[Senate Hearing 111-709]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-709
AFGHANISTAN: GOVERANCE AND
THE CIVILIAN STRATEGY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 14, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Holbrooke, Hon. Richard, Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Russell D. Feingold........................................ 44
Response to question submitted for the record by Senator
Roger F. Wicker............................................ 45
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
(iii)
AFGHANISTAN: GOVERNANCE AND THE CIVILIAN STRATEGY
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Menendez, Cardin, Casey,
Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, Corker, DeMint, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. This hearing will come to order.
Let me say, at the outset of the hearing, that the rules of
the committee are crystal clear with respect to any kind of
demonstrations of any sort, whatsoever. This committee prides
itself in listening carefully and in probing and having a
thoughtful dialogue, even about the most emotional and
contentious issues, and we ask every member of the public to
respect that and the rights of the Senators and the committee
to be able to conduct their business.
I want to thank everyone for coming this afternoon, and I
want to extend a very special thank you and welcome to
Ambassador Dick Holbrooke, who has taken time from an
exceedingly busy schedule in order to appear again before the
committee.
We look forward to hearing your insights, Ambassador
Holbrooke, and I thank you for doing this.
I might mention that Ambassador Holbrooke is a little
conscribed in the amount of time that he can be with us, simply
because he's got to leave from here directly for the airport in
order to leave to go to Islamabad and Kabul. And Secretary
Clinton will be following, I think, in a few days. So, a lot is
happening, and it is timely for us to be able to meet here
today and have this discussion.
I also want to say, very clearly, that I think Ambassador
Holbrooke has assembled an outstanding team, a group of people
many of whom I know personally and who I think bring an
enormous amount of experience and intellectual ability to this
challenge. And I congratulate him and the Secretary for that,
and I want to also say that I think he has been doing an
outstanding job under exceedingly difficult circumstances.
I think all of us know that, for 7 or 8 years, the war in
Afghanistan proceeded as if there was no, really, clear
definition of the mission or the strategy. I think it's in the
last year or so that we've begun to try to pull that together.
But, it's obviously been complicated by the events that
intervened over the course of those 7 or 8 years.
This is the Foreign Relations Committee's 11th hearing on
Afghanistan in the past year and a half, and the number
reflects both our commitment and our concern about
understanding the challenges of this part of the world--
Afghanistan, Pakistan, South Asia--and our recognition of the
critical role that this conflict plays in our own national
security.
I have said that the committee will continue, over the
course of these next months, to continue a series of hearings
on this topic, and I think it is a reflection of the importance
of what is happening there, the importance of the region. It
also is a reflection of an unfortunate fact. Last month,
Afghanistan surpassed Vietnam, a place that both Ambassador
Holbrooke and I are all too familiar with, as the longest
military campaign in American history. More than 1,000 men and
women have lost their lives in Afghanistan; nearly 6,000 of
them have been grievously injured. And we owe a duty to every
single one of them, and to their families and to the tens of
thousands of other military and civilian personnel in
Afghanistan from our country, and our partners from other
countries--we owe them all the exercise of our oversight role
in order to seriously and responsibly present them with the
best strategy possible.
It would be avoidance if we didn't say that this is a
difficult moment in the Afghan conflict. Our progress is
decidedly mixed, particularly in the south, where the Taliban
are strongest. The Taliban are currently assassinating
government officials and tribal leaders, embarking on a
campaign of intimidating Afghans who want to support coalition
efforts.
Regrettably, corruption in some quarters appears to grow.
One in three Afghan households reports having to pay a bribe to
obtain public services. And our civilian aid efforts to bring
stability and consolidate military gains are off to a slow
start in the south and in the east.
Many people have asked the question, whether or not we have
the right strategy. So, this is a good time to be asking hard
questions about the progress that we're making toward our
objectives of defeating al-Qaeda and bringing a measure of
stability to Afghanistan. It's also time to demand
accountability from our partners on the battlefield and in the
corridors of government, from Washington to Brussels, from
Kabul to Kandahar.
It is also time to assess how our strategy fits the
realities on the ground. Over the past year, some of those
realities have changed, and, I might say, few for the better. I
happen to believe that the conditions, which I set out last
October for deploying more troops, still hold today. And I'm
concerned as to whether or not those kinds of conditions are
being adequately met.
First, the insistence on the presence of reliable Afghan
troops to partner with our military as we decide to proactively
clear an area.
Second, when we engage in holding those areas, I believe it
is critical to secure capable local leaders with whom we can
partner, in order to provide effective governance. Governance
remains one of the great challenges, if not the great
challenge.
And finally, the ``build'' and ``transfer'' components of
our mission really require that area to shift to Afghan
control. And in order to do that, the civilian side must be
prepared to move quickly, with well-implemented support
structure, underneath the ``clear'' and ``hold'' efforts. When
those conditions are met, it's hard to imagine that you're not
going to have a better outcome.
Today's hearing is intended to take a tough look at the
civilian strategy to see if we are on the right path. The
administration requested $4.4 billion in fiscal year 2010 to
support civilian efforts in Afghanistan, and another $3.9
billion for the next fiscal year. And needless to say, we need
to make sure this money is spent as well as possible.
In recent weeks, the committee staff conducted 16 briefings
with the State Department and USAID in order to examine how we
are spending the taxpayers' money, dollar by dollar, sector by
sector, in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It's our intention,
needless to say, to continue to keep a close eye on how that
money is being spent to promote stability in the region.
I might add that the committee will shortly be releasing a
report--I've informed Ambassador Holbrooke about this--a report
on this topic of corruption, and hopefully it is a report which
will set out some recommendations for how we might be able to
better respond to some of these issues.
In the end, all of the billions of dollars and all of the
United States efforts--best efforts--all of the sacrifices by
our troops, are all going to be irrelevant if the United States
and our partners do not have the right strategy to establish
effective Afghan governance and, ultimately, effective Afghan
takeover of responsibility. The problem is that the key element
of this strategy is the one over which we have the least
control, and that is the willingness and ability of Afghans to
assume ownership of the effort.
For nearly 9 years, most Afghans have seen themselves as
bystanders in a conflict between the West and al-Qaeda, and a
conflict being fought in their homeland. In recent months,
we've launched a concerted effort to convince Afghans that this
is their fight. It's not an easy task, given the historic
distrust of foreigners on Afghan soil, but it's a vital one.
Ultimately, we need a better understanding of exactly what
the definition of ``success'' is in Afghanistan, and what an
acceptable state looks like there, and how achievable it is.
Many have said repeatedly--I think, Ambassador Holbrooke
among them, myself, others--that there is no military solution
in Afghanistan. Having said that, we absolutely need to
understand what the political solution looks like, and how we
get there. And those are the most relevant questions that we
want to examine in the course of the hearing today.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. I join the chairman in welcoming Ambassador
Holbrooke back to the committee.
This hearing provides an opportunity to review our progress
and refine our understanding of United States policy in
Afghanistan. There is substantial concern about our course in
Afghanistan, in part because of the recent disruption in our
own military leadership, but also because gains in governance,
development, military training, and other areas have not
occurred at a pace that boosts confidence in President Obama's
original timetable.
Some security improvements have been achieved and more are
likely to follow, but they have been hard won. In 6 months, the
President expects a review by his commanders on the status of
our efforts in Afghanistan. This review presumably would
determine the shape of an expected transition of
responsibilities to Afghan security forces in July 2011. But
absent a major realignment on the ground, it is unrealistic to
expect that a significant downsizing of U.S. forces could occur
at that time without security consequences.
This conclusion is reinforced by recent GAO and inspector
general reports that have raised deep concerns over the
viability and quality of training for the Afghan National Army
and police. The lack of clarity in Afghanistan does not end
with the President's timetable. Both civilian and military
operations in Afghanistan are proceeding without a clear
definition of success. There has been much discussion of our
counterinsurgency strategy and methods, but very little
explanation of what metrics must be achieved before the country
is considered secure.
At some moments it appears as if we are trying to remake
the economic, political, and security culture of Afghanistan.
We should know by now that such grand ambitions are beyond our
resources and powers.
At other moments, it appears we are content with a narrow,
security-driven definition of success: Namely, preventing an
implacably hostile Taliban regime from taking over the
government and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist
safe haven, regardless of what government is in power.
But even if this narrow definition of success were embraced
by the Obama administration, it would require amplification.
How much Taliban military capability and territorial control is
tolerable? What are we currently doing in Afghanistan that is
not required to achieve this narrow objective? What are
reasonable mileposts for judging progress toward success? What
time constraints do we perceive, given resource and alliance
pressures? How do dynamics in Pakistan factor into our strategy
in Afghanistan?
I recognize that the situation in Afghanistan is fluid and
not easily defined. I also understand why an administration
would not want to be pinned down to a specific definition of
success. The problem is that we are expending enormous
resources in Afghanistan. Our resources are finite, and they
must be focused effectively. We need to know if some missions
that currently are receiving resources are not intrinsic to our
objectives. We also need to know what missions are absolutely
indispensable to success, however it is defined.
We can't fall back on measuring our military and civilian
activities in Afghanistan according to relative progress.
Arguably we could make progress for decades, on security,
employment, good governance, women's rights and other goals--
expending billions of dollars each year--without ever reaching
a satisfying conclusion. In such circumstances, avoiding
mission creep toward unattainable goals is essential.
Given this situation, it is reasonable to consider the
enlistment of local militias in security operations under the
authority of a Ministry of Interior or Defense. This tactic has
been frequently debated, and may not be applicable in all
cases. But since his arrival in Kabul, General Petraeus appears
inclined to explore it.
This decision is a difficult one, given Afghanistan's
history of conflict under warlords. As such, local militias are
best integrated within a longer term institutionalization plan
for such forces. President Karzai presented a draft Afghan
Peace and Reintegration Program to NATO for consideration. The
issues of reconciliation and reintegration are now in broad
discussion. The committee would welcome some remarks on the
status of the draft program and its elements, as well as the
position of our government toward it. Who is participating and
leading the coordination of such discussions with the Afghan
Government and groups seeking reconciliation?
I am hopeful that the administration will not wait 6 months
to refine its explanation of our goals in Afghanistan. It is up
to the President to define success, and delineate how much time
and how many resources should be devoted to achieving it.
I appreciate today, as always, Ambassador Holbrooke, your
willingness to join us, and I very much look forward to our
discussion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your patience. We appreciate
it. We look forward to your statement. If you want to try to
summarize, and then engage--you've been through this many
times--we put the full text in the record as if read in full.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a
great, great honor to be back before this committee.
Thirty-fourth year I've testified before this committee,
and there's no committee that plays a more important role in
the national security interests of our country.
And I especially want to thank you and Senator Lugar for
your historic leadership in the last year and a half in regard
to at least two issues, your personal role in regard to the
Afghan elections and the leadership you and Senator Lugar
provided in what is now known as the KLB, Kerry-Lugar-Berman,
legislation for Pakistan which has had an enormous effect, and
which I will refer to again in the future.
As you said, Senator, I will be leaving for Islamabad,
directly from this hearing, through Andrews Air Force Base,
stopping in Germany to refuel and going on to Afghanistan with
Secretary Clinton. And I want to be as brief as I can.
First of all, Mr. Chairman, you began by saying we need to
demand accountability of our partners. And I think the partners
include our partnership, and I welcome the chance to speak
again before this distinguished group on our role in this
effort.
I want to just begin with the most critical point. And if
you will, may I submit my formal statement.
The Chairman. Absolutely. Without objection, it'll be
placed in the record as if read in full.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Eighteen months ago, we inherited a
situation in which Afghanistan and Pakistan were treated as
separate issues and there was no single approach to it; hence,
the unattractive acronym AfPak, which we do not use in public,
but which was designed to stress the fact that these issues are
closely related. I will return to that theme repeatedly as we
go forward.
But, I would just note that, once President Obama and
Secretary Clinton gave me this job, 35 other nations appointed
counterparts. The U.S. Government reorganized to reflect the
fact that you cannot succeed in Afghanistan without Pakistan's
involvement. And that, Mr. Chairman, is the underlying
strategic principle by which we approach the issues we're
discussing today.
In Afghanistan, since I last testified before you, there's
been considerable activity in many areas, all of which you know
about: the increase in American troops, the implementation of
the counterinsurgency strategy under General McChrystal and now
General Petraeus. We have worked very closely to do the
civilian support for that plan. But, I need to stress, as all
of us in this room know, that security is the essential
prerequisite for everything else.
In regard to the elections last year, you all know what
happened, but the point I want to underscore is that, for the
first 10 months of the administration's tenure, from January 21
of last year to November 19, the elections hung over us like a
dark cloud, often reaching critical mass, never more tense than
when Senator Kerry himself was in Kabul, playing such an
instrumental role in the resolution of that near disaster,
which, in the end, produced a legitimate government, but in a
very messy way.
At that time, we were finally able to look forward to
implementation of the strategies we're here to discuss today.
And first and foremost among those was the implementation of a
change in agriculture, a change in counternarcotics, a change
in rule of law, and changes in our attitude about funding
contractual efforts.
In this regard, Mr. Chairman, and with your prior
permission, I brought members of 6 of the 10 agencies which
work with me, and which you referred to, with me today, and
very briefly, with your permission, I would just like to
introduce them, not simply because of who they are, but because
they represent a unique interagency effort. And if they could
just quickly stand as I read their names, starting on my left,
my chief of staff from the State Department, Rosemarie Pauli;
next to her, you all know Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Affairs, Richard Verma; next to him, my deputy,
Dan Feldman, who used to work for your committee; next to Dan,
Rami Shy, from the Treasury Department; next to him, Matt
Stiglitz, from the Justice Department; next to him, Shannon
Darcy, from AID; next to Shannon, Quentin Gray, from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture; next to Quentin, Raul Ortiz, just
joined us from the Department of Homeland Security; and next to
him, Kim McClure, on her last day as a State Department
staffer--she is going on to a Council on Foreign Relations
fellowship.
In the--now, the six agencies not here are CIA, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the FBI, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
No office in the Department's history has had this
interagency. And this is designed--I brought them here today,
Mr. Chairman, to illustrate to you, as succinctly as possible,
that we have a whole-of-government approach here, and there is
very good civilian/military coordination.
On the second row, Rina Amiri, our Afghan political expert
and a former member of the United Nations team; Tim Lenderking,
our new Pakistan country director; and Jim DeHart, our new
Afghan country director.
