[Senate Hearing 111-755]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-755
HAITI: FROM RESCUE TO RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 28, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Dobbins, Hon. James, director, International Security and Defense
Policy Center, National Security Research Division, RAND Corp.,
Washington, DC................................................. 14
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Response to question submitted for the record by Senator
Robert P. Casey, Jr........................................ 44
Farmer, Dr. Paul, U.N. Deputy Special Envoy for Haiti, Boston, MA 6
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Francois, M. Rony, M.D., incoming director of public health,
State of Georgia, Atlanta, GA.................................. 21
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Additional Prepared Statements Submitted for the Record
Christopher J. Dodd, U.S. Senator from Connecticut............... 31
Kirsten E. Gillibrand, U.S. Senator from New York................ 43
U.N. Human Settlements Programme, UN-HABITAT, submitted by
Christopher W. Williams, Washington, DC........................ 44
National Haitian America Elected Officials (NHAEON), submitted by
State Representative Marie St. Fleur, Boston, MA............... 46
International Housing Coalition (IHC), Washington, DC............ 47
Habitat for Humanity International submitted by Chris Vincent,
director, congressional relations/international affairs,
Washington, DC................................................. 48
InterAction, A United Voice for Global Change.................... 50
(iii)
HAITI: FROM RESCUE TO RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 28, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:18 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Cardin, Casey, Shaheen,
Lugar, and Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
We're going to start the hearing, and I think Dr. Farmer is
not very far away.
Let me just say I apologize to all for the need to shift,
but five votes have been scheduled seriatim, starting at 10:30.
And so, had we begun this hearing as it had been scheduled, at
10 o'clock, we literally would not have had a hearing. So, I
appreciate everybody's ability to move this and advance it.
And I think what we will try to do is compress the hearing
into--we actually have a grace period of about 15 minutes
beyond the 10:30, so we have until about 10:45 or so, and that
ought to give us an opportunity to be able to get through both
the testimony and the questions adequately. I wish we weren't
pressed, but the reality is, we are.
Needless to say, today Haiti is reeling in the aftermath of
what may well be the worst humanitarian catastrophe that the
Americas have ever seen. Well over 100,000 dead, and more dying
every day. An estimated 1 million Haitians are displaced. Large
parts of Port-au-Prince and several outlying cities are
flattened. An already weakened infrastructure has basically
collapsed.
The numbers simply don't explain the horrors that millions
of Haitians are living through. Instead, we begin to understand
Haiti's tragedy through stories and images: a tent city next to
a crumbled Presidential Palace; a Haitian child dividing one
rationed meal among eight members of his family; a 70-year-old
woman rescued from the cathedral in Port-au-Prince 7 days after
the earthquake, too weak to stand, but strong enough to sing
church hymns as she was carried out on a stretcher; and only
just this morning, the photographs of the young 15- or 16-year-
old girl being pulled out alive, just a little more than 2
weeks after the earthquake.
It's impossible not to be moved by the suffering, but also
by the resilience and the dignity of the Haitian people.
It's our duty, as neighbors, and, frankly, as fellow human
beings, to respond to this tragedy. And that responsibility
does not end with the rescue. We need to help Haiti to rebuild
in a way that leaves Haiti better off and better prepared were
any future natural disaster to strike.
Since the quake, America and the world have rushed in with
as much assistance as Haiti's infrastructure has permitted,
quickly deploying search-and-rescue teams, food, water, medical
equipment, shelter, and several thousand troops.
We're also well aware of the suffering and the heartbreak
that has affected the hardworking Haitian-American community.
Indeed, my home State of Massachusetts is home to the third-
largest Haitian community in the United States, and we must do
what we can to help.
There's been a tremendous outpouring of generosity from
Americans and from the international community. People have
opened their wallets and their homes. We've been working very
closely--my staff, myself--with dozens of families in
Massachusetts to expedite the adoptions of Haitian orphans that
were already underway before the earthquake.
We're also working to make sure that our government's
relief efforts provide for the thousands of Haitian children
who were orphaned or displaced by the earthquake, within the
safeguards of the formal process that protect the children from
trafficking.
I want to commend Dr. Shah, Secretary Clinton, and
countless other Americans inside government and out who have
made an impressive, even remarkable effort that all of us can
be proud of.
I'd particularly like to honor U.S. diplomat Victoria
DeLong, who lost her life, then to recognize the enormous loss
suffered by the United Nations. The U.N. has made a massive
contribution in Haiti over the years. And when the earthquake
struck, they lost many outstanding people on the ground. We
offer our profound gratitude and our condolences to the U.N.
and to the families of the deceased.
We've also felt that tragedy personally in Massachusetts,
with the loss of Britney Gengel. And I know, personally, the
agony that her parents, Leonard and Cheryl Ann, have gone
through, first in trying to find out what her fate might be,
and now in trying to recover their daughter's body.
The task before all of us remains far from over. First, we
must continue the enormous ongoing effort to meet Haitians'
immediate need for food, water, shelter, electricity, and
emergency medical care. So far, thanks to U.N. peacekeepers and
U.S. forces, the security situation has allowed these efforts
to proceed in general calm.
Second, we need to use this humanitarian crisis to begin
reversing the poverty and environmental degradation that
plagued Haiti long before this tragedy. We cannot be satisfied
to simply restore Haiti to the unsustainable conditions of the
past.
On January 11, Haiti was already the poorest country in the
Western Hemisphere. Even before the quake, there were 380,000
orphans in Haiti. Most Haitians lived on less that a dollar a
day. One in eight children died before their fifth birthday,
and 40 percent were not enrolled in school. A hundred and
twenty thousand Haitians are HIV-positive, and rural Haitians
have been plagued by malnutrition.
So, we need to help Haitians build a sustainable
foundation--physical, social, economic--for a stronger and more
stable society. This is a chance for Haitians to re-imagine
their country as they rebuild it. We must use every opportunity
to help Haiti improve its living standards.
Haiti has duty-free, quota-free access to the U.S. market,
a large pool of low-cost labor, and a large, hardworking North
American diaspora sending money home. Haiti was actually making
steps toward recovery when the earthquake struck. And violent
crime was declining.
Haiti's progress will be more sustainable if its government
takes a serious look at longer term challenges, such as
environmental devastation and runaway population growth.
Third, Haiti's recovery must belong to the Haitian people.
They may need our help today, but they must be empowered to
build their own future down the road. President Rene Preval and
Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive need to lead the national
recovery, and civil society and democratic institutions must be
protected and nurtured. Haiti's long-term success depends on a
government that can inspire its people, work with the private
sector, attract investment, and marshal resources to provide
basic services, security, and rule of law.
Some have said that Haiti is a lost cause. Based on all I
know of the Haitian people--and I've learned a lot more in
recent days--I couldn't disagree more. Even in the darkest
hours after the earthquake, Haitians who were poor to begin
with and then lost everything, reached out to help each other.
They searched for missing neighbors. Strangers provided comfort
and shelter and shared their meager food.
Looting and violence here and there may make headlines, but
it is the Haitians' determination and decency in the face of
disaster that will make the country's future. Schools may have
collapsed, but Haitian commitment to education will not.
Elisabeth Debrosse Preval, an economist and the President's
wife, urged Haitian people to stand up again and move forward.
As they do, American will be there to help.
We are fortunate to have with us today three very
impressive witnesses with deep knowledge of Haiti and the
challenge that we and the Haitian people face.
Paul Farmer is the U.N. deputy special envoy for Haiti. I'm
proud to call Paul a friend. He's been a vital source of
insight and information for me directly and through my
daughter, Vanessa, who was Paul's student at Harvard Medical
School and continues to work closely with him.
James Dobbins, no stranger to this committee, is director
of international security and defense policy at RAND. And he
has written extensively on Haiti and on the challenges of
reconstruction.
And finally, Dr. Rony Francois, who emigrated from Haiti to
Florida in 1979 to study medicine, can speak directly to the
enormous challenge--public health challenges--that Haiti faces.
He is the incoming director of public health for the State of
Georgia.
And we welcome all of you and thank you for being here
today.
Let me turn to Senator Lugar, and then we'll welcome your
testimonies.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I'd like to thank you again for calling this important
hearing on the rescue, recovery, and longer term reconstruction
efforts in Haiti.
The unimaginable devastation caused by the earthquake and
the ongoing aftershocks since January 12, 2010, is, as you
pointed out, one of the worst natural disasters to confront the
Western Hemisphere in modern history. Nearly 3 million people
have been affected, and authorities estimate that more than
150,000 people have perished. My thoughts, and those of all of
us in this hearing, are with those who have suffered loss.
The crisis situation in Haiti has the potential to
destabilize security in the Caribbean. The social instability
in Haiti represents a critical concern for the Dominican
Republic and could have far-reaching implications if
deteriorating conditions induce a mass exodus of Haitians by
land and sea.
Immediate action by the United States to provide emergency
assistance to Haiti was clearly warranted. The heroic efforts
of American relief workers and the international teams of first
responders are deeply inspiring. I commend the administration
and many of my Senate colleagues who have worked to advance
policies and legislation that will hasten Haiti's recovery.
Last week, I called on the Secretary of Homeland Security
to grant 18 months of Temporary Protective Status for Haitian
immigrants already residing in our country and to grant visa
parole for orphans in the midst of adoption proceedings with
American parents. The Secretary's quick action on both
provisions will ensure that many vulnerable children are united
with loving families and that all people of Haitian descent in
the United States are in a position to contribute to Haiti's
recovery.
A senior economist at the World Bank has projected that
Temporary Protective Status could generate an additional $360
million in remittances sent to Haiti in 2010--on top of the
more than $1 billion transferred each year since 2006.
I am working with Senator Dodd on a bill that would
encourage the IMF to provide debt relief to Haiti and ensure
that IMF gold sale surpluses are used for low-income countries,
including Haiti. The legislation also would explore ways to
invigorate economic activity in the country by adjusting United
States-Haiti trade agreements.
Despite strong support from the United States, sustained
international participation in Haiti is vital for its recovery.
It is especially important that the international community
provide governance assistance to the Haitian people.
The failure and corruption of past Haitian governments
contributed greatly to the stress felt by the Haitian people
before the earthquake, and the limitations of the current
government constrain the prospects for recovery. These harsh
realities, compounded by the significant loss of life that has
weakened the government and other institutions in Haiti, compel
the international community to consider creative measures.
Because of the devastation, Haiti's condition approximates
that of a failed state. We should consider an enhanced role for
the United Nations in the daily operations of the Haitian
Government until the country is stable and less dislocated.
This would include the provision of food and shelter,
reconstruction activities, budgetary affairs, security, and
other aspects of governance vital to the Haitian people. The
United Nations has the credibility and capacity to perform this
role. The relationship between the United Nations and Haitian
Government should be a consensual, cooperative arrangement that
preserves Haitian participation in decisions, while ensuring
that the resources and expertise of the international community
are brought to bear on the daily problems of Haiti. If the U.N.
plays an increased security and recovery role, I believe that
Haitians would more quickly gather their bearings and begin to
rebuild their lives and their country.
A top priority must be developing and implementing a plan
to resettle temporarily the millions of internally displaced
people, for whom Port-au-Prince has little to offer. Adequate
food, water, and shelter must be delivered in earnest to these
resettlement areas.
I would also encourage the Obama administration to
coordinate Haitian-American volunteers into HTAs--Hometown
Associations--small groups of volunteers in the United States
who are linked with their former hometowns and institutions in
Haiti. Members of HTAs can serve as interpreters, support the
temporary resettlement of refugees, and provide assistance to
Haitians who are evacuated to the United States for medical
treatment not available on the island.
The Haitian-American community is eager to be involved in
the recovery of Haiti, but much greater coordination is
required to put their skills to full use. Our government should
explore ways to partner with NGOs and existing social
networking platforms like Facebook and Twitter to facilitate
this coordination. Organizing HTAs will increase our ability to
leverage the flow of the more than $1 billion remitted from the
United States.
I look forward to the insights of our very distinguished
panel of witnesses and innovative recommendations on strategies
for moving Haiti forward.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. I want to
welcome Senator Shaheen here today on the occasion of her 29th
birthday. [Laughter.]
Senator Shaheen. Thirty.
The Chairman. Thirty. Thanks for being truthful, we
appreciate that. [Laughter.]
And, again, delighted to welcome all the members of our
panel.
Dr. Farmer, we have such admiration for the work you've
been engaging in with Partners in Health, in Haiti, in Africa,
and elsewhere, and for your leadership, and for all of you who
have been contributing to this dialogue on Haiti. So, we look
forward to your testimony this morning.
We'll begin with Dr. Farmer, then Mr. Dobbins, and then Mr.
Francois.
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL FARMER, U.N. DEPUTY SPECIAL ENVOY FOR
HAITI, BOSTON, MA
Dr. Farmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
having me back here and--to testify.
I'm speaking, as you mentioned, as the U.N. Deputy Special
Envoy for Haiti--and President Clinton, as you know, is the
special envoy--but also as a physician and teacher from Harvard
who has worked for over 25 years in rural Haiti. Today, my hope
is to do justice, not by chronicling the events of the last 2
weeks, which are already well known to you, but by attesting to
the possibility of hope for the country and of the importance
of meaningful investment and sustainable development in Haiti.
That said, I will not pretend that hope is not, at times,
difficult to muster. As I was coming here into this city, I
asked my colleagues, including Dr. Kerry, ``What would it be
like to look around you and see every Federal building
collapsed--the White House, the House--the Dirksen Building,
all of them?'' And that's of course what we've seen in Haiti.
And as I was flying up here from Port-au-Prince to
Montreal, headed to a conference on coordinating donor
responses to this massive earthquake, I did the painful math in
my head and counted close to 50 colleagues, friends, and family
members who had lost their lives in the space of a minute.
The afternoon of the earthquake, several of my colleagues
from Partners in Health in the U.N. were, ironically, in Port-
au-Prince for a meeting about disaster risk reduction. Partners
in Health, through its Haitian sister organization, provides
health care to the rural poor. This meeting was in Port-au-
Prince, as I said. By focusing on training and employing local
talent, we have grown a great deal over the years. We are
currently serving a population of well over 1.2 million, and
count 5,000 employees, most of them community health workers.
Of course, not all of our colleagues survived, but the vast
majority of our colleagues did survive and have spent the last
2 weeks working day and night to relieve the staggering
suffering of the wounded and displaced.
President Clinton, our colleagues, and I have been in the
cities of Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, Leogane, as well as in the
less effective Central Plateau in Artibonite Valley.
Everywhere, we have seen great acts of bravery and solidarity.
In addition to the heroism of friends and colleagues, I
would like to note for the record the dignity and patience of
the long-suffering Haitian people. During a visit last week to
Haiti's largest teaching hospital, which shares a campus with
the ruins of the nursing and medical schools, President Clinton
remarked that no other people in the world would be so patient
and calm in the face of so much suffering. This observation,
though accurate, must not be misunderstood. People in Haiti are
afraid, not only for their options and futures, but, quite
simply, for their safety.
A few nights ago, we sat in empty medical wards. Hearing of
impending aftershocks, the patients bolted outside with their
IVs dangling from their arms. They refused, as have so many, to
sleep inside the building, any building, but instead found
tarpaulins and sheets, and lay down in the open courtyard near
the hospital. This scene has repeated itself throughout the
country and is a reminder of the logistics challenges facing
all those who would be involved in the provision of shelter,
clean water, and health care.
The relief efforts focused now on addressing the initial
wave of devastation of the earthquake will soon turn to a new
set of concerns. Hastily cobbled-together camps are at risk of
outbreaks of cholera and other waterborne disease. The Haitian
Government has wisely proposed avoiding huge camps, which would
be difficult to manage. But, we must hasten our efforts to get
tents, tarpaulins, and latrines or composting toilets to Haiti.
It is humbling to see the relief effort be so slow, in
large part because the delivery of services was so weak before
the quake. Now, we must do much more to get food and water to
people every day for some time to come.
Creating safe schools and safe hospitals, even makeshift
ones, is a known need in rebuilding society. And storm-
resistant housing must also be a carefully considered priority,
since there is little time before the rainy season. Students
need to be back in school. The planting season cannot be
missed, and requires fertilizer, seeds, and tools.
How will we fund such settlements, ongoing relief, the
sewing of seeds, the reconstruction that must follow? Major
pledges have been made by the United States, Canada, Japan,
Spain, Brazil, the European Union, the Inter-American
Development Bank, the World Bank, and others. Indeed, most
countries have responded to Haiti's plight. Even in faraway and
once afflicted Rwanda, a group of community health workers
making less than $200 a month have been able to pull together
$7,000 in donation for their colleagues in Haiti. This is but a
small portion of the billions needed, but hard to surpass as an
eloquent testimony of human solidarity.
I will make two points, Mr. Chairman. Even when such
resources are available, the task before us will be extremely
difficult. Medical jargon can be helpful here. Today, Haiti is
facing what we would term in medicine an acute-on-chronic
problem. Before January 12, the country was already facing
long-term challenges in public health and education, and an
unemployment rate of over 70 percent, and a majority of its
population living on less than $2 a day. Food and water and
security were already large problems. Does this catastrophe
present a chance for all of us to have a sounder, more
solidarity-based relationship with Haiti, or is it yet to be
another chapter in a long jeremiad of suffering and the abuse
of power?
In my last testimony here, at Senator Lugar's invitation in
2003, I expressed concern that the latter possibility was
likely--Senator Dodd was there, as well--was likely, given the
policies at our time. Today, I would like to conclude that we
are opening up the possibility for a very different way of
interacting with Haiti.
That said, let me say that I have in my life attended only
two donor conferences, both about Haiti. The last one was in
Montreal; I just came from Port-au-Prince to Montreal to here.
The first one was in Washington, less than a year ago. The
results are noteworthy and worrisome. Despite $402 million
pledge to support the Haitian Government's economic recovery
program--this was after the 2008 hurricanes, which destroyed 15
percent of the country's GDP--it was estimated that--by my
coworkers at the U.N.--that a mere $61 million had been
disbursed. In the Office of the Special Envoy, we've been
tracking the disbursement of pledges. Eighty-five percent of
the pledges made a year ago are undisbursed. Many of us worry
that if past is prologue, Haitians themselves will be blamed
for this torpor. But, as we have argued before, there are
serious problems in the aid machinery, and these have
contributed to the delivery challenges on the ground.
The aid machinery currently at work in Haiti keeps too much
for overhead for its operations and still relies overmuch on
NGOs or contractors who do not observe the ground rules we
would need to follow to build Haiti back better. The fact that
there are more NGOs per capita in Haiti than in any other
country in this hemisphere is, in part, a reflection of need,
but also, in part, a reflection of overreliance on NGOs, quite
divorced from public health and public education sectors.
Haiti will need the contractors and mission groups and
NGOs. And indeed, I speak on behalf of a very large health NGO.
But, we need to create new ground rules, including a demand to
create local jobs for Haitians and on building an
infrastructure that is crucial to creating sustainable economic
growth and, ultimately, reducing Haiti's dependence on aid. In
other words, what we need is a way of building back better that
strengthens governance, but also strengthens the Haitian
economy to provide for the needs of its people, especially the
vast majority of Haitians who are desperately poor.
