, our troops are facing the threat
of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Because of improved body armor,
troops are surviving IED blasts, but frequently suffer traumatic brain
injuries (TBI) from the concussive effects of the blasts.
What tools are needed by medical personnel to adequately diagnose
and treat TBI on the battlefield, and do you think the Services have
adequate capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. Based on my experience, I understand that our medical
personnel are doing a superb job identifying and treating the severe
TBI incidents on the battlefield. Far forward surgical care is saving
lives, and neurosurgical care is a significant contributor. I have
learned that in August 2006, the Department started using the Military
Acute Concussion Assessment, along with a clinical practice guideline,
to help identify and document mild and moderate TBI. I greatly
appreciate the significance of educating troops and their leadership
about the importance of this evaluation as soon as possible, after even
a mild injury, as well as educating medical providers on this new tool.
Question. What is your understanding of the ability of medical
personnel to diagnose and treat TBI in CONUS medical facilities?
Answer. Medical personnel are cognizant of the potential for TBI in
our personnel, both at home and on the battlefield. There is no easy,
definitive test, such as a blood test, available today to quantify the
nature and extent of injury associated with TBI. However, we are
extending the use of neurocognitive assessment tools throughout the DOD
system to help identify patients who had TBI and determine if they
still have symptoms. The majority of mild TBI does not require specific
treatment other than time to heal, but we now believe we must document
the incident and an assessment of acute signs and symptoms as close to
the time of injury as possible. I understand that treatment for
persistent symptoms is available in MTF neurology clinics.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the DOD
physical evaluation system and its ratings to fairly address the
conditions that result from TBIs?
Answer. I am aware that there are ongoing high-level efforts
between DOD and VA to improve the Disability Evaluation System. I am
told that the DOD Physical Evaluation Board evaluates impaired function
and rates individuals against established criteria for disability
compensation, and that when that disability is severe, the system works
very well. However, as DOD and VA shape a comprehensive DOD/VA system
to assess, diagnose and treat mild and moderate TBI, the potential
exists that the two Departments may have to modify the disability
evaluation system. If confirmed, I would commit to ensuring the
adequacy of the physical disability system to fairly address these
conditions.
mental health care
Question. The mental health of servicemembers and their families is
of intense concern to the committee.
What is your understanding of the scope of the problem of
diagnosing and treating post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other
mental health conditions in the Armed Forces?
Answer. I am told that DOD is educating its personnel about PTSD.
From my experience, I know that DOD assesses servicemember concerns and
symptoms of PTSD and related mental health issues upon return from
deployments and again 3 to 6 months later. Individuals who identify
symptoms are medically evaluated and referred for further diagnosis and
treatment if needed. PTSD and other mental health conditions are
treatable.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that
health care providers are appropriately trained in diagnosing post
traumatic stress and other conditions including potential suicide?
Answer. I understand that DOD and the VA have developed clinical
practice guidelines for the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD. Continuing
Medical Education is a requirement for all practicing physicians and
DOD has many educational resources available to not only ensure its
providers have the expertise to diagnose PTSD, but that its
servicemembers and their families will be educated. I understand that
the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and TBI
develop research and knowledge products that further expand the state
of the art in diagnosis and treatment.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to destigmatize
seeking care for post traumatic stress and other mental health
conditions?
Answer. Applying my professional experience as a physician, I
understand that the first step to de-stigmatize PTSD and other mental
health conditions is education of the military population. A major next
step would be to validate that those who seek and receive mental health
care are successful in continuing their military careers. Concerns
about loss of status with peers, leaders, and family members, and loss
of military career are the two major causes for individuals not seeking
care for PTSD and other mental health conditions.
Question. What would you recommend to the Secretary of Defense to
reduce suicide among members of the Armed Forces?
Answer. At this time I do not have specific recommendations for
reducing suicides. This problem has received a lot of study and
requires more. There are many initiatives that have been started to
address this issue (as well as PTSD and TBI which may be related in
some cases). We need to bring better evaluation of the programs that
exist and enhance those that work and eliminate those that are of no
value and perhaps harmful. Program evaluation should be grouped into
tracts that can be validated, such as; prevention (including
servicemember selection and resiliency training), identification of
servicemembers at risk (tools), medical/behavioral therapies and
interventions, follow-on care, long term outcomes, administrative and
cultural issues that prevent optimizing identification and care of
those at risk, and family issues.
psychotropic prescription drug use
Question. According to a recent Military Times article, ``one in
six servicemembers is on some form of psychiatric drug,'' ``17 percent
of the Active-Duty Force and as much as 6 percent of deployed troops
are on antidepressants,'' and the ``use of psychiatric medications has
increased . . . about 76 percent overall . . . since the start of the
current wars.''
What is your understanding of the accuracy of these reports?
Answer. It is my understanding that this data is based on
information collected in the Army and the rates likely differ across
the Services. Further data collection and analyses across the Services
could provide the additional information needed to determine accurate
rates both across and within each service. This will allow comparisons
and monitoring for differences that may be of statistical significance.
However, the data cited by the Military Times does direct us to
important questions to be further studied and addressed about
medication use in the deployed setting.
Question. In your view, what is driving this increase in the use of
psychotropic drugs?
Answer. From my experience, I understand that a new era of combat
has emerged, where counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare are the
norm. This places a great amount of strain on our servicemembers.