So, with that team behind us, Mr. Chairman, we have
embarked on full implementation, in close coordination with
CENTCOM and ISAF and the American Embassy in Kabul, of the
efforts that you want to discuss today.
I'd like to take a quick look forward, if I might, toward
what's coming up. On July 20, Secretary Clinton will lead the
American delegation to the Kabul Conference. This will be a
conference that involves Secretary General of the United
Nations, Ban Ki-moon, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, and
somewhere between 35 and 55 Foreign Ministers, numbers still to
be determined. It will be the largest gathering of foreign
leaders in Afghanistan since the 1970s. She is going because
she wants to demonstrate our support for the commitment, our
support for the government's efforts, our support for an
integrated civilian/military effort that combines our resources
and those of the government.
Both you and Senator Lugar correctly made the point that,
in the end, it's the Afghan Government that must succeed. We
can only help them. Anyone who shared the experience that you
and I and Senator Webb and others shared in another war, in
another century, know full well what the consequences are if we
Americanize the war. We cannot afford to repeat the mistake
which at least three people today lived through, personally.
And we carry forward those memories, not to be imprisoned by
the memories of Vietnam, but to learn from the tactical issues
that took place.
But, I want to underscore the fundamental difference
between those two wars, since you mentioned it, Mr. Chairman.
In this war, our national security interests are at stake, our
homeland security is threatened. In Afghanistan that is true,
and it affects our policy toward Pakistan.
Now, the biggest change in policy, which could not be
implemented until the political situation was behind us, is the
reintegration program that President Karzai announced in
London, signed the implementing decree on 2 weeks ago, and will
unveil fully in Kabul next week. That is the program that was
missing from the Afghan equation, the program designed to bring
Taliban fighters in voluntarily. As you said, Mr. Chairman,
there's no military solution here. So, as General Petraeus and
General McChrystal said, you're not going to win this war by
killing every member of the Taliban. It just doesn't work that
way in this kind of war.
So, the goal here is to create a new program. It was a
massive gap in the food chain of our efforts. Led by the
Japanese and the British, almost $200 million has been
assembled for this fund. The United States, for its part, with
the support of Congress, has assigned $100 million of CERP
funds for this effort, under General Petraeus's personal
control. And those of you who have talked to General Petraeus
know that he attaches the highest importance to this issue.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned your corruption report, and we
have, as you said, talked privately about it. We share your
concern, we share the concern of Chairwoman Lowey in the other
body, and we will read your report with great attention. We are
prepared, at some later date, at your convenience, to give you
a very detailed briefing of what we have done in the last 18
months. And several of the people sitting behind me have been
instrumental in that. I just want to say that we inherited no
serious program on this issue. We now have a very large number
of people from Treasury, FBI, CIA, DEA, AID, and State working
on corruption. Still, Mr. Chairman, it isn't enough, and we
well understand that.
President Karzai has committed himself, publicly and
privately, to upgrading his anticorruption office, and this
will be a major topic of conversation during the Kabul
Conference. And we will read your report with great interest.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to return to the issue of
Pakistan and Afghanistan. I said, at the outset, that we cannot
succeed in Afghanistan without Pakistan's participation. Let me
go a little further. When we came into office early last year,
we set--as an implementing goal for our strategic objective,
which is to defeat al-Qaeda and destroy them and protect our
homeland--we set several subordinate goals. One of the most
important was to bring Afghanistan and Pakistan closer
together. Since the day Pakistan became independent, in 1947,
there's been a substantial problem between the two countries,
most dramatically illustrated by the fact that, the day after
Pakistan became independent, Afghanistan opposed their entry
into the United Nations, a story which every Pakistani
schoolchild is taught in school. The border is still disputed,
and the overlay of recent events has made it even more serious.
In the last 15 to 20 years, there has been no serious
dialogue between these two neighbors, which are intertwined,
and the history of it, the Charlie Wilson's War, you're all
familiar with.
We set out the goal of improving that relationship, and in
recent months there has been the first narrowing of the
distance between Kabul and Islamabad. There have been visits in
both directions by both leaders. Those are continuing. General
Petraeus has been involved in those. Secretary Clinton, myself,
the President of the United States has encouraged it. I do not
want to leave your committee, or anyone who's listening to this
hearing, with the impression that any agreements have been
reached; they have not. I do not want to leave anyone in this
committee with the impression that some of the news reports
recently, fevered accounts of secret deals between elements in
Pakistan and elements in the Taliban, are accurate. We have no
evidence whatsoever of the accuracy of those reports. But,
there is movement. And that movement, below the radar screen,
has been massively supported by the Kerry-Lugar-Berman
legislation.
I cannot thank this committee enough--and I mean this
sincerely--for what you did last year. It was difficult, and
the initial reaction in Pakistan was not, shall I say,
pleasant, because there was a serious misunderstanding. Your
personal intervention, Mr. Chairman, ameliorated the problem.
We believe it is more or less gone.
The money is beginning to flow. The implementing operating
plans have been filed. Some of the money is going forward.
Secretary Clinton and I will be making further announcements
about this. But, the effect of the legislation is unmistakable,
and it has encouraged an improvement in United States-Pakistan
relations, a better dialogue between Kabul and Islamabad, and
some sense that we are also simultaneously, with the war
effort, looking for other ways to move this process forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Holbrooke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of State,
Washington, DC
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, thank you for this
opportunity to provide an update on our efforts in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Tonight I depart for Islamabad, and then will travel on to Kabul,
and New Delhi. This will be my 14th visit to Pakistan in the past 19
months. In addition to meetings with key leaders on a range of topics,
I will join Secretary Clinton when she leads the U.S. delegation to the
Kabul Conference. While the Kabul Conference has attracted more
international attention, we have seen a significant intensification of
our dialogue with Pakistan, where we have convened 13 successful
Strategic Dialogue Working Group meetings over the past 2 months. These
meetings followed the March 24-25 U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue in
Washington, and the Secretary's highly successful visit to Pakistan in
October 2009. The Kabul Conference and other upcoming events--including
another Afghanistan-Pakistan-United States trilateral meeting later
this year--are part of a series of milestones concluding with the
administration's planned assessment of our progress in December 2010.
As President Obama reiterated just a few weeks ago, our Core Goal
in Afghanistan and Pakistan is clear: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al-Qaeda, and prevent its return to both countries. I participated in
the fall 2009 policy review. And in close consultation with Secretary
Clinton, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, General Petraeus, Ambassadors
Eikenberry and Patterson, and Dr. Shah, my interagency team has been
working tirelessly to help implement the President's strategy. We face
huge implementation challenges on the ground. But our political and
diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other influential
countries has evolved significantly since my first official visit to
the region in January 2009, bringing us closer to facilitating a
durable and favorable resolution of the conflict.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in Pakistan, where we have seen
a steady improvement in our bilateral relationship. As members of this
committee have recognized, what happens in Pakistan has tremendous
implications not only for our goals in Afghanistan, but also for the
stability of South-Central Asia and for U.S. national security. We have
been pursuing three objectives simultaneously in Pakistan: (1)
Enhancing stability (political, economic, and security); (2) supporting
Pakistan's offensive against extremists who threaten Pakistan and the
United States; and (3) encouraging a closer relationship between
Islamabad and Kabul. Through a carefully calibrated approach, we are
seeing signs of progress. For the first time in more than a decade, we
recognize and are engaging the people of Pakistan on their legitimate
interests and priorities, even as we encourage greater collaboration in
areas of mutual interest.
Politically, Pakistan's civilian and military leaders have settled
into a relatively stable equilibrium as a result of recent
constitutional reforms. The upgraded and intensified U.S.-Pakistan
Strategic Dialogue, which Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister
Quereshi convened in March, has provided a framework to engage Pakistan
on mutual priorities and assisted the Pakistani Government in
structuring reforms crucial to long-term stability.
Economically, Pakistan's leaders have made many tough decisions
necessary to meet the mutually agreed conditions of the IMF's Stand-by
agreement. As a result Pakistan has shifted from economic crisis to a
period of economic recovery. Other tough decisions and reforms will be
necessary to ensure that Pakistan remains on the path toward economic
self sufficiency. Our overhauled assistance programs, made possible by
the landmark Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, will help
reinforce these reforms in areas such as energy. They also will further
improve our relationship with the Pakistani people by signaling our
support for addressing Pakistan's most pressing problems.
These programs would not have been possible without this
committee's leadership. We have been engaged in a substantive dialogue
on how to best structure our assistance to maximize its impact, and I
look forward to continued close collaboration as initial Kerry-Lugar-
Berman funding comes online. Equally important is passage of
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation, which would further
bolster our efforts to stabilize Pakistan's border areas by creating
licit economic opportunities. ROZs would also support Pakistani
reconstruction efforts in the border areas by stimulating economic
opportunity.
On counterterrorism issues, Prime Minister Gilani and President
Zardari have united the Pakistani people--including the opposition--
behind the Pakistani military's offensive in the tribal areas. We
cannot forget that the Pakistani people and armed forces have made huge
sacrifices as part of this fight. In the past month alone, scores of
innocent Pakistanis have been killed or wounded in suicide attacks.
Hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis have also had their lives upended.
As Secretary Clinton emphasized during her October 2009 visit and
again at the March Strategic Dialogue, the American people will
continue to stand by the Pakistani people in their time of need. We are
proud to be the world's largest provider of assistance to displaced
Pakistanis and we will build on that support, as I announced during my
June visit to Pakistan. USAID and State are continuing to provide a
range of stabilization assistance in post-conflict areas. We appreciate
this committee's support for innovative approaches to ensuring that
this assistance reaches Pakistani communities most affected by violence
and most in need of our support. Through this assistance and new mobile
and radio communications programs, we are helping the Pakistani people
to overcome the extremist narrative and end the cycle of extremist
violence.
Our focused security assistance and close cooperation with the
Pakistani military are, of course, critical tools for building
Pakistani counterinsurgency capabilities and shaping Pakistan's
counterterrorism operations. Even as we increase our civilian
assistance levels, I believe we must maintain our security assistance
and adapt it to emerging needs.
Perhaps the most significant Pakistan-related development since
January 2009 has been its improved relationship with Afghanistan.
Recognizing that Pakistan's and Afghanistan's futures are intertwined,
we have consulted closely with both governments on our strategy.
Through the trilateral process, we have facilitated a significant thaw
in relations between Islamabad and Kabul and encouraged progress on
regional economic integration. There is not yet strategic symmetry on
all topics, but the thawing of differences should create additional
opportunities as our regional diplomacy and political strategy
develops. Significantly, Pakistan's leaders now publicly acknowledge
the cross-border nature of the extremist threat and that Afghan
stability is in Pakistan's interest. Meanwhile, we have also welcomed
the resumption of more frequent high-level dialogue between New Delhi
and Islamabad, which should benefit regional stability.
Across the border, the July 20 Kabul Conference will provide an
opportunity for the Afghan Government to offer concrete plans to
benefit the Afghan people. This is the first major international
conference held in Afghanistan since the 1970s and an important step
toward greater Afghan ownership and sovereignty. We expect that
President Karzai will address commitments he made in his November 2009
inaugural address and at the January 2010 London Conference--including
on topics such as on governance and accountability, rule of law, and
economic and social development.
Among the most important announcements will be the formal launch of
an operational reintegration program, supported by an international
trust fund. Additionally, the Department of Defense has been authorized
to spend up to $100 million to support initial Afghan reintegration
efforts. Achieving a durable and favorable resolution of the conflict
will require the Afghan Government to increasingly address the Afghan
people's grievances and economic needs. This includes the sizable
number of insurgents who are not affiliated with al-Qaeda and have been
attracted to the insurgency for nonideological reasons. President Obama
discussed reintegration and reconciliation with President Karzai when
he visited Washington in May. We welcomed the Afghan Government's plan
to host a Consultative Peace Jirga with a representative group of
Afghan society to discuss the details of this reintegration plan and
broader outreach efforts. We are now supporting the Afghan Government's
efforts to implement several Jirga outcomes.
During President Karzai's recent visit, President Obama reiterated
that our support for Afghan-led reintegration and reconciliation is
based on a shared commitment to full transparency and basic principles.
Insurgents must: (1) cut ties to
al-Qaeda; (2) cease violence against the Afghan state; and (3) accept
the Afghan Constitution, including its protections for human rights and
women's equality. Our position on this last point is unambiguous.
Afghan-led peace efforts must not be a vehicle for reversing the
progress of Afghan women and girls since 2001. As Secretary Clinton
reiterated during President Karzai's visit, ``it is essential that
women's rights and women's opportunities are not sacrificed or trampled
on in the reconciliation process.'' We will not abandon Afghanistan's
women.
Another important outcome of the Kabul Conference will likely be
the announcement of a joint NATO-Afghan Government provincial
transition plan. In April, ISAF partners and allies endorsed a
decisionmaking framework to discuss with the Afghan Government. NATO
Senior Civilian Ambassador Mark Sedwill has been coordinating with
Afghan ministers to outline a detailed mechanism. Transition will not
be a single event, nor will it represent the end of the international
military and civilian assistance to the Afghan Government in a
particular province. Instead, transition will be a process by which the
Afghan Government assumes greater responsibility for security. As
conditions improve on the ground, the Afghan Government will be able to
provide improved services in key districts at the subnational level.
In this context, it is also important to understand the meaning of
July 2011. As President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Secretary Gates
have made clear, July 2011 is not a withdrawal date for all U.S. combat
forces. In the President's words, we will not ``be switching off the
lights and closing the door behind us.'' While in July 2011 we will
begin reducing U.S. combat troop levels, the size of and timing of any
reduction in forces will be determined after a thorough assessment that
will account for the views of the Afghan Government, as well as our
ISAF allies and partners. The eventual pace of the reduction in U.S.
combat troops will depend on the conditions on the ground. And even
then, our partnership with the Afghan Government and Afghan people will
not end.
As President Obama explained during his joint press conference with
President Karzai on May 12, ``Even as we begin to transition security
responsibility to Afghans over the next year, we will sustain a robust
commitment in Afghanistan going forward . . . will partner with the
Afghan people for the long term--toward a future of greater security,
prosperity, justice, and progress.'' The shape of this long-term
commitment will be clarified in coming months as we negotiate a new
Strategic Partnership with the Afghan Government. The Strategic
Partnership will provide a framework for transitioning to a more normal
bilateral relationship with the Afghan Government. Discussions will
focus on themes critical to the U.S.-Afghanistan relationship,
including our long-term commitment of security and economic assistance.
We have committed to consult Afghanistan's neighbors and key partners
as part of these deliberations, and will also keep Congress fully
informed.
