[Senate Hearing 111-782]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-782
JAMMING THE IED ASSEMBLY LINE: IMPEDING THE FLOW OF AMMONIUM NITRATE IN
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 18, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-236 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
opening statement.............................................. 1
Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, statement 18
Goodman, Mary Beth, Senior Economic Adviser to the Special
Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator from Idaho, opening statement. 4
Sedney, David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 13
Joint prepared statement with BG Michael H. Shields.......... 14
Shields, BG Michael H., Deputy Director for Operations and
Requirements, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO).......................................... 16
Woods, John P., Deputy Assistant Director for Homeland Security
Investigations, National Security Division, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
(iii)
JAMMING THE IED ASSEMBLY LINE: IMPEDING THE FLOW OF AMMONIUM NITRATE IN
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:31 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P.
Casey, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Casey, Coons, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. This hearing will come to order. Thank you
for being here today, and I'm grateful that both our witnesses
and others were able to adjust their schedules to accommodate
my schedule today. We had to move the hearing from 2:15 to this
hour, and we're grateful for that.
I will have a brief opening statement and Senator Risch,
our ranking member, will have an opening statement, and then
we'll get as fast as we can to the testimony of our witnesses.
Last week Army SPC Anthony Vargas, 27 years old, of
Reading, PA, lost his life in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan.
He had wounds suffered when insurgents attacked his unit using
an improvised explosive device. He was assigned to the 1st
Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st
Airborne Division, based at Fort Campbell, KY. Specialist
Vargas is survived by his wife Luisa and three children who
live in Clarksville, TN. His father, Julio Vargas, and mother,
Maria, live in Reading, PA.
Marine LCpl Larry Johnson, from my home town of Scranton,
PA, was killed in Afghanistan last February. Lance Corporal
Johnson was trained as a combat engineer whose job it is to
seek and destroy improvised explosive devices. He was 19 years
old. I for a couple months had his funeral or prayer card on my
desk, and I hadn't looked at it in a long time, and it's hard
to believe that it was February 18 that he died. Of course, on
the back of the prayer card from the funeral home was the
Marine's Prayer, a lot of inspiration for all of us when we
consider the topic of this hearing and also the destructive
impact of IEDs and what we must do to take every step possible
to combat it.
In March of this year, Pakistani police seized 6,600 pounds
of ammonium nitrate stashed in a fruit market in Lahore,
Pakistan. Investigators believe that the three men arrested in
the seizure were connected to a series of suicide bomb blasts
that killed more than 50 people.
The main explosive ingredient used in most IED attacks
against our troops, coalition forces, Afghan and Pakistani
civilians is ammonium nitrate. Today, this committee and this
subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and
Central Asian Affairs, meets to examine the grave implications
of the threat posed by ammonium nitrate and other precursor
chemicals in IEDs. Ammonium nitrate is a common threat faced by
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States and we need to
collectively do more to restrict the flow of ammonium nitrate
into the region.
The statistics in IEDs in Afghanistan are sobering. In 2009
alone, more than 6,000 IEDs were discovered, the vast majority
of which used ammonium nitrate as their main explosive
ingredient. A recent Pentagon report said that fully 80 percent
of IEDs in Afghanistan are made using ammonium nitrate.
According to CSIS, IEDs are the No. 1 killer of U.S. and
coalition forces, and through the first 9 months of this year
190 U.S. forces have perished and an astounding 2,459 have been
wounded by IEDs. Since January 1 of this year, more than Afghan
civilians have been killed by IEDs. So 190 of our U.S. forces,
more than 2,400 individuals wounded, and 1,200 Afghans.
In response, the Afghan Government banned the use of
ammonium nitrate as a fertilizer earlier this year, and despite
this effort and despite vigilance by the Afghan security
forces, IED incidents and casualties have steadily increased.
The Afghan Government appeared committed to this fight and has
enacted the appropriate legal measures and enforcement efforts.
But ammonium nitrate is still ubiquitous in Afghanistan due to
smuggling along supply routes from its neighbors, and
particularly from Pakistan.
The amounts of ammonium nitrate reportedly ferried into
Afghanistan from Pakistan are staggering. The Los Angeles Times
reported in May that as much as 85 tons of ammonium nitrate was
smuggled into Afghanistan and Pakistan in a single night, a
shipment that could yield more than 2,500 IEDs.
Now, what can Pakistan do to address this common threat? A
couple of things: First of all, the Pakistani Parliament should
pass legislation that better restricts ammonium nitrate and
other explosive precursor chemicals like potassium chlorate.
While I understand that farmers in Pakistan rely on
fertilizers, especially for cotton, Pakistani officials may
want to consider a temporary ban during this precarious period.
A local ban was instituted in the Multan district earlier this
year as militant attacks were on the rise. At a minimum,
Pakistani authorities need a coherent legislative framework in
order to better regulate this dangerous chemical.
The second thing they could do is that more needs to be
done to track the flow of ammonium nitrate inside of Pakistan
itself. I referenced the seizure last March in Lahore. A senior
Lahore police official in charge of that investigation said
that his officers could have tracked down the middlemen who
supplied the ammonium nitrate to the militants of Pakistan if
Pakistan required manufacturers to put tracking numbers on each
fertilizer bag. He said at the time, ``It's a totally
undocumented market. There's no reliable way of finding out who
bought the bags. That is a huge problem,'' he said.
Finally, the United States needs to work more closely with
Pakistan to ensure that ammonium nitrate does not flow across
the border to Afghanistan. The British have been very helpful
in working with Pakistani border guards to provide training and
equipment that better detect and interdict ammonium nitrate and
other illicit materials as they cross the border.
This focus on border security could have a positive
spillover effect on restricting the flow of other illicit
material across the border. The Afghan-Pakistani border is
famously porous and there's little expectation that it can be
completely sealed. However, the major crossings should receive
special priority for our efforts. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses on their recommendations as to how we can
improve on the borders.
I've reached out to numerous senior officials both here and
in Pakistan to implore them to focus on the fundamental threat
posed against our troops. I've spoken to General Petraeus on
the day he was confirmed. Of course, many of us are grateful
for his leadership and service. Former Ambassador Anne
Patterson has been a stalwart leader on this issue in
Islamabad, working to ensure that ammonium nitrate was part of
bilateral discussions with the Pakistanis. I look forward to
continuing this dialogue with her and with her distinguished
successor Ambassador Cameron Munter.
In the Senate, I led a bipartisan resolution in June
calling for governments in the region to effectively monitor
and regulate the manufacture, sale, transport, and use of
ammonium nitrate.
We've witnessed some positive developments. Ambassador
Holbrooke's team has focused in on this problem and has
intensified its engagement. Homeland Security has also played a
lead role in Project Global Shield. Later this month, the
Pakistani Government will host a national counter-IED forum,
taking essential steps on this issue.
Pakistan has also suffered horrific losses of security
personnel and civilians over the past few years. This fact
should be acknowledged as we deliberate on the war in
Afghanistan. But we must do all we can to address the supply
lines that lead to these attacks.
So we have much to do and I want to move right to our
panels, but I just will provide a brief introduction and then
ask our ranking member, Senator Risch, for his opening
comments. We are honored by two distinguished panels to help us
assess these issues. First, we will hear from Mary Beth
Goodman, Senior Economic Adviser to Ambassador Holbrooke, the
Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Second, we will hear from John Woods, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Homeland Security--Homeland Security
Investigations, I should say, National Security division,
within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Next we'll hear from David Sedney, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central
Asia, who will share the perspective of the Pentagon and,
obviously, the U.S. Department of Defense.
Finally, we'll also hear from BG Michael Shields, the
Deputy Director for Operations and Requirements, the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, known as
``JIEDDO.''
We have much to do today and we're grateful for the time
that our witnesses are providing, and we're grateful for those
who are in attendance today; and I want to turn the microphone
over to our ranking member, Senator Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Chairman Casey. Thank you very
much for holding this important hearing. Those of us--many of
us serving here in Congress are well aware of the problem with
ammonium nitrate. We don't know as much of the details as we
should. Many of us come from parts of the country where
ammonium nitrate is a very common commodity, anyone can buy it,
and anyone with a pickup truck can haul enough away to cause
serious damage. Yet, by and large, we've gotten along
relatively well in the United States with some notable
exceptions, of course.
The widespread use of ammonium nitrate, not only in the
United States but around the world, as a legitimate fertilizer
is widespread and as a result of that there are unique
challenges, ones that those working with this particular
problem I'm sure have a very difficult time with. One of the
reasons I'm very interested in this hearing is to get the
details of how you dovetail the two issues, that it's so
widespread, the use is so widespread, and second that in
certain parts of the world it has to be very closely monitored.
So with that, I'm anxious to hear from the witnesses. I do
have another commitment. We had scheduling issues with this. I
have the written testimony from the witnesses, which I'll study
carefully, and I'd respectfully request that you hold the
record open, Chairman Casey, so that I can submit questions for
the record, if you would be so kind.
Senator Casey. So ordered.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much, and with that I'm going
to excuse myself. Thank you so much.
Senator Casey. Senator Risch, thank you, and thank you for
taking the time to be here with us today, especially in light
of the scheduling change.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Ms. Goodman, thank you very much for being here. Why don't
we start with you. We'll just go right to left. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MARY BETH GOODMAN, SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISER TO THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Goodman. Thank you, Senator Casey, and thanks for the
invitation to be here today. This is the first time that I've
appeared before the subcommittee and I am truly honored to be
here, particularly for such a critical issue.