Despite the challenges, they remain incredibly resilient, motivated and
well-trained. Resources and programs are necessary to maintain
resilience and motivation. The earlier the intervention the better; and
servicemembers should be encouraged to reach out as an act of courage
and strength. Psychopharmacological treatments are an important
component of mental health care. Scientific evidence over the past
several decades shows that medications limit the severity and duration
of illness as well as being a key factor in preventing relapses and
recurrences. I am aware that experience and clinical evidence have also
been translated into recommendations for clinicians in the VA-DOD
Clinical Practice Guidelines for Major Depressive Disorder, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, Psychoses and Substance Use Disorder; and
that these guidelines are updated periodically, as required, to reflect
the most current knowledge concerning each of these conditions.
Question. In your view, is it appropriate to prescribe psychotropic
medication to military personnel in combat zones?
Answer. Each clinical case must be evaluated individually. For some
conditions, psychotropic medication may alleviate symptoms and permit
the individual to continue to function well. However, other conditions
could require medical evacuation for treatment or evaluation.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to monitor the
issuance of psychotropic medications in combat theaters?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Services and combatant
commanders to conduct a review of issuance of psychotropic medications
in combat theaters.
medication management
Question. The committee continuously receives reports that many
wounded, ill, and injured military personnel are overly medicated.
If confirmed, what action will you take to ensure that medications
prescribed for wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers are medically
appropriate and compatible with other prescriptions?
Answer. I understand that the MHS does currently have a
sophisticated and effective electronic prescribing process in place in
MTF's that minimizes prescribing errors and provides real time feedback
to providers on potential drug interactions. I am also aware that the
DOD/VA Clinical Practice Guidelines especially focus on appropriate
prescribing for common medical conditions in our population. If
confirmed, I would strongly promote the continued development and
refinement of these and other patient safety and provider education
evidenced-based initiatives. I would also encourage the Services to
ensure that processes are in place that both promote these and other
evidenced-based safe prescribing initiatives through monitoring and
incentive programs for healthcare providers that target the
optimization of safe and effective health care outcomes for all DOD
beneficiaries.
Question. If confirmed, what policies and programs will you
implement to improve pain management?
Answer. I am aware that DOD currently reviews how individiual
facilities are doing in the assessment and treatment of pain through
the mandated accreditation process; and that DOD/VA Clinical Practice
Guidelines are also in place for the promotion of optimal management of
Low Back Pain, Post Operative Pain, and Chronic Opioid Therapy. The
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 further mandated `the development and
implementation of a comprehensive policy on pain management by the
military health care system.' I am also aware that all three Services
and TMA have initiated programs to further assess pain management
within the MHS. If confirmed, I would ensure that the NDAA requirements
are met, that the results of these programs are thoroughly evaluated,
and valid conclusions are considered for implementation where
appropriate.
drug maintenance treatments
Question. The drug buprenorphine, which is similar to methadone, is
used in private sector care to treat opioid-dependent patients in drug
maintenance programs. The use of buprenorphine for this purpose is also
covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and the VA health care program.
What are your views on the use of buprenorphine for drug
maintenance treatment for opioid dependence?
In your view, should the use of buprenorphine for drug maintenance
treatment be covered under the TRICARE benefit?
Answer. I understand that while TRICARE does cover the cost of
buprenorphine or methadone when used in detoxification or medically-
supervised withdrawal from opioids, regulation prohibits its use in the
maintenance treatment of opioid dependence. There currently exists
ample scientific support for the use of medications such as
buprenorphine and methadone in the maintenance treatment of opioid
dependence.
I am also aware that TRICARE is pursuing changes in the Code of
Federal Regulations that would permit the use of buprenorphine for
opioid dependence maintenance treatment in non-active-duty
beneficiaries.
electronic medical records
Question. An area of frustration for both patients and providers is
the inadequacy of seamless electronic medical records, despite nearly
two decades of development by DOD.
What experience do you possess in the area of health information
technology?
Answer. My career has spanned the transition from paper health
records to the EHR. Boston Medical Center was one of the first health
institutions in the Boston area to commit to an EHR. Many lessons have
been learned about implementation of such an initiative including
problems that arise with off-the-shelf components that do not
communicate easily with each other (often requiring multiple data
systems), development of novel in-house systems that do not communicate
with outside data bases (and become obsolete quickly) and require great
costs to maintain, requirements for training, poor acceptance by users
(especially when end user issues are not considered in development) and
portability of information as patients change health care venues
frequently. Data systems need to be modifiable to accommodate the
unique needs of departments and sub-activities within the organization
if they are to get useful data for quality improvement processes.
Intuitive systems with comprehensive data that are reliable, fast,
portable, and communicate well internally and externally are some of
the key features needed in the EHR.
Question. What lessons from the civilian community are applicable
to improving DOD electronic medical records?
Answer. Civilian EHR and data systems struggle with solving the
problems noted above and meeting the requirements of a good system as
outlined. If confirmed, I would work with USD(AT&L) and the VA to find
suitable, financially sound and sustainable answers to these issues.
Success would be determined by implementing a system meeting the
aforementioned requirements.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you pursue to improve
electronic medical records, and in your view what are the measures of
success?