Equally important will be a sustained international commitment to
supporting the Afghan Government. Parallel to our negotiation of a new
U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, we will consult with our ISAF
allies and partners, encouraging them to publicly commit to: (1)
continued assistance for training and equipping Afghanistan's security
forces; and (2) providing long-term development assistance. This long-
term commitment is the only way to ensure that our gains are durable
and that Afghanistan does not once again become a safe haven from which
extremists plot attacks on our homeland.
Prudent planning for the future should not be mistaken for a lack
of commitment to our ongoing civ-mil efforts. I outlined our civilian
initiatives when I appeared before this committee in January and
presented the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy.
Over the past 6 months, General Petraeus and I have further
synchronized our civilian and military plans by continuing a series of
civilian-military coordination sessions. In April, we convened for 2
days in Kabul with the entire civ-mil Embassy-ISAF team, President
Karzai, and his senior ministers to review our progress and further
refine our programs. We agreed to reconvene in this format again in
October. As General Petraeus has now transitioned to a new role as
COMISAF, our close collaboration has intensified on a range of issues,
including support for Afghan-led reintegration and a sustainable
approach to increasing electricity production for Kandahar.
Like many of you, I have traveled outside of Kabul over the past 6
months to see our civ-mil efforts firsthand. Contrary to some press
accounts, our civilians have surged. More than 1,000 USG civilian
employees from 10 departments and agencies are now serving in
Afghanistan, with a goal of further increasing the civilian presence by
as much as 20 percent by the end of 2010. Many of these civilians are
deployed on the front lines, working and living in the same dangerous
conditions as our combat troops in places like Kandahar and Marjah.
Each civilian in the field often employs up 10 Afghan partners. They
are engaged in a range of activities, from rebuilding Afghanistan's
once vibrant agricultural sector, to working with key Afghan ministries
to improve provision of health, education, justice, and other services
outside of provincial capitals.
We have committed to be providing enhanced levels of oversight and
to working with the Afghan Government to improve the transparency and
accountability of its ministries. Key to these efforts has been a
reduction of our reliance on large international contractors and
establishment of an accreditation process for Afghan ministries to
receive increased direct assistance if they improve transparency,
oversight, and accountability. These measures help us manage the risk
we assume by working in such a complex environment.
We have also engaged in a clear-eyed discussion with President
Karzai on the challenges of corruption--including on the question of
how the United States and other international donors can ensure that
our contracting practices do not contribute to it. President Karzai
identified corruption as a major concern in his inaugural address and
we support steps he has taken to begin addressing this problem. These
include issuing a Presidential Decree in March 2010 that provided the
USAID-supported High Office of Oversight additional investigative
powers. It also outlined a process, which we are supporting, for
establishing a Monitoring and Evaluation Committee on corruption
comprised of Afghan and international experts. Along with other U.S.
assistance to the Major Crimes Task Force and Afghanistan's judiciary,
we are helping the Afghan Government implement additional safeguards
aimed at reducing corruption.
For sure, we face many other challenges to achieving our civilian
goals in Afghanistan, including a resilient insurgency and limited,
albeit increasing Afghan Government capacity. But we are beginning to
see initial results from our new strategy in several areas. We plan to
provide a more detailed overview of these results later this year, but
let me cite a few brief examples:
USAID's agriculture voucher program, launched in September
2009, has distributed wheat seed to more than 366,000 farmers,
trained 80,000 Afghan farmers in best practices, and employed
over 70,000 Afghans on short-term rural infrastructure
projects. In many places throughout the Afghanistan's south,
these programs are increasingly being administered under the
auspices of the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, whose extension
agents receive training from forward-deployed USDA and UAID
agriculture advisors.
In 2009, we shifted our counternarcotics strategy away from
eradication, which did little to reduce poppy cultivation and
pushed poor farmers into the Taliban's hands. Our new
counternarcotics strategy is comprehensive, combining: law
enforcement; intelligence; interdiction; demand reduction;
regional coordination; and alternative livelihoods programs.
Since implementing it, we have seen significant increases in:
the number of drug labs destroyed; the numbers of drug
traffickers arrested; the amounts of opium, poppy, heroin, and
morphine base seized; and the number of joint operations with
Afghan forces. Civilian DEA agents are helping to train Afghan
Counternarcotics Police, and working with Afghan personnel to
identify and destroy narcotrafficking networks. In the first
quarter of 2010, international and Afghan forces conducted 56
military and law-enforcement interdiction operations in
Afghanistan, largely in the south. These operations destroyed
16.3metric tons (MT) of opium, 195 kilograms of morphine, 1.2
MT of heroin, 9.8 MT of hashish and, 10.1 MT of precursor
chemicals.
We are working to restore cellular service in areas where
the Taliban has destroyed or deactivated towers. One of our
civilians embedded with the Marines in Nawa, Helmand province
reported that soon after a local cell tower resumed operation
``three cell phone shops opened in the district bazaar and SIM
cards were available in the whole of the district--without
involvement from the Marines or U.S. civilians. Farmers now
call their relatives in the district and provincial capitals to
see if prices make it worthwhile to transport their goods.
Families can warn each other about influxes of Taliban or mines
on the road.'' Cell service has recently been extended to
Marjah and Garmsir, with similar economic and security
benefits. In the coming months, ISAF and our Embassy will work
to create a backup network in areas where the Taliban shuts
down private carriers. This will provide uninterrupted access
for Afghans, improving security for communities as well as our
own civilian and military personnel.
Indeed, Afghans in areas previously dominated by the Taliban are
slowly supporting the Afghan Government. They are appreciative of the
improvements that our civilian programs are bringing to their
communities. When I met with a group of elders during my recent visit
to Marjah, they expressed gratitude for our agricultural support. They
also underscored the great personal risks they were undertaking to
stand up against the Taliban.
Ultimately, our goal is to empower the Afghan Government so that it
is in the strongest possible position as Afghan-led political and
economic efforts move forward. This will require continued progress by
the Afghan Government and continued international support. It is
important to remember that we are not alone in this endeavor. Since
President Obama spoke at West Point on December 1, ISAF allies and
partners have provided roughly 10,000 additional troops and several
hundred additional trainers to support security efforts. More than 60
countries are providing civilian assistance to Afghanistan. Under the
highly capable leadership of U.N. Special Representative Staffan de
Mistura and Ambassador Sedwill, members of the international community
are increasing their coordination on the ground and in the
implementation of their programs. They are focusing on Afghan
priorities and implementing them in a way that builds Afghan Government
capacity.
Simultaneously, we are engaging India, Russia, China, and the
Central Asian republics to discuss ways that they can support regional
stability while ensuring their legitimate interests. And building on
President Obama's June 2009 speech in Cairo, my team has made it a top
priority to increase Muslim countries' support for Afghanistan. Their
contributions carry political weight beyond providing positive effects
on the ground. To cite only a few of many examples:
The UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have posted their first
resident Ambassadors to Kabul. Seven Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC) countries participate in the international
SRAP support group.
Turkey has greatly expanded its training of the Afghan
National Security Forces.
The UAE has expanded financial assistance and is funding
several innovative initiatives.
Malaysia and Egypt have committed important medical
resources. It is hard to overstate the practical and symbolic
influence of Muslim women doctors treating Afghan patients.
As President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and General Petraeus have
emphasized, our civilian mission is crucial to the progress of our
overall strategy in Afghanistan. Additionally, our civilian programs
provide a foundation for our long-term commitment to helping the Afghan
people rebuild from 30 years of endless war. While our military mission
in Afghanistan is not open-ended, our civilian commitment will endure
long after our combat troops come home. It is essential that we remain
focused on our objectives and adapt our strategy to conditions on the
ground, while also allowing time for our new programs to demonstrate
progress.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
look forward to a continued dialogue on these issues and am pleased to
take your questions.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke.
I think we'll go with 7-minute rounds. We have a fair
number of Senators, and I want to give everybody a chance to
get their questions in.
Share with us, if you would, what you see as the major
impediments to a more rapid sense of progress in the governance
issues, the local governance issues, as well as the top-down
Kabul-to-the-local-districts components of this. And
particularly, looking at something like the Marjah offensive
and the lessons we might learn from that, what can you share
with us, marks a sign of progress there, and--and/or what are
the hurdles that you're struggling through that you see the
potential of resolving with respect to that?
Ambassador Holbrooke. The impediments, Mr. Chairman, are
extraordinary. The sheer capacity of the government and its
personnel, the risks that----
The Chairman. I assume you mean the absence of capacity.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes. The sheer capacity problem. To
get qualified Afghans, after 30 years of war, is very
difficult. A handful--a relative handful of people from the
diaspora have returned to help their country, but there's so
much talent, at countries like the United States and others, of
Afghan Americans who are living here, I would love it if more
of them would help their government. But, to go back and work
for the----
The Chairman. Why are they not?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Some did, but it's a very difficult
problem. It's very dangerous. They're frustrated by the
government structure. Corruption has been an impediment. And
they're giving up a wonderful life here. We've talked to them.
Some have--as you know, have gone back. Human resources is the
most important variable.
You know, Ashraf Ghani has said to us, and I'm sure to you,
that if you had 6,000 well-trained people, you could change it.
Second, the immense poverty of the country, the poorest
non-African country in the world; the corruption issue; the
history of the country; the illiteracy rate. You take the
police, for example. For 7 years, for reasons I cannot
understand, the United States participated in training Afghan
police, at vast expense, without giving them literacy training.
We were turning out police with 88 percent illiteracy, and it
went right by everyone. I wrote about it, as a private citizen.
As soon as I was given this job, we went at it. And with the
support of my then-counterpart, General Petraeus, we made
literacy training a mandatory part of the effort. But, how
could that have been allowed to happen? How can you have a
policeman who can't read an ID card?
Now, you mentioned Marjah. Marjah's uniquely difficult
because, as those of you who have been there know, while it has
a long legacy of interaction with the United States, it was the
area where the Kennedy and Johnson and--Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Johnson, and Nixon administrations really put in the effort,
and the people down there remember America very fondly. It's
also been ground zero for the Taliban, and it's a very
difficult area to operate in. And what the Taliban have done,
Mr. Chairman, is targeted assassinations. It's a very tough
problem.
So, the effort is multiple. Now, what are we doing about
it? We have sent more than--we have more than tripled the
American civilian presence, while always mindful of the issue
you and I just discussed earlier of avoiding the dependency
trap. We have particularly increased--increased by, in fact,
600-fold--our field presence. When I was in Marjah, 2 weeks
ago, I saw the best civilian-military interaction I've ever
seen in my experiences in wars like this. And I've seen more
than my share. They really were working together seamlessly,
under hellish conditions.
The tribal leaders I met with said, ``We're glad you're
back,'' referring all the way back to the Kennedy-Johnson era,
``but we need agriculture, we need seeds, we need security. And
we risked our lives to come meet with you today.'' And, in
fact, as if to underline the point, while we were meeting at
the tribal shura, two suicide bombers detonated themselves in
the marketplace, who had apparently been waiting for our
delegation, but, when we didn't go to the marketplace because
we ran out of time, they went ahead and did their thing,
anyway.
So, the point I want to underscore, Mr. Chairman, is how
difficult it is in a place like Marjah. That doesn't mean it's
impossible, but it will take time, and it will take resources.
The Chairman. Well, let me ask--if Marjah was difficult, is
Kandahar going to be any easier?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes, I think it will. I think Marjah
was really, really extraordinary. And you've been there, you
know that it is so remote and isolated, and yet it's so--it's
viewed as so critical, in strategic terms----
The Chairman. What I worry about the Kandahar operation is
that, you know, prior to American troops announcing they were
going to go in, there were not assassinations, there was not a
level of violence. The mere announcement has now brought on the
process of assassination and intimidation. And I doubt that
we're going to have a sufficient level of troops to be able to,
``pacify the city.'' I'm unsure of the strategy, to be honest
with you, and I wonder if you can help us understand exactly
where we're heading in that regard.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Mr. Chairman, first let me be clear,
Marjah is not Fallujah. Marjah is not going to be a battle for
the city for exactly the----
The Chairman. No, that's not Kandahar.
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. Excuse me--Kandahar will
not be a battle for the city, like Fallujah. And you, yourself,
just made that point, and I want to underscore it.
Second, General Petraeus is currently doing his own
strategic review. It would be premature of me, not having
talked to him about this issue in a couple of weeks, and about
to see him, to give you a more detailed statement, but I am--
your perception is one that I'm fully aware of and, I think,
basically, has great merit.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Ambassador, as I finish up my time
here, I'd just say to you that if, as you and I believe--and I
think you do--I know you do believe this--Pakistan is central
to the resolution, and if, as we all know, there isn't a
military solution, but you need a political one, it seems to me
that the greatest pressure comes, maybe, possibly, with
Kandahar, but certainly not in the absence of pressure on the
western part of Pakistan, which we're struggling with the
Pakistanis to get to be a sufficient level. But, if that
doesn't meet with some kind of barrier or some sort of military
presence, which I think has been withdrawn from the area to
some degree on the other side of that border, the immediate
part of that border, I think it sort of undermines what we're
trying to get the Pakistanis to do. I'm not sure you can do
both. Maybe General Petraeus has a view of how that can happen.
But, it seems to me that that review is perhaps well, you know,
that it's appropriate.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, let's see what he comes up
with, Mr. Chairman. For our part, our focus on Pakistan is
based on the fact that we recognize--and this has not been
recognized in the past--that Pakistan has legitimate security
interests in its neighbor, with an undefined border, and those
have to be taken into account; but, at the same time, nobody is
saying that Pakistan has the right to determine what happens
next door. It is simply that they--we hope they can get along,
and we've been encouraging that. And we believe that recent
dialogue between Islamabad and Kabul has been beneficial.
As for the situation on the border, General McChrystal, and
now General Petraeus, have repeatedly traveled to Islamabad.
General Petraeus made his first trip, in his new job, to
Islamabad just a few days ago. The coordination between GHQ and
Pakistan and ISAF headquarters in Kabul, virtually nonexistent
a year ago, is now well advanced. Is it as far advanced as it
should be? No, sir. But, it is moving in that direction. And
Admiral Mullen will be also traveling out to the region in the
near future to move that forward, as I will be when I visit, in
a few days.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Ambassador, I want to just
congratulate you on the efforts you've made, which have really
been unprecedented. I don't think I can recall anytime in any
war, certainly not in Iraq or otherwise, where the kind of
coordinated effort took place to bring civilian and military
leaders here to Washington, and to meet in the kind of
concerted way that we did. That several-day meeting, I think,
was exceedingly helpful. The key now is, obviously, translating
it to their followthrough and execution over there. But it
certainly laid some important groundwork.