On behalf of Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Holbrooke,
the Department is appreciative of the helpful role that the
subcommittee has played in drawing attention to the important
issues in South and Central Asia, and particularly your
leadership in helping to try and find a solution to the lethal
problem of improvised explosive devices. The bipartisan Senate
Resolution 570 that passed here in June and called for an
increased effort by the governments in the region to monitor
and regulate the ammonium nitrate was an important step in
bringing awareness to this endeavor.
Given the interagency nature of our efforts to combat the
IED assembly line out in the field, I'm pleased to be here
today with my colleagues from Department of Defense and
Department of Homeland Security.
As you know, the IEDs are responsible for a vast majority
of coalition fatalities and injuries and are also the cause of
significant civilian deaths among Pakistani and Afghan
citizens. These deaths are the results of a complex and global
network of both legal and illegal activities that facilitate
the flow of lethal aid into Afghanistan from neighboring
countries, including Pakistan.
The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan coordinates the Department of State's counter-IED
response. Our three-pronged strategy is to: one, work
cooperatively with both the governments of Afghanistan and
Pakistan to develop their domestic regulatory regimes; two, to
address the issues of transshipment; and three, to address the
smuggling issues.
A majority of the IEDs are constructed from the fertilizer
calcium ammonium nitrate, which is legally and legitimately a
dual-use traded product. However, CAN, as it is commonly known,
is not widely used to support agricultural production in either
Afghanistan or Pakistan.
On January 21, 2010, President Karzai signed a Presidential
decree banning the import, production, transportation, use,
sale, and storage of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. This decree
also authorized the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF to
seize any existing supplies in Afghanistan after a 1-month
grace period for farmers to turn in their caches. However, the
importation and distribution of ammonium nitrate for use in
mining and construction is still legal throughout Afghanistan.
While there are regulations in place to monitor and control the
use of CAN for mining and construction, to date no permits have
been issued by the government for these purposes. In the
absence of these permits, search and seizure authority exists
only for--currently exists for ammonium nitrate in any form.
During the recent United States-Pakistan strategic
dialogue, Pakistan announced that it has recently established a
national counter-IED forum that is going to host a seminar on
November 25 to address the first steps in developing a national
strategy. This seminar will bring together Pakistani
stakeholders as well as members of the international community
to discuss legislative and law enforcement strategies to combat
the proliferation of IEDs and to halt the flow of their deadly
input. This seminar will establish the foundation on which
Pakistan will build its counter-IED strategy.
While urea and di-ammonium phosphate are the predominant
fertilizers in Pakistan, we know that there are two plants, the
Pak-Arab Fertilizer Coalition Co. in Multan and the National
Fertilizer Corp. in Lahore, which legally produce ammonium
nitrate fertilizer in quantities sufficient to meet Pakistani
demands. Pakistan customs data reports that in 2009 Pakistan
imported ammonium nitrate fertilizer from Sweden, Germany,
Russia, China, and Iran. Given the low level of usage for
ammonium nitrate fertilizer in Pakistan's domestic agricultural
use, this customs data indicates that the import levels far
exceed domestic usage and thus may have been legally
transshipped onward to Afghanistan.
Ambassador Holbrooke and our team at the State Department
are working to raise awareness of the IED issue beyond the
borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The State Department has
worked cooperatively with the Department of Homeland Security
to launch Operation Global Shield and we were pleased to fund
the initial session to train and launch this effort in October
at the World Customs Organization in Brussels.
This program brings together the expertise of the World
Customs Organization, Interpol, and the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime to monitor the trade flows of 14 precursor
chemicals, including ammonium nitrate. This is in an effort to
raise global awareness of the harmful effects of these trade
flows on our troops in Afghanistan and to improve the ability
of customs and border officials in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
the Central Asian states to identify and seize the precursor
chemicals smuggled across the borders and used in the
manufacture of IEDs.
The State Department will continue to work with our
interagency partners to encourage the Government of Pakistan to
take swift and concrete action against IEDs and to actively
promote implementation of initiatives to support this goal. We
have already seen an increased engagement from Pakistan on the
counter-IED issue and, although their efforts are nascent,
Pakistan is working constructively to develop a coherent
strategy to stop the proliferation of IEDs into Afghanistan.
Embassy Islamabad will support follow-on training in early
December in Karachi to train front-line Pakistani customs
officers on interdiction techniques for IED precursors. Embassy
Kabul is also going to sponsor similar training this month as
well.
We will also continue to help the Government of Afghanistan
work to enforce their ban on ammonium nitrate and to aid in the
detection and seizure of the substances at the border. Most
importantly, we're going to encourage direct engagement between
Afghan and Pakistan, Afghan and Pakistani colleagues, to ensure
that cooperation between civilian and military agencies on both
sides of the border is at the center of the efforts to stop the
flow of IED components.
Mr. Chairman, we look forward to working with you and your
office on the important issues in the months ahead and I look
forward to taking your questions today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Goodman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mary Beth Goodman, Senior Economic Adviser to the
Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Department of
State
Senator Casey, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee,
thank you for your invitation to testify today on the critical issue of
impeding the flow of ammonium nitrate in South Asia. On behalf of
Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Holbrooke, the Department is
appreciative of the helpful role this subcommittee has played in
drawing attention to important issues in South and Central Asia and
your leadership, Mr. Chairman, in trying to find a solution to the
lethal problem of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The bipartisan
Senate Resolution 570 that passed this Chamber in June and called for
an increased effort by the governments in the region to monitor and
regulate ammonium nitrate was an important step forward in bringing
awareness to this endeavor.
Given the interagency nature of our efforts to combat the IED
assembly line out in the field, I am pleased to be joined today by my
colleagues from the Department of Defense and the Department of
Homeland Security.
As you know, IEDs are responsible for the vast majority of
coalition fatalities and injuries and are the cause of significant
civilian deaths among Pakistani and Afghan citizens. These deaths are
the result of a complex and global network of both legal and illegal
activities that facilitate the flow of lethal aid into Afghanistan from
neighboring countries, including Pakistan.
A majority of these IEDs are constructed from the fertilizer
calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN), which is a legally and legitimately
traded dual use product. CAN, as it is commonly known, is not widely
used to support agriculture production in either Afghanistan or
Pakistan.
On January 21, 2010, President Karzai signed a Presidential decree
banning the import, production, transportation, use, sale, and storage
of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The decree also authorized the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) and International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) to seize existing supplies in Afghanistan after a 1-month
grace period for farmers, who could hand over their supplies in return
for compensation for a more effective urea-based fertilizer. However
the importation, production, and distribution of ammonium nitrate for
use in the mining and construction sectors is still legal throughout
Afghanistan. While there are regulations in place to monitor and
control the use of CAN for mining and construction, to date, no permits
have been issued by the government for these purposes. In the absence
of these permits, search and seizure authority exists for ammonium
nitrate in any form.
The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan coordinates the Department of State's counter-IED response.
Our three-pronged strategy is to: (1) work cooperatively with both the
governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to develop their domestic
regulatory regimes; (2) address issues of transshipment, and, (3)
address the smuggling issues.
Our Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad are actively engaged with the
governments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to raise the profile of
this critical issue and encourage our partners to take concrete action
to combat IEDs.
I returned from Pakistan yesterday, where we discussed this issue
with the Government of Pakistan and our international partners. The
Government of Pakistan has recently established a National Counter-IED
Forum that seeks to develop a national strategy to combat IEDs and
coordinate the Government's response. During the recent U.S.-Pakistan
Strategic Dialogue, Pakistan announced that its National Counter-IED
Forum will host a seminar on November 25 as a first step in developing
a national strategy. This seminar will bring together Pakistani
stakeholders as well as members of the international community to
discuss legislative and law enforcement strategies to combat the
proliferation of IEDs and halt the flow of their deadly inputs. This
seminar will establish the foundation on which Pakistan will build its
counter-IED strategy. In addition, Pakistan is engaged in law
enforcement activities directed at stemming the flow of illegal
shipments of CAN and precursor explosive materials into Afghanistan.
While urea and di-ammonium phosphate are the prominent fertilizers
in Pakistan, we know that two plants--the Pak-Arab Fertilizer in Multan
and the National Fertilizer Corporation in Lahore--legally produce
ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The Web site for the Pak-Arab plant in
Multan states that ammonium nitrate fertilizer is produced on demand
only and not for general export. Pakistan customs data reports that in
2009, Pakistan imported ammonium nitrate fertilizer from Sweden,
Germany, Russia, China, and Iran. Given the low level of usage for
ammonium nitrate fertilizer in Pakistan's domestic agricultural use,
the customs data indicates that import levels far exceed domestic usage
and thus may have been legally transshipped onward to Afghanistan.
To raise global awareness of the transshipment of fertilizer into
the region, the State Department worked cooperatively with the
Department of Homeland Security to launch Operation Global Shield. This
program brings together the expertise of the World Customs
Organization, Interpol, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and
Crime to monitor the trade flows of 12 precursor chemicals, including
ammonium nitrate, in an effort to raise global awareness of the harmful
effects of the flow of these products on our troops in Afghanistan and
improve the ability of customs and border officials in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and the Central Asian states, to identify and seize precursor
materials smuggled across the Afghan border to be used in the
manufacture of IEDs.
Ambassador Holbrooke and our team at the State Department are
working to raise awareness of the IED issue beyond Afghanistan and
Pakistan. On August 16, the Department demarched 62 countries to urge
participation in Operation Global Shield. The State Department was
pleased to fund the initial training session to launch Operation Global
Shield in Brussels in October at the World Customs Organization. The
Department is also working with private industry to develop
alternative, less explosive variants of CAN with the goal of
encouraging fertilizer producers in the United States, Pakistan, and
elsewhere to adopt technologies to make their products less useful in
IEDs.