Answer. See above answer.
women's health
Question. In view of the expanding roles of women serving in the
Armed Forces, what are the health challenges that DOD and the Services
must address both in deployed and nondeployed environments?
Answer. The contributions of women in the military increase every
day as opportunities and roles expand for them. OEF and OIF have seen
an unprecedented deployment of female military members from all
Services and Components. We need to continue to expand our
understanding of how best to support women's health needs both in the
deployed and nondeployed status and as they transition to veterans
status. Better understanding and delivery of services includes, but is
not limited to, gynecologic and pregnancy care, urinary tract infection
treatment and prevention, hygiene in the deployed environment,
ergonomics and prevention of injury, fitness and strength development,
weight and nutrition advice, psychological stress, eliminating and
responding to sexual harassment and sexual assault and PTSD/TBI. Many
of these issues overlap with general health promotion concerns for the
force, but may require special focus to evaluate specific issues
related to women.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the adequacy of
current health services for female servicemembers, and what steps would
you take to improve them?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek input from a women's health
advisory committee to evaluate current practices and future directions
for addressing and improving women's health issues in the military. The
committee would have broad input from health professionals, enlisted
personnel and officers from constituent services. Priorities for care
and research in women's health will be reviewed with the Surgeons
General.
fort hood
Question. Based on published reports assessing the tragic shooting
at Fort Hood in November 2009 in which 13 people were murdered and 43
injured, what, in your view, are the most important lessons learned for
the medical departments of DOD?
Answer. I have not been briefed on the findings of the official
investigation into the tragic events that took place at Fort Hood on
November 5, 2009 and therefore cannot comment on specific issues.
However, it would appear that collectively we need to improve our
abilities to identify home grown terrorists and those susceptible to
radicalization. Furthermore, leaders at all levels need to accurately,
honestly and with courage, assess the behaviors of those they are
responsible for and call into question those who exhibit behaviors not
compatible with military service and the oath to protect and defend the
constitution of the United States. If confirmed, I will hold my leaders
accountable for these responsibilities.
hiv/aids surveillance and treatment
Question. According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the annual rate of AIDS diagnoses reported among males aged
15-19 has nearly doubled in the past 10 years within the United States.
In addition, the committee has received information that DOD
surveillance programs and access to care need improvement.
What is your assessment of the increase in AIDS diagnoses among
this age group, and its potential impact on the military?
Answer. The increasing incidence of HIV infection in the
demographic group identified (male age 15-19) suggests that the lessons
learned about prevention 2\1/2\ decades ago have been forgotten. We
must redouble our efforts at education. The consequences of not
reversing this trend are enormous, not only for the individuals at risk
for death and complications from this disease, but also it will limit
the number of individuals who might otherwise honorably serve in the
military. In addition, the cost of treating those infected with HIV is
substantial.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
DOD is effectively identifying and treating individuals diagnosed with
HIV/AIDS?
Answer. If confirmed, I would enhance programs aimed at HIV and STD
education, prevention, and surveillance.
use of live animals in medical education and training
Question. The committee understands that the Department allows some
limited use of live animals for medical research, education, and
training purposes.
Based on your background in medical education, please describe your
views on the use of live animals for medical education and training
given the many technologically advanced simulators in existence today.
Answer. In the future I believe advanced simulation platforms
should and will supplant the need for live animal use in medical
education. Simulators will need to be validated to provide similar or
superior training for medical personnel before they can substitute
fully for live tissue training. Some simulators can breathe, bleed,
urinate, speak, and respond to stimuli and drugs. These simulators,
combined with patient actors and scenario based training may offer
superior training models over live animals in the future. Live tissue
training should only be used when, after exhaustive analysis, no other
satisfactory substitute exists. Since student medics need to be able to
repeat a realistic training experience to gain skill and confidence to
prepare to be ready to save lives in battle, live tissue training
remains a valuable training tool today.
research on gulf war illness
Question. Both DOD and the VA have conducted research on Gulf War
Illness stemming from health concerns of veterans.
What is your assessment of the evolution of research in this field
to date?
Answer. I have witnessed the fact that more research has been done
to understand the health concerns of veterans of the Gulf War than in
any other war. A recent Institute of Medicine review of the medical
literature from this research has stated that while there is no unique
syndrome that has been identified, the Gulf War veterans experience a
wide spectrum of symptoms at a rate nearly double that of military
personnel who were on active duty at that time but did not deploy. The
medical challenge is to better understand the causes of symptoms in our
patients, particularly for the subjective symptoms.
Question. What, in your view, are the promising areas for further
research, especially for the treatment of symptoms resulting from
neurological damage due to chemical exposures?
Answer. Medical science is developing a better understanding of
brain function and brain physiology due to better tools and better
understanding from research that has been ongoing in the fields of
mental health, TBI and the spectrum of neurological diseases like
Alzheimer's, Parkinson's disease, amyolotrophic lateral sclerosis and
others. Research focused on relating symptoms to specific brain
functions, insults, or neurotransmitter changes would have major
importance, not only to Gulf War veterans, but to the broader
population.
Question. If confirmed, what approach would you take to assess the
core biomedical research programs of the DOD to ensure that the
objectives and resourcing of such research is consistent with future
potential threats to U.S. forces?
