[Senate Hearing 111-778]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-778
FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FY11 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 24, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Clinton, Hon. Hillary R., Secretary of State, Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators:
John F. Kerry............................................ 40
Richard G. Lugar......................................... 69
Russell D. Feingold...................................... 109
Jim Webb................................................. 114
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut,
prepared statement............................................. 40
(iii)
FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FY11 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez,
Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, Isakson, Risch,
DeMint, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. This hearing will come to order.
Madam Secretary, we are delighted to welcome you back here
before the committee. If I can just say quickly, as soon as we
have a quorum, Madam Secretary, we are going to interrupt for a
goal that I know you will support wholeheartedly, which is to
get a bunch of State Department nominations out of here.
[Laughter.]
And a couple of legislative items. So if you don't mind, we
will interrupt to do that. This was a meeting that we had
scheduled during the snowstorm. So it obviously didn't take
place.
I don't think any of us could think of a time in our
history when we have had a greater need for energetic diplomacy
to make the case for America globally. And we appreciate your
incredibly hard work and your many travels in the effort to do
just that, and we welcome the chance to hear from you today.
The international affairs budget is the backbone of our
civilian efforts worldwide. And from fighting HIV/AIDS to
supporting our aid workers and our diplomats on the front-line
states like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, this budget
secures the tools that we need for a more effective foreign
policy.
I think the Secretary would join me in agreeing that the
funds we have are not all that many of us wish we could have.
But we are living in a difficult fiscal environment, and they
are, nevertheless, vitally needed for our national security.
As Defense Secretary Gates said in expressing his regret
that America effectively abandoned Afghanistan after the 1980s,
``If we abandon these countries once we are in there and
engaged, there is a very real possibility that we will pay a
higher price in the end.''
It is with this history in mind and the lessons learned the
hard way that we turn to the budget today to have this
discussion. This year's total international affairs budget
request of $58.5 billion represents a 2.8-percent increase over
fiscal year 2010 amounts, including this year's supplemental.
This money is a fraction of a fraction--just 1.4 percent--of
the overall budget of our country.
We are discussing just one-sixteenth of our national
security budget, and compare that with the 2011 Defense budget
of $708 billion. It is clear, at least to this Senator, that
our foreign policy is somewhat out of balance.
This year's budget represents the beginning of our efforts
to change that and to move funds that had migrated elsewhere
back to the State Department budget. One-quarter of the
additional $6 billion in this budget for Iraq, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan is for programs previously funded through the
Defense Department, including Iraqi police training and the
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. As we grow our
civilian capacity, we are going to have to defend civilian
budgets for programs that are literally vital to our security
no matter how they are funded.
As we discussed last year, I believe that Congress ought to
get back into the business of writing authorizing legislation.
Senator Lugar and I have recently introduced legislation
authorizing the State Department's management and operations
and passed the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and
Accountability Act out of this committee.
Madam Secretary, I am pleased to support your budget
request for robust funding for the international affairs
budget, and I look forward to hearing from you, as I know all
the members of the committee do here, on a full range of
foreign policy challenges, which is always what these hearings
take advantage of.
For my part, if I can just say very, very quickly, I am
really pleased to see that this budget includes a 38-percent
increase in funding to address international climate change,
especially in the wake of Copenhagen. I want to just say
something about that.
A lot has been said about what wasn't accomplished at
Copenhagen. But the fact is that all the parties who went there
knew there wasn't going to be, nor was there an expectation of
a final treaty or agreement. What was accomplished has not
received the attention that it deserves.
The Copenhagen Accord united the world's foremost emitters
and most of the rest of the nations behind an unprecedented new
commitment to reduce emissions and report on their progress.
And for the first time, nations agreed to financing targets. We
were able to convince others to take action in large part
because we made commitments ourselves.
President Obama told the world, ``I am confident that
America will fulfill the commitments that we have made--cutting
our emissions in the range of 17 percent by 2020, and by more
than 80 percent by 2050 in line with final legislation. We have
charted our course, we have made our commitments, and we will
do what we say.'' And those are the words of the President.
As a country, we have put our credibility on the line, and
I look forward to working with members of this committee and
others, as we are now with Senator Graham, Senator Lieberman,
and others, to get a comprehensive energy, jobs, energy
independence, pollution reduction, and climate bill through the
Senate.
Madam Secretary, I am eager to hear your thoughts about how
you think we can keep our word on the range of issues, not just
from the Copenhagen Accord, but the adaptation assistance and
the other issues. Needless to say, there are more issues on the
table perhaps than at any time in recent memory, all of them
consequential--from Iran to North Korea, the Middle East--and
you are engaged in all of them. We look forward to having a
good discussion with you about them today.
Let me just thank you again on behalf of the country. I
think all of us are appreciative of your extraordinary
expenditure of energy. And we are particularly grateful to your
Department and others for the emergency response to Haiti. It
has been a tremendous effort.
I want to thank many of the people that we have worked with
directly who have helped families through a very difficult
period, some in Massachusetts, and elsewhere. We are grateful
to you and to our country, really, for the response. It has
been a remarkable response and, I think, appropriate.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming
Secretary Clinton. We are pleased to have the opportunity to
examine not only the State Department budget, but also the
priorities and policies reflected in its numbers.
Our discussion of the foreign affairs budget comes at a
time of great domestic economic stress. Many American families
are dealing with lost jobs, falling income, and declining
security. Our Nation is also attempting to address a national
debt situation that limits our policy options and could have
grave economic consequences in the near future. In this
context, our foreign affairs budget must efficiently deal with
our most immediate problems, as well as address negative trends
that could undermine the breathing space necessary to promote
domestic recovery and solvency.
We should start with the recognition that secure
international conditions are inherently fragile. We have to
expect and prepare for international political, economic, and
security shocks such as wars, terrorist attacks, energy
disruptions, and even natural disasters, as we have seen in
Haiti. World events can undercut our own economy's ability to
recover and necessitate emergency expenditures that put further
pressure on the national budget. This is especially true at a
time of global economic stress. We know from history that
societies living with severe economic conditions often do not
make good political choices. Economic desperation can spawn
ethnic rivalries, demagogic governments, extremism, and violent
conflict within and between nations.
The United States is heavily engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and Pakistan. These front-line states will require substantial
resources, and it is vital that these funds are used
effectively. Each of these countries presents unique and
difficult transparency challenges. If our investments are to be
successful, we must ensure that strong implementation,
monitoring, and review mechanisms are in place that can account
for the vast amounts projected to be spent in the coming years.
Beyond areas of heavy diplomatic and military presence, the
most critical expenditures are those that prevent problems from
spiraling into crises. In my judgment WMD proliferation, energy
insecurity, and global food shortages are the underlying
threats most likely to create the type of instability that can
lead to conflict and thereby derail our domestic agenda. I know
the President and Secretary Clinton share my concern with these
problems.
I appreciate that additional funding is being devoted to
the State Department's nonproliferation and energy diplomacy
activities. Countering the spread of biological, nuclear, and
chemical threats requires robust engagement around the globe,
and Department nonproliferation experts are making important
contributions in the former Soviet States, Iraq, and elsewhere.
State Department efforts to expand the Nunn-Lugar programs in
front-line states will only grow in the years ahead. Likewise,
bolstering multilateral nonproliferation mechanisms, such as
the International Atomic Energy Agency is a vital contribution
to meeting the threats of WMD.
The Foreign Relations Committee has paid much attention to
the impacts of energy security on our foreign policy. I am
encouraged that more emphasis is being given to energy concerns
at high levels of the State Department. Our energy crisis is
not defined by any single threat. Our current energy mix
produces near-term concerns of foreign oil supply manipulation
and price volatility, which will grow over time. Wasted
economic gains from attainable energy efficiencies are a drag
on economic recovery. We are also concerned about the possible
crises that could occur if dramatic climate change takes hold.
While some threats share solutions, others require us to
prioritize policies commensurate with the relative immediacy of
these threats.
I especially appreciate the strong and visible commitment
that Secretary Clinton has made to addressing global hunger.
Unless nations work together to reverse negative trends in
agricultural productivity, we may experience frequent food
riots and perhaps warfare over food resources. We almost
certainly will have to contend with mass migration and
intensifying global health issues stemming from malnutrition.
With these factors in mind, Senator Casey and I introduced
the Global Food Security Act last year. We are hopeful that it
will serve both as a practical starting point for improving the
efficiency of U.S. and global efforts in this area and as a
rallying point for those who agree that food security should
play a much larger role in our national security strategy.
The Lugar-Casey bill, which was passed by the Foreign
Relations Committee on May 13, 2009, is the product of more
than 2 years of study involving numerous foreign country visits
and consultations with agriculture and development experts.
Over the course of the last year, the administration, under
Secretary Clinton's leadership, has undertaken its own
intensive study of food security. As we have compared notes
with administration officials, it has become clear that the
Secretary's Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative has
reached many of the same conclusions as we reached on the most
efficient ways to expand food production and address hunger.
Both the Lugar-Casey bill and the Global Hunger and Food
Security Initiative focus on increasing agricultural
productivity and incomes, promoting research and technology,
being attentive to the special role of women farmers, and
emphasizing the nutritional needs of children. Both initiatives
would construct partnerships with host country governments,
indigenous organizations, institutions of higher learning, and
the private sector. I look forward to working with Secretary
Clinton to pass the Global Food Security bill.
I would also mention the importance of fixing our foreign
assistance programs. If we are to avoid inefficient
experimentation, USAID must have a decisionmaking role and the
capacity to evaluate programs and disseminate information about
best practices and methods. These goals are reflected in the
bill that Senator Kerry and I introduced last year, S. 1524,
the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act.
I am eager to review the State Department's Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review and the National Security
Council's Presidential Study Directive on Development when they
are ready. But in the meantime, Congress should be offering its
own ideas on how to improve our Government's development
capacity. And the Kerry-Lugar foreign assistance reform bill
has strong support in the aid community and is cosponsored by a
bipartisan group of 24 Senators, 11 of whom are members of the
Foreign Relations Committee. This level of backing for a bill
related to foreign assistance is extremely rare. The bill has
garnered wide support because it strengthens USAID and
emphasizes greater evaluation and transparency of our foreign
assistance programs to ensure we maximize the dollars that are
available. I am hopeful that the executive branch will
recognize that a bill cosponsored by a majority of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and nearly a quarter of the full
Senate should be given substantial weight in its review
process.
We appreciate very much that Secretary Clinton is with us
today. We look forward to our discussion on these and other
matters.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
We do have a quorum now. Let me move quickly to the agenda
so we can get to the Secretary's testimony.
[Recessed.]
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, thank you for letting us do
that, and we look forward to your testimony. I appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY R. CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Lugar, members of the committee. It is a real pleasure
to be back here in the Senate, to be with all of you and
participate in this important hearing.
When I was last here to discuss our budget, I emphasized my
commitment to elevating diplomacy and development as core
pillars of American power. And since then, I have been
heartened by the bipartisan support of this committee and the
rest of Congress.
I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member and all
of the members for your bipartisan support in moving State
Department nominees. One hundred fourteen were confirmed in
2009. We are now looking to get up and get nominated for your
consideration the leadership team at AID, and we are very
grateful for the expeditious support, and we hope they can move
quickly when they hit the floor. But I thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
And let me also take this opportunity to express
appreciation on behalf of the men and women who work every day
at the State Department, at USAID, here in our country and
around the world to put our foreign policy in action.
The budget we are presenting today is designed to protect
America and Americans and to advance our interests and values.
Our fiscal year 2011 request for the State Department and USAID
totals $52.8 billion. That is a $4.9 billion increase over
2010.
But as the chairman has pointed out, of that increase, $3.6
billion will go to supporting efforts in front-line states--
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Other funding will grow by
$1.3 billion, which is a 2.7-percent increase that will help
address global challenges, strengthen partnerships, and ensure
that the State Department and USAID are equipped with the right
people and resources.
Over the past 6 weeks in Haiti, we have been reminded yet
again of the importance of American leadership. I am very proud
of what our country has done, and we will continue to work with
our Haitian and international partners to address ongoing
suffering and transition from relief to recovery.
But I am also acutely aware that this is a time of great
economic strain for many of our fellow Americans. As a former
Senator, I know what this means for the people you represent
every single day.
So, for every dollar we spend, as Senator Lugar said, we
have to show results. That is why this budget must support
programs vital to our national security, our national
interests, and our leadership in the world, while guarding
against waste, duplication, irrelevancy. And I believe that we
have achieved those objectives in this budget.
Now, these figures are more than numbers on a page. They
tell the story of challenges we face and the resources needed
to overcome them. We are fighting two wars that call on the
skill and sacrifice of our civilians, as well as our troops.
We have pursued a dual-track approach to Iran that has
exposed its refusal to live up to its responsibilities and
helped us achieve a new unity with our international partners.
Iran has left the international community little choice but to
impose greater costs for its provocative steps, and we are now
working actively with our partners to prepare and implement new
measures to pressure Iran to change its course.
We have also achieved unprecedented unity in our response
to North Korea's provocative actions, even as we leave the door
open for a restart of the six-party talks. And we are moving
closer by the day to a fresh nuclear agreement with Russia, one
that advances our security while furthering President Obama's
long-term vision of a world without nuclear weapons.
With China, we seek areas of common purpose while standing
firm where we differ. We are making concrete our new beginning
with the Muslim world. We are strengthening partnerships with
allies in Europe and Asia, with friends in our hemisphere, and
with countries around the world, from India to Indonesia to
South Africa, Brazil, and Turkey. And we are working, under the
leadership of former Senator George Mitchell, to end the
impasse between Israelis and Palestinians.
At the same time, we are developing a new architecture of
cooperation to meet transnational global challenges like
climate change and the use of our planet's oceans. With regard
to the latter, I want to reiterate my support for U.S.
accession to the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Our country
stands to gain immensely from this treaty. Everything we know
from what we are picking up with respect to other countries'
use of the tools under the Law of the Sea demonstrates that we
will lose out in economic and resource rights, in terms of
environmental interests, and national security.
In so many instances, our national interest and the common
interest converge. We are promoting human rights from Africa to
Asia to the Middle East, the rule of law, democracy, Internet
freedom. We are fighting poverty, hunger, and disease, and we
are working to ensure that economic growth is broadly shared,
principally by addressing the role of girls and women.
And I want to applaud the chairman and the subcommittee
chairwoman, Barbara Boxer, for putting this issue on the map of
the Foreign Relations Committee.
Now, our agenda is ambitious because our times demand it.
America is called to lead. I think we all believe that. And
therefore, we need the tools and the resources in the 21st
century to exercise that leadership wisely and effectively. We
can bury our heads in the sand and pay the consequences later,
or we can make hard-nosed, targeted investments now. Let me
just highlight three areas where we are making significant new
investments.
First, the security of front-line states. In Afghanistan,
we have tripled the number of civilians on the ground.
Civilians are embedded with our troops in Marjah, in the combat
operations going on. As soon as an area is cleared, they are
part of the American team, along with our international allies,
who go in to hold and build.
Our diplomats and development experts are helping to build
institutions, expand economic opportunities, and provide
meaningful alternatives for insurgents ready to renounce
violence and join their fellow Afghans in the pursuit of peace.
In Pakistan, our request includes $3.2 billion to combat
extremism, promote economic development, strengthen democratic
institutions, and build a long-term relationship with the
Pakistani people. That is the vision of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman
initiative, and this includes funding for that. And I want to
thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, for your
leadership.
Our request also includes a 59-percent increase in funding
for Yemen, Senator Feingold, to help counter the extremist
threat and build institutions and economic opportunity.
In Iraq, we are winding down our military presence and
establishing a more normal civilian mission. Our civilian
efforts will not, and cannot, mirror the scale of our military
presence, but rather, they must provide assistance consistent
with the priorities of the Iraqi Government.
So our request includes $2.6 billion for Iraq. These are
resources that will allow us to support the democratic process
and ensure a smooth transition to civilian-led security
training and operational support.
As these funds allow civilians to take full responsibility
for programs, the Defense budget for Iraq will be decreasing by
about $16 billion. That is a powerful illustration of the
return on civilian investment and illustrates the point that
the chairman was making that this is really part of the
security budget for the United States and should be seen as
part of that whole.
We are blessed with the best troops in the world, as we
have seen time and again. But we also need to give our civilian
experts the resources to do the civilian jobs, and this budget
takes a step in that direction. It includes $100 million for a
State Department complex crisis fund, replacing the 1207 fund
through which the Defense Department directed money toward
crisis response. And it includes support for the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, which previously fell under
the Defense Department as well.
Secretary Gates and I are working literally hand in hand
and are committed to having a seamless relationship between the
Defense Department and the State Department and USAID to
further American security.
The second major area is investing in development. And this
budget makes targeted investments in fragile societies, which,
in our interconnected world, bear heavily on our own security
and prosperity. These investments are a key part of our effort
to get ahead of crisis rather than just responding to it,
positioning us to deal effectively with threats and challenges
that lie ahead.
The first of these is in health. Building on our success in
treating HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis, our Global Health
Initiative will invest $63 billion over 6 years, starting with
$8.5 billion in FY11, to help our partners address specific
diseases and, equally importantly, build strong, sustainable
health systems as they do.
This administration has also pledged to invest at least
$3.5 billion in food security over 3 years, and this year's
request includes $1.6 billion, of which $1.2 billion is funded
through the State Department. And I greatly appreciate the work
that Senator Lugar and Senator Casey have done to help target
the United States effort when it comes to global hunger and
food security. So this funding will focus on countries that
have developed effective, comprehensive strategies where
agriculture is central to prosperity and hunger remains
widespread.
On climate change, we could not agree with the chairman
more. Therefore, we have requested $646 million to promote the
United States as a leader in green technology and to leverage
other leaders' cooperation, including through the Copenhagen
Accord, which, for the first time--to underscore the chairman's
point--brings developing and developed countries together.
This is such an important initiative. We need leadership
from the rest of the world. This is an opportunity for us to
push this initiative and to ensure that we have support to give
to core climate change activities and to spread the burden
among other countries so that they share part of the
responsibility in meeting this global challenge.
The budget also includes $4.2 billion for humanitarian
assistance programs. Our efforts in Haiti have made clear that
State and USAID must be able to respond quickly and
effectively.
All of these initiatives are designed to enhance American
security, help people in need, and give the American people a
strong return on their investments. Our aim is not to create
dependency. We don't want to just pass out fish. We want to
teach people to fish. And we want to help our partners devise
solutions they can sustain over the long term. And essential to
this is a focus on advancing equality and opportunity for women
and girls. They are the key drivers for economic and social
progress.
And that brings me to the third area that I want to
highlight. None of this can happen if we do not recruit, train,
and empower the right people for the job.
The State Department and USAID are full of talented,
committed public servants. But unfortunately, we have too often
failed to give them the tools they need to carry out their
missions on the ground. Rather than building their expertise,
we have too often relied on contractors, sometimes with little
oversight and often with greater cost to the American taxpayer.
This budget will allow us to expand the Foreign Service by
over 600 positions, including an additional 410 positions for
the State Department and 200 for USAID. It will also allow us
to staff the stand-by element of the Civilian Reserve Corps, a
critical tool for responding to crises.
Now, while deploying these personnel generates new expenses
in some accounts, it does reduce expenses in others by changing
the way we do business. We are ending an overreliance on
contractors and finding opportunities to save money by bringing
these functions into Government and improving oversight.
So, Mr. Chairman, one thing should be very clear from this
budget. The State Department and USAID are taking a lead in
carrying out the United States foreign policy and national
security agenda. As we finish the first Quadrennial Diplomacy
and Development Review and as the White House finishes the
coordination of the Presidential Directive, we have a unique
opportunity to define the capabilities we need and then to
match resources with priorities.
The QDDR will help ensure that we are more effective and
accountable. And I want to thank all of you for your individual
contributions on so many of these issues that are important not
only to your constituents, but to our country and the world.
And Mr. Chairman, I look forward to continuing to work
closely with this committee, and I would be pleased to take
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, it is
a pleasure to be with you today. When I was last here to discuss our
budget, I emphasized my commitment to elevating diplomacy and
development as core pillars of American power. Since then, I have been
heartened by the bipartisan support of this committee and the rest of
Congress. Let me take this opportunity to thank you, on behalf of the
men and women who work every day around the world to put our foreign
policy into action.
The budget we are presenting today is designed to protect America
and Americans and to advance our interests. Our fiscal year 2011
request for the State Department and USAID totals $52.8 billion--a $4.9
billion increase over 2010. Of that increase, $3.6 billion will go to
supporting efforts in ``frontline states''--Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Iraq. Other funding will grow by $1.3 billion, a 2.7-percent increase
that will help address global challenges, strengthen partnerships, and
ensure that the State Department and USAID are equipped with the right
people and resources.
Over the past 6 weeks in Haiti, we have been reminded yet again of
the importance of American leadership. I'm proud of what our country
has done, and we continue to work with our Haitian and international
partners to address ongoing suffering and transition from relief to
recovery.
This is a time of great economic strain for many Americans. As a
former Senator, I know what this means for the people you represent.
For every dollar we spend, we have to show results. That is why this
budget must support programs vital to our national security, our
national interests, and our leadership in the world, while guarding
against waste. I believe it achieves those objectives.
our priorities
These figures are more than numbers on a page. They tell the story
of challenges we face and the resources we need to overcome them.
We are fighting two wars that call on the skill and sacrifice of
our civilians as well as our troops. We have pursued a dual-track
approach to Iran that has exposed its refusal to live up to its
responsibilities and helped us achieve a new unity with our
international partners. Iran has left the international community
little choice but to impose greater costs for its provocative steps. We
are now working actively with our partners to prepare and implement new
measures to pressure Iran to change its course.
We have also achieved unprecedented unity in our response to North
Korea's provocative actions, even as we leave the door open for a
restart of six-party talks. And we are moving closer to a fresh nuclear
agreement with Russia--one that advances our security while furthering
President Obama's long-term vision of a world without nuclear weapons.
With China, we are seeking areas of common purpose while standing
firm where we differ. We are making concrete our new beginning with the
Muslim world. We are strengthening partnerships with allies in Europe
and Asia, with friends in our hemisphere, and with countries around the
world, from India to Indonesia to South Africa, Brazil, and Turkey. And
we are working to end the impasse between Israelis and Palestinians.
At the same time, we are developing a new architecture of
cooperation to meet global challenges like climate change and the use
of our planet's oceans. With regard to the latter, I want to reiterate
my support for U.S. accession to the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Our country stands to gain immensely from the treaty--in terms of
economic and resource rights, in terms of environmental interests, in
terms of national security.
In so many instances, our national interest and the common interest
converge, and so from our own hemisphere to Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East, we are promoting human rights, the rule of law, democracy,
and Internet freedom; we are fighting poverty, hunger, and disease; and
we are working to ensure that economic growth is broadly shared.
Our agenda is ambitious because our times demand it. America is
called to lead--and we need the tools and resources to exercise our
leadership wisely and effectively. We can bury our heads in the sand
and pay the consequences later, or we can make hard-nosed, targeted
investments now--addressing the security challenges of today while
building a foundation for security and prosperity in the future.
Let me now highlight the three areas where we are making
significant new investments.
investing in security
First, the security of frontline states.
In Afghanistan, we have tripled the number of civilians on the
ground, and this presence will grow by hundreds more with the $5
billion in this budget. Our diplomats and development experts are
helping build institutions, expand economic opportunities, and provide
meaningful alternatives for insurgents ready to renounce violence and
join their fellow Afghans in the pursuit of peace.
In Pakistan, our request includes $3.2 billion to combat extremism,
promote economic development, strengthen democratic institutions, and
build a long-term relationship with the Pakistani people. This includes
funding of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman initiative, and I want to thank you,
Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, for your leadership on this
legislation. Our request also includes a 59-percent increase in funding
for Yemen, to help counter the extremist threat and build institutions
and economic opportunity.
In Iraq, we are winding down our military presence and establishing
a more normal civilian mission. Our civilian efforts will not and
cannot mirror the scale of our military presence, but rather provide
assistance consistent with the priorities of the Iraqi Government. Our
request includes $2.6 billion for Iraq--resources that will allow us to
support the democratic process and ensure a smooth transition to
civilian-led security training and operational support. As these funds
allow civilians to take full responsibility for programs, the Defense
budget for Iraq will be decreasing by about $16 billion--a powerful
illustration of the return on civilian investment.
We are blessed with the best troops in the world, as we have seen
time and again in today's wars. But we also need to give our civilian
experts the resources to do civilian jobs. This budget takes a step in
that direction. It includes $100 million for a State Department complex
crises fund--replacing the 1207 fund through which the Defense
Department directed money toward crisis response. And it includes
support for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, which
previously fell under the Defense Department as well.
investing in development
The second major area is investing in development. This budget
makes targeted investments in fragile societies--which, in our
interconnected word, bear heavily on our own security and prosperity.
These investments are a key part of our effort to get ahead of crises
rather than just responding to them, positioning us to deal effectively
with the threats and challenges that lie ahead.
The first of these investments is in health. Building on our
progress treating HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis, our Global Health
Initiative will invest $63 billion over 6 years, starting with $8.5
billion in FY11, to help our partners address specific diseases and
build strong, sustainable health systems as they do so.
The administration has also pledged to invest at least $3.5 billion
in food security over 3 years, and this year's request includes $1.6
billion, of which $1.2 billion is funded through the State Department.
This funding will focus on countries that have developed effective,
comprehensive strategies, where agriculture is central to prosperity
and hunger remains widespread.
On climate change, our request of $646 million seeks to promote the
United States as a leader in green technology and to leverage other
countries' cooperation--including through the Copenhagen Accord, which
for the first time brings developed and developing countries together
on this challenge. This is part of the administration's total request
of $1.4 billion to support core climate-change activities in developing
nations.
Our request also includes $4.2 billion for humanitarian assistance
programs. Our efforts in Haiti have made clear that State and USAID
must be able to respond quickly and effectively to human tragedies.
These initiatives are designed to enhance American security, help
people in need, and give the American people a strong return on their
investment. Our aim is not to create dependency, but to help our
partners devise solutions they can sustain over the long term.
Essential to this is a focus on advancing equality and opportunity for
women and girls, who are the key drivers of economic and social
progress in the developing world.
investing in the right people and tools
That brings me to our third area of investment. None of this can
happen if we do not recruit, train, and empower the right people for
the job.
The State Department and USAID are full of talented and committed
public servants, but we have too often neglected to give them the tools
they need to carry out their missions on the ground. Rather than
building their expertise, we have too often relied on contractors,
sometimes with little oversight.
This budget will allow us to expand the Foreign Service by over 600
positions, including an additional 410 positions for the State
Department and 200 for USAID. It will also allow us to staff the
standby element of the Civilian Reserve Corps, a crucial tool for
responding to crises.
While deploying these personnel generates new expenses in some
accounts, it will reduce expenses in others by changing the way we do
business. We are ending an overreliance on contractors and finding
opportunities to save money by bringing functions into government and
improving oversight.
a year of results
One thing should be very clear from this budget: the State
Department and USAID are taking a lead in carrying out the United
States foreign policy and national-security agenda. As we finish the
first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, we have a unique
opportunity to define the capabilities we need and to match resources
with priorities. This budget aligns our investments with the strategic
imperatives of our time.
The QDDR will also help ensure that we are more effective and
accountable. Jack Lew, the first Deputy Secretary of State for
Management and Resources, has put his skill to work in developing this
budget and in reviewing it over and over to make sure that every item
is economical and effective.
At a time of change and challenge at home and abroad, these
investments will enhance the security of Americans, assure the future
American leadership, and help build the foundations of peace,
stability, and prosperity in the years ahead. I look forward to working
with all of you as we move forward, and I would be pleased to take your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
We will do 7-minute rounds.
Recently, I came back from Pakistan, and one of the things
that they repeatedly brought to my attention was the fragility
of the economy, but also the sort of balancing act that they
have to perform, which you are well aware of, in terms of their
public opinion, their relationship with the United States, and
what they are being called on to do.
They pointed out that they are about to undergo another
round of IMF negotiations. And the pressures already of the IMF
restraints have been significant in terms of price increases
and other things that their citizens are feeling. I wonder if
you would comment on what other steps we might contemplate that
can have an impact?
We have a very significant amount of money going in. We
have got additional assistance, the $3.2 billion you have
talked about. But it strikes me that there is a broader
economic challenge and a provision of services challenge to
their people that is going to have a profound impact on the
outcome of what is happening in western Pakistan and,
ultimately, Afghanistan.
And you are no stranger, Madam Secretary, to our thinking
that what happens in Pakistan is going to be almost as
important, if not far more important to the outcome of
Afghanistan and some of what happens on the ground in
Afghanistan. Therefore, should we be thinking about a free
trade agreement or a broader trade agreement or something that
is going to send a stronger signal from us about the economic
possibilities?
Or should we work with the IMF to make sure that the next
round doesn't result in unpalatable, unacceptable pressures on
their citizens so that we undo the good that we are trying to
do in all of these other efforts, I wonder?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Chairman Kerry, you have asked one
of the most important questions that we have to figure out how
to answer. To the credit of the Pakistani Government and
President Zardari, they have complied with the IMF conditions.
They raised the price of wheat. They have raised the price of
electricity. They have demonstrated a political will which has
resulted in some positive economic outcomes for them.
But they have a very difficult road to negotiate ahead of
them for several reasons, and I will tell this committee what I
told a group of Pakistani business leaders with whom I met when
I was there. It was a very large, prestigious group,
representing a broad cross-section of the Pakistan economy. And
I told them that we did need to do more to promote trade, and I
think the ROZs, the reconstruction opportunity zones, that
legislation has been pending in the Senate. That would send a
very strong signal to Pakistan. It would use trade instead of
aid to promote economic growth.
We have committed to some large signature energy projects
because part of their economic challenge is keeping the power
on and keeping those factories humming. And so, I have ordered
a redirection of our aid so that we produce results that are in
line with the needs and aspirations of the Pakistani people.
I think we should explore additional opportunities that
might increase more trade, remove more barriers. We could try
it for a limited period of time, see what the results are, but
I think the Pakistanis have to do more as well.
And I told the business group, after we had finished
talking about the aid we give and the support we are giving and
the Kerry-Lugar initiative, Pakistan has one of the lowest tax
rates in the world. They don't tax income. They don't tax land,
and a lot of the wealth is held in these huge feudal estates.
Some of you might have seen a program on television last
night showing the failure to build schools, to staff schools,
to equip schools. They have no public education system to speak
of, and it is because the very well off, of whom there is a
considerable number, do not pay their fair share for the
services that are needed in health and education primarily.
So I think there is more we could do and more the
international community could do. But increasingly, Senator
Kerry, I am looking for ways that the IMF, the World Bank, the
United States as a donor, other donors can say to countries
that want our help, ``You have a lot of rich people''--and
those rich people make a lot of money out of their country, and
yet the people of their country are mired in poverty--``And you
are going to have to raise your tax GDP percentage rate from 7
percent to 9 percent.''
You know, United States, we fluctuate between 16 and 22
percent. They don't have the resources or the opportunity to do
that. But we can't continue to allow these countries' elite not
to do their fair share for the people of their countries.
The Chairman. Well, to their credit, I will say they are
now in the midst of a significant legislative initiative and
government initiative to do exactly that. And I know some of it
is at your urging and other people's urging.
One last question so I don't overly abuse the time here.
But this is sort of a macroquestion that I would like to ask
you. As you travel around as Secretary of State, you are
engaged in any number of efforts to leverage our interests
globally, whether it is arms control or economic interests or
counterterrorism, et cetera, et cetera.
I don't want to draw you into a fight. But the gridlock
here in Washington and the inability of us to leverage our own
economy and to begin to show the world signs of economic
strength, I have certainly run into many questions as I travel
around, ``Where is America going?''
And I would like to know if you could maybe share with this
committee--which is the appropriate place to think about this,
or at least start to--as you talk to people, to what degree is
our domestic situation, our financial situation, our lack of
cohesion with respect to responses affecting our status and
leverage and position as we try to pursue our interests on a
global basis?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, you travel also, and you
encounter the same questions and, to some extent, anxiety that
I do as I travel. The world wants the United States to lead,
even if that is not what they tell you or what they say to
their own press. But they want us to lead. They look to us.
They also look to us as the world's oldest democracy, and they
want to see us produce results and solve problems.
So I do think that we have to do a better job in
demonstrating what we know is our core strength, which is this
extraordinary country that we all love and have the privilege
of serving. It is capable of doing anything once we put our
minds to it.
But I think that this is not a partisan issue. It is not an
executive versus legislative issue. It is really an American
issue. And you mentioned climate change at the very beginning
of your remarks, and I cannot say how important it would be--I
cannot overstate it that we do what we can to show that we are
a leader in this area.
I would say for political reasons, global political
reasons, some of you may have read accounts of the President
and I kind of crashing a meeting that the Chinese, the Indians,
the Brazilians, and the South Africans were having without us
to try to figure out how they could avoid some of the
questions, the hard questions we were asking. But at the end of
a tough negotiating session, they agreed to this Copenhagen
Accord.
And this accord is the first time in probably since post-
World War II that there has been any international agreement
and the very first time that developing and developed countries
have assumed the kind of equal responsibilities to show up,
sign up, report, and verify what they are going to do. So the
political imperative for the United States to lead, to be seen
as leading, to manage this incredibly complex, interconnected
world I think is absolutely paramount.
Second, on the facts on climate change, I know that Senator
Kerry, Senator Boxer, others of you have been really leading on
this. This clean energy economy is going to be captured by
other countries.
I mean, the idea that we, the intellectual capital of the
world that invented so many of these component parts and
processes, could be outflanked and outproduced and outgenerated
in terms of income by other countries, led principally by
China, is deeply disturbing to me. This is an industry of the
future, and we have jobs that are going to go by the wayside if
we are not prepared to get in there.
Now, to me, the domestic progress that was made in 2009
with passing a House bill and what Senator Boxer did and what
you are doing on a bipartisan basis gives us a foundation. But
this is a political issue, and this is an economic issue.
People also know it is an environmental issue and a moral
issue, but I focus on what are the strategic interests that the
United States has? We have to continue to show leadership on a
global issue, and we have to get our economy moving in a
direction where we are going to reap the benefits.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Madam Secretary, I have three short items
and two longer ones. I will commence with the short ones. First
of all, I very much appreciate your commendation of the efforts
of your Department and, likewise, our shared efforts in
crafting the Lugar-Casey bill on food security. I am hopeful
that the recent work between your staff and the staff of this
committee will continue----
Secretary Clinton. Yes.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Intensively in the days and
weeks ahead. Perhaps the chairman will entertain another
hearing on the suggestions we have both made, so we can move
this along. The Lugar-Casey bill has passed out of our
committee, and I think it has broad support in the Congress as
a whole.
Second, I just note that the budget calls for 8 to 10
American centers of public diplomacy, and it is not clear where
those would be located. You will have to determine that.
The Chinese, according to our records, have now established
60 Confucius centers here in the United States, but they are
permitting only four of our centers to be built in China. I
call this to your attention so that you may consider potential
negotiations with Chinese friends as we try to extend this
important idea of diplomacy centers.
Furthermore, I appreciate your mention of the Law of the
Sea Treaty. I have just come from a conference in which Russia
and Russian aspirations were discussed. It was pointed out that
with the melting of the Arctic, huge oil reserves, perhaps
larger than those of Saudi Arabia have been uncovered there.
The Russians immediately sent a ship to the area and planted a
flag. This was a grandiose gesture. It does not establish that
they are going to be drilling shortly.
But the fact is that this is going to be an area of huge
contention, and there is a need to have some structure in place
where American interests can come to the fore. The issue has
always been sovereignty with regard to that, and sovereignty is
the issue. But we have got to pin down our sovereignty. It is
very important.
Secretary Clinton. That is exactly----
Senator Lugar. Let me just bring up the issue of plans to
construct a new Embassy in London. In the past few days news
reports and drawings of our proposed new $1 billion Embassy in
London have been in the media. The thought is that the sale of
three U.S.-owned properties in London, including Grosvenor
Square Embassy, would net us at least $1 billion as an offset.
Furthermore, we are refusing to pay the value-added tax
assessed by Great Britain of 17 percent.
How is the financing of this undertaking going? And what
comments can you make regarding the need for the new $1 billion
building, as well as this dispute over the value-added tax?
Secretary Clinton. Thank you so much, Senator Lugar.
Just very briefly, our staff looks forward to continuing to
work with yours and that of this committee, and we want to
deepen our partnership on global hunger and food security.
On the Confucius centers, the Chinese Government provides
each center with $1 million to launch, plus they cover
operating expenses that exceed $200,000 per year. We don't have
that kind of money in the budget. So we are limited in the
numbers that we
can do. And we are also raising the issue of reciprocity with
Chinese officials. So we are very aware of the concerns that
you have pointed out.
Thank you for what you said about the Law of the Sea. I
could not agree with you more. The Law of the Sea provides
commercial rights to the mining of what is in the seabeds of
the territories that are claimable under sovereignty provisions
in the treaty.
I believe, with all my heart, that we are going to be so
sorry if we don't get this up and going. And I know that you
and the chairman are committed to doing so. And if there is
more that we need to do from the administration side, Mr.
Chairman, I will get it done. You give me the date, and we will
have the people here to testify because I want everybody on the
committee and the Congress to know what is at stake here.
Finally, on the London Embassy, the construction of the
Embassy is estimated at between $500 million to $700 million.
It is self-financed because we are selling, I forget, maybe 11
sites that we currently own because we are consolidating
everything in one place. We have sold the old Grosvenor Square
Embassy, although we will inhabit it until we move to the new
Embassy.
We have--also we are selling the Navy annex. We are going
to realize a significant return on these sales, and the
estimated cost of the construction, as I said, $500 million to
$700 million. The site predeveloped was $426 million. The VAT
is $46 million. So when you add it all up, because of the
expense of doing business in London, among other reasons, it is
going to be around $1 billion.