Pakistan is engaged on the counter-IED issue, and although its
efforts are nascent, it is working constructively to develop a coherent
strategy to stop the proliferation of IEDs into Afghanistan. Embassy
Islamabad will support follow-on training in early December in Karachi
to train front line Pakistani customs officers on interdiction
techniques for IED precursors. We are pleased that senior Pakistani
military officers from Pakistan's Explosives Ordnance Disposal Company
will also attend this training. This is among the first times that the
Pakistani military provided training to Customs officials and marks an
important step both for capacity building and for interagency
cooperation.
We will continue to work with our interagency partners to encourage
the Government of Pakistan to take swift and concrete action against
IEDs and actively promote implementation of initiatives in support of
this goal. We will also continue to help the Government of Afghanistan
work to enforce their ban on ammonium nitrate and to aid in the
detection and seizure of the substance. Most importantly, we encourage
direct engagement between Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure that
cooperation between civilian and military agencies on both sides of the
border is at the center of efforts to limit the flow of IED components
in the region.
Mr. Chairman, we look forward to continuing to work with your
office on this important issue in the months ahead. I look forward to
taking your questions.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Mr. Woods.
STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WOODS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR
HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Woods. Thank you, Chairman Casey. On behalf of
Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary Morton, I thank
you for the opportunity to testify today.
Many agencies play a critical role in this important issue
and I am proud to be here alongside my counterparts from the
Department of Defense and the Department of State. The October
28 attempt to ship explosive devices through air cargo and the
attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 on December 25 of
last year underscore the threat that improvised explosive
devices, or IEDs, pose to our national security. As I will
discuss today, ICE is at the forefront of our Nation's civilian
efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and investigate the
international movement of IED components and explosive
precursors.
ICE is well positioned to accomplish this mission by using
its statutory authority to investigate and enforce criminal
violations of all U.S. export laws as it relates to military
items, controlled dual-use commodities, and sanctioned or
embargoed countries. Further, we have the capability to expand
the scope of our investigations beyond our domestic offices to
our 67 attache offices situated throughout the world.
To combat the illicit use of precursor chemicals by
terrorists or other criminal organizations who manufacture
IEDs, ICE initiated Project Global Shield, an unprecedented,
multilateral law enforcement effort aimed at combating the
illicit diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals by
monitoring their cross-border movements. This is a joint ICE-
CBP global project, which ICE proposed at the World Customs
Organization Enforcement meeting last spring in Brussels. It is
based on a collaboration among the World Customs Organization,
Interpol, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime.
This mutual undertaking represents the first time that
the threat posed by explosive precursors has been collectively
addressed by the international community.
The ultimate goal of Global Shield is to identify and
interdict falsely declared precursor chemicals, initiate
investigations, and uncover smuggling networks. In doing so,
ICE and CPB aim to build capacity among our strategic partners
and to detect illicit shipments of explosive precursors and
promote cooperation among customs and police administrations in
combating the illicit diversion of ammonium nitrate and other
precursors along the global supply chain.
Global Shield seeks to facilitate legitimate trade while
making it more difficult for those with nefarious purposes to
get their hands on components necessary for IEDs. By working
together and sharing real-time information and intelligence,
countries will be able to verify the legitimacy of individual
shipments while identifying, disrupting, and dismantling the
terrorist networks involved in the illicit procurement of these
chemicals via front companies and complicit middlemen.
We believe that Global Shield will provide invaluable data
for trend analysis to increase the global understanding of the
risks posed by precursor chemicals and their illicit movement.
The program will identify best practices to combat illicit
diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals used to
manufacture explosives, as well as monitor and track legitimate
shipments of precursor chemicals to assist in identifying high-
risk routes for future enforcement activity. Global Shield will
set the foundation for future multilateral initiatives to deny
terrorists access to other explosive components.
As an enhancement to our mission in thwarting this illegal
trade activity and as a key part of the President's export
control reform initiative, President Obama signed Executive
Order 13558 this past Tuesday, which created the Export
Enforcement Coordination Center, a multiagency center that will
be housed within ICE and serve as the primary government forum
for the exchange of information and intelligence related to
export enforcement.
One of ICE's highest priorities is to prevent terrorist
groups and others who might wish to inflict harm by illegally
obtaining U.S. military products and sensitive technology,
including weapons of mass destruction or WMD components.
All of these efforts, along with the efforts described in
full detail within my written remarks, are part of our
comprehensive strategy that focuses on assuring IED components
and precursors do not reach the hands of terrorists or others
who may wish to inflict harm and prosecute those who subvert
the rule of law and threaten our national security.
ICE remains dedicated and committed to this mission and we
look forward to working with the subcommittee on its efforts.
Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before
you today and I would be pleased to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods follows:]
Prepared Statement of John P. Woods, Deputy Assistant Director,
Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security
introduction
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, on behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant
Secretary Morton, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. The October 28, 2010, attempt to ship explosive devices
through air cargo, and the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines
Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, underscore the threat that improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) pose to our national security. IEDs are the
most prevalent form of explosive employed by terrorists around the
world and the single greatest threat to coalition forces in
Afghanistan. According to military officials in Kabul, more than 4,100
bombs were either intentionally exploded or discovered by coalition
forces in 2008, and more than 6,000 IEDs were discovered in 2009. The
vast majority of these IEDs were produced from ammonium nitrate. As I
will discuss today, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is
at the forefront of the nation's civilian efforts to disrupt,
dismantle, and investigate the international movement of IED components
and explosives precursors.
ICE is well-positioned to accomplish this mission. We have the
largest force of investigators within the Department of Homeland
Security, and we protect the nation by investigating criminal
organizations that seek to exploit weaknesses in legitimate trade,
travel, and financial systems to further their illicit enterprises.
More than 6,500 ICE special agents detect, disrupt, and dismantle
cross-border criminal networks engaged in the smuggling of people,
narcotics, bulk cash, weaponry and weaponry-related components across
our borders. ICE also has full statutory authority to investigate and
enforce criminal violations of all U.S. export laws related to military
items, controlled ``dual-use'' commodities, and sanctioned or embargoed
countries. Further, we have the capability to expand the scope of our
investigations beyond our domestic offices to 67 attache offices
situated throughout the world.
project global shield
To combat the illicit use of precursor chemicals by terrorist and
other criminal organizations to manufacture IEDs, ICE initiated Global
Shield--an unprecedented, multilateral law enforcement effort aimed at
combating the illicit diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals
for making explosives by monitoring their cross-border movements. This
joint ICE/U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) global project--
proposed by ICE at the World Customs Organization (WCO) Enforcement
Committee Meeting in Brussels, Belgium, during the spring of 2010--is
based on collaboration among the WCO, INTERPOL, and the United Nations
Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This collaborative undertaking
represents the first time that the threat posed by explosives
precursors has been collectively addressed by the international
community.
The ultimate goal of Global Shield is to identify and interdict
falsely declared precursor chemicals, initiate investigations, and
uncover smuggling networks. In doing so, ICE and CBP aim to build
capacity among strategic partners to detect illicit shipments of
explosive precursors and promote cooperation among customs and police
administrations in combating the illicit diversion of ammonium nitrate
and other explosives precursors along the global supply chain.
Customs and police administrations currently participate in several
successful operational initiatives designed to combat the illicit
diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals used by criminal
organizations to manufacture narcotics. Prior to Global Shield, no
similar initiative existed to combat the trafficking of precursor
chemicals used to manufacture explosives. The methodology of Global
Shield draws on lessons learned and best practices from similar
antinarcotic precursor projects and operations.
Global Shield seeks to facilitate legitimate trade while making it
more difficult for those with nefarious purposes to get their hands on
components for IEDs. By working together and sharing real-time
information and intelligence, countries will be able to verify the
legitimacy of individual shipments while identifying, disrupting, and
dismantling the terrorist networks involved in the illicit procurement
of these chemicals via front companies and complicit middlemen. ICE and
CBP are working closely with stakeholders from across the federal
government, including the Departments of State and Defense, to
accomplish the goals of Global Shield.
The mass production of ammonium nitrate and other precursor
chemicals largely occurs beyond the borders of countries most afflicted
by IEDs. A global effort is therefore essential to effectively combat
their illicit smuggling and diversion. The Government of Afghanistan
has taken a crucial first step. On September 23, 2009, Afghanistan
banned the importation of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and issued a
decree permitting its confiscation either stored in or transported
through Afghanistan. This ban quickly achieved significant results. In
November 2009, Afghanistan seized 500,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate in
Kandahar--one of the largest seizures of its kind in Afghanistan.
The implementation of Global Shield is underway. In October, police
and customs representatives from 86 countries participated in a
preoperational training seminar hosted by the WCO in Brussels, Belgium.
The seminar focused on the detection of precursor chemicals used to
manufacture explosives. Assistant Secretary Morton attended and
provided opening remarks. As of November 1, 2010, Global Shield became
operational, and intelligence production and information sharing among
international partners has begun.
We believe that Global Shield will provide invaluable data for
trend analysis to increase the global understanding of the risk posed
by precursor chemicals and their illicit movement. The program will
identify best practices to combat the illicit diversion and trafficking
of precursor chemicals used to manufacture explosives, as well as
monitor and track legitimate shipments of precursor chemicals to assist
in identifying high-risk routes for future enforcement activity. Global
Shield will set the foundation for future multilateral initiatives to
deny terrorists access to explosives components.
ice's counter-proliferation investigation program
One of ICE's highest priorities is to prevent terrorist groups and
others who might wish to inflict harm from illegally obtaining U.S.
military products and sensitive technology, including weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) components. ICE agents in the field conduct
counterproliferation investigations (CPI) focused on the illegal
procurement and export of specific commodities and services, including
explosives precursors. CPI priority programs address trafficking in WMD
components and materials, sensitive dual-use commodities, and
technologies sought by terrorist groups and others who might wish to
inflict harm. Other programs address illegal exports of military
equipment and spare parts to embargoed countries, significant financial
and business transactions with proscribed countries and groups, export
enforcement training for foreign law enforcement agencies, and outreach
with domestic private industry.
