[Senate Hearing 111-701, Part 5]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-701, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3454
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
----------
APRIL 21, 2010
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011--Part 5 EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
S. Hrg. 111-701 Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3454
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
__________
APRIL 21, 2010
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
JACK REED, Rhode Island LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EVAN BAYH, Indiana SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Nonproliferation Programs at the Departments of Defense and Energy
april 21, 2010
Page
Nacht, Hon. Michael L., Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic
Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy... 4
Baker, Kenneth E., Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 14
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010
U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AT THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND ENERGY
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson and
LeMieux.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; and Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Dana W. White, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard and Jennifer R.
Knowles.
Committee members' assistants present: Greta Lundeberg,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; and Brian Walsh, assistant to
Senator LeMieux.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Bill Nelson. Good morning. I want to welcome our
witnesses.
The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities is
meeting today to hear from the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and their respective efforts to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials.
We have with us this morning Dr. Michael Nacht, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, and
Ken Baker, the acting Deputy Administrator for Nuclear
Nonproliferation.
Also, we have a group of Russian university students who
are in the United States to further their nonproliferation
studies. They were, unfortunately, able to spend some
additional time in the United States----[Laughter.]
Therefore, they can attend our hearing this morning, thanks
to the ash from the Icelandic volcano. I want to welcome you
all, and I hope this experience in American democracy is
valuable to you.
The President has embarked on a three-pronged effort to
reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and
nuclear technology. As he has said in the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR), ``The threat of global nuclear war has become
remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. The most
immediate and extreme threat today is nuclear terrorism.''
Today, we will discuss the efforts at DOD and DOE to thwart
the goals of these particular nuclear terrorists. Obtaining a
global commitment to stop these potential terrorists is
critical. The United States needs to have the global community,
all of us, working together.
Last week's Nuclear Security Summit, of which I had the
privilege of attending part, with the participation of 47 key
countries, was a good start. Now, that commitment needs to be
sustained. Several countries, such as Canada, the United
Kingdom, and Russia, have been in the effort from the
beginning. Others have come on board since. But, the effort has
to be global in order to be successful. We look forward to
hearing more about the summit from our witnesses.
To implement the renewed focus on securing materials and
preventing proliferation, each of the two Departments has
requested additional funds in fiscal year 2011. We fully
support the nonproliferation efforts, and we also want to make
sure that the additional funds are executable. We look forward
to a good conversation this morning.
Let me turn to our ranking member, Senator LeMieux.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE LeMIEUX
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses for being with us today and
providing their valuable testimony.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
hearing. It's a critical time for our country as the world
grapples with how to manage nuclear ambitions of rogue states
and state sponsors of terror, most notably, Tehran. The
proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, or radioactive
material to rogue nations or terrorist organizations is perhaps
the greatest single threat to global security. So, with these
challenges in mind, I look forward to hearing from the
witnesses about how we're going to confront these issues, these
21st century threats, through nonproliferation.
While the United States and Russia and its former republics
retain most of the world's nuclear technology, expertise, and
material, the Cold War is over and nonproliferation regimes,
practices, and mores of the past 50 years will not thwart the
threats of the next 50 years. The time of mutual assured
destruction is over. Whether we admit it or not, the world has
accepted a nuclear North Korea, and I fear we are prepared to
accept a nuclear Iran. We are hearing today in the news of
Iranian shock troops being positioned now in Venezuela,
something that we have talked about in this committee as an
emerging threat to this country, as well.
We cannot talk about the future of nonproliferation without
discussing our U.S. policy towards Iran, which is focused
primarily on preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses. I welcome our guests today and submit the rest of my
statement for the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator LeMieux follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator George LeMieux
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd also like to thank the witnesses for
joining us this morning and for their many years of distinguished
service.
I want to thank the chairman for calling for this hearing. This is
a critical time for our country as the world grapples with how to
discourage Tehran's nuclear ambitions. The proliferation of nuclear,
biological, chemical or radioactive material to a rogue nation or
terrorist organization is perhaps the greatest single threat to global
security. So, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about how we
are working to make our nonproliferation efforts relevant in the 21st
century.
While the United States and Russia and its former republics retain
most of the world's nuclear technology, expertise and material, the
Cold War is over and nonproliferation regimes, practices and mores of
the last 50 years will not thwart the threats of the next 50 years. The
time of ``mutual assured destruction'' is over. Whether we admit it or
not, the world has accepted a nuclear North Korea. I fear we are
prepared to accept a nuclear Iran. We cannot talk about the future of
nonproliferation without discussing the U.S. policy toward Iran--which
has focused primarily on preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon.
However, the record of the past year is discouraging. It is
difficult to dispute that Iran is closer to possessing a nuclear
weapons capability today than it was a year ago. According to
Lieutenant General Burgess, the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, in his testimony before the full committee last week, he said
that Iran could have enough weapon-grade uranium for one bomb within
the next year. If Iran is allowed to possess a nuclear capability, it
will result in a regional and possibly global cascade of proliferation.
Even the idea of Iran obtaining this capability has changed the
balance of power in the Middle East, in reports last week there is
evidence that the Syrian Government has transferred long-range Scud
missiles to Hezbollah. This is a significantly destabilizing action.
Yet, we already hear some resigning themselves to a nuclear Iran.
But are we prepared to manage this volatile region with deterrent
concepts conceived during the Cold War? Would Iran's capability
embolden violent groups currently engaged in terrorism and subversion
in the region? At a time when the United States is reducing its nuclear
arsenal, can we provide a credible extended deterrence to partners and
allies who do not currently possess a nuclear capability? Given the
possibility that Iran could acquire this capability within the next
year, I hope our witnesses can help us understand how our current
nonproliferation projects and programs can meet these near-term
challenges.
Beyond Iran, it is imperative that the nuclear nonproliferation
regime and the rules-based international order that the United States
and our allies have spent more than 60 years building is both credible
and relevant. Global security relies on the belief that the United
States will meet its commitments and guarantee consequences. I look
forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. We're going to start with
Secretary Nacht, Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic
Affairs, and then we'll go to you, Mr. Baker.
What I would like you all to do--your written statements
are put in the record--is to take 5 or 7 minutes and share with
us your ideas, and then we'll go to you, Mr. Baker, with the
same thing, and then we'll get into some detailed questions.
Mr. Secretary?
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL L. NACHT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Dr. Nacht. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member
LeMieux, and members of the subcommittee. It's my pleasure to
appear before you today to discuss DOD's nonproliferation and
threat reduction efforts, including the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program.
DOD is working hard to build upon our legacy of
nonproliferation and threat-reduction successes, and to expand
and adjust our programs to meet today's proliferation and
emerging threats.
A word about the changing strategic environment in DOD's
strategy. Today, the threat environment posed by proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is complex and
unpredictable. President Obama recognizes the challenges of
today's WMD threats, and he's pursuing a bold agenda to reduce
proliferation dangers and to achieve the peace and security
that comes from a world free of nuclear weapons.
The recent diplomatic initiatives and policy reviews have
increased broad awareness and expectations for the United
States, DOD, and our international partners to work
collaboratively to reduce and counter WMD threats.
We have a threefold approach in DOD. First, we aim to
support and rejuvenate multilateral nonproliferation
initiatives and treaties. Second, we seek to reduce and
eliminate WMD dangers at their source and in transit. Third, we
seek to enhance our ability to detect and respond to emerging
threats. Let me address each of these elements in turn.
On strengthening the nonproliferation regime, we are
accelerating efforts to work with our allies and partners to
rejuvenate and reinforce this regime, starting with a renewed
commitment to the international legal frameworks that serve as
the foundation for our efforts. We're actively working to
strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which is the
cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the
upcoming NPT Review Conference, starting next month, we will
seek an outcome that reaffirms parties' commitment to the
treaty and shores up its three pillars: nonproliferation,
disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
In addition, President Obama has committed his
administration to pursue the ratification of a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), because it restricts additional
countries from developing, acquiring, and deploying nuclear
weapons, and it hinders the ability of nuclear powers to
develop new types of nuclear warheads. We will also seek a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that would ban the
production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.
DOD fully supports these efforts; and, in particular, the
fiscal year 2011 budget request from DOD recognizes the
nonproliferation value of these international agreements. It
aims to fund technological improvements in instrumentation and
software used for detection of treaty violations, such as air
sample monitoring, analysis of seismic events, and improvements
in infrasound detection. These measures will ensure compliance
with the NPT, the CTBT, and the FMCT.
The administration also recognizes the importance of a
variety of multilateral activities and mechanisms that help to
prevent proliferation, such as the PSI. PSI builds political
support for counterproliferation, and it increases cooperation
through multinational endorsement of the PSI Statement of
Principles and participation in PSI exercises, 30 of which have
been conducted since 2003.
The U.S. Government has taken on an important new role this
year by serving as the PSI focal point, providing support,
improving information flow, and coordinating schedules of
international activities among partners, consistent with the
President's desire to turn the PSI into a durable international
institution.
The second element, on reducing and eliminating the
threats, DOD's approach involves engaging in active
international partnerships to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers,
both at their source and in transit. The unprecedented
gathering of 47 states to address these issues during the
Nuclear Security Summit, just last week, represents a critical
step in the President's commitment to secure vulnerable nuclear
materials worldwide by the end of 2013.
Over the years, Congress has expanded CTR's authorities and
created new opportunities for the program to embark on these
important national and international security priorities. This
legislation enables the CTR program to address emerging WMD
threats and to achieve longstanding WMD nonproliferation goals
more effectively and comprehensively. Accordingly, new funding
mechanisms provide DOD with additional resources to think and
act beyond traditional projects and activities. As we move
forward, four broad principles will guide our evolution and
expansion: integration, responsiveness, stewardship, and
cooperation.
This year, we are taking real steps to exercise new
legislative authorities that would expand the CTR program,
across the globe, to reduce and eliminate emerging threats
while simultaneously continuing our important work in Russia
and states of the former Soviet Union.
In accordance with our authorities and with full
coordination with our interagency partners, in consultation
with Congress, we are seeking a determination from the
Secretaries of Defense and State to conduct CTR projects and
activities with new partner countries outside the former Soviet
Union to meet the President's broader nuclear nonproliferation
agenda.
The CTR program is DOD's mechanism to support the
President's initiative, and the requested increase of $74.5
million will support expanded security cooperation with Russia
and additional efforts with new partner countries.
Working with partner countries, DOE and other interagency
partners, and consistent with our Centers of Cooperation
Engagement model, we plan to support a Nuclear Security Center
of Excellence in China and a Nuclear Energy Center with a
nuclear security component in India, as was announced at last
week's Nuclear Security Summit. By using the centers, countries
and agencies involved will be able to provide lessons learned
and an exchange of best practices without requiring access to
actual material or weapon sites.
DOD is similarly expanding our Biological Threat Reduction
Programs (BTRPs), and we are requesting $56.9 million in budget
increase to meet our new global health security requirements in
support of the President's National Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) recommendations from DOD.
In addition to these expansion efforts, the BTRP continues
to partner with former Soviet Union countries to enhanced
biosafety and biosecurity and consolidate especially dangerous
pathogens (EDPs).
Additionally, CTR's chemical programs continue to assist
Russia with safe, secure, and environmentally sound destruction
of a portion of its chemical weapons nerve-agent stockpile that
is most vulnerable to theft or diversion.
The third element of DOD's approach, detecting and
responding to emerging threats, involves improving our ability
to respond to these dangers. For instance, instability
resulting from the collapse of a nuclear-armed state would risk
the global proliferation of nuclear material, weapons, or
technology, posing a threat to our Homeland and the homelands
of our allies. We must be prepared to detect threats and defend
ourselves against WMD dangers. This includes enhancements to
interdiction and elimination capabilities, as well as
preparations to respond quickly to an attack, should our
preventive and deterrent efforts fail.
Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Nacht, I need you to wrap up.
Dr. Nacht. I am just about done, Senator.
Our QDR identifies preventing proliferation and countering
WMD as one of the top priority missions of DOD, and we'll be
working closely with Special Operations Command (SOCOM) ability
to counter WMD operations in establishing a Joint Task Force on
Elimination (JTFE) Headquarters to plan, train, and execute WMD
elimination operations.