There is an opportunity not only to build Haiti back
better, but to build a more functional and beneficial aid
structure. Over the past two decades, U.S. aid policies have
see-sawed between embargos and efforts to bypass government,
including elected ones not to Washington's taste.
In building back Haiti, a credible body that has been
working in Haiti, such as the Inter-American Development Bank,
could help house a recovery fund. We need to commit funds and
also to disburse them. To quote Jeff Sachs, ``Haiti does not
need a pledging session, it needs a bank account to fund its
survival and reconstruction.'' Such an account could be
managed, as the chairman just noted, with partners such as the
U.N. and, of course, Haitian leadership, and would work openly
and directly with partners to design and implement recovery
plans coordinated at central and local levels. The effort must
include a comprehensive post-disaster needs assessment, which
should be supported by the United States and other partners.
Might such plans work? In some of the darkest moments of
the last 2 weeks, when the incapacity and lack of coordination
of institutions on the ground was repeatedly revealed to me, I
thought often of Rwanda and what happened there in 1994. As a
physician and teacher at Harvard, I've been lucky to work with
Partners in Health, the Clinton Foundation, and the Government
of Rwanda in rebuilding health infrastructure in three of the
last four districts that lacked central hospitals. They are now
all built. As in rural Haiti, this has been a very positive
experience. It has resulted in thousands of jobs for Rwandans,
and has created broadly accessible health care infrastructure,
all with a modest pricetag, compared to traditional aid
contractors.
If such progress can be made in Rwanda, which boasts strong
leadership, but in 1994 was the poorest country on the face of
this Earth, then one hopes it can be made elsewhere.
Our mission must be--and I will close, because I've gone
over--to note that if there's any silver lining to this cloud,
it is that we can push job creation. It is a strange irony that
supporters of economic assistance to Haiti are now obliged to
shill for cash-for-work programs for the quaint notion that
people should be paid for their labor.
Let us be honest; it is absurd to argue that voluntarism
and food-for-work programs will create sustainable jobs. But,
if we set the ground rules on reconstruction correctly, we will
be able to create sustainable jobs.
As a doctor, I can tell you that bad infrastructure and
thoughtless policy are visible in the bodies of the poor, just
as are the benefits of good policy and well-designed
infrastructure. In my almost 30 years in Haiti, I have
witnessed many political interventions and multiple coups. They
have been unpleasant, even if their effects pale in the shadow
of what we are now experiencing.
Many people look at Haiti in despair, as the chairman
noted. They say that aid is wasted, that there is no hope for
this country. I would answer them by saying that this is not
true. If we focus the reconstruction efforts appropriately, we
can achieve long-term benefits for Haiti. Putting Haitians back
to work and offering them the dignity that comes with having a
job and its basic protections is exactly what brought our
country out of the Great Depression.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Farmer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Paul Farmer, U.N. Deputy Special Envoy for
Haiti, Boston, MA
Thank you for inviting me to testify today before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. I speak as the U.N. Deputy Special
Envoy for Haiti--President Clinton, as you know, is the Special Envoy--
and also as a physician and teacher from Harvard who has worked for
over 25 years in rural Haiti. Today, my hope is to do justice to Haiti
not by chronicling the events of the past 2 weeks, which are well known
to you, but also by attesting to the possibility of hope for the
country, and of the importance of meaningful investment and sustainable
development in Haiti.
That said, I will not pretend that hope is not at times difficult
to muster.
As I was flying from Port-au-Prince to Montreal on Monday, headed
to a conference on coordinating responses to the massive earthquake, I
did the painful math in my head and counted close to 50 colleagues,
friends, and family members who had lost their lives in the space of a
minute.
The afternoon of the earthquake, several of my colleagues from
Partners In Health and the U.N., were, ironically, in Port-au-Prince
for a meeting about disaster risk reduction. Partners In Health,
through its Haitian sister organization, provides health care to the
rural poor. By focusing on training and employing local talent, we have
grown a great deal over the years. We are currently serving a
population of well over 1.2 million and count about 5,000 employees,
most of them community health workers.
Of course, not all our colleagues survived. But the vast majority
of them did survive, and they have spent the last 2 weeks working day
and night to relieve the staggering suffering of the wounded and
displaced. President Clinton, our colleagues, and I have been in the
cities of Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, and Leogane, as well as the less-
affected Central Plateau and Artibonite Valley. Everywhere we have seen
acts of great bravery and solidarity.
In addition to the heroism of friends and colleagues, I would like
to note for the record the dignity and patience of the long-suffering
Haitian people. During a visit last week to Haiti's largest teaching
hospital, which shares a campus with the ruins of the nursing and
medical schools, President Clinton remarked that no other people in the
world would be so patient and calm in the face of so much suffering.
This observation, though accurate, must not be misunderstood. People in
Haiti are afraid not only for their options and futures, but still
quite simply for their safety. A few nights ago, we sat in empty wards:
hearing of impending aftershocks, the patients bolted outside with
their IVs dangling from their arms. They refused, as have so many, to
sleep inside the building--any building--but instead found tarpaulins
and sheets, and lay down in the open courtyard.
This scene has repeated itself throughout the country and is a
reminder of the logistics challenges facing all those who would be
involved in the provision of shelter, clean water, and health care. The
relief efforts, focused now on addressing the initial wave of
devastation from the earthquake, will soon turn to a new set of
concerns. Hastily cobbled-together camps are at risk of outbreaks of
cholera and other waterborne disease. The Haitian Government has wisely
proposed avoiding huge camps, which will be difficult to manage, but we
must hasten our efforts to get tents, tarpaulins, and latrines or
composting toilets to Haiti. It is humbling to see the relief efforts
be so slow--in large part because delivery of services was so weak
before the quake. Now we must do more to get food and water to people
every day for some time to come. Creating safe schools and safe
hospitals, even makeshift ones, is a known need in rebuilding a
society, and storm-resistant housing must also be a carefully
considered priority since there is little time before the rainy season.
Students need to be back in school; the planting season cannot be
missed and requires fertilizer, seeds, and tools.
How will we fund such settlements, ongoing relief, the sowing of
seeds, and the reconstruction that must follow? Major pledges have been
made by the United States, Canada, Japan, Spain, Brazil, the European
Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and
others.\1\ Indeed, most countries have responded. Even in far away and
once-afflicted Rwanda, a group of community health workers making less
than $200/month have been able to pull together $7,000 in donations for
their colleagues in Haiti. This is but a small portion of the billions
needed, but hard to surpass as an eloquent testimony of human
solidarity.
Even if adequate resources are available, the task before us will
be extremely difficult. Medical jargon, though at times arcane, can be
helpful here. Today, Haiti is facing what we would term ``acute on
chronic'' problems. Before January 12, the country was already facing
huge long-term challenges in public health and education, the
unemployment rate over 70 percent, and a majority of its population was
living on less than $2 a day.\2\,\3\ Food and water
insecurity were already huge problems.\4\ Does this catastrophe create
a chance for all of us to have a sounder, more solidarity-based
relationship with Haiti? Or is it to be yet another chapter in a
jeremiad of suffering and abuse of power? In my last testimony here, in
2003, I expressed concern that the latter possibility was likely given
our policies at that time. Today I will spend my time focusing on the
potential for an entirely reconsidered relationship between the two
oldest independent countries in the Americas: Haiti and my own.
Let me offer, as one example of the difficult relations between
Haiti and the international community (and an echo of the 19th century
machinations I discussed in my last testimony before this committee),
the donor conference I attended here in Washington last April. It was
one of only two donor conferences I have ever attended, the second
being in Montreal earlier this week. The results of the first are
noteworthy and worrisome: despite $402 million pledged to support the
Haitian Government's Economic Recovery Program, when the country was
trying to recover from a series of natural disasters resulting in a 15-
percent reduction of GDP, it is estimated that a mere $61 million have
been disbursed.\5\ In the Office of the Special Envoy, we have been
tracking the disbursement of pledges, and as of yesterday we estimate
that 85 percent of the pledges made last year remain undisbursed.
Many of us worry that, if past is prologue, Haitians themselves
will be blamed for this torpor. But as we have argued before, there are
serious problems in the aid machinery, and these have contributed to
the ``delivery challenges'' on the ground.\6\ The aid machinery
currently at work in Haiti keeps too much overhead for its operations
and still relies overmuch on NGOs or contractors who do not observe the
ground rules we would need to follow to build Haiti back better. The
fact that there are more NGOs per capita in Haiti than in any other
country in the hemisphere is in part a reflection of need, but also in
part a reflection of overreliance on NGOs divorced from the public
health and education sectors.\7\
Haiti will continue to need the contractors, and the NGOs and
mission groups, but more importantly we will need to create new ground
rules--including a focus on creating local jobs for Haitians, and on
building the infrastructure that is crucial to creating sustainable
economic growth and ultimately reducing Haiti's dependence on aid.
In other words, what we need is a way of ``building back better''
that strengthens governance but also strengthens the Haitian economy to
provide for the needs of its people, especially the vast majority of
Haitians who are desperately poor. There is an opportunity not only to
build Haiti back better, but to build a more functional and beneficial
aid structure. Debt forgiveness is needed to ease the financial drain
which would otherwise hinder economic recovery and growth. Over the
past two decades, U.S. aid policies have seesawed between embargoes and
efforts to bypass governments, including elected ones not to
Washington's taste.\8\
In building back Haiti, a credible body that has been working in
Haiti such as the Inter-American Development Bank could help to house a
recovery fund. We need to commit funds and also to disburse them. To
quote Jeff Sachs, ``Haiti does not need a pledging session; it needs a
bank account to fund its survival and reconstruction.'' \9\ A Such an
account should be managed in collaboration with partners, the U.N.,
and, of course, Haitian leadership, which would work directly and
openly with partners to design and implement recovery plans coordinated
at central and local levels. The effort must include a comprehensive
post-disaster needs assessment, which should be supported by the U.S.
and other partners.
Might such plans work? In some of the darkest moments of the last 2
weeks, when the incapacity and lack of coordination of institutions on
the ground was revealed repeatedly, I have thought often of Rwanda and
what happened there in 1994. As a physician and teacher at Harvard, I
have been lucky to work with the Clinton Foundation, Partners In
Health, and the Government of Rwanda on rebuilding health
infrastructure in three of the last four districts that lacked central
hospitals. As in rural Haiti, this has been a very positive experience.
It has resulted in thousands of jobs for Rwandans, and has created a
broadly accessible health care infrastructure--all with a modest price
tag compared to traditional aid contractors.\10\
If such progress can be made in Rwanda, which boasts strong
leadership but in 1994 was the poorest country in the world,\11\ then
one hopes it can be made elsewhere. In part because of this positive
experience of working together with the Clinton Foundation in Rwanda
(and in Malawi and Lesotho), I joined President Clinton 6 months ago as
his deputy in the U.N. role he originated. As Special Envoy for Haiti,
President Clinton has focused his attention not only on holding donors
to the financial pledges they made, but also on reducing the risk of
disasters and on job creation through the massive public works that are
necessary to reforest Haiti, protect watersheds, and improve
agricultural yield--the backbone of the Haitian economy. Private
investment in Haitian businesses, especially small- and medium-
sized ones, is critical to rendering Haiti free of any dependence on
aid--the goal of Rwanda by 2020, a goal likely to be met.\12\ Haiti
also has, he noted, great potential as a tourist attraction but lacks
the infrastructure to welcome the millions of people who should see
Haiti's natural beauty and historic treasures like King Henri
Christophe's Citadel.
This has been our mission: to build back better from the 2008
storms. We believe that these efforts were beginning to bear fruit. We
had scheduled a meeting last week in the Hotel Montana to bring in
another round of investors and also to discuss job creation. As many of
you know, this hotel is no longer standing, and most inside it perished
on January 12. But the need for such investments, and the need for
public works that would create hundreds of thousands of jobs, remains.
If there is any silver lining to this cloud, it is that we can push
job creation. It is a strange irony that supporters of economic
assistance to Haiti are now obliged to shill for ``cash for work''
programs--for the quaint notion that people should be paid for their
labor. Let us at least be honest: It is absurd to argue that
voluntarism and food-for-work programs will create sustainable jobs.
But if we set the ground rules on reconstruction correctly, we will be
able to create sustainable jobs.
In other words, if we focus the reconstruction efforts
appropriately, we can achieve long-term benefits for Haiti. The UNDP is
helping to organize programs of this kind, which should be supported
and extended around the country. Putting Haitians back to work and
offering them the dignity that comes with having a job and its basic
protections is exactly what brought our country out of the Great
Depression.
This was always the right thing to do, and aid programs
persistently fail to get it right. So here is our chance: If even half
of the pledges made in Montreal or other such meetings are linked
tightly to local job creation, it is possible to imagine a Haiti
building back better with fewer of the social tensions that inevitably
arise as half a million homeless people are integrated into new
communities.
Haiti needs and deserves a Marshall Plan--not the ``containment''
aspects of that policy, unless we are explicit about containing the ill
effects of poverty, but the social-justice elements--but we need to be
honest about the differences between post-war Europe and Haiti in 2010.
Part of the problem, I've argued, is the way in which aid is delivered
now as compared to in 1946--well before the term ``beltway bandits''
was coined. We need a reconstruction fund that is large, managed
transparently, creates jobs for Haitians, and grows the Haitian
economy. We need a reconstruction plan that uses a pro-poor, rights-
based approach based on something far different from the charity and
failed development approaches that have marred interactions between
Haiti and much of the rest of the world for the better part of two
centuries.
Our country can be a big part of this effort. Debt relief is
important, but only the beginning. Any group looking to do this work
must share the goals of the Haitian people: social and economic rights,
reflected, for example, in job creation, local business development,
watershed protection (and alternatives to charcoal for cooking), access
to quality health care, and gender equity. Considering all these goals
together orients our strategic choices. For example, cash transfers to
women, who hold the purse strings in Haiti and are arbiters of
household spending, will have significant impact. This is a chance to
learn and move forward and build on lessons learned in adversity--to
build hurricane-resistant houses with good ventilation to improve air
quality from stove smoke; to build communities around clean water
sources; to reforest the terrain to protect from erosion and to nurture
the fertility of the land for this agriculturally dominant country. It
is the chance to create shelter, grow the local economy and incomes,
and invest in improved health. This will do much to decrease the risk
of another calamity, and to decrease the vulnerability of the poor--
especially as we face the second wave of problems, including epidemic
disease born of the earthquake.
As a doctor, I can tell you that bad infrastructure and thoughtless
policy are visible in the bodies of the poor, just as are the benefits
of good policy and well-designed infrastructure. In my almost 30 years
in Haiti I have witnessed many political interventions and multiple
coups. They have been unpleasant, even if their effects pale in the
shadow of what we are now experiencing. Many people look at Haiti and
despair. They say that aid is wasted, that there is no hope for this
country. I would answer them with the positive experience of building
Haitian-led programs in the Central Plateau and Artibonite Valley
regions that have created 5,000 jobs for people who would otherwise
have no steady work. I advance this model not because it is associated
with our efforts, but because job creation is the surest way to speed
up the cash flow that is essential now. It is also the fastest way to
make amends for our past actions toward Haiti, which have not always
been honorable.
Sitting before you, I am at my core optimistic about the
possibilities before us and the potential of our support to help rescue
and transform our poorest neighbor. The response from citizens of the
United States to the recent events in Haiti has been overwhelming and
encouraging. There is the promise of solidarity by our leadership to
make long-term commitments to the kinds of investments needed in
Haiti--and to fulfilling them.
For two centuries, the Haitian people have struggled for basic
human and economic rights, the right to health care, the right to
education, the right to work, the right to dignity and independence.
These goals, which Haitians share with people all over the world,
should direct our policies of aid and rebuilding.
As I wrote with colleagues in a recent op-ed--which is available in
my written testimony--as physicians working in Haiti, we know firsthand
that Haiti itself will soon be the casualty if we do not help build
back better in the way envisioned by Haitians themselves.
----------------
\1\ Walker, P. ``Haiti Earthquake Aid Pledged by Country.''
Guardian.co.uk 26 January 2010. Available at: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/jan/14/haiti-quake-aid-pledges-
country-donations (accessed January 27, 2010).
\2\ Flintoff, Corey. ``In Haiti, A Low-Wage Job Is Better Than
None,'' All Things Considered, June 14, 2009. Available at: http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104403034 (accessed
January 27, 2010).
\3\ In 2006, the World Bank estimated that 78 percent of Haiti's 9
million people lived on less than $2 per day. See Haiti at a Glance,
World Bank, Development Data Group (DECDG). Available at: http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTHAITI/Resources/Haiti.AAG.pdf (accessed
January 26, 2010).
\4\ For an overview of Haiti's water insecurity and past delays in
international commitments to address this crisis, see Varma MK,
Satterthwaite ML, Klasing AM et al. Woch nan soley: The denial of the
right to water in Haiti. Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human
Rights, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at NYU School of
Law, Partners In Health, and Zanmi Lasante, 2008. Available at: http://
www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/wochnansoley.pdf (accessed January 27,
2010).
\5\ This estimate of disbursements was prepared in January 2010 in
an internal memorandum of the U.N. Office of the Special Envoy For
Haiti. President Clinton, in his capacity as U.N. Special Envoy,
frequently appealed to donors to fulfill their commitments. See Helprin
J, ``Bill Clinton Chides Nations Over Help to Haiti.'' Associated
Press, September 9, 2009. Available
at: http://www.newsvine.com/_news/2009/09/09/3243861-bill-clinton-
chides-nations-over-help-for-haiti (accessed January 27, 2010).
\6\ Farmer, P. ``Challenging Orthodoxies: The Road Ahead for Health
and Human Rights.'' Health and Human Rights: An International Journal
2008; 10(1): 5-19.
\7\ Daniel, Trenton, ``Bill Clinton Tells Diaspora: `Haiti Needs
You Now,' '' Miami Herald, August 9, 2009. Available at: http://
www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/haiti/story/1179067.html (accessed
January 27, 2010).
\8\ Farmer P, Smith Fawzi MC, and Nevil P. ``Unjust Embargo of Aid
for Haiti.'' The Lancet 2003; 361: 420 423.
\9\ Sachs, J. ``After the Earthquake, How To Rebuild Haiti From
Scratch.'' Washington Post, 17 January 2010. Available at: http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/15/
AR2010011502457.html (accessed January 27, 2010).
\10\ Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Health, and Partners In
Health. ``African Rural Healthcare: An Evaluation of the South Kayonza,
Rwanda Project'' (2005-2011). Programme Report, Ministry of Health,
2006.
\11\ United Nations Development Programme. ``Human Development
Report: 1997.'' New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 146-148.
Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_
1997_en_indicators1.pdf (accessed January 27, 2010).
\12\ Republic of Rwanda. ``Rwanda Vision 2020.'' Kigali: Ministry
of Finance and Economic Planning, Republic of Rwanda, 2002. Available
at: http://www.cdf.gov.rw/documents%20library/important%20docs/
Vision_2020.pdf (accessed January 27, 2010).