And we are going to work very hard to get the VAT
exception, but we are not coming in for any appropriations.
This is really consolidating sites and becoming more efficient.
And it will also be a green building, which we value. We think
that is a great signal to send.
Senator Lugar. Let me ask a final question, this one
regarding the budget for Pakistan. There is obviously a
submission for considerable expenditures this year. But I just
want to inquire as to how expenditures are going from the 2010
budget.
The reason I ask this is that it appears expenditures are
going slowly, and there are arguments as to how much should be
channeled through NGOs as opposed to Pakistani officials,
whether they be local, regional, or national. What are your
feelings on the general progress of expenditures, whether they
are part of the Kerry-Lugar $1.5 billion or otherwise?
Secretary Clinton. We are making progress, Senator. But we
are trying to be very thoughtful about how we distribute this
money because it is a significant investment in Pakistan. We
have spent money already on some of the energy projects, which
we think are paying off, both in terms of what they are doing
for the people of Pakistan, but also because we are connected
to them.
It is challenging because we do want to go through
Pakistani institutions and NGOs wherever we can. But they have
to be vetted, and we have to feel that they are going to
perform in a way that I can come before this committee and
report to you is in keeping with our efforts.
So we can give you a very thorough readout of where the
money is in the pipeline. But we have been spending a lot of
time--and Jack Lew, I think, has talked with this committee
about that--in making sure that we are spending it right, or as
right as we can make it.
Senator Lugar. That would be very helpful to keep us up to
date. It is challenging, as you say, but it is critical in
terms of maintaining the confidence of the American people in
appropriations of this size with Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Thank you very much.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thanks, Senator Lugar.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing. And Madam Secretary, just before I ask
you some questions, I would just like to note that your
identification of the 150 account as a national security budget
is absolutely right on the mark.
A stronger State Department is vital to our Nation's
security, as is expanding and strengthening our work in such
areas as economic development, good governance, respect for
human rights, respecting the rule of law, and conflict
resolution. By ensuring these programs are well funded, we can
help our foreign partners combat the recruitment and operation
of al-Qaeda while also strengthening and protecting our Nation
here at home. So I appreciate that very much.
Madam Secretary, on a number of subjects, I have noted that
enhancing our diplomatic capacity is vital to our Nation's
security. At the same time, as you well know, with skyrocketing
deficits, we have to look at ways to eliminate wasteful or
inefficient spending. And I think one glaring example of
wasteful spending is a program that has for years now been
found to be mismanaged and ineffective: Radio and TV Marti at
the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
Given the multiple GAO reports highlighting the many
problems that plague the Office of Cuba Broadcasting and the
urgent national security and human rights priorities we face
around the world, can you please tell me why the administration
wants to continue funding Radio and TV Marti near previous
levels in FY 2011, and does this allocation of resources really
match our national security and human rights priorities?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, we are taking a hard look
at all of our aid programs for Cuba. Frankly, my goal is to be
effective in what we spend so that it actually assists those
Cubans who are fighting for freedom, who are standing up
against the abuses of the Cuban Government. And we are looking
at everything.
I mean, I can't come before you and say that any program is
sacrosanct because I want to be sure that we are getting our
money's worth. And with new forms of communication and new ways
of getting information into Cuba to help support the efforts of
people on the ground, I think we have to look at this
expenditure like every other one.
Senator Feingold. Appreciate that answer.
On a very different topic, in Africa, let us say a bit
about our policy toward the Lord's Resistance Army, or the LRA,
the rebel group from northern Uganda that is now operating
across three countries--northeastern Congo, Southern Sudan, and
the Central African Republic. It continues to kill at an
alarming rate.
As you probably know, I have authored a bill that now has
63 cosponsors and which requires more strategic attention and
resources to help address this violence. And Madam Secretary,
without sort of getting into all the weeds of this, how does
responding to and seeking to end the LRA's reign of terror
throughout the region fit into the fiscal year 2011 budget? And
does the administration have any kind of a specific plan and
dedicated resources to help address this issue?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, we are deeply concerned and
share your views about protecting civilians who have been
suffering at the hands of the Lord's Resistance Army now for
years in Southern Sudan and the DRC and Central African
Republic. We have provided support to improve the effectiveness
of military responses to the LRA. We have helped to support and
supply some of the militaries in the area.
Thus far, $6.4 million has been provided. Additional funds
will be notified to Congress soon. Resources have come from
reimbursements from the U.N. for U.S. support for peacekeeping
operations. We believe our support of these operations has
helped to degrade the capacity of the LRA.
We have encouraged the military forces seeking to defeat
the LRA and the U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region to put
a very high priority on civilian protection. There needs to be
better coordination, information, and intelligence-sharing. As
you know, we tried that once, very unfortunately, not to the
result we were seeking. But we are going to continue to work
with existing militaries and U.N. peacekeepings.
I want to be specific here because we have also provided
assistance for civilian victims in the DRC, CAR, Southern
Sudan--$1.7 million for NGOs in Southern Sudan, $1.1 million to
the International Organization for Migration for relocation
efforts in Southern Sudan, $1 million to the World Food
Programme for U.N. humanitarian air service in Central African
Republic, and of course, contributions to the UNHCR.
You know, I have been following the Lord's Resistance Army
for more than 15 years. I just don't understand why we cannot
end this scourge. And we are going to do everything we can to
provide support we believe will enable us to do that.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for that commitment.
Madam Secretary, I have concerns about supplemental
spending bills, given that they fall outside of the normal
budget process. But in this case, I would like to ask about the
INCLE funds requested for Pakistan in the FY 2010 supplemental,
the majority of which will go toward training and other support
for Pakistani police, including to do such things as to better
confront the spread of extremism.
Given the documented problems of police abuse in Pakistan
from your own State Department human rights report, including
allegations of torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings and
continuing impunity for such crimes, and given the latest
report's caution that ``corruption within the police was
rampant,'' what efforts are being taken to ensure that our
assistance to the police forces does not inadvertently end up
fueling the spread of extremism, rather than addressing the
problems we sought to address?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, this is something that we
are very focused on because, obviously, we have both legal and
moral requirements as to how money that we provide to anyone is
expended and what is done under the rubric of that kind of aid
program. And what we have done is provide training, provide
support to the Pakistanis so that they understand what we
expect from them, what we are looking to see.
We have worked with the Pakistani military to try to better
create more accountability, and we have asked that they respond
whenever any issue is raised with us. I can't sit here and say
that we know everything that is going on. But we are making a
concerted effort to try to provide more oversight and expect
more accountability in these funds.
Senator Feingold. Thank you so much, Madam Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator DeMint.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.
I appreciate your professionalism in representing our
country all over the world. The more I delve into foreign
policy, the more I believe you probably have the hardest job in
the administration.
A couple of points. First, I want to thank you for your
leadership in Honduras. As you know, that was a situation that
appeared to be moving out of control, and I think you and your
Department have got it on a good track, trying to restore
relationships within and around Honduras. I get very good
reports there from what the State Department is doing.
Let me just mention a couple of things. In Iran, obviously,
that is a big issue. My concern is timing. You have, I think,
taken an international leadership role in, I think, raising the
pressure levels in Iran. But in my conversations with people in
Israel and their concern that--well, my concern is that we may
be only a few months away from some type of action that could
destabilize the region.
And I don't sense in the Congress the urgency of timing
here of what we need to do and how quickly. And again, I
appreciate you taking the sanction idea a step further, but I
would like to hear a comment there and just ask for your
comment in a few other areas.
One, and you have mentioned, and several others have
mentioned, human rights. And I have long been a supporter of
engagement with countries like China and trade with China, but
it seems increasingly over the last year or two that human
rights, religious freedom in China, Egypt, India, Vietnam,
other countries, more and more reports that there is less
religious tolerance, that there is more problems. And perhaps
that is just a matter of what gets to the news, but I am
hearing from a lot of people directly in my office that are
suggesting a deteriorating situation.
And meeting with people from Georgia, a lot of
representatives, again I hear a concern that our emphasis is
more on Russia and even to the point of them not getting
equipment they need for basic protection, such as parts for
their rifles. So some pretty important concerns there,
specifically on Georgia.
So if I could just ask you to comment on the urgency and
timing of Iran, possible scenarios there, and just maybe your
perception of human rights, as well as a comment on Georgia?
Secretary Clinton. Thank you so much, Senator.
On Iran sanctions, we are intensely engaged with countries
around the world. In the last month, I attended the London
conferences on Afghanistan and Yemen and held numerous
bilateral meetings with countries to lay out evidence about
Iran to urge that they join with us on the pressure sanctions
track.
I just came back from Saudi Arabia and Qatar and have also
met last week with the Prime Minister of Turkey. I will be
going next week to Latin America, including Brazil.
So we are--and it is not just I. It is the top levels of
the State Department are engaged very, very directly in working
the need for sanctions. We are beginning the process in the
Security Council in New York, where language is being hammered
out based on the work that has been done by the Treasury
Department and the State Department in coordination.
We are targeting a lot of these proposed sanctions against
the Revolutionary Guard, which we believe is playing an
increasingly important role in the politics and the economy of
Iran. So we are working it as hard as we can.
I have to say that we have been heartened by the positive
response from Russia. They, I think, in their response prove
the wisdom of the President's policy of engagement. We have
made it clear from President Obama's inauguration that we will
reach out our hand if the other side unclenches its fist. And
our very clear commitment to engagement has created space for a
lot of these countries to now consider supporting sanctions
that they might not have otherwise because we have demonstrated
the strategic patience to exhaust the international efforts of
convincing Iran to do the right thing without sanctions.
So I think, Senator, we are very focused on this. We hope
that the next 30 to 60 days will see a sanctions resolution
emerge in New York, and we also have made clear with others of
our allies and partners that whatever comes out of New York, we
may pursue bilateral or multilateral sanctions on top of
whatever can be the result of the Security Council
deliberations. So this is the highest priority for the Obama
administration.
On human rights, I share your concern. It is a kind of good
news/bad news story. I mean, we see breakthroughs and positive
actions, and then, unfortunately, we do get evidence of
backsliding, discrimination, oppression, violence that is
religiously based.
We are working with a number of Muslim majority countries
to devise an alternative to their proposal of defamation of
religion, which we reject because we think that in a robust
society, free expression should be protected. But we also
recognize the sensitivity of criticizing or undermining the
religious feelings and attitudes of people.
So we are looking to see if there is a way to come up with
a resolution that will suit our constitutional concerns, and we
are working hard with a number of countries to do that. But we
speak out vigorously against human rights abuses and, in
particular, religious freedom and discrimination complaints and
will continue to do so.
And finally, with respect to Georgia, Georgia remains a
high priority to this administration. We have had a number of
high-profile visits to Georgia--Vice President Biden, Deputy
Secretary Steinberg, Special Representative Holbrooke. We have
had a very clear message that we are supporting the Government
of Georgia.
For the FY11 budget, we are requesting $90.1 million in
aid, which is an overall increase of 8 percent from the FY10
level of $73.77 million. The bulk of that will be trying to
help the Georgians sustain their work in democracy, to enhance
public confidence within their own country and in the region in
their direction. We also are continuing to provide funding for
nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related
programs, and we are heavily supporting their military
deployment to Afghanistan with new equipment, new training.
So I think that what we are doing is a very positive story,
and we stand up for Georgia in many international settings
against the very strong attitudes expressed by their Russian
neighbors.
Senator DeMint. Thank you much. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator DeMint.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Secretary Clinton, I just want to say that I think all
of America is very proud of the job you are doing.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
Senator Boxer. And I think you are just being so effective,
and I was really glad to hear that expressed in a bipartisan
way today.
I want to talk to you about women in Afghanistan. And just
yesterday, Senator Casey, Senator Wicker, and I held a hearing,
which our chairman sanctioned, to examine the status of females
in Afghanistan. And what we discussed with your wonderful
Ambassador Verveer and with Dr. Sima Samar, who I know you are
aware of, it was not good. It was alarming.
Today, the life expectancy of an Afghan woman is 44 years.
Can you imagine--44? Afghanistan has the second-highest
maternal mortality rate in the world. One out of every five
children born in Afghanistan dies before the age of 5, and over
half of all marriages in Afghanistan are forced or involve
girls under the age of 16.
Yesterday, we talked about a forced marriage of an 11-year-
old girl to a man 20 years her senior. And this child set
herself afire to get out of the situation, and it is just--it
just touches your heart. She is now back with her own family.
But here is what I wanted to discuss with you. We all know
how hard our military is working right now. Oh, Lord, we all
pray this is a success. And we all know that reconciliation is
what we are trying to achieve to get these Taliban to give up
their ways.
And what worries some of us is that women could be used as
a bargaining chip in the reconciliation process, unless they
are at the table at every single stage. Because we can't forget
these are the same Taliban who required the windows of Afghan
homes to be painted over to conceal the fact that there was a
woman inside and who take pride today in throwing acid in the
faces of Afghan girls.
Now we know you are a tireless champion for women around
the world, and we also know you have worked hard to raise this
issue of women being at the table in this reconciliation
process. But I thought I would use today as an opportunity to
get you to commit to us and to the Afghan women that you work
to ensure that these women are given a clear, transparent, and
meaningful role at every level of the reconciliation process--
to protect their right to education, to health care.
Because you know that they are not allowed to see a male
doctor, and that is why so many of them die in childbirth
because it is considered--they are shunned if they see a male
doctor. And there are no female doctors anymore. There are
some, but there are not as many as there once were. So, so many
of them are dying in childbirth. And they need to have freedom
of movement, and they need to be free of violence.
So will you make that commitment to fight to get them into
a key decisionmaking role in the reconciliation process? And
will you personally reach out to President Karzai, because I
know you have a close relationship with him, to make sure that
this happens?
Secretary Clinton. The answer is yes to both, Senator
Boxer. It is a very deep, longstanding concern of mine, which I
share with you.
In our regional stabilization strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, we lay out how we wish to advance the rights of
Afghan women and girls with key initiatives that we are
pursuing. And I would hope that this could become part of the
record, Mr. Chairman, the entire report.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The report ``Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional
Stabilization Strategy'' was too voluminous to include in this
printed hearing. It will be retained in the permanent record of
the committee.]
Secretary Clinton. But on the specifics with respect to
women, I am not going to sugarcoat how hard this is. This is a
very difficult challenge that we are making common cause with
the women and girls of Afghanistan. I am very proud of the work
that Ambassador Verveer is doing.
I have personally spoken several times about this to
President Karzai, and I will continue to advocate, as I did at
the London conference, to make sure that women are included in
the political process. Any kind of reconciliation or
reintegration effort has to take into account the rights of
women, and we are going to do everything we can to try to
protect and advance that.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. Thank you so much.
My second question kind of dovetails on Senator DeMint's on
Iran. Just recently, the IAEA released a report stating that it
found extensive evidence of activities by Iran's military
``related to the development of a nuclear payload for a
missile.''
And this is chilling to all of us. Iran's behavior not only
poses a grave security threat to Israel and the greater Middle
East, but also to efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear
materials and weapons around the globe. And I am very pleased
that the administration is focused like a laser beam on this.
And I know you recently traveled to the region to discuss
the threat from Iran and that national security adviser James
Jones traveled there, Mike Mullen, Vice President Biden. And in
addition, the U.S. Government announced a new set of sanctions
on Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard.
Now I understand you are seeking a set of new sanctions
through the U.N. Security Council, which will require the
support of all five permanent members, including China. So I
want to ask you about China.
You were recently in Saudi Arabia, which is now exporting
more oil to China than ever. Reports have suggested that Saudi
Arabia may be able to provide China the stable supply of oil it
needs, thus reducing China's reliance on Iranian oil. And this,
in turn, could make China more willing to support sanctions
against Iran.
Do you feel better about the situation with China? Do you
feel that this diplomacy of yours at the U.N. could yield the
right outcome?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, we are working at it
every single day. And the IAEA report gave us one more piece of
evidence to present to doubting countries about conclusions
regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions.
We also are making the argument in public that China's
dependence on oil from the gulf should cause it to make a
strategic calculation to support sanctions because, in the
absence of pressure that changes the Iranian efforts to obtain
a nuclear weapon, there will be an arms race in the gulf, and
that will further destabilize the gulf. It could lead even to
conflict, which could dramatically undermine the delivery of
oil from the gulf. So our argument, joined by other countries,
including some in the gulf, to China is that if you are
concerned about your market access to the Arabian Gulf for oil,
then you should join the rest of the world in sanctions.
And we were very successful when nobody thought that we
could get China on board for the North Korean sanctions, 1874
out of the Security Council. And even today, the South Africans
stopped a ship carrying North Korean weapons bound for the
Congo to cause more terrible violence and kill even more people
there.
Because we got the international community behind us and
that is what we are seeking and we are making that argument
vigorously, and lots of people are joining us to try to
convince China to join with the rest of the world.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for your service to our country.
Yesterday, Orlando Zapata Tamayo, a Cuban prodemocracy
human rights activist and political prisoner who was first
incarcerated during the 2003 crackdown on dissidents in Cuba,
died following a hunger strike protesting the Castro regime's
brutal abuses. Amnesty International recognized him as a
prisoner of conscience, and it is in his memory and the
sacrifice that he made and hundreds of others of political
prisoners who languish in Castro's jails that I want to ask you
about some concerns I have with reference to how we are
pursuing our Cuba democracy programs.
I sent a letter in January to Administrator Shah, who I
have not heard an answer from yet, asking what is the intent of
an e-mail that they sent to the grantees and contractors for
programs in Cuba? Basically, that e-mail suggested, as the
Department has suggested, that groups not travel to Cuba to
conduct our democracy programs there, and that is a real
concern.
Now there are some people have suggested that the United
States only provide support to the Cuban people, when every
single activity under these programs is specifically sanctioned
by the Castro regime. It is naive to think that independent
groups would be allowed permission from the Castro regime to
carry out those activities when even members of this committee
who have sought visas to visit human rights activists and
political dissidents inside of Cuba as part of an agenda have
been denied those visas by the regime in a clear attempt to
stop anyone who wants to visit those entities, those
individuals inside of Cuba.
So I would not expect the regime to welcome anyone to help
engage with human rights activists, political dissidents,
independent journalists in trying to promote civil society
inside of Cuba.
So we have a long history in the United States of
supporting groups around the world in groups who have lived
under the iron fist or behind what was the Iron Curtain. We
have done that in Eastern Europe. We did that with Lech Walesa.
We did it with Vaclav Havel. We did it with Alexander
Solzhenitsyn. We did it with so many others, and we did not
seek permission from those countries in the world.
For some reason, it seems to me that when it comes to Cuba,
the recent actions by the regime to arrest an American citizen
have totally frozen our actions. And I have even noticed that
in the 2011 budget request stating what our democracy programs
would do, a critical statement that existed in the 2010 request
was eliminated.
So my question is, Are we going to have a permanent freeze
on having entities that are trying to create peaceful change
for civil society inside of Cuba? Is that the policy of the
State Department?
Secretary Clinton. No, Senator. Let me first express the
U.S. Government's sympathies to the family, friends, and
supporters of Orlando Zapata Tamayo.
We were concerned about his welfare. We raised this with
the Cuban delegation during the migration talks. We urged that
he be given medical attention and care, and we are deeply
distressed by his death during a hunger strike on behalf of his
rights and to send a signal of the political prisoner situation
and oppression in Cuba, where we think there are in excess of
200 other prisoners of conscience.
We are very supportive of the work that we believe should
be done to support those people of conscience inside Cuba. As I
said earlier, we are trying to figure out the best ways to be
effective in doing that. We are currently reviewing the risks
in the wake of the baseless arrest of Mr. Gross in Cuba so that
people who are traveling in furtherance of the mission of
advocating for freedom, providing services, providing supplies
and material to Cubans will take the necessary precautions when
traveling.
This is an issue of great importance to us. We do want to
do everything we can to try to assist Cubans who are struggling
against a continuing, longstanding regime of oppression. So we
are not in any way taking a position against travel or against
the kind of actions that we think will produce positive
results. But we are engaged in a very intense review so that
what we do we think will have greater chances of being
successful.
Senator Menendez. Well, I appreciate your answer. However,
let me just say that the e-mail that came out of AID and the
statements that have come out subsequently have basically
chilled any activity in the promotion of the democracy programs
that the President in his own budget put again, which we are
pleased to see.
But at the end of the day, if a regime, whether that be in
China, whether that be in any other country in the world, can
ultimately deter the United States from its engagement of human
rights activists and political dissidents, then that pillar of
our diplomacy crumbles.
Secretary Clinton. I know. But that is not what we are
doing.
Senator Menendez. Well, I would like to see--I would like
to see what we are doing because right now we are not doing
very much. So I will follow up with that. I hope we get a
response from the administrator.
I would like to ask you two other questions. One is Senator
Kerry, Lugar, Corker, and myself have written legislation with
reference to reforming our foreign assistance institutions. You
mention the Quadrennial Defense and Diplomacy Review. I would
like to know where we are at? When can we expect to see some
tangible changes? What might these changes look like?
And my second question is, as you know, there are more than
40,000 Turkish troops occupying Cyprus. No one in the world
accepts the proposition that they are there to protect Turkish
Cypriots from Greek Cypriots, and even the European Parliament
on February 10 passed a resolution calling for the immediate
withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus.
Yet, Madam Secretary, America's Ambassador to Turkey,
Ambassador Jeffrey, very recently said in a newspaper interview
that Turkey has ``security concerns on Cyprus.'' Certainly, he
can't be supporting this rationale for keeping Turkish troops
on Cyprus. Did he misspeak?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, with respect to foreign
assistance, the QDDR will be finished this summer. We look to
it to help us coordinate with this committee and with the
Congress on the foreign assistance reforms that we believe
should be undertaken. Our goal is to enhance the capacity and
effectiveness of American foreign assistance, to better
coordinate among the various aspects of the American Government
that provide assistance.
We have everything from USDA to Treasury with its funding
of the international financial institutions to, of course,
State, to USAID and other entities as well. We want to more
clearly state the mission, more clearly resource that mission.
The White House is currently simultaneously conducting its
own review of development, bringing in all the other
stakeholders because, of course, we are only looking at State
and USAID. But I think that many of our findings will be very
much in line with the direction and the aspiration that this
committee has set forth in the legislation.
With respect to Cyprus, we strongly support the continuing
negotiations under U.N. auspices for a bizonal, bicommunal
resolution on Cyprus. We have been heartened by some of the
intense consultations going on between the Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot leadership, but there is a long way to go.
And I think that--I can't speak for our Ambassador, but I
assume he was stating the opinion of the Turkish Government.
That is something that we do not ascribe to because we want to
see the entire Cyprus situation resolved. But we certainly
understand that is the stated position of the Turkish
Government, not the American Government.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
Let me just say so the record reflects it, Senator
Menendez, that the committee has taken note formally--I spoke
on the floor in December about our efforts to try to review the
democracy promotion programs. And we all agree that the goals
are laudable, and we want to help the Cuban people, but we also
want to make sure that we are doing the most effective things
and that the programs are working.
So we are looking at that. We are going to work with the
administration. I think it is important to try to just look at
it and evaluate it. And we are going to continue our review,
and we will work with you and with the Secretary to try to
measure this.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I appreciate
that. But what I am concerned about is turning a page that we
have never permitted in our history, which is having an
oppressive regime anywhere in the world tell us how we are
going to ultimately engage in our democracy programs. And that
is the core.
We all want to see the most effective democracy programs,
but for anyone to expect that we will get a stamp of approval
from a regime to pursue it----
The Chairman. Nobody expects that, Senator. And I think
that you are, in a sense, postulating a subjective criteria
that doesn't exist here. There is no stamp of approval
necessary. We will do what we think is in our best interests,
and I am confident the administration will do that and want us
to do that.
It is simply a question of measuring the effectiveness of
what we are doing against all outcomes, and I think we need to
do that. So we will work with you. We will have a good dialogue
about it.
Senator Menendez. And I am happy, as long as we do that
worldwide, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We probably should. And I think that is
important.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for your testimony today and
your work.
I was thinking, as we were preparing for this hearing, that
one area of our discussion that often doesn't get enough of
attention is the budget itself and the management of a huge
enterprise that the State Department is. And I have always
believed whatever level of government we are talking about that
the strength of any government, especially the U.S. Government,
can only be maintained by the strength or integrity of its
agencies and the management of those agencies.
And I know it is difficult enough to deal with the issues
that you are confronted with, but you also have to run a big
agency, and we are grateful for the way you have managed that
and the team you have put in place to help you do that.
I was also struck by something that you said in your
testimony on the section on development, where you highlighted
the areas of development that the State Department is focused
on, whether it is health or food security or climate change and
clean technology jobs. But the last section of that, I thought
we cannot say this enough. And I am quoting here. ``These
initiatives are designed to enhance American security, to help
people in need, and, third, to give the American people a
strong return on their investment.'' Often, when--and you know
this from traveling our country. You know this from your work
in the Senate that when people are confronted with the
question, ``How do we save money?''--an important question
these days--they often point to cutting foreign aid as a
bonanza, as a place where we can save all kinds of money that
the reality we know is otherwise.
I was noting that the international affairs budget is about
1.4 percent of the total budget of the United States, despite
all of the--I guess the perceptions or misperceptions that
somehow there is a lot of areas to eliminate. And I think you
are demonstrating that every day that we can't at this time in
our history, especially in light of our security concerns, do
that.
Let me ask you about two or three areas. One involves our
domestic economy and the horrific recession that so many
families have lived through. Pennsylvania has a lower
unemployment rate, but 560,000 people out of work. And you
mentioned that in the opening, you mentioned the challenge of
our domestic economy in the opening comments you made.
Sometimes that connection between the international affairs
budget and the investments we make around the world may not
seem to translate into the domestic economy. But I note here
that since 2005, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, which is funded
through the international affairs budget, has financed $3.06
billion in exports from Pennsylvania, supporting 223 companies,
112 communities. There are other examples as well.
But I would like to have you talk about that because it is
not something that we talk about enough, and I think there is a
story to tell here that the American people don't often hear.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator Casey, I can't thank you
enough for asking that question because I think you are 100
percent right.
I obviously believe that what we are doing is part of our
security, and I think that case is certainly more
understandable for people today since 9/11 than it might have
been beforehand. But I also think it is essential to our
economy.
You illustrate one example of that, the Export-Import Bank.
We really believe that we can do even more through the Ex-Im
Bank, and I am going to try to encourage that approach.
Somebody asked me what I would like to do. I said I would like
to put Ex-Im Bank on steroids because I think it does so much
good work for American companies, and I want American
businesses to know that.
We are also working on a much more extensive export-driven
strategy that the President has announced and has spoken about
with business leaders. I have asked Under Secretary Bob Hormats
to lead our efforts inside the State Department because we
think there is more we can do. We can do more on our own. We
can do more in partnership with the Commerce Department, and we
intend to do that. And to reach out particularly to small and
medium-size businesses about how they can export, more lessons
that perhaps can be conveyed to them, work with more chambers
of commerce in partnership on this issue.
We want to do more to highlight American business. We are
in an economic competition, as we are in every other aspect of
the world today, and American business needs to have a partner
in the U.S. Government. Other businesses from other countries
have a strong partnership with their government, whether it is
state-owned enterprises from China or private companies from
Europe. They often have much more support from their
governments than we have in recent years given to our
businesses.
So I think in many ways we can do more to impress upon the
American public the importance of what happens at the State
Department in opening doors and in working with other
Government agencies here in the United States to promote jobs
in America.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
And maybe one more area before--I have got about a minute
left. But it is on nonproliferation. I was giving a speech
yesterday about the topic generally, and I especially
appreciate the approach that you have taken and your team, the
President, the Vice President, from a position of strength that
our No. 1 objective and No. 1 obligation is the security of the
American people. And one of the fundamental goals of the
nonproliferation strategy is to have a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal.
I wanted to have you talk about that in the context of not
just the--I guess not just the funding and the investments we
have to make in this budget to make sure that we have a safe
and secure and effective arsenal, but also in the context of
our broader security agenda.
Secretary Clinton. Well, I appreciate your recognition that
this budget and, of course, President Obama are committed to
our safe and secure nuclear arsenal, but at the same time, the
President's vision of a world without nuclear weapons. And some
have asked me how can those two coexist? And I said, well, they
can only coexist.
I mean, realistically, we know that the goal of a nuclear
weapons free world is off in the distance. So what are the
steps we need to take in order to move toward that? And in his
Prague speech outlining his vision, as well as in the State of
the Union, the President made clear that as long as nuclear
weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent.
Infrastructure repair is critically important in order to
sustain our nuclear security enterprise. And therefore, the
budget request supports programs that are important to
implementing all of the President's nuclear security agenda.
What can we do to fund the stockpile support activities that
enhance our deterrent, that make deeper reductions through
negotiations like what we are involved in with Russia on START?
How do we make the case to the Senate surrounding the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? How do we fund the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation Program?
There is just--every piece of this fits together. So it is
an issue that, of course, Senator Lugar has been a champion of
for a very long time, but I think you are so right to be
raising this issue in audiences that you speak to. Because it
is one of the most important issues confronting humanity, and
we are trying to walk the line of being committed to a goal of
zero, but being smart about how we protect and maintain our
deterrent now.
So that is the tension, but we think it is the realistic
way forward.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, thank you very much. We very much
appreciate your leadership. I particularly want to underscore
how important your statements about American foreign policy
priorities including human rights have been received
internationally.
Senator Wicker and I were recently in an international
meeting of the OSCE, and your statements particularly about the
importance of human rights, but also that we are going to
evaluate our own performance was very well received, and it has
helped us. And I encourage you to continue with your strong
commitment in that area.
I want to talk about the direction of our foreign aid
program. I strongly support what you are trying to do,
including providing more resources and more aggressive use of
our involvement internationally. But I am concerned about our
Government partners when there is a significant leakage of
funds because of corruption.
Corruption is a problem in so many places in the world. And
when we try to provide a partner with money and that money gets
used for other than its intended purpose, we are not only
denying the taxpayers of our own country the accountability
that is demanded, but we are denying the purpose for which the
foreign assistance was being made available.
I also mention in this context the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative, which Senator Lugar and I are
encouraging a much stronger participation by the United States
in the EITI. As you know, oil wealth and mineral wealth for
many countries is a curse because it fuels corruption rather
than development within a country. And I would just encourage
you, as we go through foreign assistance reform, to make sure
that we have strong accountability built into the programs and
an expectation that there must be progress in dealing with the
corruption issues among our partner countries.
Secretary Clinton. I could not agree more, Senator. First,
thank you for your continuing work with the OSCE. We view that
as an important forum. We are trying to become more engaged and
involved. We have a new Ambassador teed up to go. So we are
very much focused on what we need to do to support the broad
initiative, broad agenda of the OSCE.
On the question of corruption, this is the cancer that eats
away at societies, and it is particularly apparent in these
resource-rich societies where it is the oil curse. You know,
when you go to a country like Nigeria, whose social indicators
are falling despite the increase in oil wealth, and the
corruption is so endemic that people are just discouraged and
turned off by their own country's efforts, it is so distressing
because think of what could be done properly managed.
So we are doing several things. We are working very hard in
support of anticorruption initiatives internationally. The U.N.
has some efforts underway. We want this to be a topic in other
multilateral fora, including the OSCE, where I think it could
be quite important.
We are also pushing the Extractive Transparency Initiative
because we agree with you that this mineral wealth should be
protected as much as possible so that the revenues flowing from
it are used for the benefit of the people. And we look forward
to working with you and others on how we enhance the tools that
we have on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
I think we have to think outside the box, so to speak. How
do we get more accountability? And I think we have to have more
conditions-based aid. I know that a lot of people see aid as
something that America should do, and in certain instances,
like in the aftermath of Haiti, I agree with that. But it is
always a choice.
There are many priorities in the world that we could spend
the hard-earned taxpayer dollars on. And so, when we are
looking at aid, I think we have to have more of an approach
that says what are you going to do in return for that aid? And
how do we prevent the diversion? What are the techniques that
we use?
Some of the diversion is straight-out corruption. It goes
into people's pockets. It goes into Swiss bank accounts. But
some of it is diversion so that if we are putting money into a
health program, then the government takes their money out of
the health program. So we are not getting additive. And you
wonder why we are never getting ahead because we keep putting
money in. Other partners keep putting money in. We have to
enhance the contributions from the local communities.
A simple example is when we used to give away malaria nets,
they weren't as effective as when we made people pay just a
little, tiny something for it. So there is a lot of best
practices and good lessons learned that we are trying to apply
in our aid programs going forward, and the more we can enhance
transparency of all kinds--and I will just end with this
because I could go on about it.
But we are trying to use technology as an anticorruption
tool. So when we help to fund cell phones going into the hands
of people, they then can do mobile banking. So, for example, in
a country like the Democratic Republic of Congo, where there is
no banking system, where there are very few roads in the entire
country, in order to pay the military, a bag of money starts
off in Kinshasa, and by the time it gets to the troops in Goma,
there is nothing left.
But if we can set up a mobile banking system, we cut out
the middle people. And one of the biggest differences we could
make with our aid investments is helping to build transparent,
anticorrupt e-government systems. And some countries are very
open to that, and we are working with them. And we are also
sending this sort of little SWAT team we have of high-tech
young people around the world, working to enhance these
programs. But we are taking this anticorruption campaign very
seriously.
Senator Cardin. Well, I appreciate that response. There is
nothing wrong with conditioning aid because Americans expect
there is accountability in the use of our taxpayer dollars.
Secretary Clinton. That is right.
Senator Cardin. So we have a right to expect that the
countries are fighting corruption. I would also add to that
list the gender issues, that they are integrating women into
the programs. You have been a leader on that and gives us a
chance to advance that issue.
Let me, in the minute I have left, I want to just continue
to raise the concern of the refugees from Iraq that are in
Syria and Jordan. There was a student at Goucher University in
Baltimore who was an Iraqi refugee living in Syria that was
fortunate enough to be able to make it to the United States,
his story about so many people in his family that didn't make
because of the refugee status.
We have a responsibility in regards to the people who are
still refugees from the Iraq conflict, and I would just urge
you to continue our attention to get Iraq, the region, and the
international community, along with the United States, focused
on how we can help the lives of those people.
Secretary Clinton. We completely agree with that, and we
have a concerted effort that is looking at how we can do more
to help Iraqi refugees and try to resettle them back in Iraq,
if that is their choice.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin. As chairman, I
want to thank you for your terrific diligence in pursuing the
Helsinki Commission efforts. You have been a real leader at
that, and we appreciate it enormously.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Secretary Clinton. We are delighted to have
you here and very much thank you and appreciate the leadership
that you are providing to the Department of State and to our
diplomatic efforts all around the world. Thank you.
Last week, I had the opportunity to travel to the Balkans
with Senator Voinovich, who, as I am sure you know, is quite a
hero in the Balkans, just as former President Clinton is. And
it was remarkable to see the progress that has been made there.
But as you know, that region still is the missing piece as
we seek to see a Europe that is whole and free and at peace.
And Bosnia, in particular, I think remains a concern. I was
pleased to see your recent speech about the future of NATO and
the commitment to leave the door open for prospective NATO
members who meet the alliance's criteria.
I hope and I appreciate the leadership that you are
providing to say to those countries in the Balkans that if they
can achieve the alliance's criteria, they will be welcomed as
members of NATO, and I wonder if you could speak to that?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, Senator, as I expressed to
Senator Voinovich earlier in the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Subcommittee, thank you for going to southern
Europe and the Balkans. There is a lot of unfinished business
there. We can be proud of the role that the United States
played, but we can't rest on any laurels because there are
still some volatile situations that have to be addressed.
With respect to NATO membership, I believe strongly in
leaving the door open. I also believe it needs to be left open
for the European Union, although we have no direct role in
that. And I think it is particularly important for Bosnia.
Now we have been trying to persuade Bosnia-Herzegovina to
do the necessary constitutional reform that will enhance the
prospects for unity and not division within that country. And
some people have argued, well, that should be the carrot that
is held out to them so that if they do the constitutional
reform, then they can get into the MAP process for NATO. Others
have said, no, let them in and then don't let them become
members until they do it.
However you look at it, I think that we want Bosnia to be
looking toward Europe. We want Bosnia to stay united. We want
Bosnia to be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. So we
are constantly trying to figure out what is the best way to
achieve that. And the door remains open. When they begin to
walk through it, that is something we are still trying to work
out.
Senator Shaheen. Well, we heard some real concern on the
part not just of Bosnia, but some of the other countries in the
region about enlargement fatigue, particularly when it comes to
the EU. But also I think with respect to NATO concern that
perhaps there were other reasons why their MAP process was not
viewed favorably at this point.
So I hope that the administration will continue to remain
engaged with the EU to keep an open process and an open effort
to encourage the countries of the Balkans to consider future
membership. And maybe you could talk about what we are doing to
try and encourage that to continue?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, we are encouraging the European
Union to do more to demonstrate the benefits to Bosnia of
European integration and to work with the Government of Bosnia
to try to understand what it must do to be eligible for EU
membership. There are other countries that are also seeking
that kind of path. Serbia, which I think is very important, to
be focused on Europe and the West.
So it has been one of my highest priorities in terms of our
European policy. I am not satisfied with where we are because I
think that there has been changes going on in Europe with post-
Lisbon. There was a desire on the part of the Europeans to kind
of take care of their own business first, but we are keeping
them focused on the Balkans.
We have a lot of work to do, and we don't want to see any
moves to break up Bosnia. And we worry about that a lot. So
this is a long list of concerns. But the NATO piece of it I am
watching very closely because I share your concerns that we
want Bosnia-Herzegovina to feel like they are welcome. And they
may not be there yet, but with a little bit more effort they
could be.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate that.
And let me just be clear when I was referring to concern
over enlargement fatigue in the EU, it wasn't just in Bosnia-
Herzegovina that we heard that. It was in Serbia and the other
parts of the Balkans. So I think that is a very real concern
and one that we should continue to pursue with our friends in
the EU.
