[Senate Hearing 111-765]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-765
AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE: EMPOWERING HAITI TO REBUILD BETTER
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 19, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-054 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
opening statement.............................................. 1
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, statement......... 5
Kaufman, Hon. Edward E., U.S. Senator from Delaware, statement... 6
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, statement.. 49
Merten, Hon. Kenneth H., U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Department of
State, Port-au-Prince, Haiti................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Response to question submitted for the record by Senator
Russell D. Feingold........................................ 62
Milligan, T. Christopher, Coordinator for Disaster Response in
Haiti, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington,
DC............................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Richard G. Lugar........................................... 63
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Russell D. Feingold........................................ 65
Natsios, Hon. Andrew S., distinguished professor, School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC......... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Penn, Sean, founder, J/P Haitian Relief Organization, San
Francisco, CA.................................................. 38
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Schneider, Mark, senior vice president, International Crisis
Group, Washington, DC.......................................... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Additional Submitted for the Record
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut,
prepared statement............................................. 61
(iii)
AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE: EMPOWERING HAITI TO REBUILD BETTER
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey,
Jr., presiding.
Present: Senators Casey, Kerry, Shaheen, Kaufman,
Gillibrand, and Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. The hearing will come to order.
I want to thank everyone for being here this morning. This
is a critically important issue that we need to spend a good
deal of time on this morning, and I'm grateful you're all here
to do this.
The committee meets to discuss the effectiveness of the
international response efforts 4 months after an earthquake
devastated Haiti, and examine what remains to be done in
cooperation with the Haitian Government and the international
community. This discussion is particularly important as we
transition from recovery efforts to rebuilding.
I'd like to thank all of our witnesses for their personal
commitment to helping Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake.
On Monday, we know that Secretary Clinton honored 11 United
States officials who perished in Haiti's earthquake. I also
want to recognize their public service in the demonstration of
America's goodwill abroad.
With us today to discuss United States Government efforts
in Haiti are Christopher Milligan and Kenneth Merten. Mr.
Milligan is coordinating the largest joint relief effort that
the United States has undertaken to date. His success suggests
that investments in disaster situation relief training and
preparation at USAID have paid off. Over the last 20 years,
Ambassador Merten has worked on development issues in Haiti,
and has played a critical role in helping to save lives.
I also look forward to hearing the testimonies of our
nongovernment witnesses, each of whom has substantial
experience working on international development issues. Andrew
Natsios served as USAID Administrator during the Bush
administration. Sean Penn cofounded the Jenkins-Penn Haiti
Relief Group. And Mark Schneider is a former United States
Agency for International Development official who coordinated
the U.S. response to Hurricane Mitch in 1998. He is now a
senior vice president of the International Crisis Group.
Much progress has been made during this post-disaster
period in Haiti, which I'll review in a few moments, but the
scale of this tragedy cannot be underestimated, and we must
redouble our efforts to better coordinate relief and rebuilding
work among the international community and with the Haitian
Government. The United States has a special responsibility to
play a leading role in rallying the international community to
make good on its commitments.
I fear--and I know this is a fear that's widely shared--
that as the number of days since the earthquake grow, the
resolve and focus of the international community diminishes. I
hope--I hope that the witnesses today can reassure me that that
is not the case. We all have an obligation to make sure that
that is not the case.
I know that people on the ground are committed,
experienced, and dedicated to the task at hand, but it is our
responsibility here in Congress to ask how this critically
important endeavor can be moved faster, more efficiently and
with a greater sense of urgency, which sometimes isn't the case
in Washington, DC. But, we've got to have a greater sense of
urgency to get the job done and to make sure that Haiti does,
indeed, rebuilt better, not just to some other predisaster
level, but rebuild, in fact, in a better way for the future of
the Haitian people.
In the aftermath of the disaster, the United States
deployed 22,000 personnel to provide humanitarian aid to the
people of Haiti in support of the Haitian Government and the
U.N. stabilization mission in Haiti, known as MINUSTAH. The
USAID was first on the ground and led a 544-person disaster
assistance response team to assess immediate needs and to
provide urgent supplies of food, water, medical care, and other
aid to 1.5 million survivors left homeless by the quake. The
agency also established an interagency task force to better
coordinate relief efforts, partnering with large and small
organizations in Haiti to bring shelter, health care, and
employment opportunities to Haitians. Twenty-thousand members
of the United States military distributed food, water, and
medical supplies. Faced with large numbers of displaced
children, the Department of State stepped up efforts to help
prevent child trafficking.
More than 100 U.N. staff, including senior mission
leadership, were among the more than hundreds of thousands of
dead in the massive earthquake, representing the biggest single
loss of life in the history of U.N. peacekeeping. Despite these
losses and displacement from mission headquarters MINUSTAH has
continued its mission of maintaining a secure and stable
environment throughout Haiti. It continues to support many
nongovernmental organizations that operated in Haiti prior to
the disaster through security for international--or, for
internally, I should say, displaced persons, road clearance,
rubble removal, and other vital assistance.
Despite the immediate response from the international
community and private citizens around the world, more than a
million displaced Haitians are living in squatter communities
and remain at risk as hurricane season approaches. That is an
understatement, to say that they're at risk. It's difficult to
overstate the destruction wrought by this earthquake and the
challenges that lie ahead.
Many people who have traveled to Haiti after the June 12th
earthquake have said, ``No one can come to Haiti and leave
unchanged.'' The official death toll stands at 230,000 people,
including 104 Americans and hundreds of international aid
workers. Many experts believe that the death toll will rise to
a half a million people.
Even before the earthquake, Haiti had the highest maternal
mortality rate in the Western Hemisphere, and approximately
120,000 people were living with HIV/AIDS. Public hospitals,
before the tragedy, lacked staff, drugs, and equipment, and
numerous factors impeded access to health care services. The
earthquake has worsened the situation substantially. Haiti's
Ministry of Health estimated that over 60 percent of the
medical structures in the areas most affected by the earthquake
were damaged or destroyed and forced large numbers of the
population into makeshifts camps, where hygiene and medical
care are substandard, at best.
Post-earthquake food and water insecurity is another
substantial challenge. There's a 50-percent increase in the
price of food staples over the past year in Haiti and across
the country. The media are filled with stories and images of
unrest due to soaring food prices and pervasive hunger. Most
Haitians earn less than a dollar a day and spend more than half
their income--spend more than half their income on food.
There are--these are among the many challenges we confront.
On March 31, pledges of more than $15 billion were made at the
International Donors Conference in New York, which was attended
by more than 100 countries and international organizations.
Haitian authorities described the outpouring as, ``testimony
that Haiti is not alone.''
Now that the Donors Conference is over and officials have
returned to Port-au-Prince, the real work begins. We must match
dollars to the pledges and ensure that the international
efforts result in a Haitian state and society ``built back
better,'' to use the words of former President Clinton, who has
done great work over many years in support of Haitian
development.
Devising programs that achieve concrete, sustainable
results on a nationwide scale will not be easy. As Secretary of
State Clinton has said, in her opening remarks at the
conference, ``This is not only a conference about what we
financially pledge to Haiti, we have to pledge to do better
ourselves.'' And, of course, she's referring to post-disaster
rebuilding.
Among the long-term goals envisioned in the Action Plan for
Reconstruction and National Development in Haiti, which was
unveiled by President Preval at the Donors Conference, is a
decentralized country based on smaller nodes of population in
areas less prone to natural disaster than Port-au-Prince. The
plan also targets agricultural self-sufficiency and stricter
building codes. Also important is the development of an
education system that does not have more than one-quarter--one-
quarter--of Haitian children outside its doors, which was the
case before the earthquake.
Reconstruction efforts must include revamping of the child
welfare system and adoption policies. With black markets
difficult to quantify, there is no precise count of the number
of orphanages in Haiti, the numbers of children living in them,
or the numbers of Haitian children who are victims of
trafficking, although UNICEF does estimate the number in the
tens of thousands per year. There's a growing concern that
Haiti's already strained child welfare system is overwhelmed
and that inadequate orphanages are taking in more children than
they can handle.
International aid will be funneled through a new Interim
Haiti Recovery Commission, headed jointly by the U.N. special
envoy to Haiti, former President Clinton, and Haitian Prime
Minister Bellerive. One of the stated priorities of the Haitian
Interim Commission will be to show that commitments made--will
be to show the commitments made, I should say, and money
disbursed. At the same time, the Commission faces a dual
challenge of ensuring accountability for the billions of
dollars, while resisting the deceleration or bottlenecking of
funds. We'll be asking about that today.
The Commission will also have a critical role in improving
donor coordination. International nongovernmental organizations
and donors have saturated Port-au-Prince and overwhelmed
Haitian institutions. Experts remind us--and I know we have a
number here today--that short-term and long-term objectives are
not a zero-sum game. Approaches to short-term needs, like
shelter and job creation, must complement a wider state-
building strategy. According to former President Clinton,
``Until Haitians can live, day to day, and month to month, in
healthy conditions and out of danger, it will be useless to
expect the country to commit wholeheartedly to a long-term
national reconstruction plan. We still have to move 20- to
40,000 people from flood-prone camps before the rains hit, in
July, so that they are not at risk of drowning.'' So said
President Clinton, and we should listen to his words, and act
on them.
The U.S. Congress has taken a number of steps to help,
here. Senator Dodd introduced a bill, which was signed into law
April 26, calling for cancellation of Haiti's $1 billion
outstanding debt. The economic lift program, the so-called HELP
Act backed by lawmakers on both sides of the aisle, was passed
early this month. The law expands duty-free access to United
States markets for Haitian textile and apparel exports, and
extends existing trade preferences for Haiti through the year
2020.
Last week, the Senate Appropriations Committee committed
$2.8 billion to support relief efforts in Haiti. Currently,
this committee is considering legislation, the Haiti
Empowerment Assistance and Renewal Act, by Senators Kerry, our
chairman, and Senator Corker, who's with us today--and we're
honored by his presence, and you'll hear from him in a moment;
I'm almost done--to authorize $3\1/2\ billion of assistance
over 5 years for reconstruction and rebuilding of Haiti.
So, as we move, today, to discuss Haiti's future, we have
an obligation to do our part, that the international efforts
are effective, that it's not just about the dollars we put in,
but whether the lives of the Haitian people are changed--
changed--as a result of this work.
Haiti has its own obligations. One is to be inclusive of
all of its citizens--men, women, and children. There are a lot
of wealthy, privileged people in Haiti, and also many, many
poor Haitians, as well. All of them are Haitians. All of them
are part of the strategy, going forward.
This process won't work without Haitian Government--
governance, I should say, and leadership, which has an
obligation to be transparent. International donors and the
Haitian Government understand that a peaceful transition, next
February, to a duly elected President is vital to the country's
economic development and stability.
Parliamentary elections also need to be held. Last
February's elections were canceled because of the earthquake,
leading to the expiration last week of the Haitian Parliament's
mandate. President Preval is now the sole constitutional
authority; thus, we urge Haitian's leaders to unite in the
common interests of organizing free and fair elections in the
shortest timeframe possible. Pulling off an election is
daunting in a country where voter lists have largely been
destroyed and where 40 percent of the citizens do not have
identity documents. Despite these challenges, elections are
central to Haiti's vision for a renewed state.
President Obama has said, ``America's commitment to Haiti's
recovery and reconstruction must endure, and will endure.'' He
also said, ``This pledge is one that I make at the beginning of
the crisis, that I intend for America to keep our pledge:
American will be your partner in the recovery and
reconstruction efforts.''
In order to remain true to that pledge, I believe there are
several concrete steps that we must focus on in the days and
months ahead, and I'll be, of course, asking our witnesses
about this.
No. 1, hurricane season is coming. We can and must do
everything in our power to ensure that Haiti is prepared so
that reconstruction efforts are not set back.
No. 2, we must rally--and that's an understatement--the
international community to ensure that pledges are fulfilled
and money is spent responsibly and strategically.
No. 3, we must push for better coordination on the ground
among the various actors who are there.
No. 4, and final, we must encourage the Haitian Government
to play a responsible role during this period. The Haitian
people should have a role in determining local needs and
reconstruction priorities. Voices from outside the government
should be heard, and the government should clearly communicate
in development activities across the whole of Haiti.
We're joined today by an esteemed panel of experts who will
discuss the many challenges confronting the international
donors and the Haitian Government. Our first witness is
Christopher Milligan, USAID's coordinator for disaster response
in Haiti. Our second witness is the Honorable Kenneth Merten,
U.S. Ambassador to Haiti since August 2009. And I'll be
introducing our second panel very soon.
But, I'd like to turn to our ranking member, Senator
Corker, for his remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank all of you for coming.
And in a desire to hear from our witnesses, I'm going to be
very, very brief. But, as has been stated, one of the biggest
natural disasters ever, on January 12, 230,000 people losing
their lives, 300,000 injured, 3 million people affected.
It's amazing how many people in this country have a direct
relationship with Haiti. I know we have people who are giving
of their personal resources to help. I probably would not be
here in the Senate today without that same type experience in
my twenties. And I know people across our country want to make
sure that we deal with this appropriately.
I think there are still folks trying to help there. I know
of a lady, named Bertha Dudone, who's a Haitian citizen, who
was approved for travel outside of the country to Tennessee, to
Vanderbilt Hospital, where surgeons can deal with a life-
threatening issue, and yet we cannot, still, get her out of the
country. And so, it's those kind of things, I know, that are
exasperating many of the efforts that are taking place.
On the other hand, USAID, the United Nations, our State
Department, I think have done an outstanding job in trying to
deal with this. And I know all of us just want to see this move
along as quickly as possible.
So, I thank all of you for coming. I think that Haiti, for
years--you know, we've tried to figure out a way to help Haiti
get it right. And, you know, we've been through all kinds of
episodes. This is an incredible disaster, but possibly there's
an opportunity, with so many donors around the world coming
together, to help Haiti get it more right than ever this time.
And I think that's what all of us want to see happen.
Senator Kerry and myself have introduced legislation that
establishes benchmarks to move us along that path. I
certainly--I'd look forward to hearing your comments on that.
But, the fact is that we have some immediate needs, we have
some midterm needs, and certainly some long-term issues that we
need to deal with as a country, as a world community, and we
thank you for your testimony today.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Corker. And I appreciate
your work on this, and your presence here today.
Senator Kaufman had some opening comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD E. KAUFMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Kaufman. Yes, I just wanted to say--I just want to
thank you, both Senators, for convening--this is very
important.
Do not read into this fact that many Senators are not here
as any diminution of the importance to which my colleagues find
getting it right in Haiti. I mean, I think that--to go to the
remarks that were given, I can associate myself with all those.
But, I mean, just the basic things, the basic government, basic
water, food, housing--I mean, we're committed--this country is
committed to it, the Senate's committed to it. I want to thank
you very much for what you're doing. But, we all support this.
This is absolutely incredible, that this does not--we get to
use this as an example, as Senator Corker say, as a wake-up
call to move forward and get some of these very basic needs
straightened out for Haiti.
So, I want thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. Thank the ranking member.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Kaufman.
And, of course, we're able to have this hearing because our
chairman made it a priority, and we're grateful for Senator
Kerry. And we'll have Senators coming in and out.
So, Mr. Milligan, why don't you start.
STATEMENT OF T. CHRISTOPHER MILLIGAN, COORDINATOR FOR DISASTER
RESPONSE IN HAITI, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Milligan. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am
honored to join you here today.
Last Wednesday marked the 4-month anniversary of the
devastating earthquake in Haiti. The scale of the destruction
cannot be overstated. Hundreds of thousands lost their lives,
millions were left without shelter, water, food, and
electricity.
Traditional first responders--the Government of Haiti, the
United Nations, the in-country NGOs--were left, devastated.
Dozens of U.S. Government employees, including our dedicated
Foreign Service nationals, suffered their own losses.
That said, moments of crises can unite people. We saw how
Haitians came together to pull each other out of the rubble,
bridging economic and social divides. We have also seen the
tremendous generosity of the American people. One out of every
two families in this country contributed to the relief,
thousands more have volunteered.
The day after the earthquake, President Obama asked USAID
Administrator Shah to lead a swift, coordinated, and aggressive
response. In the days and weeks that followed, USAID leveraged
talents and resources throughout the Federal Government in a
synchronized effort.
Together, the international community launched an
impressive and unprecedented response that saved lives and
alleviated suffering. While significant challenges remain, we
have seen some unparalleled successes. U.S. search and rescue
teams took part in the most successful international rescue
effort to date, saving 132 lives. Through the World Food
Programme, we participated in the largest urban food
distribution ever, feeding more than 3.5 million people. U.S.
medical teams treated more than 30,000 patients and performed
hundreds of surgeries.
With the international community, we've supported the
delivery of emergency shelter to earthquake victims at an
unprecedented rate, providing 1.5 million people with basic
shelter, and we've helped to vaccinate close to 900,000 people
against common diseases.
Our community development programs, on average, are
employing 24,000 Haitians, getting money directly into the
pockets of those Haitians who need it most.
These efforts have had real impacts on the ground. For
example, people have access to more clean water now than they
did prior to the earthquake. Therefore, we've seen a reduction
in diarrhea illnesses by 12 percent from preearthquake levels.
But, let me be clear, the challenges before us are
formidable. The road ahead will not be easy. And many of the
hardships that Haiti faces existed long before the earthquake
and present even greater challenges now.
USAID's relief and development expertise was critical in
coordinating the successful initial humanitarian assistance
effort, and this expertise will be critical as we move toward
longer term reconstruction activities.
We've had some very positive consultations with your
committee staff on the Haitian Empowerment Assistance and
Rebuilding Act, and we appreciate the consultative process to
date.
The Government of Haiti has, through its Action Plan for
National Recovery and Development, made great strides in
identifying its needs and priorities. Supporting this plan will
require a long-term commitment on the part of the international
community, the spirit of which is reflected in the proposed
legislation. We applaud the chairman and Senator Corker for
their leadership on this issue.
We agree with the broad objectives laid out in the bill and
the statement of need in Haiti. The situation on the ground is
changing daily, and, for that reason, maximum flexibility is
needed as we address the ongoing crisis.
As the coordinator for disaster response in Haiti, I want
to thank Congress for its support, which has saved lives and
alleviated suffering. Without a doubt, there will be setbacks
on the way, but I am confident that, with the continued work of
the international community and the talent of American public
servants, we can overcome these short-term obstacles and tackle
bigger ones. With your support, we will do everything we can to
continue the humanitarian efforts and help the people of Haiti
build back better.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Milligan follows:]
Prepared Statement of T. Christopher Milligan, Coordinator for Disaster
Response in Haiti, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to join you
here today. I would like to thank you personally for your support of
the relief and reconstruction efforts in Haiti and for your commitment
to the Haitian people.
Last Wednesday marked the 4-month anniversary of the devastating
earthquake in Haiti. It is hard to overstate the scale of the
destruction caused on January 12. Hundreds of thousands of people lost
their lives. Millions of Haitians were left without shelter, water,
food, or electricity. Traditional first responders, the Government of
Haiti, United Nations, and NGOs working in-country were left
devastated. Dozens of U.S. Government employees, including our
dedicated Foreign Service Nationals in Haiti, suffered their own
losses. It's a tragedy and a grieving process that continues to this
day.
That said, moments of crisis can unite people around a common goal
and a sense of shared purpose--and we've seen that this is the case in
Haiti. We saw how Haitians came together to pull people out of the
rubble in ways that bridged economic and cultural divides.
Neighborhoods emptied into the streets, and all Haitians shared the
same fears and common challenges from the catastrophe that struck their
country.
We also have seen the tremendous generosity of the American people
in this tragedy. One out of every two families in the United States has
contributed to the relief efforts. Many thousands of people have
volunteered in Haiti to provide medical relief, distribute commodities,
or to manage a settlement of displaced people. The response of the
American people demonstrates to the world our true nature and how we
seek to improve the lives and well-being of others.
The day after the earthquake, President Obama asked USAID
Administrator Rajiv Shah to lead a ``swift, coordinated, and
aggressive'' response. In the days and weeks that followed, USAID
leveraged talents and resources throughout the Federal Government in a
synchronized effort--bringing our development experience to bear--to
support the efforts of the Government of Haiti, the U.N., and the
international community.
Together the international community launched an impressive
response that not only saved lives and alleviated suffering, but also
helped create renewed international cohesion and momentum upon which to
rebuild Haiti. While significant challenges still remain, we have seen
some tremendous successes thus far.
Search and Rescue teams from throughout the United States
took part in the most successful international rescue effort in
history, with over 40 teams from around the world saving 132
people trapped in the rubble.
Through the World Food Programme, we participated in the
largest urban food distribution operation ever, feeding more
than 3.5 million people.
U.S. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, deployed
internationally for the first time, saw more than 30,000
patients and performed hundreds of surgeries. Medical teams
aboard the USNS Comfort provided life-saving treatment for
hundreds of the most critically injured trauma victims.
We've supported the delivery of emergency shelter to
earthquake victims at an unprecedented rate, and, together with
the international community, achieved the goal of providing 1.5
million people with some form of basic shelter assistance by
May 1, 2010, prior to the start of hurricane season.
We've helped vaccinate close to 900,000 adults and children
against common diseases in an effort to prevent major outbreaks
of illness. A second round of immunizations among IDP will
begin in June.
Our community development programs are on average employing
more than 24,000 workers every day--not only getting money
directly into the pockets of those Haitians who need it most,
but most importantly jump-starting the economic recovery
through rubble removal, initial reconstruction work, and
mitigating against potential weather-related disasters.
Together with the Joint Task Force-Haiti and Navy Seabees
who took the lead on ensuring drainage canals were cleared, and
life-saving measures were in place before the rains, we've
helped to protect 40,000 Haitians who were in imminent danger
of losing their lives.
The U.S. private sector, as reported by the Indiana
University Center on Philanthropy (as of May 12), raised over
$1.3 billion for the U.S. nonprofits surveyed to respond to the
earthquake in Haiti. This includes funding that resulted from
President Obama's request to Presidents Clinton and Bush to
lead a private-sector fund-raising effort.
These results are impressive, and they reflect the work of
thousands of individuals from across the Federal Government and around
the globe. In the area of health, for example, our efforts in providing
access to water and sanitation, national disease surveillance, post-
quake access to health care, prepositioning of essential medicines,
vaccination campaigns, and malaria and dengue control efforts
contributed to the prevention of significant outbreaks. By providing
chlorine tablets to purify drinking water, we have been able to give
more people access to clean water than before the earthquake hit. That
effort has led to real impacts on the ground--already we've seen a 12-
percent reduction in diarrheal illness in Port-au-Prince. That's a 12-
percent reduction from preearthquake levels.
That said, let me be clear: the challenges before us are
formidable. The road ahead will not be easy, and many of the hardships
Haiti faces--endemic poverty, difficulty getting lifesaving medicines
when needed, lack of meaningful economic opportunities, gaps in the
government's provision of basic services, maneuvering the cities
congested streets--existed long before the January 12th earthquake and,
simply, present even greater challenges now.
USAID's humanitarian assistance expertise--worldwide and in Haiti--
was crucial in coordinating one of the largest and one of the most
successful U.S. Government humanitarian responses in history. The
Agency's development expertise is increasingly critical as we move
toward longer term reconstruction activities that address these
hardships and advance the priorities set by the Government of Haiti.
We will remain committed to working with the people and Government
of Haiti for the long term. We have closely examined how we can help
Haiti build back better and how we can help build internal capacity in
Haiti's Government, civil society, and private sector to allow it to
better serve its citizens and break free of the poverty that has
limited its potential for so long.