ICE's export enforcement program uses a three-pronged approach:
detecting illegal exports, investigating potential violations, and
obtaining international cooperation to investigate leads abroad. The
guiding principle behind ICE CPI investigations is the detection and
disruption of illegal exports before they cause damage to the national
security interests of the United States. ICE relies on specially
trained CBP officers stationed at ports of entry to inspect suspect
export shipments. Following detection of a violation, ICE agents
deployed throughout the country initiate and pursue investigations to
identify, arrest, and seek prosecution of offenders of the Arms Export
Control Act, International Emergency Economics Powers Act and other
related statutes.
The international nature of counterproliferation networks and
schemes requires a global investigative response. Our attache offices
located overseas work to enlist the support of their host governments
to initiate new investigative leads and develop information in support
of ongoing domestic investigations. The collaboration between ICE and
foreign governments in the area of CPI is the foundation for Project
Global Shield.
In fiscal year 2010, ICE agents initiated a total of 1,149 criminal
investigations into possible export violations and made 248 arrests for
export-related criminal violations, more than any other U.S. federal
law enforcement agency (reported by the U.S. Department of Justice). In
fiscal year 2010, ICE agents conducted thousands of seizures of arms,
military weaponry, and other sensitive commodities related to illegal
export schemes, valued at over $87.8 million. These efforts
significantly contributed to preventing sensitive U.S. technologies and
weapons from reaching the hands of terrorists, hostile countries and
violent criminal organizations.
project shield america (psa)
One of the most effective tools ICE agents use is our industry
outreach program, Project Shield America (PSA). Through this program,
ICE agents conduct outreach to manufacturers and exporters of strategic
commodities to educate them on U.S. export control laws, discuss export
licensing issues and requirements, identify ``red flag'' indicators
used in illegal procurement, and identify the government agencies
responsible for the licensing of export-controlled commodities and
technology. Since 2002, ICE agents have delivered approximately 19,000
outreach presentations to private industry and other entities as part
of the PSA program.
export enforcement coordination center (eecc)
A key part of the President's Export Control Reform initiative is
to improve our law enforcement capabilities to investigate violations
of U.S. export control laws. On November 9, 2010, President Obama
signed an Executive order creating the Export Enforcement Coordination
Center (EECC)--a multiagency center that will be housed within ICE and
will serve as the primary government forum for the exchange of
information and intelligence related to export enforcement. The
creation of the EECC is a key component of the administration's three-
phase reform plan for export control enforcement, with the ultimate
goal of creating a single primary enforcement coordination agency. Such
an agency would be more efficient, and would limit duplicative or
conflicting enforcement activity.
The EECC will be staffed with full-time personnel from ICE, as well
as individuals detailed from among the following departments and
agencies: State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Commerce, Energy, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other executive
branch departments, agencies, or offices as designated by the
President. Specifically, the functions of the EECC will include:
Coordinating the deconfliction of criminal and
administrative enforcement operations and coordination of
industry enforcement outreach activity;
Serving as a conduit between federal law enforcement
agencies and the U.S. Intelligence Community;
Acting as the primary point of contact between enforcement
agencies and export licensing agencies for enforcement and
licensing matters;
Resolving interagency conflicts not settled in the field;
and
Establishing governmentwide statistical tracking
capabilities for U.S. export enforcement activities.
The EECC will replace ICE's National Export Enforcement
Coordination Network (NEECN), which has led coordination among DHS
components to address challenges inherent with dismantling
transnational procurement networks. Unlike the NEECN, in which agency
participation has been on a voluntary basis, the new EECC will require
participation by law enforcement and the intelligence community
agencies. Staffing will be dedicated on a mandatory basis, but at
various levels of participation consistent with the mission of each
agency's role in export enforcement.
cpi centers
Faced with increasingly sophisticated global procurement networks,
ICE has established and implemented the concept of operation for ``CPI
Centers'' throughout the United States to more strategically utilize
CPI resources in the field. The new CPI Center concept will allow for
dedicated and experienced agents to be strategically placed in high-
risk domestic areas to improve ICE's ability to combat illegal exports
and illicit procurement networks that pose a threat to the United
States.
All CPI Centers will be staffed with seasoned criminal
investigators with years of CPI experience, will maintain an ICE
certified undercover operation unit specifically focused on
counterproliferation investigations, and will be required to house a
sensitive compartmented information facility to ensure the capability
to receive and share classified information. The first CPI Center has
been established at the ICE Special Agent in Charge office in
Washington, DC. ICE is in the process of identifying and acquiring
funding for additional CPI Centers.
case example
In January 2007, ICE received information regarding the illegal
export of U.S. technology to entities representing Iran, a violation of
the U.S. trade embargo. A joint ICE, Defense Criminal Investigative
Service, and Department of Commerce Office of Export Enforcement
investigation conducted from January 2007 to March 2008 uncovered a
vast network of companies and entities based in Iran, the United Arab
Emirates, Malaysia, Canada, and Germany that were aggressively
procuring sensitive U.S. technology and U.S. military commodities.
Further investigation revealed that some of this technology was found
in IEDs deployed against coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The subjects identified during the course of the investigation
purchased, and then illegally exported to buyers in Iran, numerous
``dual use'' commodities (goods and technologies that have a commercial
application, but also could be used to further military or nuclear
potential, and could be detrimental to the foreign policy or national
security of the United States). The investigation revealed that as many
as eight individuals and eight corporations caused the export of 120
field-programmable gate arrays, more than 5,000 integrated circuits of
varying types, approximately 345 Global Positioning Systems, 12,000
Microchip brand microcontrollers, and a field communicator. All of
these items have potential military applications, including components
in IEDs. As a result of the investigation, 35 individuals and entities
involved in procurement and movement of sensitive military and dual use
goods to Iran were arrested, indicted or convicted.
conclusion
ICE agents are working tirelessly to ensure that IED components and
precursors do not reach the hands of terrorists and others who might
wish to inflict harm, and to prosecute those that subvert the rule of
law and threaten our national security. We look forward to continuing
to work with this subcommittee on this critical national security
issue. Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at
this time.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Sedney, thank you.
STATEMENT OF DAVID SEDNEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Sedney. Mr. Chairman, it's a pleasure to testify before
you again. General Shields and I have submitted to the
committee a joint statement that we ask that you enter into the
record and each of us have a few short remarks.
Senator Casey. It'll be entered in the record. Thank you.
Mr. Sedney. Thank you, sir.
Thank you again for inviting us to speak before you along
with our counterparts from the State Department, Department of
Homeland Security, and JIEDDO.
The ongoing threat that IEDs pose to the United States, to
NATO, to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and to our partner nations
is of great concern. Secretary Gates has made this, combating
the IED threat, a paramount--has made it clear that that is of
paramount importance to the Department of Defense.
As Brigadier General Shields will highlight, defeating IED
networks is a tough and complex fight. Successfully disrupting
these networks requires close cooperation both here in
Washington in the interagency, with our allies and partners
overseas, and particularly with Afghanistan and Pakistan. As my
colleagues have already described some of those efforts, I want
to focus on one other area.
As part of the President's Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy,
we are working to build a long-term strategic partnership with
the government and people of Pakistan. This partnership is
based on building mutual trust, identifying mutual interests,
and building a partnership that is designed to accomplish the
President's core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and
destroying al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
The importance of eliminating the IED threat within the
region is clear to both United States and Pakistan. It's
important to remember, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, that
Pakistan and its civilians and military are tragic victims of
IED attacks, with more than 10,000 civilians and more than
2,000 military personnel either killed or wounded by IEDs since
January 2008, a trend that has worsened as Pakistan has
expanded its efforts against the violent extremists that are on
its soil.
Both Pakistani civilian and military leadership realize
that IED networks are the most lethal security threat within
their own country, and that's been proven again within the past
week. This realization has led to increased cooperation from
Pakistan, particularly with the Pakistani military, on counter-
IED efforts. A number of--we have made progress on a number of
fronts, which I would be happy to brief you on more fully in a
classified setting.
As partnership and counter-IED efforts have improved, our
senior defense leaders will continue to engage with and work
with Pakistan on precursor supply chains. Our bilateral
engagements on ammonium nitrate and other precursor topics will
be key to these discussions. I have made this a priority in my
discussions with Pakistani colleagues and will continue to do
so.
There are many areas that need to be improved, as you
highlighted, Mr. Chairman. Among those are intelligence-sharing
as well as the issues of Pakistani regulatory capacity and law
enforcement capacity that you highlighted. Our Office of
Defense Representative in Pakistan has and will continue to
make this effort against ammonium nitrate and other precursors
a priority of their interactions with the Pakistani military.
IEDs have been a major cause and continue to be a major
cause of United States military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan
and play a significant role in shaping today's combat
environment. The Department of Defense is committed and is
focused on addressing this critical issue, which is essential
to the success of the United States strategy in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Thank you again for calling this important hearing and I
look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Sedney and Brigadier
General Shields follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of David S. Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia and BG Michael
H. Shields, Deputy Director, Operations and Requirements, Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
Chairman Casey, distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for inviting us to appear before you today on behalf of the men and
women of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) and the Department of Defense (DOD).