With respect to NATO, as I said, I very much appreciated
the speech that you gave recently on NATO. As the strategic
concept draft is being developed, what are your main priorities
for that new concept?
Secretary Clinton. Well, as I spoke about in my speech and
as Secretary Gates reiterated the following day, we believe
that NATO must continue to be a strong, effective alliance in
the 21st century, just as it was in the 20th. And we have to
take a hard look at how we are defining our roles and
responsibilities within NATO. We have to reform NATO so that it
is more streamlined, more manageable than many people believe
it is now.
We have to look at what the sort of out-of-area challenges
are--from piracy to cyber terrorism--and figure out what
response we are going to have. We have to determine the way
forward on missile defense, which we think is critical to
NATO's future. There is just a long list of what are new
responsibilities for NATO to assume.
But Madeleine Albright is chairing the strategic concept
committee and doing an excellent job. So I think we will get a
good result out of that work, and then it will be up to the
member countries to hammer out the actual content of it.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Kaufman, the perpetual winner of the patience
award.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary. I, frankly, don't know how you
do this. [Laughter.]
Really, I watch sometimes the amount of travel and then
trying to run the State Department at the same time, it is an
incredible challenge. And I really appreciate your service in
doing this.
These are really tough times for us economically. But I am
very pleased to see that the administration has decided to have
a sizable increase in Department of State funding. I mean, I
have traveled to Afghanistan and Iraq several times, and our
troops are magnificent. But when you are there, you have to
kind of be not thinking to say, how do we stop this from
happening before it happens?
And I think that anyone that thinks about that, for having
a strong, smart, big Department of State can act as an
incredible prevention so we don't have to send our magnificent
troops out there and put them in harm's way and go through what
we go through today. And I know that you have no better
supporter in this, and it is really a great time, and that is
Secretary of Defense Gates. I mean, he really is articulate
about it.
So I noticed that in this bill, you mention in your
statement that the complex crisis fund, the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund is being transferred from DOD
to State. Can you talk a little bit about why that makes sense
in light of the roles of State and Defense?
Secretary Clinton. Well, thank you so much, Senator
Kaufman. Thank you for your service to this committee before
you were a member of it.
Secretary Gates, before I ever was Secretary of State,
understood from his many decades in Government service, and
particularly over at the Defense Department now, that our
national security was out of balance at the end of the first
decade of the 21st century. We had come to rely so heavily on
our military, and it wasn't just for their being warriors on
behalf of our security, but they were doing development,
reconstruction, humanitarian projects, just so much.
And they are so good at it, and they have more than, what,
12 times the resources that the State Department and USAID do.
But it wasn't the kind of balanced national security policy
that is in the long-term interest of the United States. So
Secretary Gates started sounding this alarm 2 years ago, and I
am very grateful for his support.
So what we are trying to do is to rebalance by moving back
and maybe for the first time into the State Department and
USAID what were known as ``1206 funds,'' the kind of pre- and
post-conflict work that should be led by civilians. There is a
lot of room for partnership with the military, but we have got
to train up a civilian capacity to be able to do this work.
And look at what is happening in Iraq. It is a perfect
example. We have a deadline to withdraw our troops. It is a
deadline negotiated with the Iraqi Government. So we are
expected to leave.
But the Iraqi Government has certain requests that it has
made of us. One of them is to do advanced-level police and law
enforcement training. The military has been doing that. They
have all the resources. They have the helicopters. They have
the hardened facilities. We don't have any of that.
So if we are going to have a chance of getting in and doing
what is expected of us, we have to have the resources to plan
for and then execute and deliver on what that mission is. So I
think that this is not easy to do, and we are asking for some
additional resources to be able to do it.
But even with our just--our Civilian Response Corps is in
the infancy, but we sent people to Haiti. We sent people to
Afghanistan. We are beginning to have more expeditionary
personnel and the resources to match.
There will always be a role for the military in
humanitarian assistance, as we saw in Haiti. We could not have
done what was done absent our military being there in force.
But we have got to be better positioned to do our part on the
civilian side, and that is what we are attempting to achieve.
Senator Kaufman. That is great. Can you talk a little bit
about public diplomacy and how you see the future of public
diplomacy in your budget and what you are doing in terms of new
ideas and things that we can do to encourage public diplomacy?
Secretary Clinton. I would strongly encourage the committee
members who are interested in public diplomacy to get a
briefing from our new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. You
know, this is not faulting anyone because when we merged USAID
and all the other public diplomacy elements of our Government
that had done so well during the cold war in the late 1990s
into the State Department, they were still independent
agencies. The mission was not clear.
To give the Bush administration their due, they tried to
figure out how best to do this. It is really hard, and it is
not a PR job. It is not a propaganda job. It is a management
job. We have enormous resources spread around the world. We
need a clear line of communication and a message that is
repeated over and over again. And let me just give you two
quick examples.
When we went into Haiti, it was a joint military-civilian
operation, but obviously, the military had a much bigger
footprint. There were some media outlets around the world who
immediately put a negative picture out there of the United
States. And the attitude previously was, well, what can you
expect from these countries? They are anti-American or their
outlets are anti-American.
We said, no, we are going to go right at them, and we did.
We called them up, and we said that is wrong. That story is
unfair. We will give you people who you can talk to. So we are
actively engaging with even outlets and countries that are not
always considered friendly to our interests. We can't leave
these stories just out there to become conventional wisdom.
In Pakistan, there were a number of stories, and our
Embassy personnel had historically been told not to respond. If
there is a story, don't respond to it. Well, that is not the
way modern communications work.
So we are--every single day, we monitor what is said on the
public media. We need to know what is being said to people in
countries where we are operating. And then if we think they are
saying something that is not true about the United States, we
try to get in there with an alternative point of view.
So our Under Secretary, Judith McHale, came from Discovery.
So she was a media executive, not an advertising person or a PR
person. So she knows how to look at this systematically. And
that is what we are trying to do, to change the message, to
change the urgency.
When I was in Qatar, I met with the board of Al Jazeera. We
are putting people on there. We are responding. This is one of
the most powerful media presences in the world that we are
engaged with. So we are not saying, well, what can you expect?
We are saying, no, you can do better. We will give people to
talk. We will give you somebody to get on that television show
and put out the American point of view.
Now we are not going to change their perspective overnight,
but we are not going to let it go unanswered either.
Senator Kaufman. Well, March 10, Under Secretary McHale is
coming. We are having a hearing on public diplomacy with former
Under Secretary Lieberman, Hughes, and Glassman.
Secretary Clinton. Great.
Senator Kaufman. So I think this is absolutely incredibly
important as we look at the world. It is a much more complex
world, and how we handle public diplomacy is key.
Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman.
I think what the Secretary just said is terrific, and I am
delighted to hear it, as I am sure we all are.
Just a few quick wrapups before we close off, unless
Senator Lugar has additional questions. But can you just share
with us very quickly the current status of the plans to assess
and assist on the Haiti rebuild?
Secretary Clinton. Yes. First, there will be a donors
conference on March 31 that the United States is cohosting with
the U.N. and other major donor countries at the U.N. in New
York. We have been engaged with the EU, with lead countries
like France and Brazil and others who have put forward--and
Canada--significant contributions. But every country in our
hemisphere has contributed something. And so, we are working to
enhance those contributions.
There is an effort underway to coordinate the Haitian
Government and the United Nations with the United States and
other donors through a development authority that the Haitian
Government would set up and run, but which would be given lines
of accountability from the donor countries as well.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, we had a plan, a well-developed
plan that we had worked on with our Haitian partners prior to
the earthquake, and we are working to implement that, as part
of the recovery, with certain changes. For example, focusing on
agriculture is one of the big issues we are trying to further.
So we will give you in probably about 2 to 3 weeks a very
thorough report. We will also include all the information we
have about what other countries are doing because this----
The Chairman. Who is heading this up for the State
Department?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Raj Shah is the lead person named
by the President and my chief of staff, Cheryl Mills, is our
State Department contact.
The Chairman. Is there going to be one single person
coordinating all of it?
Secretary Clinton. Well, right now, Raj Shah is the
designated director.
The Chairman. Right now, you say that.
Secretary Clinton. Yes.
The Chairman. And the timing of a supplemental request, any
sense of that?
Secretary Clinton. We hope within the next few weeks.
The Chairman. OK. On the QDDR and the coordination with the
Presidential study, are we going to have two different concepts
here, or what is going to happen?
Secretary Clinton. Well, that is certainly not our
intention. We are working very hard to coordinate those and to
have one voice coming from the administration. Now there will
be other elements in the PSD because of the IFIs and Ex-Im and
all the rest of it. But we want the general concepts to be
adopted administration wide.
The Chairman. And finally, just on the PCCF, which is going
to come to you guys directly this time. But last year, when it
came to you, you funneled it directly over to the Defense
Department again. And as we try to redo this, I guess that
doesn't make sense. Is that going to happen this year, or are
you up and ready to----
Secretary Clinton. We are up and ready. We are going to be
administering it this year.
The Chairman. Terrific. That is great to hear.
Do you mind? Senator Risch just quickly wanted to make a
comment, I think.
Senator Risch. Very briefly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, as you know, the people who were held
recently in Haiti as a result of their travel there to attempt
to assist some children in Haiti, most of them were from Idaho.
And as a result of that, they were held for some period of
time. Their families in Idaho were very stressed over the
situation that they were being held at.
And I just want to thank you on behalf of them. Your team,
both the team that you assigned here in Washington, DC, and the
team that was on the ground in Haiti, particularly Ted Coley
from your operation and Catherine Farrell, who was on the
ground there in Haiti, were very, very helpful to the people in
Idaho and were very responsive when some of us from the
congressional delegation jumped in and attempted to assist
those people.
As you know, many Americans are unaware of the difficulties
they face when they get ensnared in the criminal system in
other countries, and it can be very befuddling. They don't
understand why they don't have the same constitutional rights.
They don't understand that the facilities in which they are
being held aren't up to the same type of facilities here in the
United States.
But your organization was very, very responsive. I want to
thank you for that. When the media asked me, I told them
Secretary Clinton runs a tight ship, particularly in these
kinds of instances. So I wanted to pass that on to you.
We have also received communication from some of the
families, thanking us and thanking your organization. So I
wanted to pass that on to you. Thank you so much for what you
did.
Without any reference to what the facts of the situation
were there or what actually happened as far as the factual
situation, just as far as what the State Department was able to
do, you did. And we are appreciative of that. Thank you.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much. And I will pass on
those kind words, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch. I appreciate it.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Secretary Clinton, I have just three quick
items that I will mention, and I ask for your comment on any of
them.
First of all, the policy statement that you gave in your
speech at the Newseum on Internet security and cyber security
was just tremendously important. I am curious as to whether
there are any available budget figures or additional positions
that that would buttress the position that you took.
Second, we have worked actively in this committee on the
PEPFAR program, and I think there has been recognition by the
former Global AIDS Coordinator, Mark Dybul, and the present
one, Eric Goosby, and others that we cannot treat our way out
of these problems. Prevention is terribly important.
I have concerns that prevention efforts might be in for
reduction in the budget. I ask that you take a look at
prevention strategies and explain the rationale for potentially
reducing the program. I do know that the program does continue
on a very broad scale and it treats patients in a very humane
way.
And finally, I am just curious, given the outcome of the
election in Ukraine, what new initiatives we might be pursuing
there. Obviously, many of the things we have attempted to do
there have been frustrated largely by problems within the
administration of the government. That may still be the case,
but hope springs eternal.
Clearly, the affairs in Crimea are very important. So just
as a sidebar, I wanted to raise a thought about that.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Senator.
We are very serious about implementing a robust
comprehensive Internet security, cyber security policy. It has
got many aspects to it. We are reorganizing within the State
Department so that we can be more effective in the whole arena
of cyber security and better interact with our intelligence
community, Defense Department, and others who are similarly
focused.
With respect to our efforts to open up the Internet and
keep it open to protect the freedom of expression and the
virtual freedom of assembly in countries like Iran, we are
going after this with intense focus. We are providing funding
to groups. We are working with private sector partners that
often have the intellectual property and the access that is
needed. It would be perhaps of some interest to you and other
members of the committee to give you a classified briefing at
some point in the future.
And on our prevention and treatment efforts, we are
attempting to maintain and certainly fulfill our obligations on
the treatment side, even increasing. But we are moving more
aggressively on the prevention side and in building systems. So
I will give you an answer in detail about that because Eric
Goosby has given a lot of thought to how we can best do that,
and partnering with some countries that were not our partners
to any great extent before, like South Africa, where we are now
very deeply engaged in helping them.
And finally, on Ukraine, Gen. Jim Jones will lead our
delegation to the inauguration tomorrow, and we are going to
begin exploring what we can do. We want to be responsive and
supportive of this free, fair, and credible election process,
which has led to a new President.
It is difficult. We have to wait to see how the government
is formed and what their attitudes might be. But we want
Ukraine to know the United States stands ready to be a positive
partner with them for the future.
Senator Lugar. Surely the idea that the new Ukrainian
President is going to Europe first and to Russia second was a
significant statement.
Secretary Clinton. That is right.
Senator Lugar. Maybe offers some promise.
Secretary Clinton. I agree. I agree.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, as we wrap up, I wanted to
give you just a chance to perhaps say a word, if you want to,
about one issue before the Congress, before us and you right
now, and that is the conference on the Iran sanctions bill.
Deputy Secretary Steinberg wrote us expressing concerns
that the legislation would ``weaken rather than strengthen
international unity and support for our efforts.'' I know you
have submitted a number of proposed changes at this point. So
do you want to just share what you might hope would come out of
the Congress and why at this moment?
Secretary Clinton. I appreciate this opportunity, Mr.
Chairman. We very much support congressional action. We want a
very broad global sanction regime that isolates Iran,
encourages it to change its strategic calculus, and we think
that there can be a very good partnership between the Congress
and the Obama administration in order to achieve that.
Our goal is to support the purpose and principles of the
congressional bills that have been passed that are now in
conference, but to work closely with you with some suggestions
about how they would better fit into our agenda in the Security
Council, in the multilateral world, to give the President some
flexibility so that we can come out of the legislative process
with a really strong tool and not just a statement of concern
that won't really dovetail with what we are trying to achieve.
So we have a team led by Assistant Secretary Rich Verma
ready and willing to work with the Congress, the conference
committee, in order to explore how we can come out with the
best result.
The Chairman. Good. Well, I appreciate your comments on it.
We tried within the Senate before the passage to get some of
that done. It wasn't possible. But hopefully, in the
conference, we can get there, and I appreciate what you are
trying to do.
Thank you so much. I think you have covered an incredible
amount of ground and done so with clarity. And we are
enormously appreciative of how comprehensive the afternoon has
been. So thank you very, very much.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you so much, Senator.
The Chairman. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher J. Dodd,
U.S. Senator From Connecticut
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing, and, Madam
Secretary, thank you for being here.
We meet at a time of great potential and great challenge on the
world stage.
The nation of Haiti remains foremost in our thoughts, as the
Haitian people struggle to recover and rebuild in the wake of a
devastating earthquake.
Our European allies face new economic challenges, and with the rise
of new powers around the world, we face a newly competitive global
economic landscape.
In the Middle East, despite the good work of our witness and
Senator Mitchell, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process remains
tenuous, with serious and direct American involvement needed to enact
and implement an agreement.
And even as our troops begin to come home from Iraq, our new
strategy is beginning to take hold in Afghanistan, where our mission
requires as much of our diplomatic resources as of our military
resources.
Madam Secretary, we have much to discuss. And I look forward to
hearing from you on all of these issues.
But I'd like to use a few moments here, if I could, to talk about
Latin America.
I just returned from a trip to Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Honduras, and Nicaragua. These are five different countries, but the
challenges they face, and potential opportunities are tied together,
and tied to America.
I've often said that Latin America isn't our backyard. Instead, we
share a neighborhood, and as good neighbors know, our collective
futures are tied to one another.
Central America is plagued, for example, by public insecurity
related to increased drug trafficking--and America plays an
unfortunately huge role in that problem due to the demand for narcotics
in our country.
That public insecurity is endemic to the region--as are the related
issues of economic inequality. And while our neighbors can't look to us
to solve all of their problems, America must be part of the solution,
Our country rightly focuses on border security, to keep harmful
elements out. But we need to extend the definition of border security
to include keeping drug money and arms from flowing from the United
States to the region.
More in line with the State Department's jurisdiction, we need to
revitalize and refocus the Merida Initiative. Senator Leahy and I
fought to include funding for training and prevention programs, along
with other important civil society initiatives critical to a holistic
attack on the drug problem. It is important that this funding remain
strong, and that we get it to the countries that need it.
We also need to give USAID more flexibility--and more authority--to
perform its critical development function under Merida, especially with
regards to civilian capacity and rule of law programs.
And we need to encourage our partners in the region to think of the
problem as one that affects the entire region. Our approach to Latin
America has too often overlooked the importance of treating this region
as a region, rather than as a collection of unrelated nations. And
other countries, concerned with maintaining sovereignty, have made the
same mistake.
That means we are missing opportunities to improve our
neighborhood. But I have confidence in this administration, led so ably
by Secretary Clinton, to make course corrections where necessary so
that we can tackle not only the challenges in Latin America, but the
wide range of challenges we face on the global stage.
And I look forward to discussing them with you today.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question. There has been a lot of discussion of the need to empower
and transfer responsibility to local Afghans after the military has
secured areas. Yet, too often, the critical legs of counterinsurgency--
governance and development--are not in place to capitalize on security
gains.
Can you give us examples of where ``clear, hold, build, and
transfer'' has worked, especially in the south? Particularly
the last part--the transfer?
The pool from which future Afghan civil servants can be
drawn is far too shallow. For starters, decades of civil war
have left a whole generation vastly undereducated. What can we
do to overcome this lack of human infrastructure?
Answer. Our civilians and military personnel are working closely
with Afghan partners to provide security, governance, and development
in areas where there had been only Taliban control and brutality. Our
training programs for both security forces and civilians are creating
conditions that will enable full Afghanization, when we can be
reasonably certain that the changes we are creating with our Afghan
partners are sustainable by the Afghans. In other, more secure parts of
the country, we have cooperated with Afghan Government officials and
civil society to enable greater Afghan control of governance, security,
and development. We will follow that same approach in the south, when
there is a minimum baseline of security required to allow the
cooperation with the Afghan civilian authorities to continue to move
toward transfer.
Thirty years of war has taken a heavy toll on Afghan Government
capacity. Since 2002, USAID and our Provincial Reconstruction Teams
have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in education projects in
Afghanistan to expand access to basic education by training teachers,
constructing and rehabilitating schools, distributing supplies, and
offering accelerated learning programs to out-of-school youth,
particularly girls, who were denied an education under the Taliban.
USAID is also supporting higher education and nonformal literacy and
productive skills education for both youth and adults, as well as
supporting capacity development for Afghanistan's Ministry of
Education. School enrollment is now at the highest level in
Afghanistan's history, with approximately 6 million students in
school--an estimated 35 percent of them being girls.
While our education efforts will take time to bear fruit, we are
also focusing on near term solutions to assist Afghan Government
institutions directly. We are increasing significantly the number of
civilian technical advisers in key central government ministries and in
the provinces and district centers to help make Afghan Government
institutions more visible, effective, and accountable. We are working
to certify Afghan ministries and institutions so that they can receive
direct U.S. assistance, thereby enhancing ministerial capacity,
improving the effectiveness of our assistance, and decreasing reliance
on contractors.
We also are expanding subnational capacity-building efforts,
focused mainly in key population centers in the East and South, through
new civ-mil initiatives such as the District Development Working Groups
and District Support Teams. We at the same time, we are focused on
programs that give Afghans a greater stake in their government, like
the National Solidarity Program.
We are continuing our support for capacity-building in governance
and development through our Provincial Reconstruction Teams and
District Support Teams in the countryside. Our civilian and military
personnel from these teams have been working hard over the last few
years to develop and enhance the capabilities of local government
officials including provincial governors, district subgovernors,
provincial-level officials representing their ministries back in Kabul,
Provincial Councils, and Provincial Development Councils. Through our
investment in time and effort, we are developing a cadre of local
government personnel who are increasingly capable of running government
affairs at the provincial level.
This top-down, bottom-up, whole-of-government approach is designed
to build human capacity at all levels of government in Afghanistan, and
also ensure that the next generation of Afghan Government officials
possess the capabilities they need to perform their duties and serve
the Afghan people.
With respect to the first part of your question, we do not yet have
an example of a successful ``transfer'' in the south. We are just now
engaging in a major way in Afghanistan's south, as that region has
heretofore been under the primary responsibility of our U.K. and
Canadian allies, with support from other allies and partners, and us.
The Marjah operation will be an excellent test case for our clear,
hold, build, and transfer approach. We should not expect to see quick
successes in this regard. As you rightly alluded to in your question,
war has ravaged Afghanistan for the last three decades. Our efforts to
help the Afghans to extend governance into the south and east will be
somewhat groundbreaking in that government presence has been rather
thin in those regions over the last 30 years, and even farther back in
history. It will be critical that we remain flexible and properly
resourced and manned, and that our Afghan counterparts work with us
throughout this process. Sustained security will be critical to
transfer.
Question. With Kai Eide stepping down from UNAMA this spring and
with the United States and NATO stepping up its commitments this year,
civilian leadership in Afghanistan is more important than ever. UNAMA's
mandate has always been more moral, lacking the executive authority to
really tackle donor coordination issues, for example. For 8 years now,
there has been an uneven and uncoordinated civilian effort with
multiple Afghanistan envoys, ambassadors, assistance coordinators, and
aid agency representatives running around in Kabul with no one clearly
in charge to coordinate the massive international effort.
How can we effectively tackle problems of civilian
leadership among international partners of Afghanistan?
Should we be more willing to place our own development
efforts under greater international control?
Answer. Our allies and partners are sustaining and, in many cases,
increasing their military and financial commitments in Afghanistan,
often in the face of deep public opposition. There is broad
international consensus to empower the Afghan Government by aligning
international assistance with Afghan priorities and, where possible,
channel assistance through the Afghan Government. UNAMA, working
closely with key reformers in the Afghan Government, has developed a
strategy to integrate donor activities on the ground in accordance with
shared objectives and in coordination with the Afghan National
Development Strategy (ANDS). Our international partners have greatly
improved their coordination and information-sharing. We firmly believe
that the new U.N. leadership and NATO civilian leadership recognize the
need to enhance donor coordination efforts in Afghanistan and they have
begun to do so.
With regard to U.S. development assistance, considerable progress
has been made in the past year. We work closely with our international
partners in every developmental sector. The appointment of Ambassador
Anthony Wayne as the Coordinating Director for Development and Economic
Affairs (CDDEA) in Kabul (June 2009) has greatly enhanced our ability
to manage USG assistance. In addition, Ambassador Wayne has been
working closely with his Afghan counterparts to certify different
Afghan ministries, so that they may receive direct USG assistance. He
also leads Embassy efforts to coordinate our assistance programs with
the Afghan Government, UNAMA, and bilateral and multilateral donors.
Question. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
(MRRD) runs the successful National Solidarity Program (NSP), a program
in which the United States and others have invested hundreds of
millions of dollars. The new MRRD Minister confirmed by Parliament is
Jarullah Mansouri --a political pick who lacks competence and
experience to run programs like NSP. Mansouri has made public comments
suggesting he plans to scale back NSP drastically, which would
jeopardize perhaps the greatest success story we have in Afghanistan
and the lives of millions.
How will the administration work with the new MRRD Minister
to make sure programs like NSP are not jeopardized?
Answer. Minister Mansoori was confirmed in President Karzai's
second round Cabinet submission on January 16, 2010, and has stated
that he strongly supports the National Solidarity Program. Minister
Mansoori has stressed he would be guided by two principles during his
tenure: national inclusion-allowing participation of the Afghan people
to develop a sense of ownership in Ministry-led programs; and a focus
on sustainability and capacity-building. Both are key elements of the
National Solidarity Program.
The USG is working closely with MRRD and other donors including the
World Bank to ensure that programs like the NSP are not jeopardized. On
Wednesday, March 3, Minister Mansoori led an NSP monthly donors meeting
where he reaffirmed his support to the program.
Question. Pakistan Security Assistance.--The Department is also
requesting funds in the $140 million International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement account line for Pakistan, to support ``an expanded border
security aviation fleet.''
What exactly are we planning to buy, and how much is it
going to cost?
How has it been coordinated with the other security
assistance we are providing?
Answer. The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(INL) plans to use $42.5 million of the $140 million FY 2011 request
for the aviation program. However, INL does not plan to use FY 2011
funds to procure additional aircraft. Funds will provide maintenance,
support, and operating expenses for the USG-established Ministry of
Interior Air Wing (50th Squadron), including five additional Huey IIs
that were added to the program in 2009 (through reprogramming of funds)
and those INL anticipates purchasing with FY 2010 funds (four Huey II
helicopters). In addition, funds will support the positioning of
aircraft at a forward operating location (FOL) in the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) which INL plans to establish with FY 2010
funds. This will allow the Air Wing to more efficiently conduct
operations in the FATA and NWFP a critical element of support to law
enforcement as it works to ensure continued security once military
operations have concluded in these areas. In total, the FY 2011 request
is needed to provide maintenance, support and operating expenses for
the current fleet of 17 aircraft, including 14 Huey II helicopters and
3 Cessna Caravans, in addition to the 4 Huey II helicopters which will
be procured with FY 2010 funds, for a total of 21 aircraft.
These aircraft remain a powerful tool for Pakistani law enforcement
by performing critical surveillance functions; supporting operations
against traffickers, criminals, and militants; and playing a role in
the interdiction of illegal drug and weapons shipments. The operational
tempo in 2009 was the highest in the history of the program and
requests for aviation support to law enforcement agencies under the MOI
is only expected to grow throughout FY10.
INL support is coordinated with DOD and other USG entities through
the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) at Embassy Islamabad, an Embassy
Border Coordinator, as well as other coordinating mechanisms in
Washington and in Pakistan.
Question. In Secretary Clinton's Executive Budget Summary for
FY2011, she writes that the State Department and USAID ``have
identified a limited number of joint high priority performance goals
that reflect both agencies' high priorities and will be a particular
focus for the two agencies from now through FY 2011.'' On Afghanistan
and Pakistan, the goal is to ``strengthen the host country capacity to
effectively provide services to citizens and enhance the long-term
sustainability of development efforts by increasing the number of local
implementers that can achieve a clean audit to clear them to manage
civilian assistance funds.''
Please describe what steps the administration will take in
Afghanistan and Pakistan to achieve this commendable goal. What
type of program monitoring and evaluation will be taken to
measure success?
Answer. We recognize from our attempts to strengthen the host
country capacity to provide services that some ministries fare better
than others. We have a system for certifying ministries to receive U.S.
funds directly which we will expand in both countries. We are using
fewer big contractors, reducing the bureaucratic layers through which
our assistance flows, ensuring that more assistance money actually
reaches those in need. And we are dramatically increasing the numbers
of USAID officers and inspectors to monitor our aid.
Additionally, President Karzai has announced several measures to
reduce corruption and create a climate more conducive to achieving this
goal, including: the simplification of administrative systems through
the anticorruption commission, thus reducing the opportunity for
corruption and improving basic services for the population, and the
streamlining of international donor coordination through the Afghan
Government. In terms of progress, Afghanistan has established its Major
Crimes Task Force and is creating a commission against corruption.
Several U.S. agencies work with a range of Afghan counterparts on
training and building such capacity. There is also a crucial role to be
played by the Afghan people themselves--through civil society
organizations, media debate, and Parliament and other institutions--to
set out what they need from their government and what they will be able
to give in return.
On Pakistan, as is consistent with best practices in international
development, U.S. assistance will be directed increasingly through a
broad range of Government of Pakistan institutions, as well as local
nongovernmental organizations (including the private sector) with the
capacity to implement programs effectively and accountably. This
approach will help increase host country ownership, and U.S. commitment
to building a long-term partnership with the Afghan Government and
people.
Procedures are being developed in Pakistan at both the national and
provincial levels for channeling resources through governmental
agencies with the capacity to implement programs effectively.
Implementation letters for the provincial governments have been drafted
and are under review. The USAID mission in Pakistan has also begun
conducting preaward surveys of governmental and nongovernmental
institutions that will likely be recipients of U.S. assistance
resources.
The U.S. Government will provide funds to the Pakistani Government
and qualified Pakistani organizations through a variety of mechanisms:
direct sector budget support; direct funding for federal government
projects and programs; direct funding for provincial government
projects and programs; direct funding to Pakistani NGOs; direct funding
to Pakistani contractors; multidonor trust funds; and public-private
partnerships. Where appropriate, such as for technical assistance to
the Government of Pakistan and assistance in sectors where Pakistani
entities do not have the proficiency or sufficient capacity, the U.S.
Government will engage U.S and international firms and NGOs.
This transition will take time. Current activities being
implemented via U.S. firms and NGOs will not be terminated before
systems are in place to provide services via Pakistani organizations in
an accountable manner. Moreover, a ramp-up of infrastructure programs
will require a short-term increase in the need for architectural and
engineering, monitoring and evaluation services, and other specialized
U.S.-based experts.
Question. Pakistan Security Assistance.--The Department's budget
request for FY 2011 includes $1.2 billion for the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) and another $296 million for
Pakistan in Foreign Military Financing (FMF)--not counting the hundreds
of millions of dollars in reimbursements for Pakistani counterterror
operations that we will likely pay with Coalition Support Funds. This
higher funding trend really started with last summer's supplemental
request; so that in the last two fiscal years Congress has already
provided a combined $1.1 billion for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Fund, and more than $500 million for Foreign Military Financing.
(a) What measures have you used to evaluate the effort's
progress, how much ground have gained in the last year on those
measures, and how much farther do we have to go?
Answer (a). Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Fund/Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund
(PCF/PCCF): FMF and PCCF help Pakistan improve its counterinsurgency
capabilities and modernize equipment. Specifically, FMF builds our
long-term security relationship with Pakistan, including its will to
fight violent extremism, while PCCF provides Pakistan with focused
capabilities to support immediate counterinsurgency operations along
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. FMF has provided Pakistani security
forces with air mobility and enhanced communication capabilities, and
increased border security capacity.
We are building our relationship with the Pakistanis in this area.
Progress is evident in a number of areas. For example, over the past
year, Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
(formerly North West Frontier Province) and tribal areas have increased
in scope and improved in quality, in large part due to U.S. assistance.
However, the challenge we and the Government of Pakistan faces in
combating extremism cannot be understated. We will only achieve success
through sustained effort and continued funding of security assistance
programs is integral to ensure progress.
We measure progress through a number of ways, to include such
metrics as: a significant reduction in insurgent safe havens and
prevention of their return; acceptance by Pakistan's security forces of
U.S. training; and increased cooperation to share information in
support of operations against terrorist groups. The Exchange on Defense
Planning also provides the opportunity for the United States to engage
with Pakistan's military on strategic planning and procurement.
(b) How well are you able to track exactly how Pakistani
security forces are making use of the equipment we have been
providing them?
Answer (b). The equipment has been procured through U.S. security
assistance is critical to the fight. For example, the F-16 is used
almost exclusively by the Pakistanis to target insurgents in the
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
According to the Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan flew 891 F-16s sorties
between August 2008 and August 2009. Additionally, the Pakistan Navy
has used its P-3 aircraft to conduct interdiction efforts to patrol its
borders and to support Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), the
multinational naval patrol force that engages in marine monitoring and
interdiction activities in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Also, equipment like night vision goggles, has
allowed Pakistan's security forces to operate at night which is a
significant advantage over insurgents.
(c) How much longer do you plan this level of funding to
train and equip Pakistan's security forces?
Answer (c). PCCF is designed to respond to changing operational
requirements on the ground, it is difficult to predict, the level of
counterinsurgency assistance that may be required in future years.
Reiterate the scope of the challenge we and they are facing, making
clear that it is likely that we will have PCCF needs in outyears.
Question. The Obama administration has gone to some lengths to
emphasize that the United States is not in the nation-building business
in Afghanistan despite the investment of billions in economic
assistance, including a $3.8 billion request for FY 2011. On January
25, at a talk before the Center for American Progress, National
Security Advisor Jim Jones emphasized again that we were not involved
in ``nation building'' in Afghanistan, but rather ``capacity building."
How does the Obama administration define ``nation
building''? Is the United States currently involved in nation-
building anywhere, and if so, please provide specific examples?
How does the Obama administration define ``capacity
building''? How does it apply in the Afghanistan context?
How does ``capacity building'' differ from ``nation
building'' in Afghanistan?
Is the United States involved in ``capacity building'' in
Pakistan? ``Nation building''? Please explain how the framework
of our Pakistan assistance strategy differs from our economic
assistance strategy for Afghanistan, given the similar
institutional weaknesses and other similarities in both
countries.
Answer. As the administration has said publicly, we are
accelerating the hunt for al-Qaeda and its extremist allies in
Afghanistan through a surge in troops. Simultaneously, we are
accelerating training for the Afghan National Security Forces and
capacity-building assistance for the Government of Afghanistan. Both
efforts will allow the Afghan Government to take the lead in
Afghanistan. Neither effort is an open-ended commitment.
Nation-building normally connotes development for development's
sake or the type of wholesale recovery assistance the United States
applied to Germany and Japan in the post-World War II era. We are doing
neither in Afghanistan. The Afghan people and government are building
Afghanistan, and the nature of the future Afghan state will be defined
by the Afghans themselves. We are building their capacity to build
their nation themselves. Building Afghanistan's capacity to stand on
its own and provide for its own security is in our national interest.
It will ensure that Afghanistan is never again a safe haven for
terrorists targeting the United States.
In terms of capacity-building in Afghanistan and its
implementation, our strategy reflects the urgency President Obama has
directed to reverse negative trends in the region. It consists of the
following key elements, which are integrated and synchronized with
military activities to achieve short-, medium-, and long-term
objectives. The success of civilian programs depends on an improving
security environment in Afghanistan.
Reconstruction and Development: Job creation is critical to
undermine extremists' appeal in the short term and for sustainable
economic growth in the long term. Our top reconstruction priority is
implementing a civilian-military (civ-mil) agriculture redevelopment
strategy to restore Afghanistan's once vibrant agriculture sector. This
will help sap the insurgency of fighters and of income from poppy
cultivation. Creating links to cross-border trade, while also
increasing the Afghan Government's capacity to secure its borders and
increase customs revenue, will support sustainable long-term economic
growth and job creation in the agriculture and other sectors.
Simultaneously, we are sustaining efforts to build the Afghan
Government's capacity to provide improved health and education
services.
Improving Governance: Our governance efforts are helping to develop
more responsive, visible, and accountable institutions in Kabul,
particularly at the provincial, district, and local level, where most
Afghans encounter their government. We continue to increase the number
of civilian technical advisers in key central government ministries, as
well as provincial capitals and district centers, to partner with
Afghans in this capacity building effort. We also are supporting the
Afghan Government's reinvigorated plans to fight corruption, with
measures of progress toward greater accountability.
Rule of Law: Justice and rule of law programs focus on creating
predictable and fair dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the
vacuum that the Taliban have exploited. Our rule of law efforts
complement ISAF's expanded emphasis on training capable Afghan National
Police and support Afghan-led anticorruption efforts.
Advancing the Rights of Afghan Women: Investing in women helps
advance our civilian stabilization efforts and strengthen Afghan
communities' capacity to withstand the threat posed by extremism.
Sustaining and expanding critical gains in women's rights and
empowering Afghan women is also critical to unleashing the full
economic potential of the Afghan people. Integrated into our
programming are key initiatives focused on: women's security; women's
leadership in the public and private sector; women's access to judicial
institutions, education, and health services; and women's ability to
take advantage of economic opportunities, especially in the
agricultural sector.
Focused Civilian Assistance: The President's resource request for
our strategy includes a sizable amount for civilian assistance to
implement our programs. Aligned with our national security objectives,
civilian assistance helps to build Afghan capacity in key areas and
also reassure Afghans that our commitment is long term. We are
decreasing reliance on large contractors and increasing our direct
assistance to select Afghan ministries we have certified for
transparency and accountability. Recognizing that we cannot abandon
Afghanistan as we did in 1989 following the Soviet withdrawal, our
civilian effort must be sustained beyond our combat mission so
Afghanistan does not become a safe haven for al-Qaeda.
Expanded Civilian Presence: Accompanying an increase in civilian
assistance is an ongoing, significant increase in civilian experts--
beyond the tripling of deployed U.S. civilians that occurred over the
past year, from 320 civilians on the ground in Afghanistan in January
2009 to over 950 on the ground today. Civilian experts partner with
Afghans to enhance the capacity of government institutions and help
rehabilitate Afghanistan's key economic sectors.
In terms of capacity-building in Pakistan, we are partnering with a
nation with much greater capacity and a more developed infrastructure
than in Afghanistan. We are working with the international community in
helping Pakistan overcome the political, economic, and security
challenges that threaten its stability, and in turn undermine regional
stability. And we seek to build a long-term partnership with Pakistan
based on common interests, including a recognition that we cannot
tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose
intentions are clear.
We are making a sizable, long-term commitment of economic
assistance, consistent with the landmark Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation
that authorized $7.5 billion in U.S. civilian assistance over 5 years,
with the following objectives:
Helping Pakistan address immediate energy, water, and
related economic crises, thereby deepening our partnership with
the Pakistani people and decreasing the appeal of extremists;
Supporting broader economic and democratic reforms necessary
to put Pakistan on a path toward sustainable job creation and
economic growth, which is necessary for long-term Pakistani
stability and progress; and helping Pakistan build on its
success against militants and the elimination of extremist
sanctuaries.