In doing so, we will continue to work in close partnership with a
number of other U.S. Government agencies, especially the Department of
State, but also the Department of Defense, Centers for Disease Control,
the Department of Agriculture, and others, and we'll focus on areas and
sectors where we can add the greatest value:
Promoting economic growth by expanding agriculture and
infrastructure, including housing;
Improving security and governance;
Investing in infrastructure and energy;
Supporting sustainable health care.
The magnitude of the challenge requires an international response,
so we are working to leverage resources and work with the international
community to support the strategic decisions made by the Haitian people
and their Government. Reconstruction will be a shared effort, and the
U.S. Government will work with the Government of Haiti and the
international community to ensure that the activities of each donor are
a reflection of their comparative advantage.
We are committed to working with the Government of Haiti, the
private sector, and civil society to develop accountable and
transparent systems that allow us to track funding every step of the
way, ensure coordination, and maximize the effectiveness of our
investments.
The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission or IHRC, which was recently
approved by the Haitian legislature, will play a key role in ensuring
transparency and accountability of donor funds. The IHRC will allow for
Haitian-led planning, sequencing, and prioritization of projects--for
example, it will help ensure that a hospital is not built without a
road that can reach it. It will also provide greater efficiency in the
reconstruction phase as donors coordinate and harmonize their
investments with Haiti's plan, identifying gaps and limiting
duplication of effort. The IHRC will manage a publicly available ``aid
platform'' database, which will serve as a central location for
information on the allocation and management of resources and funding.
This allows for increased transparency and accountability in the
utilization of resources.
USAID and the Department of State are committed to engaging the
Haitian diaspora in our reconstruction and development programming. The
diaspora is a tremendous resource, not only in the close to $2 billion
they provide annually in remittances--amounting to approximately 30
percent of Haiti's GDP--but also in their language skills, cultural
understanding, and diverse technical skills. The reconstruction and
development of Haiti must ultimately be led and sustained by the people
of Haiti if it is to be successful, and that requires nurturing local
capacity. The diaspora can work side by side with the Haitian community
to develop the skills needed to truly build back better.
We are integrating the lessons we've learned from 30 years of work
in Haiti and 50 in development internationally to respond quickly and
effectively to the most critical needs, while planning for longer term
reconstruction of the country. We are also applying a very critical eye
to what's worked in the past and what hasn't--and focusing our efforts
only on those activities that will have the greatest impact on
sustainably improving the lives of Haitians, giving U.S. taxpayers the
biggest return on their investments in Haiti.
The overarching principles I've laid out before the committee--
Haitian-led, inclusive, accountable, transparent and coordinated--are
very much in line with the principles set forth in the Haiti
Empowerment, Assistance, and Rebuilding Act of 2010. The Government of
Haiti has, through its Action Plan for National Recovery and
Development of Haiti, made great strides in identifying its needs and
priorities. Supporting this plan will require a long-term commitment on
the part of the international community, the spirit of which is
reflected in the proposed legislation.
We have had several very positive conversations with your committee
staff on the recently introduced legislation, S. 3317 Haiti
Empowerment, Assistance, and Rebuilding Act of 2010, and appreciate the
consultative process your staff has engaged in as you drafted your
legislation.
We applaud the chairman and Senator Corker for their leadership on
this issue. We agree with the broad objectives laid out in the bill and
the statement of need in Haiti. The situation on the ground is changing
daily, and for that reason, maximum flexibility is needed as we address
the ongoing crisis in Haiti. For instance, in a year, Haiti could have
a new government in place. Given the uncertainties that lie ahead, it
would be our suggestion to provide the administration and those of us
on the ground greater flexibility and to allow us to work closely with
you on how to best implement our programs.
As the Coordinator for Disaster Response in Haiti, I want to thank
Congress for its support for and involvement in efforts to date. Your
support, and the support of your constituents, have enabled my
colleagues throughout the Federal Government and me--in partnership
with the nonprofit and international communities--to save lives and
mitigate the suffering of millions in Haiti. Our Agency is committed to
honoring the trust that Congress and the American people have placed in
us by making investments in Haiti that are sustainable, scalable, and
lead to self-sufficiency. The recent congressional passage of the
bipartisan Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act will help promote
such sustainable development by expanding duty-free access to the U.S.
market for Haitian textile and apparel exports and extending existing
trade preference programs for Haiti.
I have worked in development for the last 20 years, including in
Iraq, Post-Suharto Indonesia, Zimbabwe, Ecuador, and in Vietnamese
refugee camps in the Philippines. I know that the scale and scope of
the challenges that confront Haiti are immense. Without a doubt, there
will be setbacks along the way. But I am confident that with the
continued work of the international community and the talent of
American public servants participating in this effort, we can overcome
these short-term obstacles and substantively tackle bigger ones.
With your support, we will do everything we can to continue this
successful humanitarian effort in Haiti while building the foundations
for meaningful, measureable, and transformative change for its people.
I truly believe that we have a seminal opportunity to help Haiti build
back better, and to put it on a path to a much better future.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much, Mr. Milligan.
Ambassador Merten.
What I failed to do at the beginning, which I should always
do, is, if you can--you were pretty good about time? We want
try to limit time. All of your statements, by the way, will be
made part of the record, so if there's something you miss,
it'll be in the record. If you can try to do it in, maybe, 5
minutes, that'll be great.
Ambassador Merten. Do my best.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH H. MERTEN, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO HAITI,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI
Ambassador Merten. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
I'm honored to join you here today.
As you know, Haiti suffered a massive 7.0 earthquake on
January 12, with an epicenter just southwest of Port-au-Prince.
An estimated 2 million people lived within the earthquake zone.
Those 35 seconds changed the face of a nation that was already
the poorest in our hemisphere. The quake left 230,000 dead, and
displaced more than 1.2 million, and generated billions of
dollars of damages in reconstruction costs.
Assisting Haiti in recovery and rebuilding is a massive
undertaking that requires a well-coordinated, well-funded,
Government-of-Haiti-led effort. The outpouring of international
support has been tremendous. But, it's not only about the
numbers, it's about the Haitian people and those from around
the world who have been united in partnering with them.
On behalf of the Embassy staff, I'd like to convey my
gratitude to Congress, and especially this committee, for its
continued concern and unflagging support of Haiti, its people,
and those of us on tours in the country.
I have been involved with Haiti on and off for more than 20
years. This is my third tour there, and I have served as a
counselor officer, later as chief of the economic section, and
have worked for the special advisers on Haiti. I have seen,
firsthand, the progress the nation has made, making it even
more devastating to witness the destruction of the earthquake--
physical, social, and economic.
In my 23 years in the Foreign Service, I have never been
prouder of the work that I am doing and the people with whom I
serve. In the face of the tragedy, more than a third of us lost
our homes and all of us have had a family member, friend, or
colleague die or suffer injury. We came together and worked to
do all we could for those in need.
Many Haitians do not refer to the earthquake by name. They
call it ``bagay la,'' meaning ``the thing.'' They ask each
other, ``Where were you when 'bagay la' happened?''
I want to share a couple of examples from Embassy personnel
on what happened that night.
After the quake, assistant regional security officer Pete
Kolshorn, who lived on a ridgeline, immediately left through
the door of his house and looked for his neighbors, who were
also Embassy employees. From the neighbor's house, he jumped
over the ridge and down about two stories and saw an Embassy
officer buried up to her waist, her face covered with dirt and
blood, and calling for help. He saw her husband, moving with
spasms to try and free himself. Beyond him, Kolshorn saw an arm
protruding from the wreckage. Without a thought for his own
safety, he threw a hose over the cliff, scaled down shear rock
to reach the victims, and, with the assistance of one of the
Embassy's local guard force, began to rescue those three
colleagues. All three were seriously injured, two with serious
head wounds. With the help of other neighbors, Kolshorn brought
all three up the cliff, where there were two doctors.
That same night, assistant regional security officer Rob
Little covered Port-au-Prince on motorcycle, visiting every
employee's residence to check on them, particularly in cases
where we had not been able to contact them via radio. He helped
us determine, that night, the whereabouts of our employees, and
as he did so, in total darkness, with streets thronged with
homeless people and blocked in many cases, by rocks, trees,
houses, and bodies.
These are just two stories of the heroic efforts that
occurred in the hours and days following the quake. Our
conference room became an emergency operating room. We
evacuated over 16,000 American citizens back to the United
States, including my wife and two daughters. This is one of the
largest evacuations since World War II. We delivered
humanitarian aid, food, and water, and seldom slept more than 4
hours. Many of us slept under our desks, in the hallways, or in
tents. I slept on a canvas cot in the Embassy for 3 weeks,
because I could not get back to my house.
Indeed, it was the funds granted to the Haiti mission by
Congress that allowed us to build a resilient U.S. Embassy in
Port-au-Prince, which was completed in 2008. This became a safe
haven for so many after the quake, and, frankly, helped us
expedite the rescue effort, I would guess, by about 5 days. Our
efforts would not have been possible, let alone successful,
without the support of colleagues across the government and
around the world. We had more volunteers than we had desks for
them sleep under.
The State Department and USAID and countless other agencies
supported us, as we supported each other, in the most selfless
of ways. Today, we remain committed to supporting the
government and people of Haiti as they seek to build back
better.
In my confirmation hearing last July, I stated that in the
aftermath of the tropical storms of 2006 and 2008, Haiti simply
did not have the resources to rebound from such setbacks. That
observation is even more true today.
We have much to be proud of. The United States Government's
responsiveness to date, and the results that we have achieved
working with the Government of Haiti and our international
partners, has been great. Now, however, is a period of
transition from the most critical humanitarian relief efforts
to long-term development. The International Donors Conference
of March 31 sent a clear message: donors and the Government of
Haiti are committed to working together to make the vision that
the Government of Haiti presented for its country a reality.
The Conference raised billions in pledges for Haiti's
reconstruction. On behalf of the United States, Secretary
Clinton pledged $1.15 billion over 2 years to help Haiti lay
the foundation for long-term, sustainable development. In so
doing, the United States, together with the Government of Haiti
and other donors, committed to hold itself to the highest
levels of transparency, and accountability, and to include all
stakeholders, and give voice to the Haitian people in the
delivery of that assistance. We will also coordinate efforts to
avoid duplicative investments.
I'm glad the legislation that Chairman Kerry and Senator
Corker proposed echoes this commitment. It demonstrates that
the United States is committed to supporting and partnering
with people in the Government of Haiti, as both President Obama
and Secretary Clinton have said, not just in the months to
come, but in the years to come. It focuses on long-term
development goals that align with the needs of the Government
of Haiti while not forsaking humanitarian relief efforts.
I'm happy to say that much of what is called for in the
proposed legislation is happening both on the ground and in
Washington. Going forward, maximum flexibility is what is
needed to address the ever-changing and uncertain situation on
the ground. Our hope is that we can continue to work with you
and your staffs to provide this flexibility as you develop a
legislative response to the crisis.
Learning what took place after the tsunami, the Government
of Haiti is on its path to create a Haitian development
authority. To give the Haitians time to stand up this
authority, the Government of Haiti has empowered an interim
structure. For 18 months, there will be the Interim Haitian
Reconstruction Commission, whose mandate is to ensure that
implementation of the Government of Haiti's plan is
coordinated, that projects are properly planned and sequenced,
that efforts are effective, bottlenecks swiftly addressed, and
that all involved adhere to the highest standards of
transparency and accountability.
We're pleased that Congress recently passed the Help Act,
which extends trade preferences to Haiti that will lead to job-
creating investment there. This is key to Haiti's economic
development.
There's much to be done in the coming months. President
Preval has announced his intent to hold elections, originally
scheduled for February, before the end of the year. The U.N.,
the OAS, and IFES have completed election assessments, and
we've begun working with the Government of Haiti and our
international partners in support of parliamentary and
Presidential elections expected later in this year.
As was the case in 2005, the U.N. and others will work on
the logistics and security around the elections, registering
citizens and making sure we include those that are displaced.
Shortly after assuming office, Secretary Clinton called on
the State Department and USAID to undertake a review of United
States policy to Haiti. Through an interagency review process,
consultations with the government, and fellow donors, we
identified four key sectors for future investment--that will be
agriculture, energy, security and rule of law, and health--in
which the United States has comparative advantage in providing
assistance.
After the earthquake, we revisited that assessment with the
Government of Haiti again. The Haitians strongly support deep
investment in these key sectors; and in pursuing these
investments, we will adhere to the following set of principles:
United States assistance to Haiti will be deployed in an
integrated plan, focusing on specific sectors. United States
assistance will respond to the Government of Haiti's priorities
and build the Haitian Government's capacity. United States
policy and assistance to Haiti will be aligned around common
development goals and harness the strengths of the entire
United States Government through a coordinated approach. And
United States assistance to Haiti will leverage and complement
the resources of other donors and the private sector. And,
finally, the U.S. assistance will be subject to rigorous
monitoring and evaluation. We are confident that these
investments will help Haiti realize a better tomorrow.
I will try and wrap this up very quickly.
Much has been said about the resilience of the Haitian
people. Indeed, they are incredibly strong people, whose love
of life, even over the past 4 months, has inspired so many of
us. Together with the Government of Haiti and international
partners, we can achieve lasting change and help the Haitian
people realize sustained development and stability. Years from
now, when people ask me where I was when ``bagay la'' happened,
I will recount the story of those 35 seconds, but, more
importantly, I will recount the many heroic efforts and common
humanity that followed.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Merten follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Kenneth Merten, U.S. Ambassador to the
Republic of Haiti, Department of State, Port-au-Prince, Haiti
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to join you
here today.
Haiti suffered a massive magnitude 7.0 earthquake on January 12,
2010, with an epicenter just southwest of the capital, Port-au-Prince.
An estimated 2 million people lived within the zone of heavy to
moderate damage. The earthquake was the worst in Haiti in the last 200
years. Thirty-five seconds changed the face of a nation that was
already the poorest in our hemisphere. The quake left 230,000 dead,
displaced more than 1.2 million, and according to the Post Disaster
Needs Assessment led by the World Bank in cooperation with the
Government of Haiti generated an estimated $11.5 billion in damages and
reconstruction costs. Assisting Haiti in recovery and rebuilding is a
massive undertaking and requires a well-coordinated, well-funded,
Government of Haiti-led effort. The outpouring of international support
has been tremendous, but this is not only about numbers, it is about
the Haitian people and those from around the world who have been united
in partnering with them.
On behalf of the Embassy staff, I would like to convey my gratitude
to Congress, and especially this committee, for its continued concern
for and unflagging support of Haiti, its people, and those of us on
tours in the country. I have been involved with Haiti on and off for
more than 20 years. This is my third tour. I have served as a Consular
Officer, later as Chief of the Economic Section, and as Assistant to
the Special Advisors on Haiti. I have seen first-hand the progress the
nation has made, making it even more devastating to witness the
destruction of the earthquake--physical, social, and economic. In my 23
years in the Foreign Service, I have never been prouder of the work I
am doing and the people with whom I serve. In the face of tragedy--more
than a third of us lost our homes, and all of us have had a family
member, friend, or colleague die or suffer injury--we came together and
worked to do all we could for those in need.
Many Haitians do not refer to the earthquake by name. They call it
``bagay la'' meaning ``the thing.'' They ask each other where they were
when ``bagay-la'' happened. I want to share with an example from
Embassy personnel.
Deputy Regional Security Officer Pete Kolshorn who lived on a
ridgeline, immediately leapt through the door of his house and looked
for his neighbors who were also Embassy staffers. Their house was gone.
Looking over the ridge, and down about two stories, he saw an Embassy
officer buried up to her waist, face covered with dirt and blood,
calling for help. He then saw her husband moving in spasms to try to
free himself. Beyond him, Kolshorn saw an arm protruding from the
wreckage. Without a thought for his safety, he threw a hose over the
cliff, scaled down sheer rock to reach the victims and with the
assistance of one of the Embassy's Local Guard Force Locally Employed
Staff members, Renald Jean Belfort. All three were seriously injured--
two with head wounds. With the help of neighbors, Kolshorn brought all
three up the cliff where there were two doctors. One man needed
immediate medical care. Carrying two stretchers at a time, then
returning for the third, Kolshorn worked to get to the main road. This
effort took 7 hours--having to trek through the most horrific of
conditions. When he came upon a trapped child, Kolshorn put the
stretchers down and with the help of a stranger fed the child. If
someone had told me this story 5 months ago, I would have had
difficulty believing it. Today it is a reality.
The same night, Assistant Regional Security Officer Rob Little
covered Port-au-Prince on motorcycle visiting every American employee's
residence to check on them, particularly in cases in which we had not
been able to contact them. He helped us determine that night the
whereabouts of our employees and he did so in total darkness with
streets thronged with homeless people and blocked in many cases by
rocks, trees, houses, and worst of all bodies.
These are just two stories of the heroic efforts that occurred in
the hours and days following the earthquake. Our conference room became
an emergency operating room; we evacuated 16,000 Americans back to the
United States--including my wife and two daughters--one of the largest
such evacuations since World War II; we delivered humanitarian aid,
food, and water; and seldom slept more than 4 hours. Many of us slept
under our desks, in the hallways or in tents. I slept on a cot in the
Embassy for 3 weeks, because I could not get back to my house.
Indeed, it was the funds granted the Haiti Mission by the Congress
that allowed us to build the resilient U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince.
Our Embassy, which was completed in June 2008, became a safe haven for
so many in the aftermath of the quake--serving as nerve center,
shelter, hospital, kitchen, and perhaps most importantly, a place where
we could all come together and support each other.
Our efforts would not have been possible let alone successful
without the support of colleagues across the government and around the
world. We had more volunteers than desks for them to sleep under; were
in contact with the USAID and the Department of State here in
Washington every minute of the day; they and countless other agencies
supported us as we supported each other in the most selfless of ways.
Today we remain committed to supporting the Government and people
of Haiti as they set out to build back better.
At my confirmation hearing last July, I stated that in the
aftermath of the tropical storms and hurricanes that caused extensive
damage from 2006 to 2008, Haiti simply did not have the resources to
rebound from such set-backs on its own. That observation is even more
true today.
We have much to be proud of--the U.S. Government's responsiveness
to date and the results that we have achieved working with the
Government of Haiti and international partners have been great as Chris
Milligan's testimony states. Now is a period of transition--from the
most critical humanitarian relief efforts to long-term development.
The International Donors Conference Towards a New Future for Haiti
that took place on March 31, 2010, sent a clear message: donors and the
Government of Haiti are committed to working together to make the
vision the Government presented for its country, reality. The
conference raised $9.9 billion in pledges for Haiti's reconstruction.
On behalf of the United States, Secretary Clinton pledged $1.15 billion
over 2 years to help Haiti lay the foundation for long-term sustainable
development. In so doing, the United States, together with the
Government of Haiti and other donors, committed to hold itself to the
utmost levels of transparency and accountability; to include all
stakeholders; give greater voice to the Haitian people in the delivery
of our assistance; and to coordinate efforts and avoid duplicative
investments.
I am glad the legislation that Chairman Kerry and Senator Corker
proposed echoes this commitment. It demonstrates that the United States
is committed to supporting and partnering with the people and
Government of Haiti, as both President Obama and Secretary Clinton have
said, not just in the months to come, but in the years to come. It
focuses on long-term development goals that align with the needs of the
Government of Haiti, while not forsaking humanitarian relief efforts. I
am happy to say that much of what is called for in the proposed
legislation is happening both on the ground and in Washington. Going
forward, maximum flexibility is what is needed to address the ever-
changing and uncertain situation on the ground. Our hope is that we can
continue to work with you and your staffs to provide this necessary
flexibility as you develop a legislative response to the crisis.
Learning from what took place after the Southeast Asian Tsunami,
the Government of Haiti is on the path to create a Haitian Development
Authority. To give the Government of Haiti time to stand up the
Authority, the Government has empowered an interim structure. For 18
months there will be the Interim Haitian Reconstruction Commission,
whose mandate is to ensure that implementation of the Government of
Haiti's plan is coordinated, projects are properly planned and
sequenced, efforts are effective, bottlenecks are be swiftly addressed,
and all involved adhere to the highest standards of transparency and
accountability.
We are also pleased that Congress recently passed the Haiti
Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act, which extends trade preferences to
Haiti that will lead to job-creating investment there.
There is much to be done in the coming months. President Preval has
announced his intent to hold elections, originally scheduled for
February, before the end of the year. The United Nations, the
Organization of American States (OAS), and the International Foundation
for Electoral Support (IFES) have completed election assessments. We
have begun working with the Government of Haiti and our international
partners in support of Parliamentary and Presidential elections
expected later in 2010. As was the case in 2005, the U.N. through
MINUSTAH, the OAS, and CARICOM will play vital roles in the logistics
and security around the elections, registering of citizens--including
those who are displaced--and monitoring the balloting.
Shortly after assuming office, Secretary Clinton called on the
State Department and USAID to undertake a review of U.S. policy on
Haiti--to evaluate our existing programs and policies, assess the
alignment of our efforts with the needs of the people and Government of
Haiti, and determine how we can be most impactful. Through an
interagency review process, consultations with the Government of Haiti,
and fellow donors, we identified four key sectors for future U.S.
investment--agriculture, energy, security/rule of law, and health in
which the United States has comparative advantage in providing
assistance. After the earthquake we revisited our assessment, again
discussing with the Government of Haiti what its greatest needs were
and what it wanted from the United States, and expanded the scope to
accommodate new needs in governance and infrastructure. The Government
of Haiti strongly supports deep investment in these key sectors and in
pursuing these investments, we will adhere to the following set of
principles:
U.S. assistance to Haiti will be deployed in an integrated
plan, focusing on specific sectors and geographic regions of
the country.
U.S. assistance to Haiti will respond to Government of Haiti
priorities and build the Haitian Government's capacity toward
sustainable and economic growth.
U.S. policy and assistance to Haiti will be aligned around
common development goals and harness the strengths of the
entire U.S. Government through a coordinated approach.
U.S. assistance to Haiti will leverage and complement the
resources of other donors and the private sector.
U.S. assistance to Haiti will be subject to rigorous
monitoring and evaluation.
We are confident that these investments will help Haiti realize a
better tomorrow.
Over the course of the past 4 months, I have witnessed the worst
human suffering and the best in human compassion and support.
Tragically the Embassy lost several members who continue to be missed
and in memory of whom we remain committed to our efforts on the ground.
Among the deceased are: Victoria DeLong, the Cultural Affairs Officer
at the Embassy who had worked to build bridges of understanding and
respect. The wife and young children of Andrew Wyllie, a decorated
State Department officer working with the United Nations. And six
locally employed staff: Jean-Daniel LaFontant, Olriche Jean, Jacques
Josue Desamours, Laica Casseus, Joseph Fontal, and Racan Domond.
Much has been said about the resilience of the Haitian people.
Indeed, they are incredibly strong people whose love of life, even over
the past 4 months, has inspired so many of us. Together with the
Government of Haiti and international partners we can achieve lasting
change and help the Haitian people realize sustained development and
stability. Years from now when people ask where I was when ``bagay la''
happened, I will recount the story of those 35 seconds, but more
importantly I will recount the many heroic efforts and common humanity
that followed.
Senator Casey. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your statement
and your work on this, and the personal connection you bring to
this. We're grateful for that, and especially at a hearing; we
often don't have a personal witness in the ways that you've
described.
And I wanted to start with the--one of the fundamental
concerns that we have in the near term--I'll start with Mr.