______
[From the Miami Herald, Jan. 23, 2010]
Tales From the Front
(By Drs. Paul Farmer, Louise Ivers and Claire Pierre)
The vocabulary of clinical medicine is large and arcane, but a
couple of concepts are useful in diagnosing what is happening in Haiti
and in setting a path. In the coming weeks, there will be scores of
prescriptions for Haiti, but there must also be diagnoses, too. What is
going on right now would be described in clinical terms as an ``acute-
on-chronic'' picture: Haiti's majority has long been dealing with
serious problems and to this has been added the acute injury of a
massive earthquake affecting much of the country, most notably its most
heavily populated areas.
If any kind of chronology can be imposed on a disaster of this
magnitude, we are moving into the next phase, where rescue and relief
operations continue--miraculous rescues of those trapped are still
occurring, with one young girl and her brother pulled from rubble the
other day and now recovering at the largest urban hospital--and are
complemented by slowly coordinated efforts to bring food, drink,
shelter, and basic medical services to the millions affected by the
quake.
Some of the aid is starting to move, as repeat visits to Port-au-
Prince's general hospital reveal: In the space of less than a week, the
hospital, run by local staff, has been assisted by scores of surgical
and medical volunteers and has moved from no functioning operating
rooms to a dozen that are busy all day, every day and throughout the
night, too.
This disaster has brought together goodwill and interest in Haiti
such that for the first time in the country's history, there may soon
be enough surgeons and trauma specialists.
There are, of course, many kinds of trauma, and even those who
escaped unscathed physically have lost friends and loved ones, to say
nothing of material possessions.
Across the country, as people continue to search for missing family
members and friends, a kind of numbness is giving way to grief. Rescue
workers and medical personnel and ad hoc logisticians, most of them
Haitians, will need a break, as some of them have been working nonstop
for over a week. One of our collaborators is still in the clothes in
which she escaped with her life from her home.
sense of calm
Everywhere here you see Haitians helping each other. Despite
reports of violence, what strikes many of us is the overall sense of
calm: Former President Clinton, after bringing surgical supplies to the
general hospital, noted that no other people in the world would be so
patient and calm in the face of so much suffering.
A young Haitian colleague, already on the faculty of Harvard
Medical School, is organizing scores of volunteers from every class.
People have opened their homes and yards, which are covered with
makeshift shelters: The chronic problem of housing in Haiti is now
worsened by the acute problem of half a million newly homeless.
In addition to cross-class cooperation, it is clear that the
Haitian diaspora, which scattered across North America and Europe (and
even Rwanda, where a small group of Haitians is busy raising funds) has
a lot to offer beyond material assistance. One post-surgical ICU
doctor, Dr. Ernest Benjamin, wrote to his home institution in New York
to say that ``at last this is starting to look like a functioning
hospital.''
He and other Haitian professionals living in the United States--
Haitian physicians and nurses are a powerful force there--have much to
offer a large-scale rebuilding effort if it is coordinated with efforts
to rebuild national institutions.
Another helpful notion from medicine is the pledge to ``do no
harm.'' Knowing what not to do is not the same thing as knowing what to
do--who can be sure of what to do when nothing of this scale has been
registered before?--but it is important nonetheless to learn from years
of international aid to Haiti.
First, long-term lack of coordination of relief and reconstruction
efforts will be costly. Competition between self-described donor
nations is worse than unhelpful. Even now, there is bedlam as medical
teams arrive with excellent skills and intention, but insufficient
coordination.
The many clinicians now in the country need to work together as a
team.
One potential model of recovery for Haiti is the nation of Rwanda.
After the 1994 genocide, Rwanda was overwhelmed by the international
helping class, which included, in addition to many people of good will,
a flock of trauma vultures, consultants and carpetbaggers. Under the
strong leadership of the nascent government, including now-President
Paul Kagame, leaders insisted that recovery and reconstruction aid be
coordinated by the central and district governments. A number of
nongovernmental organizations left Rwanda, but most would argue the
decisions made then have helped to create a new model of collaboration
between public and private actors, and contributed to Rwanda's
remarkable post-genocide stability and growth.
The Government of Rwanda has made a generous fmancial gift to the
people of Haiti.
Second, neglecting the immediate-term needs in favor of the long
view is a mistake. People need food, water, shelter and sanitation in
the days and months to come, to complement the emergency medical care
that has been dispatched.
Third, those who wish to help in the next few days would be wise to
hold off on most in-kind donations. Some of these will surely be needed
soon, but the best thing to do right now is to send cash to
organizations that have deep connections to Haiti and can draw on local
knowledge and local hands to respond to the immediate needs of the
injured, homeless, and sick.
resettlement efforts
Fourth, we must do no harm in resettlement efforts. Housing will be
an enormous challenge, and will require the best minds on the planet.
We need to avoid creating intermediate-term camps that become slums.
Fifth, we must make sure that deportation of Haitians from the
United States and elsewhere stops.
Prescriptions for Haiti will be bountiful from outside, but we must
ensure that the prescriptions are correct. Haiti needs a different kind
of assistance, one built on solidarity and respect and rooted in what
the Haitian people want for themselves. Assistance offered now must
develop food sovereignty for Haiti and investment in the rural area,
now seeing an influx of those displaced from the capital.
The next few weeks will reveal some sense of the long-term
prognosis for the reconstruction of Haiti. There is already talk of a
$12 billion rebuilding tab.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Farmer.
Mr. Dobbins.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES DOBBINS, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH
DIVISION, RAND CORP., WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Dobbins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The history of prior American and international
interventions in Haiti must instill a sense of caution
regarding the prospects for working any real transformation
there. Yet, as a candidate for assistance, Haiti has many
advantages over other fragile states, including some in which
the state-building process has yielded quite positive results.
Most of the--most of those sorts of states are surrounded by
conflict-prone and predatory neighbors.
Haiti, in contrast, sits in the midst of a zone of relative
peace--of peace and relative prosperity. All of Haiti's
neighbors are much richer, and none have any interest in
destabilizing Haiti or inhibiting its development. Neither is
Haiti divided by competing ethnic or religious groups. Haitians
have a strong sense of national identity and no serious
sectarian divides. Haiti also has a large and relatively
prosperous diaspora, many of whom are located at no great
distance and enjoy frequent contact with their families on
island. So, Haiti does have certain inherent advantages.
In addition to these inherent advantages, I think there are
three relatively new conditions that suggest that, this time
around, we may do better than we have the last few.
First of all, the final departure of President Aristide in
2004 has greatly diminished partisan rancor in both Port-au-
Prince and Washington. At a moment when Bill Clinton and George
W. Bush are campaigning together for relief to Haiti, one may
hope that this American divide, which so hobbled American
efforts to help Haiti in the past, has definitively closed.
Second, the outpouring of sympathy for Haiti as a result of
the recent earthquake seems likely to yield a substantial
increase in American and international aid levels. More money
means more assistance, but it also means more leverage to
promote change.
Finally, the very immensity of the recent disaster has
administered a shock to the Haitian political structure that
can help ease resistance to reform and undermine longstanding
barriers to progress within Haiti.
My own experience with Haiti dates back to the American
intervention of 1994. This was one of five such nation-building
operations with which I became associated, including Somalia,
early in the decade, then Bosnia and Kosovo, and, finally,
Afghanistan, on behalf of the Bush administration. And since
leaving office, I've had an opportunity to reflect not only on
that American experience, but also on a dozen or more U.N. and
other operations with which the United States was not closely
associated. And so, I'd like to offer a number of proposed
guidelines for assistance to Haiti that's based on that broad
experience of the last 60 years in these kinds of missions in
fragile island states.
First, security is an essential prerequisite for reform, as
it is for private investment. In the absence of security, any
positive changes will be washed away. So, the bad news is that
an international security presence in Haiti is going to be
required for a long time. The good news is that Haiti is not a
particularly difficult society to secure. Contrary to the
popular image, the Haitian population is neither heavily armed
nor inclined to violence. One has only to regard the patience
with which the people of Port-au-Prince has awaited succor over
the last 2 weeks to recognize its essentially peaceful
character. Haiti is no Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan.
American troops, therefore, are unlikely to be required
once the immediate emergency passes. I think the United Nations
should be able to secure Haiti successfully with the modest
reinforcements that have already been authorized.
I do think that the United States should consider
increasing the assignment of American police officers to the
U.N. police contingent there. We have a unique attribute to
draw on, which is a number of Haitian-American police officers,
in big cities like Miami and New York and elsewhere, who, I
think, can offer a valuable contribution to the U.N. police
force, which is helping to secure Haiti.
Second lesson drawn from these past operations is that
stabilization and reconstruction operations take time. The 1994
American-led intervention was a case in point. That operation
was almost entirely successful in its own terms, but those
terms were much too narrow. In launching the intervention,
President Clinton promised to restore a freely elected
President and then to keep American troops in Haiti only long
enough to organize new elections and inaugurate a new
President. And he promised to do this all within 2 years.
This, his administration proceeded to do, hitting every
benchmark, achieving every target, and suffering almost no
casualties. But, 2 years was too short a time to fix a society
as troubled as Haiti's, and the 1994 intervention accomplished
little of lasting value.
Recent post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction
operations have lasted--have been lasting 8 to 10 years. The
current operation began in 2004, but I think, as the result of
the earthquake, we basically have to set the clock back to zero
and assume that a U.N. peacekeeping force is going to be
required there, probably for another decade at least.
Third, in a post-conflict environment, economic development
and political reform programs need to be evaluated not just on
their potential to promote growth and social justice, but on
their capacity to ease tensions in the society and promote
reconciliation among long-hostile groups. This means that
programs to relieve poverty, create jobs will be a necessary
part of a larger aid effort, even if their immediate impact is
sometimes rather ephemeral.
Fourth, assistance should be focused on building a more
competent and efficient state. This is probably my most
important message. Haiti's vulnerability to natural disaster is
not just a matter of weak building codes and poor
infrastructure, but, more fundamentally, the result of having
an exceptionally weak state, one that cannot provide even
minimal public services--security, power, water, health, and
education--to the majority of its population.
Large amounts of American aid and other donor money are
going to flow into Haiti in the coming weeks, and the
temptation will be to spend most of it, as Dr. Farmer
suggested, on American and foreign NGOs that can deliver
essential services with fair reliability and good
accountability. But, this sort of aid leaves no lasting local
capacity to sustain those services. A second priority will be
on bricks and mortar. But, this too will leave the underlying
Haitian institutions unaltered.
Aid, therefore, also needs to be directed on a priority
basis toward enhancing Haiti's capacity to govern itself. This
means providing Haitian Government the wherewithal to hire
well-qualified staff at competitive wages and programs to
further train such staff and provide them information systems
and other support services needed to maximize their efficiency.
Fifth, Haiti needs to be built from the bottom up as well
as the top down. It's not just Port-au-Prince; it's the rural
populations. It's not just the government ministries in Port-
au-Prince; it's creating the capacity of the Haitian Government
to actually penetrate and deliver services at the local level,
and also to promote the development of local leadership, local
mayors, local councils, and provide them the wherewithal to
assist their constituents.
Sixth, the U.S. Government needs to organize itself for a
sustained, high-intensity effort. I would suggest that the
Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State should invest a single
individual
with the authority and responsibility for Haiti, comparable to
that
which Ambassador Richard Holbrooke currently exercises for
Afghanistan.
Congress should authorize and appropriate new money for
Haiti, not in the usual categories of development assistance,
security assistance, counternarcotics assistance, refugee
assistance, et cetera, but in a single account, unencumbered by
earmarks and special limitations, and then work, through the
consultative and oversight processes, with whomever the
administration designates as its point person, to make sure
this money is carefully targeted and well spent.
Seventh, it's important the international program for
reform of Haitian institutions not bear a ``Made in
Washington'' imprint. I believe that the United States should
work to establish conditions for assistance, and to insist
those conditions are met through institutions like the United
Nations and the World Bank. We should help those institutions
target the reforms that are feasible and essential, and to set
the conditions which will use the leverage that assistance
provides to get those reforms effectuated.
And the United States should work quietly behind the scenes
to use its political influence to make sure that the Haitian
institutions do, indeed, adopt those reforms and embrace them.
And the United States, of course, should be contributing
directly and substantially to both U.N. and World Bank efforts.
I would suggest the division of labor would be the United
Nations continuing to take the lead in reforming the security
sector, including police, courts, and prisons, in supporting
elections and promoting political reform, while the World Bank
takes the lead in supporting economic and social reforms.
Finally, there are a couple of things that the United
States is uniquely positioned to do by reason of its proximity.
These involve trade and immigration.
Senator Kerry, you already mentioned the very generous
preferential access Haiti has to the United States market. This
is a time-limited access, and I would suggest we, on that as
well as on the peacekeeping force, essentially set the clock
back to zero and assume that that access begins as of today
rather than as of when it actually went into effect.
And second, I do suggest, as I think Senator Lugar was
suggesting, that the United States should consider a temporary
increase in family unification immigration to the United
States. Haitian society may be economically dysfunctional, but
Haitian immigrants have, quite the contrary, proved to be
exceptionally hard-working, family-oriented, law-abiding
contributors to our society, even as they are one of the
largest sources of support for those they leave behind in
Haiti. Every dollar they remit to relatives in Haiti is another
dollar that does not need to come from the U.S. taxpayer.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James Dobbins, Director, International
Security and Defense Policy Center, National Security Research
Division, RAND Corp., Washington, DC
In considering how best to help Haiti recover from the January 12
earthquake, it is important torecognize that one now has an
international disaster relief operation superimposed on top of a
preexisting post-conflict reconstruction mission. The earlier of these
two operations began in 2004, when American and then-United Nations
troops assumed responsibility for security in Haiti.
Of the two operations, humanitarian relief is clearly the more
urgent, but post conflict stabilization and reconstruction is
ultimately the more important. One intends to restore Haiti, the other
to transform it.
The ultimate aim of any post conflict mission is to leave behind a
society better able to look after itself. Usually this means the
ability to manage political domestic competition in ways that do not
spill over into violent conflict. In Haiti's case, the objective must
also be to improve that society's capacity to deal with the sort of
natural disaster that, given this country's location, will continue to
strike with some regularity.
In trying to help fix a failed or failing state, one must begin by
analyzing the sources of fragility. The earthquake demonstrated the
weakness of Haiti's infrastructure. It also highlighted the weakness of
its governing institutions. This is the true source of Haiti's
vulnerability to conflict and to natural disaster. In Haiti's case,
state-building, rather than nation-building is the more apt description
of our mission.
The history of prior American and international interventions in
Haiti must instill a sense of caution regarding the prospects for any
transformation. Yet as a candidate for such assistance, Haiti has many
advantages over other fragile states, including ones where the nation-
or state-building process has yielded positive results. Most of those
states were surrounded by conflict prone and predatory neighbors. Haiti
sits in the midst of a zone of peace and relative prosperity. All of
its neighbors are much richer, and none have any interest in
destabilizing Haiti or inhibiting its development. Neither is Haiti
divided by competing ethnic or religious groups. Haitians have a strong
sense of national identity, and no serious sectarian divides. Haiti
also has a large and relatively prosperous diaspora, many of whom are
located at no great distance and enjoy frequent contact with their
families on the island.
So Haiti does have certain inherent advantages. In addition, there
are three newer factors which provide some hope that future efforts to
help Haiti can yield more enduring results than those of the past.
First, the final departure of ex-President Aristide in 2004 has
greatly diminished partisan rancor in both Port-au-Prince and
Washington. At a moment when Bill Clinton and George W. Bush are
campaigning together for relief to Haiti, one may hope that this
American divide, which so hobbled American efforts to help Haiti in the
past, has definitively closed.
Second, the outpouring of sympathy for Haiti as a result of the
recent earthquake seems likely to yield a substantial increase in
American and international aid levels. More money means more assistance
and also more leverage to promote change.
Finally, the very immensity of the recent disaster has administered
a shock to the Haitian political structure that can help ease
resistance to reform and undermine longstanding barriers to progress.
My personal experience with Haiti dates back to the American
intervention of 1994. This was one of five such nation-building
operations with which I became associated, beginning with Somalia
earlier in that decade, and ending with Afghanistan in the aftermath of
9/11. Since leaving government, we at RAND have issued a series of
studies looking at the results of post conflict stabilization and
reconstruction missions across each of these American-led
interventions, plus a larger number of U.N.-led operations. Based on
this body of work, I offer the following suggested guidelines for
future aid to Haiti.
First, security is an essential prerequisite to reform, as it is to
private investment. In the absence of security, any positive changes
will eventually be washed away. Fortunately, Haiti is not a difficult
society to secure. Contrary to the popular image, the Haitian
population is neither heavily armed, nor inclined to violence. One has
only to regard the patience with which the people of Port-au-Prince has
awaited succor over the past 2 weeks to recognize its essentially
peaceful nature. Haiti is no Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan. The
comparative docility of the population is, in fact, one reason why very
small numbers of armed men have on occasion been able to threaten the
state and overturn governments. In 2004, for instance, Aristide was
driven out of office by an insurgency numbering in the very low
hundreds, equipped with nothing but small arms.
American troops are, therefore, unlikely to be required once the
immediate humanitarian emergency passes. Securing Haiti should be well
within the capability of the current U.N. peacekeeping force, modestly
strengthened as it is being to help cope with the new, post-earthquake
challenges. Nevertheless, the United States can and should help the
U.N. in this task by assigning an increased number of American police
to the U.N. international police contingent. In doing so, the United
States should draw, in particular, on Creole-speaking Haitian-American
policemen from places like Miami and New York.
Second, stabilization and reconstruction operations take time. The
1994 American-led international intervention was a case in point. That
operation was almost
entirely successful in its own terms, but those terms were much too
narrow. In launching the intervention, President Clinton promised to
restore a freely elected President and then to keep American troops in
Haiti only long enough to organize new elections, inaugurate a new
President, Parliament and local officials. He promised to do this all
within the space of 2 years. This his administration preceded to do,
hitting every benchmark, achieving every target, and suffering almost
no casualties in the process. But 2 years was too short a time to fix a
society as troubled as Haiti's. In the end the 1994 intervention
accomplished little of lasting value.
Recent post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations
have been lasting 8 to 10 years. The current effort in Haiti began in
2004, but the country has since suffered devastating flood damage and
now the earthquake. The clock on this operation therefore needs to be
set back to zero hour, and the U.N. Security Council should plan on
keeping a peacekeeping force in Haiti for another 8 to 10 years.
Third, in a post-conflict environment, economic development and
political reform programs need to be evaluated not just on their
potential to promote growth and social justice, but for their capacity
to ease tensions in the society and promote reconciliation between long
hostile groups. In Haiti, these competing groups are not ethnic or
religious but rather economic and social. Programs that might
exacerbate such tensions should be scrapped or adjusted, in favor of
those that draw competing groups into collaboration, even where the
immediate economic payoff of such programs may be less. This means that
programs to relieve poverty and create jobs will be a necessary part of
any larger aid effort, even if their immediate impact is ephemeral, for
without such visible signs of progress, significant elements of the
population may be inclined to block longer term, larger payoff efforts
at reform.
Fourth, assistance should be focused on building a more competent
and efficient state. Haiti's vulnerability to natural disaster is not
just a matter of weak building codes and poor infrastructure, but more
fundamentally the result of having an exceptionally weak state that
cannot provide even minimal public services--security, power, water,
health and education--to the vast majority of its people. Haiti is, for
instance, the only state in the entire Western Hemisphere that does not
provide free primary education to most of its children.