Additional U.S. assistance is helping Pakistan build a foundation
for long-term development and strengthen ties between the American and
Pakistani people. Both are demonstrating that the United States is
committed to addressing problems that affect the everyday lives of
Pakistanis. Where security and capacity allows, the United States
Government will provide assistance through Pakistani implementers to
enhance the long-term sustainability of our efforts. As in Afghanistan,
the security environment, particularly in the North West Frontier
Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas, will impact the
success of some assistance programs. A particular emphasis in those
areas is strengthening Pakistani communities against extremism in part
by assisting marginalized citizens, including women and youth.
Question. Last year Congress provided separate funding to begin
reversing the deferral of our contributions to international
organizations until the very end of the fiscal year. But this year's
budget request does not explicitly request additional funding to
continue that effort.
Are you seeking funding to continue the process of reversing
our deferral of payments to international organizations--
particularly those carrying out key national security missions
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization?
If you haven't requested such funds, why not?
Answer. The Department did not include a specific request for funds
for reversing deferral in the FY 2011 budget. The administration had to
make many difficult decisions during the FY 2011 budget process,
balancing competing priorities within the constrained level of the
Department's overall budget request for State Operations.
The Department anticipates completing the process of reversing
deferral at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with funds
available for this purpose in FY 2010. If any FY 2010 funds still
remain after reversing deferral at OPCW and NATO, the funds would go to
beginning the process of reversing deferral at the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
Question. The President's budget requests $350 million to fund
voluntary U.N. organizations and agencies, representing a 10 percent
decrease from FY10. Among those organizations receiving decreases in
funding is the U.N. Development Program.
Answer. The FY 2011 President's Budget includes $350.55 million for
voluntary contributions through the International Organizations and
Programs account. Due to the constrained overall budget level, the FY
2011 request for this account is a slight decrease from the FY 2010
request level of $356.66 million. The FY 2011 request for the U.N.
Development Program, however, is the same level requested in FY 2010.
Question. What are your plans for nominating someone to fill the
position of Representative of the United States to the United Nations
for U.N. Management and Reform?
Answer. We share the committee's view of the importance of U.N.
budget and reform issues, including increasing the efficiency and
effectiveness of U.N. programs and ensuring budget discipline. The
administration is currently considering candidates for the position of
Representative of the United States to the United Nations for U.N.
Management and Reform to help advance this agenda. The USUN Management
and Reform Section is currently being led by Ambassador Joseph Melrose
(retired).
Question.
Please describe the transition between the U.N. procurement
task force and its integration into the OIOS. How many
investigators from the Procurement Task Force have been hired
by OIOS? Is the investigations department of the OIOS [in]
operation? How many investigations are currently ongoing? Why
did the U.N. not renew funding for the Procurement Task Force?
Robert Appleton, who headed to the Procurement Task Force,
applied to be OIOS's director of investigations more than a
year ago. But after a hiring panel selected him and 3 other
finalists from a pool of 73 candidates, another board recently
decided to restart the process, because all 4 finalists were
American males, according to U.N. officials in media reports.
What is the process of hiring a director of investigations?
What is the status of Robert Appleton's candidacy? What steps
is USUN and IO taking to ensure this position is filled and
that OIOS is operational and continues the investigative work
started by the Procurement Task Force?
The U.N.'s investigative and oversight chief Inga-Britt
Ahlenius is being accused of systemic mismanagement and
favoritism in a letter from her staff, copied to Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon and all staff of her Office of Internal
Oversight Services.
Please comment on the overall effectiveness of the head of
OIOS, Inga-Britt Ahlenius.
Answer. Following the General Assembly's decision to transfer the
Procurement Task Force's (PTF) functions and caseload into the Office
of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) Investigations Division (ID) in
December 2008, Undersecretary General Inga-Britt Ahlenius established,
with our strong support, a distinct unit within the ID to handle
financial, economic, and administrative misconduct cases and the
remaining PTF cases. This new headquarters unit was to be staffed with
at least eight permanent investigators headed by a Unit Chief at the P-
5 level (senior investigator). Initially, three former PTF staff were
hired full-time to this unit. An additional nine people (eight of whom
were former PTF staff) were hired temporarily to help with the PTF
transition. According to OIOS, six former PTF staff are currently
employed with OIOS, four of them elsewhere in the ID. Currently, there
are 50 investigators and 214 open active investigations (32 of which
are former PTF cases) within the ID. The U.N. did not renew funding for
the PTF as it was meant to be a temporary body to deal immediately with
a vulnerable area of procurement and financial fraud within the
Secretariat following the oil-for-food scandal.
The process of hiring the director of investigations begins with
advertisement of a vacancy announcement on the U.N. Web site. Once the
announcement closes, a short list of selected candidates is developed
by the head of OIOS based on the recommendations of a panel of experts
established to assist the head of OIOS. The final selection or
selections by the head of OIOS are submitted to the Secretary General
for his approval and appointment.
In the fall of 2008, OIOS Head Inga-Britt Ahlenius selected Robert
Appleton as the best candidate following a unanimous recommendation by
the panel and presented him as her choice to be the next director of
investigations. The Secretary General rejected the appointment because
of the failure of Ms. Ahlenius to follow the U.N. rules generally on
recruitment and appointment of senior level officials which includes a
requirement to submit three final candidates, one being a woman. The
vacancy was then readvertised, and following another selection process,
Mr. Appleton was again submitted by Ms. Ahlenius to the SYG as the most
qualified candidate, but again she refused to submit three candidates,
one being a woman. Unfortunately, the Secretary General and Ms.
Ahlenius still have not reached agreement over this appointment.
Ambassador Rice has raised this issue directly with the Secretary
General and Ms. Ahlenius, and continues to press for robust and
vigorous work on investigations.
Ms. Ahlenius was appointed to head OIOS in July 2005 due to her
extensive experience in the area of audits and strong reputation for
promoting high ethical standards and transparency. She has been at the
forefront of the U.N. in promoting these goals. However, despite her
strong principles and background in audits, her management of the OIOS
has not been effective in the area of investigations. Ms. Ahlenius
relied heavily on Mr. Appleton and his expertise when he served as
chairman of the PTF. When the PTF ended and Mr. Appleton departed, the
management of investigations suffered.
Question. In January 2011, Southern Sudan is scheduled to hold a
referendum on the question of unity or separation under the terms of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Over the next 10 months, Sudan--both
North and South--must continue to work to complete critical
arrangements over borders, citizenship, revenue, and other critical
issues. At the same time, Southern Sudan must prepare for the
challenges of potential independence while confronting growing violence
within its own borders. Please summarize the contours of U.S. support
for Southern Sudan.
How much are we providing in assistance and what are our
goals for FY 2010 and FY 2011? Given the urgency of the
timeline on the ground there, how much of this assistance can
be expected to be programmed prior to January 2011?
Answer. The promotion of a peaceful and stable Sudan, whether as a
unified state or two separate entities coexisting peacefully, and full
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) continue to
be top United States Government (USG) priorities within the Sudan
Strategy. In FY 2010, the USG is focused on ensuring stability, as well
as promoting security and the rule of law in Sudan. Whether the
decision is independence or to remain a semiautonomous region of a
unified Sudan, our assistance is designed to help the Government of
Southern Sudan (GOSS) prepare to govern responsibly.
The USG spent approximately $900 million in FY 2009 humanitarian
assistance funding in Sudan and eastern Chad related to Darfuri
refugees. The nonhumanitarian budget for FY 2009 assistance to Sudan is
$376.7 million. For FY 2010, the USG budget for nonhumanitarian
assistance to Sudan is $427.8 million. Because humanitarian assistance
is allocated on a worldwide, as needed basis throughout the year we do
not yet have the humanitarian budget totals for Sudan for FY 2010 or FY
2011. For FY 2011, the administration has requested $439.9 million in
nonhumanitarian assistance for Sudan.
Though the operating environment is uncertain for the coming year,
it is anticipated that the FY 2009 funding and a significant portion of
the FY 2010 funding will be programmed in the lead up to the January
2011 referenda. Given the urgency of the January events, every effort
will be made to program the resources as quickly as possible. Of the FY
2010 funding, approximately $20 million is going to support the January
2011 referenda or referenda related programs. While FY 2011 funds will
not likely be available prior to the referenda, the FY 2011 budget
request for nonhumanitarian assistance of approximately $439.9 million
will be critical to support the above initiatives in Southern Sudan,
the Three Areas of Abyei, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan, and
possibly other vulnerable regions in Sudan following the referenda,
regardless of outcome. In order to prepare Southern Sudan for the
potential of independence or permanent semiautonomous unification with
the North, USG assistance is focused on improving peace and security,
increasing capacity for just and democratic governance by the (GOSS),
investing in the needs of the people of Southern Sudan, and providing
the necessary tools and training to foster economic growth.
Additionally, the USG envisions that significant humanitarian
assistance will continue to be needed over FY 2010 and FY 2011 to
address ongoing humanitarian needs. The USG is continuing to provide
assistance for reintegration of southern Sudanese returnees and
refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo currently in Southern
Sudan. The USG partners with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), which is involved in ongoing contingency planning in the
leadup to the January 2011 referendum.
In FY 2011, the USG will also address the threat of new or renewed
conflict by increasing attention and funding for conflict prevention
and mitigation programs that focus on peace dividends, local solutions
to community conflict, successful implementation of important political
processes, and the peaceful mediation by state authorities of local
conflict. Support will be provided for efforts to resolve post-2011
issues, including cross-border development, security and movement,
interethnic relationships, and oil security.
A key USG objective for FY 2010 and FY 2011 is the
professionalization and training of the GOSS military and the Southern
Sudan Police Services (SSPS). In particular, the USG recognizes the
significance of assisting the SSPS with strategic planning, training,
literacy, resources, and infrastructure development so that they can
develop the capacity to mitigate security threats and enforce the rule
of law. The transformation of the GOSS military and police forces are
crucial to promoting the long-term stability and security of Southern
Sudan. Another key goal of the FY 2010 and FY 2011 budgets is
supporting just and democratic governance in Southern Sudan. More
specifically, USG assistance will contribute to existing efforts to
strengthen core government institutional development and build capacity
at the various levels of government, facilitate consensus-building,
strengthen the post-elections legislative assembly, and strengthen
civic participation in the interim and post-CPA periods. Our funds will
enable the government to expand the delivery of services and deepen the
accountability, transparency, and responsiveness of key government
institutions in the South, as well as the Three Areas. In FY 2011, we
will build on existing programs to improve key public sector executive
functions in the GOSS and strengthen anticorruption efforts, financial
governance, civil service reforms, and GOSS efforts toward
decentralization. USG assistance will also go toward promoting greater
civil society involvement, civic education, and government
responsiveness to the views of Southern Sudanese constituents.
The USG is committed to assisting the GOSS invest in its people by
engaging local stakeholders in rebuilding health and education systems
at central, state, and county levels. Our FY 2011 budget is focused on
health care delivery in target areas, specifically through the
strengthening of maternal and child health services and the expansion
of access to high-quality voluntary family planning and reproductive
health care services and information. USG assistance will support
interventions that target priority health threats, improve potable
water and sanitation resources, nutrition, and reduce the burden of
infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis,
polio, and neglected tropical diseases. In order to address these
goals, the FY 2011 budget will support improvements in six health
system components: health governance in administration, human
resources, health management information systems, financial management,
logistics, and service delivery.
In terms of education, the USG will continue to work on affecting
systemic changes at the subnational, state, and county levels for more
equitable gender-based policies and practices in education. Funds will
be used for formal and nonformal education activities to improve the
quality and access of basic educational services, particularly for
girls and women. USG assistance will provide teacher training,
curriculum reform and development, and government capacity-building to
plan, budget, administer, and manage education delivery, all in an
effort to help build long-term sustainability of Southern Sudan
educational services.
Last, USG funds for FY 2010 and FY 2011 will be focused on
improving economic capacity and business opportunities across Southern
Sudan to rebuild a growing private sector economy, especially
agriculture-based, which is critical to increasing jobs for the
unemployed youth and increasing nonoil revenues for the GOSS. USG
assistance will build and improve roads in order to facilitate local
and regional trade and service delivery; we will also enhance modern
energy services in the key towns of Southern Sudan. In order to meet
our economic growth objective, USG assistance will seek to create an
enabling and fiscally disciplined environment for business and new
employment opportunities, as well as to improve the capacities of the
GOSS in fiscal management, policy, regulatory matters, budget planning,
and procurement. We will provide technical assistance and business
training to Sudanese construction firms for rebuilding the country, and
we will promote private sector development by supporting
entrepreneurship through microfinance lending, assistance with land-
reform policies, and establishing new agriculture activities. In terms
of agricultural production, expansion, and reform, the underlying
objective of U.S. assistance will be to improve overall food security.
Question. The Global Health Initiative (GHI) calls for
substantially increased spending, programmatic development, and
monitoring and evaluation. Will additional staffing, with funding, be
provided for posts to carry out these expanded duties?
Answer. In addition to the efficiency gains we fully expect through
improved GHI coordination and collaboration, we are currently reviewing
the staffing patterns at USAID to ascertain what changes are necessary
to support the GHI in both the field and Washington. In addition, the
GHI Plus countries will have access to the GHI Reserve Fund and can
request funds based on what is most needed on the ground, whether that
be additional technical assistance, management, or other staffing
needs. Finally, we will continue building the USAID workforce through
the Development Leadership Initiative (DLI), employing new health
officers through this program to further strengthen the Agency's
capacity to execute, monitor and evaluate health programming.
Question. I am concerned about a $50 million cut in proposed
support for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Turberculosis, and Malaria
from the enacted level for FY 2010. At the same time, the Consultation
Document for the GHI offers little information on how implementers of
this plan will work with the Global Fund. Please describe the planned
interaction between the U.S. Global Health Initiative and the
multilateral Global Fund.
Could you explain the rationale for this cut from the
enacted level for FY 2010?
Answer. Global AIDS Coordinator Eric Goosby, who serves as the U.S.
Government Global Fund Board Member, has consulted with Global Fund
Executive Director Michel Kazatchkine about the GHI. Deputy Global AIDS
Coordinator Ann Gavaghan held consultations with other Board donor and
implementing bloc delegation members about the GHI at the Global Fund
Board meeting in November 2009 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The GHI
Consultation Document outlines the broad themes for interaction between
the U.S. GHI and multilateral donors, including the Global Fund:
``Strengthening and leveraging other efforts: The GHI is built on the
recognition that improving global health outcomes is a shared
responsibility. The needs are too vast and the challenges too great for
any one country or organization to address alone. The U.S. Government
will join multilateral efforts involving the United Nations and others
to make progress toward achieving Millennium Development Goals 4, 5,
and 6. Indeed, a key principle of the GHI is to strengthen and leverage
key multilateral organizations, global health partnerships, and private
sector efforts . . . the GHI will strengthen the U.S. Government's
already close collaboration with the Global Fund . . . the GHI will
emphasize accountability for achieving substantive outcomes and
rigorously monitor impact without increasing the reporting and
administrative burdens on partner countries. Indeed, harmonizing and
reducing these reporting requirements is a key element of the GHI's
approach to monitoring and evaluation.''
Question. Multidrug resistant (MDR) TB represents a grave and
growing health threat globally and potentially in the United States as
well. Enhancing laboratory capacity is a critical component of
addressing MDR-TB and a core feature of health systems strengthening as
outlined in the GHI. The designated target in the GHI, of detecting and
treating 57,200 multidrug resistant cases of TB, however, is
significantly lower than the objective set out in the Lantos-Hyde
legislation to support the diagnosis and treatment of 90,000 new MDR
cases by 2013. Please explain the rationale for this lower target and
the practical implications of this and other differences regarding
targets for tuberculosis between the GHI and Lantos-Hyde.
Answer. We established conservative targets that took into account
the impact of currently available diagnostics and drugs. The treatment
of 57,200 cases of MDR TB in USAID priority countries represents a
significant increase compared to the mere 6,000 cases of MDR TB that
were treated according to international standards globally in 2008.
However, these targets could be surpassed substantially with the
introduction of new technologies and enhanced donor contributions to
the Global Fund and other TB control programs. We are working with
public-private partnerships on the development and introduction of new
diagnostics and drugs, and once clinical trials and country level
evaluations are completed, we anticipate that these new tools will help
to accelerate TB case detection and shorten treatment duration. In
addition, country level evaluations of more rapid tests for MDR TB are
already underway in numerous countries, and the clinical trials on
several new drugs to treat TB are promising. These developments could
substantially increase our impact.
Question. Climate Change.--The United States recently associated
itself with the Copenhagen Accord and pledged to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions in the range of 17 percent by 2020. There are now over a
hundred countries associated with the Copenhagen Accord, of which
approximately 60 countries have voluntarily inscribed carbon pollution
reduction pledges.
(a) What are the next steps in implementing this Accord and
what role do you see the administration playing in these
efforts?
(b) How does the administration plan to deliver on its
contribution to the global climate finance goal of $100 billion
annually by 2020? Recognizing that this finance goal will be
reached through a combination of support from both the public
and private sectors, what mechanisms do you find most promising
for mobilizing these sectors?
(c) Do you believe that domestic legislation is necessary to
fulfill our mitigation commitment? How would failure to pass
legislation impact the implementation of the Copenhagen Accord
and the ability of the global community to achieve necessary
reductions?
Answer (a). To date, 120 countries have associated with the
Copenhagen Accord, accounting for more than 80 percent of global
greenhouse emissions. We will continue to encourage countries to
associate with the Accord and inscribe their commitments to mitigate
their greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, we are now working
with partners in a variety of fora to operationalize all elements of
the Accord, including the provisions on mitigation, transparency, and
financing.
Answer (b). In Copenhagen, in the context of meaningful mitigation
actions and transparency on implementation, we committed to working
with other developed countries to jointly mobilize USD$100 billion a
year by 2020. We anticipate continued scaling-up of public financing
through bilateral and multilateral channels, particularly to support
adaptation, capacity-building, and other developing country climate
priorities, as well as work to reduce barriers to market-based
approaches.
However, private sector finance driven by carbon markets is
anticipated to account for the majority of funding flows to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions. While governments cannot direct private
capital, creating the right incentive structure can help accelerate an
already strong trend toward low-carbon investment. Domestic mitigation
targets will be essential in directing investment flows toward low-
carbon alternatives in each sector, and efficient and liquid carbon
markets will be important in transmitting the carbon price signal
throughout the economy.
Strong federal legislation with a cap-and-trade component could
significantly assist our efforts to meet these climate finance
objectives--in particular, through auctioning set-asides and
international offset provisions.
Answer (c). The administration supports the passage of
comprehensive clean energy and climate legislation to bolster the
American economy, enhance our national security, set the United States
on a path to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions and be a leader in
clean energy technology. Failure to pass legislation would negatively
impact the leadership position of the United States in the climate
negotiations and the ability of the global community to achieve
necessary greenhouse gas reductions.
Question. Last year, when asked about modernizing the U.S. foreign
assistance apparatus, you responded that it was something you would
pursue vigorously. Since that hearing, you authorized the Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review, meant to provide ``short-, medium-,
and long-term blueprint for our diplomatic and development efforts''
and guidance on ``how we develop policies; how we allocate our
resources; how we deploy our staff; and how we exercise our
authorities.'' In a similar vein, the White House announced a
Presidential Study Directive on Global Development Policy meant to be a
whole-of-government review of U.S. development policy.
What legislative outcomes do you expect to come from the
QDDR? Will requested legislation be similar in scope to S.
1524--the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability
Act, passed out of this committee last November?
Answer. The QDDR addresses many aspects of the Foreign Assistance
Revitalization and Accountability Act and shares its overarching
objective of strengthening the capacity of USAID and State to establish
and implement effective global development policies and programs [note:
the QDDR does not deal with other agencies]. During Phase 2 of the
QDDR, task forces are being instructed to identify any legislative
changes that would be necessary to implement their recommendations.
Thus, while it is possible that some QDDR recommendations will require
legislative action, it is premature to determine whether or not that is
the case. The QDDR's recommendations will also be reflected in the FY
2012 budget request. We look forward to engaging with you and hearing
your views on the QDDR Phase 2 priority areas.
Question. Relationship Between the Department of Defense and the
State Department.--In the FY11 budget request, the State Department
asks Congress to fund three items (``to begin to rebalance roles
between DOD and State'') that in past years have been entirely or
largely funded through the DOD budget: Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Capability Fund ($1.2 billion), Iraq Police Training ($295 million),
and the USAID Complex Crises Fund for reconstruction, security and
stabilization activities ($100 million).
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). The Department
is requesting $1.2 billion for the PCCF and another $296 million for
Pakistan in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Could you cite some
specific examples to explain why you need the PCCF because FMF would
not work? Could you explain how the two accounts will be managed and
executed differently? Last year when Congress provided the State
Department $700 million for the PCCF, the Department transferred all of
the money as soon as it got it, in one fell swoop, to the Defense
Department for it to manage. Are you going to do the same thing this
time? How will it be different?
Answer. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) is
designed to complement Foreign Military Financing (FMF), not replace
it. Both tools are designed to support our foreign policy objectives.
PCCF is designed to focus funds on a specific country--Pakistan--with a
specific need--enhancing counterinsurgency (COIN) capability. It
authorizes assistance for the full range of Pakistani security forces
relying upon selected Foreign Assistance Act authorities as well as the
FMF authority under the Arms Export Control Act. FMF will enhance the
ability of Pakistan's military to mitigate against existing and
emergent threats, participate in international stability operations,
and meet its legitimate defense needs. Our use of FMF to support
Pakistan's COIN requirements will be targeted toward providing
capabilities that bridge the immediate requirements met by PCCF to more
enduring transformational solutions.
The Department is continuing to develop our oversight and
management procedures for PCCF with the goal of preserving the
flexibility and agility needed to support the requirements in the field
while ensuring that this is truly a State Department-managed program.
Both State and DOD are committed to the successful implementation of
PCCF as a State Department-managed program in FY 2011 with the goal
being a seamless transition of the program. A major difference in the
management of PCCF will be increased State Department oversight and
involvement throughout the execution process, which will ensure that
this major assistance program aligns with our broader foreign policy
objectives in Pakistan.
As is true with FMF and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF),
DOD will continue to be the primary program executor. We are currently
engaged in discussions with our DOD counterparts over how best to
manage PCCF so that it preserves the flexibility and agility needed to
support requirements in the field.
Question. Complex Crises Fund.--The administration has requested
$100 million for the Complex Crises Fund which it will use in a similar
manner to DOD's $100 million section 1207 authority--to respond to
emerging or unforeseen crises through support for reconstruction,
security, or stabilization. Who will administer this fund? What
criteria will guide which projects will be funded? Will this replace
section 1207 funds?
Answer. The goal of the Complex Crises Fund (CCF) is to advance
peace and stability through the prevention of and/or timely response to
emerging or unforeseen complex crises overseas, and to seize
opportunities to advance peaceful transitions, democratic governance,
and development progress. The CCF was created in the FY 2010 Department
of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act
(SFOAA) (Div. F, P.L. 111-117), consolidating what had been separate
budget requests for a Rapid Response Fund and a Stabilization Bridge
fund. For FY 2010, the SFOAA directs USAID to administer the $50
million fund, in consultation with the Secretary of State. FY 2010 is
the last year for security, reconstruction, and stabilization-related
funding under section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163), as amended, which
authorizes DOD to transfer up to $100 million to the Secretary of State
by September 30, 2010. These funds could be used by any agency
undertaking appropriate foreign assistance activities at the direction
of the Secretary of State. Section 1207 program decisions have been
made under an interagency concurrence mechanism managed by State (the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization), which
is independent of the CCF. In FY 2010, section 1207 funds total $100
million; thus, together with CCF funds, $150 million is available
during FY 2010 between the two accounts. USAID has established a
standing interagency working group to help administer CCF projects and
guide their development and execution. The administration's FY 2011
request of $100 million for the CCF is lower than the combined total of
section 1207 and CCF funds available in FY 2010. It is the first year,
however, that all of the funds and authorities to prevent or respond to
emerging or unforeseen complex crises overseas are sought to be granted
to the Secretary of State.
Question. On December 15, 2009, Secretary Gates sent a memo to
Secretary Clinton in which he proposed a ``Shared Responsibility,
Pooled Resources approach'' for DOD and State to work together on
security assistance with funding mechanisms for security capacity-
building, stabilization, and conflict prevention overseas. What is your
reaction to Secretary of Defense Gates' proposal to have ``shared
responsibility and pooled resources?'' Who would be in charge of those
funds and the personnel in the field?
Answer. My staff is carefully reviewing this proposal, which
touches on topics that are currently being addressed in the QDDR and
other ongoing administration reviews. The concept of pooled resources
is an intriguing one that has been proposed in various forms over the
past decade. It is one of many concepts that are being evaluated in our
ongoing reviews which contemplate a variety of implementation
mechanisms. The outcomes of these reviews will inform the FY 2012
budget and legislative cycle, which I expect will provide a more
comprehensive direction on security capacity-building, stabilization,
and conflict prevention activities overseas. It is critical that we
find mechanisms which provide adequate funding, but also ensure that
all assistance activities support our broader foreign policy goals.
Question. Police Training.--There have been significant criticisms
over the way in which the State Department's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) oversees and implements
police training worldwide. For example, the Special Inspector General
for Iraq (SIGIR) recently released a report asserting that the State
Department cannot account for more than $1 billion it paid out to
contractor DynCorp to train police during the first years of the Iraq
war. This raises questions about whether INL has sufficient capacity to
appropriately oversee this important function. Yet, the FY10 war
supplemental will shift responsibility for police training in Iraq from
DOD to State, requesting $517.4 million to fund this effort, INL is
also responsible for an estimated 2.5 billion dollars' worth of funds
spent on training police around the world.
There have been significant criticisms over the manner in which the
State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs oversees police training. Does INL have the
personnel and organizational capacity to properly oversee and implement
police training?
Answer. The Department acknowledges that the rapidly expanding
demand for trained police in both Iraq and Afghanistan at times
strained our efforts to provide optimal oversight. The Department
recognized the need to expand contract oversight for our police
training programs and is taking all appropriate steps to add staffing
and standardize procedures. The Department's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is in the process of adding
significantly more contract officers on the ground and reviewing INL
contract management business processes and management controls, and
establishing detailed Standard Operating Procedures the contract
officers. This will enable the successful implementation of existing
quality assurance surveillance plans. We have learned from the
continually evolving program demands in Iraq and Afghanistan that we
must respond with greater oversight by adding specialized personnel
with technical skills necessary to effectively oversee and manage INL
police training programs.
INL does have the personnel and organizational capacity to properly
oversee and implement police training programs. INL has operated
numerous successful police missions throughout the world including
those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Georgia, and East Timor. In each of
these missions, INL has demonstrated the ability to work with
multinational partners and host governments in providing effective
police training services and facilitating police reform. INL conducted
the first civilian police (CIVPOL) mission in Haiti in 1994. Since
then, over 7,000 U.S. law enforcement personnel have participated in
police development missions in 16 nations. The missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, conducted in hostile environments, have been particularly
challenging as police training needs must be flexible and responsive to
fluctuating demands driven by military operations.
In Iraq, INL is designing the future Iraq police development
program to include a much higher proportion of USG direct hire
personnel--approximately one USG employee for every six contractors to
ensure proper management and oversight. Overall INL will employ 350
senior law enforcement officials and subject matter experts--supported
by additional program staff in Washington and Baghdad--to focus on
institutional development and capacity building in the Iraqi police
services ensuring sustainability of police reform in Iraq.
Question. What steps are being taken to strengthen INL's ability to
oversee this function? Should we consider transferring responsibility
of this function to another entity--such as USAID or the Coordinator
for Stabilization and Reconstruction
(S/CRS)? Does INL rely too heavily on contractors to implement police
training--does the State Department need to build in-house capacity to
handle this function?
Answer. As outlined in the response to Senator Kerry's question
above, the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has significant experience with managing
police training programs throughout the world. Large-scale programs in
Iraq and Afghanistan present unique challenges and INL is responding
with greater oversight and the addition of personnel with technical
skills necessary to effectively oversee and manage these police
training programs.
INL is the only USG entity with the operational experience,
technical expertise and the mandate to implement such foreign police
training missions. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) was established to coordinate USG interagency
resources and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or
prepare for post-conflict situations. S/CRS has begun to build police
and rule of law expertise within its Civilian Response Corps Active
component. Though this is vital to U.S. efforts in reconstruction and
stabilization around the world,
S/CRS cannot replace regional and functional bureau expertise. S/CRS
can provide assistance but lacks the operational background and subject
matter expertise to conduct a sustained, advanced skill-based police
development program such as that planned for Iraq. To require S/CRS to
perform this function would detract from its core mission.
Likewise, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
does not have police training as a core function, and lacks INL's depth
of expertise to conduct broad-based international police development
programs around the world. USAID has conducted limited training in
community policing and INL will use lessons learned from its own
programs and that of USAID's as it designs the curriculum for the Iraq
police development program.
Although the Department of State and its interagency partners
historically have relied on contracts to secure subject matter
expertise for its police development efforts, INL is exploring
different mechanisms that will allow it to tap other sources of police
training expertise, such as a recent Memorandum of Understanding signed
with the New York City Police Department to support the police training
mission in Haiti. Specific to Iraq, INL is designing the future police
development program to include a much higher proportion of USG direct
hire personnel--approximately one USG employee for every six
contractors. In addition, INL's program offices in both Baghdad and
Washington, DC are expanding the number of USG subject matter experts
to manage directly the police program in the field and in Washington.
This in-house capacity will serve as the foundation of continuing
police development efforts in Iraq.
Question. Turning Over Civilian Police Training to the Military in
Afghanistan.--The President's new strategy depends heavily on training
the Afghan army and police to defend their country. While you have been
supportive of the President's determination to devote more resources to
this critical task, you recently mentioned in an op-ed in Politico in
December that meeting the objective will require more than additional
trainers. A report sent to Congress at the end of October summarized
the dismal state of the Afghan police. We have spent $6.2 billion on
police and the Ministry of Interior since 2002, but only about a third
of recruits can read and write, and roughly 1 in 10 trained units is
capable of operating independently. Using private contractors, the
State Department has tried for years--and spent billions of dollars--to
train a civilian police force with limited success. Now the task is
being handed over to the Pentagon, which is scheduled to take over
police training this March. This is a pivotal change, and many are
concerned that we will end up training a paramilitary adjunct for the
counterinsurgency fight versus a civilian police force.
Given General McChrystal's expressed and understandable
desire for the police to play a counterinsurgency role and the
shift in training to the Pentagon, what does this mean for the
prospects of a real civilian police force to promote the rule
of law at the local level? This is something that I think we
both agree is vital.
Answer. DOD has had the lead for development of Afghan security
forces since 2005 and has transferred funding to State to implement a
police training program on its behalf since 2007. The transfer of
contract responsibility for police training is an effort to eliminate a
larger management layer so that resourcing, funding and other
management issues for this large-scale training mission are more
efficient. The use of law enforcement experts is expected to remain a
focal point of the program, and the Department of State will continue
to play a role in Afghan law enforcement training through program
policy, oversight, and overall direction for the police program through
Ambassador Eikenberry. Instruction in human rights, women's issues,
values, ethics, drug awareness and first responder duties all remain
core elements of the police curriculum to provide recruits with
essential civilian policing skills required for effective engagement
with local populations.
Question. There are reports that the Pentagon in on the verge of
awarding the police training contract to Xe Services, the firm formerly
known as Blackwater. Even though the State Department doesn't have
jurisdiction over the awarding of this contract, does a new contract
for a company with Blackwater's track record and reputation make sense
from a political and public relations point of view? What kind of
message does it send to the Afghan people?
Answer. The State Department does not know which company will be
awarded the police training contract by the Defense Department. The
ability of the Afghan National Police--and the international personnel
who support, train, and mentor them--to conduct their duties with
professionalism and respect for others is essential to the development
of a police force which can be trusted. We expect that the requirements
of the police training program--which includes regular interaction with
Afghan police and local populations--will be met by whichever company
is awarded the contract.
Question. The FY11 budget request and FY10 war supplemental do not
include additional funds to support Haiti rebuilding. Thus far, all of
the funds being used to support Haiti relief efforts have come from
existing accounts and emergency humanitarian funds. For example,
apparently USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has reduced
programming funds in all other regions by 40 percent to cover Haiti
relief. What is the status of plans to assess and assist with
rebuilding Haiti? Who is leading this effort in the State Department--
do you plan to assign a single coordinator to handle all aspects of the
recovery?
Answer. The Department of State is reviewing USG policy and
assistance efforts in Haiti in light of the January 12 earthquake. Our
goal is to help Haiti build back better. This will require careful
coordination with the Government of Haiti and international donors.
Shortly after assuming office, Secretary Clinton designated her Chief
of Staff, Counselor Cheryl Mills, to be the lead for our policy in
Haiti. A decision has been made to name a single coordinator to
oversee, under Counselor Mills' direction, all aspects of our policy
and assistance vis-a-vis Haiti.
Question. Who is in charge of coordinating the Haiti 2020 team?
Answer. Counselor Mills' Policy Advisor, Meghann Curtis, is the
Policy Planning Director of Haiti 2020. Ms. Curtis has been Policy
Advisor to Counselor Mils since April 2009. Rueben Brigety is the
Coordinator of the Haiti 2020 team. Mr. Brigety is a Deputy Assistant
Secretary in the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration.
Question. What is the timing of the supplemental request for Haiti
and what funding level is anticipated? What do you anticipate as the
potential U.S. share of an international effort to support Haiti's
recovery over the next 5 years?
Answer. We are working with OMB to determine both dates and dollar
amounts of a special fiscal year 2010 Haiti supplemental. Once these
are determined, we will be in a better position to urge generous
contributions from the international community.
Question. According to the latest U.N. figures, over 1.3 million
people are living in makeshift tent cities that have popped up in
parks, public spaces, and even in a golf course by people made homeless
by the earthquake. According to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), only 24 percent of people living in these
so-called ``spontaneous settlements'' have received basic tents or
tarpaulins that can shield them from the elements. These figures are
especially troublesome since the rainy season comes in April--followed
by the hurricane season in June. Will there be universal coverage by
the time the rains start? Are there plans to put in place more
permanent housing? What is the timeframe?
Answer. For emergency shelter, the immediate relief goal is for
every household in need (est. 240,000-300,000 households) to receive
some form of assistance (two plastic sheets or one family-size tent) by
1 May. To date, 160,000 plastic sheets and 24,500 family-size tents
have been delivered to serve approximately 185,000 families. The 29
humanitarian agencies reporting to the Emergency Shelter Cluster (ESC)
lead agency are on track to deliver emergency shelter assistance (2
plastic sheets or 1 family-size tent) to 258,000 families by May 1.
An estimated 600,000 of the 1.29 million displaced by the
earthquake have left Port-au-Prince; 95 percent are living with family
or friends in other towns and cities. For the intermediate term,
shelter programs funded to date will assist an estimated 23,000
households with transitional shelter before hurricane season. The
transitional shelter kits will be in-country and distributed by end of
April; the package includes cement, timber, steel hurricane strap, roof
nails, nails and piping. An estimated 33 percent of the total could be
completed and occupied by beneficiaries by June 1 with the remainder to
be completed within 6-12 months. The Shelter Cluster has set a goal of
providing transitional shelter to 120,000 households within 12 months
of the disaster.
Question. An estimated 1.1 million people require access to
emergency latrines. What steps are being taken to address this need?
What is the timeframe? How is this being coordinated by donors--who is
doing what? How many actual latrines need to be built in order to meet
the need for 1.1 million?
Answer. In water and sanitation, 1.2 million people are now
receiving treated water; 196 IDP sites have been assessed and 46 of
these sites require immediate sanitation interventions. The goal is to
construct 11,000 latrines. Approximately 2,750 latrines have been
constructed, and an additional 800-1,000 latrines should be completed
by mid-March. An estimated 7,400 trench latrines will be completed by
April 15. The goal is to have one latrine for every 100 people in 3
months, one latrine for every 50 people in 6 months, and one latrine
for every 20 people in a year. Thirty-six million dollars in OFDA
funding has been committed to accomplish this goal. Key U.S. NGO
partners working on hygiene issues and latrine construction include,
Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in
Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA), CARE, Adventist
Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), American Red Cross (ARC), Action
Contra La Faim (ACF) and many others.
Question. Your administration has announced the launching of a
Global Health Initiative, a 6-year, $63 billion integrated plan that
seeks to build on U.S. work in combating HIV/AIDS and malaria with a
new emphasis on women and girls and a more holistic approach to
fighting disease and helping countries build health systems. These are
all welcome developments, and I look forward to continuing to work with
you on this Initiative. The Global Health Initiative calls for
substantially increased spending, programmatic development, and
monitoring and evaluation. Will additional staffing, with funding, be
provided for posts to carry out these expanded duties?
Answer. In addition to the efficiency gains we fully expect through
improved GHI coordination and collaboration, we are currently reviewing
the staffing patterns at USAID to ascertain what changes are necessary
to support the GHI in both the field and Washington. In addition, the
GHI Plus countries will have access to the GHI Reserve Fund and can
request funds based on what is most needed on the ground, whether that
be additional technical assistance, management, or other staffing
needs. Finally, we will continue building the USAID workforce through
the Development Leadership Initiative (DLI), employing new health
officers through this program to further strengthen the Agency's
capacity to execute, monitor and evaluate health programming.
Question. You have had an ambitious agenda for global women's
issues since the beginning of your tenure. However, the Global Women's
Issues office has had to scrape a budget together for staffing and
travel, and their program funds come from the Human Rights Democracy
Fund and Development Assistance funds.
What budget are you requesting for that office? Is that
level sufficient for the office to fulfill the ambitious
mandate you have given it? Do you envision that the budget will
grow in order to increase the office's capacity? Will that
office have specified program funds?
Answer. We are working to increase S/GWI's capacity to meet the
ambitious mandate that we have given it. Specifically, we are
requesting $3.483 million in FY 2011 operating funds to support S/GWI's
continued growth in staffing and office capacity. S/GWI is using
funding granted for FY 2010 to purchase 8 additional slots above the 11
that the office currently possesses. The acquisition of these eight
slots will occur over the course of 2010 and 2011 and will be used to
increase the number of staff with grants and programmatic expertise.