Milligan, if you don't mind, with regard to the hurricane. Can
you give us a sense of what USAID is doing to prepare for the
hurricane season?
Mr. Milligan. Thank you. That's an excellent question. And
it is an activity--it's a concern that we are continuing to
address.
We have made progress in preparing for the hurricane
season, but we still are not there yet; we are still preparing.
We are consulting with our international partners on their
plans, and coordinating with them. For example, we're aware of
the plans of the World Food Programme to preposition supplies
in 15 to 20 places around the country, in preparation. We have
worked with the Department of Defense, which has completed
assessments of hurricane shelters. We're reviewing those
assessments and see what needs to be done. And we're
coordinating with the Government of Haiti on its own hurricane
preparation plan so we know how to be most supportive as part
of an international community on that.
We are ensuring that other USG assets are prepositioned in
response. We're aware of DOD's plans to have emergency response
capability within a matter of 24 to 48 hours.
So, this is the current status of our preparation, and is a
top priority for us.
Senator Casey. Let me ask you--well, what's the biggest
challenge, in terms of the preparation? One, do you have enough
resources? That's one question. Are there enough resources that
you can bring to bear? But, two, what's your most difficult
challenge in preparing? Is it infrastructure or is it the fact
that the Haitian Government may not have the capacity to do
what they need to do to prepare adequately? What's your--I know
you're still in the midst of developing it, but what's the
biggest challenge you face? And do you have the resources you
need?
Mr. Milligan. One of our major challenges is assessing the
impact of the earthquake on the shelters and the prevention
that we had in place already. As you know, there is an annual
earthquake--hurricane season in Haiti, and the government
prepares, on an annual basis, in coordination with
international partners. What we are currently assessing is the
impact of the earthquake on the preexisting capabilities. And
we're getting that information, and it's coming in, and we're
coordinating it with the government. It's difficult for me to
judge, at this point, on additional resource requirements, but
I'm not aware of any, at this time.
Senator Casey. And if--and then I'll move to the
Ambassador--but, I think it would help the committee to be able
to have, maybe in written form, an outline of the hurricane
preparation.
Mr. Milligan. Happy to provide that.
Senator Casey. That would amplify the record. And I want to
stay within my time, since I was imposing that on others.
Mr. Ambassador, one of the real concerns that I think a lot
of people have is--we know how events like this are covered;
there's a lot of coverage at the beginning, that begins to
diminish, and I'm not sure the American people have a real
sense of what's happened, here, what kind of aid we've
provided, what the nature of that is, but also, and right now,
I think, more importantly, what's going to happen, going
forward. When they hear numbers like $15 billion being
committed, and they hear about conferences, that's very
positive, but I think what most people out there are concerned
about is, Where are we with the deployment of those dollars?
And, in particular, if you can highlight, or Mr. Milligan can,
What's the current state of affairs as it relates to something
as fundamental as just basic health care on the ground? If you
can walk through that. I know we only have about 3 minutes, and
I'll move to Senator Corker, and I can come back to it. But, as
best you can in a short time.
Ambassador Merten. OK, very briefly, thank you.
I think one of the things that we look forward to, to
working with our Haitian and international partners on, is, as
the Haitians stand up the IHRC, this will monitor and provide
transparency to the public and to those who are interested in
the actual disbursement of moneys, not only that the United
States has contributed, but others. In fact, the Web site is
already up and running, and we can provide that to you
separately, if members of the committee and staff are
interested. I think this is a major step forward, which will,
in effect, sort of hold people's feet to the fire, to allow it
to be public, you know, who has pledged what, and where they
are, in terms of those pledges.
You know, I think we will be working very closely on that
committee to ensure that things move quickly, that the
reconstruction process moves as quickly as, certainly, we want
it to do. I think--I know that the Haitians--I know President
Preval has told me that he is eager to see things develop as
quickly as possible. So, I think this will be a useful tool for
us to: a, monitor; but, b, sort of push through the speed with
which this happens.
Senator Casey. In the 2 minutes that I have in my question
period, can either of you provide an overview or a quick
assessment just on health care delivery on the ground?
Mr. Milligan. Senator, there has been no significant
widespread infectious disease outbreak in Haiti, despite the
severity of the earthquake, displacement of people, and the
initial disruptions of the health care system. The rapid
response within the health sector, which included efforts in
water and sanitation, national vaccination campaigns, national
surveillance, and vector-borne disease control have likely
contributed to this.
We have had two isolated cases of diphtheria, including a
young man who passed away after receiving treatment. Despite
this tragic outcome, diphtheria is endemic to Haiti, and these
two cases are not indicative of an epidemic. There is
sufficient antitoxin in-country to treat 25 to 100 cases, and
CDC is ready to assist with additional doses, if necessary.
But, Senator, as you know, the status of the health care
system in Haiti was challenged before the earthquake, one of
our key requests in the supplemental is health care funding,
because we need to help rebuild the public health care
infrastructure. Traditionally, the funding for health care
bypassed the government and is not sustainable. We need to help
rebuild the public health care system. We also need to continue
to provide health care services for the displaced persons. And
through our supplemental, we're requesting funds for long-term
rehabilitations for victims of the earthquake.
Senator Casey. Thank you. I'm out of time.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
your testimony.
I think--you look at the many efforts that Americans have
been involved in, in Haiti for years--I mean, at the end of the
day, just to call it like it is, people, generally speaking,
try to figure out a way to work around the government to
accomplish things there, because they care about the people. I
have generally good feelings, personally, about President
Preval, and--I think he's a nice man. At the end of the day,
though, the government has been incredibly ineffective, even in
good times, in administering the country in such a way that the
Haitian people can flourish.
So, right now, in the middle of this tragedy that's
occurred, who's in charge down there, and who--you know, like,
who is the person that is in charge, ultimately--I know there's
all kinds of organizations involved--the U.N., USAID, State--
who's in charge? You know, if--I know it cannot be the
President, so who is in charge of what's happening in Haiti?
Ambassador Merten. I would disagree with you and say that
President Preval is in charge. He is the leader of the Haitian
Government. He's democratically elected. He is making
decisions. I will say----
Senator Corker. He's making reconstruction decisions and
he's----
Ambassador Merten. He will become----
Senator Corker [continuing]. Deciding where the resources
go?
Ambassador Merten. His Prime Minister, Prime Minister
Bellerive, will be chairing the IHRC with former President Bill
Clinton. And I think that that the Commission will--our belief
is that that will prove effective in expediting the
decisionmaking process and moving things forward with speed,
that I think we both agree is----
Senator Corker. Well, today if somebody had a major issue
they wanted dealt with, they'd call--we'd pick up the phone and
call President Preval, and he would make that decision, on the
spot. Interesting.
Ambassador Merten. I mean, I--he is still the
democratically elected President----
Senator Corker. I understand that----
Ambassador Merten [continuing]. Of the country. He has the
authority, and, you know, we have found him to be responsive to
our concerns and to our requests. You know, we don't always
find ourselves in agreement with him, obviously, but, in broad
terms, he has been responsive to us.
I think it's worth recalling that his government--and I
would completely agree with you--was inefficient, perhaps we
should say, at--before the earthquake. I think the Haitians--
most Haitians, speaking honestly with you, would agree with
that. Our strategy is to work with the Haitian government and
build them up so that they, over time, have increased capacity,
so don't have problems, in terms of getting decisions out of
them. And so, they do have the experience----
Senator Corker. OK, so there's a need to--and I'm not--
look, I mean,--and I appreciate so much what you guys are
saying, and I appreciate what you do--but we're going, in the
process of all this need, where 3 million people are affected
and people don't have homes, as Senator Casey has mentioned,
hurricane season is coming, there's all kind of health care
needs--today, the man that's on the ground and making things
happen, the sheriff, if you will, is President Preval. Is that
what you're telling me?
Ambassador Merten. Again, he is the leader of the country,
he has got a lot of support from the international community,
me, you know, the American Development Bank, Canada, EU,
France. We meet with him regularly. You know, we work with the
Haitian Government, not just President Preval, the Prime
Minister, who is also a decisionmaker in the process. Again,
they are doing their job and making their decisions, as needed.
Senator Corker. And who's our day-to-day leader down there,
as far as coordinating all of the reconstruction efforts and
other types of activities?
Ambassador Merten. Well, we have our AID mission director.
We also have Chris, who's down there. We participate in the
U.N. coordination system, called the ``cluster system,'' which
is broken down into various substantive areas, to coordinate
our efforts. I think that works reasonably well. I don't know
if Chris has anything he wants to add to that, or not.
Senator Corker. Term ``cluster'' creates a little bit of a
concern, I might add.
So, who's developing----
[Laughter.]
Senator Corker [continuing]. Who's developing, if you will,
the--I know that Senator Bingaman and I, when I first got here,
began looking at some of the things that were being done by
various communities to help there be a vision in Haiti, to help
move it along. And, you know, it was, some ways, like pushing
rope, as you can imagine. And I think when you talk about
building up the government there, that some degree of that
still exists. So, who's developing the--if you will, the--sort
of, the vision of what Haiti's going to be over time? That's
almost a word bigger than necessary today, with all the
immediate needs, but who's doing that?
Ambassador Merten. Well, again, our strategy is a country-
led strategy. The Haitians have certainly, in the post-
earthquake period, through the needs assessment, dictated what
they believe is their priorities and what they view is the
roadmap ahead. Again, we work with them, and with our
international partners, to coordinate our efforts to help them
get there. They clearly don't have the ability to do it on
their own. And this is, of course, where we come in. I hate to
keep going back to the same thing, but our view is that the
IHRC will be a very useful tool in coordinating this effort,
focusing the Haitians and our partners on the needs as
discussed earlier in that document, and keeping us--keeping our
eye ahead on that roadmap.
Senator Corker. So, our role--explain to me and those on
the committee--so, if the President there is in charge, and the
international community is working together to make things
happen on the ground, what is our role in that, exactly? I
mean, are we the de facto moral leaders there? Are we just one
of a group of people? I mean, be realistic about what our role
is there. And I would expect that it's a very strong role, and
certainly, I know, individuals like you are very committed, but
tell us the reality of what our role is in relation to everyone
else.
Ambassador Merten. I'd like to--I would agree with you, we
have a very strong role in Haiti. We are close, we have deep
relationships with Haiti. I think our relationships with--at
all levels of the Haitian Government are good. I think we do
play a very key role. At the end of the day, we're talking
about a sovereign country, however, which has a democratically
elected President with whom we deal. You know, our goal is to
work with them with a sense of partnership, to support them
where they need it. And, you know, they have asked us, on
various occasions, for help, and we--as you've seen over the
past 4 months, we've been providing it.
I think that partnership respect and responsibility would
characterize, in three words, I guess, our relationship with
the Government of Haiti.
Senator Corker. So, my time is up, and I think you get the
gist of my concerns. Look, so there's this tension, and
millions of people that Americans have identified with and care
about. And so, you have this tension of people wanting to
ensure that they have those needs that they have, that are
huge, that are met. And, at the same time, we have an
incredibly ineffective government, and an international
community that is working together to get things done. And so,
I know that many of us on the committee have said, ``You know,
should we do something?''--because we care about the people
there more than we care about other government, ``Should we do
something more draconian?'' And I know that it is a sovereign
country, kinda-sorta. It wouldn't exist without the
international community. And I understand we have to have
respect for that. But, I just think there's a tension there,
and I don't think we've fully addressed that. I think we're,
you know, working around that issue. And, in the interim, I
think a lot of people are suffering as we try to pay tribute to
a government that has been very ineffective. And I'm not saying
any of us could have been any better, with the infrastructure
there. But, I hope that we will--
I hope we will not play games with that. I think we all care
about folks there. And I guess I'll stop, but I get the sense
we kind of are. I get the sense that we're not addressing the
reality of the situation on the ground, because we want to
allow a sovereign government to exist, and respect that, as we
do--we respect the rule of law, we respect democracies--but, at
the same time, as we respect that, it's my sense a lot of
people are suffering. I don't know what the answer is, but guys
like you that are on the ground will, hopefully, help us with
that.
Ambassador Merten. Senator, I completely understand your
concerns, and I share many of them, myself. You know, you have
my commitment that we will do our very best to make sure we
reach out and do the best we can for those people that are
suffering, and that we will press the Government of Haiti to
make the decisions that are necessary to make sure that can
happen.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling
this hearing.
Thank you very much for being here to talk to us about your
work in Haiti.
I was able to travel down to Haiti with Senator Landrieu
earlier this year, right around Eastertime, and I got to meet
with you, Ambassador. And thank you for all your hard work.
Obviously, we have extraordinary challenges in Haiti. And
one of the areas of my gravest concern are the children of
Haiti. One of the concerns that I have is the education level,
that at least half of the children in Haiti are not being
educated, and 80 percent of them that are, are paying for
school in a community that has so little money available to
provide for their families. Haiti has a 52-percent illiteracy
rate, and these are some of the grave challenges.
Now, I understand that the United States is not heading up
the education pillar, and I understand the need for donor
coordination, but I'd like to hear from you what role you think
we can play in the development of a quality public education.
Ambassador Merten. Senator, thank you for your question.
When I talk to Haitians, education is one of their top
priorities. And immediately following the earthquake, we
contributed $6.2 million for temporary schools, and we are
currently refurbishing 600 schools in Haiti.
We will continue to work, through our bilateral USAID
program, to improve the quality of education. But, as you know,
we are part of a broader international effort, and our programs
can't be a mile wide and an inch deep. So, we are working with
other donors who are taking a lead in the education sector.
We're aware, for example, that the IADB is proposing to proceed
with a $2 billion program in education, and we're coordinating
with them on that. We also coordinate with the French and the
Canadians in this sector, because they can bring resources to
bear, as well.
We work well with UNICEF. UNICEF has just completed an
assessment of 133 schools that require rubble removal so that
schools will open. And so, we're coordinating to ensure that
UNICEF is getting the resources it needs to the broader
international community, and MINUSTAH and others, to have that
rubble removed.
Senator Gillibrand. Since we are charged with the pillar on
infrastructure, can we use that charge to go in and really
create--remove the rubble, for example, and create the
infrastructure for the school system? Because one of the other
concerns--you know, we also are addressing health--we can use
these schools as the focal point for community services, so
when we get the children into the schools, we can use it as a
delivery mechanism for vaccinations, for health care, for aid,
for food, anything that families need to receive. If they can
go to their local school to receive that support and assistance
and health care, it would be a very good way to create a hub
system that can be very effective that we could support through
our responsibilities on infrastructure and health.
Mr. Milligan. Yes. Rubble removal is one of our top
priorities in moving forward. As you know, there is enough
rubble to fill five Louisiana Super Domes, and it's an enormous
task. We're working with the Government of Haiti and the
international donors to prioritize which areas of rubble need
to be removed first, and prioritize residential areas and
schools, moving forward. And, in fact, that was the good work
of UNICEF. And we want to support rubble removal in these
priority areas, because one of the international community's
goals is to ensure that schools do reopen in September.
Senator Gillibrand. I'd also like to address the issue of
orphans. You know, we had reports that there were hundreds of
thousands of orphans before the earthquake. We documented
50,000 children in orphanages, placed in orphanages. Obviously,
that number is greatly expanded, and there are many children
who do not have parents or relatives that are able to keep them
at home in a family environment. And all statistics and all
studies show that it's far better for children to be raised in
a family environment, as opposed to an institutional
environment. What is the United States policy with regard to
the orphanages in Haiti and what we can do for the children who
are orphaned in Haiti today?
Ambassador Merten. Just to look back on what we've done
since the earthquake, first, to respond to that, we--I was
personally involved with expediting the release of--and travel
of--1,000--just shy of 1,000 orphans from Haiti prior to the
earthquake in these last 4 months. That is in comparison to
roughly 300 per year, who we typically help come to the United
States. It is, as you understand, a sensitive issue, both here
and in Haiti. Our concern, obviously, is to protect the
adoptive parents, but also protect the children, and to make
sure that there are legitimate and, indeed, true orphans that
are coming here.
There is legislation in Haiti which is--which has been
passed by the lower House of Congress. It still needs Senate
approval. Unfortunately, we do not have a seated Senate right
now. We probably will early in the next year. And you have our
commitment that we will work with the Senate to push for their
passage of that bill. Once that bill is passed, it contains
certain provisions, at least in its current form, that would
facilitate and expedite the adoption process.
Senator Gillibrand. Within--I mean, I want to address the
processes and protections within Haiti----
Ambassador Merten. Right.
Senator Gillibrand [continuing]. For--you know, for
adoptions within Haiti. Foster care--is there any discussion of
increasing foster care or guardianship programs in Haiti? And
then, separately, after we discuss that, I'd like to discuss
international adoptions. But, I'd like to----
Mr. Milligan. OK. Yes.
Senator Gillibrand [continuing]. At least address
separately, What does the Haitian Government intend to do? Is
there any movement toward improving the quality of care that we
can offer children through families, if possible, in Haiti?
Mr. Milligan. Senator, the status of orphans and vulnerable
children is a major concern for us, particularly given the
disaster. USAID immediately provided--I'm sorry--the U.S.
Government immediately provided about $10 million to support
orphans and vulnerable children.
The Agency for International Development, through its
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, launched programs on
emergency child protection, helping to register vulnerable
children, and trace them, providing safe spaces for children,
support for caregivers, and activities to reduce the potential
of trafficking in persons.
We've also supported public education programs and alert
systems and emergency phone numbers.
I understand the Department of State, G-TIP, has
immediately launched programs to reduce the possibility of
trafficking in persons, as well, and the Department of State's
Bureau of PRM is considering more support to UNICEF in order to
address trafficking in persons.
We do have, as part of our supplemental request, $11.5
million to look at the longer term issues, and they are
consistent with your priorities, to look at more community-
based relationships, and supporting that capability within
Haiti.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding the hearing today.
I apologize if you've already covered some of this ground
in the time that I was not here, but, in responding to the
earthquake, the Department of Defense sent in a number of
resources. Are those resources now being transferred to USAID
and State, or what's happening with those? And how well is--if
they are being transferred, how well is that transfer
proceeding?
Mr. Milligan. Perhaps I could begin on this one.
First of all, our military colleagues did an outstanding
job in Haiti. And I have worked in--20 years in development and
2 years in Iraq. We had excellent coordination in Iraq, but I
have never seen the level of civilian/military cooperation as I
have seen----
Senator Shaheen. Great.
Mr. Milligan [continuing]. In Haiti. And not only with
their U.S. Government counterparts, but with the NGO community
and international organizations. They were essential for the
initial successes of the humanitarian assistance effort.
We coordinate, with the Department of Defense, any of their
excess property. And so, we have facilitated delivery of excess
property to the Government of Haiti and also to local NGOs.
It's a very smooth process, and it's one that we're happy to
do, because it provides more assistance to those who need it
most.
We also have been coordinating with the Department of
Defense on the location of their ongoing bilateral programs in
Gonaives and other parts of the country, so there's a
coordination between the development people, ourselves, and the
Department of Defense on how best to use these assets, and
where to place them. And again, I have to emphasize, it has
been exceptional, the level of coordination out there.
Senator Shaheen. That's great. And so, you said you're
coordinating how best to use the assets. Is DOD still there now
with those resources, or has that transfer been accomplished?
Mr. Milligan. DOD has a Joint Task Force Haiti that
deployed immediately following the earthquake. It will be
transitioning, on June 1, to a very robust DOD program that's
focusing on the middle-term priorities, such as reconstruction
of some schools, and preparations for the hurricanes, and those
activities. So, again, the Joint Task Force now, I believe, is
about 800 individuals, standing down on June 1. But, in the
meantime, the other DOD activities have been ramping up. I
suspect they will have about 500 people on the ground in Haiti
in a matter of a few weeks.
Ambassador Merten. If I could just add to that.
Senator Shaheen. Sure.
Ambassador Merten. They will have around 500 members, I
believe, of the Louisiana National Guard up in Gonaives, which
is the region of the country most susceptible to flooding and
damage from hurricanes. They will also be conducting a very
robust series of what they call ``medical readiness
exercises,'' not just in the earthquake area, but around the
country, which will provide medical care to people not
typically touched by the established medical system,
particularly in rural areas, which--where people's medical care
is, understandably, you know, the worst in the country. So,
that will be ongoing for the coming months.
Senator Shaheen. Great. At the March 31 International
Donors Conference, the Haitian Government came in with a 10-
year recovery plan, as I understand, and the plan cost $11\1/2\
billion, and the Haitian administration sought about $4 billion
for first 18 months. And I think everybody should be proud of
the response from the international community. The donors
pledged nearly $10 billion, and $5.4 billion for the first 18
months. Is this aid coming in? Is there evidence that this is
coming in? And how is this getting channeled? Is it going
through the infrastructure that was developed in response to
the earthquake? And who's in charge of executing the funds? And
how is the Haitian Government involved?
So, I've given you about four questions there, but----
Mr. Milligan. Well, I applaud the Government of Haiti's
efforts to lead a successful Donors Conference, and we're very
glad that the pledges were made. And we will be pressing upon
donors to honor their pledges.
Some of the ways forward include the development of a
Multidonor Trust Fund. These have been very effective in other
cases. We have been negotiating--if you were--consulting, if
you will--with international partners and the World Bank. The
World Bank will chair the Multidonor Trust Fund. We have
agreement on one standard agreement that all donors will use so
that we have a unity of effort with the trust fund.
Donors will have to make a pledge of a significant amount
in order to be voting members on that trust fund. At the same
time, we are very supportive of the Interim Haiti
Reconstruction Commission that was established by decree
recently. This will play a very effective role in, not only
laying out strategic vision that is government-led, but also in
assuring accountable and transparent use of funding, and
providing more information to the people of Haiti about where
the funds are going, and why they're going there.
At the same time, it'll avoid duplication of effort among
donors. So, this is something that, from a development point of
view, we strongly support.
Senator Shaheen. So, is the Donors Trust Fund--has everyone
agreed to set that up already, or do we--are we still waiting
for agreement from certain partners?
Mr. Milligan. The--we have broad agreement on the
establishment of a Multidonors Trust Fund. And I understand
that the Brazilians have already made a financial commitment to
that trust fund. I believe that it's $55 million, but I could
clarify that, for the record.
Senator Shaheen. So, there has been agreement from the
donor community to do this, and everybody's signed on, and it's
going forward?
Mr. Milligan. Yes.
Senator Shaheen. Good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
I know we're coming to the end of the panel--we want to be
cognizant of the time--but, I wanted to go back, Mr. Milligan,
to a question about the hurricane season. What can you tell us
about the international community's efforts to have a storm
tracking system put in place, or a better system that's been in
place to date? Is there any information you can provide on
that?
Mr. Milligan. Sir, I'd like to provide you with a fuller
explanation of that, but I'd like to provide a response for the
record, if you will. I don't have that information available
now.
Senator Casey. OK. I think that's critically important.
When we see the devastating effect of the hurricanes--that the
hurricane season can have, I think it's important that we know
that. And I'd appreciate a prompt response to that.
I guess, I wanted to come back to the question of health
care delivery on the ground, and also food security. And again,
on both of these, there may be more information to provide for
the record. But, either of--either of you, Mr. Milligan or the
Ambassador--what can you tell us about those two issues? Maybe
starting with food security. What's the current state of
affairs?
Mr. Milligan. With respect to food security, there has been
no increase in malnutrition rates following the earthquake,
largely, in part, due to the enormous emergency food
distribution, feeding 3.5 million people. But, we know that
there is a link between the emergency food and the
sustainability of the agricultural sector. In order to be
prepared to address that important transition issue, we
mobilized a team of experts from Worldwide USAID to come and
examine how best to transition from an emergency response in
the food sector, to sustain agricultural programs.