The urgency of the immediate crisis requires that donor countries
themselves provide people with food, water, medicine and shelter,
bypassing the Haitian state. As we move beyond this emergency relief
phase, the next priority will be to repair the country's most basic
infrastructure--hospitals, schools, roads, electricity, telephones and
government buildings. But these institutions should not be rebuilt on
the old, inefficient, corrupt foundations. Rather the scale of this
disaster offers the opportunity to accelerate long planned, oft delayed
reforms in each of these sectors.
The port of Port-au-Prince has, for instance, long had the highest
cost per ton in the hemisphere despite having the lowest wage rate. We
should help rebuild this port, but not with the same grossly
inefficient management and distorted cost structure. The same goes for
the education ministry, the electric company, the telephone monopoly,
the health ministry and the court system. Repair or replace the
buildings, by all means, but also insist upon fundamental reforms in
the management of these institutions.
Large amounts of American and other donor money will flow into
Haiti in coming weeks. The temptation will be to spend most of it on
American and foreign NGOs that can deliver essential services with fair
reliability and good accountability, which Western legislators insist
upon. But this sort of aid leaves behind no lasting local capacity to
sustain those services. The second priority will be on bricks and
mortar construction. This too will leave the underlying Haitian
institutions unaltered. Such aid should, thus, be oriented to the
extent possible on enhancing Haiti's capacity to govern. This means
providing the Haitian Government the wherewithal to hire well qualified
staff at competitive wages, and programs to further train such staff
and provide them the information systems and other support service
needed to maximize their efficiency.
Fifth, the Haitian state should be built from the bottom up as well
as the top down. This means assistance to mayors and local councils,
and funding which will allow key government agencies to establish a
presence beyond Port-au-Prince. For decades the population has moved
off the land and into the big cities, particularly the capital. This
exodus has now, as a result of the earthquake, been reversed.
Assistance efforts should be designed to help those who have left the
city to find a livelihood in the countryside, rather than return to the
shanty towns from whence the have fled.
Sixth, the U.S. Government needs to organize itself for a sustained
high-intensity effort to promote these reforms. The President and
Secretary of State should invest a single individual with authority and
responsibility for Haiti comparable to
that Ambassador Richard Holbrook currently exercises for Afghanistan.
Congress should authorize and appropriate new money for Haiti not in
the usual categories of development assistance, security assistance,
counternarcotics assistance, refugee assistance, etc., but in a single
account unencumbered by earmarks and special limitations, and then work
through the consultative and oversight processes with whomever the
administration designates as its point person to ensure that this money
is carefully targeted and well spent.
Seventh, it is important that the international program to reform
Haitian institutions not bear a made-in-Washington imprint. Large-scale
international assistance will carry with it significant leverage to
promote change, but this pressure needs to be exerted in a carefully
calibrated manner. Candidate programs for reform need to be carefully
chosen, local champions identified and empowered, local opponents co-
opted, politicians lobbied and the public informed. The United Nations
and the World Bank, the two major international institutions most
heavily engaged in Haiti should be out in front, choosing and designing
the necessary reforms and conditioning assistance on their achievement.
The United Nations should continue to lead in reforming the security
sector, to include police, courts and prisons, and in supporting
elections and promoting political reform. The World Bank should assume
leadership throughout the economic and social sphere, identifying the
key changes needed and setting the conditions for assistance. The
United States should work in concert with the other key donors,
particularly Canada, France and the European Union, forming a small
core group to quietly help the U.N. and the World Bank define their
reform objectives and then working largely behind the scenes to ensure
these objectives are achieved. The United States should contribute
directly to U.N. and World Bank funds for Haiti, and should make sure
that its own bilateral programs, and those of other donors contribute
to, rather than undercut the reform programs set out by these
institutions.
Finally, there are a couple of things that the United States is
uniquely positioned to do by reason of its proximity to Haiti. These
involve trade and immigration.
In 2006 Congress passed legislation providing Haiti uniquely
generous but time-limited access to the U.S. market. As with the U.N.
peacekeeping mission, the time clock on this access should be set back
to zero, recognizing that the earthquake has more than swept away
whatever had been accomplished since these preferences originally went
into effect.
The United States should also consider temporarily raising its
annual quota for Haitian immigration. Haitian society may be
economically dysfunctional, but Haitian immigrants have, quite to the
contrary, proved to be hard-working, family-oriented, law-abiding
contributors to our society, even as they are one of the largest
sources of support for those they leave behind in Haiti. Every dollar
that they remit to relatives in Haiti is another dollar that does not
need to come from the U.S. taxpayer. Expanding legal Haitian
immigration thus seems a classic win-win proposition.
The current crisis, though tragic, offers the chance to boost Haiti
out of decades of poverty and misrule. A successful strategy for doing
so will require several elements: care in the design, sustained U.S.
commitment, effective international coordination, and, above all, a
focus on strengthening Haiti's governing institutions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Dobbins, for some
very thoughtful suggestions.
Dr. Francois.
STATEMENT OF M. RONY FRANCOIS, M.D., INCOMING DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC HEALTH, STATE OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA, GA
Dr. Francois. Good morning, Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member
Lugar, and members of the committee.
My name is Dr. Rony Francois. I'm a physician and a doctor
of public health by training. I'm also the immediate past
secretary of health for the State of Florida, as well as the
immediate past director of public health for the State of
Louisiana. Effective Monday, I will be the director of public
health for the State of Georgia.
I want to thank the committee for inviting me to testify on
the topic of ``Haiti: From Rescue to Recovery and
Reconstruction.'' My testimony will focus on the following:
extent of the damages, immediate relief needs, some
intermediate goals, and the long-term path to recovery and
development.
Extent of the damages. An earthquake of 7.0 magnitude is a
challenge for any country, but when it occurs in one of the
world's most fragile countries, its intensity seems potentiated
as it finds a destructive and sinister synergy in the vast
landscape of feeble structures. The estimated mortality is
about 200,000. There are about 4,000 missing Americans. The
number of injured approaches 1 million. The number of people
affected is approximately 3 million. The economic damage is
difficult to quantify.
My mother- and father-in-law lost everything in Haiti.
Fortunately, they were in the United States with me when the
devastation occurred.
Immediate relief needs. With the great number of people
affected, the critical needs are food and water, medical care,
temporary shelters, security, and sanitation.
In terms of diet, the most vulnerable groups are the
newborns and young infants, who require age-appropriate
formula.
However, tensions in the capital city and also the
countryside continue to grow, as many families do not have
access to food and other basic goods. The escalation of
frustration is already inducing violence, and if resources are
not more strategically distributed throughout the country, the
security situation on the ground could rapidly deteriorate.
Medical teams must also remain vigilant about wound
infections, sepsis, malaria, tetanus, respiratory infections,
and typhoid, as thousands more could die if conditions are not
closely monitored and immediate steps are not taken to mitigate
risks.
Intermediate goals. In light of over 50 aftershocks of a
magnitude of 4.5 or greater, a thorough assessment of the
structural integrity of the remaining homes and buildings is
absolutely critical for the future safety of the population.
Before entering the United States and earning his doctorate
degree in structural engineering, specializing in foundations
and water resources, my brother, Carl, worked as an engineer in
Port-au-Prince. And building codes at that time did not exist,
and construction practices were geared to withstand hurricane
wind forces, and not earthquakes.
In order to forecast the magnitude and, hence, the cost of
debris rubble removal and disposal, it is appropriate to
compare this recovery effort to the models and lessons learned
after the September 11, 2001, destruction at the World Trade
Centers, after Hurricane Ivan's aftermath in Pensacola, FL, and
after Hurricane Katrina's devastation of the Gulf Coast States,
where recovery is still ongoing today.
The materials collected during this cleanup can be recycled
or transported as fill for reclamation land along the coast of
the bay of Port-au-Prince.
Assuring proper drainage of rainwater will be a massive
undertaking with the Mountain l'Hopital's steep watershed and
the drastic reduction of previous areas with tree-cutting
practices and anarchistic construction. The existing system was
already obsolete and undersized and did not seem to rely on
accurate hydrological data.
In addition, with the earthquake's underground stresses
generated from the wave propagation, it must be anticipated
that the majority of structures and pipes--mostly concrete--
have sustained irreversible damage.
The waterworks and sewer infrastructures, gauged against
current environmental standards, were already inadequate.
Construction from scratch might be considered.
The source of water supply might be adjusted after
evaluation of the Cul-de-Sac Plain aquifer capacity and
inventory of other reserves through groundwater hydrology.
Another viable option is to tap into the bay of Port-au-Prince
readily available sea saltwater through a desalination process.
Long-term reconstruction and development. Decentralization
away from Port-au-Prince must be a priority goal of future
development efforts. The earthquake has already triggered an
exodus of the population to various parts of Haiti. In order
for that migration to become permanent, investments must be
made in agriculture, food security, local jobs, tourism
infrastructure, security, roads, and airports.
Access to rudimentary medical care must also be
decentralized with a network of community health centers across
the country. Public health must become the foundation of this
new health system and foster the widespread training and use of
health promoters of agents--or agents of health.
Improvements in literacy should also remain central to any
development efforts.
I would like to share with the committee a few of the
recommendations of the Haiti Advisory Group, created by
executive order on July 14, 2004, by former Florida Governor
Jeb Bush. The advisory group consisted of 17 prominent Haitian-
Americans with significant experience in Haitian issues. The
advisory group formulated a set of 25 recommendations to the
Governor and the State of Florida. These prophetic
recommendations, which are still very relevant today, included
a wide range of problematic issues that fall in the following
categories: security recommendations, economic development
recommendations, disaster preparedness, environmental
rehabilitation.
Although Florida was the main partner of these projects, I
would propose that these recommendations be adopted by the
United Nations. Examples include creation of a dedicated
professional exchange and training program with the Government
of Haiti. This would allow volunteers, utilizing their vast
experience and skills, to travel to Haiti to provide in-country
technical assistance and training. The objective of a
professional exchange and training program would be to provide
Haitian participants with the knowledge, skills, and resources
they need to work more effectively in their respective fields
and to build greater capacity within Haitian institutions.
For example, Haiti produces only about 80 physicians each
year. But, that number would steeply decline, since many of the
medical schools were destroyed. What will happen to medical
students already enrolled? How will they complete their
studies? Will opportunities to study aboard be made available?
A sharp increase of injured and a sharp decrease in doctors
creates a formula for an intractable disaster.
The international community should utilize its great
expertise and experience in law enforcement, corrections, and
public safety to assist the growth and professionalization of
the Haitian National Police.
The United Nations could sponsor a Haiti Trade Mission and
Matchmaker Fair in which representatives of Haitian businesses
can travel abroad to meet their counterparts. Promotion of
investment in Haiti, as well as networking and identification
of export opportunities of Haitian products, would be primary
goals.
The United Nations should begin now to assist Haiti's
Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism in its plan to
create a targeted tourism marketing campaign to attract
Haitian-Americans and other visitors to their country as
tourists in order to rediscover its natural beauty and
historical attractions.
Haiti's infrastructure is now exponentially more vulnerable
to hurricane-induced disasters like mudslides and flooding.
Hurricane season begins June 1, and immediate action must be
taken to mitigate potential risks. The United Nations should
employ its well-developed expertise and experience with natural
disasters to provide technical assistance to the Republic of
Haiti's Directorate of Civil Protection in order for this
agency to develop appropriate disaster management and
infrastructure and training.
In closing, I extend fervent prayers to all of those who
are affected by the earthquake, as well as to the first
responders who came from near and far. I also want to
acknowledge the magnanimous generosity of those who have
contributed to the relief efforts in Haiti.
As we move forward, the United States and the international
community must assure that investments made in rebuilding Haiti
are actually carried out through community-based organizations,
faith-based entities, nongovernmental agencies, and nonprofit
organizations.
My personal hope is that a new generation of leaders will
emerge from these ashes to selflessly lead Haiti onto a new
path of prosperity through integrity, hard work, transparency,
perseverance, and true democracy.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Francois follows:]
Prepared Statement of M. Rony Froncois, M.D., MSPH, Ph.D., Incoming
Director of Public Health, State of Georgia, Atlanta, GA
Good morning Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar and members of
the committee.
My name is Dr. Rony Francois. I am a physician and a doctor of
Public Health by training. I am also the immediate past-Secretary of
Health for the State of Florida as well as the immediate past-Director
of Public Health for the State of Louisiana. Effective Monday, I will
be the Director of Public Health for the State of Georgia.
I want to thank the committee for inviting me to testify on the
topic of ``Haiti: From Rescue to Recovery and Reconstruction.'' My
testimony will focus on the following: (1) Extent of the damages; (2)
the immediate relief needs; (3) some intermediate goals; and (4) the
long-term path to recovery and development.
extent of the damages
An earthquake of 7.0 magnitude is a challenge for any country. But
when it occurs in one of the world's most fragile countries, its
intensity seems potentiated as it finds a destructive and sinister
synergy in the vast landscape of feeble structures.
The estimated mortality is about 200,000. There are about 4,000
missing Americans. The number of injured approaches 1 million. The
number of people affected is approximately 3 million. The economic
damage is difficult to quantify.
My mother and father-in-law lost everything in Haiti. Fortunately,
they were in the United States with me when the devastation occurred.
immediate relief needs
With the great number of people affected, the critical needs are
food and water, medical care, temporary shelters, security and
sanitation. In terms of diet, the most vulnerable groups are the
newborns and young infants who require age-appropriate formula.
However, tensions in the capital city and also the countryside
continue to grow as many families do not have access to food and other
basic goods. The escalation of frustration is already inducing violence
and if resources are not more strategically distributed throughout the
country, the security situation on the ground could rapidly
deteriorate.
Medical teams must also remain vigilant about wound infections,
sepsis, malaria, tetanus, respiratory infections, and typhoid as
thousands more could die if conditions are not closely monitored and
immediate steps are not taken to mitigate risks.
intermediate goals
In light of over 50 aftershocks of a magnitude of 4.5 or greater, a
thorough assessment of the structural integrity of remaining homes and
buildings is absolutely critical for the future safety of the
population. Before entering the United States and earning his doctorate
degree in structural engineering--specializing in foundations and water
resources--my brother worked as an engineer in Port-au-Prince and
building codes at that time did not exist and construction practices
were geared to withstand hurricane wind forces and not earthquakes.
In order to forecast the magnitude and hence the cost of debris/
rubble removal and disposal, it is appropriate to compare this recovery
effort to the models and lessons learned after the September 11, 2001,
destruction at the World Trade Centers, after Hurricane Ivan's
aftermath in Pensacola, FL, and after Hurricane Katrina's devastation
of the Gulf Coast States--where recovery is still ongoing today.
The materials collected during this cleanup can be recycled or
transported as fill for reclamation land along the coast of the Bay of
Port-au-Prince.
Assuring proper drainage of rainwater will be a massive undertaking
with the Mountain l'Hopital's steep watershed and the drastic reduction
of pervious areas with tree-cutting practices and anarchistic
construction. The existing system was already obsolete and undersized
and did not seem to rely on accurate hydrological data. In addition,
with the earthquake's underground stresses generated from the wave
propagation, it must be anticipated that the majority of structures and
pipes (mostly concrete) have sustained irreversible damage.
The waterworks and sewer infrastructures gauged against current
Environmental Engineering standards were already inadequate.
Construction from scratch might be considered.
The source of the water supply might be adjusted after evaluation
of the Cul-de-Sac Plain aquifer capacity and inventory of other
reserves through groundwater hydrology. Another very viable option is
to tap in the Bay of Port-au-Prince readily available sea saltwater
through a desalination process.
long-term reconstruction and development
Decentralization away from Port-au-Prince must be a primary goal of
future development efforts. The earthquake has already triggered an
exodus of the population to various parts of Haiti. In order for that
migration to become permanent, investments must be made in agriculture,
food security, local jobs, tourism infrastructure, security, roads, and
airports.
Access to rudimentary medical care must also be decentralized with
a network of community health centers across the country. Public health
must become the foundation of this new health system and foster the
widespread training and use of health promoters or agents of health.
Improvements in literacy should also remain central to any
development efforts.
I would like to share with the committee a few of the
recommendations of the Haiti Advisory Group created by Executive order
on July 14, 2004, by former Florida Governor, Jeb Bush. The Advisory
Group consisted of 17 prominent Haitian-American members with
significant experience in Haitian issues. The Advisory Group formulated
a set of 25 recommendations to the Governor and the State of Florida.
These prophetic recommendations, which are still very relevant today,
included a wide range of problematic issues that fall into the
following categories:
Security Recommendations
Economic Development Recommendations
Disaster Preparedness/Environmental Rehabilitation
Although Florida was the main partner for these projects, I would
propose that these recommendations be adopted by the United Nations.
Examples include:
Creation of a dedicated Professional Exchange and Training
Program with the Government of Haiti. This would allow
volunteers, utilizing their vast experience and skills, to
travel to Haiti to provide in-country technical assistance/
training. The objective of the professional exchange and
training program would be to provide Haitian participants with
the knowledge, skills, and resources they need to work more
effectively in their respective fields and to build greater
capacity within Haitian institutions.
For example, Haiti produces only about 80 physicians each year,
but that number will steeply decline since many of the medical
schools were destroyed. What will happen to medical-students
already enrolled? How will they complete their studies? Will
opportunities to study abroad be made available? A sharp
increase of injured and a sharp decrease in doctors creates a
formula for an intractable disaster.
The international community should utilize its great
expertise and experience in law enforcement, corrections, and
public safety to assist the growth and professionalization of
the Haitian National Police (HNP).
The United Nations could sponsor a Haiti Trade Mission and
Matchmaker Fair in which representatives of Haitian businesses
can travel abroad to meet with counterparts. Promotion of
investment in Haiti, as well as networking and identification
of export opportunities for Haitian products would be primary
goals.
The United Nations should begin now to assist Haiti's
Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Tourism in its plan to create
a targeted tourism marketing campaign to attract Haitian-
Americans and other visitors to their country as tourists in
order to rediscover its natural beauty and historical
attractions.
Haiti's infrastructure is now exponentially more vulnerable
to hurricane induced disasters like mud-slides and flooding.
Hurricane season begins June 1 and immediate action must be
taken to mitigate potential risks. The United Nations should
employ its well-developed expertise and experience with natural
disasters to provide technical assistance to the Republic of
Haiti's Directorate of Civil Protection, in order for this
agency to develop appropriate disaster management
infrastructure and training.
In closing, I extend fervent prayers to all of those who are
affected by the earthquake as well as the first responders who have
come from near and far. I also want to acknowledge the magnanimous
generosity of those who have contributed to the relief efforts in
Haiti. As we move forward, the United States and the international
community must assure that investments made in rebuilding Haiti are
actually carried out through community-based organizations, faith-based
entities, nongovernmental agencies, and nonprofit organizations. My
personal hope is that a new generation of leaders will emerge from
these ashes to selflessly lead Haiti onto a new path of prosperity
through integrity, hard work, transparency, perseverance, and true
democracy.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Francois.