At present, S/GWI oversees the Iraqi Women's Democracy Initiative,
which is funded through the Human Rights Democracy Fund, to expand
training and capacity-building for Iraqi women political leaders. We
fully expect S/GWI will continue to administer this Initiative in the
future. Additionally, S/GWI will continue to work with its bureau
counterparts inside the State Department and with USAID to maximize
programming resources for women as well as develop a strategy to
leverage private sector resources to support programs aimed at
combating against women and promoting women's social, economic, and
political empowerment.
Question. Global Engagement.--The President is requesting $100
million to support ``Global Engagement'' that will forge ``a new
beginning with Muslim communities around the world.'' This request
stems from the President's speech on human rights and democracy in
Cairo in 2009. Few details are provided as to what programs this fund
will actually support.
Can you please provide greater clarity as to how this fund
will be used to support the broad goal of ``global
engagement?'' How will these programs complement those already
undertaken by ECA? Can you provide a list of the target
countries and how much money is budgeted for each? Where do
these funds fit into the State Department budget?
Answer. In June 2009, President Obama delivered a speech at Al
Azhar University in Cairo that called for engagement based on mutual
interest and mutual respect with Muslims around the world. We plan to
use the President's request for $100 million of ESF funds for Global
Engagement activities in the FY 2011 budget to establish and expand
programs that address areas in which he pledged that we would invest
and engage and that further the goals of deepening and broadening our
relationships with Muslim communities. Funding requested for Global
Engagement activities will be targeted at Muslim-majority countries and
Muslim communities. This funding will help to fill gaps in these focus
areas for FY 2011 and we will seek to transition to base funding in FY
2012.
Please note that President Obama's speech was a vision statement
for our relationship with Muslims around the world. Democracy and human
rights were areas of emphasis in that speech, among many others. These
programs, however, do not focus specifically on just democracy and
human rights. They focus on building partnerships that will advance
human development, science and technology, and economic opportunity.
To support economic opportunity, Global Engagement plans to invest
$35 million in FY 2011 in a Global Entrepreneurship Program (GEP). The
GEP is focused on supporting and empowering entrepreneurs by
marshalling partners around specific areas considered essential for
creating a successful ecosystem for entrepreneurs. The GEP is the
concrete, programmatic fulfillment of the Obama administration's
commitment to use America's strength as an entrepreneurial culture to
develop entrepreneurship around the world. Entrepreneurs are known to
be a key ingredient in driving job growth, which underpins political
stability and civil society. Initial partner countries include Egypt,
Indonesia, and Turkey, with planned expansion to Pakistan next year.
Specific program areas include Entrepreneurs in Residence, which will
establish locally based entrepreneur/mentors to build a network of
expertise in developing countries. Angel investing networks will be
created in countries where no such support exists. The Entrepreneurship
Bridge program will pair U.S. and foreign partners to structure
appropriate incubators/accelerators/centers of commercialization to
help take innovation from lab to main street, and E-Mentor Corps, a
Web-based matching of mentors and entrepreneurs in developing
countries, will be the focal point for knowledge exchange.
With $25 million under the Human Development element, the
Department will scale some of the most effective programs of the Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs so that they will have broader
reach and by seeding and launching new programs in high priority
countries that ECA does not presently have the resources to launch,
helping to expand both the depth and range of our exchange efforts in
high priority countries. This includes New Beginnings in Education for
Economic Opportunity and New Beginnings in Science and Technology which
will provide community college scholarships and faculty exchanges,
targeting future scientists, activists, and innovators. A complementary
New Beginnings in American English Initiative will provide English
training, teaching and scholarships to expand access to media and
journalist training, and to encourage civic action. Funds will also be
used to support the Special Representative to Muslim Communities'
initiatives to promote empowerment through education and access to
information.
Science and Technology (S&T) is the third focus area of Global
Engagement, with $40 million allocated to advance scientific
collaboration among priority countries and the United States. The
Department and USAID, in collaboration with partner agencies and
partners in the region, are developing four scientific Centers of
Excellence that will serve as loci of collaboration and support for
scientists in the region who are seeking to address the challenges
associated with climate change, water, renewable energy, and health.
Work on these centers is already underway, but funding is needed to
launch them. The location of the centers will be chosen based on the
ability to leverage existing institutions as well as support from other
government and private partners. S&T Funding will also support a Global
Digital Science Platform to encourage collaboration and close knowledge
gaps around key development challenges, and build local S&T capacity
through an International Science Partnership. Finally, S&T funding will
target science and technical training for young women through
University partnerships that encourage knowledge-sharing, teacher and
administrator exchanges, and online collaboration.
Question. The FY10 joint spending plan for the Civilian
Stabilization Initiative includes $31.7 million for policy and plans,
including ``extensive interagency planning and coordination.'' Can you
please provide me in greater detail the specific activities associated
with this figure and how much each activity and subactivity will be
funded?
Answer. The $31.7 million allocated to ``Policy and Plans'' in the
FY10 joint spending plan funds the direct staff (72 fulltime FS and GS
employees), working in the immediate Office of the Coordinator, and the
offices of Planning, Strategic Communications, Conflict Prevention,
Resource Management, and Knowledge Management-Information Technology.
The $31.7 million also funds an additional 72 contractor positions (19
for Knowledge Management-Information Technology and 53 distributed
across the other above offices of S/CRS), and 5 of the 12 detailees
(remaining 7 are nonreimbursable) from other USG agencies who are
assigned to S/CRS. It also covers all operating expenses of S/CRS as
noted below.
The personnel of S/CRS serve as core staff actively engaged in
whole-of-government planning and conflict assessment, international
outreach, public and congressional affairs, and providing
administrative and IT support to S/CRS, which forms the backbone to the
activities of the Civilian Response Corps. The majority of these
personnel also regularly deploy for either specialized missions and/or
as Standby members of the Civilian Response Corps.
The $31.7 million does not include funding for the S/CRS Office of
Civilian Operations, which is covered under the allocation entitled
``CRC Operations Support'' in the FY 2010 joint spending plan.
A more specific breakdown of the $31.7 million is included in the
following table:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expense FY 2010 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Labor and Fringe Benefits.......... $10,665,648 Covers labor and
fringe for 72 FTE
with 28% fringe.
IRM Desktop Support................ 1,000,000 Central IRM LAN
support; 3 locations
200 seats.
KMIT Contractor Support............ 2,298,056 Funds 19 contractors
to augmented staff
to develop KMIT
solution, provide
internal user
support in 3
locations, and
enhance S/CRS web
presence.
IRM MOU............................ 216,000 Reimbursable senior
level support.
Bandwidth for VTC.................. 750,000 Usage of VTC to
support dispersed
locations.
Reserve/Detailees.................. 1,000,000 For unbudgeted
requirements and
reimbursable
detailees.
PC Applications.................... 1,200,000 To develop user
applications/
databases.
IT Technical Refreshment........... 400,000 Establishes the base
for periodic
refreshment of
existing equipment.
DS Security SA-18.................. 484,240 A new cost associated
with Springfield
Annex.
Alterations/Space.................. 100,000 To continue to tailor
SA-18 for CRC use.
Shuttle Service.................... 300,000 Provides scheduled
transportation to
connect SA-18 with
other S/CRS
locations.
Contractor Support................. 7,865,480 Funds 53 contractor
support positions,
including support to
expanded S/CRS
operations. Includes
common-servicing to
CRO, e.g.
administration,
travel, facilities.
Utilities/Building Services........ 274,049 Pays for billed
water, after hours
HVAC, electrical,
trash, laborers and
trucks and other
miscellaneous costs
when not included in
rental.
Telephones......................... 500,000 Basic and long
distance landlines.
Portable devices/cell phones....... 300,000 Equipment and monthly
charges for
government-issued
equipment (e.g.
Blackberries).
Travel............................. 1,015,288 Outreach and all non-
deployment travel,
including staff
development-related
travel.
Printing........................... 75,000 Supports briefing
materials and
publications,
including ``Civilian
Response.''
Rent............................... 2,500,000 Includes partial rent
due for SA-18; will
increase in FY 2011
for full year.
Overtime/Awards.................... 160,000 Funds Bureau-managed
personnel costs not
funded under Central
Salaries, including
performance awards.
Staff Development.................. 250,000 Provides for non-CRC
professional staff
development
training.
---------------
Total........................ $31,653,761
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Iraq.--The administration is requesting $517m in FY 2010
supplemental funding for the International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement account for police training in Iraq. Please explain the
transition of police training from the Department of Defense to the
Department of State.
What steps is the State Department taking to take over
responsibility from DOD for the training of Iraqi police forces? Why
must there be significant increases in funding for this purpose in the
FY 2010 supplemental and FY 2011 budget, if the State Department is not
expecting to assume responsibility until the beginning of FY 2012?
Answer. The Department of State (State) is working closely with the
Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure a smooth transition of
responsibility for police development in Iraq. In March 2009, State led
an interagency Joint Transition Planning Team (JTPT) assessment with a
view to identify future program priorities through consultations with
Government of Iraq (GOI) officials and USG personnel. This visit served
as the basis for developing a new, State-led police development program
which will be significantly smaller in size and scope than the current
DOD program, which consists of thousands of military servicemembers.
The State program will shift away from the previous counterinsurgency
oriented mission toward a civilian police model focused on community
policing. As requested by the GOI, we will no longer concentrate on
force-generation, but will instead emphasize advanced professional,
management, and leadership skills for senior officials that will
further build the capability to effectively manage internal security
operations and support the rule of law.
State and DOD are coordinating closely to ensure a smooth
transition of responsibility for police development from DOD to State.
DOD's drawdown plans are taking into consideration the future police
program structure. As the transition date nears, the current DOD
program will closely mirror the future State program. State and DOD
also have been working together to identify equipment and resources
that DOD may be able to provide or leave behind in an effort to
minimize costs and leverage the assets of each agency. To ensure
planning efforts remain closely linked, State has deployed senior
personnel to work within United States Forces--Iraq's (USF-I) Iraq
Training and Assistance Mission (ITAM). ITAM, in turn, has provided a
military planner to State.
Although responsibility for the police training mission does not
transfer to State until October 1, 2011, there are numerous startup
requirements and myriad long lead-time tasks which require funding 12-
18 months in advance. These include necessary base camp and aviation
facility upgrades, significant security infrastructure costs to meet
the necessary Diplomatic Security standards for Chief of Mission
personnel that are different than those under which the military
operates, and the procurement of aircraft for transportation between
program hubs and field locations. The FY 2010 supplemental request will
fund these one-time, startup expenses.
FY 2011 funds are needed to cover salary and operating expenses in
August and September of 2011, in order to have the State, International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) program up and running on October
1, 2011. The remainder of the funds will be spent to cover early FY
2012 operating expenses, and will carry the program through until INL
receives FY 2012 funding.
Question. When will this transition be complete? What are the goals
of the police training program, and what are the metrics that will be
used to assess these goals?
Answer. The transition of Iraq police training from the Department
of Defense (DOD) to the Department of State (State) will be complete on
October 1, 2011.
The goal of the police training program is to support the Iraqi
Ministry of Interior (MOI) in its progress toward becoming a self-
sufficient organization and the primary provider of internal security,
while protecting human rights and supporting the rule of law. As
requested by the Government of Iraq (GOI), State will provide focused,
high-level advising and consulting in core areas of police leadership,
management, strategic planning, curriculum development, and other
advanced skills.
State is currently developing a set of metrics to assess progress
toward these goals. The metrics will allow State to determine which
areas within the MOI need additional focus and which are adequately
developed, so that advisors may make adjustments to the program as
necessary. The metrics will be a useful tool in measuring the
effectiveness of the program and will serve as a resource for
evaluating the success of the program. Currently being drafted, some
key indicators of success include an improved capacity to conduct
complex investigations, increased reliance on physical evidence, a
strong relationship with civil society, improved public trust in the
Iraqi police to enforce the law, a robust MOI internal affairs program
and effective leadership and management controls.
Question. What lessons have been learned from previous State
Department efforts at police training, as well as the experience of the
Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT)?
Answer. The State Department has extensive institutional knowledge
in police training, gained from over 15 years of experience managing,
leading, and participating in police training missions in 16 nations
throughout the world. State's police development experts draw on that
extensive knowledge as they form new programs. In Iraq, we have been
involved in police training since 2003 and have worked with the
Department of Defense (DOD) on Civilian Police Assistance Training
Teams (CPATT) since 2004.
Each country, including Iraq, presents unique challenges and
programs must be developed to address those circumstances. State
performs assessments and conducts extensive consultations with police
officials to develop effective training programs. We do not merely
import existing police training models used in other countries as this
would not adequately address host-nation civilian police training
needs.
Another factor we consider is the level of development within the
police structure as that helps to determine the type of training
program needed in a given country. For example, focusing on force
generation and increasing the number of police officers trained is an
inadequate strategy in many countries if the program does not also
develop the management and leadership infrastructure to supervise those
forces. Building organizational and personnel capacity requires that
reform begin at the highest levels. It is also critical that all facets
of the criminal justice system, including, police, the judiciary, and
corrections, develop simultaneously to guarantee that reform is
consistent and sustainable.
Additionally, there are recurring criminal justice development
issues throughout the world that State has experience and developed
tools to address. Some illustrative examples include: the need to
combat corruption within the police force; the importance of developing
a plan to address local, informal justice systems; the need to
delineate areas of responsibility among multiple entities with shared
interests; developing the capacity for strategic planning; and the
importance of increasing public trust in the police, just to name a
few.
The CPATT mission began with force generation and an emphasis on
counterinsurgency operations. Although these efforts were necessary and
successful, effective management infrastructure within the Ministry of
Interior (MOI) is also needed and, if not developed, could result in
short-lived progress. This situation could leave the Iraqi police
unable to transition from a paramilitary counterinsurgency force to a
civilian policing institution.
The future State-led program in Iraq will build upon the success of
CPATT efforts by instituting training that focuses on advising and
consulting with senior MOI officials. This work will build capacity
within the senior ranks to administer an enormous institution (with
over 500,000 personnel) and allow the GOI to effectively sustain the
progress made under the CPATT program.
Question. The administration is requesting nearly $1.57 billion in
the FY 2010 supplemental request and $1.8 billion in FY 2011 for
diplomatic operations in Iraq.
How will the reduction of U.S. troop levels to 50,000 in FY
2010 and to zero by the end of 2011 impact diplomatic
operations?
Answer. The Departments of State and Defense are working closely to
ensure that the reduction of troops will minimally impact diplomatic
operations in Iraq. The joint plan for reducing PRTs reflects careful
planning between the two Departments to ensure a smooth transition
during and after the U.S. troop drawdown and continuing to contribute
to a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq.
There are currently 22 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in
Iraq, with one PRT in each of the 15 provinces outside of the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) area, one team for the KRG located in Erbil,
one embedded PRT (ePRT) in Anbar and five ePRTs in Baghdad. The ePRTs
will consolidate into 16 PRTs by the end of August 2010, when the U.S.
military will drawdown to 50,000 troops. As the military draws down
from 50,000, the Departments of State and Defense have determined a
suitable drawdown plan for 11 of the 16 PRTs, with the majority of PRTs
closing down between spring and summer 2011, as the military resources
become unavailable. By October 1, 2011, the Department of State will
assume full responsibility for all roles, including security and
logistics support, previously performed by military units at the five
remaining provincial presence posts--Kirkuk, Ninewa, Basrah, Diyala,
and Erbil.
PRTs slated to close will preserve and hand over key contacts so
the five enduring provincial presences and the U.S. mission can
maintain key engagements in these provinces. For example, the Basrah
provincial presence post will be engaged with Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and
Maysan provinces through a combination of visits by U.S. officials to
meet with provincial leaders, and Iraqi staff resident in each of the
three provinces who would take direction from the post in Basrah. The
other posts would have similar relationships with their neighboring
provinces to ensure the United States continues to maintain
relationships and influence with provincial leaders and communities and
maintains situational awareness of threats to.
The vast majority of current military activities will transfer to
the Iraqis with the USG only assuming responsibility where necessary.
Ambassador Hill and General Odierno oversee this review process in
Baghdad. In Washington, there is an interagency group, chaired by the
Department of State, which meets to ensure appropriate coordination and
support. The Vice President is actively engaged in overseeing the
transition and holds regular meetings with senior staff, as well.
Question. The administration is requesting nearly $1.57 billion in
the FY 2010 supplemental request and $1.8 billion in FY 2011 for
diplomatic operations in Iraq.
How many diplomats do we currently have at Embassy Baghdad and
roughly how many do we expect to have in January 2011 and January 2012.
Answer. As of March 12, 2010, there are 647 American State
Department staff at Embassy Baghdad. This number includes Foreign
Service officers and specialists, eligible family members (EFMs), Civil
Service employees on limited, noncareer appointments (LNA), 3161 Civil
Service employees, and personal services contractors (PSCs). It
excludes locally engaged staff (LES), other agency staff, and security,
life support, and maintenance contractors. The Chief of Mission has
ultimate authority regarding staffing size and composition. Staffing
numbers for 2011 and 2012 are estimates only.
At this time, utilizing the categories above, current estimates are
595 State Department staff in Embassy Baghdad in 2011 and 588 in 2012.
Question. According to the supplemental request, the Department
plans to establish two consulates (in Basrah and ``northern Iraq''),
three Provincial Diplomatic Teams (Ninewah, Diyala, Kirkuk), as well as
maintaining the PRTs in Najaf and Anbar open through 2011.
(a) When are the consulates and PDTs expected to open? How
will the three PDTs, two consulates and two remaining PRTs
differ in function?
Answer (a). There are currently 22 Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) in Iraq, with one PRT in each of the 15 provinces outside of the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) area, one team for the KRG located
in Erbil, one embedded PRT (ePRT) in Anbar and five ePRTs in Baghdad.
The ePRTs will consolidate into 16 PRTs by the end of August 2010. All
but five PRTs will close between spring and summer 2011, with the Najaf
and Anbar PRTs closing last on September 30, 2011. PRTs in Basrah,
Erbil, Ninewah, Diyala, and Kirkuk will remain past October 1, 2011.
The Department of State has committed to assume full responsibility for
all operations related to the five enduring provincial presences,
including logistics and security support, by that date.
The five provincial presences will become increasingly strategic
between now and October 1, 2011, and carry forward the most crucial
lines of operation of their predecessor PRTs. The overall mission of
the five enduring provincial presences will be to contribute to a
sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq by (1) mitigating and
mediating Arab-Kurd, Sunni-Shia, and provincial-Baghdad tensions; (2)
strengthening the capacity of provincial institutions in key flashpoint
locations; (3) balancing foreign interference; (4) providing a platform
for the United Nations (U.N.) and other organizations; (5) promoting
the safe return and resettlement of displaced persons; (6) encouraging
foreign investment and economic development; (7) reporting on strategic
trends, events, and drivers of Iraqi instability; (8) presenting
American policy and promoting American culture to the Iraqi people; and
(9) providing limited services to American citizens.
The specific mission of each provincial presence will vary and
individual teams will emphasize different parts of the overall mission
statement depending on particular dynamics of the province, the mix of
destabilizing forces and the strategic opportunities presented.
Two of the five provincial locations after October 1, 2011, will
ultimately convert into U.S. consulates. We intend to have consulates
in Basrah and a second location, pending discussions with and approval
by the new Government of Iraq and U.S. congressional notification. The
consulates will carry out the same missions as the other provincial
presences, in addition to providing services for American citizens and
possibly other traditional consular functions. Our goal is to have the
two consulates inaugurated and providing limited services for Americans
by December 31, 2011.
(b) What portion of the Iraq operations budget is expected
to be spent PDTs and PRTs in FY 2010 and FY 2011? What will the
security costs be?
Answer (b). If the FY 2010 supplemental request is passed, the
funding expected to be obligated in FY 2010 for the PDTs and PRTs is
$897.7 million. This includes funds carried forward from the FY 2009
supplemental, the FY 2010 enacted funding for Iraq Operations, and the
FY 2010 supplemental request, if enacted. Of the estimated $897.7
million, $574.1 million is expected to be for security costs.
Based on current estimates, $1.3 billion will be obligated in FY
2011 for PDT/PRT operations including $885.1 million for security
related costs, if the FY 2010 supplemental is enacted.
(c) How will the State Department engage with the majority
of provinces not home to consulates, PDTs or PRTs?
Answer (c). The United States is committed to maintaining
nationwide reach in Iraq even as our military forces drawdown. By
October 1, 2011, the Department of State will assume full
responsibility for five provincial presences outside the Embassy, in
Basrah, Erbil, Ninewah, Diyala, and Kirkuk. The Department of State
will use these five regional diplomatic presences to monitor
developments and maintain key relationships in their areas of
responsibility. For example, the Basrah provincial presence will also
be engaged with Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan provinces through a
combination of visits by U.S. officials to meet with provincial
leaders, and Iraqi staff resident in each of the three provinces who
would take direction from the post in Basrah. The other posts would
have similar relationships with their neighboring provinces to ensure
the United States continues to maintain relationships and influence
with provincial leaders and communities, and maintains situational
awareness of threats to stability.
Question. The FY 2011 budget request includes $400 million for the
West Bank and Gaza. Please provide a breakdown of how this funding will
be used. Also, please provide a breakdown on the assistance provided,
as well as pledges, by other international donors.
Secretary Clinton pledged $900 million at the ``International
Conference in Support of the Palestinian Economy for the Reconstruction
of Gaza'' at Sharm el-Sheikh in March 2009. Please provide the
committee with a status update of this pledge.
Answer. The Department's $400.4 million request in FY 2011 for the
West Bank and Gaza ESF program provides support for the Palestinian
Authority (PA) to build transparent, accountable, and credible
institutions of government; encourage economic development that can
provide jobs for the Palestinian people; deliver higher quality
government services; promote the rule of law in areas under the PA's
control; and continue humanitarian and recovery assistance to the
people of Gaza. Our assistance matches the priorities in PA Prime
Minister Salam Fayyad's 2-year reform and institution-building program,
which aims to establish the foundations of a future independent, viable
Palestinian state that is a responsible neighbor to Israel and that can
meet the needs of its citizens without reliance on external donor
support.
The Department's FY 2011 request for ESF will support the PA's
priorities in the following areas:
$200 million in direct budget support to the PA.
$72.5 million for the delivery of basic education, health,
and water services.
$81.4 million in programs to help develop the environment
for growth in the Palestinian private sector.
$15.5 million in food, medical, and other humanitarian
assistance for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
$31 million to enhance democratic reform, respect for human
rights and the rule of law, and increase civic engagement.
Donors largely have met their commitments from the 2007 Paris
Donors' Conference. According to conference organizers, donors have
contributed $5.5 billion in assistance to the PA over the past 2 years
against total pledges of $7.7 billion in support for the Palestinian
Reform and Development Plan (2008-2010). We continue to pursue an
aggressive outreach strategy to ensure timely delivery of assistance,
and coordinate closely with other donors through the Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee and local donor coordination mechanisms.
To date, the United States has provided a total of $761 million
against the more than $900 million pledge that Secretary Clinton made
at the Sharm al-Sheikh donors' conference in March 2009. The pledge had
three components:
Pledge Component: $200 million in budget support to the PA
The $200 million in budgetary support was transferred to the
Palestinian Authority in July 2009.
Pledge Component: Up to $300 million for urgent humanitarian needs
The United States has obligated $208 million to date for
assistance to the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza
through UNRWA, the World Food Programme, and other
international and U.S. nongovernmental organizations.
Pledge Component: Up to $400 million in support for the Palestinian
Reform and Development Plan (PDRP)
The United States has obligated $353 million to date toward
project assistance and security sector reform.
Question. Please provide to the committee, in a classified or
unclassified format as appropriate, detailed information on the efforts
the United States Government has undertaken to secure the release of
four American citizens held in Iran: Shane Bauer, Joshua Fattal, Sarah
Shourd, and Kian Tajbakhsh.
Answer. The Department of State is committed to ensuring fair and
humane treatment for U.S. citizens detained overseas, and we stand
ready to assist detained citizens and their families within the limits
of our ability and authority in accordance with international law.
However, in countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, where
the United States does not have diplomatic or consular relations, the
Department of State is limited in its ability to assist U.S. citizens
who are detained or missing.
The Swiss Government, acting through its Embassy in Tehran, serves
as protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran and provides consular
services to U.S. citizens detained in Iran.
During consular visits with detained U.S. citizens, the Swiss often
provide such items as reading material, letters from family members,
food, changes of clothing, and toiletries.
U.S. citizens Shane Bauer, Joshua Fattal, and Sarah Shourd were
detained in Iran during a hiking vacation in Iraqi Kurdistan, allegedly
for crossing the unmarked border with Iran on July 31, 2009. Since
then, the Swiss have been granted consular access to the three on two
occasions; the most recent visit was on October 29. On March 9, the
hikers were permitted to phone their families in the United States.
This marks the first time in over 7 months that the families heard the
voices of their loved ones.
Unfortunately, during the two consular visits with the hikers,
Iranian officials did not permit the Swiss to present, either verbally
or in written form, a Privacy Act Waiver, which would authorize the
Department to share information about their cases. Without a Privacy
Act Waiver, the Department of State is prohibited from providing
further details on this case.
The Swiss have not been granted consular access to Kian Tajbakhsh
or Reza Taghavi, who are dual Iranian-American citizens. The Iranian
Government does not recognize dual citizenship and will not permit the
Swiss to provide protective services for U.S. citizens who are dual
Iranian nationals. We are in frequent contact with the families of both
Dr. Tajbakhsh and Mr. Taghavi in the United States.
In the case of Robert Levinson, who disappeared during a business
trip to Kish Island in March 2007, the United States continues to call
on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide any
information on Mr. Levinson's whereabouts and follow through on its
promise to share the results of its investigation with the Levinson
family or the Swiss Embassy in Tehran.
In these and similar cases involving American citizens abroad, we
use a variety of diplomatic tools to ensure that the host government
understands the U.S. Government's concern for the welfare of its
citizens abroad. One such tool is to issue official statements; the
most recent such statement was issued on March 9, 2010, on the third
anniversary of Mr. Levinson's disappearance. The text of the statement
is noted below.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
----------------------------------------------
For Immediate Release
March 9, 2010
2010/279
STATEMENT BY PHILIP J. CROWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC
AFFAIRS
Case of Missing U.S. Citizen Robert Levinson
Today marks the three-year anniversary of the disappearance of U.S.
citizen Robert Levinson, who went missing in Iran during a business
trip to Kish Island in 2007. Mr. Levinson will remain a priority for
the United States until he is reunited with his family.
He is the father of seven children and grandfather of two--his
second grandchild was born in his absence. The Levinson family misses
him desperately and hopes he will be able to walk his daughter down the
aisle later this year.
In December 2007, Mrs. Levinson first met with Iranian officials
who expressed a willingness to share information about their
investigation into her husband's disappearance with the family. We ask
that Iran stand behind its commitment to provide full details about
their authorities' investigation.
The United States also calls on Iran to resolve the cases of the
five American citizens who are unjustly detained in Iran: Joshua
Fattal, Shane Bauer, Sarah Shourd, Kian Tajbakhsh, and Reza Taghavi.
We ask anyone who may have information about Mr. Levinson to
contact us or the Levinson family via their website:
www.helpboblevinson.com
Question. While the State Department has proposed an overall
increase in assistance to Yemen in its FY 2011 proposal, there has been
a significant shift in the accounts that are used. For example, the
Global Health and Child Survival and Economic Support Fund accounts
increase from $8m and $5m, respectively, FY 2010 to a proposed $21m and
$34m in FY 2011, while the budget proposal eliminated the Development
Assistance account altogether in FY 2011 from $35m in FY 2010.
Why were such significant shifts in the Yemen accounts
necessary?
What impact do the shifts have on program continuity?
Answer. As part of our policy review of Yemen that began last year,
USAID has developed a new 3-year country stabilization strategy for
Yemen, which it will begin to implement in the coming months. The shift
in accounts is simply to better reflect the nature of programs being
funded. These funds will continue to go to the same programs
articulated under the 3-year development stabilization strategy. The
shift will have no effect on program continuity. For example, the
increase in
ESF is for USAID interventions designed to improve livelihoods and
basic service delivery in communities in the country's most unstable
areas. The increase in
GHCS funding for Yemen will improve health care services for vulnerable
populations. For further information, USAID's Yemen Country Strategy is
available online at: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/
documents/yemen/USAIDYemen
2010-2012Strategy.pdf.
Question. Please detail the limitations and constraints placed on
USG personnel as a result of Yemen's challenging security context.
To what extent are U.S. direct-hire staff able to access and
oversee projects and programs, especially outside of Sana'a?
Answer. The challenging security environment does place limits on
the movement of U.S. Government civilian personnel. However, the U.S.
Government is working with Yemen and its international partners to help
implement and oversee much-needed projects that address Yemen's
challenging economic, social, and governance issues. USAID implements
all programs through grantees and contractors with a presence in Sana'a
as well as in governorates where programs are active. Their local staff
members do not face the same security constraints as U.S. Government
personnel, and thus have considerable geographic access and mobility.
Despite the deteriorating security situation, USAID continues to
meet its development goals--especially in basic health and education--
in areas where it continues operations, such as Shebwa and Amran
governorates. In other areas, however, USAID has been compelled to
reduce operations. USAID health and education activities in Sa'ada
governorate were reduced in recent months because of the Houthi-
Government of Yemen conflict. A similar situation exists in al-Jawf
governorate because of ongoing tribal conflicts there.
Due to the urgent situation in Yemen and increased levels of
development assistance, USAID recently devised a new 3-year strategy
focusing on stabilization and addressing drivers of instability through
integrated local development in targeted areas. Given security
constraints and limited staffing, USAID will effectively implement the
new strategy by investing in a robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
project. This will enable continuous monitoring of individual project
inputs and outcomes, as well as analysis of the overall impact of USAID
programs on stability in Yemen. We look forward to briefing you further
on our efforts as they develop.
Question. The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (VCCR), a multilateral treaty which grants
individual foreign nationals a right of access to his or her consulate,
and ensures that consular officials can visit their nationals and
arrange for their legal representation. Additionally, the United States
was a party to the VCCR Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, which gave the International Court of Justice
jurisdiction over disputes related to the VCCR. In Avena and other
Mexican Nationals, the ICJ ruled that the United States must provide
``review and reconsideration'' for a group of Mexican nationals who
were arrested and denied their consular rights and are now on U.S.
death rows. In October 2009, I, along with Senators Leahy, Franken,
Feingold, and Cardin sent a letter to Secretary Clinton and Attorney
General Holder, requesting the administration's input on how to ensure
that the United States comply with its obligations under Avena and the
VCCR. At the present time, we have not received a response. Please
provide your views on what steps the administration and Congress can
take to address this issue in a timely manner.
Answer. The Department shares your desire to ensure that the United
States complies fully with its international obligations to provide
consular notification to foreign nationals, and your goal of ensuring
compliance with the ICJ's Avena judgment. We look forward to working
with Congress to address this issue.
Question. Burma.--All of us are deeply concerned by a Burmese
court's recent, politically motivated decision to sentence U.S. citizen
Nyi Nyi Aung to 3 years of hard labor following several months of
detention and mistreatment. The Department has made concerted efforts
to secure Mr. Aung's release, proceeding in a manner and at a level
that it believes holds the best chance of producing a desirable
outcome. These exertions have regrettably not produced the results we
all seek.
What is your current assessment of Mr. Aung's treatment and his
overall physical condition? Is he being afforded regular access to his
family and consular officials?
Answer. Consular officials have repeatedly made clear to Burmese
officials the need to respect the rights of Kyaw Zaw Lwin (also known
as Nyi Nyi Aung) and international conventions concerning the treatment
of foreign prisoners.
During a March 12 consular visit, Mr. Lwin reported the current
prison is more relaxed than Insein prison was, as he is able to
communicate with other inmates during his twice daily exercise, and he
is also able to purchase food and other goods from the outside the
prison. Mr. Lwin reported no mistreatment. Mr. Lwin reported he is in
good health except for recurring leg pain, for which prison officials
have assured they will provide medical attention.
The Department of State has repeatedly requested immediate and more
frequent consular access to Mr. Lwin. The Embassy will have consular
access to Mr. Lwin again in 2 weeks, when his aunts will also be
allowed to visit.
Question. Given that ongoing departmental efforts have not secured
Mr. Aung's release, is the Department considering pressing his case at
a higher level to signal the priority the U.S. Government attaches to
his freedom?
Answer. Throughout the detention of Kyaw Zaw Lwin (aka, Nyi Nyi
Aung), the Department of State has engaged Burmese authorities at
senior levels to press for his fair treatment, protest reported
mistreatment, and urge more frequent consular access. We have
repeatedly made clear to the Burmese Government that Mr. Lwin's
immediate release is a high priority for the United States Government,
both within the administration and within the Congress. We will
continue to work to secure his release in a manner that we believe has
the best chance of achieving the outcome we all seek in this case.
Question.Climate/Environment.--The United States recently
associated itself with the Copenhagen Accord and pledged to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions in the range of 17 percent by 2020. There are
now over a hundred countries associated with the Copenhagen Accord, of
which approximately 60 countries have voluntarily inscribed carbon
pollution reduction pledges.
(a) What are the next steps in implementing this Accord and
what role do you see the administration playing in these
efforts?
(b) How does the administration plan to deliver on its
contribution to the global climate finance goal of $100 billion
annually by 2020? Recognizing that this finance goal will be
reached through a combination of support from both the public
and private sectors, what mechanisms do you find most promising
for mobilizing these sectors?
(c) Do you believe that domestic legislation is necessary to
fulfill our mitigation commitment? How would failure to pass
legislation impact the implementation of the Copenhagen Accord
and the ability of the global community to achieve necessary
reductions?
Answer (a). To date, 104 countries have associated with the
Copenhagen Accord, accounting for more than 80 percent of global
greenhouse emissions. We will continue to encourage countries to
associate with the Accord and inscribe their commitments to mitigate
their greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, we are now working
with partners in a variety of fora to operationalize all elements of
the Accord, including the provisions on mitigation, transparency, and
financing.
Answer (b). In Copenhagen, in the context of meaningful mitigation
actions and transparency on implementation, we committed to working
with other developed countries to jointly mobilize USD$100 billion a
year by 2020. We anticipate continued scaling-up of public financing
through bilateral and multilateral channels, particularly to support
adaptation, capacity-building, and other developing country climate
priorities, as well as work to reduce barriers to market-based
approaches.
However, private sector finance driven by carbon markets is
anticipated to account for the majority of funding flows to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions. While governments cannot direct private
capital, creating the right incentive structure can help accelerate an
already strong trend toward low-carbon investment. Domestic mitigation
targets will be essential in directing investment flows toward low-
carbon alternatives in each sector, and efficient and liquid carbon
markets will be important in transmitting the carbon price signal
throughout the economy.
Strong federal legislation with a cap-and-trade component could
significantly assist our efforts to meet these climate finance
objectives--in particular, through auctioning set-asides and
international offset provisions.
Answer (c). The administration supports the passage of
comprehensive clean energy and climate legislation to bolster the
American economy, enhance our national security, set the United States
on a path to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions and be a leader in
clean energy technology. Failure to pass legislation would negatively
impact the leadership position of the United States in the climate
negotiations and the ability of the global community to achieve
necessary greenhouse gas reductions.
Question. Black carbon soot is estimated to be a significant
contributor to rising global temperatures, with recent studies
estimating that it is responsible for 18 percent of the planet's
warming, compared to 40 percent for carbon dioxide--placing it in the
top three of the strongest climate-forcing agents. Last July, the G8
Leaders Statement committed to addressing these soot emissions. The
administration took a step forward in December when it announced in
Copenhagen that it would commit $5 million to jump start international
cooperation on a strategy to reduce black carbon emissions in the
Arctic. What else are you doing to follow up on the G8 commitment to
take rapid action to address black carbon and what more needs to be
done in terms of international cooperation on black carbon?
Answer. There are at least two important fronts for international
cooperation on black carbon. The first is mitigation. As you note in
your question, recent scientific studies have indicated that black
carbon is a potent warming agent. The $5 million initiative that we
announced in Copenhagen last December was an important step forward,
but it was never intended to be sufficient by itself. We are working
with our partners in the Arctic Council to build this into a broader
initiative that will include active participation by all Arctic
countries. We've started in the Arctic on account of its strong
sensitivity to black carbon pollution, but we expect that United States
and Arctic Council leadership on this issue will lead to even broader
efforts in the very near future.
The second front for international cooperation is in research.
While we know that black carbon is cause for concern, we still have
much to learn about the nature of its sources, transport, and impacts.
We're proud of the work that U.S. scientists have done to promote
international cooperation on these research topics, through the Arctic
Council's Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program and its Taskforce on
Short-Lived Climate Forcers, as well as in an emerging effort under the
UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). An
expert group under LRTAP has been convened to consider whether there
are ways to specifically address black carbon as part of ongoing
efforts under LRTAP to look at mitigation of particulate matter
emissions. We also continue to promote bilateral research initiatives
involving scientists from NOAA and EPA, among others. Such research
efforts are critical to improve our understanding of black carbon as a
pollutant and to inform effective mitigation efforts.
Question. In the FY 2011 budget, there is $57 million allocated to
State Department for climate adaptation efforts and $187 million for
USAID. Please describe the types of efforts you expect State and USAID
to engage in that provides the best benefits to people adapting to the
impacts of climate change. More specifically, please describe the role
you see for ecosystem based adaptation or the use of biodiversity and
ecosystem services as part of an overall adaptation strategy within
State and USAID.
Answer. Our funds will focus on helping countries adapt to and
build resilience to the impacts of climate change. We will particularly
target our resources to the least developed countries (LDCs), small
island developing states (SIDS), and African countries, which will be
the most severely affected by the impacts of climate change. FY 2011
adaptation assistance will build on the significant new funding for
adaptation in the enacted FY 2010 budget.