And I also want to say to you that I think you are really
onto something. The complications of India, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan, we all know very, very well. It is very, very
difficult, with years and years of history, suspicion,
conflict, paranoia. But, if that can somehow be managed, that
may be, by far, the most effective way to resolve this
conflict. I think you know that, and I think you're pursuing
it. But, that is perhaps the avenue of greatest potential
nonmilitary resolution, and I really wish you well with that,
because I think it is critical to the outcome.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Ambassador Holbrooke, at the risk of
oversimplifying the history of the situation, in 1998 we had
two of our Embassies in Africa attacked by, apparently, al-
Qaeda cells. This was a severe shock. But Afghanistan was
different, because al-Qaeda had training camps there that were
protected by the Taliban. From those camps came attacks upon
New York City and Washington, DC. We went to war because the
Taliban refused to give up the al-Qaeda camps, and that began
the war that we're discussing today.
Now, many Americans reading about al-Qaeda today would say
that a good number of them probably reside in Pakistan, and
therefore they would accept the fact that the two neighboring
countries have to be considered together. It should be noted
that al-Qaeda has the potential of basing operations far beyond
the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. For instance, the New
York Times had a Sunday story in their magazine about Yemen.
The suggestion was that Yemen might be such a place. This is
because of, among other things, the country's remoteness and
the central government's continued difficulty in addressing
political unrest there. Others have suggested Somalia because
of the overall lack of governance that has plagued the country
for several years, which has endured in part because of
intruding elements from neighboring states.
The point that I'm making is that we started in Afghanistan
because we thought that's where al-Qaeda was, and we wanted to
disrupt any further activity that might threaten us in the
United States of America. Now, 10 years later, as we've all
pointed out, we are still there. My point in raising these
questions about metrics was--and you've answered this in part--
perhaps in the future they could lend us credible evidence that
President Karzai's efforts have been successful, and that a
central government has been formed which possesses reasonable
ability to maintain law and order within the country and repel
outside forces. They could also quantify that the United States
and our allies are doing a great number of good things with
regard to improving the country's agriculture, strengthening
its economy, and so forth. This is at least a possible
scenario.
But, as you pointed out, it's not quite that simple,
because President Karzai will continually be under pressure
from those in Pakistan who say that, after all, Afghanistan is
a legitimate security interest of ours, not just because it's a
neighbor, but, because it is seen by some Pakistani leaders as
contested territory with their perceived adversary India.
Furthermore, they note that Taliban from Pakistan come over
into Afghanistan and vice versa. Right now, President Karzai
appears to be dealing with some types of Taliban hopefully
trying to define those with whom he can work as opposed to the
other elements that are not willing to negotiate. Even as we
engage in Kandahar and pursue success in our engagement, once
again, at this time it is hard to tell what the definition of
success may be. We will need metrics to quantify, for example,
the effects upon any elements in the city as our operations
proceed and after they conclude, especially among those who do
not wish either the United States or even Afghanistan itself
well.
I'm coming to the conclusion that fighting al-Qaeda through
trying to reform or reshape Afghanistan may not have been where
we should have started or hoped to have finished. The question
is, How do we best address our threats and interests in
Afghanistan without broadening that mandate and move on?
I raise this because at the beginning of the Obama
administration, the President called some of us around the
table. He discussed the withdrawal from Iraq, and some persons
in attendence, who shall remain nameless, said, ``Mr.
President, get a sharper pencil. July 1 of this year is too
long.'' Well, the President stuck to the plan and we are, in
fact, withdrawing. But, right now we don't have a strong
government in Iraq. The Parliament is there, but has only met
once since a legitimate election. This is a tough endeavor, and
similar difficulties will continue to emerge in Afghanistan.
I think we really have to begin to define our objectives
because the wealth of the United States is not limitless, nor
are the casualties of our forces and the number of people we
have available. The thought that we can meander on without
calibrating metrics on the basis of which we can define success
unacceptable.
So, I am hopeful that at some point after the Kabul
Conference, you and the Secretary of State and others will
bring us clarity of what is going to be an acceptable
definition of success in Afghanistan. At the same time, we must
worry about the threat al-Qaeda poses to Yemen, Somalia, and
all sorts of other places. We must also consider strategies, a
different strategy, for dealing with al-Qaeda cells throughout
the world, as opposed to sending tens of thousands of forces
and trying to revamp the country in question. I hope you can
sharpen the focus a little bit as to what might come out of the
upcoming conference. It is possible that clarifying the future
with regard to our efforts in Afghanistan is premature right
now, and that the release of the commander's review in December
signifies the time at which these issues should be addressed.
But, in order to have the continuing strong support of the
Congress and the American people, a better sense of success,
and a real definition of the term as it applies to Afghanistan
are going to be required.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, first of all, there's no
part of your analysis that I would take issue with. Now, let me
address your specific points.
First, quickly, the Kabul Conference. The Kabul Conference
is going to have several focuses, but the one I want to draw
our attention to is the reintegration program, which has
finally been announced, and which is now--the money has been
assembled, a good chunk of money--and we all agree, there's no
final military solution to this war, there has to be a way to
get Taliban fighters off the battlefield, and this is the
route.
Second, you mentioned the December review process. That is
a review process, and the President will look at how the policy
is done and make his own judgments. It would be inappropriate
for me to foreshadow it, but we're ready, thinking--you asked,
earlier, not to wait until December. As a matter of fact, only
this week and last week, I've sat down with my colleagues at
the National Security Council staff, and we've talked about how
to do this. And we will be continuing that discussion in Kabul
next week with Secretary Clinton and myself and General
Petraeus and Ambassador Eikenberry. And, in addition, we are
going to have another one of our civilian-military exercises in
Kabul, in the fall, one that David Petraeus and I planned
before he took his current assignment.
Second point concerns our--the fact that our commitment--
our combat commitment in Afghanistan is not open-ended, a point
you made, which we all agree with. There's been a lot of
dispute about what July 2011 means, and you will--you mentioned
it in your opening statement; you raised some questions about
it.
So, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to address
that absolutely critical issue.
What the President said was clear. He was going to send
additional troops to Afghanistan and then, in July of next
year, he would begin careful withdrawals, in accordance with
the situation, but withdrawals would begin. The size, scope,
timing, pace, and an endpoint for combat troop presence has not
been decided on, nor would it be appropriate to decide on it
when troops are still arriving in the country and when issues
like the situations that Chairman Kerry just mentioned, in
Marjah and Kandahar, are still in a very intense phase. But,
we're looking at it continually.
Second, and most importantly, from my point of view, since
this team behind me and myself have been charged, not with the
military operations, but with the civilian support of those
military operations, it has been stated flatly, by the
President and the Secretary of State and others of us, that
there will be a continued economic and development assistance,
Congress permitting, and continued support for training of the
army and police, Congress permitting, beyond the combat troop
presence.
Senator Levin, in your other committee, has made very clear
how much importance he attaches to it, as have you and Chairman
Kerry and others. I cannot stress how important this is,
because Afghanistan cannot go forward unless the international
community, led by its greatest nation, the United States,
continues to fulfill its commitments in the area, beyond combat
troops. Now, it's obviously much cheaper, and it's obviously
something that can only occur as the police and army are
trained and able to stand on their own feet.
And, as for economic and development assistance, that's
essential. What happened in 1989, when the Soviets left and the
world, led by the United States, just turned its back on
Afghanistan and watched the liberation of eastern Europe, never
recognizing that the fall of communism had begun in
Afghanistan, never recognizing we had a commitment, is a lesson
of history we cannot afford to repeat. And it was a direct line
from the 1989 decisions to 9/11. And we all know the history
here.
So, I want to stress what 9/11--what July 2011 is, and is
not, Senator, and the importance of continuing it.
And, in terms of your saying ``sharpen our pencils,'' I
will take this pencil with me, and it is very sharp, and we
will continue to drill down. As both you and Chairman Kerry
have said, we are fully committed to this effort.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. I'd like to welcome Ambassador Holbrooke.
It's, of course, always great to see you.
And I want to thank Chairman Kerry for calling this hearing
today. It reminds us that our engagement with Afghanistan can
and must extend beyond military operations. I'd like to add,
given the questions raised about whether further changes are
needed to our leadership team in Afghanistan, I think all of us
should think carefully before calling for the replacement of
those whose assessments on the ground have provided candid
insights, including the assessment of our Ambassador in Kabul,
that adding more troops will only increase instability. And I
think the time has come for the President to set a flexible
timetable for responsibly drawing down our troops so that we
can focus on pursuing a sustainable global strategy to combat
al-Qaeda. We've been talking about the countries of Somalia and
Yemen, here, for almost 10 years on this committee, and yet
somehow we get focused on an Afghanistan, we get focused on an
Iraq, and we've never seriously addressed these other places,
despite the repeated warnings that have been available ever
since 9/11.
Ambassador Holbrooke, I'm pleased that President Obama did,
at least, set the start date for the redeployment of the
troops, although I think a start date alone is insufficient.
People in Wisconsin agree. And a new CBS News poll found that
54 percent of respondents now say the United States should set
a timetable for the withdrawal of United States troops from
Afghanistan.
Secretary Clinton, here before us, has suggested it'll take
3 to 5 years to transition control to Afghan security forces. I
think that timeframe's too long. But, I'd ask you to just
comment again--I know you were already saying a little bit in
response to Senator Lugar--but wouldn't it be helpful for the
President to at least lay out a flexible timetable for
maintaining United States troops in Afghanistan, to address not
only the concerns among the American people, but the concerns
among the Afghan population, that this should not be an open-
ended occupation?
Ambassador Holbrooke. First of all, Senator Feingold, it's
a pleasure to see you again. And I'm not entirely surprised at
your question. It's one you and I have discussed before in
other forum.
I have to, respectfully, say that I am very leery of
setting a date certain, made here, for the absolute withdrawal
of our support to the Afghan police and army. Now----
Senator Feingold. But, you heard my question, my friend.
Ambassador Holbrooke. You were talking about----
Senator Feingold. I said ``a flexible timetable.''
Ambassador Holbrooke. OK.
Senator Feingold. I did not say----
Ambassador Holbrooke. But, then----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. A hard and fast----
Ambassador Holbrooke. But, then you talked--OK. So, I want
to be clear, then, so you and I are on the same wavelength,
because it's very important. When you say ``a flexible
timetable,'' you want to set a notional end date, but you're
willing to reexamine it?
Senator Feingold. I don't want--actually, I would rather
not set it; that's not my job. I'm asking the President----
Ambassador Holbrooke. OK.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. The administration--to give
us a vision, with some time guidelines, about when they think
the troops can come out of Afghanistan. No, I think it's much
more----
Ambassador Holbrooke. You're talking about the combat
troops.
Senator Feingold. Yes.
Ambassador Holbrooke. OK. That is above my paygrade. I
thought we were talking about the other parts of our presence
there. But, I think we have to start by understanding several
things about this extraordinarily difficult country that fate
and destiny has placed us in. It's not where you choose to
fight to defend the American homeland. It's the most remote
logistical place the United States has ever fought in its
history, a landlocked country which is very difficult to
resupply in under these extraordinary conditions.
But, given that fact, and given the direct correlation
between Afghanistan and our homeland security--and I should be
more precise; Afghanistan, Pakistan, and our homeland
security--I am very leery about setting an end date at this
point. But, I must leave that to the President after he's done
the review.
I do not have any problem with July 2011, in reference to
the earlier colloquy I had with Senator Lugar. The idea here
was quite clear: to tell the world and the Afghans that we do
not have an open-ended, limitless Vietnam-type escalation. When
I got to Vietnam, we had 10,000 troops. When I left, we had
500,000. At least two members of your committee were there,
under much more dangerous circumstances. And we cannot repeat
that. And President Obama was very conscious of that.
At the same time, I stress again why this isn't Vietnam.
This is about our national security. Vietnam was not. And if
our national security requires us to continue to fight because
you have organizations like the TTP in western Pakistan
training people like the Times Square bomber--luckily, training
him quite badly--and declaring that they wish to target the
United States, in addition to al-Qaeda's targeting, we cannot
be oblivious to that.
Now, both you and Senator Lugar mentioned Somalia and
Yemen. It is not correct--this is not my area, but I follow it,
and it is not quite correct to say the United States is
ignoring it or has no plans in it. We are taking actions in
it--and the New York Times article, which you referred to,
Senator Lugar, was very clear. It began with a drone strike,
which was very effective in taking out an al-Qaeda group in
Yemen. And that article was--it was a very interesting article,
but we--the al-Qaeda and other organizations, like the TTP, are
specifically targeting us, and we cannot ignore them.
Senator Feingold. Ambassador, let me just switch to another
question before my time runs out.
United States civilian strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan pledges support for the Afghan Government
reintegration efforts for Taliban and other fighters. And you
touched on this, but how have the Karzai administration's
efforts at reintegration--the Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Program plan and the Consultative Peace Jirga--
translated, so far, on the ground, in terms of rolling out this
plan in the initial districts where it's envisioned?
Ambassador Holbrooke. The rollout has not yet reached the
provinces and districts, Senator Feingold. That is the next
phase. We do have, as I think I mentioned, maybe before you
arrived--we have put $100,000 with--$100 million, with
Congress' approval, of CERP funds, at the disposal of General
Petraeus and ISAF, to do this through ISAF, but the main route
for doing this--what you and I called ``reintegration''--is
through the Afghan Government and the trust funds, which the
British and the Japanese have led, to which the United States
did not contribute. The Japanese took the lead.
It is our absolute goal, highest priority, to urge and
encourage and press the Afghan Government to fulfill its
already-stated commitment to put reintegration officials in
every one of the contested districts in the country
immediately, and to support them with logistics and make this
plan work. Because every day, under the intense pressure that
ISAF has put on the Taliban, there are people contacting local
authorities and saying, ``We want to get out of this war, we
want to have--we want to have land, we want to have a job
we're--we don't have any ideological commitment to Mullah Omar
or the Taliban.'' And up to now, there was no way they could do
it. And it's only now that, with this program--and the program
is--just been unveiled, so this--again, to me, this is the most
important new development, and this is one of the main things
that Secretary Clinton will focus on, on her trip.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I--and I want to
thank the Ambassador for coming. I know he has a wealth of
knowledge, and certainly has served our country for many years.