In fact, thank you--thank you, all of you, for helping to
really lay out the magnitude of the challenge here and put a
lot of ideas on the table about things we need to think about.
We--in the timeframe that we have, I think, if we do 7-
minute rounds, then every Senator ought to have an opportunity
to be able ask questions. And if we could ask you to keep the
answers tight--obviously encompass everything that you want to,
but we want to try to cover a broad swath here, if we can.
On a personal note, let me just say, Dr. Farmer, speaking
as a dad, I want to thank you for the example and the
opportunity that you have shown my daughter, who I know just
values enormously the relationship and what she's learned
working with you. And I want to thank you for that.
Let me begin by asking--I want to come back to the
framework that you raised, Dr. Farmer, about the rules of the
road, and I think it's very important to look at that. But, let
me just ask you very quickly, any of you, about an immediate
challenge.
There's a lot of concern about the access to food in Haiti,
and whether or not there are adequate levels and if the food is
being appropriately distributed. And WFP has requested
emergency funds to feed 2 million people over the next 15 days,
essentially flooding food into the arena. Can you speak, very
quickly, to this question of the adequacy of food and assess
the current food distribution efforts?
Dr. Farmer.
Dr. Farmer. Thank you, Mr. Senator.
In the short term, it's difficult to think of an
alternative to WFP, which has the procurement capacity. I mean,
it's hard to find other groups that might have that kind of
procurement capacity, other than the ones noted by my
colleagues testifying here today, which is remittances, cash
transfers to households; that will also work to allow people to
buy their own food.
At the same time, the rules of the road--I would go back to
those even for a group as august as WFP. For example, how can
we focus on local procurement of foodstuffs so that food
insecurity in Haiti is not heightened by the huge, but
necessary, influx of food from abroad right now?
And I just could, you know, give one small example from our
own work in central Haiti, which I've shared with my colleagues
at WFP. We have--the proper treatment, not surprisingly, for
malnutrition for children is something called food, and we grow
peanuts--mostly, but it can be other grains as well--peanuts
locally, and make what is essentially peanut butter, which is a
ready-to-use therapeutic food, you know, and is enriched with
vitamins, right there in local food-processing plants in
central Haiti. And we've gotten the WFP to support that. And
so, if we ramp up production of an endeavor like that in a
moment like this, if we get the right kind of peanuts,
multivitamins, other things that are needed to enrich this
paste, we'll have done several things at once: One, we'll have
responded to the acute need, which is extreme. I mean, it's
very upsetting, to put it frankly, how hungry people are right
now. Number two, we'll have bought local produce from local
farmers. Number three, we'll have created jobs in processing
plants.
And, you know, it's not unthinkable that a processing plant
like that could be scaled up to respond to needs elsewhere--in
other parts of the country, certainly, but also other parts of
the world. So, I think the rules of the road still should
include, what's your plan for local job creation? How can we
link our very needed short-term interventions to long-term
interventions that will not leave Haitians dependent?
The Chairman. So, that raises the question, How do you get
from here to there? I mean, as I listen to you say, it'd be
great to ramp up the production, it'd be great to, you know,
engage the local community. Who's going to do this? I mean, one
of the things that has struck me as I talk to various groups on
the ground--and we've been dealing with various, sort of,
hotspots--is, Who's going to--Who's coordinating this overall
effort? Who's going to call the shots and say, ``You got to get
the debris out of here, and here's where the debris is going to
go, and here's the rebuild, and here''--you know, you begin to
organize all of that. There are a lot of free actors floating
around. Can you speak to this question of who's going to both
direct and enforce these rules of the road? And how do we get
the kind of coordination necessary to make sure that we are
shifting to a Haitian solution as fast as possible?
Dr. Farmer. I'm sure that my colleagues have thoughts on
this, as well, but I would say the way that we do this is
actually write it into the rules of the road for our--as a
condition for some of our aid--not a condition on the
recipients, but, rather, the condition on the donors.
Some of the problem--if you go from, say, the Marshall
Plan, which you've talked about, you know, many times over the
last few years--if you go from the Marshall Plan to some of the
legislation written by the Senate, 1961 to now, you'll see, you
know, the rise of a class of contractors, again, who can
provide useful services that are difficult to obtain in
settings like Haiti or the places Mr. Dobbins mentioned. That's
true. But, I think if we shift the rules formally and say,
``This aid is dependent on our reforming ourselves, in a
way''--so, I think part of it is really in your hands.
On the ground, what I saw--you know, and I--it's very
possible--and I've been writing a little bit about this from
Haiti--to bemoan the lack of coordination. But, what I'm seeing
is going from this chaos, as you might imagine the first nights
afterward, to a little bit more coordination and a little bit
more coordination, et cetera. So, the U.N. is trying to
coordinate along lines of the health cluster, and that
structure is emerging right now. And I think it's probably the
necessary structure.
And then, finally, on the district level--I mean, most of
this stuff is happening in Port-au-Prince, as you know, but on
the district level there are 10 districts in Haiti, 10
``departments,'' they're called. There need--needs to be a
really locally driven process there. And this may not be the
most popular thing to say, but in 1995, when Rwanda laid down
the law, saying, ``If you, as an NGO, wish to work here, you
have to follow the following rules. You have to fit into our
development plans.'' You know, it's estimated by some that half
of the NGOs left Rwanda in a huff. And there were all sorts of
critiques of Rwanda at the time. But, I think, in retrospect,
many would argue that they really were right to push forward a
tough line on this.
So, I--you know, in summary----
The Chairman. Right.
Dr. Farmer [continuing]. I think part of it's going to be
in your hands, and part of it is going to be in the hands of
the U.N., and part of it's going to be in the hands of the
local government.
The Chairman. Mr. Dobbins, you've been on the institutional
side of this. What are your thoughts about the rules?
Ambassador Dobbins. I think it's useful to make a
distinction here between the relief phase. Now, if there's one
thing that the international community and the United States
does well, it's disaster relief in these kinds of situations.
It looks messy when 1,000 different autonomous organizations,
NGOs, governments, and international institutions all show up,
but it works, and it works remarkably well. And it is working
in Haiti. That doesn't really require fixing, in my view. It
requires resources, but people are generous, and it is the
best-resourced thing the international community does.
You then have the question of moving beyond relief to
recovery, and driving that recovery toward institutional
reforms that will make future relief operations less necessary.
That does require more hierarchical structure. I think the
United States needs to help design such an effort, and it needs
to help drive such an effort, but it shouldn't, itself, be the
flag on which that effort is put.
The Chairman. Fair enough.
Ambassador Dobbins. As you suggested, I think the U.N.
needs to coordinate and become the flag under which political
reform and reform of the security sector takes place. And I
think the World Bank is the logical focus for planning and
conditioning assistance across the economic and social
spectrum.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following up on the chairman's thought about who is in
charge and how the government is to proceed, I would like to
ask for your comments by citing a very interesting poll that
appeared in this morning's Miami Herald, with the headline
``Haitian-Americans Dissatisfied With Haiti's Response to
Disaster.'' This poll, conducted in both Creole and English,
found 63 percent of the 400 Haitian-Americans surveyed
disapproved of how Haitian President Rene Preval's government
has responded to the earthquake. The unhappiness runs so deep
that a majority of Haitian-Americans support the United Nations
and the international community taking over Haiti's day-to-day
operations, at least until Haiti recovers from the catastrophe.
Interestingly enough, an overwhelming majority of those
surveyed were happy with the United States Government's
response. In fact, 96 percent approved what we had been doing.
Additionally, 88 percent approved of the United Nations
response. Furthermore two-thirds of the Haitian-Americans
polled are so concerned for Haiti; they'd be willing to move
back there temporarily in order to assist with the
reconstruction.
I cite these figures to first make the point that Haitian-
Americans have never expressed this level of satisfaction for
any U.S. response to the many unfortunate afflictions the
country has faced in the past. Second, not only are Haitian-
Americans receptive to a strong U.S. role in the response to
the earthquake, they are also largely in favor of sustained
U.N. participation. Though these Haitian-Americans do not see
it as immaterial as to which party takes charge, they do
believe that one or the other had better do so.
The respondents to the poll also assert that President
Preval is not a good communicator, and that he has not
addressed the nation since the earthquake occurred. Public
relations may not be his forte. But, the fact remains that he
is Haiti's leader, and the Haitian Government has to be
reconstructed in some form, even if the United Nations and the
United States take effective control of reconstruction efforts.
My statements are all in preface for asking for your
judgments on Haiti's political future. What is going to occur?
The common thought is that this earthquake has been a disaster.
Futhermore, going forward, most believe that it will continue
to be a disaster, because of the Haitian Government's lack of
political sophistication, capacity to effectively respond to
the crisis, and ability to strike any sort of rapport with the
Haitian people. As I've noted, we even have Haitian-Americans
saying, in essence, that ``We're so concerned we're prepared
even to move back to Haiti temporarily in fairly large numbers
for a while to try to bring some relief to the process.'' I
believe all of this reflects the lack of almost any confidence
on behalf of a majority of observers regarding the Haitian
Government's ability to effectively respond to this crisis. Do
any of you have any thoughts about the question of effective
future governance there?
Yes, Doctor.
Dr. Francois. Senator Lugar, essentially my thought again,
is about the analogy of how we respond to a tragedy or a
hurricane here in the United States. What happens is that,
whether it's Florida or Louisiana, we may ask the Federal
Government for help. And, likewise, Haiti is now in dire needs
of an international response. What's different is that the
infrastructure and the plans that are in place in probably
every State, is that you have an infrastructure where the
Federal Government can come in and insert itself to support
that response. That sort of framework is totally absent.
In 2006, as secretary of health for Florida, we made a
public health mission trip to engage the leadership about
preparedness. And you can tell, from the lack of the response,
that we were not taken up on that--on that offer.
So, essentially, I think that, because of that lack of
existing infrastructure, you really need the--a coordination
of--for example, from the United Nations, to sort of lead that
response, because it's certainly nonexistent on the ground.
That makes it more difficult, because the folks coming in don't
really know the terrain, which, again, that knowledge could
have been facilitated by existing plans on the ground, which,
again, are nonexistent.
Ambassador Dobbins. Senator, I suspect the Haitian-American
community wouldn't object if Haiti became the 51st State, but I
don't think, probably, the rest of our--or your constituencies
are going to support that. So, I don't think we have any option
but to try to rebuild a Haitian state structure, one that's
more resilient, more capable than what we have today or had a
year ago. And therefore, I do believe that state-building is
the core--the core mission of the post-relief phase.
Dr. Farmer. Thank you, Senator.
You quoted the Miami Herald today, but in the Washington
Post today there is something, I think, of equal note. It says,
``Haiti Government gets minimal aid. Less than a penny on each
U.S. dollar is sent to leadership.'' And that's almost
certainly true. None of this money that's pouring into Haiti is
going to the government.
And I just want to--just a few vignettes of, again, whether
that would be an effective way or not. I don't know; it's not
my area of expertise. But, just a few examples from the last 2
weeks in Haiti.
I mean, before the hurricane, looking at the budgets of
money going to, for example, the U.N. for, you know, the U.N.
presence there, the budget for IT, information technology, was
larger than the combined budget, I believe, of the Ministries
of Health and Ministry of Education, together.
During the Gonaives hurricane, when we were told that the
roads were blocked and that the city was inaccessible and there
was no one there, that was not true. The roads were not blocked
and the director of public health was at his post, but he had
no tools to do anything. And I was with--on--right after the
recent earthquake, with the Minister of Communication. She did
not have a phone. You know, I gave her my phone. I mean, these
kind of absurdities go on and on.
The university hospital, the general hospital, when we got
there, late at night, we found--at 10 o'clock at night, we
found the director of the hospital and director of nursing, who
had, herself, just had a grandchild the day before and had lost
the family and home. They were there at work. But, they have to
have the tools of the trade. And as it's true in medicine, so
it must be in all of the other arenas of engagement.
So, I would say that, in addition to appropriate skepticism
about the capacity of the now devastated government to
implement some of these necessary interventions, we also need a
healthy dose of skepticism regarding, as I said earlier, the
way our aid has been funneled so exclusively to the
nongovernmental sector.
Senator Lugar. So, the recommendation is more aid to these
government officials to give them a chance to respond, in
addition to continued assistance to NGOs and the rest of those
on the ground there.
Dr. Farmer. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I'm going to ask consent that some opening comments be
made available in the record----
The Chairman. Absolutely.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. If we can, and try to move this
along.
[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher J. Dodd,
U.S. Senator From Connecticut
I want to thank Chairman Kerry for holding this hearing, and our
distinguished witnesses for sharing their expertise with us today.
I want to extend a special greeting to my good friend Dr. Paul
Farmer. Paul has been active for years in helping the most vulnerable
in Haiti and around the world. His organization, Partners in Health, is
one of many already operating in Haiti that has heroically gone above
and beyond the call to respond to this earthquake.
We should begin by acknowledging that, aside from the monumental
policy challenges posed by the disaster in Haiti, the Haitian people
have experienced a tragedy on an unimaginable scale. Estimates of the
death toll are in the hundreds of thousands, with countless others
injured, homeless, orphaned, or in desperate need of food, water,
shelter, and medicine.
The numbers merely hint at the scope of this catastrophe. The
Haitian people have spent generations watching their country teeter on
the brink of collapse, as government after government has done little
to fight corruption, ignored the rule of law, and failed to provide
basic security and social services. Battered by natural disasters and
shocking poverty alike, Haiti has one of the lowest life expectancies
in the world.
Haiti was just beginning to turn a corner toward a brighter future
when this earthquake struck. Now, sadly, the Haitian people must once
again start over.
This tragedy, as could have been expected, has brought out the best
in the American people. From the rescue workers, men and women in
uniform and State Department, Embassy, and USAID officials risking
their own lives to bring comfort to the victims to the ordinary
Americans texting donations to assist in relief efforts, our people
have sent a clear signal to the Haitians: you are not alone.
The United States Government must also act to help the Haitian
people shoulder the burden of rebuilding their country and moving
forward in the wake of this disaster.
In the short term, I believe it is incumbent upon the Obama
administration to bring our allies together to establish security and a
sense of order in Haiti. Considering how much of the country's
infrastructure and government personnel have been lost, I would like to
see the United Nations take on a more active role in day-to-day
governance, in close partnership with the Haitian authorities.
The U.N. would lead an international effort to help the Haitian
people get back on their feet, assisting in the rebuilding of
infrastructure, institutions, and lives--while working to ensure that
those who have been driven out of their homes by the destruction of
Port-au-Prince are resettled.
I've also suggested that the Obama administration help to
coordinate Haitian-American volunteers in the United States by forming
Hometown Associations, small groups of community members who could use
their unique experiences and skill sets to do things like serve as
interpreters, support the temporary resettlement of refugees, and
provide assistance to the most severely wounded Haitians who are
evacuated to the United States for medical treatment not available on
the island.
For our part, I think Congress should focus on alleviating the
economic crisis that lurks behind the immediate humanitarian crisis in
Haiti.
Senator Lugar and I will be introducing legislation this morning
instructing the Secretary of the Treasury to work with other nations to
relieve Haiti of their outstanding international debt, including debt
incurred through 2011. Additionally, our legislation will help to spur
economic activity, which is an absolutely essential element in the
recovery process, by promoting trade between the United States and
Haiti. Last, our bill will instruct the U.S. Government to work with
the Inter-American Development Bank to implement an infrastructure
development fund that should be used in invest in Haiti's critical
infrastructure, including roads, power lines, clean water and
sanitation.
These are steps we can take right now to help Haiti rebuild and
recover, and in my mind, they represent the beginning, not the end of
our efforts. Over the coming weeks and months, I look forward to
working with other members of this committee, including the chairman,
on legislative ideas that can be begin to tackle the more long-term and
systemic roadblocks that Haiti will face.
But we shouldn't imagine that our work will be short or simple.
This burden requires many shoulders. President Obama has already
pledged the full support of the American people. Let us do the same.
Senator Dodd. But, again, to you, Dr. Farmer, we thank you
immensely. And I've enjoyed a good relationship with this
gentleman for a long time, and commend him immensely for his
work in Haiti and elsewhere.
Jim Dobbins and I have worked together on numerous issues
over the years.
And, Dr. Francois, welcome, as well.
I want to pick up on this whole point. Even prior to the
events of 2 weeks ago, in many ways, and having grappled and
worked in Haiti for various years, going back to my Peace Corps
days, 40 years ago, on the border with Haiti and Dominican
Republic--even absent what has occurred over the last 2 weeks,
in many ways Haiti has been a failed state. On countless
occasions, those of us, either on this committee or elsewhere,
have worked, at various times, to try and provide assistance.
And we have had the obstacles of refusing to provide assistance
to even governments that were questionable in their
effectiveness or the levels of corruption that existed, and the
like, in Haiti.
And so, in a way, I think the point of, one, dealing with
the immediate problems of seeing to it that we're getting
resources to get people through this period of time. And while
doing that I suggest the idea that, given the magnitude of this
tragedy, this offers an opportunity, frankly, to do some things
that people have talked about for decades in Haiti, and yet,
for various reasons, have been unable or unwilling to grapple
with. And that is to start talking about the long-term ability
of this country to become self-sufficient, both in terms of its
ability to feed and house itself, as well as to govern itself.
And that's the opportunity that I think we've been offered, not
just our country, obviously, but the community at large. So the
question is, How do we do this? And I think there are some
wonderful suggestions here.
We ought not to get into the debate as to whether or not we
need to continue to provide for the immediate needs. But, I
think we really need to get into this discussion very quickly,
as to how we're going to emerge from this tragedy with the
opportunity to do some things that we've never, for various
reasons, been able to achieve before.
But, if you asked me the question, which I wouldn't know
the answer to, today ``Who should I call in Haiti if I wanted
to talk to someone about this?'' my impression is, there really
isn't anyone to talk to, at this point, while we're down there
basically wandering around trying to provide assistance, where
we can, to people through existing organizations.
Senator Lugar and I are introducing legislation today. Jim
Dobbins, you talked about it, in terms of the barriers to
trade, the debt issues. These may not seem like much, but they
go to the heart of what Paul Farmer is talking about, and that
is getting beyond this immediate need, and getting to the
question of how we can start to provide work.
I don't know why, for instance, we're not suggesting today
that--just putting people to work to clean up rubble, you could
be paying people $2 or $3 a day, and doubling their income,
just to create the arteries so that assistance can get to
people at this particular point. I mean, it's things that can
be done immediately to provide some longer term economic hope.
And I wonder if you might flesh this out. Is it too wild a
suggestion to be talking about, at least temporarily, some sort
of receivership? If this were any other entity, we'd be talking
about it being completely bankrupt and to the extent then we
could talk about some sort of international receivership of
this country to begin to then not only provide the immediate
relief, but also then to start to provide the assistance to
them to build. I'm fearful that what you're going to have
happen is that this goes right back to where it was before: the
handful of entities in Haiti that have run the show for years
and years, economically and others, a small group of families
run the country. We all know that, at the end of the day. In
the midst of all of this, I'm fearful we're going to roll right
back into that situation again, only the conditions will be
worse.