Other aspects of my testimony are included in my written
statement in the record.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Nacht follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Michael Nacht
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member LeMieux, members of the
subcommittee, it is my pleasure to appear before you to discuss the
Department of Defense's (DOD) nonproliferation and threat reduction
efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The Department is working
hard to build upon our legacy of nonproliferation and threat reduction
successes and to expand and adjust our programs to meet today's
proliferation and emerging threats.
strategic environment and dod's strategy
Today, the threat environment posed by proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) is highly complex and unpredictable. As Director
of National Intelligence Blair stated in his February 2010 testimony
before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: pursuit
and possible acquisition of WMD will continue well into the future. He
recognized that the Intelligence Community ``continues to assess that
many of the countries that are still pursuing WMD programs will
continue to try to improve their capabilities and level of self-
sufficiency over the next decade. Nuclear, chemical, and/or biological
weapons--or the technologies and materials necessary to produce them--
also may be acquired by states that do not now have such programs;
terrorist, insurgent, or criminal organizations, acting alone or
through middlemen.'' Such an intent to acquire WMD, combined with
powerful cross-cutting global trends of the 21st century--such as
technological advances, an increasingly interconnected global economy,
the emergence of new strains of disease, the persistence of terrorism,
black-market proliferation, and the frailty of strategically important
states--create conditions that allow for dual-use technology, sensitive
materials, and personnel with the scientific expertise to design and
use those technologies to become increasingly accessible to potential
state and non-state adversaries.
President Obama recognizes the challenges of today's WMD threats
and he is pursuing a bold agenda to reduce proliferation dangers and to
achieve the peace and security that comes from a world free of nuclear
weapons. Recent diplomatic initiatives and policy reviews have
increased broad awareness and expectations for the United States, DOD,
and our international partners to work collaboratively to reduce and
counter WMD threats. Ongoing efforts include:
Presidential-led diplomatic initiatives, such as the
G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Nuclear Lockdown Initiative;
Advancement of international nonproliferation and
disarmament frameworks, including last week's Nuclear Security
Summit, the recently signed New START Agreement between the
United States and Russia, and the upcoming Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference;
National-level strategies and policy reviews focusing
on WMD threats, including the 2009 National Strategy for
Countering Biological Threats, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review (2010 QDR), and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (2010
NPR); and
Independent studies, such as the Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, known as the Graham-
Talent report, and the congressionally-commissioned 2009
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study and report titled,
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat
Reduction.
DOD is actively working to implement the President's vision. We
have undertaken a series of policy reviews to develop a comprehensive
approach to advance these goals and we are aligning our strategies and
approaches accordingly. The 2010 QDR identified preventing WMD
proliferation as one of six key challenges faced by the United States,
and it recommended that the United States increase its efforts to
secure vulnerable nuclear materials and expand the biological threat
reduction program. Most recently, the 2010 NPR elevated the prevention
of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism to the top of the U.S.
policy agenda and aligned U.S. nuclear weapons policies and posture to
address these most pressing security threats.
Combined, evolving and emerging WMD threats along with
unprecedented efforts to reduce those threats have raised the profile
and priority of the Department's nonproliferation and threat reduction
programs and tools. As President Obama made clear in his April 2009
speech in Prague, overcoming the twin dangers of WMD proliferation and
WMD terrorism requires a comprehensive approach. DOD is aligning our
programs to become more flexible, agile, and responsive to build upon
our long legacy of securing our Nation and the world from WMD threats.
Here our approach is three-fold: First, we aim to support and
rejuvenate multilateral nonproliferation initiatives and treaties.
Second, we seek to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers at their source and
in transit. Third, we seek to enhance our ability to detect and respond
to emerging threats.
strengthening the nonproliferation regime
For years we have worked with our allies and partners to develop a
global nonproliferation infrastructure that can reduce our collective
vulnerability to these weapons. The current network of initiatives,
regimes, and treaties offers some important tools for advancing this
critical agenda--but much more remains to be done. Today, we are
accelerating efforts to work with our allies and partners to rejuvenate
and reinforce the nonproliferation regime, starting with a renewed
commitment to the international legal frameworks that serve as the
foundation for our efforts.
We are actively working to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT)--the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the
upcoming NPT Review Conference in May 2010, we will seek an outcome
that reaffirms parties' commitment to the treaty and shores up its
three pillars: nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. We want to discourage the abuses of the treaty
withdrawal provision and ensure that there are real consequences for
treaty violations. At the same time, we will emphasize our support for
peaceful uses of nuclear energy that do not increase the risk of
weapons proliferation. The NPT Review Conference is not an end in
itself, but a critical milestone in the effort to enhance
nonproliferation efforts worldwide. Efforts this May will contribute to
our ambitious nonproliferation agenda.
In addition, President Obama has committed his administration to
pursue the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The CTBT is important to the nonproliferation effort because it
restricts additional countries from developing, acquiring, and
deploying nuclear weapons, and it hinders the ability of nuclear powers
to develop new types of nuclear warheads. In the meantime, as a sign of
our commitment to the CTBT regime, we will continue to maintain our
unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons-testing. Finally, we will also
seek a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that would ban the
production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.
DOD fully supports these efforts. In particular, the fiscal year
2011 budget request recognizes the nonproliferation value of these
international agreements. It aims to fund technological improvements in
instrumentation and software--such as air sample monitoring, analysis
of seismic events, and improvements in infrasound detection--used for
detection of treaty violations. These measures will ensure compliance
with the NPT, CTBT, and FMCT.
The administration also recognizes the importance of a variety of
multilateral activities and mechanisms that help to prevent
proliferation, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Since its establishment in 2003, PSI has grown to include 95 endorsing
countries. PSI builds political support for counterproliferation and
increases cooperation through multinational endorsement of the PSI
statement of principles and participation in PSI exercises, 30 of which
have been conducted since 2003. By endorsing the PSI, partners
recognize the urgency of the WMD proliferation threat and commit
themselves to taking action to stop shipments of proliferation concern
on a voluntary basis, consistent with national legal authorities and
relevant international law. The PSI also helps build the capacity of
countries on the front lines of WMD transshipment to counter
proliferation by hosting exercises in which countries share best
practices, engage in scenario planning, and examine decision making
processes. The U.S. Government has taken on an important new role this
year by serving as the PSI ``Focal Point,'' providing support,
improving information flow, and coordinating schedules of international
activities among partners consistent with the President's desire to
turn the PSI into a durable international institution.
In addition, this administration is seeking Export Control Reform.
Under the rubric of ``Higher Walls Around Fewer Items,'' our goal is to
make exporting dangerous or sensitive items much more difficult, while
at the same time lowering unnecessary barriers to profitable technology
exports that pose no threat to our security. This broad-based
interagency effort to review the current system and process of
administering and enforcing U.S. export controls is close to making its
final recommendations, and, with the cooperation of Congress, will then
start the work of implementation.
Despite these efforts, we recognize that this nonproliferation
regime is under serious strain, in large part because of countries that
choose to violate both the letter and the spirit of their commitments
and because some countries choose to live outside this regime
altogether. Responding to this challenge, this administration has gone
on the diplomatic offensive to address nuclear proliferation threats,
seeking to reclaim lost ground with allies and partners. This outreach
is paying real dividends. Our demonstrated commitment to engagement and
our efforts to find diplomatic solutions is helping us to put more
pressure on the world's two greatest current proliferation threats,
Iran and North Korea. In the case of North Korea, the successful
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 has
demonstrated the international community's resolve to stem the DPRK's
ability to pursue nuclear, ballistic missile, and other WMD-related
activities, and to prevent proliferation to and from North Korea. The
United States has undertaken close coordination with partners on full
implementation of the resolution, which provides for, among other
things, enhanced provisions regarding inspection of suspect cargo.
reducing and eliminating threats
The second element of the Department's approach involves engaging
in active international partnerships to reduce and eliminate WMD
dangers both at their source and in transit. Vulnerable nuclear,
biological, and chemical materials that are secured or eliminated
cannot be used for harmful purposes by terrorists or other hostile
actors.
As this committee is aware, the CTR Program has been working to
reduce nuclear, biological, and chemical threats since its inception in
1992, and has established a successful track record. Building on that
success, we are transforming and expanding the CTR Program to meet
today's threats. Over the years, Congress has expanded CTR's
authorities and created new opportunities for the program to embark on
these important national and international security priorities. This
legislation enables the CTR program to address emerging WMD threats and
to achieve long-standing WMD nonproliferation goals more effectively
and comprehensively. Accordingly, new funding mechanisms provide the
Department with additional resources to think and act beyond
traditional projects and activities.
Four broad principles--integration, responsiveness, stewardship,
and cooperation--will guide our evolution and expansion. First, we are
fully integrating CTR within broader whole-of-government counter-WMD
approaches, as well as within productive and established bilateral and
multilateral frameworks. Second, the CTR program is becoming both agile
enough to accept targets of opportunity and flexible enough to utilize
CTR in new regions and for new projects. Third, we are improving
resource management and stewardship by better aligning expenditures
with priorities, improving execution and accountability of funds, and
developing sustainable, long-term solutions and capacity-building
opportunities for our partner countries. Fourth, the CTR Program has
renewed its focus on the cooperative components of our program,
including establishing mutually beneficial projects with our partner
countries and ensuring that the vision for any project includes common
awareness of threats and solutions. Local vulnerabilities will be met
with local solutions.
With these principles as our guide, we will engage with countries
and regions to achieve common goals and provide sustainable
capabilities. Depending on the vulnerabilities, local capacity, and
status of our relationship with a given country, we could employ any of
the following four models as a template to expand CTR engagements and
related projects and activities. First, the ``Traditional Model'' has
been employed with individual former Soviet Union (FSU) states to
establish an exceptionally high level of capability and national
proficiency to deal with various materials and various levels of
vulnerability. Next, a ``Tailored Model'' seeks to work bilaterally
with countries to tailor CTR projects to identify and address specific
vulnerabilities within the context of political and capability
realities. A ``Regional Model'' seeks to develop baseline capabilities
across a region to reduce the potential for future threats to emerge
and to provide countries with the capacity to recognize those threats
if they do emerge. Although key international partners will be
important in each of the four models, the regional model is likely to
rely most heavily on the participation and engagement of the
international community. Our final model, known as ``Centers of
Cooperation,'' will allow the Department to partner with key countries
to increase information sharing and to develop best practices for
appropriate CTR objectives. Instead of focusing our efforts on securing
materials or building capacity at the source, our efforts will focus on
developing long-term relationships that will have positive second- and
third-order effects throughout the region.
Although I have discussed our broad strategy and new approaches to
meet our requirements, we cannot do all that the President and the
world demand without additional resources. The CTR budget has held
steadily around $430 million over the past 3 years. This year, however,
we are taking real steps to exercise new legislative authorities to
expand the CTR Program across the globe to reduce and eliminate
emerging threats while simultaneously continuing our important work in
Russia and FSU countries. This is why the President has requested a
significant increase in the DOD CTR budget through fiscal year 2015.
The overall fiscal year 2011 budget request for the DOD CTR Program is
$522.5 million, a 23 percent increase over fiscal year 2010. Program
enhancements in fiscal year 2011 over the fiscal year 2010 baseline
include an additional $74.5 million to fund the Global Nuclear Lockdown
Initiative and $56.9 million to expand the Biological Threat Reduction
Program. I would now like to describe some examples of recent successes
and plans to implement this new strategy in several areas of our
nuclear, biological, and chemical threat reduction efforts, as well as
our Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI) and Defense and Military
Contacts (DMC) programs.
As you are well aware, the CTR Program has been involved in
reducing nuclear threats for a long time. It has been almost two
decades since Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act
of 1991, the hallmark legislation that established the Nunn-Lugar
Program. Within 6 months of its enactment, the United States and the
Russian Federation signed the CTR Umbrella Agreement and began the
arduous task of eliminating the enormous number of strategic offensive
arms that had been built up by the Soviet Union. Although elimination
work has largely been concluded in the other states of the former
Soviet Union, it goes on to this day in Russia as ballistic missiles,
launchers, and ballistic missile submarines continue to be dismantled.
In addition, the Department continues to work closely with the
Department of Energy and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense
(MOD) to ensure the appropriate infrastructure is in place to enable
Russia to sustain over the long term the hundreds of millions of
dollars worth of modernized physical protection systems that have been
installed at nuclear weapons storage sites. Finally, the Department
continues to assist Russia in transporting nuclear warheads from
operational locations to dismantlement facilities or more secure,
consolidated storage sites.
Although we continue to focus on the Department's mission to reduce
nuclear threats in Russia, we also are building upon our legacy of
success to meet the President's broader nuclear nonproliferation
agenda. The unprecedented gathering of 47 states to address these
issues during the Nuclear Security Summit last week represents a
critical step in the President's commitment to secure vulnerable
nuclear materials worldwide by the end of 2013. The CTR Program is
DOD's mechanism to support the President's initiative and the requested
increase of $74.5 million will support expanded security cooperation
with Russia and additional efforts with new partner countries. As
required by the fiscal year 2008 legislation, the CTR Program will seek
a determination from the Secretaries of Defense and State to conduct
CTR projects and activities with new partner countries outside the FSU.