A number of us wrote a letter to you, asking for this
hearing--and my guess, is you might have had hearings anyway--
but, the reason we wrote the letter--bipartisan letter--was to
provide Congress and the American people with a definition of
the ``end state'' for our civilian operations in Afghanistan,
clear objectives for the civilian mission, and a detailed plan
for achieving those objectives, and the very specific,
measurable metrics being used to measure progress toward
achieving those objectives.
I have to say, I've been here for an hour and 10 minutes, I
have heard nothing--nothing about that. And, while I respect
the Ambassador--I've heard a lot about process, I've heard a
lot about meetings--I have no earthly idea--no earthly idea
what our objectives are on the civilian front. And I don't know
if you have time to begin doing that right now, but this has,
so far, been an incredible waste of time, from the standpoint
of hearing those.
And I have tremendous respect for you, but maybe we have
the wrong witness. I hope we'll have, maybe, Secretary Clinton
and Eikenberry, maybe Crocker--I know he's supposed to come.
But, could you answer the question that was the purpose of
these hearings in the first place?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I'm sorry, you don't feel that I've
told you what our civilian----
Senator Corker. You've told me----
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. Programs are?
Senator Corker [continuing]. A lot of process. I'd like to
know, with definition, what our end state is for civilian
operations--the very question we asked when we set this hearing
up--is, in Afghanistan, clear objectives for the civilian
mission, a detailed plan for achieving those. I'd like to hear
you talk about that.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well----
Senator Corker. I mean, I'd glad--I mean, we have a lot of
interagency folks here, but I'm not hearing anything that talks
about where we're going.
I'd also like to know how the withdrawal date that's been
set affects that, and how it affects those we're working with
in the----
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well----
Senator Corker [continuing]. Country.
Ambassador Holbrooke. First of all, Senator Corker, I
believe I have discussed our civilian programs in very
considerable detail, within the constraints of time. But we did
prepare a report for this committee, earlier this year, which
was entered into the record, and which I will be happy to enter
into the record again, if you wish, and you can go through
every one of the programs.
The reason I brought my colleagues with me was to show that
this was a whole-of-government and unprecedented effort.
Now, on the specifics, since you want specifics,
Afghanistan is an agricultural country. It exported
agricultural products until 1978 and the Soviet invasion. We
have--trying to rebuild it. This was not being done for the
first 7 years of this war. We have--your committee has given us
a great deal of money for agriculture, and we are spending it
wisely in a joint AID/USDA effort, which Senator Lugar has,
particularly, been involved in--food, seeds, cash-for-work
programs, encouraging alternatives to opium production.
Second, rule of law. We are spending the money you've
authorized for us to create a justice system which can cut into
the Taliban's propaganda about corruption and lack of a justice
system.
Third, counternarcotics. We have ended poppy eradication, a
radical change, because all we were doing by eradicating poppy
seeds--poppy crops--was driving farmers--poor farmers--into the
hands of the Taliban.
Fourth, a major program of subnational governance, where we
are putting aid directly to the district level.
Fifth, a major effort in specific areas, some of which were
alluded to earlier, such as electricity for Kandahar. Senator
Kerry asked earlier about Kandahar. One of the major issues
here is to bring electricity to the people as a benefit of the
international presence.
The whole range of activities we have is designed to
support the country and to support General Petraeus's
counterinsurgency effort. He and I--I was his counterpart until
2 weeks ago, when he moved to Kabul. We have worked intimately
in an effort to create a joint civilian/military effort.
And I am happy to provide you with every detail you wish,
in private briefings, on behalf of me and my team.
Point No. 2, in regard to the end-state issue you raised. I
want to be clear on the difference between ``end state'' and
``exit strategy.'' If we--it--this is my personal view,
Senator, but if we walk away from Afghanistan again, as we did
21 years ago, the consequences will be similarly catastrophic
because of the unique strategic position of Afghanistan and the
reaction that would have in Pakistan, China, India, and the
country to Afghanistan's west--Iran--as well as the larger
region--that includes Russia, Saudi Arabia, India--and even
extending to Western Europe, which is concerned about terrorism
from that region just as much as we are.
So, I hope that, when we talk about ``end state,'' we talk
about a sustainable end state which can--involves continued
American economic and development assistance, and we continue
to fulfill our obligations to train the police and the
military. This will not be cheap, but it will be a fraction of
the money that is now being authorized and appropriated for the
military campaign.
When we will be able to transition to that is impossible
for me, or anyone, to say, but it won't be on a single day; it
will be a gradual process. And that is what the review in
December and the President's decisionmaking will focus on.
Senator Corker. You know, our foreign policy, generally
speaking--I know we've had some rough times over the last
several years--has been something that we've been able to
address in a bipartisan way. And I think that the issues that
you're dealing with, that we're dealing with, in Afghanistan
are incredibly tough.
I still don't--I haven't understood what the administration
was saying in the beginning. That's not to be critical of them;
I just don't understand. I still don't understand. I've met
with you and your staff over at the State Department. It's just
incredibly vague to me. And I think what we are doing--we have
partners, which include the Pakistanis and everybody around--
that--they don't know what we're doing, they don't know when
we're leaving. They think we're leaving shortly, I think. We've
just had colleagues who have come from there. We've got a
President there that's having to play both sides, because he
wants to survive, because he doesn't know what our intentions
are. The Pakistanis don't know what our intentions are, I don't
think, and they're making accommodations on both sides.
So, I just have to tell you, I send letters to parents and
spouses, and what I feel, because of this lack of clarity, is
that we are in Afghanistan because we're in Afghanistan, and
that we don't have the will to be successful, and we don't have
the will to leave, because of some of the things you just
outlined. But, I just don't hear any clarity. And again, I want
to support the administration, I want to support you, because
that's what we need to do, as a country, is, at the shore's
line, let the partisanship that--but, I have to tell you, as a
person who wants to do that, I still don't understand. OK? And
I have average intelligence.
So, I would ask you to please--or maybe let's have some
witnesses in here that can shed more light or be more specific.
But, I don't understand, and I'm very concerned, and I think
we're sending a lot of mixed signals. And I think there's a lot
of dissension, actually, as I listen to you, even within the
administration itself; and that has to end.
And I'd just ask you, please--you have a lot of
experience--help us understand. You haven't done that today.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well----
Senator Corker. And I would ask the chairman to please have
some witnesses come in and explain to us what the end state is,
what we can envision Afghanistan being whenever this withdrawal
does take place, because I still do not understand. We've
changed it. Now it's sort of a degraded country, where they
have conflict, but it's not out of control. I mean, the bar
continues to change.
And I'm just concerned, as an individual; and yet, I want
us to be as--if we can, all on the same page, as much as
possible; but, I think, to do that, this has got to be much
clearer than has been outlined.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, I'm sorry that my answers
don't fully satisfy you, but I want to be very clear on this,
because I understand your comments, and I respect them.
First of all, the core question, the one you're asked by
your constituents and I'm asked by everybody, ``Why are we in
Afghanistan?'' The short, simple answer is: 9/11, direct
threats to our national security interests, and the fact that,
while our enemies against our homeland are on the Pakistani
side of the border, this is a single struggle, and we have to
strengthen the Afghan Government and teach it to stand on its
own feet over time, so that we can move forward while we do
other things, that fall outside the scope of this hearing, to
dismantle, deter, and defeat al-Qaeda.
Now, if you do not believe that it's a threat to the
homeland, then we have an honest difference of opinion. But, I
think the Times Square bombing incident shows clearly how
dangerous that situation is.
Second, on the civilian mission, again, it's in support of
a single civilian/military counterinsurgency mission. And we
have benchmarks, requested and required by the Congress and
submitted to you, and our overarching goal here is always the
same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda, and prevent
its ability to threaten the United States. And we believe, all
of us--and there is no division on this in the executive
branch--that the situation we face out there is a direct
threat. We believed that before the Times Square situation
occurred, and I don't think anything could have proved it more
vividly.
And to achieve this, we have to degrade the Taliban, as
well, because they are part of the enemy's structure--a
different part, but an integral part--that we face.
Now, the Afghan Government doesn't yet have the capacity to
deal with this on its own. How could they, after 30 years of
war? And so, the civilian part of it, the things I've just
mentioned to you--police, government capacity, rule of law,
subnational government, training provincial officials, women's
empowerment, and a whole series of other major issues--are part
of our civilian programs, and we're happy to come back up to
your office--we appreciated your visit to us--and continue this
dialogue.
Our civilian strategy is designed from keeping al-Qaeda at
bay, and it's designed to help Afghan institutions establish
conditions for stable governance. Our plan has these
benchmarks, which have been briefed to you and your colleagues,
and we're happy to discuss them in detail at any time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you very much for your
extraordinary service. We appreciate it very much. Always
appreciate your appearing before our committee.
I want to, first, ask a followup question to Senator
Feingold. We talk a lot about the July 2011 and the--as you put
it, the beginning of a careful withdrawal. Well, the President
made this announcement in late 2009. Can you just give us an
update whether we are on target, as the administration had
envisioned when these statements were made in late 2009, as to
the careful withdrawal of our troops, or are we ahead of
schedule? You seem to be somewhat optimistic on some of the
progress that had been made, but would you--would you say that
we are meeting the expectations that the administration set out
when the President addressed this issue in late 2009?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Are you talking about the December 1
speech, the West Point speech?
Senator Cardin. Correct.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, I appreciate your personal
comments. In regard to your question, I do not want to give a
optimism/pessimism report to you of that sort at this time. I'm
about to go back out there again on my 15th trip. I'd like to
report back. I think that there--significant elements of
movement forward, in many areas, but I do not yet see a
definitive turning point in either direction. And we now have a
new and a tremendously dynamic commander on the ground--General
Petraeus--and I'm looking forward to seeing him, for the first
time in his new capacity. And I do--simply do not have a
personal judgment on that issue now.
Senator Cardin. Well, I do think we're entitled to be
informed as to how well we are meeting the expected schedule
that the President obviously had in mind when he gave his
speech in December.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, excuse me for interrupting, I--
perhaps we had a miscommunication. As I mentioned to Senator
Corker in my previous answer, we have put forward the
benchmarks, which you requested. We've briefed on those, and
those go through the specific criteria, point by point by
point.
Senator Cardin. No----
Ambassador Holbrooke. And we can go back over them.
Senator Cardin. No----
Ambassador Holbrooke. I thought you were addressing a--kind
of a larger----
Senator Cardin. No, I was----
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. Almost intuitive answer.
Senator Cardin. Well, what I'm trying to get is that--
obviously, the President had certain expectations in mind as to
where we would be in July 2011, when he made his speech in
December 2009. I'm just trying to figure out whether we're on
schedule to meet the expectations that the administration had
when the speech was given.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I guess my simplest answer to you
would be, in some areas we're ahead of schedule, in other areas
we're on schedule, in other areas there's much to be desired.
And the--for example, the attrition rate for the army and the
police has gone down. That is a really important factor. But, I
honestly don't know whether it's seasonal, anecdotal, or it's
sustained. We won't know for a while. That's why the President
did not--does not want to pull this tree up by the roots every
month and reexamine it. It has to nurture.
General Caldwell, in charge of the training, is in constant
touch with us, and he's reporting how they're moving forward.
Nothing is more important than getting the police and army up
to sustainability.
On the other hand, as the colloquy with Senator Kerry
indicated, in Marjah there are not enough judges, there are not
enough local police yet, and people are being assassinated.
And, as General McChrystal said publicly, Marjah is not gone
quite at the pace expected, but it's moving forward, in the
estimation of ISAF.
So, you have to take these, issue by issue. There is no
single answer, yet, to this extraordinarily complicated
situation.
The elements that I stressed in my opening statement, sir,
involving the progress in Pakistan, should not be neglected.
Pakistan is at least as important to our national security.
Senator Cardin. And I understand that, and I understand
that's not an easy issue. I'm just trying to judge whether we
can expect the careful withdrawal that will begin in July,
whether we're on target to accomplishing that.
Let me go on to the second point, and that is--we all talk
about the ability of Afghanistan to control--that is, the
security of its own people and to run a country with good
governance and respect for human rights. I've expressed,
previously, my concern that the United States aid and the
international aid not be a source of funds for corruption in
Afghanistan, that there be accountability in these funds. And I
know that the administration has set up certain
accountabilities on the funds that are being made available.
I would like to add to that the information that
Afghanistan has mineral wealth, and whether we are certain that
these are not just fungible dollars, and therefore, the
international assistance and United States assistance could be
a source to fund a corrupt regime which robs the country of
good governance which is absolutely essential. How can you
assure me that we're making progress on the funds getting to
its intended purpose and not being used for corruption?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, just one point on your
previous question. I think I may have answered part of the
question you asked prior to your arrival. I want----
Senator Cardin. I was here from the beginning.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Oh, OK, then I----
Senator Cardin. Promise, the whole time.
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. Apologize. But, I want
to underscore that the pace and scope of the drawdowns will
depend on the situation.
Senator Cardin. I heard you say that.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes, OK.
On the accountability and mineral wealth problems--very,
very important issues--on accountability--and this committee
has been really aggressive in pushing us on this, and we share
your concern. When we came into these jobs, about 8.8 percent
of all the aid money was going through the government, so 91
percent was bypassing it through NGOs, and that was undermining
the government we were trying to strengthen. Yet, to funnel it
all through the government ran the very serious risk of losing
accountability.
So, we set out a plan, a timetable, year by year, to
increase the amount of money that goes through the government.
And we're now up in the high teens, and we hope to keep
increasing it to 30, 40, and 50 percent. But, the
accountability issue is critical.
We have accountability criteria for each ministry. Some
ministries have been certified, others have not. For example,
agriculture, the ministry--our most important nonsecurity
program--the ministry hasn't been certified yet, because we
don't feel their accounting will meet the GAO standards, the
SIGAR standards, our own standards. So, this is a very, very
tough issue for us. But, we have made accountability our
hallmark, while also trying to build government capacity.
There's sometimes a tension between those two.
On the mineral wealth issue reported in the New York Times,
perhaps a little misleadingly, it's not a new discovery that
Afghanistan is a wealthy mineral area. What is, however, new is
that, with modern techniques, the extractive industries can
reach areas that were quite remote. Afghanistan's mineral
wealth, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, is very
substantial. I'm not going to throw the numbers around that you
read about in the New York Times, because I have no independent
corroboration of those. But, there's no question about copper,
lithium, and some very critical, strategically important, rare
earth elements.