Answer. I understand that the core biomedical research programs in
DOD are requirement-driven, and those requirements are based on
military unique issues. I also understand that the governance of the
biomedical research is through the Armed Services Biomedical Research
Evaluation and Management committee, which the ASD(HA) co-chairs. If
confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to fulfill this critical
leadership role.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
medical budget
1. Senator Akaka. Dr. Woodson, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) is charged with many duties and
responsibilities. Among them is to serve as the program manager for all
Department of Defense (DOD) health and medical resources and to prepare
and submit a DOD Unified Medical Program budget to provide resources
for the DOD Military Health System (MHS). These duties emphasize
significant experience in the various areas of healthcare management
and administration. The Unified Medical Program budget occupies a
significant part of the overall DOD base budget. For example, the
fiscal year 2011 DOD budget request includes $50.7 billion for the DOD
Unified Medical Budget to support MHS. DOD's overall base budget
request for fiscal year 2011 is $549 billion. You stated in your
advance policy questions, as well as your confirmation testimony,
before the Senate Armed Services Committee that you have experience as
a healthcare administrator. What specific and relevant financial,
logistical, human resource, and other healthcare administration
education, certification, or experience do you have that will enable
you to be an effective program manager of a $50 billion enterprise?
Dr. Woodson. I fully understand the large set of budget
responsibilities that are assigned to the ASD(HA) in leading the
Military Health System enterprise. My previous work and career
experience has been broad. As a physician and former senior medical and
health care leader, I have dealt with, advised others on, and helped
developed solutions to complex budget issues in a multi-dimensional
healthcare system. Likewise, as an Associate Dean and senior leader in
a major university, I have managed departmental budgets, and given
advice on and contributed to developing strategic solutions to budget
issues. In my role as USAR General Officer and Commander, I have been
responsible for and managed millions of DOD dollars for training and
readiness. Furthermore, I have been formally educated in DOD and POM
budgeting process. Finally, I understand that the process of managing
the MHS enterprise is a team effort, and the most important skills are
those of leadership and knowing how to establish the vision of
excellence and efficiency and how to get people to work toward common
goals. If confirmed, assisting me in the role of ASD(HA) are a large
number of talented and experienced experts. The Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Health Budgets and Financial Policy
(HB&FP) acts as the principal staff assistant for all DOD financial
policies, programs and activities. This office is responsible for
budget formulation and oversight, program analysis and evaluation with
my guidance. The ASD(HA) and DASD(HB&FP) must work closely together and
are supported by several departments, as well as the Service Surgeons
General and the Service Chief Financial Officers. The most important
skills in budget management are clear guidance and management of staff
process to produce timeliness of budget reviews, submission, and
reporting. I have significant experience in all of these matters across
the breadth of my work and career experience.
unified medical command
2. Senator Akaka. Dr. Woodson, the House of Representatives'
version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2011 [H.R. 5136] includes a provision for the creation of a
Unified Medical Command (UMC). H.R. 5136 states that a UMC would remove
many of the challenges present under the current structure caused by a
disconnect between requirements determination, which is performed by
the Services, and resource allocation, which is currently controlled by
the ASD(HA). A UMC could result in significant savings for DOD as well.
A 2006 Center for Naval Analyses study concluded that a single medical
command could reduce DOD's healthcare cost by $344 million annually.
What is your opinion of the UMC proposed in H.R. 5136?
Dr. Woodson. It is my understanding that the Department has
undertaken a number of studies over many years regarding the most
effective organizational approach for health care delivery. The top
health care priority of the Department is medical readiness--to ensure
that servicemembers are medically ready for deployment and combat, and
to ensure the medical forces are ready to support the warfighter
anywhere in the world. All organizational approaches for consideration
must not compromise this fundamental requirement. If confirmed, I will
work with Secretary Gates and Under Secretary Stanley to determine what
organizational model best enhances our medical readiness, offers
greater agility for decisionmaking, introduces efficiencies in
administrative processes, and reduces costs of those processes.
Certainly, the UMC proposal in H.R. 5136 is one option that could be
evaluated against these criteria.
3. Senator Akaka. Dr. Woodson, what role do you see the ASD(HA)
performing in UMC?
Dr. Woodson. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary Gates and
Under Secretary Stanley to determine what organizational model best
enhances our medical readiness, offers greater agility for
decisionmaking, and introduces efficiencies in administrative
processes. The top health care priority of the Department is medical
readiness--to ensure that the servicemembers are medically ready for
deployment and combat, and to ensure the medical forces are ready to
support the warfighter in the field. Regardless of the organizational
approach ultimately chosen, I believe the ASD(HA) will remain the
principal medical advisor for the Secretary of Defense, and in this
capacity will have broad authority and responsibilities for the medical
mission of the Department.
traumatic brian injury
4. Senator Akaka. Dr. Woodson, recently some of my colleagues and I
sent a letter to Secretaries Gates and Shinseki describing some of our
concerns about traumatic brain injury (TBI) care in the Military
Departments. One of the primary concerns was over the inadequacies in
the Post Deployment Health Reassessment Program. If confirmed, what
will you do to ensure these assessments are being completed?
Dr. Woodson. The Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) is a
critical part of our armamentarium in the area of health surveillance.