As part of the President's Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, we are in
the midst of building a strategic partnership with Pakistan based on
mutual interest, mutual trust, and mutual respect. President Obama has
said that ``America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's
security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that
the great potential of its people can be unleashed.'' Our partnership
with Pakistan is designed, in part, to accomplish our core regional
goal of disrupting, dismantling, and destroying al-Qaeda and its
extremist affiliates. The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, led by
Secretary of State Clinton and her Pakistani counterpart, Foreign
Minister Quereshi, has helped widen the scope of our partnership to
include all spheres of bilateral cooperation. The Strategic Dialogue
has helped elevate bilateral dialogue to advance this partnership, and
has also provided a forum to discuss the tough issues that we must face
as partners, from the transnational threat posed by extremist safe
havens in Pakistan to the threat posed by improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). Separate engagements at all levels of the Department of
Defense--from Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen, to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy and at working levels throughout the
Department--have begun to advance the dialogue with our Pakistani
partners in combating this threat. Because of the sensitivity of much
of our cooperation, as we are sure you understand, there are some
aspects of our discussions with Pakistan on which DOD would need to
brief members in a classified setting. We would welcome that
opportunity.
The importance of countering the threat posed by IEDs cannot be
overstated. IEDs have been a major cause of U.S. military deaths in
both Iraq and Afghanistan, and play a significant role in shaping
today's combat environment. DOD has prioritized countering the IED
threat, and it is a focus area for Secretary Gates. From the
establishment of JIEDDO as the nexus of DOD counter-IED efforts, to the
urgent prioritization of the development and acquisition of Mine-
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and the establishment of a
standing Senior Initiatives Group chaired by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Joint Staff
Director of Operations, DOD has brought significant resources to bear
in trying to counter the IED threat.
DOD responds to the IED problem from the military perspective, but
we have increasingly recognized that interagency cooperation and
cooperation with foreign governments are essential in addressing this
complex issue. Active coordination with U.S. Government diplomatic,
economic, intelligence, and military resources, as well as cooperation
from foreign governments, is the key to a successful effort to defeat
IED networks. We rely heavily on the Department of State to assist in
this area.
IEDs continue to represent the most lethal threat to U.S. and
coalition forces in Afghanistan and to the success of the U.S. strategy
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Homemade explosives (HME) and other bulk
explosives are the enabling factors in 9 of every 10 IEDs in
Afghanistan. IEDs have resulted in the deaths of 1,046 coalition
soldiers since January 2008, causing 2 of every 3 coalition fatalities
in Afghanistan. The challenge of interdicting this HME threat is
considerable and must be addressed using a comprehensive approach,
applying a range of assets in close partnership with our allies and
other countries in the region. Combating this threat is crucial to the
success of the U.S. strategy. The best way to obtain results is through
engagement with the international community, including the Government
of Pakistan, collaboration within the U.S. Government and with
multinational partners, and through the use of technology, training
tools, and methods, along with a substantial and enforceable regulatory
or legal regime.
JIEDDO assesses that the vast majority of significant precursors
for HME in Afghanistan--ammonium nitrate fertilizers and potassium
chlorate industrial chemicals--originate in, or transit through,
Pakistan. Additionally, it is assessed that a significant portion of
the weaponization process for HME precursors occurs in areas outside
Afghanistan. Complicating this picture is the dual-use nature of many
of these precursors; they are the product of legitimate industries that
produce items such as agricultural fertilizer and matches. Although
there is a limited manufacturing base in both fields, there is a larger
chemical broker and transportation industry that, often unwittingly,
makes up the IED supply chain. An additional challenge is the absence
or infancy of Pakistani regulatory and law enforcement regimes to
control the sale, transportation, or weaponization of these materials.
Should Pakistan institute an effective regulatory regime, it still
would require a much more robust enforcement capability than the one
that is currently in place. Once precursor materials have entered the
retail chain, efforts to restrict the movement of ammonium nitrate-
based fertilizer and other HME precursors into Afghanistan are hindered
by the high profit margins these products can bring to those who deal
in them. The economic incentive to smuggle becomes too high. It is
important to remember that Pakistan and its civilians and military are
tragic victims of IED attacks, with over 10,000 civilians and over
2,000 military personnel either killed or wounded by IEDs since January
2008. In our efforts with Pakistani military counterparts, they have
recognized the common threat of IEDs and have cooperated in ways that
have exceeded the expectations of some.
Our efforts to counter IEDs require what JIEDDO's Director,
Lieutenant General Michael Oates, calls a ``combined arms approach.''
This includes applying multiple material and nonmaterial solutions
along the long line of IED production and using them to detect and
disrupt IEDs in place or while being emplaced; IEDs constructed,
acquired, or transported; and the diversion of precursors for IED
manufacture both before and after weaponization.
Just as the IED supply chain is not limited by national borders,
the counter-IED response cannot be limited to the interdiction of HME
precursor materials in Afghanistan. Success against the supply of HME
precursor materials is essential to reduce the effect of IEDs on our
forces, as well as on government personnel and civilians in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. To achieve this success, JIEDDO will continue to employ
its three core functions and to integrate these functions: (1) rapid
response, (2) training, (3) and operations and intelligence fusion, to
achieve an effect greater than the sum of each individual effort
separately. Broader DOD efforts to focus intelligence, operational, and
acquisition efforts will also be key over the long term.
Although there is still much to be done, we will need to focus on
interrupting the IED supply chain, including through border
interdiction efforts. As much of the licit and illicit material
transport in Afghanistan is through smuggling and the black market, the
more success that we have at border interdictions, the greater the
reward for smugglers as the black market price goes up. Our success
means that we may soon reach a point of diminishing returns.
Although there is much to do, Pakistan's recognition of the
challenge has driven some progress. Through the Office of Defense
Representative-Pakistan, and with coalition partners, DOD continues to
work on collaborative efforts with Pakistan to enhance our collective
ability to defeat IED networks. If requested, DOD can provide
additional information in classified settings on our cooperative
efforts. Although DOD's efforts, along with other U.S. departments and
agencies, to work with the Government and Security Forces of Pakistan
on the IED-related challenges have only just begun, Pakistan recognizes
the threat IEDs pose to their own security, but faces significant
capability and capacity challenges. As with Coalition Forces in
Afghanistan, IEDs are the single-highest casualty-producing threat
against Pakistan military and security elements. The Pakistanis do
appear to recognize the importance of a multilateral, comprehensive
governmental solution to tackling the IED problem in order to protect
Afghan and Pakistani civilians, as well as the security units trying to
protect them.
There are additional efforts underway to develop needed
capabilities and partnerships with the Government of Pakistan. The
Department of Defense stands ready to bring its significant experience
and expertise to bear to optimize the responses to this problem, which
is essential to the success of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much, Mr. Sedney.
General.
STATEMENT OF BG MICHAEL H. SHIELDS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
OPERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS, JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO)
General Shields. Chairman Casey, thank you for the
invitation to appear before you today on behalf of the men and
women of the Joint IED Defeat Organization. On behalf of
Lieutenant General Oates, I'm honored to be here representing
JIEDDO.
To call our mission a challenging one would be a
considerable understatement. Improvised explosive devices
continue to represent the most lethal threat to United States,
coalition, and Afghan forces, as well as Pakistan security
forces and civilians. It's a weapon of tactical, operational,
and strategic influence. Homemade explosives and other bulk
explosives constitute approximately 80 to 90 percent of every
IED in Afghanistan. The topic of this hearing couldn't be more
relevant to the fight we now face.
We face an adaptive and agile enemy, determined to inflict
the most casualties, often in ways that expose them to the
least amount of risk, but always in a manner that's difficult
to predict due to range of options available to insurgents. The
enemy shifts its tactics, techniques, and procedures to adjust
to our behavior on the battlefield. These options include how
the device is detonated, ranging from remote-controlled and
victim-operated to command wire IEDs.
JIEDDO assists U.S. Central Command in multiple ways, to
include providing analysts and analytical tools for the
warfighter. This near real-time reachback analytical support
gives tactical commanders multiple layers of situational
awareness. Additionally, JIEDDO's rapid acquisition of material
and nonmaterial solutions supports efforts to attack networks,
defeat IEDs, and train forces.
JIEDDO also supports information-sharing through our Joint
Knowledge Information Fusion Exchange, referred to as JKnIFE,
and it's also accessible to the coalition, as well as IED and
HME recognition guides, handbooks, and test kits.
I've brought a couple of examples of some of our handbook
products that we provide both to U.S. forces and coalition
forces. We've got enough for the subcommittee. I've also
brought an example of calcium ammonium nitrate in its
fertilizer form, ammonium nitrate in its processed form, and
the commercial ammonium nitrate. Sir, if you'd like we can move
this forward, if you'd like to see this, and we can provide
copies of this at the conclusion as well.
Senator Casey. Sure. Thank you very much.
General Shields. The IED assembly line is not limited by
national borders, nor can the response be limited to the
interdiction of HME precursor materials in Afghanistan. The HME
threat is considerable and must be addressed using a
comprehensive approach by applying a range of assets in close
coordination with our allies and partners. The application of
economic, political, and military solutions to the HME-based
IED problem is the right approach. Success against the supply
of HME precursor materials wherever they exist is essential to
reducing the effect of IEDs on our troops and on those
government personnel and civilians who are critical to the
success foreign our counterinsurgency strategy.
Pakistan acknowledges the threat IEDs pose to their own
security. It suffered over 10,000 casualties since 2008 and, as
with coalition forces in Afghanistan, IEDs are the single
highest casualty-producing threat against Pakistani military
and security organizations, with over 2,000 military either
killed or wounded. The Pakistanis recognize the importance of
the multilateral comprehensive governmental solution to
tackling the IED problem in order to protect Afghan and
Pakistani civilians, as well as the security units trying to
protect them.