Working with partner countries, DOE, and other Interagency partners,
and consistent with our Centers of Cooperation engagement model, we
plan to support a nuclear security Center of Excellence in China and a
Nuclear Energy Center with a nuclear security component in India, as
was announced at last week's Nuclear Security Summit. By using the
centers, countries and agencies involved will be able to provide
lessons learned and an exchange of best practices without requiring
access to actual material or weapons sites.
The Department is similarly expanding our biological threat
reduction programs, and we are requesting a $56.9 million budget
increase to meet our new global health security requirements in support
of the President's National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
and 2010 QDR recommendations. In Afghanistan, we are working at the
request of the acting Minister of Public Health to help consolidate an
independent collection of diagnostic laboratories under a new National
Public Health Laboratory in Kabul. The Department is also considering
expanding the program into Sub-Saharan Africa, where we believe there
are opportunities to implement regional approaches for human and animal
disease detection, diagnosis, surveillance, and reporting.
In addition to these expansion efforts, the BTRP continues to
partner with FSU countries to enhance biosafety and security and to
consolidate especially dangerous pathogens. In Georgia, we completed
construction of a new Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) located in
Tbilisi and also renovated other human regional diagnostic
laboratories. In Kazakhstan, the CTR program is a member of a
Kazakhstan Government cross-functional working group appointed to
design a new Central Reference Laboratory. A successful CRL
groundbreaking ceremony took place on March 30, 2010, and actual
construction is expected to begin in a few months. Lastly, in Ukraine,
the CTR Program is working with the Ministry of Health to consolidate
all of Ukraine's human especially dangerous pathogens at a DOD-
renovated interim human central reference laboratory, and we are
developing plans to renovate facilities for a permanent human central
reference laboratory for reference diagnosis and safe secure research.
We are also planning to construct a veterinary central reference lab to
consolidate all of Ukraine's animal especially dangerous pathogens and
provide for reference diagnosis and safe and secure research.
CTR's chemical programs continue to assist Russia with safe,
secure, and environmentally sound destruction of a portion of its
chemical weapons nerve agent stockpile that is most vulnerable to theft
or diversion. This year we also hope to complete elimination of on-site
equipment at the former nerve-agent weapons production facility at
Novocheboksarsk. Our efforts are intended to achieve U.S. chemical
agent proliferation prevention goals while helping Russia comply with
its Chemical Weapons Convention requirements. At Russia's request, and
in our judgment to the mutual benefit of the people of the United
States, we will continue some technical support for the Shchuch'ye
Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility, which began eliminating chemical
weapons in March 2009. The United States contributed more than $1
billion to the construction of this facility, and our continued
technical support will assist in maintaining the operational status of
U.S.-furnished equipment, as well as equipment supplied by other donor
countries, so that the elimination process continues expeditiously.
In addition to CTR's programs to secure nuclear, biological, and
chemical material at the source, the WMD Proliferation Prevention
Initiative (PPI) is CTR's means to enhance our partners' abilities to
detect and interdict WMD ``on the move.'' DOD has just completed a
multiyear effort with Azerbaijan's State Border Guard Service-Coast
Guard and elements of its Navy to enhance maritime detection,
surveillance and interdiction capabilities on the Caspian Sea and we
will continue to provide sustainment to that project for another 2
years. In Ukraine, we are working with the State Border Guard Service
to enhance maritime detection and interdiction capabilities on the
Black Sea, as well as providing extensive assistance to land borders
between the key ports of entry along the Moldovan border and in the
Chernobyl Exclusion Zone.
Although not an element of CTR, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA)'s International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) complements
the capital-intensive investments of the WMD-PPI program through its
modest yet effective ``train and equip'' efforts. The ICP is unique in
its legislative authority to partner explicitly with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and U.S. Customs in furtherance of deterring the
proliferation of WMD across the FSU, the Baltic states, and in Eastern
Europe. We are currently working with DTRA to determine how best to
expand the program globally.
The final element of the Department's threat reduction efforts is
the Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) Program, which is currently
transitioning to meet changed legislative guidelines and expanded
authorities to support specific relationship building opportunities for
CTR engagement in new geographic areas. Under this new approach, the
CTR Policy Office will develop policy guidance in close cooperation and
coordination with OSD's regional offices, AT&L/Treaties and Threat
Reduction, and the Unified Combatant Commands. DTRA's CTR Program
Office will administer the program in accordance with that guidance.
detecting and responding to emerging threats
The third element of the Department's approach involves improving
our ability to detect and respond to emerging WMD dangers. Here the
Department has a particular responsibility to our Nation, as well as to
our allies and partners. For instance, instability resulting from the
collapse of a nuclear-armed state would risk the global proliferation
of nuclear material, weapons, or technology, posing a threat to our
homeland and the homelands of our allies. We must be prepared to detect
threats and defend ourselves against WMD dangers. This includes
enhancements to interdiction and elimination capabilities as well as
preparations to respond quickly to an attack should our preventive and
deterrence efforts fail.
Our Quadrennial Defense Review identifies preventing proliferation
and countering weapons of mass destruction as one of the top priority
missions for the Defense Department, and our fiscal year 2011 budget
request reflects that commitment. This request will fully fund efforts
to enhance SOCOM's ability to conduct counter-WMD operations by
increasing funding by $60 million. It will also establish the standing
Joint Task Force Elimination (JTF-E) Headquarters to plan, train and
execute WMD elimination operations. The JTF-E works in conjunction with
special operations forces to locate, characterize, secure, disable or
destroy hostile WMD programs or capabilities in a non-permissive or
semi-permissive environment. It will also provide nuclear disablement,
exploitation, and intelligence capabilities with increased capacity to
coordinate operations with Special Operations Forces. Currently the
Joint Staff is developing several options for the command and control
structure and force-sizing for the standing headquarters.
The budget request includes $22 million to improve capabilities for
national technical nuclear forensics technologies and the fielding of
new capabilities, including funding for ground and air collection.
Other key capability enhancements anticipated by this budget request
include the modernization of WMD Civil Support Teams and CBRNE
Consequence Management Response Forces to assist State and local
governments in the event of a WMD attack, as well as enhanced technical
reachback capabilities to ensure warfighters have real time access to
information on WMD. We are also working to adapt our architectures,
plans, and operations so that we can respond to WMD crises with greater
speed and agility.
Additionally, we must engage partner nations, allies, and the
broader international community to improve our ability to detect and
respond to such dangers and reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. Here
we are working to support a number of multilateral efforts, including
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), an
international partnership of nearly 80 states and 4 observers that
enhances individual, regional, and collective capabilities to combat
nuclear terrorism through deterrence, prevention, detection, and
response objectives. Through multilateral activities and exercises,
partners share best practices and lessons learned. The United States
and Russia, co-chairs to the GICNT, are currently taking tangible steps
that will transform the GICNT into an action-oriented and
institutionalized program.
closing remarks
The world is changing and the Obama administration is bringing a
full court press to assemble like-minded countries to meet our
collective national and international security obligations to make the
world safe from all weapons of mass destruction. These efforts continue
to underscore the need and relevance of the Department's
nonproliferation, threat reduction, and WMD detection and response
tools. The Department takes its responsibilities seriously and we are
building on our legacy of success to evolve and expand to meet today's
challenges.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Baker?
STATEMENT OF KENNETH E. BAKER, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, I want to apologize up front; I
caught a cold vacationing in Florida, but I assure you, sir,
that it did not come from the great State of Florida. So, I
apologize for the cold. [Laughter.]
Senator LeMieux. Mr. Chairman, I already corrected the
record; he caught it at the airport before he came to Florida.
We know that he could not have gotten a cold in Florida.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir, it was in the airport or, in Virginia,
but it was not in Florida. But, I enjoyed my vacation, even
with the cold, in Florida.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Baker, it's an oxymoron, ``cold/
Florida.''
Senator LeMieux. Right.
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm Ken Baker, Principal Assistant
Deputy Administrator of the NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, and the Acting Deputy Administrator.
It's always a great pleasure to come before this committee
to tell you about the NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation program.
I'm prepared to make a formal written statement, Mr. Chairman,
and, with your permission, I will submit that for the record. I
do have about 3 or 4 minutes of oral testimony.
Senator Bill Nelson. That was already entered, 12 minutes
ago.
Mr. Baker. Thank you, sir.
The President is requesting $2.7 billion for fiscal year
2011 for the nonproliferation program, an increase of 26
percent over the last year's funding levels. We are trying to
prevent nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of
terrorists, to stem the further proliferation of nuclear
weapons, materials, and technology expertise to build them.
I'm not one to hype the threat. It's not easy to build a
nuclear weapon. But, the consequences of any nuclear attack or
nuclear incident would be so dire that it would greatly affect
all of our American citizens. We must do everything we can, as
quickly as possible, to ensure that this does not happen.
The President has challenged the United States and
international community to accelerate our materials security
efforts over the next 4 years. The fiscal year 2011 budget
request reflects the initial investment from this challenge.
Our fundamental priority is the security of nuclear materials
because if terrorists are unable to acquire nuclear materials,
a weapon cannot be fashioned. In fact, the largest portion of
our budget is aimed at making sure that vulnerable nuclear
material is protected, removed, and disposed of. These first-
line-of-defense programs are the heart of the President's 4-
year effort and drive the increases requested for the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and Material Protection,
Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program.
For example, the budget increase requested to allow the
GTRI to remove an additional 530 kilograms of excess highly-
enriched uranium (HEU) from countries such as South Africa,
Mexico, Serbia, Ukraine, and Belarus, as well as to convert
seven additional reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium
(LEU).
The Fissile Materials Disposition (FMD) program is also
essential to our efforts toward nuclear disarmament and a world
free of nuclear danger. This program works to dispose of
surplus U.S. HEU and U.S. and Russian weapon-grade plutonium.
Of the funds requested for the FMD program, 87 percent is for
efforts to dispose of surplus U.S. weapon-grade plutonium. The
largest part of this involves the construction of a Mixed-oxide
(MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility in Aiken, SC, which has been
underway for over 2 years, and it is on schedule and within
budget. FMD has also made progress in the disposition of Russia
surplus weapon-grade plutonium. Just last week, at the Nuclear
Security Summit, Secretary Clinton and Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Lavrov signed a protocol amending the Plutonium
Management Disposition Agreement. This agreement commits both
countries to dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of surplus
weapon-grade plutonium, which, combined, represents enough
material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons.
Our security work in Russia has been going on for many
years, and the results are tangible. Thousands of nuclear
warheads and hundreds of tons of weapon-grade plutonium are
better secured today, due to our efforts. But, we have
additional work to do. The job is not complete. We have
identified some new areas that need to be addressed before we
can conclude our efforts in Russia.
We're concerned about two things. First, the
sustainability. It would do us little good to have spent years
working to improve security in Russia if we fail to help our
partners create a sustainability program in nuclear security.
The second thing we must do is to look beyond Russia to create
multiple sustainability levels of defense, such as providing
radiation detection monitors and related response training over
the world, and securing seaports away from our borders through
our Second Line of Defense program. No security program is
perfect, and any system can break down due to human error,
equipment malfunction, or overwhelming attack. Multiple layers
of defense help mitigate these issues.
Our elimination of weapon-grade plutonium in the three
reactors that were remaining in Russia, I can say today, sir,
is complete. Two reactors that make weapon-grade plutonium were
shut down 1 year ago, and the last one was shut down last week.
So, we have completed this program of shutting down all weapon-
grade plutonium reactors in Russia.
This budget request will allow us to continue to provide
vital support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We want to continue to
revitalize the U.S. nuclear safeguards technology and human
base, which has suffered attrition over the years, through our
Next Generation Safeguards Initiative.
Last, we want to continue using the investment in world-
class capabilities of DOE's nuclear weapons labs to conduct
research and development of new technology capabilities to
support the Nation's arms control and nonproliferation efforts.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, I thank this committee for your
continued support and longstanding and newly ambitious efforts.
We are equipped to play a critical role in preventing
terrorists, rogue states, and proliferators from acquiring a
nuclear component.