The PDHRA is to be completed by every servicemember who returns from
deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
Per Department of Defense Instruction 6490.03, the Secretaries of the
Military Departments are to ensure that the post deployment assessments
are completed within the established timeframes in the Instruction. The
first step in assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of these post
deployment activities is to ensure that the assessment forms are
completed. For these efforts to succeed, it is critical that the
Military Health System (MHS) work very closely with the Services to
ensure the bridges between the commanders' responsibilities and the
medical activities are well defined. We will reinforce the lines of
communication with the Services, in conjunction with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, to ensure they have
the mechanisms in place so that all returning servicemembers complete a
PDHRA.
We have to ensure with all certainty that all PDHRAs are reviewed,
referred (if needed), and acted upon by a trained health care provider
to ensure the servicemember's concerns or positive indications of a
physical, neurological or mental health condition is evaluated and
treated, if indicated. If confirmed, I will make sure that both the MHS
and the Services have the procedures in place to achieve a goal of 100
percent completed PDHRAs, and have the quality processes that go along
to ensure the right and appropriate follow ups are done.
5. Senator Akaka. Dr. Woodson, how will you ensure privacy to
enable the collection of honest assessments?
Dr. Woodson. The Military Health System (MHS) takes the issue of
protecting personal information very seriously and strives to ensure
that each beneficiary is afforded a health care environment that
facilitates an honest, truthful, dialogue with his or her medical
provider. This is best achieved in the nondeployed clinic setting, but
is also afforded to those servicemembers in more austere environments.
Our medical providers are regularly trained on the DOD Health Affairs
(HA) and TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) policies and business
practices which comply with Federal laws, DOD regulations, and
guidelines governing the privacy of health visits and the security of
medical information of our servicemembers. More specifically, DOD HA
and TMA have an ongoing process for developing and managing the
delivery of specialized, role-based Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Compliance and Privacy Act training for all
MHS personnel as a key element of the TMA Privacy Office training and
awareness program. These efforts are augmented by the overall promotion
of a culture of compliance through privacy and HIPAA security
awareness, education, and outreach activities, including orientation
sessions, seminars, and conferences.
6. Senator Akaka. Dr. Woodson, how will you ensure that results are
being properly screened and followed up on?
Dr. Woodson. The first step in assessing the efficiency and
efficacy of post deployment activities is to ensure that the assessment
forms are completed. For these efforts to succeed, it is critical that
the Military Health System works very closely with the Services to
ensure the bridges between the commanders' responsibilities and the
medical activities are well defined. We will establish a very solid
line of communication with the Services, in conjunction with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, to ensure they have
the mechanisms in place so that all returning servicemembers complete a
PDHA and PDHRA. We must also ensure that we adhere to our own clinical
practice guidelines on completing post deployment health assessments so
that if a servicemember is screened or reviewed and subsequently
requires a referral, it is acted upon by a trained health care provider
and the servicemember's concerns or positive indications of a physical,
neurological or mental health condition is evaluated and treated, if
indicated.
va-dod collaboration
7. Senator Akaka. Dr. Woodson, I understand that troops go through
a demobilization process upon return from deployment. I have also been
told that Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) representatives are not
always present during the demobilization process, particularly for
Guard and Reserve units. What advice can you offer to enable better
collaboration with VA and DOD to ensure a successful demobilization
process?
Dr. Woodson. It is DOD policy that the VA is invited to the
demobilization of all returning Reserve component (RC) forces (Active-
Duty Forces do not demobilize when they return to the United States).
To improve the coordination between the Departments, we could actively
coordinate our demobilization station activities with the regional VA
centers and local Vet Centers. As an outreach activity, the regional VA
representative from the home station of the returning unit could also
be invited and actively engaged with the returning veteran population.
The VA is also invited and is a key participant in the Yellow Ribbon
Reintegration Program (YRRP), but since that is a voluntary program,
there are still significant returning veteran populations that are not
reached. As another option to increase participation in the YRRP, DOD
could encourage the Services to require all of their demobilizing
servicemembers to attend YRRP events prior to departing demobilization
stations.
Note: Currently, Touch Point 1 is Veterans Affairs' (VA) Reserve
Component Demobilization Initiative to ensure Operation Enduring
Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) Veterans returning from the
combat zone are introduced to VA during out-processing at the 61
demobilization sites. Servicemembers receive an overview on VA services
and benefits and are enrolled in VA healthcare.
Servicemembers are assigned an OEF/OIF program manager to contact,
who will set up initial health and dental appointments at the VA
facility of their choice. Since May 2008, VA has supported over 1,295
demobilization events, briefed over 73,000 Veterans, and enrolled over
70,000 of them, for a 95-percent enrollment rate.'' VA's website at
http://www.oefoif.va.gov/SevenTouchesOutreach.asp is very helpful.
suicide prevention
8. Senator Akaka. Dr. Woodson, nearly as many American troops at
home and abroad have committed suicide this year as have been killed in
combat in Afghanistan. Preventing suicides is a tough challenge. But we
must begin to change a culture that discourages at-risk servicemembers
from seeking help when needed. If confirmed, what specifically will you
do to change this culture?
