[Senate Hearing 111-749]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-749
SUDAN: A CRITICAL MOMENT FOR THE C.P.A., DARFUR, AND THE REGION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 12, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Gration, Maj. Gen. Scott, USAF (Ret.), Special Envoy to Sudan,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators:
Richard G. Lugar......................................... 33
Barbara Boxer............................................ 38
Roger F. Wicker.......................................... 40
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
United States Agency for International Development, Washington,
DC, prepared statement......................................... 29
(iii)
SUDAN: A CRITICAL MOMENT FOR THE C.P.A., DARFUR, AND THE REGION
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Casey, Lugar, Isakson,
Risch, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
My apologies to all for the delay. But, obviously we had
three votes, and I thought it was more important for us to able
to be here in a continuum. And I appreciate everybody's
understanding and indulgence.
And, General, thank you very much for being willing to be
patient. We appreciate it.
We do have another pressure on us, which is, we have a
back-end use of this room, which is also competing with us. So,
we're going to have to try to see if we can do this within the
framework of about an hour, an hour and 15 minutes, which I
think will be possible and adequate.
I know, General, you will not be sad that your time before
us will be somewhat limited.
We're very pleased to welcome you back here, General. I
appreciate your service as the President's special envoy for
Sudan. And I know you're just back from your travels in East
Africa.
And this is, I think, by most people's perception, a
critical moment for Sudan. A lot of emergencies come with
little warning, and we have to react to them. But, in Sudan
today, we not only have a map of the faultlines that exist, but
we have a timetable for the potential tectonic shifts that are
going to take place in the days to come. So, we have a lot of
warning about what may or may not take place in this part of
the world.
In January 2011, a short time from now, the people of
Southern Sudan are scheduled to vote in a referendum on
independence. Every credible poll predicts that the outcome
will be a vote for separation. Multiple experts also tell us
that if the referendum does not take place on time, then the
renewal of a war that claimed 2 million lives becomes a tragic
possibility, perhaps even likelihood.
Far less certain is how you find a peaceful path forward.
Southern Sudan is not preordained as a failed state, but its
fragility is very, very clear. And neither the modalities for
peaceful separation nor the mechanisms for successful
governance currently exist.
So, we all understand the stakes. According to Director of
National Intelligence Dennis Blair, while a number of countries
in Asia and Africa are at significant risk of a new outbreak of
mass killings over the next 5 years, Southern Sudan is the
place where, ``a new mass killing or genocide is most likely to
occur.''
The implications of Sudan's instability do not end at its
borders. Countries dependent on the Nile's waters, or anxious
about their own separatist movements, have concerns. Southern
Sudan's neighbors worry about an exodus of refugees. And the
Lord's Resistance Army continues to wreak havoc across Southern
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central
African Republic.
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, as we often
refer to it, was intended to create a very different future.
The larger peace crafted by that agreement has held. But, hopes
for democratic transformation, an ambitious goal for just 5
years, have gone unfulfilled.
Last month, Sudan held its first national elections in a
quarter century, as were called for under the CPA. The Sudan
People's Liberation Movement and other opposition parties
ultimately boycotted the elections in the North, citing
intimidation, voter fraud, and other acts. The White House and
most independent observers described the process as ``seriously
flawed.''
Today, we would like to understand the significance of the
balloting, but we also need to look at the larger picture of
the challenges that Sudan faces. That includes, still, Darfur,
where the current deadlock leaves many people in camps, trapped
in what our top diplomat in Sudan described to me as ``a
miserable stasis.''
Others in areas such as Jebel Marra are exposed to renewed
fighting with Khartoum's old tactics, causing new waves of
anguish, civilian casualties, and displacement.
While the CPA provides a timetable for North and South,
there is no clear timetable or agenda for a peace agreement in
Darfur. For those in the camps, 7 years after the onset of the
genocide, the questions remain the same: land, security,
justice, and compensation. We need to find a way for their
voices to be heard, and we need to empower Darfur's civil
society, not simply its armed men.
We must also ensure continued humanitarian assistance to
millions of people in need in Darfur, including vital
protection programs that were lost when Khartoum expelled 13
aid groups in March 2009. And we should explore whether
simultaneous early recovery activities can be pursued in tandem
with humanitarian aid in order to make lives better for the
long-suffering people of Darfur.
With a timetable for one potential calamity laid out before
us, and an ongoing crisis still playing out in Darfur, this is
the moment for contingency planning, ensuring that we have the
resources in place to respond to events and working proactively
with the Sudanese, North and South, the U.N., Sudan's
neighbors, and other partners, from preventing the worst from
coming to pass.
Given Dennis Blair's warning, the stakes are clear. And our
window to help the Sudanese people find a peaceful solution is
rapidly closing. It's time for Congress to reengage on Sudan.
As the CPA nears its final act, I am developing legislation to
help shape our Sudan policy and ensure that our policy
maximizes the chances of peace. The bill we're working on will
seek to reframe United States assistance, prepare for the
potential changes that may come, accelerate contingency
planning, send important signals to Khartoum, Juba, and other
partners, and build United States diplomatic and development
capacity to address what may become a very difficult season in
the life of Africa's largest country.
I look forward to working with the administration and my
colleagues here today to lay the groundwork for meeting the
complex challenge that we face.
Our sole witness this morning is Gen. Scott Gration, the
President's special envoy to Sudan. And, given the regional
stakes, we would have welcomed another witness from the State
Department to share a broader perspective, but we do appreciate
USAID's willingness to contribute to the discussion and provide
a written statement.
And we welcome you, General Gration. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming
General Gration back to the Foreign Relations Committee.
The United States has long been invested in helping to
stabilize war-torn Sudan. We have been engaged in this problem
because it has national security implications and because we
have a moral interest in working to prevent humanitarian
disasters and genocide.
Sudan has been fractured by economic and power-sharing
disputes between ethnic groups, as well as relentless violence
upon civilians. Conditions there brought a U.S. declaration of
ongoing genocide and an International Criminal Court indictment
of President al Bashir.
The death toll of the North-South conflict and the graphic
scorched-earth strategy in Darfur also elicited remarkable
grassroots activism in the United States. Along with like-
minded nations, we've achieved some success in preventing
military escalation and protecting millions of people at risk
in Darfur and the South.
But a peace agreement in Darfur is distant and clouded by
uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement process. Failure of the peace agreement between North
and South could have catastrophic consequences for all of
Sudan.
In testimony earlier this year, ADM Dennis Blair, the
Director of National Intelligence, said, ``A number of
countries in Africa and Asia are at significant risk for a new
outbreak of mass killing. Among these countries, a new mass
killing or genocide is most likely to occur in Southern
Sudan.''
Admiral Blair's stark assessment was prompted by evidence
that the parties are moving toward conflict, rather than
establishing the foundation for a sustainable peace. Each side
is arming itself with far more lethal equipment than was
deployed during the North-South civil war. This weaponry is
being purchased with the income from oil that has flowed to
both sides since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed.
These military expenditures have come at the expense of basic
services and infrastructure for the people of Sudan. Rather
than conclude agreements on wealth-sharing of the demarcation
of borders, as called for in the peace agreement, Khartoum and
Juba appear to be consolidating their ability to contest oil-
producing areas along the proposed border. Neighboring
countries have begun to organize their military postures for
potential instability on the borders with Sudan.
Most observers agree that South Sudan is poorly equipped to
govern its territory and lacks capacity to provide for its
inhabitants. International capacity-building efforts, including
training security forces and building a functioning capital
city in Juba, are ongoing, but insufficient. Moreover, during
the last 12 months, violence between ethnic groups in South
Sudan has reportedly killed 3,000 people and displaced more
than 400,000.
As international attention to the North-South conflicts
increases, Darfur risks being relegated to a lesser priority.
This may suit the Khartoum regime and its proxies, as well as
the myriad criminal elements operating in the Darfur region.
Consequently, international vigilance toward Darfur should be
heightened.
Although the mortality rate across Darfur has dropped, some
3 million people remain displaced and at risk. Through United
States efforts, several expelled aid agencies have been able to
return to Darfur, but the safety net for Darfur's displaced
millions remains tenuous.
The United Nations hybrid peacekeeping mission with the
African Union continues to lack adequate helicopter support to
respond to threats to civilians across vast distances.
Given these complex circumstances, United States efforts
related to Sudan must be fully resourced, and the
administration must be speaking with one voice.
Last July, during General Gration's testimony before our
committee, he identified several staffing needs. I look forward
to hearing from him today about whether these needs have been
met and whether any additional resources are required for this
problem. I also look forward to his assessments of the
prospects for negotiations, as well as United States options in
the event of escalating conflict.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Lugar, for helping
to set the stage for this hearing. We appreciate your comments.
And, General Gration, if you would--we'll put your full
text in the record as if read in full, if you could summarize,
it will give Senators a little more time to have a dialogue
here, in the time we do have. So, we look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. SCOTT GRATION, USAF (RET.), SPECIAL
ENVOY TO SUDAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
General Gration. Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar
and other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I
really do appreciate this opportunity to come here this morning
to discuss the situation and to answer your questions about the
difficult challenges that lie ahead.
The issues we face today, as you know, are very complex,
and the time is very, very short. And the next months, as you
pointed out so clearly, are so critical, as we strive to
increase security and stability, peace and prosperity in Sudan.
I'd like to just take a few minutes to just say a little
bit about what's happened in the last 14 months. The recent
rapprochement between Chad and Sudan has gone a long way to
ending the proxy war that was such a devastating situation. Our
team has played an integral role in unifying the rebel
movements. And we hope that the peace talks will resume again,
later this month, in Doha, to formalize the peace deal and get
that cease-fire moving ahead.
Looking ahead, as you rightly point out, Darfur will
continue to be a priority. And we're working with the
Government of Sudan, the Africa Union, the United Nations to
end the remaining conflicts.
Beyond the political talks, our objective remains to
increase security and stability at the local level, at the
individual level. And we're helping to negotiate agreements on
power-sharing, wealth-sharing, land reform, compensation, local
justice, and the accountability mechanisms.
Recently, as you know, the Sudan held its first multiparty
elections in 24 years, and we've consistently echoed the
concerns expressed by the international observer missions about
the logistical challenges, the violations of civil liberties,
the harassment of opposition groups, and the ongoing problems
that we're facing right now in the tabulation phase. But, these
observer groups have also stated that the elections fulfilled a
critical milestone of the CPA; they ushered in a renewed civic
engagement across the country. Over 16,000 candidates from 72
different political parties ran for executive offices and the
1,841 legislative seats. And 25 percent of those will be filled
by women. Nearly 80 percent of Sudan's eligible voters
registered, and over 10 million Sudanese inked their fingers as
they cast their votes.
The elections represent an important first step in
increasing the political space, and an initial movement toward
the democratic transformation, both the North and the South.
As we anticipate the end of the CPA in 2011, there are
several more important issues that have to be resolved this
year. And among them are preparing for the referenda in Abyei
in Southern Sudan; conducting popular consultations in Southern
Kordofan and the Blue Nile; and finalizing the demarcation of
the borders in North and South and also in Abyei. And, of
course, we're going to have to negotiate those critical post-
CPA agreements.
As you mentioned, I just returned from a series of meetings
in Addis, and while there, we met with representatives of the
parties, senior leaders from the African Union, the United
Nations, and other partners who are interested in Sudan. And
together we're assembling a strong team of international
regional stakeholders to implement the remaining CPA milestones
to support these negotiations that have to take place about
post-CPA issues, and to advance the vital programs in Darfur.
We must never forget, though, that it's really this NCP and
the SPLM who are really the only essential parties to the
negotiations. And we must continue to help them to work
together, and make that our top priority.
I want to reiterate our unequivocal commitment to fully
implementing the CPA. We must ensure that the southerners and
residents of Abyei get an opportunity to vote in the referenda.
And whether the South chooses unity or secession, it's
imperative that the international community work now to ensure
that the Government of Southern Sudan has the increased
capacity to govern effectively, to provide security, and to
deliver public services to its people. To achieve this, a
robust and concerted international effort will be required.
And on our part, the United States has already begun to
expand its presence in the South. In the next month, we'll be
sending a senior diplomat with experience in the region to lead
our efforts on the ground. The United States Government and its
growing team of international partners are increasingly well
postured to respond to the many challenges and opportunities in
Sudan.
And with that, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Gration follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jonathan S. Gration, Major General, USAF (Ret),
U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Kerry, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
I am honored by the opportunity to discuss with you today the situation
in Sudan and the important challenges that lie ahead. As you noted in
your invitation to testify, the coming months clearly bring a series of
critical decision points for policymakers in Khartoum, Juba,
neighboring capitals, and here in Washington as well. I will focus my
remarks today primarily on the road to the referenda in January 2011,
the post-2011 planning and capacity-building that need to continue at
an accelerated pace, and issues of peace, accountability, and security
for Darfur.
Prior to January 2011 there are a number of tasks to be undertaken
in a short time period. The United States and the international
community in general must be prepared to assist the parties in this
endeavor to help maintain peace and stability in Sudan and the region.
Before we look ahead, though, it's important to take a moment to take
stock of some of the most important recent developments.
Chad and Sudan have made notable progress in their bilateral
relationship, moving toward stopping the long-running proxy war
among rebels from both states and ending support to the rebels,
deploying a joint border monitoring force, and opening the
border between the two countries on April 14.
Peace talks under the auspices of the U.N. and African Union
in Doha have resulted in unification of some Darfur rebels into
two groups and involved civil society in preparations for
negotiations. However, the Darfur rebel leader with the most
popular support among the Fur, Abdul Wahid, has refused to
participate in the talks. The Justice and Equality Movement--
the most militarily significant rebel group in Darfur--last
week suspended its participation in the talks amid new reports
of clashes with government forces in Darfur.
In April, Sudan held its first multiparty elections in 24
years in a largely peaceful manner. We share the serious
concerns expressed by the Carter Center, the European Union,
and other organizations that undertook election observation
missions about widespread logistical and administrative
challenges and procedural irregularities, restrictions on civil
liberties, some cases of fraud, harassment by military and
security services, and that the ongoing conflict in Darfur did
not permit an environment conducive to elections. We also have
concerns about the tabulation process. As these observation
missions have also noted, the elections failed to meet
international standards. There were some positive outcomes from
these elections, in addition to fulfilling a Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) milestone. Dozens of registered parties
and thousands of candidates participated, and over 10 million
votes were cast, according to the National Elections
Commission. The elections period also saw renewed engagement by
civil society groups and increased civic participation among
the populace.
We cannot ignore the challenges that continue to exist, and there
is daunting work ahead. There are less than 8 months remaining until
the referenda. Before those votes take place, there are important
issues in the CPA that must be resolved, including:
1. North/South Border Demarcation: Earlier this year the parties
approved a report detailing undisputed areas of the North/South border,
but they need to agree on remaining disputed areas and urgently begin
demarcation.