What we have done in the meantime is that we worked hard to
provide a lot of inputs to farmers, ahead of the rainy season,
to ensure a productive harvest. We didn't want the Haitian
people to lose a harvest because of the earthquake. We--as you
know, the domestic production of food is essential to food
security. We, as an agency--USAID--have contributed more than
$110 million in food assistance following the earthquake. And
agriculture is one our four deep investments that we propose to
follow in the supplemental. And we propose to do it in three
ways. First, one, jump-starting the rural economy by ensuring
that farmers have the right inputs, that they have--prepared
irrigation canals, and that they can move forward with the
planting and harvesting.
Second, we want to link the farmer more into the
marketplace to ensure that he or she gets the benefits of their
products by looking at the value chain, providing post-harvest
facilities that will ensure that their crops do get to market,
and also looking holistically--for example, the road system,
how it fits in, so that we have a comprehensive approach to
agriculture.
And, finally, our approach will emphasize the capacity of
the agricultural sector, looking where research would be
helpful and how we can build the capacity for research, the
capacity for innovation, and the capacity for the Haitians to
carry this forward.
Senator Casey. Mr. Ambassador, a number of us have raised
questions about--Senator Corker asked you a number of questions
about the Haitian Government and their ability to provide, not
just leadership, but results for the people in this terribly
difficult period in their history.
I guess--what can you tell us about, or what's your--what's
your sense of, or--and in addition to, what's your vision for--
this--the ability of this government to improve day-to-day
governance in the delivery of services in conjunction with, and
simultaneously with, the reconstruction efforts? It's a--both
are difficult, but what's your sense of the--of both governance
and reconstruction, going forward? Being able to happen
simultaneously?
Ambassador Merten. I think it can happen, and I--but, I
certainly don't want to overpromise. I mean, I think it's going
to be a long-term effort that we need to work at, in a
sustained way, in working with the Haitian Government and
developing strategies which can bolster their capacity to
function as a government, to provide the services, to respond
to the needs of the people who elected them. And this is not
something that's going to happen overnight. But, our view is,
over the past 20 years of working around the Haitian
Government, and viewing them, in many cases, correctly, as an
obstacle, I think we've realized that we need to sort of engage
with the government to make sure that they have the capacity to
provide the services that, in many cases, are being provided by
some NGOs or by international donors. And our strategy is to
work with our colleagues and with the Haitian Government to
allow them to get to a point where they can do that. It's not
going to happen overnight, however.
Senator Casey. I'll wrap up my time. I'd just say, by way
of summary, we--by my count, the Congress has taken four big
actions, at least: debt cancellation, the economic lift
program; No. 3, the $2.8 billion in the supplemental; and also,
Senator Kerry and Senator Corker's bill, the Empowerment
Assistance and Renewal Act. That's wonderful. We're happy about
that. But, you need to keep telling us what we've got to do to
be more effective here. I hope you're not ever reluctant to do
that. Because hearings are great, and focus and attention is
great, but it's going to be, in the end, action and results
that we can measure. We can go to the American people and say,
``We passed this bill, we took this action, and here's the
result.'' We--there's just not enough of that right now, not
only on this terribly difficult problem, but on a lot of
things.
I know that--Senator Corker--and I'm going go to Senator
Kaufman, as well.
Senator Corker. Yes, I know we have another panel of
witnesses, and we know how to get you guys on the phone. We
thank you for your service. And out of respect for the next
panel, I'm not going to ask any more questions. But, thank you.
Senator Casey. Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I--and most of the questions I was going to ask have
been asked. But, Mr. Milligan, I'd want to kind of zero in for
just a few minutes on clean water. What's the situation in
Haiti with clean water?
Mr. Milligan. I'm sorry, sir?
Senator Kaufman. Clean water. Providing water for the folks
in Haiti.
Mr. Milligan. Oh, sure, yes. During the emergency response,
clean water has been a key focus for us, because--not only
because it's necessary to sustain life, but also it's key to
sanitation.
The--during the initial response efforts, we have seen
about a 50-percent increase in the production of clean water.
We mobilized a chlorination system quickly that enabled
increased access to clean water. So, a greater number of
Haitians have access to this clean water than before the
earthquake.
One of the things that we're aware of is, as we transition,
we have to ensure the sustainability and the viability of the
water providers. And so, as of last Sunday, water is no longer
subsidized outside of the IDP settlements. Inside the IDP
settlements, water is still arriving via tanker truck to
bladders, because that's necessary to maintain sanitation
levels in----
Senator Kaufman. How--what's the big problem, do you think,
going forward? Is it money or is it technology or----
Mr. Milligan. With water, sir?
Senator Kaufman. Yes.
Mr. Milligan. It's--I think that there are several things.
It's capacity. We have had--there was--prior to the earthquake,
there was a reorganization of the water sector. I think the
NEPA, which is the provider of water, is doing, actually, an
outstanding job, given the challenges, because they're
responsible for the entire water and sanitation sector. They've
done a very good job. We need--they need continued capacity
support and building. There's the basic question of overall
water infrastructure. As you know, prior to the earthquake,
there are very few people who were part of that network. And
so, continued work on that.
One of the things we want to do is to--through the use of
supplemental funds--is to ensure a focus outside of Port-au-
Prince, in growth polls, to target the capacity of local
government so local government can plan better and how to
provide services. And I'm sure that one of the services they're
going to want to plan better on is provision of water.
Senator Kaufman. Great. I want to know--anything we can do
to help on this as we go forward, please, let us know.
Mr. Milligan. OK. Will do.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Kaufman.
Mr. Milligan, we want to thank you for your testimony. Mr.
Ambassador, for your testimony. We'll thank you in advance for
the written testimony you'll submit. And we're grateful for
your service to the country and the work you've done in Haiti
already. Thank you very much.
We'll move to our second panel. It's--this is, as well, an
esteemed panel of nongovernment witnesses.
Our first witness is the Honorable Andrew Natsios,
distinguished professor at Georgetown University's Foreign
Service--School of Foreign Service, and a former USAID
Administrator. Our second panelist is Sean Penn, the founder of
J/P Haiti Relief. That organization located in San Francisco.
And then, finally, Mark Schneider, senior vice president,
International Crisis Group, Washington, DC.
And I'd like to thank each of our witnesses again for being
here, for providing not only your testimony, but, in all cases,
your work literally on the ground in Haiti and your commitment
to getting the strategy right, in terms of what we do, going
forward.
I'd ask the witnesses, because your testimony will be
submitted for the record, to try to keep your testimony within
that 5-to-7 time range, if that's at all possible.
We'll start from the right of the table, going right to
left. Mr. Natsios, we'll begin with your testimony. And the
floor is yours.
Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW S. NATSIOS, DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR,
SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON,
DC
Ambassador Natsios. Thank you very much, Senator. I want to
thank the committee for inviting me to speak today.
I would, first, like to compliment the United Nations
agencies, particularly UNICEF, the World Food Programme, UNDP,
and United Nations Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian
Assistance, the NGO community, USAID, the U.S. military, and
the State Department--for an excellent job in a very difficult
circumstance. There are two things that led to a very difficult
response; first, that Haiti was a failed state prior to the
earthquake. Typically, as in Indonesia, for example, during the
Aceh earthquake we had a highly functional national government
that helped us with what we had to do, that could make
decisions and that was competent in getting lots of things
done. That was not the case before this earthquake in Haiti.
Second, this natural disaster also happened in the capital
city, where all the NGOs, the U.N., and all the government
ministries were located, and there was a massive loss of life
among the people who would normally manage the response. So,
Haiti is very atypical. There are 62 disasters a year that
USAID responds to through its disaster response mechanism. You
hear about one or two, because they make it onto the news. The
rest of them, you don't ever hear about, because they're
actually handled so well, in terms of the nature and content of
our response, through both Democratic and Republican
administrations. So, I'm very proud of the agency's work and of
its disaster response staff. I ran that office, 20 years ago,
under President George H.W. Bush, as my first job in
international work.
But, I want to talk a little bit about, not the relief
response--if you ask questions, I'd be glad to discuss this
topic--but more about the condition of the Haitian Government
because I think the worst thing we can do is be nice about this
issue and apply a Disney World assessment to what we're dealing
with.
We are dealing with one of the worst-governed countries in
the world, and clearly one of the worst-governed countries in
Latin America. There was an earthquake in Chile that was
comparable to that of Haiti; 500 people died in Chile while
230,000 people died in Haiti. What's the difference? The
difference is that the Chilean, along with the Costa Rican,
Government are the two best-run Latin American governments. And
therefore, if you have an earthquake in a country that's highly
functional, with a strong government presence, you can help
them do their work; you don't do it for them.
For the last 30 or 40 years, we have basically been
administering public services in Haiti, through NGOs, through
contractors, through the U.N. agencies, because the Haitian
state can't do it itself. Eighty-five percent of the children
in school in Haiti are in private schools; only 15 percent are
in public schools because the the Ministry of Education is so
dysfunctional.
A World Bank study examining Haitian bureaucracy was
conducted about 5 or 10 years ago, and it showed that 30
percent of the people working in the bureaucracy are phantom
employees; they don't exist. They get paid, they're on the
payroll, but they don't report for work, ever, and most of them
don't even exist. In one ministry of 10,000 workers, 50 percent
of the staff were phantom employees.
Some advocacy groups have been in favor of using money for
budget support to support this system, which I think is a
terrible idea. We are basically taking the clientele networks
that control the Haitian state and putting more money into
them. The reason the aid community has gone around the Haitian
state is because it's so dysfunctional.
I collected a few statistics which I thought would be
illustrative of the condition of the Haitian state. First,
Transparency International, a well-respected international NGO
that does work on corruption, gave Haiti the 10th lowest score
in the entire world in terms of corruption levels. Its rank
falls next to those of Equatorial Guinea, Burundi, and Iran.
Second, there is a very interesting statistic about the
nature of doing business in Haiti provided by the World Bank in
its Ease-of-Doing-Business Report. Haiti ranks 151st out of
183, having the worst business climate in the world, save 30
other countries. And as a result, legitimate businesses don't
go there because it's hard to register, you have to pay bribes
to get your licenses, and so on.
The reason why the country's so poor is because the
business climate is so bad. There have to be efforts to reform
it because, if that is not done, then all other reforms and all
other aid that we provide will simply not be effective. Unless
there is a growing private sector, a dynamic economy, and an
emerging middle class, with a growing private sector economy.
Haiti will remain a failed state in 5 years unless major
reforms are undertaken now.
There are 2 million Haitian Americans. They are upwardly
mobile, they're hardworking, they're entrepreneurial, but they
live here and in Canada, not in Haiti. Eighty percent of
Haitians with college degrees live in Canada and the United
States, not in Haiti. That is a very disturbing statistic.
There's a massive drain of skilled people out of the country to
the United States. And when they get here, they do very well.
So, it's not the Haitian people; it's the system that is
profoundly dysfunctional.
How do we change this? Well, for one, we're going to have
to try to bring back, in my view, the diaspora to Haiti. We did
this, by the way, very quietly in Afghanistan. During the first
few months, we brought back 1,000 Afghans from the diaspora
living in Europe and the United States--including Ph.D.s and
major business figures. And, the five best-run ministries in
Kabul were run by the diaspora people we had brought back. We
quietly put them on the USAID payroll, not directly, but
through our contractors, and those people ran what turned out
to be the best-run ministries.
I suggest, on a larger scale, something like that be done
with other donors because, if we just funnel money into the
existing system, it's not going to improve governance in the
country. Unless you improve governance and the rule of law, you
are not going to have a functional Haitian state, and you will
continue to have what we just had happen. Instead of what we
saw in Chile, we will witness a recurrence of this terrible
tragedy at some point in the future with another natural
disaster.
I could go through a whole bunch of other indicators, but
there's one other statistic that's also very relevant and
should be mentioned here. Haiti is one of the most densely
populated countries in the world. It ranks 30th in terms of
land per capita. And the 30 countries that are more densely
populated are little, tiny countries like Singapore which is
rich, but it's not a country; it's a city-state. Haiti is more
densely populated than India. It cannot feed itself, even if it
had the best agricultural system in the world. We should
improve the agricultural sector. USAID and other donors are
proposing with the Haitian Government to decentralize the
economy away from its concentration in the capital city: this
is a very good idea. I strongly support it. We need to put more
of a focus on that. But, unless there's industrialization in
Haiti, it will continue to be a very poor country.
Industrialization did take place in Haiti during the 1980s
and the mid-1990s. There were 400,000 people working in
factories--assembly plants, basically, for manufacturing soccer
balls, shoes, clothing and such--and they received a monthly
wage. They were paying taxes. And, then, there was political
chaos with Aristide and the military coup, and then the United
States imposed economic sanctions. These sanctions, along with
political turmoil and rampant violence, drove the middle class
out of Haiti to the United States and Canada and the
manufacturing plants moved to Central America.
So, unless there's order, and unless we open our markets up
to Haitian products, they are not going to have a growing
economy. We should take a holistic approach. We need to have a
free trade agreement with Haiti so there are no restrictions on
the importation of Haitian goods to the United States. I don't
think it's a big threat to our economy to open our markets up
to one of the poorest countries in the world. Congress did a
very good thing in 2008 by passing a partial bill. I think we
need a full bill. We need a full bill to open markets up
because that will attract the business communities of Canada
and the United States, possibly using people from the Haitian
diaspora to begin industrializing the country, not just in
Port-au-Prince, but in other parts of the country as well. And,
perhaps, this industrialization can also be attached to
agriculture because you can have industrialization where you're
bottling canning and there is food processing. We also need
rural roads for that.
One of my concerns regarding the aid budget is that there's
a lot of money for programs that are visible, quick, and
appealing. But, no one wants to fund the programs that aren't
politically appealing. And this is not just in Congress; this
is the case with the executive branch, too. Thirty-five percent
of our total foreign aid budget worldwide is for health
projects. Do you know anybody in favor of disease? I don't know
any interest group in favor of disease. There are, however,
lots of people who don't like agricultural programs. I won't go
through them all; you can guess who they are. But, they usually
would stop USAID's request for more money from this body for
agricultural programs. They don't like fertilizer, they don't
like GMO seed, or they think it's competition for the U.S.
farmers, which is nonsense. And so, such programs do not get
funded--until the recent food crisis occurred caused by rising
food prices.
The governance and democracy component of of AID
constitutes only 4 percent of our aid programming, while 35
percent is dedicated to health. So, the money is not there to
do the things we need to do because the budgets are earmarked
based on political pressures, which I understand. I was a
former State legislator of Massachusetts for 12 years; I
understand the pressures that Members of Congress are under.
And, I ran AID for 5 years; I know what you all requested of
us: the things that help people, personally. If we don't
improve governance in Haiti, we're not going to be able to have
the Haitian Government running schools that children go to or
providing health clinics that can treat people so we don't have
to keep going in with this huge international apparatus to run
the country on their behalf.
So, we need governance reform as a top priority. That is
what's in the AID budget. I urge Congress to approve, without
any restrictions, what AID requested in terms of its governance
and democracy program because, without it, this reconstruction
effort is simply not going to work.
And, the second most important thing is economic growth.
People say, ``We need to just have free trade.'' That is not
enough. Haiti needs to have improved policies to make it easier
for people to start businesses, to create jobs, to have
economic growth. Haiti needs rural roads to stimulate economic
growth. If there's economic growth, citizens pay taxes, which
will fund the Haitian Government to operate the way it's
supposed to operate, not as a failed state.
So, those are some ideas. I have written testimony with
many other ideas, but time is short, and I know you want to ask
questions, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Natsios follows:]
Prepared Statement Andrew S. Natsios, Professor, Georgetown University
School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC
In the wake of the January 12 quake that killed more than 200,000
people and left over 1 million homeless, an avalanche of humanitarian
aid poured into the Haiti to save lives and reduce human suffering.\1\
Due to its magnitude and proximity to Haiti's lone urban center and
economic hub, Port-au-Prince, this earthquake has demonstrated the
extent and scope of vulnerability of the Haitian population, of whom
over 80 percent were below the poverty line before the earthquake.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61703220100208.
\2\ CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/fields/2046.
html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the immediate crisis stabilizes, the United States must
transition its assistance programs in Haiti in order to promote broad-
based, long-term economic growth and gradually phase out short-term
humanitarian aid. In March of this year, the Haitian Government
unveiled their ``Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of
Haiti,'' which portrayed this tragic event as ``an opportunity to unite
Haitians of all classes and origins in a shared project to rebuild the
country on new foundations.'' \3\ The Government's desire to ``reverse
the spiral of vulnerability'' created by natural disasters seems to
focus on the proper target.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Government of Haiti: http://www.haiticonference.org/
Haiti_Action_Plan_ENG.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This tragedy was not simply a natural disaster; it was a man-made
disaster stemming from a failed Haitian state characterized by
widespread patrimonialism, corruption, and critically ineffective
service delivery. Despite $5.3 billion in foreign aid invested by
bilateral and multilateral donors from 1990 to 2005 (approximately $1.5
billion of which came from the United States), Haiti persists as one of
the poorest and worst governed countries in the hemisphere, if not the
world.\4\ Much of this U.S. Government assistance has been humanitarian
rather than nation-building assistance, and has kept people alive
through repeated political crisis. The Government of Haiti has been
characterized as autocratic and unstable. To ensure loyalty within a
society that has been riddled with gang violence and plagued by abject
poverty for decades, elites have created patronage networks to employ
their supporters, provided selective public services to them, all
funded by rent-seeking and limits on the creation of legitimate
institutions which might challenge their monopoly control over the
society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ National Academy of Public Administration: http://
www.napawash.org/haiti_final.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2009, Transparency International assigned Haiti the 10th lowest
score in the world on its Corruption Perception Index, next to
Equatorial Guinea, Burundi, and Iran.\5\ According to an advisor to the
organization, Roslyn Hees, coauthor of the handbook ``Preventing
Corruption in Humanitarian Operations,'' Haiti is the perfect storm for
corruption risk due to ``shattered institutions, an anemic state, a
history of graft, and the sudden deluge of aid money.'' \6\ Not only
does this failed state ensure that the majority of Haitians will remain
poor, but it also limits the potential of aid programs that simply
provide budgetary support to the Haitian Government. The solution must
be to focus on improving public policy, establishing the rule of law,
and improving governance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org/
policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.
\6\ Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/03/10/AR20100
31003012.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the bleak outlook that exists today, Haiti did experience a
promising period of industrialization in the late 1980s during which
time a class of regularly paid workers was developing from an emerging
base of assembly plants. However, with the overthrow of Jean-Bertrand
Aristide in September 1991, a military regime took control of the
country; the violence and repression that followed locked the country
into a self-destructive condition that remains to this day. Even though
Aristide was brought back to office with international help 3 years
later in 1994, the hope he had represented largely vanished as he
brutalized his opponents and drove the emergent working and middle
class to Canada and the United States.
Additionally, U.S. and U.N. Security Council Sanctions in the 1990s
contributed to the end of the hope of industrialization and economic
growth. These sanctions created a skilled labor shortage as there was
an exodus of the Haitian educated, middle class to the United States
and Canada, a trend that continues to this day. In fact, a recent poll
has indicated that 67 percent of Haitians would emigrate if they could.
Two million Haitians already live in the United States, of whom 60
percent are now American-born, and four-fifths of Haiti's college-
educated citizens live outside of the country. A new Haiti must have
substantial educated middle class as a foundation, or it will fail.
The weakness of the Haitian state is clearly evident when this
tragic event is juxtaposed with an equivalent earthquake in Chile in
February which led to less than 500 casualties and was far less
consequential in terms of physical destruction. Unlike Haiti, Chile is
one of the best governed countries in Latin America, has a very
impressive business community and a vibrant nonprofit sector. In Chile,
it is apparent that building standards were enforced so buildings did
not collapse in the earthquake, emergency response teams were
reasonably well-prepared, and the government demonstrated the capacity
to help. In Haiti, however, it is very apparent that the situation was
the opposite.
In a new book, ``Violence and Social Orders,'' Nobel Prize winning
economist Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast argue that it
is the density of legitimate institutions that distinguishes rich from
poor countries. Rich countries have them, and poor countries do not.
The United States, for example, is probably more densely packed with
institutions per capita than any society in world history which is one
of the primary determinants of America's wealth and stability. In fact,
there is one nonprofit for every 160 people in United States and over
85,000 units of government serving U.S. citizens. If measurement was
possible, Haiti would probably have the lowest number of legitimate
institutions of any country in the Western Hemisphere, and perhaps the
world.
A World Bank study of Haitian governance reports noted that ``30
percent of civil service were phantom employees . . . One ministry had
10,000 employees, only about half of whom were ever at work.'' A USAID
evaluation of Haitian Government institutions reported they are
``characterized by lack of trained personnel; no performance-based
personnel system, no accepted hiring, firing, and promotion procedures;
heavy top down management; and a decided lack of direction.'' In a
word, Haiti was already a failed state before the earthquake took place
and the poor response after the earthquake was a function of it being a
failed state.
International business and capital markets do not invest money in
failed states, and without such investment, job creation on the scale
necessary to change the dynamics of Haitian society is impossible.
Beyond the terrible loss of human life from the earthquake, a much less
visible, but nevertheless significant devastation was the destruction
of jobs, businesses, and economic activity. So, Haiti now faces the
twin economic challenge of mass unemployment from the earthquake and a
terrible business climate derived from its failed state status.
According to the World Bank's 2010 ``Ease of Doing Business''
Indicators, which provide an objective measure of business regulations
and their enforcement across 183 economies, Haiti ranked 151st , making
it very difficult to start a legitimate business.\7\ The Bank's report
indicates that, while the average cost of starting a business is 4.7
percent of income per capita in OECD countries and 36.6 percent across
Latin America, it constitutes 227.9 percent of income per capita in
Haiti. And, while registering property in OECD and Latin American
countries takes an average of 25.0 and 70.4 days respectively, it takes
over a year in Haiti. According to the Bank's ``Protecting Investors--
Transparency of Transactions Index,'' Haiti has scored 2 out of 10,
significantly below the average score of 4.0 across Latin America.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ World Bank: http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/
?economyid=85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These figures demonstrate that, without formal institutions capable
and able of providing the enforcement mechanisms necessary to decrease
risk and uncertainty, businesses will not pursue economic opportunities
and invest in the economy even though this is essential for recovery.
Thus, any effort to build new institutions must incorporate private
sector development; it cannot solely target the Haitian state in a
vacuum.
Despite the critical importance of these objectives, the challenge
ahead is daunting, particularly considering the general consensus among
the international donor community that long-term development programs
in Haiti have been largely ineffective in the past. A National Academy
of Public Administration report of 2006 on why foreign aid has failed
in Haiti summarized general donor opinion which has ``variously
characterized Haiti as a nightmare, predator, collapsed, failed,
failing, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom, virtual or pariah state.''
The World Bank is poised to invest another $100 million in Haiti even
though the Director of its Operations Evaluation Department claimed in
2002 that ``the outcome of World Bank assistance programs [in Haiti
from 1986 to 2002 has been] rated unsatisfactory (if not highly so),
the institutional development impact, negligible, and the
sustainability of the few benefits that have accrued, unlikely.'' The
Bank also noted that ``Haiti has dysfunctional budgetary, financial or
procurement systems, making financial and aid management impossible.''