Again, I appreciate this opportunity, and I'm ready to take
your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker follows:]
Prepared Statement by Kenneth E. Baker
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Committee Members, for the opportunity
to present the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) fiscal year 2011 President's budget request for
the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation mission is both critical and
multi-faceted: to provide policy and technical leadership to limit or
prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-related
materials, technology, and expertise; to advance technologies to detect
WMD-related proliferation worldwide; and to eliminate, reduce, or
secure surplus nuclear weapons-related materials. In short, we detect,
deter, secure, or dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological
materials worldwide.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation portfolio is $2.69 billion, an increase of
25.8 percent from fiscal year 2010. As NNSA Administrator D'Agostino
has stated, this budget request is a ``direct and tangible display of
the President's commitment to this mission, and a demonstration of the
critical role NNSA plays in implementing the President's unprecedented
nuclear security agenda.'' NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
program is a key component of the President's nonproliferation vision,
and we are working--together with our more than 130 international
partners--to achieve these global security goals.
This comprehensive nonproliferation, nuclear security, and arms
control agenda was outlined in the President's April 2009 speech in
Prague, Czech Republic and consists of several key objectives,
including:
Implementing a new international effort to secure all
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in 4 years;
Taking concrete actions toward a world without nuclear
weapons;
Breaking up nuclear black markets and halting nuclear
smuggling; and
Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT).
The fiscal year 2011 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget
Request can be summarized into these four major categories of effort.
This fiscal year 2011 request funds efforts to support the President's
nuclear security vision, as an early step in meeting this multi-year
initiative.
Additionally, within these four categories, we are making solid
contributions in cross-cutting administration and NNSA priorities,
including strengthening the Nation's Science and Technology (S&T) base,
reinvigorating America's scientific and technical human capital, and
upholding our strong commitment to effective project management.
Specifically, our $2.69 billion fiscal year 2011 request includes:
More than $1 billion for the Fissile Materials
Disposition (FMD) program to dispose of surplus plutonium and
highly enriched uranium by constructing a MOX Fuel Fabrication
Facility and a Waste Solidification Building, developing a
capability to disassemble excess nuclear weapon pits, and
supporting Russian plutonium disposition activities. The fiscal
year 2011 request aligns management and funding
responsibilities for the interrelated surplus plutonium
disposition activities, in support of U.S. nonproliferation and
arms control objectives, under a single appropriation. The
fiscal year 2011 Russian Fissile Materials Disposition Request
seeks $100 million of a total $400 million U.S. commitment to
support plutonium disposition in Russia. On April 13, 2010,
Secretary of State Clinton and Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs Lavrov signed the Protocol to amend the 2000 Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA).
Over $590 million for the International Nuclear
Materials Protection and Cooperation (INMP&C) program (an
increase of $18 million) for additional Material Protection
Control & Accounting (MPC&A) upgrades, expansion of MPC&A
cooperation with countries outside of Russia and the former
Soviet Union, and additional deployment of radiation detection
systems to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other
radioactive materials under the Second Line of Defense program;
Nearly $560 million for the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI) (an increase of 68 percent) to remove and
secure high-priority vulnerable nuclear material around the
world in 4 years, accelerate additional conversions of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) fueled research reactors to the use of
low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, and to provide a comprehensive
approach to permanently deny terrorists access to nuclear and
radiological material at civilian sites worldwide;
Over $350 million for the Nonproliferation and
Verification Research & Development (R&D) program (an 10
percent increase) to provide the key technical support for the
President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda; and
Nearly $156 million for the Nonproliferation and
International Security (NIS) program (a decrease of almost 17
percent, primarily the result of a reduction in activities to
support verification of disablement of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea nuclear program) to safeguard nuclear
material; control the spread of WMD technologies, equipment,
and expertise; and verify nuclear reductions and compliance
with international regimes, treaties, and agreements.
securing nuclear weapons and materials from terrorists
The President's April 5, 2009 speech in Prague presented a vision
to address the international nuclear threat. His call to secure all
vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within 4 years is a
cornerstone of this strategy. Within the U.S. Government, the Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation will perform a significant portion of
this crucial nuclear security work. Implementing this nuclear security
initiative will require expanding and accelerating our security
cooperation with Russia and other key countries, pursuing new
partnerships to secure nuclear materials, and strengthening nuclear
security standards, practices, and international safeguards.
Our fiscal year 2011 budget request funds early efforts to support
the administration's nuclear security vision, as a first step in
meeting this multi-year initiative. Two Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation programs are providing sizeable contributions to this
goal: the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the International
Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation programs.
The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) mission is to reduce
and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials at civilian
sites worldwide. To execute this mission, GTRI: 1) Converts research
reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU); 2) Removes and
disposes of excess nuclear and radiological materials; and 3) Protects
high-priority nuclear and radiological materials from theft and
sabotage. These three key subprograms of GTRI--Convert, Remove, and
Protect--provide a comprehensive approach to achieving its mission and
denying terrorists access to nuclear and radiological materials.
The 68 percent GTRI increase in the President's fiscal year 2011
budget request accelerates these threat reduction activities to secure
all vulnerable nuclear materials in 4 years. Among other priorities,
the fiscal year 2011 budget request allows GTRI to initiate efforts to
remove over 1,650 kilograms of excess HEU and convert an additional 7
research reactors to the use of low enriched uranium fuel.
Additionally, as part of its mission to reduce the use of HEU in
civilian applications globally, GTRI will address the anticipated
supply shortage of the medical isotope Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) by
implementing projects demonstrating the viability of non-HEU based
technologies for large-scale Mo-99 production.
The International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation
(INMP&C) program works in the former Soviet Union and other countries
of concern to secure nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear
materials. The Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A)
program achieves this mission by providing security upgrades at nuclear
sites, consolidating these materials at fewer sites that are more
secure, and supporting the development of sustainable MPC&A systems.
Beyond security upgrades, the MPC&A program also works with partner
countries to develop regulations and procedures concerning the material
control, accounting, and physical protection of nuclear materials,
including in the areas of training, education, transportation, nuclear
security culture, protective forces, material measurements, nuclear
material accounting and inspections. In Russia, INMP&C partners include
the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), the State Corporation for Atomic
Energy (Rosatom), and Rostekhnadzor, the Russian nuclear regulatory
agency.
As agreed under the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative of 2005,
major progress was made on security upgrades in Russia, including
completion of all MOD warhead storage sites by the end of 2008. As a
result of this success, some important upgrade work was added to
MPC&A's mission after February 2005, and that work is currently being
accelerated to support the President's 4 year nuclear security goal.
Although this particular program is one of our more mature threat
reduction efforts and has made considerable progress in Russia and
elsewhere, work remains to be done to secure other vulnerable nuclear
materials around the world within 4 years.
The fiscal year 2011 INMP&C budget request allows this program to
continue additional nuclear security upgrades at the 19 (out of 214)
remaining Russian buildings within the program's scope where upgrades
have not been completed, and to complete five of these 19 buildings in
fiscal year 2011. It also provides for comprehensive sustainability
efforts to continue transitioning maintenance of completed upgrades to
Russia. Under the fiscal year 2011 budget request, the INMP&C program
also would expand nuclear security cooperation to new partner countries
outside of Russia and states of the former Soviet Union, in order to
meet the administration's global nuclear security agenda.
toward a world without nuclear weapons
The President has acknowledged that the goal of a world without
nuclear weapons will not be reached quickly, but he stated that America
will take concrete steps toward this goal. Our Nonproliferation and
International Security (NIS) program is engaged actively in these
efforts, including the support we provided for negotiating the new
START treaty with the Russian Federation and supporting efforts towards
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In
fiscal year 2011, NIS will build upon these current efforts by
continuing to provide policy and technical support for nonproliferation
and arms control treaties and agreements that strengthen the
nonproliferation regime and promote transparent WMD reductions. In
addition, NIS also will continue to develop and deploy transparency
measures to ensure verifiable nuclear reductions and compliance with
nonproliferation and arms control agreements. This includes work that
benefits from support provided by the Nonproliferation and Verification
Research and Development (R&D) program, to develop technologies that
detect potential clandestine weapons programs or illicit diversions and
provide options for the dismantlement of nuclear equipment, weapons,
and components, and develop new monitoring tools to ensure that the
obligations of foreign governments are being met. Particular emphasis
will be placed on the development of scientifically sound verification
approaches that meet the President's goal of an effectively verifiable
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) while protecting critical
national security equities.
Investments in NNSA's R&D program provide the core U.S. capability
for advances in both U.S. and international capabilities to monitor
arms control and nuclear-related treaty obligations, such as those
conferred by the NPT, the FMCT, and the CTBT. The R&D program
contribution includes research, development, production, and delivery
of space- and ground-based sensors to detect nuclear detonations.
Additionally, this program leads the nonproliferation community's R&D
effort to advance next generation detection capabilities to detect
foreign nuclear materials and weapons production facilities and
processes. In keeping with the President's commitment for verifiable
treaties, in fiscal year 2011 the R&D program will include test and
evaluation activities to demonstrate new U.S. treaty monitoring
technologies and capabilities.
Our Fissile Material Disposition (FMD) program is also a crucial
component of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation contribution to the
administration's nonproliferation and arms control agenda, through its
mission to eliminate surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium and U.S. and
Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium. Of the funds requested for FMD,
87 percent is for efforts to irreversibly dispose of surplus U.S.
weapon-grade plutonium. The largest part of this involves the
construction of the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) in
Aiken, SC, which has been underway for over 2 years and is on schedule
and within budget. The MFFF is scheduled to start operations to produce
MOX fuel in 2016. Overall, the MOX project is 42 percent complete with
two significant buildings (the 57,000 square foot administration
nuilding and the 38,000 square foot secured warehouse) completed in
2009, for a total of 10 out of 17 auxiliary buildings completed to
date. The Waste Solidification Building (WSB) is scheduled to begin
operations in 2013 to support MFFF cold start-up testing. Overall, the
WSB project is 34 percent complete.
In addition to constructing the MOX Facility and the Waste
Solidification Building, the Department of Energy is exploring
combining NNSA's Pit Disassembly and Conversion Project and the Office
of Environmental Management's Plutonium Preparation Project into a
single project, to be managed by NNSA and located in the existing K-
Area Facility at the Savannah River Site. As a result, the President's
fiscal year 2011 Budget Request supports realigning funding and
management of interrelated surplus U.S. plutonium disposition
activities under a single appropriation within the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation appropriation. Complying with the Department's project
management order, DOE Order 413, FMD will develop a conceptual design
report, along with the requisite project support documentation to move
toward a Critical Decision 1 (approval of alternative selection and
cost range) determination. This preparatory work prior to alternative
selection will be completed approximately 12-18 months from the start
of such work.
In addition to progress on U.S. fissile materials disposition, FMD
has also made much progress on disposition of Russian surplus weapon-
grade plutonium. In 2009, the United States and Russia completed
negotiations on a Protocol to amend the 2000 Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement (PMDA), and on April 13, 2010 the Protocol was
signed by Secretary of State Clinton and Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs Lavrov. Under the PMDA, each country commits to dispose of no
less than 34 metric tons each of surplus weapon-grade plutonium--enough
material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. The amended PMDA
reflects both Russia's revised plan for disposing of its 34 metric tons
of surplus weapon-grade plutonium using fast reactors under certain
nonproliferation conditions and Russia's commitment to implement its
program independent of any assistance beyond the $400 million U.S.
financial contribution. The Protocol calls for both countries to begin
disposing of their surplus plutonium in the 2018 timeframe. The fiscal
year 2011 Russian Fissile Materials Disposition Request seeks $100
million of the total $400 million commitment to support plutonium
disposition in Russia, with the balance of the more than $2 billion in
estimated remaining costs to be borne by Russia.
breaking up black markets and halting nuclear smuggling
As a complement to our facility-based physical security efforts
that serve as a first line of defense, NNSA executes a number of
programs that provide an additional layer of defense by detecting and
preventing illicit transfers of nuclear-related materials, equipment,
and technology. These programs help implement the President's Prague
speech call to build on efforts to break up nuclear black markets and
detect and intercept dangerous materials in transit.
Within the Office of International Nuclear Materials Protection and
Cooperation, the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Core program cooperates
with foreign partners to install radiation detection equipment at
borders, airports, and strategic ports in Russia, other former Soviet
Union states, Eastern Europe, and other key countries, and to provide
related training and support. The Core program is also teaming with
foreign law enforcement agencies to provide equipment, develop
training, conduct exercises, and exchange best practices in mobile
detection. The SLD Megaports Initiative likewise cooperates
internationally to deploy radiation detection equipment and provide
related training to key, high volume and/or strategically located
ports. The fiscal year 2011 budget request provides for SLD
installations at an additional 55 sites in 19 foreign countries, and
for the completion of Megaports installations and activities at 4
additional foreign seaports.
The Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS)
supports efforts to halt illicit trafficking by strengthening global
capacity to prevent the theft, diversion, and spread of nuclear
materials, technologies, and expertise. Specifically, NIS is training
international partners in export control, licensing, enforcement,
interdiction, and physical protection of nuclear materials. These
programs include the International Nonproliferation Export Control
Program (INECP), which works with foreign country partners as well as
domestic USG export enforcement agencies to strengthen national export
control systems, practices, and awareness. Additionally, the
Cooperative Border Security Program (CBSP), focusing on building
overarching border security system capacity, works with foreign country
partners to create training programs and shape analytical methods and
tools so that states can deploy sustainable capabilities to protect
their borders. NIS also provides specialized support to domestic
licensing, enforcement, and interdiction agencies through such efforts
as the Interdiction Technical Analysis Group (ITAG). ITAG supports
Department of State-led interagency interdiction working groups that
review potential proliferation activity and transactions in the
nuclear, missile, and chemical and biological fields, by providing
technical analysis of proliferation-relevant commodities and
technologies through reachback to the national laboratories. The fiscal
year 2011 budget request supports the continuation of these efforts.
Finally, the fiscal year 2011 budget request increase for the
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program will advance development,
testing, and evaluation of next generation capabilities to detect the
illicit diversion of special nuclear materials, both internal and
external to nuclear facilities.
strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation treaty
President Obama has also called upon America and its partners to
strengthen the NPT as a basis for cooperation. The Office of
Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) will continue efforts
to strengthen nonproliferation regimes and multilateral organizations,
by providing international policy expertise and technical responses to
address issues concerning the control of proliferation-sensitive items,
in order to help shape
nonproliferation policy initiatives both domestically and
multilaterally. NIS will also help develop a new international civil
nuclear framework to further the President's energy security and
environmental goals without jeopardizing national security. NIS will
work within existing regimes and arrangements, including via peaceful
nuclear cooperation agreements and the national NPT review process,
among others, to help develop and advance this new framework.
In fiscal year 2011, NIS also will work to strengthen and support
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--and the international
safeguards system it administers--to confront the challenges posed by
nuclear proliferation and global nuclear energy expansion. NIS will
continue to implement the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI),
which is working to revitalize the U.S. technical and human capital
base supporting IAEA safeguards, and to develop the tools, approaches,
and authorities needed by the IAEA to fulfill its mandate far into the
future. This includes developing and implementing new safeguards
concepts and approaches, and working with partners to develop nuclear
infrastructure in countries pursuing nuclear energy programs that
emphasizes safeguards, security, and nonproliferation obligations. NIS
also will implement IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol,
at DOE facilities and continue to engage industry and the IAEA to
incorporate safeguards requirements early-on in the facility design and
construction phases. Additionally, NIS will continue bilateral
safeguards partnerships to develop new safeguards approaches, help
states implement their NPT safeguards obligations, and facilitate the
nuclear safeguards and security infrastructures required for new
countries to access the peaceful benefits of clean nuclear energy.
cross-cutting priorities
Integrated across these four broad categories of effort, the
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program is also implementing over-
arching administration and NNSA priorities, including:
Strengthening the Nation's Science and Technology (S&T)
base;
Reinvigorating America's scientific and technical human
capital; and
Upholding our strong commitment to effective project
management.
Increases in our fiscal year 2011 budget request directly support
Presidential and NNSA priorities to strengthen the Nation's Science and
Technology base. The increase in the Nonproliferation and Verification
R&D budget by $34 million, or 10 percent, for example, will expand the
program's basic and applied research for nonproliferation and national
security applications and fund new technical capabilities to meet the
President's nonproliferation and arms control treaty monitoring
objectives. The R&D program remains the Nation's largest long-term
basic R&D program in this area and supports not only NNSA customers but
also the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and the
Intelligence Community.
As Administrator D'Agostino noted in his testimony last week, NNSA
is working to develop and retain the next generation of scientists,
engineers, and technical experts required to meet our critical mission.
For example, through our Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, we will
significantly develop human capital within the DOE National
Laboratories by supporting over 100 Next Generation Safeguards
Initiative summer interns at the Laboratories, funding postdoctoral
fellowships in international safeguards, and sponsoring six safeguards
courses. In fiscal year 2011 and beyond, our R&D program will continue
developing the next generation of nuclear engineers and scientific
researchers through a $15 million per year, university-based program--
the 10-year Integrated University Program. This program is coordinated
with component efforts by the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
To further develop scientific and technical human capital, the
Office of Fissile Materials Disposition has co-sponsored (with DOE's
Office of Environmental Management) several Regional Nuclear Suppliers
Outreach events for American suppliers interested in providing services
and products in the nuclear sector. At these events, U.S. companies are
given insight into current and future markets for products and
services. Additionally, they learn the requirements of the Nuclear
Quality Assurance program applicable not only to DOE but to the
commercial nuclear industry. This forum helps ensure that NNSA has an
adequate number of qualified commercial suppliers, and helps more
American companies become qualified to supply similar products and
services to the commercial nuclear power industry. Currently, more than
1,800 people are employed by the project at Savannah River Site with
more than 4,000 working on MOX-related activities in the United States.
As Administrator D'Agostino also noted last week, with the
increased resources you provide us comes our increased responsibility
to be effective stewards of taxpayers' money. The Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation program takes this responsibility seriously, and we
implement the highest standards of project management practices to make
our programs more efficient and more cost-effective. Our MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility effort is a good example. Despite their size and
complexity, both the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) and
Waste Solidification Building (WSB) projects are progressing on
schedule and within budget in accordance with their approved cost and
schedule baselines. Additionally, the MFFF project recently celebrated
a milestone of 3 million workhours without a lost day of work due to
injury.
As another effective project management element, we are increasing
our cost-sharing efforts, not just as a matter of fiscal responsibility
to the American public but as a force multiplier to address high-
priority international nuclear security and nonproliferation
objectives. Our cost-sharing partnerships include both monetary
transactions and in-kind contributions, and additional Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation programs are incorporating cost-sharing as part of
their revised program model and project management practices. With
respect to monetary donations, to date, Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation has received approximately $60 million from seven
overseas partners to execute our internationally-recognized
nonproliferation work. However, our programs also utilize in-kind cost-
sharing agreements. For example, under the Second Line of Defense Core
Program, DOE/NNSA and Russia's Federal Customs Service have agreed to
equip all of Russia's approximately 350 border crossings by 2011, and
the costs for this effort will be split approximately evenly between
DOE/NNSA and the Russian Federal Customs Service. The Second Line of
Defense/Megaports Initiative has 12 cost-sharing arrangements in place
for portal monitoring equipment installation and training. Under our
Fissile Materials Disposition program, although the United States has
committed to contribute $400 million in support of plutonium
disposition efforts in Russia, the Russia Federation bears
responsibility for the approximately $2 billion remaining required to
implement its plutonium disposition commitment. Additionally, over the
past 10 years, the Russian Federation has provided over $30 million
toward the cost of conducting research and development on the Gas
Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) for plutonium disposition in
Russia, and intends to continue to support that effort on a 50/50 cost
sharing basis. As a final example, the Russian Government has committed
to provide $3 million to help remove the HEU spent fuel from the Vinca
Institute in Serbia as part GTRI's fuel removal work
Since 1994, DOE/NNSA has spent approximately $2 billion on Russian
nuclear security work. Sustainability is the key to ensuring that these
national security investments continue to be utilized to their full
potential. We continue to stress to our Russian partners the importance
of sustaining these systems, including the eventual need for Russia to
take the full financial responsibility for sustaining completed nuclear
security enhancements. To this end, the INMPC&A program recently
reached agreement with Russia's Rosatom on a Joint Sustainability and
Transition Plan. This plan identifies specific timelines for each site
to take over financial responsibility for sustainability related
activities in Organizational Planning, Human Resource Development,
Regulatory Development, Operational Cost Analysis, Maintenance,
Performance Testing, and Configuration Management. We believe that such
sustainability efforts, combined with the other project management
practices referenced, will return the maximum benefit to the American
public for their investment in global security and America's national
security.
conclusion
In conclusion, I am proud of NNSA's nonproliferation
accomplishments to date. The fiscal year 2011 budget request for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation builds upon a strong foundation of
past achievements that will help us reap genuine security dividends
from our nonproliferation efforts in the future. We have a narrow
window of opportunity here and now, making use of fleeting global
momentum on nonproliferation already underway, to renew our commitment
to nonproliferation and nuclear security. Although the challenges to
nuclear security are many, the potential benefit from expanded and
accelerated international cooperation to address these challenges is
enormous. Together with our interagency and international partners,
through concerted action, and the continued support of Congress and the
American people, we can reach this shared goal. I thank the chairman
and the committee for your time.
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Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, gentlemen.
We'll turn to Senator LeMieux first.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you for your testimony. I want to
say, as a prefacatory remark, that I'm supportive of your
efforts, and the administration's efforts, to reduce the amount
of weapon-grade nuclear material in the world, to lock those
materials down so that they don't get in the hands of rogue
states. I also support the President's efforts--I know that he
has come forward on trying--to get rid of tactical nuclear
weapons because of the dangers that they could get into the
hands of rogue states.
I want to focus specifically on a rogue state that we know,
or at least we believe, is trying to arm itself with a nuclear
weapon and that's Iran. We've heard testimony, in front of the
full committee, that Iran may be able to produce a nuclear
weapon in a very short time period, certainly less than 5
years, maybe from 1 to 3 years. We heard testimony, yesterday,
that Iran may be able to develop an intercontinental ballistic
missile within 5 years.
I want to focus if we can, to start off with on Iran, on
Tehran's efforts. We have, of course, the knowledge that we
gained months ago on the new facility that they have in Qom. It
seems that despite the administration's overtures to have a
diplomatic solution to this, that Tehran has snubbed its nose
at us and is proceeding on the path of developing a nuclear
weapon.
How concerned are you about Iran's acquisition of enough
weapon-grade fissile material to make a nuclear weapon?
Mr. Secretary?
Dr. Nacht. It is a serious concern of DOD and the
administration. It's a top priority of this administration to
prevent Iran from developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Very recently, Under Secretary Flournoy and the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, General Cartwright, testified just last
week, in fact, in front of the full Senate Armed Services
Committee, and cited the two central objectives of our policy,
working to prevent Iran from acquiring these weapons and
countering Iran's destabilizing activities and support for
extremists in the Middle East.
Our primary focus continues to be enhancing regional
security cooperation with Middle Eastern partners. We're
working actively to counter destabilizing Iranian activities by
strengthening the capacities of vulnerable states in the
region. Through prudent military planning, we continue to
refine options to protect U.S. and partner interests from
Iranian aggression, to deter Iran's destabilizing behavior, and
to prepare for contingencies, all while reducing the risks of
miscalculation.
There is currently legislation in Congress that has passed
the House and Senate overwhelmingly and which would levy new
unilateral sanctions on Iran's importation of refined petroleum
and also take away much of the President's flexibility to grant
waivers. The Department of State and the White House are
concerned because the extraterritoriality provision in the bill
could undermine our attempts to levy multilateral sanctions.
This is a highly sensitive issue, but we hope to move forward
with it.
It's a combined effort at trying to limit Iranian
capabilities and build support in the region to dissuade the
Iranians from proceeding down this path. We have intensive
discussions going on in New York now with the United Nations
(U.N.) to craft language of a U.N. Security Council resolution
which will provide meaningful sanctions against the Iranian
Government.
Senator LeMieux. I think we all would like to see
meaningful sanctions. Up until this time, that has not been
achieved. We know that the President, from what we read, is
working on it with China and Russia, and we hope that that
comes about. But, we also know that the last time that we
worked to bring the world community together to stop a rogue
country from gaining a nuclear weapon, it didn't work. That was
with North Korea. If we continue on this path, it may happen
again. Hope springs eternal that sanctions will work and that
we will change Ahmadinejad's mind, which seems unlikely to me.
A moment ago, you talked about military planning and
contingencies. Can you elaborate on that?
Dr. Nacht. I'll just state what Secretary Gates stated on
Monday of this week, that he had written a memo that presented
a number of questions and proposals intended to contribute to
an orderly and timely decisionmaking process with respect to
the Iranian nuclear weapons program. In support of the
administration's pivot to a pressure track on Iran earlier this
year, this memo identified next steps in our defense planning
process, where further interagency discussion and policy
decisions would be needed in the months and weeks ahead. That's
all I'm able to say at this time about planning for
contingencies with respect to Iran.