And we--the Defense Department has a group, under Paul
Brinkley, a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, that has been
working on this. He has been working with us to work with AID,
Ex-Im Bank, OPIC, and TDA, to make sure that we help the Afghan
people, No. 1, develop those resources for the benefit of the
people, strengthen their own economy through doing it, avoid
the resource curse that has plagued so many oil-producing and
copper-producing nations, and, finally, make sure that the
United States has a level playing field. In the case of the
famous copper mine at Aynak, China dominated that. There have
been all sorts of questions about how they got that contract.
They paid a lot more for it than any Western country would have
paid, and so it was a strategic investment for them. They have
the ability to do that in a way that we don't, and we're
working hard on that.
I would be happy to brief you further on this, but, I do
want to say one last thing about it. Secretary Clinton is
personally engaged on this issue. And if I'm not mistaken,
Ashraf Ghani probably talked to you about it, Mr. Chairman, as
well, because it's a very important issue.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, I'd just urge we have
complete transparency--our government insists--on the mineral
issues in that country.
The Chairman. Absolutely.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes.
The Chairman. We will insist on it.
Ambassador Holbrooke. And we're going to--Senator, we're
also--I think the Afghans are seriously considering joining up
to the Extractive----
Senator Cardin. EITI.
Ambassador Holbrooke. EITC, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Ambassador Holbrooke, I need to----
Ambassador Holbrooke. EITI, I apologize.
The Chairman. I need to apologize; I need to go to a
meeting on the START agreement now. Senator Lugar will chair,
in my absence, and Senator DeMint is recognized. I'll try and
get back, if I can.
Senator DeMint. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you, and your whole team behind
you, for your service to our country. I recognize probably the
most difficult diplomatic situation anyone could work in.
I'd like to ask just a couple of questions related to the
civilian-political side of the equation in Afghanistan. My
question really comes from a perspective of some folks who have
been on the ground in Afghanistan over the last couple of years
to--well, 3 or 4 years--as part of a religious group that's
working through an NGO. And I've got a good friend who's been a
part of that. A year and a half ago, he came back, after a long
stay there, and one of his colleagues had been killed by the
Taliban. There wasn't a lot of security. But, the enemy was
clearly the Taliban. And the people were, at that time, more
looking to the United States for protection. And the folks
working through the NGO were afraid of the Taliban.
He just returned, and I had a good conversation with him
last week after another long stay of working on the ground.
But, the situation has changed and deteriorated, in his mind,
to the point where they fear the government now more than they
do the Taliban, that government leaders are increasingly
speaking out against non-Muslims in the country. And the bottom
line from his perspective is, the deadline is defeating us, is
that the people know we're leaving. Even if we make it somewhat
flexible, we've made it clear that our commitment's not to
finish the job, but to leave.
And this is not my own opinion, but one I'm getting from
people working on the ground, that the people are developing
alliances with the Taliban for protection, and other insurgents
in the country. Government figures are developing stronger
relationships with the Taliban, which is making them
increasingly antagonistic to non-Muslims in the country. And
all the alignment now, on the civilian side, is in expectation
of America being gone. Even the government is moving more that
way.
And we have a situation now where we've got soldiers
fighting and dying there for a government that, if left to
their own devices, might throw them in jail or even kill them
for being non-Muslim. And so, after just listening to the
conversation, first of all, it comes back to what you said
before--and I was glad to hear you say that the deadline--that
you don't agree with a deadline. But, the President, even
though he's equivocated to some degree, has still left that out
there, that that is his goal, to get out. And I agree somewhat
with Senator Corker, in that we have not said, ``Here is what
we are going to achieve before we leave.'' We talk about a
situation on the ground, but what are we going to achieve
before we leave?
But, to--I know that's more of a question--or, I mean, a
perspective than a real question, but I'd just like to hear
your comment on what appears to be a deteriorating situation
brought on by the presumption that the United States will be
gone in a year, or in a year and some time period after that.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I have no doubt, Senator, that your
report of your friends and associates is accurate--a perception
on their part--because I've heard the same things. You hear
many different things about policy, from many different people.
And the President's position has been misrepresented, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, by a lot of people--
journalists, columnists, leading public figures. But, I think
it's quite clear he did not say, ``We're withdrawing in July
2011.'' He said, ``We're beginning withdrawing.'' And you heard
one of your colleagues on the other side question that as being
insufficient. Now you're questioning it as being too far. This
is an issue in which there's a legitimate grounds for
disagreement. But, I did not say I disagreed with the deadline.
What I said was, this is what the deadline means, and the U.S.
military command has supported and accepted this deadline, and
has endorsed it, publicly.
Now, the deadline applies to combat troops. And it's not a
deadline; it is the beginning of a departure. And the size and
scope and end state of that departure will be determined by the
situation on the ground, but it will begin. And that is to
incentivize the local authorities in Kabul to take on their own
responsibility for their--for solving this problem so it is not
open-ended situation.
In that regard, the President will make specific decisions
down the road after the--or--during or after the policy review.
And he will deal with that, based on what he hears from General
Petraeus and the Command and Ambassador Eikenberry and the
Embassy and other people advising him.
In terms of the reaction on the ground, Senator, I have a
slightly different perception--but, again, it's hard to come by
firm data--is--there have been many public opinion polls taken
in Afghanistan, despite the conditions. They're all face-to-
face, because telephones obviously won't do it. Every poll
shows that less than 10 percent of the people support the
Taliban. Less than 10 percent. ARD, ABC, BBC, the Charney
Group, which briefed us the day before yesterday here in
Washington, they all come up with the same number. A lot of the
other people--nobody wants to return to the black years of the
Taliban--the women, especially; they suffered so much, and they
remember it so vividly.
On the other hand, they're not all satisfied with the
services and support they get from the Kabul government. And
Kabul itself, for reasons that go back to the discussion I had
with some of your colleagues earlier, is not always capable of
producing the right kind of human resources, infrastructure,
and programs for this, and corruption and rule of law are huge
problems.
But, if you look at every indicator--electricity, cell
phones, roads, the GDP of the country, agricultural
production--every one of these things has had a dramatic
improvement. Last year, Afghanistan had a 22-percent growth in
GDP, obviously against a very small base. That's nondrug,
legitimate GDP, by the way.
So, I think that the situation is not quite as clear-cut as
you say it is. As I said earlier, there are elements of
movement in many areas. And if you go around Afghanistan, you
see these extraordinary visions of women cooperatives and
farmer efforts to rebuild and undo 30 years of war. We need to
be able to continue to support those efforts as we go forward,
even after the combat troops leave Afghanistan.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, sir.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, sir.
Senator DeMint. Thank you.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Ambassador, we welcome you again, and thank you for your
service to the country.
I wanted to raise an issue that reminds me that--in
Washington we use a lot of acronyms describing programs and
agencies. Unfortunately, there's one acronym I think that a lot
of Americans actually know what it is, and it's IEDs. And we've
talked about this a number of times, and I appreciate your work
on it. There are actually two. It's--the acronym IED, plus the
acronym AN, for ammonium nitrate when we talk about improvised
explosive devices. The question I have--well, let me just first
set forth the predicate.
We've all been concerned about this issue, as you have, and
I know the administration, at all levels, has. We introduced a
resolution a couple of days ago that passed. A number of us
were cosponsors of that--Senator Webb, along with me and
several other colleagues. And what we asked for in that--or, I
should say, what we set forth as the reason for the resolution
was the following: No. 1, urging the Governments of Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and other central Asian countries to fully commit
to regulating the sale, transport, and use of ammonium nitrate,
the main destructive ingredient in the IEDs; second, calling on
the Secretary of State to continue to diplomatically engage--
she and your team has already done this, but more needs to be
done; third, to work with the World Customs Organization and
other bodies on initiatives to improve the controls on IEDs;
and then, fourth, urging the Secretary of State to work with
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and central Asian countries to encourage
and support improvements in infrastructure.
So, the question I have is--I realize that this resolution
has been passed recently, but the question I have is, give us a
status report as to how our government, and especially the
State Department, has been already engaged in fulfilling those
objectives, and what you can tell us about it. Because we have
a basic problem, where you have a legal prohibition on ammonium
nitrate in Afghanistan, but a huge problem in Pakistan that is
both a problem of law, but also a problem of figuring out ways
to stop the inflow of ammonium nitrate into Afghanistan from
Pakistan.
And the numbers are stunning. I mean, we know that it's--
IEDs are the--by far, the biggest killer. Pennsylvania, just
since the beginning of the year, we've lost six soldiers, four
as a result of IEDs. We're over 51 killed in action in
Pennsylvania, and over 270 wounded. So, I just wanted to get
your latest update and give us the benefit of that.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator Casey, I share your concern,
I share your astonishment that so little was done on this in
the past, and I want to commend you and Senator Webb for
continuing to push. And in the privacy of this room, I would
urge you to continue to do it, because this is a really
critical issue, and your public pressure has helped those of us
who share the concern.
The Pentagon has a task force on this--on the IED issue, as
you know, headed by Ashton Carter. And we're working with him.
As far as ammonium nitrate goes--AN--we were successful in
getting the Afghan Government to issue a Presidential decree
banning the import, production, transportation, use, and sale,
and storage of AN fertilizer. However, it is still legal to
bring it in for mining and construction sectors, as you well
know. And that's a major--that's a legitimate use. And there
are not adequate alternatives, except something like dynamic,
which brings similar problems with it.
We do not have enough action, yet, on the Pakistani side of
the border. And here is a perfect example of why the two
countries cannot be disaggregated for purposes of policy. We
got what we wanted on one side of the border, but we haven't
gotten it on the other yet, and Americans are being killed and
wounded because of this. And I can assure you that we will take
this up again when I go to Pakistan in a few days, and other
senior officials go, as well.
I don't know if we need to go any further with that answer
now, because you and I have spent so much time on it. But, I'm
glad we got a chance to raise it in public and to assure you
that this administration has task forces and puts it as a
priority, and we will continue to do so.
Senator Casey. Thank you, and I appreciate that. We'll
continue to push on our end, as well. And I know--I failed to
mention Senator Kaufman was also one of our cosponsors.
I wanted to go to the question of President Karzai. I don't
have much time left, but I do want to raise this question. You
say, on page 3 of your testimony, ``We expect''--and I'm
quoting, ``We expect that President Karzai will address
commitments he made in his November 2009 inaugural address.'' I
and others have been very critical of his leadership, or
sometimes what can only be described as lack of leadership. I
don't expect you to evaluate my analysis. But, I guess I'd ask
you--and I think the American people have a real concern
about--they know it's an uneasy alliance and there are all
kinds of problems, but I guess the one question I'd ask you is,
What are the--how should we measure his performance, based upon
those commitments? What are the signals or the signs or the
substantive achievements or goals that he should meet that you
are most interested in, in terms of advancing our mission
there? I realize that we have been frustrated sometimes, and I
realize that we can't expect perfection, but I think we need
some way to measure progress, and I wanted to get your sense of
what indicators you are most interested in.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I think, in specific regard to your
question, which focused not on the government or the war, but
one individual, I think, as chief executive of the country, the
way to evaluate him is the way you evaluate any chief
executive. Does he lay out a clear program? He did. Does he
fulfill his own deadlines? Sometimes. And are the programs he
lays out effective? Sometimes.
I'm not here to plead on his behalf, or to criticize him,
but only to point out what we all know, which is that he may
have the hardest job of any chief executive in the world,
because of the complexities and poverty of the country. The
programs he has laid into place are programs that we all feel
comfortable with. And the difficulty of implementation, which
has been the subject of repeated exchanges this afternoon, is
one that we just have to keep working on.
And then there's the issue of corruption. And we all
agree--and President Karzai has said this publicly--that
corruption is a serious issue. And he's working on it, and he's
upgrading the High Office of Oversight, which is in charge of
that issue.
It would be unfair, however, to hold any one person
accountable for the totality of events inside any country, even
if that person is the chief of state. And in this particular
case, even more so, with a good chunk of the country insecure,
ethnic divisions, and, historically, a complicated relationship
between Kabul and the outlying regions, which have different
ethnicities to them.
So, I am not--I think he's doing the best job he can under
the circumstances. I know that doesn't satisfy some of your
colleagues, but I do absolutely know he's doing that. And if
the reintegration program gets off the ground, and if it's
successful, it will have a huge effect.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman, one bit of housekeeping. In
response to Senator Corker, Mr. Holbrooke referenced a report.
I'd like to ask unanimous consent that that report be inserted
in the record of this hearing at that point in the testimony.
Senator Lugar. Without objection, the report will be placed
in the record.
Senator Wicker. I think that the context is important
there, and I don't want people who read this transcript to have
to refer back to a previous hearing. So, thank you for that.
[Editor's note.--The report mentioned above ``Afghanistan
and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,'' was first
submitted for the record at the January 21, 2010, hearing on
Afghanistan. It was too voluminous to include in the printed
hearing but will be maintained in the permanent record of both
hearings.]
Senator Wicker. You know, I think, Ambassador Holbrooke,
you have answered a lot of questions today. And clearly you are
an experienced and longsuffering diplomat, and you have
demonstrated that today, too.
Why are we in Afghanistan today, in 2010? Well, we are in
Afghanistan because of 9/11. And we're in Afghanistan in 2010
because we still are not sure that the situation that arose
from Afghanistan in 2001 might not happen again there.
I think you've made a compelling case that there are direct
threats to the United States of America that could arise from
that area. I think you've made an excellent case about the
unique strategic position of Afghanistan and its neighbor,
Pakistan. Clearly, we're interested in Yemen, we're interested
in Somalia, but there are things about the location in
Afghanistan that give al-Qaeda an advantage for being in
Afghanistan that it would not have to have if they had to rely
on a safe haven in Yemen or Somalia.
You've made a very telling statement, Mr. Ambassador, about
the consequences if we walk away from Afghanistan, as we did 20
years ago. And I believe that's almost a direct quote of your
testimony today, that the results could be catastrophic, as
they were earlier because we walked away.
And in that context, I want to ask you to respond, Mr.
Ambassador, to the comments of CIA Director Leon Panetta
recently, when he said that United States officials had not
seen any firm intelligence that insurgent troops in Afghanistan
are interested in reconciliation, which I think we've
acknowledged in this room today, is important if we're going to
bring this effort to a successful conclusion.