2. Southern Sudan Referendum Preparations: The parties must
finalize composition of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, to be
approved by the newly formed National Assembly, and these bodies must
immediately create plans to undertake voter registration and develop
voting procedures within a very tight timeline.
3. Abyei Referendum Preparations: In addition to finalizing the
composition of the Abyei Referendum Commission that must create similar
plans, the parties must also resolve sensitive questions around who is
eligible to vote in Abyei. The Abyei boundary must also be demarcated.
4. Popular Consultations for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile:
Technical committees have begun planning, but commissions to be created
from newly elected state assemblies will undertake the actual
consultations. Postponed state-level elections in Southern Kordofan
must first take place before this state's commission can be formed.
The above issues are complex and it is clear that time is limited.
The NCP and SPLM must work together in an atmosphere of open dialogue
and trust, consulting with other Sudanese stakeholders as necessary to
ensure broad support. These CPA issues recently took a back seat to
electoral preparations, but now the parties must refocus and intensify
their implementation efforts. Both the government in Khartoum and the
Government of Southern Sudan are in the process of reallocating
positions based on electoral results. In the coming weeks following the
elections, they will need to quickly appoint credible ministries and
institutions that are able to gather support for the tough decisions
that lay ahead.
As we look to the referenda, which are stipulated by the CPA and
enshrined in the Interim Constitution of Sudan, we have carefully
considered possible scenarios for which the international community
should be prepared. The scenario we'd like to see is outlined in the
CPA: credible and peaceful referenda are undertaken during which
Southern Sudanese choose unity or secession, and the people of Abyei
choose whether to remain with the North or join the South. In this
scenario the outcomes are respected by the National Congress Party
(NCP), the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), other political
parties and Sudanese citizens, as well as the international community,
including those who signed on to the CPA as witnesses and supporters of
implementation of the CPA in 2005. We must also be prepared to respond
to less favorable scenarios.
We are mindful that the end of the Interim Period will change the
relationship between the north and south, regardless of the outcome of
the two referenda. We continue to strongly encourage the parties to
formalize a framework for negotiations on post-CPA issues. The critical
issues for agreement will include: citizenship, management of natural
resources such as oil and water, the status of transboundary migratory
populations, security arrangements, and assets and liabilities.
Agreement on such issues is necessary both to inform the choices of
voters and to ensure a smooth post-2011 transition. We are committed to
helping mobilize and coordinate international efforts underway to
assist the parties with these negotiations. We must be prepared to
invest substantial political and diplomatic energy, as well as
technical assistance, to ensure that political will is fostered and
agreements are not only reached but also implemented. Only with
sustainable arrangements will the parties be able to navigate the many
hurdles coming in 2011 and beyond.
Whether or not Southern Sudan becomes independent in July 2011, and
regardless of whether it includes Abyei or not, the Government of
Southern Sudan will require effective leadership as well as
strengthened capacity to undertake effective and accountable
governance, provide security, and deliver services to its citizenry. A
robust, concerted international effort will be required to assist in
this capacity-building effort.
In order to assist in building up the capacity of Southern Sudan,
we are undertaking a ``Juba Diplomatic Expansion'' to include staffing
and material assistance on the ground in Sudan to support USG foreign
policy objectives. Operating under Chief of Mission authority, staff
from the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and
the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) will provide support to Consulate
General Juba and complement USAID's robust presence in the runup to and
following Southern Sudan's January 2011 referendum. Staff is assisting
in strategic and contingency planning, program oversight, and technical
assistance, both in Washington and in the field.
In keeping with President Obama's emphasis on multilateral efforts
in Sudan,we are working closely with our partners in the international
community through the Troika, Contact Group, and ``E6'' group of
envoys. We have an ongoing dialogue with key regional organizations and
states, including the African Union, European Union, Arab League,
Sudan's nine neighboring states, China, Russia, and others. We also
regularly engage with the United Nations on U.N. missions in Sudan.
With substantial U.S. input, the Security Council recently renewed the
mandate of the UNMIS peacekeeping mission, emphasizing the need for the
mission to continue its support to the CPA parties to implement all
aspects of the CPA, and requesting that UNMIS be prepared to assist the
parties in the referenda process. Promising new leadership on both
Sudan peacekeeping missions bodes well for future mission operations.
The parties have much to do in the final phase of Sudan's Interim
Period and it is our sincere hope that strong international engagement
will further bolster these efforts.
While much attention will be focused on the North-South process
over the next year, we continue to work on Darfur and the many
important unresolved issues there. A definitive end to conflict, gross
human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur remains a key strategic
objective, as made clear in the U.S. Strategy on Sudan. Violence
continues in and there are credible reports of continued aerial
bombardments by the Government of Sudan. This is unconscionable and we
have called on the government to immediately renew its cease-fire.
Following progress in Chad-Sudan relations earlier this year, the
Darfur peace talks in Doha saw positive progress with the signing of
two framework agreements between the Government of Sudan and Darfur
rebels in February and March. We are concerned about the Justice and
Equality Movement's decision to leave the peace talks and are
encouraging them to return to the negotiating table The U.N. and
African Union are now working hard to include the voices of civil
society representatives in the process, implement a cease-fire on the
ground, and enter into meaningful and productive political negotiations
between the parties. While issues such as cease-fires, power-sharing,
and wealth-sharing can be addressed at a high level in Doha, we need to
think more creatively about how to bring the people of Darfur into
local conversations about compensation, land tenure, and rebuilding
their communities. Additionally, as stated in the U.S. Strategy on
Sudan, accountability for genocide and atrocities is necessary for
reconciliation and lasting peace. In addition to supporting
international efforts to bring those responsible for genocide and war
crimes in Darfur to justice, we are consulting closely with our
international partners and Darfuri civil society on ways to strengthen
locally owned accountability and reconciliation mechanisms in light of
the recommendations made by the African Union High Level Panel on
Darfur led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki.
Local peacebuilding, rule of law, and reconciliation activities
must be revived and strengthened. We should not wait for a negotiated
political settlement to begin improving the lives of Darfuris. For
instance, we are supporting the role of women in peacebuilding and
working on the imperative of reducing gender-based violence in Sudan.
One of the administration's highest priorities for Darfur is to improve
security so that the people on the ground who have suffered so greatly
can see a tangible improvement in their living conditions. We continue
to work closely with UNAMID and relevant stakeholders to enhance
protection of civilians, expand humanitarian space for the delivery of
life-saving assistance, and consolidate gains in stable areas to
prepare for the voluntary return of people to their homes. This is not
an easy process, but it's one international donors must undertake with
great urgency. We are also working with our international partners to
improve access for UNAMID and humanitarian workers to areas still
affected by fighting between government and rebel forces, such as Jebel
Marra and Jebel Moon, as well as intertribal fighting, especially in
South Darfur. We are also working with the U.N. and other key partners
on a plan to provide increased security in the triangle that is formed
by El Fasher, Nyala, and El Geneina, where up to half the population of
Darfur lives. In the long term, it is imperative to address the
underlying causes of conflict, including disputes over land and water
resources. This will require the cooperation of the Government of
Sudan, vigorous diplomacy by the United States, and sustained support
from the international community.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, General. We appreciate the
summary very much, and we look forward to a chance to have this
dialogue.
Do you agree, first of all, with Admiral Blair's
assessment, which both Senator Lugar and I put forward today?
General Gration. Yes, I do, sir.
The Chairman. You do. And where would you place--I mean, at
this point in time, post-election and given the dynamics, where
would you place us on that course, at this point?
General Gration. I think we have to redouble our efforts. I
think the international community----
The Chairman. Is it safe to say we're behind?
General Gration. We are, sir.
The Chairman. How far behind?
General Gration. I think it's possible to get done
everything we have to get done, but we can't waste another
minute. The time is now.
The Chairman. Exactly what--give me the order of priority.
What has to happen here to make this work?
General Gration. There's three things that have to happen.
The first is that we have to take the lessons from the
elections and turn them into solutions for the referenda. There
has to be better voter education. There has to be a better
system of logistics and procedures and administration. And
there have to be processes put in place. And that means that
the referendum commission has to be appointed by the National
Assembly. They have to be financed and they have to be given
the training.
I worry about the diaspora registration. This registration
will be so complex--and it happens in July 9--that's when it
starts--because they have to register people in countries
outside, in 14 different nations, and they don't have the
system of chiefs to do that. And there's sometimes not the
requisite birth certificate and those things to prove residency
of the South. These are issues that have to be resolved. And
I'll move quickly. But, we have to learn the lessons and do the
preparation. That means that ISIS, the international monitoring
teams, have to be on the ground right now, working not as
referees that throw in a red card, but as coaches and folks
that can help make this successful. Because if we're not
successful in achieving a referenda that is credible from
international standards and represents the will of the people--
and so, they say, ``Yes, my will has been acknowledged,'' and
that the North can recognize that, I believe it's going to be
problematic.
The Chairman. Will all of those steps require the
cooperation--in fact, the full, almost, leadership of the
North?
General Gration. Many of them do. But, the South has a very
important role, because it's really--it's a joint effort. And
if it's not just a North issue and it's not just a South issue;
there's got to be a lot of work together. And the international
community has to be part of this, as does the regional partners
in Africa.
The Chairman. But, it's also fair to say that, I mean, the
North has obvious reservations about the outcome of that
referendum. Has anything shifted in their attitude about that?
Do they fully expect that referendum to produce a separate----
General Gration. Yes, sir. In my conversations with leaders
in the North, I believe they do. They recognize this has to
take place. But, I would also say the second and third aspects
that we have to do in the short term is, we have to get
agreements on the post-2011 issues of which oil revenue
allocation is the most important issue.
The Chairman. Who's driving that right now, General?
General Gration. It's got to be both. And they've set up an
agreement, where there's three members of the South and three
members of the North and an executive committee. Those groups
are going to start talking. But, it has to happen as soon as
possible, because these are tough issues. And there's other
things that have to happen, in terms of, maybe an audit and
maybe some more technical----
The Chairman. Is there a referee or catalyst for that right
now?
General Gration. They've asked the Norwegians, because of
the history that they've had with the oil, to help. They've
also asked us to help as technical advisers. And we've also
been working with Chatham House and other people to come up
with some options for them, looking at other wealth-sharing
arrangements like with the pipeline that goes from Chad to
Cameroon, the TBC, and things like that. So, we'll continue to
provide the technical advice.
But, now I believe it's not any more time left for study.
We have to start making the negotiation, and we need to
encourage both the North and the South to do that as soon as
possible.
The last issue you mentioned, though, is the border
demarcation. Without a clear boundary, it's going to be very
difficult for the South to move on with independence. And so,
we have to move very quickly to get the President and the
Presidential organization to issue the report and then to start
working out those areas where there's conflicts and start
demarcating those areas where there's agreement. That has to
happen--all these things have to happen by November.
The Chairman. We were the essential ingredient of the
creation of the CPA itself.
General Gration. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Are they still accepting our stewardship/
leadership, with respect to these priorities you've just
described, in the same way?
General Gration. Very much so. But, we also need to have
other people step up to the plate. We're not going to walk away
from our leadership and our commitment, but we have to have
more people join with us. And this would include the
international community and it would include members of Africa
nations. It would also include the U.N. And that's why we're
reaching out in a very concerted way to expand our team; not
that we're stepping away, but to make sure that other people
step up to the plate. And this become an international issue to
resolve, and not a U.S. issue to fix.
The Chairman. General, do you believe that you have the
tools that you need, yourself, in order to meet that schedule?
Or do you need something more than you have today?
General Gration. The President has been superb and have
given me everything I've asked for. The Secretary of State,
Secretary Clinton, has just been marvelous--and her team.
Now, obviously, as we go into this period, if the South was
to choose independence, there are things that have to happen.
And we're in consultations right now assessing the various
options. And certainly, we will be coordinating with the
Congress, because there are things that will, I believe, in the
out years, require a change in allocation of resources and the
way we do business--in the South especially, but also in the
North.
The Chairman. So, you're saying that part of the next few
months has to be dedicated to preparing for the expectation
that there will be a declaration of independence, and we're
going to have to deal with a very fragile state at that point.
Is that correct?
General Gration. That's correct. If they choose unity,
that's pretty easy. If they chose independence, I believe that
there's much work that has to be done in the very near future.
The Chairman. Are you confident that if they choose
independence and--let's put it this way. If the modalities are
worked out--the oil, the boundaries, et cetera--I assume your
judgment would be that, if they choose independence, and that's
worked out, that the prospect for violence goes down
significantly. But, if the oil issue is outstanding and the
boundaries remain outstanding, the odds of violence are very
high. Is that----
General Gration. That would be my assessment.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. General Gration, the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, as we understand it, was a complex series of
agreements. Can you describe the other arrangements that are
often lumped together as a ``complex series of agreements''
that are a part of this CPA?
General Gration. Yes. And in response to Senator Kerry, I
just listed those that are really make-or-breaks.
Senator Lugar. Right.
General Gration. But, you're exactly correct. We have been
able to work with the Sudanese in what we call our ``trilateral
talks,'' to reach agreements on all aspects of the CPA. But, it
really means that other things have to happen. First of all,
the national election law has to be changed to give the South a
blocking majority; an extra 40 seats. And there's other seats
that have to be happening.
Senator Lugar. And that has to happen through the
Sudanese----
General Gration. Right.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Parliament.
General Gration. We expect it to happen somewhere the 1st,
or sometime after President Bashir is inaugurated.
Senator Lugar. I see.
General Gration. The second thing that has to happen is
that we have to, as I said, do the border demarcation. And
that's--and the popular consultations--and those are part of
the CPA.
But, there's a whole lot of issues on top of the CPA that
are looming. And things like, What happens to the citizens if
they were to choose independence? And we have to work through
that. Things like debt relief. Things like assets and
liabilities. Whose currency will we use? How do we establish
the reserves? And we're having to work with the IMF and the
World Bank on those issues. Things like airspace control. Who's
going to--How do you do that transition from the North, who now
is responsible for airtraffic control and navaids, to moving
that to the South?
So, sir, there's a wide variety of issues that cross all
aspects of government that we're going to have work through.
So, my belief is that there will be independence, but there
will be a time where these other functions are transitioned in
a methodical and a safe and a secure way to the South.
Senator Lugar. Now, when you use the phrase ``We will need
to do these things,'' are you speaking about the United States?
Are you speaking about the United States plus Norway? The
United Kingdom? Other African states? If you were asked to
describe the organization of the reponsible parties, how would
you respond to that?
General Gration. I would respond that, ultimately, it's the
North and the South that have to meet agreements. They live
there. They're going to live with--the longest border that they
have with any country is going to be between the North and the
South, should they choose independence. And they're the primary
actors that have to reach agreements and implement.