Dr. Woodson. DOD recognizes that the stigma of seeking help is at
times a barrier to accessing needed care. Servicemembers need assurance
that they can seek psychological health care and treatment, and
maintain a successful military career. If confirmed, I will continue
stigma-reduction initiatives such as the Real Warriors Campaign, and
engage leadership to shift DOD to a culture that promotes healthy and
help-seeking behaviors and lead collaboration efforts among the
Services to combat a culture that discourages our military members from
accessing necessary care. I will enhance ``safe-havens'' within
commands for soldiers to seek behavioral health counseling and advice
without suffering repercussions and allow transfer of behavioral health
information important to monitoring soldiers ``at-risk'' as they move
between commands. This will maximally protect soldiers, commanders and
unit missions. It is imperative that servicemembers receive the care
and treatment they need.
9. Senator Akaka. Dr. Woodson, suicide prevention is difficult and
challenging. There have been a lot of people in the Services and the VA
who have worked diligently on this issue. The Services have experienced
a rise in the number of suicides since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
started. In order to prevent suicides, I believe we need to better
understand its causes. If confirmed, what specific actions will you
recommend for the Services to address suicide prevention?
Dr. Woodson. I acknowledge that suicide is a complex issue, but the
rise in suicides among servicemembers is deeply concerning and
unacceptable. If confirmed, I will recommend the Services work in
collaboration with each other and the VA to coordinate surveillance
efforts, evaluate, and share best practices. I share and support DOD's
commitment to ensure the well-being and safety of all servicemembers
and their families.
I will seek to enhance the effectiveness of the Defense Centers of
Excellence and the National Intrepid Center of Excellence whose
missions are to address and find answers to the concerns around
behavioral health, suicide prevention and TBI. Also, I will support the
findings and implement recommendations of the Task Force on Suicide
Prevention led by General Chiarelli as they relate to actions that can
be taken by ASD(HA). I will review the findings of the DOD Task Force
report and will use its recommendations to guide the development of
additional policies to reduce suicides as appropriate.
10. Senator Akaka. Dr. Woodson, what specific actions will you
recommend so that there is greater collaboration between the Services
and VA regarding suicide prevention?
Dr. Woodson. DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have a
strong partnership and I support continued collaboration between the
agencies to optimize suicide prevention efforts for servicemembers,
veterans, and families. If confirmed, I will recommend increased
coordination and information sharing between the DOD and VA to
facilitate collaboration on multiple areas of suicide prevention. I
will work with Secretary Shinseki to enhance and leverage community-
based VA programs and available behavioral health specialists to treat
servicemembers. I believe we can leverage each other's strengths to
better serve our servicemembers, veterans, and their families.
joint duty requirement
11. Senator Akaka. Dr. Woodson, the Goldwater-Nichols Act set a
requirement that officers must complete a full tour of duty in a joint
duty assignment or receive a waiver prior to being selected for
appointment to the general or flag officer pay grade. Currently, a
waiver for this requirement exists for medical officers, dental
officers, veterinary officers, medical service officers, nurses, and
biomedical science officers in the Services. If confirmed, will you
recommend to the Secretary of Defense that the above named categories
of officers be subject to the joint duty requirement of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act? Please explain.
Dr. Woodson. If confirmed, I would not make this recommendation.
The current statute allows for the flexibility for those career fields
to promote along with their peers, so not to be disadvantaged due to
the special nature of their work.
By policy, a joint experience and a required joint duty assignment
is defined as ``an assignment to a designated position in a multi-
Service or multi-national command or activity that is involved in the
integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at
least two of the three Military Departments. The preponderance of the
officer's duties involve producing or promulgating national military
strategy, joint doctrine, joint policy, strategic plans, or contingency
plans, or to commanding and controlling operations under a combatant
command.''
Due to the specialized nature of their work and career paths, these
officers are unable to meet the intent of Goldwater-Nichols' joint
experience and the Department's definition. However, the Department's
increased focus in joint matters, allows each officer to apply for
experience points due to the nature of their individual assignment
regardless of career field in order to gain the joint qualification.
It should be noted that many medical specialty officers actually
have deployed and work in multi-service ``joint'' environments. Most of
the MTFs in the current theaters of operation are staffed by tri-
service military medical officers. If confirmed, I will work with the
Services and Service Surgeons General to define opportunities for
medical officers to receive education and experience in joint and
interagency operations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb
disability evaluation system
12. Senator Webb. Dr. Woodson, in your responses to the advance
policy questions, you stated you would give your fullest attention to
the lengthy processing times that have occurred in the Disability
Evaluation System (DES) pilot program. Delays of a year or longer have
been reported. While extended processing time is sometimes necessary,
it is generally not in the best interest of the servicemember. The
responsibility for addressing this important transition issue lies with
the joint DOD-VA Senior Oversight Committee (SOC), but I understand
that the SOC's members are not working together as well as they should.
What specific steps will you take to address this issue and other
efforts to improve a servicemember's transition from DOD to DVA care,
treatment, and benefits?
Dr. Woodson. The DES Pilot, established in November 2007 and now
operating at 27 locations, is processing Active component
servicemembers on average, in 311 days. This is about 43 percent faster
than the Legacy DES. As a member of the Senior Oversight Committee, we
will continue to strive to improve the DES process. Only through
collaboration between DOD and VA can we provide the health care and
benefits our servicemembers need as they transition.
13. Senator Webb. Dr. Woodson, what steps can be taken to foster
better coordination and collaboration with your counterpart, the Under
Secretary of Veterans Affairs for Health?