Mr. Panetta said this--and you've read the testimony, but
let me quote, for the record--``We have seen no evidence that
they are truly interested in reconciliation, where they would
surrender their arms, where they would denounce al-Qaeda, where
they would really try to become part of that society. My view
is that, unless they're convinced the United States is going to
win and that they are going to be defeated, I think it is very
difficult to proceed with a reconciliation that is going to be
meaningful.'' That's as far as I will quote this President's
CIA Director, and ask you to respond there.
You may feel that the President's position on the July 2011
beginning of withdrawal is clear, as you've said. But I would
submit to you, Mr. Ambassador, that it is not clear to everyone
who listens, and it's not clear to the Taliban, and it's not
clear to the people who feel threatened by the Taliban.
I agree with you, the vast majority, overwhelming majority,
of Afghan people do not want the Taliban back, but they are
legitimately worried about who would fill a vacuum if indeed
they are interpreting the President's position in a way that is
different from the way you are.
We have walked away before, according to your own
testimony. And so, how can our enemy in Afghanistan who might
be willing to acquiesce and say, ``Yes, we want to be part of a
peaceful society and a peaceful government''--how can they feel
that they're going to be defeated if we are sending a signal
that, depending on conditions on the ground in 2011, we might
yet make a decision to walk away?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, in regard to Director
Panetta's comments that you quoted, I agree with his comments.
They are not inconsistent with what I said, because he was
referring to reconciliation, the idea of higher level
negotiations--or, effectively, negotiations--with the
leadership of the Taliban Supreme Shura, also known as the
Quetta Shura. And the press, at the time of his hearing, was
filled with reports--erroneous reports--of deals in the offing.
It just wasn't true. And Director Panetta was trying to clarify
the record. And what he said was precisely right.
I have been talking about reintegration, the program
announced, supported by the United States and the international
community, which is so critical to take fighters off the
battlefield. There's some overlap between the two. But, I think
we all see the clear distinction.
In regard to your other question, you stated correctly the
misunderstandings. All I can say is that the misunderstandings
are, in an ironic sense, enhanced by constant questioning of
the date. The President has been clear on what he said. I've
tried to be clear this afternoon, in testifying before you.
But, some people continually--in the guise of helping the
United States, some people assert that the President is
leaving, when he made clear he is not. He is starting a
withdrawal, and that it will be--the size and scope and pace
will be determined based on the situation and our national
security interests. But, some troops will begin to leave.
That's a big distance from the misperception that both you and
I have seen.
And I understand your point, because it concerns me
greatly. And I never make a speech where this doesn't come up,
and especially overseas. So, I appreciate your comments, and I
take them to heart.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, it is good to see you again. I have great
admiration for your spirit of public service and the energy
that you bring into anything that you do here.
I would also like to say that I identify with Senator
Lugar's opening statement and, to a certain extent, with the
concerns that Senator Corker was laying out that there are a
lot of people in this country who are very confused. And I
think, when you're working on this as intently as you are, the
perception may be different. But, there is a real need for
clarity in terms of what actually can be accomplished through
the way that we are going about this.
We know that we have an obligation to be doing something
here because of 9/11, but we also know that international
terrorism is, by its very nature, fluid and mobile. There were
no real operational al-Qaeda in Iraq when we got to Iraq. They
came and they left largely before we decided to withdraw. We
know that al-Qaeda is active in other countries. We have seen
estimates, from Mr. Panetta, General Jones, and other people,
that the level of al-Qaeda inside Afghanistan is less than 100
people. I know where your jurisdiction is, and I know the work
that you're doing cross-border. But, for a lot of Americans,
this is a very confusing thing.
Also, you and I know, from history, how effective targeted
assassinations are.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes.
Senator Webb. You will recall, when you were talking about
the very beginning of when you were in Vietnam, when President
Kennedy first announced the escalation in Vietnam and the
Vietcong were assassinating an average of 11 government
officials a day.
So, a lot of this talk about people being nervous about our
timeline in Afghanistan, I would venture that a good bit of
them are more nervous about the wedge that is being driven
between them and this government because of the policy of
targeted assassination.
So, all this sort of comes together in a way that, just
speaking honestly because I greatly respect what you're trying
to do and I've withheld any judgment about our policy until
this December review--I said that when General Petraeus was at
his confirmation hearing--but this is becoming more and more
opaque to the public understanding as it has evolved.
What I'm looking for is what we're going to need to see,
what the American people need to see by December are measurable
results in a policy not simply program by program but evidence
of political stability, rather than operation by operation and
an agreed-upon conclusion. I take your point, which isn't
whether we will walk away from an obligation, but there has to
come a time when it will be appropriate for us to withdraw.
We're not going to be there forever.
That's what the American people need to see here. And
that's what I'm going to be looking for. And I wish you well.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, there's almost nothing you
said I can quarrel with. And you used the two words that you
used which echo, and I hope that we all remember, are
``measurable results.'' We--Senator Kerry began by saying
``accountability,'' and you talk about ``measurable results.''
So, we're judging ourselves by that. The President is demanding
that of the military and civilian team that you have had
testify before you.
That's why I'm making this trip. I was just in the region 2
weeks ago. I'm going back. I'm not doing it for the Frequent
Flyer miles. And I cannot tell you how deeply we feel that
pressure, particularly because, as several of your colleagues
have said, American men and women are risking their lives,
sometimes paying the ultimate price, for this policy. And it
has to work. We owe it to them.
At the same time, we recognize, as Senator Wicker said,
that this began with 9/11. We're not there in the way we were
in that other war that you and I remember. And so, we have to
make this work. No one knows it better than the outstanding
general who is commanding ISAF. I've known a lot of four-star
generals in my career, and I've never seen anyone better than
David Petraeus. And he is coming in under extraordinary
circumstances. And he has immediately intensified the efforts.
Just to give you one example, which shows civilian/military
and addresses you point, the very first issue he raised with
us, in his first telephone conversation with Ambassador
Eikenberry and me, and General Lute from the NSC, of civilian/
military, was electricity in Kandahar. You all understand the
relevance of that to the war effort.
We're going to give it our best.
Senator Webb. Well, again I don't want to belabor this. I
just want to be very clear here, I would agree that our
difficulty, with respect to responding to international
terrorism, was illuminated by 9/11. The question I'm going to
be looking at over the coming months is whether we can address
the issue of international terrorism through the structure that
we're putting on the ground in Afghanistan. And that will be
the----
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well----
Senator Webb [continuing]. Benchmark here.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator Webb, I just want to finish
my response, then, by focusing again on what I really actually
wanted to talk about more here today, which is Pakistan. And
you understand why I answer your comment with that comment.
The western part of Pakistan, the lawless areas, are the
epicenter of the issues that threaten our country. They're
directly linked to the Taliban, but they're in Pakistan.
We have made real progress in Pakistan in the last year and
a half. But, the focus is so overwhelmingly on Afghanistan--for
valid reasons; that's where our troops are--that we have lost--
we haven't even recognized the movement in Pakistan, across the
board--economically, politically, strategically--and the fact
that that is an important step forward. You want measurable
results? There's one.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Senator Webb.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke, for being here. And, to
you and all of the folks who are sitting behind you, thank you
all very much for the work that you're doing.
I would like to go back to the issue of reconciliation and
focus on that a little bit. You mentioned, Ambassador
Holbrooke, the polling that has been done shows consistently
that women, in particular, have concerns about the Taliban and
would not like to see them return.
One of the concerns that I have heard consistently about
any reintegration or reconciliation efforts with the Taliban
are that that would be at the expense of women and progress on
women's rights and women's issues on the ground. So, I wonder
if you could talk a little bit about what's being done to
ensure that any efforts at reintegration and reconciliation
will not undermine progress for women in Afghanistan.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I can assure you, as I know the
Secretary of State has assured you, that this will not be
allowed to happen. I could give you many facts on this--in
London, in the conference coming up next week; in the visit
here by President Karzai and his Cabinet--we have--in the
percentage of women in the Jirga--we have--in the National
Assembly--we and the previous administration have consistently
made this a priority issue. On every trip I make, I meet with
women legislators or women civic society groups. They are the
bravest people in the world, as you know firsthand from when
you and I were over there together. And I can assure you that
the United Sates will make sure that they are involved in every
area.
We also have these direct programs. They used to be handled
under contracts. I felt the contracts distanced us too far from
the actual issues, so we eliminated most of the contracts.
There were some complaints, and some of the complaints reached
your committees. So, I want to explain very clearly to you,
Senator, that we terminated as many contracts as we could in
order to give more flexibility and more responsiveness in the
women's programs through the Ambassador--the Ambassadorial Fund
for Women--instead of these long 2-, 3-year lead times for
programs which don't meet the current crisis. This is also true
in Pakistan. I know you've talked to the Secretary of State
about this, as have many of your colleagues. I can assure you,
we will never let this issue out of our sight.
Now, in regard to reconciliation, if you read Secretary
Clinton's speeches on this, and her comments, mine, and, of
course, the President's, we have always made this is critical
variable. If somebody wants to be reintegrated or reconciled,
they have to accept the constitution and they have to renounce
violence, and we need specifically, in any reconciliation
talks, due respect for all minorities and the role of women. It
would not be possible to go back to the black years.
Senator Shaheen. Well, could you, then, talk a little bit
more about how this process might work. Are we on the same page
with President Karzai on how reintegration and reconciliation
will happen? What elements of the Taliban are we focused on?
And what's the role of Pakistan as we're looking at how any
negotiation efforts would go forward?
Ambassador Holbrooke. You're talking about the role of
women or the whole reconciliation?
Senator Shaheen. I'm talking about the whole process, but I
assume that the role of women is part of that.
Ambassador Holbrooke. We're on the same page with President
Karzai on the role of women. But, I would be misleading you if
I said that everyone in Afghanistan society and public life
agrees with that. There are many conservatives who are anti-
Taliban, but have the same views of the role of women that you
and I would object to. And in Pakistan, it's even more evident.
And so, we can never cut down our vigilance on this.
The last three times I was in Afghanistan, I called on the
Ulema Council, the senior religious governing body,
specifically to discuss about these issues, because here are
anti-Taliban people, but they're very conservative. That's a
legitimate part of Afghan society. And many Afghan women
themselves have told me that it's legitimate, in their views.
But, at the same time, we cannot leave it where it is. And we
are constantly talking about it.
Now, on the larger issue about reconciliation, we and
President Karzai have begun an intense dialogue on this issue,
which Secretary Clinton and I will continue on this trip. And
we've had similar talks in Islamabad. But, I would tell you, in
all frankness, that we're in the early stages of those talks.
We couldn't begin them until after the inauguration, after the
London conference, and after a certain sorting out. And, very
importantly, Senator, we want reintegration programs to be out
there and established before we start getting out in front.
That's why Director Panetta made the comments that Senator
Wicker referred to.
And the last point here is critical. The success or failure
of reconciliation efforts will be linked directly to the
success of the military operations. The more pressure, the more
success that General Petraeus and his troops have, the more
likely it is that the other side will recognize the
impossibility of their situation.
Many people come to us and say, ``You ought to have a
cease-fire. Stop it. It'll work.'' I have, based on my own
experience, the opposite view. Military success on the
battlefield dictates the conditions of this sort of process.
Senator Shaheen. So, can you just briefly address
Pakistan's role?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Pakistan's role in reconciliation is
ambiguous and opaque at this point. It is something that we
want to learn more about Pakistani attitudes toward--remember,
we're talking about reconciliation in Afghanistan----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. Not Pakistan's own
relationships. But, they have five major insurgencies going on
in their country: the Afghan Taliban; the Pakistani Taliban,
who are the trainers of the Times Square bomber; LET, which was
responsible for the Mumbai bombing; the odious Haqqani network
group--Haqqani group are the ones in north Waziristan who have
been attacking the American Troops; al-Qaeda itself; and
several other groups. So, their situation is enormously
complicated and unique to Pakistan.
And this is the first time, Senator, we've really had these
discussions in Islamabad. And we're very grateful to the
leadership that has been shown by the Pakistani Government and
its military leaders for the kind of dialogue that is underway
as part of the strategic dialogue that Secretary Clinton and
Foreign Minister Qureshi have headed.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar. Let me intrude for just a moment. The
Ambassador will need to leave for the airport in 15 minutes.
This does allow for two 7-minute question periods, which would
be allotted to Senators. But, I would ask Senators to be
respectful of that. The Ambassador, as we know, is flying
directly to the scene.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. I'll let Senator Kaufman----
Senator Lugar. Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador, I want to thank you for your service. And I
especially want to thank your team. This is tough duty, under
the best of circumstances, and the sacrifices that your team
makes over.
And the second thing I'd say is, I think it's really key--
you know, we kind of gloss over it--it's the civilian side of
this that's going to make the difference in this. I think our
military is performing incredibly. They know what they're
doing. They're doing it well. But, it's going to be the
civilian part of this that's going to make this a success, or
not, in my opinion.
In that--with that in mind, you know, we talk about
benchmarks. One of the benchmarks I've had for the last year
and a half is not just generally corruption, but what happens
when we get the many people we've brought in, our civilian
people, and they start working with the ministries, and they
start uncovering corruption, and they find specific cases
that--they have wiretap information, they have all kinds of
investigative information. So, I'd like your comment about--
there was a June 28th article, in the Washington Post, that the
Kabul government's been derailing these as the cases are being
brought. To me, this is extremely, extremely serious. It goes
right to what he said in his statement. It goes to our success.
Not that there's corruption in general, but that, when you find
corruption and you bring the case, that the case--the people
are either--the cases are being pushed aside or the people are
being pardoned.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Could you just clarify the specific
question, sir?
Senator Kaufman. Oh, June 28, there was an article in----
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes----
Senator Kaufman [continuing]. The Washington Post----
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. I remember it.
Senator Kaufman [continuing]. That says that the----
Ambassador Holbrooke. This is the corruption article.
Senator Kaufman. Well, not just corruption. The article
says that when--they're finding cases. They are checking--
investigating them. They're bringing in the cases. And the
cases are being dismissed----
Ambassador Holbrooke. I see.
Senator Kaufman [continuing]. By the Kabul government. I
mean----
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, I read the article carefully,
and the companion one in the Wall Street Journal. We're very
concerned about it. And I just can't comment on the specifics
of the cases, because I just don't know enough about them. And
I don't think I should comment on internal Afghan ongoing
investigations.
The man they've talked to--mentioned--Mr. Zima, was part of
the bribery case against Muhammad Noor. He was the former
treasurer of Hajj operations. Mr. Noor's boss, the minister,
escaped the country before he could be arrested under the
indictment. Noor himself has been convicted by the
anticorruption tribunal, sentenced to 15 years in prison and a
$900,000 fine. And I understand that the Afghans are commencing
an extradition effort against Minister Chakari.