The second tier are those neighbors, those nine countries
that live, bordering them.
And then, the third tier is the rest of Africa. And Africa
should be helping Africans. And that's why we're working very
closely with the Africa Union to make sure that they're engaged
and are part of the solution.
Then there's that tier of support and influence and
leadership that comes from the international community. And it
stretches from China and Russia, certainly Europe, but it also
stretches to Asia and South America. This is a global issue
that requires an international solution.
So, when I say, ``we,'' it's in the very broadest terms.
And while the United States can't own it, there's leadership we
can bring; there's resources and technical abilities that we
can bring. But, certainly we have to do this in concert and in
a collective way with all of our partners.
Senator Lugar. But, as you suggest, somebody really has to
lead this. The importance of negotiations between officials
from the North and South are obvious. But, even then, someone
in the South or the North would have to pull together a team
designated to talk to other parties.
The question I'm trying to reach is, Do you and your staff
have the ability to liaise with outside actors? For example,
you mentioned ISIS, the international group that work on
elections. Can you call them in and say, ``You know, we really
need to have application by your folks now so that people
understand the election procedures''?
General Gration. We're committed to doing everything we
can, and everything we need to do, to do exactly that. And, in
many cases, we can have a leadership role that's direct. Some
places we have to have an indirect role. And where we use
influence and the power that all of our government has in.
And this is where Congress can be very useful, too. You
have an opportunity to meet with people that come through the
Senator Foreign Relations Committee, and if we can work to
elevate Sudan in the inboxes of all these national leaders,
that would be very useful. But, we have to continue to do that.
And we have to continue to use other partners to use influence.
But, you're exactly right that there are certain areas that
have been carved out for the AU, for example, and the U.N. But,
there's certain areas that we're going to all have to jump in
an fix. And if the United States has to step up, certainly we
want to make sure that failure is not an option and success is
what we achieve.
Senator Lugar. Hypothetically, if a referendum was held and
it was deemed very clear that the result was independence and
independence was subsequently declared, at that point, who,
physically, in the South, takes charge? In other words, if
there is to be the negotiation, first of all, on the building
of the institutions, quite apart from dealings with the North,
who, physically, is empowered by this type of result of a
referendum in Sudan to do something?
General Gration. Well, we've had elections in the South,
and President Kiir, who runs the autonomous state of Southern
Sudan, and the Government of Southern Sudan will continue to
have the lead. And----
Senator Lugar. He'd be recognized, clearly, because of the
previous election.
General Gration. Yes, sir.
Senator Lugar. Yes.
General Gration. So, he would continue to have the lead,
along with his party, which is the SPLM, and the leaders in
that party. And they've already been posturing for this.
They've already been working out who is going to actually have
the lead on these negotiations, both with the IGAD and the AU
and those things, but also with the North.
And, historically, it's been Riak Mashar who has been
working together with other partners. But, we'll see, as they
reorganize their government, who will actually be the interface
with the NCP.
Senator Lugar. How many people do you have on your staff
supporting you in your role as special envoy to Sudan? For
instance, with regard to the Pakistan situation, as things are
improvised, maybe a staff of 30 or 40 people have been cobbled
together. What sort of a group do you have?
General Gration. We have a core group that comes out of the
State Department. And that's around 20 now, with interns and
folks that we have on fellowships and that kind of thing. But,
then we've also been able to get help from other agencies who
have seconded people to us. And so, we run--people that are
actually working full time on Sudan--around 30--28 to 30. But,
that number's going to go down in the summer, and some of the
people that we have for those fellowships may not get replaced.
But, the State Department is working through us. We're
working very closely with Pat Kennedy. And I've got to tell
you, my belief is that we're going to have the capacity that we
need to do the job that we must do.
Senator Lugar. Well, that's good news.
General Gration. Yes, sir.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
General Gration, welcome.
And I certainly want to thank Chairman Kerry for holding
this very important hearing.
Let me first express my support for the Obama
administration's effort to scale up our diplomacy and
development efforts in Southern Sudan to prepare for the
referendum and its aftermath. And, as you said, the stakes of
the coming months are incredibly high, not only for Southern
Sudan, but for the entire country, as well, and for the region.
We must do all we can to ensure that the referendum is held
on time, and that it is held fairly and peacefully. And we must
help the Southern Sudanese to get a handle on the many
security, development, and governance challenges before them.
At the same time, we have to be ready for all possible
scenarios, including one in which the National Congress Party
seeks to destabilize or disrupt the agreed-upon process at the
same time that it escalates the crisis in Darfur, or foot-drags
on efforts to bring about peace.
I've expressed concern at different times, including during
the runup to last month's election, that the administration has
not spoken out more forcefully about the abuses by the NCP, or
sought to hold them accountable. And although I am not opposed
to engagement, we need to be firm and to be sure that any
engagement is based on actual evidence that the NCP is willing
to cooperate and has made concrete progress on previous
problems.
So, General, let me ask you a few questions. In your
discussions of the NCP, what have you conveyed would be the
consequences if they take actions to disrupt the referendum
process? Have you prepared a way in which we would act in that
scenario?
General Gration. Obviously, these are decisions that would
have to be made through the process--decisionmaking process
that goes through the National Security Council. But, certainly
we've been very clear that we will not tolerate obstacles or
roadblocks or messing with the referenda. We believe that it
needs to happen on time, and we believe it needs to happen in a
way that reflects the will of the people. And so, rigging,
messing with, or destabilizing would be things that we would
condemn. And there would be consequences that are negative.
We believe, also, that when it comes to applying these
pressures, that if we can get a community of nations to work
with us, that these pressures will be more effective when the
international community is on board. And that's why we're
working very hard to make sure that the international community
is seized with this issue, that they also understand the
importance of the referenda, and that they are partners with
us, so that when it comes time to apply pressures, when it
comes time to make sure that this referenda goes forward, that
it's the whole international community that brings pressure to
bear on the North.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate what you said. But my
question was: What would the possible consequences be? And are
we in the process of preparing, or have we prepared, a scenario
if they act this way? I don't want to just hear about what the
process would be. I want to know if it's happening. Are we
ready?
General Gration. We are ready. These discussions take place
in the administration, in the National Security Council, and
certainly have been taking place in the State Department. Many
of these things, for obvious reasons, are things that we don't
talk about in public. And we'd be very happy to come up here,
as we have in the past, to brief the staffs on the options that
we have available, should the scenarios warrant.
Senator Feingold. Well, I appreciate that some of this
shouldn't be shared in this setting. But, is there anything you
can share, with regard to the types of consequences that this
government may suffer if they mess around with this situation?
General Gration. Well, obviously, what they want is to be
unyoked from sanctions, to get legitimacy, to move into the
circle of nations that are respected. And so, to take that away
would be a big thing. You know, in other words, to condemn, to
further isolate, to marginalize them would be something that I
believe would have a strong effect.
But, the range, beyond that, of things that we can do is
great. And they include things that we briefed with your staff.
But, we can give you more specifics on that.
[A written response by General Gration follows:]
I am willing to brief you and any other Members and cleared staff
about the details of the strategy in an appropriate setting.
Senator Feingold. I look forward to that.
General, I have been very concerned, also, by the level of
violence within Southern--South Sudan. As you know,
humanitarian groups report that over 2,500 people were killed,
an additional 350,000 were displaced, by interethnic and
communal violence in 2009 alone. And the Lord's Resistance Army
continues to foment terror in the southwestern corner of the
country. To this end, what can be done by the SPLA or the U.N.
peacekeeping mission? How can we help strengthen the existing
disarmament program in order to reduce these levels of violence
and protect the civilians during this very turbulent period?
General Gration. This is a focus of our shop. We right now
are putting together a conflict mitigation package that looks
at everything from the ground level of sensing and figuring out
where these conflicts are, and then works all the way up
through the top of the government and the command-and-control
system.
The deal is, is that, in many ways, we haven't gotten out
in front of these things, because we don't know that they're
happening until they've happened. And so, our response has
really been to take note and to write a report. And that's sort
of what's been happening with our U.N. folks, the same. We want
to be able to get in front of these situations, to have a
mobile and an agile force that can get to these problems before
they occur. And so, we're working on conflict mitigation teams,
giving them the communications that they need, giving them the
mobility they need, and to try to get out in front of these
problems before they happen.
This is also something that we're trying to do in Darfur.
We're concentrating on an area between the three major cities
that includes Jebel Marra. But, conflict mitigation, increasing
the security mechanisms, and the infrastructure are primary
things. Because, if you look at all the problems that we have,
we can't do development, we can't do early returns, we can't
move on to governance, we can't put in place security--I mean,
social infrastructure and economic infrastructure, because of
the insecurity. So, insecurity and stability are high priority
for this administration, and we're working on just that.
Senator Feingold. And in regard to Darfur, despite some
small successes, obviously the situation there remains
unresolved. Over 2 million people--displaced people--still
living in camps. And earlier this week, the JEM rebel groups
suspended their involvement in peace talks after alleging that
the Sudanese Government has launched fresh attacks on Darfur.
First, from what you know, is there any truth to these
allegations? And second, what impact has--which you've referred
to--the Chad-Sudan rapprochement had on the potential for
viable peace talks?
General Gration. We were encouraged when the agreements
were made. And you're exactly right that when we started, on
the 15th of March of last year, we anticipated that we'd be
able to finalize the cease-fire and get agreements on power-
sharing, wealth-sharing, and compensation. This did not happen.
And it's true that the JEM has walked away and has taken back
to guns.
We understand that there has been some fighting going on in
eastern part of Darfur. We don't know the details yet, because
UNAMID hasn't been able to get out there to look at that. But,
we'll keep an eye on that. And we certainly condemn any kind of
offensive action on either side. And we've said that publicly,
and we've said it privately. And we'll continue to work with
all of our partners and the U.N. to make sure that this doesn't
continue. We prefer a negotiated settlement that's lasting. And
we're very disappointed with this increase----
Senator Feingold. But, you have not denied here that the
Sudanese Government has launched fresh attacks on Darfur. You
have not confirmed it, but you have not denied it. Correct?
General Gration. I believe that they have.
Senator Feingold. OK.
General Gration. But we're trying to get the extent of
those. What would happen is, if I could just explain a little
bit, it's our understanding that when President Deby and other
people made an agreement with Khalil Ibrahim, the head of the
JEM, that they were supposed to stay in the area around Jebel
Moon and in camps. During the negotiations that have happened
over the last 2 months, they have moved to the east and the--
SAF, I believe, in recent days, has retaliated against them.
But, again, we condemn this. We condemn all offensive
action. And we want them to go back to the table. We believe,
on the 15th of May, the Government of Sudan will come back to
Doha, and we hope, at that time, that Khalil Ibrahim will bring
his team back also.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Gration, our country owes you a debt of thanks. You
have what may be the most complex and difficult envoy
appointment in the history of the United States. And I think
your predecessor, Mr. Williamson, would have agreed to that,
after he left.
I would like to follow up on the Senator from Wisconsin's
question and your comments about conflict mitigation teams. I
have been to the Darfur region of Sudan. I have also listened
to testimony at previous hearings on Sudan. I remember the
previous administration never had the logistical capability to
really do the job it wanted to do. Do you have the tactical and
logistical capability to get conflict mitigation teams to the
places they need to go, either through what you have at your
disposal or cooperation with UNAMID or the other people
involved?
General Gration. Yes, sir. I believe we're reaching that
point. For example, you're exactly right that UNAMID was in a
buildup point, up until now. And now, we're encouraging them to
start patrolling the roads; get out of the super camps, get out
of the three cities, and get out and start patrolling the roads
between Nyala and Fasher and El Geneina. And we believe that,
just as we've seen in the past, as they started patrolling
between southern Kordofan and Darfur, that taxis and transports
and people started following the security of the UNAMID
vehicles. And the--we believe that if they can get out--and
then the NGOs--there's 15,000 NGOs and people that are working
on everything from stability to early recovery to development,
that are just hunkered down in the three big cities. And we've
got to get them out of the towns and into where the people need
some help. And I believe that, if UNAMID can get out of the
cities and start patrolling the roads, that that will improve.
But, we also have to hold the Government of Sudan
responsible. In reality, it's the government of the country
that's responsible for its people. And I understand that that's
going to be difficult for a while, but they also have to become
part of the solution. And we're pushing them and working with
them to make sure that they, too, control the banditry, control
the Janjaweed, and control those things that they may have more
control over than the UNAMID forces. And if that all happens
together, we may be successful. But, it's going to be an uphill
battle.
Senator Isakson. On that point, in March 2009 the
Government in Khartoum expelled 13 NGOs operating in Darfur. I
happened to travel to Darfur with Senator Corker about 3 months
later. I think Chairman Kerry had been there a couple months
before. Has the Government in Khartoum behaved itself better,
vis-a-vis the NGOs that are there trying to deliver
humanitarian assistance to the Darfuri people?
General Gration. It's difficult to tell if they have. But,
what has happened is that the increase in banditry, carjacking,
kidnappings, and the basic unrest that is at the local level--
not at the strategic proxy-war level, but at the local level--
has prevented people from getting outside of the towns. And
that's why security and getting rid of the banditry and the
Janjaweed and the roadblocks is absolutely what has to happen.
And then, when that happens, maybe the government can move on.
But, I will tell you, sir, what's happened is that we've
been able to work through the ways that we've been able to
cobble together--and NGOs and the United Nations fill in the
gap--we've been able to work on food and health and sanitation
and water. What we're missing is those things like gender-based
violence, treatments, mitigation. And there's some aspects of
the NGO expulsion that we haven't been able to restore. Those
are the things we have to work on, in this next phase, very
hard to make sure that individuals feel safe when they go out,
and women are not put at risk of rape, and that people have a
system that, when they're wronged, they can get it righted
through a system of justice and a rule of law and a pattern of
order. Those are the things that we have to get, because while
we're making great strides, in terms of rebel unification and
Doha and the rapprochement, it has not changed the lives of the
people on the ground. They're still living in dire conditions.
They're still having gross human rights abuses, just because
they don't have a way out. And this has to become a priority
not only of the United States, but of the Government of Sudan
and the international community.
Senator Isakson. Well, I know a year ago the incidents of
rape and gender-based violence had started to decline in
Darfur. From your statement I take it that it is picking back
up again, or is it----
General Gration. No, it has started to decline. You're
right. And even the number of deaths. And last year we dipped
down to where only 16, what we call, ``excess deaths,'' or
deaths related to conflict. But, the reality is, if there's
one, there's too many.
Senator Isakson. Right.
General Gration. And therefore, if there's a single woman
who's raped, that's bad. And if there's a single fatality, of a
civilian that's caught up in this conflict, it's unacceptable.
And we're going to drive this to zero.