So, what about the idea of some sort of international
receivership for Haiti for the next 2 or 3 years so that we
can, one, do the immediate needs--provide the immediate needs,
but, second, start to provide that kind of support and
assistance that would build or construct a set of institutions
that would allow them to provide for their own self-
sufficiency?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, there are certainly precedents
for that. We've set up provisional international
administrations in East Timor----
Senator Dodd. Right.
Ambassador Dobbins [continuing]. In Kosovo, in--and in one
or two other situations like that. We've done that in cases
where there was no local government or where we overthrew the
local government. I don't know of any in which we displaced an
existing government that was universally recognized. And so, I
think that it would be controversial and difficult to simply
impose an international administration in Haiti, unless there
was, you know, a pretty clear demand within Haiti for that kind
of----
Senator Dodd. It sounded like, in his poll that was
conducted this morning----
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, there's a clear demand in the
Haitian-American community. But, that's, I think, a little
different than a clear demand in Haiti. So, I guess I'd be--
there are precedents. It has been done.
Now, frankly, you know, we don't do this all that well--the
Coalition Provisional Authority in Haiti, the U.N. missions in
Kosovo and in East Timor--they've been successful, but they've
had difficulties. I mean, this is not easy to do.
So, I do tend to think that a supportive role--clearly, the
international community is going to be providing most public
ser-
vices in Haiti. In fact, they already were, before the
conflict. But, whether you'd want to formalize that, I'd be a
little skeptical, Senator.
Senator Dodd. Paul, any thoughts on this?
Dr. Farmer. I think that, given the extremity of the
circumstances, you know, I wouldn't be surprised if you'd hear
support in Haiti, on the streets, as they say, in the same way
that you did among Haitian-Americans.
That said, I think there must be another way to do this
accompaniment of an extremely fragile civil service and
government.
And the problem, as you and I have discussed on a number of
occasions, all this see-sawing policy, you know, this flipping
back, especially over the last 2 decades. And it has taken a
toll, because, you know, if you--if the policy is, ``OK, we're
going to bypass, completely, the public infrastructures, and
only support, with our aid, the NGOs''--and you made this point
in 2003, in this very room--then--that we're harvesting some of
that now. There is--that's why things were--the government was
weak before January 12.
So, I think--and I'm not really qualified to comment on
receivership; I just don't know enough about it, and I know
there are other people here who do--I think there will be
resistance to that, and I think that we can find a means of
accompaniment.
And, you know, just back to the example of gainful employ
for the hundreds of thousands of people, or millions, really,
who need employment now--I mentioned--again, I'm troubled by
the title ``cash for work,'' because it's so absurd.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Dr. Farmer. But, if we were to put significant amounts of
our support in the cash-for-work programs that are around
watershed protection, agricultural endeavors, and made sure
there is gender equity or focus on women, especially in these
efforts, we could have substantial transfer of resources to the
poor and the needy. And if we do that with an eye, as in
Rwanda, toward strengthening the local government structure, I
think that would be a better received.
But, of course, people are at the end of their rope, as you
are guessing.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Dodd. Dr. Francois, do you have any quick comments
on that all? Quickly.
Dr. Francois. Sorry. My only comment would be to refer to
that Haiti Advisory Group that was put together. And, again, as
I mentioned in my testimony, those recommendations are very
much alive and could be very useful as we move forward.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And I want to thank our witnesses.
My sense is that Haiti is a place where we have an
opportunity. There's universal support of the people of Haiti.
I think all of us, in some form or fashion, have been touched
by Haiti. I can absolutely say I would not be in the U.S.
Senate today without having been to Haiti in 1982. And I know
that there are Americans all across this country that have been
involved there and certainly are touched and saddened by what
has occurred. It does seem like we have an opportunity to get
this right. And I appreciate the analysis that has been given,
and also appreciate the comments by my friend from Connecticut.
I have to tell you that there's no question in my mind, we
need to do whatever is necessary right now, as far as pouring
resources in. And we just need to be in charge, and that's
what's happening; the international community is in charge.
I think there's no question that all of our efforts in the
past to do good things, which many of you are involved in, in
some ways do undermine the government. Because we all--let's
face it--we all--every volunteer group, every NGO does what it
does in Haiti in spite of the government. We work around the
government. That's what everyone does. And I think that the
notion of building the government up in some form or fashion,
that's an important concept.
And I think your reference to Rwanda, which I would say--
with dramatically different leadership, let's face it--it is a
great example of what can happen.
I guess, as I listen to the very good analysis, Mr.
Dobbins, about some of the things that need to occur, I still
have difficulty understanding how we're going to transition
from what we all need to do, whatever it takes now, to causing
Haiti to actually take the lead.
And I--while maybe ``receivership'' is not the right word
to use, I have to tell you, for a period of time I think
something far more draconian than just us working behind the
scenes to prod reforms and those kind of things are going to be
necessary.
And so, I think we're saying the right things, concepts-
wise, but I find it very difficult to believe, with the type of
leadership that Haiti has had--we see people here in Haiti
flourish under good government. We know that government has
been an absolute disaster for generations in Haiti, and it,
unfortunately, has held wonderful people back from reaching
their potential. And I sense that we're going to have to do far
more draconian things to cause the country to function.
And I wish you would expand just a little bit more. I
don't--I mean, the concepts you've laid out are great. I just
don't know how we get from A to B without us taking a much,
much stronger role than what you've signified, as it relates to
rebuilding.
All kinds of urban development opportunities. I mean,
there's tremendous opportunities just in how we lay out
infrastructure and change cities like Cite Soleil and other
kind of places, which can never flourish in their existing
form. There are things we can do now that I don't think the
Government of Haiti ever will have the ability to do in the
short term.
Ambassador Dobbins. I think it's important to understand
that in Haiti we're now superimposing a relief and recovery
operation on top of an existing post-conflict stabilization and
reconstruction operation. In other words, there has been
international operation in Haiti, with 10,000 troops and about
a billion dollars a year of assistance, since 2004, which was
actually beginning to make a difference when it was set back,
first by a series of hurricanes and then by this latest and
largest disaster. So, there are, in fact, reform programs that
are agreed internationally, that are--in many cases, are agreed
with the Haitian Government, that are in place and were
beginning to have effect.
We now need to redouble our effort to complete those
reforms. We need to evaluate whether there are new and more
ambitious reforms that could be put in place as the result of
the greater flexibility of the Haitian system, created by this
disaster and the additional resources. We need to evaluate the
new ideas that are coming forward.
But we--what we need to make sure are that the new
operation operates synergistically with the old operation and
the old structures that were set up.
I do believe that we--that, as I suggested, somebody in the
U.S. Government, in the administration, needs to be made
responsible for the overall American policy toward Haiti,
toward integrating that policy with other governments,
representing it with the Haitians, and working with the
Congress. I think the Congress needs to provide that individual
with the resources necessary, and the flexibility, so that they
can choose carefully those targets for assistance of that sort.
I do think that, for instance, in the question of
infrastructure, you know, actually bricks-and-mortar stuff, our
experience in Iraq suggests that simply building things for
people is of little enduring value if they haven't invested--
and if they--and if you don't have a contractual plan in which
there is funding--a funding stream for maintaining that
infrastructure once you've built it.
We built a whole bunch of electric plants in Iraq. Iraqis
weren't charging for electricity. And since they weren't
charging for electricity, there was no resource stream that was
going to maintain those electric plants once they were built.
When the World Bank builds an electric plant, they require a
plan which has that kind of built-in resource stream that will
sustain the project.
So, we do need people who know how to do these things, who
have done them before, I think, to take the lead, set the
criteria, establish the conditionality, and then use our
political influence and our money to make sure those conditions
are met.
Senator Corker. Well, thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for having the hearing, and I
hope that--we very seldom, candidly, have a--much of a way to
make a lot of difference--I hate to say it--on this committee.
I hope that, somehow or another, we will keep a focus on this
panel----
The Chairman. I hope you're speaking for yourself on that.
Senator Corker. Well, you did a great job with Karzai, and
I'll say that again. But, it really----
[Laughter.]
Senator Corker [continuing]. The fact is that this is an
opportunity for us, I think, to continue to put pressure--to
make sure that more draconian steps are taken, instead of
willy-nilly kinds of things that have yielded the same kind of
results.
And I thank you for the hearing, and for your testimony.
The Chairman. Well, I couldn't agree with you more,
Senator, I think--and we'll come to that point, after Senator
Shaheen. But, I don't disagree with you at all. I think this is
a moment, and I think it's going to take a tough hand of
leadership.
I noticed the vote has not gone off, so in true Senate
fashion, we're kind of drifting along here. [Laughter.]
We can extend the time a little bit and have a second
round, which is good.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Yes, I prefer to think of it as an
opportunity to finish my questions. So.
I want to thank each of you for being here, and for your
insights into this horrific human tragedy. I share my
colleagues' gratification at the outpouring from not only the
United States, but from the rest of the world, to try and
respond to this tragedy.
And I guess my first question, before I ask more about the
long term, is if each of you are satisfied that everything is
currently being done that can be done with the short-term
relief efforts. Dr. Farmer, you talked about how slow the
relief efforts are, and, to a great extent, that's because of
the lack of infrastructure. But, is there more that should be
done right now to address those relief efforts?
Dr. Farmer. Thank you very much, Senator.
I think there is a mismatch between the degree of interest
and resources that we, including we as a nation, are putting
in, and the ability to absorb it, which is the--you know, the
fruit of failed policies in the past. Now, that--in the middle
of an emergency like this, you're not going to spend a lot of
time on diagnosing----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Dr. Farmer [continuing]. That problem. And so, I would say,
yes, there is more that we can do, but it's very specific
things. For example, you bring in surgeons, but you have to
also bring in supplies and long-term nursing, et cetera.
And if I could bring this back to our previous discussion--
and I used the word ``accompaniment''--if we have the patience,
even for the relief work--because the relief work is not going
to be over in the next weeks--if we have the patience to
accompany properly the various actors on the ground, which
include, of course, lots of NGOs and church groups, et cetera,
but also the remnants of the Haitian public health and public
education sector, I think we'll have reward in--you know, back
to Senator Corker's question. You know, if you, say, for
example, had a division between the NGOs in Haiti--a division
of labor--and the international financial institutions, like
the World Bank, and you said to the NGOs, ``Look, part of your
job now is to find a way to help accompany this shattered
public infrastructure back, whether that be schools''--and 85
percent of schooling in Haiti is private. So that--and, to me,
if you look back and say, ``That's one of the reasons Haitians
are not very literate, because they have these''--they call
them ``l'ecole borlette,'' you know, like lottery schools,
because you take your chances when you go there. So, we need to
have a Ministry of Education that could insist on proper, not
just building codes, but curriculum. And that's going to take a
patient kind of relief accompaniment. Same for health care.
And I'd just like to, again, sound a note of great
optimism. When we--I've been in Haiti, as I said, 25 years. For
the first 15 years of my engagement--and our engagement--we did
not do this the right way. We had a lot of good will, we built
a hospital in a squatter settlement. We're very proud of it. I
was there Sunday morning. It was spotless. There were people
lying on the floor who had been tended to and had casts and
were post-op. You know, all the beds were full. So, I was very
proud, and all of us are.
But, what we really needed to do, which we did over the
last decade, was to say, ``How can we do this same thing in the
public health sector, with the Ministry of Health?'' And so, we
did. And we created thousands of jobs, and strengthened and
rebuilt these public hospitals. That's an M.O. that I endorse,
not because we did it, but because it's an effective way of
addressing this lack of absorptive capacity in the public
sector.
And I think the same can be said for--and it's more
difficult with agriculture, of course, because those are
privately held fields, many of them. But, at least for health
and education, NGOs have to do this. ``Do this,'' meaning what?
Support the weak public sector.
One of my colleagues just passed me a note saying that the
Haitian Government is looking for $3.4 million just to pay rent
for office space. Who can deny that they have no office space?
Their--all their federal buildings collapsed.
So, then that's a transition--and I'll stop--just to the
private investment part. Haiti does not want to be dependent of
foreign aid any more than Rwanda does. And Rwanda's vision for
development is called Vision 2020, and it says by 2020 there
will be no foreign aid going into Rwanda. In order to do that,
of course, we need job creation and private investment.
I had been working a lot with the Inter-American
Development Bank, and I can tell you, again, to sound a note of
optimism, last fall all the hotels in Port-au-Prince were full
of people who'd come in to invest in Haiti from Latin America,
Haitian investors. Couldn't get a hotel room. We were going to
have a meeting this week in the Montana Hotel, which,
unfortunately, just collapsed. But, it was for investors. So--
from Ireland--so, I think there is good news out there, if we
can just marshal our resources.
Senator Shaheen. Well, to follow up a little bit on what
Senator Corker raised, and to go back to what I think each of
you are saying, as you look at longer term, is the first
priority governance--assistance with governance in Haiti? And,
if that's the case, then who should we look to to take
responsibility to do that? Is it the international community?
Is the United Nations the entity that's going to get that done?
Is it oversight from this committee and our State Department in
the United States that's going to get that done? Is it pressure
from the Haitian-American community? Who takes responsibility
to get that--if it is governance--to get that done?
Ambassador Dobbins. I--as I suggested, I mean, I think that
the--that in the security sector--police, courts, prisons--and
in the general political support of the Parliament--elections--
I think the U.N. is the best place to do those.
I think, in terms of resuscitating ministries, like the
Education Ministry, Transportation Ministry, Agricultural
Ministry, and the Health Ministry, it's probably somebody else.
It may vary. A single country may decide, ``OK, we're going
to fund public education in Haiti.'' And Japan or the United
States or someone else will say, ``That's going to be our
sector. We'll do public education.'' It has to fit in a broader
framework. Or, as I've suggested, the World Bank or the Inter-
American Development Bank may take a major ministry or a
major--you know, recreating downtown Port-au-Prince as their
focus, and become the main funder and coordinator of other
funders in that.
I do think that a division of labor between the World Bank
and the U.N. should be the two primary international
institutions. I think the United States can be very
influential. But, I think that, you know, an American czar who
sits in Haiti and makes these kinds of decisions would probably
be counterproductive.
The Chairman. Senator----
Senator Shaheen. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. I'm going to have to cut you
off.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And let me thank our witnesses. I think this has been a
very helpful hearing.
We're looking--the Congress is looking at our foreign aid
programs and how we restructure our foreign aid programs and--
in order to use foreign aid more effectively in carrying out
U.S. objectives internationally. And at a previous hearing, I
raised the issue on gender-matters issues and how many of the
countries that we do business with, their record on gender
equality is very, very poor, and how can we focus our foreign
aid program to be more effective in carrying out that
objective.
When we look at Haiti and look at our previous foreign aid
commitments in that country, we certainly were not terribly
successful, as it related to the governance issues, as we've
seen in this crisis. So, the question is basic, What can we
learn from Haiti as we look at trying to restructure our
foreign aid programs internationally?
What can we learn from Rwanda? I was--Mr. Farmer, I was
very impressed by your observations of the progress that's been
made in Rwanda. I mean, how do we sort of learn from our
experiences so that we not only focus on what needs to be done
in Haiti, from the point of view of longer term sustainability,
including governance issues and international assistance and
investment and jobs, but what can we change in--I guess, in the
overall strategy of this country, in trying to avoid another
Haiti in the future?
Dr. Francois. Thank you, Senator.
I believe that, you know, that change that you're referring
to has to begin inside Haiti. And when we talk about, you know,
governance and leadership, again, we have to remember that this
country rose to become independent back in 1804. So, again, I'm
personally, you know, skeptical about trusting entities that,
in my opinion, have not delivered. Again, all you have to do is
look at the response, or lack of thereof, of the leadership in
Haiti.
So, as we move forward, I believe that we need to partner
with leadership that has utmost integrity, leadership that puts
Haiti and the Haitian people first.
Senator Cardin. But, here's the dilemma. We can't--
governments are what they are. Yes, we can try to impact them
and impact the way that they develop the institutions of
democracy that can protect their people from not only natural
disasters, but from abusive practices of a government. That
needs to be part of our strategy.
I guess my point is, How do we structure our foreign
assistance budget that does not become a tool for anti-American
intervention in the country, but is--uses the right incentive,
so that when we put money into a country, we know that it will
get to the purposes for what we intend?
Ambassador Dobbins. Let me offer a rather self-serving
response to that. We don't have a very introspective,
reflective foreign-aid bureaucracy.
The Defense Department spends a lot of time and a lot of
money trying to find out what it did wrong. After-action
reports, tactical, operational, and strategic lessons are a
major element of military learning. And if you look at the
military from--in Iraq, from 2003 to 2007, you see very
substantial improvement, because they reflected on what they
did wrong; they wrote studies, they changed the doctrine.
We don't do that.
The British aid agency spends a lot of its money on
research and analysis, and gets people to tell them what
they're doing wrong and how they could do it better. And
there's no money in the AID budget for that kind of
retrospective, ``What did we do wrong? How can we do better?''
Now, this is a self-serving analysis. That's what the RAND
Corporation does. And we do it for the Pentagon all the time.
And so, that's a--sorry.
Dr. Farmer. I don't work for the RAND Corporation. And so--
but I want to echo what you say, as a volunteer. I mean, I'm
lucky enough to be able to be a volunteer for all these--this
quarter of a century in Haiti and Rwanda because I have a job
at Harvard.
But, I--and I want to say what you're--what you suggest is
not at all self-serving. There is no real critical feedback
loop in foreign aid. And we can easily develop that. We can use
RAND or universities or other people who are not just trying to
be part of the Beltway Bandit scene, but are really saying,
``How can we improve the quality of aid and not have us looking
back and saying, gee, you know, Haiti or Rwanda or whatever
was''----
I mean, Rwanda, for example, prior to the genocide, was
called ``The Switzerland of Central Africa.'' And there's a
book, by a man named Peter Uvin, called ``Aiding Genocide,''
which is about how the aid that was going in--massive amounts
of aid--mostly from France and Europe, I believe, not from our
country--actually set the stage for the genocide. And you'll
see that--some would argue that the massive amounts of aid
going into Haiti have actually served--inadvertently, I
believe--to weaken, for example, food security.
The good news is, with very--you don't need to be a nuclear
scientist to figure out that some of the rules of the roads
would be the ones you mentioned. For example, gender equity.
What are the ground rules on job creation for women in a grant
even to do with education and health, agricultural improvement,
small business investment? And that's one--you know, job
creation, gender equity.
The--if half of--a lot of these big grants, half of it goes
to overhead. And I've done some study of this at Harvard,
looking at major grants in the health care sphere, where more
than 50 percent doesn't leave the United States, or stays in
consultancies, in overhead. I just think that's way too high.
And we can create a lot of jobs just by tweaking the rules a
little bit.
And then, finally, I would say, integrating this into the
district plans of these places--into the local plans--is
difficult, but critical.
Senator Cardin. That's very helpful. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thanks very much, Senator Cardin.
We're on the back end of the vote here. We have a couple of
minutes. I would just like to ask a couple of things.
Some Haitians have complained that they haven't heard or
seen very much from President Preval since the earthquake. Is
that a fair criticism?
Do you want to speak to that, Dr. Francois?