\8\ Even the Government of Haiti, in 1997, admitted that it had a
serious aid management problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ National Academy of Public Administration: http://
www.napawash.org/haiti_final.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Historical evidence suggests that countries can make significant
reforms following a catastrophic natural disaster of the scale Haiti
has just been through. It is important to note that the solidarity and
optimism expressed in the GOH's ``Action Plan for National Recovery and
Development of Haiti'' is nothing new. According to Robert Klitgaard in
his study ``Addressing Corruption in Haiti,'' when Aristide came to
office in 1991, he promised to ``wash away the old Haiti of Papa Doc
and Baby Doc Duvalier, the tonton macoutes, the predatory corruption''
when in fact he simply replaced one tyranny with another. As recently
as April 2009, ``Prime Minister Michele Duvivier Pierre-Louis gave an
impassioned speech to Haiti's aid donors: `I believe that together we
will seize this opportunity to make a real difference and change
forever the course of history,' she said. `We strongly believe that
Haiti is at a turning point, perhaps even a tipping point.' But she
also acknowledged that Haiti calling for a new beginning can evoke
derisive laughter. `In Haiti, popular comedians have for the past 50
years parodied the almost theatrical repeated announcement of a `Great
Beginning' in which they did not really believe themselves. The time
has come to break away from such cynicism.' '' \9\ Action Plan itself
calls for a ``progressive increase in decentralized skills'' and an
``increase in the role of [local] municipalities in reducing
vulnerabilities and protecting inhabitants.'' However, such reform will
remain superficial unless there is true ownership in the Haitian
Government. The composition of the Action Plan's proposed Interim
Commission for Haitian Reconstruction has been called into question by
Transparency International's Senior Consultant Roslyn Hees: ``the
majority of the commission would be made up of international agencies
and a minority would be made up of Haitian representatives. Even within
the Haitian representation, there is no one from civil society, except
a representative of Haitian unions, who cover a minuscule proportion of
the Haitian workforce since most of the workforce is informal and not
unionized.'' \10\ Although it is essential that the Haitian Government
assume ownership in the agenda-building process, it is critical that
the United States contributes only to a long-term development plan that
is both inclusive and transformational.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Robert Klitgaard, ``Addressing Corruption in Haiti,'' February
2010: http://www.cgu.edu/PDFFiles/Presidents%20Office/
Addressing%20Systemic%20Corruption%20in%20Haiti%20_3_.pdf.
\10\ http://talkradionews.com/2010/03/corruption-watchdog-worried-
by-haitian-reconstruction-plan/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the United States transitions from short-term humanitarian
assistance toward the reconstruction of Haiti's shattered capital and
economy, our aid must alter the power structure within the Haitian
Government and economy, the open the society up to genuine democratic
principles and to a free market economy. Too many policymakers in
Washington too often take reconstruction literally--as bricks and
mortar alone--when in fact rebuilding needs to address much more than
that. Clearly, port facilities, roads, bridges, schools, health
clinics, and water systems (which were already crumbling before the
earthquake) must be rebuilt. But, if that is the extent of our
reconstruction efforts, then Haiti will simply revert to its failed
state status and whatever is reconstructed will begin to crumble over
time without institutions to ensure maintenance.
Moreover, U.S. technical assistance to Haiti has proven ineffective
because the institutions necessary to take advantage of these knowledge
transfers do not exist. Since 1989, USAID/OFDA has offered an
``Advanced First Responders Course'' throughout Latin America and the
Caribbean within its Technical Assistance and Training Program (TATP).
From June 1998 to May 2003, there have been more than 12,000 first
responders in the TATP which has certified more than 2,100 active
instructors. However, no matter how much training is done, functional
institutions--which Haiti does not have--are needed to use the trained
people properly.
Unless the U.S. Government balances physical reconstruction and
technical assistance with institution-building--a much more difficult,
time-consuming, less visible, but more essential effort--Haiti will
remain a failed state. The political pressure from Washington, as it
has been in other state-building exercises, will be for Haiti
reconstruction to be fast, visible, and produce measureable results
when, in fact, building functional institutions will take 10 to 20
years, its greatest successes will not be dramatic or visible, and many
will be difficult to quantify or measure. Aid efforts in Haiti in the
past have focused too much on delivering public services through
nongovernmental organizations and international organizations instead
of the trying to reform the Haitian institutions that should be
delivering these services.
Thus, first and foremost, Haiti's transformation into a functional
nation requires a strong emphasis on issues of governance and rule of
law within our aid programs. The predominant culture and values of a
society can either facilitate or impede development. The latter is
certainly the case in terms of Haiti's destructive political culture
which has been marred by patramonialism, clientelism, and patronage
networks.
Lawrence E. Harrison points out in his book, ``The Central Liberal
Truth,'' that ``Haiti suffers from a complex web of progress-resistant
cultural influences which spreads the message that life is capricious
and planning futile. There are high levels of social mistrust.
Responsibility is often not internalized. Child-rearing practices often
involve neglect in the early years and harsh retribution when kids hit
9 or 10.''
In ``Violence and Social Orders,'' Douglass North describes two
types of societies: limited-access order and open-access order
societies. Most of human history has been dominated by the former which
are ``governed by a dominant elite or coalition that stays on top by
controlling and distributing patronage and privilege. How you fare, in
a limited-access order, depends on who you are and whom you know.''
Over the past few hundred years, however, open-access orders have
emerged which ``allow political participation and economic access on
equal terms according to impersonal rules. Broad, government-enforced
rights replace selective, government-distributed privileges.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Jonathan Rauch
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using North's terminology, it is critical that there is a
transformation in Haiti from such a limited-access order to an open-
access order because they are ``more politically stable and
economically successful than their precursors; in fact, today they
dominate the world. But developing a culture based on rule of law under
which dominant elites willingly surrender their monopoly on power can
take centuries, if it ever happens at all. Only a mature natural
state--one with durable institutions, a military under firm political
control, and elites who are acclimated to the rule of law--can make the
transition to an open order.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Jonathan Rauch
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any effort to build new Haitian institutions will also require
security, without which the exodus of educated professionals will
continue. The GOH must develop a trained police force which respects
human rights, avoids politics, and ensures the security of the Haitian
people. Criminal gangs linked to the drug trade have grown more
powerful over the past few years and are behind the growing violence in
Haitian society. Unless this is trend is arrested, any effort to build
new institutions will fail. While crime fighting has been entirely the
province of some 9,000 U.N. peacekeepers since 2004, the Haitian
Government must develop local police and security forces for sustained
security with the U.N. providing back up until these institutions are
functional.
Of course, institution-building efforts must be coupled with
progrowth economic policies. The GOH's Action Plan aptly recognizes the
need to decentralize the country economically and politically away from
Port-au-Prince through the development of regional economies and the
subsequent diffusion of job creation. Haiti needs to develop a
functioning economic system, agricultural export markets, and a rural
road network. And although Haiti currently enjoys duty-free access to
U.S. markets for certain Haitian-made apparel items through the Haitian
Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008,
a more comprehensive free trade agreement between our countries will
tie our economy with Haiti's and recreate a market for Haitian products
which with economic reform can stimulate growth and job creation.\13\
The Haitian private sector will be much more likely to accept reform
than the public sector, and thus can be an engine for progress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ USAID Summary: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACN939.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We must also encourage the participation of the prosperous,
educated Haitian-diaspora in the United States and Canadian because
they have the potential to be major assets in the reconstruction of the
country. As Haiti is only 600 miles from the U.S. mainland, such
individuals would be able to come and go with relative ease. Such
efforts should be accompanied by a program that enables Haitians to
come to the United States to attain education. The most successful
institution-building program used by USAID historically was its
scholarship programs which brought 18,000 students a year to U.S.
colleges and universities to get their graduate degrees. The USAID
scholarship programs have been phased out over time because Washington
regulators demanded immediate and visible results which scholarships
could not produce. But they can produce transformational long-term
change because graduates usually return to their home countries from
their U.S. experience as reformers. Bringing promising Haitians to the
United States to get their graduate degrees with safeguards to ensure
they return to Haiti when they graduate can complement the return of
the Haitian diaspora to build new institutions.
Such transformational programs would surely affect the economic,
social, and political power structures of Haitian society. But without
buy-in from elites, the vested interests in Haitian society will
undermine any reform efforts. Even though major natural disasters are
sometimes a catalyst to reform movements, no outside aid agency,
whether it be the U.N., World Bank, the NGOs, or USAID, can substitute
for Haitian leadership.
Without such competent and honest Haitian leadership, any
institution-building exercise will fail. Lasting change will be
achieved when Haitian political leaders show the political will to
enact and implement major political and economic reforms. Haitian
President Prevel has shown some technical skill in undertaking improved
governance over the past 2 years, but he remained virtually invisible
in the humanitarian aid effort which damaged him politically. He will
need help, and one of the best ways of generating that help in a
country which has had a chronic leadership deficit, is to bring back
Haitians from the diaspora to help him build new Haitian institutions.
It is important to differentiate between the political
``ownership'' recommended here within and other circumstances in which
donor agencies simply provide budgetary support to recipient country
governments so that they may pursue their objectives, regardless of
what they may be. Paul Collier, in his book ``The Bottom Billion,''
equates the external provision of budgetary support to countries like
Haiti to the large inflows of oil revenue enjoyed by oil-rich
developing countries such as Nigeria that have ``depressingly little to
show for it.'' He argues that past evidence demonstrates that ``large
inflows of money without any restrictions do not seem to be well spent
in many of the countries'' where the poorest populations reside.
Certainly in Haiti, where corruption is rampant and much of the
government bureaucracy is a phantom, such budgetary support would
attract predatory forces, even if controls were introduced.
Regarding the aid allocated by the United States for the
reconstruction of Haiti, a very long-time horizon will be required as
it takes considerable time for institutions to form in such a society.
Any development plan of less than 10 years will not yield sustainable
and transformational results. Given the operational context through
which aid programs will operate, the usual quarterly measurements
demanded by the federal oversight agencies will not be useful and as
contracts and grants will not be implemented within standard timeframes
because of Haiti's weak institutions.
To do this there must be a reduction of the regulatory and
compliance burden on USAID. The Haitian Government and the USAID
mission in Haiti will be empowered if funds are provided with as little
micromanagement from Washington as possible. And, as predictable
funding streams allow for greater dedication to programs, it is
important that there is as much funding at the beginning of the plan as
at the end. Washington must also avoid earmarking any funding by
sectors or programs as the most transformational sectors have the least
interest group support in Washington and will not produce short-term
measureable outcomes.
If western countries want to end the dysfunctional cycle of crisis
and failed band aid development in Haiti, only an institution-based
model of reconstruction will succeed. U.S. aid programs must be
designed to facilitate better governance by the Haitian Government in
addition to economic growth across Haitian society. Priority must be
placed on the agricultural sector and the secondary road network to
create an integrated national Haitian economy, rather than one
dependent exclusively on the capital, Port-au-Prince. The professional
expertise of the Haitian diaspora should be utilized, and scholarships
must be extended to train professional managers and technical staff in
GOH ministries. And, such initiatives should be complemented by
security sector reform that produces a functioning criminal justice
system and police force to protect the Haitian people. While history
may project a pessimistic outlook for Haiti's transformation, it also
provides critical lessons that the GOH and international community must
consider in order to move Haiti toward a brighter future.
Senator Casey. Mr. Natsios, thanks very much.
Mr. Penn.
STATEMENT OF SEAN PENN, FOUNDER, J/P HAITIAN RELIEF
ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, CA
Mr. Penn. Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, my name is Sean
Penn. I've been on the ground in Haiti, since the first week
following January's earthquake, as NGO director and CEO for the
J/P Haitian Relief Organization.
Since that time, my team and I have lived in a tent camp in
the Bourdon area of Port-au-Prince, adjacent to and
administering aid to a 55,000-person IDP camp, one of the
largest ad hoc camps in the country. My organization has been
designated camp manager of this site, locally called ``Terrain
de Golfe'' by the U.N. International Organization of Migration.
From our first days in Haiti, my team and I witnessed
amputations without anesthesia or IV pain medication, things we
soon were able to supply to hospitals and clinics throughout
the city and country; emergency amputations performed in
spontaneously raised tent operating rooms, dusty and mosquito-
ridden; limbs severed from children with tools more familiar to
the local hardware store than to those we traditionally expect
in the hands of surgeons.
It is true that this stage of post-quake trauma and drama
has largely subsided. Only 2 weeks ago, however, a less
tangible, visible, or fundable emergency raised its head. Our
camp clinic diagnosed what became the first confirmed case of
diphtheria. I rode in the back of the ambulance while the
patient was refused from several hospitals because the 15-year-
old boy, Oriole Lynn Peter, was diagnosed with a disease for
which those hospitals had no treatment capability.
In this city of ruins, five fully functionally hospitals
have been allowed to close, despite the emergent disasters, due
to financial undersupport and the inertia of protective
overscrutiny. In many cases, the bureaucracy of international
aid is ``protecting people to death.''
Diphtheria is among the first of five things that an
American traveling to Haiti is inoculated against, and yet, in
a country devastated with hundreds of millions of American-
donated dollars of dedicated emergency aid, and billions
pledged for reconstruction, there were no isolation wards, few
ventilators and, despite the all-out last-minute efforts of the
administrations of every major hospital in the city, the
American Red Cross, the dedicated and beyond-job-description
effort of the commander of U.S. military forces in Haiti, the
WHO, USAID, and the CDC, along with a fractured Haitian
Ministry of Health, it took 14 hours, between all of these
organizations, to locate a single patient dose of the
immunoglobulin that would have likely saved this 15-year-old
boy's life, had it been readily available.
As we rode through the rubble and traffic-blocked streets
in search of his care, I held the ankle of an animated and
normal 15-year-old boy, who, to his own knowledge, was merely
suffering from a sore throat and a bit of fever. He couldn't
have known that the grey-hued bacteria in his esophagus would
kill him within a day and a half, and it did.
Since that day, a series of diphtheria cases have come to
light, including another one in our camp, brought to our
hospital 4 days ago.
But, diphtheria is only one of many diseases that threaten,
in particular, the 1.8 million displaced today, living in
compressed and unsanitary camps, where tent-to-tent
construction would take just one match to create an inferno
that can incinerate thousands.
In a city where nearly no access--where there is nearly no
access to electricity, there is little fuel to run the
generators, few lights to generate, and the rapes of women and
children may occur at will, it will be the rain of this season
that spreads the diarrheal diseases, where, globally, 80
percent of the fatal cases are among children under 5. There
are hundreds of thousands of them in Port-au-Prince alone.
It should be said that, while there are claims to grand
programs of immunization, it is the simple truth that Haitians,
for the most part, remain unprotected, and that there is little
evidence that those that have been immunized have records or
access to established boosters and followup necessary with
the--as with all immunizations.
It should also be said that, in a city the size of Port-au-
Prince, as with the densely populated--all densely populated
areas of Haiti, the idea that, as in the case of the diphtheria
immunoglobulin, a single warehouse maintains what little supply
may exist, is an unacceptable acceptance.
Prevention is difficult to get people excited about, but
cold chains for the transport and preservation of these
necessary immunizations and treatments must be established
throughout Port-au-Prince and Haiti, as much stockpiles for the
necessary remedies for the dehydration that comes with
diarrheal diseases.
It must also be said that the quality and training of
prequake health care in Haiti was already at a minimum, and
that with the death and flight of so many among the most
capable in Haitian medical community, that it will be some time
before the international medical staff will be relieved of the
humanitarian and training demand.
I come here today as a witness, not only to the state of
current emergency, but also to the heroic efforts of the United
States and international doctors, soldiers, and relief workers,
of the NGOs in partnership and service with the great Haitian
people and their government.
I come here today and hope that we'll address with bold
clarity the razor's edge upon which Haiti lies, so that all in
our own country, all that our country has given in sacrifice
and service, will not be washed away with this rainy season and
leave bright and dancing Haitian eyes to go still in death from
disease and flood and, God forbid, the man-made disaster of
violent unrest.
From President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, and
Secretary of Defense Gates, and throughout the policies and
generosities offered this situation to date, the United States
can hold its head very high. The compassionate and no-nonsense
posture of our military has been moving and inspiring. But,
with the official emergency phase declared over, as most of
them redeploy into other struggles, we owe it to all of them,
and to ourselves, in reestablishing the character of American
foreign policy, to stay the course in Haiti. Make no mistake,
this is a war against our ally and neighbor, and we have only
this chance to show the world that we are willing to fight that
war and save its victims, and are not dependent on hating and
killing their assailant.
It is a war against the diseases and preventable disasters
caused by nature and poverty. And the United States military
has played, and must continue to play, a central role in Haiti,
as the surge of the enemy is imminent. Countrywide, we have
dropped American troop levels from about 22,000 to somewhere in
the area of 500.
We must also not underestimate the likelihood, known to all
of us on the ground in Haiti, of some level of violent social
unrest. As Americans, we could call on the Government of Haiti
and our own Government to acknowledge that a state of emergency
still exists, to demand full transparency in the way that aid
is distributed, and accountability for how aid organizations
advertise themselves in the solicitation of funds. Full and
total transparency.
Now is the time for all concerned parties to acknowledge
that an emergency phase is simply an economic determination and
that prevention of foreseeable human tolls on massive levels--
in particular, young children--cannot be summarily dismissed by
the aspiration of a monumental reconstruction, offering
empowerment, demanding independence in governance, or claiming
it is a distraction from the rebuilding of a country that, in
many ways, was never built in the first place.
The Haitian people are as strong and resilient as any I've
ever seen. There are great lessons of character for our country
to learn from the Haitians. President Preval and his
administration have proven, in their prequake efforts, the will
of Haiti to overcome its devastating legacies. But, to demand
of them, or encourage their demand of, a fractured society's
independence prematurely will be murder by another name. Issues
of equity and distribution of aid are a fine aspiration, but,
when the emergency room has got a line out the door, and the
hospital pharmaceutical stockpile has not been inventoried, we
have to find a way to treat patients while the counting is
done, and not leave them at the door to die on the street.
I am, and I believe I speak for all responsible aid
workers, in full support of parallel planning and
reconstruction and the nurturing of an independent people's
self-reliance. But, as we punish those who are lazy, punish
those who are corrupt, so shall we kill the innocent and the
willful.
In an emergency, donors offer money and expect it to be
spent helping people. I hope we are here today to encourage
just that.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Penn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sean Penn, Founder, J/P Haiti Relief
Organization, San Francisco, CA
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Sean Penn. I
have been in Haiti as Director and CEO of my NGO J/P Haitian Relief
Organization, and have been on the ground in Haiti since the first week
following January's earthquake. Since that time, my team and I have
lived in a tent camp in the Bourdon area of Port-au-Prince, adjacent to
and administering aid to a 55,000 person IDP camp, one of the largest
ad-hock camps in the country. My organization has been designated by
the U.N. International Office of Migration as camp management for this
IDP camp.
From our first days in Haiti, my team and I witnessed amputations
without anesthesia or IV pain medication, things we soon were able to
supply to hospitals and clinics throughout the city and the country.
Limbs severed in spontaneously raised tent operating rooms, dusty and
mosquito ridden. Limbs severed from children with tools more familiar
to our local hardware store than to those we traditionally expect in
the hands of surgeons. It is true that this stage of post-quake trauma
and drama has largely subsided.
Only 2 weeks ago however, a less tangible, visible or fundable
emergency raised its head. Our camp clinic diagnosed what became the
first confirmed case of diphtheria. I rode in the back of the ambulance
while the patient was refused from several hospitals because the 15-
year-old boy, Oriole Lynn Peter, was diagnosed with a disease for which
those hospitals had no treatment capability. In this city of ruins 5
fully functional hospitals have been allowed to close despite these
emergent disasters, facing financial undersupport and overscrutiny. In
many cases, the bureaucracy of international aid is protecting people
to death. Diphtheria is among the first five things that an American
traveling to Haiti is inoculated against, and yet, in this devastated
country with hundreds of millions of American donated dollars of
dedicated emergency aid and billions pledged for reconstruction, there
were no isolation wards, few ventilators, and despite the all out last
minute efforts of the American Red Cross, the administrations of every
major hospital in the city, the dedicated and beyond job description
effort of the commander of the U.S. military forces in Haiti (Major
General Trombitas), the WHO, USAID, and the CDC, along with a fractured
Haitian Ministry of health, it took 14 hours between all of these
organizations to locate a single patient dose of the immunoglobulin
that would likely have saved this 15-year-old boy's life had it been
readily available. As we rode through the rubble and traffic-blocked
streets in search of his care I held the ankle of an animated and
normal 15-year-old boy who to his own knowledge was merely suffering
from a sore throat and a bit of a fever. He couldn't have known that
the grey-hued bacteria would kill him within a day and half and it did.
Since that day, a series of diphtheria cases have come to light,
including another one in our camp brought to our hospital 4 days ago.
But diphtheria is only one of many diseases that threaten, in
particular, the 1.8 million displaced today, living in compressed and
unsanitary camps, where tent-to-tent construction would take one match
to create the inferno that could incinerate thousands. In a city with
nearly no access to electricity there is little fuel to run generators,
few lights to generate, and the rapes of women and children occur at
will. It will be the rain of this season that spreads the diarrheal
diseases that globally find their victims--80 percent among children
under 5. There are hundreds of thousands of them in Port-au-Prince
alone. It should be said that while there are claims to grand programs
of immunization it is the simple truth that most Haitians remain
unprotected and that there is little evidence that those that have been
immunized have records or access to establish boosters and followup
necessary with all immunizations. It should also be said that in a city
the size of Port-au-Prince, as with all the densely populated areas in
Haiti, the idea that, as in the case with the diphtheria
immunoglobulin, a single warehouse maintains what little supply may
exist is an unacceptable acceptance. Prevention is difficult to get
people excited about. But cold chains for the transport and
preservation of these necessary immunizations and treatments must be
established throughout Port-au-Prince and Haiti, as must stockpiles of
the necessary remedies for the dehydration that comes with diarrheal
diseases. It must also be said that the quality and training of
prequake health care in Haiti was already at a minimum and that with
the death and flight of so many among the most capable in the Haitian
medical community, that it will be some time before international
medical staff will be relieved of the humanitarian and training demand.
I come here today as a witness not only to a state of current
emergency but also to the heroic efforts of United States and
international doctors, soldiers, and relief workers, of the NGOs in
partnership and service with the great Haitian people and their
government. I come here today in the hope that we will address with
bold clarity the razors edge upon which Haiti lies so that all that our
own country has given in sacrifice and service will not be washed away
with this rainy season and leave bright and dancing Haitian eyes to go
still in death from disease and flood, and God forbid the manmade
disaster of violent unrest. From President Obama, Secretary of State
Clinton, and Secretary of Defense Gates and throughout the policies and
generosities offered this situation to date, the United States can hold
its head very high. The compassionate and no nonsense posture of our
military has been moving and inspiring. But, with the official
``emergency phase'' declared over, as most of them redeploy into other
struggles, we owe it to all of them and to ourselves in reestablishing
the character of American foreign policy to stay the course in Haiti.
Make no mistake, this is a war against our ally and neighbor, and we
have only this chance to show the world that we are willing to fight
that war to save its victims and are not dependent on hating and
killing their assailant. It is a war against the diseases and
preventable disasters caused by nature and poverty.