Dr. Woodson. There is always much that can be done to improve the
communications and collaboration between DOD and VA, especially as it
affects the care and distribution of benefits for our returning
servicemembers, veterans, and their families. As the DOD/VA Health
Executive Council (HEC) is the established body to oversee and
implement our joint programs, if confirmed, I intend to establish and
maintain a continuous dialogue with my co-chair, the VA Under Secretary
for Health, on ways to strengthen the HEC and its work groups.
14. Senator Webb. Dr. Woodson, how will you ensure that the DES
pilot program has the support it needs to ensure medical and
administrative personnel are postured to support our wounded warriors
in transition as effectively as possible?
Dr. Woodson. Before implementing the DES pilot, DOD and VA examined
the staffing requirements for DOD and VA administrators at each
location. Upon implementation, the Military Departments increased
staffing at some locations and will continue to assess DES staff
requirements. Additionally, VA has identified new, Pilot-specific
staffing requirements and is hiring additional personnel. As the Pilot
expands, the Departments are exploring contract options to address
examination requirements where VA needs additional support to meet DES
requirements.
I will also ensure that medical testing and consultations required
for the disability evaluation process have the highest priority. I
support temporary payment of premiums within the managed care network,
to facilitate rapid evaluation and result reporting for wounded
warriors within the disability evaluation process.
medical task force
15. Senator Webb. Dr. Woodson, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010
directed DOD to stand up a Task Force on the Care, Management, and
Transition of Recovering, Wounded, Ill, and Injured Members of the
Armed Forces within 180 days of its enactment; however, it is my
understanding that neither this task force's charter nor its members
have been approved by the Department. What is the status of this task
force, and what steps will you take to ensure it can meet its reporting
requirements as specified in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010?
Dr. Woodson. The current status of the Task Force is that it has
been funded by the DOD Comptroller ($2.25 million for the first year),
a new Executive Director has been hired, and a draft charter is
prepared. To ensure that the Task Force does not lose momentum and that
it is accountable for its progress, there will be a public meeting
(announced in the Federal Register) 60 days after the approval of the
charter. The funding, charter approval, and public meeting will all
serve to maintain the Task Force's positive momentum.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
electronic health record
16. Senator Burris. Dr. Woodson, in your advance policy questions,
you state that one of your major goals is the Electronic Health Record
(EHR). As a member of both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the
Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, this is of particular interest to
me. What are the major obstacles facing the EHR and how do you plan to
advance this initiative?
Dr. Woodson. The major obstacles facing the DOD EHR include first
and foremost, ensuring the system is embraced by the majority of our
healthcare providers. It must suit their technical needs and meet their
human need for ease of use while guarding patient privacy, controlling
and managing access and security. Technical challenges include
operational availability, speed, and usability issues; and system
challenges related to the ease and feasibility of updating the system
to incorporate new capabilities. Much has already been done to address
these issues and I will continue to expedite ongoing efforts to meet
these challenges. Data systems need to be modifiable to accommodate the
unique needs of departments and sub-activities within the organization
if they are to get useful data for quality improvement processes.
Intuitive systems with comprehensive data that are reliable, fast,
portable, and communicate well both internally and externally are some
of the key features needed in the EHR.
I understand the power of EHRs and how they can help to enhance the
quality of care we deliver to our patients. Our doctors, nurses,
medics, corpsmen, and administrators have to be comfortable with the
system they are using to ensure they fully embrace the power of the
EHR. If confirmed, I will work within the Department and with other
Federal agencies and the private sector to advance EHR initiatives and
ensuring standards-based interoperability. To advance this initiative,
I would work closely with the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to complete the analysis of alternatives
(operational effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle cost); and to
have the appointment of a program manager and the establishment of a
formal program office completed. Additionally, I will work to address
the constraining nature of the DOD acquisition process in order to
respond to the rapidly changing demands of the IM/IT environment. In
concert with the EHR efforts, I would look forward to developing
decision tools to allow health providers to work smarter and deliver
the highest quality of care that is evidence based.
My career has spanned the transition from paper to electronic
health records, and many lessons have been learned about implementation
of such an initiative. Boston Medical Center was one of the first
institutions in that area to commit to an EHR; as such, I am prepared
to transfer that experience to inform my efforts in advancing the EHR
for the Department and its highly mobile patient and provider
populations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
adara networks health care technology contract
17. Senator McCain. Dr. Woodson, just over a year ago, I called for
an investigation into allegations of misconduct in connection with the
award of a contract for military electronic medical records. In the
years that preceded that contract award, the winning company (Adara
Networks, Inc.) obtained more than $20 million in defense
appropriations earmarks. From an investigation that followed, we
learned: (1) the decision to award the contract to Adara did not adhere
to Federal acquisition regulations; (2) there were errors in judgment
and a lack of program and acquisition planning, transparency, and
oversight; and (3) the electronic computer code from the military
health system was improperly leaked to Adara--a violation designed to
give it an unfair advantage. At the end of the day, this flawed
contract was cancelled--but not before $10 million of the taxpayers'
money was wasted, since none of the products that Adara delivered were
ever used. Based on the Department's review, this contract scandal set
back the development of a military electronic medical records system by
at least 2 years. This is not a pretty picture. If confirmed, what are
you going to do to fix it?
Dr. Woodson. Within DOD, there is an understandable emphasis on
streamlining the acquisition process to get results as fast as
possible. While this is a desired outcome, acquisitions must still be
conducted with absolute integrity and in full compliance with
prescribed statutes, regulations, and policies.