Senator Isakson. Will the vote on the referenda take place
next February? Is that right? Is that the target date, or is it
April, or----
General Gration. What's happening is, the referenda has to
be completed 9--or 6 months prior to the end of the interim
period. So, technically--and now the South is asking for the
referenda to actually occur in the early part of December so
that they can count the votes and then make the announcement on
the 9th. That's a little bit different than what we were aiming
for before.
Senator Isakson. Right.
General Gration. But, we'll have to see how that
progresses. But, actually, January is the big date we're
driving for.
Senator Isakson. Of next year?
General Gration. Of 2011, which could mean that
independence could come as early as the 9th of July, should the
South choose independence.
Senator Isakson. Last question. And I apologize that I
missed your verbal testimony, but I've been trying to scan the
prepared text beforehand. In it, I see you say that they have
made progress on relationships in Darfur, particularly with the
proxy war. That was the one with the Chadian rebels and the
Janjaweed. Is that correct?
General Gration. Yes, sir. As you remember, a year ago, the
Chadian rebels that were supported by the Government of Sudan
actually came within a half a mile of President Deby's palace,
and the JEM got within 13 miles of Bashir's. That situation has
ended.
Senator Isakson. And so we have a better climate there, as
far as that proxy war is concerned?
General Gration. Assuming that it doesn't start up again.
But, right now, President Deby's doing the right things in
Chad, and the Government of Sudan is doing the right things
with their Chadian rebels. And I believe that's not going to be
an issue at the strategic level anymore. But, at the tactical
level, we're having these things that Senator Feingold talked
about.
Senator Isakson. Thank you for your service, General.
General Gration. Thank you.
Senator Casey. General, thank you very much for your
testimony, and especially for your remarkable public service.
As Senator Isakson noted, it doesn't get more difficult than
the assignment you have. We're grateful for your service, a
continuation of service to the country which goes back a number
of years. We're grateful for that.
And in particular, I wanted to follow up some of the
questions Senator Isakson had as it relates to the--I guess,
the general topic of what has happened and what is happening
now with regard to aid organizations. I know you played an
instrumental role in the reentry of those organizations into
the country. But, I wanted to get your sense of that,
generally, in terms of the impact of the expulsion or the--if
any--the continuing impact of that expulsion.
Second, to have a conversation about efforts that you have
made, and will continue to make, to reduce gender-based
violence. How do we do that? What are the steps to implement? I
know you spoke of it a moment ago. And in your testimony, I
know you cite the, ``imperative of reducing gender-based
violence in Sudan.''
So, I guess, generally, two questions: One on the--kind of,
the status of the impact to the aid organizations, or the
impact of not having them there for a period of time; and then,
second, the gender-based violence, the strategy to combat that.
General Gration. As I pointed out before, we did make great
gains to stop what could have been an absolute disaster. There
was 1.2 million people at risk. We lost, in some places, 85
percent of the capacity. That has come back.
The problem is, that because of the violence and the
carjackings and the banditry, it came back in a more
centralized way in IDP camps. And while the number--we really
don't know if it's 2.0 or 2.7--there are still too many people
in IDP camps. But, the problem is, is that we've gone into a
mode of sustained relief. And we're entering our 7th year of
sustaining people with food and health care and things. And
it's great we're doing that. But, at some point, we have to
break that mold, and go into sustainable recovery and
development, where people get an opportunity to go back to
their lands, under Hakura, where they get to be able to have
farms and get herds again and move out and establish villages
and homelands. That has to change. And so, what's happened is,
is that we did, but we consolidated, and we made it more of an
institution. We have to break out of that.
But, that ties in a little bit with gender-based violence.
There's the institutions that have to change in Darfur. We have
to make it possible for women to be part of the police force.
We have to make it possible that they not only work on women's
programs, like right now what we're doing, collecting firewood
and making that easier, and solar--and all those are important
things, but they have to be integrated more into the society.
And I believe that, when those things happen, that some of
these issues may decrease even further.
But, in the short term, we have to provide, No. 1, a safety
place where women who have been violated can go and get the
treatment they need, where they can have the counseling that
they need, and where we support those kind of programs. And
there have to be NGOs that come in to develop those programs in
a more widespread way. That has been an area that I feel that
we have not been as successful as that we need to be.
So, building the short term, but then making the
institutional changes that give women a more prominent place
and that give them the respect and the tools that they need to
become contributors in a larger way.
Senator Casey. In the short term, as it relates to that
violence against women, is it both a resource and a structural
question? In other words, that--as you said, they need to have
a place to go for counseling and other services. But--and I
realize that's--that could be both resources and structure--
but, is there a basic law-enforcement protective element that's
missing here--that there aren't enough law enforcement
officials that are creating the kind of order, or investigating
an allegation of rape, or investigating an act of violence?
What--in other words, what is it that you have to do in the
short term? I realize the long-term question of integration is
into--that those are longer term questions. But, short term,
what is--what exactly do we need to have happen to bring down
the level of violence, in addition to having extra services,
like counseling and other services?
General Gration. In the short term, the U.N. forces--the
U.N./AU forces have to provide an umbrella of security--more
than they're doing right now. In most areas, they don't patrol
past 10 o'clock at night. And they don't patrol where the women
have to go out and collect firewood and those kinds of places.
I believe, in the short term, there has to be more security
that's put on there.
Senator Casey. How do you change that? Just those two--the
lateness of the--you know, after 10 o'clock, when they're going
out to collect fire--I mean, how do you change that, in the
near term?
General Gration. Those are things that we're actually
communicating with the U.N. I just was up in New York, and I've
been talking with the U.N. commanders in the field. I was with
them on the 6th, just a couple days ago. And so--in Darfur,
talking about all these issues of how we raise security up.
But, we're going to have to do a better job in putting security
zones and then security corridors where the folks do their
seasonal migration. Those things have to happen.
But, in addition to that, the Walis and the government have
to put in place systems of government where people who commit
crimes can be identified and that they're brought to justice
and incarcerated or dealt with or punished or whatever that the
system of law does. Right now, the problem is, is that there's
not that system. And so, when there's crimes committed against
women and men, that there's not a system that you can bring
people to justice. So, the local justice system, the whole
accountability process--it goes all the way back to 2003. Those
are things that we're working with the international community,
with the AU. And these have to be put in place. And we're
already 7 years too late. And they have to become a priority.
And it's a huge priority for me. I will continue to raise it.
It's very important that we fix it, from a short-term relief,
but we actually make systematic changes that will ensure that
women are protected, that human rights are protected, and that
people can grow old with dignity.
And these are things that we just have to get to. And
they--we've put them aside too long as we've concentrated on
food, water, sanitation. But, we've got to go out and fix these
things, because it's part of the soul, and that's so very
important.
Senator Casey. Thanks very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. General Gration, thank you for your service
and for your testimony today. This has been a passion of yours
for some time.
Sudan has also been a passion of Congressman Frank Wolf of
Virginia. In a letter to the President, dated May 5, 2010,
Representative Wolf mentions his two decades of involvement in
this country. He offers his opinion that hope is quickly fading
in the process. He references an advertisement, placed in the
Washington Post and in the publication Politico by six
respected NGOs, calling for Secretary Clinton and Ambassador
Rice to exercise personal and sustained leadership on Sudan in
the face of what they call ``a stalemated policy.'' And Mr.
Wolf joins what he calls ``a chorus of voices'' urging that the
President empower Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice to take
control of the languishing Sudan policy.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that this letter be included in the
record at this point.
The Chairman. Without objection, it will be.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
[The letter submitted for the record by Senator Wicker
follows:]
May 5, 2010.
Hon. Barack H. Obama,
The President, The White House,
Washington DC.
Dear Mr. President: ``If President Obama is ever going to find his
voice on Sudan, it had better be soon.'' These were the closing words
of New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof two weeks ago. I could not
agree more with his assessment of Sudan today. Time is running short.
Lives hang in the balance. Real leadership is needed.
Having first travelled to Sudan in 1989, my interest and
involvement in this country has spanned the better part of 20 years.
I've been there five times, most recently in July 2004 when Senator Sam
Brownback and I were the first congressional delegation to go to
Darfur.
Tragically, Darfur is hardly an anomaly. We saw the same scorched
earth tactics from Khartoum in the brutal 20-year civil war with the
South where more than 2 million perished, most of whom were civilians.
In September 2001, President Bush appointed former Senator John
Danforth as special envoy and his leadership was in fact instrumental
in securing, after two and a half years of negotiations, the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), thereby bringing about an end to
the war. I was at the 2005 signing of this historic accord in Kenya, as
was then-Secretary of State Colin Powell and Congressman Donald Payne,
among others. Hopes were high for a new Sudan. Sadly, what remains of
that peace is in jeopardy today. What remains of that hope is quickly
fading.
I was part of a bipartisan group in Congress who urged you to
appoint a special envoy shortly after you came into office, in the hope
of elevating the issue of Sudan. But what was once a successful model
for Sudan policy is not having the desired effect today. I am not alone
in this belief.
Just last week, six respected NGOs ran compelling ads in The
Washington Post and Politico calling for Secretary Clinton and
Ambassador Rice to exercise ``personal and sustained leadership on
Sudan'' in the face of a ``stalemated policy'' and waning U.S.
credibility as a mediator.
In that same vein, today I join that growing chorus of voices in
urging you to empower Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice to take
control of the languishing Sudan policy. They should oversee quarterly
deputies' meetings to ensure options for consequences are on the table.
There is a pressing and immediate need for renewed, principled
leadership at the highest levels--leadership which, while recognizing
the reality of the challenges facing Sudan, is clear-eyed about the
history and the record of the internationally indicted war criminal at
the helm in Khartoum We must not forget who we are dealing with in
Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP). In addition to the
massive human rights abuses perpetrated by the Sudanese government
against its own people, Sudan remains on the State Department's list of
state sponsors of terrorism. It is well known that the same people
currently in control in Khartoum gave safe haven to Osama bin Laden in
the early 1990s.
I believe that this administration's engagement with Sudan to date,
under the leadership of General Gration, and with your apparent
blessing, has failed to recognize the true nature of Bashir and the
NCP. Any long-time Sudan follower will tell you that Bashir never keeps
his promises
The Washington Post editorial page echoed this sentiment this past
weekend saying of Bashir: ``He has frequently told Western governments
what they wanted to hear, only to reverse himself when their attention
drifted or it was time to deliver . . . the United States should
refrain from prematurely recognizing Mr. Bashir's new claim to
legitimacy. And it should be ready to respond when he breaks his
word.'' Note that the word was ``when'' not ``if'' he breaks his word.
While the hour is late, the administration can still chart a new
course.
In addition to recommending that Secretary Clinton and Ambassador
Rice take the helm in implementing your administration's Sudan policy,
I propose the following policy recommendations:
Move forward with the administration's stated aim of
strengthening the capacity of the security sector in the South.
A good starting point would be to provide the air defense
system that the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) requested
and President Bush approved in 2008. This defensive capability
would help neutralize Khartoum's major tactical advantage and
make peace and stability more likely following the referendum
vote.
Do not recognize the outcome of the recent presidential
elections. While the elections were a necessary part of the
implementation of the CPA and an important step before the
referendum, they were inherently flawed and Bashir is
attempting to use them to lend an air of legitimacy to his
genocidal rule.
Clearly and unequivocally state at the highest levels that
the United States will honor the outcome of the referendum and
will ensure its implementation.
Begin assisting the South in building support for the
outcome of the referendum.
Appoint an ambassador or senior political appointee with the
necessary experience in conflict and post-conflict settings to
the U.S. consulate in Juba.
Prioritize the need for a cessation of attacks in Darfur,
complete restoration of humanitarian aid including ``non-
essential services,'' unfettered access for aid organizations
to all vulnerable populations and increased diplomatic
attention to a comprehensive peace process including a viable
plan for the safe return of millions of internally displaced
persons (IDPs).
When the administration released its Sudan policy last fall,
Secretary Clinton indicated that benchmarks would be applied to Sudan
and that progress would be assessed ``based on verifiable changes in
conditions on the ground. Backsliding by any party will be met with
credible pressure in the form of disincentives leveraged by our
government and our international partners.'' But in the face of
national elections that were neither free nor fair, in the face of
continued violations of the U.N. arms embargo, in the face of Bashir's
failure to cooperate in any way with the International Criminal Court,
we've seen no ``disincentives'' or ``sticks'' applied. This is a worst
case scenario and guaranteed, if history is to be our guide, to fail.
Many in the NGO community and in Congress cautiously expressed
support for the new policy when it was released, at the same time
stressing that a policy on paper is only as effective as its
implementation on the ground. More than six months have passed since
the release of the strategy and implementation has been insufficient at
best and altogether absent at worst.
During the campaign for the presidency, you said, regarding Sudan,
``Washington must respond to the ongoing genocide and the ongoing
failure to implement the CPA with consistency and strong
consequences.'' These words ring true still today. Accountability is
imperative. But the burden for action, the weight of leadership, now
rests with you and with this administration alone. With the referendum
in the South quickly approaching, the stakes could not be higher.
The marginalized people of Sudan yearn for your administration to
find its voice on Sudan--and to find it now.
Sincerely,
Frank R. Wolf,
Member of Congress.
Senator Wicker. General Gration, the elections are supposed
to take place in January--early January. There's talk of
December. This is the middle of May. You've testified that
we're behind. We don't yet know what the boundaries of these
jurisdictions will be. As far as I can tell, we don't know what
the boundaries of Abyei, the subdistrict, will be. We don't
know who will be eligible to vote, even, in these elections.
Why are we behind?
General Gration. Well, let me just go back and say that
certainly we respect Congressman Wolf's participation, and we
listened very carefully to what he said.
I will also say that Secretary Clinton is certainly in
control of the policy of Sudan. I send her e-mails all the
time. We have discussions all the time. And she certainly is in
charge, along with the President, in what we do over there.
So--but, you're right that we have a lot of work to do
before July 2011. And the reason we're behind is probably a
little bit historical. You know, we signed this agreement in
2005, but we really didn't get serious about reaching the final
agreements on the 12 outstanding issues until last year.
Those--the agreements have been reached, but we haven't really
finished the implementation.
So, we know, for example, in border demarcation--we made an
agreement that we would use the boundary that was present on
the 1st of January 1956. Now, the implementation piece is
making sure that we go and find, from archives, where that
boundary was, and, where there's disagreements, that we work
those things out.
And we've offered our technical expertise to help with that
process. There's about 80 percent of it now that we've been
able to figure out. There are some areas where we'll probably
be able to resolve relatively easily. And when I say ``we,''
it's the team of experts and both the North and the South.
Senator Wicker. Is this going to require agreement by
Khartoum?
General Gration. They--yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. They must agree on the boundary.
General Gration. And the South, sure. Yes. It's their
country and they're the ones that have to agree on where that
boundary goes.