There are additional efforts under way, as mentioned
previously, to develop needed capabilities and partnerships
with the Government of Pakistan. The JIEDDO Deputy Director for
Operations Integration will travel to Pakistan in support of
CENTCOM over Thanksgiving, to participate in the Pakistan-
hosted counter-IED seminar with senior personnel of the
Pakistani military, Ministry of Interior, as well as our Office
of Defense Representative, Pakistan. The goal is to enhance
cooperation between the United States and Pakistan on counter-
IED efforts and assist Pakistan in developing a comprehensive
counter-IED strategy.
JIEDDO stands ready to respond to counter-IED requirements
generated from the combatant commanders and will continue to
support efforts with other U.S. agencies to work with the
government and security forces of Pakistan on this challenge.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to stand before the
subcommittee and I'm prepared to answer your questions.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
I've grateful for the testimony of all of our witnesses,
and also wanted to welcome Senator Coons from Delaware, who for
me becomes the third Senator from Delaware to serve on the
Foreign Relations Committee in the short time that I've been in
the Senate. When I got here Senator Biden was the chairman of
the committee, and then Senator Kaufman used to sit right over
there, and we welcome Senator Coons, unless you have anything
you wanted to say before we start questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the welcome
and the opportunity to join you in this important hearing. I
apologize for my late arrival. I had a previously scheduled
meeting. This is my first week.
I think this is a very important topic, and in reading the
briefing materials beforehand was reminded of just the
challenges that both our troops in the field face and that
civilians face in theater. A young man who grew up next door to
me in Delaware was killed by an IED December 11, 2005, and I
never forget every day that there are American service men and
women who are suffering either debilitating injuries or losing
their lives due to these weapons.
So I just wanted to command you and thank you for
organizing and pursuing this hearing and the conversation, the
multiagency and multilateral conversation, on stopping the IED
supply chain.
So thank you for the chance to speak, Senator.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator.
We'll go to a round of questions. We have some flexibility
today, so we don't have to be too restrictive on time. But I'll
try to keep within a reasonable amount of time, maybe 7
minutes? I'll try to keep within the committee rules and
traditions.
But Ms. Goodman, I wanted to start with you, with regard to
the State Department. You just returned from a visit to
Pakistan. You spoke in your testimony about the Counter-IED
Task Force. It's critically important that the American people
know that's happening. I wanted to get your sense of how that's
going so far in Pakistan, who will actively participate, and
what's your sense of how far along that task force is in
Pakistan.
Ms. Goodman. Thank you for your question, Senator. Our
Embassy in Islamabad, as well as the British High Commission,
have been working cooperatively with the Pakistani Government
for several months now, trying to talk to them about regulatory
best practices and trying to help them develop some overview of
how a domestic regulation might look. The Pakistanis have been
engaged, but, as you're well aware, we have not yet seen them
develop a comprehensive regulation that they've taken before
their national assembly. We're continuing to work with them on
that.
During our recent United States-Pakistan strategic
dialogue, we were able to have the issue of the ammonium
nitrate on our agenda, which was a step forward for Pakistan in
their public acknowledgment of addressing this issue with their
Pakistani interlocutors and the Pakistani public. So we took
that as a very positive sign that they are going to be more
forthcoming and more willing to have these negotiations on a
regular basis.
The national counter-IED forum that they're going to have
on the 25th of November will not be publicly open as far as we
understand it, but it will have broad participation from many
of the ministries within the Pakistani Government, notably led
by the Ministry of Interior, but it will also have
participation from provincial governments as well as from
several other ministries that have some level of involvement in
this, including the customs authorities. So for the Pakistanis
to convene all the stakeholders is really a significant step
forward. It will also have participation from the Pakistani
military, so this is a positive step in having the interagency
cooperation there.
Senator Casey. The one concern that we all have is that
there must be a sense of urgency, and it has to be a sense of
urgency within and throughout several countries, including our
own. What's your sense from having just returned from Pakistan?
Is there an urgency that is at the highest levels, or do you
still think it's not yet at that point?
Ms. Goodman. Senator, I can't promise you that this is the
top priority in Pakistan. But I can tell you that Ambassador
Holbrooke did raise this with the top levels of the Pakistani
Government. We've had discussions with President Zidari, Prime
Minister Gilani, the military leadership, and numerous
ministers involved in the process in the Pakistani Government.
So it is something that they are keenly aware of as a
strategic and important interest that we are following closely,
and they have promised to follow through and to move in their
system to develop a more comprehensive approach.
Senator Casey. In terms of the legislative mechanics, we
have our own challenges here with the movement of our
legislation, but what's your sense of the framework or the
timeline for that? Do you have any sense of that yet, or is it
too----
Ms. Goodman. I think it's a bit too early to have any
predictions on that, unfortunately, Senator.
Senator Casey. Well, I hope we can continue to both monitor
and push hard on that as best we can. I know that the State
Department has that concern.
I know that the strategic dialogue here in the United
States, I think even beyond this issue, more broadly, is
critically important to continue that dialogue. The last one
that took place here in the United States, was a few weeks ago
now--Secretary Clinton raised this issue with the Pakistani
leaders at that dialogue.
Ms. Goodman. It was on the agenda. We have 13 working
groups under the strategic dialogue and it was on the agenda
for more detailed and comprehensive discussion in our
counterterrorism and security working group. So that's where it
was discussed, with the expert leaders and the ministers who
participated in that session.
Senator Casey. I only have a few more minutes in this
round. But in terms of the Department of Defense, Mr. Sedney, I
wanted to ask you about what's your sense--to the extent that
you can comment, because I know some of this you can't get into
certain details--in a broad way as to the degree of intensity
or the priority that the Pakistani military places on this?
I ask you that with some knowledge of the strength of their
military and the strong leadership they have. The two visits
I've had in the last couple years to Pakistan I have on both
occasions been able to meet with General Qiyani, who's a very
capable military man. But I don't yet have a sense as to the--
I'm sure the awareness is there--whether or not this is a top
priority for his military or at some level close to his level
as the leader of their military.
Mr. Sedney. Mr. Senator--Mr. Chairman, rather, we found
that--and I think this is similar to our own experience with
IEDs over the course of our encountering them--that the
Pakistani military is to an increasingly and very serious
degree understanding the threat that they pose to their own
military and their own civilian population. We have raised this
issue at the highest levels, including with General Qiyani. As
I mentioned, I've raised it in my discussions. My boss, Under
Secretary Michelle Flournoy, has raised it in her discussions
with her Pakistani counterparts, and we have done that up and
down, up and down the chain.
What we found over the last year particularly is a very
responsive Pakistani military. There are a number of areas of
the Pakistani military where our cooperation sometimes
encounters roadblocks. This has not been one of them. The calls
get returned right away. The sense of urgency is increasing. Is
it as high as it might be? I think I'll leave that to the
Pakistanis to decide, but I can certainly say that it is
increasing very rapidly. The level of cooperation, the spirit
of cooperation, as the Pakistanis have been exposed to some of
the work that JIEDDO and the U.S. military has been doing into
counter-IEDs, they've found that work bringing them the
possibility of capabilities that they know they need.
I want to thank General Shields and his team for sending
people to the seminar next week during Thanksgiving to
participate in that. I expect that the interest of the
Pakistani military will only continue to grow, so it's on a
positive trend, getting close to where you're looking for, if
not there yet.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Casey, and thank you to
the panel for those informative answers.
If I might, to Ms. Goodman. What else can we be doing to
leverage support with regional allies to further strengthen the
regime that's evolving in Pakistan and to further strengthen
the domestic ban on ammonium nitrate importation in
Afghanistan? What else could we be doing with regional allies
or with partners in the field?
Ms. Goodman. Thank you, Senator. It's an excellent
question. The ammonium nitrate is certainly flowing from all of
Afghanistan's neighbors. The State Department has done some
demarches to the Central Asian states to try and assess what
their current regulatory regime is. Unfortunately, we did not
get a very comprehensive response back, simply because this is
the first time we've ever raised this issue with some of these
countries, so they had to do some homework themselves to
determine what their laws were on the books.
So we continue to work with the Central Asian states as
well to help them in trying to find a regulatory solution
there. The real winner in terms of making a difference is going
to be having more border coordination and more training of
their border and customs officials, so that they know how to
detect these types of materials going into Afghanistan. That's
what we're seeking to do, is to enhance that engagement.
Senator Coons. Is my perception that these borders,
broadly, are highly porous and poorly policed correct?
Ms. Goodman. That's 100 percent correct. They're incredibly
porous.
Senator Coons. And to Mr. Woods, if I might: I was very
interested to hear about Global Shield and the partnership
through the World Customs Organization. Is there some broader
multilateral partnership possible here with our more advanced
industrialized allies in precursor exports and materials that
are dual use? Does this set the stage for a broader
conversation about things that
are precursors for other production, whether narcotics, AN, in
other contexts? What else could we be doing through
multilateral organizations that would strengthen the regional
efforts around Afghanistan?
Mr. Woods. That is correct, Senator. Through the World
Customs Organization, we did hold this training seminar last
month, where 86 countries did participate. It wasn't totally
focused on Southeast Asia. In her opening statement, Ms.
Goodman stated how as far away as Sweden was shipping and
transshipping ammonium nitrate into Pakistan. So this is a
worldwide effort that we are looking at and looking at taking
this into the next step, and not just with the 14 precursor
chemicals, but down the road looking at other components and
other strategies to stop--for counterproliferation efforts.
Senator Coons. If I might, just a closing question to the
whole panel. How engaged and how helpful has the Karzai
administration been on the ground in Afghanistan in embracing,
adopting, and then actually enforcing the new regulatory regime
we're trying to press them toward, if I might?
Ms. Goodman. President Karzai was very helpful in issuing a
Presidential decree in January of this year to completely ban
the import of the fertilizer. As with everything that we do in
Afghanistan, it's a question of the capacity to implement.