Senator LeMieux. Mr. Baker, do you have anything you'd like
to add on this?
Mr. Baker. We're just as concerned as you are, sir. What
we're doing is looking at all the procurements that may be
going into Iran, and trying to stop those procurements. They
may be dual-use equipment used for nuclear capabilities, we're
working that very hard with industry. We know, in an
unclassified setting, that there are many procurement lines.
We're educating industry on the export control rules, on the
licensing rules, and we're trying to cut off these networks
going into Iran to help Iran build a nuclear weapon. We were
and are concerned. We're doing everything in DOE, from an
export-control standpoint and with industry, to try to stop any
procurement that may be dual-use-type equipment.
Senator LeMieux. I can't stress enough how much this
worries me. I hope, and I would assume, that this is a topic of
daily conversation in your lives. I can't think of any other
priority that would come ahead of this topic. This is a country
that its leader is openly hostile to the United States of
America, openly hostile to our allies in Israel, and says he
wants to wipe Israel off the face of the map.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to have entered into the record this
Washington Times article from today, which was a front-page
story, if I may?
Senator Bill Nelson. Without objection.
Senator LeMieux. It is about Iran boosting its Qods shock
troops in Venezuela.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator LeMieux. At our last subcommittee hearing of this
committee, we discussed, in detail--and I would hope that it's
something that you all have focused on, and, if you haven't
focused on, you will--the gathering storm and alliances between
Caracas and Tehran. We know that President Ahmadinejad has
visited President Hugo Chavez several times, that there is a
direct flight from Caracas to Tehran, with some sort of extra-
airport-type arrangement, where they don't go through customs,
and people can get off the plane and get on the plane without
knowing who they are. We know that Hezbollah and Hamas are set
up in Latin America. We know that our friends in Colombia are
dealing with Venezuela, allowing narcotraffickers to fly over
their airspace.
Senator Nelson and I have the great pleasure to have so
many military installations in Florida. I had the opportunity
to visit one in Key West this weekend, which is our Joint
Interagency Task Force that does phenomenal work interdicting
these narcoterrorists. If you look at the flight paths of these
trafficking planes, they're all flying over Venezuela. We know
that Venezuela is cooperating with the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia. A Spanish judge has recently come out and
said that, in a formal proceeding, Venezuela was working with
the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) to assassinate President
Uribe and his predecessor. Now, we find out that Iran is going
to put shock troops in Venezuela.
I want you all to focus on this topic because I'm worried
about an Iranian attack from the south, not just from the east.
I hope that this is something that you've at least focused on
or talked about. I'd be happy to hear any response you'd like
to make to that.
Mr. Secretary?
Dr. Nacht. I would just say that the issues you've raised
are taken most seriously at the highest levels of DOD and our
Government. DOD does not comment publicly on any military
planning in which we are engaged. Any specific questions you
might have on Venezuela we can take for the record and we'll
get back to you with specific responses.
Senator LeMieux. Mr. Baker?
Mr. Baker. Likewise, sir. Again, we're trying to work all
the technology, and, like I say, all the procurement networks,
which we know pretty well in DOE, and educating industry to
stop anything going into Iran. We're working this hard, and in
an unclassified setting, we know many of the networks. What we
can do, from DOE, is use our capabilities at the laboratories,
our technology capabilities, and our connections with industry,
which is vast, to educate them on lines of procurement that
goes into Iran, to try to stop any dual-use equipment that
could be used to help them build the nuclear program.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you both, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, I have other questions, but I want to defer
to you. I know that you'll have questions for our panel here
and perhaps I'll have an opportunity to ask some more questions
later.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Mr. Baker, in the programs that the NNSA has to prevent
Iran from getting materials and technology, you mentioned the
export controls. Talk to us about the support of the IAEA, and
talk to us about preventing nuclear smuggling.
Mr. Baker. We're doing very much on nuclear smuggling, sir.
We have many programs that help this.
Number one, we have what we call a Second Line of Defense
program where radiation detection units are put on borders of
countries in Russia and also the former Soviet Union. What we
do is stop things at the border that may be smuggled out of the
country. Right now, we have identified 650 sites that we're
trying to put radiation detection in, and we have 400 of them
completed.
What we're doing in Russia--and Russia is paying for half
of this, and we're paying for the other half--or every spot
around Russia, about 200 spots, is that we have put a fence
around Russia with radiation detection to ensure things cannot
be smuggled out easily.
We also are working seaports. We have 100 seaports from
which things are coming to the United States that we are trying
to put radiation detection in. We have finished 27 of them. We
will have another 13 done this year. We'll have the whole
system done by 2015, covering all the megaport issues.
We also work in export control. We are educating people on
licensing of dual-use equipment. We're educating industry.
We're educating the enforcers of export control laws on the
danger of this stuff getting out.
We have, sir, as you probably know, some cases in the
past--I can't say much here--that things have been already
caught by our systems on the borders of Russia.
It is a system that is working pretty well. Like I say, we
have to have triple phenomenology, if I can use that word, that
we try to protect it at a source, but if that fails--and an
insider is a big problem, we know, that could try to get this
stuff out; they know the vulnerability of the system--we can
stop them at the border or stop them at the seaports, and also
educate everyone on export control rules. Hopefully--you don't
ever know what you don't know--we're getting this done as
quickly as we can. It's a very critical area.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you please characterize the
cooperation by Russia, and characterize the cooperation of the
host countries in those seaports?
Mr. Baker. With Russia, generally, I can't tell you; with
the customs people in Russia, there is a better relationship. I
have the relationship right with the head of customs. He is
really, really good to work with. There are parts of Russia
where it's tougher. But putting this border security system up
around Russia, customs has been very cooperative. They're just
as scared as we are. It's worked really well in the nuclear
smuggling area.
On seaports, it's a little tougher but we know where
they're at. When we go in and explain what we're trying to do
to help to keep things coming from the United States, it's a
little tougher, but we're succeeding. Just this last summit, we
had a megaport agreement signed with Italy, and we had a
megaport signed with Argentina. It is working. We have, if I
can say this, sir, right now more agreements than we have money
right now on megaports. So, it is working. It's a little
different, a little more difficult than it is with Russia right
now with customs, but it is working. I want you to know, we're
doing everything we can to make it work even better.
Senator Bill Nelson. Please describe the historical
relationship with Russia, going back to Nunn-Lugar.
Mr. Baker. I've been working with Russia for a long time.
In the Nunn-Lugar days, it was tougher. Russia didn't trust us.
They knew that they needed our help. I've gone into Russia,
sir, in the middle-1990s, and I've seen things that I would
like to tell you in person, that I don't want public. It was a
scary time. When the Berlin Wall came down, many things became
vulnerable, and Russia needed our help. They needed our help
with giving clothing to the guards that guard the nuclear
weapons. We had to build an accounting system for them. We had
to build a regulation system for them. We worked really hard.
But now, today, it seems like Russia has gone on
personalities many times. I've seen things that I've never
thought I would see, and I used to be war-planning advisor to
President Reagan in the White House, so I was the guy that held
the football for the President, and I saw things I used to
target. They would show me these things. They know my
background. But, I've been working with them; they know we're
there to help them, and they know we're there not as spies,
even though I've been called that before. The relationship has
really improved over the years. It got a little tougher after
the invasion of Georgia. But, Russians said, and we said,
regardless of what happens with things, our work has to
continue. This is the security of two great countries. It's our
national security. Many times people ask me, ``Why are we doing
this in Russia?'' It's our national security that we're
concerned about; one nuclear device getting over here.
It has been tough at times, but we've succeeded. Again, you
don't know what you don't know, but they have shown us things
that I'd never thought I would see. We've been in warhead
sites. They took me to a place called West 19 not very long ago
where all the warheads are. When Dr. Condoleezza Rice was here,
she said that was the worst site she ever saw. We fixed it. Now
it's just as good as Pantex or one of our other facilities.
We're getting ready to take the Office of Management and Budget
to that site to show them the type of work that we did on West
19. So, we've seen things. They opened up to us.
Now, when is the window going to close? I hope never.
There's a great relationship between President Obama and
President Medvedev. But, we know in 2\1/2\ years they're going
to have an election in Russia, and there are two guys running,
and one of them is going to win. I know the one who's going to
win if they both run, but it is really a great relationship.
President Medvedev and President Obama agreed in Prague, and
they also agreed in this summit, that they will work closely
together because nuclear terrorism is the biggest thing there
is, and they both want to stop this.
Right now, we have a bilateral commission headed by
Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov. My boss, Dan
Poneman, Deputy Secretary of Energy, and I work all the nuclear
security in Russia and the nuclear energy. What we do every 6
months is we lay out what needs to be done in Russia, from a
security standpoint, and then we report on what we've done.
Every 6 months. I just met with him 3 weeks ago, and we have
another report. We'll do another report in June.
This checklist goes to Secretary Clinton and then goes to
the President to show everything we're doing in Russia and how
we're accomplishing--it's like a metric.
It's a long answer to your question, sir, but I'm
optimistic the relationship will stay good for the next 3
years, and hopefully we can get all the work done in Russia
very soon.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about the other parts of the old
Soviet Union where nuclear weapons and materials were kept?
Mr. Baker. The other parts of the Soviet Union have been
pretty good. Right now we're blending down all the HEU in
Kazakhstan. We're getting ready to do that with GTRI. We have
an agreement that came out of the summit from Ukraine, where we
can have all their HEU and bring it back. We're taking HEU out
of Poland. We're also taking HEU out of Belarus.
They've been cooperating pretty well. I can't give you an
example. It's hard sometimes. It's really hard, and we have to
work with them. Sometimes you have to give them a little more
money than you wish you could to get the stuff out. But, it's
our national security. If you look at DOE's budget on this,
compared to the defense budget, well, you can't even see it;
it's a little squeak. It's very low for, in my opinion, the
biggest threat this country faces, as Dr. Nacht said.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Let's address our support
to the IAEA.
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir.
We are building more and more support for the IAEA. The
IAEA needs help. They need technical people. We're getting
people from our laboratories to volunteer to go and work.
Another thing they need, badly, is new safeguards. Right now,
we have a new safeguards initiative that is educating more
people, expertise, better technology, measurements, and also
better concepts on safeguards.
For the last 30 years, we have lived with safeguards that
should have been updated. But, now, during the nuclear
renaissance, we have to build better safeguards for the IAEA,
so we're building that. That's going very well. This committee
has supported us very well in that. We have a 5-year window
that we're building technology. We have 200 interns right now,
post-docs, learning safeguards, so we won't have a brain drain
on this for the IAEA. This is going very well with the IAEA.
What we're working with IAEA is the Convention on Physical
Protection. They call it IAEA 225. That regulation is what the
IAEA makes all countries that have nuclear material hold to;
this is what they check. We're updating that to make it
tougher. After September 11, we had to change things. We're
almost there, in a new IAEA 225, Revision 5, we call it. The
President said this. He got commitments out of all 47 members
that were here at the summit that they would push Revision 5.
It's in 120-day review period right now.
We're helping the IAEA have better safeguards. We're trying
to give them more technology. The President said in Prague that
he wanted to support the IAEA. I think we're doing that, to the
best of our ability, to give them what they need to do their
job.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Baker.
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. In terms of trying to secure the nuclear
stockpile of the world, HEU, for example, I would assume that,
when the Soviet Union fell and the Cold War ended, when we
started our relations with Russia, that some kind of accounting
was undertaken to determine where everything was. Do we have
confidence that we know today where all the weapon-grade
material is in the world?
Mr. Baker. I think we do now. I think I can say in an open
hearing that when we started this work in 1994, they didn't
even know. We started it, and we've built procedures--I'm
trying to keep this unclassified--that we know where the
material was located. Now, again, sir, you don't know what you
don't know, as I say. But, we think we have a good handle on
it.
Russia, I think, would admit back in those days they did
not have a handle. We saw this when we went in there. I think
today we do in Russia.
We also think we know where all the HEU is in the world. We
have a document, done by our Global Threat Reduction Agency,
that shows where we think all the HEU is in the world also.
We feel we have a pretty good handle on that. One thing we
have not been able to do in Russia is to get into their serial
production plants. These serial production plants--they won't
let us in--are where they build weapons. We've secured about
everything, or we soon will; we have 19 buildings to go and
then we're finished. Then, we'll get into the sustainability
area, which we're working right now in Russia. We've completed
210 of the buildings. There's 229. In this fiscal year 2011
budget, we're asking for money to finish these 19 buildings in
Russia. All the Ministry of Defense work is done. The warhead
sites are done. We took half of those and secured those, and
DOD took the other half and secured them. Like West 19 I was
telling you about, it was a facility that we did. They're
secure.