But, in many cases--and certainly in Abyei, there's no
question where the boundary is. It was laid out very clearly at
The Hague, and it's just a matter of demarcating it. So,
there's really no question where the boundary is. It's just a
matter of sticking some cement pylons in to let the people know
where the boundary is.
Senator Wicker. OK. So, we're behind, in that respect,
because we didn't get going on looking at those historical
boundaries that were agreed to, back in 2005?
General Gration. We could have probably put some more
effort in earlier. But, the reality is, it really doesn't
matter. The reality is, is that we're here, today, where we
are, and we have a very tight timeline to get all these things
accomplished. And that's why we're calling on the parties,
we're calling on the Africans, and we're calling the
international community to work together in a collective way to
resolve these problems, to meet the deadlines, so that we can
have a peaceful divorce, a civil divorce, instead of a civil
war. That's our goal.
Senator Wicker. Your testimony today was that we must have
a clear boundary decided by November. Is that date part of the
CPA?
General Gration. No, it isn't.
Senator Wicker. That seems to be a very late date, to me.
Does it bother you that, possibly before a December vote, we
would still have unresolved the issue of the boundary?
General Gration. That's exactly why we say we would like to
have this boundary demarcated by November, so that it is not an
issue as they reach a vote.
Senator Wicker. But, you anticipate it will be November
before we can do that.
General Gration. I anticipate that that is the end--that's
when we'd like to get it done by. But, I believe that if we
work together--this is a long boundary, and there are some
issues, especially up around oil, that may be contentious. And
so, we will provide whatever support we can. But, we believe
that if it is done by November, then it is not an issue that
will be factored into the referendum. If, for some reason, we
can't get this thing demarcated until after the referendum, we
believe it will be a problem, in terms of independence.
Senator Wicker. General, Mr. Kiir--Salva Kiir--was elected
by the people of the South, with 93 percent of the vote. He has
stated the upcoming referendum is a choice between being second
class in your own country or being a free person in an
independent state. Is there any question in your mind that he
supports secession?
General Gration. I've talked to him, and I believe he does.
Senator Wicker. Indeed. Now, he got 93 percent of the vote.
How close are the boundaries of the electorate that chose him
and the boundaries that you expect to be agreed upon before
this referendum can take place?
General Gration. President Kiir and I have discussed all
the issues that have to be done. And we've--share the same
views on the things that have to be done before they move
forward with a referendum. And I'm not sure I understand you
question, but----
Senator Wicker. He was elected within a jurisdiction that
obviously had boundaries. How different will the demarcation be
of that area and the area that will vote in the referendum?
General Gration. He was elected in an area that does not
have formal boundaries. You know, we know sort of where the
states are, but--the border between the North and the South
that follows the 1956 is not going to be the border that exists
today. There's areas in Darfur where the border will move. And
there's areas around Hegleig where the border will move to
reflect that 1/1/56 agreement. So, in other words, the state
borders that exist today will not be the final border.
Senator Wicker. Well--thank you--would it help your job,
General, if the Secretary of State and Ambassador Rice stepped
forward and took a more visible, active role in this so as to
heighten the level of importance that our American Government
places on this issue? Would that be beneficial to you, if they
stepped forward and became more visible?
General Gration. I think Secretary Rice is already working
with--in her job as Ambassador in the U.N.--to highlight these
issues. She's called for hearings. She's working the issue very
hard, and we're in constant communication.
Secretary Clinton has been superb and continues to help in
every way she can to raise this level. She has been
coordinating with other Foreign Ministers of the Troika. We've
put out joint statements. And she's been extremely positive and
helpful, and as has the President.
Obviously, there's more things that can be done. And we're
working with her staff and her people to elevate these issues
as they come up. But, I have no complaints about the level of
effort that people above me are putting into it.
Senator Wicker. Well, Mr. Chairman, my round is over. If
there's a moment or two, I may jump back in for a second.
The Chairman. Yes, we're going to have to wrap it up in a
moment. Why don't you go ahead?
Senator Wicker. Well, OK.
The Chairman. Well, let me ask some, because I had a couple
questions, and then we'll come back to you.
Senator Wicker. OK, sure. Then I'll take a second round, if
you have a moment.
The Chairman. But, let me follow up on what Senator Wicker
is saying, because my own impression is, General--I know you're
working this as hard as you can; and having been out there and
having dealt with this a little bit, I think you've got to have
increased leverage, over these next few months. And,
effectively, what you're sitting here and saying is, you've got
enough, and the Secretary and the Ambassador are doing what's
necessary. If it doesn't come together at the current pace,
it's on their doorstep, according to you.
I think you ought to get a little more leverage into this
effort, because I don't think it's going to happen at the
current pace, unless there is additional oomph. Not your--it's
not that you're not doing it. It's not that you're not there
and pushing it. We just all know what the reservations are
here. We all know what the game is.
And I think if the spotlight isn't a little more--you know,
most of the world doesn't have a clue that 2 million people
were killed there. They only think about Darfur. The prospects
of that war reopening are exactly what Dennis Blair has said.
And I think it's imperative to get this accelerated.
It's also my understanding--I wanted to ask your comment on
this--that humanitarian agencies are unable to reach as many as
half the rural population in Darfur. Is that accurate today?
General Gration. That is accurate, because of the banditry
and the roadblocks and things that are going on. That's very
true.
The Chairman. Well, that's also unacceptable at this stage
of where we are in this process. I mean, you know, we got very
specific promises from the government in Khartoum last year,
and you worked on it, I worked on it. We thought we had a
sense--``OK, humanitarian aid's going back in there and we get
in, in full.'' Now we know that that government is even
involved, according to your testimony today, in some of the
attacks that have taken place. And I don't think we've
progressed as much as many people would have hoped or would
like to see us progress.
So, my sense is, if it isn't going to just kind of stagger
across a line or be a situation of, you know, kind of a least
bad disaster or something, I think we have to try to up it. We
have to here, too. I think this hearing is for this purpose.
But, I think we have to try to help you to figure out whatever
is necessary to try to avoid that. Because, there's an
unbelievable amount to be done in a short span of time, more
than, probably, one country and one very dedicated general and
his team--which is a significant team--can pull off.
I don't know how you want to respond to that, but I'll give
you a chance to.
General Gration. I take your point, and I certainly will
raise those at the appropriate level.
I would like to clarify one thing. I misunderstood your
question. It is true that we're meeting the needs of the people
in IDP camps. What is not true is that we're able to get out in
the countryside, where a lot of the Arabs, nomads, are. And so,
there's a population that is not being met. But, in many ways,
those were not being met before the NGOs got pushed out. So, I
apologize. I misunderstood----
The Chairman. That's true. I agree with that. I understand
the camp distinction from the rural areas, which I mentioned.
But, that's precisely what I'm trying to get at. One would have
hoped that, given the efforts in Doha, given the change in the
government, given your presence, given our new President and
our concern and all of the effort, that, in fact, we wouldn't
be now hearing about government attacks and, you know, the
other kind of violence. I think that we're looking for a level
of continued progress that would indicate differently.
One other thing I'd just like to ask you, very quickly--
this afternoon Senator Lieberman and I are going to be rolling
out something called the American Power Act, which is an effort
to try to change America's energy posture in the world and
respond to some of the demands of climate change in various
parts of the world.
It's my understanding that Darfur, as well as the South of
Sudan, are places where that climate change is, in fact,
manifestly evident today and having an impact on the
populations and, indeed, even on the violence. I wonder if you
would perhaps speak to that. I'm not claiming it's responsible
for genocide or other things--that's not what we're saying--but
that environmental factors have, in fact, exacerbated conflict
and is resulting in some contest over water, wells, and other
kinds of things, which results in violence. Can you speak to
that?
General Gration. Yes, sir. You've just really hit the nail
on the head, as we think about development. Out of the last 100
years, 19 years out of the last 25 have been the worst, in
terms of rainfall. So, what I'm trying to say is, in--that the
last 25 years have been far less rain that's fallen on Darfur.
The water tables have dropped 2 meters in recent years. The
competition, not only for water, is terrible. And the
desertification is definitely moving South.
In addition to that, Sudan has cut down more trees than any
other country in Africa. And Darfur is actually the worst place
for that. In fact, there's--only Brazil and Indonesia exceed
them in hectares; 8.8 million hectares destroyed in Sudan. And
so, these issues, the fact that the trees have been cut down,
the fact that we're just having less rain, is putting
tremendous pressure on these populations. And as we think about
the future, we've got to tackle these issues. And you're
exactly correct. I would like to see the people, in their spare
time--soldiers--out there planting trees and working on these
things. We did it in Ethiopia, and we saw the water tables come
up, as when it does rain, these grasses and trees are able to
grab the water and hold them, instead of runoff.
So, you hit on a problem that is near to me. I've raised it
with Vice President Taha. I've discussed it with Mutrif, in the
Foreign Ministry. I discussed it with the leadership of UNAMID.
And I've discussed it throughout. I am dedicated to not only
bringing the security, but working the long-term answers for
Darfur, and they include acknowledging the climate change and
fixing them.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Wicker, a couple questions, then we need to wrap it
up, here.
Senator Wicker. OK, yes.
General, the laws must be changed by the National Assembly
before the vote can take place. Well, when do you anticipate
that action by the national legislature will take place?
General Gration. They've actually changed the law. There's
already a law that was put in place in December that allows the
referendum to take place. What needs to be done is that they
have--the National Assembly has to approve the Southern Sudan
Referendum Commission, and then they also have to appoint the
Abyei Referendum Commission. But, the law has been changed--I
mean the law was put in place to allow this commission----
Senator Wicker. But, those other two actions must take
place in order for the process to go forward. When do you
anticipate that that will be done?
General Gration. We anticipate it will be done sometime
after the 25th, probably around the 1st of June.
Senator Wicker. First of June. OK. Well, thank you. Have
you had discussions with Russia about coming in and taking a
major partnership role with the United States in making sure
this is a peaceful and amicable divorce?
General Gration. Yes, I had a meeting 2 weeks ago with
Mikhail Margelov, and we've--we talk, and certainly we're
looking at seeing if--what the relationship could be of Russia
to Sudan, because they have access that we don't have, they
have capabilities that we don't have. And we're looking right
now and figuring out a way that we could team together to do
just that.
Senator Wicker. OK. And one other thing, Mr. Chairman.
I'm concerned about the testimony that Khartoum might be
better disposed to all of this if somehow their government were
less of an international pariah. Am I characterizing your words
correctly, General Gration?
General Gration. I think it's clear, in my discussions with
them, that they would like to move to a position where the
government would be more respected and more accepted by the
international society.
Senator Wicker. Well, I'd simply point out, Mr. Chairman,
that the facts are what they are, and the President of Sudan is
internationally indicted, and that can't be ignored. And when
that happens, it does have an effect on your international
reputation.
I appreciate the Chair indulging me.
Let me say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, this has been
helpful. It had to be abbreviated, because of the room. I would
hope, soon, this committee or perhaps a subcommittee could
convene another hearing on this issue.
Chair mentioned the importance of continuing to highlight
the significance of this issue. I would hope that that a
representative of one of these NGOs that sees it differently
than General Gration could be brought to testify. I would hope
that----
The Chairman. That's going to happen----
Senator Wicker [continuing]. Roger Winter----
The Chairman. [continuing]. And Senator Feingold have
already----
Senator Wicker [continuing]. Might be invited also.
The Chairman. We've already approved a hearing. Senator
Feingold will have it--at the subcommittee. And we hope to have
other voices there.
Senator Wicker. When will that be, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. I'm not sure when it is. A few weeks.
Somewhere soon.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. I'm heartened to hear that.
And I appreciate the Chair indulging me.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Gration, you've got a big task. We want to try to
be helpful. And we want to, obviously, be successful. And we
want to avoid this looming emergency, which we are defining
here today, and you've defined previously. We all know it's
there. It's tricky, but we are here not to do anything except
find ways forward and to try to be helpful with you.
So, we thank you very, very much for the job you're doing.
Thanks for coming in today. And we look forward to following
up.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of the United States Agency for International
Development, Washington, DC
For 5 years, we have discussed the roadmap of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) and what we are doing to support its milestones.
Now that discussion is changing. In 8 months, millions of Sudanese will
decide their future as a nation. Next year, our current roadmap will
end, and our path ahead could go in many different directions.
What does the future hold? The United States is committed to
supporting the Sudanese as they invest in a better tomorrow for all of
Sudan, and we have already contributed billions of dollars in
humanitarian, security and development assistance toward that end. In
Darfur, the Three Areas, and southern Sudan, our assistance has saved
lives, improved living conditions, and given people hope that the
opportunities of coming generations will be better than the last. The
challenges are daunting, but we have a stake in Sudan's future, and we
plan to continue our walk alongside our Sudanese partners through the
end of the CPA roadmap and beyond.
Just weeks ago, the Sudanese people voted. The overall lack of an
adequate enabling environment in Sudan largely prevented a credible
electoral process from taking place. A national security act that
bestows security forces with extensive powers to arbitrarily detain
citizens without charge facilitated the detention of activists and the
breaking up of campaign gatherings during the pre-election period.
Political parties had limited abilities to exercise their freedom of
assembly, and the press remained heavily censored. As a result, most
major northern parties boycotted the elections, and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement withdrew its candidates from the Presidential and
most northern races. The elections took place despite these challenges.
The Carter Center said the process did not meet international
standards, and observers noted widespread procedural irregularities
that provide important lessons for all of us as Sudan moves toward the
final phase of the CPA. We have yet to complete inaugurations and the
final round of postponed elections--including in Southern Kordofan,
where popular consultations are to take place--so it may be too early
to make a final assessment. USAID will monitor what occurs once the
National Assembly convenes, and a new government is formed. Will it
really be a new unity government of multiple parties all working
together? Or will it be politics as usual?
But, in setting a context for the flawed elections last month, we
should not lose sight of the fact that, just 6 years ago, Sudan was in
the throes of a brutal, bloody, two-decade civil war, that southern
Sudan is still one of the most inaccessible regions in the world, and
that its people speak dozens of languages and have had little or no
experience with participatory democracy. Despite the significant
shortcomings, the elections brought about increased levels of political
competition and civic participation in the pre-electoral period, and
witnessed commendable efforts by the vast majority of poll workers,
voters, domestic observers and party poll agents to make polling
successful and largely peaceful. The Sudanese people, many for the
first time in their lives, had a say in who represents them.