Programming will support investments in science and analysis for
decision making; promote governance systems that are inclusive,
transparent, and responsive to the needs of their constituents; and
implement climate solutions as integrated components of other
development activities that are compromised by climate change.
In FY 2011, we also propose to launch a new USAID program to
benefit the Pacific islands that focuses on climate change adaptation.
USAID programs will extend the Famine Early Warning System and other
climate forecasting technology systems such as SERVIR to help
vulnerable counties adapt. The State Department will make contributions
to the multilateral Least Developed Country Fund and Special Climate
Change Fund, which both focus on adaptation assistance for the most
vulnerable countries, and to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCC) for its adaptation work.
Ecosystem-based adaptation will play an important role in USG
adaptation assistance. For example, climate change is expected to alter
rainfall patterns, which will exacerbate erosion and groundwater
retention problems in degraded ecosystems. One way to achieve the
adaptation goals of improving water supply and quality is by improving
the state of the watershed ecosystem services.
A concrete example: USAID's East Caribbean Regional Mission is
developing an adaptation program that will combat climate stresses on
water and coastal resources through watershed restoration and the use
of natural processes. This natural approach has the multiple benefits
of providing shade, reducing erosion on hillsides, promoting
groundwater recharge, and reducing pollutant discharges to reefs and
fisheries, which provide for food and attract tourists.
Question. Last year, the administration proposed a joint initiative
with Mexico and Canada to use the Montreal Protocol to phase down
hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs, a significant greenhouse gas used in
refrigeration, mobile air conditioning, and foam-blowing. What
proactive steps will the administration take to promote the phase-down
of HFCs this year?
Answer. The administration recognizes the considerable climate
benefits which could arise from a phase down in the consumption and
production of HFCs. We continue to support an amendment to the Montreal
Protocol to address HFCs, and are working with Canada and Mexico on a
proposal for consideration in 2010. We will also work with other key
developing countries, such as China and India, to better understand
their concerns and find ways to make progress on this important issue.
Question. As part of the $10 billion per year fast-start funding
for 2010-12, specifically what types of initiatives and climate finance
efforts do you see funded and do you envision the noncarbon dioxide
fast-action strategies as part of this effort?
Answer. The U.S. contribution to collectively provide, with other
developed countries, funding approaching $30 billion for the period
2010-12 will be composed of a mix of direct assistance programming
through USAID and the State Department and programming (through both
Treasury and State Department mechanisms) to multilateral funds such as
the Climate Investment Funds, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Least
Developed Countries Fund, and Special Climate Change Fund.
The USG's approach combines bilateral assistance with multilateral
initiatives to help ensure our developing country partners have the
capacity to take advantage of new multilateral funds and private-sector
financing.
Within the U.S. climate change assistance ``pillars'' of Clean
Energy and Sustainable Landscapes, we will place particular emphasis on
partnering with developing countries that support the Copenhagen Accord
and are willing to create and implement Low Carbon Development
Strategies. USAID will also continue to partner with EPA, the UNFCCC,
and other donors to help countries meet their new obligations under the
Accord to complete national greenhouse gas inventories every 2 years.
Our bilateral assistance will begin laying the groundwork that will
enable developing countries to take part in emerging international
carbon markets and develop new low carbon sectors of their economies.
The Department of Treasury is the primary vehicle by which the U.S.
Government provides contributions through multilateral delivery
channels, including the Climate Investment Funds and the Global
Environment Facility. Multilateral assistance promotes institutional
structures governed jointly by developed and developing countries,
which are needed for a coordinated, global response to climate change.
Multilateral institutions complement bilateral assistance by leveraging
contributions from other donors, making capital investments in
infrastructure, providing a range of tailored financial products, and
working across a number of countries.
We believe that addressing noncarbon dioxide, short-lived climate
forcers such as black carbon, methane, and tropospheric ozone is also
an important part of the overall strategy to combat climate change.
These types of activities are a feature of several of the programs and
initiatives mentioned below.
In Copenhagen, the United States announced several new initiatives.
The United States and five other developed countries collectively
pledged $3.5 billion over the 2010-12 periods for REDD+ (Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) activities. We also
joined four other countries in the 5-year, $350 million Renewables and
Efficiency Deployment Initiative (Climate REDI), which will promote
improved appliance and efficiency standards, expansion of markets for
solar lanterns and solar home devices, the new multilateral Scaling Up
Renewable Energy Program (SREP, one of the Climate Investment Funds),
and a clean energy information platform. We have committed $85 million
over 5 years to this initiative. In addition, the United States
committed $5 million ``toward international cooperation to reduce black
carbon emissions in and around the Arctic.'' We anticipate other
countries will also contribute to this effort.
In addition to the initiatives announced in Copenhagen, we intend
to support initiatives developed under the Major Economies Forum on
Energy and Climate (MEF) process. We also intend to continue funding
the multilateral Methane to Markets Initiative, which focuses on
innovative ways to capture, store, and use methane from such sources as
landfills, mining shafts, leaking gas pipelines, agriculture, and
flared gas.
Question. In your talk last year to the Antarctica Consultative
Group, you mentioned other noncarbon dioxide gases, the so called
short-term forcers, which include black carbon, hydrofluorocarbons,
methane, and ground-level ozone. What role do you see the United States
playing to help develop fast-action mitigation and carbon-negative
strategies? Have you considered the benefits of a governmentwide task
force on fast-action mitigation strategies targeting increased use of
biochar or promoting enhanced urban albedo, the white roofs Secretary
Chu is calling for to reflect solar radiation back into our atmosphere?
What other strategies could help advance this promising effort?
Answer. On short-lived forcers, the United States has taken a clear
leadership role internationally. From our Arctic black carbon
initiative to our trilateral North American proposed amendment to the
Montreal Protocol to the continuing strong work of the Methane to
Markets partnership, we have worked to bring nations together to act on
a broad range of short-lived forcers. This same range of strategies,
including catalytic initiatives, international conventions, and public/
private partnerships, can be leveraged to promote additional mitigation
strategies as they are identified.
Question. Multilateral climate negotiations remain high on the
international agenda. It is widely believed that increased help to the
developing countries, to reduce their carbon emissions from forest
destruction (REDD), will be a key to success. To what extent is the
administration's $347 million request for sustainable landscapes
focused on capacity-building activities for REDD as distinct from
traditional conservation activities? Can you provide a quantitative
breakdown of the funds for these two purposes?
Answer. Our $347 million request for sustainable landscapes in FY
2011 is distinct from our traditional conservation activities (AKA
biodiversity program), although there may be a small overlap in places.
Biodiversity and Sustainable Landscapes funds will be programmed toward
their respective objectives, the former being conserving priority
species and ecosystems, the latter being transitioning countries toward
long-term emissions reductions and increased sequestration related to
forests (REDD-plus).
Prior to FY 10, much of our biodiversity funding was also intended
to contribute to our climate change objectives. Beginning with FY10 and
continuing with FY11, the President has requested funding specific to
climate change, including Sustainable Landscapes. These requests are
aligned with the intent of the FY 2010 Appropriations bill's Statement
of Managers, which directed that Sustainable Landscapes funding should
be used to support activities to maximize climate change mitigation and
should not duplicate efforts implemented through biodiversity programs.
The administration's formal FY 2010 guidance on implementing
Sustainable Landscapes Programs says that such programs must not be
attributed to other foreign assistance objectives. In addition, those
programs should address one or more of the following policy priorities:
1. Creation or implementation of national or subnational
REDD-plus strategies;
2. Greenhouse gas inventories and accounting;
3. Forest carbon market readiness;
4. Targeted field demonstrations and investments.
We anticipate that FY 2011 guidance will be similar.
In addition to the $175 million for USAID Sustainable Landscapes
program in the FY 2011 request, the $347 million total includes: $20
million for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act; $95 million and $15
million for the World Bank's Forest Investment Program and Forest
Carbon Partnership Facility (both with a specific climate change
focus), respectively; $32 million to the Global Environment Facility
for projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from forests and
landscapes; and an additional $10 million to international agencies,
including the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, IUCN, and
the International Tropical Timber Organization.
There is the potential that Sustainable Landscapes and biodiversity
funds may be used in projects that meet the objectives of both
programs, in which case they will be accounted for separately. The
administration's FY 11 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ)
narrative (which will be posted online shortly at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/137936.pdf), will have break-outs for both these
initiatives.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. The administration's FY 2011 request calls for $100
million in new Economic Support Funds (ESF) to help fund some of the
initiatives to reach out to the world's Muslim communities that
President Obama articulated in his June 4, 2009 Cairo speech.
We understand from staff briefings that the baseline funding for
these kinds of programs in FY 2010 is about $700 million. Given the
importance of the Cairo speech and the emphasis that the President has
placed on forging new partnerships with the Muslim world, is an
increase of $100 million (about 14 percent) sufficient for the
transformative kind of engagement envisioned by the President?
Answer. The vision that the President called for in his Cairo
speech is to reframe our relations with Muslims around the world based
on partnership; to seek a ``New Beginning'' based on working together
and building alongside each other in areas of mutual interest and the
areas that people care most about in their everyday lives. This is a
long-term vision.
It is also important to note that this new funding is meant to
build upon and complement our broader engagement efforts, including our
existing foreign assistance and development work, public diplomacy and
our day-to-day diplomatic efforts in USAID missions and embassies
around the world. Fully integrated with our broader efforts, new
programming will have a much greater impact than if it were treated as
a separate, standalone effort.
Still, we do not expect to transform people's lives completely in
the first year of this effort. But, we do expect to make it clear that
we are in fact delivering on the President's words and vision with
deeds and with tangible programs and partnerships that address peoples'
needs and their aspirations.
In the near-term we want to lay the foundation for our efforts and
deliver tangible programs and partnerships that substantiate the
President's and Secretary's vision. The $100 million of new funds
requested will support programs we are developing in key areas of
focus: Economic Opportunity, Science & Technology, and Human
Development with an emphasis on youth and women and girls. Programs
will build on local capacity and have a wide reach--both in terms of
the people impacted and the symbolic resonance of the effort
undertaken. We want these programs to be developed in partnership with
local stakeholders and to have a demonstrable impact on people and
communities in the areas where they are established.
We expect to leverage that funding in several ways, so that it will
have a multiplier effect. In some cases, small investments of funding
could provide local stakeholders the tools and platforms--and attract
other funders--to support those local efforts. In other cases, funding
will help develop the enabling environment needed to attract other
donor support or investment. In addition, we are bringing a ``whole-of-
government'' approach to this effort so that we can capitalize on
resources available in other U.S. Government agencies, ranging from
Overseas Private Investment Corporation to the National Science
Foundation.
By working on programs with a wide base of partners and
stakeholders and by leveraging the expertise and capabilities of the
private sector, we expect that these programs and partnerships will
achieve a wider reach and produce deeper developmental results.
Question. What kind of plans are in place to ensure the
sustainability of any new programs that are launched?
Answer. Sustainability will be vital to the ``New Beginning'' and
one of our key measurements for success. There are three primary keys
to sustainability. The first is our focus on local ownership. We will
identify the most proven and effective local groups. These are the
groups that are in communities: that are vested and will be there for
the long-haul. Our aim will be to provide the most effective USG tools
and private sector tools to support, advance, and scale their efforts.
By supporting what is already there and has already demonstrated
success, we will help to ensure the durability and sustainability of
those efforts.
For example, as part of our goal to support entrepreneurship, USAID
recently organized an outreach ``listening session'' in Cairo with
representatives of the local and regional private sector exploring
issues associated with entrepreneurs' access to finance. We have
involved USG participation across U.S. Government agencies in these
listening sessions, and are feeding the resulting information into our
program planning. These listening sessions are a vehicle not only to
benefit from the perspective of local stakeholders, but to identify the
most effective and impactful groups, who are already delivering for
their communities. These are the groups we aim to partner with and
support--thereby unleashing unfulfilled potential at the local level
for long-term durability and success.
Second, we will build on our existing approach to public-private
partnerships. Our focus will be interest-based collaboration. We are
spending time with key private sector partners to better understand
their objectives and interests and attempting to forge partnerships
based on shared interests--which will help those partnerships to endure
and be sustainable.
Finally, USAID, as the operating home for this effort, will work
closely with the Department of State to ensure that the programs funded
through Global Engagement are integrated and leveraged with existing
programming, that these efforts are sustainable, and that they are best
suited to enhancing our Muslim engagement policies. For example, we
hope to implement a new holistic approach to youth programming with the
aim to promote a responsible and successful transition to adulthood.
Current programs typically address challenges from a single-sector such
as Economic Growth or Health. This funding would be used instead to
support programs that cut across sectors. For example, we will advance
basic education linked to opportunities for higher education,
vocational training, or employment; reduce barriers and increase
opportunities for decent work through policy reform, skills training,
mentoring and public-private partnerships; and support access to
quality health and social services.
For all the programs and activities in this area, we are working
with our missions abroad to develop these programs to be both
developmentally sound and responsive to local expression of priorities
and need. We are using USAID's strategic resource management tools to
ensure that programs are results-driven and have a strong monitoring
and evaluation component built in from the beginning.
Question. Is the administration seeking to develop new public-
private partnerships in this realm?
Answer. Yes. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are the framework
for the vast majority of the programming in this area. The President's
Cairo speech generated great enthusiasm from private sector actors for
working with the USG to further the President's vision and goals.
Funding requested will help to establish a range of programs which will
help us to leverage and harness private sector enthusiasm both at home
and overseas. In addition, one of the primary objectives of this effort
is building people-to-people ties and working together--this is best
achieved through building programs with a wide base of partners around
a shared effort.
We have already begun private sector outreach leveraging USAID's
Global Development Alliance, State's Global Partnership Initiative and
the broader interagency team's existing network of partners; in
addition we are reaching out to and cultivating new partners, who have
been interested in working with the USG in response to the President's
speech. We have asked our embassies in key countries to engage with
their host country's private sector to explore public-private
partnerships to advance the New Beginning. As the Special
Representative to Muslim Communities visits with civil society leaders
in Muslim communities around the world, she is consistently seeking out
the best civil society organizations with whom embassies can partner at
the local level. At home, we are exploring collaboration with leading
Silicon Valley companies, NGOs and foundations. There is very high
interest and a wide range of exciting opportunities. Funds requested
will help to seed and catalyze many of these partnerships.
Question. We understand that the Director of Policy Planning (S/P)
has the lead in coordinating ideas for implementation of vision
articulated in the Cairo speech. Without operational capacity of its
own, S/P will have to hand off day-to-day management of these
initiatives, however. How do you envision this process playing out?
Answer. S/P has the lead in coordinating the specific
``deliverables'' of the Cairo speech, while S/SRMC has the overall
policy lead on Muslim engagement at the Department of State. S/P, S/
SRMC and USAID work closely together, and will work jointly to ensure
that programs meet our policy objectives. USAID has the global reach,
technical expertise, and procurement capability to be the operational
home for this effort. We view this as an opportunity to model State-
USAID collaboration across both agencies.
Another key to making this a success is the effort already underway
to develop a results-based framework. This framework will set clear
performance objectives for all three baskets of activities and will
include strict criteria against which proposed activities will be
reviewed before funding decisions are made. A rigorous monitoring and
evaluation component will also be applied in order to ensure our
programs are having the desired measurable impact.
Question. The administration's FY 2011 foreign assistance budget
request highlights support for Yemen as a key foreign policy objective.
Please elaborate on plans for increased assistance for Yemen. At the
late January meeting in London of the ``Friends of Yemen,''
participants are reported to have agreed to a five-point plan to help
address the multitude of challenges Yemen faces, including the need for
improved coordination among international donors. How has the United
States altered its approach to providing assistance to Yemen in the
aftermath of this meeting?
Answer. President Obama has recognized the need to intensify our
efforts in Yemen, as is reflected in our increasing foreign assistance
to Yemen. Foreign assistance has been steadily increasing, from $17.2
million in FY 2008 to $40.3 million in FY 2009. The latter figure does
not include approximately $67 million in FY 2009 1206 funds or other
humanitarian funds. We estimate FY 2010 assistance will be $67.2
million, and the President's FY 2011 budget requests $106.6 million for
Yemen, representing a 59-percent increase over FY 2010.
Yemen is a key foreign policy priority for this Administration. Our
basic strategy is two-pronged. We are simultaneously working with the
Government of Yemen to improve its capacity to combat terrorism in the
short term while seeking longer term improvements in the government's
capacity to govern the country and meet the population's essential
services needs. The United States will provide assistance and support,
but Yemen is a sovereign nation responsible for its own development and
security.
We are seeking to stabilize the country through a variety of
training and development programs to improve governance, defense and
counterterrorist forces' capabilities, and maritime and border
security. As part of a U.S. policy review of Yemen that began last
year, USAID has developed a new country strategy for Yemen, which it
will begin to implement in the coming months. USAID intends to spend
$121 million over the next 3 years, subject to the availability of
funds, on stabilization initiatives in Yemen to increase youth
employment and other economic opportunities (including agriculture);
improve government service delivery in education and health care;
support transparent, decentralized governance; and empower youth,
women, and other marginalized groups to participate in the political
process. Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) projects address key
administration priorities including offering positive futures for
Yemeni youth, empowering Yemeni women, promoting job creation and
education, and encouraging political reform and peaceful civic
participation for all Yemeni citizens. A Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor (DRL) program in Yemen is increasing public awareness
and understanding of religious freedom and tolerance with a particular
focus on youth. New programs will support independent media and access
to information to promote government transparency and accountability.
Through these efforts, we intend to change the base conditions that
make Yemen a fertile breeding ground for al-Qaeda.
We are also increasing our multilateral efforts to help Yemen
confront its immediate economic, social, political, and security
challenges while paving the way for necessary long-term reforms. At
January's London Meeting on Yemen, the international community
reaffirmed its shared goal of a peaceful, prosperous, and united Yemen.
This meeting was not a donor's conference, but sought to consolidate
international support for Yemen's political and economic reform
efforts. It launched the Friends of Yemen process, which will provide
sustained international engagement with Yemen to address the broad
range of challenges facing the country. The Friends of Yemen will seek
to identify priority immediate and long-term actions for the Yemeni
Government to take, through two working groups focusing specifically on
(1) economy and governance and (2) justice and the rule of law. The
Government of Yemen and the group of Friends will discuss ways and
means of implementing Yemen's National Reform Agenda, including through
better donor coordination on the ground.
Neither the London meeting, nor the subsequent Friends of Yemen
process, has altered the U.S. approach to providing assistance to
Yemen. Increased U.S. engagement with and assistance to Yemen are the
result of a policy review that the administration conducted in 2009;
USAID's new stabilization strategy for Yemen, which will guide its
programs there, predated the London meeting, as did MEPI's
comprehensive programmatic interventions. USAID is currently reviewing
proposals for its new program, which should be implemented in the
coming months. While foreign assistance to Yemen is increasing, it is
important to note that the U.S. Government will not program these funds
directly through the Yemeni Government. The U.S. Government did not
make any new funding commitments at the London meeting.
Question. Three American citizens--Sarah Shourd, Shane Bauer, and
Josh Fattal--have been imprisoned in Iran since July 2009 for illegally
entering the country while they were trekking in the mountains along
Iran's border with Iraq. They have since been charged with espionage.
Separately, the Iranian regime has jailed other U.S. or dual nationals,
including Reza Taghavi, who has been detained without charges since
May, 2008; and Dr. Kian Tajbakhsh, who was jailed in July 2009, in a
crackdown against protesters following the June 12 elections.
Meanwhile, the Iranian Government has provided little information on
the whereabouts or well-being of Robert Levinson, a U.S. citizen who
went missing in Iran in 2007. What is the status of the
administration's efforts to resolving these and other such cases, and
what is the strategy for overcoming the obstacles that have thus far
prevented their resolution.
Answer. The Department of State is committed to ensuring fair and
humane treatment for U.S. citizens detained overseas, and we stand
ready to assist detained citizens and their families within the limits
of our ability and authority in accordance with international law.
However, in countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, where
the United States does not have diplomatic or consular relations, the
Department of State is limited in its ability to assist U.S. citizens
who are detained or missing.
The Swiss Government, acting through its Embassy in Tehran, serves
as protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran and provides consular
services to U.S. citizens detained in Iran.
During consular visits with detained U.S. citizens, the Swiss often
provide such items as reading material, letters from family members,
food, changes of clothing, and toiletries.
U.S. citizens Shane Bauer, Joshua Fattal, and Sarah Shourd were
detained in Iran during a hiking vacation in Iraqi Kurdistan, allegedly
for crossing the unmarked border with Iran on July 31, 2009. Since
then, the Swiss have been granted consular access to the three on two
occasions; the most recent visit was on October 29. On March 9, the
hikers were permitted to phone their families in the United States.
This marks the first time in over 7 months that the families heard the
voices of their loved ones.
Unfortunately, during the two consular visits with the hikers,
Iranian officials did not permit the Swiss to present, either verbally
or in written form, a Privacy Act Waiver, which would authorize the
Department to share information about their cases. Without a Privacy
Act Waiver, the Department of State is prohibited from providing
further details on this case.
The Swiss have not been granted consular access to Kian Tajbakhsh
or Reza Taghavi, who are dual Iranian-American citizens. The Iranian
Government does not recognize dual citizenship and will not permit the
Swiss to provide protective services for U.S. citizens who are dual
Iranian nationals. We are in frequent contact with the families of both
Dr. Tajbakhsh and Mr. Taghavi in the United States.
In the case of Robert Levinson, who disappeared during a business
trip to Kish Island in March 2007, the United States continues to call
on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide any
information on Mr. Levinson's whereabouts and follow through on its
promise to share the results of its investigation with the Levinson
family or the Swiss Embassy in Tehran.
In these and similar cases involving American citizens abroad, we
use a variety of diplomatic tools to ensure that the host government
understands the U.S. Government's concern for the welfare of its
citizens abroad. One such tool is to issue official statements; the
most recent such statement was issued on March 9, 2010, on the third
anniversary of Mr. Levinson's disappearance. The text of the statement
is noted below:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
----------------------------------------------
For Immediate Release
March 9, 2010
2010/279
STATEMENT BY PHILIP J. CROWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC
AFFAIRS
Case of Missing U.S. Citizen Robert Levinson
Today marks the three-year anniversary of the disappearance of U.S.
citizen Robert Levinson, who went missing in Iran during a business
trip to Kish Island in 2007. Mr. Levinson will remain a priority for
the United States until he is reunited with his family.
He is the father of seven children and grandfather of two--his
second grandchild was born in his absence. The Levinson family misses
him desperately and hopes he will be able to walk his daughter down the
aisle later this year.
In December 2007, Mrs. Levinson first met with Iranian officials
who expressed a willingness to share information about their
investigation into her husband's disappearance with the family. We ask
that Iran stand behind its commitment to provide full details about
their authorities' investigation.The United States also calls on Iran
to resolve the cases of the five American citizens who are unjustly
detained in Iran: Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer, Sarah Shourd, Kian
Tajbakhsh, and Reza Taghavi.
We ask anyone who may have information about Mr. Levinson to
contact us or the Levinson family via their website:
www.helpboblevinson.com.
pakistan
The FY 2010 budget for Pakistan reflects a Foreign Assistance
amount very close to the Kerry-Lugar Pakistan bill authorization level
of $1.5 billion. An additional $344 million is requested in the
administration's 2010 supplemental budget request.
Question. a. Have all FY 2009 Foreign Assistance resources for
Pakistan been expended? What if any remain in what sectors?
Answer. No, the majority of the FY 2009 supplemental funds have not
yet been expended. However, they will all be obligated prior to the end
of September 2010. Please see attached chart.
Question. b. What have been the primary challenges in spending the
amounts appropriated?
Answer. Challenges to the effective implementation of U.S. and
other donor assistance programs include: the poor security situation
and presence of extremist elements in many parts of the country;
Pakistan's limited capacity to absorb and effectively use external
resources; public sector corruption; suspicion of U.S. intentions and
long-term commitment; and the possibility that the Government of
Pakistan may take time to implement key policy reforms that will help
sustain U.S. and other donor assistance. These challenges underscore
the importance of designing programs that help build implementation
capacity and rigorous performance monitoring, and of intensifying
diplomatic efforts to persuade Pakistan to implement much-needed policy
reforms.
Question. c. Would you provide the committee the amount of FY 2010
appropriations expended to date by purpose and type of implementation
mechanism, in percent of total and dollars? The implementation
mechanism is intended to inform Congress of the manner in which the
resources are channeled to implement the program--e.g., through direct
programming through a U.S. contractor/local contractor, through a trust
fund mechanism, through quasi-governmental Pakistani entity/NGO,
through Pakistan Government entity Federal/Provincial/local, or other
channel.
Answer. We anticipate submitting the FY 2010 Spend Plan to Congress
shortly.
Question. d. Would you provide a similar breakdown as described
above (b) of remaining resources expected to be expended in FY 2010 for
Pakistan?
Answer. Challenges faced in FY 2009 will likely remain in FY 2010.
Security concerns will continue to prevent U.S. personnel from direct
monitoring and evaluation in conflict-affected areas. We will rely on
alternative mechanisms, such as monitoring and evaluation by locally
employed staff (LES) and independent Pakistani CPA firms, as well as
the use of a geographic information system.
Most of our new implementation partners will have management
capacity issues that will require USAID to provide institutional
strengthening and collaborative oversight. As Pakistan's government
structures and civil service, especially in the FATA, KPk, and
Balochistan, continue down a lengthy path of reform and capacity-
building, we should expect their absorption capacity to be limited at
first, and grow with time. Potential areas of institutional
vulnerability include budget and procurement systems, internal control,
accounting, and institutional policies. By investing in these areas, we
are accepting the risk of loss of funds through inefficiency, theft, or
general lack of capacity to handle large amounts of funding.
It will also take time for the GOP to implement key policy reforms
needed to accelerate transformation of the economy, and the GOP will
require ongoing support and pressure from the international community
to maintain its commitments. Benchmarks the GOP will need to meet by
the next IMF review in August include: implementing the Value-Added
Tax; meeting deficit targets and setting a sound macroeconomic
framework for the next fiscal year; and adjusting energy prices and
performance to eliminate subsidies.
Question. e. Would you provide a prospective purposes, timetable,
and implementation mechanism for the planned expenditure of the $344
million additional resources requested in the FY 2010 supplemental
budget request?
Answer. Please see attached FY 2010 supplemental budget request
which describes the purposes of the funding. Resources are needed to
implement our civilian assistance strategy and help the Government of
Pakistan address urgent demands for improved power supply, water
sanitation, income support to families affected by conflict, and
policing. The specific timetable and implementation mechanisms will be
set upon date and level of appropriation; however, it is our intention
to fully obligate all of these resources within the near future.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
afghanistan
The FY 2010 Foreign Assistance budget for Afghanistan is currently
estimated to be $2.89 billion following upon $2.76 billion in FY 2009.
An additional $1.77 billion is requested in the administration's 2010
supplemental budget request.
Question. a. Have all FY 2009 Foreign Assistance resources for
Afghanistan been expended? What if any remain and in what sectors?
Answer. The majority of the FY 2009 supplemental funds have been
obligated but not yet expended.
Question. b. What have been the primary challenges in spending the
amounts appropriated?
Answer. Challenges to the effective implementation of U.S. and
other donor assistance programs include: the poor security situation
and presence of insurgents in the south and the east. We have also been
challenged by Afghanistan's limited capacity to absorb and effectively
use external resources, and our desire to attempt to ensure that our
resources do not contribute to the level of corruption in Afghanistan.
These challenges underscore and highlight the importance of
designing programs that help build sustainable implementation capacity
and rigorous performance monitoring to ensure meaningful oversight.
Question. c. Would you provide the committee the amount of FY 2010
appropriations expended to date by purpose and type of implementation
mechanism, in percent of total and dollars? The implementation
mechanism is intended to inform Congress of the manner in which the
resources are channeled to implement the program--e.g., through direct
programming through a U.S. contractor/local contractor, through a trust
fund mechanism, through quasi-governmental Afghan entity/NGO, through
Afghan Government entity Federal/Provincial/local, or some other
channel.
Answer. We anticipate submitting the FY 2010 Spend Plan to Congress
shortly.
Question. d. Would you provide a similar breakdown as described
above (b) of remaining resources expected to be expended in FY 2010 for
Afghanistan?
Answer. Challenges faced in FY 2009 will likely remain in FY 2010.
As our military clears additional areas of Afghanistan, as we
transition to hold-build operations, and our capacity-building begins
to take hold, we expect to encounter fewer challenges to dispersing
funds. Security and other concerns will, however, continue to make it
difficult or constrain U.S. personnel from direct monitoring and
evaluation of some of our programs and projects in conflict-affected
areas. We will rely on alternative mechanisms, such as monitoring and
evaluation by locally employed staff (LES) as well as the use of a
geographic information system. For more information, please refer to
our FY 2010 Spend Plan that will provide more details.
Question. e. Would you provide the prospective purposes, a
timetable, and the respective implementation mechanism for the
requested $1.77 billion in additional resources requested in the FY
2010 supplemental budget request?
Answer. Please see attached FY 2010 supplemental budget request,
which describes the purposes of the funding. Resources are needed
urgently. The specific timetable and implementation mechanisms will be
set upon date and level of appropriation; however, it is our intention
to fully obligate all of these resources within the very near future.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
agriculture in afghanistan and pakistan
Question. In an attempt to accelerate development programming in
the prime economic sector of agriculture, the administration has sought
to employ multiple agencies, especially the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, through additional deployment of personnel and resources
generally associated with the U.S. Agency for International
Development.
Please provide the committee with a description of the activities
that will be carried out in Afghanistan and Pakistan as part of an
agricultural strategy. Include data on the amount of funding
anticipated for each activity and identify the agency that will be in
the lead with regard to implementation.
Answer. In Afghanistan, the U.S. Government's (USG's) top
reconstruction priority is to restore Afghanistan's once vibrant
agriculture sector. To that end, the USG has developed an Agricultural
Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan with two goals: (1) increase
agricultural-sector jobs and incomes and (2) increase confidence of
Afghans in their government. Achieving this requires a whole-of-
government approach and drawing upon the assets and capabilities of
multiple departments and agencies.
Activities that USAID will carry out in Afghanistan as part of the
agricultural strategy will focus on the following objectives:
FY 2010 base
Programmatic Focus ($Millions)
Agricultural development fund (ag credit)......................... $50
Support for ag university, research, and extension................ 20
Regionally focused agricultural development programs (southeast
and southwest at $20 million each)............................ 40
Value chain development........................................... 5
Watershed and irrigation management and technology transfer....... 4
Program Support Costs............................................. 6
______
Total......................................................... $176
In FY 2010, USDA anticipates receiving funding from State/USAID at
the following levels for each activity:
FY 2010 base
Programmatic Focus (Strategy Objective) ($Millions)
Watershed management and irrigation (Obj. 1.3).................... 15
Direct assistance to MAIL (Obj. 2)................................ 48
MAIL capacity building (Obj. 2)................................... 20
Agricultural Trilateral Activities................................ 3
______
Total......................................................... $86
In Pakistan, State/USAID is asking USDA to implement activities in
accordance with the USDA investment strategy for Pakistan, developed in
coordination with USAID in Islamabad and Washington, DC. The investment
strategy calls for $20 million of FY10 funding in activities as
follows:
FY 2010 base
Programs ($Millions)
Wheat Production Enhancement Imitative............................ $1
Control of Animal Diseases........................................ 1
Water Management.................................................. 1
U.S./Pakistan Secretariat for Strategic Initiatives on Agriculture
(SSIA)........................................................ 1
Cotton Productivity Enhancement Program........................... 7
APHIS/NAPHIS Collaboration........................................ 3
Agricultural Economic Information Agency.......................... 3
Soil Salinity Reduction Program................................... 1
Aquaculture Enhancement Program................................... 1
USDA Exchange Program............................................. 1
______
Total Budget.................................................. $20
Question. How will the agriculture strategy be complemented by
related development activities? How are these activities being
coordinated in the field?
Answer. USAID is the lead development agency in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. USDA supports USAID activities in the field and Kabul by
focusing on ministry-to-ministry support (in this case, building the
capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock in
Afghanistan and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Pakistan). In
addition, USDA draws from land grant universities and its agencies to
provide direct technical assistance.
USDA is a member of the Agricultural Policy Working Group (AWPG) at
the U.S. Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad. All agriculture projects and
activities USDA undertakes in Afghanistan and Pakistan are vetted and
approved by the APWG, which has members from USAID, State, and other
U.S. Government entities working in the agricultural sector.
Question. Please describe for the committee how function 150 funds
that are transferred to other USG agencies will be monitored and
evaluated for effectiveness. What agency is in charge of this M&E
function?
Answer. USDA will assume responsibility for monitoring and
evaluating funds it receives from USAID via a 632(a) transfer agreement
and place monitoring and evaluation staff in country. This staff will
oversee projects' fiscal operations and ensure that projects are
achieving their stated goals. USDA and USAID will provide the committee
with regular joint reports on the use of these funds.
Question. What is the level of funding for FY 2010 and planned for
FY 2011 that will consist of direct support to Afghanistan and Pakistan
Government agencies? What will be the purpose of these transfers and
what agencies, U.S. or otherwise, will be accountable for M&E?
Answer. In Afghanistan, USDA will provide in FY10 $48 million in
direct support to the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and
Livestock (MAIL). The purpose of this funding will be to support
capacity-building efforts within MAIL, including the creation of a
grants management unit that will enable MAIL to implement and manage
agriculture projects. USDA will be responsible for the monitoring and
evaluation of these funds transferred to MAIL.
In Pakistan, none of the $20 million in funding for projects USDA
will implement will be directly transferred to the Government of
Pakistan. Funds will be used to implement projects in partnership
between USDA and Pakistani agencies, such as USDA's APHIS and
Pakistan's NAPHIS.
Question. The budget justification indicates that funding for
extractive industries transparency had been eliminated? What was the
reasoning? Given that the State Department has launched an initiative
on this front, how will that be funded and to what amount? Why is the
administration not seeking funds for the EITI multidonor trust fund?
Are bilateral programs a better use of limited funds? If so, why?
Answer. The Obama administration remains a strong supporter of the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and we will
continue to support this important effort into the future. The
administration sees EITI as a key part of our broader governance
promotion and anti-corruption strategies. While the administration does
not request specific funding for EITI, as an EITI supporting country,
we provide ``in-kind'' political support, promote the initiative
publically, and work with foreign governments through our Embassies to
facilitate implementation. The State Department participates in the
EITI Board and State and USAID participation in the World Bank's Multi-
Donor Trust Fund Facility.
All of the $4.5 million FY 2010 funding for EITI provided by
Congress will go into the EITI Multi-Donor Trust Fund facility (MDTF)
that is administered by the World Bank and overseen by a Management
Committee which includes State and USAID representation. In FY 2008 and
FY 2009 Congress provided at total of $6 million in funding for the
MDTF. State and USAID recently attended the annual meetings for the
EITI and helped approve the authority to disburse MDTF resources to
civil society groups in EITI countries to help ensure that actors
outside of government and the extractive industry are able to play an
active role in the EITI process.
EITI is only one of the extractive sector governance efforts that
the administration supports. As a complement to multilateral efforts
like EITI, our embassies and USAID missions overseas regularly engage
with host countries on broad governance and transparency promotion
efforts including USG efforts to address rule of law and governance
reforms, increase public sector capacity, and strengthen independent
media and civil society checks and balances.
The Department's new Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative
(EGCI) seeks to leverage USG expertise to provide technical support to
governments of developing countries that are on the verge of receiving
sizable financial windfalls and that demonstrate the political will to
build transparent and accountable energy sector governance. EGCI will
complement EITI and other reform efforts and will be tailored to the
specific needs of individual countries. By providing USG technical
assistance to the next generation of energy producers, we help them
maximize the value, efficiency, and development potential of energy
production and revenue flows. We are providing $1.4 million in FY 2010
to launch this initiative.
Question. Through the Global Health Initiative, representatives
from the administration have stated that the budget should not focus on
specific diseases, but on integrated programs and strengthening health
care systems. Is the administration abandoning congressional intent of
fully funding the HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis programs that was
enacted in 2008?
Answer. No. The Global Health Initiative (GHI) is an umbrella of
management, integration, and coordination among existing U.S.
Government health programs. PEPFAR is the cornerstone of the GHI, and
PEPFAR and other disease-specific programs will be part of the GHI but
remain distinct, consistent with their legislative authorizations. At
the same time, the unified whole-of-government approach across health
issues under the GHI will enable these disease-specific programs to
better achieve their goals and improve the health of people living with
HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria. The administration looks forward to
continuing to engage and consult with Congress on the strategy and
implementation of the GHI to ensure maximization of global health
resources consistent with congressional intent.
Question. During the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic the Federal
Government learned a lot of lessons about emergency preparedness in
terms of everything from monitoring and evaluation to the distribution
of vaccines. What role do you think the State Department should play in
addressing the shortcomings found, and is adequate resources dedicated
to ensure that we are better prepared for future pandemics?
Answer. The State Department plays two major roles in pandemic
preparedness: coordinating the USG international efforts to combat
animal and pandemic influenza and engaging political leadership in
affected and donor nations through bilateral interactions and
multilateral forums. Our engagement with international partners works
to strengthen pandemic preparedness and response by promoting
transparent efforts to share information and best practices. Our work
also aims to maintain international commitment to this important topic
as there is a potential for complacency resulting from the mild H1N1
pandemic. Many of these activities are undertaken under the U.S.
initiated International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza
which includes a yearly ministerial meeting (see below) and a ``Core
Group'' chaired by the Department's Special Representative for Avian
and Pandemic Influenza (Dr. Kerri-Ann Jones, Assistant Secretary of
State for Oceans, Environment and Science). In response to the 2009-
H1N1 outbreak, the Department initiated and continues to host a series
of coordinating meetings with the 2009-H1N1 vaccine donor countries,
the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), and the Office of the U.N. System Influenza Coordinator
(UNSIC).