Dr. Francois. Senator--Chairman Kerry, I've watched quite a
bit of news on this tragedy. I have not seen President Preval
but once, and what he said was that he lost his home. So,
again, understanding, really, the magnitude of this earthquake
and what it has done--again, it's--I can certainly understand
that there would be an initial paralysis in any leader, but,
from my perspective, crises, again, are where good leaders
define themselves. So----
The Chairman. Well, let me pin all of you down for a second
here, because I want--we've got to try to pull this in. And I
apologize. There are a number of questions, particularly about
the aid programs, that we wanted to air publicly, that would
be, I think, very valuable.
But, let me get at, sort of--What percentage, would you
say, of Port-au-Prince, has to be rebuilt now?
Dr. Farmer. Just as an eyewitness, the majority of it.
because, all--again----
The Chairman. Are we talking about 75, 80 percent?
Dr. Farmer. Seventy--75 percent, yes.
The Chairman. Seventy-five-percent rebuild.
Dr. Farmer. The standing structures are--there's this
fecklessness of it, so you'll have a building standing or a
home standing, surrounded by collapsed buildings. So----
The Chairman. That is a--I mean, that's just a--it boggles
the mind, to think about clearing the debris and where it's
going to be put. And then to begin to contemplate the rebuild
after that is--you're looking at several years of major
investment and construction, correct?
I don't see how this--I want to come back to Senator Dodd's
concept. Maybe ``receivership'' is the wrong term. But, I don't
know how you get this done with any semblance of normality, in
terms of the approach. This has to be a kind of--a, you know--
and, again, I think this probably the wrong term, but it's
almost--it's like a
D-Day invasion. I mean, you've got to have so many moving parts
coordinated, and you've got to come in there with a new city
planning concept. You got to have a vision for what you want
this place to look like. And what kind of government buildings?
And where are they going to be put? And will that contribute to
the functionality, in the long term of the country? I don't see
any entity, at this point, or movement--and I've talked to Dr.
Shah about this--that suggests to me the global community is
coming together around that kind of organizational effort in
the way that it ought to.
Dr. Farmer. I'd just like to get this out of the way,
Senator. As someone who has been very much opposed to any
encroachment on the sovereignty of Haiti, as someone who has
underlined the dignity of the Haitian people and their struggle
over 200 years for basic social and economic rights, and
perhaps also underline some of my own country's previous and
less than fruitful engagement, I would like to say that I still
agree--you are right--there is not--we need--this task is so
massive that we--you know, we need the international A-team on
this case, working with the Haitian people. We still, you
know--and I can tell you--in Haiti, I went to a meeting where I
saw 40 or 50 Haitian architects and urban planners working
under a tree, trying to work. So, I think there are people
there.
The Chairman. I'm convinced that this can be coordinated. I
don't--it doesn't have to be the--I believe that this can be
pulled together. I need to run and vote. So, I apologize for
kind of--I believe it can be pulled together, and I think it
can be done in a way that empowers Haitians. You can pull--you
can work hand in hand. But, I don't think they would, for a
second, balk at the notion that there's an expertise that is
necessary, there are resources necessary, there's a level of
planning necessary, and so forth, that they would acknowledge,
beyond the current capacity.
I think you can develop this. And if you put the rules--the
rules are so critical, that you talked about. If there's an
active effort not to just leave it all to the NGO or to the
outside contractor, or to whatever entity, but to bring the
Haitians into the process and rebuild sufficiently, you create
wealth, you create confidence, you begin to build that future
that we're looking at.
Otherwise, I think--what Senator Dodd said--we're just
going to buy into a kind of diminishing sense of urgency, a
diminishing focus of attention, and ultimately wind up in the
same unsustainable situation that we have faced for the last 25
years, as you know. You've been struggling with it.
So, we're not going to let go of this. We're going to stay
very focused. We're going to try to press this concept of how
we're going to pull this together, because there is a
willingness to put a lot of aid and effort into it.
I think, you know, the best chance for Haiti--the best
chance for Haiti, in all of the definitions that we have given
it, in terms of the problem over the last 25 years--is to take
this moment and create the kind of joint, internationally
cooperative rebuilding effort that provides a sustainable
Haiti. And I think that the key is to really get at that.
We're going to talk with the administration about it. And
we'll obviously have them up here at some point in the near
term to talk about this. And then we look forward to following
up with you.
We will leave the record open for--if you don't mind--for
about a week. And maybe some colleagues--we'll try not to
burden you with any written questions, but I would like to
build the record, with respect to some of the things that we
weren't able to ask you publicly today.
So, I thank you.
Ambassador Dobbins. Senator.
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Dobbins. Could I just say, it's refreshing to
come up here and make a series of proposals and be told that
we're not asking for enough. And it's refreshing to have that
pressure coming from both sides of the aisle. I think this is a
very hopeful sign.
The Chairman. Well, appreciate that comment. We'll look
forward to working with you very, very much.
And I am absolutely convinced that unless we get this thing
into a bigger coordinated concept, we're just buying into the
same old, same old. And then, of course, everybody'll walk
away. And that'll have an impact on failed states elsewhere,
and other prospects elsewhere. So, I think that there's a
uniqueness to this challenge. And hopefully we can take it in
hand.
Dr. Francois, I--if I don't get over there, they'll cut me
off on the vote. So, I got to get over there. I apologize,
profusely.
So, we stand adjourned. And I thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kirsten E. Gillibrand,
U.S. Senator From New York
When a massive earthquake shook Haiti and its people on January 12,
it left hundreds of thousands buried in rubble and an entire country in
complete despair. Whenever people are suffering around the world,
Americans have always been compelled to do what we can to help. It is
who we are.
We have poured in hundreds of millions of dollars in donations;
sent teams of medical units and supplies to help bring relief; and
dispatched thousands of troops to help the Haitian Government securely
provide these supplies.
I am proud of the response of our government, our nonprofits, our
faith-based organizations, and our communities.
I share this commitment to help the people of Haiti in the wake of
this unspeakable tragedy. In an effort to make it easier for American
citizens to donate to disaster relief, I cosponsored legislation, which
has become law, to waive tax deduction limits on all charitable
contributions to Haitian relief efforts.
In addition, I urged President Obama to grant Temporary Protected
Status (TPS) for Haitian nationals residing in our borders. I
appreciate that the administration acted since the earthquake to
quickly allow Haitians in the United States--to continue to be able to
live in this country without fear of returning to a country ravaged by
such devastation.
While there are many urgent needs in Haiti, I believe that the
United States must particularly focus its relief efforts on the
children of Haiti. I worked with my colleagues in the Senate to call on
the administration to ensure that the safety and well-being of Haiti's
orphans are given top priority in U.S. relief efforts. I was pleased to
see that the Department of Homeland Security responded to our call,
announcing humanitarian parole for children who have been legally
confirmed as orphans and were in process for an intercountry adoption
to the United States.
In order to unite Haitian orphans with prospective American
families while ensuring that children with existing Haitian families
are not mistakenly taken from Haiti, I urged the administration to work
with the families and the licensed adoption agencies in Haiti and the
United States to complete all of the appropriate vetting as quickly and
as carefully as possible. I also joined my colleagues in requesting
Secretary Napolitano to work quickly to expand humanitarian parole to
orphans in Haiti that have close family members in the United States.
Finally, I have called for a moratorium on external debt that Haiti
owes to the InterAmerican Development Bank. In the aftermath of the
worst earthquake in Haiti in more than two centuries and with the world
community focused on bringing the Carribean nation immediate relief and
reconstruction efforts, Haiti must not be saddled with repaying its
outstanding multilateral debt in the foreseeable future. As President
Clinton, the U.N. Special Envoy for Haiti, has said, Haiti made a good
beginning and was closer than ever to securing a bright future before
the earthquake. Despite this tragedy, President Clinton still believes
that Haiti can succeed. We all stand in unity with the Haitian people
and remain hopeful that their country will recover, succeed, and
overcome.
The extreme loss of life and unimaginable hardship that many are
experiencing from this disaster is heartbreaking and tragic. Many of
these families have experienced far too much anguish already. My
thoughts and prayers are with the families, both in the United States
and in Haiti, affected by this disaster.
______
Response of James Dobbins to Question for the Record by
Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
debt relief
Question. Since 2007, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has
only provided grants to Haiti. Last year, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank forgave $1.2 billion in debt relief to
Haiti. Haiti completed the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
program which triggered another wave of debt relief amounting to $62.7
million by the Paris Club group of official creditors. However, Haiti
still owes more than $1 billion in debt. In the case of the IDB, Haiti
still owes $441 million.
It is my understanding that the multilateral lending institutions
are discussing ways limit Haiti's debt as a result of this catastrophe.
In the 110th Congress, I introduced the Jubilee Act, which not only
provided debt relief to some of the most indebted nations, but it also
sought to stop predatory lending to these nations. Mr. Dobbins, what
can the United States do, in concert with the international community,
to ensure that Haiti does not emerge from this crisis heavily indebted
once again? Do you believe this is the right time to call on Haiti's
creditors to forgive the remainder of its debt?
Answer. Under current circumstances, most if not all aid to Haiti
should be in the form of grants. Loans should be considered only in the
case of commercially viable projects which will result in a clear
revenue stream capable of both amortizing the debt and maintaining
whatever has been built. Donors providing grant assistance to Haiti
should exercise their influence to insure that the Haitian Government
does not undertake unnecessary or ill-considered financial commitments.
Further debt forgiveness should certainly be considered as part of the
international communities response to the Haitian earthquake.
______
Prepared Statement of U.N. Human Settlements Programme, UN-HABITAT,
Submitted by Christopher W. Williams, Washington, DC
phase one: emergency response to haiti earthquake
On 14 January, UN-HABITAT (see institutional information below)
together with other members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
consolidated inputs from 12 International Organizations (IOs) and 24
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) into the United
Nations Flash Appeal. Specific proposals on shelter relief and recovery
prepared by UN-HABITAT are incorporated in the Flash Appeal (see annex
1). On 15 January 2010, the Secretary General established the United
Nations Disaster Assessment Team (UNDAT) to undertake a rapid
assessment of the needs in Haiti following the earthquake in Port-au-
Prince. Among the lead sectors, the United Nations formed the
``Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Item Cluster.'' Representatives of UN-
HABITAT and 12 UNOs and NGOs under the leadership of the International
Organization for Migration are in Haiti as part of the UNDAT.
UN-HABITAT and other members of UNDAT are gathering information to
adjust the Flash Appeal to realities on the ground. The agency is
exploring coordination mechanisms and identifying opportunities for
partnerships with Haitian officials, international organizations, as
well as citizen groups that have emerged to address basic needs. The
process is challenging given the intense demand for the affected
population estimated to be over 500,000, the collapse of ports, IT, and
road infrastructure. As part of UNDAT, the organization will next month
consolidate the outcomes of the rapid assessment into a revised Flash
Appeal.
phase two (a): shelter recovery
The shelter recovery strategy advocated by UN-HABITAT is based on
experience working in post-disaster situations in which 70 percent of
affected population is living on less than $2/day. The organization
seeks to ensure that the provision of housing is equitable, responds to
the needs of those most vulnerable (informal settlements, displaced),
and involves the affected communities in the rebuilding effort.
Focus on Non-Displaced Populations: The shelter recovery strategy
focus is on nondisplaced populations to assist those who want to
rebuild housing in their former neighborhoods. Experience worldwide
shows that people affected by disasters are keen to return to their
homes as soon as possible to regain a sense of place, adjust to the
psychological trauma of the disaster, and reclaim their lives.
Self-Build and Re-use of Rubble: Despite the extent of devastation
in an earthquake there is a surprising amount of reuseable materials
that can be salvaged for the purposes of Haitians rebuilding their
homes. Using rubble with earthquake-resistant technologies, the
approach has proved highly effective when deployed elsewhere including
by Pakistanis in the aftermath of the earthquake. The approach will
provide a more durable solution that will resist rains and hurricane
winds. It will avoid the logistical bottlenecks that Haitians may
encounter if they rely solely on tents which may only arrive in great
quantities at the beginning of the rainy season and won't hold up.
Shelter Resource Centers: The establishment of shelter resources
centers, also applied effectively in other post-disaster situations,
including Pakistan, provide demonstration, information, and technical
assistance. They also double as community centers and can be used by
shelter partners for the distribution of nonfood items.
Cash-for-Work: Haitians are in desperate need for cash as most
forms of employment have been destroyed, yet most Haitians are able and
willing to work. Cash-for-Work systems can be put into place for the
collection of rubble, both for relocating rubbish and for salvaging
materials for housing reconstruction.
Building Material Support: Haitians can use salvaged materials but
they will also need roofing and other select building materials to
reconstruct housing. It will be important during the recovery period
for the international community and Haitian organizations to purchase
materials. Haitians can use the shelter resource centers to disburse
the materials at a subsidized rate or on a ``material-for-work'' basis.
A related challenge will be congestion at the ports. The United States
could make this a priority and expedite the delivery of needed building
materials, as it is doing to distribute food.
phase two (b): urban systems recovery
The earthquake, having devastated the city of Port-au-Prince, is
perhaps the world's largest urban humanitarian crisis. By its very
nature it requires a comprehensive, urban systems management approach.
This involves supporting simultaneously multiple delivery mechanisms
including shelter, land, water, sanitation, urban safety, health and
food. The challenge for recovery is coordination and identifying ways
of managing expertise across various sectors in urban areas. UN-HABITAT
views the first weeks following a disaster as crucial for supporting
government and urban stakeholders to respond to the enormous urban
rehabilitation effort. In practice this implies supporting government
to convene stakeholders to ensure that the planning process is
consultative and participatory, to invest heavily in coordinating the
process, and to provide technical assistance for implementation.
phase three: reconstruction
UN-HABITAT welcomes efforts in the coming weeks to organize
consultations that bring together Haitians and the international
community to consider ways to design urban development to transform not
just Port-au-Prince but, more importantly, the wider economy of Haiti.
An important proposal is investment Les Cayes and Cap Haitien as well
as Port-au-Prince in seaports and free enterprise-zones that generate
new manufacturing jobs. This would require substantial investment in
infrastructure and housing, as well as job training and rapid skill
development to support working people and their families. The
development of multiple urban centers in Haiti will enable Haitians
with support from the international community to reconstruct Port-au-
Prince as a more efficient, sustainable, and better serviced
municipality, thereby reducing precarious settlements on hillsides.
institutional overview
UN-HABITAT is the agency of the United Nations responsible for
housing and urban development, and for assisting Member States to
achieve Millennium Development Goal Target 11 (on slum improvement),
and Target 10 (on water and sanitation in cities). There are an
estimated 1 billion people living in informal settlements and slums.
The United Nations estimates that at current rates of growth, there
will be 2 billion slum dwellers by the year 2030. Simply stated, one in
three of humanity will be living in urban slums.
With headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, UN-HABITAT maintains field
operations in 87 countries managed by regional offices in Japan (Asia
and Pacific), Brazil (Latin America and the Caribbean), Poland (Eastern
Europe), Kenya (Africa/Arab States), and Habitat Program Managers in 40
country offices through a cooperation agreement with its sister agency,
UNDP. The organization is a member of the U.N. Chief Executive Board,
Inter-Agency Standing Committee of Humanitarian Agencies, United
Nations Development Group, Commission for Africa, WHO Commission for
Social Determinants of Health, and the Commission for the Legal
Empowerment of the Poor, among others.
UN-HABITAT advances shelter and urban development strategies by
providing policy advice, technical assistance, and credit enhancements
to governments, municipal authorities, private companies, and NGO/CBO
partners in a wide range of countries. These include emerging market
economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, as
well as low-income and very-low-income countries in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America. The organization also works with countries in conflict,
post-conflict and post-disaster situation in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Liberia, Sudan, tsunami-affected Asian countries, West Bank
and Gaza with a combined project portfolio of $800 million. The
Governments of Japan, Sweden, Norway, Spain, Bahrain, Italy, Canada,
and the United States provide annually both general and special purpose
support.
humanitarian assistance
UN-HABITAT is principal member of the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee for humanitarian operations (IASC) chaired by the Office of
the Coordinator of Humanitarian Agencies (OCHA). It serves as the lead
agency for the Housing, Land and Property (HLP) cluster and is
currently supporting an initiative of the IASC to develop a strategy
for enhancing humanitarian assistance in urban settings. In emergency
situations it supports the efforts of the international community to
identify appropriate strategies for shelter recovery and urban land and
service delivery systems. The organization maintains an active network
of experts from diverse backgrounds who it calls upon to support relief
and recovery efforts in emergency disaster situations. Of particular
relevance to ongoing crisis in Haiti is the response strategy deployed
by the UN-HABITAT in Pakistan in the aftermath of the earthquake.
______
Prepared Statement of The National Haitian America Elected Officials
(NHAEON) Submitted by State Representative Marie St. Fleur, Boston, MA
introduction
The National Haitian American Elected Officials Network (NHAEON) is
a nonpartisan coalition determined to improve relations between the
United States and Haiti. NHAEON is committed to bringing a renewed
national and local focus to key legislative, diplomatic, security,
economic, and human rights issues that impact Haiti. There are 21
Haitian-American elected officials in NHAEON representing six states--
Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New
York. NHAEON, in collaboration with the National Organization for the
Advancement of Haitians (NOAH), submits the following request for
coordinated and substantive Haitian-American involvement in the Haiti
Relief Effort.
background
An earthquake of 7.0 magnitude hit Haiti on January 12, 2010. Its
epicenter was primarily in the capital, Port-au-Prince. Nevertheless,
the devastation caused by the earthquake and its ensuing aftershocks
stretch well beyond Port-au-Prince. Carrefour, Delmas, Petionville,
Leogane, Croix-des-Bouquet, Jacmel and other nearby cities/towns have
all sustained tremendous damages. The Haitian-American community thanks
President Obama and Congress for the leadership shown in response to
this tragedy. Our government's swift, focused and unequivocal support
for the Haitian people and its commitment to provide relief have set
the tone for this international emergency relief operation. As well,
the Haitian-American community appreciates the authorization of
Temporary Protective Status (TPS) for undocumented Haitians currently
in the United States. Those who are benefiting from TPS will not only
be able to work but they will also be able to send some remittances
back to Haiti to help their families.
As Haitian-Americans Elected Officials who represent significant
constituencies, many of whom are of Haitian descent, we offer this
testimony in support of the three following principles:
1. The Sovereignty of the state of Haiti must be recognized and
protected. We recognize that the governance of Haiti is not very
strong. However, the Government of Haiti is a recognized and
democratically elected body. We categorically oppose the concept of a
receivership for the state of Haiti. We believe that our American
Government must play a significant role in accompanying the Haitian
Government in its journey to build a stronger and much more predictably
functioning state apparatus and to rebuild the country. American
ingenuity and determination, properly directed, will allow us to chart
a course that will support the strengthening of democratic
institutions. We know strengthening democratic institutions can be
realized by directing technical and financial support with clear
measurable goals and objectives (i.e., the role of Partners In health
and the Inter-American Development Bank). The United States is
particularly well-suited to help Haiti because it is home to the
greatest number of Haitian professionals across all disciplines. These
Haitian-Americans are passionate about Haiti and ready to actively
participate in setting forth the vision of a rebuilt-Haiti and the
implementation of that vision. As well, we, as Haitian-Americans have
the direct connections with Haiti, we are connected culturally,
linguistically and in many case, we have a financial stake in getting
the rebuilding of Haiti right.