Now we must look toward the next, most critical milestones, the
popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and the
landmark referenda on Sudan's future status, and do what we can to
ensure a peaceful post-2011 Sudan or an orderly transition to two
separate and viable states at peace with each other.
the south
Building capacity in the south has been the cornerstone of USAID's
strategy in Sudan since 2004. USAID's goal is to help establish a
transparent, just, democratic government able to deliver basic services
to its people, whether southern Sudan chooses unity with the north or
independence in 2011. The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) did not
exist before 2005. Every government structure and system has had to be
crafted from scratch. The committed men and women who serve in the
government are not career politicians, nor have they benefited from the
lessons, assumptions, and experience of a life lived in a democratic,
transparent state. Initially, the GOSS had no offices, no pens, no
paper, and no staff to undertake the most basic tasks needed for a
government to function. But with our assistance, the key GOSS
ministries have established systems for hiring people, for formulating
budgets, and for establishing office systems. This has required
tremendous dedication on the part of GOSS officials, who have been
willing to roll up their sleeves and persevere through each one of
these processes. Considerable progress has been made in establishing
functioning institutions where there previously were none. Ministries
are functioning, revenue is coming in, payments are being made, and a
legal framework is being built.
Today, USAID is working with the GOSS to intensively address
logistical and training needs to prepare for the upcoming referenda and
mitigate conflict. We have concentrated our support on public sector
financial management, and we are helping establish legal and regulatory
frameworks that will facilitate growth in the private sector.
At the same time, USAID is continuing its development programs in
the south to improve people's lives and provide them with an
opportunity to make their needs understood, and working in close
coordination with the GOSS to ensure that the gains are sustainable.
Southern Sudan has among the highest maternal mortality
rates in the world--one woman dies for every 50 live births.
Infant mortality is also unacceptably and shockingly high, at 1
death for every 10 live births. For years, USAID has worked to
improve these indicators, expanding urgently needed services to
13 counties in the south. As a result, more than 2 million
people in southern Sudan have improved access to high-impact
maternal, child health, and family planning services.
Less than half of people living in southern Sudan have
access to potable water and only 7 percent have access to
proper sanitation. This threatens the lives of southern
Sudanese--especially children--so USAID is working to improve
water supply and sanitation facilities in four southern states
and the Three Areas through borehole drilling, hand pump
repair, and latrine construction, as well as hygiene promotion.
USAID is also marketing purification tablets in 16 urban and
semiurban market towns to promote better household hygiene and
create demand for sanitation.
Improving access to education is vital to building Sudan's
long-term human capacity. USAID programs focus on primary
education, girls' education, teacher training, and
institutional development. Activities target out-of-school
youth, women, girls, and other vulnerable and marginalized
groups. They also enhance GOSS capacity to sustainably manage
the education system and establish more equitable gender-based
policies in education. As a result, Sudanese citizens have
greater access to improved education services and English
language instruction. They also have more confidence in the
government's ability to deliver these services. Primary school
enrollment has increased markedly--from 1.1 million in 2007 to
1.4 million in 2009.
To improve the south's devastated infrastructure USAID is
rehabilitating hundreds of kilometers of roads and building
electricity-generating systems across southern Sudan and the
Three Areas. In 2009, seven permanent bridges were completed
along the Juba-Nimule road, the entire road was maintained, and
critical repairs were completed. As a result, travel time has
been reduced from 6 to 3.5 hours between the two towns, and
daily traffic has nearly doubled. In 2010 and 2011, the road
will be paved, creating the south's first paved road outside
the state capital of Juba. This year, USAID began implementing
a 5-year, $55 million project designed to ramp up agricultural
productivity, increase trade, and improve the capacity of
producers, private sector, and public sector actors in southern
Sudan to develop commercial smallholder agriculture. A primary
focus is helping smallholder farmers' and producers'
associations to enhance production, facilitate marketing,
extend agricultural credit, and promote post-harvest storage
and processing technologies in high-production areas near
improved road networks in southern Sudan.
However, make no mistake: the situation in the south remains
volatile. Community insecurity and interethnic clashes worsened in
2009, killing more than 2,000 people and displacing at least 250,000
others. An alarming new aspect of the conflict is that women, children,
and elderly are now routinely victims of the violence. There are
several reasons for these clashes. Southern Sudan is only very slowly
emerging from nearly a half century of violent conflict. The GOSS is
not yet functioning at a high enough capacity to protect the people who
live in rural and remote areas. Rule-of-law institutions including the
police, courts, and prisons are understaffed, ill-equipped, and only
functional in major urban centers. Poverty and lack of economic
opportunity is widespread, and small arms are widely prevalent among
the civilian population, especially the youth in cattle camps. Armed
youth are well-organized and well-equipped, with some operating in
criminal gangs that lack respect for government authorities or
traditional leaders.
The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) also continues to terrorize the
people of southern Sudan, killing over 200 people and displacing 70,000
during the past 18 months alone. We appreciate the efforts of Senators
Feingold, Brownback, and Inhofe to sponsor the Lord's Resistance Army
Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act and hope that the LRA will
soon cease to be a threat to the men, women, and children of southern
Sudan.
USAID continues to respond to emergency needs resulting from
ongoing conflict and associated displacement in southern Sudan.
Humanitarian programs include provision of primary health care,
nutrition, agriculture and food security, water, sanitation, and
hygiene services. They focus on mitigating tensions caused by a lack of
resources or their inequitable distribution and ensuring the successful
return and reintegration of more than 2.2 million people to southern
Sudan and the Three Areas. USAID continues to prioritize delivery of
essential basic services in areas of high population returns, while
incorporating disaster risk reduction activities to better address
long-term recovery challenges. Working closely with the GOSS, USAID
humanitarian programs provide a vital link between relief and long-term
development initiatives, while minimizing potential gaps in assistance.
To build up the capacity of southern Sudan, USAID is also a central
contributor to the Juba Diplomatic Expansion, mentioned by Special
Envoy Gration in his testimony. This diplomatic expansion in the Juba
Consulate General will include staffing and material assistance aimed
at expanding our existing foundation of long-term U.S. presence in the
south, no matter the outcome of the January 2011 referendum. During the
lead up to and immediately after the referendum, USAID personnel from
the Civilian Response Corps will likely deploy as interagency subject
matter experts to complement ongoing efforts to strengthen Government
of Southern Sudan capacity during this critical period.
the three areas
Stability is the most essential aspect of a peaceful transition in
the Three Areas of Abyei, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan. In peaceful
times, communities on both sides of the border share natural resources,
trade and economic interests, movement of pastoral populations, and an
array of local cross-border political and security arrangements. During
the civil war, southern Sudanese communities that border the north
suffered tremendously from repeated attacks by the Sudan Armed Forces
and by northern tribal militia groups resulting in killings, burned
villages, stolen cattle and repeated displacement. These grievances
have yet to be reconciled. High expectations for visible benefits of
peace remain unmet, and tensions and instability remain high.
However, progress is being made. Two years ago, people and local
authorities in Kurmuk, Blue Nile, were disillusioned by the lack of
peace dividends and tangible improvements in political integration,
economic opportunity, and access to services promised by the CPA. At
that time, it was quite possible that Kurmuk could return to war
because many residents believed that they were better off before the
peace. In 2008, USAID began a robust program that made $6 million of
small, in-kind grants to Sudanese authorities, organizations, and
companies for a range of activities including infrastructure (air
strips, staff residences in isolated areas), reconciliation meetings,
and expanded social services such as education (a large new secondary
school), health (two training institutes), and water. We sought to
concentrate activities in one place, implement them rapidly, support
state and local government ownership and eventual management, and link
to civil society to build capacity and accountability. This model
resulted in a critical mass of visible improvements in Kurmuk that has
changed the mentality of citizens who are now more contented with peace
and with the performance of their local and state governments. Many of
Kurmuk's residents now believe their government is committed to peace
and development. They are also more confident that they and their
government are better prepared to take on future challenges.
Simultaneous with southern Sudan's referendum on unity in January
2011, the people of Abyei will vote in their own referendum on whether
they want to be part of southern or northern Sudan, regardless of the
outcome of the south's referendum on unity. Blue Nile and Southern
Kordofan will remain part of northern Sudan, but they will go through
popular consultations to ascertain the will of the people on
constitutional, political, and administrative issues. Both of these
processes have the potential to have game-changing effects on the
country. Abyei is a critical, resource-rich area, and its status will
be critical to planning the future. And the popular consultations, if
implemented well, could stand as an example of federalism and popular
engagement that could guide Sudan in creating a new constitution when
the interim constitution expires in 2011.
In addition to our ongoing humanitarian and development assistance
programs, USAID has planned a comprehensive program to support these
political processes, including technical assistance for administering
the referendum and implementing popular consultations, promoting and
enabling civic participation, and conducting international observation.
The involvement and support of Sudan's national and state governments
are critical for international efforts to be effective.
darfur
Since 2003, the crisis in Darfur has affected an estimated 4.7
million people, including 2.7 million people that were driven from
their homes. The conflict in Darfur has evolved to include more local,
intracommunal conflict and opportunistic banditry , with primarily
economic rather than political motivations, in addition to attacks
between armed movements and the government, and rebel-on-rebel attacks.
USAID and the international humanitarian assistance community continue
to provide immediate, life-saving assistance to conflict-affected
populations as security and access permits. However, many needs remain,
particularly in remote, rural areas outside of the camps. USAID
provides support to conflict-affected people both within and outside
camps through nongovernmental organizations, U.N. agencies, and U.N.-
managed cluster-based humanitarian coordination mechanisms. We
encourage partners to actively coordinate to ensure that assistance is
complementary, comprehensive, and consistent, and that assistance
provided meets appropriate international standards. USAID partners
provide emergency relief supplies and implement emergency programs in a
variety of sectors, including health, nutrition, water, sanitation,
hygiene, food security, agriculture, shelter and settlements, economic
recovery, protection, and coordination.
However, ongoing violence continues to significantly hinder
delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people in Darfur, as
do bureaucratic impediments imposed by the Sudanese Government. The
increased frequency of kidnapping, carjacking, robbery, and interethnic
violence has caused a number of international humanitarian
organizations to either temporarily suspend their programs in Darfur or
relocate international staff from remote field locations to urban
centers. In addition, despite peace negotiations, the Sudanese
Government and armed opposition groups have restricted humanitarian
access to civilians affected by significant conflict in the Jebel Marra
region of Darfur in early 2010.
Following the Sudanese Government's March 2009 expulsions of
humanitarian organizations, the agencies that remained--and to some
extent Sudanese Government ministries--adapted to ensure delivery of
life-saving assistance in Darfur. Although swift actions successfully
averted a humanitarian crisis, service provision in many sectors
remains challenged primarily by the reduced presence of the United
Nations and nongovernmental organizations in many locations and poor
access due to continued insecurity. We do not have the eyes and ears on
the ground in Darfur that we used to, which hinders our ability to
monitor our assistance.
However, more than a year after the expulsions, we are trying to
shift our focus from gap filling to the evaluation of program quality
and ensuring effective need-based aid delivery within the existing
humanitarian context. The Sudanese Government has demonstrated a
willingness to support some humanitarian efforts through primary health
care service delivery and safe drinking water provision. As other
critical needs remain, additional engagement and support is necessary,
and USAID continues to support the United Nations in advocating for
increased Sudanese Government support in all humanitarian sectors,
including protection.
The expulsions resulted in a significant loss of capacity for
humanitarian protection activities in Darfur and measurably slowed
ongoing activities such as women's centers and livelihoods activities.
Remaining relief organizations have continued to conduct humanitarian
protection activities, including support for victims of sexual and
gender-based violence and development of child-friendly spaces, and the
U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA) has made some progress in garnering state
and federal support for programs in sexual and gender-based violence.
In North Darfur, the Sudanese Government Humanitarian Aid Commission
has authorized the reestablishment of nine women's centers, and UNFPA
has government approval to revitalize a women's center in a camp in
West Darfur, including a training curriculum on sexual and gender-based
violence.
USAID continues to seek opportunities to expand humanitarian
protection activities and encourages partners to mainstream these
activities within their ongoing and proposed programs. Some examples of
protection mainstreaming include distributing food aid to women and
monitoring vulnerable children after distribution; ensuring that
latrines are well-lit, lockable, and separated by gender; and providing
training for livelihoods that do not require women to walk significant
distances from the safety of their communities.
While continuing to provide crucial emergency assistance, USAID has
also begun to look toward opportunities for early recovery in Darfur.
In areas of relative security, windows of opportunity exist to build on
our current programming with activities that are more developmental in
nature. Our early-recovery initiative will start several quick-
implementation projects that aim to rapidly deliver benefits for
selected communities, while building experience among local partners
that will allow USAID to more easily scale up into a larger development
program when peace and security return and the situation stabilizes.
contingencies
With all of these uncertainties, USAID has placed a high priority
on planning for contingencies and improving our ability to respond to
them. Around the world, our emergency programs are designed to be
flexible, need-based, and ready to respond rapidly to issues as they
emerge. International Disaster Assistance funds are, by their very
nature, flexible, allowing us to reallocate resources to respond to
situations. After the March 2009 expulsions, for example, it was this
flexibility that made it possible for us to rapidly shift funds to
expand programs among our remaining partners.
We are also supporting an enabling environment for community
security in southern Sudan. These efforts aim to address some of the
root causes of conflict and put in place rapid, demand-driven responses
to bolster understaffed and underequipped state and local government
officials through the provision of equipment, training, and visible
infrastructure projects. In Jonglei, a USAID-provided riverboat now
allows a county commissioner to quickly visit villages that have become
flashpoints for violence and work to resolve conflict before it erupts.
But perhaps most vital to our ability to respond to situations as
they emerge is our long-term presence throughout Sudan's most volatile
areas. Two years ago, Abyei erupted in violence that devastated the
town and displaced more than 25,000 people. The Abyei area has long
been a priority for USAID, and our ongoing presence there allowed USAID
and its partners to rapidly assess the situation and provide essential
emergency assistance to those most in need. With USAID funding, a group
of USAID partners was able to mobilize and coordinate a response to
mitigate the impact of the emergency because they were already on the
ground, and because they had already spent years building trust among
the local community.
Nobody knows for certain what the future holds for Sudan. In 2000,
could anyone have predicted the extraordinary signing of the CPA and
the relatively sustained peace that has followed? Could we have
foreseen the sheer devastation that would visit Darfur and its people?
Could we have anticipated an orderly census and elections and the
opportunity for self-determination among a people who had only known
war?
Twenty years of civil war not only destroyed farms, roads, and
buildings, but also families, communities, and hope. Today, we continue
our efforts to restore hope for the people of Sudan by giving them our
commitment to work together to build a new future, full of promise and
opportunity, and to walk with them to the end of the roadmap and
beyond.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for giving
USAID the opportunity to submit this testimony for the record. We
appreciate your attention to Sudan and your ongoing support to our work
in Africa.
______
Responses of Special Envoy to Sudan J. Scott Gration to Questions by
Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was concluded in
January 2005 with the help of a large group of international actors,
including Sudan's neighbors, Norway, the U.K., the United States, as
well as the United Nations.
What has been the role of the broader international
community as the CPA has been implemented?