We think we have a fairly good handle on it. Matter of
fact, I'll leave it at that. It is a fairly good handle. We
don't know, maybe, if we got it all. But, we do have a document
that shows where it's at in Russia. We do have a document that
shows where the HEU is throughout the world. In our GTRI, our
goal is to protect 200 reactors. That's our goal. Right now, we
have converted 63 reactors. We converted or shut down 71 of
them, together. Some of them just shut down; we didn't have to
convert them.
Senator LeMieux. Can I interrupt you for a second?
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir.
Senator LeMieux. The 200 reactors, is that focused on ones
that can create material that can be used for weapon
production, as opposed to just ones that are for domestic
electric production?
Mr. Baker. All of this is that they can make a weapon. This
is HEU.
Senator LeMieux. Right. So, you've not only mapped out
where all the material that's already existing may be, but
then, are also trying to reduce that material. You're also
trying to secure the areas where it could be created so that it
doesn't get out into the world.
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir. We are.
Senator LeMieux. What efforts, if any, has the United
States undertaken with China to work in a similar collaborative
fashion as we are doing with Russia?
Mr. Baker. I can tell you what we do in China. China is a
country that many people think ought to pay their own way. We
have worked with the civilian sector of China; we have not
worked with the military section. What we have done with the
civilian sector of China, one, China has converted two of their
reactors from HEU on their own to LEU; they paid the money, $30
million. We have four neutron reactors in China that we want
them to convert. They have to have a special type of fuel to
convert these, so we're helping them build that special type of
fuel to convert these reactors. From these neutron reactors,
there are other places, like Pakistan and other ones, and we're
going to try to convert them.
We have what we call a ``Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Technology,'' called PUNT, in China, and that's to work with
them on safeguards, to educate them on export control, and to
educate them on nuclear technology and on dual-use equipment.
We have worked that with China, and, basically, at no cost to
us. We ran a prototype detector on a megaport in China. One
megaport. They paid for the equipment. We provided the
expertise. We hope to do more in China besides one megaport,
but they wanted to see us demonstrate how to use one.
What we have right now is a goal that China will pay at
least 60 percent of this, and maybe 70 percent of the work we
do, and we pay the 30 or whatever percent left.
China is not going to be a Russia at all, but we are
working with them on these things that are so important, like
nuclear smuggling. It's gone fairly well, and we hope to do
more. But, on the military side, they don't want any part of
us.
Senator LeMieux. One final topic I'd like to raise with you
goes back a little bit to what we first started with. We know
that there are countries who are going to want to have nuclear
power. There are peaceful countries. I have a list here of the
countries around the world who have nuclear reactors, some in
places that I didn't know had reactors, a total of 437,
according to this document from March 31, around the world.
Right now, Iran's saying it wants nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. We doubt that very much. But what happens?
What should we be doing going forward? I know, Mr. Secretary,
you've made a career out of studying policy. This seems to be
about as difficult of a policy question as one can imagine;
when we have difficult states, when we have rogue countries,
when we have Iran. But, it's not going to just be Iran, it's
going to be Syria; it's going to be Venezuela; it's going to be
other countries that are going to say that they're going down
this same path that North Korea went down and Iran is on, which
is, ``Well, we want it for peaceful purposes,'' and then all of
a sudden there's a bomb.
How do we, as part and leader of the international
community, handle this trend, which we know will occur? Is
there a way that we can set up some kind of international
regime that will deal with these types of states wanting
nuclear energy which we believe will be pretextual for them
obtaining a weapon?
Dr. Nacht. Thank you for that question, Senator. The whole
premise of the NPT was to facilitate the growth in the use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while closing off the
nuclear weapons option. Despite all of our difficulties with
Iran and North Korea in recent years, actually all things
considered up to now we've been rather successful. There are
only a handful of countries that are not members of the NPT or
have really not behaved properly with respect to the NPT.
We hope that in the NPT Review Conference next month in New
York, one of the outcomes will be a strengthened treaty regime
which will make it more difficult to withdraw from the treaty
and which will provide more incentives by strengthening the
IAEA for growth of peaceful programs while closing off the
nuclear weapons option.
Also, in the NPR that DOD just recently produced, we note
that countries that are non-nuclear weapon states and that are
in full compliance with their nonproliferation obligations,
that those countries would not be the subject of use or
threatened use of nuclear weapons by the United States.
Whereas, countries that are not in compliance with their
nonproliferation obligations, as Secretary Gates said, all
options for the United States are on the table. We are
providing both incentives and disincentives for states not to
go down the nuclear road.
We know that some states are concerned that, if Iran
acquires nuclear weapons that their security is threatened; it
might stimulate their own interests. We're working very hard,
diplomatically and with our own counterparts at the military
level, to ensure that they are--especially our allies and
partners--secure.
Senator LeMieux. There is significant concern of an arms
race in the Middle East with countries like Saudi Arabia and
others who wanted weapons.
Dr. Nacht. Yes. Prominent figures in the field, like former
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and others, have characterized
the current situation as a tipping point, where perhaps several
additional states could go down the nuclear road if we don't
solve this problem. We're very aware of this, and we have a
wide variety of activities underway with every one of these
governments to try to provide the incentives and assure them
that it's really not the way to go, to go down the nuclear
path.
This is even true with our NATO allies. We have several
European countries that looked at nuclear options years ago,
and they foreswore them because they're under the nuclear
security guarantee of the United States as part of Article 5 of
the NATO treaty. We don't want any of those countries to
rethink their idea, so we want to, in fact, strengthen our
extended deterrence relationships with every one of these
countries. It's really a multifaceted strategy.
At the same time, we realize that because of climate change
concerns, because of fossil fuel supply uncertainties, for a
variety of reasons, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is
probably going to grow, and perhaps grow quite considerably
over the next several decades. The challenge will only increase
for us, increase for the IAEA, increase for DOE and DOD, to
play a meaningful role, to make sure countries understand that:
peaceful path, no problem; weapons, not desirable, not
permitted. The strategy keeps evolving because the players
evolve, the technology evolves, and some of the policy issues
evolve.
Senator LeMieux. I think the challenge we have is that, as
we progress in the modern world for some of these rogue states,
having the capability of nuclear power even is a marquee; it is
something that brands them in the higher echelon of states
around the world. They want that branding. It's one thing for a
country to agree and say, ``We're not going to seek nuclear
weapons,'' but when you can't trust the country to start with,
and they're say a country like Syria, who we believe is further
assisting in getting missiles to Hamas and Hezbollah; if a
country like that says, ``Okay, well, we want a nuclear power
plant for peaceful purposes,'' just like with an Iran, you
don't believe them. How does the world community set up a
structure--and maybe this is part of what you're working on--
ahead of the problem so that we're not being reactive to a
country that now says, ``We're building a reactor, we're
building a nuclear power program.'' How do we get ahead of it
so that there's some kind of sanctioning that's going to have
to occur for, not just, ``We want to have a weapon,'' but also,
``We want to pursue nuclear energy''?
Dr. Nacht. The country that you mentioned, Syria, is a
member and a part of the NPT. If they want to move further into
the ``nuclear energy for peaceful purposes'' area, they have to
work with the IAEA, which is to not only facilitate their work,
but to also ensure that there's no weapons activity related to
this peaceful purposes.
Mr. Baker. There are hundreds of reactors
Dr. Nacht. We need to strengthen the IAEA, as Ken Baker has
said, because they don't have enough resources and enough
capability at the moment to do the kind of job we all think is
needed. At the same time, we have to demonstrate, perhaps with
other countries, like Iran--which Syria will pay close
attention to--that, to move down the road will incur tremendous
disadvantage, tremendous pain to them, so they should have no
incentive of any kind to think about diverting any peaceful
nuclear program for weapons.
Mr. Baker. There are 189 countries that are members of the
NPT, and Article 2 of the NPT says they can build nuclear power
for peaceful uses. What we're doing--DOE's doing--is this
Advanced Safeguards Program that we're trying to give the IAEA.
Once a country gets nuclear power, proliferation becomes a
bigger problem, so the IAEA challenge, as Dr. Nacht said, is
greater. We have to give them better safeguards.
We also are helping countries have a better export control
system. We're working with many countries getting tighter
control on nuclear weapons. But, if they're a member of the
NPT, and Article 2 says they can do that, as Dr. Nacht said,
you can't very easily stop them, but you have to have controls,
you have to give the tools and capabilities to the IAEA to make
sure they're not doing something else.
Senator LeMieux. Iran's a signatory to the NPT, right?
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir, they are.
Senator LeMieux. North Korea was, and then they backed out?
Mr. Baker. They've withdrawn.
Senator LeMieux. So, there's no teeth on the back side of
this?
Dr. Nacht. Sir, this is what we're engaged in right now,
which is a tough sanctions program that we're developing toward
Iran, and a tough sanctions program that's been implemented and
may further be strengthened against North Korea.
To have targeted sanctions, to have penalties to the
leadership, penalties to those who make the decisions, in order
to, hopefully, change their policies.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Nacht, the DOD CTR program is also
going to play a role in the global lockdown effort. What is the
DOD plan to achieve that goal?
Dr. Nacht. We're currently engaged in several activities,
and we're seeking additional funding for CTR, specifically
related to the global lockdown. Funding for spent naval fuel
and fissile material disposition in Russia--several of them are
Russia-related; site security enhancement in Russia; and
automated nuclear warhead inventory control in Russia. These
are building on longstanding CTR programs we've had with the
Russians. By the way, I should add in response to some of the
previous questions, DOD's relationships with the Russians at
multiple levels are really quite good, from the very highest
levels of military officials and political leaders to people in
more technical capacities and people at the working level.
In addition, as part of the global lockdown we are seeking
funds to establish Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence
outside the former Soviet Union, one in India and one in China;
each has somewhat different objectives. These centers will
assess equipment and manpower; they'll provide material
security training; they'll demonstrate enhanced security
procedures and processes; and they'll provide lessons learned
without having to be directly at the site of where weapons are
located.
Again, it's an effort to work together and to enlist in
these cases Indian and Chinese support, which is central as
trying to facilitate the global lockdown.
By the way, I should also add in response to a previous
question there was a strategy. In developing the strategy for
the global lockdown, the work for the global lockdown that just
happened has been in place for a long time; there was an
interagency assessment that was commissioned, and a
comprehensive classified assessment was done, of where the
material is. We can't say for certain that we know where
everything is in every country, but we're quite confident that
it provides the sound basis for moving ahead on the global
lockdown process.
A number of activities in Russia, and some new centers
outside of Russia, are the elements of about $74 million in
additional funding for how CTR will contribute to the global
nuclear lockdown.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about in those countries of the
former Soviet Union outside of Russia?
Dr. Nacht. We've had longstanding activities there, where
we've been involved in Kazakhstan, for example, and in a number
of other countries of the former Soviet Union. We're also, as
part of CTR that was not only nuclear, deeply involved on the
biological and chemical weapons side as well. There's a lot of
consultation activity in trying to identify sites, build
support for the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical
Weapons Convention verification procedures. It's a multifaceted
activity in a number of countries for nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons.
Senator Bill Nelson. All of the areas that the Soviet Union
had nuclear material and weapons, outside of what is today
Russia, you feel good about a lockdown?
Dr. Nacht. We're very intent on achieving the President's
goal of locking down this material in 4 years, but it's tough.
We learned about uranium in Kazakhstan quite a long time ago,
and it didn't actually initially come through the Intelligence
Community. I think it would be misleading to say that it's
going to be a totally comprehensive, air-tight system that we
know of in advance. We're going to have to roll up our sleeves,
work in these countries, work with them, build momentum, and
show that cooperation in the global nuclear lockdown is in
everybody's interest. I think as we do that we're very hopeful
that we can achieve the President's goal.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you provide to the committee, in
classified form, your analysis, or analyses done previously, in
between the time that the Soviet Union was disintegrating in
late 1991 up to when the Nunn-Lugar program started, where you
all, in Nunn-Lugar, were actually on the scene? Would you share
with the committee in classified form the answers to the
obvious questions? Was that material secured? What possibly was
not secured? What is its viability today, if it were unsecured,
and so forth?
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you very much for doing that.
Now, are the global lockdown activities of the CTR program
and the NNSA programs coordinated?