2. The allocation and distribution of foreign aid must be reformed
so that it is also aligned with supporting building capacity in the
state of Haiti and its civil institutions. Given the emergency
situation that exists on the ground in Haiti, we respectfully request
that Foreign aid be distributed directly to or through the Haitian
Government with clear objectives and accountability measures to support
the capacity of its ministries and departments. Such an approach will
strengthen the functional capacity of ministries such as the Ministry
of Health, Education, Transportation, Energy, Environment and others.
In addition to the ministries, there is a governmental system in place
that includes the heads of the 10 departments of the country, the
mayors of the various municipalities and, among local elected
officials, there are azecs and kazecs that serve the population as
recognized elected officials. The full utilization of this existing
system makes distribution of relief much more efficient and will
strengthened these institutions as we move forward toward
reconstruction.
3. The People of Haiti and Haitian-Americans must have an integral
role in the recovery and rebuilding of Haiti. There are approximately
2.5 million Haitians and Haitian-Americans who were born in Haiti,
living here in the United States of America. This group has sired
approximately 5 million Haitian-Americans born in the United States.
Haitian-Americans are appreciative of the enormous outpouring of
support from our American Government and our fellow Americans for the
people of Haiti. We are proud of the role that our Armed Forces and
medical professionals are playing on the ground to assist the
devastated people of Haiti. However, Haitian-Americans grow
increasingly frustrated watching the continual deterioration of an
already devastated country without access to direct avenues for their
time and talent to mitigate the suffering of the Haitian people and to
help with the recovery of Haiti. Therefore, we respectfully ask for
inclusion as a direct partner in the planning now underway for the
recovery and rebuilding of Haiti.
Thank you for the opportunity to offer written testimony on The
Haiti Relief and Rebuilding Effort. Our actions in this moment is
critical to the future of the state of Haiti, many of our families
there and the quality of life for many of our constituents here in the
United States.
______
Prepared Statement of International Housing Coalition (IHC),
Washington, DC
The International Housing Coalition (IHC) has been monitoring the
situation in Haiti with a particular focus on the impacts of the
disaster on housing and critical residential infrastructure. The
situation is desperate, as we all know, and efforts are now rightly
focused on immediate relief, life-saving medical care, critical food
and water, and security. At the same time, the enormous destruction to
Haiti's housing stock threatens not just the immediate health and well-
being of the population, but the country's long-term social and
economic viability. Experience around the world shows that the post-
disaster rescue phase quickly morphs into recovery and then
reconstruction. This process will happen in Haiti with or without the
support of the international community and a comprehensive
reconstruction plan.
The U.S. Government (USG), along with other parties, has a critical
role to play in making reconstruction resources available quickly.
These resources must be used in a strategic way to steer the
reconstruction process in a positive direction. They must be used
equitably and efficiently to shelter families and reestablish
communities in ways that enhance their resistance to future natural
disasters.
More than a million Haitians are homeless and many more are living
in unsafe compromised structures. Shelter is a precondition for
economic development, health, and security, and investments in other
sectors are compromised when recipients lack safe and secure shelter.
The importance of shelter cannot be overstated given the physical and
psychological toll that the earthquake has taken on the population in
and around Port-au-Prince.
ihc recommendations
Establish a Reconstruction and Development Authority to
oversee and coordinate reconstruction efforts. The USG should
support the immediate creation of a redevelopment authority for
greater Port-au-Prince. The authority would develop a
reconstruction strategy and implementation plan. It would manage
and disburse redevelopment funds for housing and basic
infrastructure (e.g., local roads, storm water drainage, water
reticulation, and sewerage). It would be in a position to pool
funds from the United States and other donor agencies to maximize
impact, coordinate shelter construction with infrastructure
provision, and build linkages between reconstruction and local
investment. It would promulgate and monitor minimum standards for
construction. Successful housing reconstruction requires effective
public administration and management. Areas not suitable for
reconstruction should be identified and mapped quickly, before
informal reconstruction gains traction and residents should be made
fully aware of these restrictions as soon as possible.
Ensure that assistance is accessible and provides appropriate
incentives to residents of all income levels to rebuild and improve
their homes. Given the scale of the disaster and the resulting
housing deficit, rebuilding must utilize the full range of local
resources and institutions in addition to internationally provided
support. As a practical matter most housing will be provided by the
homeowners themselves and much of this will involve the incremental
rebuilding of remaining structures or improvement of the temporary/
transitional shelter received in the early days of the relief
effort. Assistance for home reconstruction must provide creative
incentives for families and others to build using materials and
techniques that increase resistance to future disasters, while
still providing opportunities for small-scale builders, for self-
help construction, and for efforts by community groups and
cooperatives.
Ensure that housing and infrastructure reconstruction efforts
support and enhance local economic development. Employment
generation should be an explicit objective of the rebuilding
process in order to increase household income and thereby stimulate
consumer demand and production.
______
Prepared Statement of Habitat for Humanity International Submitted by
Chris Vincent, Director, Congressional Relations/International Affairs,
Washington, DC
background
Habitat for Humanity International (HFHI) was founded in 1976 as a
nonprofit, ecumenical Christian housing ministry. Today Habitat
operates in 94 countries, has about 2,400 registered affiliates, and
has built nearly 300,000 houses worldwide, providing simple, decent,
and affordable shelter for more than 1.5 million people. HFHI is one of
the most recognized, well respected, and largest charities in the
United States, and the premier not for profit organization focused on
affordable housing. For more information, visit www.habitat.org.
The mission of HFHI Disaster Response program is to develop
innovative housing and shelter assistance models that generate
sustainable interventions for people vulnerable to or affected by
disasters. As a result of lessons learned in responding to major
disasters for more than 10 years, such as the Asia tsunami and
Hurricane Katrina, Habitat has developed disaster response systems that
enhance its capacity to respond to disasters. Habitat employs these
systems to monitor emergencies, to perform needs assessments, and to
design programs for sheltering and housing recovery. Disaster Response
also builds the capacity of the global Habitat community in the areas
of disaster mitigation, preparedness, and recovery through education,
training, and partnerships.
HFH Haiti has been assisting vulnerable people with their shelter
needs since 1982 through various types of housing support. Support has
included basic shelter loans, increasing access to materials, providing
technical assistance and vocational training through its innovative
USAID-funded Building and Training Center project, teaching financial
literacy, helping families to rebuild post-hurricane devastation, and
promoting disaster-resistant shelter options.
habitat for humanity's haiti response
A Disaster Response Assessment Team (DRAT) of regional and disaster
response experts from Habitat for Humanity International (HFHI or
Habitat) is currently in Haiti working with local Habitat staff to
assess local capacity, reestablish operations, and carry out an
assessment of damage to the shelter sector. The extent of the damage is
yet to be tallied, but early estimates are of 1.5 million people
homeless as a result of the earthquake. This is at least five times the
magnitude of the 2008 hurricane.
HFHI is closely coordinating its disaster response with both
multilateral and private agencies. Recent meetings include daily
meetings in Port-au-Prince of the UN-OCHA sponsored Shelter Cluster led
by IOM; daily calls with USAID; participation in the Shelter and Water/
Sanitation strategy session at the Clinton Global Initiative meeting on
January 19, 2010, in West Palm Beach, FL; and coordination with other
INGOs including the American Red Cross, CARE, CHF, World Vision, and
others. A common recurring theme is how to meet immediate shelter needs
while transitioning to recovery, reconstruction, and mitigation of
future disasters--``building back better.'' This focus is very aligned
with Habitat's multiphased strategy.
Habitat's strategy offers immediate, transitional, and long-term
solutions for decent, affordable shelter. The size of Habitat's
commitment depends upon fundraising efforts currently underway.
Following the 2006 tsunami in Asia, Habitat raised $78 million and
served 25,000 families with shelter assistance.
Habitat for Humanity will have three primary phases of work in Haiti
Phase I--Early recovery starter kits. The kits are designed to help
families make immediate repairs or construct emergency shelter.
Materials in the kit include a bucket, tarpaulin, wire, rope, pry bar,
mason's chisel and trowel, gloves, nails, hammer and saw. The kits will
be distributed by Habitat employees and partners with distribution
beginning as early as this week.
Phase II--Rehabilitation and cleanup. Habitat will mobilize people
to remove debris, salvage materials that can be reused, and assist in
rehabilitating homes that can be repaired. These activities could
include a ``cash for work'' component providing local, able-bodied
people with the tools and means to help with the recovery and earn a
small amount of money for meeting other basic needs.
Phase III--Reconstruction and recovery, including Core homes/
Transitional shelters. Habitat plans to replace destroyed homes using a
transitional shelter model, rebuilding in a way that reduces risk and
improves construction quality. These houses can be added to over time,
providing an immediate solution along with the beginnings of a
permanent home. The core transitional shelter unit will adhere to
international Sphere standards, with living space for the average
Haitian family of five.
Additionally, Habitat plans to implement its recovery project
through Habitat Resource Centers that provide technical assistance and
support to restoration of the construction sector as well as direct
housing production. Habitat Resource Centers support housing
development and improvements, identifying gaps in the local supply of
housing materials, designs, finance and skills and addresses them in
ways that support local livelihoods. Throughout, Habitat will cultivate
partnerships with local residents and other humanitarian organizations
that can multiply the effectiveness of its response. Habitat is looking
into ways to stimulate the low-income housing sector longer term, such
as technical support and loans to small enterprises, and development
and local production of construction materials.
Habitat is also looking for funding to collect baseline data into a
Geographic Data System, combining satellite photos and field data to
help identify immediate shelter interventions, monitor their
implementation, and gather information for later phases of recovery on
land availability/tenure and disaster risk mapping.
recommendations
Transitional Shelter: USAID should shift the policy focus from
temporary to transitional shelter as the preferred intervention.
Temporary shelter costs are substantial and the money often does
not translate into an investment for the affected individuals; by
contrast, transitional shelter costs are comparable to temporary
shelter costs and constitute an investment. Additionally, there is
a capacity-building potential of transitional shelter, supporting
expertise in the local population and potential for local
employment. Thus, the USG should work to focus time and attention
on the issue of transitional shelter, working to ensure that when
possible resources are not wasted building temporary encampments
that will remain for years to come, but that resources are spent
working to create transitional shelter solutions that will allow
families to remain as close as possible to their community and
invest in shelter solutions for the long term.
The USG should ensure that when relocation of affected
families is necessary, the relocations are located in stable
locations as close to the affected areas as possible and within
natural or expected growth corridors.
Housing Expertise: Housing will be a major focus of the
rebuilding effort over the long term and the U.S. Government should
build the overall capacity and expertise on shelter and housing
within USAID, the State Department and other agencies responding in
Haiti. With U.S. Foreign Assistance lacking a shelter and housing
focus to any significant degree on an ongoing basis, enhancing
current staff and expertise will be essential. More specifically,
USAID needs added capacity to support transitional shelter
initiatives--both in Haiti and in general disaster planning and
mitigation.
Funding for Permanent Housing: Given USAID lacks a program for
housing, any funding appropriated by Congress for Haiti focusing on
the long-term needs must include specific language to ensure
funding for programs to support transitional shelter and housing
solutions.
Partnerships: The USG should encourage NGO cooperation and
coordination and specifically encourage partnerships to leverage
NGOs with key core competencies with donors and NGOs with existing
funding to ensure that quality implementation of programming.
The USG should develop a sustainable reconstruction strategy
for rebuilding Port-au-Prince that recognizes that the most
vulnerable families have been located in high hazard zones. These
areas should be rezoned to preclude residential construction and
that rehousing of permanently displaced families considers
livelihood opportunities.
Material Donations: The USG should work with the Haitian
Government and U.S. NGOs to ensure coordinated and equitable access
to points of entry for material donations to support
reconstruction, ensuring that supply chains are as effective,
efficient, and low-cost as possible.
______
Prepared Statement of InterAction, A United Voice for Global Change
Two weeks after a terrible earthquake rocked the Haitian capital
and surrounding areas, aid continues to pour into the country and
increasingly is reaching those in need. Despite huge challenges,
humanitarian access is improving daily. In support of the Haiti
response, InterAction members--U.S. nonprofit humanitarian and
development organizations, often referred to as U.S. NGOs--have
collectively received an outpouring of donations from the public--
totaling over $350 million as of Monday, January 26, with the number
expected to rise in the coming weeks. NGOs in the InterAction network
have several thousand staff on the ground responding to needs. In
typical NGO fashion, the vast majority of these staff are Haitian
nationals. The situation that these staff are confronting is profoundly
challenging, with conditions on the ground changing day by day.
interaction ngo response
Over 82 InterAction members are responding to the needs. Examples
of the efforts of humanitarian response professionals include:
Within 8 days of the disaster, one InterAction NGO had
opened a new field hospital in Carrefour. The hospital
initially had 17 emergency and medical staff providing primary
care and emergency surgery. Another member supported the
medical treatment of 2,200 people in Leogane 4 days after the
initial earthquake. Another NGO has reached nine geographic
areas by partnering with the U.N.'s health cluster.
Within 48 hours, one member had activated USAID's Supply
Chain Management System (SCMS) project team in Haiti which
began shipments of emergency medicines and supplies to Port-au-
Prince Hospital. As of January 19, more than 40,000 pounds
(18,000kg) of medicines and emergency medical supplies from
warehouse stock had been distributed.
Several members are providing psychosocial support for
children.
One member has distributed emergency shelter materials and
tents to hundreds of people. It plans to work with local
Haitians to rebuild structures destroyed in the quake.
In one InterAction member's Dominican warehouse, Haitian
University students are working side by side with local youth
groups, former street children, and NGO staff to prepare much-
needed food and hygiene kits for survivors.
One member has a well-established office in the Dominican
Republic which is proving invaluable to facilitating the
administration and staffing of food and supply distributions at
relief centers.
Another InterAction NGO has been able to leverage over a
decade of experience working with local staff in rural areas in
Haiti and good connections with local authorities and
communities to transition its development program into
emergency relief activities.
situation on the ground
Everything must be brought to Haiti through the airport and port,
or by road from the Dominican Republic. In the first week of the
disaster, the airport was inundated with supply and personnel planes
for the U.S. military and humanitarian agencies--causing a logistical
bottleneck. The airport congestion has been ameliorated and the number
of planes landing has increased but the demand remains much greater
than the airfield's capacity to receive and discharge aircraft. Access
to Port-au-Prince by ship was almost completely cut off and has only
recently been partially restored with differing reports of its current
capacity ranging from 10-40 percent. The extensive destruction of
infrastructure, particularly roads, continues to make access to the
affected population especially challenging.
After dealing with the immediate tragedy of staff losses and the
need to locate the lost family members of staff, the NGOs on the ground
faced further logistical problems due to shortages of funds and
available cash. Over the last 2 weeks some banking services have
resumed and fuel is available at many gas stations, but other needs for
basic services continue; the most urgent priorities are water, food,
health care, and shelter. While urgent surgical needs are decreasing,
post operative care is an important concern. In addition, experts have
estimated that there are currently approximately 63,000 pregnant women
in Port-au-Prince, and 15 percent of them are likely to face life-
threatening complications. This week attention has increasingly turned
to the need to provide shelter for the approximately 1 million Haitians
left homeless by the disaster. On Monday, the U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that the U.N.'s
International Office on Migration (IOM) has requested tents for 250,000
families. While these will provide immediate relief once they arrive
and are erected those housed in tents will remain vulnerable in the
upcoming rainy and hurricane seasons. Conversations have begun among
the NGOs and with USAID and the U.N. about the need for transitional
shelter.
child protection
A priority for the U.S. NGO response includes the plight of
children who have become separated from parents or unaccompanied or
orphaned as a result of the earthquake. InterAction continues to stress
that international adoption should not be the first response to helping
protect and care for vulnerable children. Following the immediate
provision of life-saving assistance to children, it is critical to
identify and protect extremely vulnerable children from situations of
potential exploitation or abuse. Tracing family members and reuniting
children with existing relatives is the best solution for vulnerable
children in post-crisis situations. It is extremely difficult to
determine whether children truly are orphans in many cases, and it
often takes considerable time to fulfill the legal requirements for
adoption of both the United States and the child's country of origin.
(For more information, visit the InterAction Web site: http://
www.interaction.org/article/international-adoption-and-haiti-after-
earthquake.)
u.n.-u.s. government coordination
A high level of coordination between U.S., international and
military actors is critical to meeting the array of challenges on the
ground. Throughout the last 2 weeks both the U.S. Government and the
U.N. have given coordination between their official efforts and the
NGOs top priority. In Haiti, the U.N. cluster system was activated
within a week of the disaster; 12 clusters focusing on camp
coordination and management, education, shelter, food, logistics,
nutrition, protection, water and sanitation (WASH), agriculture, early
recovery, emergency telecommunications, and health are serving as the
internal coordination mechanism for the U.N./NGO effort. The clusters
are holding regular meetings to coordinate their joint efforts. To
support response efforts, six clusters have been mobilized in the
Dominican Republic. Furthermore, InterAction has been in close
communication with the office of the U.N. Special Envoy to Haiti,
former President Bill Clinton. On the U.S. Government side, USAID--
through the leadership of USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah and its Office
of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)--has provided NGOs with superb
access and support at the highest levels. Within a few days of the
disaster, USAID approved funding to support the establishment of an NGO
coordination cell in Port-au-Prince. InterAction is partnering with the
Geneva-based International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), to
stand up and staff this coordination cell. To further improve
coordination between the NGO community and the U.N., the cell will be
colocated with the U.N. coordination office staffed by OCHA. These
humanitarian professionals will free up emergency responders to focus
their energies on saving lives and helping people.
military coordination
InterAction applauds President Obama's appointment of the USAID
administrator as the official emergency response coordinator. While the
military is providing critical logistical support in Port-au-Prince by
repairing the port and providing airlift capacity and protection for
humanitarian operations, the President has recognized that the civilian
agencies have the necessary expertise and experience to guide the U.S.
response. Military from the United States and Canada are supplementing
the efforts of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to
provide much-needed security for relief distributions. Last week, it
was reported that tens of thousands of MREs (meals-ready-to-eat) and
rations of water were distributed to desperate earthquake victims at a
golf course inside Port-au-Prince. This is but one of the numerous
examples where the lift capacity of the U.S. military combined with
U.S. NGO logistical and staff capacity on the ground to move urgently
needed relief.
long-term needs
As media attention moves on from Haiti in coming months, it is
imperative that the United States and the broader international
community do not forget the country's reconstruction and long-term
development challenges. We applaud the commitment of the administration
to seek necessary funds from the Congress. Close collaboration between
OFDA and the USAID mission in Haiti will be needed so that emergency
response efforts dovetail as seamlessly as possible with recovery and
long-term development activities. There are positive signs that this
collaboration is already beginning. The large Haitian-American
community will no doubt provide much-needed human and technical
expertise in the longer term NGO effort. The overarching NGO objective
is to engage local civil society in an effort to build long-term
capacity of local institutions. This will be critically important in
securing Haiti's future development.
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