How significant a role does the United States play today,
and what will be that role in the future?
Answer. The broader international community has been involved since
the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) largely through
their participation in the CPA-mandated Assessment and Evaluation
Commission (AEC). The AEC, staffed with international experts and led
by a senior British diplomat, provides a venue for the international
community to speak with one voice in monitoring and encouraging CPA
implementation. Other coalitions, including the U.S.-U.K.-Norway
Troika, the wider Sudan Contact Group, and the Envoy-6--which includes
the envoys from the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council
and a representative from the European Union, provide useful fora for
multilateral diplomatic engagement on Sudan. Sudan's neighbors,
particularly Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya, have undertaken
periodic high-level diplomatic engagement, especially in the last year,
to push both parties to renew their commitment to implementing the
CPA's provisions.
International community engagement has also focused on critical
areas of humanitarian, development and peacekeeping assistance,
particularly in Southern Sudan, have sought to promote economic and
social development and build the capacity of the Government of Southern
Sudan to undertake accountable and transparent governance and begin to
provide basic services to citizens. During the CPA Interim Period, the
largest financial contributors in Sudan after the United States have
been the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, and
the European Commission; these and other international donors have also
been active contributors to UNDP and the World Bank-managed Multi Donor
Trust Funds. The Trust Funds, however, proved slow and cumbersome in
disbursing donor funds; to date 62 percent of funds have been
disbursed.
The United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General
for Sudan (SRSG) has deployed UNMIS peacekeeping forces, and civil and
political affairs elements focusing on crucial CPA-related processes,
such as the national elections in April and the upcoming referenda on
the future status of Southern Sudan and Abyei. The African Union is
playing an increasingly active role, primarily through President Mbeki
and the African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP),
on CPA-related issues, in particular referenda preparations and the
negotiation of post-CPA arrangements. The United States is currently
undertaking intensive discussions with the U.N. and AU regarding
international collaboration on support for remaining CPA issues,
referenda preparations, and technical and political assistance to post-
referendum negotiations.
The United States played a crucial role in encouraging the
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army to
negotiate and sign the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Since
the CPA's signing the United States has been the international leader
in diplomatic engagement and bilateral assistance to Sudan, having
provided more than $6 billion in assistance since 2005. The United
States is also a major supporter of the two U.N. peacekeeping missions
in Sudan: UNMIS and the UN/AU mission in Darfur. In June 2009, the U.S.
Special Envoy to Sudan organized a Forum for Supporters of the CPA in
Washington, DC, to reenergize international attention on the CPA.
Through the summer and fall of 2009, the U.S. Government facilitated
direct talks between the CPA parties to agree to resolve 12 outstanding
CPA issues.
The United States will play a leading role in encouraging the
parties to carry out peaceful and credible referenda processes, and for
the parties and international community to respect the results. In
addition, the U.S. Government will continue to provide development
assistance to support the implementation of the referenda, as well as
popular consultations in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states.
Whether Southern Sudan chooses unity or secession, the United States
will be a key partner in ensuring that the Government of Southern Sudan
has the capacity to govern in a transparent and accountable manner, and
to provide basic services to its people. The United States will also
continue to closely monitor the political, humanitarian, and human
rights situations in Northern Sudan, including Darfur and other
marginalized areas such as Eastern Sudan, and will look for
opportunities to achieve U.S. goals and objectives in the North no
matter what the outcome of the referenda.
Question. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is a complicated series
of agreements concluding in a referendum on unity in the south of
Sudan. While many important elements, such as borders and wealth
sharing remain to be agreed, the referendum on unity may well be the
decisive element between war and peace.
What considerations would compel the North and the South to
avoid conflict at this moment? How is the international
community reinforcing these? Does the CPA or do ongoing
negotiations allow for the option of extending a period of
transition to ensure South Sudan does not become a failed state
upon its creation?
What is the prospect that the referendum will not be agreed
to be held by the Government in Khartoum or that the minimum
parameters for the poll will not be achieved to make it valid?
What would this mean in terms of the CPA and in terms of those
international partner countries that have been party to the
agreement?
United Nations
What role does the United Nations play in the CPA
implementation and what role after July 2011?
What mandate does UNMIS have with regard to CPA
implementation? What role does UNMIS have as of July 2011?
What initiatives has USUN undertaken with regard to Sudan
over the last 18 months?
Answer. Most Sudan analysts agree that both parties to the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) benefit politically and
economically from peace, and that neither benefit from a return to
civil war. Despite this, the events of the next 12 months are likely to
place significant strain on the relationship between the parties as
well as their individual relationships with key domestic
constituencies, which could push them toward increased confrontation.
Key near-term sources of potential conflict include the runup to and
conduct of the referenda in both Southern Sudan and Abyei, Northern
rejection of referenda results, failure to reach an adequate
understanding of post-referenda arrangements between North and South,
and the inability of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) to govern
effectively and maintain adequate control over the security situation
in the South.
Continuation of the partnership and high-level productive dialogue
between the CPA parties over the next 12 months will be crucial to
prevent conflict from reemerging. This includes indications of progress
on key post-CPA issues such as continued oil revenue-sharing,
citizenship rights, and division of debts and assets, which may provide
an incentive for the North to accept Southern independence. The
international community, including the African Union High-Level
Implementation Panel on Sudan, the United Nations, and key actors such
as the United States, Norway, and the United Kingdom, continue to play
an active role in bringing the parties together to resolve these and
other key issues. In addition, the United States must continue to focus
attention on conflict mitigation and prevention in Southern Sudan and
the Three Areas, including by continuing efforts to build the
governance capacity of the GOSS, professionalizing the Sudan People's
Liberation Army and Southern Sudan Police Service, and focusing on
conflict mitigation and peace building activities at the state and
local levels in flashpoint areas.
The CPA prescribes a 6-month period after the referenda before the
close of the CPA's Interim Period and implementation of the referenda
results. Any amendment to this arrangement or extension of the Interim
Period must be agreed upon by both parties, which we view as unlikely.
Credible, peaceful, on time referenda for Southern Sudan and Abyei
are milestones of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and are high
priorities for the United States and other international actors in
Sudan. The Southern Sudan referendum is likely to face significant
challenges, not least due to the nearly 2-year delay in the
establishment of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission and Southern
Sudan's vast size and limited infrastructure. While many important
lessons were learned in the April 2010 elections, little time remains
for referenda preparations. With just 6 months remaining, significant
efforts will be needed to conduct credible referenda on time.
Although the ultimate responsibility for the organization and
management of the referenda (and the creation of an acceptable
political and security environment) falls to the Government of Sudan
and the Government of Southern Sudan, international support for the
referenda must be robust, in an effort to maximize the credibility of
the result. Support includes U.S. Government technical support on
referenda administration, civic and voter education, and international
observation, implemented in coordination with logistical and technical
assistance by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (see answer below),
and an international donor Basket Fund managed by the U.N. Development
Program.
Given the enormity of the decision and the potential consequences
of the Southern Sudan referendum-- namely, the emergence of a new,
independent state in Africa--it is critical that the entire referendum
process be deemed credible to ensure that the results are accepted by
domestic and international stakeholders. This will also likely
facilitate international recognition of an independent Southern Sudan,
should that be the outcome of a credible referendum process, and help
dampen Northern reluctance to accept referenda results. This includes
achieving the required 60-percent turnout of registered voters
necessary to consider the referendum legal, agreed to by both CPA
parties and embedded in the 2009 Southern Sudan Referendum Act. If this
threshold is not met, the referendum will need to be rerun within 60
days of the declaration of the final results of the first vote. Robust
voter education, careful planning around polling locations in both
Northern and Southern Sudan, and due attention to security
considerations will be required to ensure that all eligible voters who
wish to register are able to do so, and that all registered voters are
able to cast their ballots.
Aside from the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the U.N.'s
multidimensional peace support operation focused on supporting
implementation of the CPA, the U.N. facilitates high-level meetings on
Sudan and CPA issues, such as the June 2010 briefing on Sudan at the
U.N. Security Council by officials from the U.N. and the African Union,
including former South African President Thabo Mbeki. Throughout the
CPA's Interim Period, the U.N. has been mindful of the agreement's
cease-fire and security arrangements and wealth- and power-sharing
frameworks. After the end of the Interim Period in July 2011, the U.N.
plans to continue providing support to Sudanese peace and development
processes primarily through the activities of its agencies (such as the
World Food Programme, U.N. Development Program, etc.), funds, and
programs.
The original UNMIS mandate was set forth in U.N. Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1590 in 2005 and tasked UNMIS with supporting CPA
implementation by performing several major tasks, including: monitoring
and verifying the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and
investigating violations; assisting in the establishment of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs; developing a
police training and evaluation program, and otherwise assisting in the
training of police; assisting the parties to the CPA in promoting the
rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection and
promotion of human rights; and providing technical assistance to the
CPA parties, in cooperation with other international actors, to support
preparations for and conduct of elections and referenda.
The UNMIS mandate has been renewed and clarified at times to refine
UNMIS' responsibilities. UNSCR 1812 of April 30, 2008, tasked UNMIS
with providing technical and logistical support to help with border
demarcation and to begin preparations to support national elections.
UNSCR 1870 of April 30, 2009, added language regarding support for the
referenda. This language regarding referenda support continues in the
most recent renewal with UNSCR 1919 of April 29, 2010, which directs
UNMIS to prepare to play a lead role in international efforts to assist
with referenda preparations. The resolution also emphasized that UNMIS
should continue assistance to the parties to implement all elements of
the CPA, including creation of the referenda commissions and popular
consultation bodies, along with implementation of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration's decision regarding Abyei. In light of increasing
violence in Southern Sudan, the renewal also called for UNMIS to
implement a civilian protection strategy in areas at high risk for
conflict.
The United States led the negotiations regarding the renewal of
UNMIS' mandate resulting in the adoption of U.N. Security Council
resolution 1919 on April 29, 2010, which renewed the mandate until
April 30, 2011. UNMIS, per the U.N. Secretary General's July 2010
Report, has initiated a strategic planning process focusing on the role
of the U.N., both in the remainder of the interim period and beyond, as
called for in UNSC resolution 1919 (2010). We hope that the U.N. will
continue to engage robustly in efforts relating to peace, security,
protection of civilians, assistance, human rights, and other needs. If
the U.N. establishes another presence on or after April 30, 2011, the
Security Council must fashion a mandate, in consultation with the
Sudanese, which is responsive to the security, assistance, and other
needs in Southern Sudan at that time. Given that the CPA will end 6
months following the January 2011 referenda, any successor U.N. mission
would not have CPA-related functions.
The U.S. Mission to the U.N. (USUN) liaises with other delegations
and international organizations on Sudan-related issues in New York,
and engages with Security Council members on Sudan during the quarterly
U.N. briefings on UNMIS and the UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). With
regard to UNMIS, USUN works closely with other Security Council members
and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to ensure adequate
planning for the referenda to take place. USUN has also encouraged the
U.N. to begin working with the parties on its post-referenda presence
in Sudan. USUN also informs the Council of our bilateral position on
Sudan during briefings on Sudan by International Criminal Court (ICC)
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo and briefings by the head of the African
Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, former South African President Thabo
Mbeki.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence has indicated that
Sudan is currently at greatest risk of extreme violence and mass
atrocities.
How has this affected the administration's efforts to
contribute resources and diplomatic effort to this region since
that DNI determination that you confirmed at the hearing?
Please provide a list of costs to the United States of its
commitment to Sudan since 2001, to include the costs
associated with Darfur and our contributions to the United
Nations, on an annual basis.
Please provide an overall percentage of U.S. assistance
vice other donors to Sudan since 2001.
Characterize and estimate as much as is possible the costs
of an outbreak of war in Sudan in human and financial
costs.
While the Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan has cobbled together a large staff of over 40 people
in Washington alone, how has the office of the Special Envoy
for Sudan fared in its requests for support? Please be specific
as it relates to resources, personnel, hiring methods and
length of term.
What other agencies and USG individuals are working
alongside the special envoy's efforts to improve the outcome in
Sudan to achieve U.S. goals? Please be specific in identifying
and enumerating the details.
What if any planning is there to deal with the consequences
of the Sudan referendum on unity for the south?
What is/will be the policy of the United States if the
referendum asserts independence for the South, or
independence is determined by unilateral declaration by the
Government of South Sudan?
What role does the United States expect to take and with
what means and what partners if the referendum determines
an outcome or conflict ensues?
Answer. The United States remains committed to preventing violence
in Sudan. In an effort to build the capacity of Southern Sudan, the
U.S. Government has undertaken a ``Diplomatic Expansion'' to include
staffing and material assistance on the ground in Sudan to support U.S.
Government's foreign policy objectives. Operating under Chief of
Mission authority, staffs from the Department of State's office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the
Civilian Response Corps (CRC) are and will continue to provide support
to Embassy Khartoum and Consulate General Juba as well as complement
USAID's robust presence in the runup to and following Southern Sudan's
January 2011 referendum.
U.S. assistance appropriated from FY 2001 to FY 2010 and allocated
to Sudan by State and USAID totals approximately $10.7 billion to date.
This includes the costs of humanitarian food and nonfood assistance,
security, peacekeeping, reconstruction and development assistance for
all of Sudan as well as Darfur related assistance in Eastern Chad. An
estimated $5.6 billion of this assistance was related to Darfur/Eastern
Chad and approximately $3.27 billion of this total was CIPA funding for
support to UNAMID and UNMIS.
For all donors, the U.S. Government assistance accounted for
approximately 35-36 percent of total Overseas Development Assistance
(ODA) to Sudan for the 2001-08 period. Information is not yet available
for the period since 2008.
One major focus of the U.S. Government's strategy in Sudan, along
with the correct implementation of the CPA and bringing peace and
justice to Darfur, is to avoid an outbreak in hostilities because the
possible human and financial costs of an outbreak of war in Sudan are
incalculable. A full outbreak of violence could destabilize the
country, potentially mirroring the Second Civil War that began in 1983
and resulted in an estimated 2 million civilian deaths and displacement
of 4 million persons. We would expect large-scale conflict along the
border, irregular low-level insurgency, increased military buildup in
neighboring states, increased arms trade, increased draw in regional
terrorist elements, and increased human insecurity including refugee
flows and internally displaced persons. An increase in violence could
also undermine Sudan's oil production and shipment capabilities,
cutting the internal revenues to both the North and the South.
Over the past year, the Special Envoy's Office (S/USSES) has
increased its staff significantly through fellows and details from DOD,
CIA, and USAID. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) detailed four planners to S/USSES to consolidate
interagency conflict prevention and stabilization plans that link U.S.
Government strategy and policy to implementation plans and resource
requirements. Through the Diplomacy 3.0 initiative, the Office of the
U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan will gain three additional professional
staff to help prepare for the referendum.