We must also not underestimate the likelihood, known to all of us
on the ground in Haiti, of violent social unrest. As Americans, we
should call on the Government of Haiti and on our own government, to
acknowledge that a state of emergency still exists. To demand FULL
TRANSPARENCY in the way that aid is distributed and accountability for
how aid organizations advertise themselves in the solicitation of
funds. Full and total transparency. Now is the time for all concerned
parties to acknowledge that an ``emergency phase'' is simply an
economic determination, and that the prevention of foreseeable human
tolls on massive levels, in particular young children, cannot be
summarily dismissed by the aspiration of a monumental reconstruction,
offering empowerment, demanding independence and governance, or
claiming it as a distraction from the rebuilding of a country that in
many ways was never built in the first place.
The Haitian people are as strong and resilient as any I have ever
seen. There are great lessons of character for our country to learn
from Haitians. President Preval and his administration have proven in
their prequake efforts the will of Haiti to overcome its devastating
legacy. But to demand of them, or encourage their demand of a fractured
society's independence prematurely, will be murder by another name.
Issues of equity in distribution of aid are a fine aspiration, but when
the emergency room has got a line out the door and the hospital
pharmaceutical stockpile has not been inventoried, we have to find a
way to treat patients while the counting is done and not leave them at
the door to die on the street.
I am, and I believe I speak for all responsible aid workers, in
full support of parallel planning in reconstruction and the nurturing
of an independent peoples self reliance. But as we punish those who are
lazy, punish those who are corrupt, so shall we kill the innocent and
the willful. In an emergency, donors offer money and expect it to be
spent helping people. I hope we are here today to encourage just that.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Penn.
Mr. Schneider.
STATEMENT OF MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schneider. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Corker.
Let me express my appreciation, as others, for the
bipartisan support for Haiti reflected in this hearing and in
the Kerry-Corker legislation that many of you have supported.
Both reflect what is absolutely essential, as we've heard
today; that is, a long-term commitment to Haiti's recovery,
sustainable rebuilding, and refounding.
And I use that--the term ``refounding''--yesterday, in
fact, was Haiti's Independence Day, the Flag Day in Haiti.
President Preval went to Arcahaie and spoke, and called for
unity among all the political forces in the country; and, in
fact, Haiti's future depends on that kind of political
consensus if it's going to move forward.
In the aftermath of the worst natural disaster in the
history of the hemisphere, the lives and futures of more than a
million men, women, and children, that are still displaced in
spontaneous and collective shelters, remain uncertain and
extremely fragile. Tropical storms are anticipated almost every
day, and an approaching hurricane season, the physical threats
of mudslides and flooding, and the fear of another quake are
frightening realities for all Haitians.
And the reality is that, while some 7,200 of the most
vulnerable have been moved to sturdier sites, others have not,
and many, many more should be classified as most vulnerable.
There are also several hundred thousand in what are called
high-risk camps, where serious health risks currently exist.
There's an urgent need, in terms of what needs to be done
immediately. There's an urgent need for a final decision on the
resettlement strategy, jointly, of the Government of Haiti,
with OCHA--that is, with the Coordination for Humanitarian
Affairs of the United Nations--the United States, and others,
and the funds identified to begin, rapidly, to execute that
strategy.
I returned from Haiti last Thursday, after 4 days in Port-
au-Prince; it's my second visit there since January. As many of
you know, I've made many visits to Haiti over the course of the
last past several decades.
Crisis Group always emphasizes security, governance, and
political stability. And that was the focus of my visit, so
that's what I want to speak to you about today. Security starts
with the U.N. peacekeeping forces of MINUSTAH. It needs to be
bolstered with more U.N. police and more authority. Without it
there is, in fact, going to be chaos.
MINUSTAH has to be strengthened, particularly with respect
to the police forces among it, and it needs to have the
authority to reach out and to essentially help the Haitian
National Police assure protection in the camps, particularly
for vulnerable women and children.
At the same time--and this goes to the questions that you
heard--there's an emergency and there's also a longer term
effort to rebuild some kind of state structure. The United
States and the U.N. need to renew the priority for
strengthening the Haitian National Police--the HNP--complete
the vetting of its force, and restart training. Until last
Monday, that was not possible, because the Haitian
parliamentarians were in the police academy after the
Parliament building had collapsed. They're now leaving. And
now's the time to begin retraining the police force.
As you know, some 4,000 prisoners escaped under unclear
circumstances from the national penitentiary on the day of the
quake, including hundreds of gang members and serious
criminals. According to the HNP, they've recaptured some 567, a
few others were killed, and the prison population is back to
800. But, there's no question, none at all, that gang members
are trying to sink their roots into their old or new
communities in Martissant, Bel-Air, as well as Cite Soleil. And
that's why we see kidnappings going up. The rising number of
kidnappings and sexual assaults, particularly in the camps,
require remedial action.
I walked, at night with U.N. police, through one of those
camps at the Ancien airport, the old military airport runway.
There are now 17,000 families on that runway, more than 80,000
people. They live in tent slums transplanted from nearby Cite
Soleil and elsewhere. There's 138 of these kinds of encampments
in Haiti. Close to 60 percent function without a camp
management agency. In too many, I saw male and female latrines
and showers side by side, and that virtually invites sexual
assault. There have been too many reports already of rapes. And
while there were rapes and sexual violence previously, before
the quake, that does not excuse the current violence,
especially since several of the camps are under international
management. Due diligence is required to make it less likely
for those unacceptable assaults to take place.
On governance, let me just mention two critical issues
you've been discussing this morning.
The reconstruction program approved by Haiti's Government--
and this, to some degree, I think Senator Corker responds to
your question about the vision--this is the plan that was
prepared and presented by the Haitian Government to the Donors
Conference. It was put together by the Haitian Government, in
interaction with international experts, including the diaspora.
And that essentially sets out a series of principles and goals,
and their priorities, including for financing. And some of them
are education, particularly expanding public education,
agriculture, environment, governance, etc.
Right now, the reality is that things have not been moving
as fast as they need to. Pledges were made of $5.2 billion over
the next 18 months, $10 billion over the next decade, and it's
essential that these begin to be implemented so that there's
both more visible and real physical and spiritual renewal in
Haiti.
The Interim Reconstruction Commission that was part of that
proposal has yet to reach agreement on who will be the
executive director, who will staff it, and how it will build
new capacity in Haiti's ministries, because it has to do two
things. It has to move projects that deal with the problems of
reconstruction, and it also has to begin to help build a
Haitian state that can function.
And here, let me just mention one thing with respect to
what Andrew said. He's right about the history of Haiti the
past couple of decades, in terms of dysfunctional state. But,
over the last couple of years, Haiti had begun to move forward.
That really needs to be recognized--it fell back horrendously
with the earthquake, but now we have to ensure that the program
of reconstruction deals both with immediate helping the people
of Haiti, but also building a functioning government.
Second, governance is crucial. You have to have a
government for reconstruction to succeed. You don't have a
legislature right now. One-third of the Senate and the entire
lower House terms ended last Monday. Between now and next year,
you have got to go through general elections and move as
quickly as possible in that direction.
President Preval, when I was there, announced that he was
committed to the November 28th constitutional date for
elections. The U.N., the OAS, have now issued a technical
report that says it's possible. But, things have to happen now.
And that means, essentially, that the money needs to be made
available to permit individuals after the quake to obtain new
identify cards, voter registration, identifying the places
where people will vote, training the workers. You know the
requirements. That has to begin. And to lessen tensions, the
government has to reach out to the opposition and begin to form
some kind of consensus about how to move forward.
Finally, on stability. It's based really on whether or not
the rule of law begins to be seen in Haiti, whether you're
going to see actions by the police to deal with crime, whether
the U.N., together with Haiti, can move that forward, and
whether reconstruction can begin to move forward more quickly.
Most worrying is the possibility for serious social unrest.
Political movements are already beginning to take advantage of
the very real hardships, frustrations, and anxieties endured by
more than a million Haitians. We've seen many demonstrations
now, and they are becoming more regular.
Now, what can be done? You mentioned things that have
already--in process here in the Congress----
Senator Casey. Mr. Schneider, will you--we need you to wrap
up.
Mr. Schneider. OK. I just--one, Congress has to pass the
emergency supplemental. Every day it's delayed means you can't
do things in Haiti. Two, there needs to be a comprehensive
strategy against sexual violence, put together by MINUSTAH, in
Haiti. Three, the technical financial support for elections has
to move forward. And, finally, in terms of long-term U.S.
support, it has to focus on the area of governance and the rule
of law: police, justice, prisons. Other donors don't like to
get into this area. Without it, there's not going to be
security. Without security, there's not going to be investment.
Without investment, there's not going to be jobs and growth in
Haiti.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President,
International Crisis Group, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the ranking member and the
committee as a whole for continuing its bipartisan support for a long-
term commitment by the United States to Haiti's recovery, sustainable
rebuilding and ``refounding.''
There are more than 1 million Haitians in shelters--men, women, and
children. In the aftermath of the worst natural disaster in the history
of the hemisphere, their lives and futures remain extremely fragile.
With tropical storms anticipated and an approaching hurricane season,
the physical threats facing the people in 1,282 spontaneous camps and
collective centers in 13 municipalities including the capital, Port-au-
Prince, are real. While the most vulnerable are being moved, not all
have been and others who have not been classified as ``most
vulnerable'' probably should be.
There is an urgent need for decisions on resettlement strategy by
the Government of Haiti with OCHA, MINUSTAH, the United States and
others and the funds identified to begin rapidly to execute that
strategy.
I returned from Haiti last Thursday night after 4 days on the
ground in Port-au-Prince. It was my second visit there since January
12. As you know the Crisis Group has been analyzing the factors driving
conflict in Haiti since 2004. Our focus always emphasizes security,
governance, and the underlying political stability of the country. Our
last report on March 31, the same day as the U.N. Donor Conference,
underscored that stability depended on a reconstruction program based
on broad political and social consensus and Haitian ownership, a
transparent and accountable multidonor funding mechanism and an
efficient Haitian Government-led implementing structure that could move
rapidly enough to instill confidence in Haitians and domestic and
foreign investors and that answered the questions of democratic
governance and the rule of law, as a matter of urgency. Some of those
questions have been partially answered, others still require both
decisions and action.
We pointed out in our March 31 report, ``Haiti: Stabilisation and
Reconstruction after the Quake,'' that most of Haiti's
parliamentarians' terms were about to expire, which they did, on May
10. President Preval is in his final year in office as are the
country's mayors and the obstacles standing in the way of credible
elections have to be overcome. We said then that the continuing
presence of the U.N. peacekeeping force was essential both to support
the Haitian National Police (HNP) in making Haiti safer and to protect
civilians, particularly women and children within IDP camps, where a
now even weaker HNP is unable to do so. After my visit there this past
week, it is clear that all of those recommendations remain valid. There
has been some progress in many arenas--just not enough and not fast
enough.
The Congress has to move in one key area. The emergency
supplemental proposal for $2.8 billion for Haiti reconstruction was
submitted by the Obama administration on 24 March. We urged that it be
submitted even earlier but compared to past timeframes it was among the
speediest after natural disasters, as was the March 31 Donor
Conference. The supplemental has not yet reached the floor in either
House. In general I know there is strong congressional support for this
measure and it must be passed soon. Failure to have the authority to
spend those resources will increasingly bind the hands of project and
program managers in USAID, the State Department and Treasury--and send
the wrong message to other donors.
In assessing the current situation, we can look first the progress:
The Donor Conference--which took place far more quickly than the
response to the 2008 hurricanes--was a success and $5.2 billion was
pledged for the first 18 months to carry out the Action Plan for
National Recovery and Development of Haiti (PARDN), proposed by the
Haitian Government with the aid of international experts, as part of
its $10 billion decade-long recovery plan. It included a multidonor
trust fund, and a hybrid Haiti/international Interim Haiti
Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) with parallel auditing,
decentralization, regional development hubs and a call for vast
investment in human and physical infrastructure as well as encouraging
state institution-building.
President Preval and PM Bellerive--despite the political risk
involved--won parliamentary approval for the IHRC. Last Monday Preval
also cochaired a meeting on elections with the U.N. SRSG and
specifically supported holding parliamentary and Presidential elections
according to the Constitution on November 28. Parliament also took
action to avoid any jerry-rigged transitional government next year if
there is unavoidable delay of a few days in the election calendar.
Preval recently endorsed in writing the findings of U.N. and OAS
assessment teams and announced on the radio that the election would be
scheduled for 28 November, tasking the provincial electoral council and
the donors to meet that deadline.
Also positive is the news that former Prime Minister Marc Bazin has
gathered another five former Prime Ministers representing different
ideologies in a Forum of Former Prime Ministers. They have stated their
willingness to serve as ``senior statesmen'' offering independent
advice and counsel to the government. Preval has indicated a
willingness to engage with them for that purpose.
During my previous visit to Haiti in March there was no agreement
on where to move the must vulnerable people in the shelters and some
victims were still waiting for tarps or tents. It now appears that most
Haitians in need have received a tent or tarps--covering more than 1.5
million people. There are two functioning official government
campsites, at Corail Cesselesse and Tabarre lssa, where with
international support, tents, basic access to water and sanitation,
food, security, and lights have been provided to some 7,200
individuals. There are the beginnings of a more robust HNP and U.N.
Police presence around the camps. Haitian agriculture production is up,
and the U.S. approval of new legislation that increases the window for
Haitian textile imports also should also boost jobs in that industry
and Haitian agriculture production is up. And about 100,000 or more
Haitians are receiving cash for work on a 2-week revolving basis.
This progress would be seen as quite significant if the magnitude
of the challenges were not so immense.
Second, the challenges: Everything needs to move faster. Plans
exist on paper but the decisions about alternatives remain unclear. Few
of the implementing mechanisms are in place. Fifteen of the countries'
seventeen ministry buildings collapsed in the quake. Now the trailer,
Quonset but and open air tents that house a small portion of ministry
employees also serve as physical reminders of the devastation suffered
by state institutions.
Security has been negatively affected by the escape of more
than 4,000 prisoners from the national penitentiary, including
some hundreds of gang members and serious criminals. According
to the HNP, a total of 567 have been recaptured, and a few
others killed and the prison population is now back up to 800.
However, there is little question that the gang members are
trying to sink their roots into their old or new impoverished
communities in Martissant and Belair as well as Cite Soleil.
There was also serious damage to the Haitian National Police
infrastructure. Some 77 police officers were killed, another
253 suffered severe injuries, another several hundred have not
returned for unknown reasons. The National Police headquarters
and some 45 stations and substations collapsed or suffered
major damage along with numerous police vehicles. The rising
numbers of kidnappings and sexual assaults, particularly in the
camps, requires urgent remedial action. Perhaps most worrying
is the possibility for serious social unrest as political
movements take advantage of the very real hardships,
frustrations, and anxieties being endured by more than a
million Haitians. Already demonstrations--some with a threat of
violence--are taking place regularly in the capital and in a
few other cities. All of these conditions could become
aggravated in the event of floods and mudslides before
emergency precautions can be taken.
It is clear that within the MINUSTAH structure, additional HNP
are needed to support security needs. It also is clear that the
HNP has to be supported to restart its fledgling reform
program, including enabling the 22nd police recruiting class to
begin its training at the police school. It also should be
supported in completing the vetting process and in carrying out
post-quake investigations.
The 99 Members of the Haitian Chamber of Deputies and a
third of their Senate ended their terms last Monday. The
government consists of President Preval, his ministers and 19
Members of the Haitian Senate along with 140 mayoral councils
and other local officials. The planned February 28
parliamentary election was postponed. Nearly 40 percent of
voting sites in the key departments had been destroyed in the
quake and hundreds of thousands had lost their voting IDs,
while others had fled to the country side. The Office of
National Identification (ONI) had not updated the basic civil
registry since 2005. Since then, an unknown number of people
turned 18--500,000 have died, including 230,000 deaths in the
quake, which also prompted 600,000 to flee the capital--all of
which has created conditions that would tax even a well-
functioning civil and voting registration bureaucracy. The
current CEP, even though it has yet to actually manage an
election since it was only named after the 2009 polls, had
already been criticized by political opponents. A hard and fast
path has to be blazed to get from here to Presidential and
legislative elections in November so that a new government can
take office on 7 February 2011. For the least contentious
process, the government needs to pursue more consensus with the
opposing political party elites and other opponents, including
some renewal of the CEP and its mandate. Those steps would
underscore President Preval's commitment for November
elections, a credible government in place next year, and
political stability. It also will require immediate technical
and financial support from the international community to every
aspect of the process, moving quickly on the civil and voting
registration process, political party support, widespread civic
education, electoral observation and helping the CEP meet the
major logistical challenges in the aftermath of the quake.
Further, the IHRC, for which the enabling decree was not
issued until 5 May, is not in place. The position for IHRC
executive director was just posted and will not be closed until
June 30 and there have not been final decisions on who will
staff that agency or how it will work with the Haitian
ministries. Over its proposed 18-month operation, the IHRC
needs not only to be flexible, lean, and move projects faster
than ever before, transparently and efficiently. It also has to
be structured and managed so that it serves as a temporary
building block to long-term strengthening of Haiti's Government
capacity--both in Port-au-Prince and around the island. Ideally
ministry planning and policy units and perhaps the key initial
implementers would be seconded to the IHRC to work side by side
with international experts all of whom would return to their
ministerial homes when this critical 18-month initial phase is
complete. The IHRC also must reach out into the departments at
least for reporting purposes if the decentralization process is
going to be real.
The government is still quite far away from filling the
budget gap by 30 September 2010, Initial evaluations in March
by the government, IMF, and other partners showed a budget gap
of $350 million. Revenue collection has been better than
expected and the economy has been gradually rebounding,
particularly in areas such as telecommunications, and there
have been some reductions in spending plans, which have helped
to reduce the gap to $270 million. Budget support commitments
currently total some $95 million to date, which leaves a gap of
some $175 million. There is further promised funding of $30
million in July from the World Bank. The United States could
make a very strong statement of support for rebuilding Haiti's
Government and meeting critical needs if it were to contribute
a significant amount to fill that budget gap--with appropriate
safeguards. One way would be to agree with the Haitian
Government that a portion of that support would cover the costs
of paying police salaries, including those of the incoming 22nd
police recruitment class, and perhaps teachers and health
professionals as well.
The middle class--from teachers to small business owners to
government employees--who have lost their homes may have been
lost in the cracks until now. However, there is not yet a clear
sense of how the recovery process will help these men and women
jump-start new enterprises and cover their expenses.
Meanwhile, the transitional camps are not fully in place.
Some 7,300 designated ``most vulnerable'' have been moved to
Tabarre Issa and Conrail but that definition probably is too
narrow. If the rains arrived in force this week, there would
likely be others who would not only be inundated but at risk of
being washed away. The numbers of the displaced change so
frequently that it is impossible to substantiate a full
registry of the displaced. The numbers have grown from 1.3 to
1.5 and most recently 1.7 million.
Let me briefly describe some of the conditions in the camps
we drove by and the several we walked through, including on
night patrol with U.N. police. There is a glaring distinction
between the extremely well-organized transitional shelter area
where some of the most vulnerable have been moved and most of
the other camps. In the new government/U.N. transitional space
at Tabarre Issa, there is space between the rows of tents, a
police presence and NGOs working to make life seem more normal.
There was even including a group that films a soap opera in the
camps during the day and screens it at night to the camp
dwellers. On the other hand, there are also hundreds of
disorganized, massive camps in Port-au-Prince where make-shift
canvass and tarp tent-like shelters virtually sit on top of one
another, such as the ``Ancien Aeroport Militaire,'' which I
visited last week, and which hosts as many as 16,732
households, according to the shelter cluster campsite registry.
On a 5-per-household basis, this translates into 83,660
persons, over 80 percent of the population of some of Haiti's
Caribbean neighbors, in transplanted tent slums from nearby
Cite Soleil and elsewhere. Another example is the Champs de
Mars campsite, just outside the National Palace, where some
50,000 individuals of 10,312 households now live. A total of
138 of these camps are found in the capital, Port-au-Prince,
and of these close to 60 percent (79) function without a camp
management agency.
In too many, male and female latrines and showers set up
side by side virtually invite sexual violence. There have been
too many reports of rapes in camps since January. Yes, there
were rapes and sexual violence in the nearby urban slums of
Cite Soleil and other areas before the quake, but this does not
excuse the current violence, especially since several of these
camps are under international management. Due diligence is
required to make it less likely for those unacceptable assaults
to take place.
In our last report, Crisis Group urged in our last report,
following my trip to Haiti in March, that the U.N. Police and
the HNP agree on a standard set of joint walking patrols
through the camps and that a fixed joint police presence be
established in the larger camps. The United States has obtained
38 tents and other facilities for that purpose. It is now 4
months after the quake and the tents have not yet been
installed. And only now are the joint walking patrols
beginning, but not everywhere and not on a schedule that
permits checking and gives the residents a sense of security.
HNP and U.N. Police say they agree it needs to be done but full
implementation remains to be seen. This month's scheduled
arrival of a contingent of 110 female police officers from
Bangladesh can significantly boost MINUSTAH efforts to support
the Haitian National Police and the relief agencies managing
the camps in that regard.
Finally, I would urge the committee to encourage the administration
to seek several measures to strengthen the MINUSTAH peacekeeping effort
in an upcoming Security Council resolution:
1. Strengthen MINUSTAH's mandate by giving it primary
responsibility for setting priorities with respect to integration of
other U.N. agencies in the U.N. country team in order to better carry
out its peacekeeping mandate. An early example would be to establish an
integrated country team approach to the problem of sexual violence in
the camps, coordinating available resources of UNDP, UNFPA, UNIFEM,
UNHCR, UNICEF and OCHA.
2. Ensure that the MINUSTAH mandate enables UNPOL on behalf and in
close consultation with the HNP to guarantee security in the camps,
particularly with respect to vulnerable women and children, and to
support the resettlement of those at risk.
3. Extend the mission's mandate for 2 years.
4. Direct that MINUSTAH have available all necessary expert
personnel to fulfill the election support role request by the
Government of Haiti.
5. Support the Secretary General's call for an increase in the size
of UNPOL during this critical period and seek additional Haitian
diaspora with police experience to bolster its capacity.
Helping Haiti achieve its goal of recovery, reconstruction, and
refounding will place enormous demands on the United States, the United
Nation, the OAS and other members of the international community.
Fulfilling those demands will enable Haiti to move past this disaster.
Nothing less is acceptable.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
We're honored to be joined by our chairman, Chairman Kerry,
and we're grateful that he organized this hearing.
Chairman Kerry.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. Well, Senator Casey, thank you for chairing
the hearing. Senator Corker, thanks for being part of this
effort.
And I apologize that I wasn't able to be here, but I was
chairing a classified briefing in another part of the Capitol.
Let me thank both panels for coming here today. I
understand there was a productive discussion with Ambassador
Ken Merten and the Haiti response coordinator, Chris Milligan,
of USAID. And we're grateful for their efforts since January
12.
Also, I am delighted to be here with my constituent and
former USAID Director, Andrew Natsios, who brings a lot of
experience to these kinds of efforts. And he's been on the
front lines of these things for a long time.
Mark Schneider, thank you for your stewardship of the Peace
Corps, and we appreciate your comments just now, and your help
and observations here.
And, Sean Penn, whose stewardship of the Jenkins/Penn
Haitian Relief Organization has seen him now spend 4 months on
the ground, managing a camp for 50,000 displaced Haitians in
Petionville. And we thank you very much for that commitment and
for the knowledge that you're sharing with us and bringing to
us about this challenge.