We're continually working with the ministries involved and with
the border officials there to train them and to equip them in
how better to detect the ammonium nitrate and other precursors
as well.
But it's a slow process. I mean, it's going to have to be
an ongoing effort, with additional funding provided, so that we
can ensure that they're able to use the best technology and the
best resources available to ensure that they are living up to
their full capability in detecting this.
It's an ongoing effort with them. The cooperation that
we've received from the Ministry of Interior and from the
Presidency's Office once we made them aware of this issue was
quite good; the Department of Agriculture; they've all been
very cooperative.
To date, there has not been any regulation issued by the
Ministry of Interior there to create the permit system that is
needed for the importation of ammonium nitrate for either
mining or for road construction. So that is something that our
Embassy in Kabul is actively engaging on, to ensure that that
permit system is put in place and we're able to effectively
monitor it.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Mr. Woods. If I might add, Senator, additionally, this week
in Brussels there are Afghanistan customs officials and police
officials that are receiving Global Shield training and
learning the methodologies that we plan to deploy around the
globe in this endeavor. They have shown full commitment to
this, and right after President Karzai's decree there was a
500,000-pound seizure in Kandahar province that was the initial
success, and there have been other seizures to the like.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Mr. Sedney.
Mr. Sedney. Broadly, since the issuance of the decree,
which made possible the seizure of a lot of the ammonium
nitrate that was already in Afghanistan, we have had a series
of quite successful operations, as Deputy Assistant Secretary
Woods just mentioned one example. So the cooperation of the
Afghan security forces in going after these existing caches or
other caches of ammonium nitrates that have been brought in
since has resulted in a real dent in the amount that's there.
But, as, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned at the beginning, IEDs
continue--IEDs and ammonium nitrate continue to be a serious
problem. I think we've seen some change over the last several
months in the kinds of IEDs that are being used, but that's a
discussion that I've have to have at a classified level.
General Shields. Senator, JIEDDO is an enabler for the
combatant command. I wouldn't be able to comment on the
administration and would have to defer to State.
Senator Coons. Thank you. I appreciate the answer.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Coons.
I wanted to ask both General Shields and Mr. Woods. It's a
tough question to answer because you're predicting or making
judgments about what the implication of some action would be.
But if you had a full ban in Afghanistan, what's your sense of
the implications of that?
Mr. Woods. Well, I think the ban would have to go beyond
the borders of Afghanistan. The issue here is the smuggling
into Afghanistan, identifying those transshipment points and
the actual countries that are being utilized to smuggle into
Afghanistan the ammonium nitrate and other precursors.
Senator Casey. And in the absence of any legislative change
in Pakistan, are there ways right now that the border security,
border interdiction, could be beefed up on the Afghan side? I'm
just trying to think of ways that, instead of waiting for
legislative changes, is there more we could be doing on the
borders? And I'd ask that to the whole panel.
Mr. Woods. Well, that's part of our training technique,
capacity-building within these countries, is to look at the
trade data and look at diversion techniques that these
middlemen will utilize. The fact that they would, maybe not
market it as ammonium nitrate, but market it as something else,
and train them in the methodologies that we use in interdiction
here in the United States, to use at their own borders.
Senator Casey. Going back to Ms. Goodman, I think probably
a number of people were struck by one of the lines from your
testimony, looking at page 3, where you say, and I quote,
``Given the low level of usage for ammonium nitrate fertilizer
in Pakistan's domestic agricultural use, the customs data
indicates that import levels far exceed domestic usage and thus
may have been legally transshipped onward to Afghanistan.''
That alone I think indicates just numerically or
quantitatively that this is not a product that is essential for
farming or other use in Pakistan. When you present that data as
part of an argument or an assertion to the Pakistani civilian
leadership, what do they say? What's their response?
Ms. Goodman. Senators, in the conversations I've had
regarding this subject, they acknowledge that the calcium
ammonium nitrate is not the fertilizer of choice in Pakistan.
With very limited exception, I have found no one there that
even professes to use this among the farmers that we've talked
to.
Urea is the most common available fertilizer there. It is
certainly the cheapest and it is the most widely available.
Pakistan also uses a bit of DAP, but it is also a bit more
limited and more for some crops of export, to make them a bit
greener, if you will, before they're exported. So the calcium
ammonium nitrate is not something that is widely used.
These two plants that I mentioned do produce enough to meet
the domestic needs of Pakistan. We have every reason to believe
that the imports coming in are in excess of the domestic usage.
It's very hard to get specific trade data on this, particularly
in a place like Pakistan. The most recent data is from the
United Nations, the Food and Drug Organization, and so all the
trade data does support that by no means is CAN a fertilizer of
choice in Pakistan.
Senator Casey. I was going to ask, General Shields, I don't
know if you're able to walk through all of this, but just from
the point of view of transport and movement, can you describe
for us how--and I know in my opening I talked about that L.A.
Times story about the 80 tons transported in 1 day, a quantity
that can produce 2,500 IEDs.
To the extent that you can say, tell us how that happens?
How does that sizable--that kind of tonnage, how does that get
moved from one plant in Pakistan into Afghanistan on a single
day? Even if it were half, if it were 40 tons, just describe
for us, if you can, the movement of that, how it happens?
There's obviously--I'll say it; you don't have to--there's
definitively corruption and payoffs and all kinds of other. I
don't think there's any question about that. But tell us as
much as you can in this setting about how that happens?
General Shields. Sir, it was mentioned earlier, the
challenge with the porous borders. Of course, there's two main
POEs as well. There's a lot of effort going on to improve the
detect piece.
What I was going to mention on a previous question is the
training aspect for attacking the network in Afghanistan. It's
a capability that JIEDDO is capable of providing. We provide
analysts from regional command all the way down to battalion
and we provide analytical counter-IED support all the way down
to the battalion in support of the current intel uplift that's
ongoing.
But the ability to understand what we refer to as the
taxonomy of the network and the logistics piece and how they
move, that's a challenge. The piece that was brought up earlier
about the porous border, border security standards, how they're
disguising shipments, that is also challenging.
So I can't address the piece how it gets from plant to
border, but I can tell you that JIEDDO is focusing in on the
network piece and the different functional nodes and components
of the network and how they move within the country of
Afghanistan. Sir, the rest of the answer I'd request to submit
in a more classified forum.
Senator Casey. OK. Thank you.
I don't know if Senator Coons has another round, but I
wanted to pose one more in the couple seconds I have here. Can
you describe the degree to which Pakistani and Afghan senior
officials have interacted or cooperated? Do you have any sense
of that? Anyone, but I think Ms. Goodman maybe.
Ms. Goodman. As Mr. Woods has said, both countries
participated in the Global Shield training that we did in
Brussels. So there was some interaction there, and they both
received the same training. Then we know that there has been
some followup training with both governments as well
separately.
At the next session of our trilateral strategic dialogue
that we have--Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States--we've
already had some internal discussions saying that this would be
an issue which we hope to put on the agenda so that we can have
a more tripartite discussion on it. We don't yet have a date
set for that, that trilateral meeting, but we're anticipating
that it will happen early in the new year. So we will use that
opportunity to bring them together in a more cooperative
setting and have those discussions.
Senator Casey. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator. I'll just ask, if I
might, one or two more questions.
What do the Pakistanis offer as sort of the major
impediments or the major reasons they can't move more swiftly,
given the evidence you've suggested, to bar the export into
Afghanistan? We've talked about porous border. We've talked
about a lack of clarity about the ways that they're moving it.
What's their major reason?
If I hear you correctly, it's really not broadly used
domestically. There would be, in response to Senator Casey's
question, no dramatic impact on their domestic construction or
farming industries. What's their major reason for not being
more active, more aggressive, more cooperative on this issue
with us?
Ms. Goodman.
Ms. Goodman. Senator, I think they are being cooperative in
working on this issue. I would note that, even in the United
States, we've not yet developed a pure regulatory force to
track this and to monitor the shipments. So it is quite
difficult. They are working to try and develop some mechanisms
to trace the imports with the freight forwarders and the
movements internal in the country, but there really isn't the
sophisticated use of technology in a lot of this trading. It's
a very undocumented economy. A lot of this is just simple
barter in the markets, with cash changing hands. So the
paperwork that exists here certainly would not be available
there. It's just a very difficult process to try to put the
paperwork in place and the monitoring in place.
But it is something that they're working on.
Senator Coons. I may have missed this in the previous
testimony, but urea and DAP do not have the same lethal
potential when mixed with fuel oil, or are they equally
effective? My sense was that they are effective fertilizers,
not effective components to explosives.
Ms. Goodman. That's correct, sir. It's the nitrogen that
causes the problem. So it's the calcium ammonium nitrate that
is by far the most lethal in these attacks, and the urea is a
more natural form that's easily used for the fertilizer, but
doesn't have--it can be used, but it's much more difficult to
do so, is my understanding.
Senator Coons. To Mr. Woods: Are there efforts globally to
put tracers or tagging molecules or identifying elements within
these when produced in more reliable or advanced ally nations,
like Sweden for example, that would help us trace the flow of
ammonium nitrate through the global security?
Mr. Woods. This is part of our project, is to have
countries be educated to what their ammonium nitrate exports
are doing and who they are selling them to, at the same time
tracing that trade data and making sure that it's complete and
correct. We're in the process of doing an analytical product to
look at the trade data of who is actually shipping, making
shipments out, and who is bringing shipments in of this
ammonium nitrate.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Ms. Goodman.
Ms. Goodman. I'll just add, Senator, that the State
Department does have a subgroup that we're working on to work
with the private sector, to work with industry and the
fertilizer institutes, to do just as you're saying, to find
ways to make the product itself less explosive and also to find
ways that we might be able to use some taggants and some
traceants to have a more effective marketing trace here and in
Pakistan.