The Special Envoy works in close concert with the following
agencies and offices:
Department of State:, S/CRS, AF, INL, IO, F, PRM, S/WCI, S/
CT, S/GWI, EEB, CA, PD, PA, DRL, L, INR, ISN, DS, S/P
U.S. Agency for International Development:
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
Department of Defense: OSD/Africa, OSD/StabOps, JCS/J5,
AFRICOM
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Department of Commerce
Department of Treasury
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) provides for the
people of Southern Sudan to choose unity with the North or secession in
an internationally monitored referendum in January 2011, and residents
of Abyei a simultaneous referendum that will allow voters to choose
whether Abyei retains its administrative status in the north, or joins
Southern Sudan, irrespective of the results of the southern referendum.
The U.S. Government is working with the CPA parties in Sudan to
prepare for orderly, credible, and peaceful referenda in January 2011.
The U.S. Government supports referenda that reflect the will of the
people and will respect whatever decision is made in a credible
referendum process.
The U.S. Government will continue to work with the international
community to stabilize Sudan and, depending on the outcome of the
referendum, support an orderly transition to two separate and viable
states or the continuation of Sudan as a single state.
______
Responses of Special Envoy to Sudan J. Scott Gration to Questions
Submitted By Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. As you know, in March 2009 the Sudanese Government
expelled many of the largest aid organizations working in Darfur.
During the hearing, you acknowledged that despite international efforts
to rebuild humanitarian aid capacity since, specialized programming--
particularly projects addressing violence against women and girls--
remains dramatically reduced. What steps are you taking to ensure that
the African Union--United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
and humanitarian organizations are granted access to regions and camps
in Darfur to work to restore this capacity--particularly medical care
and counseling for victims of gender-based violence?
Answer. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) has been endemic in
Darfur since the conflict began in 2003. The situation for women and
girls in Darfur further deteriorated after the March 2009 expulsion of
13 international NGOs and closure of three national NGOs. The
Government of Sudan (GOS) also continues to restrict the movement of
personnel from the U.N./AU (UN/AM) Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) movement.
The United States Government facilitated the return of several NGOs to
Sudan, but security conditions on the ground and restrictions imposed
by the GOS continue to impede SGBV programming. As a result, USAID's
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance encourages its partners in Darfur
to incorporate SGBV protection in all sectors in order to maintain
coverage, where possible, for survivors of SGBV.
The United States continues to press the Government of Sudan (GOS)
and the armed movements to allow UNAMID and humanitarian organizations
uninhibited access to vulnerable populations and victims in need,
especially in areas of conflict. USAID provides leadership, technical
expertise, and official donor representation in the Darfur Humanitarian
Country Team (HCT), which includes representatives from UNAMID and the
U.N. mission in Sudan. The HCT meets frequently and provides a venue to
discuss coordinated efforts to improve humanitarian access in Darfur.
USAID also remains an active participant in the High Level Committee
(HLC) for Darfur. The Sudanese Government and the U.N. cochair HLC
meetings, which provide an opportunity for principals to discuss
security and humanitarian access issues.
Despite these efforts, the ongoing conflict, insecurity, and
targeted attacks against humanitarian assets and relief workers
continue to significantly reduce humanitarian access and hinder the
delivery of humanitarian assistance, which include assistance to
survivors of SGBV, to affected populations in Darfur. In recent months,
a number of international humanitarian organizations have either
relocated international staff from remote field locations to urban
centers or temporarily suspended programs in Darfur due to increased
frequency of kidnapping, carjacking, robbery, and interethnic violence.
To improve the broader security and humanitarian environment in Darfur,
the United States is working with UNAMID and other stakeholders on the
ground to design and implement a Darfur security and stabilization
plan. At every opportunity, the United States emphasizes that UNAMID
must have unrestricted movement and access to ensure the delivery of
needed humanitarian assistance--assistance that includes support to
victims of SGBV. UNAMID is developing a comprehensive strategy on SGBV
prevention and response in consultation with other U.N. agencies in
Sudan and Darfur as part of its efforts to improve the protection of
women and girls in conflict. UNAMID has also intensified training on
gender mainstreaming for UNAMID police and military units in an attempt
to equip them to deal with SGBV cases and gender issues in communities.
Question. I understand that your office is currently preparing a
Darfur stabilization plan that will include a strategic framework for
addressing gender-based violence. When can we expect to receive the
details of this plan?
Answer. The Office of the United States Envoy to Sudan, working
with the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
(UNAMID), the African Union (AU) and others, is developing a concept
paper on the Darfur Security and Stabilization Initiative. The aim of
the initiative is to encourage a Darfur-based dialogue among the
stakeholders to minimize military operations, identify priority
intervention areas that enhance security and stabilize communities, and
provide an environment conducive for peace talks. One of the priority
areas of intervention is law and order, within which stakeholders can
address the issue of sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV). The
discussions on the process and the plan are ongoing with various
stakeholders, but we hope to share the framework details as soon as
possible.
Question. As you know, the United States is the leading
international donor to Sudan and in order to realize treatment and
support for women and girls in Darfur, the United States must take the
lead. How is the United States working to prioritize funding for
programs to prevent, combat, and treat gender-based violence in Darfur?
Answer. Since FY 2005, the USG has committed almost $3 billion in
food and nonfood humanitarian assistance to people affected by the
crisis in Darfur and Eastern Chad. This has included funding for
humanitarian protection programming, including support for victims of
SGBV and SGBV prevention activities.
Security conditions on the ground continue to impede sexual- and
gender-based violence (SGBV) programming. As a result, USAID's Office
of Foreign Disaster Assistance encourages its partners in Darfur to
incorporate SGBV protection in all sectors in order to maintain
coverage, where possible, for victims of SGBV. Incorporation of SGBV
protection in all sectors strengthens protection for all conflict-
affected people and helps provide humanitarian protection services when
more focused approaches are not possible. Examples of protection
mainstreaming include: improving food aid through distribution to
women; ensuring that latrines are well-lit, lockable, and separated by
gender; and providing training for livelihood skills and activities
that do not require women to walk significant distances from the safety
of their communities.
Despite the lack of Sudanese Government support, the U.N. and other
humanitarian agencies continue to implement SGBV programming in Darfur
where security permits. In addition, USAID implementing partners work
to combat and prevent incidents of violence through women's
empowerment, skills building, and income-generation programs
implemented as a part of broader livelihoods programming. USAID
partners in Darfur implement a variety of livelihood training and
support programs for women both within and outside internally displaced
persons (IDP) camps. USAID-supported agriculture and food security
programs empower women and enhance livelihood opportunities by
targeting women, widows, and female-headed households in agricultural
extension and livestock rearing training as well as seed distributions.
Question. How can the United States press the United Nations to
prioritize efforts to address violence against women in Darfur,
including through a sustained, consistent, and sufficient funding
commitment?
Answer. The United States continues to advocate for, support, and
coordinate with U.N. agencies on SGBV programs through diplomatic and
assistance efforts. During the renewal process of the African Union--
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur's (UNAMID) mandate, the
United States highlighted the need for continuation and prioritization
of SGBV efforts. Supporting the efforts of U.N. experts and bodies to
monitor and report on SGBV, including in UNAMID, the U.N. Security
Council Sudan Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts, the Human Rights
Council's Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights, and the
Special Representative of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in
Conflict, is also of critical importance.
To improve coverage and coordination of SGBV efforts in Darfur, the
Department of State recently allotted $1.86 million in Economic Support
Funds for a SGBV prevention and response program in Darfur, to be
managed by the U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA). USAID has also provided
$500,000 to UNFPA to facilitate technical coordination between
humanitarian organizations working on SGBV prevention. UNFPA has been
designated as the lead in Darfur to coordinate the U.N. and NGOs on the
prevention of and response to SGBV. As of October 2009, the North
Darfur Humanitarian Aid Commission had authorized the reestablishment
of nine women's centers and UNFPA had Sudanese Government approval to
revitalize a women's center in an IDP camp in West Darfur that included
SGBV training.
USAID continues to coordinate with U.N. agencies that work with the
Sudanese Government to protect the legal rights of SGBV victims and
gain support for SGBV activities throughout Darfur. Through both the
Humanitarian Country Team and other channels, the U.S. Government
coordinates with U.N. agencies on SGBV, working with the Sudanese
Government to expand health, psychosocial, legal aid, and livelihoods
support to vulnerable women and families in IDP camps and host
communities, particularly the rural areas of Darfur.
The United States continues to work with the U.N. to advocate for
better access for humanitarian organization. During the past year, the
U.N. has advocated more heavily for formal Sudanese Government
acceptance of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the U.N. agency mandated under the global humanitarian cluster
system to lead humanitarian protection activities. To date, the
Sudanese Government continues to prohibit UNHCR from leading
humanitarian protection activities in North and South Darfur, asserting
that UNHCR lacks a mandate to work with IDPs and that the organization
is seeking to assume the government's role in protecting its people.
______
Response of Special Envoy to Sudan J. Scott Gration to Question
Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
Question. In order to prepare for a referendum in January 2011 and
the possible separation of Southern Sudan, a number of things need to
take place in a very short amount of time. Below is a list of issues
that you have indicated need to be resolved and/or steps that need to
be taken. Please identify what you are doing to help the Sudanese
accomplish each of these tasks and the date by which each issue will be
resolved.
1. Demarcate the North-South Border and Abyei
2. Finalize the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission and the
Abyei Referendum Commission
3. Register voters and develop voting procedures in the South
and Abyei
4. Hold popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue
Nile State
5. Decide citizenship questions, including for the 2 million
Southerners who fled to Khartoum during the war and are
unlikely to return to the South
6. Resolve the issue of assets and debts
7. Resolve water rights
8. Reach a revenue-sharing agreement
9. Accommodate pastoralists that move from the North to the
South
Answer. CPA Issues. While attention is given to referenda
preparations and post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) negotiations,
the CPA parties (Government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation
Movement) need to ensure that remaining CPA issues are implemented.
Many of these issues were discussed during U.S. Government-led
trilateral talks with the CPA parties that led to agreement on 12
issues in August 2009. North/South border demarcation is central among
them, and while some experts believe that field demarcation should
happen prior to the referenda, others indicate that map delimitation is
sufficient for North/South voters to know which side of the border they
inhabit. The CPA parties have agreed on more than 80 percent of the
North/South border line, while the remaining disputed areas must be
agreed to by the Government of National Unity Presidency through a
mechanism yet to be defined. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration and
Embassy Khartoum officials have consistently raised the need for
demarcation with senior officials and have offered U.S. technical
assistance with demarcation and the creation of a mechanism to resolve
disputed border areas. However, the parties have not formally requested
this assistance. Regarding Abyei boundary demarcation, the CPA parties
have agreed to the boundaries as set by the July 2009 Permanent Court
of Arbitration ruling. However, boundary demarcation in the field has
stalled due to boundary demarcation committee fears over security in
the Abyei region. As mandated by the CPA, popular consultations in
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States should be held prior to the end
of the Interim Period in July 2011. Planning is underway in Blue Nile;
however delayed state elections need to happen before Southern Kordofan
can hold consultations. Through USAID's implementing partners, the U.S.
Government gives assistance to organizations that provide technical
assistance and expertise in the form of training, consultations and
study tours for individuals from the two states involved in preparing
for and conducting the consultations. Given the civic engagement
necessary to ensure adequate popular participation in these political
processes, civic education is also a heavy component of these
activities.
Referenda Issues. The holding of credible referenda in Sothern
Sudan and Abyei in January 2011, in accordance with the CPA's
timeframe, is central to U.S. priorities in Sudan. As a cornerstone of
the CPA, an internationally witnessed agreement, the outcomes of
credible referenda should be respected by the Sudanese and the
international community. Conducting credible referenda is contingent on
the timely development of operational plans, to include registration
procedures and polling plans, by the Southern Sudan and Abyei
Referendum Commissions. The Southern Sudan Referendum Commission was
sworn in on July 6, 2010, almost 2 years behind the schedule laid out
in the CPA. However, the parties have yet to agree on nominees for the
Abyei commission. Through USAID, the U.S. Government will provide
technical expertise to the referenda commissions on procedures,
planning, and logistics, similar to assistance provided to the National
Elections Commission. This support will include capacity-building,
logistics, equipment and supplies, and provision of referendum
commodities. The U.S. Government and its implementing partners are
closely coordinating with U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIIS) and U.N.
Development Program (UNDP) officials tasked with providing significant
logistical and technical support to the referenda. In addition, USAID
supports voter education and domestic and international observation of
the referenda.
Post-CPA Issues. The negotiation of sustainable post-CPA
arrangements is critical to North/South stability in the period
following the referenda, especially in the event of southern secession.
Such arrangements, if properly negotiated, could help facilitate long-
term positive relations between both entities. In late June, the
parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding setting out a framework
for formal negotiations that was finalized in early July, and talks
officially opened in Khartoum on July 10 under the facilitation of
former South African President Thabo Mbeki's African Union High-Level
Implementation Panel on Sudan. The talks are supported by the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the IGAD Partners
Forum, which includes the United States. The U.S. Government will work
closely with international actors to ensure sufficient coordination and
support to negotiations and to provide political engagement if
requested by the parties. Additionally, technical assistance is being
offered to the Southern Sudan Referendum Task Force through possible
USAID-funded secondments and existing expert advisors who are embedded
in relevant Government of Southern Sudan ministries.
Among post-CPA issues identified in the 2009 Southern Sudan
Referendum Act, several are crucial to determining the post-CPA
relationship between North and South. The citizenship status of
southerners in the north and northerners in the south should be decided
prior to polling so that voters' anxiety regarding their status is
assuaged. The U.S. Government continues to urge the parties to reach a
fair agreement that respects the rights of all Sudanese. The status of
Sudan's substantial debts and national assets, both key areas of
concern for the Government of Sudan, will require extensive
consultations with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and
other governments, and will probably not be finalized until shortly
before formal independence, if southerners so vote. The U.S.
Government, through technical experts, may provide assistance to
technical discussions on such financial issues, along with banking and
currency issues. Water rights, which include access to transboundary
aquifers and the possible division of Sudan's current Nile water quota,
also remain unresolved, though some analysts indicate that this can be
arranged at a later date.
The status of the oil sector and the sharing of the substantial
revenue derived from it is the most significant post-referendum issue,
and should be agreed upon prior to the referendum. The parties will
likely require broad international technical assistance from oil and
revenue experts. Given the urgency of the issue, the U.S. Government is
closely coordinating with actors such as Norway who are well positioned
to provide oil sector-related assistance. Last, determination of
transborder access for pastoralists must be resolved prior to formal
independence, and the U.S. Government is undertaking diplomatic
outreach to the two parties to remind them of the urgency of this
issue, especially for nomadic populations in the Abyei Area.
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