If confirmed, I will review the actions that have occurred to
improve Military Health System acquisition processes and management
since this contract was cancelled and will further continue to monitor
and oversee positive changes to ensure future misconduct does not
occur. I will continue to emphasize and commit to acquisition
integrity, ensure that the TRICARE Management Activity acquisition
workforce is properly credentialed to ensure acquisitions have the
appropriate planning, transparency and oversight and implement any
follow-up actions that guarantee adherence of acquisition policy and
program management with all Federal and Department policy and
procedure.
18. Senator McCain. Dr. Woodson, exactly how will you assign a
priority to ensuring that MHS develops its electronic medical records
system with integrity and under a transparent procurement process that
accords with all applicable Federal laws and regulations?
Dr. Woodson. If confirmed, I will ensure that the proper ``checks
and balances'' are in place among the Functional Sponsor (the system
requirements owner), Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) (the system
acquirer), Chief Financial Officer (the Defense Health Program
financial manager), and Chief Information Officer (the system's
assessor of Subtitle III of Title 40) and well-defined roles,
responsibilities, and accountability of the aforementioned positions
are clearly articulated. In addition, I will ensure policies are in
place to support the governance structure and process and that those
policies are enforced and enable program visibility. These
organizations will work together to ensure an open and transparent
acquisition process, with full accountability for integrity at every
step along the way.
19. Senator McCain. Dr. Woodson, how will you ensure that line
management across the electronic medical health records procurement
community will be held accountable to that standard of performance and,
ultimately, to providing our service men and women with the best
electronic health records capability at the most reasonable cost to the
taxpayer?
Dr. Woodson. Along with many other new acquisition reforms, TRICARE
Management Activity (TMA) acquisition authority has being centralized
under one organization, now led and managed by a Senior Executive
Service employee dual certified in program management and contracting.
This individual is the CAE. The CAE's acquisition authority and
accountability will span all Military Health System procurements funded
with the Defense Health Appropriation, which includes the electronic
health records procurement community. This individual, along with new
hired acquisition professional staff, will report directly to me and
will directly manage the Program Executive Officer for the electronic
health records program. It is my understanding that establishment of
policy is underway for proactive enforcement and monitoring through use
of metrics and conforms to DOD Directive 5000 guidance.
______
Question Submitted by Senator David Vitter
abortion in dod medical facilities
20. Senator Vitter. Dr. Woodson, given your expertise and previous
comment that the men and women serving this country ``deserve the very
best facilities and care,'' can you answer how much the allowing of
abortions on military bases under the Burris amendment will increase
the drain on medical facilities and practitioners on military bases
adding to the pressure our military is already facing?
Dr. Woodson. With respect to your specific question regarding the
potential impact on highly engaged military treatment facilities of
allowing the additional workload of pre-paid abortions, I am not aware
of any firm workload projections. If history is an indicator, it may be
relevant that according to a 2008 Congressional Research Service
Report, in 1994, when pre-paid abortions were allowed in overseas
military treatment facilities, none was performed. Thus, it may be
difficult to develop a solid estimate of the number of pre-paid
abortions that might be performed. Finally, for purposes of context,
military treatment facilities reportedly provide 38 million outpatient
visits per year, and it appears that pre-paid abortion services would
impact a relatively select group of health care provider (e.g.
gynecologists).
______
[The nomination reference of Jonathan Woodson, M.D.,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
April 22, 2010.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Jonathan Woodson, of Massachusetts, to be an Assistant Secretary of
Defense, vice S. Ward Casscells.
______
[The biographical sketch of Jonathan Woodson, M.D., which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Resume of Career Service for Jonathan Woodson, M.D.
Education:
City College of New York; September 1973-June 1977, B.S. Biomedical
Sciences
New York University; June 1977-June 1979, M.D., Medicine
U.S. Army War College: May 2002-July 2004, M.S. S., Strategic
Studies
Employment record:
Massachusetts General Hospital/Harvard Medical School; June 1979-
June 1982, Residency Internal Medicine
Massachusetts General Hospital/Harvard Medical School; June 1982-
December 1986, Resident General Surgery
Massachusetts General/Harvard Medical School/Waltham Weston
Hospital; January 1987-June 1987, Fellow General Surgery
Massachusetts General Hospital/Harvard Medical School; July 1987-
June 1988, Fellow/Resident Vascular Surgery
Boston University School of Medicine; July 1988-present
Honors and awards:
Civilian:
Samuel Speigel Award - Academic Excellence (1979)
Merck Manual Award - Academic Merit (1979)
Jobst Vascular Fellows Award (1987)
Tyler Research Fund Award (1990)
Surgical Teaching Award, Boston University (1990)
Surgical Teaching Award, Boston University (1991)
Black Achiever Award, Boston, MA(1995)
Select one Top Vascular Surgeons in Boston (2007)
Selected for inclusion in listing of ``Top Surgeons''
in the United States (2008)
Gold Humanism in Medicine Award, Association of
American Medical Colleges (2009)
Listed in Consumers Guide to ``Top Doctors'' in
America (2009)
``Citizen of the Year'' Award, Omega Psi Phi
Fraternity, Boston, MA (2009)
Military:
Legion of Merit