We have a huge anticorruption effort underway, but it built
on nothing. There was nothing when we came.
Senator Kaufman. No, I--look, I totally----
Ambassador Holbrooke. And so, to set it up has taken some
time. Also, as I said earlier, Senator Kaufman, the elections
really slowed it down. I'm not trying to defend our inability
to have done more on this issue. It is of the highest
importance. General Petraeus and I and Ambassador Eikenberry
all share that concern. And we take that article very, very
seriously.
Senator Kaufman. Because I--you know, there's a general
charge of corruption, and clearly that's been one of the issues
that people have talked about, and I think that's serious. But,
I think what my----
Ambassador Holbrooke. You're talking about Task Force 2010.
Senator Kaufman. 2010?
Ambassador Holbrooke. On the--you mean, on the American
side.
Senator Kaufman. Yes.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes.
Senator Kaufman. So--but, I'm just saying the--to me, where
the rubber hits the road, the benchmark, the civ-mil metrics,
all that kind of stuff--one of them is, when we get our folks
over there, and we bring in good folks from DEA, FBI, and the
rest of it----
Ambassador Holbrooke. Right.
Senator Kaufman [continuing]. And we start to bring cases,
you know, will the cases actually--will the government have the
will to actually bring the cases, is one of the key--not just
general corruption--you know, allegations, discussions,
rumors--but, actually bringing cases. And I think this is
especially true when you go into Kandahar, because I think when
we go into Kandahar, we're going to find many, many cases of
corruption. This is the Pashtun. This is the--the government.
So, I'm just concerned that--I'm going to be watching very
carefully.
Ambassador Holbrooke. You know, Senator, the Anticorruption
Tribunal of Afghanistan just convicted a border police general,
named Saifullah Hakim, and two of his aids, on corruption
charges. He had 800 ghost soldiers on his payroll. This
tribunal's only been in existence for 5 months. It's a direct
result of the efforts of the team that's seated behind me. It's
part of the major--on the U.S. side----
Senator Kaufman. Yes.
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. We have the Major Crimes
Task Force. I don't want to leave you with the impression that
we're solving the problem. But, at least we've identified it.
Senator Kaufman. Right.
Ambassador Holbrooke. We're working on it. It's one of our
highest priorities.
Senator Kaufman. Right.
Ambassador Holbrooke. And this tribunal in Kandahar has a
conviction rate of about 90 percent.
Senator Kaufman. Good. And I'm just--and, as you know, in a
war on counterinsurgency it's a battle between whether the
people respect the government, or not. It's kind of basic to
counterinsurgency. There's a lot of talk, in the committee,
about all these different things that not true. We know what
counterinsurgency is. And one of the things, Do they respect
the government, and will the rule the government? And clearly
this is whether the government do that.
Ambassador Holbrooke. One last point, Senator. Admiral
Mullen, responding to these concerns and recognizing a
previously unrecognized fact, which was, one of the major
sources of corruption was in U.S. military contracts,
established the task force I mentioned a minute ago--Task Force
2010. And I think that the admiral in charge of it is--I think
you met with her--I think that's the admiral you're referring
to.
Senator Kaufman. Right.
Ambassador Holbrooke. And I apologize for not remembering
her last----
Voice. Dussault.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Admiral Dussault. Yes, she has been
into our offices, and we're working very closely with her. And
they--and their Task Force 2010 is really important, and its
task is to review all contracts in order to limit contract-
related fraud. Imagine that a year and--a year ago, this--the
issue wasn't even acknowledged. Not an excuse, and it's not a
solution, but at least we're being open and addressing it
directly now.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
And thank you, Senator Menendez, for yielding. I appreciate
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Kaufman.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Thank you, Ambassador, for your service. I appreciate you
have to leave. I hope you appreciate I have to cast votes on
lives and billions of dollars.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. So, I'll try to make it as quick as
possible.
I remain deeply concerned. I agree that you cannot talk
about Afghanistan without talking about Pakistan. Obviously the
more troops we deploy to Afghanistan, the more dependent we
become on Pakistan for transit, logistical, and other support.
So, as we developed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act
of 2009, I sought to include provisions that would ensure the
United States has, one, a comprehensive strategy to eliminate
terrorist threats and close safe havens to Pakistan; and, two,
to assess the effectiveness of assistance provided, including--
as it relates to efforts undertaken by the Government of
Pakistan--to disrupt, dismantle, defeat extremist and terrorist
groups in the FATA and settled areas.
Now, as of this moment, the administration has yet to
provide these congressionally mandated reports, as the law
calls for. I highlighted that fact in a letter to Secretary
Clinton last week, and urged the completion of those reports.
Have you been involved in the preparation of those reports?
And are you ready to make such congressionally mandated reports
to Congress?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, of course I'm ready to
comply with any congressional mandates, as I have throughout my
career.
Senator Menendez. And have you participated in the creation
of these reports?
Ambassador Holbrooke. With your permission, Senator, may I
just consult Assistant Secretary Verma for a second?
Senator Menendez. Surely.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Because I just need to clarify what
we're talking about here.
Senator Menendez. Surely.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I was not aware of a noncompliance on
a mandated report.
[Pause.]
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, my colleagues believe we are
in compliance with the dates and the deadlines of the
requirements from this committee and the Congress, and that
there was a request for an update. I am not familiar with your
letter to Secretary Clinton. Perhaps Secretary Verma can
address that.
But, I do want to assure you, because it is--not just
because we have an obligation to you, but because it is
everything I've believed in, in my career, that we owe you
whatever information----
Senator Menendez. Well, I----
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. You ask for.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. I would just simply----
Ambassador Holbrooke. And I don't know what we would----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. I would just simply ask you,
and through you to the State Department, reiterate my request
to Secretary Clinton. If you're all in conformance, then
somehow this member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
has yet to see that report. So, I would like to see it, and I'd
like to get a copy tomorrow, if I can. If it's already out
there, then we should be able to have it.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Of course you----
Senator Menendez. I certainly will not vote for any more
money unless I have a clear sense that we are headed in the
right direction or that we are meeting goals and our resources
are being well spent. And I can't do that unless I start off
with the basis of understanding that we have benchmarks, and
those benchmarks are being met. So, I hope we can get the
report. Somehow maybe it missed my office.
I have one other question, and then I'll let you go.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I absolutely--I will commit that we
will--as soon as this meeting's over--will drill down,
determine what the issue is, and locate where it is, and we
will be back to you.
Senator Menendez. Now, one more question. General
McChrystal had a series of comments that he made about our
civilian side overall. Of course, he was relieved of his
command. I just want to know this: Are we all on the same page?
You, the Ambassador, now General Petraeus--are we all on the
same page? Because even being on the same page, it is a hard
battle and challenge to win. But, if we're not all on the same
page, it certainly doesn't create confidence in those of us who
are asked to cast votes here for a continuing engagement. So,
maybe you can reassure me that we are all on the same page,
moving in the same direction, executing the same strategy, and
moving toward a goal that we can collectively have success
with.
Ambassador Holbrooke. It's a very legitimate question, of
course, in light of the Rolling Stone article, which obviously
was extraordinarily unfortunate and necessitated a completely
correct decision by our Commander in Chief, because basic
issues of civilian/military control were involved. And although
it brought to an end the career of a very distinguished and
fine officer, it was necessary to do.
As far as your core question goes, let me assure you and
state again, for the record, that my counterpart, until 2 weeks
ago, was David Petraeus. For a year and a half, we worked
seamlessly, continually. He is now the counterpart, of course,
of the Ambassador. There was never a problem between us. We had
tactical disagreements. But, we traveled around the world
together. We testified before your committee together. And we
forged a common civilian/military strategy. I've been involved
in civilian/military efforts all my career. This is the best
one I've ever seen. And, as I've said before, General Petraeus
is the outstanding senior officer I've ever worked with. And we
are absolutely on the same page when it comes to the overall
strategy and working together. There are disagreements once in
a while, and the press exaggerates them.
The article was a group of ad hominem remarks, some of them
aimed at me, which made no difference to me, in my conduct of
the war, nor, in fact, for my regard for General McChrystal.
President Obama, addressing exactly the point that you raised
in his meeting with us the day that he changed the command, and
then in his public statements, made absolutely clear that we
were all on the same page.
I've done CIVMIL before, and we're in good shape here. And
I am fully satisfied about it. And I will be seeing General
Petraeus in just a couple of days, and we will continue this.
Senator Menendez. Have a good journey. I look forward to
the report.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
And special thanks to you, Ambassador Holbrooke, once
again, for remarkable testimony and responsiveness to the
questions of our members, and likewise pledges to bring
additional materials, as requested, in a timely way.
And we wish you godspeed in your travels. We're hopeful
that the conferences you have will be very productive for our
country, as well as those with whom you are working.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
And thank you, again, for Kerry-Lugar-Berman. It really
made a difference.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, sir.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Questions Submitted by
Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. The U.S. Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization
Strategy pledges support for the Afghan Government reintegration
efforts for Taliban and other fighters. Human Rights Watch, in a new
report, has noted concerns that reintegration incentives, for example,
to mid or higher level commanders, who can bring in combatants under
their command, may be given without proper vetting for human rights and
other abuses. What kinds of mechanisms are in place or should be put in
place to ensure appropriate protections?
Answer. The program document for the Afghan Peace and Reintegration
Program (APRP), which was endorsed by participants at the July 8
meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and unveiled at
the Kabul Conference, makes it clear that the APRP ``is not a framework
for pardoning all crimes and providing blanket amnesty. Grievance
resolution and afwa [forgiveness] will be sought in accordance with
Afghanistan's Constitution, laws and treaty obligations.'' The program
document notes that ex-combatants will be granted political amnesty,
freedom of movement and freedom from arrest for past political actions
only if they agree to live within the laws of Afghanistan and subject
themselves to its treaty obligations. It also states that the Afghan
Government will ``set a legal framework for political amnesty and
forgiveness . . . in consultation with the justice sector, respecting
Afghanistan's laws, Constitution, and treaty obligations, and the
Afghan people's desire for peace.'' The APRP also provides for the
formation of a legal team within the APRP's Joint Secretariat which
will ``align the terms of political amnesty and grievance resolution/
afwa with the Afghan Constitution and existing domestic
counterterrorism and criminal legislation.'' This team will also
provide advice to the Afghan Government including the APRP's High Peace
Council and will ``prepare the legal framework and guidelines for
amnesty and grievance resolution within the boundaries set by
Afghanistan's Constitution and treaty obligations.''
Question. Under Secretary Flournoy, in her testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee last month, mentioned a ``high peace
council or commission, which will be the Afghan mechanism that will
really begin to try to start thinking through reconciliation.'' How
does the Afghan Government plan to ensure broad and effective
representation on such a high council, including by women and minority
religious and ethnic groups? How will it assure the Afghan people of
the representative and transparent nature of such a mechanism?
Answer. The Afghan Government is in the lead on reconciliation and
reintegration initiatives in Afghanistan and they are making every
effort to ensure that the High Peace Council will be inclusive. At the
Kabul Conference they released their reintegration plan, the Afghan
Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), which offers the following
assurances about representation on the High Peace Council:
``The High Peace Council will seek to represent the views of
all Afghans and provide political and strategic leadership to
the Program [APRP]. The Council will be comprised of state and
nonstate actors, women and minorities, military, civilian and
respected individuals, including representation from both
Afghan Houses of Parliament. There will be space reserved for
existing/potential reconcilees within the HPC, contingent upon
their acceptance of the laws of Afghanistan.''
``Afghan men and women will be seated on the High Peace
Council, and Afghan women, victims, and civil society groups
will play a vital role in monitoring the peace and
reintegration process; providing advice to the Government on
how to promote peace that benefits all Afghan citizens and
ensuring that all opinions can be expressed and all voices
heard. The APRP will also promote the role of victims and civil
society groups in promoting constructive debate, building
conflict management and grievance resolution capacity, leading
advocacy for rights of all and ensuring inclusive processes.''
``Social outreach and communications for the APRP will be
conducted at national and subnational levels using contemporary
media, governors' spokesmen, and traditional forms of
communication through mosques and provincial jirgas. The
National Ulema Council--which will be represented on the High
Peace Council--will encourage cooperation. According to the
APRP's program document, ``The communications and outreach plan
will promote peace, and will continuously and transparently
convey information on progress to the public.''
______
Response of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Question Submitted by
Senator Roger F. Wicker
Question. Afghanistan's parliamentary elections are scheduled for
September 18, 2010. What steps are being taken to ensure that the same
difficulties that plagued the 2009 Presidential elections do not
resurface in September?
Answer. The Independent Electoral Commission [IEC], which is under
new and improved leadership this year, is working to address problems
that surfaced in the 2009 Presidential elections. We assess that it is
on track to improve security, transparency, and accountability for the
upcoming parliamentary elections. The IEC is largely on schedule in
registering voters, preparing polling center and ballot materials, and
hiring staff. We are encouraged by the IEC's plans to detect and
mitigate fraud for the September 18 parliamentary elections, some of
which are described below:
--The IEC has developed a number of new security features to prevent
the reproduction and/or tampering of sensitive materials, which
include a unique serial number on each ballot for tracking purposes
as well as barcode readers that will scan the ballot packs and
tamper evident bags.
--As a means of improvement from previous elections, the IEC also plans
to finalize the list of polling centers at least 1 month prior to
Election Day. The development of a two-tiered assessment this year
is a more comprehensive approach for determining and establishing
the list of viable polling centers.
--In order to ensure that there will be no movement of materials prior
to counting, votes will be counted at the polling station, in full
view of political agents and observers. The number of votes cast
for each candidate will be entered both in numbers and words to
mitigate the tampering of the result sheets--another notable
improvement from last year's elections.
We are also encouraged that the Electoral Complaints Commission
appears to be well led. Two of the five electoral commissioners are
international experts--one Iraqi and one South African. Both are highly
regarded.
A persisting problem for the upcoming elections is the difficulty
of recruiting female searchers for prospective polling centers, which,
according to the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), is due to budget
constraints. We will continue to push this issue with the MOI to ensure
that enough female searchers are recruited and trained for the
elections.
Security also continues to be a problem, more so in some provinces
than others. Security will most likely be the ultimate determinant of
voter turnout on Election Day, especially with regards to female
voters, who require extra protection. MOI has also been tasked to
provide police forces to guard female voters, but has yet to do so.
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