Mr. Baker. I can start. I can say: absolutely. Coordination
has been good the last few years. One example is the Ministry
of Defense sites in Russia. When Russia said, ``Come in and do
our warhead sites,'' we worked with DOD. Like I told you, sir,
we did half of them, they did half. We coordinated very well
together. On this 4-year lockdown, as Dr. Nacht said, we will
get the job done. We have decided, basically, what lanes we're
in, who's going to do what, and where. We meet with DOD quite
often. Matter of fact, we have a big meeting with DOD just
tomorrow to discuss this 4-year plan even more. In my opinion,
from a DOE perspective, it is working extremely well.
Dr. Nacht. Yes, and I would say, really, the same thing.
Sometimes cooperation in some areas leads to cooperation in
other areas. For example, we've just gone through a very
intensive experience producing the NPR, and there was really
intimate involvement by NNSA, the NNSA leadership, and the DOE
leadership in the production of that report. All the signals,
all the incentives, from the top leadership of our departments
is to encourage more collaboration at other levels, including
in CTR, which has been going on very well for many years. We
know we have to work together because we each bring different
perspectives and different expertise to the table.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, does DOD know the full
extent of the material involved in this effort for which you
all have responsibility?
Dr. Nacht. For the global nuclear lockdown? Yes, as I
mentioned, there was a major study--it's a classified study--
done before the rollout for the global nuclear lockdown, and
that is really the basis for our understanding of what we have
to go after to achieve the President's goal in 4 years. That's
been shared with the interagency.
Senator Bill Nelson. Your testimony is that you think that
other countries are sharing our concern about these materials?
Dr. Nacht. Absolutely. I think the President has been
extraordinarily effective in communicating the seriousness of
this problem. Even as recently as a few years ago, prominent
Russian figures spoke openly about their skepticism about
nuclear terrorism. They were happy to work with the United
States on securing some of their own sites, but they didn't
really think that problem at least was their problem. Now, I
think they're fully aware; I know that they're fully aware of
the seriousness of the problem, both because of the nuclear
proliferation issue that we've discussed already, and also
because of the terrorism issue that they've experienced in
their own Moscow subways.
The President, through the combination even recently of the
NPR and completing the New START and the Nuclear Security
Summit, all leading up to the NPT review conference, and his
statement earlier last year in September at the U.N. at the
opening of the General Assembly, all are really having an
effect on heightening awareness and support around the world
for this problem. As we know, 47 national leaders met in the
United States; it was the largest group of its kind since San
Francisco in 1945.
Senator Bill Nelson. I must say that I was pleasantly
surprised that, on fairly short notice, that many leaders
showed up.
Dr. Nacht. Right.
Senator Bill Nelson. It does, indeed, express their
concern.
Mr. Baker. I think, sir, that this summit, at least in my
experience in nonproliferation, was the biggest thing to ever
happen. I do believe, like Dr. Nacht, that they all are
committed; they all are just as scared as we are. If you look
at the initiatives that came out of the summit, it was more
than we expected. Some people in the White House said it was
five times better--I won't name names--than they ever thought
it would be. If they're going to do this again in 2 years in
South Korea, it's going to keep emphasis high in nuclear
security.
Senator Bill Nelson. I think you're right. I think what
they're waking up to is, if a terrorist attack can occur in the
Moscow subway, it can occur anyplace.
Mr. Baker, is Russia fully committed to taking back the
original Russian material?
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir. We have taken back most of it. We have
some left. But, they have been really easy to work with. What
we have, every 6 months we go to Russia or they come here--most
of the time we go to Russia--we lay out the schedule for the 6
months on takeback of Russian fuel. This has worked very well.
We had some complications, like we can't pass fuel through
Kazakhstan, so we had to take some of it by train and then by
boat around to Mayak, Russia, where it was going to be stored.
We have it there. Russia is on board with us, sir, 100 percent.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are other countries willing to pay
part of the cost to secure this material?
Mr. Baker. On this, most of the costs have been with us.
They're willing to give up the HEU if we can convert the
reactor to LEU, but most of the cost, on this Russian takeback,
has been on our shoulders.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about plutonium?
Mr. Baker. Plutonium, we have a little plutonium that we're
trying to bring back, or bring back someplace, from one of
these countries of which I'd rather not say in public. But,
plutonium will take time. We have this agreement with Russia
now to get rid of 34 tons. I know that's not all of it, but, I
think, as this goes along and they burn 34 tons and we burn 34
tons--like I said, that can make 17,000 weapons--in my opinion,
time will tell, they will continue to burn more and more
plutonium in the reactors, just like we will continue.
Hopefully, the momentum will not stop with 34 tons of plutonium
in each country.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Baker, you had talked earlier
about the disposition of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade
plutonium by converting it to the fuel for the commercial power
reactors. The facilities were originally supposed to be
operational by now, but now they've been delayed until 2016.
It's a hefty cost. The Government Accountability Office
completed a report that found that the project may not have
enough plutonium feedstock. What is NNSA planning to do to make
sure the plutonium is available?
Mr. Baker. Sir, we're working that problem right now. We
have, we know, 9.6 metric tons of plutonium right now that we
can burn. It depends on how fast you burn it through the MOX
system. The MOX system is able to burn 3 metric tons of
plutonium a year in their reactor. So, we do have a problem on
feedstock. We're working that right now. We're trying to find
out where because the pit disassembly plant has been delayed,
and we haven't even gone to Critical Decision-1 with the pit
disassembly plant. We're concerned, but we're working that
problem hard. We have both environmental management people, in
DOE and NNSA, working together to make sure we have feedstock
to burn through that MOX system when it comes on in 2016.
But, it is a problem, and I will keep you advised, sir, how
we're working this. Hopefully, we'll find a solution for it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Nacht, DOD is now doing a task
force that is going to be available to destroy WMD. Tell us how
it's going to be organized, who's going to participate, how are
they going to be trained, and what is the needed funding.
Dr. Nacht. Thank you, Senator. Yes, we've requested $22
million initially against this effort. This is the JTFE
headquarters, which would be developed in conjunction with
SOCOM, to locate, characterize, secure, disable, or destroy WMD
in, potentially, a conflict or other semi-permissive
environment, not a peaceful environment.
Our QDR identified preventing proliferation in WMD as a top
priority for DOD. This is the first time, really, that this has
happened. That's also having an effect on senior civilians in
DOD, senior military, the combatant commanders, and others.
They are elevating in their own minds, their own activities,
and their own planning: stopping and dealing with WMD in their
daily work.
Having called it a top priority for DOD, we're now
establishing this study headquarters for WMD elimination. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff study is underway. The Secretary of
Defense will make a decision down the road about the precise
nature or the characteristics of the center. All I can say is,
we're in the early stages of studying how this would be set up.
SOCOM will be a central player in these activities.
Senator Bill Nelson. How does this fold into the lessening
of warheads that will be required under the new treaty?
Dr. Nacht. That's a somewhat separate activity. We have a
treaty with the Russian Federation, assuming it's ratified by
the Senate and the Russian Duma, that will enter into force
sometime this year and will lead to the reduction of the number
of deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Those reductions will
take place by the respective governments and will be verified,
both collaboratively and by national technical means, on both
sides. That's something we have a lot of experience on, going
back to SALT I, back in 1972. We have almost 40 years of
experience of doing this with the Russians. This treaty has its
own special characteristics, but I think we're very confident
it's a highly verifiable treaty. That's separate from this
activity, which is really to, if necessary, disable or destroy
WMD in the hands of folks that we think are very antithetical
to U.S. national interests. It's much of a special ops kind of
activity.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. I think what you ought to
do is come also to the committee in a classified session and go
through some of that with us.
Dr. Nacht. On the JTFE, yes? I'm happy to do that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, and perhaps bring in Admiral
Olson's folks on that as well. Is the CTR program going to play
a role in any aspect of that task force?
Dr. Nacht. Yes, I think, absolutely. The work on CTR and
related aspects of dealing with WMD proliferation is a
community within DOD. Some of our experts are sitting right
behind me, such as Deputy Assistant Secretary Hersman and her
team in Policy; we have other key people on the Joint Staff
that we work with in the Services, in Under Secretary Carter's
organization, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, including
Mr. Weber, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. We have a
whole community, and we work on all of these activities really
very closely together.
There's also an international dimension. We talk to NATO
about this. We're involved with countries around the world
through PSI. It's quite comprehensive, but it's really quite
coherent. I think, unquestionably, it is a growing priority for
DOD, reflecting what the President has said, that the
likelihood of global nuclear war is low, but nuclear attack is
not low, and we need to elevate nuclear proliferation and
nuclear terrorism as the top security concerns in the nuclear
area.
DOD is responding. It is responding to this directive.
Senator Bill Nelson. You spoke as if the treaty just
announced by the U.S. and Russian Presidents was going to be
confirmed later this year. Do you know something that I don't
know?
Dr. Nacht. ``Hopefully.'' I said ``hopefully'' that you
would consent to ratification in this calendar year. Whenever
you consent to ratification. We can't move forward with the
elements of a treaty until it's in force. It doesn't enter into
force until the treaty has been consent to ratified and has
been deposited in the national capitals and in Geneva. Until
that is done, there won't be any action taken. We're hopeful
that Senate consent to ratification will be done in calendar
year 2010, but you would know far better than I.
Senator Bill Nelson. I'm hopeful, as well.
Are both the CTR and the NNSA nonproliferation programs
executable? Both of you have requested additional funds for
fiscal year 2011. Can you use those funds in a timely fashion?
Mr. Baker. The short answer is, yes, sir. We had very low--
last year, in our program that is part of the 4-year plan--
uncosted balances. In GTRI last year, we had $8.6 million
remaining uncommitted. The MPC&A program, which is securing
things in Russia and other places, we had $7.6 million. We
think every penny that the President is asking for can be
spent, or most of it can be spent. We will have uncommitted
down below double digits. We are off, as hard as we can,
working the 4-year plan.
Dr. Nacht. In DOD, by far the two biggest areas where we're
seeking additional funding are to support the global nuclear
lockdown, which we've discussed now at some length, and in
BTRP. We've actually cut funding in a number of other areas to
reduce the additional amount of funds that we are requesting. I
can tell you, as someone who's personally involved in this,
this went through an incredibly intensive scrubbing within DOD
with folks who, in the comptroller's office, look at program
analysis and evaluation, with folks who look at technical
feasibility, the policy community, the acquisition community;
they all worked very intensively to come up with requested
funds that were fully executable, and they're fully consistent
with the President's top priorities.
They also, and I would say, funding reflects importance to
some degree; the fact that there's increased funding for these
areas is another tangible signal that DOD is really taking
these areas as very high priorities. The Secretary of Defense
is extraordinarily supportive of this effort.
Senator Bill Nelson. In the DOE budget you have included
funds for space-based nuclear detectors. Your budget says that
these sensors are going to fly on Global Positioning System
(GPS) satellites and on Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS).
There is legislation mandating the maintenance of the
capability provided by these detectors. Yet, the Air Force no
longer has the nuclear detection sensor manifested on a SBIRS
satellite. What do you understand is the status of these
nuclear detection sensors on the SBIRS satellite?
Mr. Baker. We are still building. If I can, sir, I'll give
you a more expanded answer for the record, if it's okay.
But, we have expanded, and we have continued to build,
nuclear detection sensors. You are right; it's been a struggle
with the Air Force on launching these things. We're trying to
work that right now. We have a commitment in DOE to continue to
build these sensors, and hopefully they will fly on SBIRS one
day, or however they get up there. But, if I can, I'd like to
provide you a more detailed classified answer to that question.
There is a problem here, and I agree with you.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you. We've had some problems
with the SBIRS also, so let's get into that in an appropriate
setting.
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Now, let me ask you, Mr. Baker, the Library
of Congress is running a program called the Open World Program.
It works with Russia to develop broader understandings between
Russian folks and American folks. It's focused on civil society
with extensive judicial, legal young leaders, and regional and
local governmental exchange programs. It's sponsored
nonproliferation programs focused on export controls and
technical safeguards.
The Russian participants in these programs have visited our
national laboratories and had discussions about the
nonproliferation programs. The Library of Congress would like
to continue to partner with NNSA to expand the program to the
Ukraine.
Are you willing to discuss this initiative with the
director of the program, to see if there are areas of mutual
interest?
Mr. Baker. Absolutely, sir. It's a good program the Library
of Congress is running. The Library of Congress has been
working with Pacific Northwest's lab and our lab in Oak Ridge.
We support our national labs' involvement, and we will continue
to support this endeavor by the Library of Congress.
Senator Bill Nelson. Does any of the staff have any more
questions? [No response.]
Okay, gentlemen, this has been a very illuminating hearing.
We want to thank you for the hearing. We want to thank you for
your public service.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
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