In collaboration with USDA, USAID, and HHS/CDC, the Department is
working closely with the WHO, UNSIC, the Government of Vietnam, and the
European Commission in preparing for the International Ministerial
Conference on Animal and Pandemic Influenza (IMCAPI), scheduled for
April 19-21, 2010, in Hanoi, Vietnam. IMCAPI will seek to ensure
continued action by governments, international and regional
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to
build long-term capacity to control the spread of animal influenza and
prepare for the next influenza pandemic. This is an essential step for
ongoing preparedness.
The Department of State is contributing to the HHS led interagency
2009-H1N1 After Action Review. We will also be playing a leading role
in international efforts to assess the response to the H1N1 pandemic by
WHO, other international bodies, and donor countries. The Department is
committed to ensuring that governments and international and regional
organizations continue to regard preventing and responding to outbreaks
of H5N1 in poultry and other animals, as well as preparing for a
potentially catastrophic human pandemic, as priorities of the highest
order. These goals remain a key U.S. foreign policy objective in our
efforts to strengthen international security.
To further the Department's efforts to combat pandemic influenza,
we have allocated $450,000 to host a series of multilateral workshops
aimed at working toward a better understanding of how planning for
avian influenza affected the response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and how
future pandemic planning can be improved. We recently regularized
pandemic and influenza staffing by establishing four permanent direct
hire positions with a focus on global pandemic preparedness. USAID
mobilized assistance during the H1N1 pandemic through its Humanitarian
Pandemic Preparedness (H2P) initiative, taking measures to identify
populations most at risk, train staff and volunteers, and get out
messages to reduce disease spread. USAID is also providing technical
and operational support to the WHO's efforts to provide vaccine to
developing countries. USAID will continue providing support to ensure
provision of timely data from countries across Africa, Latin America,
the Middle East, and Asia to identify vulnerable populations;
strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacities for rapid H1N1
diagnosis in 26 countries (16 in Africa and 10 in South America);
support sample transport in 17 countries to regional laboratories;
inform local pandemic planning; and help ensure post-marketing
surveillance of vaccination efforts.
Question. Since the disaster in Haiti, substantial attention has
been given the Haitian orphans. In addition to the situation in Haiti,
it is estimated that 132 million children are orphaned worldwide due to
HIV and other illnesses, conflict, natural disasters, severe poverty,
and abandonment.
As part of your confirmation last year, I asked you about the
administration's commitment to the plight of orphans. You stated the
orphans and vulnerable children will remain a high priority for the
Obama administration and that six agencies were working in this area.
You also said that an interagency task force was updating and refining
the strategy toward orphans in light of the worldwide economic crisis
that was making more children vulnerable. What conclusions did the
interagency group come to in addressing the needs of this population?
What resources has the administration committed?
Answer. As noted in the Third Annual Report to Congress on Public
Law 109-95, the interagency group concluded that the strategic
priorities for FY 2010 and beyond are to collaborate across U.S.
Government agencies to: (a) increase support for child welfare and
child protection system strengthening; (b) increase support for the
economic strengthening of poor households to keep families intact; (c)
improve assistance to children living outside of family care; and (d)
improve the monitoring and evaluation of these, and other, common
priorities. In FY 2008, the latest year for which final figures have
been compiled, seven USG agencies provided over $5 billion in
assistance to highly vulnerable children and their families.
Question. Today's papers were full of stories regarding the expense
of the new Embassy in London. The Department has assured us in the past
that the costs for the new building would be covered by the sale of the
present buildings in Grosvenor Square.
Please provide a breakdown of the costs of the new Embassy in
London including land acquisition, site preparation, and anticipated
construction costs. Please demonstrate how these costs will be offset
based on sales of USG properties in London by listing the final amounts
received for each property and who the buyer was. It is my
understanding that a dispute still exists with the British Government
regarding a 17 percent value added tax (VAT) charge that the United
States is refusing to pay--what is the status of that negotiation.
Last, how does the cost of this building compare with our Embassy in
Baghdad?
Answer. In 2006, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO)
developed a Long-Range Facilities Plan (LRFP) that analyzed several
multiyear plans to renovate the existing London Chancery and compared
those options against constructing a new embassy compound, hereafter
referred to as the New London Embassy (NLE).
OBO determined the cost of a complete renovation of the current
chancery would be about $600 million and would take about 7 years;
however, even a renovated current chancery would still not meet all
security standards, significantly due to a lack of required setback
that cannot be remedied. In addition, OBO did not have funding for this
option.
The OBO analysis concluded an NLE is the only feasible alternative
to meet U.S. diplomatic requirements and provide a secure, safe,
modern, and functional embassy in London. The LRFP recommended and the
Department implemented a self-financing approach using revenue from the
sale of Department properties in London to fund an NLE.
It is important to note that the cost of the property plays a large
part in project costs as well as local construction costs. Independent
sources routinely place London as the top second or third most
expensive real estate market in the world. Office rents and housing
prices, regardless of the state of economy, are high--which results in
high residual land values. This, combined with a dearth of sites for
development plus normally high demand for land, keeps prices at a
premium.
The following provides a breakdown of the costs of the self-
financed NLE project. Some of these costs are estimated and may vary
depending on the exchange rate.
New London Embassy Expenditures
Real Estate Transaction and Chancery Lease Back Costs a. $183,000,000
Acquire Nine Elms Site b................................ 184,000,000
Construction Costs c.................................... 737,000,000
Value Added Tax (VAT) (Construction).................... 46,000,000
--------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total............................................... $1,150,000,000
a includes leaseback costs of $165 million and brokerage fees.
b includes VAT.
c includes construction and construction related costs (planning,
design, supervision, security management).
Sales Proceeds
Property and Purchaser Income
Navy Annex (sold)--Grosvenor Square Limited, a private
consortium led by entrepreneur Richard Caring....... $494,000,000
Chancery* (under contract)--Qatari Diar Real Estate
Investment Company (owned by Qatar Investment
Authority).......................................... 520,000,000
MSGQ* (to be sold)--The MSGQ will be sold at a later
date................................................ 10,000,000
Chancery Leaseback Rent Refund*......................... 144,000,000
--------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total............................................... $1,168,000,000
*Estimated; based on projected 2012 exchange rates.
As noted above, total expenditures for the NLE and site are
estimated at $1,150,000,000 and the total estimated income from sales
proceeds is $1,168,000,000, resulting in an estimated net gain for the
USG of $18,000,000.
The Department continues to engage the British Government
concerning the relief of all taxes associated with the acquisition and
construction of the NLE. In December 2008, the Department requested an
exoneration (whether through an exemption or reimbursement) of VAT
applicable to the purchase of the new embassy site, as well as on the
locally acquired materials and services needed to construct the
facility. In May 2009, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
informed the Embassy that Her Majesty's Government (HMG) was unable to
accommodate this request. We have, however, successfully obtained, for
the first time in the U.K., an exemption from the imposition of the
stamp tax associated with this project. Additionally, because the land
acquisition closed prior to December 31, 2009, VAT was assessed at a 15
percent rate, rather than the standard 17.5 percent rate. On January 8,
2010, the VAT that was required for the land purchase was paid. The
U.S. Government will continue to pursue reimbursement of the VAT on the
site purchase as well as exoneration of VAT on construction materials
and services, currently at a rate of 17.5 percent.
The Baghdad New Embassy Compound, awarded in FY 2005, cost $620.2
million in OBO funds. In addition to OBO funds ($620.2 million), the
Department used approximately $240 million of Diplomatic and Consular
Program funds for follow-on projects.
Question. In your testimony to the committee, you stated that, ``we
have too often relied on contractors, sometimes with little oversight''
and that one of the intentions of the FY 2011 budget is to hire full-
time staff in order to reduce the need for such contractors.
In which fields are you intending to replace contractors with these
new FTE and roughly how many contract positions are you seeking to
eliminate?
Does the Department have an accurate count on the number of
contractors that are working in substantive areas, both as contractors
and as employees, and what functions they are doing? Can you share with
the committee the number and examples of the nonpersonal security work
that contractors perform at the Department?
Answer. We are now conducting the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review (QDDR) effort at State and USAID, one area of which
focuses on developing a more balanced workforce. As part of this
process, the Department is preparing guidance and criteria, based on
guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, that will enable
bureaus to examine their workforce and make determinations as to where
in-sourcing may be appropriate. The guidance will direct bureaus to
review functions on a regular basis consistent with the criteria to
ensure inherently governmental and mission critical functions are
performed by government employees. These reviews will also aim to
ensure that other functions are performed with an appropriate balance
of government and third party contract personnel as necessary to
adequately manage contractor performance and retain a sufficient degree
of core capabilities.
This balanced workforce initiative will transcend all domestic
Department of State bureaus and offices; however it is too early in our
process to identify the specific fields in which we would replace
contractors with FTE or to estimate the overall number of positions to
be in-sourced. To provide some perspective, the Department currently
has 22,772 domestic employees, of which approximately 8,800 are
contractors. Our information regarding the type of work these
contractors perform is limited to broad job categories such as
information technology support and language services. We are currently
working to develop a system to better inventory the number of service
contractors by job function, as mandated by Public Law 111-17, Division
C, Section 743.
Question. Would a third term for President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia
present obstacles for support of funding Plan Colombia and for the
ratification of a free trade agreement with Colombia? In addition, how
would President Uribe's continuation in office affect Colombian-
Venezuelan relations?
Answer. On February 26, Colombia's Constitutional Court ruled 7-2
that the constitutional amendment process to allow President Alvaro
Uribe to run for a third term could not legally go forward. As we have
said consistently, this was an issue for the Colombian people and
Colombian institutions to decide. This democratic process and President
Uribe's statesmanlike response that he would abide by the Court's
decision show why Colombia is a vibrant and mature democracy, and a
valued partner for the United States.
Question. Despite strong support from the United States, sustained
international participation in Haiti is vital for its recovery. It is
especially important that the international community provide
governance assistance to the Haitian people. The failures and
corruption of past Haitian governments contributed greatly to the
stress felt by the Haitian people before the earthquake, and the
limitations of the current government constrain the prospects for
recovery.
These harsh realities, compounded by the significant loss of life
that has weakened the government and other institutions in Haiti,
compel the international community to consider creative measures.
Because of the devastation, Haiti's condition approximates that of a
failed state. If the U.N. plays an increased security and recovery
role, I believe Haitians will more quickly gather their bearings and
begin to rebuild their lives and their country.
Going forward the relationship between the United Nations and the
Haitian Government should be a consensual, cooperative arrangement that
preserves Haitian participation in recovery decisions, while ensuring
that the resources and expertise of the international community are
brought to bear on the daily problems of Haiti.
In this regard, should we consider an enhanced role for the United
Nations in the daily operations of the Haitian Government until the
country is stable and less dislocated? This would include the provision
of food and shelter, reconstruction activities, budgetary affairs,
security, and other aspects of governance vital to the Haitian people.
The United Nations has the credibility and capacity to perform this
role.
Answer. The undertaking to assist Haiti in recovery and rebuilding
is massive; it will require the Government of Haiti to lead a well-
coordinated, well-funded effort assisted by the United States, the
United Nations, other nations, international organizations, the Haitian
diaspora, and nongovernmental organizations. Actors from across the
U.N. system provided assistance to the government and people of Haiti
long before the tragic January 12 earthquake, and we expect that they
will continue their work, in close partnership with the Government of
Haiti, for a long time to come. This includes not only efforts in the
security sphere--where the MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission has bolstered
and helped to train the Haitian National Police--but also the U.N.'s
work on relief, recovery, and reconstruction.
The relationship between the U.N. and the Haitian Government has
been and should be a consensual, cooperative arrangement, with the U.N.
and other international actors recognizing the Haitian Government's
central role and authority. The Haitian Government's primacy in the
relief effort is critical to gaining the trust and support of the
Haitian people and diaspora. It is important to underscore that there
has been consistent agreement among major international donors for our
efforts to be conducted ``in cooperation with and support of'' the
Haitian Government.
Demonstrating its commitment, the U.N. will cohost and provide the
venue for the ``International Donors' Conference Towards a New Future
for Haiti'' on March 31. The donors' conference, cohosted by the U.N.
with the United States, in cooperation with the Government of Haiti,
and with the support of Brazil, Canada, the European Union, France, and
Spain, will seek to mobilize international support for the development
needs of Haiti to begin to lay the foundation for Haiti's long-term
recovery. At the donors' conference, Haiti will present its vision for
its future and how international support can assist. Donor countries,
international organizations, and other partners will have an
opportunity to pledge resources, to coordinate in support of Haiti's
long-term recovery, and to commit to a sustained effort to support
Haiti.
Question. a. How does the administration plan to engage with
recently elected President Yanukovych and what has been your approach
to Crimea, the status of which has been an ongoing source of tension
within Ukraine?
b. What is the status of economic development and confidence
building projects in Crimea, including exchange programs with the
United States and the opening of a U.S. presence post, which was a
component of the 2008 U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership?
Answer a. The administration looks forward to deepening our
strategic partnership with Ukraine in collaboration with President
Yanukovych, who was elected in a vote that international and domestic
observers assessed as essentially free and fair. President Yanukovych
himself has spoken publicly about implementing this strategic
partnership. The United States fully supports Ukraine's sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity, and recognizes no spheres of
influence in the region. A strong and independent Ukraine contributes
to the security and prosperity of Europe.
The United States bases its friendship with Ukraine on the
principles of the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership of
December 2008. In addition to our support for Ukraine's independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity, these principles include the
belief that democracy is the guarantor of prosperity and freedom, and
the importance of defense and security cooperation. To implement the
charter, the United States and Ukraine established the U.S.-Ukraine
Strategic Partnership Commission in July 2009. The commission's
inaugural meeting took place last December in Washington; we look
forward to a next session in Kyiv after the new government is in place.
We are conducting high-level engagement with the new leadership to
pursue U.S. priorities, including critical economic and energy sector
reform, as well as Ukrainian cooperation on nonproliferation issues in
the leadup to the Nuclear Security summit in Washington in April.
President Obama raised all these issues with then-President-elect
Yanukovych during a February 11 telephone call. National Security
Advisor General Jones discussed these priorities further with President
Yanukovych at the February 25 inauguration in Kyiv. President
Yanukovych has responded positively to our contacts, indicating that he
intends to pursue a strong relationship with the West, and that he will
attend the Nuclear Security summit.
In Crimea, we will continue our outreach efforts to strengthen the
region's further integration with the rest of Ukraine, and to promote
mutual understanding between the United States and Crimea. Ambassador
Tefft will visit Crimea the week of March 8. The United States will
continue its assistance efforts to support the region's development and
contributing to stronger linkages between Crimea, other parts of
Ukraine, and Europe.
Answer b. The U.S. mission in Kyiv is actively leading outreach
efforts aimed at all inhabitants of Crimea, including youth and Tatar
audiences. We have conducted exchanges, media outreach, and cultural
diplomacy in an effort to promote mutual understanding of U.S. society
and values, and strengthen academia, civil society, and local
government capacity. In addition, Embassy Kyiv recently established
centers in Simferopol and Sevastopol to advise Crimean youth about U.S.
educational opportunities. We have also established low-cost Internet
centers at the main public library in Simferopol and elsewhere in
Crimea, as well as throughout Ukraine. One-time assistance funding of
$850,000 from a Georgia war-related supplemental has permitted this
increased public diplomacy spending in Crimea during FY09 and FY10.
In recognition of the region's importance, the U.S. significantly
expanded its aid for 2009 and 2010 to Crimea. We provided $27.8 million
in assistance to Crimea in FY 2008-09, $19. 5 million of which was part
of an FY08 supplemental. USAID and other programs focus on promoting
economic development, health, democracy in Crimea. The U.S. mission in
Kyiv works with businesses, local governments, and civil society to
provide tangible economic and social gains, including improvements in
the delivery of key economic and public health services. Aid to improve
the business and investment environment will help diversify the Crimean
economy. Health programs will help control tuberculosis. Media
assistance will strengthen the reach and effectiveness of the region's
independent media, providing meaningful alternatives to existing
sources. Governance initiatives will build leadership skills in key
constituencies, including Crimean Tatar youth. Programs to improve
Ukraine's energy security support modernization of the municipal
heating network and assist municipalities with energy planning and
energy efficiency strategies.
The Obama administration is reviewing plans on opening new
diplomatic posts abroad, including one in the Crimean capital of
Simferopol, one of the elements of the December 2008 U.S.-Ukraine
Charter on Strategic Partnership. Further review by both the Department
and Ukrainian authorities would be necessary before such a presence
post can be established. Such a post would expand exchanges and promote
mutual understanding between the United States and Crimea.
Question. The State Department is asking for authority to retain
and spend all passport and consular fees, providing a new stream of
funding for the Department outside of the regular appropriations
process.
For FY 2011, what is the estimate of the amount of fees that
would be received? How much currently goes to the U.S.
Treasury, and how much would go to the Department of State?
If this permanent authority is provided by the Congress,
under the Department's suggested language, what role does the
Congress have in guiding the use of these fees? Does usage of
the funds require an appropriation, or only a notification and
a year-end report?
Answer. Currently, the Department of State has authority to retain
certain consular fees, including the Machine Readable Visa and Border
Crossing Card fees, the border security surcharge on passport and
immigrant visa applications, the expedited passport fee, the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative surcharge on passport applications, the
diversity visa lottery fee, the fee for an affidavit of support, and
the fee to process requests from participants in the Department's
Exchange Visitor Program for a waiver of the 2-year home-residence
requirement. Other consular fees must be deposited in the general fund
of the Treasury and may not be retained by the Department of State.
Consular fees are based on the cost of providing consular services to
the public, and retaining the fees will allow us to offset the expenses
associated with these services. These expenses include the purchase of
supplies and equipment, and the salary of personnel.
Under the consular fee proposal in the President's FY 2011 budget
request, the Department would be able to retain any revenues from
passport and other consular fees that are currently deposited in the
Treasury, including the passport application fee, the passport
execution fee, immigrant visa application fees, and fees for other
consular services including American Citizen Services that are provided
primarily overseas.
Currently, the Department expends significant appropriated
resources to support these activities because the associated fees for
these services are deposited in the Treasury. The total projected
revenue for FY 2011 under the proposed authority is approximately $782
million. Planned use of the retained fee revenue would be included in
the Department's annual financial plans which are submitted to the
Congress soon after the appropriations legislation for each fiscal year
is signed into law.
Question. During President Obama's recent State of the Union
Address, the President stated that it would be the administration's
goal of doubling American exports over the next 5 years under the
``National Export Initiative.'' The goal of increasing U.S. exports is
one that I applaud and support. Multiple governmental agencies
including the Department of State as well as the Department of
Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and others have been
designated to be involved in this effort. Yet, I struggle to see
evidence of the National Export Initiative reflected in this proposed
budget of the Department of State. For example, the U.S. Trade and
Development Agency budget increases at a rate below the average
increase for non-Frontline State spending. This is an agency whose
primary purpose is to promote U.S. exports and reports that every
dollar is spent by the agency results in $40 in U.S. exports.
Please explain how the National Export Initiative is
reflected in this budget and how it might be reflected in
future budgets.
Answer. The National Export Initiative (NEI) is an interagency
effort coordinated by the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC)
led by the Commerce Department. We support the administration's request
for increases in FY 2011 budget requests for the Commerce Department
and other TPCC agencies to support export promotion efforts. In the
USAID budget, $10 million has been allocated to the Economic Growth,
Agriculture and Trade Bureau for this initiative. These foreign
assistance funds will complement U.S. commercial diplomacy by helping
our partners in key developing country markets to streamline customs
and other import administration procedures, thereby lowering the cost
of U.S. products to customers in those markets.
State Department officers work in a close partnership with their
Commerce Department colleagues, particularly in our embassies and
consulates abroad where Commercial Service officers are part of our
country teams. Our embassies and consulates also work to leverage the
resources and support for exporters offered by the Export-Import Bank
(ExIm), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Small Business
Administration and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.
I have sent a message to all U.S. Ambassadors to highlight the
importance of commercial diplomacy in their support for U.S. business
abroad. We are working closely with our TPCC colleagues to strengthen
the advocacy process to ensure that high-level U.S. Government
officials are prepared to discuss commercial issues with foreign
government officials. We are working with the Commerce Department in
support of foreign trade missions and encouraging our Chiefs of Mission
to engage with the U.S. business community when they are in the United
States to encourage interest in markets abroad.
Much of what the State Department does to advocate for business
interests abroad does not require additional resources at this time.
This could change given the transitional nature of the domestic and
global marketplace and scope of this initiative in the future. Our U.S.
embassy and consulate staffs offer U.S. exporters assistance every day
by providing country-specific expertise on markets and potential
customers. Embassy officers assist in investment and commercial
disputes and provide U.S. firms with critical insight into local
political and judicial systems in foreign countries. We also work
closely with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and other
agencies to enforce international trade rules to help level the playing
field for U.S. companies. We also support efforts to negotiate new
balanced trade agreements that improve market access for U.S.
manufacturing, agricultural and services exports.
Question. During your testimony, you discussed the increased role
of the Export-Import Bank (ExIm Bank) in this initiative. As Exim Bank
is an independent, self-sustaining executive agency which only receives
funds from the 150 Account for expenses of the Inspector General of
Exim Bank, how will the Department of State increase Exim Bank's
effectiveness in financing and increasing U.S. exports?
Answer. The National Export Initiative is an interagency effort,
and the Department of State and other agencies of the USG, are working
to increase U.S. exports. As we proceed to reach out to the U.S.
business community, in Washington and through our embassies overseas,
we are highlighting and promoting ExIm's programs more than ever. In
fact, the State Department's Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business
Affairs will be hosting an Internet seminar on ExIm Bank programs in
March for embassy officers worldwide.
Question. Given the focus of the National Export Initiative, how is
the Department of State working to minimize the impact on U.S. exports
and job loss due to the ongoing cotton dispute with Brazil?
Answer. The administration continues to prefer a resolution to the
cotton dispute that does not include Brazil resorting to
countermeasures. We are disappointed to learn that Brazil's authorities
decided to proceed with countermeasures against U.S. trade in this
dispute. Working closely with the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, we are consulting with Congress and American
stakeholders, and we plan to continue to engage Brazil on this issue.
organizing for civilian crisis response
While you and Secretary Gates have indicated, side by side, the
importance of right-sizing the foreign assistance budget for our own
national security, you have both also indicated the necessity to
organize our civilian agencies for this role in the 21st century. As
you well know, I have long supported such efforts, to include
strengthening the ability of civilian agencies to deploy personnel as
effective partners to our troops and independently where necessary. I
am pleased to see that the Civilian Stabilization Initiative remains a
priority in the budget and hope to see it organized and led with the
resources and personnel appropriate to this important security-related
response capacity.
While the Department of Defense has embraced the clear necessity to
organize for the deployment of civilians in crisis areas around the
world through policy decisions (3000.5) and reorganization (creation of
the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce-CEW), it appears the State
Department is not moving with the same urgency or commitment.
Question. Why has the State Department Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) lacked priority and
emphasis within the administration in the face of growing and
persistent requirements for civilians from State, USAID, and other
civilian agencies to deploy to places determined to be of the highest
priority by the President such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and
perhaps places such as Haiti or even Yemen in the future?
Answer. Robust funding for S/CRS and further development and
employment of the CRC and other tools continues to be a priority for
me, for the Department as a whole, and for the President. Although it
is true that S/CRS is not leading our civilian response efforts in
Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, its tools and personnel have been
involved in our efforts in all three places, particularly in
Afghanistan. Currently, S/CRS has approximately 20 members of the
Civilian Response Corps and S/CRS staff serving in Afghanistan and who
are central to our efforts at civil-military planning, support for the
U.N., and strategic communications. S/CRS has assisted in our Haiti
effort and is just finishing a civilian-led assessment and planning
process for our Embassy and USAID mission in Sana'a.
In the coming months, as S/CRS continues to grow, my senior staff
and I expect that Ambassador Herbst and his team will take on a more
central coordinating and operating role in our most important conflict
prevention and conflict response challenges.
Question. What are your intentions with regard to matching the
commitment you made with Secretary Gates to lead our lead civilian
foreign policy agency to be an effective locus of organization for
deployment of civilians? Is it possible to innovate upon S/CRS advances
made to date in order to organize and coordinate for reconstruction and
stabilization missions determined by the President to be in our
interests?
Answer. I remain fully committed to ensuring that the State
Department, along with USAID, has the necessary civilian capacity
effectively to respond to the nation's most important national security
challenges. S/CRS has made very significant strides already, and, in
the past few months has achieved a new level of readiness and maturity.
In connection with the QDDR process this year, I am confident that we
will build on S/CRS's successes and make further advances to create a
larger and even more effective State, USAID and whole-of-government
civilian response capability.
Question. How will you ensure the hard-fought progress made through
S/CRS to date is not lost and that the utility of its tools, such as a
planning capacity, its innovation and coordination across agencies, its
collaboration with DOD, as well as critical learned lessons and
resident knowledge are collected and maintained as civilians return
from difficult assignments in crisis zones?
Answer. S/CRS is continuing to develop a database of best practices
by capturing lessons learned from reconstruction and stabilization
operations and incorporating them in doctrine, training, and future
operations. After Action Reviews (AARs) of individual engagements are a
primary means of distilling lessons and best practices. Evaluations are
conducted while operations are ongoing, and final AARs are drafted
after consulting with a wide range of interagency experts and external
partners in both face-to-face meetings and online surveys. Such AARs
are studied to glean best practices and lessons learned.
S/CRS is working closely with USAID, DOD, and the Center for
Complex Operations at the National Defense University in the
establishment of a ``Whole-of-Government Lessons Learned Hub.'' With S/
CRS as the policy lead, an integrated civilian-military, multiagency
pilot project is underway on Afghanistan and Iraq Provincial
Reconstruction Teams that will institutionalize a standing interagency
lessons-learned capacity. This interagency collaboration includes
participating civilian agencies (DOS, USAID, USDA, and DOJ) as well as
the Defense Department and a number of DOD entities. In managing the
PRT lessons-learned project, the CCO has partnered with USIP and the
Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training to interview returning
civilian PRT members, using an interagency-agreed questionnaire. An
interservice team is interviewing military personnel using the same
materials. We are looking to create direct links to the field for rapid
implementation of best practices.
Question. Resources are an essential element of the Civilian
Stabilization Initiative and should be properly located to achieve
their purpose. Although I am pleased to see my persistent call for a
Crisis Response Fund to be housed at State rather than relying on DOD
section 1207 funds for the same purpose I wonder how State has
organized to continue with the proper use of such funds. Why does USAID
appear to have a parallel account? Is it for Stabilization and
Reconstruction purposes?
Answer. We welcome your support for the proposed FY 2011 Complex
Crisis Fund (CCF), which we see as the natural successor to the 1207
funding program. While specific decisions will have to wait for the
conclusion of the legislative process, USAID, S/CRS, and F are
currently consulting on the best way to organize to implement the CCF,
building on the expertise S/CRS has developed in managing the 1207
program. While the FY 2010 CCF was appropriated to USAID, we see this
as being used for purposes similar to 1207, or for conflict prevention
and conflict response activities, which is also how we envision the FY
2011 CCF.
Question. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and its agency,
USAID, responded as they have done so well over the years in
cooperation with the Department of Defense and others in the immediate
humanitarian response following the earthquake. As the humanitarian
crisis settles the U.S. must decide on the path ahead for our
engagement which I have noted earlier should encourage an international
effort.
Why was the designated Deputy Assistant Secretary within the
PRM Bureau for the Haiti Task Force not seconded to S/CRS in
order to directly employ the resident S/CRS planning and
coordination tools including the engagement of the nascent
Civilian Response Corps (CRC) mechanism?
Answer. The 12 January earthquake in Haiti came on the heels of a
9-month-long process to review the USG's policy and assistance on Haiti
lead by my Counselor and Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills. The selection of
Deputy Assistant Secretary Reuben Brigety of the Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration, to lead this process under Mills allowed us to
bridge steady state with crisis response planning, particularly given
DAS Brigety's background linking national security, humanitarian
affairs, human rights, and foreign assistance reform. S/CRS reached
into its staff as well as Active and Stand-by members of the Civilian
Response Corps to provide the majority of the staffing for Task Force
IV, which had the lead on this effort. In addition, S/CRSs signature
whole-of-government planning process and coordination tools were
enlisted in the effort, which within days had successfully convened
over 150 experts from 45 federal offices and agencies to lend their
expertise to a complex and rapidly evolving planning environment. In
the space of 3 weeks, Task Force IV produced a compendium of planning
products from situation analysis and future assessment needs to policy
issues and a supplemental budget justification in support of the USG's
strategy for recovery and reconstruction in Haiti from immediate
transitory measures to a 5-year horizon.
Question. Was there a conscious decision to bypass S/CRS and the
years of development we in Congress have encouraged since 2003? If so,
why?
Answer. USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah was designated the unified
Haiti disaster coordinator by the President since the earthquake relief
was so clearly a humanitarian task for which rapid food, medical, and
search and rescue assistance was needed. USAID's Bureau of Democracy,
Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance has the mandate to provide
humanitarian assistance in natural disasters, and has extensive
experience in rapidly and effectively coordinating with international
and nongovernmental humanitarian assistance providers and other USG
agencies, including the U.S. military in such situations.
S/CRS was and continues to be important as we manage our response
to this tragedy, primarily by supporting our forward planning efforts
and by coordinating some of the interagency contributions to the
effort.
Question. How will the State Department continue to build upon the
resources dedicated to building an effective civilian response capacity
in the Crisis Response Corps (CRC), as well as the tools to help in the
planning, training, and coordination of all civilian agencies providing
personnel for deployment?
Answer. I am confident the QDDR process will point the way forward
for the further development of the function pioneered and practiced by
S/CRS and funded by the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI). As
part of the QDDR process we are looking at everything--filling all the
gaps in our ability to respond to complex challenges, possible new
authorities needed, resource gaps, and the necessary scope and size of
our ``tools.'' One thing is for sure; continued building of our
response capacity will require continued funding, in 2011, 2012, and
beyond. I would also ask you to help us recruit, train, and employ a
robust and effective force with flexible hiring authority, an expansion
of the definition of personnel able to serve in the CRC, and the
ability to offer dual compensation to USG retirees who want to come
back and contribute to this effort without losing their pension.
Question. The administration's CSI request includes $69.6 million
for CRC deployments. The State Department FY 2011 Congressional Budget
Justification indicates that there is a ``growing demand for CRC
[deployments] in sub-Saharan Africa and South Central Asia,'' and that
the Secretary has already committed one such deployment to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Are deployments to these areas to be made in FY 2010 or FY
2011? Specifically, how many and what size deployments does
that administration contemplate for the remainder of FY 2010
and for FY 2011?
How many members of the CRC are currently deployed? Where
are they deployed, and what functions are they serving? What
contribution have S/CRS and the CRC made to the civilian surge
in Afghanistan? What contribution are they making in response
to the Haiti earthquake?
Answer. The demand for CRC deployments continues to grow as we
progress in fully staffing the CRC and the capability becomes more
widely known throughout the government. The deployments to sub-Saharan
Africa and South Central Asia are in FY 2010 but we expect them to
continue into FY 2011. Unfortunately, due to the demand driven nature
of the work, we can only provide specific numbers of CRC that we
anticipate deploying for the remainder of FY 2010. CRC deployments
scheduled for the next 3-6 months include: 10-15 CRC to Sudan; 5 to the
DRC; 20-plus to Afghanistan; and a handful to a number of other
countries. We anticipate that demand will continue to grow for CRC
deployments in FY 2011.
Currently, 25 CRC are deployed. In addition, 15 S/CRS staff are
deployed to countries including Yemen and Kyrgyzstan. Afghanistan is
the largest deployment with 13 CRC members currently supporting joint
civilian-military planning efforts, strategic communications, and
corrections issues. In addition, there is one CRC member embedded with
CENTCOM to support joint planning efforts in Afghanistan. One CRC-S
Standby member is deployed to Chad working with MINURCAT on upcoming
elections and one CRC-A member is in Sudan. In the DRC, there are two
CRC members who were part of a larger CRC team conducting assessments
in a variety of areas--including gender based violence, SSR, minerals
trade--at the request of Embassy Kinshasa. In Pakistan, one CRC member
is strengthening strategic communications and outreach efforts of the
Embassy. At SOUTHCOM, S/CRS has one CRC Standby member from the
Department of Commerce working on reconstruction and stabilization
issues in Haiti. In Haiti itself, the CRC has deployed five members to
conduct a variety of different missions related to the post-earthquake
reconstruction and stabilization. In Sri Lanka, one CRC member is
supporting the ongoing DDR activities in country.
Question. I have long sought to strengthen the institutional
Inspector General offices and find it is especially important given the
vast resources being dedicated to U.S. efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan. Effective institutional oversight is the currency for
greater confidence from Congress in our expenditures overseas. While
Special Inspectors General were established in Afghanistan and Iraq and
were granted authorities, such as the hiring of annuitants and
retirees, similarly helpful authorities and significant resources were
not provided for the oversight offices within State and USAID.
(a) It is not a matter of resources alone however. Please
explain why our institutional Inspector General offices are not
given the authorities and resources deemed essential to the
Special IG entities?
Answer (a). OIG Response: Resources--For FY 2011, the President's
budget request for State OIG ($63 million) will not substantially
inhibit our audits, inspections, or investigations. In accordance with
the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, the Department fulfilled
its obligation to apprise Congress of the OIG funding request to the
Department (FY 2011 CBJ, Vol. 1). OIG's original FY 2011 request, $76
million, was based on our current and projected requirements. In FY
2010, OIG's base funding ($54 million), plus all supplemental funding
available is $68.9 million. OIG appreciates Department and
Congressional interest in our resources and the trust placed in OIG by
both to undertake a swift but prudent expansion of our oversight
portfolio.
Authorities--In 2008, the State Department delegated OIG its
statutory authority to hire personal services contractors (PSCs) for
international work.
In 2009, OIG responded to SFRC questions on needed OIG authorities,
which were undertaken by the committee, specifically for:
(1) Expansion of PSC authority to include domestic authority,
and
(2) New Civil Service and Foreign Service annuitant hiring
authorities, which now are being coordinated by SFRC with
committees with related jurisdiction.
These personnel authorities would increase OIG's capability to
respond to oversight needs across the globe, however, only Congress can
provide OIG additional statutory authorities such as 5 U.S.C. 3161, the
use of PSCs domestically, and the expanded use of Civil Service and
Foreign Service annuitant through partial retirement offset reduction.
Recently, OIG requested that the SFRC provide 5 U.S.C. 3161 authority
to OIG.
(b) How are you building the institutional capacity within
State and USAID IG offices to be more responsive to the
significant challenges and tasks associated with our foreign
policy and foreign assistance commitments in places such as
Pakistan and Afghanistan? How are you ensuring there is no
dropoff in productivity across the rest of the globe as
resources and personnel are directed to Afghanistan and
Pakistan?
Answer (b). OIG Response: OIG continues to hire and train new
personnel to meet oversight requirements and achieve full staffing
levels. OIG makes the best use of its limited resources by prioritizing
its work, focusing on high-risk, high-dollar programs and placing the
greatest emphasis for new growth on sustaining oversight in post-
conflict and crisis countries and regions. In 2008, with additional
resources available, OIG launched new offices to address emergent
oversight needs. These new officers are the Middle East Regional Office
(MERO) and Middle East Investigative Branch (MEIB).
OIG will continue to expand its oversight efforts in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and West Bank/Gaza, and its focus on issues
important to Congress such as global health initiatives, global women's
issues, and trafficking in persons. OIG will also continue to respond
to new areas requiring oversight as evidenced by its announced review
of the Department's response to the disaster in Haiti.
In Afghanistan, OIG-MERO currently has assigned four staff members
full-time--two auditors, including the audit-director, an auditor-
analyst, and an office support specialist. This staff is supported with
a budget of $2.5 million in FY 2010 and $3.5 million in FY 2011.
In Pakistan, OIG-MERO has hired or identified positions for three
staff members to be assigned full-time--an audit-director and two
auditor-analysts. This staff is supported with a budget of $2 million
in FY 2010 and $3.6 million in FY 2011.
The full-time staff in Pakistan and Afghanistan is in addition to
staff deployed from the U.S. on a temporary duty (TDY) basis from
Washington, DC, and those assigned TDY from the MERO and MEIB hub
offices in Cairo and Amman, respectively.
Beyond the work of MERO and MEIB, all OIG offices have conducted
oversight work in countries within the Middle East and South Asia
regions in recent years. For example, the OIG recently released its
inspection of Embassy Kabul and the inspection report on Embassy
Islamabad will be issued this spring. In October 2009, OIG published
its report on the Audit of the Construction and Design of the New
Embassy Compound in Baghdad, Iraq and in June 2009, OIG's Office of
Audits released a joint report with the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction on ``Joint Audit of Blackwater Contract and Task
Orders for Worldwide Personal Protective Services in Iraq.''
Meanwhile, OIG continues to provide oversight of programs and
offices for the Department of State, Broadcasting Board of Governors
and the International Boundary and Water Commission, with prioritized
oversight activity, both domestically and overseas.
From FY 2008 to FY 2010, the Office of Investigations increased its
staff of criminal investigators from 10 to 36 and anticipates an
increase to 38 by the end of FY 2010. In FY 2009, the OIG created the
Middle East Investigative Branch (MEIB) within the Office of
Investigations to conduct investigations in support of the Department's
expanding Middle East and South Asia mission. MEIB's primary mission is
to respond to criminal allegations and support investigative activities
concerning Department programs, employees, and contractors in the
Middle East and South Asia, with focused concentration on high-value,
high-risk areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
MEIB has a total of eight criminal investigators, with three
stationed domestically and five stationed in Amman, Jordan, Baghdad,
Iraq, and Cairo, Egypt, respectively. This translates to more than 22
percent of INV's entire investigative staff dedicated to the Middle
East and South Asia region. From these locations, OIG can move its
personnel easily, as needed, throughout the region. During FY 2010, INV
plans to add another criminal investigator to MEIB.