Senator Coons. Thank you all very much.
Senator Casey. Thanks very much.
We've heard a good bit about the plant at Multan. Before I
ask the question about the owners of the plant, I wanted to ask
you a question about that. What, if anything, can you tell us
about the impact of the floods on that plant or on the flow
itself? I'm assuming it's--published reports say it's slowed
down. Do you have any current kind of status report on that?
Ms. Goodman. The plant owner in Multan is someone that is
very well known to the U.S. Embassy and, more specifically, to
the consulate in Lahore. It's a family that has been very
cooperative with any request that we've made to them. They've
allowed us to come to numerous site visits. They've really
extended all courtesies and all efforts to assist us in
anything that we have engaged with them on. We have no reason
to anticipate that that will change in the future in any way,
shape, or form.
In regards to the floods, this is actually an incredibly
appropriate question, Senator, because we've seen that one-
fifth of Pakistan was under water. Significant loss of
agricultural production. We know that in order to meet some
basic food security needs in Pakistan they will have to do some
very quick, rapid planting. Currently they're working on what
they call the rabi season for wheat, just to get it in the
ground as quickly as possible, to do an early harvest.
So there will have to be a significant amount of fertilizer
used in order to basically stave off the food insecurity
issues. Right now, there are many countries that are working to
provide some assistance so that Pakistan can get the seeds and
the fertilizer that they need. Most of the imports of
fertilizer so far that have been announced by other governments
are in the form of urea, just because that is the preferred
fertilizer in the region. But this is something that we're
going to be monitoring very closely, because it will be
essential for Pakistan to have the fertilizer in order to do
the early harvest and replanting that they need to do because
of the floods.
Senator Casey. In light of the floods or because of the
floods, was there any diminution in the productive capacity of
that plant?
Ms. Goodman. I think because of it there hasn't been as
much demand, so we've seen some of----
Senator Casey. It wasn't that the plant was adversely
impacted?
Ms. Goodman. Not in the least, no.
Senator Casey. I was going to ask you about the owners and
you spoke, you spoke to that. You're asserting that they have
been cooperative and they share this concern. Is there anything
that we have attempted to do or we can do in terms of
engagement with those owners, short of--prior to any kind of
legislative or any other kind of change? Is there any way that
they've helped us to provide the kind of support you'd want,
whether it's tagging of bags or some other way to track the
flow of ammonium nitrate right from the plant? Or maybe there's
not much that the owner can do.
Ms. Goodman. In my conversations with the owners of the
plant, they've been receptive to anything that we want to
suggest, because they are very concerned about this. This
obviously has an impact on Pakistani citizens as well. So they
are actually seeking advice and seeking input from us on things
that we would advise that they can do to either put taggants or
traceants or things that could help in determining the impact
of this.
So we're in constant engagement with them about some
technologies that could be used. Again, they're very receptive
and very open to any input that we want to give them.
Senator Casey. You list the number of initiatives or
strategies that are in place, some just getting under way. You
list Project Global Shield, the counter-IED forum, the
beginnings of that in Pakistan, what JIEDDO is doing, what
Defense is doing, what State is doing, what Homeland Security
is doing. And you go down that list. I guess I have a couple of
questions. One is, how do we measure results of all of those
efforts? Because for the American people, I think this issue
becomes just pretty fundamental. They hear day after day people
being killed, or soldiers being killed, mostly soldiers, but
civilians as well, so they hear a lot about that. They hear a
good bit about IEDs and they I think are increasingly hearing
about the topic of ammonium nitrate.
But it's difficult for us to be able to say, well, we have
Project Global Shield in place, they're working on legislation,
this U.S. agency is doing this, you go down that list. But
they're probably going to look at someone like me and say, but
where are the results and how do we measure that? I know in
some ways it's premature to measure some results, because
you're just--some of these efforts are just getting under way.
So it's a tough question, but I want to open it up for the
whole panel, about how do we measure and when should we
measure, in terms of the slowing down or substantially
impacting the flow of ammonium nitrate from Pakistan or other
places into Afghanistan that threatens our troops? Any thoughts
on that?
Mr. Sedney. Mr. Chairman, you're absolutely right that the
only thing that matters is results. So far we've had the
beginnings--in Pakistan, we've had the beginnings of results.
We've had more results in Afghanistan, as Mary Beth Goodman
laid out. We are pushing this urgently.
But in terms of measuring what we're doing--and the
measurement, of course, is the safety of our troops, the safety
of Afghan military and civilians and Pakistani military and
civilians--the responsiveness that I described earlier that
we've been getting from the Pakistan military, and I think Mary
Beth has been saying on the same side from the Pakistani
civilian side, is encouraging, but there is a long, long way to
go.
Maintaining the focus on this that you're bringing, that
this hearing brings to the issue, I think is quite important,
because changing behavior, adding capacity--and Pakistan, as
Mary Beth Goodman has laid out, lacks a lot of capacities. So
it's both a matter of them taking regulatory steps, but, as in
the case of Afghanistan as well, the implementation is going to
require the training and support that JIEDDO's going to be able
to provide. It's going to require the training and support that
DHS and others can provide.
At the same time, I want to caution--and I may ask General
Shields to say as well--as we move on ammonium nitrate, the
enemy is adaptive. There will be other ways of coming after us
with IEDs. This is a struggle which as we've gone through the
past year's in Iraq and Afghanistan we've found that we have to
keep looking ahead as well. I know that General Shields and his
colleagues at JIEDDO are doing that as well.
I look forward to coming back, and I'm sure my colleagues
do as well, in really a matter of months, because I think we
are on the prospect of progress. But I welcome your holding us
accountable to that and having us come back and do this hearing
again within, as I said, in a matter of months, to see if those
prospects that we're describing have turned into the reality
you're seeking.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
General, do you have anything you wanted to add to that?
General Shields. Sir, just to echo the comments that have
been made. JIEDDO continues to focus on gaps and
vulnerabilities. We'll continue to focus on increasing the
capacity and the capability of U.S. and coalition forces. As
you know, we're providing support in Hornfels as well, and I
think we need to continue to increase the capability of the
Afghan security forces as well.
We've talked comprehensive approach. How do you make it so
expensive that it compels the threat to make a choice between
that and making payroll? Those are some other things that we
need to be looking at as well. But JIEDDO is focused on those
gaps and vulnerabilities and we'll continue to maintain that
focus and are training and assisting in support of CENTCOM both
in theater with the RSOY piece as well as back in the States at
our combat training centers. We've got a mobile training team
capacity. We can bring the training to the forces in theater.
We can bring it to them at host station. We support all of the
COCOMs with that capacity as well.
Senator Casey. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
If I might, just a final question to Ms. Goodman. Given the
dramatic amount of relief from the flooding that's going to be
needed and that hopefully the United States is involved in
delivering, both through relief agencies privately and through
our government, I just want to make sure I understood. I was
pleased to hear there was a conversation between Ambassador
Holbrooke and President Zidari. Did Secretary Clinton also have
the opportunity to press this issue, and what was the response
of the Pakistani leadership and administration to this issue?
And is there more that this body can or should be doing to help
press the issue with the Pakistani government?
Ms. Goodman. Senator, I was referring to the trip that
we've just returned from. Actually, on Tuesday night Ambassador
Holbrooke and I returned from Pakistan. So we were able to have
some of these discussions as recently as this week with
President Zidari and Prime Minister Gilani and other senior
leaders in Pakistan. So they are aware of this issue now. It's
not something that necessarily had been brought to their
attention until several months, maybe a year ago. So now we're
raising the awareness beyond just the military channels, but
also the civilian channels in Pakistan, so that there is a more
coordinated interagency response there and we can move forward
on some of these regulatory issues with them through their
national assembly.
The followup will continue. I mean, this is something that
we'll be raising on all of our trips out there. Secretary
Clinton is certainly aware of the issue and has had
conversations herself regarding this issue. But it is something
that we continue to raise with the highest level of
interlocutors there.
Senator Coons. And you found them to be generally
receptive, or----
Ms. Goodman. Absolutely, sir. We've been working with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others to try and again do some
education so that they see the implications of this, and also
to make them aware of how concerned we are, but also of the
internal dynamics that they face with their private sector on
this issue. This is a legally traded good, so having to develop
this regulatory process is something that they're looking at
and will continue to follow up with us on.
But they so far have been incredibly receptive to doing
this. It's just a question of how do you do it, what's the best
method of doing it. Again, we continue to have these
conversations and we're going to continue to have them until we
see some resolution on the ground.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. I know we have to wrap up. Thank you,
Senator Coons. I appreciate your questions and being here at
kind of a late hour for a hearing. In the Senate we don't often
have hearings at this hour.
Just by way of two or three things on summation, and I want
to allow each of our witnesses a final comment if you would
like. But on this question of engagement at the highest levels,
I think it's critically important that Secretary Clinton,
Secretary Gates, Secretary Napolitano at every possible level,
that this gets raised and repeated. It's like everything else
that we see every day of our lives. Unless we repeat ourselves
and be that squeaky wheel and keep after this, it will drift.
There's nothing that substitutes for the leader of a major
U.S. Government agency, leaders of our government, raising it
over and over again with the Pakistanis, just as we have to,
members of the Senate as well, have to do that. And I'll
continue to do that.
I want to thank you for this testimony today. I don't know
if any of our witnesses--do you have anything you want to add
to your testimony? Of course, your full testimony will be made
part of the record and we'll leave the record open for a number
of days for other members to submit questions, and I'll
certainly have written questions as well. But anything else
that anyone wants to add?
[No response.]
Thank you very much. We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:46 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