All of us understand that--I think we all understand--that
Haiti--the world has certainly witnessed Haiti suffer perhaps
the worst disaster that our hemisphere has ever seen. And while
we don't see the CNN reports on the daily basis that we did
previously, and there isn't the media crisis of urgency the
public is witnessing on a daily basis, the truth is that 4
months later the tragedy is still unfolding. And the challenge
for people on the ground remains enormous.
Many Haitians today are living in desperate and dangerous
conditions, and, in many ways, our work in Haiti is just
beginning, which is the purpose of this hearing and the
importance of the legislation that we've just introduced.
It's a reality that, even before the earthquake, Haiti's
challenges were profound. But, now 1.3 million Haitians have
lost their homes, and, even as we hold this hearing today, in
the days ahead, the rains are pouring down, dripping through
temporary nylon tarps, and turning the ground to mud. Still,
Haiti's largest port, many of its roads, and its water and
electricity infrastructure are essentially destroyed. And the
serious health and environmental challenges include mudslides,
untreated sewage, a medical system that, on its best days,
struggles to care with the basics of care.
Shockingly--and this is one of the things that I'm most
concerned about; we've had some internal discussions about it
here--4,000 schools were flattened. That risks presenting all
of us with a lost generation of young Haitians. For many of
them, their education ended with the earthquake, and there are
efforts, obviously, to try to restore that; some going back to
the schools that they have, some, as Sean Penn shared with me
earlier--there are about 300 kids in his camp, for instance,
who are getting schooling in their school.
But, I think one of the greatest tasks ahead of us is to
make certain that every kid in Haiti is in some kind of school,
now, every day. And I can't think of any task more important,
beyond, obviously, the basics of day-to-day subsistence, that
could help to build the longer term future of Haiti.
I would comment, Mr. Chairman, that I think that the--the
world has responded to Haiti, at least in the initial days,
with a relatively impressive set of promises and of immediate
engagement. Our challenge now is to maintain that sense of
urgency. In the hours to sort of translate--what were hours and
days of rescue efforts have to now translate into months and
years, even, of a sustained reconstruction.
Senator Corker has joined with Senator Durbin and Senator
Cardin and I to introduce legislation which will make a $3.5
billion commitment to rebuild Haiti over the next 5 years. And
during the funding of those 5 years, we want to ensure that our
efforts are sustained, and we want to empower our aid agencies
to engage in effective planning. And that's one of the most
important things, I think, here.
We try to establish a framework within which we can have
democratic and competent governance, with adequate security,
economic growth, and environmentally sustainable programs,
particularly engaging women and children. And it tasks--our
legislation tasks USAID with developing a comprehensive
rebuilding and development strategy, and establishes a senior
Haiti policy coordinator who will be responsible for advising
and coordinating the United States policy in Haiti.
Clearly, the people of Haiti need to be empowered and
engaged in this effort as we go forward. Mark referred to the
security challenge, and that is real, but also we've got to
ensure that democracy does not become another casualty of the
earthquake. And so, I endorse the notion that Haiti can, and it
should, hold elections in November, as planned, and that we
must do everything possible to guarantee that that can happen
seamlessly.
So, finally, I would just say that I think the world is
ready to help, but I'm not sure the world has been presented
with the kind of concentrated leadership and focus that is
going to be necessary to coordinate the massive rebuilding, the
massive clearing and then rebuilding, that is going to be
imperative here.
Over 100 countries have pledged $15 billion, at the Donors
Conference that was held in April, but we have yet to make
certain that there is going to be the delivery system for those
funds, and the mechanism which is going to maximize the
coordinated development necessary so that Haiti can absorb the
aid that is standing at the ready. And so, we look forward to
listening further to the witnesses here today as to how that
coordinated effort can take place, and what is missing today,
so that we don't fall flat on our own words. There have been a
lot of speeches given about how this event, given all the past
challenges Haiti has faced, has to become sort of the principal
organizing moment, if you will, for Haiti not to be always in
crisis, but to build that sustainable future.
So, I think the word ``sustainable'' is a critical one as
we think about the testimony of our witnesses.
Thank you very much, Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And we're grateful
for your leadership on these and so many other issues.
I wanted to start our questioning with a focus on the IDP--
the camps, and the internally displaced persons across Haiti.
I guess, Mr. Penn and Mr. Schneider, together, and Mr.
Natsios, as well, but just in terms of the reality on the
ground in those camps, if you had--and you did, in your
testimony--just some of it by way of repetition--but, if you
had to list the urgent, or most urgent, needs in those camps,
in terms of the approach of the international community and the
Haitian Government, and, by extension, what we can do, in the
United States.
Mr. Penn. If I can make just the one correction, for the
record, the what was formerly Jenkins/Penn Haitian Relief
Organization is simply J/P Haitian Relief Organization. And to
save everyone time today, what we do is on our www.jphro.org
site.
Senator Casey. OK.
Mr. Penn. So, serving in camp management at the Petionville
camp, we originally were designated as the No. 1,
topographically, dangerous camp in the city. And that was for
flood and mudslide mitigations. So, the designations to date
have been that. That's the high risk that we have relocated on
the basis of. So, once the mitigations were complete--we
originally had 32,000 people at
high risk; there was an assessment done by the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Navy Seabees--at that time, 750,000 persons,
roughly, would have to be moved out of the camp to allow for
the mitigations that would put those people out of risk, the 32
among the 60,000 in camp. Later, there was a advancement of the
mitigation program that led to what was a minimized number, of
approximately 1,200 families, or 5,000 people. We initiated
what then was the first relocation program, on that basis.
In terms of equity, and understanding that other camps were
in the same sort of risk in--these zones of other camps
throughout the city and the country--we had to stand down on
relocation. And that brings us back to the state of things in a
camp.
The state of things in the camp, as has been said, is,
these are not tents, they're tarp shelters. They have ground,
with no cover on them, in most cases. And by this time, in
virtually every one of these camps, the soil is contaminated
with fecal matter that is going to create these diseases,
particularly raising when the rain comes.
In many camps, depending upon which area of town you're
looking at, you have gang infiltration. That is on the rise.
Guns are coming up from out of rubble and other places. People
are coming out of a state of shock. And the unified spirit is
breaking up a little bit into a more desperate spirit, and
people are becoming much more increasingly vulnerable.
Most of the camps that we're talking about, in a city that
has almost no light, fall into absolute darkness, so you can
imagine your children walking around in compressed tent-to-tent
construction, with alleys about this wide, and a culture of
tens of thousands of them roaming around at night, totally
vulnerable to predatory behavior, as well as disease, as well
as fire, as well as problems of a totally acceptable level--by
``acceptable,'' I'm talking about what seems to be the case in
Haiti--acceptable level of massive malnutrition, as opposed to
starvation. And so, this is a situation we're in now.
And these--it should be understood, these tent camps did
not exist in Haiti prequake. So, when people look at these
things on the news, understand that these hundreds of thousands
of people throughout this city--and 1.8 million, I believe it
is, displaced throughout--are in a brand new setting of
spontaneous camps, where we have then come, as NGOs and the
other international agencies, and tried to put some kind of
services into the middle of this. In most cases, lighting is
not part of that. In most cases, generators are not there for
lights that are not there to illuminate the areas near, for
example, latrines and so on.
So, when we talk about camp management--and I'll summarize
this now--we're talking about a situation where IOM has been
largely depended upon to recruit those people who would be camp
managers. There are charitable agencies, there are NGOs that
are on the ground, with enormous funds, and they have to be
counted on to recruit those camp managers, who will advocate,
camp by camp, and not just ghost-advocate by supplying a simple
service, as water, and then coming back every few days to fill
a bladder, but to actually take accountability for the actions
of all NGO actors necessary to the services on a humanitarian-
standard basis while there is an aggressive effort to relocate
people to either planned sites, which is going to be continued
as a--continue to be necessary for this--at this time, as well
as temporary--and, ultimately, permanent--shelters, and in the
greenhouse system.
Senator Casey. I only have a little--about a minute and a
half left for this round, but----
Mr. Schneider. Just very quickly.
Senator Casey [continuing]. Mr. Schneider. Sure.
Mr. Schneider. It seems to me, the most important thing to
do immediately, which can be done immediately, is to direct
that there be joint walking patrols by the United Nations
police and the Haitian National Police in the major camps, day
and night, on a regular basis, and hold them accountable to do
it. That's No. 1.
No. 2, of the 128 or so camps, there are about 19 of them
that are way over 10,000. In one of the camps I visited, there
were 80,000 people. The Champs de Mars camp holds somewhere
around 47,000. And the Petionville golf club is in the same
neighborhood. And the issue is, it seems to me, that in those
camps, you need to have fixed sites where police are available.
The United States finally, now, has double tents, where they're
going to give them to the U.N. and IOM to place in these camps.
That has to be done. You have to have fixed places where people
can go to complain and where they know that there are police
there, which will reduce, some degree, the level of risk.
And the second is that you have to make a decision on
resettlement strategy, about what you're going to do with these
people over time. It's not going to happen overnight. It's not
going to happen for--unfortunately, for a long period of time.
But, you need to make the decision about--this is what you're
going to do for each category of displaced persons.
You've now got three government-run secondary camps where
you're going to take the ones most at risk. You have to ensure
that that begins to be expanded on a much more rapid basis.
Only 7,200 people have been moved. Before the rains and the
hurricanes come, you need to move all of those who are most at
risk, perhaps 20,000 or so.
At the same time, you have to provide the people with the
vouchers and the assistance, if they do have houses marked with
green paint as safe or able to be repaired, to return there.
You need to provide them with those vouchers and actually have
them go back and start the repair process.
But, the decision has to be made about the resettlement
strategy now.
Senator Casey. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. I want to thank all of you for your
testimony--I think it's been outstanding--and certainly the
personal commitment to the people of Haiti.
Mr. Schneider just gave a list of those immediate things
that he believes ought to happen. I wonder, Mr. Penn, if you
want to add to that or give a different perspective as to if
you, yourself, were the person dealing, ultimately, with the
immediate needs of people in Haiti. What are those things that
you think are possible to occur today, that are not happening,
and could, with just a change of emphasis?
Mr. Penn. Well, I would second what Mr. Schneider said, in
terms of patrol. The body that does that patrol--I can tell
that you that, at the current time, in terms of embedded
MINUSTAH troops in areas of certain campsites, and so on,
there's not something so simple as the demand that they have a
translator with them. In one case, a 13-year-old girl was raped
in a camp not 50 yards from the MINUSTAH site, and they did not
pursue any kind of investigation of it for the 8 hours it took
before the morning came and they hired a translator for $5 a
day. So, those kinds of things, I think, can--are pretty simple
to solve, but there has to be the motivation to do it.
In terms of the general presence of MINUSTAH, I think a
softer posture, one more represented by the--in the way that
the United States military was, with the slung rifles and
without a sort of storm trooper feel would be helpful, because
there are very experienced and skilled troops within the Blue
Helmet Corps, as well, but I think that there's got to be a
kind of reassessment of the way in which they posture
themselves within Haiti now, especially now, as tensions are
beginning to rise. And I think that it's a moment to be very
aggressive, in terms of policy, in terms of getting in there
and saying, ``We've got to capture this moment of general
civility before it goes,'' and offer something to it. So, I
would say, more important than a kind of a storm trooper
mentality would be the offering of translators so that you
could take care of people as the smaller issues and as the
tragedies on a more individual basis occur.
Lighting, expansion of camps. When we talk about lands
available--and I think we've all seen this--you're talking
about big, flat areas, which have been determined to be out of
flood zones, that just take a few more bulldozers and a bit
more gravel to expand these sites to take in thousands more
families.
And another thing is that, when a lot of fingers were
pointed at the Government of Haiti for not giving the lands in
time, as the organization managing the camp from which these
people were being relocated to receivership at Corail, the
services were not available once that land was processed. So,
when we were able to--for example, to put eight serials a day
into the buses and cargo trucks to move these people to a safe
place from a dangerous place, which was all that the intention
was, we were told, each day, ``Hold off, send less. We don't
have the tents. We don't have enough bladders. We don't have
enough latrines. We don't have enough security. We don't have
enough lights.'' Well, those were the things that both the
government, the international aid communities, and the private
sector had given us all a sense that were present. And still
today, whatever's in warehouses, the coordinated effort is
still largely dysfunctional.
And so, it should not be such a--if there--if it is
decisive and bold, as has been the--those tragedies that took
place on--when Lieutenant General Keane was present with a
larger amount of U.S. troops, that clear and decisive strategy
is what led to the beginning of what we have. Now it has to
continue. And when it continues into the neighborhoods--for
example, those inspected houses, by UNOPS and the Minister of
Public Works and Transportation, that have been inspected and
are safe from the--with no damage from this earthquake, you
still, again, are going to have the issue of, ``Do we have the
capability, the capacity of services as NGOs and others come
in, to serve those areas for relocation?''
Senator Corker. So, you're no shrinking violet.
Mr. Penn. I'm sorry?
Senator Corker. So, you're no shrinking violet. So, what is
it that you would make happen, as far as the ability to get the
things out of the warehouses, on the ground? I mean, what is
the one thing that you, as a person who's witnessed this, who's
been on the ground--I mean, what are--what is it we can do to
change the dynamic of these things not occurring in a timely
basis when the resources, it sounds like, possibly exist in
various area of Haiti today?
Mr. Penn. Well, I think one of the things is to leave it to
those agencies that are able--those agencies and organizations
that are immediately able to act with those things, and also to
start changing the conversation related to equity and
distribution of aid.
What happens here is, you'll have an incomplete package of
aid, something that will not ultimately be sustainable for the
families that are given it, and that then, once that is
distributed, you don't--you--when you try to enhance it to
bring it up to something that will actually allow them a life
forward, then people will tell you, in the agencies and in the
government, ``Well, as long as we can't get that to everybody,
that's too much,'' and you bring it down to an incomplete. So,
what you're doing is, you're leaving one incomplete project as
you move on to the next incomplete project.
This is certainly true in the health care area, where we
don't have--when there's, you know, advertisements of great
immunization campaigns. Well, it's just simply not true. There
is no great immunization campaign. So, what it comes down to is
that I think that all agencies, all charitable organizations
can declare, on a single Web site, what's available, in terms
of tents, tarps, temporary structures, heavy equipment, all of
those things, and then those organizations that are able to,
with the cooperation of the Government of Haiti, establish some
legal means by which they can relocate people, whether that's
on a sunset basis or on a permanent basis, with an assistance
package that's definable and sustainable, as well, so that
those organizations can be, in effect, deputized to go forward
and make that happen.
Senator Corker. I notice my time is up. And, Mr. Natsios,
there's a lot of things, longer term--obviously, the immediate,
with the season coming up, these obviously were more pertinent
questions today. I do look forward to talking to you about the
tension that you relayed regarding the governance issues and
our desire to actually move beyond the way things have been in
Haiti for years. So, I look forward to talking to you later.
I thank you all for your testimony.
And, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Chairman, for having this
committee hearing.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Chairman Kerry.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Mr. Natsios, I was reading your testimony, which I was not
able to be here for. Obviously, you're telling it pretty
bluntly, and you ought to. But, I was struck by a number of
things.
One, you say, ``The international business and capital
markets do not invest money in failed states. And without such
investment, job creation on the scale necessary to change the
dynamics of Haitian society is impossible.''
One question would be, How are we going to begin to create
the transition necessary to get that kind of investment here?
But, you go on to point out that the historical evidence
suggests that countries can make significant reforms following
a catastrophic natural disaster on the scale Haiti has been
through. But, you also point out that, historically, Haiti's
had a series of governments that have promised those, and
nothing has happened, noting ``Baby Doc'' Duvalier, ``Papa
Doc,'' the Tonton Macoutes, the predatory corruption, et
cetera.
So, where do you begin, here? I'd like to get a sense of
how we take advantage of this moment to create the order out of
chaos that has been the sort of political structure and some of
the humanitarian situation in Haiti.
Ambassador Natsios. Well, the first thing I'd say, Senator,
is that in any major disaster, including in the United States,
a great opportunity exists to undertake reforms. I might add,
from my ``Big Dig'' experience, that I had a few weeks where I
could do almost anything, within the law, of course--fire
people and so on. But, once those few weeks was over, the old
political alliances suddenly took hold, and I started having
constraints on what I could do. I learned my lesson the hard
way as I should have fired more people. I fired a whole bunch
of people the first week, but I waited too long to fire others.
That's true, to an exponential degree, in Haiti. It's true in
any country with a crisis. Because a huge number of civil
servants, many of whom were phantom or had never reported for
work even though they got salaries. The very structure of the
Haitian Government itself have been destroyed. When the
ministries are flattened, people have been killed in the
ministries, and you could legitimately go back and say, ``We
are going to review all of the ministries to see who's a real
employee.''
The Chairman. Who's going to do that?
Ambassador Natsios. Frankly--U.N.----
The Chairman. Where does the sovereignty issue----
Ambassador Natsios. Well, I think we need to say----
The Chairman [continuing]. Fit into that?
Ambassador Natsios.--The donors who are putting money into
budget support, as the Brazilians just pledged, need to say to
the Haitian Government, ``This money is not being released
until you do a census, in each ministry, of who is real and who
is not; and then, if they're real, are they part of their
boss's patronage network, or do they have some qualification
for their job?''
The second thing I would do, which is very important, is to
create an incentive within the United States capital markets to
invest, which would be a free trade agreement. Congress, in
2008, passed a law which established a partial free trade
agreement for certain apparel items. It should be complete. And
then, I think there would be a huge message to the business
community, ``This is where we want to start investing.''
Because they did it before in the 1980s and 1990s, and then
they all shifted their investments to Central America because
of the political chaos and the sanctions regime. So, I think a
free trade agreement would send a message that investment is
wise.
The third thing I would do can be taken from a mutual
friend of ours, Michael Porter at the Harvard Business School,
who is one of the leading experts in the world on microeconomic
reform and competitiveness reform. We in USAID used his
theories all over the world to guide reforms, to improve the
business climate, and to make it easier to start new
businesses.
My old staff at AID said, ``Some of the things you tried,
Andrew''--you know, experiments that weren't successful--``this
experiment with microeconomics was the biggest success you had
on the economics side.''
We already proved it worked in a number of countries.
There's no reason the same sort of thing can't be done in
Haiti; you go through all the regulations and laws and see
whether they encourage business creation and job creation or
they do the opposite. If they do the opposite, you issue
executive orders, through the President, to change them.
King Abdullah of Jordan, in 28 days, passed more reforms
than any other head of state in the world so Jordan could join
the World Trade Organization. He has an 8-percent growth rate
now in Jordan; or the last time I saw, it was 8 percent. His
country has also enjoyed the fastest accession to the WTO and
massive levels of investment. The whole country is being
industrialized now. AID drafted a lot of the rule changes that
he signed. In fact, he ordered us to do it. He told us, ``I
want it done now.''
If Preval is really interested in doing this, then he's
going to offend interests because there are monopolies in the
economy that don't want new businesses which might break their
control of the economy. This is not just because someone wasn't
paying attention; there are monopolistic business interests in
the country that do not want competition from new businesses
coming into the country.
And so, I think there are three things that could be done,
soon, that would have a positive effect on the business
climate, and it would begin to change the dynamics of the
economy.
The Chairman. Very helpful. Has anybody consulted with you
in this process?
Ambassador Natsios. AID staff often consult with me.
The Chairman. Current staff.
Ambassador Natsios. Yes. Current staff. I don't think
anybody in AID would disagree with anything I just said. Career
staff. Dr. Shah wouldn't either, I don't think. He's focused on
economic reform, himself.
The Chairman. I understand.
But, do you believe that the structure is in place to
accomplish what you just talked about?
Ambassador Natsios. UNDP is capable because I believe
they're the ones managing the Multi-donor Trust Fund. I sit on
their advisory board here in Washington.
We must say to the U.N. or World Bank, ``we will
politically get behind you''--because they can't do this alone.
There's going to be huge resistance from the political bosses
in Haiti to purge the lists. Because, if you purge the lists,
you're going to cause explosions. So, you have to get the Bank
or U.N. agencies behind the reform, and all the donors and
embassies to say, ``if anybody starts causing trouble, we will
be with you.'' If you just tell them to do it, and you don't
get behind them, they're going to have trouble doing it,
politically, because of the resistance.
The Chairman. Well, I think it's a--let me just say--I've
said this a couple of times, previously--it's a prerequisite to
getting this done. Nobody's in a mood to throw money into a
hole, here. That's not going to let anybody dig out of
anything. We've been down this road, several times. And I think
this is a unique moment for a reformation, with respect to the
entire structure.
Also, I think, if you're going to attract the investment
and get the diaspora to be investing and doing the things
necessary, it's going to be critical for them to see that there
is that transformation.
Do either of you, the other witnesses, want to add to that?
Yes, Mark.
Mr. Schneider. Yes, just a couple of things.
One is, with respect to, essentially, opening U.S. markets.
That actually is something that Brazil's Foreign Minister urged
at the Donor Conference in New York, for the entire global
community, that all restrictions on Haiti's exports should be
removed. I think that that makes a lot of sense at this point.
Second, it's not a totally negative situation with respect
to investment. The Royal Caribbean Cruise Company has a $50
million investment program in the north. That's continuing.
They have announced that it's going to move forward.
Telecommunications investment, as well, are being made.
The issues are whether you're going to be able to ensure
there's security and a sense of the government dealing with
some of the policy issues that then sustains investment. The
legislation just passed by the Congress, in terms of opening up
U.S. markets with respect to textiles, assumes that's going to
permit something on the order of 40 or 50,000 additional jobs
in that apparel industry, which is quite positive.
The one area where I say--that Andrew just mentioned--that
I think is probably an area that has not had a sufficient
focus, is on small business--not micro-enterprise. There's
movement there. There's a lot of investment there. But, on
small business, particularly those who lost their stores, their
small operations, in the quake. There isn't any credit
operation there that's available for them to restart. And a lot
of them lost their homes, too. And that, I think, is an issue
that needs more attention.
The multilateral trust fund is going to be run by the World
Bank, but UNDP is going to be a critical advisor in that.
And I guess the only other thing that I would say is that
budget support--yes, is needed, with the right kinds of
conditions to provide assurance of transparency. The reason
that Haiti has a deficit of about $270 million, is because of
the quake. The last 2 years, they ran their macroeconomic
policy framework fairly well. They got kudos from the World
Bank, the IMF, the United States, et cetera. And they were able
to get to the HIPC threshold point. Right now, though, they've
got to pay their teachers, they've got to pay their police, and
they don't have the resources.
So, I think that the fact that the supplemental includes
provision for budget support is important. The United States
can target that, and monitor it to, let's say, pay for the
salaries of the police and teachers that are working.
The Chairman. Mr. Natsios, let me pick up on two things,
quickly. One, you said there has to be--to accomplish what we
need to in Haiti, you say there has to be a reduction of
regulatory compliance burden on USAID.
Ambassador Natsios. Yes, I did.
The Chairman. That obviously pertains to us, among others.
Speak to that, would you, just for a minute?
Ambassador Natsios. I will. I've written an essay on this
matter, which is actually three chapters of a book I'm writing
on foreign aid, that'll be published by the Center for Global
Development. I will send it to your staff next week.
But, Nancy Birdsall is publishing the essay. It's going to
upset some people. I didn't understand this, to the extent that
I was able to after I left office; I studied the General
Accounting Office, the Inspector General's Office, the Office
of Management and the Budget, the Federal Acquisition
Regulations, which are now 1,973 pages long, and the oversight
committees of Congress--principally, not foreign oversight but
foreign policy oversight. The Federal Acquisition Regulations,
you have no control over as that's done by another committee in
Congress. The Embassy Security Act, also not done by your
committee. It's draconian. They call the AID missions in many
countries ``prisons'' because the AID officers can't get out;
neither can the Embassy diplomats because no other country in
the world has these kinds of restrictions on it.