This shift of resources to the Middle East and South Asia has
corresponded with a large increase in INV's overall domestic and
worldwide workload. The number of OIG Hotline complaints processed rose
from 533 in FY 2007 to 1,004 in FY 2009 (an increase of 88 percent) and
is on pace in FY 2010 to surpass last year's total by a wide margin.
The number of cases opened also rose from 37 in FY 2007 to 126 in FY
2009 (an increase of 240 percent).
To adjust to the increased workload, INV has taken measures to
enhance productivity. For example, INV has also procured a new
electronic Case Management System (CMS), which is due to come online
during FY 2010 and will replace an outmoded system in use since 1999
that is not accessible remotely. This new system will, for the first
time, enable INV personnel stationed overseas to instantly update case
files, communicate much more efficiently with Washington and greatly
increase productivity.
(c) After strong congressional pressure there are now 3
USAID IG staff in Afghanistan and a similar number of State IG
staff, while there is 20 staff on the ground working for the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) which was
established only a short while ago. Washington, DC, staff is
similarly overweight within the SIGAR relative to the
institutional IG offices.
(i) What changes have been made or will be made to
strengthen the institutional IG offices?
(ii) How will you ensure the institutional capacity for
audit and oversight are sufficient to each and every
environment within which we expect to employ foreign
assistance and other foreign policy resources?
(iii) Please break out the amounts from the FY2010 and
FY2011 budgets intended for State IG and USAID IG use by
total and by region, and where possible for Afghanistan and
for Pakistan.iv. Why does the FY2010 Supplemental Budget
Request include $14 million for SIGAR on top of $30.2
million for FY2010 while OIG request is for only $3
million?
(iv) Why does the FY2010 Supplemental Budget Request
include $14 million for SIGAR on top of $30.2 million for
FY2010 while OIG request is for only $3 million?
Answer (i). OIG Response: OIG has received a substantial amount of
resources since 2007, as detailed below, to increase its oversight
capabilities. This corresponded with equal or larger increase in
oversight responsibilities for the increasing budget and programs in
the Department, in addition to the work on post-conflict and crisis
regions.
OIG has judiciously used these resources to strengthen its existing
offices and create an overseas presence for the first time. The large
increase in OIG oversight products and investigations in crisis and
post conflict areas since 2007 speaks for itself. OIG also coordinates
and deconflicts its work with other institutional and special OIGs in
organizations such as the Southwest Asia Planning Group and the
International Contract Corruption Task Force. As for Afghanistan, OIG
has determined that its current mix of overseas and domestically based
personnel best supports its oversight mission there.
OIG personnel stationed in Amman and Cairo provide oversight of
major U.S. Government programs in crisis and post-conflict areas,
including Afghanistan. Staff members in these offices conduct audits,
program evaluations, investigations and financial attestations of
contracts and grants on performance and procurement issues, as well as
program oversight by management. The temporary satellite office in
Kabul, with assistance from the regional offices and Washington, DC,
provides direct oversight of the same types of Department-funded
programs in Afghanistan. This configuration of personnel provides OIG
the greatest operational flexibility, while incurring substantially
lower risk and life support costs. In addition, it avoids unnecessary
duplication of oversight with SIGAR and reduces the administrative
support burden on Embassy Kabul.
In terms of strengthening OIG's resources base, since 2008 OIG has
received an array of additional funding. In 2008, the base funding was
$33 million. If the 2011 President's budget is enacted, the base
funding level will be $63 million. A major part of the increase was a
result of the need to include the MERO and MEIB offices in the base
funding. Before 2011, these two offices were funded by supplemental
funding, which OIG understands will not be available in FY 2011.
In response to the question on OIG authorities, the OIG supports
the new proposed authorities and other OIG-related provisions that SFRC
(See page 2.) is now considering for the reauthorization of the Foreign
Relations Act.
On overseas staffing, MERO and MEIB provide oversight to post-
conflict and crisis locations overseas. MERO maintains 80 percent of
its staff based overseas, and an additional 10 percent in TDY-
deployable status. MEIB maintains its entire staff overseas or in TDY-
deployable status. These offices are continuing to assign additional
staff overseas.
The Office of Inspections has, since its inception, deployed
domestically based staff overseas on inspections trips that can include
multiple-post reviews and onsite, thematic reviews of programs at work
overseas.
Answer (ii). OIG Response: Congress plays a key role in ensuring
that OIG maintains sufficient institutional capacity by providing
sufficient resources and maximum personnel authorities that permit us
the flexibility to staff our teams with the best mix of talent and
experience.
Answer (iii). OIG Response:
FY 2010
$54M = regular appropriation
$2M = ESF Pakistan
$2.4M = Egypt
$2.5M = Jordan
$2.5M = Iraq
$2.5M = Afghanistan
$2.0M = Pakistan
$1.0M = Gaza
FY 2011
$63M = regular appropriation request
$2.0M = Pakistan ESF transfer
$2.4M = Egypt
$2.5M = Jordan
$2.5M = Iraq
$3.5M = Afghanistan
$3.6M = Pakistan
Answer (iv). OIG Response: OIG is not in a position to answer this
question.
Question. I appreciate the higher profile attention you are giving
to international energy matters. We must work to push forward on
cleaner and renewable energy sources for the future, while also working
to secure the reliable oil and natural gas supplies that are so
critical to the global economy. An area of particular importance is
opening the Southern corridor to link Central Asian and Caucasian
energy sources with consumers in Europe. Special Envoy Morningstar has
put a great deal of effort into this project, and his work is
commendable. Yet, some in the region still question U.S. commitment,
particularly in comparison to the Clinton administration support for
the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline project. Could you please update us
progress on Nabucco, and also comment on how Nabucco progress fits with
our efforts related to the complicated issues of Nagorno-Karabakh and
Turkey-Armenia relations?
Answer. We strongly support Europe's efforts to bring natural gas
to Europe through new, diverse routes, including the Nabucco pipeline.
Let me be clear. We strongly support Nabucco, but it will ultimately be
built only if and when the case has been made that it makes commercial
sense. That is why Ambassador Morningstar and his team have put so much
effort into encouraging the parties whose interests are most directly
engaged (Europeans, producer countries, transit countries, Turkey) to
lay the necessary groundwork so that appropriate investment decisions
can be made.
There have been several positive developments regarding Nabucco.
The Intergovernmental agreement was signed by all partner countries in
July 2009. Since that time, the Parliaments in Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Turkey have ratified the agreement. Commercial negotiations between the
Nabucco partners and several gas suppliers, including Azerbaijan are
underway. Negotiations between Turkey and Azerbaijan regarding gas
sales and transit are nearing completion. Politics are playing a role
in these negotiations but we believe that an agreement is in the
commercial and strategic interests of both Turkey and Azerbaijan and
have encouraged both countries to finalize the agreement as soon as
possible, so that companies can make appropriate investment decisions.
With respect to BTC, the situation today is more complex than it
was 10 years ago. The Europeans, for example, are much more involved in
Nabucco (and a Southern corridor) than they were in BTC. European
companies will be buying the gas, and as much European unity as
possible will be necessary for successful completion of the project.
The world and the region are very different places in other ways as
well. We will continue to work as hard as possible to guide Nabucco and
the Southern corridor to a positive conclusion and believe that our
efforts will be successful.
Question. Please specify funding and personnel requests for the
global critical energy infrastructure program and explain any
reductions in support for this program and priorities in FY 2011.
Answer. The Coordinator of Counterterrorism (S/CT) has the lead for
implementing the global critical energy infrastructure protection
(GCEIP) program within the Department of State. S/CT does not submit a
separate budget request for GCEIP but supports this program through
Anti-terrorism Assistance program funds. S/CT devoted approximately 1-
1.3 FTE to the implementation of GCEIP in FY 2010 and expects to
continue this effort at a similar level in FY 2011. Most of this
activity involves outreach to potential foreign partners. The GCEIP
program assumes that foreign partners will pay the costs for specific
assistance requested of the United States. This is already occurring
with respect to a sizeable and growing program with a major energy
producer.
Question. G20 leaders made a pledge to phase out ``inefficient
fossil fuel subsidies'' (CBJ p. 597). How is the efficiency, or lack
thereof, of energy subsidies being assessed? What is the plan of action
for implementation of this pledge outside of the United States?
Answer. In Pittsburgh, the Leaders of the G20 countries made a
critical commitment to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies over
the medium term while providing targeted support for the poorest. This
groundbreaking effort will encourage the conservation of energy,
improve our energy security, and provide a downpayment on our
commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Fossil fuel subsidies displace important public investments and
drain government finances, worsen balance of payments, lead to
underinvestment in infrastructure, and can contribute to energy
shortages. Eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and using some of those
freed resources for targeted social assistance could significantly
improve the quality of life of low-income households.
Cutting energy subsidies leads to reduced consumption, lower import
demand and increased availability of energy for export--all helping to
reduce the likelihood of a future supply crunch.
The OECD and IEA estimate that eliminating fossil fuel subsidies
worldwide would reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent or
more by 2050. Removing fossil fuel subsidies helps eliminate market
distortions, strengthening incentives for investments in energy
efficient technologies and nonfossil energy supply.
Following the Pittsburg summit, G20 Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors called on the IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank to produce
a joint report on energy subsidies. This analysis will inform G20
efforts to craft implementation strategies and timeframes, based on
national circumstances, for rationalizing and phasing out inefficient
fossil fuel subsidies, and for providing targeted assistance programs.
The State Department is making implementation of the G20 commitment
to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies a key element our
international energy policy. Pressing for expeditious implementation of
the commitment will be an important part of our bilateral engagement
with other G20 partners.
Question. New authorizing language and new expenditure of $5
million is being proposed for the International Renewable Energy
Agency. What office would be the U.S. representative to IRENA? What
role would the U.S. representative play in expenditure of proposed
funds through IRENA? What, if any coordination, will be
institutionalized between IRENA and the IEA and IAEA?
Answer. The State Department's Bureau of Oceans, Environment and
Science (OES) Assistant Secretary will serve as the U.S. focal point
for IRENA. In this capacity, OES works closely with other Bureaus
within the State Department, including The Bureau of Economic, Energy,
and Business Affairs (EEB), The Office of the Legal Adviser for Ocean
International Environmental & Scientific Affairs (L/OES), The Bureau of
International Organizations (IO) and the various regional bureaus.
Additionally, the State Department coordinates U.S. Government
involvement with IRENA through an interagency process that includes the
Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the Department of Commerce (DOC), the National Security Council (NSC),
the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM), the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID).
The United States currently participates in the Preparatory
Commission that is working to establish the policies, work program, and
organizational structure of IRENA prior to IRENA coming into force. If
Congress authorizes U.S. participation in IRENA before it enters into
force, then the United States is expected to be a member of the IRENA
Council which has the authority and responsibility to ``consider and
submit to the Assembly the draft work program and the draft budget of
the Agency.'' It is within that capacity that the United States would
exercise its responsibility and authority to help ensure that the
expenditure of funds conforms to the mission and objectives of the
organization.
The IRENA founding statue calls on IRENA to cooperate closely with
existing institutions to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. The
United States, along with other like-minded participating countries, is
seeking to ensure that IRENA's work plan and programmatic portfolio
complements and does not compete with or conflict with ongoing efforts.
In State Department discussions with the leadership of the IEA and
IRENA, both Secretariats have indicated strong interest and willingness
to coordinate and cooperate with each other. For example, IRENA has
included IEA representatives in a variety of the workshops that IRENA
has sponsored, and IRENA's 2010 work program includes stocktaking of
global renewable energy activities among multilateral fora, such as the
IEA. As nuclear energy is not within IRENA's mandate, there is not
expected to be any institutionalized relationship established between
IRENA and the IAEA.
Question. The CBJ (p.766) states: ``A primary focus of the
Department's diplomatic efforts in the area of energy security is
promoting the development and implementation of policies in foreign
governments designed to foster growth in the clean energy sector.''
Please clarify if ``clean energy'' includes nuclear power and advanced
coal technologies.
Answer. In its diplomatic efforts to promote energy security (using
State Department operational funds), the Department includes both
nuclear power and advanced coal technologies--defined as Carbon Capture
and Storage and Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC)
technologies--as technologies that have the potential to reduce global
and national greenhouse gas emissions. With regard to international
assistance funding, in accordance with congressional directives in the
FY 2010 appropriations bill, we will only use FY 2010 ``clean energy''
funds to promote the sustainable use of renewable energy technologies
and end-use energy efficiency technologies, carbon sequestration, and
carbon accounting. The primary objective of these programs will be to
reduce, mitigate, and/or sequester emissions of greenhouse gas
emissions. We would like to have a further dialogue with Congress on
this issue for FY 2011 and beyond.
Question. Please explain the proposed budget reduction for
``Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy'' within EEB.
Answer. In fact, it is not actually a decrease but rather shifting
of internal accounting within a centralized budget in EEB as we were
building the full capacity of the Office of the Special Envoy for
Eurasian Energy.
Question. What, if any, funds beyond assessed contributions are
likely for the International Energy Agency given its increased role
relative to the G20, UNFCCC negotiations, and enhanced engagement with
China and India?
Answer. The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an important
vehicle to help advance our collective energy security goals and to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. I believe the IEA is the premier
source for developing best practices and policies for new energy
technologies and energy efficiency--which are integral to the
transformation to a low carbon economy. The agency's efforts to improve
the transparency of energy data and its wide-ranging analysis are
laudable and enhance its global credibility.
Given this, I have encouraged senior State officials to commit
voluntary State funding to support the IEA's work on new energy
technologies, more efficient energy markets and training, outreach to
important new consumers such as India and China, and on developing low
carbon technology platforms. Funding will also support G20 developing
country members in meeting commitments to eliminate inefficient fossil
fuel subsidies, and help provide training for developing country
government officials in statistical analysis and transparent reporting
of data concerning energy markets, fuel reserves, and energy
consumption.
Question. What funds and personnel are being proposed for the
Office of the International Energy Coordinator?
Answer. David Goldwyn was sworn in as Coordinator for International
Energy Affairs on August 17, 2009. The office of the Coordinator
currently has four full time personnel, with plans to increase staffing
by an additional three full time positions, for a total of seven
(including the Coordinator). Broken down, this includes one SES, two
Foreign Service positions, two civil service positions, a schedule C
and a contractor. In addition, the Department is utilizing matrix
management so that all personnel focusing on energy matters within the
Department of State can be called upon by the Coordinator as
appropriate. We are currently finalizing the financial plan for FY 2010
and the FY 2011 budget has been submitted. We expect to have sufficient
resources to fund the operations of the Office of the International
Energy Coordinator to ensure it can carry out its mandate.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Questions Submitted
by Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. Secretary Clinton, as you know, defeating al-Qaeda and
dealing with the broader problem of violent extremism requires that we
use all of the tools at our disposal, including important nonmilitary
tools provided by the international affairs budget. In the FY11
function 150 budget request, some of these tools come under explicitly
terrorism oriented budget lines, like the new countering violent
extremism program. However, there are a number of other budget lines
supporting activities--such as economic development, good governance,
respect for human rights and the rule of law, and conflict resolution--
that can help to counter al-Qaeda's ability to recruit and operate. How
do you plan to reach out across the different relevant programs to
ensure we maximize and coordinate some of the potential benefits of
these various initiatives with our broader counterterrorism efforts?
Can you also tell us more about the countering violent extremism
program--such as how a country would be determined a priority for the
funding and how the program will relate to the wider assistance effort
we are undertaking in a specific country?
Answer. The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program uses all of
the relevant diplomacy, development, and defense tools at our disposal
in order to maximize and coordinate programs and potential benefits
with broader counterterrorism efforts. The Department of State
coordinates accounts and agencies' planning, budgeting, and
implementation efforts to ensure that U.S. Government responses meet
the complex challenges posed by CVE. The Department of State makes
decisions about resource allocation in a coordinated, coherent way so
as to maximize the leverage and effectiveness of U.S. Government
assistance on this multifaceted problem. In budget formulation, for
example, we examine assistance requests through both a country program
lens as well as from a global, sectoral perspective to ensure that
programs in each country and region complement each other, avoid
duplication of effort, and support U.S. strategic objectives. This
applies to counterterrorism programming just as in other areas of
assistance.
Various U.S. Government agencies have done an impressive job in
recent years to further the U.S. Government's understanding of the
radicalization process and the underlying factors that foster
extremism. This knowledge is based on significant research and analyses
conducted by the intelligence community as well as the many studies
conducted by the private sector and academics. The Department of State
then applies this knowledge in developing programs that will make a
genuine difference in communities vulnerable to radicalization and
recruitment toward violence.
Before beginning new programs in any country, the Department of
State assesses that country's radicalization problem. These assessments
are based on polling and surveys and other means of assessing
individual and community attitudes. The results are examined in light
of the contextual information described above, to guide programming and
serve as a baseline to measure program effectiveness.
Additionally, the Department of State considers programs that are
already in place to address CVE issues, threat assessments from the
intelligence community, and a country's capacity and willingness to
work with us.
The first task is to identify the at-risk populations. To
successfully develop and implement CVE programs, we seek to understand
the specific dynamics of the cohorts we are focusing on, not just by
country, but sometimes even down to the community or neighborhood
level. Every cohort and community possesses unique demographics,
grievances, and, in many cases, ties to overseas family members--
factors that influence the cohort's potential vulnerability to
extremist pressures.
The second task is to develop programs that fit the characteristics
of the intended audience. We develop programs in concert with the
interagency community in Washington, our missions in the field, partner
nation governments, local community leaders, and civil society
organizations, who are best positioned to identify points for
intervention. CVE is also a regular subject of discussion at our
Regional Strategic Initiative meetings. Our success depends, in part,
on having local programs delivered by credible people who can help
vulnerable individuals become resistant to extremist messages. We know
that programs that are not tailored to the specific cohort or community
are likely to have limited appeal, and, ultimately, to be ineffective.
CVE is approached from many perspectives and organizations within
the Department of State, including the Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Office of the Special Representative
to Muslim Communities, and regional bureaus. We also coordinate with
several Bureaus in the U.S. Agency for International Development and
other agencies to make sure that efforts to engage civil society and
counter radicalizing narratives through existing programs are focused
in the right areas.
We have an excellent relationship with the Department of Defense
(DOD), which informs our CVE programming. Together the State and
Defense Departments can complement each other's strengths and efforts
in the field, and determine which CVE efforts are best done by the
military and which are best handled by civilians. A number of offices
that fund CVE projects and research in the DOD and its combatant
commands have expressed a desire to collaborate with us on new
programs.
We are also working with foreign CVE partners. For example, in
November 2009 the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism hosted
a Multilateral ``Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)'' Workshop with
Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the
United Kingdom as a first step in developing a more cooperative
multilateral approach to CVE. Participants discussed approaches, target
audiences, specific interventions designed to counter terrorists'
recruiting efforts, and information-sharing. Programs that gave
participants insight into the challenges of police work with diaspora
communities in the United Kingdom and Australia generated a lot of
interest as possible templates. A follow-on workshop is planned for
mid-May with the same international partners plus Denmark and France.
Question. At the Senate Intelligence Committee's annual threat
assessment hearing, the Director of National Intelligence testified
that, ``looking ahead over the next 5 years, a number of countries in
Africa and Asia are at significant risk for a new outbreak of mass
killing . . . [and] among these countries, a new mass killing or
genocide is most likely to occur in Southern Sudan.'' Madam Secretary,
I know you share my concern about the rising violence in southern Sudan
and that you are well aware of the potential for it to worsen in the
runup to and then after the South's vote on self-determination next
January. I know State is working hard to prevent the resumption of
conflict between the parties of the CPA, but could you tell me,
Secretary Clinton, what steps are being taken to prevent violence
between communities within Southern Sudan and whether you believe our
efforts are commensurate with the risk of mass killings and genocide as
stated by the DNI?
Answer. Since the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) began in 2005, there has been progress in Southern
Sudan in working to build a stable political environment devoid of the
overt threat of violence. The United States Government (USG) has worked
throughout the implementation process with the Government of Southern
Sudan (GOSS) to build effective political capacity and responsible
governance, foster the conditions and capacities for longer term
development, and mitigate the risk of renewed conflict. However, we are
aware of the increasing intercommunal violence in the South, and we
share the DNI's concern regarding the escalation of violence between
communities within Southern Sudan and the potentially destabilizing
effect it could have on the region. This violence is especially
troubling as the national elections and referendum on southern self-
determination draw closer.
Since 2005, the USG has focused its assistance programs to support
the implementation of the CPA, with a specific conflict-mitigating lens
to address potential threats to the agreement, including providing
peace dividends that help maintain the CPA's viability and addressing
the root factors that fuel conflict. Currently, the USG has a program
that is focusing on community security through a fast-starting, quick-
implementation, flexible small-grants mechanism to support southern
Sudanese authorities, institutions, and organizations. We are utilizing
southern Sudanese NGOs and companies in order to invoke local ownership
of the conflict mitigation efforts. Activities are concentrated in two
clusters of counties in Southern Sudan as well as in Abyei, Southern
Kordofan and Blue Nile. This community security program started in
Southern Sudan in October and is already showing early signs of success
in terms of increasing the capacity of local authorities to manage
conflict.
In addition to this program, the USG is in the process of standing
up new conflict mitigation programs in Sudan in response to the spike
in violence seen in Southern Sudan in 2009. The aim of these programs
will be to address the factors that contribute to conflict in order to
prevent it while simultaneously building government and local capacity
to prepare for and respond to conflicts when they do arise. In an
effort to prevent and alleviate conflict effectively and appropriately,
conflict mitigation programs will focus on addressing fundamental
weaknesses in existing conflict mitigation and response efforts, as
well as supporting state and local institutions to prevent breakdown of
law and order in Southern Sudan.
Specifically, the USG will assist institutions at the state and
local levels to implement a conflict management communication and
information system that enables southern Sudanese authorities in high-
risk areas to network with communities and civil society groups to
identify and respond to destabilizing conflicts and violence. We will
also coordinate with local and international partners to help state
governments to develop stabilization strategies and to build up early
warning and response capacities. Additionally, we will facilitate the
implementation of resolutions from local reconciliation agreements
among parties to conflicts in high risk areas. Finally, we will assist
U.N. agencies' civil affairs partner efforts to inform and educate the
local population on the various stabilization initiatives and planning
processes.
The USG is now playing a leading role in preventing violence in
Southern Sudan and the Three Areas. Sudan is a priority for the
administration, and we continue to work tirelessly at all levels of the
government to ensure peace and security for all people in Sudan.
Question. Critical to addressing this violence sustainably is
helping the Government of South Sudan transform its army and police
into disciplined and accountable security forces that prioritize
civilian protection. Could you tell me what steps we're taking to help
build this capacity, where dedicated funds will come from in the FY11
budget, and how this effort will be coordinated with other agencies
undertaking such work and among our other Sudan priorities, of which I
know there are many?
Answer. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) in 2005, the United States Government (USG) has supported the
transformation of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and
Southern Sudan police forces into more disciplined and accountable
security and service forces that can better respond to security
threats.
The USG is assisting with the transformation of the SPLA through
unit-level training of rank-and-file soldiers, as well as a series of
train-the-trainer courses for officer staff skills, military police,
and noncommissioned officers. The USG is also facilitating the
development of centralized management of army resources, including the
establishment of procurement regulations and plans for improved
accountability. Finally, the USG is also providing communications
systems and training to support command and control of the SPLA between
the General HQ outside of Juba and the SPLA's divisions throughout the
south.
Assistance from the USG to reform the GOSS police force, the
Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS), includes funding police,
judicial, and corrections advisors to the United Nations Mission in
Sudan (UNMIS) as they help develop local police and SSPS through
training, advising, and mentoring. This training varies widely from
basic policing to elections security and crowd control. UNMIS is also
helping the SSPS establish ``cattle units'' to address cattle raids
which are one of the instigators of tribal violence in the south. USG
assistance also funds equipment for SSPS specialized units, which are
intended to respond quickly to security threats during the April 2010
elections and the referendum in 2011.
From FY 2005-09, the USG provided $159 million of PKO funding and
$27.326 million of INCLE funding to support security sector reform of
the SPLA and SSPS, respectively. For FY 2010, the USG intends to
provide $44 million of PKO funding and $11.25 million of INCLE funding
to continue these efforts. For FY 2011, the administration requested
$42 million of PKO funding and $24.35 million of INCLE funding.
Coordination of security sector reform efforts is accomplished
through weekly interagency working group meetings, weekly conference
calls with stakeholders on the ground, Interagency Policy Coordination
meetings, and ad hoc meetings and conference calls as needed. In
addition, USG efforts are coordinated with other donors and
international institutions as appropriate. Because of the destabilizing
effects of renewed violence on CPA implementation, governance, civil
society, and regional development, the USG has made security sector
reform in Southern Sudan one of our highest priorities.
Question. A large portion of our resources in the function 150 FY11
budget request-- about 7 percent-- is directed to Afghanistan. I am
pleased that the administration is attempting to balance our massive
military presence in Afghanistan with a new civilian strategy, but I
remain concerned that no matter how good a civilian strategy we have,
with a flawed military strategy, we may be undermining our efforts. Are
you concerned about the impact of our funding for civilian programs
when you see that even these huge portions of our State and
International Programs budgets for Afghanistan are dwarfed by DOD
spending?
Answer. Our plans rely on seamless civilian-military integration.
Establishing security requires military engagement, which is costly in
budgetary and human terms, but essential for the civilian elements of
our strategy to take effect. Similarly, long-term success and drawdown
of our troops requires success of our civilian efforts. Military and
civilian leaders spent last year getting the inputs right in
Afghanistan, putting into place the structures, the concepts, and
organizations necessary for a comprehensive civil-military campaign.
President Obama announced a more focused policy in December at West
Point; the necessary resourcing to support our objectives, however, had
begun months earlier, with additional troops and civilians already in
place and many more on the way.
The operation in Marjah is the initial step of what will be a 12-
to 18-month civ-mil campaign. The Afghan Government, with the active
support of the United States and United Kingdom Embassies, is already
launching the delivery of essential public services. The rapid delivery
of governance and development to a ``cleared'' area is essential to
executing our new population-centric strategy of forcing the Taliban to
work from the ``outside in,'' instead of from the ``inside out.'' Key
development activities will include the rapid expansion of USAID's
agricultural stabilization and cash-for-work program (2,500 residents
will be employed immediately), technical and logistical support for the
lead Afghan official in Marjah, resources to recruit and train
qualified local Afghans to fill civil servant positions, and the
construction of a highway connecting the area to the provincial
capital.
Civilian engagement is vital to the initial security operations and
on-going stability, and it should be resourced sufficiently to play its
part. The recent budget request reflects our expanded effort and the
need for additional resources to fund our civilian activities.
Question. Secretary Clinton, given the recent spotlight on Yemen, I
was not surprised to see an increase of $22.5 million in FMF funding
for Yemen--one of the largest country-specific increases in the
function 150 budget request. Last month, State Department officials
testified before this committee that the Houthi rebellion in the North
and a secessionist movement in the South contribute to Yemen's
instability and have distracted the Government of Yemen from the fight
against al-Qaeda. I was pleased to see a cease-fire agreement with the
al-Houthi reached last week, but we've seen cease-fires before, only to
have a return to arms. In light of all of this, what are we doing, in
addition to the legally required Leahy vetting, to ensure
accountability and transparency in the use of our resources, so that
FMF funding for Yemen isn't utilized for these conflicts, now or in the
future, undermining our counterterrorism efforts in the country?
Answer. The United States uses Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to
train and assist Yemen's Central Security Forces (CSF) and other Yemeni
Government organizations engaged in counterterrorism operations. Those
organizations include the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of
Interior security forces, the Yemeni Coast Guard, Air Force, and
Special Forces, and the Central Security Force's Counterterrorism Unit
(CTU). They all have discrete responsibilities focused on
counterterrorism and border control. All equipment transferred to
Yemeni forces is covered by end-use agreements, which ensure
transparency by requiring Yemen to grant the U.S. Government full
access to monitor how the equipment is being used.
The United States welcomes the cease-fire in Government of Yemen--
Houthi conflict. We understand a mediation commission representing all
parties is monitoring compliance with the terms of the cease-fire. We
hope efforts will begin the urgent process of reconciliation and
reconstruction to bring the conflict to a permanent end.
Question. Diplomatic reporting plays a critical and
underappreciated role in keeping our government informed about what is
going on around the world. In many situations, our Embassy officials--
through completely open channels--may be better suited to obtaining
information than the intelligence community. Yet there is no
interagency strategy that would ensure that the State Department's role
in meeting our government's overall information needs is reflected in
its budget. Do you agree that diplomats are often the eyes and ears of
our government, and do you also agree that our capabilities in this
area would be strengthened if there were an interagency strategy that
identified where the need is greatest and ensured that the appropriate
resources were provided?
Answer. I agree that our diplomatic reporting provides crucial and
unique insights into what is going on around the world. For example,
we're gratified that the intelligence community regularly includes
diplomatic reporting as one of its most credible, reliable, and
frequent sources. The State Department hopes to appreciably increase
our hiring to ensure that our staff overseas can not only continue to
provide its valuable insights, but also can increase it significantly.
State continually solicits input from foreign affairs agencies to
highlight areas in which we're meeting their information needs,
identify areas where more focus would be welcome, help us target our
efforts, and support our requests for additional resources. While not
focused exclusively on reporting, we employ a highly developed, formal
system that annually develops strategic plans at the mission, Bureau,
and Department level. We use that system to plan strategically, manage
our performance, and request resources. Always produced with
interagency input, those plans articulate multiyear, forward looking
strategic plans and foreign policy priorities, and identify our highest
priority funding and personnel needs. Additionally, State this year
launched a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) to
ensure that State has a short-, medium-, and long-term blueprint to
guide our diplomatic and development efforts.
We are confident that our extensive informal and formal planning
and feedback tools ensure that we can identify where the need for
diplomatic reporting, personnel, and funding is greatest.
Question. As you know, the last few months have seen political
paralysis in Nigeria resulting from President Yar'Adua's extended
absence. A few weeks ago the Nigerian National Assembly made the Vice
President Acting President, an important first step in ending this
paralysis, but regional and religious tensions persist and the
potential for instability remains high. I held a subcommittee hearing
on this issue just yesterday as the Nigeria situation would seem to be
a pretty clear-cut case requiring sustained diplomatic engagement at
very senior levels. And I certainly commend you and your colleagues at
State as I recognize the significant outreach underway to address
Nigeria's political crisis and ensure it doesn't worsen or turn into a
full-blown conflict. Accordingly, as you seek to enhance our diplomatic
capacity, how does the FY11 budget request anticipate the short-term
needs of crisis and conflict prevention around the world as well as the
longer term work of protecting democratic gains and mitigating
tensions, before we've reached a crisis point?
Answer. We are closely following developments in Nigeria. We are
pleased that the Nigerian National Assembly took steps to address the
political vacuum, granting the Vice President executive powers as
Acting President. We continue to engage with our Nigerian counterparts
at senior levels to ensure that democratic principles and rule of law
are respected. In the FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification (p.p.
134-139), we have requested almost $648 million for Nigeria. Though the
majority of funding--nearly $568 million--is for health and HIV-AIDS
programs, the request includes $4 million for conflict mitigation and
reconciliation, almost $5 million for other security assistance, $15
million for education programs, $25 million for democracy and
governance programs, and $31 million for economic growth programs.
Conflict prevention is an important area of attention in foreign
policy diplomacy and foreign assistance globally. Based on analysis, we
know that some conflicts might be avoided through carefully structured
and targeted programs, while others are perhaps unavoidable. Our FY
2011 budget requests $824 million for conflict mitigation and
reconciliation activities in 22 countries with ongoing problems,
including over $600 million for Afghanistan. Our request for USAID's
Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)
includes $38 million to help missions assess the risk of future
conflict and how to address conflict prevention or mitigation. In
addition, since our budget requests are made too far in advance to know
for certain where crises will emerge, we have requested FY 2011
resources under the Complex Crises Fund ($100 million) and the
Transition Initiatives account ($48 million) to address emergent
situations. Of course, in such situations, existing funds are also
examined to see if reprogramming is a possibility to address new, high
priority needs.
In addition to conflict prevention and mitigation, the State
Department and USAID implement a broad range of foreign assistance
programs that build the foundations for stable, prosperous, and well-
governed states that meet the needs of their populations by advancing
democracy and good governance, broad-based economic growth, and
investing in people. In FY 2011, the President requested nearly $20
billion for these programs throughout the world.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Questions Submitted
by Senator Jim Webb
Question. Despite the administration's stated intent to reengage
Asia, a comparative examination of regional spending does not reflect
this commitment. Of the six regional Bureaus in the State Department,
the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs has the smallest FY11
budget request, totaling $169 million. Additionally, Foreign Military
Financing for East Asia is 1.3 percent of the overall FMF request ($70
million out of $5.4 billion). East Asia also has the lowest
International Military Education and Training (IMET) allocation with
only $9.3 million, compared to Europe with $30.5 million, Africa with
$16 million and the Near East with $18.6 million. In contrast, funding
for Frontline States (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq) accounts for 18
percent of the overall budget and 60 percent ($6.1 billion) of the
budget's growth.
How much funding did the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs (EAP) initially request during the State Department's
internal budget deliberations?
Answer. The FY 2011 budget request balances the many pressing needs
for increased staffing and programs at our overseas posts. The
strategic importance of the East Asia and Pacific region to U.S.
national security, economic prosperity, support of human rights, and
environmental initiatives was carefully considered as part of this
process, and the FY 2011 request reflects the Secretary's and the
President's priorities for this region within the global context. The
ongoing Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review is continuing to
look at how we can better implement foreign policy initiatives
worldwide and may identify further enhancements for our activities in
this vital region.
Given the administration's goal of reengaging Asia, please
provide a detailed rationale for providing EAP with the lowest
level of funding among regional bureaus.
Answer. The United States has made a substantial commitment and
investment in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, and we must ensure that
commitment is fully supported. Any tradeoffs are applied worldwide, not
only to the East Asia and Pacific region.
To what extent does the comparatively low level of funding
for State Department activities and foreign assistance in East
Asia reflect a tradeoff in favor of activities in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iraq?
Answer. The United States has made a substantial commitment and
investment in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, and we must ensure that
commitment is fully supported. Any tradeoffs are applied worldwide, not
only to the East Asia and Pacific region.
Question. Of the 565 new Foreign Service and Civil Service
positions requested in the budget, how many of these positions will be
dedicated to EAP?
Answer. Of the 565 new Foreign Service and Civil Service positions
for which funding was requested in the Department's FY 2011 budget, 292
are for the regional bureaus. Of the 292 regional positions requested,
130 are for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 27 are intended for EAP.
Question. Why does East Asia have the lowest IMET allocation? Does
this low funding prevent the United States from expanding military-to-
military relations in the region? How does it impact regional military
capacity?
Answer. IMET is allocated by country and is based on the training
requirements and absorptive capacity of each recipient country. Since
training requires a certain level of English proficiency, we are
limited in the amount and types of courses we can offer to several
countries in this region. For those countries, a major component of our
IMET program is English language training, which increases the pool of
students eligible for a broader range of IMET-funded opportunities.
The amount of IMET funding allocated for the East Asia and Pacific
region for FY 2008 through FY 2010 increased by 44 percent. The request
for FY 2011, while a more modest percentage increase than in previous
years, is still an increase in absolute terms over FY 2010 levels.
IMET funding is only one of many security cooperation programs and
activities that we use to enhance our military-to-military relations in
the region. Other security assistance funding, such as Foreign Military
Financing and Peacekeeping Operations/Global Peace Operations
Initiative, as well as a wide range of DOD programs such as ship
visits, exercises, and visits/meetings between senior DOD officials and
military leaders of those countries strengthen our relationships and
improve regional military capacity.
Question. Does the Department of State have a plan to address the
need for a new Embassy in Hanoi? How high does the Department rank this
project in terms of our various embassy construction priorities around
the world?
Answer. Hanoi is on the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
(OBO) Top 80 list for new construction.
Congress directed the Department to follow the Secure Embassy
Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA) for replacement
of facilities at vulnerable posts. The process for identifying and
prioritizing projects begins with review of the Vulnerability List
mandated by SECCA. This list, published each year by the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security (DS), ranks facilities according to their
vulnerability across a wide variety of security threats.
The Vulnerability List is then used to establish the Top 80 list of
posts where new embassies (NEC), new consulates (NCC), new office
buildings (NOB), and new annex buildings (NOX) are needed to reduce
security vulnerability. The Department last updated the Top 80 list in
2008. Embassy Hanoi is ranked No. 58 on the Top 80 list. The list will
again be updated in summer 2010, after DS releases a revised
Vulnerability List.
From FY 2010 through FY 2019, the Department plans to construct, on
average, six capital projects (NECs, NCCs, etc.) each year.
Accordingly, the Department expects to award contracts for about 60
capital projects over the next 10 years. Consistent with Embassy
Hanoi's current ranking at No. 58 on the Top 80 list, the Department is
on track to award an NEC contract there in FY 2020.
Regardless of post's ranking on the Top 80 list, the construction
of an NEC in Hanoi is predicated on acquiring a site. While the
Department has identified an appropriate site, it has not been able to
reach an agreement with the Government of Vietnam (GOV) on reciprocal
property rights. The GOV wants the right to acquire property in the
United States; however, the GOV is not willing to extend equivalent
property rights to the United States. The Department continues to raise
this reciprocity issue with the GOV, with Under Secretary for
Management Patrick Kennedy due to visit Hanoi in April 2010 to address
the issue with the GOV.
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