The worst thing that can be done in these emergencies,
which I urge you to avoid in this bill, is that OMB judges how
AID is doing by how fast it disburses money, not by whether the
policy's the right one, the program is the right one. If you're
dealing with a failed state, everything moves in slow motion.
If you have local input, it slows down even more.
The Chairman. Yes. Yes.
Ambassador Natsios. And so, I would urge you to avoid using
disbursement rates as the principal mechanism for judging
whether AID is doing a good job. That's done all over the
world. It's a stupid standard, in my opinion.
The Chairman. Well said. We've got to spend some time
together.
I'm not going to ask you the next question now, because I
want to--I'll take it up--but, I want to talk to you about the
institutional--institution-based model that you talk about.
Because we have to get this right, and it deserves more time.
And we'll do it.
Mr. Penn, last question before I have to run, here, in a
moment. What do you need to get the--you need a decision,
right, about moving people? There has to be some clarity with
respect to where you're going to go, in terms of getting people
into the greenhouses and moving them appropriately. What's it
going to take to do that? What's the restraint on that
happening right now? Is that a decision that has to be made by
President Preval? Does this involve the U.N.? Who has to make
that decision? And how do we get that?
Mr. Penn. It's President Preval, and it's an acceptance of
the reality and the enforcement of it by the U.N., in the sense
that most of the people in the IDP--in our camp are renters.
They could be going back to a situation either where there is
an exploitation of the landowners by people who had not resided
there, or an exploitation by landlords of those who come back,
and rent-gouging. There's got to be some kind of a forgiveness
of the last 4 months of rent--people do not have the money to
pay that--and assistance package that allows them to get by
with some reasonable sense of a future-building and getting
their legs, without the overbearing outsiders' notion of what
their job is to empower and create independence. Right now, to
build the house, they're going to have to have nails and a
hammer.
So--and we need that definition of what the proof of
ownership is, some protection from rent-gouging, and then, from
the international community, the clear resources to make
communities, many, in which case, don't have any access to
water, many that will need security provisions, and so on,
especially as it relates to putting in T-shelters on rubble-
clearance sites, and, while those happen, not to have people
who had not lived there before.
So, it's those clear definitions that allow us, as merely
supplemental or supportive agencies of the Haitian people, to
be able to go in and do what we have to do.
The Chairman. Well, I'm getting a sense from each of you,
in the course of this, the way these challenges are sort of
sitting out there, that there is, in this crisis, an absence of
a kind of focus point of decisionmaking, a kind of leadership
structure and/or that we're sort of trapped in a lot of
bureaucratic tug and pull. And we have to break out of that. Is
that a fair statement for each of you? I see you nodding.
Mr. Penn, yes?
Mr. Penn. Yes. Yes.
The Chairman. Mr. Natsios.
Ambassador Natsios. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. In part. I think that there's a need in
Haiti for that central coordination and also in the United
States.
The Chairman. Right. But, as of now----
Mr. Schneider. It doesn't exist.
The Chairman [continuing]. It isn't there. And so, we're
going to watch this thing, potentially, unravel, rather than
move in the direction that we want it to.
Senator Corker, do you have anything additional?
Senator Corker. No, I think--before you had arrived, I
mean, I--you know, we're in--we have----
The Chairman. That says it all.
Senator Corker [continuing]. We have this tension that
exists, because this country is a sovereign country. And we
should respect that. We have people on the ground, though, that
are not being dealt with appropriately. And I know, even months
ago, when this first began, in this committee, you know, we
talked about that tension and how this was an opportunity, on
one hand, to maybe break out of it. But, we're still not doing
that. And I think the frustrations that Mr. Penn is having on
the ground, that Mr. Schneider has observed, they still exist.
I don't sense there's a will--and I don't even know what the
right answer is. OK? I don't know how you work around a
``sovereign government,'' with an ``international community,''
in--as our previous panel said, it's a ``cluster system,''
which I think is well-defined--I don't know how we do that.
And, Mr. Chairman, I'm very frustrated, but I thank the
witnesses for all that they've contributed, but I think that we
still have not, as a country, made some of the tough decisions
that need to be made.
I will say that Mr. Penn's testimony pointed to the great
work our military was doing. They're now not there in the form
they were before or in the presence they were before. But, I
hope that those of us who care about this have some ability to
make things happen in a different way than they are right now,
and I don't know what the----
The Chairman. I agree with you.
Senator Corker [continuing]. Answer is.
The Chairman. Well, I think you--as I mentioned earlier,
the sovereignty issue is an important one. But, I'll tell you
this, if countries are going to be putting $15 billion in
there, and they're going to be investing in the future, they
have a right to expect that the sovereignty is going to be
cooperative and there is a way to move forward.
Mr. Penn. If I may, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Penn. If there's one thing that combines all the issues
both of rebuilding and disaster relief, that really needs the
immediate attention, without any bias towards any disagreements
that may exist between the Government of Haiti and anyone else,
the hospitals that do exist in the biggest city of the biggest
natural disaster, with such a death toll, and with all of the
emergencies that are coming our way, likely, with these rains,
these hospitals have got to be staffed, have got to be
supplied, and have got to be administrated to.
The Chairman. I couldn't agree more. As you know, my
daughter spent a week down there as a doctor, working in the
hospital, and came back with lots of those observations and
notions. And it's something we have to do.
So, we have our work cut out for us. We're enormously
appreciative of you--each of you coming, sharing your thoughts
today. It's very, very helpful. There's a lot on the table for
us to digest, and I promise you, we'll get back to you and
follow up on these things. Look forward to doing that.
Thanks so much.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher J. Dodd,
U.S. Senator From Connecticut
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I want to thank
all of our witnesses for coming before this committee today, especially
Ambassador Merten who has done a tremendous job leading his Embassy
team in Port-au-Prince during what was, and still is, a catastrophe.
Our many thanks to you and your entire staff for your remarkable public
service. I also look forward to hearing from the rest of our witnesses
who bring a wealth of knowledge, experience, and passion to this
matter.
The United States Government has provided more than $1 billion in
humanitarian funding for Haiti and the private sector has likewise
contributed an additional $1 billion. We as a nation can, and should
be, proud of that contribution and all the people that have been helped
as a result.
I am also proud to have authored the Haiti Recovery, along with
Senator Dick Lugar, and thank the chairman of this committee and others
for their support. That legislation was recently signed into law by
President Obama, and as a result, important steps have been taken to
relieve Haiti of its outstanding international debt, and to set up
international trust funds for Haiti to support investment in
infrastructure including the development of electric grids, roads,
water and sanitation facilities, and reforestation initiatives.
However, despite these important first steps, I have a series of
fundamental questions that I believe need to be answered before we can
hope to see tangible and real progress in rebuilding Haiti. In my view,
the challenge of rebuilding Haiti is not that we don't know how to do
it, or what needs to be done.
In fact, it seems as though the Haitian Government has signed off
on a comprehensive rebuilding plan that includes essential elements
including temporary shelter (and moving people out of sprawling tent
camps as quickly as possible), urban development, security, health,
water, energy, infrastructure, and education. I understand that it
includes capacity-building within the Haitian Government
and focuses on distributing the population away from already
overcrowded urban centers.
So in many senses the roadmap is clear. But my question is, Who is
driving? Who is truly leading this effort and is the Haitian Government
actually capable of leading its own recovery effort? Empowering Haiti
to rebuild assumes that Haiti has the capacity to rebuild itself, and
I'm frankly not sure that is the case. What does the international
footprint in Haiti look like and what should it look like given the
magnitude of the devastation and the extraordinary cost involved in
rebuilding the country?
Will most of the burden fall on the United States or do we have
truly willing and capable international and Haitian partners?
I do not believe, of course, that we should occupy Haiti. We should
not take lightly the importance of sovereignty, not discount the
Haitian people's long history of enduring difficult times. But we
cannot pretend that Haiti can lead its own reconstruction. The goal is
simple: Provide Haitians with a legitimate, functional state--one
capable of managing the day-to-day tasks of government and providing
security, economic stability, and social services. But I worry that how
we achieve it is far less clear.
______
Response of Ambassador Kenneth Merten to Question Submitted by
Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. I understand that decentralization has been an
intentional effort of the post-earthquake phase with a particular focus
on agriculture. Can you describe in more detail the agriculture
strategy being developed? What kinds of efforts are being made to
provide opportunities for people who have settled outside the city and
may wish to remain there instead of returning to the city to do so?
Answer. As we work with the people of Haiti to ``build back
better,'' the United States Government (USG) supports the Government of
Haiti (GOH) plan to strengthen its agricultural sector and cope with
the displaced persons in the peri-urban centers and rural areas.
Agriculture is central to the Haitian economy, generating nearly 25
percent of GDP and employing over 60 percent of the population. The
USG, along with other donors such as France, Canada, Spain, Brazil, the
Inter-American Development and World Banks, the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on
Agriculture (IICA), along with Haitian and USG civil society members,
endorsed the Haiti Country Investment Plan for agriculture June 2. This
Country Investment Plan for agriculture includes specific goals to
boost economic opportunities and food security for the displaced
persons and the rural sector. Consistent with the administration's
Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative (GHFSI) and GOH plans, USG
agriculture investments will be made across the supply chain from
research to the farm to the market to the table. These investments will
help modernize infrastructure, jump-start rural economic growth and
development, empower small farmers, expand farmer access to markets and
value chains, reestablish agricultural services and rebuild
institutional capacity, and improve natural resource management.
To ensure sustainability of the private sector investments, the USG
will also work to build capacity at the Ministry of Agriculture. We
will train and deploy Haitian technical trainers and extension agents.
We will also help provide basic services such as access to inputs and
supplies, and of critical importance will focus on small-scale farmers,
and areas with the greatest potential to increase employment. USG
resources will target and integrate investments across three geographic
corridors identified by the GOH as priority growth poles for new
development: (1) The Saint Marc Corridor which will be anchored by the
St. Marc growth pole; (2) the Northern Corridor which will be anchored
by the Cap Haitien growth pole; and (3) the Cul-de-Sac Corridor which
will be anchored by Port-au-Prince.
Closely linked to Haiti's ability to develop a functioning
agriculture sector, and more urgently, to its ability to withstand
future hurricanes and storms, is the need for radically improved
natural resource management in Haiti. The USG strategy for Haiti will
focus on watershed management and on growing the market for alternative
cooking fuels, including Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), particularly in
Port-au-Prince and the new urban growth poles.
______
Responses of T. Christopher Milligan to Questions Submitted by
Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. S. 3317 would authorize funds for assistance to Haiti in
fiscal years 2010 through 2014.
Does the administration have a view on the appropriate
funding levels for assistance to Haiti in fiscal years 2012
through 2014?
Does the administration consider it important that the
Congress authorize assistance for those years now, rather than
doing so in connection with future year budget requests?
Answer. We are pleased that Congress supports long-term efforts to
help Haiti recover from the worst recorded natural disaster in the
Western Hemisphere. Demonstrating through this legislation that the
American people are committed for the next 4 years will both send a
message to the Haitian people and to other donors about our commitment
to Haiti, but it will also allow the administration to plan a robust
reconstruction effort. At this time we do not have a completed budget
request for fiscal years 2012 and beyond; however, we look forward to
working closely with Congress to determine appropriate funding levels
and timelines.
Question. In your testimony, you state in connection with S. 3317
that ``Given the uncertainties that lie ahead, it would be our
suggestion to provide the administration and those of us on the ground
greater flexibility and to allow us to work closely with you on how to
best implement our programs.'' Do you believe S. 3317 as drafted
provides the flexibility you refer to here? If not, please indicate
what changes in the legislation you would recommend to provide such
flexibility.
Answer. USAID appreciates changes to the bill that increase
flexibility and minimize administrative burdens, particularly the
change in reporting requirements to harmonize with the agency's
existing reporting schedule. We support the spirit of the legislation
and look forward to working with the committee as it moves forward.
Question. What is the administration's assessment of the capacity
of Haitian institutions to implement programs consistent with the
objectives of S. 3317? To what extent does the administration envision
the need to rely on non-Haitian implementing partners in order to
implement assistance programs effectively?
Answer. Haiti's profound development and political challenges have
been in part the result of weak public institutions, poor public
financial management, political instability (10 Presidents and several
coups since 1990) and vulnerability to corruption. In the absence of a
strong government, international NGOs, which are vital implementing
partners for the USG, are often relied upon for basic services.
Our implementation strategy includes capacity-building of the
government at all levels to provide essential services currently
needed, and to plan, manage, and budget for operations in the long
term. We will partner with the GOH to mutually invest in the technical
capacity of the Finance Ministry and other key institutions. This
partnership will improve the GOH's ability to create and manage budgets
in a transparent fashion, collect taxes, and effectively use limited
resources in support of ongoing development. In addition, we will
support and grow local civil society institutions so they can hold
their government accountable during reconstruction and into the future.
We are actively encouraging the utilization of Haitian-American and
local firms and NGOs in reconstruction activities. Through outreach
efforts, we are engaging directly with the U.S. Haitian-American
community, helping them understand the U.S. foreign assistance strategy
and how to best do business with USAID. Other encouragement may include
conducting assessments of local NGOs and providing technical assistance
to build their organizational capacity to receive direct awards. In the
future, such cooperation with these firms and NGOs may include public-
private partnerships.
Question. What steps does the administration intend to take to
monitor and evaluate assistance programs for Haiti to ensure that such
programs effectively produce the desired outcomes?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID recognize that monitoring
and evaluation are essential to measure the impact and effectiveness of
our sustained investment of hundreds of millions of dollars. Under the
USG post-earthquake strategy for Haiti, the U.S. Mission in Haiti will
establish an independent monitoring and evaluation (M&E) team of
specialists who will collect and analyze data on program performance,
and issue summary evaluation reports.
Monitoring and evaluation systems will be integrated into the
design of every USG-funded program. To ensure cost-effective data
collection, the USG will invest in a cross-sector, strategy-wide data
collection platform so that each program shares a common system.
Through this system the M&E team will track inputs, activities,
outputs, outcomes and impacts of development activities at the project,
program, sector and national levels. The M&E team will then use this
information to evaluate the design, relevance, effectiveness, and
impact of the development program. Attention will also be paid to the
efficient use of resources, and the sustainability of the results
beyond donor funding.
Thorough assessment at every level will help create an overarching
impact evaluation of the national development strategy. Over time, the
USG will learn from the successes and failures of its strategy and will
make course corrections as necessary. Future programming will benefit
from evidence-based designs that take the lessons of past evaluations
into account.
To help make the USG Haiti strategy sustainable, these M&E systems
will be integrated, shared, and transferred to public sector entities
as appropriate. The USG will also partner with the GOH to train
officials in data collection, evaluation techniques, and evidence-based
best practices.
Question. S. 3317 provides authority for assistance funds to be
contributed to a multidonor trust fund for reconstruction and recovery
expenses related to Haiti.
Does the administration envision providing assistance
through one or more such multidonor trust funds? If so, please
give examples of particular multidonor funds the administration
might consider utilizing for such purposes.
Of the amounts the administration has requested for
assistance to Haiti for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, what
portion of such funds does the administration envision using
for contributions to such multidonor funds?
Answer. It is clear that the destruction of the earthquake
substantially reduced GOH revenue, creating an urgent need for budget
support. We anticipate that the Multi-Donor Trust Fund established by
the World Bank will provide an appropriate vehicle for channeling
budget support, while a United Nations Development Programme trust fund
will be an essential support upcoming elections.
The overall strategy recognizes that successful reconstruction
efforts will require both strengthened Haitian institutions and
cooperation with non-Haitian implementing partners. USAID has set the
enhancement of Haitian public institutions' capacity as a vital
element.
Prior to the Haiti Donors' Meeting in New York on March 31, USAID
and the Department of State worked closely with key donors, including
the European Commission, Canada, Spain, France, Brazil, U.N. and World
Bank to support the creation of both the Interim Haiti Recovery
Commission (IHRC) and the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (also known as the
Multi-Donor Trust Fund). As these two mechanisms are established they
will create a mutually beneficial relationship that will be integral to
aligning donors around the GOH strategy. The IHRC will also provide
oversight, transparency, and monitoring of the funds spent through the
Multi-Donor Trust Fund.
The President's supplemental budget request for Haiti references a
U.S. contribution of up to $120 million to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund.
Any decision for the USG to contribute to this fund will depend on our
confidence that it is being administered effectively and transparently
and that it would be the best use of taxpayer funds.
USAID also anticipates granting approximately $5 million to the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to support upcoming
elections in Haiti. UNDP will administer and manage donor contributions
to the electoral budget through a trust fund (separate from the World
Bank-run multidonor trust fund). The UNDP trust fund will be an
important vehicle to facilitate and coordinate donor resources for
impending elections. It will fund technical and logistical support to
the elections commission, and supervision of the electoral process to
ensure that international standards are met. The USG contribution will
help fund election commodities such as ballots and ballot boxes, voter
education material, and training material.
______
Responses of T. Christopher Milligan to Questions Submitted by
Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. How is USAID seeking to gain systematic, regular
participation by a broad range of Haitian civil society groups into the
planning, implementation, and evaluation of its programs?
Answer. USAID recognizes civil society groups as important
partners, both in the immediate reconstruction process, and in the long
term as we work with the people of Haiti to build a sustainable,
democratic, and economically vibrant future. Civil society
participation is a cross-cutting theme throughout all USAID programs in
Haiti, and the President's Supplemental Request for Haiti contains $62
million for public institution and civil society strengthening. We will
support local civil society institutions so that they can play a key
role in reconstruction and hold government accountable in the future.
Community participation is a principle that serves as a cornerstone
of our agency. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) currently
implements a program to enhance citizen participation in relief and
recovery. It establishes venues such as focus groups, media
programming, and press conferences, through which citizens and
government officials discuss Haiti's reconstruction and ways in which
citizens can participate. It also builds Government of Haiti (GOH)
capacity to use electronic media, Internet-based platforms, and direct
interaction with community members to seek information regarding local
and national development priorities. This improved information-sharing
will increase government transparency and cultivate a culture of
government accountability to citizens. In addition, OTI implements a
community driven temporary employment program, reclaiming neighborhoods
by clearing rubble from public spaces, thoroughfares, schools and
hospitals. This program links local governments with their
constituents. Members of the community join the Mayor in a
participatory process of selecting residents for cash for work teams.
Those people selected then have the opportunity to earn wages while
contributing to the cleanup and rebuilding of their neighborhoods.
We support the GOH's decision to include a civil society
representative on the board of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
(IHRC). We also anticipate that the IHRC, in its role as a coordinating
body, will facilitate dialogue between civil society, government, and
other actors in the reconstruction efforts. The IHRC is committed to
ensuring mechanisms are in place to guarantee transparency and
accountability, investigate complaints and measure impact. Through
these mechanisms, the people of Haiti will play a crucial part in
ensuring reconstruction efforts progress transparently and fairly.
(More information about the IHRC can be found at www.ihrc.ht.)
Additional oversight and evaluation will come from the USAID Office
of the Inspector General. Funding requested in the proposed
supplemental bill will help the Office of the Inspector General to
ensure that USAID resources in Haiti are used for the greatest good and
that additional oversight is provided on the ground in Haiti. This will
support an array of oversight activities, including outreach and
education, financial audits, performance audits, investigative
activities, and coordination and staffing.
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems will be integrated into the
design of every USG-funded program. These systems will track inputs,
activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts of development activities at
the project, program, sector and national levels. The M&E teams will
then use this information to evaluate the design, relevance,
effectiveness and impact of the development program. To help make the
strategy sustainable, these M&E systems will be integrated, shared, and
transferred to public sector entities as appropriate. The USG will also
partner with the GOH to train officials in data collection, evaluation
techniques, and evidence-based best practices.
We will also encourage greater use of Haitian-American and local
firms and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as we implement
reconstruction activities, including those executed through public-
private partnerships. This may include assessing local NGOs and
providing technical assistance to build their organizational capacity
to receive direct awards. We are also engaging directly with the U.S.
Haitian-American community, helping them understand the U.S. foreign
assistance strategy and how to do business with USAID.
Question. While international coordinating bodies and the Red Cross
are reporting that over 90 percent of earthquake survivors in need have
received adequate shelter and aid, reports from many camps in and
around Port-au-Prince vary widely and many paint a far less promising
picture of the continuing emergency. The President of one camp, the
Automeca camp, a ``priority'' camp located in Port-au-Prince, reported
on May 3 that no food aid has reached the camp since February and only
three food deliveries were carried out in total. Apparently, 80 percent
of officially sanctioned camps still have no camp managers and thus no
real conduit to the international aid coordinating bodies. What is
being done to address this ongoing emergency situation and how can
USAID encourage the international coordinating bodies and the cluster
system to work more closely with Haitian civil society and the
leadership structures set up by IDP camp residents to improve the
coordination and regularity of aid delivery and assistance?
Answer. USAID continues to play an active role in the coordination
of humanitarian aid to populations affected by the January 12
earthquake in Haiti. USAID staff remain actively involved with the
Government of Haiti and United Nations to improve the situation of
displaced people by responding to ongoing and emerging needs, and
contributing to the reconstruction process. USAID partners continue to
implement programs and deliver services.
USAID strongly encourages its partners to coordinate both with the
international humanitarian coordination system and with members of
local Haitian leadership. Recognizing the importance of such
collaboration to the effective program implementation and prevention of
overlap and duplication in programs, USAID implementing partners
regularly conduct beneficiary identification and program design
activities in consultation with local authorities and communities.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM), as head of the
Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster, has developed a
system for communicating and coordinating with the local camp
leadership. According to the latest data from CCCM Cluster, 63 percent
of the IDP population who reside in camps do not have a formal camp
management agency. However, at least 97 percent of all IDP camps have
informal camp management committees, and the international community
recognizes the vital role that this local leadership plays. IOM has
provided mobile phones to the leaders of camp committees to facilitate
communication with assigned IOM Camp Management Officers and provide
access to the international humanitarian coordination mechanisms such
as the cluster groups. IOM has trained approximately 400 formal and
informal camp managers and continues to conduct trainings in English,
French, and Creole.
USAID is also beginning a project in which we will train community
mobilizers to facilitate two-way information exchange regarding camp
management, relocation processes and resettlement options. This
project, implemented through IOM, aims to ensure that messages between
the government, the humanitarian community and the affected population
are coordinated and effective. The community mobilizers will maintain
open communication channels to help the affected population stay
abreast of developments and enhance their ability to make informed
decisions. Concurrently, the mobilizers will collect and analyze
information provided by the IDPs for use by the humanitarian community
to better meet their needs and formulate effective policy.
Regarding food distribution, from January to mid-April, the U.N.
World Food Programme (WFP) and partner NGOs, with substantial USAID
support, met the urgent food aid needs of approximately 3 million
people or roughly a third of Haiti's population, in the immediate
aftermath. Currently, WFP and partnering NGOs are providing additional
targeted food aid assistance to identified vulnerable populations
(predominantly women and children).
USAID and its partnering NGOs continue to provide services in many
camps including free, safe, drinking water distribution and health
care. USAID also supports cash-for-work and food-for-work programs
nationwide. USAID regularly meets with WFP and implementing partners to
monitor the effectiveness of these programs and follow up on reported
programming gaps.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
